
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES



ETHIOPIA'S 2006 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: CRITICAL APPRAISAL

BY

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ADDIS ABABA

JANUARY, 2016

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF THE ADDIS ABABAUNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS

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Acronyms

AFD:	Alliance for Freedom and Democracy
AIAI:	Ali-itahad Al-Islamiya
AMISOM:	AU Mission in Somalia
ARPCT:	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ASWJ:	Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama
AU:	Africa Union
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CT :	Counter Terrorism
EIIPD:	International Institute for Peace and Development
EPLF:	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF:	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESDL:	Ethiopian Somali Democratic League
FANSPS:	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy
FBC:	Fana Broadcasting Corporate
HoA:	Horn of Africa
ICG :	International Crisis Group
ICJ :	International Court of Justice
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM:	IGAD Somalia Mission
IMI :	International Military intervention
ISS:	Institute for Security Studies
IPSS:	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
MP:	Member of Parliament
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSF	National Security Force
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
OLF:	Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF:	Ogden National Liberation Front
OPDO:	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PFDJ:	Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice
PM:	Prime Minister
PSIR:	Political Science and International Relations
R2P:	Responsibility to Protect
SPF	Somali Police Force
SPLM /A	Sudan people Liberation/ Movement
SRRC:	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
TNG:	Transitional National Government
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UEDP:	United Ethiopian Democratic Party
UIC:	Union of Islamic Courts
UNMGOS:	United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
US:	United States
USC:	United Somali Congress
UNITAF:	US-led unified Task Force
USSR:	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WMD :	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSLF:	Western Somalia Liberation Front

Abstract

This research is a critical assessment of Ethiopia's 2006 military intervention in Somalia. The research investigated Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia whether it was right decision or was it a manifestation of hates for Somalia?. Qualitative research methodology has been used in the course of collecting and analyzing data by employing both primary and secondary sources as method of data collection. Primary data are collected through key informant interviews from individuals in various institutions. Secondary sources used in this study include books, journal articles, reports and pertinent web sources. Based on the above mentioned sources of data the study has tried to answer the research questions that have aim of appraising Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia. The finding shows that Ethiopia's military intervention has been regarded as the most essential strategic decision. Its successful operation encouraged other African countries Such as Uganda and Burundi for military intervention through the African Union. From the findings, it is concluded that the Ethiopian military achieved what no western States and African countries thought to be possible. Its daring response to the lawlessness in Somalia laid the foundation of the current elected Somali Government and AMISOM.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

1.1 .Background of the study

Africa is a conflict prone continent and has had a history of the largest prevalence of civil wars and instabilities compared to any other region of the world. There have been a number of conflicts[1] in different parts of the continent. Although many of these conflicts are relatively short-lived, they have nonetheless proved to be among the bloodiest compared to similar occurrences elsewhere (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000).

The Horn of Africa comprises Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and the Northern region of Kenya. In strictly geographic terms, however, only Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia comprise the Horn (Medhane, 2004).The Horn of African sub-region is one of the most known unstable and conflict-prone areas in the world. The sources and types of conflict are diversified and it is less predictable (ibid).

The region has been manifested by prolonged civil wars and other conflicts over the past three decades, which have severely disrupted its development and integration. As Berouk Mesfin states: "The collapse of state authority in Somalia, the fragility of the new state of South Sudan and its tensions with Khartoum, the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and a partially developed agenda of political Islam in the region are the major security threats hampering development and regional integration in the area." .One of the recent example is a violent conflict between groups led by President Salva Kiir and former vice president Riek Machar, with serious security implications for the region(De Waal,2014). Healy (2007) notes that the region is "a community of states in which the security of any one country is intimately connected to the security of all the others". This applies as much to states internal security as to regional security among them. And one of the known failed state in the Horn is Somalia.

[1] For example, the Eritrean War of Independence (1961-1991); the Shifta War (1963-1967), a separatist insurgency by ethnic Somalis in Kenya; Ethiopian Civil War (1974-1991), between the ruling government of Ethiopia and various rebel groups); Ogaden War (1977-1978) between Ethiopia and Somalia; Ethiopian-Somali Border War (1982); Djiboutian Civil War (1991-1994); Ethio-Eritrea War (1998-2000); Somali Civil War (1986-present); Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993) which primarily involved UN intervention; Insurgency in Ogaden (2007), there was a suppressed coup attempt in Kenya (1982); the post-election civil conflict (2007-2008) in Kenya.

Somalia achieved its independence on July 1, 1960 comprising the former Italian Trust Territory and the former British Protectorate of Somaliland. Even though there is homogeneity in terms of language and religion in Somalia, this homogeneity has never saved them from suffering from two decades of civil war and humanitarian crisis. The Somali people are divided by clan affiliations, the most important component of their identity. The clans use deeply ingrained customary law to govern their communities completely independently of modern state structures. These traditional groupings still hold immense influence over society (Mwangi, 2012).

Somalia is engulfed in a Hobbesian world, virtually "a war of all against all." .A number of different factors such as colonial legacy, external intervention, clannism, Siad Barre's dictatorship, and the intensification of armed opposition contributed to the disintegration of Somalia in 1991. Somalia has been struggling, since then, with the complete absence of a functioning central government and consequently of law and order (Kidist, 2010).And the problem is not yet alleviated.

Even though there were a number of groups who competed for power, none of competing factions were strong enough to take the place as ruler of the country, producing first chaos ,but gradually a form of stateless order and finally a sanctuary of terrorists .The whole country has become a breeding ground for warlords, pirates, kidnappers, bomb makers etc (Gettleman, 2009). Even though there were various attempts by international communities to create stable Somalia, it is/was difficult to bring genuine solution for the people of Somalia because of interest based intervention by various States.

By using the vacuum of power as golden opportunity in Somalia, UIC strengthen itself dominantly in Somalia. In the light of years of state collapse in Somalia and the consequent absence of law and order, a number of sub-clan based Sharia' Courts in Mogadishu united to form the Union of Islamic Court (UIC) in 2000. The UIC rose to power in February 2006 by defeating all the warlords, including the USA funded Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism (ARPCT), who until then carved Mogadishu and most of south and central Somalia among themselves (Omar et al., 2012). In the time of its administration it tried to impose harsh measures on the people and Jihad against Ethiopia. After World War II, while interstate war has relatively rarely occurred, civil war has increased in frequency. This civil war has dramatically increased the intervention of external states (Nye, 2007). One of long lasting

civil war is in Somalia which allowed international communities to have intervention on the land of Somalia.

States are highly pushed to have intervention because those civil wars are expanding and initiating terrorism. As a result, terrorism and national security become two main issues being prioritized by most of the nation states across the globe. To stop these civil wars and prevent the growing rate of terrorism, the international community is using intervention as a means of solution (Ahmed, 2013). One of the known unilateral intervention in Somalia is Ethiopia's 2006 military intervention. The aim of the research dealt about the military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia in 2006.And the paper will critically examine on the Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia Militarily. Indeed intervention is not new idea .It happened in different parts of the world. Israel is the most common known state in its activity of military intervention in different Arab States. For example, its intervention in Iraq in 1981 was notable.

1.2 .Statement of the problem

Violent country by its nature have negative externality because it disrupts not only economic interaction in its own but also the neighboring States (Eberle *et al* 2003). The most commonly cited manner in which a conflict in one country affects another is through the possibility of conflict initiation across the border. In some situations war in one country directly increases the risk of war in neighbouring countries (Gleditsch , 2003).The relationship of Ethiopia and Somalia is not good and it is difficult for Ethiopia to opt silence in the ongoing conflict of Somalia.

The 2006 military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia had been seen in various ways. Some of scholars supported the intervention as essential and necessary and others see it as a danger for the long lasting sovereignty for Ethiopia. Some analysts observed the war in Somalia as the latest in national and religious wars between "Christian" state of Ethiopia and Muslim state of Somalia. Others saw the war as Ethiopian aggression in the search for territorial aggrandizement and secure access to the sea. Others writers portray the conflict as a pre-emptive invasion to impede UIC from the establishment of a Taleban-style state in Somalia that would provide a home base to al Qaida. Some considered it as a proxy war between Ethiopia and its arch enemy Eritrea (Abdul, 2007:6).

According to Wise (2011), the Ethiopian intervention of Somalia from December 2006 to January 2009 would strengthen the development of Al-Shabab's ideology, recruitment mechanism and it enables to get acceptance by agitating the people of Somalia that they have been invaded by "Christian" Ethiopia. According to the Wise (2011), the action of Ethiopian was totally wrong and paved the way for strengthening of Al-Shabab and UIC as a whole. The writer did not see the legitimate security of the state and other results like AMISOM.

As cited by Warbrick and Zeray in (2007) *in their book of Ethiopia's Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia*: Some Legal Implications Similarly, the former US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Professor David Shinn disapproved of the Ethiopian military intervention, saying, 'as the recent fighting showed conclusively, the Ethiopian military is far more powerful than the militias of the Islamic Courts, which never posed a serious military threat to the Ethiopian homeland, including the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region. But according to Professor Shinn was comparing the military power of Ethiopian government and the UIC. But is it necessary for Ethiopia to wait until the UIC strengthen itself and pose threat to it?

Masters (2013) in his book *Al-shabab, Background* he stated that in 2003, division was developed between AIAI's more moderate elders ,that had an interest to create a new political front, and younger members who had a plan to the establishment of a "Greater Somalia" under fundamental "Islamic rule". Hence, the hardliners eventually joined forces with an alliance of sharia courts, known as the Union of Islamic Court (UIC), serving as its youth militia. Al-Shabab and the UIC control of the capital in June 2006 and their victory created a fear of spillover jihadist violence in neighboring Ethiopia. And the competition of Egypt to be dominant in the upper riparian state of Nile was great .So the researcher tried to analyze the role of other states and UIC in the land of Somalia and upon its people in the time of Expansion of UIC[2]. The present research describe did Ethiopia has a legitimate security or interest or not. Related to this issue, some military and political analysts have spread an incorrect and misleading message to the international community suggesting that Ethiopia has an interest in colonizing Somalia.

[2] The establishment of the Islamic Courts was not so much an Islamist imperative as a response to the need for some means of upholding law and order. The Islamist agenda in the Courts was not particularly 'programmatic'; they were not presided over by expert Islamic judges, nor were they adherents to any specific school of Islamic law. The enforcement of the Courts' judgments depended on militias recruited from the local clan. At root, the Islamic Courts were part and parcel of clan power in Mogadishu. They served specific Hawiye clans and earned the support of the Hawiye business class of Mogadishu for whom the primary purpose of the Islamic Courts was to provide 'security.

