The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse 1977 - 1991
| dc.contributor.advisor | Zewde, Bahru (PhD) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ayele, Fantahun | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-13T10:47:28Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-19T12:02:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-06-13T10:47:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-19T12:02:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-05 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Although the army faced security problems in many parts of the country since 1975, the real test came in 1977 when most of Eritrea fell into the hands of the insurgents and the guerrilla operation in the Ogaden developed into a full-scale invasion by Somalia. By 1977, therefore, the army appeared to be on the verge of total defeat. The response to this national emergency had a long-lasting impact on the army s organization, operation and equipment. The conscription, training and deployment of a huge militia force within a short time and the crucial role it played in defeating Somalia came to influence the Darg s belief in military organization, placing the premium on quantity rather than quality. Meanwhile the Darg's quest for a reliable arms supplier bound Ethiopia to the Soviet Union which supplied the army with enormous weaponry as well as military advisers for more than a decade. Although they significantly contributed to the defeat of Somalia, the Soviet military advisers failed to plan a successful counter-insurgency operation in northern Ethiopia . The application of conventional military tactics and strategy in the war against the northern insurgents brought about only temporary relief. The huge campaigns, such as the Red Star and Bahra Nagash Operations, showed that military might alone could not stamp out the insurgency. Insurgents could only lose the war when permanently isolated from the local population. The army failed to attain that fundamental goal. Internally, the army had a number of serious institutional problems. Not only did these internal problems undermine the army's capabilities but they also demoralized the combatants. Besides, war weariness and disillusionment made the army vulnerable to the insurgents onslaught. The fall of Afabet in 1988 marked the beginning of the end. It was followed by the Shere military disaster. The coup attempt that occurred soon was aborted within hours. The appointment of new commanders and the deployment of additional conscripts could not reverse the worsening military situation. The fall of Me~ewa into EPLF hands in February 1990 made the collapse of the Second Revolutionary Army (SRA) imminent. Elsewhere other army units continued to lose additional battles Finally in May 1991 the thiopian army one of the largest and most heavily armed in Africa, disintegrated following the flight of Mangestu H. Maryam to Zimbabwe | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Addis Ababa University | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/12345678/709 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Addis Ababa University | en_US |
| dc.subject | Ethiopian Army | en_US |
| dc.title | The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse 1977 - 1991 | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |