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Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Centre for African and Asian Studies

**Post-Brexit UK's Africa Strategy in Peacebuilding Process: the case of
Somaliland**

**For Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in
African and Oriental Studies (Human and Economic Development)**

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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

DECLARATION

I, Hanna Andargachew declare that this thesis is my original work and that all sources of the materials in the research paper have been duly acknowledged. The matter embodied in this research paper has not been submitted earlier for award of any master's degree best of my knowledge and belief.

Hanna Andargachew

June 2019

I, -----, confirm that this research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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This is to certify that the senior essay prepared by **Hanna Andargachew**, entitled; “**Post-Brexit UK’s Africa Strategy in Peacebuilding Process: the case of Somaliland**” and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for MA Degree in **African and oriental studies** complies with the regulations of the university and meets the accepted standard with respect to originality and quality.

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ACRONYMS

AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somali
CSSF	Conflict Stability and Security fund DFID
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
NIESR	National Institute of Economic and Social Research
NEPAD	Nations Economic Partnership for Economic Development
SRO	Senior Responsible Owner
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
SDF	Somaliland Development Fund
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
DFID	Department for International Development
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
SSF	Somalia Stability Fund
NAS	New Africa Strategy
ICAI	Independent Commission of Aid Impact
HMG	Her Majesty Government
TDI	Telephone Death Interview
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

ABSTRACT

The major purpose of this study was to assess the post-Brexit UK Africa strategy. This study employed a qualitative research technique and qualitative content analysis of coded data. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and individuals in Somaliland working closely on Peacebuilding and governance issues responded to the open-ended survey questionnaire on Somaliland security and stability. According to the results of this research, UK has been the biggest actor in Somaliland support for development through the UK AID program. However, the UK's considerable commitment to help regional peacebuilding with the Somalia Strategy with the government in Mequadisho has posed a threat to Somaliland's completed peacebuilding, as this comprises the UK's policy of direction in recognizing Somaliland statehood. Post-Brexit UK Africa strategy is promised to take higher risks and accept lower returns to deliver in the toughest areas in the continent such as the Sahel region. The strategy is promised to give opportunities for economic development in the most difficult environments, helping tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict. However, implementing the strategy is anticipated to take more time and will not benefit Somaliland Peacebuilding process in a different way than before until after a few years' time. Moreover, post Brexit UK Africa strategy will contribute directly to some of the positive 'shifts' towards constructive engagement and conflict outcomes, because the strategy put priority in re-structuring how the UK is previously situated to respond to security and stability area. This study concludes that the legality of Somaliland will continue not being the primary agenda in post-brexit UK Africa strategy. However, there are hints when conducting this research that the UK acting alone without the EU may strengthen old colonial ties with countries such as Somaliland. From the Somaliland side, the country is busy in making the country stable and secure to show Somaliland's importance to the international community a secured region and expects this to extend to state recognition. However, there is no sign for State recognition in the UK politics, at least not yet. As a result, it is preferable for the post-Brexit UK Africa strategy to engage and for the Somaliland government to comprehend the shift in strategies as well as the challenges and opportunities that it will bring to situate themselves.

Key Words:- Brexit, Peacebuilding, New Africa Strategy, Security, Somaliland

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the study

The June 23, 2016 Brexit is expected by the Brexit supporters to reshape UK's global position. As UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt put it: "We need to begin with a realistic assessment of our global position" (Suess, 2019). This also implies that Brexit is also process of fitting the UK to the new global order that has already been created by other phenomena. The rise of China and the new populist movement in the US by Donald Trump which are now becoming popular is paving the way to reshape the globe. China's remarkable influence and support in Africa has forced the shift for African countries to rely more on China than the West. China has become the most important ally for Africa. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Forum 2018, in Beijing, hosted by President Xi Jinping, attracted more African leaders than the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly (The Economist, 2019). Chinese state-backed companies have helped set up "special economic zones" in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda as well as Djibouti (The Economist, 2019). China through the 'no strings attached' and 'win-win' approach has pledged to spend \$60billion over three years for development assistant (Prizzon, 2018). Taking these as a good example, this year Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, is set to host the first Russia-Africa summit followed by Japan and Britain who are planning to host a similar meeting (The Economist, 2019). Military ties are strengthening alongside the diplomatic ones. In 2017 Turkey built its largest first overseas military base in Africa, in Somalia. It is also thought to be keen to open a base in Djibouti; the UAE through its famous logistic company called DP world Logistics is also building the Barbara port in Somaliland and the Barbara corridor is becoming important to the region as well.

While the west focuses on aid to Africa, China showed more can be done on investment. European countries are stepping up their presence in the Sahel, the arid region on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, aiming both to end Islamic terrorism and stem the flow of migrants to Europe. As others have increased links with Africa, America has cut funding for development and diplomatic programmes. It has announced a 10% reduction in troops in Africa (Browne, 2018). Trump in the US and Brexit in Europe is now the most recent phenomena that shows the extension of how the new global order will be affecting the relationship and partnership of countries. While Trump

seems to show less interest in Africa, it seems Britain is using the opportunity to do more and boost the relation to trade more with Africa. While Trump who has yet not set foot in Africa shows US has no strong Africa strategy, Britain Prime Minister May, on her visit to Africa has announced that UK will remain committed to spend 0.7 per cent of gross national income on official development assistance and in addition a new Africa strategy approach with an increased 4.7billion pound sterling annual support to Africa until 2030 (GOV.UK, 2018). The primary goals of the new Africa Strategy, according to PM May, are to increase UK influence in Africa post-Brexit for commercial and political gain, foster interdependence, address long-term causes of conflict, illegal migration, and instability, and continue to reduce immediate threats to the UK. (GOV.UK, 2018).

There are five strategic areas, one being a geographical focus, where the UK will focus under this new Africa strategy. These strategic areas are Security and Stability, Mutual prosperity, Demography, Climate change and the Sahel. These strategic areas are claimed by the government of UK to reshape and align already existing works as well as resources to focus more on the new strategic pillars. (GOV.UK, 2018) However, it must be proved that Brexit alone will make the UK a more powerful and effective partner for Africa. These five strategies are expected to guide UK's work in Africa, at least for the next six years of each UK overseas departments action. The Deputy Head of Mission in Ethiopia explained the new strategy as re-writing UK's approach to deliver the best outcome for the pan-African Challenges.

The focus of this paper will be the first pillar of the strategy which is Security and Stability. It is obvious this paves the way for curious researchers to do further investigation in seeking for something new from the strategy especially for the nations in fragile areas in which the international community response could not succeed in. For instance, according to Barawani (2017) Somaliland and Somalia by which the Peacebuilding process has had some divergent experiences, actors and interventions; meanwhile to date the efforts did not bring any solution to the longstanding problems in Somalia.

The research focused on Somaliland since it is a former British Protectorate located in the very conflict-prone region of East Africa, Somalia. Somaliland's international commitment to peace and sovereignty is remarkable. This will also be a good test case for the UK's post-Brexit Africa

strategy's effective collaboration for peace building. Somaliland achieved full independence from the United Kingdom in 1960 and joined the former Italy Protectorate to form Republic of Somalia through the Act of Union. After eruption of civil war in 1988, Somaliland declared independence from the rest of the country in 1991 (Barawani, 2017).

The crisis in Somalia which lead to a failed state, has received significant regional and international attention over the years because of the factors arising in the conflict; piracy of the Somali coast, acts of terrorism perpetuated mostly by al-Shabaab, significant number of migrants and border conflicts with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya (Shaw, 2003)

One of the reasons for the failure of international intervention in Peacebuilding in Somalia is because the intervention focus was not solely on Peacebuilding rather efforts are focused on counter-terrorism. While the case of Somalia has proved systematic failures of international interventions in restoring security and stability, the case of Somaliland may be an exhibit of an extraordinary project of domestically led state- building within the larger failure of Somalia (International Peace Supporting Training Cenrer, 2014).

Somaliland with this opportunity along with historical background has evolved from domestically led state building to seeking international recognition process and support. Somaliland has conducted an election and has appointed its 5th president while celebrated its 23rd year of *de facto* independence from the Somali Republic and is a multiparty state. The effort seems to be not only stability and state building but also democratization and sustainability.

Somaliland does not receive direct budgetary support like other developing countries do mainly because of its political status, does not have a *de jure* status. So much has been done with the amount that has been received but as a country suffering from several economic challenges such as high unemployment and lack of infrastructure it needs more support from big development actors such as the UK (Nagda, 2017).

The international support Somaliland gets on Peacebuilding and state construction will also be discussed on the thesis. Somaliland posed a membership application for AU in 2005 which was not accepted. Even-though, the AU fact-finding mission in 2005 concluded the situation was sufficiently for AU to find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case it was not taken

into action (International Crisis Group , 2006). AU initiation for the recognition for Somaliland is a very important which can be easily followed by other regional and international communities. However, failure to make a special arrangement by the AU forces member country such as Ethiopia to sign an agreement to be a shareholder with a 20% share for the Berbera Port separately (Cannon, 2017). The Somaliland government applauded this as an opportunity to strengthen ties with Ethiopia.

Somaliland being a *de'facto* states most researchers and authors give a higher emphasis on succession right. However, this qualitative research seeks to develop an opinion to provide a good understanding on how the UK interacts with Somaliland with its new strategy and why act differently and will not look at the possibilities or recognition in depth.

Former colonial powers have different interest and different approaches in their engagement strategy with their previous colonies. France extending engagement to francophone African countries and UK in the commitment to support commonwealth countries. UK position on mending to historical ties is now becoming strong after the Brexit and the announcement of the UK Africa Strategy. UK Minister of Foreign Affairs on his visit to Africa promised UK due to Brexit will be able to mend historical bondages more than ever but also areas where the UK has traditionally played a smaller role (Mutambo, 2019). Theresa May on her visit to Africa covered Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana which all are commonwealth. This has been celebrated by former Colonies of UK giving indication of more fund will come. However, this support has extended to non-previous colonies looking at border political and economic interests where Somali is one of them. The UK hosted the London Somalia conference in May 2017 to accelerate progress on security sector reform, build on the international response to drought and humanitarian crisis, and agree the new international partnership needed to keep Somalia on course for increased peace and prosperity by 2020 (GOV.UK, 2017). This also seems to show UK's stand between capacitating Somalia military, Somali National Army (SNA), taking over from the AMISOM. Improving Somali capability contributes to worsening relations between central and federal governments, or between Somalia and Somaliland. The research will look how UKs pledge to support on Somalia (Somalia Strategy) affects the support given to Somaliland. Improving Somali competence worsens relations between the central and federal governments, as well as between Somalia and Somaliland. The study will examine at how the UK's pledge of help for Somalia (Somalia

Strategy) influences support for Somaliland.

UK's engagement in Africa is through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) handling diplomatic relations, Ministry of Defense (MoD) supporting security sector, military support and the Department of International Development (DFID) providing aid. When it comes to conflict-prone areas like Somaliland, however, there is a coordinated effort by the three UK government units through the UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, as well as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool. The UK seeks to respond promptly and effectively by having a unique financing mechanism specially adopted by parliament for conflict prevention and reduction. In addition to the Conflict, Stability and Security fund (CSSP) the UK enters into different bilateral and multilateral agreements to engage in Peacebuilding support in Somaliland such as Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), EU development fund and supporting the UN and Africa Union AMISOM. The research paper analyzes this deeply to look at the UK's approach of its Africa strategy pre and post Brexit. More crucially, the study sought to investigate the influence of Brexit on the United Kingdom's African Strategy as well as the United Kingdom's assistance for Peacebuilding operations in Somaliland. Since Somaliland lacks de'jure status and was a British protectorate until 1940, the UK's support and recognition of Somaliland will be critical as Somaliland seeks statehood recognition in regional and international forums. The researcher investigated the new African Strategy to see if it brings hope for Somaliland's peace and, if so, whether it leads to recognition.

1.2. Statement of the problem

The new UK Africa strategy which is an unpublished document “having a long-term strategic vision of prosperous, safer, healthier sub-Saharan Africa which sees the UK as a partner of choice for peace, trade and economic development, is less reliant on aid and is more resilient to shocks and stresses”. However, Africa is demographically, economically and historically diverse. The Horn is not the same as the Sahel and to the North. The African Strategy needs to be studied with country context as well as considering regional dynamics. As the concept of the new strategy is yet not communicated well, studies need to focus more on country context and provide recommendations how the strategy needs to be tailored and give direction how implementation could be successful. For instance, in order to get effective results, the strategy must take into

account the specific country situation. Given its various peculiarities, a country such as Somaliland should be included in that consideration.

Failure to recognize Somaliland's statehood by the international and regional communities including AU is ignoring Somaliland's success story on peace, stability and governance by using indigenous traditions and culture. To the contrary the international community has provided support in sustaining the Peacebuilding process directly and indirectly without the recognition. The amount and type of support received can be contested. Somaliland still faces several challenges, both internal and external, which it must overcome if it is to continue its promising development.

All these aspects need to be considered when countries such as the UK identify priorities and come up with a strategy. It is obvious as the nation to satisfy the appetite of national interest of UK, National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) has contributed a lot with its findings to identify strategies to bring change. Meanwhile, nowadays, it is time to go beyond identifying strategies in a way they are to be more responsive to a community's needs in fragile areas otherwise the consequence will be a failure from all sides. Even though Prime Minister May announced the strategy, implementation has been slowed due to the drama of the 'deal' or 'no deal' issue between the UK and the EU. However, the UK's Foreign Minister is revamping its Commonwealth offices and the Department of International Development in various nations in order to position themselves to implement the strategy without regard for its efficacy.

As a result, the researcher found that there is a vacuum in analyzing the new strategy, which has yet to be contextualized, as well as researched how African nations might position themselves for effective implementation of UK's support. This paper investigated how the new strategy on security, Peacebuilding pillar different from the previous one and what the achievements and failures of previous UK engagements in Africa.

Since Somaliland is a unique case on the continent, peace was achieved using traditional and homegrown ways, and it is located in the Horn of Africa, where tensions on regional dynamics develop by the day. The researcher chose Somaliland to determine whether such factors are taken into account by the new Africa strategy or are ignored. Furthermore, this research thesis studied the United Kingdom's assistance for Somaliland and what post-Brexit Africa strategy might bring

to Somaliland's support for peacekeeping.

1.3. Objective of the study

1.3.1. General objective

The study's main objective was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the UK's post-Brexit Africa strategy, with a focus on the Somaliland peacebuilding process.

1.3.2. Specific objective

- To examine post Brexit UK's commitment to support the Peacebuilding process in Somaliland
- To outline the UK's post-Brexit Africa policy for ensuring security and stability in fragile regions like Somaliland.
- To determine how the Brexit will affect the UK's relationship with Somaliland (from the standpoint of the new UK strategy on Africa).
- To assess the UK's post-Brexit commitment to aiding the Somaliland peacebuilding process

1.4. Significance of study

In respect of today's dynamic and very variable condition in global situation, lack of up to date empirical studies is the identified gap particularly for nations seeking for international response to their adverse situation. For Somaliland, this study is important to bridge the study gap and proposed way forwards by investigating win-win approach from the post UK Africa strategy. For the UK, it enabled for the nation could understand whether it is at appropriate position in designing this era deserved strategy or not. For the student researchers: the study served as the source to empirical literature review for the futuristic researcher in this area of research especially a country like Somaliland with lots of complex issues open to many fields of research. In addition, this study would help the student researchers to be aware and knowledgeable of post Brexit UK Africa strategy. It means the study would help for the author to be a better analyst and it could be a help as a future reference for more studies in the future.

1.5. Limitation of the study

The post Brexit UK Africa strategy is a broad concept, which consists of numerous interactions,

but the scope of this study is restricted to the topical and spatial areas. Topical approach of the study was limited to see making aware of Peacebuilding process and partnership in respect of Somaliland. The spatial aspect of the study was limited to Somaliland.

The research is limited focusing in the current events of Brexit which keeps on rolling and full of new events as conducting the research. The research neglected the new events of Brexit and did not analyze what it will mean to the NAS as it keeps being an ongoing process and unpredictable. The ‘New Africa Strategy’ name is also being considered by the UK government to be changed to ‘New approach to Africa’ by the end of March. This by itself is an evidence for the study area to be an ongoing and eventful process. The Study has captured the announcement of UK Africa Strategy after the Brexit decision and have investigated initial documents and events until February 2019 which the recommendations were based upon. Other events beyond February were not included.