Ethiopia cannot have a realistic colonial agenda toward any countries (Temsegen, 2012).The core argument of the study is UIC could have been the security threat to Ethiopia and it has right to have self defence. So there is a gap in some writers by considering Ethiopia as war monger state which have an interest in colonizing Somalia. And the researcher is interested to search it. The writer tried to investigate Ethiopian intervention in 2006 and propose new insights to broaden and deepen our understanding about it.

1.3. Objectives of the study

The main or general objective of this study is to investigate issues concerning Ethiopia's 2006 military intervention in Somalia. As such the specific objectives are:

- To identify causes that makes Ethiopia to be forefront in the interference of Somalia and to see the role of other States
- To check whether there were any other options other than intervention
- To what extent and in what ways is Somalia's ongoing state of collapse can be used as security threat to the Horn of Africa or how might terrorist group seek to exploit it?
- To assess the role of regional states in Somalia
- To assess/see the goals which have been achieved so far because of interference.

1.4. Research Questions

To achieve this objective one main research question and four other related sub-questions had been posed:

- To what extent and in what ways UIC and its affiliates were security threat for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa?
- What were the motivations factors for Ethiopia to be forefront in the intervention between union of Islamic court and Transitional Federal Government of Somalia than other states?
- What were the roles of other States in Somalia?
- Were there other options than intervention in Somalia from Ethiopian side?
- Did the intervention bring expected results?

1.5. Methodology and Methods of data Collection

1.5.1. Methodology

This study is a qualitative study which attempts to describe Ethiopian military involvement in in Somalia and try to make an understanding about the research questions that are better handled in a qualitative approach since the topic involves a lot of underlying and complex issues that cannot be possibly measured in quantitative methods and statistical data. Qualitative research has an aim of addressing questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experience dimension of human's lives and social worlds'(Fossey et al, 2002:717). Since the issue of intervention heavily interrelated with the social world and human beings who coin different meanings to different phenomena like terrorism, it is imperative to use qualitative methodology or approach to this descriptive study. Qualitative research seeks to make the most of a myriad of specific information that can be derived from and about that context, by purposely selecting settings and informants that differ from one another (Babbie & Mouton, 2003:277).Therefore, this research paper relied on the use of the qualitative approach. The research questions are found to be effectively addressed by the qualitative approach by focusing on the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. First and for most, the concern of the qualitative approach on textual and documentary analysis makes it more appropriate for this research. Secondly, the focus of the qualitative approach with meanings and the way people understand things (Denscombe, 2007:174-175; Ritche and Lewis, 2003:3), makes it the most relevant methodology to this research. The research methodology employed qualitative approach by qualitatively examining and interpreting texts. It examined various debates that revolved on Ethiopian military intervention. The researcher had tried to evaluate its activity in various ways by depending on certain academic literature.

1.5.2. Methods of data collection

I employed various ways to gather data. Sources of data are documents and academic literature. The researcher has both used secondary as well as primary sources of data. These include books, articles, media publications and interviews. The study is organized as a desk study, surveying the available literature on extremists in the Horn of Africa. It draws from scholarly works, reports, policy documents and briefs, where findings, perspectives and positions have been assessed and

evaluated .In addition, the researcher had used interview with higher government official from Ministry of foreign affairs and key informant from Institute of Security Studies (ISS).

1.6. Scope of the Study

Ethiopia is one of the countries which had a long year subversion activity with Somalia in their relations ships .Two of them have busily engaged themselves upon subversion activity. The scope of the study covers since the time of Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in 2006. It mainly focuses on the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia on December 2006.

1.7. Significance of the Study

This study can be used as a source of material for other researches. It can enable to get information about the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia. It also invites other researcher to conduct a detail analysis about the intervention. It assists at least to see things in another way in which some people blame its activity by considering Ethiopia as an aggressive state. And the research by itself may not be a glaring enough to explain all things concerning on military intervention in Somalia.

1.8. Limitation of the Study

To gain a much more balanced picture, it would have been important that to critically evaluate different sides.There were some shortcomings while doing such research. One of the problem is bias in scholars. Since it is related to politics, some writers want to express it in their own sight. Some writers highly appreciate the deeds of UIC and they degraded TFG.[3] In addition, it was difficult for the researcher to go to Somalia and met higher Somali government officials.

1.9 .Ethical consideration

The researcher had considered ethics which are expected from researcher while conducting the research. An official letter was written from department of political science and international relations to respective institutions for the facilitation of the study. The researcher had asked the

[3]The TFG was established at the Eldoret and Mbagathi conferences held in Kenya from 2002 to2004 under international auspices to unify the Somali factions. After a split in the TFG, one of the factions, led by the speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, moved to Mogadishu.

consent of key informants and had got response from the concerned body. The study purpose was explained to the key informants on voluntary basis. Key informants have the right to give response on questions which they needed to do so. The right of each respondent to refuse or answer for few or all questions was respected. Names of key informants have been reveled because of their interests.

1.10. Organization of paper

This paper is organized into six chapters. The first chapter presents the problems that the paper aims to examine. In particular it provides an overview of the research topic, the research problem, the research objectives and questions. The second chapter examines the concepts of military intervention and security issues and theoretical concepts of military intervention. Chapter three states about a short historical background of Somalia, Extremism in Somalia. Chapter four discusses on Ethiopia's intervention and activities of some states and some unsuccessful attempts of peace process. Chapter five explain about the consequence of intervention at regional and international level and the last chapter discusses about summary and conclusion of the study.

CHATER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter presents review of related literature on military intervention its types and theoretical and conceptual framework of interdependence and interstate relations. It is organized in two sections .The first section presents a review of related literature on military intervention. And the second section presents theoretical and conceptual framework of interdependence and interstate relations.

2.1.1. Military intervention

2.1.1.2. Concepts of military intervention

There is no clear cut definition for the word intervention. Several writers have long been grappling with the problem of defining it. As Rosenau (1971) has remarked "the concept of intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity". It is seen in different ways by various actors. Distinction has to be made between acts of intervention and other forms of international politics. Chinese considered American as an intervention when the Americans make statements about human rights of the Tibetan People; in the same way Pakistan and other Islamic countries making statements about the Kashmiri peoples' right to self-determination is seen as tantamount to intervention in domestic affairs. It is a highly contested term in part because outside involvement comes in somany forms (Leurdijk, 1986; Little, 1975; Regan 2000; Rosenau ,1968; 1969; Wriggins ,1968).

Indeed even non-intervention is sometimes seen as intervention .For example, in the case of the Spanish civil war (1936-39) , Britain and France abstained themselves from taking sides with the republican forces fighting Franco. Similarly, Palestinians see the American failure to Protest against Israeli atrocities against them and Israeli invasion of Lebanon during 1982 as intervening on the side of the Israelis. Therefore the concept of intervention as I mentioned before is difficult to reach a single definition on it like that of other social science terms. And it is better to give appropriate meaning which give sense for the research objective and my concern is military intervention. Before proceeding to military intervention it is better for researcher to take on of the definition of intervention which have been forwarded by some scholars.

Military interventions are defined as "the movement of regular troops or forces such as airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country into the territory of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, with the cause of some political issue or dispute'' (Pearson & Baumann, 1993:4).Military interventions are a controversial and highly debated concept within global politics. They have been undertaken for various reasons and they varied from unilateral intervention or by single state to collective intervention via the UN. But the type of intervention that has garnered the most attention and the most controversy in the post-Cold War era is those undertaken for humanitarian reasons. And various States entered in Somalia in the name of Humanitarian purpose even though it is implausible. One of the first intervention in 1992 by UN and it was not fruitful even though the intervention claimed itself as Humanitarian (Greaves, 2009).

Some writers see intervention as an instrument of foreign policy .For instance, Morgenthau (1967) proposed that intervention is an ancient and well-established tools which enables states to achieve their political interest. According to Rosenau (1969), the defining characteristic of intervention versus other instruments of foreign policy is that intervention is both convention breaking and authority oriented. Therefore, states intervene in other states to bring a change of domestic political of another state. Viewed in this light, intervention is a tool that states use to pursue their foreign policy goals. Interventions especially military intervention are incurs cost for the intervener state. Thus, to be successful interveners must have access to a large amount of resources. Given this, scholars have argued that an asymmetry of power is a necessary condition for intervention

Mitchell (1970) argued that there are four factors that influence states' interventions .These are characteristics of the country in conflict, nature/characteristics of the intervener, relation patterns between the groups in the target and intervener, and the character of the international system. Ethiopia's 2006 military intervention had been influenced in the way of above listed conditions by Mitchell. The conflict in Somalia was very much intractable which cannot be resolved easily. Since Somalia has been influenced by the legacy of European colonizer and clannism, they are reluctant to search for solution rather they are exaggerated it from day to day. Actually neighboring states have sizeable factors for the continuation of the conflict. The intervener State i. e Ethiopia fears about its security because it has been attacked so many times before attack 9/11 of America (Philips, 2002).

The relationship between the intervener State and the target state was full of suspicion and are not trusted each other .And the international community was not ready to solve the problem by focusing on appropriate solution rather States were competing for their own interest during that time .Even though there were some peace process by international community, they were not effective at all.

Military intervention remains controversial both when it happens and when it fails to happen. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention[4] has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Since there is threat of terrorism states, become too sensitive for the people and for their territorial integrity. Matters of national sovereignty remain the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. The decision to intervene and the choice intervention strategy have important implications for both the intervening and the target state (Saunders, 2011).

The most important source of willingness to intervene is the perception of a threat to national security, but even with the same state leaders may differ in how they identify such threats. Most cases of military interventions, like troops, equipment or air support, are provided in support of one of the parties, although in some cases they can be neutral, such as with the deployment of troops to supervise a ceasefire or control a buffer zone (Bercovitch et al., 1991).This fact was common in the land of Somalia by Ethiopia and other competing sates such as Egypt and Eritrea.

All interventions including military intervention are fundamentally political decision. There are various questions that should be dealt before having intervention. For instance, Questions of power, interests, bureaucratic politics and international and domestic politics undoubtedly affected whether leaders choose to intervene or consciously decide not to intervene. That is the reason why intervention is an inherently political action with inescapable consequences"(Wesis,1999:p.41).

Lahra Smith (2009) wrote an article called "explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya" .In this article she argued that political uncertainty and violence, close election results and biased electoral institutions are commonplaces in African elections (ibid, pp. 867-68) and disproportionate use of force, high level of citizen protest, problematic electoral procedures

[4]Military intervention is too much controversial idea. There is no unanimously consensus upon it. It has different meaning for those intervener state and other states.

and greater stakes was observed in Ethiopia's election of 2005.The domestic situation of Ethiopia was not good because of 2005 national election. And this situation by itself have its own role for interference of Ethiopian government. Ethiopian government knew that the result of the election was biased and the people were on the way to have revolution against it. So, it must have enter in Somalia to impede the link between the internal and external threat because it may be too much difficult for Ethiopia if UIC gained power (Smith, 2007).

