

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**SOUTH SUDAN: FAILURE IN STATE BUILDING AND ITS  
REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

**BY**

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**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

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## **ACRONYMS**

AAPA = Addis Ababa peace Agreement

AN = Anya-Anya

ACODE = Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment

AU = African Union

AUHIP = Africa Union High-level Implementation Panel

CAR = Central African Republic

CPA = Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR = Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo

EAC= East African Community

GoRSS = Government of the Republic of South Sudan

GoS = Government of Sudan

GoSS = Government of South Sudan

IDP = Internally Displaced Persons

ICG= International Crisis Group

IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority on the Development

IPSS = Institute of Peace and Security Studies

ISS = Institute for Security Studies

JEM = Justice and Equality Movement

KCB = Kenya Commercial Bank

LAPSSET = Lamu Port linking the South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor

LRA= Lord Resistance Army

NCP = National Congress Party

NCP = National Congress Party



NGOs = Non-Governmental Organizations

OECD DAC = Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development/  
Development Assistance Committee

SPLA= Southern Sudan Liberation Army

SPLM/A= Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

SPLM/A-IO) = Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army- In Opposition

SSLM = Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

UN= United Nations

UNHCR= United Nations Humanitarian Commission of Refugees

UNISFA = United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNMISS = United Nations Mission in South Sudan



## ABSTRACT

*This thesis deals with Failure of State Building in South Sudan and its Regional Implications for the security, political, and socio-economy of countries in the Horn sub-region. The study examines the underlying factors that caused civil war in South Sudan from various angles and perspectives. Qualitative research methodology is used in the course of collecting and analyzing data by employing both primary and secondary sources as method of data collection. Primary data are elicited through key informant interviews from individuals in various institutions that are knowledgeable on the subject of the study. Secondary sources used in this study include books, journal articles, reports and pertinent web-sources. Based on the above mentioned sources of data the study has tried to answer the research questions that are composed of historical, political and economic causes of the conflict between North and South Sudan; underlying factors of civil war in South Sudan after independence; and South Sudan's state failure implications for the Horn region.*

*The finding of the study has shown that the civil war in South Sudan has far-reaching security, political, and socio-economic consequences on the peoples and states of the region. First, since the conflict in South Sudan is linked to the complex conflict system in East and the Horn of Africa, and Central Africa and North Africa, it is likely to draw in most of the state and non-state actors in the region. This is likely to result into a crisis in the region and would bring about a shift in the balance of power in the region and reshape the regional security architecture. Second, civil war in South Sudan would result in undermining the democratization processes that are currently underway in most countries in the region. Third, the countries of the Horn of Africa like Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia that have strong economic ties with South Sudan are also adversely affected by the civil war in South Sudan. Fourth, apart from humanitarian responsibility to grant asylum to so many refugees by the neighboring countries, refugees can affect stability in the host countries, and insurgent rebel groups may use the resultant instability in the border regions. Finally, the conflict has destroyed the ecology of the country that has led to the shortage of food, drought, famine, and desertification both within South Sudan and the countries of the Horn sub-region.*

*Therefore, South Sudan's neighbors have to be vigilant against the impending civil war as it is by far the worst security, political and socio- economic threatening episode. Thus, the international community led by the United Nations, with support of the African Union, the European Union, the United States, and IGAD should exert pressure on the warring parties to stop the fighting in order to save South Sudan from descending into a complex political, and socio-economic turmoil that could lead to total state collapse.*

## CHAPTER ONE

### Introduction

#### 1.1. Background of the Study

Africa is considered as one of the world's zones of conflict characterized by wars, poverty, disease, and instability (Osaghae and Robinson, 2005). During the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of governments in the 48 sub-Saharan African countries. During the same period many of these countries also experienced different types of civil strife, conflicts, and wars (Abdalla, 2002). Particularly, the Horn of Africa has been one of the world's most conflict-prone regions experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990 (William, 2014). As a result the Horn is affected by regime insecurity, terrorism, religious extremism, and tribalism (ibid).

Sudan is located in the Horn of Africa where protracted conflict reflects the long-standing economic disparities, political exclusion and social and cultural deprivation in the distribution of political and economic power between the centre and the peripheries (Ahmad, 2010). South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 after a devastating protracted Civil War ending centuries of a tortured history characterized by slavery, colonialism and ethnic violence as key features of its political landscape (ACODE, 2014).

However, the overall political and socio-economic situation in South Sudan since independence has been highly fragile. South Sudan is composed of more than 200 ethnic groups, with the Dinka and the Nuer as the largest communities (Kameir, 2011). The conglomeration of these various ethnic groups accounted for the internal conflict to happen in South Sudan. Particularly, the violent conflict that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013 remains unfolding and ethnic politics is highly tense and shaped conflict dynamism along ethnic lines (Sorbo, 2014).

South Sudan's economic and political system remains highly vulnerable to both internal and external forces due to fragile nature of the state (Awolich and Akol, 2013). Despite having awareness of South Sudan's state building challenges, international community

has been surprised by sudden and unexpected outbreak of violence on 16 December 2013 that have taken lives of thousands of innocent citizens (Mayai, 2014).

This study explores the political crisis and unrest within South Sudan, its far-reaching impacts on the national economy, state building and its regional implications.

## **1.2. Statement of the problem**

Conflict remains endemic to the Horn of Africa, of which the situation in Sudan was and still is a case in point (Medhane, 2004). Sudan remains an unstable state with cycles of ruthless Civil Wars that devastated its infrastructure, threatened its territorial integrity, flawed its economic growth and engendered woeful humanitarian destitution and catastrophes (Jok, 2012).

South Sudan is rich in natural resources and fertile land, but has historically been marginalized and disempowered. In 1955, a Civil War began in the Southern regions of Sudan when the demand for Southern autonomy was rejected following independence in 1956 and Africa's longest Civil War ensued (ibid). To remedy such tragic occurrences, a number of peace building initiatives have been attempted among which the most significant ones is the Addis Ababa Peace Accord, signed in 1972, that initiated 11 years of peace and recovery; and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 which brought to an end to a second phase of Civil War that re-erupted in 1983. The CPA of 2005 provided a framework for the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which formed the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), to pursue peace and thereby guaranteeing South Sudan the right of self-determination. On 9 July 2011, six years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending Sudan's decades-long civil war was signed, South Sudan formally went its own way by creating Africa's 54th state.

In January 2011 the peoples of South Sudan celebrated the independence of their country hoping the unfolding of a bright future within the newly emerged country even though there are unimplemented provisions of the CPA in its relations with North Sudan. These include the Abyei Protocol, the demarcation of the North/South border, and the conduct of popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States. Hence, these

unresolved issues continue to challenge relations between the two countries. In spite of its tense relation with the North, South Sudan got its independence through popular Referendum in 2011 as stipulated in the CPA. Initially, the independence of South Sudan from North brought about hope and joy among the Southerners who had faced high humanitarian crisis and suffering since independence in 1956. However, the hope of seeing a bright future in the newly independent state of South Sudan has been short-lived and turned into human suffering that they had experienced under successive Sudanese regimes.

The widely shared hope among the states of the world was to promote peace and avoid state failure in Southern Sudan through successful state building. However, this agenda was not flourishing in the short-term in addressing the target, largely because it failed to generate confidence in the GoSS (Ylönen, 2012). Mainly, the political and ethnic splits that plagued the South during the Second Civil War and the CPA interim period unsurprisingly continued in the independent country today, that greatly complicating the already daunting prospect of building the new state (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). The political conditions are far from constituting a favorable context for state building (ibid). A governing party (SPLM and SPLA) dominating the political scene is misleading. The political elite as a whole are raven by internal divisions and divided into competing interest groups (Nyong'o, 2011).

Thus, despite the fact that the political leaders were given the task of building a state with the assistance of the international community, South Sudan was triggered by power struggle within the ruling SPLM. This led to the crisis that quickly took on an atrocious dimension because it fed off of a society that has not been at peace with itself for a long period of time (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). Consequently, rivalry among politicians is considered as one of the main challenges of state building in South Sudan due to the fact that the leaders mobilized their ethnic constituencies that created instability along these lines. Hence, State building in South Sudan after independence remained under crisis. The crisis is still ongoing as a result of which different expected and unexpected consequences are unfolding.

In connection to this, the dismissal and subsequent appointment of new officers excluded key political actors and groups intensified the power struggle between President Salva Kir and his former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar. This created political crisis, and a condition of mistrust between the rival political, ethnic and military camps within the SPLM/A, which in return led the country to Civil War that resulted in humanitarian crisis (UNHCR, 2014). The protracted political conflict, which heavily relied on ethnic mobilization for support, recently in turn threatened peace and stability in South Sudan and beyond.

This internal conflict in South Sudan after independence has political and socio-economic implications for the region. Hence, conflicts within South Sudan have far-reaching security and economic consequences to peoples of the region. As South Sudan is located in the Horn of Africa, instability within the country could have destabilizing and spillover effects on the neighboring countries. The Horn of Africa as an arena of regional security complex composed of many states including South Sudan. Hence, unrest in South Sudan would have far reaching impacts on the entire countries of the wider sub-region. Furthermore, the political fate of each country in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant, and how strong or weak (Beruk, 2011).

This study attempts to investigate the challenges that the Civil War in South Sudan could pose to state building and examine whether the crisis can have regional implications to other countries in the Horn of Africa. There is no major study which has identified the impact of the 2013 South Sudanese ongoing Civil War on the countries of the Horn of Africa, which has a remarkable impact and experiencing extreme violence. It is hoped that the study would contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the issue under study. In the light of this, the study critically examined the nature, causes and consequences of the conflict and its implications in the country and for the neighboring countries.

### **1.3. Objective of the study**

#### **1.3.1. General objective**

The general objective of the study is to examine the failure in state building in Southern Sudan and investigate the implications thereof for the Horn of Africa sub-region.

#### **1.3.2. Specific objectives**

The specific objectives of the study include:

- To explain the socio-historical, political and economic context that resulted in the civil wars between South Sudan and Sudan;
- To identify factors that triggered the civil war in South Sudan after independence; and
- To indicate the implications of Southern Sudan's state failure for the Horn of Africa.

### **1.4. Research questions**

The study has been guided by the following sets of key research questions:

- What is the socio-historical, political and economic context that resulted in the unfolding of the civil war in South Sudan?
- What are the outstanding factors that led to the civil war again in South Sudan after independence?
- What are the regional implications of Southern Sudan's state failure?

### **1.5. Significance of the study**

The study has been a remarkable contribution to the understanding of the genesis of conflicts in South Sudan by investigating the conflict dynamics in the country and its eventual bearing on the Horn of Africa sub-region. Hence, it is envisaged that the study would contribute to the existing literature in relation to the ongoing political dynamics in South Sudan. Moreover, it can serve as a reference material for those interested in conducting further study on the subject under investigation.



## **1.6. Scope of the study**

The study is limited to examine and analyze the failure of State building in South Sudan and its implication for the Horn of Africa. The study is restricted to investigate the possible implications of state failure in South Sudan for peace and stability in the Horn sub-region. Hence, the study directly deals with the plausible causes that led to South Sudan's failure in state building after independence and the impacts thereof for the security and stability of the countries in the Horn of Africa.

## **1.7. Limitation of the study**

The researcher has faced with challenges in accessing relevant information owing to the political crisis that is shaking South Sudan. In this regard, the researcher could not get relevant information from the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan and IGAD, due to ongoing political turmoil in South Sudan. They were busy with meeting being held in Addis Ababa on how to solve conflict ravaging the country. Beside, the study is subjected to shortage of time and money in all its course of progress is also the major limitation.

## **1.8. Methodology and Methods**

### **Methodology**

The study employs qualitative research approaches that offer specialized techniques for obtaining in-depth response about what people think, do and feel (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Qualitative research method is most often employed to answer the why and how of human behavior, opinion, and experience and elicit information that is difficult to obtain through quantitative methods of data collection (Ibid). Qualitative research is designed to study ongoing social processes, study records or artifacts that shape or are produced by these processes, and talk to people who are engaged in or affected by the processes being studied (Ibid).

Thus, in an attempt to study the regional implications of South Sudan's state building failure, the investigation relies on the qualitative approach. As a result, discussion of concepts and data analysis of the study would be illustrated and presented qualitatively.

In the first place, the existing literatures on Civil War between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A in general and post CPA political development until the conducting of the Referendum in particular will be reviewed. Next, attempt is made to assess theories which could best describe conflict in South Sudan and undertake analysis based on pertinent theories that best describe the crisis in South Sudan.

### **Method**

The research is based on data elicited from both primary and secondary sources. Hence, primary data will be collected through Key Informant Interviews to be held with experts, Ambassadors and politicians from various institutions like the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on the Development (IGAD), Embassies of Republic of Sudan and South Sudan, and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University, among others.

Secondary sources of data are used in the form of review and analysis of pertinent documents. This is undertaken through collection of data from diverse published and unpublished sources. Reaction, opinion and views of prominent scholars, politicians and researchers provided earlier in relation to South Sudan's civil war and its implications for regional security and stability is substantiated by consulting relevant journals articles, reports, conference papers, and books.

### **1.9. Organization of the Study**

The study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter deals with the background, the research problem, objectives, research questions and methodology. Literature Review, conceptual and Theoretical framework of the study has been presented in the second chapter. Chapter three deals with findings related to the Civil War in South Sudan and its challenges to state building. Furthermore, this chapter looks into the underlying internal and external causes of the conflict. In Chapter four, analysis of the findings is undertaken in terms of theories that best explain the regional implications of South Sudan's state building failure. The last chapter draws conclusion from the findings and provides recommendations on the possible way of solving the ongoing crisis in South Sudan.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1. Literature Review**

Few studies dealing with the Civil Wars including its causes, dynamics and actors, peace building initiatives, the CPA, and the post-referendum issues have been conducted so far. Thus, it is necessary to critically review some of the existing works so as to elucidate their significance to the theme of this study. This chapter examines the protracted conflicts that have taken place for almost half a century between the central government of Sudan and the peripheral peoples of the south. The causes of the Sudanese Civil Wars that have occurred between north and south would be enunciated in this section. In addition, the post-CPA political developments are described and analyzed. Furthermore, concept of Civil War will be accentuated. Lastly, the basic concepts of civil war and theoretical Perspectives that best describe Civil War, in general and that of south Sudan conflict, in particular will be appraised and employed as a framework of analysis. To show and analyze the regional implication's of South Sudan civil war, the notion of Regional Security Complex Theory is also examined under this section.

##### **2.1.1. Overview of Civil War between North and South Sudan**

At present, most wars are fought within countries, rather than between countries. Particularly, in the wake of the end of Cold War, these conflicts are subsumed under the rubric of 'insurgencies', 'ethnic unrest', 'nationalist movements', or 'tribalism' (Nisbet, 1999). As a result, wars, armed violence and insecurity continue to bended Africa, thereby contributing to human suffering and obstructing poverty alleviation efforts across much of the continent. Many of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries experienced armed conflict in recent decades (Burgess, 2009). In the last decade, the majority of conflict-related deaths and injuries in the world have occurred in this region and large numbers of people continue to suffer from insecurity and different forms violence, which are intimately related to the ever-present challenges of poverty, governance failure and weak states in the region (ibid).

The Horn of Africa is known for decades as one of the geographical spaces marked by internal dissidence and interstate conflicts. Africa's longest Civil Wars occur in this region (Wasara, 2002). Among which, the prolonged Civil Wars in Sudan are said to be protracted in terms of its longevity in the Horn of Africa during the past two centuries.

Prior to their split, the history of Sudan and South Sudan was marred by colonization, exploitation, sectarianism and war (Attree, 2012). Sudan and South Sudan are culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse. They contain at least 19 major ethnic groups and 600 sub-groups (ibid). Relations and competition between different groups have been bound up in religious, racial and ethnic ideology. Wars and conflict faced the government of Sudan on every front, i.e., internally and externally. Internally, Sudan has been in continuous conflict with its Southern region for more than four decades (Daoud, 2012) and externally, it was under the colonial domination by the foreign countries almost for two centuries. Thus, after independence from Britain in 1956, the country witnessed four military coups in 1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989 (Attree, 2012). Prior to the independence of the country, in 1956, the Southern parts of the country were affected by socio-economic and political exploitation of the colonial states and that of the central government of Sudan. The mutiny of the South thus began prior to the country's independence in 1955 when the region refused to be governed by a small Arab elite stationed in Khartoum (Daoud, 2012). The South engaged in two civil wars against the government, which is reviewed in the following section. Both Civil Wars, the first (1955-1972) and the second (1983-2005), had a devastating impact on the people of the South. Accordingly, a number of scholars have advanced divergent views and accounts regarding the context and responsible factors for sparking and perpetuating the conflict between North and South Sudan.

### **2.1.2. Causes of Civil War**

Several factors underpin the civil wars in Sudan. Alier (1973) maintains that the North-South conflict "dates back to pre-colonial days and has its roots in cultural, racial, and economic antagonisms" that have led to a perpetual state of conflict. Hardallu (2001) and Collins (2008) also concur with the view that the genesis of the conflict is basically related to the interplay of a combination of historical, racial, economic, and political

factors some of which are associated with the events of the last 200 years. On the other hand, Boshoff (2005) argues that dispute over religion, identity, governance, inequality, resources, self-determination, autonomy, and secession are the main causes for the north-south conflict. Thus, it is imperative to examine its antecedents within the socio-historical, economic, and political context in order to properly understand the underlying factors associated with conflicts in Sudan.

### **Socio-Historical Factors**

The North-South conflict owes its genesis to the colonial past. Sudan's ethnically and religiously diverse people were brought together for the first time under a centralized government and administration during the Turko-Egyptian colonial rule that lasted between 1820-1882 (Beshir, 1984). Colonial rule was a brutal one for the South for it promoted the slave trade, which became a state activity and became rampant and widespread extending far into the South, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Darfur (Girma, 1997). In the late nineteenth century, slave trade reached its height when about millions of Southern Sudanese, predominantly from the Dinka country, were "enslaved and sold like cheap commodities" by Arab, European, Egyptian, and Turkish traders (Salih, 1994).

The insurgent group of northern Sudan under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed ibn al-Sayyid Abdallah brought an end to the Turko-Egyptian occupation in 1882 and subsequently British colonial rule was established and continued to dominate Sudan (Girma, 1997). Although the British intervened militarily, they were unable to stifle the Mahdist Movement. After the Mahdi's forces occupied Khartoum in 1885, they successfully established Sudan's first theocratic state and used Islam as a unifying force (ibid). Subsequently, like the preceding rule the peoples of South Sudan were treated cruelly and brutally under the Mahdist rule. Even if the slave trade had continued with greater vigor, the Arabic language and Islam were imposed on the South by force and 'Shari'a' became the law of the land (ibid). However, this failed to achieve the expected success in Sudan and only worsened the division between North and South (Francis, 1998). Despite strong resistance by Southerners against the government's action, they

were successfully suppressed by the Mahdi's military forces (Girma, 1997).

In 1898, the Mahdist state fell to the Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary forces and Sudan became a British colony for more than half of a century (ibid). With the advent of British rule, the expansion of Islamic culture was banned and replaced by the expansion of Christianity and the English by Christian missionaries in the South (Francis, 1998). Nevertheless, the educational monopoly held by these missionaries did not encourage the southerners' participation in the politics of Sudan (Collins, 2008). The discrepancy remained even more pronounced due to the introduction of separate administration for the South.

### **Economic and Political Factors**

Sudan is considered as one of the most socially unequal countries in the world and its people highly rely on its vast landmass as means of livelihood and survival. Sudan's economy heavily depends on the agriculture sector (80%). Whilst Khartoum serves as the financial capital where economic development is concentrated, the South possesses the rich land that fuels the economy (Fahmi, 2012). Southern Sudan has greater access to water and has much more fertile soil, whereas the north of the country is on the edge of the Sahara desert (ibid). But it is the northern part of the country that benefited from large irrigation systems of investment and the south was considered as having nothing worthy of mention in terms of investment (Francis, 1998).

Since the 1970s, the discovery and expansion of oil production in the southern part of the country came to play a significant role in the economy leading to competition between the peoples of Northern and Southern Sudan. Since the commencement of production, oil revenues contributed about 70% of Sudan's export earnings and 50% of its GDP and became very important for the Government of Sudan (GoS) (Fahmi, 2012). Therefore, the attempt by the GoS to control these resources to ensure survival of the Northern regime on the one hand, and the Southern resistance on the other contributed to Sudan's civil strife. Besides, since the largest part of the economic infrastructure and development projects were concentrated in the north-central region and very few economic, social, and administrative structures were built in the South (Girma, 1997), the periphery's

relationship with the central government has been characterized by exploitation and marginalization (Francis, 1998).

Daoud (2012) maintains that political power was concentrated in the hands of the few northerners resulting in political dominance that caused considerable resentment in the regional areas, particularly in the South and West. It also led the Southern, Western, and Eastern parts, to carry armed conflict against the government demanding either equitable political, socio-economic share or full-fledged secession. Hence, there has been an obvious long-term financial and geopolitical interest in territorially controlling Sudan's oil fields. This has been at the heart of North – South enmity and considerable armed violence (Tawl, 2011).

### **2.1.3. The First and the Second Sudanese Civil Wars**

This section highlights the First Sudanese Civil War following independence during the years between 1955 and 1972, and the Second Civil War from 1983 to 2005 along with the peace processes made to settle and end the Sudanese conflict.

#### **The First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)**

The Sudanese civil wars were a direct result of social, historical, economic, and political factors. Between Sudan's independence in 1956 and 1958, Khartoum was led by weak coalition governments that, among others had failed to contain the South's rebellion (Daoud, 2012). Johnson (2006) explains that the civil war began in 1955 before Sudan became officially independent. As a result of political uncertainty, Southern insurgents sparked off the separatist movement called the 'Anyanya' (AN) or 'guerrilla movement' in 1960 onwards with the purpose to organize guerilla attacks in the southern Sudan against the northern army ( Regasa, 2010)

As a symbol of increased opposition the AN escalated their attacks against the newly formed GoS with the aim of achieving autonomy for the South. This was met with further repressive action by the GoS, which further fuelled the conflict (Johnson, 2006). Johnson argues that it was the 1964 mutation that was seen as the true beginning of Sudan's civil war. In 1964 General Ibrahim Abboud became Sudan's President who tried to ensure

national unity by declaring Islamisation and Arabisation in the South. This move led to open revolts in the South and galvanized the AN into more effective organization forming the SSLM/A led under General Joseph Lagu who spearheaded the fight against GoS. Hence, the forced merger of the North and South Sudan into the fold of independent Sudanese nation-state and the ill-devised policies of the subsequent military and civilian regimes exacerbated the problem and engendered devastating civil wars between the two societies (Hamid, 1989).

In order to find solution to the conflict, the Addis Ababa peace Agreement (AAPA) was signed between the Nuiameri regime and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1972. In the Agreement, it was stipulated that Southern Sudan was entitled with wealth-sharing and power-sharing benefits signified by an arrangement of regional autonomy. Thus, the entire south would be a self-governing unit with its own legislative, executive and judicial institutions; English would serve as the working language of the region; and the Anya- Nya army would be integrated into the national army and serve in the South as part of the national army (Wama, 1997). However, the central assumption of the agreement to stall the quest for secession by limiting it to autonomy within the framework of national integration soon deteriorated due to short-sighted measures taken by the government. With the view to curtail any unified Southern opposition, the government amended the national constitution in 1980 dictating the division of Southern Sudan in to three provinces contrary to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. To make matters worse, the regime declared the imposition of ‘Sharia law’ in the country in 1983. Following the discovery of oil near Benitu in Southern Sudan, the government maneuvered to subsume the area within the territory of North Sudan (Girma, 1999) and the cumulative effect of these measures led to the abrogation of the 1972 Agreement and the resumption of another devastating conflict in the country spearheaded by the government and the SPLM/A (Wama, 1997).

### **The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)**

Sudan’s Second Civil War started as a continuation of the first civil war. It broke out in 1983, between the SPLM/A and the government taking place for the most part in Southern Sudan. It has been described as one of the longest and deadliest wars of the later



part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century during which approximately 1.9 million civilians were killed (UNHCR, 2001) and more than 4 million southerners have been forced to flee their homes.

There are few differences between the First and Second Civil Wars. Firstly, while the First Civil War was fought exclusively over autonomy issues, the discovery of oil in the late 1970s in the South added a resource factor to the Second. In turn, the conflict intensified as neither side wanted to lose the resource to the other. Additionally, while the conflict in the First War was limited to the north and South, conflicts multiplied beyond as rebel movements were growing in the east, west and north in the second. Finally, while the southerners in the First Civil War fought for the South's autonomy, in the second the South's leaders claimed an ideological affiliation to liberate the entire Sudan, and thus the name 'Sudan People's Liberation Army' (Johnson, 2006).

During the Second Civil War, the SPLA presented itself as a socialist movement that did not only intend to 'liberate' the Southerners but also all of Sudan. The predominant understanding in the Movement was that Sudan's problem is not 'the South' but the highly unrepresentative centre (Deng 2011). Even though the Second Civil War began in 1983 precipitating the overthrow of the Numeiry's regime, the advent of the newly democratically elected government after that could not end it. After a series of protracted efforts, the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A entered into negotiation and finally signed a historic peace agreement known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Naivasha Kenya, in 2005, which effectively ended Africa's longest civil war (Johnson, 2010). The CPA has been hailed as a serious and historic instrument that embodies provisions such as power sharing and wealth-sharing provisions, which are deemed necessary to alleviate the real causes of the conflict (Healy, 2008). The CPA established a six-year interim period and autonomy for the South, incorporated agreements on boundaries, security (where Southern rebels were to be integrated into the regular army), and equal revenue sharing from the South oil fields (a matter that caused concerns regarding peaceful North/South relations) (ibid). Furthermore, it set a timetable by which Southern Sudan would have a referendum to determine its future in January 2011.

#### **2.1.4. Post-CPA Political Developments**

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 marked the formal end of the protracted war that had ravaged southern Sudan since 1983 (Ylönen, 2012). As a result, the semi-autonomous government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was established in the regional capital Juba and in the ten southern states. Relative peace allowed many of those displaced by the war to return home and local markets and trade with neighboring countries flourished (UNHCR, 2010). Subsequently, the three arms of government: the Judiciary, the Executive and the Legislature began to work ceaselessly to build institutional capacities thus preparing Southern Sudan for the greater role of becoming a new nation (Debay, 2012). Moreover, the SPLA has also attempted to transform itself into a National Army and the six years since the signing of the CPA has also resulted in the formation of requisite institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Auditor General's Chamber, and the Peace Commission, among others (ibid).

The CPA paved the way for the replacement of the state-imposed political, economic and social order with a regionally-based system in the South. This regional political-economic order was centered on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) as the strongest local political actor in Southern Sudan (Ylönen, 2012). The SPLM facilitated the participation of other political parties in Government (GoSS) and their representation in parliament. It has also spearheaded a number of dialogues with Sudanese political parties and civil society groups, including traditional chiefs and community leaders to bring about national reconciliation and healing for sustainable peace. GoSS together with the 10 State Governors, held annual Governors' Forums to address developmental issues at state level. It has also embarked on Public Service Reforms aimed at bringing about a lean but efficient and effective Civil Service in the post-CPA period (Debay, 2012).

During the six year interim period since 2005, South Sudan also paved the way for tangible peace building and conflict prevention (ibid). Largely conditioned by the commitment to peace through state building, the CPA adopted a prominent security structure as well as an emphasis on sharing political power and wealth (CPA, 2005).

Donor countries, United Nations agencies and international and national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have worked diligently to ensure that security, social and physical infrastructure development projects are prioritized (Ylönen, 2012). Consequently, Southern Sudan was poised to reap the benefits of the peace dividend. Overall, many of the provisions of the CPA have been implemented except some murky areas where there was no progress. While all of these accomplishments are rewarding, as Southern Sudan moves from semi-autonomous to independent state, tensions are high with fears of internal insecurity and external aggression (Deng, 2011).

Between 2005 and 2011, the implementation of CPA increasingly came under threat and its implementation seriously fell behind schedule. Following two postponements, Sudan-wide elections were scheduled for April 2010. In January 2011, the people of Southern Sudan were set to hold a referendum in which they will decide whether to remain part of a united Sudan or to secede. Both these events presented risks of serious instability (UNHCR, 2010). However, there was no violence associated with the January 2011 Referendum process, but there has been serious displacement and violence in three main areas: Jonglei, Malakal and Abyei, as a reminder of how quickly violence can erupt and the devastating impact it can have on the livelihoods of people who were barely recovering from decades of civil war. These three areas remain key flashpoints for current and future violence and the response of national and international actors to the violence being perpetrated (Debay, 2012).

There is potential for serious social, political and military challenges to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), which could complicate the process of state formation in the newly independent state (Deng, 2012). As South Sudan focuses on recovery and development, a number of key challenges are in the process of emerging. The recent tensions in north-south border regions have also highlighted several security issues that constitute potential flashpoints for renewed conflict, including the environmental impacts of the oil industry and the management of the country's water resources (Ylönen, 2012). In this regard Debay (2012) maintains that after South Sudan got its independence and became sovereign state, security issues will persist to exploit large amount of human and capital resources. Hence, through plans of Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration (DDR) it is intended to shift the traditional forms of security into the modernized forms of defence forces. Similarly, as returnees are resettled, and food security improves, the need for humanitarian assistance is expected to decline as well.

Moreover, between 2011 to 2012 most violence experienced within South Sudan appears to be related to deeper problems of governance failure, lack of security, rule of law and poor economic opportunity, especially in rural and pastoralist regions, rather than new tensions on the issues of independence (Reeve, 2012). However, conflicts and incidences of violence were largely isolated and none constituted a major threat to the state as a whole. Most violent conflicts continued to be in some way connected to cattle rustling, but the dynamic evolved further towards escalating cycles of inter-communal violence and the deliberate targeting of women, children and civilian centers (ibid). Rebel militia activity also increased in local severity, as did violent responses by the army, but remained geographically confined to areas of Greater Upper Nile historically prone to schisms of armed factions (ibid).

### **2.1.5. The South Sudan Civil War after Independence**

The recent history of the Republic of South Sudan following independence has been troubled. When the South Sudanese voted for independence in 2011, many of them foresaw a bright future of freedom, peace, development and prosperity. The international community too expected progress in the new country. Yet since South Sudan's independence, the world has mostly received miserable news from the country (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). The recent political and violent conflict between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar, who are the leading members of the SPLM/A, represents a new dimension of instability. The conflict could potentially result in a failed state, an outcome that could destabilize the whole region (ACODE, 2014).

The current crisis began in July 2013, when President Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet including his chief rival, Vice President Riek Machar, without any justification (Sørnbø, 2014 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014). One month later, President Kiir also removed two state governors, who were suspected of representing a threat to national security (Gil, 2014). Power restructuring continued with the dissolution of all SPLM structures on 15

November (ibid). Analysts agree that Kiir's move entailed a power struggle that had been taking place within South Sudan's ruling party, the SPLM (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). A number of senior SPLM members, including Machar and the SPLM's Secretary-General, Pagan Amum, had increasingly viewed Kiir's leadership as autocratic. Kiir's decision was apparently also further driven by Machar's aspirations to run as the SPLM's presidential candidate in the upcoming elections in 2015 (Sudd Institute, 2014).

On 16 December 2013, fighting erupted between the Nuer and the Dinka fractions of the Presidential Guard in Juba. According to military sources, the fighting started when unexpected changes were made to the guards' deployment (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). Other reports stated that fighting broke out after President Kiir ordered the arrest of dissident politicians (ibid). The events of 15-16 December 2013 marked the beginning of violent conflict and its escalation into an open civil war. Following the initial clash, Kiir accused Machar and other SPLM officials of attempting a coup against his government whereas Machar in turn denied any involvement in the events (Sudd Insititue, 2014). Several government officials were arrested for their alleged links to the violence, including Pagan Amum and Machar fled Juba for Jonglei State. In the following days, targeted ethnic killings of civilians took place in Juba, illustrating the immediate ethnic implications of the political power struggle between Kiir and Machar (Gil, 2014). During the days and weeks after the clashes erupted in Juba, heavy fighting between army units loyal to the government and soldiers loyal to ethnic leader spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity, Central Equatoria, and Upper Nile (International Crisis Group, 2014) and it was reported Machar had the support of 10,000 recent army deserters and a number of local militias (ibid).

In December 2013, rebels held the strategically important towns of Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal. The latter two are particularly important centers of oil production. Using aerial bombardment allegedly carried out by the Ugandan army, the government was able to regain control of Bor and Bentiu (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). Control over Malakal and Bentiu has shifted hands between rebel forces and government troops several times since the end of 2013 (ibid). While the army has secured a number of strategically important targets such as major towns and oil infrastructure, the rebels have retreated into the bush

and started attacking government troops using guerilla tactics (International Crisis Group, 2014). On 21 December 2013, Riek Machar officially took leadership of an armed rebellion based in the northern part of the country involving mainly Nuer commanders and troops. The fighting rapidly escalated as the armed forces split along political and ethnic lines and conflict spread to important parts of the country (Gil, 2014).

The violent conflict that erupted in South Sudan and pushed the country towards civil war is the result of diverse factors. These are: political disputes between members of the country's leadership, a dysfunctional political system, and historical distrust between the Dinka and the Nuer (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). As asserted by the Sudd Institute (2014), the current crisis in Republic of South Sudan developed strictly as a political issue within the party, but there were underlying post-CPA issues that had not been addressed. Particularly, there are three main social factors that could have played a significant role in escalating what can be strictly stated as political dispute into an open war. These include the history of the liberation process induced ethnic rivalry, disequilibrium in the army, and poor social and economic conditions (ibid).

The current violence that lasted for more than a year has severely deteriorated the humanitarian, economic and political situation in South Sudan and in its neighboring countries (Gil, 2014). Both sides in the conflict seem to have committed atrocities especially in the two cities of Bor and Bentiu that have been seriously damaged (ACODE, 2014). Since December 2013 when fighting erupted in Juba, seven South Sudan's states have been affected by the violence, that has left an estimated 23,000 people dead and over one million displaced (UNHCR, 2014). Large sections of the South Sudanese population have faced atrocities, displacement and food shortages. At the beginning of May 2013, fighting and food insecurity had forced more than 400,000 people to flee to neighboring countries. In the course of which more than 100,000 South Sudanese refugees had entered Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda (ibid). UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations are trying to help about 3.7 million people at high risk of severe food insecurity (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Although it is difficult to quantify the decline in South Sudan's economy that resulted from the conflict, severe economic effects have become increasingly apparent, as signified by the country's fiscal position that has deteriorated as a result of reduction in government revenues (Sudd Institute, 2014). This led to budgetary constraints and the abandonment of government plans to increase investment. The disruption of oil production due to the violence has had the largest economic impact, as 98 % of the government's income was generated from the oil industry (International Crisis Group, 2014). The violence and instability also affected the small traders and large firms from Kenya and South Sudan's other growing trade partner. The conflict has also impacted regional economic and political integration. For instance, it has eroded South Sudan's previously slim chance of being admitted to the East African Community in 2014 (Koos and Gutschke, 2014).

In order to end the civil war in South Sudan, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), quickly mandated three envoys to broker a peace deal between the Southern Sudan government and SPLM/A in opposition. Under the auspices of IGAD, the warring parties signed a cease-fire deal on 23 January 2014 (Gil, 2014), that was repeatedly violated. On 10 April 2014, four months after the out-break of violence, Machar's spokesman announced that the rebels were planning to establish a nationwide rebel government intended to collectively and adequately address the current concerns associated with peace, security as well as humanitarian situation in the country (Sudan Tribune, 2014). Further peace talks between Kiir and Machar, mostly about the destiny of four former senior government officials, including sacked SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum, were still stalled since the end of April (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). On 9 May, after the detainees had been released from prison and in response to international pressure to end the violence, Kiir and Machar agreed on a one-month cease-fire and signed a peace deal. Yet only hours after signing, each party accused the other of attacking its opponent's troops in several locations (Sudan Tribune, 2014). In general, Koos and Gutschke (2014) maintain that both Kiir and Machar have demonstrated relatively little desire to reach a compromise during the peace talks. Despite the fact that thousands of civilians have been killed in recent violence and almost one million people

remain displaced, the protagonists remain unwilling to overcome their largely interpersonal dispute.

## **2.2. Conceptual and theoretical framework**

Under this section the conceptual understanding of state building and Civil War will be elucidated by explaining the definition of the terms. The prominent theoretical perspectives that shed light in the process of the persistent civil wars are also discussed here. Finally, the notion of Regional Security Complex is also examined and reviewed.

### **2.2.1. Conceptual framework**

Concepts of ‘state building’ and other terms that are related to state building like ‘peace building’ and ‘nation building’ are discussed below.

#### **State Building**

Since the 1990s, state-building is widely understood as the set of actions undertaken by national or international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been eroded (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). State-building refers to the establishment or re-establishment and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods (Bogdandy et al, 2005). Similarly, state-building has been defined in the OECD DAC Finding Paper as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations” (OECD, 2011:20).

Accordingly, the process of state-building must be understood against the background of long-term historical and structural factors that contribute to shaping the contours of state formation and the nature of state-society relations. It must be also realized within the exigencies of current circumstances in the country concerned (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). These may include, for example, the risk of conflict or effects of previous conflict either internally or on the region, or the impact of economic pressures generated by global recession, debt, limited trade opportunities, financial imbalances and commodity prices (OECD, 2011, Bogdandy et al, 2005). In relation to this, Brinkerhoff (2007) argues that the key goals of state-building include provision of security, establishment of the rule of



law, effective delivery of basic goods and services through functional formal state institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for the new set of state institutions being built. It is clear that state-building is primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited. But the community of development partners and their governments can broadly contribute to support and facilitate the political and institutional processes that can strengthen the foundations of a resilient state and society (OECD, 2011). According to Fritz and Menocal (2007), State-building is especially challenging when it takes place in conflict-ridden environments and places where criminal or other forms of violence are prevalent or where the threat of violent conflict looms.

Furthermore, when talking about state-building there are other terms that are closely related: 'nation building' and 'peace building'. There is confusion over the meaning of these terms and some authors use the terms interchangeably, some with completely different meanings. In general, most people use 'state-building' to refer to interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state (Scott, 2007). In contrast, 'nation-building' refers to the creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). It also refers to the process of constructing a shared sense of identity and common destiny, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences and to counter alternative sources of identity and loyalty (Bogdandy et al., 2005). On the other hand, peace-building cannot just be about ending violence, but also about creating sustainable peace. The focus on sustainable peace has prevented peace-builders from withdrawal of situations after the cessation of violent conflict rather they have been forced to work on state-building activities like democratization, capacitating the bureaucracy, building justice systems, etc. (Scott, 2007). Hence, despite the growing tendency in policy usage to equate the three terms, state-building is a process distinct from nation-building and peace building.

States failure become fragile when state structures lack the political will or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and safeguard the security and human rights of their populations (Bogdandy et al., 2005). International or national engagement thus need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the

relationship between state and society (Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Importantly, current policy discussions on state-building refer to what may be more precisely termed either *state-rebuilding* (in post-conflict situations) or state strengthening (i.e. increasing capacity in fragile and weak states) that should be usually combined with efforts to make states more responsive and accountable (OECD, 2011).

After becoming independent on July 9 2011, South Sudan became the international community's next big state building project. The key objective of external support is to stabilize a state that is emerging from decades of civil war, riven by internal conflict and marred by underdevelopment (Lacher, 2012). Donors are hoping to prevent South Sudan from imploding under its internal tensions and to preclude further destabilization of the conflict-ridden region spanning the Horn of Africa. In addition, foreign assistance is also aimed at reducing the potential for conflict with Sudan (ibid). However, building a state in a vast and landlocked territory would be an extremely challenging task even in the absence of conflict. But South Sudan is not at peace (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). The political and ethnic splits that plagued the South during the Second Civil War and the CPA interim period unsurprisingly continue in the independent country today, greatly complicating the already daunting prospect of building the new state (ibid).

Hence, it is obvious that South Sudan faces enormous challenges. Even under a strong development- oriented leadership and with effective international assistance, progress in state building will be likely slow (Ylönen, 2012). Lacher (2012) maintains that the new state faces a number of mutually reinforcing structural obstacles such as lack of basic infrastructure, the weak development of markets, and the lasting legacy of insecurity left by the civil war. However, the political conditions are far from constituting a favorable context for state building (ibid). The facade of a powerful governing party-SPLM and SPLA dominating the political scene is misleading. The political elite as a whole are riven by internal divisions and divided into competing interest groups (Nyong'o, 2011). In its quest for the stability, the South Sudanese leadership is vulnerable to the demands of the innumerable rival groups for political inclusion and access to the resources of the state (ibid). Thus, despite the fact that the political leaders were given the task of building

a state with the assistance of the international community, South Sudan was triggered by power struggle within the ruling SPLM. This led to the crisis that quickly took on an atrocious dimension because it fed off of a society that has not been at peace with itself for a long period of time (Koos and Gutschke, 2014).

### **Civil war**

The term civil war has various definitions and refers to various terms such as ‘internal conflicts’, ‘political violence’, ‘armed conflict’, ‘civil strife’, ‘civil conflict’ and ‘new war’. Sivard (1996) defines civil war in terms of any violence resulting in more than 1,000 conflict- related deaths per annum. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also define civil war as intra-state conflict with at least 1000 battle-related deaths with both rebel group and government troops suffering human losses and the latter at least suffering 5% of those losses. Green (1997) defines civil war as ‘generalized, sustained violence afflicting most or all of a state’.

Sterwart, Humphreys, and Lea (1997) conceptualize civil war in terms of major participants on different sides as being groups within a state with a political goal of challenging or upholding government authority that involve large scale violence. Gurr (1997) defines political violence as collective attack within a political community against the political regime that involves the use of violence to attain ends within or outside the political order. He identifies three forms of political violence, namely: ‘turmoil’, which is relatively spontaneous and an organized political violence with substantial popular participation; ‘conspiracy’, which is highly organized political violence with limited participation; and ‘internal war’, which is highly organized political violence designed to overthrow the regime in power with widespread popular participation. Eckstein (1965) defines internal war as ‘any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rules, policies’.

Small and Singer (1982) also define civil war as any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metro-pole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance from both sides. The main distinction between civil and an international war, therefore concerns the internality of the war to the territory

of a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant. Civil war is further distinguished from other forms of internal armed conflict by the requirement that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated, and that the war exceeds a certain threshold of the deaths of more than 1,000 in a typical sense (Lindemann, 2008). While civil war is normally portrayed as a breakdown of 'normal' peacetime economic, political, and social development, it is not only as the breakdown of society but also as a way of reordering society in particular ways (Berdal and Malone, 2000).

Civil war became pronounced in many African countries since the end of the Cold War. Sub-Saharan Africa is typically perceived as doomed with almost inescapable violent conflicts, in which 20% of the populations live in countries that are at war with themselves and low intensity conflict has become endemic to many other African countries (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). The region expounds high values for all major risk factors commonly associated with the onset of civil war. These include high ethnic fragmentation, extremely poor economic performance, persistent inequalities, worsening environmental scarcities, high dependence on primary commodity exports, and weak democratic institutions riddled with neo-patrimonial rule (Lindemann, 2008).

Hence, Sub-Saharan Africa is the world's most conflict intensive region, with 24 out of 48 countries having experienced at least one period of civil war over the past 50 years (ibid). Particularly, civil war has become a way of life in some countries. In Angola, two generations have grown up under conditions of civil war since they have never lived under conditions of peace and stability and do not know what peaceful development of the state is about (Hironaka, 2005). In the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, decades-long civil wars were unfortunately became too common in some countries of Africa. Countries such as Angola, Somalia and Nigeria have experienced civil wars during their entire history as independent states. Other countries such as Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Sudan have been embroiled in seemingly intractable civil wars throughout much of their history (ibid). Sudan and Uganda have witnessed the most deadly campaigns of one-sided violence over this period (Williams, 2014).

### **2.2.2. Theoretical framework**

In spite of the prevailing recognition among scholars and policy-makers about the growing problem of civil war, there is no scholarly agreement about the essence of civil wars. However, the various approaches on civil war could be considered from five perspectives in this study and can be combined to explain how the interaction of these factors leads to the current civil war in South Sudan. Hence, this section discusses the theoretical approaches of the proposed framework for understanding civil war.

#### ***i. Manipulative Elite Theory***

This theory of civil war assumes fragility in ethnic group relations and social construction of identities, but focuses on top-down rather than bottom-up mobilization (Gagnon 1994). Elites contend for power by manipulating social divisions and blowing them out of proportion with threat, fear and hate discourse and propaganda, ruling out compromise and pursuing aggressive crisis politics (ibid). Manipulative Elite theory is an opportunity centered conflict theory in as much as elites create opportunities with issues and crisis to advance their interests and goals (Tilly, 2003). Conciliation is difficult when rival leaders demonize their adversaries as those who can never be trusted and must therefore be defeated, dominated or ethnically cleansed (Gagnon 1994). In order to facilitate conciliation there is pressure and sanctions by external states and international agencies on ethno-national leaders (Tilly, 2003).

#### ***ii. Ethnic Mobilization Theory***

This theory is based on reaction to economic and political discrimination that affects certain sections of society (Schock, 1996). Ethnicity is an independent variable and its role is to explain the probability of the outcome of civil war at the beginning and end (Kalyvas, 2005). Sambanis (2004) views ethnic conflict among groups and the state capitalists that may be tempted to divide the workers along ethnic lines giving high wages and senior positions to the members of dominant ethnic group while marginalizing other smaller ethnic groups aimed at making huge profit. Ethnic groups can be distinguished by skin colour, appearance, language, religion and some attributes of a common origin or their combination (Horowitz, 1985). The conflicting ethnic groups hold onto their

identities and do not accept other identities (Kaufman, 1996). According to Ali (2009), societies consisting of various segments may have complaints and grievances that can lead to occurrence of violence in the quest for resolving them. For example, hatred between different ethnic and religious groups is one of the major causes of civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2008). Political exclusion may also happen when certain section of society is marginalized and discriminated against from governing a particular country (ibid).

### **iii. Ethnic Diversity Theory**

The ethnic diversity theory argument comes in two main variants: ‘ethnic fractionalization’ and ‘ethnic polarization’. Ethnic fractionalization assumes a linear relationship between ethnic segmentation and violent conflict whereby high degree of fragmentation makes a country more prone to civil war (Lindemann, 2008). One can broadly distinguish between perennialist and modernist lines of argument. While perennialists stress the primordial nature of ethnic differences and suggest that these make political stability difficult to achieve, modernist argue that it is the advent of the modern state that leads to the politicization of cultural difference leading to the rise of destabilizing ethnic nationalism (ibid). Hence, ethnic fractionalization is clearly important in explaining a broad category of armed conflict that includes minor scale insurgency (Sambanis 2004). On the other hand, Ethnic polarization holds that the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is non-monotonic, with less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries (Lindemann, 2008).

### **iv. Economic Conflict Theory**

This theory assumes that there is a relationship between a country’s economic performance and its vulnerability to the onset of civil war (Sambanis 2004). The two most common factors used to assess the impact of economic theory of conflict are *income levels* and *economic growth*. The former holds that the onset of large-scale violent conflict is related to the existence of economic deterioration and lower income levels that are significantly associated with higher civil war risks (Lindemann, 2008). The latter assumes a link between a country’s economic growth rate and the onset of large-scale

violent conflict, in which low economic growth makes a country more prone to civil war (ibid).

Economic theory of conflict holds that ethnic divisions have been over-rated as root causes of civil wars that occurs in underdeveloped countries with weak governments that are ethnically divided (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Collier (2004) argues that the root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development, in which neither good political institutions nor ethnic and religious homogeneity will able to provide significant defence against large-scale violence. Collier (2004) also asserts that what causes the civil war is the presence and durability of a rebel army with financial and military capabilities. War lords and violence entrepreneurs organize unemployed youths into armed groups. They may initially be motivated by political goals, but over time they tend to resort to criminal activities for financing rebellion, that becomes entrenched as a way of life. Facilitators of rebellion are mountains, rainforests, weak and corrupt government. Collier *et al* (2007) interpret the Economic theory of conflict as focusing on the feasibility of the rebellion. The original objectives of the rebels are not the ones that push them to start war. If the rebellion is feasible it will occur regardless of the objective. The feasibility hypothesis concludes that when rebellion is feasible civil war will occur no matter the circumstance (Ali, 2009).

#### **v. Relative Deprivation theory**

One of the oldest and most intuitive ideas about violent conflict is that it stems from the existence of economic inequalities. This inequality comes in two variants: ‘dominant variant’ and ‘minority variant’. The first focuses on the impact of inter-personal or ‘vertical’ inequalities, while the second emphasizes on the significance of inter-group or ‘horizontal’ inequalities (Stewart, 2000). If people are convinced that there is a gap between what they perceive, deserve and actually get, they will likely develop discontent and this can lead to rebellion (ibid). Hence, the origin of the Relative Deprivation Theory stresses the degree of the economic inequality in a society (Schock, 1996). It also emanates from one’s judgment in respect to one’s circumstances and social status in the society following which discontent, anger and resentment and other emotional factors prevail (Douma, 2006). Their intensity depends on the degree of the

subjective evaluation of one's standing or status in the community as one feels is owed by society. How an individual manages the self over desired outcomes is the most important focus of the theory (ibid).

### **2.3. Regional Security Complex Theory**

Security complex theory was first brought forward by Barry Buzan in his book entitled 'People, States and Fear' (1991) that aimed to set a conceptual framework to provide a critical understanding to security studies (Coskun, 2006). Security complex is a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan, 1991). The complexities are held together not by the positive influences of shared interest but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of military, political, economic, societal and environmental factors (Sheehan, 2005). In security terms, Buzan argued that a 'Region' 'means a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other (Buzan, 1991). Moreover, military and political threats are more significant and these are potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range.

Buzan stressed that regional security systems such as South Asia with, for instance, the military standoff between India and Pakistan can be seen in terms of balance of power as well as patterns of amity, in which relationships involves genuine friendship as well as expectations of protection or support, and of enmity, in which the interactions set by suspicion and fear arising from border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations, long-standing historical links, whether positive or negative (ibid). According to Buzan, these patterns are confined in a particular geographical area. Hence, the term security complex is designate the ensuing formation (Buzan & Weaver, 2003).

Buzan's concept of Regional Security Complex offers a feasible tool for conceptualizing regional security in the contemporary international system by making at least two very significant contributions. First, it brings out the relative importance of regional security



analysis vis-a-vis other (i.e. national and global) levels of analysis of the international security system (ibid). Second, it offers the necessary criteria for self-definition that are rooted within indigenous patterns of security interdependence rather than general and systemic factors shaping the nature of the international security system (ibid). However, security complexes are exposed to four major types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts that are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts that arise from trans-national threats caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation or resource scarcity (Buzan, 1991).

Fortunately, this theoretical framework provides an adequate unit of analysis that facilitates comparison and generalizations to a very high degree. It is also comprehensive and adaptable enough to be applied to the Horn of Africa because the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant and how strong or weak. Hence, given its geo-political position and interest the conflict in South Sudan has quickly assumed an international dimension with the potential to destabilize the entire Central and Eastern Africa sub-region and beyond. Accordingly, the study uses the Regional Security Complex as the theoretical framework to analyze and show how South Sudan's civil war has implications to the Horn of Africa sub-region in the political, economic and social sense. Hence, applying Buzan's theory provides deeper insights into how different types of conflict suddenly erupt and quickly spread in space and time.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN AND CHALLENGE TO STATE BUILDING**

#### **Introduction**

South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011, following the end of a devastating protracted Civil War of a tortured history characterized by slavery, colonialism and ethnic violence as key features of its political landscape (ACODE, 2014). As Stefan Wolff (2012) puts, the independence of South Sudan statehood was accomplished in a three step process: a referendum on 9 January 2011 confirmed the South Sudanese people's overwhelming desire to separate from the rest of Sudan; on 9 July 2011 independence was officially declared, and on 14 July 2011 South Sudan was admitted to the United Nations as its 193<sup>rd</sup> member state. The independence of the South may not have been a foregone conclusion, but it was foreseen as an option in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) (ibid).

However, the transition to independence and statehood could be viewed as circumscribed by sets of formidable challenges. First, in the context of the state-building process, the political economy of the new state continued to be shaped for while by the historical evolution of its relation with Northern Sudan signified by the fact that the two countries have a long history of war and mistrust with an uncertain future (Kameir, 2011). Second, the implementation of the CPA provisions has left a number of unresolved issues leading to disputes between North and South Sudan associated with border demarcation, Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile (Debay, 2010). Wolff (2012) maintains that the CPA failed to resolve all of the problems between the two sides—partly because the agreement was not fully implemented and partly because some issues were either left for later negotiations or not foreseen. Most critical among these were questions concerning borders and oil revenues, both of which brought north and South back to the brink of all-out war in April 2012. On the other hand, Kameir (2011) stated that the South is besieged by the daunting challenge of state-building with respect to both legitimacy and accountability, related to democratic governance, peace building and human rights, and

the fulfillment of the state's core functions such as security and justice, service delivery, mobilization of revenue, facilitating economic development, and employment generation. Therefore, after South Sudan gained independence most of these issues remain unresolved. Yet, a number of factors that are at the heart of South Sudan's problems include: inter-communal conflicts, political disputes and insurgencies, complex humanitarian crisis, collapse of the economy, and the lack of constructive relations between the government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoRSS) and the GoS. These are the challenges that the world's newest state has had to confront in the years after independence. Hence, directly or indirectly, these challenges resulted in the violent conflict that erupted in the December 2013 in the Republic of South Sudan, that has suffered a tremendous political and social upheaval that turned into major violence engulfing significant parts of the country. Based on the available studies, this chapter elucidates the underlying causes of Civil War that assumed to be internally and externally-driven. Attempts also made to look at the internal and external actors that are implicitly or explicitly involved in South Sudanese conflict, and analyze and examine South Sudan's Civil War as a challenge to state building.

### **3.1. Underlying Causes of Civil War in South Sudan**

There are varying views on the causes that relate to the current conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and hence, it is important to underlie some common and specific factors that underlie the conflict in South Sudan. The current conflict in South Sudan reflects a diverse set of drivers. According to some studies, the conflict is often viewed as the effect of: the outstanding political and economic issues of the country and the political struggle between the two top leaders: President Salva Kiir and former Vice president Reak Machar (Le Riche, 2014). Hammerstad (2005) asserted that the root causes of the South Sudanese conflict vary in scope from inter and intra-tribal and regional conflicts and from competition over dwindling natural resources to the quest political power. Importantly, the Sudd Institute (2014) also maintains that although the underlying post-CPA social issues had not been addressed, the current crisis in the Republic of South Sudan developed strictly as a political issue within the ruling party. There are three main factors that have played a significant role in escalating a political dispute into an open war. These

include the history of the liberation process that induced ethnic rivalry, disequilibrium in the army, and poor social development. Awolich & Akol (2013) and the Sudd Institute (2014) explain that prior to the violence, a number of factors that include skewed power structure within the party, the weak institutional restraints on excessive power in the hands of few individuals, lack of adherence to the party constitution, and the growing number of factions and power centers within the SPLM.

### **3.1.1. Internal Factors**

South Sudan's declaration of independence in July 2011 marks the culmination of prolonged civil war between North and South Sudan. However, in December 2013 Civil War became re-emerged in South Sudan after independence. Hence, this section reviews the internal causes of civil war within South Sudan.

#### **Political Rivalry within the SPLM/A (1991- 2005)**

Long before the outbreak of violence in December 2013, political stability in South Sudan was threatened by the unresolved and protracted rivalries between President Kiir and former Vice President Machar, dating back to the 1990s (Gil, 2014). Hence, the current internal crises within the SPLM/A could be traced back to the establishment of the SPLM/A itself. At the beginning of the birth of the movement in 1983, disagreement over vision and leadership within the party led to an internal fight between two factions (Sudd Institute, 2014). One faction was made up of 'Separatists' whose primary objective was an outright independence of South Sudan and the other faction comprised 'Unionists' who wanted to fight for the transformation of the old Sudan into a 'New Sudan' (Nyaba, 1996). Although the differences were basically tactical and ideological, the fight that ensued between these two factions pitted the Nuer against the Dinka in the end, thereby resulting in the beginning of political rivalry (Sudd Institute, 2014). The SPLM 'Unionists' won eventually and the leaders of the 'Separatist' faction were either neutralized or absorbed into the SPLM/A. Many of the militia problems that confronted the SPLA throughout the course of the liberation struggle, particularly in Upper Nile were rooted in this history and are linked to the current crisis (Ibid).

After being a major in Sudan's national army, Kiir joined the SPLM led by John Garang

**Comment [u1]:** Salva kir ...SPLA weakness

in 1983, and helped in forming the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). By contrast, Machar entered the SPLM/A in 1984 (Gil, 2014 and Sudd Institute, 2014). Disapproving Garang's objective of a 'United Sudan' with recognition of the South and fighting for South Sudan's secession, Machar broke away and formed the SPLM/A Nasir group in 1991, which evolved, and became the 'South Sudan Independence Movement/Army' (SSIM/A) in 1995 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011 and Sudd Institute, 2014). This split led to serious internal conflicts between the Nuers and the Dinka, culminating in massive displacement and deaths in the two communities. Khartoum uses Riek Machar as new proxy in the civil war in what had been a relatively successful counter-insurgency tactic against the SPLM/A. (Koos & Gutschke, 2014; Awolich, 2014 and Gil, 2014)

As a result of internal tensions within his group that was weakened militarily, Riek Machar decided to pursue a peace agreement with the Sudanese government and eventually negotiated and signed what was known as the Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). In 2002, Riek Machar realized that the Khartoum Peace Agreement was a travesty as the government successfully stifled any chance for its meaningful implementation, following which he started communicating with John Garang, then leader of the SPLM/A (Sudd Institute, 2014). In January 2002, Machar welcomed and agreed to merge back into Garang's SPLA, and he was made the third man in the SPLM's power structure. The return of Riek Machar and Lam Akol to the SPLM helped to unite the people of South Sudan prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (Ibid).

### **Post- CPA Power Struggle within SPLM/A (2005- 2013)**

After Garang's death in 2005, his deputy, Salva Kiir Mayardit, became the SPLM chairman and commander-in-chief of the SPLA, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, and the first vice president of the Republic of Sudan, Riek Machar became his deputy and Lam Akol became the foreign minister of the Sudan (Sudd Institute, 2014). This was largely to appease ethnic tensions and launch a process of reconciliation and national cohesion. The prospects for the envisaged referendum and independence of South Sudan propelled this unity, as South Sudan's secession was the

one thing only few South Sudanese disagreed with (Gil, 2014).

After the signing of the CPA, the SPLM held its Second National Convention in 2008. In this convention, signs of power struggle emerged as Riek Machar sought to contest for the SPLM chairmanship, a position that would make him president in the 2010 elections (Awolich and Akol, 2013). However, President Salva Kiir retained his position and also expressed publicly that he did not want to work with Riek Machar and then SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum, intending to appoint people of his choice (Sudd institute, 2014). Even though the meeting was highly politicized, the delegates voted to keep the status quo to ensure continuity and unity within the party in the face of the 2010 Elections against Sudan's ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP). Hence, Kiir was reconfirmed as the chairman, Riek Machar his first deputy, and Pagan Amum the secretary general (Awolich & Akol, 2013; Gil, 2014 and Sudd Institute, 2014).

Despite the fact that Salva Kiir chose Riek Machar as his running partner to keep the party's and people's unity, the 2010 Elections created another source of tensions within the SPLM. The undemocratic procedures to choose party candidates for various political positions used by the Political Bureau (SPLM's highest political organ) ensued and hurt relations among companions within the party (Awolich, 2013). Those who were not selected to contest on the SPLM tickets stood as independent candidates, and most of them lost in the elections. This move fundamentally led to some notable rebellions in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. The rebellion was led by David Yau Yau, George Athor, Johnson Oliny, Gatluak Gai and others particularly, from this areas (Sudd Institute, 2014). Regardless of the differences over the 2010 elections, the SPLM leaders stood together and led the country towards the referendum and the subsequent independence (Awolich & Akol, 2013). The people of South Sudan were more united during the referendum than any other time before. It was hoped that the leaders would take advantage of this unity to build a new state that accommodated all (Sudd Institute, 2014). However, these hopes were dashed just weeks before independence when reports emerged that the president and the vice president were at odds over some articles in the transitional constitution. The president accused the Vice President of an attempt to run a parallel government (Ibid).

Even if the problem was solved and the two leaders apparently buried their differences, the origin of the current intra-party power struggle is alleged to have reappeared in late 2012 (Awolich & Akol, 2013 and International Crisis Group, 2014). The highest members of the Political Bureau visited South Sudan's ten states, which was for the purpose of giving thanks to the people for their strong support during the years of the liberation struggle and of leading a successful referendum that guaranteed independence (Awolich & Akol, 2013 and Sudd Institute, 2014). Instead of congratulatory intentions, these political leaders quickly found a condemnation of the party alleging that the government had not been able to deliver the highly required services such as road networks, health facilities, security and education, among others (Awolich and Akol, 2013). In March 2013, after the return of the SPLM leaders from the field, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held to deliberate on the criticisms. At the meeting, the top party leaders blamed each other for the noticeable failure in the political, economic and social conditions (Sudd Institute, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013). Particularly, Pagan Amum and Riek Machar challenged the President openly, blaming him for failing the party and declared their intentions to dethrone him from the party chairmanship in the next 2015 SPLM National Convention (ibid).

At the end of the meeting, the Political Bureau was apparently divided and people became increasingly angry. The President took the challenges presented against him as an attack on his personal character. To show his frustration, in April 2013 he removes delegated powers from Riek Machar and rumors of government reshuffle followed thereafter (Awolich, 2013 and Blanchard, 2014). By July 2013, especially on the occasion of South Sudan's Independence Anniversary, the split within the party became clear. Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General, who normally ran the ceremony of such events, was absent. Even during the anniversary commemoration, the President deliberately refused to acknowledge the presence of Riek Machar at the ceremony (Awolich, 2013 and Sudd Institute, 2014). After the Independence Anniversary, party officials were talking publicly about the internal party politics centered on the political disagreements over the party's leadership and future direction that highly led to splits (International Crisis Group, 2014). While the situation in the party was going out of control, the President decided to dissolve the entire cabinet, including the sacking of top

leaders like Riek Machar (the ex-vice president) and Pagan Amum (the SPLM Secretary General) (Koos and & Gutschke and Sudd Institute, 2014). This action of the president resulted in the creation of a new government that excluded all those who disagreed with him politically and this in turn aggravated the crisis, especially, when he gave very senior cabinet positions to people from outside the party who had recently joined the SPLM (Awolich & Akol, 2013).

Moreover, the president dissolved, the SPLM party structures in November 2013, in that the political future of a number of SPLM leaders was clearly threatened (Sudd Institute, 2014). The suspension of the party structures essentially angered those who were removed and seemingly consolidated the two factions under Riek Machar and Pagan Amum against the President (Blanchard, 2014 and Awolich & Akol, 2013). As it was clearly stated by the Sudd institute (2014), under the leadership of Riek Machar on December 6, 2013 these groups held a joint press conference, in which they sharply criticized the President and his new government and blamed him for dragging the country purportedly into chaos. This press conference seriously heightened the internal party crises and provoked fears among citizens. The government led by Vice President James Wani Igga reacted to the press conference angrily and it was obvious that the country was in deep crisis. Only a week after the press conference the violent events of December 1, 2013 ensued (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Political rivalries between the two men remained. Kiir and Machar have significant disagreements on fundamental aspects of the party and country's leadership, and governance and direction. The two men believe in two different kinds of relations with Sudan. Contrary to Machar, Kiir is willing to keep good relations with Sudan and cooperate with Khartoum regarding their respective insurgents. Machar also disagreed with Kiir in the way of running the country and has criticized his dictatorial tendencies (Gil, 2014). Article 101 of South Sudan's Transitional Constitution, vested numerous powers on the President, who can run state affairs with very limited consultation, including removal of elected officials. President Kiir over-used these powers, notably after Machar declared in March 2013 his intention to contest for the party chairmanship. The numerous dismissals of SPLM officials from any executive positions consequently



are indicative of the result of a long-term struggle for power between Kiir and Machar (Gil, 2014). Political disputes were also fuelled by the instrumentalization of ethnic identities by both sides, leading to an even more complex crisis (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014).

### **Politicization of Ethnicity**

In the years following the signing of the CPA, Southern Sudan continued to suffer from deeply engrained an ethnic and clan-based political split, which is locally referred to as 'tribalism' (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011 and Ylönen, 2012). Due to the fact that tribalism is largely the socio-political practice and order, it can serve as ethnic political mobilization, and continued to inspire organized violence and political instability in South Sudan (ibid). Particularly, a remarkable political and social upheaval as divisions within the ruling party (SPLM/A), from 1990s to present, turned the country into major violence influenced by unsettled problems of tribalism in South Sudan (Breidlid and Arensen, 2014).

For a long time, political dispute in South Sudan has been viewed through a lens of old and deeply bitter narrative of ethnic rivalry between Dinka and Nuer, which is exacerbated by a host of complicating unresolved political, economic and social issues (Sørnbø, 2014). As asserted by Koos and Gutschke (2014), despite the fact that the Dinka and the Nuer fought side by side against the government in Khartoum for decades, the relation between them remains uncertain. In 1991 internal leadership struggles between late SPLM leader John Garang (Dinka), Riek Machar (Nuer), and Lam Akol (Shilluk) led to a split within the SPLM and manifested ethnic rivalry for leadership purposes (Sørnbø, 2014). These splits have, in one form or another, pitted the Dinka community against that of the Nuer and this political rivalry got worse over the years (Sudd Institute, 2014). A bloody conflict exploded mainly between Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups (ICG, 2014) leading to deadly wars between these two communities. In the fighting, the Nasir faction of SPLM created by Machar and Akol, composed of Nuer fighters, killed at least 2,000 Dinka civilians in what was known as the 'Bor massacre', on 15 November 1991. This moved planted bitterness and hatred between the two ethnic groups (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2011 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014) and it was one of the grossest human rights

violations at that time (Gil, 2014). As a result, the 1991 split more than any other incident drove the two communities apart, especially after thousands of Dinka civilians were killed allegedly on orders from Machar. These political feuds were tuned along ethnic lines and became a duel of superiority of one ethnic group over the other (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2011 and Sudd Institute, 2014). However, twenty years later, in August 2011, Machar publicly apologized for his part in the massacre hoping that it would bring unity to the Dinka and Nuer tribes (Sudd Institute, 2014).

Even though this happened almost a quarter of a century ago, the event remained fresh in the collective memory of the Dinka and the Nuer with a potential to fuel resentment in the current struggle (Koos & Gutschke, 2014 and Sørbo, 2014). Hence, the current crisis in South Sudan also reflects the underlying tension and mistrust among South Sudanese belonging to the country's two main different ethnic groups: the Nuer and the Dinka. This largely dates back to Sudan's civil war (1983-2005) when the SPLM and SPLA (and factions within them) competed for power by mobilizing support around ethnic lines (Gil, 2014 and Sørbo, 2014). In fact, the ethnic targeted killings reported during the current crisis resonate with the 1991 inter-ethnic violence generated by the SPLM/A split between the Garang faction (Dinka), supported by Kiir, and the Machar one (Nuer) (ibid).

Mareng (2009) suggests that there is a sense that all conflicts in the country have a political basis that also acquired an ethnic dimension, with civilians being deliberately targeted on their basis of ethnicity. The disorder of political structures relating to ethnic groups has been a significant contributor to the power struggle among the South Sudanese communities (Sørbo, 2014). While much of the conflict is political, there are also ethnic drivers to the escalating violence, and the two are often difficult to distinguish. Dinka and Nuer ethnic identities were deliberately politicized during the Second Civil War, and militarized structures within communities, such as the 'Gelweng', 'Titweng' and 'White Army/Bunam' that remain powerful reference points for many young Dinka and Nuer (ICG, 2014). The polarization and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and its ready manipulation by powerful elites are a key factor that risks a rapidly deepening and widening war with serious regional humanitarian and political consequences (South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014). Moreover, the persisting political

behavior in South Sudan based on ethnic strongman-patronage loyalties tend to hinder broad-based national development by conning it along ethnic, clan or family lines (Ylönen, 2012).

As it was the case in 1991, ethnicity was not the initial cause of the sparking of violence in December 2013, although it was used in the conflict to target the opposition. Moreover, the unhealed wounds and lack of justice and reconciliation from atrocities in the past may have contributed to spread and intensify fighting as well as to some of the human rights violations committed during the crisis (Gil, 2014).

### **Absence of Good Governance and Strong Institutions**

Since it became independent, South Sudan has had to develop its institutional framework, establish laws, and public services and infrastructures (Gil, 2014). To this end, the international community in South Sudan has engaged to strengthen the state - building process. They support South Sudan in peace consolidation (thereby fostering state building and economic development), exercising responsibilities for conflict prevention and protect civilians, and developing government capacity to provide security, establishing rule of law and to strengthen the security and justice sectors (ibid). As written by Koos and Gutschke (2014), institutionally, the South Sudanese state is well designed with division of powers of the government into legislative, executive, and the judicial branches. The federal state structure also takes into account the cultural and regional differences within South Sudan and in theory it delegates substantial decision-making power to the federal states.

Despite these efforts, allegations of corruption, lack of good and fair institutions as well as poor delivery of public goods and services remain the main features of the country (Gil, 2014). South Sudanese central state and public institutions are largely under the control of the former rebel movement, the SPLM. Former SPLM officers or persons loyal to the group occupy most senior positions in all branches of the state, including the sub-national levels (Ylönen, 2012 and Koos & Gutschke, 2014). In this regard, Ylönen (2012), maintains that the SPLM/A has sought to monitor those individuals within the government administrations who might pose a threat to its control of the institution in

question by selecting lower ranked members according to party or strongman loyalties. Formal qualifications have rarely been the key criteria for obtaining a specific government position, and the state's performance has suffered as a result (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). This is in part why there have been complaints of powerlessness and inability to perform independently of the influence of the dominant party in particular among some of the GoSS ministers and directors of commissions and other institutions who are not members of the SPLM/A (Ylönen, 2012).

By and large, the GoSS institutions can be characterized by a patron-client system. This involves the so-called strong-men and high-level individuals who are able to access state resources, use them privately, and channel them onwards to followers. They are also able to influence the appointment of individuals for public posts. This tends to happen highly along family, clan and ethnic lines (ibid). Hence, the SPLM's informal networks have reduced the importance of the formal democratic institutions and processes provided by the South Sudanese constitution, which in turn reduced the population's confidence in the state. The result is a weak state with limited institutional capacity, lack of legitimacy, and an unhealthy symbiosis between the armed forces, the government, and the state (Koos, 2014 and Sudan Tribune, 2014).

Moreover, Corruption and greed has become a pressing issue as it proves to be one of the main resources fueling the economy, furthering the cycle of tension and violence over wealth-sharing and natural resources (ICG, 2013). As Ylönen (2012) asserts, the lack of competent politicians and administrators to manage government finances and the employment of officers largely through patrimonial networks favored the widespread use of state funds for private purposes. Particularly, some SPLA commanders who had become civilian office holders after the war continued to conduct economic affairs according to a 'war mentality' (ibid). Pocketing of state funds for private ends is widespread among civil servants and security officers, which involves some highly influential SPLM/A individuals. Large or small scale Corruption has continued to be a serious issue after South Sudan's independence (ibid).

Therefore, South Sudan is considered a 'fragile state' due to these shortcomings and

presents a potential for instability higher than any other developing country. Such fragile institutional situation was compounded by the precarious security situation, due to the difficulties faced by the government to disarm the population after independence (Nyong'o, 2011 and Gil, 2014). Because of the on-going and emergent rebellions by various militias in the country, notably in the Greater Upper Nile (Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states), many local communities have sought to retain their weapons for self-defense (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). Moreover, Kiir's government has sought to integrate these militia fighters into the police and the military forces that resulted in the creation of over-sized forces with very little professional training leading to loose command and control (Sudd Insitute, 2014). Consequently, South Sudan's security situation is extremely complex, with armed civilians on one side and disorganized police and military forces on the other, incapable of handling any significant unrest and often causing it (Gil, 2014). Overall, this situation had a negative impact on the peace and security of the regions situations and state legitimacy, and poses a threat to political stability in South Sudan (Ylönen, 2012) and accounted for the present on- going civil war in the country between the government and the rebellious factions.

### **3.1.2. External Factors**

Support from neighboring countries and the international community for South Sudan was high. In the years that followed the signing and implementation of the CPA, South Sudan became a decisive tie in the regional economy, attracting both capital and workers from neighboring countries and other parts of the world (ICG, 2014). Likewise, with the emphasis on constructing sustainable peace through state building, there was an unprecedented external intervention in South Sudan and donor response has been substantial (Ylönen, 2012). From 2005 to 2012, thousands of international advisors, UN military and civilian personnel, NGO workers, diplomatic and donor agency staff and private contractors, as well as billions of dollars in pledged aid have poured into South Sudan (Gordon, 2014). Hence, Southern Sudan received a huge flow of private financing along with public investment and development plan (Ylönen, 2012).

However, the peace building engagement was undermined by contradictions between its narrow focus on state building and the local political, economic and social context in

Southern Sudan (ibid). Their general focus is on supporting South Sudan's transformation into a peaceful and effective state, largely based on state-building theory that equates state visibility and service delivery with effective governance and state legitimacy (Gordon, 2014). Hence, the complexity of the situation in socio-economic and political terms and the potential challenge it poses to South Sudan was not taken into consideration effectively (ibid).

In addition, foreign businesses were allowed to dominate the local scene, from large to small-scale enterprises. This created complaints and hostility between sections of the local communities and immigrant entrepreneurs with small businesses. The GoSS did not successfully handle and solve this problem due to a number of its leaders who benefited personally from foreign investment and business partnerships (Ylönen, 2012). Thus, the partnership between foreign interests and economically powerful cadres has undermined state legitimacy among local communities excluded from the benefits of economic development. This economic inequality has continued to pose threats to the political stability of the state (Deng, 2011).

At this point, it should be noted that external investment and economic support is not neutral nor does it directly lead to development and economic equality (ibid). Each external donor brings its own set of approaches, relationships, motivations and historical understandings in its dealings with GoSS, local leaders and communities, and with them, particular sets of dynamics and logistics that must be managed by all (Gordon, 2014). Hence, external sources of funding are charged with diverse political imperatives and may have unintended consequences depending on local economic management (Ylönen, 2012). A major shortcoming in this regard was that the external intervener's partnership with the SPLM/A elite resulted in a weak institutional framework to manage the central government (ibid) and budgetary management standards actually declined over the period 2007-2012 (De Waal, 2014). Such weak institutional arrangement combined with another factor like the selling and leasing land to foreign investors has increased public grievances and disputes within the communities and continues to be one of the major causes of local conflicts in South Sudan (Ylönen, 2012). Arguably, many international protagonists of peace through state-building in Southern Sudan viewed this external

intervention as acceptable or inherently African and conditioned by the African context (Deng, 2011). Unfortunately for independent South Sudan, the kind of governance and economic development that prevailed from 2005 to the present undermines state legitimacy and stability in the long-term by defying political openness and balanced development (Ylönen, 2012).

Generally, with all of the above deriving factors implicitly or explicitly, the devastating civil war erupted in South Sudan between the government led by the President and other top political leaders, and politically excluded factions led by the erstwhile Reek Machar. In the ongoing conflict, large number of South Sudanese people, (ICG estimates more than 10,000) have been killed and hundreds of thousands made destitute and forced once again into refuge. South Sudan's civil war has also a short and long-term political, social and economic implication for the country itself and the neighboring states which will be examined in Chapter Four.

### **3.2. Internal and External Actors in South Sudan's Civil War**

In order to thoroughly understand the civil war and its challenges to state building in South Sudan, it is also necessary to identify the key actors. Hence, this sub-section looks at the internal and external players in South Sudanese conflict that commenced in December 2013.

#### **3.2.1. Internal actors**

Even though the present civil war is the result of an internal struggle within the SPLM mainly over political power, it has engulfed the whole country dragging regional and international actors as well (Sudd Institute, 2014). The leading actor in the civil war is the party members of the SPLM whose leadership is the key factor in the strife. Due to the fact that the national constitution does not provide opportunity for the political elite to compete for positions of government power within the party, internal struggle for power is unavoidable. Hence, the fight within the SPLM is basically a struggle over national power (ibid). As stipulated by the Sudd Institute (2014), the power struggle within the SPLM is between three distinct factions:

### **The Nasir Faction led by Riek Machar**

This political group, also known as the SPLM/A in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), is the main opposition faction whose existence dates back to the 1991 split within the SPLM/A (Sudd Institute, 2014). The main actor in this group is Riek Machar who has the intention of becoming the SPLM Chairman and thereby the President in 2015 (ibid). The other players in this faction are Taban Deng Gai (former Governor of Unity State and the chief negotiator for Riek-led faction), and Alfred Lado Gore (former national minister of environment and prominent Bari- Equatorian) now Machar's deputy (South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014). Alfred Lado Gore named himself as the faction's "chief ideologue." Although he is the highest-ranking politician, the SPLM Political Bureau refused to approve him as the candidate for the position of governor. Afterwards, he ran as an independent candidate in the 2010 Elections in Central Equatoria and joined the rebellion (Sudd Institute, 2014).

### **'Garangists or Garang Boys'**

They are the second opposition faction of the SPLM who are loose coalitions of SPLM loyalists and are sometimes also known as 'SPLM-7'( this refers to SPLM leaders detained in December 2013 and released in early 2014 and now part of the IGAD mediation process) (ICG, 2014 and South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014). Many of its members were detained immediately after the outbreak of violence. Key players among this faction are Madam Rebecca Nyandeng de Mabior (widow of John Garang), Pagan Amum (former SPLM secretary general), Deng Alor Kuol (former foreign minister of Sudan and former minister of cabinet affairs of South Sudan), Kosti Manibe (former minister of finance) (Sudd institute, 2014). This group has been unable to articulate a clear alternative vision or leadership and lacks military weight.

### **President Salva Kiir and senior SPLM leaders**

This faction is led by President Salva Kiir and a number of senior SPLM leaders. Key actors are the President himself, James Wani Igga (Kiir's deputy), Kuol Manyang Juk (the defense minister), Daniel Awet Akot (former deputy speaker), Nhial Deng Nhial (the government's chief negotiator in the IGAD-led talks), Paul Malong Awan (the current Chief of General Staff of the SPLA) (Sudd institute, 2014). These individuals variously



represent the hard line or loyalist viewpoints in the government (South Sudan Protection Cluster, 2014). Likewise, the national army, the SPLA, which is still intimately connected with the SPLM, is also a key player in the current conflict. After the signing of the CPA, the SPLA was recognized as the official army of Southern Sudan and subsequently the Republic of South Sudan. It has been very challenging to transform this guerrilla army into a professional one (ibid).

### **3.2.2. External actors**

In South Sudan's civil war external forces are not the main players like the domestic actors. However, either for fueling or mediation purposes regional and international actors engage in the conflict. In the following sub-section, the study reviews both the regional and external actors in South Sudan civil war.

#### **Regional Actors**

The crisis in South Sudan has drawn the involvement of regional countries, especially members of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) like Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan (Sudd Institute, 2014). As asserted by International Crisis Group (2014), Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan have put their weight behind the IGAD-led mediation process. Particularly, Uganda has provided military support to the government (Sudd Institute, 2014) by actively involving in the conflict in South Sudan (ACODE, 2014). At the request of the Government of South Sudan, Uganda gave direct military support to secure and retake territory (ICG, 2014) and currently battling the rebels to restore stability in the country and allow humanitarian aid to reach the internally displaced civilians (ACODE, 2014). There is the historical relationship between Uganda and the ruling (SPLM/A) that stretched from the war of independence. Uganda supported the SPLM/A against the Government of Sudan by accusing the latter of aiding the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in northern Uganda (ibid). Uganda also mistrusts Riek Machar for linking the LRA to Khartoum for military, financial and strategic support as a likely threat to the Museveni regime (Sudd Institute, 2014). Uganda's other interests relate to the fact that, since independence in 2011, South Sudan has become Uganda's biggest export market and hence the decrease in trade is an issue for concern by many stakeholders in Uganda (ACODE, 2014).

Although Kenya has not contributed armed forces in support of the government, it is apparently in support of the President and playing a great mediating role to end the conflict (Sudd institute, 2014). Behind unverified rumors of offering aid to the rebels, Ethiopia also acts as the leading mediator country among the IGAD member states (ibid). On the other hand, the Government of Sudan has been both passively and actively involved in South Sudan's internal conflicts at various times since 2005 up to the present crisis (Gordon, 2014). The two Countries' relations have been associated with oil and other pending CPA issues that include the issues of Abyei, boundary demarcation and others (Debay, 2012). Nevertheless, following the mid-2013 Sudan-South Sudan rapprochement, Khartoum's interest in South Sudan's stability is greater than ever, and President Bashir has publicly supported President Kiir (ICG, 2014). Even though the Khartoum government denies it, the South Sudanese government accused Sudan of aiding rebels. Instead, Sudan accused South Sudan of supporting the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and SPLA-North rebels (Sudd institute, 2014). In relation to this, the Sudd Institute (2014) also maintains that the dispute and blaming of each other between Sudan and South Sudan predate the crisis, as a result of which the two nations mistrust one another. This very old distrust between the two countries, if not handled properly, coupled with the current tensions, could result in fighting between the two countries and eventually endanger the cooperation agreements (ibid).

In addition to the efforts made by IGAD to bring an end to the conflict, the African Union has also played roles in the on-going work of the Commission of Inquiry led by former Nigerian President Obasanjo (ibid). To end the crisis, the collaboration efforts of the African Union with the international community is the necessary step to be undertaken and this helps in exerting pressure on the parties in the conflict to negotiate their differences. Although IGAD has been successful in achieving the ceasefire agreements and bring the two factions to negotiate on their divergent positions leading to sustainable political settlement, it is also important to ensure its accomplishment (ibid).

By and large, the divergent interests of the neighboring countries have made it difficult to maintain a regional approach to contain tensions threatens that could escalate the conflict (ICG, 2014). Furthermore, International Crisis Group (2014) maintains that the desire of

neighbor countries for entrenching regional stability through workable political and military solutions to the conflict is driven by their divergent interests: first, border security as it relates to the massive inflow of refugees and conflict spill over to these states owing to cross-border settlement of ethnic groups having similar identity markers and the mutual intervention of regional state (ibid); oil production that is the main source of revenue for Sudan and also the concerns for Kenya and Uganda as far as the Lamu pipeline is concerned coupled with the massive investment of its banks in South Sudan (Ibid); and finally, regional power ambitions especially, by Ethiopia and Uganda that followed diverse approach of solution to the political conflict. Each of these specific interests of the state thus makes difficult prospect to solve the conflict on a regional bases (Ibid).

### **International Actors**

The international actors are not clearly identified as decisive players in the South Sudan civil war. However, there is purportedly competition between China and the United States for influence over the government of South Sudan. Despite the fact the United States are apparently the main players in terms of influence over the government and the SPLM factions, there is fear that South Sudan is getting drawn more towards China because of its oil investments in the country and that worries the United States (Sudd Institute, 2014). The President and the government spokesperson also accused the United States of having supported the insurgent group and the coup in an attempt to get a new government that will renegotiate oil deals. The President specifically accused the US of having proposed an interim government that does not include him (ibid). On the other hand, although China has mostly remained silent it is undertaking a lot of diplomatic work behind the scenes to ensure the upkeep of its interest in the region. Even some reports recently stated that China is supplying weapons to the South Sudanese government. As the member of the veto power in the UN Security Council, which it uses as cover for advancing its interests, recently Russia has also entered the scene by helping the government of South Sudan when the council was considering imposing sanctions on the warring factions. However, this could create tension between these giants and could potentially prolong the peace mediation process (ibid).

Similarly, the United Nations (UN) and the Troika (US, Norway and the UK) are the other international groups that are involved in the civil war in South Sudan. The UN through the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), has been marred in local conflict whereby conflicting parties blame the UN of supporting the other. Mainly, the government side has been very serious of the UN and its intentions that have brought harmful relationship between the two institutions. In this regard, the Sudd Institute (2014) stated that the close interaction between Riek Machar and the former UNMISS head of the mission prior to the crisis has possibly entailed local suspicions against the UNMISS. However, the UN body has been doing a great job in shielding civilians on its bases and catering for their needs. In fact, the visit of Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General, resolved the tensions between the government and UNMISS. Furthermore, the Troika was another external patron in South Sudan that was formed during the CPA negotiations for the purpose of providing financial and technical support to the parties in the conflict to negotiate on their differences. After the civil war re-erupted in December 2013, this group has been reassigned one more task to do a similar job to help the warring factions to reach at agreement. Certainly, the Troika has its own interests and tries to push the parties to reach a settlement that fits into those interests that may complicate the process (Sudd Institute, 2014 and ICG, 2014).

In general, these kinds of external forces, both benevolent and oppositional, have had a minimal physical presence on the ground, particularly, in Jonglei and other states, but all of them shape South Sudan's political, social and conflict dynamics in numerous ways (Gordon, 2014). However, by resolving the ongoing political crisis of South Sudan should provide effective security for its population by ending armed conflict within its borders and creating the peace and stability that citizens and other stakeholders demand.

### **3.3. South Sudan's Civil War as a Challenge to State Building**

South Sudan remains unstable with cycles of devastating civil wars that destroy its infrastructure, threaten its territorial integrity, flout its economic growth, and engender a woeful humanitarian crisis and catastrophes (Jok, 2012). Among a number of African countries, it has been seriously affected by violent conflicts. As a result of both the legacy of armed conflict and the failure of the new state's political elite to prioritize state and nation building over personal ambitions, South Sudan remains very fragile (Nganje, 2014). The potential for such fragility became evident during the recent political crisis when violence resulting from simmering tensions between President Salva Kiir and his erstwhile rival Riek Machar quickly degenerated into the targeted killings of civilians in some parts of the country (Ibid). What began as political conflict stemming from governance failure and failed nation-building exercise has rapidly changed into an ethno-regionalist war that is destroying the social fabric of South Sudan, which in turn negatively affects state building (Roque, 2014).

Hence, one of the unpleasant realities of any war situation is that it divides communities, and this is exactly what is happening in South Sudan following the outbreak of the current conflict. Now more than ever in the history of the South Sudanese people, the level of distrust and hatred is simply unimaginable (Sudd institute, 2014). This partly explains the unwarranted, callous and indiscriminate killings of innocent and unarmed civilians that both sides to the conflict meted out to those suspected of supporting the other side (Ibid). Interlocking political and tribal divisions between the two main ethnic groups, the Dinka and the Nuer, threaten to distract the country from state-building efforts and plunge it into internal turmoil, adding to the misery caused by protracted fighting with the North (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2011 and ACODE, 2014). To make the state building project even more challenging, South Sudan remains the least-developed country with inadequate infrastructures, little experience of self-governance and administration, and rudimentary level of education and health services (Nyong'o, 2011). Thus, the deep ethnic cleavages that are coupled with other factors including governance deficits have greatly undermined the state building project in the new nation (ACODE, 2014).

In such heightened and polarized war, there are a number of potential political impacts that the Southern Sudanese society would have to confront with. There is a possibility that some South Sudanese may find themselves most likely to identify politically along ethnic lines whose consequences in terms of instability either in politics or other aspects are enormous (Sudd Institute, 2014). If not settled in good time, the development of ethnic-based politics akin to what Kenya has experiencing in its recent history by marginalizing the Luos by preventing them from getting closes to the locus of power. If this situation were to happen in South Sudan, it would be extremely difficult to achieve peace and stability (Nganje, 2014 and Sudd Institite, 2014) and consequently, the prospect for state building becomes too challenging than ever in the country. What is more is that when large ethnic groups like the Dinka or Nuer are able to achieve a political outcome, either through winning election or coming to power militarily, it will have a corrosive effect on South Sudanese nationalism. Such groups will most likely identify more with their ethnic groups and politics will largely be driven by ethnic solidarity rather than operating as a merit-based system in terms of ideas one espouses, experience, and competence (Sudd Institute, 2014). Therefore, a national cohesive program should be adopted and a permanent Constitution recognizing all ethnicities on an equal footing should be developed so that trust among all South Sudanese citizens could prevail. At the same time, South Sudanese leaders should address the organization and the functioning of the period between now and the next elections scheduled for 2015.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTHERN SUDAN'S STATE BUILDING FAILURE**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter discusses states of affairs in the Horn of Africa from the notion of regional security complex by highlighting the geopolitical and security situation of the region and the far-reaching impact of the current South Sudan conflict on the states of Horn of Africa. South Sudan's state building failure and its political implications to the proximate states of Horn of Africa is also examined and analyzed under this sub-section by analyzing the impacts of instability of Southern Sudan on the national economy of the neighboring countries that endangered the production of oil and other economic activities. This is undertaken along with the repercussions of South Sudanese conflict on the humanitarian situation and the natural environment of the countries of the region, which are already prone to drought and has weak national economy.

#### **4.1. The Horn of Africa from the Notion of Regional Security Complex**

Before discussing South Sudan's failure in state building and its repercussions to the region, it is indispensable to look at the nature of geo-political and security situation in Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa presently consists of seven countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, which are members of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), plus South Sudan, which became independent on July 9, 2011 as the latest addition to the region. If Somaliland, which has declared its independence from the rest of Somalia achieves international recognition as an independent state, the number of countries in the region will increase to nine.

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-prone regions in Africa. The region was by no means peaceful before the era of decolonization. During the period roughly between the early 1800s and the era of decolonization, for example, it experienced many wars, that revolved mostly around state formation and empire building; slave raids; control of resources and trade routes; colonization and resistance to colonialism; and the liberation

struggle (Kidane, 2011). The populations of the region have endured many inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts during the post-independence era and the present (Medhanie, 2004). Despite changes of regime and international efforts to broker peace agreements, the countries of the region experienced consistently high levels of violence, within and across borders (Love, 2009). The incongruence between the legacy of colonial boundaries, ecological zones and cultural affinities peculiar to the region often means that disputes in any one country have political and economic implications beyond their own local sphere. Among scholars there is a growing recognition that the interconnectedness of conflicts in the region and their causes renders their resolution particularly complex and challenging (ibid).

The characteristics of conflict in the Horn of Africa made the development of peace and security mechanisms more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa (Khadiagala 2008). Conflict had occurred at every level-within states, between states and among proxies as well as between government forces. The use of force to achieve political goals was the regional norm and democratic accountability was largely absent (Healy, 2009). Regime change was generally achieved through violence rather than peaceful means, just as political grievances were typically addressed through armed rebellion. Inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lay at the root of many of the internal conflicts in the Horn. Large communities experienced economic marginalization and political exclusion in a manner often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines (ibid).

Many of the conflicts in the Horn challenged the basis of statehood. This applied to the political dynamics in Ethiopia and Eritrea, North and South Sudan and Somalia and Somaliland. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) possibilities of new states emerging from conflict meant that essentially domestic conflicts had foreign policy implications. Cliffe (2009) maintains that the advancement of regional foreign policy through proxy forces in neighboring countries was part of the 'normal' pattern of relations, entrenching a system of mutual intervention that had proved highly resilient and survived radical political reconfigurations including changes of regime. With hostile neighbors generally acting as enablers and multipliers of one another's conflicts there were several



opportunities for trouble making. The principles of AU particularly regarding ‘non-interference’ did not guide regional relationships in the Horn as reflected in IGAD member states extensive involvement in each other’s internal wars. In the Horn of Africa, all representatives of the sovereign states had won military victories against the prevailing order and were proud to have ousted what they call abusive regimes. They had no attachment to the stagnant kind of stability that the AU represented (ibid) and hence, the region is understood as Africa’s most enduring conflict and security complex sub-region thereby generating a multitude of threats to human, environmental, and global security.

South Sudan is among a number of the Horn of African countries that have not only been devastatingly affected by violent conflict but whose polity also remains highly fragile as a result of both the legacy of armed conflict and the failure of the new government to give priority to state and nation building (Nganje, 2014). The potential for such fragility to encourage mass atrocity became evident during the recent political crisis when violence resulting from simmering tensions between President Salva Kiir and his erstwhile deputy Riek Machar quickly degenerated into the targeted killings of civilians in some parts of the country (ibid).

The violence has led to substantial uncertainty over the stability of Africa’s newest country and its immediate neighboring countries. As a result, the South Sudanese government is now at war with at least seven armed groups in 9 of its 10 states (Mutopo etal, 2014). Scholars and politicians asserted that internally and externally, the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of the conflicts are so serious and devastating. To start from the security and political implications, the civil war threatens to spill over into the East African region. Accordingly, the conflict has drawn countries of the Horn like Uganda to be involved militarily complicating mediation efforts of IGAD casting doubt on the neutrality of the sub-regional organization (Awolich, 2014). There is a genuine risk that Rwanda, Eritrea and Sudan may be drawn into the conflict in support of Uganda or the South Sudanese rebels (Mutopo etal, 2014). With the conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) ongoing, the region is currently highly unstable. In addition, the economic consequences of civil war are severe. Oil production, which is the

main economic activity in South Sudan, has fallen by 20% since the fighting started with two of South Sudan's major oil producing states, namely Unity and Upper Nile being the most affected by fighting (ibid). The international oil companies that dominate the oil industry in South Sudan have evacuated their personnel to neighboring countries, mainly Kenya. Lamu Port linking the South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor, or LAPSSET, project envisages the construction of transportation links between Kenya and Uganda and the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is also hindered by the conflict (Gil, 2014). In the services sector, capacity is severely limited as a result of evacuation of foreign employees. In the banking sector, for example, Kenya's Unity Bank pulled its staff out of South Sudan and is running a restricted service using national Sudanese staff (Koos, 2014)

Moreover, the UNHCR (2014) reported that the current civil war in South Sudan has led to the death of over hundred thousands of peoples and over a million internally displaced persons and prolonged the suffering of the South Sudanese population. The number of refugees fleeing the conflict continues to rise in neighboring countries of Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya seeking shelter and other forms of protection. Various NGOs and donor agencies in the humanitarian and development sectors have had to evacuate their personnel and close down some operations, which have reduced capacity to provide medical aid and clean water to displaced families.

From the foregoing discussion of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, it can be realized that the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant, and how strong or weak (Beruk, 2011). Furthermore, all states in Horn of Africa share some social and cultural values emanating from centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and politico-economic linkages. Hence, the countries of Horn of Africa should be concerned with and affected by the civil war in South Sudan, particularly as the battle zone approaches the countries' shared borders. Proximity indicates a greater potential for spillover, which in this context refers to the spread of violence and other security-related issues from the conflict country to its neighbors (Phillips, 2014). Overall, the civil war in

South Sudan resulted for its failure in state building and continues to have far reaching consequences to the neighboring countries and beyond. This could include the possibility of destabilizing the countries of Horn region and beyond militarily, politically, socially and economically, which are examined and analyzed in the following sub-sections.

#### **4.2. Implications for the Security of Regional States of the Horn**

The current conflict within South Sudan has far-reaching security consequences to the peoples and states of the region. This is compounded by the fact that the region constitutes interlinked regional security complexes. In addition to the regional inter-linkage, South Sudan is bordered by nine countries: Sudan in the north; Ethiopia in the east; Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the south; and the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya in the west. Each neighboring state has strategic interests at stake and would be directly or indirectly affected by political development within South Sudan between the Government faction lead by S. Kiir and the insurgent group lead by R.Machar.

A peaceful region and peace in South Sudan would benefit not only itself, but also the other neighboring states of Horn Africa.<sup>1</sup> Given its geo-political position, the conflict in South Sudan has quickly assumed international character with the potential to destabilize the entire Central and Eastern Africa sub-regions and beyond. Thus, its neighbors have to be vigilant enough against the impending civil war as it is by far the worst security threatening process ever to take place in the Horn region and most likely to affect the region sooner or later.<sup>2</sup> They should react in advance to this incident and assess carefully its security implications to their respective national cognizant that it would also destabilize regional security complexes interlinked to South Sudan.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, the current civil war in South Sudan threatens to spill over to the East African region. Accordingly, there is the issue related to the refugee flow from South Sudan to the bordering regions of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan. Since mid-December 2014,

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin ,Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>2</sup> ibid

<sup>3</sup> ibid

more than 370,000 South Sudanese have arrived in those countries (UNHCR, 2014). Apart from humanitarian responsibility to grant asylum to so many refugees by the neighboring countries, insurgent rebel groups may use the resultant instability to destabilize the border regions.

The spillover effect of the crisis may also extend beyond refugee flows to the destabilization of peripheral areas where kin communities such as the Nuer, Dinka, Shulluk and other ethnic groups reside in the adjacent countries bordering South Sudan<sup>4</sup>. For instance, with the vulnerability of porous borders and the natural mobility of the Nuer in gaining access to the neighboring regions of Ethiopia, the consequences of the crisis will not be limited to South Sudan.<sup>5</sup> The long-term effect on Ethiopia's federal structures that rely on a delicate balance between numbers and power-sharing arrangements could be significant given previous historical experiences. In 2003, refugee camps in Ethiopia were at the centre of violent conflict due to the impact of large-scale migration to the regional state of Gambella with a population of about 160, 000 (Borchgrevink and Sande Lie, 2009). In Ethiopia's federal system, regional administrative power is allocated in direct proportion to the population of the country's ethno-cultural communities. The relative numerical superiority of a certain ethno-cultural community would therefore entitle it to more power and representation than the other (ibid).