The other limitation of the study is that almost all studies focused on Somaliland is centered around statehood recognition of Somaliland. Even though, the purpose of the study is not to look at the recognition process the researcher found that looking at Peacebuilding of Somaliland should give an emphasis to the *de facto* state dynamics. However, due to the time and the restrictive nature of study, refrained from investigating the aspect of recognition process intensely. Though, it has been considered only to show the complexity of Somaliland status.

Considering data collected for the research, the researchers position of being an employee of the DFID has been a huge opportunity. However, it was a challenge that most data acquired for the research were either confidential and cannot be shared externally or sources cannot be quoted in external documents. Even though, ethical considerations were taken highly the researcher feels that this is one limitation for the paper not to make intensive recommendation. However, the research type selected, qualitative content analysis, enables to create insights into the problem and develop hypotheses for potential quantitative research in future for other scholars.

1.6 Organization of the study

This thesis is organized in to three chapters. This chapter introduced the thesis topic, objectives, significance and limitation. This chapter contains the background on which enough information is gathered for the reader to have a clear picture of Brexit in relation to the new global order.

Description of priority areas in the New Africa strategy is also included. The chapter includes the success of Somaliland's Peacebuilding process and Somaliland's context. The research poses a major question how the UK's NAS understands a complex country such as Somaliland and take that into consideration in its approach and implementation.

The second chapter will focus on literature review supported by different theories and practices of the world, which will assist the research to produce different arguments on the selected area. The theoretical framework will focus on how pro and anti-Brexiteers look the New African Strategy. Including arguments that UK can success in sustaining Peacebuilding process in the region.

The third chapter will deal with the methodology that describes how to go through the issues that are raised in the objective and research question. This chapter basically deals with the data collection and instrument selection approach. Preparation of questionnaires and conducting interviews will be the main approaches for gathering data, since the research type is qualitative with few sample selections. Also document review will be part of this research to assess the secondary policy documents and some research papers to compare and analyze the perception on the New Africa Strategy, scholar's thoughts and give some analysis on effective collaboration and partnership in Peacebuilding process.

The fourth and the fifth chapters will put the result of the collected data by analyzing the data and providing a comprehensive summary for the finding respectively. The issues of Somaliland stability and security and UK's engagement. Whether the complexity of Somaliland has been considered in UK's engagement and more so on the new UK Africa strategy after the Brexit. The chapter also analyzed understanding of UK's engagement and priority by the Somaliland Government and how Brexit and UK Africa strategy is perceived by Somaliland scholars, people working with British NGOs and research organizations. The conclusion to be drawn in the final section concerning the suggestions which are relevant to the issues mentioned in the previous chapters would be pointed out. It provides a general overview of the recommendations, which contains the scope for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis consists of elements—theories on Peacebuilding and partnerships. Using these theories in combination with the empirical part this study led towards the framework of analysis for the research problem would be answered and the thesis purpose would be fulfilled.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process that involves everyone affected by a damaging conflict in the process of encouraging people to dialogue, rebuilding relationships, and reforming institutions for positive change to last. Relationship transformation is critical to putting an end to violence (W.Doyle, 2000). Immanuel Kant's model of Perpetual Peace (1795) peace can be obtained through a combination of republican governments accountable to their citizens, international law to regulate state behavior, and economic interdependence to create interests in maintaining (Steinberg, 2013). Although broad factors that apply to most conflicts can be determined, specific parameters that must be addressed by peacebuilding methods include the (net) specific level of international commitment available to support a durable peace and the local origins of animosity (W.Doyle, 2000) .

New approaches to peacebuilding, based on social-psychological theories, emerged towards the end of the Cold War. Boutros-Ghali announced when announcing his Agenda for Peace in 1992 the word 'Peace-building' was used largely. It broadly used for vague term connoting activities that goes beyond crisis intervention, such as long-term development, and building of governance structures, including NGOs (Lambourn & Herro, 2008). In order to convert relationships and governing styles and structures into more lasting, peaceful ones, a wide range of approaches, procedures, and phases are required (Conflict Transformation, 2003).

As the number and extent of peacebuilding workshops and dialogues increased, without noticeable reductions in intergroup violence, some analysts recognized that the narrow focus on elite activities was insufficient to resolve protracted religious, ethno-national and other forms of identity conflicts (Steinberg, 2013). To supplement the elite or top-down exchanges, bottom-up

forms of commitment interactions were developed to change social attitudes and perceptions at the societal levels. Theorists argued that without extensive support for concessions and compromises with the enemy, agreements among leaders would be readily undermined by ‘spoilers’ and would not stand the test of time.

This showed the necessity of wider efforts to promote societal transformations in resolving religious, ethno-national and other forms of identity conflicts, in the form of unofficial diplomacy, and ‘people to people’ or grass-roots activities (Steinberg, 2013). Such processes were expected to create the broad empathy and understanding necessary to cut across the divisions, thereby, according to the theory, promoting collective attitude changes necessary for peace. An extended application of theories of victimhood, forgiveness and reconciliation in international conflict was followed and highly promoted. (Steinberg, 2013). This was seen effective in Rwandan Peacebuilding process. Fortunately, many of the participants in the liberal peace controversy have begun to realize the limitations of this framing and begun to engage in self-criticism and reconstruction. A good number of the leading protagonists are now coming to the support ‘Indigenous peace building’.

In the past, humanitarian aid—which the UK provided in conflict-prone nations—was considered to be impartial and unrelated to efforts to promote peace. Later, this was changed to include quick-impact projects as a means of stabilizing. For the UK government, conflict prevention and many aspects of peacebuilding are interchangeable (Lawry-White, 2003). Peacebuilding was viewed as a post-conflict activity in the UK's engagement, rather than as a pre, during, and post-conflict initiative. However, peacebuilding entails a multifaceted range of measures that explicitly reduce the risk of a lapse or relapse into destructive conflict by addressing conflict causes and consequences; strengthening national, community, and individual capacities to effectively address conflict; and laying the groundwork for long-term peace and development (UNICEF, 2016).

To understand the Peacebuilding process, it is required to understand the overview of conflict and peace across the continent. David Francis (2008) on her book, *Peace & Conflict in Africa*, provides the main theoretical background of the thesis giving an overview of conflict resolution, peace-building, security, and development. A conceptual analysis on causes of conflict in Africa

and the common features by looking at the continent from state collapse and anarchy in Somalia to protracted wars and rampant corruption in the Congo; from bloody civil wars and extreme poverty in Sierra Leone to humanitarian crisis and authoritarianism in Sudan. The author also tries to show why the continent is the center of growing political and media attention. The focus from ‘elite led’ peacebuilding to a people-centered approach in Africa.

The Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) Annual Report (Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), 2015) gives general idea on how UK’s strategy of responding to conflicts, instability and insecurity around the world. It also sets the strategic direction UK is following in Peacebuilding support. Through the CSSF, the UK and international partners ensure security from threats such as terrorism, corruption and illegal migration or human trafficking. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2018) review also provided the impact of the money spent in these conflict prone areas through the CSSF.

Other researchers such as Mark, Aisha & Nick (2017) criticize the CSSF on its impact and UK’s effectiveness on the Peacebuilding support. In their article, *the conflict, Stability and Security Fund Diverting Aid and undermining Human Rights*, argue that UK is spending money providing support to military security forces in several states who are involved in human rights abuses. They argue that the fund is not transparent. In their article, they also provides example of evidences on how aid money is skewed towards areas where there is a national self- interest, rather than where the developmental need is greatest.

Furthermore, aims to highlight the work on the common aim, the reconstruction of society after conflict – building peace. Peacebuilding systems should primarily address the societal insecurity of the post-conflict society (Swan & Krampe, 2010). To establishes sustainable peace, a careful, comprehensive and systemic approach through Peacebuilding systems is needed. Moreover, such an approach depends heavily on an integration of environmental security management in the Peacebuilding system.

2.2. Brexit and UK Africa Strategy

UK’s interest in conflict prevention and Peacebuilding pillar seems to be vast. It is not only in relation to the success of its poverty reduction work, fighting terrorism and controlling organized crimes but also controlling the migration and human trafficking in the continent which has been a

major issue on the Brexit campaign. An anonymous conflict advisor from DFID explained that UK understands stability as a condition that goes much further than the mere absence of violence: fundamentally, it is about communities, states and regions being able to manage conflict and developmental change peacefully over the long-term. In this way it is a positive vision of peace.