Sometimes intrastate conflict can affect any states even though there is geographical difference. For example, the piracy problem in Somalia's coast affected negatively most countries in the world as the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important passages of most transnational vessels transporting goods. It threatens the global transaction of goods and transport system for it directly and indirectly affects the global economy. Due to this, many Western countries sent naval forces to the coast of Somalia to fight piracy and eradicate them (Harper, 2012).But many scholars agree that there are different factors which invites third parties to enter militarily in another states (Pearson et al; Regan, 1998) .These factors include specified geography, geopolitical motives and the level of conflict. These are most important factors that directly linked with military interventions of third parties in an intrastate conflict. According to Pearson, states highly motivated to intervene when the level of the conflict is high, or have cross-boundary or ethnic affinity with the targeted state (Regan: 1998).Ethiopia thought that the level of conflicts was high and the members of UIC were propagating that they have finished their preparation to have Jihad against Ethiopia. They initiated their supporter to fight any ''infidels''i. e enemies of Allah. And Ethiopia had two times of war in the cause of boundary with targeting State.

States sometimes interfere in internal conflicts of other country militarily to counteract other external states as a proxy. When more external actors of different behavior and interest involve in an internal conflict of others, the spillover increases and conflict grows to an international level. States often create friendship with local actors in order to advance their own interest. They involved themselves in the conflict resolution process and strive to produce a solution of their favor while the counterpart states also act in the same manner (Gleditsch et al, 2008: 5, 8).The interference of different States in the issues of Somalia to achieve their own interest was surprising. Not only countries of the Horn of Africa but also other state like Egypt were highly

involved in internal affairs of Somalia. Eritrea's interference in the issue of Somalia is the best instance for this.

As internal conflicts spill over impacts in their region is obvious, the regional involvement in the conflict is also obvious. The dimensions and issues of would be changed with increased number of external actors in other states. Regional states cannot stand with nearby conflicts where transnational criminal units and conflicting elements operate. The assumption of those extremist group initiated Ethiopia to intervene in the state of Somalia. Therefore, states get involved into conflicts in other countries because of their national and regional security (Gelb, 2009: 131).Ethiopia had also an assumption which says peace of our neighbor is our peace and in contrary the instability of our neighbor is our instability which makes it always to be alert.

Military intervention highly occurred in failed States because there is an assumption that these states can provide fertile ground for terrorism, drug trafficking and host of other ills that threaten to spill beyond their borders. Somalia is thus a problem not just for Somalis but for Ethiopia United states and the world. In particular, the being of Somalia as provider of a sanctuary for al-qaeda has become an important concern; and piracy of Somalia's coast affects vital international shipping lanes which remains a menace (Bruton, 2010).If a state is failed, it is easy to terrorists because it is not capable to control such groups easily in its territory .This fact has been observed in Somalia because of the absence of strong central government.

The most significant reason for regional interferences in the internal conflict of Somalia is insecurity spill over. The vacuum which had been created by the downfall of the Somali state generated a large scale of criminal and terrorist activities in Somalia and the region. As a result, the Spillover effect of this conflict has further become an international problem because of its tremendous effect on peace, security and development in the east of African region. Al-Shabaab, as Al-Qaeda's wing in the region, operates in Somalia where they recruit nationals of other states in the region to spread terror and violence in the region while the regional states engaged themselves in tackling of spillover effect to their territories (Kidist, 2009). Even though, issues have become a serious concern of the international, regional and sub-regional states, the situation is more problematic to some of Somalia's close neighbour states.Therefore, Ethiopia's role in Somalia was active in both politics and military approaches since the civil war broke out in Somalia (Moller, 2009).

2.2. Types of intervention

There are various types of military interventions. Scholars often define a democratic intervention by depending on stated or revealed interests of the intervening state (Meernik 1996; Williams and Masters 2011; Peceny, 1999).These scholars see it from the interest of intervening state. That is to say, did the state intervene in order to promote democracy in the target state? The different types of military intervention by various states in Somalia could not be considered as democratic since the intervention emanates from their own interest. The application of the intervention refers most directly to the direction of the intervention or the target of the intervention: the sitting regime or rival factions. By depending on the interest of states, it is appropriate to see the intervention in Somalia in two ways .These are permissive intervention and Hostile.

2.2.1 Permissive intervention

Interventions can be classified into various ways .For instance, authorizing organization (whether UN or non UN); level of participation (whether unilateral or multilateral); legitimacy (by law or custom). One of the types of intervention is permissive intervention in which the government of one states invites or allowed other state into its territory (Eisenhamerová, 2011).These permissive principles are open to manipulation to serve the interests of interveners. Some states may use the permission for their targeted aims as has been mentioned before. There are various reasons for the intervening states to enter into another .And these States thought that they are legal to enter to Somalia crisis. Ethiopia[5] had propagated that she had been invited by TFG of Somalia and has its own interest to protect her citizen from the attack of UIC

2.2.1.1 Self-defense

Article 51 of the UN Charter and the UN's Definition of Aggression Resolution of 1974 had given the inherent right of a state to self-defense or a group of states to collective self-defense mandated under international law. Accordingly, it is allowed for states to protect themselves from

[5]Since Ethiopia is part of the confrontations of the Horn region, the spillover effect of these wars and violent conflicts in one way or the other negates Ethiopia to be instable and less peaceful (Tesfaye, 2010).

aggressive attack of another state. The labeling of particular acts as aggression are essentially political constructions as it has been discovered 1930s by the League of Nations .This treaty right reflects customary law. States subjected to an armed attack may respond individually or seek the assistance of other States in collective self-defense (Schmitt, 2013).

Thus the United States considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an act of aggression but she would not need to raise question upon its own attack on Panama in 1989 as such. Moreover, a state's right to defend itself through an intervention prior to being attacked, known as anticipatory self-defense, has long been considered to be conditional on fear of a demonstrably imminent attack. Israel's bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981was justified as self-defense by Israel but this was far from being universally accepted as legitimate in the absence of an imminent attack (Reiter,2005; Ramberg, 1982).There is sometimes distortion in the concept of Self-defense. Mostly those western states interpreted the concept according to their interest .They gave political meaning for it. Ethiopian intervention in Somalia is related to that self-defense by the state which aims the protection of its citizen from Jihad that have been propagated by UIC. And it has a legal ground from articles 51 of UN even though the article is interpreted according to the interest of America in a way she needs. In fact different rules and laws are not implemented equally sine they have no clear implementation mechanism.

2.2.1.2 Protection and Rescue of Nationals

Protection of nationals is a concept that refers to the conducting of a military intervention in the territory of a third state aimed at the protection and/or rescuing of threatened nationals of the intervening state. This type of operation bears some similarity between humanitarian interventions because of that both involve the use of force to prevent harm or additional harm to individuals or groups in the territory of another state (Ruys, 2008). This doctrine proposed certain requirement for states that want to intervene in other countries for the protection of their nationals abroad. These conditions include: there should be an imminent threat of injury to nationals; a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them and; the action of the intervening state is strictly confined to the objective of protecting its nationals (ibid).

There is still disagreement on the concept of protection of nationals. For instance, America's intervention in Grenada in 1983 seen in different ways .some writers are skeptical over its intervention. The pretext of protecting up to 1000 American lives, though no attempt appears to have been made to rescue them through a process of negotiation and there were doubts about the extent to which they were genuinely in danger, but writers like (Moore, 1984) see it as right decision to save the lives of its nationals. Ethiopia did not raise about the protection of nationals in its intervention in Somalia. Rather she feared on the integrity and sovereignty of state .

2.2.1.3 Response to Terrorism, Drugs and Weapons of Mass Destruction

States are using the concept of self defence in response to terrorism, the threat of drugs and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post 9/11 attack, UN security council urged every member states to strengthen themselves and to counter transnational terrorism and decrease the risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from being captured by those non state actors or terrorist .Thus, states are striving to control proliferation to non-state actors (Heupel, 2008). Even though there are terrorists and extremists in various places, Israel and USA are using response of terrorists for their own targeted interest. There is no definition of terrorism that would leave actions by Israel and the United States indisputably free of the charge. Nor is there a rule in international law that allows states that possess weapons of mass destruction to attack other states that might be acquiring them. Ethiopia considered UIC as remnants of AIAI which attacked Ethiopia so many times in 1990's .And UIC had an intention of snatching the land of Ogaden region through forcefully which is not acceptable in the current world.


2.2.2. Hostile Interventions: Oppositional and Rival

A hostile intervention is when the outside state intervenes to oppose the existing government. Hostile intervention has an aim of clearing existing barriers to democratic transformation, thereby allowing for alternative groups to assume power and put in place more liberal. Its intention is to create democratic state by eradicating dictatorship in one state (Masters, 2012).According to the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset (Kisangani &Pickering, 2008) hostile interventions may either oppose the target government, or support rebel or opposition groups. The former intervention is referred to as oppositional and the latter is referred

to as rival. Given that hostile interventions take on different forms, it is logical to ask if differences in the direction of the intervention result in different regime change outcomes for the target states.

Oppositional intervention is a military intervention that is against to the sitting regime and/or in support of rival factions. The assumption is that hostile interventions have the greatest probability of creating democratization in the target state. For instance a study which was conducted Pickering and Kisangani (2006) revealed that hostile interventions have an immediate democratizing impact on the target state, and the impact is traceable over ten years out from the point of the intervention. But the intervention which took place in Somalia by middle East States and others like Sudan and Egypt was not to create democratic government rather they had an intention to weaken the power of Ethiopia and to sustain their own biased interest. Notably the act of Egyptian was biased non ending type of intervention in Somalia .It highly engaged itself in Somalia for sustenance of its power in the region and to use the river of Nile by weakening other competitive riparian States of the Nile or region

Figure 1.***Civil war and military intervention in Somalia***



Sources: UCDP GED v. 1 - 2010; DPKO; various government, academic, and NGO documents

From the above graph, it is possible to grasp that there were a number of military interventions by different bodies via unilaterally or by individual state and multilaterally through UN. The intervention is not ended yet and the war is still continues. Ethiopia has intervened in Somalia since 1990's. But its known military intervention is 2006 that cost a lot .The evidence is got before 6 years .It did not depict the current casualties in Somalia. And it shows that there was an attempt by different states to solve the problem of Somalia.

2.3 Conceptual and Theoretical framework

Given the fact that military intervention is an area that has been extensively studied, it is imperative to contextualize my analysis in Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. Under this section the conceptual understanding of military intervention and international relationship of States will be elucidated by explaining the definition of the terms. The prominent theoretical perspectives that shed light in the process of the interaction of states are also discussed here. Finally, the notion of Regional Security Complex and Regional Order Approach are also examined and reviewed.

