

*Addis Ababa University*  
*School of Graduate Studies*  
*Faculty of Business and Economics*

*Beneficiary Impact Assessment of Demobilization and  
Reintegration Program:  
The Case of Dansha Resettlements Project*

*A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of  
Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the  
requirement for the Degree of Master of Public  
Administration  
in the Department of Public Administration and  
Development Management.*

*By Aklilu Kidanemariam*  
*Advisor, Ato Teferi Regassa*

*Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*  
*June, 2008*

*Declaration*

*I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.*

*Declared by:*

*Name: -----*

*Sign. -----*

*Date: -----*

*Confirmed by Advisor:*

*Name: -----*

*Sign. -----*

*Date: -----*

*Place and date of submission: -----*

*Addis Ababa University*  
*School of Graduate Studies*

*Title: Beneficiary Impact Assessment of Demobilization and  
Reintegration Program:  
The Case of Dansha Resettlements Project*

*BY Aklilu K/mariam*

*Faculty of Business & Economics*

*Master of Public Administration Program*

*Approved by the Board of Examiners*

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*Advisor*

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*Sign.*

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*Examiner*

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*Sign.*

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*Examiner*

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*Sign.*

### **Acknowledgements**

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Ato Teferi Regassa, my thesis advisor for his critical comments and constructive suggestions.

Moreover, I want to extend my deepest appreciation to Ato Mulugeta Gebrehiwot for his encouragement and helpful comments.

I also want to extend my appreciation to my wife Abriha G/medhin and my children for their moral support and encouragement they gave me during my thesis work.

I am also indebted to my friends for their company and support.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the type – setter Achamyesh Tesfaye for her patience and cooperation in carefully typing the manuscript.

## Acronyms

ACP - Alternative Certification Program

BOA – Bureau of Agriculture

BOE – Bureau of Education

BOH – Bureau of Health

<sup>0</sup>C - Degree Celsius

CSA – Central statistics Authority

DRP – Demobilization and Reintegration Program

EPRDF – Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

ENDF – Ethiopian National Defense Force

FGDs – Focus Group Discussions

GTZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)

IGAD – Inter Governmental Authority for Development

IAR – Institute of Agricultural Research

IRR – Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction

Km – Killometer

MTCP – Military Career Transition Program

N.A. – Not Available

NGOs – Non – Governmental Organizations

OLF – Oromo Liberation Front

PASDEP – Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty

USA – United States of America

US – United States

TPLF – Tigray People’s Liberation Front

TGE – Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TSS – Transitional Subsistence Support

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

UN – United Nations

WHO – World Health Organization

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## ***Abstract***

*The purpose of this study is to assess the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Dansha resettlement project. It is to make impact assessments on the ex-combatants' economic independence and their subsequent acceptance by the host community. The study was highly important to examine the potential risks of the resettlement, which is taken as a means to reintegrate ex-combatants, and draw possible lessons to prevent these risks. To meet the objective of the study, both primary and secondary data were used. For the primary data, key informants were interviewed and questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected 120 settlers and focus group discussions were undertaken. The data were analyzed using descriptive and qualitative techniques.*

*The findings of the study clearly show that the settlers are reintegrated economically, socially and politically in a sustainable way. The economic impact assessment of the program revealed that the settlers were provided land for farming and housing facility. They also had access to credit, pension scheme, and other transitional subsistence support such as farming tools, seeds and other extension packages. Like wise, the settlers are now economically reintegrated, having the capacity to produce sesame for cash and sorghum for food. Livestock breeding and off-farm activities also helped them to have sustainable livelihood in the area.*

*The social impact assessment also indicates that settlers have got sufficient social services, that are access to health, potable water and education which are comparatively adequate to support the settlers. The study also shows that settlers have close relationships with host community and high involvement in political and social affairs of the society.*

*Therefore, it is inferred that, existence of sufficient social infrastructure, access to credit and market, with potential area for farming and livestock are observed to be potential strengths that enabled settlers to be successful. On top of that, the close relationship with the host community and among themselves encouraged the achievement of sustainable reintegration.*

*The study concludes that resettlement scheme can be an effective way of reintegrating ex-combatants. For the success of such type of resettlement, it needs to be guided by well-organized documents, committed government, motivated staff and willing beneficiaries. It also should be based on adequate and reliable socio-economic study with proper implementation and monitoring.*

*On top of that, the consent of the host community with the above mentioned factors is decisive for successful reintegration of ex-combatants.*

*The study then recommends that clear and consistent orientation on benefits and modalities of reintegration should be stated appropriately. It also recommends better training on agricultural extension, and veterinary services should be realized.*

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## **Chapter one:**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1. Background of the Study**

The Dansha resettlement project was launched by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1994 to resettle ex-combatants of TPLF/EPRDF as farmers. The project lasted until 1998. This research, thus, aims at assessing its impact after 10 years of the end of the project. The target beneficiaries of the project were veterans of the EPRDF liberation army who spent more than a decade of their lives as guerilla fighters. The assessment attempts to measure the success/failure of the reintegration in all aspects of economic, social and political dimensions.

Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (DRP) become significantly important projects for different types of transitional societies including post conflict restructuring and those undergoing political and/or economic reforms.

DRP is not a new tool of policy. It was practiced during the Twentieth Century at various times, that is against the defeated Axis Powers after the Second World War, in the aftermath (consequence) of wars of national liberation that ended Colonial Rule, and DRP that was practiced after the Viet Cong Victory in Vietnam. In these situations, DRP was largely something practiced by Victors against the Vanquished/defeated.

The rise of DRP was simply a response to needs. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the fall from power of various Cold War dictatorships in Asia and Africa, and the conflicts that often ensued, the rise of conflicts caused or fuelled by resources, etc., all these tested the abilities of the international community to bring peace to troubled lands. These all account for the re-discovery of international sanctions as a tool of policy, demobilization and reintegration program. DRP is inextricably linked to both conflict resolution and conflict prevention. Almost every peace agreement written since the two World Wars has included a provision for DRP, despite the fact that the concept has undergone more analysis (Gerald, 2005:300).

DRP for ex-combatants is key to an effective transition from war to peace. The success of demobilization and reintegration signals the end to organized conflict and thereby provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country. Undertaken in a peace time context, a demobilization and reintegration program enables a government to

restructure its public expenditure infavour of poverty-oriented problems and to consolidate peace efforts.

After decades of civil war with a military dictatorship, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in May 1991. This resulted in the defeat of the largest armed force in Africa at that time. In the context of a transition from war to peace, the TGE understood that the absence of a formal demobilization and reintegration process of these ex-soldiers would be an imminent threat to peace and national security of the country.

Accordingly, the TGE created a commission (the Commission for the Demobilization and Rehabilitation of Former Army and Disabled War Veterans) with a task to demobilize and reintegrate the ex-soldiers. The immediate task of the Commission was to prepare the ex-soldiers for civil lifethrough orientations given at different assembly centers which contributed to the restoration of security and stability by creating a cooling period to them. The long-term task of the Commission was to resettle ex-combatants and facilitate their social and economic reintegration into peaceful, productive and self-sustained lives. At a later stage, the Commission was assigned to an additional responsibility of demobilizing and reintegrating 21,000 fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) captured by the EPRDF-led government in 1992 and 50,000 EPRDF combatants from the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) (Colletta: 1996:1).

According to a report by GTZ (1994:60), the Commission, beyond designing the program, had the task to solicit international support since implementing the project as the scale of the demobilization and reintegration initiatives coupled with severe resource constraints were above the capabilities of the government. As a result, significant resources were mobilized from donors through different channels. Such resources even led to the designing of different projects including the Dansha resettlement project which was particularly initiated as a result of the decision of the TGE to reorganize the EPRDF army as a National Defence Force. The project resulted in the demobilization of about 50,000 ex-combatants. The size of the EPRDF army at the time was about 120,000 of which most of the members were Tigreans. The government's decision was, therefore, to downsize the army by about 50,000 Tigrean soldiers to give opportunity to the rest of the ethnicities in the new National Defense Force.

According to Tesfaye Taffesse (1996:17), the return of these ex-combatants to their places of origin meant returning them to the highlands of Tigray, where overpopulation has already created serious scarcity of farm lands in the region. On the other hand, there were vast low-lands which were undeveloped due to low social and economic infrastructure. Consequently, the Commission, with

the consent of the government, encouraged the ex-combatants to opt for a resettlement in the uninhabited low-lands of Dansha with the objective of providing them with enough farm lands for their reintegration. This project, on its way, was tasked to play a pioneering role to future resettlements of landless youngsters from the highlands of the region to provide them with a sustainable employment.

The Dansha resettlement project, which currently hosts for about 4,000 ex-combatants, is located in the north-western flank of the country, almost half way between Gonder and Humera. It is a typical lowland area characterized by a relatively high temperature, 26<sup>o</sup>c average with sufficient amount of rainfall and fertile soil which makes it possible to carryout rain-fed agriculture. Besides, the settlement area had been hitherto uninhabited.

The Ministry of Defense deployed its regular forces and machinery to assist the clearing of the land and the overall operations of this project. The German government through GTZ also contributed significant amount of funds that were adequate to the purchase of construction materials for the residential buidings and social services of the settlers along with the equipments required to run the social infrastructure constructed. With the development of the farm land, the completion of the construction of residential buildings, schools, clinics, hospital and water facilities, the project was ended in 1998. After that the project was handed over to the regional and local administration of the region for its handling and administration.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

DRPs are complex operations with overlapping and interdependent phases, involving many participants and complicated issues. DRPs take place in specific social and political contexts at several levels: the state, community, family, and at individual levels. Experts in the area usually recommend that demobilization and reintegration shall be addressed appropriately and adequately during the peace process, without eroding the combatants' social and cultural values. When social and cultural values are eroded and ethnic tensions prevail, reintegration become far more complex and difficult to achieve. Thus, ex-combatants, who can potentially destabilize a country but who also share many characteristics of the poor population at large should justifiably be treated as a special target group for receiving priority support (Colin 1997:5).

Demobilization and reintegration of combatants is a difficult task, because the transition from civil war to peace, disarming combatants and reintegrating them into civil life is politically sensitive and fraught with risk. On top of that, if the combatants have fought for an elongated civil war, they have little experience of civil life, their combat skills have no value in the post-war economy, and they tend to lack some other marketable skills. Without assistance, they would likely find it difficult to

establish themselves and engage in a productive livelihood the situation of ex-combatants become more precarious because veterans feel that they have made great sacrifices for the country and the public in general and the government in particular owe them a lot for their priceless sacrifice. In this sense, they present themselves to the society as a political threat with their combat skills (Colletta: 1996:7).

Armed forces, if they are not reintegrated effectively, can pose danger to the society. For this case, Haiti is a good example. According to Mobekk (2005:221) the reintegration approach used in Haiti was flawed. It did not allow the majority of the former army members and the supporting groups to re-enter civil life and adapt socially and economically. On the contrary, these groups were still on the periphery of civil society. Economically, many ex-combatants turned to other criminal sources of income which created problem to the society. This indicates the magnitude of the problem.

The other fundamental point that makes DRP difficult is that although demobilization might be implemented quickly, reintegration is by its nature a slow social, economic and psychological process. Successful reintegration into civil life depends to a large extent on the initiative of the ex-combatants and their families and on the support they receive from their communities, the government, NGOs, or other foreign development cooperation. In the long-term the reintegration also depends on the process of democratization including the recovery of a weak state and the maturing of an independent civil society (JOaO, 2005:98).

From these different cases, we can not expect DRP to succeed without other corresponding improvements in political cooperation, psychological readiness of ex-combatants and cooperation of different stakeholders. The task gets more complicated when particularly the combatants come from irregular forces or guerrilla fighters who acquire little or no marketable skills in the civilian economy. Moreover, resettlement of ex-combatants is a complex task with little history of success.

Resettlement is a complex process that involves intricate combinations of social, political and economic factors that render the outcomes difficult to predict and manage. Part of the difficulty lies in the range of different actors involved including: planners, officials, extension agents, beneficiaries, and the host community. Each of these constituencies and different interest groups within them often envisage resettlement as radically different and often contradictory (Pankhurst, Alula, 1991:67)

Resettlement for ex-combatants is risky and often expensive experiment. The settlers are selected from a group that has hardly any experience with farming or commercial agricultural production. A considerable number of the Dansha resettlement ex-combatants were too young, when they left their home areas to join the TPLF. After they joined the guerrilla warfare, they were more occupied

in the protracted war than in agricultural activities. This indicates that the ex-combatants had little experience in farming. Most of them also had lost the ability to cope with the rural way of life during the long serving in the army. This objective situation made them vulnerable towards the harshness of the climate and the physical hardship of farming. On top of that, this project was targeted at ex-combatants with a background of an irregular army, intended to resettle them in a new area with a further objective of making them play an exemplary pioneering role to the future could be settlers coming from the densely populated highlands of the regional administration. After the completion of the project, an impact assessment has never been done, and this research intends to make an impact assessment study of the project after 10 years of its completion and measure whether the ex-combatants have integrated themselves successfully and in a sustainable manner with the society without showing serious deviant behavior.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

1. Have the ex-combatants in the Dansha project successfully and sustainably reintegrated into civil life? If yes, what are the key factors that contributed to the successful reintegration of the ex-combatants? If no, what are the constraints?
2. Are the ex-combatants reintegrated economically, socially and politically?
3. Can resettlement be taken as an effective means of reintegrating ex-combatants?

### **1.4. Objective of the Study**

The current study has both general and specific objectives, that needed to be addressed in the research findings.

#### **1.4.1 General Objectives**

The basic and general objective of the study is to examine the Dansha Resettlement Project of the ex-combatants' economic independence and their subsequent acceptance by the host community they have been resettled to.

#### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of this study are to find out answers for the research questions formulated above. Thus, the study specifically attempts to:

- qualify whether resettlement can be taken as a means of reintegrating ex-combatants
- measure the extent of social, political and economic sustainability of ex-combatants .
- examine whether the ex-combatants are successfully integrated into the society without showing deviant behaviour.
- develop and draw lessons to fill in knowledge gaps of what works and what does not work in reintegration for future projects.

### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

It is thought that the study can benefit the following stakeholders from the research. The immediate significance of the study could be locally for the community. The government of Ethiopia can draw lessons from the study for future planning and policy-making decisions in resettlement cases. Planners, donors and international communities can also draw similar lessons for their future funding activities in Ethiopia or even outside Ethiopia. Even ex-combatants themselves may find it a valuable document to get some workable experiences for successful reintegration process. African politicians, especially, can take lessons from this study, because experiences in resettling and reintegrating of ex-combatants are still relatively limited.

In some countries, conflicts have continued intermittently for many years, inhibiting full-scale programs for demobilization and reintegration. In other cases, hostilities have ended only recently and reintegration programs are still in the earliest stages. Even if we considered only the IGAD region we can see that there is an actual task of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants to implement the Sudan peace agreements and a huge task of the same in Somalia and a similar task of disarming and reintegrating rebels of the Lord Resistance Army in Uganda. On the other hand there is a knowledge gap on viable option of reintegration approaches to ex-combatants into civilian life. Therefore the study will obtain relevant experiences that are valuable in conducting reintegration programs in less developed countries especially Africa, where disarmament and reintegration of combatants is still a major task to promote peace and stability in the continent. Well-conceived programs that address these issues can contribute significantly to political and ethnic reconciliation, rehabilitation of the economic base, and restoration of social capital at community level.

### **1.6. Delimitation of the Study**

The task of demobilization and reintegration in Ethiopia was huge, involving multifaceted approaches and diversified projects. Although the study covers some background information on the overall task, it is mainly confined to the resettlement approach and particularly to the Dansha resettlement project. This study is therefore, confined to the analysis of issues that concentrate on the stated objectives.

### **1.7. Limitation of the Study**

Resettlement of ex-combatants is complex and multi-disciplinary in nature, thus, due to the limited period of time, finance and capacity, it is difficult to include all aspects of it in the assessment.

On the other hand, the impact assessment also gave emphasis on the limited reintegration factors that can significantly affect the settlers. These are the settlers' involvement in their economic, social

and political life. The other variables can not be incorporated in the findings of the assessment within this limited time. It is also limited by the sample size of the target group of 4000 ex-combatants, which only comprises 120 participants.

### **1.8. Methodology**

In order to attain the envisaged objectives of the impact assessment, the study is conducted with a descriptive and qualitative methods. The methods comprised the research tools such as key informant interviews, focus group discussions and survey questionnaires. On May 2008, close ended along with open ended questionnaire in Tigrigna was administered to 120 systematically selected settler households in the study area. These 120 settlers were taken from the six villages. That is 20 settlers from each village were selected. The selection process was the N<sup>th</sup> number sampling. There are about 500 household in each village having consecutive house numbers. Then every 25<sup>th</sup> household was selected.

Since the technique was interviewer – administered survey, two enumerators were selected by the researcher and given training on how to ask questions and record the responses of the settlers. The enumerators, based on the training given, gathered the data of 111 respondents and handed over to the researcher.

At the same time, two focus group discussions were conducted by the researcher in the settlement area. The focus group members were taken from the six villages who are *Kebele* officials and former group leaders in the project implementation.

The focus group discussion was so interactive because all the group members were willing and interested to participate in the dialogue. This was very helpful in generating reliable information.

On top of that, interviews were conducted with *Woreda* committee member at their office and former project management members in Addis Ababa at the end of May, 2008.

To allow valid inference to be made, an effort was done to make the sample selected representative of the population. The secondary data was also extracted from different reports, study papers of the project area and other relevant documents of the resettlement.

The procedure of gathering data was firstly reviewing the secondary data and then interviewing the key informants. Secondly, a focus group discussion and survey questionnaires were followed.

### **1.9. Organization of the Study**

This paper is organized in five different chapters. The first chapter, as shown so far, deals with the background, the magnitude of the problem, objectives, research questions, significance and the scope of the study and the methodology employed. The second chapter focuses on literature review, which reviews the three phases of DRPs, the IRR model, and empirical experiences in different countries. The third chapter deals with the description of the study area and the methodology designed. The fourth chapter explains and discusses the results obtained from both the primary and secondary sources. Data obtained from both sources is analyzed and interpreted based on the conceptual frame work and literature review, IRR model. Finally, the last chapter includes: summary, conclusion and recommendations.

# **Chapter Two**

## **Literature Review**

### **2.1. Introduction**

To make proper assessment of any subject matter, it is essential to have a look at the theoretical aspects of the study. As such this chapter reflects on the theoretical aspects of Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (DRPs), and Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) and different empirical experiences.

