

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**POST-COLD WAR CHINA-SUDAN POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

BY
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Lists of Acronyms

AU	African Union
BPI	Bribe Payers Index
CCMD	Chinese Consortium for the Merowe Dam
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporations
CNPCIS	China National Petroleum Company in Sudan
CPA	Cooperative Peace Agreement
CPC	Communist Party of China
CSTP	Cultural Scientific and Technical Protocol
CWE	China International Water and Electric Corporation
CWHEC	China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Corporation
CWHE	China Water and Hydro-Power Engineering
ETC	Economic and Technical Cooperation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOS	Government of Sudan
GNPOC	Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GPE	Global Political Economy
HRF	Human Rights First
HRW	Human Right Watch
ICC	International Criminal Court

IMF	International Monetary Fund
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NCP	National Congress Party
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIF	National Islamic Front
NOC	National Oil Company
PRC	People's Republic of China
RSPO	Red-Sea Petroleum Operating Company
SIPSC	Sinopec International Petroleum Service
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SPLM/A	Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
ZPEB	Zhonyan Petroleum Exploration Bureau

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Abstract

Not surprisingly, bilateral relations between countries invariably encompass interests and constraint. China-Sudan, post cold war economic and political relations has posed both challenges and opportunities. China's non-interference principle, protecting the Sudan regime from pressure of international community caused confrontation with the Western countries. Using the principle as a tool to prevent others not to intervene, it provided weapons, in exchange of oil money and investment opportunities. Consequently, using the military hard-wares imported from China the regime enhanced gross violations of human rights, such as, torture, mass killings and detention. Embargoes, sanction and resolution on the Sudan regime for its human rights catastrophe were annulled and acquitted by China arguing that responding the situation in Sudan is an internal problem deserved to be solved internally. Furthermore, the two countries' have forwarded their political interest globally; Sudan supported China's membership in the UN Security Council in 1970s, and it was defeated its human rights allegation in 1980s at the UN human rights council by the support of African countries including Sudan. On China part, it was supported a unified Sudan, opposing the South Sudan independency. The objective of the thesis is to explore the political and economic elements harmonizing and hindering relationships between the two countries in the post cold war period. To ascertain this, predominantly qualitative with minimal level of quantitative research methodologies are employed. Both primary and secondary sources of data are utilized. By doing this, the study demonstrated issues such as, Western pressure on China to drag its diplomatic ally, internal dynamics in Sudan such as, security factor and the secession of South Sudan, as obstacles for their relations. It also found out that, the economic cooperation between the two countries is showing opportunities. The major contributing factor for this is the exploration and production of oil in Sudan, coupled with China's demand of energy for its manufacturing industries. After the exploration of oil in Sudan, the country's economic activities have shown a significant growth. Job opportunities for its citizen, value added to GDP diversified investment opportunities from the oil revenue. As a result, the balance of import-export of the two countries was in favors Sudan. Since, China has eagerly come to Sudan to extol oil and to access investment opportunities for its companies, it was importing 64% of Sudanese oil out-put, which covers 7% of its overall oil consumption. And as a state owned enterprise the CNPC became a major oil explorer company, which shares 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) in the oil consortium.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

States establish bilateral and multilateral relations to realize their common objectives, regardless of geographic location. In the contemporary globalized world order, states need to integrate and cooperate in various fields for their common interests. Especially, cooperation in political and economic matters in particular has assumed more importance. Hence, China and African relations is not out of this reality strived their relations since the course of time.

Despite the vast distance, and they share neither language nor culture China's first contact with Africa is traced back to 202 B.C. (Liang; 2011:4). But its relation with Sudan could be traced to as early as 414 AD. But their trade relation was commenced in the 10th century when China's ship loaded with commodity goods transported to the port of Sudan (Anshan, 2007:6). After a period of minimal contact, China's relation with the continent was ignited during the Bandung conference on Non-Alignment in 1955, during which China and Africa resume each other (Aning and Lecoture, 2008). Following this Conference, China established diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1956, with Morocco, in 1958 followed Sudan and Ghana in 1959 (Ayengabo, et.al:3). Thereafter, between 1963 & 1965 the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, visited ten newly independent African countries. After this visit, they started a continuous political and economic engagement (Saferworld, 2011:4).

China's policy in Africa between 1949 and 1978 was initially influenced by ideology and support of independent movements by providing military aid, training for liberation movements and economic assistances (Hart-Landsberg & Burkett, 2005). African states also reciprocated by giving diplomatic support to China in the international institutions such as for its permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971 and to tackle allegation of human rights violation in the human rights council. To this end among the 76 countries' votes in favor of China 26 were from African states including

Sudan to get a seat and 32 African countries were voted for China for its human rights condemnation (Anshan, 2007:75).

After a decade of retreat in the China-Africa relationship, there are important events which reignited Beijing's interest on the continent. The first was China's international relation after the Tiananmen Square incidence in 1989 where democratic demonstrators were brutally killed by the PRC soldiers followed by international condemnation of China. This induced Africans for alliance. The kick off and expansion of its economy in the 1990s and 2000s, as a result of market based economic reform in 1978 became an additional motive to China to come to Africa in search of market and raw materials (Taylor, 2011).

Both political and economic motives therefore, inspired China to come to Africa. Following this turn economic exchange and explore of natural resources and political enforcement augmented. For instance, economically, at the mid of 1990 trade relation between the two parties was US \$2 billion and US\$40 billion in 2005 and in 2013 it inclined to US\$160 billion. And politically, China became voice and shoulder of African countries in the international institutions (Dent, 2011). The strengthening of political and economic ties between China and Africa allowed Beijing to develop relationships with states often shunned by the rest of the global community. As a result, China's foreign policy has been welcomed by many of these shunned states for its relation attached with no any conditionality. Sudan was one such shunned country with which Beijing developed a strong relationship (Peter, 2004).

Although, Sino-Sudan relations assumed as early as 4th century as mentioned above, their formal diplomatic ties was marked in 1959, just three years after Sudan's independence (Fernando,2007).But in reality, Beijing was reluctant to enter into Sudan until the 1990s. It was, the year 1989 which brought a turning point for both countries to search each other. In Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF) now reconstituted into National Congress Party (NCP), control political power through coup d'état in 1989. Consequently, it fall under the surveillance of the West for its supporting international terrorism and supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war, found it China as an alternative partner potential partner. And China's retreat from Western allegation such as, European Union and the US for its cruel

act of the Tiananmen Square as it mentioned above sought it to come to Sudan (Large, 2008:3).

Economic inception of China-Sudan has reignited when President al-Bashir visited China in 1995, for requesting oil development. China immediately sent the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in early 1996. This becomes a reason of their economic projection until today. Besides oil development, China and Sudan are also largest trading partners, their trade profile increased from a mere record of US\$200 million in 1990, reached US\$5.7 billion in 2007 (Shichor, 2007). And show an increment to US\$7.5 billion in 2009. A significant proportion of this trade is oil but China is diversifying into a variety of businesses as well (Foster, 2001).

In so doing in economic relations, politically, China's ruling party (CCP) has a close relationship with Sudan's ruling party (NCP). Central committee of the two parties visited each other in 1997 and 2000 (Large 2009: 617). And in December 2008, a CCP "goodwill" delegation led by Chen Jiwa, deputy secretary of the CCP's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regional Committee, visited Sudan by the invitation of the NCP. It held meetings with senior NCP politicians and the governor of the Kordofa region (Sudan Tribune, December/2008). So, Political elites of both states have played a role in directing bilateral relations. Especially, the Chinese government has cultivated effective close political relations with Sudan's ruling leadership, the NCP from the early stages under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s to the deepening of ties under Hujinato in the 2000s (Jakobson & Zha 2006). Globally, the NCP of Sudan supports for Beijing's one China policy and ardent supporters of China in the international institutions such as in UN as it mentioned above. And domestically, between 2003 and 2008, when the Darfur conflict was intensified, and disgrace of human rights continued and pressure was exerted from outside. China was curtailed the Sudanese government (Macfarlane, 2013:20).

By the early 1990s, the economic reforms in China, initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, had begun to produce changes and progress, and the Chinese economy was recording significant growth and forced to follow "go out side policy" for energy and market. For this reason, economic relations of the two countries developed from a comparatively minor relation to the country's most important external economic

partnership after the oil export in the beginning of 2000s. Hence, oil became primary commodity for the intensification of trade relations between the two countries'. To this end, Sudan, however, has become a centre of established Chinese economic interest, which has continued to expand in recent years (Ajakaiye, et.al, 2009:33).

1.2. Statements of the Problem

Since the end of the cold war China has displayed a reinvigorated interest in the African continent. It has positioned itself as Africa's leading development partner based on bolstered trade and investment. China's foreign policy towards Africa in general and to individual countries such as Sudan in particular is based on rhetoric of mutual cooperation, mutual benefit and partnership. The use of such approach implies a positive outcome between China and Africa, where both parties gain from their interactions (Tull, 2006:466).

China's priority interest in Africa is economics and diplomacy (Taylor, 2004a). To this end, it has targeted three main areas of interest. Firstly, the potential of individual African countries' market for its manufactured goods; secondly, as a resource pool for raw materials to meet the demand of its growing economy, and thirdly, as a diplomatic partnership to take African numeric advantage in the international stage (Shelton, 2001 and Alden, 2005).

Since its engagement in the continent among others is for the sake of searching the untapped natural resources, its foreign policy toward Africa is primarily in favor of countries which have rich natural resources such as oil and minerals (Taylor, 2008:76). Doing this, its approach to these countries is without any conditionality, whether there are human rights, good governance and democracy exerted on the African regimes as a precondition in doing business with them. Because, this perception and stand was emanated from its non-interference principle, which advocated internal issues are remained to solve internally. To this end, it propped up African dictators at the cost of these basic rights (Brook, 2007:4). Therefore its way of doing business with Sudan does not take into account human rights, good governance, transparency and accountability.

This was visible when it was provided necessary weapons, and made fertile oil market at home, when the conflict in Sudan/Darfur/ was highly intensified. As reciprocity of its gross human rights violations and the civil war in the Darfur region the UN Security council was endorsed successive resolutions on the Sudan Government, but China was refuted these by using its veto power in the UN Security Council, providing the non-interference principle (Taylor, 2004a:98-99). As a result of the atrocities in Darfur the ICC has ordered a warrant on some suspected government officials, but China was once more refuted this order maintained the sovereignty of Sudan.

Having said these, this research aims to explore the nature and implications of China's political and economic relations with Sudan since the end of the cold war. With the intent of examining whether China's activities and presence in the country is mutually beneficial or whether they have negative consequence for both countries or to one of them.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The overall objective of this study is to analyze the political and economic relations between China and Sudan, and assess their Challenges and opportunities.

Specific Objectives are:-

- To examine the post 1990s China-Sudan Economic relations
- To evaluate the nexus between China's non-interference principle, issues of human rights the impact of displacement for the sake development
- To appraise the major challenges and prospects of Sino-Sudan relationships

1.4 Research Questions

1. Does China's advocacy of non-interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign

State rhetoric or a reality?

2. Do the economic relations of the two countries benefited symmetrically?

3. What are the challenges and opportunities of China-Sudan in post Cold-War?

1.5 Core Argument

Sino-Sudan economic and political cooperation increased after the end of the Cold War. This is due to China's burgeoning economy demanded energy for its industry, market for its manufactured goods coupled with Sudan's request for oil development and diplomatic partnership.

1.6 Research Methodology and Methods of Data collection

1.6.1. Methodological Approach

The approach employed to undertake this study is mainly the qualitative methods of study. Qualitative research is an explanatory and descriptive methodology. Thus the method was used for the exploitative and descriptive nature of the paper. To this end, pertinent data for the study was gathered and analyzed descriptively. In order to evaluate the nature of the political relationship between the two countries, issues such as human rights, non-interference principle, military cooperation and development are basically studied in descriptive form.

The need to use quantitative approach is derived from the aspects of co-operations dealt under this study, i.e., trade and investment as far as the economic ties of China Sudan is concerned. Thus, statistical data is used because trade, investment and economic measurements in general are essentially quantitative concepts. Much we are aware with and without statistics have obvious differences in the rate of growth and economic position among communities and states. And thus statistical data such as tables are graphical representations and indispensable for clear understanding and analysis of economic aspects of the two countries. Henceforth, quantitative approach is employed (Kuznet, 1968).

1.6.2 Methods of Data Collection

This research has used both primary and secondary sources of data. As far as secondary sources are concerned books, journal articles, official documents, selected internet sources; magazines, news papers and working papers are selected and reviewed based on their relevance on the topic.

To substantiate the collected secondary data, I was entailed primary data gathered through unstructured in-depth interviews. For this purpose, the interviewees' were selected purposively; from officials in Sudan and China Embassies in Addis Ababa. And I also incorporated scholars from Addis Ababa University who supposed have better knowledge and experiences for this study.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The fact that socio-economic and political cooperation is vital for over all development and social transformation need states to establish relations with one another. The cooperation of China and Sudan in terms of common political and economic interests has no different objective. It is aimed at achieving all-round socio-political and economic development.

Hence, as an academic research, the study contributes to clarify the heated debate on the issues of the coming of China to Sudan whether it is a threat or an opportunity. In light of its support of pariah regimes or as a development partner. Also, it helps to recall or inform researchers, policy makers, state leaders and governments of both China and Sudan to reform and revise their foreign policy orientation according to the cost benefit analysis of both countries.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study

1.8.1 Scope of the study

The study demarcates post Cold War China-Sudan relations; Challenges and opportunity. Therefore, it is not a position to deal their relations in earlier period. The study also not included other related relations such as culture. In similar vein, the study is focused primarily on Sino-Sudan, economic and political relations, in so doing, it is not inclusive all African countries.

1.8.2 Limitation of the Study

Primary data collected for the study obtained from both sides are not balanced due to time and financial constraints. Financial hindrance to travel to both countries and time constraints impinged greatly to collect materials from both countries as these countries are

out of the researcher's geographical boundary. As the topic is related to China-Sudan, interviewees' of both countries Embassies, in Addis Ababa were reluctant to cooperate. However, with limited availability of data, analysis has been made without much affecting my study to realize the overall objective of the study.

1.9 Structure of the Paper

This paper is consisted of five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is an introduction under which background of the study, statement of the problem, research question, core argument, objective of the study, significance of the study, methodology and methods of data collection are presented. The second chapter covered the theoretical frameworks which discussed the theories which are appropriate to study the coming of China to Africa. And the review of related literatures tells what other scholars views' about the relations of the two countries' and to that of Sino-Africa. While the third Chapter of the paper is about political relations of the two countries. Here, the historical ups and downs in relations, such as ,non-interference principle, issues of human rights, military relations are assessed. The focus of the fourth chapter is Sino-Sudan economic relations in the post Cold War period. In this chapter, the trade profiles of the two countries, investment engagement of China in Sudan is discussed in both descriptive and tabular forms.

And the fifth chapter is Challenges and opportunities of the two countries. External pressure from western countries and civil societies aimed to alienate the relations of the two countries. And internal dynamics; from secessionist movements, opponents of the Sudan government and the secession of South Sudan seen as a threats for their harmonious relationships. In economic areas, China's state owned companies in Sudan, its labor practice and development endeavor taught us as a main factor to foster the relations of the two countries. Needless to say, the paper ends up by giving conclusion of the chapters in chapter six.

Chapter Two

2 .Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

This chapter consists of three major sections. The first section is the theoretical framework that provides some important theories related to the coming of China to Africa. International relations theories and global political economy are appropriate to analyze inter- state relations. In terms of realism, issues to maximize power and survival of the state are addressed, while in the economic nationalism the indirect impact to achieve the desired power of a state is economy. So, the political economy is due emphasis to discuss. The second section is assessed definition and concepts of terms. The concept of national interest, sovereignty, foreign policy, non-interference which related a country's relation with others is deal. While the third section deals about the literature review that tells about different writers and scholars on the relations of China - Africa.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

The scope of this study is grounded in the fields of both International Relations (IR), and Global Political Economy (GPE). The theoretical framework therefore draws from theories emanating from both traditions. The dominant theories in International Relations are Marxism, Liberalism and Realism and from GPE, are critical theories, (eg. Marxism), Liberalism and Economic Nationalism. These theories are useful for explaining states behavior in the international system.

However, China's involvement in Africa can be well explained from a Realist perspective of International Relations, since it is the theory that most appropriately explains China's political stance towards Africa and from the perspective of Political Economy, the theory of Economic Nationalism is applicable for the explanation and understanding of the political economy of China's investment in Africa (Roy, 1996).

According to the great proponent of Political Realism, Hans Morgenthau, the main aim of states within the international system in the pursuit of their national interest "defined in terms of power" (Morgenthau,1973:5). Thus due to the structure of the international system, states are inherently self interested entities, with the aim of building power so as to

gain and maintain an advantage in terms of the balance of power. It follows, therefore, that the definition of power and how it is used depend on the current political and cultural milieu (Morgenthau, 1973:9). In this sense, China's foreign policy and external behavior are seen as responsive to the changing dynamics of the international environment (Zhao, 1996:12). For example, the concept of energy security is fast gaining prominence as strategic objectives for powerful states whose behavior can be explained in terms of Realism (such as China) will prioritize "securing trade and trade routes assuring relations with export countries conducive to continuing energy trade" (Heller,2003:355).

Furthermore, Realism contends that, in order to be politically powerful states cannot afford to concern about questions of morality. For realist, the most important foreign policy objective is the survival of the state in the international system (Zhao, 1996:9). Therefore, states act rationally towards the achievement of this goal, and do not allow issues of morality to impede their achievement. Realists assert that states are the most important actors in the international system. In the case of China, it has been argued that it's recent vigorous participation in international trade and the international system is not the result of a desire to become more politically and economically integrated but rather the desire to become diplomatically and economically stronger (Roy, 1998:229). Realist is therefore, a useful tool for explaining and analyzing China's foreign policy behavior.

However, it is not sufficient to view China's involvement in Africa only through the lens of Realism. (Roy,1996:235). For this reason, it is also necessary to view from the perspective of Economic Nationalism. Like Realism, Economic Nationalism propounds the primacy of the role of the state in the global system (O'Brien &Williams, 2004:14). Economic Nationalists argues that, the state's role has not diminished as a result of globalization, because the process of globalization is actually driven and shaped by states, and furthermore national economies are the most important actors in international economic processes (Pickel, 2003:113). A further similarity with Realism is that, Economic is also preoccupied with power. The most central concern of Economic Nationalism is that of bolstering national power (Nakano, 2004a:222). Thus, Economic Nationalists recognize that there is a profound connection between wealth and power (O'Brien & Williams, 204:15).

For Economic Nationalists, the well-being of the nation is of central importance for the rise of power (Nakano, 2004a:222). In order for a state's economy to develop and modernize, the state needs to mobilize the nation through state policies such as trade and investment. In so doing, it create national and international market (Nakano, 2004a:219). The state's role in economic development ultimately contributes towards the formation of a national identity, because "economic development forms and enforces the idea and sentiments of the nation which increases the political power of the states (Ibid: 222). Thus, the relationship between the economy and the nation is an important issue for Economic Nationalists (Ibid: 33).

Economic Nationalism is therefore, an additional suite for the study of China's foreign relations towards Africa. The main priorities of Chinese nationalism are economic development, national unity, independence and international prestige (Chen Zhmin, 2005:52). Of the other economic development is seen as the most important priority, the one that encompasses all other national aim (Ibid: 52). It is thus, within the framework of these theoretical perceptions that China's involvement in Africa will be analyzed and understood.

2.2 Definition and Concept of Terms

The relations of China and Sudan are characterized by foreign policy, sovereignty, national interest and non-interference. The bilateral relation of these countries is to maintain their national interest, through their foreign policy objectives. As both states are sovereign enough, they have legal rights to conduct an agreement. To substantiate the relations of the two countries concerned, terms will be define and contextualized as follow.

