

THE ROAD TO AFRICAN UNION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

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Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CEAO	Economic Community of West Africa
CFA	Comminute Financiere Africaine (CFA)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOP	Gross Domestic Product
ECA	Economic Commission on Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECONOMG	Economic Community Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GNP	Gross National Product
IDA	International Development Assistance
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCAM	Afro Malagasy Common Organization
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
PAFMEC (S)	A Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central and (Southern) Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UAM	Union of African states and Madagascar
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Abstract

The thesis the Road to African Union evaluates earlier and current attempts made to unify the States of Africa.

The evaluation covers a period of almost one-century, from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 21st century.

The main objective of the research is to identify whether there were (are requisite conditions fro unification, such as compatibility of political values, greater economic and social transaction, peace and security and positive external environment in Africa.

The thesis concludes that those requisite conditions for unification have not been sufficiently available in Africa despite some changes occurred after the demise of the Cold War in the 1990s.

The paper also tries to evaluate the achievements and failures of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

It argues that the achievements of the OAU, in the political, economic and social dimensions were low.

Finally, the paper attempts to show the structure, objective and functions of the new African Union, and tries to compare and contrast the Union with the defunct OAU.

Introduction

Africa is a mosaic of peoples, cultures, ecological settings and history. The continent has an area of 11,677,240 square miles (30,244,050 square Kilometers), stretching from the Mediterranean in the north to the meeting point of the Atlantic and Indian oceans in the south (Chazan 1999: 5). It has the highest arable land per capita in the world; its landmass of 2.1 million hectares with 32% of forest and woodland and 6.2% arable land is twice its share of world population (Mosha 1981) Africa has a population of some 730 million (roughly 10 percent of the world's population) who speak more than eight hundred languages. Seventy percent of the population lives in the rural areas who earn their living either through farming or animal rearing (Chazan 1999: 5). Africa is also rich in minerals and other resources. It has one quarter of the world's hydroelectric power and only 3% is presently utilized. The continent contains the largest reserves of metallic ores (top producer of cobalt and nickel), non-ferrous base metals (top producer of copper, lead and zinc); precious metals (top producer of gold and diamond) and non-metallic deposits (a leading producer of phosphates) (Mosha 1998).

Africa's international contact in the 16th century and afterwards, was to its disadvantage. European merchants shipped millions of Africans, to work on their plantations in the Americas. In the Trans Atlantic Slave Trade, more than 30 million Africans were transported to America from 1500 to 1890, leaving the continent with out young cultivators.

The trade distorted the already booming economic and cultural civilizations. While Europe and America were prospering through industrialization, Africa failed in an exploitative and unproductive

system and relation of trade. The trade also created psychological inferiority on the part of Africans.

Following the deterioration of the importance of slavery in the economy, Europeans began to colonize Africa, which culminated at the Berlin conference of 1884-1885. The impact of colonialism was again severe on Africa, a continent that was still under the debacle of slave trade.

In the social dimension, they disrupted accustomed ways of earning a livelihood. In the name of Christianity, the colonizers dismantled African customs, and obsessed in perpetuating white domination. In the name of education, they taught their civilization and history, with little regard for African civilization.

In the economic aspect, colonialism adversely affected production, distribution and consumption. Africans became producers of raw materials for the industries of Europe. They produced cash crops such as palm oil, rubber and cotton, and minerals like copper and gold by ignoring the production of subsistence (consumer) goods.

Migrants from Europe appropriated the most fertile land from the natives and established their own farms or plantations, as a result of which African farmers began to sell their labour to the land owners. African men also migrated to supply labor for the production of minerals in the mines, particularly to western Africa. Hence, only women became producers of food for their families. Forced labour was also common during the construction of railways that served for the exploitation of the economy.

Politically, the boundaries they left behind became a source of conflict among the present states of Africa. These boundaries were artificially made to satisfy their own system of administration, which

resulted in the distortion of traditional social and economic patterns. It also created differences among the various African countries in their quest for nation building and economic development and stability.

The Cold War was another unpleasant occurrence that impacted on the history of Africa. The Cold War had a negative effect on the political economy of the continent. African countries' adherence to super-power ideologies exacerbated inter-state conflicts that entailed instability. Excessive arms supply by the Super Powers ushered in unnecessary arms build up and diverted the human, financial and physical resources from development to unproductive and wasteful engagements. At the continental level, reaching at decisions by African leaders on issues vital to their interest became difficult.

The direct involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies in African politics created instability, tension and suspense among the states of Africa. There were a lot of conflicts, either directly or indirectly instigated by the Super-Powers, and a lot of conflicts where they or their allies were directly involved, the intervention of France in Chad and in Zaire (Congo), Britain in Rhodesia and Uganda, Cuba in Angola and Libya in Chad among others are illuminating. Eventually, when the Cold War ended, Africa became marginalized. It no more became a continent of strategic importance to the Super-Powers.

According to the Dependency School of Thought, the trade patterns that developed in the 16th century and thereafter during the colonial period by Western Europe made many African countries to produce food and minerals for the world market and primarily to trade with the former colonial countries. The price and the demands for the products fluctuate greatly, affecting incomes for sustainable development programs. Multi-National Corporations of the North-froze

small competing firms of Africans, leaving the continent to remain a supplier of primary goods, which are not sufficiently available in the industrialized countries.

In the name of trade liberalization, Africa is expected to lose around US \$ 1.2 Billion by 2005, when the world trade volume is expected to increase by US \$ 200 billion, out of which 70 percent of the wealth is set to go to the treasures of the West (Panos 1999).

In a recent study, the unequal exchange of countries shows how much Africa lost its world trade share. From 1965-1995 the unequal exchange of Mozambique grew from -8% to -75%, Nigeria's from -1% to -172%, Angola's from -25% to 203% and Egypt from -1% to -21% on the other hand the industrialized countries' registered positive growth rate USA from + 1% to 6%, France from + 2% to +7%, Germany from +2% to +11%, and Japan from +1% to +11%.

Another major problem in relation to this factor is the debt problem. The total external debt of Africa skyrocketed from its low level of US \$ 12.6 billion in 1975 to nearly US \$ 300billion currently. The debt proportion to GNP (Gross National product) increased from 20% to 100% in 1977 and 110% in the late 1980s. Regionally, in East and Southern Africa the ratio was 11.55%, and in North Africa it was 163.02% between 1997 and 1998. The figures indicated Africa's complicated economic situation.

Conflict has become a hindrance to the development of Africa. It inflicts human misery through death, destruction of assets and property, and constant displacement and insecurity. Violent conflict hinders the process of production, produces situations for pillage of the countries' resources, and diverts their application from development to servicing war.

Although, it is difficult to separate the causes of conflicts in Africa from the impact of external powers, some Africa leaders also have to share the blame to those conflicts.

In the past decade more than 2 million people died of such conflicts and more than 10 million have become the victims of forced migration and starvation. Arms importation in the 1980 in Africa was more than twice that of the rest of the third world.

Between the 1960s to the 1990s Africa has experienced as many as 80 violent changes of governments. By 1980s, only 39% of the 48 Sub-Saharan African countries (i.e. 19) enjoyed a more or less stable political condition, 23% (i.e. 18 countries) were under armed conflict.

A study conducted by one research group shows that in the conflict countries, the majority had negative growth in real per capita. Life expectancy also deteriorated. For instance, among the 18 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in conflict, life expectancy is between 40 and 50 years. Infant mortality grew alarmingly; for example, in Sierra Leone it reached 132, in Guinea Bissau 129, in Liberia 113, in Chad, Somalia and Angola 112, and in Ethiopia 107 per 1000 by 1995.

Adult literacy in the continent is again one of the least in the world. For instance, literacy rate in Somalia by 1993 was 25%, in Sierra Leone 30%, and in Burundi and Ethiopia 34%. With regard to access to safe water between 1991 and 1993 only 12% of the Central African 18% of the Ethiopians, 25% of the Guinea Bissauans and 33% of the Ugandans had access to safe water. Access to health services in similar years was 24% in Angola, 13% in Central African Republic, 26% in Congo (Brazzaville) and 33% in Congo (Zaire).

The idea of collaboration in the continent was inspired by the anti-colonial and antiracist activities of the peoples of African decent

living in North America and the West Indies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Schraeder 1996: 35). This pan-African cooperation gained momentum, however, during the acquisition of independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Davidson 1994).

Even if, African leaders have accepted the need to unity, there has been major discrepancies vis-à-vis the realization of this unity. First, there seemed to be different out looks as to the sources of African commonality. Second, while the goals of unified political community was widely shared among the major spokesmen of the Movement, the question of when and under what conditions can such a unit be achieved was a source of major disagreement (Ryan 1997: 3). Third, there was also difference over the kind of structure and goals of such an organization (Schraeder 1996: 136).

The existence of such differences, nevertheless, did not deter African leaders from establishing the Organization of African unity (OAU) in 1963 in order to achieve those objectives enshrined in the Charter of the Organization. These objectives include: the promotion of unity and solidarity among African states, achieving a better life for the people of Africa, and the promotion of international cooperation.

The OAU, according to Mayall (1971: 28) was at its inception, and then after, chronically weak even by comparison with other regional organizations. Only in the area of ending colonialism, racism and apartheid, among those objectives stated, that the OAU was relatively successful.

The OAU had given birth to the African Union in Durban in South Africa in 2002. The establishment of the Union has prompted different type of questions among from different quarters with in and outside Africa.

Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to investigate the presence of pre-requisite conditions in Africa, which can affect the formation of a lasting and successful political community.

Hypothesis

In the absence of requisite conditions of unification such as compatibility of political values, greater social and economic interaction, peace and security, and positive external environment, it may be long before a strong African Union is realized.

Method of Data Collection

The thesis used both primary and secondary sources to collect the necessary data. The primary sources include resolutions, such as the resolution of the Manchester Congress (1945), Charters, like the Charter of the OAU and the UN the Constitutive Act of the African Union, different OAU documents, and works of various scholars. Lots of attempts were made by the writer to interview scholars and functionaries in the AU, but there was no success due to lack of cooperation. The secondary sources include books, articles and journals.

Organization of the Thesis

The thesis is organized in such a way that the sequence of events that transpired in due course of forming the African Union. The first chapter is on the theoretical framework used and definition of terms.

The second Chapter contains the history of previous unification attempts, specifically from 1900 (the first Pan-African Conference) to 1963 (the formation of the OAU).

The third chapter is an evaluation of the OAU and the factors that contributed to the weakness of the OAU. Emphasis is given in the areas of economic development, peace and stability and eradication of colonialism.

The last chapter discusses partly on African Union. It focuses on the, the constitutive Act of the union. The chapter also treats African current conditions and tries to prospect the future.

Conclusion (Prospect)

The establishment of the Organization African Unity witnessed a success story in the history of Africa's unification movements. However, in its forty years the achievement registered by the Organization is limited.

In the area of economic development, the Organization could not achieve one of its objectives enshrined in the Charter-bringing a better life for Africa. The problem can be seen in the areas of domestic products, in the productive sectors (both in industry and agricultural sectors) and its position vis-à-vis the world economy.

In the area of achieving peace and stability, the OAU's achievement is also limited. Relatively, the organization did manage to mitigate boundary and territorial disputes, and secession attempts by one of its principle- the principle of *uti possedetis juris* (All-member-states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of additional independence). However, in the areas of decreasing internal conflict and refugee problems, the OAU does not escape from critics. Internal conflicts are serious problems to the continent currently. They have become the main source of death, migration and poverty.

There had been a lot of factors that contributed to the weakness of the Organization. The first emanated from the Charter of the OAU. Objectives enshrined in the Charter and the power given to the Organization to achieve those objectives is incompatible. The organization was given insufficient power to achieve those pertinent objectives.

The second had been the prevalence of greater national feeling after independence, which prohibited many African states not to cede any part of their sovereignty to the Organization.

The third had been the existence of inter and intra-state conflicts, which diverted the attention of many African states from development to destructive acts of war.

The fourth had been the existence of dual commitment among African countries. Many African countries pay tribute to other organizations, outside of the continent. For example, many African countries are members of the Arab League and while the Anglophone countries are members of the Commonwealth. Similarly, many Francophone countries are members of the French community. This dual commitment has been creating suspension among members of the OAU.

Finally, the Cold War was the major impediment in the function of the OAU. The ideological division that prevailed among African countries made decisions difficult to reach. It was again, the major cause of conflict in the continent.

