

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF

PHILOSOPHY



A THESIS ON THE TITLE:

A MISPLACED ARISTOTILIAN METAPHYSICAL CLOSURE

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A Misplaced Closure of Aristotelian Metaphysical World

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Chapter One

Introduction

A Misplaced Closure of Aristotelian Metaphysical World

1. Introduction

Questions and inquiries must be understood. When we collect and survey credible puzzles and questions critically, we learn therefore understand something about our particular inquiry. Far greatly we also learn what is to be refined or discovered in the constellation of concepts in the puzzles and questions themselves. Such awakening of thinking through the exercise of puzzles and questions leads to a higher conceptual ability of abstracting and to an extended metaphysical reflection. Therefore such a critical learning has a metaphysical consequence. Then the ground of a metaphysical hypothesis of physical inquiries is an extensive quantity of the collection and survey of credible puzzles and questions.

In this paper we collect and survey two systematic metaphysical concepts. We will examine the characteristic aim of their objects of metaphysical concepts presupposing that there is metaphysical object underneath nature and its phenomena. The writer of this paper and the philosophers at investigation by this paper agree on the idea that there are metaphysical existences. Aristotle argues that this metaphysical existence is independent of us while Kant believes that it is our human nature that has a metaphysical characteristic.

Kant's metaphysics claims an antecedent and a priori plan placed in mind for our senses and for our thinking and Aristotle's metaphysics claims almost similar but of an external start. This paper will investigate and try to establish a certain scheme for investigating their conceptual frameworks. In conclusion we will see if there is a point in both philosophers which could be or integrated in contrast and establish some way of correct mode for such objects of metaphysical conceptions.

2. Background of the Study

University of Adelaide in Australia referred Aristotle as 'the first to create a comprehensive system of western philosophy.' How so? Aristotle's works have lost the contextual glues of his days. But the fundamental system of abstractions and his methodology of discussing them or the approaches he followed to his discussion points have I think survived the test to time. Cicero said reading his works is like a river of gold, most probably a metaphor for his systematic line of reasoning. Even the philosopher against whom or in contrast to whom we are investigating Aristotle on, Kant, referred Aristotle as an acute thinker.

His metaphysical discoveries are one of those difficult to understand. His metaphysics is closed but after him other metaphysical discoveries have been made. How do we understand him in the background of these other discoveries? For a philosophy student to have to wrestle with such crucial issues adds a great value to study in philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. Our study here is argumentative. The paper assumes metaphysical existences as the philosophers at issue do. This is a clinical investigation and analysis of two metaphysics in terms of their unique characteristics and points views with the emphasis for a general pattern of metaphysical closures in Aristotle and Kant. This paper's approach explains the metaphysical stands of the philosophers at issue in terms of their unique histories and characteristics in terms of the thesis under discussion: a misplaced closure of Aristotelian metaphysical world.

A metaphysical pattern investigation suits a student philosophy. Attempt to analyze and identify links between broad metaphysical thought patterns and specific metaphysical thought systems in general and in Aristotelian metaphysics in contrast to Kantian metaphysics in particular is one such a study.

This is interdisciplinary study of two metaphysical works with a focus on a misplaced metaphysical closure. The claim of this paper is Aristotle's metaphysical closure in contrast with Kantian metaphysics is a misplaced closure. We will examine and hypothesize whether both metaphysical system of thought have made sense in a closure perspective and we ask ourselves whatever questions make sense in this perspective. This will lead us to investigating the possibility of integration of both metaphysical speculations and establish a genuine appreciation for both.

This paper also assumes the mechanism by which the principles of metaphysics work on other works of the philosophers. It is the paper's assumption that the metaphysical mechanism of these philosophers and the inferential and assumptive processes upon which other studies depend is related to metaphysics. Because of this our metaphysical investigation includes other investigative works done by the philosophers because metaphysics influence the thinking system of other studies or vice versa.

3. Statement of the Problem

Aristotle closes the world under physics. He argues his metaphysical dimension is a discovery of such kind in the highest level. Therefore his words on metaphysics are the last words on the issue. However, we have seen other metaphysical claims made after him. Anybody who takes Aristotle's discoveries seriously would be contradicted by the rest of the metaphysical discoveries. The option left then is to study or investigate Aristotle's claim in contrast to others other metaphysical claims.

4. Objectives of the Study

4.1. General Objective

First of all, the objective of this paper is to prove the misplacement of Aristotelian metaphysical closure, and present an integrative closure. This will further our understanding or our grasp of

metaphysical conceptions of the two philosophers. Therefore it makes contribution as to how and where there is a credible question about the points at issue. Philosophy is at most important issue to our daily activities of thought as well as experience. As metaphysical exercise widen our abstractive general logical capacity, so does this exercise paper widen that scope in creating occasions for strong metaphysical arguments.

It is also in this papers scope to fight skeptic and skeptical thought of Socratic kind which rests on argument that nothing is constant and we could ask or doubt or contradict everything. The process of Socratic pursuit of the genuinely perplexing essential distinctions in the appearance of everything seeming true and false at the same time lets the sophistic skeptics seem a right position. This paper assumes the existence of core beings or metaphysical substances withthe philosophers it investigates. Contrary to Socratic view appearances of nature are preserveable if explained in dimensions or classifications or qua this or that sense. Such explanation begins with basic beings which are beyond logic. Logical divisions or classifications are close to metaphysical relationships of things. Different from ontological division, a study of being qua being or qua dimensional sense is an inquiry of covering all continuous and discrete object of understanding. Such view or sense of the world shows the world is in a certain way.

Descartes believed that each person possessed a mind-a uniquely human attribute that was not subject to the laws of the universe, (Carlson, 2010) he meant mechanical universe. Contrary to the intent of his insight we could take his particular assertion as reassert it as: metaphysical view is the mind's or consciousnesses mechanical universe and show how important any metaphysical investigation is.

In due process this paper illuminates the remarkable influence of metaphysical system of thought. The cumulative progress in metaphysics provides as opportunity or nudges us to do integrative works on the past works of our great philosophers. To investigate philosophers of a certain perspective in contrast or against one another's substance is another way of studying Aristotle for essential elements inKant's perspective.

4.2.The Specific Objective

The general objective is to inquire into Aristotle's works of logic, science, ethics and aesthetics for the misplaced closure of Aristotelian metaphysical world which is tied in his methodology and substances.

1. To examine the systematic components in Aristotle's and Kant's metaphysical works.
2. To identifythe locations and identify the metaphysical patterns made in their works.
3. To explore their works with special interest for a misplaced metaphysical closure.
4. To show that Aristotle and Kant had approached their works and thoughts in a way that they are systematically organized around a metaphysical system of closure.

5. Significance of the Study

Classic philosophers are still fundamental to contemporary philosophic debates and discussions. Aristotle has been a great fascination for serious of series investigations around the world. His systematic world view has provided a frame to the reach of human grasp. One of the frames is

his metaphysics which kind of mimics his other works in different aspects. To investigate this frame in contrast or against other important frame will give us a fundamental insight into both frames and in to the possibility of discovery of other frames. Investigation of these two metaphysical principles for the specific thesis of a misplaced closure for Aristotelian metaphysics could be nearly as significant study as the metaphysical frames themselves. Therefore undertaking this investigation to show the above underlying patterns is a significant metaphysical argument. Other significances of the study are:

- Promoting a deeper understanding in Kant and Aristotle's works as opposed to a random readings;
- offering information regarding the basic metaphysical clues in attempts to understand Aristotle and Kant metaphysical conceptions;
- Furthermore, the study is also meant to motivate; provide a renowned interest in Aristotle's metaphysical reading.

6. Delimitation of the Study

Investigating Aristotelian metaphysics in the context of Kantian metaphysics is already a framed work for the thesis. Even if our study centers on one of Aristotle's work, this paper still uses his other works such as his logical, scientific, ethical and aesthetic work. This is because his metaphysical works are spread all around his other works as a systemic structure of theory of nature.

Accordingly, to conduct a study on 'A misplaced closure of an Aristotelian metaphysical word' requires extensive investigation and repeated reading of all of the materials. But in its scope the study has limited in analyzing the main works of logic, science, ethics and aesthetics with a main emphasis on metaphysics which the researcher has an extensive experience of repeated readings on. The other metaphysical study this paper has to do is Kantian metaphysics. This investigation is important because it give us a contrastive background on the investigation of misplaced closure of an Aristotelian metaphysics.