First the basic concepts and evolutions of DRP with its phases is discussed. Second, the resettlement schemes of ex-combatants are outlined. In the third section, the theoretical framework of the study are presented. In the fourth section, the causes and solutions of resettlement failure or success are assessed. Lastly empirical experiences are assessed and obtained essential lessons.

### **2.2. Evolution and Phases of Demobilization and Reintegration Program**

In the developing world, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants has emerged as an important issue for governments and non-government organizations (NGOs) when conflicts are resolved. DRPs for ex-combatants are important instruments for peace keeping and for preventing armed conflicts. In post-war societies there is a wide scope of tasks in the field of development – oriented emergency aid. Successful combatant demobilization reduces the risk of soldiers destabilizing society and signals the opposing parties or conflicting government's willingness to comply with the peace accords. It thereby contributes to the transition for governing through democratic means. In the case of a peace time demobilization, the government benefits over the long-term, from reduced public expenditures on the military, thereby easing fiscal pressures or releasing resources for development efforts (Colin : 1997:2).

The transition from a war economy to sustainable peace, posed new challenges for development cooperation. Here it is realized that emergency aid alone is not sufficient to support war-affected societies in their effort to rebuild a civil society and to utilize the potential of ex-combatants for productive purposes. Special programs have been developed for the reintegration of ex-soldiers, guerrilla fighters and members of other armed groups, thus reducing the use of violence and helping ex-combatants to gain perspectives in a civil society. Today reintegration programs are important steps in the continuum from disaster to development (Colletta 1996:13).

According to Colletta (1996:15) and Colin (1997:3-5), DRPs are integral components of development policies which decrease the risk of violent outbreaks of conflicts and at the same time provide important economic impulses for recovery and rebuilding war- torn societies. There are



three interdependent phases that can be distinguished in DRPs. These are demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. Each one of them here under are briefly discussed.

### **A. Demobilization**

Demobilization is defined as the formal and usually controlled discharge of active combatants from the army or from an armed group. The process of demobilization comprises massing troops together in camps designated for this purpose of encampments, where subsequent registration and disarming of the combatants is undertaken. The purpose of demobilization phase is to count and monitor the soldiers and to prepare them for their discharge. It covers maintenance supplies for the combatants and generally also transport when they return to their home regions. Demobilization takes place on a contractual or statutory basis at stipulated places and is implemented within a limited time frame. The objective of demobilization is to reduce or completely disband an army.

The demobilization of combatants is initially to be understood as the opposite of mobilizing (recruiting) soldiers. Consequently it is generally carried out by the army. If there are several warring factions to demobilize troops, the United Nations (UN) often co-ordinate and supervise demobilization. From the military point of view demobilization takes place within short periods, so that an army can be disbanded, or the troop number can be reduced or an army can be assembled in a new structure.

Demobilization can be an essential first step on the continuum from emergency aid to long-term development. The demobilization process determines the terms and conditions of the transitional phase from war to peace. Demobilization as the first segment of DRP, holds an important function from the success of the over all process. Before demobilization or even just at the beginning of the project, a series of preliminary military and political conditions must be fulfilled. The following conditions are to be understood as essential requirements for effective demobilization process. Their weight may vary from case to case or from country to country.

- The general consent of the political representatives of the state or the warring parties is absolutely vital. All parties to the war must agree to demobilization, even if not all parties are affected by demobilization in the same way.
- The procedure and the benefits of demobilization should be stipulated in a peace accord or a law.
- Donors should be included in the planning of the DRP when the peace agreement is being prepared. Demobilization can be accelerated and facilitated by early provision of funds.
- The participation of neutral, international observers is an establishing factor especially when demobilization takes place as an integral component of a peace process.

A definite time frame and demarcation of assembly areas facilitates demobilization and provides clear perspectives for combatants.

**B. Reinsertion** refers to the entitlement packages which provide a safety net during the transition from war to peace. These packages help ex-combatants and their families' bridge the difficult period between demobilization and reintegration.

Once demobilized ex-combatants are transported to their destinations of choice, they have to establish their lives in a civil environment. At the same time, they may have very limited resources for sustaining themselves in the short term.

Reinsertion assistance would commonly target the major survival concerns of ex-combatants and their families, food, housing, health support, and education for children (the "basic needs basket"). Cash benefits compensate ex-combatants for the loss of their income sources. Support for housing, health, and children makes up for the loss of fringe benefits that soldiers received while in service. These latter entitlements can be offered in cash or in kind, depending on three considerations: transactional costs, the financial capacity of the banking or postal system, and the logistical capacity of the implementing agency.

**C. Reintegration** is defined as the process of which ex-combatants acquire civil status and regain access to civil forms of work and income. Reintegration is a social and economic process with an open time frame, and it is part and parcel of the general development of the country.

For ex-combatants, families, and communities alike, reintegration is a continuous, long-term process that takes place on social, political, and economic level. Social and political reintegration is broadly defined as the acceptance of an ex-combatant and his or her family by the host community and its leaders. Economic reintegration implies the financial independence of an ex-combatant's household through productive and gainful employment. Long-term reintegration ultimately is the Yardstick by which the success of a DRP is measured. Successful long-term reintegration can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun.

There is a very broad spectrum of approaches and measures to promote reintegration at different social and economic levels. Both the depth of intervention of such programs and the duration can vary widely. Also the starting point and the target groups of such programs depend to a large extent on the political situation in the country and on the political influence of combatants and ex-combatants.

The acceptance that a reintegration program enjoys and the social prejudices that the ex-combatants are facing, depend to a large extent on the political situation in the country and on the circumstances of the demobilization. One important condition for reintegration programs is therefore the economic condition of the society. There are two different contexts that are distinguished here with respect to possible reintegration scenarios. These are reintegration in war affected societies and reintegration in stable civil societies.

### **2.2.1. Reintegration in War-affected Societies**

Reintegration of ex-combatants frequently takes place in post-war societies. Directly after a war or civil war the social and economic structures have to be rebuilt and restructured. This situation is often characterized by a shortage of food and general supplies. In addition there is an elevated risk that existing conflict revert to armed disputes.

While the reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war societies is essential, it is also extremely difficult. Reintegration is one of the preconditions for lasting peace. Reintegration measures can prevent the use of force as both an “income – creating measure” (criminality) and a means of resolving social conflicts. Reintegration programs should, therefore, strengthen the self-help potential of ex-combatants.

The study concludes from this situation that, reintegration in war – affected societies is very sensitive and difficult. While the ex-combatants are emerging from war having combat skills & experiences but tend to lack other marketable skills and experiences, the dominant culture and institutions in the country will often deny recognition of these experiences and this will lead to frustration and disturbance to use force.

### **2.2.2 Reintegration in Stable Civil Societies**

The reintegration of ex-combatants in relatively stable societies with functioning markets and economic cycles raises problems which differ from those in war-torn societies. This category includes the demobilization of armies that have participated in extra – territorial conflicts or fought in wars. The consequences of such wars are not perceived in the same light through out the country. The need for targeted reintegration measures is often underestimated in countries with a relatively strong economy. However, it is especially in these countries that ex-combatants remain permanently excluded from the formal sector. Their lack of skills and formal qualifications deny them access to jobs and even in the informal sector competition is high. Without qualified training and without social acceptance they are likely to remain marginalized. Reintegration program can be implemented either in urban or rural depending on the choice of the ex-combatant. Any strategy for sustainable rural reintegration must identify suitable areas for resettlement and ensure that ex-

combatants have clear title or secure rights to the land. Hereunder the study assesses resettlement for ex-combatants.

### **2.3. Resettlement Schemes for Ex-combatants**

According to Desalegn Rahmato (1998:2), resettlement, especially land resettlement is a phenomenon of population redistribution either planned or unplanned. Resettlement is movement of people from areas where there is no other factors that are suitable for the smooth maintenance of life to areas presumed to be endowed with potentials that could provide opportunities for the same end. Hence, the term resettlement is understood as planned or unplanned movement of people to get access to enough land, resources and adequate rainfall for betterment of their livelihood.

According to Colletta (1996:19), the provision of shelter and sustainable resettlement solution for ex-combatants is an immediate task of a national reintegration program. The issue of resettlement encompasses two main perspectives. These are the immediate resettlement and long-term solutions including land reform. The immediate resettlement solution is usually the return to home village or community. The adequate supply of shelter and accommodation for ex-combatants is an urgent task at this stage.

Settlement solutions have to be available to the ex-combatants but the decision of when, where and under what circumstances is so complex that can not be decided by a resettlement program. It remains very much a decision of the individual governed by many social and economic challenges. Many of the ex-combatants are drawn to the towns, because they can no longer imagine earning their living by working in the field or others do not have sufficient land to maintain themselves. When he was a soldier, he had high social status associated with city life. This situation pushes him to refrain from living through hard work in agriculture.

Many governments resettle ex-combatants and their families on newly allocated land within the scope of government programs. In this situation, free land, cheap credits and improved infrastructure are some of the pull factors that will attract especially young and able-bodied ex-combatants to farming.

Colin (1997:37) has summarized, that resettlement schemes for ex-combatants are risky and often expensive experiments for two reasons:

- ☛ The settlers or the would-be farmers are selected from a group that has hardly any experience with farming or with commercial agricultural production. Settlers are often selected on the grounds of political or military merits rather than on the grounds of skills.
- ☛ Many resettlement schemes have no sufficient links to local markets. They remain as a special field of national rural development policy as they rely on direct subsidies from the

state or foreign donors. The management is often a reflection of military command structures with little agricultural or managerial know-how.

Hereunder the theoretical framework of the study, that is the impoverishment risk and reconstruction (IRR) model designed by M. Cernea (2000) is presented.

#### **2.4. Theoretical framework of the study**

For making proper assessment of the study, it is important to have a look at the theoretical aspects and set a framework of the study. As such this sub-chapter reflects on the theoretical aspects of the impoverishment risk and reconstruction (IRR) model as a framework to resettlement which was developed by Cernea (2000).

According to M. Cernea (2000:22), the IRR model has three fundamental concepts. These are risk, impoverishment, and reconstruction. These building blocks are further split into sets of specifying notions, each reflecting another variable of impoverishment or of reconstruction. These variables are interlinked and influence each other; some play a primary role and others a derivative role in either impoverishment or reconstruction.

The components of the model are from landlessness to land-based resettlement, from joblessness to reemployment, from homelessness to house reconstruction, from marginalization to social inclusion, from increased morbidity to improved health care, from food insecurity to adequate nutrition, from loss of access to common property resources to restoration of community assets and services, and from social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding:

The IRR model is selected in this study, because it gives emphasis on risks to be prevented and on reconstruction strategies to be implemented in resettlement process. The components of the IRR model can also be influenced through informed planning, in order to diminish the impact of one or several components as given conditions require.

The IRR model is so important in assessing resettlement, because it has four distinct but interlinked functions. These are predictive (warning and planning), diagnostic (explanatory and assessment), problem – resolution in guiding and measuring settlers' reestablishment, and research function in conducting theory-led field investigation.

The model's predictive capacity results from the in-depth knowledge of past processes stored and synthesized by the model. This knowledge helps to predict likely problems 'hidden' in the new situation. Thus the model equips management and planners with a power to anticipate that is essential in planning for risk-reduction.

The diagnostic function refers to capacity of the model to explain and assess the project situation. The specific risk assessment (diagnosis) supplies in advance information and recommendations crucial for project preparation and planning of counter risk measures.

The problem-resolution capacity results from the model's analytically incisiveness and its explicit action. The IRR model is formulated with awareness of the social actors in resettlement, their interaction and ability to contribute to resolution. As a result, the practical utility of the model increases greatly by moving from prediction and diagnosis to prescription to action.

The research utility of the model comes from its ability to guide data collection in field and coherently aggregate empirical findings along the model's key variables. It also makes possible comparisons of responses to risks across cultures, countries and time periods. Therefore, the model becomes a compass for strategies to reconstruct settlers livelihoods and identify the risks for impoverishment. Hereunder the study assesses common processes of impoverishment risks.

#### **2.4.1 Major Impoverishment Risks in Resettlement**

According to M.Cernea(2000:23) the empirical findings of many resettlement researchers reveal the presence of several basic regularities. Comparing these empirical findings, studies have identified eight common processes and constructed a general risk pattern. The convergent and cumulative effect of these processes is the rapid onset of impoverishment. The eight common processes are the following.

**Landlessness** refers to loss of land. Expropriation of land removes the main foundation upon which people's productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods are constructed. Unless the land basis of people's productive systems is reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with steady income-generating employment, the affected families become impoverished. As people in agrarian countries usually depend on land for their livelihood, land scarcity plunges them into insecure situations.

**Joblessness** refers to losing wage employment. Joblessness among settlers often surfaces after a time delay, rather than immediately, because in the short run resettles may receive employment in project-related jobs. Such an employment, however, is short-lived and not sustainable.

**Homelessness** refers to risk of worsening housing conditions. Loss of shelter tends to be only temporary for many settlers, but for some, homelessness or a worsening in their housing standards remains a lingering condition. In a broader cultural sense, loss of a family's individual home and the loss of a group's cultural space tend to result in alienation and status deprivation. Settlers often can not incur the labour and financial costs of rebuilding a house quickly and are compelled to move into "temporary" shelters.

**Marginalization** occurs when families lose economic power and spiral on a “down ward mobility” path. Many people find themselves in lower social conditions without recovering their previous social and economic ties than before. Many individuals cannot use their earlier acquired skills at the new location, human capital is lost or rendered inactive or obsolete. Economic marginalization is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization, expressed in a drop in social status, in settlers’ loss of confidence in society and in themselves of injustice, and depended vulnerability.

**Food insecurity** refers to the risk that people will fall into temporary or chronic undernourishment that is calorie–protein intake levels are below the minimum necessary for normal growth and work. Food insecurity and undernourishment are both symptoms and results of inadequate resettlement.

**Increased morbidity and mortality** refers to the decline in health levels. Overall, in the absence of preventive health measures, direct and secondary effects of dislocation include psychosomatic diseases, diseases of poor hygiene (such as diarrhea and dysentery), and parasitic and Vector-borne diseases caused by unsafe and insufficient water supplies and unsanitary waste systems. Social stress and psychological trauma are accompanied by various illnesses when impose high risks on the resettlement.

**Loss of access to common property and services** refers to having no access to common property and services. For poor people, particularly for the landless and asset less, loss of access to the common property assets that belonged to relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial grounds, quarries, and so on) results in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels.

When settlers access to resources under common property regimes is not protected, they tend either to damage reserved forests or increase the pressure on the common property resources of the host areas’ population. This becomes in itself a new course of both social conflict and further environmental degradation.

**Social disarticulation** refers to the tearing apart of existing social relationship.

It disperses and fragments communities, dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties, Kinship groups become scattered as well. Life sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self – organized mutual services are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable “social capital” that compounds the loss of natural, physical, and human capital.

Poverty becomes not just an absence of income and assets, such as land, shelter, and food but also the loss of reciprocity networks which directly worsens the corollaries of poverty i.e. powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability. These risks threaten not only the people resettled, but the host populations are also affected. Here after a concise description of this is given.

In addition to impoverishment risks mentioned above, recognizing the specific risks to hosts is integral to using the risks and reconstruction model and approach. Obviously, risks to hosts are not identical with the risks to settlers, in substance or intensity, but are related to them and may also result in impoverishment implications. The inflows of settlers increase pressure on resources and scarce social services, as well as competition for employment. Prices of commodities tend to rise and health risks in the host area increase.

The most effective safeguard for the hosts' interest is an adequately designed and financed recovery plan for the settlers. When resettlement sites and host-area populations are identified, it is the appropriate time for considering not only the risks to settlers but also the risks to hosts. Experience has proven that when special opportunities are made available to settlers, it is wise to allow hosts as well, whenever possible, to share such opportunities. This minimizes tensions and competition between the two populations.

In sum, the IRR model captures a broad range of hazards, not only the economic risks, but also the social and cultural ones. It introduces a view on resettlement that reveals the causal mechanisms of impoverishment, its main processes and dimensions. These include income and non-income dimensions of impoverishments, such as assets impoverishment, housing impoverishment, health, nutrition and educational impoverishment, loss of organization, and powerlessness.

Therefore, to prevent the above mentioned impoverishment risks, reconstructive strategies must be multidimensional, taking the form of a comprehensive and systematic resettlement program. This is reflected in the second part of the IRR-model, which reverts and converts the risks pattern analysis into a reconstruction pattern strategy.

#### **2.4.2 Risk Reversals and the Components of Reconstruction**

According to Cernea (2000:24), the risk model has to be read "in reverse", turned on its head, and thus it maps the way for reconstructing the livelihoods of those resettled. Risk recognition is crucial for sound planning. Such on-the-ground risk assessment can-and, in fact, must-lead directly to the planning of counter-risk activities. Use of this model as a tool for project preparation and actual planning of resettlement has *already been practiced*. The internal logic of the IRR model suggests that to prevent and overcome the patterns of impoverishment, it is necessary to act in time to attack the risks and stop them from becoming reality.

The primary objective of any resettlement process should be to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of settlers. In further examining the components of this reconstruction, first we will address the basic economic variables, land, employment, and then, those referring to community reconstruction, housing, and social services.



Settling people on cultivable land or in income generating employment is the heart of the matter in reconstructing livelihood. Success tends to be correlated with several options, such as identifying equivalent lands, crop intensification or a shift to more valuable crops, diversification of on-farm or off-farm activities. Technical assistance and favorable social policy measures must accompany land-based resettlements. Over all, the combination of providing land, and employment opportunities is an important strategy for recovery.

Better shelter condition is one of the relatively easy-to-achieve improvement in settlers' livelihoods, so impoverishment through worsened housing can be effectively prevented through fair recognition of housing reconstruction costs and successful planning decisions.

The reconstruction of communities, networks, and social cohesion is essential. Community reconstruction refers to group structures, including informal and formal institutions, while overcoming marginalization refers primarily to the individual family or household level.

Re-creating community structures and community owned resources is a complex endeavor that cannot be accomplished overnight, the initial allocation of resources to resettle, including access to common property resources, is virtually decisive for settlers' successful "takeoff" at the new site. If access to resources is below a critical limit (on a per-family or per-capita basis), the take of is jeopardized, but if it provides a minimal but viable basis, post resettlement development can build upon it and be successful. Enabling the rebirth of community institutions is paramount for successful resettlement and livelihood reconstruction.

Nutrition levels and health will depend in the long run on progress in settlers' economic recovery. But in the short run, reconstruction requires that sudden disruptions in food supply and risks to health and life are arrested through immediate counteraction, even before full economic reconstruction is undertaken. Sustainable reconstruction, however, requires long-term planning to foster needed changes in settlers' behaviour and their ability to cope with the circumstances of the new habitat.

Therefore, optimizing the reconstruction part of the IRR model provides the broad chart for pursuing the reestablishment of settlers along several clear indicators. The evidence quoted demonstrates that, a) Impoverishment risks can be successfully attacked and reversed. b) Livelihood reconstructions, however difficult, is feasible along the specific directions identified. and c) The body of replicable positive experiences is growing continuously.

The IRR model is fully compatible with the most advanced resettlement policies in existence today and offers a methodology capable of vastly increasing consistency and effectiveness in the

implementation of these policies. But resettlement is a complex process that involves intricate combinations of social, political and economic factors that render the outcomes difficult to predict and manage. Resettlement has probably been the least successful undertaking in the history of development. Thus, hereunder the study assesses why resettlement projects fail.

## **2.5. Why do Things so often go wrong in Resettlement Projects?**

According to Chris de Wet` framework (cited in Cernea 2000: 34 ), there are two views as to why things so often go wrong in resettlement. These are: “Inadequate inputs” and the “Inherent complexities” approaches. These different “diagnoses” have implications for how we should go about attempting to improve resettlement outcomes.

The inadequate inputs approach argues that resettlement goes wrong, principally because of a lack of the proper inputs, that is, national legal framework and policies, political will, funding, pre-resettlement surveys, planning, consultation, careful implementation, and monitoring. Lack of these inputs is what gives rise to what Michael Cernea has conceptualized as the eight principal impoverishment risks mentioned above.

The general risk pattern inherent in resettlement can be controlled through a policy response that mandates and finances integrated problems resolution. Proper policy, political will and provision (particularly funding) can overcome the problem of inadequacy of inputs, and the impoverishment risks can then be turned into opportunities for reconstruction, such that resettlement-becomes resettlement with development leaving the resettled people better-off than before. In contrast to this, is an approach, called the “Inherent Complexity” approach. Because of the nature of involuntary resettlement, it is characterized by a complexity, which gives rise to a range of problems that are more difficult to deal with, and involve more than providing the kind of inputs mentioned above.

The writer (Chris de Wet cited in Cernea 2000:36) tried to identify some of the main characteristics of resettlement, and showed how they generate a complexity around resettlement, which gives rise to the threats which, while not necessarily all equally threatening in all instances, seemed to him to be all but inherent in the process of resettlement as such. These threats seem to operate at different levels of comprehensiveness or incorporation.

The main characteristics of resettlements are the following:

- Resettlement involves imposed spatial change, in the sense that it involves people having to move from one settlement area to another. This has cultural, social, political and economic implications. The spatial change thus requires people to develop new sets of relationships.
- Spatial change usually involves a change in the patterns of people’s access to resources.

- Resettled people usually find themselves in larger, and more heterogeneous settlements than previously. Not only have new settlements been larger, but also more ethnically diverse. This tends to give rise to problems around the competition for resources.
- Resettlement involves people in wider structures. They are drawn into structure of the resettlement scheme and its administration.

The combination of the above factors of resettlement tends to lessen people's material well-being, limit their choices and control over their circumstances, and increase the presence of social tension and conflict within new settlements. These threats can be challenged with clear policy criteria for making evaluations and decisions, and clearly mapped out procedures. If there is a complexity inherent in resettlement that does in fact give rise to threats and consequences, and if we are to come up with a policy approach that is able to counter those threats, it is going to have to be able to accommodate, and deal with, that complexity.

Unless we deal the risks/threats that Cernea has identified and explored, there will be no successful resettlement. And unless we secure the proper "inputs" such as national level legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-resettlement surveys, planning, participation, careful implementation and monitoring, we will not be able to turn those risks/threats into reconstruction opportunities. Therefore, to ensure genuine participation and improve project outcomes, policy reform requires.

- A democratic participatory approach to project planning and implementation, involving authentic participation which involves the ability to influence decisions, reexamination of the criteria allowing the state to relocate people and appropriate property, and free flow of information at all stages of a development project which may cause resettlement.
- A wide range of resettlement options, involving, approaches designed to open out choices, allowing people to mix and match options to their needs.
- A flexible, learning-oriented approach to resettlement project, involving, the necessary range of skills in the implementation team, as well as sufficient funding, to allow for flexibility. The challenge is thus to develop policy that enables a genuinely more participatory and open-ended approach to planning and decision-making which is better able to accommodate the complexity inherent in resettlement.

This may in turn increase the risks for planners, implementers, and funders, all of whom might wish to draw clear boundaries and time lines around projects.

An unrealistically constrained process generates problems, resistance and unanticipated outcomes of its own, usually in a very costly manner. Genuine open-ended participatory planning brings

people on board, identifies real problems and practicable solutions, makes for realistic budgeting and plans, enhances local capacity and leadership and reduces conflict.

## **2.6. Empirical Experiences**

This sub-chapter generally reviews relevant experiences and takes lessons from the different countries such as Angola, Cot D'ivoire, Haiti, and South Africa. These events attempt is at presenting different experiences, where DRP plays an important role in ending fighting and securing peace if implemented effectively. Each experience seeks to map out the background which preceded DRP, the key stakeholders involved, and how each constituent phase of the DRP unfolded or revealed. Here under the experiences of these countries will follow.

### **DRP in Angola**

According to Joao Gomes Porto (2005:70), for the last 27 years, Angola has been engulfed in cycles of protracted civil war, racked by poverty and under development. The government of Angola developed a demobilization and reintegration plan and established a general demobilization and reintegration program to accomplish the plan.

In Angola, agriculture was a high priority on the government's agenda for economic recovery. Then in order to provide basic inputs that will guarantee the self-subsistence of ex-combatants and their families in the period immediately following resettlement, the government made available a subsistence agriculture kit to all ex-combatants returning to rural areas by the provision of seeds, tools, fertilizer, veterinary drugs, and technical assistance. The construction of infrastructure (schools, health posts, feeder roads, small bridges, markets, and administration buildings agricultural infrastructure, water supply and sanitation systems) was prioritized as a means of sustaining the demobilized soldiers.

In Angola, while professional training was considered a fundamental element in successful reintegration policies, experiences of the International Labour Organization have emphasized that "training of ex-combatants for employment has to be strictly demand-driven". Within the demobilization process, emphasis was placed on short-term, flexible and cost effective training, geared especially for self-employment and other skills needed for reconstruction. In this country, the objective of the social reintegration sub-component was to promote the peaceful return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers into their communities of choice, prioritizing the following actions. These were sensitize communities to the return of demobilized soldiers, discuss and improve ex-combatants understanding of their civic rights and responsibilities, inform and provide counseling to ex-combatants about sexually-transmitted diseases and other health-related issues, and so forth that will help rebuild social capital in the communities of return.

From the Angolan experience, the study can deduce the following lessons:

- The government has willingness to plan and implement the demobilization and reintegration process.
- The reintegration process was based on the agricultural strength of the country and the training of soldiers was demand-driven.
- The government recognizing its limitations tried to form and strengthen partnerships with NGOs to ensure implementation of the reintegration process.

### **DRP in Cote D'ivoire**

According to Patrick Heller (2005:109), in Coted d'ivoire, many of the elements for a successful DRP initiative, that is extensive funding and detailed advanced planning among them, have been in place for months. But no significant reduction in tensions has taken place. In the stage of its evolution, the Ivorian case serves primarily to underscore a fundamental lesson. DRP is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in the recipe of a successful peace building process, and unless the political environment is at least minimally conducive to progress, DRP initiatives will have little opportunity to gain real traction. Almost a year after the accord was signed, there had developed little sentiment among the commanders or the combatants on either side of the parties that demobilization was prudent.

According to the writer, the following question was raised. Why, in the presence of a well-funded, reasonably organized technical structure, has DRP in Coted 'Ivoire, been such a non-starter? The answer is DRP, but a piece of peace, and cannot succeed until other key enabling conditions are at least partially in place. The trappings of DRP, in fact, when not accompanied by other genuine steps along the road to confidence-building, can be manipulated to further aggravate the political tensions between the warring parties. In cases like Cote d' Ivoire, in which neither side has won military victory and peace depends on negotiated settlement, it is unrealistic to expect even the most technically excellent DRP process to succeed when there is no security, no trust, and no nascent cooperation between the parties, without the presences of a highly controlling international force.

Therefore, we cannot expect DRP to succeed without other corresponding improvements in political cooperation, and unless the international community can utilize what leverage it has to apply pressure to the parties, the DRP process is likely to continue to be characterized by false starts and token actions. This is not meant to denigrate (be little) the significance of extensive planning, for the reinsertion and reintegration phases, which are notoriously complex and absolutely central to the success of any DRP enterprise, but shows the importance of peace, stability, trust and cooperation on the implementation of DRP.

The lessons drawn from Cot Divoire's demobilization and reintegration program are:

- many of the elements necessary for successful DRP initiative, such as planning and funding were in place
- The enabling conditions were not achieved at the time of demobilization process.
- There was no success of DRP, because there was no peace, confidence and trust among the warring parties.
- This shows that DRP can not be successful unless the enabling conditions, such as security, trust, and cooperation are in place.

### **DRP in Haiti**

According to Erin Mobekk, (2005:207) DRP was essential to foster stability and peace in Haiti, but it was largely ignored in 1994 and then the problems have compounded. Here it will outline and analyze the DRP process, identifying the key factors and their consequences.

The demobilization of the armed forces was successful in so far as it dissolved the military structures, and therefore the institutionalized violence and the politicized army that had controlled Haitian political life. However, there was a clear absence of proper planning, resource mobilization, needs assessment and counseling. Most of the factors that constitute effective demobilization were either ignored or improperly conducted.

Reintegration is the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to re-enter civil life and adapt socially and economically. The success of this process is dependent upon both ex-combatants and civil society. It is a long-process, which along side economic and social reintegration includes a substantial psychological adjustment. Since many of the crucial factors for successful reintegration were ignored, there were key problems with the reintegration process in Haiti.

The first problem with reintegration lay in issues of compensation and unemployment. The army had its institutional power and status (which also meant economic power) removed, but they were not compensated in any visible way. The former soldiers had more difficulty in obtaining a job because of their previous connection to the army. Reintegration suffered because this effort was not taken in conjunction with a reconciliation process.

The second challenge for reintegration was that, due to the extreme poverty in Haiti, the retraining was seen as favoring the former military. The program was perceived to be rewarding the repressors with no parallel efforts being channeled towards the repressed. The complex issues of reintegration seem to have been largely ignored, with the focus primarily on removing the uniforms and

retraining the force without taking into consideration the effect this had on civil society, and whether or not they were prepared for reintegration.

The third issue was ignoring the calls for justice. Reintegration could not take place without a degree of reconciliation within Haitian society. However, reconciliation could not come about without a process of justice. By ignoring justice, and hence supporting impunity, reconciliation was flawed and reintegration was difficult and fraught with problems at best, impossible at worst.

A fourth problem intensifying the difficulties of reintegration was the Haitian government's apparent lack of willingness to support the process. The government was not as supportive of the reintegration as it could have been, primarily because it was politically controversial. There was a fear that support for the reintegration program could be seen as betrayal of the people who had suffered under the military regime.

Lastly, there was a significant need for psychological adjustment as part of reintegration. To reintegrate such a group into civil society would need considerably more than vocational training. The strategy would require a psychological shift, which needed to be addressed during the retraining period. There also needed to be awareness that this process would take a long time. An appropriate communication strategy should also have been directed at the civil population since they were also psychologically unprepared for reintegration.

Therefore, these problems of reintegration resulted, the ex-combatants turned to other criminal sources of income economically. The psychological adjustment was never comprehensively attempted. Furthermore; a key reason why reintegration was unsuccessful the last time was due to the insufficient focus on the psychological shift necessary for reintegration. The majority of former combatants were not prepared to become part of civil society. They had possessed too much power and status for too long to be able to settle into civil society without a significant mind-shift.

Local ownership of DRP is crucial for its success, however, in Haiti's situation where the local government is as yet incapable of conducting such a process, and it is clear that unless such a process is conducted democracy will be endangered.

The lessons that can be taken from the Haitian DRP are:

- The demobilization was successful because the military structure was dissolved.
- The crucial elements for successful reintegration, such as, resource mobilization, proper planning, need assessment and counseling for psychological adjustment were not in place.
- The importance and necessity of reintegration was not properly communicated to the society.

- There was lack of willingness and commitment of the government to the reintegration program.
- Therefore, these were the essential elements for the failure of reintegration which created problem for peace and democracy in the country.

### **DRP in South Africa**

According to Rocky Williams (2005: 277) South Africa has undergone a wide-ranging DRP process. What is vital about the management of a national demobilization strategy is that this is not primarily a military responsibility. The primary responsibility for managing the medium to long-term aspects of demobilization lies with the civilian authorities themselves. It is they who possess the requisite skills, resources and empathy to reintegrate demobilized personnel into civilian society. Equally important, demobilized soldiers are unlikely to trust an organization that has severed them from service for their post-military career planning.

Civil society too is a critical actor in this regard given the fact that it is at the grassroots that the impact of reintegration is most profoundly manifested. The role of the armed forces in a demobilization process is essentially threefold first it must identify, hopefully on the basis of an “ideal” age/skills/rank profile, the appropriate persons for demobilization.

The second responsibility is to prepare these persons for demobilization through appropriate preparatory training career counseling, psychological profiling and civilian employment exposure. The third responsibility is to ensure that once persons have left the force their remuneration packages, pensions and medical aid are in place.

In South Africa, more attention was given to focus on national demobilization strategies such as ‘alternative certification programs (ACP) where by the substantial organizational, managerial and technical skills of the armed forces can be converted to use within the civilian sector. In the western literature “alternative certification” is best described as programs designed to facilitate the entry of college graduates with appropriate subject matter expertise into class room teaching or administrative positions in the schools, to demonstrate competency requirements, and to gain the necessary expertise through field-based experiences while holding a teaching position:

ACP within the USA, for instance, takes place within the broader context of defense downsizing. This downsizing has profound effects on force levels within all Arms of Service within the US Armed Forces. To prepare military personnel for a second career upon severance, a variety of Military Career Transition Program (MTCP) has been instituted.



In South Africa, skills, which could be developed and converted within an ACP program, could include leadership skills, effective written and oral communication skills, team-building, strategic capabilities, and ability to work with large groups of people. Most senior and middle ranking officers from all integrating forces in South Africa possess graduate or diploma qualifications from civilian tertiary institutions, as well as having completed a variety of staff courses at the different Arms of Service Staff Colleges, (the latter providing extensive background in managerial, strategic, financial and administrative techniques). Junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers have, for their part, completed a range of military courses in areas of functional specialization, leadership and basic management skills.

The advantages of alternative career certification programs as the dominant human resource conversion strategy within South Africa are, therefore, Various, these are: -

- a) They would allow military personnel who are about to be demobilized the opportunity to convert their skills to gainfull use within the civilian sector. This contributes substantially to reduction in the levels of uncertainty and insecurity amongst personnel about to be demobilized.
- b) Given the fact that ACP are not full-time courses, military personnel can complete their certification whilst still in uniforms. The government can, at little cost, contribute towards their education and in this arena by allowing them “time off” to study and prepare themselves for their impending demobilization.
- c) ACP provides for the utilization of the extensive skills which military personnel have acquired within the armed forces for the benefit of both the public and private sector. More particularly it ensures that formed soldier are guaranteed relatively stable employment in the future.
- d) It would provide a visible demonstration by both government and the armed forces that the welfare of formed soldiers is being considered. Furthermore, it ensures that the ongoing resources invested in defense will, ultimately, have a developmental “spin-off” conversation and accreditation of military experience and qualifications represents a practical use of skills acquired that would not, in the normal course of events, have social utility.
- e) South Africa already possesses growing expertise in this arena most notably the various accreditation initiatives that have been forwarded to the National Qualifications Board for consideration as well as the different courses begin offered at Certain Business Schools within the country. These institutions, and their not inconsiderable resources, need to be more effectively harnessed to endeavors in future.

What this experience has attempted to illustrate is that because of these various initiatives, what is urgently required is a higher level of coordination within a broader policy, strategic and organizational matrix. In essence all the strategic approaches outlined above required a practical implementation, which will ensure the success of demobilization and reintegration.

From these different experiences, the study can take lessons that, the frequency of its use should not necessarily be taken to indicate that DRP is always a successful policy instrument, rather it is often the only instrument available. What DRP can do is play an important supportive role in helping embed a promising peace settlement. What it can do is save a flawed or unpopular peace settlement. As the repeated attempts at DRP in such as Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti discussed above illustrate, until the politics become more favourable, it is unlikely to succeed and the peace is unlikely to hold.

The technical perfection of the DRP process is not an independent variable, but depends on politics. Some countries forgot the vital role of reintegration in DRP. Many of the early failed attempts at DRP did not include specific provisions for reintegration, undermining the attractiveness of peace for fighters who still faced economic and political incentives to fight.

From the South African experience, the study can take positive practical knowledge such as:

- There was a high concern to involve the civil society in the reintegration program.
- The role of the armed forces in demobilization process was clearly stated, to identify the appropriate person for demobilization, appropriate counseling for psychological preparation to civil life and preparation of remuneration packages.
- The full commitment of the government to provide training to convert the skill to be able to work within the civilian sector, which was very essential factor for successful reintegration.

To sum up the experiences mentioned above, DRP comprises a number of components. These are political, economic and psychological components. What all of the experiences mentioned, show that the political components get the most attention (who can be trusted, who is a spoiler, who gets political power, who forms the armed forces, who gets demobilized etc). Following that, economic components generate attention as the aspect of reintegration most often considered (who gets rewarded or compensated, where resources go, etc). Across all the experiences, taken, there has been very little evidence of attention to the social and psychological aspect of the DRP process.

When reintegration is done well, as in the case of South Africa, it began to address some of the social or psychological impact of conflict and help both individuals and communities move from viewing people as ex-combatants to seeing them as citizens. Given the increasing recognition of the importance of achieving individual and more vitally community closure in order to avoid a

mutation of the conflict or at worst, its reigniting, the failure of the majority of these DRP efforts to address this, is a problem and worrying.