What is the prospect in creating a unified and long lasting African Union?

Unfortunately, Africa doesn't possess the pre-requisite conditions necessary for the formation of a lasting and successful union.

Although, currently there is an attempt to have a compatible form of democratic government among African states, Africa still needs to work more to such ends. In some countries hope is being restored, in others, however, deception through institutions, harassment of opposition political parties and election frauds still continue.

The continent lags behind the rest of the world in all forms of communication. The trade link that is believed to facilitate unification is meager yet. Attempts to increase such continental trade through regional integration did not bring the expected result.

Africa continues to be a continent of war and migration. Although, the end of the Cold War ignited hope, specifically in the area of preventing conflicts, existing data indicates that war is still pervasive in Africa. Conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Liberia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc. continue to affect the economic, political and social dimension of African lives.

The end of the Cold War did not bring the expected positive external environment. Africa is marginalized both politically and economically. The relation that exists between Africa and the developed countries or International Development Institutions (IMF and the World Bank) is not on equal footing. Hence, the continent has become implementer of the policies dictated by these countries or institutions, regardless of its pros and cons and existing reality. Under such circumstances the prospect of forming a strong and long-lasting union is not gleaming. It may take a long time for Africa to form economic and political Union continentally.

CHAPTER ONE

Conceptual and Theoretical Frame work

a. Definition of Terms

A lot of confusion exists among political scientists who study political unification on conceptualization of terms such as integration, unification, union and sometimes cooperation. Some, like Miklosy (1965), preferred to use the terms “unified”, “integrated”, or “united” interchangeably and point to any kind of unity, unification, integration, pooling of resources, building up of communal power, etc. Others try to define them separately as the following definitions suggest.

Integration:

The concept of integration had not been precisely and consistently defined. For instance, Hass (1969:20) understood integration as “a process where by political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectation and political activities toward a new center

whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.”

To Lindberg, integration is the process whereby “nations forego the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision making process to new central organs;” and it is also “a process where by political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new actor” (Lindberg in Robertson 1966).

The writer shares the definition given by Ryan (1967:5)

Integration designates both a process and a static condition. In the first case the term refers to the dynamic process through which the units of a given regional system are drawn more closely together. The process may be precipitated by a mutual interdependence of the units in the spheres of economics, ethnology and defense, or by common historical experiences such as colonial participation within the same administrative structure. The process may or may not be guided or initiated by inter-governmental institutions.

He further states:

Its culmination is a community in which an ultimate loyalty to the central institutions is instilled among a vast majority of the population.

Union and Unity

Most literature do not indicate what exactly distinguishes union from unity. While some scholars have used them interchangeably, others have preferred to treat them with a certain degree of difference.

For instance, Bakwesegha (1994:3) indicated that these two terms were understood by the founding fathers of the OAU in a different fashion “The vision held by the founding fathers of the OAU was one of a union. However, at the time, this was considered to be farfetched and impermissible for Africa to achieve. With this in mind, the idea of unity appeared to be more realistic and convenient...”

There are no clear distinguishing criteria of union from unity, although, union is assumed to be greater in its range of unification, as the names African Unity, and African Union indicates. African Union is assumed to contain more institutions that have greater power to make decisions. However, such distinction is not crystal clear and the writer may use the terms interchangeably as found necessary.

B Conditions for Unification

One of the major challenges of international politics is the identification of conditions under which stable, peaceful contact and unification among nations states could be possible and likely. Even for the plethora of factors identified in the literature as potentially important, for one plausible assertion there often exist another equally plausible proposition between states, their relevance in relation to one another, and the sequential relationship that exists among these multitudes of allegedly important factors (Deutsch 1967; Cobb and Elder 1970).

At this juncture, there is a need to make it clear that the requisite conditions discussed below and through out the paper do not have a direct causal relationship in the formation of a unified political community. As Ryan (1967:125) mentioned, findings by researchers only suggest that lasting and successful union depends on the presence of requisite conditions prevailing among the units to be merged.

The paper again refers to Ryan's suggestion "If the process geared to the establishment of these requisite conditions are guided by inter-governmental organizations, the supposed embryonic form of a future authoritative, inclusive government, then the relationship between politico-socio-economic background conditions and the establishment of a new community is most direct."

There is also a need to point out that “ accurate measurement of the various conditions is extremely difficult and judgments must be necessarily cautious and guarded” (ibid.).

Finally, the writer understands the formation of a unified political community in the process of unification, as one in which the means of violence is monopolized by the central institutions. The central institutions have the authority to make decisions affecting the distribution of resources.

I. Compatibility of Political Values:

The following analysis emanates from the prevailing democratic theory, which insists that consensus or, more explicitly, consent is vital to the growth of a healthy and unified political community. Similarly, a political structure that permits wide participation in decision making should be conducive to unification, whereas one that is authoritarian should invite dissidence and in time disintegration.

II Greater Transaction

a) Social transaction

Karl Deutsh (1970) extensively treats the object of transaction. The general hypothesis in this regard is that unification among individual states is promoted by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them.

b) Benefits from economic transaction

The hypothesis is that unification depends on the extent to which groups that would benefit in each country from an expansion of trade, or the development of investment policies are more dominant than groups, which feel they would not benefit (Jacob and Teune 1964:35-38).

III. Presence of Positive External Environment

The international environment within which an integrative effort exists is as crucial to the outcome of the effort as is its domestic environment. Nevertheless, as Cochrane (1969:193) stated, while the international environment may be able to frustrate an integrative effort, the international environment no matter how predisposed it may be to lend approval and support to regional venture cannot guarantee the success of an integration movement.

But, an international environment is assumed to have greater adverse effect on the continent of Africa on the effort to create a continental union, since the continent largely depends on the international community for its "political" as well as economic benefits.

IV Peace and Security

Peace and security is acknowledged as the absolute prerequisite for the establishment of an effective African union (Abdul 2002). This is based on the assumption that any process of peaceful communication among states, and cooperation in economic development and international partnership will promote common understanding, shared values and hence a political community.

These are the four important conditions that this paper intends to use to evaluate the recent attempt of creating a successful and long lasting African Union.

C. Theories of Unification

So far, we have seen definitions and conditions of unification from the point of view of various schools of thought. In this section, we would like to frame them under specific theoretical framework.

a) Federalism- it is the oldest most widely known tradition of political unification. The theory, argues “ A supranational state which possesses sufficient political authority and coercive and material power to satisfy the member states’ needs for collective defense, internal security and economies of

scale” still allowing them to “maintain their individual identities and to exercise local autonomy in appropriate fields of policy” (Pentland 1975:11).

In explaining the process of unification, federalists tend to rely heavily on the purely political elements of power and bargaining. They argue that the necessary integration depends primarily on the will, ability and relative power of the elites involved in bringing it about.

b) Pluralism

The theory that the united political community is a system of sovereign states, which while not governed by any supranational authority, is attributed by such “an intensity of amity, communication, and interaction between its members that war is quite inconceivable to them as a method of conflict resolution” (ibid.).

Like the federalists, the pluralists emphasize political rather than socio-economic factors in fostering an integration process. For them, the key to the unification process is in the attitudes and behavior of the political elites of the states concerned and the manner in which these influence and reflect the attitudes and behavior of the general public” (ibid.).

c. Functionalism

There could be no person, who articulated the theory of functionalism as

David Mitrany:

In a world of sovereign states, divided by conflicts and political rivalries, peace could be maintained by promoting international cooperation in limited functional areas of common interest. While the states would be reluctant to surrender "sovereignty" by merging their separate identities to form a larger federation, they could be persuaded to transfer executive authority to an international organization. (1992)

He further went to state that

If international activities could be organized around basic functional needs such as health, transaction, trade, communication, scientific and cultural activities, etc. There could be as many international organizations... and that successful performance of functions of a technical nature far removed from political controversies-by these organizations would promote the habit of cooperation among governments. They would be willing to cede more and more tasks to such organizations, and this would pave the way for broader political cooperation (Ibid).

Critics of this theory emerged from different directions. Hass (1968), the founder of the functionalism variant-Neo-functionalism, argued that the theory ignored the important distinction between background variables and heterogeneity conditions and expectations prevailing at the time a union is established, as well as new aspirations and expectations that develop after the initial experience. He also criticizes the basis of the theory's negligence to the conditioning impact of nationalism. The theory still neglects to treat the world setting or the external environment in which unification takes place.

Hass and Whiting (1956:452-3) also stated that the functionalist argument assumes a rather sharp discrepancy between technical and political queries. Technical matters are held to be uncontroversial. Hence, they could serve as a background for effective international organization, since nations would not object to delegating power in an area of little importance.

But a given question might be technical at one time but it does not mean that it will continue to be so in future. A change in the nature of the members constituting the government may invest any issue with a new importance, which pushes it to a new realm of political debate. A non-debatable function 'technical' for the duration of its removal from political conflict may stop being so due to new group demands and aspirations in one or several member states.

d. Neo-functionalism

The neo-functionalists share the intellectual traditions of functionalism, but they differ from the classical functionalists on the question of politics. Classical functionalism is sometimes regarded as essentially a non-political approach to the solution of political problems; in that the latter would be resolved by giving attention to technical matters (Kegley and Witkopff 1980).

In Contrast the Neo-functionalists argue:

Political institutions and policies should be crafted so that they lead to further integration through the process... the expansive logic of sector integration...neo-functionalism... has as its ultimate goal-the creation of federal state" (ibid.).

Advocates of neo-functionalism differ in their opinion with regard to the type of political community formed through the process of unification. Some favor the emergence of a federal state, while others tend to focus on supranational community.

The neo-functionalists share some of the criticisms given for the classical functionalist theorists. Because, unification is a multidimensional phenomenon, involving the political and social as well as the economic system, there is no assurance that the "logic of sector integration would proceed automatically" (Kegely and Witkopff 1980:531).

Stephen George (1991:21) criticizes Neo-functionalism on the basis of the theory's negligence of the role of leadership and underestimation of the strength of nationalism. To wind up the discussion of this chapter it would be worth while to depict the vivid position of the thesis. Those contending theories hug a legion of salient points, which nation-states can endorse in their efforts to the creation of political communities, through the process of peaceful unification. Africans had also the opportunity to debate on those theories.

During the early years of unification attempts, Africa was broadly divided in to the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, commensurate with the ideas of the Federalism and functionalism theories respectively. The former argued that continental union could only be approached on the basis of the principles of Federalism, while the latter insisted on the functionalist strategy of technical unification. The OAU was established in line with the functionalist approach.

In the analysis of the process of African Union, neither of the extreme positions of the two theories is favored. Rather political, economic and social unification is to be practiced simultaneously. This is because politics cannot be separated from social and economic affairs, at least in Africa.

One of the impediments to be faced by the simultaneous unification approach is the selection of those areas that deserve priority in the unification

process. Cognizant, of our criteria of selection in the previous discussion of requisite conditions, the focus of the analysis lies on political compatibility, peace and security, expectation of economic benefits and social transactions and external conditions.

CHAPTER TWO

Concept and Origin of Pan-Africanism

I. The Movement Between 1900 and 1945

It is difficult or perhaps impossible, to bestow a vivid and precise definition of the term Pan-Africanism.

Geiss (1976:3) indicated that of Pan- Africanism comprises three areas: the intellectual and political movements among Africans and Afro- Americans who considered Africans and peoples of African descent as homogenous, political unity of Africa or at least close political cooperation and it stressed or looked for the cultural unity or political independence of Africa.

Walter (1993) cites Esedebiy's definition and says, "Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural phenomena which regards Africans and peoples of African descent abroad as a unit. It seeks to regenerate and unify Africa and promote a feeling of oneness among the people of the African world. It glorifies the African past and inculcates pride in African values".

Both Geiss and Walter's definitions restrict the concept only to the political as well as the cultural aspect of the movement by ignoring its economic

aspect. An inclusive definition of Pan-Africanism to the three areas- political, economic and political- is given by Mackay (1963): "Pan-Africanism is a powerful ideal. It has cultural, economic, and political aspects, a complex and varied historical evolution. It is related to the concept of the 'Brotherhood of Negro Blood', the 'African personality' and 'Negritude'".

Colin Legum (1963) attempted to distinguish pan-Africanism from other movements.