UK Peacebuilding strategy gives priority to create cohorts of peacemakers that work together to create and sustain a new vision and narrative for peace so providing an alternative to narratives of conflict and competition. This new narrative energizes and mobilizes people into a movement, generating positive momentum that begins to challenge and transform negative norms thus driving societal change. In addition, it believes to work programmatically through country level Peacebuilding strategies to intentionally address conflict drivers and obstacles to peace (Tear fund, 2016).

This deliberate programmatic response is supported by the development of conflict monitoring systems to identify threats and opportunities and ensuring responses remain focused on the key conflict drivers. This country strategy led programmatic action focused on conflict drivers and obstacles to peace provides a depth of understanding of the issues and credibility which then feeds into and supports the development of movements through which impact at scale is achieved. The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool, along with the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, is one such initiative.

Definitions of partnership are based on numerous assumptions. McQuaid (2000) divides partnership reasons into three categories: first, 'the sum is greater than the parts' is a potential for synergy; second, when involving both development and delivery of a strategy or a set of projects or operations, although each actor may not be equally involved in all stages; and third, in public-private partnerships, the public sector is not pursuing purely commercial goals. McQuaid does agree that there are different types of power in partnership, and that the greatest power generally rests with those controlling resources, and that they are likely to dominate the partnership, where the other fourth category of partnership reason should have been included in his list as political domination.

Five main dimensions of partnership are now discussed:

- a) what the partnership is seeking to do, i.e. its purpose and whether it is strategic, or project driven;
- b) who is involved, i.e. the key actors and the structure of their relationship in the partnership;
- c) when i.e. the timing or stage of development of the partnership process and changing relationships and activities over time;
- d) where, i.e. the spatial dimension;
- e) how the activities are carried out, the implementation mechanisms. A further set of characteristics, the expected benefits of the partnership, are considered in the next section. Each of these dimensions for analyzing partnerships also have themselves several axes, or sub-dimensions.

However, there must be a balance struck between greater complexity (and realism) and clarity of any partnership typology. (McQuaid, 2000). Finally, each of these components will have direct implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of a partnership and for the balance of power within it, and so can help form a basis to analyze these issues.

Brexit will have significant consequences for UK, Europe, and for the global order. Supporter of Brexit such as James Duddridge, former UK Minister to Africa, argues strongly that UK without the EU ties the relationship between Britain and Africa will get stronger. To support his argument, he presents the example of EUs decision to reduce funding for the African Union Mission in Somali (AMISOM), which was against Britain's wishes (Simon, Emma, & Balazs, 2017).

Gopaldas (2017) wrote on described the situation that despite significant challenges, both Britain and Africa could emerge as winners from the shift which indicates the Africa Strategy could be effective and would be well received. However, statement may be true for trade deals more so than stability and security and Gopaldas (2017) point is highly contested. Price (2018) and Simon, Emma, & Balazs (2017), looking at in general what the 'divorce bill' will bring to the prior aid commitments UK made and the danger of looking inward, focusing on UK's self-interest. The authors argue that Brexit will bring a UK Africa relationship which is centered on enhancing trade relations and new investment approaches rather than focusing on peace-building. Price (2018) demonstrates the issue of 'unilateralist' which the UK is seeking post-Brexit and how it presents

challenges rather than opportunities to Africa.

2.3. A New Long-Term UK approach to Sub-Saharan Africa

Through the lens of the UK leaving the European Union and its role as part of Global Britain UK approaches sub-Saharan Africa beyond aid support (Yeates, 2019). With regard to inclusive growth, trade, investment, and economic partnerships, working with and through the private sector, and supporting African access to high-quality international investment through the UK's financial expertise, the Department for International Development Economic Strategy (2017) explains that this entails using UK expertise and influence more broadly and engaging more ambitiously with rising powers as examples. Economic partnership should therefore put a priority.

In addition to economic partnership security and stability is also a focus as the essential foundations for growth and prosperity, supporting African countries efforts to tackle the underlying drivers of fragility; climate change and sustainable natural resource management, helping African nations to manage the shocks of climate change and unlock their full economic potential; and, a step change in UK's support for the demographic dividend including access to voluntary family planning (Yeates, 2019).

2.4. Somaliland

The pre-colonial stateless society was very egalitarian, with social ties (both group and individual) controlled through the Xeer (Somalia customary law), which, in conjunction with Islam, prevented the lineage system from disintegrating (Elmi & Barise, 2006). The voluntarism linked with the absolute necessity of relying on one's own labor and livestock rather than exploiting others was what gave the Xeer lasting force in the absence of centralized coercive machinery (Richards, 2015). With colonization in the late nineteenth century, Somalis were subordinated to a central state for the first time, ruled by the Italians in the south and the British in the north, resulting in a shift in the locus of power and politics (Jhazbhay, 2003).

Southern Somalia and its northeast enclave were known as the Republic of Somalia at the time, while the north was known as British Somaliland as politics and power were transferred to urban administrative centers during colonialism, because the North and South's colonial experiences,

becoming a British protectorate and an Italian colony, differed in keyways (Jhazbhay, 2003). Because the British soldiers' major objectives in 'Somaliland' were to secure food supplies, Somali mutton, for their military garrison in Aden, and to prevent other colonial powers from seizing control, they adopted a strategy of limited economic and political engagement (Richards, 2015).

Because of the above, the British left the Somaliland economically underdeveloped and marginalized, but they also left the traditional structures which later became the basis for Peacebuilding and state formation largely intact (Barawani, 2017). Quite differently, the Italians in the Republic of Somalia pursued a strategy of direct rule, and accordingly imported a whole new political system with centralized economic planning, state appropriation and substantial support for big enterprises (Barawani, 2017). The colonizers followed a strategy of uprooting local producers to force them to integrate with the increasingly centralized national economy. As for the cultural sphere, Somali practices, values and language were perceived as inferior and something to be 'overcome' to 'modernize' the society. On 26 June 1960, Somaliland obtained independence from Britain (Barawani, 2017). Six days later, on 1 July, under the premiership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, Somaliland united with the former Italian Somalia to form the sovereign Somali Republic. In Following the overthrow of SiadBarre in May 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared the secession of the northern regions to form the independent 'Republic of Somaliland,' the territory of which corresponded to that of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was elected President of Somaliland in May 1993 (Jhazhay, 2017). Somaliland's population are of the Issaq, Gadabursi and Ciise (Dir), and Dolbahunte and Warsengeli clan-families, the latter two of which belong to the Darodcon federation of clans, and the Issaq, which constituted the backbone of the SNM (Richards, 2015).

Somaliland currently maintains complete autonomy and independence from Somalia and refuses to cooperate with the 'federal' government in Mogadishu. There are, however, contested territories in Togdheer region between 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' on one side (since both lay claims on the lands), and between the two regional entities and Khaatumo regional authority on the other. (Barawani, 2017). The territorial dispute between 'Somaliland' and 'Puntland' dates back to 1998, when Puntland was created and declared the region to be part of its jurisdiction. It had previously been claimed by 'Somaliland' since the events of the Somali civil war in 1991 (Jhazbhay, 2003). 'Puntland' claims this territory based on family links with the region's main Darod clans, whilst

'Somaliland' says the region was part of the previous British Somaliland protectorate, to which the self-proclaimed regional state considers itself the successor. Khaatumo state was founded in 2012 by politicians from the Togdheer region's districts of Sool, Sanaag, and Buuhoodle. The people of the Khaatumo region have traditionally been in favor of an unified Somalia (Jhazbhay, 2003). The Dervish State, which existed from 1896 until 1920, was based in the Khaatumo area. Because the Dervish State was the cradle of the Somali independence struggle against the British and Italian domination of colonial Somalia, the Khatumo regional authority claims the Sool and Sanaag regions. (Jhazbhay, 2003).

Figure 2. 1Map of Somaliland



Figure 2. 2 Somaliland Independent Monument



2.4.1. Peacebuilding process in Somaliland

Because of the huge fragmentation of social and political disintegration and the absence of traditional elders' national ownership, Somalia's Peacebuilding initiatives were mostly driven by domestic actors; as a result, the international community is accused of not being context-oriented and not being based on the realities on the ground; and, in the meantime, the international community is accused of having competing interests and viewpoints, which muddled the process (Barawani, 2017).

