DEACT Hardware Solution to Rowhammer Attacks
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Date
2024-05
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Addis Ababa University
Abstract
Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) technology has advanced significantly,
resulting in faster access times and increased storage capacities by shrinking
the size of memory cells and tightly packing them on a chip. However, as the scaling
of DRAM continues, it presents new challenges and considerations that need to
be addressed. Smaller memory cells and the proximity between them have led to
circuit disturbance errors, such as the Row-hammer problem. These errors can be
exploited by attackers to induce bit flips and gain unauthorized access to systems,
posing a significant security threat.
In this research, we propose DEACT, a counter-based hardware mitigation approach
designed to tackle the Row-hammer problem in DRAM. It moves all frequently
accessed rows to a safety sub-array. DEACT aims to prevent further row
activations and maintain hot rows, effectively eliminating the vulnerability. Furthermore,
our counter implementation requires smaller chip area compared to existing
solutions. Moreover, We introduce DDRSHARP, a cycle-accurate DRAM simulator
that simplifies configuration and evaluation of various DRAM standards. DDRSHARP
provides over 1.8x simulation time reduction compared to contemporary
simulators. Its performance is optimized by avoiding infeasible iterations, minimizing
branch instructions, caching repetitive calculations and other optimizations.
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Keywords
DRAM, CPU, Rowhammer, Security, Side channel attack