On top of the above experiences, the case studies on Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda, which was discussed by Collotta are attached in Appendix - A. The following lessons can be taken from these case studies:

- Political support has been a major factor for successful program implementation.
- A responsive and flexible approach allowed for an effective implementation of the program.
- Limited orientation leaves the demobilized ex-guerrilla with overly optimistic expectation about civil life.
- A well planned approach enabled quality implementation of the program .
- Pre discharge orientations are important for successful reintegration.
- Full economic and social reintegration can only be achieved with complete national reconciliation.
- Central coordination and decentralized implementation with community and beneficiary participation were very essential elements for successful implementation.

## **2.7. Summary of the Chapter**

From this review, the study can summarize that, with the resolution of civil conflicts in the developing world, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants has emerged as an important issue for government and non-government organizations. Successful combatant demobilization reduces the risk of soldiers' destabilizing society and signals the opposing parties willingness to comply with the peace accords. In the case of a peace time demobilization, the government benefits over the long-term from reduced public expenditures on the military, thereby easing fiscal pressures or releasing resources for development efforts.

In cases where combatants have fought in long-lasting civil wars, the former combatants have little experience of civil life, their combat skills have no value in a post-war economy, and they tend to lack other marketable skills. Without assistance, they will likely find it difficult to establish themselves and engage in a productive livelihood. However, the situation of ex-combatants is more precarious, because veterans feel that they have made great sacrifices for the country or their cause and are now owed something for their sacrifice. This makes the process more difficult and sensitive.

The purpose of reintegration programs is to ensure ex-combatants financial independence and their acceptance in the community. Combatants are a sensitive category and have a legitimate expectation that they should be rewarded for the success of the liberation war and should participate in the fruits of peace. The long-term reintegration of veterans is influenced by the absorptive

capacity of the area of reintegration, the endowment set for reintegrating veterans themselves and the quality and quantity of entitlements provided.

Resettlement is a complex process that involves intricate combinations of social, political and economic factors. But access to land and to supportive social capital are the main determinants of successful rural reintegration. Any strategy for sustainable rural reintegration must identify suitable areas for resettlement. It may be preferable to locate ex-combatants in their communities of origin or where they have relatives, rather than to new area. If the latter approach must be chosen, the beneficiaries and members of the surrounding communities must be involved through out the process of economic and social reintegration for it to be successful.

The success or failure of the resettlement program can be measured by the theoretical framework Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model developed by Cernea (2000). Even though, the IRR model was developed for development – induced resettlements, it offers useful tools that can be applicable for conflict induced resettlements, as most of the problems raised are common to the ex-combatants resettlement. Resettlement is a multi-faceted process characterized by eight simultaneous components mentioned above.

These impoverishment processes are potential risks that can be minimized or controlled by sound and well-organized resettlement policy. Planners are now getting attuned to the idea that a carefully planned approach will be necessary to address the complex problems associated with resettlement. As resettlement planning decisions have an effect on the lives of the resettled people, concerned decision makers are forced to encourage community participation in planning and implementing resettlements.

## **Chapter Three:**

### **Description of the Study Area and Data Presentation**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter describes the study area with its relevant activities and also presents data obtained. First, the description of the study area is presented. Secondly the data which are obtained from the secondary and primary sources are discussed.

#### **3.2. Description of the study area**

The resettlement area is located in the low lands of Western Tigray about 100 km South of the town of Humera near a place called Dansha. It is bounded by 1332'N – 1355'N latitude and 36 41'E 3659' Longitude. The area is suitable for growing a number of high valued crops notably cotton, sesame and sorghum. The annual rainfall ranges from 900 mm to 1100 mm, and the mean annual temperature ranges from 24<sup>0</sup>C to 28<sup>0</sup>C .

The total size of the project area is 31,710 hectares. It is covered by different flows of basaltic rocks mainly overlain by black cotton soil. The topography is largely flat to gentle low land plain, and the altitude ranges from 600 to 800 mts above sea level. It was mainly covered by thorn bush and Acacia trees. While big trees with broader leaves were found in a few locations, savannah grass was abundant.

In addition to the adequate rains, the area contains many streams that carry a significant volume of water for up to five months after the end of the rainy season. Its potential is therefore considerable. It was this potential together with the high absorptive capacity of the vast virgin lands which has made it suitable for settlement. The major objective of the project was to assist 4000 demobilized soldiers to become self-supporting through the development of a resettlement scheme encompassing the following activities. The activities were physical infrastructural development (construction of buildings, roads etc), rainfed agricultural development, water resource development, forestry development, soil and water conservation, livestock and poultry development, and other income generating activities.

Even though, the total project area was about 31,710 hectares, the area prepared for immediate development by the project was, 5,500 hectares for farm land, 600 hectares for village layout, 600 hectares for forestry development and 1,200 hectares for grazing. Therefore, the total area prepared for immediate use was 7,900 hectares.

In the land distribution process, every ex-combatant was allocated about 1.5 hectare of land for cultivation, moreover for those ex-combatants who were capable of cultivating additional farm

land, it was planned to allocate up to 2.5 hectares of land. But for the ex-combatants who were coupled, the allocated farm land in a household was about three hectares.

Every village was laid out near the main road of the project site, and were six in number. The villages were established with Kebele standard. For each village it was allocated 50 hectares for construction works and homestead farming and each farmer was provided with 1000  $m^2$  for these purposes. The project also allocated and developed small nursery sites for each village, which was communally owned and settlers were encouraged to further expand it on their own in the long-run.

On top of that communally owned grazing land of 200 hectares for every village was allotted and developed during the project period, and further expansion was encouraged as the need for additional land areas that could be managed by the civil administration.

This situation then created favorable condition for different activities to be done, the activities were rain fed agriculture, housing construction, building of social service facilities and settlers' economic functions.

### **1. Rainfed agriculture**

According to Klaus, (1997: 37), the project area was suitable for rainfed agriculture, the rainfall pattern is uni-model starting in early June and ending early September. The soil is fertile and the seasonal rainfall is adequate for growing such high valued crops like cotton and sesame as well as sorghum and others. Although the final decision as to what to grow was left to the ex-combatants themselves, they were encouraged to grow cotton and sesame.

As for the agriculture situation of the settlement, the soil is fertile and crop rotation will help to maintain the quality of the soil. Until some time, no further nutrients through fertilization were needed. The weed problem with cotton was assumed to have less damage to sorghum and sesame, as these crops grow fast and if the first and second weeding are done thoroughly, the crops can dominate the weeds.

Training and extension services were needed, because not all the ex-combatants had a profound experience in farming. For providing extension services, the best solution was to station one extension agent in the settlement to give advice whenever a problem occurs. Furthermore, training in pest management and the use and handling of pesticides was also given.

On top of that, a pool of 80 settlers were trained as pest scouts for cotton. With further training and a follow-up in sorghum and sesame pests, they could function as promoters and resource persons for the other farmers. Another area of training and services was the whole livestock section. Extension in animal husbandry and veterinary services were requested by the settlers as most of

them planned to buy livestock and engage in dairy farming or other livestock keeping activities. This service was provided later by BOA, as the livestock were kept in sizable numbers, when sufficient water was supplied and the harvest provided some cash income to buy animals.

The project conducted cotton variety trials in 1995 with the result that the initially chosen variety was confirmed as the most suitable one, of the few varieties tested. Cotton yields reach at least 12 quintals per hectare in two-year trials. In 1996 the project left the cotton trials and undertook some tests instead, with lowland wheat and three vegetable varieties (tomato, onion and carrots). Wheat did not produce a very high yield, but it was at least shown that it can be grown in the area, and the vegetables showed promising performance.

There were also trials with improved soil preparation. It was suggested that deep subsoil ploughing was an appropriate measure for the soil in the project area, but the problem of water logging that existed in some parts would not have been solved with sub-soilers.

The project also conducted trials with improved seeds, of sorghum and sesame, fertilizer and pesticides. The designation 'trials' were done once. The project did not do further variety trials, as the chosen variety proved to be the best of the available ones. Fertilizer was not applied, because it was not needed at the time. Pesticides were applied on the whole scheme when significant pest incidences occurred.

The project initiated agricultural extension in cooperation with Bureau of Agriculture (BOA). This aspect of the project was an important component towards helping the settlers acquire the necessary skills and become self-sustaining farmers. Then the project with the cooperation of BOA, assigned qualified extension workers and trainers to undertake this task. Regular agricultural extension was not necessary during the project-directed cotton cultivation in 1995, but when the shift to smallholder farming with sesame and sorghum occurred in 1996, the BOA assigned extension workers in the settlement, to follow the farming activities of the settlers.

The Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) did not actively participate in the cotton trials, but provided seeds of different specifications for the trial layout. There was also a trial of support establishment of nurseries for environmental conservation. The outcome of the project's afforestation attempt in 1995 testified a production of 200,000 seedlings. But the survival rate was low because the seedlings were handed over freely and without sufficient orientation.

Finally the supervisory structure of the project agricultural sector (Farm managers, units managers, pest control group leaders) was transformed into or replaced by an extension structure with specific specialists and Development Agents under the supervision of BOA. This implied that the project

with the cooperation of BOA, did significant efforts to strengthen farming which is the important factor for economic reintegration in Dansha.

## **2. Housing Construction**

The Dansha resettlement project planned to organize the settlers in six villages of nearly similar sizes. For constructing the houses, twelve earth block making machines were installed in the three hangars, some part of their work was undertaken in 1995, and production was started early 1996.

Until the construction of the block houses, the dwellings of the settlers were thatched huts, which were constructed by the labor of the settlers themselves. Earth block production had just started in November 1996. The block production was accelerated by increasing the number of crushers and opening three Citadob block production centers with two shifts of eight hours.

This capacity was able to produce an average of 500,000 blocks per month. These numbers of blocks helped to construct 100 housing units per month. Production of doors and windows also started in December 1996 and 20 pieces of doors were produced per day. For these construction activities, 230 newly trained masons (most of them ex-combatants) have been deployed in the resettlement center. The labour contribution of the settlers was organized through groups, which was 40 household heads and three trained masons attend to the construction, of 10 housing blocks. These groups were supervised by site engineers (one per village) who report to the project's construction coordinator. In the housing construction, the settlers were enthusiastically contributing their labor. However, there were some difficulties concerning the residential constructions.

a) Acceptance of earth block houses among the settlers:

The settlers had serious doubts about the durability of compressed earth block with a low cement content.

b) Difficulties with the so far unknown building technique:

The contractors were emphasizing that building with Citadob blocks is very simple, but the technique is rather different from conventional building design and considerable precision. The construction staff of the project and newly trained masons didn't have any experience with the technique.

c) Supervision and coordination requirements: House construction was supposed to go on simultaneously in different villages, whereas the project's supervisions capacity and experience with the technology was limited.

To minimize these difficulties, the project, by giving high priority as soon as possible, tried to complete the earth block houses in all the villages. The performance of the settlers in the building



work with the Citadob materials was monitored closely. These integrated approaches helped the project to accomplish the housing construction effectively.

According to the project progress review (Bernd Leber, 1998:7) the houses were given to the settlers at the beginning of 1998, on a lottery basis to the group members of forty. At the time the shelter were moved out from the temporary shelters to a better constructed and relatively durable house.

### **3. Social Service Facilities**

The construction of public facilities had progressed much faster than that of the residential houses, because it did not depend on the earth block technology. The social infrastructure buildings (shops, health centers, schools, mill houses and the hospital) had progressed relatively far ahead of the construction of residential houses.

As a whole, the technical standard and material volume of the planned infrastructure and social service facilities was rather high. Once completed, it had elevated the settlement above the standard of comparable rural sites in the region. This was justified to some extent in view of the remote location and hard to live. The fact that the ex-combatants have devoted substantial periods of their lives and forgone other educational and economic opportunities was also a certain justification for a preferential treatment. However, the infrastructure Services issue should not be seen in connection with the settlers only.

Among the main justifications for the fairly high technology and input level are the potential benefits for the surrounding population (host community) in this long neglected area. The farmers living there, the trans-migrants (seasonal cultivators and farm laborers) and the pastoralists that use the area all stand to benefit from the hospital, roads, market facilities and eventually even the schools and other installations serving the settlement. If this is handled accordingly, it will help to avoid conflicts over land use and other common property issues between the settlers and host community. Therefore, serious attention should be given to keeping the infrastructure and service facilities open, and the benefits accessible for the host community and the non-permanent migratory users of the area.

With regards to running of the social services in the settlement, the Region was fully committed to take all the required roles and functions. The commitment was expressed by the Bureau of Health (BOH), Bureau of Education (BOE), and Bureau of Agriculture (BOA).

The BOH had developed a strategy to staff the hospital and health stations as part of the overall plan for the Humera area. The BOH realized that in order to operate sustainably, local health

institutions must be allowed to run revolving funds for drug supplies and for the maintenance and improvement of their equipments.

The Bureau of Education (BOE) was the one who had involved before the other bureaus by sending teachers and was committed to maintain the necessary level of staff.

After all the infrastructure facilities were completed, Dansha enjoyed an exceptionally high standard of facilities and services. This helped to minimize the health risks of the settlement and consolidate the motivation of the settlers to stay and build their future in Dansha.

#### **4. Water supply**

The studies and activities undertaken in 1994 and 1996 had proved that the project area's underground water potential was fairly satisfactory. Then it has been established that there is adequate water to satisfy the domestic water consumption of the settlers. At the beginning of the project time, boreholes with yield of up to 5 liters per second and handpump wells up to three wells per village have been drilled and it was enough to satisfy the short-term water requirement of the settlers.

The focus in 1996 was to drill eight holes and establish the water distribution system for six villages and one at the Dansha town to supply the host community. Then a local contractor was hired to drill eight productive deep wells. But the first six attempts up to 250m had been unsuccessful and the water problem appeared to endanger the whole project. Therefore, more specific identification of locations for drilling had to be done additionally. Then another hydrogeologist with vast experience in similar lowland formations has meanwhile identified promising geological formations in sites not too far from the villages. Two deep wells were drilled at a distance of about 4.5 km away from the villages and have been found very productive, with a yield of six litres per second. Thus sufficient water supply for villages 1, 2, and 3 was secured with relatively little pipe work (about 15 km for the three villages).

The hydro geologist had also identified drilling sites near villages 4, 5 and 6. Thus a deep well was drilled which was very productive, with a yield of six litres per second. Another deep well was drilled in the Dansha town, which created greater satisfaction for the town dwellers. Therefore, these recent drilling success has improved the perspectives for successful development of the settlement. In this process, the project supplied the necessary pipes, reservoirs, pumps and generators according to the specifications (Bernd Leber, 1998:9). This access to potable water supply is one of the essential factors for social reintegration of settlers.

## 5. Economic Strategies of the Resettlement

Klaus (1997) also assessed the economic strategies of the settlers. They were grouped into four different categories. These were male farming, male income-generation, female farming, and female income-generation activities.

These categories did sometimes overlap, but the main income will be derived by one of these activities. Before looking into the categories, let us see the prior experiences of the ex-combatants. According to the survey conducted by Tesfaye (1996: 46), a considerable segment of the ex-combatants were too young when they left their home areas to join the TPLF. This does not, however, discard their exposure to peasant/rural life in Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia during the year of struggle. Despite all that, one can state with certainty that they were much more preoccupied by the protracted and highly engaging war than in agricultural activities.

**Category a)** the male farming activities were the major of the economic strategies. All the male ex-combatants, who were able to do agriculture, planned to make agriculture as their main income source. These farmers first started with their allocated plot of 1.5 hectares, and were trying to enlarge this plot by their own initiative and also diversified their agricultural production by buying livestock and keeping gardens. They were planning to follow the traditional farming of Ethiopia with additional activities in dairy farming, cattle rearing, goat or sheep keeping and gardening. Step by step they planned to enlarge their activities. The basics for this category was the first yield of sorghum and sesame and the importance of a diversified agricultural basis was necessary to food security, especially livestock and farming which are closely linked. As Pankhurst notes, It is nevertheless important to stress the close relationship between crops and livestock in the production systems. Livestock needs to be fed from land and its products; land needs to be cultivated with livestock. The dung of the livestock fertilizes the land and the yield from the land is threshed using livestock, Pankhurst, 1992 cited in Stefanie, 1996 : 41). Some of these male farmers might hire paid labour to help them during the weeding and harvesting period, but the majority of labour inputs were provided by themselves with the help of their family members. Here, agriculture was their base of income and were able to secure their survival. **Category b)**, male income- generation activities, which was the minority of the strategies for survival in the settlement. The Commission planned these kinds of activities for around 1,000 household heads. These activities were given priority to all settlers who had physical challenges to farming because of disability. These activities depended on the initiatives of the Commission. The Commission planned and organized grain mill cooperatives, trade activities for small shops, tailoring, butchery, bee-keeping and the like. These activities' success was directly dependent on the surplus of income available in the settlement.

**Category c)** the female farming activities, probably were half of the female economic strategies. Female ex-Combatants also were allocated a plot of 1.5 hectare. These settlers were either using it

themselves, if they were single or they merged it with the plot of their husbands and work on it in partnership. That meant, they were helping their husbands at the weeding and harvesting period, but mainly were cultivating the garden and livestock related activities. If the females were single, all decisions and activities were managed by themselves. Women, with this agriculturally based economic strategy, were reinvesting their money in further farming activities, in gardening and livestock .But agriculture was their main base for survival. **Category d)** the female income-generation activities, covered the other half of all female strategies for economic survival. They already started some small businesses like cafeterias, beer brewing, small restaurants, tailoring, handicrafts, bee –keeping, trade and the like. Some of these activities were given to some female ex–combatants by the Commission, but most of them were generated from the women’s own initiatives and were dependent on an own initial investment.

These strategies were basically successful in changing the lives of the settlers. One of the main factors for these to be successful was the provision of credit facility by the project. Dedebit credit and saving institution had an important role in offering credit and saving the settlers’ extra income that can be deposited. One clear instrument in reducing poverty is provision of credit service through micro-finance institutions. This emanates from the fact that the poor has generally no access to the formal financial sector due to lack of “right” type of collateral. Micro-finance is, therefore, a powerful tool to reduce poverty and a means of building financial system that serve the poor as it provides various products that are deemed to be convenient to low income societies (Roy, 1998:22).

Therefore, Dedebit credit and saving institution allows the settlers to protect, diversify and increase their source of income which is an essential path to reduce poverty. The settlers have the opportunity to borrow a small amount of money to take advantage for business activities or to bridge any cash flow-gap in their sustainable reintegration.

