A Critical Reflection on Moore’s Moral Philosophy
| dc.contributor.advisor | Dewo, Tenna(PhD) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tareke, Tesfay | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-27T07:47:06Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-18T12:18:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-06-27T07:47:06Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-18T12:18:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-06 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis deals and examines Moore’s concept of moral philosophy. He considers the subject matter of ethics should be examining the nature of the concept good or answering for the question what is good. He believes that good is simple, indefinable and non-natural property. In this regard, Moore is rejecting naturalistic and metaphysical theories of ethics for the reason that these theories are failing to deal the primary concern of ethics and are committing of the naturalistic fallacy for being defining of good by natural and metaphysical properties. His moral theory rotates around the attack of these theories. So, for Moore one who tries to define good in any sense is just committing a fallacy. If this is so, I will argue that Moore’s notion of morality has a limitations or weaknesses in describing of his moral concept while he is rejecting to natural and metaphysical theories of ethics and in his saying of good is indefinable | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/12345678/3953 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Addis Ababa University | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.title | A Critical Reflection on Moore’s Moral Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |