Being and Freedom: a Phenomenological Critique of Transcendental Philosophy and a Defense of Heidegger’s Ontology of Freedom
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Date
2025-02-01
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Addis Ababa University
Abstract
This dissertation undertakes a phenomenological critique of transcendental philosophy's
conception of freedom and advances a defense of Martin Heidegger’s ontology of freedom.
Rooted in the phenomenological method, it explores the viability of a phenomenological
ontology and interrogates how freedom is conceptualized through transcendental subjectivity.
The study contends that the dominant discourses on freedom—ranging from classical liberal to
postmodern frameworks—remain deeply embedded in notions of mastery, control, and subject
object dualism inherited from transcendental philosophy. These paradigms, rather than
emancipating the subject, subtly reinforce structures of domination and exclusion.
By contrast, Heidegger’s ontological approach to freedom offers a radically different path: one
that grounds freedom not in agency or autonomy but in the primordial openness of Being itself.
This ontological freedom is examined as the essence of human existence (Dasein), revealing its
ethical and existential implications. Further, the dissertation interrogates whether contemporary
liberation movements, especially in subaltern contexts, adequately reflect or obscure the deeper
ontological structures that underpin freedom. Through this analysis, the study argues that only a
phenomenologically grounded ontology of freedom can overcome the limitations of
transcendental frameworks and open the way to a more authentic, non-dominative understanding
of human liberation.
Keywords: Being, Dualism, Inter-subjectivity, Ontology of Freedom, Phenomenology,
Transcendental Philosophy, violence,
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Keywords
Being, Dualism, Inter-subjectivity, Ontology of Freedom, Phenomenology, Transcendental Philosophy, violence