The growing influence of Somalia's bordering governments within AMISOM has harmed the mission's reputation among Somalis, and these failures have not only put AMISOM personnel in danger, but have also harmed the mission's efficacy (Barawani, 2017) . Somaliland took a drastically different strategy than Somalia; that indigenous contribution be mobilized and harmonized based on building and bargaining the restoration of peace and stability. This was locally-driven, locally-financed, and context-based agenda for the quest of peace and stability (Allison, 2015). Somaliland has made notable progress in building peace, security and constitutional democracy within its *de facto* borders. In fact, the Somaliland model can teach the rest of Africa that African people are able to fix their problems without the western narratives of conflict resolution on Peacebuilding (Richards, 2015). Although, Somaliland had taken

preliminary but significant steps towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization under Egal during the 1990s, the polity increasingly struggled to maintain this process urging the first decade of the 21st century (Barawani, 2017).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

3. Introduction

Brief description of the study area, research design and approaches, population and sample, data collection method, reliability and validity test are presented in this chapter. Further description and illustration is given on how each data collection tool is applied.

3.1. Research approach

This study used a qualitative descriptive research design. The purpose of adopting a qualitative descriptive research design for this study was to enable the researcher to have complete opinion of subjective conviction of Somaliland focused team represented by the Department for International Development, Ministry of Defense, Stabilization Unit and Foreign and Commonwealth Office about Post Brexit UK Africa strategy in Peacebuilding process of Somaliland based on their personal experience and knowledge. The research also included opinions from Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International cooperation and Civil society organizations working on Peacebuilding in Somaliland. As the research method the study deployed qualitative content analysis to systematically categorize coded text of transcribed verbalizes as the responses given by Somaliland focused teams to the open-ended survey questions and literature/article /annual report materials of the aforementioned offices.

3.2. Method of data collection

According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), method is a specific data collection process in accordance with the assumption of the selected methodology. Primary data are those which are collected a fresh and for the first time and thus happen to be original in character (Kothari, 2004). Thus, this study applied mainly the following information gathering tool; Questionnaire; semi structured Interview; observation; and Records / literatures, policy brief, annual reports and critics. Data gathering tools are detailed below.

3.3. Primary Data Collection

3.3.1. Individual key informant interview

For the consumption of qualitative content analysis this study carried out in depth interview with UK overseas experts working on diplomacy, peacebuilding and development for they could talk their subjective conviction about Post Brexit UK Africa strategy in peacebuilding process based on their personal experience and knowledge. The researcher also attended workshops, sessions and information briefing on the new African strategy. In addition, the researcher conducted five interviews with various officials, including foreign relations advisers, consultants on UK-supported programs, CSOs working on peacebuilding, and the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, checklists and interview questions were designed in such a way that the study detected team members' subjective conviction in describing the post Brexit UK Africa strategy on security and stability in fragile areas, what Brexit will bring to the partnership of the UK and Somaliland (from the new UK's strategy on Africa approach perspective), and the post Brexit UK's commitment to supporting in addressing Somaliland's stability and security threats.

3.3.2. Secondary Data Collection

This study reviewed literature/article / report materials. The research also analyzed publications of journal and articles on Peacebuilding process of Somaliland to understand how Peacebuilding is defined and the process UK follow when engaging in a conflict prone area. Moreover, the Somaliland Development Fund and the Conflict Stability and Security fund (CSSF) annual reports were also taken in due consideration.

3.4. Data analysis technique

This study assessed post Brexit UK Africa strategy and explored subjective conviction of UK conflict advisors and new Africa strategy focused teams in British embassy, Addis Ababa who have to regularly assess the quality of UK strategy, and who may be considered 'epistemological gatekeepers, in the sense of controlling access to the desirable inputs and outputs of the strategy. The study also examined several papers and journals that provide commentary on the benefits of Brexit for the UK and the UK's status in the world. The review further considered several independent evaluations of the UK's Africa engagement strategy and the efficacy of its partnerships with nations such as Somaliland. And, in order to conduct qualitative content

analysis, the following procedures were used: organizing data in a way that is easy to look at, allowing the researcher to go through each topic to pick out concepts and themes; finding and organizing ideas and concepts; coding and categorizing ideas and concepts; building overarching themes in the data; ensuring reliability and validity in the data analysis and findings; and finding possible and plausible explanatory variables.

Data from the in-depth interview and secondary sources were analyzed using descriptive qualitative methods. All the recorded conversations were transcribed verbatim. As cited in Brown (2008), such as addressing all pieces of evidence and major rival interpretations, focusing on the most significant aspect of the interview and questionnaire and employing the researcher's prior knowledge were used to further the analysis. Narrative explanations given during in-depth interviews were captured by the researcher note and transcribed later during analysis. The researcher was also active on observations of both verbal and nonverbal behaviors as they occur, and immediate personal reflections about the interview.

3.5. Instrument Reliability and Validity

For ensuring the consistency of the research findings and the accuracy with which a method measures what it is intended to measure, the study implemented the following way of instrument reliability and validity. In this study findings validity is enhanced because they are confirmed by more than one instrument measuring the same thing i.e. individual in-depth interview and review literature, magazine, articles and annual reports.

This study reduced the researcher effects by ensuring that the researcher (interviewer) belongs to the same cultural group of the interviewees who are working in British embassy and is exposed to discussions and information on the new Africa Strategy. In addition, among different type of triangulation this study applied triangulation from different method by looking at the same checklist and guiding questions and trying to answer them using different research methods i.e. in-depth individual interview and review literature, magazine, articles, project evaluation papers and annual reports.

Moreover, following the completion of all interviews, contacts were made with senior program owners who have been in charge of relevant programs at the Department for International Development, the Stabilization Unit, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in order to get their

feedback on the veracity, appropriateness, and accuracy of the research findings. By contrasting how the researcher has categorized and coded the results into themes with how a colleague would have done it in the past, external validation of the coding technique was also carried out. For instance, World Vision International previously created a qualitative content analytical matrix for the subjective beliefs of respondents in the course of qualitative Telephone Death Interview (TDI) surveys on conflict sensitivity and implementing programs in conflict environment (World Vision International, 2005).

3.6. Ethical Consideration

To collect data the ethical permission was taken official letter and email sent by the researcher. A request was made if respondent required an official letter from the Addis Ababa University. The respondents were asked respectfully to receive the required information based on their willingness. Responses of respondents were unnamed as requested in the paper. Confidential papers which the researcher was exposed to due to her position were not quoted. However, they were used to advance research and to look published resources. The ideas were not used in the absence of a published documents or official announcements. The researcher disclosed the privacy of respondents and was kept secretly the information collected from respondents. Confidentiality is considered in all levels of the study during information gathering.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4. Introduction

This chapter attempt to analyze and interpret the data collected. The results were made to relate to the key considerations discussed in the literature review sections. At the same time, the data was analyzed in association with the research questions raised in chapter one. The central focus of the presentation and analysis of data was to examine the post Brexit UK Africa strategy on Peacebuilding and stability. Finally, summary of findings with respect to these same issues were presented and discussed in a way the researcher could grasp ideas leading to the next conclusion section.

4.1. Respondents' profile

East Africa conflict advisor and UK new Africa Strategy pillar leads, represented by the Department for International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were the respondents with high profile in respect of their personal experience and knowledge. Almost they were long tenured in diplomatic work for enlarging UK's diplomatic presence over the world. During the field work the researcher has conducted five in-depth interviews with these high-flying executives and advisors.

The researcher has also conducted interview with the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation official, Somaliland Development Fund – Programme Manager, researcher on conflict resolution who part of the traditional Peacebuilding process in 1991, a PhD candidate on Somaliland Sustainable Development and Diplomacy, and Saferword - UK based NGO working on security and stability in Somaliland and Somalia.

