



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
CENTRE FOR AFRICAN AND ASIAN STUDIES**

**THE DRIVERS, TRENDS AND EFFECTS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION  
FROM ETHIOPIA'S KEMBATA-TEMBARO ZONE TO SOUTH AFRICA**

**HAILU MEGERSA REGASA**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE CENTRE FOR AFRICAN AND  
ASIAN STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL  
FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICAN STUDIES (MOBILITY AND  
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES IN AFRICA)**

**FEBRUARY, 2025**

**ADDIS ABABA**

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**ADDIS ABABA**

## DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation, which I submit for the degree of PhD in African Studies (Mobility and Citizenship in Africa) at the Centre for African and Asian Studies, College of Social Sciences of Addis Ababa University, is my original work and no material in this document has not previously been submitted to another university for any degree. References from other authors have been duly acknowledged.

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This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by Hailu Megersa entitled: *The Drivers, Trends and Effects of Irregular Migration from Ethiopia's Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa* and submitted for the fulfilment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in African Studies (Mobility and Citizenship in Africa) complies with regulation of the university and meets the accepted standards with originality and quality.

Signed by the Examining Committee:

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## Abstract

*This research aims to analyse the factors, trends, and impacts of irregular migration, with a particular focus on the Kembata migrant routes leading to the Republic of South Africa. Recent studies indicate a notable increase in both international and intra-African migration, positioning South Africa as the main destination for migrants within the region. Nevertheless, the issue of irregular migration to South Africa has not been extensively studied, despite the rising number of migrants residing there. To fill this gap, this study employs a concurrent cross-sectional mixed-methods approach to investigate Ethiopian migration to South Africa. Data has been drawn from household survey (n=659), in-depth interviews (n=24) and FGDs (n= 6) conducted in 2022. In addition, secondary literatures and legal documents had been desk reviewed. For the quantitative part, both descriptive and inferential statistical methods were employed. The data collected through survey questionnaires has been verified, coded, entered and analysed by using SPSS Version 26. Descriptive statistics had been employed to summarize basic quantitative data, while inferential statistics, including binary logistic regressions, had been used to examine the factors influencing households' migration decisions. Descriptive statistics such as mean, frequency, range, variance and standard deviation were used to show demographic, socio-economic and other relevant characteristics of the respondents. Binary logistic regression had been used to see households overall migration decisions. The findings of the study have revealed that being a young male, having a large household size, the presence of family members, and the availability of smugglers has positively influenced households' decisions to migrate. Possession of farmland at the places of origin, being employed and married in ones abode have a negative influence on household decisions for migration. The study findings have further shown that prior information about the place of destination has an effect on household's migration decision. The results of the study have further revealed that migrants have been using hidden unregulated routes to South Africa since the early 1990s. Limited job opportunities in their home countries on one side and the presence of strict migration policies on the other side have been forced the migrants to rely on the service of smugglers for migration. As a result of the dangers associated with traveling overland, women have increasingly opted for air travel over men. The study also emphasizes that migration to South Africa is not always permanent, as some migrants eventually return to their home country. The study suggests that government actions and policy interventions should be based on such empirical evidence to promote safe and regular migrations while addressing potential migrants' aspirations and needs in their pursuit of a better life. The results of this study are expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on Ethiopian migration by providing a better understanding of the complex factors driving irregular migration along the Southern Route.*

**Key Terms:** drivers, patterns, migration policy, irregular routes, Ethiopian diaspora, South Africa

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

AEC	African Economic Community
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	African National Congress
ARRA	Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUDA	African Union Development Agency
BLAs	Bilateral Labour Agreements
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CAP	Common African Position
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CMP	Common Market Protocol
CSA	Central Statistical Agency
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DEL	Department of Employment and Labour
DHA	Department of Home Affairs
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EHoA	East and Horn of Africa
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund
ESS	Ethiopian Statistical Services
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GCM	Global Compact on Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMRF	International Migration Review Forum
INS	Immigration Nationality Service
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JLMP	Joint Labour Migration Programme for Africa
KTZoFED	Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Finance and Economic Development
LMAC	Labour Migration Advisory Committee
L-MAPs	Labour Migration Action Plans
MENA	Middle and North Africa
MIP	Minimum Integration Programme
MMC	Mixed Migration Centre
MMP	Missing Migrants Project
MMR	Mixed Migration Research
MPFA	Migration Policy Framework for Africa
MPF	Migration Partnership Framework
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MoLS	Ministry of Labour and Skills
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NLMP	National Labour Migration Policy

NPC	National Partnership Coalition
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PEAs	Private Employment Agencies
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PICUM	Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
RCPM	Regional Consultative Process on Migration
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
RMPF	Regional Migration Policy Framework
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UN DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNHCR	United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter deals with background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study and research questions, the scope, limitations and of significance the study, and organization of the study.

## 1.1. Background to the Study

Mobility is common all over the world, with some people moving within their own region and others moving from one part of the world to another (IOM, 2021). Human mobility across borders has occurred since the dawn of time; nevertheless, large-scale international migration only began in the early nineteenth century (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Slavery and colonialism were two of the most important factors that have triggered large-scale human mobility in the world. European colonialism was followed by a significant European emigration first to Africa and Asia, and then to the Americas and Oceania. This was followed by forced labour or chattel slavery from Africa to the New World's plantations and mines (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014). Around 12 million African slaves were estimated to have been transported to the Americas involuntarily by 1850. Since the 1950s, however, the pattern of migration has shifted, with emigration from newly independent poor countries to wealthy industrial nations, primarily to Western Europe and North America (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020).

Migration is one of the major events in the twenty-first century that is referred to as the "Age of Migration". This is due to the emergence of an accelerated, globalised, feminised, securitized, and increasingly politicised world (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). The number of international migrants in 2000 was 173 million (2.8 % of the world's population) and it reached 281 million (3.6 % of the world's population) in 2020 (Hofmann *et al.*, 2020; IOM, 2024). In 2050 the number of international migrants is expected to reach about 379.6 million that constitute 3.9 % of the world's population (Hofmann *et al.*, 2020). In terms of the proportion of international migrants to the total number of their population, Oceania has the largest share of international migrants (22%), while North America has the second largest number of international migrants (15.9%) followed by Europe (11.6%), Latin America and the Caribbean (2.3%), Africa (1.9%) and Asia (1.8%). At a country level, the top five origins of international

migrants are India (18 million), Mexico (11 million), the Russian Federation (10.8 million), China (10 million), and the Syrian Arab Republic (over 8 million) (IOM, 2021).

In terms of destinations for international migrants, in 2020 Europe was the largest destination with 87 million international migrants (30.9%). This was followed by Asia with 86 million migrants (30.5%), North America with 59 million migrants (20.9%), and Africa with about 25 million migrants (9%), respectively [(IOM, 2021; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2020)]. Furthermore, the 2021 IOM report indicates that the USA is the major destination for international migrants hosting more than 51 million international migrants followed by Germany, Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom occupying from the second to fifth rank with 16, 13, 12 and 9 million international migrants, respectively.

Throughout history, the people of Africa have engaged in both seasonal and cyclical migrations, as well as establishing permanent residences in new areas that offer resources and support for their livelihoods. The common perception of Africans as desperately trying to flee the continent, especially towards Europe, has been challenged by the reality of migration occurring within Africa itself. While Africa is often portrayed as "a continent on the move," suggesting a mass exodus, the fact is that most migration happens within African borders (Moyo, Laine & Nshimbi, 2021). Although migratory trends are increasing both to and from Africa, a considerable number of African migrants opt to stay within the continent (IOM, 2021; UN DESA, 2020). Compared to other regions, Africa has the lowest rate of intercontinental migration (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). These narratives of an African "exodus" and a perpetually mobile continent stem from a skewed perspective in migration literature, which tends to emphasize the Global North or reflects European political agendas aimed at limiting migrant access. Furthermore, this perspective neglects the reality that most migration occurs within the Global South (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020).

Migratory movements in Africa are increasing in the number of migrants both from and within the continent. The number of African migrants outside the continent has significantly increased from 17 million in 2015 to 19.5 million in 2020 (IOM, 2021). Thus, in 2020, about 11 million African migrants made their destination to Europe, nearly 5 million migrants to Asia, and around

3 million in North America. African countries with the largest number of migrants living abroad are Egypt, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and Algeria, in their descending order (IOM, 2021; UN DESA, 2020). An intra-continental migration within Africa constitutes the largest share of African international migration. Similarly, the IOM (2021) report indicated that a significant increase was recorded in African international migrants within the continent since 2000. For instance, the number of intra-African migrants between 2015 and 2020 increased from 18 million to 21 million. Within Africa, the Republic of South Africa is the most important destination for migrants. As a result, it hosts around 2.9 million international migrants (UN DESA, 2020). Other African countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Gabon, Libya, and Kenya are important destinations for intra-continental migration within Africa (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). The intraregional migration in Eastern and Southern Africa is characterised by a significant movement of labour migration within and from the sub-region (IOM, 2021).

Ethiopia is a hub of international migration in the Horn of Africa. All in all, Ethiopia is serving as a major origin, transit, and destination of irregular migrants in the Horn of Africa (Meron, 2020; Tekalign, 2021a). In the 1970s and 1980s, the humanitarian crisis that caused political, socio-economic, and environmental catastrophes like recurrent drought, famine, political disorder and civil war in Ethiopia led people to migrate internally and abroad. Moreover, Ethiopians also migrate abroad in search of better economic opportunities mainly to the Middle East, North America, Europe, and in Africa (Girmachew, 2021). As Girmachew (2021) stated there are three major waves of Ethiopian emigration: the first was before the 1974 revolution where Ethiopian emigration was relatively small and the probability of return was also high; the second was during the *Derg* period (1974-1991) and the third during the post-*Derg* period. Large-scale Ethiopian emigration was recorded as of the mid-1970s with the downfall of the Ethiopian monarchy. The Red Terror campaign of the military-cum-socialist government (also known as the *Derg*) that ruled Ethiopia for 17 years (1974-1991) also led to a massive exodus of Ethiopians particularly from urban areas to neighbouring states and mainly to the US (Solomon, 2019; Girmachew, 2019). After the downfall of the *Derg* in 1991, most of the Ethiopian refugees who had been estimated at 800,000 were repatriated from refugee camps in neighbouring countries, mainly from Sudan, back to Ethiopia. On the other hand, international migration also increased during the post-*Derg* period due to frequent ethnic conflicts, political repressions, post-

election violence, and in search for better economic opportunities (Girmachew, 2021; Habte, 2015).

Ethiopia, a landlocked country with a fast-growing population has faced multiple challenges, including poverty, unemployment, low agricultural productivity, landlessness, and limited access to basic services (Kafle, Benfica & Winters, 2018; Castelli, 2018; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019; Tekalign, 2021b). Moreover, the revolution in communication technology like telephone, internet networks, and global televisions, has offered information for potential migrants to make migration decisions (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013). Ethiopians are also among the most significant immigrant population in South Africa in terms of size with much of the immigrants being undocumented and irregular (Girmachew, 2019). Moreover, the Ethiopian migration from Hadiya and Kembata areas is predominantly caused by an enabling environment created by the existence of smugglers (Kinfe, 2019; Meron, 2020). In general, migration is considered by young people to achieve personal, family and social expectations allured by migrants' remittance and their success stories as well as the positive image about migration and migrants circulated in the family narratives (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). Migration from these areas is in line with the network migration theory.

There were increased migrations of both educated and unskilled migrants from Ethiopia after 1990s to different destinations abroad (Abel, 2023). The Ethiopian government estimated that around 3 million Ethiopian diasporas are living abroad in 2019 (Solomon, 2019). In 2020, the major destinations for Ethiopian migrants had been the USA, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Sudan, and South Africa, in descending order (Abel, 2023). Migrants from the Southern region of Ethiopia mainly from Kembata-Tembaro, Hadiya and Wolayita are among the major groups made their destination to South Africa with the robust networks of migration established and linked every towns and rural villages (Tekalign, 2021a). Although official statistical data on Ethiopian irregular migrants are lacking, the existing scholarly estimates and global data shows, Ethiopian emigrants from Kembata-Tembaro Zone is among the major migrant groups in South Africa.

Irregular migration from Ethiopia was made through three major routes: the Eastern route via Djibouti and/or Somalia to the Gulf States and the Middle East; the Southern route via Moyale on the Ethio-Kenya border mainly assisted by brokers, then travel through Tanzania and

Mozambique to South Africa; and the Northern route via Gondar and Metema to Sudan, Egypt and Libya and further to Europe (Fejerskov & Meron, 2020; Girmachew, 2019). In the Horn of Africa, 80% of Ethiopians and 20% of Somalis have chosen the southern route for their migration to South Africa (Horwood & Forin, 2019). Most Ethiopian migrants are smuggled through Kenya along a route that goes through Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique before arriving in South Africa (Meron, 2020; Frouws & Horwood, 2017). It is important to highlight that the routes used by irregular migrants heading to South Africa are quite dynamic and adaptable, frequently changing to avoid border controls and checkpoints established by various government authorities (Frouws & Horwood, 2017). Migrants along the Southern routes were assisted by a network of smugglers and they used to possess bogus travel documents purportedly from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia [Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), 2019]. The majority of these migrants originate from Ethiopia and Somalia, with two-thirds of these migrants to South Africa being from Ethiopia mainly originating from Hadiya and Kembata areas in the Southern region (Girmachew, 2019, 2021). This migration underlines the network and cumulative causation theories as migration from this area is facilitated mainly through the presence of strong social networks in facilitating, maintaining, and perpetuating migration patterns from this area to South Africa.

Current African migratory movements are becoming more complex comprising asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular migrants. Estimates suggest that between 13,000 and 20,000 individuals have been migrating along the southern route to the Republic of South Africa annually for the past fifteen years (Horwood & Forin, 2019). An up-to-date statistical estimate on irregular migrants from Ethiopia to South Africa is non-existent and the 2020 IOM's African migration report only cited about 2,000 Ethiopians were found in detention in Tanzania (IOM, 2021). Thus, an increasing intra-African migration, specifically, a surge in numbers of irregular migration within Africa calls for deeper understanding. Efforts by African nations to limit mobility stand in contrast to the continent's long history of fluid movement. Destination countries within Africa often perceive both irregular migration and regular mobility as threats to the economic and physical security of their citizens. In South Africa, for example, there is considerable demand for policies that target immigrants, especially those from other African nations, who are frequently blamed for issues such as HIV/AIDS, crime, and seen as a danger to local employment and cultural values (Nyamnjoh, 2013). Despite on-going initiatives for regional and continental

integration, there is a notable lack of focus on policies designed to protect migrants. The absence of a pan-African framework that emphasizes the social protection of African migrants leaves them vulnerable to xenophobia, mistreatment, and exploitation (Moyo, Laine, & Nshimbi, 2021).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration governance as the integration of legal norms, legislative measures, policies, customary practices, and organizational structures. This comprehensive framework functions at multiple levels, ranging from local to global, and offers direction on how nations should handle migration in its diverse forms (IOM, 2019a). A crucial point to emphasize is that successful migration management must take into account the overall needs of migrants, as well as the economic and social advantages they provide (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2021). Therefore, issues of migration governance in Africa initially need to redefine the concept of migration within African ontology and revisit migration policies and legal frameworks in Africa for safe and regular intra-African migration. The AU also aspired to create an integrated and politically united Africa based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism, among others, Africa to be a continent of 'seamless border and introduction of African passport' by solemn declaration of Agenda 2063 (AU, 2015). It is against this backdrop that this study aims to examine irregular migration in Africa with particular emphasis on Ethiopian irregular migrants to the Republic of South Africa.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Irregular migration has recently caught the attention of the international community as both national and international actors have tried their best to address the root causes of irregular migration, albeit with little success (Ashenafi & Melese, 2020). In November 2015, after European organizations convened the Valletta Summit on Migration with African leaders, they officially launched a financial scheme called the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) as a remedy for the problem at hand, i.e. addressing the root causes of irregular migration and asylum-seekers (Raty & Shilhav, 2020). In line with this, on 19 December 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) at Marrakesh intended to establish comprehensive global migration governance (Perocco, 2019). However, the GCM seemed to further support restrictive immigration policies within the EU, failing to effectively address the crucial issue of regulating undocumented migration.

An empirical study by Girmachew (2019) assessed the migration patterns as well as migrants' transnational activities. His study properly addressed the drivers of irregular migration with comparative perspectives and gave an emphasis to network factors and transnational social ties. Similarly, empirical works by Habte (2015), Sebsibe (2018), and Yohannes (2018) focused on the causes and consequences of migration, and the effects of remittances on origin communities. Even these studies lack an in-depth analysis on determinants and consequences of migration. Thus, this study contributes to filling the existing gaps in the empirical literature through analysis of the determinants and effects of Ethiopian migration to South Africa, particularly considering the case of irregular emigrants from Kembata-Tembaro Zone in Southern Ethiopia.

Kembata-Tembaro Zone is selected as the study site based on previous studies (Ashenafi & Melese, 2020; Girmachew, 2019, 2021; Tekalign, 2021b; Assefa *et al.*, 2017) there are considerable increase in the number of irregular migrants. The existing empirical studies indicate that the Kembata-Tembaro zone is the origin and the sole source of irregular migrants from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa (Estifanos & Zack, 2016, 2019, 2020; Desta, 2010; Tadesse, 2011; Zewdu, 2014; Haile, 2015; Admasu, 2018). Kembata-Tembaro Zone is the second most densely populated zone in SNNPR next to Gedeo Zone (878p/km<sup>2</sup>), with a population density of 705 inhabitants per square kilometres. It is much higher than the crude population density of the region 193 persons per square kilometres and even very much higher than the national average population density projected by CSA (2010) about 67.1 persons per square kilometres. Kembata-Tembaro Zone also has the highest average family size (5.5 people per household) in the region and this is also higher than the regional average family size (4.9) (BoFED, 2019). While neighbouring zones like Gurage (4.5), Hadiya (5.4), Wolayita (4.8), and Halaba Special woreda (5) relatively have lower family sizes than Kembata-Tembaro Zone and all these factors drive irregular migration from this area.

Some studies (e.g. Assefa, Seid & Tadele, 2017; Girmachew, 2019; Tekalign, 2021a) indicate an increase in the number of migrants from the study area through irregular channels despite the state's restrictive measures at origin, along the route and in the destination, and xenophobic reactions in the host communities. The emigration of Ethiopians to South Africa began in the mid-1990s, however, a significant number of emigration from the study area began in 2000 (Yordanos & Zack, 2019). The exact figure of migrants is yet unknown but it is estimated that in

2021, between 200,000 and 300,000 Ethiopian immigrants live in South Africa (Tekalign, 2021a). As Girmachew (2021) stated, around 95 percent of Ethiopians migrate to South Africa through irregular channels and regularise their status through the asylum system. A large number of Ethiopian irregular migrants to South Africa primarily originate from Hadiya and Kembata-Tembaro Zones, and they constitute one of the largest Ethiopian communities in South Africa. Consequently, some villages and districts in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone such as Damboya, Angacha, and Doyogena are known as typical migrant localities (Girmachew, 2019; Tekalign, 2021a). However, migration to South Africa involves a risky journey and demands crossing the borders of many African states (Girmachew, 2019). There is a good possibility for the potential migrants to encounter high risks like physical and emotional stress, detention, deportation, disappearance, and loss of life along the routes due to natural and human-made disasters while on their way to the destination area (Yordanos, Zack & Vanyoro, 2019; Tekalign, 2021a). The families of migrants also face labour shortage, debt repayment problem, dependence on remittance, and school dropout (Yordanos & Zack, 2019; Girmachew, 2019). Thus, this study gives deeper analysis to understand the drivers, routes, and effects of emigration from the study area to South Africa through irregular channels.

The hitherto existing studies tend to address migration in general and they tend to neglect irregular migration as a theme. As a result, irregular migration has been overlooked by many empirical works conducted on Ethiopian migrants to the Republic of South Africa. Some masters' theses conducted in the area focused on the causes and consequences of migration (Teshome, 2010; Sebsibe, 2018; Solomon, 2011; Yohannes, 2018), socio-economic effects of migrations (Habte, 2015; Tadesse, 2012) remittances and impacts on origin communities (Abinet, 2011; Girmachew, 2014). These empirical studies have, however, the following limitations and gaps in addressing irregular migration. First, they tend to focus on causes and consequences of migration and the effects of remittance on origin communities. By so doing, they gave a minor attention to interrogate the complex processes of irregular migration. Second, little emphasis was given to the agency or facilitators of irregular migration such as brokers, household members, social capital, smugglers, and networks. Third, they omitted analysis of migration governance policies and legal instruments that exists at different geographical levels, namely, Continental, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Country.

Recently an emerging body of migration policies both at the global and state level inclined to restrict and discourage migration as well as punish migrants. For instance, in the European policy discourse, migration is depicted as a crisis that needs to be tackled through border management and return migration to places of origin (Bufalini, 2019; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021). In response, the Europeans embarked on ‘migration diplomacy’ with African states, among others, the two important were the November 2015 Valletta Summit and the December 2018 Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Geddes & Maru, 2020). In this regard, Ethiopia is a key African partner with the European Union on restricting migration through Global Compact, in return receiving EUTF funding for projects, budget support, and development assistance (Raty & Shilhav, 2020) as well as to establish industrial parks (Tsion, 2020). However, recently the EU took a punitive measures of visa restriction on Ethiopians due to the Ethiopian authorities have not adequately responded to readmission requests, and challenges continue regarding the issuance of emergency travel documents, as well as the coordination of both voluntary and involuntary return operations (Fikreab, 2024; Council of the EU, 2024). At the continental level, the African Union (AU), African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and states migration policies and legislations in Africa are also influenced by the EU's mentorship and financial support (Geddes & Maru, 2020; Hofmann *et al.*, 2020). Thus, there exists a wider gap in the analysis of migration governance policies and legislations in intra-African migration studies. This study attempted to re-problematize irregular migration within African ontology and to analyse African migration governance policies and legal instruments in line with the long-standing Pan-African agenda of free movement of persons.

In line with the above arguments, this study attempted to address the following specific research questions:

1. What factors drive migrants to emigrate to the RSA through irregular channel?
2. How is migration decision made at the household level and who is taking part in migration decisions and financing?
3. What complex migrations experience both the opportunities and risks of migrants?
4. What efforts and strategies were developed by smugglers and migrants in response to stricter border controls and vulnerabilities during migration?

5. To what extent do the existing migration policies and legal instruments in Africa contribute to the irregular status of migrants? Are they restrictive or flexible enough to allow the free movement of people?

### **1.3. Objectives of the Study**

Broadly, the major objective of this study is to investigate the drivers, patterns, and effects of irregular migration in Africa with emphasis on Ethiopian emigrants from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the Republic of South Africa. Specifically, this study is intended to:

- i. assess the culture of migration and migration decision-making processes in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone.
- ii. examine the drivers of irregular migration of Ethiopians to the Republic of South Africa.
- iii. Assess the trends of irregular migration from the study area to the Republic of South Africa.
- iv. examine the effects of irregular migration on migrants, their families and the places of origin.
- v. analyse the migration governance policies and legal frameworks existing at continental, RECs, and country-levels in Africa.

### **1.4. Scope and Delimitation of the Study**

As issues in the study of migration are multifaceted and multidimensional, it is difficult to address all the diverse issues in one single study. Therefore, the scope of this study is delimited conceptually, geographically and methodologically. Conceptually, the study is delimited to inquire about the drivers, patterns, and effects of irregular migration only, and geographically, the scope of the study is bound in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Central Ethiopia Regional State. Temporally, the study explored the trends of irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone over the past twenty-five years and also provided an investigation of current status of migration from the study area. Concerning the unit of analysis, this study focuses on the households guided by multiple theories to address the multifaceted nature of migration. This study employed a mixed methods research approach to study the drivers, patterns, and effects of irregular migration only, and geographically, the scope of the study is bound in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa. It integrates both quantitative and qualitative methods in a single

study. This approach has a multifaceted nature that integrates the strengths from both quantitative and qualitative methods and thus enabling the researchers to gain a detailed understanding on the topic under investigation.

### **1.5. Limitation of the Study**

The following were seen to be the limitations of this study. Firstly, the study primarily depends on the cross-sectional data at the origin of migrants. Thus, information about migrants' experience along the routes and in South Africa was collected from the returnee-migrants in the study area at the time of data collection. Second, although migrants were exposed to different types of effects along the route and in the destination including death, xenophobic attacks, disappearance, and different forms of exploitations, or psychological shocks, the study has not addressed the psychological effects of irregular migration both on migrants and their families. And, thirdly, the study has not addressed the effects of migration on the host country and communities. Fourthly, as the study focuses exclusively on the Kembata-Tembaro Zone, it cannot fully represent the broader picture of Ethiopian migration to South Africa. Finally, analyses on migration governance policies were based on the desk review of policy documents and interviews from Ethiopian authorities and expertise working on migration.

### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

The issue of irregular migration from Ethiopia to South Africa involves a complex mix of socio-economic, political, and environmental elements that have significant consequences for both the countries of origin and destination. This research examines the factors and trends driving irregular migration, offering important insights into the fundamental reasons that lead individuals to embark on these dangerous journeys. Grasping these dynamics is essential for policymakers to formulate targeted strategies that tackle root issues like poverty, unemployment, political unrest, and environmental degradation. The results of this study can guide policymakers in Ethiopia and South Africa, as well as regional organizations, in understanding the complexities of migration trends. By pinpointing the motivations behind irregular migration, this research can help in developing comprehensive migration policies that not only prioritize border security but also promote sustainable development efforts aimed at alleviating the factors that drive migration.

Irregular migration is a global challenge that necessitates collaborative efforts among nations. This study emphasizes the importance of strengthened cooperation between Ethiopia and South Africa, along with other regional countries, to tackle the issues associated with irregular migration. It calls for unified strategies that include legal frameworks, humanitarian initiatives, and economic collaborations. This research contributes to the academic discourse on migration by offering empirical data and analysis relevant to the Ethiopian situation. The study also highlights the vulnerabilities that migrants encounter during their journey and upon reaching South Africa. By documenting these experiences, it stresses the necessity of implementing a human rights-centered approach in migration policies that prioritize the safety and dignity of migrants. In sum, this research acts as an essential reference for policymakers, scholars, and professionals involved in migration matters.

### **1.6. Organization of the Study**

This study is organised into seven chapters. The first chapter is an introductory chapter that comprises background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, scope and delimitation of the study, limitation and significances of the study, and organisation of the dissertation. Chapter two deals with the literature review part that includes concepts and definitions of migration and irregular migration, empirical review on the determinants, patterns and effects of irregular migration, and theories of migration. The third chapter would dwell on the description of study area, research philosophy and research design, methods of data collection and analysis as well as ethical issues.

The study results are presented in three chapters. Chapter four focuses on the drivers of irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone. This chapter also presents the migration decision making process and the culture of migration in Kembata-Tembaro Zone. Chapter five discusses the processes and patterns of irregular migration from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa with its underlying effects. The sixth chapter discusses the migration governance and the policy frameworks that exist at the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and at state (Ethiopia and RSA) levels. Finally, chapter seven draws conclusions and recommendations based on major findings and their implications for policy, theory and further study.

## **CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

This chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section offers a definition of key terms of migration and irregular migration. The second section focuses on determinants of irregular migration to South Africa. The third section deals with the migration decision making process and the culture of migration in the study area. The fourth and the fifth sections present the patterns and effects of irregular migration, respectively. Under the sixth section migration theories are examined to understand their historical development and limitations in addressing contemporary migration patterns, while the other theories form the basis for the study's conceptual framework. The seventh section presents a historical overview of migration in Africa. This section also discusses the myths and narratives associated with Africa's international migration. Lastly, the seventh section reviews empirical literature on the determinants, patterns and effects of irregular migration. This section also presents the conceptual framework of the study.

### **2.1. Definitions and Concepts of Migration and Irregular Migration**

Migration is a broad term in its scope, nature, and purpose of discussion. As a result, it is subject to different undertones and explanations. The definitions and concepts of migration are shaped by geographic, legal, political, and methodological factors (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021; IOM, 2021). For instance, sociologists focus on structure of global human mobility and the social construction of boundary of belonging (Amelina & Horvath, 2017), while geographers' interpretations centre on the temporal and spatial aspects of migration (Windzio, 2018; Sert & Erenler, 2021). Similarly, economists explaining migration from an economic perspective focus on factors like income gaps and unemployment (Amelina & Horvath, 2017; Moreno, 2017). The term migration is not well-defined even in international law (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021). Therefore, the term migration is defined, discussed, and interpreted by various scholars and institutions from different perspectives.

As stated by Sironi and Emmanuel (2019), migration is broadly defined as a change of residence either permanent or semi-permanent, through a voluntary or involuntary move with no regard to

internal and international migration. Whether it is long or short, easy or difficult, the act of migration involves origin, destination, and intervening set of obstacles (Lee, 1965). Hein de Haas (2021:4) defined human mobility as “people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to live, including the option to stay” rather than as the act of moving or migrating itself. King (2012) defined migration based on the distance and duration of migration. In terms of distance, international migration involves crossing the nation-state's boundary and in terms of duration, migrants should stay in the host area for at least one year. Thus, based on these classifications’ scholars categorised migration into different forms either as internal or international, or temporary or permanent or regular or irregular migration or voluntary or forced migrants like economic migrants and refugees.

Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) located in Nairobi, Kenya defined migration as the “process of moving, either across an international border or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants” (RMMS, 2015:13). Nevertheless, this definition is not universally accepted by all countries and each country employs different criteria to identify international migrants. A migrant in most cases is understood as a person who makes a trip. However, there are some instances by which people who have not made trips are referred to as migrants. For example, children who were born abroad from migrant families generally are called second or third-generation migrants. Conversely, returnees who have made long-term international migration are not referred to as ‘migrants’, when they come back home (IOM, 2019).

The term mobility, like migration, is used to describe the complex movements of people across borders. Nonetheless, the two terms are neither synonymous nor interchangeable (Ponzanesi, 2019). Mobility refers to the movement of people across borders with no regard to the type of movements (local or international, rural or modern) and duration of stay (short or long) (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021). Ponzanesi (2019) argues that mobility is a newly emerging interdisciplinary field that tends to give due emphasis for social issues such as power inequality, power and hierarchies in relation to geographic issues of territory, borders and scales. Thus, critical migration scholars like Cohen and Sirkeci (2021) and Mawere (2020) recommend the usage of ‘mobility’ or ‘movement of persons’ rather than migration. This is due to the term migration

implies sedentariness is a norm while mobility is an exception. Moreover, mobility is considered as a basic element of human freedom that demands the liberty to choose opportunities of better living conditions, health, and education (UNDP, 2010; Brace, 2015). From a mobility perspective, migration is considered as a type of geographic movement of people (Medda-Windischer *et al.*, 2012).

The term migration has dealt with the freedom of movement in Ethiopian migration related policies and legal frameworks. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution Article 32(1) stipulates the freedom of movement of Ethiopians or foreign nationals within or beyond the territory of Ethiopia (FDRE, 1995). The proclamation, and regulation enacted following the 1995 FDRE constitution does not provide a lexical definition for migration; rather they give us essential elements required for in or out migrants. For instance, immigration proclamation number 354/2003 and regulation number 114/2004 stated that both entry to and departure from Ethiopia requires possession of valid travel documents like valid passport, visa, identity card, residence permit, and health certificate. The Diaspora Policy of Ethiopia (2013) defined diaspora as a people of Ethiopia or Ethiopian origin living outside Ethiopia. Thus, the above definitions of migration in Ethiopian legal frameworks are expressions related to the act of migration through documented or regular channels.

There is no clear and universally accepted definition of irregular migration (IOM, 2021; Robin, 2019a; UNICEF, 2017). Irregular migration has a wider definition including people crossing borders intentionally without permission, those who have unintentionally crossed borders without permits, those who have become irregular after entering the country regularly, children born from irregular migrants, and those who crossed borders through human trafficking (Mcauliffe & Koser, 2017). Irregular migration involves both “irregular entry and irregular stay” (Provera, 2015:4). However, it is worth quoting IOM’s definition where irregular migration is considered as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries... [Sic., usually includes persons crossing international borders without a valid passport or travel document]” (2019:116). Therefore, such terms as ‘illegal migrants’, ‘smuggled migrants’, ‘undocumented migrants’, ‘unauthorised’, ‘clandestine’ and ‘illicit migrants’ are used to refer to cases of irregular migration (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014; IOM, 2019; UNICEF, 2017).

The complexity and diversity of migration processes worldwide are the main factors contributing to the difficulty in defining terms such as legal, illegal, regular, and irregular migration. The term "illegal" carries negative connotations that can dehumanise and stigmatise migrants, hindering empathy and understanding. It refers to the movement of individuals across borders without proper authorization, documentation, or in violation of a country's immigration laws (Echeverría, 2020). On the other hand, legal migration involves the movement of individuals across borders in compliance with the immigration laws and regulations of the destination country (Provera, 2015:4). The term "illegal" fails to capture the nuanced and often desperate circumstances that migrants face, oversimplifying their complex situations (Casarico, Facchini, & Frattini, 2015). In contrast, irregular migration encompasses a broader range of scenarios. It includes intentional border crossings without permission, unintentional crossings, becoming irregular after initially entering a country legally, children born to irregular migrants, and individuals who are victims of human trafficking (Mcauliffe & Koser, 2017). Irregular migration refers to migrants who fail to adhere to existing immigration procedures and regulations (McAdam, 2019). In this context, the term "irregular migration" is preferred as it is considered a more neutral way to describe the movement of individuals who do not meet the legal requirements for migration or stay in a particular country. It acknowledges that people may migrate due to various reasons such as conflicts, economic circumstances, or lack of legal pathways, rather than as a deliberate act of violating laws (Echeverría, 2020).

An 'irregularity' in migration is a judicial status that describes the relations between a migrant and one or more states (Spencer & Triandafyllidou, 2022). Irregularity is the result of conflicts in the logic of the social space such as free-market economy, globalisation, and transnationalism that promote free movement of people and goods; and the logic of the political space or the states that need to limit and regulate mobility factors to maintain its politically constructed, historically and ideologically distinguished identity and sovereign power within its territorial jurisdictions (Echeverría, 2020).

Many empirical sources, including Amelina & Horvath (2017), IOM (2021), Mcauliffe & Koser (2017), and RMMS (2015), mention irregular migration is associated with the term "problem". In contrast to regular migration, irregular migration is often regarded as a "problem, risk, or danger" that requires neutral or more aggressive responses. It is considered a necessary problem that

should be addressed or confronted (Robin, 2019). Castles, de Haas & Miller (2014) and Girmachew (2019) criticise the dichotomy between regular and irregular, legal and illegal migration, as immigrant status can easily and frequently change between categories. Furthermore, migrants utilise both regular and irregular channels, blurring the distinction between the two (Girmachew, 2019). Such labelling stems from legal provisions that wrongly dichotomize migrants into the categories of "deserving and undeserving", and differentiate between "legitimate and illegitimate" (UNICEF, 2017). The line between irregular and regular migration is not always clear-cut, as individuals considered irregular migrants may be legalised through special regularisation schemes provided by host states. Conversely, regular migrants can become irregular if their permits expire (King, 2012).

Human smuggling, also commonly referred to as "migrant smuggling" or "people smuggling," was defined by Article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) as "the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (UN, 2000). As of May 2019, 112 countries had signed the protocol and made human smuggling a criminal offence. While national legislation differs in how the offence is worded, the UN definition is the gold standard around which all are modelled (Campana, 2020). In the academic literature various authors have tried to narrow down the definition of the phenomenon. Kyle and Koslowski, for example, put forward the following definition of human smuggling: "an individual's crossing of a state's international border without that state's authorization and with the assistance of paid smugglers" (Kyle & Koslowski, 2011). Here again, no clear, direct victims are identified as an element in the definition. Attempts to clarify exactly what kind of crime is being committed in terms of victims, offenders and harm have rarely been successful. Human smuggling is still often linked to and confused with human trafficking, even though it is the aspect of exploitation that distinguishes the two phenomena (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018).

Human smugglers are service providers who are generally perceived as facilitators of human movement through illegal channels across international borders. The service that a smuggler provides – for a fee – is to help a migrant to overcome a boundary or a barrier that they would be

challenged to surmount on their own (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018; Sanchez & Antonopoulos, 2023; Yordanos & Zack, 2019). In cases where safe and legal routes are open to migrants, they are able to arrange their own travel or hire a relocation consultant or recruitment agency, which help people find jobs, plan trips and integrate into new locations. They may be physical – to help migrants cross a challenging piece of terrain, such as a sea, desert or giant border fence; they may be political – a heavily armed border, a violent conflict zone, a high surveillance presence in an authoritarian state, a country with a restrictive immigration policy or an impenetrable visa regime. Smugglers often help protect migrants from local bandits, criminals and rent-seeking local officials (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018).

Irregular migration under Ethiopian law is expressed as the act of movement without complying with the rules of exit from, and entry and stay in Ethiopia (Proclamation No. 1178/2020). Therefore, according to Proclamation (1178/2020) irregular migration is an illegal act and assisting illegal entry, exit and stay of a person for direct or indirect financial or material gain is a criminal act punishable by imprisonment and fine. Thus, for this study irregular migration is defined as human mobility across different states borders from Ethiopia to the Republic of South Africa without having legal permits or documents to travel and work at the destination.

## **2.2. Determinants of Irregular Migration**

Several factors are forwarded by scholars to answer the question why people migrate. Among these, the push factors in origin such as poverty, unemployment, insecurity, high population growth rate, and the pull factors in the destination like better economic prospects are considered as the major drivers of migration (Kafle, Benfica & Winters, 2018; Castelli, 2018; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Echeverria (2020) proposed three different hypotheses on the causes of irregular migration. The first cause of irregular migration is an outcome of the ineffectiveness of state mechanisms and policies, such as problems of knowledge production and policy design, problems of policy implementation, and budget restraints. The second hypothesis focused on the role of external factors such as the forces and processes of globalisation on the economy, and politics and society that are gradually eroding the privileges and controlling capacities of the state with for instance effects of globalisation of economy, politics, and society. The third

hypothesis focused on internal actors, forces, and processes that undermine the state's ability to control migrant populations (Echeverría, 2020). Many scholars like Andersson (2016), Castles and Miller (1993), and Koser (2010) also linked the inefficiency of state policies to tackle irregular migration leading to the rise of the 'migration industry'. The communities in the migration industry include, among others, migrant community members, small informal entrepreneurs, criminals related to international mafias, lawyers who advise how to evade laws and controls, human smugglers, false document providers, labour and housing providers, credit providers, and usurers (Echeverría, 2020).

Some scholars (e.g. Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021; Mawere, 2019; Horwood, 2015; Kainth, 2010) summarised the major determinants of migration in the Horn of Africa as economic, political, demographic and socio-cultural factors. Economic factors are the major causes for migration though other non-economic factors appeared to be equally important. In most developing countries, low agricultural productivity, natural resource degradation, lack of prospects for improvement, natural disaster, unemployment, and underemployment are the major push factors forcing people to migrate towards developed countries (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021; UNCTAD, 2018). On the contrary, prospects for employment, high wages, better facilities, and working conditions are among the economic pull factors that attract migrants to the developed countries (Horwood, 2015; Kainth, 2010).

Political factors have both encouraging and discouraging impacts on migration. For instance, states legal restrictions have an impact in discouraging migration if not stopping it (Horwood, 2015). High fertility rate and natural increases in population are demographic factors that force people to migrate (Kainth, 2010). Socio-cultural factors including, among other's family disputes and the quest for independence among the younger generation, better communication and transport facilities and education contributed to attitudinal and value changes that promote migration (Kainth, 2010; Meron, 2020). In the Horn of Africa region, the low level of human security combined with media's illumination about the wealth and opportunities abroad, technology, and transnational networks have initiated and facilitated the mobility of people by crossing international borders (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). In this region, mobility is one of the exit strategies for survival and poverty reduction due to the growing population. Moreover, poor

young men in rural Ethiopia are targeted by smuggling networks to lure them by promising better living opportunities in South Africa (Messay & Teferi, 2017).

Irregular migration from Ethiopia is primarily caused by economic drivers such as poverty, unemployment, low agricultural productivity, land shortage and population pressure (Girmachew, 2021; Meron, 2020; Tekalign, 2021b). Moreover, the revolution in communication technology like telephone, internet networks, and global televisions furnished information for potential migrants to make migration decisions (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013). In South Africa, Ethiopians are among the most significant immigrant population in terms of size with much of the immigrants being undocumented and irregular (Girmachew, 2019). Moreover, the Ethiopian migration from Hadiya and Kembata areas is predominantly caused by the enabling environment created by the existence of smugglers (Kinfе, 2019; Meron, 2020). In general, migration is considered by the young people as a means to achieve personal, family and social expectations allured by migrants' remittance and their success story as well as the positive image about migration and migrants circulated in the family narratives (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). Thus, this study provides an in-depth analysis to understand the major drivers of migration from the study area to South Africa through irregular channels.

### **2.3. Patterns of Irregular Migration**

The history of migration is as old as humankind's existence in the world (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Statistics on irregular migration are non-existent; however, estimates for the years between 2008 and 2017 indicated that 7.4 million irregular migrants were found in Europe (IOM, 2018). According to the IOM (2017) data for the years between 2009 and 2017, the list for major sources countries of African irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Italy include Eritreans with 108,991 migrants, Nigeria (93,881) migrants, Tunisia (37,854) migrants, Gambia (37,199) migrants, Somalia (36,332) migrants, Mali (34,872) migrants, Senegal (27,871) and Cote d'Ivoire (26,901) migrants. In 2020, over 19.5 million migrants were originated from Africa and live outside Africa, and nearly 21 million migrants were migrating within Africa. In the same year, the number of Africa migrants living in Europe (11 million), Asia (around 5 million) and North America (near to 3 million) (IOM, 2024). A significant number of African emigrants to Europe originated from the Maghreb region of North Africa (Flahaux & de Haas,

2016). From the East African region, the numbers of migrants constitute 9.8 million (27%) of African migrants, and the large share of them migrate within the continent. Moreover, the region exhibits lesser flow of migrants to Europe but major migration destinations are the Gulf States and South Africa (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020).

Migration trends across Africa are increasing, including both international and internal movements. Despite this growth, a considerable portion of African migrants decides to stay within the continent (IOM, 2021; UN DESA, 2020). In comparison to other regions, Africa has the lowest rate of intercontinental migration (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). The portrayals of an African "exodus" and a "constantly mobile continent" arise from an imbalance in migration literature, which primarily focuses on the Global North or the political agendas of Europeans seeking to restrict migrant access. Such a stereotype overlooks the fact that the majority of migration actually takes place within the Global South (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020). However, Africans only relocate when they are compelled to do so by external forces beyond their control. The attempts made by African states to restrict mobility contradict the reality of Africa's extensive history of flexible mobility. Africa is a continent that comprises interconnected spaces, which have constantly experienced shifts, displacements, and reconfigurations through various events such as wars, conquests, and the movement of goods and people (Nyamnjoh, 2013).

The present and future patterns of African migration to Europe and America were shaped by the colonial and neo-colonial ties with the former colonial powers (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). The trans-Atlantic slave trade was among the major events that shaped the history of human mobility in Africa. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries Europeans transported an estimated 15 million African slaves to the New World to work in the plantations (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014; Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). The demographics of African migrants are characterised by adult migrants with a median age of 30.9 and approximately equal percentage in gender with males about 52.9 % and females about 47.1% (UN DESA, 2017). Other trends of African migrants include more educated and better socio-economic status, and characterised by mixed migration mainly driven by economic and political factors (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). Despite the politician's narrative and media depiction of Africans "exodus" to Europe, the major destination for the bulk of African migrants remained Africa (UNECA, 2017). In fact, Africa has

the lowest rate of intercontinental migration compared to other world regions (Flahaux & de Haas, 2016).


Migration trends in Africa have been increasing whether voluntary or forced, internal or international (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020; IOM, 2021). In 2015, the scale of international migration was estimated at 17 million people and it reached 19 million in 2019 (IOM, 2021). The percentage of Africa's international migrants in 2017 was 2%, which is lower than the global average of 3.4 percent. The higher number of international migrants outside the continent is from North Africa (UNCTAD, 2018). Similarly, the scale of intra-African migration was increased from 18.5 million people in 2015 to over 21 million in 2020 (IOM, 2021). During this period Africa also faced a remarkable population growth that had a direct impact on migration. In terms of population growth, the African continent has one of the fastest growth rates in the world and it is predicted that in 2050 African population could - exceed the 2 billion mark (IOM, 2020).

Between 1990 and 2017 the pattern of intra-African and international migration from Africa had been classified under three distinct trends. First, in the 1990s, the pattern of African migration was characterised largely by an intra-continental one. In 2000, the number of intra-African migrants was 12.5 million and in 2017 reached 19.4 million. Second, the number of African migrants living out of the continent was 6.9 million in 1990 to 16.9 million in 2017. Thirdly, the percentage of Africa's international migrants also increased from 1.8 % in 2000 to 2% in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018).

The pattern of migration in sub-Saharan Africa mainly occurs within the region and the numbers of migrants to the rest of the world also increasing (IMF, 2016). In Africa, countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire and Libya have major migrant hosting countries. From these, South Africa is the major migrants' destination followed by Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria (UNECA, 2017; TSION, 2017). Sub-Saharan regions of Africa have a relatively low rate of migration, about 2% of the region's population. However, the stock of migrants is growing steadily due to the highest growth of population (IMF, 2016). In many ways, contemporary African migration has been shaped by colonial practices. Thus, the colonial era basically transformed the account of migration in Africa. These partially led to sedentarization of nomadic

and semi-nomadic people into relatively peasantry. Secondly, European colonisation that led to urbanisation in Africa increased migration flows to urban centres (UNECA, 2017).

**Figure 2.1: Migration patterns within and from Africa**



Source: Williams, W. (2024). *African Migration Trends to Watch in 2024*. African Centre for Strategic Studies, p.2.

Migration patterns in Africa are predominantly irregular. Approximately 90% of African irregular migration occurs through the trans-Saharan routes, specifically the Agadez, Niger-Sabha, and Libyan corridors leading to Europe. The primary destinations for irregular migrants

within Africa include Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and South Africa (UNCTAD, 2018). There is a significant and increasing trend of irregular migration both within the Horn of Africa and beyond. This region experiences a mix of migration types, including irregular migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees (Horwood & Frouws, 2021). Many migrants opt for irregular migration due to the daunting nature of regular migration pathways, which are often too costly for the poor and difficult to navigate in obtaining entry visas to South Africa. Approximately 95% of migrants from the Horn of Africa heading to South Africa are undocumented or irregular (Girmachew, 2021). Two-thirds of irregular migrants from Ethiopia are smuggled through Kenya, traveling via Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique to reach South Africa (Meron, 2020; Frouws & Horwood, 2017). Nonetheless, the routes used by these irregular migrants are highly dynamic and subject to frequent changes by smugglers to evade border enforcement and checkpoints (Frouws & Horwood, 2017). Among those migrating from the Horn of Africa, 80% of Ethiopians and 20% of Somalis take the Southern route into South Africa. It is estimated that between 13,000 and 20,000 individuals migrate along this path each year (Horwood & Forin, 2019).

The migration of individuals across borders in Africa is shaped by historical links formed during the colonial period and common linguistic connections (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). However, Ethiopia differs from other African countries that were never colonized, as it does not follow this typical migration trend. As a result, Ethiopian migration lacks a specific pathway, leading to the spread of Ethiopians across different continents (Girmachew, 2021). In addition, migration patterns within Africa are quite unpredictable, with the Republic of South Africa becoming a key destination for irregular migrants (UNCTAD, 2018).

Throughout its history, the Republic of South Africa has experienced various migration trends, which can be categorized into three main phases: colonial migration, migration during the apartheid era, and migration after apartheid (Eigelaar-Meets, 2018). The colonial past of South Africa attracted European settlers, mainly from the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch founded a colony that was later taken over by the British in the nineteenth century (Wesseling, 2015). This led to a significant number of Europeans moving to South Africa in search of economic opportunities, land, and resources (Ross, 1993). During the Apartheid Period (1948-1994), the South African government implemented strict racial

segregation policies that profoundly influenced migration patterns. These policies included the forced relocation of millions of Black Africans from rural areas to designated homelands known as Bantustans, aimed at preserving racial separation. Moreover, non-white populations faced migration restrictions that limited their mobility and opportunities within the country (Crush, 1995; Posel, 2001). Following the end of Apartheid, South Africa saw an increase in migration from neighbouring African countries as well as from regions such as Asia and the Americas. The promise of economic opportunities, political stability, and the nation's reputation for democracy attracted migrants seeking a better future. However, this influx has also led to discussions and challenges related to issues like xenophobia and the integration of diverse communities (Crush & Tevera, 2010).

The migration pattern of Ethiopians to South Africa is influenced by complicated social dynamics, the availability of communication technologies, information exchange, and financial transfer systems (Teshome *et al.*, 2013). Communication technologies play a crucial role for smugglers in maintaining their networks and facilitating money transfers (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). Furthermore, the migration flow from Ethiopia is affected by government policies that restrict mobility. Migrants from the Kembata region typically travel from Hossana to Dilla and then on to Moyale. From Moyale, they navigate through Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique/Zimbabwe before reaching South Africa. Most Ethiopian migrants primarily travel on foot or by vehicle, although some who can afford it opt to fly part of their journey (Meron, 2020; Frouws & Horwood, 2017). This study also assesses the extent and impact of restrictive state policy on mobility that has led to an irregular pattern of migration from Ethiopia.

Irregular migration to South Africa is supported by a network of smugglers referred to locally as *delala* (brokers). These brokers serve as informal facilitators for migrants by providing essential information to those looking to migrate, coordinating the migration process, and facilitating informal money transfers (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). They also supply bogus travel documents that are claimed to be from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The selection of routes and the arrangement of transportation and other necessary services for irregular migrants are organized by these local smugglers or brokers (*delalas*) to help them cross borders (MMC, 2019). Brokers often occupy the 'middle space' between migrants, states and employers. They can act as extensions of the state, seeking to outsource border controls and colluding with

employers to cheapen and commodify migrant labour (McCollum & Findlay, 2018). Brokers can also work on migrants' behalf, finding ways of circumventing restrictive border control policies and practices (Tekalign, Fekadu & Deshingkar, 2018). Research has shown that the persuasive tactics used by brokers to attract potential migrants were effective in enticing them to participate in irregular migration (Bisrat *et al.*, 2017; Messay & Teferi, 2017). A qualitative study conducted by Yordanos and Freeman (2022) suggests that the smuggling trade flourished due to the assistance provided by smugglers along the routes to South Africa, which was a reaction to the government's strict border control policies and closures. This, in turn, led to an increase in the number of irregular migrants.

### **2.3.1. The Nature of Migration Facilitation from Ethiopia to South Africa**

Scholarship on migrant smuggling is relatively new. It started during the second half of the 1990s and has received a considerable amount of media, policy, public, and academic attention over the last two decades (Uddin, Rahman & Khalid, 2022; Belloni & Tshabalala, 2019). In this period, much of the policy-oriented research related smuggling with irregular migration, connecting the issue to criminalization and illegality and resulting in the idea of 'combating' it, which went hand in hand with overly-simplistic descriptions and fear-driven narratives of smuggling. It was also frequently indicted as a fundamental cause of irregular migration, not a reaction to or result of stricter border control policies and practices (Siegel, 2019; İçduygu, 2020). However, more recent critical research carries a cautionary message: while it is true that smuggling may involve criminal elements, it is also historically true that debates on migrant smuggling are not simply descriptions of an existing reality but to some extent are also a part of the process of framing that reality (Uddin, Rahman & Khalid, 2022; İçduygu, 2020). Alongside this growing scholarship challenging the binary of the 'predator smuggler' who needs to be apprehended and the 'vulnerable migrant' who needs to be saved, another emerging body of literature in anthropology, politics and international relations has focused on the materiality that regulate the processes of moving and migrating (Keshavarz, 2024).

All over the world, irregular border crossing or other forms of illegal migration have been a response to restrictive migration policies and the obstacles created by policy-makers and law enforcement (Siegel, 2019; Kerwin & Warren 2017; Ogu, 2017; Nyamnjoh, 2021). Human smuggling, while playing a major role in irregular migration, is a phenomenon that is poorly

understood, and the distinction between human smuggling and trafficking is often blurred (Belloni, & Tshabalala, 2019). The policy approach to migration and human smuggling has been predominantly confined to law enforcement and securitization – an ineffectual response that results in migrants being criminalised by the state and perceived as ‘others’ by citizens (Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018). Human smuggling is a recent term linked to the transformation of illegal migration into a commercial enterprise by organised groups, who assist migrants in a coordinated way, in exchange for high monetary gains (Uddin, Rahman & Khalid, 2022).

It is very common in the media, policy papers, and even some academic works to consider irregular migrants and refugees as victims of ruthless, untrustworthy criminal smugglers. Empirical studies (İçduygu, 2020; Tekalign, 2018; Sanchez, 2018) do however demonstrate the wide range of counter-arguments. While there is some mention of events and cases of ruthless and unscrupulous behaviour by smugglers or the involvement of criminal organisations, there are also numerous narratives describing a social context of assistance, negotiation and protection. A study by Tekalign (2018), on the Eritrean-Sudanese Ethiopian migratory corridor, İçduygu (2020), on Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe also reveal that migrant smuggling emerges as a ‘socially embedded collective practice’ that facilitates the movement of people despite the criminalisation of irregular migration and smuggling and the militarisation of borders. As migration requires a careful decision-making process, migrants or refugees are active agents in planning their departures and journeys (İçduygu, 2020).

As migration enforcement and criminalization increases, smuggling activities are increasingly being facilitated by local operators, who specialise in the provision of specific tasks (Sanchez, 2018). We do know that the reliance on smuggling emerges from the lack of accessible, legal and safe mechanisms for mobility. Restrictions from governments expand the need for “clandestine migration services”, contributing to an increase in smuggling business (Barchet, 2018). Smugglers form an important part of the brokerage network that facilitates irregular migration. Smugglers provide a wide range of services, from physical transportation and illegal crossing of a border, to the procurement of false documents (Yordanos & Zack, 2019). Indeed, smugglers may facilitate migration by serving as “gate-openers” (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019) and providing protection for migrants and refugees from below (Tekalign, Fekadu & Deshingkar,

2018). From this perspective, the risks migrants encounter en route are an extension and part of the structural violence of global inequality and the deprivation of the mobility rights of migrants (Yordanos & Zack, 2019).

Members of the community usually consider people smuggling as a legitimate enterprise rather than a criminal activity and regard smugglers as well-connected and knowledgeable entrepreneurs. They view illegal people smuggling as a strictly rational business with its own specific risks, just like any other business, and they ‘silence morality’ (Siegel, 2019). Not all smugglers appear to be equally experienced and successful and sometimes they fail to complete their mission or make serious and even fatal mistakes during the trip. But in many cases, mainly those that are not registered in police statistics and do not attract media attention, the smuggling operations are successful. These successes reinforce the smuggler’s positive image and function as an informal advertisement for recruiting new clients (Sanchez, 2018; Achilli, 2018).

Many countries around the world lack laws criminalising smuggling. In many communities facilitating migrants’ journeys is seen as part of a complex series of care, support and knowledge that help communities and their members move and survive. Together these practices may be known to be illicit, but legally do not constitute a crime (Barchet, 2018). This is also part of the reason why many migrants do not consider smuggling facilitators’ criminal actors, but service providers and even benefactors (Sanchez, 2018). Until 2013, in many migrant sending areas of Ethiopia, brokers openly collected money, recruited, transported and hosted migrants in their own safe houses. Even the security in certain areas considered them to be creators of opportunity. However, now brokers have moved from the public scene to underground operations in many parts of Ethiopia. They undertake their services via telephone and local representatives. Most of the negotiations between brokers and potential migrants are made telephonically. After the Ethiopian government recently intensified control infrastructures and introduced tough anti-human smuggling regulations to control clandestine migration, the actors and practices of facilitating overland migration and clandestine crossing of international borders have become more complex than before (Tekalign, Fekadu & Deshingkar, 2018).

There is a well-established and dynamic system of migration brokerage that links villages and towns in Southern Ethiopia with chains of smugglers in transiting border towns and countries. The lead broker has several suppliers (*akirabiwoch*) or collectors (*sebsabiwoch*) at his command

who are paid a commission per aspiring migrant that they forward (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). In Hadya and Kembata, migration brokerage is a socio-culturally embedded business. Brokers make money in migration facilitation by using their multiple relations – ethnic, clan, religious, geographical – with potential migrants and their families. Migration brokers are integrated into the community; they participate in local worship services and their children attend the same schools as those of the residents. They belong to the same local burial organisation (*idir*). Thus, brokers at origin abide by local values and norms. The basis of the trust between the brokers and potential migrants is also embedded in these multiple relationships, community values and norms. Successful brokerage is determined by the lead broker's ability to establish a structure of 'supply' at the place of origin and the ability to establish strong networks with hard-working, smart and trustworthy individual smugglers along the transit route, based at each important point along the route. The fact that most of the migrants from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa have little or no education and do not speak any of the languages spoken en route to the destination place makes the services of the smugglers indispensable (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019; Yordanos & Freeman, 2022).

#### **2.4. Effects of Irregular Migration**

International migration has advantages and disadvantages both to the sending and receiving countries (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). On the positive side, migration facilitates development in the receiving country as it provides access to the required knowledge, expertise, and services, and unskilled labour of the migrants. They contribute significantly to the economy through their participation in the labour market (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Intra-continental migrations have positive impacts for both origin and destination countries. For instance, for the destination countries migration fosters economic structural transformation, enhances labour productivity and fills labour gaps, higher levels of consumption and broader tax base. The contribution of migrants to GDP was estimated at 19% in Cote d'Ivoire, 13% in Rwanda and 9% in South Africa. On the other hand, the countries of migrants' origin also benefited from remittances that account 3.5% of Africa's total GDP in 2018, and boost trade and investment through diaspora networks in the destination countries (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The disadvantages to the receiving country were raised from the perspectives of causing

an undesirable influx of migrants, and social impacts like crime and security threats (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016).

