



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE STUDIES

Center for Federal Studies

State and Nation Building in Ethiopia: With Special Reference to
the Ethiopian Federalism

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May, 2015

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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School of Graduate Studies
College of Law and Governance
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A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree in Masters of
Arts in Center for Federal Studies

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Dedication

To my Dad and my Mum

Acknowledgement

Many persons and institutions deserve my word of thanks for their cooperation and invaluable support to bringing this study to completion. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Yacob Arsano, my thesis supervisor and Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations. His patience and scholarly guidance exposed me to intellectual insight as a young scholar. My sincere thanks and appreciation extends to Dr. Tafesse Olika, who unfailingly read and edited my thesis.

I heartily thank the Forum of Federations, Ethiopian Office which covered the cost of my study. Special thanks to Mr. Shawn, Mr. Maeregu, Mr. Teshome, Mr. Endale, Miss. Meron and Miss. Elizabeth. No word to express about Professor VKP who financially and morally supported me while I decided to withdraw my education in 2013. Dr. Dereje Feyissa, Professor Kjetil Tronvoll and Goitom Gebruel deserve extended appreciation as they exposed me to practical interdisciplinary research while I have worked as ILPI's Research Assistant at Center for African Studies, Addis Ababa. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Dereje Feyissa and Dr Meron Zeleke, for their moral, financial and scholarly supports in many ways. I sincerely appreciate the Center for Federal Studies for allowing and facilitating conditions to complete this thesis. Moreover, I thank all of my friends who, in one way or another, have energized me.

Moreover, I thank all government institutions and informants cooperated allowing me to access their available sources for information I needed to complete this thesis. These are the House of Federation; the House of Peoples Representatives; the Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy; the Office for Government Communication Affairs; EEPCo; Office of GERD; ONCCPPCGRD; Offices of EFDUF, UDJ, BP and OFC; Benishangul Gumuz Regional Council Office, Office of Benishangul Gumuz Regional State Vice President, BGRS Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, ONCCPPCGRD Benishangul Gumuz Regional and Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party Office.

Last but not least, I warmly appreciate my father and mother for showing me unreserved concern and support all the times. Sir Tewolde Woldemariam, Ketema Wakjira, Ebissa Bayissa, Yerosan Mesfin, and Kiya Gezehagn deserve extended thanks as they have had academic and moral inputs while doing this thesis.

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Acronyms

ASEAN.....	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU.....	African Union
BP.....	Blue Party
DAC.....	Direction, Alignment, Commitment
DFID.....	Department for International Development
EFDUF.....	Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum
EPDRF.....	Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Revolutionary Front
ESM.....	Ethiopian Student Movement
EU.....	Europe Union
FDRE.....	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian
FGD.....	Focus Group Discussion
GDP.....	Growth Domestic Product
GERD.....	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GTP.....	Growth and Transformation Plan
OECD.....	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFC.....	Oromo Federalist Congress
ONCCPPCGRD.....	Office of National Council for the Coordination of Public Participation in the Construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam
SNNP.....	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
TPLF.....	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
UDJ.....	United for Justice and Democracy
UN.....	United Nations
UNDP.....	United Nations Development Program
USA.....	United States of America
USSR.....	United States of Soviet Russia
WWI.....	World War I
WWII.....	World War II

Abstract

In politico-historical terms, nation building has been central during state formation or consolidation in all parts of the world. Nation building basically urges to create one nation without due consideration of diversity in the country. After Westphalia treaty, in practical terms, most European states objected to destruct diversity and create culturally homogenous polities. Moreover, in the postcolonial periods, the African and Latin American states have pursued nation building strategy in the state formation and consolidation attempts. The inherent problems (denial of people-hood, overlapping citizenship and nationality and cultural homogeneity) of nation building project had/have challenged the political elites in order to respond to societal demands. In the mean time, the concept of state building has emerged in a way to accommodate diversity through the institutional, policy and politico-psychological innovations like federalism, democracy and multiculturalism. Federalism is of such innovation to establish a state nation instead of nation state through the elements of shared-rule and self-rule balancing nation-hood and state-hood.

The Ethiopian experience shows plausible centralist-unitary pursued by successive regimes through cultural assimilation. As a result of failed/confused nation-building project the Ethiopian state and society have experienced rough vertical and horizontal relations. In Ethiopia nation building, reasonably has failed having implications for post-1991 Ethiopian state and society. Understanding the historical trajectory of the Ethiopian state and society, the EPDRF regime has come up with state building project through ethnic federalism and revolutionary democracy. Later on, the regime has lavishly added two strategies: developmental state and a dominant party democracy. In the last two and half decades the country's socio-economic and political developments are shaped by strategies of state and/or nation building projects. Accordingly, Ethiopia under EPDRF has experienced two state building phases: from 1991-2001 and from 2001-to present thereby mixing state building and nation building projects together. The first phase of Ethiopia's state building approach has been responsive whereby historical injustices were addressed both in the constitution and institutional arrangements. The post 2001, however, has implied a retreat to unresponsive state and nation building approach where national issues are given priority without/little due consideration of regional self-rule.

The objective of this study is to explore the role that GERD contributes to state and nation building projects in contemporary Ethiopia. To pursue this, the study used both secondary and primary data sources. The data showed that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is one of mega-projects under construction exhibiting socio-economic, political, psychological and geo-political dynamics. The finding denoted that GERD has positive contribution in the contemporary state and nation building projects through socio-economic, psychological and geo-political aspects endeavoring to enhance national consensus. It has the potential to strengthen the federal shared-rule while its contribution on the regional self-rule will be the potential policy and scholar research interest. However, the development drive long the developmental state seems to undermine the federal values and democratization processes that might be unresponsive approach of state building project. Some nations still demand their own nationhood than national statehood informing the gaps and challenges to Ethiopia's ethnic federalism. The study suggests addressing issues undermining responsive state and nation building approach in line with the federal democracy would result in successful state and nation building in Ethiopia. This in turn enhances national consensus and bring about smooth state-society and intra-society relations.

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Structures of the states of the world are unitary, federal or mixed. The rationale behind having unitary, federal or hybrid systems, in one way or another, are for territorial integrity and creation of national consensus with the identified framework (Pierre, 2005:221). Accordingly, keeping the territorial integrity of the states and creation of national consensus among different groups differ based on the form of the states. In unitary states, he adds, the attempt to obtain consensus is by recognizing the state as the sole source of coercive authority within the national boundaries whereas federalism deliberately reduces national consensus to the greatest common denominator between the various groups composing the nation. The hybrid systems, however, mix both cases (Ibid).

Whether unitary, federal or hybrid systems, the objective is either to build the state (state-building envisioning state nations) or to build the nation (nation-building objected to create nation state). According to Kidane, (1997: 122), the initial stages of state formation (contextually meant state-building) were accomplished mostly through expansionist conquests or reactions to such efforts. Hence, state-building and nation-building are inherently part of state-formation (Atsuko and Gordana, 2005:116). State formation is not a simple process of one ethnic group becoming one state. This means, sometimes, the conquerors intermarry with and quickly absorb their neighbors thereby creating a new nation out of several pre-existing ethnies, as in the Zulu case. As another option, the conquering nation merely dominates its ethnic neighbors but fails to absorb those thereby forming multi-ethnic empires or multi-national states. In such cases, the conquered were nations when they became into larger states (Ibid). The nature and context of state-formation (construction) varies from state to state but with the same move towards integrating the territory and different (diverse) groups under one socio-economic, cultural and political control.

The discussion of state building has experienced a renaissance becoming a topic of several books, journals, articles, etc in contemporary periods (OECD, 2008; Vaughan, 2011 & Markakis, 2012). The issue has got attention following the collapse of the socialist block and become more popular

particularly after 9/11 terrorist attack on America followed by the US ‘War on Terror’ and ‘humanitarian interventions’. Conventionally, most scholars use the concept of state building from the external perspective, referring to interventionist strategies in order to restore and rebuild the institutions of the state-bureaucracy (Ingram, 2010; OECD, 2009). In contrast, the concept of nation-building connotes the creation of common cultural and psychological identity within particular territory of the state. Accordingly, state-building is subsumed in and regarded as necessary component of nation-building. More specifically, state-building is a result of external construct while the development of a cultural nation takes shape by itself (Scott, 2007:5).

There is considerable confusion regarding the difference between state building and nation-building. On one hand, some authors use the two concepts inter-changeably while others employ completely different meanings (Hippler 2004; Goldsmith 2007). Despite this, however, the historical settings and contexts in which state and nation buildings have been used and discussed show some conceptual departures between them. Both have been points of discussion and simultaneously appeared. Nation-building was heavily discussed in the 1950s and 1960s and had strong conceptual link with modernization theories of development (Hippler 2004). For more than three consecutive decades after WW II, the US and the USSR had used nation-building as an ideological tactic to limit the reach of their enemy (Ibid).

As the intervention of USA and USSR had increased in the internal affairs of other states of the world, for instance, Vietnam, both state-and nation-building concepts were out off the debates in international politics. In addition, the shift of thinking from high role of the state in the market to reducing the role of the state and unleashing the market overlooked nation and state buildings as concepts (Fukuyama, 2004). But the emergence of the concept of good governance in the 1990s contributed a lot to re-emergence of the discussions and debates of state building particularly in the developing countries (Scott, 2007).

State building has quite different conceptions. For experts of development, for instance, state building is a sub-set of development. Development is more holistic and hence state-building is one aspect of it. Economists, however, focus on increasing the capacity and effectiveness of state interventions in the market as well as in society for economic growth. Therefore, both experts of development and economists failed to develop a comprehensive definition of the concept of state-building and as a result they have understood it in a very narrow manner (Ibid, 2007:6).

In much of the literature on security, state-building has been understood as to be synonymously with peace-building (Ibid). They argue that state-building is either temporary or something that happens in 'post-conflict' contexts. But, this way of conceptualizing state-building is weak. This is because state-building is not necessarily a peace-building process that takes place in the post-conflict contexts. In short, peace-building, arguably, is a subset of state-building. The international relations conception of state-building emphasizes on the external perspective of state-building (exogenous), meaning the 'international community' has the role to restore the state after destruction (either by war or natural hazards) through intervention. In the contrary, political science and other social studies focus on the historical, socio-political and cultural context of the society within the state overlooking the role of external actors in state-building (Ottaway 2002).

However, comprehensive conception of state building has been provided in the 'Emerging Policy Papers' of the Department for International Development (DFID, 2010: 12). According to the same source, state building combines two important dimensions: enhancing capacity of the state to function and the political processes that underpin the state-society relations. Put differently, it is about strengthening the relationship between the state and society, and developing effective ways of mediating this relationship. Hence, state building is a long-term, historically rooted and internal process driven by a wide range of local and national actors. In the literature of political science state building is conceived as the ability of the state to control its territory and people thereby realizing stability and legitimate government that are necessary for smooth state-society relations (Tilly, 1990). This is not only a departure from understanding the concept of state-building as synonymous with nation building, but also conceptual departure that has taken place later on with the emergence and popularity of federalism-a political system which doesn't require cultural homogeneity (Migdal, 2004). In the light of this, state building is a political process rather than classical understanding of state formation and just a question of technical capacity enhancements. Accordingly, the dynamics of state building are threefold: it involves political deals (usually between elites), the prioritization of core government functions and the willingness of the government to respond to public expectations.

Generally, there are two theoretical approaches to state-building process. The first is the position of the international relations school that understands state building from the external actors (foreign countries) in order to build or re-build the institutions of weaker, post-conflict or failing

states. The second approach tends to the view of the political science that defines state building as an indigenous national process driven by state-society relations following a set of principles developed by the OECD, which identifies state building as an area for development assistance (OECD, 2007).

Coming to Ethiopia, the time and way of Ethiopian state formation exhibited varieties of explanations. Some say the process of Ethiopian state formation has an old history and then Ethiopia has more than three thousand years. Others argue that the Ethiopian state formation has started during the north ward expansion in the 16th and 17th centuries. The counter south ward expansion and control started in the mid 19th century could be recent Ethiopian state-formation (Markakis, 2011) is the other explanation. Whatever the case it is, the political history of the Ethiopian state has been overwhelmed by centrifugal tendencies. Consequently, instead of focusing and diverting state resources to development endeavors, Ethiopian governments have been preoccupied with regime survival (Goitom, 2014). Hence, the country has experienced problematic state and nation building projects whereby the political culture of the country continues to be zero-sum game and competitive interest among elites of different groups (Merera, 2010).

Most literatures on the contemporary Ethiopian politics have focused more on nation building (within the ethnic federal approach) than state building. Even literatures focusing on state building in post-1991 Ethiopia have dealt with technical policy analysis related to the succession of Ethiopian public sector reform program (Vaughan, 2011). Shortly put, the scholarship on Ethiopian politics since 1991 has given less attention to the vertical (state-society) and the horizontal (intra-society) relations. This is the gap in the literature this study attempts to fill. To do this the researcher has employed the approach to state building under the Ethiopian federation from two perspectives. The first perspective complements with nation-building, but tries to avoid confusion between state and sub-state nationalisms. From this viewpoint, state-building refers to the complex process of building national unity and integrating the different identities of ‘nations’, ‘nationalities’ and ‘peoples’ of Ethiopia so that the so called ‘community of citizens-national citizenship- created under shared socio-economic and politico-cultural systems (Kidane, 1997; Vaughan, 2011). The second perspective of state building refers to developing and capacitating institutions of the country. In this vein, state-building is meant enhancing the capacity and

effectiveness of the country so that the state has the potential to perform its core functions.

The socio-economic and political landscape in the post-1991 Ethiopia is hoped to be inclusive and promised to address the historic grievances (Andreas, 2013). However, this is the virtue that is yet to be realized. As Dereje (2013: 156) puts, “What happened since 1991 was more than a regime change but rather a fundamental restructuring and reconfiguring of the Ethiopian state in a way to constitutionally and practically recognize cultural, social, economic and political pluralism.” In a complementary to the federal arrangement, the EPRDF government has pursued the concept and practice of developmental state since early 2001 with the stated motive to bring rapid economic growth within short period of time so that the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia will be getting rid of poverty (Aaron, 2013).

In addition to following the identity based federal approach that Ethiopia follows, the key socio-economic developmental undertakings of the Ethiopian government of the day would help contribute to state-building, holding the nations, nationalities and peoples together within the territorial jurisdiction vis-à-vis the drive for respective autonomy. In other words, beyond their socio-economic rationale, the development projects would have positive spillover effect in enhancing national consensus among the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. In light of this, the country is hosting huge socio-economic development projects – both by private and government agencies – most of which are beyond one regional state jurisdiction in terms of financial and administrative matters. Federal projects have spill-over effects beyond regional boundaries. For instance, sugar and cement factories, railways, hydropower projects, and other infrastructural activities are the areas of federal competencies (Aaron, 2010).

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) fits into these and can contribute to state-building project in Ethiopia. The entire cost of the dam (\$4.8 billion) is to be financed by the Ethiopian peoples and the government. As a means to mobilize financial resources, the government has issued bonds targeting all Ethiopians in the country and abroad. According to one source, the Chinese bank will also cover about \$ 1.8 billion related to turbines and associated electrical equipment of the hydropower plant¹. The major benefit of the dam will be hydropower production with some potential irrigation.

¹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam

1.2 Problem Statement

In state-society relations, Ethiopia since the 1930s has experienced three transformations that range from the rule of landed autocracy to military dictatorship and to multinational federation. During the *ancien regime* and the military government political power was highly centralized and both regimes dealt with societal problems through despotic rule reflecting pan-Ethiopian conception of the state and failed to address regional aspirations. The post-1991 political development was intended to resolve the historically problematic state-society relations through ethnic federalism. Here, the question under the EPDRF is, whether ethnic federalism is good for Ethiopia or an obstacle to national unity (Aaron, 2006). Differently put, the contemporary Ethiopia's grand political struggle is between those who hold to a pan-Ethiopian conception of the state and those who espouse ethnic federalism (Aaron, 2006). According to Dereje (2013), the two views have become the subject of discussions and debates among domestic and international scholars, and practitioners'. Those who argue against the fate of the current federal experiment in Ethiopia see it from the lens of the federations of previous USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. For Alem (2010), for instance, the identity based federal engineering in Ethiopia would lead to the country's disintegration in a long run because such arrangement weakens national unity. To the contrary, the architects of post-1991 Ethiopian polity seem to be the ombudsman of the 'ethnic based Ethiopian federalism' justifying it as the only option as far as keeping the territorial integrity of the country is concerned which relies on the interest of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia (Andreas, 2013). Many scholars and observers also support this idea attributing the current Ethiopian federalism as innovation to cop up with the country's complexity and, hence, more or less it seems to be sound (Assefa, 2013; Merera, 2010).

Others are very skeptical regarding 'the federalism in operation' and argue that the system is missing its objective (Tewolde, 2014²; Merera, 2010; Asnake, 2010). In their view, the current regime uses federalism to deceive Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities and Peoples where the real political life signals the analogy of "old woman with new dress", implying that the system is highly centralized where the majority of nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia have not yet have substantial socio-economic, cultural and political stake (Merera, 2010). Moreover, the

² Interview with Tewolde Woldemariam, Senior TPLF founder and member, MA Candidate at Center for Federal Studies, AAU, on October 16, 2014 at 9:00-12:00am

concept and usage of developmental state darkens the hope for genuine ethnic based federal arrangement. It signals centralization tendencies discouraging basic federal elements and reversing nations, nationalities and peoples' socio-economic, cultural and political rights enshrined in the constitution (Asnake, 2010). Dereje (2013) argues that although the role of resource in shaping the Ethiopian politics seems implicit, historically the issue of controlling the resource-rich southern³ part of today's Ethiopia has been, perhaps, the only and/or major factor for the expansion of the old Abyssinian state since the 1850s.

Following the fall of the military regime, disintegration or federalism has been the only options for Ethiopia. Eritrea became independent state *de facto* in 1991 and *de jure* in 1993. There was strong Oromo nationalism to establish independent Oromia state. There were also many nationality questions during early 1991. Hence, in the face of threat of disintegration the idea of preserving the territorial integration and unity of Ethiopian society based on equality where every nation, nationality, and people of Ethiopia have the right to preserve, develop and sustain their own history, culture and socio-political narratives was/is more sound. Therefore, except the few, majority of the ethnic based movements opted for federal state structure as a means to state-building in post-1991 Ethiopia.

The federal constitution and democratization process have been experienced in Ethiopia for more than two decades today. There are both success and challenges (Assefa, 2013). The constitution has redefined the Ethiopian state and society in a way to address nationalities' question, yet not fully realized for all nations, nationalities, and peoples⁴. Despite the short comes, the constitutional and political approach of the post 1991 has been responsive to the realities and problems of the Ethiopian state and society. Accordingly, ethno-territorial federal model, liberal democracy and multiparty system have been the socio-economic and political frameworks of Ethiopia (Andreas, 2013).

³The term 'northern versus southern in Ethiopia is highly contested. But, throughout the history of state formation in Ethiopia, northern part represents the ancient Christian highland kingdom, Abyssinia, dominated by Amhara-Tigrean identity-Geez first and Amharic language second, with values of Orthodox Christianity. To the contrary, southern part represents all lands and peoples forcefully incorporated to the legacies of Abyssinian state and gave birth to modern Ethiopian state. It includes today's Ethiopian southern, central, western and eastern parts.

⁴The constitution has established five regional states which belong to their respective nations: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia and Afar whereas unique arrangement has done for Harari regional state. Other nations, nationalities, and peoples not yet have established their own states. Although establishing as many regional states for more than 80 ethnic groups is difficult and challenging, however, there are nations which the constitution kept silent clustering them in one regional state: SNNP, Benishangul Gumuz, and Gambella.

As Clapham (2013) argues, in addition to the ethno-federal arrangement, the EPDRF has come up with developmental state concept for building the institutional capacity and further socio-economic and political integration in Ethiopia. According to Abbink (2011), the developmental state project of the Ethiopian government of the day is emerged to set priorities and limit the capacity of the constituent regional states. In Abbink's view the ideas of the federal constitution and the expectations of Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples are sandwiched by the regime's revolutionary democracy and developmental state (Ibid). Hence, the governments' heavy hand in socio-economic development is visible since 2001. The construction of mega projects is one among the many. Mega-projects have dual purposes: socio-economic development of the country on one hand and on the other strengthening and enhancing the national consensus of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia in the face of ethnic-based federal experiment. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has pivotal relevance in this regard.

The federal constitution and democratization process have been experienced in Ethiopia for more than two decades today. Nonetheless, the constructive federal ideas of the Federal Constitution and constitutional rights of the regional states and nations, nationalities and peoples are yet desired to be respected in Ethiopia. In other words, state-building in Ethiopia is challenged within the framework of ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy and developmental state. Unless this challenge is addressed whether role the mega-projects such as GERD play with regard to state-building approach in Ethiopia could be questioned.

1.3 Research Questions

The research questions identified below are supposed to help assess the state and nation building in Ethiopia strategies and approaches focusing on the post 1991 developments. The questions are framed in such a way that they would help guide the study to understand and explain the changes, continuities and challenges in Ethiopian state and nation building attempts in different regimes having implication on the contemporary one. In other words, the questions help the researcher to identify and understand whether state and/or nation building is viable within the framework of ethnic federalism. Accordingly, 1) Are the strategies of the Ethiopian federation nation building or state building? 2) Why low level of national consensus and unity among the nations, nationalities and peoples on domestic issues? 3) To what extent and how mega-projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam enhance national consensus and then contribute to state

building in the Ethiopian federation? 4) Beyond socio-economic development needs in what other ways would the GERD benefit the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples?

1.4 Objective of the Study

The general objective of the study is to have an insight into the EPDRF's state-building approach within the framework of ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy and developmental state in contemporary Ethiopia. The study has also the specific objectives. Examining the strategies of Ethiopian governments to nation building or state-building and to historicize challenges and implications these have had on contemporary Ethiopia; to investigate how the EPDRF's state-building projects and analyze the gaps, and to explore the role of the GERD in enhancing national consensus and the extent to which it contributes to state building under Ethiopian federation are the specific objectives of the study.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study contributes towards understanding the evolution, nature and context of contemporary Ethiopian state and the socio-economic and political settings within the umbrella of federalism. It further contributes towards understanding Ethiopian federalism in view of the mega infrastructural development. The outcome of the study helps researchers those are interested to conduct further studies on GERD's contribution in state building and enhancing national consensus in contemporary Ethiopian state.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The focus of the study is on the post 1991 socio-economic and political developments either to state or nation building and/or both. In this regard, the contribution of the mega-projects during the EPDRF is examined in a way to strengthen the shared-rule and enhance national consensus. Among these mega-projects the contribution of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in state and nation building would be the component of analysis. The EPDRF strategies of state and nation building: ethno-territorial federal model, revolutionary democracy and developmental state are also revisited and upraised.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The study has the following major limitations. Firstly, there is shortage of secondary sources of data on the socio-economic and political role of mega-projects. Particularly, very few systematic and comprehensive scholarships have been undertaken on socio- economic and political role of the GERD. Secondly, due to the fact that the GERD is under construction, its role in contributing to state- building strategies in Ethiopia is speculative. Moreover, the fact that the study depended on firsthand information the researcher has faced challenges to draw comprehensive and scholarly views and opinions. While conducting interviews, observations, and focus group discussions there were censorships and issues of confidentiality.

1.8 Methods of Data Collection and Research Methodology

I) Methods of Data Collection

Qualitative methods of data collection are central to the study. Accordingly, both primary and secondary qualitative sources of data are collected and analyzed.

1. Primary Sources and Methods

For the purpose of this study, the researcher has made observation to the project area, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Interviews were made with government officials; civil servants; opposition political parties; Addis Ababa University students and staffs; and citizens (merchants, shoe shine boys, rural and urban peoples through formal and informal communications). From the government institutions, the following are visited to collect reports, documents, interviews and research outcomes related to GERD.

- ❖ The Office of the House of People Representatives
- ❖ The Office of the House of Federations
- ❖ The Office of the EPDRF
- ❖ The Ministry of Water and Energy
- ❖ The Government Communication Affairs Office
- ❖ The Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo)
- ❖ The GERD Office

- ❖ The Office of National Council for the Coordination of Public Participation in the Construction of GERD
- ❖ Benishangul Gumuz Regional State officials/decision makers and local communities
- ❖ Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD)
- ❖ Opposition political parties: EFDUF, OFC, UDJ and BP

2. Secondary Sources

The secondary data that informed the study are drawn from books, journals, articles, and official reports. In order to establish the validity of the secondary data interviews, interviews, observations, focus group discussions have been conducted.

II) Research Methodology

The research methodology of the study is exploratory. The emphasis was given to what extent mega-projects contribute in state building in contemporary Ethiopia. Hence, the study particularly dealt with the socio-economic, political and psychological contribution to smoothen vertical (state-society) as well as horizontal (intra-society) relations in contemporary Ethiopia.

1.9 Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is introductory section. In this chapter, the background of the study-historical and contextual realities of Ethiopian state formation and its dynamics; contemporary state building efforts and challenges-is dealt. In addition, the objective of the research, major research questions and the methodology of the study are included. Moreover, the chapter has had discussions of (significance, scope, limitations and setup) of the research.

The second chapter has provided the conceptual framework of the research. In this chapter, clarifying the historical, political and technical ambiguity between nation-building and state-building; the role of resource in strengthening interdependence among the constituent units in federations; drawing lessons from some federations in the world and contextualizing them to Ethiopia are some of the central themes are discussed. Lastly, the framework of state building has been setup to guide the consecutive chapters to discuss state-building process in Ethiopia. The third chapter has delved to the historical perspectives of state and nation building projects since

1855. This is relevant because today's Ethiopia is entirely the thesis, antithesis and synthesis of the past shaping contemporary socio-economic and political settings. Continuity and change in the strategies of state building in the country up to 1991 and/or after 1991 are examined. The chapter ended discussing the strategies of EPDRF's state and nation building: ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy and developmental state. It also indicted that whether the EPDRF state and nation building approach is responsive and/or unresponsive.

The fourth chapter presents the contribution that the mega-projects have and particularly of the GERD in the process of Ethiopian state and nation building. The chapter examines GERD to what extent it mitigates the challenges that the incumbent government is facing in state and nation building. GERD's contribution is seen from its multifaceted input in the socio-economic developments and strengthening state-society relations. In addition, the challenges and prospects of GERD have also been discussed. The last chapter presents the major findings and the conclusion of the study.

Chapter Two

Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Despite the claims that ‘history ends’ as a result of the collapse of communist states and the emergence of globalization (Fukuyama, 1992), the world is still deeply embedded in the languages and practices of nation-building and state-building. The major factor for the revival is the change in the attitude of major powers; the international security and financial institutions following the end of the Cold War and the collapse and disintegration of the socialist bloc. During the Cold War, the primary threat to international peace and security was strong states whereas in the post-1991 the source of the problem has become states that are too weak-hence, the need to build the nations or the states supposed to be threat to the domestic, regional and international peace and security (Woodward, 2011:1). This was evident following the violent break-up of the socialist bloc and Yugoslavia in 1991 and the humanitarian crisis in Africa. The case redirected the international attention to building up both the government capacities and institutions (state-building) as a solution to domestic, regional and international crisis.

Thus, state-building and nation-building as concepts continued to puzzle those who want to understand the condition of the world society and the direction in which it is leading (Atsuko and Gordana, 2009:1). Historically, nation building has been understood as a collective/national identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given political territory. But, after the end of Cold War in general and the 9/11 terrorist attack on America in particular, it has assumed a variety of understandings which leads to interchangeably using with state building (von Bogdandy, *et al.*, 2005:585). To the contrary, the emergence of the idea of multi-national state witnessed the inability to build a ‘nation’ ‘out of many’ paving the way to the discussion of state-building. This means, in a multi-ethnic society nation-building project is not in a position to create ‘national consensus as is expected. Hence, federalism has become central to state-building whereas unitary, in most cases, favors nation-building Kymlicka, (2006).

In addition to the ambiguity in understanding, there is also confusing interface between nation building and state building. Exposing the disparity between state building and nation building on

one hand and employing them differently for different realities of the society on the other is not always appreciated (von Bogdandy et al., 2005:580). For instance, Chesterman (2004) uses only the term state-building because, he claims, nation-building is specific to post-colonial situations whereas Dobbins (Dobbins *et al.*,2003) solve the problem in an equally sweeping, but opposite fashion by declaring all US involvements in post-conflict reconstruction, from Germany to Iraq, to have been exercised in nation-building. Francis Fukuyama (2004), however, acknowledges that there is a distinction between state-building and nation-building but his usage of the terms suggest that he regards nation-building as a term employed in the language of politics describing what he – in academic discourse – calls state-building. Goldsmith (2007) uses the two concepts interchangeably. Other scholars, on the other hand argue that nation-building and state-building are not synonymous but are actually conflicting processes (Ottaway, 1999).

The source of the ambiguity and lack of clarity between the two concepts results from the context and nature of state formation on one hand and the motive behind employing (nation and state) building on the other. Arguably, the difficulty in understanding the boundary between them emanates from the failure to provide clear definition by identifying the similarities and distinctions between the nation and the state.

2.2 Nation-building Versus State-building: Clarifying the Ambiguity?

If a state has experienced civil wars or its political regime is militarily defeated, the next step would be how to rebuild the (nation or state). In other words, the question will be ‘does that state need nation-building or state-building or both?’ (Von Bogdandy *et al.*, 2005: 580). In addition to the question of relevance, the debate is either which come first or which includes the other. According to Rokkan, (1971) state-building precede and drove nation-building in the traditional ‘model case of French while an opposite direction of causality as nation building (both economic and cultural) supported and resulted in late process of state-building in Italy and Germany. However, Linz (1993:255) remarks that in European context, state-building historically preceded nation-building, even in Italy and Germany where it was the existence of core states, Piedmont and Prussia, that made nation-building possible in both countries (Zilbatt, 2004).

The context of applying either nation or state building has been conventionally taken as in post conflict situations particularly pertinent to post-WWII was not the case before WWI. The

scholarly discussions and debates of nation-building and state-building had been an integral part of discussions of nation and state particularly in the post Westphalia treaty, which, as many argue, defined modern state system. Nonetheless, the practical understanding of the concepts remains debatable. Many scholars regardless of differences and similarities in persuasions come up with different understandings of each concept. Political practitioners as well tend to use nation and state building interchangeably with and without being conscious of what nation-building and state-building are all about. This substantiates the fact that the concepts have not been exhaustively clearly understood to inform public-policymakers and social researchers. Among the factors contributing to the ambiguity in understanding nation and state building, how history of the world within broad socio-political context has treated them should take substantial stake (Atsuko and Gordana, 2009). This means the way practitioners define nation and state and influence how they /construe nation building and state-building process. In short, the confusion begins from the failure to differentiate between the nation and the state and which one is the subset or element of the other (Ibid).

This chapter attempts to clarify the difference between nation and state in order to help avoid the ambiguity attending the interpretation of nation-building and state-building. In analyzing the interface between nation-building and state-building equally important are concepts like weak states, failing states and failed states from which either nation-building or state-building strategy is sought for rebuilding. These are given emphasis to in the following subsections.

2.2.1. Understanding the 'Nation' and the 'State'

In the past the concepts of nation and state were used interchangeably and this is visible in different disciplines. In international relations, nation-state is considered as the most consolidated political entity, being a product of territorial sovereignty (Evans and Newnhan, 1998: 572). Here we see an attempt to combine the two concepts with little or no emphasis on their distinction. But there are numerous national groups without a defined state (Palestinians, not yet qualified as statehood); there are numerous states composed of several national groups without a defined national identity and strong political clout (multinational states such as most African countries). For example, the conceptual difference and applicability between nation and state varies in the context of the USA. In the US nation usually refers to peoples of the whole country instead to a specific national group (Watson, 1977:1). The position of the United Nations complements with

the understanding of the USA. The UN uses ‘nations of the world’ to actually represent the states of the world (Kellas, 1998 3). However, ‘nation’ and ‘state’ display distinct political conditions and definitions.

According to Anthony D. Smith, (2009: 40) there is theoretical distinction between the concepts of state and nation, but in practice they overlap in many. Walker Connor accepts the existence of great distinction between nation and other forms of social groups. He critically questions to differentiate the notion of British from that of Welsh, or Belgian from Flemish, or Spanish from Basque nation? Accordingly, he says “Nation is neither a state nor population of a state without regard to its ethnic composition.” (Connor, 2009:40). Thus, there is a debate among the scholars related to the interface between the nation and the state. Let us have a look in to each concept separately.

2.2.2. What is Nation?

To the interpretation of nation-building it is necessary to understand the definition of the concept of nation. According to Bauer (2000:19), defining the concept nation is not an easy task. In pointing out the difficulty he asks: “Is the nation a community of persons of common descent? Or is it the community of language that unites human beings as a nation? Or is it, the consciousness of a common bond that unites the nation?” (Ibid). The previous conceptions of nation were to define it as a group or race of people who shared history, traditions, culture, (sometimes religion and usually language) (Carolyn, 2005: 2). Accordingly, the United Kingdom, for instance, comprises four nations: the English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh. The assumption is that the people of a nation generally share a common national identity. From this point of view, nation building therefore is strengthening that common identity out of the existing diverse ethno-identities.

According to Atsuko and Gordana (2009:213), in the emergence of scholarly debates on conceptual understanding of nation there are three distinctive perspectives: primordialism, ethno-symbolism and modernism. While the primordialists claim that nations have emerged in the distant past the position of ethno-symbolist is to locate the process of nation-formation in the medieval period through the transformation of ethnic groups. For the modernists the nation is entirely a modern phenomenon. Hence, while the first two perspectives explain nation-formation

on historically continuous process (nation's persistency), modernism explains/assumes discontinuity and argues nations as a novelty attributing it to modern era. In the light of the modernists the ideas and discussions of the nation are inherently related to nationalism, an ideology for reintegration of the society and the state (Ibid: 11) As Rafael Utz, (2005: 3) argues, the academic debate on nations and nationalism came to the table in 1887 and today has continued to be a puzzle in academic sphere. Accordingly, there are three main schools of thought: the nationalist, modernist and imaginist (Ibid; Atsuko and Gordana, 2009: 11). For the nationalists nation is a collective process of becoming aware of one's nationality. In the early 19th century for instance, scholars such as Renan regarded nation as a "soul", a "spiritual principle" or a "moral conscious" (Utz, 2005:4).

In the view of modernists nations have appeared as a consequence of the process that marks modernization and industrialization (Atsuko and Gordana, 2009:9). The imaginists argue that nations are 'imagined'. This view is most prominently represented by Benedict Anderson, who argues nations only exist through an act of the imagination. And he goes on to saying that 'nations should be distinguished by the style in which they are imagined' (in Utz, 2005:4). This is the constructivist view which understands the nation as a subjective state of mind, keystone of political consciousness, abstract but politically objective (Anderson, 2008: 15).

For Joseph Stalin, a 'nation' is "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifest in a common culture" (Weber, 2003: 24). From anthropological point of view, a sense of affinity to a particular nation relies on the 'qualitative degrees of the belief in common nationality (Ibid). This is to say that there are various elements and attributes of the human nature that constitute nationality.

Connor (2005: 40-46) agrees that the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that unites the people but recognizes that the nature or sources of such bond remain obscure-*emotional than rational*. Giddens, (2009:11) defined nation as a "collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states". In the words of Anthony D. Smith (2009:17), nation is:

A named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs.

Generally, nation is a community of people whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness; whose conception is subjected to a process of identification, unconsciously perceived by the masses and derived from a political experience-often an external threat or a sense of grievance-that brings together the need of survival, protection and wellbeing (Bloom, 1990: 50-53).

2.2.4. Understanding the 'State'

The state is complex and broader than the nation encompassing both physical and psychological aspects of certain group. Owing to this fact it is more difficult to define the state than the nation. According to Strauss (2006:190), the term state is not that old. Conventionally speaking, the Greek word *Politeia* has been translated as a republic and sometimes equated with the idea of the state. However, the pre 16th century conception of the state is merely about empires and kingdoms (Ibid). The first difficulty is therefore regarding dating the emergence/birth of the state. As Breuilly argues, (2009: 213), the process of formation of a modern state assumes, among others, the process of territorialization and centralization of power. This means the process of state formation pre-supposes institutional function and implies that the emergence of nation predates the development of modern state (Ibid). Grosby, (2009) relates the formation of nation with the process of institutionalization of territorial kinship and argues saying: "The nation is a bounded community where its boundaries are not only geographically determined but also sealed by the extent of a belief system. The state is a political concept while the nation is a cultural and a psychological body". From this it is possible to argue that nation is primarily cultural and incidentally political given that elites utilize it for power-relations (instrumentalism).

State has been defined by different scholars from different perspectives. Max Weber defines state as "A human community that successfully claims for itself the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory with determined boundaries" (Weber, 2003: 24). Here Weber conceptualized state with having basic features-community, power and territory. According to Demisse (2014), the understanding of the definitions of the state have not been

solved rather exhausted implying that there are many conceptions and definitions of the state from different angles but without providing any clear and working definition. Migdal (2005) understands the state from two ways: first, he discerns the state as a political practice (which he stated as prudential); second, he understands the state as an idea (image) (Ibid). In Migdal's (2005: 16) own words: "The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts*" (emphasis is original).

In light of this definition the fundamental elements of state are overlapping and reinforcing or contradictory and mutually destructive but that also coexist. As per Migdal's view, the state has monopoly over the society within a given territory that has to be accepted by the society (legitimacy). Equally important is the claim of the state to capability of administering its assignments in three classical areas: norm setting, sanctioning in cases of deviation from norms, and the execution of sanctions (Migdal, 2005). Charles Tilly (1975) understands the state as an organization which controls the population occupying defined territory having distinct features from other organizations in the same territory. Hence, the state is autonomous, centralized, and coordinated institution. According to DFID (2010: 12), the state is the principal unit for exercising public authority in defined territories and the central structure in international relations. Accordingly, the state consists of: first, institutions or rules that regulate political, social and economic engagement across a territory and determine how public authority is obtained and exercised; second, the state consists of organizations (the executive, legislature, and judiciary) at the national and the sub-national levels which operate within those rules.

2.2.4. Weak, failing, and failed (collapsed) State

The concepts of weak, failing and failed (collapsed) state are clouded by conceptual ambiguity and are used interchangeably. Hence, the attempt to conceptualize them has to commence with an understanding of what a state is. According to Clapham (2000), 'a weak, failing and failed or collapsed state is characterized by what it is not' the state. This means the extent to which a state delivers political goods makes it either strong, weak, failing, or failed. According to Rotberg (2004), the levels of their effective delivery of political goods distinguish strong from weak; weak

from failed states. Strong states generally perform well but weak states do not. The more poorly weak states perform the weaker they become hence failing. Failing states become failed if the further deterioration is not tackled. In general, the ‘failed state, by definition, is the polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a ‘nation-state’ or ‘state-nation’ in the modern world’. Failed states have destroyed infrastructures, flourishing corruption, low GDP, indebtedness, disrespect for the local currency, loss of legitimacy, etc (Hopking, 2000). To add, a failed state is categorized by violence owing to the fact of lack a central authority with monopoly of legitimate use of force in the society. Somalia after 1991 is the best example for this.

From the above discussion it is possible to understand that the state failure has two dimensions: first, the state’s loss of legitimacy as a result of refusal of dissatisfied citizens to obey its authority; second, the state’s loss of efficiency as a result of increasing malfunctioning of its institutions (may be due to lack of resources, infrastructures or debt burden) making the government irrelevant to the citizens (Migdal, 2005). As Zartman, (1995: 5) summarizes, ‘the state is failed when it has lost its legitimate authority of decision-making and security guarantor for a society and consequently the laws and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstructed in some form, new or old’.

In this vein, the concepts of weak, failing and failed (collapsed) state are central to the discussion of nation- building and state-building processes. The starting point for failing and failed states is often a weak state where the focus is on socio-political cohesion of a society. Holsti (1996) claims that low level or even absence of vertical legitimacy (massive lack in loyalty of the population towards its leaders), weak infrastructural powers, lack in horizontal legitimacy (intra-society hostile relationships) are common structural deficits of weak states. The end phase of this state of affairs is a dysfunctioning (failing) state which, if not properly managed, would lead to collapsed (failed) state. It is also possible to argue that state failure as a result of a break-down of central authority of state particularly takes place in post-conflict situation.

To wind up the discussion on nation and state, multi-ethnic entities are states rather than nations. And for such states *statism* – feelings of affinity with state structures and symbols – is preferable than nationalism (Atsuko and Gordana, 2009). Put differently, it is difficult to have representative nationalism in countries with divided societies. For instance, if we contextualize the case to

Ethiopia, it is easier and clear if one says Ethiopian state than Ethiopian nation. The Ethiopian state is the home of many nations, nationalities and peoples whereas Ethiopian nation might be challenging.

2.2.1 Nation-building

Regarding the debates on issues surrounding national unity in highly divided societies, the attention of scholars rests on the potential centrifugal factors (Czarnecka, 2001). This means that national minorities with aspirations of building their national state may demand separation from the existing multinational states (Kymlicka; 2000). Hence, the remedy to keep the national unity of existing multinational state was/is nation-building strategy of integrating the minorities to the national socio-cultural, economic and political platforms. In this regard, many countries have gone through three stages of nation building moving from: (1) ethnically complex and hierarchically organized states to (2) nations negating their cultural diversity (presumption of nation states) and contemporarily, to (3) pluralistic-egalitarian models where diversity is recognized and states adjust their ideologies and institutions on the basis of it (Czarnecka 2001). The first stage was a period of imperium whereas the second stage characterizes the modern era in which culturally homogeneous nation states sought to be created (Gellner, 1983), and the third phase is about multiculturalism, which Czarnecka (Ibid) has termed as 'pluricultural integration'.

National integration became the concern for social scientists, policymakers and governments in post-colonial Africa (von Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2008). This is important in the context of multiethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual African societies. Since recently, nation building is regarded as a policy to promote state building and peace building in the continent. Nonetheless, the effects of nation building on national integration and consensus have not been clearly examined (Miguel, 2004: 362). Even there is no consensus among the scholars regarding nation building. Some see nation building as a policy that promotes state building whereas others argue that it has caused considerable ethnic conflict (Ibid).

The challenge is, as discussed above, the fact that nation and nationalism are core components and inputs to nation building. According to Bloom (1990:55), "Nation-building is the process of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement and a sense of national identity among the people". Accordingly, nation-building occurs in two configurations: The first is when the state

precedes the nation (state-nation). In this case, the state that has already been created by way of power politics seeks homogeneity through the strategy of nation-building process. The second is when the nation precedes the state (nation-state). This is when the communities of people have come to perceive themselves as a nation and then demand the creation of their own states. Hence, nation-building is a process of collective-identity formation with a view to legitimizing public power within a given territory.