4.2. Brexit and UK Africa strategy

Even though, the referendum of UK leaving the EU decision was won by 51.9% for Leave to 48.1% for Remain with a small difference UK's commitment in implementing leaving the EU is priority for most government department in UK (Browne, 2018). However, the UK still would like to assure the world that by leaving the EU a stronger UK which will be in the center of the globe

will come out. For the assurance UK has been making promises and pledges such as the African Strategy which brings a £4.7b annual additional support to Africa. However, the debates continue how the UK can come strong. This included that Brexit is an opportunity to recreate a Global Britain after a period of EU membership that saw the UK neglect its former partners, particularly the Commonwealth; and economically, which means getting at least the maximum benefit they used to have as EU member (Hayes, 2018).

However, these reasons are not well agreed and received by majority of respondents from the Department of International Development and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. They do not share that Brexit will bring all the three and benefit from the decision in this way. However, despite the reason the UK civil servant including overseas offices are committed to implement the decision of the UK nationals. Displaying the commitment of EU exit also have a risk of UK losing its importance and appearing weaker for its partner in the 'deal' and 'no deal' saga with EU.

Respondents gave reflection on the importance of the New Africa Strategy as the strategy bringing a re-structure on UK's approach and how to act post Brexit. It focuses more in creating a synergy between UK's departments in overseas such as DFID, FCO, DIT and MoD. Few respondents in Department for International Development argue that the strategy and the pillars chosen did not bring a 'new strategy', a new area of work, rather it is positioning the UK's different departments to come together and to bring an impactful result in UKs engagement in the continent. The process of creating a one UK government overseas, referred as *One HMG*, was started in 2016. However, that was limited to using common resources by department such as having a regional Human Resource hub which gives support to all departments from Pretoria or a using one corporate services for the departments. This resulted several job losses for local and UK based staff. This was celebrated as bringing a huge financial saving for UK which is spend in overseas offices. However, few amendments were made after implemented as it was believed that some measures didn't bring efficient results.

It seems the New Africa Strategy is taking a bigger step in bringing the synergy of departmental work at strategical level. By strategic level, thinking the long-term impacts as well as looking the how to position tackling threats, effective post-Brexit engagement, developing mutual benefit from areas of engagement using all HMG assets in all departments. Positioning the overseas office

has been a focus to coordinate and take forward a strategy. For the UK, this will help creating the one HMG aspiration with this agenda. The current re-structure of overseas offices is that the 4 department (DFID, FCO, DIT and MoD) coming together and forming teams in the four pillars (excluding the Sahel which is only applicable to the region) which is led by Shift Senior Responsible Officers (SRO). This has not yet developed and looked at how it affects previous team strictures or area of work.

4.2.1. Security and Stability Pillar of the New UK Africa Strategy

FCO Africa Director, Harriet Mathews who is also a former Ambassador to Somalia, in a speech on October 31, 2018 indicated that UK's success in the previous engagement in supporting Africa have been hugely highlighted as having a real impact on ending piracy in the Gulf of Aden, resolve the civil war in Somalia and tackle Ebola in West Africa (FCO, 2018). Though the 2nd point is not a brief and clear indication what the UK has achieved in Somali where the South Somalia remains to be unsecure. However, the achievement in the North could have been specifically indicated but again UK cannot claim resolving the civil war in Somaliland as it was achieved without interference by external actors. So far, the United Kingdom has supported the sustainability of achieved gains in Somaliland through poverty reduction, infrastructure development, basic services provision, institutional construction, and formalizing the Peacebuilding process (GOV.UK, 2017).

The study detected the UK Security and Stability pillar team members' subjective conviction in describing the post Brexit UK Africa strategy on security and stability in conflict prone area such as Somaliland. Coding and categorizing ideas and concepts from team members was tabulated in the following way.

Table 4. 1: Subjective conviction of team members to post Brexit UK Africa strategy on security and stability of Somaliland

Topics	Responses	Categories
Peacebuilding process in Somaliland		
What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like in assuring legality of <i>de facto</i> of Somaliland?	I am not sure for the legality of Somaliland <i>de facto</i> is the primary agenda in post Brexit UK Africa strategy	Very low subjective conviction on the post Brexit UK Africa strategy in assuring legality of <i>de facto</i> of Somaliland
	The fact remain that UK's recognition policy is not consistent.	
	To forward UK's position on the recognition of Somaliland <i>de facto</i> as the nation we need to place more effort to enlarge our diplomatic presence in the globe, so I am not sure for it is considered in post Brexit UK Africa strategy	
What are win-win opportunities significantly expected from post Brexit UK Africa strategy?	It is not easy for the post Brexit UK Africa strategy enforces Britain to refrain from being among powerful players to secure privileged access to resources at the expense of the wider population otherwise securing win-win opportunities	Very low subjective conviction on the post Brexit UK Africa strategy in assuring win-win opportunities

Conted'

Questions/topics	Responses	Categories
Peacebuilding process in Somaliland		
	Sure, post Brexit UK Africa strategy will take higher risks and accept lower returns to deliver in the toughest markets; may it gives opportunities for economic development in the most difficult environments, helping tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict	Very high subjective conviction on the post Brexit UK Africa strategy in assuring win-win opportunities
What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like for optimal responses to the Somalia crisis? And What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like in promoting sustainable stability?	Sure, post Brexit UK Africa strategy enforces us to address incentives for conflict and violence and to curb economies built around narcotics, smuggling and trafficking; this might be taken as initiation to the optimal response to the Somali crisis	Very high subjective conviction on the post Brexit UK Africa strategy in assuring optimal response to the Somali crisis
	It is obvious post Brexit UK Africa strategy will contribute directly to some of the positive 'shifts' towards constructive engagement and conflict outcomes, because it should support constructive processes and capacities at the institutional, community and individual levels, towards social cohesion; So, this enforces us to strengthen ability of Peacebuilding elders	Very high subjective conviction on the post Brexit UK Africa strategy in promoting sustainable stability

Source: individual in-depth interview (February, 2019)

Table 4.1 above presented individual in-depth interview results

Among the Security and Stability pillar team members expressed their view with very low subjective conviction regarding to post Brexit UK Africa strategy in assuring legality of *de facto* of Somaliland. Sources mentioned by review literature/article /annual report materials also strengthened responses given by the team members and were detailed in the following way: “The international community of sovereign state also accept the concept of Stimson doctrine of non-recognition and clearly stated that they did not recognize the state or government if the territorial changes or treaties that have result from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of united nation”

Meanwhile, some scholars considered that the absence of international recognition in Somaliland seemed to be posing more coherent challenges to Peacebuilding and stability, but it curtailed the aspiration of all international interventions and competing interests (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

As shown in Table 4.1, the Security and Stability pillar team expressed very low trust about the post-Brexit UK Africa strategy for ensuring win-win chances. However, the internal restructures of bringing all department together and having a common influencing and engagement strategy will result an appearance of a strong UK in Africa. Sources mentioned by review literature and articles also strengthened the appearance of a strong UK presence without any new concrete change from previous strategies.

In economic spectrum as outlined in the above table among the team members majority described their view with very high subjective conviction regarding Post Brexit UK Africa strategy taking higher risks and accept lower returns to deliver in the toughest markets; may it gives opportunities for economic development in the most difficult environments, helping tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict. However, this is only true in a certain area. Respondent from both the UK departments and Somaliland officials agrees that the Prosperity pillar of the New Strategy will come stronger as implementation is considered.

"Post Brexit UK Africa strategy may enable Britain to have freedom in utilizing its resources in building opportunities for economic development in the most difficult environments by providing

new insurance products to attract investment into difficult markets - for example, from pension funds," said a DFID respondent.

4.3. Post Brexit New Africa Strategy looking at Somaliland

All respondents from Somaliland agree the importance of UK support in the country and how UK has been a huge fund provider. The Somaliland Development Programme was mentioned by all respondents where the UK provide 50% of the funding for the programme (SDF, 2019). The programme focuses on Energy Security and Resource Efficiency in Somaliland. All respondents contacted from Somaliland speak highly of the programme achievement. However, the team from the DFID Somaliland the existence of risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption. Respondents also recognize EU's support in the election 2016 and countries such as Denmark, Germany and Norway who has provided support in infrastructure as well as basic services. Due to the historical relation between UK and Somaliland, all respondents think UK is the biggest actor in Somaliland sustainable process of peace building. This has been seen in the Somalia Conference in 2017 and UK leading the whole process. There has been also an attempt to bring the South Somalia and Somaliland to host a talk between the two. Respondents think this will remain the same after Brexit. However, few numbers of respondents think that this will change, and more focused, strong commitment and increased funding will be provided by the UK to Somaliland. The researcher found that this attitude is due to the Foreign Minister announcement of 'renewing the historical bondage' of Britain which gave the idea that UK will focus more on the Commonwealth countries.