2.3.1. Conceptual framework

Concepts of International relations and other terms that are related to international relationships such as regional integration and spillover effect and others will be discussed in this chapter. It mainly focus on the nature of the state in its relationship with others .

From the perspective of neo-realist, international relations can be defined as a struggle for power and peace (Vasquez ,1998, p.187). A neo-realistic state-centric approach takes state as a central and major actor in any kind of relationship. It used the territorial trap of political authority belonging to the state. In view of neorealist ,see the relation of state as anarchy in its external relations and hierarchy on the inside (Barnett,2001,p.49).The theoretical paradigm adopted for this research can be summarized as neo-realist in principle as the struggle for power and peace has been omnipresent in Somalia, which is treated as a state by the international community notwithstanding its status as a completely failed state.

2.4. Realism

There are different theories concerning on international relation. In this research basically two have been selected for discussion. These are realism[6] and liberalism. The most acceptable one for East African states is realism because it can fit the situation in this place. It is better to put the assumption of realism before proceeding to any points here. Those assumptions include; the state-centric assumption; i.e. that states are the most important actors in the international system that they act in such a way as to maximize their national interest, and finally that the international system is in a state of anarchy (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2006). Considering multilevel governance, a realist would thus argue that the role of regional and international organizations is minimal since they have been dominated by some powerful states. Since neither of these levels of governance have any power worth mentioning nor will therefore not have had much influence in the decision-making process concerning the Libyan intervention as an example.

The realist argument stated that intervention is legitimate activity to protect national security and to maintain the international balance of power. Realists explains that anarchical condition of the international system is the cause for legitimate intervention. Self-help policies and the principle of non-intervention are contradictory. As it is put in a rather crude way by Krasner, anarchy necessarily implies self-help. There is no universal political authority. Each states can decide its own policy, and there is no barrier on options that can be considered as legal, including intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Self-help implies that each state can do anything which is not contrary to international law and beneficial to it .It chooses; non-intervention implies that there are some things that a state should not do (Alemida, 2002).

Realists are skeptical of the motives of intervening states will enter into another state in the aim of a genuine humanitarian intervention (Morganthau, 1967). Benn and Peters ,1959; Caney, 2000) argue that 'states rarely act out of altruism and contend that they will usually intervene to further their national interests rather than the fundamental rights of people abroad'. But Chris Brown (2002) describes the emphasis realists place on motivation as 'being a little puzzling' pointing to the widely held assumption that for 'an action to count as humanitarian it must be motivated unambiguously by genuine cosmopolitan values. He, however, argues that the

[6] Realism has the intent of 'ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason'. In the analysis of foreign policy, the theory examines the past political decisions and events, and uses them to foresee their consequences.

'motives of state behavior should not actually undermine humanitarian efforts'. This was not happened exactly in the case of some of Africa's most serious conflicts the hasty humanitarian backpedaling in Somalia and Rwanda when these so called 'motives' were no longer considered to be important coming for special mention. States by themselves need power to secure their interest. The existence of Super institutions are not as much binding and fruit full. We have seen minimal role of different regional organizations in solving the problem of States. Mostly these institutions are the instruments of powerful states to implement their interests. The intervention of Ethiopia was not actually altruistic activity. It has an intention to weaken the power of the UIC and strengthen its power.

Realists give much emphasis for national security in the condition of anarchy constitutes states to have legitimate intervention. To justify the defence of national security, realists override the principle of non-intervention. In a state of war, self-help which may lead to military interventions, is the only source of national security for the state. In his discussion of realist thought, Michael Doyle observes that for realists states 'cannot abide by the rules of sovereign equality, sovereign non-intervention when security is at stake' (Brown, 2002).

It is better to see Ethiopia's intervention from the perspectives of realism since it related its intervention with self-help. It does not mean that States have to intervene in the internal affairs of another state by using self-help as pretext .Basically international laws and norms are not well respected equally in all States and it various according to the capacity of State even though it is equally proposed on the paper .Therefore, the thought of realism is best fit in the intervention in the Horn of Africa because of the existence of different security dynamics in the Horn.

States carried out interventions in the Horn of Africa only because they believed their interests were at stake; Ethiopia believed that there will be threat to its territory and national security .And it also assumed that UIC is threat to its economy because those groups can interrupt the daily activities of state by creating various inconveniences. States in the Horn were the key actors in launching the interventions and non-state actors did not play a decisive role in them. International organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union and other supranational bodies could not enforce states to do anything they did not want.

Acharya (1996:3) argues that international relations could be observed in terms of "structural properties of the international system, specially of the distribution of power." In his explanation of international system, he states that:

> *In anarchy states seek security through self-help, either by increasing their own military and economic capabilities and/or through alliance with stronger powers. But security can only be achieved in a limited way, because of the operation of the "security dilemma", where by attempts by any state to improve its security by acquiring the means of power provokes other states to follow suit, there by rendering the initiating state as insecure as before (Acharya, 1996:3).*

According to Acharya (1996:3), neo-realists disagree with the idea that international institutions are important in shaping state behavior and encouraging peace, he rather argue that international institutions are mere servants of power holders. If we take Ethiopia as instance in 1990s, it was vulnerable for series of attacks by Al-ithad Al - Islamiya in its different cities. No one worried about Ethiopia. International institutions did not help Ethiopia to protect its sovereignty from this terrorist group. Only after 9/11 US and other powers extended their support for fighting terrorism. Another situation which might suggest the neo-realist position is the Ethio-Eritrean War in 1998. Here again the two countries fought bloody battles in order to protect their interests. The role of the international institutions in protecting the peace and security of the world states is weak. For instance, Eritrea had been accused so many times by its neighbours that she is violating International law but no international institutions have stopped this confrontation between Eritrea and its neighbors. Ethiopia repeatedly complained as it is directly affected by Eritrea's move in arming, training and deploying several anti-regime Ethiopian opposition groups (Moller, 2009).

The historical relations of Ethiopia and Somalia, their actual and potential security problems and the way they react to it has neo-realist element. The researcher of this thesis selected realism which can fit in the Horn of Africa that had so many competitors' states that aimed to be hegemonic power in the regions and to dominate the rest. As it has been observed above, those UIC were extremists in their nature and being revenge actors, Ethiopia tried to defend itself from vicious and trouble makers of the members of in the Horn of Africa. So, the best theory which can elaborate the realty of Ethiopia and Somalia is realism.

2.5. Liberalism/Idealism

Similar to realism, neoliberalism sees states as rational actors. But their difference is neoliberalism argues that there is a large variety of factors influencing what constitutes the national interest. The national interest for neoliberals is not necessarily a maximization of power. For neoliberalism, long-term economic prosperity and regional stability are two concepts which seem more central to the national interest than power. In the process of achieving these long-terms goals, neoliberalism gives much emphasis for international institutions in reducing the stress in the international system which might impede states from achieving these goals. It is through international institutions that states institutionalize mutual rules and norms through which the possibility of behavior that fosters mutual gain is enhanced. This is based on the core liberal idea that seeking long-term mutual gain is often more rational than realizing individual short-term goals (Nye, 1988).

Neoliberals see the above example of NATO's intervention in Libya in another way. In their analysis of the case of Libya, a neoliberal would thus not downplay the importance of regional and international organizations in the process leading up to the NATO intervention in Libya. According to neoliberalism, regional and international organizations are highly relevant in coordinating and promoting certain types of state behavior, even if they adopt the realist assumption that states are rational and self-interested actors (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane ,2005).

> *Similar to realism, neoliberalism assumes that states attempt to maximize their utility, which is defined by their national interest through their foreign policy. When realists define the national interest in terms of security issues, neoliberalists acknowledge the complexity of the process that precedes the formation of the national interest, after which they come to the conclusion that it is generally better to formulate it in terms of a long-term goal to maximize a states' wealth (Florini 1996, p. 364). Also, both theories do not deny the existence of norms in the international community.*

For neoliberal institutionalism, the system is manifested by the interdependence of states. This interdependence means that states are interested to have cooperation also through institutions to reduce transaction costs and to have trust in reciprocal agreements (Newman, 2007).In this way

international organizations are more relevant and can help to stabilize some shared values and norms. In this process, organizations can develop an identity and possibly autonomy in relation to the state. They are a promise of integration with a peace potential to solve the self-help view of anarchical state relations (Keohane, 1989).

Cooperation is considered a value and it can give benefits for the state. Therefore, even in the case of hegemonic decline, governments may be willing to counterbalance the possible associated regime decline (Keohane, 1984). Although neoliberalism may consider norms more enduring and influential than neorealism, both consider them determined by fixed (powerful) state preferences (Florini, 1996).Even though their thought seems interesting, it is not properly implemented on the ground. We have a number organizations or super institutions but they cannot prevent intra state conflict in different states. Intuitions are not even impartial since they are dominating by some powerful states which are not willing to discharge their responsibilities properly and their agreement have not meaning beyond paper value in most of the time. Hence, liberalism cannot be applied to Horn of Africa.

2.6. Regional Security Complex Theory

Before we directly proceeding to regional security complex theory ,it is better to have clear idea about the region of the Horn of Africa .Buzan define a region is "a distinct and significant sub-system of security relations that exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into close geographic proximity with one another." (Buzan, 1991:188).Moreover, military and political threats are more significant and these are potentially imminent and strongly felt when states are at close range .This definition could fit for Ethiopia and Somalia case because they have intimacy in geography. Buzan identifies four major characteristics of a security region. He contends that a security region must be comprised of two or more states. Furthermore, the states must be in relative geographic proximity to one another. Thirdly, the security interdependence on within the regional level is more pronounced than at the global level states and lastly regional states are more vulnerable to neighboring instability than global system instability.

Buzan proposes the idea that within a given geographic area, patterns of enmity and amity can affect regional sub-systems and have the result of security complex. A security complex is, "a

group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another''(Buzan,1991:189).

Regional Security complex theory was first brought forward by Barry Buzan in his book entitled ,*People, States and Fear (1991*) that aimed to set a conceptual framework to provide a critical understanding to security studies (Coskun, 2006). Security complex is a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan, 1991). The complexities are held together not by the positive influences of shared interest but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate across a broad spectrum of military, political, economic, societal and environmental factors (Sheehan, 2005).

There are a number of reasons to identity Security complexes properly. These include the arrangements of units, the patterns of enmity and amity, and the distribution of power are all levels of consideration in security complex identification. Since they are relative terms, many of these things are difficult to measure objectively. The intensity of a security complex is quantified by the level of security interdependence between the states which can be measured by strong, weak, positive and negative. These interactions among the states within the security complex generate a web of activity. Ultimately, patterns in amicable and aggressive relations emerge between the actors. A complex is the byproduct of intensified levels of fear or trust.