2.2.1 Concept of national interest

Different scholars define national interest differently. As a result it is not possible to give any universally acceptable definition of this concept. Ardent realist and intellectuals of international relation, like Hans Morgenthau who has dealt with the concept in his various writing used the term in different ways and assigned variety of meanings. The use of the term like common interest, primary and secondary interest community interest identical

and complimentary interests, material interest, is synonymous concepts of national interest for him (Miskel, 2002: 65).

And it is the fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guides the decision makers of state in formulating their foreign policy (Nathan, 1986: 10). It is also seen as those elements that constitute the states most vital interests which include political independence, territorial integrity, military security economic well-being and development at large. National interest is key concept in any country's foreign policy and the making of foreign policy begins by identifying the state's priorities key national goals (Miskel, 2002: 31).

As Kissinger and Robert (1998:7) argue, the identification of national interest is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. Interests are essential for establishing the objectives or ends that serves as the goals for policy and strategy. "National interests are the foundation and starting point for policy prescriptions. National interest also help to determine the types and amounts of the national power employed as the means to implement a designated policy or strategy. Accordingly, the bilateral relations of every country in general and, China and Sudan in particular are to maximize their national interest. Their agreement in economic well being, or diplomatic cooperation is for the interest of their populace. Political scientist, like Hans Morgenthau (1979:23), forwarded that, national interest are permanent features of the international system. Regardless of what government is in power the interest of a nation state is constant and perpetual as the component of the policy making process. They are "unaffected by the circumstances of time and space. But some interests are varied depending of time, space power and alliance.

The key concept of interest is not to be defined with a meaning that is fixed once and all; rather its generic concept is unchanging in terms of its importance to the international system. But this did not mean that individual interests could not be adjusted or newly created in order to take into account changes in the international system (Morgenthau, 1973:27). Hence, the concept of national interest employed two meanings, according to Tong Xue (2002:21); one is in the concept of international politics, i.e. the interest of a nation in the global arena. And the second is the interest of state as the highest level in

domestic politics, i.e. government interest or a government that represents the people's interest.

Likewise, general interests are shared interests when states have common well-being between or among them. Henceforth, the motive behind Sino-African in general and Sino-Sudan relations in particular could be explained as shared interests. Links such as trade, investment diplomacy could bind them together (McEwen, 2011:6). National interest can be divided into four; such as, Political interest, security interests, economic interests and cultural interests (Tong, Xue, 2002: 18). Further more, each of these general categories of interests can be sub-divided into more concrete interests. For example, Security interest; can be divided into military superiority, territorial security and maritime interests. Economic interests similarly can also divide into export- import, trade, the attraction of international financing overseas investment (ibid).

Hence, national interest became the fundamental basis for a nation's foreign policy for international and domestic objectives .Therefore; both China and Sudan have national interest as objectives. As was mentioned in the theoretical section, one of China's motives in Sudan is to extract energy, i.e. oil as a means. This is the fact to maximize its power and to get international recognition and prestige from economic development as an end (Kaarbo, et.al, 2011:20).On Sudan's part, its relation with China has both economic and political objectives. Politically, it needs internationally recognized, territorially integrated, continuation of its political system. And economically, is to maximize the well being of its citizen and to enhance its national prestige through import/export, trade and attraction of FDI, as one objective of national interest. So both states have national interest as a primary objective to implement their foreign policy.

2.2.2 Sovereignty

The concept of Sovereignty is complex and debatable to define sometimes it is totally contradicted. In usual way, sovereignty is defined in one of two ways. The first definition applies to supreme public power, which has the right and the capacity to the holder of legitimate power, who is recognized to have authority. When national sovereignty is discussed, the first definition applies and it refers in particular to independence, understood

as the freedom of a collective entity to act. When popular sovereignty is discussed the second definition applies and sovereignty is associated with power and legitimately (Benoist, 1999: 3).

On the international level, sovereignty means independence, i.e. non-interference by external powers in the internal affairs of state's own fate. International norms are based on the principle of the sovereign equality of independent states. International law excludes interference and establishes universally-accepted rules. Thus sovereignty is eminently rational, since the sovereignty of a state depends not only on the autonomous will of its sovereign but also on its standing vis-à-vis other sovereign states. From this perspective, one can say that the sovereignty of any single state is the logical consequence of the existence of several sovereign states (ibid).

According to the Montevideo convention on rights and duties of states of 1933 article 1 provides for contemporary notion of sovereignty:-

“The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications.

“A *permanent population; a defined territory; Government* and Capacity to enter into relations with other states.”

Hence, both China and Sudan are sovereign entities. They enter into agreement for their common interests as they have a capacity and legal right to do so. The concept of non-interference is closely related to the principle of sovereignty (Cohen 2004: 20). They are linked in a sense that, a state possesses the legal and political authority to define, implement and defend its interests without intrusion from other states (ibid). In the contemporary Chinese foreign policy, the defense of sovereignty internationally reflects “Beijing’s sensitivity to possible outside involvement in affairs perceived by China as strictly domestic matters” (Carmod and Taylor, 2009:9). China emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference in its own foreign policy to avoid the creation of “international precedents” that might be used by the West to interfere in the affairs of its domain (ibid).

2.2.3 Non-interference

The concept of non-interference has been in literature and in documented sources, since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Specifically seen for the first time in the 1973 French constitution (Malan, 1997: 62). But, the gradual shifts in international ideas were emphasized in writings in the United States (US) and Europe throughout the 19th and 20th century (ibid). Non-interference formed an important part of many theories, policies and debates. Here it is necessary to differentiate and conceptualize between non-interference as a doctrine or principle.

According to Merriam Webster's (2010: 167) thesaurus the terms below can be serving as a basis for other theories.

Doctrine:- refers to the basic belief or guiding principles of a person or group. It can also be seen as a statement of an official government policy where as:-

Principle:- can refer to a basic truth law or assumption, which can serve as a basis for other theories. Meanwhile, this study will refer to the doctrine of non-interference, as a belief and guideline, not as a principle to reiterate China's principle.

Traditionally, legitimate exceptions to non-interference were only made in the case of self-defense or to preserve international peace and security with the permission of the UN Security Council and the states involved (Yebolt, et.al, 2009: 2). Some scholars have argued that this doctrine's position has reduced military intervention and conflict between states which enter into the sovereignty of another state. Initially many non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and non-state actors were adhered to the doctrine later on states also join to the camp (Seybolt, et.al, 2009). The Chinese government, which aims to increase Chinese influence in Africa has advocated the doctrine of non-interference in sovereignty of a state as its foreign policy principle (Aning, 2010: 145).

2.2.4 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is the basic and framework of a nation's relations with other countries. The foreign policy of a state is composed of specific goals designed to be achieved in the course of its relations with the other states. These goals are selected from diverse interests

of a state as the most important and achievable ones. These are mainly related to interests having to do with political, economic, military, relations with other states (Hartmann, 1978:530).

It can be also defined as state's foreign official relations who involve the formulation of a state while negotiating with other states to protect or to expand its vital interests (Brouk, 2006: 11). Foreign policy making is affecting by different factors. These factors can be divided in to internal, and external factors. Domestic factors include geography, topographic characteristics, population, natural resources, and level of development. And the external factors are world organization international law, customary law, the nature and characteristics of world economy, the policies and actions of other states and world public opinion (Aluko, 1977). Furthermore, foreign policy objective are characterizing by various techniques, like:-

Diplomacy: - is the process of representation and negotiation by which states usually deal with one another in terms of peace and to resolve disputes in times of conflict (Cross, 2000). Thus in this case states use diplomacy to attain their purpose by agreement rather than by war. The distinct type of diplomacy which applied in inter-state relationships are persuasion (a domestic technique through which states seek to achieve their purpose by advancing their arguments and offering to do something in return), compromise (a method that enables two states to modify their position on an issue in order to reach a stable relationship based on the principle of give and take), and threat of force (a method through which one state forces the other to accept certain terms of agreement by applying force (ibid)

Similarly, it also, Categorized to implement such as, trade, investment and foreign aid, and conceptualized it as:-Trade policies and foreign aid: - are known economic instruments which may be defined as an economic capacity, institution or techniques explicitly or implicitly applied to foreign policy goals. There can be divided in persuasive economic techniques which use the methods of offering economic reward in return for satisfactory modification of another state behavior and coercive economic techniques which is other scheme through which a state threatens the other with deprivations unless it submits. Example, embargo and sanctions (Kaarbo, et.al 2012: 92)

Military techniques: - are used as a last or ultimate alternative means of influence using some sort of military power. States may use or conduct to war to protect and promote their national interest (Murithi, 2009: 94).

2.3 Literature Review

The increase in China's economic and political involvement in Africa is arguably the most momentous development on the economic and political discourse in the contemporary period (Taylor, 2009:1). As a result, both threat and praise being reaped from African and Western scholars and politicians. They suppose that, the presence of China in Africa in general and with individual countries in particular is for the sake of its resource desire and quench only itself (Ibid).

Critics have claimed that, for the most part, Africa is exporting primary products and raw materials to China with uncompetitive price, while importing cheap manufactured goods from China, in exchange similar to that of the colonial era. Indeed, they accused that China is a new colonizing power, exploiting Africa's natural resources and flooding the continent with low-priced manufactured products (Tull, 2006; Taylor, 2009:5). And Scholars like (Shelton, 2001:118) and (Muekelia, 2004:4), also deserved criticism for China's involvement in Africa. They proposed that, China's approach in Africa with "rogue states" and corrupt governments has considered as a threat for the continent. They argue that China is not use its economic leverage as a political tool, and threaten to cut off financial to recipients that repeatedly violate human rights, good governance and corruption. They claim that, development aid and investment rewards the behavior of dictators and actively funds the oppression of reformists. In addition to the critique that aid conditionality simply does not address the desired outcome instead of encouraging embezzlement, theft and corruption (Ibid).

Other scholars such as, (Davis, 2007; and Leyman, 2005), also claimed, Chinas efforts to secure market, alliance, and to meet energy demands is contributing to massive human right violations in Sudan. China was a backer of the regime when it displaced villagers to explore the oil rich areas by providing necessary weapons to oppress its citizen in exchanges of oil for money and investment dealings with China (Draper, 2006: 3).

On the other side of China's presence in Africa, its turn from reform experiences in the past three decades, its experience of immense economic growth and forming stable government, can serve as a model for developing countries in Africa on how to eliminate poverty and make strides in industrialization. Scholars such as (Wenping,2007:27; & Anshan,2009:65),stated there is a growing trend to view China's rapidly evolving presence in Africa as a force of good for the continent after its stagnation in the post independence period. They expressed the view that the Western colonial power had their chance to deliver development to Africa when they were there, but they failed miserably. They added that, now it is China's turn to provide an alternative development path (ibid). This assumption also supported by African writers and governments that the Chinese loans and other form of assistance to many countries often with no string attached is giving local autonomy to decide their own fate and flexible condition without imposing certain values and preconditions unlike to the loans from Western financial institutions which put criteria on the money they lend (Thomson, 2006:102).

However, the reciprocal nature of China's engagement with authoritarian regimes, states in transition and states with weak or no governance institutions has made a number of scholars more pessimistic about China's influence. This is clearly illustrated by its relationship with Sudan (Khartoum), where China in the past blocked UNSC sanctions against Sudan (Khartoum) in order to maintain uninterrupted access to oil being adhered to the principle of non-interference (Canning, 2007: 54; & Lombard,2006).

Hence, the literature survey found that despite lots of article Journals, review articles, books and researches focusing on the relationship between China and Africa in general, there are limitations of observing in the case of China-Sudan relations in particular. Therefore, this thesis is aimed to show the cons and pros of the relations of the respective countries. This aimed to provide ample information in order to narrow the rift of their relations, by exploring the range of differences, and to actualize the speculations of China and Sudan political economy.

Chapter Three

3. Political Relations between China-Sudan

This chapter deals the political relations of China and Sudan since the post cold war. It identifies and analyzes key manifestation of China's relationship with Sudan with regard to non-interference, Human rights, China's position in the Darfur conflict the cost of development induced displacement and China-Sudan military cooperation and China's shading of the Sudanese government from the allegation of international criminal court, is discussed.

3.1 Background

During the Cold War, China's primary interests in Africa were to stand against the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union, and more importantly, to promote the one China Policy. But later on, its approach changed to one of political diplomacy and, search of extractive industries or economic motives (Wang, 2010:33). Despite their diplomatic relations established in 1959, their economic relations was commenced, after the visit of President Jaafar Nimerri to China requesting oil development in 1970 (Morro, 2009:3). China in this period has not the skill and the capital to respond Nimeiri's request. As a result, between 1970s up to the end of Nemeiri's regime in 1989, their relations was nominal (ibid: 22).

It was after the post Cold War period, their relations took a new stage. This was as a result of two incidents in both countries. The first was, the National Islamic Front (NIF/NCP) in Sudan took power in 1989 through coup'd'état. And the second was the incidence in Tiananmen Square in June, 1989, where peaceful demonstrators were massacred by soldiers of the PRC, and many were tortured and detained (Large 2008a: 94). As a result of this incidence, western countries were condemned China and imposing military embargo and economic sanctions unanimously (Ibid). Therefore, China sought African countries in general and specific countries like Sudan in particular as an alternative ally. Conveniently, African countries on the other hand, were quick to rush to support Beijing in the face of the intense criticism by the West (Taylor, 2006:60).

This converged interest pulled both countries' to integrate their relations after the aforementioned period (Large, 2008:95). As it mentioned above, between 1960 and 1989 Chinese relations with Sudan was characterized with limited diplomatic relations and minor economic involvement. Sudan exported, cotton, sesame, vegetable, where as China was exported military weapons, textile products, detergents with offering its first comparatively small loan and aid package in the 1970s (Shinn, 2009:87).

Similar to that of President Nimeirri's visit, in the 1970s President al-Bashir also visited China in 1995 to request e in the development of oil resources. China immediately admitted the request by way of signing an oil development agreement between the government of Sudan and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1996 (Morro, 2009:3). As a result, from mid 1990, Sino-Sudanese relations developed from limited diplomatic connections, to be regular and more cooperative in economic and political terms (Large, 2008:87). Besides government intimacy, they also employed party to party relations as well. They are complimented by extensive political contacts, involving regular tours by leading CCP officials such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and cooperative agreements between key members of the Sudanese and Chinese governing political elites (Large, 2007:58).

China supported Sudan's interests in international institutions, and used its UN Security Council seat to block or dilute resolutions against Sudan. For instance an economic sanction imposed by the UN in 1996 and by the US in 1997 due to the party's ideology and its ties to terrorism was intervened by China in its development endeavors (Halper, 2010:100). In return, al-Bashir's administration favored Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), provided lucrative contracts and supported China at international forums publicly backing one China policy and voting in favor of China at the UN (Shinn, 2009:91).

Hence, as Zambels (2011; 56), argued, China's commercial and economic interest in Sudan has increasingly come to take precedence over political interest. As mentioned above at (Shinn, 2009:87), the cordial relations of the two countries has emancipated since 1960, but they don't have regular interaction then after. Their relations intensified after the burgeoning of the Chinese economy highly demanded energy resources in early 90s coupled with Sudan's oil development interest. So, their economic interest, which oil taken

as a central became a reason to maximize Political sway of bilateral relations (Large, 2009:11). And as it can refer in section, 4.2.1, below, China's main drive to Sudan is economic specifically, oil which surpassed political motives (Ibid)

3.2 China's non-interference doctrine

China reaffirmed, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as a guiding of its foreign policy with Africa (Taylor 1998: 451). These are, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, since the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 (PRC, 2000). Despite these principles are emerged into the stage of politics after 1955, they were formed in 1950s and matured in the 1980s. The principle, non-interference is one of them which China is contested China's relations with its allays in the contemporary period. (Jackobson, 2007:239).

China's role in African domestic politics and economic approaches has been guided by this principle which it deems as the internal affairs of other states. This is because the Chinese government itself does not allow others to interference in its own domestic affairs. And it didn't itself either. China's stand to it as, (cited in Anthoy, 2012:2), states, "don't do to others you don't want have done to yourself." The Chinese government advocates that national governments alone should be the focus on matters relating to domestic matters (Iyasu, 2011). China's approach to this principle was to increase friendship, while seeking the trust and cooperation of friendly political parties and regimes in African countries (Osakwe, 2012). China believes that, through non-interference it is able to maintain stable relations with foreign governments and ensure that economic cooperation is unaffected by political change (Potter, 2012:11).

China protect other's not to interfere in Sudan's domestic affairs .It believes that, Sanction or interference is not a solution to solve confrontation rather political solution and dialogue can reap the situation and come up with durable peace .¹ This could be addressed

1.Interview with Dawit Yohannes, PhD candidate at Addis Ababa University, Institutions of Peace and Security studies,06 March/2014

putting the conflicting party on the table (Iyasu, 2011:66). For most African countries including Sudan, the policy of non-interference is more attractive factor in their partnership with China (Ayenagbo, et.al, 2012). Because, China was willing to overlook and underdog corruption instability and human rights violations, while helping host country. Rather build up economic, political and military muscles with no attached conditions (Zha, 2006:67-68). However, there are growing concerns that the policy is merely to benefit Chinese business and investment interest in Africa. Because, it is a shadow of contemporary conflicts and socio-political realities of the continent that, China used to approach. This is due to the fact that, the application of the policy has been fixed to feet Chinese interest at the cost of human rights and good governance (Festus, 2013:20).

In the case of Sudan which is China's key trading partner and major oil supplier from Africa, despite China's claims of non-interference policy, it was involved in the domestic affairs of the country to protect its economic interests. China supplied the Sudan government with arms and weaponry.² During the Darfur crisis and the civil war with the South, though it was prohibited and sanctioned by the international community it was delivered armaments (Hilsum, 2008:26). These arms were used for persistent and systematic violations of human rights in Darfur and during the North-South civil war by government forces. So, the supply of arms to a country which is recognized as abuser of its citizen by the international organization shows a transcendence of its non-interference doctrine (Friedman, 2010:96).

China's approach to Sudan is after the withdrawal of Western oil firms from Sudan in the mid 90s. Their resignation was twofold, firstly, in protest against Sudanese government for its human right record and, secondly security threats by rebel force against their firms and workers. This scenario and the invitation of president al-Bashir pulled China to involve and substitute the western firms in the Sudan's oil sector (Large, 2008a:18). Doing this, the Chinese investment in oil in Sudan has been to intensify the cruel act of the regime and enable to upper hand its political and becoming more pariah and repressive (Ibid: 21). As Elijah Aleng, (Cited in, HRF, 2008:13), stated," When you exploit oil and resources,

2. Interview with Professor K.Mathew, PhD. Professor of International Relations, Addis Ababa University 07, March/2014. 3:00-3:50 pm

nothing goes to the population, then you are financing the war against them with resources and that is not acceptable.”

Sudan which is a partner of China's government is widely known to pursue policies of mass human rights abuses in spite of this, China refuse to condemn the perpetrating regime for its human right violations, rather it supports financially, military, and gave political shield (HRF,2008:12). As Boukoro stated this:-

The principle of non-interference has served to safeguard China's own sovereign rights. In the case of human rights China and most African nations argue that state sovereignty is paramount not least because the human rights protection regime is a state based mechanism. A non-interference principle holds that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another's internal affairs. (Boukoro, 2010:43).

For this reason, Beijing's support for right abusing regimes of Sudan was undermined and incurred reciprocity on its investment projects. China's close economic ties to repressive states both obstruct international efforts to promote violations of human rights, and also carry hazardous political consequences for China which shed its reputation from outside and the militant in Sudan (HRF, 2008:13).The SPLA and the people of Darfur believe that China is a partner for the genocidal government in Khartoum and it is interfering in domestic affairs of Sudan by supporting the regime in power (Morten, 2008:17).

Firstly, conditions contributing to the conflict in Darfur were undoubtedly highlighted by the importance of actual oil money after 1999 which contributed to the grievances of rebels and the real economic and political marginalization suffered in Darfur (Large 2008c: 7). Secondly, capital flowing to the central government from the largely Chinese funded oil industry directly financed the war making activities of the predatory Sudanese state against the populace of Darfur (Salih 2007: 36).. For instance, in 2007 and 2008, China's made; 350, battle tanks, 25 light tanks,44 combat planes and 28 attack helicopters were used in attacks against Darfur civilians (Darge, 2011:30). Indeed China's interference by selling arms directly worsened conflict and insecurity and led to numerous violations of human rights in Darfur.

Beijing's repeatedly relied on non-interference to justify its opposition to UNSC sanctions and interventions in, whilst failing to link its oil investment and arms sales in Sudan to the atrocities, instead highlighting its humanitarian contributions. This discontent reveals clear contradictions in China's non-interference principle. Therefore, “the conflict in Darfur posed

major political crisis as a result of China's non-interference policy into Sudan (Jakobson, 2009:41).

Over the issue of Darfur, the meaning of non-interference was further interpreted in two ways;-firstly, China as main investor in Sudanese oil had reason to have an interest in the stability in the region due to its oil investment. China identified this problem by supporting Khartoum with weapons and armory to protect the security of the oil fields. Consequently, the government shored up its Western flank, the marginalized province of Darfur by arming the *Janjaweed* militias; which supplemented its regular army and launch raids on the non-Arab population base of potential rebel's supporters (ICG, 2011:5). These proxy fighters were accused of the atrocities in Darfur, and they were funded and provided with arms by the Khartoum regime, which is supported by oil revenues from China (Lee and Shalmon 2008; Raine, 2009). So without the oil revenue, the Khartoum government would be unable to fund the Janjaweed militia (Lee and Shalmon 2008). A Sudanese refugee (cited at, Darge, 2011:27), stated as "it is obvious that Chinese support for the government in Khartoum, military, economic, and political has made it possible for the army to continue to fight in Darfur."

In practice Beijing has not moved away from the entanglement of sovereignty and non-interference. Initially, China was objecting the interference of others in Sudan. But it shows a gradual pragmatic shift from staunch supporter of not to interference into persuasive stance then to the support of the principle. Hence, China itself has not permanent standpoint on the principle; rather manipulated it in terms of its national interest.

3.2.1 China's duplicity position on Darfur issue

The crisis in Darfur challenged China's diplomatic stance (Holslag, 2008:83). It reaps compromise between traditional norms that, rested on the importance of non-interference in sovereign state, and accommodation of pressure to resolve Darfur problem (Ibid: 71). In 2003, full scale conflict erupted between Sudan's government forces and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), militant from the Darfur region demanded greater political representation in the central government and a place in the ongoing North-South peace process (Flint and de Waal,2005:76) and (Jok,2007:126). Khartoum responded by arming

the Arab militia force, the *Janjaweed*, and unleashing them against the (JEM), intending to drive out the non-Arab populations (Darge, 2011:27). The *Janjaweed* looted, burned, and decimated villages Air bombed the Darfur region, targets arbitrarily throughout the region using Chinese armaments (Meredith, 2005:599).

As a result, Darfur has internationalized China's relation with Sudan and drawn closer attention to its wider involvement in the African continent. Darfur has been described and recognized, as the world's worst humanitarian crisis by the UN in 2004 (Jok, 2007:115). The government sponsored mass killings, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement which had made 2.5 million people entirely reliant on aid to survive, and estimated of total casualties tallied over 200,000 people (Jok, 2007:115; Watts, 2007). Beijing initially strongly opposed any efforts in intervening in the security conditions, in Darfur as was recommended by the international community (Taylor, 2011:146).

When the full extent of the Sudanese government's military campaign in Darfur came to light in 2004, Western states particularly, UK, USA and France, sought action against Sudan in the United Nations Security Council. They posit the responsibility to protect, the Darfurians, which implied that the international community has the right and obligation to put the primacy of sovereignty aside when a state fails to protect its own citizens (Bellamy, 2005:51). However, these efforts were hampered by China. The Chinese responded that what was happening in Sudan was an internal affair that could be solved by the Sudanese central government. Beside this, the problem in Darfur is poverty, illiteracy and social and economic backwardness. Therefore, persistence economic development is a solution instead of sanction and interference³

It is therefore clear that, just from the beginning of the crisis, the Chinese supported the stance of the Sudanese government. For example, when the Sudanese government rejected proposals for the replacement of the African Union peacekeeping force, by UN peacekeepers, China was on the same position with Sudan refused to accept (Oslo forum, 2008:38 and)⁴.It was supported with a combination of protection and political help through

3.Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section, China Embassy in Addis Ababa. 22, February,2014

4. Interview with Dawit Yohannes, PhD candidate at Addis Ababa University institution of Peace & secur

high level meetings between Chinese and Sudanese government officials. (Large, 2008c:8). China's diplomats opposed sanctions with its veto power and abstention of successive resolutions was regarding Darfur having been the motive of protecting its economic interests;

(---) the Chinese oil interests and investments in Sudan and its status as one of the principal suppliers of arms to Sudan, it is not surprising that China opposed UN sanctions and resolutions. Sanctions would have put its interests at jeopardy. [This was], something that was explicitly referred to as reason for the opposition to these resolutions and the threat to veto them by the China representative. (MFA, PRC, 2004:9 and,)⁵.

Beijing asserted that “ a resolution on Darfur must come from engagement and negotiations, recognizing and respecting Khartoum as legitimate, contrary to the widely expressed western coerciveness and threats” (Loke 2009: 209). As mentioned above, Chinese foreign policy based on the, five principles specifically to non-interference and sovereignty was reinforced with its relations with Sudan (Karrar, 2010:18). The principle of, sovereignty and non-interference being the main tenets which China adopted. In the Darfur case, China meant that human rights violation in Darfur is something within the sovereignty of the Sudanese government to deal with. Because a country's sovereignty is the foremost collective human right and sovereignty is the guarantor of human rights. Interfering in the name of human rights in a sovereign state is violation of territorial integrity of the state (Xinhua, December 12, 2005).

Have been said all above, a breakthrough came in mid-2004, when China began to shift its position on the Darfur issue, no longer offering unconditional support to the Sudanese government. This was a result of a combination of international pressure calling for China to adopt a responsible stakeholder role in international affairs. And, concurrently, trends within Chinese foreign policy circles that called for review of Chinese foreign policy and the strengthening of efforts to cooperate with the other major powers (Karrar, 2010:6).

Thereafter, China began a diplomatic campaign aimed at persuading the Sudanese government to Change its policy by sending special envoys such as Lu Guozeng, and met Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in 2005 and dealt about the Darfur issue

5. Interview with Professor K.Mathew, PhD, Professor of International Relations, at Addis Ababa University,

(Jok,2007:115). In similar manner, the assistant minister of foreign affairs, Zhai Jun undertook four visits to Sudan and met with the president and senior officials of the Ministry of foreign affairs in Sudan. These envoys urged the Sudanese government to improve the humanitarian situation in the Darfur region and not to confront with the international community through a hard line approach (ibid:8).

However, Beijing's obstructionist policy began to tentatively shift more from 2005 onwards. When the Security Council passed resolutions in March 2005, where the Chinese representative began to show a more willingness to discuss the resolutions provided that the integrity of the country (Sudan) would be guaranteed (Padraig, et.al, 2008:7). Consequently, from 2006, Chinese diplomats increased their active role in trying to persuade Khartoum and cooperated with the international community in the efforts to stop the violence in Darfur (Jakobson, 2009:424).

Hence, Chinese diplomacy became more visibly engaged through public official statements for ceasefire, and as individual diplomatic visits to Sudan and Darfur to pressurize the Sudan government (Holslag, 2008:80). Beijing shifted its position from fixed stance to one of active engagement and mediation by attempting to convince the regime in Khartoum (Bellamy, 2005:51). As Potter (2012:12), observed below;-

In the early years of the Darfur crisis, China, true to its stated policy of non-interference, treated the Darfur situation as an internal conflict. However, over time, China changed its stance, first shifting to passive support of the government of Sudan without opposing international efforts to intervene in Darfur, and eventually beginning to play an aggressive diplomatic role in bringing the UN peacekeeping force and making more pressure on Sudan.

Along this line, China sent Ambassador Zhai Jun as a special envoy to the Chinese president to meet with Sudanese president and in a meeting on 8 April 2007 and asked Al-Bashir to calm the situation, because China was under tremendous pressure for its stand due to the Darfur issue (Dagne, 2011:28). Moreover, Jun requested the government of Sudan to accept AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur, despite refused by Khartoum (Karrar, 2010:9). In similar vein during president Hu Jintaos visit to Khartoum in 2007,he demanded his Sudanese counterparts to cooperate with the international community and the Security Council .This immediately signaled the fact that China was unable to take any more stand against the Western position (ibid).

Unless we [China] are called by any African country to interfere and do something to assist the respective country, we do not interfere into any African country. All African countries do not want to interference in their domestic affairs, so if African does not want to interfere, china also keeps the interest of African people. We do not stand against the will of the people. So China opposing non-interference. China's sending diplomat to reconcile the situation was by the request of the Sudanese government.⁶

All else aside, the appointment of Ambassador, Liu Guijin as a special envoy to Darfur reached China's climax shift on the Darfur in favor of the international community's position. China joined the West in publicly pressuring Sudan on 31 July 2007, when it supported resolution 1769, which authorized the UN to send a 26,000 peacekeeping force to Darfur (Mendith, 2005:95). China also announced that it was sending 275 military engineers and 43 civil engineers to take part in the UN peacekeeping force in the region.

As Holslag (2008a:74), asserted China's intention to divert was characterized by different scenarios; as its primary consideration was its economic ambitions which have been repeatedly spoiled by Sudan's security conditions. In fact, from 2004 onwards, escalating violence in Darfur put Chinese oil operation at risk (Ibid:74), Chinese oil workers have been directly threatened and abducted, disappeared by separatist groups of the JEM, demanding China's resign from the region and many oil wells are at threat in the conflict areas (Large,2008b:6). Equally important, attention broadcasted to the international communities through media about the Chinese hosted Olympic Games of 2008. Activists were connected the event with the Darfur conflict, naming 'the Genocide Olympics' which China hosted to be. The campaign and the Darfur issue were about to threaten "the positive image China had wanted to project" in the eye of the international community (Budabin, 2011:139). The other campaign which was entitled "Save Darfur" was successful in getting celebrities involved in the campaign. One of the most dramatic events occurred in February 2008, when former artist adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympic, Hollywood star director Steven Spielberg, resigned his position from the Beijing Olympic committee membership due to pressure by 'Save Darfur' campaign (Jakobson, 2009:420).

6. Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section Chinese Embassy in Addis .Ababa, 22,February/2014

The Chinese government thus increasingly found itself losing credibility as a responsible power and hence, status and respect in the eyes of much of the international community because of its support for a regime that was crimes against its own people. China's issues of non-intervention had previously been used by western to paint a picture of China as a responsible and non-integrated member of the international community (Carlson, 2006:217).

Additional more decisive move was the involvement of high ranking U.S. politicians in the campaign who raised the possibilities of a boycott of the Beijing Olympics in Congress in March 2007 (Ibid:149). This was reinforced, when Joseph Biden, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 96 other members of the senate wrote a letter to then President Hu Jintao, urging Beijing to use its influence in Sudan to help solve the crisis in Darfur. This move of the campaign to a governmental level had a decisive impact on Beijing (Carmody and Taylor, 2009:6-7).

The reference to the "Genocide Olympic" by mounting humanitarian advocacy campaign in the first half of 2007, together with the negative media attention focusing on China's role in Darfur, clearly disturbed Chinese [officials] and be used boost their efforts pressuring towards Khartoum (Reuters, 16 May, 2007).

China's changing stance on the Darfur crisis suggested Beijing was a flexible and pragmatic in its application of the non-interference principle. As Ofodile rightly notes "China's leaders are pretty conservative in their principle. They will not want to perform a major foreign policy u-turn, but these moves are a sign that they are willing to be increasingly flexible in their approach not only towards the crisis in Darfur but also other foreign policies too." (Ofodile, 2009:9). Relative to its, stance to the principle gradually China became pragmatic, proactive and flexible. China is no longer willing to merely react to Changes in the external environment, if not embracing of multilateral diplomacy and activities a 180 degree turnabout from recent years.⁷ Hence, it can be elucidate that, China's position of defending the non-interference principle seen as orthodoxy is a rhetoric one which can alter its position if necessary.

7. Interview with Dawit Yohannes, PhD candidate at Addis Ababa University, Institution of Peace and Security studies, 06 March/2014

3.2.2 China's Response to the ICC's Warrant on Sudanese officials

The crisis in Darfur again entered a new phase when the general attorney of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, called for the warrant of arresting for Sudanese officials including president Omar al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. Once more, Chinese diplomacy found confronted by a new challenge as a result of the Darfur crisis (Karrar, 2010:12). China expressed its grave concerns over the ICC decision on the warrant, concerned it as “the activity of international criminal court must be benefited to the stability of the Darfur region and the accomplishment of the settlement of the crisis, not focused on individual cases.” (Iyasu, 2011:56). China once more coated and intended to impede the Sudanese officials from accusation by the court for their verdict on the conflict (Ibid).

With Resolution 1593, the Security Council ordered the ICC to investigate the situation in Darfur; the Council passed the resolution as a binding measure, making it compulsory for all states to comply with these provisions. After 20 months of independent investigation, the prosecutor found reasonable evidences that, some Sudanese officials were responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. But, Khartoum called the ICC prosecutors a “junior employee doing cheap work.”(Jok 2007: 191).Sudan denied that mass crimes have been committed in Darfur and insisted that its own judiciary is competent to deal with whatever has occurred in that region. Substantially, they refused to hand over the two suspects (Harun and Ali Kushayb) to the ICC. Instead appointed them into higher position (ibid), although it “condemn deeply” the violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, believed that the perpetrators must be brought to justice (ibid).

China not only, abstained from voting on the resolution 1593 ICC's direction to investigate the alleged crimes, but it also used its muscle to prevent a strong, collective condemnation of Sudan's non-cooperation with the ICC. This is the fact that China's close military, political and economic relationship with the government of Sudan protected it from condemnation and further investigation (Srinivan, 2008: 67). Basically, China has been economic interest in Sudan, specifically, oil so to maintain its historical economic interest with the regime in Khartoum, it was not able to denied its traditional political support.

Because it's cooperating with the ICC could be losing its credibility and followed the negative consequence from Sudan.⁸

Furthermore, people's daily on 17 July, 2008, stated "the ICC decision poured oil on the fire and obstructed the efforts of the peaceful settlement and negotiations between the armed movements in Darfur and the Sudanese government." China believed, what were needed in Darfur at that time were the enhancement of peace and encouraging dialogue among all the parties and not the threatening of certain parties to the conflict with penalties and arrest warrants (Potter, 2010:11). To reverse this action, Chinese diplomats immediately began conducting negotiation with Washington, Russia and with a member of European capitals and to contain the impacts of the ICC's decision to freeze its decision on Sudan (Holsag, 2008:26).

On 08 August 2009, Chinese representative to the UN, Ambassador Wang Guangya, took to call the Security Council to use its authorities to freeze the prosecutor of the ICC's indictment of the Sudanese president. He further stated as:-

In China's opinion, no progress could be expected in the Darfur peace process without the full cooperation of the Sudanese government and described the decision of the ICC as inappropriate and poorly timed, and that it would severely undermine the mutual confidence and cooperation between the UN and the Sudanese government (cited in Anshan, 2010:36).

Nevertheless, as a permanent member of the Security Council, China has been a responsibility to ensure the binding decision by the Council. China lost that fight, standing behind of Sudan, but Sudan thanked it for its effort, and stated "we do appreciate the support that China has given us in the Security Council," President Bashir's speech (cited in, HRF, 2008:8).

3.3 China's Human Rights Policies and its implication in Sudan

Human rights are by implication," a set of principles ideas about the treatment to which all individuals are entitled by virtue of being human" (Schmitz & Sikkink, 2002:517). The logic therefore, is that despite the myriad different cultural practice that exists through out the world, there is one thing that each individual has in common with each other and that is

8. Interview with Professor K.Mathew, PhD, Professor of International Relations, at Addis Ababa University, 06, March/2014

humanity. Doing this, there are certain basic humanitarian treatments to which all human beings are entitled to (Frank, 2008:198).

In order to understand the human rights practices of China in Africa, it is helpful to look its human rights nature domestically. China in fact was amongst the initial group of 48 states who adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Furthermore, China has signed and ratified the international covenant on civil and political rights. And it is an active party to the International Bill of Human rights (ibid). Despite being subject to the International Bill of rights, it maintains a culturally relativist position on human rights. Because Beijing believes that each country has the right to interpret human rights according to its own domestic customs (Smitz and Sikkin).

Kenneth Roth (2006:20), states that, when it comes to human rights, China foreign policy is skeptic. To China, human rights are relative, and each country must have the freedom to define its own ways of human rights principle. This idea emanated from the ten affirmations that form the basis of the Beijing Declaration, which states that every state has the right to choose its “own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights.” Thus China views external intervention on the grounds of human rights as a violation of the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs (Taylor, 2005:5).

However, the West believed that human rights have historically arisen from a need to protect citizens from abuse by the state, which might suggest that all nations have a duty to intervene and protect people wherever they are. But the developing countries, including China and most African nations, argue that state sovereignty is paramount, not least because the human rights protection regime is a state’s mechanism. A noninterference principle holds that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another’s internal affairs (Wang,2010: 41).Of particular concern is the situation in Sudan, a country devastated by massive human right violations, forced displacement, in extraction of oil and conflict ridden country. Sudan is a country where China has traded arms and invested in oil resources without sufficient considerations for human rights of the population. In many ways, China’s economic relations with Sudan have affected the human rights situations therefore the worse (Amnesty Int’l:2006:1).

In this regard, it is worth noting that, Chinese arms supply to Sudan since the 1990s have been used by the Sudanese government and militias to commit massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law (Sonya, et.al, 2012:66). Such violations have included directed and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian settlements, which have caused deaths and mass forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Planes and helicopters bought from China have been used to launch aerial bombing on villages to clean the ground, to be ready for ground troops in the armed conflict in Southern Sudan until 2004 and the Darfur from 2003 up to the end of 2006 (ibid:2). Powell testified on his article as:-

To meet the demand for oil and other natural resources, China has built relationships with African states. Rich in mineral resources, but plagued by poverty and corruption, many of these states rely on oil exports to sustain their economies. This is why China has partnered with Omar al-Bashir and traded weapons for oil. These weapons are supplied to the military and militias in Sudan, who then use them to systematically kill the non-Arabs in the Darfur region of Southern-Sudan, and exacerbate the civil war (Powell, 2008:158).

Between extraction, transportation, storage and refining, and even use of oil, the development of Sudan's oil industry at all has been a Chinese production and involvement. Chinese state owned enterprises (SOE) are the main actors for the activities of these developments.

China needs African development in general and Sudan in particular, so if you mention different government's peace, security and stability we provide humanitarian aid to Sudan to improve the livelihood of Sudanese people. Europeans put some criteria .the most thing about human right is development China believes development brought peace and stability. The most important for human right is economic development.⁹

Sudan has allowed Chinese companies to extract and transport crude oil for export at the same time that it has enabled the al-Bashir government to consolidate its power and violate human rights. The termination of Western companies to engage in development endeavor with oppressive regime of Sudan, allowed China to replace them and got an opportunity to import oil at cheaper price and enable to get diplomatic privilege with Sudan (Powell, 2008:157). Khartoum had played a central role in these human right violations, with China's willingness. Because China was a close alliance of Sudan during the Darfur

9. Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section Chinese Embassy in A.A, 22, February, 2014

conflict and “no other power holds to influence over Khartoum as China regarding human rights” (Richardson, 2006:57).

China believes that, human rights, good governance and democracy should follow economic development. The basic feature of conflict and violations of human rights are emanated from lack of economic development. So states such as Sudan should give a priority concern for economic development to tackle human rights violations, promote good governance and democracy. But in real and actual terms it is indisputable to assume Africans in general and Sudan in particular addresses economic development without human rights and good governance.¹⁰

Since China is biggest trading partner, whom it purchases 70 % of Sudan’s oil export until independence of South-Sudan, it does not want to pursue Khartoum. Because the nature of Chinese government regarding human right in its domestic is condemned by the international community and human rights activists many times. So what it did not implement in its own people can not realize in Sudan.¹¹ Instead they used oil money from China for the war fare activities in Sudan;-Cordon noted it as:-

Not only did Khartoum use Chinese oil money to fund its ethnic cleansing of southern insurgents, but China sold them the weapons to do it. In violation of a UN embargo, \$100 million worth of aircraft and small arms were sold to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir between 1996 and 2003. The Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin, explained, “We don’t believe in embargoes. That just means that people suffer. From a practical consideration, embargoes and sanctions can’t solve problems (Condon, 2012:9).

China’s growing economy needs energy and draws seventy percent of its imported oil from Sudan. Putting pressure and an embargo on Khartoum to shape up on human rights, would threaten the lines of China-Sudan relations in this regard (New York Times,16 May, 2006).What China perceive is that energy security is a backbone of economic prosperity, and this resulted to national security, which gives foreign policy implementation. Hence, maintaining energy security is at the cost of human rights (Pan, 2006, Reeve, 2006).

China’s Deputy foreign minister is quoted at (Brooks, 2006:44), said” “business is business. We try to separate politics from business.” And I think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them.” And as Roth (2006:16), indicated it in other way,” when Western governments try to use economic

10. Interview with Kemal Bashir Ahmed, minister plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa,11 February.2014

11. Interview with Professor K.Mathew, PhD, Professor of International Relations, at Addis Ababa University,06 March/2014

pressure to secure human rights improvements over Sudan, China is pardon gives dictators the means to resist”

3.3.1 Military Relations

Since the 1990s, China has been one of the major global suppliers of military equipment and small arms to Sudan (Kotecki, 2008: 211). Military cooperation and arms supplies constituted a significant area of state links between the two countries. (Large, 2009) noted that, China has been a prominent supplier of arms to Sudan since 1971, especially during the civil war between 1983-2005 and the Darfur conflict between 2003 and 2007. These included anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, ammunition, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircrafts. (Atrree, 2013) further stated that, China supplied 72% of the Small Arms and Light Weapons to the government of Sudan between 2001 and 2008. Another face of Chinese military cooperation in Sudan has been the assistance of Chinese companies for the building of weapon factories outside the capital, Khartoum (ibid).

This is the fact that when China comes for acquiring oil from Sudan, its own part came with handful of weapons (Alden, 2005b:142). During the 1990s, control of oil producing areas and exploitation of oil became critically important to Khartoum, enabling it to generate funds and acquire arms to consolidate its power and wage war against rebel groups, such as SPLM/A (Atrree, 2012). Most of the income generated from oil sales was spent on acquiring and manufacturing arms. Between 1996 and 2006, in spite of UN Security Council embargo, Sudan bought a US\$700 million worth of aircraft and small arms from China. These were the period where oil money was emancipated as Sudan’s major source of income (Ibid).

Table, 3.1, military sales between China and Sudan between 1996 and 2009

Year	1996	1999	2001	2003	2004	2006	2007	2009
Type	Z-6 Fighter air- craft	F-7M Fighter Jets	Rock et prop elled	Morta r Roun ds	A-5C Fantan Fighter	Militar y Trucks	K8,train er aircrafts ,F-7,jets	FC-1 Fighter air crafts

Quantity	12	7	1500	2,500	20	200	6	12

Sources:- (Small Arms Survey 2007; Jok, 2007:191; HRF, 2008; UN, Comtrade, data, 2010).

The kick off of the conflict in Darfur was in 2003, and it escalated with in the next successive years until, the eve of 2008. Likewise, China’s exporting military weapons for the country become regularly and increased in type and quantity in these years. So it could elucidate that, China was a means for the violation of human rights by the Sudan government.

Sudan’s aggressive purchase of arms from China has drastically risen since 1999. Arms expenditures by Khartoum in general, tripled from 1999 to 2000, then quadrupled in 2001, and climbed to fifteen fold in 2002. It also tripled again in 2003, but dropped by one-third in 2004, and rose in 2005. By 2006, Sudan’s small arms imports from China had risen to more than 680 times their 1999 levels due to the escalation conflict in Darfur (HRF, 2008:21). As Miller in 2007, writes;-

In exchange money for oil, Beijing provides weapons and diplomatic support. China has supplied Sudan with tanks, artillery, helicopters and fighter aircraft. China has flooded Darfur with anti-personnel mines. It is estimated as much as 80 percent of Sudan's oil revenue goes to buy arms. Beijing has also helped Sudan build its own factories to manufacture small arms and ammunition, the real weapons of mass destruction in Khartoum's campaign of ethnic cleansing. Chinese-built helicopter gunships reportedly operate from airfields maintained by the Chinese oil companies (Miller, 2007:9).

Due to the escalation of the conflict, small arms were not enough to control the war. Hence, Sudan tends to engage in heavy weapons too (Shinn & Eisenmen, 2005:8). As a result, it introduced fighter aircraft or heavy arms, Mortars, and Military Trucks from China to Sudan (Xinua, 2006:29).

According to the 2006 Amnesty International report, China has also been supplying Sudan with military vehicles and military expertise too. They found 222 vehicles were acquired from Dongfeng Automobile of China. In October, 2005 for instance, Chinese commanders and the Sudanese minister of national defense drew up a plan to train the Sudanese armed forces in China. And more cooperation was promised in 2007 between chiefs of each

country's armed forces to develop the military relations of the two countries (Amnesty Int'l, 2006). Doing this, China is backing by providing weapons, giving training to its cadet, so it is backing the Sudan government in domestic conflict. According a rebel fighter in Darfur in 2006, (cited in, HRF, 2007):-

China is enemy number one, said an official of the southern side in the North-South civil war. They are the ones who kept Bashir in power for so long, providing him with weapons to try and win the war in the South. They are the ones who supplied him with helicopter gun ships on the attacks on Bentiu (District of Darfur), and other places. They are evil. They are the ones providing military support to the government on Darfur; Of course they are (HRF, 2007:8).

Likewise, the Sudanese government also has been acquiring military aircraft, light tanks and combat planes. Such aircraft have been used to carry out numerous human rights abuses through air raids for the displacement of people with the oil revenue (Shinn, & Eisenman, 2005:16). For instance, in 2001, sixty percent of the government's oil revenue went towards military spending (ibid).

China has several reasons for wanting Khartoum to remain well armed. For one thing, arms sales provide Khartoum with an incentive to keep giving China preferential access to oil. And Beijing has used arms exports to Sudan, to facilitate oil extracting deals with Chinese companies and to inter Sudan's oil exploration and production (HRF, 2008:25). Secondly, as the country (Sudan), continuously at war with itself for many years, it is considered as valuable customer of arms. And thirdly, as Chinese state owned enterprise are under threat from different timely rebellions in Sudan, it is believed, they are used as a protection for their companies by Sudanese military forces (ibid).

Although China and Sudan were condemned by the international community and Human rights organizations for their military cooperation. Sudan claims that, the primary objective of a country is to maintain law and order. Doing this, Sudan has a rationality to buy weapons and protect its citizens and the governance as a whole from external atrocities, threats and instability.¹² China on the other hand has a national objective to maximize its interest either by selling its manufactured products such as weapons and making diplomatic deals with other independent states.

12. Interview with Kamal Bashir Ahmed; Minster Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Abab,11 February/2014

3.3.2 The contradiction of development

Oil exploration and infrastructure developments have caused a significant amount of displacements in Sudan. This is commenced with the construction of 2000 km of pipeline from Heglig oil fields to Port-Sudan. The government of Sudan allowed the eviction of local communities along sides of the pipeline. Between 1999 and 2003 in the Upper Nile eastern region, 48 villages were burned and over 55,000 people were displaced (Terminiski, 2008:11). The worst thing is the oilfields war between villagers and government forces has caused a displacement of 174,000 people from the Bantiu region in 2000 and from the Ruboka region of South-Sudan in the same year.

Indeed, these activities were employed by the arms imported from China. For instance, at the early exploitation of oil fields of Block 1 and 2 in Unity state, when China's CNPC began to explore oil in the region, the company ordered the Sudan government to be ready for exploitation from people backed by Chinese weapons and armaments. Thus the government forces were responsible in forced displacement and killings of civilian population which are living there when ever they resisted their expulsion. In addition planes were bombed reinforcing the militias and supported the armed forces, attack villagers, and destroying homes until the area was depopulated (Amnesty Int'l, 2006:3).

The Chinese state owned companies like, CNPC also facilitated the scenario by building road to travel to the army and militias to launch attacks on civilians. Sudanese tanks and Soldiers cleaned the area from inhabitants then followed Chinese companies for development (Askouri, 2007). Furthermore, in clearing and depopulating of the area for oil exploration, this company was backed the Sudanese government's armed forces by providing weapons from oil revenue (Ibid).

In constructing the Merowe Dam contracted by CNPC subsidiaries, the China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Corporation (CWHEC) and the China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE), has had destructive human impacts. In order the reservoir to run or extend 200 Kms, it resulted in forced displacement of 50,000 civilians (Enkua, 2010:103). And others more than 10,000 civilians have been resettled against their will and on poor land for irrigation. In September 2003, a group of

farmers returned from the resettlement site to their original villages when they realized how the poor the area was for farming. But the government met them with unprovoked violence using live bullets and injured many to return back (Large and Patey 2011: 20).

On Sept. 30 of, 2003, a group of men, women and children of Korgheli Village demonstrated against the Merowe dam around the dam site. The police ruthlessly attacked those using live bullets, tear gas and plastic rods. Three men were shot, severely injured and were taken to Karima Hospital. A number of women were injured in the scuffles with the police. Many public figures were arrested on site and taken to Kober prison where they were detained for a month and were subjected to torture and abuse (Sautman, 2006:71).

The construction of the Kajbar Dam which located near the Egypt-Sudan border also resulted in displacement of more than 60,000 people from 30 villages in the area. The dam is constructed by both Sudanese and Chinese companies' joint venture, which caused chasing of Nubian tribes residing in the area for a long period. Just after the inauguration of the dam for construction in 2000, the tribes gathered and protested the construction, to which the government of Sudan responded by sending a riot police and security units to break up the demonstration. In June 2007, police shot and killed more than 20 protesters who were attacking construction equipments and arrest demonstrators (Kotecki, 2008). Forced displacement as carried out by Sudanese army troops and government backed militias in these oil exploring areas constitute a violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. A government that is responsible for or disregard the large scale international displacement of its own citizens violates its obligation under the charter of the UN, which requires all members states to the UN " to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom for all" (Article 55 and 56).

Despite Scholars' argument above as 'development' caused displacement of people violated human rights, the stance of both Sudanese and Chinese governments was speculated as a constructive positions. Countries of Africa in general have low level of technological development; they have ample natural resources but lacked skill, capital and development knowhow. So to gain long effect there is a scarification of short benefits. The construction of large Dams and the extending of long pipelines is an opportunity for the majority of Sudanese and for the continuous and sustainable development of the country.¹³

13. Interview with Kamal Bashir Ahmed .Minster Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa. 11 February/2014

When comparing short effect and longer benefit, development is compulsory for all over the world, not specific to Sudan. The sustainable economic development and durable peace and harmony are the outcome of consistence economic development. Since, displacement is somehow, shifting of permanent residency to new one which life still perpetuated, it could take as a constructive experience.

When we look at all of these sections they all are aggregated to the non-interference principle which is a persistent reason for all the grievances raised. The devastative human right violations in Darfur were shielded by China's veto power in the UN Security Council against successive resolutions which pursue the regime in Khartoum. This crisis was inflicted sever damage both in human and material terms and resulted in sour relations of the Sudanese government with the international community. Despite these were the main bottle necks which were commonly condemned, they have common vested interests to react these accusations.

Chapter Four

4. Economic Relations between China-Sudan

This chapter deals with economic relations of the two countries since the end of Cold-War. To this end, it aims to address China's manifestation of economic motives with Sudan in terms of bilateral trade, investment and infrastructure developments discussed. It also covers issues such as, constructions of hydro-powers, Dams oil refineries and pipelines. Issues of China's position within the interim periods of rapprochement and its position after South Sudan's independence also included.

4.1Background

Formal economic and technical assistance between China and Sudan was commenced by the 1962 agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC), which remained effective until 1970. The relation was further boosted in 1970 following the visit of President Jafaar Nimeirri to China, requested trade deals. Following his visit a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol (CSTP) were signed in the same year. These agreements increased China's assistance to Sudan in infrastructure, and encouraged a flow of professional staff, mainly in the Chinese assisted hospitals' projects (Tadros, 2012; 27). Between 1970 and 1980s Sudan received US\$ 500 million free interest project-based loans from China with easy repayment terms. Eight projects were identified during this period, by the Sudanese part for channeling China's aid. These included the construction of two bridges, the Friendship Hall, 410 km of tarmac road linking Median and Gedarif, Hassaheisa textile mill, a hospital as well as rice cultivation and fishing projects (Pannel, 2008:706).

Following the political turmoil resulting from the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the Chinese Government led by Deng Xiaoping formulated new economic reforms in 1978 which emphasized ins and outs of economic relations. As a result, by early 1990s this reform showed immense positive results (Tangri, 1999:77). Hence, China's approach to Sudan after this period increased in key economic sectors. Following this, from 1990s,

Sino-Sudanese relations developed from limited diplomatic and economic connections to more intensive engagement (Large, 2008: 87). An Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, and an Agreement on Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation was signed respectively in 1990 and 1992. These agreements made China to provide some interest free loans for university laboratory equipments, irrigation equipments to Sudan (Central Bank of Sudan, 2010).

4.2 Post 1990, China-Sudan Economic Relations

China's economic policies towards Sudan promulgated during the mid-1990s was part of China's general design to exploit natural resources and to expand its diplomatic prestige in African countries (Haroz, 2011:30). China's emergence as a giant developing country or a new ascending power in the international political and economic arena stimulated by its large scale industrialization programe generated increasing demands for natural and fuel resources. The decade also marked a shift in the orientation of the country's foreign policy from ideological and cultural motives to one of diversified economic sectors (Alden and Alves 2008: 44).

The contemporary economic relations were strengthened with the agreement set-up of Sino-Sudanese Committee for economy, trade and technical cooperation in 1993. This agreement was upgraded into Chinese-Sudanese Joint Ministerial Committee in 1994. Investment protection agreement and the agreement on prevention of dual tariff were also added in May 1997 (Zeig, et.al:2005). Another noteworthy factor is the intensive high-level exchange of visits between 1994 and 2008 by top officials between the two countries. In all Nineteen such visits were undertaken; thirteen from the Sudanese part including two presidential visits and six from China's part including one presidential visit (Suliman, 2008:13).

4.2.1 Intensification of inter-relations between Sudan and China

China-Sudan complementary needs can also see in another dimension. When Iraq led by President Saddam Hussein was invaded Kuwait in 1991, the government of Sudan (NIF/NCP), was supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war, and Sudan was associated

with terrorism after the assassination attempt on President Mubarak in June 1995 in Addis Ababa. These factors isolated Sudan from both the Middle East and the West. Consequently, it encountered under sanction from the UN in 1996 and from the US in 1997. As a result Sudan faced with high economic inflation (Natsios, 2012:108). Consequently, Sudan turned to China in the middle of the 1990 to find an alternative partner for economic cooperation and to fend off the economic sanctions.

Large (2009:612), also stated, "amidst conflict and instability in Sudan, the government in Khartoum faced protracted external adversity and turned to China as its key international sponsor." In line of this, the rapid growth of China's economy resulted from its economic reform from centrally planned to more market oriented in the late 1990 has forced China to seek energy resources outside its borders. Concurrently, Chinese per-capita gross domestic product has increased more than three fold and on average the country's economy grew more than 8 percent annually for the last three decades (HRF, 2008:11). Hence, this also is an additional factor for, Sino-Sudanese relations to develop from limited amount of trade on cotton to more intensive engagement focused on Sudanese oil exploration and production (Ansah, 2011).

In short, the presence of China in Sudan reconciled with the interest of Sudan that in search an alternative partner for energy extraction and exploration (Ibid). Kaplinsky (2006:62) ,also see it as "to overcome these economic difficulties, the Sudanese leading group began enthusiastically looking for an influential business partner who could extract oil and mobilize other natural resources to lubricate their weaken economic muscles." And (Carmody & Taylor, 2009:36), seen this as "Khartoum's need for investor coincided with China's growing thirst for oil." Consequently, the period between 1991-1995 was a transformation and agreement deals such as an agreement of oil development in 1994 and bilateral agreement between the CNPC and the government of Sudan in 1995 to engage in extensive economic ties (ibid). It was since 2000 that, Sudan's export to China increased intensively particularly after exploration of oil in August 1999 (Ibid: 12).

Following exploration of oil and subsequent finding of it in 1999, Sudan became one of largest recipients of China's foreign direct investment in Africa (Cheng, et.al, 2009:21).

For their strong economic relationship between the two countries, China cancelled 63% of Sudan's debt which accounted US\$67.3 million debt in 2001 and it cancelled more US\$170 million in 2007. It also provided a US\$13 million interest free loan to construct a new presidential palace in Khartoum (Atrree, 2012).

In short, the take of their economic relations was assumed in early, 2000, after oil produced and began to export (Suliman, 2009:10). China-Sudan economic and political relations expanded significantly after this period (Kuo, 2012:4). If so, the pulling factor that China drive to Sudan is seeking of oil. China's main motives to come to Sudan *citrus paribus*¹⁴ therefore is for development of oil (Nicolas, et.al, 2006:82). Because its investments in the sector compared to others is (99.9%) where others are insignificant share which shows industrial 0.07%, Services, (0.03%), and agriculture 0.0001 % (Drumond, et.al, 2013:10). Beuce and Bulcke (2009:44), also claim that, China's drive to Africa is its hunger of natural resources, specifically oil. Large (2008:54) also reiterated this as "China's engagement in Sudan developed after president al-Bashir requested oil concession in 1995 and the consequence entry into the country of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the same year."

Both Burr and Collins (2010:248-249), also ironed the assumption that, China entered Sudan in the mid 90s for oil purposes, because China expected to have huge amount of oil after it turned to oil importer from 1993. Kleine also testify it as:-

Chinese presence on the African Continent is far from uniform. It can be found in places where there is a concentration of natural resources required for the economic development of China. Access to so-called strategic resources is a high priority for Beijing authorities, given that they see continued double-digit growth figures as a basic condition for maintaining their political legitimacy. Whereas China shows only minimal interest in countries such as Rwanda, Benin, or Togo, where natural resource wealth is very limited, China's presence is growing in Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The reason for Beijing's interest in these countries is that China currently imports from them over 25% of the oil consumed annually by its energy-hungry economy (Kleine, 2008:51).

According to my interviewee, "China's main drive to Sudan is economic imperatives such as to engage in development projects, access of raw materials and market for its manufactured products added to oil exploration. Because, Sudan has a large untapped

¹⁴ Remain things as they are, remain things constant: Trade, political issues.

resource of oil and market potential along with the opening up of economic development emanated from oil income. It has also been benefited from a stable trade partner enable to import its product.¹⁵.

4.3 Trade Relations

Sino-Sudan trade relation was stimulated since the end of the cold war with China's trade liberalization at home converged with Sudan's initiation of oil extraction. Conveniently, their trade ties has grown remarkably since early,2000 with the booming of oil based economy resulting in increased demand for Chinese manufactured goods in Sudan (Large, 2008:58).The exchanges of goods and services during the period [1990-1995] was insignificant which the two countries were in the middle of economic transformation ((Ibid)

But, after the development of oil, it remains at the heart of relations and dominates Sudan's trade with China. Between, 2002 and 2009, Sudan was China's sixth-largest oil supplier world-wide, and set third from Africa next to, Nigeria and Angola. It counted for 7 per cent of China's total crude imports and 64-68 % of Sudan's export of it's over all oil production every day. Consequently, the significance of Chinese oil trade in Sudan has spurred the trade relationship between the two countries economy (Alden, et.al: 2008).

Table, 4.1, shows Sudan's oil export to China from 2000 up to 2011 in thousand barrels/day

year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total local production	196	221	247	270	304	346	434	617	646	634	594	541

¹⁵ Interview with Kamal Bashir Minister Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa,11 February/2014

Export to China	34.56	125.4	141.	158.0	194.5	221.4	277.	394.8	413.	405.	380.	346.
		40	44	8	60	440	760	80	440	760	160	240

Sources :(Salih, 2007, Hong, 2007; Deng, 2011:24, and Sandres, 2012).

As it indicated in the table above, oil export to China gradually increased from its inception in early 2000, up to 2009, and declined from, 2009 onwards. Since 75 %o of Sudan’s oil wealth is in South-Sudan, its secession enable to take this oil concession (Sandres, 2012). Consequently as (Zafar, 2007, and, Sandres, 2012:8) looked, Sudan’s economy showed promising development in the period when oil was began to export to China. Hence, it was oil as a resource and China as a trade partner which gave additional value, and contributed to greater share of GDP for the country. Where, other sectors’ contribution to FDI is marginal, such as; the industrial sector 0.56%, service 0.080% and agriculture 0.02%. Over this period, where oil is began to export to China (99%), in total while non-oil exports cumulated and counted only a small share of (1%) (Ibid).

Independent observers such as the (IMF) also forwarded, oil represented around 57 percent of Sudan's total government revenue and around 78 percent of export earnings in 2011. And according to the table above and the IMF projection, Sudan's oil earnings substantially declined following the South-Sudan secession. According to the IMF report, oil accounted for 32 percent of total export earnings and 30 percent of Sudan's total government revenue in 2012 (IMF, 2011). Besides their bilateral trade exchange, Sudan is strategically important to China’s goal of diversification of trade partners to remain independent and conforms to China’s strategy to establish itself on the global oil market (Ibid). China’s trade with Sudan reflects the patterns of overall trade with Africa. For instance, the increase in China-Sudan trade matches the overall dynamics of increasing trade with other African partners. According to Jakobson (2006: 60-73),” for China, Sudan was a model site of engagement in Africa predating the expansion of its relations with the continent.”

Henceforth, the characteristics of trade relations between the two countries reflected China-Africa, trade feature in general. China's exports to Sudan are mainly consisting of manufactured goods such as textile products and clothing, footwear, transport equipments such as automobiles, trucks and aircraft vehicles household utensils, electricity and electronic equipments. And as it indicated in section 3.3.1, apart from good governance and human rights issues in Khartoum, Beijing also exports large sum of military hard wares to Sudan (Shinn, 2006:65).

On the Sudan's side, agricultural products, such as cotton, live animals, meat, oil seeds, sorghum, sesame, vegetables and fruit took significance portion of Sudan's exports to China added to oil (Jobarteh, 2008:70). Likewise Sudan's export items to China represented the trade profile of China-Africa. As a result, Sudan is China's 3rd trade partner from Africa next to Angola and South-Africa. China's role as Sudan's leading trading partner therefore is undeniable with bilateral trade for the Sudanese economic take off during its stay with the country (Large, 2009:616).

Table,4.2 China-Sudan, aggregate trade volume between the years 2003 and 2009 in (US\$)

Years	China's exports to Sudan	Annual China Export growth rate (%)	Sudan's export to China	Annual China imports Growth rate (%)	Trade Balance
2003	654 million	60.54	1.02 billion	45	552million
2004	815 million	70.5	1.71 billion	18.3	644 million
2005	1.29 billion	58.5	2.61 billion	53.3	1.32 billion
2006	1.41 billion	9.3	1.94 billion	-25.7	530 million
2007	1.48 billion	5.0	4.13 billion	112.9	2.65 billion
2008	1.52 billion	4.5	4.32 billion	104	2.80 billion
2009	1.50 billion	-0.93	3.35 billion	-2.89	1.85 billion

Sources: (Pannel, 2010:710, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2004, China trade statistics, 2005 -2008); also at, <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn>

Naturally, if a country's export is greater than it imported, it has greater balance of payment which incurred its foreign currency to re-invest further projects. As the table shows, the trade balance of the two countries favors Sudan, so it has a trade surplus for Sudan, where as China has a trade deficit all over the years counted. In this context, Sudan's export to China has raised the share of GDP for the country.

As China's engaged in economic sectors in Sudan commenced, the country came up with promising developments. Sudan which is endowed in natural resources was idle from benefiting of its fortune, despite there was an attempt other oil developer companies, before the arrival of China. But Chinese state and the state owned companies made this history. They turned the country from oil importer to a profit laden exporter, to cover its public expenditure from the revenue earned (Kamal Bashir).¹⁶

In short, China's relationship with Africa has been economically beneficial for much of African countries. As Hilsum notes "as a result of intensified trade links with China, African countries such as Sudan has enjoyed higher growth rates, better terms of trade, increased export volumes, higher public revenues" (cited in Friedman, 2010:140). Despite widespread criticism of China's practices in Sudan by Western dominated institutions, such as the World Bank begrudgingly acknowledged the positive economic impacts of China in Sudan and noted it shortly "China's investments ease Sudan's poverty" (Miller:2009:12 &Rui,2009). Equally, the GDP of Sudan has risen from 2.6 percent on average in 1999-2001 to around 6.4 percent in 2001-2004, and 6.8 percent in 2005-6 largely and it hit to 13% in 2009, a result of China's growing consumption of commodities such as oil and growth to 11% in 2009 (Jacques, 2009: 327). China's growing demand for oil accounted for 18 percent of overall growth in oil demand globally between 2000 and 2005, and positively affected the terms of trade for countries rich in oil and natural resources such as Sudan (Zafar,2007:113).

4.4 China's investment in Sudan

In the early 1990s, Sudan presented to China untapped economic potential (Large 2008a: 96). Sudan presented a strong opportunity for China and played a significant role in China strategic energy expansion abroad (Large and Patey 2011: 10). As Taylor (2006: 943-944)

¹⁶ Interview with Kamal Bashir, Minister Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa,11 February/2014

pointed, China has been pursuing an “outward-looking oil economy” since 1995. The drivers most associated with China oil diplomacy are two fold; firstly; rising domestic demand as a result of China development; and secondly, as a long-term objective, to position China as a global player in the international oil market (Ibid: 938). So, Chinese companies invested abroad are the result of the domestic policy it endorsed “going out” strategy in search of resources (Ibid). As Zewig and others, stated it as;-

China’s foreign policy has had to increasingly reflect the domestic policy imperative of ensuring a smooth uninterrupted flow of raw materials imports to satisfy its burgeoning economic growth path. This it has done by encouraging state-controlled companies to seek out exploration and supply contracts with countries that produce oil, gas, and other resources. At the same time, Beijing aggressively courts the governments of those countries with, investment, trade deals, debt forgiveness, and aid and security packages, an effective combination not seen in Western countries (Zewig, et.al, 2005:27).

Since, Sudan is the third largest producer of crude oil in sub-Saharan Africa, contains 563 million barrels of conventional proven reserves according to 2001 census, this underpinned China to come to Sudan (Hurst, 2006:8). Approximately 15 companies are operating in the country’s oil development. Among, these mainly are from Asia, particularly, from China (CNPC), Malaysia (Petronas) and India (ONGC). The Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs), role in developing the oil industry in Sudan has substantial share; as it depicts form table 4.3 below, most of the oil development are covered by the Chinese firm, CNPC, so, it could be argued that,” without the Chinese investments, Sudan would has remained unable to exploit its oil resources.”(Patty, 2006:33).

Therefore, as a state owned Oil Company, China National Petroleum Company, which is China’s arm in securing oil overseas, was granted oil concession as a response of President al-Bashir’s request in 1995. It signed an agreement with Sudanese government few months later, and started to develop the Heglig and Unity oil fields located on the border of Sudan and now South-Sudan consequently This laid the foundation for petroleum cooperation between the two countries. Since then the CNPC expanded its operations and acquired more oil concessions in Sudan by holding a 40% interest in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which it owned the rights in blocks 1, 2 and 4 (Heglig and Unity fields), 92% interest in block 6, Fula region, 41% interest in Petrodar consortium which owns the rights of blocks 3 and 7, and as it indicated detail in table 4.3, below.

As a result of its effort, CNPC's produced oil on August 30, 1999, when the first tanker loaded 600,000 barrels of crude oil produced left for Singapore. This event marked Sudan's transformation from an oil importer to an oil exporter realizing the country's aspiration to become a player in the international oil industry in one hand, and fastened the bilateral relations between the two countries on the other (Tadros, 2012). As a result, Sudanese oil revenue was supplemented the government budget and to the GDP in general from 9 percent to 26 percent, in the periods between 2000 and 2009 with an average of US\$3 billion every year (Ibid).

Besides the oil revenue, China allocated \$20 billion for oil investment for further exploration and development, apart from soft loans, grants and other forms of aid with in the period of 1999 up to 2004 (Jacob,2005). Sudan's historical friendly relations with China, its political isolation and its economic potential made an attractive investment prospect for China.”(Haroz, 2011:22, and)¹⁷.China and Sudan are natural partners with complementary needs and requirements that provide mutual benefits. Sudan sought investment and international support and China wanted to capitalize on Sudanese untapped resources.” (Pannel, 2008:723).This concurrently integrated with the belief that Chinese governments stressed with the possession of oil will be a source of computation for global supremacy. The Chinese leadership believes that, “China's future oil strategy will be influenced by the growing strength of its oil companies need to vie with international firms in the world market.” Meanwhile, the going out strategy will facilitate the export of oil-exploration, thus creating and promoting bilateral trade between China and host countries. “(Hong, 2007:7). As the table below depicted, the share of the Chinese oil company exceeds the rest, which indicated China's aggressive approach for oil control and a possible domination on it.

¹⁷ Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa.
22,February/2014

Table, 4.3 Chinese NOCs in oil investment in Sudan

Blocks	Consortium	Location	Companies	Equity share
1,2,4	GNPOC (Greater Nile petroleum operating company)	Abyei Region, border of Sudan & South-Sudan	CNPC Petronas ONGC Sudapet	40% 30% 25% 5%
3,7	PDOC (Petrodar operating company)	Block,3, is in South-Sudan, Thar & Mala regions, & block,7 is on the border of both countries	CNPC Petronas Sudapet Sinopec	41% 40% 8% 6%
6	CNPCIS (China National petroleum corporation international)	Sudan (Khartoum)	CNPC Sudapet	95% 5%
13	CNPC, Pertamina and Sudapet	Sudan (Khartoum)	CNPC Pertamina Sudapet Dindir Express	40% 15% 15% 15% 15

(Sources: Mitchell,2006:112)

As we can learned from the table, the larger share of the oil investment in Sudan is dominated by Chinese company (CNPC), which controls higher amount of oil development compared to other companies in the consortium. In time, Sudan has become a focal point for Chinese economic and oil investments. Oil wealth has benefited the NCP, and has also formed the foundation of the Chinese infrastructural, business and other activities surrounding Khartoum (Shinn, 2007).

Alongside Chinese investment in the oil industry, Chinese economic cooperation in Sudan has grown remarkably with Sudan receiving 46 percent of China's net nonfinancial overseas direct investment to Africa in the years 2002-2007, and around 22 percent of China's accumulated net overseas direct investment to Africa at the end of 2008 (Large, 2008:99). Chinese companies have successfully secured contracts for large infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric facilities, the Khartoum airport, textile plants, Merowe and

Kajbar dams (Reeves, 2007), a \$345 million pipeline that will channel water from the Nile River to Port Sudan, and a \$325 million water system.

4.5 Construction and Infrastructure Utilities

The governments of China and Sudan have taken their oil-based relationship beyond extraction. Since, Sudan's most productive oil fields are situated deep within the country's interior it required the construction of a system of pipelines and pumping stations to transport oil from there to export through port-Sudan for export. As a result, oil revenue diversified to the construction of hydro-electric Dams. The Merowe and the Kajbar dams are among these, which will be discussed in turn below.

Equally engaged in the oil sector, Sudan's oil pipelines were constructed by Chinese companies. The longest of among them which covered more than 1,500 kilometers from Block 1, in Unity State, to transport crude oil to Port Sudan, picking up oil from Blocks 2 and 4 on the way. This pipeline is operated by GNPOC and was constructed by CNPC through its wholly owned engineering subsidiary, China Petroleum Engineering Construction Corporation (CPECC) (HRF, 2008:16). Other 870 kms pipeline also constructed by CNPC, linking Melut Basin to oil export terminal at Port Sudan. Similar pipeline also runs 1,100 Km from Block 3 and 7, of the Thar and Mala regions now, South-Sudan which is extended to Port Sudan. It was built by engineering subsidiaries of the China petrochemical corporation, also known as Sinopec group. Through two Sinopec subsidiaries namely, Sinopec international petroleum service corporation (SIPSC) and Zhonyuan petroleum exploration Bureau (ZPEB). SIPSC received the contract and ZPEB served as a subcontractor, which built nearly 500 Km of the pipeline (Anshan, 2011).

Subsidiaries of CNPC, Sinopec group were involved in the development of marine terminals namely, (Bashir I and II), between 2000 and 2002, for the loading and storage of more than 400,000 barrels of oil destined to export (Zweig, et al. 2009). Although the Sudan government owns both terminals, GNPOC is the operator for Terminal I and petrodar

operates terminal II. CNPC subsidiary CPECC has been the primary subcontractor for the construction and development of both terminals (ibid).

Similarly, CNPC has been involved at El-Gily oil refinery which able to purify 50,000 barrels per day. On May, 2000, construction of Khartoum Refinery with annual crude processing capacity of 2.5 million ton and expanded to 5 million to in 2006 was completed. CNPC and the government of Sudan officially signed on jointly investing and construction of the refinery with each party sharing of 50% the operation of this refinery brought an end to Sudan's long history of dependence on imported oil products. Wu Bangguo, then vice premier of the Chinese Government visited the refinery and stated "A Model of a Delight and pioneering Spirit, A moment to Sino-Sudanese Friendship." (Rui, 2009:16). Consequently, in 2002, CNPC took a contractual agreement of two years of Khartoum petrochemical plant which became operational with an annual production capacity of 15,000 tons of polypropylene.

China's exploration, production and transport through pipelines of oil in Sudan has emerged with over all economic transformation of the country. Their relationship in this regard is allowing to exploit and to stimulate its economic leverage which oil as a stimulator. Hence, there is an opportunity to both sides from their relations. On the one hand, China's extraordinary growth is increasing its dependence on countries of having natural resources such as Sudan which enable it to gain its desire. On the other side, China's demand for resource could pave the way for Sudan to maximize the returns from its natural resources, which acquire the desired technology and improve its infrastructure. Therefore, the Chinese are committed in the development endeavors. According to Sierra Leon Ambassador to China Sohr Johny sated in 2005 (cited in Bosshard);-

The Chinese are doing more than the G₈ to make poverty history. If a G₈ country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, we had still holding meetings! The Chinese just come and do it. They don't hold meetings about environmental assessments, human rights, bad governance and good governance. I am, just saying that Chinese investment is succeeding because they don't set high benchmarks (Bosshard, 2007:11).

Unlike to the West which has been fixed to pre-conditions, Chinese are doing their business with out any bureaucratic chains. They portray that, development is the main concerns for peace and stability. If Africa in general and Sudan in particular is not develop

and improve its livelihood as China wishes, human rights, good governance and rule of law will be ignored¹⁸. The development of oil pipelines, the constructions of dams also a symbol of cooperation and opportunities for both countries. China Dam building Companies such as Sinohydro are taking the opportunity of China's overseas policy to engage in developing of new projects in Sudan (Hildyard, 2008:12). The Merowe Dam, with a capacity of 1,250 MW of electricity, was one of the largest projects where Chinese state owned companies contracted (Brewer, 2008:11). The contract for the Dam was signed in 2002 and 2003, and work began in early 2004 and completed in 2009. When completed it was electrified 307 villages, and became main electric supply to industries and became an electric power reserve for further opening of new industries. The Chinese Consortium for the Merowe Dam (CCMD) which dealt a contractual agreement with the Sudanese government in 2002 and in 2003, the China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) and the China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Corporation (CWHEC, or Sinohydro), jointly won the bid and constructed within the scheduled period (Ibid).

The Kajbar Dam is the other power plant constructed by Chinese investment firms. Companies such as CNPC have been involved in the feasibility study and construction of the dam project since 1997 (Bosshard, 2013:1). The Kajbar Dam is located along the Egypt-Sudan border specifically in the Kajbar village which is located far away from the capital was in chronic condition of deserving electric power. It constructed by a joint project by the Sudanese Kajbar Hydroelectric Company and two Chinese firms, the International Water and Electricity Company and the Machinery Export and Import Company of China, it enable to solve the power demand in the region. The dam is now producing 360 megawatts of electricity which delivered electric power for its inhabitant.

4.6. China's position at the cross-roads of Sudan and South-Sudan

Chinese efforts to resume oil production restrained during the rapprochement period, 2005-2011. Because most of its oil assets remain in the South while it's traditional diplomatic

¹⁸ Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section Chinese Embassy in Addis
22 February/2014

ties are aligned with the North. Its interplay between the parties during the interim period was a necessary precondition for China's future fate in South-Sudan's oil bonanza (Wang, 2013:10). To scrutinize this scenario, the pre and post referendum of South-Sudan in relation to China-Sudan relations will be discussed below.

4.6.1 Trilateral relations during the interim Period of (2005-2011)

China's perpetuation of status quo of exploring oil in unified Sudan, may affect negatively after the secession of South-Sudan. So the continuity of a unified Sudan or its separation from the South becomes China's critical issue to decide (ICG, 2012:2). As it is informed in section, 4.2, China's primary interest in Sudan was, oil and majority of the oil fields are in the South. South-Sudan's independence was high in the agenda of China (Ibid: 7).

A potential to use oil resource, and growing international pressure for peace, Sudan's civil war ended when the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed between the National congress party (NCP), Khartoum and the Sudan people's Liberation Movement (SPLM), Juba, in 2005 (Woodward, 2011:7). The CPA granted Southern Sudan the right to political self determination and scheduled a referendum on the full political independence of the Southern (Dange, 2011:21; Large, 2009:620). It also allowed South-Sudan to govern itself as a region, effectively operating as a "quasi-independent state" administered from Juba under the political authority of the SPLM during the interim period (Woodward, 2011:8). China originally was opposed the South's separatism worried of losing its status quo of oil concession which mostly found in the South-Sudan (Erasmus, 2011). To this end, China gave a \$ 3 million grant aid in 2005, to Khartoum for North-South Sudanese during the negotiation whether to continue unity or separation, in spite of ardent secessionist of the SPLM, refute unity (Dange, 2011:5, ICG, 2012:3).

As South Sudan prepared for referendum in 2011, China recognized the inevitability of independence. China now welcomed the outcome of the referendum in which South-Sudanese is statehood (ICG, 2012:3). Beijing's foreign office declaring the results as "a step forward to durable peace and stability in Sudan" and China assume to continue its oil

development status quo that had been a contractual agreement during a unified Sudan (People's daily, 2011). To this end, Beijing opened a consulate in Juba in September, 2008. China stepped up its bilateral assistance to South-Sudan as an important part of its effort to improve its standing with the government of South-Sudan (Large, 2011:56). Beijing then sought to deploy multi-purpose development assistance to the country. For instance, in November 2010, China provided a grant of US\$31.5 million for development projects in areas of water supply, education, health and agriculture (ibid).