With a region that is known for cross-border migration (of the pastoral Nuer as well as refugees fleeing the conflict in South Sudan) where the national identity of the inhabitants of the bordering areas is very fluid, the balance in terms of power-sharing between ethno-linguistic communities in neighboring regions could easily be destabilized.<sup>6</sup> Particularly, prior to 2003 changes in Gambella Region is an outcome of such demographic change due to the massive influx from South Sudan has been the creation of what has been termed by one of the writers 'the minority in power but majority in number situation' (Borchgrevink and Sande Lie, 2009). Influx of hundred

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<sup>4</sup> ibid

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina, Lecturer at Addis Ababa university, Political Science and international Relations, February 23, 2015

<sup>6</sup> ibid

thousands of refugees could create similar imbalance in the regional states bordering South Sudan again.<sup>7</sup>

Generally, the countries of the Horn seem to be aware of the fact that the ongoing civil war in South Sudan is likely to draw in most of the state and non-state actors in the region, including the golden opportunity it offers to such regional spoilers as Eritrea, Libya, Egypt, and Al Shabab as well as local rebels such as the ONLF and OLF to destabilize Ethiopia, Al Shabab and LRA to destabilize Uganda, and all of them to destabilize, by default or design, the whole region.<sup>8</sup> As far as Eritrea is concerned, its security strategy is expected to depend mainly on its perceived Ethiopian security strategy towards the Sudan and South Sudan. However, it is unclear if the same holds true of the rest of South Sudan's neighbors.<sup>9</sup> Though regional stability figures prominently in its security agenda, Ethiopia is likely to be concerned with the developments in South Sudan as long as any violence there could spill over to Gambella, a historically marginalized and volatile region in Ethiopia that has strong cultural and ethnic ties with South Sudanese. Moreover, Ethiopia shares more than 1,000km border with South Sudan that is straddled by their Anyuak and Nuer peoples and the ongoing Construction of the Great Renaissance Dam that poses also a great concern.<sup>10</sup>

A very recent development that factors in an assessment of the regional security implications of the civil war is the signing of an agreement on the use of the waters of the Nile by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya, to which Egypt has objected in the strongest possible terms. In this connection, the role that Egypt played is pretty hard to miss, given its long-standing national security interest in the Nile. Hence, Egypt's is against the interest of Ethiopia and other riparian countries in the region and may probably use crisis in South Sudan to destabilize the Horn and divert the riparian states of

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<sup>7</sup> Interview with Dr. Sunday Okello Angoma, lecturer and Reasercher at AAU institute of peace and Security Studies, February 21, 2015

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin ,Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>9</sup> ibid

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina, Lecturer at Addis Ababa university, Political Science and international Relations, February 23, 2015

the Nile basin to renegotiate existing treaties that are detrimental to its interests.<sup>11</sup>

Civil conflict can also cause apprehension in neighboring states when munitions such as mortar rounds unintentionally cross the border. Incidents like these are part of the reason why civil war near the border areas can provoke inter-state conflict between neighbors (Byman and Pollack, 2007), and the potential for this is likely to affect decisions about military spending. It is important to note that civil war around the shared borders does not necessarily increase the likelihood of civil war in a neighboring state. In fact, research suggests that the actual diffusion of civil war seems to be conditional upon other factors such as cross-border ethnic communities (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008) as can be seen from the case of conflict in Gambella and Beneshangul- Gumuz border areas. Nonetheless, this suggests that civil war in neighboring country is sufficient to concern an adjacent state, representing a serious security threat. Regardless of whether the neighboring state experiences a civil war itself, it may need to prepare for this possibility, or the possibility of other threats such as violence below the threshold of civil war, or inter-state conflict with the civil war state (Byman and Pollack, 2007).

As far as the conflict in South Sudan is linked to the complex conflict system in East and the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and North Africa, it is deep-seated and self-reinforcing, civil war in South Sudan is likely to result into a crisis in the region that most security analysts fear a favorable environment could be created for extremist groups to occupy and further destabilize the region as is the case in Nigeria and Somalia<sup>12</sup>. Unfortunately, state collapse in South Sudan could create a vacuum that could easily be taken advantage of extremist elements from Somalia, Mali and Nigeria who would use it as a launching pad to destabilize the entire continent.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, Berouk said that it would also bring about a shift in the balance of power in the region and reshape the regional security and economic complexes. As a result, the AU should take the lead in crafting a coherent South Sudan peace process to be followed by the major regional

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with Fisaha Shawul, Directory For Somalia and South Sudan, at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa, February 10, 2015

<sup>12</sup> *ibid*

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

organizations including IGAD and EAC as well as neighboring states.

### **4.3. Political Implications for the States of Horn of Africa**

Intra-state wars have mutated either in response to the collapse of central authority as in the case of Somalia, or to the survival, splintering or emergence of rebel groups leading to immense suffering, international intervention and the emergence of new conflict actors (Ansorg, 2011). Conflicts have also contributed to the birth of new states such as Eritrea, and most recently South Sudan, and the unrecognized states of Somaliland and Puntland (ibid). Two years after South Sudan became independent, the country is engulfed by deadly civil war since December 2013. This devastating episode greatly affects the process of state and nation building in South Sudan and eventually, the attempt of expanding and establishing government structure and institutions at various levels is relinquished. The present day civil war as the causes of state building failure in South Sudan has its own political implications on the neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa.

In this heightened and polarized civil war there are a number of actual and potential political impacts that the South Sudanese society and Horn of Africa countries would have to grapple with. Accordingly, the proximate neighboring countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and others would be politically, militarily and socio-economically either implicitly or explicitly, would be affected by the civil war in South Sudan. In this regard, the crisis in South Sudan has drawn the involvement of regional countries especially members states of IGAD, a regional body that is credited for mediating the end of conflict that paved the way to the independence of South Sudan (Awolich, 2014). Uganda, a member state of IGAD, has militarily deployed its forces which are actively involved in the conflict in South Sudan siding the Government of South Sudan. Ugandan soldiers helped to secure Juba International Airport and other key installations and are currently battling the rebels led by the former Vice President Machar to restore stability in the country and allow humanitarian aid to reach internally displaced civilians.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Dr. Sunday Okello Angoma, lecturer and Reasercher at AAU institute of peace and Security Studies, February 21, 2015

Uganda has historical linkages with the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that dates from the war of independence in which it supported SPLM/A against the Government of Sudan, which it accused of aiding the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels in northern Uganda (ACODE, 2014). Uganda also mistrusts Riek Machar for his links with the LRA to induce Khartoum to provide LRA with military, financial and strategic support. The existence of the notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and rebels of ADF in Central African Republic (CAR), DRC and other Uganda rebel groups in DRC, means Uganda has to be worried about the conflict in South Sudan which could enable these rebel groups to regroup and attack Uganda.<sup>15</sup> However, with the involvement of Ugandan troops alongside South Sudanese government forces, a number of voices have been heard, both locally and internationally, calling for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops for fear of leading the war a regional semblance. Although Uganda claimed its involvement militarily as driven by the need for protecting civilian and to stabilize insecurity in South Sudan, it has greatly challenged the peace process facilitated by IGAD to end the conflict between the warring factions. Besides, as far as South Sudanese civil war has implications for the security of the neighboring countries of the sub-region, the involvement of Uganda further complicated the regional political and security situation in the Horn of Africa.

The South Sudanese Civil War has also political implications for Ethiopia, which is a leading member of IGAD. For instance, the mission of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which is composed of entirely Ethiopian troops numbering slightly more than 4000 could be easily affected by the spread of the current conflict in Unity state and Warap and the encirclement of Abyei.<sup>16</sup> Facilitated by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, Chief of the AU-High-level Implementation Panel (HIP), the Addis Ababa Agreement on Abyei was signed by the SPLM and the Government of Sudan (GoS) on 20 June, 2011. The main objective of the Addis Agreement on Abyei is to ensure that this border area remains demilitarized until proper demarcation is undertaken (Ward, 2012). The same agreement provided for the

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<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

<sup>16</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015



deployment of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission composed of Ethiopian forces. UN Security Council Resolution 1990 authorized a UNISFA under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (ibid). Therefore, Ethiopia may need to be wary of any redeployment of UNISFA troops inside South Sudan as that could lead to a dreadful confrontational situation that requires siding with one of the factions. This will certainly affect its relations with both South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan, seriously undermining the mediation efforts between the two.<sup>17</sup> If implicated as taking side in the internal crisis of South Sudan, the negative impact of a civil war within South Sudan will not be limited to the Ethiopia but also to the mediation effort by President Mbeki.<sup>18</sup> Thus, Ethiopia has to tread carefully to ensure its fair-handed role of peacemaker and mediator.

Moreover, the neighboring countries of South Sudan have to discharge their mandate effectively on behalf of the region and Africa. Thus, an additional diplomatic burden for Ethiopia, (which is more than other neighboring countries has a very high stake in this crisis), remains the usual balancing role it plays within IGAD and the divergent interests of its member states, particularly Sudan and Uganda, who might lend support to different factions in the ongoing crisis. Here close assistance by the AU and the UN will be critical to ensure transmission of unequivocal messages to the warring factions, and their external supporters.<sup>19</sup>

The long-term interest of the states in the region will only be ensured through democratic states that are peaceful within themselves and with their neighbors. Support and encouragement for solving the divergent interests in SPLM and SPLA is the best place to start with.<sup>20</sup> But above all, IGAD, AU and the UN need to note that at the heart of the current crisis lays SPLM, which is the current ruling group in South Sudan, formed as a liberation movement, but proved unfit to offer an effective leadership to transform a new war-torn country into a democratic state that could make use of its resources for the

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with Fisaha Shawul, Director For Somalia and South Sudan, at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa, February 10, 2015

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>19</sup> ibid

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina, Lecturer at Addis Ababa university, Political Science and international Relations, February 23, 2015

wellbeing of its population.<sup>21</sup> Thus, solving the current crisis in South Sudan requires resources, a concerted effort and sustained pressure on the political leadership of SPLM and the military leadership of SPLA to kick-start a genuine transformation.<sup>22</sup> Most crucially, a prolonged civil war in South Sudan would result in undermining the democratization processes that are currently underway in most countries in the region.

#### **4.4. Implications for the Economy of Regional Neighboring Countries**

The countries of the Horn of Africa form a regional system, in which conflict within any one of the countries and between any two has tended to have significant reverberations in others. In such extended ‘zones of insecurity’, the domestic problems of security have complex borderland repercussions, which increase regional insecurity with variations around the Horn (Love, 2009). Internally, civil wars have substantial adverse economic consequences for the countries in which they occur in terms of capital flight, loss of human capital, national educational systems forcing post-conflict countries to face unique challenges to development (Collier, 1999) as in the case of South Sudan. Civil wars also have profound regional and international consequences, such as reducing a civil war state’s international trade and reducing economic growth in neighboring countries (Phillips, 2014).

The ongoing South Sudanese civil war has also economic consequences both at the domestic and regional level. Internally, although it is difficult to quantify the decline in South Sudan’s economy that has resulted from the conflict, severe economic effects have become increasingly apparent that the country’s fiscal position has deteriorated as government revenues have decreased (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). This has resulted in budgetary constraints and the abandonment of government plans to increase investment. The disruption of oil production due to the violence has had the largest economic impact, as 98 percent of the government’s income stems from the oil industry (ibid). When fighting spread to the oil-rich states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, the already-reduced oil output decreased by a further 40 percent since oil-field technicians were

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin ,Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>22</sup> ibid

either evacuated or fled the troubled areas (ibid). Production in the Upper Nile and Unity states declined particularly steeply with the latter recording a loss of output of about 50,000 barrels per day (b/d) as oil fields were shut down in January 2014 (ICG, 2014). While this drop represented approximately half of Unity State's usual capacity, production in Upper Nile was not as heavily affected. Nevertheless, the output from Upper Nile's blocks 3 and 7, the two most productive blocks in South Sudan, decreased from about 200,000 b/d to approximately 160,000 b/d (Sudan Tribune, 2014). At the same time as the country's oil income has declined, the costs incurred by the conflict have eroded the small funding reserves accumulated since oil exports were resumed in summer 2013. For instance, in February 2014, the country's legislative assembly approved a supplementary budget of 749 million South Sudanese pounds (254 million USD) to cover the costs generated by the conflict (ibid).

Given the above discussion of South Sudanese civil war with effects on the national economy, the domestic economic deterioration is not limited to South Sudan but rather has an implication on the regional economy. Particularly, the drop in oil production has impacts on the neighboring countries economy. Mutopo et al (2014) maintain that oil transit fees and money from a transitional financial arrangement constitute an important source of income for Sudan since nearly all of oil infrastructure is found on the northern side whereas most of the active oil fields are located on the southern side of the contested North-South border. Millions of northerners and southerners live and engage in business together and those who inhabit the borderlands have been sharing pasture and water resources for centuries. Hence, the current conflict mainly affects Northern Sudan that has strong economic ties with the South. Nevertheless, Sudan is also condemned for employing and supporting proxy militias around the border areas to destabilize South Sudan and other states of the Horn.<sup>23</sup> China, the biggest investor in South Sudan's oil fields and the main purchaser of its crude oil, also felt the fallout from the crisis as oil companies such as the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec were forced to evacuate their workers from the oil fields in Unity State.

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<sup>23</sup> Interview with Fisaha Shawul, Directory For Somalia and South Sudan, at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa, February 10, 2015

Furthermore, the violence has also made subsistence farming impossible or considerably more difficult for large parts of the population in country and the marginalized adjacent people's of the neighboring countries thus leading to short or long-term famine at the domestic and regional level.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, day-to-day commercial activity in South Sudan has been disrupted, and thousands of foreign workers from neighboring countries have returned home.<sup>25</sup> Since independence, South Sudan has become Uganda's biggest export market. According to the Bank of Uganda, Uganda exported goods worth \$403.68 million (Shs1 trillion) to South Sudan in 2013 and the volume of export to South Sudan is bigger than the exports to Asia and the Middle East combined. Within weeks after the start of the war, Uganda's exports to South Sudan were reduced by 80%, with income dropping from Uganda shs 271 billion per month to 54 Billion (Salim, 2014). Several thousand Ugandans working in South Sudan's construction and service sector have left and this has also affected Ugandan society, as remittances from Ugandans working in South Sudan are an important source of income for their families back home.<sup>26</sup> Awolich (2014) maintains that since 2006 South Sudan has bought 20 percent of Uganda's export goods, which makes it Uganda's largest customer. The increased insecurity and instability in South Sudan has thus had a devastating impact on the Ugandan economy.

The violence and instability in South Sudan also affected the small traders and large firms of Kenya, South Sudan's trade partner. Approximately 20,000 (of 27,000) Kenyans have returned home already, including small traders who have lost stocks and assets (Koos and Gutschke, 2014). In 2012, Kenyan exports to South Sudan were valued at 209 million USD. Shipments to and from South Sudan accounted for approximately 12 percent of transit traffic at the Mombasa Port, an increase of 83.8 percent over 2011 (ibid). Due to the violence, exports to South Sudan have dropped off, since cargo bound for the country cannot be transported. Large Kenyan firms including banks, road freight companies, and clearing agents have temporarily suspended their work in South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2014). In 2012, Kenyan banks withdrew approximately 47 percent of their non-domestic

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin ,Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>25</sup> Interview with Dr. Sunday Okello Angoma, lecturer and Reasercher at AAU institute of peace and Security Studies, February 21, 2015

<sup>26</sup> ibid

profits from the South Sudanese market. Before the outbreak of the current conflict, the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) had announced plans for further expansion, and the Central Bank of Kenya had held talks to establish an official exchange rate with South Sudan. However, the KCB has since closed three of its 22 branches in South Sudan in response to the violence (Koos and Gutschke, 2014).

Moreover, the conflict has also impacted regional economic and political integration. For instance, it has eroded South Sudan's previously slim chance of being admitted to the East African Community in 2014.<sup>27</sup> The conflict has also jeopardized the 20 billion USD Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project between Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, which is to develop a new port in Lamu, Kenya, and an oil pipeline from South Sudan.<sup>28</sup> Fighting has already delayed the signing of the agreement on the oil pipeline, which was scheduled for December 2013. If South Sudan drops out entirely, this will impact the project's potential profitability since South Sudan has the major share of the oil deposits.<sup>29</sup> While South Sudan was able to attract more foreign investment after the resumption of oil exports in mid-2013, the renewed uncertainty about oil production as well as the insecurity and political instability are likely to discourage major foreign investment in the near future. All in all, the conflict is a significant setback for regional integration and development.<sup>30</sup>

Overall, the connection between civil war and economic issues contribute to the regional nature of conflict and development processes (Collier, 1999). Civil war has its own consequences on the economy of neighboring countries by adversely affecting the national economy and put them at risk. Phillips (2014) shows that civil war leads to negative growth in a civil war country and nearby countries. He argued that military spending could contribute to this because it diverts funds from roads and schools, but he seems to suggest that this only occurs in the country in which the civil war takes place. Murdoch and Sandler (2004) assert that civil wars lead to regional negative economic

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<sup>27</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>28</sup> Interview with Mr. Husni Mustafa, a Diplomat at the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*

growth through uncertainty and direct disruption of economic activity. In connection to this, the South Sudanese civil war has affected the proximate neighboring countries of the sub-region, particularly as indicated the involvement of Uganda troops that forced the government to undertake further military spending. Due to the fact that a state is apt to be aware of the possibility of a nearby civil war leading to its own civil or regional conflict, the state's rational response would be to increase its preparedness for conflict (Phillips, 2014). This probably would mean increased military spending and other measures such as increasing training and shifting of security resources toward the border (ibid). Nevertheless, in the case of South Sudan the neighboring states except Uganda, are following nonmilitary options to alleviate the conflict and to reduce the risk of crisis spreading to the region by attempting to negotiate between the warring factions. But given the self-help nature of the international system, it seems unlikely that states will invest all of their resources in negotiations.