Buzan revealed the example of the military standoff between India and Pakistan that regional security systems can be seen in terms of balance of power as well as patterns of enmity, in which the interactions set by suspicion and fear arising from border disputes, interests in ethnically related populations, long-standing historical links, whether positive or negative . According to Buzan, these patterns are confined in a particular geographical area. Hence, the term security complex is designate the ensuing formation (Buzan & Weaver, 2003).And the case Ethiopia and Somalia is similar to the above explanation.

Buzan's concept of Regional Security Complex gives observable tool for conceptualizing regional security in the current international system by making at least two very significant contributions. First, it brings out the relative importance of regional security analysis vis-a-vis other (i.e. national and global) levels of analysis of the international security systems. Second, it offers the necessary criteria for self-definition that are rooted within indigenous patterns of

security interdependence rather than general and systemic factors shaping the nature of the international security system (Buzan, 1991).

Fortunately, this theoretical framework provides an adequate unit of analysis that facilitates comparison and generalizations to a very high degree. It is also comprehensive and adaptable enough to be applied to the Horn of Africa because the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Hence, given its geo-political position and interest, the conflict in Somalia has quickly assumed an international dimension with the potential to destabilize the entire of Eastern Africa sub region and beyond. Accordingly, the study uses the Regional Security Complex as the theoretical framework to analyze and show how Somalia's civil and faction's war has an impact of destabilizing upon Horn of Africa. Hence, applying Buzan′s theory provides deeper insights into how the intertwined nature of Horn of Africa needs intervention to quit on going conflict in Somalia.

Within the regional security literature two theories primordially stand out: the regional security complex theory (RSCT). (Buzan, 1983; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Buzan and Wæver, 2003) and the (Lake and Morgan, 1997). The first theory have been discussed so far and let have proceeded to next i.e. regional orders approach theory.

2.7. **Regional order approach Theory**

On the central question of ascertaining what is regional about security, the regional order approach presents a slightly different orientation. Two writers Lake and Morgan, define that a regional system is "a set of states affected by at least one trans-border but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area" (1997: 48). They built on the concepts of 'neighborhood' and 'spill over' effects to define 'externalities' as "costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them" (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 49). A regional security system is thereby produced if a "local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states" (p.49).Lake and Morgan (1997: 50) argued that, "externalities are not necessarily bounded in their effects to states within a particular geographic neighborhood by taking the US as an instance in Middle east. Even though they argue that "geography might bind most members of a regional security complex together", they also underline that "geographic proximity is not a necessary condition for a state to be a member of a complex (p.12). For this reason, even though

there is an intention to associate security to regional complexes following Buzan and Wæver, the regional dimension of a complex seems to be jeopardized. Likewise, Buzan and Wæver argue that Lake and Morgan's view "not only destroys the meaning of levels, but also voids the concept of region, which if it does not mean geographical proximity does not mean anything" (2003:80).

According to this theory, there are a number of issues that cannot be bounded with geographical proximity. Buzan and Waever highly focus only on geographical intimacy .But Issues like terrorism can affect any regions unless there is appropriate solution for it. Ethiopian government was propagating that the instability could have a probability to be spread in the Horn of Africa and could have an impact of destability in the region and beyond.

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOMALIA

3.1. Introduction

Background of Somalia will be dealt under this chapter. It overviews about the historical background of Somalia .The chapter focuses on its history under colonization, post-independence of the state and the reign of Ziad Barre. In addition to this, it gives explanation concerning on extremism in Somalia by taking different instances of extremists and terrorists such as Al Shabab, Alequedea,Al-itihad Al –islamya and UIC**.**

3.2. Background and Historical Review of Somalia


Somalia is found in the Horn of Africa, adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula. It is surrounded by the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to the east, by Kenya to the southwest, by Ethiopia to the northwest, and by the Republic of Djibouti to the north .Somalia occupies very important geopolitical position though its political nature is dominated by clan competition (Lewis, 2002).

They are examples of homogeneous societies and distinct from others in the Horn of because of such peculiar features. They have common language, culture, and religion (Castagno 1959; Martin 1966; Lewis, 2002). Despite this homogeneity, Somali society is characterized by tribal divisions and infinite rivalries against the backgrounds of personal and sectorial power struggles for a long period of time. The population of approximately 10.9 million is made up of six major clan families: the Darood, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, the Dir, and the Digil and the Mirifle (Lewis, 2002).

Even though Prior to European colonial arrival Somalis did not have a central state in the sense of a Western Weberian bureaucratic state, they had home grown administrative system. They used it to resolve disputes which arise between them. As British anthropologist I. M. Lewis stated, the Somali traditional structure had three core elements. These are traditional social structures, or the clan; customary law (*Xeer*); and traditional authorities, or the clan elders. Their economy is depended on livestock and farming and many are pastoral-nomads (Lewis, 1999).

The nature and character of people are mostly according to their natural habitat, historical events and cultural experiences in the course of several centuries. They have been highly influenced by the number of uncertainties like political turmoil and external interventions of different states. And these conditions have left their own mark on the people of Somalia (Shay, 2010).

Figure 1. Major Somali Clans and Sub clans



Source: (Lewis, 2002)

3.3. **Colonial History**

As it is known in History, European states had colonized African states. Beginning in the late 19th Century, during the 'Scramble for Africa' following the 1884 Berlin Conference, British had influenced the interest of others and it was successful in colonizing of Somalia. The strategic interest of Somali was attractive for any one and there was great competition by different state (Lewis, 2002).

According to Lewis this interest by the British in preventing the occupation of Somalia by a rival power stemmed not from any sensitivity to the desires of the Somali people but was rather driven by a desire to maintain the supply of meat from Somaliland to its forces stationed in Aden (pp. 40-41). It was during this time that the British Somaliland protectorate was established through a series of treaties that included promises of protection between the British Empire and local clans living in the region in order to "secure a supply market, check the traffic in slaves, and to exclude the interference of foreign powers" (Samatar ,1989, p.31).

Many of Somalia's current issues and various crisis have been impacted by past events and cultural nature of Somalia .The solutions of Somalia should be seen in consideration of all things to bring long term solution. Steve Kibble (2001) writes, "The history of Somalia is impossible to understand without some knowledge of the interweaving of an un-centralized egalitarian political system...with the effects of British, French and Italian formal colonization... and the attempt to create a post-colonial modernist nation state".

3.4. Independent Somalia

3.4.1. Civilian Government (1960-1969)

Modern Somalia was born out of a 1merge of two protectorate land of Somalia i. e the British protectorate land and Italy protectorate land together in 1960 even though the sense of clannism is still there (Lewis, 2002; Pham, 2013). The civilian government had a constitution which had been adopted by referendum in 1961 (Lewis, 2002).There were also number of parties in Somalia. It's very important to mention here that, those who had led the nation's freedom movement during independence struggle as well as post civilian government had advocated for unitary government *(Ibid).*

In the first nine years of its existence, the Somali state was parliamentary democracy that allowed unrestricted political activity. The political and social system for everyone except women in Somalia even though it allowed for women in 1963. The system of administration was a mixed traditional tribal norms and values together with western life style. Excluded from the all-male arena of clan-based politics, women have directed their collective political acumen and agency into the civil society space that opened up after state collapse (Jama, 2010).

3.4. 2 .The Regime of Ziad Barre

Somalia had faced a problem in 1969 because of the killing of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke by one of his bodyguards .It had the effect of creating an unexpected power vacuum as the Prime Minister was away at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The Prime Minster had busily engaged himself in advocating of the right of Palestine people. At the end,

there had been over thrown of civil government and had replaced the reign of dictator of Ziad Barre.

Before 1990, military coups were the main means of capturing power in the majority of African states (Charlton ,1983;First ,1970; Houngnikpo ,2010). Many African States have committed it. But it does not mean that the coups stopped in post 1990.This state of affairs stimulated a considerable volume of scholarly literature devoted to the study of various aspects of military interventions in African politics (Decalo ,1976). Somalia as being part of Africa, had also experienced coup by Ziad Baree in 1969. On 21 October 1969, a coup led by Major General Mohamed Ziad Barre took power amid genuine excitement by the people of Somalia, who had grown increasingly outraged over the corruption, nepotism and injustice perpetuated by their elected representatives (Bulhan, 2008).During the reign of Ziad Barr, the philosophy was scientific socialism but it could not be implemented properly.

By early 1970s the regime organized a repressive statewide control apparatus. Finally power became in the hands of Ziad Barre and he had centralized everything in the land of Somalia. His slogan became scientific socialism, and banned any sense of clannism. In reign of Ziad Barre he banned clannism and focused on Scientific Socialism. As cited by Lewis, Speaking as the leader of Somalia, Ziad Barre argued that: "tribalism and nationalism cannot go hand in hand… it is unfortunate that our nation is rather too clannish; if all Somalis are to go to hell, tribalism will be their vehicle to reach there" (Lewis, 2002).

Even though, he banned clannism he was assisting for his relatives and his supporters with many things. In the first time he got popular support and acceptance by the people of Somalia because he used the question of irredentism i.e. claiming of the land from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. This helped him to get the sentiment of the people in the land of Somalia. After the 1977/1978 war with Ethiopia and his defeat, the relationships of Ziad Barre with the people became too strained (Elmi, 2013).

After Barre regime had been defeated by Ethiopia in 1978, he shifted his ideology and alliances. socialism was formally abandoned in 1980 after the Soviet Union cut off economic and military support to Somalia in 1977. With the inflow of refugees to the country, the loss because of the war, the downward spiraling economy and the antagonism against the regime was accentuated. As a result, the Barre regime's exercise of power changed character such that corruption and nepotism became widely spread across the state of Somalia and people started fleeing the

country on political grounds. To suppress political opponents and the public's dissatisfaction, the regime implemented divide-and-rule policies, where feelings of clan affiliation were used to trigger and escalate competition, dissatisfaction and conflict among Somalis, thereby increasing people's awareness of clan identity (ibid).

The assistance of US for Ziad Barre had been continued .In early 1980s, US assisted different things like weapons, financial aid and generous loans because of its interest in the strategically located naval base in Berbera. Other western states also highly assisted Somalia even though there was great violation human right by Ziad Barre in Somalia. Thus, Somalia became dependent on western aid, as it was a major part of the economy. Unfortunately, the assistance could not change the life of Somali. Yet, neither did this aid noticeably fuel industrial development nor improve living standards for the population. Since there was a great corruption, the aid gave beneficial only relatives of certain ethnic groups. State was an abstract entity that they were not a part of it for the majority of Somalis. The Somalia's strategic importance reduced with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the Barre regimes lost donation, financial capacity to uphold the state through patronage and coercion (ibid).In 1991, the dictatorial regime was overthrown by oppositional groupings, leaving a power vacuum making it possible for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, to seize power, which resulted in a power struggle between opponent clans.