On the achievement of Somaliland Peacebuilding process, the researcher found that even though the achievement was gained using traditional methods by excluding external actors. All respondents affirm that the extraordinary achievement need to be sustained and external actors need to support the Somaliland Peacebuilding process. One respondent indicating that Britain knowing the traditional and cultural ways of governance and administration in the region through the colonial period is better positioned to be the largest supporter in the peacebuilding process.

In Peacebuilding process of Somaliland externals communication strategy was not at appropriate position to lean towards the traditional Peacebuilding makers and giving attention to them. Meanwhile this day UK's new strategic approach is not a one-size-fits-all vision – implementation

will be tailored to country needs and contexts and expected to consider the engagement.

Even while supporting the delivery of social services, UK can create opportunities for new, positive relationships, experiences, norms, and experiences and narratives related to inter-group collaboration across lines of conflict, aimed at ensuring the welfare of all groups, particularly children, adolescents, caretakers and social service providers.

4.4. Threats For Somaliland Peace And Security

The threats for the achieved Somaliland peace by respondents were categorized as internal and external.

4.4.1. Internal threats

Youth unemployment, poverty, climate shocks, and a lack of infrastructure are currently the most pressing threats to Somaliland. These were stressed strongly in discussions with respondents, that the youth can exhibit and even cause instability. According to what has occurred in Ethiopia and Sudan, youngsters in Somaliland may be motivated by what is happening in the region and cause instability in Somaliland without a clear political demand other than economic problems. The absence of formalization of traditional structures within the governance system was also identified as an internal threat.

Somaliland initially started peace by traditional methods, through lengthy and inclusive conference of clan's leaders and without external mediation such as the Boorame Grand Conference. The conference was held for four months between different clans and an accomplishment to start a Peacebuilding in the country (Jhazbhay, 2003). The shift from a clan-based form of political representation and competition to political parties' base political representation was followed in 2007.

There have been many attempts in institutionalizing the traditional leaders 'Gurtii' system but still have its own flows and challenges in formalization process as traditional leaders are not selected through democratic process. The 'Gurtii' where the Council of Traditional leaders come together has been passed through inheritance without election as well as selection by the community. Lack of commitment of new members has been mentioned as a concern by respondents from CSOs in Somaliland. Three governance structure exists in the current Somaliland Government system; the

formal government system with parliament and an elected President, the customary law with traditional leaders and the third being Sharia Islamic religious law. All these need to be formalized and systemized but if not poses a threat in being a political stage.

4.4.2. External threat

The 5 respondents from Somaliland agree on Somalia to be the most dangerous and number one external threat to Somaliland peace. The South Somalia being filled with terrorists and radical Islam thought from all over the world is the most imminent threat. Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and it has been a place where terrorists from Afghanistan and Syria operates from. Warlords continue to hold control in Somalia and violence has resumed to a disturbing degree. Most interviewed for this research felt that the international community spending billions in stabilizing Somalia is missing the point. Almost all attempts of stabilizing Somalia have not been effective and still the international community is continuing support in the same manner but ignoring the achievement in Somaliland.

A Somaliland Foreign Ministry reply quickly discussed how Somalia can pose a threat to Somaliland, Kenya, and Ethiopia. He described Somalia's expansionist mentality by pointing to the goal of having a powerful military to enable them to construct 'the Greater Somalia.' Somalia poses a significant threat by attempting to house every Somali descent under one roof.

Another external threat to the region is that the development of the Barbara Corridor and the coming of the UAE company of DP world to Somaliland. This will rise the tension in the region and create a volatile regional dynamic. UAE's broader push for allies in the Horn, including a burgeoning relationship with Ethiopia and Eritrea, reflects far wider ambitions than just the break with Djibouti. A respondent who has done a number of researches on the area explained that this will create another interest into the regional dynamics extending the matter to what is happening in Yemen.

4.5. The consequence of lack of Recognition of Somaliland

Somaliland has shown extraordinary determination for recognition as independent peaceful country. However, there is no guarantee that stability will continue, and several inter-related challenges threaten to unsettle the territory (Allison, 2015). It appears that the world and regional

communities, including the AU, are ignoring Somaliland's success story in terms of peace, stability, and governance by failing to acknowledge Somaliland's statehood. Relations with African multilateral institutions are also complicated. According to the respondents, there is no possibility of recognition from the AU or IGAD because both ignore Somaliland's achievements. By granting Somalia a seat, IGAD demonstrated the organization's disregard of Somaliland's existence in the area. This also applies to the Arab League, which did the same thing, which was not well received by the Somaliland administration or the majority of respondents interviewed by the researcher.

In December 2007 the Bush administration considered whether to back the Somalia transitional government or to acknowledge the less volatile Somaliland secessionists (Behabtu, 2009). This will continue to be the case for International engagement in Somaliland which needs to choose the support made to Somalia Vs Somaliland and its legitimacy. The UK hosted the London Somalia conference in May 2017 to accelerate progress on security sector reform, build on the international response to drought and humanitarian crisis, and agree a new international partnership needed to keep Somalia on course for increased peace and prosperity by 2020. This also appears to be in between choosing capacitating Somalia military, Somali National Army (SNA), taking over from the AMISOM and creating another stable country in the region, Somaliland. Improving Somalia capability contributes to worsening relations between central and federal governments, or between Somalia and Somaliland.

Ethiopia seemed to have a better position in the engagement with Somaliland before Prime Minister Abiy came to power. The collaboration between Somaliland over the Barbara corridor gave a hope from Ethiopia as it was a first counter country level official engagement (Brendon & Ash, 2017). In addition to this there were some technical support provided and Ethiopia's engagement in Somalia were seen very positively by Somaliland. However, this was changed where Abiy visited the Somalia President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmaajo', recently. Abiy Ahmed's May 2018 pronouncement that Ethiopia would seek to use Sudanese, Eritrean and Somali ports were of surprise or immediate concern for Somaliland as the respondent in Somaliland foreign affairs office. Abiy's strategy and foreign policy is not yet clear in the region

(Cannon, 2017). However, the moves already taken by him and his concept of 'regional cooperation' has made him very unpopular in Somaliland.

The lack of recognition by the international community has prevented the country from getting direct budget support and limited the chance for Somaliland's contribution globally. Somaliland has been a close ally for the international community in their fight against terrorism in Somalia and the region, international organized crimes, human trafficking and climate change. However, the *de'facto* status of the country has denied getting any 'seat' in of the international and regional talks on the issue. It's not only Somaliland that will be affected from this rather the collaboration required in the horn is affected. For example, IGAD could have looked at the situation further before denying Somaliland a position.

International Crisis Group (ICG), that Somaliland's demand for recognition explains "The question confronting the international community is no longer whether Somaliland should be recognised as an independent state, but whether there remain any viable alternatives," the ICG report says.

Recognition is as much a question of security as it is economic development. The longer Somaliland remains unrecognised, the greater its vulnerability as it limits its international and regional engagement.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5. Summary of major Findings

In principle UK having a New Africa strategy is important and a positive way of showing how it's partnership in the continent remains a strong agenda post Brexit. However, Brexit remains to hold lots of uncertainties. The divorce with EU made UK to concentrate in internal politics more than ever. UK politics has been unpredictable post Brexit, a lot of shaking has happened and even tested the most bureaucratic system that was built for centuries. People now question whether people went into voting with knowing and understanding the full consequence of their votes. It is now contested that the leave campaign was not presented with facts and true information on the consequence. With all these UK would like to show it has a place in global development, current levels of aid and longstanding commitments to eradicate poverty. The research finding was that the New Africa Strategy is a result of this. In UK's instability and unpredictability of the politics and economy, UK came and announce the strategy with a pledge of £4.7 billion a year. Even though, this is a positive action for the UK to remain important actor in the glob it's not still assuring for the partners. While the increase of support is celebrated Brexit was followed by a devaluation on the pound. The research found that this has been accepted as a temporary challenge recipients of UK support sees this as a bad start and would like a reassurance that UK strategy works to their benefits rather than a mere pledge.

