



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES (IPSS)

**ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ETHIOPIA: THE CASE
OF BENISHANGUL-GUMUZ REGIONAL STATE, METEKEL MANDURA WOREDA**

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AUGUST, 2021

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF GRADUATE
STUDIES, INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES

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DECLARATION

I, **Asnakew Tuwi**, declare that this research, entitled **“Ethnic Federalism and Conflict Management in Ethiopia: The Case of Benishangul-Gumuz Region State: Metekel Mandura Woreda”** submitted to Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security Studies is my effortful result and the all sources that have used for the research have been appropriately acknowledged. Hence, I would like to confidently declare that this research shouldn't, and will not be submitted to any other institutions in the same form to pursue degrees.

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Signature _____

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This Thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as College supervisor.

Name of Advisor _____

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Date _____

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, my heartfelt thanks to God who helped me to complete this thesis. Next, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Mesfin Gebermichael for his unreserved constructive intellectual guidance and very useful comments for my better and competent accomplishment. His bright approach and the easy communicating system gave me great confidence to pass through many challenges while conducting this study. Moreover, my deepest gratitude also goes to my dear parents, Emmpu Begutah and Tuwi Chito who believe in me and helped me to keep the struggle for my dreams. I also owe special thanks to my beloved sister Yshiwork Tuwi and all my brothers for their astonishing moral support throughout my study. Furthermore, I want to forward my gratitude to all research participants, which I do not mention their names here for their cooperation and patience in giving me valuable information and assistance of any kind, which contributed to the research outcome.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF ACRONYMS	vi
ABSTRACTS	vii
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background of the Study	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem.....	4
1.3 Research Questions	6
1.4. Research Objectives	7
1.4.1 General Objective	7
1.4.2. Specific Objectives	7
1.5. The Study Areas	7
1.6. Significance of the Study	7
1.7. Scope of the Study.....	8
1.8. Limitation of the Study	8
1.9. Organization of the Thesis	9
CHAPTER TWO	10
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND Related LITERATURE REVIEW	10
2. Introduction.....	10
2.1. Theory and History of Local Government	10
2.2. Definition of Local Government	11
2.3. The Conceptual Framework.....	12
2.4. Democratization of Local Government.....	12
2.5. Local Government in Africa	13

2.6. Ethnicity	15
2.6.1 Primordialist Approach of Ethnicity	15
2.6.2. Instrumentalist Approach of Ethnicity	16
2.6.3. Constructive Approach	16
2.7. Theory of Conflict.....	17
2.7.1. Ethnic Conflict.....	17
2.7.2. Local Government and Ethnic Conflict Management.....	18
2.8. Ethnic Politics	20
2.9. Conflict Management System	21
CHAPTER THREE	24
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	24
3.1. Research Approach	24
3.2. Research Design.....	25
3.3. Sampling Techniques	25
3.4. Data Sources.....	26
3.5. Method of Data Collection.....	27
3.5.1. Interview Questions.....	27
3.5.2. Focuses Group Discussion.....	27
3.6. Data Analysis and Interpretation.....	28
3.7. Ethical Consideration	28
CHAPTER FOUR.....	29
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION	29
4. Introduction.....	29
4.1. Resources Competition	29
4.1.1. Economical Interest as Driving Factors.....	30
4.1.2. Political Interest as a Deriving Factor	31
4.2. Ethnic Politics as Driving Factor	32

4.3. Ethnic Based Party Threatening Ethnic Security	33
4.3.1. Dynamics of Conflict in Metekel Mandura Woreda	34
4.4. Actors in the Conflict	35
4.4.1. External Actors	35
4.5. Ethnic Conflict Management	36
4.5.1. Local Administrations in Conflict Management in Metekel Zone.....	38
4.5.2. Conflict Management in Mandura Woreda	40
4.6. Challenges for Ethnic Conflict Management	41
4.6.1. Excluding Socio-Culture in Conflict Management	42
4.6.2. Socio-cultural Value in Conflict Management	43
4.6.3. Institutional Fragmentation.....	44
4.7. The Role of Local Government in Ethnic Conflict Management	45
4.7.1. Local Administration in Conflict Management.....	46
4.7.2. Local Leaders in Ethnic Conflict Management.....	47
4.7.3. Effective Local Leaders in Conflict Management.....	47
4.7.4. Instruments of Conflict Management	48
4.7.5. Ethnic Mobilization in the Conflict.....	49
CHAPTER FIVE	51
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	51
5.1. Conclusion.....	51
5.2. Recommendations	52
REFERENCES	53

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Local administrations in Mandura Woreda	26
Table 2: Group discussion based on their ethnic background	26

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BDP	Boro-Shinash Democratic Party
BGDP	Benishangul-Gumuz Democratic Party
BGRS	Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State
BPLM	Benishangul People Liberation Movement
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GERD	Great Ethiopia Renaissance Dam
GPDM	Gumuz People Democratic Movement
GPLM	Gumuz People Liberation Movement
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
UNGA	United Nation General Assembly

ABSTRACTS

Ethnic federalism allows the political authority of local governments to manage ethnic issues in their respective region of the country. In this autonomy, the power of local administration is given to the local people or local institutions to manage ethnic-related conflicts at the local level of society. Following this most people study that ethnic federalism is a source of ethnic conflict as an ineffective state structure to manage ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. This study is examining the institutional function in conflict management at the local level of administration. The main objective of the study is to determine factors that affect local administration in conflict management in Metekel Mandura woreda. Methodologically, the researcher employed a qualitative research approach, cause study research design, primary and secondary data sources, purposive sampling techniques, and an explanatory method of data analysis in the study. The findings of this study are ethnic line institutional administration at a local level encouraged ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society. Moreover, the study found that the absences of reconciliation and compensation, and non-integrative socio-cultural conflict management with institutional conflict management in the conflict managements are a problem for the continuity of ethnic conflict in Mandura woreda.

Keywords: Local government, ethnicity, ethnic politics, ethnic conflict, conflict management

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Historically, local government is the process of controlling local issues by transferring central political power, limited place, to the lower level of society especially to manage regional borders (Leybo and Entin 1985; 291). It is self-management, which is a system of sharing power with the local institutions to take care of local affairs at the grassroots level of society. Representing individuals or institutions to exercise what seems logical authority to manage a community problem as a process of delegation (Baranov et, al. 1995). Aijaz (2007) argues that self-government is and will be the basis of a truly democratic system. He also argues that "you can't build a consolidated democracy if you don't build the list of functions such as accountability, participatory, and responsibility." These local governments also hold the management of the future where they deal with the local problem because they are close to the people.

In Africa, Local government administration is a grass-root structure as recognized by the law of their specific government system. Local government can be defined as a sub-national level of government within a limited geographical area in a larger national territory that has jurisdiction over a limited range of state functions (Keith, 2002).

Watts (1999), argues that local government ranges from metropolitan municipalities of megacities to states, small-town councils, and villages. Their purpose also varies as a multi-purpose of its municipalities or a single-purpose if it's in a special district. The special categorical of local government is they are found in the lowest level of the structure and they are the ones closest to the people. Moreover, how the local government manages the conflict at a local level of society.

Logically conflict is divergent of an idea or interest between an individual or collective within interaction and seeks to achieve incompatible goals among deferent parties at the same time, (Fisher et al, 2000:4 and Ramsbotham, et al, 2005). The main purpose of local government is to manage these ethnic-related conflicts at the local level of administrations (Watts, 1999).

Ethnic conflict is a conflict or disagreement between two or more ethnic groups attached with ethnic lines, color, or race in the society to control resources (Bussmann/Scheider 2009: 15-19).

The economic and political interests of groups or individuals in social interaction cause ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic state. That means ethnic conflict is the result of interaction by belonging to one ethnic group to get the advantage.

The perception of ethnicity in or out-groups thinks that in specific one thing i.e. that mostly in opposite direction not interested to share an equal resource to achieve the same goal with other ethnic groups. Individually seek to take all advantage in the base of their ethnic identity (Bussmann/Scheider 2009; 15-19). For political advantage, all ethnic groups shock relatively domination on resource / politically & other terms (Gurr 1970-200). Therefore ethnic identity is a means for local governments to drown/manage conflicts for political advantages.

Conflict management; Burton (1987) conflict management is relating to the roles of government to managing or controlling the occurrence or avoiding violent conflict and minimizing the intervention of actors to make the situation peaceful. Most African countries do not manage conflicts effectively due to different security challenges on the continent and people prefer to manage conflicts. The conflict management system should emphasize mutual synergies that place conflict groups to re-establish the past social interaction in a peaceful, nonviolent manner (Kaufman, 2006). The way of those actors' involvement may change the relationship within those ethnic groups in intention. This means that the involvement of government actors in conflict management is a non-violent or violent action. These ethnic intentions might be affected by such destabilizations, along with what they each stand to win or lose (Anderson 1999, Rieff 1997, and, Hinde and Pulkinen 2000).

Local institutions are expected to play an active role to manage conflicts and contribute a lot to avoid conflict behaviors in an integrative system. More specifically, while regions and clan leaders are responsible for maintaining security within their border but they cannot ensure it and, particularly on ethnic conflict. The intervention of local government in managing ethnic conflict sometimes lacks an institutional approach and it pays the way to ethnic tension (Global Security, 2019). In Ethiopia since 1991, the state accepted the power-sharing system with local administrations on the base of an ethnic line as a federal state structure (Assefa, 2006).

Therefore the decentralization of self-government authority to local government is to manage ethnic conflict at the local level. And it is to work closely with the people to control the whole

government activities (Assefa, 2006). The power-sharing system aims to manage plurality and ethnic conflict in ethnic federalism. Many studies show that ethnic-based federalism creates the opportunity for local society constitutional to manage ethnic intension and maintain security and building an institutional bridge between ethnic groups to share power in a society (Halabo 2016,p.11). Mainly, economic resources, political interests, and boundary issues are known for a multi-ethnic group as sources of conflict. Nowadays, the cause of ethnic insecurity is shaped by a border dispute due to the boundary disagreement between the two conflicting ethnic groups, (Ahmed, 2003).

In the study area, how the local government managed conflict to sustained ethnic security at local levels. The major bodies of local governments are formally for the study purpose starting from Zone administrators and woreda security offices including police offices and informally, religious fathers, and clan elders are part of local administration in the region. The zone security administrators function according to power shared from the regional state security administration with visual the institutional reality closely with the grass root society (local leadership). The cause of conflict is economic and political instability or ethnic line violence to win the conflict situation (Asnake, 2009).

In Mandura woreda, more than five ethnic groups are living such as Gumuz, Amhara, Shinasha, Agew, and Oromo, etc. For many years the social relation of an ethnic group in this area was harmonious. After introducing self-administration to local people in the ethnic line group interests were contradicted in social life. The decentralization of power to local government crated new demand and interest for multi-ethnic groups sometimes emerges conflict among ethnic groups in a new form of relationship (Dessalegn, 2010).

To manage social conflict at a local level the government adopted an Ethnic federalism state structure base on ethnic lines and geographical location of the ethnic setting (Mulugeta, 2018). This state structure created new geographical boundary demarcation of the past provinces creates ethnic institution at local administration (Asnake, 2009). To adders the above problem this thesis tries to examine the role of local government in conflict management, which will help ensure the peaceful coexistence of all ethnic groups in the region.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Ethnic-based federalism as conflict management to manage ethnic conflict is a debatable concept or problematic in the academic arena to exercising institutional role at local administration in Ethiopia. The conflict management system is integrating social value and legal approaches in managing conflict in a multi-ethnic state or not. In Ethiopia, many Researchers studied that the institutional structure in the base of ethnic federalism as a conflict management system in Metekel including Mandura woreda in BGRS. For instance, Berhanu Gutema's (2007) Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Restructuring State and Society": Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia' provided a chapter to examine the state restructuring process in BGRS and to determine whether the ethnic federal formula in Ethiopia is an appropriate model to empower and equalize the diverse and disparate ethnic groups.