3.4.3. Post 1991 Somalia

After the fall, of Ziad Barre ,Somalia had entered into continuous Chaos and crisis .British Somali land immediately got her independence (de facto) in 1991 and Italy Somali land also got its independence in 1998 (de facto). .Both of these regions achieved relative peace than Central and Southern Somalia. Somalia become the center of intervention in the name of humanitarian intervention and the first was in 1992 by UN. There was a competition of regional states and others to enter in Somalia and it will be discussed in the next chapter in detail how different states had a rivalry with each other for their own interest in Somalia.

In 1992, in the wake of the collapse of the Somali[7] state and at the height of the civil war, Somalia set a benchmark for humanitarian crises in the immediate post-Cold War world. The people of Somalia had suffered from war and famine and millions have been affected by war and famine. war and famine became its manifestation . Two decades later, as international efforts[8] to restore a functional central government continue, Somalia is again being described as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 1.5 million people internally displaced, over half a million Somalis living as refugees in neighboring countries, and humanitarian access extremely restricted (Bradbury,2010).

3.5. Extremism in Somalia

The existence of failed state had given a golden opportunity for terrorists to enter in Somalia. There are a number of extremists and terrorists in the land of Somalia. Indeed terrorists could be found in everywhere but failed state and ungoverned space helps them to be effective in their mission. Before starting any discussion, it is needed to get facts about a true and undistorted image of Islam, and I think it is important to correct the definitions of "jihad"[9] and "holy war "as presented by the western media. A clearer definition of jihad is to describe it as "an internal spiritual struggle within oneself, and not warfare against unbelievers" (Ibrahim, 2010, p.2).

3.5.1 Al-Shabab

Extremists who use Islamic religion as a cover to agitate in its modern form first appeared in Somalia to counter the dictatorships of Ziad Barre. Although there was earliest example of an indigenous Somali Islamist group in the 1970s, the most prominent movement was Al- Itihaad al- Islamiya (AIAI) which was founded sometime in the early 1980's (Harnisch 2010a, 10; Shinn 2011, 204). AIAI's had an ideology which seek to establish an "Islamic state" and to unify Somalia with the neighbouring ethnically Somali territories, most notably Ethiopia's Ogaden

[7]Thousands of Somali people have been killed since the time of fall of Ziad Barre for more than two decades .And the international communities could not bring any visible change without talking about it for the last two consecutive decades.

[8] See 1996 Sodere process, 1997 Cairo peace accord and 2000 Arta peace process.

[9] "The word Jihad is from the Arabic root word JHD which basically means striving or struggle. In [the] Sufi tradition, the self is the enemy and conquering the self is overpowering the enemy and one of the best formsof Jihad. Unfortunately, the West describes Jihad as a holy war which is a wrong translation. If one translates holy war back to Arabic, the translation would be harb-e-maqadas or sacred war"(Ibrahim,2010)

region (Gartenstein-Ross 2009, 26; Stevenson 2007, 43).It was not influential in the time of fall of Ziad Barre but there were some members there. It became notable when it governed the Somali town Luuq from 1991 to 1996 and conducting several terrorist attacks within Ethiopia in the mid-1990s (Menkhaus 2005 ; Shinn 2011). After it had been attacked by Ethiopia in Luuq in 1996, it had changed its strategy of abandoning to hold territories and started spreading its ideology via military means and most of whom were not politically active (Menkhaus ,2005).

In 2003, it had conducted conference in the Somaliland town of Laascanood to decide upon a new political front and there was a disagreement between members of AIAI .Due to this reason, young radicals had created their own groups. Within days these youths had launched a parallel conference and in which they founded al -Shabab as a rival Islamist movement (Dagne , 2010; Shinn 2011,). The principal founding members were the late Aden Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Abdi Godane Mukhtar Ali Robow, Faud Mohamed Khalaf Shangole and Ibrahim Haji Jama al-Afghani; all of whom are believed to have fought in Afghanistan under al Qaeda (Dagne, 2010; Harnisch, 2010). Although it tried to create a number of assassinations (Menkhaus 2005, McGregor 2008,) it appears that initially al -Shabab played no major role until it joined the Union of Islamic Courts(UIC) as an elite militia some time during 2005.

Al Shabaab, which means 'the youth" or "the boys" in Arabic is a militant Islamist group founded and based in Somalia. The group has against the Transitional Federal Government as well as the African Union (AU) peace keeping force, the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Al Shabaab[10] began as part of the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) when the Courts Union gained power in the Somali capital of Mogadishu in 2006, then the Ethiopian Forces intervened to root them out, and the leadership went into exile.

3.5.1.2 Strategic objectives

It has its own principal objective of creating a Somali Caliphate of the Wahhabi Islamic sect in Somali-inhabited regions of the Horn of Africa. It had tried to use various mechanisms such as byway of militarized intervention by taking advantage of the vacuum in Somalia's failed statehood as a golden opportunity. It also used Ethiopian intervention as an instrument in

[10] Al-Shabaab itself is currently internally split: A radical faction that includes foreign fighters operates along the coast from Kismaayo in the South up to Afgooye (near Mogadishu). They oppose Sheikh Mukhtar Robow (Abu Mansur), an Al-Shabaab spokesman, whom they accuse of nepotism after he accepted entering into agreements with international aid organizations.

agitating the people. In addition, it used United State' s strategic interventions in Somalia as rallying points and a motivating element among Somali youth as a driving force for recruitment and national sentiment of discontent (Agbiboa,2013).

3.5.1.3. Ideology

Catering to the violent and often destructive methods of committing violent operations, the organization believes in creating a nucleus of Wahhabi sect stronghold in Somalia that would create an Islamic State of the Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. In addition, the growth of Al Shabab's influence in Somalia has regional implications for peace and security that can be seen in its support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia and terrorist bombings and kidnappings in Uganda and Kenya (Abdulkadir, 2012).

3.5.1.4. Inspirations

It is to inspire Wahhabi Islamic front in the Horn of Africa by starting from Somalia. The organization aspires to take over Somalia and spill-over its ideology throughout the Horn of Africa and onwards to the Central, South and Eastern Africa at large. The organization aims to remove Western influence in the Horn of Africa and eventually in Africa in the process, liquidate all other forms of traditional Islam that has been the norm in most parts of east Africa (Anzalone, 2013).

Figure 2.the Emblem of Al-shabab.



Source: (Ali,2008) in his Article the Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidiin –A Profile of the First Somali Terrorist Organisation

To have clear understanding over the ideology of al-Shabab, it is very useful to analyze the logo of this-organization. It consists of the map of all Somali inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa,

which al-Shabab intends to integrate under the rule of Islam. The map of the Horn of Africa at the center of the symbol depicts Al -Shabaab's primary geographical location. It has aim of using light gun to accomplish its objective and its ideology is represented by the Quran and shahada written above in Arabic (Ali, 2008). The emblem of al-Shabaab[11] expresses that the organization`s ambitions do not exceed the borders of the region of Horn of Africa. It uses Quran in order to get acceptance by Muslims and to initiate them for its objective.

3.5.2. Al -Qaeda

Another extremist group which is highly disturbing this world is Al Qaeda. It is a "jihadist" organization with a global reach. In keeping its original mandate, it has an aim of mobilizing of Islamic world to attack those who are obstacle for Muslims and Islam in its thought .It considers itself as guard of Muslims. In defence of Islam and its adherents, al Qaeda conducted attacks on targets of the US, its allies and friends to inspire and instigate a perpetual campaign. Although it did not get mass supports of Muslims, it seeks to exploit the anger, suffering and the resentment of Muslims against the United States In 1988, Osama bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from a network of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union. The group conducted a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. and allied targets, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Gunaratna, 2005:2).Al-Qaeda's main target is to establish Islamic states in any where Muslims are living. Its methodology to achieve its goal is using of "jihad". Al -Qaeda's ideology, often referred to as "jihad", is marked by a willingness to carry out armed struggle against those who in their view try to prevent the establishment of an Islamic state (ibid).

East Africa has attracted special interest from the United States and international community because of its early links to transnational Islamic terrorism. In 1998, United States Embassies in Dares Salaam (Tanzania) and Nairobi (Kenya) were bombed, killing a handful of U.S. citizens and hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians. In the wake of the embassy bombings, an organized al-Qaeda cell was uncovered in Nairobi, Kenya. In 2002, one of Kenya's most popular tourist destinations, Mombasa, experienced two further terrorist strikes, this time in the form of

[11] For further information see Chris Harnisch (2010). Al Shabaab's First International Strike: Analysis of the July 11 Uganda Bombings, Critical Treats, July 14, retrieved from http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaabsfirst-international-strike-analysis-july-11-uganda-bombings-july-14-2010-4532

coordinated and simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel popular with Western tourists and an Israeli-chartered aircraft departing from the Mombasa airport (Piombo, 2007).

3.5.3 .Union of Islamic Court (UIC)

UIC is also another Somali originated Extremist groups which had got high dominancy in Somalia. The phenomenon of UIC[12] in stateless Somalia first appeared in north Mogadishu in August 1994. After nearly four years of persistent anarchy and political failures, Islamic clerics from the locally powerful Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye (Somalia's largest and currently most powerful clan), with the blessing of their 'secular' political leaders, founded the first fully functioning sharia court (Barnes & Hassan, 2007).

The establishment of the Islamic Courts was not genuine of Islamic imperative to solve the problem of Somali people and to create peace and order in Somalia. The agenda of the courts was not particularly programmatic; they were not presided over by expert Islamic judges, nor were they adherents to any specific school of Islamic law. The enforcement of the Courts' judgments depended on militias recruited from the local clan. At root, the Islamic Courts were part and parcel of clan power in Mogadishu .They served specifically Hawiye clans and earned the support of the Hawiye business class of Mogadishu for whom the primary purpose of the Islamic Courts was to provide 'security' (ibid).

The socio-political actions of the UIC led to their own destruction, which in turn adversely affected the provision of security in the country. During their brief six-month rule the UIC made two mistakes in the run-up to the Ethiopian invasion which led to their destruction. One was their adoption of jihadism and jihadist threats against the Ethiopian state. The second mistake was the manner in which the UIC implemented 'morality policing'. As their influence grew, they became increasingly more radical and began imposing their Islamic version of "s*haria* law" on the Somali peoples. The result was that they were perceived to be violating the fundamental rights and freedoms of the local populace, which led to their being discredited (Mwangi, 2010).