It is also noteworthy that given South Sudan's position as a regional oil producing country, a long-drawn civil war could also result in the closing of transnational energy corridors throughout Central and Eastern Africa with devastating effects. Most importantly, a protracted civil war in South Sudan would not only result into reversal or stagnation of regional economic growth. It could also erode the political and other socio-economic development processes currently underway in most countries of the region.

#### **4.5. Socio-Ecological Implications for Neighboring Countries in the Horn of Africa**

The impacts of South Sudanese civil war on the humanitarian situation and environmental degradation at the regional level is reviewed and analyzed in this section. The ongoing conflict has severely undermined the humanitarian and socio-economic situation in South Sudan and in its neighboring countries. Since fighting erupted in Juba in December 2013, seven out of South Sudan's 10 states have been affected by the violence, which has left an estimated hundreds of thousands of people dead and over one million displaced and sought refuge in the neighboring countries, mainly Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya (UNHCR, 2014). Large sections of

the South Sudanese population have faced atrocities, displacement, and food shortages. As of the beginning of May 2013, fighting and food insecurity had forced more than 400,000 people to flee to neighboring countries. Up to 100,000 South Sudanese refugees each had entered Ethiopia and Uganda. Yet most of the people fleeing their homes have remained within South Sudan's borders. Approximately 80,000 of the more than 800,000 internally displaced persons have sought shelter within local bases of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (ibid). However, even these supposedly safe camps have come under attack, and people seeking refuge have been targeted and killed. Hence, many innocents lost their lives in the brutal conflict as a result of which one of the world's largest refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) crises in the world today was experienced (UNHCR, 2014). UN agencies and international nongovernmental organizations are trying to help more than 3.7 million people, one-third of the entire South Sudanese population facing high risk of severe food insecurity. At the beginning of April 2014, the World Food Program announced plans to supply the population of South Sudan's remote areas with about 30,000 tons of food and by 14 April 2014 it provided food assistance to almost 600,000 displaced South Sudanese (World Food Program 2014).

As can be observed from the ongoing crisis in South Sudan and throughout the world, refugees flee into neighboring states in search of shelter and protection. The influx of refugees to other countries has impacts on the proximate neighboring countries of the Horn of Africa sub-region since they are interconnected in political and social and economic terms. Even though refugees are usually victims and not necessarily affiliated with militants, they can nonetheless affect stability in the host country. Lischer (2003) argued that refugees can compete with natives for jobs, which could lead to political crises or upset a sensitive ethnic balance, among others. In this regard, among the other neighboring countries of South Sudan, Ethiopia becomes the most affected by refugee flow in to the regional state of Gambella and Beneshangul-Gumuz. Hence, it is feared that the 2003 conflict on the border areas of Ethiopia and South Sudan between inter-communal groups that remained unsolved could be reignited leading to the political crisis

in the region.<sup>31</sup> Refugees can pressure the host government to get involved in the conflict from which they fled, and provide resources to opposition groups in the host country. The very presence of refugees in a country is associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict (Saleyhan, 2009). Independently of whether a new civil war actually breaks out, the host country could be expected to increase military spending as refugees enter its territory, anticipating a potential domestic conflict or other security threats (Phillips, 2014).

If there is a large inflow of refugees from neighboring country instability increases further. The arrival of several hundred thousand refugees is a huge logistical and economic challenge for a country (Collier, 1999). From the socio-economic points of view, the present-day South Sudanese civil war becomes a great challenge to the countries of the Horn due to the fact that responses to the humanitarian situation need huge capital, which are already economically fragile and weak militarily.<sup>32</sup> Hence, the civil war further aggravated socio-economic problems in the sub-region. Furthermore, refugee communities can alter the ethnic and social structure and increase economic rivalries. These can lead to tensions between the local population and the refugee community. These can lead to chain reactions that trigger regional conflict.<sup>33</sup> Brown (1997) describes this situation as “bad neighborhoods” in the sense of geographical clusters of countries affected by violent conflict, ongoing refugee movements and regional instability.

One of the most pertinent questions in this context is the importance of the militarization of refugees and the abuse of humanitarian aid for the purposes of rebellion. Although studies presume that refugees may participate in a war under specific circumstances, there are plenty of studies on the causes of mass flight primarily indicating violence by state and non-state actors. It is still quite unclear what general impact refugees have on the

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<sup>31</sup> Interview with Dr. Merera Gudina, Lecturer at Addis Ababa university, Political Science and international Relations, February 23, 2015

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Dr. Sunday Okello Angoma, lecturer and Researcher at AAU institute of peace and Security Studies, February 21, 2015



diffusion of violence, or why refugee flows can be dangerous for security (Jacobsen 2000). In this regard, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) established a statistical correlation between refugee flows and the start of civil war. Refugees extend the networks of rebel groups and enable transnational diffusion of combatants, weapons and ideologies. Lischer (2003) maintains the conditions under which refugees can cause a regional diffusion of violence. Militarization of refugees is characterized by increasing arms smuggling, military recruitment and training inside refugee camps and military activities by refugees outside their camps. Lischer believes that the diffusion of international conflict cannot be explained simply by socio-economic factors like the size of the refugee camps, absence of control, presence of many young men or poor living conditions. Instead, these conflicts must be understood in a political context, in relation to the origin of conflict, the refugee policies of the target country, and the impact of external state and non-state actors (ibid).

With the last point, Lischer addresses a very important factor that can have a huge influence on conflicts in general and regional conflict systems in particular: the impact of humanitarian and development aid. Very often, humanitarian aid provides food not only to helpless refugees but also to combatants. It protects the families and relatives of militants, supports the war economy by providing resources to conflict parties (voluntarily to gain access to refugees or in-voluntarily by the robbery of aid supplies by the rebel groups or by the establishment by rebel groups of a taxation system in the refugee camps), and lends legitimacy to combatants where conflicts are described in simplified terms in the international media in order to acquire donations or bargain with refugees.

The role of regional identity and ethnic factors for diffusion of militant violence should not be underestimated. Fearon (1998) maintains that the diffusion of violence through ethno-political factors takes place in different ways. There can be a security dilemma where an ethnic group feels insecure because of violent conditions in a neighboring country and is prompted to start a preemptive rebellion. An ethnic group can also start fighting out of solidarity with their ethnic brethren in a neighboring country. An intervention by a neighboring government to protect their ethnic brethren is also conceivable (ibid). Despite this argument it is still not exactly clear how ethno-political

factors lead to diffusion of violence in the sub-region of Horn of Africa as a result of South Sudanese crisis.

On the other hand, one of the unwelcomed results of the conflict is the environmental damage caused to livelihoods the individual citizens, which directly affects development drives. The outbreak of the civil war has not only resulted in the loss of lives, pillaging and destruction of property, but also crippling of the people's sources of livelihoods (Lanzer, 2013). For example, the conflict created a very insecure environment, which uprooted people from their homes and this means that those who depend on farming, fishing, and animal keeping both for subsistence and income are no longer able to have the favorable environment for their economic activities (ibid). This, in turn, implies that the quality of health of the population considerably decreases as individuals or households will now have to depend on handouts from their relatives and international humanitarian organizations. Given this, the current South Sudanese conflict has seriously destroyed the ecology of the country where the populations are more agrarian relying much more on wild foods and fishing and by moving animals outside of traditional grazing areas.

The impacts of the conflict on the environment is not only limited to South Sudan. Rather it has a far reaching consequence on the countries of the Horn. If the civil war is prolonged, the natural environment continues to be endangered and primarily, the peoples can easily fall prey to the problems of drought and famine, which can gradually expand to the proximate countries that are already prone to drought and desertification. The destruction of the environment in South Sudan affects all the countries of Horn Africa sub-region that are strongly tied to each other by the social and natural environment. With the ongoing crisis, the neighboring countries of South Sudan have their own national and economic interests in the country<sup>34</sup>. Hence, the devastation of the ecology greatly impacts on the interests of those countries in the region. Particularly, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, has put their interests behind in the peace process and try to impose their

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with Mr. Husni Mustafa, a Diplomat at the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

national interests.<sup>35</sup> In this regard, Sudan is directly affected by the deterioration of the environment where they are more sensitive and connected with issues of oil production and pipeline to South Sudan<sup>36</sup>. On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya, which seeks entrenchment of a secured environment, cannot escape from the problem of the south due to the fact that their peoples and the physical environment have more affinity to the South Sudan.<sup>37</sup> Over all, the ecological destruction caused by civil war in South Sudan has implication for the regional countries that are highly connected to each other in various ways.

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with Fisaha Shawul, Directory For Somalia and South Sudan, at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa, February 10, 2015

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Mr. Husni Mustafa, a Diplomat at the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Berouk Mesfin, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, February 18, 2015

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Conflict and instability trends in the Horn of Africa continue to make the sub-region one of the most unstable localities in the world. Significant portions of the Horn Africa remain unable to extricate themselves from the vicious cycle of armed conflicts, extremism, communal violence, political instability, and state failure that has plagued them for decades. Hence, the region is understood as Africa's most enduring spots of conflict and security complex, thereby generating a multitude of threats to human, environmental, and global security. South Sudan is among the Horn of African countries that have been devastatingly affected by violent conflict. As a result of both the legacy of armed conflict between North and South Sudan and the failure of the new government to give priority to state and nation building, it remains highly fragile. Particularly, the ongoing civil war has led to substantial uncertainty over the stability of Africa's newest country and its immediate neighboring countries.

The study examined South Sudan's state building failure as a result of the raging civil war and its implications for the states of region from the theoretical perspective of Regional Security Complex, which best fits to analyze the problem under the study because it is argued that the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of the neighboring states. Indeed, no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant and how strong or weak (Beruk, 2011). To this end, the study analyzed the nature, course and consequence of the ongoing civil war that undermined the process of state and nation building in South Sudan. The study also found out that South Sudan's state building failure due to ongoing civil war on the security has negative political, socio-economic, and environmental implications for the countries of the Horn of Africa. Hence, the countries of the Horn of Africa are affected by the civil war in South Sudan, particularly as the battle zone approaches the countries' shared border areas.

The finding of the study has shown that the present-day conflicts within South Sudan have far-reaching security consequences to the peoples and states of the region. This is compounded by the fact that the region constitutes interlinked regional security

complexes and South Sudan is bordered by nine countries. Each border state has strategic interests at stake and would be directly or indirectly affected by the political developments in South Sudan.

As far as the conflict in South Sudan is linked to the complex conflict system in East and the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and North Africa, it is likely to draw in most of the state and non-state actors in the region. It offers opportunity to regional actors like Eritrea, Libya, Egypt, and Al Shabab as well as rebel forces such as the ONLF and OLF and LRA to pursue their activities with relative ease and convenience. Hence, civil war in South Sudan is likely to result into a crisis in the region that could serve as a breeding ground. This would also bring about a shift in the balance of power in the region and reshape the regional security architecture.

The study also found that a prolonged civil war in South Sudan would result in undermining the democratization processes that are currently underway in most countries in the region. As far as the long-term interest of the states in the region could only be ensured through democratization and economic development that enables them to be at peace with themselves and with their neighbors, support and encouragement for internal democratic reform and solving the divergent interests in SPLM and SPLA is the best place to start with. Thus, the AU should take the lead in crafting a coherent South Sudan peace process to be followed by the major regional organizations including IGAD and EAC as well as its neighboring states.

Furthermore, the study found that the ongoing conflict in South Sudan has affected the socio-economic and humanitarian situation in its neighboring countries. Economically, the countries of the Horn of Africa are adversely affected by the civil war in South Sudan in a manner that has profound consequences on their economic activities. Hence, the current conflict mainly affects Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia that have strong economic ties with South Sudan. Particularly, the impacts of drop in oil production due to conflict is not limited to the neighboring countries but also affects foreign investors like China, India and others. Besides, the study revealed that agricultural and commercial activities in South Sudan have been disrupted, as a result of which thousands of foreign workers from neighboring countries have returned home. In addition, the conflict has

impacted regional economic and political integration. For instance, it has eroded South Sudan's previously slim chance of being admitted to the East African Community in 2014. The conflict has also jeopardized the 20 billion USD Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project envisaged to link Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan by developing an oil pipeline from South Sudan. Overall, the conflict is a significant setback for regional integration and development. Given South Sudan's position as a regional oil producing country, a long-drawn civil war could also result in disrupting transnational energy corridors throughout Central and Eastern Africa with devastating effects. Most importantly, a protracted civil war in South Sudan would not only result into reversal or stagnation of regional economic growth. It could also erode the political and other socio-economic development processes currently underway in most countries of the region.

From the point view of humanitarian situation, the current civil war in South Sudan has left thousands of people dead and over a million internally displaced persons sought refuge in the neighboring countries, mainly in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR, 2014). Even though refugees are usually victims and not necessarily affiliated with militants, they can nonetheless affect stability in the host country. Refugees can compete with natives for jobs, which could lead to political crises or upset a sensitive ethnic balance, among others. Hence, the study has found out that apart from humanitarian responsibility to grant asylum to so many refugees by the neighboring countries, insurgent rebel groups may use the resultant instability to destabilize the border regions. The spillover effect of the crisis may also extend beyond refugee flows to the destabilization of peripheral areas where kin communities such as the Nuer, Dinka, Shulluk and other ethnic groups reside in the adjacent border areas of South Sudan.

Regardless of whether a new civil war actually breaks out, host countries could be expected to increase military spending as refugees enter their territory, anticipating a potential domestic conflict or other security threats (Philip, 2014). Refugees extend the networks of rebel groups and enable transnational diffusion of combatants, weapons and ideologies. Hence, the arrival of several hundred thousand refugees is a huge logistical

and economic challenge for countries of the Horn region, which could further aggravate their socio-economic problems. Moreover, the current conflict in South Sudan has destroyed the ecology of the country by disturbing the livelihood of rural populations relying on wild foods, fishing, and moving animals outside traditional grazing areas. The impacts of the conflict on the environment is not only limited to South Sudan rather it has a far reaching consequences for the countries of the Horn peoples and states of the region to the shortage of foods, drought, famine, and desertification.

Overall, the study found that civil war in South Sudan is an outcome of state building failure and continued to have far reaching consequences to the neighboring countries and beyond militarily, politically, economically and socially. Therefore, South Sudan's neighbors have to be vigilant against the impending civil war as it is by far the worst security threatening episode. They should react in advance to this incident and assess carefully its security implications to their respective national security interests cognizant that the conflict in South Sudan would also destabilize regional security. Hence, as different analysts puts the international community led by the United Nations, with support of African Union, European Union, the United States, and IGAD should exert pressure on the warring parties to stop the fighting and observe an immediate cease-fire agreement in order to save South Sudan from descending into a complex political, and socio-economic turmoil that could lead to total state collapse.

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## **Annex 1, Interview Guide**

1. What do you think the causes of North-South conflict in Sudan since independence?
2. What do you think the underlying causes of South Sudanese civil war that breakout in December, 2013?
3. How do you perceive the role of elite power struggle and politicization of ethnicity in shaping conflict dynamism?
4. How do you see the reaction and responses of immediate neighbor countries to South Sudan Civil War?
5. How do you see the engagement of internal and external actors in South Sudan Civil War and its impacts on the regional security?
6. What would be the likely implications of Southern Sudan Civil War on the Horn of Africa Sub-region? Economically, politically and socially, particularly to Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda?
7. How do you assess the lack of durable Security architecture at the regional level in the horn of Africa?
8. What should be done to end South Sudan Civil War?
9. What roles civil society and state actors should play in managing and resolving Civil War in South Sudan?

## Annex 2, List of Key informants

NO	Informant's Name	Institution	Position	Date and place of interview
1	Brouk Mesfin	Institute for Security Studies	Senior Researcher	February 18, 2015 at Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office
2	Fisaha Shawul	Ministry of Foreign affairs	Director for Somalia and South Sudan	February 10, 2015 at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa
3	Husni Mustafa	Political diplomat	Sudan Embassy	February 18, 2015 at the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Addis Ababa office
4	Dr. Merera Gudina	DPSIR at AAU	Lecturer and researcher	February 23, 2015 at Addis Ababa university, Political Science and international Relations
5	Dr. Sunday Okello Angoma	Institute of Peace and Security Studies at AAU	Lecturer and researcher	February 21, 2015 at AAU institute of peace and Security Studies

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that '**SOUTH SUDAN: FAILURE IN STATE BUILDING AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS**' is my own original work and that it has not been submitted for obtaining any qualification in any other university. All sources used or quoted have been properly acknowledged.

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Mulugeta Teshome

May, 2015

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

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Kassahun Berhanu (PhD)

May, 2015