Even though it is difficult to draw a line between all the above mentioned strategies, farming can be taken as the major strategy for survival in the settlement area but complemented by the other small businesses strategies

### **3.3. Data Presentation**

In undertaking the study, data were collected from primary and secondary sources. The secondary data sources are project documents such as operational plan, socio-economic survey, project progress review and planning workshop documents.

The primary data were gathered by survey questionnaires, focus group discussion and key informants interviews. The questionnaires were distributed to 120 settlers of which 111 were

properly filled and collected. The focus-group discussions were undertaken with two groups, having six settlers each. The members of the groups were *Kebele* officials and group leaders at the time of project implementation. The key informants were two from the former project management, one from the current *Woreda* committee member, and one from the Bureau of Education of the *Woreda*.

Hence, all the findings presented below are summarized from these 111 questionnaires. As the study is trying to make the discussion understandable, it further divides the results of the questionnaires into sections to be discussed along with the already obtained secondary data. The sections are general characteristics of the sample, economic reintegration, social reintegration, and political reintegration.

#### a) General Characteristics of the Sample

To begin with, let us forward the general information gathered from the first part of the questionnaire, which is the general characteristics of the sample ex-combatants.

**Table: 4.1 Sample distributions by sex, age, service year, educational background and family situation.**

		Frequency	Percent
Sex	Male	94	84.7
	Female	17	15.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Age	31-35	18	16.2
	36-40	20	18.1
	41-50	48	43.2
	50+	18	16.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Years of service in army	< 5 years	3	2.7
	6-10 years	24	21.6
	11-15	42	37.8
	15+	39	35.2
	N.A.	3	2.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Educational Background	Illiterate	3	2.7
	Literate	3	2.7
	Grade 1-4	44	39.6
	Grade 5-8	52	46.8
	Grade 9-12	9	8.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Marital Status	Not married	5	4.5
	Married	94	84.7
	Divorced	12	10.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Size of family	2	4	3.6
	3-4	29	26.1
	5-7	56	50.5
	Above 7	17	15.3
	N.A.	5	4.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

Sources – Own field survey 2008

According to the information obtained from the survey, 94 respondents (84.7%) are male and 17 respondents (15.3%) are female. The age standard also shows, 48 respondents (43.2%) are between 41 and 50 years old, while 18 respondents (16.2%) are above fifty. This indicates that significant number of the respondents (59.4%) are above 40 years old. This age in line with their injuries in the war and the hardships of the area, can influence the settlers to expect more from the government.

On top of that, the respondents' service year in the military is that 42 respondents (37.8%) are between 11 to 15 years and 39 respondents (35.2%) are above 15 years. This indicates that 73% of the respondents have stayed more than 10 years in the military service.

Majority of ex-combatants have struggled for more than 10 years, and this situation created difficulty to convince them to be demobilized. This is one of the reasons that made them oppose demobilization and pushed them to have high expectation from the government.

The educational background of the respondents shows that 55% of them are from grade 5 up to 12. This indicates that the settlers have the capacity to understand the extension packages that can be provided by extension agents. On top of that, almost all have the ability to read and write. This gives opportunity to be a developmental farmer capable of imitating change, because education is one of the factors that are considered to influence the rural society in development. It also implies that the settlers are capable to implement the new technologies that can be introduced by the extension agents and enable them to be economically reintegrated.

As it is also clearly shown in the above table, 94 respondents (84.7%) are married and 56 respondents (50.5%) are having from three to five children, 33 respondents (29.7%) are having less than two children. Therefore 80.2% of the respondents are having less than or equal to five children.

## b) Economic Reintegration

**Table 4.2 Sample distribution by provision of reintegration assistance and access to pension**

Pension of the Respondents	Monthly pay in Birr	Frequency	Percent
	100-200	41	36.9
201-400	49	44.2	
401-600	2	1.8	
N.A.	19	17.1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	
Did you receive TSS Payment?	Yes	46	41.4
	No	55	58.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
If your answer is yes, for how many months?	No. of months	Frequency	Percent
	6 months	16	14.4
	12 months	18	16.2
	Above 12 months	12	10.8
	N.A.	55	58.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	
Was the government assistance adequate?	Yes	8	7.2
	No	86	77.5
	N.A.	17	15.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

From the above table, the study can indicate that most of the ex-combatants are getting pension . Asked whether they are having pension or not, 83% of the respondents responded that they are taking pension from Birr 100 up to 600 every month, which can serve as a safety net, when the harvest is poor and as a support for off-farm activities when the yield is good. This pay continues for lifelong and enables to keep the moral of the settlers and assist them in their economic reintegration.

According to the interview to key informants, the TSS payment was carried out by giving salaries to the ex-combatants and providing free basic health care until good harvest was achieved. The project also provided food rations, seeds, tools for ploughing and other services until the settlers reach a stage where they can stand on their own and become self-sufficient.

Even though 58.6% of the respondents said that TSS payment was not given by the government, the focus group discussion and the former management committee member of the project reported that TSS payment was paid as a salary every month until the settlers obtained adequate yield. This implies that TSS payment enabled the settlers as a bridge to economic reintegration.

Regarding the reintegration assistance, asked whether the assistance given was satisfactory or not. 86 respondents (77.5%) reported that it was not satisfactory, while 8 respondents (7.2%) responded positively.

In the field survey, 58.6% and 77.5% of the respondents disagreed on the adequacy of transitional subsistence support and over all reintegration assistance respectively. Regarding this, disagreement, it was discussed with former project management member and focus group members.

According to the key informants of the project management, the ex-combatants were given orientations on what to expect and the overall environment of the resettlement area. But this was not without a problem. The reorientation programs were given by their unit commanders at their discharge points and there were evidences where the substance of the reorientation was adulterated by explanations that at the end, the expectations of the settlers became beyond what the program could afford. Some were informed that they will reintegrate as modern commercial farmers with all the amenities of a modern farm. Some were even given exercise books from their units that help them pursue their studies. Some of them said that they were told to go to school with their salaries so that they can fit as educated citizens in the society. Therefore, it can not be said that the orientation programs went well as designed. Infact, one of the major problems at the beginning months of the resettlement program was to address the unrealistic expectation of the settlers.

The main reason for the distortion of the orientation was the high resistance of the demobilized soldiers. The psychology of the demobilized soldiers from the very beginning was that they are being victims of their own victory. When they found that some of their former comrades were retained in the army with military ranks providing them decent salary to lead their lives, they felt disadvantaged and most of them were resentful of their demobilization. Efforts were done to convince them of the decisions political correctness and none of them could resist the argument that demobilizing some TPLF members was a correct political decision for the type of the political system they fought for. But the feeling of resentment for their being demobilized, overwhelmed them.

Even though, the ex-combatants were given orientations and decided freely to go to Dansha, they were not fully convinced to be demobilized from the army.

At the reinsertion period in Dansha resettlement, the ex-combatants continued to receive their monthly salary up until three years after the demobilization. The objectives of these post-discharge salary payments were to ease the transition process to civil life, and upto the ex-combatants harvest becomes reasonable to make them self-reliant.

The other important transitional supports were pensions and health support packages. Pensions, being open-ended support given to ex-combatants through both the reinsertion and reintegration phases, were given to almost all ex-combatants after their salaries were discontinued. At the same time, all the ex-combatants received some form of health support or free basic health care. To



minimize the health related problems in Dansha resettlement, one medical doctor, eighteen health assistants that are stationed in all the six villages, 43 health assistants found in the health centre and about 20 health scouts were assigned. The clinic that is located at the centre of the villages possessed about 100 beds, a laboratory and a pharmacy with reasonable quantity of drugs.

In the focus group discussion, there was a consensus that, even though, the satisfaction of settlers is low, the government provided the settlers, land, a two-room houses, seeds and farm-tools, social services such as access to potable water, health services, and elementary and junior high schools with their facilities. Therefore, this indicates the TSS payment and reintegration assistance was adequate, but their dissatisfaction is said to be emanated from their lack of conviction to be demobilized.

**Table 4.3 Sample distribution by ownership of livestock**

Cattle	No. of Oxen & Cows	Frequency	Percent
	1-5	46	41.4
5-10	52	46.9	
11-15	6	5.4	
16-20	1	0.9	
N.A.	6	5.4	
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	
Goats or Sheep	No. of Goats or Sheep	Frequency	Percent
	10-20	29	26.1
21-30	72	64.9	
31-50	4	3.6	
N.A.	6	5.4	
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

The above table shows that all settlers are producing cattle, and it indicates that 53.2% are having greater than 10 Cows and Oxen.

According to the focus group discussion, all members agreed that almost all settlers own cattle, even the female-headed households own 3 to 5 cows or oxen. Since, the resettlement area is very suitable for breeding cattle every settler is encouraged to do so.

Regarding ownership of goats and sheep, 29 respondents (26.1%) own 10 to 20 goats, 72 respondents (64.9%) own 21 to 30 goats and 4 respondents (4.6%) own more than 30 goats. This can be a good indicator for the area's suitability to animals. This also implies that settlers are producing significant number of livestock, which is an essential factor for economic reintegration.

**Table 4.4 Sample distribution by annual production (sesame and sorghum)**

Sesame	No. of quintals	Frequency	Percent
	1-5	48	43.3
6-10	9	8.1	
11-20	1	0.9	
N.A.	53	47.7	
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	

<b>Sorghum</b>	5-10	66	59.5
	11-20	7	6.3
	21-30	8	7.2
	31-50	1	0.9
	50+	0	----
	N.A.	29	26.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

The above table shows that 48 respondents (43.3%) reported that their annual production of sesame is 1 to 5 quintals but 10 respondents (9%) accepted that their annual production is greater than five quintals. This indicates that significant number of settlers are producing cash crop, which strengthens their economic reintegration. The rest do not participate in producing cash crop but in breeding livestock and off-farm activities.

Regarding the Sorghum, 66 respondents (59.5%) reported that their annual production is from 5 upto 10 quintals while 16 respondents (14.4%) get greater than 10 quintals. But in the focus group discussion, all without any difference, came to an agreement that almost all settlers obtain adequate sorghum yield for food.

**Table 4.5 Sample distribution by off-farm-activities and their attitude to productive livelihood with access to market and credit**

	<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Do you participate in off-farm activities?</b>	Yes	44	39.6
	No	67	61.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>If your answer is yes what is your annual income?</b>	1000-5000 Birr	23	20.7
	5001-10,000 Birr	11	9.9
	10,001 – 20,000 Birr	8	7.2
	20,001 – 50,000 Birr	2	1.8
	N.A.	67	61.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Do you have problem in selling your product?</b>	Yes	29	26.1
	No	82	73.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>If your answer is no, how do you sell it?</b>	Take it myself to market	2	1.8
	cooperatives take it	24	21.6
	use all possible means	56	50.5
	N.A.	29	26.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>How is your economic situation in comparison to the host community farmers</b>	Better	22	19.8
	Equal	30	27.1
	Lower	50	45.0
	N.A.	9	8.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>It was difficult to establish yourself and engage in a productive livelihood</b>	Strongly agree	77	69.4
	Agree	17	15.3
	Neutral	14	12.6
	Disagree	3	2.7
	Strongly disagree	---	---
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>The role of credit or micro finance institutions was significant in your sustainable development</b>	Strongly agree	62	55.9
	Agree	22	19.8
	Neutral	6	5.4
	Strongly disagree	7	6.3
	N.A.	14	12.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

Regarding off-farm activities, asked whether the settlers participate or not, and 44 respondents (39.6%) reported that they participate in off-farm activities. Concerning the annual income by off-farm activities 23 respondents (20.7%) earn from Birr 1000 – 5000, while 21 respondents (18.9%) earn above Birr 5000. According to the FGDs, many settlers are encouraged to participate in off-farm activities, by building small shops on the side of the main road that crosses the villages. One of the factors that encouraged the off-farm activities is the presence of the cotton spinning factory, which hires many full-time and part-time workers. This situation signifies that settlers do not only depend on farming, but also in other activities, which are very important to economic reintegration.

With respect to access to market, almost three-fourth of the respondents agreed that they do not have problem in selling their products and buying inputs. They sell their products either to traders or cooperatives organized by the settlers.

Concerning the cooperatives, the focus group discussion presented that, each *Keble* is having a cooperative and the whole settlement area is having a Union of the cooperatives. These cooperatives provide inputs and buy products of the settlers. On top of that, they provide the settlers credit and share the profit to all members. For example in 2007/8, the Union of the settlement had a profit of two million birr. This implies that settlers have access to market, as well as get profit from the co-operatives which enable settlers to strengthen their economic reintegration.

The respondents were asked to compare the settlers economic situation with the host community farmers. Then 22 respondents (19.8%) reported that settlers are better, 30 respondents (27.1%) responded that they are similar, but 50 respondents (45%) reported that they are lower than the host community. Here, it is shown that atleast half of the respondents reported that they are similar or better than the host community.

The focus group discussion indicated that there is similarity in economic situation between settlers and host community, while settlers are much better in social service facility. This implies the strength of the economic and social reintegration of the settlers.

Most ex-combatants (84.7%) thought that it was very difficult for them to establish themselves to engage in productive livelihood, while some (2.7%) disagree. In actual fact, this was one of the main reasons for dissatisfaction to live in the settlement area, which was confirmed by the focus group discussion.

According to the responses gathered and shown in the above table, 75.7% of the respondents reported that micro finance had an important role in their economic development. The settlers got an opportunity to take credit from the micro-finance institution and undertake different off-farm activities.

For all the strategies of the project mentioned earlier, and especially for male and female income generation activities, the role of micro-finance is very essential, because one clear instrument in fighting against poverty is provision of credit services through micro-finance institutions. According to Roy (1998:20), micro-finance institutions are critically important to reduce poverty. This emanates from the fact that the poor has generally no access to the formal financial sector due to lack of “right” type of collateral. Micro-finance is therefore, a powerful tool to reduce poverty and a means of building financial systems that serve the poor as it provides various products that are deemed to be convenient to low income societies.

In Dansha resettlement, from the beginning of the reintegration process, the settlers had access to credit from Dede-bit credit and saving institution. This institution started giving service to the settlers starting from 1997. This institution has allowed the settlers to protect, diversify and increase their source of income, which was very essential to go out of poverty and hunger. This institution also helped them to borrow a small amount money to take advantage of a business opportunity or to bridge a cash flow gap.

Dede-bit credit and saving institution assists the settlers in building their capacity in sustainable self-employment activities by providing them financial services like credit and saving. This access of credit gave an opportunity for settlers to borrow and save in the institute. In 1997, settlers had a saving of Birr 810,103 while in 2001, they had Birr 2,389,018. At the same time, the credit taken by settlers in 1997 was Birr 1,310,500 and in 2001, was 5,758,000 (Tegadel, 2002:23).

Likewise, according to the *Woreda* report in 2007, the saving of settlers showed that it was increased to 7 million. On top of that, in 2007, about 1565 settlers become members of extension package and took a credit of 1.428 million that can be paid back in three to five years. In this extension package, the settlers activities are planned and have close monitoring by the extension agents.

The report also clearly shows that, settlers who had access to credit, tried to participate in irrigation activities. About 894 settlers are cultivating 103 hectares of irrigated land with a yield of 3,200 quintals of onion, papper, fruits etc. The estimated annual income of these settlers in 2007 was about 1.6 million.

### c) Social and Political Reintegration

**Table 4.6 Sample distribution by provision of housing and enrollment to school**

Were you satisfied with the house given?	Responses	Frequency	Percent
	Yes		17
No		90	81.1
N.A.		4	3.6
<b>Total</b>		<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
If you have children, do they all go to school?	Yes	94	84.7
	No	9	8.1
	N.A.	8	7.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

Concerning the housing issue, asked whether they are satisfied with the house given to them, 90 respondents (81.1%) responded negatively, while 17 respondents (15.3%) responded positively. Majority of the settlers reflected that they did not accept the durability of the earth block houses.

Regarding the housing issue, a question was asked to the former project management member, why the project introduced the new technology of earth block houses.

The response of the interviewee indicates that there was a need to implement the resettlement in a reasonable faster period of time as the burden of managing the project was on the budgets of the Ministry of Defense and the Commission which is very huge. On the other hand there was also an intention of providing them reasonable housing to minimize the harshness of the environment of the settlement area. A combination of both made the project to look into a new technology producing adobe bricks in a semi-industrial level. The project management thought this could allow them to build houses massively in a relatively shorter period of time. It also assumed that houses built with these bricks would provide higher quality of life than tukuls that could be built using the local materials that could also add to the deforestation of the area. This response indicates that, though, the settlers are not satisfied, they were provided with necessary construction materials and technical assistance to construct their houses.

From the above table, the study can also deduce that 84.7% of the ex-combatants are sending their children to school. This implies that settlers have good access to education which is one of the indicators of social reintegration.

**Table 4.7 Number of schools, students and teachers in Dansha in 2007**

S. No.	Category	Number	No. of students in 2007			
			Male	Female	Total	Female %

1	Primary School	3	265	1991	4256	46.78
2	Secondary School	1	156	127	283	44.87
3	Teachers	72	-----	-----	-----	-----
4	Class rooms	71	-----	-----	-----	-----

*Sources – Woreda BOE*

From this, the study can conclude that the student – teacher ratio is 63 and the student – class room ratio is 64. This proportion is some what reasonable and nearer to the standard set by the region which is 50 in primary and 60 in secondary schools.

**Table 4.8 Settlers access to social service and relation with the host community**

	Response	Frequency	Percent
Do you make relationship with the host community?	Yes	111	100
	No	0	----
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Your acceptance by the host community is good	Strongly agree	60	54.1
	Agree	33	29.7
	Neutral	8	7.2
	Disagree	5	4.5
	Strongly disagree	2	1.8
	N.A.	3	2.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Do you get satisfactory health service?	Yes	17	15.3
	No	94	84.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
If your answer is no, what is the reason?	Short of drugs	4	3.6
	Short of personnel	2	1.8
	Short of equipment	2	1.8
	All of the above	86	77.5
	N.A.	17	15.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you have adequate water supply?	Yes	80	72.1
	No	26	23.4
	N.A.	5	4.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

All respondents agreed that the relationship with the host community is so good and 93 respondents (83.8%) did assure that the settlers acceptance by the host community is encouraging. This implies that the host community’s cooperation in the resettlement was an important factor for social reintegration.

Regarding the health services, asked if they are getting satisfactory service, 94 respondents (84.7%) responded negatively while 17 respondents (15.3%) responded positively.

Concerning the social service, all the focus group members agreed that, though there are some shortages of drugs and personnel, the service of the settlement is either better or equal to the health services delivered in other *Woredas* or *Kebeles*.