Asnake K (2009) studied "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions" is almost a prominent literature in this regard. He explores that the adoption of ethnic federalism as government systems in Ethiopia had resulted in the emergence of regional and local conflict by proliferating centers of ethnic competition.

Mesfin Gebremichael's (2011) Ph.D. dissertation on "Federalism and Conflict Management in Ethiopia: Case Study of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State", is the other extensive work that mainly focused on the examination of whether the federal arrangement has created an enabling environment in managing conflicts in the country or not.

Moreover, Mulugeta Anbessa's (2018) study on "Ethnic Federalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia: The Case of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State "All researches studied institutional arrangement in BGRS" to address social conflict. In different from other researchers this thesis explores the local government role in conflict management in the case of Metekel Mandura woreda as an institutional conflict management gap.

Lederach (1997) explores a conflict management system, as institutional conflict management reconciliation is forgiving each other and compensation is minimizing a security dilemma of conflicting parties. The other is a lack of common understanding about social cognitive perception, national conscience, and responsible community that resulted from the literate people as a mode of worldwide (Ibid).

Most researchers argued that the main goal of ethnic-based federalism is to manage ethnic-based conflict at the local level (ethnic recognition). But in my point, ethnic line power decentralization to local government in the current ethnic conflict management is escalated social conflict. For instance, the current conflict emerges from local leader's interest and is supported by external actors invited innocent civilians for political conflict. As institutional truth, the local government and central government are managing the conflict in ethnic lines and violent manner or not. Why? (Documents reported Metekel, 2013).

At local administration, the institution mostly leads by majority ethnic groups this is undermined institutions to manage conflict at the local level. This is because the formation of the institution administration is basically in the majority ethnic group of the area and sometimes excluding the interest of another ethnic advantage in the institution arrangement (Asnake, 2009). Therefore to manage ethnic conflict in the country, it needs a civilized society and qualified democratic institution that to ensure the reality of local administration at the grass-root level (Kaufman, 2006).

The ethnic line approach in conflict management will not intend as an institutional involvement system to sustain peace and security in an ethnically diverse society (Asnake, 2009). This approach of conflict management encourages local leaders to manage conflict out of the institutional approach because of ethnic and institutional links in a political arrangement at a local level (Ibid).

Arresting individuals or leaders and groups in conflict management is not stopped ethnic violence, but ethnic violence still exists, and nothing changes well. Because of mismanagement in conflict, they see each other as enemies for revenge because there is no reconciliation and compensation between ethnic groups, which is encouraged by the government to ethnic coexistence to build new social relationships between conflicting, groups (Lederach, 1997).

According to Ethiopia's constitution of 1995, the structure of government designed on the ethnic-based boundary, narrowing the national consciences of people, it creates local thinker society and emerges ethnic conflict in the country. In another way, the constitution has created autonomous regional states and local government which is responsive to local issues and

accountable to local people (Assefa, 2006). So it needs further investigation to address' ethnic-based political arrangement in ethnic federalism

The decentralization of power to local government is to functionalizing the FDRE constitution to address' ethnic issues as nation nationality of Ethiopia people. There is no specific rule that establishes to address ethnic minorities at the regional constitution that is stated in the federal level of the constitution. For instance Oromia regional state constitution Proclamation No 116/2006, Article 3(1) stated that the complexity of regional constitutions and statutes creates the impression that the regional states have done just that in their constitution to address the interest of other ethnic groups in the regional constitution. There is also an executive council which is chaired by a chief administrator or a mayor (for city administrations).

Moreover, various institutions at the local level have been established to deal with the bureaucratic works of local administrations and city administrations. This study argued that the decentralization of political power based on ethnic lines will create competition to control resources in a multi-ethnic society.

This study examines the conflict management system at the local institution in the current ethnic conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda in BGRS. This particular study investigates that giving political power to the institution in ethnic line as conflict management is not enough without considering regional constitution to address ethnic minority at local government administration.

1.3 Research Questions

What are the ethnic-based conflicts and what causes them in Mandura woreda?

- What is the role of ethnic federalism up on ethnic conflict management at local institution in Mandura woreda?
- Why political conflict cause ethnic conflict at local institutions in the Mandura woreda?
- How did the local institutions understand the cause of ethnic conflict and managing the conflict?
- What conflict management systems have been adopted by local institutions to manage ethnic conflict in the woreda?

1.4. Research Objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of local institution in ethnic conflict management in Metekel Mandura woreda

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

- To assess the role of ethnic federalism up on ethnic conflict management in Mandura woreda
- To identify the political and ethnic-based conflict at local institutions in the Mandura woreda
- To assess the institutional understanding in political and ethnic conflict management at local level
- To identify the conflict management systems to adopted by local institutions to manage ethnic conflict in the woreda

1.5. The Study Areas

The study area is Metekel Mandura woreda in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State western part of Ethiopia. It contained twenty-five kebeles like Mangeiry, edida, Anzebguna, and Genet Mariam. This study analyzed that ethnic-based institutional administration undermined the local administration's role in ethnic conflict management. This woreda exercised ethnic conflict for more time because of the lack of effective institutional conflict management and ethnic line institution in the region. Mandura woreda is a place of multi-ethnic group zone, inhabited by different ethnic groups such as Gumuz, Shinasha, Amhara and Agew, etc. The lack of clear institutional principles to accommodate the interest of ethnic groups at the local level is the problem of sustained peace and security in the region. Ineffective governmental performance to deal with ethnic issues at the local level is the institutional fault in the region.

1.6. Significance of the Study

The study was concerned with investigating the solution to the current ethnic-based conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda. It will also be important to examine the role of local administrations

in ethnic conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda in BGRS. The government could be creating clear rules and regulations that can address ethnic issues in ethnic-based federalism to manage ethnic conflict in the institution. Indeed, it recommended what principles and rules to apply to local leaders and the federal military force to manage ethnic conflict incorporation and mutual coexistence for sustainable peace and security in multi-ethnic states. Moreover, the study could examine the advantage and disadvantages of ethnic federalism for local institution to manage ethnic conflict. It will be references to other researchers to do more on local administration and ethnic conflict management.

1.7. Scope of the Study

This study analyzed the role of local administration in ethnic conflict management in Metekel Mandura woreda. It also tries to explore the influence of ethnic-based conflict on local government in conflict management. Like another region, the area is covered by multi-diverse ethnic groups including indigenes and non-indigenous people who have to share the national image or consciences of the country. Started from 1991 new state structure of ethnic-based federalism in the region is adopted to manage ethnic-based conflict among ethnic groups. But the demarcation of regional state boundary and political competition in the base of an ethnic line created conflict relationships among ethnic groups. This is the motive for the researcher to study the area to understand the cause of the conflict and conflict management system of local administration in Mandura woreda. Indeed the study will be conducted in Mandura woreda security administrators, police offices, religious leaders, and selected local elders in the area. This selected cluster is very essential for this research to give information about the situation because the issue is related to institutional functions and experience in the social life of the society.

1.8. Limitation of the Study

The ethnic conflict of the Metekel zone stopped transportation service from Assosa to the Metekel zone Mandura woreda which wares a basic challenge during data collection. Due to security the problem of area, the service delivery is not voluntary to give transportation service because of no one to take care of responsibility. To collect the data, the researcher traveled with a regional special force that traveled to manage the conflict in the area. The continuity of ethnic

conflict in the area majorly limited researchers to study the area. The special force was forced by the officer to help the researcher in travel by government service is another challenge to the success of the data collection in the study area. The misperception and negative attitude outlook of the community in the base of ethnic color to give more explanation in the cause study to help researcher is the big problem in data collection. The feeling of red people and the fear of black to give clear information on the situation is another challenge in the study. The researcher collected the informant with help of recognized individuals' assistance and kebele administration support to minimize the ethnic threat in the focus group discussion.

1.9. Organization of the Thesis

The research contains five chapters the first chapter including a background or introduction, and statement of the problem, and the objectives of the study. Chapter two; this chapter mentions different literature reviewed base on ethnic conflict, local government, conflict management mechanisms. It all so reflects local institutions' interest in conflict resolution to sustain peace and security, power-sharing, and resource sharing to integrate the community.

Chapter three; describes the research methodology that the researcher used in the study Specifically, research approach, research design, sampling techniques, research instruments, and used explanatory data analysis and presentation in the study. Chapter four; deals with primary and secondary data source's results and data analysis and data interpretation, finding of the study. Chapter five; this chapter concludes the issues of research and recommendation.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND Related LITERATURE REVIEW

2. Introduction

This chapter tries to explore the theoretical and conceptual framework of local government concerning another demission, and the words local government, ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and conflict management system in Ethiopia and other countries across the world. Indeed how local government can manage ethnic conflict at the local level to sustain peace and security in the community. And this chapter attempts to understand the negative and positive relationship between local government and the central government in the state.

2.1. Theory and History of Local Government

The first historical development of the local government was Anglo-Saxon England in (C.700-1066 AD). The local government structure of England in 1707 was related to the modern local system of the United Kingdom that was not shared with another part of the country. In the recognized meaning they are two basic categorical ideas to distinguish the nature of local government (Jackson, W. E. 1960). The major point to understand the meaning of the local government is traditional meaning and belief with natural law (Mabileau, PGales year) and (Dhill R Leach, J steuert year). Jackson, W. E. (1960) argued that the effectiveness of local governments are depending on central government interest but exercises the legal authority right with the support of local interest.

Local government is a system of power decentralization to local people as self-government to administrate specific places in the federal arrangement (Adnan, 2013). Olowu (1988:12) classifies local government in two relevant concepts; first understanding central government, power-sharing to the sub-national or regional government, or the existing federal and regional government in the sovereign state.

The second approach is listing particular elements that determined the local government in specific ties. These five elements are the main to differentiate local government from other local institutions: (1) personal legality, (2) localness, (3) really citizen participation, (4) required the

self-capacity building to administer some demarked area from central authority, and (5) specific authorities to execute a variety of functions. These elements are essential to separate the local government from other forms of the local institution at the local level and to achieve the effectiveness of participation in institutions to maintain social security.

Robson (1937: 574) as cited by Adnan (2013) explain local government from a legal perspective: local government is a division of authority and giving protectoral assistance for local people, a community that's not self-governed before and including the legal rights and specifically institutions to rule its civil society. The existence of legal authority at the grassroots level of the society is ensuring the participatory democratic system. It encourages people to reflect their opinion on local issues following constitutional plant form.

2.2. Definition of Local Government

From a social perspective: The local government is a social institution established to govern individual behavior in social interaction. It shapes aggressive human behaviors in the interactions externally and internally with local authoritarian forces (Rice and Sumberg, 1997). It uses as a mirror to guide social relations in the interaction to feeling the basic necessity of survival to shape the cultural behaviors in the interactions externally and internally to influence (Rice and Sumberg, 1997).

From a political perspective: Local government is a political institution that exercises legitimate authority at the local level on side of the central government. It is the democratic integrating system of administration with the vision of some democratic principles like transparency and accountability for the effectiveness of a governed system with citizen participation (Dragos and Neamtu; 2009 & Hasrutu & Radu 2009). In legal and geographical concepts, local government is regulated by the central government who gives the power to the local community with some territorial boundary according to the central government to control specific areas with legitimate power (Ibid).