On the side of the country of origin, migration also has its pros and cons. Although they benefit from the remittances but suffer greatly from brain drain due to the increasing migration of skilled labour (Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016). Migrant sending countries are highly concerned about the loss of a young talented workforce through brain drain. However, migrants also contributed to the development of their home countries by sending remittances and being involved in enhancing foreign direct investment (FDI), bilateral and international trade (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2017). Occasionally, public opinion in host countries is against migration and considers immigrants as economic burdens that, in turn, may create social tension, increments in criminality, and economic externalities on native capital, labour markets, wages, and public finance. However, international migration has a greater impact in enhancing the socio-economic development and social diversity in host states through migrants' contribution in an increase of social capital, innovation, and increased international linkages through trade and FDI (Gheasi & Nijkamp, 2017).

An irregular migration poses many challenges and risks to the migrants en route to the aspired destination. Though it is difficult to provide the exact number of missing or dead Ethiopian migrants along the route, some estimated that at least one of every four migrants undertaking the journey towards Europe, the Gulf states and South Africa dies or disappears (MMC, 2020; Tekalign, 2021b). CSA (2021) Labour Migration Survey indicates that an estimated 51,089 Ethiopians are missing migrants with 84.6 % are males and 15.4 % are females (CSA, 2021). Reports from the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC, 2020) and the Missing Migrants Project (IOM, 2017) indicates that Ethiopians migrants lost their lives during the journeys due to physical hardships like travel on foot, on board boats and trucks that crosses mountain ranges, deserts and seas, and exposed to harsh environments that leads to death by dehydration, exhaustion and starvation. Migrants also die by sinking in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, by suffocation inside sealed containers, attacks by wild animals, violence by border guards, smugglers and militias, and also from gender-based violence (Horwood & Forin, 2019).

Irregular migrants are commonly following clandestine routes and international data on the fatalities of migrants were limited (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2017). Migrants en route faced the most common risks such as hunger, thirst, physical exhaustion from long journey and harsh climate, illness, missing, death, sexual violence, ransom and debt bondage, labour exploitation, robbery, detention and lack of access to social services (Meron, 2020; Horwood & Forin, 2019; Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2017). IOM's Missing Migrants Project (MMP) began to gather and compile information on global migrants vanishing and missing on migration routes. In 2013, due to the sinking of two boats near the Italian island of Lampedusa, about 368 migrants died (IOM, 2021). The five years (2014-2018) systematic data record by MMP indicated that about 30,900 people lost their lives on the migration routes. Of the various routes, the Mediterranean Sea route claimed the highest number of death tolls (about 17,919 people). The death tolls of migrants during the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea are alarmingly growing from year to year. For instance, in 2017 the death record while crossing from North Africa to Spain was about 272, while in 2018 it rose to about 813. Despite the rise in death tolls due to sinking boats, migrants also lost their lives due to harsh environment, violence and abuse, dangerous transportation system, and starvation and sickness (IOM, 2019).

Migrants undertake a dangerous journey from the place of origin until they reach their destinations. Around one-third of Ethiopian irregular migrants are smuggled by boat with the rest being taken by road and on foot (Meron, 2020; Frouws & Horwood, 2017). While undertaking the journey, some of them may die while others are abused or injured in the hands of smugglers. The movements of irregular migrants are full of ups and downs such as travel during darkness and through forests. Smugglers exact a high price on them, and face robberies, beatings, arrest by local police, travelling in suffocated sealed airless containers and overloaded boats, shortage of food, water, and health facilities (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013). Emigrants also faced kidnapping and torture for ransom payment that lead to loss of life and missing in Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Mozambique and Malawi. Violence, severe working and living conditions, and xenophobic attacks in the Gulf States and South Africa also led to loss of migrants' lives (Horwood, & Forin, 2019; Tekalegn, 2021b).

The routes to Southern Africa are the most dangerous to cross for Ethiopian migrants'. As a result, according to the data by Mixed Migration Centre the number of dead and missing migrants from Ethiopia tripled along the eastern and southern routes in the year between 2016 and 2019 due to EU externalisation of border control and stricter control along the northern route to Europe (MMC, 2020). For instance, in the period between 2012 and 2019 about 4,265 deaths and 1,707 migrants disappeared from the major migrant sending districts of Hadiya and Kembata-Tembaro (Tekalign, 2021b). The loss and missing of family members has deep emotional and economic effects on the families. For instance, the death or missing of a husband left all burdens on the relatives who got indebted to cover the travel expenses, smuggling fees and to cover household costs. As a result, the burden of repaying debt and carrying up children fell on the wives alone. Moreover, the elderly mothers and fathers of migrants not only lose the care and economic support of their children but also lose their property or land mortgaged to finance the journey of their migrant children (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2017; Tekalign, 2021b).

In South Africa, migrants faced the risks of frequent xenophobic attacks, and the major ones occurred in 2008, 2015 (Amusan & Mchunu, 2017) and 2019 (MMC, 2019). In September 2019, a widespread anti-immigrant violence erupted in South Africa that targeted one thousand foreign owned businesses and claimed at least the lives of 12 people. In response, the Nigerian government took a reprisal against South African business and temporarily shut down South Africa's diplomatic missions in Lagos and Abuja (Ibid.). The rise of COVID-19 pandemic has increased the stigmatisation, racism and xenophobia against the migrants on the ground they were incriminated for spreading the pandemic (IOM, 2021).

## **2.5. Migration Decision Making and the Culture of Migration**

Migration researchers often assume that migration decisions should be extremely rational and defined by the utmost possible cost-benefit analysis due to its long-term consequences (Czaika, Bijak & Prike, 2021; Spaan & Naerssen, 2017; Thompson, 2017; Haug, 2008). In terms of international migration, a large number of researchers have investigated migration intentions and the factors that influence them (Hagen-Zanker & Hennesey, 2021; Czaika, Bijak & Prike, 2021; Ruedin, 2021). Others have focused on a set of factors such as year of arrival, age at the time of

migration, duration of stay abroad, marital status, family members left behind, employment, education, host language ability, and social networks (Güngör & Tansel, 2014; Piotrowski & Tong, 2013). Economic models have long dominated research on migration decision-making, with migrants viewed as rational individuals weighing the economic costs and benefits of migrating or staying. This contends that migration is a process in which people choose their destinations based on their unique circumstances and prioritise maximising their financial gains (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

The contemporary society has witnessed the emergence of mobility and international employment as crucial aspects, with the migrant lifestyle playing a significant role in career development and success (Rodda, 2015). However, it is apparent that certain nations exhibit a higher degree of mobility compared to others. Over time, migration has become a prevalent behavioural pattern, capturing the fascination of many within society (White, 2016). These societies can be characterised as possessing migration cultures (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021). Migration is defined as the physical movement across national borders from one geographic location to another (Andresen *et al.*, 2014). Culture, on the other hand, is defined as the assimilation of learned and shared values that influence our way of life, perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes, differentiating one human group from another (Mockaitis, 2002). It encompasses the collective programming of the mind with universal, collective, and individual values (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021).

Although the concept of the culture of migration is not new, scholarly debate about this aspect of migration has just recently evolved (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021). Most authors (Connell, 2008; Galam, 2015; Heering *et al.*, 2004; Massey *et al.*, 1998; Van Mol *et al.*, 2018) emphasise large numbers of external migration for a long time, sometimes continuing for several generations (Liang & Song, 2018) as migration history; others (Sirkeci, Cohen & Yazgan, 2012) highlight push-pull factors such as economic, social, and political situation in origin and destination countries, while others (Elrick, 2008; Wilson, 2010) focus on varying beliefs, behaviour, and values. Richardson (1983) may have been the first to use the phrase "migration culture." He defines migration culture in the context of St. Kitts-Nevis Island as "locally adaptive traits of the particular island society in question [where] migration is economically and socially fundamental to insular ways of life" (Richardson, 1983).

There is no agreement among researchers regarding the traits that characterize a society as a migrant culture (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021). Many scholars (Connell, 2008; Galam, 2015; Heering *et al.*, 2004; Massey *et al.*, 1998; Van Mol *et al.*, 2018) point to significant and prolonged outward migration, often spanning multiple generations (Liang & Song, 2018), as a key aspect of migration history. In contrast, Sirkeci, Cohen, and Yazgan (2012) focus on the economic, social, and political contexts. Although the idea of migration culture has gained attention in recent literature, a comprehensive understanding is still lacking. Numerous studies identify specific characteristics of migrant culture or concentrate on individual aspects. Moreover, there is limited research that explores the underlying reasons or causes of migration culture instead of merely its manifestations; for instance, the influence of personal or societal values on individuals' willingness to migrate is seldom discussed. Consequently, the term "migration culture" is often used to describe observable migration behaviours within societies rather than being shaped by deeper societal cultural factors. The question of whether certain cultural traits encourage or discourage migration—potentially identified as "migration values"—is an emerging area in the literature that warrants further investigation (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021).

Scholars defined the culture of migration from different perspectives. Some scholars have defined the culture of migration in the context of cumulative causation, as Kandel and Massey (2002) stated “international migration is cultural in the sense that the aspiration to migrate is transmitted across generations and between people through social networks”. Horváth (2008) similarly defined a culture of migration refers to the 'changes in values and cultural perceptions' brought about by previous migratory experiences within a given community with a long migration history. In this context, persisting migratory behaviours can become referential behavioural repertoires that guide and drive decisions made by social actors (Massey *et al.*, 1993). Based on their study on Mexican communities, Kandel and Massey (2002) noted that in societies with a high rate of international migration, mobility is a norm rather than an exception. Migration becomes a rite of passage, especially for young males. Staying home is considered lazy, unenthusiastic, and undesirable in marriage.

The culture of migration is linked to the history of migration in the origin communities (Horváth, 2008; Heering *et al.*, 2004) and the historical and cultural ties between the origin and destination

countries (Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003). In their studies of Swedish-speaking minorities' migration from Finland to Sweden, Hedberg and Kepsu (2003) linked the culture of migration with historical and linguistic ties. Wilson (2010) stated that Mexican migrant culture has profound historical origins. Material (economic) base, social ties, rituals, and ideologies are all parts of the migrant culture. Wilson (2010) emphasises the aspects that help migrants by easing migration and adaptation in the destination country, stating that Mexican migratory culture is understood to be based on attitudes and norms that sanction the maintenance of reciprocity networks, the formation of ceremonial kinship bonds, and the advancement of religious traditions.

The culture of migration defined in the context of Turkish mobility by scholars such as Sirkeci, Cohen and Yazgan (2012) as formed by national and transnational conflicts, regional disparities in socioeconomic development levels in Turkey, and the simultaneous influence of ethnic strife and socioeconomic deprivation and Timmerman *et al.* (2014) as “living in a migration-impacted region or not.” Galam (2015) defined the culture of migration not only considering the long history of migration but also in terms of affordability and the socioeconomic opportunities of Ilocano migration from the Philippines to Hawaii. The state's institutionalisation of migration in the Philippines has considerably aided the establishment of a Philippine culture of migration. Van Mol *et al.* (2018) argue that large numbers of emigration may create a culture of movement, or as Cohen and Jónsson (2011) stated, the culture of migration “can emerge among people and communities who become habituated to mobility”. Liang and Song (2018) summarised that the culture of migration is responsible for the generational transmission of international migration.

Heering *et al.* (2004) used social capital theory and the theory of cumulative causation to examine the importance of family networks and migration culture in the continuation of Moroccan emigration from a gender perspective. Heering *et al.* (2004) stated that as networks expand; a form of migrant culture emerges, allowing access to superior social and economic opportunities overseas. Within the context of migratory culture, migration is thought to be the only way to raise one's level of living; those who stay are losers, while those who leave are winners (Heering *et al.*, 2004). According to Ali (2007), the conception of migration culture includes concepts, practices, and cultural artefacts that promote the celebration of migration and migrants, such as beliefs, desire, symbolism, myths, education, and migration celebrations in various media and tangible products. Furthermore, migration culture is emphasised as a taught

social behaviour; people learn to move and aspire to migrate. Ali (2007) argues that the culture of migration is “a complement to examining economic factors and network ties to migrate” and “while the culture of migration may have its roots in migrant networks, its effects spread out to those without such social networks” (Ali, 2007). The importance of remittances in enhancing migrant culture has also been emphasised (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021).

The establishment of a migratory culture may be related to certain types of values in a country. These values strengthen the notion that migration is a long-term objective that must be achieved (Massey *et al.*, 1998). As people become captivated by the same migratory goal, migration becomes a habitual action or a cultural norm that pushes others to sustain a pattern of behaviour (White, 2016). According to Hedberg and Kepsu (2003), migration decisions are cultural; they are a component of people’s identities and are shaped by individual and community beliefs. That is, personal beliefs serve as motivators for achieving migratory goals, whereas group norms across society that tolerate movement reinforce such decisions. Increased connectivity between sending and receiving districts facilitates the movement of information, ideas, money, and migration. Irregular movement will be culturally accepted as a valid life option by the majority, a position similar to the "culture of migration." Tian *et al.* (2020) recently used mobile phone data to identify the transmission of social distancing practices from Mexican immigrants in the United States to their social networks in Mexico. It is worth noting that emigrants are frequently portrayed as role models in their home country’s cultural narrative (Kandel & Massey, 2002; Rapoport, Sardoschau & Silve, 2020).

The discourse surrounding migration and cultural transformation has predominantly focused on the cultural dynamics entrenched within the receiving nations. Conversely, migration possesses considerable ramifications for the cultural dynamics within the originating countries and possesses the potential to overhaul the global cultural framework (Rapoport, 2021). The notion that immigration undermines Western values and institutions is a prevalent subject amongst right-wing nationalists, spanning from outright conspiracy theories concerning a Great Replacement to more subdued pleas for the preservation of the imperilled indigenous culture and its principles (Rapoport, Sardoschau & Silve, 2020). During a 2018 speech, President Donald Trump of the United States cautioned European leaders to exercise vigilance as immigration was "altering the culture" of their respective countries. Nevertheless, migrants can exert influence on

cultural transformation by reintroducing cultural values and customs from their host nations into their native communities (Rapoport, 2021).

Migration has frequently been delineated as a transformative encounter that exposes migrants to fresh cultural, social, and institutional standards. Once assimilated, these standards may be conveyed back to their place of origin through familial, social, and community networks (Rapoport, Sardoschau & Silve, 2020). Sociologists have coined the phrase "social remittances" to characterise this process (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011), which Rapoport, Sardoschau, and Silve (2020) have alternatively labelled as "Cultural Remittances". They have discerned that migrants are not a haphazard sample of their home country's populace; instead, they are self-selected based on various variables such as age, gender, education, wealth, or ethnic heritage. The concentration of immigrants in ethnic communities is a notable characteristic of international migration. The concentration of Turkish individuals in Germany, Tamil individuals in Switzerland, Moroccan individuals in the Netherlands and Belgium, Greek individuals in Australia, and Ukrainian individuals in Canada serve as prominent examples (Epstein & Gang, 2010). The prevailing explanation for the formation of immigrant clusters lies in the availability of advantageous network externalities, whereby previous immigrants offer shelter and employment opportunities, provide assistance with credit applications, and generally alleviate the challenges associated with settling into a foreign society. A growing body of literature (Girmachew, 2019; Meron, 2020; Yordanos & Freeman, 2022; Crawley, Nyamnjoh & Garba, 2022; Dereje, 2022) similarly highlights an ethnic clustering phenomenon among Kembata and Hadiya communities in major South African cities such as Johannesburg and Durban over the past 25 years, driven by the pursuit of improved living prospects. This study aimed to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the cultural aspects surrounding the migration of Kembatas from southern Ethiopia, an area that has received limited attention in previous research endeavours.

Migration is not solely driven by coercion stemming from natural or man-made violence, but rather serves as a means of acquiring knowledge and broadening one's perspectives<sup>1</sup> (Van Reisen

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<sup>1</sup>In African folklore, the act of mobility assumes a societal imperative that extends beyond mere economic necessity. A pertinent African proverb suggests that those who have not traversed extensively are prone to believing that their own mother is the sole purveyor of culinary expertise. This Ugandan proverb, widely acknowledged across various African languages, implores individuals to step outside their comfort zones and embark upon uncharted journeys.

*et al.*, 2019). Consequently, we contend that the understanding of migration processes cannot be solely rooted in economic factors. The cultural facet of migration assumes a supplementary role in migration research (Dereje, 2022). Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) acknowledge the various methodologies through which migration decisions are shaped, as well as the foundation of individual decisions on a population's social behaviours and cultural beliefs. Within the context of southern Ethiopia, the movement of individuals in the Hadiya region is referred to as "flow" rather than migration, as it is perceived as an inherent element of the natural order rather than a transgression (Dereje, 2022). Moreover, Dereje (2022) points out that this perspective on population movement diverges from the narrow understanding of migration embraced by policy communities, who tend to overlook contextual considerations. The Kembata and Hadiya communities express a sense of entitlement when discussing their migration to South Africa, envisioning it as a means to improve their circumstances.

There are numerous elements encompassing migratory culture, which include its material (economic) foundation, social bonds, rituals, and ideology. To illustrate, the phenomenon of migration in Mexico possesses profound historical roots that have been extensively examined in various works on colonial Latin America in general, and Mexico in particular (Wilson, 2010). Over the past 25 years, a substantial number of Ethiopians have undertaken migration to South Africa in pursuit of improved living prospects and as a pathway to European and North American countries. Nonetheless, Ethiopian migration to South Africa represents a relatively recent occurrence that coincided with political changes in both nations during the early 1990s (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022). The culture of migration plays a pivotal role in perpetuating migration across generations, both within domestic boundaries and on an international scale (Dereje, 2022). The primary aim of this section is to examine the cultural dynamics of irregular Ethiopian migration from the perspective of Kembata emigrants residing in the Republic of South Africa. Through this investigation, we aim to shed light on the broader cultural implications of these migratory phenomena by exploring the motivations, objectives, and challenges encountered by Kembata emigrants. By focusing on their experiences, we can glean valuable insights into the cultural factors that influence the migration decisions, integration processes, and the impact on their home society.

In previous studies (Sebsibe, 2018; Yohannes, 2018; Girmachew, 2021; Meron, 2020; Yordanos & Freeman, 2022), there is limited understanding of the cultural factors influencing irregular Ethiopian migration to South Africa. The emigration of Ethiopians to South Africa began in the mid-1990s; however, a sizeable number of emigrations from the study area began in 2000s (Yordanos & Zack, 2019). Kembatas have a brief history of migration to South Africa; however, they have an old history of internal migration. Tagesse (2015) argued that the Kembatas migrated to their present land around the 11<sup>th</sup> century from the southeast around the Bale highlands. The name Kembata is also derived from *Kambato*, meaning the man who led the migration of the first settlers, and he was considered the father of Kembata. The 1950s and 1960s were a turning point in the growth of Hadiya-Kembata's migrant labour systems, mainly to the plantations in the Awash Valley and the Wonji and Metehara areas (Dereje, 2022). Notwithstanding the existing economic pressures that caused migration, other factors such as the role of political networks, the culture of migration, and the spirituality of migration have played a vital role in the increased migration of Kembatas to the RSA (Dereje, 2022). Therefore, this study intends to explore the specific cultural norms, values, perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that shape migration decisions to urge people to leave the Kembata community to South Africa.

## **2.6. Revisiting Migration in Africa**

### **2.6.1. Historical Overview of Migration in Africa**

Migration within Africa is a deeply rooted phenomenon that has played a significant role in the shaping of different regions on the continent (Mlambo & Mpanza, 2019; EU, 2020). Approximately 2,000 years ago, the expansion of the Bantu-speaking peoples from modern-day Cameroon and Eastern Nigeria marked one of the largest migrations documented in history. This movement led to the displacement or integration of local populations in East and South Africa (Lucas, 2015; EU, 2020). The trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic trade, influenced by the practice of slavery, led to the movement of highly mobile groups of people organised around ethnic, religious, and cooperative networks such as Diola, Soninke, Hausa, and Pulaar (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). These large-scale migrations gave rise to the idea that pre-colonial Africa was a 'frontier continent', suggesting that states in that era were characterised by their adaptability and willingness to explore new territories rather than being tied to specific borders. Migration during

this time could serve as a deliberate strategy for conquest and expansion or as a response to external pressures from rival states (Håkansson, 2022).

Throughout various historical periods, peoples in Africa have participated in circular and seasonal migration, as well as establishing new permanent settlements in areas conducive to sustaining livelihoods (Laine, Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020). These movements were primarily driven by the need to find secure land for agriculture or grazing in reaction to climatic factors such as droughts or floods (Lucas, 2015; Håkansson, 2022), as well as social and political conditions like pilgrimages, internal conflicts, and the impact of slavery (Lucas, 2015). In cases except where villages were deserted (Nkamleu & Fox, 2006), migration tended to be temporary, short-term, and seasonal (Bakewell & de Haas, 2007). For example, nomadic herders traditionally travelled with their livestock in search of fertile grazing lands: in the Horn of Africa between modern-day Somalia and Ethiopia, in East Africa between Kenya and Tanzania (Makinwa–Adebusoye, 2006), and in West Africa between northern Nigeria and Cameroon (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019).

Migration and the formation of states were closely linked: the movement of people had a significant impact on social and political dynamics, as well as on the development of states. Changes in state formation processes also affected the nature of migration (Keeton & Schirmer, 2022). Before 1750, migration was largely seen as voluntary and driven by economic factors, serving as a crucial strategy for dealing with the uncertainties and challenges faced by agricultural communities (Ibid.). According to Manning and Trimmer (2020), migrants moving between communities, whether temporarily or permanently, played a prominent role during this time period. This migration helped foster a strong cultural focus on collaboration and mutual support, as well as contributed to the existence of relatively weak and unstable political systems. Interactions between regions and communities were more likely to be peaceful rather than violent, driven by cooperation rather than conflict. However, post-1750 migration took on a different character, characterised by forced displacement caused by aggressive centralising powers. Individuals and entire communities were uprooted and relocated through coercion and violence (Carneiro, 2012; Keeton & Schirmer; 2022).

The historical mobility patterns in pre-colonial South Africa had significant effects on the collapse and establishment of states, a phenomenon referred to as the “Mfecane Equilibrium”

(Shillington, 2019). The term “Mfecane” translates to “crushing” in Zulu and is used by scholars to characterise the violence, forced relocations, and repeated political centralization linked to the emergence of Mthetwa, Ndwandwe, Swati, Ndebele, and particularly Zulu authorities. Throughout the Mfecane period, the scale and severity of invasions and forced displacements increased dramatically (Makhura, 2006; Wright, 2009). Some people became refugees, fleeing in search of safety in other areas. Consequently, during the Mfecane Equilibrium, migration transformed into a deliberate strategy carried out by newly centralised, militarised states and the forced displacement of refugees escaping from these states. Historical records from the 1820s indicate that groups from northern KwaZulu-Natal migrated to the coast and engaged in trading activities, including the sale of slaves. Annexing armies under the command of aggressive states such as Soshangane, Zwadengaba, and Shaka moved northward towards the coast during the early 1820s (Keeton & Schirmer, 2022). The movement patterns of settler migrations in the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries can provide insights into later African migrations. The descendants of the initial Dutch and French farmers, later identified as Afrikaners, utilised a strategy of resistance against colonial policies when they ventured into the interior of South Africa. The “Great Trek,” a series of spontaneous migrations rather than a single event, culminated in the establishment of two independent republics where issues related to citizenship and governance were of utmost importance (Fourie, 2022).

African migration, historically, has involved both voluntary and forced movements within and out of the continent (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). The trans-Saharan slave trade predates the trans-Atlantic slave trade and was established by the Libyan Berbers around 2000 BCE (Saleh & Wahby, 2022). Through seasonal migration, they developed a trading network that included the transportation of slaves. The Arab Conquests in the seventh century further stimulated this trade by creating a higher demand for slaves and more commercial incentives through intercontinental connections (Wright, 2009). The earliest significant forced migration of Africans beyond the continent occurred during the Atlantic slave trade, wherein millions of men, women, and children were captured and transported to the Americas between 1526 and 1867 (Mlambo & Mpanza, 2019; Ware, 2017; Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). Estimates suggest that between 11.8 and 12.5 million Africans were taken from their homelands, with approximately 9.6 to 10.8 million reaching the Americas (Bruey & Crawley, 2024). Unfortunately, these numbers do not

include many others who perished during the raids or died during the treacherous journey to the coast (Nunn, 2008).

The establishment of plantations along the coast and in Zanzibar brought about significant changes in the migration patterns of 19<sup>th</sup> century East Africa. This era witnessed the movement of enslaved individuals from the interior regions to the coast and Zanzibar on a large scale (Shillington, 2019). Another significant historical development in 19<sup>th</sup> century East Africa was the expansion of ivory trade to global markets. To transport ivory from the interior regions to the coast, labourers known as porters were employed due to the lack of alternative transportation methods (Pallaver, 2022). Porters hailed from various regions, with a significant number coming from the Kamba region in present-day Kenya, the Nyamwezi region in western Tanzania, and the Yao region in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique. During the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, portering was a seasonal occupation, with porters engaging in circular migration patterns (Shillington, 2019; Pallaver, 2022). According to Paul Lovejoy (2011), approximately 1,650,000 slaves were traded in East Africa during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with nearly half of them being kept in the region for plantation labour. These "*shamba*" or field slaves, worked for their owners for four or five days each week, while using the remaining time to cultivate their own land for personal subsistence. The crops grown independently by these enslaved individuals were shared between the labourers and their owners (Pallaver, 2022).

Throughout history, Africa has thrived on the movement of people, a trend that continues today despite increasingly stringent restrictions and border enforcement measures (Laine, Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020). In the pre-colonial era, migration was a common occurrence across different regions of Africa. This migration involved both permanent moves for the purpose of exploring new territories or escaping conflicts and oppression, as well as temporary and cyclical movements related to various activities such as hunting, trading, agriculture, and religious practices (Laine, 2021). Borders serve as a reflection of a nation's power and authority, delineating who is included within the country's boundaries and who is excluded. Unlike fixed boundary lines, borders are dynamic and can change over time depending on interactions between different groups of people (Moyo, & Laine, 2021). In Africa prior to the colonial era, the modern concept of boundaries as we know them today did not exist. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, three distinct types of frontiers had emerged across the continent. The first type was the enclave,

where different cultural and ethnic groups coexisted. The second type was the contact frontier, where separate political and cultural entities existed side by side, such as the Yoruba states and Dahomey, or the Buganda kingdom and neighbouring communities in East Africa. The third type was the separation frontier, a traditional boundary dividing communities with a buffer zone claimed by neither side, often found in densely wooded areas like the Sambisa forest or desert regions in Nigeria (Ibid.). Indigenous African borders were in a constant state of flux due to revolutionary movements and conflicts like the Mfecane and the Fulani jihads. These changes were further complicated by colonial boundaries established during the Berlin Conference, disrupting the natural progression of states in Africa (Laine, 2021).

In relation to borders in post-colonial states, it is important to recognize that the colonial period introduced the idea of the Westphalian nation state in Africa (Mbembe, 2019). Prior to colonialism, territories in Africa were not defined by borders or identities linked to specific regions, but rather by allegiances to rulers, religions, and tribes. The establishment of the Westphalian nation state in Africa as a result of colonialism has had a lasting impact on the continent. While borders did exist in Africa before colonisation, they were fluid and served as meeting points for different cultural and political groups, rather than strict separations. These borders were porous and allowed for movement and trade (Ibid.). The concept of defining political control through territorial boundaries, known as statehood, was culturally foreign and a European concept imposed on Africa (Engelbert, Tarango & Carter, 2002), and have contributed to continued conflict on the continent (Moyo & Laine, 2021).

Following the establishment of formal boundaries by European leaders after the Berlin Conference in 1885, the colonisation efforts had a significant impact on the movement of people and the existing territorial structures (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). Various ethnic and cultural groups found themselves separated across different colonies (Adepoju, 1995b), as the colonial agenda focused on exploiting local resources which in turn resulted in a new spatial divide affecting migration patterns (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). A notable aspect of the European colonies south of the Sahara was the scarcity of labour, particularly during the early years of colonial dominance from the 1880s to the 1930s (Okia, 2022). This scarcity led to the implementation of coercive colonial policies such as forced labour, population displacements, and taxes to meet the needs of the colonial powers (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). The repercussions of these policies were

seen in the emergence of new migration trends and the transformation of rural to urban landscapes, as individuals moved from inland regions to coastal cities and areas rich in agriculture and mining resources. A common characteristic of these migrations was their circular nature, often occurring seasonally. For instance, in countries like Côte d'Ivoire and the Gold Coast (now Ghana), migrants played a crucial role in the growth of plantation economies centred on crops like coffee and cocoa. Similarly, in regions like Senegal and Gambia, seasonal workers known as '*navetanes*' were integral to the expansion of groundnut production. These migration flows not only shaped economic activities but also influenced the social fabric of these societies (Ibid.).

During the colonial period, cooperation among colonial powers towards the exploitation of local resources led to the organised movement of workers from regions with reserves of labour. This movement was controlled through specific agreements, such as the one between Portuguese Mozambique and South Africa, where workers were provided for the mines in South Africa (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). Moreover, colonial states employed indirect methods of coercion to mobilise labour, like land confiscation and restrictions on independent farming of valuable export crops by African farmers in their homelands. These tactics were commonly used in European settler agriculture and mining industries in Southern, Central, and to a lesser extent, Eastern Africa (Juif, 2022; Frederick & Meerkerk, 2022). Some colonies implemented policies that aimed to limit the mobility of Africans and keep labourers tied to local plantations or settler farms while criminalising migration (Okia, 2022). The most overt and persistent forms of forced labour mobilisation were observed in Belgian and Portuguese Africa (da Silva & Alexopoulou, 2022), but they were also prevalent in British and French colonies (Okia, 2022; Killingray, 2022). Throughout this period, urban centres experienced growth in population and size, becoming hubs for government, trade, mining, and industry (Frederick & Meerkerk, 2022). Consequently, urban migration contributed to significant demographic shifts, often from inland areas towards coastal regions (de Haas & Frankema, 2022).

The migration routes for military recruits were complex and extensive, as they travelled from rural areas to towns and sometimes to remote parts of a vast empire. The utilization of the manpower of tropical Africa for wartime purposes, especially for overseas service during World War II, marked the largest and most focused movement of Africans out of the continent since the

days of the slave trade (Killingray, 2022). Even before the colonial scramble for Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, African soldiers had been employed by European powers for imperial ventures beyond the continent. For example, the Portuguese enlisted African soldiers in their colonies in South and East Asia, while the French recruited Egyptian slaves to fight in Mexico in the 1860s. The Italians established Eritrea as a military outpost that produced *askaris* (local soldiers) for deployment in Libya. The phenomenon of military migration primarily involved men, although some wives did accompany their husbands. *Askari* settlements were established in German colonies (Moyd, 2014). During the years of crisis between 1939 and 1945, large numbers of African soldiers were recruited and sent to various regions to participate in military campaigns, including battles in Europe, Africa (including Madagascar), the Levant, and Asia. The war effort also required a significant amount of labour, with civilian workers and military units, who were subject to military discipline, being mobilised for support (Killingray, 2022).

After winning independence in the early 1960s, a complex interplay of dual and conflicting processes shaped the trajectory of African nations. The struggle for political power led to the dismantling of colonial federations like French Western and Equatorial Africa, British East Africa, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). In the aftermath of independence, many newly formed states implemented strict regulations on residency, employment, and movement for foreign nationals, driven by local politics and a desire to prioritise national interests in the job market and often resulted in xenophobic sentiments and actions (Adepoju, 2000a). During periods of political unrest and economic downturn, certain events tend to occur more frequently, such as those seen in Ghana during the 1970s or when Nigeria deported 1.3 million immigrants within a two-week period (Black & King, 2004). Despite these challenges, there were also forces working towards continental integration, motivated by the ideals of pan-Africanism. The establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and later the African Union in 2001 marked significant milestones in this regard. Regional integration initiatives, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed in 1975, have been more successful in promoting free movement, residence, and settlement within their member states. However, enforcement of these protocols can be weak, leading to continued restrictions on migration even within these regional blocs. Overall, the processes of nation-building, pan-Africanism, and regional integration have shaped migration patterns in Africa, with migration flows often gravitating towards key economic hubs like South

Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria in ECOWAS (Adepoju, 2000b).

Africa's post-colonial nations increasingly focused on expelling foreigners, displacing enemies within and across borders, and repatriating international refugees. One of the most significant changes in migration patterns over time is the shift “absorption” to the “expulsion” or from welcoming migrants to pushing them out, reflecting evolving attitudes in African communities and states towards immigration and the integration of outsiders (de Haas & Frankema, 2022). This transition from absorption to expulsion is also evident in the militarization and use of force by state violence (Killingray, 2022). Decolonization and post-colonial conflicts often led to mass displacement of unwanted populations. For instance, in the early 1960s, nearly a million French settlers and tens of thousands of Algerian soldiers were forced out of Algeria (Eldridge, 2016; de Haas & Frankema, 2022). The historical trend towards repatriation of foreigners applies not only to refugees but also to millions of “illegal” immigrants who entered host countries and were later expelled under threat of violence (Adepoju, 1995b). From the late 1950s to the early 2000s, there was a wave of mass expulsions across Africa. For example, Ghana expelled between 500,000 to 1,000,000 people to neighbouring countries in 1969, Uganda expelled 50,000 individuals to India and the UK under Idi Amin in 1972, Nigeria expelled 1.5 million to Ghana, Niger, and Chad in 1983 and Ethiopia expelled 80,000 to Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. These forced migrations deeply impacted the region (Frankema, 2022).

The emergence of independence also brought significant changes to the migration patterns of African people to other regions around the world. The post-independence European migration policies towards African nationals were less restrictive, mainly hindered by travel and resettlement costs rather than visa requirements (European Commission, 2018). After recovering from the aftermath of the Second World War, Western European nations experienced a period of rapid industrial growth known as the “golden age” (Eichengreen, 2007). A shortage of unskilled labour was evident during the 1960s and 1970s. Initially, “guest workers” from Southern Europe filled these labour gaps, and temporary labour migration agreements were signed with North African countries. Despite the economic recession of the 1980s, chain migration and family reunification sustained these migration flows due to Europe's demographic decline and ageing population, leading to a structural demand for cheap foreign labour (de Haas, 2008).

Furthermore, in the Gulf region, which is resource-rich but sparsely populated, there was a notable increase in demand for migrant workers from Asia and Africa under strict temporary and controlled conditions (de Haas & Frankema, 2022).

### **2.6.2. Myths and Narratives on African Migration**

The human movement from Africa has been inaccurately labelled with terms such as "mobile Africa" (IOM, 2005), "roaming Africa" (Van Reisen *et al.*, 2019), "a continent on the move" (Moyo, 2021; Flahaux & de Haas, 2016), and a "migration crisis" (Bufalini, 2019), which do not align with the true nature of African mobility within and beyond the continent (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020; Batisai, 2022; Leal & Harder, 2021; Crawley & Teye, 2024). Migration, along with the fears commonly associated with it, has been politicized to a great extent globally, with a particular focus on Europe (Czaika & de Haas, 2017). Much of the existing research on migration between Africa and Europe has emphasised the potential for movement, especially from Africa to Europe (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2017; Flahaux & de Haas 2016). In the popular media, this has often been depicted as a potentially uncontrollable influx of migrants, known as the "myth of invasion" (Geddes & Maru, 2020), reflecting Eurocentric perspectives and Western notions of categorising migrants (Duvell, 2021).

The Eurocentric viewpoints have propagated misconceptions, myths and biases regarding migration (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). One prevalent misunderstanding is the idea that Europe is the primary destination for most African migrants, when in reality internal and cross-border migration within countries in the Global South are far more significant numerically (Horwood & Frouws, 2021). In Europe, there has been a tendency to depict the increasing number of refugee arrivals as unprecedented, and the recent rise in asylum seekers and migrants in Europe was deemed a crisis that posed a threat to European civilization, leading to intensified border security measures to deter migrants and refugees. The portrayal of African migration to Europe as a "refugee crisis" has also been questionable, as most migrants came from conflict-torn countries like Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, rather than Africa (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). Securitization of migration implies viewing migration as an existential threat to a nation-state, leading to demands for control or even complete halting of migration. Despite this, such responses have been deemed ineffective and inappropriate (Adepoju, 2020).

However, scholars such as Robin (2019), Van Reisen *et al.* (2019), Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi (2020), Batisai (2022), and Crawley & Teye (2024) have raised concerns about the prevailing narrative on international migration, which predominantly focuses on movements from the Global South to the Global North. Contrary to common belief, the migration of Africans to Europe is not as massive as portrayed, and it is not characterised by invasion or mass exodus (Robin, 2019). Moreover, Van Reisen *et al.* (2019) identified two significant drawbacks in migration studies. Firstly, there is dissatisfaction with the macroeconomic approach to migration, specifically the widely accepted 'push-pull' theory that is often used to explain movement from Africa to other regions. Secondly, the traditional European perspective on 'migration' as a potential threat to society demanding regulation does not align with the African context, where mobility is viewed as essential for sustaining livelihoods. The solutions proposed for addressing migration-related challenges are often shaped by Eurocentric ideologies, favouring the Westphalian state model as the primary approach to managing migration issues. However, the African experience highlights the importance of recognizing mobility as a fundamental component of sustainable livelihoods, rather than solely as a societal threat that requires strict regulation (Van Reisen *et al.*, 2019).

Throughout the history of Africa, movement has played a crucial role, according to Mbembe, who suggests that continuous movement has been a fundamental aspect of spatial organisation on the continent (Mbembe, 2018). The language used to discuss mobility in Africa may also challenge the racial categories imposed by Western societies. African perspectives often emphasise themes of integration with foreigners, inclusive community that encompasses the living, the dead, the unborn, humans, and non-humans, as well as interconnectedness with nature as part of a larger chain of beings (Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2019). The phenomenon of intra-African migration defies common misconceptions that Africans are solely fixated on leaving the continent, particularly for Europe. In reality, the majority of migration takes place within Africa itself (Moyo, 2021; Batisai, 2022; Crawley & Teye, 2024). Contrary to popular beliefs and misconceptions about African migration being primarily focused on Europe due to poverty and violence, the truth is that the first destination for immigrants from Africa is often within the continent itself (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020).

Despite common portrayals of Africans as highly mobile, the truth is that the continent of Africa does not exhibit the same level of mobility overall (Moyo, 2021). Contrary to popular beliefs, most Africans are not desperately trying to leave the continent en masse, particularly for Europe (Laine, Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Flahaux & de Haas, 2016). Even in the case of refugees, only a small percentage, around 5.6%, actually leave Africa, with the majority choosing to stay within the continent (UNHCR, 2019). Most refugees and asylum seekers in Africa are hosted by neighbouring countries within the region. South Sudan has been a major producer of refugees in Africa, with 2.3 million in 2018, ranking third globally behind Syria and Afghanistan (IOM, 2019). While Syrians and Afghans have been the largest groups of first-time asylum applicants in the EU since 2013 (Eurostat, 2020), the majority of South Sudanese refugees are hosted by neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This highlights the importance of acknowledging the realities of intra-Africa migration and the complex dynamics surrounding refugee movements in the region (UNHCR, 2019; Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020).

Africa is known for having the lowest rates of migration compared to other regions in the world (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021). Most African migrants and refugees tend to relocate within the continent, specifically to neighbouring countries, rather than crossing borders to other continents (McAuliffe & Kitimbo, 2018; Parshotam, 2018). This trend is particularly notable in sub-Saharan Africa, where a significant majority (89%) of international migrants move between countries located within the same region (UN DESA, 2019; IOM, 2019; Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). Asylum seekers, in particular, tend to stay within the region where they seek refuge, as they often lack the means and resources to embark on long-distance journeys. For instance, approximately 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees, with the majority seeking refuge in Uganda and Sudan (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021).

Migration within the African continent is more common than migration from Africa to Europe or other regions of the world. Approximately two-thirds of African international migrants reside within Africa in another African country (Dick & Schraven, 2018). Despite this, Africa is not characterised by mass emigration. In 2017, over half of the global migrants came from just 21 countries. The top ten countries with the highest numbers of migrants leaving were India (6.4% of global migrants), Mexico (5.0%), Russia (4.1%), China (3.9%), Bangladesh (2.9%), Syria

(2.7%), Pakistan (2.3%), Ukraine (2.3%), Philippines (2.2%), and the UK (1.9%). Egypt had the highest percentage of migrants leaving among African countries, but ranked only 19<sup>th</sup> in the world. A total of 36.3 million migrants left African nations, accounting for 14.1% of the global migrant population, which is considerably lower than Asia's (41.0%) and Europe's (23.7%) shares (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

Empirical evidence has shown that African migrations into Europe predominantly follow regular patterns, and it is contrary to popular belief that only the poorest individuals migrate (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021). Due to the limited opportunities for legal migration to Europe, many migrants still opt for unsafe journeys across the Mediterranean. In 2019, Frontex reported approximately 40,000 irregular border crossings from Africa into the European Union, which only accounted for less than 10% of the total regular migrations from Africa to Europe between 2019 and 2020 (Yaro & Setrana, 2024). Irregular border crossings from Africa to Europe made up less than one-third of all irregular crossings into Europe in 2019. A report on African migration estimates that a substantial 94% of African migrants who cross the oceans do so through regular means (Achieng & El Fadil, 2020). Contrary to popular belief, studies have consistently shown that it is not the poorest individuals who choose to emigrate. Countries with medium incomes, such as Mexico, Morocco, and the Philippines, are often the top countries of origin for migrants. In Africa, migration flows primarily stem from the northern and southern regions of the continent, rather than the poorer sub-Saharan countries. This is because emigration requires not only economic means but also social and human capital (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021).

### **2.6.3. Migration Governance and Legal Frameworks**

Migration management encompasses a series of policies, strategies, and programs designed to optimise the advantages of migration while simultaneously minimising any negative consequences and meeting the diverse needs of migrants (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migration governance involves a combination of legal standards, laws, regulations, policies, traditions, and organisational frameworks. This overarching framework operates at different levels - from local to international - and provides guidance on how states should approach migration across its various forms (IOM, 2019a). The key takeaway here is that effective migration management must consider the holistic

needs of migrants alongside the economic and social benefits they bring (Laine, Moyo, & Nshimbi, 2020).

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) [2019a] emphasises the importance of effective migration governance, which includes upholding global standards, protecting the rights of migrants, developing evidence-based policies through a government-wide approach, and collaborating with partners to tackle migration and its related challenges. While states play a key role in managing migration, mobility, and nationality issues at both national and international levels, various actors like citizens, migrants, international organisations, the private sector, unions, NGOs, community groups, religious institutions, and academia also play a significant part in the complex field of migration governance (Betts & Kainz, 2017; Lubale, 2023). In the realm of international migration, governance takes on different forms such as individual countries' migration policies, deliberations between states, engagements in multilateral forums, and the initiatives of international organisations. This intricate landscape is further influenced by relevant laws, norms, and policies related to labour migration (IOM, 2019a).

The African Union, and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, along with its member states, have shown a strong dedication to adhering to both compulsory and non-binding international agreements concerning the governance of migration (Lubale, 2023). There are contrasting perspectives on migration between Africa and Western countries. Africa tends to emphasise the positive effects of migration on development, while Western countries often focus on the security and stability implications (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Critics argue that African migration policies have been influenced by Western-centric ideas and are primarily carried out with funding from the West (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2019). The global regulation of migration governance is mainly influenced by two significant international agreements: the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, in addition to the Global Compact on Refugees (UN, 2018b). Furthermore, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) defines the term "refugee" and outlines the rights of refugees, as well as the legal responsibilities of States to protect them. While these agreements offer guiding principles, their enforcement relies on the discretion of United Nations (UN) member States to devise domestic policies and pass laws as they see fit (Lubale, 2023). These binding treaties carry legal weight

and serve as the basis for preventing and safeguarding against human and labour rights violations. They incorporate principles from key United Nations documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) (IOM, 2021). States affirm these international laws by including them in their constitutions or passing legislation (Lubale, 2023).

There are non-binding agreements that influence how migration is managed in the countries of origin, transit, and destination at different stages of the migration process such as before departure, during departure, upon arrival, while in residence, and during the return/reintegration phase (Lubale, 2023). Apart from these agreements, there are numerous international guidelines regarding migration that are not legally binding. Two examples of these non-binding frameworks are The Global Compact for Migration (United Nations, 2018a) and the International Labour Organization Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (ILO International Migration Programme, 2006). Moreover, the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and many individual states have demonstrated their support for promoting free movement of people through various documents like Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Carella, 2024).

Worldwide, as well as in Africa, there is a growing recognition of the significant and diverse impact that migration can have on development (Carella, 2024). The African Union adopted the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 and the UN General Assembly approved the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. These initiatives prioritise promoting safe, orderly, and regular migration, as well as enhancing remittances, decent work, and labour migration (AUC, 2018). The 17 SDGs, established by the international community in 2015 with a target to be achieved by 2030, are universal and applicable to all countries, not just developing ones. Therefore, they are equally relevant to both the Global North and the Global South (Carella, 2024). The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda explicitly mentions migration in Goal 8, which aims to “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable

economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”. Specifically, SDG Target 8.8 focuses on “Protect labour rights and promotes safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment” (UN, 2015:19). Another SDG that addresses migration is SDG 10, which seeks to reduce inequality within and among countries. Target 10.7 aims to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (UN, 2015:20).

Yet another attempt at achieving comprehensive migration governance on a global scale is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which was discussed at the Marrakesh Intergovernmental Conference on December 19, 2018, by 164 UN Member States. The vote resulted in 152 in favour, with five countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, United States) voting against, 12 countries abstaining (Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore, Switzerland), and 24 countries not voting (UN, 2018). The GCM is influenced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015) and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 2016 (Perocco, 2019). It outlines a vision with 10 guiding principles, including a focus on people, international cooperation, respecting national sovereignty, adherence to the rule of law and access to justice, sustainable development, human rights, a gender-responsive and child-sensitive approach, and a whole-of-government and whole-of-society strategy. In addition, there are 23 objectives that provide a framework for regulating migration conditions (Bufalini, 2019). However, the GCM has faced criticism for its lack of clarity on how it distinguishes between "regular" and "irregular" migration, as the latter does not have a universally recognized legal definition. This ambiguity has led to concerns that the Compact may inadvertently support restrictive immigration policies within the EU, failing to effectively address the crucial issue of regulating undocumented and under-documented migration in a straightforward manner (Perocco, 2019).


Collaboration between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) has focused on migration issues (EU, 2020), with various frameworks being developed as soft laws to address these challenges. These frameworks include the Cairo Action Plan, the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, the Rabat

Process, the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, the Tripoli Process, the Khartoum Process, and the Action Plan of the Valletta Summit (Tsion, 2017). In November 2015, leaders from Africa and Europe gathered in Valletta to discuss a common strategy for managing migration. This meeting came at a time when the EU was facing a significant influx of asylum seekers, with more than one million individuals seeking refuge in European countries. European leaders were struggling to find a unified approach to address this issue and sought to collaborate with their African counterparts. The result was the Valletta Summit on Migration, where the Valletta Action Plan was agreed upon. The Valletta Action Plan aimed to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, improve cooperation on legal migration, enhance the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, combat irregular migration, smuggling, and human trafficking, as well as work together on return, readmission, and reintegration efforts (Raty & Shilhav, 2020). Besides, a new financial instrument called the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was launched at the summit. This fund pooled resources from EU member states, the European Development Fund, and the EU budget to provide support in line with the priorities set at the Valletta Summit. The EUTF for Africa has provided significant funding to countries like Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Niger, and Mali to receiving €307.5m, €282.2m, €270.2m, €253m, and €214.6m, respectively, to address the various challenges related to migration in these regions (Ibid.).

Overall, it seems clear that the EU policy agenda on African migration retains a strong focus on irregular migration, even when addressing specific issues of intra-African migration efforts such as job creation (Adepoju, 2018). Here, the AU's view goes beyond strengthening policy and legal frameworks by expanding legal migration pathways and raising awareness about the dangers of smuggling; identifying migrant smuggling cases; along with implementing the investigation and prosecution of migrant smugglers (EU, 2020). Therefore, Europeans and Africans agreed on the objective of orderly and controlled migration as shown by adoption of the Global Compact for Migration in December 2018, albeit much more enthusiastically on the African side. However, this adherence to the principle of managing migration flows is also based on different visions. From the African perspective, controlling migration flows pursues an objective of protecting migrants' human rights given the dangers of exploitation and trafficking

for their natives. From the European perspective, controlling immigration means above all restricting migration flows (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021).

**Figure 2.2: Emergency trust fund for Africa – funding by region**



Source: EU. (2020). *Intra-African Migration*. P.38.

The terms of EU-African migration governance partnerships are criticised as the dominance of European approach over Africans, while the EU used the provision of its funds to influence African migration agenda and used conditionality to pressurise African countries to comply with its migration objectives. The EU wants to show its power to its African partners with this policy and has changed its focus from “give more to get more” to a principle of “give less to those who do the least”. However, the EU suffers from a credibility problem with its African partners. To date, the EU and, especially its member states, have neither pledged enough nor kept their promises. This is particularly true with regard to legal immigration routes for African nationals.

Furthermore, the Europeans are losing influence in Africa in face of the emergence of Russia, China and Middle Eastern countries (Bertossi, Ouassif & Tardis, 2021).

## **2.7. Theoretical Framework**

Migration study is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary which attracts interest from geographers, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and others. Thus, the field of migration studies is fragmented into various social science disciplines and this indicates the absence of agreement among analysts on the models and conceptualizations of migration studies (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020; Hochleithner, 2018; de Haas, 2021; Carling *et al.*, 2020).

Migration theory should answer questions such as why migration occurs, who migrates and who stays, what the spatial and temporal patterns of migration look like, and how migration self-perpetuates (Carling *et al.*, 2020). However, there is no single theory of migration that can explain the multifaceted aspect of migration rather multiple pieces of theory that explain the diverse aspects of migration. Thus, migration theories are fragmentary and alternative theories are sometimes having conflicting assumptions and are able to explain specific aspects of migration (Carling *et al.*, 2020; Hochleithner, 2018). For a better understanding of migration one needs to select best fitting concepts and theories (Carling *et al.*, 2020) and combine existing theories across disciplines that range from economics to anthropology (de Haas, 2021). Therefore, the inadequacy of existing theories of migration to explain all forms of migration is not to mean they are mistaken, rather theories should be appropriated, and if possible should be combined to bridge the gap between theoretical assumptions and claims (Carling *et al.*, 2020).

To comprehend the factors driving migration, various theories have emerged from different social science fields since the late 1800s. These migration theories can be grouped into two primary theoretical frameworks: functionalist and historical-structural social theory (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). For example, neoclassical theory (rooted in economics), push-pull models, migration systems theories (derived from geography and demography), and network theory (originating from sociology) all fall under functionalist social theory. This perspective views migration as a means for individuals or families to optimize their income through a cost-benefit analysis (de Haas, 2021; Semela & Cochrane, 2019). The functionalist migration theories

consider migration as a positive phenomenon and an optimization mechanism until the equilibrium between as well as within societies exists (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). In the same vein, neo-Marxist theory, dependency theory, world systems theory, dual labour market theory, and critical globalization theory are categorized under historical-structural social theory. These theories view migration as a phenomenon shaped by structural economic disparities and power imbalances, highlighting the exploitation of marginalized and vulnerable populations by dominant elites (Girmachew, 2014; de Haas, 2021). This section presents a theoretical review of selected theories used to better understand and explain the migration processes of Ethiopian migrants from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the Republic of South Africa.

### **2.7.1.1. The Push-Pull Theory**

The Push-Pull theory is one of the earliest theories on migration and considers the macroeconomic situation in sending and receiving countries as major factors of migration. Ravenstein's Laws of Migration gives a systematic principle for this theory. He concluded that migration is shaped by a combination of economic factors operating in the origin of what he calls "push" factors with "pull" factors at the destination (Zanabazar *et al.*, 2021; Bufalini, 2019; European Union, 2018). Thus, his approach to study migration is known as the "push-pull" theory of migration, it shaped and influenced the theories that emerged later on (Assefa, Seid & Tadele, 2017; Gurieva & Dzhioev, 2015). According to Ravenstein, migration is mainly caused by economic factors. He argues migration is interlinked with development (Bufalini, 2019). Lee (1965) revised Ravenstein's law of migration and proposed a new analytical framework of migration. Thus, Lee's analytical framework is referred to as the "Push-Pull" model. He concludes that migration is caused by push factors like unemployment, poverty, low wages and human rights issues in the homeland and the pull factors such as high life expectancy, job opportunities, political freedom, economic stability, education and welfare system in the destination (Zanabazar *et al.*, 2021).

The Push-Pull theory hypothesises that the roots of international migration can be traced back to the economic underdevelopment of countries that are still developing (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2020). In this context, poor economic conditions such as low wages, high unemployment and underemployment, slow economic growth, poverty, and increasing population in rural areas

create a Malthusian strain on natural and agricultural resources, which are seen as "push" factors. Conversely, the "pull" factors attracting migrants to destination countries include better job opportunities, higher wages, and improved welfare systems. These elements are identified as the key variables that elucidate the reasons behind international migration, including both legal and illegal movements towards industrialized nations (de Haas, 2014).

Urbański (2022) categorized the factors driving migration into three main groups: economic, political, and social. Economic push factors consist of high unemployment rates, limited job opportunities, and overpopulation in developing nations, which compel individuals to seek better prospects in developed countries (Ibrahim *et al.*, 2019). Social factors that drive migration include inadequate healthcare services and a lack of religious tolerance, prompting individuals to relocate in search of improved conditions (Khalid & Urbański, 2021). In addition, political push factors that affect migration encompass war, terrorism, a biased justice system, and an absence of governmental tolerance (Urbański, 2022). The pull factors are those aspects that attract migrants in the destinations like economic factors such as job opportunities, better shelter and higher living standards (Zanabazar *et al.*, 2021). Khalid & Urbański (2021) clarify the pull factors also include social and political factors such as improved healthcare services, religious tolerance and freedom from persecution.

The push-pull migration theory has been criticized for being a simplistic explanation of the factors influencing migration without considering their relative significance (Hochleithner, 2018). Furthermore, poverty and demographic elements alone do not sufficiently explain the reasons for migration (Bufalini, 2019; European Union, 2018). Wage differences are also inadequate in explaining the motivations behind irregular migration. For example, the ability to migrate is more closely linked to the costs associated with migration rather than just wage disparities. Consequently, it is not necessarily the most impoverished individuals who migrate, as evidenced by the case of irregular migrants from Africa who paid between \$1,200 and \$1,500 to smugglers (Ogu, 2017).

The determinants of irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro zone also align with the theoretical assumptions of push-pull theory. For instance, some studies conducted in the area (Girmachew, 2021; Meron, 2020; Tekalign, 2021b; Teshome, 2010; Habte, 2015) indicated that

irregular migration from Ethiopia is primarily caused by economic drivers such as poverty, unemployment, low agricultural productivity, landlessness and income inequality that considered as push factors. Moreover, migrants are further attracted by opportunities in the destination areas such as better income and employment opportunities, and better living conditions in the destinations (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019; Teshome, 2010; Habte, 2015).

### **2.7.1.2. The New Economics of Labour Migration**

The new economics of labour migration suggests that migration decisions are influenced not just by the labour market, but also by conditions in other markets, such as capital and unemployment insurance markets (Grüne & Adele, 2017). This framework emphasizes risk-sharing as a key factor in a household's decision to migrate, viewing migration as part of a broader strategy to diversify income sources and enhance the security of household livelihoods by mitigating risks (Bakewell & Sturridge, 2021; Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019). According to this theory, migration is seen as a collective household choice rather than an individual one. In this context, migration serves to diversify household income in case local income sources fail. Individuals often migrate temporarily rather than permanently, aiming to broaden household income and save money to address the economic challenges that initially compelled them to leave (de Haas, 2014; Massey, 2015; Wickramasinghe & Wimalaratana, 2016).

The new economics of labour migration born out of the neoclassical tradition was related to the work of Oded Stark (1984). This theory is seen as a criticism against the micro version of neoclassical theory or another alternative theory that enriches and modifies this theory (de Haas *et al.*, 2020). Moreover, income maximisation is not the only factor, but also it involves risk minimization and status maximisation. Thus, what matters are not only the absolute gains but also the relative deprivation (Hochleithner, 2018). It shares the basic tenet of the neoclassical theory by which the rational choice of individuals to maximise utility but differs on the decision to migrate by stating that it is not an individual migrant alone rather a family or household that decides on whether the family member should migrate or not (Anggoro, 2019). The new economics of labour migration, according to Stark and Bloom (1985), emphasised relative deprivation, on households being a major decision-making unit and diversifying risks as determinants of migration.

The new economics presents theoretical foundations that diverge from the neoclassical perspective (Porumbescu, 2015). Firstly, migration decisions should be viewed as family rather than individual choices, with households recognized as culturally defined units of production and consumption (de Haas *et al.*, 2020; Anggoro, 2019). Secondly, wage disparities are not a prerequisite for international migration; families may choose to migrate to mitigate risks associated with economic inequalities even in the absence of such wage differences (Hochleithner, 2018; Porumbescu, 2015). Thirdly, international migration cannot be separated from local migration; improvements in local economic conditions do not necessarily lead to a decrease in migration. Fourthly, international migration does not stop simply because wage differences between sending and receiving regions are eliminated; motivations for migration can persist (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Lastly, government policies regarding labour markets, capital insurance, and social security systems (such as unemployment insurance) significantly impact the decision to migrate (Porumbescu, 2015).

The NELM highlights there are factors influencing migration decision making by households other than income maximisation (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). The first factor is migration as risk sharing behaviour of the family. This implies the primary objective of the decision of one or more members of their family to migrate is not to maximise income rather to disburse and minimise risks. Consequently, migration should occur even in the absence of wage gaps (Hochleithner, 2018; Porumbescu, 2015). Second, the NELM assumes migration as a household investment strategy to provide capital investment on family farms or small businesses due to the prevalence of imperfect credit and insurance markets which are inaccessible to non-elite groups in the developing countries (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Finally, the NELM argues that migration is motivated by poverty or relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty (Žičkutė & Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, 2015).