[12] The UIC blamed Ethiopia of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs while Ethiopia in turn accused the UIC of promoting a hidden agenda aimed at destabilizing the unity of the Ethiopian State. Ethiopia also contended that the leadership of the UIC was controlled by forces that are still actively pursuing the vision of a Greater Somalia. It affect Ethiopia's political independence and territorial integrity. The UIC was created in 2006 out of the 16 Islamic courts in Mogadishu in response to these warlord attacks and the insecurity in Mogadishu on a district base and implemented Sharia law to ensure security in an area characterized by lack of state law and institutions.

According to Markus V. Hoene (2010), the UIC was a combination of about fourteen courts which includes some extremist elements with jihadist and militant agenda. It included groups like al-Shabaab which started as UIC's youth wing with 400 fighters and reached 2000 just before Ethiopian intervention; former AIAI members who prefer to keep low profile after 9/11; Majuma Ulema which started by religious leaders (Ulema) in order to provide security for Mogadishu neighborhoods with a vision of establishing an Islamic state; and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) which was an offshoot of Majuma Ulema in order to help the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in his quest to defend the traditional Somali Islamic practices from foreign, and especially Salafi/Wahhabi encroachment.

Hoene also explained that the UIC also included different individuals who had capacity in assisting of it with Finance. Individuals like Haji Abukar Omar Adaani who is from Hawiye clan and he was one that assisted UIC in finance. His interest is to protect his business; Hassan Dahir Aweys from Hawiye who was a former Somali army colonel in Ziad Barre regime and former military commander of AIAI that earned him an inclusion in US terrorist list; Sheikh Sharif who was formerly a member of Majuma and was elected a chairman of Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) in 2004 which late became UIC and considered a moderate who finally became the current TFG president (Hoene, 2010).

There were also some members such as Hassan Abdullahi Turki from Darood/Ogadeen clan who was a militant and an early member of AIAI ,Adan Hashi Ayro from Hawiye clan like Aweys who fought for AIAI in Mogadishu, northern Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the went to Afghanistan for military training who allegedly has a link with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and later in 2005 became the leader of al-Shabaab but killed by US attack in 2008; Ahmed Ali Godane of Isaaq/Arab clan from Somaliland who worked for the remittance company called Al Barakaat and attended military training and considered as international jihadist who was implicated with Ayro in the killings of foreigners; Mukhtar Robow from Rahanweyn/Leysan clan who was allegedly trained Somali militants, also fought alongside with Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2001, later became UIC's deputy Defense Minister and finally joined al-Shabaab as spokesman and deputy commander; and Sheikh Ali Warsame from Isaaq clan who is a conservative religious leader educated in Sudan and later became a military leader in AIAI with a suspected connection with UIC(Ibid).

CHAPTER FOUR: ETHIOPIA'S 2006 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA.

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia will be dealt in detail. The chapter tried to analyze the motivated factors or justifications of Ethiopia to intervene into Somalia by using different secondary documents and interview. In addition to this, the role of regional and other states in Somalia in the time when UIC controlled most parts of Somalia in 2006 will be explained with deep analysis.

4.2. Legal Implications

International law condemned the use of force between states with the exception case of Security Council authorization for the use of force, and that done in self-defence. Self-defence on international level is generally regarded at least by international lawyer as a legal right defined as and legitimated by international law. Governments by and large agree. When they have used force, they have nearly always claimed self-defence as their legal justification (Schachter, 1989).

There is a debate on the concept of self defence, particularly in the interpretation and application of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which today provides as a base for states for the use of force in self-defence. More recently, the debate has revolved around the so-called doctrine of pre-emption; that is, whether military force that is employed pre-emptively can be justified under the rubric of self-defence or not. The United States (US) for example, in its National Security Strategy, has instituted a policy of using pre-emptive self-defence to prevent hostile acts by terrorist groups and rogue states using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Ritcher, 2003).

Even though interference in the affairs of sovereign state is not allowed, instability that can be used as threat for the neighbor provide legitimacy for intervention of other state. There is a norm of non-intervention in international law. However, if instability threatens an external power's interests in the beleaguered state or the surrounding region, as Hoffman (1984) argues, the power may appeal to the principle of self-help to justify military intervention. For example, states have often used the protection of their citizens living in an unstable country as justification for military intervention (Akehurst, 1977).

Ethiopia guides its external relations with a *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy* document issued in 2002. According to this document, Ethiopia's foreign policy to Somalia is defined as a damage limitation policy. It aims at limiting of the damage on Ethiopia which emanates from the instability of Somalia. This is based on a clearly stated conviction of the EPRDF regime that the condition of instability in Somalia is likely to persist for some time. Despite the pessimism, the document states Ethiopia's sincere desire to see a friendly government in Somalia committed to fighting disorder, terrorism and extremism in cooperation with its neighbors (FANSPS, 2002).

As I had mentioned in chapter three, UIC was a group of Sharia Courts that were mostly supported by the prominent Hawiye clans in Somalia and evolved as a major competitive faction in 2006 by defeating several warlords including those constituted and assisted by the US. In June 2006, the UIC took control of much of Southern and Central Somalia including the capital city of Mogadishu. The UIC declared and tried to establish an "Islamic state"; ordered Somalis to comply with stringent Islamic rules with the period it controlled Somalia (Rabasa, 2009).

In late 2006, the Ethiopian parliament authorized the government to take all necessary measures against the force of UIC in Somalia in response to what it said plans for an invasion by the Islamic courts movement. The parliament approved the resolution on 30 November 2006 by 311 votes to 90 against, and 16 abstentions, stating that: Parliament hereby authorizes the government to take all necessary and legal steps to stave off a declaration of "holy war" and invasion by the Union of Islamic Courts against the country (Ministry of Foreign affairs, 2006).

A Resolution of Ethiopian Parliament authorized the Government to take all legal and necessary measures against any invasion by the UIC, subject to the prior exhaustion of all peaceful avenues the effort to find a peaceful route turned out to be a failure. A Chapter VII Security Council resolution, Resolution 1725 condemned the extremists' bombings in Baidoa, and authorized IGAD and the Africa Union (AU) to deploy a protection force to Baidoa. The UIC was not interested to accept Security Council's move, and on 8 December officially declared that it was fighting Ethiopian troops to the south-west of Baidoa[13]. The UIC gave warning for Ethiopia to

[13]Baidoa is a place where severe type of war took place between TFG and UIC. It was a center of TFG in a time when UIC controlled all areas of Somalia. The region is also one of the most important markets in southern Somalia, conducting significant trade in local and imported cereals, livestock and non-food items. Main economic activities in the town include small, medium and large scale business, self-employment, and livestock and agricultural trade.

leave Somalia within a week unless she faced a major attack from it. Ethiopia for its part, revealed that it had launched a self-defence operation against the UIC and foreign fighters in Somalia. Ethiopian warplanes bombarded Mogadishu airport shortly after the declaration on 24 December (Warbick and Zeray, 2007).

Ethiopia relied on a number of reasons for its military intervention in Somalia. Some of the reasons include; the inherent right to self-defense, a terrorist threat, and intervention by invitation and the protection of the right to self-determination of the Ethiopian Somalis, amongst others. There are two separate but related issues we need to consider here. The first one is a question of intervention upon invitation. In principle, international law permits third-State intervention by force into another State if there is clear consent from the government of the State where the intervention takes place. Ethiopian intervention was invited by TFG of Somalia which got international recognition (ibid).

There is controversy over the recognition of TFG. Gray in his *book of International law and use of force* he gave an explanation that TFG is given recognition by the international community.AU and Security Council supported it. Most explicitly in July 2006 the security council said that it supported the TFG and its parliament as the internationally recognized authority to restore peace , stability and governance to Somalia and that it was ready to consider a limited modifications of the norms of embargo to enable the TFG to develop Somalia's Security sector and national institutions .The security council called on all parties inside and outside to refrain from action that could provoke or perpetuate violence .This implies that it has already got recognition and it can invite another state for assistance in a time when it is in trouble(Gray, 2008) .But the main problem of TFG was its being of weak. So it has a right to invite external state in time of the problem it faced.

The other factor which had been raised by Ethiopia was intervention by the invitation of TFG. Military intervention by invitation into a civil war situation poses very problematic questions of fact and law. In most cases, these interventions are not acceptable unless the inviting government is a constitutionally installed government. There must be care in inviting of government. Invitation have fulfill certain requirements. Some of them are; invitation should be clear to the intervening State, the invitation is given on an ad hoc basis, the intervention is not contrary to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter (the prohibition of the use of force) and the intervention does not

run against peremptory norms, for instance, violations of humanitarian law .According to Gray and Allo, TFG is internationally recognized government and it can invite other states in time of facing problem. Except its weakness, it has no problem to invite other state since it has got recognition by the Security Council and others (Allo, 2010).

The UIC was not merely a Somalia's force, as became clear in the course of the conflict by the capture of foreign fighters. There were citizens of various states who involved themselves in the war. Notably Eritrean troops and officials, Arab fighters and some Ethiopian rebels such as OLF. Taking into account the international and regional legitimacy of the interim Government, the concern about terrorism, the fact that Ethiopia's intervention was and is not contrary to peremptory norms including the prohibition of aggression. Ethiopia's intervention based upon the invitation of the interim Government may be lawful. Mostly unilateral intervention is often controversial and for both the intervening State and the State where the intervention takes place or targeted states (Interview, 2015; Allo, 2010).

The other justification of Ethiopia to fight the UIC with the Somali Government was its inherent right to self-defence. All States have an inherent right to defend themselves when they face an armed attack from another State, or by State-sponsored armed groups, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Firstly the right aimed to address an attack from the state. But 9/11 had changed the situation and the notion of self defence is using for terrorists. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 acknowledged that international terrorism can be threat to international peace and security. It also assured that states have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in time of threat. In Resolution 1516 of 2003, the Council avowed the need to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. Ethiopia took UIC as the former members of AIAI which attacked her cities in 1990's.This condition obliged the state to defend herself from those members. Ethiopia considered its response as self defence (Allo,2010).

Ethiopia considered UIC as a threat. One of the three groups that comprised the leadership of the UIC was consisted of radical Islamists led by Sheikh Hassen Dahir Aweys. Aweys was one of the military commander of the extremist AIAI in the 1990s; he had a direct contact with Osama Bin Laden; and had the plan to establish Taliban-like Islamic regime in Somalia. He became the Chairmanship of the *Shura Council*, in October 2006 and he got a mandate to approve the decisions of the officially highest organ of the UIC, i.e. the *Supreme Islamic Court of Banaadir*.

Aweys accession to the most power organ of the UIC further radicalized the domestic and foreign policy of the UIC (Terdman, 2008: 53, 58 – 63). UIC's verbal Jihadist threats were backed by Bin Laden's call for international mujahidin to come and fight the infidels in Somalia (Pirio, 2007).Because of this speech Ethiopia's officials worried too much. AIAI before it changed its name to UIC had attacked Ethiopia and this could create suspicion and threat on leaders of Ethiopia (Marchal, 2013).