2.3. The Conceptual Framework

This study seeks to investigate factors that influencing the roles of local government in ethnic conflict management in Metekel Mandura woreda in BGRS. The study assumes that the local administration's role in ethnic-based conflict management was influenced by ethnic political interest of local leaders, economic resources, traditional conflict management system and the conflict management of the government is excluding the social-cultural value of the society or integrates conflict management system. Therefore to integrating the conflict management system what instrument is to be adopted by institutions for peaceful conflict resolution in multi-ethnic society?

2.4. Democratization of Local Government

The formation of local government or the existence of a power-sharing system is a recent phenomenon for undeveloped states to interact with a central and local institution with local peoples in the country (Hartmann, 2008). In the modern sense, it is a new structure of government reform in which recognizing the existence of power at the local level of society to integrate the higher level of government to respond as will rights up-down approach governing system. Most of the states denied the existence of local government in their constitution. For instance, in 1787 the Constitution of the US, the Constitution of Swiss in 1848, the Canadian Constitution of 1867, and the Federal Constitution of Australia in 1901, all the constitution was being unresponsive to the issues that affected local government and the essentiality of local government to the grass root of society (Jackson, W.E. 1960).

Followed the Second World War self-government was increasingly in the federal state flowers to integrate the democratic ruling system in the framework of constitutionalism. In 1988 Brazil's constitution was supported by the civil government by interest to sign extensive to the protection of self-government. In the reverse of this, the constitution of Swiss in 1999 was interested in the recognition of local government to sit in practices. Indeed above the Italian constitution of 1999 and 2001 take a reform for devolution, recognition of regions province and municipal authority in the country. The major aim is to increase the role of the local authority in delivering social services to society. In this, all local authority's is the way to democratization the state power to achieve growth and development in the country (Jackson, W.E. 1960).

2.5. Local Government in Africa

In Africa, Local government administration is a grass-root structure as recognized by the law of their specific government system. Local government can be defined as a sub-national level of government within a limited geographical area within a larger national territory that has jurisdiction over a limited range of state functions (Keith, 2002).

Watts (1999), argues local government ranges from metropolitan municipalities of mega-cities to counties, small-town councils, and villages. Their purpose also varies as a multi-purpose of its municipalities or a single-purpose if it's in a special district. The uniqueness of local government is they are found in the lowest level of community and they are the ones closest to the people.

According to Peter Abraham (1946), there is an unsuccessful condition for African states in local government capacity building, in the public institution, as well as the private sector. It is not well integrated with the new system of power decentralization to local people. Starting from 1950 the political emancipation and the colonial masters are challenged the African local system. But not all African leaders, some of the areas need decentralization of political power to address the local problem of community. The democratization process create the interests of African leaders to building capacity at the local level of the community to initiate the African ruling system development (Kaufman, S.J.2006).

Historically, started from Axumite civilization up to the 1850s decentralization was dominant in the country to exercise their municipal power to control and create inter-relations with local people. But it changed after the 1850s when centralization of the political system started to dominate the country in 1855. The country was ruled by the triple authority where the emperor work as central the municipal and local nobility exercises the power at the local level and the province at the middle level (Markakis 1975 and Gebru 1991). This system shows that the existence of dual authority or power-sharing with different levels of government. All the regimes that have had the monarchal authority since then used local authorities to guard their political power, suppress resistance, and extract revenue to sustain political administration. Since 1991 the country has been undergoing a process of decentralization power to local institutions which is premised on embedding democracy at the grass-root level to managing ethnic conflict.

Article 39 (3) of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution gives privilege for ethnic groups to self-government up to secession as an opportunity and it increases ethnic politicization in local administration. The article created the majority and minority rights in contradiction in the multi-ethnic region to cause ethnic conflict. The constitutions of regional governments did not clearly state the rights of minority ethnic groups in the regional constitution. This is the cause of displacement of minority ethnic groups in majority ethnic groups in all regions

The decentralization process has been used to reinforce the dominance of the EPRDF power arrangements and gives priority to ethnic line institutional to answer the ethnic questions. Because there are no clear principles that may force the regionals to address the interest of ethnic minorities in institutional works as subunits of the federal constitution. There is also an executive body that is appointed by the executive leader or chairman, (for city administrations). Indeed, different institutions have been established to deal with the institutional work at local woreda or zonal administrators, Art 3(1) of Oromia Proclamation No 116/2006. The regional constitutions and the proclamations authorize the woredas and city administrations to decide on matters relating to their social services and economic issues, adopt their budgets and hire and fire their administrative personnel.

Moreover, there is a shortage of clarities in the regional constitutional and legal framework that makes zone or woreda and city administrations subordinate structures of the regional governments. It lacks the constitutionality to control local issues and to maintain social security to the community at the local level which cannot address by the central government. Its decentralization is premised on the integrative culture of control and representation and on embedding a tradition of democracy. Yet, as has been indicated, local authorities are still used for controlling and preventing dissenting views article 50 (4) FDRE constitution (1995).

Recognizing self-government in ethnic federalism is to functionalizing local administrations to exercise legal authority at the local level. But how is it possibly in diversified ethnic groups, In contrast to this, Mahler (2002) argued that the ethnic line power-sharing system did not only enhance the democratic process, it also increased ethnic conflict at a local level? In my point of view self-government in a multi-ethnic society is essential to address ethnic recognition in the state, but I argued that the absence of a strong rule that can manage ethnic plurality in ethnic federalism as an institution is caused by ethnic conflict. Especially the regional governments

should clearly define the functional assignments in the side of federal government Art 39 FDRE constitution (1995).

2.6. Ethnicity

The term "ethnicity" is the modern concept it's the agreeable name of the whole ethnic groups as a common word for people; it's the identification term for all individuals from other groups (Tonkin et al, 1996:23). According to Max Weber (1996), ethnicity is a common perception of people attached with cultures beliefs and customs that they share in common in the seating of place or categorical class. Hutchinson and Smith (1996:35-40) in deeded to state the formation and concept of ethnicity from a different perspective, mention the three basic approaches such as primordial, instrumentalist, and constitutionalist approaches.

2.6.1 Primordialist Approach of Ethnicity

The essentialist or primordialism approach of ethnicity focus on exaggerate parents in a specific class of some group that shares in the community without consideration of time and space. They stand on the physical cultures and traditional customs of individuals that get from birth from some ethnic groups that received as unchangeable things up to death (Horowitz, 1985). The essentialist belief that social interaction cannot change circumstance majorly argued on socio-cultural and family interrelationships with identity groups and interrelationship among ethnic groups (Geertz, 1973; Van den and Berghe 1979; Horowitz, 1985; Lewis, 1994).

In primordialism perception, an ethnic group is parent performed and established to preserving cultural norms and rigid social perception living style. They missed the social interaction with technology and global community interaction in one global world highly influences the traditional way of life and carat the new environment to community, the increasing the human choice or basic needs in interaction with other ethnic groups. Indeed political, economic, and socio-interaction with an external ethnic group or join other ethnic groups during migration or marriage can influence the past ethnic formation (Eller and Coghlan, 1993; Harff and Gurr, 2004:96).

2.6.2. Instrumentalist Approach of Ethnicity

The instrumentalist approach is different from primordial ideology because of its emphasis on flexibility or interchangeability nature of ethnicity that forces the new class to filter ethnicity as an individual or group ethnicity to the other groups. Ethnic identity is not rigid it is changed with conditions or factors to get the economic and political interest of the class (Ukiwo 2005 and Esman 2004). Indeed Chon and Bass (1996) argued that ethnic identity is used by politicians to alien ethnicities with something as an instrument to win the situation.

In a Political sense, leaders use ethnicity as a force to pursue the interest with exaggerates the limited differences for political business (Max weber 1997). For instance in Nigeria, Rwanda, and Burundi in the 1990s created state insecurity as a fragile state fr political advantage. From individual perception, ethnicity is the common relationship of the individual as a categorical class of economic or economical exchange (Ibid).

The instrumentalist approach fails in the defined ethnicity based on blood relationship of one ethnic group like culture, custom wearing style. And it lacks the advantage of the ethic interaction in the time of joying one to another ethnic group through marriage. This is an emphasis on the economic value of the socio-structure class in society used by leaders to exploiting ethnicity for the grievance of their interests, and advantages (Vayrynen, 1999:128).

2.6.3. Constructive Approach

This approach is different from others because it focuses on issues or ways of ethic formation and exchangeability with circumstances. It reflects that ethnic identity is flexible, not rigid it can join by individual or social groups, for instance, civil community, teacher association, and political activists with self-supporter class division group (Jenkin, 1997). Vayrynen (1999) reflects the idea of socio-construction of ethnic identity and re-establishing ethnic ethnicity states on the change of time to engage in reconstruction and re-organizing socio of world. This socio-cultural construction among different ethnic groups with other ethnic identity groups forms national identity. So it needs government assistance to national identity and nation-building in a political way to consensuses to new ethnic identity (Cornell and Hermann 1998:85).

2.7. Theory of Conflict

Logical the concept of conflict is divergent of an idea or interest between an individual or collective and both seek to achieve the same goals differently at one time (Fisher et al, 2000:4; Ramsbotham, et al, 2005). The existence of Incompatible goals from different parties based on their interest and value or ideology and religion is making the party's manage the conflict with differences (Bono, 1985:5; and Wright 1990:16-17). The matter of social structure, inequality in wealth, political ideology, and lack of infrastructures in the society cerate the autogenic social relation leads the conflict situation to manage the conflict in the constructive or in the destructive result (Dahrendorf 1957, in Jeong, 1999:5; and Kriesberg 1998:22).

The major core of the social conflicts depends on the situation of behavior, attitude, and misperception of difference among individuals and parties, but can resolve through cooperation, conciliation, or hostility. Galtung (1996) states that the dynamic nature of the social conflict is can escalate or dis-escalate the conflict situation such as behaviors; attitudes and structure, and change the conflict situation among parties. The emotional behaviors that can develop from the latent stage are invisible to the parties themselves. In the manifest stage the aggressive behavior is visible partially but not actual violence (clash). Violence conflict is the appearances of the whole conflict futures starting from the latent stage up to escalation actors up to the destruction of the material resources and humane life and environments (Sandole, 2003:40).

The similarity of social conflict is may be associated with a national, regional, and international character. But Global conflict is Social conflicts in the issue of wealth or economic crisis and ideology lead by religious fundamentalism. But the source for the national social conflict to termination of the conflict from one state to another or cross borders like a great leak region shaped by identity conflict and national movement(Ramsbotham et al., 2005:98).

2.7.1. Ethnic Conflict

Donald Horowitz (1985). Defined ethnic conflict is interest straggle commonly in an exclusive way on mutual interest with competition to achieve a goal with some categorical group or class in asocial life. Social conflict at the state level is mostly caused by political, economic, and social structures like ethnic groups, race, and lack of democratization or rule of law within the state

(Kupchan, 2001). Dr. Zerihun (2005) argued that traditional militarizing ethnic groups in a conflict situation are one undermined the government's role in conflict management. Each ethnic group resides in a certain geographical area they perceived that resource as communal material unshared they alien resources with their ethnicity. In more the political system of the state is ethnic federalism that links ethnic politicians and resources like fish and water or not to permitting another ethnic group to use it. Hence to protect their property and to protect themselves from other ethnic groups to control resources they use a defense mechanism that can easily trigger conflict (Ibid).

The Individual security issue is the other cultural and traditional cause of conflict that is related to the defense mechanism. The political interest and the conflict management system of the past create security dilemmas in the society in such a way that it considers another ethnic group as an enemy (Zerihun, 2005). The lack of government support and incline the mind of society through education and unchecked proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the deliberate arming of certain communities without consideration of the security of others is a major threat to sustained peace and security in the country (document, 2013).