The new economics of labour migration theory intended to address an overemphasis on structural factors and theoretical limitations of the neoclassical and historical-structural perspectives (Porumbescu, 2015). This theory successfully brings together agency and structural factors of migration in its theoretical framework. The new economics argue that migration is temporary and return migration is considered a success. This is unlike the neoclassical theory that assumes migration permanently for income maximisation and returns migration as a failure

(de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020; Hochleithner, 2018; Žičkutė & Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, 2015). The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) has faced criticism for its focus on micro-level factors, which leads to a neglect of historical contexts and a failure to connect household decision-making with macro-structural elements. As a result, it overlooks the influence of government actions, policies, labour market dynamics, and power imbalances (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019).

The migration determinants and decision making process in Kembata-Tembaro zone seem partly to fit with the theoretical assumptions of the NELM. As Girmachew (2019) stated migrants are not only motivated by higher income in the destination rather they need to diversify income through remittance against risks at home. Moreover, this also supports the NELM assumption of the relative deprivation as cause for migration in the study area. Other studies (Meron, 2020; Girmachew, 2021; Kiefe, 2019) also indicate that migration decision also involves households and some also cite the significance of community level factors such as churches, pastors and brokers, and their roles in supporting and facilitating migration projects.

### **2.7.1. 3. The Network Theory**

Network theory is one of the key frameworks that seek to explain the on-going nature of migration (Sha, 2021). According to social capital theory, migration is driven by the interpersonal connections between migrants' places of origin and their intended destinations. These connections enable potential migrants to access information about opportunities, risks, and challenges, as well as support that can help reduce the costs associated with their relocation (Borojo, 2020). Network theory highlights the role of social networks in facilitating, maintaining, and perpetuating migration patterns. As such, it offers a fresh perspective compared to structural analyses that focus on wage disparities, push-pull dynamics, capitalist growth, and market expansion; historical analyses that emphasize colonial relationships between origins and destinations; and micro-analytical approaches that centre on individual and household decision-making. This theory views international migration as both a social and economic phenomenon (Sha, 2021).

Migration networks create a unique connection between communities that send migrants and those that receive them in specific destination areas. These networks consist of interpersonal

relationships that link potential migrants, previous migrants, and non-migrants in both the origin and destination locations, often based on kinship, friendship, and shared community ties (Blumenstock & Tan, 2016; Sha, 2021; Wagner & Katsiaficas, 2021). They are essential to international migration, functioning as channels for information and resources, providing short-term support, and lowering the costs and risks associated with migration, which in turn affects the choice of both origin and destination sites (Blumenstock *et al.*, 2021). Furthermore, these networks facilitate the exchange of information and encourage continued migration. They also significantly enhance employment prospects within migrant communities and offer guidance to irregular migrants regarding affordable and reliable brokers, border guides, as well as strategies to manage anxiety and actions to take in the event of deportation (Bircan *et al.*, 2020; Sha, 2021).

Migrant networks are an invaluable social capital to new migrants that furnish them with discerning information about the destination and provision of start-up help with housing, employment, or obtaining documents that assist migrants to decide and plan their emigration (Meeteren & Pereira, 2018). Immigration networks also play an important role by accessing information that minimises migration cost, easy challenges of acculturation, assist new immigrants to find jobs, and reduce their expenses (Liang, 2014). Social networks also function as a conduit for flow of resources between origin and destination. It was through these interpersonal links that information, people, and goods including money remitted through informal transfer systems by migrants (Sha, 2021).

Scholarly thoughts on the role of networks in international migration have been mainly influenced by the study of Mexican migration to the USA that was conducted by Massey and his colleagues. Thus, one of the limitations of network theory raised here is the absence of empirical works in other parts of the world and the role of the Internet and social media in providing diverse sources of information than before (Meeteren & Pereira, 2018). Network theory faces various criticisms. The first criticism highlights that the theory tends to emphasize positive outcomes while neglecting its negative consequences (Ahmad, 2015). Secondly, research has shown that the traditional view of network theory as gender-neutral is incorrect (Côté *et al.*, 2015). For example, Ryan (2011) found that migrant networks are more likely to facilitate migration for men than for women. Thirdly, network theory is criticized for failing to consider the influence of other significant migration facilitators, such as employers, government officials,

traffickers, and brokers, which exist outside of migrant networks (Wagner & Katsiaficas, 2021; Dekker & Engbersen, 2014). Lastly, with the advent of the Internet, migrants may seek assistance from sources beyond traditional networks. Potential migrants can connect with unknown immigrants at their destination through online platforms and access information about their destination via YouTube, blogs, Facebook, and other social media. As a result, the impact of the Internet and social media on promoting and facilitating migration is often overlooked by migrant network theory (Meeteren & Pereira, 2018).

The principles of network theory appear to facilitate irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro zone to the Republic of South Africa. For example, it is common in this area for men who have migrated to encourage their relatives and family members to participate in the migration process. As noted by Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign (2019) and Yordanos & Zack (2019), social connections can draw other community members into the migration flow by sharing information and providing support for the journey, as well as assistance in securing housing and employment at the new location. The influence of migration networks is often seen when individuals have family members or friends from the same community who are already migrants. These networks lower migration costs by offering aspiring migrants valuable information about the migration process, job opportunities, and housing options at their destinations. Consequently, social networks and social media play a significant role in driving these individuals to migrate to South Africa.

#### **2.7.1.4. Cumulative Causation Theory**

Cumulative causation refers to whatever the original conditions initially caused migration; international migration tends to perpetuate itself through time due to migrants' accumulated experience of living and working, the knowledge and skills as well as the valuable information they acquired (Massey *et al.*, 1994). The theory of Cumulative Causation initially developed by Myrdal (1957) in order to explain the perpetuation of international migration through reciprocal cause and effect processes between factors that induce migration and migrants' actions. Cumulative causation theory assumes migration is initially a social process motivated by sharing information, resources, and assistance through social networks in the communities of origin (Heer, 2002). The theory of cumulative causation emphasises the presence of kin and friendship

networks as significant factors that shape and sustain migration (GLOPP, 2007:1-2). It is these networks that sustained migration from the origin areas by minimising barriers of migration for deprived individuals. This theory argues the reproduction of migration through the diffusion of social capital through the community of origin. According to the theory of cumulative causation, people's accumulation of migratory experience serves as social capital for other people to migrate from the same community of origin. In other words, possessions of robust migration experiences by people from origin communities practically access everyone in sending communities to migration (Paredes-Orozco, 2019). The first and essential issue in the theory of cumulative causation is an accumulation of social capital which is how members of a community get access to resources and knowledge about migration from the former migrants through family and friends' networks. Therefore, this accumulated social capital minimises the cost of migration through the provision of information and other forms of help like shelter and job searching in the destination for aspiring migrants (Fussell & Massey, 2004).

The cumulative causation theory assumes migrations only exacerbate the underdevelopment of sending countries and serve as the source of cheap labour for the receiving country. Therefore, cumulative causation theory does not consider migration as means to development but rather leaves developing countries without their valuable human and material capital resources that are exploited for the benefit of industrialised countries and urban-based capitalist elite groups. The migration results in economic decline to sending countries through dependency, instability, and developmental distortions (de Haas, 2008).

### **2.7.2. Historical-Structural Migration Theory**

The historical-structural theories embedded in the neo-Marxist political economy assume migration as an instrument of exploitation. They highlight structural constraints on individuals that usually reinforce disequilibrium unless the government intervenes to redistribute resources (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). The historical-structural theories formulated in the 1950s and 1960s as an antithesis to the modernization theory based on the premises of migration as a rational choice of individuals that normally function in the capitalist system. Historical-structural theories share the following common assumptions derived from Marxist thought: causes of international migration is rooted in history of macro-structural forces, the direction and nature of transnational population movements explained primarily through exploitative and dis-equalising

economic forces of global capitalism, and critical assessment of the systems and effects of international migration as generally related to world capitalist market (Morawska, 2013). Historical-structural approaches may be more useful to explain migration within and from poor or ‘developing’ countries or occurring under conditions of oppression and violence (de Haas, 2021).

Historical-structural theories put emphasis on the world system as a single capitalist system in which the powerful capitalist core states are supplied by cheap labour from the poor nations in the periphery (O’Reilly, 2015). Migration decisions are influenced by such structural factors as money, links and information. Moreover, players and aspects of state such as historical ties, recruitment practices, structural inequality and past migrations have also deep effects on migration behaviour and decision. Thus, the historical-structural approach came up with an alternative explanation of migration as the result of an exploitation system than optimization mechanism as in functionalists’ theory (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Historical-structural approach shares the push-pulls model, however, consider an individual’s action from a structural perspective through a critical and global viewpoint. At this juncture, migration is further an element of exploitation of the developing world (O’Reilly, 2015). Historical-structural theories criticise the neoclassical approach due to migration being primarily constrained by the structural forces, migrants have no free choice to move (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020).

The historical-structuralism’ criticised for overlooking the political and cultural processes of migration (O’Reilly, 2015). They also further criticised for the absence of room for human agency as they view migrants as passive victims of capitalism (pushed and pulled by global macro forces) desperately migrate to survive (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019; de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Thus, irregular migrants are passive victims in the hands of smugglers and traffickers contrary to the fact that the majority of migrants move on their free will (de Haas, 2021).

The historical-structuralist theories explain the determinant factors of migration in the study area caused by the globalisation forces. Even though this theory does not exactly accommodate the decisions of all migrants, some have been migrating because of labour market needs in the companies of the RSA. The historical-structuralist theories help to explain the structural factors for migration from the study area and the effects of global forces like neo-colonialism in shaping

migration governance and Africa's policy frameworks on migration. This also explains the effect of government restrictions contributing to the irregular nature of migration from the Kembata-Tembaro zone to the Republic of South Africa.

### **2.7.3. The Aspirations-Capabilities Theory**

The aspirations-capabilities model conceptualises individual migration as the function of aspirations and capabilities (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). There is an association between increased emigration and human and economic development due to an access to such resources as money, knowledge, and networks give people the desire and a means to migrate to urban areas or overseas (*Ibid.*). According to de Haas (2021) the central idea of the aspirations-capabilities model is to establish a single comprehensive migration framework by integrating the fragmented theoretical insights across disciplines. Here, aspiration is considered as the overall people's life ambition and apparent geographical opportunities, and capabilities human beings ability to lead lives they have reason to value and to advance the practical alternative they have (de Haas, 2021). The study of migratory movements should consider the aspirations and capabilities of individuals that are influenced by micro, meso and macro level factors (Kuhnt, 2019).

The young people are induced by such macro-level factors as the growth and expansion of capitalist economies to migrate into urban areas and overseas. Declining employment opportunities due to mechanisation, large scale production and trade links in the rural areas, and increasing education and infrastructure encourages people to migrate into urban centres and abroad that provide job opportunities and new lifestyles in the industrial and service sectors (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2019). In contrast to the historical-structural approach, the aspirations-capabilities model argues that migration is not a desperate flight out of misery rather it is an individual's and families' investment in a better future. In addition, migration decisions are made by social groups, and this implies the presence of durable co-dependency between non-migrant and migrant household members (de Haas, 2021; de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020). Since, migration drivers are multifaceted and complex, the decision to migrate is mediated by migration infrastructure at systemic level and capabilities at individual level (Mercandalli *et al.*, 2019).

At micro-level, the aspirations-capabilities theory developed a conceptual framework at individual and household level, to understand the question why some people move and others are

not (Carling & Collins, 2018). This conceptual framework provides researchers to analyse the extent to which migrants' aspirations and capabilities are affected by meso and macro level factors in order to acquire holistic understanding on drivers of migration (de Haas, 2021). The aspirations-capabilities theory puts human agency at the core of migration processes and migration is a means to achieve the goals of individual livelihoods rather than a passive reaction to structural imbalances and spatial difference in opportunity (*Ibid.*). The actual capability to emigrate is crucial in migration processes despite the diversity of determinants that influence an individual's perception and aspirations because people only migrate when they have managed to get a suitable agency and opportunity structures (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020).

In sum, as migration theories are fragmented across disciplines, there are no single migration theories that adequately explain all forms of migration. Therefore, to bridge the gap, perhaps it necessitates an appropriation of theoretical assumptions and claims from existing theories (Carling *et al.*, 2020). The functionalist migration theories consider migration as a positive factor that contributes to productivity and prosperity as well as equilibrium between origin and destination through two-way transfer of money, goods and knowledge. Migration is an optimization strategy through which individuals and sometimes households secure access to better income and other livelihood chances (de Haas, 2021).

The major problem of migration research is the lack of a dominant body of theories that enable a generalised understanding of migration. Among the factors that contributed for the absence of comprehensive body of theories of migration include addressing the causes, experiences and effects of migration from destination perspective alone (receiving country bias), the supremacy of government perspective contribute to uncritical categorization and biased views on migration and migrants (methodological nationalism), division along disciplines and methodological ground, especially between the positivist (quantitative) and interpretative (qualitative) approaches as well as between voluntary and forced, internal and international migration (de Haas, 2021).

Functionalist theories are better positioned to explain the unrestricted forms of human mobility like internal migration and the migration of high-skilled workers while the historical-structuralist theories are well-versed to explain government restrictions, exploitation and forced type of

migrations (de Haas, 2021). Therefore, de Haas (2021) recommends appropriation of insights from functionalists and historical structural approaches instead of rejecting either of them and the validity of theoretical assumptions are dependent on specific conditions such as levels of analysis, situation under which migration occurs and particular social and class groups concerned. Consequently, a certain level of combination and integration of both the functionalist and historical-structural paradigms enable to concurrently incorporate both agency and structure in explaining migration. He put a way forward instead of establishing totally a new theory for searching concepts and analytical tools that enable to bridge insights provided by existing theories (de Haas, 2021).

In sum, using these theories in studying the Ethiopian migration to South Africa helps to gain a thorough understanding of the various factors driving this phenomenon. Each theory sheds light on different dimensions of the migration process, from personal motivations and social connections to larger structural influences. This approach facilitates a nuanced analysis that can guide policy and practices concerning migration in both nations. The Push-Pull theory explains that various conditions in Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Ethiopia may compel individuals to migrate, and on the other hand, South Africa may offer several attractive pull factors, including improved economic prospects, higher wages, established Ethiopian migrant communities and allure of a better quality of life can also serve as significant incentives for migration. In line with the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) the case of Ethiopian migration to South Africa, families may choose to send members abroad to diversify their income streams, invest in education, or navigate local economic uncertainties. The remittances sent back home can greatly enhance family welfare and further encourage additional migration. Network theory highlights the importance of social networks in facilitating migration. Established Ethiopian communities in South Africa can offer support, information, and resources to newcomers. As more Ethiopians move to South Africa, they create conditions that encourage additional migration, such as forming communities, sharing valuable information, and generating job opportunities and this can better explained with theory of cumulative causation. Historical-Structuralism theory used to analyses how historical and structural factors influence migration trends. In the context of Ethiopian migration to South Africa, one might consider the historical backdrop of colonialism, economic exploitation, and political dynamics in both nations.

## 2.8. Empirical Literature Review

While a rich body of literature exists on Africa's irregular migration to Europe that indicates an increase in the number of migrants that meet strict border control reactions from transit and destination countries (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019; Ogu, 2017), the scale and nature of migration within Africa are under researched. Therefore, migration literature on African migration tends to focus on the challenges of irregular migration to Europe (Ogu, 2017; Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). As migration through regular channels is becoming increasingly challenging, thousands of Africans attempt to cross state borders as irregular migrants each year (Kinfe, 2019). In Africa, there is an absence of insurance, migration derived by risk disbursing and sharing among members of the family (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021). As Sumata and Cohen (2018) highlighted, migration serves as an insurance against uncertain income prospects such as poverty and insecurity. Thus, migration improves the economy of the destinations through provision of labour and that of the origin through reducing unemployment, and sending remittances (Robin, 2019). Although the existing literatures (e.g. Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021; Kinfe, 2019; Sumata & Cohen, 2018) stated Africa's irregular migration as a desperate flight out of poverty and uncertainty due to political instability, thus, the drivers and patterns of intra-African irregular migration not yet adequately studied.

The empirical literature shows that both economic and non-economic factors are equally important determinants of migration in the Horn of Africa. For instance, studies by (Cohen & Sirkeci, 2021; Mawere, 2019; Horwood, 2015; Kainth, 2010; Kinfe, 2019; Messay & Teferi, 2017) indicated that the major determinants of migration in the Horn of Africa are economic, political, demographic and socio-cultural factors as well as and environmental factors such as resource scarcity, drought, crop failure, food insecurity, and severe poverty. Moreover, Cohen & Sirkeci (2021) highlights that in most developing countries, low agricultural productivity, natural resource degradation, lack of prospects for improvement; natural disaster, unemployment, and underemployment are the major push factors forcing people to migrate towards developed countries. On the contrary, prospects for employment, high wages, better facilities, and working conditions are among the economic pull factors that attract migrants to the developed countries (Horwood, 2015). Beyond the push-pull factors, other determinants of migration such as the culture of migration and smuggling networks (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019;

Girmachew, 2021; Meron, 2020; Tekalign, 2021b) were little researched. This study explores the drivers of migration including the culture of migration from the study area.

Ethiopia's location makes it a source, destination and transit of migrant's refugees within the region and to South Africa, the Middle East and Europe (Kinfе, 2019). Similarly, empirical works (Girmachew, 2021; Tekalegn, 2021b; Meron, 2020; Kinfе, 2019) show that the major drivers of both internal and international migration in Ethiopia related to economic factors such as low income, poverty and unemployment followed by political factors like repression, insecurity, and ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the rural youth in Ethiopia considered migration as the only way out of poverty (Girmachew, 2021). However, other determinants of migration such as diaspora network mainly through peer pressure and family support (Tekalign, 2021b; Girmachew, 2018), high population growth, persistent culture of migration, and the presence of strong social support including moral and financial backup for migrants to emigrate even through perilous and irregular channel (Tekalign, 2021b; Girmachew, 2018; Asnake & Fana, 2021), and the role traffickers and smugglers in encouraging people to migrate (Girmachew, 2021; Kinfе, 2019) were highlighted as inducing migration.

Studies show that Ethiopian migrants en-route South Africa are preferred by migrants due to being less bureaucratic, time saving, cheaper, and more likely to be successful (Kinfе, 2019; Tekalign, 2021a; Girmachew, 2021; Asnake & Fana, 2021). Moreover, irregular migration from Ethiopia increased in response to the new restrictive laws on migration (Proclamation No. 909/2015; 923/2016 and 1178/2020) that make regular migration through private employment agencies bureaucratic, expensive and time consuming (Girmachew, 2018). The number of Ethiopian migrants to South Africa reported as decreasing since 2015 due to strict border control measures in Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi led to imprisonment and deportation of migrants en route as well as mounting xenophobic reaction against migrants in South Africa (Girmachew, 2021). However, analysis of legal frameworks in the migration research from Ethiopia to South Africa (Teshome, 2010; Girmachew, 2014; Habte, 2015) was almost non-existent. Recently, in Ethiopia strict migration controls and border governance are supposed to be the remedy for illegality and to reduce vulnerability in migrants, however, the extent to which such restrictive policies reproduce irregular migrants and risks faced by immigrants yet not sufficiently explored by empirical studies (Tekalign, 2021a). This study provides analysis of legal frameworks and

policies in Africa and particularly those RECs crossed by Ethiopian migrants on their way to South Africa.

Some empirical literature also cites the significance of community level factors such as churches, pastors and brokers, and their roles in supporting and facilitating migration projects (Meron, 2020; Girmachew, 2021; Kiefe, 2019). For instance, in Shashogo, the church received a large amount of remittances from Ethiopian migrants living in South Africa, for as migrants attributed their successful migration to divine intervention as local pastors in Shashogo provide prayer services to prospective migrants (Meron, 2020). As Girmachew (2021) and Kiefe (2019) mentioned, migration is facilitated by a network of traffickers and smugglers that stretch from rural areas and small towns in origin to the destination countries. In addition, the smuggling of migrants further facilitated through corruption to get cooperation with the law enforcing bodies and some traffickers and smugglers also alleged to have ties with some local, regional and federal officials including the police and security forces. However, the level to which the community levels particularly the church that provides spiritual support to migrants and the enabling role of brokers are adequately studied. In general, compared to intra-African migration, an Africans irregular migration towards Europe is better researched. As a result, an irregular migration within the continent was given less attention (Ogu, 2017; Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). In line with this, Cohen & Sirkeci (2021), Tekalegn (2021b) and Girmachew (2021) and they suggested a thorough study of irregular migration in Africa. Therefore, this study gives insights into the role of social networks and smugglers in the Ethiopians migration to South Africa.

The facilitation of irregular migration to South Africa is primarily carried out by a network of smugglers locally referred to as '*delala*' (brokers). These individuals, who belong to the migrant community, play a crucial role in assisting migrants through the process by providing necessary information, organizing the journey, and managing informal financial transactions (Fekadu, Deshingkar, & Tekalign, 2019). They are also known for providing fake travel documents purporting to be from countries like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia (MMC, 2019). These local smugglers, or brokers, take charge of planning the route, arranging transportation, and offering additional services to irregular migrants as they navigate border crossings (Frouws & Horwood, 2017). Brokers typically operate in the 'intermediate space' between migrants, governmental authorities, and employers. While some may work to exploit and commodify migrant labour by

colluding with employers and delegating border controls on behalf of the state, others may strive to protect the interests of migrants by finding loopholes in strict border enforcement policies (Tekalign, Fekadu & Deshingkar, 2018). Studies have indicated that the persuasive techniques employed by brokers in recruiting potential migrants play a significant role in enticing individuals to pursue irregular migration. Through a qualitative investigation conducted by (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022), it was revealed that the surge in smuggling activities was driven by the brokers' efforts to aid migrants in response to the heightened border restrictions and closures that had spurred an increase in irregular migration to South Africa.

Smugglers form a vital part of the brokerage network that aids irregular migration. They provide a variety of services, from physical transport and illegal border crossing to procurement of counterfeit documents (Yordanos & Zack, 2019). In fact, smugglers can facilitate migration by acting as “gate-openers” (Fekadu, Deshingkar, & Tekalign, 2019) and providing protection to migrants and refugees from below (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022). Viewed from this perspective, the hazards encountered by migrants en route are an extension and component of the structural violence of global inequality and the denial of migrants' mobility rights (Yordanos & Zack, 2019).

Community members frequently perceive human smuggling as a legitimate enterprise rather than a criminal activity, viewing smugglers as well-connected and experienced businesspeople. They see illicit human trafficking as a purely rational business with its own unique risks, akin to any other business, and they ‘mute morality’ (Siegel, 2019). Not all smugglers are equally capable or successful, sometimes failing to fulfil their mission or making grave and even deadly mistakes during the journey. However, in numerous instances, particularly ones that go unreported in police statistics and unnoticed by the media, smuggling operations succeed. These successes bolster the smuggler's positive image and serve as an informal promotion for attracting new clientele (Sanchez, 2018; Achilli, 2018).

A robust and evolving system of migration brokerage connects villages and towns in Southern Ethiopia with a network of smugglers in border towns and countries en route. The primary broker commands several suppliers or collectors who receive a commission for each migrant they obtain (Fekadu, Deshingkar, & Tekalign, 2019). In regions like Hadiya and Kembata, migration brokerage is deeply ingrained within the socio-cultural fabric. Brokers profit from

migration facilitation by leveraging their diverse connections - ethnic, clan, religious, geographical - with potential migrants and their families. They are part of the community, participating in communal worship, sending their children to the same schools as local families, and belonging to the same local burial organisations. Consequently, brokers adhere to local norms and values, which form the basis of trust between them and potential migrants. The success of a broker is determined by their ability to establish a strong 'supply' structure at the origin and a strong network of diligent, intelligent, and trustworthy individual smugglers along the transit route. This network is particularly crucial as most of the migrants from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa are less educated and do not speak any of the languages used along the route, making the smugglers' services indispensable.

Most empirical studies focus on the macroeconomic drivers of migration including poverty, unemployment, low agricultural productivity, landlessness, population growth, and limited access to basic services (Winters, Kafle, & Benfica, 2018; Tekalign, 2021b). Others have focused on micro-level factors such as year of arrival, age at the time of migration, duration of stay abroad, marital status, family members left behind, employment, education, and host language ability (Piotrowski & Tong, 2013; Güngör & Tansel, 2014). Studies on migration typically focus on either structural or individual-level factors and tend to ignore culture as a driver of migration (Nyamnjoh, 2021). In our opinion, categorizing migration exclusively as either individual or collective oversimplifies the reality. This study proposes a different approach, suggesting that migration should be viewed on a spectrum, with individualism and collectivism at opposite extremes. Seeking to fill this knowledge gap, this paper discusses the culture of migration in Ethiopian irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

Epstein and Gang (2010) view the culture of migration as the clustering of immigrants in ethnic communities as a significant characteristic of international migration. This phenomenon can be seen in the concentration of Turkish persons in Germany, Tamils in Switzerland, and Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium. The prevailing explanation for the formation of immigrant clusters is the presence of beneficial network externalities. Previous immigrants offer housing, job opportunities, help with loan applications, and assistance in overcoming challenges associated with adapting to a new society. Empirical literature on Ethiopian international migration (Crawley, Nyamnjoh & Garba, 2022; Estifanos & Freeman, 2022; Dereje, 2022)

highlights an ethnic clustering trend among the Kembata and Hadiya communities in major South African cities like Johannesburg and Durban over the past 25 years.

The cultural factors of migration are assumed to play a supplementary role in migration research (Dereje, 2022). Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) acknowledge the foundation of individual decisions is shaped by people's social behaviours and cultural beliefs. Within the context of southern Ethiopia, the movement of individuals by the Hadiya people is referred to as "flow" rather than migration, as it is perceived to be an inherent element of the natural order rather than a transgression (Dereje, 2022). Moreover, Dereje (2022) points out that this perspective diverges from the narrow understanding of migration embraced by policy makers, who tend to overlook contextual considerations. The opportunity to migrate is considered a right by the local community. The Hadiya communities express a sense of entitlement (*darifirma*) when discussing their migration to South Africa, envisioning it as a means to improve their circumstances. Consequently, we contend that the understanding of migration processes cannot be solely rooted in economic factors. This study aims to examine the cultural dynamics of irregular Ethiopian migration from the perspective of Kembata emigrants to the RSA. By focusing on their experiences, we can glean valuable insights into the cultural factors that influence migration decisions and the impact on their home society.

Understanding the decisions made about migration is crucial for policy makers, the general public, prospective migrants, and migrants themselves (Czaika, Bijak & Prike, 2021). In terms of international migration, a large number of researches have investigated migration intentions and the factors that influence them (Hagen-Zanker & Hennesey, 2021; Czaika, Bijak & Prike, 2021; Ruedin, 2021). Others have focused on individual aspects such as year of arrival, age at the time of migration, duration of stay abroad, marital status, family members left behind, employment, education, host language ability, and social networks (Güngör & Tansel, 2014; Piotrowski & Tong, 2013). Economic models have long dominated research on migration decision-making, with migrants viewed as rational individuals weighing the economic costs and benefits of migrating or staying. This contends that migration is a process in which people choose their destinations based on their unique circumstances and prioritise maximising their financial gains (Hagen-Zanker, 2008).

Studies have shown that both irregular and regular migrations have many common reasons, such as lack of employment prospects or the presence of conflict and instability (Kuschminder *et al.*, 2015). This is closely followed by drought that affects agricultural activities (Yaro & Setrana, 2024) and political issues such as oppression, insecurity, and ethnic tensions in the country like the recent conflict in Tigray region erupted in November 2020 (Üstübici *et al.*, 2023). As Tekalign (2021a) demonstrates, the boundaries between official and unofficial, lawful and unlawful, government and business sectors are muddled as migrants and brokers employ various techniques within the framework of labour mobility regulations, revealing the complicated realities of migration processes.

Ethiopia stands out as one major source of irregular migrants to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) (Meron, 2020; Tekalign, 2021a). The Ethiopian migration from Kembata areas is perpetuated by the existence of social networks (Girmachew, 2021; Tekalign, 2021b), and a permissive environment created by the presence of smugglers (Meron, 2020). In general, migration is considered by young people to achieve personal, family, and social expectations allured by migrant's remittances and their success stories, and the positive image about migration circulated in family narratives (Fekadu, Deshingkar, & Tekalign, 2019). The study extend this argument by indicating the role of households in the migration decision making process as major actors with risk disbursing behaviour than individuals for income maximisation. We argue that families are key players in the decision making process as the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) emphasises the importance of family in migration, proposing that family movement can maximise predicted family income while also reducing household migration risk (Stark & Bloom, 1985).

This study aims to advance understanding of migration decision making and provide valuable insights for regional policy development. The primary goal of this study is to make a meaningful contribution to the dialogue surrounding migration decisions, particularly from the viewpoint of households. This area has received little attention compared to the dominant economic models that view individuals as the sole decision makers in migration. Second, it aims to add to the existing literature on migration decision making. Previous empirical studies in Ethiopia have mainly focused on macroeconomic imbalance and income gaps as the primary cause of migration (Girmachew, 2019; Messay & Teferi, 2017; Tekalign, 2017). The study aims to

emphasise the importance of other factors such as household and kin networks in the migration decision making process. Thirdly, it offers a deeper understanding of south-south migration. This paper addresses a significant gap in the study of migration by presenting region-specific policy suggestions rather than just concentrating on migrations between the northern and southern hemispheres.

Migration management encompasses a series of policies, strategies, and programs designed to optimize the advantages of migration while simultaneously minimizing any negative consequences and meeting the diverse needs of migrants (The Berne Initiative, 2004). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) emphasizes the importance of effective migration governance, which includes upholding global standards, protecting the rights of migrants, developing evidence-based policies through a government-wide approach, and collaborating with partners to tackle migration and its related challenges (IOM, 2019a). There are contrasting perspectives on migration between Africa and Western countries. Africa tends to emphasize the positive effects of migration on development, while Western countries often focus on the security and stability implications (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Critics argue that African migration policies have been influenced by Western-centric ideas and are primarily carried out with funding from the West (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2020). The global regulation of migration governance is mainly influenced by two significant international agreements: the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, in addition to the Global Compact on Refugees (United Nations, 2018b).

Worldwide, as well as in Africa, there is a growing recognition of the significant and diverse impact that migration can have on development. The African Union adopted the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 and the UN General Assembly approved the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. These initiatives prioritize promoting safe, orderly, and regular migration, as well as enhancing remittances, decent work, and labour migration (African Union Commission, 2018). The 17 SDGs, established by the international community in 2015 with a target to be achieved by 2030, are universal and applicable to all countries, not just developing ones. Therefore, they are equally relevant to both the Global North and the Global South (Carella, 2024). The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda explicitly mentions migration in Goal 8, which aims to “Promote sustained, inclusive

and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”. Specifically, SDG Target 8.8 focuses to “Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment” (UN, 2015:19-20). Another SDG that addresses migration is SDG 10, which seeks to reduce inequality within and among countries. Target 10.7 aims to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (UN, 2015:19-20).


Yet another attempt at achieving comprehensive migration governance on a global scale is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which was discussed at the Marrakesh Intergovernmental Conference on December 19, 2018, by 164 UN Member States. The GCM is influenced by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015) and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 2016 (UN, 2016; Perocco, 2019). It outlines a vision with 10 guiding principles, including a focus on people, international cooperation, respecting national sovereignty, adherence to the rule of law and access to justice, sustainable development, human rights, a gender-responsive and child-sensitive approach, and a whole-of-government and whole-of-society strategy. Additionally, there are 23 objectives that provide a framework for regulating migration conditions (Bufalini, 2019). However, the GCM has faced criticism for its lack of clarity on how it distinguishes between "regular" and "irregular" migration, as the latter does not have a universally recognized legal definition. This ambiguity has led to concerns that the Compact may inadvertently support restrictive immigration policies within the EU, failing to effectively address the crucial issue of regulating undocumented and under-documented migration in a straightforward manner according to Perocco (2019).

Ethiopia has been instrumental in supporting the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) since its launch. During the development and adoption phases, a prominent delegation from the Ethiopian government acknowledged the importance of the Compact and wholeheartedly supported its goals (Okoth & Gure, 2021). The delegation also pledged to implement these objectives, recognizing their potential to significantly influence national migration policies and strategies. Consequently, Ethiopia has identified ten key priorities related to the GCM and was recently recognized as a GCM Champion country in East Africa. This acknowledgment was formalized through an endorsement letter sent by the Ethiopian

government to the International Organization for Migration Headquarters. Ethiopia is actively working to implement the GCM in accordance with sustainable development goals (SDGs) and other relevant initiatives. The government has provided guidance to incorporate the Compact into the country's second five-year Growth and Transformation Strategic Plan (GTP II) for 2015-2020 and the Ten-Year Development Plan (FDRE-NPC, 2022).

South Africa has actively participated in the formulation of the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) and is dedicated to aligning its National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP) with the principles set forth in the compact. However, it has not ratified the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) (RSA National Department of Employment and Labour (DEL), 2022). On a continental level, South Africa has officially supported various agreements regarding labor migration within the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Nevertheless, there is a notable inconsistency between its protectionist migration policies and the more liberal approach to free movement promoted by these agreements, raising concerns about the coherence of South Africa's migration strategy. Although there are numerous policy frameworks and regional directives addressing migration issues, very few have been formally ratified and implemented within the country. SADC is particularly notable as the only African Regional Economic Community (REC) that has not fully embraced and operationalized a policy framework supporting the free movement of people (Langalanga, 2019). Hence, South Africa, despite embracing a Pan-African identity and welcoming certain African migrants based on their skills and economic potential, harbours an underlying exclusivist sentiment towards these same migrants (Peberdy, 2009). This sentiment was exemplified in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration for South Africa (White Paper on International Migration, 2017).

Figure 2.3: Conceptual framework on drivers and effects of irregular migration



Source: Own Construction, 2022.

Migration is a complex and multifaceted global issue that involves every country in the world. In this study irregular migration from the study area is broadly conceptualised as a household's decision to diversify income or disburse risks rather than simply the function of income gaps. At individual and household level, migrants' age, gender, educational level, family size, place of birth and residence, occupation, and income are major determinants for migration. Moreover, migration from the study area is derived by socio-economic factors such as unemployment, poverty, shortage of farmland, conflict and insecurity, and migrants' success stories. While prospects in the destination like job opportunities and better income are attractions to migrate irregularly to the Republic of South Africa. The meso level factors such as the presence of social networks, smugglers and brokers, family and peer pressure, communication technology, culture of migration and migration policies play an enabling role in the irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa.

The meso level factors also determine the processes and pathways of irregular migrants from the study area. This is due to irregular migrants largely relying on the service of migrant smugglers or *delalas* for their travel to the RSA. Irregular migration from the study area will have both positive and negative effects on migrants and their families as well as migrant sending communities. The money they remit to their family will enable them to create jobs and reduce poverty in their origin. On the other hand, migrants both during travel and in the destination will face lots of ups and downs. Migrants along their journey and in RSA face harsh journeys, illness and death, robbery and theft, missing, ransom payment, debt bondage, detention, xenophobic attacks, violence and abuse, and debt burden. Migrants' remittances also create an income gap and dependency on remittance as well as loss of young workforce and school dropout.

## CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology of the study. The first section presents about description of the study area. The second section deals with the research philosophy and worldviews of the study. This section is followed by two sections presents about the research approach and design, and samples and sampling procedures used in the study. The next section is deal about data sources and methods of data collection employed in the study such as questionnaire, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and document review. Finally, the subsequent two sections present about the methods of data analysis and ethical considerations in the study.


### 3.1. Description of the Study Area

This study was conducted in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone in the Central Ethiopia Regional State, was formerly part of the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State (SNNPR) of Ethiopia (Endale & Cheng, 2024). Kembata-Tembaro Zone is one of the five zones clustered under the newly established Central Ethiopia Region (EPO, 2023). Kembata-Tembaro Zone has eight *woredas* (Angecha, Damboya, Kedida-Gamela, Kechabira, Doyogena, Hadero-Tunto, Adilo Zuria and Tembaro) and four town administrations (Durame, Shinshicho, Hadero and Doyogena). The *woredas* are further sub-divided into 135 *kebeles* of which 118 of them are rural and 17 are urban and suburban *kebeles*. Durame, the capital of Kembata-Tembaro Zone, is located 350 km from Addis Ababa through Shashemene and 296 via Hosanna, and 119 km from Hawassa, the capital of SNNPR. The annual average rainfall ranges between 1100 and 1460mm with an average annual temperature being 22<sup>0</sup>C. Topographically, Kembata-Tembaro Zone lies between 501 and 3000 meters above sea level (KTZoFED, 2019; Habte, 2015, Teshome, 2010).

The study was conducted in two migration sites, Angecha and Doyogena districts, located in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone within the Central Ethiopia Regional State. These sites were selected based on previous findings that indicated the prevalence of migration in these areas (Girmachew, 2019; Tekalign, 2021b; Yordanos & Zack, 2019). Empirical studies show that the presence of significant number of migrants from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone through an irregular channel with an estimated number of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa between 200,000 and 300,000 (Tekalign, 2021a). The population size of the Kembata-Tembaro Zone was projected to be about 1,021,421 by the Ethiopian Statistical Services (ESS) in 2022. It is one of the most densely

populated areas in Ethiopia, with a population density of 753.3 inhabitants per square kilometre (ESS, 2022). Therefore, high population growth (about 2.8% per year), high dependency ratio (47.2%) and large family sizes (5.5 people per household) are demographic factors that led to shortage of farmlands that forced people to migrate from Kembata-Tembaro Zone (KTZoFED, 2019).

**Figure 3.1: Map of the Study Area**



Source: Ethio-GIS

### **3.2. Research Philosophy and Worldviews**

This study employed a pragmatic philosophical worldview which helps to combine both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Pragmatic philosophy is chosen because many scholars (e.g. Morgan, 2007; Johnson *et al.*, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a; Bergman, 2011; Creswell, 2015; Creswell & Clark, 2017; Maarouf, 2019) accept pragmatism as a naturally associated worldview with mixed methods research. Second, the issue of migration is multifaceted and complex, thus, a complete analysis of such a problem requires a combination of data sources and methods from both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Therefore, pragmatism is a commonly chosen philosophical paradigm for mixed methods research due to its practical, multi-perspective and flexible research philosophy (Lisle, 2011). In the context of studying irregular migration, a pragmatic paradigm can offer several advantages that align with the complexities and challenges of this phenomenon. Firstly, a pragmatic paradigm allows for a flexible and adaptive research methodology that can accommodate the dynamic nature of irregular migration patterns. Secondly, a pragmatic paradigm encourages interdisciplinary integration of diverse perspectives in the research to develop a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted factors that contribute to irregular migration in Africa. Furthermore, a pragmatic paradigm emphasises the importance of empirical evidence, data-driven analysis, and practical solutions in addressing complex social issues such as irregular migration.

### **3.3. Research Approach and Design**


This study employed a mixed method approach due to the multifaceted nature of migration where the researcher would have an opportunity to integrate both quantitative and qualitative methods (Fabregues *et al.*, 2020). This approach is very important for this study because irregular migration is a more complex issue that needs to capture perspectives from different stakeholders. First, it employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to gain a deeper and holistic understanding, and second to answer different types of questions (*Ibid.*). Quantitative methods like surveys used to produce numerical data on drivers of migration, demographic and socio-economic background of migrants, patterns and effects of irregular migration (Creswell & Clark, 2018). In contrast, the qualitative methods would enable us to explore the complex situation of irregular migration such as the role of culture and social networks, migrants'

experience and the policy frameworks related to migration. In this case, ethnographic studies, like in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, give insights to assess the nature and processes of irregular migration (Hollstein, 2014).

The second is triangulation, which can give a chance for convergence and corroboration of research results that are derived from different sources and research methods (Greene *et al*, 1989). Triangulation, to mean integration of multiple data sources, theories and methods for deeper understanding on the issue (Creswell & Clark, 2018). In this study, the triangulation technique has been used to integrate survey data with in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. This helps in obtaining a better understanding on the nature of irregular migration such as the drivers, patterns and effects as well as the culture of migration, the nature of social networks, migration decision making, and the process of migration facilitation through brokers.

The study employed concurrent mixed methods design, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods. This design was chosen for its efficiency in collecting and analysing both types of data simultaneously, allowing for the triangulation of results to identify both convergence and divergence (Creswell & Clark, 2018). Data for both quantitative and qualitative studies were collected concurrently from July to October 2022. The quantitative data for this study was collected through survey questionnaires simultaneously with the qualitative data through in-depth interviews and focused group discussions (Bryman, 2004). The survey questionnaire was used to assess the determinants, patterns and effects of irregular migrations from study participants while in-depth interviews and FGD guides were used to generate qualitative data on understanding of irregular migration in the study area.

**Figure 3.2: The Procedures in Implementing a Concurrent Mixed Methods Design**



Source: Adapted from Creswell & Plano Clark (2018).

### 3.4. Samples and Sampling Procedure

As stated earlier, this study has aimed to investigate an irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa by focusing on both migrant and non-migrant households in the area. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were used to select research participants for both quantitative and qualitative methods. The major target groups had been migrant households or households having at least one migrant member in South Africa, and non-migrant households or households with no migrant members in South Africa during the time of data collection. In addition, research participants to generate qualitative data consisted of Ethiopian migrant

returnees from South Africa located in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone and experts from the Labour and Social Affairs Office.

The quantitative data for this study was collected through a cross-sectional survey conducted on 659 households. A multi-stage sampling technique was used to select samples from the target population. In the first stage, two *woredas* (districts) from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone in Central Ethiopia Region with a high number of irregular migrants to the RSA were purposively selected. Then, two *kebeles* (the lowest administrative unit below the district) from each district were chosen through purposive sampling based on a higher number of irregular migrants. In the third stage, sampled households were classified into migrant and non-migrant households. Thus, 1,760 migrant households and 3,146 non-migrant households were taken as a target population for this study. Migrant households (MHHs) are those households with at least one household member migrated to the RSA, while non-migrant households (NMHHs) are those without any migrant members during the survey period. Ultimately, 659 sample households were chosen using a systematic random sampling technique. The samples were distributed between migrant and non-migrant households through disproportionate allocation for between-strata analysis. The number of sampled respondents for each *kebele*, percentages of proportions, was calculated in relation to the total household size (See Table 1). The study sample size was determined using Kothari's (2004) sample size determination formula for finite population.

$$n = \frac{Z^2 \cdot p \cdot q \cdot N}{e^2 (N-1) + Z^2 \cdot p \cdot q}$$

Where: n – sample size; N – the population size;  $z^2$  – the value of the standard variate at a given confidence level, to be determined from a table showing the area under the normal curve; p population proportion; q –stands for 1-p; and  $e^2$  – acceptable error (the precision).

**Table 3.1: Sample size distribution of selected respondents of the study area kebeles.**

Selected <i>Kebeles</i>	Total Number of HHs	Number of Sampled MHHs	Number of Sampled NMHHs	Total Number of Sampled HHs
Wanjela	705	67	36	103
Leino	1,463	96	102	198
Garba Fandide	1,363	73	104	177
Shino Funamura	1,375	80	101	181
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,906</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>659</b>

MHHs- Migrant households

NMHHs- Non-migrant households

Qualitative data was gathered through in-depth interviews and focused group discussions (FGD) with purposively selected participants through non-probability sampling methods, such as purposive and snowball sampling techniques. The qualitative studies such as in-depth interviews and focus group discussions provide deeper insights to assess the drivers and processes of irregular migration (Hollstein, 2014). In this research, a purposive sampling method was used to gather ethnographic data from migrant returnees, and, and experts of labour and social affairs office in four kebeles (sub-districts): Wanjala, Shino Funamura, Garba Fandide, and Leino, located in the Angacca and Doyogana districts of Kembata-Tembaro Zone. The selection of the study sites for qualitative research followed the same method of quantitative research.

The sample sizes for the purposive sampling were not necessarily predetermined before data collection. Instead, they were established based on practical considerations and the attainment of theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is defined as the stage in data collection where new information ceases to provide further insights into the research questions. Consequently, a total of 24 research participants were interviewed. Practical factors such as participant availability and resourcefulness are also considered when determining the selection of participants for in-depth interviews. Five in-depth interviews were conducted in four selected *kebeles* (villages) with migrant returnees and 4 in-depth interviews with experts of the labour and social affairs office. An unstructured interview guide was prepared on topics such as migration aspirations, determinants of migration, and migration decision making to collect data through both in-depth interviews and FGDs. Six FGDs were conducted in four selected *kebeles* (villages) with migrant returnees and two FGDs with experts of the labour and social affairs office. All of the in-depth interviews were conducted in person by the researcher at the time of data collection through survey questionnaires. Trust and rapport were established with research participants through the experts in the labour and social affairs office and by utilising field assistants who were knowledgeable about the localities.

### **3.5. Data Sources and Methods of Data Collection**

The data for this study was collected using questionnaire, in-depth interviews and FGD guides from both migrant and non-migrant households, migrant returnees and experts in the experts of labour and social affairs office in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone. The quantitative data for this

study was collected using questionnaires and the qualitative data through in-depth interviews and focused group discussions guide. In addition, secondary documents and policies relevant to irregular migration and migration governance policies in Africa, in general and Ethiopia and the RSA, in particular were desk reviewed.

### **3.5.1. Questionnaire**

The quantitative data for this study was collected using a questionnaire. For this particular study, a semi-structured questionnaire was administered to generate quantifiable information as well as qualitative data on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics; and the determinants, patterns and effects of irregular migration. The survey questionnaire was administered to a total of 659 sample population. The questionnaire was prepared in English, and translated and administered in local languages for simplicity and to avoid ambiguity. During the data collection stage, the researcher was assisted by field assistants recruited based on their understanding of the issue, experiences, and fluency in the local language. They were trained on various elements of the questionnaire, specific research issues, ethical issues and objectives of the study before their involvement in the survey.

### **3.5.2. In-depth Interviews**

Qualitative data for this study was collected through in-depth interviews to complement, triangulate and enrich the quantitative data collected using questionnaires. As Dawson (2007) stated, interviewing will help researchers to achieve a general understanding of the interviewee's point of view and questioning for more detail. A total of 24 research participants were interviewed, with the sample size chosen based on saturation threshold. Practical factors such as participant availability and resourcefulness are also considered when determining the selection of participants for in-depth interviews. As a result, 5 in-depth interviews were conducted in four selected *kebeles* (villages) with migrant returnees and 4 in-depth interviews with experts of the labour and social affairs office. An unstructured interview guide was prepared on topics such as migration aspirations, determinants of migration, and migration decision making to collect data through both in-depth interviews. All of the in-depth interviews were conducted in person by the researcher at the time of data collection through survey questionnaires.

### **3.5.3. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

Focus group discussion guide was used to collect the qualitative data for this study. FGD gives an opportunity for the researcher to collect diverse responses from a single meeting, reduce researcher biases, and raise the probability of remembering issues to be forgotten, participant interaction and group effect as important data analysis (Dawson, 2007). Focus group discussions were held with purposefully selected participants based on their willingness. The researcher organised FGDs that consisted of a group of 6 to 8 purposefully selected participants from migrant returnees, and experts in the labour and social affairs office. Thus, the FGD guide was focused on determinants of irregular migration, migration decision and financing, culture of migration, patterns and effects of migration, and migration governance and migration policies. One focused group discussion was conducted in each *kebele* and two focused group discussions with experts in the labour and social affairs offices (a total of six FGDs) were held.

### **3.5.4. Document Review**

The researcher collected various types of published and unpublished documents from Addis Ababa University library, online from different academic sites and local governmental offices. The first part involves document review of primary sources related to irregular migration, including official reports from different offices like zone labour and social affairs, the police office, finance and economic development office and at national level from MoLSA and MoFA. Secondary sources like reports of international institutions like IOM, UNHCR, MMRs and MMP, international treaties, conventions and protocols, countries constitutions, proclamations and directives, MA/PhD theses, newspapers, figures, maps, journal articles, working papers and other relevant documents were collected. The second part was policy reviews on migration governance and policies by collecting legal documents existing at continental, RECs and country level.

### **3.5.5. Validity and Reliability Instruments**

In this study, the validity of the research findings was enhanced by utilizing multiple methods, including interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and document analysis. The results from the interviews were subsequently cross-verified with those obtained from the FGDs and the documents. To ensure the validity of the research instruments prior to data collection, the

researcher sought feedback from experts, including advisors, and peers, regarding the face validity, content validity, and format of the questionnaires. Content validity of the adapted measures was assessed by two PhD experts specialized in human geography and demography. A pilot-test with a small sample size in the study sites was conducted and adjustments were made based on feedback of pilot study data. Field data collectors were carefully chosen and supervised by the principal researcher at each study site. The field workers received a one-day training focused on the content of the questionnaire, ethical considerations, and approaches to interact with the respondents. This followed by rephrasing and simplifying certain questions to ensure they were easily understood by respondents, thus enhancing the validity and reliability of the data.

The researcher employed a questionnaire method to enhance the reliability of the instruments. To enhance the reliability of the study instruments, they underwent thorough reviews by colleagues and experts, followed by a pilot test in the field. This pilot study involved 30 randomly selected respondents. To measure internal consistency, the researcher utilized Cronbach's alpha coefficient ( $\alpha$ ). The analysis yielded reliability values of 0.84 indicate that the responses are reliable for data collection and were subsequently administered as planned.

### **3.6. Methods of Data Analysis**

In this study, both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analyses were employed. For the quantitative part, both descriptive and inferential statistical methods were employed. The data collected through survey questionnaires is verified, coded, entered and analysed by using SPSS Version 26. The specific details of data analysis are presented in the following subsections.

#### **3.6.1. Quantitative Data Analyses**

The study utilised quantitative data analysis methods, such as descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics were employed to summarise basic quantitative data, while inferential statistics, including binary logistic regressions, were used to examine the factors influencing households' migration decisions. The descriptive statistics such as mean, frequency, range, variance and standard deviation were used to show demographic, socio-economic and other relevant characteristics of the respondents. Statistical tools like chi-square test, Mann-

Whitney U Test, and crosstabs were employed to compare the proportions, and to assess the relationships of selected variables between migrant and non-migrant households. Linear regression analysis was used to identify best determinants of irregular migration among the independent variables. Binary logistic regression was used to see households' overall migration decision.

Econometric analysis is employed to examine the determinants of irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the Republic of South Africa. To understand the migration phenomenon in the study area, the determinants of migration were examined using a binary logit model. Both probit and logit models can be used for binary response variables to estimate the impact of multiple explanatory variables on categorical response variables through maximum likelihood estimation. However, there was no significant difference in estimation results between the two models. Therefore, for this study the binary logit model was chosen because the dependent variable is binary (migrant household and non-migrant household), and the coefficients are interpreted in terms of odds ratio. According to Gujarati (2004) the functional form of the binary logit model to predict the possibility of migration was put as follows:

$$Li = \ln \left( \frac{p(yi = 1)}{p(yi = 0)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_i x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$Li$  represents the likelihood of migration, where 1 is assumed if the household has a migrant member and 0 if the household does not have a migrant member going to South Africa  $\beta_0$  = is the intercept,  $\beta_i$  = is represents estimated coefficients of each independent variable, indicating the change in  $Li$  for a unit change in the independent variables ( $x_i$ ) for continuous variables and a discrete change for non-continuous variables.  $x_i$  = denotes the list of independent variables that influence the household migration decision, and  $\varepsilon_i$  = the error terms.

Researchers suggest various methods of sample size calculation for logistic regression. Peduzzi *et al.* (1996) give us a simple formula ( $N=10k/p$ ) for the minimum number of cases to run multiple logistic regression.  $P$  is the smallest proportion of positive or negative cases in the population (0.25) and  $k$  is the number of predictor variables. Then,  $N=10 \times 16/0.25=640$ , the minimum sample size required is 640. Initially, 18 predictor variables were selected based on

literature review, however, later based on bivariate analysis 16 variables with p-value less than 0.25 were selected to run the logit model with total number of sample size of 659.

The dependent variable chosen for the study is based on households' migration status to analyse the decision making process of whether to send migrants to the RSA. Therefore, the dependent variable in the study is migration status (MIGSTAT), which is a dummy response variable. A value of 1 indicates that a household has a member migrated to RSA, while 0 indicates that the household did not have a migrant member. The explanatory variables hypothesised in the study include sex, age, marital status, family size, education status, employment status, average monthly income, place of birth and residence, farmland ownership, house ownership, conflict and insecurity, poverty, population pressure, expected job at RSA, expectation of better income at RSA, presence of friends and family members in RSA, presence of social and migrant networks, and the presence of smugglers and brokers that were selected through reviewing literatures, consulting experts and knowledge of the study area.

**Table 3.2: Summary of hypothesised independent variables and their expected signs**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Type of variable</b>	<b>Descriptions and Measurement</b>	<b>Expected sign</b>
<b>Sex</b>	Dummy	Female is less migrant than males 1= if female; 2= if male	+
<b>Age</b>	Categorical	The younger age is the higher probability for migration than elder 1= for 15-24 years; 2= for 25-34 years; 3= for 35-49 years; 4=for 50-64 years; 5= for above 65 years	+
<b>Marital status</b>	Categorical	The unmarried has higher probability to migrate 1=for single; 2= for married; 3= for divorced; 4= for widowed	+
<b>Family size</b>	Continuous	Large family size led to the greater probability to migrate Number of Household members	+
<b>Educational status</b>	Categorical	The more educated had less likely to migrate 1=for don't read and write; 2= for read and write only; 3= for primary education; 4= for secondary education; 5= for certificate; 6= for diploma; 7= for degree and above	-
<b>Place of birth and residence</b>	Dummy	Urban residence is less probable to lead migration 1=if rural, 2= if urban	-
<b>Employment status</b>	Dummy	Unemployment led to more migration 1= if Yes; 2= if No	+

<b>Average monthly income</b>	Continuous	Higher income at home lead to less migration or may help to finance migration	+/-
<b>House ownership</b>	Dummy	Amount of income in Ethiopian Birr (ETB) Possession of house may lead to less need to migrate or may help to finance migration 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+/-
<b>Farmland ownership</b>	Dummy	Having farmland supplies a source of income to finance migration or discourages migration 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+/-
<b>Poverty</b>	Dummy	The poor household has the more likelihood to migrate irregularly 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Conflict and insecurity</b>	Dummy	Presence of conflict and insecurity push households to send migrants 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Population pressure</b>	Dummy	High population pressure pushed households to send migrants 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Expected job opportunity at RSA</b>	Dummy	Expectation job at RSA attract households to send migrants to RSA 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Expectation of better income at RSA</b>	Dummy	Expectation better income at RSA attract households to send migrants to RSA 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Presence of family members or friends at RSA</b>	Dummy	Presence of family members or friends at RSA establish social ties for migrants 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Presence of social and migrants' network at RSA</b>	Dummy	Presence of social network play as enabling factor for potential migrants 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+
<b>Presence of smugglers and brokers</b>	Dummy	Smugglers and brokers serve as the main facilitators of irregular migration 1= if Yes; 2 if No	+

Source: Hypothesized based on literature review

Before executing the binary logit model, the relevant assumptions in econometric analysis were taken into consideration. The multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables was checked and all variables are found lower than 10 values of Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and greater than 10% Tolerance (See the Table in Appendix I), therefore included in the regression analysis. Absence of significant outliers in the data source was confirmed from case-wise plot (See Appendix II).

The validity of the model is also tested before interpreting each coefficient by the model of goodness-of-fit tests of Chi-square coefficient and its significance value. As indicated in Table 4.4 the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients has Chi-square value of 382.463 with a p-value of 0.000 shows that all the independent variables included have significant ability to predict the household's decision to send migrants irregularly to the RSA or not. The Hosmer and Lemeshow

Test confirmed the model has good fit with Chi-square value of 5.866 and p-value of 0.662. Therefore, it shows the model is appropriately fit to the data. The Cox and Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square results show that the independent variables in the model explain about 44% to 58.7% difference on the response variable. The performance of the full model is predicted about 82.4% of the observed respondents' decisions for irregular migration to the RSA were correctly predicted by the model (See Appendix III).

Factor analysis was employed to determine the logical subsets of items and identify factors extracted into dimensions on the perceptions and cultural values of households towards migration. In this study, factor analysis with principal components extraction was employed to determine if the statements reflect identifiable factors associated with perception and cultural values of households towards migration. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical method used to highlight variation by calculating principal data components and revealing significant patterns within the dataset (Shrestha, 2021). Fifteen Likert items acquired were used in the analysis of respondents' perceptions of migration of youth from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone towards the Republic of South Africa. Cronbach's alpha is used to evaluate the reliability of a questionnaire. It gives a straightforward method for determining whether or not a score is credible. It is used under the idea that several items assess the same underlying construct; for example, in perceptions towards migration from Kembata areas, there are a few questions that all ask various things, but when aggregated, can be said to measure overall migration perceptions. Internal consistency is measured by Cronbach's alpha and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient greater than 0.7 is measured as acceptable. In this study, the item of factor studied and the scale used has a Cronbach's Alpha score of 0.841, indicating that the responses are trustworthy and can be used to generalise the items evaluated for this study.

Factor analysis consists of three basic steps of data appropriateness assessment, factor extraction, and factor rotation and interpretation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is used to assess the appropriateness of data for factor analysis while analysing migration perception. Similarly, the Bartlett's test of Sphericity, correlation matrix, and determinant score are performed to determine whether the data set is suitable for running factor analysis. The correlation matrix reveals that there are few items with inter-correlations greater than 0.3 between the variables, implying that the predicted factor model looks to be appropriate. The determinant value is a crucial test for

multicollinearity. The correlation matrix's determinant score is  $0.010 > 0.00001$ , indicating that there is no multicollinearity.

The KMO statistics value is  $0.824 > 0.6$ , indicating that the sample is suitable and the factor analysis is appropriate for the data. The correlation matrix's adequacy is tested using Bartlett's sphericity test. The sphericity test by Bartlett is very significant at  $p < 0.001$ , indicating that the correlation matrix has substantial correlations among at least some of the variables. The test value in this case is 1414.449, and the related degree of significance is less than 0.0001. As a result, the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix fails. The significant result of  $< 0.05$  indicates that a factor analysis for the data set may be useful. The number of initial unrotated factors to be retrieved is determined using Kaiser's criterion and the Scree test. The variation explained by those individual linear components is represented by the eigenvalues associated with each factor. The presentation of any factor loadings with values less than 0.5 is muted since the coefficient value is less than 0.5. The study used the Principal Component Analysis extraction method and the Varimax orthogonal rotation approach with Kaiser Normalisation. The diagonal anti-image correlation tests the understanding of each item's sampling adequacy. After factor extraction, the communalities reflect the common variance in the data structure.