As it is depicted in the above table, 80 respondents (72.1%) appreciated that there is adequate water supply, while 26 respondents (23.4%) opposed. Regarding the water supply all focus group members appreciated the adequacy of water supply, without any doubt. This implies that settlers have good access to potable water which is an important indicator of social reintegration of settlers.

**Table 4.9 Settlers access to common property, relation with relatives, level of political participation and host communities' access to social service**

	<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
What is the level of relationship with your families that are in your place of origin?	High	17	15.3
	Medium	11	9.9
	Low	83	74.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
Do the social services of Dansha serve the host community?	Yes	111	100
	No	0	---
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
What is your access to common property? (Water, grazing area, forest etc)	High	97	87.4
	Medium	9	8.1
	Low	5	4.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>
What is your level of participation in social & political organizations?	High	108	97.3
	Low	3	2.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100</b>

*Sources – Own field survey 2008*

Regarding the relation with their relatives, 83 respondents (74.8%) reported that there is a very low relation with their grandfathers or uncles found in the settlers place of origin. But the rest said that there is somehow good relation with their relatives.

The focus group discussion pointed out that, even children who completed 10<sup>th</sup> grade do not know their grand mothers and fathers, this shows that the connection of settlers with their families outside Dansha is weak, because the area is distant from their place of origin and there is no adequate means of communication.

The respondents were asked to respond, if the host community has an access to the social services of the settlement or not. All the respondents responded positively. This indicates that the settlers and host community get equal opportunity to use the social services. This was one of the important factors, which created harmony among the settlers and host community. This situation had a strong impact on effective social reintegration.

Regarding the right and access of settlers to common property, such as water, grazing land, forest etc, 97 respondents (87.4%) said that they have equal right to use these common properties while 5 respondents (4.5%) responded negatively. This situation also shows that there is a positive relationship between the settlers and host community, which enabled the social reintegration to be strengthened.

Concerning the participation of settlers in political and social affairs, almost all respondents agree that their participation is high. Almost all of them indicate that they participate in the political and social organizations, in elections etc.



### **3.4. Summary of the Chapter**

The Dansha project is located in Western Tigray. It is virgin and fertile that receives sufficient amount of rainfall. The area is also naturally endowed with good grass and vegetation indicating, among other things, the potential of livestock raising.

From the field survey study and secondary data sources, it is inferred that the project provided the settlers, land, housing, potable water, social services such as schools, health posts and a hospital.

The settlers have access to pension scheme and credit facility. Most of the settlers are breeding cattle, goats and participate in off-farm and on-farm activities. The settlers income in all of the activities is encouraging.

Therefore, the study can conclude that the settlers are economically, socially and politically reintegrated. But many settlers show dissatisfaction, which influenced their response in giving accurate information. Some of the responses gathered from the questionnaires seem to be distorted, because they were totally different than the information given by focus group discussion and key informants. This indicates lack of conviction of ex-combatants in the process of demobilization.

## **Chapter Four:**

### **Discussion and Analysis of Findings**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

In this chapter, the findings of the study, which are presented in chapter three, are discussed and analyzed in detail.

For the sake of simplicity the chapter is classified in to different parts. Discussions of findings are presented on demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of the ex-combatants in Dansha resettlement. The details of economic reintegration on the basis of impoverishment risks on landlessness, and joblessness is presented. The social reintegration on social disarticulation, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property, and relation with host communities is discussed. Then, political reintegration is discussed.

#### **4.2. The Demobilization and Reintegration Process in Dansha Resettlement**

The Dansha resettlement program is undertaken to reintegrate the demobilized ex-combatants of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. In this demobilization process, the role of the armed forces' commanders were basically three:

- They identified the appropriate persons for demobilization, based on the profile or criteria set for the purpose.
- They did prepare the persons for demobilization through appropriate orientation and counseling for psychological preparation.
- They tried to ensure that once the persons have left the force, their remuneration packages, pensions & medical aid are in place.

Based on this, the demobilization process was undertaken to transform the identity of military personnel to civil status. The implementation of this process had major activities of preparation of the overall demobilization based on the political decision of the government, identification and establishment of discharge centers, developing transparent criteria for selection of soldiers that would be demobilized, and disarming them. At the discharge centers, it was the primary task of the commanders to sensitize the veterans for the reasons why they are to be demobilized. Thus orientations on the benefits and modalities of the reintegration program were undertaken.

The demobilization of ex-combatants triggered a reinsertion and reintegration process, affecting not only the ex-combatants themselves but also their families and the host community. The feeling, reactions, and emotions of each group, the degree of coincidence of positive or negative experiences among members of each group and within each group determined the lasting success of reintegration as an economic, social and political phenomenon.

Reinsertion and reintegration are important phases of the transition from combatant to civil life. These two phases lie in a continuum rather than being defined stages. Reinsertion pertains to the short-term period of approximately six to twelve months after demobilization. During this phase, ex-combatants face the challenges of establishing a civil household and familiarization of life with the project area.

Reinsertion payments were important political tools, demonstrating to combatants that their years of service are appreciated. Without such payments, combatants could have little incentive to demobilize themselves and resettle in Dansha. The government continued to provide salaries to cover the entitlement packages that help bridge the period until reintegration.

Reintegration refers to a long-term period of approximately two to three years during which ex-combatants gradually become accepted community members, both in social, economic and political terms. It is also a process by which ex-combatants acquire civil status and gain sustainable income and livelihoods.

Reintegration indicators for rural ex-combatants are disaggregated into ownership of agricultural land, ownership of livestock, having quantity or quality of work, participation in different off-farm activities and get reasonable income and other savings (economic reintegration).

Besides that, the ex-combatants access to social services such as health, education, potable water and acceptance by host community (social reintegration) and involvement in local political and bureaucratic structures, voting patterns, membership in local community associations (political reintegration) are taken as essential indicators for measuring ex-combatants success or failure for the reintegration process.

The study tried to make “impact assessments” on the reintegration process of the Dansha resettlement program using the aforementioned components of the IRR model designed by M.Cernea (2000). The success/failure of the Dansha resettlement process is measured by the following eight components of IRR model under economic, social and political reintegration.

#### **4.2.1. Economic Reintegration**

The primary objective of the Dansha resettlement process was to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihood of settlers. In this section, the study addresses the economic variables of land, agricultural and off-farm activities. The ex-combatants, who have been absorbed by the resettlement area, were provided with comprehensive support from the government and its partners.

### **a) From landlessness to land-based resettlement**

As far as asset ownership in Ethiopia is concerned, land is the most important resource on which livelihood of the rural community is highly dependent. Thus, its scarcity or availability is among the major factors that could indicate vulnerability of households to food insecurity.

All settlers were allotted land for farming, house construction and for different gardening activities. Land facilitates the main foundation upon which settlers' productive systems, commercial activities and livelihoods are constructed. People in the agrarian countries usually depend on land for their livelihood, because land scarcity plunges them into insecure situation.

Success in resettlement tends to be correlated with bringing new lands into production through land clearing, diversification of on-farm or off-farm activities. Empirical evidences confirm that success in developing world is determined by the land-based resettlement.

As the secondary data indicated, all settler households got between 1.5 to 3 hectares, and this is better off than most farming families in Tigray highlands (Klausa, 1997:78). On the other hand, the national average, landholding size is 0.95 hectare (CSA, 1999, cited in Tesfaye 2007:71)

On top of that, the available land to each household is not fragmented, and as a result individual farmer would not waste his time by moving from one farm plot to the other. Besides, it will make easier and less costly to invest and apply different agricultural inputs and technologies, and even adopt different soil conservation measures provided by extension agents.

### **b) From joblessness to reemployment**

The bulk of reintegration activities focused on agriculture, because that was the most widely available option for ex-combatants. Distribution of seeds and tools, the provision of credit, and the provision of training and technical assistance have attempted to help ex-combatants and their families reestablish productive farming activities. The concern in restarting agricultural production stemmed from the view that agriculture could provide a means to assure the sustainability of resettlement.

To satisfy their economic interest, settlers undertook different economic strategies. The dominant strategy followed by settlers was farming with the assistance of off-farm activities. According to the survey gathered, the study inferred that 53.2% of the respondents owned from 6 to 10 cows or oxen, and 94.6% of them owned ten or more goats, while 64.9% are owned 21 to 30 goats. Regarding annual crop production, 43.3% of the respondents got a production of one to five quintals of sesame and 9% of the respondents obtained six to ten quintals of sesame. Concerning sorghum 59.5% of the respondents got a production of 5 to 10 quintals, while 14.4% of the respondents got a

production of greater than 10 quintals. That is 73.9% of the respondents obtained at least five quintals or above.

Of course, regarding sorghum, all focus group discussion members agreed that all settlers are getting adequate yield for feeding themselves with out waiting for government aid. On top of that, the survey proved that 39.6% of the respondents participated in off-farm activities and earned significant amount of money, 20% of the respondents earned between Birr 1000 to 5000, 9.9% of them between Birr 5001 to 10,000 and 9% of them earned above Birr 10,000 per year.

According to the interview conducted with the *Woreda* committee member in 2008, there are a number of settlers who are employed in the cotton spinning factory in Dansha. Almost all settlers got a pension scheme that is greater than Birr 200.00 per month, which is sustainable safety net support. Pension scheme is a major source of income and most settlers count on this as a reliable and predictable source of resources. Though there are complaints that it has not increased in line with inflation, and yet considered as one source of income among many. It is proved by the *Woreda* committee that 93% of the settlers who are eligible for pension scheme are receiving pension.

In the reintegration process, in addition to the land and house allotment, there was a support provided to some ex-combatants who are selected by the settlers depending on their disability. This support was designed by the project to help agriculture, which is the mainstay of the settlement. The non-agricultural businesses were organizing shops, grinding mills, sewing machines and providing cows for milk. Fourteen sewing machines were given for 14 female settlers, six grinding mills were given to 48 settlers and 12 shops were given for 12 female settlers while 754 milk cows of better species were given for 754 settlers. There is also sesame oil extraction which is initiated by a relatively high number of households (Tegadel No. 2, 2002:18).

From the above mentioned findings, it is indicted that all settlers are having enough land for farming and own reasonable number of cows, oxen and goats. Some of the settlers are producing cash crop (sesame) and all of them are producing sorghum which is sufficient for their food.

Regarding the size of cattle, the *Woreda* report in 2007 shows that there were 11,700 oxen/cows in 2002 but in 2007, the size increased by 133.7% and become 27,348. A significant number of the settlers (39.6%) are participating in off-farm activities that have good and encouraging income.

From the focus group discussion, the study obtained information which indicates the well-being of individual settlers. There were about 7 settlers who slaughtered 3-5 oxen, at the marriage of their children in 2007. This indicates poor saving mentality but having excess to spend.

In the same discussion, even though few in number, there are settlers who contribute Birr 500 every week for their *Equib*. There were also prize winners as heroes of development. On top of that, there are some settlers having land for irrigation that produces fruits and vegetables and sell them to the surrounding towns. According to the *Woreda* report, there are 894 settlers who participate in the irrigation having a total Birr 1.6 million. Some settlers among them own a tractor for ploughing and field transportation.

According to the focus group discussion, significant number of the settlers are members of the cooperatives of the *Kebeles* and the Union of the settlement in 2007 got a profit of Birr one million that can be distributed to the members of the Union. This is a significant income for the members. The focus group members also indicated that, currently, almost all the settlers are not waiting for government aids. It looks that all settlers decided to solve their problems by themselves.

Therefore, the above mentioned points imply that the economic reintegration of the Dansha resettlement is undertaken effectively. Economic reintegration also implies the financial independence of the settlers through farming and off-farm activities.

#### **4.2.2. Social and Political Reintegration**

##### **a) From homelessness to house reconstruction**

Better shelter condition is one of the factors that help settlers to improve their livelihood. So impoverishments through worsened housing can be effectively prevented through fair recognition of housing construction costs and successful planning decisions. Regarding the housing issue, all settlers were provided with a two-room house. These houses were brick houses, which are comfortable for living and better than the houses found around. But this didn't satisfy the settlers, because of the unrealistic expectation of the settlers to a modern house with a shower, electricity supply, latrine and so on. In the survey they were asked if they were satisfied by the provision of houses, but 81.1% of the respondents responded negatively. The main reason for this exaggerated expectation is the lack of conviction to be demobilized. Most of the settlers accept the government decision for the need of demobilization. But when it comes to them to be demobilized, no body agreed. The other factor that contributed to a wrong expectation is the distorted orientation given by their unit commanders. The promises that were given by their unit commanders created high expectation. This made it very difficult, to the efforts done after demobilization, to convince them of the appropriateness of the political decision of the government.

##### **b) From marginalization to social inclusion**

Marginalization occurs when families lose economic power. And economic marginalization is often accompanied by social and psychological marginalization, expressed in a drop in social status, leads

to settler's loss of confidence in society and injustice. Psychological marginalization and its consequences are typically overlooked in resettlements planning. In the Dansha resettlement, the settlers who came from the same unit or units were grouped together to establish a village, that helped to prevent loss of confidence in society and themselves. Community reconstruction refers to group structure, including informal and formal institutions. Enabling the rebirth of community institutions is of paramount importance for successful resettlement and livelihood reconstruction. The settlers were from the beginning up to now self-sufficient and also respected by host community. This shows that there was no loss of dignity their in social status and even no economic and social marginalization.

**c) From food insecurity to adequate nutrition**

During physical relocation, sudden drops in food availability and incomes are predictable. Subsequently, as rebuilding regular food production capacity at the new site may take years, hunger or under nourishment tends to become a lingering long-term effect. As the case of Dansha resettlement, these risks were prevented by continuous provision of their salaries until adequate harvest was achieved. The resettlement project took comprehensive measures to avoid the food insecurity problems. The first and foremost measure was to effectively counter act the primary risks of landlessness and joblessness. These primary risks were effectively countered by allotting adequate land for farming and creating favourable conditions for self-employed activities. Until the settlers achieved adequate produce, they were provided with pocket money and other transitional subsistence supports. These activities of the project helped to minimize the food insecurity problem of the settlers and in the end led them to adequate nutrition.

**d) From loss of access to common property resources to restoration of community assets and services**

Loss of access to the common property assets that belonged to the host community such as pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial grounds, quarries, and so on, results in significant deterioration in income and other livelihood levels. Loss of common property resources has ravaging long-term consequences on the livelihoods and social standing of settlers (Gaim 1990:42). In Dansha resettlement, the settlers access to common property assets was encouraging. The common property assets of Dansha and its surroundings are equally and mutually used by both the settlers and the host community. In the field survey, it was asked whether they have access to common property or not, 95.5% responded positively.

The majority of ex-combatants seem to have felt welcomed by the community. The key factors for such successful social reintegration are good relations with their family, friends, community, in effect the ex-combatants social capital. Such social capital is still relatively strong, even after years

of prolonged civil war. Even though, most settlers were pessimist about the transitional process to civil life, their acceptance by the community and family was encouraging. Here the acceptance of settlers by the host community was asked, and majority of the respondents (83.8%) responded positively.

Full social reintegration and self-sufficiency are the expected eventual outcomes of the resettlement program. Thus, as economic self-sufficiency is indicating good in most cases, the social integration of settlers to host community has not shown any problems. The local communities are always consulted and they participate in utilizing the social services such as education and health facilities with the settlers.

#### **e) From increased morbidity to improved health care**

One of the criteria for successful implementation of resettlement program is the accessibility of health service for the settlers. Massive population resettlement can cause serious declines in health levels. In such type of situation, unsafe water supply and poor sewerage systems increase vulnerability to epidemics and chronic dysentery and so on. The resettlement of Dansha, as mentioned before, took serious measures in the social service facilities to prevent these problems.

To minimize the health related problem, the project assigned at the starting period, one medical doctor with other 61 health assistants and 20 health scouts. There was a clinic with 100 beds, a laboratory and a pharmacy with reasonable quantity of drugs. This preparation helped to minimize the diseases of poor hygiene and parasitic diseases caused by unsafe water supplies & unsanitary waste systems.

Regarding the health service in the Woreda report in 2007, there are 105 employees among whom, one is health officer and 12 nurses. There are three health posts, each having three personnels. In the field survey and focus group discussion, the group' members agreed that there is reasonable provision of health service when compared to the situation of the region.

According to the national standard of health service provision adopted from WHO, there should be one health post for population of 5000 people, one health centre for 25,000 people and one district hospital for 250,000 people (PASDEP, 2004 cited in Tsfaye Abebe, 2007:64). However, in Dansha resettlement project, there is one district hospital and 3 health posts. This indicates that there is a sufficient health service. Despite this, there is dissatisfaction of health service provision by the respondents (84.7%). This could be due to the hostile environment and high prevalence of malaria outbreak and the disability situation of the settlers. But the focus group members agreed that though there is shortage of drugs and personnel, the service of the settlement is either better or equal to the health service delivered in the *woredas*.



Animal health is the other important factor that highly affects the production and productivity of agriculture, particularly for agrarian economies like Ethiopia. As the focus group discussion is concerned, there is one animal health post that can control the animal's disease. Therefore, the aforementioned human health service and animal health service in the resettlement area, undoubtedly have significant positive effects, on the day to day activities of settlers to attain the ultimate goal, food security.

According to the importance of resettlement program, resettlement should be undergone in adequate and sufficient planning of fulfilling the necessary infrastructure and basic needs in the area. Water supply is then one of the important necessities for resettlement to succeed in improving health.

Regarding water supply in Dansha, the secondary data of the resettlement indicates that there were three boreholes with yield of up to 5 liters per second each and hand pump wells up to three wells per village, to satisfy the short term water requirement. On top of that, at the end, the project supplied deep boreholes in every village with necessary reservoirs, pumps and generators according to the specification. The provision of water has a positive effect on the social well-being of the settlers. Regarding this water supply, 72.1% of the respondents and all focus group members appreciated this service.

#### **f) From social disarticulation to networks and community rebuilding**

Social disarticulation refers to the tearing apart of existing social relationships. This disperses and dismantles patterns of social organization and interpersonal ties. But in the case of Dansha resettlement, the situation was different. The ex-combatants were organized into villages depending on the relationship they had in the army units because this can help them to act around common interests and meet their most pressing needs.

In the project area, there are local institutional arrangements that provide social security and safety nets for the settlers. '*Iddir*' is the most important exemplary institution. Through '*iddir*', funeral processes are facilitated and closely attended, financial expenses are covered, and multiple forms of solidarity and support are offered to the mourning family. Members of the '*iddir*' use their institutional resources for fulfilling several goals of self-help in their daily lives in addition to extending extra mutual support during funeral and mourning. Membership in the basic neighborhood '*iddir*' is equally open to all village community members indiscriminately.