2.7.2. Local Government and Ethnic Conflict Management

Most Africa conflicts are ethnic's structure but it is shaped by ethnic politics according to essentialist model and delegation of authority to the local government (Braathen et al, 2000). In most African states power of centralization is associated with ethnic groups and cultural regions' oppression of other social classes (Markakis, 1994).

The local power-sharing system with local people in undeveloped societies creates ethnic hostility in the base of ethnic political groups in the region with getting the support of intellectual groups as the instrumental value of ethnicity. However, introducing self-government in a multi-ethnic political party and multi-diverse ethnic groups are can't adder's democratic governing system (Edward and Mansfield, 1995). For instance, the 1999s Conflict among ethnic groups is mentioned in Rwanda, Burundi, and Algeria during election time.

In Ethiopia, Follow the dawn fall of the military regime, the state introducing a democratic system to the country as a new logic to readdress the post-social conflicts by decentralizing the power to local institutions to investigate the root cause of the ethnic conflict in the country. But

the decentralization of power to the local societies in the ethnic base party is not enabled to resolve the social conflict; it creates a new ideology of ethnic-based movements (Merara Gudina 2007). Therefore, a power-sharing system in the base of ethnic-based politics with exclusive limits is undermining institutional performance in the country. Indeed it creates confusion at some local administrations or ethnic groups as the debate on the concept of ethnic-based federalism in theory and practices reality at local levels of government. Moreover, the local government or federalism is the new idea of 1991 in Ethiopia to address ineffectiveness of power-sharing system among ethnic groups of the past regarding the concentration of power at two ethnic groups specifically Amhara and Tigray people in Ethiopia (Merara 2007 & Asnake 2009).

The researcher argued with the idea of Aalen as he stated that local government or self-administration is power competition among different ethnic groups at the local level. This power completion gives the power to the majority ethnic group to administrate the limited territorial boundary in Ethiopia like in Metekel between Amhara, Agew, and Gumuz people. Others argue that it creates a sense of hegemony of ethnic manipulation on the minority group for instance conflict between Nuer and Agenwak in Gemballa regional state. In the two ten decades in Ethiopia, there is disagreement among scholars in the implementation of ethnic federalism in the country. Most researchers focus on three major contending views that affected the effectiveness of power devolution to local in the base of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia (Aalen, 2002 & Asnake, 2009).

Andreas (2003) stated that the restructuring of Ethiopia in ethnic-based federalism is an innovative mind seating to local administrations to a formed an ethnic political party. It encourages power marginalization between majority and minority ethnic groups in some areas at local government administration.

Merara Gudina (2007) explains the local power-sharing on the other side state that lack of equal power-sharing, lack of true democratic participation, and self-government, invalid the soundness of ethnic consciences between the central and regions to implement federalism in the country. The third scholar's category mentions that post-1991 in Ethiopia there is no strong integrative idea and ideology and practices to managing the existing ethnic conflict rather than ethnic power competition (Asnake, 2009). The mentioned researchers didn't focus on the

institutional role in ethnic-based federalism to manage ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic state like Ethiopia, India, and Switzerland, etc. most of them argued that the government structure or power devolution as conflict management to multi-ethnic states

2.8. Ethnic Politics

The current ethnic-based party and ethnic identity politics is undermined institutional function to managing ethnic conflict in the country. Ethnic politics is a way of exercising political ideology with ethnic alignment to hold political positions of the country. In this political system, individuals and politicians encourage one group to be conscious of their ethnicity as a base to a holed political position in the country (Merara, 2007). Indeed Legesse Tigabu (2010) explored that the consideration of ethnic identity as a factor to the holed political position is affected ethnic interaction at the local level in the country. Moreover, the replacement of military government by ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia is another intension among the ethnic political competition for political advantage in the country (Merara, 2007).

The restructuring of Ethiopia's state in 1991 motivated the elites to alien Political issues with ethnicity to win the political position by marginalizing some ethnic groups in different regional states (Markakis, 1998). In Ethiopia, the state designed by the government in ethnic seating and geographical territorial boulder's still generating ethnic conflict among ethnic groups in the country. For instance in Somalia between Afar and Issa in 2002, Garri and Borana in 2002, Nuer and Agenwak 2002 in Gemballa with highlanders 2003, and Oromo and non-Oromo in 2005(Abbink, 2006 and Assefa, 2006).

Many scholars argued that Ethno-regional conflicts and ethnic-based conflict in Ethiopia have resulted from ethnic politicization and ethnic territorial demarcation in the bases of the ethnic majority of the population in the region. In the regional administration, the lack of democratic institutions to facilitate and practices legal authority at the local government level makes the other ethnic groups to be displeased and killed in the Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella region for a year. And in the southern region, the people how's not belonged to the southern were displeased (Asnake, 2009). The result of ethnic-based politics in multi-ethnic groups is in ethnic conflict in the most diverse ethnic societies. For instance, the current conflict in the Metekel Mandura woreda in the Benishagul-Gumuz region, in the Oromia region, and the Tigray region

are the most examples. But ethnic federalism is the solution but not in the line of ethnic politics form; because it challenges federalism in conflict management at the local administration system (Asnake, 2009).

Different researchers argued that ethnic-based federalism is the last option for Ethiopia to decentralize political authority to local government to manage the post-ethnic conflict. Therefore the alignment of power is to manage ethnic conflict at the local level but in the line of ethnic politics created ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society. In addition to that, the introduction of ethnic federalism in the country is too limiting ethnic group differences to accommodate our diversity to think cooperative for national perspective aims and ideology of federalism and local government of the state (Mulugeta, 2018).

2.9. Conflict Management System

The conflict management system was introduced in the 1970s for the first time with inters groups and social psychologists (Brahnam et al., 2005). Thomas et. Kilmann (1974) classified the conflict resolution models in two stake levels with contending elements like compromising, beneficiary, avoiding, collaboration, and competing. Robbin (2003) states that the conflict lived or survival with the establishment same antagonistic interest, disagreement, change, result, consistency, and survival or lived hood. Moreover, what challenged the effectiveness of the conflict management process is managers may be escalated the nature of conflict in an alarming situation (Ibid).

Aghedo (1999) indeed, argued that conflict management is similar in terms of big tree shadow. He listed the three points in disaggregated, in a situation such as a term, an approach, and a discipline. As a term, conflict management refers to a process in which parties dispute are reduced emotional feeling and creates a positive outlook with opposition in attitude. As an approach, it is a systematic way of studying deeply the causes, actors, dynamics, transformation, containment, avoidances, and resolution. Aghedo, categorizing their conflict stage per-conflict, and post-conflict stages to understand the roles of the peacemaker to manage the conflict situation.

Other Conflict management strategies fall into the category of poor communication but successful international cooperation and negotiation involving a capacity level bargaining force.

The role of third party intervention as a third middle man to re problems and manly beneficial way for individuals to use alternative situation based conflict management system to focus on patterns negotiation (Aula et Siira, 2010). The conflict management process model emphasizes the outcome of conflict and situations and intervention in the conflict conflicts (Appelbaum et al., 1999). Indeed it deals with the dynamics of the conflicting nature and structural models that view the situation under overly rigid circumstances.

Darling and Walker(2001) states that a conflict management system requires individual behaviors and attitudes to understand the nature of individuals, groups, organizations, and social participation to resolve conflicting issues to achieve common goals such as exemplary, integrative, fixable, and solution seeker. (Matta, et. Corby, 2000) states that conflict management means first of all managing /controlling a conflict situation and seek a solution for conflicting groups.

Many scholars, such as Sutter Schooled al. (2007) say that the process of conflict management at the stage level is opposed to the idea of the inner fear; emotional behaviors, and outcomes. The conflict management process is aloud stapes it needs assessment, listing the competing group's idea, and brings it into real practices or to the truth (Du et al., 2011). Mosaic (2012) to be ineffective in the conflict management process the steps use to identify the cause of conflict, analyze the conflict, and set the man's solution to the conflict.

Negotiation is one of the conflict resolution mechanisms which are functional when conflicting parties draw the same principle that will lead them to an agreement. It creates a better situation to dispute parties to meet each other to agree on one principle for mutual advantage (Zertman, 1978 and Lewicki et al 2003, 4-6).

Mediation is another means of conflict management in which the conflicting parties voluntarily accept the assistance of third parties to negotiate them without force to reach an agreement (Siger 1990: 20). Bingham (1985: 5) furthermore state that partiality of the third parties in conflict as assistances to negotiate the conflicting parties is very essential to sustain peace and security.

Arbitration and adjudication are other conflict resolution mechanisms in the third party acts according to the case as a judge to punish who fails the agreement. The decision in both systems

is legally binding and mostly realized both side cases of the disputes. Are legal systems of conflict resolution in which you bring your case to the court to make a decision.

Conciliation; Patz (2003) and Merrill, (2005) argue that Conflicts can solve by religious fathers, clan leaders, and civil society actively participating as a whole. They bring both perpetrators and victim individuals and groups to give forgiveness or compensation in the name of God to renew the future relationship (Rigby, Andrew Lynne Rienner, 2001). Truthful speaking absence of compensation and reconciliation in conflict management extended the ethnic intention among ethnic groups. And also political exclusion in the line of ethnic groups leads to ethnic violence (Cederman, et al. 2010).

Integrative ethnic conflict management: it identifies the problems of the ethnic groups in the question and tries to reach a result that gives the groups a mutually acceptable satisfaction on the incompatible interests of the parties. It is emphasis examining existing differences to bring a solution to members of ethnic groups. This conflict management strategy is effective when other groups are interested in cooperation and the sources of conflict are having seen as manageable (Sillars, 1980).

The implication of the conflict management system to the study is to identify the conflict management strategy of local institution in multi ethnic groups at the local level. The local institution needs to deal with the conflict with the socio-cultural value of the society, for instance, reconciliation is acceptable for all communities as elders, and religious of social belief. All conflict management systems are useful based on conflict situation and cause of conflict and interest of the parties, therefore the explanation of these conflict management systems is to select the one in the usefulness to ethnic conflict management in the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter reflects the research methodological issues of the study. The methodological part includes research approach, research design, sources of data, methods of data collection, sampling techniques and data presentation and data analysis, and ethical considerations have been provided in this part.

3.1. Research Approach

The study adopted a qualitative research method. The qualitative research method is the systematic inquiry into social phenomena in natural settings. These phenomena can include but are not limited to, how people experience aspects of their lives, how individuals and/or groups behave, how organizations function, and how interactions shape relationships. In qualitative research, the researcher is the main data collection instrument. The researcher examines why events occur, what happens, and what those events mean to the participant's studies. And it explains the social facts of people; explores what people shared in common as well as individually (Creswell, 2007). This approach is a choice because of suitable to explain the fact of the social reality in changeable circumstances. Qualitative research is one investigate knowledge about the primary sources in the constrictive perspective (Creswell, 2007). It opens the opportunity for the researcher to find out deeply about phenomena in the study (ibid). Accordingly, to achieve the objective of this study, this is focused on examining the role of local government in ethnic conflict management as an institutional function, therefore; this is clothed to the qualitative research approach.

Indeed Flick (2002:27) states that "Qualitative research" is specifically interested in the study of social relations, reality, and facts of social interaction in the world community. Different from the quantitative method in qualitative research data is mediated through the researcher or the "human instrument." Indeed, in this research design, the researcher personally interacted with people and visited areas or offices or recorded behavior; at the natural environment places.