It differs from so-called pure Pan national movements- Pan Germanism and Pan- Arabism, for example- in that the peoples being united do not have an identical language or nationality. Here it resembles more closely such super-national movements as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turanism (Turkish unification). To the extent that it is directed towards the political emancipation and unification of all of Africa, irrespective of nationality, language, race or religion, it falls into the category of Pan-Continentalism. Here it can be related to two types of continental solidarity movements distinguished by principle of unity and motive. Where the basic principle of unity is geographical contiguity and the motivating force is the desire to transcend parochialism and to achieve the power, security and economic benefits of

large-scale political organization, it resembles Pan-Europeanism and Pan-Americanism. Where the principle of unity is common status (i.e. colonialism) and the motivating force is the desire to remove alien rule and all of the indignities and disabilities connected there with, it resembles Pan-Asianism and Latin-Americanism.

The birth of Pan-Africanism relates to two closely inter-related factors. The first is the realization by Africans that they possess close cultural affinity, that "they have had similar experiences especially in their recent history, that they constitute in the world a downtrodden group, and that they share similar problems and aspirations" (Akintoye 1976:98). The second is the need of Africans to pull together to achieve independence and possess a more effective voice in world affairs (ibid.).

Although, these factors relate to Pan-African movements in the twentieth century, the origin of Pan-Africanism, however, goes back to the nineteenth century. A number of books show that the Pan-African idea was entirely a creation of the black men in the New World and the West Indies, from where it was imported to Africa. For instance, Woronoff states that the origin of the movement had no association with Africa but it was originally a result of the New World Negroes interest in their own lot and not a concern with other peoples of their race (Woronoff 1970: 15).

However, Akintoye (1976:58) does not accept such kind of arguments. He states, "... In reality, Pan-Africanism owed its origin to two separate movements, one in the New World and the other in Africa itself."

It is true that the Pan-African idea partially originated in the New World in the 1800s, but the historic conditions before the 1800s indicate that the idea emerged due to the existence of Africa and African peoples' related matters. Firstly, the eviction of Africans resulted in the African Diaspora. Secondly, the slave trade decimated Africa's prime population for hundreds of years, drying West Africa and creating a disturbance on the political balance of African peoples. Thirdly, the slave trade and its chaos hindered the continent's political and economic development. It was exactly this "uprooting of millions of Africans and the condition of slavery which laid the foundations for Pan-Africanism and Black Nationalism in the US and the West Indies" (Chrisman and Hare 1974).

Partially, the idea of Pan-Africanism originated in Africa. Well-known proponents of the movement were Dr Wilmot Blyden and Bishop James Johnson, both of West Africa. Dr Wilmot Blyden (from Nigeria) like the later Marcus Garvey, exaggerated African culture and urged educated Africans to abandon the adopted European values and cling to their own culture. James Johnson on the other hand, opted for the unification of Africa into a single

Christian state and insisted on the creation of African Christian church to be manned entirely by Africans and free of all European cultural attachments. Johnson also proposed that the 'Africans in exile' to return home to the unified Africa. (Akintoye 1976: 98).

These two movements, (both by Dr, Wilmot Blyden and James Johnson), eventually converged in the Organization of Pan-African Congresses that existed from 1900 to 1945.

II. Pan-African Conference and Congresses (1900-1945).

As stated already, although the early stage of the Pan-African Movement is associated with names like Paul Cuffee, John Russ Wurm, Martin Delaney, Edward Blyden, Robert Campbell and others, "the idea of one Africa to unite the thought and ideals of all native peoples of the dark continent" belongs to the twentieth century thinkers " (Akintoye 1976:98).

The First Pan-African Conference was the result of the active participation of William Silivister, a West Indian (Trinidad) by birth, an African by descent and a lawyer by profession. There were some historical conditions that necessitated the launching of the conference both in Africa and the New World.

In Africa, especially British Africa, it was a period of mental and political ferment. The Hut Tax War in the hinter Land of Freetown (Sierra Leone) broke

out in 1898. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society in the Gold Coast (Ghana) agitated for land distribution. The Nigerians began to found independent African churches (Geiss 1974: 181).

In the Gold Coast and Nigeria adopting African names and clothing, an external symbol of the return to traditional values also aroused much commotion. In Southern Africa, the Boer War broke out, and the Ethiopian movement began to develop. In Rhodesia, the Matabele uprising was controlled with excessive bloodshed, like the uprising in Banchunaland further south. Nevertheless, a successful and shining victory that bolstered up the confidence and strength of the colonies as well as the Negroes in the Americas was Ethiopia's victory over Italy in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa. (Ibid)

In America and the West Indies, there occurred the Sugar Crisis and the Enactment of Jim Crow Laws in the Southern United States. In the mean time racism was an acknowledged doctrine even at the universities (Wallestein 1967:7). (Geiss 1974: 181).

The participants of the London conference of Pan-Africanism were predominantly from the New World. The representatives were eleven from USA, ten from the West Indies, five from London and four from Africa, one from Canada and one unknown. The African representatives included Benito Sylvian

(Ethiopia), F.S.R. Johnson (Liberia), Gwdove (Sierra Leone) and A.F. Ribeiro from Gold Coast, (Geiss 1974:181).

The resolutions of the conference were modest. Its aims included "to bring people of African descent in all parts of the world together and there by serve as a forum through which they could protest against European colonization in Africa". It also included "to appeal to missionary and philanthropic opinions in Britain to protect Africans against the aggressions of the colonizers". Finally, it aimed at "finding ways of establishing more friendly relations between the African and European peoples of the world." (Akintoye 1976:98).

The impact of the First Pan-African Conference was demonstrated with the foundation of different movements in Africa and in the New World. In the US the Niagara movement appeared in 1905, followed by the formation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1910. In Africa, the African National Congress was created in South Africa in 1910. In West Africa, the first contacts helped for the convening in 1920 of the National Congress of British West Africa (Woronoff 1970).

It took about two decades before Dubois organized the First Pan-African Congress in 1919 in Paris. This was the period where participants of the First World War were making a Peace Conference in France. Dubois was assigned to

perform two tasks by the NAACP, to investigate the complaints about discrimination and maltreatment of Negro troops in the US army stationed in France, and to secure African interests at the peace conference. With a strong backing from Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese who represented Dakar in the French parliament and who persuaded George Clemenceau despite opposition from USA and London, Dubois and his fellow delegates attempted to get the allies to implement one of the main principles President Woodrow Wilson (USA) had laid down for the peace settlement- the right of self-determination of peoples.

Sixty delegates met and drafted a limited but explicit series of political demands for the participating units in the peace conference. The demands included the need for international laws to protect native Africans, for the protection of exploitation by foreign capital, for the abolition of slavery and capital punishment and for the right to education (Woronoff 1970: 18; Geiss 1974:236; Mbuyinga 1979:3).

With regard to independence, the resolution only proposed a modest demand requiring the natives of Africa "to have the right to participate in the government as fast as their developments permit" (ibid).

In this congress also, the African participants were insignificant compared to the number of participants in the other continents. The USA sent sixty delegates, whereas thirteen came from French West Indies, seven each

from Haiti and France, three From Liberia, two from the Spanish colonies and one each from the Portuguese colonies, San Domingo, Britain, British territories in Africa, French territories in Africa, Algeria, Egypt, the Belgian Congo and Ethiopia.

The number of African delegates increased at the Second Pan- African Congress held in London, Brussels and Paris in 1921. At this time, forty-one out of the one hundred and thirty delegates came from Africa. The congress affirmed those previous resolutions, emphasizing the "recognition of the principle of racial equality, without denying actual discrepancies in the level of development" (Geiss 1974: 244).

Other decisions included, the demand in the increase of inter racial communication among the oppressed peoples. It also demanded the criteria of achievement should be the level of civilization rather than race or color, that access should be given to education, in the widest sense of the term and to freedom of worship; tolerance of all forms in society, cooperation with the rest of the world on the basis of justice, freedom of peace, the return of Negroes to their own countries and protection of investment capital. The second resolution, worth mentioning requested on the need to local self-government under the limitation of a self-governed world. In its insistence on the sovereignty of all peoples," the Second Pan-African Congress of 1921 went beyond its forerunner

in 1919 and took up again the lead given by the Pan- African Conference of 1900" (Geiss 1974: 244).

The remaining Pan-African Congresses were, more or less, acts of faith and almost of desperation. The reason might be because" the out look was so bleak or Dubois was too far ahead of the times... (or) the period was not propitious for action (or) the congress had no real means for action"(Woronoff 1974).

The Fourth Pan-African Congress met in New York in 1927, and affirmed the decisions of the previous congresses. Following this conference, the role of native Africans began to expand with the realization of two new Pan- African organizations. The first of these, the International African Friends of Abyssinia (I.A.F.A), emerged to organize assistance to Ethiopia, after being a victim of the ruthless attack by Mussolini's Fascist Italy in the late 1930s. The members of this organization included J.B Danquah (Ghana), Jomo kenyatta (Kenya) and Mohammed Seid (Somalia) (ibid).

A second organization, the International African Service Bureau, was established to facilitate the struggle against colonialism. It was led by such Pan-Africans as Wallace Johnson, the West African Trade Unionist, Jomo Kenyatta (Representative of the Kikuyu Central Association at the time), and George Padmore of Trinidad (ibid).

The most important organization, however, was the Pan-African Federation formed in 1944 in Manchester by representatives of various black peoples' organizations in London. This Federation, in addition to adopting a program which strengthened the first four congresses, declared, *inter alia*, the following aims: "to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and peoples of African descent through out the world", to seek self determination and independence for African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers claiming sovereignty and trust ship over them", to grant "equality of civil rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination" and "to strive to co-operate between African peoples and others, who share their aspirations" (ibid.) .

These demands consisted crucial of such issuer as points of "self-determination" and "independence" and the idea of uniting the peoples of the continent, which laid the foundation for the next congress.

III Pan- Africanism From 1945 to 1962

The year 1945 was a landmark in the history of Pan-Africanism. After the end of the Second World War, the Pan- African Federation, which was formed in 1944 under the leadership of Pan- Africanists, and Africans of the new generation such as Padmore, CL.R James, Wallace Johnson and Jomo

Kenyatta, organized a congress in Manchester (Woronoff 1970:22-23). This congress "Put the finishing touches to pan- Africanism's evolution into a set of theoretical and practical political conceptions elaborate enough to meet the needs of the contemporary anti colonialist struggle" (M'buyinga 1979:33.)

It was not just the leadership of the Congress, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Chief H.O. Davies, Chief S.L. Akintola, Wallace Johnson, and Peter Abraham's, from Africa, that gave the Manchester congress an African flavour, but the resolutions and the composition of the participants made it different from previous congresses.

...It was quite distinct and different in tone out look and ideology from the four that had preceded it. While the four previous conferences were both promoted and supported mainly by middle class intellectuals and bourgeois Negro reformists this Fifth Pan African Congress was attended by workers, trade unionists, farmers, cooperative societies and by Africans, and other colored students. As the preponderance of members attending the congress were African, its ideology became African nationalism (Nkrumah in M'buyinga 1979:33).

The Manchester congress substituted the weak and cautious demands of earlier congress resolutions by analyzing and condemning colonialism; "Since the advent of the British, French, Belgian and other European colonialism in West Africa, there has been regression instead of progress as a result of

systematic exploitation by these alien imperialist powers. The claims of partnership, trust ship, guardianship and the mandate system", do not serve the political wishes of the people of west Africa" (Resolution of the Manchester Congress).

Young leaders of the Congress seemed to reject the peaceful strategy of Dubois more strongly. Their quest for freedom by resorting to the militaristic option of Garvey. In the section entitled " Declaration to the Colonial Powers" the members expressed:

... (We) believe in peace. How could it be other wise, when for centuries the African peoples have been the victims of violence and slavery? Yet, if the Western World is still determined to rule man kind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom, even if force destroys them and the world... we will fight in every way we can for freedom, democracy and social betterment.(resolution of the Manchester Congress)

The striking feature of events after the Manchester Congress was a shift of re-orientation. Previous Pan-African congresses, organized by Dubois had a Pan- Negro tendency, the Manchester Congress changed this attitude .The focus was on the peoples of Africa who were the primary victims of colonial domination, rather than for the Negroes in America.

From Manchester to Accra

For about twelve years after the Manchester conference, there was no important Pan-African congress, until Ghana, which became independent in 1957 convened meeting as one for the First Independent African States in Accra in 1958. The reason for the absence of congresses are not clear, but it might have been partly due to the fact that leaders of the Pan-African Movement were preoccupied with the difficult function of emancipating their respective countries to convene a Pan-African Conference. A fresh major attempt mobilizing African states for a common objective appeared when Ghana founded a Department For African Affairs Staffed by known advisors like George Padmore and T.R. Makonnen.