According to Von Bogdandy (2005:585), in most cases, state-failure results in nation-failure. Nation-failure is a process in which the requirements of normal politics, the social substratum essential for the acceptance of majority and redistribution decisions disappear (Ibid). As an aggravated form of state-failure, nation-failure is particularly relevant to multi-ethnic states. It happens when politically mobilized communities start defining themselves by shared religion, class, language, or ethnicity differed to the others. The issue here is when the cultural projection of a nation is no longer convincing to “the others” it creates lack of national consensus on the cultural traditions, customs, symbols, rituals, and the common historical experiences of the past (Ibid).

In light of the above discussion, it is also possible to argue that contemporary Ethiopia has experienced nation-failure. This is because everything related to the country’s identity and politics has been attributed to the past-nation building project, national operation or colonial thesis (Merera, 2003). More often than not, the idea of *double citizenship* (national and regional-ethno citizenship) in federal system has been revitalized in contemporary Ethiopia. We observe the debate between ‘Am [Oromo First; Sidama First; Somale First] and Ethiopia Second’. Equally important, the concept of ‘am Ethiopia forcefully; but Oromo naturally’ shows nation-failure in the context and realities of the contemporary Ethiopian state-society relations.

As aforementioned, the approach of nation-building is usually intensified after the decision to end a conflict (Riemer, 2005). It is “a process of creating ‘one nation’ out of diverse peoples and cultures; a ‘melting pot’ ” (Merera, 2003:94). Mary (2009:16) provides more general and compact understanding of nation building. He understands nation-building as intermingling of the societal relationships, self-determination, nationhood and identity. Tolz (1998) argues that “Nation building is about defining ‘who are we the people’ and fostering the people’s national identity.”

Discernible from the above scholars' conception is that nation building is developing common identity (either primordial or constructed) among the people who identify themselves as nationals of a particular state.

Successful nation building project results nation-state. Nation building encourages state nationalism over ethnic nationalism whereas state building balances the two (Alem, 2005:315). Nonetheless, very few states are successful in nation building resulting nation-state, like France, replacing ethnic identity with national identity by superimposing the later. Therefore, nation building has to be seen as distinct socio-cultural and political process from state building.

2.2.2 State-building

In pre-WW II period, state building as a concept and usage in scholarly discussion was rare and highly related to nation building. It has got popularity in the post -WW II era particularly following the presumption that states can be weakened either by inter- or intra-state war (von Bogdandy, 2009:581). As discussed above, there are some indicators of state weakness, for instance, disharmony between peoples, inability to control borders and the entire territory, growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and failure to deliver political goods, economic underdevelopment and infrastructural decay. Hence, two aspects of state-weakness: not altering the willingness of the peoples to the state and government (state fails) and the other aspect is when the nation fails (the peoples change their attitude towards the government and the state and look for another alternative) (Ibid).

As to the definition, state building is also one of the contested concepts. In the literature, it has been narrowly defined, misunderstood, or equated to other concepts. For instance, to some scholars and policymakers it is synonymous to nation building whereas others equate it with peace building. However, state-building is a different concept. It can be supplementary to nation building, peace building, state formation and any other socio-economic and politico-cultural but is not a means to them. More precisely, state building is a base for state formation, nation building and peace building.

State-building is the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of public structures for efficient delivery of public goods (von Bogdandy et al, 2005: 584). This understands state


building from the government perspective based on legitimacy. In modern sense, the source of legitimacy is the people provided that there is balance between the governing and governed on one hand and the existence of a bond uniting them (Ibid). This view sees state building as a general and ongoing processes being an end to nation building in particular and other societal processes in general. Mary, (2009:16) argues that state building refers to building state apparatus, institutional capacity and state-sovereignty. It sees state building as an external intervention and a means to nation building. As Ghani, (2006:30) puts, state building is achieving trustful state-society relationship. In the light of aforementioned views, loss of legitimacy is the primary cause of fragile /weak, failing and failed state; it is where the political, economic and social destructions begin. Hence, state building is concerned with the capacity of state and its institutions underpinning its legitimacy as measured by the level of state-society relations.

There is also the tendency of understanding state building as a means to state formation (Atsuko and Gordana, 2005:116). According to Kidane, (1997: 118), “[h]istorically state building was generally accomplished by coercive means through conquests or in the process of resisting conquests”. The realities of the contemporary state formation is with the lens of the current global democratization process and growing concerns for violation of human rights –these have made the option of state building by fusing it with federal democracy (Ibid). For instance, Tilly (1975) explains state building as the presence of the state in rural areas to remove any aspiring detachment tendencies or other kinds of segmentation when there is crisis in vertical state-society relations. Hence, the goal of the state building is to homogenize the population and breakdown the segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies, legal systems and infrastructure (Tilly, 1990).

According to DFID in DAC series paper, state-building is an action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to ensure effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between the state and societal groups. Two things are central as per this definition: the first is enhancing state’s ability to function and secondly developing state society relation (DFID, 2009:4). It further points that state building is about establishing capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states.

The OECD (2008) understands state building in three basic ways. First, state building is not a technical process of strengthening governmental institutions (preferably institutional building) rather it is about state-society relations – the psychological attachment of the citizens to the physical state and the government. This is achieved if the state successfully represents the general good of the society. Second, state-building is primarily an endogenous process, as opposed to the argument of donors’ perspective that is subject to multiple factors. Sustainable state-building is endogenous that softens the interrelations among different groups in the society. Third, state-building is a dynamic process with three-interrelated elements from the state-society relations perspectives. These are political settlement among elites, survival functions and expected functions of the state to earn legitimacy and bring about stability. The following diagram is illustrative of these perspectives of state building.

Diagram 2.1 Elements of state building from the perspective of State-society relations



Source: OECD, 2008

Whether in federal or unitary systems, state-society relations are both horizontal and vertical. In federal systems there are horizontal relations among the constituent units of the federation. The vertical aspect is about power relations between the federal (central) state and the constituent units. The relations between the federal and the constituent units are characterized usually by asymmetry as the former is in many aspects stronger than the latter. Hence, federal concessions are discouraged in order to avoid the tendency towards state building process that would result in

unitary governance. According to Zilbatt (2004:75), the opposite holds true. For instance, the above diagram indicates that there are three functions pertinent to state-society relations: political settlement, survival and expected functions.

a) Political Settlement

This is about ensuring common understanding among elites to organize political power which serve the interests and beliefs of the society. Sometimes, it goes beyond elites and embraces the whole society. Political settlement is regarded as the rules of the game; hence the first is to be built in establishing legitimate state-society relations. When there is lack of political settlement, political crises and violent conflicts take place endangering state-society relations. This was the case in Ethiopia after 2005 election where inter-elite political negotiations became complex, resulting street violence in some major cities like Addis Ababa. In addition political settlement among elites is not only the case during elections but also during power division schemes.

b) Survival Functions

Effective state-building projects have to do with survival functions. Survival functions initially consolidate authority of the state and builds confidence of the citizenry in the government. Put differently, the basic functions of the state have to do with the security of the state and the people. To do this the state has to be able to generate revenues, put in place the rule of law and establish institutional frameworks for security enforcement or other sanctions that might be used to guarantee the survival of the state and society.

c) Expected Functions

Expected functions are other extra functions that the society anticipates from the state. These functions are not essential for the survival of the state. They are about efficient delivery of public services, good governance, and other services such as health, education, infrastructure; employment programs; personal safety and access to justice to the society by institutions of the government. Conversely, such functions are also crucial to building the legitimacy for the government.


The level of citizens' awareness of their rights/entitlements and duties vary making the priorities the societies of the world set for themselves. The more citizens are aware about their rights and duties the more they expect the state to perform its functions. Hence, the line between survival and expected functions is blurred. In some contexts, failure to ensure macro-economic stabilization can precipitate regime change, or threaten the survival of the state. The economic dimensions of state-building often begin by addressing macroeconomic imbalances, such as the fiscal deficit, trade deficits and debt arrears. In the light of this, success in these areas depends on institutional capacity and commitment of political elites to put in place viable socio-economic policies. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo's 2001 debt relief package provided by the IMF was not matched by political and institutional reforms, and the opportunity to translate debt relief into wider state-building and peace-building projects (DFID, 2009: 7).

Seen from the lens of the above discussion, federal Ethiopia has experienced political settlement, survival and expected functions. As Asnake (2011) puts, in Ethiopia there are very weak and fragile opposition political parties on one hand and a *de facto* dominant party. Put differently, the country has experienced weak/no political settlement neither within the opposition political parties nor the ruling party. Regarding the survival functions, addressing the identity question is on the basis of ethnic federalism.

In the above discussions, the conceptual and practical difference between nation and state building has been exposed. According to (Linz, 1993:367), outcome of successful the state-building is *state-nation*, whereas nation building gives birth to *nation-state*. For instance, Spain, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and India are examples of state nations. As opposed to nation state, state-nation refers state that makes diversity and democracy possible. In light of this, state nation has (multicultural, multinational, symmetric federal institutions) and consociation practices inducing action of accommodation (Linz et al, 2004).

More precisely, Linz has differentiated nation-building and state-building with context of precedence from the European perspective. Regarding which comes first, Linz strongly argues that state-building has historically preceded nation-building (Linz 19993:355). The conceptual characteristics, features and differences of state-building and nation building processes are summarized in the following figure.

Diagram 2.2: Conceptual characteristics and differences of the nation building and state-building processes



(NB: The first three elements (main dimensions, sociological mechanism and sources of differences show the conceptual characteristics of each approach whereas the rest elements show features and difference of the two

Source: Linz, 1993; Stepan and Yadav, 2007

Thus, state building is a process that integrates the disparate groups, peoples and nations together. It also determines the relation as well as makes the state represents all these different groups structurally and institutionally. Put differently, building unity without undermining diversity through the carefully negotiated terms that are acceptable to all on national issues. Hence, vertically all groups have the same perception and belongingness to the state as well as horizontally there is symmetric relations. Even if there is rough horizontal relations among the groups, the vertical function remain pivotal to experience successful state building.


2.3 Perspectives on State building

Three strands are prominent regarding the understanding of the functions of state-building. First, it is means to the ultimate end of nation building. In other words, state building can enable nation building while the latter does not necessarily guarantee the former. The state building is about restructuring the institutions of the state while nation building is more complex. Moreover, the former is an external intervention focusing on building state apparatus, institutional capacity and

preserving the sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, nation building as an internal/indigenous and is about societal relationships, self-determination, nationhood and identity (Mary, 2009:16). Thus, nation-building, transcends the state-building and draws on many more sources because a nation is not a state nor is nation-state necessarily coterminous with nation. Second, it basically gives more weight to state-building than nation-building. Had nation building been the subset of state building the today's world wouldn't have experienced identity based civil wars sometimes thereby leading to the creation of new states (Kymilcka, 2006; 2005). It is possible to argue that in the state where one cannot find one dominant ethno cultural and linguistic group, building a nation out of the many groups becomes difficult. Hence, the value of federalism is of particular importance in this regard. Third, state-building and nation building are used interchangeably (Fukuyama, 2004).


Ethiopia is multinational federation. Hence, state-building remain central approach for the purpose of this study. State-building in Ethiopia can be examined from two approaches: responsive and unresponsive (DFID, 2010). The approach which gives priority to meet public expectations in order to enhance state legitimacy is responsive state-building. Here, state-society relationship is smooth lending the state legitimacy. The political settlement extends beyond elites reflecting broader compact between the state and society. To the contrary, when the primary focus is on ensuring state power at the cost of public expectations the state-society relations would be affected thereby leading the government to rely more on the system of patronage that would ultimately lead intra-elite tension and instability in the society at large. This is as a result of unresponsive state and nation building approach. Needless to say, the combination of the two perspectives (responsive and unresponsive) is the reality of state and nation building approaches in most developing countries. The following diagrams (A and B) illustrate the two perspectives.

Diagram 2.3 Responsive State-building Approach



Source: DFID Practice Paper 2010:13

Diagram 2.4 Un-responsive State-building Approach



Source: DFID: 2009:8

2.4 Resource, Infrastructure and State building

Resource and infrastructure capacity building can have either positive or negative implications on state building. Basedau (2005:8) argues that abundance and scarcity of resource will create a 'paradox of plenty and scarcity'. This is depending on the administrative competence of political elites and state-society relations (Norman, 2012). Infrastructural capacity of the administrative units of state (federal or unitary) determines the process of state building (Ziblatt, 2004). In this regards, smooth and healthy state-society relations very important for infrastructural capacity-building efforts of states in general and federal states in particular. To the contrary, unhealthy asymmetrical relations between the federal state and the constituent units would be a stress on infrastructural and administrative capacity-building drives the federation. The federalist state-formation model departs from unitary state-formation into two basic ways. First, federations can be formed through combination of coercion and compromise. Second, the degree of institutionalization resulting infrastructural capacity is mandatory in federalism (Ibid).

The emphasis that the supra-state institutions (EU, AU, ASEAN, etc) give in integrating many different states under bigger umbrella is to boost the economy of the member states through inter- and intra-state trade using common resources (oil, water, ports (sea, air, and land), etc) (Dosenrode, 2010). This is the argument of functionalists who assert that societies or nations of the world come together and establish common administrative unit which oversees the economic rationales and possibilities among the member societies and or states. They further argue that economic integration has positive spillover effects over socio-cultural and political aspects which will serve as a base to unify nations of different states. In this regard, the European states have been, to some extent, successful in establishing the European Union (EU).

Functionalist approach can be perceived beyond economic integration. For instance, the need for socio-economic and political integration among European states was to create strong Europe in order to challenge the dominance of the US. This is the argument of neo-functionalists that has come into being slowly (Ibid). Hence, the integration of Europeans came from the European Economic Commission to European Union anticipating many things from the new supra state. The functional and neo-functional approaches can be applied to particular states of particular interest in multi-national states. In Ethiopia, for example, the need to restructure the country through the federation of nations, nationalities and peoples is because the state-society relations were either weak or biased. The Ethiopian state builders since 1855 were exclusively relied on functional approach in exploitative manner with hierarchical state-society relations. Put differently, the drive of Emperor Menelik II to expand and control the south, south-western and eastern parts of the present day Ethiopia was for economic motive. After Menelik II, the socio-economic and political trajectory was within the framework of nation building project. National consensus and unity within highly centralized unitary system, assimilation policy to create one nation, and preserving its territorial integrity have been prominent features of the pre-1991 Ethiopian politics. However, the post 1991 experience basically rely on federalism and democracy in order to address the historical nationalities' questions. Accordingly, the state-building approach is within the framework of ethnic federalism in contemporary Ethiopia.

There are two possible arguments in favor of federalism in multinational states. First, federalism takes place simultaneously with state formation (Ziblatt, (2004). Second, infrastructural capacity building in multinational federal states offset the appeal for state disintegration where different

ethno-national groups claim autonomy and/or separate state. In short, federalism in multinational states can help create greater national consensus. Pierre (2005:222) explains:

Resource must be diverted into national flags, anthems, education, arts councils, broadcasting corporations, film boards; the territory must be bound together by a network of railways, highways, airlines; the national culture and national economy must be protected; ownership of resources and industry by nationals must be made of policy.

In the light of the above statement, dam building has contribution in economic growth basically in developing countries. In addition to promoting state-building project it can help countries' drives for basic infrastructure development. It has also positive spillover effects for building physical and social facilities. For instance, dam is built in remote areas (periphery), it helps encourage industrialization and in turn accelerate economic development (Austin, *et al.*, 2012). Arguably, this is the direct positive contribution in state-building process. The experiences of East Asian countries comply with this as both the states and governments there have won legitimacy and experienced stable political situations (Routley, 2012). In contrast, there are states with abundant resource experiencing failing state-building projects. For instance, in Nigeria, since the exploration of the oil resource in the Niger Delta the country experiences lack of political settlement among the elites, complied with unfulfilled citizens' expectations while the state's survival is served through government coercion. The Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc. fit this reality.

In sum, the chapter has made an attempt to clarify what nation-building and state-building mean. The study believes that they are two concepts have different meanings and implications in practice. The focus of the study is on state building in contemporary Ethiopia. The discussion is to view the Ethiopian experience from the historical perspective as a background and gives the weight of the state- building efforts under the EPDRF. In the following chapters, the focus is lent to state building in Ethiopia centering the physical aspect of the state within the purview of the ethnic federalism. The purpose is to understand and explain to what extent the nature of relations between the federal state and constituent units enhance or hamper the drives of the country for development through mobilizing the potential human and natural resources in the federation. In doing so, the emphasis is on the role of the mega-projects of the prominent one the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Chapter Three

State Formation or Consolidation: Contending Debates on the Ethiopian State

3.1. Introduction

As discussed in Chapter Two, state building is widely perceived as forging and consolidating a nation-state. States of the world have emerged through different processes of state formation. If anything they have in common they have given up their identity markers such as culture, language and psychological makeup in favor of the political dominant group (Asafa, 2009). In postcolonial African context, for instance, the process of formation of most of the states has been through the highly centralized unitary model whereas federalism has been viewed as a divisive state-building strategy. What has happened, however, is the opposite (Kidane 1997:120).

To be sure, all most all African states are multi-ethnic due to the fact that they are the creation of colonial powers. The postcolonial African governments have also failed to restore and sustain the original African identities. As a result, the process of state formation is incomplete in the continent. Hence, in contemporary Africa, particularly in the Horn African region the birth of breakaway states has become increasingly frequent. This is because, in addition to the multiethnic character of the states, the African governments are almost invariably authoritarian. The structures of African governments are not only undemocratic, but also ethnocratic being controlled by politically dominant ethnic groups. This has the effect generating political mobilization of ethnic communities resulting ethnic-based tension and conflicts (Roza 2004: 179). Where minority ethnic groups' demand for democratic participation in exercising state power is unmet they quest for self-determination in order to establish their own separate nation states (Ibid).

Differentiating the linkage between democracy and federalism is not the focus of this study. The focus of this exercise is to recognize diversity and allow different groups to exercise their democratic rights under the umbrella of the existing state. This requires democratic federal arrangement. Akhtar *et al.* (2008: 3) explain:

Diversities (language, religion, ethnicity, nationality, culture, race, etc.) are not to be considered as a burden but as an asset that states can build upon... should be considered, as

an opportunity that states have to cope and accommodate, build on and cherish which will contribute to a sustainable peaceful development.

Federalism permits regional self-rule and shared-rule thereby sustaining societal integrity within the same political administration. This does not only provide the institutional framework for distributing and sharing political power but also permits and regulates the participation of ethnic communities in decision-making (Watt, 2007). The tensions and conflicts in many parts of the world today are the continuation of aggressive ethno nationalism. This is why the theoretical discourse on self-determination of peoples has revived and become prominent among scholars and policymakers today (Kidane, 1997).

The federal experiment in contemporary Ethiopia is not an exception. Since its inception, the Ethiopian state has experienced social, economic, cultural and political complexities. Given the different interpretations and narratives of the history of its existence as a polity, it is difficult to have authentic and comprehensive understanding of the trajectory of the country's politics. The process of Ethiopian state formation and the justifications given to it have been contested for different political interests and motives. According to Merera (2003), there are three narratives about the political history of the country. The first narrative is that Ethiopia as a state has existed more than 3000 years. This narrative traces back Ethiopia to the Axumite state, dichotomizing the pre 1855 as a traditional Ethiopia and the developments that unfolded in post 1855 as efforts to consolidate/reunify Ethiopia (Clapham, 2013). The second narrative claims that Ethiopia is a country of 120 years (Asafa, 2009). The third narrative asserts that Ethiopia is only 40 years old following the federation of Eritrea to it in 1952 (Demisse, 2014). These competing perspectives aside, the political history of the Ethiopian state complements with Kidane's view. According to Kidane (1997:19):

Although the roots of the Ethiopian state can be traced to the Axumite Kingdom (c. first millennium B.C. to 10th century A.D), the Zagwe Dynasty (c. 1100 A.D.-1270), and the Abyssinian Kingdom-Christian Highland Kingdom (c.1270- 1750), the Ethiopian state was essentially created in the second half of the 19th century.

In a nutshell, the purpose of this chapter is not to verify which one of the above narratives is plausible regarding the Ethiopian state. The interest here is to understand and explain the

strategies the successive Ethiopian governments beginning from that of Emperor Menelik II to that of the present-day have taken to maintain and sustain the Ethiopian state. In short, the interest is to identify successes and shortfalls in the socio-economic and political policies of the successive regimes of contemporary Ethiopia.

3.2. State Formation or Consolidation: Contending Debates on Ethiopia

The history of the country is one of the contested issues lacking consensus among scholars, practitioners and policy makers. Ethiopia's socio-cultural, territorial and political history has been biased and politicized thereby lacking authenticity (Ezekiel, 2014:8). The general tendency has been to attempt to signify the history of the Semitic groups (Amhara-Tigrean) (Merera, 2003: 93). This means that the making of Ethiopia has been the Amhara-Tigrean project negating the equivalent role of the other socio-economic, cultural, linguistic, religious and political communities indigenous to the area (Ibid). In recognizing the subjective interpretation of Ethiopian historiography Mesfin (1999) questions the reason why the country's socio-cultural and political history is contested. He (1999: 143) explains: "[This is] because of the failure to comprehend the peoples' own perception of themselves and their own institutions ... serious flaws in the interpretation of Ethiopian history have become accepted as established truth."

Hence, the historiography of the Ethiopian state formation has remained to be a source of profound contention (Alem 2005:320-322), At one extreme, the 'pan-Ethiopian nationalists contend that the Ethiopian state is 3,000 years old arguing it has existed for millennia successfully countering ethnic and regional challenges by forging a distinct national identity. According to this view, the peripheral peoples and their cultures have been assimilated into the culture of Amhara-Tigrean core and, hence, Ethiopia is seen a melting pot/a nation-state (Dereje, 2006). At the other extreme view is that the former Abyssinia-land and kingdom of the Habashas-colonized more than two thirds of the present-day Ethiopian territory and peoples through expansion to south, south-west and east parts (Asafa, 2009; Bahru, 2002; Merera, 2003). The third, and the credible, view is that the Ethiopian state is a historically evolved empire-state (Alem, 2004; Bahru, 2002; Teshale, 1995).