3.2. Research Design

The researcher used a case study research design. Research design is a systematic framework for action that serves as a bridge between research and questions and the implementation of research. In the case study research design the researcher selected to employ this research method to undertake the process of data collection and data analysis that combine the relevant to the research, usually over a specific time (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001:396). Most of the time, data is acquired from various sources comprising of documents and interviews (Yin, 1994). It deals with the cause root of the conflict, dynamics, and actors involved in the conflict. The researcher used a qualitative method, cause study, including semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, informal interviews, and relevant documents. Due to lack of time to study all areas of ethnic conflict the researcher selected cause study research design because it limits the attention of researchers to targeting only the study area to determine the cause of conflict. This research design is very useful to analyze the main actors in the conflict, geographical location in the selective area, and to deal with the dynamic nature of the conflict in the study area

3.3. Sampling Techniques

The researcher used a purposive sampling strategy to select highly knowledgeable key informants like security offices, polices offices, woreda administration, religious fathers, and clan leaders as sources of data for the study. The purposive sampling technique is the most effective one when one needs to study the socio-political domain with experts in social interaction (Tongco, 2007). Thus, the researcher employed these sampling technics to meet the participants who have more knowledge and exposure to the issue under the social conflict, and to get relevant and reliable information. Moreover, purposive sampling in social research takes information from elders of the community as sources to recommend the social real situation. In terms of sample size, the researcher conducted in-depth an interview with seven key informants, upon which the data reached its saturation level and one FGD with eleven participants with different backgrounds. In the base of a categorical description of the participant, the research collected data from zonal security administrator, woreda administration, and woreda security administration including policies and local elders or religious leaders respectively.

Table 1: Local administrations in Mandura Woreda

symbol	Key informants	In number	Position
A	Zone security office	1	Officer
B	Woreda security office	1	Officer
C	Woreda administration	1	Officer
D	Police officers	2	Commanders & commissioner
F	Special forces	2	Commissioner & commander

This mentioned are mainly high contributions in institutional conflict management system as exercise local government role at the local level

Table 2: Group discussion based on their ethnic background

Groups	Ethnic groups	Numbers	Age	Education Level	Sex M/F	Positions
FGD1	Gumuz	3	50-60	1-5	2M&1F	Clan elders
FGD2	Amhara & Gurage	3	50-55	5-10	2M&1F	Elders/religious fathers
FGD3	Agew& Oromo	3	50-58	5-10	2M&1F	Elders
FGD4	Shinasha	2	40-45		2Ms	Elders
Total		11				

The listed above groups were discussed one group discussion based on the ethnic contributions in the community respectively.

3.4. Data Sources

The researcher conducted primary and secondary data in the collection. Primary data was collected through interviews, four group discussions, and secondary sources were gathered by

analyzing documents such as published and unpublished materials, books, journal articles, and news reports e.tc.

3.5. Method of Data Collection

Regarding the data collection method, the researcher collected primary data through an interview, FGD, and secondary data by analyzing different documents.

3.5.1. Interview Questions

The researcher used open-ended interviews for the study. This open-ended interviews participant allows asking worded questions, so responses are open-ended (Borg, 2003 & Creswell, 2007). It is a useful method of data collection technique in qualitative research (Creswell, 2007). There are different types of qualitative interview designs, such as informal, unstructured, and semi-structured interviews developed to obtain truth and rich data (Ibid). Open-ended interviews allowed the participants to contribute as much information as they desire. And it allows the researcher to ask probing as much as a follow-up. Indeed it allows the participant to express their viewpoint particularly sensational issues without limiting theme selves' specific questions (Ibid) accordingly to extract similar researcher has prepared semi-structured interview guidelines to participants. The researcher interviewing the key informants in their offices and by adjusting free time for participants to discussed deeply on the questions.

3.5.2. Focuses Group Discussion

Bloor and Fiona (2006), states that focus group discussion is a wise way of thinking, sharing, and discussing the issues with a collection of individuals invited by the researcher. Indeed they confirmed that used to provide information on common understanding and social norms in a targeted specific issue. At the base of this study, the researcher conducted four focus group discussions in Gilege Belles' town, the Metekel zone, with eleven participants. The participants were choices from different ethnic groups (Gumuz, Amhara, Agew, and Shinasha, Oromo, and Gurage) based on their experience and knowledge on the issue of understudy and willingness to take part in the discussion. Local people have an eligible culture and wisdom of conflict resolution in their life experiences. So the necessity of group discussion is to understand the ethnic groups to suggest the solution to ethnic conflict. These ethnic elders have the attitude to

analyze the conflict based on norms and in a way to sustain peace and security for the future. Therefore the study was conducted by FGD and interview key informants in the study area.

3.6. Data Analysis and Interpretation

The study employed an explanatory data analysis method that was collected from primary and secondary sources. Therefore, in this study, all data, collected through qualitative techniques have been analyzed qualitatively. The major issues and frequent occurrence of the problem were identified, analyzed qualitatively to determine the nature, actors, and roles of local offices to sustain community security. Indeed the findings of the study were analyzed based on the respondent informants. As Bernard (1994), stated that qualitative data analysis mostly depends on the presentation of selected issues and comments from respondents that invite the reader to understand shortly, took the researcher months or years to figure out. Moreover in qualitative data, the quotes give insights into individual experience in a particular case of study.

3.7. Ethical Consideration

To successful data collection, the researcher considered and respects the morals of all participants. It may be a knowledge matter among ethnic groups regardless of identity consideration in what the cause to make the conflict to ethnic violence/others. The issue that leads them to conflict is a lack of knowledge, misperception, and targeted on the antagonist idea. It is better to put into consideration their level of knowledge, communication during the data collection time. Moreover, their social life and norms of the community, collaborative, and integrative way of looking to create a responsible community in the area should be considered kindly. During the data collection time, the researcher considered the participant opinions to be successful information.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4. Introduction

This chapter deals with the analysis of data obtained from primary and secondary sources. In the process of analyses and interpretation, each data collected through different instruments have been used in qualitative methods. Here the objective and basic research questions of the study have been addressed and presented thematically and explanatory under different topics and sub-topics. More specifically it is elaborated below.

4.1. Resources Competition

Natural resources are the source of economy for all ethnic groups to the subsistence of family life. But aligning natural resources with the ethnicity of the local people is created a misunderstanding to share resources. The interest of the ethnic group in the area is to take ownership of the resources in the base of exclusion ethnic groups (FGD2 interview March 7/2013). In the institutional administration, the interest leaders are to share institutional administration and resources is forceful in the denial of the advantage of other ethnic groups at local administration. Therefore the right to be the owner of natural resources exaggerates conflict and creates exclusive interest to groups those who 'belong' and those who are latecomers and limited rights to use at a local level. So the internal frustration for resources and political administration in ethnic lines is the source of ethnic conflict (Ibid).

The resources are not only a source for ethnic violence's in the area but it is also a way to identification interaction in the community and power relations between individuals and groups. The performance and economic status of ethnic groups in the region are different; this creates other antagonistic interests in the region to conflict. The social interest in the Metekel Mandura woreda of Amara and Agew with indigenous people creates social interaction with different social conflicts. Success in agriculture, trade, and other entrepreneurial activities also contributed to strained relations as the two sides' friendship and conflict interest (FGD3 interview 7/2013).

The political interest of the ethnic group to control resources and further their agendas of entrenching the past social interaction as resources issues to get support from people. Therefore the memories of the people to invite other ethnic groups to share natural resources in an ethnic-based political arrangement are affects consciences to common development because of ethnic-based institutional arrangement (Interview B 7/2013).

4.1.1. Economical Interest as Driving Factors

Mandura woreda is a get way for Amhara to share economic resources with indigenous people in the area. After the formation of the ethnic party (GPDM) in the region, the institutional interest to share the economic resource with other ethnic groups is changed. The contradictions of political and economic interest at a local institution in the area emerged ethnic party disagreement in the region. This area is covered by forest and suitable for agricultural farming, but the political instability in the region to share these resources cause economic conflict in the area (Informant A March 7/2013).

In terms of population of the area, Gumuz is highest than the Amhara and Agew population in the woreda, but the economic status and education level of Gumuz people is very low and incapable to feed the family in a year. Because of incapable of institutional advisers in the region indelicately the power is exercised by non-indigenous and not empowered the Gumuz for institutional work. The Amhara population who live in the Metekel zone is economically rich with a high education, why the Gumuz people still illiterate in the region. This inequality in institutional administration at the local level of government makes federalism dysfunctional in managing ethnic conflict in economic issues (FGD3 7/2013).

According to the woreda administration, this is an institutional administration problem at the local level of society. The local leaders and military ethnic groups were interested in excluded the non-indigenous from a political and socio-economic advantage. This is not a way to address the institutional problems in the economic distribution of local administration. Therefore Self-government in multi-ethnic groups caused economic conflict at the local institutions (Interview C 7/2013).

Another is the way of linking ethnic lines for institutional administration or issues of local administration in ethnic diverse society are challenge to sustain economic security of the

community. The involvement of the local government in conflict management has not protected the society from economic threats. The loss of human life and the destruction of infrastructural service to society affect the political stability and economic capacity of the people in the area (FGD2 March 7/2013).

The study argued that institutional conflict management to address the economic interest of the society in the region is the problem of the local government. The social service transportation that was established to encourage the people to create jobs and to assist the economical status of the society is a great problem in the region. There is an unequal distribution of economic resources in the region; the Gumuz considers this ineffectiveness of institutional administration is caused by the existence of non-indigenous people in institutional administration in the region. Therefore this high generalization of the ethnic group is the major problem to refusing the Amhara, Oromo, and Agew in institutional work in the region.

4.1.2. Political Interest as a Deriving Factor

Ethnic political conflict is a conflict among a non-indigenous with Gumuz community and leaders for political interest in the ethnic base for institutional administration. Ethnic politicization is for containing political role in the majority of the ethnic group to control institutional function in the area. This will pay the manner for the insurrection group to mobilizing Gumuz adults to kill different ethnic groups in their homeland (Interview A 7/2013).

The woreda leaders explain the conflict as follows: The ethnic conflict is a problem of institutional function to address Gumuz ethnic interest because the ethnic majority in a particular area is Gumuz and are a few in political administrations in the region. Ethnic-based institutional arrangements emerged ethnic conflict with brothers and friends in Mandura woreda (Informant C March 7/2013).

Ethnic base as an institution to manage conflict is opposed with government function in the way to manage political conflict in multi-ethnic society to address social interest. Institutionally the affirmative actions to indigenous people are developed to ensure a democratic system but created institutional refuse for highlanders in Mandura woreda. This created political interest in conflict management with non-indigenous to cooperating with Gumuz as friendly or brother in institutional work (FGD4 March 7/2013).

To address the past social, political, and economic inequality among ethnic groups there is affirmative actions for indigenous people at the local level. These actions created inclusive ethnic groups in the Mandura woreda. This affirmative action raises some other inequality among Gumuz and Amara ethnic as political interest in conflict management. These contradictions of political interest amongst ethnic groups lead the people to help a military ethnic group to displace non-indigenous people in Mandura woreda (interview C March 7/2013)

The alignment of political conflict with color is the reason for the death of a red non-Amhara individual in Mandura woreda as a color conflict. In conflict, red-color peoples have been killed without figuring out their ethnicity due to their color only. The Gumuz who married Amhara and Agew are loosed their children and wife because of color conflict. This creates a chance for Gumuz to deny individuals who did not longer communicate in Gumuzegn language to representing the institution at local (FGD4 March 7/2013).

4.2. Ethnic Politics as Driving Factor

Ethnic politics interest is risky and affected the countrywide consciences as a nation and replaces Ethiopian nationality with ethnicity, opened the manner for politicians to mobilizing their ethnicity on the federal, nearby, and neighborhood stage to a holed political role in Ethiopia. The attention of ethnic groups as identification to the holed political role is affected ethnic entrepreneurs on the national interest established ethnic superiority at the local level (document report 2013).