7. Organization of the Study

The study covers five Chapters. The first chapter comprises **Background of the study; Statement of the Problem; Significance of the Study; Objectives of the Research; Delimitation of the Study; Organization of the Study**. The second chapter refers Review of Related Literatures, which are relevant for the study. Mainly this chapter deals with different citations of journal articles, books, reports, and other similar sources employed to support this research. Chapter three Studies about **Research Methodology; study design, data collection sources and type of data analysis**. Chapter four composed of Data Analysis and Data Interpretations of the Study. Finally, the last Chapter consists of the Conclusions and Recommendations.

Chapter Two

2. Kantian Metaphysics

2.1. A Metaphysical Level of Presuppositions

Whether it is Aristotle's or Kant's, both metaphysical inquiries are about the correct highest things to be thought of things. This correct thinking of the correct highest thing to be thought of is the absolute necessary law of thought of the correct highest thing to be understood or thought of; not a correct thinking of the particular correct object.

2.1.1. First Level Representations

Kant's argument starts with how this thought of the correct highest thing starts with us 'the mode in which mind is affected by its own activity is time and space which are not spontaneous but systematically apriori' whatever happens the happening must have been represented, and for the happening to be represented something must antecede it making representation possible. This possibility of being represented or being able to be received in perception is made possible because of the formative but apriori influence of time and space designation which makes the external time and space a property of the internal.

The formative conditions of space and time make all designation of manifold representation of time and space possible. Such existence is created because of the relation to the sensing existence are phenomena; and then space and time as much as in the external lie in the internal as receiving template in the mind as the foundation of experience phenomena.

The objective validity of space and time or designation is created during the sensuous engagement with the physical world. Such engagement has an infinite diversity of determination of the condition of the mind's receptivity. Therefore 'space and time as pure empirical intuitions contain apriori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena' which intern means objects or phenomena or experiences have internal power of representation in their external relations.

Considering the apriori system of time and space transcending the sensuous time and space, our mental activity has a transcendental distinction but with a sensuous aim for all things. The intuition of time and space is then a formal condition of experience. Experience itself is possible because of this antecedent primitive form of intuition we just saw. This whole theory of space and time as the internal designation as much as it is external implies sensibility has a subjective presupposing law of the sensuous world.

2.1.2. The Second Level Representation

The manner or the condition of the exercise of thought is possible on the antecedent designation through the consciousness of time and space before the experience of time and space sensuously. With the forms arising out of the inner fountain of pure designation the power of receiving representations designating changes to the power of cognizing representations. Cognition is exercised under abstraction or deduction of the universal condition law of external sense or empirical designation. The recognition of the law of a priori representations or the recognition of the universal conditions of external intuitions of empirical intuitions then transforms phenomena into the synthetic unity of phenomenon. Thereby making a distinction of two different sources of representation in the conception of a thing. One is sensing and the other is thinking. One is a mere designation of representations the other a synthetic conjunction of the manifold intuitions of representations, This an a priori law of cognition or thinking but also with first level representation which the law of thinking cannot anticipate a priori in the thinking representation.

The determination of phenomena through the condition of the synthetic unity of phenomena is the recognition of the universal condition of external designation. This is empirical designation thereof is a necessity or objectivity determined as a determination of empirical conception.

Therefore sensuous intuitions of time and space give an element that cannot be anticipated by thinking. With the correspondence to sensuous designation and addition certain relations are added to space and time designation. What the universal conditions of external designation belong to is an empirical intuition. Empirical designation or thought in general is the synthesis of the form of designation, the synthesis of the matter of experience and the synthesis of the relations of perception.

‘The foundation of experience presents in a priori designation upon which it might base its designation’. This is a transcendental deduction explanation and determination of their objective validity a priori. Significance and meaning coming from the sensuous and empirical designation abstracts the empirical criterion of necessity and unity as reality. The real has a mode of existence which is the continuous and uniform generation of quantity. Quantity is reality or by means of quantity’s apprehension empirical consciousness can within certain continuous time rise. Unity is peculiar to an a priori condition of necessity of the categories, while phenomena consists in the mere relation of something in general the senses.

Time and space as mere representation or phenomena stand under no law of conjunction except that which the thinking the second representation or conjoining faculty prescribes. We have seen that the sources of our cognition or thinking are both a priori thought and a posterior thought. It is then in the fundamental nature of our thinking to refer to our sensibility. Therefore the function of abstraction, deduction is done on the presupposition of the actual presence of the antecedent general object and relation. This means ‘the faculty of cognition supplies from itself an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense’. The act of cognition of the universal conditions of external designating ability has a pure empirical ‘form of sensibility without sensation which exist a priori. The relations formed by these a priori forms of sensibility

or antecedent time and space without sensations are the grounds of empirical conceptions as the synthesis of experience. These traces or deductions of the source of the conceptions of the forms of sensibility are transcendental.

Our senses cannot designate or intuit. Causal or necessary conceptions are the presupposed condition of rules of relations of empirical representations abstracted by the form of sensibility. It is done without sensation or the cognition of universal conditions of external experience.

The cognition of the universal condition of external intuition designates or intuitively notes objects in opposition to objects or phenomena or sensual existence which are not things in themselves. The universal conditions of external intuitions or the pure cognitive conditions are given by the condition of sensibility. Cognition determines the relation or conception of the object in its a priori element and it also establishes the reality of the objects in the sensuous application of itself. Therefore 'the faculty of cognition supplies from itself an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense' but also cognition itself is possible because objects of perceptions confirm to the nature of our faculty.

The proper limit of the cognition of the universal conditions of external intuition is empirical base of intellectual cognition. The possibility of a thing or object can be proved by the corresponding sensuous intuition to the conception or the universal condition of external designation. The conception of necessity is the habit inherently originating in the connection of representation being therefore merely subjective. The external necessity applied to a priori necessity in the connections of conceptions is the closest but particular necessity or absoluteness exhibited in the understanding. Therefore there are the conceptions of necessities that originate in cognitional connections existing a priori. And all this in the end shows us that which has necessarily in our subjective conditions.

1.2. Kantian Categories

What appears to senses is the representation of space and time what appears is the objective where thought starts to apply another a priori categorical plan. This in turn leads to a representation as it is understood no more as it appears. Understanding is done on an internal presupposition mediated on representation of what appears. Antecedent forms facilitate the analysis and conversion into conceptions of intuitional representations. Therefore the antecedent forms of conceptions are ontological functions or unities of the highest general logic or thought.

The antecedent unities of thinking are categories. They are quantity, quality, relation and modality. They are the laws of general logic which enlarge the range of our knowledge of the intuitively represented representations of space and time. They are the formal conditions of the content of our thinking but they enlarge our knowledge of the sensuous experience. Because they add a higher presupposed plan for intuited time and space to be represented again on. This categorical presupposition is second rank to time and space. Therefore the mediate ground for further distinguishing ranks, logical place of unities and conceptions of representation. As we see

here, categorical unity is analytical unity of intuited representation based on a ground that is away from the senses which directly intuit representation from external experience. This mediated analysis is then further transcendental than the forms of intuition. Categories are further away and not direct intuition. Categories are not fully on their own because they base their mediate representation on representation of space and time. Categories cannot be cognized alone without the sensuous form of space and time. Categorical concepts then are how the conception of understanding understands.

Conceptions of the categories are objective only when they are applied to sensuous objects of space and time. The only validity of categories is admitting objects of the sense. The categorical presuppositions of the general quality, quantity, relation and modality are the origin for all generated, realized, quantified, qualified, related and mode of conceptions of objects of intuitions. Something which is in general the senses cannot be represented by categories therefore both cannot do one without the other.

Categorical application is analytical unity. It is an employment of a transcendental representation into sensuous representation. The basic reason a priori perceives that which similar design in the external. The form of understanding is the law or logic of abstraction which abstracts the empirical conditions. The elements contributed by each separated and distinguished ranks of cognition are different. For example the senses do not do understanding or second level representation. Categories understand. This means space and time or the formal intuitions, the presupposition of the sensuous intuitions keep things as they appear but categories keep things as they are understood. The a priori design conceptions, the representation of non-sensuous is void or empty without the content of the sensuous intuition. Intuition is blind or limited without conceptions or categories. The conditions of manifold representations are only found in sensibility; without it, even if all the possibility of nature was open to us, understanding cannot see nature in itself. Categories themselves contain the forms of space and time; because categories cannot be cognized alone without the basics of the sensuous form of space and time as their start. An object of thought as it appears is phenomena while an object of thought as it is understood is thinking. Categories bring unity to intuition therefore bring understanding to what appears. The sensuous cognition then is representation of the relation of a synthesis of the manifold to categories.