The conventional understanding of Ethiopian state formation has been attributed to the southward expansion of the Abyssinian state though there were attempts to expand northward from the south

from the 15th-17th century. This was, among others, by Somali and Oromo population movement that changed the territorial, sociological and political dynamics of the historic Ethiopia. The multi-ethnic Ethiopia from the 17th century onwards is role of the Oromo movement that dominated the 'Era of Princes' (Merera, 2008:115). Merera (Ibid) further explains:

The southward expansion of Abyssinian state was preceded by centuries of Oromo penetration into historic Ethiopia-Abyssinia. Moreover, by the turn of the 18th c, the Oromo elites were playing a dominant role in the ruling homes of Gondar, Wallo, Gojjam and Shoa. The apex of Oromo dominance in the Abyssinian state was during the 'Era of Princes' which Tewdros II made ending to it.

Nonetheless, in the historiography of the country, it was the southward expansion that gave birth to Ethiopian state. As a result, the northerners were regarded as the first citizens of Ethiopian state presumably with more benefit as compared to the southerners (Markakis, 2011). This has prompted some to call for rewriting and reinterpretation of Ethiopian history (Merera, 2010).

Before the ascendancy of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1930 the official name of Ethiopia was Abyssinia. In all academics debates, scholarly works and speeches of practitioners Ethiopia was equated to Abyssinia. The political history of the country was also divided as early, medieval and modern Ethiopia. In fact, before Emperor Menelik II incorporated the 'south' Ethiopia by no means represented the size of the present-day territory of the country. This doesn't, however, mean that there were no interactions between the northern and southern peoples in early periods. The idea here is the subjective nature of equating Abyssinia with present-day Ethiopia.

The rational way of understanding the political history of Ethiopia is by examining the socio-economic and political developments that unfolded in the country under the successive regimes after in the 19th century. Accordingly, the policy strategies and practices from the incumbency of Emperor Menelik II to the Ethiopian government of the day are briefly appraised as follows.

3.2.1 The reign of Emperor Menelik II

Emperor Menelik gave Ethiopia its present-day shape by successfully expanding its territorial jurisdiction to the south, southwest and east. The initiative to establish and consolidate centralized state was taken by Emperor Tewodros II, who ended the Era of Princes-Zamana Mesafint

declaring himself as King of Kings in the 1855 (Rubenson, 1994). After the death of Tewdros, his Tigrrian rival Emperor Yohannes IV inherited the vision of the predecessor with more moderate approach. He was also busy with external aggressors giving more emphasis to foreign policy than domestic affairs (Bahru, 2002). Menelik who succeeded him in 1889 considerably engaged to expand the Ethiopian state. His approach was a mix of violence and conciliation. Nonetheless, he was regarded as the Hitler of Ethiopia. In fact, the way he controlled the incorporated peoples and territories has had implications for the socio-economic and politico-cultural dynamics of the present-day Ethiopian state. In other words, the challenges the succeeding Ethiopian governments have faced are by and large their legacies in the processes of the expansion and the policy and praxis each inherited from its predecessor. Differently put, the expansion has created complex state-society and inter-societal relationships that the Imperial Ethiopian government and the military regime failed to address.

By 1900, Menelik made Ethiopia to take its present-day shape by negotiating and concluding boundary treaties with the European powers that had established colonial outposts in adjacent areas. Having realized this he started his project of political centralization and modernization. Political centralization involved pacification of the incorporated regions as well as effective control of the regional power centers whereas by modernization is generally meant establishing strong of the state bureaucracy through the introduction of modern education and European technology (Merera, 2002). For instance, he established council of ministers in 1907 and introduced modern education in 1908 (Bahru, 2002; Merera, 2010).

Hence, the process of Ethiopian state formation, though not officiated, started by Emperor Tewodros. Emperor Menelik II completed and Emperor Haile Selassie I consolidated it. This marked the period of Ethiopian state formation. Therefore, Ethiopian state doesn't mean Axumite kingdom or Abyssinian state. Although the name 'Ethiopia was there since 4th c AD in the Ge'ez version of the Bible and identified the term with the country in the Kebra Negast during the introduction of the Solomonic Dynasty (Bahru, 2002:1), it was not officially used in political sphere until 1931 when Emperor Haile Silase changed the name of the country to Ethiopia (Asafa, 2009). The original Ethiopia was meant 'black world'-the area and peoples of sub-Saharan, which Asafa called it 'Original Africa'. But, the successive Ethiopian elites confused the original Africa with Abyssinia and contemporary Ethiopia (Ibid). From that period on wards, the country has

been ruled as a single political entity despite the multilingual, multi-religious and disparate societies in Ethiopia in many ways.

State-society relations in the present-day Ethiopia are also debatable. This is as a result of confusion of Ethiopian-ness. There are two perspectives on this: ethnic Ethiopian-ness and civic-Ethiopian-ness. The ethnic Ethiopian-ness sees the Ethiopian state and society as an entity composed of separate cultural groups dominated by the Amhara-Tigrayan culture. Hence, the priority is given to the ethnic self, supporting and justifying self-determination through decentralization of state power-ethnic federalism. The civic Ethiopian-ness gives priority to civic self and Ethiopian citizenship over ethno-cultural or any other primordial sentiments (Aaron, 2006). This duality of Ethiopianism has negatively impacted on the process of identity formation on one hand and state or consolidation on the other. Hence, the politics of building contemporary Ethiopia as an empire state has prevented successive regimes from building a viable country (Asafa, 1993; 2009).

3.2.2 Ethiopian state during the incumbency of Emperor Haile Selassie

As aforementioned, the period from 1855-1930 was considered as a period of either Ethiopian state formation and/or consolidation (Markakis 2011:89). Emperor Haile Selassie inherited and consolidated the state structures that Emperor Menelik started to build. As discussed in Chapter Two, there is considerable confusion in using state building and nation building by scholars and practitioners as well. The case is more visible and ambiguous in Africa where nation and state building strategies are aimed at weakening ethnic affinities in favor of a national identity (Beken, 2005). National identity is, partially or fully, something constructed in which one or few ethnic groups given substantial role in state-formation. In other words, the experience of many African states (except Ethiopia and Liberia) show that the major indicators of the national identity are the legacy of colonialism and colonial rule. For instance, in postcolonial African state the official or working languages, celebration of New Year etc. are not the traditional values and cultures of African peoples. In general, since the idea of state building has missed its objectives of granting and respecting the identity of peoples ethnic conflicts have become the challenge in Africa. This shows that the strategies used to consolidate the postcolonial African state have not been successful. The ethnic identities of African citizens are guaranteed to sustain the viability of the African state. In examining the case of Ethiopian state, Kidane, (1997:120) maintains:

Like most other African states, Ethiopia's state-building strategy following its expansion was characterized by highly centralist and unitary accompanied by unbridled arrogance of the ruling elite. The different national entities, especially those newly incorporated by conquests, were allowed little space for autonomous cultural development much less for self-rule. They were instead forced to assimilate into the culture of the dominant nation—mainly the Amhara nation.

Following Menelik II the political dynamics in the Ethiopian state passed through internal transformations. There was competition between the conservatives-led by Empress Zewditu-old Shoon nobilities and the modernists-led by Teferi Mekonnen (later Emperor Haile Selassie) who ended the old rivalry. He championed the political race and ushered in a modern state administrative centered on absolute monarchy. With the adoption of the first written constitution in 1931 for Ethiopia, he followed the French model of ‘nation building’, which officially sanctioned political homogenization (Alem, 2005). His strategies included an elaborative hegemonic acculturation program by equating political centralization with civic nationalism; the notion of Ethiopian national identity based on the Abyssinian culture and political tradition; and assimilation policy through Amharic language and Orthodox Christianity (Genenew, 2010:47).

According to Alem (2005:30), three social engineering projects were attempted by the Ethiopian regimes: first, the social engineering project of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-74), second, the socialist model of the military regime, third, the ethno-federalist model of the EPDRF. Emperor Haile Selassie’s model was to expand and consolidate the structures he inherited from Menelik. Merera (2008) argues that the newly incorporated South was to be assimilated along three prolonged ideologies: Orthodox Christianity; Amara cultural ethos and commitment to Ethiopian unity.

To conclude the discussion on the strategies during the Imperial regime, nation building was considered as an end whereas state building was a means to an end. Haile Selassie’s strategy was to realize Menelik’s policy of *makinat* (pacification) of the conquered territories by the political class of the conquerors through the policy of assimilation. Hence, the issues of state-society relations were liquidated through church and bureaucracy within the framework of ‘nation building’. Accordingly, in Imperial Ethiopian society national identity had been considered and treated as one. It is therefore possible to argue that the target of the Imperial regime was to build

the Ethiopian nation-state. However, both state building and nation building were implemented. The state-society relation was managed through the modern bureaucracy.

3.2.3 Ethiopia during the Military regime

The 1974 Ethiopian revolution had brought socio-economic and political changes in the country. The driving ideology of the 1974 revolution was Marxism-Leninism on one hand and its commitment was towards Ethiopian nationalism nation-state project on the other (Markakisis, 2011:161). The background of the revolution was the collective response to nation-building project of the Imperial regime (Alem, 2005:322). The Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) had begun championing the common class struggle whereas the Eritrean and Oromo movements became bearers of national and /or regional struggles. The overall socio-cultural and political situation of Ethiopia during the Imperial regime stated by Walleign Mekonnen, the Ethiopian Student Movement activist at Addis Ababa University in the 1970s. According to him: “If you ask anybody what Ethiopian (culture, language, religion, national dress and music; authentic citizen, etc) is that of the Amhara or Amhara-Tigrean” (quoted in Merera, 2003:97).

Hence, political mobilization was the outcomes of the national and class oppression under the Imperial regime. As Bahru (2002: 209) puts, “Opposition to the Imperial regime had many facets”, hallmarked with the explosion of revolution in 1974 ending the Imperial regime. Then, using the lack of organized civil body, the military controlled political power (Tafesse, 2012:64) and seemingly hoped to provide holistic socio-economic and political transformation in the Ethiopian society.

The attempt of the Military regime in smoothing the state-society and intra-society relations in Ethiopia was vague and full of confusion (Henze, 2007:21). It adopted Marxism-Leninism not in conformity with the context reality of the country. Due to this, the regime had plunged the Ethiopian state and society into deep socio-economic and political crisis. Henze (1990) argued that the Military regime was accused of three issues: applying the Marxist-Leninist dogma with too much zeal and in an oversimplified manner; pretention of its base on industrial proletariat; and abusing the peasants, rushing to collectivization and failing to create prerequisites for successful socialist regime.

Nonetheless, the Military regime's efforts did not constitute a major break from the Imperial regimes policies (Merera, 2008). For instance, despite attempts, the military government did not satisfactorily address the national question in Ethiopia that became a major source of crisis. The regime moved to take the second social-engineering program on the basis of Marxism-Leninism (Alem, 2005). In other words, the regime began to take some gestures toward cultural pluralism through launching the National Literacy Campaign and Television and Radio broadcast of folk music and dance. According to Merera (2008:122), the more programmatic and direct response to the rising demands of ethnic nationalisms came with the declaration of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) in April 1976 recognizing the rights of all nationalities to regional autonomy. However, this left only to be on as the regime espoused 'Ethiopia First', discarding the lofty premises in the NDR (Asnake, 2009:56). According to Genenew (2010: 48), militarization and state collapse characterized the period of the military regime. According to Ezekiel (2014:11), the revolution has brought about no substantive socio-cultural change to the effect of closing a long chapter in the country's political history. Hence, centralized state dictatorship became the reality leading to and/or exacerbating centrifugal forces through ethnic-based political mobilizations that led to the downfall of the regime in 1991.

3.2.5 Ethiopia under EPDRF Regime

The purpose of historicizing nation or state building is to show that the Imperial regime and the Military government have sustained the centralist unitary-state model in which the politically minority ethno-national groups were to be assimilated by the politically dominant culture in pre-1991 Ethiopia (Kidane, 1997:121; Mohammed, 1994). This has had implications for the post-1991 Ethiopian state and society (Goitom, 2014: 27). In 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF) – a coalition of largely ethnic-based movements – toppled the Military regime and took the mandate to administer Ethiopia. Eritrea became a *de facto* independent state under the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF). The rough understanding of political situation of the period is that Ethiopia was a 'failing state' while Eritrea was a new state and, hence, both facing the challenges of state building.

In Ethiopia, the EPDRF has realized the difficulty of state building in Ethiopia on the basis of centralist-unitary model through strategy of assimilation by coercion. Hence, the immediate

solution of the regime in order to address ethnic and regional problems in post-Dergue Ethiopia is to pursue the policy and practice of ethnic-based federalism in which the right of national shared-rule and regional self-rule of the country's nations, nationalities and peoples would be recognized and respected. A National Conference for Peace and Democracy in which 400 delegates of many political and insurgent groups participated was called up and held in Addis Ababa in July 1991. The Conference adopted a transitional charter which established a transitional government for Ethiopia. The Transitional Charter also recognized unconditional right of every nation, nationality and people in the country; and adopted multiparty system and federalism as viable state-building strategy. The EPDRF has used the recognition of the 'nationality question' as the basic cause of the social, economic and political contradictions in Ethiopia. In the post-1991 Ethiopia, the EPDRF pursues three different and controversial state-building strategies: ethnic federalism, democratization and developmental state. The strategies are briefly revisited and appraised separately below.

a) Ethnic Federalism

Traditionally, federalism was regarded as a process of state formation in which smaller units join to create the state. In contemporary times, the relevance of federal arrangement in multi-ethnic societies is for two reasons; first, to accommodate diversities and demands of ethnic groups; second, to protect the territorial integrity of the state through the union of ethnic groups. This implies that federalism prevents (resolves) or mitigates ethnically inspired conflicts and thereby can ensure stability in states (Roza, 2004). Furthermore, federalism aims at compromising internal pluralism and keeping external uniformity (Dicey, 1959).

In multiethnic states, decentralization and power-sharing among different groups can also be used as options. As mentioned in Chapter two, federalism is one of the more common arrangements of state building that most African leaders have often viewed as reinforcement of ethno national loyalties that undermines efforts to state building. State building through centralized unitary structures has also not succeeded in transforming multinational states into nation-states. For instance, countries like the United Kingdom, France and Spain that popularly taken as typical nation-states are in reality hardly nation-states (Connor 1994). As is also discussed in Chapter two,

the aim of state building is to integrate different nations and desperate societies in order to establish representative, neutral, and peaceful multinational state. Put differently, state building has the potential to keep the loyalty of the citizens within their nationhood while nation building transfers citizens' loyalty from the nation to the state. In this vein, state building minimizes conflicts that would arise between the nation and the state (Kidane, 1997).

This subsection discusses the Ethiopian federal experiment, one of the key/central strategies of state-building project of EPDRF, in the post-1991 Ethiopia. The post 1991 Ethiopian state building is a federal model (Markakis, 2011). According to Clapham (2013), the country has old federal experience of which the post 1991 was a departure from the historic one. Clapham's understanding of Ethiopian state is within the category of scholars who believe the country's history is more than three thousand years. He asserts, "Ethiopian federalism in the post 1991 is revolutionary as compared to the preceding one. Before 1936, the country has had federal features, given the diverse and rugged nature of the terrain. However, there had previously been no formalized federal structure."

In the light of this analysis of Ethiopia's federal experience, the Era of Princes was the period in which the power of the sub-national units was higher than that of the center. The attempt to end that era was through centralizing power that started by Tewodros II. But the era continued until 1941, when the peripheral power was significantly challenging the center (Ibid; Markakis, 2011). Mesfin (1999:142) complements Clapham's view of Ethiopia's federal experience. Mesfin argues that Ethiopia, since the ancient times, has federal institutional arrangement although regions had not the status of states⁵. However, Ethiopia's federal experience before the ascendancy of Emperor Haile Selassie can be challenged from both proponents of national oppression and colonial thesis. This can be a point of debate and departure as well given the contested Ethiopian political history. But the Ethiopian state and society in the post-military regime has been directed along the democratic federal state, *de facto* from 1991-1994 and *de jure* since the 1995 (FDRE Constitution').

⁵ There are different names for sub-national units in different federations. For instance, in Switzerland, they are called Cantons; in Germany, Bundesra; in USA and Ethiopia states; in Canada and RSA provinces, etc.

As aforementioned, the foundation upon which the EPDRF's state building strategy is built is the recognition and institutionalization of ethnic identity with special emphasis given to the historically oppressed nations, nationalities and peoples. This is believed to be the only mechanism that could guarantee stability and sustain the existence of Ethiopia as a state (Assefa, 2006). The long last nationalist movements organized and marched under the banner of their own national identity within the framework of self-determination, have had an eager to be rid of resentful memories of the fallen older and its dead projects-*centralized unitary system and nation building*. Andeas (2010:43) strongly argues that federalism has enabled Ethiopia in two folds; first, it survived the country from further disintegration and secondly it established a legitimate political authority in the history of the country. He continues that by this time nations, nationalities and peoples are persuaded not to renounce Ethiopia but instead to join together to form a legitimate political order for peaceful mutual cooperation (Ibid).

As both the Transitional Charter and the 1995 FDRE Constitution confirm, Ethiopia's federalism has been adjusted along ethno-territorial lines (Article 46 of FDRE constitution). According to Roza (2004), it is a new state building strategy focusing on two things: protecting the identity and rights of nations, nationalities and peoples and ensuring the unity of the Ethiopian state. Article 46 of the FDRE Constitution makes explicit the ambition to realize ethnic and territorial issues stating: "States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the peoples concerned" (Beken, 2005:11). Although the model of Ethiopia's federalism is subjected to debates, the set-up of federations is generally either identity (ethnic) or territorial depending on the objective realities and elite's subjective decision to address the concerns of societies. Hence, while some scholars and practitioners advocate the ethnic principle, others argue for the territorial principle.

Clapham (2013) sees the Ethiopian ethnic federalism as a potential to state building. He argues that federalism has served its historic mission in rectifying the deep-seated imbalances among the peoples of what had indeed been an empire extended by conquest over a large number of other peoples who had not historically been the part of the already created national territory. As a result of this, the post 1991 system has promised to dismantle inequality between peoples of the embodying state and those who forcibly been incorporated into it. Hence, the central mission of

Ethiopian federalism is to establish and sustain the country where historical inequality had been removed.

There are a plenty of debates with regards to the model of Ethiopian federalism. In the first place, there is the fear that invites ethnic conflict and risks of state disintegration. The worry in this view is that Ethiopia may face the fate of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The second view asserts that Ethiopia is a colonial empire (Frank, 2009). Due to this, it sees the federal exercise as yet another colonial trick than emancipating nations, nationalities and peoples from the past injustices and oppression. As a solution to these historic and current situations, this view advocates decolonization. The third and the last is the view of that argues that the ethno-federal arrangement in has maintained the unity of the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples on one hand and the territorial integrity of the state. This is the position of the ethno nationalists and practitioner politicians. The view provides full recognition to the principle of ethnic self-determination (Alem, 2005: 313-314). Kassa Tekleberhan, (2010: 12), who although recognizes the existing controversies, posits the relevance of ethnic-based federal arrangement stating: “If I don’t want my wife to divorce me, I have to work on our relationship and the same is true for her; and this holds true for nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.”

Hence, the Ethiopian society has been redefined and decomposed to the nations, nationalities and peoples. In other words, ethnic federalism, although there are different forms of federal arrangement, is taken as the only option to suit the sovereignty and territorial integrity (unity) of the country. As Assefa (2006) puts, identity based federal approach has been regarded as the only ideal type for post 1991 Ethiopian state.

b) Revolutionary Democracy

The second and more ambiguous state-building strategy of EPDRF is revolutionary democracy. In the 1990s, in addition to cultural autonomy and self-determination, the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples’ immediate need has been democracy. In the 1991 Transitional Charter many federal and democratic values have been stipulated whereas the 1995 FDRE Constitution overwhelmingly deals with human ad democratic rights, freedoms and values. EPDRF on the

other has keenly understood the need of democracy for the Ethiopian state and society to earn domestic and international legitimacy. Hence, the 1995 FDRE Constitution has established and declared the Ethiopian state as a federal democratic republic.

The principle of EPDRF's revolutionary democracy has framed in a way to balance the legacy and interest that the TPLF developed during its insurgency. The global and domestic context matches with liberal democracy whereas the EPDRF legacy was democratic centralism (EPDRF, 2007). Generally, the EPDRF has articulated the concept of democracy from an ideological strategy inherited from the armed struggle of the 1970s and 1980s on one hand and a codified discursive strategy that has to coexist with the liberal dominant model following the collapse of socialist regime (Bach, 2011:649). Accordingly, it has publicized its own model of democracy. The Ethiopian democracy has been conceptualized as revolutionary (Tronvoll, 2012)-meant vibrant with its ideological underpinnings. The bases of revolutionary democracy are communal participation and consensual representation led by a vanguard party in contrary to liberal democracy that is based on individual participation, diversity of views and interests with plural representation (Tronvoll and Haggmann, 2012).