However, the most indicators for the development of relations between the two countries was began in Oct.2010, with the upgrading of diplomatic relations and appointment of Ambassador Li Zhiguo to be Chinese new consul General in Juba. In the same month, a CPC delegation visit to Juba provided confirmation of high-level engagement by Beijing a head of the referendum. Thus, China's historic support of Sudan and its advocacy of a one Sudan policy might have undermined as if China recognized South-Sudan (Mulugeta, 2013:175).

4.6.2 Secession, marking a change in China's approach?

The creation of a new Republic of South-Sudan marked the triangular pattern of relations connecting Beijing with both Khartoum and Juba simultaneously (Large, 2011:57). On July 9th, 2011, the security of China's Sudanese oil assets complicated when South Sudan concluded a referendum in support of independence from the North, thereby splitting Sudan into two. This partition of Sudan created a dilemma for China's oil exploitation. Roughly three quarters of the remaining oil now belonged to the South, but the infrastructure to exploit it pipelines, refineries and export terminals were in the North (ICG, 2012:26).

To trigger its long effect development of oil in unified Sudan, China became one of the first countries to recognize the independence of South-Sudan, and took further steps to cement its ties with the new nation. As a result in early 2012, Beijing expressed its interest borrowed South Sudan US\$8 billion for infrastructure development (Sudan Tribune, 2012). This was promised after president Salva kiir visited Beijing in April, 2012. Its growing engagement was also demonstrated through the increasing number of Chinese

businesses in South-Sudan. For instance, CNPC picked up some of its assets in the Sudan to South-Sudan established a branch in Juba; while its headquartering remain in Khartoum. In light of its concession in the oil industry, and the prospect of untapped investment opportunities and infrastructure development, it appears that economic motive specifically oil are largely guiding Beijing's economic relations with the new nation (Mulugaeta, 2013:175). Its approach however was non-sided one of them, rather being neutral. Yilmaz, witnessed it as:-

In 2012, the deep socio-economic divisions in Sudan led to the partition of the country into a north and south. China, a firm supporter of Khartoum, abstained from taking sides in the beginning of the dispute although it maintained close relations with the central government. However, after the South voted in a referendum for independence, Beijing recognized the new state and established diplomatic relations with the South Sudan (Yilmaz, 2013:2).

For instance, when Khartoum began to block shipment of Southern oil by the end of 2011, for export demanding transit fee, Beijing was hard pressed by both sides to mediate the conflict. China's engagement has hesitant to take a side and simply continued to appeal for restraint and dialogue instead of putting pressure on one of them (Wang, 2011:4). "China is not fully supporting one side over the other, and their maneuvering has not gone unnoticed. By trying to move away from Khartoum so as to get too closer to South-Sudan so as not to cause displeasure to Khartoum-neither Khartoum nor Jubal be happy with China" (Sandres, 2012:8). Although Sudan and South-Sudan split, both countries and China have common interest for the continuity of the oil business .According to Kemal Bashir (2014):-

The Chinese managed to persuade the two sides to give up the military option and come to the negotiation table. In his opinion, the Chinese are unable to do much more, as the political will to reach does not lie in their hands but rather with the government of Sudan and South Sudan. China can not be a good mediator because of its history between the two Sudanese, a history associated with backing of the Khartoum government (Kemal Bashir, 2014)¹⁹.

Beijing has shown a gradual shift towards of South. For instance, it cancelled a fund for agricultural projects in Sudan for the lack of oil guarantee and shifted this fund to University of Juba for computer laboratory (Sudan Tribune, 2012). (Large, 2009:624). So, the succession of South Sudan in 2011 fundamentally changed China's diplomatic and

¹⁹ Interview with Kamal Bashir, Minister Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Embassy of Sudan in Addis Ababa, 11 February/2014

economic relationship with Sudan. Although Sudan has the necessary refineries and pipelines, South Sudan possess around 75 percent of the oil reserves (Sarwar,2012:174).Furthermore, China's involvement with the Khartoum regime and complicity in state-sponsored violence has undermined China's perceived legitimacy among local populations, in the war-ravaged South (Hirono, 2011:339). As a result, different signs of protesting against China were surfaced by the South –Sudan. For instance, on the visit of president Kiir in 2012 Chinese Foreign Minister Spokesperson stated, "Chinese oil companies and their partner have major projects in both Sudan and South-Sudan. Their legitimate rights and interests deserve substantial protection," (Sandres, 2012:4).

Ann Ito (2012), Minister of Agriculture South-Sudan argues as, "if they [China], want to protect their assets, the only way is to develop a very strong relationship with the government of South-Sudan, respect the statehood of the country and we will do business." (Sudan Tribune, 2012, June 07). Despite this difficulties among the Southern population and some segments of the SPLM/A, the South Sudanese government is taking a pragmatic stance towards Chinese investment, leave aside previous confrontations, looking forwards to important Chinese economic engagement in energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, and agriculture (Int'l C. G,2012:4). South Sudan's need for Chinese investment to upgrade its inadequate road network develop agricultural irrigation systems, and create a public water supply system overrides past feelings of animosity (Sarwar, 2012:177).

Though China's historical support to Khartoum means a lingering uneasiness and accused in the South, the prevailing sentiment today among government elites is "there are no permanent enemies but permanent interests" (Hirono, 2011:342). "Juba is taking a pragmatic view, looking not to the past but to the huge role China could play in trade and development, now and in the future. China's first Secretary Embassy of China to Ethiopia witnessed as" the secession of South-Sudan didn't came up with change in the bilateral relations of Sudan (Khartoum), and China." Its oil extraction is shifted from Sudan to South-Sudan, since the wealth is mostly reserved in the South. So China's perpetuate of oil development is not terminated, unless it changed in location." This is the fact that, the

change is not for China, instead for Sudan which lost its resources as the result of the split of South- Sudan.²⁰

China's substantial interest in the oil sector is closely linked to its political ties with the regime in Sudan and after South-Sudanese independence it shifted mostly to South-Sudan. This is seen through concessional loans to make the ground ready for further investment opportunities in the new nation But the deniable fact is that, China's approach to Sudan was a reason for Sudan to withstand internal conflict and external pressure (Dange, 2011 and).²¹ The government of Sudan made this opportunity as a foundation to promote development including setting up a resource stabilization fund, diversified its investment projects to non-resource sectors, encouraging domestic investment, improved its infrastructure including electricity, water supply.

Trade profiles of the two countries shows a trade surplus for Sudan with US\$ 1.5 billion in average every year. Its proper utilization of this revenue enables the country to expand its development endeavor beyond oil. The Merowe Dam, the Kajbar, oil which extended from oil fields to Port-Sudan for export, and water pipelines, and oil refineries were built. China's engagement in the oil industry fascinated the complementary needs of both countries. Since Sudan covered 7% of the oil demand of China, which incorporated 68% of Sudan's daily oil output. To this end, the countries witnessed amicable economic benefits from their relations. Doing this, they have faced restraints and constraints.

²⁰ Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary Head of Political Section Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa.
22, February/2014

²¹ Interview with Kamal Bashir, Minister Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia.

Chapter Five

5. Challenges and Opportunities

This Chapter deals with two major and six subordinate sections. The first one tells about the challenges of their relations, doing this, sub-sections such as external pressure and internal dynamics critically analyzed. Likewise, the second major section is about the prospects of the two countries. Sub-sections of this are economic prospects, China's labor practice in Sudan, nature of China's companies in development endeavor in Sudan are discussed accordingly.

The presence of China in Sudan since the post cold war has been certain constraints, restraints and prospects as well. China and Sudan was received skepticism, from human rights activists, state leaders, scholars and politicians. They have also received optimistic support from Government of the two countries. They persistently, testify their compliment relations on their economic nurturing.

Prior to 1980s, Chinese relations with African countries were driven largely by ideological considerations, i.e. to preach its communist ideology which presenting itself as an alternative to both the West and the Soviet Union.” (Brautigam, 2009:204). But after the end of the Cold War, China portrayed itself as an attractive economic partner and political friend of African states. For African governments, this presented an alternative to the Washington Consensus which emphasized on liberal democracy, human rights, good governance and free market. They favored the “Beijing Consensus” which emphasized support without interference and added non-conditionality in internal affairs in delivery of aid, advocated state led development model (Jauch, 2011:1).

5.1 Challenges of their Relations

At the outset it should be noted that, China's approach to Sudan should not be seen separately from that of the continent as a whole. As noted in previous chapter, the most obvious reason that, compelled China for close relations with Sudan is to secure energy, to fuel its rapid economic growth and foreign markets for its manufactured products, and

equally important in searching of diplomatic partner (China Monitor, 2005). Doing this, extracting of the untapped resources, investment opportunities and diplomatic partnership have been a basic interaction of China-Sudan contemporary relations. To this end, they have encountered different constraints to realize their desired relations. These could be categorized into external pressure and internal dynamics. Externally, pressure imposed from Western countries was a main obstacle to consolidate their relations. Equally, Sudan's internal dynamics, such as security problems, South-Sudan independence are considered as impediments.

5.1.1 External Factor

The presence of China in Sudan was a main point of discussion in the international arena since its appearance, by human right activists, politicians and policy makers alike. This was connected with its aggressive approach of foreign policies to extract resources, but its ignorance for human rights, good governance, and corruption facilitated by its principle of non-interference. Therefore, this section will attempt to see the external factors retarded their bilateral relations.

5.1. 1.1 Western Countries' response to Chinese presence in Sudan

Western countries' oil companies were engaged in Sudan prior to China's arrival for oil exploration. Among these, Chevron Oil Company from USA commenced oil exploration in 1970s, and withdrew in 1992 (Patey, 2007). And Talisman from Canada was highly engaged in these activities in the 1980s. However, it resigned from the country due to security problems in Sudan and damaging Western public pressure for their alignment with the Sudan Government (Alden, 2005). Having this, China substituted them through its state owned enterprises (SOEs), since the mid, 1990. Then after, it was condemned, violated and discredited by the eye of the Western countries, human rights activists and pressure groups and intellectuals for backing the Sudan regime (Safeworld, 2012:90).

The international community's concerns about the Chinese presence in Africa range from preserving normative cosmopolitan ideals such as the protection of human rights, political freedoms to fears about diminishing western political and material influence in Africa. As

with the local responses, international views are mixed, though there is a predominance of a negative perception about Chinese activities in Africa (Padriag, et.al 2007:2).

China has been portrayed as exercising “irresponsible global leadership” because of its resource, particularly oil and security interests and has been accused of hiding behind a commitment to non-interference policy in order to pursue a “predatory” foreign policy in Africa there by grabbing Africa's resources without any “moral principle.” In the UN Security Council, it has used its veto right to “undermine” sanctions against the Sudanese government, which has refused to co-operate with the African Union (AU) and the UN on the deployment of a large peacekeeping force to end the crisis in Darfur that has already killed hundreds of thousands of people. To quote Zafar (2007:104).

China’s lack of attention resistance to governance, democracy, and human rights issues in Africa, as testified by its support of pariah regimes in Sudan and its delinking of aid from political reform, has raised concerns that the flow of Chinese aid caused, African governments to delay reforms that promote openness and accountability. Given the propensity for corruption in the management of natural resources, China’s lack of attention to matters of resource transparency and mechanisms of oversight among its African partners has been a cause for concern for Westerns to impose more pressures.

Specifically, its policy of consolidating the military power of the regime in Sudan to gain influence and secure resources has been internationally condemned (Enkua,2010:103).Western media and human rights organizations suggested and Chinese military assistance and arms exports have contributed to the security crisis in the conflict ridden areas of Darfur, Human Rights Watch (2007) has reported that weapons delivered from China to Sudan, included, ammunition, tanks, helicopter, and fighter aircraft since 1995 have aggravated the war making activities and extensively transcended gross human rights (Indun, 2006:22).

Since the entrant of China into Sudan, lobbies against Sudan's human rights violation have been telling China's CNPC to divest out of Sudan and take a firm, moral stand against the crimes perpetrated by the Khartoum regime, particularly in the Darfur conflict. Since Sudan's oil revenue is funneled into strengthening the military and procuring arms and equipment, the CNPC has been accused of indirectly supporting Sudan's human rights

violations. This issue has become a bone of contention between China and the West. Thus to Beijing, the conflict in Darfur, however atrocious it may be, is Khartoum's internal business (Edinger, 2008).

China made its stand quite clear by inviting al-Bashir to Beijing a week before South Sudan claimed independence. Western nations condemned China for not arresting al-Bashir, against whom arrest warrants were issued by the International Criminal Court in 2009 and 2010 (ICC, 15 July, 2010). Of course, China has been denigrated by the west, branded as a 'threat' and characterized as dishonest, deceitful and mysterious. China was also seen as an ideological threat to Africa when the continent gained independence (Mawdsley, 2008). These old labels, have been given a new impetus in years, due to China's increased engagement with Africa; terms such as new scramble, new imperialism and China threat have become increasingly common (Large 2008a). China's foreign policy and its consequence of non-interference policy with African partners such as Sudan is further criticized; as it is promoting aid without any preconditions to these rogue states of Africa is advertising of corruption and retarded good governance (Naim 2007: 1). As critically stated by, Tull 2006:

Beijing uses the pillars of its foreign policy, notably unconditional respect for state sovereignty and its corollary, non-interference, in the pursuit of its interests, be they energy security, multi-polarity or the One China principle. To achieve these goals, Beijing is prepared to defend autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms for narrow ends for narrow ends of regime survival (Tull, 2006:476).

In a tour to Africa, in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that the United States promoted human rights and democracy which China's approach in Sudan and in Africa at large stating as "even when it might be easier or more profitable to look the other way i.e. ignoring of human rights and promoting of bad governance adding not every partner makes that choice, but we do and we will" (The Guardian, 2012: 1). These comments were criticized in Chinese media, and seen to be a deliberate attempt to undermine China- Africa relations (Reuters, 19 May, 2012).

Numerous NGOs and campaigners worked tirelessly to bring Darfur to the world's attention with undoubted success and impose pressure on China-Sudan (Mamdani, 2009). Human Rights groups argued "China was, the principal impediment to a swift decisive

action and identified it as indispensable to Sudan and as having significant important leverage over the Government of Sudan (GOS), as a result (Houser and Levy 2008: 63). Therefore, putting pressure on the relations of the two countries, either independently or together is a main element to resolve the conflict in Darfur in the short and detach China's relation with Sudan in the long (Ibid).

For this fact, external pressures, including international outrage over atrocities in Darfur which reached an upsurge in 2007 (Jakobson 2009: 420). Despite this, China's leaders have repeatedly portrayed it as a responsible world power, and international criticism presented strong self interested reasons for Beijing to act (Jakobson 2009: 412; Large 2008a: 99). However, the impact should not be overstated, the trend toward deeper engagement on Sudan in China's diplomacy was differentiated before the 2008 Beijing Olympics which were connected to Sino Sudanese relations by way of ,” genocide Olympics” campaign (Contessi, 2010: 329; Large 2008c: 99).

“Save Darfur” was the most additional vocal advocacy group in this regard, in large part. American celebrity Mia Farrow, who supposedly found China guilty of cooperating with Sudan, she intended to use the” Beijing Olympics” as tool to enforce China (Farrow, 2007). Winning the Olympics was a dream for the Chinese government and its people, it was deemed to be China's “global coming out party” an opportunity to showcase China's rapid economic growth and newfound modernity and reputation (Carlson 2007: 252). The Olympic milestone was meant to be a global symbol of “China's new status and identity” winning the host rights means winning the respect, trust and favour, of the international community (Wang, cited in Budabin 2011: 141). Mia Farrow coined the term, “Genocide Olympics” and it quickly became part of everyday language. Three months after the term's first use there was a 400% increase on the previous three months in the number of newspaper articles linking China to Darfur (Hamilton 2011).

Consequently, as the violent killing in Darfur drew increasing foreign media attention, Beijing's close ties with Bashir's regime in Khartoum became detrimental to China's reputation. Heavy international criticism was centered on China's sale of small arms to Sudan, its opposition to anti-Darfur resolutions in the United Nations, and Beijing's

general failure to leverage its influence on the Bashir administration to foster peace. Furthermore, as the International Criminal Court indicted President al-Bashir for genocide, the Darfur advocacy campaign culminated in massive protests against the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

5.1.2 Internal Dynamics

5.1.2.1 Security factor

Oil investments since 1999 have exacerbated local grievances, and heightened North/South disparities in Sudan (Large and Patey 2011: 188). Moro (2011: 70-71), further, underlines land dispossession without compensation, environmental damage, a lack of local consultations, and heightened conflict as new infrastructure, such as roads and airstrips, facilitated the activities of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In spite of Chinese companies claim to be balancing these ramifications with development assistance, building schools and health care facilities. Moro argues that, these claims are refuted by local populations (Moro, 2011: 73). He added that, “some development projects have indeed been implemented by oil companies but their positive impacts, if any, is limited. Such projects have been implemented without consultation with the intended beneficiaries, and are mostly small benevolent interventions” (Ibid: 85).

Not surprisingly the perception of Sudanese reveal rather than presenting Sudan with an alternative development opportunity, Chinese investments contributed in facilitating the aggressive policies of the Government of Sudan, Large and Patey (2011: 181) further, argue, China’s engagement blends into a longer history of top-down, centralized disempowerment and deprived “authoritarian development.” In Sudan, a system of petro-patronage exists, whereby rent-seeking elites have maintained power through the revenue accrued from oil exports (Ibid: 180). In Sudan, oil revenue has transformed Sudan regime into a Corporation with an unrestrained lust for wealth and power (Large and Patey 2011: 181). Askouri noted this as:

Sudan is often cited as the most prominent example of China’s support for an undemocratic and repressive regime, and where its non-interference principle has been most criticized. China is the main investor in Sudan’s oil exploration, chemical industry and rail transport. China has sold arms to Sudan and there are claims that these have been used to fuel the

conflict in Darfur. China has also supported Sudan in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, threatening to use its veto against attempts to impose an oil embargo on Sudan (Askouri, 2007: 74-85).

Chinese engagement has not radically altered Sudan prospects for development, but rather become part of an established structure of marginalization by an authoritative elite and significant sum of money extravagated at the expense of the poor, which obliged them to quarrel and lose their trust on the regime and the Chinese. Hence, the oil industry in Sudan has been a bone of contention between local people, the government and the Chinese companies at large (Jakobson 2009: 419).

Particularly significant was the issue of anti-Chinese sentiment within African people in general and in that of Sudan in particular (Saferworld 2011: 13). China's entrenched role in Sudan's internal politics has significantly challenged China's engagement and foreign policy. As critiqued, "following a top-down economic development approach, i.e. not from grass-root level, Chinese economic assistance has encouraged elitism, deepened social and class divisions and widened corruption" (Askouri 2007: 72). China's relationship with Khartoum, and the impacts that investments have had for local populations has meant that, China is increasingly linked with the politics of the Government of Sudan. (Ibid: 81) This author remarks that, "China and Sudan are joining hands to uproot poor people, expropriate their land and appropriate their natural resource." (Ibid:81). As a Darfur fighter stated, (cited in, HRF).

China is enemy number one, said an official of the southern side in the North-South civil war. They are the ones who kept Bashir in power for so long, providing him with weapons to try and win the war in the South. They are the ones who supplied him with helicopter gun ships on the attacks on Bentiu (District of Darfur), and other places. They are evil. They are the ones providing military support to the government on Darfur; Of course they are (HRF, 2007:8).

Consequently," China faced security issue as well in Sudan." In 2004, two Chinese workers were abducted from western Sudan by rebels (China Daily, 2004; Holslag 2008). Equivalently, in 2007, the Darfur rebels attacked an oil field, and abducted two workers, quoting the head of the rebel group in Kordofan, and further warned that, "the latest attack is a message to the Chinese companies in particular, the Chinese companies are the biggest investors in the Sudanese oil industry which incorporate the regime in power" (Osman,

2007). And, in 2008, nine Chinese CNPC workers were abducted in Southern Kordofan, and five were subsequently killed by forces under a commander claiming affiliation with the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement, citing as the reason the exclusion of local populations from oil wealth (Large 2009: 618). According to Large, (2008b:6), many non-governmental actors in Sudan- including the Darfurian Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) declared China as their enemy.