Factor loading values convey each variable's link to the underlying factors. The variables that with loadings values greater than 0.50, imply that they are indicative of the factor. After extraction and rotation, the data set has three different linear components with eigenvalues greater than one. The three components are retrieved and account for 51.92% of the overall variation. It is proposed that at least 50% of the overall variation be explained by the retained components. The results suggest that three factors can explain 51.92% of the common variance shared by fifteen variables. This reflects the KMO score of 0.824, which is deemed good and also suggests that factor analysis is beneficial for the variables.

### **3.6.2. Qualitative Data Analyses**

Qualitative data collected from in-depth interviews were analysed using thematic analysis to provide a detailed understanding of the qualitative information. The in-depth interviews, conducted in Amharic, were recorded in audio format and later transcribed into English. The

researcher then engaged in a careful and continuous reading of the material to grasp the meanings behind the diverse data obtained through various selected techniques. In the second step, the transcribed script was coded and given pseudonym, and cross-checked for accuracy by the interviewers before being subjected to thematic analysis. In the final step, patterns were identified through grouping related themes together to qualitatively analyse the data, specifically focusing on responses regarding the culture of migration. Each theme was analysed using direct quotations and narrative descriptions. This analytical approach aligns with mixed methods studies, combining qualitative findings with quantitative data for a more comprehensive understanding.

The research process involved the examination and analysis of secondary sources such as reports, documents, legal papers, theses, newspapers, journal articles, working papers, and other pertinent materials. These findings were used to corroborate and enhance the primary data. A thorough desk review of migration governance, policies, and legal frameworks established by the African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Ethiopia, and South Africa was conducted to gain a deeper insight into the subject.

### **3.7. Ethical Considerations**

Research ethics is a moral principle guiding research from its beginning to the end. Ethical issues are becoming a crucial element in all scientific research. Accordingly, a social science researcher has the responsibility to protect research participants and keep their integrity (Creswell, 2015). The study adhered to fundamental research ethics commonly practised in social science research endeavours. Drawing from Dawson's (2009) guidelines, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality, and the right to provide feedback were the cornerstones throughout the process of gathering both quantitative and qualitative data for the study. Initially, great care was taken to engage the interest of participants by clearly elucidating the study's objectives and the level of information required using local language. Participation in the study was purely voluntary to ensure the authenticity of the information provided. Anonymity was a crucial ethical consideration in this study, maintaining the direct responses of participants. Consequently, respondents were represented by pseudonyms during data presentation to safeguard their anonymity should they prefer not to disclose their identity. Furthermore, confidentiality was the

primary ethical principle of this study, ensuring that information was only shared for academic purposes and not disclosed to third parties.

In sum, the research approach, design, sampling techniques, methods of data collection and analysis discussed under this chapter will serve as a bridge to present the results and discussions of this dissertation in the coming chapters.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DRIVERS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION

This chapter deals with the determinants of irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the Republic of South Africa. The first section presents determinants of migration to South Africa. This section tries to explain the features of migrants in terms of the demographic, socio-economic and network related determinants of migration from Kembata based on descriptive, inferential and qualitative results of the study. The second section deals with the household's migration decision making process in Kembata to the Republic of South Africa. The third section presents the culture of migration in Kembata-Tembaro Zone and its role in Kembatas migration to South Africa.

### 4.1. Drivers of Irregular Migration to South Africa

This section presents the results both descriptive and econometric analysis to understand the driving factors for migration from the study area to South Africa. The univariate and bivariate analysis for both continuous and categorical variables serves as a basis for the binary logistic regression analysis of 18 individual/household levels demographic and socio-economic variables, the macro push-pull factors and meso level predictors of irregular migration selected based on empirical literature review. Thus, to investigate the determinant factors and identify the predictors of migration, this study employed a binary logistic regression (binary logit model). The binary logit model was chosen for this study by taking migration status as the dependent variable where it is dichotomously coded as 0 for non-migrant households and 1 for migrant households. Researchers suggest various methods of sample size calculation for logistic regression. Peduzzi *et al.* (1996) have given us a simple formula ( $N=10k/p$ ) for the minimum number of cases to run multiple logistic regression. P is the smallest proportion of positive or negative cases in the population (0.25) and k is the number of predictor variables. Then,  $N=10 \times 16/0.25=640$ , the minimum sample size required is 640. Initially, 18 predictor variables were selected based on literature review, however, later based on bivariate analysis 16 variables with p-value less than 0.25 were selected to run the logit model with total number of sample size of 659.

Before executing the binary logit model, the relevant assumptions in econometric analysis were taken into consideration. The multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables was checked

and all variables are found lower than 10 values of Variable Inflation Factor (VIF) and greater than 10% Tolerance, therefore included in the regression analysis. Absence of significant outliers in the data source was confirmed from case-wise plot (See Appendix I and II).

**Table 4.1: Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of migrant and non-migrant households**

Variables		Migration Status of Households				Total		$\chi^2$	p-value
		Migrants HHs		Non-Migrants HHs		Freq.	%		
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%				
SEX	Female	8	2.5	120	35	128	19.4	110.686	.000
	Male	308	97.5	223	65	531	80.6		
	Total	316	100	343	100	659	100		
AGE	15-24	53	16.8	65	19	118	17.9	33.517	.000
	25-34	134	42.4	119	34.7	253	38.4		
	35-49	114	36.1	95	27.7	209	31.7		
	50-64	13	4.1	50	14.6	63	9.6		
	Above 65	2	0.6	14	4.1	16	2.4		
	Total	316	100	343	100	659	100		
MARS	Single	190	60.1	116	33.8	306	46.4	54.375	.000
	Married	122	38.6	198	57.7	320	48.6		
	Divorced	2	0.6	7	2	9	1.4		
	Widowed	2	0.6	22	6.4	24	3.6		
	Total	316	100	343	100	659	100		
EDUC	Don't write and read	9	2.9	60	17.5	69	10.5	81.521	.000
	Read and write only	71	22.5	31	9	101	15.3		
	Primary education	82	26	85	24.8	167	25.4		
	Secondary education	120	38.1	101	29.4	221	33.6		
	Certificate	11	3.5	6	1.7	17	2.6		
	Diploma	16	5.1	17	5	33	5		
	Degree and above	7	2.2	43	12.5	50	7.6		
	Total	316	100	343	100	659	100		

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

This section first presents the results of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of both migrant and non-migrant households participated in quantitative survey. The greater number of respondents the household survey were male (80.6%) and while (19.4%) were female. About 8(2.5%) migrant households respondents and about 120 (35%) of non-migrant household respondents are female. While about 97.5% of migrant and 65% of non-migrant household respondents are male. The large share of respondents age range lies between 25 and 34 (38.4%) and 35-49 (31.7%) together constituted about 70% (Table 4.1), which indicate the majority of irregular migrants found in the productive age. the majority of respondents were married (48.6%) and single (46.4%). As indicated in Table 4.1 above about 60.1% of migrants household constituted singles while 33.8% are unmarried among non-migrant households. This indicated there is a significant difference in the percentages of marital status across migration status of households with young unmarried or singles are more prone to irregular migration to Republic of South Africa. The Chi-square result also confirms that there is a significant difference in the proportion of marital status of respondents with respect to migration status with p-value  $.000 < 0.05$ .

Family Size of responds ranges between minimum one and maximum sixteen. The mean family size is 6.04 and the standard deviation was 2.329 (Table 4.1). This is much higher than the average household size in Ethiopia 4.8 and the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region 4.9 (SNNPR BoFED, 2019). Educational level of the majority of respondents' household is secondary education (33.6%) and primary education (25.4%), these two constituted about 59% of the survey respondents. The young adults with primary or secondary educations are more prone to irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa. There is significant difference is observed in the proportion of educational status of respondents across the migration status with p-value  $0.000 < 0.05$  (Table 4.1).

The age range of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions participants are between 26 and 62 years, and with mean age of 41. Qualitative interviews and FGDs were made with 10 migrant returnees, 2 deportees, 8 non-migrant groups, and 4 experts working in labour and social affairs offices. The majority of participants were males (20) and 4 were females. The participants were perpesefully selected from migrant-returnees, deportees, non-migrants, aspiring migrants,

civil servants, community elders, experts at police and justice office, education, culture and tourism, and labour and social affairs.

**Table 4.2: Binary logistic regression results on the determinants of migration to the RSA.**

Variables	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
SEX(1)	2.817	.425	44.021	1	.000	16.730
AGE			26.502	4	.000	
AGE(1)	.983	.323	9.270	1	.002	2.672
AGE(2)	1.320	.379	12.137	1	.000	3.742
AGE(3)	-.381	.535	.507	1	.477	.683
AGE(4)	-.886	.942	.885	1	.347	.412
MARS			22.454	3	.000	
MARS(1)	-1.296	.277	21.888	1	.000	.274
MARS(2)	-.530	1.023	.268	1	.604	.589
MARS(3)	-1.791	1.154	2.407	1	.121	.167
FMSZ	.130	.054	5.816	1	.016	1.139
EDUC			24.886	6	.000	
EDUC(1)	1.623	.535	9.221	1	.002	5.070
EDUC(2)	.886	.508	3.045	1	.081	2.425
EDUC(3)	.888	.500	3.156	1	.076	2.430
EDUC(4)	1.866	.840	4.936	1	.026	6.465
EDUC(5)	1.331	.676	3.874	1	.049	3.785
EDUC(6)	-.814	.687	1.403	1	.236	.443
EMP(1)	-2.657	.482	30.366	1	.000	.070
MONIN	.000	.000	4.042	1	.044	1.000
FARM(1)	-.695	.273	6.453	1	.011	.499
FAMMEMBERS (1)	-2.424	.424	32.716	1	.000	.089
NETWORK (1)	1.182	.264	20.072	1	.000	3.260
SMUGGLERS (1)	.803	.259	9.592	1	.002	2.232
Constant	-2.493	.921	7.322	1	.007	.083

LR Chi-Square (26) = 382.463, p=0.000

Reference Category= Non-migrant household

Log likelihood=529.998

Number of observations= 659

Correct prediction of all samples = 82.4%

Hosmer-Lemeshow Test Chi-square (8) = 5.866, p=0.662

Source: Own Household Survey, 2022.

The validity of the model is also tested before interpreting each coefficient by the model of ‘goodness-of-fit tests’ of Chi-square coefficient and its significance value. As indicated in Table 4.2 the Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients has Chi-square value of 382.463 with a p-value of 0.000 shows that all the independent variables included have significant ability to predict the households’ decision to send migrants irregularly to the RSA or not. The Hosmer and Lemeshow

Test confirmed the model has good fit with Chi-square value of 5.866 and p-value of 0.662. Therefore, it shows the model is appropriately fit to the data. The Cox and Snell R Square and Nagelkerke R Square results show that the independent variables in the model explain about 44% to 58.7% difference on the response variable. The performance of the full model is predicted about 82.4% of the observed respondents' decisions for irregular migration to the RSA were correctly predicted by the model (See Appendix III).

The econometric result in Table 4.2 showed that out of 16 explanatory variables used in the logistic regression model 11 variables were found to be statistically significant in determining irregular migration to RSA. In the binary logit model result variables sex, age, family size, educational status, monthly income, presence of family and social networks, and existence of smugglers and brokers are important variables that influence households' migration decision positively and significantly at less than 5% probability level ( $p < 0.05$ ). Results from in-depth interview and FGD participants also pointed out the major drivers of irregular migration were multifaceted that include economic push-pull factors, presence of facilitators or enabling factors and others related to cultural factors. Some of the major factors frequently cited by participants include improving their livelihoods and helping family, the existence of brokers (*delalas*) as the sole enablers, relative deprivation (to change their life like others), absence of job opportunity at home, in addition to the brokers migration to RSA was facilitated by family members settled at RSA.

#### **4.1.1. Individual and Household Level Demographic Factors**

*Sex of Respondents (SEXR)*: the greater number of respondents in the household survey were male (80.6%) and while (19.4%) were female (Table 4.1). The result indicates that males are more vulnerable to irregular migration as compared to females. There is a statistically significant difference in the sex distributions across the migration status of respondents as  $p\text{-value } 0.000 < 0.05$  at 5% level of significance (Table 4.1). There is a moderate or medium association between sex and migration status with Cramer's V value of 0.41. The results of regression analysis indicate that sex of household respondents has a significant and positive effect on the households' decision to send migrants irregularly to the Republic of South Africa with p-value less than 0.05. When all other factors remained constant, males have a 16.73 times greater chance to emigrate irregularly to RSA as compared to females. The probability of males to

migrate irregularly was 94% as compared to females who have only lower probability to migrate irregularly (6%).

The result of this study is consistent with findings of previous empirical studies on Ethiopian migration along the southern route to South Africa by Teshome, Bailey & Teller (2013), Yohannes (2018), Habte (2015), Sebsibe (2018), Henok *et al.* (2017) and Tadesse (2012). Being male is significantly associated with higher tendency for irregular migration also witnessed in the empirical studies conducted in the other regions of Africa by Yendaw (2021) on emigrants from Niger and Mali to Ghana in West Africa and the works of Dennison (2022) and Dibeh *et al.* (2018) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The results of qualitative data also shows that migration to South Africa was characterised by sex selective or highly male gendered due to the risky nature of long distance overland route through illegal crossing of state's borders and the laborious nature of the work mainly trading business loaded with goods for door-to-door sale at RSA.

*Age of Respondents (AGE)*: the large share of respondents' age range lies between 25 and 34 (38.4%) and 35-49 (31.7%) together constituting about 70% (Table 4.1), which indicate the majority of irregular migrants found in the productive age. The Chi-square test result shows that there is a significant difference in the distributions of age of respondents across migration status with  $p\text{-value } 0.000 < 0.05$ . The result of the Spearman correlation coefficient shows that there is a strong positive correlation between age and migration status of households ( $p=0.080$ ) (Table 4.1). Age has significant and positive association with migration status at  $p\text{-value}$  less than 0.05, significance level. The respondents in the age category 25-34 years have 2.672 times higher propensity to migrate through an irregular system than the respondents in the reference category (15-24 years). While those respondents between the ages range of 35-49 have 3.742 times higher than those in the reference category, which implies they have higher propensity of irregular migration than any other age categories. In contrast, when other things remain constant, a unit increase in respondent's age led to a decreased tendency to migrate irregularly to RSA by 0.683 times for the category of 50-64 years and 0.412 times for those of above 65 years. This finding was similar with earlier studies (Petros, 2020; Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013; Ashenafi & Melese, 2020; Bisrat *et al.*, 2017; Dennison, 2022) that supports the view of the most vulnerable age groups to irregular migration is the young and most productive age groups.

*Educational Status (EDUC)*: the educational level of the majority of respondents' household is secondary education (33.6%) and primary education (25.4%), these two constituted about 59% of the survey respondents (Table 4.1). The young adults with primary or secondary educations are more prone to irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa. A significant difference is observed in the proportion of educational status of respondents across the migration status with p-value  $0.000 < 0.05$  (Table 4.2). The result of the Spearman correlation coefficient shows that there is small positive correlation between the level of education and migration status of households ( $p=0.007$ ) (Table 4.1).

Educational status has significant and positive effects on irregular migration. Literate respondents have odds of 5.070 times likelihood to migrate irregularly than the non-literate ones, when other factors remain constant. Those with primary and secondary education have nearly 2.5 times the risk of migrating irregularly to the RSA as compared to those in the reference category (don't read and write). The likelihood of irregular migration is higher among certificate and diploma graduates with odds of (6.465 and 3.785, respectively) as compared to those in the reference category. However, the propensity to migrate irregularly to the RSA decreases by 0.443 times for those graduated with degree or above as compared to those in the reference category, while other things remain unchanged. Thus, the most vulnerable groups for irregular migration were those who had lower educational qualifications than those who attended advanced education (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013; Petros, 2020; Henok *et al.* (2017; Bisrat *et al.*, 2017).

**Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of categorical variables used in the regression analyses across migrant and non-migrant households**

Variables		Migration Status of Households				Total		$\chi^2$	p-value
		M HHs		NM HHs		Freq.	%		
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%				
EMP	Yes	157	49.7	119	34.7	276	41.9	15.182	.000
	No	159	50.3	224	65.3	383	58.1		
FARM	Yes	199	63	185	53.9	384	58.2	5.526	.019
	No	117	37.1	158	46.1	275	41.8		
POVERTY	Yes	246	77.8	242	70.6	488	74.1	4.554	.033
	No	70	22.2	101	29.4	171	25.9		
CONFLICT	Yes	129	37.6	112	35.4	241	36.6	1.289	.525
	No	213	62.1	204	64.6	417	63.3		
POPPRESSURE	Yes	195	61.7	249	72.6	444	67.4	8.867	.003
	No	121	38.3	94	27.4	215	32.6		
JOBOPP	Yes	241	76.3	246	71.7	487	73.9	1.762	.184
	No	75	23.7	97	28.3	172	26.1		
BETTERINC	Yes	199	63	234	68.2	433	65.7	2.009	.156
	No	117	37	109	31.8	226	34.3		
FAMMEMBERS	Yes	185	58.5	157	45.8	342	51.9	10.747	.001
	No	131	41.5	186	54.2	317	48.1		
NETWORK	Yes	183	57.9	288	84	471	71.5	54.755	.000
	No	133	42.1	55	16	188	28.5		
SMMUGLERS	Yes	169	53.5	225	65.6	394	59.8	10.044	.002
	No	147	46.5	118	34.4	265	40.2		

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

*Family Size (FMSZ)*: the household family size of respondents ranges between minimum one and maximum sixteen. The mean family size is 6.04 and the standard deviation was 2.329 (Table 4.4). This is much higher than the average household size in Ethiopia, 4.8. As the variable failed to meet normality assumptions to run a parametric test, a non-parametric Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was carried out to compare the mean rank distribution of family size across migration status or between migrants and non-migrants households. The result indicates that the distributions of family size across the migration status of households were similar with the mean rank for migrant household (338.91) and non-migrant households (320.86) were not statistically different,  $U = 51059.500$ ,  $p = 0.220$  ( $> 0.05$ ). The result of the Spearman correlation coefficient shows that there is weak or small negative correlation between family size and migration status of households ( $p = -0.045$ ) (Table 4.5).

The results of the regression analysis show that family size has a positive and significant association with migration. When other variables remain constant, a unit increase in the family size leads to increased odds of favouring irregular migration decisions by a factor of 1.139. An increase in the number of households is associated with higher probability to migrate irregularly from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the RSA. This result conforms to empirical studies on migration from Hadiya and Kembata-Tembaro Zone by Tsedeke & Ayele (2017) and Petros (2020) that indicates the existence of strong statistical evidence on the positive association between an increase in family size and irregular migration. This was also consistent with empirical studies in China by Zhao & Zhong (2019) and Bangladesh by Mendola (2008) as the odds of migration are becoming higher with increasing numbers of households.

**Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables used in the regression analyses across migrant and non-migrant households**

Variables	Migration Status of Households						Total	Sig
	Non-Migrants HHs			Migrants HHs			N	
	N	Mean Rank	Sum Ranks	N	Mean Rank	Sum Ranks		
FMSZ	343	321.85	110396.00	316	338.84	107074.00	659	.249
MONIN	343	292.56	100349.00	316	370.64	117121.00	659	.000

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

On the other hand, the econometric result revealed that marital status was found to affect household decisions for irregular migration negatively with level of significance.

*Marital Status (MARS)*: the majority of respondents were married (48.6%) and single (46.4%). As indicated in Table 4.1 about 60.1% of migrant households constituted singles while 33.8% are unmarried among non-migrant households. This indicates there is a significant difference in the percentages of marital status across migration status of households with young unmarried or singles who are more prone to irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa. The Chi-square result also confirms that there is a significant difference in the proportion of marital status of respondents with respect to migration status with p-value  $.000 < 0.05$ . The Cramer's V value 0.287 indicates the presence of small association between marital and migration status (Table 4.1). In the regression analysis, marital status was found to have significant negative influence on

households' decision to migrate irregularly to the RSA. The likelihood of irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone was decreased by a factor of 0.274 for married than singles or unmarried respondents', keeping other variables unchanged. Divorcees were 0.589 times less likely to migrate irregularly as compared to unmarried or single. The odds of widowed participants decreased by a factor of 0.167 times compared to those participants in the reference category (singles). Empirical studies on international migration both in Ethiopia (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013; Henok *et al.*, 2017; Stochario, 2017; Bisrat *et al.*, 2017) and other parts of Africa (Dennison, 2022; Dibeh *et al.*, 2018; Yendaw, 2021) confirms that the likelihood of being married seems to have negative influence on irregular migration. Thus, unmarried or singles were the most vulnerable age group to irregular migration.

#### **4.1.2. Socio-economic Factors**

*Average Monthly Income (MONIN)*: the mean monthly income of respondents is 1,974.67 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) and the standard deviation is 901.243. The household monthly income of respondents ranges between minimum 500 ETB and maximum 5400 ETB (Table 4.4). A non-parametric Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was carried out as the variable failed to meet normality assumptions to run a parametric test. A comparison of the mean rank distribution of average monthly income of respondents across the migrants and non-migrants households indicates that the distributions of the mean rank for migrant household (197.05) and non-migrant households (125.10) were statistically different,  $U= 7387.000$ ,  $p= 0.000 (< 0.05)$  (Table 4.4). The result of Spearman correlation coefficient shows that there is weak negative correlation between average monthly income and migration status of households ( $p= -0.205^{**}$ ) (Table 4.5).

Households' average monthly income has positive but there is no significant association with households' decision for irregular migration. A unit increase in the average monthly income has increased the likelihood of irregular migration to the RSA by a factor of 1.000, when other factors remain constant. This shows average monthly income has the same odds of success for both higher and lower income households or the variable average monthly income of households has no significant influence on families' decision for irregular migration to the RSA. Nonetheless, this result was not consistent with Petros (2020) who stated that the propensity of irregular migration was higher among individuals with higher earning capacity and income levels

as compared to individuals with lower income levels. This may be due to tightening control of borders after the outbreak of COVID pandemic and the resulting an increased travel costs and risks associated with it along the routes.

**Table 4.5: Spearman correlations between continuous and ordinal variables**

		MIGSTAT	AGE	FMSZ	EDUC	MONIN
MIGSTAT	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.080*	-.045	.007	-.205**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.040	.249	.852	.000
	N	659	659	659	659	659
AGE	Correlation Coefficient	.080*	1.000	.058	-.325**	-.003
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.040	.	.136	.000	.948
	N	659	659	659	659	659
FMSZ	Correlation Coefficient	-.045	.058	1.000	-.070	.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.249	.136	.	.074	.430
	N	659	659	659	659	659
EDUC	Correlation Coefficient	.007	-.325**	-.070	1.000	-.008
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.852	.000	.074	.	.847
	N	659	659	659	659	659
MONIN	Correlation Coefficient	-.205**	-.003	.031	-.008	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.948	.430	.847	.
	N	659	659	659	659	659

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

*Employment Status (EMP)*: the majority of respondents (58.1%) are unemployed, implying as it could be a major driver of irregular migration to RSA. The above result shows that the majority of migrants were unemployed before their emigration to the RSA. The Chi-Square test result also shows the presence of significant difference in the proportions of distribution of employment status of migrants within migrant and non-migrant households with p-value .000 < 0.05. There is weak association between employment and migration status with Cramer's V value 0.152 (Table 4.3). Employment status has a significant negative influence on households' decision for irregular migration in the study area. Those participants who were employed were 0.070 less likely to emigrate irregularly from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the RSA. This indicates irregular migration to RSA is higher among unemployed than employed participants. Participants in an in-depth interviews cited lack of employment prospects and the low wages pushed the youth from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa in search of better economic prospects.

Therefore, the youth became hopeless due to lack of employment opportunities including current university graduates becoming jobless, serious shortage of land, high population pressure and poverty.

Similarly, studies (Abshula & Allais, 2019; Bisrat *et al.*, 2017; Dennison, 2022) indicated that unemployment acted as push factor amongst irregular migrants. Therefore, unemployment is strongly correlated with migration as being unemployed significantly increases the propensity of migration (Simona-Andrea, 2017). An increase in the employment rate in the southern region of Ethiopia was associated with a decreased rate of irregular migration to South Africa (Petros, 2020). Labour market conditions and economic development are considered as the major determinants of international migration (Silvia, 2018). In recent years, lack of employment opportunities coupled with lower values attached to education in Hosana and Durame areas were the major push factors for irregular migration even for those with better educational status (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022).

*Farmland Ownership (FARM)*: land ownership basic asset for people's livelihood in the rural areas. About 58.2% of households possess farmland while 41.8% do not own farmland. The differences in the proportions of agricultural land ownership between migrants and non-migrants' households were statistically significant with p-value  $0.019 < 0.05$  (Table 4.4). There was small or low association between household farmland ownership and migration status with Cramer's V value 0.09. Households' farmland ownership has a significant negative influence on the likelihood of a family's decision in favour of sending its member through irregular migration to the RSA. Households' who had their own farmland had a 0.499 times decreased likelihood to emigrate irregularly to RSA as compared to those who had not possessed farmland. The result is consistent with Beneberu & Lemlem (2023), Schurmann *et al.* (2022), Messay & Teferi (2017), Kaag *et al.* (2019) and Shishay (2019) shows households that own land have a lower interest to migrate. Shortage of farmland was significantly associated with irregular migration that households have negative or decreased likelihood of migration with a unit increase in their farmland size.

Furthermore, the FGDs and in-depth interviews participants raised both the push factors at origin and pull factors in the destination were pointed as driving factors for irregular migration to the

RSA. During in-depth interviews with migrant returnees it was poverty that pushed them to migrate in search of decent life for themselves and to improve the wretched living condition of their households. On the other hand, participants cited absence of any government efforts to redress the problem of unemployment for instance by establishing industrial parks like the ones that have been done in the other parts of the country. In addition, the existing government system was highly bureaucratic and corrupt and mainly raised nepotism and favouritism based on ethnicity and kinship to fill existing small numbers of civil service posts dashed their hopes to work and live at home.

The economic factors for irregular migration from the study area align with the relative deprivation theory. The main reason for migration is competition in life and those who migrate achieved a better life for themselves and their families. Moreover, non-migrants are encouraged by the success of migrants that can be expressed in the amount of money they send to their family and subsequent improvement in their family life. Their household lives were significantly transformed with the money remitted from South Africa. The former small thatch-roofed huts were replaced by new and better built houses furnished with modern appliances like satellite television, refrigerator, and modern furniture. Some others bought a car or opened new business in the nearby small urban centres, while the most successful ones moved their family and business into major towns like Durame, Hosana and Hawassa. As a result, irregular migration has created a big life and income gap between those who have migrant family members and those who have not. This has, in turn, served as further inspiration not only for unemployed people but also those who have run their own private business and government employees. An excerpt from the narration of 27 years old deportee-migrant, clearly portray the perpetuation of irregular migration through income gaps in the study area as follows:

The major reason for migration from this area to South Africa is economic. There is a serious problem of unemployment and shortage of land. Therefore, young people like me have no option other than to migrate. Look at me; I am in my mid-20s; have tried to migrate illegally twice, once to RSA through Moyale and at another time to Europe via Sudan. But, unfortunately, I was captured and deported in both cases. Still, if there is a possibility, I would aspire to re-migrate. In addition to a serious problem of unemployment, migration created major income gaps or inequality in the society. For instance, look at the major businesses or the buildings where the Abyssinia and Awash Banks opened as well as the major hotels at Doyogena, they are owned by South African migrant-returnees. A man who imports Bajaj here is a South African migrant returnee. He has his own container and imports 50-100 bajaj's in one

trip. He is now making frequent business trips to China and other countries. His family are still living in RSA. As a result, migration is currently a dream even for those who are employed and run their own small businesses to improve their business and to change their livelihoods by working at RSA within a short period of time. Thus, they aspire to become a millionaire in a very short time like the earlier migrants (Participant 18, Interviewed in August 2022).

The relatively better economy of South Africa than Ethiopia offers higher wages and hence acts as a pull factor for Ethiopian migrants. The potential migrants are also allured by the information they have got from family members and friends residing in RSA via virtual tour using video calls through social media platforms such as imo, viber, whatsapp and others about their businesses. Therefore, the success of pioneer migrants was a source of inspiration and attraction for non-migrants at home. Another important factor pointed by the FGD participants in relation to income gaps was the gradually widening gap in the exchange rate between the Ethiopian birr and the US dollar that increased the amount of money remitted to home becoming very high.

*Cultural Factors:* the culture of migration in the area was considered another factor for irregular migration. One of these factors cited by participants was that being idle is socially unacceptable. Therefore, the youngsters had to migrate either locally, mainly to plantation areas in the Awash valley for seasonal labour work, or to embark on irregular migration to South Africa. The second reason is related to strong spiritual rationalisation of irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa that was positioned in the prophetic tradition of evangelical Christianity in the early 2000. Thus, South Africa is revealed by prophets as they saw the vision of God opening the Southern Route through which the people will go and bring back prosperity. This was followed by large-scale irregular migration from Hadiya and Kembata to the Republic of South Africa in the early 2000s. Another spiritual practice is related to the local church leaders in blessing the departing migrants in a farewell ceremony prepared either at home or in church. As a result, South Africa was assumed as a land of salvation for Kembatas and Hadiyas.

Another driving factor related to culture in the study area for irregular migration is related to a huge spending on annual celebration of the festivity of *Meskel*. In addition, the lavish amount of money spent by migrants from South Africa for their family for *Meskel* celebration further created a relative deprivation for households who do not have migrants' abroad. Thus, some resorted to mortgaging their land while others sold hybrid milk cows to finance their annual holiday. The relative deprivation also witnessed in burial practices and the culture of serving

mourners during farewells. Participants point out as there is no system of serving guests with bottled water and feasts, rather all these practices were introduced through the families of “*Dabube’s*” or Southerners (they used to call those households having migrants in South Africa). In addition, the excessive amount of money spent on the burial cemetery and an iron fence put on the burial place was considered as an indicator of social status that in turn allured the non-migrant household to migrate in order overcome both economic inequality and the new social indices created by irregular migration to South Africa. Consequently, nowadays the cultural attitudes of the general public associate as success emanates from South Africa. A lived experience of a migrant returnee aged 42 years shows how migrants’ success stories shaped the culture of migration from Kembata. He said that:

A migrant said to be successful; his success will be seen from his family success eventhough they come back with little capital. Another cultural impact of migration related to marriage for instance, a girl for South African groom was seen as she got lottery. Another is the amount of gifts given to bride family was too high. Another during burial the use bigger feasts and use of mineral spring water. Among the major celebration is Meskel, and during Meskel a family alone (South Africans) slaughter an ox alone. Remittance from RSA also not only created income gaps among society and but also inflation in the market (Participant 11, Interviewed in Wanjela on July 2022).

#### **4.1.3. Social Network Factors**

*Presence of Social and Migrants’ Network (NETWORK)*: the majority of respondents (71.5%) replied that the presence of social and migrants’ network is the main enabling factor for irregular migration to RSA. The chi-square result also indicates the presence of statistically significant differences in the observed distributions on the presence of social and migrants’ networks as an enabling factor for irregular migration within migrant and non-migrant households with p-value  $.000 < 0.05$ (Table 4.3). The Cramer’s V value 0.288 indicates that there was small or low association between presence of social and migrants’ network and migration status. In the regression analysis, the presence of social and migratory networks in RSA had a positive and significant effect on household decisions to send migrants irregularly. The odds of irregular migration to RSA were 3.26 times greater for households that have family and social networks as compared to those who have no family or social networks at RSA. Other studies (Beneberu & Lemlem, 2023; Girmachew, 2019) indicate the presence of local and transnational social networks have increased the likelihood of irregular migration through creation of better

connection and provision of resources that in turn minimises the duration of migration taken to reach the destination. Researchers in the other parts of the world, mainly from Latin America, considered the presence of social networks as the most important facilitators of international migration (Migali, 2018; Ortega and Peri, 2013; Beine, Bourgeon & Bricogne, 2017).

The network factor played a significant impact on the large-scale irregular migration of Kembatas to South Africa. Participants pointed to the major reason as the presence of strong personal and family networks that link non-migrants with established migrants in the RSA. Most participants noted that the initiation of irregular migration from Kembata and neighbouring Hadiya in the mid-1990s was considered the opportunity created for few individuals from the area to emigrate to RSA by the Ethiopian ambassador to RSA. Therefore, he was frequently cited by participants as a gate opener. Then, followed by a large number of irregular migrations from Kembata as people are enticed by the economic success of the pioneer and an enabling environment created by the family network of these earlier migrants. Thus, the pioneer migrants serve as a source of information, finance and host for the later emigrants to South Africa. Sponsoring and taking in a large number of family or kin members is considered as one of the major indexes of success of migrants in South Africa. A liberal refugee law in the first half of the 1990s introduced by South Africa was another enabling factor for irregular migrants to get temporary asylum with the right to work from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA).

*Presence of Smugglers and Brokers (SMUGGLERS):* the existence of smugglers and brokers as an enabling factor of irregular migration along the southern route is responded by the majority of both migrants (53.5%) and non-migrant households (65.6%). The Chi-Square test result also shows a significant difference in the proportions of observed distribution of respondents considering the presence of smugglers and brokers services to RSA as an enabling factor for irregular migration within migrant and non-migrant households with p-value  $.002 < 0.05$ . There is weak association between presence of smugglers and brokers, and migration status with Cramer's V value 0.123 (Table 4.3). The presence of smugglers and brokers as enablers of irregular migration to the RSA had a positive and significant impact on household decisions for irregular migration. The likelihood of irregular migration to the RSA is 2.232 times higher with the service of smugglers and brokers as compared to the absence of the service of smugglers and brokers.

Empirical studies (Beneberu & Lemlem, 2023; Blumenstock *et al.*, 2021; Massey *et al.*, 1993; Yohannes, 2018) confirmed the higher likelihood of migration was positively associated with the presence of migrants' network. The recruitment tactics employed by smugglers and brokers to attract potential migrants were compelling, effectively enticing them to engage in irregular migration (Bisrat *et al.*, 2017; Teferi & Messay, 2017). A qualitative study conducted by Yordanos & Freeman (2022) found that the smuggling trade flourished due to the support provided by smugglers along the routes to South Africa, particularly in response to stringent border control policies and closures, which consequently led to an increase in the number of irregular migrants. They noted that, in contrast to the earlier days when family networks and a limited number of facilitators were involved in aiding the initial migrants, the situation has evolved into a thriving smuggling enterprise with numerous participants extending from the origin points through transit areas to final destinations and beyond.

Irregular migration from Kembata-Tambaro Zone as well as neighbouring Hadiya was unanimously pointed both by interviewees and FGD participants was facilitated by the smugglers locally known as *delalas* (brokers). Migration to South Africa through an irregular system is always possible through the service of smugglers. The brokers' furnished potential migrants with migration information and experience; they arrange all the travel process and work in South Africa. The enabling role of brokers is significant for those migrants who used a direct air flight to South Africa in traversing the lengthy visa process either through bribe or provision of forged travel documents. Consequently, the brokers were considered reliable service providers with affordable cost, time saving and less bureaucracy as compared to the legal systems. In addition, what participants stressed is there is no sufficient reason to justify their trip to South Africa to go through the legal system (to get visa) in absence of any foreign employment agreement between Ethiopia and South Africa. This adds the importance of brokers as the sole enablers and the only option at hand for aspiring migrants to reach the dreamed land of South Africa.

*Presence of Family Members or Friends at RSA (FAMMEMBERS)*: the majority of respondents (51.9%) replied presence of family members and friends at RSA was a pull factor for irregular migration to RSA. The Chi-Square test result also shows a significant difference in the proportions of observed distribution of respondents considering the presence of family members and friends at RSA as a pull factor for irregular migration to RSA within migrant and non-

migrant households with p-value  $.001 < 0.05$ . There is weak association between presence of family members and friends at RSA and migration status with Cramer's V value 0.128 (Table 4.3). The presence of family members or friends at RSA also had significant influences on the households' migration decision in the study area. The odds of having no family members or friends at RSA have led to a decreased likelihood of irregular migration by a factor of 0.089 times as compared to those who had family members and friends in the destination. This finding aligns with Ortega & Peri (2013), Beine, Bourgeon & Bricogne (2017) and Migali (2018), who indicated the presence of family and social networks from country of origin in the destination, was considered one of the most important facilitators of international migration. Therefore, the likelihood of irregular migration for those people having contacts with a network of international migrants or returnees were higher (Beneberu & Lemlem, 2023) due to migrants local and transnational networks played a significant role in perpetuating irregular migration through better ties and provision of resources that in turn minimises the duration of migration that took to reach the destination (Girmachew, 2019).

## **4.2. Migration Decision Making and the Culture of Migration**

This section contains two subsections. The first part deals with migration decision making processes in Kembata-Tembaro Zone. The second part addresses the cultural dynamics of migration from the area to South Africa.

### **4.2.1. Migration Decision Making Processes**

The migration decision making involves a complex process influenced by a multitude of factors, among others, including the migrants' prior knowledge or information. The survey findings indicate that prior knowledge about migration destinations is important in the household's migration decision making process. As shown in the survey result (in Table 4.5) the majority of respondents (58.5%) have had some information about the place of destination, while 27.5% have had sufficient prior knowledge about migration processes to the Republic of South Africa. Only 14% respondents replied as they resorted to irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa without any prior knowledge about the destination. This result corroborates with Czaika, Bijak & Prike (2021) who viewed migration decision as a highly informed decision characterised by rational cost and benefit analysis about livelihood opportunities. Thus, possession of

sufficient knowledge and information about livelihood opportunities are preconditions for the establishment of migration aspirations. The theory of cumulative causation also assumes migration is initially a social process motivated by sharing information, resources and assistance through social networks in the communities of origin (Heer, 2002).

**Table 4.6: Migrants’ level of access and source information before they went to RSA**

<b>Having sufficient information before migration to RSA</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Percent of Cases</b>
Yes	87	27.5	
Somehow	185	58.5	
Not at all	44	14.0	
<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
<b>Migrants’ sources information (Multiple response item)</b>			
Earlier migrants	276	27.5	87.3
Social media	60	6.0	19.0
Mass media	53	5.3	16.8
Friends at RSA	166	16.5	52.5
Returnees from RSA	167	16.6	52.8
Family and/or community	93	9.3	29.4
Smugglers and brokers	115	11.4	36.4
Peers and kins	75	7.5	23.7
<b>Total</b>	1005	100.0	318.0

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Migrants’ level of access to information significantly differs temporally as observed from in-depth interviews with migrant-returnees from South Africa. Pioneer migrants from Kembata were mostly traders who had friends from the neighbouring Hadiya, from whom they got migration information about South Africa. However, the respondents’ noted that emigration of Ethiopians to South Africa witnessed a significant increase since 2000 with the help of an Ethiopian diplomat working in South Africa, who assisted his kin and relatives to immigrate to South Africa. Therefore, the earlier migrants had very limited access to information that was only gained from brokers. The 45 years old migrant-returnee, Dobamo (pseudonym), specified as he has no sufficient information about the route as well as the destination as follows:

I went to South Africa in 1997. When I planned to migrate to RSA, I hadn’t had enough information because unlike now, there was neither Facebook nor other social media outlets and even mobile technology (Participant 02, Interviewed in August 2022).

However, the later generation of migrants got migration experience from diverse sources including previous migrants from their household or neighbours. The migration information can now be primarily accessed through social media like Facebook, Imo, Viber or What's app. The earlier migrants to South Africa easily showed their lives in RSA through pictures and video calls using different social media platforms to their brothers and friends at home. This has clearly been noted by Abraham (pseudonym), a 27 years old aspiring migrant, as he was allured to migrate by information furnished to him from South Africa by his cousins and friends; "...every day I used to communicate with my cousins and friends through mobile and Imo. They showed me their business via video call and that has inspired me to join them" (Participant 20, Interviewed in August 2022).

The result of survey data indicates that a large number of respondents (87.3% or 276/316) had accessed information about the destination from the earlier migrants. Moreover, respondents also indicated other sources of information for aspiring migrants, including migrant returnees from South Africa (52.8%), friends in RSA (52.5%), smugglers and brokers (36.4%), family and/or community (29.4%), peers and kins (23.7%), social media (19% or 60/316) and mass media outlets (16.8%). Interviewees have also indicated that the main sources of migration information were the earlier migrants from their households. In recent years, migration information sources had been diverse including migrant returnees, migrant household members in RSA, community, friends, and brokers. In addition, the social media platforms have led to easy, fast and virtual communication between South African migrants and those remaining at home. A study by Kelemework *et al.* (2017) also showed the vulnerability of urban youth to irregular migration, as they are more exposed to migration information and influence.

Regarding the migration decision making, about 89.6% of the respondents view that the decision was made by migrants themselves (Table 4.6). However, still a large number of respondents (67.4%) replied their emigration to South Africa was decided by their families. As the survey result indicates the involvement of friends (16.1%) and peers and kins (9.2%) were very low in the process of migration decision making in the study area. Recent study in Ethiopia by Asnake and Fana (2021) indicated that the decision to migrate is no longer a personal matter; rather, it is a group decision made with input and support from the diaspora, families, and religious and traditional community leaders. Families host farewell parties for departing migrants in some

migration hotspot locations, such as Hadiya in southern Ethiopia, where neighbours, community members, and religious leaders are encouraged to attend to support and bless the migrants. Additionally, these farewell gatherings used to solicit donations from the neighbourhood to pay for the migrant's travel costs. Similarly, the study corroborates to a study by Meron (2020) case study from Shashogo in Hadiya, neighbourhood of Kembata, the long-distance migration to RSA decided by agencies such as families and friends.

**Table 4.7: Migration decision makers and facilitators of migration to RSA**

Migration decision makers (Multiple response item)	Frequency	Percentage	Percent of Cases
Migrants' themselves	283	49.1	89.6
Families or households	213	37.0	67.4
Friends	51	8.9	16.1
Peers and kins	29	5.0	9.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>182.3</b>
Facilitators of irregular migration to RSA (Multiple response item)			
Family	290	54.2	91.8
Friends	91	17.0	28.8
Smugglers	92	17.2	29.1
Peers and kins	62	11.6	19.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>169.3</b>

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Nearly all in-depth interviewees and FGDs participants noted that households are the main decision makers on irregular migration to South Africa. The initiative to migrate emanates from the potential migrants, who will notify their family about their decision to migrate to South Africa. In some rare cases households oppose the decision, which mostly ended in favour of migration after long consultation that may include members of an extended family. This is partly the reason behind households' migration decision making process was accompanied by a sort of prayers and feasts attended mainly by members of the extended family and kins, which ended up in collecting some amount of money used to finance for the departing migrant member. In some cases, the person who finances the migration process appeared a sound decision maker in the

migration process. This can be seen from the experience of Dobamo (pseudonym), 45 years old migrant-returnee in Leino *kebele* stated that “the decision and the financial support during my migration to South Africa were mainly made by my uncle”. In addition, household consultation on migration decisions also extended to family members living abroad, mainly earlier migrant members at RSA. There were some cases where young children leave suddenly without informing their family and only call their family after they reach Nairobi or other places to get money requested by the smugglers.

Migrants’ households play a significant role not only in the migration decision making process but also in facilitating irregular migration to South Africa as well. The survey result shows that about 91.8% (290/316) respondents replied their trip to South Africa was facilitated by their families. As shown in Table 4.7 below, 29% of the respondents, their trips were facilitated by the smugglers, while some others stated as their friends engaged in the facilitation process (28.8%) and through their peers and kins (19.6%). Most aspiring migrants' decision-making processes involve several parties and interests. These relocations are frequently international endeavours involving cooperation among family members and relatives in the sending, transit, and destination nations. Investment in the relocation of one household member may be considered an investment in the entire household because it is expected that these moves will improve the household's livelihood. It is also likely to improve the migration prospects of other household members. Other people may gain from migration in addition to the migrant who hopes to enhance his or her socioeconomic situation through moving. Family members and household members may contribute to the migration in the hope of receiving remittances. The possibility of receiving a portion of the smuggling fee exists for the middlemen (many of whom are close relatives and close friends) who take part in the networked international smuggling networks. In addition to gaining from hiring newcomers as shop clerks, hosts at the receiving end of the migration journey also profit from the labour exploitation ingrained in marriage relationships (Yordanos & Zack, 2019).

Irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone was facilitated by different actors operating at origin, in the transit and destination countries. During in-depth interviews participants articulated that irregular migration to South Africa is facilitated by households through prayers at farewell sessions, harnessing finance to cover the travel cost and accessing brokers through kins

networks. However, they noted that brokers played a significant role in the facilitation of irregular migration to South Africa. Earlier, brokers operated from the study area but now-a-days they are invisible partly due to the legal restrictions and partly using the technological advantage they used to run their business mainly from South Africa through mobile phone guidance in dealing about the price, the route through which migrants used to travel and connecting them with smugglers to assist migrants to cross the state's borders. Whatever the mode of travel (either flight or land route), it is impossible to reach the desired destination without employing one or more brokers. An excerpt from a 62 years old migrant-returnee interviewee elucidates the above views as follows:

I got migration information and experience from the broker. All my travel process and the work at RSA were arranged by the broker. As we reached South Africa, the broker asked 50 dollars per head to process our asylum process. Thus, he collected the money and immediately processed our asylum and assisted us to engage in work. After I was established at RSA, I took my brothers and my brothers-in-law to RSA. All these movements were made possible only through the agency of the broker. Thus, without a broker there is no migration to RSA. You are blind without a broker and he is the one who gives you a blind stick. Money has also been remitted back to Ethiopia only through the broker. Whatever the case, the broker is a reliable mode of money transfer that connects emigrants at RSA with their families back home (Participant 01, Interviewed in July 2022).

This is similar to earlier empirical studies by Kinfe (2019) and Meron (2020) who have indicated the Ethiopian migration from Hadiya and Kembata areas are predominantly facilitated by the enabling environment created by the existence of smugglers. The irregular migration of Ethiopians to South Africa is influenced by complex social dynamics, availability of communication technologies, the flow of information, and money transfer mechanisms (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019). Informal local smugglers, known as *delalas*, organize the routes and transportation arrangements for irregular migrants to facilitate their border crossings (Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

Migrants from Kembata-Tembaro Zone harness finances from diverse sources to cover their travel expenses to South Africa. As shown in Table 4.8 below, the survey result has revealed that the sources include selling household assets including cattle (38.3%), financial support from migrant relatives and friends living in South Africa (37.3%), renting and mortgaging of own land (37%) and using own savings (36.1%) are the major ways used by migrants to get the sum of money to finance their migration to RSA. Still some others were able to cover their travel

expenses through financial sponsorship of their household members living abroad (19.3% or 61/316), borrowing money from relatives living in Ethiopia (12.7% or 40/316) and a few of them were migrating to bigger cities to work and save money (6.6% or 21/316).

**Table 4.8: Ways financing irregular migration to RSA**

Ways of covering migrants' travel cost to RSA (Multiple response item)	Frequency	Percentage	Percent of Cases
Own savings	114	19.3	36.1
Migrating to bigger cities	21	3.5	6.6
Renting and mortgaging land	117	19.8	37.0
Selling family asset	121	20.4	38.3
Borrowing money from relatives	40	6.8	12.7
Financial assistance from families abroad	61	10.3	19.3
Financial assistance from migrant relatives and friends at RSA	118	19.9	37.3
Total	592	100.0	187.3

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Similarly, the qualitative result from in-depth interviews with migrant-returnees corroborates the results in Table 4.8 above. Therefore, migrants employed various mechanisms to collect the amount of money needed to cover the overall cost of migration to South Africa. A few respondents tell as they were covered through their own savings. In this regard, mortgaging land, migrating internally to bigger cities and plantation areas were the major ways of getting money to finance their migration. But most participants stressed their migration to South Africa was financed partly or at all by the contribution of their extended family members. For the recent migrants, however, sponsorship from South Africa was the major mode of financing migration. In turn, the sponsored migrants were made to serve in the business of their sponsors until the balance sheet was corrected through repayment of debt in an equivalent amount of year's services for the amount of money spent to finance their migration.

The amount of money spent by migrants to cover their travel cost varies based on the mode of travel preferred by migrants, usually at an increasing rate throughout the years. According to the

survey result the minimum amount of money spent by migrants to cover their travel expenses was 10,000 Ethiopian Birr and the maximum was cost 750,000) Ethiopian Birr. Qualitative study participants also noted the amount money paid to finance irregular migrants varies from time to time as well as depending on the mode of travel. In some cases, migrants were charging a higher amount of additional payments by the smugglers to cross borders and/or families requested to send money to pay bribes for border crossing and to get out of prison their migrant members along the routes to RSA. Thus, those participants who migrated in the early 2000s indicated that the overall cost of migration ranges from 20,000 to 67,000 Ethiopian Birr. The amount of money to cover travel costs has increased in recent years. A participant who was deported after two years of prison in Tanzania noted that he paid a total of 120,000 Ethiopian in 2017 for the land route travel to South Africa. They indicated the current market price of migration has alarmingly increased to reach 500,000 to 600,000 Ethiopian Birr for the land route and 800, 000 to 1,000,000 Ethiopian Birr for the flight mode of travel.

#### **4.3.2. The Culture of Migration**

Scholars define the culture of migration from different contexts and perspectives. Some scholars define the culture of migration in the context of cumulative causation as stated by Kandel and Massey (2002): “international migration is cultural in the sense that the aspiration to migrate is transmitted across generations and between people through social networks”. Horváth (2008) similarly defined a culture of migration refers to the 'changes in values and cultural perceptions' brought about by previous migratory experiences within a given community with a long migration history. In this context, persisting migratory behaviours can become referential behavioural repertoires, guiding and driving the decisions made by social actors (Massey *et al.*, 1993). According to Ali (2007), conception of migration culture includes concepts, practices, and cultural artefacts that promote the celebration of migration and migrants, such as beliefs, desire, symbolism, myths, education, and migration celebrations in various media and tangible products. The importance of remittances in enhancing migrant culture is also emphasised (Kumpikaite-Valiuniene *et al.*, 2021).

The act of emigrating is not an isolated occurrence, but is linked to societal beliefs and values, that shape and are shaped by situations in the home country setting, which function as driving forces behind migratory actions and further reinforce attitudes about migration (Horváth, 2008).

Thus, we comprehend migration culture in accordance with Horvath's concept, which claims that a migratory culture matures into a cultural fact in the communities of origin, comprising significant changes in the value systems of the sending societies. Therefore, this part of the study explores the specific cultural norms, values, perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that shape migration decisions to urge people to leave from the Kembata community to South Africa.

In this part, fifteen items were used to gather data on the perceptions and cultural values of households towards migration. Factor analysis was employed to determine the logical subsets of items and identify factors extracted into dimensions. In this study, three factors were extracted based on Eigenvalue greater than one. The first factor that is related to cultural values of the society include the consideration of migration as normal life representing a stage in the transition to manhood, non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage, level of families involvement in the migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves, the cultural values of the society that are encouraging and positively supporting migration, currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination, and migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles.

As shown in Table 4.9 below about 35.4% the respondents strongly agree and 35.1% of respondents agree with the mean value of 2.21, in the study area migration is considered as a normal part of life representing a stage in the transition to manhood for the young. This result is in line with Massey *et al.* (1994) and Kendall and Massey (2002), which stated the 'culture of migration' perceives migration as assuming distinct symbolic roles within a specific society. Initially perceived as a potential, discretionary, or desirable practice, migration can evolve into a vital and imperative social undertaking, nearly obligatory for specific social groups. For instance, it can manifest as the primary indicator of the transition into adulthood, possessing functions akin to a traditional rite of passage. In the case of Mexicans, while employment in the United States holds great significance as a rite of passage for young men, offering them freedom, economic autonomy, and the potential for exciting new experiences, it does not possess the same allure for young women (Cerrutti & Massey, 2001). Horváth (2008) further elaborates that contemporary industrialised societies encompass the process of transitioning into adulthood through two primary domains: education and the labour market. However, for rural youth,

pursuing further education at the tertiary level lacks appeal, as local employment prospects remain precarious. The youth perceive migration as a prospect that may harbour higher economic potential, even though it may be overshadowed by potential negative consequences associated with the nature of work and employment status that migration entails.

About 33.9% of respondents strongly agree and 33.5% of respondents agree with mean value 2.23 which perceived that non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage among the society in the Kembata area. This finding is also consistent with the empirical studies in other parts of the world such as Ali (2007) in Indian migration to the United States of America; Timmerman (2008) in Turkish migration to Europe; and Kandel and Massey's (2002) study of Mexican migrants to the United States of America. Ali (2007) noted migration, in the Indian context, transforms traditional social relations in India. Migration is not just about economic success, it is also about the status and marriage networks at home, two social concepts that are central to how Indians define their identities.

The criteria for an eligible individual and an esteemed family have undergone drastic changes. Likewise, Kandel and Massey (2002) uncovered that Mexican immigrants to the United States exert a profound influence on the social values of prospective migrants in Mexico. Those who choose not to pursue migration are perceived as indolent, lacking entrepreneurial spirit, and unappealing as potential partners. The social standing of migrants surpasses that of non-migrants, thus prompting migration to become the most expedient means of augmenting one's desirability in the marriage market or elevating their status value as a potential mate. Timmerman's (2008) finding in Emirdag, Turkey, also corroborates the younger generation perceiving the benefits of marriage migration as being closely tied to the opportunity of residing in a modern, democratic, and prosperous nation. Specifically, men are driven to emigrate with the aim of enhancing their socio-economic circumstances. They hold a strong belief that Western Europe offers greater ease in terms of earning a livelihood.

**Table 4.9: Response on perceptions towards migration**

Items	SA (%)	A (%)	U (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	St.dev.
1. Migration is considered as a normal part of life representing a stage in the transition to manhood.	112(35.4)	111 (35.1)	17 (5.4)	66 (20.9)	10 (3.2)	2.21	1.220
2. Migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success.	133 (42.1)	159 (50.3)	13 (4.1)	10 (3.2)	1 (0.3)	1.69	0.724
3. Aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations.	109 (34.5)	157 (49.7)	18 (5.7)	24 (7.6)	8 (2.5)	1.94	0.966
4. Youngsters who do not attempt to migrate are seen as lazy and un-enterprising by the community.	98 (31)	105 (33.2)	27 (8.5)	69 (21.8)	17 (5.4)	2.37	1.272
5. Non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage.	107 (33.9)	106 (33.5)	29 (9.2)	70 (22.2)	4 (1.3)	2.23	1.175
6. Families are more involved in the migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves.	113 (35.8)	161 (50.9)	24 (7.6)	15 (4.7)	3 (0.9)	1.84	0.828
7. The cultural values of the society are encouraging and positively supporting migration where migrants are considered as heroes.	99 (31.3)	117 (37)	36 (11.4)	63 (19.9)	1 (0.3)	2.21	1.102
8. There are some cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants.	92 (29.1)	121 (38.3)	39 (12.3)	53 (16.8)	11 (3.5)	2.27	1.153
9. Migration transforms the traditional idea of marriage and status.	137 (43.4)	117 (37)	18 (5.7)	43 (13.6)	1 (0.3)	1.91	1.028
10. Migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status.	157 (49.7)	109 (34.5)	10 (3.2)	39 (12.3)	1 (0.3)	1.79	1.005
11. Glorification and celebration of migration has an impact on the rate of school dropout.	191 (60.4)	108 (34.2)	7 (2.2)	10 (3.2)	0	1.48	0.697
12. Migrants utilize religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination.	154 (48.7)	142 (44.9)	14 (4.4)	6 (1.9)	0	1.59	0.667
13. Currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination.	93 (29.4)	88 (27.8)	41 (13)	70 (22.2)	24 (7.6)	2.51	1.320
14. Migration enables the family to enhance the family's socio-economic status through remittance.	161 (50.9)	135 (42.7)	15 (4.7)	5 (1.6)	0	1.57	0.661
15. Migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles.	130 (41.1)	94 (29.7)	32 (10.1)	57 (18)	3 (0.9)	2.08	1.148

Note: N=316, SA=Strongly Agree, A= Agree, U= Undecided, D= Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree.

Regarding the cultural values of the society that are encouraging and positively supporting migration where migrants are considered as heroes were agreed by 37% of respondents with mean value of 2.21. This result supports an empirical study by Dereje (2022) on Hadiya, stating the Hadiya people view their relocation to South Africa as a rightful decision, believing that one

should move to where opportunities are abundant. In their eyes, a true hero is not limited to their local community or joins university, but rather someone who ventures beyond these boundaries. This mind set of migration plays a significant role in the perpetuation of migration within the Hadiya community, spanning across generations and both within their home country and internationally. Kandel and Massey (2002) in their study on Mexican migration to the USA argued that it is important to acknowledge that emigrants often continue to shape the cultural narrative and are frequently regarded as role models.

About 38.3% of respondents with a mean value of 2.27 agreed that there are some cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants in the study area. About 29.4% of respondents with mean value of 2.51 strongly agree that currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination. Similarly, about 41.1% of respondents with mean value of 2.08 strongly agree that the society in the study area perceived that migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles.

In-depth interview participants stated that the local community in Kembata had varying perceptions regarding migration. For instance, if an individual is older and has a stable income, their family may discourage them from leaving. Therefore, those who are financially well-off, such as merchants, wealthy individuals, and higher-paid civil servants, are not inclined to relocate to RSA. However, being sitting idle without a job for a young male is considered as laziness and encouraged to migrate and work like his peers. Thus, migration is an accepted normal part of livelihood and a rite of passage to manhood in the society. Non-migrants also appeared less appealing in the marriage market. This is due to the family being willing to accept a marriage request from a groom from South African (*Debubes*) migrant families for their daughter rather than non-migrants that were considered as if she won a “lottery”. Another thing is non-migrants are unable to compete with migrant households in the amount of dowry and gifts offered to the bride's family which is now appealing high.