Revolutionary democracy has come through three ideological sequences and underpinnings (Bach, 2011). The first sequence is Marxist-Leninist ideology in the pre 1991 that was purely the TPLF perspective. In this perspective, democracy is seen and manifested as per the Marxist ideology. The second ideological sequence that shaped Ethiopian democracy was the liberal reforms of the transitional period (1991-1995). Revolutionary democracy and liberal institutions, then, were designed to feed each other rather than contradict (Bach, 2011:643). The liberal institutions like constitution, multiparty system, free press, and elections, etc. are institutionalized along the revolutionary democracy. Liberal democracy is supposed to legitimate the survival of the EPDRF leadership while revolutionary democracy has been maintained as core doctrine of the political ideology (Abbink, 2011). The last ideological sequence within the EPDRF was the TPLF split in the 2001 reconfiguring the Ethiopian revolutionary democracy and giving birth to more contested concept-developmental state in Ethiopia (Vaughan, 2011). According to Bach (Bach, 2011:646), as a result of this third sequence, there seems to be the tendency to narrowing political space and

freedom seemingly an indication of a shift from state building to nation building. Tewolde, 2014 has stated that some developments in the post 2001 Ethiopian politics as *'revisionist narrative'*.

The EPDRF model of democracy has faced critical criticisms. According to Merera (2003 & 2011), revolutionary democracy is nothing but what the EPDRF has invented for itself where the conscious choice of this ideology is driven by the hegemonic aspirations of the vanguard party and its elites. Although revolutionary democracy is officially presented as an anti-thesis of liberal democracy, the basis of its modus operandi is democratic centralism-principle of Marxist-Leninist. As Merera (Ibid) continues to argue, revolutionary democracy as one of state-building strategies of the EPDRF has brought about fusion of the party and the state negating all democratic values.

The late Prime Minister Meles also, albeit very late, has exposed the ambivalence of the concept of democracy of the EPDRF after the post 2005 election. He said: "The relevance of democracy for us is unquestionable and we did that, but the debate should be how best we achieve it within our context" (cited in Tronvoll and Haggmann, 2012:280). He meant that the universal standards and liberal principles of democracy have to be addressed and shaped in the interest and whim of the ruling party and political elites.

Although the rhetoric of revolutionary democracy was primarily used for domestic consumption for the last two decades, it remains to be ambiguous for the international community (Vaughan, 2011). Recognizing EPDRF's revolutionary democracy resonate the ideological design of Marxist-Leninism. But the Ethiopian experience, according to Tronvoll and Haggmann (Ibid), has reinvigorated as a response to a threat of internal dissent within the party, which could be an explanation for the strengthening of revolutionary ideas for post Ethio-Eritrean war. Bach on the other has dual position. According to Bach (2011:644), in the first decade of EPDRF's rule, revolutionary democracy seems neither revolutionary nor democracy rather it is a symbol of giving due emphasis on the creation of federal democratic constitution and multiparty system within the parliamentary democracy. During its first phase, the EPDRF defended the collective rights through the notion of nations, nationalities and peoples; it had a firm stance that people is the governing body than mere representation. Later on revolutionary democracy has become a

continuous struggle-a malleable ideology; a powerful fighting tool (exclusionary weapon, discursive exclusionary strategy targeting opposition parties, radical EPDRF officials) (Ibid).

Generally, revolutionary democracy is one among the highly ambiguous concepts employed by the EPDRF government in relation to liberalism – it both rejects and endorses liberal democracy. It provides justifications for fusing political and economic power in party-state relation. It may remain party revolutionary for the identity-based federalism; state-owned lands; absence of democratic practices and the liberal principles (Bach, 2011:656). Since 2001 and particularly after the 2005 national elections, liberal reforms and the revolutionary democracy are contradictory and the feature of EPDRF's silent authoritarian character (Bach, 2011:643). As a result, the government is escaping from it and has endorsed the other side of its own democracy. According to Tronvoll (2012: 282), since the May 2010 national elections the revolutionary democracy lingua has been muted in favor of a dominant party democracy. But at the same time, according to the ruling party, it is the ideal model of democracy designed to fit the context of Ethiopian society and state. Hence, exhibiting theoretical and practical gaps has attracted scholarly attention. The interest of this is also in its role as one of the key state-building strategies of Ethiopia since 1991.

c) Developmental State

The concept of developmental state was initially used to describe East Asian States which have experienced rapid economic growth through state-led development policies. The definition and parameter of developmental state, however, remains to be controversial as regards how state intervenes in the market and what role the state should play in the process of development. Hence, there are many attributions associated with developmental state that vary from state to state. However, the notion is not new to the literature in economics and political science particularly in developmental economics and international political economy. Narrowly, the term has been used to refer to state-led economic planning, as it is in the case of East Asian Tigers. It was Chalmers Johnson⁶ who first conceptualized developmental state in the 1980s (INEF, 2010).

⁶ Chalmers Johnson is regarded as a father of Developmental State concept when he coined it in his study on industrial policy in Japan. Accordingly, he argued that the East Asian countries including Japan were based neither on Soviet-type command economies nor on laissez-faire free market economies, but on 'market-conforming methods of

According to Routley (2012:8), developmental state has four basic attributes. These are: (1) capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy; (2) development oriented political leadership; (3) symbiotic relationship between some state agencies and key industrial capitalists; and (4) successful policy intervention which promote growth. In addition to this summary, Routley has identified one key distinction that is, perhaps, central to the understanding of developmental state. According to the working definition provided by Routley (2012:8), developmental state: “[h]as sufficient state capacity to be effective in its targeted areas and has developmental vision such that it chooses to use this capacity to work towards economic development”. According to this definition, the state that has developmental structures and performs developmental roles could be described as developmental state. These two elements can exist separately of each other but needed in combination for a developmental state to be successful (Ibid). Mkandawire has similar understanding of developmental state to Routley. Mkandawire (2001: 289) defines it as saying: “Developmental state has two components: one ideological and the other structural”. It is ideological when the legitimacy is judged on the government’s ability to promote sustainable development; hence, the mission of the state becomes ensuring economic development. The structural component emphasizes on the capacity to implement national economic policies effectively that is determined by various factors-institutional, technical, administrative and political (Ibid).

Such an impressive and relatively growth record experiences of the East Asian countries have led to an interest in the transferability of developmental mode of governance to other developing countries (Mkandawire, 2001). Most scholars, in this regard, argue that the transfer is not a straightforward process. In light of this, the transfer of this model to developing continents like Latin America and Africa has generated hot debates among scholars and practitioners of which African case is more contested (INEF, 2010). Regarding the transferability of developmental model to African states, there are two views. The first is the ‘Impossibility Theorem’ arguing that African states will not able to become developmental states because they are weak, predatory and kleptocratic (Musamba, 2010, 30-31). The second view argues the possibility of transferability of developmental mode of governance by adapting the developmental-state model to the African context, hence, ‘Possibility Theorem’ (Mkandawire, 2001:294; Routley 2012: 26).

state intervention-Capitalist Developmental State (Johnson 1982:1999 cited in INEF, 2010: 8).

When we come to the Ethiopian experience, the idea of developmental state was there during the transitional period. Before the fall of the military government, TPLF had a socialist thinking based on Marxist-Leninist understanding of society, economy and politics. However, the western liberal thinking coincided with EPDRF's control of Ethiopian state and society. As a result, EPDRF's political economy thinking was like pendulum: on one hand it has to adjust itself with the global context and domestic realities. On the other, it has developed and inherited the democratic-centralism during its insurgency that could be an instrument to prolong its power. Accordingly, on one hand EPDRF has decided to control the commanding heights of the country's economy and opened the market for the private sector (EPDRF, 2007:65-68).

Ethiopia under the incumbent regime seeks to build a developmental state hand in hand with deepening its democracy. The position of the government was clear even as it controlled political power where on one hand liberalizing the economy and on the other controlling major economic bases (land, for example). However, the concept and practice of developmental state made clear in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which envisions transforming the economic and political terrain of the country (UNDP, 2012). The UNDP report also shows the position of the incumbent regime as it has assumed power in 1991.

Despite the above argument, Ethiopia as a developmental state has been made public in 2001 (Asnake, 2010). Other scholars specifically date it after the May 2005 national elections (Abbink, 2011). Routley, on the other, described and labeled Ethiopia as one of 'Aspirational Developmental States' including the Republic of South Africa saying the Ethiopian state has not yet developmental structures to play developmental roles rather its key political actors (elites) have stated an intention to make Ethiopia one of the Developmental States (Routley 2012:12).

According to Abbink, developmental state as a concept and practice marks the fourth phase of the EPDRF's ethno-federal experiment discussed above. Accordingly, the five year Growth and Transformation Plan is the highest stage and best indication of Ethiopia's ambition to experience developmental model stressing on economic growth. It entails full emphasis on national economic development whereby political consideration would be secondary and legitimacy would be sought in the economic growth achievements such as infrastructure, road building, hydro-power mega

projects, double digit GDP growth, and foreign direct investment etc. on one hand and technocratic approach on the other. Put differently, huge foreign land-lease deals, emphasis on investments and growth figures, mega-dam building and road construction etc. are what the country is experiencing but trumping the quest for federalism and democratization (Abbink, 2011:598).

Ethnic federalism and the revolutionary democracy have driven the state building project of the EPDRF for the last 23 years. In addition, the regime has added other two concepts: developmental state and dominant party system. These have the potential to satisfy and/or frustrate the country's nations, nationalities and peoples impacting positively/negatively on state-society and intra-societal relations. The discussion conducted with different stakeholders showed variety of views on the effort of EPDRF's state-building project. Some argue that revolutionary democracy and developmental state may frustrate ethnic federalism-which the nations, nationalities and peoples need and enshrined in the federal and state constitutions as well (Assefa⁷ and Tafesse⁸, 2014). The opposition political parties see them as instruments of realizing EPDRF's ambition to remain hegemonic crippling opposition political parties and making them irrelevant (EFDUF, 2014⁹; UDJ, 2014¹⁰; BP, 2014¹¹). However, the position of the EFDUF on the ethnic federal model is the same but accuses the government for its inability or unwillingness to fully practice it as per the FDRE Constitution.

In this Chapter the attempt has been made to identify the viable approach to keep the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state on one hand and accommodation of identity and cultural differences among more than 80 ethnic groups on the other. Historically, emphasis was given to the physical state and civic nationalism while ethnic nationalism was regarded as a curse. Accordingly, nation-building project has never met its mission putting the Ethiopian state and

⁷ Interview with Assefa Fischea, PhD, Associate Professor of Center for Federal Studies, Addis Ababa University on August 8, 2014 at 2:00-4:00 pm.

⁸ Interview with Tafesse Olike, PhD, Lecturer of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University on August 21, 2014 at 3:00-5:00 pm.

⁹ Interview made with EFDUF General Secretary, Alemu Kohra on August 23, 2014 at 9:00-11:00 am.

¹⁰ Interview made with UDJ president on September 16, 2014


¹¹ Interview with Getaneh Balcha, and Tesfalem Tesfaye, Blue Party Research and Strategy Department Heads, on September 16, 2014 at 4:00-5:30 pm. Getaneh is Head of Research and Strategy Department whereas Tesfaye is Head of Social Studies Department.

society in 'uncertainty'. As a result, Ethiopia experienced continuous state-society and intra-societal crises during the Imperial regime and the military government. Hence, state building has been problematic due to the fact that nation-building project has failed. Such problems are common for the rest of African states where states are unable to develop integrating economic, political and socio-cultural systems. During the Imperial regime and the military government in Ethiopia, the political elites failed to craft a state out of the multitude of nations, nationalities and peoples with some regard for cultural diversity and rights to self-governance. The Imperial regime was highly exploitative, extroverted and underdeveloped while the military government remained too confined (Kidane, 1997: 120).

In the last decade of the 20th century, in Ethiopia, the move has been seemingly state-building project recognizing and sustaining the existence of complete different nations, nationalities and peoples. Hence, they are constitutionally recognized and the federal arrangement which fits the reality of the Ethiopian society has been endorsed-*ethnic federalism*. However, after the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, the imperatives of the country's socio-economic and political trajectory has tended to nation-building (Amharic language is increasingly becoming the lingua franca of the country; extensive penetration of the nations, nationalities and peoples by the federal government-territorially, politically and economically, etc. and excessive integration) which basically contradicts with territorial, cultural, economic and political autonomy of the nations, nationalities and peoples.

Examining the EPDRF's state building approach that the regime has showed a mixed approach: responsive and unresponsive. The institutional and constitutional aspect till 2001 has been responsive state building. The incumbent government has popularized the motto of '*unity-in-diversity*' that basically signifies the ethno-federal model the Ethiopian state. However, intra-party elites' division and the Ethio-Eritrean war have shifted responsive state building to unresponsive since 2001. In this vein, national issues have been championed regional/identity issues. The federal flag has been put one meter higher than the regional states' flag showing federal government supremacy and subordination of regional states. Moreover, the planning and implementation of many socio-economic and political policies are top-down through party-chain. The following diagram summarizes the current state building approach of EPDRF.

Diagram 5.1 EPDRF's State Building Approach



Source: Adopted by the researcher (2014)

As shown above, when state building approach becomes unresponsive, the survival functions of the government become self-serving; expected functions are neglected and narrow political bargaining. Thus, the system serves elites on political power and ignoring the interest of the rest of the society. In the context of ideological shift from ethnic federalism to more centralizing tendency, the government has embarked many huge mega-projects envisioning economic prosperity as discussed below.

3.6 Mega-Projects during the Growth and Transformation Plan and Rationales

As a result of the plans and strategies of the Ethiopian government in last ten years, the country has experienced a double-digit economic growth (MoFED, 2010; WB, 2014¹²). To continue this growth, the government has prepared the first five year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) from 2009/2010-2014/2015. To realize this, mega-projects are given priority due to their holistic impact on the economy. Accordingly, the government has identified five areas of public expenditures as mega-projects. Due to this, the government has termed¹³ the first GTP as '*Yemega Projectoch Zemen*' (Period of Mega-projects). In light of this, five of them are termed as mega-projects. These are railways, fertilizer industry, roads, sugar factories and hydropower plants.

The railway development has more than hundred years of railway development since 1917 in Ethiopia. Although the intention was to liquidate Ethiopia's, the Ethio-Djibouti railway was constructed connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti. However, this sector has not yet developed (MoFED, 2010). Identifying the failures and challenges to develop the railway network sector, the government has given focus in the GTP. Accordingly, construction of railway from three corridors and five lines at national level has been started. In addition, light railway development is taking place in Addis Ababa from East-West and North-South. In addition to its economic benefits to the national economy, it creates employment opportunity for many people's while construction. According to the government report, the current status of this railway development is promising. The light railway development in Addis Ababa will start giving service in near future (January, 2015)¹⁴. Generally, the cost of railway development requires more than 150 billion birr¹⁵.

The second mega-project identified by the government during GTP is fertilizer industry. The agriculture sector continues to be the major source of economic growth during GTP. To make it more successful and productive, different strategies have been designed. These are increasing agricultural production and productivity, improving natural resource management and utilization, building disaster prevention and preparedness capacity, improving agricultural marketing,

¹² World Bank Group; 3rd Ethiopia Economic Update; Strengthening Export Performance through Improved Competitiveness; June 2014

¹³ <http://www.hidasse.gov.et/web/guest/organizational-structure>

¹⁴ ETV, August 12, 2014

¹⁵ <http://www.hidasse.gov.et/web/guest/organizational-structure>

promoting the participation of the private sector in the agriculture sector and ensuring food security in rural households. To do so, having fertilizer industry at home is vital. Hence, the government has taken the initiative to establish fertilizer industry, which requires more than 100 hundred billion birr (MoFED, 2010). According to the government sources, eight fertilizer industries are under-construction in Oromia National Regional State. When completed, agricultural productivity will increase and hence, food self-sufficiency would be realized. In addition, the cost of importing fertilizer that Ethiopia pays will totally diverted to another socio-economic activity at home or encourages domestic saving.

Road development is one of the basic infrastructural developments and has been the backbone for so far speedy economic growth in Ethiopia. Naturally, it has many advantages: simplifies the accessibility of goods and services, encourages urbanization, and accelerates development in general. Recognizing this, the government has given an emphasis for it in GTP. Accordingly, the position of the government is continuing huge new road constructions and repair programs in all urban and rural areas of the country. Especially, interconnecting rural concrete roads at kebele level and with urban roads is given emphasis. Generally, road sector development in Ethiopia has three sub-sectors: air lines, maritime and land road¹⁶.

The fourth mega-project during GTP is establishing sugar factories. According to some studies, the Ethiopian topography and weather condition is suitable for sugar production. However, the country lags behind in terms of the development of sugar sector. It was during the imperial regime that the three sugar factories-Wonji, Matahara and Fincaa-have been established. These three sugar factories couldn't satisfy the domestic consumption as well as export sector. To address this shortage of sugar consumption, the government has been working on expanding and improving these three sugar factories so far. This couldn't address the problem. To meet the growing population number and the demand for sugar consumption the government has planned to establish more sugar factories during the GTP period. Accordingly, huge capital investment is taking place with the cost of more than 100 billion birr. In addition to expansion programs of Wonji, Matahara and Fincaa sugar factories, new sugar factories like in Kessem (in Afar),

¹⁶ Ibid

Welkaiyt (in Tigray), Tana Beles (in Benishangul Gumuz), Kuraz (in SNNP), Tendaho (in Afar) and more than ten sugar factories in general are under construction¹⁷ (Tewolde and Fana, 2013¹⁸).

The fifth, mega-project under construction during GTP is hydropower plants. Ethiopia has major rivers like Blue Nile, Omo, Tekeze, Wabi Shebele, Didessa and Juba that can generate huge hydroelectric power (MoI, 1974: 3)¹⁹. However, it is the country that has made least use of its water resources. Ethiopia has long been interested in exploring the possibilities of building dam on its water resources. For example, in 1927 Ethiopia reached an agreement with J.G white Engineering Corporation of New York, for a number of engineers and experts to visit Lake Tana and study the feasibility of building a dam at the source of Blue Nile. This initiative was failed due to stiff opposition from the Egypt side and the impending Italian invasion of Ethiopia (EIIPD, 200:4). More pervasive and effective study to explore the possibility of building dam was carried out in between 1956-1964 by the U.S Bureau of Reclamation including a survey of the Blue Nile Basin (1956 – 1964). Among the four potential hydropower sites the study identified, the GERD site is one of those noted at the time.

Energy plays vital role for the industry plans which mainly geared towards import substitution and leading the industrialization drive of the country. Industrial plans like sugar, cement, chemicals, and metal and engineering corporations demand sustainable and enough energy supply (MoFED, 2010). Hence, energy sector is mandatory for the speedy economic growth and encourages industrialization during the GTP period and beyond. To realize this, the government has planned to increase energy consumption from 2000MW in 2010 to 8,000/10,000MW at the end of the GTP. From this the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributes 6000MW. Other alternative energy sources like air energy 120MW at Ashengoda, at Aysha 300MW, at Adama 150MW, at Mesobo Harena 50MW in general adds 720MW to the plan. Moreover, some 60MW from geothermal energy and about 607MW from sugar production (ethanol) are part of boosting the energy sector of Ethiopia (MWIE, 2014).

¹⁷ Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (<http://www.etsugar.gov.et/index.php/en/>)

¹⁸ Tewolde Woldemariam and Fana Gebresenbet, 2014; Socio-Political and Conflict Implications of Sugar Developments in Salamago Wereda, Ethiopia, IPSS, AAU Press, pp. 117-143

¹⁹ Ministry of Information (1974); EthiopiaM Today: Power and Irrigation, Commercial Printing, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Not only for domestic consumption but also encouraging energy export to neighbor countries generates foreign currency. According to EEP, (2014) currently the country exports more than 160 MW to its neighboring countries-Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya. Let alone others, from GERD, about 2500MW is for domestic consumption whereas the rest 3500MW is for export. From this, the country gets 150 million dollar per month hence 1.5 billion dollar per year. Due to this, many of Ethiopian citizens say 'our water is our oil' (EEPCo, 2013).

Generally, mega-projects, and promotion of micro and small-scale industries are a key strategic direction (MoFED, 2010). As explicitly put in the GTP main document, the encouraging economic results and good practices from the 2005-2010 have brought about strong national enthusiasm and confidence among citizens. The enthusiasm of citizens as a result of development agendas is an opportunity to strengthen national consensus of the state (Ibid: 122). The document says:

One economic and political community is the end of the government and its means is realizing development culture that respects the constitution, human rights and democratic values (Ibid: 104)...Ensure a federal democratic political and economic community...strengthening relationship between nations, nationalities and peoples to lead to better integrated political and economic community in the country...ensuring national consensus around the objective of ensuring one economic and political community (Ibid: 105).

As per the above statement, development is seen as the instrument to enhance both institutional vertical relations and horizontal ones

In this regard, Mann, (1993) puts, "Infrastructural capacity is a determinant factor in federal states where the constituent states have to possess high levels of infrastructure for sustainable and successful federation." In federalism, the pre-existing units are institutionalized and embedded in their societies so that the sub-units are capable of self-governance. In contrast, the argument continues, the state building process in weak institutional and infrastructural capacity of sub-units makes them not embedded in their societies. This makes the state builders to look for unitary solutions where federal paradoxes emerge. In addition, the political core moves to absorb the pre-existing sub-units of the federal state to establish a unitary state (Ibid).

The contemporary Ethiopian experience seems to complement with what Mann argued. Hence, this thesis centrally argues, that the need for launching as many as national mega-projects is to enhance national consensus and build up the state.

The rationality of embarking on as many as mega-projects since 2005 has a political economy objective. Economically, the government has envisioned making Ethiopia one of the middle-level earning countries at 2015 whereas the political objective is the EPDRF's desire to extend its political power through developmental state paradigm. The government has made public during the last summer discussion with all civil servants, students, teachers, and higher institution teachers. As per the discussions, the government is confident to win the coming national election whereas any potential challenge against it will be put in the box of 'anti-development'. However, opposition political parties' elites accuse the government for this and other narrowing down of political space in general. As a result, the opposition political parties will not get the chance to work with Ethiopian society and participate in development activities (Getachew, 2014).