The decentralization of institutional authorities through ethnic lines in the region is an immediate cause for political conflict among ethnic groups inside the Country. The insurrection ethnic group agreed with Sudan Gumuz ethnic group because this ethnic party opposed the ruling regional party in BGRS. These ethnic insurrection parties troubling Ethiopia as a rebel group for 17 years and a cause for the displacement of ethnic groups in Metekel deal peace concluded as much as 2012(Document report 2013).

The negotiation among the federal forces, local administrations, and the insurrection ethnic group isn't crated the good opportunity to ethnic groups to continue the social and economic relationships in the area because there is no retching agreement between institutions they manage the conflict in their way not accordance of institutional role(FGD3 March 7/2013) This ethnic

political line impacts the countrywide sense of right and wrong amongst ethnic relationships' inside the area due to the fact the resource sharing among ethnic groups is with ethnic line feature (Ibid).

The study argued that in ethnic-based politics, leaders and individuals prepared army relationships as the institutional role to manage the conflict situation to serve their ethnic groups in the conflict. Therefore lack of a neighborhood conflict management system to address ethnic interest at the local longer is reaping conflict relationships among ethnic groups in the country. Indeed it opened ethnic violence in the sense of red and black conflict.

4.3. Ethnic Based Party Threatening Ethnic Security

Symbolic leader's representation in the base of ethnicity for political administration in multi-ethnic society is caused ethnic conflict to share economic and political resources. It is considered one ethnic group; it cannot solve the ethnic collective threats, it believes in the majority of the ethnic member as indigenous people to stay in holding political position (Interview C March 7/2013).

At the woreda administration level power and socio-economic advantages are wished to be controlled by Gumuz rebel ethnic group. The BGDP is the first political party and it including the five ethnic groups in the collation political party of the region. After the coming of prosperity party in the region, the Gumuz quota was decreased in a political position not as before this is cause to refuses prosperity party in the region to raise the question as a marginalized ethnic group (FGD1 March 7/2013).

The regional ethnic parties formations are refuse the political position of non-indigenous in the region and are different in the way to achieve the interest of the community of the region. The GPLM is targeted to kill red color people including indigenous people like Shinasha ethnic and Gumuz leaders. GPDM targeted to fight to restructure the institutional arrangement in the base of the ethnic majority of the region. Because of the ethnic party, ethnic groups are forced to support the expectance of the ethnic party in the region like (GPLM) Gumuz people liberation movement, (BDP) Boro-democratic party, (BPLM) Benishangul people liberation movement, in separate from the ruling region ruling party of in the region. Ethnic politics is helped ethnic

groups to feel like autonomies in the specific area by opposing the existence of other ethnic minority groups in the region (Interview A March 7/2013).

4.3.1. Dynamics of Conflict in Metekel Mandura Woreda

The political and economic conflict in the area has emerged from ethnic parties to individuals and leaders in the institution. This ethnic mobilization of military rebel ethnic group as economic interest is to get support from Gumuz ethnic in the area. The encouragements of the conflict are undermined the institutional role in the conflict situation was the assistance of external actors as ethnic groups for extra personal agenda in the region (FGD4 interview 7/2013). The other is the institutional disagreement among regional ethnic parties to manage the conflict in the community.

The interest of the ethnic-based party in the region is to protect their ethnic interest-only than the whole common security of the people, most of the time pursued to take a political position, and they did not take care of the condition of the region. The people living in a village have not political interest but they are an instrument for the political agenda of leaders and rebel ethnic groups in the area, but the federal and regional governments still fail to take consideration to manage the issues. They are mobilized by rebel ethnic groups for political agendas. Since conflict is the result of social interaction, but the local government and others did not initiate the conflict to manage. The individuals who were delegated by the regional government to manage the conflict managed the conflict in the ethnic line (FGD1 interview 7/2013).

The Gumuz are caught in the middle of the fighter over Metekel Mandura because rebel ethnic groups paved them into the forest and the federal forces regard them as insurgent military functions. The alignment of this conflict with color created a misperception on Gumuz to refuse federal forces in a conflict situation. The interest of Amhara inside of federal forces to revenge the Gumuz is the other to difficulty the conflict management in the region. This encourages them to label the conflict in color and mistrusts the federal forces in conflict management. For the institutional fault at the local level the life of innocent people in conflict was loosed (FGD1 interview March 7/2013).

4.4. Actors in the Conflict

The actors that are involved in the conflict externally Sudan Gumuz ethnic line trained the Gumuz youth to influence the ruling political party of the region. Internally OLF, they involve in controlling the resources of the area and threatening state security to extend their ethnic politics in the BGRS. And military rebel ethnic groups fight to a political position in the region to restructure the institutional role according to ethnic-based federalism. These are the main actors in the Metekel Mandura woreda conflict. The problem that affected local government to manage the conflict in the area is the interest of local leaders in conflict management as a revenge of red and black in personal and institutionally as conflict resolution by security providers of federal command force in the society (Interview C March 7/2013).

The ethnic political conflict in the Metekel Mandura woreda is not mobilized by Gumuz military groups alone but encouraged by others such as Amhara investors, spongers, activists, OLF, and individuals who work in the name of investors in the region by giving guns to organized military groups and cheating the Gumuz youth to personal agenda. Therefore the main agenda of an ethnic political party is to win the political position by excluding the other ethnic groups of the regions (interview C March 7/2013).

“This ethnic-based conflict of the Mandura woreda is indirectly emerged from internal and external actors to in stabling the state power”. The case of the conflict in this area is political issues rather than resources and boundaries issues. This leads to the dissemination of the life of the people in the Metekel zone because of the relation of the TPLF and OLF with local leaders of the region (Informant A 7/2013).

4.4.1. External Actors

The mistrust agenda of external power Sudan and Egypt to instable the security of the state to divert the attention of ethnic groups to conflict in the ethnic group. Sudan and Egypt in the conflict are indirectly supported the local administrators' to escalate the conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda. The Mandura woreda security administration office state that “there is no historical social conflict between Gumuz with Amhara ethnic they live in harmony for a long year but ineffectiveness and misrepresentation of an ethnic group in administration system create

rebel ethnic group to invite we to the ethnic conflict”. The alignment of the ethnic politics of local government affects institutions to protect human life from violence in the Mandura district. The absences of democratic institutions and civilized communities to discuss the issues to bring the solution to the conflict are the trust of the community and the wish of the people (Informant D March 7/2013).

The interest of the rebel ethnic group and local administrators concerning the cabinet is to refuse the institutional inequality through mobilizing Gumuz people at the local level. Their wish is to restructure the Gumuz ethnic representation in a political position in the region as BGD of the regional party followed (FGD1 interview March 7/2013). According to the Gumuz ethnic community elder’s explanation, the political conflicts are not the intention of the Gumuz community it emerged from the restructuring of regional power allocation to local people to ensure ethnic equality at the local institution (Ibid).

The relationship of Gumuz and Amhara and Agew was taken an uncounted long year. But unfair power decentralization, lack of attention for Gumuz people and the political interest of local leaders in the area is reason to misperception of community to commit ethnic-based violence in the region. Therefore the conflict is not between Gumuz and Amhara or the Agew community it is between political ethnic-based groups by mobilizing ethnicity as an instrument to escalate the conflict. The conflict is the political interest of some individual's not ethnic conflict by nature. It is the conflict of some organized military groups that are supported by external political elites to mobilize the conflict into ethnic behaviors or lines (FGD2 7/2013).

Therefore the reason for the complexity of the conflict in types and forms is the assistance of the external force in the conflict. This agent promoted and was interested in sponsors any rebel groups and security threats against the agenda of the state.

4.5. Ethnic Conflict Management

Ethnic-based conflict management is integrating institutional conflict management with socio-cultural wisdom in conflict management. Therefore the cultural wisdom of society is degraded by the military ethnic group to implementing and invalidates the role of local administrations in ethnic conflict management. The number of non-indigenous in the institution is high in number this creates intention to support the military rebel ethnic groups. It discharging Gumuz people in

local institutional administration with non-indigenous, this created confusion on local leaders to address issues at the local level (Informant C March 7/2013).

According to Gumuz culture, women are not being to kill, they are mothers and feeders. This conflict is difficult because the elders and women who try to manage the conflict were killed by the rebel military and also by the federal command force. These kinds of conflict management systems destroyed the socio-cultural wisdom of Gumuz society in conflict management. The conflict management system used by local security administrators is explained by Gumuz elders in the following way;

All Gumuz in this conflict is justified as a military ethnic group, but most of the innocent Gumuz are killed by federal command posts and by rebel ethnic groups the Gumuz is a means of gaining political advantage. Women are how's involved in conflict management by sending maize to another side of the conflicting parties as a mediator were killed (FGD1 interview March 7/2013).

Aligning the conflict with ethnicity, race, and color is affecting local institutional in conflict management in Metekel Mandura as accepted by Gumuz youth. The effectiveness of the local agency in informing Gumuz adults as trained by external forces is the weakness of local government performance in controlling their society, the subject of junta groups the existences of interest for individual gain benefits and sustain the political position for personal advantage(Informants F March 7/2013).

The federal force in conflict management is also alien the conflict management system with ethnic bias and color without understanding the community values and why the people interested to join the rebel group. For instance, many Gumuz elders who are delegated by society to negotiate with federals were killed by federal common forces in the village meeting. Other Gumuz elders are killed by rebel ethnic groups when they tried to manage the conflict. In a conflict situation, there is no difference between junta force and federal force in conflict resolution. This is very problematic institutional conflict management as a western conflict resolution system, therefore the Gumuz people are sandwich in the conflict (FGD1 March 7/2013).

The social media and Amhara activists and singers are other fuel of Metekel Mandura conflict informal propagated Metekel belong to Amhara, is not to be the sources to ethnic and political

conflict. The individual misperception of Amhara and Gumuz of Metekel creates a dilemma in the mind of the Gumuz local leaders to receive the mission of external forces. For instance, the ethnic violence committed in 2010 in Jawi on Gumuz whose lives in the Amhara region is an intention for Gumuz to the current conflict in Mandura woreda (Informant A March 7/2013)

The group discussion reflects that Amhara regional government aimed to achieve land resources in a positive way to limit food security, but the regional border demarcation challenged them to get land in Metekel Mandura woreda as state structure of ethnic federalism. The demarcation of the border on an ethnic basis has emerged an exclusive perception and misperception of the people to deny the land and political positions to the Amhara ethnic group at local administration. Another is the increase of Amhara and Agew people in the region which affected the agricultural land of the Gumuz (FGD1 interview March 7/2013).

The number of the educated elite in Mandura woreda mostly Amhara and Agew affected the Gumuz opportunity in Mandura woreda for their lower qualification. Most of the time, the Amhara elites are refusing the existence of affirmative action in the area. So indeed, the Gumuz does not benefit from government support to change their mind and attitude perception of the community accordingly (FGD1 interview March 7/2013).

The study found that the lack of the cooperative relationship of the Amhara regional administration and the Benishagul-Gumuz regional state to make a mutual regional security zone among ethnic groups is to be a solution. And less attention of local leaders to create awareness for the people to deal with issues without emotional characters. Therefore the fault of the two regions to deal with the root cause of the conflict rather than citing the conflict as an ethnic conflict between Gumuz and Amara to manage is a big problem to the future to the sustainability of ethnic security in the region (FGD4 March 7/2013).

4.5.1. Local Administrations in Conflict Management in Metekel Zone

Local power decentralization is based on ethnic lines that affect history, socio-cultural interaction, and national consciences of ethnic groups to manage conflict. The way to acquire the political position at the regional and local level with ethnic ties according to ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia caused a series of ethnic conflicts (Asnake, 2009).

The interest of the local government to share authority in the non-ethnic base with other ethnic groups is the other problem of local administration in conflict management. This problem to share economic and political power is the arrangement of ethnic federalism on ethnic lines for local administration as an institutional function. This is not new but exaggerates after the coming prosperity party as an opportunity for institutional reform in the region (Informant C March 7/2013).

Color conflict; it linking the color in means to control the color-based intention of black Gumuz people and other nonblack people to escalate the conflict situation. As an ethnic conflict, it is the conflict between Gumuz ethnic groups and non-Gumuz ethnic groups but as color, it joins like Amhara, Agew, Shinasha, and Oromo ethnic groups (FGD2 interview March 7/2013).

Race conflict; the intensions of all conflicting ethnic groups in the conflict were raced killing targeted this cloth to local leaders to support the mistruth agenda of the junta ethnic military groups to make relation with local leaders. William C (1835),¹ states that the mind of all ethnic is deducted by racism disease to serve the interest of their ethnic to destroy the particular ethnic groups like the Nazi party and Holocaust in 1933.

The study found that conflict was managed forcefully based on color, race, and ethnicity by local administrations. The local administrations are missed an integrative conflict management system for both ethnic groups. The security providers have not tried to manage conflict according to socio-culture to promise people for the future to acknowledge their mistakes and forgot the past wrong action. Moreover, the current conflict management of local government did not create the vehicle situation for conflicting ethnic groups to find out solutions to the conflict. Indeed not separate military ethnic groups from civilians or nonmilitary groups in conflict management.

Militarizing one ethnic group is not the solution to sustained ethnic security it creates other threats /ethnic security dilemmas between non-militarized ethnic groups to revitalized the conflict. Ethnic militarization is an opportunity to revenge others groups for instance conflict relationship of Gumuz and Amhara in Jawi; in Gongaw woreda and edida kebele in Mandura

¹ William (1835) explored that in ethnic conflict all ethnic groups are hilled ethic diseases including institution no one to impartially to manage the conflict in the society.

woreda. After the rebel come into negotiation with the command force to solve the conflict in the region the militarized group's revenge civilians (Interview A March 7/2013).

In the Mandura conflict, the individuals and local leaders were arrested but ethnic violence is continued in the area nothing changes well. Still, they find each other as an enemy for revenge because there is the fault of local administration in conflict management. In the FGD the elders reflect the conflict management system in this way;

“If No reconciliation and face-to-face discussion among the ethnic groups that are supported by the local government, the threats will be continued. The local administrators should encourage cooperative relationships among ethnic groups to build new hops among ethnic groups. Still, we fear our brothers and friends as an enemy why? The involvement of the federal government in conflict management does not reward the mind of society from killing and ethnic threat”. The solution is telling the truth about the mistake! (FGD1 interview March 7/2013)

The study argues that the conflict was not managed according to the socio-culture of the community. The local administrations to meeting ethnic groups on the issues discussed to bring the last solution in accordance's of community interest and as institutional conflict management.

4.5.2. Conflict Management in Mandura Woreda

In Mandura woreda, the conflict management system is used by the local institution is not sustaining the common relationship of ethnic groups in the woreda. The immigration of Amara people into Metekel Mandura woreda is a problem to manage political issues of conflict among ethnic groups in the area. The Amhara people come to this area of Metekel Mandura woreda is to search the land for economic life, the ethnic perception of local people as the owner of land engage in political and economic conflict. The Amhara people ask self-administration to use land in Metekel Mandura woreda of BGRS as local self-government regional boundary demarcation on ethnic is engaged local institutional to refuse Amhara interest in the region. This interest of non-indigenous people is shocked the local leaders in Metekel as Metekel Aworaja to refuse Amhara ethnic in the region (Informants C March 7/2013).

Ethnic-based parties in the regional state denied Gumuz in the Amhara region for political competition because the political position is for region ethnic groups as ethnic federal state

structure of the federal governing system. The interest of highlanders is going to manipulate local self-administration in the Metekel region of BGRS (Informant B March 7/2013). The Mandura woreda security administration office explains the conflict in this way: There is no historical social conflict between Gumuz with Amhara ethnic they live in harmony for a long year but ineffectiveness and misrepresentation of an ethnic group in the local administration system made people in ethnic conflict (Ibid).

The alignment of the ethnic politics of locale leaders affects institutions to protect human life from violence in the Mandura distinct. Still, the past and the current conflict management of the government did not create the vehicle situation for conflicting ethnic groups to bring the solution. Not integrated social value in discussion among ethnic leaders, and the general Cause of the conflict with the whole community. The institutional conflict management system was not friendship conflict management; it uses military force, ethnic line, and color to preserve ethnic security in Mandura woreda. The absences of democratic institutions and civilized communities to discuss the issues to bring the solution to the conflict are the trust of the community and the wish of the people (FGD3 March 7/2013).

4.6. Challenges for Ethnic Conflict Management

The main challenges to the local institutions to manage the ethnic conflict have they not managed the conflict according to the principle of the institution and the culture of society. Other are local leaders in conflict situations take an ethnic side as members for instances teachers, and clan leaders, sinner local administrators and religious fathers all are not partial in the conflict situation(Interview A 7/2013).

The woreda administration reflects that locale leaders who lived the position in the area turned back to oppose the ruling government. This is the main condition to the variability of the military groups to train and joins the military ethnic groups in Metekel Mandura woreda (Informant C March 7/2013).

Moreover, they explain the challenges in the following; in local administration, some local leaders are not interested to leave the political position, they want to stay in the position for a long time only through the experience without educational qualification. If they lived political

position they targeted to refuse the government institution principle by cheating the innocent people in ethnic line (Ibid).

4.6.1. Excluding Socio-Culture in Conflict Management

Managing conflict according to the culture of the society is fruitful to sustain peace for the future among ethnic groups. The forceful conflict management of local institutions did not resolve ethnic threats in society; it not allowed the people to discuss during the conflict management. There is a social institution that can encourage the people to manage the conflict according to the traditional institution to end the ethnic conflict in society. In the conflict management system social value, socio capital, and wisdom of the society were not integrated by local administrations (FGD2 interview 7/2013).

The local security providers did not interested to use the socio-culture value of the society in conflict management. This conflict is continued because of the misperception of the illiterate ethnic group. The military groups informal raise the institutional problem by opening conflict on other ethnic groups as a solution to achieve their political representation. They fail to deal with the issues systematically by giving the priority to social security of ethnic groups inters at the local level (FGD1interview 7/2013).

Legal institutional conflict management is dealing with the cause according to rule of law and ensuring justice to society and justifying the non-representation in the institution to the regional government to protect the democratic rights of the society (Interview D 7/2013).

In a violent behavior of conflict management system, people are not voluntarily obeying the rule of law they choose death. The local governments were trying to negotiate the political and economic interests of ethnic groups in non-violence. In violent repression of conflict management, the civilians were hurt in the region. Most clean elders argued that federal command forces and security providers are chosen military force as means of conflict management to resolve ethnic conflict in the area (Informant F March 7/2013).

The study argued that to manage ethnic conflict it needs wise compromising conflict management knowledge and strategy that could resolve the threat to the future, uncertainty, reached information for the community to trust the government. Therefore lack of enough

information, about some ethnic group's behaviors, is created security dilemma on the federal command force and security providers to manage the conflict in violence more likely.

4.6.2. Socio-cultural Value in Conflict Management

The conflict management systems of security administration yet bring change in the social life of the community. They managed the conflict based on color, and ethnic line this is the reason for the continuity of color conflict in Mandura woreda. Therefore in the conflict management in Metekel Mandura woreda, local government like policies forces, regional special forces, and elders are challenged by Gumuz culture of revenge misperception (FGD1 interview 7/2013).

Most people in conflict management are not satisfied by the strategy of the federal force and security providers. For the reason that the people that reflect their idea were immediately killed by federal forces, this encourages the people to support the military ethnic groups in Mandura woreda. The absence of consideration for civilians by the local government in conflict management is the problem to the continuity of ethnic conflict in the Mandura woreda. In the conflict management system, the local administrations including the federal command post managed the conflict in a violent a destructive manner (FGD1 interview 7/2013).

As ethnic political interest in the region Gumuz is considered as rebel groups in different organizations because of the misrepresentation or threat of regional government on Gumuz ethnic, this cause to killed more civilians in the conflict management. This political conflict is gaining color and ethnic conflict acceptance among the local people and causing human insecurity in the region by deceiving the Gumuz community to refuse a new prosperity party (Interview A March 7/213).

This conflict management system was explained by religious fathers as followers: All ethnic groups, peoples, and individuals did not govern by religious principles they were interested in revenge on other groups, our religious institutional principle invalid by the evil act of political advantage lied on human blood. Killing life with mistake have it limits this is not killing it is dehumanization it is ignoring God's creatures as the bible said that "the king vs. king the brother revenge his brothers as prophet word it is the end of days" (FGD2 interview March 7/2013).

The study found that the continuity of ethnic insecurity of the Metekel Mandura woreda is the involvement of ethnic activists and ethnic-based political parties of the region. Therefore the issue of ethnic politics is a cause for ethnic interest to whole political position plays a great role in the politicization of human life in a conflict.

4.6.3. Institutional Fragmentation

The regional government promises to local administrations in fake institutional reform in equal ethnic positions is motivated the local leaders to support military ethnic groups. The regional political power administration system controls all resources without inviting unemployment to benefit from the resources of the region. The other is the absence of cooperative of the regional institutions and local government in the institutional goal and ineffective implementation of the institutional principle one to the conflict (Interview C 7/2013).

In institutional administration, there is no justice's there is no equal treatment for all ethnic groups it was corrupted by ethnic line and color bias in the region. For instance, lenience's for minerals cooperative organization work in the region is under control of the regional government and their family unless the organization cannot be recognized. Indeed mismanagement of the existing natural resources benefiting the jobless youth and lack of good opportunities for youth in the region (FGD3 interview 7/2013).

Inequality of economic resource distribution according to quota in the institutional administration system is the way to the inter-ethnic conflict to mobilizing the people and local offices in the conflict management (FGD4 interview 7/2013)

This study, argues that the ethnic base for holding political position in Metekel Mandura woreda resulted in ethnic conflict in the region. Therefore regional or local leaders in the Benishangul-Gumuz region are established to extended their political interest and economic life rather than solving and sustained the community peace and economic security.

The alignment of ethnic and indigenous people for political administration in ethnic line is created misperception on indigenous to refusing the ethnic Amara in Metekel Mandura distinct to integrate with other ethnic groups of the region. It creates a conflicted relationship between indigenous with other ethnic groups and affects the national integrations of people within a state.

Therefore ethnic base boundary demarcation is affecting the local government in the ethnic conflict management system (Interview C 7/2013)

The alignment of the ethnic groups with ethnic-based conflict in Mandura woreda is the propaganda of the individuals or group whose interest to benefits from the Metekel conflict. The impressment of the local administrators without fined them as actors of the conflict before the investigation is the other opportunity for Gumuz society to support military groups in the region (Interviews D March 7/2013).

Moreover, equal institutional representation in ethnic-based federalism is one to exercise to solve ethnic problems at local administration; but they restructure of power holding system at the local level after the coming of prosperity party is decreased the number of Gumuz leaders in political position. Mostly in political positions, the Gumuz leaders are a symbolic political representation. It does not benefit their people in economic performances, education status, and social services at the local level (Interview C March 7/2013).

The study argued that the existence of a multi-political party to engage local participation is very important, but ethnic politics in multi-ethnic groups affect local leaders in conflict management. Indeed it narrows the national identity and inclusive political identity of the state by localizing national identity and affects the common history and heritage of the community at the national level.

4.7. The Role of Local Government in Ethnic Conflict Management

Local government is a democratic system of administration to benefit the whole society to achieve community development at the local level (Mustafa K, Hussein, 2003). Indeed they argue that democracy is an exercise in a well-developed society. Undeveloped society lacked qualified leadership manpower to work in collective identity and integrate the society interest as they wish of the community development to satisfy the interest of multi-ethnic society. Democracy is an integrative social system as one village community without exclusion on color, race, and ethnic line and it works to ensure equality of all citizens (Ibid).