Categories or understanding bring unity but alone they are insufficient to supply us with material or objective truth into the intuition, but as forms of thought. The modes of objects of the antecedent plan placed in the mind for our senses and for our thinking are the a priori starts. The categories like the forms of intuition are further away abstractions of the application of thought to objects of further lower smallest units, the smallest unit of all intelligible points in the physical world or experience. The further away abstraction of the further lower representation is enlightenment while the further lower representation of the further higher abstraction is objectification. Enlightenment to objectivity is the power of cognizing the objects of representations. The formal intuition or categorical forms of intuition give us unity.

1.3. Kantian Form and Matter

In the phenomena the condition or the mode in which they are connected in the object is composite parts. The mode, the condition under which understanding is to be exercised is inseparably connected with the conception of matter and form. Matter and form are abstractions in transcendental sense; matter is the determinable or synthesizable or connects in general; and the form is the matter's determinations or connections of abstracts being made of every difference in that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined in both level of representation.

3. Aristotelian Metaphysics

3.1. Metaphysical Beings as Things in Themselves

What is it that stands under the knowledge of things? The cause? The being? The things we know are able to know over and above the properties of things, the substance? Like the substance in chemistry; what is the stuff our understanding our mind as a thought based on or stuffed on? These wonders are for the ultimate structures of our wonder, wonder being what we are.

For one, the ultimate matter is a basic intelligible subject of dependency while the physical perceivable matter is the ordinary matter. The basic kinds of being contribute to facts having the true conditions, as grammatical construction contribute, to speech and writing. Mind independent features are explanatory features of the actual world like grammar is. Our metaphysical search is the search beyond the meaning of a word to the irreducible object of the world.

The highest pattern of our ordinary objects of experience is extra linguistic object. It is the highest existing kinds of things which are the basic kinds of increasing generality of classification of the ordinary objects of our experience.

The highest linguistic structure or the smallest units of grammar explain language in the bottom up to any spontaneous structure of speech and writing. Such analogies are extensive to the ultimate structures of thoughts qua thought or knowledge qua knowledge. They encourage our inquiry for the stuff or units of our ability to think. Our ordinary objects of experience are experienced in such basic terms like the units of grammar. They increase in generality of classification of things that stand under the collection of properties of thing.

In little lower level, to grasp this ultimate being is to reach at irreducible natural goal in the behaviors of thing. Without the basic unit underlying objects of understanding, both the investigation of the natural world and the science of nature is impossible.

3.1.1. Level of knowledge

The perceptual forms are bodily forms while the thought forms are representational forms. Realizing thought's form is realizing the form of the object in the way object does in itself. Our faculties intersect. Mind is mixed with the body. Thought picks the automatic universal while perception picks the particular sensations. Even if mind abstracts and the senses discriminates so neither is wholly passive in its defining activity. Specific forms actuate themselves in specific matter of suitable kind. Therefore perception becomes the form it receives thinking becomes the form it receives. An intelligible form is for the mind and a sensible form is for the perception. There is a proper object for the eye of the mind /the cognitive state/ to work or actualize by experience, the mind is such a nature as to be capable of undergoing actualization. Sensuous perception is inescapable because what appears to us has some existing property.

3.2. Substance

Substances are the thinkable but irreducible and ineliminable structures of experience. Substantial systems of thought do not depend on mind or language like the science of language does or on conceptual creations. The substantial beings are inherent; but the inherent grammatical structure only mirrors the structure of metaphysical or substantial beings which are model structures of thought of things.

Conceptual schemes for a certain collection of properties can be created by us but realities and the natural world are not creative of our conceptual schemes. Such are the metaphysical units. The fabrics of the world qua basic building blocks of thought as thinkable in the world resist conceptual creations of our own making. It is independent of the infinitely en-forming, structuring capacity of our thought.

The better known by nature is what is apparent in what is immediately clear in physical world but this, the better known by immediate clearness is the less intelligible by nature. Both the better known by nature and the more intelligible by nature are the conditions of our knowing anything.

The deep invariant pattern in nature is the more intelligible. The more intelligible in nature are worst known by the nature of what appears. The more intelligible, basic, by nature which is not the immediately clear are objects of understanding which are not objects of the better known by nature or by senses which are the immediately clear. That which we think over and above property of things which is a thing in itself and which is entirely seen and represented by our minds cannot be accessed like we access what appear to our senses. If it is accessed it is at a fundamental level of existence of things. Therefore the primary substance is inherently or self-evidently or indemonstrable the beginning of the general fabric of the physical world. The resulting inference of necessity or intrinsic unity or implied principle or order is the core of our cognitive process. We can say that the basic structure of mental representation are related to the basic metaphysical structures of things in themselves, to that which is all there is out there, that which is correct or that which metaphysically sustain things.

The knowledge of the primary things makes the deductions of the less well known things possible. An intuitive cognitive state which is an apriori epistemic condition, an intellectual insight is the first faculty or capacity or power of the mind. It is comparable to sense perception but only as a nature of seeing of seeing before, an inner eye of the intelligent kind. This way of knowing cannot be proofed like the lower principles generated from it are deduced. Knowledge of the first premises comes from such other way of knowing. Fundamental principles are the sources from which other principles are deduced. The grasp of first principle, substance, is a final intellectual state characterized as unmediated intellectual apprehension of first principles. The point where the rank of the objects of understanding begin or end is an intuitive, aprior, and substantial knowledge which is a result of a necessary epistemic condition. Necessity by nature comes then from the deep invariant pattern of nature which is the more intelligible not from the better known by nature.

3.2.1. The Four Principles of Substance

The knowledge of being qua being, a knowledge of that which is all there is, a knowledge of that which is correct. It will eventually be causal knowledge. For example metaphysics takes man and horse and change them to a universal causal generality. The first classification as form and matter qualifies and quantifies our metaphysical search of what the 'ousie', that stuff our understanding, our mind as a thought based on. The thing our mind independent of its nature experiences as a being qua being and just in virtue of itself are plural substances of matter and form, essence and cause. All are only intelligible metaphysical life not sensible.

The ultimate principles, matter, end, cause and form as the metaphysical bedrocks are basic subject of predication. But when all properties are removed in thought the subject that remains is that basic which survives the removal, making all the rest accidental to it. In such hierarchy the form can survive the removal of matter but matter cannot and so is principles of substances: essence, and end. Therefore, intelligible form is better or near highest ultimate being, substance than intelligible matter, end, essence are.

4. Aristotelian Natural Theory and Closure under Physics

Presumptuous principles are unknown to be necessary. Metaphysical realism is the most essential real structure therefore not presumptuous. Objects of understanding even if they are forms, primary substances, they are not separate from particulars. The most real in nature is the capture of the substantial univocity or essence of the multivocity of physical world. Our search for the objective features of the external world is in the essential properties of the external world.

Physics is the theory of causal explanation. Causal explanations are based on the central point of matter and form. A secure principle is a grasp of such necessary truth. But the necessary and the apriori are different. In the conceptual framework of metaphysics and physics the matter is the

subject. The form is the moving cause, the moving necessity of the coming to be. However, as we have seen earlier, they both preexist as intelligible basics. The power the form has to cause or produce a change is a form that has a source in something else or in itself qua other. The cause form is the source of being unified for the matter. However, 'matter and form are for the sake of which, the immanent in nature, and nature in general are. Even the matter considered at this highest level of mental representation has no perceptible matter only intelligible matter.

Nature is subject of change; the objects of understanding, the objective features of the external world are the factors or the causes of nature's change. The objective feature of the external world is the first actuality of a natural body which has life in potentiality. To reach for this objective feature is then to be able to explain any aspect of the knowledge of natural world. Thus the enduring particulars of the objective feature locate, configure and identify the physical world in being its explanatory principles. Our mental representations of substantial beings of the world then are the hypothetical necessity to facts or ordinary features of the world. Physics is the theory of the motion of such substantive quality and quantity. The hypothetical necessity of the matter aspect of a thing for the substance or for the objective feature is the nature of the natural world. Therefore the hypothetical necessity, the nature of the natural entity move the material, regulates the behavior of the physical world, and is the first actuality of a natural organic body which has life in potentiality.

Metaphysics and physics or the study of being qua being and study of nature meet in the hypothetical necessity. Physics creates the occasion for an examination or investigation of the highest cause of the world around us. The complete account of the physical domain then is in the description of the hypothetical necessity of the form for the matter.