The First Conference of Independent African states was a historical one, which attempted to guide "the destiny of very different states from moderate Liberia to militant Ghana, from the ancient Empire of Ethiopia to the reborn states of Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and from Arab Egypt and Mixed Sudan" (Woronoff 1970:31). The First Conference was undeniably successful although it did not quite meet the expectations of its promoters. There were issues such as the Algerian cause, which needed a more militant and immediate efforts in the eyes of both Nkrumah and Nasser of Egypt to address. The conference did not legitimize the use of arms to achieve freedom.

Ghana again convened the Second Conference in December 1958. This time the participants were not governments but "peoples" who came from political parties and trade unions, student and youth movements and the men's and women's organizations of Africa, from both the independent states and the colonies. Unlike, the First Conference of Independent African states, the resolutions of the Second All African peoples' Conference were more forceful and demanding.

Subsequent conferences continued in Tunis (1960) and Cairo (1961) by intensifying resolutions and resorting to options for armed confrontation. Nevertheless, the decisions could be implemented provided these were approved by of the respective governments, which was not the case often.

Lurking into division

The resolutions favouring violence which have been passed in the meetings of the "peoples" in Accra, Tunisia and Cairo, created resentment on the part of many ex-French colonies, whose principal motto during the struggle for independence was that of 'Peaceful Self-determination.'" In 1960, the leaders of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania, Madagascar, Senegal and Upper Volta, met in Brazzaville and discussed the resolutions of the Accra and Tunisia

Conferences, They objected to the militant nature of those resolutions. In the meantime the Brazzaville Twelve group was created.

To counter the moves of this group, a second bloc (The Casablanca group) was formed by Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco in 1961. The member states had no geographical contiguity, ethnic religious or linguistic make up, but had similar experiences that could help them to stand up in tandem. The center of the bloc composed of the states that had first achieved independence and had conducted their own foreign affairs. They were also under tense confrontation with the former colonial powers and the West. Gradually, they developed similar African ideologies and a close but informal alliance was maintained on very controversial and international issues (Woronoff 1970:51).

The most cohesive force in the bloc was, however, their resort to Lumumba, immediate Algerian independence, the support for Morocco's claim to Mauritania and their favouring of militant anti-colonialist struggles (Ryan 1967: 103).

Some moderate states began to feel the impact of the division between these two blocs, and commenced a reconciliatory attempt, in the early 1960s which paved the way for the emergence of a new group (the Monrovia group) ,composed of Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Libya

(having left the Casablanca group), Tunisia and members of the Brazzaville group.

Pan-Africanism and Political Unification

One needs to think beyond the literal meaning of the Greek word "pan" (meaning all) to comprehend the central idea of Pan-Africanism towards the political unification of African States.

There are sources, which indicate that the ultimate goal of the Pan-African movement had been the realization of the United States of Africa. For instance, somewhere, one of the participants of the 1900 London conference uttered the Pan-African Conference is the beginning of a union (Walter 1993).

It could be surprising if one can speak of political unification before achieving independence. Therefore, the focus in every Pan-Africanist thinking was the acquisition of independence by individual states first. Nevertheless, as soon as freedom became a reality, a different enthusiasm for unification emerged.

... race consciousness might be expected to split the continent in two rather than unite it. True, with the struggle for decolonization reaching its peak, this racial aspect was tempered by the more recent Bandung brand of solidarity among all colonial peoples. But this was too vast to reinforce continental unity. There were also more elemental sources, such as the recognition that the peoples of the African

continent had been subjugated and exploited for centuries because of their rivalries. Without a reaching unity of action, the continent might never be able to throw off the yolk of colonialism. And once the several nations were independent, should new rivalries arise the continent could again fall victim to a policy of divide and rule. Whatever the sources or the reasons there was no doubt that a sentiment of unity and solidarity enveloped the continent and powerfully influenced the course of Africa (Woronoff 1970: 80).

There were continental, inter-state and regional attempts to unify the independent states of Africa. At the continental level the most important attempts were made in Ghana during the Conferences of the Heads of States and the peoples in 1958. The resolutions indicated that the final aim of African states was the formation of a union.

At the inter-state level, the Ghana-Guinea Union was one sign of attempts towards unification. In 1986 Nkrumah and Sekou Toure (Guinea) announced the formation of a future union, after the latter declared its withdrawal from membership to the French Community. This union was expected to perform different tasks such as to help the other African countries gain independence, to build a free and prosperous African community and to promote greater unity among African states (Woronoff 1970: 90).

This union was not, however, the type of union we perceived in the previous chapter. The states could possess their own foreign representations. Each state only pledged to follow the principles of independence, unity, African personality and the interests of the peoples rather than projecting institutions to align their policies. Another unification attempt at the inter- state level was the Mali Federation-formed between Mali and Senegal. The proposed unions were more of economic than political. Due to a number of reasons, however, the federation died before it could be assumed anywhere. (Ryan 1967: 116).

At the regional level, a unification attempt has been made in East Africa by the states of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (Tanzania). The Pan African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), created in 1958,helped the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda to meet in Nairobi in 1963 to endorse the establishment of an East African Federation. The goal was to include the remaining East African independent countries like Ethiopia and Somalia and to go to Central and Southern Africa and establish a greater federation.

Like the previous unification attempts, this federation could also yield no viable result.

Another regional unification attempt was the one that was held in French North Africa by Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia before they achieved

independence. They preferred to coordinate their policy on the international front, as symbolized by the creation in Cairo in 1948 of the Comité de Libération du Maghreb Arabe. This unity projects were discontinued after Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence in 1958.

CHAPTER THREE

The Organization of African Unity

I. Prelude to the Addis Ababa meeting

It is already stated that two political trends had emerged, in the African political scene preceding the foundation of the Organization of African Unity. The first trend was the establishment and consolidation of the nascent independent states within the available colonial boundaries, which were artificially drawn by European colonizers. The second trend was a pan -African movement aspiring to bring together those independent states for general or specific objectives.

It was widely accepted among African leaders “that unity and solidarity would not only assure a common front to safeguard Africa’s interests and give it a more effective voice in world affairs but would also provide an antidote to the danger of fragmentation and remove some of the obstacles to rapid economic and social development on a broad and rational basis”(Berhanykun1976: 15).

The existence of wider agreement on the formation of unity and solidarity among the newly independent African leaders did not, however,

mean that no division had occurred on the structure and authority of the future organization and political and economic matters. In fact, as stated in the previous chapter, on the eve of the Addis Ababa meeting of 1963, Africa found it self divided into various blocs, such as the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville Twelve. This division occurred not from one, but from different historical, continental and international factors. These factors included, *interalia*, the impact of colonial legacy, the inter play of pan - Africanism and nationalism, the impact of the Cold War ideology, the role of the United Nations in the Congo Crisis (1960 -62), the situation in South Africa, and the status of Algeria *vis -a-vis* the remaining independent African states.

The African states were sharply divided on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the activities of the UN in the Congo Crisis. Some member states of the Brazzaville Twelve-argued that the UN had intervened excessively outside of its mandate, while others, the Casablanca Group, maintained that at the outset the UN intervention was so meager. The Monrovia group, on the other hand, seemed to be satisfied with the role played by the UN to stop the crisis in that country (*ibid.*).

Nevertheless, the crisis taught African leaders two important lessons. One was the realization of the fact that without solidarity among the African states, an African problem such as the Congo could hardly be solved by the UN,

and the other was that the Cold War and other divisive non-African influences "could easily spread over the continent whenever African solidarity was lacking" (ibid.). Hence, the need both to strengthen unification among the African states and to remove negative foreign influences in alleviating African problems seemed a strong motivating factor for the establishment of a continental organization.

Soon, the Foreign Ministers of independent African states began to carry out detailed preparations. There were four views circulated during the discussion on the structure of the organization.

Advocates of the first view maintained that Africa needed a single Charter superseding the existing African Charter of Casablanca, the Lagos Charter of the Monrovia Group, and the UAM Charter of the Brazzaville Twelve. The Charter was assumed to contain wider principles to which all African countries could subscribe, like the Bandung Declaration drawn up by the non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa, or like the Atlantic Charter, drafted during the Second World War by Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt. Presenters of this view were Libya and Sudan which acknowledged the need to have a united Africa but "assumed that, after signing such a charter, each African state was expected to go about its business at home and abroad very much as before" (Cervenka 1969: 20).

The second opinion enjoyed some support from African statesmen like President William Tubman of Liberia. This opinion was to the effect that besides a declaration of principles, a loose association of African states, modeled in the Organization of American States, should be created within a framework of an All African Organization (ibid.).

The third view maintained that it was much too early to talk of an Organic African Unity at the time and that all the situation really called for was enhancing economic cooperation among the countries of Africa. They argued that unity among African states could only come in step-by-step and through establishing regional organizations. Advocates of this view, in addition to the Brazzaville group included Ethiopia and Nigeria (ibid.).

The last view was in opposition to all the three views insisting on the creation of a real and organic unity for Africa on a truly continental scale. Advocates of this view, the Casablanca members spearheaded by Ghana, demanded the formation of a Union Government of Africa with all the machinery needed to "make it work, an African civil service, an African High command, a court of justice and other common all African institutions" (ibid.). This outlook was based on the belief that political unity should come before economic cooperation and that only a continental union modeled on the

Constitutions of the USA and USSR could be effective to achieve good results for Africa.

It could be argued that advocates of the first three views, members of the Monrovia and Brazzaville groups, were strongly looking down at any kind of political union of Africa, whereas the last view insisted on creating a politically unified organization.

The debate continued during the meeting of the Assembly. Emperor Haileselassie of Ethiopia tried to persuade the leaders to narrow down their differences. He insisted that the deliberation would not end up without forming a single organization

“what we still lack, despite the efforts of the past years, is the mechanism which will enable us to speak with one voice when we wish to do so and to take important decision on African problems when we are so minded--the commentators of 1963 speak, in discussing Africa, of the Monrovia states, the Brazzaville group, the Casablanca powers, on these and many more. Let us put an end to these terms (Haileslasie in Wolfers 1976).

Nevertheless, Nkrumah of Ghana was not compromising, and still insisted on the formation of a politically unified Africa.

African unity is above all a political kingdom which can only be gained by political means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the political kingdom not on the other way round (Nkrumah in Cervenka 1969).

The Nigerian Prime Minister, Tafawa Balawa, master-minding the Monrovia group was a strong opposer to Nkrumah's views.

A suggestion has been made for the establishment of an African common market. This is a very good idea, but I must say that we in Nigeria feel it is a very complicated matter. We want an African common market, but can we do it by taking the continent groupings in Africa?" (Balawa in Cervenka 1969).

Many books wrote that the speech made by the Algerian delegate, Ahmed Ben Bella, has brought the debate to a common understanding.

A charter would no value to us... we must all agree to die a little... so that African unity may not be an empty word (Ben Bella in Cervenka 1969).

After a lengthy debate the organization of African unity was finally established on 25 May 1963.

II. Functional Evaluation of the OAU (1963-1991)

A genuine evaluation of the activities of the OAU in the last forty years must consider those purposes stated in the Charter of the Organization. In this section, however, we limit our discussion to the following specific issues.

- A. Eradication of colonialism from Africa
- B. Coordinating and intensifying efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa
- C. Achieving peace and stability

A) Eradication of Colonialism From Africa

Not only the Charter of the OAU depicted the organization's commitment in masterminding liberation struggles, but the subsequent resolutions drawn and adopted by the members and the practice seen by these members afterwards truly witnessed that the OAU had taken the lion's share in the struggle against colonialism. Almost all the resolutions agreed upon in the various meetings of the Assembly urged the member states to give nationalist movements any assistance possible in the pursuit of their struggle.

The Organization set up a Liberation Committee composed of Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The Committee had two major duties, to coordinate aid to the liberation movements and to coordinate the action of the movement (Woronoff 1970).

Apart from assisting those freedom fighters who were under direct military confrontation, against the colonial powers in various parts of the continent, the OAU had also used other political and economic measures to undermine colonial powers. Economically, for instance, the Organization called for an effective boycott of foreign trade with the colonialist countries and politically, the members of the OAU agreed to interrupt diplomatic relations with countries such as Portugal. The anti-colonialist struggle was so successful

that by the beginning of 1990s the last African country, South Africa, achieved its freedom.