The major problem for ethnic violence in Metekel Mandura woreda is the political and economic interest clash between local Gumuz and Amhara and Agew respectively. The local institutions

did not ensure self-administration to solve community problems in the region. In self-government, the federal government's constitutional consistency is not Clearfield to hold compressive ethnic interest at the local level. To manage ethnic conflict local security, the woreda administration, and zone administration are not successful because of the institutional system in the line of the majority of the local population (Interview B March 7/2013).

The absence of impartiality of local conflict managers to differentiate the civilians and the military ethnic groups is the fault to manage the conflict constructively with the cultural value of the society. All ethnic groups are not satisfied by the conflict management of the local administrations and federal police forces. It not stops human life from death but continued far relationships of Gumuz and Amhara ethnic groups. There is no personal problem between the Gumuz people and the Amhara people, but the chair issue affected the civilian security in the region.

4.7.1. Local Administration in Conflict Management

The Delegation of political authority to local government basically to brings the solution to the ethnic-based conflict in a multi-ethnic society. But the introducing the new ideology of ethnic federalism mixed with ethnic politics according to the constitution of 1991 article 39 engaged the people in ethnic violence affected the performance of local administrations to manage conflict. The cause of the conflict is ethnic politics, and the alignment to hold a political position in a multiethnic society with ethnic lines is created disagreement in institutional administration. Therefore the solution to managing the conflict is replacing the ethnic political parties with the national party that can accommodate the interest of whole ethnic groups in the region (FGD3 interview 7/2013).

In conflict management, the local administrations should be impartial. And could encourage the community to interact and coming together to discuss each other to tell and explain their opinion to find the solution to the conflict according to the socio cultures of the community. The role of security providers is only as a middleman to facilitate the conflict management system to the conflicting party because the cause is complex and multiple. The absence of attention for the local civilians by the local government in conflict management is the problem to the continuity of ethnic conflict in the Mandura woreda (FGD4 March 7/2013).

The study argued that the political conflicts in Metekel Mandura woreda as escalate by local leaders of Gumuz and elders and investors of Amhara in Majery kebele. This reflected that ethnic politics at the local level of administration is the opportunity for ethnic mobilization than managing ethnic conflict.

4.7.2. Local Leaders in Ethnic Conflict Management

The conflict created tension among ethnic groups in the region this ethnic group intention places the local leaders to stand on ethnic exclusion than collective groups in conflict management. Another ethnic notion that manifests the conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda, ancient ethnic rivalries – a view commonly held of the Gumuz-Amara or Gumuz Agew relationship in Metekel Mandura woreda. The ethnic mobilization between the groups is alien to political and economic conflict as a base interest of individuals and rebel ethnic groups won't achieve in the conflict (FGD3 interview 7/2013).

However, the solution and cause of ethnic conflict in society is the local government. An absence of powerful local leaders that responsible and accountable to the people to build a new future for a new generation is one problem in conflict management. Democratic society develops national consciences and moral leaders that are impartial from a personal interest and specific group that works for the advantage of the whole people of the region. Local leaders facilitate the local institutional function to ensuring the well-being of society. It exercises the local leadership and supports community development interests. In Mandura, woreda leaders fall to funding and distribute the existing resource inequitable share to manage the conflict (FGD2 7/2013).

4.7.3. Effective Local Leaders in Conflict Management

The alarming conflict situation in Mandura woreda was continued by mismanagement of the local leaders including the police's command post; the lack of information about the culture of society to manage local conflict made to kill innocent citizens of the state. Institutional conflict management and cultural conflict management are not different in interest and as well as in agenda they work for the sake of social security. Truth speaking, the ethnic violence of Mandura distinct is the benched for non-indigenous and indigenous local leaders to sake personal and group interest in the conflict. So the strategy to negotiate Amhara and Gumuz in Mandura woreda to resolve ethnic conflict to the future is not enough to be concluded by federal forces

alone, but it needs collective work for all ethnic groups including religious fathers, clan leaders, and mothers as peacemakers to localize the conflict management system according to the social-cultural pearls of wisdom of the society (FGD4 March 7/2013).

4.7.4. Instruments of Conflict Management

The conflict management instruments that can sustain social relationships among the ethnic groups are integrative strategy and reconciliations. Reconciliation is one of the conflict management instruments that can sustain ethnic security in a multi-ethnic society. It is very important to change the misperception of individuals and conflicting parties to turn back the past social relationship. It came after and during the negotiated settlement of the violent conflict. In this system of conflict management, the perpetrator recognized the pain of the past and the victim forgave the bad deeds or the past fault (FGD2 interview 7/2013).

Reconciliation is the result of an elite man, a morally responsible community. It is intellectual work to the civilized community to give value to something like respect, equality, diversity, or considering pluralism as an advantage for national building. It adds our specific identity differences and working for community services or national development. Therefore ethnic interaction of the society is deep as social interaction goes long. The local administrations should manage the conflict in a way to sustain the future ethnic relationship in diverse ethnic societies (FGD3 interview 7/2013).

Integrative conflict management instrument/technic is important to social conflict it uses practical knowledge to manage the conflict situation with governmental assistance to sustained peace and community security. This conflict management strategy is very important because it dealing the complex issues in ethnic conflict to sustain common security. It is a skillful conflict management system by possessed more information from different parties to find solutions and deeply fruitful implementation but the local administrations lack to manage the conflict in this manner (FGD4 interview 7/2013). The study argued that the absence of integrative strategy and reconciliation in conflict management is the one for the continuity of ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society.

4.7.5. Ethnic Mobilization in the Conflict

The disagreement between the regional government and the rebel ethnic group is an opportunity for people to invite ethnic rebel groups into the region. Followed the fault of the regional government the Gumuz people supported the military ethnic group organization in the region to fight the regional power as ethnic issues. The local people and local leaders feeling prosperity party interaction in mistrust way with Gumuz people in the region. The government fails to create common awareness to society in the base of the prosperity party as an oppressive ideology for common co-existence for peace and ethnic security to resolve ethnic antagonistic interest in institutional administration in the region (Interview A March 7/2013).

Non-institutional response to the local community is the main sound to refuse the prosperity party in Metekel Mandura woreda. But in fact, inequalities in the regional position as prosperity party is one to military ethnic group and local leaders as an ethnic political opportunity to fight in ethnic line. The local leaders wish to be a leader for a long time and not interest to share political power with non-indigenous people, if they leave the political position they become mobilizing the people to conflict (Interview B March 7/2013).

In conflict management leaders and elites used ethnicity as instrumental to mobilize the people in their interest to fight in the ethnic base for political purposes. It is the misunderstanding of ethnic groups to managing ethnic conflict situations between local leaders of Amara and local leaders of Gumuz society. Other is not understand why they fight without know for the agenda this shows that the government's attention problem to the society in the region. In conflict management, the security administration lacked the distinction between innocent Gumuz and rebel ethnic groups. The movement of the Gumuz people to the remote area in Mandura woreda is the fear of federal forces for the sake of life and insurgent group punishment (Interview B March 7/2013).

Ethnic base power devolution creates ethnic political institutions, so ethnic politics is a vehicle opportunity for ethnic political conflict at a local level of government. This translates into institutional inequality at the local level of society up to a tendency towards ethnic violence. Mostly the misperception of individuals and social media and singers cheating and confusing the Amhara community by saying Metekel is belonging to Amhara as past Aworaja provinces. For

instance, Mahari Degefow songs motivate Amhara people and create intension on Gumuz local administration office in the self-administration system as the paradox of self-administration (Interview C March 7/2013).

The study argued that in institutional conflict management, individuals, local leaders, security providers, and religious fathers emphasize individual identity interests to manage the conflict situation. The common security of the society cannot be ensured in this way of the conflict management strategy. Moreover, argued that ethnicity, color, and race are the main factors that affected local administration in conflict management. Moreover found that non-integrative instruments in the conflict management system did not constitute a successful conflict management culture; it damaged institutional resources and continued negative ethnic emersion to the future in the diverse ethnic society.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusion

In this chapter, the study tried to conclude the result discusses with sub-topics of local government functions in Ethiopia with interesting reflection. Ethnic line power delegation is exclusive functional competencies and self-administration for majority ethnic groups was set as ethnic criteria for local government in Ethiopia, it undermines the institutional role in ethnic conflict management in a multi-ethnic society.

Ethnic federalism is a state structure design to manage ethnic conflict in a multi-ethnic society. This study argued that the devolution of power to local government is constitutionally recognized, and it deals with the grass-root issues of the society. The study found that the existence of local authority in ethnic lines at the local level is created ethnic threat and power completion at the local level. To address this local government has an increasing role to deal with local issues in federal states, placing new demands on ethnic groups to self-administration in the base of ethnicity as institutional ethnic-based federalism. In multi-ethnic groups, ethnic federalism is undermined the compressive perception by giving power in ethnic base to the local institution at a local level. Therefore the solution to successful conflict management in ethnic federalism is institutionalizing the local administration system at a local level.

Ethnic-based federalism is providing both similar competencies as well as significant ethnic recognition in a multi-ethnic society. The manner of allocation of political authority to local government appeared crucial in ethnic-based federalism to resolve the problem at the grassroots; in reverse to this, it creates a competitive world among ethnicities to hold a political position at the local administration. In ethnic federalism, local government powers are not listed spherically in the Constitution they are granted following ethnic-based federalism of the federal government and regional constitution but not refusing the existence of the multi-ethnic groups in the region state. The finding of this thesis is ethnic line institutional administration at the local level is the main source of conflict in a multi-ethnic society.

The study examines that how the local institutions manage ethnic conflict at a local level. And what is the cause for ethnic conflict in Metekel Mandura woreda in the Benishangul-Gumuz

regional state? This study tried to reflect ethnic politics misperception in the alignment of the issues with ethnic senses and develop ethnic mobilization for conflict relationships among ethnic groups to achieve political agenda. The absence of effective manpower and cognitive thinkers in the community affects the role of the institutions in ethnic conflict management. Through the discussion between federal forces and rebel ethnic groups of the region, the government brings some temporary security and hopes to solve the security problem of the area. Therefore the study examines the role of the local institution in ethnic conflict management as challenged by the local leaders and individuals in the region.

Moreover, the study found that the institutional conflict management strategy exercised by local administration still didn't manage ethnic conflict. The conflict management system of local leads creates other ethnic threats among ethnic groups in the region. In ethnic-based federalism the institutional conflict management system is affected by ethnic-based local government administration to ethnic conflict among ethnic groups. Ethnic-based federalism as a state structure is not a problem but it needs systematic knowledge that deals with ethnic issues in mutually agreeable points to sustained peace and security of the community in the state.

5.2. Recommendations

In Ethiopia allowing local government to exercise democratic function at the local level is very important for local people; it encourages people participation and acknowledged the existence of diverse ethnic groups in the country. On the other hand, it creates ethnic politicization for politicians to mobilize their ethnicity as a tool for the political advantages of their ethnic groups; local administration is useful for a multiracial diverse society at the local level to resolve ethnic-related issues in an institutional framework. An apolitical party based on ethnicity as a base for holding institutional administration in a multi-ethnic society is embodied national interest at the local level of administration. To maintain the peaceful relationship of ethnic groups in the region institutional conflict management and local administration system should be evaluated in integrative socio-cultural values and social wisdom in conflict management, and to create common awareness and understanding for the community through education. Indeed the consideration of ethnic ties as a base for the institutional requirement is the major problem in local administration in ethnic-based federalism.

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