3.5. Teleology

Natural functions or material substance is directed towards an end that is actual in a sense of substantial cause, or different dimensions of causal facts. Any of the knowledge of natural world we acquire can be explained in such causal structures. They are irreducible natural causes in the behaviors of things even if they are ontological concepts. These causal facts have asymmetrical causal structures. The causal asymmetry in nature, the capture of factual explanatory order has a consequence of the capture of the deep invariant pattern or order. This implies supra-physical entity in nature at the highest top of causal asymmetry. It is an irreducible natural cause in the behavior of things. The asymmetry is structure of causation. The teleology or non-designer design and function of nature, This can be explained by the structures of species and genus are such points. The fact that this is a horse is a kind of brute physical fact devoid of metaphysical dimension. At the bottom, the nature of the causal asymmetry of genus and species is the horse's inner principle of function. These causal functions explain physical activities without some intentional agent or other designing activities.

Nature has pattern and regularity. It is always or for the most part a function which serves to unify the entire organism or the characteristic life activities of the kinds to which the organism in the hierarchy of genus and species belongs to. A full natural process in physics or biology has the ultimate moving principle which is understood only in the light of the fully developed causes or end of the ultimate process.

The biological or physical function is the deriving paradigmical point. It gives structure and principle. The criterion of objects gets its structure that comes from the ontological basicness of the function or paradigmic inherence. The criterion of object is no way a mere logical construct out of the lower properties. That which is in virtue of itself, the properties defined in terms of the genus or kind not the genus in terms of the specifiable properties is the object criterion of natural object. It starts with the irreducible natural entity. Object is out there in itself and a method to discover it too.

In the teleological substance the explanation of essence is a structural requirement or formative to be made of a certain kind of matter and function. The species for example corresponds to a substantial form. The character or the function is the form, the matter is an intrinsically characterless. It underlies a certain role or function of the qualities of them all. The substances in a given system are these entities crucial for the natural goal of the behavior of the system. To reach at irreducible natural goal in the behavior of things is to give significance to things. Such Teleological ontological priority is an account of substances which are deemed fundamental because of the role or function they play in the world.

3.6. Categories

A substantive prime matter is not the same as the predicative substance on to which properties of things are stuck; the supra-ontological being between form and matter is the necessary and invariant feature or substance. The substantiveness onto which properties are stuck are categories which are still schemas of conceptual beings. Such as quality, quantity, relation.... Categories cannot be considered as the last location and causal influence of the elements in the world as the four metaphysical causes are considered. Categories are basic logical objects of physical world not basic objects of the physical world. However, categories and metaphysical substances are perceptible objects treated in special way.

3.7. Hylomorphism

The law that governs matter is what is the matter the matter of. The substantial form present in the matter sets the behavior of the matter. Explaining the puzzles of physical magnitudes requires the capacity of our mental magnitude. It the perceptive penetration of analysis in form of mental removal or addition. This shows that objects of understanding, substantial beings are not separated from particulars.

The composites of matter and form as a structure of the physical arrangement are hylomorphic beings. Hylomorphism is formation of physical or conceptual object or paradigm which is the source of stable physical system. The primary substances are hylomorphic core beings of the invariant and necessary feature of the world. The categorical frameworks which underlie nature are hylomorphic. The characterization of the elements of matter and form as arrangement of the world is to identify the basic furniture of the world. Matter and form or hylomorphic materialism is neither reductive materialism or nor platonic dualism. The basic or intrinsic unities or the predication structure of inferential terms which are matter and form even if they have a pattern of metaphysical matter, they are designations of a unified body. Such a necessary existence is not atomic necessary existence 'atom is a stuff not an object or an individual as opposed to substantial objects. Hylomorphism is then the mechanistic essentialism in terms of form and matter about that which is all there is in the physical world. The inference of a necessary result from this characterization then is the closure of the world under physical structure of hylomorphism. 'Hylomorphism closes the world under physics under the motion of substantive quality or quantity or form and matter.' It creates a complete understanding of the range of possible systematic interrelations.

3.8.Substances, Hylomorphism, Teleology, and Categories

The location and causal influence of the elements /forces that actually make things happen/ is in the world. That which is the highest, ousie is the last irreducible being. Metaphysical divisibility is substantial or horizontal divisibility while categorical classification is hierarchical. As no more divisible unit, Hylomorphism are metaphysical elements. Hylomorphism is categorical individualization, the coming to be a unity and each is substantial individual. Hylomorphic individuals are not further divisible qua categories.

The life in potentiality is the first actuality, the irreducible and individual unity, the substantial form of living things which contributes to one of the metaphysical principle. Substances have fundamental role or function in the world. The function is the form underlying a certain role or function of the qualities of them all.

The ultimate substances apply to categories therefore the categories trace the ultimate substances and predicate that apply to them. Existential class at root is categorical class. Categorical smallest units of properties are entities below facts but not as objects of substances. The smallest categorical unit creates homonymy. Rearrangement of matter and form as a compound of subject and predicate of the object is abstraction of hylomorphism which are materially individualized forms. But the intelligible aspect of metaphysical element is over and above the components which is the genus of the properties not the properties. The smallest exclusive and exhaustive units of properties are categorical in essence.

Chapter Three

Research Methodology

1.1. Study Design

The study design of this paper is suited to argumentative structure. First I lay down the focal points of debates which contribute to the substance of our investigation. All the points that are laid down in this first part are a rephrase and quotes as the researcher understood the philosophers to be stating. Because Kant's metaphysics is the investigative background to the Aristotelian metaphysics we will start with his metaphysics. We will do this in a way Aristotelian metaphysics is structure. Therefore Kant's metaphysics is restructured to an Aristotelian organization. Kant's metaphysics is presented not as it is presented by Kant. Analyzing the issues and the arrangement is later repeated in the analysis and interpretation parts.

Chapter two has three divisions the first is devoted to our background or contrastive metaphysics: Kantian. In this we will divide Kant again to the principle of our reflection, our thesis. Our thesis assumes that Kant argued we have a metaphysical presupposition. We will try to see these claims in detail rearranging the presuppositions in levels as first level representations and the second level representation and then we go to look for parallels in Kant for Aristotelian categories and form and matter.

This trend is continued in the Aristotelian metaphysical review where we try to match the arrangements in Kantian review as has been done above. As we have started Kant's metaphysics with his basic claim which is 'we presuppose' so also in Aristotle's metaphysics we start with what is that he has claimed is metaphysical: he claimed that metaphysical beings are things in themselves independent of us. To just show some trace of similarity to Kant's levels I will try to show how Aristotle thought about levels of knowledge in close similarity. Then on, we will review: what is that thing independent of us he says is, and their nature and number.

The next review in this chapter is important points in Aristotle's discovery of the metaphysical objects. Nature in physics and nature in biology in some dimension are part of his metaphysical references unlike Kant. Therefore here different from their source we will discuss them. Kant in his metaphysics has mentioned them but not from the source and dimension Aristotle did.

Drown from chapter three chaptersfour of analysis and interpretation is divided into three debating points. The first is the most important or the essence of thesis: are our metaphysical objects dependent on our nature as Kant said or independent like Aristotle said? This will help us infer the type of the possibility of closure. The second debate is the start of representation. Both of them that accept mental processes are representations. If so then is this like Kant said or like Aristotle said or is there any other way? The third and last part is as it is laid in the review Aristotle's physical and natural sources for his metaphysical objects. We will try to interpret and argue how these fair in Kant's line of thinking or any other reasoning.

In chapter five, drawn from the analysis and interpretations we will explain how we can conclude that Aristotle's metaphysical world has a misplaced closure. We will go in detail in each debating and review points how this conclusion comes about. In some details, we will make sidelined assertion that there are some things in both to be taken. Finally we will conclude this chapter ends with an affirmative note of a suggestion of a correct design of the correct metaphysical closure.

The organization of this research is fit to philosophical implications of research methods of the philosophers themselves. Both philosophers have contrary approach based on their metaphysical conception. Kant bases on subjectivity while Aristotle bases on objectivity. Only through both ways of intervention we can fully understand the reality this research is trying build. The combination of research methods which includes elements of both Aristotelian and Kantian approaches will improve the quality of research. Where there is a lack of objectivity associated with Kantian approach, we adopt an Aristotelian approach to the development of our key research instrument. With a single organization approach we cannot capture the reality of misplacement in greater detail by just observing or interpreting on our own. Kant adds a dialectic tool to our argument of misplacement.

Because this research is argumentative research, it requires the research to adopt a creative or speculative stance rather than act as an observer. It is a useful technique since new theories can be built, and ideas can be generated. We can structure, absolutisation Kant and we can subjectivize Aristotle. The way this research thesis is conducted and instruments developed is the method of the research pursuit and techniques for questioning the underlying assumptions generate ideas and build a theory.

1.2. Data Collection

Most data used here are different lines of reasoning for the claims made. The basic nature of the data involved here are theoretical or speculative. In addition to the books that are at issue reviews of Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, notes of other readings by the philosophers at issue are used as raw and analyzed data. The collation as well as the analysis of the data involved here are collected and analyzed on the reflective principle of a misplaced closure of Aristotelian metaphysical world. The thesis is the principle of reflection for all the data used.

The argument in the second chapter is to show how our nature is a nature of a certain capacity in Kant's perspective. This builds a background against Aristotle's claim that our capacity has a power of grasping that which is absolute. In fourth chapter we analyze and interoperate these substantial contradictions. In the fifth chapter we conclude the results of the arguments in the. If we put the argument in the thesis in a rough syllogistic outline it looks like this:

Kant

-Presuppositions are antecedent conditions.

- Our faculties have antecedent conditions.
- Therefore our faculties presuppose.

Aristotle

- A conception of a thing in itself is absolute.
- The absolute has no presupposition.
- A thing in itself has no presupposition.
- Our faculties are capable of a thing in itself.
- Therefore our faculties are capable of the absolute.

In Combination

- The absolute law is our natural necessity.
- Our faculties have natural necessities.
- Therefore the nature of our faculties is absolute.

The Mismatch

- Aristotelian metaphysics places the absolute independent of us.
- The nature of our faculties is the absolute.
- Therefore, Aristotelian metaphysics has misplaced the absolute.

The Replace

The immutable structures of our cognition are a priori conceptions of the empirical world.

The immutable structures are absolute.

Our cognition's a priori conceptions of the empirical world are absolute.

1.3. Sources and Type of Data Analysis

This metaphysical argumentation is intended to challenge deep assumptions underpinning Aristotelian metaphysics and Kantian metaphysics in contrast to each and specially Aristotle in contrast to Kant's. This type of data analysis uses the tools of argumentation derived from philosophical traditions, concepts, models, and theories to critically explore and challenge the metaphysical closure assumed by Aristotle and in contrast to Kant's lack of such commitment and insight. Definitely Aristotle's concepts and theories are argued for in relatively non-Kantian modes of thought and discourse. Therefore to see how Aristotle's concepts and theories look in the context of metaphysical theory and concepts after thousands of years since Aristotle asserted his. So we formulate philosophical criticism, questions and problems that enunciate in deduction the misplacement the research is aiming at. All the supporting philosophical text is offered by way of explanation and a quest for argument to ultimately build the original doubts that motivated us to take up this study.

This study concerns with the investigation of the most fundamental aspects of the universe. Such philosophical study is about questioning assumptions, digging for deeper understanding. Doing the investigation of the most fundamental is about the journey, the process, as much as it is about the destination, the conclusion. Such analysis differ from other disciplines, in which the experts

can agree about most the fundamentals; instead this is a research of what is that fundamental itself in the conviction that it is important to educate ourselves on the fundamentals because our lives are deeply informed with many basic assumptions. And different assumptions would lead to different ways of living.

This research is possible under a fundamental assumption of what can be determined. The question 'why research?' would have been under attack if a certain level of the Aristotelian out there existing reality of objectivism is not possible. This is the element missing in Kant's approach to metaphysical objects. It is this that we are taking to Kant even if we discuss Aristotle in contrast to Kant. Kant downplays 'the world of empirical entity, made up of hard tangible and relatively immutable structures that are independent of the cognitive efforts of individuals' he discovered in a subjective context; in contrast to Aristotelian world of a concrete reality that can only be discovered through sense observation and measurement in the context of cognitive power overpowering itself to the extent the immutable structures are maps of the cognition.

To research is to identify causal explanations and fundamental laws that explain regularities we would like to discover. To achieve this end is to generalize results or in this particular paper case utilizing a hypothetico-deductive process. This process entails the formulation of the hypotheses developed from the researcher's conceptualization of a particular phenomenon, in this case metaphysical phenomenon. Independent causes lead to verification or refutation of the effects. 'The hypothetico-deductive approach involves the quantitative operationalisation of concepts, which involves reductionism, that is, the problem is reduced to its smallest elements because reduction enhances a problem's comprehension.'

As explained, the researcher's view of reality is the corner stone to all other assumptions, that is, what is assumed there predicates the researcher's other assumptions. The metaphysical assumptions have other respective assumptions about knowledge and human nature. The philosophers' view of ontology effects and underlies their epistemological persuasion which, in turn, effects their view of human nature, consequently, choice of methodology logically follows the assumptions the researcher has already made. This paper presents a thorough discussion on the nature of these metaphysical assumptions. This paper creates contrary questions, problems, tensions and solutions for the opposing views for the purpose of building the misplacement and replacement.

Chapter Four

Analysis and Interpretation

2. Analysis

2.1.Independent or Dependent?

First of all, the question of the ultimate thing presupposes the subject who asks this question to be absolutely capable of all there is or presupposes the absolute nature of the subject to be the ultimate. The difference and similarity of these frameworks is the difference and similarity of Aristotle and Kant.

The absolute basic thing the mind thinks or knows the world with is Kantian while the absolute thing the mind as thinking or knowing need to grasp or reach to is Aristotle. They both start with different particular for a different particular end but perusing the same claim of discovery of a knowledge of that which explains the existence of a thing which is only an object of knowing, and is the last and irreducible existing object. Kant starts with a designation or noting capacity of our senses. Aristotle starts with the chaos of each which has no value and existence separated from its genus and species. Kant says we as beings of certain kind or conditions are responsible for this thing. A thing of knowing exists for Kant, it exists in a certain way because we exist in a certain way while Aristotle say no it is out there furnishing the world as we see it independent of us. A thing of knowing to be known exists because it exists all out there independent of what is immediately clear.

They both share the claim the correct absolute and correct is for the sake of which the physical domain is the way it is. What is subjective about our faculty of understanding? Aristotle's claim implies either our subjectivity is objective of what is all there is or there is no such thing called subjectivity at the highest level of faculty of understanding. Otherwise if he argues we are creatures of objective capacity without these we would ask him, how a dependent process could see an independent of its process untouched by or unbounded by its realities. If he understood things in themselves then he must have intuited them as things in themselves but what intuit is an understanding and therefore our understanding must have a means to intuit the independent absolute, where is it? And how? Even if we assume the mind independent factors of understanding of the actual world provide a point of unity or a necessity how does it do? In what way do we know it?

They both discuss about objects beyond language and meaning of words; which they both say it is a source of significance lies in. There seems to be again a correspondence in putting significance to things. Kant says significance is application of the categories to sensuous intuitions. But Aristotle says significance is the finding of the irreducible conceptual system of physical things. We could see that Kant puts us at the center source of that capacity of creating

the irreducible according to our apriori plan while Aristotle thinks our mind doesn't create it, it sees it. We could make them agree on we have an apriori eye to an aprioriirreducable thing in the sensuous things and they both think that objects that underlie a thing that appear have both somehow increasing generalities and they are mental representation. We can see the basic thing in the world because they are out there as we see them sensuously and intellectually. But here we can ask is our capacity to see then the character of the underlying objects or we make underlying objects out of a possible other underlying object independent of us. We cannot know in the chaos of what appears or in the what is immediately apparent but penetrate into what is naturally better known underlying object. Yes but to whose nature the naturally better known is better after the penetration of what appears or after the penetration of what is apparent? Is it only for our nature or for nature as absolute?

The reality of our capacity is our natural necessity. It must be our secure principle when reflecting on what is that which is the highest or irreducible existence or reality we are bound not to escape or we to start anything on. Kant's metaphysics points to something that antecedes in our mind's capacity of representations. Our mind affects itself by a systematic apriori mode of capacity as opposed to a spontaneous chaos of the particulars as Aristotle says. Kant's point is as much essential absolute claim as Aristotle's is, it is only subjective to our nature. Kant puts sensuous forms as representational forms, too. Not just the conceptual as Aristotle did. We can say he saw the Kantian claim that even in the apriori conceptions there is sensuous assumption and a derive to sensuous application which Aristotle might have mistaken to apriori plan to be an external thing's thing in itself. Even if Aristotle did not have levels of representation Kant had. Aristotle saw one depth which sees such underlying objects Kant saw levels to our capacity which sees.