B. Economic Achievement

In the 1960s Africa was at lower level of development. The growth of GDP per capita was only 1.3 percent, compared with 3.5 for developing countries in general. The average increase in gross domestic product for Sub-Saharan states was 3.9%, significantly lower than the 4.5% growth for all low-income countries (Chazan et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the aspiration that Africa could achieve economic growth given its abundant human and material resources was high.

All attempts of achieving economic development through out the 1970s and 1980s was unfortunately pursued by individual countries without the coordination of the OAU as it was practiced during the anti-colonial struggle, which finally followed a different path of development. Chazan et al. (1999) argued that, during the first twenty years after independence, (1960- 1980) ideological distinctions were consequential in shaping the aims, policies, and institutions of African countries. The governments practiced different economic strategies and doctrines from the relatively market-oriented approaches of Ivory Coast and Kenya to socialist experiments in Tanzania, Ghana, Guinea Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique.

The results of such independent experimenting of policies outside of the OAU were desperate in the 1970s and 1980s. There was a general declining in output, fiscal short falls and rising debt. The 1980s, which was commonly referred to as Africa's "Lost Decade", brought further crisis in incomes, social services and investment (ibid.).

The crisis had several features. From 1980 to 1987, gross domestic product grew by only 0.5 percent on average for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Only eight countries in the region displayed growth rates above five percent, including Botswana, Mauritius, Congo (Brazzaville), and Cameroon Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, and another nine manifested negative growth including Liberia, Nigeria, Niger, Zambia, and Mozambique. For the region in general, GNP per capita dropped by an average of 2.8 percent a year, with at least twenty-eight countries showing negative trends (ibid.).

With regard to productive sectors, the region's industrial output dropped by a yearly average of 1.7 percent during the first seven years of the 1980s. Referring to the World Bank data, Chazan et.al (1999) wrote that during this period agricultural growth averaged only 1.8 percent annually. The economic gap between the rest of the world and Africa also increased. The continent's share of global GNP fell from 1.9 percent in the 1960s to less than 1.0

percent; global trade from 4 percent to less than one percent: and global foreign investment flows from five percent to one percent in 1990-96 (Mosha 1998).

One of the most visible aspects of the economic malaise in the 1980s was in relation to debt. The region's external debt rose from about \$16 billion in 1975 to \$58 billion in 1980 and \$ 144 billion seven years later. The debt ratio to GNP reached as high as 110% in the late 1980s from 20% in the early 1970s (Alemayehu 2001).

A number of studies and countless number of strategies have been proposed to provide remedies to the crises. A substantial part of these studies emphasized the need for economic integration among African states. Hence, on the belief that this was a better solution, the OAU applied its efforts on the establishment of sub-regional economic integrations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), etc.

OAU's appeal for regional integration was buttressed by a number of factors. The formation of bigger markets would promote economies of scale and scope, as it would encourage specialization and economic complementarities, as countries would take advantage of variances in production, infrastructure, and trade. The opening up of regional markets and harmonization of monetary

policies should enhance intra-regional transactions, making African states to move away from their traditional dependence on northern economies. Merging markets offer a further possibility of increasing the attractiveness of regional economies to outside investors and increasing the bargaining leverage of member states. The formulation of common tariffs and investment regulations can also increase investors and increase the bargaining leverage of member states. The formulation of common tariffs and investment regulations can also increase protection for local products (Chazan et al. 1999).

Although the OAU insisted on regional integration schemes and succeeded in establishing dozens of regional and sub-regional organizations, many of such institutions, however, existed only on paper. Available data and facts on the ground show that the OAU has hardly achieved its economic objective enshrined in its charter.

C. Achieving Peace and Stability

Emperor Haile Selassie once said that the *raison d'etre* for the founding of the OAU was to achieve the peace and stability of the continent. To this effect, the Charter of the Organization established, as one of the principal institutions, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration under

Article VII, along with the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers and the General Secretariat.

UN Security Council recognized OAU'S competence to deal with conflicts involving actions with respect to threats of the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression' which strictly fall within the competence of the Council. On 30 December 1964 it declared, "that it was convinced that the Organization of African Unity should be able, in the context of article 52 of the Charter, to help find a peaceful solution to all the problems and disputes affecting peace and security in the continent of Africa" (Cervenka 1963:69).

Boundary and Territorial Disputes

It has been stated that the present boundaries of Africa are the legacies of colonial frontiers drawn up by the colonial powers, without considering the political, social, economic and ethnic interests of the areas affected. However, the founding fathers of the OAU were aware of the fact that those boundaries would be a source of potential conflict and therefore did not dare to change them. There were a number of factors.

First, in the 1960s the majority of African countries that achieved independence did not achieve domestic stability and cohesion and would only be in chaos by boundary arrangements.

Second, if revision of boundaries happened, it would stimulate secessionist demands with the resulting disintegration of the parent state. Third, member states believed “that the tribal balance” on which the political structure of a state often depended would be upset by any changes of the frontiers which divide tribes between neighboring states. The annexation of a population could increase the size of a tribe inside a country, which might then quickly lead to internal conflict” (Cervenka 1969: 70).

Thus, the principle of securing the status quo, which is often referred as the principle of *Uti possedetis juris*, was adopted at the Cairo Summit in 1964. The resolution stated, “All member-states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence (ibid.).

The founding fathers of the OAU have to be credited for reducing boundary conflicts and secessionist activities. As Adedeji (1999: 5) wrote it must be admitted, “given the artificial and arbitrary nature of national borders in Africa, inter-state conflicts could have been a more common occurrence particularly as most intra state conflicts usually have implications and fallouts for neighboring countries and regions.” He further argued “the vision of the founding Fathers of the OAU in declaring these borders inviolable has paid rich dividends in reducing considerably, the occurrence of inter-state conflicts during the past forty years,” (ibid.).

This does not mean that there were no boundary conflicts. There were fifteen separate border disputes involving thirty states, which escalated to armed confrontations notwithstanding OAU's continued efforts (Gambari 1993). The most notable included disputes between Ghana and Togo, Mali and Burkina Faso, Tanzania and Uganda, Algeria-Morocco, Somali-Ethiopia and recently Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In a nutshell, the Organization of African Unity has achieved some successes, particularly in the area of liberating colonial states and in mitigating boundary disputes. Nevertheless, it had achieved little in the areas of economy and peace and stability.

III Factors Related to OAU's Weakness

The liberation of the Continent did not automatically bring about peace and prosperity for Africa, and a better life has only become a reality in some parts of the continent and not in others. Conflict and wars over the years led to immense loss of life and displacements and misery in many parts of the continent. The factors behind its weakness are many and varied:

A. Existence of Greater National Feeling

There are two different views as to the question of whether nationalism has existed in Africa (nationalism is understood here with the political

unification of different ethnic groups within a single state). The first view maintains that African nationalism is infused with political ideas about the oneness of Africans, and about the interdependence of African states in achieving rapid economic and social progress, in defending themselves from external enemies, and in establishing an effective African presence in world affairs. An advocate of this view was Colin Legum (1963).

The second view states that nationalism is impossible in Africa. Alfred Cobban in Getachew (1962) argued, "that national self-determination may in its normal political connotation be out of the question in Africa." Many writers argue that African nationalism was developed by external powers than through internal factors. For instance, Legum (1964) wrote that modern African nationalism had developed largely as a reaction to European nationalism, rooted in its ideas of European supremacy and of a world revolving around Western Europe.

Randrianja (1996) similarly stated that the partition of Africa between the different colonial powers fostered the development of struggles for independence and the growth of nationalism and that nationalism in the continent had been elaborated in the political struggles for de-colonization as a reaction to the racist and disparaging views of colonial ideology. Shapperson (1966:49), in the same fashion, argued that all nationalisms are the product of a

reaction against external forces. Nevertheless in Africa “whose partition and introduction to the apparatus of the modern state came at a time when Europe was throwing up chaotically those processes for which the terms nationals ... are adequate but necessary labels, external factors have a peculiar force.”

He added that there were six important external factors to the development of nationalism in Africa. They were the character of the culture of the occupying power, identification of the person with the new society; a period of residence overseas, periods of residence by Africans not necessarily overseas but in other states in Africa, the First and Second World Wars (1914-18 and 1939-45), and foreign ideological influences.

The impact of nationalism in Africa was rather clearer in the area of creating or strengthening unity among member states. This was practically seen on the question of giving priority either to individual sovereignty or continental unity. Woronoff (1970:8) wrote that there was no willingness among African countries to sacrifice dearly won sovereignty in the cause of unity nor to create a genuine machinery that might disapprove of the policy of a sovereign state or ask it to fulfill pledges made on the altar of unity.

In a public lecture, at the Addis Ababa University in September 2001 the former OAU Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Dalim A. Salim, said that African leaders completely forget the decisions they made at the summits when

they returned back to their individual countries. This is due to the fact that they are always pre-occupied with their own national problems.

B. Dual Commitment

Most member states of the OAU belong to different sub-regional organizations, the African -Arabs, are members of the Arab League; many former British, colonies belong to the Commonwealth, most former French colonies belong to the Francophone group.

The OAU has eight Arab countries, which are at the same time members of the League of Arab states, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Mauritania Somalia and Djibouti. These countries have taken divergent views on a number of occasions. For instance, Boutros- Ghali (1984:180) stated the following." Whereas the Arab-Israeli conflict which was the central concern of the Arab states was regarded by the African governments as an issue alien to them and to their primary interests, the African countries thus preferred to maintain a neutral stand between the Arabs and the Israelis"

Not only the African -Arab countries are members of another organization other than the OAU, but more than one third of the membership of the Organization of African unity (sixteen countries) are also members of the commonwealth (Ingram 1994:169).

Some writers have tried to show that membership in the Commonwealth had beneficial effects on the OAU. However, a number of situations indicated that dual commitment, which it spurned, was disadvantageous to the OAU. To take a simple example, as one writer put it, when the OAU recommended African countries to break of diplomatic relations with Britain, in relation to the issues of Rhodesia and South Africa in the 1960s, only Ghana and Tanzania did so, while other African Commonwealth member countries rejected OAU's appeal.

As Ingram stated "relations with the Commonwealth had always been complicated by the fact that one of the OAU's central objectives was the complete elimination of colonialism" (ibid.). This continued to disturb some Africans who would have insisted to bolster up the organization.

C. The Impact of the Cold War

The impact of the Cold War on African political economy has been widely discussed in academic circles. Many of the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, and the escalation of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Ethiopia and Somalia were attributed to the Cold War (Adedeji 1999, Keller 1996).

With regard to the arms race, the impact of the Cold War was demonstrated in the Horn of Africa. For over a thirteen-year period, Soviet

military assistance to Ethiopia was estimated to have been as high as USD 11 bn. The size of the Ethiopian armed forces increased from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later. By 1991, the army was estimated to be over 600,000 strong. Somalia's army increased from 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987. (Keller 1996). In the same period, Ethiopian defense budget grew from USD 103 million to almost USD 472 million. From 1977 to 1985, Somalia's defense expenditure skyrocketed from USD 36 million to USD 134 million, and Sudan's from USD 237 million to USD 478 million (ibid.).

Apart from the unnecessary arms build up and diversion of resources, that could have been used for development, the Cold War caused divisive effect with the resource of the OAU.

Obasanjo summarized the impact of the war;

At the continental level, most issues were seen through the prism of the Cold War. Consequently, African states could not make objective decisions or reach consensus on issues vital to their interests. The division of African states in to Casablanca and Monrovia groups in the early 1960s for instance was a result of the ideological polarization of African leaders at that time along the East-West divide. Even when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963, the congenial discord between the two groups hindered the successful pursuit of such objectives as common and collective security, economic cooperation, and political union of the continent (Obasanjo 1996: 16).

EL-Ayouty also stated that the Cold War enhanced Africa's dependency on the two ideological opposed camps in terms of armament, diplomatic support at the UN, and economic development. In the process of playing the friendship and cooperation game with EAST or WEST, Africa incurred the following problems:

It did not rely effectively on the OAU for conflict resolution; several of its states became pawns in the super power chess games; the civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and the Sahara were allowed to go on without African solutions; the motto of African solutions for African problem became a hollow slogan ...African cohesion was reflected not in deeds and programs on the continent, but in words and conference diplomacy of the African Group at the UN; and the African agenda of unity and development was invoked only in large unwieldy OAU ministerial and summit conferences ,which were rocked by divisions and antagonistic national programs and priorities .