The cultural values of the society encourage migration and tend to look at South Africa as a land of opportunity. The positive societal values about migration to South Africa also spiritually rationalised that put the country as a ‘land of salvation’ blessed with plenty of opportunity for

Kembatas and their neighbours, Hadiyas. The primary motivation for individuals to migrate is to enhance their quality of life, as they may find it difficult to achieve such improvements in their current location. However, when they migrate, their aim is not only to improve their own lives but also those of their family members and relatives. Migration allows them to work towards their personal goals while also relying on God for their success. In society, respect is predominantly bestowed upon individuals who have achieved significant economic success. Non-migrants themselves are also subject to disdain, as their failure to migrate is seen as a sign of weakness and lack of industriousness, particularly when their peers are engaging in migration.

The second factor is related to migrant related issues such as the cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants, transformation of the traditional idea of marriage and status, migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status, glorification and celebration of migration has an impact on the rate of school dropout, and migration enables the family to enhance the family's socio-economic status through remittance. Based on the result in Table 4.9 above, the culture of migration of the society in the study area was transformed. The traditional idea of marriage and status in the society was strongly agreed by 43.4% of respondents with a mean value of 1.91. This result supports Ali's finding (2007), which stated the fluid nature of societal hierarchy allows the newly wealthy and those striving for upward mobility to attempt to turn their riches into social status. Those who have experienced an increase in wealth often flaunt and distribute their newfound prosperity. The amount of money is utilised for traditional customs such as dowries, wedding expenses, and other important milestones where lavish amounts are spent on elaborate feasts.

In the same vein, about 49.7% of respondents with mean value of 1.79 strongly agreed that migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status that in turn sustains migration aspiration in the study area. This is consistent with Timmerman's (2008) result that indicates the migration phenomenon, particularly the extravagant way of life and lavish expenditures of Turkish migrants during their summer vacations in Emirdag, has created an impression of Europe as a land of abundance and prosperity. This, in turn, led in the society values that glorify and celebrate migrants to rise and contributed to an increased rate of school dropout in the study area as large number of the youth joining the migration was strongly agreed by 60.4% of respondents with mean value of 1.48. However, this result is not consistent

with Timmerman (2008) study in Emirdag, Turkey, as her result put that joining higher education is seen as the most important tool to realise their aspiration to migrate.

About 48.7% of respondents with a mean value of 1.59 strongly agreed that migrants utilise religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination. This result supports Mondain and Diagne (2013) finding that the Wolof society of West Africa uses various institutional and social factors to contribute to the formation of a migratory system, particularly the values that hold significance and receive substantial backing from the religious authorities. Similarly, Dereje (2022) argues that religious rituals were common in the study area and their neighbours, Hadiya, through both globally recognized evangelical pastor and blessings bestowed upon migrants' journey to South Africa by local church leaders. He elaborates that in 2001, Pastor Peter Youngren revealed a prophecy that depicted God opening a southern path to Hadiya, enabling people to travel and restore the wealth of Hosanna. Wilson (2010) stated that the cultural aspect of Mexican migration involves the trans-nationalisation of religious rituals such as the utilisation of *compadrazgo* (ritual kinship) to provide assistance during the process of migration and adaptation. Additionally, Catholic rituals play a crucial role in this context. In her monograph, Hagan (2008) illustrates how religious observations, rituals, and icons are employed before, during, and after migration. Prospective migrants may visit churches and make promises to engage in specific behaviours if they successfully reach their destination (Wilson, 2010).

The culture of migration in the study area also transformed as most of the respondents perceived (50.9% with mean value of 1.57) as migration enables the family to enhance their socio-economic status through remittance. This finding also supports Kendall and Massey (2002) result, which argues that people in Mexican communities characterised by high rates of international migration come to see foreign wage labour as a valuable way to improve their economic situation. This allows them to elevate their material standards of living, as well as to invest in consumables and save money. At the same time, remittances sent back by migrants provide a source of starting capital for other households in the community. Because of this, migrants are generally seen as successful and admired by others in the community.

FGD and in-depth interview participants argued that migration to South Africa not only enhanced a household's socio-economic status through remittance but also transformed the

traditional views of social status in Kembata society. Migrants utilise religious performances and rituals before migration to ensure their safe arrival. Thus, the family will gather to bless and raise funds to finance the travel of departing migrants. In the church also there are special prayer sessions for migrants and in return they will send money to the church in form of tithe (*asrat*) and gifts, and to support the destitute. The positive attitudes of migration towards South Africa thrived in the society can be seen from the relative deprivation of non-migrants through remittance to migrant families in the customary practices of marriage, funeral, and changing social index of the society. The societal culture of respect and prestige was now changed and the *Debube* (South African migrant returnees and their families) were accorded better respect and social status. Marriage also becomes a costly business in Kembata society due to the amount of dowry paid and the money invested on wedding ceremonies become unremittingly high. Traditionally, gifts to the bride's family are low that range from 500 to 1000 Ethiopian Birr but now the bride family will receive from 40,000 to 100,000 Ethiopian Birr with different household appliances such as Sofa, Smart TV and others. In turn, they will present such gifts as Apache Motorbike, urban land and others.

The relative deprivation also seen with respect to funerals as migrants' remittance created a sense of competition and inferiority of non-migrants. Participants noted that the introduction of spring water to serve guests during funerals was introduced through migrant households. Another thing is a large sum of money invested for building a burial site cemetery (*hawelt*) and subsequently the amount of feast prepared for its inaugural ceremony. In-depth interview participants noted that RSA migrants invest a huge amount of money for the funeral ceremony and prepare feasts for deceased members of their family. The amount of money invested on funerals is by far too large than the money used for treatment and medication. Serving guests with bottled spring water was also started by RSA migrant families earlier, but that is not the case. In addition, the excessive amount of money spent on the burial cemetery and an iron fence put on the burial was considered as an index of social status that in turn allured the non-migrant household to migrate in order overcome both economic inequality and the new social indices created by irregular migration to South Africa. Consequently, nowadays the cultural attitudes of the general public associate success mainly come from South Africa.

Likewise, the annual celebration of *Masala (Meskel)* witnessed a significant investment of funds, contributing to a sense of deprivation in the society and fostering aspirations for migration to South Africa. *Masala (Meskel)*, or the finding of the True Cross of Christ) is a prominent public celebration marking the New Year. Over time, this institution with its Christian origins has become ingrained in the local culture, blending indigenous and Christian values. The masala festival, celebrated as the New Year festival, holds a significant tradition of offering food and drink sacrifices to ancestral spirits. This ritual takes place on the day following the *Masala* festival, where an ox is sacrificed. On the subsequent day, the head of the family (usually the father) accompanies one of his sons and brings milk, honey, and a portion of the meat to the graveyard. If the grave is old, they would apply a smear of *masincho* tree on it. They would then place the milk and honey on three pieces of *ensete* (false banana) leaves. Those who are able to afford milk and honey offer them, while those who cannot offer what they have available. Therefore, for this annual ritual, the household invests a huge sum of money to buy ox to be sacrificed either independently or in a group. The remittance from South Africa had significantly impacted the balance among households on the level of *Masala* celebration. For migrant households, hundred thousands were remitted for their relatives at RSA to spend on *Masala (Meskel)*, non-migrant households pray on collection of money by the end of the feast until the coming *Meskel*, in extreme case mortgaging land that serve as source of allure to migrate to keep balance with their migrant household neighbours.

Migration to South Africa also created visible gaps in livelihood and social status. One participant during FGDs argued how migration transformed the traditional values of wealth and social status in the area as follows:

There are two things that happened as a result of migration in this area. One is there is a clear difference in terms of livelihood between migrant and non-migrant households. As a result, there is a perception in our community that a person who returned from South Africa is wealthy. This is due to economic progress witnessed in the migrants' household by looking at their houses, household items, cars and their business. The migrant was accorded high respect as "teleq sew" and were non-migrant is given lower status. Before the beginning of migration to South Africa, there were some families which the society accorded them respect and they did not send their families to RSA. However, an index of social status was changed, a high respect and prestige is given now to South African migrants and their families (Participant 04, Interviewed in July 2022).

Therefore, migration has a detrimental impact on student dropout and interest in education. Everyone wants to study now since everyone wants to migrate rather than pursue school to have a grade 8 or 12 document because even joining the military requires a grade certificate. Even a youngster may have formed an interest in migrating to RSA as a child, or it may have become a childhood fantasy. They began forcing their fathers to sell land when they were 16 years old.

The third factor is household related factors like migration is accepted as a vehicle for economic success, aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations, youngsters who do not attempt to migrate are seen as lazy and un-enterprising by the community, and migrants utilise religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination. The result in Table 4.8 shows that households perceived that migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success as 50.3% of respondents agreed and 42.1% of them strongly agreed with a mean value of 1.69. This result conforms to previous study by Meron (2020), which stated migration is frequently portrayed as a feasible option for making a living in the study sites. People's perception of risk can be understood through traditional sayings, which reveal their belief that migration can lead to a better life, despite the risks involved. Horváth (2008) citing Pieke and his colleagues (2004) explained situations where migration became the favoured and coveted approach, disregarding the prospects of connecting with local job markets. In simpler terms, when individuals can efficiently generate resources through migration, their motivation to engage in traditional economic activities may diminish.

In addition, about 49.7% of respondents with mean value 1.94 agreed that the aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations. This finding is consistent with Ali (2007), but the argument of the culture of migration posits that migration is a socially learned behaviour, with individuals acquiring the knowledge and desire to migrate. Ali (2007) citing Kandel and Massey's (2002) research on Mexican migrants in the United States explains that the culture of migration is based on non-migrants observing and seeking to imitate the migratory behaviour of individuals with whom they have social connections. Consequently, the culture of migration is a result of the increased prevalence of migration within a community and the growth of migration networks. Therefore, most of the respondents (33.2% and 31% strongly agree, respectively and the mean value 2.37, had the perception to consider the youngsters who do not attempt to migrate as lazy and un-enterprising by the community. Consequently, families are more involved in the

migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves as 50.9% of respondents or the mean value of 1.84 answered agreed and 35.8% of them strongly agree.

In-depth interviews and FGD participants indicated that migration is considered a major livelihood option to achieve economic success. Migration is not new to Kembatas. Due to population pressure in the area, people used to migrate internally at least since the 1940s into different neighbouring towns such as Shashemene and Arsi Negele after 1960s to the major sugar plantations in Wonji and Metehara. However, with the opening of the door to South Africa in the 1990s, the Kembatas are primarily heading to RSA. Currently, network migration to South Africa became robust and economic success of migrants made the society believe success largely comes from South Africa.

In addition, a test of correlation was conducted to investigate the presence of a significant relationship between individual and/or household level variables and the perceptions of migration culture in Kembata-Tembaro Zone. As the data failed to meet normality assumption, a Spearman correlation was used to test the relationship between interval/ratio scale variables. The result of the Spearman correlation coefficient (in the appendix IV) shows the presence of weak negative correlation between age of respondents and their perception towards migration ( $p = .026$ ). Family size and educational status of respondents have weak positive association with perceptions towards migration with  $p$ -value 0.004 and 0.224<sup>\*\*</sup>, respectively. There is a moderate relationship between households' monthly income and their perceptions towards migration ( $p = .30$ ). This may be due to the change in the nature of smuggling business and migrant sponsorship. Currently, migration brokers as well as sponsors who cover all the travel cost for migrants are operated from South Africa. A qualitative study by Yordanos & Freeman (2022) based on the Ethiopian migrants from Southern Ethiopia cites recent migration has connection to the labour markets demand at South Africa by the former settled Ethiopian emigrants' as they call them "bosses". Thus, the recruitment of additional labour from home was associated with the transformation of their informal business at South Africa from door-to-door into tuck-shop business lead to an increased demand for reliable labour and further expansion of the tuck-shop business in to different corner of the township was another incentive for extra labour recruitments by the "bosses".

As previously stated in the beginning of this section, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is made to extract and identify the variables. Thus, in this section, the 15 items acquired in the analysis of respondents' perceptions of migration of youth from Kembata-Tembaro Zone towards the Republic of South Africa. Cronbach's alpha is used to evaluate the reliability of a questionnaire. It gives a straightforward method for determining whether or not a score is credible. It is used under the idea that several items assess the same underlying construct; for example, in perceptions towards migration from Kembata areas, there are a few questions that all ask various things, but when aggregated, can be said to measure overall migration perceptions. Internal consistency is measured by Cronbach's alpha and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient greater than 0.7 is measured as acceptable. The item of factor studied and the scale used has a Cronbach's Alpha score of 0.841, indicating that the responses are trustworthy and can be used to generalise the items evaluated for this study.

Factor analysis consists of three basic steps of data appropriateness assessment, factor extraction, and factor rotation and interpretation. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is used to assess the appropriateness of data for factor analysis while analysing migration perception. Similarly, the Bartlett's test of Sphericity, correlation matrix, and determinant score are performed to determine whether the data set is suitable for running factor analysis. The correlation matrix (in appendix V) shows that there are enough correlations to justify using factor analysis. The correlation matrix reveals that there are few items with inter-correlations greater than 0.3 between the variables, implying that the predicted factor model looks to be appropriate. The determinant value is a crucial test for multicollinearity. The correlation matrix's determinant score is  $0.010 > 0.00001$ , indicating that there is no multicollinearity.

Table 4.10 shows that the KMO statistics value is  $0.824 > 0.6$ , indicating that the sample is suitable and the factor analysis is appropriate for the data. The correlation matrix's adequacy is tested using Bartlett's Sphericity test. The Sphericity test by Bartlett is very significant at  $p < 0.001$ , indicating that the correlation matrix has substantial correlations among at least some of the variables. The test value in this case is 1414.449, and the related degree of significance is less than 0.0001. As a result, the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix fails. The significant result of  $< 0.05$  indicates that a factor analysis for the data set may be useful.

**Table 4.10. KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity**

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.		.824
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. Chi-Square	1414.449
	df	105
	Sig.	.000

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The number of initial unrotated factors to be retrieved is determined using Kaiser's criterion and the Scree test. The variation explained by those individual linear components is represented by the eigenvalues associated with each factor. The presentation of any factor loadings with values less than 0.5 is muted since the coefficient value is less than 0.5.


**Table 4.11. EigenValue (EV) and Total Variance Explained**

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %	Total	% of Variance	Cum. %
1	4.823	32.152	32.152	4.823	32.152	32.152	2.982	19.881	19.881
2	1.667	11.115	43.267	1.667	11.115	43.267	2.579	17.191	37.073
3	1.298	8.653	51.921	1.298	8.653	51.921	2.227	14.848	51.921
4	.965	6.435	58.356						
5	.860	5.736	64.092						
6	.845	5.633	69.725						
7	.744	4.958	74.684						
8	.688	4.584	79.268						
9	.617	4.113	83.381						
10	.570	3.800	87.181						
11	.467	3.117	90.297						
12	.443	2.952	93.250						
13	.379	2.524	95.773						
14	.343	2.285	98.058						
15	.291	1.942	100.000						
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Cum. means Cumulative.									

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The eigenvalues and total variance explained are shown in Table 4.11. The principal component analysis extraction method was employed in this study for factor analysis. Fifteen linear components are discovered within the data set prior to extraction. After extraction and rotation, the data set has three different linear components with eigenvalues greater than one. The three components are retrieved and account for 51.92% of the overall variation. It is proposed that at least 50% of the overall variation be explained by the retained components. The results suggest that three factors can explain 51.92% of the common variance shared by fifteen variables. This reflects the KMO score of 0.824, which is deemed good and also suggests that factor analysis is beneficial for the variables. This preliminary solution implies that the final solution will only extract three components. With an eigenvalue of 4.823, the first component explained 19.881% of the overall variance. With an eigenvalue of 1.667, the second component explained 17.191% of the variance. With an eigenvalue of 1.298, the third component explained 14.848% of the variance.

**Figure 4.1. Scree plot**



Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Figure 5 depicts the Scree test with eigenvalues on the y-axis and the 15 component numbers in their sequence of extraction on the x-axis. Large factors with larger eigenvalues are retrieved first, followed by smaller factors. The scree plot is used to assess how many elements to keep. The scree plot reveals that three components have eigenvalues greater than one and account for the majority of the total variability in the data. Other factors account for a very minor part of the variability and are regarded as less important.

**Table 4.12. Summary for factors related to migration perceptions with factor loading**

Factor No.	Factor related Marker	Item No.	Diagonal Anti-image Correlation	Community after Extraction	Factor Loading
1	There are some cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants.	8	0.823	0.598	0.758
	Currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination.	13	0.732	0.425	0.646
	The cultural values of the society are encouraging and positively supporting migration where migrants are considered as heroes.	7	0.839	0.512	0.616
	Migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles.	15	0.900	0.656	0.594
	Migration is considered as a normal part of life representing a stage in the transition to manhood	1	0.896	0.441	0.567
	Non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage.	5	0.804	0.520	0.562
2	Glorification and celebration of migration has an impact on the rate of school dropout.	11	0.752	0.646	0.802
	Migrants utilize religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination.	12	0.775	0.512	0.688
	Migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status.	9	0.886	0.604	0.628
	Migration enables the family to enhance the family's socio-economic status through remittance.	14	0.879	0.403	0.606
	Migration transforms the traditional idea of marriage and status.	10	0.873	0.557	0.564
3	Aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations.	3	0.660	0.591	0.760
	Youngsters who do not attempt to migrate are seen as lazy and un-enterprising by the community.	4	0.769	0.545	0.622
	Migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success.	2	0.752	0.435	0.618
	Families are more involved in the migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves.	6	0.863	0.342	0.551
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.					

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The study used the Principal Component Analysis extraction method and the Varimax orthogonal rotation approach with Kaiser Normalisation. After extraction, Table 4.15 shows factor loading, diagonal anti-image correlation, and communality. The diagonal anti-image correlation tests the understanding of each item's sampling adequacy. After factor extraction, the communalities reflect the common variance in the data structure. Factor loading values convey each variable's link to the underlying factors. The variables that with loadings values greater than 0.50, imply that they are indicative of the factor.

Factor one is named 'Cultural Values of the Society,' and it has six components extracted using the Principal Component Analysis method to identify the most relevant variables that explain the cultural values in the society that explain perceptions towards migration. Accordingly, six variables extracted with factor loading greater than 0.50 have an impact on perceptions of the society towards migration. There are some cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants, currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination, the cultural values of the society are encouraging and positively supporting migration where migrants are considered as heroes. Migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles. Migration is considered as a normal part of life representing a stage in the transition to manhood, and non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage have correlations of 0.758, 0.646, 0.616, 0.594, 0.567, and 0.562, respectively with factor one. With an eigenvalue of 4.823, the factor cultural values of the society explained 19.881% of the overall variance.

The second factor, dubbed 'Migrant Related Factors,' explained 17.191% of the variation with an eigenvalue of 1.667. This factor had five items: glorification and celebration of migration has an impact on the rate of school dropout, migrants utilise religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination, migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status, migration enables the family to enhance the family's socio-economic status through remittance and migration transforms the traditional idea of marriage and status had correlations with factor two of 0.802, 0.688, 0.628, 0.606 and 0.564, respectively.

Factor three is labelled 'Household related factor.' It has four items: aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations, youngsters who do not attempt to migrate are seen as lazy and un-enterprising by the community, migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success, migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success and families are more involved in the migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves each with a correlation of 0.760, 0.622, 0.618 and 0.551 with factor three. With an eigenvalue of 1.298, the third component explained 14.848% of the variance.

In general, this chapter presents the descriptive and econometric results of the drivers of irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Ethiopia to South Africa. The study showed that households considered their decisions to send migrants among family members based on variables such as sex, age, marital status, household size, employment, farmland ownership, presence of family members and friends in the RSA, and the existence of smugglers. The study conclude that most migrants possessed varying levels of prior knowledge or information about migration and the migration decision-making process involves migrants themselves and their families both at home and abroad mainly at the destination. This corroborates with the new economics of labour migration, which assumes households made a favourable decision to send migrants to the RSA due to two interrelated factors: income gaps created by remittances and the rise of cultural values that celebrate migrants. Overall, the study demonstrates that the culture of migration among the Kembatas is primarily driven by a cumulative migration experience facilitated through migrant social networks. Economic incentives, such as prospects of better income and improved living conditions, are the main drivers for individuals to embark on this migratory journey. In addition, social factors, including familial networks, community ties, and remittances from migrants, significantly influence households' attitudes toward migration. In the next chapter the study presents the patterns and effects of irregular migration.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: PATTERNS AND EFFECTS OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION**

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the trends of irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa and seeks to describe the characteristics of migrants based on the demographic and socio-economic traits of their households. This subsection highlights key demographic and socio-economic aspects of the households involved in the study to give a comprehensive overview of the migrants' families. The following two subsections explore the spatial and temporal trends of irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa over the past twenty-five years. The second part addresses the impact of irregular migration on the migrants themselves, their families, and the local area under study. This chapter addresses the following two objectives of the study. The first objective is to assess the trends of irregular migration from the study area to the Republic of South Africa. And, the second is to examine the effects of irregular migration on migrants, their families and the places of origin.

### **5.1. Patterns of Irregular Migration**

This section examines the trends of Ethiopian migration to South Africa, emphasizing the demographic and socio-economic attributes of migrant households, alongside the spatial and temporal patterns observed among the Kembata migrants.

#### **5.1.1. Demographic and Socio-economic Profiles of Migrants**

This subsection discusses key demographic and socio-economic traits of the households involved in the study to provide an overview of the migrants' families. The survey results indicated that a significant majority of migrants (97.5%) are male (see Table 5.1), highlighting the influence of gender on participation in irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa. The age distribution shows that most migrants fall within the 25-34 year age range, followed by those aged 35-49, indicating a concentration of individuals in their productive years. Additionally, the marital status data from the cross-sectional survey revealed that a substantial portion (60.1%) of the migrants are married, and most (89.2%) had achieved secondary education or lower at the time of migration.

**Table 5.1: Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of migrants**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Sig.</b>
<b>Sex</b>	Female	8	2.5	.000
	Male	308	97.5	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Age</b>	15-24	53	16.8	.000
	25-34	134	42.4	
	35-49	114	36.1	
	50-64	13	4.1	
	Above 65	2	0.6	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Marital Status</b>	Single	122	38.6	.000
	Married	190	60.1	
	Divorced	2	0.6	
	Widowed	2	0.6	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Educational Status</b>	Don't write and read	9	2.8	.000
	Read and write only	70	22.2	
	Primary Education	82	25.9	
	Secondary Education	120	38.0	
	Certificate	11	3.5	
	Diploma	16	5.1	
	Degree and above	7	2.2	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>99.7</b>	
	Missing	1	0.3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>		
<b>Place of Birth and Residence</b>	Rural	185	58.5	.003
	Urban	131	41.5	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
<b>Employment status</b>	Employed	261	83	.000
	Unemployed	55	17	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Type of occupation</b>	Government Employee	14	4.4	.000
	Farmer	102	32.3	
	Merchant	71	22.5	
	Private/NGO employee	11	3.5	
	Daily labourer	74	23.4	
	Student	21	6.6	
	Private business	99	31.3	
	Unemployed	34	10.8	
<b>Total</b>				
<b>Family size</b>	Mean= 6.16	Min=1	Max=16	.000
<b>Monthly Income</b>	Mean= 2313.95	Min=500	Max=5400	.000
<b>Land Size (in Hectare)</b>	Mean= 0.89854	Min=0.01	Max=4	.013

Source: Own Household Survey, 2022

The survey result shows that the majority of irregular migrants (97.5%) to the Republic of South Africa are male (Table 5.1). The Binomial test result also confirms there is a significant difference in the proportion of male and female migrants (P-value = .000). The lower proportion of female migrants might be related to: the nature of travel through irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa which is characterised by long travel by car and on foot that took a couple of months and contains a perilous journey by crossing the national boundaries of different African states; and the dangerous and laborious nature of the job at the Republic of South Africa did not encourage females to migrate. The FGD discussion results with migrant returnees also corroborate these ideas. They stated the Republic of South Africa is considered an imagined land only for male migrants due to the risks encountered both along the journey and in the destination. Therefore, the female migrants preferred destinations are the Arab Gulf States due to the safest mode of travel made through air flight and they are employed in the domestic works unlike the arduous door-to-door trade by carrying materials like blankets and curtains by male migrants in the Republic of South Africa.

As can be seen from the survey result of Table 5.1, the dominance of males in the irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa is evident. Similar studies (Teshome, 2010; Solomon, 2011; Habte, 2015; Asmelash & Litchfield, 2019; Girmachew, 2019; Tekalegn, 2021a) also revealed that irregular migration was dominated by males due to the risky nature of journey, the hardships migrants' encountered along the route to the destination as well as the life risking and laborious nature of the work in the townships of South Africa. However, informants indicated that in recent years females also joined the migration to the Republic of South Africa through marriage and to work in the tuck-shops. An empirical study by Yordanos and Freeman (2022) also witnessed the change in the demographic profile of Ethiopian migrants' to the Republic of South Africa over the past 25 years. They stated recently female migrants are heading to the Republic of South Africa through the marriage market and due to labour demand in the informal economy of South Africa established by Ethiopian emigrants with the transformation of their door-to-door business into a tuck-shop business.

Age is another major demographic variable that should be assessed as migrants' age composition is vital to understand which migrant age groups are vulnerable to irregular migration. From the

cross-sectional survey, it is possible to assume the majority of irregular migrants to the Republic of South Africa are found in the productive age categories. As Table 5.1 shows about 42.4 % of migrants' are between the 25-34 ages range, while 36.1% of them are between 35-49 years and 16.8% of migrants' age ranges between 15-24 years. The result of Chi-square test (P-value = .000) also witnessed the presence of statistically significant difference in the proportion of migrants age categories. Accordingly, 99.4% of migrants are economically active working age groups. Even though the occurrence of migration can be seen at all age levels, a number of migration studies have revealed that the age level of the majority of migrants are concentrated in the young adult age groups (Tadesse, 2012; Habteyes, 2016; Wondimu, 2016; Nyikahadzoi *et al.*, 2019; Stocchiero, 2017). FGD participants are mentioned some of the reasons for why majority of migrants to RSA are young adults are due to the difficulty of long journey on foot and by car needs a physical maturity to survive, the high amount of money required by the brokers to finance their migration and the difficult nature of work at the destination.


Marital status is another demographic characteristic that affects the decision of an individual for migration. With regards to marital status, the survey result indicated that the majority (60.1%) of migrants are single and married (38.6%) together constitute about 98.7%. The divorced and widowed group constituted the lowest percentage of migrants, about 0.6% each. The Chi-square test result (P-value = .000) indicates the presence of statistically significant difference in the proportion of migrants across the marital status. Similarly, other studies (Bisrat, 2014; Wondimu, 2016; Habte, 2015; Ashenafi & Melese, 2020) indicated that the tendency to migrate is higher among singles or unmarried groups due to relatively minimal responsibility they had as compared to the married groups.

Several factors are pointed out by the FGD participants and in-depth interviews for the dominance of singles. The first one is that it is relatively easier to migrate for one who is single than married. The second is the changes in the system of migration financing, earlier migrants were married young adult migrants that were able to finance their migration on their own due to the assets they possess including the land. However, currently migration is financed through family and friendship networks of earlier migrants and/ or through debt migration financing by the brokers, both settled at the destination. Consequently, the dominance of young unmarried groups in the irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa mainly established due to even

the teenagers are joining the migration either through sponsorship of relatives at RSA or forcing their family to cover the cost of their migration unless they coerced them to join in the military.

When we look into the level of education of the respondents (in the Figure 5.3 below), the majority of them completed secondary (38%) and primary education (25.9%). The result of these two groups indicated that the majority (63.9%) of irregular migrants to the Republic of South Africa attended the primary and secondary levels. These groups are followed by those who have basic literature or are able to read and write (22.2%). About 5.1% of them are diploma graduates and 2.2% of them have degrees and above. The Chi-square test result (P-value = .000) indicates the presence of significant difference in the proportion of educational attainment of migrants. This result conforms to the previous studies (Ashenafi & Melese, 2020; Zerihun & Asnake, 2018; Asmelash & Litchfield, 2019) that the highest educational status by most migrants are primary and/ or secondary education.

**Figure 5.1: Educational Level of Migrants**



Source: Own Household Survey, 2022

The educational status of migrants, mainly primary or secondary school may suggest that there is a high level of school dropout and thus, most migrants are more likely those individuals who dropped out of their education either before their migration or during their migration. FGD discussants also stressed that currently students are attending their learning half-heartedly as everybody aspires to migrate. Their focus on education has seriously declined and most of them unwillingly even complete grade 8 and/or grade 12 due to family pressure.

The place of birth and residence is another demographic characteristic that affects the decision of an individual for migration. The survey results in Table 5.1 show that about 58.5% of migrants' originated from the rural areas while about 41.5% of migrants' place of birth and residence are in the urban areas. The result of Binomial test shows a significant difference in the place of birth and residence between rural and urban with (P-value= .003). Key informants and FGD discussants also noted an increase in the number of migrants from urban areas relative to the number of urban residents due to the growth of urbanisation in the areas. As a result, the former rural *kebeles* are currently upgraded to emerging towns while others become *woredas* centres. In addition, a study by Kelemework *et al.* (2017) also shows the vulnerability of urban youth to irregular migration as they are more exposed to migration information and influence. In this regard, key informants noted that the expansion of telecom services like the internet provide the youth an opportunity to acquire sufficient information by using the internet cafes in the *woreda* towns or even by using data service with the smart phones at hand. This assisted the earlier migrants to attract their friends or family members at home by inviting them to visit their business through virtual platforms like imo, viber or what's app. Thus, the former hearsay about RSA mainly from brokers, migrant returnees and their families now complemented and/ or even substituted with a more advanced virtual information systems among the aspiring youth migrants.

In understanding the drivers of migration, assessing important demographic variables like occupation type and income of the migrants have great importance. The survey result revealed that the majority of respondents (83%) were employed before their migration, while about 17% of them were unemployed. The result of the Binomial test (P-value= .000) indicates the presence of a statistically significant difference between employed and unemployed. About 24% of the respondents were employed in more than one occupation. The major occupations of migrants

before their migration to RSA include farming (32.3%), private business (31.3%), daily labourer (23.4%), merchant (22.5%), government employee (4.4%) and private or NGO employee (3.5%). The mean monthly incomes of migrants were 2313.95 birr with minimum 500 birr and monthly maximum income was 5400 birr. The Chi-square test result (P-value= .000) also shows that there is a significant difference in the median income of migrants compared with the median income in the country. This conforms to the study by Zerihun and Ansake (2018) point that unemployment and low income are among the push factors for migration in search of better life and to support families.

Lastly, in the survey there was an attempt to assess the family size and land size distribution of migrant households. With regard to family sizes, it ranges from 1 to 16 with an average of 6.16. Thus, the sampled households' size in the study area are well above both from the SNNPR and Kembata-Tembaro zone's total, which are 4.9 and 5.5, respectively (BoFED, 2019). The Chi-square test (P-value= .000) confirms there is a significant difference between the median family size of migrant households and the median family size of Kembata-Tembaro Zone. This implies the existence of high population pressure on the available resources in the study area. FGD and in-depth interviews participants stressed that high population pressure coupled with shortage of farmlands forced the youth to opt migration both internal as well as international as its last resort. Land is the basic productive resource for agricultural activity that is scarcely distributed across the respondents. The mean land size of migrants' households is 0.898 hectare and the minimum and the maximum land possession is 0.01 hectare and 4 hectare, respectively (as shown in the above Table 5.1). The Chi-square result (P-value=.013) indicates there exists a significant difference in the average farmland size of migrant households as compared to the national average household farmland size.

### **5.1.2. Spatial Patterns of Irregular Migration**

The spatial patterns of international migration from Africa are largely shaped by colonial and linguistic ties (Idemudia & Klaus, 2020). However, Ethiopia does not share this pattern with African or European countries having never been colonised. Therefore, migration patterns from Ethiopia do not have a well-defined route and Ethiopians are dispersed over different continents (Girmachew, 2021). The pattern of migration in Africa is largely irregular, and the Republic of South Africa is one of the major destinations for irregular migrants in Africa (UNCTAD, 2018).

Most Ethiopian migrants from the southern parts of the country have been heading along the southern route to the Republic of South Africa as their final destination. About 96.2% of Ethiopian irregular migrants from Kembata had only one aim when they migrated and that was to land in the Republic of South Africa. Still a few migrants (3.8%) aspired to migrate beyond and through the Republic South Africa into the Global North mainly to the United States of America, Europe and Australia (See Table in Appendix VI). Most research participants during interviews and FGDs frequently raised the Republic of South Africa as their solitary dream in their pursuit of better life opportunities since the mid-1990s. Thus, their migration to Republic of South Africa is primarily economic in content but the prospects to reach the destination was justified spiritually as prophesied by the pastors during the farewell ceremony of the departing migrants as well as a failure in the process of migration was considered as a *fait accompli*.

Spatially, the Republic of South Africa has remained the major destination for Ethiopian migrants over the past 25 years with only a few targeting it as a transit to the European and North American states (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022). A similar study in the neighbouring Hadiya by Dereje (2022), underscored the presence of a strong spiritual rationalisation of irregular migration to the Republic of South Africa that was positioned in the prophetic tradition of evangelical Christianity. Here are two ways in which spirituality manifested in the process of migration. The first is related to the prophecy revealed by a globally situated evangelical arrived to Hosanna in 2001(Canadian Christian Evangelist, Pastor Peter Youngren) in a religious conference attended by the Hadiya and neighbouring Kembata. He revealed that “I saw a vision of God opening a southern route to Hadiya through which people will go and bring back prosperity to Hosanna”, and this was followed by a peaked irregular migration from Hadiya and Kembata to the Republic of South Africa in the early 2000s. The second is related to the local church leader’s practices of blessing the departing migrants (Dereje, 2022).

A sizable number of Ethiopians migrate to the Republic of South Africa through irregular migration in spite of the perilous journey involving the crossing of international borders of many African countries. The reasons for choosing an irregular mode of migration include cost effectiveness compared to the regular routes (76.3%), the lengthy and costly bureaucracy of regular migration (50.3%), lack of possibility to enter to RSA through regular routes (39.9%), persuasion by the brokers (35.4%) and the difficulty to get an entry visa to RSA (30.1%).

Likewise, Tekalegn (2021b) and Girmachew (2021) argue that irregular migration is preferred over regular channels due to regular migration being highly challenging and unaffordable to the poor.

During in-depth interviews, informants noted that the travel to the Republic of South Africa through the regular mode is impossible partly due to the difficulty to fulfil the legal requirements particularly to get RSA visa to travel through the regular channel and partly the legal mode is time taking, challenging and expensive to the poor. As a result, the easiest and preferable way to reach RSA is to depend on the service of the brokers that is cost effective, affordable and time saving. Similarly, during focus group discussion with experts of Labour and Social Affairs Office at Doyogena they point out the reasons for migrant's preference of irregular mode of migration as follows:

The major mode of migration to RSA is irregular because there is no bilateral agreement between the governments of Ethiopia and RSA for legal migration. Therefore, there are no legal ways to go and work in RSA. It is also challenging and prohibiting getting an entry visa to RSA. Here the broker is the only way for migrants' to reach RSA. Another reason for why migrants preferred broker is the cost is affordable as it provides alternative modes of travel (air and land routes) and payments are also made either by mortgaging land or in cash paid in terms (mostly part of payment at the beginning of the journey and the rest when the migrant arrive at RSA). Another is the lengthy legal procedure to get paper documents, for instance, you need to wait a minimum of three months to get a passport. As a result, brokers remained the reliable service providers for aspiring migrants to realise their dream to migrate into the RSA (Participant 25, Interviewed on August 2022).

Consequently, a few irregular migrants possessed the necessary legal documents during their migration to the RSA. The survey result in Table 5.2 shows that about 42.1% of migrants had only a passport, 29.4% had both legal passport and visa, and about 28.5% of migrants had possessed either passport or visa. During in-depth interviews, informants noted that the visas possessed by most migrants are either forged or accessed by brokers through bribes in the transit posts like Moyale. Legal documents like passports and visas have nothing to do for migrants who went on foot journeys. The land route sojourners also advised to destroy and throw out their passport by the smugglers to minimise the risks of deportation in case of capture by police along the route and it has nothing to do for the asylum application process for migrants at RSA.

The patterns in the modes of transport and the migration routes used by Ethiopian migrants have also changed over time. The migrants used one or more modes of transport system that combined the land route (foot travel, car and motorbike), water transport using boats, and air flight. The survey result (in Table 5.2) shows that the majority of emigrants used mixed modes of transport systems within the land route such as foot travel (77.5%), car (75%) and motorbike (2.8%). While about 21.5% of migrants used aeroplanes, 49.7% of them used boats on their way to the RSA. During in-depth interviews participants indicated that as the air flight is expensive, the majority of migrants went on through the land route that employs the travel by car, and on foot. While others, still mix part of their travel through air flight and the remaining done over land. Moreover, the air flight mostly used by females (commonly the wives and/or prospective wives of established Ethiopians at RSA) and the majority of male migrants preferred mode of travel to RSA is the land route as it is cheap compared to air flight and does not require having legal documents (like passport and visa). The modes of transport used involve public transport cars from origin via Hawassa to Moyale, and foot travel and using tiny boats over lakes and the Indian Ocean as well as the use of sealed container trucks and cargo trucks with loads of grain like maize. Therefore, most Ethiopian migrants mainly travel on foot or in vehicles, some migrants who can afford to fly part of their entire journey (Meron, 2020; Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

The pattern of irregular migration from Ethiopia is also determined by the states of policy restriction on mobility. Through the land routes the migrants from Kembata areas move from Hossana via Dilla to the Ethio-Kenya border town of Moyale. From Moyale they cross the borders of Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to enter the Republic of South Africa. The majority of migrants indicated that internally within Ethiopia they usually travel through Hossana via Hawassa to Moyale highway and the changes in the patterns of land routes began to vary after Moyale. For instance, 69% of survey participants noted that they used the route from Moyale through Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique to the Republic of South Africa. About 16.1% used a direct flight from Addis Ababa to Republic of South Africa, others (9.5%) used the route pass through Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia to Republic of South Africa and still some groups of migrants (5.4%) went through Kenya, DRC, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to Republic of South Africa.

As FGD participants noted the routes are changing frequently due to stricter government control. The pattern of frequent changes not only limited to the land routes but also to the flight mode. Earlier migrants used a direct flight from Addis Ababa to Johannesburg or from Addis Ababa either used Nairobi, Maputo, Harare, or Lilongwe as a transit to RSA or employed mixed mode as they finished the remaining part of the trip over the land route. However, nowadays the government's tight controls forced them to change the flight direction through long and more costly routes like through Dubai or via West African states like Nigeria and Guinea.

The choice of the routes and the mode of transport systems used by irregular migrants are also influenced by a complex family and social networks, and finally negotiated with and arranged by the smugglers. The patterns of migrants preference of the routes through which they travelled to RSA (as shown in Table 5.2) depends among others on smugglers choice (45.3%), recommendation of the route by family networks (44%), migrants perception of the route as easier to travel (40.2%), safety of the route (27.2%) and cost effectiveness and affordability of the route (20.6%). Informants during in-depth interviews noted that the choice of migration routes mainly depends on the brokers, and the economic capability of migrants. Initially, the choice of flight or land route by the migrants depends on the agency of brokers. All the travel process of irregular migration including arranging the necessary paperwork, mainly false travel documents for flights, or arranging the transport, searching the safe land route and bypassing the border check points either through bribes or hiding migrants are impossible businesses to achieve without the brokers. The second consideration on the choice of the route is the economic capability of migrants. As the flight mode is unaffordable and challenging to fulfil the necessary legal requirements, most migrants preferred the land route. The flight mode is used by a few numbers of earlier migrants, by females and the second or succeeding male migrants from the household as the cost of travel financed by the first migrants established at RSA. Therefore, the choice of the route and arrangement of transport and other facilities for irregular migrants are prepared by informal local smugglers (*delalas*) (Frouws & Horwood, 2017).

The data summarised in Table 5.3 below indicates that an overwhelming majority of migrants (90.5%) sought the aid of smugglers or brokers for their journey to South Africa. Approximately 57% of these migrants engaged different smugglers at various stages of the journey, while a quarter (25%) relied on a single smuggler for the entirety of their migration. The consistency in migrants' dependence on smugglers for their South African journey was evident in the survey. Also, the Chi-square test result highlighted that there is no significant variation in the usage of smugglers by migrants during different enforcement periods ( $P > 0.001$ ). The Phi coefficient further corroborates a weak positive correlation between the enforcement period and the reasons for resorting to smugglers ( $\Phi = 0.117$ ). These findings show that there is no difference in the use of brokers for Ethiopian migrants to South Africa compared to those migrating to Europe. As the study by (Tekalign, 2018; Bakewell, Gezahegne, & Sturridge, 2020) indicates Ethiopians irregular migration to Europe via Sudan is facilitated through a network of brokers that operate from origin to the destination.

**Table 5.2: Correlation between time of enforcement and reasons to engage smugglers**

Variables		In the 1990s (n=86)	In the 2000s (n=212)	In the 2010s (n=16)	After 2020s (n=2)	Total (n=316)
Did you use smuggler/s on your travel to the SOUTH AFRICA	No	9(10.5%)	19(9%)	2(12.5%)	0(0.0%)	30(9.5%)
	Yes, only for part of the journey	6(7%)	19(9%)	2(12.5%)	0(0.0%)	27(8.5%)
	Yes, many for different parts of the journey	46(53.5%)	125(59%)	7(43.8%)	2(100%)	180(57%)
	Yes, one for the entire journey	25(29.1%)	49(23.1%)	5(31.3%)	0(0.0%)	79(25%)
<b>Total</b>		86(100%)	212(100%)	16(100%)	2(100%)	316(100.0%)

$X^2$  value=4.339, df=9, p-value=0.888     $\Phi = 0.117$

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The phenomenon of irregular migration to South Africa often involves different mechanisms to traverse international borders along the migratory routes. A considerable portion of respondents (73.1%) managed to evade border controllers to cross national frontiers, while nearly 39.6% admitted to bribing border officials.

The pattern of irregular migration to RSA involves different mechanisms of crossing international boundaries of the states along the routes. As Table 5.2 shows the majority of respondents (73.1%) crossed the borders of states by hiding from border controllers, and about 39.6% of them are through bribing the border guards. During in-depth interviews participants also cited that hiding in the large cargo trucks or sealed containers, travel over swampy areas and lakes with tiny boats, hidden travel through the forests and in the nights, brokers bribing the border controls and police are some of the mechanisms used to cross states borders. The failure will lead to capture and long detention, labour exploitation (long hours of work on farms or *shamba*), deport, or request for additional payment to get release from prison. Thus, there has been a shift in the patterns of migration routes followed and modes of transport used by migrants over the past three decades since the beginning of Ethiopian irregular migration to RSA in the early 1990s. The large number of earlier Ethiopian migrants to RSA completed their journey with no significant risks along the route, relatively in a short period of time, and with or without the help of brokers. However, the choice of migration routes and modes of transport by the current migrants are varied based on the migrants' economic capacity, and their social capital (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022).

### **5.1.3. Temporal Patterns of Irregular Migration**

The emigration of Ethiopians to South Africa began in the mid-1990s, however, a significant number of emigration from the study area began in 2000 with the help of an Ethiopian diplomat working in South Africa, who assisted his kin and relatives to immigrate South (Yordanos & Zack, 2019). The exact figure of migrants is yet unknown but it is estimated that currently, about 300,000 Ethiopian migrants live in South Africa (Tekalign, 2021a; Dereje, 2022). This section considers the temporal patterns of migration in terms of migrants' years of migration experience.

Temporally, the distribution of Ethiopian migrants by the year of their migration experience show that most migrants (67.1%) had migrated to the RSA in the 2000s. While about 27.2% of them immigrated to RSA in the 1990s, about 5.7% of respondents immigrated after 2010 (See Table in Appendix V). During in-depth interviews both informants and experts of Labour and Social Affairs noted that irregular migration to the RSA started in the mid-1990s and increased after 2000. However, migration particularly internal migration and seasonal labour migration was not new to Kembatas. Before the Kembatas have had an experience of internal migration

largely caused by population pressure and land shortages, in search of jobs primarily to the major plantations such as Wonji and Metehara at least since the 1950s and 1960s and while others migrate to neighbouring areas of Shashemene and Arsi Negelle.

The research participants frequently mentioned that the Kembatas joined an international migration to RSA in the early 1990s. The earlier migrants were mostly traders who had friends from Hadiya's (neighbouring people), and from whom they got migration information about South Africa. The main reasons for migration to RSA are economic due to shortage of land, population pressure, and large family size. The beginning of irregular migration from Kembata to the RSA was not entirely attributed to economic factors. One of such non-economic factors mentioned by both the research participants and literature is the political developments (regime changes) in both Ethiopia and the RSA in the first half of the 1990s. In 1991, the downfall of the Derg regime (1974-1990) that restricted exit mobility's followed by liberalised migration policy under the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with relatively relaxed access to passport and other travel documents as well as the government pledged to freedom of movement earmarked by several legal provisions (Germachew, 2019; Dereje, 2022). The fall of Apartheid in 1994 and the dawn of democracy under the African National Congress (ANC) led government in RSA to introduce a liberal refugee law that allowed asylum seekers to claim for temporary asylum status with the right to work and study. This led to the opening of South Africa that followed an increased migration with Ethiopians being among the pioneers in the post-1994 migration to South Africa (Netshikulwe, Nyamnjoh & Garba, 2022; Yordanos & Freeman, 2022).

Most research participants indicated that the immigration of the Kembatas to South Africa increased significantly in the early 2000s, a finding supported by existing literature on this migration trend. While economic pressures were a primary driver for migration, other factors such as political networks, migration culture, and the spiritual aspects of migration also played crucial roles in the rise of Kembatas moving to South Africa (Dereje, 2022). Participants in focus group discussions and in-depth interviews frequently highlighted the significant influence of an Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa, who served as both a facilitator and a key figure in Kembatas' migration. Other studies (Yordanos & Freeman, 2022; Dereje, 2022) noted that the ambassador assisted some of his relatives in immigrating, which helped initiate large-scale

migration to South Africa. As such, he is recognized for establishing political migration networks for both the Hadiyas and Kembatas. The ambassador leveraged Ethiopia's support for the South African independence movement to create these networks, making it easier for migrants to enter South Africa, especially since the late President Nelson Mandela was sympathetic to Ethiopian migrants. Consequently, the Department of Home Affairs was more lenient regarding asylum applications from Ethiopians. Research participants passionately discussed the ambassador's role in encouraging people to migrate for work. They referenced a quote from a parliamentary address by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi: “*Neb yetem zoro wede kefo new marun yemiametaw*” (The bees wherever they go eventually bring honey back to the hive). During his visit to Kembata, the ambassador publicly urged young people to migrate, work, and eventually return home. Furthermore, political instability following the 2005 election contributed to the youth's decision to migrate to South Africa. The income disparities created by remittances from migrants further fuelled the increase in Kembata immigration to South Africa.

The pattern of irregular migration to RSA witnessed a decline in the number of migrants from mid-2018 to 2020 from the time it reached peak in 2005 and 2006. This can be attributed to government strict measures on the local brokers, awareness creation efforts and the coming of COVID-19 pandemic led to implementation of strict border closure by the states. During in-depth interviews the expert of Labour and Social Affairs explained that intensive awareness creation efforts through their offices and IOM provided in each *kebele* as well as by establishing anti-irregular migration clubs in the schools amid increased risks of irregular migration helped for a temporary decline in the number of migrants. As a result, the churches who blessed migrants for safe arrivals to the destination thereby providing spirituality now stopped to bless the departing migrants. The rise of COVID-19 pandemic was another factor that contributed to the decline in the number of migrants as states put a tough border closure and travel bans.

However, the gradual waning of states travel restrictions and border reopening coupled with economic crisis caused by inflation and political instabilities, weak government (both regional and federal level) attention to tackle the problem by reducing unemployment or in absence any effort to regularise this migration route made to reap again the number of irregular migrants to the RSA. In this regard, they mentioned Prime Minister Abiy's visit to RSA in 2020 brought nothing new in regularising the nature of migrations except requests for the safety of Ethiopian

immigrants living at RSA in the face of growing xenophobic attacks on the migrants. As FGD discussants stressed the problem is not information gaps about the risks encountered rather societal attitudes about migration. Therefore, currently everybody aspires to migrate and even the teenage students are joining the migration process by dropping schooling at grade 8 or 10. This was further heightened by fluctuating climatic conditions that led to crop failures in the recent years.

The patterns of migration to the RSA also witnessed some changes in terms of the migration information, decision making process, migration cost and mode of payments over the past thirty years. Research participants cited that the source of information for the pioneer migrants to RSA attributed to merchants who accessed from neighbouring Hadiya while others stressed the role of Ambassador Tesfaye as source of information and door opener. The later migrants provided migration information by the network of families at RSA, the brokers and the households of earlier migrants mainly for the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, in the later times information about South Africa began to be easily and visually accessed through technology like Facebook, Imo and What's app that replaced the previous telephone communication. In the early phase of migration, as participants noted migration decisions were primarily made at family level and the departing migrants were usually blessed their journey by the church elders and/or pastors on the feasts prepared for the farewell ceremony. However, recently an increasing number of teenagers are migrating in absence of such ceremonies; some are still without consultation with their families.

The brokers remained the prominent agents of migration and the sole enablers for migrants to reach the RSA over the past three decades. The amount of money charged by the brokers for their services that included all travel costs of migrants are unremittingly increasing. During in-depth interviews with migrant returnees indicated that the amount of money is relatively cheaper in the early phases as the pioneer migrants paid 3,000 to 6,000 Ethiopian birr (1\$ equal to 6.158333birr= from 487\$ to 974\$) for the land route and from 18,000 to 24,000 birr (2923\$ to 3,897\$) for air flight, however, recently migrants are paying from 500,000 to 600,000 birr (1\$ equal to 51.926703= 9,629\$ to 11,555\$) for the land route and more than 1 million birr (19,258\$) for the air flight.

The amount of money spent by migrants to cover their travel expenses varies based on their preferred mode of travel, which has generally seen an increasing trend over the years. Survey results indicate that the least amount spent by migrants on travel expenses was 1,925.79 USD, while the maximum was 14,443.44 USD. The women were likely to pay the highest fees as they used to travel through safe mode or aeroplane to South Africa.

The earlier migrants mostly covered their travel costs on their own or to some extent with the help of extended family members. Later mortgaging and selling of household assets, primarily land appeared as a reliable means to cover the travel costs. The pioneer migrants were mostly fathers who later sponsored the migration of their elder sons, brothers and other extended family members. This pattern is recently complemented and even substituted by a new source of finance mainly through sponsorship from the RSA by the earlier migrants. The mode of payment also varied as the earlier migrants paid in one instalment in cash or mortgaging their land through long-term lease contract, the recent migrants are paying in two instalments the first before starting their journey and the second as soon as they reached at the RSA. Moreover, migrants over the past decades were charged additional payments along the route.


The patterns of irregular migration to the RSA witnessed some changes over the success of migrants to reach the destination on the expected time. As indicated in the Table 5.3 about 82.9% of respondents successfully reached the destination withstanding the legal barriers and perilous journey, the rest (17.1%) of them failed as they were captured, imprisoned and subsequently deported or still some others are missed along the route. However, the times migrants extend along the journey depend on different conditions such as the mode of travel and tighten or looser states legal barriers. The survey result in the Table 5.5 shows that on average it took about two months and a week (67.82 days) to reach the RSA with some reach in one or less than a day for those travels through air flight and for some it took up to three years of perilous journey mostly on the land route. The majority of migrants complete their journey within six months (93.5%) and a great number still manage within or below three months (79%). A few fortunate migrants along the land route and only those who managed to migrate via air flight were successful to reach the destination within a week (23.7%) and some within a day or half (12.2%). The large number of these migrants (72.9%) reached the destination on their planned date (37%) or

somehow on the expected time (35.9%). About 27.1% of these migrants reached the destination very late from their anticipated date.

As the data failed to meet the conditions for a parametric analysis; hence, a non-parametric Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was employed to evaluate the mean rank distribution of the duration it took for immigrants to reach South Africa, segregated by gender. The analysis revealed a significant variation in the spread of the duration to reach South Africa across genders, with  $U = 993.000$ ,  $p > 0.05$ . Females reached the destination over a short period of time as compared to male counterparts.

The patterns of migration to RSA are not entirely permanent migration and it is characterised by returning migrants to home. As indicated in Table 5.5 the large number of migrants returned to home between 2015 and 2020 (40.7%) and after 2020 (39.7%). In fact, the pattern of return migration began in the early 2000s. About 0.6% of early migrants returned back to home between 2000 and 2005, with a gradually increasing rate as 4.2% of them returned between 2006 and 2010 and 14.7% of them between 2011 and 2015. In-depth interviews with migrant returnees showed that as most of migrants who succeeded to reach RSA are returned to home after working and accumulating capital at least that enable them to start business at home after working for a time that ranges a decade or two. Therefore, most migrants began to return to home after 2005, and with increasing scale after 2015.

**Figure 5.2: Line map for time of departure and return of migrants**



Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The primary reason for return migration as the majority of survey participants (65.8%) noted they need to work and live at home. Other factors for return migration include family visit (11.7%), unable to get opportunities at RSA as expected (7.6%), illness (7%), fear of xenophobic attacks in RSA (6%), and deportation (1.9%). As a result, the majority of them have no plan to return to RSA (79.4%), while a small number of them have not yet decided where to stay (11.7%) and a few of them still aspire to re-migrate into the RSA (8.9%). As FGD and in-depth interview participants mentioned, the primary reason for returning to home is related to the factors that initially caused migration, and what migrants and the society consider the success of migration. Tumebo (pseudonym) aged 45 is one of migrant returnee at Doyogena town noted his experience as follows:

I went to RSA before, around 2005, through a direct air flight to Johannesburg. In RSA, I faced xenophobic attacks several times. I was severely injured and survived but my property was looted and I lost two of my brothers. After I recovered from my injury, I managed to work there and returned home in 2011. Here, I started a small cereal trade and I have no plan to return to RSA. I come here to work and live in my country. Migration to RSA has positively improved

my family life and they are now living better off but we are not happy due to the loss of my brothers as the emotional pain on my family was incurable with whatever economic gain (Participant 02, Interviewed in July 2022).

Another migrant returnee, Tesfaye (pseudonym) aged 62 stated the reason for his return migration as follows: “Initially, when I left Ethiopia, I said goodbye to Ethiopia and I didn't have the intention to return back to Ethiopia. But due to problems at home, especially the pressure and harassment on my wife to take my property forced me to return back to Ethiopia. As a result, I returned back to my family after thirteen years of stay at RSA.” Still another factor for return migration is related to the reasons that initially derived migrants. Desalegn (pseudonym) aged 52, migrant returnee in Doyogena stated that:

As a returnee migrant I think that I was successful to achieve my initial objective of migration. For instance, I have taken two of my sons to work at RSA, and secondly, as most of the people migrate after marriage and having children; their long absence was a waste in their life. However, I took my wife after three years and my marriage survived from divorce and other problems. It was two months after I returned home and I never returned back to RSA. Thus, my assets are my children who I left back in RSA and I came here also with no money because I invested in them. Migration is not good; it seems like slavery because you waste your life. Many of the migrants were killed by robbers through knives and guns. I was spared three times but saved with the help of God but many of them were affected including loss of life, physical injury and look even when there was a time a brother killed his brother only for the sake of business (Participant 07, Interviewed in July 2022).

The first reason why migrants return back to home is achieving economic success that primarily forced them to emigrate to RSA. A successful migrant returnee is not solely defined by their financial gains from South Africa to invest back home; they are also individuals who have facilitated the emigration of their extended family and loved ones, even if they returned without any money. Several factors contribute to the temporary nature of migration, including legal obstacles and security concerns at the destination. Most Ethiopian migrants in South Africa hold asylum status, which requires renewal every three to six months, while many others lack asylum documentation altogether, as noted by several returnees who highlighted the challenges in obtaining South African citizenship. Moreover, they often face a precarious existence in South Africa, dealing with frequent xenophobic attacks. Some returnees described their survival as a "miracle or God's plan," and the limited access to social services further motivates their return migration. Consequently, most participants do not intend to return to South Africa.

## **5.2. Effects of Irregular Migration**

The irregular migration of individuals from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Southern Ethiopia to South Africa has profound effects on migrants, their families, and the communities from which they originate (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013). For migrants themselves, the journey and settlement in a new country bring both challenges and opportunities. On the positive side, migration may offer improved economic prospects, access to better education and healthcare, and exposure to diverse cultures (Oyindamola, Bidemi & Atta, 2023). However, migrants often face significant challenges such as adapting to a new environment, dealing with legal issues and social isolation. The psychological impact of leaving one's homeland and the stress associated with navigating a foreign society can also be substantial (Ambler *et al.*, 2023; IOM, 2021; Petros, 2020; Kassegn & Gashaw, 2017).

Families left behind in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone also experience a range of effects. While some households benefit from remittances sent by migrants (Girmachew, 2019; Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013), there is often a disruption in familial dynamics and a strain on relationships due to physical separation. The absence of family members may lead to increased responsibilities for those remaining, impacting daily life and routines (Tekalign, 2021b; Petros, 2020). The migrant sending communities in the Kembata areas underwent various changes as a result of the departure of significant numbers. Culturally, the departure of community members can lead to a dilution of traditional practices and blending of cultures as individuals adapt to their new surroundings (Petros, 2020; Habte, 2015). On the positive side, returnees may bring back new skills, perspectives, and resources that can contribute to the development of their home communities (Yohannes, 2018; Habte, 2015; Bisrat *et al.*, 2017).