The role of elders and former guerrilla fighters, who were commanders in the struggle, in the lives of the village community is indispensable. The conflict resolution capacity of these senior fighters is vital in creating stability and security in the entire village community. These senior and accepted settlers are the prime facilitators in the process of extending welfare support when needed. For

example, according to focus group discussion, there was an incident of a single settler who lost 9 cows on Oct. 2007. After, the incidence the village was organized by the senior ex-combatants and money was contributed. Then 12 cows were bought and given to him.

The settlers have their local institutions that enable them to discuss their local issues. Local institutions are freely initiated by the community members without any external pressure and serve as forums for discussion of common concern. They facilitate a free, safe and enabling environment, serving as vehicles of community participation. They enhance the freedom of community members as masters of their own affairs.

The settlers in their formal and informal associations discuss many issues of community concern. The process of electing leaders, voting, running meetings, keeping discipline, and managing the entire discussion procedures reveal the fact of proven local community potential in governing affairs of the entire community. Therefore, the more the community is empowered at local level, the better will be their self-governance and popular participation, which is fertile ground for livelihood adaptation. These local institutions facilitate the functioning of local self-governance, which in turn channels access to productive resources in the process of livelihood adaptation. Thus, the rearticulation social institutions had proven successful at propelling the pursuit of settlers' economic development and livelihood adaptation in the Dansha resettlement scheme.

In addition to the above mentioned points, education is one of the factors that are considered to help influence the decision of rural households and the level of awareness about sustainable development. It helps to disseminate improved and modern technologies that could ultimately bring about the desired change in the living standard of settlers. With regard to education, the project built three elementary schools and one high school. The Bureau of Education of the region also assigned teachers and other necessary staff members.

According to the annual *Woreda* report of 2007, the population of the project area that lives in six villages is 19,280. The number of students from grade 1-upto 8 was 4256 (male – 2265, female – 1991), from grade 9 up to 10 was 283 (male – 156 female – 127). Therefore, the total number of students in 2007 was 4539, while the number of teachers was 72 and the number of class rooms was 71. From this, teacher-student ratio was 1:63 and the class room-student ratio was 1:64.

The survey also attempted to assess the level of access to primary education. Almost all respondents reported that they have good access to primary and secondary education and thus they are able to send their school age children. From the survey, 84.7% of the respondents send their children to school. This shows that they are aware of sending children to school and have the capability to cover the expenses of school fees. But most of them indicated that there is shortage of teachers and

materials. According to the discussion held with the *Woreda* education bureau expert, the schools are more or less better equipped with desks, blackboards, classrooms, and even books when compared to other schools around. Of course, it is true that, there is shortage when compared with what it should be.

To sum up, in the field survey, the sample group was asked whether they are satisfied with the social services or not. The majority of the respondents responded positively on water supply but have dissatisfaction on health and education services. Almost all of them reported that there is shortage of inputs and manpower.

The focus group discussion indicated it is more or less better than the services given in other areas of the region, despite the shortage.

The social services provided to the settlers are reasonably good. There is a hospital and three health posts, one high school with three elementary schools and an adequate water supply. This situation proves that the social reintegration is undertaken effectively.

Social and economic reintegrations are linked to each other. If the economic reintegration is successful, then the social reintegration is likely to be successful. Reintegration, in the final analysis, is a social phenomenon. Ex-combatants who have a good relationship with their family also have a good relationship with the community, but disharmony with family members tends to be reflected in disharmony with community members. The field survey indicates that, the settlers among themselves and with the community, have good relationship, and the host community is pleased with the provision of better social services as well as the achieved peace and stability in Dansha.

When we see the psychological make-up of the ex-combatants, they understand that they helped bring peace and stability to the country. They also consider themselves as heroes and victors of the war. On top of that, because of long years of struggle, they may have little knowledge on how to take initiatives toward self-sufficiency. This pushes them to develop unfounded expectation from the government.

Here, there was a significant need for psychological adjustment as part of reintegration. The strategy would require a psychological shift, that ought to be addressed during the reorientation period. The project management tried to adjust the unrealistic expectation by giving repeated seminars and discussions with the settlers. These efforts could not totally change the mind-set which was created before. But now, though not completely pleased and satisfied with the

resettlement area, their current feeling is not to wait for government aid, but to work hard and be self-sufficient.

#### **g) Political Reintegration**

An overall objective of demobilization and reintegration programs is to ensure that former combatants are politically 'delinked' from military structures, and are not unreasonably favored by formal and informal authority structures. In Dansha resettlement, the right to form associations to vote in elections has been upheld.

Regarding the political participation, 97.3% of the respondents agreed that they participate in party and government political activities. Almost, all of them are members of the associations (youth, women and farmers) and participate in *kebele* and village administrative decisions. All of them agreed that they participated in elections of the *Woreda*, Region and Federal representatives.

#### **4.2.3. Expressed Dissatisfaction**

The above findings that are clearly stated in economic, social and political reintegration indicate that the performance of the project was encouraging. The settlers were effectively reintegrated economically, socially and politically. The reintegration program ensured the ex-combatants financial independence and their acceptance by the host community. This result was achieved by the appropriate leadership of the project management, high participation of settlers and high consent of the host community.

Although positive outcomes in many respects, many settler's expressed dissatisfaction in the reintegration process. In the field survey, many respondents responded negatively on the adequacy of provision of housing, social services, and total reintegration support given by the government. But some of the responses were basically disproved by the key informants, former project management members and *Woreda* committee members.

As could be seen from the findings, some respondents might have deliberately distorted, modified or withheld information. Having unrealistic expectation and dissatisfaction, ex-combatants may blur the fact crucial to the understanding, explanation or description of the problem concerned.

Some experiences show that organized settlers have a tendency to see all survey activities as a prelude to forth coming assistance programs. Thus, they often associate research surveys with provision of assistance by national or international agencies. Therefore, in supplying information to outsiders, respondents weigh carefully the short-term benefits they can expect to get, irrespective of the reality or fallacy of the stories they tell to outsiders. Often, serious considerations and carefully thought calculations lay behind their answers.

The interest of a researcher is to maximize precision of information while that of the beneficiary respondents most of the time is to secure provision of assistance by giving information which in their opinion would arouse the sympathy of donor community. There is rarely a meeting of mind or identity of purpose between the respondents on the one hand and the researcher on the other. The motives of the respondents and the objectives of the researcher often belong to separate and independent categories which are at time difficult to reconcile (Gaim 1990:22).

The ex-combatants' unrealistic expectation and dissatisfaction may push them to distort the information gathered by questionnaires. But the study tried to counter-balance these pieces of information by interviewing two former project management members, two *Wordea* committee members and two settlers' focus-group discussions.

Incases where combatants have fought in long-lasting civil wars, like the Ethiopian case, the ex-combatants have little experiences of civil life, their combat skills have no value in production activity, and they tend to lack marketable skills. This situation of the combatants did not show them bright future in demobilizing themselves. They also become precarious and feel that they have made sacrifices for the country and are not remunerated for their contribution. In this sense, they will likely find it difficult to accept and establish themselves to engage in a productive livelihood. This situation of the combatants made them resistant and defensive to the orientation given in the discharge centers.

In the discharge centers, as mentioned before, the ex-combatants were given orientations on what to expect from the overall situation of the resettlement program. But, the orientation was distorted and gave unnecessary promises to cool down their objection towards demobilization. This negative feeling of the combatants could be one factor for distorting the reorientation program by the unit commanders. The commanders were threatened by the objection of the soldiers and gave unrealistic promises. This shows that the demobilization phase was not successful to convince the settlers.

Therefore, regarding the orientation, it can be deduced that the reorientation programs were not implemented well as was designed. In fact, one of the major problems at the beginning months of the resettlement program was how to address and handle the unrealistic expectations of the settlers.

The study tried to assess, why the reorientation programs failed in their implementation. The main factor for its failure was, the demobilized soldiers were not ready to accept the decision of the government, which says "For political stabilization and reconstruction of the country, there is a

need for proportional representation of all the peoples of Ethiopia in the army”, that triggers the reduction of the TPLF members.

Therefore, though they are dissatisfied by their being demobilized and hostile temperature of the area, they are economically, socially and politically reintegrated.

### **4.3. Summary of the Chapter**

A significant proportion of the demobilized ex-combatants was encouraged to participate in the Danhsa resettlement scheme for reintegrating themselves. The scheme represented a major departure from traditional reintegration approaches. That is instead of returning ex-combatants to their original communities, the government planned to resettle a large proportion of the demobilized ex-combatants in new communities on sparsely populated land in Western Tigray.

According to the secondary data obtained, the ex-combatants, though they had unrealistic expectation, they voluntarily participated in the project activities. The Commission and Ministry of Defence with the collaboration of GTZ jointly managed the program. The governments’ rationale for this concentrated resettlement was firstly, because of the origin of the ex-combatants was situated in an over populated, draught-prone region that can offer few reintegration opportunities but in contrast, far fewer people reside in Dansha, which is potentially fertile.

The program therefore provided effective and rapid, support for the ex-combatants economic activities. Moreover, the communal living experiences of ex-combatants in the struggle helped them to be able to form closely knit communities themselves.

The settlers are participating in farming (crop & livestock) and off-farm activities that enable them to obtain reasonable amount of yield. Even if they have dissatisfaction, all settlers are leading their livelihood without waiting for any government aid. This can prove their effective economic reintegration. The settlers were also welcomed by the host community and were provided with organized social facilities. At the same time, the settlers are participating in the political decisions of their locality.

Therefore, the ex-combatants are successfully reintegrated. The determinant factor for success were the careful assessment of the project area, effective planning and implementation of the reintegration process, close involvement of beneficiaries and the high degree of organization of the settlers.

## **Chapter Five:**

### **Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

This last chapter of the thesis summarizes the findings of the research and draws implications. First summary of findings are presented. Secondly a general conclusion of the entire research is given to encapsulate the whole idea. Lastly, recommendations for problems seen in the findings are given.

#### **5.2. Summary of Findings**

There is a general common understanding on the meaning and importance of DRP. Demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of military personnel are central contributions to the restoration of civil society and the peaceful return to productive civil life. The study realized that there are at least three interwoven technical phases of any DRP: demobilization including disarmament and discharge, reinsertion, and reintegration including resettlement.

Through the project, the government of Ethiopia has achieved to demobilize a substantial number of soldiers from Defense army of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia without even being faced with serious problems. The formidable task of demobilization and reintegration was smoothly tackled on account, of close cooperation between the Ministry of Defense, the commission and GTZ, who jointly designed and implemented the project. The main objective of the project was to reintegrate the ex-combatants in Dansha and to make this settlement sustainable and independent from food aid or financial aid.

The government and the commission should, at the outset, be appreciated for the wise decision they made in opening up alternative, the Dansha settlement project, where the demobilized fighters could productively be engaged.

The fact that the project area was uninhabited, virgin and receives sufficient amount of rainfall with fertile soils, has made Dansha an ideal place to pursue rain-fed agriculture. This fertile environmental situation helped the settlers to produce adequate sorghum for their food and sesame for cash generating. The area is also naturally endowed with good grass and vegetation, which enabled settlers to raise livestock. All the settlers have oxen, cows or goats. Regarding livestock the successful ones own above 10 cows and 30 goats. According to the Woreda report in 2007, the settlement had 11,700 cattle in 2002 and 27,348 cattle in 2007. This indicates the rapid growth of livestock and success of the settlers to raise livestock in the area, which strengthens the economic reintegration of the resettlement.

The reintegration of the ex-combatants was done effectively and correctly in view of the interviewed key informants. The whole veterans agree that they received a two-room house, 1-5 to 3 hectares of land for farming, the right of access to credit, access to education and health services. Supply of water is secured, there are three boreholes with a yield of 5 litres per second each, and three hand pump wells in each village. There is also a reservoir in every village and there are spare parts and six-generators that serve as a reserve. The cost of water per gallon was ten cents in order to build up a reasonable maintenance fund. Therefore, regarding the availability of water, the study concludes that there is enough supply of water for consumption. Thus important achievements have been made regarding social services. The settlement has a district hospital and three health posts led by health officer and 12 nurses. The hospital provides reasonable service to the settlers.

Substantial proportion of the settlers are literate that helped them to make use of improved and modern technologies that could ultimately bring about the desired change in the living standard of settlers, and hence sustainable local development. This in turn created conducive environment to raise awareness among settlers in different aspects such as family planning, prevention of HIV/aids, proper utilization and conservation of natural resources.

Access to education is adequate when compared to the existing situation of the country. The class room-student ratio is 1:64 and that of teacher-student ratio is 1:63. All settlers are sending their school age children to school. Currently there are 4539 students from grade 1 up to grade 10. Significant number of settlers are participating in off-farm activities by their own initiatives and at the same time they are provided with project facilities such as grinding mills, shops, sewing machines etc.

To strengthen these activities, most of them take loans from Dedit credit and saving institution, and save their income in the institution. For example, saving of the settlers in 1997 was Birr 810,103 while in 2001 was Birr 2,389,018 and the credit taken by the settlers in 1997 was Birr 1,310,500 and in 2001 was 5,758,000. (Tegadel No. 2, 2002:23).

According to the annual *Woreda* report of 2007, the saving of settlers in 2007 was 7 million. This indicates that the settlers are economically improving. The *woreda* report also indicated that 93% of the settlers are getting pension scheme. On top of that there are 894 settlers who participate in irrigation, getting a total income of Birr 1.6 million. This indicates that the economic reintegration is effectively carried out.

The settlers' relation with the host community is good, and their access to common property is encouraging. There is no conflict among the settlers and host community. Despite the dissatisfaction emanated from the unrealistic expectation, the data shows that their economic



standing and access to social services are sufficient and the ex-combatants are accepted by the host community. This implies that the settlers' economic and social reintegration is successfully undertaken.

Further more the settlers originally came from similar units with similar psychological make-up. This gave a good opportunity that enabled the settlers to re-establish social networks and association easily. Such practices are basic conditions for the formation of social bondage among the settlers in order to promote their socio-economic conditions.

To uphold the essential pillars of resettlement, voluntarism, identification of underutilized land, consultation with host community, proper preparation before settlement, appropriate leadership and monitoring are crucially important criteria for the success of any resettlement program.

To this end, the study indicated that these criteria are fulfilled. The settlers, though they had wrong expectation, came voluntarily to the settlement area. All necessary preparation before settlement were done, such as health service, water supply etc. The other fundamental factors for success of the project were appropriate planning, high commitment of the government strong cooperation of the host community and devotion of the settlers.

### **5.3. Conclusion**

The objective of the study is to find out answers for the following research questions formulated in chapter one:

1. Have the ex-combatants in Dansha project successfully and in a sustain manner reintegrated into civil life? If yes what are the key factors that contributed to the successful reintegration of the ex-combatants? If no what are the constraints?
2. Are the ex-combatants reintegrated economically, socially and politically?
3. Can resettlement be taken as an effective means of reintegrating ex-combatants?

To find out answers for the above research questions, the study, used different ways to gather data, these are reviewing secondary data, questionnaire survey, settlers focus group discussion, interview to former project management members and Woreda experts and officials. Then the information gathered by the above instruments was qualitatively analyzed. Therefore, the following conclusions are made based on the data analyses.

-The demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants was done effectively and appropriately  
-Resettlement of Dansha has served as an effective & successful means of reintegration of ex-combatants.

### **Economic reintegration**

- All settlers are given land, which is the critical production factor that serves for farming, housing construction and gardening.
- The settlers had an opportunity to take credits and save their excess income.
- The settlers' access to market was resolved fundamentally through the cooperatives.
- The area potential for livestock is well exploited; almost all settlers are raising livestock.
- Almost all settlers are having pension scheme that can cover cash gaps when necessary.

### **. Social reintegration**

- Houses were provided for all settlers
  - Access to education, health and potable water is strengthened.
  - The confidence of settlers in the economic potential of the resettlement area is strengthened.
- The settlers' relationship with the host community is encouraging.

### **Political reintegration**

- All settlers believed that they are participating in all local political activities. They have got association of their own (youth, farmers and women's) and participation in elections and other party activities. This also indicates the political reintegration of the settlers.

Therefore, important achievements have been made in economic, social and political reintegration, and the overall goal of the project was actually achieved, that is, ex-combatants are settled in the Dansha lowland area with a sustainable socio-economic basis.

### **The key factors for this successful reintegration were:**

- the strong political leadership exemplified by commitment was the crucial factor for successful program implementation.
- the social capital, the network of ex-combatants among themselves and with their social environment, was essential to successful reintegration which was fostered throughout the program.
- A host community support has a critical component in the reintegration program by developing harmonious relation with the settlers.
- Community sensitization and political awareness were paramount in this effort.
- The discipline and loyalty of settlers towards the Commission and TPLF with the solidarity and feeling of group cohesion during the fighting time are positive and remarkable factor to enable them work hard.
- Sincere participation of the host community had pertinent effect on the success of settlement.

#### **5.4. Recommendations**

The reintegration process of Dansha resettlement is believed to be successful, but it could have been better, if the following factors were realized. Therefore, the following recommendations are made based on the findings.

- Policy based, clear and consistent orientations on the benefits and modalities of reintegration program should be given at the discharge centers.
- Implementation of better agricultural training, extension and veterinary services, gardening and reforestation programs should be realized.
- Reintegration program should adjust expectations inline with the endowments and situation of the country.
- Emphasis on the importance of timely information, and counseling services on the transition from combatants to civilian should be given.