To Sum up, the cold war had an adverse effect on the function of the OAU.

CHAPTER FOUR

The African Union

Requisite Conditions for Unification

In the first chapter, it has been already noted that the requisite conditions for unification do not have a direct causal relationship in the formation of a unified political community. But findings by researchers suggest that lasting and successful union depends on the presence of requisite conditions prevailing among the units to be unified. We have already stated that the requisite conditions. Henceforth a discussion on compatibility of political values, greater transaction, peace and security, and presence of positive external environment will be made.

a. Compatibility of Political Values

We have already stated that the compatibility of political values referred in the thesis were those democratic values, which seem to be of major importance in the domestic politics of the states concerned. Democratic theory maintains that consensus or consent is vital to the growth of a healthy and unified political community. Similarly, a political structure that permits wide participation in decision-making could be conducive to unification; whereas one that is

authoritarian invite dissidence and in time disintegration (Jacob and Teune 1964:35). Democracy, being one with a wider conception, is understood here with its universal principles: a constitution with a bill of rights, free and fair elections, provision of an independent judiciary, a free press, and a military under civilian control.

Mosha (1998:9) stated that attainment of common values in Africa is the only viable foundation through which social cohesion and stability can be achieved to ensure that peace and harmony reigns in the continent and integration becomes a sustainable process.

Mosha further argued:

Western Europe which makes up the EU (European union) what they do share among other things are common values in democratic principles, human rights, good governance, market oriented economies as well as shared aspirations and goals ... (1998:10).

During independence, most African states inherited authoritative government structures designed by colonial powers for their own ends. As Drame (1996: 202) noted, the type of order formed by conquest was a military order, which coerced the colonized peoples in to a state of submission. The conquerors dismantled pre-colonial systems of government. In their endeavor to introduce measures such as indirect rule, in order to strengthen their authority,

they embedded people in dual authoritarian structures. Before giving over power, the rulers focused on arranging the changeover in many African countries in such a way as to install governments suitable to colonial interests (ibid.).

Except for a few regimes most of them were not representatives of the people and had been burdened through different maneuvers by the colonial administration such as removing of nationalist leaders held to be unsympathetic towards colonial interests, gerrymandering and electoral frauds, administrative and policy harassment, etc (ibid.). As a result, in the years between the 1960s and 1980s the predominant kinds of regime in the continent were military oligarchies, civilian one party states, or hybrids of the two (Bratton and Walle 1997:9). According to Bratton and Walle, the most common institutional formation “was a plebiscitary system in which a personalistic leader, who had come to power by a military "coup had constructed a single ruling party that periodically ratified its limited political legitimacy through ritualistic, non-competitive elections” (ibid.).

Bratton and Walle also indicated that in 1989, twenty-nine African countries were ruled under some kind of single party constitution, and one-party rule. Eleven African countries were ruled directly by the military, without the pretence of political party institutions.

One reason, probably the main one, that encouraged the preservation of one-party military rules was the impact of the Cold War in Africa.

The rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold-War (1945-89) contributed to the construction and maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Africa. The global contest for geo strategic spheres of influence led both super-powers into alliances with African strong men who became skilled at winning external support by declaring ideological affinity with an international patron or threatening to cross over to a rival camp (Bratton and Walle (1997: 134).

They further argued that the Soviet Union had attached it self with some of the poorest countries in the continent like Ethiopia and Mozambique, and the United States cooperated with some of Africa's most despotic regimes including those in Zaire, Somalia and Sudan. Many scholars agree that a new type of regime, which looks like democratic in its character, emerged in the 1990s following the demise of the Cold War. They argue that since the demise of the bipolar world system, an international consensus had surfaced with regard to the desirability of pluralist democracy. Governments deriving their mandate from multi party election had substituted many one-party or military regimes since the early 1990s. Obasanjo (1997: 18), Bratton and Walle (1997), chazzan and etal (1997: 408), Ellis (1996) Drame (1996), and Crabneburg (2000: 21) share similar views.

Although, the presence of elections does not necessarily signal the existence of democratic governance, some figures depict that more elections were held after 1990 than before 1990. For example, in the first five years (1985-89) competitive elections were held in only nine Sub-Saharan African countries, in which an opposition party obtained a presence in the national legislature. Some of these countries were Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe (Bratton and Walle 1997: 8)

In the few years after 1990, the number of African states conducting legislative elections rose to 38 out of the total of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Opposition parties won legislative seats in 35 of these elections, and the average share of legislative seats held by opposition parties grew from 10% in 1989 to a somewhat more robust figure of 31% by 1994 (ibid.).

Apart from elections a change in the leadership type was also portrayed. For example, before 1990, nine out of ten incoming national leaders were appointed to their positions by military or party elites. The change was also felt in the political structure of the regimes. Single party rule that prevailed before 1990 had been substituted almost entirely by new constitutional rules (ibid.).

Experiencing such democratic changes does not necessarily lead us to conclude that a complete transfer of regime types has occurred in the Continent.

As Bratton and Walle argued, "in many other respects the Africa of 1994 was not marked by difference from the Africa of a decade before" (ibid.).

It was indicated that the transfer of regimes, from one, which was dominantly authoritarian, to democratic like regimes is partly associated with the end of the Cold War. As Chazan and etal (1999: 408) explain, after the demise of the bipolar rivalry, competition on the basis of strategic importance over Africa had sharply decreased. Thus, Africa is no more a continent to be sought after to serve the interests of the superpowers. Hence, most African leaders could not continue their one- party states through manipulation of these super powers.

The end of the war also brought the United States to crusade for democracy by threatening the cut overall aid commitments to Africa and by concentrating resources in states that not only carried out market reforms but also pledged to respect civil and political liberties (Bratton and Walle 1997: 134). Ake (1995) also stated "No patience or tolerance is shown towards those who hesitate to accept Western values or are fussy about which version they accept."

European countries also followed a similar fashion. For example, former French President Mitterand succinctly declared at a Franco- African Summit at La Baule (France) in June 1990 that From now on ... France will link its aid to the efforts of those heading toward more freedom (ibid.).

The situation compelled Africans to realize by the 1990s that:

They could no longer court external support by professing Marxism-Leninism or anti-communism. To receive development assistance, they had to observe human rights, practice efficient and honest governance, and hold genuinely competitive elections. Hence, the demise of the war found most African governments more vulnerable to western pressures and thus more likely to respond to protest with political reform (Bratton and Walle 1997:134).

Although externally pressurized democracy leads to nowhere finally, there is a need to accept that universal democratic rights could facilitate unification. Keeping the democratic rights of society makes governments heed to the interests of the society-trade unions, labour unions, opposition parties, civic, religious and professional associations, etc. This would facilitate the implementation process of whatever decisions are taken.

African leaders' commitment to enshrine democratic governance in the Constitutive Act is a breakthrough by it self "promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.". Nevertheless, what is observed in most individual states is discouraging. As Ake expressed:

The democratization of Africa appears to have been largely a matter of form than content. But the ascendancy of form over content results in a significant blockage to democratization. For the people of Africa, instead of

emancipating them, democratization is becoming a legitimating of their disempowerment. They are effectively worse off than they were before democratization. For their alienation from power and their operations are no longer visible as problems inviting solution (Ake 1995: 70).

Africans need to work harder to promote the emerging democratic values. They should not pretend on the basis of elections, rubber-stamp parliaments, and other institutions.

B. Greater Transaction and Economic Benefit

1. Social Transaction

Theoretically, it has been argued that unification among individual countries is promoted by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among people. There exists a lack of data, which indicates the degree of interaction among African countries. Some findings portray that interaction among African peoples is so meager by Western or East Asian standards.

A World Bank Report (2000: 134) indicated that especially when South Africa is excluded, Africa is behind the rest of the world on almost all dimensions of infrastructure development, quantity, quality, cost and equality of access. The report showed that by 1997 Africa's (excluding South Africa) paved roads had

been 171,000 Kilometers, which is 18% less than Poland. Among the total number of telephones, which was about 10 million during the same year, half are found in South Africa, which is less than Brazil's.

African transport prices are the highest of any region. Air transport prices across the continent are two to four times prices over the Atlantic. The costs of telephone calls between African countries might be 50-100 times the prices of calls within North America (ibid.). In broadcasting technology, radio dominates Africa's mass media. By 1969 radios in Africa reached 104 million, or 19.8 per 100 people, compared with 3.6 television and 0.3 personal computers per 100 people (Okigbo in World Bank 1999). Africa possesses the world's least developed information and communications infrastructure with only 2% of the world's telephone and fewer than two telephones per 100 inhabitants. On average one telephone line serves 200 people, and in Mali, Niger, and Zaire there is one line fore every 1000 people (Jensen in World Bank 1999).

Another area where interaction can occur is through education and cultural festivals such as sport competition. Although there is lack of information on the number of student population who attend courses outside of their countries in other African countries, it is possible to surmise that the figure does not exceed other regions of the world. Similarly, fans that cross borders to other countries to watch football or other competitions are few compared to other

regions. It could be safely argued that interaction among the peoples of Africa is less than the degree of interaction needed for the formation of a unified political community.

2. Economic Benefit

Economic benefit, in a narrower sense, could be equated with mutual welfare. According to Ryan (1967: 158) economic gain could be considered to be the consequence of the integration of national economies. A product of 'such action', the quantity of goods and services produced with given inputs increases. As Ryan further argued assuming the existence of appropriate economic and societal conditions, economic gain would result from integration of two or more national economies, as it gives a big market for more efficient employment of resources and lower unit costs assuming the newly created market was guided by the principle of comparative advantage and free market elements.

Regional integration has been a good strategy advocated by the OAU, ECA and other studies. So many arguments about on the advantage of integration. One is that of efficiency - when producers and countries specialize in goods that they can produce more cheaply. Another is that the economies of scale that cannot be gained on the domestic market can usually be gained on a greater regional market. It also provides experience and the benefits of competition for generally

high-cost producers with little danger than in the wider world (Mwamandzingo 2001: 2).

The small size of African economies and the declining of primary products forced African leaders and the ECA to accept economic integration as the road to development. Hence, in 1970, 1973, 1977 and 1979 different guidelines were made to achieve the final aim of establishing an African Economic Community in five successive stages, namely Preferential Trade Area, Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, and Economic Community (Kinfe 1999:5).

Those guide lines and the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action culminated when the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) was signed in Abuja in 1991. The Treaty could help all African countries to form sub-regional economic blocs with the ultimate goal of establishing an African Economic Union by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the result of regional integration attempts are limited. Studies show that the continent's intra- regional trade as a share of total foreign trade has always been low (6 percent in 1990) compared with Western Europe (72 Percent), Eastern Europe (46 percent), Asia (48 percent) and North America (31 percent) (McCarthy (1996: 215).

There are different reasons for such a failure: one is the lack of political ability and the will to carry through integration programs in the face of the loss of sovereignty which these cause and uncertainty over the distribution of the gains

and losses of integration (ibid.). Another factor could be the result of the similarity of the production structures of most African states and thus exportable products tend to be competitive rather than complementary. Moreover the existence of inadequate transport and communication, which contributed to the disjointed nature of African economies and highly limited the movement of goods, persons and capital could be cited as cause. In addition the shortage of currency convertibility, the continued existence of tariff and non - tariff barriers, fear of loosing out to more developed member country of sub-regional groupings, and discrepancies among political leaders have continued to be impediments to closer integration through out the continent (Mwamandzingo 2001:10). The lack of participation by the majority of the population is also another factor. As Nomvete cited in Kinfe 1999:5). Stated:

Follow up of decisions taken at the sub-regional meetings is left to the Heads of State or to a few ministers and civil servants in the ministers dealing with cooperation matters or in the office of the president. The rest of the government and the population of the country are not involved In fact they may not even know that there is a treaty establishing the cooperation agreement. The treaties or articles of association are the private property of a few politicians and civil servants. No body else reads or knows them.

The economic relations that existed between African states and other European and non-European Countries still excessively dependent on supplies of manufactured products originating from developed countries, even when comparable products are available within a sub-regional preferential arrangement is another problem. This kills the rationale for creating bigger markets to facilitate the growth of viable production enterprises (ibid.). When economic integration among African countries increases the chance of the benefits to be gained through the results of such integration will increase, thereby further increasing the chance of achieving greater political community.