### **5.2.1. Effects on Migrants**

Migrants would face a number of challenges along the routes to South Africa during their journey and in the destination. Migrants were encountered severe challenges during their travel to South Africa. Participants mentioned among others, hunger and thirst (87%), exacted additional high price along the journey (85.8%), violence and abuse (77.8%), robbery and theft (74.4%), beating and torture (70.6%), suffocation and injury through the perilous journey (69.9%), labour exploitation (68.4%), human trafficking (66.5%), kidnapping and ransom

payment (66.1%), missing along the journey (64.6%), arrest and deportation (60.4%), loss of life (59.8%), and capsizing boats (51.9%). This result corroborates to the previous studies along the Southern route in which migrants faced multiple challenges such as night time travel, hiding in the forest, theft, beatings and arrest by the local police (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013), emotional stress, deportation and requested additional payments along the routes (Girmachew, 2019; Ambler *et al.*, 2023), and missing and death due to both natural and human made disasters (Tekalign, 2021b; Yordanos & Zack, 2020).

During in-depth interviews, migrant returnees mentioned the major challenges along the routes in their travel to South Africa include long prison in the transit countries mainly in Tanzania and Malawi from three months to years and followed by deportation back to home with the help of the Ethiopian government and international organisations such as IOM. Other challenges along the routes include illegal crossing of state borders by hiding from border guards and police that need to travel through dense forests, in the night and using weak sheep to cross over the water bodies, and they faced physical exhaustion, emotional stress, hunger, thirst and illness. About the challenging nature of an overland route to South Africa, a 57-years-old migrant returnee stated his experience as follow:

I travelled a long journey to reach Musina, the first place I applied for asylum to the Department of Home Affairs in South Africa. When I reached Musina, I was very tired because I was old. I collapsed due to shortage of food and drinking water as well as hardship along the journey. It is not an exaggeration if I said soft drinks are as plentiful and cheap as water in South Africa. Thus, I took so much soft drink to recover. Though I was employed in the shop, I was unable to work; my skin is becoming dark and darker. The physicians in RSA were White and I was faced with a language problem to communicate with them. I used translators to communicate and the physician told me that my health problem is blood pressure. Along the journey some countries are good and others are bad for migrants to cross. For example, Tanzania and Mozambique are bad for Ethiopians; Malawi is best and helpful for Ethiopians (Participant 01, Interviewed in July 2022).

**Table 5.3: Problems that migrants encountered in their way to RSA**

During our travel to RSA, I encountered	Frequency (%)		
	Yes	No	Total
Robberies and theft	235 (74.4)	81(25.6)	316 (100)
Suffocation and injury through perilous journey	221 (69.9)	95 (30.1)	316 (100)
Hunger and thirst	275 (87)	41 (13)	316 (100)
Arrest and deportation	191 (60.4)	125 (39.6)	316 (100)
Violence and abuse	246 (77.8)	70 (22.2)	316 (100)
Exacted additional and high price	271 (85.8)	45 (14.2)	316 (100)
Human trafficking	210 (66.5)	106 (33.5)	316 (100)
Missing along the journey	204 (64.6)	112 (35.4)	316 (100)
Loss of life	189 (59.8)	127 (40.2)	316 (100)
Kidnapping and ransom payment	209 (66.1)	107 (33.9)	316 (100)
Beating and torture	223 (70.6)	93 (29.4)	316 (100)
Capsizing of boats	164 (51.9)	152 (48.1)	316 (100)
Labour exploitation	216 (68.4)	100 (31.6)	316 (100)

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

However, the experience of those migrants travelling by air flight is different as their major challenge is bypassing the legal requirements required to travel to South Africa that are mostly a business of brokers, who are able to access through bribes or provide bogus documents to their customers. During in-depth interviews with migrant returnees, one of my interviewees said:

I travelled to South Africa through direct air flight. The broker I used here [in Kembata] is a person from my kin and he took me to Addis Ababa and transferred me to a Tigrian broker named Zelalem. In Johannesburg, there was another Hadiya broker who received migrants named Girma. First, we made a flight from Addis Ababa to Tanzania but we were identified then captured and deported back to Addis Ababa that night during transit at Tanzania. The reason for deportation was that we used a fake visa. Before our flight the brokers Zelalem and Girma [now he is here in Addis Ababa as he came for his personal business] instructed us to stamp the forgery visa they gave us in the plane by getting into the toilet room. In Addis Ababa, we were imprisoned and released after one day but our passports were taken from the airport. Then immediately, I called my broker named Iyasu, and I told him I lost my passport. He told me do not worry, nothing happens to you or you do not need to pay any money. He told me that

you will get your passport soon, and until I come to you enjoy your beer. He came in the afternoon around 9 o'clock and he gave me money and my passport. Then, I returned home to visit my wife and my children. After some days, my brother in Addis Ababa gave me a call to return to Addis Ababa for the trip. The second time, we made the first flight to Nairobi. Again due to one of Hadiya migrants showing a wrong paper there all of us were captured and now we were rejected only from our flight to South Africa. However, now the broker in Kenya came to us, he arranged a flight for the next day and we were successfully reached in South Africa through a direct flight from Nairobi to Johannesburg (Participant 04, Interviewed in July 2022).

**Table 5.4: Problems that migrant faced during their sojourn in RSA**

During my stay at RSA, I faced	Frequency (%)		
	Yes	No	Total
Plunder of properties	271 (85.8)	45 (14.2)	316 (100)
Physical and psychological violence	200 (63.3)	116 (36.7)	316 (100)
Heavy workload	224 (70.9)	92 (29.1)	316 (100)
Absence of legal right to work	192 (60.8)	124 (39.2)	316 (100)
Arrest and deportation	125 (39.6)	191 (60.4)	316 (100)
Arrest only	160 (50.6)	156 (49.4)	316 (100)
Labour exploitation	177 (56)	139 (44)	316 (100)
Debt bondage	188 (59.5)	128 (40.5)	316 (100)
Violence and abuse	234 (74.1)	82 (25.9)	316 (100)
Lack of access to social services	179 (56.6)	137 (43.4)	316 (100)
Restricted space for trade	214 (67.7)	102 (32.3)	316 (100)
Risk of corruption by officials	205 (64.9)	111 (35.1)	316 (100)
Xenophobic attacks	259 (82)	57 (18)	316 (100)
Severe working and living conditions	235 (74.4)	81 (25.6)	316 (100)
Robbery and theft	276 (87.3)	40 (12.7)	316 (100)
Burglary	272 (86.1)	44 (13.9)	316 (100)

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Similarly, irregular migrants from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa also faced serious challenges during their sojourn in the destination. As shown in Table 5.4 the majority of respondents stated as they faced robbery and theft (87.3%), burglary (86.1%), plunder of properties (85.8%), xenophobic attacks (82%), severe working and living conditions (74.4%), violence and abuse (74.1%), heavy workload (70.9%), restricted space for trade (67.7%), risk of corruption by officials (64.9%), physical and psychological violence (63.3%), absence of legal right to work (60.8%), debt bondage (59.5%), lack of access to social services (56.6), arrest only

(50.6%), labour exploitation (56%), and arrest and deportation (39.6%). Similar empirical studies (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013; Triandafyllidou & Bartolini, 2020; Yordanos, 2017; Petros, 2020; Yordanos, Zack & Vanyoro, 2019) were support this finding as irregular migrants were exposed to varying level of risks and faced segregations, emotional distress, humiliation, physical injury, and various forms of extortion by officials. Irregular migrants encountered xenophobic attitudes from citizens and immigration officials in the host country, discriminated in social services, and suffered physical violence, harassment and long-time detention by the police in South Africa (Karagueuzian & Verdier-Chouchane, 2014). Moreover, irregular migrants were resented by the jobless Black South Africans for taking from them the small-scale informal businesses in the townships and Ethiopian immigrants' inability to speak English or any other South African languages further exposed them to "money talks", it is they pay money to talk on their behalf on any issues with officials (Yordanos, 2017; Yordanos, Zack & Vanyoro, 2019).

On the other side, the precarious situations faced by the Ethiopian migrants in South Africa arise from the nature of debt financing and the resulting reciprocal relationship between the pioneer and the latter migrants. This can be noted from in-depth interviews with migrant returnees that clearly stated "unlike the earlier migrants I was not engaged in the door-to-door trade rather I began to work in the shop owned by my brother. I was working there until the amount of money he paid to cover the overall cost to South Africa". This kind of debt financing is common for the later migrants by the pioneer migrants and led the rise to reciprocity in financing, hosting and job securing for newcomers, and securing labour services for their business and a means to get relief from the stressful informal tuck-shop business for the established migrants. Yordanos and Zack (2019) also argued that the reciprocal relations in debt financing was turned into exploitation of the new migrants by the pioneer because they sponsored them through provision of loan that could be repaid either in cash or in kind through their labour after they reached South Africa.

**Table 5.5: Prospects of migration on migrants' livelihoods and lives**

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Percent of cases
Has migration brought a major change in your life, livelihood or economy?	Yes	283	89.6	
	No	33	10.4	
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
If you say "yes" to question number 3, what are the major changes? (You can choose more than one option).	My capital has improved	201	24.0%	71.5%
	Self-reliance and supporting family	206	24.6%	73.3%
	Job creation	84	10.0%	29.9%
	Becoming investor	17	2.0%	6.0%
	Sufficient consumption	107	12.8%	38.1%
	To send children to schools	115	13.7%	40.9%
	Supporting extended family members	108	12.9%	38.4%
	<b>Total</b>	838	100.0%	298.2%
After you reached RSA, did you manage to get a job as expected?	Yes, I got it immediately as expected	129	40.8	
	Not as expected	173	54.7	
	No jobs found at all	14	4.4	
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Irregular migration also brought major changes on the migrants' livelihoods and lives as 89.6% of participants replied and only 10.4% replied their emigration to South Africa has no changes in their livelihoods. The major changes brought on migrants' lives also include becoming self-reliant and supporting their family (73.3%), improvement in their capital (71.5%), able to send children to school (40.9%), supporting extended family members (38.4%), being self-sufficient in consumption (38.1%), engaged in job creation in their locality (29.9%), and transformed to be an investor (6%). This result corroborates to the previous studies by (Teshome, Bailey & Teller, 2013) migration improved the socio-economic status of migrants and their households' livelihood through accumulation of assets such as land, livestock, houses, businesses (like hotels, shops, garages) and vehicles. The qualitative response during in-depth interviews with migrant returnees also supports this finding and they narrate that South Africa is a land of opportunity for livelihood improvements vis-a-vis significant risks. This can be clearly seen from the experience of one of the participants interviewed in Leino *kebele* stated that:

After we reached South Africa, we got plenty of opportunities to work and improve our lives. However, we are not safe and there are too many challenges, even risk of losing life due to frequent attacks. The local peoples in South Africa are hostile to migrants, and we do not have rights there because we are migrants. Let me tell you my suffering as an example; I lost two of my brothers who were killed by the robbers in South Africa, while I was physically injured and recovered after eight years. However, the issue is not at all gloomy, look at my family's house that could not have been built like this if we had not migrated to South Africa. The business I am running here is also another positive improvement that comes from the money I brought from South Africa. Once you succeed in reaching South Africa, economically you are beneficiary in two ways, one from better work and income available there, and the second the amount of money you accumulate here in Ethiopia when you send money due to the gaps in exchange rate between the two states (Participant 03, Interviewed in July 2022).

Similarly, empirical studies by Yordanos (2017) confirms the above findings which stated that for the majority of Ethiopian migrants, arrival in South Africa marks the beginning of a new chapter filled with challenges. Since many young male immigrants from Ethiopia and other countries lack formal qualifications, they are compelled to seek work in the informal sector. This presents a new set of difficulties as they not only face competition from fellow immigrants but also encounter resentment from local small-scale businesses and unemployed Black South Africans in townships and other areas. The challenges faced by Ethiopian migrants in South Africa go beyond simply finding employment, as they must also navigate complex social dynamics and overcome prejudices in order to build a better future for themselves.

Regarding the job opportunities at RSA, as shown in the Table 5.5 a large number of respondents replied that they did not get the job in South Africa as they expected (54.7%), while about 40.8% of respondents answered they got the job in South Africa as they expected and 4.4% of respondents replied as they did not found any job at all. In the same vein, during in-depth interviews with migrant returnees, they had mixed reactions about the job opportunities in South Africa. Some put South Africa as a land of bountiful opportunities to improve their livelihood; others reiterated that they did not get the opportunities in South Africa. However, what is commonly told by both groups is their life in South Africa is by far better than here in Ethiopia. As most of these participants agreed, the primarily available job for Ethiopians in South Africa is carrying goods for door to door trade and small scale retail trade in the urban quarters or locations as big scale trade is run by the Chinese, Indians and Pakistanis. Recently, unlike the previous migrants, Ethiopian migrants are employed at tuck shops run by the former migrants from their family or by their co-ethnic groups. In shop business migrants work either paid salary

or work as business partners with a share (whom they used to call the owner of the shop), this enables you to buy the shop from your share after working some years by paying back the amount of money assessed for the shop by the owner.

This finding also confirms Triandafyllidou and Bartolini (2020) that argues irregular migrants joined irregular employment. Therefore, these workers are not covered by social security protections for sickness, work-related injuries, unemployment, or retirement. In some cases, non-compliance with legal regulations may be a deliberate choice by workers seeking immediate cash benefits rather than long-term security provided by social security benefits. However, this decision ultimately leads to their exclusion from the benefits enjoyed by regular workers in the formal economy. It leaves them more vulnerable to exploitation, with weaker enforcement of their labour rights, increased uncertainty about their job security, and a lack of consistent income.

**Table 5.6: The major occupations of migrants engaged in RSA**

If your answer for question number 5 is 'yes', what is your main occupation in RSA?	Frequency (%)		
	Yes	No	Total
Cloth/ belt/mattress retail trade	237 (78.5)	65 (21.5)	302 (100)
Employment in private sectors	18 (6)	284 (94)	302 (100)
Employment in government sectors	2 (0.7)	300 (99.3)	302 (100)
Street vendor	117 (38.7)	185 (61.3)	302 (100)
Employment in other shops owned by kins and peers	260 (86.1)	42 (13.9)	302 (100)

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The household survey result in Table 5.6 above indicates that the major occupations of irregular migrants in RSA include employment in the tuck shops owned by their kins and peers (86.1%), cloth/belt/mattress retail trade (78.5%), working as street vendor (38.7%) and a very few number of migrants (0.7%) replied as they were employed in the government sectors. Similar studies by Yordanos (2017) and Yordanos, Zack & Vanyoro (2019) confirms that as many Ethiopians are becoming employed in the thriving fast fashion informal retail industry alongside local and foreign migrants in prominent urban areas such as Johannesburg and Durban. They are

continuing the legacy of the initial Ethiopian migrants who played a key role in establishing the small-scale retail market in these regions and have achieved significant success in their businesses and finances. The experience of migrant returnees gained during in-depth interviews strengthen this idea as they put that most Ethiopian migrants in South Africa start by taking goods such as blankets and mattresses in credit and they sell door to door in different quarters of the towns. However, this initial business is gradually transformed into shops and other businesses as they adapt to the culture of the host. A quote below from two of migrant returnees interviewed in the study area furthers this view.

Initially I was working in Natal at a place called Dandi then I shifted to Johannesburg. My initial work in South Africa was door to door trade by carrying blankets and other goods in the locations. It is similar to a kind of trade here in Ethiopia known as “suq-bederete”. First, I lost 60,000 birr due to the people whom I gave the goods in credit failed to pay me. But a year later, I was adapting and improving my life. I recovered my business through the money that was worth 30,000 birr through equb (a traditional savings and credit institution with a rotating fund) and I was very happy (Participant 13, Interviewed in August, 2022).

The second participant also narrated as his initial business of door to door trade was gradually transformed into a tuck shop business.

In South Africa, I started to work in Durban and my first work was selling goods by carrying door to door through credit. In this trade we will give goods in credit that will be paid after two to four months. However, later I started to work in the shop. Initially, I didn't think the shop trade was profitable. I changed my location to Zenini around Musina. There, I was successful in my shop business (Participant 14, Interviewed in August, 2022).

The above two quotes from interviews with migrant returnees’ supports the quantitative findings that Ethiopian migrants initially up on their arrival to South Africa commonly joined the door to door trade by carrying goods such as blankets, cloth, belt and mattresses. However, they gradually transformed their business into shops mainly in the major quarters of South African cities like Johannesburg and Durban. The nature of employment for the later migrants was shifted with the nature of migration financing as research participants noted during FGDs. Therefore, most of the recent female migrants sponsored by either prospective husbands or their brothers, and males by their relatives were used to work in the tuck shops owned by their sponsors unlike the earlier migrants’ that work in the door to door trade in the informal economic sector.

The average monthly income of respondents ranges between a minimum 1000 Ethiopian Birr and maximum 500,000 Ethiopian Birr with 33,197.46 mean monthly incomes of Ethiopian emigrants at RSA. The majority of respondents (45.61%) earns monthly on average between 10,000 and 50,000 Ethiopian Birr and while about 39.5% of them earns less than 10,000 Ethiopian Birr on average per month. However, about 7.37% of participants replied that they get between 50,000 and 100,000 Ethiopian Birr, still another 7.37% of respondents earn a monthly average income that ranges between 50,000 and 100,000 Ethiopian Birr. Participants' narrative during qualitative in-depth interviews indicates that there are major income and livelihood improvements in South Africa as compared to what they had earned when they were in Ethiopia. The amount of monthly income varies across participants and it depends on the amount income they earn from the informal trade business they have been engaged in South Africa. Therefore, they stated that the amount of income they gained in South Africa is enough to improve their livelihoods and support the extended family members in Ethiopia.

**Table 5.7: Comparison of average monthly income of migrants in Ethiopia and South Africa**

		Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test		
		N	Mean Rank	Sum of Ranks
Migrants average monthly income at RSA in Ethiopian birr - The average monthly income of the respondent before their migration to RSA	Negative Ranks	12 <sup>a</sup>	13.42	161.00
	Positive Ranks	150 <sup>b</sup>	86.95	13042.00
	Ties	0 <sup>c</sup>		
	Total	162		

a. Migrants average monthly income at RSA in Ethiopian birr < The average monthly income of the respondent before their migration to RSA

b. Migrants average monthly income in RSA in Ethiopian birr > The average monthly income of the respondent before their migration to RSA

c. Migrants average monthly income in RSA in Ethiopian birr = The average monthly income of the respondent before their migration to RSA

**Test Statistics<sup>a</sup>**

Z	-10.771 <sup>b</sup>
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on negative ranks.

As the data failed to meet the assumptions for the parametric test, a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test was carried out to see the presence of a significant difference in the average monthly income of migrants before their migration in Ethiopia with their average monthly

income in South Africa. The result of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the average income of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa had statistically significant change than the income they earned in Ethiopia before their migration ( $Z = -10.771$ ,  $p = .000$ ). The median average monthly income of migrants shows an increase after their migration to South Africa (average rank of 13.42 vs. average rank of 86.95). This finding confirms the previous study by Teshome, Bailey and Teller (2013) that argues irregular migration to South Africa has a major impact on the amount of income earned by migrants.

**Table 5.8: The habits and reasons of migrants to send money for their families and relatives**

Variables	Frequency		(%)
	Yes	No	Total
Did you send money to your families and relatives at home?	84(89.9)	32 10.1)	316 (100)
If your answer to question number 8 is 'yes', why did you remit money home? (Multiple response item) (n= 284)	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Percent of Cases</b>
For household consumption	271	27.4	85.8
To repay debt	95	9.6	30.1
To help other poor relatives and families	177	17.9	56
To construct/buy house	163	16.5	51.6
To cover educational fees of children	137	13.8	43.4
To start a new business	61	6.2	19.3
To cover the travel cost of my family members to RSA	86	8.7	27.2
Total	990	100	313.3
If your answer to question number 8 is 'yes', how did you send the money to your family? Multiple response item) (n=284)	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Percent of Cases</b>
Through formal money transfer systems	186	44.1	59.4
Through informal money transfers	189	44.8	60.4
Sent through persons	47	11.1	15
Total	422	100	134.8

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The majority of participants (89.9%) replied that they have had the habit of remitting money back to home for their relatives, while a few participants (10.1%) respond that they do not send money back to home. Respondents also mentioned that some of the reasons to remit money back to home are for household consumption (85.8%), to assist the poor members of the families and relatives (56%), to construct or buy house (51.6%), to cover education fees of children (43.4%), to repay debt (30.1%), to cover the travel cost of my family members to RSA (27.2%) and to start a new business (19.3%). Similarly, during in-depth interviews participants mentioned that they were remitting money to their relatives on certain important occasions both in time of happiness and grief. As most participants raised the money remitted back to home were either used to repay the debt and get back the land mortgaged to finance their migration or aimed to finance the migration of their family members to South Africa. This can be seen from the experience of one of the return migrants interviewed in Wanjela *kebele* that shared it as follows:

Before I migrated to South Africa, I was a farmer and merchant. Therefore, I was able to raise around 15,000 birr through my own savings and the rest 3,000 birr was contributed by my family members. After I reached RSA, in my turn I was sending money for them during the time of Meskel celebration and when they faced serious problems. Above all, I covered the money to finance the trip of four of my family members to South Africa, as I took two of my brothers and two of my wife's brothers (Participant 09, Interviewed in August, 2022).

Ethiopian migrants remit money back to home both through formal and informal money transfer systems. The result in Table 5.11 above shows that about (60.4%) of the respondents replied as they send money to Ethiopia through informal systems, and about (59.4%) remit money to their family through informal money transfer systems. While others (15%) respondents replied that they remit money to their family through persons. Qualitative in-depth interviews participants also argued that brokers are here again the sole channel of money transfer back to home. They rose as their status in South Africa was restricted under short term renewal of refugee status; their right to engage in the formal economy is limited. Therefore, the nature of money transfer back to Ethiopia is largely through informal channels. Most of the respondents did not even know what amount of money is charged by the broker for the money transfer services. This was partly due to the nature of exchange rate of RSA Rand into U.S Dollar then into Ethiopian Birr. As participants mentioned, if the amount of money gained through this exchange rate is high, the amount of money charged to transfer money is low and vice versa. Whatever the case, what all participants agreed was the broker is a reliable mode of money transfer for South Africa back to

home. This conforms to earlier study by Yordanos, Zack & Vanyoro (2019) that the irregular status of migrants marginalised migrants in South Africa from getting basic social services like bank accounts and they have been denied access to join the formal economy in South Africa. In addition, Girmachew (2019) argues that a large number of undocumented Ethiopian migrants in South Africa and the Middle East are facing challenges of remitting money to home through formal transfer systems. Consequently, about 90% of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa used to send money to Ethiopia through informal money transfer systems (Isaacs, 2017, Girmachew, 2019).

**Table 5.9: The current occupation of respondents after returned to back to home**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
What is your current occupation?	Farmer	59	18.7
	Trade/merchant	127	40.2
	Private firm/business	22	7.0
	Supported by my children	1	0.3
	I have no work	27	8.5
	Transport service or driver	26	8.2
	Construction	1	0.3
	Broker	2	0.6
	Housewife	3	0.9
	Employed in private sector	3	0.9
	Yet not started work	12	3.8
	Total	284	100

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The survey result in the Table 5.12 shows that the migrant returnees were employed in different economic sectors after they returned back to home. The major occupations mentioned by return migrants include trade (40.2%), agriculture (18.7%), still they do not have job (8.5%), some were bought their own car and engaged in transport sector (8.2%), opened their own private businesses (7%), yet no started to work (3.8%), housewife (0.9%), employed in the private sector (0.9%), some were engaged in brokerage (0.6%), some lead life with their children support from South Africa (0.3%), and the remaining others work in construction sector (0.3%). FGDs participants also noted that migrant returnees are found at varying levels of employment after their return

from South Africa. Those who returned back to home with better financial savings started to run their own business and created job opportunities for others. They were engaged in constructing buildings in the towns, opened hotels, cafeterias, and others were mainly engaged in the transport sector. Some other migrants were returned back to their agricultural works and while others returned to their government employment. However, what participants stressed where there is now a clear livelihood gap between returnees and non-migrants mainly seen in their houses and the quality of household apparatuses. Yet some others were leading their life from the money remitted by their children from South Africa.

### **5.2.2. Effects on Migrants Families**

As migration is a household strategy, it has an obvious effect on the migrants' family left behind. The money remitted by irregular migrants from South Africa had both positive and negative impact on their households that stayed behind at home. The survey result in Table 5.13 shows that the majority of participants (92.4%) replied that the money remitted to their household members brought a major change on their livelihoods and income, while others replied as it led to negative consequences like dependency on remittance (31.2%), children loss of interest to learn due to increased motivation to migrate to South Africa (23.9%), negative impact on culture (15.6%) and it led quarrels among family members on remittance dividend (16.6%). Studies by Girmachew (2019) and Teshome, Bailey and Teller (2013) irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone had major impact in bringing socio-economic improvements on migrants' households and it is a major impulse for circular migration from the area. Further, Girmachew (2019) argues that in the Hadya and Kambata, residents are receiving more and more remittances from migrant family members, particularly during significant social occasions such as *Meskel*, weddings, and funerals. These remittances serve a dual purpose: to express emotions of joy or sorrow, and to fill the void left by the absence of these migrants who would have otherwise provided non-material support. Families who have members living abroad are increasingly sharing their resources with others in the community, not only during times of need like illness or crop failure, but also during times of celebration such as holidays or weddings. These resources may come in the form of money, food, materials, or equipment, which would otherwise require significant financial investment to acquire.

Nevertheless, migration has not always positive effects on migrants' households in Kembata-Tembaro Zone. Migration has led to loss of money or property, migrant missing and death both along the route and in the destination have a major economic and emotional impact on migrant households. The following two narrations from in-depth interviews with migrant family members witness the above view. The first is interviewed in Shino Funamura *kebele*, tell about the impact of migration on his family as follows:

Migration has a negative impact on my family. The first thing is we lost my brother, who died along the route to South Africa as he was not physically fit to withstand challenges. And he died of hunger and thirst along the route. The second is we lost the money including the family assets that were used to finance migration (Participant 24, Interviewed in August, 2022).

The second one is the emotional cost of migration particularly in the case of missing migrants along the route is incalculable. An extract from in-depth interviews with 62 years elder and the father of missing migrant states:

It has been two years since my son left from here to South Africa through the land route. But he is missed along the route and we did not hear anything about him for the last two years. However, recently he sent a message to us through a deported returnee as he was in prison in Tanzania. Apart from this we do not have any more information about the whereabouts of our son. (Participant 12, Interviewed in August, 2022).

This result conforms to earlier study by Tekalign (2021b) which argues that the families of missing migrants, whether lost along migration routes or in the countries they were headed to, endure years of uncertainty and anguish not knowing the fate of their beloved ones. The search for their missing relatives presents numerous hurdles, including personal, legal, and financial obstacles. Furthermore, repatriating the remains in the unfortunate event of death also poses a significant challenge for these grieving families.

Irregular migration to South Africa has also negative impacts on the nurture of the children, who would grow mainly without fatherly guidance and follow up in their education. Moreover, participants in the FGDS noted that devaluing education has another impact as children model their seniors; migration becomes the sole aspiration of children rather than education. Elderly family members also encounter significant difficulties following the loss of their children, particularly when they have put up their property or land as collateral to help fund their children's trips. Aged parents are frequently left without the financial assistance that they relied

on their children to offer in the event of their journeys being fruitful. These hardships are exacerbated when the deaths or disappearances affect more than one child within a single family (Tekalign, 2021b).

**Table 5.10: The effects of migration on migrants' household livelihoods**

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Percent of Cases
What changes have been noticed in your family that stayed back home after you reached RSA and remitted money?	Improvement of life and income	290	51.4	92.4
	Dependence on remittance	98	17.4	31.2
	Lack of interest to learn due to high interest to migrate	75	13.3	23.9
	Negative impact on culture	49	8.7	15.6
	Quarrels among family members on remittance	52	9.2	16.6
	Total	564	100.0	179.6
Do migrants' households move to urban areas in search of business and better social services more than non-migrants households?	Yes	182	57.8	
	No	76	24.1	
	Not Sure	57	18.1	
	Total	315	100.0	
How do you compare your family's income before and after your migration to RSA? Their current income is:	Much better income now	114	36.2	
	Somewhat better now	177	56.2	
	More or less the same	19	6	
	Worse now than before	5	1.6	
	Total	315	100.0	
Did your migration to the RSA negatively affect your family life at home?	Yes	145	45.9	
	No	171	54.1	
	Total	316	100.0	
If 'yes', what is/are the effect/s?	No one stays at home to take care of the elderly and sick persons	104	41.9	72.2
	Problems to take care of children	54	21.8	37.5
	Unable to repay debts	15	6	10.4
	Dependency of family members on remittance	75	30.2	52.1
	Total	248	100	172.2

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

Another area that migration left a negative effect on migrant families related to disagreements and subsequent conflicts over loss of mortgaged land in time failure of migrants to reach the destination, dependency on remittance and conflicts over dividends of remitted money. Long absence of a husband also leads to divorce and family separation particularly in case the absentee

husband fails to send money, the wife is looking for another person to get support and in due course even she gives birth to a child outside of her formal marriage. In focused group discussions with police forces at Gerba Fandide *kebele* they mentioned the major legal cases brought to their offices that related to migration are conflicts over land mortgage is common in the area and disputes over share of remittance among the extended family members. The latter case is common mostly during the yearly celebration of *Meskel* due to migrants most commonly remitting money during this time. This is consistent with Tekalign (2021b) study that argued for the deep impact of migration on households particularly the wives in case of debt financed migration. He stated that in cases of death or disappearance, the debt does not disappear. It is often the responsibility of migrant wives to take on the financial burden if their husband passes away or goes missing during the migration journey.

The survey result in Table 5.10 indicates a large number of migrant households (57.8%) move to urban centres in search of better facilities and in search of new businesses as compared to non-migrants households. In contrary, about 24.1% of participants replied as there is no difference between the migrant and non-migrant households' movement to urban areas, and about 18.1% of respondents replied as they are not sure whether there is difference in the pattern of movement to urban centres between migrant and non-migrant households. Regarding the changes in their households' income after their emigration to South Africa, about 177 (56.2%) of the respondents replied that it has witnessed relatively improved, while about 114 (36.2%) replied that their household income is much better than before. Still a few of respondents 19 (6%) answered as it was more or less the same as before and about 5 (1.6%) replied as their income is declined now than before their emigration to South Africa. This finding, also supported by previous research (Henok *et al.*, 2017, Bisrat *et al.*, 2017; Kelemwork *et al.*, 2017; Kassegn & Gashaw, 2017) stated that migration brought an improvement on migrant households but its effect lacks sustainability. Therefore, an end of migration experience led to household economic insecurity and the probability of reconsidering to remigration is common among the migrant returnees.

### **5.2.3. Effects on Kembata-Tembaro Zone**

Irregular migration from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to the Republic of South Africa has both positive and negative consequences on the migrants' origin areas as well. The survey result in the Table 5.14 below shows that South African emigrants were took part in supporting development

projects in the origin areas as well as engaged in charity 186 (58.9%) and still a significant number of respondents 130 (41.1%) replied that they were not participated in contributing to the development projects as well as charity works in their localities. Respondents indicates that the major areas they contributed to the development works in their localities include contribution to church (97.3%), construction of schools (18.3%), development of potable water (10.8%), donation to *Idir* (5.9%), construction of healthcare services (3.8%), and support to the Grand Renaissance Dam of Ethiopia (1.1%).

**Table 5.11: Positive effects of migration on migrants' localities**

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Percent of Cases
Have you ever contributed money for charity or community projects in your locality?	Yes	186	58.9	
	No	130	41.1	
	Total	316	100.0	
If 'yes', which project?	School	34	13.3	18.3
	Potable water	20	7.8	10.8
	Healthcare centre	7	2.7	3.8
	Church	181	71	97.3
	<i>Idir</i>	11	4.3	5.9
	Renaissance dam	2	0.8	1.1
	Total	255	100.0	137.1
Does migration have positive effects in your woreda or kebele?	Yes	175	55.6	
	No	69	21.9	
	Not Sure	70	22.2	
	Total	315	100.0	
For question number 23, if your answer is "yes", what is/are the positive effects of migration in your woreda or kebele?	Flow of remittance	111	27.1	66.1
	Job creation opportunities	91	22.2	54.2
	Poverty reduction	123	30	73.2
	Improved social services	85	20.7	50.6
	Total	410	100.0	244.0

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

The majority of research participants 175 (55.6%) replied that migration has positive impacts on their locality. In contrast, about 70 (22.2%) of respondents were not sure about the impacts of irregular migration on their locality, while the rest 69 (21.9%) replied as migration has negative impacts on their locality. Research participants indicated among the major positive impacts of migration on their locality includes its contribution to poverty reduction (73.2%), increased the

flow of remittance to their locality (66.1%), enhanced the job creation opportunities (54.2%), and contributed to the improvement of social services (50.6%).

The positive effects of irregular migration to South Africa also mentioned by the FGDs and in-depth interviews participants. The sought migration has positive impacts on the local developments through job creation, construction of new buildings and improvements in the livelihoods of migrants' families. From South Africa migrants remit money to support their families, the church, donations for the destitute mainly through the church and they support local development projects like potable water, electricity, school and healthcare. This can be clearly seen from the experience of a young transport provider interviewed in Garba Fandide *kebele*:

I am currently working as a driver of Isuzu public transport bus. My three elder brothers are working in South Africa. Their migration to South Africa has been a major contribution to my family and even to this kebele because we now have three Isuzu public transport buses that give service from here to Angecca and Doyogena, while earlier people used to travel out from this area on foot. In addition, we are now planning to invest in a petrol or gas station in Garba Fandide that did not exist yet. My brothers from South Africa send money to help the destitute through the church and they are active participants in supporting local developments through their association in South Africa named Limat Le Fandide (Association for the development of Fandide) and on the national project such the Grand Renaissance dam. They used to engage in charity works like supporting the helpless, donating the church and sponsoring a person from the poor families and they cover the whole travel expenses to South Africa (Participant 20, Interviewed in August, 2022).

A study by Girmachew (2019) also stated that religion plays a significant role in the exchange and distribution of remittance money among households that do not have migrating members and religious establishments. In fact, religious organisations are the primary recipients of contributions from migrants, aside from their immediate families. These remittances are increasingly being directed towards religious institutions, particularly during special occasions like Epiphany or when there is a need for construction, renovation, or community initiatives. The sum of money transferred is believed to be substantial and often includes non-monetary contributions. The acknowledgment and blessings received from the community are crucial for the emotional and social well-being of the donor family, both in their home country and in the destination country.

**Table 5.12: Negative effects of migration on migrants' localities**

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Percent of Cases
For question number 23, if your answer is “no”, what is/are the negative impacts of migration in your woreda or kebele?	Inequality among people	142	45.2	84
	Dependence on remittance	95	30.3	56.2
	Shortage of labour force	77	24.5	45.6
	Total	314	100.0	185.8
Does migration have negative consequences on education or students' learning?	Yes	220	69.8	
	No	27	8.6	
	Not Sure	68	21.6	
	Total	315	100.0	
For question number 27, if your answer is “yes”, what is/are the negative effects of migration on education or students' learning?	School dropout	195	39.6	88.6
	Lack of attention	202	41.1	91.8
	Loss of professionals/teachers	95	19.3	43.2
	Total	492	100.0	223.6

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

As the survey result in the Table 5.12 above shows that migration had some negative consequences on the migrants' localities. The research participants mentioned some of the negative consequences such as migration created inequality or income and life gaps in their origin society (84%), their household members became dependent on remittance (56.2%), and it led to a shortage of labour force in the migrants' household (45.6%). Irregular migration has a significant impact on the education sector or the students learning in the study area. The result in Table 5.12 shows that the majority of respondents 220 (69.8%) agreed that migration has negative consequences on the education sector and a few respondents 27 (8.6%) of them replied that migration has no impact on students' learning. Still about 68 (21.6%) of them are not sure about the implications of migration on the education sector. Among the negative consequences of irregular migration from the study area, respondents cited some of them as students' decreased attention towards their learning (91.8%), school dropout (88.6%), and loss of education professionals or teachers (43.2%).

Irregular migration has not always left positive impacts on the Kembata-Tembaro Zone as participants of in-depth interviews and FGDs witnessed. They noted that irregular migration negatively affected the system of economy and the cultural values of the society. The money remitted from South Africa to the migrant households created disparity with those does not have migrants that led to relative deprivation. This can be well noted during the annual *Meskel*

celebration, migrant households prepared expensive feasts usually by slaughtering a bull. In the same way, the feasts prepared to serve the mourners during funerals were changed with the introduction of serving bottled spring water through the *Debube* families. The practice of marriage also shifted the soaring cost of the bride and the type of gifts presented to the bride's family. Remittance from South Africa also created inflation in the market. During in-depth interviews with an expert of Labour and Social Affairs in Angecca *woreda* rose that the money remitted from South Africa is disturbing the market prices in this area. For instance, the cost of urban residence land is alarmingly increased with a huge amount of money paid simply by South African migrant families.

The education sector is significantly affected by the irregular migration to South Africa. This is mainly due to student's loss of interest in education, high dropout rate and loss of education professionals. During FGDs discussion with education experts in Doyogena *woreda*, they argue that the education sector is significantly affected by migration. Interest in education has declined. Despite a good success in education coverage, education quality is poor. One factor is the devaluing of education and children's aspiration is shifted to migration. Another is some government civil servants also migrating leaving their jobs in search of better opportunities. Therefore, families finance migration to South Africa either forcedly as children coerced them through different mechanisms or willingly believing that migration is an opportunity harnessed by their children like others to bring household livelihood improvements. Earlier study by Habte (2015) stated that children experience considerable pressure when they are deprived of fatherly guidance and lack father's presence at a young age. This absence could potentially harm the bond between the children and father permanently.

Furthermore, irregular migration is complained in-depth interviews with participants for its negative impact on the social norms in the area. Divorce is becoming common due to the long separation between the migrant husband and the wife left behind in the area. In this regard migration also brought lifestyle changes among male migrants by adopting the host culture. Therefore, when they get back to home they come back with certain behavioural changes that led to conflict and subsequently divorce. Still some others successful in their business also engaged in a second marriage with a young woman. Some migrants also returned to their locality with some behavioural problems such as alcoholism and drug addictions. Above all migration

degraded the social norms and people became unethical, particularly the youth. In an in-depth interview with an expert of Labour and Social Affairs in Angecca *woreda* that boldly noted stated that:

One of the negative effects of irregular migration from this area is that the person becomes unethical. It undermines our culture of respecting each other particularly by the young generation. Students begin to carry mobile phones at school and they are bullied or disturbed in the class, they do not have interest to learn rather they aspire to migrate from their early childhood. At the age of around 15 and 16 years, the children began to coerce their family to send them to South Africa. Even the church ethics have declined. Formerly people went to church to pray but now they are joking in the church. They said we do not want to live here and at the end of every church prayer, they said lets meet in South Africa (Participant 23, Interviewed in August, 2022).

This result is in line with the previous study by Habte (2015) stating that there have been cases of married men accused of committing adultery in South Africa. Similarly, their wives in their home country are also facing the same blame. Some of these women have even given birth while their husbands are away. Consequently, some of these couples have ended up getting separated or divorced. This issue tends to arise when migrants spend extended periods of time working in South Africa. Another problem is family conflict over the share of the remitted money from South Africa. As a result, a series murder cases were recorded due to disagreements over the money sent from South Africa. The nature of neighbourhood social life such as having coffee together is impacted by the changes in the livelihood gaps created by migration. In general, as migration has contributed to the improvement in the livelihoods and migrants support the local development efforts, migration has also brought negative effects on the market systems, education, and cultural norms of the society.

Overall, this chapter concludes that Ethiopia serves as a prominent origin for irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa heading towards South Africa. The state's restrictive policy on mobility significantly influences this irregular migration from Ethiopia. The research aimed to understand the contributing factors and discern the evolving patterns of migration flows over time. Migration has both positive and negative effects on migrants, their families and their localities in different ways. The next chapter discusses the implications of migration policies and governance in Africa for the irregular migration.

## **CHAPTER SIX: MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN AFRICA**

This chapter presents the implications of global migration governance practices and African migration frameworks for the perpetuation of irregular migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa. The first section deals with migration governance and legal frameworks for better migration governance in Africa. This section presents an overview on the global migration governance and legal instruments adopted by the African continent, the legal instruments and policy frameworks by the AU at the continental scale. The second section deals with the migration governance and legal instruments ratified and developed by the RECs particularly those found along the Southern routes (IGAD, AEC, COMESA and SADC). Under the third and fourth sections, the treaties, conventions, protocols and other non-bindings international, continental and regional levels ratified by Ethiopia and RSA also analysed. In addition, in this section the constitutional guarantees, proclamations and other related documents used to govern migration by the Ethiopian and Republic of South African governments were desk reviewed. The fifth section addresses these implications of migration governance policies and legal frameworks for the migration of Ethiopians from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa.

### **6.1. Migration Governance and Legal Frameworks of African Union**

Global migration governance refers to the rules and frameworks that enable countries to cooperate more effectively in achieving their goals than they could if acting independently. In line with broader patterns of cross-border interconnections, there has been a significant surge in human movement across international boundaries (Betts & Kainz, 2017). The term "migration governance" is commonly used to describe the actions taken by different entities, such as local governments, national governments, private companies, regional organizations, and international organizations, to manage or regulate migration in its different forms (Geddes, 2022). The IOM has described migration governance as “the collective frameworks of legal norms, regulations, policies, traditions, and organizational structures—spanning subnational, national, regional, and international levels—and the processes that influence and regulate how states address migration in all its forms, balancing rights and responsibilities while fostering international cooperation” (IOM, 2024). Better migration governance refers to the process of ensuring that migration is

safe, orderly, and respectful, while also considering the socio-economic welfare of both migrants and the host society. It promotes the socio-economic welfare of both migrants and society by adhering to international standards and laws. Moreover, improved migration governance can be attained by creating evidence-based policies using a comprehensive "whole of government" strategy (AU, 2018). This section presents the migration governance policies and legal frameworks adopted by AU, both the binding and non-binding agreements endorsed by Africans for better migration governance in the continent.

The idea of integration and free movement has been a long-standing topic of discussion within African politics, dating back to the establishment of the OAU in 1963 (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). The successor to the OAU, i.e. the AU, was created in 2002 with the Treaty of Abuja and has, since then, shown a commitment to a progressive migration agenda that recognizes the valuable contribution of migrants to sustainable development and inclusive growth (Geddes & Maru, 2020). While efforts towards integration were made through various frameworks and declarations, it was not until after 2015 that the movement gained significant traction. The AU Summit held in South Africa, along with negotiations for the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) in Kigali in 2016, played a crucial role in revitalising the discussion around free movement within the continent. These events ultimately led to the drafting and eventual adoption of the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment (Ibid.). Overall, there has been a renewed focus on the importance of free movement within Africa, with the AU taking concrete steps towards facilitating greater mobility and integration across the continent (AUC, 2018; Geddes & Maru, 2020).

Africa has been at the forefront of establishing legal frameworks regarding migration. In response to the influx of African refugees fleeing conflicts arising from anti-colonial movements, the 1969 OAU Convention was created, making it the first regional refugee convention globally (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The African Union (AU) has since developed various policy frameworks to regulate both voluntary and forced migration on the continent. These policies are rooted in the vision of African economic integration, as outlined in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) of 1994 (Martins & Mohamed, 2024). Member States of the AU pledge to implement measures, either individually or through regional

agreements, to ultimately achieve freedom of movement for individuals and ensure their right to reside and establish within the community. Despite the focus on migration issues within the AU, many of the policies remain non-binding, making it challenging to monitor developments at the continental level (EU, 2020).

**Table 6.1: OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters related to governing migration issues in Africa**

No	OAU/AU Legal Instruments Governing Migration	Date of Adoption	Status
1	OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	September 10, 1969	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
2	The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights	June 01, 1981	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
3	The <i>Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community</i> (AEC)	June 03, 1991	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
4	Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	June 10, 1998	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
5	African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)	October 23, 2009	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
6	The Niamey Convention on Cross Border Cooperation	June 27, 2014	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
7	The Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment	January 29, 2018	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters
8	The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)	March 21, 2018	OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters

Source: Adopted from African Union Home Page from list of OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters

The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa is the oldest continental convention on migration governance adopted by the Heads of African States and Governments convened from 6<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> September 1969, in Addis Ababa (OAU, 1969). This convention is currently ratified by the 55 African states. It was adopted in response to an increasing refugee crisis in Africa and refugee problems are a source of conflict among member

states, as well as the need to resolve refugee problems with a humanitarian approach. Member states accented under articles 4 and 5 of the convention on non-discrimination against refugees on certain grounds, and voluntary and safe repatriation for refugees should be respected in all cases (OAU, 1969).

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted by the Heads of African States and Governments in June 1981, primarily aimed to promote and protect human and people's rights and freedom in Africa (OAU, 1981). The Charter stipulates specific issues related to migrants' rights under Article 12 as the right to live and freedom of movement within the state borders, the right to leave and return to the country, the right to seek and get asylum in case of persecution, and prohibition of mass expulsion of non-nationals (OAU, 1981). The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted seventeen years later in 1998 by OAU member states parties to the African Charter to Human and Peoples' Rights (OAU, 1998).

The OAU adopted the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in Abuja, Nigeria on June 3, 1991. Article 25 (1c) of this Treaty established the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters, one of specialised technical committees of the AEC, as an institutional framework that oversees migration issues (OAU, 1991). Human mobility and settlement in the continent were dealt under Chapter Seven entitled Free Movement of Persons, Rights of Residence and Establishment. Accordingly, Article 43(1) stated Member States have agreed to implement, either on their own or through partnerships with other countries, the required actions to gradually enable unrestricted movement of individuals. This includes guaranteeing that their citizens have the right to live and work within the Community. To this end, Article 43(1) specified that "Member States agree to conclude a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment" (OAU, 1991).

**Table 6.2: Migration policies, common positions, agendas, plans and programmes related to governing migration issues in Africa**

No	Policies, common positions, agendas, plans and programmes governing migration	Date of Adoption
1	Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA)	2006
2	The African Common Position on Migration and Development	2006
3	The Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children	2006
4	The Minimum Integration Programme (MIP)	2009
5	The Joint Labour Migration Programme for Africa (JLMP)	2015
6	The African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want	2015
7	Common African Position on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration	2017
8	Migration Policy Framework Plan of Action (2018 – 2030)	2018

Source: Adopted from African Union Home Page from list of OAU/AU migration policies, common positions, agendas, plans and programmes

In 2006, the African Union (AU) adopted three key documents related to migration: the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the African Common Position on Migration and Development, and the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) is a non-binding document that was approved during the 9th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, which took place from June 25 to 29, 2006, in Banjul, Gambia (AU, 2006a). This framework identifies nine major thematic issues concerning migration, along with associated sub-themes, and provides policy recommendations for AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to consider. It serves as a comprehensive guide covering various aspects such as labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, the relationship between migration and development, and interstate cooperation and partnerships. Additionally, it examines the social consequences of migration, including its effects on health, the environment, gender issues, and conflict (AU, 2006a).

The African Common Position on Migration and Development adopted in the Executive Council 9<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held 25-29 June 2006, in Banjul, Gambia (AU, 2006b). This document

acknowledged the majority of African migration took place within Africa and emphasised the driving factors of migrations are conflicts, poor governance, poverty, lack of opportunities, underdevelopment and environmental factors. It is particularly concerned with irregular migration from the security perspectives. Migration has the potential to boost development in Africa by improving the distribution of income and fuelling growth through productive employment opportunities. The state parties have agreed that when managing 'illegal or irregular migration', it is crucial to uphold the human rights of refugees and follow the principle of non-discrimination. The battle against unauthorised migration should be conducted with utmost respect for human rights, dignity, as well as through cooperation at regional and international levels. In addition, all countries involved - origin, transit, and destination - must share responsibility in tackling this issue effectively. This document recommends that at national level among others each state should adopt a national migration policy and at continental level to finalise the Strategic Framework for Migration Policies (AU, 2006b).

The Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children was adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Tripoli, 22-23 November 2006 (AU, 2006c). The action plan was adopted by European Union and African States as they are committed to addressing the issue of human trafficking, particularly women and children, by working together effectively. They agreed to sign, endorse, and effectively put into practice the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Penalise Trafficking in Persons, particularly Women and Children, which complements the Convention. States are encouraged to establish dedicated units within their law enforcement agencies that focus on combating human trafficking. These units should have a clear mandate to develop and implement targeted strategies to address this issue effectively. Additionally, states should appoint special national focal points to oversee and coordinate efforts in the fight against human trafficking (AU, 2006c).

The Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) adopted in 2009 and encompasses various regional and continental programs with the goal of providing a comprehensive overview of current initiatives, pinpointing financial obstacles hindering their progress, and seeking solutions by sourcing additional resources needed for their advancement. Within the MIP are detailed action plans tailored for individual communities and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), along

with a strategic plan for the African Union Commission (AUC), complete with a robust monitoring and evaluation system. These measures are designed to establish the necessary conditions for successful implementation and execution of the programs (AU, 2009a). One of the main goals of the initial phase of the MIP (2009-2012) includes achieving complete freedom of movement for individuals within the regions, as well as facilitating partial freedom of movement between different regions. However, the primary challenges that may hinder or delay the effective implementation of the MIP primarily include insufficient financial and human resources within RECs and the AUC, a lack of decisive leadership and coordination from the AUC, conflicting national policies with regional approaches, and to a lesser extent, the multiple memberships of countries in different RECs. In order to expedite the process of continental integration, the AUC must collaborate closely with RECs to address these obstacles and take appropriate actions to overcome them (AU, 2009a).

African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) was adopted by the special summit of the Union in Kampala, Uganda on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009 (AU, 2009b). The convention was designed to stop and prevent the issue of internal displacement by tackling the underlying reasons, particularly on-going conflicts and repeated disasters that result in people being forced to leave their homes. Such disasters have a severe impact on individuals' lives, as well as on peace, stability, security, and progress. AU recalled that the rationale for adopting this convention is the absence of a comprehensive African and global legal and institutional structure dedicated to preventing internal displacement and ensuring the safety and support of those who have been internally displaced. Therefore, the states were obliged to incorporate the convention into their domestic laws. Article 5 of the convention stated that “States Parties shall bear the primary duty and responsibility for providing protection of and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their territory or jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind” (AU, 2009b). As stated under Article 8(1) “African Union shall have the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (AU, 2009b).

In 2015, the African Union (AU) introduced the Joint Labour Migration Programme for Africa (JLMP), with backing from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International

Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The main goal of this program is to enhance the governance and supervision of labour migration and movement within the continent. The JLMP stands out as a pioneering global effort dedicated to aiding in the successful enforcement of regulations concerning human mobility, which are crucial for both development and integration (Mo Ibrahim Foundation in 2019). This initiative, developed in partnership with Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), aims to address the challenges and opportunities associated with labour migration in the region. The main goal is to enhance the efficiency of governance and regulation of labour migration and mobility in Africa, ensuring it is conducted in accordance with legal principles and with the active participation of various stakeholders including government officials, legislators, social partners, migrants, international organisations, NGOs, and civil society groups. This initiative aims to increase transparency, accountability, and fairness in the management of labour migration, while also fostering collaboration and engagement among all relevant parties for sustainable development (AU, 2015c). The program played a vital role in creating two important draft policy papers for Africa: the migrant welfare program and the AU Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers. A review conducted by the JLMP Steering Committee uncovered several noteworthy accomplishments. Initially, the program set up a successful management system and offered technical and operational assistance to the AUC and three RECs (SADC, ECOWAS, and EAC) in managing their labour migration initiatives. Additionally, the assessment revealed that the JLMP played a key role in establishing the AU Labour Migration Advisory Committee (LMAC) (ILO, 2022; Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want adopted by the African Union Summit held in January 2015. Among the seven aspirations of the Agenda, the second contained issues related to free movement of peoples that read as “An integrated continent; politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance”. Under goal 8 of this aspiration put at continental level by the year 2018, all visa requirements for travel within Africa were eliminated, and a legal structure was put in place by 2023 for the issuance of the African Common Passport. The Regional Economic Community (REC) allows for unrestricted movement of both individuals and goods/services among member states. In addition, African travellers are granted the convenience of obtaining visas upon arrival at designated entry points (AU, 2015a). Agenda 2063 serves as a comprehensive strategic roadmap for the next 50 years,

outlining key priorities to be achieved in the First Ten Year Implementation Plan. The initial ten-year implementation plan encompasses all of the flagship projects and programs endorsed by the AU Summit. Among these, one is “The African Passport and free movement of people,” aimed at reforming Africa's legislation in order to facilitate the movement of people across the continent. Despite political promises to dissolve borders and encourage the issuance of visas by Member States, there are still many restrictions in place. The goal is to promote the free movement of all African citizens within all African nations by the year 2018 (AU, 2015a).

The Common African Position (CAP) on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted by responsible ministers of member states for migration in 2017. The CAP in its preamble recognized that the phenomenon of irregular migration has increasingly become a pressing issue, growing in scale and posing a threat to the safety and rights of migrants. This calls for a holistic strategy in managing migration that prioritises human rights within legal boundaries (AU, 2017b). The fifth focus area of the CAP on the Global Compact on Migration deals with irregular migration and regular pathways. It acknowledges the significant issue of irregular migration in Africa and the potential benefits that could come from addressing this through proper regularisation, it is essential to emphasise the necessity of implementing policies that facilitate safe and organised labour migration, while also safeguarding the rights of migrant workers (AU, 2017b).

To facilitate continental integration in accordance with the goals of the Treaty that established the African Economic Community, the African Union adopted the Niamey Convention on Cross Border Cooperation in 2014 and the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018. The Niamey Convention, which was adopted in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on June 27, 2014, is grounded in the objectives and principles of the AU's Constitutive Act and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Its purpose is to encourage cross-border collaboration at local, sub-regional, and regional levels throughout Africa (AU, 2014a). Meanwhile, the AfCFTA, adopted on March 21, 2018, aims to create a single market for goods and services, facilitated by the movement of people, to promote greater economic unity across the continent. This initiative supports the Pan African Vision of "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa," as articulated in Agenda 2063 (AU, 2018b).

In January 2018, African Heads of States and Governments adopted the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, which pertains to the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. This action reflects their dedication to Article 43(2) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AU, 2018a). The rationale for adopting this protocol also recalled as part of commitment under Article 4 (2) (i) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, intended “to gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment among member states” (AU, 2018a). Ten (Article 6-15) out of thirty seven articles of the protocol deals with the free movement of persons that include the right to entry, official documents required, African Passport, free movement of residents in border communities, free movement of students and researchers, free movement of workers, and issues related to permits and passes. While the other two articles (Article 16 and 17) cover the right of residence and the right of establishment. States party to the protocol agreed as per Article 6(2) “Member States shall implement the right to entry by permitting nationals of Member States to enter into their territory without the requirement of a visa” and Article 10 (1) put states parties “shall adopt a travel document called “African Passport” ... and facilitate the issuances of this passport to their citizens” (AU, 2018a). However, the protocol was signed only by 32 African states and ratified by Rwanda, Mali, Niger and Sao Tome and Principe. Therefore, the protocol awaits ratification by at least 15 African states to enter into force (UNECA & AU, 2023; Teye & Oucho, 2024). Nevertheless, more and more African nations are now providing electronic visa options and some are even offering visas on arrival for travellers from fellow African countries. It seems that the pace of ratification of the protocol is not keeping up with the advancements in visa accessibility and other border-crossing initiatives being implemented by certain African Union Member States (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongo, 2024).

The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (2018 – 2030) and its corresponding Plan of Action represent an updated version of the 2006 AU Migration Policy Framework (MPFA), originally ratified in Banjul, The Gambia. This new framework builds upon its predecessor by offering thorough policy directives to AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Covering nine key thematic areas including Migration Governance, Labour Migration and Education, Diaspora Engagement, Border Governance, Irregular Migration, Forced Displacement, Internal Migration, Migration and Trade, and other Cross-Cutting issues, the

revised framework is designed to address the evolving migration landscape in Africa. It aims to provide a strategic roadmap for Member States and RECs to effectively manage migration within the continent (AU, 2018c).

The Free Movement Protocol has played a role in breaking down entry barriers by adopting and implementing free visa regimes (such as visa on arrival and visa-free travel) (Teye & Oucho, 2024). The 2020 Africa Visa Openness Report reveals a significant milestone in promoting the free movement of people within the continent by certain Member States (AU, 2021). According to the report, over half (54%) of Africa now allows migrants to enter without the need for visas, marking a 9% increase from the 2016 data. This means that less than half (46%) of Africans require visas to travel to the remaining 46% of African countries. In addition, around a third of Africans can obtain visas upon arrival in 28% of other African nations, while 26% can freely travel to another 26% of African countries without visas. Despite these advancements, only three countries in Africa - the Gambia, Benin, and Seychelles - offer visa-free access to all African nations. While the overall rating for visa openness is positive, the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions have hindered progress in human mobility. This underscores the importance of establishing visa-free systems that can withstand economic disruptions (AU, 2021; Teye & Oucho, 2024).

In spite of the advancements made since the late 1960s, efforts for greater integration at both continental and regional levels are facing multiple challenges, especially concerning the facilitation of free movement for individuals. These obstacles comprise security concerns of Member States, some states failing to recognize the advantages of the African Union Free Movement Protocol, lack of awareness about the Protocol, insufficient capabilities in managing migration and cross-border mobility, lack of strong political determination among States, persisting visa restrictions, and heightened apprehensions of mass migration from states and special interest groups in member countries, particularly in more affluent economies. Moreover, the delay and non-ratification of free movement agreements and provisions on the rights to residence and establishment by Member States, as well as inadequate infrastructure and connectivity at the regional economic community (REC) and continental levels, contribute to the hindrances in achieving seamless integration (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongo, 2024).

