Constitutional Review: The Ethiopian Perspective
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Date
2015-05
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Addis Ababa University
Abstract
For a given state to be a constitutionally democratic one in which constitutional values and
principles sought to be realized through fostering limited and self-government ingredients, an
institutional mechanism of enforcing constitutional supremacy must be there. These ingredients
amongst others include the provision of basic rights and freedoms, division of governmental
powers between the two levels of government or separation of powers between and among the
three arms of government, a representative government, extra-ordinary amendment procedures
of provisions in constitution, and recognition of the constitution as the higher law of the land.
Experiences around the world have been telling us that in nations whereby stable constitutional
democracy has been built, basic rights and freedoms are protected and enforced in a better
manner, governmental processes are limited, Popular sovereignty Political freedoms, and rule of
law...etc. have been flourished. In contrary to this, in states who failed to build a stable
constitutional democracy, there have been instabilities and it has been a reason for the birth of
dissident groups, as well as the coming in to power and dethrone of a number of governments.
Popular revolutions in USA and France in the last quarter of eighteenth century are instances of
the latter case. The post revolution eras in these countries and in post-world war two eras of
other countries (e.g. Germany) where by constitutional democracy had been built successfully
over periods of time through their effective system of constitutional review are indicators of the
first instance. The central issue of this study focuses on, whether or not our constitutions, since
the adoption of the 1931 constitution of Ethiopia, had been recognizing these important means of
constitutional democracy and facilitated their practicability through a system of an independent
and effective constitutional review. The writer‟s investigation of this issue reveals that the pre1991 Ethiopia, except the 1975 draft constitution of Ethiopia, the essence of constitutional
democracy had not been built. Reasons are either limited recognition of the ingredients of
constitutional democracy or the absence or ineffective institutional means of guarding these
constitutional values. The ineffectiveness reason has to do with those constitutions failure to
empower courts the power to review legislative and executive acts. A look in to the 1995 FDRE
constitution reveal that these ingredients are there; but, the institution empowered to guard these
values is not the judiciary. The writer on the basis of historical and practical reasons calls the
empowerment of the ordinary courts or constitutional court to this power. As the last option,
given technical and independence reasons he calls the need to readjust the existing system of
constitutional review
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Keywords
constitutional values,constitutionally democratic,Ethiopia constitution