


ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSIY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCEINCES
CENTER FOR AFRICAN AND ORIENTAL STUDIES



**EVALUATING THE CHALLENGES OF IGAD-LED PEACE PROCESS OF
SOUTH SUDAN**

BY
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ADDIS ABABA

October, 2016

**EVALUATING THE CHALLENGES OF IGAD-LED PEACE PROCESS OF
SOUTH SUDAN**

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BY

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Abstract

The purpose of study is to evaluate the challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan. Its objective is to evaluate and assess the challenges surrounding the South Sudan peace process mediated by the IGAD-led team. To address these objectives, the researcher employed qualitative research design to make use of its advantage in gaining detailed information about the issue, to examine reflections, understandings and knowledge of negotiators and refugees by offering an in-depth understanding of a particular problem and challenges. South Sudan became

an independent state from the Sudan in July 9, 2011, following an internationally monitored referendum, which was held on 9 January. However, almost after three years of independence, the world newest state backslide into the horrific civil war on 15, December 2013, due to the power rivalry within SPLM/A. The war resulted in the massive loss of human life and property destruction. Consequently, the regional organization, IGAD swiftly launched the peace process on Saturday 4th January 2014, in order to halt the crisis in South Sudan. Nevertheless, the peace process faced enormous internal and external challenges during the peace talk and also at present the Joint Monitoring and Evolution Commission (JMEC) is facing impediment in the implementation process. Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends the concerned bodies such as the IGAD, AU, IGAD-Plus and UN should exert pressure on both warring parties so as to speed up the implementation process of Peace Agreement because the South Sudanese are suffering by intense security problems and food crisis associated with the conflict up until now. Besides, the international community should keep out, those who are uncompromising and create impediment to the implementation of the peace accord, from the rank of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). Because the evidences indicate that both belligerent parties leaders are not portrayed their political will and good faith to implement the Peace Concord.

Key words: Conflict, Challenges, Conflict Resolution, Peace, Peace-building, South Sudan

Lists of Acronyms

ABC	Abyei Boundary Commission
AU	African Union
AUCISS	African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
ALF	Azania Liberation Front

DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
COH	Cessation of Hostilities
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EFMA	Economic and Financial Management Authority
EU	European Union
FD	Former Detainees
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
GONU	Government of National Unity
HSBASSS	Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan
IASSW	International Association of School of Social Work
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFSW	International Federation of Social Work
ICF	Islamic Charter Front
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JIU	Joint Integrated Units
JMEC	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MVM	Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
NCP	National Congress party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NEC	National Elections Commission
NIF	National Islamic Front
NIF/NCP	National Islamic Front or National Congress party
NUP	National Unionist Party
PCSG	Payson Conflict Study Group
PDF	Protection and Deterrent Force
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SAF	Sudan Army Force
SAF	Sudan Alliance Forces
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SDSRB	Strategic Defense and Security Review Board
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition
SPLM/A	Sudan People's liberation Movement/Army
SSCC	South Sudan Council of Churches
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Front
SSIM	South Sudan Independence Movement

SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SI	Sudd Institute
SSPG	South Sudan Provisional Government
TMC	Transitional Military Council
TGONU	Transitional Government of National Unity
UNMISS	United Nations Mission In South Sudan
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defense Force

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Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The recent conflict in South Sudan traced its origins back to the colonial past. The seeds of the wars have been sown by the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial rulers that administrated North and South Sudan separately, which resulted in decades of civil wars between North and South Sudan. The Ottoman-Egyptian incursion of Sudan in 1821 had catastrophic consequences for the peoples of the South, during the time; the slaves were raided mostly from the south, which involved European, Egyptian and northern Sudanese merchants, that intended to controlling the profitable slave trade channel of the South. And the commencement of north-south divide was connected with this commercial exploitation of the Sudan (Yohannes, 2015:49). The main factors that contributed to the split were inability of some areas to carry on the burden of new forms of taxation and land ownership and the ensuing expansion of slave-raiding and slave-owning that largely contributed to the exploitation and subjugation of the South (ibid). Due to the fact that, the Sudanese resistance galvanized against the Ottoman-Egyptian authorities, in 1885, the Ottoman-Egyptians were expelled by the Sudanese Mahdist. However, the Egyptian rule later resumed by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule in Sudan in 1899. Under the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad and his successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, the Mahdist state (1885-1898) extended towards the southern region of Bahr al-Ghazal but never incorporated the entire of the South. However, the Mahdist regime persistent slave-raiding in the South has become a conflict-ridden element and shaped the north-south separation of slave-master link that created deeply the political development of the later years (Hersch, 2013:2; Yohannes, 2015:48).

On September 2, 1898, the Khalifa dedicated his army to a frontal attack against the Anglo-Egyptian force massed on the plain outside Omdurman. But the Mahdists lost the battle after five-hour fought with Anglo-Egyptian forces. The Mahdists vanished about 11,000 fighters, including Khalifa. Khalifa died in fighting at Umm Diwaykarat, in Kordofan, in November 1899, thus this show that the end of mahdists resistance or rule in Sudan (Ofcansky, 2015:22). Then the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule was established in 1899, which dominated by the British and administered the North and South Sudan as divide and different states under a Governor General. Therefore, this "divide and rule" policy reinforced Arabism and Islam in the North, whereas, in South, which encourages African identity and administer the South as an "African" rather than "Arab" colony, ruling through native structures of authority (Yohannes, 2015:49).

The British officials also described to cultural and religious distinctions between Arabic-speaking Muslim North and an "animist" and Christian South. Actually, the highlight on real and imagined disparities was closely linked to British attempts to avert Arabic culture and Islamic values from dispersal into southern Sudan. The administration language in the North was Arabic, and English in the South. Whereas a government educational system was gradually developed in the North, education was left to missionaries in the South. From 1922, onwards the movement of people and goods between the two areas was strictly limited. The Southerners were prohibited to bear Arabic names and "mixed" marriages involving northern and southern Sudanese were strongly discouraged. Further, the British "Southern Policy" reinforced separate development policy between North and South. Consequently, the economy in South was badly affected because of the region's isolation. Eventually a 1930 decree affirmed that blacks in the Southern provinces were to be considered as a people distinct from Northern Muslims. As a result, the colonial administration discouraged Islam and Arab traditions and dress in South, but tried to

revive African traditions and tribal life that the slave trade had disrupted (Hersch, 2013:4; Ofcansky, 2015:26).

However, in 1947, the British abruptly inverted such policy and decided that the South and North would become an independent country, but without allowing people of the south "Closed Districts" Ordinance to exercise their right to self-determination. Thus, the British change the Southern Policy by appoint northern Sudanese elites against Egyptian ambitions of uniting the Nile Valley, which became the main reason that resulted in the first war that broke out on August 18, 1955, during the eve of Sudan's independence from the Anglo-Egyptian administration on January 1, 1956, was to end for 17 years, start as a low level revolt with the mutiny at Torit, Equatoria by Southern soldiers resisting transfer to the North. Thus the root of this conflict were several unfulfilled promises made to southerners by the departing British and northern elites. Even after the independence, the consecutive regimes of Sudan later failed to consider the Southerners demands for a federal arrangement that was banned by the central government (AUCISS, 2014:16; Yohannes, 2015: 49).

Eventually, the first stage of the civil war was ended in 1972, by signing the Addis Ababa Agreement, between the North and South, with recognizing the ethnic diversity of the Sudan. The Agreement granted the regional autonomy and comparative representation in the national assembly for South, however, in 1983 the second north-south war was to break out, when the government in part under pressure from Islamists, effectively abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement by reversing the 1973 commitments on Islam and use of Arabic in the South as well as weakening the federal arrangement. Thus, President Numeiri, who instituted the Islamic Sharia law as the supreme law of the county as well as by dissolving the Regional Assembly and dividing the South into three administratively weak regions Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el

Ghazal, that activated Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army/SPLM/A to be established against it in the same year (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2006:13; AUCISS, 2014).

The analogous policy followed by Bashir since 1989 together with conflict over oil and water resources with the SPLM/A led to the second incident of the civil war known as Anya-Nya II (1983-2005) (Yohannes, 2015:49). According to Salman (2013) Plans for the construction of the Jonglei canal project, which was a cause of conflict that flared up in Southern Sudan. Because the project was opposed by the Southerners, and seven people were killed in the demonstrations against the canal in 1976. The demonstrators saw the canal as another project harming the Southern environment and the local communities in the canal area, for the benefit of Northern Sudan and Egypt.

The War was fought between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of the South and the Northern government based in the capital Khartoum was brought to an end by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Naivasha, Kenya. The agreement was brokered by the United States, several European countries and IGAD. The CPA sought to address many issues, such as power and wealth sharing, security arrangements etc, in spite of the label, it is not a comprehensive peace and it has not been able to stop armed conflicts within various regions of Sudan. While the war was declared ended in the south by the signing of the CPA, the armed struggle continues intensely in the Darfur region in the west and in various areas within Southern Sudan and in dispute territories in the east (Abdelnour, *etal* 2008:7-8).

According to Barltrop (2012:9) the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was a high-level political and military agreement, which did diminutive to alleviate feelings among many people about issues such as inequality, prejudice, unfairness, impunity and corruption. The CPA agreement established a six-year interim period, beginning July 9th 2005, where Southern

Sudanese would govern their own regional affairs and participate equally in the national government. The South's administration adopted the title 'Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) rather than being designated as a regional body simply. The GoSS would have full autonomy including its own government, constitution, army, banner and budget (Daoud, 2012:45). The agreement also specified an important provision for referendum in 2011, to determine whether the majority of the southern populations will have opted to split the southern territories from the north or remain united (Abdelnour, *etal* 2008:8).

Accordingly, the southerners were disposed to secession due to the poor implementation of CPA on many fronts and other above-mentioned factors. In mid-2010, Salva Kiir said, "It will need a miracle to change the Southerner's opinion about separation." On February 14th 2011, the first official referendum results were declared. As expected, the South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for partition. On July 9th, the South Sudan celebrated its official independence from Sudan forming The Republic of South Sudan, Africa's newest state (Daoud, 2012:49). However, nearly after three years of independence South Sudan relapse into civil war on 15 December 2013 because of the power struggle within the SPLM/A, which later escalated into violence conflict and mass killing. The violence has largely been committed by Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), with both sides using armed groups and militias in the conduct of hostilities.

In an attempt to stop this crisis, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional bloc of the northeastern African countries, immediately launched the peace talk by selecting the three envoys such as Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Mohammed El Dhabi of Sudan. As a result, the IGAD-led mediation of first round talks between the warring parties was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on Saturday 4th

January 2014. But the IGAD-led mediation of peace process later declared into IGAD-Plus, (which included the Troika countries (USA, UK and Norway), the UN, the AU, the EU, China and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)) because of the team was faced various internal and external challenges during the peace process. Nevertheless, the belligerent parties eventually were signed the peace agreement in August 2015, due to the IGAD-Plus pressure.

Therefore, this document has assessed the internal and external challenges that the IGAD-facilitated peace process of South Sudan confronted during the peace talk and the prospects of peace agreement in ensuring lasting peace for South Sudanese. The paper also to some extent examined the ongoing process of implementation of peace agreement led by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC).

1.2. Statement of the problem of the study

South Sudan declared its independence in July 2011, after the protracted civil wars with Sudan. But almost after the three years' independence, the world newest nation was dragged to the brutal civil war in December 2013, which caused enormous death, destruction and displacement of the people of South Sudan. According to the Sudd Institute (2014:2) the internal division within Sudan people's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) had existed at the beginning of its formation in 1983. There were differences in the vision and management of the party. These were 'separatists' who supposedly articulated absolute independence of South Sudan to be the main objective of the movement. The other group was led by 'Unionists' who sought to fight for the change of the old Sudan into a 'New Sudan'. This gave rise for an internal struggle between the two factions.

On the other hand, International Crisis Group notes that the most severe division occurred in 1991, when mention Garang's unilateral decision-making, the absence of Political-Military High Command meeting and the inability to hold a SPLM convention, lead to the separation of armed group known as SPLM-Nasir, by Reik Machar, Lam Akol and other various leaders. During this time the two sides fought the "Bor Massacre", armed forces consisting the White Army (Nuer youth) that was fighting beside Machar groups and the group took responsibility for the deaths of some 2000 Dinka Civilian in Bor (International Crisis Group, 2014:5).

Furthermore, the SPLM convened its Second National Convention in 2008, which was the first since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In that conference, symptom of power struggle appeared as Riek Machar wanted to compete for the SPLM chairmanship, a position that would make him president in the 2010 expected elections. But President Salva Kiir desired to maintain his position. These circumstances precipitated to violent conflict that broke out in South Sudan in July 2013. The political turmoil launched when President Salva Kiir announced a chief cabinet reshuffle in which Vice-president Riek Machar and Pagan Amum, the Secretary General of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and other key officials were abdicated from office. This political action demonstrated the apparent fissure within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The dismissed leaders of SPLM in their part charged in press conference President Kiir of using repressive behavior violating the party and national constitutions. After long postponement National Liberation Council was held on 14 December where President Kiir again approved Pagan Amum's dismissal and abolition of secret balloting. The dismissed officials and their followers refused the next day session, then the armed conflict started that evening between the Nuer and the Dinka factions of the presidential Guard in Juba (Gil, 2014: 4).

Thus, the following days combating widespread swiftly to Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states. Therefore, the war casualties such as rape, execution, arbitrary arrests and detentions; enforce disappearance; torture, and burning, plundering and occupation of private property were enormous (Sorbo, 2014:1). Following this crisis the IGAD quickly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on December 27, 2013 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. As anticipated, this meeting helped in forging what was chiefly regarded, and rightly so, as a critical regional response to the crisis, basically showing its commitment to mediate between South Sudan's warring parties. To immediately start the envisaged mediation process, the summit ensured that Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Mohammed El Dhabhi of Sudan were chosen as exceptional emissaries (Akol, 2014:3).

Subsequently, the first round of peace talks between the warring parties began in January 2014 (Ibid), a few weeks after the fighting broke out, hosted by regional bloc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the talks were focused on attempts to immediately end the fighting and all the death and obliteration that it was causing (Blanchard, 2014:1). In consequence of, on 23 January 2014, the cessation of agreement was signed between the parties in conflict, in order to halt the conflict and fighting between them. However, the regional rivalries and power struggles; the centralization of decision-making at the HoS level and associated lack of institutionalization within IGAD as well as the expanding peace process beyond South Sudan's political elites were the major factors which remain challenges and limited IGAD's mediation efforts (International Crisis Group, 2015:i).

Despite the signing of the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties, the peace process was unsuccessful in ending the conflict and fighting between warring parties. Because

the unwillingness of the two Antagonist parties to respect what they have pledged and signed for in the peace deals as it was seen in their repeated backslid into conflict. Accordingly, Later IGAD-PLUS was declared in March 2015 following the fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation of the crisis (International Crisis Group, 2015:3). The IGAD-PLUS' approach to the mediation is shaped by two reasons: firstly, that the parties are unwilling to come to an agreement without pressure and secondly, that IGAD would need to call on the weight of the wider international community to exert the necessary pressure in a coordinated manner (International Crisis Group, 2015:4).

Therefore, the researcher wants to evaluate the internal and external challenges that the IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan faced during the peace mediation and at present the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission facing in the implementation process of the peace Agreement as well as to examine the reflections of different participant and concerned bodies concerning the stumbling blocks as well as the overall circumstance of the peace process of South Sudan.

1.3. Justification of the study

The reviewed literature indicated that the recent ongoing conflict scenario of the South Sudan underpins on the long historical period of conflict which triggered for the current South Sudan atrocious civil war and the role of different groups and their interest in the conflict. This resulted in human insecurity, political turmoil and economic devastation. Even though, there is commending efforts on the negotiation process between the warring parties with support from IGAD member states and other various stakeholders, the peace process is still couldn't end the

conflict. Therefore, evaluating and assessing the internal and external challenges of IGAD-led peace mediation process is remains an issue worth investigating.

1.4. Objectives

1.4.1. General objective

The general objective of this study is to inquiry and understand the challenges of IGAD-led peace process of the South Sudan during peace deal and in the implementation phase of Peace Agreement by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and to examine and assess the reflections of different stakeholders and participants regarding the stumbling blocks of peace procedure.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

- To indentify and analyze the internal and external challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan during the peace negotiation.
- To assesses the impediments that Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) facing in the implementation process of the Peace Agreement.
- To examine the reflections of various participants and stakeholders concerning the stumbling blocks as well as to evaluate the overall circumstance of the peace process of South Sudan.

1.5. Research Questions

This study addressed the following research questions: -

- What are the internal and external challenges of IGAD-led peace process of South Sudan during peace talks?
- What are the obstacles which Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) confronting in the implementation process of Peace Accord?
- What are the reflections of different interlocutors and concerning bodies about the stumbling blocks and overall scenario of peace process of South Sudan?

1.6. Significance of the Study

It is important in creating awareness about the challenges that the IGAD-led mediation team faced during the peace process in South Sudan present conflict resolution. Moreover, the study gives knowledge about the challenges in the implementation process of peace agreement as well as the prospect of peace agreement in ensuring sustainable peace in the South Sudan by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC).

Furthermore, the study serves as a reference for other researchers, academicians, practitioners, government and non-governmental organizations in future investigation particularly for those who are interested in conflict resolution activities.

1.7. Organization of the study

This thesis encompasses five chapters. Chapter one deals with background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives (general and specific), research questions, rationale,

relevance, scope and limitations of the study. Chapter two proffer about conceptualizing the terms like peace, peace process, conflict resolution, peace-building, actors and approaches of peace-building as well as liberal peace-building versus post-liberal peace-building. Besides, it contains review of related literature which related with the historical underpinnings of conflict in Sudan and how the South Sudanese treated during the condominium rule, throughout the independence movement as well. Moreover, chapter two comprises the beginning of Southern armed struggle and foreign contact of SPLM/A during the first and second civil wars (1956-1972 & 1983-2005), respectively. In addition, the chapter concerning with the CPA and its provisions as well as the gradual boost of South Sudan self-determination and the grounds for seceded from the North. Finally, the chapter enumerates the root and immediate causes of current conflict of South Sudan.

Chapter three stipulates about research methodology which includes research design, sampling techniques and sample size, sources of data, data collection, data analysis method and ethical consideration. Chapter four apropos finding and analysis, highlight on challenges that faced IGAD-led mediation team throughout of peace talk and in the meantime, JMEC confronting the challenges in the implementation process. Thus, this chapter deal with from the beginning of the peace process up to the initial stage of implementation process of South Sudan peace agreement by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). The final chapter is relating to conclusion offers a summary of the research's findings and suggested recommendations for South Sudanese warring parties and other stakeholders.

1.8. Scope of the study

It is limited in terms of trying to map and evaluate the challenges of IGAD-led Peace process of South Sudan during the peace talk and up to the initial stage of the implementation of the peace agreement by Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC).

1.9. Limitation of the study

The researcher faced enormous challenges throughout the study has been conducted. One of the challenges were time constraint and financial problem because the qualitative research in nature is time consuming and costs money during data collection and analysis as well.

The other challenge that the researcher faced during data collection was unavailability of participants in place particularly the refugees because they live in different place in their rent house in Addis Ababa. They go only to get services in Jesuit Refugees Service Center so that the researcher could not get them in group to conduct focus group discussion. Therefore, the researcher conduct only in-depth interview with them independently. In addition, at the beginning the researcher set an objective to conduct in-depth interview with chief mediators but the researcher couldn't access them and get their addresses which create difficulty to get most reliable data on the study due to financial constraint and geographical barrier. Therefore, the researcher was forced to conduct interview with other stakeholders and participants in the peace process.

Moreover, the researcher got the letter from the Center to contact the AU representative on the peace process of South Sudan many times but the workers in peace and Security Council were not willing to cooperate with the researcher. The researcher also got the chance to meet

with three of civil societies negotiators of South Sudanese through email but only one of them responded.

From Ethiopia peace committee the researcher again contacted with some of them such as the chair person, the secretary and one of the keynote speaker in the symposium which was held in Addis Ababa from 6-7 June 2014. Thus, the researcher conducted discussion; face-to-face interview and email interview with these participant respectively but one of the committee member and a journalist were not willing for interview. The researcher also got the chance to contact with former JMEC secretary but he was not voluntary for interview due to the security issue. These all constraints have its own limitations in reliability of data on the study. Even though these challenges faced, the researcher accomplish his study successfully.

Chapter Two

2. Conceptual Framework and Review of literature

2.1. Concept of Peace

The root of the term deriving from the Latin word *pax*, so the word peace is commonly considered as a contractual affiliation that denotes communal recognition and agreement, in the Western world. Sympathetic of peace throughout the world often unveil a much deeper comprehension of peace in relation to the human condition, which also contains inner peace (Millier, 2005:56). So there are two meanings of peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace as a notion pay attention on ending war and all physical violence, even as positive peace implies the presence of peaceful, just structures and relations reduced level of or as an idea absence of physical and structural violence. This signify the existence of fairness and social stability through formal and informal institutions, practices and norms (McCandless, *et al* 2011:27).