In January 2012, 29 Chinese workers were kidnapped while working on a construction project, along the North-South borders by, rebel remnants of the SPLM who remained in the North after secession. This incident represented the third case of abduction of Chinese working in Sudan since 2004, as Chinese workers became increasingly attractive targets for Sudanese rebels hoping to leverage China to put pressure on Bashir's administration (Wee, 2012).

It is clear that, China's engagement with the regime has brought about were insecurity and threatened its main stay. As Holslag (2009:25) stated, China's economic ambitions have been repeatedly "spoiled by Sudan's gloomy security climate which enable to think critically to resume going out from Sudan." From 2004 onwards, escalating violence in Darfur put Chinese oil operations at risk and oil workers have been directly threatened by separatist groups, and many oil wells are in conflict prone areas and imposed them to search alternatives (Holslag 2008: 74). In spite of Sudan being important oil producer, its proven reserves still constituting only 5% of the total in Africa (Downs 2007: 46),financing new alternatives would allow China to diversify its investment portfolio and avoid reliance on a single country for energy security. Taking the first steps to do so, Chinese enterprise, Sinopec purchased its first overseas upstream assets from Angola for \$2.46 billion in 2010 (Lee, 2010).

Besides security problem, the post-peace, relations between the two Sudanese has been strained, with disagreements over division of oil revenues and border demarcation ongoing as of writing, and continued conflicts in Nuba and Abyei, making the region conflict-ridden area (Dange 2011: 18; Gettleman 2012; ICG 2012; Johnson 2011: 170). These uncertainties have pushed China more to search alternative oil out-put out of Sudan. Things became worse after; South Sudan cut off all oil production in protest against

Khartoum and proposed oil transit fees, in January, 2012 (Gettleman 2012; ICG, 2012: 21). China, with majority holdings in GNPC which operates chiefly in South Sudanese regions, was forced into an increasingly uncomfortable position.

Most importantly, as stated in section 4.2, China's motives and deriving factor to come to Sudan was in search of oil. But the share of Sudanese oil in China's overall oil imports has declined after reaching "the high water mark of 2001-2" due to quality of oil (Large 2008:285). Or "due to the overall effects of factors such as the mediocre quality of crude oil in Sudan" the emergence of more and more replacement oil suppliers in Africa, the possible declination of both Sudanese oil wealth, and the increasing attention towards oil reserves in Sudan domestically" all these contemplated China to retreat from Sudan (Sandres,2012)

5.1.2.2 The Secession of South-Sudan

China-Sudan relations have begun to decline after the CPA agreement in 2005 and picked after South-Sudan declared independence in 2011. While China's historic relationship with Khartoum has prevented China from backing the South, Southern control of Chinese oil investments means that Beijing must also avoid disenfranchising the Salva Kiir administration. As such, Beijing promised to send humanitarian aid to South Sudan, and dispatched a new special envoy led by China's top diplomat in the Africa province, Zhong Jianhua, to facilitate peace (Wang, 2013). Hence, within the interim period of 2005-2011, China was hard faced to mediate the two parties. After efforts of reconciliation defiance, China has intended to sack towards South-Sudan.

The first official contact between Beijing and the SPLM was made when a high-ranking SPLM delegation visited Beijing in March 2005 to discuss possible economic co-operation. This relation reinforced, when Salva Kirr, vice-president of Sudan and first in command of the SPLM/A, made a state visit to China in July 2007 (Large, 2009:612). Meanwhile, their relations has formalized when Beijing establishing 'quasi' diplomatic relations with the government of South-Sudan in 2008. These two events illustrated that, China's political move indirectly recognized the independence of South-Sudan. At the

same time, it also formed a new diplomatic axis between Juba and Beijing, allowing China to engage South-Sudan in its own, bilateral terms (Sandres, 2012).

Since China's main stay with Sudan was access of oil, the discontinuation of Sudanese oil production resulting from the succession of South Sudan has jeopardized China's energy security in the region (Large, 2008). China's relations with South Sudan have undergone a visible evolution and gradual shift from Sudan after the outcome of the referendum. Beijing has discomfort its stake by working fully within the one Sudan, two systems framework created by the CPA, and later to accept the new nation state of South Sudan (Large, 2011). It was doubtful whether to offend, old friend and cheer with new ones.

Chinese efforts to resume oil production have become increasingly difficult because its oil assets remain in the South while its traditional diplomatic ties are aligned with the North, forcing China to mediate the conflict while attempting to retain neutrality. However, the lack of progress among Chinese diplomats presents Beijing with the question of intervention, Should China intervene on behalf of one party to resume oil production in the Sudan? (Wang, 2013:16).

Yet, despite decades of vocal and material support for Khartoum as it fought Southern secessionist movements, and in contradiction with its sovereignty doctrine, Beijing ultimately supported the 2011 referendum and recognized South Sudan as an independent nation (Large, 2011; Zambelis 2011). The CPA, in altering the political architecture of Sudan, compelled China to alter its orientation to the North, and adjust its stated principles by acknowledging the validity of Southern secession (Large 2008a: 102).

Chinese engagement with Southern Sudan, and later Republic of South Sudan, marks a surprising divergence from the traditional Chinese resistance to support secession, (Holslag, 2008: 76), which enabled China to tilt its diplomatic approach to South-Sudan and gradual detachment from the North (Ibid). As a result in early 2012, Beijing expressed its interest in loaning to South-Sudan US\$8 billion for infrastructure development and to rehabilitate the country from its devastated civil war reconstruction (Sudan Tribune, 2012). Additionally, China cancelled an aid of laboratory equipments intended to provide to Sudan and donated to South-Sudan to retaliate and change former enemy to friend (Jakobson, 2007:188). Beijing's relations with the Government of Southern Sudan subsequently deepened through these aid, and expanded investment and broadened their

efficient development and management of oil resources. Because, the oil is in the South, and it was now time for China to re-orient its engagement. As the independent South Sudan gradually assumed control of its oil industry, it invited China's companies (GNPOC) to engage and start their operating. Immediately, they established new headquarters in South Sudan which were in the North, and inaugurated their activities (Ibid).

After Independence in July, 2011, South-Sudan took with it 75% of unified Sudan oil concession (Ibid). Following this independence, the South Sudan government ordered major oil companies to move their headquarters from Khartoum to Juba, and take their stake in the oil bonanza (Wang, 2013:14).

China remains the dominant actor in the oil industries in North and South and the top buyer of their oil. Its primary concern following partition remains the security of its oil assets, the vast majority of which now lie in South Sudan. Prior to separation, China invested billions of dollars in establishing the oil industry and importing more than 60 per cent of the countries' crude. Now, the Chinese led oil consortiums are shifting their focus and operations to south-Sudan (Sandres, 2012:14)

Equally to economic approach, political relations also shifted. President Hu Jintao's representative to Independence Day ceremonies, Jiang Weixin, signed a joint communiqué with Southern officials recognizing the new state, establishing diplomatic relations and upgrading China's consulate to an embassy (cited in, ICG, 2012:12). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Juba and bilateral exchanges increased frequently. Though China's historical support to Khartoum means a lingering uneasiness remains in the South, the prevailing sentiment among government elites is "there are no permanent enemies but permanent interest". Juba is taking a pragmatic view, looking not to the past which China accused for its supporter of Khartoum, but to the role China could play in trade and development endeavors with South-Sudan (ICG, 2012:23).

5.1.3 Impacts of Imported manufactured products

Trade exchanges between two or more countries are a blessing for the economic motivations of the parties under consideration. When the flow of goods and services is complementary, it could be prospects for their relations. However, if the volume of inertest

slanted to one of the parties, the cost incurred by the other is a curse for it. Regarding the exchanges of manufactured products between China and Sudan it could not be out of this reality

5.1.3.1 Threats of manufactured products

China is exporting massive manufactured products to Africa. It can be argued that competition from Chinese imports discourage the de-industrialization activities in the continent. It could prohibit knowledge and skill transfer, where the products are imported readily made at home. On the other corner, some poor people could benefit from the cheap already Chinese made products, while for a short gain (Ajakaiye, 2006:8). However, there is a threat for local producers, where by failed to compete with Chinese products.

The most daunting challenge is the influx of goods which are often, better quality and cheaper than local products, which arise conflict in local market of Sudan. While local consumers for their affordable price are happy, domestic industries, especially textile industries, suffer in the long run as a result. Eroded by cheap Chinese imports the already established industry of the local infant industry of Sudan and resulting in factory closures and the inevitable job and income losses (Shin, 2005) and (Kaplinsky, et.al, 2006). The Hassaheisa textile mill in Sudan for example terminated its works job contract and its production capacity reduced from 65% to 20% between 2004-2009 (Ibid). As Edinger reiterated it as “China sees African countries as an important market for its exports, and as a good incubator for emerging Chinese state-owned multinational companies.” (Gill *et al*, 2006).

Likewise, Chinese immigrated legally or illegally to Sudan also opened “China shops” and as a street vendors, sold Chinese manufactured products which included leather products, textile products, scarves, shawls, hats and sports bags and luggage, toys and other items for babies ; mattresses, blankets, towels, rugs and flooring and small household appliances and electronic goods (Park, 2009:8). This created lots of conflicts with the local community emanated from conflict of interests. Because, Chinese investments in small retail outlets or in’ China shops’ are mostly undertaken by the Chinese themselves hardly create linkages

to the local economy, as they sourced cheap consumer goods from China and return their profit back home .This instances, has negatively affected local traders, who could not withstand the Chinese competition (Jauch,2011:6, Zafar 2007:104)

Furthermore, the quantity and price of Chinese textile products sold in Sudanese market are still the most fundamental challenge. The fact is that cheap Chinese imports discourage diversification of the productive based of the Sudan economy away from crude agricultural and mineral products towards manufacturing and eventually service or knowledge intensive activities. This is a challenge which new investors may either find it unattractive to compete with cheap Chinese imports or find it unnecessary because Chinese imports are so large leaving no significant excess demand which new entrants can aspire to meet (Ajakaiye, 2006:8).

The quantity, quality and cheaper price of imported Chinese products to Sudan hence have both a setback and forward effects. Inhabitants earning low wages, middle class which able to afford are beneficiaries from the influx of these goods. But in the long run, the outcome could be disastrous. Continue importing and selling of imported manufactured products will halt the existence and incubation of local industries. As a result thousands of workers engaged in the local industries will loss their jobs, resulted from outcompete with the Chinese products. The way forward in this regard is, despite there is some blessing, there is a long way negative outcome in the long run which retarded local industries from in cubing.

5.2 Opportunities of their relations

China's economic principles that guide its policy towards Africa are Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. Based on these principles, China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building (Wang, 2010: 45). To this end, China's policy towards Africa has given priority to economic cooperation such as, trade, investment and engaged in the extractive industries. The rich natural resources countries of Africa such as Sudan accepted China's approach for their common interests (Ibid).

5.2.1 Economy perspective

Economic ties between China and Africa have increased at extraordinary rates since the end of the Cold-War. From the late of 1990, China's need for natural resources is referred as the main reason for its involvement in Africa. This is due to the fact that, when it mobilized heavy industries and its economic boom domestically, shifted from being a net exporter to a net importer of oil in 1993, (Brautigam, 2009:204). Its economic development has forced its growing demand of energy and other raw materials from Africa. To get the acceptances of African for its resource desire it persistently forwarded messages of win-win cooperation (Tull, 2009). Which both of them need each other and expecting symmetric gains from their relations.

Sudan which is endowed with natural resources was mature to respond to China's increasing demand for raw materials and energy. Conversely, Chinese energy investment in the country is often accompanied by aid for infrastructure. As a result, Chinese companies have been involved in the oil production industry for roughly two decades in Sudan. Hence, China is not only import a great percentage of Sudan's total oil exports but it also engaged in infrastructure developments projects that are basic for the country's economic transformation (Esther, 2006: 30).

China's engagement in development projects in Sudan enable the country to diversify the revenue earned from the services and products of Chinese companies .And Chinese principles of development assistance in exchange of oil and investment rights in Sudan release large sum of money in the form of grant free loans, aid for Sudanese development projects. The Export-Import Bank of China, its official export credit agency is a main financial transmitter in these development projects and strengthening the economic relations.

Table, 5.1; Linkage effects of Chinese investment projects in Sudan

Year	Project	China-financier	Contractor	Added Capacity	Project cost in \$ million	China contribution in \$ million
2001	El-Gaili combined cycle power plant, phase I	Exim-Bank China	Harbin power equipment company limited (HPEC)	200MW	150	-----
2003	Power transmission & transformation line project for the Merowe hydro-Dam	Exim-Bank China	Hydro-Power Equipment company limited (HPEC)	1776 KM	175	140
2003	Merowe Hydroelectric Dam	Exim-Bank China	Sino hydro	1250 MW	1200	400
2004	Bridge between Khartoum & Sudan-Egyptian Border	CNPC	Jilin province international Economy & trade dev't cooperation	0.44	20	10
2005	Water supply System of GEDARIF & FASHIR	Exim-Bank China	China-National construction & Agricultural Machinery impt. & Expt. Corp. (CAMC)	3000 m ³	100	75
2006	Construction of Ruffa Bridge	China poly Group corporation	China Railway 18 TH Bureau Group Co.Ltd	0.394 M	23	-----
2006	NEC transmission line	ExIm-Bank China	CMEC	340 KM	81	81
2007	El-Gl-ailli (AlJail),pow	ExIm-Bank China	Harbin powerEquip	100MW	210	160

	er plant Phase II		ment Company Limited			
200 9	Constructio n of 300 MV gas fired power plant in Al- Fulah	Ex-Im Bank, China	Shandong Electric Power Constr. Corp.	300MW	518	----- -

Source, (Aluko, 2007; Wang, 2010:168).

The outcome of the table above has enormous indications. It can be seen that, the capacity of generating electricity has enhanced to three fold. As a result more than 10 million inhabitants are benefited from the power it generated. Moreover, industries waiting for power embrace it to produce their product (Shishory, 2005:21). Owning of basic infrastructures such as roads, water and electricity is vital to facilitate economic development. Similarly, roads, pipelines and bridges also gave glamour of hope for the development of the country and to individual citizen in particular (Ibid).

Therefore, it is undeniable that enhanced cooperation with China has generated flourished economic development for Sudan. Chinese engagement with the country has been a key factor in the positive economic growth. China's investment in vital infrastructure has provided an alternative source of revenue for the government, job opportunity for its citizen and is helping to unlock its vast economic opportunities in general. The effective and efficient utilization of such natural resources can certainly enhance Africa's development prospects in general (Zafar, 2007:23).

On the other end, China desires of raw material, market for its product and diplomatic partnership, as Sudan quest for China's investment. Therefore, they have complementary needs. Despite their relationship is not symmetric, but not as such one is exploiting the other.²² Haroz (2011), also reiterate as;

In many ways, China and Sudan are well-suited partners. Much of Sudan is cash-hungry, infrastructure-deficient, and resource rich. On the other hand, China is flush with cash, seeks

²² Interview with Dawit Yohannes, PhD candidate at Addis Ababa University, institution of peace and security studies, 06 March/2014

greater investment opportunities for its burgeoning private sector, and requires massive natural resource infusions to feed its booming economy (Haroz, 2011:65).

With increasing common interests and complementary needs the two sides have great opportunities to accelerate their economic development.²³ China's original approach of convergence with Sudan was centered on business rather than politics, with China reaffirming publically that it was possible to separate business and politics (Brooks, 2007:5). Poverty has been a consistent challenge for Sudan its per capita GDP was \$38 in 1996, when China and Sudan entered into an agreement for oil exploration. By then, physical infrastructure was generally inadequate; institutions were the most diverse due to the geographical, ethnical and political division among its population. At the same time, the country is among the wealthiest in terms of natural resources, not only oil, but also minerals, water and agricultural land. Meanwhile, it has substantial potential for rapid infrastructure, industrial and service development. This provided enormous business opportunities for local firms and Chinese SOEs (Rui, 2009:57).

When Sudan's National Islamic Front, now reinstated to NCP seized power in 1989, its ideological agenda and links to terrorism quickly led to international isolation and, ultimately, incurred U.N economic sanctions in 1996 and followed by US in 1997. As a result of deteriorating relationships abroad, and pressure from the West in particular, the regime looked to China to develop its oil sector and found a willing partner. Though an unstable investment climate, the relative economic isolation meant China enjoyed a particularly favorable entry into a largely investment opportunity through its SOEs (Brautigam,2011:104).

Since, China's primary goal is "to exploit" untapped resources in the country it become a reason to activate Sudanese economy. Arguably, these became an opportunity to both sides. On the one hand, China's extraordinary growth is obliged to intensify its investment opportunities in Sudan. As a result, China's demand for resources and invested more could pave the way for Sudan's economic motivation, and improve its infrastructure development (Xinhua, 14, May 2007). China's purchase of raw materials and investments has raised the country's annual economic growth rate to more than nine percent for the consecutive of 2000 up to 2007. Edinger (2008:33), noted as "when the first barrel of oil from Sudan was produced, and exported to Singapore in 1999, three years later the

²³ Interview with Liu Pengyu, First Secretary, Head of political Section China Embassy in Addis Ababa.
22, February/2014

Sudan's revenue rose substantially." Between 2002 and 2008, with the increasing oil output and price in the country, shows significance progress (Lee, 2008: 50).

Table 5.2; Sudan's economy from 2002-2009, impacts of oil exports to China

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Population (Million)	32.7	33.6	34.5	35.4	36.3	37.2	39.2	40.3
GDP, Per Capital (US\$)	474	572	619	703	831	1247	1480	1358
Growth Rate of GDP in %	6.5	6.1	9.1	8.3	9.3	10.2	6.8	4.5
Government Revenue (US\$,Million)	2991	2814	4095	4873	6030	9578	12635	8504

(Source: Central Bank of Sudan. May, 2010, cited in Brautigam, 2011:47).

Important note here is that, despite a recession in world economy, in 2008/09, Sudan was influenced relatively little by the fall in oil price in this period. Because its oil exports were managed under long term contracts of fixed price with China irrespective of increased or decreased the world oil price, ensured the stability of oil income. Therefore, it is indisputable that enhanced cooperation with China could generate positive spin-offs for Sudan (Edinger, 2008:65).

China is seen as a responsible for tremendous economic achievements in Sudan, pulled the country away from misery by investing in development endeavors changed the country from poverty into prosperity. Though Western medias and politicians portrayed Sudan as a failed state on the verge of

complete collapse under civil war and poverty, China more often regards and made Sudan a land of opportunity.

5.2.2 China's labor Practice in Sudan

African in general, has been contentious issue with widely held perceptions that Chinese, state owned enterprises (SOEs) bring their own labour from China, seriously underpay local workers, and subject them to extremely harsh conditions and ignored workers rights (Edinger, 2008:53). Similar to the Western investors invested in Sudan, who only brought managers and Engineers and hired mainly local laborers, the Chinese enterprises and entrepreneurs also employ local workers in Sudan, where as sectors of high profession rarely came from China (Peter, 2007:28).

In addition of hiring of local workers, China's SOE established backward and forward linkages through which transfer of technology to local firms, and providing training, generating income and contributing to skill transfer (Chirschman, 1998). This is due to the effort and commitments of the Sudanese government which become much stricter in requiring including Chinese companies, local human resources during their operation in the country. Up on the agreement of the two sides, it was mandatory to recruit up to 50% and in some sectors 90% of local employees from local market (Stephen, 2008:11).