Regarding the current commencement of as many as current mega-projects in Ethiopia, the following excerpt taken from the informants indicates:

EPDRF has engaged itself with the construction of many socio-economic development projects-in rural and urban areas. It seems to compensate the Ethiopian society for its carelessness and reluctance in the last 15 years simply wondering here and there for the cultural, civil and political rights credibility. However, from the 2005 national election, EPDRF has drawn some lessons. As a result, it is everywhere in socioeconomic development spheres. If you look Addis Ababa, everything is messed up for road, water, electricity, railway, housing etc. construction. Where was the government before seven or eight years? Didn't EPDRF knows the responsibility to do what it is doing now? I think, the current focus on such mega-projects-say sugar, cement, hydropower, road, housing, etc. is for reconciliation and diversion politics (Asefa Fiseha, 2014).

Generally, the rationales of the mega-projects are twofold: the first is for national economic growth while the second is envisioning socio-political integration among the nations, nationalities and peoples through developments. For instance, regarding the North-South and East-West railway construction where the center is at Sabata, the following excerpt confirms this.

There are two reasons for why the government has planned and undertaking construction of national railway from North-South and East-West. The first reason is for transport service while the second one is to interconnecting the four tips of the country together so that resource mobilization and utilization will be easy. It will link peoples, cultures and resources together. Where mega-projects operate we see the chance to know each other's

culture, identity and interest and develop sentiment of togetherness. Moreover the practical unity in diversity exists in national development projects like sugar and cement factories, hydropower stations, etc. (His Excellency Ato Nasir Kanso, Member of House of People Representative, 2014).

Although issues indicated in GTP are holistic, socio-economic development is the overarching objective of the government. According to MoFED, 2010, energy sector is believed to be the backbone to realize GTP. In addition to hydropower source, alternative energy sources like wind, solar and geothermal are identified to increase the national energy consumption to more than 10,000MW. From this, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam contributes 60% as it generates about 6000MW.

Among the previous and contemporary mega-projects in Ethiopia, the GERD is experiencing non-economic discourse in and outside of the country. It is becoming a bargaining means between the government and the Ethiopian society on one hand and among the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples on the other. The eroded national unity and consensus (Tafesse, 2014) is believed to be revitalized by GERD and hence, the project positively contributes to state building thereby filling the gap created as a result of conflicting ideas and practices of ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy and developmental state. The GERD's contribution in state and nation building under Ethiopian federation is discussed in following chapter.

Chapter Four

The GERD as the Strategy to State and Nation Building Strategy under the Ethiopian Federation

4.1. Introduction

In the post-1991, Ethiopia has experienced both transformations and continuities. The major changes in the country's political trajectory include ethno-national self-determination and new cultural and language policy. These departures from policies under previous Ethiopian regimes have redefined the nature of state-society (vertical) as well as intra-society (horizontal) relations in Ethiopia. Continuities in the Ethiopian political system are also discernible in the following areas: First, as in the previous periods, there is top-down ideology and political practice (Abbink and Hangman, 2011). Second, there is continuity related to the political economy of the post-1991 Ethiopian regime i.e. state ownership and control of rural lands and agricultural inputs are still among the major defining features of the EPRDF government (Ibid). Although there are debates, controlling factors of production has become instrumental to fund regime expenses and secure political power. Some policymakers and scholars describe land expropriation from peasants either by the government or private investors as land grabbing (Meckelburg, 2014: 144; Dereje, 2014). Third, the absence or limited role of free media and CSOs since the inception and practice of developmental state concept²⁰ has narrowed the democratization process in the country. Lastly, the overlaps between party and the state in contemporary Ethiopia again remains to be another continuing element in the Ethiopian state building under the EPDRF (Batch, 2011).

Clapham (2013) provides the historical incidence for changes and continuities in contemporary Ethiopia. He argues that the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000 has been the major factor in EPDRF's reversing much of the constitutional provisions of FDRE Constitution. During the outset of ethnic federalism, regional autonomy, human and democratic rights are issued as never to be compromised. The EPDRF's current move, however, prioritizes national-*civic issues* than regional-*identity and this shows* the regime's centralization tendency (Assefa, 2014; Abraham,

²⁰ Since the adaptation of the developmental state concept, civil servants, private sectors, media and individuals have put in either box of developmental or rent seekers. Those who comply with the policies and strategies of the government are developmental whereas those who challenge are anti-developmental.

2014²¹). In light of this centralization tendency of the regime, it seems that the following point is important to take note of. That is, the current federal model has to transform itself to a more viable and stable approach if the socio-economic and politico-cultural contexts have to guarantee the territorial integrity (unity) of the Ethiopian state where, of course, respect of equality in diversity among the diverse peoples of the country are ensured. That means national unity and consensus are central as far as identity and constitutional issues are not undermined (Dereje, 2014²²). The preamble of the FDRE Constitution informs the readiness and commitment of all nations, nationalities and peoples to build a common and single political state²³. Much of the current social, economic and political developments are linked to this provision to justify the withering away of federal and democratic values by the actions of the federal government (Assebe, 2014²⁴).

EPDRF's state-building approach has two phases. The first phase covers the period 1991-2001. This is during when identity has been central to the regime's state-building approach, resulting efforts to establish liberal institutions. Hence, civil and political rights have been given priority, as ensuring them is the only guarantee for peace and development in Ethiopia. Following the Ethio-Eritrean War, however, issues of national security overwhelmingly dominated the political discourse. The second phase that has reversed the first phase commenced after 2001 and it is when the government began to identify that ethno-nationalism has weakened both state-society and intra-society relations in Ethiopia. After the fall of Ethiopian military government and Eritrea's independence, EPDRF firmly believed that the only common enemy of all Ethiopian people is poverty. Hence, to rid of this problem addressing nationalities' question was seen as a viable solution. However, the lessons drawn from the Ethio-Eritrean War has forced the EPDRF to give priority to national issues. Accordingly, the federal flag is put one meter higher than the regional flags, Amharic language is revitalized to be the *lingua franca*, and strengthening the military and development are given priority. The Ethiopian government has also prepared national plans, policies, and strategies by adopting the developmental-state model (WB, 2012²⁵; 2013²⁶;

²¹ Interview with Abraham Mengistu, MA Candidate at ECSC and office at MFA, 2014, October 8 at 10:00-12:00am

²² Interview made with Dereje Feyissa, PhD, African Research Director at ILPI and Associate Professor of CFS, AAU, 2014, October 20 at 2:00-4:00pm

²³ Preamble of FDRE Constitution, 1995

²⁴ Interview made with Assebe Regassa, PhD, Lecturer at Dilla University, August 21, 2014 at 11:00am-2:00pm

²⁵ Michael Geiger and Chorching Goh; First Ethiopian Economic Update; Overcoming Inflation, Raising Competitiveness, the World Bank, 2012

Milkessa, 2014²⁷).

4.2. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)

Many hydrological, hydro-political and geological studies focusing on Ethiopia show that the country is naturally endowed with water resources. According to a study undertaken by the Ethiopian government, Ethiopia has twelve (12) major river basins, eleven (11) fresh water lakes, nine (9) saline lakes, four (4) crater lakes and more than twelve (12) major swamps or wetland systems (FDRE, 2002 cited in Yacob, (2007: 145). Nonetheless, the country didn't utilize its water resources because the focus was how to maintain its independence (Kinfe; 2000; Yacob, 2007: 150). Information obtained from EEP indicated that Ethiopia has more than 1.4 million MW green energy developments which are free from carbon dioxide. In the light of this, the hydropower potential is about 45-50 thousand MW, from wind and solar about 1.3 million MW and from geothermal more than 10,000MW²⁸. Currently, the emphasis is given to harnessing hydropower energy potential envisioning to transform the Ethiopian economy and society. The promising economic growth (on average the GDP grew 10% annually between 2004 -2011) and its sustainability in Ethiopia increases the demand for energy input to the national economic growth (Ibid).

The government's commitment to increase the installed electricity capacity is both for domestic energy consumption and export. Domestically, it is central to encourage industrialization whereas its export generates foreign currency. Exporting electricity has economic and geopolitical advantages. Economically, it helps, as mentioned, the country earn foreign currency and also diversify its export items. Geopolitically, export of energy resources encourages economic interdependence with the neighboring countries. Moreover, it strengthens the country's relations on the basis of harmonious and mutual respect. This ultimately opens up many economic options for Ethiopia. For instance, Ethiopia will have the opportunity to use ports of its neighboring harbour countries (Tafesse, 2014).

²⁶ The World Bank, June 2013, 2nd Ethiopia Economic Update: Laying the Foundations for Achieving Middle Income Status


²⁷ Milkessa Midaga, 2014, Official Language Choice in Ethiopia: Means of Inclusion or Exclusion? Open Access Library Journal, 1:e932. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1100932>

²⁸ Ethiopia Electric Power, GERD 3rd Year Special Edition, March 2014

There are financial and diplomatic challenges Ethiopia faces to utilize its water resources for multipurpose. Yet, the country is working on how to meet the energy demand to realize its socio-economic development drives. Since 1960s the commencement of many hydropower plants has been visible with promising progress. Particularly at present, the country is busy with construction of hydropower generation plants. For instance, in 2009 and 2010 alone, the Ethiopian government has embarked big hydropower projects-Tekeze (300 MW), Tana Beles (460 MW) and Gilgel Gibe II (420 MW). The construction of Gilgel Gibe III with expected capacity of 1,870 MW is in progress to be completed by the end of 2014. Ethiopia's big push in the energy sector, however, is the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The Project site, Description, and expected Benefits of the GERD are presented as follows.

4.3.1. The Project Site

Geographically, the GERD is located in Benishangul Gumuz Regional State at 30km distant from Guba town. The project is 750km far from Addis Ababa to North West, through Debre-Markos and Chagini towns while it is at 850km distant from Addis Ababa to West through Nekemte and Assosa towns. Guba woreda, in turn, is located in the northern tip of the region bordering Sudan. Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State is one of the nine regional states constituting the Ethiopian federation with two city-administrations. It is located in the western part of Ethiopia. It shares boundary with Amhara National Regional State to the north and northeastern; Oromia National Regional State to the east; Gambella Peoples Regional State to the south and both the South Sudan and Sudan to the west. The following is the map of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State.



Five ethnic groups are described as indigenous groups and, hence, are owners of the region while the rest are described as settlers. The five indigenous ethnic groups are Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo accounting for only 57% (446,828) of the estimated total population of the region (Asnake 2009). Around the project there are sparsely populated Gumuz, Berta and exogenous Amhara people. Although the number of the peoples to be displaced as a result of the project is not known, the government believes the project would displace not more than 5,000 peoples (MWIE, 2014) whereas individual researchers estimate the figure to be more than 20,000 (Janifer, 2013).

According to the official data, the Benishangul-Gumuz Region is endowed with plenty of resources: natural, livestock, water and metallic resources²⁹. Central to this study is that the region has huge water resource potential that could be utilized for both irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. For instance, Upper Beles, Anger, Dabus, and Dindir are rivers that have potential for irrigation. Rivers with potential for hydroelectric power generation are Upper Beles, Middle Beles, Lower Didessa, Dindir, Abay at Mabil, Abay at Mandala, Abay at Border, Dabus, Dura and Hoha (Ibid).

²⁹ www.benishangulgumuz.gov.et, accessed on September 21, 2014

4.2.2 Description of the GERD

According to media and public relations expert at NCCPGERD, the idea to commence the GERD was there before ten years from now under the supervision of the late Prime Minister Meles. He added that the EPDRF has started negotiating with the Sudan as soon as it controlled the political power in Ethiopia, which resulted in the establishment of Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999 (Hailu, 2014)³⁰. The technical site survey of the project was carried out two times: the first in October 2009 and the second in July to August 2010, both by Studio Petroangeli under close supervision of PM Meles Zenawi (Ibid). Then, the project has been publically launched on April 2, 2011³¹.

The GERD is the real game changer in the energy sector and particularly on Nile water (Dereje, 2014). It is built on the Abay in the western part of Ethiopia about 40km from Sudan's border. At 6,000 MW, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, as well as the 8th largest in the world. The total cost of the project is about \$4.8 billion which is around 15% of the Ethiopian GDP. According to the government, the construction of the dam can be completed without any foreign aid. The Ethiopian government has stated that it intends to fund the entire cost of the dam by itself. It has issued a bond targeted at Ethiopians in the country and abroad to that end³². The contract for the construction of the dam was granted to the Italian firm Salini and the French company Alstom supplies the power turbines. However, the Chinese banks promised to cover the cost of turbines and other electrical equipment that costs \$1.8 billion.

The reservoir capacity of the dam is more than the annual flow of the Nile water at the Sudanese-Egyptian border (it stores some 74 billion cubic meters of water to generate 6,000-mega watt of electricity). This makes the dam the first largest in Africa and also stands 8th in the world (Dereje, 2014). Although the country has more dams before, GERD, is believed to be of historic because of the 'possibility of the impossibility'-financial limitation and weak diplomacy as compared to Egypt (Ferrari, McDonald and Osman, 2013: 1-6).

³⁰ Hailu Abraha, 2014 ONCCPPGRD, Public Relation and Media Communication Expert, interviewed on

³¹ EEPCo News letter Vol.1/Issue No. 16/ June-July, 2013: GERD

³² <http://www.hidasse.gov.et/web/guest/about-gerd-dam>

The construction of the project is going well without facing substantial challenge so far both from inside and outside. According to government sources, as of November 2014, the dam is already 40 % complete³³. The challenge from the lower riparian states particularly from Egypt is nowadays, not as strong as it used to be. Internally, despite the financial challenge, companies and peoples engaged in the construction of the project work 24 hours. Obviously, there is financial limitation, which the government is not in a position to collect as much money as it expected (Hailu, 2014). According to Hailu, three reasons for this: the first is inflation, low level of awareness and less limited from the government to coordinate. However, the other sides of argument for financial limitation are technical and political reasons. Some say the decision to construct the GERD is top-down and until recently; the Ethiopian society is not well understood. They add, the way the civil servants, for example, cut their monthly salary for the project is not persuasive rather coercive. Others posit that the project is politically motivated though it has socio-economic and regional benefits to Ethiopia (FGD 1 and 2).

To overcome this, ways of fund raising are diversified. The technical work that the government has done is giving media coverage for GERD. Both government and private owned media gave much of time to the project and as a result peoples and individuals have access to understand about the relevance of the project for their lives. They adapted the languages and intentions to have the project and in such manner the government technically made the project that of the nations, nationalities and peoples. In addition to the usual contribution to the GERD-salary of civil servants, individual gifts and organizational donations, GERD SMS lottery is becoming a viable fund raising mechanism. The NCCPPCGERD³⁴ has reported that from 8100 A mobile lottery more than half million Birr is collected per day. Fekadu, the PRMC Directorate Director, believes: “If the game continues in such manner, the cost of the project would be easily covered by the Ethiopian society.” In Amaha’s, (2014) view, “The way comedians and artists currently play the mobile lottery is fascinating and also attracting.”³⁵

4.2.3. Expected benefits of the GERD

According to some reports, Ethiopia since 2005 has experienced a remarkable economic growth.

³³ EBC, November 15, 2014

³⁴ EBC, November 8, 2014.

³⁵ Amaha Dagne, 2014, merchant in Gullele Sub-city around Menen, interviewed on October 22, 2014 at 5-6pm

The latest media report confirmed that this economic growth has the effect of rendering Ethiopia 'African Tiger'³⁶. In addition, the government plans that the country will join the rank of the middle-income countries by 2025. To realize this plan through consistent and robust economic growth, Ethiopia needs dependable, affordable and sustainable energy supply. One of the foremost rationales for the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is meeting the country's energy demand.

According to World Commission on dams (2000), there are five indisputable facts about the impacts (positive and possible negative) of large dams. First, they have had considerable benefits and important contributions to human development. Second, they have severe social and environmental effects that are in most cases unacceptable and unnecessary. Third, dams have the benefit of distributing resources inequitably as compared to other alternatives. Fourth, they help in bringing collaborative approaches to create conditions for positive resolution of conflicts and competing interests that arise over dams. Five, continuous negotiation on dams is important for improving the effectiveness of water resource projects by offering different stakeholders a choice of how to best meet their needs (WCD, 2000:7). In view of this, the GERD, though is too early to see all of its impacts, would possibly meet most of these benefits of large dams. It is expected to generate about 67% of Ethiopia's energy supply, thereby playing vital role in the country's overall economic development. A study shows that the GERD's social and environmental effects have not been severe. According informants, the exact contribution of GERD in terms of benefit sharing aspect is difficult to tell due the fact that it is still under construction. According to a study, the experience of previous dams in Ethiopia in benefit sharing and local conflict resolution approaches as well as negotiations to offer all stakeholders a choice to meet their needs has been negative (Bezuayehu, 2006). It is possible to argue that the GERD, for obvious reasons, is project that encounters competitive and conflicting interests at both domestic and external levels. At the domestic level, competitive and conflicting interests of institutional aspect could originate from local, regional and federal levels ethicizing the sharing of benefit from the project. For example, an informant, who prefers anonymity, questioned: "Who will benefit more than the other from the project and how? Do you think the Somalis will benefit equally with the Tigrisians or the Amharas from the GERD?"

³⁶ The Gurdian, Dereje Feyissa, 2014.

Effective development and management of hydropower is central for sustainable economic development and growth of Ethiopia. Due to the fact the country has huge potential of hydro energy the Ethiopian government has embarked on projects for electric power generation by constructing hydropower plants. This is necessary for sustainable development of the country's economy. Amongst Ethiopia's hydropower sector development projects is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the biggest hydroelectric power project in Africa.

The GERD's potential benefits are many and multi-faceted. It is expected to generate an installed capacity of 6,000 MW and 15,128 GW annually. It would satisfy the increasing domestic demand for electricity by providing reliable hydropower supply, which is part of the country's Universal Electrification Access Program. It is expected to increase the electrification level of the Ethiopian rural society from 46%-75%. In addition, when completed and starts full operation it is expected to create employment opportunity for more than 12,500 peoples³⁷. It will accelerate industrialization in Ethiopia by supplying cheap, secure and affordable electric power to light, middle and heavy industries. The outputs from different industries in turn help maximize consumable and exportable items, the necessary economic arsenal to lift millions from poverty (Hailemikael, 2014)³⁸. It will also encourage urbanization as well as rural-urban interconnectivity in the country at local, regional and national levels. The construction of power transmission lines from the project site to different power centers results rural-urban interconnection and encourages urbanization. Big power transmission line of about 700km with 500 volt capacity, for instance, is being constructed from the project site to Addis Ababa through Didessa-Holeta-Sabata. In addition, two medium power transmission lines are under construction from Mizan-Tepi-Didessa and from Holeta-Sabata II-Sululta II aand Akaki II³⁹. As a result, the level of infrastructural development in Ethiopia improves with positive spillover effect in enhancing rural-urban relations on one hand and inter-regional connection.

In addition to the above, the GERD is expected to encourage the development fishery and tourism as well as inter and intra-regional power interconnection that is necessary for trade and development. The GERD will also have positive contribution in green economy as it minimizes

³⁷ <http://www.eepco.gov.et/projectcat.php?pcatid=2>

³⁸ Hailemikael Ketema, Office at House of Federation, interviewed on September 15, 2014 at 10:00-11:30am.

³⁹The cost of this construction requires more than 1.2 billion dollar of which China Private Company will cover 85% whereas the rest 15% will be financed by EEPCo.

the emission of CO₂. One of the many reasons why Ethiopia is constructing the GERD is to keep the promise of being key player in fighting carbon emission (Zelege Kebede⁴⁰). It will also give Ethiopia opportunity to become net exporter of hydroelectric power to its neighbours, which in turn helps accelerate its economic growth. According to a report, “strengthened hydropower development can both increase near term economic growth and make the energy system more climates resilient. More reservoir storage distributed over the country would provide more reliability and protection from regional droughts” (World Bank, 2010). Beyond its socio-economic benefits, the GERD is a national pride and an indication of Ethiopia’s commitment to eradicate poverty. According to government sources, different interviews and FGD, it is one of the events that have united all Ethiopians irrespective of their differences in ethnicity, religion, language, political outlooks. It is an important symbol of Ethiopianness, the feeling of one identity and dignity that was demonstrated during the Ethio-Eritrean war (EEPCo, 2013:3⁴¹; Tegbaru, 2014; Desalegn⁴², 2014; FGD 1 and 2). In general, the construction of GERD would satisfy domestic energy consumption that is necessary to boost the industry sector in order to lead the economy.

At regional level, the GERD strengthens the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) that is established in 2005 by seven Eastern Africa countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo/DRC/, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Sudan) recognizing as the potential benefits from developing regional power pool. The mission of EAPP is to ensure secure, affordable, sustainable and reliable source of electricity for Eastern Africa region by pooling together electric energy resources in a coordinated and optimized manner. Its objectives include increasing rate of access to electricity, reducing cost of electricity production and creating attractive investment climate in the region. In this regard, GERD would play a vital role to encourage regional economic integration through infrastructural interconnection. Ethiopia and Kenya signed an agreement in April 2013 as an example of this move. The construction of Ethio-Kenyan electric line has already started; the size of the line is 500 volt and 2000MW. It starts from Wolaita Sodo to Suswa and has 1045km of which 433km is within Ethiopian territory.

The excess power generated from GERD will be part of the African power pool, thereby leading

⁴⁰ The GERD and the lower riparian countries Available at hidasse.com.

