A Critical Reflection on Ayer’s Moral Concept
| dc.contributor.advisor | Dewo, Tenna(PhD) | |
| dc.contributor.author | Tsegay, Teklehaymanot | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-27T07:41:52Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-18T12:18:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-06-27T07:41:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-18T12:18:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016-06 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Ayer is prominent thinker in his ethical theory, that is, emotivism. Normative moral propositions are, according to Ayer, cognitively nonsense but they are emotively meaningful. This means that they are not factual rather they express emotion or feeling. In this thesis, I would argue that moral propositions are not only emotively meaningful but also they are cognitively meaningful. Moral statements are not only contains emotion but also reason. Reason and emotion are inseparable. The thesis also shows that Ayer’s principle of verification is inconsistent. The reason is, if verifiability is taken as criterion of meaningfulness, ethical propositions are cognitively meaningful. In defense of utilitarianism, I argue that moral judgments are verifiable in terms of their consequences. What I have defended is universalistic act- utilitarianism | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/12345678/3943 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Addis Ababa University | en_US |
| dc.subject | Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.title | A Critical Reflection on Ayer’s Moral Concept | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |