The Role of Military Power in Ethiopia’s National Security (1974-1991)
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Date
2002-06
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Addis Ababa University
Abstract
Among the most intriguing problems confronting students of international relations is the role of
military power in the furtherance of a state’s national security. In fact, it is a subject with such
wide ramifications that no claim to comprehensive treatment can be easily made. Nonetheless,
this study attempts to hold a consistent view of the subject when taking up the Ethiopian case in
the 1974-1991 period.
The study begins by considering the concept of national security, which basically signifies the
protection of a state’s vital interests from threats assessed by the regime in power, and that of
military power, which is the capability of a state to employ its armed forces effectively in
support of national security goals. The study also discusses and applies the realist approach to
national security, which holds that national security is basically safeguarding a state’s core
interests (such as territorial integrity and political independence) from threats emanating from
outside its borders and are primarily political and military in nature. Furthermore, the approach
calls for a focus on military power considered to be, in peacetime as in wartime, the most
essential element of national strength and security.
The study then presents the political dynamics of Ethiopia. The country was governed by an
authoritarian and Marxist-Leninist leaning regime the policy-making responsibility of which was
practically concentrated in the hands of one individual, namely Mengistu Haile Mariam. Plagued
by political frictions and civil wars, the country grappled with numerous military and political threats, which were essentially ingrained in the Horn of Africa region. Against the backdrop of these threats, the post-1974 regime engaged in and maintained a high level of military spending,vigilance and capability. The study emphasizes that the net result was the creation of probably
the largest and best equipped Armed Forces in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study also stresses that
the regime guided the Armed Forces by a doctrine largely based on the Soviet model, centralized
the High Command, conducted constant indoctrination and surveillance, and put its faith in the
accumulation of weaponry which was mainly provided by the Soviet Union.
The study finally notes that the Armed Forces were used in three ways. First and foremost, they
were employed for defense of the country against external aggression, forcing Somalia to desist its
invasion of the Ogaden in 1978. Secondly, the Armed Forces were used in a compellent role, as
applied to Somalia in 1982 through cross-border air raids and infantry-armored excursions to force
it to reverse its anti-Ethiopian activities. The third and last use of the Armed Forces was strategic
intelligence, which was concerned with the gathering and analysis of information on the
capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action of the states in the Horn of Africa, and
also involved carrying out covert operations such as the substantial military aid imparted to friendly insurgent groups operating in Sudan and Somalia
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International Relation