Legislative Constitutionality of the Federal Parliament on Matters Uncovered Under the Fdre Constitution: Based on Empirical Appraisal of Laws
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Date
2012-01
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Addis Ababa University
Abstract
Looking in retrospection the modalities adopted under the FDRE Constitution in establishing
lawmaking authority appears defective in two fundamental aspects. The feature of constrained
parliamentOlY systems, which primarily focuses on strong judicial independence to offset the
odds of separation of power i.e. the fusion of executive and legislative organs, does not exist in
( the constitution. The idea of parliamentary supremacy in constrained system is locked between
the supremacy of the constitution and the valid enforceable limitations upon lawmaking. It
constrains the exercise of power through strong judiciary with its exclusive checks to defend the
constitution and eriforce the basic principles which mostly are dubbed as entrenchment,
justiciability and supremacy. The other essential defect goes to the manner employed in the
division of legislative power between the federal and regional governments. In this respect unlike
most of the constitutions of federations that leave reserve clause upon the states while the federal
government holding only enumerated powers, the FDRE constitution is short of elastic clause
that generally allows lawmaking authority upon the federal government. Often dubbed as
implied power doctrine, such elastic clauses is necessary in federations to constitutionalize in
order to render the federal laws legitimate in the event it becomes compulsury 10 exercise a
particular matter which does not belong in its enumerated jurisdictions. Nevertheless, regardless
of the lacuna and without unequivocal constitutional authority the HP R had practically jumped
in such areas via several legislations. The empirical examination of certain laws in force
indicate a number of matters which need constitutional backs are simply left to the federal
government to determine via ordinary laws. Besides, the legislative exercise is not only uneasy to
enact in the form of parliamentary laws but also no extraordinary procedure has been followed.
The practice evidently was reinforced the HP R authority can rightly goes beyond the text of the
l constitution to confer additional competencies upon itself with no threat on its constitutionality
or the parliament is the maker and breaker of the institutions for which the constitution
entrenches. The specific legislations tabled for empirical appraisal have significantly shaped the
exercise of political power both qua constitutions in their scope and in lieu of the constitution in
terms of the mailers engulfed on the substance of federal powers. In this particular foci those
laws regarding the head of states of the republic, systems of federal intervention into the regions,
intergovernmental relations (IGR), competency of the second chamber, federal power over theautonomy of the city of Addis Ababa, and functional independence of the judicial organ etc can
remarkably be high lightened as the points of contest. The legislations mentioned with their
other kin exclusively stands on Art 55(1) qua constitutional source of authority to mark
legislative legitimacy on the part of the parliament. Unfortunately if it is not to help as a safe
passage to bond the acts to conform to the constitution, the examined laws tell different context
both in scope and content. Neither the specific authority can be attached with the enumerated
jurisdiction of the federal government nor the constitution puts an inference on the possibility to
provide legal Fameworks in the sense they actual appear now. At times they resemble restrictive
lawmaking tendencies rather than the underlying principle for a more protective approach
during enforcement. In fact it is not a surprise the varieties of these legislations would have
welcomed serious constitutionality tests for if it had been in other jurisdictions who adopt strong
independent constitutional adjudicative organ. Otherwise it would have faced ostensible
recourses for valid constitutional amendment so long as the laws had brought something new to
the actual text of the constitution.
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Legislative Constitutionality of the Federal Parliament