The research found in all documents reviewed for this research that the UK is committed to defend global peace and security by promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Respondents from conflict prone areas such as Somaliland supported the idea that UK's support on the area has a lion's share as well as the engagement found to be meaningful. However, there is still no indication UK would take a bold move in Somalia and Somaliland engagement post- Brexit. The only indication found is that UK's renewal to historical ties more than ever.

In addition to the bilateral engagements through different departments the research found good imitations to be enhanced more look at the African Stability Fund where parliament approves

funding for security and stability in addition to the 0.7% UK's GDP on International Development (0.7% pledge made at the OECD with other 6 countries) (Quinn, 2017). Technical assistance in the sector is also appreciated by the respondents of Somaliland.

Somaliland is a unique example where an ingenious Peacebuilding process was effective. Though the research found unique characters pertinent to Somaliland. The finding did not exclude the reason why it can't work elsewhere. However, it also shows ignoring the success just because Somaliland is not a recognized state is not fair to Somaliland. It is also not reasonable for other countries who could follow Somaliland's foot print. The process of recognition takes internal and external process. Somaliland proves that the internal achievement of Peacebuilding is huge but external support seems to be minimal.

5.1. Conclusion

Based on the summary of the findings above this study concluded that *de'facto* status of Somaliland is not the primary agenda in post Brexit UK Africa strategy. This paper does not analyze Brexit by itself and does not criticize the UK national's choice, however, found that leaving the EU for UK is a longer process than anticipated, especially by UK citizens and civil servants. This will hurt UK as well UK partners, especially in Africa, where UK provide the largest support.

UK has been the biggest actor in Somaliland support for development and has been involved in supporting the accomplished peacebuilding process. However, UK's engagement with Somali and its high commitment on Peacebuilding in the region from the South Somali government has been a threat to Somaliland accomplished Peacebuilding as well as its journey of recognition.

The Africa Strategy by itself does not guarantee assurance of undivided attention and increased support from the UK. As has been said, the £4.7 billion fund pledged by the UK started with entertaining a devaluation of pound in its funding support. This by itself shows that unless the UK get leaving the EU process right it cannot guarantee its partners for additional support. Both political and Economic discourses in the UK due to Brexit will affect the partnership as well as the pillar areas which are continually appearing by UK government officials.

5.2. Recommendation

Brexit will have significant consequences for UK, Europe, and for the global order. UK has been emphasized 'UK national interest' and 'UK values' in its partnership with others. This word has been emphasized more and since UK is promising to be 'Global Britain' revising its foreign policy and strategies UK's vision to Africa is still vague and contested. African scholars in analyzing the new course of Brexit and the words appearing in the 'big talks' seems to be limited. The communications that are being used in the campaign of Brexit as well as post Brexit has not been constant, and this should not be left for politicians and scholars in UK. Boris Johansson, UK's former foreign Minister a figure to the leave campaign, on an article in 2012 expressed his belief that the problem with Britain's former colonies is 'not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in charge any more' (Eva & Patrick, 2017). This is the person that lead the process of Brexit and UK's foreign policy. However, one of the respondents from Somaliland for my research referred Boris Johansson as 'Somaliland's friend' and that things might be better for Somaliland if he is the next PM. This shows how Africans are left in the dark and are confused with the inconsistent message we get from UK on Brexit post strategies.

For a country such as Somaliland which has a good relationship with UK aims to get more information on the post Brexit priorities, agendas and how it is planned to be implemented. There is also an aspiration from the Somaliland side that this will help a certain degree to the struggle Somaliland is making to be recognized. For this, Somaliland should focus more on understanding the UK politics at this critical time rather than making assumptions. So, it is better for the post Brexit UK Africa strategy to be engaging and Somaliland government to understand the shift of strategies as well as the challenges and opportunities that it will bring to situate themselves. African Institutions, academicians and politicians need to be engaged in the matter.

UK in setting the five pillars to the New Africa Strategy has considered one area of priority to be a geographical focus area, the Sahel. This is a very good start looking at a region that request a contextual analyze and a contextual response. The Sahel is one of the most unstable regions in the world. However, Somalia is also a similar region sharing most of the threats in the *Sahel*. If UK's New Africa Strategy could have recognized that add Somalia as a strategy area.

The peacebuilding process in Somaliland is a rare case story. I don't think a recognition to the country is a requirement to praise the success and amplify the results achieved using indigenous peacebuilding process. If achievements are not recorded well, if stories are not told properly even the youth in Somaliland will forget soon. The globalization effect is strong to neglect even an evidence for the 21st century that African indigenous systems work. African countries and academicians should differentiate the recognition and the achievements of the traditional peacebuilding process. Even the south Somalia, could learn something from it.

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ANNEX

Checklists and Guiding Questions

Prepared by: Hanna Andargachew

Research Topic: - Post Brexit UK's Africa Strategy in Peacebuilding Process of Somaliland

Dear Respondents,

I would like to show my heartily respect for your generous time and honest as well as important responses. This checklist and guiding questions are designed to collect information about Post Brexit UK's Africa Strategy in Peace -building Process of Somaliland. The information shall be used solely for academic purpose as a partial fulfillment of the requirements of research project work for completing my MA in African and Oriental Studies at Addis Ababa University. Therefore, your genuine response to the questions below is crucial for the success of my study. Hence you are kindly requested to participate in this study. Lastly, I want to assure you that this research is only used for academic purpose authorized by Addis Ababa University.

If you have any question, you can contact the researcher by the following address E – Mail:

_____ Telephone No: _____

Thank you again!!!

Checklists and guiding questions

Post Brexit UK Africa strategy in Peacebuilding process of Somaliland

Theme one: Peacebuilding process in Somaliland

Topic one: Legality of *de facto* of Somaliland

Checklists

- ✚ Admit the legality of *de facto* of Somaliland in any situation
- ✚ Considering legality of *de facto* in Somaliland for alleviating coherent challenges to Peacebuilding and stability
- ✚ UK value-added contributions in legality process of Somaliland

Guiding questions

- ✚ What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like in assuring legality of *de facto* of Somaliland?

Theme one: Peacebuilding process in Somaliland

Topic two: Important win-win opportunities in Peacebuilding process

Checklists

- ✚ Important win-win opportunities in Peacebuilding process

Guiding questions

- ✚ What are win-win opportunities significantly expected from post Brexit UK Africa strategy?

Theme one: Peacebuilding process in Somaliland

Topic three: Optimal responses to the Somalia crisis

Checklists

- ✚ Responses in incorporating home-grown traditional governance and locally adequate cultural horizons of pursuit to maintain peace and stability
- ✚ The recognition of the traditional elders as peacemaking actors

- ✚ Customize ‘conflict sensitivity and Peacebuilding capacity development package’ to Somalia context
- ✚ Inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable Somaliland
- ✚ Demonstrating a high degree of flexibility in theatre by giving genuine response to Somalia crisis

Guiding questions

- ✚ What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like for optimal responses to the Somalia crisis?

Theme one: Peacebuilding process in Somaliland

Topic five: Promoting sustainable stability

Checklists

- ✚ incorporating home-grown traditional governance and locally adequate cultural horizons of pursuit to maintain peace and stability
- ✚ Horizontal social cohesion by building bridges within and among divided groups at the community level
- ✚ ‘Conflict sensitivity and Peacebuilding capacity development package’ that is modular and very customizable to different context
- ✚ The recognition of the traditional elders as peacemaking actors

Guiding questions

- ✚ What does post Brexit UK Africa strategy look like in promoting sustainable stability?

Checklists

Guiding questions for Somaliland Respondents on Peacebuilding process

1. How the home-grown traditional governance and locally adequate cultural peace and stability working in Somaliland? Will this guarantee sustainable stability in the country? and how a 'learning culture' was fostered to replicate this to other regions?
2. The tie between Somaliland and Somali, how would it affect the accomplished peace gained in Somaliland and what will it mean to sustainable security in the region?
3. Is partnership with other nations and regional organizations affected by being a *de facto* state? Do you think the partnership with others will contribute to recognition of the country?
4. How UK and Somaliland's diplomatic relation? What strategies are focused on by the partnership?
5. What are the win-win opportunities in partnering with other nations for Somaliland Peacebuilding process?