In other word, State University of New York Press (2007:6) described the positive peace that entails the betterment of all structural and whole impediments of peace and so the formation of genuine peace. In tackling the require for justice, equity, democracy and an end to structural violence. Further, Cortright (2008:6) stated that peace is beyond the absence of war. It is "the maintenances of an orderly and just society", orderly in being protected against the violence of aggressors, and just in being defended against exploitation and maltreatment by the more powerful.

Therefore, according to Armengol (2013:1) peace process imply the consolidation of a negotiation system once the agenda, procedures, schedule and facilitation elements are defined. So, negotiation is just one of the phases in a peace procedure. Moreover, a “peace process” is a

“procedure intended for bringing violence and armed struggle to stop”. He further described that the signing of a peace accord is solely the commencement of the true “peace process”, which comprises the period called “post-war rehabilitation”.

2.2. Concepts of Conflict Resolution

The term “Conflict” is used to mean a variety of things, in a collection of contexts under the mantle of conflict are words such as, serious disagreement, incompatibilities, fight, argue, contest, debate, combat, clash and war etc. These are the equally evocate terms to understand the term conflict or to know which description of behaviour fit under the title of conflict. According to Bercovitch (1990) a situationalist thinker defines conflict as a “situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties” as suggested by (Wani, 2011:105). In other word Millier (2005:22) defines conflict as ‘to clash or engage in a fight’, a confrontation between one or more parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends. This was all about the word conflict, now we have to understand the real connotation and meaning of resolution. The word “resolution” means, The quality of being resolute, A firm decision, An expression of opinion or intensions agreed on by a legislative body, The action of solving a problem or dispute (Wani, 2011:105).

Therefore, the concept of conflict resolution is “Where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other.” Conflict resolution refers to a range of process aimed at alleviating or eliminating sources of conflict (Ibid). According to Fisher (1997:268-69) Conflict resolution is a process that transforms conflicts in a long-lasting manner rather than settling disputes or suppressing differences, by addressing basic human needs and

building qualities of sustainable relationships between groups through creating structural mechanisms involving equality among identity groups, multi-culturalism, and federalism as appropriate to each situation as cited by (PCSG, 2001:18). Moreover, Conflict resolution is an umbrella term for a whole range of methods and approaches for dealing with conflict: from negotiation to diplomacy, from mediation to arbitration, from conciliation to conflict prevention, etc (Wani, 2011:105).

2.2.1. Negotiation

Negotiation is one of the approaches in a conflict resolution or peace process. According to Millier (2005:51) negotiation is Communication, usually governed by pre-established procedures, between representatives of parties involved in a conflict or dispute. As a method in the management and resolution of conflict, negotiation is conducted on diverse grounds: to identify common interests and develop unilateral or multilateral initiatives in pursuit of objectives, to de-escalate a conflict situation. In other word, negotiation is understood as being the process by which two or more opposing parties (either countries or internal actors within a country) decide to confer their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution to their demands (Fisas, 2012:11).

2.2.2. Mediation

It is a problem-solving negotiation process in which an outside, impartial, neutral party works with disputants to assist them in reaching a satisfactory negotiated agreement. Unlike judges or arbitrators, mediators have no authority to decide the dispute between the parties; instead, the parties empower the mediator to help resolve the issues. The assumption is that a

third party will be able to alter the power and social dynamics of the conflict relationship by influencing the beliefs and behavior of individual parties, by providing knowledge or information, or by using a more effective negotiation process and thereby helping the participants settle contested issues (PCSG, 2001:45).

2.2.3. Arbitration

It is a traditional method of dispute settlement whereby the conflicting parties voluntarily search for a single arbiter or arbitration court to arrive at a final judgment. The arbiter is an authoritative and legitimate third party, superior in strength to the parties to the dispute. The recommendation reached by a (neutral) arbiter is considered binding (PCSG, 2001:8). In other word, Millier (2005:16) described as a mechanism for resolving conflicts whereby the disputants identify their grievances and demands, fix a procedural process, and willingly submit the decision of outcomes, which are to be final and binding, to an external entity. The contending parties often select the majority of the members of the third party, which normally takes the form of a tribunal.

2.2.4. Conciliation

The process by which two sides in a dispute agree to a compromise. The agreement has to be voluntary; the process of conciliation, unlike arbitration, does not coerce the disputants to accept the proposed solution (PCSG, 2001:17). According to Shined (2012) Conciliation means ‘the settling the disputes without litigations’. It is a process in which independent person or persons are appointed by the parties with mutual consent by agreement to bring about a

settlement of their dispute through consensus or by using of the similar techniques which is persuasive.

2.2.5. Shuttle Diplomacy

The word “shuttle diplomacy” was coined to describe then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s efforts to broker peace in the Middle East following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, “shuttling” back and forth between nations and leaders to produce cease-fires and peace agreements. While the term shuttle diplomacy is most often used to describe situations in which the negotiator travels long distances to meet with the parties involved, the strategy of meeting with world leaders separately is often used even when they are in the same place, in so-called “proximity talks” (Haffman, *et al* 2010).

2.3. The Notion of Peace-building

According to Suhrke, *et al* (2007:2) the idea of “peace building” occurs from the recognition that addressing aggressive conflict must exceed the immediate end of hostilities. The former Secretary-General of UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s described the concept of peace building in his *Agenda for Peace* as “action to identify and support structures which will be tend to strengthen and solidify peace so as to avoid a relapse into conflict”. While potentially counting a very large number of activities, in practice it is understood in the UN and the international aid community as usually involving post-conflict programs for humanitarian assistance, return of refugees, economic rebuilding, reconstruction of key government institutions, elections and political reforms, justice reform, security sector reform and the establishment of foundations for

long term development and social reconciliation, often in the context of international dedication to provide peacekeepers and financial support.

In other word, Millier (2005:56) described the concept of peace building as policies, programs, and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic institutions and structures following a war or some other devastating event. Peace building by and large aims to create and ensure the conditions for ‘negative peace’, the mere absence of violent conflict engagement, and for ‘positive peace’, a more comprehensive understanding associated to the institutionalization of justice and freedom.

2.4. Actors and Approaches to Peace-building

2.4.1. Track One Diplomacy

Track One Diplomacy or Official Diplomacy has a long history whose roots lie in the remote history of humankind. De Magalhaes (1988:17) describes Official Diplomacy as, “an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties” as suggested by (Mapendere, 2000:67). The most important feature that distinguishes Track One diplomacy from all other forms of diplomacy is its formal application at the state-to-state level. It follows a certain protocol to which every state is a signatory. Track One Diplomacy is usually considered to be the primary peacemaking tool of a state’s foreign policy. It is carried out by diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of states and is aimed at influencing the structures of political power. Also included among the Track One players are the United Nations, the Vatican, and regional economic and political groupings such

as the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), the Organization of American States (OAS), and many others (Ibid).

2.4.2. Track Two Diplomacy

An initiatives taken by non-governments organizations and individuals to resolve, prevent, or mitigate conflict (PCSG, 2001:73). Montville (1991:162) defines Track Two Diplomacy as, “unofficial, informal interaction between members of opponent groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” as cited by (Mapendere, 2000:68). Montville emphasized that Track Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One Diplomacy, but compensates for the constraints imposed on leaders by their people’s psychological expectations. Most important, Track Two Diplomacy is intended to provide a bridge or complement official Track One negotiations (Ibid).

2.4.3. Track Three Diplomacy

It is an initiative that operates and mediates in the field within a divided society, trying to reconcile it. It does not aim specifically to resolve the wider conflict but instead focuses on the concepts of contact and understanding as a way of setting the table for resolution (Thornton, 2003). Therefore, Track Three actors represent a dense array of grass roots groups, enlightened persons, cultural minorities, networks and popular movements who have marginal clout on decision making power and are unable to achieve requisite social change without external help. This track tries to influence indirectly by transitional media advocacy, lobbying and citizen

activism. Conflict transformation at the grassroots level lies with the peoples and communities directly affected by it (Lederach, 2003).

2.4. Liberal Peace-building versus Post-Liberal or Hybrid Peace-building

The core principles of liberal peace-building is underscore on building institutions based upon market economics and democracy. The contemporary peace-building approaches is often described as “liberal peace-building”. It reflects the idea that maintaining peace in post-conflict societies requires a multifaceted approach, with attention to a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs. Therefore, the theoretical underpinning of liberal peace-building is the liberal peace: the idea that certain kinds of societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are (United Nations University Press, 2009:7-11). Whereas, according to Roberto Belloni (2012:22) defines “hybrid” as “a state of affairs in which liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist” as cited by (Yamashita, 2014).

Besides, the post-liberal or hybrid peace approach defines the crisis of liberal peace, at base, as one of legitimacy. International peace-building is characterised as coercive, ‘top-down’, technocratic, uncompromising and blind to the local conditions in which it is pursued. It centred on imposing the western model of the Weberian state on those unwilling or not ready to accept it, and for whom it is thus ‘alien’, liberal peace-building is held to favour the interests of local ‘elites’ and international interveners, rather than the majority who bear the weight of both conflict and liberal peace engagements (Nadarajah, *et al* 2015). By contrast, hybrid peace constituted by organic configurations fusing international and ‘local’ structures, practices, values and identities. It is more ‘inclusive’ and participatory, emerges ‘bottom up’ and is therefore more

legitimate for its bearers, even as it departs in different ways from the elusive ideal of liberal peace (Ibid).

Therefore, the notion of hybrid peace is designed to include, as part of strategies to achieve sustainable peace in post-conflict societies, diverse institutions and norms that deviate from the predominant, Western model of peace-building. More specifically, hybrid peace signals a willingness to accept and work with traditional institutions and values based on religious, tribal, and kinship connections, and to explore how they can be combined with those of modernity to bring a lasting peace (Yamashita, 2014).

2.5. Historical underpinnings of conflict in Sudan

The European colonial powers dispatched their agents before they colonize Africa. The main task of these colonial agents was to study the existing situation of the continent and send the information back to their respective governments. According to Mortimer (1991:34-36) among these colonial agents sir Samuel Baker was one of the British explorers who arrived in Sudan in 1869. He received a commission as governor of Equatorial province with orders to annex all territories in the White Nile basin as well as to suppress the slave trade. In 1874 Charles George Gordon, a British officer, succeeded Baker. Gordon disarmed many slave traders and hanged those who defied him. By the time he became Sudan's governor general in 1877, Gordon had weakened the slave trade in much of the south. Later Gordon was killed by Mahdists in 1885. Then Mahdist regime imposed traditional Islamic law. Mahdist rule Sudan from 1884-1898 where Mahdiah has become the first authentic Sudanese nationalist government. But Mahdi died after the capture of Khartoum in 1885. After that Abdallah ibn Muhammad-called

Khalifa (successor) emerged as leader of Mahdiah. Khalifa consolidated his power and instituted an administration in Sudan.

However, in 1895 the British government authorized Herbert Kitchener to launch a campaign to conquer Sudan again. The expedition started on March 1896. Khalifa in part led his army to frontal attack against the Anglo-Egyptian force, eventually the Mahdist were overwhelmed by superior British arms at the battle of Omdurma (Ibid:8). Following this both British and Egypt set up the condominium administration in Sudan. Ruay (1994) noted that the term condominium implies to the agreement between United Kingdom and Egypt, called the "Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan" that was signed in Cairo on January 1899. Under the condominium administration Sudan was separated into "Middle-eastern and Arabicized North and "African, and Negroid" South (Ruay, 1994:34). Though they agreed to jointly control Sudan, the actual master of Sudan was British. This was because Egypt itself was under the British colony since 1882. The fundamental cause for British invasion of Egypt was to gain control of the Suez Canal and in doing so it would keep European rivals out of the Suez route to India and the Far East.

2.7. Southern Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian rule

During the Anglo-Egyptian joint authority the Southern Sudanese were maltreated than the North. According to Mortimer (1991:41) the British authorities consider the southern provinces like Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile as a separate and remote region. They applied "closed door" ordinance to most districts in southern provinces by regulating the movement of non-native persons into the south, except a few Arab merchants that monopolized the limited trade activities in the region. The enunciation of separate policy administration for the

south was deeply influenced by administrators who wish to prevent the spread of Arabism and Islamism from the Black Africa. This concept of halting the penetration of Arab into hinterland of Africa had prevailed long before the incursion of the Sudan. The preliminary action that was taken by the British to cut off the South from the North was the announcement of the October 1922 of the passports and allow ordinance which authorized the Governor-General to declare any part of the Sudan. Thus the southern Sudan entirely became closed region for foreigners Sudanese from the other side were not permitted to enter (Raay, 1994:41).

On the other hand the south administrators, in their part not willing to take part the meetings of the Governors that was held annually in Khartoum, they convened their own annual meetings in the south (Ibid). The Northerners were hampered from toward the inside the South. Following this the southern were isolated from the rest of Sudan as well as outsiders too. The British strengthened their colonial administration in south in the 1920s.

According to Johnson (2003:11) the British declared the 'south policy' in 1930, the policy confirmed that the administration of the south was to be developed not 'Arab' lines rather 'African' lines and that the prospect of the southern Sudan might finally lie with the countries of British East Africa, rather than with the middle East. They have already different administrative development in North and South earlier to articulation of the policy. The practice has been described 'Indirect Rule' in other parts of Africa, but was more usually called 'Devolution or 'Native Administration' in the Sudan. Thus the rule was that the local administration of colonial peoples should be conducted via native structure of authority using indigenous custom.

Ruay (1994:42) states that the way in which the British deal with the affairs in the South was both awkward and not as good; they made discrimination in development projects between the South and the North. The most serious from all of was the British appointing the Northerners

over the southerners, particularly after independence. The primary objective of the British occupying the south was to control the Nile valley. The British outlook towards the Southern people was complete negative stereotypes and insults. Ruay, further notes that "the wider gap prevail in material culture between the sophisticated Arab and the primitive savage, bare and shameless south". The positive achievement of the condominium rule in southern Sudan was the elimination of slave trade from the region, beyond this nothing had done for the people of southern (Ibid:36-37).

Johnson Also described the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptian rule was a great happiness to all the slavery suffered areas of the Sudan, mainly south. Because in the early 1870s the slave capture reached its climax in the south. The government not only eliminate the slave trade, but also affirmed the institution of slavery illegal (Johnson, 2003:6). Generally, during the condominium administration the southern Sudanese were marginalized, excluded and separated from economic, social, cultural and political sphere of life.

2.8. South Sudan during independence movement

The British hegemony over the Sudan had been legalized in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1898, that acknowledged the Sudan as an Egyptian possession administered by British administrator instead of the King of Egypt. According to Johnson (2003:22-23), the Sudan independence question was first raised by Northern Sudanese Graduates in 1942. Initially the British refused the principle of self-determination, but later accepted the ideas of Sudanese freedom as an approach in its confrontation with Egypt. From 1946-1952 the British in the Sudan were very aware of possessing to keep further advance of the momentum for self-government, leading to independence. However, the political scenario was changed in 1952, due to the free

officers' coup which brought the ascendancy of Najib and Nasir in Egypt. Following this the new government dedicated itself to the principle of self-determination for the Sudan, simultaneously attempting to persuade Sudanese agree to union with Egypt. As a result of this a pro-Arabist form of nationalism linked with Egyptian nationalism proposing the unity of the Nile Valley in 1920s.

During this time the southern Sudanese leaders were not included in the agreement. In 1952 the Legislative Assembly approved a self-government law, which laid down the process by which the Sudan would elect its first self-governing law making body and the conditions which would have to be attained to self-determination. The law was at first an agreement between the pro-independence parties and the Southerners in which the Northern members had refused the creation of the position of minister for the South in the new government, but had acknowledged safeguards for the South enshrined in the Governor General's powers (Johnson, 2003:26).

The first self-governing parliamentary elections were held at the end of 1953, and the Southern politicians were contested the elections by the newly formed Liberal Party and won the majority vote in the South. But the National Unionist Party was the only party which elected to parliament in the entire country. Then the party established the government, with Al-Azhari as prime minister. In the parliament majorities were anti-unionist, thus the union with Egypt became no longer alive. The representatives Liberal Party members attempted to raise the question of a separate administrative rank for the South by proposing federalism as a constitutional solution. This was due to the announcement of Sudanization process after election and the appointment of the Northern to all the senior positions in the South. This was followed by dissemination of dissatisfaction in the South. Therefore, the Southerners perceived this as the onset of Northern colonization of the South. Due to the fact that in October 1954, the Southern

Sudanese leadership consisting members of the Liberal and Unionist Parties, tribal chiefs from all the three provinces and delegates of the Southern Sudanese Diaspora in Khartoum convened their conference in Juba to discuss the political destine of the Sudan as well as the political prospect of the South within the Sudan (ibid: 26-27)

In 1955 the rebellion erupted at Tority among soldiers of Equatorial Unit. The revolt spread to other garrisons of Southern troops as well as police. In the episode many Northern were killed and few form Southerners. The uprising was the beginning of the Southern struggle against Northern domination. But the insurgence created separation among the Southerners, because the Equatorial demanded the leadership of the Southern nationalist movement, as the number of the mutineers tremendously composed Equatorial. Eventually, they determined to vote for independence of the Sudan from Egypt, but on the condition that a federal system for the whole country be adopted, with an autonomous state in the South. Northern consider federation only for the sake of the Southern vote in the parliament which proceeded independence. Sudan attained its full self-government on 1 January 1956 (ibid: 27-28).

2.9. Genesis of Southern armed struggle

According to Kiefe (2005:115) the main causes to the beginning of Southern uprising was the huge gap between the North and south. The gap between North and South Sudan widened in everything believable. It was intensified by the attitude of the northern political elites in the wake of the struggle for independence. This was allegedly aimed at marginalize and avert the South from power-sharing. The complete marginalization of the South from the political, administrative and economic life of the country consequently led to the rebellion of August 1955 in the South. This happened just on the eve of independence and the civil war sustained until

1972. On the other hand Salih (2001), explained that the South-North conflict was a result of the long history of mutual antagonism characterized by northern domination over the South. Further, General Abbud (1958-1964), the leader of the military government adheres a policy of Arabization and Islamization in the South mainly highlighting on education. He made Arabic as medium of instruction in the place of English and encouraged proselytizing Islam and further expelled missionaries from South in 1964. In addition to, they carried out the military expedition against the Southern Sudanese mostly targeted on educated. This resulted in many senior political figures and students were compelled to left neighboring countries, particularly Uganda. There they established the exile movement known as Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) and a guerrilla army called Anya-Nya, which means poisonous snake, it was formed in 1963(Johnson, 2003:30-31; Sidahmed *et al* , 2005). The groups joint together with any external military back and armed themselves through theft. Subsequently, the disunity has been occurred among the movement. The principal split came in the difference over how to overthrow Abboud and to pass to civilian rule in Khartoum.

On October 1964, Abbud was toppled, and then replaced by the civilian government. Having the beginning of civilian rule came the legalization of political parties. Clement Mboro, the experienced person of the 1947 Juba conference, created the Southern front in Khartoum, mostly composed of a new generation of educated Southern Sudanese. He became Minister of the Interior in the civilian government. The exiles were invited for round-table dialogue on the settlement of the Southern problem in 1965. But eventually, they divided in lines of tribal and personal causes (Johnson, 2003:32). Kiefe (2005:113), noted that the ethnic rivalry has prevailed clearly among the various groups. For instance, the Dinka and the Taposa, Dinka and Nuer, and

Nuer and Murle. The other is also resource-based conflicts emanating from antagonism for grazing land and cattle ownership.

Among them William Deng discarded the call for Self-determination instead struggle for a federal solution and remained as leader of Sudan African National Union (SANU) 'inside'. The remainders Aggrey Jaden and Joseph oduho go back to Uganda as leaders of SANU as 'outsiders' and keeping separation as their main goal and joined with Azania Liberation Front in Kampala. The two main guerrilla military commanders Emilio Tefeng and Joseph Lagu were at conflict with each other (Johnson, 2003:32; Sidahmed *et al*, 2005). In 1967, the Azania Liberation Front had been replaced the Southern Sudan Provisional Government, headed by Aggrey Janed, but later left the movement due to the domination of Dinka 'Clique' (Johnson, 2003:33)

In March 1969, the Southern Provisional Government was changed into the Nile Provisional Government, led by the Dinka young man Gordon Mayes. On the other hand, General Tefeng established the Anyidi state government in 1969 by opposing the Nile Provisional Government. The other faction that led by Joseph Lagu, the Anya-Nya commander of Equatoria setup-the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM). The rebels groups had developed foreign links by the 1969 to gain armed support. For instance, Israel trained Anya Nya recruits and sent weapons through Ethiopia and Uganda to the mutineers as well purchased arms from Congolese rebels and international arms traders with money collected in the South and from among Southern Sudanese exile communities in the North America, Western Europe and Middle East. Furthermore, the rebels captured arms, equipment and supplies from government troops and controlled much of the rural area in the South and operated from remote camps, while government forces occupied the region's major towns (Ofcansky, 2015:38).

Through time Lagu won the recognition from all factions as an absolute commander. Ultimately, in January 1971, the SSLM emerged as the rigorous guerrilla force that united political and military representation of the rebel south. Lagu was given the position of a major general and bring back in the national army (Sidahmed, *et al* 2005). The war in South was fought with growing violence from 1965-1969. The war had caused for the deaths of about 500,000 people. Many hundred thousand of Southerners were forced to hide in the forests or fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries (Ofcansky, 2015). The first considerable massacres of Southern civilians took place during the time of the first Umma government in 1965. Both SANU and the South Front were sometime refused and contested the succession of elections held in South. The South Front led by Clement Mboro and Abel Aliers, more radical than William and drew its membership from the all three provinces, and many of its members were also connection with the Anya-Nya. SANU was strongest in Bahr al Ghazal, William Deng province. In 1968 elections William Deng fixed to an electoral coalition with Sadiq al-Mahdi's faction of the Umma party, but Deng was murdered by the army. Later the two parties joined forces with others independents in the constituent assembly to fight, for devolutionary powers to regional governments and against the adoption of Islamic Constitution, but the coalition was delicate.

Ultimately, rejected on both issues, the representative of the two parties were led by Abel Alier walked out of the assembly. The mobilization of votes in the North was conducted fundamentally along lines of religious connection. This is one cause why Islamazation of the South has been a persistent policy of all governments dominated by the sectarian parties NUP/DUP, Umma and NIF. Thus the Northern were presented Islamization and Arabization as indispensable policies to create national Unity in 1950s. Further by 1960s, the opinions of the major parties had evolved to support of an Islamic State. This would have deprived of full legal

and political rights of non-Muslims and objected by Southerners and various marginalized, liberal and radicals Northerners. The serious of coalition government dominated the parliamentary in 1965-1969; the leadership was swing between the Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party.

Eventually, the coalition was unstable due to the division within both parties (Johnson, 2003:36). In this circumstances, in the late 1960s and early 1970s three important episodes led to peace. These included a military coup, on 25 May 1969, organized by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri, in combination with Free Officers in the army, which placed him in power, who then proposed that Sudan become a secular, socialist state. Second, gory confrontations in 1971 between the Umma Party and Ansar brotherhood, the two parties constantly opposed to negotiation with the south, led to a decrease in the power of Islamic fundamentalism in the government. Third, strong leadership by mutineer leader Joseph Lagu overcame ethnic cleavage and personal rivalries among the disparate rebel groups, bringing them together into the stronger Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. These events led to the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which provided for the demobilization of guerrillas and their reintegration into Sudanese society. More importantly, it provided for a great deal of religious and cultural autonomy for the South (Salih, 2001; Thyne, N.D).

After the coup, the government announced a policy declaration for the Southern Sudan, termed the 9th of June Declaration. The Declaration for the first time acknowledged the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South, and also confirm the right of the Southerners to developed their cultures and traditions within a united Sudan. The announcement sketched a plan for Southern Sudan, that included an official pardon for all Southerners involved in the conflicts; "economic, social and cultural development to the South"

and "appointment of a minister for Southern Affairs". Based on this Nimeiri appointed two men, these were Joseph Garang and Abel Alier. Joseph Garang, was one of the vanguard Communist Party leader and Southern Sudanese Lawyer appointed as the minister of Southern Affairs. The other was Abel Alier, appointed as minister of Housing; he was politician and the Southern Lawyer (Salman, 2013). But Joseph Garang was not capable to persuade the most prominent Southern leaders to negotiate, at the same time there was rivalry within the Revolutionary Council for position. As a result of this was the escalation of skirmishing the whole of 1970 and much of 1971 in the Southern Sudan (Johnson, 2003:36).

Therefore, Salih stated that the greatest achievement of Nimeiri's during his ten years in power was the Addis Ababa Accords, to terminate the seventeen years of civil war between the North and the South, the agreement was signed in February 1972, between the Sudan Government and the main Southern insurgent groups was Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The agreement brought peace and approved the South region to self-government with a united Sudan (Salih, 2001). The Peace Agreement was signed with the back of the international community and with religious based institutions, especially churches. As a result of the Addis Ababa Accord the seventeen years of harrowing civil war from (1955-1972) was ended, with limited autonomy to the South. Thus following the treaty, the Southerners had experienced the relative peace and development.

However, the self-determination and freedom granted to the south was existed for short period of time, because of the Islamic fundamentalists were opposed the 1972, Addis Ababa Agreement from the beginning, due to the Nimeiri alienation of nearly all the Northern political groups. The political parties were banned, their leaders were imprisoned, and their properties were confiscated. The Southerners were perceived Nimeiri as blessed with vision and ideals or

described him as a national hero and peace maker, following the Addis Ababa Agreement, but most of the Northerners considered him as bloody, ruthless dictator and also some Northerners politicians and intellectuals were doubtful the genuineness of him. Therefore, the Umma Party, DUP, and ICF perceived the Addis Ababa Agreement as a new major stumbling block for their Arab-Islamic vision of the Sudan. The leftists also considered it as a dangerous reactionary agreement against the liberal and socialist forces in the whole of the Sudan. In 1973, the permanent constitution of the Sudan was promulgated, that consolidated the extensive powers of the President and the one-Party rule.

Then Nimeiri began to interfere with the appointment of his candidates for the senior political position from the early days of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Consequently, in 1978 Abel Alier was commanded by Nimeiri to withdraw from the nomination for president of the High Executive Council in favor of Joseph Lagu. Clement Mboro, the speaker of the Regional Assembly was also detached in 1979. Further, Nimeiri unexpectedly issued presidential orders dissolving the Regional Assembly and High Executive Council in October 1980. He substituted Lagu with Gismahall Rassas, a southern, who lived in the North. And also appointed the cabinet and commissioners of the Southern provinces. This indicated that a fall foul of the self-Government Act of 1972, Addis Ababa Accord (Salman, 2013:366-367).

In addition to President Nimeiri was compelled to announce the sharia (Islamic law) for the entire Sudan in 1983. The declaration of this "September Laws" was followed by series of decrees, which harshly limited the rights of non-Muslim. Following the announcement of these laws thousands of public physical penalties had been implemented, including floggings, amputations and executions, particularly the first two years (Thyne, N.D).

The other decisions that taken by Nimeiri was ignite the resentment of the Southerners. Among these the chevron company discovered oil in South, but a decision to build a refinery in Bentiu, where the oil was discovered was inverted. The processing plant would be built in Kosti, in the North, and oil would be exported via Port Sudan. Another was the intention for the construction of the Jonglei canal project in South Sudan were accomplished after Addis Ababa Agreement was concluded, and the work started in the late 1970s. The canal was planned under, and reference to it was included in the Nile Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. In the Agreement Egypt and Sudan would share the cost of the project and the water preserved. In 1976, the Southerners were opposed the project and Seven people were killed. Because of the demonstrators saw the canal as another project harming the Southern environment and the communities in the canal enclave (Salman, 2013:368; Wama, 1997:9-10).

On the other hand, Sidahmed, *et al* (2005) stated that the last step in breaking the Addis Ababa Accord and signaled the end of the decade long peace between north and south was the move to assault the battalion and division of the south into three regions (the province of Bahr El Ghazal Equatoria and Upper Nile). Nimeiri could have taken that with some kind of southern support. For instance, Joseph Lagu from Madir tribes was provide southern backing under alleged reason of fighting Dinka hegemony. Thus the measure proved grave and provided a direct reason for resuming the civil war again, but it was not the root cause of the revolt, rather was the pretext. The battalion mutinied because of delayed salary payments and allegation of misappropriation of £107,000 public fund at the brigade. Following the aforementioned factors the second civil war was outburst from 1983-2005 between the North and the South. So that the second civil war was directly associated with the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972) which began during the eve of independence and lasted almost seventeen years. The cause of the war

was the Sudanese government attempted to force Arabic as the official language and Islam as the official religion of the country's. As a result the first conflict erupted. The war came to an end in 1972 when the government granted the South extensive autonomy.

However, the central government reneged on many of its promises of self-administration as well as the proclaimed sharia as the foundation of the Sudanese legal system in September 1983, by al-Nimeiri. His decrees, known as the September Laws, were angrily resented by secularized Muslims and the non-Muslim Southerners. The Islamic Laws and the executions and amputations ordered by religious courts was denounced by the SPLM. In the meantime, the security situation in the South had become worst, which resulted to renewed the civil war by the end of 1983. In the early 1985, a general strike in Khartoum, due to the over rising food, gasoline and transport costs that paralyzed the country. The combination of the South's re-division, the announcement of sharia for the entire country, the resumed civil war and the growing economic hardships situations that all contributed to the al-Nimeiri downfall. A group of military officers organized by Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab overthrew al-Nimeiri, on April 6, 1985, he escaped to Egypt. Al-Dhahab pledged to negotiate to demise the civil war and to hand over power to a civilian government within 12 months. Even though the common people accepted and backed the Transitional Military Council (TMC), al-Dhahab was not capable to resolve Sudan's economic difficulties, restore peace to the South, and established national unity.

However, al-Dhahab attempted pacification with the South, but his refusal to abrogate sharia annulled his proposal and persuaded SPLM leader John Garang, this illustrate that the central government still wanted to subjugate the South. Even so, the koka Dam Declaration was signed between two sides in March 1986, in Ethiopia, which called for a Sudan “free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism, and all causes of discrimination and disparity,” repeal of sharia,

and a constitutional conference. Despite general acceptance of the declaration, al-Dhahab delayed its implementation because of opposition from Muslim conservatives over repeal of sharia. Meanwhile, fighting between the SPLA and government forces continued in the South (Ofcansky, 2015:41-43).

Following the aftermath of al-Numayri's overthrow, around 40 parties registered with the TMC and announced their plan to take part in national politics. They ranged from those committed to revolutionary socialism to those that supported Islamism. Of the latter, the National Islamic Front (NIF), led by Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, had succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main vehicle for the Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations. Policy dissident over sharia, the civil war, and the country's future direction made for a perplexed political scene. In this anxious situation, al-Dhahab endorsed the pledged April 1986 general election, which the authorities spread over a 12-day period and delayed in 37 constituencies in the South because of the civil war. Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma Party won 99 seats. In June 1986, Sadiq al-Mahdi formed a coalition government with the Umma, DUP, NIF and four parties from the South.

Unfortunately, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and incapable of governing Sudan. As a result, his reign characterized by Party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals, and political instability in Sudan. In the same year in office, Sadiq dismissed the government because it had botched to draft a new penal code to replace sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end the civil war in the South. Additionally, Sadiq formed another vain coalition government, with the DUP and the Southern political parties, to maintain support. Al-Marghani of the DUP and al-Turabi of the NIF were intensively involved in the political plotting surrounding these governments. In November 1988, al-Marghani and the SPLM leadership on their own signed an agreement in Addis Ababa as a main example that included provisions for a cessation of

hostilities in the South, repealing of sharia, lifting the state of emergency and obliteration of all foreign political and military agreements. The agreement was opposed by NIF, because of its position on sharia. The agreement also opposed by the government, this resulted for withdrew of the DUP from the coalition (Ofcansky, 2015:44).

As a result of this senior military officers presented Sadiq with warning demanding that he makes the coalition government more representative and that he announce terms for ending the civil war. On March 11, 1989, Sadiq respond in dissolving the government and established a new coalition that included Umma, the DUP, representatives of Southern parties and trade union. Sadiq asserted that his new government was dedicated to ending the civil war through implementation of the November 1988 DUP-SPLM accord, as well promised to provide food relief to famine areas, reduce the governments international debt, and build a national consensus. However, unable to deliver on these promises finally caused his downfall (Ibid: 44). The civil war continued in Sudan until the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.

The Anya Nya fighters were absorbed into the Sudan Armed Force under the terms of Addis Ababa Agreement, though many Southern groups protested the agreement by departure the SAF and taking refuge in Ethiopia. The rebel units gathered further recruits, mostly from the and also among the Dinka, the majority groups in the South, and later called themselves as Anya Nya II. The former Anya Nya who had been absorbed into the SAF after the 1972 agreement fought the guerrillas instead of the national government. On the other hand, when al-Nimeiri re-divided the South and imposed Islamic law, the allegiance of Southern armed forces wavered. As a result of this al-Nimeiri introduced more Northern troops into the South and attempted to transfer the former guerrillas to the North. Therefore, SAF units mutinied in Bor, Pibor, Pachal and other Southern garrisons in mid-1983 (Ofcansky, 2015:318).

Consequently, on July 31, 1983 Anya Nya II and rebellious army personnel met in Ethiopia and formally established, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and announced the formation of its political wing-the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) under the leadership of colonel John Garang, this was referred to as SPLA/M. This the new movement was different from the previous Anya-Nya rebels, which portrayed itself in its early declaration as unitary, not secessionist, socialist, not communist and pragmatic, not dogmatic. Therefore, the fundamental point that the movement emphasized later was a nationalist one, enthusiastic to tackle the problems of the entire Sudan, not solely those of the South (Sidahmed, *et al* 2005).

According to Wama (1997) the SPLM expressed inclusive goals: the creation of “a united Sudan under a socialist system that affords democracy and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, beliefs, and outlooks. A united and a socialist Sudan can be achieved only in the course of prolonged revolutionary armed struggle. Peaceful struggle has always been met with brutal suppression and cruel killing of our beloved people.”

Thus the SPLM in view of itself as an agent of the South, East, the West and Nuba mountains, as well as saw the war as struggle for liberation built on a populist, but even so socialist, ideological base. The fight in opposition to oppression and domination represented the major idea of SPLA/M ideology (Ibid). In other word the rebel groups initially stated overthrowing the government as their original goal. Conversely, in later years of the conflict, southern goals differed with some wanting total secession, and others looking for regional autonomy, religious freedom, and profits from natural resource extraction (particularly from oil revenue) (Thyne, N.D).

However, the Southerners failed to achieve unity under Garang. Although the SPLM/A declared and pronounced in its Manifesto in 1983 that it was fighting for a secular democratic

united states and the New Sudan, but the quest for self-determination suddenly appeared in 1991. This divergent view led to the internal conflict and violent outcomes within the SPLM itself. Eventually, the opponent groups that led by Riek Machar, Lam Akol Ajawin and Gordon Koang Chol, broke away from the SPLM in August 1991 and then established a separate liberation movement. The movement was referred to as the “Nasir Group,” in reference to the city of Nasir in the Upper Nile province in Southern Sudan, where the Shilluk tribe lived. Later the division within SPLM manifested itself as an ethnic dimension (Ahmad, 2010:7; Salman, 2013:380).

Immediately after its establishment, the SPLA launched its military activities in South Sudan, its early targets were oil and water. Both the Chevron oil operations and the Jonglei canal project were assaulted by the SPLA and closed, by early 1984 (Salman, 2013:371). Initially, the SPLM/A's employed military tactics of ambushes of military vehicles and attacks on police stations and small army posts, particularly in the Nuer and Dinka enclaves. In early 1985 SPLM/A's attempt to raid eastern Al-Istiwai but met sever resistance from the SAF and government militias. The SPLM/A's occupied Rumbek in Southern Bahr al-Gahezal in 1986 for several months and assaulted the provincial capital, Wau. SPLM/A's took Kurmuk, Pibor post, Qaysan and Tonga in 1987, in A'ali an-Nil. By early 1988, a number of towns on the Ethiopia border had captured by SPLM/A's, and also controlled the countryside around Juba, and the major Southern city. Due to this ten thousands SAF were cut off from supplies, except received provisions by air.

Nevertheless, the SPLM/A's avoided conventional engagements against SAF unit. The Government, backed militias had become active in areas where the Dinka and Nuer dominated SPLM/A's strong holds. The militias played a main role in the fighting and were in part to blame for the damage the civilian population continued. The arming of tribal groups aggravated

presented inter-communal conflicts and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. Moreover, millions of villagers were displaced from their homes as a consequence of the fighting and the ravages of militias, the SPLM/A, Anya Nya II, and the SAF (Ofcansky, 2015:319).

For instance, by 1989, one million Southerners had settled in Khartoum, while hundreds of thousands had moved to other cities and towns. As well, some 350,000 Sudanese registered as refugees in Ethiopia. At least 100,000 had sought refuge in Juba and approximately 28,000 in Uganda. On March 18, 1995, Garang announced a new military strategy which aimed to take the war to the North, in cooperation with Northern Sudanese opponent groups. This strategy was failed for the most part because the Northern groups inept in military capabilities to continue the offensive against Khartoum. On the other hand, the SPLM/A and a collection of Northern groups that incorporated the Army Legitimate Command, DUP, SCP and Umma Party signed the National Democratic Alliance charter. This alliance called for “opening up new fronts in both East and West, and preparing for a revolutionary insurrection in the North” (Ofcansky, 2015:320).

On March 3, 1996, the government ordered a unilateral cessation of hostilities throughout Southern Sudan, but Garang refused to accept it. However, Khartoum signed a peace agreement, on April 10, 1996, with the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and the SPLA Bahr al-Ghazal Group led by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, a former SPLM/A deputy commander. The groups pledged to safeguard Sudan’s national unity and to rehabilitate severely affected areas of South Sudan, but they failed to achieve either goal (Ofcansky, 2015:320-321). On the other hand, the government signed the Khartoum Peace concord, on April 21, 1997, with the Equatoria Defense Force, South Sudan Independence Group, SSIM, SPLA Bahr al-Ghazal Group, SPLA Bor Group, and Union of Sudan African Parties. The accord guaranteed “freedom of movement,

assembly, organization, speech and press and...an equitable representation of southerners at all levels with Sudan.” But conflict sustained in South Sudan over the subsequently six years, in spite of ongoing regional peace talks sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Ofcansky, 2015:321)

Subsequently, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol, on July 20, 2002, in Kenyan, which provided for a referendum on self-determination for the South after a six-year transitional period. In the same year both sides agreed to an end of hostilities throughout all Sudan. In November 2002, a second round of meeting in Machakos resulted in the signing of an agreement that intended a structure for provisional government. In May 2004, an agreement signed into last form. Eventually, the warring parties as a final point signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on January 9, 2005, that ended one of Africa’s most costly and overwhelming wars (Ibid).

2.10. The Foreign Relation of Sudan People's Liberation Movement during the second civil war (1983-2005)

- **Libya**

Throughout the civil war between Khartoum and the SPLA, the relationship between Muammar al-Qadhafi and John Garang raised serious questions among Sudanese leaders regarding Libya’s intentions. Because Muammar al-Qadhafi had a long history of providing financial support to the SPLA. He had a prolonged, personal connection with John Garang. Garanang’s visit to Tripoli in April 1984 secured significant military aid. Libya also continued contact with Northern Sudanese opposition figures and for many years had ties with dissenters in

Darfur, causing concern in Khartoum that Libya might support the rebel movements that initiated the conflict (Shinn, 2015:279; Wama, 1997:21).

- **Ethiopia**

Under Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–91), the military government of Ethiopia's strongly supported the SPLM/A against the government in Khartoum. Because of, Mengistu was hostile with Numairy. Due to support of Nimeiri for Eritrian secessionists and anti-government forces in Tigre and Oromo. Ethiopia provided most considerable support. When the battalion from Bor and Pibor took refuge in Ethiopia, Mengistu favored to support the SPLA instead of the Any Nya II since Garang rejected the notion of secession. The SPLA's was permitted to operate a powerful radio station on the Ethiopian soil to report military campaigns and the outcome of meetings between Sudanese political units and to promote the fundamental philosophy of the movement. Mangistu, provided military aid in the form of transport planes, helicopters, and trucks that sometimes carries SPLA forces and supplies among base camps in western Ethiopia and even into Sudanese territory. Ethiopian forces also provided long range artillery to attack Sudanese towns from Ethiopia (Wama, 1997: 20-21).

- **Eritrea**

Eritrea gained formal independence from Ethiopia after two years of demise of the military regime of Ethiopia in 1991. Eritrea had charged Sudan by the end of 1993, with supporting the activities of Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which carried out attacks against the Asmara government. As a result, in December 1994, Eritrea sponsored a meeting between the SPLM/A and several prominent Sudanese opposition groups, including the Umma Party, the DUP, and the Sudanese Allied Forces. Eritrea cut off its relations with Sudan at the end of 1994, became a strong supporter of the SPLM/A, and in January 1995, allowed the opposition National

Democratic Alliance (NDA) to place its headquarters in the previous Sudan embassy in Asmara (Shinn; 2015: 280).

- **Uganda**

Uganda support the SPLM/A, because of Sudan assistance to various Ugandan rebel groups, in particular the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, whose ambition was to overthrow the Ugandan government. Uganda signed an agreement with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) to provide military training and to improve infrastructure between the two countries in early 2007. There were about 250,000 South Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda; most of them had returned to South Sudan by 2010. Uganda and South Sudan were humanizing their communication links and expanding commerce. Uganda, ever more appeared that favored the independence of South Sudan (Shinn, 2015: 284-285).

2.11. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Its Provisions

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement concluded on January 9, 2005, between the GOS and the SPLM/A in Naivasha, Kenya. It was witnessed by messengers of thirteen countries and organizations, such as the presidents of Kenya and Uganda and representatives of Egypt, Troika countries (Norway, UK and US), Netherlands, the African Union, the European Union, the IGAD, the Arab League, and the United Nations. The CPA called for a permanent break in fighting between the north and the south. Both the Government of Sudan (GOS) and SPLA agreed to military halt and a symbolic demise of the war. The fundamental principles of the CPA is based on self-determination, security arrangements, wealth sharing, and power-sharing. There were also special political and security arrangements for the controversial enclaves of Abyei, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. The CPA dictates that the resolution of

the armed conflict in Sudan will ultimately depend on a popular vote to take place in the south by means of referendum in 2011, to determine whether the majority of the southern populations will choose to separate the southern territories from the north or continue united (Abdelnour, *et al* 2008; Salman, 2013:393; Ofcansky, 2015:321).

According to the CPA, the Sudan government recognized Sudan as a multicultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-lingual country. The government also agreed “the conflict in Sudan is the longest running conflict in Africa. It resulted horrific loss of life, as Taha noted that nearly two million Southerners lost their life, and four million people were displaced. The war damaged the infrastructure of the country, squandered economic resources, and caused innumerable suffering, predominantly with regard to the people of South Sudan.” Nevertheless, the CPA ended the bloodshed, between the North and South Sudan from 1983-2005, and scheduled a referendum for self-determination in January 9, 2011, which really led to the eventual division between the North and the South (Daoud, 2012:46; Taha, 2012: 54).

2.11.1. Provisions of the CPA

According to Alene (2011) the CPA is the combination of six agreements signed between the GOS and the SPLM/A, in Kenya from 2002 to 2004, such as the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002, Agreement on Security Arrangements signed on 25 September 2003, the Agreement on Wealth-sharing signed on 7 January 2004, the Protocols on the Resolution of the Conflicts in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile signed in May 2004, and the Protocol on Power-sharing signed on May 2004. Among those, the most important agreement was Machakos Protocol, with regard to the provisions of the CPA. Its preface emphasized the call for to rectify the development inequalities and historical injustices, between the different regions of the Sudan

(Salman, 2013:395). The Machakos Protocol encompasses an extensive framework setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process, and structures of government plus on right to self- determination for the people of Southern Sudan, and on state and religion. These were considered an influential instrument to change the ‘old’ Sudan to a ‘new’ Sudan distinguished for advocating equal opportunity, democratic system, and fairness to the entire Sudanese paying no attention of their differences (Alene, 2011: 42).

Particularly, the Protocol need democracy, accountability, equality, respect and justice for all Sudanese within a united Sudan, self-government for the people of Southern Sudan, and involvement in the national government, self-determination in which the GOS and SPLM/A after the end of the interim period, mutually organize an internationally supervised referendum for the people of Southern Sudan to verify unity or secession after the end of the Interim Period (Ibid: 42). Further, the Protocol permitted Northern Sudan to persist with its *Sharia* laws, while exempt *Sharia* law in South Sudan. However, this obviously manifest the demise of the new secular unified Sudan basic under the SPLM Manifesto of July 1983 (Salman, 2013:396).

Moreover, the CPA encompasses provisions on power-sharing between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A, which is an essential milestone in creating a platform in which Southern Sudanese could participate in governance for the first time in history. This resulted in Colonel Garang’s appointment as vice-president in the Khartoum Government. On 9 July 2005, Dr. John Garang was sworn in as first vice president. He was succeeded by Mr Salva Kiir after his mysterious death in an airplane crash on 30 July 2005 (Alene, 2011:42; Nicholson, 2013:38).

The CPA also grants the people of Southern Sudan to institute their own three-level of government-regional government and local governments and take part in the Government of

National Unity (GONU). The Southern are also allowed to use powers that kept for the GONU (national security, nationality, immigration, foreign policy, currency, national natural resources etc). As maintained by the provisions, the seats allocated the National Executive in the run up to national elections shall be allocated as 52 percent for NCP, 28 percent for the SPLM, 14 and 6 percent for other Northern and Southern political forces, respectively (Alene, 2011:42).

As well as the CPA includes wealth-sharing provisions relating to land possession and natural resources, oil and non-oil revenues (Ibid).The peace agreement more specifying, that at least 2 percent of the net oil revenue is assigned to oil producing regions and the rest produced in southern Sudan should be shared equally between the Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan during the interim period, whereas, the oil produced in the North belongs solely to the GONU (Brosché, 2009; Alene, 2011). It establishes the National Petroleum Commission to formulate policies and supervise their execution. The CPA also provides reparation for those whose rights are dishonored by oil agreements. Sharing of non-oil revenues between the GONU and GOSS from federal sources in the South such as customs and immigration, airport taxes are also preserved in the Wealth-sharing Protocol. Besides, the CPA stipulates tax level to each level of government, and expresses the call for overcoming inequalities manifest in the country via reconstruction and development funds and institution of a two different banking system (Islamic and conventional), for North and South, respectively (Alene, 2011).

The protocol also embodied the military provisions in the Agreement on Permanent cessation of hostilities and Security Modalities, as well as an exceptional political and security arrangements for the contested areas of Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan. The regions were ignite fighting during the second civil war in Sudan (Ofcansky, 2015:321). Abyei is a contested

enclave situated on the border of the north and South Sudan and is engaged with both north and South Sudan in oil-wells, ethnic diversity and migration routes (Brosché, 2009).

In view of this, the CPA provides the area its own special administrative status to be taken care of by a local executive council, whose members are elected by its inhabitants. As maintained by the CPA, the responsibility of determining its boundaries rests on the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) to come up with 'final and binding' decision. In addition, the inhabitants are entitled to cast either votes to continue in the North or unite to Southern Sudan in the referendum because of, the referendum scheduled to be held simultaneously with Southern Sudan (Alene, 2011). As well, the Abyei agreement take account of economic power sharing in the form of apportion of oil revenues from the Abyei area, 50 percent to the National Government, and 42 percent to the GoSS and the remains divide locally. Thus the agreement provides a special status for Abyei enclave. However, was not given to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (Brosché, 2009).

The security agreements protocols of the CPA embody the provisions required to established a Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of soldiers from both North and South by equal numbers, to make sure security in strategic areas. Following this the forces of both side were redeployed along the border of North–South as defined on January 1, 1956. The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) act as a representation of National Unity and serve as a new National Army when the referendum affirms unity against Southern secession. A Joint Defense Board composed of chiefs of staff and their deputies from both North and South was established to coordinate their respective forces and to command the JIUs. Both side created a Cease-fire Political Commission and a Cease-fire Joint Military Committee to supervise accomplishment of the cease-fire arrangement. Finally, the two sides called for the United Nations to send a peace-support mission to Sudan to monitor and

confirm the implementation of the security provisions, to oversee the national demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration campaign involving soldiers on both sides, and to support implementation of the CPA in general (Ofcansky, 2015:322).

Generally, the CPA was concluded by embodying all four building block of key provisions of power sharing between North and South, such as, *Political* in the creation of Government of National Unity (GONU) and GOSS, *economic* in the form of apportion of the oil revenues, *territorial* in the form of a south/north boundary and future referendum on secession as well as the exceptional status agreed to Abyei and *military* with the arrangement of the JIUs, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of other forces and redeployment of SAF and SPLA (Brosché, 2009). Even though, the CPA declared the end of civil war in south, however, it was not able to stop armed conflicts within various regions of Sudan. Therefore, the armed struggle continues intensely in the Darfur region in the west and in various areas within Southern Sudan and in contested territories in the east.

2.12. The Path to South Sudan Self-Determination

The year 2011 signify an important historical occasion in the history of the Sudan in which the peoples of Southern Sudan decide the destiny of the country in the manner that assert united country or declare the crack of Sudan in two different entities of Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan through an internationally supervised referendum held in January 2011. This right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan is enshrined in the legal framework of the Machakos Protocol, which states

...The people of the South Sudan have the right to self-determination inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status...At the end of a six year interim period there

shall be an internationally monitored referendum organized jointly by the GOS and SPLM/A for the people of South Sudan to confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession (Chapter 1 of the CPA as cited by Alene, 2011:52).

Therefore, the factors that led the South Sudan to secession were the impact of the Northern Arabs' policies, the malfunction of the peace processes and the existence of deep-rooted historical grievances. All these factors were related with economic, social and political affairs.

According to Daoud (2012:53) one of the most important factors that contributed to the secession of South Sudan is the Northern Arabs' national policies. Their policies can be categorized under regional discrimination and Arabization and they were able to implement them because they had exclusive control of the government after independence. The Northern Arabs were the most educated and as such were strongly favored by the colonial powers who transferred all economic, social and political powers at independence.

Authorizing the Northern Arabs was a direct result of the Anglo-Egyptian discriminatory sharing of resources and social and economic investment from 1898 to 1956. The Anglo-Egyptian administration concentrated almost all social and economic activities, investment, and capital resources in the Khartoum province and the Northern Province to the neglect of the rest of the country. The center of investment was The Gezira (between The Blue and White Niles) and the Riverian districts, both of which fall in the Khartoum region. The discrimination was also applied to the allocation of transportation, communication and education facilities (Ibid).

Moreover, the group effort of the Sudanese Government and with some Arab countries (Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, etc) united an endeavor to Islamise, Arabicise and colonise the non-

Arab Sudanese inhabiting in Sudan. These actions deprived of their fundamental human rights of freedom of choice, culture, association, identity and religion of non-Islamists/ black Africans dwelling in southern Sudan as suggested by (Nicholson, 2013:36). In addition, the socio-economic exclusion and pillaging of resources from southern Sudan without development and prosperity opportunities granted to the south continued as well denied any political rights for South Sudanese and other African tribes and none of them has ever led a government since independence in 1956 (Ibid).

The Northern Arabs carried a policy of regional segregation politically. This led to losing ground the central government's legitimacy in the eyes of regional groups and they turned to separatism as in Wood's framework as cited by (Daoud, 2012:56). These alike groups to a great extent were underrepresented in the national government. Since independence the Northern Arabs who make up a minority in the country but monopolized most of the government positions. According to Nicholson (2013:39) the Khartoum government neglected its political duty in terms of the responsibility to safeguard all Sudanese citizens by means of imposed Arabic and Islamist driven principles and attitudes, for instance, Sharia Law and Arabic as the only national language to the damage of English and African speaking Christians and other religion batch. There was no incorporated political structure prevailed between northern and southern Sudan. Therefore, the black majority of Africans were felt isolated and alienated and could not live in concord.

The additional cause which led to the secession in the case of South Sudan is the survival of entrenched historical grievances. The historical grievances and the failure of reconciliation inflated the cultural barriers, for Southern Sudanese. A mid-age Southerner, describing his

feelings about the unity of Sudan said, “In every Southern house, whether Muslim or Christian, someone has been lost to the war.” as cited by (Daoud, 2012:71).

As a result, approximately 2.5 million were killed in protracted civil war, most of whom were Southerners. Another 4.5 million were dislocated and millions more were affected by post-war natural crises for example famines. The Southern Sudanese have faced enormous suffering. This suffering has been mentally connected to the North. Furthermore, the Southerners who lived in the North often felt never-ending humiliation and racism. The majority of the Southerners working in the North were treated like not skilled. Most of Southern Sudanese place the burden of humiliation, grisly killings, underdevelopment, poverty, and marginalization on the North (Ibid).

The other factor that indicate secession has become virtually inevitable because the implementation of the provisions of the CPA were damaged by mutual mistrust and suspicion between the GOS and SPLM/A. For example, the election of June 2010 was not as free, fair and democratic as anticipated prompting the departure of Yasir Arman, the SPLM/A candidate from contesting for the office of the Republic indicating the disengagement of the SPLM/A from the national politics (Alene, 2011:53).

Therefore, these factors determined the Southerners to vote for independence even though, the path to self-determination was a long and difficult one, the SPLM was astutely and wisely negotiated for over more than a decade, with both the NIF/NCP government in Khartoum and the opposition National Democratic Alliance (“NDA”) political parties and trade unions in Sudan’s neighboring countries. Thus, the issue of Self-determination raised, for the first time in 1965, during the preparation for the caucus conference. During the time, a few of the Southern Sudanese leaders wanted to bring the issue of the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan

to roundtable dialogue. But this demand was forcefully rejected by the Northern parties. As an alternative, some of the Southern leaders, led by William Deng, returned to their original demand of federation, which was also and once more neglected by the Northern parties.

As a result, the question of the right of self-determination was not raised again for the next twenty-five years. However, in September 1991, the search for self-determination suddenly found its way into its menu of demands. In that year, the SPLM/A convened a meeting of its Political Military High Command, in South Sudan, in the town of Torit. The session was held, in August 1991, after one month of fragment groups, led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol Ajawin, broken away from the SPLM/A, and set up a split liberation movement. Hereafter, the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan would dominate the political campaign, program, and activities of the SPLM, raising serious uncertainties about its commitment to the united New Sudan, strongly expressed eight years earlier under its 1983 policy (Salman, 2013: 379-381).

In January of 1992, the government of the Sudan, represented by Ali Al-Haj, a leading member of the NIF, met with Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, in Frankfurt, Germany, who had just broken ranks with the SPLM/A in August 1991. The meeting held from January 23 to 25, 1992, and the two parties were signed the Frankfurt Agreement or referred to as the Frankfurt Declaration. The agreement was recognized the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan, with the option of secession.

In 1992, the Nigerian President and the OAU chairman Ibrahim Babangida hold peace talks, between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A's. During the time the SPLM/A was seriously weakened, due to a division within the rebel movement and the overthrow of the Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991, the SPLM/A's leading foreign supporter. As a result, a weakened rebel movement represented by faction led by Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. John Garang.

In the peace talks the Government of Sudan proposed majority rule, which meant the constitution should be based on sharia and the South could be exempt from the Islamic code of punishments. However, the SPLM/A factions pushed for a secular democratic system and the right of the South to a referendum on self-determination. But the Government of Sudan rejected secularism and refused the proposed referendum for South Sudan (Young, 2007).

In October 1993, the U.S. administration called for a meeting in Washington, D.C. The meeting was attended by the SPLM, led by John Garang; the splinter groups of the SPLM, led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol; and representatives of the National Democratic Alliance, of the Northern opposition groups. Thus, in the meeting, each of them signed a separate statement that included a reference to the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan as the means for ending the conflict in the Sudan. In April 1994, the SPLM, called for a national conference in Shagdom in East Equatoria state, in South Sudan. The convention approved the right of self-determination for the three provinces of Southern Sudan (Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile), as well as the Abyei area, South Kodofan, and Blue Nile states in the North. Hence, the meeting went further than the decisions of the Torit meeting in September 1991(Ibid: 383-385).

Furthermore, on July 20, 1994 the IGAD countries involved in the South Sudan problem, following the failure of the second round of the Abuja meeting in 1994, between the government and the SPLA, severely contradictory over the issues of religion and the states. The malfunction of Abuja opened the way for a joint initiative proposed by the Sudan's partners in IGAD. Thus a Declaration of Principles (DoP) drafted by Ethiopia and revised by Eritrea. The draft was completed, on July 20 1994, in Nairobi, and presented to the government of Sudan and the SPLM. Therefore, IGAD announcement stated that “the right of self-determination of the people of South Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed.”

But in September of 1994, the government of Sudan officially disregarded the IGAD Declaration. Later on, in 1997, the Declaration was agreed, and form the foundation for negotiations with the SPLM (Johnson, 2003:174-175; Salman, 2013:385-386).

Following, the aforementioned development, the SPLM rapidly started to discuss and attempted to induce the Sudanese political parties to endorsed the aspiration for self-determination. As a result, the DUP was the first Northern Sudanese party to recognize the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan, on July 13, 1994, in Cairo Agreement signed by the DUP, represented by Ahmed Al-Sayyed Hamad, and the SPLM, represented by Yousif Kuwa Mekki. The Agreement emphasized the close and special relationship between the DUP and the SPLM, as well underscored the need to preserve the unanimity of the Sudan, and emphasized that the problems of the Sudan could only be resolved by dialogue. Moreover, the Cairo Agreement also approved the IGAD Declaration of Principles of the right of self-determination for South Sudan, but eventually the agreements, promises and Declarations that were violated by the North (Salman, 2013:386-387).

On December 12, 1994, five months after the Cairo Agreement, the Umma Party and the SPLM concluded an agreement in Shagdom, in South Sudan, the parties were represented by the secretary-General, Omer Nour-Al Daiem represented the Umma Party and the SPLM represented by Salva Kiir. With this agreement, the SPLM had the approval of the two largest political parties in the Sudan for the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan and laid down detailed procedures for the exercise of this right. The agreement also granted the South a Confederal system of government during the transitional period, which was another major breakthrough for the SPLM. Furthermore, the three parties (Umma, DUP and the SPLM) met together in Asmara, on December 27, 1994, with newly formed Sudan Alliance Forces ("SAF"). This alliance

referred as the "Main Political Forces in the Sudan", and signed the Declaration of Political Agreement. The Agreement after confirming the unity of the Sudan as the strategic choice of all the political groups, and recognized the right of self-determination for Southern Sudan (Ibid: 387-388).

In addition, the grouping of the Sudanese opposition parties and trade unions, which were organized under the Umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance and included the SLPM, endorsed the rights of self-determination, for the people of South Sudan as a basic, democratic, and human rights. The approval took place in Asmara, Eritrea, during the NDA's meeting held from June 15-23, 1995. The declaration, emphasized on the pressing need to achieve peace and justice for all the marginalized people of the Sudan and the establishment of the New Sudan. It also endorsed the Principles of IGAD as important facts for a just and sustainable resolution for the problems of the Sudan and recognized that the right of self-determination provided the basis for ending the civil war. The Declaration, further affirmed the areas that badly suffered by the war were the Abyei area, Southern Sudan, and the Ingasana mountains in the Blue Nile Province (Salman, 2013:388-389).

On April 21, 1997, the NIF government of the Sudan signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, with a number of Southern groups, including a splinter groups led by Riek Machar. The Khartoum Peace Agreement was preceded by the conclusion of a short agreement, called the Political Charter for Peace. The Charter was signed on April 10, 1996, in Khartoum, by a number of Southern parties and organizations. The Charter included a reference to the right of self-determination for the people of South Sudan to be exercised after a transitional period to be agreed upon by the parties. Furthermore, the Khartoum Peace Agreement also reconfirmed the rights of self-determination for South Sudan, that pronounced in the Frankfurt Agreement, as

well as it paved the way for splinter groups to take part in the government in Khartoum.

Additionally, the NIF government issued the constitution of the Republic of the Sudan on July 1, 1998, which enshrines in article 139(g) the right of self-determination for South Sudan. Therefore, all above listed instruments were a significant achievement for both SPLM and its splinter factions, and obviously depict their diplomatic skills and abilities. Thus the agreements certainly paved the way for conclusion of the Machakos Protocol on July 20, 2002. The protocol was signed between General Salva Kiir on behalf of the SPLM/A and Dr. Ghazi Salahdiin on behalf of the GoS before President Moi at State House, which is the most important of the CPA, on Self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan (Joung, 2007; Salman, 2013:390-391).

Therefore, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 9, 2005, was the culmination of protracted and monotonous peace negotiation between the rebellious SPLM/A and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). It stipulates for a six year interim period with democratic elections by 2009, and a self-governing southern government, and also scheduled for referendum of self-determination for the peoples of South Sudan in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2006). In January 2011 the referendum on the South's independence was done, under the close international inspection, and the people of the South Sudanese opted for secession with a 99 percent majority vote. On July 9 2011, Africa's largest country seceded into two, formalizing the long anticipated independence of South Sudan. The Republic of South Sudan was born and became the world's newest state (McKay, 2012).

However, on 15, December 2015, nearly after the three years of independence, the world newest state plunged back to the atrocious civil war, which resulted for the massive loss of

human life, property destruction, civilian displacement as well as traumatized social fabric and trust of the South Sudanese.