C. Peace and security

Peace and security is the absolute pre-requisite in any unification attempt. Mosha (1998:19) argued, "The insecurity and instability created by conflicts in Africa has been a major prohibitive factor to an accelerated process of integration in the continent." Abdul, and et al. (2002: 2) also stated that "peace and security is recognized as the absolute prerequisite for the establishment of an effective African Union and regional economic integration, alongside the attainment of good governance and economic development."

Conflict is the contemporary challenge confronting Africa. African conflicts are characterized by the fact that as some of them stop others emerge. For

instance, as the Liberia conflict approached a final resolution by 1998, the Sierra Leone conflict erupted. The Sudanese problem is still alive and. The Somalia case has not been settled. In Angola, the thirty years long war seem to be on the finishing line after the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi (Mosha 1999:9). At present conflict has erupted in the former peaceful state of Cote d'ivore.

Figures available after the end of the Cold War indicate that conflict is one of the most important impediments to the political and economic development of Africa. As the following table indicates, by the end of 1998 only 39 percent of the 48 Sub-Saharan Africa countries (i-e-11 countries) faced political crisis and turbulence while 38 percent (i.e. 18 countries) where engaged in armed conflict (Adedeji 1999).

Countries faced with armed conflict/civil strife (category one)

Angola
Burundi
Central Africa
Republic
Congo (Brazzaville)
Democratic Republic of
Congo (formerly Zaire)
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda

Source in Adedeji
(1999:5)

Countries under severe political crisis and turbulence (category 2)

Cameroon
Comoros
Djibouti
Gambia
Ghana
Madagascar
Malawi
Niger
Nigeria
Togo
Zambia

Countries enjoying more or less stable political condition (category three)

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Cote d 'Ivoire*
Equatorial /Guinea
Gabon
Guinea
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Sao Tome and Principe
Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Zimbabwe

* Coted'Ivoire is in a state of crisis by the end of 2002

The first two categories constitute more than 60 percent of the total number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa needs to deal with those conflicts that have currently unfolded and those that are continuing in the future as potential threats to the realization of the African Union. Some of the following potential threats need to be addressed.

- Actual and potential external threats of force protestation (invasion).
- External threats of destabilization and terrorism
- Potential sources of conflict with neighbors such as undemarcated borders, contested natural resource control
- Violent crime and banditry associated with economic recession
- Ethnic, religious and regional cleavages and the incapacity of governance structures to manage disputes peacefully
- Insufficiently institutionalized constitutional order.
- Weak governance institutions and corruption
- Mass distress migration due to natural and man made calamities.
- HIV/ AIDS and its impact on institutions and capacities including security services (Abdul and etal 2002: 2).

D. Presence of Positive External Environment

Africa's benefit from the demise of the Cold War is that the continent is compelled more toward self-reliance as the flow of arms, aid, and interventionary advice affecting Africa's development programs came to an end (El- Ayouti 1994: 179). This benefit is, however, accompanied by a number of problems. For instance, if we see the economic aspect, Africa has been sorted

out as the only regional loser in the December 1993 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Conference (GATT). In its wake, the Continent faces a likely increase of imported food prices, loss of preferential advantage, greater race in the area of banking and services, and loss of bio property rights (Obasanjo 1997). When the value of world trade is expected to increase by at least US\$ 200 billion by 2005, 70 percent of the wealth is expected to go to the industrialized countries of the rich North. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to lose around US\$ 1.2 billion a year (Panos 1999:11).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, African economies have increased by only a miserable 1.5 percent per annum, which is lower than the rate of growth in the 1980s, a period that has been described as a "Lost Decade", whereas Africa's share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) fell from 37.1 percent in 1990 to 36.3 percent in the Total Sub-Saharan Africa debt is currently estimated to be 300 billion (Obasanjo 1996: 25)

As many scholars argue, external intervention in Africa decreased after the end of the Cold War when the strategic and economic benefit of Africa slowed down. The Russians are overwhelmed by domestic political and economic challenges (Roth child 1996: 231). The American interest in Africa proved to be insignificant. Schraeder (1996: 1930) expressed different trends of US foreign policy towards Africa in the Post- Cold War era. A first trend is the presence of the historical tendency among U.S policy makers to see Africa as a

back- burner issue. Another trend has been the country's measures to cut the budgets allocated to Africa. This budget deduction is a manifestation of US officials' perception that the continent is less important in the Post- Cold War era.

Another trend, according to Schraeder, is again the reinforcement of Washington's tendency to relegate responsibility for overseeing its African policies to those national security bureaucracies that make up the executive branch; the State Department, the Defense Department and the CIA, as well as their specialized agencies devoted specifically to Africa. The impact of this, as Schraeder argues, "is that U.S policies on Africa have become fragmented, interpreted differently according to the established organizational missions of each bureaucracy" (Schraeder 1996: 194).

As the US tried to decrease its involvement in Africa, there were also some trends, which show that the former is still interested in the latter. In the area of "Islamic Fundamentalism, resolution of regional conflicts, and promotion of multi party democracy the United States involvement has been very significant" (ibid.).

Perhaps, the most influential agencies in Africa currently are international development institutions. As Ake (1995: 80) stated "The multilateral development institutions, principally the IMF and the World Bank,

have gained a virtual monopoly of Western multilateralism in Africa and are also the main implementing agents of political conditionality.

Africans have now New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) launched by African leaders as an agenda for the renewal of the continent. Led by the governments of Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal, NEPAD is a new form of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialized countries and multilateral agencies. Through NEPAD, African leaders pledged to promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic management, and people centered development (Africa Development: 2002). What distinguish NEPAD from previous programs is the emphasis on African ownership and a demonstrated commitment on the part of the democratic leaders to take Africa's destiny in their hands (Ibid.).

NEPAD has various political, economic and social initiatives. For instance, the Peace, Security and Political initiative, describes that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development and African leaders pledge to work both individually and collectively to promote these principles (NEPAD 2001). The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative on the other hand, emphasizes on state- capacity building for development (ibid).

The Regional and Continental Approach Initiative focuses the provision of essential regional public goods (such as transport, energy, water, ICT, disease

eradication, environmental preservation, and provision of regional research capacity (ibid). Sectoral Initiative include bridging the infrastructural and the education gap, giving urgent attention to the health sector, ensuring an agrarian revolution, bridging the digital gap, especially in the area of information communication technology, developing the energy sector, designing comprehensive agenda for production diversification and creating an agenda for resource mobilization through increasing domestic saving and increasing private capital inflows and new debt aid reform initiative.

Although, the G-8 countries, and the international community have endorsed the NEPAD initiative, it is difficult to state at the moment that the West can be induced its to divert attention from East Europe to Africa. The international environment is not as such too conducive for Africa despite some recent attempts by the US to approach African leaders, for its own security reasons. The move by the international community to bolster up the unification attempt of African leaders seems slow.

2. Establishment and the Constitutive Act

In 1979 African leaders formed the Committee on the Review of the Charter of the OAU in order to streamline the Organization to gear it for the challenges of the changing world.

All the successive attempts by the Committee to bring an effective amendment did not succeed until a fresh discussion was held in Sirte. Libya, on

September 1999. At the Fourth Ordinary Summit in Sirte, African leaders agreed to amend the Charter. The Summit concluded with the Sirte Declaration aimed at

1. Effectively addressing the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world.
2. Fulfilling the peoples' aspirations for greater unity in conformity with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
3. Revitalizing the continental organization to play a more active role (Documents 2002).

To achieve those stated aims, the leaders decided to establish an African Union in conformity with the Ultimate objectives of the Charter, achieving greater unity for Africa (ibid.).

At the 36th OAU summit meeting in Lome, Togo, in July 2000, African leaders adopted a founding document called the Constitutive Act, laying down objectives, principles, institutions and an operational framework.

In 2001 in Lusaka, the leaders looked at the implementation of the African Union and mandated the Secretary General to work out the modalities and guidelines for the launching of the organs of the Union (ibid.). The new Secretary General Amara Essy accepted the task of transforming the OAU to the Union within a year.

Durban

After a transitional period of one year, the African Union (AU) officially replaced the Organization of African Unity on 9, July 2002 with the presence of 43 Heads of state and Government from across the continent.

Some of the rationale behind the establishment of the Union, as enshrined in the Constitutive Act, is to

- take up the multifaceted challenges that confront the continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world.
- Accelerate the process of implementing the treaty establishing the African Economic Community in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more effectively the challenges posed by globalization.
- To build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector.
- Promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of development and integration agenda, and
- Promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and ensure good governance and the rule of law.

The threat of globalization is stated in the preamble as one cause behind the formation of the Union. Although, some literature claim that globalization creates opportunities to generate or expand wealth, acquire knowledge and skills and improve access to goods and services, there are a number of books that argue otherwise, at least in the case of Africa. For example, the program of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) described how globalization could affect less developed countries.

In the absence of fair and just global rules, globalization has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology. It has limited the space for developing countries to control their own development, as the system has no provision for compensating the weak. The conditions of these marginalized in this process have worsened in real terms. (NEPAD 2001)

Stating why Africa is not utilizing globalization for its own benefits, the program states.

In part, Africa's inability to harness the process of globalization is a result of structural impediments to growth and development in the form of resource outflows and unfavorable terms of trade and ...Failures of political and economic leadership in many African countries impede the effective mobilization and utilization of scarce resources in to productive areas of activity in order to attract and facilitate domestic and foreign investment (Ibid.).

The program also argues that the low level of economic activity means that the instruments necessary for the real injection of private funds and risk taking are not available, and the result is a further decline (ibid.). This is the self-perpetuating cycle that weakened Africa's capacity to participate in the globalization process, characterized by increased polarization of wealth and poverty. In order to break the self-perpetuating cycle African countries have to pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration in the continent.

Some of the objectives of the Union include, the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between countries and peoples of Africa, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member states, promoting peace, security and stability, democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance and promoting sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies and develop and promote common policies on trade, defense and foreign relations to ensure the defense of the continent and the strengthening of its negotiating positions.

Recently in the First Extraordinary meeting of the Assembly and the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the Executive Council, held in Addis Ababa from February 1 to 3, the Assembly and the Executive Council decided to include the role of Africans in diaspora, as one objective, although the debate on

the definition of the term “Africans in diaspora’ is not yet concluded. The decision to be incorporated in the Constitutive Act reads as follows: “Invite and encourage the full participation of Africans in the Diaspora in the building of the African Union in its capacity as an important part of our continent” (Constitutive Act 2003).

The African union comprises the following organs

- A. **Assembly**-it is the supreme organ of the Union comprising Heads of State and Government.
- B. **Executive Council**- comprises ministers of Foreign Affairs or other ministers charged with the responsibility of dealing with the Union. All the issues discussed in the Council will have to feed in to the Assembly.
- C. **Permanent Representative Committee**- it is composed of permanent representatives and other plenipotentiaries to the Union. This structure was not formally recognized under the OAU. It closely works with the Commission on the appointment of commissioners, consultants and follow up summit decisions. The activity of the committee feeds in to the Executive council.
- D. **Commission**- The commission will be based in Addis Ababa the Head quarter of the Union, and will be headed by the chairperson of the AU.

E. **Specialized Technical Committees**- It will be established within the Secretariat and headed by commissioners. It studies issues such as Rural Economy and Agricultural matters, and financial matters, trade, customs and immigration matters, science and technology, etc.

F. **Pan-African parliament (PAP)** - The protocol establishing the PAP was adopted in 2000 during the OAU Summit in Lome, Togo. Though the Constitutive Act of the Union does not clearly state the powers of the PAP, the protocol provides that for the first five years of the parliament's existence, it will have advisory and consultative powers only.

G. **Court of Justice** - The Constitutive Act simply states the establishment of the Court of Justice and for the protocol on its statute. It does not declare what the functions and powers of the Court are and whether it will have jurisdiction over states or nationals.

H. **Economic, Social and Cultural council** - This is one organ of the Union that is expected to provide civil society participation.

I . **Financial Institutions**- The constitutive Act says that the protocols relating to the rules and regulations for the institution shall be defined.

The institutions identified are

1. The African Bank
2. The African Monetary Fund and
3. African Investment Bank

J. **The Peace and Security Council**- The constitutive Act recognized this organ later.

The African press had given different opinions, following the establishment of the Union.