⁴¹ EEPCo News letter Vol.1/Issue No. 16/ June-July, 2013: GERD

⁴² Desalegn Wegene, PhD Candidate at AAU, interviewed on March 24, 2014 at 4:00-5:00pm

to a better integrated and prosperous Eastern Africa region. According to Verhoeven (2011), the GERD has tremendous benefits to Sudan and Republic of South Sudan as both countries face the same challenges in poverty reduction, summarizing the GERD's regional economic integration role as "*Black Gold for Blue Gold? Sudan's Oil, Ethiopia's Water and Regional Integration*" Such infrastructural and economic integration leads to peace and tranquility in the region. In hydrological terms, the GERD releases stored water on a regulated manner, saving the Sudanese from floods and excess silt load. Both Egypt and Sudan receive regulated and predictable water flow throughout the year. It would also save some 8 billion cubic meters of water that could have been lost by evaporation if stored in Sudan or Egypt. In short, in Ethiopia water is stored in deep highland gorges where evaporation is minimal.

4.4. GERD's Contribution to State-building Process in Ethiopia

In chapters two and three, an emphasis was given to conceptualizing state and nation building in general and in the Ethiopian experience in particular. In this light, the objective of this study is to examine the federal-model approach as state-building project after 1991. The federal-model approach, *inter alia*, keeps the territorial integrity of the physical state and addresses the historical injustices. Accordingly, the reality of state building in Ethiopia ensures nations, nationalities and peoples' cultural autonomy and political self-determination. Put differently, the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia need to retain the identity of Ethiopian-ness as it was before 1991.

The conceptual understanding of state building this study has employed basically relies on both state-society and intra-society relations in Ethiopia. For this purpose, the framework of analysis is the chemistry of the elements of state and nation building approach in political science. The elements are political settlement among elites, survival and expected functions of the government. These elements determine the state-society relations in every states of the world (DFID, 2008 & Migdal, 2005). Historically, Ethiopia has had distorted state-society and intra-society relations that could be attributed to different reasons. A possible explanation for this is the processes and ways of Ethiopian state-formation (Goitom, 2014).

The EPDRF's model of state building has provoked arguments against or for ethnic federalism. In the first place, the Ethiopian federalism has been criticized for exacerbating rough relations

among nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. It has broken or weakened the pan-Ethiopianness of the majority of the ethnic groups in country (Alem 1997). On the other hand, the ethno-federal arrangement is appreciated and welcomed by the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. For example, Andreas (2013) argues that the Ethiopian federalism has renewed /redefined the Ethiopian state by improving state-society and intra-society relations both constitutionally and institutionally. The emphasis given to the construction of GERD in this subsection is that it would help enhance state-society and intra-society relations in contemporary Ethiopia. Put differently, the rationales of EPRDF's commitment in this regard is to reconstruct the national consensus in the country. The basic competing questions that need to be raised in this regard are: Does the GERD bring political settlement among different elites? Is the EPDRF's intention its own security in power and/or the survival of the Ethiopian state? Is the purpose of the GERD to address the socio-economic lives of Ethiopian society?

Before discussing contribution of GERD to state and nation building in the Ethiopian federation, it is necessary to highlight the role of human and material resource in Ethiopian state politics. Needless to say, the past successive Ethiopian regimes' general tendency has been to divert their attention from civil and political issues to the mere love for physical Ethiopian state (e.g. Bahru 2002). The central theme in Ethiopian politics was control of resources, both economic and political power (Bekele, 2014⁴³). Employing neo-colonial thesis, Bekele further argues that controlling land for different purposes⁴⁴ has been/is neo-colonial legacy. Gebrehiwot (2013) however devalues the economic rationale of ethno-nationalists.

River water resource is found to be one of the integrating factors in Ethiopian political history. As some studies show, the motive of the northward expansion of the Somalis and the Oromo in pre-18th century was to control river basins for their cattle and agricultural activity (Mesfin, 1999). The southward expansion of the Ethiopian state was for the control of economic and human resources necessary for military contest against the European colonial powers. The attempt is to make resource discourse as one of the major factors Ethiopian politics. If utilization and management of resources in a given state failed to bake common bread for the entire multi-ethnic society, they become means of conflict, destruction and state failure. In this regard, the Abay

⁴³ Bekele Gerba is the Secretary General of OFC, 2014, on August 2014, at 9:00-11:00am.

⁴⁴ Commercial agriculture, horticultures, housing, roads, hydropower dams, sugar and cement factories.

River water sounds more for two reasons. First, Egypt sees it as its economic, geopolitical, and historical security. Second, for Ethiopia, Abay, among other things, is to which the Ethiopian people have sentimental attachment and hence has important symbolic socio-political value. In short, it is a symbol of Ethiopian nationalism and pride as well hope for economic development of the country. The inability to develop and utilize Abay epitomizes past Ethiopia's political and economic underdevelopment. According to Goitom (2014:11), the name and commitment given to the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are the possible indication of this. In Goitom's own words, "GERD represents a leap out of the dark ages of underdevelopment and national humiliation in Ethiopia" (Ibid). The GERD as EPDRF's state-building project should be seen from the parameter to what extent it has would encourage or discourage state-society and intra-society relations.

4.4.1. State-Society Relations

There are three perspectives on state-society relations. These are society-centered; state-centered and state-in-society approaches (Demisse, 2014). Society-centered approach puts society at the center and understands the socio-economic and political dynamics of the society. State-centered approach emphasizes on state autonomy and its relevance in shaping the society. The state-in-society approach balances the above two approaches and is the set of some other perspectives. Migdal's state-in-society approach, for instance, rests on the 'co-constitution' or 'mutual embeddedness' of state and society (Migdal, 2005). According to Demissie (2014), due to the major political events and processes had been confined to national level and controlled by few elites, there had been weak state-society relations in pre-1991 Ethiopia. Demissie (2014: 46) explained: embed

In Ethiopia, state-in-society synthesis is to enlighten local community's interest in state and engagement in state political processes, notably in processes of contest and competition, bargaining and compromise among different groups of community over state power, resources, citizenship, history, symbol and identity in various forms, at different level of state, and for various objectives (goals) and using different strategies.

From argument we can understand that the pre-1991 Ethiopia has experienced weak or minimal state-society and inter-society relations. In contrast, state and nation building requires robust state-society and intra-society relations where, despite the difference, state has to be neutral and representative. Intra-societal relations should also have been based on equality, respect and

tolerance thereby developing common national sentiment and consensus. The approach that this study has employed complements with the state-in-society synthesis whereby state-led development projects on one hand and societal engagements on the other has the potential to influence state-society relations in Ethiopia. Specifically, the potential benefit of GERD in the processes of bargaining and compromise among the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia is considerable. The role GERD in political settlement, survival, and expected functions are briefly presented as follows.

a) Political Settlement

As discussed in Chapter two, political settlement is about ensuring common understanding among elites to organize and share power in order to serve the needs and interests of the society. Political settlement sometimes goes beyond elites, embracing the whole society. Discussion with elites of five national parties-EPDRF, EFDUF, UJD, BP and OFC- have been made in order to analyze the extent of consensus they have on GERD. From the focus group discussions and interviews conducted there are different views. EPDRF's position has been discussed Chapter three of this thesis. The views of the opposition political parties are categorized into two major areas: economic and political aspects of state-building role of GERD. The economic aspect is obvious i.e. it helps strengthen the economic interdependence among the nations, nationalities and peoples of the country (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Poverty is the root cause for inter- and intra-ethnic tensions in the political history of the country. Hence, economic development is keen as the remedy for sustainable peace and tranquility among the people of the country. The political aspect of state building is whether development is an end or a means to state building. It is possible to argue that the outcome of successful state- building approach development. The proponents of political aspect of state building in Ethiopia need constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopian polity. Nonetheless, civil and political issues are incomplete as the EPDRF is retreating from the process of democratization and [ethnic] federalism.

The third aspect of political settlement is intermediate. It is moderate in the sense that it understands changes and continuities in Ethiopian political history and argues that government comes and goes but national development schemes persist through generations. In view of this, it is possible to argue that mega dams such as GERD will positively contribute in many ways. The

way the Ethiopian government is manipulating the Nile mythology as a public property irrespective of the differences among nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Hence, the GERD is expected to have political settlement role among the different nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.

Elites from opposition political parties accept GERD as a national development project. Had they been in political power, they argue, they would construct more hydropower dams and agree that the GERD is necessary and timely. In most instances, they appreciated the efforts and commitment of the citizens and government in constructing this project of national importance. However, they contend that ‘GERD is highly politicized in order to serve political interest of the EPDRF arguing that all things related to GERD are top-down and politically exclusionary. Moreover, although they consensually agree to the necessity of constructing GERD and its socio-economic benefits, they also argue that there are issues that need to be given priority for sustainable state building in the Ethiopian federation. The central argument they posit is not against the development drives of EPDRF but its narrowing down of civil and political rights.

First, there is the view that questions the role of development in state building process in Ethiopia. For example, Engineer Gizachew Haile, the former president of UDJ, questions:

Is development a means or an end to building Ethiopian state? GERD is either an input to state building or instrument to it or an outcome of successful Ethiopian state building process. Otherwise, the mere constructions of as many mega-projects as EPDRF is doing can’t build the state.

The position of the Blue party complements the above statement, but negates the state building of GERD mentioning the ‘Secession-Clause’ as to be the bottleneck to Ethiopian state and nation building under EPDRF regime. Getaneh argued:

If Benishangul Gumuz Peoples have the right to secede from Ethiopia then why should I pay for the project? For me having secession clause in the constitution and constructing GERD in its current manipulations is EPDRF’s self-refuting project. Loving two things at the same time is impossible!

The third view drawn from discussions with opposition political parties sees the GERD as an instrument to sustain the political will of EPDRF. Ato Alemu Kohra, 2014 said, “EPDRF is accusing us as if we are incapable and not willing to participate in the country’s development schemes.” In his view, the EPDRF has already judged the opposition as against the project to the

extent even willing to joining Egypt. He sees the GERD and other mega-projects as means to serve EPDRF's diversionary politics. Fourth, the other opposition political party elites have consensually understood GERD and other mega-projects as national development schemes. Particularly with regards to GERD, they agree that it in Ethiopia's national interest and added that any Ethiopian government should do even more. Specially, UJD and Blue Party argue that, despite the EPDRF's securitizing it, the GERD is for the 'Ethiopian nation'.

From the above discussions, it is possible to understand that GERD has brought about political settlement among elites in Ethiopia. Nearly all opposition political parties accept it as a project that is important for Ethiopia. There are two possible reasons for this. The first reason is that it is for political strategy. The Abay mythology and the psychological attachment to it have made many people to give moral and financial support for the construction of GERD from the outset of the project. Fortunately enough, the researcher was in Bahr Dar on April 2, 2011 for educational trip to Blue Nile as a student of Geopolitics and was able to observe many people in the town were happy and did not believe themselves when they heard about the launching of a 5250MW project on Abay. The construction of GERD is supported by the majority of the Ethiopian society. The day after the launching of the project has been publicized, many people showed their moral support and commitment to the government in a peaceful demonstration held at 'Meskel Square' (Hailu, 2014)⁴⁵. The second reason is that GERD has undeniable socio-economic benefits. According to H.E. Ato Nasir (2014)⁴⁶, the GERD will add 5% to the existing GDP when its construction is completed. The project is expected to transform the Ethiopian economy and make Ethiopia one of the middle income countries by 2025. These factors have persuaded the opposition political parties to consensually agree on GERD. In other words, the opposition political parties were forced to support the project in order not to lose political support and credibility in the eyes of citizens.

⁴⁵ Hailu Abraha, Public Relation and Media Communication Expert at ONCCPPCGRD, interviewed on July 10, 2014 at 9:00-11:30 am

⁴⁶ H. E. Ato Nasir Kanso, member of House of Peoples Representatives and Science and Information Technology Standing Committee, interviewed on September 28, 2014 at 3:00-4:00pm

b) Survival Functions

Survival functions consolidate the authority of the state and build confidence of the government in power. As discussed in chapter two, survival functions include security issues, generating revenue and establishing conditions under which security or other sanctions might be used (rule of law). Theoretically speaking, development is not the part of survival functions. But the EPDRF elites see it as a survival function. As H.E. Ato Nasir puts:

The only enemy, which the Ethiopian peoples and the state have, is poverty and we only struggle against it. EPDRF is on power to struggle and eradicate poverty, no other business we have. GERD is part of our struggle. The Ethiopian people evaluate our development related works and will give or take away the chance to rule them.

More or less, the EPDRF understands development as both ‘a means and an end’ to secure its position in political power. With regards to EPDRF’s survival functions there are two contradictory perspectives. The position of EPDRF members appreciates the effort of the EPDRF government in extending the domain of its survival functions. Although survival functions are politico-security issues, socio-economic improvements are also one of the survival functions for the Ethiopian government. The second perspective is that represents the position of the opposition political parties. In view of many other informants from opposition political parties, the government has retreated from its survival functions (FGD 1, 2014)⁴⁷. They argue that since 2001, civil and political rights, democratization and ethno-federal values have become secondary in the government’s political discourse. Developmental-state model has featured prominently at the expense of the constitutional rights and identity issues of Ethiopian people (Milkessa, 2014). This may be destructive to the state and nation building in the Ethiopian federation. Milkessa explained:


Any development scheme in Ethiopia, whether at federal, regional or local levels, should be within the framework of the federal constitution. Especially the government shall be curious while commencing mega-projects because they have the tendency to circumvent ethnic federalism. Otherwise, everything will be destructive as we would have many countries.

c) Expected functions

⁴⁷ Focus Group Discussion 1 made at Sidist Kilo on April 20, 2014 at 2:00-5:00pm. The members of the FGD are representatives of students, civil servants, and business persons.

In state and nation building process, expected functions are that the society anticipates from the government. Expected functions are not essential for the survival of the state. However, they help sustain state and nation building projects and earn legitimacy for both the state and government. Government’s efficient public service delivery, good governance, development of infrastructure, employment opportunities, personal safety and access to justice, anti-corruption measures, and accountability (fair elections, free media, etc.) are some of expected functions. In this regard, GERD can be an expected function as it encourages infrastructural development, employment opportunities, and most importantly its role in efficacy of public service delivery through electric power generation. These will have the effect of increasing the attachment of citizens towards the Ethiopian state and promised overall socio-economic improvements. The failure to realize GERD has been equated to living ‘with poverty’. From the above discussion, it is possible to deduce that GERD has roles in the state-building process in the contemporary Ethiopia. The following diagram summarizes this.

Diagram 4.1. GERD’s contribution in State building in contemporary Ethiopia



Source: adopted by the researcher, 2014.

4.4.2. Intra-Society Relations

In state-society relations are aspects of intra-society (horizontal) relations that particularly are more challenging in multi-ethnic states (Demisse, 2014). Although intra-society relations in the country were not smooth in the pre-1991 period, the tone has been exacerbated after 1991. In other words, in present-day Ethiopia intra-society relation is weak whereby one ethnic group is suspecting the other (Demisse, 2014). The reason for this is the prevalence of historical injustices that the previous undemocratic systems of rule in the country have sown among the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia peoples and that the ethno-linguistic model of federalism has aggravated. Albeit the promise to solve the problem, the Ethiopian ethnic-federal model has reconfigured the structure of the country along ethno-cultural and linguistic lines that could not result in smooth horizontal relations on the basis of equity, tolerance and respect.

During the second phase of EPDRF's state building approach national issues were focused on instead of ethnic issues. The objective of the regime became to build economically strong Ethiopian state as per the preamble of the FRDE Constitution. This has revitalized the issue identity and question of self-determination. In what appears to bring about a break through to the previously existing intra-society tensions by prioritizing national issues in order to build healthy intra-society relations, the government embarked on constructing mega development projects such as GERD, for example. The discussions with government officials and individual informants show that GERD has created a sense of unity and love among different groups. One of the informants stated:

There have been forceful socio-economic and political marriages among the Ethiopian peoples. And the current trend shows the way to sustain these marriages. At family level, for instance, children, property, and religion have roles to discourage 'divorce' even if there are different incompatibilities. Likewise, the GERD is the common property and has married all nations, nationalities and peoples.

To understand from the above is that the GERD would help sustain territorial integration and national consensus of the Ethiopian peoples who finance the costs of its construction. To secure the project that has also helped to penetrate such remote areas and peoples, the government would have military base that is necessary to protect the project and the whole country from external threats. Many other mega-projects in Afar region, SNNP (South Omo case) and Oromia have such multi-faced objectives. Moreover, the GERD has created an opportunity to establish solid

relationship among Ethiopians at home and abroad. The Diaspora whose previous attachment has been limited to their families and relatives now engaged in national development projects. According to information from the Diaspora Participation Office at ONCCGERD, in the last three years the East African citizens in abroad have contributed more than 5.4 million dollars for GERD (Mesele, 2014⁴⁸). To continue their financial and moral support to GERD, the Diaspora are mobilizing and coordinating themselves by establishing more than 111 offices and 122 sub-offices in different cities of the world⁴⁹. Other things remaining constant and improve, the GERD is becoming a unifying card of all Ethiopians irrespective of where they live, what they think and who they are⁵⁰.

Generally, many argue that the GERD is historically the third incident next to Adwa and the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War, which united all Ethiopians irrespective of their difference in religion, ethnicity, political position, etc (FGD 1&2; Desalegn, 2014; Assefa, 2014; Zerihun, 2014⁵¹). There are four basic reasons for this: it is public funded; well manipulated; Abbay mythology (the Ethiopian peoples' historical attachment to it); and trans-boundary nature of its water resource in Ethiopia – the Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Benishangul Gumuz are the four regions that share its water). In short, the GERD would help create domestic economic integration in the Ethiopian federation and this in turn, in one way or another, would strengthen the center-periphery relations in terms of resource integration and utilization. Economic integration would have resulted in possible political integration. Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (needs citation). This means the existing interest and drive for secession-for example the case of Oromo, Sidama, Somali, etc. decreases on one hand and weak historical attachment of peripheral peoples to Ethiopian state can be strengthened.

⁴⁸ ETV news at 8:20 pm, 2014 by Mesele G/Hiwot

⁴⁹ONCCPPCGRD, Special Edition, and April 4, 2013

⁵⁰ Temesgen Beyene, ETV news, 8:00pm , April 4, 2014, speech made by Kassa Tekleberhan on the conference held at Assosa regarding Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Day festival

⁵¹ Informal discussion with Zerihun Abebe, Researcher at MFA, on November 17, 2014 at 7:00-8:30pm

4.5. Challenges and Prospects of GERD: the Domestic and Regional Context

Among the many factors that attract attentions towards GERD are its challenges and prospects. These are that attract the interests of geo-politicians, hydrologists, governments, and international non-governmental organizations⁵². The challenges and prospects of GERD could be explained in terms of both domestic and external contexts. Domestically, provided its construction completes, the increase in electricity export could cause typical Dutch disease effect, i.e. appreciation of real exchange rate which can lead to shrinkage in the current exporting sectors. Given the fact that Ethiopia's main exports are agricultural commodities, agriculture may be negatively affected and consequently the poorer part of the Ethiopian population may suffer negative outcomes (Hathaway, 2008).

In addition, the project is highly politicized and externalized by both the Ethiopian government and the opposition political parties (EOPP). The EPRDF government has no confidence on the EOPP and assumes them as the potential enemy of GERD. The EOPP elites (2014) complained:

The government is not allowing us to visit the project area; and fully engage in the construction of GERD. It has no confidence on us and always equates with Egypt. We have the right to fully participate in socio-economic and political developments of this country as citizens and as constitutionally established opposition political parties.

The opposition political parties have also attributed the construction of GERD to EPDRF's desire to sustain its hold on power. From the inception and actual commencement of GERD's construction, the EPDRF has monopolized the project (Gizachew, 2014). "Before making the construction of the project public the government should have consulted with the opposition political parties, different stakeholders, and local peoples" (Alemu, 2014; Getaneh; 2014; Tesfalem, 2014). Civil servants are contributing their monthly salary for two and/three rounds to finance construction of the GERD (Bakana, 2014⁵³). However, the reality is that they are not paying their money by consent. A High School Director in Horo Woreda who preferred anonymity put: "We made decision at Woreda level and informed our school teachers that their one month's salary is contributed for construction of the GERD. This is because failure to do so would mean punishment with labeled of being 'anti-development'. Hence, we did not consult

⁵²Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam-A Mega-Dam With Potentially Mega-Consequences:
<http://allafrica.com/stories/20121203.htm>

⁵³ Interview with Bakana Wakwaya, MA Development Studies, Research Consultant interviewed on September 20, 2014 at 10:00-12:00am

them when we decided on their salary.” The experience of instructors of higher institutions of learning is similar (Merera, 2014). In the words of Merera (Ibid.):

Just three individuals from the AAU sat and decided by themselves. I have no information about it and nobody as well. We heard the decision which says, ‘All AAU teachers and staff members have agreed to sacrifice their one month salary for the construction of GERD’. I don’t personally oppose the move but we have to be consulted and debate on it. How three persons decide on the rights and lives of the rest?

Milkessa (2014) argues that there are ethnic groups who set prioritization. He explains:

For the mainstreams, Abbay revives traditional Ethiopian-ness and civic nationalism. For others GERD serves the EPRDFites to win political support by instrumentalizing in order to sustain their politico-economic hegemony in Ethiopia. For the peoples of Benishangul Gumuz the project has both advantages and disadvantages⁵⁴. For the Oromos, Somalis and others the priority is on civil and political rights, questions of self-determination and citizenship. There are many mega-projects so far in Oromia serving the entire peoples but good for nothing for the Oromo in the region.