2.2.First and Second Level Representation, Where does it start?

It is also true that mind at sensuous designation of time and space level has infinite enformability or determinations but is only an occasion for the general or universal conditions of external designation to build a relation of necessity and unit out of those manifold. The apriori are as Aristotle said more intelligible and are not better known immediately by nature and both the apriori and what appears are the condition of knowing anything; but how could this be the same as saying a fundamental level of existence is indemonstrably the beginning of the general fabric of the physical world? If they should be the same what can they add to the reality of our mind and our being?

As Aristotle says if they are independent, to grasp these ultimate beings is to reach at irreducible ineliminable structures of experience are natural goals in the behaviors of things and it is also true to investigate the natural world without these basic systematic units, understanding is impossible because they are factors under understanding. But it is just that they are not out there, they are apriori or subject to the reality of the mind and are true fundamentals about the system of the reality of the actual fabric of the world.

To rephrase Aristotle in the context of similar Kantian idea the immediately knowable the apparent cannot intellectualize the intelligible, and the intelligible cannot know the immediately knowable; as Kant said understanding cannot anticipate and the senses cannot cognize necessity and unity. Aristotle is right when he said the more intelligible by nature is a representational form but there are not sufficient and pleasurable arguments that say realizing these representational forms is realizing the form of the object the way the object does independent of us.

The reality of our mind, the principle or order of our cognitive capacity, the basic structure of our mental representation cannot be that which is all there is and that which is correct or that which existentially sustaining is thing for all when it is only so for us.

Yes, we cannot that which sustains existentially created by us but they are our nature's frameworks for our own creations. Aristotle as firm arguer in the principle of the irreducible particular to be the metaphysical object, he deduced such forms from teleological study and added essence and the efficient cause from another dimension of the physical world to be metaphysical elements. Kant thought such irreducible as tools of building metaphysical objects not objects themselves. Form and matter as which are substances in Aristotle are instances of particular properties not instances of particular metaphysical substances in Kant's metaphysics. Or rather we could reverse and state that Aristotle took the irreducible matter and form to be the particular metaphysical substances or identity or conceptions not just particular characteristic instances of properties as Kant did. Aristotle gives this last Kant's assumption to his categories in exact reverse to Kant's categories with his form and matter. Therefore, we can conclude that as it is stated in Kant's metaphysics representation starts with the senses not with thought as Aristotle thought.

2.3.The Theory of Nature and Closure

The causal structure of the physical world has hierarchy thereof a supra-physical entity at its highest top; this fact implies a causal asymmetry. Such asymmetries physical structure is the inner principle of motion and rest. Aristotle took the supra-physical description as a description of a correct existing thing. But even causation as it looks in physics is subjective to the reality of our mental capacity. If it was not we would not be able to know. In light of his such closure of physics, his metaphysical closure assumes an out there, a supra-metaphysical object too; the most exact object of understanding, the unmoved mover, and the ultimate principle is taken as the most fully developed cause for the causal structure of the highest of all objects of physics calling it metaphysics. However, even this is impossible because in physics in our day's findings have not closed physics as he did, yet.

Aristotle's concept of the hypothetical intelligible necessity, the deepest nature of the natural world moves the material. It regulates the behavior of the physical world; if we take the hypothetical intelligible necessity as metaphysic object and the physical material as its

component in this conception metaphysics and physics meet each other. Kant's concept of time and space are the first metaphysical being in of the reality of our existence of physics. But Kant does not take it as far as arguing the complete account of the physical domain is a thorough examination of the hypothetical indelible necessity; for this paper we can say a thorough examination of the time and space as our reality is where an account of our subjective object of metaphysical being starts.

It is true the highest existing kinds of objects are extra linguistic but not extra mind; they are subjective to the nature of our capacity to perceive and receive representations. This doesn't mean mind creates them as Aristotle thought such argument would amount to but our mental capacity as a mode or metaphysical reality for further down activities of itself has an a priori or antecedent platform. Prior to what it creates. Aristotle's hypothetical intelligible necessity is derived from his principle of the supra-physical entity in physics drawn or taken for analogous metaphysical existence. We can see here how his theory of nature in physics is related analogously to his metaphysical closure.

2.3.1. Teleology

The other is the teleological ontology Aristotle argues on. The un-intentional essence of nature has its unconscious agent in the function of things. He claims the specifiable properties of natural things are defined by the functional genus of the object of metaphysical object criterion of natural objects. The functional genus in terms of the specifiable properties is the object criterion of the lower properties. True but the genus that defines the properties is based on subjective universal condition of external designation to us, it is our realities first and most.

The deep invariant pattern in nature being the objective feature of the external world, It is the first actuality of a natural body which has life or diverse functional or essential existence in potentiality; but if we change the presupposition to be the reality of our mind we can say the deep invariant pattern in our mind's nature the objective feature. It sees and states the first actuality of our experience which is life and diverse functional existence in potentiality. So from supra-teleological arguments Aristotle drew essence as one of the metaphysical elements. Again analogous in Kant's metaphysics we have modes of things as a metaphysical conception.

2.3.2. Categories

Kant reversed Aristotle's categories. Kantian categories are real metaphysical points than what Aristotle said categories are. Aristotelian categories are highest abstractions of the properties of things, one step highest than the chemistry stuffs. Kant took categories to be almost a replacement to the Aristotelian four substances. Kantian categories are objects of understanding of the transcendental or pure conceptual a priori antecedent intellectual elements of thought of external things. This characteristic of intellectual property is what Aristotle thought is the character of the substance with a far deeper and independent mode of existence. This is one of the places where these two philosophers sound to have conceived or discovered a conceptions of

significance with Kant seeing more significance in what Aristotle thought there is not much, I mean metaphysically.

The question Aristotle asked presupposed the core of our intellectual intuition is a structure out there in itself. Therefore he asked if the highest abstracted properties of things out there are quality, quantity, relation,... what is these all base on which is out there but could only be seen by the inner mind's eye? Kant asked the same question with presupposition that our view of the highest abstracted external things must start with what our abstracting capacity's nature starts with. This last one takes us straight to what Aristotle said what Aristotelian categories are.

The categories cohere or intersect with other physical and metaphysical works but not for a metaphysical claim; therefore not as irreducible natural intelligible metaphysical objects. He concludes that only the irreducible is the ultimate. Instances of particular properties are different from instances of particular substance. It comes down to this for him. Form and matter are underlying themes of structure in his work. Aristotle's categorical conceptions are kinds of dependency on the mind. Categories are a standard criterion to cause of a thing. But in one higher place than the categories he puts the most persisting thing than categories which is not dependent as categories are on the mind. Therefore, categories for Aristotle are logical positions. For Kant they are metaphysical objects.

2.3.3. Hylomorphism

Hylomorphism is below metaphysics higher than categories, in between them. It is a conception of highest connection in the intelligible things. Hylomorphic compounds are compounds of subject and predicate. Hylomorphism is in Aristotle a composition with highest, closes, nearest implication for the full fledged metaphysics. In his metaphysics we can see that he added only efficient cause and essence on top of hylomorphic elements. He did not reverse to our nature as he started it in the categories. Categorical hylomorphic individual is different from elemental hylomorphic individual, and also different from metaphysic individual. Particular hylomorphic and metaphysics are like the species and genus he discovered in studying nature and the way to understand in increasing generality of the location of things.

How form and matter are connected is also how these two philosophers differ. Their mode of connection of these two faculties appears to be drawn from the metaphysical principles Aristotle has for such connections. Hylomorphism as essential materialism; it is a mechanistic essentialism which brings more concept to why our subjective reality is more absolute than the absolute of all thing there is. Because for one it professes it is a stable physical system which is true only to our capacity which is bound. Second, it is the most intelligible mechanistic essentialism which is not just atomic or platonic dualism. Yes, our existence as a reality therefore our capacity of existence has an antecedent or apriori element as well as a brute physical existence devoid of metaphysical view. Therefore these absolutes should have to come to our reality that what is correct is independent of us but only in the sense that what is in as an

apriorias metaphysics is. And finally hylomorphism creates a complete understanding of the range of possible systematic interrelations, hylomorphism could still be a mere logical construct of the physical properties and still be a possible range of possible systematic interrelations within properties of things.