Johannesburg's Black Community Oriented City Press (June 30,2002) wrote 'the AU was the new continental vehicle purpose designed to take on the challenges of the 21st century and to realize the African renaissance (Press Review 2002). Contrary to the above view, an editorial in Gaborone's Weekly, Mmegi (July 5-11, 2002), called it "a giant paper tiger", and wrote that although the idea of the AU is noble, the situation on the ground points that its birth might be premature. It continues to say that Africa needs to put its house in order first and totally overhead its activity for the AU baby to thrive into mature adulthood (Ibid.).

3. The AU and OAU, Similarity and Difference

The African Union is expected to be broader in its scope than the OAU. It is expected to alleviate the poverty of the people of the war-ravaged Africa. As the World Press Review (2002) stated, the AU has pledged to do better, unlike the OAU, which respected the sovereign powers of its member countries.

The Review further stated that the organs of the Union would make it different from the OAU.

Modeled on the European Union, it will have its own Parliament, Central Bank, and Court of Justice. Perhaps most significantly, its Peace and Security Council has a mandate to intervene in regional conflicts involving war crimes, genocides and crimes against humanity, giving its power that far exceed those of the OAU (ibid: 3).

Jacob Zuma, Deputy President of South Africa wrote that the different situations in which the AU and the OAU have been formed give a vivid picture that though the aim of Africa Unity still runs through like a thread in both Organizations, the two institutions are not entirely the same (Zuma in Document 2002). The OAU was also formed in an environment where by Africa was under colonialism, while the Union was formed in a situation where conflict and wars have over the years led to loss of life, displacements and misery in many parts of the continent (ibid.).

Although, it is too early to compare and contrast the functions of the six-month child, the AU, from the 39 year old defunct OAU, it could be possible at least to compare the contents enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the Union and the Charter of the OAU.

Objectives and Principles

Some of the objectives of the Union are a continuation of those of the OAU. For instance, objectives such as “achieving greater unity, defending the

sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence of its members” were also available in the Charter.

However, the Constitutive Act goes further to include objectives like “the promotion of democratic principles and institution, and popular participation and good governance,” as objectives that were difficult to be incorporated during the formulation of the Charter for various reasons.

The Charter of the OAU, had the following objectives, stated under article 2.

- a. to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states
- b. to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.
- c. to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.
- d. to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, and
- e. to promote international co-operation having due regard to the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Constitutive Act of the Union, contains 14 objectives, stated under article 3, which includes

1. achieve greater unity and solidarity between the Africa countries and the peoples of Africa
2. defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states;

3. accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent
4. promote and defend African common positions on issues of interests to the continent and its peoples
5. encourage international cooperation taking due account of the charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
6. promote peace, security and stability on the continent
7. promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance
8. promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.
9. establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and international negotiations

The Constitutive Act also copied some of the principles of the OAU Charter, such as

- a. The sovereign equality and independence among member states of the Union.
- b. Respect of borders existing on achievements of independence

c. Non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another.

There are, however, new principles added in the Act that were not in the OAU charter, like the principle of

d. The right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide, and crime against humanity.

e. Promotion of gender equality

f. Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism.

g. Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional change of governments.

Organs

The Act of the Union includes some organs that were not present in the Charter of the OAU. Such organs include the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, Permanent Representative Committees, the Peace and Security Council and the Financial Institutions. Other organs like the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Commission, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council were already there.

The principal institutions of the OAU were the Assembly of Heads of state and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration.

Like the OAU, the Union still remains under the control of the Heads of State and Government. Under article 6 of the Constitutive Act, it is written that the Assembly, which is composed of the Heads of State and Government, shall be the supreme organ of the Union.

The functions of the Assembly is stated under article 9 which include the following:

- a. Determine the common policies of the Union.
- b. Monitor the implementation of policies and decision of the Union as well as ensure compliance by all member state
- c. Appoint and terminate the appointment of the judges of the Court of Justice.

A slight change has been made recently with regard to the power of the chairperson of the Assembly. Like what was written in the OAU charter, in the constitutive act adopted in Lome, Togo, the provision that the chairperson of the Assembly had only the right to call extraordinary session upon approval by a two thirds majority of the member states. The Chairperson could also serve only for a period of one year.

However, in the amendment made at the First Extraordinary Session of the Assembly in Addis Ababa from February 1-3, 2003, the Chairperson of the Assembly can call extraordinary session after due consultation with all member states, with out looking for a 2/3 majority support. The Constitutive Act (2003)

says that “At the initiative of the Chairperson and after due consultation with all member states, or at the request of any member state and upon approval by two thirds majority of member states, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.”

The amendment also states to increase the term of office of the Chairperson for a period of one year when the need arises “The Assembly shall elect its Chairperson from among the Heads of State or Government at the beginning of each ordinary session and on the basis of rotation for a period of one year. The assembly in exceptional circumstances, may, however, extend the term of office of the incumbent for a period not exceeding one term”

Similar composition is seen in the Executive Council of the Union, as it was in the OAU. The Council “shall be composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or such other ministers or authorities as are designated by the governments of member states.” Under article 13 of the Constitutive Act, the Executive Council “shall be responsible to the Assembly. It shall consider issues referred to it and monitor the implementation of policies formulated by the Assembly.”

Another organ of the Union, that was not provided for in the OAU charter is the Pan-African Parliament. The Constitutive Act, under article 17, justifies the establishment of the Parliament “in order to ensure the full

participation of African People in the development and economic integration of the continent, a Pan-African Parliament shall be established." However, the Act does not say anything about the function, composition and powers of the Parliament, except that those will be defined in a protocol relating thereto. Similarly, the statute, composition and functions of the court is not defined in the Constitutive Act.

There is no indication that the Assembly shall cede any sovereignty to the Pan-African Parliament, where in most country state sovereignty lies. In a public lecture, Dr Trini Jinuala, Speaker of the South African Parliament, stated that although the ultimate aim of the Pan-African Parliament should be to evolve into an institution with all legislative power, at the moment the African Union has not ceded sovereignty on anything. She argues that it is not possible to legislate until such time that countries cede sovereignty to the Parliament it shall have a consultative and advisory power. This seems to give the Union an intergovernmental structure rather than a statue of a supranational entity.

The Union, under Article 19, shall have such financial institutions as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.

The Peace and Security Organ, was not in the original Constitutive Act, but it was added later. However, no member state has ratified the Protocol to establish this organ, although, in a speech made at the first Extra-Ordinary

Meeting of the Assembly, the current Chairman of the Assembly, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, referred it as a crucial organ to keep the peace and security of Africa. “---we continue to be confronted by the challenges of peace and stability on our continent --- All of us are convinced that this (Peace and Security Council) will help us to respond more effectively to the imperative to move the entirety of our continent to a situation of peace and enhanced safety and security of our peoples” (Statement 2003).

Unlike, the OAU Charter, the Act of the Union incorporates measures against members which do not comply with the decisions of the Assembly and the Act on financial matters as enshrined under Article 23. “The Assembly shall determine the appropriate sanctions to be imposed on any member state that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the budget of the Union.”

Furthermore, any member state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communication links with other measures of political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly. Article 23 gives the Union certain power to take measures on countries that fail to comply with the decision of the union.

Specific measures that are to be taken when failing to comply with the decisions and policies of the union are outlined in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union, presented at the First Ordinary Session convened from

9-10 July 2002 at Durban, South Africa, of the Assembly of the Union. According to Rule 35 of the procedure, a member state shall be suspended from the right to speak, vote and receive documentation at meetings of the Union, offer to host sessions of the Assembly or of the Executive Council or any other meetings of the Union and present candidate for any position or post within the union, when in arrears of payment amounting to two years but not exceeding five years of its assessed contributions.

When defaulting in making arrear payment of contributions amounting to five years or more, suspension of the member state, including the above measures, the right to have the contracts of employment of its nationals renewed; and provision, by the union, of funds for new projects in a member state could be effected.

The Procedure also specifies sanctions for unconstitutional change of government under rule 35. Unconstitutional change of government is defined in the procedure as a military and unconstitutional take over against a democratically elected government, intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government, replacement of democratically elected governments by armed dissident groups and rebel movements, and refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after a free and fair elections.

Whenever such unconstitutional change of government occurs the chair person of the Union and the Chairperson of the Commission are entitled to immediately, on behalf of the Union, condemn the action and suspend the member state from the Union and from participating in the organs of the union, provided that exclusion from participating in the organs of the Union shall not affect that state's membership in the Union and its obligations towards the Union.

With all these measures, if the government that took power unconstitutionally refuses to return to constitutional order, the Assembly shall immediately apply sanctions against the regime including visa denials for the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change, restriction of government to government contacts, trade restrictions and any other sanction as may be recommended by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The question that arises out of such a provision is whether such measures would enforce the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change to return to the constitutional order given the existing low economic, social and political relations among African countries.

The African Union has clearly indicated where sessions would be held under rule 5 of the Assembly and rule 6 of the Executive Council as "the session of the Assembly (executive council) shall be held at the headquarters of the Union, unless a member state invites the Assembly (Executive council) to hold a

session in its country, provided that the Assembly (Executive Council) holds a session at the headquarters at least every other year in the case of the Assembly and at least once every two years in the case of the executive council.

Conclusion and Prospect

The birth of the African Union in Durban on 9, July 2002, could be said, is the result of the long years of struggle by African peoples and leaders to achieve greater unity.

There were a number of earlier pan-African Congresses organized by both people from the new world (America) and the West Indies and Africa. Such Congresses, among other things, had the objective of unifying the peoples of Africa against white domination.

In the early 1960s, some 32 countries that achieved independence by then, formed a loose organization, known as the Organization of African Unity, on 25 May 1963. The Organization was assigned to carry out some political, economic as well as social activities. In the political field, the OAU would organize African countries for more unification against internal as well as external threats. Whereas in the economic and social spheres it would improve the life of African countries and increase social interaction among different peoples of the continent.

In its 39 years of existence, the OAU achieved little in those areas. Africa has gone, both politically and economically, from bad to worse. The Organization could not save the continent from the impact of Cold War rivalry and Cold War related conflicts. The living standard of the peoples of Africa in

the 1990s was by far worse than it was in the early 1960s. It was in the area of fighting against colonialism in Africa, that the OAU registered a success story. It also played an important role in mitigating Inter-state conflicts due to boundary and territorial disputes.

It is not yet vivid whether the present Union is similar to the type of union that was conceived by earlier Pan-African leaders. However, it could be argued that the African Union is the result of the continuation of the earlier Pan-African struggles.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union holds some objectives that were not in the Charter of the OAU. Such objectives include “the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, and popular participation and good governance.” Other objectives such as “achieving greater unity, defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence of its members” were already in the charter of the OAU.

Similarly, some of the principles such as the principle of “non-interference” and the “idea of sovereignty” are simply a continuation from the OAU, with certain modifications. The Union allows member states to intervene in a state that is undergoing grave circumstances, like war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity.

The Union incorporates some additional organs that were not in the OAU. Such organs include the African Parliament, the Financial Institution and the Court of Justice. However, their duties are not yet specified adequately.

Until now, there is no indication that African leaders would cede sovereign power to any organ of the AU. The ultimate power of the Union, like that of the OAU, still rests on the Assembly, which comprises the Heads of State and Government of Africa. This seems to give the Union an inter-governmental structure rather than a supranational model.

The present Union does not resemble the type of union conceived in this thesis, i.e. a union which has a means of violence at the central institution, and the central institutions having authority to make decisions affecting the distribution of resources, unless the union transfers itself from an intergovernmental to a supranational type of organization.

For the formation of a strong political community the political, economic and social conditions are less conducive yet. This should not be interpreted in such a way that if these conditions are fulfilled a political community could be realised. But the formation of a strong political community depends on the presence of those conditions. There are no compatible political values across the continent. Some countries are relatively democratic, others are in a state of transforming themselves into democracy, and many governments are still authoritarian.

There is low social and economic transaction in the continent. Almost 90 percent of the continent's economic relations take place with countries outside of Africa, dominantly Western Europe. Only less than 10 percent of the existing economic relation is conducted among the states of Africa. Social transaction, that is the relation between African peoples, is still at a lower level, due to infrastructure and other reasons.

War continues in many parts of Africa. This will continue to create division among member states of Africa and divert the continents' resources for unwanted ends.

The international environment is not yet conducive for Africa. The continent remains marginalized when the developed countries' attention diverted toward East Europe.

The prospect does not seem bright for Africa, unless African countries form a strong political community that can look for remedies for their multi-faceted problems.

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