Table, 5.3; CNPC's employment localization in the Sudan, during its oil exploration

Name	Chinese Share in No.	Chinese share in %	Sudanese share in No.	Localization of Sudanese in %	Others in %
CNPC as operator\ oil Fields				% average operator	
Blocks,1,2 and 4	32	2.6	1200	93	4.4
Blocks 3 and 7	52	2.6	902	88	9.4
Block 6	88	23.5	286	68	8.5
Block 15	8	24	25	63	5
Block 13	8	36	14	63	1
Khartoum Refinery corporate	375	32	795	68	-----
Khartoum petrochemicals	34	15	189	59	26

firm					
Petrochemical Trading company	4	2.9	131	97	0.1

(Source: Edinger,2008:27; Rui, 2009:56)

As it is witnessed from the table the range of Sudanese engagement in the sector is between 60 and 93. This elucidates, local employee are more beneficial in job opportunity. Besides this when an agreement was signed between the two parties, for conducting oil refinery in Khartoum in 2000, CNPC was required to transfer all the necessary skill and technologies to local enterprises, who won sub-contract from the company during its operation (Tull, 2011:471). As a result, in China-Sudan business venture, transfer of skill and technology also a factor of opportunity. To meet these requirements, this could be realized through training either on site training, or in China’s SOEs headquarters in Beijing. By selecting those with potential to study in China and return to work in Sudan. For instance, since 1998-2008, CNPC has spent \$ 2.5 million to enable 65 students to study and obtaining degrees in petroleum technology at the University of Beijing (Rui, 2009:63).

Despite China is accused for importing of its own labor from home, the scenario in Sudan is out of this reality. Most Chinese companies have a mandatory to recruit local workers upon the agreement of the two countries. So, this created an opportunity for Sudan, since, local workers have get job opportunity and enable to transfer skill and technology to Sudanese employee.

5.2.3 Role of China Companies in development endeavors in Sudan

Chinese companies and investors have several features which enable them to make a unique contribution to the Sudan’s development endeavor (Bridsall, et.al, 2003:60). During their investment activities in Sudan. They are more willing to take risk in their development areas, when comparing with Western firms such as, Chevron. Chevron was granted its oil concession in 1974 and discovered oil in 1978 in small amount (Talisman Energy, 1998: 4.). However, Chevron suspended its operation in the Sudan by the end of 1984 and eventually withdrew from Sudan.

According to John Silcox (1993), the president of Chevron’s overseas operations at the time, “withdrawal was made because they did not want to expose their employees to “unnecessary risk” civil war zone of North-South Sudanese. The fact that Chevron’s

employees were attacked several times by the southern rebel groups which forced it to resign from its pioneer of oil development (Ibid). Improving peace and stability, good governance and addressing the problem of corruption have been considered by a host government for attracting potential investors and keeping existing ones in the country. But in the entrance of China in Sudan is in the opposite ends. There was conflict and unstable political uncertainty, civil strife there (Rui, 2009:71). The Chinese companies including, CNPC, however, took the risk of entering Sudan in 1995 for development projects, when conflicts between the south and the north continued and escalated. Consequently it has faced abducting of his workers from their site warning not supporting and engaged in development endeavor for the Sudan regime (Ibid).

To put pressure on the Chinese companies, the Darfurian rebel (JEM) attacked Chinese oil operations in Defra Kordofan in October 2007 and issued an ultimatum to Beijing to withdraw from Sudan within a week (Large, 2008:652). The second serious incident was happened in Oct.2008, when nine Chinese CNPC workers were abducted in Southern Kordofan, and five of them were subsequently killed by forces of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). But the CNPC is not showing any attempt of resignation nor drag its legs. Instead, it refused their request to terminate contract and leave but continue investing and engaged in development projects dealt with different approaches (Ahmed, 2010: 6).

The Chinese companies deployed a different approaches to deal with in the conflicting areas, including encouraging the peace process and sharing the oil revenue between the rebels in the south and the central Government in the North. Most Chinese believed that poverty is the fundamental cause of the conflicts in Sudan, and stimulating the economic development will contribute to enhance the peace process (Bouder, 2008:58). Likewise, they were willing and able to work on low margin projects, which enable the Sudanese to implement more affordable expenses. Additionally, Chinese bidders for sub-contracts in the oil and infrastructure sectors could offer prices one third lower than their Western and even Malaysian and Indian counterparts. For example in the bid of the Merowe Dam the Chinese company cut the price from US\$1.9 billion to US\$1.2 billion excels these bidders and accomplished below the schedule (Zhu, 2008:15).

Since Western oil companies have been barred from investing in Sudan due to public pressure at home and because of the sanctions imposed on Sudan by the UN in 1996 and US in 1997 and over state-sponsored terrorism, al-Bashir's government can only look to the East to attract investors (US treasury, 2011). The presence of China and its state-owned enterprise played a significant role in requesting of al-Bashir's demand. Thereafter, Chinese companies are invested in neglected country which its political certainty is not quite sure, in high risk areas, in general and in conflict areas in particular. In many conflict affected areas of Sudan, a great proportion of the population is grateful to see new schools, factories, refineries, Power dams, highways and rail road's as a result of Chinese investment in the country responded their request by providing revenue for the government and participating themselves in the construction sectors (Indun,2007:18).

Similarly, CNPC has the technology, human resources, equipment and efficiency to provide a comprehensive service covering oil exploration, refining and petrochemicals. Therefore it offered the foundation for sustainable development of the Sudanese oil industry. Before the Chinese entry, the Government of Sudan had a vision to “build up the integrated Sudan Petroleum Industry and make the oil industry the engine of the country's economy” (Rui, 2009). Such an integrated Sudan Petroleum industry was envisaged to have upstream exploration as well as downstream petrochemical production for export via pipeline by the Chinese firm. CNPC was able to provide all the technology and equipment needed to realize this vision (CNPC, 2008). Hence, Chinese companies are well known for their accomplishment of on time projects; According to Sahr Johnny, Sierra Leone's ambassador to Beijing (cited in Hilsum, 2009),

The Chinese are doing more than the G₈ to make poverty history in Africa. If a G₈ country had wanted to rebuild the stadium we had still holding a meeting! The Chinese just come and do it. They don't hold meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad governance and good governance. It's not of course all rights but what should do African sates is take the benchmark of Chinese development which insists us to benefit mutually from our relations (Hilsum, 2009:92).

The Chinese are very quick in decision making, performing and their responsible for symmetric interests. CNPC for instance, as the largest State-owned oil firm in China considers itself to have the obligation to maintain good relationship with the Sudan and

also to protect “China’s image.” Given these obligation and support, Chinese managers are able to use long-term strategy to develop relations with the host institutions of Sudan (Indun, 2008). China’s firms are not primarily profit motive rather they also as an image builder of their country. They also create a convenient platform for bilateral relations of between the two countries. China not only now imports a great percentage of Sudan’s total oil exports, but its companies also help Sudan to establish a complete and viable oil export industry from exploration, production and refining to sales of crude oil, gasoline and petrochemical products. Whereas their Counterparts from the West and Petronas from Malaysia and ONGC from India are more constrained by short-term of profit maximization (Weng, 1995)

Beside oil explorer companies, Chinese construction companies have a range of advantages over their local and foreign competitors including: 1) good quality with low-cost and skilled labor, 2) hands-on management style, 3) high degree of organization, 4) general aptitude for hard work, and 5) access to relatively cheap or accessible capital. While the SOEs can secure the necessary funds for advance payment from their head offices in China, they and other smaller private companies in Sudan may also secure loans at flexible rates from Chinese banks such as the China Development Bank and the China EXIM Bank (Edinger, 2008:49).

While local and foreign construction companies operate on profit margins of 15-25% ,Chinese companies usually operate on margins of under 10%, making them extremely competitive (Raine, 2009). They under certain circumstances undercut competitors by up to 25% on the price of the overall bid (Edinger, 2008a). Chinese companies are also quickly earning a reputation for good quality and timely sometimes before the deadline, rendering them popular in both the public and private sectors (Ibid: 75).

Chinese technology is generally recognized as ‘appropriate’ for local employee of Sudan. The techniques and practices many of the Chinese companies bring are usually low-tech and relatively easy for Sudanese to emulate as opposed to the often specialized and capital-intensive equipment employed by western companies. While some Chinese companies maintain the use of low-level technology, others are slowly adopting more sophisticated

methods of technology. They also, are utilizing comparatively cheap equipment within the reach of indigenous firms. (Edinger, 2008:54). It is indisputable that China's engagement with Sudan is producing positive results in the economic dimension of development. After the two countries decided to cooperate in economic development in early 2000, they mutually benefited from their trade exchange, investment projects and political affinity in the international foras. China which was resource hungry and ambitious to investment it get an access in Sudan. On the other hand, Sudan which was marginalized by the West was found China the only powerful alternative country for its political and economic survival.

The two countries have forward and backward effects. The drawbacks which constrained their harmonious relations were external pressure from western countries and civil societies, which imposed their economic and political pressure on China to withdraw from Sudan. Similarly, internal dynamics, such as security threats from rebel forces, and the succession of South Sudan induced China to split its political and economic activities from one into two Sudan. While, in economic relations most of their relations were a win-win approaches. Despite Sudan was marginalized by western countries and their firms, China's engagement in Sudan enable to survive the hard times. Its companies engaged in the development endeavor, was an opportunity for local employee, Chinese state companies was take risk in the conflict areas, China was won the development bids at reasonable and fair price and most of all, Sudan has assured a permanent and reliable oil trade partner, which was a main source of income for its economic trajectories.

CHAPTER SIX

6. CONCLUSIONS

The study has attempted to assess post Cold War Sino-Sudan, political and economic relations. The common denominator that pressed to discuss were the elements of challenges and opportunities of their relations. Politically, China's approach of non-interference emanated from its foreign policy, its human rights policies and its impact in Sudan, military relations of the two countries, China's reflection to the ICC in respect of Sudan seen as a drawback of the countries relation. And economically; trade, investment relations of the two countries and infrastructure development were employed to discuss. The study also unraveled the challenges of their relations which encompassed external pressure and internal dynamics.

The most contested factor for the relations between the two countries' is predominantly aggregated on the non-interference principle. Its main tenet was non-interference in the domestic affairs of any sovereign state, where domestic issues of a sovereign state is exclusively the legitimate right of that state to decide. Doing this, China was reluctant to cooperate with the international institutions such as the UN adhered to the principle. In the Darfur conflict, the UNSC critically condemned the Sudan government for its human rights violations. Consequently, it passed successive resolutions to subdue the regime. However, China watered down and refuted these resolutions by abstaining from vote or objected them using its veto power in the Council.

What is noteworthy is that, China's stand on behalf of Sudan applauded the government to exacerbate its oppressive and repressive actions on its people. China was worked in obstructing international punitive and humanitarian action in the name of protecting Sudan's territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, Beijing's close ties with the regime became detrimental to its reputation globally. Heavy international criticism led to its relations with the West and human rights activists getting deteriorated effects. Consequently, western countries, pressure groups, celebrity individuals and civil societies were imposed extensive pressure on the two countries against their cooperate atrocities.

Similarly, as a result of China's cooperation with the regime, also, incurred a challenge within Sudan for their harmonious relationships. It faced security threats from liberation movements and militia factions. To this end, Chinese employee in Sudan was killed, kidnapped by these groups in order to exert pressure on China. But China was claimed that, the conflict in Sudan was as a result of backwardness and poverty, to this end it was actively engaged in balancing of the government and the militants by dividing the oil revenue and in promoting peaceful solutions for the conflict.

The secession of South Sudan also taken as other constraints too. Since 75% of unified Sudan oil wealth is went with the new country after its independence in 2011, China which was a partner of one Sudan split its economic and political potential into two Sudan. Within the interim period of rapprochement and following the consequent of independence, China's economic and political resources which were concentrated in Khartoum split into the two countries. China's providing of aid, development projects which was anticipated in exchange of oil sell and its SOE's investment opportunities were given to South Sudan too. As a result, the significance of the Khartoum government for China diminished.

The two countries' interdependence also observed in the international arena as well .They support each other and made a common front with other African countries on global political and economic issues. Sudan supported China's claim to become member of the United Nations Security Council in the 1970s. Among the 76 votes in favor of China in this period, 26 of them were African countries, Sudan was one of them. And with strong support from Sudan and other African countries China defeated western countries' anti-China proposal at UN conference on human rights in 1980s. And, Sudan in 1996 was unilaterally under sanction by the UN and in 1997 by the USA, and by the Arab countries for its cooperation with Saddam Hussein in the Gulf-war and for its suspicious of supporting terrorism. This made China to remain an alternative supper-power which has the capacity to explore natural resources and able to rescue Sudan from its economic meltdown. And as the result of the Tiananmen incidence of 1989, western countries were condemned and marginalized China, for its humiliation on peaceful democratic demonstrators; however most of African sates including Sudan were with China.

Regarding party to party relation points of view, the Communist Party of China (CPC), was made frequent visit to Sudan and perched communist ideology. The National Congress Party (NCP) of Sudan on its part was visiting Beijing on invitation of its counter-part and taking trainings and sharing experiences

In short, politically, China was a major partner in defending and protecting the Khartoum regime from external pressure by refuting subsequent resolutions endorsed by the UN Security Council and providing necessary weapons to tackle its civil war. In similar vein, Sudan was also a major ally of China in adding numerical advantage with other African countries to vote in favor of China and tackling their common negligence by the west.

Since, the intent of this study was to examine and explore the political and economic relations between the two countries'. Like their political maneuvering discussed above, the study has also observed and revealed their economic relations too. Sudan found itself cut off from the Western oil firms and diplomatic partnership converged China's interest to engage into the untapped oil market and investment opportunities in Sudan. Few years later after China engaged in development projects, Sudan became major oil exporter. It exported oil to China and diversified the oil revenue into other investment projects, such as hydro-power, Dams, oil pipelines, highways, schools, hospitals.

Since, oil is among the driving forces of Sudan's economy to activate. China's engagement in this sector is a praise outcome for the two countries'. China's investment in Sudan and the consequent of Sudan's oil export to China, the country generally shows promised economic growth job opportunities for its citizen. Most of China's investment firms recruited local employee up on the agreements of the two countries. For instance, in the production and exploration of oil, as it can refer in table 5.3, page 78 more than 70% of the employee is recruited from local market. In addition to the daily wages, skill and knowledge transfer has also been an advantage to the Sudanese employees. Hence, the overall economy of the countries shows prosper, as can be refer to table 5.2,page 69 above, the GDP, the government revenue and GDP per capital showed significance improvements.

China's involvement as a trading partner in Sudan enabled it to get a reliable and profitable trade partner. As table 4.2, page 47 shows, the import and export difference of the two countries favors Sudan with nearly US\$1.5 billion dollars every year. This is the result of which Sudan's commodity has got access and reliable market in China. From the start of their renewed interest in the mid of 90s, Sudan's main trading partners with 88% of its export items was China. So it can be assumed that China is a contributing factor for Sudan's overall economic growth. On the China's side, its main approach to Sudan is in search of oil. It developed the oil sector and got a reliable oil partner. Despite China has an opportunity to engage in other oil rich countries of Africa such as in Nigeria, in Angola, Gabon and Libya. Its engagement in Sudan is an opportunity for Sudan. Therefore, economic relations of the two countries are, asymmetrical; or they are not complementary benefited. Instead China's importance to Sudan exceeds Sudan's importance to China. Or the hard fact from these relations is they got what they want from each other.

Generally, China's economic and political activities in Sudan are able to produce opportunities for the country's economic development and it introduced into the stage of politics. This is because the Sudanese government crafted, carefully handled and implemented policies that can promote the desired prospective outcomes from the two countries relations. This implies that, the presence of China in Sudan is not as an exploiter and exploited relationship. Rather, it is a complementary approach which enables the two countries to exchange the resources, the capability, the capital and the skills they have.

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Appendix (1): List of key informants

Name of informants	Date and place of interview	Position and organization
Professor K.Mathews	Addis Ababa University 07 March,2014 3:00-3:50 Pm	Instructor at AAU,PSIR Department,
Dawit Yohannes	Addis Ababa University 06 March,2014 11:30 Am-12:40 Pm	PhD, candidate institution of peace and security studies, Addis Ababa University
Liu Pengyu	China Embassy, Addis Ababa 22 February,2014 10:00-11:15 Am	First Secretary Head of political section, China Embassy in Ethiopia
Kemal Beshir Ahmed	Sudan Embassy, Addis Ababa 11 February,2014 10:00-11:30 Am	Minister Plenipotentiary Bilateral Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, Sudan Embassy, in Ethiopia

Appendix (2): Interview Guideline Questions for Professor K.Mathews

Introduction

I am, Ermias G\ Egziabher a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Post-Cold War China-Sudan Political and Economic Relations: Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Sino-Sudan, political and Economic relations by describing and analyzing the cost-benefit outcomes of the relations between the two countries.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. How do you evaluate China's advocacy on "human rights as belonging to national government? What can you say about its consistency?
2. What is the hidden agenda that China was defending the Sudanese officials from the ICC warrant, for their cruel act in the Darfur conflict? What relations do this with China's principle of non-interference?
3. What mechanisms are available for encouraging the inflow of beneficial Chinese FDI and discouraging the inflow of harmful one in the contemporary China-Africa economic relations?
4. What policies might be introduced to maximize the positive impact of incoming Chinese FDI in terms of employment creation, foreign exchange earnings, knowledge and technology transfer in its relation with Sudan?

Appendix (3): Interview Guidelines Questions for Dawit Yohannes

Introduction

I am, Ermias G\Egziabher a post graduate student in International Relations, AAU.I am doing my MA thesis on Post-Cold War China-Sudan Political and Economic Relations: Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Sino-Sudan, political and Economic relations by describing and analyzing the cost-benefit outcomes of the relations between the two countries.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

- 1.The China-Africa political relations in the contemporary period is debated between those assumed it is an opportunity for Africa and those see it as a challenge. What are the factors to be and element of Challenges and opportunities? And why?
2. What is the impact of China's aid to Human rights and good governance to African countries? Does it pursue its foreign policy goals through this aid?
3. China was defending the government of Sudan in the Darfur conflict, but after it exhausted pressure by the international community, it turned to impose the Sudan government to accept successive resolutions endorsed by the UN. What factor does China enable to change its policy?
4. Why China is highly engaged with African countries of having extractive industries? What differs China from other countries of having similar interest?
5. Do you think the economic relations between Sudan and China is symmetrical. If not what type of policy does to follow Sudan to narrow the difference?

Appendix (4), Interview Guidelines Question for Liu Pengyu

I am, Ermias G\Egziabher a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU.I am doing my MA thesis on Post-Cold War China-Sudan Political and Economic Relations: Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Sino-Sudan, political and Economic relations by describing and analyzing the cost-benefit outcomes of the relations between the two countries.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. China is adhering to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign state, how do you evaluate this principle in China-Sudan perspectives during the Darfur conflict?
2. What implication does the secession of South-Sudan on the continuity of China-Sudan political China-Sudan political and economic relations?
3. China was defending the government of Sudan in the Darfur conflict, but it exhausted pressure by the international community, it turned to impose the Sudanese government to accept successive resolutions endorsed by the UN. What factors does China enable to changes its policy in this case?
4. Why is China highly engaged with African countries of having extractive industries? What differs China from other countries of having similar interest?
5. What are the effects of Chinese FDI in Sub-Sahara Africa, specifically Sudan?

Appendix (5), Interview Guidelines Question for Kemal Bashir Ahmed

I am, Ermias G\Egziabher a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Post-Cold War China-Sudan Political and Economic Relations: Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Sino-Sudan, political and Economic relations by describing and analyzing the cost-benefit outcomes of the relations between the two countries.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. How do you evaluate for the displacement of more people without compensation in the China-Sudan joint venture Development projects? What cost-benefit does it has?
2. What implication does the secession of South-Sudan on the continuity of China-Sudan Political and economic Relations?
3. What is your view on the controversy regarding supply of weapons to Sudanese which was used during the Darfur conflict? What cost, benefit does it has?
4. Do you think the coming of China to Sudan is for economic reasons? How do you differentiate it from political interest?
5. In What way or manner does the presence of China in Sudan benefit the local people? What change or improvement does seen after China's engagement in Khartoum?
6. How do you address yourself for displacing China's product for local industry of Sudan?

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Ermias G/Egziabher

June, 2014

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Dr.M.Venkataraman

June, 2014