Kantian hylomorphism is similar to Aristotle's hylomorphism but it is not put and recognized as categories are recognized in Kant. In both ranks of Kantian metaphysical conceptions matter and form just like in hylomorphism matter and form are composites in time and space representation in the categories. In the phenomena they seem to be again the horizontal elements of phenomena and categories. Matter and form in Kant seem to be so small unit that they cannot be taken to be metaphysical units. But Aristotle took them as metaphysical units for this exact reason. Kant saw form and matter as tools or bricks of conceptions. Just like conceptions of any kind are tools of thinking.

Aristotle in hylomorphism seems to want to have a metaphysical conception of relation. But he left relation as a conception of categories dependent on mind but he has already claimed metaphysics as independent categorical relations or as mind independent object. Therefore, we put hylomorphism in between categories and metaphysics seeing the elevated importance of the existence of metaphysical relation.

Chapter Five

Conclusion and Recommendation

1. Conclusion

1.1.A Misplaced Closure

1.1.1. First Representation

Our ways of interacting with the world starts from subjectively inherent mode of designating powers of our faculty. Our senses act on the basis of the inner sensible stamp therefore from their half dictated in the inside to time and space in the outside. However, our capacity for representation is pointless on its own because it is made of the qualities of the external world's irreducible aspects such as time and space. Then a thorough examination of time and space as our reality is part of account of our subjective objectivity.

The grasp of natural necessity is the grasp of hypothetical such intelligible irreducible necessities. Therefore the enduring particulars of the objective features are the hypothetically necessary for the physical aspect of necessity. The opportunity to synthesis comes after the sensuous designation with the capacity of the second representational mode of thinking. The designation capacity of our senses gives the material mode of space and time to other faculty called understanding which is a process of relating representations in cognitive necessity. Such abstractions or a deduction of the universal conditions of external designation is what happens after the immediate designation in terms of time and space. This part of our conclusion is to state what is better plausible as to where representation starts. Aristotle thought the senses have no touch the ultimate as we have seen the ultimate starts from the senses substantially.

1.1.2. Second Representation

This condition of the second round representation is the universal condition of external designation. In this part representation is the things thinking thinks belong to things. Second representation is done on what the second representation or thinking cannot anticipate, as the first representation called sensuous intuition does. Therefore second representations based on its own second level anticipation gives unity and necessity to diverse or manifold of representations from represent time and space of sensuous intuitions.

Necessities and unites of the universal of external designation are objects of the second level representation. They are designated or noted in opposition to other relations of objects in space and time. The first object is of the antecedent time and space, the second is its own universal condition of external designation which the conjoining faculty prescribes as law of conjunction and here there could be representation of representations and on and on. Such prescription of representation on representation presupposes the actual presence of object and relation on the

material of representation of time and space (the ground of empirical conception). Most pleausurably Aristotelian metaphysics starts from this level of representation. The difference being even this level bases on the sensuous start, an apriori stamp of each being the constant them. Aristotle was right claiming closure but he placed closure out beyond us, above and over the mind he designated to have the capacity to see or discover it. If we placed the closure and what is above and over the mind in our own mind's capacity. Then we correct the misplacement and add what Kant refused to do, closure.

1.1.3. A Dependent World

The actual world has mind dependent features to explain it. This does not mean Aristotle thought thought got nothing to do with the irreducible elements of the world. Rather he is saying only mind can see it or process it or discover it with a hard word and exercise. It seems he thinks mind has no priori promoting or hindering nature of its own. He rather thinks our apriori is what is apriori about all possible nature not just us. Both Kant's apriori designations even if they are about the actual world they are mind dependent. Our anticipating capacity cannot designate or note the causal or necessary relation the universal condition of external designation prescribes. This means what the first representation cannot be done by the second neither is the second by the first, because their background is different. They are independently correlates. The irreducible units are our subjective apriori reality. The deep invariant patten in nature of our mind, the objective feature of our mind is the first actuality of our experience which has life's diverse existence in potentiality. Based on that, our mental representations as necessities of substantial beings of the world are the hypothetical necessities to facts and ordinary features of the world, therefore, dependent on our nature.

Let alone the function of thought, even the condition of the possibility of the perception of chaos of what appears is an apriori mental capacity. The external relation of our senses to the physical world is because of an internal power of representation. Our metaphysical world is dependent and we are such beings. The mode of objects of the antecedent plan placed in the mind for our senses and for our thinking are the apriori starts. The forms of intuition, of the forms of time and space give us the manifold of representation. The further away abstraction of the further lower representation is enlightenment. The further lower representation of the further higher abstraction is objectification. The conditions of manifold representation are only found in sensibility. Without sensibility even if all nature as Aristotle said was open to us our understanding cannot see it.

Kantian categories or our highest receptors limit themselves when they apply themselves but enlarge sensibility by applying their mode to sensuous things. Conjunction of representations into a conception by categoric apriori conjunction is the highest principle in all human cognition. The formal conditions of the mode of objects placed in the mind is the condition of apriori intuitions which starts externalizing the exercise of thought of an object by giving the condition of the necessary apriori rule, therefore the external is the exponent of a apriori rule.

Intelligibility of things is a position of a thing in relation to understanding. Our reality is a conjunction; a relation to understanding but a thing might contain more in its complete possibility

1.1.4. Categories

In categorical discussions we see clear misplacement of philosophical conceptions. The reason why Kant replaced Aristotelian categories up in the rank of philosophical conceptions is because Kant saw a lot of significance in metaphysical conceptions being deduced from the basic properties of things as much as those properties being a property of our nature in particular. Aristotle misplaced these as lower but general logic dimensions of things. These misplacements are reverses of conceptual depth and reverses of range of reach. Obviously Kant added more depth and range to Aristotelian categories. It looks like he thought categories are misplaced in Aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotle misplaced a metaphysical closure in origin, position and to some extent in content. Kant looked very inspired by the categorical discoveries of Aristotle and saw a different placed, origin and content for Aristotelian metaphysics. There are other points in misplacement between these great thinkers of different age.

1.1.5. Argument Against Kant's Guard of Critical Reason:

The objective to save guard our thinking or our thought from centuries and millennia old confusions that comes from in one hand force in forms of dogma and dictations of circumstance and in the other hand that comes from fraud of reductive techniques and tactics of mechanical motion is very important. Our mind in its general mechanics is helpless when objects of the mind are not sorted out without mixed senses of existences. Therefore, it is in the interest of metaphysics to continuously keep the progress of our thought at its highest open. Kant refuses Aristotle's idea of metaphysical closure in spirit. But if we look deeper into his hypothesis and its implication, he is being unreason to refuse closure. His hypothesis clearly claims closure or do not show how it doesn't claim closure or it can stay open. The argument that metaphysics has to stay open to its own criticism is to guard against dogmatism is a double standard. Because he doesn't show how his metaphysical claim can stay that way. Rather they could fight dogmatism because they are above the operating system of dogmatism. If he cannot reason so then he might be misplacing his own metaphysical conceptions.

1.1.6. How Aristotle was right on firmness:

The Socratic method of constant pursuit of doubt to reach at undoubted knowledge presents us no legitimate things to think about or let us have nothing close or approximate to the truth or liker the truth as such. Socratic method of investigation and examination is about having our opponent and our ourselves qua other refute himself and ourselves or have him and ourselves

conflict with other claims he/we agree on. In consequence this silences thinking in general. This method throws away meaning or supposition of something definite or basic about the world. But metaphysical claim is a claim that the world is a certain way not nothing at the same time or not many things at the sometime. Aristotle ran away from mind dependent metaphysics to bring anchor of physics to our thought and deep his predecessors with to fantasize on what appears and annihilate thought. This was a worthy fight. But Kant's refusal of closure to deep dogmatists away is to invite the enemies of Aristotelian metaphysics in particular and metaphysics in general. Both agree on what their respective enemies influence is: annihilation of thought. Aristotle fought sophists who tried to destroy the search of objectivity or truth. Kant fought sophists who professed objectivity and truth by force and fraud. As a tradition of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular they complemented each other. They guarded against the changing faces of the enemies of thought and the delicacy of the nature and power of our thought.

1.1.7. Hylomorphism

Matter and form like Aristotle said are close objects of understanding as hylomorphic union. But how to take them whether as Aristotelian instances of metaphysical substances or like Kantian particular instances of properties of metaphysical substances is the subject of our debate here.