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Appendix A. Demobilization and Reintegration Program Experiences from three Countries (Colletta, 1996:44)

S.No.	Issue	Ethiopia	Namibia	Uganda
1	<b>Political dimensions Time Frame</b>	Demobilization and reinsertion was commenced in June 1991. Reintegration was completed in 1996.	Demobilization was undertaken in mid-1989. Reinsertion did not start before 1991. Reintegration programs stayed for long time with no clear dead line.	Demobilization and reinsertion started in December 1992. Reintegration was continued up to late 1997.
2	<b>Political context</b>	The program took place in the political context of a chaotic transition from war to peace with strong political commitment. Initially, a program was designed by the World Food Program and the International Labour organization. After several adaptations, the government firmly took control of the program and its implementation.	The program was part of the larger pacification process under United Nations auspices. A Namibian government did not exist at the time of planning. The incoming government was committed to providing assistance to ex-combatants but lacked expertise and resources. No comprehensive program was ever developed.	The program was a peacetime operation initiated by and enjoying the full support of the government; which has been in control of the entire program.
3	<b>Key lessons</b>	Political support has been a major factor in successful program implementation despite the program's emergency nature.	Lack of political guidance and incomplete national reconciliation proved problematic for program design and implementation.	When full-fledged war ended in 1986, the victorious forces integrated former opponents into the national army. Then political support has been a major factor in successful program implementation. The fact that the program took place during peacetime allowed for thorough preparation.
4	<b>Target groups</b>	In all, over 475,000 combatants of the Derg and Oromo liberation Front (OLF) have been demobilized. They were the only target group and received assistance regardless of rank. Those who served less than 18 months received only reinsertion support.	Close to 50,000 ex-combatants from both warring factions have been demobilized. They were the only target group and received assistance regardless of rank. Tailored assistance was provided to San Bushmen ex-combatants.	A total of 36,353 soldiers have been demobilized in these phases. Target groups were ex-combatants, spouses, children, and communities.
5	<b>Identification of needs and opportunities</b>	Some qualitative data were collected in the discharge centers, but no profile was developed. No other studies were undertaken.	No study was undertaken	A social economic profile was developed that formed the basis for another study on program design. A study of the institutional structure was also undertaken.
6	<b>Socio economic profile</b>	Most ex-combatants were under the age of 25 when they joined the Derg army. About half of ex-combatants are married; the rate is higher in rural areas. About half of the ex-combatants have children to support. Most ex-combatants are physically fit. Almost two – thirds of ex-combatants are physically fit. Almost two-thirds of ex-combatants have not gone beyond primary school. An estimated 5% of Derg ex-soldiers and 20% of OLF ex-fighters are female. Health status is unknown.	Guerrilla ex-combatants have low educational and skills levels. Most joined the army in their twenties and stayed for over ten years. Most are married and have an average of four children. Their health status does not appear worrisome. Up to 30% of members of the guerrilla army may have been female, they were mostly engaged in support services.	Perhaps one-third of ex-combatants had joined the movement before age 18. The vast majority are married with, an average, over three children. The health status of almost half of all ex-combatants is poor, and many are assumed to carry the HIV Virus. Their educational and skills levels are low. Only a small percentage of ex-combatants are female.

		<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
7	<b>Key lessons</b>	A responsive and flexible approach allowed for an effective (although incomplete) method for developing multiple strategies.	The lack of systematic efforts for identifying needs and opportunities led to incomplete program design. These effects were compounded by repeated targeting errors.	The socio economic profile allowed for the development of a comprehensive support package. Close adherence to targeting criteria averted leakages.
8	<b>Demobilization Pre discharge Orientation</b>	Pre discharge orientation was incomplete because it focused on issues of political reconciliation.	Some limited predischarge orientation was undertaken for both armies, but it was by and large insufficient.	Pre discharge orientation programs were enhanced over time and were greatly appreciated by the ex-combatants. The program included environment, health, legal and program issues. Wives were targeted in special sessions
9	<b>Post discharge orientation</b>	No specific post discharge orientation about local issues was undertaken.	No specific post discharge orientation about local issues was undertaken.	A post discharge orientation program on district-specific opportunities and constraints has been developed for the final phase.
10	<b>Key lessons on demobilization</b>	Longer periods of encampment led to discontent and unrest. The provision of information about the challenges of civilian life in a poor country was neglected.	Ex-guerrilla had overly optimistic expectations about civilian life because of limited orientation. Holding back or reassigning units, and thus not registering them created risks for peace and threatened program implementation.	A graduated approach enabled management to improve the quality of implementation and benefits over time, in accordance with the lessons of experience. The pre discharge orientation in the later phases proved vital for successful reintegration.
11	<b>Reinsertion Cash benefits</b>	A one – time cash payment was made to all ex-combatants at the time of discharge. Urban ex-combatants received monthly payments in cash for six to seven months for consumption purposes, depending on army affiliation. The payment was effected through the district offices.	The former South-West African Territorial Forces received their salaries until independence. A one-time cash payment, largely for consumption purposes, was made to unemployment ex-combatants from both sides almost two years after demobilization. The payment was effected through a commercial bank, and leakages were substantial because of lack of records.	Each ex-combatant received a cash payment for consumption and investment, in three installments for phase one and two installment thereafter. The first payment was effected in cash before discharge, the later installments through a commercial bank.
12	<b>Food allowance</b>	Ex-combatants received food rations in kind for six to ten months, depending on army affiliation and mode of subsistence.	Former guerrilla fighters received food rations in kind for twelve months as part of the refugee resettlement program.	Food expenses for ex-combatants and their families were included in the cash package.
13	<b>Housing assistance</b>	No specific housing support was offered to ex-combatants. Rural ex-combatants were assisted in accessing land for housing. Communities provided some materials and labour for reconstruction.	The DRP did not include a specific housing component.	Each ex-combatant received twenty iron sheets and ridges as well as other support (in cash equivalent) for materials and labour. The iron sheets were consistently delivered late. Consequently, iron sheet were monetized for phase three ex-combatants.
14	<b>Health Support</b>	Each ex-combatant and his or her family receives health support until he or she is considered reintegrated.	Health support was extended to ex-combatants between demobilization and independence in March 1990. Since then, they have not received assistance.	Basic health needs for ex-combatants and their families were covered under the cash entitlement. A pilot health care fund was established in phase two, but support was too limited. It was extended there after.
15	<b>Support for children's education</b>	On limited occasions, children received support in the form of school fees and materials through NGOs.	No education support component for children was included in program.	Two children per ex- combatant were paid school fees for one school fees for one school year in the first two phases. Many girls were discriminated against in larger families. In phases three, all biological children receive support for the school fees for one year.

		<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
16	<b>Key lessons</b>	The sheer number of ex-combatant beneficiaries precluded more comprehensive reinsertion support. Its design, however, was highly appropriate.	Reinsertion support has been sporadic, uncoordinated, late, and in complete, contributing to ex-combatant frustration.	Comprehensive reinsertion support was based on a basket of basic needs and minimized discontent. Late delivery of in-kind contributions was the most substantial implementation problem.
17	<b>Reintegration Rural Support</b>	Access to land has been facilitated for rural settlers. All received tools and equipment. A distinction has been made between cash croppers, food croppers, and pastoralists. Many among the two latter groups received an ox or heifer.	Ex-combatants have been a main target group of the government's resettlement program. They received land, production assistance, food, and other basic needs.	All ex-combatants received a cash equivalent for the purchase of seeds and tools. Access to land was facilitated through the involvement of local communities.
18	<b>Urban support</b>	Employment support, formal education, vocational trainings, skill certification, placement, and credit services were offered. The credit scheme operates on a grant basis, and its sustainability criteria include social and political concerns.	The training offered to ex-combatants is supply driven and in general does not meet the requirements of the labour market. Most trainers lack qualifications. The program is expensive.	A training program has been introduced in phase two, consisting of formal education, vocational training, and apprenticeship training. Information and counseling have received increasing attention during implementation, including referrals to ongoing small-scale credit and grants programs in a limited number of districts.
19	<b>Pension scheme</b>	Eligible ex-combatants are covered under the government's pension scheme. With the exception of the disabled, those eligible for pensions have not received any other support.	A small number of ex-combatants from both armies are eligible for pensions.	A pension and gratuity scheme has been developed outside the program, especially for former officers, to compensate them for the unitary package.
20	<b>Key lessons from reintegration</b>	The design of multiple strategies on the basis of the model of subsistence was exemplary and effectively assisted the reintegration of the majority of ex-combatants.	Resettlement and rehabilitation support have not yet been able to facilitate the self-sufficiency of beneficiaries. The training program is largely ineffective. Benefits have been unevenly distributed among ex-combatants.	Initially this was a reinsertion program, but pilot reintegration components have been added with qualified success. Although not all encompassing, the gender focus was the strongest of any program thus far.
21	<b>Social Dimensions Psychological reintegration</b>	No detailed information is available, but psychological reintegration does not seem to have posed serious problems.	Many ex-combatants lack a purpose in life and have developed a dependence syndrome. Some are under several mental stress.	By and large, ex-combatants have mastered reintegration without psychological problems.
22	<b>Mutual Support</b>	Most ex-combatants meet their former comrades regularly or occasionally. They help and counsel each other.	Ex-combatants have developed informal networks. They jointly work on economic projects or on the fields.	Ex-combatants have formed a large number of groups and jointly undertake economic projects. They provide each other with information and counseling.
23	<b>Land and Housing</b>	Most rural ex-combatants were able to access land through government support. About half the ex-combatants own a house, which significantly helped reintegration.	Many ex-combatants found access to land, no major problem.	Form all, only than 10% did not have access to land, but approximately 40% did not have a house.



		<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>
24	<b>community sensitization and acceptance</b>	<p>Peace and stability committees have been created by government to further reconciliation. Community leaders are well informed about the program. Most ex-combatants joined their old communities and were therefore generally received well, especially when they participated in community activities.</p> <p>District officials were involved in decision making through local advisory and other communities. Communities have received repeated attention. Ex-combatants elected their representatives as members of committees.</p>	<p>The council of churches in Namibia (CCN) established repatriation committees, but its mandate did not explicitly include ex-combatants reintegration. The government did not undertake specific efforts.</p> <p>Most ex-combatants joined their old communities. Community acceptance commonly depended on the ethnic background and army affiliation of the ex-combatant. In some cases, communities expect repentance. Overall, ex-combatants have been treated fairly.</p> <p>On selected occasions, community and church representatives were involved but without proper planning. Ex-combatants remained passive beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Sensitization tours were conducted regularly, but their impact on community sensitization was limited. A social communication component has therefore been introduced. Most ex-combatants joined their old communities. By and large, ex-combatants were welcomed by their communities. Some communities resented the special assistance, and a few others still see ex-combatants as traitors. Stigmatization became a problem and led to change in terminology. Community and beneficiary involvement.</p> <p>District advisory committees have been created, comprising district officials. Communities have received limited attention. Ex-combatants elected their representatives as members of committees and to assist district – based staff.</p>
25	<b>Key lessons</b>	<p>Central coordination and decentralized implementation, as well as. Community and beneficiary participation have been exemplary. Here staff motivation was essential for implementation.</p>	<p>Uncoordinated implementation of various components led to duplication and high transaction costs. Centralization negatively affected staff morale. Lack of staff motivation and qualification rendered many services ineffective. The lack of monitoring and accounting led to misuse of funds.</p>	<p>Outreach activities have been limited, but field representation decentralization, and the participation of ex-combatants proved very useful. The management information system and accounting and auditing procedures have been exemplary and were major factors in smooth operations and donor support.</p>
26	<b>Economic reintegration</b>	<p>The majority of ex-combatants seem to be poorer than their civilian neighbors, their income may reach no more than 50% of average earnings.</p>	<p>Generally, ex-combatants remain a vulnerable group among the poor, even many of those who had received training or resettlement support. Their income may be as low as one-third of average earnings.</p>	<p>Most combatants joined the ranks of the poor upon demobilization. They may earn less than half of average incomes.</p>

From these experiences, we can summarize that DRPs of military personnel are central contributors to the restoration of civil society. We can also identify that there are at least three inter woven technical phases of any DRP. These are demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. It also indicates that participation of ex-combatants, provision of information to ex-combatants, responsive and flexible approaches are fundamental elements to successful reintegration. It adds that graduate approach can enable the management to improve the quality of reintegration implementation.

## Appendix B

### Cover letter for Questionnaire

This survey is being carried out to find out how the **demobilization and reintegration program** is effectively undertaken. It is so important to assess the veterans' situations, attitudes, participation in the community and their contribution in poverty alleviation. Please answer the questions freely and put a thick mark (✓) on the box but V<sub>1</sub> – V<sub>51</sub> is for researcher's use only. You can not be identified from the information you provide and no information about individuals will be given to any third party. It will be used only for the purpose of research study. **All the information you provide will be treated in the strictest confidence.** Your cooperation, attitudes and opinions are very important to the success of the study and will be kept strictly confidential. Your opinions and responses will only be used when grouped with those of the other people participating in the survey.

The questionnaire should take you about 20 minutes to complete. Please answer the questions in the space provided. Try to complete the questions at a time when you are unlikely to be disturbed. Also, do not spend too long on any one question. Your first thoughts are usually your best! Even if you feel the items covered may not apply directly to your working life please do not ignore them. Your answers are essential in building an accurate picture of the issues that are important to improving the working lives of veterans to be reintegrated.

**When you have completed the questionnaire please return it to us in the enclosed free post envelope.** I hope you find completing the questionnaire enjoyable, and thank you for taking the time to help us. If you have any queries or would like further information about this project, please call me on 09-11-22-44-82.

Thank you for your help!

**Aklilu K/mariam**

# QUESTIONNAIRE

## 1. Personal Profile

### 1.1. Gender

Male

Female

V<sub>1</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

### 1.2. Age

20-25 years

26-30 years

31-40 years

41-50 years

Above 50

V<sub>2</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

### 1.3. Year of Services in army

Below 5 years

6 - 10 years

11 - 15 years

Above 15 years

V<sub>3</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

### 1.4. Educational back ground

Illiterate

Literate

Grade 1-4

Grade 5-8

Grade 9-12

College

University

V<sub>5</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

1.5. How much is your Pension?

V<sub>6</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Less than 200
- 201-400
- 401-600
- 601-800

## 2. Family Situation

2.1. Marital status

V<sub>7</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Not married
- Married
- Divorced

2.2. What is the size of your family?

V<sub>8</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- 2
- 3-4
- 5-7
- Above 7

2.3. If you have children, do they all go to school?

V<sub>9</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Yes
- No

2.4. If your answer is no, why not?

V<sub>10</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- I can't afford to send them all
- They have to work and help me

## 3. Assistance

3.1. Did you receive Transitional subsistence support (TSS) payment?

V<sub>11</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Yes
- No

3.2. If your answer is yes, for how many months did you receive salary,

V<sub>12</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- 6 months
- 12 months
- Above one year

3.3. Was the government assistance adequate.

V<sub>13</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Yes

No

3.4. If your answer is no, what was your expectation?

V<sub>14</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3.5. Were you satisfied with the house given?

V<sub>15</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Yes

No

3.6. If your answer is no, what was your expectation?

V<sub>16</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. Are you successfully reintegrated economically?

4.1. Concerning livestock

V<sub>17</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

4.1.1. Cattle

Less than 5

5 - 10

11 - 15

16 - 20

above 20

4.1.2. Goats/Sheep

V<sub>18</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

10 - 20

21 - 30

31 - 50

Above 50

4.1.3. Donkey/mule

V<sub>19</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

1 - 2

3 - 4

5 - 6

Above 6

4.2. Annual crop income

4.2.1. Sesame

V<sub>20</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- less than 5 quintals
- 6 - 10 quintals
- 11 - 20 quintals
- 21 - 40 quintals
- above 40 quintals

4.2.2. Sorghum

V<sub>21</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- less than 10 quintals
- 11 - 20 quintals
- 21 - 30 quintals
- 31 - 50 quintals
- above 50 quintals

4.2.3. Do you produce other crops?

If so, what and how many quintals?

V<sub>22</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

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4.3. Do you participate in off-farm activities?

V<sub>23</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Yes
- No

4.3.1. If your answer is yes, what is your annual income?

V<sub>24</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- up to birr 5000.00
- Birr 5,001 - 10,000
- Birr 10,001 - 20,000
- Birr 20,001 - 50,000

4.4. Do you have problems in selling your product?

V<sub>25</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Yes

No

4.5. If your answer is no, how do you sell it?

V<sub>26</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

I take it myself to market

Cooperatives take it

Traders come and take it

I use all possible means

4.6. How is your economic situation with comparison to your neighbors?

V<sub>27</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Better

Equal

Lower

4.7. How do you value your standard of living? It is equal to \_\_\_\_\_

V<sub>28</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

the standard of rich peasant

the middle income peasant

the lower level peasant

below poverty line

4.8. It was difficult to establish yourself and engage in a productive livelihood.

V<sub>29</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

strongly agree

agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

4.9. The role of credit of micro-financial institutions was significant in your sustainable development.

V<sub>30</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Strongly agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

5. Veterans social reintegration.

5.1. Do you make relationships with the host community? V<sub>31</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Yes

No

5.2. If your answer is yes, how? V<sub>32</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

By marriage

By trade

edir, equib

different traditional social organizations

5.3. Your acceptance by the host community is good? V<sub>33</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Strongly agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly disagree

5.4. Do you get satisfactory health service? V<sub>34</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

Yes

No

5.5. If your answer is yes, what is the standard of the service? V<sub>35</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

adequate supply of drugs

reasonable number of medical personnel

adequate health equipments

timely service

All the mentioned above are satisfactory

Nothing



5.6. If your answer is no, what is the shortage?

V<sub>36</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- shortage of drugs
- shortage of personnel
- shortage of equipments
- poor service
- All the mentioned above are less

5.7. Do you have adequate water supply?

V<sub>37</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Yes
- No

5.8. If your answer is no, what is the situation

V<sub>38</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- no adequate potable water
- no adequate water for sanitation
- no adequate water for livestock
- there is shortage for all mentioned

5.9. Do you get adequate service in education?

V<sub>39</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- Yes
- No

5.10. If your answer is yes, what?

V<sub>40</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- enough teachers
- adequate books
- adequate teaching aids
- all are enough

5.11. If your answer is no, why?

V<sub>41</sub> \_\_\_\_\_

- shortage of teachers
- shortage of books
- shortage of teaching aids
- all

6. General questions

6.1. What is the relationship of settlers with host community? V42 \_\_\_\_\_

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6.2. What is the level of relationship with your family that are outside of Dansha? V43 \_\_\_\_\_

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6.3. Do you agree that, the Dansha resettlement become an exemplary to other settlement?  
How? V44 \_\_\_\_\_

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6.4. Do the social services in Dansha serve the host community to what extent? V45 \_\_\_\_\_

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6.5. Do the settlers help each other? V46 \_\_\_\_\_

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6.6. What is your access to the common property? V47 \_\_\_\_\_

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
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6.7. What is your level of participation in social and political organization? V48 \_\_\_\_\_

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Appendix – C : Location of Dashna




SOURCE: Prepared by

# Appendix – D : Map of Dashna Resettlement Project



Map of Project Location



SOURCE: Humera Settlement Project office, 1996  
(adapted)