The majority of funding for programs and projects comes from donor support rather than contributions from Member States. Additionally, many Member States struggle to meet tax revenue targets and face significant levels of inequality, hindering progress towards inclusive growth and development goals. Achieving good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law is a challenge in most Member States (AU & AUDA-NEPAD, 2022). Due to the reliance on external support, particularly from the European Union and the United States, donor-driven processes take precedence over initiatives aligned with African priorities and objectives outlined in key policies. This is particularly evident in the migration of skilled workers: while Africa aims to retain skills, donor nations seek to attract skilled workers in fields like healthcare (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongo, 2024). Moreover, the migration framework outlined by the African Union is primarily advisory in nature. However, African nations face challenges in terms of resources and capability to fully implement the African migration strategy. A review of the policy framework in 2006 highlighted the lack of institutional knowledge within governments, attributed to frequent turnover of staff. In addition, there is a noticeable absence of effective collaboration and information exchange on migration matters among governments (Achieng & El Fadil, 2020). Furthermore, there are inadequate mechanisms in place to evaluate and oversee the implementation of the AU's migration framework, leading to limited monitoring capabilities by the AU Commission. In 2016, only a small team of three individuals were dedicated to migration issues within the AU's Social Affairs Department. These constraints underscore the need for a more comprehensive evaluation of an "African approach" to migration, particularly when juxtaposed against migration policies influenced by European nations (Bertossi, Ouassif, & Tardis, 2021).

There are several factors contributing to the slow approval of the Protocol, such as a lack of understanding and recognition of the benefits of free movement of people and its impact on African economies. Additionally, there is a tendency to view the AfCFTA and the African Union Free Movement of Persons Protocol as separate entities at the policy level. A recent study commissioned by the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) revealed that many African countries are concerned about their sovereignty and control over the flow of people (UNECA & AU, 2023). There are also apprehensions regarding security risks associated with unrestricted movement. Some nations are worried about the public health implications of large numbers of migrants entering their borders.

The challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic have further hindered governments' willingness to support the free movement of people. This cautious approach has impacted the ratification process of the Protocol (Madubuko, Hasham & Charumbira, 2024). Several prominent countries in Africa, including Nigeria and South Africa, have shown hesitance towards embracing the idea of allowing free movement of people within the continent. The African Continental Free Trade Area agreement has been endorsed by 35 member states of the African Union, with the exception of Eritrea. By December 2019, 29 countries had officially ratified the agreement. However, only four member states have ratified the supplementary protocol concerning the free movement of people (Bertossi, Ouassif, & Tardis, 2021).

## **6.2. Migration Governance and Legal Frameworks of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)**

Africa currently has eight different Regional Economic Communities (RECs), with some belonging to more than one (Teye & Oucho, 2024). When it comes to dealing with regional migration, three key regional bodies stand out: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). These organisations not only represent most of the sub-Saharan countries, but also include the continent's most densely populated nations. They also play a significant role in migration as recipients, transit points, and countries of origin, especially in regions where migration trends are particularly dynamic (Adepoju, 2018). Of these, ECOWAS was a pioneer in the field of regional migration management. In 1979, they developed the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, setting a precedent for the rest of the region (Teye & Oucho, 2024). This section presents the migration governance and policies of the RECs in the region through which Ethiopian migrants are crossing on their way to South Africa.

At the sub-regional level, several Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have established a variety of legal and policy instruments that are incorporated into their founding treaties or specific protocols. These tools are essential for promoting the movement of people within these regions. Notable examples include the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People and the Right of Residence and Establishment (1979), the COMESA Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation

and Eventually Elimination of Visa Requirements (1984), the COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence (2001), the IGAD Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region (2020), the IGAD Protocol on Transhumance from the same year, and the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) (Madubuko, Hasham & Charumbira, 2024). Although the East African Community (EAC) lacks a specific protocol for free movement, it does contain provisions for the free movement of labour within its founding treaty and Common Market Protocol (EAC, 2009). Likewise, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) also include clauses for free movement of people in their foundational agreements. It is noteworthy that ECOWAS stands out as the only REC where all member states have ratified the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). This section analyses the migration governance and legal frameworks of the RECs along the South Route (IGAD, EAC, COMESA, and SADC) that are traversed by Ethiopian migrants heading to South Africa.

The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 in Nairobi, Kenya as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which was founded in 1986 (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). The Migration Policy Framework of the IGAD was inspired by the African Union Commission's Migration Policy Framework (2006) (Teye & Oucho, 2024). The framework acknowledges the significance of labour migration, which often occurs in an irregular manner (IGAD, 2012). On 26 February 2020, IGAD made a significant step forward by adopting the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD region during a meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. Article 4 of this Protocol outlines a detailed plan for the gradual realization and execution of the Protocol. This plan is further elaborated in an annex to the Protocol. According to the roadmap outlined in Article 4, the initial phase focuses on granting entry rights and eliminating visa requirements among member States by the year 2028. The subsequent phase that aims to establish rights for workers to move freely within the region, is scheduled to be completed by 2031. Following this, the third phase aims to provide residency rights in any member State by 2034, while the fourth and final phase aims to implement the right to establish businesses in the region by 2037. This development marks a significant milestone in IGAD's efforts towards regional integration and

cooperation. Currently, IGAD is actively encouraging Member States to sign and ratify the protocol, requiring a minimum of four ratifications for it to come into effect (IGAD, 2020). Although no specific migration policy has been developed by any member state, the framework intends to offer direction on the policies and laws of countries regarding migration. It also highlights the importance of safeguarding migrants, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022).

The IGAD Migration Action Plan (2015-2020) serves as a roadmap for implementing the IGAD-RMPF, enabling the REC and its Member States to identify and bridge gaps in their migration policies through collaborative research and dialogues at the national level (IGAD, 2014). Furthermore, IGAD introduced the Protocol on Transhumance in 2020, specifically targeting pastoral and nomadic communities crossing borders between member states. Various instruments and agreements have been developed to facilitate discussions and actions related to migration within the region (IGAD, 2020). The Declaration on Labour, Employment, and Labour Migration in the IGAD region (2021) advocates for the quick ratification of International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions to safeguard the rights of migrants and their families (IGAD, 2021). Collaborating with the ILO, IGAD has also developed guidelines on Rights-Based Bilateral Labour Agreements (BLAs) to assist Member States in negotiating agreements with Gulf countries, focusing on upholding the rights of migrant workers (IGAD, 2022). One of the notable achievements of IGAD is the safeguarding of refugees hosted by its member states. The Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education, established in 2017, mandated member states to develop comprehensive national strategies to incorporate refugees into their educational systems (IGAD, 2017). Similarly, the Kampala Declaration on Jobs, Livelihoods, and Self-Reliance in 2019, ratified by IGAD member states, underscored the importance of granting refugees in host countries the opportunity to work and ensuring their rights in the workplace (IGAD, 2019). Moreover, discussions on effectively managing migration and promoting cooperation between member states have been on-going through the Regional Consultative Process on Migration (RCPM). The main goal of this process is to ensure consistency in migration policies and enhance the capabilities of countries and the region as a whole in implementing the Migration Policy Framework (MPF) and other regional policies. The RCPM aims to facilitate conversations and collaboration among IGAD member states on managing migration by improving understanding and coherence in policies related to migration, as well as building up regional,

institutional, and technical capacities to effectively implement the migration policy framework for Africa and other AU/IGAD migration policies (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022).

The relationship between IGAD and the EU has been significantly influenced by AU-EU relations, which have implemented various agreements such as the 2006 Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process) and the Joint Africa–EU Declaration on Migration (AU-EU, 2006). These agreements have highlighted the importance of effectively managing migration and development, promoting legal migration and mobility, enhancing border control, and tackling irregular migration. In 2007, the Joint Africa–EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility, and Employment (Tripoli Process) was established with a focus on creating more and better employment opportunities in Africa. Subsequently, the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process) was launched in 2014, followed by the Action Plan of the Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015. These initiatives aim to combat human trafficking and smuggling, as well as address the underlying causes of migration from the African continent. Overall, these efforts seek to strengthen cooperation between IGAD and the EU in addressing migration challenges and promoting sustainable development in the region (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022). All nations in the East and Horn of Africa region have officially embraced the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), with Ethiopia and Kenya taking the lead as champion countries. In addition, Djibouti joined these two countries in submitting their voluntary reports to the 2022 International Migration Review Forum (IMRF). The formulation of migration policies in the EHoA region is predominantly influenced by the African Union (AU) Migration Policy Framework for Africa and its Plan of Action (2018-2030). Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC) have developed policy instruments that specifically address the migration dynamics in the region, providing guidelines to Member States during migration policy deliberations (Okoth & Gure, 2021).

The East African Community (EAC) is another regional community that has adopted the migration policy frameworks to govern the mobility across its member states. The Treaty for East African Cooperation signed in 1967 by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania aimed to facilitate the free movement of individuals across these countries, marking a significant aspect of cooperation (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongo, 2024). In addition, the Treaty Establishing EAC in 1999 outlined specific measures to promote unrestricted movement of people, labour, and services,

along with the rights of residence and establishment (EAC, 1999). In 2009, the Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Common Market further emphasised the freedom of individuals to travel between borders, implementation of integrated border management, elimination of barriers to the movement of labour and services, and the rights of residency and establishment (EAC, 2009). This protocol was put into effect in July 2010, solidifying the commitment to enhance regional cooperation and integration within the East African Community (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The East African Community (EAC) Protocol on the Common Market, also known as the Common Market Protocol (CMP) of 2010, is a guiding document that lays down the rules for the free movement of individuals and labour among the EAC Partner States (Teye & Oucho, 2024). Part D of the EAC-CMP specifically addresses the unrestricted migration of individuals and workers, including the recognition of qualifications from citizens within the EAC. Part E highlights the strategies for allowing individuals to establish themselves and reside in different countries within the EAC (EAC, 2009). In addition, the EAC has initiated the Regional Strategic Framework for e-Immigration in 2014 with a focus on digitising immigration systems in Partner States to enhance efficiency. Although Partner States have pledged to align their national legal frameworks to facilitate free movement, progress has been slow due to concerns about maintaining national sovereignty. Despite this, countries like Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda have taken steps through the Northern Corridor initiative to eliminate barriers related to trade and immigration. Furthermore, the development of the EAC e-Immigration Policy (draft) aims to provide further guidance on managing the regional e-immigration system (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The goal of the EAC One Stop Border Posts Act (2016) was to simplify the process of cross border migration to support cross border traders who engage in business activities across different borders (EAC, 2016). The EAC Gender Policy (2018) acknowledges migration as a key focus area, recognizing that while men are more prominent in regional migration, women are also actively participating in migration. At present, the East African Community (EAC) is in the process of creating a regional labour migration policy aimed at addressing the movement of workers both within the region and from other areas. In addition, the EAC is formulating the EAC Council Directive on the Coordination of Social Security Benefits to help member states harmonize their social security laws, facilitating easier access and portability of contributions. Moreover, the EAC is also developing a Refugee Management Policy to establish a cohesive

strategy for managing forced displacement within the region (Okoth & Gure, 2021; Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 1993 in Kampala, Uganda, and received formal approval in 1994 in Lilongwe, Malawi. A significant component of COMESA is the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Rights of Establishment and Residence, which was adopted in 2001 (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). This protocol comprises two main legal instruments: the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements (1984) and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence (1998, adopted in 2001). The 1984 protocol aimed to enhance free movement among Member States by eliminating visa restrictions. Following this, the 1998 protocol was created to offer guidelines for Member States on ensuring freedom of movement by abolishing visa requirements (Part II), promoting labour mobility (Part III), and facilitating the movement of services (Part IV) (COMESA, 1998). However, progress in ratifying these protocols has been slow; only Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have both signed and ratified the free movement protocol. Other member states, such as Seychelles and Mauritius, have introduced visa waivers, while Zambia has granted a visa waiver for nationals on official business (Teye & Oucho, 2024). Recently, COMESA has renewed discussions regarding the implementation of these protocols, beginning with the release of Guidelines for the Movement of Goods and Services across the COMESA Region in 2020. This document sought to resolve conflicting commitments among EAC and SADC members within the COMESA region (COMESA, 2020).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the fourth regional bloc that Ethiopian migrants traverse on their way to their final destinations. Initially, in 1996, SADC proposed a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, which was later updated and renamed the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 1997. This revised protocol was further amended and officially adopted in 2005, allowing citizens of member states to enter without a visa for up to 90 days (SADC, 2005). However, despite being established for several years, the ratification process has been sluggish due to concerns from major host countries such as South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. These nations fear that the protocol could lead to an influx of immigrants from neighbouring countries (Maunganidze, 2021). Currently, only four out of the 16

member states have ratified the protocol, rendering it inactive. Nonetheless, the protocol permits member states to create bilateral agreements for visa exemptions. Several countries have already waived visa requirements for one another, including Comoros and Madagascar (visa on arrival for all), as well as Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (a mix of visa-free entry and visa on arrival), and Seychelles (no visa needed). Individuals wishing to settle in a member state can apply for a permit from the appropriate authorities there (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). South Africa has expressed a preference for bilateral and small multilateral agreements concerning labour migration (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has formulated three successive Labour Migration Action Plans (L-MAPs) in the years 2013-2015, 2016-2019, and 2020-2025 to guide Member States in implementing measures to enhance labour migration within the region. These plans span over five years, with the initial L-MAPs being introduced between 2013 and 2015, leading to the establishment of the Labour Migration Policy Framework in 2014 (SADC, 2014). Currently, SADC is in the process of developing its Regional Migration Policy Framework, which will direct Member States in formulating national migration policies (Teye & Oucho, 2024). The primary focus of the Labour Migration Action Plan for the years 2016-2019 is to promote labour migration for the purpose of regional integration and development within the SADC Region (SADC, 2016). The third SADC Labour Migration Action Plan for the years 2020-2025 aims to enhance the role of labour migration in promoting regional cooperation and integration within the SADC. The main objective is to improve the management of labour migration for the socio-economic development of the region. This is to be achieved through three strategic objectives: strengthening labour migration policies and regulatory systems to ensure better governance of labour migration, safeguarding the rights of migrant workers, increasing awareness of their contributions to development and regional integration, and empowering migrant workers to participate in socio-economic development processes in both their countries of origin and destination (SADC, 2020). The SADC Labour Migration Action Plan (2020-2025) highlights the importance of all Member States creating thorough national policies regarding labour migration. While there is no specific deadline mentioned, it is generally understood that this must be completed within the framework of the LAMP by the year 2025. Currently, four Member States (Lesotho, Namibia, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe) have already established comprehensive national labour migration policies and have begun implementing their respective

Action Plans. On the other hand, four Member States (Botswana, Eswatini, Malawi, and South Africa) are still in the process of developing their policies at different stages. Furthermore, five additional SADC Member States (Comoros, the DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zambia) have recently shown interest in creating a labour migration policy (SADC, 2020).

Overall, the gradual inclusion of rules that mandate member countries to collaborate in managing migration as embedded in their foundational agreements and specific regulations on the movement of people appear to be promoting increased freedom of movement (Ndegwa, Atta-Mensah & Ndongu, 2024). The most accessible and friendly Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are the ECOWAS and the EAC. Thanks to the Free Movement of Persons Protocol, all ECOWAS nationals can travel to other member countries without needing a visa. EAC is the next best performer, with citizens of 80% of member states enjoying visa-free travel. On the other hand, COMESA ranks lowest among regional blocs, with 44% of members requiring a visa beforehand and 30% able to get one upon arrival (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The 2019 Visa Openness Index Report reveals that Africans still need visas to visit 51% of other African nations (a decrease from 55% in 2016), with 26% receiving visas on arrival and 25% (a 5% increase from 2016) having eliminated visa requirements for fellow African travellers altogether (African Development Bank, 2019). In the IGAD region, some members can be classified as welcoming in terms of visas, while others are more restrictive. Uganda (5<sup>th</sup> most open in Africa), Kenya (13<sup>th</sup>), Somalia (14<sup>th</sup>), Djibouti (17<sup>th</sup>), and Ethiopia (18<sup>th</sup>) all scored above average, whereas South Sudan (50<sup>th</sup>), Eritrea (51<sup>st</sup>), and Sudan (52<sup>nd</sup>) rank among the least open countries on the continent (AfDB, 2019; Geddes & Maru, 2020).

At the national level, most efforts towards facilitating free movement are tied to regional economic communities, but some countries have independently chosen to enhance their own systems. Significant advancements have been achieved in promoting visa openness for African citizens. There are also an increasing number of African countries allowing visa-free entry for nationals from other African nations (Hirsch, 2021). The 2022 Africa visa openness report by the AfDB (2022) revealed that 48 out of 55 African countries now offer visa-free access to citizens of at least one other African country, with 42 countries extending this privilege to nationals of five other countries. Remarkably, three countries provide visa-free travel to all other African nations. The report further indicated that over half of Africa, with 29 countries, allows visa on

arrival for citizens of at least one other African country. In addition, 24 countries grant visa on arrival to nationals from five or more countries, and 14 countries offer this option to individuals from 35 or more African nations (AfDB, 2022). Efforts are also underway to introduce regional passports and national identification cards for cross-border travel. Other initiatives include the proposed African passport and the implementation of special travel regulations for border residents, along with the introduction of e-Visa services (Madubuko, Hasham & Charumbira, 2024).

In the past ten years, numerous African nations have been crafting their own migration policies, with the aim of utilising the advantages of migration for the advancement of their societies and economies (Teye, 2022b). These national policies typically encompass a wide array of migration-related issues, ranging from internal migration, regular and irregular migration to forced displacement, while also taking into consideration overarching concerns like climate change, development, and health. It is common for these policies to be in alignment with various international, continental, and regional agreements. The development of national migration policies has been greatly influenced by the AUC Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) which was officially adopted by Member States back in 2006. Despite the MPFA being in place for a decade, only Nigeria (2014), Mali (2014), and Ghana (2016) had managed to finalise their respective national migration policies or labour migration policies during that time. In 2018, the MPFA underwent a revision to address identified shortcomings at both regional and national levels, with a concerted effort made by the AUC to promote the framework to Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Following the revisions to the MPFA, several countries such as Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have embarked on the development of their own national migration policies, all in line with the principles outlined in the MPFA (2018) where the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) principles have been integrated (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The establishment of migration governance frameworks has highlighted the importance of migration in Africa's development. Nonetheless, various obstacles impede the execution of migration policies throughout the continent (Teye & Oucho, 2024). The main issue is the insufficient political commitment to implement regional free movement initiatives. Additionally, there is a lack of strong coordination among the different stakeholders involved in migration

activities. To improve migration management in Africa, effective collaboration and coordination among institutions and actors both within and across regional and national boundaries are essential. Despite this, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) face issues with coordination and cooperation in addressing migrants' needs. Another obstacle is the insufficient human resource capacity and funding in Africa for state institutions handling migration governance. Moreover, many governments lack interest and political will to prioritise migration as a crucial development issue (Teye *et al.*, 2022). Implementation of migration policies has also been inadequate, with some governments showing reluctance in implementing certain aspects (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

### **6.3. Migration Governance and Legal Frameworks of Ethiopia and South Africa**

Ethiopia has made significant progress in upholding internationally recognized human rights by endorsing various international and regional regulations governing migration issues (IOM, 2017). Ethiopia's commitment to complying with global legal standards is not only influenced by its responsibilities arising from ratified international agreements but also by the provisions of its Constitution. The Constitution serves as a foundation for integrating ratified international treaties into the Ethiopian legal framework and serves as a guide for interpreting not only the relevant laws but also the fundamental rights and liberties enshrined in the Constitution (Constitution of the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia, 1995). The agreements ratified or acceded to by Ethiopia pertain to the status and treatment of refugees, the prevention of human trafficking and smuggling, the safeguarding of children, the elimination of slavery and forced labour, and broader human rights treaties of the UN and African Union addressing civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights, as well as the protection of marginalised groups such as women, children, individuals with disabilities, and the prohibition of racial discrimination (IOM, 2017).

Ethiopia has not yet ratified key migration-related conventions from the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) that significantly affect labour migration. These include the UN International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, as well as ILO Conventions 97 (Migration for Employment Convention) and 143 (Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention). However, there are signs that Ethiopia is moving towards ratifying the UN International Convention on the Rights of All

Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (IOM, 2017; Tekalign, 2021b). Moreover, Ethiopia has not ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights regarding the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Furthermore, Ethiopia has not consented to the individual complaints procedures outlined in any of the aforementioned UN or African Union treaties. As a result, individuals cannot submit complaints to the relevant UN or African Union bodies regarding Ethiopia's non-compliance with these treaties (IOM, 2017).

Ethiopia has played a pivotal role in the endorsement of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) since its inception. Throughout the creation and adoption stages, a distinguished delegation from the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) recognized the significance of the Compact and fully embraced its objectives (Okoth & Gure, 2021). The delegation also committed to executing these goals, understanding the substantial impact they could have on national migration initiatives and strategies. As a result of these efforts, Ethiopia has taken steps to identify ten key GCM priorities and was recently designated as a GCM Champion country in East Africa. This recognition was solidified through an official letter of endorsement sent to the International Organization for Migration Headquarters by the GoE. Ethiopia is actively implementing the GCM in alignment with sustainable development goals (SDGs) and other pertinent processes. The government has issued directives to integrate the Compact into the country's second five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) from 2015 to 2020 and the Ten-Year Development plan (FDRE-NPC, 2022).

Ethiopia has embraced the African Union's Free Movement Protocol (FMP) at the continental level, although it has not yet formally ratified it. In 2018, the country introduced a visa upon arrival service for all African Union Member States and implemented an electronic visa system. At a regional level, Ethiopia has also adopted the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Regional Migration Framework and IGAD's Free Movement Protocol and Transhumance agreements. Furthermore, Ethiopia has developed a draft migration policy that aligns with the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and AU's Free Movement Protocol. This policy has received approval from the Prime Minister (Okoth & Gure, 2021).

Since the migrant crisis in the EU during 2015/16, there has been a significant shift towards integrating migration into the foreign policy of the EU. The Migration Partnership Framework (MPF), established in 2016, has played a crucial role in this integration, along with other informal agreements related to the return and readmission of migrants. The EU has focused on five priority countries in Africa, including Ethiopia, with the aim of increasing cooperation on the return of irregular migrants from the EU (Fikreab, 2024). Through various financial instruments such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF), Ethiopia has received substantial financial support from the EU to manage migration and refugee challenges. This financial support has also contributed to changes in migration and refugee policies within the country (Tekalign, 2021b; Kiya & Bakewell, 2022; Raty & Shilhav, 2020). The EU has exerted influence on Ethiopia's refugee law, leading to its revision in 2019, as well as the signing of agreements related to return and reintegration. This cooperation has led to improved collaboration in areas such as combating trafficking and enhancing border security, as well as promoting intra-European cooperation on a country-specific level. Ethiopia has been highlighted by the EU and its member states as a model within the Khartoum Process, receiving privileged funding and support compared to other members (Castillejo, 2017). This close cooperation between the EU and Ethiopia has strengthened ties and collaboration in various areas related to migration management (Fikreab, 2024).

In 2016, the Ethiopian government made a significant agreement with the European Union to allocate 30% of job opportunities in new industrial parks to asylum seekers and refugees. The World Bank and UNHCR then provided Ethiopia with a substantial amount of US\$350 million to support the integration of refugees into local communities (Mehari, 2018). This initiative aimed to enhance refugees' access to employment in various sectors such as agriculture, environment, industry, and small businesses in both urban and rural areas (Geddes & Maru, 2020). The CRRF project in Ethiopia includes the development of three industrial parks valued at USD 500 million, referred to as the Ethiopia's Job Compact by the EU (12). This initiative aims to generate employment opportunities, with an estimated 100,000 jobs to be created - 70,000 for the local communities and 30,000 for refugees. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is among the financial backers of these industrial parks. After Ethiopia's commitment in September 2016 to establish these parks, the EIB expressed willingness to finance the project alongside other partners (EIB, 2016). A total of €20 million has been earmarked for this purpose

(Tsion, 2018). Nonetheless, actual construction of the parks has not commenced yet. Given the significant potential for job creation associated with these parks, this delay is a cause for concern and a setback to the project's goals (Tsion, 2020).

Since the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), Ethiopia has made significant advancements in addressing various migration challenges through the development and revision of practices, proclamations, directives, and policies (FDRE-NPC, 2022). Specifically, key changes have been observed in the National Population Policy, Diaspora Policy, Overseas Employment Proclamation, Immigration Proclamation, Refugee Proclamation, and Anti-Human Trafficking and Smuggling Proclamation. However, it is important to note that Ethiopia currently lacks a unified migration policy that aligns with its other development strategies (IOM 2019; Ataklti & Birtukan, 2023). Notable updates include the replacement of Refugee Proclamation 409/2004 with Proclamation No. 1110/2019, which is currently in effect. The Ethiopian Overseas Employment Proclamation (No. 923/2016) was amended and ratified by Proclamation No. 1246/2021, and has been implemented accordingly. In addition, Proclamation No. 1178/2020 addresses the Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Persons. Furthermore, a directive has been issued to establish the organisation and functioning of the National Partnership Coalition, along with a drafted regulation for the Rehabilitation of Victims Fund. In 2019, Labour Proclamation No. 377/2004 was repealed and substituted by Proclamation No. 1156/2019. There has also been a directive outlining how private employment agencies should deliver their services in the country. A draft directive is currently being developed to implement the revised overseas employment proclamation No. 1246/2021. Lastly, a new draft directive is in progress to replace the directive No. 65/2011 concerning the Rehabilitation of Victims of Returnees (FDRE-NPC, 2022).

Proclamation No. 1178/2020, along with Proclamation No. 923/2016 and the amendment proclamation No. 1246/2021, play a crucial role in Ethiopia's management of migration (Ataklti & Birtukan, 2023; Kiya & Bakewell, 2022). Proclamation No. 1178/2020, enacted in 2020, aims to combat irregular migration by focusing on preventing human trafficking and smuggling, supporting victims, and holding offenders accountable. It replaced a previous proclamation (Proclamation No. 909/2015) and introduced harsher penalties for offenders, including fines of up to 500,000ETB and sentences ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment. In addition, it

granted the National Council and the National Partnership Coalition the authority to manage migration, contributing to a comprehensive approach towards migration issues. The primary goals of Proclamation 1178/2020 are to reduce the number of victims of irregular migration and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. Proclamation No. 1178/2020 focuses on preventing individuals from going missing as a result of irregular migration, while Proclamation No. 923/2016 includes measures to prevent disappearances, repatriate bodies, and provide support to the families of victims, particularly Ethiopian migrant workers employed legally as domestic workers abroad. Articles 8-14 of Proclamation 1178/2020 outline procedures for preventing, protecting, and prosecuting cases related to human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, which can result in disappearances and fatalities during migration, including labour migration overseas.

The Overseas Employment Proclamation (923/2016) is a key piece of national legislation aimed at overseeing the migration of Ethiopian workers. This proclamation, officially known as Proclamation No. 923/2016, was put into place to facilitate Ethiopians seeking employment opportunities abroad by providing them with necessary training and guidance. In order to ensure the protection of Ethiopian labour migrants, the 2016 proclamation calls for bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) to be established between Ethiopia and the countries receiving these workers. Currently, Ethiopia has BLAs in place with Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. These agreements outline the working conditions for migrant workers as well as the requirements for Ethiopian nationals seeking employment in these countries. Furthermore, the proclamation mandates that individuals undergo pre-departure training before embarking on overseas employment. This training covers important aspects such as the working conditions in the destination country, the specific skills needed for the job, and the rights and responsibilities of the workers. Prospective migrants are expected to meet certain qualifications, including completion of training, a minimum of 8<sup>th</sup> grade education, and a certificate verifying their competency. Proclamation 923/2016 allows for three different methods of overseas recruitment: through public employment services based on intergovernmental agreements, through private employment agencies (PEAs), or through direct employment. Regardless of the recruitment method, all individuals must have a written employment contract approved by the Ministry of Labour and Skills (MoLS). MoLS is responsible for registering these contracts, monitoring PEAs, and maintaining communication with labour officials in destination countries to ensure

the safety and well-being of migrant workers. To further protect Ethiopian workers abroad, foreign employers are required to provide life and disability insurance for their employees as per the provisions of the proclamation. Private employment agencies (PEAs) and employers alike are held accountable for the welfare of Ethiopian migrant workers under this legislation.

In 2021, Ethiopia made changes to the Ethiopian Overseas Employment Proclamation (No. 923/2016) through the Ethiopia's Overseas Employment Proclamation Amendment (No. 1246/2021). These amendments eliminated the requirement of an 8<sup>th</sup> grade education for individuals seeking overseas employment. Now, workers only need to provide a certificate of occupational competence. The revision of the proclamation was prompted by the Ethiopian government's ban on labour migration to the Middle East in October 2013. This decision came after numerous reports of abuse towards Ethiopian migrants in Middle Eastern countries, as well as the mass deportation of 165,000 undocumented Ethiopian migrants from Saudi Arabia. The main goal of the proclamation was to safeguard labour migrants and regulate the overseas employment of Ethiopian citizens. However, these regulations are specifically for unskilled labour migrants travelling to the Middle East through private employment agencies. Unfortunately, this ban unintentionally led to the rise of 'illegal' routes and secret migration networks, further endangering migrants to human trafficking and exploitation (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022).

Ethiopia has committed to international agreements such as the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugee Issues in Africa (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022). Building upon these agreements, Ethiopia enacted the National Refugee Proclamation No.409/2004, ensuring that the government cannot deny refugees or asylum seekers entry into the country or send them back to a place where they may face persecution. While the proclamation grants refugees certain rights, it also imposes limitations on their freedom of movement, ability to work for wages, and access to education. Refugees are required to reside in designated camps, restricting their mobility. In 2019, the Refugee Proclamation No.409/2004 underwent revisions and was replaced by Proclamation No. 1110/2019. This new proclamation clearly outlines the rights of refugees regarding residency, education, healthcare, financial services, and the right to engage in wage-earning employment either individually or as a group in various sectors like agriculture, industry, small-scale

enterprises, crafts, and commerce. One of the significant advancements of the new proclamation is that it allows refugees the right to work and earn a living, marking a substantial improvement from the previous regulations.

Ethiopia has been opening up various opportunities for the diaspora, particularly in the area of investment and development initiatives. The Investment Proclamation No 280/2002 was a significant milestone as the first legal framework specifically catered towards the diaspora community. Its main objective was to make investing in Ethiopia more appealing to the diaspora by classifying foreign nationals of Ethiopian descent as local investors, enabling them to own property such as land within the country. In addition, the second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) highlighted the diaspora's role in supporting the country's progress through direct investments in key sectors like healthcare and education, especially in regional areas. Moreover, the Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012 was introduced to offer tax incentives to the diaspora, such as exemption from corporate income tax for a period of up to 10 years and personal income tax exemption for expatriate workers in industrial park enterprises for five years. The diaspora policy of 2013 (18), later revised in 2015 (19), places emphasis on engaging the diaspora in development efforts, encouraging their involvement in democratic processes and peace building activities, as well as advocating for their interests. The policy also stresses the importance of knowledge transfer and technology adoption across different sectors. Although the diaspora may have limited political rights, such as voting, they are entitled to equal access to resources and services as local citizens, the issuance of a special identification card known as the Yellow Card under Proclamation No. 270/2002 (20) allows the diaspora to access such services. The Yellow Card, also known as the Ethiopian Origin ID Card, is granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin, granting them certain rights and privileges similar to Ethiopian nationals, with exceptions like voting rights and specific employment sectors such as security.

In the process of drafting the ten-year development plan for the country (2020/21-2030/31), the Ministry of Planning and Development has established Key Performance Indicators to evaluate progress towards national migration-related priorities. The Ethiopian Statistics Service has been tasked with creating a strategic plan to assess the integration of these indicators and performance within government organisations (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022). To enhance this integration process,

the Government of Ethiopia, with support from IOM, has provided training to department heads on incorporating migration issues into their respective development plans. In alignment with the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) signed in 2018, the Ethiopian government is in the process of developing a National Migration Policy. The focus of this policy is on promoting job opportunities for Ethiopians through industrialization and enterprise development, in line with the country's overall development objectives. Furthermore, a migration governance indicator (MGI) has been created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Attorney General's Office, and IOM to support this initiative. In April 2022, a draft of the migration policy was shared with stakeholders, including development partners, embassies, and UN agencies, with plans to present it to the Council of Ministers. This demonstrates the commitment of the Ethiopian government to address migration issues effectively and inclusively in its national development agenda (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022).

In light of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has introduced a series of institutional and structural changes. Proclamation 1178/2020 led to the transformation of the Taskforce into a National Partnership Coalition (NPC) and the restructuring of the existing four working groups into six (Awareness and Foreign Employment, Law Enforcement, Returnees Protection and Rehabilitation, Diaspora Participation and Development, Migration Information Management, Research and Investigation Teams) through directive No. 563/2021. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is currently in the process of deploying labour attachés to key destination countries for Ethiopian migrant workers. This initiative aims to safeguard the rights, dignity, security, and interests of Ethiopian workers abroad. Furthermore, a dedicated directorate has been established under the Ethiopia Statistics Service (ESS) to gather, organise, and analyse comprehensive data on migration and ensure its proper dissemination. The Immigration Nationality Service (INS) has undergone restructuring and is now operating in accordance with Regulation No. 449/2019. The National Disaster Risk and Management Commission, previously under the Ministry of Peace, has been reorganised and now reports to the Office of the Prime Minister (FDRE-NPC, 2022). In addition, the National Job Creation Commission was founded in 2019 with the goal of facilitating the creation of 20 million jobs by 2030 as part of the Government's employment strategy (Okoth & Gure, 2021).

The creation of the National Partnership Coalition and the Overseas Employment Board stemmed from Proclamation No. 1178/2020 and Proclamation No. 1246/2021, which aimed to enhance the management of migration within the country (Ataklti & Birtukan, 2023). The National Council led by the Deputy Prime Minister and responsible to the Prime Minister acts as the top-level authority for coordinating migration-related matters. The Prime Minister's Office, in close collaboration with various ministries and offices, oversees the political aspect of migration matters (Fikreab, 2024). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) also plays a crucial role in engaging with the Ethiopian diaspora. The Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate focuses on involving the diaspora community both within and outside Ethiopia. Furthermore, the Ethiopia Diaspora Agency, established under MoFA in 2018, aims to facilitate the participation of Ethiopians and individuals of Ethiopian descent in the country's development efforts (AFFORD, 2020). The former ARRA (Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs), operating under the Ministry of Peace, is tasked with overseeing activities related to refugees. Now made accountable to the Prime Minister, it serves as the primary representative for all matters concerning refugees and asylum-seekers (Kiya & Bakewell, 2022).

Although Ethiopia has made significant strides in developing progressive migration policies, the implementation of these policies is hindered by a lack of resources dedicated to managing migration initiatives (Okoth & Gure, 2021). Ethiopia currently lacks a structured system for collecting and sharing migration data, with the central statistical agency only gathering limited information on migrants. The establishment of the National Coalition Partnership for Migration (NPC) through Proclamation 1178/2020 has improved coordination efforts within the government, but there is still a need for greater awareness among government officials at both the federal and regional levels. As Okoth and Gure (2021) further argue that there remains a gap between migration responses and policy implementation at the federal and regional levels, with limited coordination of migration efforts within regional governments despite the NPC's efforts. Addressing these challenges will be crucial in ensuring the effective management of migration in Ethiopia.

South Africa has officially ratified a wide array of international agreements and treaties that pertain to labour migration and safeguarding the rights of migrant workers. The country has endorsed all fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), along

with a number of technical conventions indirectly related to migrant workers. South Africa played an active role in the development of the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (GCM) and is committed to aligning its National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP) with the principles outlined in the compact. However, South Africa has not ratified the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) [RSA National Department of Employment and Labour (DEL), 2022]. On a continental scale, South Africa has endorsed and made official various agreements concerning labour migration within the AU and SADC. The country is a member of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), yet the discrepancy between its protectionist migration policy and the more open movement of people approach in these agreements raises questions about the coherence of South Africa's migration framework. While there are numerous policy frameworks and regional directives on migration issues, very few have been formally ratified and put into practice within the country. SADC stands out as the only African Regional Economic Community (REC) that has not fully endorsed and operationalized a policy framework supporting the free movement of people (Langalanga, 2019).

Migration has been a longstanding phenomenon in the Southern African region, particularly with regards to labour migration. The South African migrant labour system, for instance, dates back to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century (Crush, *et al.*, 2006; Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2016). Peberdy (2009) has conducted a detailed analysis of the evolution of South Africa's immigration policy, delineating three distinct phases: 1910–1948, 1948–1994, and post 1994. The first immigration law in South Africa was the Aliens Act of 1911, later known as the Aliens Control Act, which effectively barred foreign Black Africans from obtaining legal long-term residency in the country. In addition, it aimed to block immigration from India. Subsequently, in the 1930s, restrictions were tightened to limit the influx of Jews and Catholics (Hirsch, 2024; Moyo & Laine, 2021). In the early 1900s, a series of Immigration Acts were introduced in South Africa to manage the flow of immigrants into the country. Among them were the 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act, the 1930 Immigration Quota Act, and the 1937 Aliens Control Act. These laws laid the foundation for future immigration legislation, such as the Aliens Registration Act of 1939 (Peberdy, 1998). It is crucial to acknowledge that the immigration policy in South Africa during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was discriminatory and selective. As noted by Peberdy and Crush (1998),

immigration was predominantly viewed as a 'white issue,' with immigrants being exclusively considered white. The government categorised whites into desirable and undesirable categories when formulating policies, thereby excluding black individuals from the immigration policy, as they were perceived as temporary residents who would eventually return to rural areas. In summary, the historical trajectory of migration and immigration policies in South Africa presents a complex and exclusionary narrative, underlining the racial biases and discriminatory practices that were prevalent in the country during that time (Moyo & Laine, 2021).

In 1948, the National Party took control of South Africa and consequently made changes to immigration laws in order to conform to the apartheid system. This led to several revisions of immigration laws between 1948 and 1994 with the aim of tightening government supervision over immigration. Some notable amendments during this period include the 1972 Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act, the Aliens Amendment Act of 1978, and the Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Act of 1984 (Peberdy & Crush, 1998). Despite the slight easing of restrictions with the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activity (Act 87 of 1986) and the Aliens Control Act 96 (Act 96 of 1991), discriminatory provisions remained deeply rooted (Moyo & Laine, 2021). The Aliens Control Act of 1991, known as “apartheid’s last act”, served as the core of South Africa's immigration policy in the 1990s and early 2000s (Government of South Africa, 1991). Although subject to constitutional scrutiny, particularly concerning the rights of migrants, the Act continued to be in effect 12 years into the post-apartheid era (OECD/ILO, 2018).

In the 1990s, the Mandela government in South Africa adopted a more compassionate approach towards immigrants, particularly those from neighbouring African countries. Mozambicans residing unlawfully in South Africa were granted a one-time amnesty to regularise their status (Hirsch, 2024). The Constitution of 1996 also safeguards the rights of migrants and migrant workers. The Bill of Rights, found in Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, enshrines a list of human rights applicable to all individuals within the Republic of South Africa, irrespective of their migration status, with the exception of certain rights reserved for citizens. Only permanent residents and recognized refugees are entitled to receive social grants through the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) (RSA-DEL, 2022). The South African government initiated a comprehensive consultative process that resulted in the release of a Green

Paper on International Migration in 1997, followed by White Papers on Refugees and Immigration. Subsequently, the 1998 Refugee Act and the 2002 Immigration Act were enacted. The Immigration Act of 2002, utilised for over 15 years, facilitated the regulation of significant changes in migration patterns and the distribution of migrants across various sectors of the economy. This legislation, specifically Sections 26 and 27, was amended by the Immigration Act of 2004 before coming into effect in July 2005, signifying a departure from the apartheid-era immigration laws according to researchers (Moyo & Laine, 2021).

During the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, immigration to South Africa followed a structured system called the “two-gate policy” (Crush, 2000; Peberdy, 2009). The front gate welcomed individuals who met the standards of appeal set by the ruling minority, while the back gate had a dual purpose of keeping out unwanted migrants while allowing in cheap and compliant labour for temporary periods. This policy was closely linked to the grand apartheid plan, particularly the homelands policy and influx control, blurring the distinction between citizens (specifically the native population) and foreigners (Peberdy, 2009). The indigenous people of South Africa were often treated as foreigners in their own land under this policy. Through bilateral labour agreements with five neighbouring SADC countries (Botswana, ESwatini (Swaziland), Lesotho, Malawi, and Mozambique), mineworkers were brought in to work in South African mines (RSA-DEL, 2022).

Over the past twenty years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the South African government has put in place a comprehensive legal framework that is in line with international human rights and labour standards in relation to various aspects of labour migration. The government also ensures access to social benefits before migrants return to their home countries (RSA-DEL, 2022). However, a study conducted by Moyo (2017) on Immigration Acts and Amendment Bills from 2007 to 2014 suggests that while the South African government claims to be improving the permit processing system for foreigners, it appears to be simultaneously tightening the conditions for migration. This indicates that migration is being viewed as a security concern, leading to selective migration and the securitization of migration (Landau, 2012; Moyo, 2020). Similar approaches to migration are also observed in other Southern African countries such as Botswana and Namibia (Campbell, 2010). It is argued that the continued selectivity of migration policies in the region, focusing on the securitization of migration, goes against the goals of promoting free human mobility. Instead,

it creates barriers that reinforce borders, which in turn contributes to irregular migration and related challenges (Moyo & Laine, 2021).

During 2015-2016, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) initiated an extensive consultation process that led to the creation of a new Green Paper on International Migration in 2016 (DHA, 2016), followed by the development of a White Paper in 2017 (RSA-DEL, 2022). These documents emphasise that well-managed international migration can bring significant benefits and should align with the Constitution and the National Development Plan 2030. A key issue in the debate over South African immigration policy has been the shortage of skills, which is closely linked to migration's role in development planning (OECD/ILO, 2018). The White Paper's approach to international migration is based on the belief that there is a considerable number of irregular migrants from Zimbabwe and Lesotho in South Africa, and it is imperative to focus on the needs of disadvantaged South Africans negatively impacted by these migrants (World Bank Group, 2018). According to the preliminary White Paper, more than 90% of asylum seekers do not qualify for asylum (Hirsch, 2024). The proposed changes include establishing 'Asylum Seeker Processing Centres', revoking the automatic right to work and study for asylum seekers, considering options for resettling refugees in other countries, and making non-compliance with deportation orders a criminal offence (DHA, 2017; World Bank Group, 2018).

The migration policy in South Africa appears balanced on paper, but in reality, it leans heavily towards deterrence and enforcement. The country's current stance on migration policy is outlined in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration (Maunganidze, 2021). Decades of oppressive apartheid regulations concerning mobility have fostered negative perceptions toward African labourers in various South African establishments. Following the end of apartheid, xenophobic sentiments and sporadic violence have sadly become commonplace in interactions between citizens and foreigners, particularly those from Africa and Asia (Facchini, Mayda & Mendola, 2013; OECD/ILO, 2018). It is widely believed that migrants, particularly undocumented low-skilled workers, are in direct competition with local residents for housing and social amenities. This perception has led to tensions and misunderstandings between different groups within the country (Chikohomero, 2023; Hirsch, 2024). The lack of employment opportunities for deprived South Africans can largely be attributed to the sluggish economic growth, which in turn is a

result of inadequate government policies and ineffective management. The government has at times blamed the influx of migrants from other African nations for its own shortcomings in providing essential services. This scapegoating of migrants is not only reckless but also has the potential to have serious consequences. Over the years, there have been numerous instances of violent attacks on vulnerable migrants, highlighting the urgent need for a more holistic and inclusive approach to migration in South Africa (Hirsch, 2024). Despite the implementation of an action plan to address xenophobia in 2019, there has been little progress in curbing xenophobic rhetoric and behaviour. The situation remains complex and requires a multi-faceted strategy to promote understanding and harmony among all communities residing in South Africa (Maunganidze, 2021).

Thus, while South Africa adopts a Pan-African identity and is open to certain African migrants based on their skills and economic contributions, it also harbours an underlying exclusivist attitude towards these migrants (Peberdy, 2009). This attitude was highlighted in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration for South Africa (White Paper on International Migration, 2017). Many migrants and refugees faced barriers to entering these exclusive communities, forcing them to turn to human trafficking and other illegal migration methods (McCall, 2015; Cuttitta, 2017; Moreno-Lax, 2018). This situation raises questions about how such a position aligns with the regionalism and Pan-African identity that the SADC region and the African continent are aiming to promote. Notably, intra-African migration and mobility are often more restricted than migration from outside the continent into Africa. For example, South Africa has implemented visa restrictions for many African countries, while citizens from most European nations can enter the country without a visa (Moyo & Laine, 2021).

#### **6.4. African Migration Governance and Legal Frameworks' Implications on the Ethiopians Migration to South Africa**

The migration legal frameworks and governance systems in Africa has obviously contributed to the irregular nature of migrations in the continent including Ethiopians migration to South Africa. This might be the result of African migration policies have been influenced by Eurocentric ideas, the gaps between more liberal migrations policies of the AU and RECs and

the actual implementations at state level, and securitization of African state borders have implications in minimizing the pathways of legal migrations in Africa.

When analysing the Ethiopian migration to South Africa, first the dominance and influence of global migration governance and policies are significant impacts in shaping both the understanding and the nature of migration systems in Africa. African migration governance and legal frameworks were dominated by Eurocentric ontological and epistemic lenses nurtured during the colonial period to the present time (Adepoju, 2020). The lasting effects of colonialism are a significant factor, visible in the way borders were defined and imposed. During colonial rule, many boundaries disrupted long-standing traditions of interaction that existed before these artificial divisions. Thus, under strong EU influence, the focus of migration management policies in Africa has shifted toward border restrictions, increasing control and security at border towns and crossings (Ong'ayo, 2018). Since the early 2000s, the EU has worked to influence migration policies by exporting its preferences and practices to African nations. These efforts have particularly targeted the return of irregular migrants from African countries to their places of origin. As a result, migration governance can often be seen as imposed on African countries or, at a minimum, reflecting priorities that align closely with those of non-African nations (Geddes, 2022).

The exclusionary perspective imposed on Africa during colonial rule was a tool of statecraft and resource exploitation. Southern Africa serves as a key example, where native reserves and Bantustans (Zanker & Bosing, 2024), were established and governed under the belief in rigid, closed ethnic boundaries. These boundaries were enforced by restricting movement and settlement across ethnic groups, except for labour migration to colonial mines and farms (Mamdani, 1996). This legacy influences modern anti-immigrant sentiments and movements in South Africa. Colonial policies that intentionally restricted mobility normalized differences based on national borders. As a result, the post-Apartheid state continues to struggle with deeply ingrained suspicions of migration from other parts of the continent. Barriers to movement within Africa significantly undermine the vision of Pan-Africanism. These obstacles are exacerbated by the European Union's (EU) policy of externalizing its borders into Africa to curb migration. The strategy operates on the assumption that restricting intra-African mobility will, in turn, make it harder for Africans to reach Europe (Zanker & Bosing, 2024).

Another Eurocentric discourse on migration governance influenced African policies often reflects a “sedentary bias”. This perspective assumes that Africans should remain in their place of origin and views migration as an exception, heavily influenced by the perceived “threat” of African migration to Europe. However, despite alarmist narratives prevalent in European media, most African migration happens within the continent. Research consistently shows that over 80% of African migrants stay within Africa (Sempijja, 2021). In addition, when Africans do migrate to other continents, 94% do so through regular channels. Globally, African migrants make up just 14% of the international migrant population, in contrast to 41% from Asia and 24% from Europe (Zanker & Bosing, 2024). Terms like "migration crisis," "combating illegal migration," and "containing migration" have become common among leaders, leading to the securitization and politicization of migration policies. These approaches often fail to prioritize the protection and dignity of migrants, indirectly or directly exacerbating their vulnerabilities (Sempijja, 2021).

The European perspective, and more broadly that of the Global North, has heavily influenced how migration is perceived, discussed, and addressed in policy and public discourse. This approach often fails to accommodate the diverse and complex ways migration is understood in other contexts, such as in Africa (Zanker & Bosing, 2024). The 2018 Global Compact for Migration exemplifies this imbalance; although it aspired to provide a global framework, it ended up being relatively one-sided (Pécoud, 2020). Furthermore, the prevailing interpretation of international legal norms overlooks the power dynamics embedded in these laws and policies. In Africa, norms surrounding governance, leadership, gender, and migration are undeniably shaped and influenced by the enduring legacy of colonialism (Zanker & Bosing, 2024). Therefore, African migration policies are criticized being influenced by Western-centric ideas and are primarily carried out with funding from the West (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Mawere, Van Reisen & Van Stam, 2019). The adoption of this Western approach to migration governance led to irregular status of migrants within Africa like the case of Ethiopian migrants to South Africa. As Girmachew (2021) stated, around 95 percent of Ethiopians migrate to South Africa through irregular channels and regularise their status through the asylum system.

The relationship between migration and development in Africa challenges the dominant narrative that migration stems from failed development and hinders progress in both origin and destination countries. On the contrary, evidence highlights that migration is not only a product of

development but also a driver of it (IOM, 2020; Zanker & Bosing, 2024). African policy documents frequently refer the “untapped potential” of migration and emphasize the role of migrants as “agents of innovation and development”. These documents particularly focus on improving the regulation of migration, reducing remittance costs, and promoting labour rights. The central goal is to harness the development-migration nexus by managing mobility effectively (Zanker, 2019). However, as Zanker (2019) argued migration policy documents often lack clarity when addressing legal migration. For instance, the Roadmap (2014–17) from the fourth EU-Africa summit frames legal migration as the “promotion of alternatives to irregular migration” but does not specify what these alternatives entail. When such documents provide more detail, they prioritize education as the main avenue for legal migration, with labour migration following as a secondary focus.

The rhetoric of securitization of border and the language of border management is again a European import into Africa. For instance, the Valetta Action Plan prioritizes “preventing and fighting irregular migration,” a key focus for the European side. However, the securitized language and measures associated with this goal are evident across all regions. Policy documents consistently highlight the potentially destabilizing effects of unmanaged migration on national, regional, and international security and emphasize a rhetorical commitment to combating “illegal” or “irregular” migration (Raty & Shilhav, 2020a). This creates a universal migration-security nexus, with a strong emphasis on controlling irregular migration. Thus, migration governance policies in the EU imparted discourse focused on restriction-oriented practice to Africa (Zanker, 2019). The growing securitization of intra-African migration also hindered progress in ratifying Africa’s free movement of person’s agenda. By February 2020, only four countries—Mali, Niger, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe—had ratified the protocol, far short of the required 15 (AU, 2019). This reflects the reluctance of African states to ease restrictions on intra-continental mobility, despite notable successes in implementing free movement agreements through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and bilateral arrangements (Maunganidze, 2017; Adepoju, 2020).

Several factors explain the heightened securitization of migration within Africa, directly affecting the push for the free movement of person’s agenda. One key factor is the continent’s fragile security environment, marked by a range of on-going and emerging threats. Civil wars in

Africa frequently involve militia groups and armed gangs that operate in opposition to or in support of governments. Notable terrorist organizations, including Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Islamic State, present serious security threats. Al-Shabaab is particularly active in the Horn and Eastern Africa, a vital area for migration pathways leading to the Middle East and Gulf (eastern route), Southern Africa (southern route), and Europe (northern route). This region is also home to more than 4 million of Africa's 7.4 million refugees and over 8 million of its 17.8 million internally displaced individuals (Adepoju, 2020). Consequently, securitization of borders led the rise to well-established and dynamic system of migration brokerage that links villages and towns in Southern Ethiopia with chains of smugglers in transiting border towns and South Africa (Fekadu, Deshingkar & Tekalign, 2019).

Migration policies and practices that emphasize border securitization and restrict migrant movement inevitably affect migrants, exposing them to heightened risks such as stigmatization, xenophobia, denial of access to essential services, mistreatment, and increased arrests and deportations. These measures also drive migrants to depend on irregular actors and routes, amplifying the dangers of trafficking and other forms of criminal activity. In addition, heightened border securitization leads to border management practices that negatively affect migrants, including excessive use of force, restricted access to asylum, and overly stringent screening procedures. These risks are exacerbated when migrants navigate through conflict zones, areas of violence, or regions severely impacted by climate-related challenges (Sempijja, 2021). This is true for Ethiopian migrants to South Africa exposed to varying level of risks due to the irregular nature of their travel. Migrants are encountered high risks like physical and emotional stress, detention, deportation, disappearance, and loss of life along the routes due to natural and human-made disasters while on their way to the destination area (Yordanos, Zack, & Vanyoro, 2019; Tekalign, 2021a).

The irregular nature of Ethiopian migration to South Africa also impacted by significant gap between the policies established by the African Union and the actual implementation of these policies by its member States. The policies formulated by the African Union in the past twenty years suggest a progressive stance on migration within the continental political sphere. The reassessment and modification of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) in 2017 and 2018 provided an opportunity for both the African Union and its member States to

acknowledge the importance of robust policy and institutional frameworks for effective migration management. This process emphasized the necessity of viewing migration as a crucial element of development, rather than solely as a pressing issue to be addressed. Consequently, the revised MPFA offers recommendations for strategies and approaches to improve migration governance at both national and regional levels (Adepoju, 2020). Considering these intricate challenges, the African Union Commission (AUC), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), national governments, and international agencies and organizations have formulated comprehensive policies. However, they occasionally face obstacles in the form of insufficient strategic collaborations, investments, and political determination needed to advance the agenda (IOM, 2024).

The implementation of African migration policies and governance faces several challenges, including insufficient political will to enforce regional free movement frameworks, poor coordination among stakeholders involved in migration activities, and a shortage of both adequate human resources and funding. Regional cooperation within RECs has shown improvement, but there is still a need to enhance mechanisms for better information sharing and policy alignment (Le Coz & Pietropolli, 2020). Strong coordination and collaboration among existing institutions and stakeholders, both within and across regional and national boundaries, remain critical for effective migration management in Africa. However, organizations like SADC, ECOWAS, and EAC, along with other RECs, continue to face challenges in coordinating efforts to meet the needs of migrants (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

Research from African sub-regional communities, such as ECOWAS and SADC, reveals that state institutions tasked with migration governance often lack the human, technical, and financial resources needed for effective policy implementation (Teye *et al.*, 2022). To improve migration management, it is essential to provide adequate resources, systems, skills, and capacity-building support to these institutions and stakeholders. This includes addressing a broad spectrum of issues, from enhancing migration data systems to developing strategies for mitigating the vulnerabilities faced by migrants (Le Coz & Pietropolli, 2020; Teye & Oucho, 2024). A significant challenge lies in the lack of interest and political will among various governments to prioritize migration as a crucial development issue (Teye *et al.*, 2022). Many countries hesitate to allocate resources or invest in migration policies, favouring other sectoral priorities instead. This

reluctance hinders the effective implementation of existing policies and frameworks. It is therefore vital to secure commitments from African governments to independently support, prioritize, and invest in migration policies within their national development plans, especially as external funding or support diminishes (Teye & Oucho, 2024).

The lack of bilateral labour agreements between Ethiopia and South Africa implies absence of legal pathways and contributing to the irregular nature of Ethiopian migration to South Africa. Bilateral labour migration agreements (BLAs), grounded in the principles of human and labour rights, serve as adaptable tools for managing migratory flows while addressing recruitment needs, labour shortages, and improving the protection of labour and human rights in diverse socio-economic contexts and labour market conditions. When effectively implemented, BLAs are among the most critical instruments for safeguarding migrant workers (AU, 2020). Ethiopian state officials identify the lack of legal migration pathways as a key driver of increased irregular migration. They argue that the EU's approach to addressing illegal migration without offering avenues for legal migration does not align with Ethiopia's interests. Ethiopian officials advocate for expanding legal migration opportunities as a practical strategy to combat irregular migration (Fikreab, 2024). This perspective is supported by research in West Africa, such as findings by Altrogge and Zanker (2019), which suggest that enhancing legal migration options can help address irregular migration.

The concept of mobility and freedom of movement often remains more theoretical than practical in reality. This is primarily due to corruption at border crossings, where visa fees are circumvented and replaced by informal payments directly to border officials. In addition, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) typically do not serve as the primary implementers of policies; instead, they rely on their member states to carry out policy directives (Welz, 2015). Consequently, the responsibility falls on individual countries to translate these policies into national laws, a task that may be hindered by a lack of political willingness to do so (Zanker, 2019). As a result, the corrupt practices present within migration governance institutions at the origin, along the journey, and at the destination significantly affect Ethiopian migrants traveling to South Africa. For example, officials from the Home Affairs department have frequently been arrested and found guilty of corruption and fraud. In 1998, the numerous corruption and fraud cases reported by the media prompted the establishment of an anti-corruption unit within the

department, with assistance from the National Intelligence Agency. During its first year, this unit investigated 225 fraud cases, leading to 69 convictions (with 104 convictions in 2000). However, the effectiveness of this underfunded anti-corruption unit has been limited thus far. Various research reports on the asylum process, including findings from the 2010 Zimbabwean Documentation Project, indicate that widespread corruption persists (Segati, 2011).

In general, this chapter concludes that while African migration policies demonstrate strengths in fostering regional integration and upholding the rights of migrants, they encounter considerable challenges related to implementation, resource availability, and public perception. It is essential to address these shortcomings in order to establish more effective and sympathetic migration governance across the continent. Many African nations participate in regional organizations such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and SADC, which advocate for the free movement of people, thereby enhancing economic opportunities and cultural exchanges. Certain policies prioritize the protection of migrants' rights, including those of refugees and asylum seekers, in alignment with international human rights standards. There is a growing emphasis on tackling the root causes of migration—such as conflict, poverty, and climate change—rather than merely addressing its consequences. In addition, numerous African countries collaborate with international organizations like IOM and UNHCR to enhance migration governance and secure resources for capacity building. However, a notable gap often exists between policy creation and actual implementation, resulting in ineffective management of migration issues. Many nations also struggle with limited financial and technical resources needed to carry out comprehensive migration policies effectively. Furthermore, negative public attitudes towards migrants can lead to discriminatory policies and practices that undermine the rights of both migrants and refugees. The absence of reliable data on migration trends further complicates evidence-based policymaking and hinders efforts to effectively address migration challenges.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on summarizing the key findings of the study and drawing conclusions, while the second part discusses the potential implications for policy and suggests directions for future research.

### **7.1. Conclusions**

The movement of people within Africa has registered a significant increase, with South Africa standing out as the top choice for irregular migrants. Despite the rise in the number of migrants, the issue of irregular migration from Ethiopia to South Africa has not been properly dealt with. Ethiopia serves as a prominent origin for irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa heading towards South Africa. Yet, the routes these migrants take are incredibly dynamic and changing, frequently adapting to circumvent border regulations and authority checkpoints. The state's restrictive policy on mobility significantly influences this irregular migration from Ethiopia.