2.13. The Root Causes of Current Conflict in South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan gained its independence from the Sudan, following a plebiscite that was held on 9 January 2011. The Republic of South Sudan is bordered by Ethiopia in the East, Kenya in the Southeast, Uganda in the South, Democratic Republic of Congo in the Southwest, the Republic of Central Africa in the West and Sudan in the North. It became an independent nation, divided into 10 states in three provinces: Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial and Greater Upper Nile. It becomes the home of more than 60 ethno-linguistic groups, among these the Dinka and the Nuer are, the dominant ethnic groups respectively. But after its independence, South Sudan has returned into internal conflict, due to the internal power struggle within SPLM/A.

According to the AUCISS (2014:20), the current South-South conflict partly based on CPA, although, it solved the decades elongated conflict between North-South, in 2005, but it also indicators to some of the current conflict's root causes. Thus the Commission analysis that the present conflict can be resulted, partly, to the defects of the CPA, in terms of procedure and outcomes, as well as its execution. The CPA was a defected peace process at different tiers. First, it pursued the dominant paradigm of 'liberal peace-building', which in practice tends to advantage 'negative peace', with its obsession with ending violence, without given an attention for democracy and structural transformation. Therefore, the central highlight on ending the conflict led the international community to overlook wrong in the 2010 general elections, and no commitments to democracy and transformation by the GOSS in the post CPA-era. So that, lack of enough attention to building democratic institutions and the failure of institutions to mediate

and resolve conflicts, in the post-independence period in South Sudan lead to the eruption of violence in December 15, 2013 (Ibid).

The second, failure of the CPA was also the inability to address old south-south grievances and problems, especially, the interior conflicts within SPLM/A, and with other formations during the civil war, even though, it emphasizes on issues of marginalization and exclusion on a north-south line. The third, was partially related with the second, the exclusion of other important actor's, including other rebel groups in the south, such as SSDF and parties in the north, and as well civil society, both in the North and South. Thus the CPA was concentrated only on the limited interests of the NCP and SPLM. This laid the foundation for a replicate of the exclusionary practices of the past, in South Sudan (AUCISS, 2014:20).

On the other hand, DeVries, *et al* (2014) argued that the root causes for the current crisis in the SPLM/A, particularly the 1991 divide in the SPLA, incomplete integration of militias in 2006, as well as the absence of the reconciliation processes among communities and warring groups since the signing of the CPA in 2005. Furthermore, De-Vries and Justin stated that the main cause for the current political and humanitarian crisis lies a failure of governance. It means that the inability and reluctance by political elites to overcome internal challenges, and the incapacity to deal with the general and growing frustrations of the South Sudanese people. Thus the failure of governance affects the entire administrative and political levels of society (ibid).

In contrast, Yohannes (2015:49) argued that the heart of the recent conflict in South Sudan is the power struggle between elites of different ethnic background. It assumes ethnic dimension finds its origin back to the 1990s, where leaders of the SPLM/A contested for political power and mobilizing support along ethnic lines that caused for fracture within SPLM/A of those who united with Dr. John Garang and Salva Kiir and those with Dr. Riek Machar, Dr. Lam Akol

and Gordon kong. Therefore, the ethnic fissure during this time lead to the fighting culminated in the so-called “Bor Massacre” 2,000 civilians, Bor-Dinka, were killed by the SPLA-Nasir faction (Pospisil, 2014).

Hence, the split between the SPLA forces, based on ethnic milieu have been resulted for the current political rivalry between the government of president Salva Kiir Mayardit, and former vice-president Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon, and led the country to very intense and brutal civil war (Okello, 2015:134). Additionally, South Sudan Human Right Commission reported that the current conflict in South Sudan have been characterized by ethnic dimensions. Because of the Sudan peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) the national army absorbed former ethnic militias in 2005, subsequent the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and afterward continued to absorb more tribally based armed groups. The process of absorbing the large number of ethnic armed groups in essence resulted into Nuer-led armed groups constituting a tribal majority in the SPLA. Some of these troops continued to keep allegiance to their ethnic Nuer Commanders including Riek Machar.

Conversely, the SPLA also consists of professional soldiers mainly from Dinka tribe and including also Nuer, who are loyal to Salva Kiir as the lawful Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA. So, when the political conflict within the SPLM translated into fighting, the two factions found themselves in contradictory sides fighting each other and exchanging allegations and counter-allegations mainly that the Dinka massacred Nuer in Juba and that the Dinka were massacred in Bor, Akobo, Bentiu, and Malakal by the Nuer rebels groups.

Moreover, Onekalit (2014) *noted that* a growing rivalry on the way the country was being governed, especially within the SPLM party levels, and the decision by the former Vice President Riek Machar-now leader of SPLM/A in-opposition to confront the incumbent

President Salva Kiir for the SPLM leadership and later presidency in the 2015 general elections, which led to current crisis. In the higher level of government there was a persisted growing dissatisfaction on the way the president was managing affairs of the state, particularly Some important members of the party sense that the President overlooked the SPLM party when filling in cabinet positions, and made decisions based on the counsel of a limited group of advisors from his home area, the Greater Bahr EL Ghazal. Simultaneously with governance challenges, accusation of corruption in state institutions and the growing infringement of human rights by the regime. Therefore, all the above mentioned factors precipitated for the eruption of violence fighting between the presidential Guard in Juba, on December 15, 2013, and late widespread to other towns.

2.14. The Immediate Cause of Conflict

The brutal conflict that broke out in South Sudan and pressed the country towards civil war is the trigger by diverse factors, mainly the political quarrels between the country's leadership. According to (Sudd institute, 2014:4) the beginning of the current intra-party power struggle is said to have re-emerged in late 2012 when high-level SPLM members of the Political Bureau visited South Sudan's ten states. The expressed aim of the state visits by the party officials was to thank the people for their unwavering, great support rendered throughout the years of liberation struggle and for leading a successful referendum that unquestionably guaranteed independence. Whereas in the states, these political leaders quickly found that what was planned to be a laudatory affair turned out largely as a condemnation of the party. Considering the masses, the ruling party had mislaid vision and direction, as it had not been able

to deliver the badly needed essential services such as infrastructure, health facilities, security, and education.

After the return of the SPLM leaders from the field reported a meeting of the political bureau was allegedly convened in March 2013, to share the criticism from the masses and a disagreement appeared to have followed prompting the top party leaders to trade accusations over who was to blame for this apparent failure. In that meeting, the First Deputy of the SPLM, Riek Machar and Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General are said to have confronted the President frankly, blaming him for failing the party and declared their intents to depose him from the party chairmanship in the next SPLM National Convention. At the end of the meeting, the political bureau was divided and people were bitter. In April 2013, a month after the said meeting, the president withdrew delegated powers from Riek Machar to demonstrate his clear resentment (Ibid:4-5).

In July 2013, President Salva Kiir, declared a major government officials reshuffle in which Vice-President Riek Machar and several other key officials were sacked from their position, including the Secretary General of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, was officially prevented without any clear reason (Gil, 2014:4). The restructure was much-admired by various analysts as a constructive step and many citizens appreciated it as an excellent step to save resources to be used for basic service delivery and enhanced infrastructure. However, the reshuffle had the consequence of intensify political conflicts and tensions within the SPLM (Mutanda, 2015:21).

On December 6, 2013, the fired official convened a press conference in Juba, in which they accused the president of running the party in ways that violated the party constitution. The press conference called for convening the Political Bureau in order to organize the agenda for the meeting of the National Liberation Council, the party's legislature. But instead of responding to a

legitimate constitutional right of the people who held the press conference, the president directed his Vice President James Wani Igga, to issue a very crude response in which he dismissed entire their claims and accused them of being “disgruntled” for their loss of power (Jok, 2014:3).

On December 14, 2013 Tensions were high in Juba, focused on the stressed relationship between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar as the SPLM National Liberation Council meets. As a result, on December 15, 2013 Riek and other key politicians boycotted the second day of the National Liberation Council meeting. At around 10:30 pm that night fighting between Nuer members of the Presidential Guard, loyal to Riek and government, mostly Dinka, Presidential Guard soldiers start in the SPLA ‘Giyada’ Headquarter and spread to some surrounding areas. At around midnight Nuer and government soldiers fight over the New Site arms store in the north of the capital, Riek flees Juba (Human Right Watch, 2014:22). Therefore, this political disputing and anger within the ruling party translated into armed conflict between the presidential Guard of Tiger Battalion, in December 15, 2013, in Juba.

Following this Salva Kiir, dressed in military uniform, addressed the nation and declared that there had been an attempted military coup d’état, on 16 December 2013. He indicted Riek Machar, the former vice-president of being in back the attempted *putsch*. Talking from his hiding place Dr. Machar betrayed that there had not been an attempted coup d’état at all. What happened in Juba was a misunderstanding between presidential guards within a single military unit. According to him he had no relations with any coup attempt (Blanchard, 2014:7; Okello, 2015:134). However, on the contrary, he quickly declared himself the leader of an armed opposition movement that became the "SPLM/A in Opposition". The movement rapidly took control of significant parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states, and fighting spread to other areas as well (International Crisis Group, 2014). On the side of the government, the SPLA forces

loyal to Kiir started offensives to get back territory in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, and fighting in the contested states has been violent as the opponent forces struggle to take and hold utmost territory earlier to a possible cessation of hostilities (Blanchard, 2014:3). As a result of the conflict the majorities of foreign aid staff and oil workers in these states have been evacuated or have wanted protection at U.N. bases (Ibid).

According to UNMISS (2014:7) gross human rights abuses and violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law have taken place in the situation of the fighting during this period. Brutality against civilians associated with the conflict has largely been committed by both pro- and anti-government forces have deliberately pursued civilian targets in Leer, Panyijar, Baliet, Akobo, Juba, Bor, Malakal and Bentiu. The utter numbers of people seeking refuge in UNMISS bases attests to the purposeful targeting of civilians (Hutton, 2014:6). Other armed groups have also been involved, often associated with the two major parties. Direct violations against civilians have included forced recruitment, including of children; targeted killings; conflict-related sexual violence; lack of distinction between civilian and military targets; arbitrary detention and ill-treatment; disruption of education and access to services; and the burning and destruction of homes, crops and other means of livelihood, apparently with the objective of forced displacement (UNMISS, 2014:7).

In addition the AUCISS (2014:112-118) reported that the cases of sexual and gender based violence committed by both parties against women. It also recognized extreme brutality exercised through mutilation of bodies, burning of bodies, draining human blood from people who had just been killed and forcing others from one ethnic community to drink the blood or eat burnt human flesh. Such crimes committed in Juba and elsewhere, witnesses of crimes committed in Bor Town, also provided evidence of brutal killings and cruel mutilations of dead

bodies. In Malakal town, reports of abduction and disappearance of women from churches and the hospital where communities had sought refuge during the hostilities that began in December 2013 were widespread.

Furthermore, the International Rescue Committee (2014:7) noted that since the eruption of conflict in mid-December 2013, tens of thousands of people are estimated to have been killed and 1.4 million people have been displaced inside the country, and almost half a million have wanted refuge outside the country, particularly in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan from the total population of 12 million. Those displaced by the conflict are frightened to return to their home areas, electing instead to endure shocking conditions, lack of basic services and other threats in areas of displacement. Therefore, following this appalling conflict, the regional organization, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development convened a summit in Nairobi on December 27, 2013 in order to search how to end the turmoil that has already caused huge losses in retaliatory attacks by the Nuer on the Dinka in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states for the attacks against the Nuer that were orchestrated in Juba by government soldiers (Jok, 2014:2). Ultimately, the peace agreement was signed in 17 August, 2015 by the SPLM/A in Opposition and on August 26, 2015 by the government of South Sudan.

In spite of a peace agreement was signed, the conflict has progressively expanded across the country in recent months, culminating in an outbreak of hostilities in the capital Juba on 8 July 2016. Resumed fighting together with an economic crisis and immense needs are deepening the humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the current quiet period in violence comes at a time of rising hunger and alarming food insecurity. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projects that the number of severely food insecure people will increase from about 4.3 million in April 2016 to 4.8 million by July 2016. The risk of famine cannot be controlled in parts of Unity

state and the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region where disastrous food security and nutrition indicators are being reported (European Commission, 2016:2).

According to the UNSC (2016:4) the security condition remained tense in the greater Upper Nile and greater Bahr el-Ghazal regions with intercommunal tensions remaining high in Boma and Jonglei, partly as a result of a cross-border assault into Gambella, Ethiopia. Armed clashes intensified in Wau Country in Western Bahr el-Ghazal between SPLA, SPLM/A in Opposition and unknown armed groups. In the greater Equatoria, violence involving armed groups, accompanied land-grabbing and the harassment of civilians continued to be reported.

Chapter Three

3. Research Methodology

3.1. Research Design

The researcher employed qualitative research design. The reason for choosing qualitative research design is mainly because of its advantage in gaining detailed information about the issue, as stated by Creswell (2007). Qualitative research is also concerned with qualitative phenomenon i.e phenomena relating to quality rather than quantity and it is also concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behavior (Kothari, 2004:5). Therefore, this research method helped the researcher to explore reflections, understandings and knowledge of negotiators and refugees by offering an in-depth understanding of a particular problem and challenges rather than presenting it with numerical representation.

The purpose of this research has been to explore and assess the challenges that IGAD-led mediation faced during the peace process and in the implementation stage of peace agreement. Hence, this research is descriptive research. According to Kothari (2004:2) the major purpose of descriptive research is description of the state of affairs as it exists at present and fact finding enquiries of different kinds. Descriptive research sets out to describe and to interpret what is or was. It looks at individuals, groups, institutions, methods and materials in order to describe, compare, contrast, classify, analyze and interpret the entities (Abiy, *et al* 2009).

Therefore, the researcher selected and employed this method to report the challenges that the IGAD-led mediation team has confronted during the peace process and at present in the implementation stage the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) is facing.

3.2. Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

Purposive sampling method was used to select research participants who were concerned persons of the study. According to Patton (2002) Purposeful sampling is a technique widely used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources as cited by Palinkas, *et al* (2013:2). In other word, purposive sampling is also known by different names such as Non-probability sampling, deliberate sampling and judgment sampling. In this kind of sampling, items for the sample are selected deliberately by the researcher (Kothari, 2004:59). This sampling technique was used as a means to select research participants. This was purposively done in order to understand the reflections, understanding and knowledge of negotiators and refugees that owned in the peace process in depth.

Moreover, the researcher used snowball sampling method in order to get knowledgeable and experience participant in the peace process. Snowball sampling (also called network, chain referral, or reputational sampling) is a method for identifying and selecting the cases in a network. It begins with one or a few people and spreads out on the basis of links to the initial cases or one research participant refers another, and that person refers another, and that person refers another. According to Berg (2001) Snowballing is sometimes the best way to locate subjects with certain attributes or characteristics necessary in a study. The researcher got the research participants in this way to conduct in-depth interview.

Therefore, totally ten participants were participated in this interview through face-to-face interview and email interview. The participants were selected from different categories of stakeholders in the peace process (i.e. from the government, the opposition, the IGAD, the civil societies and the refugees).

3.3. Data Collection Methods

Relevant data were obtained from primary sources and secondary sources. According to Kothari (2004:95) primary data are those which are collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in character. Hence the methods of gathering primary entails; interview, observation, questionnaires, content analysis and etc. primary data was gathered through in depth interview. In depth interview is appropriate to gather data in detail for the qualitative research as suggested by Creswell (2007).

Moreover, the researcher extensively used secondary sources such as books, thesis, journals, agreement documents and reports. Secondary data means data that are already available i.e. they refer to the data which have already been collected and analyzed by someone else (Kothari, 2004:95). Therefore, the research tried to consult these sources to compile this study.

3.4. In-depth Interview

Scholars like Denzin (1978) and Spradley (1979) as cited by Bruce (2001) define interview as simply as a conversation with a purpose of gaining information. The primary purpose is to gain relevant information from the stand point of the research objective and to gain constructive view from participants in the research.

It is often used as a method of generating data for understanding people's knowledge, experiences, opinions, beliefs, needs, perceptions, and constraints. It can be categorized as structured, semi-structured or unstructured in their settings (Robson, 1993). Therefore, the researcher conducted in depth interview with selected participants who were participated in the peace process and other stakeholders. Triangulations were used to make the data more credible and valid, crosschecking information from different stakeholder and participants in the peace

process (Government, Opposition, Refugees, Civil societies and IGAD). Hence, the researcher interviewed different individuals using the interview guidelines to triangulate the data from different directions. In-depth interviews were conducted with ten key informants. These in depth interview participants were selected purposively based on their knowledge and understanding they have in the peace process.

3.5. Data Analysis

The researcher analyzed the data by using qualitative method in a thematic way. For this purpose, the researcher follow certain steps first the researcher recorded all interviewees' voice by tape record during data collection and later the researcher transcribed manually after repeatedly listening recorded voice of interviewees. For the purpose of accuracy of data analysis, codes were given to each research participants by giving pseudonyms or false names for actual participants for anonymity in this stage.

Second stage was separating and extracting significant statements that pertain directly to the peace process. In this stage of analysis, the transcripts were read and reread to separate words and sentences of participants' reflection on the peace process using color by highlighter pen to identify significant words, phrases and statements of particular participants during transcribing on hard paper.

Third step of data analysis was formulating meanings for significant statements. Under this stage the researcher sorted similar ideas of in depth interview participants to formulate meanings of peace process based on highlighted significant statements of participants. Fourth step of data analysis was categorization of formulated meanings of peace process. In this stage the researcher formed sub themes to write analysis of peace process and the researcher did

accordingly. Following the thematic area the entire data transcripts were re-arranged. This is because Strauss, *et al* (1998) argued that events, happenings, actions/interactions that are found to be conceptually similar in nature or related in meaning are grouped under more abstract concepts which are termed as categories.

Fifth stage of analysis was integrating the findings into thorough description of the fact being studied. In this stage, the already arranged and organized data were set to be analyzed by triangulation the data which were gathered by two major methods such as primary and secondary sources. Because triangulation increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and methods in social science research as stated by Sabina, *et al* (2012). Social science reality is so complex that it is impossible to be captured by a single way of data collection or technique that needs triangulations of data analysis from different sources. According to Patton (2002), triangulation strengthens a study by combining different methods. Hence, the researcher analyzed data by triangulation from primary and secondary sources.

The findings from these two sources were integrated in places where it is necessary by describing the fact of the peace process. Analysis of data was made by giving greater emphasis for subjective reality of participants' experiences in the study.

3.6. Ethical Consideration

The research topic is approved by the Centre for African and Oriental Studies of Addis Ababa University. The objective of the study was explained to the identified participants. The researcher told his participants briefly that any information concerning them would never be passed to any individual or institution without their agreement. The participants were kindly requested to be part of the study. They were also informed that it was their right not to participate

at any time in the process of data collection. To ensure anonymity participants were not required to write their names. In this research, actual names of participants and facts that show their clear identity is hidden and replaced by pseudonyms. This is because according to (IFSW and IASSW, 2004) study dealing with human beings should be done in great caution. Thus, common research ethical values of autonomy of a person, justice and beneficence were respected during this study.

Chapter Four

4. Analysis and Interpretation

4.1. The beginning of the peace process of South Sudan

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification was established in 1986 with a focus on drought and desertification, and renamed in 1996 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with an expanded mandate that incorporated conflict resolution. The expansion of the mandate was due partially to IGAD member states' long history of cooperation and conflict with one another. IGAD's conflict resolution attentions have historically paying attention on the north-south conflict in Sudan and now the south-south conflict and various conflicts in Somalia. An IGAD peace process to resolve Sudan's long running second-civil war (1983-2005) was commenced in the early 1990s and gained power in the late 1990s when Kenya was IGAD's chair. IGAD's mediation, led by General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, received significant support from the "Troika" (U.S., UK and Norway), particularly at the end of the process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan's independence in 2011. But immediately nearly after three years of independence South Sudan immersed into atrocious civil war (International Crisis Group, 2015:3).

Following the spoiling for a fight broke out in December 2013, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization of nations including Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda, swiftly mandated three mediators to broker a peace deal between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar (Koos, *et al* 2014:2). But Starting from July of 2013, when Salva Kiir disband his entire cabinet, a number of initiative have been in place, it was very clear from that point on that if he sacked his entire cabinet, will be possibility that they going to

run travel is extremely high. So from the very beginning there was moves within the region mostly bilateral moves between the countries of the region, many mission that went to South Sudan, they tried that Salva, what he just did, so that conversation was going on, so there was some initiative almost bilateral between countries. Because, Dr. Tewodros Adhanom went there some point and another conversation was made with Uhuru kenyata is there just tried and get Salva Kiir specifically more about the decision had made.

According to one of IGAD staff member South Sudan is the child of IGAD. It was born out of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was brokered by General Lazarus Sumbeiywo took nearly, the process is South talk about it decade but take a little bit short time. So IGAD from the very beginning had stick ensure that South Sudan succeed that on the one hand. On the other hand, when that conflict broke out, it had severe regional implications for everybody. It had implication for Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. So every IGAD member countries were concerned in terms of their internal security, economic interest and humanitarian dimension of conflict.

Therefore, from very beginning the IGAD countries were concerned about what is going in that country. Obviously, every IGAD countries had their own specific issues. Ethiopia was mostly concerned about the dynamics around Gambella. The sudden influx of Nuer refugees into Gambella change the demographic surrounding of Anuak and create the tension between the two ethnic groups. There was so much concern for Ethiopia associated typically with people move in large numbers because of security problems. Kenya would not directly affected by security dimension perhaps her economic interest might be damaged because the banking industry in South Sudan is almost exclusively run by Kenya. Although the macroeconomic run by Uganda, Kenya provide overall financial institution. So both Kenya and Uganda have economic interest

over it but for Uganda a coup in Juba had very severe security implication because the potential danger for internal destabilization of Uganda was very high as Joseph Kony elements were operating in neighboring countries like Central Africa Republic and DRC. Therefore, the Uganda government officializing its support to stop the potential genocide that was broken out in South Sudan in December 2013. The Uganda official's argument was that genocide was coming up.

So the first move would be around December 17, 2013, when Dr. Tederowos Adhanom, the Ethiopia Foreign Minister, under the IGAD council of ministers went down to Juba to understand from Salva Kiir various issues especially focusing on his initiation to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. This was very fast initiative after 15 December 2013. On 26 December, 2013 his excellence, Haile Mariam Desalegn the chairman of IGAD and his excellence Uhuru Kenyata the rapporteur of IGAD went to South Sudan. Therefore, the evidences indicated that there were aforementioned initiatives before IGAD started the peace talk.

Thus, the peace process was launched as a result of the outbreak of the conflict in South Sudan. Following the outburst of fighting, IGAD quickly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on December 27, 2013 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. As anticipated, this meeting helped in forging what was chiefly regarded, and rightly so, as a critical regional response to the crisis, basically showing its commitment to mediate between South Sudan's warring parties. To immediately start the envisaged mediation process, the summit ensured that Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Mohammed El Dhabhi of Sudan were chosen as exceptional emissaries (Akol, 2014:3).

Besides the selection of the said peace envoys, the IGAD December summit also highlighted the need to have an inclusive peace process. Subsequently, the peace talks between

the warring parties began in January 2014 (Ibid), a few weeks after the fighting broke out, hosted by regional bloc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the talks were focused on attempts to immediately end the fighting and all the death and obliteration that it was causing (Blanchard, 2014:1).

As one interviewee says that Ethiopian Prime Minister, Haile Mariam, who is also the Chairman of IGAD Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, and the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, who is also the rapporteur of IGAD Assembly of the Heads of States and Government, visited South Sudan's capital Juba, and called for an end to the conflict. IGAD Council of Ministers met in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, on 27th December 2013, and called for an IGAD-led peace process for South Sudan, and the first round of the talks was held in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, on Saturday 4th January 2014.

Therefore, the Negotiators to the South Sudan Peace Talks were mainly: The warring parties, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition. They were the first parties to the peace talks. Later the Former Political Detainees were included, and then the other stakeholders: the Faith-based group made up of religious leaders from the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) representing Christians and leaders from the South Sudan Islamic Council representing Muslims in South Sudan. Also the civil society organizations (CSOs) from South Sudan (those under government controlled areas) and those under the Opposition's controlled area, and those from the Diaspora were also allowed to take part in the negotiations. Other participants included the Women's Bloc, Eminent Personalities from South Sudan. Generally, there were seven groups of participants and the total number of participants was about "89" delegates all together.

The negotiators were selected by their respective camps or groups based on the criteria set out by IGAD. IGAD wanted an-inclusive participation from the different sectors or

communities of South Sudan to be represented at the peace talks. On the other hand, one of the respondent states that the Horn of Africa is known by conflict situation, for instance, during the war intensified in Sudan, between the North-South Sudan, these people were already there to pursuit peace particularly the envoys. During this time, in mediating work IGAD putout principles for mediation in 1994, what we called IGAD Declaration of Principles, during that time Seyoum Mesfin was Ethiopia Foreign Minister, he had involved in this mediation efforts of the conflict. General Lazarus Sumbeiyow of Kenya, who was a veteran of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, between North and South Sudan, during the Naivashai days and the General Mohammed Ahamed El Dhabhi from Sudan, who was also a veteran observer of Sudan and South Sudan regional politics.

The respondent explained that when the conflict of this nature arises IGAD together with AU looked around for capable and experienced statesmen who could put together these two parties to the mediation work and must have been consultation among the leaders. Then they selected envoys from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan because these countries are neighbor to South Sudan. There was also a consensus among them to settle conflict through peaceful ways and they supposed to mediate the warring parties. The mediators were envoys, who were guiding the conversation and also they have responsibility to ensure whatever the conversation might allow South Sudan to resolve the conflict and tension between Salva Kiir government and Riek Machar. The negotiators were the teams selected by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, and also whoever else that involved in the peace process.

On the other hand, to do in a manner that will ensure a peace agreement to be signed South Sudan get back to path of sustainable peace process, resolve the conflict and put together a dispensation that negotiate the current dilemmas. It was actually a vague defined communiqué of

27 December 2013, which enjoined the mediators to undertake the experience to interlocutor between stakeholders in South Sudan in an all-inclusive political dialogue. Therefore, the role was to ensure that whether the negotiating table presented a broad prospector of South Sudanese fabrics and this had positive dimension to peace process. The more complicated dimension to it was trying to ensure that the negotiation did not play round because in every negotiation they have to balance between needs, interests, personalities and actors. These were parts of what the mediators doing to ensure the process of negotiating needs, interests and position. So they straining the delaying giving bring them back to line up to try to focus on conversation.

Moreover, as one interviewee from civil societies explain that when the mediation works preparing, he was participating in certain capacity. There was a committee formed in Ethiopia by representing the Ethiopian peoples. This was people to people efforts for peace. During the time, he was one of the Keynote academic speakers in the first symposium, which took place at the hall of the Economic commission for Africa. In that symposium nearly all stakeholders were participated like the two warring parties, members of civil societies, women bloc, youth, faith-based leaders, journalists, peace NGOs and also there have been international supporters of peace. It started with symposium and then it went on very careful. The mediators were serious about the inclusivity of the process. He said that inclusivity was very important and a wise choice. They insisted that should be inclusive and continue with that, the work was done very carefully and in balanced way, although sometimes they could not avoid accusations of partiality, but the mediators were impartial and very knowledgeable and even handed.

This shows that negotiators played pivotal role, no matter how long the peace process took to reach a solution to the problem. The negotiators negotiated somehow first in bad faith which was why took long to reach at consensus after more than 20-months of talks. But due to

pressure from the international community (such as America, Britain, Norway, European Union and the IGAD heads of State), the negotiators were able to reach a Peace Agreement in South Sudan.

4.2. The Agendas of Peace Process

Almost all interviewees responded that the agenda of the peace process are formulated by IGAD-mediators together with the parties to the conflict. The reason was to allow smooth negotiations because the agenda that the parties did not agree on should not generate good discussions. But from the government side one interviewee said that there were too many hands in formulating the agendas. He stated that we told IGAD and IGAD mediators formulate the agenda based on the causes of conflicts. As a result, the government sides were not happy because they thought that the agenda was imposed on them from outside. The international community was involved too much in the peace process and the both warring parties did not agree on agenda.

On the other hand, one of the IGAD staff members said that every peace process has some stumbles, some of them are clearly defined and other is not, because at the beginning of every negotiation people will posture around. They will not be clear exactly what it is and what they want because everybody tried to knockout others and try to liberate their own positions. So typically what happens in the first round talks was what it was called talks about talks during the travel talks. The mediators try and understand how the parties see its problem, so that this open session was primarily led by the mediators first started from contacting the parties bilaterally, pulling game and shuttle diplomacy. So, that was a mediation phase almost all exclusively

associated with designing the rules of engagement. Rules of engagement is very important in pulling agreement framework around the whole process.

As a consequence, all rules set by the mediators because the process need to be proceeded. If they leave it the parties typically will take days and weeks before they come up on the agenda. The mediation team was providing them grass root of engagement, speed up the process and also they needed to get ownership from the parties. So basically somebody have to do paper work which is border line someone has to do so. The rules were given to the parties like drafting, changing it whenever they need to change and come back to generate, negotiate and agree on issues all are going to bond by this rule. Once bond by this rules, they go to the next Batch, which is the question of inclusivity. The question of inclusivity was written in the communiqué of 27 December, 2014, and another communiqué of January 31 and March 23, 2014, and also the mediation to do certain thing basically to ensure that political call on South Sudanese when born.

Again after the time of determination of the different categories were initiated by the mediation based on the understanding of what communiqué required and shared with the negotiating parties, they agreed to keep and force inclusivity. These were categories that they think to involve in the peace process and the role of the mediation was to generate agenda on the basis of its understanding of where the parties are with the concurrence of the parties themselves. So no agendas put on the table which the parties never agreed to.

Hence, as one respondent from civil society alluded that the agenda included negotiations to end the conflict, study of the root causes of the conflict, how did the war start, and what would be the solution to the conflict. The agenda produced an Agreement called “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”. On the other hand, the interviewee

from the government side noted that the main agenda should bring peace to South Sudan. But in order to bring peace for South Sudan they have to understand each party, their demands and points of conversation or points of agreement. The agenda which was presented supposed to reform institutions, cessation of hostilities and ceasefire and open corridors of humanitarian system.

On the contrary, also from the opposition side stated that the SPLM/A in opposition were looking for federal system. They want the federal system to be incorporated in hand to reach the peace agreement. Secondly, they need the reform for all government institutions. The third one is, they need the government to pay money for those who were killed and the property that were damaged in the war. Lastly, the SPLM/A in opposition needed two separate army force.

But the Juba government did not agree with federal system. According to Tiitmamer (2015:2) federalism has from start to finish the negotiations proven to be contentious as the parties found it difficult to agree on a particular system of governance. It is also an issue of great concern to many stakeholders beyond the warring parties particularly the people of Equatorial region, the Nuer and Dinka who have their own understanding of federalism. And also the government reject the issues of two separate army in the country but later agreed the two separate army must be there, to compensate those who killed or victims of the war and they agree with all institutional reform. So they have big gap between the warring parties during the peace process on the agendas.

On the one hand, the respondent from the civil society's side noted that the efforts were to convince the warring parties to cessation of hostilities, to stop fighting and to negotiate. This is the main issue during the peace process. So that they may handle conflict, the disagreement or the dispute through peaceful means on roundtable discussion. Hence, the effort, concentration

and focus was on convincing the two parties, even though it had been difficult for two years but they came to an agreement after two years. They agreed a number of times and this was bridged. However, they accused each other instantly and were not willing to abide by the agreement. One interesting thing is the mediators insisted that they would work with both parties leadership with Salva Kiir and Riek Machar because it was mainly these two top leaders had seriously quarreled around their personalities and question of power, this unfortunately down to the community conflict.

According to Fok (2014:5) from the beginning what was important was to cease the killings. As a result, the government delegation to the Addis Ababa-based negotiations demanded on the talks being limited to the warring parties that the quickest way to end the violence was a direct dialogue between the government and the opposition. But the rebels, the donors and the civil society organization pushed for an inclusive approach. The oppositions were at this time talking about change in power, and justice and accountability for the incident of violence that took place in Juba when the fighting broke out. Further, the insurgent talk about political strategies of each party, with opposition underscoring a commitment to institutional reforms, democracy, tackling corruption and changes in the system of governance (Ibid).

Therefore, the issue of approval of the peace agenda by the both parties is very controversial, because the respondents react different views. Some say that the agendas were accepted by both parties and the other say that the agenda were not accepted particularly by the government. As one of interviewee from the government side says that both parties want peace in any conflict, they want to have peace that is favor to their terms but what it mean the peace agreement that it been signed really to be honesty trying, was not acceptable by the government and even by the opposition parties, because the people were pressure to sign it, so it sign the

parties prefer that to be given negotiate, so that they get peace agendas that they can be happy to sign and be happy to implement. This always imposed because the mediators under pressure, the parties to the conflict under pressure, the region under pressure and the continental organization under pressure, so they have to sign it. However, as one of interviewee from the civil societies side described that the agenda items presented were accepted by the parties because they participated in drafting these agenda items.

In addition, one of the respondents alluded that they negotiated and discussed. They had negotiators, there were observers and the civil societies members. The inclusivity is there and it is clear. The inclusivity was achieved through study of influential groups in the country. This helped in the negotiation process during and outside roundtable talks. There were attempt to influence the two warring parties on the issue of cessation of hostilities and then gradually the government made an agreement on August 26, 2015. The agreement which is holding up to now largely this was because of pressure of the people of South Sudan and the international communities. But the agreement was broken a number of time by both parties, because of it concentrated around those oil states, which both parties were demanded to monopolized. These oil states are the Blue Nile, Unity state and Jongile state. Therefore, this oil wealth changed hands many times. The cessation of hostilities was breached around there in the way interested to control oil wealth.

4.3. The Challenges of the Peace Process

The peace process faces numerous internal and external challenges before and after signed the “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”. According to, Yohannes (2015:52) challenges that destabilize the efforts of solving the conflict

before reaching to an agreement was the unwillingness of the two Antagonist parties to respect what they have pledged and signed for in the peace deals as it was seen in their repeated backslid into conflict. As one interviewee from civil society said that much of the reason for the delay of peace agreement was the internal factor, which is lack of trust and the absence of give and take spirit, this zero sum game type of thing in both of the leaders of the warring parties. It was disheartening. According to him that there was no any serious outside challenge, although the Ugandan army was there to uphold the government side. But this was not mean much they insisted that to protect the capital city from falling apart say that they were doing a middleman's jobs and so on, but it was difficult, however, it was not the most serious external challenge. He noted that there was no visible and serious outside challenge. The main challenge came from intransigence and inflexibility of the warring parties leaders, who knew each other more than anyone else. They became very stubborn.

The other challenge was there were the military men behind them especially, the president foreign minister who was very stubborn and intransigent and there were individuals pushing for the delay of peace agreement and also internally the ethnic factor is there. However, one can't say that the ethnic factor was the serious one. It was personal thing largely of the president and vice-president. The president was very much criticized before the breakout of the hostilities for his incapacity, financial misuse and dependence on oil revenue which were squandered. The opposition party mostly said there was no development in the country such as infrastructural development, the funds were totally erect and the capital investment was mugged so there was unhappiness in the population.

In contrary to the remarked by the respondent representing the civil society, a refugee noted the presence of an external challenge from Ugandan army supporting the Salva Kiir

government and internally the peace agreement could not be respected by both warring parties which delayed the peace process. Again there is also another challenge that the Riek Machar army has no the logistic capacity to move back to the country soon for the implementation of the peace agreement. So that is why, the peace agreement is not respected and implemented comprehensively and this in turn delayed the peace process.

On the other hand, as one of the refugee explained that for delay the politicians know what they are doing, sometimes they don't need to hurry because this is political issue. They take long process so as to do the work in a good way better than hurry. The main internal problem is the failure to fulfill and implement what they have in agreement. Similarly as one refugee described that it may be the internal challenge delayed the peace process because the government did not agree with the opposition parties to come to an agreement. The government signs sometimes and refuses the other time the peace deal and also breaks it anytime they wish. Therefore, the reason for the delay of the peace process is the vacillation of the Salva Kiir government to sign and implement the peace agreement.

Besides, though seven of the eleven political detainees were released and finally allowed to join the peace talks in Addis, the rest four was remained in detention and are under trial of treason which was detrimental for solving the conflict given that the release of all detainees puts as a condition by Riek Machar for significant political discussion to take place and the existence of different armed opposition groups often with competing interests and the need to accommodate their interests in the mediation agenda in order to outcome an all-inclusive lasting solution for the conflict makes the mediation efforts challenging (Yohannes, 2015: 52).

Moreover, the fright of being accountable for the ethnic killing leaders in the top rank caused in their past and present contention for power might constrain their genuine commitment

to find solution for the conflict (Ibid). According to Awolich (2015:7) the solemn challenges to the IGAD mediation had been the fact that the mediators did not simply understand the power of momentum. At any time the talks reached a critical stage, the mediators would send the parties on recess. During recess, momentum fades away and when the parties returned, they came with their positions hardened and on many occasions they break a promise on previously agreed positions. In addition, the mediation seemingly suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is assumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any stalemates with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit. Whilst the pressure from the IGAD leaders was welcomed, it seemingly interfered with the smooth flow of the mediation. It felt that the mediators were not fully in charge of the process and therefore were not as creative and were pulled to all directions (Ibid).

The other challenge was also internally, it has been difficult to implement the Peace Agreement on the ground because the parties did not show good will and political will to implement the peace agreement. Dr. Riek Machar was asked the question about the issue of reservation, during the interview with VoA journalist by the name Shaka. He said that this issue of reservation which president Salva Kiir has expressed many times before signing on the 17 August the day we were expected to sign the peace agreement. However, he signed peace agreement on 26 August and he also stated that before the heads of state and government of IGAD that he was having reservation. In a press conference again on the 15th of September he also did express his reservation so that we were invited to New York where he declined to come and he opted to talk to the UN Secretary General through video conference or link. In spite of these reservations and the peace process didn't meet our minimum interest, we move forward to

implement of the peace agreement and we called president Salva Kiir should drop his reservations (VoA News, 2015).

Additionally, on the side of the Government, President Salva Kiir issued a decree in December 2015, creating 28 new states which contradict the provisions of the Peace Agreement that recognizes ten states. Therefore, the SPLM/A-in Opposition and the international community rejected the creation of the 28-states because they violate the provisions of the Peace Agreement. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional political bloc that supervises South Sudan's peace talks, on 31 January 2016, asked the GRSS to suspend its plan to implement the 28 states, claiming that Kiir's decree was contradictory with the August peace agreement (HSBASSS, 2016:4).

It was clear that the creation of the twenty-eight states delayed the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Dr. Riek Machar criticized the decree of 28 new states by the President Salva during his interview on VOA. He said that this was a unilateral action of Salva Kiir which we didn't accept and raised the issue of 21 states during the negotiation at end of December 2014 and we table the issue at the negotiation so as to resolve this matter once and for all, but he was not ready and rejected it.

Dr. Riek Machar said we are criticizing President Salva Kiir for taking unilateral action; we are not criticizing him for a number of states. It was obvious during the negotiation before IGAD he refused the 21 states and maintained 10 states. He allowed IGAD to confirm the 10 states in it. We are criticizing its principle of acting unilaterally violating the peace agreement furthermore Dr. Machar criticize the 28 states on the basis that it may fuel a new border conflict. He also said the 28 states have no convincing basis while the 21 states which we declared have based on the former British colonial districts which had borders delineated and demarcated. The

states are made in order and the border dispute committee recognize it while the 28 state might cause a dispute, this dispute would be detrimental (VoA News, 2015). According to HSBASSS (2016:1) the president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, issued an administrative decree that divided South Sudan's ten states into 28, on 2 October 2015, moving the country's unstable peace process into confusion.

However, from the government side James Wani Igga the vice-president said that the creation of 28 states do not affect the peace agreement since it was the demand of the people for the devolution of power on the ground. This was seen when the people expressing their pleasure in dancing and celebrating everywhere in the whole country. Therefore, this shows that the issue of federal systems was welcomed by almost everybody (VoA News, 2015).

Further, internally the government did not withdraw its forces outside the National capital Juba, as stipulated in the Peace Agreement. In the agreement all military forces within Juba shall be redeployed outside a radius of 25km from the center of the national capital beginning thirty days after the signing of this Agreement and complete after ninety days (IGAD, 2015: 24). Juba the national capital of South Sudan was supposed to be demilitarized after the signing of the Agreement by the Parties, but did not happen because the government did not withdraw the forces outside the capital. The government said it faces some logistical challenges in terms of accommodation of the forces in areas where they will be stationed some 25-kilometers outside the national capital. The issue of demilitarization of Juba is the major setback to the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

However, James Wani Igga, the vice-president of South Sudan through the interview on VOA with John Tanza Mobusu an aging editor said about the implementation of the peace agreement on the 26 of August Salva Kiir signed the agreement. The next day immediately he

declared the permanent ceasefire and also ordered the bulk of his army to start moving outside Juba according to the provision of the agreement which they were supposed to relocate up to the radius of 25 kilometers outside Juba. This was already started, however; there was existing financial difficulties there (VoA News, 2015).

The return of the designated First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar Teny for the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU), also delayed because Dr. Machar cannot return to Juba if Juba is not fully demilitarized. The Peace Agreement says during the transitional period of 30-months; all government forces should be withdrawn from the national capital. The forces that are allowed to be in Juba by the Agreement were the Joint Integrated Police Units made up of government forces and SPLM-SPLA in Opposition forces. The return of the SPLM in Opposition Advance Team to Juba was also delayed because the government was concern about the size (number of the advance team to be about 5000 but the SPLM/A In Opposition want to be not more than 3000) that was allowed only later. They started arriving on 21st December 2015.