Bakana (2014) agrees with Milkessa by arguing: “Economically, the GERD is very important but not in a priority to be done. Priority is political freedom which paves the way for development.” The failure to finish the project as per the schedule would invoke resentment against the government, though not against the project. According to Yerosan (2014⁵⁵), “the GERD at least serves the EPDRF for two rounds of national elections: 2015 and 2020.” This means, the incumbent government instrumentalizes the project to win political support. Moreover, the poor benefit-sharing culture in Ethiopia would be one of the potential challenges for the government. Addressing these and related issues such as like ‘Who contributes what?’ ‘Who gets how much?’ ‘Who are the beneficiaries?’ would be as serious as oil in Nigeria (Assebe, 2014). According to Hailu (2014), from all government institutions, the military and the police are in the forefront in terms of giving up their monthly salary and other contributions to the GERD.

Externally, the move of Egyptians is a major challenge. Previously, Egypt has been strongly working on how to block international support to construct hydropower and irrigation projects by Ethiopia along the Blue Nile. In this regard, Ethiopia is successful today. After the Ethiopian government and people have shifted attention to develop and utilize the waters of Abbay by

⁵⁴ Its advantage to the region is obvious but also the project has some disadvantages. The identity and self-determination (self-rule) of the indigenous peoples would be challenged as mobility to the region increases. Currently, the exogenous peoples are about 46% and after the completion of GERD, their size increases challenging the local and regional decision makings. The hand of the federal government will also be heavy for the projects security.

⁵⁵ Interview with Yerosan Mesfin, MA Candidate at AAU, interviewed on September 21, 2014 at 4:00-6:00pm

financing from domestic sources, Egypt has diversified its techniques to continue claiming hegemonic position on the Nile. One senior diplomat from the Ethiopian Ministry of foreign Affairs explained that the focus of the Egyptian government's diplomatic move has been/is to stop or disrupt the construction of GERD by using different tactics such as threat of military action, diplomatic subterfuge, impeding Ethiopia's relations with (Italy-Salini, Russia and Tanzania), threatening to close the Suez Canal to Ethiopia's use and ban the Ethiopian airlines flight over its air space as a counteraction⁵⁶. According to Dr. Yacob Arsano, the regional and international dynamics of Nile River can be seen from the theoretical issues regarding sustainable utilization and management of shared water resources. This implies that the construction of GERD has security, environmental, socio-economic and legal implications. The environmental and socio-economic aspects are under investigation whereas the legal aspect is subject to different explanations. In short, the competitive and cooperative dimensions among the Nile riparian countries have security implications on the GERD. In other words, the construction of GERD ignites interests of all riparian states of the Nile.

To make it cooperative, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have organized a group of experts to assess the potential effects of GERD. The group is known as the International Panel of Experts made up of ten members: two from each of the three states and four international experts. The IPE has conducted their impact assessment and submitted it to the three governments in June 2013. However, the report has not yet verified the Ethiopian claims and the Egyptian counter-claims. The Ethiopian government has hailed the panel's report as "The dam offers high benefit for all the three countries and would not cause significant harm on both the lower riparian countries" while the Egypt repeatedly said "the report calls for more analysis of downstream countries"⁵⁷. In the mean time, Egypt has withdrawn from the ongoing discussions to use it as bargaining chip. After six months, however, Egypt reconsidered its position and showed the willingness to continue further studies on GERD in October 2014.

Although GERD would be important diplomatic card in the region, there are divergent views on

⁵⁶Speech made by Ambassador Dina Mufti, States Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at AAU on monthly discussion prepared by Post-graduate students of Journalism and Communication seminar entitled, 'Current Egyptian Diplomacy and Ethiopian Response' February 28, 2014.

⁵⁷ International Panel of Experts (IOPE) on Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Final Report, Addis Ababa, May 31st, 2013. http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/international_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam_final_report_1.pdf

the Ethiopia's diplomatic strength and rationale. Some scholars and practitioners believe that GERD is a game changer in the region and becomes a 'card of regional decision' (Dereje, 2014; Goitom, 2014; Assefa, 2104). In Goitom's words:

Once the dam becomes a matter of fact, however, the decision-making rationale is likely to change significantly. Ethiopian state possesses the diplomatic influence, strategic weight, economic and military resources to pursue one of its perennial aspirations: successfully challenging Egypt's hegemony in the Nile Basin. Egypt cannot reverse the process neither through military or diplomatic means so that it will have to learn to live with the GERD.

However, Tafesse questions Ethiopia's diplomatic strength as well as its foreign policy directives as compared to that of Egypt (Tafesse, 2014). He also argues that the position of Sudan is not yet clear⁵⁸. If the Ethiopian government is diplomatically smart and strong enough, it would persuade Sudan to sign the Entebbe Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA). With regard to Egypt, as mentioned, he maintains that it is diplomatically more powerful than Ethiopia⁵⁹. The common denominator of the scholars is that GERD has potential mutual benefits and challenges to both Ethiopia and Egypt in particular. Surplus energy from the project could be important part of the regional economic integration of the states in as they would have access to cheaper and environmentally friendly electric supply. In addition, storing water in the Ethiopian highlands will help increase the volume of the whole Nile water; hence, less water evaporation than in Egypt (MWIE, 2014).

So far, what has been discussed in this chapter is the role of GERD in contemporary Ethiopian state-building project. Although the mandate of the government is to work on social and economic improvement of the Ethiopian society, GERD is taken as something beyond that as the EPDRF claims its construction as 'the Possibility of Impossibility'. The project has motivated all citizens in the country and from abroad promising socio-economic developments of Ethiopia. Despite the politicization of the project from both sides – the government and the opposition political parties – citizens at all levels are happy about the project and showed their commitment to finance its construction. The media (both government and private owned) have given full

⁵⁸ According to Wikileaks, a 2010 internal email records Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir's agreement to host an Egyptian airbase in Kursi in the west of Sudan's Darfur region. This base would be used to launch an Egyptian assault on the Ethiopian dam, if diplomatic efforts fail. <http://wikileaks-press.org/stratfor-sources-reveal-egypt-sudan-contingency-plans-to-secure-nile-water-resources/>

⁵⁹ "Egypt warns Ethiopia over Nile dam," Al Jazeera, June 11, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/06/201361144413214749.html>

coverage of the GERD in different panel discussions, workshops, meetings, speeches, etc. Today, the GERD has been more or less socialized and become daily public issue where everybody has enough understanding about its expected national, regional and local benefits. The advocacy which is made by comedians, artists, journalists, and professionals helped in terms of socialization of the GERD.

Therefore, the GERD has made smooth the state- building process in Ethiopia in the post 1991 whereby ethno-linguistic approach of Ethiopian federalism has triggered views in support for or against it. Differently put, it would strengthen state-society and inter-society relations thereby resulting in healthy and sustainable state-building approach in a ‘state-in-society’ synthesis. Relative political settlement among elites, perceiving GERD as both survival and expected functions of the EPDRF promises of responsive state- building approach in Ethiopia. This doesn’t mean that development of socio-economic, political conditions and infrastructure in contemporary Ethiopia has escaped criticism. There are still questions related to democracy, federal values and issues of good governance and political culture of tolerance to dissent political views.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

The notion of nation building has undergone historical changes. Nation building in Western Europe following the 1648 treaty of Westphalia was to destruct diversity and create culturally homogenous polities. In democratic federal and states in contrast, the aim of nation building is accommodation of diversity and govern culturally diverse peoples under one political roof through constitutional and institutional means. In other words, the federal political arrangement has arisen out of lack of correspondence between concept of nation state and the empirical reality it has to grapple with (Oommen, 2008). Democratic federal system has to address three inherent problems of nation-states. These are; first, the nation-states deny people-hood to ethno-culturally diverse peoples within their territory; second, nation-states link citizenship and nationality together; third, nation-states pursue the idea of creating culturally homogenous societies. The reality, however, shows that only tiny proportion of world's distinctive religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups have formed their own states (Ibid). Hence, a solution is accommodating diversity within the territory of democratic federal state. As Oommen, (2008) argues, there is the need to substitute the concept and practice of nation-state by the notion of *national state* (state nation). Tilly (1975: 24) understands national states as “relatively less centralized, differentiated and autonomous organizations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contiguous and clearly bounded territories”. In light of this view, federalism has the potential to balance people-hood and state-hood through harmonizing the elements of *national shared-rule* and *regional self-rule* (Watts, 2009; Kymlicka, 2006).

Ethiopia during the last two decades has gone through a process of change that could expressed in terms of restructuring the Ethiopian state along pluralist line; rapid economic growth, and its emergence as a regional power. Politically, it has shifted away from nation building to a multinational state, which is instituted in the form of ethnic federalism to address the historical grievances of the ethno-culturally diverse communities in the country. Economically, the country's GDP is growing, though the actual growth rate is contested (WB, 2014). Through huge public expenditure there are massive infrastructural development, expansion of social services,

diversification of export items and increasing FID making it to become one of the world's most preferred destinations (WB, 2013).

There are internal and external explanatory factors for the above rapid changes in post-1991 Ethiopia. Internally, there are at least three factors. First, the ethnic federal arrangement has given it relative political stability necessary for socio-economic improvements. This is despite there are low intensity insurgency movements in some parts of the country. Second, the developmental-state model that the incumbent Ethiopian government pursues might have well-directed the economic liberalization of the country with promising economic growth. Third, the emphasis given to public investment from the government side, the external development assistance, remittances from the Diaspora and foreign direct investment are important factors for socio-economic improvements in the country since the last two decades (Tewolde, 2014).

Externally, Ethiopia is emerging as a relatively important regional-power actor who is playing active role in peace making and peace keeping in the Horn of Africa and the continent at large has become remarkably important. This role together with the commencement of construction of GERD has lent Ethiopia increased negotiating power at both sub-regional and continental levels. As a result, there is change of power dynamics between Ethiopia and Egypt from confrontation to dialogue on the issue of utilization of the Nile today. At the same time, by constructing mega dams on its major rivers that cross international boundaries Ethiopia has become an important supplier of hydroelectric power to its neighboring countries that could be one of the necessary bases for regional economic integration. These all are not however secure from some potential challenges. For example, the developmental-state paradigm of the Ethiopian government narrows down the political space and constrains civil and democratic rights of citizens. There is visible structural tension between liberal democracy and developmental state in domestic politics. Regional security issues are also not totally promising as there is proxy war with Eritrea in Somalia as well as other threats to regional security.

The post-1991 state-building approach in Ethiopia is in order to establish and sustain a multination Ethiopian federalism, which is seen as a solution to the problems of minority groups that have already experienced the trauma of the failed nation-building projects (Gilbert, 2009:7). Kymlicka (2006) argues that multination federalism is the best system for resolving civil wars in

multi-ethnic countries like Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been the site of separatist struggles and center-periphery conflict, which provides a means to restrain the centre while also alleviating secessionist tendencies (Andreas, 2010). Nonetheless, the contradictory state-building strategies of EPDRF regime has trickled the promises of Federal Constitution. In addition to revolutionary democracy, which has been challenge to federalism and democratization in early periods, developmental state and dominant party democracy have become more bottlenecks at the present. Developmental state needs centrally planned socio-economic and political policies whereas a dominant party democracy hampers multiparty system. Hence, the federal government is becoming more powerful bypassing the constitutional federal power division – the elements of shred-rule and self-rule. In other words, the current state and nation-building move of the federal government undermines the declared intent and purpose of ethnic federalism.

In short, the EPDRF regime's state-building approach has showed a mixed of outcomes: responsive and unresponsive. The institutional and constitutional aspect till 2001 has been responsive state building. The incumbent government has popularized the motto of '*unity-in-diversity*' that basically signifies the ethno-federal model of the Ethiopian state. However, the division in the intra-ruling party elites' and the Ethio-Eritrean war has shifted responsive state building to unresponsive since 2001. In this vein, national issues have been champions over regional/identity issues. The federal flag has been hoisted one meter higher than the regional states' flags thereby showing the supremacy of the federal government and subordination of regional states. Moreover, the planning and implementation of many socio-economic and political policies are top-down through party-chain. It is in such context that GERD and other mega-projects have started to be constructed with the potential to having impact on EPDRF's state and nation building project.

Accordingly, the study has found the following major findings. The pre-1991 state and nation building approach was generally unresponsive whereby there was no political space for elites' negotiations to organize political power. These regimes were only focused on survival function of the state and the government thereby ignoring the society's socio-economic and political interests and needs. However, the post 1991 development state and nation building in Ethiopia has been responsive in a way that political settlement among elites has started through multiparty democracy. The EPDRF government has indentified that addressing '*historical nationalities*'

question, as a survival function of the Ethiopian state. It has redefined the Ethiopian state and society within the framework of ethno-territorial federalism that endorsed in the federal constitution and institutional arrangements. But, the post 2001 developments have challenged this responsive state and nation building approach and as a result it has become unresponsive.

As a strategy to mitigate the unresponsive state and nation building approach of EPDRF, the GERD has experienced beyond socio-economic discourses in a way to strengthen state-society relation in Ethiopia. The project requires more than 4 billion \$ and self-financed. The government is generating the income to finance the project through domestic bond selling and donations from the Ethiopian people at home and abroad. However, more than 80% of the current expenditure is covered by the Ethiopian government whereas the money collected from the Ethiopian people is generally not more than 26% (ONCCPPGRD, 2014; Herald, 2014). As a result of GERD, there are increasing local developments like construction of bridges and roads, electricity grids, expansion of towns with facilities for the displaced communities. In addition, GERD has created employment opportunity for more than 8,500 people and the figure will increase to 12,500 people when it starts full operation.

Mega-projects, provokes strong emotions because of their potential or actual costs and benefits to the political, socio-cultural, economic, and environmental lives of the society. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam can be an example of this as it has attracted national, regional, continental and international media (Janifer, 2013). Ethiopia's unilateral decision⁶⁰ has generated debates since 2011. Specially, it has drawn protests and calls for negotiation from the Egyptian side to stop the construction of the GERD. As regards the number of displaced people as a result of the project the figures vary. Some independent researchers approximate the number of the displaced people up to 20 thousand people whereas some studies of the government show not more than 5000. There are sparsely populated Gumuz, Berta and exogenous Amhara people around the project.

GERD has economic rationale that is interwoven with the socio-cultural aspect to overcome poverty. The purely development aspect of GERD is motivated by two factors: the EPDRF domestic political will and Ethiopia's place in the geopolitics of North East African region. That

⁶⁰ The Nile River basin is shared by eleven countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Uganda, Sudan, Democratic republic of Congo, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania

means in the study on GERD there is the need to consider Ethiopia's relations with Egypt, Sudan and other riparian states on one hand and address the state of Ethiopian domestic affairs.

During the field research conducted two themes dominated the FGD and interviews. The first theme is related to the necessity of generating more hydroelectric power which the economy demands. This argument was based on sovereignty principle, "Ethiopia's absolute right to use its water resources". Hence, GERD is purely for socio-economic development. The second theme gives more weight to politico-psychological relevance of GERD historicizing the Ethiopian peoples' emotional attachment of to Abbay – Nile mythology. In this view sees the GERD as a national identity expressing: "Abbay is Ethiopia's identity and national hood". Thus, the general perception is that Ethiopia needs more energy to develop and the GERD has the lion share in generating hydroelectric power.

Domestically, the GERD is perceived as a unifying force across ethnically diverse peoples of Ethiopian society. However, some respondents voiced one possible drawback: that it might become a political and strategic target in times of war. The Renaissance Dam may further the political goal of unification in the short term and may meet the economic goals of income-generation and domestic electricity supply in the midterm. It also may offer socio-cultural benefits such as general development and poverty alleviation provided profits from the international sale of electricity are well-managed and equitably distributed; environmental costs of the GERD will be long-term

Most of the interviewees believed that electric power as the key to development. Out of the informants, the majority support the GERD regardless of their ethnic identity and political affiliations arguing: "Reliable electricity is necessary to attract investment to build industry." The Ethiopian government and people are keen to move the country's identity away from poverty and reliance on the donor community towards status of self-sufficiency. Respondents were also emphatic about the contribution that each Ethiopian is contributing for construction of the GERD. Some interviewees are skeptical about the government's position on GERD's negative effects on the economy of the lower riparian states (Alemu, 2014⁶¹). This view is contrary to the position of Ethiopian government that claims the GERD has positive economic and political impact for all riparian countries, particularly Sudan and Egypt.

⁶¹ Ato Alemu has been served as General Energy Manager of Southern in EEP Co

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Appendixes

I. Leading Questions for Interviews and FGD

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
CENTER FOR FEDERAL STUDIES

This is to kindly request you and your organization in order to have access to data for academic research entitled “The Contribution of Mega-Projects in State Building under Ethiopian Federation: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” Recognizing your ideas and reflections for the reliability of the research, the researcher would like to interview in person or through group discussions. Your willingness to provide information through interviews and written materials are highly appreciated. The findings of this study will be only for purpose acknowledging your and the organization’s ideas, views and reflections. Therefore, I humbly request you adjust your precious times and avail yourself for the interviews and other cooperation.

I. Details of the Interviewee

1. Name: _____
2. Organization: _____
3. Position: _____

II. Questionnaire for the Ethiopian Opposition Political Parties

To: Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (MEDREK)

To: Justice and Democratic Unity Party (Andinet)

To: Ethiopian Blue Party

To: Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)

Addis Ababa

1. How does your party understand the Ethiopian state and the Ethiopian society?
2. Do you think that there is considerable national consensus among the different groups in Ethiopia? If your answer is no or low level of national consensus among the nations,

nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, what are the factors? What would be the solution to this?

3. How do you evaluate the last 23 years of Ethiopian social, cultural, economic and political situations? Do you think the EPDRF over all socio-economic and politico-cultural policies promote national consensus among the different groups or discourage it? How, explain it.
4. How do you see the constitutional provisions on one hand and the practical issues related to the overall nations, nationalities and peoples rights'? Are they convergent or divergent?
5. How do you see the strategies of EPDRF's of ethnic federalism, revolutionary democracy, developmental state and one party dominant political system?
6. As you can observe there are huge mega-projects under construction by the government like sugar and cement factories, hydropower generations, railways, etc. From these mega-projects, it is obvious that the country can get huge economic benefits. However, do you think that these mega-projects can enhance/create national consensus among the ethnic groups?
7. What do you think about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam? Would it be survival or expected function of the government? Consider the timing and capacity to construct it.
8. Do you think that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has the potential to unite the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples together and hence enhance national consensus?
9. What are the challenges and opportunities (both internal and external) that the GERD has for Ethiopia and its society?
10. If your party has given the chance to rule the country, what would be the areas of focus and prioritization?
11. What institutional, ideological and policy measures would your party take to enhance national consensus among the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples?

Thanking you and Your Party in advance!

Regards,

Leading Questions for Interview at HoF and HoPR

1. Do you think that there is considerable national unity and consensus among the different groups in Ethiopia? If your answer is no or low level of national consensus among the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, what are the factors?
2. As you can observe there are huge mega-projects under construction by the government like sugar and cement factories, hydropower generations, railways, etc. From these mega-projects, it is obvious that the country can get huge economic benefits. In addition to economic benefits can they enhance/create national unity and consensus in Ethiopia?
3. Do you think that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has united the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples together in and abroad Ethiopia? To what extent?
4. What are the challenges and opportunities (both internal and external) that the GERD has for Ethiopia and its society?

Thanking for in advance cooperation!

Regards

III. List of FGD members

1. Focus Group Discussion 1 made at AAU on April 20, 2014 at 2:00-5:00pm. The members of the FGD are representatives of students, civil servants, and business persons.

No.	Name	Occupation	Age	Gender
1.	Amaha Dagne	Business man	35	M
2.	Kabe Werash	Business woman	29	F
3.	Mesfin Melaku	Civil Servant, MFA	26	M
4.	Wubayehu Tolessa	MA Candidate	25	F
5.	Debele Hailu	BA student	23	F
6.	Berhanu Takele	PhD Candiadte	29	M

2. Focus Group Discussion Two made at CMC on September 18, 2015 at 5:00-7:00 pm. The members of the FGD 2 are representatives of students from Kotobe, Ethio-China College and Civil Service University.

No.	Name	Occupation	Age	Gender
1.	Eyob Daba	MA Candidate	35	M
2.	Abraham Mengistu	MA Candidate	29	F
3.	Woderyelesh Geleta	MA Candidate	26	M
4.	Gadafa Wakoya	BA student	25	F
5.	Hanna Motuma	BA student	23	F

IV. Psychological and Life attachment of Nile and GERD to the Ethiopian people

Nile

...My name is Africa I am the mother of the Nile.
O Nile, my prodigal daughter on the wilderness of the desert
Bringing God's harmony to all brothers and sisters
And calming down their noises of brass in their endless naked-nesses
O Nile, you are music that restore the rhythm of existence
Into the awkward stampeding of these Middle Eastern blind-nesses
You are the irrigator that cultivate peace
From my Ethiopian sacred mountains of the sun
Across to nod on the East of Aden and across Sinai
Beyond Gibraltar into the heights of Mount Moriah
O Nile, my chosen sacrifice for universal peace offering
Upon whose gift the heritages of Meroe and Egypt
Still survive for the benefit of our lone World.....

(Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin (1937-2006), Ethiopian Poet Laureate, August 1997 in Zerihu: 2011: iii)

GERD

(Abbayyaa, akka durii miti, taate **Wabii Kiyjaa**: Blue Nile is not as it used to be; now it is **My Guarantee**
Abbayyaa, bakka durii hin jirtu, taate **Jiruu Kiyjaa**: Blue Nile is not as it used to be; now it is **My Life**

(Song used as background to mobilize and initiate people about GERD, taken from Oromia
Radio and Television Organization, Sep 11, 2014)