Ethiopian migration to South Africa is influenced by a combination of demographic, economic, and socio-cultural factors, and the global inequalities or unequal access to mobility rights due to externalization of border management practices. Most irregular migrants are of working age, and the migration trends are predominantly male-dominated. This gender disparity is largely due to the dangers associated with long-distance overland routes, which involve crossing borders illegally, as well as the physically demanding nature of the work, particularly in trading businesses that require transporting goods for door-to-door sales in South Africa. Moreover, the economic disparities created by remittance inflows further incentivize irregular migration, as individuals seek improved economic prospects in the RSA. Thus, structural factors are fuelling a rise in migration both within and beyond Africa. If these factors persist, Ethiopian migration from Kembata-Tembaro Zone to South Africa at an increased rate.

The study concludes that households are the sole decision making unit in the study area, and most migrants possessed varying levels of prior knowledge or information about migration. This corroborates well with the new economics of labour migration, which assumes households made a favourable decision to send migrants to South Africa due to two interrelated factors: income gaps created by remittances and the rise of cultural values that celebrate migrants. The networks

established between migrants in South Africa and their home countries have contributed to a strong culture of migration. The migration culture of Ethiopians to South Africa can be explained by the cumulative causation model, which suggests that as persons have positive migration experiences over time, they are more likely to see migration as a beneficial choice for themselves, their families, and their communities. Remittances play a vital role in stabilizing household incomes in vulnerable economies, enhancing food security, and facilitating access to education.

Effects of irregular migration on migrants resulted from being presented but absent from protection schemes due to securitization of borders and criminalization of migration. The study concludes that the patterns of migration to South Africa have made through irregular routes with significant role played by network migrations and brokers as an overwhelming majority of Ethiopians (90.5%) migrate with the aid of smugglers or brokers. The reasons for choosing irregular migration routes vary, including their cost-effectiveness compared to regular routes, the time-consuming and costly bureaucratic procedures involved with legal migration, and the inaccessibility of regular routes to enter South Africa. The scarcity of opportunities in their homeland, coupled with the government's stringent measures to curb migration has been forcing migrants to rely on smugglers. In addition, there is no sufficient reason to justify their trip to South Africa to go through the legal system (to get visa) in absence of any foreign employment agreement between Ethiopia and South Africa.

The pattern of Ethiopian migration patterns to South Africa are not entirely permanent, with instances of migrants returning to their home countries. Migrants return back to home is achieving economic success that primarily forced them to emigrate to RSA. The temporary nature of migration is related to legal barriers and security issues at the destination. Many Ethiopian migrants in South Africa possess asylum status that requires periodic renewal every three to six months, while others lack any asylum documentation, as many returnees have noted the limited opportunities for obtaining South African citizenship. Furthermore, they often live precariously, facing frequent xenophobic attacks; some returnees describe their survival as a "miracle or God's plan." The lack of access to social services also contributes to their decision to return. Consequently, most participants do not intend to return to South Africa. Unlike, the

neoclassical theory, return migration is considered as a success for Kembata migrants to South Africa.

The migration of individuals from the Kembata-Tembaro Zone of Southern Ethiopia to South Africa has major effects on migrants, their families, and the communities from which they originate. The study concludes that migration has positive effects on the migrants' livelihoods. Migration improved the socio-economic status of migrants and their households' livelihood through accumulation of assets such as land, livestock, houses, businesses (like hotels, shops, garages) and vehicles. The household lives were significantly transformed with the money remitted from South Africa. The former small thatch-roofed huts were replaced by new and better built houses furnished with modern appliances like satellite television, refrigerator, and modern furniture. On the other hand, migrants faced serious challenges and encountered risks during their journey to South Africa along the routes and during their sojourn in the destination. Irregular migrants encountered xenophobic attitudes from citizens and immigration officials in the host country, discriminated in social services, and suffered physical violence, harassment and long-time detention by the police in South Africa.

Finally, the present African migration policies have been influenced by Eurocentric ideas and are primarily carried out with funding from the West. African union free labour mobility ideas never realized due to both policy failures and practice on the ground. Though, Africa tends to emphasize the positive effects of migration on development, western countries often focus on the security and stability implications. Despite the ratification and adoption of international and local migration policies by the AU, RECS and individual states in Africa towards achieving the Pan-African vision of continental unity with freedom of mobility, the actual situation in the African states restriction on mobility. Several prominent countries in Africa, including Nigeria and South Africa, have shown hesitance towards embracing the idea of allowing free movement of people within the continent. Thus, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) could play a crucial role in removing obstacles to the movement of people within the region.

## **7.2. Recommendations**

Irregular migration presents considerable challenges in Ethiopia, particularly in the Kembata-Tembaro Zone. To effectively address these issues, it is essential to propose tailored

recommendations for a range of stakeholders, including government entities, local administrations, NGOs, civil society organizations, and the migrants themselves. These suggestions aim to create actionable strategies that contribute to a safer environment for those considering migration.

1. The Ethiopian government should adopt a proactive approach by:

- Implementing educational initiatives about the dangers associated with irregular migration. These programs should target schools, community groups, and utilize social media to broaden their reach.
- Encouraging local job creation by supporting small businesses and agricultural projects to strengthen the local economy. When employment opportunities are available, individuals are less inclined to migrate.
- The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should lead efforts to initiate and negotiate bilateral agreements promoting free movement of people between Ethiopia and South Africa.
- The Ethiopian Embassy in South Africa should facilitate the establishment of a memorandum of understanding between the two countries. This agreement should focus on information exchange, collaborative research initiatives, and mechanisms that foster consistent dialogue between Ethiopia and South Africa. A bilateral labour agreement could ensure the safety and rights of migrants traveling to and residing in South Africa, while also promoting the legalization of their status.
- The Ethiopian government should focus on enhancing the skills of migrants through training programs and negotiating specific visa programs tailored to skilled workers from Ethiopia, aligning with South Africa's labor market demands.

2. Local administrations can play a pivotal role by:

- Facilitating community forums where residents can openly discuss migration-related issues. This promotes dialogue and encourages localized solutions.
- Creating resource centers that provide crucial information and support for youth contemplating migration.

- Collaborating with NGOs to share resources and expertise, maximizing the overall impact on the community.
3. NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) can refine their strategies by:
- Developing and executing training programs that equip individuals with skills that align with market demands.
  - Offering counseling services for those considering migration, providing mental health resources to enable informed decision-making.
  - Advocating for policy reforms and raising awareness about the rights of migrants both within Ethiopia and in South Africa.
4. Migrants themselves have responsibilities that include:
- Thoroughly researching their intended destinations. It is crucial for migrants to seek accurate information concerning the migration process, including potential dangers such as trafficking, exploitation, and legal issues. Understanding local laws and cultural norms can help avoid complications.
  - Engaging with organizations dedicated to supporting migrants, which can provide invaluable resources and guidance.
  - Keeping informed about the latest news and updates regarding migration policies. This awareness can assist in making more informed decisions.

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## Appendences

### Appendix I: Collinearity diagnosis Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Collinearity Statistics	
		Tolerance	VIF
1	SEX	.888	1.126
	AGE	.682	1.466
	MARS	.632	1.583
	FMSZ	.813	1.231
	EDUC	.805	1.242
	EMP	.349	2.863
	MONIN	.915	1.093
	HOUSE	.606	1.651
	FARM	.685	1.460
	POVERTY	.588	1.700
	POPPRESSURE	.478	2.094
	JOBOPP	.559	1.790
	BETTRERINC	.778	1.285
	FAMMEMBERS	.496	2.018
	NETWORK	.885	1.130
	SMUGGLERS	.705	1.418

a. Dependent Variable: MIGSTAT

### Appendix II: Casewise plot

#### Casewise List<sup>a</sup>

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a. The casewise plot is not produced because no outliers were found.

### Appendix III: Model prediction

**Classification Table<sup>a</sup>**

Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct	
		Non-migrant Household	Migrant Household		
Step 1	MIGSTAT	Non-migrant Household	273	70	79.6
		Migrant Household	46	270	85.4
	Overall Percentage				82.4

a. The cut value is .500

### Appendix IV: Spearman correlation on the perception of migration to South Africa

Correlations		MIGSTAT	AGE	FMSZ	EDUC	MONIN
PERCEP	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.026		.224**	.030
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.649	.950	.000	.697
	N	316	316	316	315	174
AGE	Correlation Coefficient	-.026	1.000	.075	-.284**	-.022
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.649	.	.182	.000	.775
	N	316	316	316	315	174
FMSZ	Correlation Coefficient	.004	.075	1.000	-.047	.040
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.950	.182	.	.402	.599
	N	316	316	316	315	174
EDUC	Correlation Coefficient	.224**	-.284**	-.047	1.000	.037
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.402	.	.629
	N	315	315	315	315	174
MONIN	Correlation Coefficient	.030	-.022	.040	.037	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.697	.775	.599	.629	.
	N	174	174	174	174	174

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Household Survey, 2022.

**Appendix V: Correlation matrix and determinant score**

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5	Item 6	Item 7	Item 8	Item 9	Item 10	Item 11	Item 12	Item 13	Item 14	Item 15
Item 1	1.000	.200	.232	.411	.315	.228	.359	.306	.316	.287	.134	.157	.355	.173	.441
Item 2	.200	1.000	.400	.201	.324	.215	.248	.180	.186	.234	.136	.136	.083	.247	.335
Item 3	.232	.400	1.000	.346	.172	.266	.268	.072	.216	.128	.071	.233	.146	.079	.231
Item 4	.411	.201	.346	1.000	.438	.228	.352	.173	.175	.129	.033	.093	.159	.033	.332
Item 5	.315	.324	.172	.438	1.000	.329	.472	.309	.300		.056	.166	.302	.200	.441
Item 6	.228	.215	.266	.228	.329	1.000	.217	.105	.242	.157	.138	.142	.134	.142	.307
Item 7	.359	.248	.268	.352	.472	.217	1.000	.488	.375	.430	.195	.167	.191	.198	.476
Item 8	.306	.180	.072	.173	.309	.105	.488	1.000	.364	.367	.153	.115	.404	.183	.416
Item 9	.316	.186	.216	.175	.300	.242	.375	.364	1.000	.577	.398	.394	.307	.385	.504
Item 10	.287	.234	.128	.129	.302	.157	.430	.367	.577	1.000	.343	.286	.216	.342	.536
Item 11	.134	.136	.071	.033	.056	.138	.195	.153	.398	.343	1.000	.496	.042	.355	.349
Item 12	.157	.136	.233	.093	.166	.142	.167	.115	.394	.286	.496	1.000	.208	.230	.349
Item 13	.355	.083	.146	.159	.302	.134	.191	.404	.307	.216	.042	.208	1.000	.163	.426
Item 14	.173	.247	.079	.033	.200	.142	.198	.183	.385	.342	.355	.230	.163	1.000	.384
Item 15	.441	.335	.231	.332	.441	.307	.476	.416	.504	.536	.349	.349	.426	.384	1.000

a. Determinant score = 0.010

## Appendix VI: Table on Spatial patterns of irregular migrants

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
RSA as an intended destination of migrants	Yes	304	96.2	96.2
	No	12	3.8	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
If No, where was the ultimate destination	Europe	2	16.7	16.7
	USA	8	66.7	83.4
	Australia	1	8.3	91.6
	German	1	8.3	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	12	100.0	
Reason to choose irregular mode of migration	It is cheap compared to regular routes	241	76.3	
	Lack of possibility to enter RSA through regular routes	126	39.9	
	The lengthy and costly bureaucracy of regular migration	159	50.3	
	Persuasion of brokers	112	35.4	
	Difficulty to get entry visa to RSA	95	30.1	
	<b>Total</b>			
Possession of legal documents during emigration to RSA	Yes, I had a legal passport and visa	93	29.4	29.4
	I had only a legal passport and not visa	133	42.1	71.5
	No, I had neither a passport nor a visa	44	13.9	85.4
	I had only Identity card	46	14.6	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
Modes of travel transport used to to RSA	Car	237	75.0	
	Airplane	68	21.5	
	Foot	245	77.5	
	Boat	157	49.7	
	Motorbike	9	2.8	
<b>Total</b>				
The route used to travel to RSA	Hossana—Hawassa--Moyale—Kenya---Tanzania---Malawi---Mozambique ---RSA	218	69.0	69.0
	Hossana---Hawassa—Moyale—Kisumu (Kenya)—Kigali (Rwanda)—Simbwanga	30	9.5	78.5

	(Tanzania)---Denza-- (Malawi)---Lusaka (Zambia)--- RSA			
	Hossana---Hawassa—	17	5.4	83.9
	Moyale—Kenya--- DRC---Tanzania--- Zambia---Zimbabwe--- RSA			
	Addis Ababa --- RSA	51	16.1	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
I choose the route I travelled through:	Recommended by family and network	139	44.0	
	The smuggler opted for the route	143	45.3	
	It was assumed to be easier	127	40.2	
	It was assumed to be safer	86	27.2	
	The price was affordable and cheaper	65	20.6	
	<b>Total</b>			
Means of crossing international boundaries on the way to RSA	By bribing the border controllers	125	39.6	
	By hiding from border controllers	231	73.1	
	Crossed without any problems	102	32.3	
	<b>Total</b>			

## Appendix VII: Table on Temporal patterns of irregular migrants

Variables	Categories	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
When did you go to RSA	In the 1990s	86	27.2	27.2
	In the 2000s	212	67.1	94.3
	After 2010	18	5.7	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
Have you successfully reached to the RSA	Yes	262	82.9	82.9
	No	54	17.1	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100	
If your answer is Yes, how much time did it take you reach RSA	Below or within 1 day	32		12.2
	Within a week	62		23.7
	Within two weeks	70		26.7
	Within three weeks	79		30.2
	Within a month	115		43.9
	Within two months	176		67.2
	Within three months	207		79.0
	Within six months	245		93.5
	Within a year	261		99.6
	In three years	262		100.0
	Mean=67.82	Min=1		Max=1095
Did you reach RSA in your planned time	Reached on expected time	97	37.0	37.0
	Somehow on expected time	94	35.9	72.9
	Very late from the expected time	71	27.1	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	262	100.0	
When did you return back home	2000-2005	2	0.6	0.6
	2006-2010	13	4.2	4.8
	2011-2015	46	14.7	19.6
	2015-2020	127	40.7	60.3
	After 2020	124	39.7	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	312	100	
Why have you decided to return home	I want to work and live at home	208	65.8	65.8
	I could not find opportunities in RSA as expected	24	7.6	73.4
	I was deported	6	1.9	75.3
	I came to visit my family	37	11.7	87.0
	I was scared of living	19	6.0	93.0

	in RSA due to xenophobia			
	Illness	22	7.0	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	
Do you have a plan to return to RSA	Yes, I have a plan to return	28	8.9	8.9
	No, I don't have a plan to return	251	79.4	88.3
	Undecided	37	11.7	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	316	100.0	

**Appendix VIII: Ratified international and regional human rights instruments governing migration issues by Ethiopia**

Key international and regional legal instruments	Ratified/Acceded
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)	(2007)
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2004)	(2012)
UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)	(2012)
ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1946 as modified by the Final Articles Revision (1946)	(2003)
ILO Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (1956)	(1999)
ILO Convention No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999)	(2003)
ILO Convention No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (1973)	(1999)
ILO Convention No. 97 concerning Migration for Employment (1949)	X
ILO Convention No. 143 – Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (1975)	X
ILO Convention No. 181 concerning Private Employment Agencies (1997)	(1999)
ILO Convention No. 81 concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and Commerce (1947)	X
UN Slavery Convention of 1926 and amended by the Protocol of 1953	(1969)
UN Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949)	(1981)
UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1956)	(1969)
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW (1979)	(1981)
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC (1989)	(1991)
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, CRPD (2006)	(2010)
UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICESCR (1966)	(1993)
UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR (1966)	(1993)
OHCHR Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000)	(2014)
OHCHR Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (2000)	(2014)
UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Articles (1990)	X
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (1960)	X
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1975)	X
UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	(1969)
UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	(1994)
UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD (1963)	(1976)
Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)	(2001)
African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	(1973)

(1969)	
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981)	(1998)
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (1998)	X
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2005)	X
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) (2009)	(2009)
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) (1990)	(2002)

Sources: Adapted from IOM (2017)





20. Which of the following push factors forced you to migrate to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. Unemployment
2. Poverty
3. Land shortage
4. Conflict and insecurity
5. Family and peer pressure
6. Migrants and returnees economic success
7. Population Pressure
8. Better living condition of migrants household
9. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

21. Which of the following pull factors attracted you to migrate to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. Job opportunity in RSA
2. Expecting better income in RSA
3. To join family or meet relative
4. Presence of family members or friends
5. Better facilities and living conditions in RSA
6. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

22. Which of the following factors had facilitated your migration to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. The presence of social and migrant networks
2. Presence of communication technology
3. Existence of smugglers and brokers
4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

## Part II. Migration Decision and Culture of Migration

**Instruction:** Please answer by circling and/or writing on the blank space.

1. Had you had sufficient information about RSA before you migrated?

1. Yes
2. Somehow
3. Not at all

2. If your answer to question is number 2 is, 1 or 2, how did you get information about the place of destination? (You can choose more than one option).

1. From earlier migrants
2. From social media
3. From Mass media
4. From friends in RSA
5. From Returnees from RSA
6. From family/community
7. From smugglers and brokers
8. From peers and kins
9. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

3. Who was a decision made on your migration to the RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. Myself
2. Family or household
3. Friends
4. Peers and kins
5. If others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

4. Who facilitated your migration to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. Family
2. Friends
3. Smugglers
4. Peers and kins
5. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

5. Who covered the cost of your travel to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).

1. From my own savings
2. By migrating to bigger cities to get and save money
3. By renting and mortgaging my land
4. By selling my family assets, including cattle
5. By borrowing money from relatives in Ethiopia
6. By receiving financial assistance from families abroad

7. By getting financial assistance from immigrant relatives and friends settled in South Africa

8. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_

6. How much did it cost you to travel to RSA?\_\_\_\_\_

7. Perceptions towards migration:

**Instruction:** The items stated in the table below are expected to be rated under five categories which represent, 1= Strongly Agree (SA), 2=Agree (A), 3= Undecided (U), 4= Disagree (D), and 5=Strongly Disagree (SD). Please show your preference by putting a tick mark (✓) on each box provided beside the items.

Factors		SA	A	U	D	SD
No	Migration Perceptions	1	2	3	4	5
7.1	Migration is considered as a normal part of life representing a stage in the transition to manhood.					
7.2	Migration is widely accepted as a vehicle for economic success.					
7.3	Aspirations to migrate are socially transmitted across generations.					
7.4	Youngsters who do not attempt to migrate are seen as lazy and un-enterprising by the community.					
7.5	Non-migrants are less desirable as potential mates for marriage.					
7.6	Families are more involved in the migration decision and financing than the migrants themselves.					
7.7	The cultural values of the society are encouraging and positively supporting migration where migrants are considered as heroes.					
7.8	There are some cultural practices in the society that appease migration and migrants.					
7.9	Migration transforms the traditional idea of marriage and status.					
7.10	Migrants' lavish spending on feasts, weddings, funerals, and dowry are indicators of social status.					
7.11	Glorification and celebration of migration has an impact on the rate of school dropout.					
7.12	Migrants utilize religious performances and rituals before migration to successfully reach the destination.					
7.13	Currently families are less willing to send their youngsters to RSA due to the perilous journey to and xenophobic attacks at the destination.					
7.14	Migration enables the family to enhance the family's socio-economic status through remittance.					
7.15	Migrants brought new practices back to home like religion, marriage customs, drugs, language, and other lifestyles.					

### Part III. Patterns of Irregular Migration

**Instruction:** Please answer by circling your choice and/or writing on the blank space.

1. When did you go to RSA?
  1. Before the 1990s
  2. In the 1990s
  3. After 2000
  4. After 2010
  5. Others(specify)\_\_\_\_\_
2. Was the RSA your intended destination?
  1. Yes
  2. No
3. If your answer for question number 2 is 'No', where was your ultimate destination?
  1. Europe
  2. USA
  3. Australia
  4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
4. What was your reason to choose an irregular mode of migration? (You can choose more than one option).
  1. It is cheap compared to regular routes
  2. Lack of possibility to enter RSA through regular routes
  3. The lengthy and costly bureaucracy of regular migration
  4. Persuasion of brokers
  5. Difficulty to get entry visa to RSA
  6. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
5. Had you had legal documents like a passport and a valid visa during your migration to RSA?
  1. Yes, I had a legal passport and visa
  2. I had only a legal passport and not visa
  3. No, I had neither a passport nor a visa
  4. I had only Identity card
  5. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
6. If your answer to question number 5 is 2 or 3, did you get a forged document from somewhere?
  1. Yes, from smugglers
  2. Yes, from other persons
  3. Not at all
  4. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
7. Did you use smuggler/s on your travel to the RSA?
  1. No
  2. Yes, only for part of the journey
  3. Yes, many for different parts of the journey
  4. Yes, one for the entire journey
8. Why did you use a smuggler/s?
  1. It is cheaper
  2. Recommended by friends/family in RSA
  3. It is easier
  4. I have no other alternative
  5. The smuggler persuade me
  6. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
9. How did you get access to a smuggler?
  1. I approached the smuggler by myself
  2. Friends/ family got me in touch
  3. The smuggler approached me after he heard about my intention
  4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
10. How would you perceive your smuggler(s)? (You can choose more than one option).
  1. As a friend
  2. As a fellow migrant
  3. As a service provider /businessperson

4. As a protector    5. As an information resource    6. As a human trafficker  
7. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
11. If you did migrate with the escorting of a smuggler or broker, how much did you pay them in Ethiopian birr?\_\_\_\_\_
12. What are the main modes of transport you have used in your travel from your homeland to RSA? (You can choose more than one option).  
1. Car        2. Airplane        3. Foot        4. Boat        5. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
13. Which route did you used to travel to RSA?  
1. Hossana--- Hawassa—Moyale—Kenya --- Tanzania ---Malawi --- Mozambique --- RSA.  
2. Hossana--- Hawassa—Moyale—Kisumu(Kenya) --- Kigali(Rwanda) – Simbwanga (Tanzania) --- Denza (Malawi) --- Lusaka (Zambia) --- RSA.  
3. Hossana--- Hawassa—Moyale—Kenya --- DRC ---Tanzania --- Zambia --- Zimbabwe --- RSA.  
4. Addis Ababa --- RSA.  
5. Others (Specify)
14. Why did you choose the above route to reach RSA?  
1. Recommended by family and network                      2. The smuggler opted for the route  
3. It was assumed to be easier                                      4. It was assumed to be safer  
5. The price was affordable and cheaper                      6. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
15. How do you cross the international boundaries during your travel to RSA?  
1. By bribing the border controllers                      2. By hiding from border controllers  
3. Crossed without any problems                              4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
16. Have you successfully reached to the RSA?    1. Yes                                      2. No
17. If your answer for question number 16 is ‘yes’, how much time did it take you to reach RSA?\_\_\_\_\_ (in months)
18. Did you reach the RSA in your planned or expected time?  
1. Reached on the expected time                              2. Somehow on the expected time  
3. Very late from the expected time                              4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
19. What is your opinion on irregular migration to the RSA?  
1. I support it strongly        2. I support it partially        3. I oppose it strongly  
4. I am not sure
20. Do you encourage your friends to go to the RSA like you did?  
1. Yes, I strongly encourage them                              2. No, I don’t encourage others  
3. I am not sure
21. If your answer to question number 20 is ‘yes’, why do you encourage people to go to the RSA? (You can choose more than one option).  
1. Better opportunities in RSA                              2. It is hard to work and live there  
3. The movement is easy and comfortable    4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
22. If your answer to question number 20 is ‘no’, why you do not encourage people to go to the

RSA?

1. The opportunities over there are not as expected
  2. The movement is very hard and risky
  3. It is possible to work and live here
  4. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
23. In your opinion, what should the Ethiopian government do to curb irregular migration to the RSA?
1. Stop by taking strict measures
  2. Encourage youth to legally migrate to RSA
  3. Create economic opportunities here in Ethiopia
  4. I don't want to say anything
  5. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
24. As a returnee migrant, do you have a plan to return to the RSA?
1. Yes, I have a plan to return
  2. No, I don't have a plan to return
  3. Undecided

**Part IV. Effects of Irregular Migration**

**Instruction:** Please answer by putting tick mark (✓) on your choice and writing on the blank space.

No	Questions	Choices	Yes	No
1	What problems had you or other migrants encountered on your way to the RSA?	1. Robberies and theft		
		2. Suffocation and injury through perilous journey		
		3. Hunger and thirst		
		4. Arrest and deportation		
		5. Violence and abuse		
		6. Illness		
		7. Exacted additional and high price		
		8. Human trafficking		
		9. Missing along the journey		
		10. Loss of life		
		11. Kidnapping and ransom payment		
		12. Beating and torture		
		13. Capsizing of boats		
		14. Labor exploitation		
		15. Others (specify)_____		
2	What challenges did you face during your sojourn in RSA?	1. Plunder of properties		
		2. Physical and psychological violence		
		3. Heavy workload		
		4. Absence of legal right to work		
		5. Arrest and deportation		
		6. Arrest only		
		7. Labor exploitation		
		8. Debt bondage		
		9. Violence and abuse		
		10. Lack of access to social services		



6. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
14. What is your current occupation?\_\_\_\_\_
15. How much is your estimated current total capital?\_\_\_\_\_
16. What changes have been noticed in your family stayed back home after you reached RSA and remitted money? (You can choose more than one option).
1. Improvement of life and income
  2. Dependency on remittance
  3. Lack of interest to learn due to high interest to migrate
  4. Negative impact on culture
  5. Quarrels among family members on remittance
  6. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
17. Do you think migrants' household move to urban areas in search of business and better social services more than non-migrants households?
1. Yes
  2. No
  3. Not Sure
18. How do you compare your family's income before and after your migration to RSA? Their current income is:
1. Much better income now
  2. Somewhat better now
  3. More or less the same
  4. Worse now than before
19. Did your migration to the RSA negatively affect your family life at home?
1. Yes
  2. No
20. If 'yes', what is/are the effect/s? (You can choose more than one option).
1. No one stays at home to take care of the elderly and sick persons
  2. Problems to take care of children
  3. Unable to repay debts
  4. Dependency of family members on remittance
  5. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
21. Have you ever contributed money for charity or community projects in your locality?
1. Yes
  2. No
22. If 'yes', which project? 1. School                      2. Potable water                      3. Healthcare center
4. Church
  5. Others (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
23. Does migration have positive effects in your *woreda* or *kebele*?
1. Yes
  2. No
  3. Not Sure
24. For question number 23, if your answer is "yes", what is/are the positive effects of migration in your *woreda* or *kebele*? (You can choose more than one option).
1. Flow of remittance
  2. Job creation opportunities
  3. Poverty reduction
  4. Improved social services
  5. Other (specify)\_\_\_\_\_
25. Had migration negative consequences in your *woreda* or *kebele*?
1. Yes
  2. No
  3. Not Sure
26. For question number 25, if your answer is "yes", what is/are the negative impacts of migration in your *woreda* or *kebele*?(You can choose more than one option).
1. Inequality among people
  2. Dependency on remittance
  3. Shortage of labor force
  4. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

27. Has migration negative consequences on education or students' learning?

1. Yes

2. No

3. Not Sure

28. For question number 27, if your answer is “yes”, what is/are the negative effects of migration on education or students' learning? (You can choose more than one option).

1. School dropout

2. Lack of attention

3. Loss of professionals/teachers

4. Others (specify) \_\_\_\_\_





## **Appendix X: Survey Questionnaire Kembatissa**

### **Addisaabi Yunversitita**

### **Gadissa Roshsha Kolleejja**

### **Afriikina Issiyi Sereeggo Xaaxxitta**

Hada baadu martaa abaroosu yoossariin Wiinshantaa xa'mmatuta

Iittanteentaa Fanqashshaannu:

Tann xa'mmato qome qaadu Tophphe keeni seerbeelo darbaiin; Kambaataa Xambaaro zooniichch Dabuubi Afriiki Rippaabiliika yamamano boqo xawiin sereegantaa sereeggo waabita qu'mmi assiihaat. Kambaataa Xambaaro zooniichch Dabuubi Afriiki Rippaabiliika assamano seerbeelu darbau bareedagiin aagiccii sereeggiihans ki'nne beeqqamu abbishsh tamanoa. Ti xa'mmatut sereeggi qaadii qixxanteeii ihanian, a'nnu kann xa'mmatoon hinc yitoo xa'mmaakkata fanqashshiin xabbeenata waabita aassiteenunta abbisiin xa'mman kann xa'mmatoon aassiteenanta waabit sumuurant afantaaiihaa laaluntis beebayyantaaii ihus dagsiisota iittaamm. Sereeggoontas beeqqanteenatanneehaa assiteentae xabbeenata dikkishshahaa wozanie galati teesoonin hinc assaamm.

#### **Wudu:**

- Fanqashshu'nne doo'rratoochch kibbiinii aasantoo onata ma'nneen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.
- Xa'mmatosi aleen su'mma xaafu hasisanoba'a.
- Horaanta xa'mmaakkaa fanqashshu'nne xabbeenagiin fanqshshiin kaa'lliyye'e.

#### **Waabita qu'mm assitaa keeni naqaashsha**

- Waabita qu'mm assaanchi su'mmu: \_\_\_\_\_
- Waabit qu'mm yitoo woradu: 1. Angacca 2. Daambooyyata

### 3. Dooyyoganna 4. Qaaccabiira

- Waabis qu'mm yitoo qabalit: \_\_\_\_\_.

#### **Wona Qooba: Seebeelo darbai mashkaakkata**

#### **Awwansuta: Fanqashshu'nne doo'rratoochchis kibbiinii aasantoo onata ma'nneen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.**

1. Meegut: 1. Meaata 2. Goonchu
2. Umuru:
  1. 1-15
  2. 25- 34
  3. 35-49
  4. 50-64
  5. 65 woggeechch aluudu
3. Mini assi duuhata: 1. Aagisumbuu/buuta 2. Aagishsheeii/ sseeiita 3. Gaffa'rranteerii  
4. Mini amat rhiteerii 5. Wolu yooda (caakkishshe) \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Abaroosi batinnit fanqashshuta aassaanchu bargin meoot? \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Roshsha gardabbu mahaan?
  1. Anabbabuhaa xaafuhaa dandaamba'a.
  2. Xaafuhaa anabbabuhaa xalla
  3. Wona gardabbi roshshata
  4. Lanki gardabbi roshshata
  5. Sertifikeeta
  6. Dipoolooma
  7. Digiritaa isiichch aluuduhaa
6. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen qalanchina hei ma'nmit hakkabaat?
  1. Gaxaraa
  2. Katamaa
7. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen hujj'ne mahaan ikke? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)
  1. Mangisti minia hujataanchu
  2. Hogai galaanchua
  3. Zazzalaanchua
  4. Gilli minia hujataanchu
  5. Barea hujataanchu
  6. Rosaanchua
7. Gagi hujita 8. Hujit yooeba'a. 9. Wolit hujit yooda( caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
8. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen hujit yoo'nnee ikkoda mereeraanchut again aagu'nne habankatan? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
9. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen aphphut/maatit yoo'nne?
  1. Yooe
  2. yooeba'a
10. Xa'mmo 9 fanqashshu'nne yooe yitaa'ii ikkoda ma hagarat aphphut yoo'nne ikke? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudiin fanqashshii dandeenno)
  1. Minu
  2. Hogo uullat
  3. fanqalaansaannu/caameelu
  4. Ameezannat
  5. Zazzalo xaaxittu
  6. wolu yoo'nne (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
11. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen yoo'nne aphpho qaxu habankaan? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.

12. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen baanki daftaru yoo'nne?  
 1. Yooe  
 2. Yooba'a
13. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen abaroosu'nne gagisi hei minu yoos?  
 1. Yoos  
 2. Yoosiba'a.
14. Dabuub Afriika mariichch bireen abaroosu'nne gagisi hogo uullat yoos?  
 1. Yoos  
 2. Yoosiba'a.
15. Xa'mmo wollo 14 fanqashshu'nne "yoos" yanoo ikkoda hogo uullasi haraarimat hektaariin habankatan? \_\_\_\_\_ hektaara.
16. A'nnu marteenantahanniichch bireen abaroosiichchi'nne Dabuub Afriika marree mannu yooinddo?  
 1. Yoou  
 2. Yooba'a
17. Abaroosiichchi'nne ki'nneechch wolu Dabuub Afriika marr waallee mannu yooinddo?  
 1. Yoou  
 2. Yooba'a
18. Dabuub Afriika mariichchi'nne bire wolu hada baadi afoo daggeenan ikke?  
 1. Dagaamm  
 2. Dagaamba'a
19. Xa'mmo wollo 18 fanqashshu'nne dagaamm yanoo ikkooda xawaaqqu danditeenanta afoo/afaakkat hakkanneet/hakka'rrootaan? \_\_\_\_\_.
20. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika marteenunta gombansitoo gajaajjaakkat hakka'rrootaan? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)  
 1. Hujita hoogu  
 2. Buximat  
 3. Uulla kontit / heu hoogu  
 4. Xumma hoogu/ dohixxu hoogu  
 5. Abaroosina jaali gombansu  
 6. Seerbeelo daraba'aanina fanqaltoo aphpho gou  
 7. Manni batinnit  
 8. Seerbeelo darba'aanni yoossa bareedat galtit  
 9. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
21. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika marteenunta qaatissuu midansitaa gajaajjaakkat hakka'rrootaan? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno)  
 1. Dabuub Afriika wayyano huje saamu heus  
 2. Dabuub Afriika wayyitaa aagut heaaga qorabboombii  
 3. Hikka heaa abaroosi abaallaan heii  
 4. Dabuub Afriikaan abaroosuee jaallaii yoo bikkii.  
 5. Dabuub Afriika wayyat kaalatuti galte duuhatii yootannee  
 6. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_.
22. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika darbaeenunta makkata duuhata qoocitoo mashkkaakkat

hakka'rootaan? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)

1. Birsit martoo manniin daqqanchu heu
2. Waabita daqqeenno teknoolloojit heu
3. Seerbeelo manni fanqalaansaannu heuhuu defo'oot heuhuu
4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_.

**Lanki Qooba: Seerbeelo darbai aannitaa seerbeelo darbai bahila xuuddaa xa'mmaakkata Awwansuta: Fanqashshu'nne doo'rratoochchis kibbiinii aasantoo onata ma'neen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.**

1. Dabuub Afriika mariichchi'nne birita Dabuub Afriikitannee waabit yookki'nne ikke? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)

1. Ikkaae qaxat waabit yooe
  2. Qahunt waabit yooe
  3. Mexxit waabitii yooba'a
2. Xa'mmo wollo 1 ikkaae qaxat waabit yooe yanoo ikkoda waabis hannoochch daqqiteen? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno)

1. Birsit martoo seerbeelo darba'aanniichch
2. Maexxooma galte waabe bu'leechchoochch
3. Mandaqqansaanniichch
4. Dabuub Afriika yoo jaallaachchie
5. Dabuub Afriikiichch waalto seerbeelo darba'aanniichch
6. Abaroosiichchii gadiichchii
7. Darabbaachchiee ilamiichchiee
8. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye.)\_\_\_\_\_

3. Ki'nne Dabuub Afriika mari aannita qomegiin aanneeii ayeet? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)

1. An gagunkui
  2. Abaroosu
  3. Jaallai
  4. Darabbaii ilamuii
  5. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
4. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika marteenunta taaphansee'nnee ayeet? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno)

1. Abaroosu
2. Jaallat
3. Defo'oot
4. Darabbaii ilamuii
5. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_.

5. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika marteenunta woqqee fuluta xuffoo/miqqoo ayeet? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno.)

1. Gagiintai suxx
2. Baadi aazeen annannata annannata katammata darbai hujachch
3. Uullata hirrii afisiishsh le'eccinii
4. Abaroosi aphphuta/maatita ameezannat fau'nna hirr
5. Gizza baado yoo ilamiichchie le'eecc
6. Hada baadoon heaa ilamiichchie assantooe dikkishshaan

7. Dabuub Afriika yoo abaroosiichchiee jaallaachchiee daqqeemmi birr dikkishshaan

8. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_

6. Dabuub Afriika marii habanka birra fushshiteen? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.

7. Seerbeelo darbaitanee yoo xuudi keenanchaakkata

**Awwansuta:** Woroodiin meemaari aazeen fintantoo sawwitaakkata ontita xuudi keenanchaakkata keentaahaarra. 1= Abbishsh iittamaamm 2= iittamaamm 3. Aannimba'a 4. Iittamaamba'a 5. Abbishsh iittamaamba'a. Kann hagariin **fanqashshu'nne** (√) malaata doo'riteenta wollo lokkaan assiin doo'rriyye.

Wolluta	Xa'mmaakkata	1	2	3	4	5
7.1.	Seerbeelu darbau gadisi aazeen rosammee heechcha kifila ihan, harde goonu hardoomat toltaa maruta assammi xuudamano.					
7.2.	Seerbeelu darbau aphpho deettuta assammi xuudamano					
7.3.	Seerbeelo darbai qulxuhuu hasanatii gadisi aazeen yoogan qalanchiichch qalanchiba higan waalleehaa.					
7.4.	Gadisi aazeen darbaiin galtita dooritota akeekkumbu wodallat qallaakkagaa qoxartumbura assant xuudantaau.					
7.5.	Gadisi aazeen hada baadu darbaumbu hardit darbaooriin tuuteeccanseemmada galtee jaalaan yoossa doo'rramu hirikkeemaa.					
7.6.	Darbai aannita aanniinii marancha fuluta xufiin abbas qooba darba'aariichch abba abaroosu aaqqano.					
7.7.	Gadisi aazeen darbau iitsawwiin dikkissaaruu darba'aannu goonsitaa bahili aalut qoocanteeu.					
7.8.	Gadisi aazeen seerbeelu darbauhaa darba'aannuhaa dikkissaa bahili aalut qoocanteeu.					
7.9.	Gadisi yoo mini assina bahili sawwitaakkata seerbeelo darbaiin dooranteeu.					
7.10.	Darba'aannu ilmoochchii, bollochchii, moogi seeriihaa qootiihaa fushshitaa feqqe'nni fuluta gadisi aazeen abbinni xuudishshata assant aaqqanteeu.					
7.11.	Gadus seebeelo darbaii aasee xoqqeemu abbinnuhuu su'mmuhuu rosaanni roshshata aguri aleen abbata ciimuta gashshiyyeeu.					
7.12.	Darba'aannu martaa baadu xummiin iillitunta mariichchissa bireen ammanaato annaakkaan xalootu assamanossa.					
7.13.	Tann jeechchoon seerbeelo darbai maranchat ganisi abba ikkan waaliintasii Dabuub Afriikaan iillanossa aaggichchaakkata gibina					



7. Dabuub Afriika marteenan Defo ta'mmiteentaa ikke?
1. Ta'mmimba'a
  2. Bakkane maranchaa ta'mmiyeemm
  3. Hoolamita defo'oota annannata maranchaa ta'mmiyeemm.
  4. Matu Defo horaantai wiimaanta maranchaa ta'mmiyeemm.
8. Defoon maru mii doo'rriteen?
1. Uba ikkotannee
  2. Shalala ikkotannee
  3. Dabuub Afriika yoo jaallai/abaroosue sazzooebii
  4. Wolit doo'rratut yoobaibikkii
  5. Defus sazzooebii
  6. Wolu yooda (Caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
9. Defoontas hattigoon daqqanteen?
1. Defos hashsh anent daggoommii
  2. Jaallata'nn/ abaroosua'nne daqqansitooee
  3. Dabuub Afriika maraammiga daggo defu gagaankas waalleet xawisiishshoe
  4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
10. Maranchaa ta'mmiteenta Defo/Defo'oota hattiguta caakkiseenen? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
1. Jaaliga
  2. Qixxen maramanohanniga
  3. Kaalatuta hinc assanohanniga
  4. Qorabaanchiga
  5. Wolu yooda (Caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
11. Dabuub Afriika marteentaa/Darbaeentaa Defo taqeen ikkoda Defoohans habanka birra miqqeen? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
12. Dabuub Afriika marteenta/Darbaeenta jaata hakka fanqalaansaannu ta'mmiteen? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
1. Kaameeliin
  2. Aroppilaaniin
  3. Lokkaan
  4. Markabiin/jalibiin
  5. Wolu yooda(Caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
13. Hakka marancha maara ta'mmiteeneet Dabuub Afriika marteentaa?
1. Hossanna—Hawaassa—Moyyalle— Keniyyaa—Tanzaniyya—Malaawii— Mozaambiik— Dabuub Afriika
  2. Hossanna—Hawaassa—Moyyalle— Kissimuu(Keniyyaa)— Kigaalii (Ruwaandaa)— Sinbiwwonigaa (Tanzaaniyya)— Deenzaa (Maalaawii)---- Lusaakaa (Zaambiya)--Dabuub Afriika
  3. Hossanna—Hawaassa—Moyyalle— Keniyyaa—Demokraatikki Kongoo—Tanzaniyya— Zaambiyaa----Zimbaabiwee— Dabuub Afriika
  4. Addissabaa-----Dabuub Afriika
  5. Wolu yooda

14. Dabuub Afriika marteenta/ darbaeenta marancha maara mii doo'riteen?
1. Dabuub Afriika yoo jaallai sazzeen
  2. Maaras Defo doo'rreetanee
  3. Shalalaa yi sawweemmibii
  4. Woqoossi qorabameeha yyi sawwi yeemibiii
  5. Womaashusi danamu ikkobi
  6. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
15. Dabuub Afriika marteenta jeechchuta baadaakka gabala hattikkeen higgeen? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
1. Gabala qorabaannii maqanxa aasiin
  2. Gabala qorabbaariichch maaxamiin
  3. Mexxu hawwuhuu yoobaii gabala higu dandiyyeemm.
  4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
16. Dabuub Afriika zumata duuhaan iilliteen?
1. Iilleemm
  2. Iillimba'a
17. Xa'mmo wollo 16 fanqashshut iilleemm yanoo ikkoda Dabuub afriika iillii habankata jeechchuta aaqeekke?\_\_\_\_\_ (agannaakkata)
18. Dabuub Afriika iillii qaadeemma jeechchoon iilleemmaa?
1. Qaajjoommi jeechchoon iilliyyeemm
  2. Qaxiinkas qaajjoomm jeechchoon iilliyyeemm
  3. Qaajjoomm jeechchoon abbishsh dalashsheet iilleemmii
  4. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
19. Seerbeelo darbitanee yoo'ne sawwittu mahaan?
1. Abbishsh dikkisaamm
  2. bakkani dikkisaamm
  3. Abbishsh gibaamm
  4. Gibaamm
  5. Aannimba'a
20. Jaallaa'nne ki'nnega Dabuub Afriika darbaunta faareisseenan?
1. Faareisaamm
  2. Woliro'oota faareisaamba'a
  3. Aannimba'a
21. Xa'mmo wollo 20 fnshshu'nne dikkisaamm yanoo ikkoda miihaat wolu mannu Dabuub Afriika marunta faareiseenoo? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
1. Dabuub Afriika woyyu huje saamu yootanee
  2. Dabuub Afriika hujatuna heu kee'mma ikkotanee
  3. maranchas shalalataa makkkataa ikkootanee
  4. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiiyye)\_\_\_\_\_
22. Xa'mmo wollo 20 fnshshu'nne dikkisaamba'a yanoo ikkoda miihaat wolu mannu Dabuub Afriika marumboga faareiseenumbuu (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
1. Dabuub Afriika yoo huje saamu qorabeemma qaxa ihu hooggotanee
  3. Woqqoos kee'mmahaa kaa'llixaamuhaa ikkotanee

4. Kanne woyyu hujatina hei saamu yootannee
5. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_

23. Ki’ne xuudigiin Dabuub Afriika mareenno seerbeelu darbaw ka’mmamii Tophphe Mangistu ma assu hasisano? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo’rii dandeenno)

1. Qaarata guzumuta aqqiin faisu hasisano
2. Hardit seeraamua woqqeen hada baadu martunta faareisu
3. Hardit darbaumbuga kanne ikkaa qaxata hujita qooccu hasisano
4. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_

24. Fanqalteen Dabuub Afriika mari saamu yoo’ne?

1. Fanall mari qaadu yooe
2. Fanqall mari saamu yooba’a
3. Annimba’a

**Shoolki Qooba: Seerbeelu darbaw iillisano ciimuta xuuddaa xa’mmaakkata**

**Awwansuta:** Fanqashshu’ne doo’rratoochch (√) malaata assiinii aasantoo onata ma’neen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.

<b>Xa’mmaakkata</b>	<b>Doo’rratuta</b>	<b>Yoou</b>	<b>Yooba’a</b>
1. Dabuub Afriika mareenno jaata a’nnuu wolu daraba’aannuu marancha aleen iillee’ne hawwu yoou?	1. Bogamuhuu mooggutii		
	2. Odaa aazeen marameenno maranchaan keenamina odd musat		
	3. Gorruhuu sagabitii		
	4. Usurutii baadu qaatisameen fanqalu		
	5. Genit kaa’llixxu		
	6. Moosu		
	7. Marancha aleen bargammahaa abba gizzahaa xa’mmu		
	8. Seebeeluta manna fanqalaansitaa manni angaan ubu		
	9. Fooli hoogu/ rehut		
	10. Marancha aleen bau/ aageemmabu hoogamu		
	11. Urumabu/wozino gizza xa’mmamu		
	12. Oolamu/ orbaat		



1. Qorabboommigaat daqqeemmii
2. Qorabboommigaatiba'a
3. Hujita daqqu dandimba'a
6. Xa'mmo wollo 5 fanqashshu'nne qorabboommigaat daqqeemmii yanoo ikkoda Dabuub Afriika huji'nne mahaan ikke? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta doo'rrii dandeenno)
  1. Oddishshata, qabattona firaashshi quxo zazzaluta
  2. Gilli dirijjiti aazeen baatamannee'nne
  3. Mangisti hujeen miqamannee'nne
  4. Woqqee ali zazzaluta
  6. Ilamie/ jaallai suuqaan miqamannee'nne
  6. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
7. Dabuub Afriikaa he'eenanyian again mereeraanchut aagut habanka birra? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
8. Dabuub Afriikaa he'eeanan baado yoo abaroosiihaa ilamiihaa gizza sokkeenan ikke?
  1. Sohaamm
  2. Yooba'a sohaamba'a
9. Xa'mmo wollo 8 fanqashshu'nne sohaamm yitaaii ikkoda habankata jeechcho annannoomaan sokkeenan?
  1. Aganaan aganaan
  2. Higg higg woggaan mate te lame
  3. Sassakki aganaan
  4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
10. Xa'mmo wollo 8 fanqashshu'nne sohaamm yitaaii ikkoda gizzas miihaat sokkeenantaa? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
  1. Mini aazi ta'mmii
  2. Beenna baatii
  3. Hoongaannu abaroosuhaa ilamuii kaa'llii
  4. Galte mini hi'rrii/minii
  5. Ooso roshsha mini fuluta miqii
  6. Haaroota zazzalo hujita insii
  7. Abaroosi abbaallat DabuubAfriika waaltunta woqqee fuluta xufii
  8. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
11. Xa'mmo wollo 8 fanqashshu'nne sohaamm yitaaii ikkoda gizzas ma woqqeeneet abaroosii sokkeenantaa? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
  1. Seeraamita gizza higisi woqqaakkaan
  2. Seerbeeluta gizza higisi woqqaakkaan
  3. Baadu martaa manniin
  4. Wolu yooda ( caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
12. Baadu hakkadaat fanqalteentaa? \_\_\_\_\_.
13. Baadu mii fanqalteen?
  1. Baadoontai hujatiihaa heiihaa aanneemmitannee
  2. Dabuub Afriika hujita qorabboommigiin daqqimba'a
  3. Afammi baadu fanqalloommitannee

4. Abaroosu xa'mmii
  5. Dabuub Afriika wolo baadi keenu gibeemmabii waajjeemmitanee
  6. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyee) \_\_\_\_\_
14. Teesu hujikki'nne mahaan? \_\_\_\_\_
15. Teesu yoo'nne aphphut habanka ganantaau? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
16. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika iilliteen gizza sohu insiteentaachch zakkiin baado yoo abaroosi'nne aleen ma hagara doorancha zahicciteentaau? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
1. Aago leinuhuu woyyata heechchata heuhaa insiteeu
  2. Sohamano gizzaan dikkau/ qorabaannu ihu
  3. Xoqqeemu darbai hasu galleansa rosi hasanassa dirriteeu
  4. Bahili aleen gibsawwi ciimuta gashshiyeeu
  5. Abaroosi abbaalla aazeen tame aagaqqamu hoogu qoocciyeeu.
  6. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyee.) \_\_\_\_\_
17. Ki'nne sawwitiin Dabuub Afriika marro/ darbao abaalchu yoo abaroosu zazzalo hujitaa mexxooma kaalatutaa hasiin dabuub Afriika marree mannu yoobai abaroosiichch abba katama mareenno yiteen saww yiteenan?
1. Saww yaamm
  2. Saww yaamba'a
  3. Aannimba'a
18. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika mariichchi'nne bireenii zakkiinii yoo abaroosi'nne aaguta hattiguta tuuteeccansiteenan? An Dabuub Afriika marroommiichch zakkiin abaroosie aagut:
1. Abbiss woyyiteeu
  2. Qaxiintas wayyiteeu
  3. Aguxxamaa
  4. Wodoochch kotteeu
19. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika maru/darbau baado faoo abaroosi'nne heechcha aleen genita iillishsheeu?
1. Iillishsheeu
  2. Iillisimba'a
20. Xa'mmo wollo 19 fanqashshu'nne iillishsheeu yanoo ikkoda iillishsho genit mahaan? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
1. Baado nubaau abaroosu xooranona xijjossa manna ukukkeesano Manchu heu hoogu
  2. Oosuta ukukkeesano Manchu heu hoogu
  3. Le'eccinoommi beenna miqano Manchu bacu
  4. Abaroosu hadaachch sohamano gizza qorabaannuhaa dikka'aannuhaa ihu
  5. Wolu yooda ( caakkashshiyee) \_\_\_\_\_
21. A'nnu Dabuub Afriika marteentaachch zakkiin abaroosu'nne heano hegeegoon hujatantaa gadi projektaakkaa te bareedata hujita hujatii gizza sokkeen daggeenan?(Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)

1. Sokk dagaamm
2. Yooba'a sohimba'a
22. Xa'mmo wollo 21 fanqashshu'nne sokkeemm yitaa'ii ikkoda awwant hakka'rroos dikkisihaat sohamme'ii?
1. Roshsha mini                      2. Muccuru agi woa                      3. Fayyima xaaxxitta
4. ammanaato xaaxxittii/xalooti minii      5. Wolu yooda (caakkashshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
23. Seerbeelu darbau ki'nne abaroosu heano qabaleen te woradaan iittisawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeeu?
1. Ciimuta gashshiyyeeu              2. Yooba'a gashshimba'a              3. Qiiaba'a
24. Xa'mmo wollo 23 ciimuta gashshiyyeeu yanoo ikkoda seerbeelu darbau awwant yooriichch hattas iittisawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeei? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
1. Hada baadiichch sohamano gizzu bargamu              2. Huje saama qooccu
3. Buximata kotisu                      4. Mexxooma galtita wooyyisu
5. Wolu yooda ( caakkashshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
25. Seerbeelu darbau ki'nne abaroosu heano qabaleen te woradi aleen gibsawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeeu? 1. Ciimuta gashshiyyeeu      2. Yooba'a gashshimba'a      3. Qiiaba'a
26. Xa'mmo wollo 25 ciimuta gashshiyyeeu yanoo ikkoda seerbeelu darbau hattas gibsawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeei? (Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
1. Gadisi aazeen galte annannoomata qoocciyyeeu
2. Hadaachch sohamano gizza qorabaanchu/dikka'aanchu ihu
3. Hujatano manni maqee kontita              4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
27. Seerbeelu darbau ki'nne abaroosu heano qabaleen te woradi roshsha kasaan gibsawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeeu?
1. Ciimuta gashshiyyeeu              2. Yooba'a gashshimba'a              3. Qiiaba'a
28. Xa'mmo wollo 27 fanqashshut ciimuta gashshiyyeeu yitaa'ii ikkoda hatta gibsawwi ciimuta gashshiyyeeu?(Mateechch aluudu fanqashshuta aassii dandeenno)
1. Roshshata muru                      2. Roshshaa aassitoo tishshitta kotisu
3. Lubbaamata/ rosisaannu darbai daafiin hoogu      4. Wolu yooda (caakkishshiyye)\_\_\_\_\_

**Addisaabi Yunversitita**  
**Gadissa Roshsha Kolleejja**  
**Afriikina Issiyi Sereeggo Xaaxxitta**

**Hada baadu martaa abaroosu yoossariin Wiinshantaa xa'mmatuta**

Iittanteentaa Fanqashshaannu:

Tann xa'mmato qome qaadu Tophphe keeni seerbeelo darbaiin; Kambaataa Xambaaro zooniichch Dabuubi Afriiki Rippaabiliika yamamano boqo xawiin sereegantaa sereeggo waabita qu'mmi assiihaat. Kambaataa Xambaaro zooniichch Dabuubi Afriiki Rippaabiliika assamano seerbeelu darbau bareedagiin aagiccii sereeggiihans ki'ne beeqqamu abbishsh tamanoa. Ti xa'mmatut sereeggi qaadii qixxanteeii ihanian, a'nnu kann xa'mmatoon hinc yitoo xa'mmaakkata fanqashshiin xabbeenata waabita aassiteenunta abbisiin xa'mman kann xa'mmatoon aassiteenanta waabit sumuurant afantaaihaa laaluntis beebayyantaaii ihus dagsiisota iittaamm. Sereeggoontas beeqqanteenatanneehaa assiteentae xabbeenata dikkishshahaa wozanie galati teesoonin hinc assaamm.

**Wudu:**

- Fanqashshu'ne doo'rratoochch kibbiinii aasantoo onata ma'nneen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.
- Xa'mmatosi aleen su'mma xaafu hasisanoba'a.
- Horaanta xa'mmaakkaa fanqashshu'ne xabbeenagiin fanqshshiin kaa'lliyye'e.

**Waabita qu'mm assitaa keeni naqaashsha**

- Waabita qu'mm assaanchi su'mmu: \_\_\_\_\_
- Waabit qu'mm yitoo woradu: 1. Angacca            2. Daambooyyata
- Waabis qu'mm yitoo qabalit: \_\_\_\_\_.

**Wona Qooba: Seebeelo darbai mashkaakkata**

**Awwansuta: Fanqashshu'nne doo'rratoochchis kibbiinii aassantoo onata ma'neen xaafiinii fanqashshiyye.**

1. Meegut: 1. Meaata 2. Goonchu
2. Umuru: 1. 15-24 2. 25- 34 3. 35-49 4. 50-64 5. 65 woggeechch aluudu
3. Mini assi duuhat: 1. Aagisumbuu/buuta 2. Aagishsheeii/ sseeiita 3. Gaffa'rranteeii  
4. Mini amat rhiteeii 5. Wolu yooda (caakkishshe) \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Abaroosi batinnit fanqashshuta aassaanchu bargin meoot? \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Roshsha gardabbu mahaan?
  1. Anabbabuhaa xaafuhaa dandaamba'a. 2. Xaafuhaa anabbabuhaa xalla
  3. Wona gardabbi roshshata 4. Lanki gardabbi roshshata 5. Sertifikeeta
  6. Dippoolooma 7. Digiritaa isiichch aluuduhaa
6. Qalanchina hei ma'nmit hakkabaat?
  1. Gaxaraa 2. Katamaa
7. Huji'nne mahaan ikke? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluudu fanqashshii dandeenno)
  1. Mangisti minia hujataanchu 2. Hogai galaanchua 3. Zazzalaanchua
  5. Gilli minia hujataanchu 5. Rosaanchua 6. Barea hujataanchu
  7. Gagi hujita 8. Hujit yooeba'a. 9. Wolit hujit yooda( caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
8. Hujit yoo'nnee ikkoda mereeraanchut again aagu'nne habankatan? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
9. Abaroosu'nne aphphut/maatit yoo'nne?
  2. Yooe 2. yooeba'a
10. Xa'mmo 9 fanqashshu'nne yooe yitaaii ikkoda ma hagarat aphphut yoo'nne ikke? (Mate fanqashshoochch aluuudiin fanqashshii dandeenno)
  1. Minu 2. Hogo uullat 3.fanqalaansaannu/caameelu
  4. Ameezannat 5. Zazzalo xaaxxittu 6.wolu yoo'nneeda (caakkishshiyye) \_\_\_\_\_
11. Abaroosu'nne yoo'nne aphpho qaxu habankaan? \_\_\_\_\_ birra.
12. Abaroosu'nne baanki daftaru yoo'nne?
  2. Yooe 2. Yooeba'a
13. Abaroosu'nne gagisi hei minu yoos?
  2. Yoos 2. Yoosiba'a.

14. Abaroosu'nne gagisi hogo uullat yoos?

2. Yoos

2. Yoosiba'a.

15. Xa'mmo wollo 14 fanqashshu'nne "yoos" yanoo ikkoda hogo uullasi haraarimat hektaariin habankatan? \_\_\_\_\_ hektaara.

16. Abaroosiichchi'nne Dabuub Afriika marree mannu yooinddo?

1. Yoou

2. Yooba'a

17. Abaroosiichchi'nne Dabuub Afriika marr waallee mannu yooinddo?

2. Yoou

2. Yooba'a

18. A'nnu wolu hada baadi afoo daggeenan ikke?

2. Dagaamm

2. Dagaamba'a

19. Xa'mmo wollo 18 fanqashshu'nne dagaamm yanoo ikkooda xawaaqqu danditeenanta afoo/afaakkat hakkanneet/hakka'rrootaan? \_\_\_\_\_.