According to Mogae (2016:2) the chairperson of Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) report that the pre-transitional period of 90 days provided in the Agreement ended without the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) due to the absence of the SPLM/A-in Opposition from the first meeting of JMEC on 27 November 2015. During that time, they had not returned to Juba for several reasons including a dispute between the Parties over the size of the advance team delegation contributed to the Commission's inability to meet quorum. Unfortunately, disputes over the representation of other political parties continue to limit the inclusiveness of representation in the process envisaged by

the Agreement. Other political parties remain unrepresented at JMEC as well as in other key institutions where their participation was foreseen.

The chairperson further noted that the TGoNU was not established by the revised date of 22 January 2016 partly because of other's departure from the framework of the Agreement. The primary one was the unexpected decision by the Government to form 28 states replacing the 10 states that comprised South Sudan at independence in 2011 and which existed at the time of signature of the Agreement. The President of South Sudan issued decrees on 24 December 2015 in which he formally dissolved the 10 states and created 28 new states. A number of provisions of the Agreement are predicated on the continuation of 10 states with the expectation that states both in terms of numbers and boundaries could be re-examined in the course of developing a permanent constitution, the process for which is provided for in the transitional period of the Agreement. Therefore, the President's actions contradict the terms of the Agreement. Both the SPLM/A-in Opposition and the SPLM (Former Detainees) have made clear their opposition to the formation of 28 states describing the existing government's decision as unilateral, and a violation of the Agreement (Ibid:3-4).

Externally, the parties to the conflict accused foreign forces of interests in South Sudan conflict. Parties accused regional powers such as Sudan and Uganda of involvement in the conflict. Sudan was accused by the government of South Sudan of supporting the armed opposition (the SPLM/A-in Opposition), and the SPLM/A-in Opposition accused Uganda of involvement in South Sudan conflict by openly supporting the South Sudan Army (SPLA) with backup from the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). The roles of Sudan and Uganda in the peace process have been damaging to IGAD's mediation efforts in South Sudan because of their entrenched and incompatible interests (Getachew, 2015:2).

The other challenge also externally, were the competing interests and different ways of the IGAD member states pursued beyond the IGAD-led mediation process against the efforts to solve the conflict. Particularly, those who involved in the peace process (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda) desire for South Sudan regional stability in the political and military (mainly of Uganda) routes. They pursued as viable solutions for the conflict is driven by their interests in: border security as it relates to the mass influx of refugees and the easiness with which the conflict spill over to these states owing to cross-border settlement of ethnic groups. These groups, having similar identity markers and the mutual intervention of regional states; the oil industry that is the main source of revenue for Sudan and also concerns for Kenya and Uganda as far as the Lamu pipeline is concerned. Beside these, Kenya worry of the massive investment of its banks in South Sudan; and regional power ambition especially of Ethiopia and Uganda that preferred opposite routes of solution to the conflict, political and military, and plays impartial and partial roles, respectively. As the latter is a neutral mediator (under the IGAD-led mediation process) and as the same time a warring party in the conflict sided with the government of South Sudan (Yohannes, 2015: 52).

Ethiopia and Kenya also had vying interests; they were competing for control over the mediation process (Awolich, 2015:8-9). Each of these states specific interests thus makes difficult to solve the conflict on regional base.

Therefore, the evidences show that the regional rivalries and power struggles were the challenges for IGAD mediation process. As one of the staff member of IGAD described that when this conversation start the unity of IGAD as the region came under challenge in the sense that Kampala wanted her own thing, Ethiopia wanted something like different and Khartoum was concerned about other issue. Even though the warring parties agreed in the Peace agreement

during the peace process, they were not still agreed in number of things like mentioned above.

Hence, implementation of the Peace Agreement is very difficult because the Parties feel that the Agreement was imposed on them by the regional and the international community of IGAD-Plus. Their position is shaky with regards the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

As one of respondent from the civil society's side explained that as usual they stick to some points like ceasefire agreement and cessation of hostility but mainly they accused each other on infringement of ceasefire. So both sides were often intended blatantly to accuse each other. It was one sort of that the government side was spoiling the chances of peace but it was reciprocated because when one side pledged the peace and the other reciprocated. This continued affecting the population of South Sudan over two million people to exile and many were killed in the war. The death has been always reported as tenth of thousands. Since this was an orchestration of the ethnic element by the parties, the Nuer lost a lot because they were hit by Salva Kiir military at the initial stage. This has recorded by AU Human Right Commission as the war crime perpetrated during the war.

"The UN-Secretary Ban Ki-Moon said that horrific crimes have been committed against the civilians in this war. The social fabrics of South Sudan has been shattered to mend it the provisions and peace agreement related to justices, accountability and reconciliation must be implemented in full" (VoA News, 2015).

So there were serious disagreements on almost all the issues they discussed ranging from power sharing to transitional security arrangements. On power sharing the government initially wanted 70% of the ministerial portfolios in the transitional government of national unity, while the SPLM/A-in Opposition wanted 70% too. But they were pressured to make compromises which indeed they made and came to accept 53% for the Government and 33% for the SPLM/A-

in Opposition, and the former Political Detainees, and the other political parties were given each 7% of power sharing in the Transitional Government of National Unity. The government also did not want the Former Political Detainees to be given any share in power, arguing that they were not a party to either the Government of the SPLM/A-in Opposition. There were also disagreements on payment of arrears of the SPLM/A-in Opposition in the aftermath of the Peace Agreement. The Opposition wanted their external debts, which they incurred during the 20-month-conflict to be settled by the Transitional Government of National Unity, while the government rejected, arguing that the SPLM/A-in Opposition should settle its own debts. And there were more disagreements during the talks till the signing of the Peace Agreement.

The other major disagreement was on the power of the First Vice President during the Transitional Period. The President cannot take decisions without consulting the Vice-President and also on security arrangements during the Transitional Period. The Opposition wanted to have two armies during the Transitional Period, while the government wanted one unified army during the Transitional Period. The Opposition said they don't trust the government and the army in Juba, which has killed civilians in Juba, Malakal, Bor and Bentiu during the time when the conflict broke out on 15th December 2013. So the Opposition wanted to have two-armies during the transitional period. They said its army would guarantee the implementation of the Peace Agreement and avoid the government abrogate the agreement. While the government on the contrary couldn't accept separate armies, and accused the Opposition of a plan to stage a rebellion. This was a major area of disagreement. Eventually, this was settled during the IGAD-PLUS mediation, they agreed to have two separate armies during 18-months of the 30-month-transitional period.

As one of respondent from the government side explain that there is still big misunderstanding between warring parties. The opposition think that the government insult them for tried coup attempt and supposed to them as betrayal. So they have to work strongly together to bring peace agreement in to implementation. It was obvious they tried to get their sides during the peace negotiation but there were big difficulties between the belligerent parties, the warring parties and the mediators, the mediators and the international communities and the international communities and the South Sudanese warring parties. So all these things created mistrust and a peace negotiation to be delayed. These circumstances brought about nearly the negative feelings or people who feel that the peace negotiation not fair to them into the implementation.

According to International Crisis Group (2015:3) IGAD-PLUS was introduced in March 2015 following fifteen months of unsuccessful mediation. “IGAD-Plus” an organization that includes the IGAD member states as well as major international partners including the United States, UK, Norway, AU, EU, UN, and China should include a wide range of South Sudanese stakeholders such as churches, mosques, women, youth, civil society, opposition political parties, and semi-autonomous armed groups (Getachew, 2015:1). This inclusion would help to create a common understanding and sense of ownership among all South Sudanese stakeholders. It could also serve as a catalyst for local political, ethnic, and tribal leaders in the most war-torn states of South Sudan, particularly Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States, to begin local peace processes to create reconciliation and stability in their communities (Ibid). IGAD-PLUS’ approach to the mediation is shaped by two reasons: firstly, that the parties are unwilling to come to an agreement without pressure and secondly, that IGAD would need to call on the weight of the wider international community to exert the necessary pressure in a coordinated manner (International Crisis Group, 2015:4)

Therefore, IGAD-PLUS was introduced into order to re-energize the peace process. It was to add more weight and energy to the peace process. The regional and international participation and contributions were needed to boost the peace process.

As one of the respondent described that IGAD-PLUS was introduced after fifteen months of unsuccessful negotiations because the parties to the conflict did not respect IGAD instead they (government in particular) pointed accusing fingers at IGAD Chief-Mediator, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin, and had often accused him as a dictator. IGAD-PLUS was announced in order to give maximum pressure to the warring parties. And indeed it was because of IGAD-PLUS that was why the parties were able to reach a peace agreement by the 17th August 2015. The United Nations, the African Union, IGAD, EU, and the rest played greater role by mounting pressure on the warring parties to reach a peace deal.

Hence, the IGAD-Plus succeeded in pressuring the parties into signing the fledgling agreement called the Agreement on the Resolution of Crisis in South Sudan on August the 17 and 26, 2015, respectively (Awolich, 2015:9).

The Troika was actually around from CPA continued to exist up to now and their initiative from the outset had grievance and conflict. So the role of the Troika was to provide financial assistance for peace process. Thus, the Troika (US, UK and Norway) and other like the European Union, China, and others were involved in the peace process through their international envoys. They acted as major donors to support IGAD facilitate the peace process and also they sent their special envoys to be in Addis Ababa to pressure the warring parties to reach a peace Agreement. The Troika and the rest gave pressure to the parties to reach a peace agreement. One way of giving pressure was the threats of sanctions on individuals in the government and the SPLM/A-in Opposition. As one interviewee from the civil society informed

that the involvement of the Troika in the South Sudan peace process helped to facilitate and enable the parties to reach a peace agreement as a result of the pressure they exerted on the parties to the conflict. The participation of these countries helped greatly in reaching a peace agreement as they gave a deadline of August 17, 2015. This was a major role played by the expanded mediation team known as IGAD-Plus.

However, the interviewee from the government side described that their involvement has a positive and negative impact. Its positive impact are in a sense that they are interested in bringing peace to South Sudan, perhaps to the region and also funding the peace process particularly the US but Norway and UK urged warring parties to the peace agreement, even though they don't funding the peace process. In opposite, the negative side was their influence in a sense that the peace negotiators were not trusted by certain party specially the government side to be honesty brokers. The government was under the pressure from these countries to sign the peace agreement. He also said that once they want to bring peace, they don't influence the parties in the conflict. Therefore, as long as the purpose is to bring peace, it is so significant to let the warring parties negotiate their own peace. And the main goal should be to try to bring peace rather than using the agendas of peace for themselves despite they are funding the peace process.

In terms of challenge also the overall document which was developed is quite ambitious and the establishment of a fully functional government that the agreement required was the other challenge. But in this entire process the government always try to find way out and resolve these dilemmas by their own means without necessarily having to tackle deep rooted issues of South Sudan. It is known that at the time South Sudan born as nation what happened was a new problem associated with creating a new state with old factors. So the historical legacies that existed within SPLM/A were put together with tension and new tension marked all tensions. So

in order to get out South Sudanese out of these dilemmas, they have to primarily acknowledge these challenges exist because until now the regime in Juba has been reluctant to do this. Therefore, denying the existing reality is a solemn challenge. He also said that the government hide its head buried in the sand and probably ostrich buried just the head in the sand, if they are hiding but their backside all of them have all these situation.

Accordingly, the question of the peace process in solving the root cause of conflict is very controversial because the interviewees responded mixed answers, some said the peace agreement addressed the root causes and others said not addressed the root causes of conflict. The interviewee from the government side described that at the beginning they did not want to address the root causes of conflict. Therefore, the mediators couldn't understand why the South Sudanese are fighting. It is clear that the conflict must have root causes that trigger fighting within SPLM/A. The root causes of the conflict didn't clear up during the peace negotiation and that is why it couldn't be solved within three to six months especially at the beginning wasted a lot of time. The mediators considered the root cause of the conflict as a tribal issue but rather it is a political power struggle within SPLM/A.

As one of the refugees noted that the root cause of conflict is something which is still the failure of politicians. It can be said that the failure of the leaders of South Sudan because it was one party which was divided. They have vision to get South Sudan in good place when the late John Garang died. When Salva Kiir became a president he started chasing the Equatorian from offices and took all the presidential position. Since then Riek Machar sat down in his home until the government itself start fighting against Nuer in 2013 in Juba. He fought only one ethnic group, which is Nuer, they began to kill all Nuer house to house. People died just because the failure of our political leaders. If the people who have vision for the nation, why they fight?

The respondent from government side further said that from the very beginning up to now the mediators didn't understand the nature of South Sudanese societies. Of course we got a lot of support from international community when we were fighting Sudan. They consider the South Sudanese as well educated in everything but the reality is not like that because our elites are very few which is not more than 500 people that is why the church try to mediate the conflict. Therefore, the international communities must understand the capacity of South Sudanese so as to implement the peace agreement.

As one interviewee from the opposition side explained that there is still hatred between the two communities of the Dinka and Nuer. The peace agreement itself won't bring the solution for South Sudanese problems alone unless the two leaders committed to work together with open heart leaving their rivalry for power aside and this may bring about the end of the problems. Thus, if they don't work together, there will be another war.

In addition, from the refugee side the respondent stated that the peace agreement would not address the root causes of conflict because what is happening in South Sudan is like what has happened in Rwanda in 1994. The same genocide happened in South Sudan and the same people were killed in Juba, Malakal, Benitu and Bors just looking for only one ethnic group house to house and perpetrated sexual abuse. Actually, the president with his people targeting only to kill Nuer. This peace agreement will not bring a lasting peace unless they are supposed to be punished in advance and they should apologize the community for the mass killings. Although they signed the peace accord, the Nuer people are still killing by government forces in Juba, Benitu and even in the refugee camp under UN in Malakal. What they did is shame to them they can't bring it out. He also expressed his suspicion that one day they will pick up their weapon to revenge and fight again another war. Therefore, evidences show that the peace

agreement will not bring lasting peace in South Sudan because there is still anger within the young people.

However, the interviewee from the civil society responded that the Peace Process will address the root causes of the problem. One way of addressing the root causes of the problem is by allowing the warring parties to share power in a national unity government for a transitional period of 30-months and then later they go for democratic elections. According to IGAD (2015: 40) the agreement has an important chapter, chapter five which talks about Transitional Justice, where perpetrators of violence and abuses during the conflict will be prosecuted by the Hybrid Court of South Sudan, which will be headed by judges select by the African Union and South Sudanese judges.

Correspondingly, as one interviewee from refugees said that the peace agreement attempted addressed the root cause of the conflict because when the international community and the IGAD investigated the root cause of conflict, they responded that there was no coup. So they tried to advise the president to come to an agreement with the vice-president and reinstate his position.

The peace process also tries to address the root causes of the problem by incorporating the Arusha Agreement for the re-unification of the parties during the transitional period. According to Awolich (2015:10) the parties to the talks were able to sign the agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM, on 21st of January 2015. The agreement deal with the three broad categories of issues: political, organizational, and leadership. The key provisions, on the political issues include the need for the SPLM to make a public apology for having created the crisis in the country. The agreement also called for the reversal of the decisions that dismissed party leaders in 2013 and the redefinition and articulation of the SPLM vision. The other important

point was the dedication of the parties to use both the Arusha intra-party agreement and the IGAD led mediation in Addis to conclude a peace settlement.

In tackling some of the organizational issues, the parties agreed to address the manner of voting question, accepting the use of secret ballot as the mode of voting when there is no consensus on contentious issues and the use of show of hands on non-controversial issues. Besides, the SPLM constitutional provision, which allowed the chairperson of the party to nominate 5% of the delegates to the convention, was abolished. Instead, the Political Bureau is now tasked to formulate a policy on the representation of minorities in state congresses and in the national conventions. Moreover, there was a dispute over the size of the national convention and the agreement urged the party to review the total number of delegates to the convention. Finally, in the existing SPLM constitution, the SPLM deputy chairpersons, Secretary General and the Political Bureau members are nominated by the chairman and confirmed by the Convention, Political Bureau and National Liberation Council. This is abolished; now, all candidates for all positions will be elected directly by the National Convention. Concerning leadership matters, the most significant provision was the agreement on two 5 years' term limit for the SPLM chairman at the national and state levels.

But this might be difficult to implement because President Salva Kiir may not accept to step down for Dr. Riek Machar Teny, the leader of the armed SPLM-SPLA-in Opposition, who wanted to contest for the chairmanship of the ruling party the SPLM, what triggered the conflict in South Sudan. The peace process may not in a way address the root causes of the conflict. In contrast, although the agreement came into achieve on the 21st of January 2015, the parties have been slow to fully implement its provisions, particularly the SPLM-IO has been uncertain to fully embrace the Arusha agreement because most of the SPLA-IO commanders are not

members of the SPLM political leadership besides Riek Machar and Taban Deng Gai (Awolich, 2015:11).

On the other hand, the interviewee from IGAD said that the agreement has potential to address the root cause of the problem. Chapter one is more of triggers a lot to do with institution, decision making processes and composition of different government institution. A good component of Chapter Two is associated with the demilitarizing South Sudan or Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement. Chapter Three is about Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction which is connected with analysis the issues of marginalization of some community. So Chapter Three Supposed to talk to organize how community get the sense of cohesion.

Chapter Four talks about the issue of Resource, Economic and Financial Management on how to allocate the budget. He also said Chapter Five and Six are so critical, Chapter Five deals with Transitional Justice, Accountability, Healing and Reconciliation. So it talks about legacies and bringing back the community together to restore peace. Chapter Six the ultimate peace agreement parameter of permanent constitution. This is what is supposed to frame all the other chapters. The constitution is ultimately peace agreement for any country. It is an embodiment of how they proposed and deal with issues in. So the overall way that agreement was designed in such a way that every chapters independently and collectively takes all root causes, solutions and some proximate issues tried to address in the new constitution. Consequently, if it is implemented in honest and good faith, the desired peace is going to be achieved.

Therefore, the issue of peace process in bringing lasting peace for South Sudanese is problematic because as most of interviewees described their uncertainty in the implementation of peace agreement. The respondent from the government side stated that the document itself as it is

written and signed will not bring lasting peace for South Sudanese rather the South Sudanese themselves should learn from their bad experiences which were destructive, embarrassing and unnecessary. If they learn from these catastrophes and implement the peace agreement as they signed, the lasting peace will prevail among themselves.

Moreover, as one refugee explained that if the South Sudanese committed to this peace agreement comprehensively and if those issues concerned or the root causes of conflict address in good political will, the people of South Sudanese could go and choose their own political leaders to power. Hence, the respondent noted if things go this way, the peace agreement will bring lasting peace for South Sudanese. As a result of this the respondent said that if South Sudan becomes a peaceful place, how can I be here? so I should have gone back to my country. I hope my country will be good soon. If the problem addressed all peoples will, we will go back there. This is what I hope and all my fellow thinking the same way. They want to go back to their country, if the situation gets good. Similarly, the other refugee said that he will go back to his country when the peace agreement is implemented because as a refugee right now until the peace agreement is implemented, I cannot say anything. However, in the future when my country comes together once again, I will go back to my homeland.

On the contrary, as one refugee explained that we are here with different purpose, when we came as the refugee. Some they came as sick people and some they came for protection case some protection case they will not go back home easily. We need to think what is good for some years to see, if there is no revenge, we will see then we can go. Like me now I am Nuer there is problem because my uncle is Dinka, he protect me when the Nuer people need to kill me because of my uncle. I am Nuer my father is Nuer but my mother she is Dinka. So they need to kill me for

that simply. I cannot go to Dinka I am not belong to them but I will go to my people Nuer, they don't like me because of my uncle. So I cannot go to my homeland easily.

The other interviewee from the SPLM/A in Opposition noted that the peace agreement will not bring lasting peace in south Sudan. Because Salva Kiir is still creating something we couldn't accept or something which was not in the agreement. The issue of 28 states is a great problem in South Sudan which is not resolved and probably may bring about another war. Because the SPLM/A in opposition were preparing themselves and their troops to deploy to Juba and this may cause a serious fight between the warring parties. Therefore, Juba supposed to be demilitarized in order to avoid clash and the joint integrated force should be there to take care especially Juba. However, the soldiers of the government forces were still there because Salva Kiir declined to move his troops out of Juba.

Moreover, the respondent from IGAD said that one of the challenge that JMEC is going through even for transitional government of national unity six months than the road, Salva Kiir went ahead to create 28 new states. This is in a political argument like a joke and is not political will to implement the peace agreement on the ground. If we take the constitutional review process the National Constitutional Amendment Committee is in the trouble because of the challenges by decree of 28 new states but the agreement was based on ten states. But the interviewee from the civil societies stated that the peace process can bring lasting peace to South Sudanese, if the agreement is implemented in good faith and perpetrators of violence brought to justice and also the victims of the conflict compensated. In addition, they should be stopped from contesting elections in 2018 in order to avoid further violence.