Aristotle did not see that the collection of property he wants to give to matter is of our own making which we are obliged by our nature not as something which is out there because of his metaphysical presupposition. Categories as the highest kinds of beings of properties are horizontally not hierarchically the substance of each category in Aristotle. The basic intrinsic unity is a pattern of hylomorphic matter. If we notice here, Aristotle's reluctance to put relation as one of ultimate have had him discover a different but highest union called hylomorphism. It is a combo of metaphysical substance from above and Aristotelian categories from below. Form and matter are also abstractions but with reverse position and with the same smallest unit role. One pairs as introducer the other pair as ultimate conclusions.

2. Recommendation

The investigation of metaphysics has a far more elevated aim than all the understanding can achieve within the sphere of experience. With instrument of reason metaphysics confidently takes upon itself the execution of the solution for elevated aims. Generally speaking, the instrument of reason when abstracted to objects of metaphysical level becomes pure general logic which is broadly referred to in metaphysics as 'apriori principle'. Such metaphysical investigation seeks to widen the range of our apriori knowledge or our reach of pure general logic. Such acute penetration and endeavor into determining or arranging or viewing things in dimensions or senses creates opportunities to discover or unfold systematic constellation of metaphysical principles.

A metaphysical study qua one dimension is dependent on the logical space of the metaphysical dimension it is studied as. Different metaphysical concepts professed by different philosophers

are conceptual discoveries or necessary results of the labor and power of their analytical cognitive processes and their ability to systematically demonstrate.

Metaphysical concepts relate to apriori objects or objects of the highest abstraction or generality which cannot be demonstrated a posteriori. The mode in which object of metaphysical concepts are given determines what lies in the concepts. The mode in which the objects of Aristotelian metaphysical concepts are given and the mode in which the objects of the Kantian metaphysical concepts are given is basically different even if they share the same in logical and the spirits of nature.

As high as metaphysics is, there is nothing that determines the function of our thought as metaphysics does in both philosophers we have studied here. Both inherently imply metaphysics has practical employment in for it underlies our activities at its core. To let up metaphysics for it is the abstractive dimension of practical things and to be absorbed in the mechanics of metaphysics in denial of its non-mechanical sense is to lose the war but to win the battle. An immersion into the study of metaphysics is equipping ourselves for the battle.

I recommend a further study on the extent and depth of these two metaphysical concepts and further refine and discover more connection and disparity, of their affirmative integrated concept out of their merger in contrast of one with the other.

2.1. Aristotle's Correct Doctrine and Kant's Correct Design

The rightful metaphysical closure possible then is the subjective objectivity. Kant did not claim closure because he thought or argued that any dogmatism is bad for a reasoning mind. But how can he claim to say while he still thinks no dogmatism is itself dogmatism. We have to defend mind from force and fraud; but firmness of some sort, the sort which is clear and integrated about our nature in all its aspects is inescapable as subjectivity is.

Kant thinks even his metaphysics uncriticized and taken as dogma as demonstration from sure principles is despotic, obnoxious and a barbaric legislation. Because when taken to a level of idealism it means it obliges us to assume the existence of things external to ourselves. But what about this notion itself of not taking ideas to dogmatism would not itself be dogmatic to some extent? At some point there is firmness in not being firm or dogmatism, even in being flexible itself. What we should look at is the substance of the point and the sufficiency of the proof of the argument. For example he says 'for pure reason or general logic to enlarge our knowledge is a groundless pretension' true, what I want to ask is, wouldn't it be again grounded for us to put this kind of principle as doctrine or dogma? Is this inherent in such a principle? He thinks this defends application to an object and the deeply concealed antecedent apriori ground of the unity of sensibility. As we have also seen he had explained why it is unreasonable to complain why we cannot be able to perceive the internal nature of things or why we cannot perceive the appearing of things in themselves by apriori designation' because we penetrate into the interior of nature by

using these apriori observing and analyzing grounds anteceded apriori; in us such apriori grounded questions, analysis compel nature to reply.

This much is right and grounded but to want our cognition rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience is to extend the range of our judgments beyond their bounds. When the anteceding apriori are not extended beyond the range of our intuition, they furnish us with the means of discovery of conceptions of objects; his fear is we leave apriori intuitions without experience to dogma or doctrine, then they lie exposed to delusion or bold pretensions and conceit without the power of refusing the axiomatic assent through declarations and bend to dogmatic illegitimate demand. Because the mind thinks, 'it has absolute need through and in the act of itself of its own self-consciousness'.

This takes us back to Aristotle's way of fighting the sophists or dogmatists of his time who claimed nothing is true or false, right or wrong which annihilated the process of thinking anything legitimate in our mind. We start with something more right or similar to right, truer than the other. This puts our efforts of determining the better object of thought among the many others. But unless we take such techniques as doctrine or dogmas, as Kant says our mind will be exposed to delusions or bold pretensions and conceit of sophists. Therefore with the presupposition in mind of a principle as it is set by Kant which claims a continuous criticism of itself, we can have ideology or doctrine. For that matter there is no other way of seeing an assertion of such magnitude than this.

The recommendation of this paper in addition to the suggestion that a certain amount of the sense of doctrine is important; this paper also recommends an affirmative set of metaphysical doctrine below.

2.2.The Correct Closure

Differently than Aristotle thought, sensation is not empty of that ultimate thing Aristotle thought only thought has. Sensation shares the ultimate. It is the gate keeper of its far relative of the fully ultimate category because category looks for worth in sensation. The ultimate conditions manifold representations are only found in sensibility. The sensuous representation of the categorical is objectification; while the categorical abstraction of the sensuous representation is enlightenment. Sensation is the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation or intuition. As much as the external object there are inner pure empirical intuitions or representation which exist apriori in the mind as mere form of sensibility without any sensation to begin with. These are time and space. The synthesis of spaces and times is the apprehension of external experience or a phenomena or all cognition of the object of experience. Sensuous intuition or empirical representation is the critique of the apriori principles in its keeping understanding stay in the intelligible world. The apriori form principles or the rules of unity or necessity in synthesis of external experience or phenomena are foundations of experience. The application of the conditions of apriori intuition to a possible cognition of experiences makes

apriorisynthetic judgments possible and keeps the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental unity of consciousness.

Our power of thinking the objects of sensuous intuition using the categories is understanding. Understanding judges by means of the spontaneous arrangement of diverse representation. The objective foundation of the possibility of experience is necessity. Abstraction or annexation of all the empirical condition under which the understanding is exercised is general logic. Receptivity of impressions are far the sensuous intuition while the spontaneity of thought for conception is construction. The spontaneity of thought requires that diversity of determinations of the conditions of the mind's receptivity be examined after a certain manner. Diversity of determinations of the conditions of the mind's are received into the mind and connected in order afterwards to form cognition out of it. The universal condition of experience's determination of the real is conceptual. The possibility an object can be proved only by means of representation corresponding to the conception. The laws of conception could be a general law of understanding or the particular law of understanding. Conception is the reasoning of the reasoning of an object and the structure of the thought of an object

The categorical conceptions in Kant are the same in intent of their general function as the Aristotelians are. That is why Kant kept the name categories even if the place they do their function is very elevated than the Aristotelians. I recommend that we keep up Kant's placement of the categories as metaphysical realities.

Cognition in itself is a mark of an apriori distinction of existence. The conceptions of necessities that originate in the principles of cognitions existing apriori arrange our view of the world under certain relations. The categories application to possible experience will present us with a systematic category of apriori principles of the understanding. We think something in general and determine it on one hand sensuously, but on the other distinguish the general represented object from the particular or apriori mode of intuiting it. Conceptions of apriori principles as have sensualized conceptions of understanding present us with objective judgment of things only in conjunction.

In Aristotle's terms space and time are the intelligible prime matter but why cannot we take the intelligible prime matterness as an united property or character which are planned in our mind. An apriori intuition is another way of knowing the point where knowledge begins. The intelligible prime matter and form which I hereby think have similarity to space and time planned in our mind. A perceptible object treated in a special way is the discovery of conceptions. The study of perceptible objects by the tool of the prime form planned in us is the discovery of conceptions.

The mode of objects of the antecedent plan placed in the mind for our senses and for our thinking are apriori starts. The forms of time and space give us the manifold of representation. The second apriori only perceives that which it proceeds or looks after its own design similar in

external. The a priori design is empty and voids without the content the senses. The senses without conceptions or categories are blind and limited. The conditions of manifold representations are only found in sensibility. Without it, even if all nature as it is was open to our understanding we cannot see it. Intelligibility is a position of a thing in relation to our understanding. Our reality is a conjunction of the two levels of representations but a thing might contain more in its complete possibility.

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