4.4. The Success of Peace Process

In return to the conflict and the ethnic carnages, the Horn of Africa states under Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) immediately sent to Juba three emissaries led by Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin (Ethiopia) including General Lazarus Sumbeiywo (Kenya) and General Mohammed Ahmed Mustafa al-Dhabi (Sudan) meant to create spaces for peace talks and the mediation process to take place between the protagonists President Salva Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar (International Crisis Group, 2014: i). So there were all seventh round of peace talks split in different sessions held mainly in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar town of Amhara region. The talk was held as from 4th of January 2014 to 17th August 2015. One of the respondent from the government side noted that the agenda was all about peace, stop fighting, open humanitarian corridors, return refugees and form the government for national unity.

Thus, the success of the IGAD-led mediation endeavors and the international pressure is that a cessation of hostilities agreement was signed between parties on 23 January 2014 who agreed to cease the war and hostile propaganda to each other and protection of civilian and also the parties agreed to form a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) under the leadership of IGAD (IGAD, 2014:3-4). Moreover, the parties were signed an agreement on the status of detainees, who committed to effort to speed up the release of the political detainees, an all-inclusive dialogue and National Reconciliation Process to provide enduring solution for the conflict (IGAD, 2014). On 9 May 2014, the two parties in conflict was signed a peace agreement, they agreed to stop all hostile activities within 24 hours and also agreed that a transitional government of national unity will offer the best chance for the people of South Sudan to take the country forward (IGAD, 2014:2).

According to Yohannes (2015:51) the IGAD-led mediation efforts have born some successes that comprise: the release of seven of the eleven political detainees and allowed them to join the peace talks in Addis Ababa in February and from 6-7 June 2014, an inclusive IGAD-led symposium was held in Addis comprised over 250 South Sudanese representing the government, the opposition, political parties, faith-based groups and civil society organization meant to initiate the inclusive phase of the mediation process. The deployment of IGAD Monitoring and Verification Team like in Bor, Jonglei and Bentiu regions intended to monitor the implementation of Cessation of Hostilities (COH) signed between conflict parties and the authorization of IGAD a Protection and Deterrent Force (PDF) from the region as its part. However, as one of the interviewee from the opposition side described that the overall success was achieved in 17 August 2015.

On the other hand, the interviewee from IGAD stated that the peace agreement was a cost delivering agreement and this can be taken as success, despite this peace agreement implementation restore peace or not.

4.5. The Resolutions and Implementation of Peace Agreement

The resolution of the conflict started with the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan by the parties to the conflict on Monday 17th August 2015 and by the President of the Republic of South Sudan Salva Kiir on Wednesday 26th August 2016, an agreement has eight chapters. In Chapter One they agreed to form Transitional Government of National Unity; Chapter Two: deal with Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement; Chapter Three: decided on Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction; Chapter Four: concerning the issues of Resource, Economic and Financial Management; Chapter

Five is about Transitional Justice, Accountability and Healing; Chapter Six: decided on Parameters of Permanent Constitution; Chapter Seven: talk about the formation of Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission(JMEC) to implement the agreement, and finally they agreed on the Supremacy of this Agreement and Procedures for Amendment of the Agreement (IGAD, 2015).

Consequently, regarding the peace agreement all respondents expressed their own opinion. The interviewee from the government side continuously argued that the agreement is comprehensive but the implementation became a problem because the peace agreement is imposed from outside. And the provisions and requirement that exists in the document are complicated, so we don't have the capacity as South Sudanese to implement it or hold it. However, the government in its part needs to simplify the peace agreement to be implemented.

The first stage is peace agreement, ceasefire, open humanitarian corridor and form the government of national unity. The second stage is reconciling with the transitional government of national unity and talking about the reform. After the interim period they must run their country avoiding things that created this problem. But they can't put it as part of document or as part of the agreement because by doing that they are condemned one side or the other. So that the peace makers do not condemn one side, they should listen to both sides in order to bring them to the common ground and implement whatever they have agreed. Therefore, the issue of siding to one side is the problem of this peace agreement.

A respondent from the SPLM/A in opposition stated that it is a good agreement but the problem is all about implementation. If the two leaders implement the peace agreement in honest and good faith that will bring peace. However, the absence of commitment from the two parties to implement the peace agreement has created uncertainty on implementation of peace

agreement. In the same way, the refugees said it is fair peace agreement because the two parties discussed issues like why they were fighting at first place, what are the factors that motivated the war and they attempted to eliminate those kinds of factors. Thus, they reflected that this negotiation about South Sudanese country is good and fair in order to come together once again.

On the other hand, the respondent from IGAD said that it is very difficult to balance the peace agreement. He also said that either lose all or all win but losing and winning has different levels because of the imbalance of the individual interest. However, he said a fair deal for South Sudanese and warring parties because the distribution of ministers divided it properly. The government has taken the first key one and Riek Machar has taken the internal affairs and Former Detainees (FD) foreign affairs. These kind of distribution can balance the peace agreement in many ways. For instance, chapter one is about the decision making process in getting 67% over of voters in the parliament in order to make decision. The 67% especially, in relation to the expanded parliament there is no one single party that can get 67% without forming an alliance with other party. So it is being provided that any party should bring issues on the table for discussion in the new agreement. They have to negotiate with another parties in order to reach to the common ground. This means that their issues do not come on the roundtable the same way they planned it. It may be changed and the hope of those changes are all about for the betterment of the country not for detachment. So the decision making process is something that has been designing in such a way that no single group can capture the state. Therefore, there have to be conversation designed in a way that the president alone on key critical national issues can't make a decision without the concurrence of the first vice-president.

Therefore, the evidences indicate that if the will to implement the peace agreement by belligerent parties that push South Sudan to a new political dispensation, the resolutions of the

conflict enshrined in the peace agreement are appropriately implemented. That is why there is the great need for the parties to adhere to these resolutions.

As aforementioned the peace process was done by the mediators from the cessation of hostilities up to the final peace agreement. At the present there is second stage that is the phase of implementation of peace agreement is doing by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC). It headquarters in Juba. The chairperson of the commission is Festus Mogae, the former president of the Republic of Botswana. The membership of the JMEC comprised representatives of the Parties to this Agreement, other South Sudanese stakeholders, and regional and international guarantors and partners of South Sudan, which responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement and the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, including the adherence of the Parties to the agreed timelines and implementation schedule as described in Chapter VII, Article 3 of the agreement (IGAD, 2015).

The JMEC will watch over the work of Ceasefire and Transitional Security Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM), the Economic and Financial Management Authority (EFMA), the Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), the National Elections Commission (NEC), and all other transitional institutions as stated in the Chapter VII, article 4 of the peace agreement. Moreover, the JMEC will report on the status of implementation of peace Agreement every three (3) months in writing to the TGoNU Council of Ministers, the Transitional National Assembly, the Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union and to the Secretary General and Security Council of the United Nations, as described in the Chapter VII, article 5 of the agreement (Ibid).

Therefore, the process of implementation of peace agreement is ongoing until the election will hold in 2018.

Chapter Five

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

The peace process was launched as a result of the outbreak of the conflict in South Sudan in 15 December 2013 within the army unit of presidential Guard. Following the outburst of fighting, IGAD quickly convened an emergency summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on December 27, 2013 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. As anticipated, this meeting helped in forging what was chiefly regarded and rightly so as a critical regional response to the crisis basically showing its commitment to mediate between South Sudan's warring parties. To immediately start the envisaged mediation process, the summit ensured that Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya and Mohammed El Dhabhi of Sudan were chosen as exceptional emissaries.

Therefore, the peace talks between the warring parties began in January 2014; a few weeks after the fighting had broken out hosted by regional bloc in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the talks were focused on attempts to immediately end the fighting and all the death and obliteration that it was causing.

However, the peace process faces various internal and external challenges during peace negotiation and after signed the "Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan". These were the intransigence and rigidity of warring parties to come an agreement. Then an unwillingness of the two opponent parties to respect what they have promised and signed for in the peace deals as it was seen in their frequent relapse in to conflict and lack of trust and the absence of give and take spirit, this zero sum game type of thing in both of the leaders of the warring parties during the peace process.

Additionally, among the eleven political detainees the rest four are remained in detention and under trial of treason which is detrimental for solving the conflict. The other challenge was existence of various armed opposition groups often with competing interests and the need to accommodate their interests in the mediation agenda so as to outcome an all-inclusive lasting solution for the conflict makes the mediation efforts challenging.

Moreover, the fright of being accountable for the ethnic killing leaders in the top rank caused in their past and present contention for power might constrain their genuine commitment to find solution for the conflict. The serious challenges to the IGAD mediation had been the fact that the mediators did not simply understand the power of momentum and the mediation seemingly suffered from lack of full mandate and independence. This is assumed from the fact that the mediators hardly tried to resolve any stalemates with the parties. Instead, they consulted the Heads of State and Government whenever hurdles were hit.

The other challenges were the contending interests and different ways of the IGAD member states pursued beyond the IGAD-led mediation process against the efforts to solve the conflict, particularly those who involved in the peace process (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda). So there was no unity among IGAD member states during the peace process.

Furthermore, the other problem was on power sharing the government initially wanted 70% of the ministerial portfolios in the transitional government of national unity, whereas the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition wanted 70% too. But they were pressured to make compromises which indeed they made and came to accept 53% for the Government and 33% for the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition, and the former Political Detainees, and the other political parties were given each 7% of power sharing in the Transitional Government of National Unity.

The other major disagreement was on the power sharing between the government and the First Vice President during the Transitional Period. The President cannot take decisions without consulting the Vice-President. During the Transitional Period, on the side of security arrangements the Opposition wanted to have two separate armies. The government wanted one unified army. The Opposition said they don't trust the government and the army in Juba, which has killed civilians in Juba, Malakal, Bor and Bentiu during the time when the conflict broke out on 15th December 2013. So the Opposition wanted to have two-armies during the transitional period. They said its army would guarantee the implementation of the Peace Agreement and avoid the government abrogate the agreement. While the government on the contrary couldn't accept separate armies, and accused the Opposition of a plan to stage a rebellion. Eventually, this stalemate was settled during the IGAD-PLUS mediation, they agreed to have two separate armies during the 30-month-transitional period.

Therefore, IGAD-PLUS' approach to the mediation is shaped by two reasons. Firstly, that the parties were unwilling to come to an agreement without pressure and secondly, that IGAD would need to call on the weight of the wider international community to exert the necessary pressure in a coordinated manner. IGAD-PLUS was announced in order to give maximum pressure to the warring parties. Indeed, it was because of IGAD-PLUS that was why the parties were able to reach a peace agreement by the 17th August 2015.

Externally, the parties to the conflict accused foreign forces of interests in South Sudan conflict. Parties accused regional powers such as Sudan and Uganda of involvement in the conflict. Sudan was accused by the government of South Sudan of supporting the armed opposition (The SPLM-SPLA in Opposition), and the SPLM-SPLA in Opposition accused Uganda of involvement in South Sudan conflict by openly supporting the South Sudan Army

(SPLA) with backup from the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). Because of their entrenched and incompatible interests, the roles of Sudan and Uganda in the peace process have been disparaging to IGAD's mediation efforts in South Sudan.

During the peace process, even though all above mentioned obstacles faced, they were signed the peace agreement. The SPLM/A in Opposition signed on 17 August 2015, whereas the government on 26 August 2015.

In the meantime also it has been difficult to implement the Peace Agreement on the ground because the parties did not show good faith and political will to implement the peace agreement. That is, President Salva Kiir issued a decree in December 2015, creating 28 new states which contradicts the provisions of the Peace Agreement that recognized 10 states. Additionally, the government did not withdraw its forces outside the National capital Juba, as stipulated in the Peace Agreement. In the agreement all military forces within Juba shall be redeployed outside a radius of 25km from the center of the national capital of South Sudan. The military forces should be withdrawal beginning thirty days after the signing of this Agreement and complete after ninety days. As a result, the return of the designated First Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar Teny for the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), delayed because Dr. Machar cannot return to Juba if Juba is not fully demilitarized.

In addition, the arrival of the SPLM-In Opposition Advance Team to Juba was also delayed because the government was concern about the size (number of the advance team to be about 5000 but the SPLM/A In Opposition want to be not more than 3000) that was allowed only later. They started arriving on 21th December 2015. Hence, the pre-transitional period of 90 days provided in the Agreement ended without the formation of the Transitional Government of

National Unity (TGoNU) due to the absence of the SPLM/A (In Opposition) from the first meeting of JMEC on 27 November 2015.

Therefore, the evidences show that the IGAD-led mediation team was used the power based approach mediate the parties in conflict during the peace talk. In consequence of, the warring parties were/are not happy by IGAD-led peace process and enthusiastic to implement the peace agreement. Because they considered the peace agreement was signed by the influence of international community. Consequently, as the conflicting parties are reluctant to be abide by and implement the peace agreement, the peace accord in brining sustainable peace in South Sudan is very contentious and it has also the prospect to be collapsed peace concord.

5.2. Recommendation

The researcher studied from the beginning of the peace process up to the initial stage of implementation of the peace agreement. Because the issue of implementation of the peace agreement is ongoing and it needs further study, the researcher couldn't cover the entire process of implementation of peace agreement in the study.

Therefore, the implementation of Peace Agreement relies on the commitment and political will of the warring parties. So the international community should exert pressure on both warring parties so as to speed up the implementation process of Peace Agreement because the South Sudanese are suffering by intense security problems and food crisis associated with the conflict up until now. Besides, the international community should exclude, those who are uncompromising and create impediment to the implementation of the Peace Accord, from the rank of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU). Because the evidences indicate

that both belligerent parties leaders are not portrayed their political will and good faith to implement the Peace Concord.

On the South Sudanese side, the warring parties and other stakeholders should implement the peace agreement as they signed for the well-being and amelioration of their societies of South Sudanese rather than condemn and complain the international community's for imposed peace agreement. In addition, they should develop the culture of tolerance and peaceful means of conflict resolution rather than solving the dispute by military means; they should build up the strong national identity and sense of solidarity among the heterogeneous communities of South Sudanese by accepting their culture, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity.

Moreover, they should establish strong institutions to run the country to the path of development and to ensure sustainable peace for their communities. And also they should enforce law to mitigate the pervasive corruption which create suspicious and lack of trust among communities on their leaders.

On the IGAD side the IGAD member countries should work hard in order to ensure the peace and security of their countries in particular and the region in general by putting aside their vying interest for regional power as well as they should follow the same route to solve any inter-state and intra-state conflict that arise.

On the AU side, the AU has a mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of member countries conflicts. Therefore, it should look for the immediate solution to the conflict before escalating into violence and mass killing rather than contributing troops for peace keeping after the fighting breakout.

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Appendix

Annex 1. Key Informants

1. Moses Chrispus Okello

IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism Analyst and Recorder of peace process during negotiation.

2. Daivd Dang Kong

Deputy Representative of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Mission Office to Ethiopia and African Union.

3. Akuel Bona Malwal

An Ambassador of South Sudan to Ethiopia and Djibouti. He is a Permanent Representative to AU, IGAD and UNECA. He was also partaker in the peace process.

4. Nicholas Manidle

He is South Sudan Journalist, Editor and reporter of the peace process during the peace negotiation from Addis Ababa for about two years.

5. Terekegne Adebo (Dr.)

Associate professor, Department of Political Science and International Relation, Addis Ababa University and the secretary for "People to People" peace committee or Ethiopian Peace Committee for South Sudan. He was one of keynote academic speaker in an inclusive symposium of IGAD-led mediation process, which held in Addis Ababa from 6-7 June 2014.

6. Rt. Rev. Msgr. Tesefasellassie Medhin

Bishop of the Eparchy of Adigrat, the chairperson for Ethiopian Peace Committee or "People to People" Peace Committee for South Sudan, Board member of Association of Member Episcopal Conference in East Africa (AMECA) and Permanent Secretary of Ethiopia Episcopal Conference.

7. Teferi Mokonnen (Dr.)

The former student dean of Addis Ababa University and one of keynote academic speaker in an inclusive symposium of IGAD-led mediation process, which held in Addis Ababa from 6-7 June 2014.

8. Tuti

South Sudan refugee now he is living in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and he was student in South Sudan during the civil war broke out in 15 December 2013.

9. William Gabrbell

South Sudan refugee, now he is living in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and he was student in South Sudan during the civil war broke out in 15 December 2013.

10. Makulja Daki

South Sudan refugee, now he is living in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He was a pastor in apostle church in South Sudan. He was in Malakal when the conflict started in 15 December 2013.

Annex 2. General elaboration about research for volunteer participants for consent to take part in research.

Guide lines for interviews of research on Evaluating peace process of South Sudan:

Reflections from Negotiators and Refugees in Ethiopia

January, 2016

Dear Research Participants,

My name is Mulugeta Birhanu, a master student in Centre for Africa and Oriental Studies in Addis Ababa University. I thank you for taking time to take part in this interview. At present time, I am working on my MA thesis for the partial fulfillment of master of Citizenship and State in Africa. My study is *Evaluating peace process of South Sudan: Reflections from Negotiators and Refugees in Ethiopia*. To do this study, I purposefully selected *Negotiators and Refugees in Ethiopia*. Accordingly, the data I get from you is solely for academic purposes and will not be used for other purposes. Dear participants, your response will be kept confidential and I kindly request you to participate voluntarily in this study. The quality of the study depends up on your genuine response. So I would like to ask your consent. As we progress in the interview I shall be taking notes. I shall appreciate your comments on all issues I wish to know about in case there are areas on which you feel uncomfortable to comment, kindly feel free to indicate so and we shall proceed to other issues. Furthermore, participation on this study interview is on your free will that you can withdrew at any time you want if there is a situation that make you feel uncomfortable.

Thank you in advance of your kindly cooperation!!

Confirmation statements of consent from Key participants of this Study

I certify that I have read and understand this consent form and agree to participate as a key informant in the research described. I understand that any information obtained from me for this research will be kept confidential. To further ensure privacy, I have the option of using a pen

name. I agree that all known risk to me have been explained to my satisfaction and I understand that no compensation is available from Addis Ababa University, its employees and the researcher for any injury resulting from my participation in this research. I understand that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled and the subject may terminate participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.

Signature -----

Date -----

Annex 3. Interview Guiding Questions for Negotiators

Background Information

Age _____

Sex _____

Ethnicity _____

Place of Birth _____

Marital status _____

Educational status _____

Part One:-The beginning of the peace process

1. Is there any peace initiatives before IGAD launched the peace process of South Sudan? if yes, what are those initiatives and what are their roles?
2. How IGAD started the peace process of South Sudan conflict?
3. Who are the negotiators of the peace process of South Sudan?
4. Who select them? How they are selected?
5. How do you see the roles of these negotiators in the peace process?

Part Two:- The Agendas of peace process

6. Who formulated the agendas for the peace process? was it by negotiators, government or opposition groups? Why?
7. What are the agendas of the South Sudan peace process?
8. Do you think that the peace agendas are accepted by both warring parties? If yes how or if no why?

Part three:-The Challenges of Peace Process during the Peace Talks and After the Peace Agreement Signed

9. Why is the peace process is delayed? Is there any internal and external challenges? If yes how?
10. How do you see the position of warring parties during the peace process?
11. Is there any misunderstanding between the warring parties during the peace negotiation? If yes why?
12. Why IGAD-PLUS declared? Some literatures says mediation in South Sudan become beyond the capacity of IGAD, how do you reflect on this?
13. How are the Troika (USA, Norway & UK) countries and China involved in the peace process? How do you see their involvements of them in the peace process?

Part Four:- the successes and failures of the Peace Process

14. How many peace talks were convened? when, where and what are their specific agendas? How do you see the success and failure of peace talks?
15. Did the peace process address the root causes of the conflict? If yes how or no how?
16. Do you think that the peace process will bring lasting peace for South Sudanese? if yes how or no why?

Part five:- the resolutions and implementation of the peace process

17. What are the resolutions of the peace process?
18. How do see the resolutions for peace?
19. How are the peace resolutions are implemented?
20. What is your personal reflect on the peace process?

Annex 4.

Interview Guiding Questions for refugees

Background Information

Age _____

Sex _____

Ethnicity _____


Place of Birth _____

Marital status _____

Educational status _____

1. What are the root causes of the conflict of the South Sudan?
2. Why is the peace process delayed? Is there any internal and external challenges? If yes how?
3. Do you think that the peace process would address the root causes of the conflict? If yes how or if no why?
4. Do you think that the peace process will bring lasting peace for South Sudanese? If yes how or if no why?
5. Do you want to stay here in Ethiopia or go back to your homeland? How do you think about your future?

Fig.1. Map of South Sudan



Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS
October 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Source:-Wells, (2016) “Those Who Could Not Run Died” *Civilian Perspectives on the Conflict in South Sudan*, Center for Civilians in Conflict, United States of America

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that the thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name -----

Signature-----
Date-----