Zemedkun Tekle, a spokesman for Ethiopia's Information Ministry asked: 'What did you expect us to do? Wait for them to attack our cities?' The reactions of the international community to Ethiopia's intervention may help find some answers to this major question (quoted in Gettleman ,2006:2).The speech of spokesman implies that there was imminent threat which could emanated from UIC.

4.2. Self- Defence

4.2.1 The Norm of Self-Defence

The norm of self-defence can be defined in its simplest way as the right of a sovereign nation to defend itself from internal and external aggression. Self-defense in its appropriate meaning is the right of all nations and none of them are expected to be bound by UNSC to have self-defense if they faced clear and present danger. State can exercise self defence if she is invaded by other. It is not needed for a state to wait until she got UN approval (Hunter,2009).Many nations have cited Article 51 as a basis for their primary right to undertake unilateral military actions by justifying their action as self-defense[14], with or without UN approval. This has, in some cases, worked out well for the acting state resulting in little or no argument in the UN, yet in some cases, as with the Israeli attack on Iraq, resulted in international condemnation. There is no absolute consensus even the concept of self-defense (ibid).

After Ethiopia became involved in Somalia, it was stated by a representative of the Ethiopian government that the position of the State in using military force was based on the right of self-defence and the need to safeguard national sovereignty, peace and stability. This position was thereafter confirmed as also being based on that of invitation by the host, with the Ethiopian

[14]Self-defense is sometimes a controversial idea .Israel repeatedly used such concept to justify its interference in different Arab States. For example its attack in Iraq.

Prime Minister specifically stating that Ethiopia did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted government of Somalia, internationally recognized government of Somalia to assist them in averting the threat of terrorism. The position, as confirmed by the United Nations Secretary-General, regarded the initial Ethiopian involvement as self-defensive measures against the UIC and terrorists in neighboring Somalia (Warbrick and Zeray, 2007).

In its self defence the Ethiopian government also took the regional actors which competed each other in Somalia for their interest as a danger. Especially the deeds of Eritrea and Egypt was the notable one and each acts will be dealt in the next at this chapter. Consistent with a deeply ingrained pattern of giving support to the enemy of one's enemy, Eritrea has provided arms to a wide range of anti-Ethiopian forces in Somalia, hoping to tie Ethiopian forces down in the Ogaden. According to a 2006 UN report, 2000 Eritreans troops to be in Somalia supporting their respective ally i.e. UIC (Lyons, 2007).

The special representatives of the secretary general reported that the Prime Minster of Ethiopia claimed the unequivocal and public support of Africa union .He said that only one state in the security council had challenged the self defence measure of Ethiopia .Therefore, the UN security council did not put into question the measure we took self defence .Similarly various governments in different parts of the world have supported our right of self defence and have refrained from putting out any kind of declaration which might have put into question our inherent right of self defence (Gray, 2008).

4.2.2 .Self Defense and Article 51 of UN

The right of self defence always starts from with article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The article states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Member states are expected to report to Security Council after they take measures in the time of self defence (UN charter, 1945, pp,10-11).

The *inherent right* to self-defense does not involve the Security Council in any other way than the need to report. The Security Council's approval is not needed, although in almost any case it might be preferable. In addition, the Security Council's silence *is* an endorsement or at least an approval in relation to latter half of article 51 which says that self defence shall not in any way

affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security. Meaning that *if* the Security Council disapproves of the actions, which the State has or is about to take, it must address the issue and under Chapter VII *veto* the exercise of self defence because it is or would be a threat to international peace and security. UIC has a supporter of terrorists and it would be difficult for Ethiopia. So, Ethiopia has an inherent right to defend itself .US for instance states that there was a link between UIC and Al-Qaeda.[15]

4.3. The Components of Self Defense

4.3.1 Necessity and Proportionality

The concepts of necessity, imminence, and proportionality play a central part in regulating a state's use of force against an imminent or actual attack by non-state actors. While all three are requirements that must be considered in the law of self-defense, their exact content remains somewhat unclear (Akande and Liefla¨nder, 2013).

Any use of force in self-defense must be abide by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Necessity limits the use of military force to the attainment of legitimate military objectives. Proportionality can be seen in two ways. Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict-the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. In the former, it refers to a belligerent's reaction to a grievance and, in the case jus in bello, there should be the balance between the achievement of a military goal and the cost in terms of lives. The attack must be abandoned if the loss of innocent life or destruction of materials is out of proportion to the importance of the objective (Gardam, 1993).

Any state that seeks to invoke the right of self-defense should be required to come up with concrete evidence that it has suffered an attack to convince the international community. She is expected to reveal that the entity against which the right of self-defense is exercised was the source of the attack, the threat of attack is continuing, and that the use of force is necessary to protect the state from further injury because of this threat. Necessary in the modern law self defence , refers that the action must be by the way of the last resort after all peaceful means have not been successful (Gardam,2004) . Superficially, such a showing seems to be made easily. Sometimes it may be more difficult, as in the case of terrorist attacks (Charney, 2001). In

[15]CNN, *Pentagon official: U.S. attacks al Qaeda suspects in Somalia* (9 January 2007) http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/01/08/somalia.strike/

case of Ethiopia its act of self defence was not with government rather with extremist groups i.e. UIC. It is difficult to measure the proportionality since it has aim of changing of their extremist agenda.

The proportionality test is also heavily debated. Without having a deep analysis on proportionality, it can be interpreted that the reaction must not exceed its objectives, namely to stop military actions and prevent future incidents. The proportionality and necessity tests also assists the state to differentiate lawful self defence and revenge. Proportionality arises a question in self defence if it is with terrorists .What is necessary and proportionate when dealing with terrorist groups? It is most difficult to evaluate it in terrorist group's act in a different way than regular or irregular armed forces as their purpose is not only to win but also to spread terror and fear. It is therefore hard or even impossible to predict the outcome of certain measures. It is not even clear what responses work in dealing with extremists. As it has been stated, Ethiopia was arguing that its response was mainly to the former leader of AIAI and its aim is to eradicate these radicalist groups who have been living with in urban centers mostly.

Ethiopia took UIC as terrorists that are the remnants of AIAI which attacked Ethiopia in 1990s.So its aim was to avert the situation and could not see the casualties with that war and proportionality is not clearly known according to the interview which had been conducted before with Fisseha Shawul. He explained that Ethiopia tried to take appropriate measure which was not deviated from its objective and ended it with in six days. The intervention has no intention of revenge except preventing the future attack. The intervention was not beyond the changing of the assumption of Empty dream of creating Greater Somalia and wrong assumption of weakening Ethiopia by different regional states. For example, Egypt had tried to weaken Ethiopia to use the river of Abay freely without any claim by upper riparian states. So, it was striving to achieve its objective through interference in Somalia in turn to destabilize Ethiopia. Her activity of weakening Ethiopia had been started in ancient times .Especially, it reached at intense level during the reign of Anwar Saddat[16].

[16] Sadat was the most famous leader in Egypt. He had an intention not to share a single litre of water for upper riparian states. It was depicted in his speech. He said one thing which pushed Egypt to war is water.

4.3.2 .Imminent of Threat

There is a general agreement among states that the threat should be imminent to have self defence. But Bush administration is blaming concerning on immanency of threat. The Bush Administration was arguing that modern warfare and recent innovations in military technology, which may also be employed by non-state actors engaged in terrorist activities, changed the whole calculus of self defence. Warfare is now much more devastating and can occur with less warning, which gives considerable advantage over an opponent if allowed to strike first. It would thus be unreasonable and unrealistic to employ the orthodox principles governing the right to self-defence, namely to await the occurrence or the threat of an imminent armed attack to use defensive force. Nations threatened by such weapons may not have the time to appeal to the United Nations and may be compelled to use pre-emptive force to prevent an opponent from gaining an overwhelming military advantage (Bakircioglu, 2009).

The apologists of the Bush Doctrine attempt to discard the imminence rule by indicating that modem technology is capable of causing unparalleled damage and loss of human life. In other words, it is argued that modern weaponry (including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) poses an unprecedented threat to the world security. Such weapons are portable, relatively easy to make, cheap to produce, and therefore are perfect weapons for rogue states and terrorists. Consequently, if necessity can be demonstrated before the attack, then a nation should not be required to wait to be attacked before it can defend itself, especially if the first blow is potentially devastating (ibid).

As it is observed, the issue of imminence by itself is not clear and unanimously agreed .The advancement of technology had also created threat for the state because terrorists may create unprecedented threat for a state. This situation in turn makes US and other states to be susceptible over any terrorist or Rogue state. Concerning on the imminence of threat posed by UIC. Primer Melese tried to show it in his explanation.

> *You have the jihadists led by Al-Ithaad Islami, which I am sure you know, is registered by the United Nations as a terrorist organization. And so, for us, the Islamic Courts Union is not a homogeneous entity. Our complain is with Al-Ithaad, the internationally recognized terrorist organization. It so happens that at the moment the new leadership of the Union of the Courts is dominated by this particular group. Indeed, the chairman of the new council that they have established is a certain*

colonel who also happens to be the head of Al-Ithaad known by targeting several attacks against Ethiopia. Now, the threat posed to Ethiopia by the dominance of the Islamic Courts, by Al-Ithaad, is obvious (Sudan tribune,2007).

Commenting on some opposition parties' fear that Ethiopia might be criticized by the international community for the military action, Meles said that the government of Ethiopia could not refrain from defending itself while waiting for the approval of others who were not facing the brunt of the UIC. "Not all countries will support us, since countries respond to their own interests. After all, the UIC had not declared Jihad against the UN, but against Ethiopia" (Horn Affairs, 2011). But at the same time, Meles was pledging to seek international support for Ethiopia's actions, as reported by Sudan Tribune (2007). In any case, he echoed that the government would have to pay the price to defend the country. He criticized the stand of opposition political parties against the decision. Meles described the stand of some of the opposition parties as "imprudent and a historic mistake" (Sudan Tribune, 2006). Even though there was difficulty in taking the issue of imminence objectively by all states, Ethiopia was attacked by those extremists groups in 1990's .She was propagating that there was clear and actual threat which was posed by AIAI before it shifted itself to UIC. And she said that what is my guarantee not to be affected by UIC? Ethiopia was in threat since they raised the irredentist claim and "Jihad."

4.4. The relationship of Ethiopia and Somalia

4.4.1 Ogaden : The Contending place between Ethiopia and Somalia

Ogaden has been a site of contention for a long period of time. Firstly Christian Abyssinia state and Muslim emirs. Then there was also a contention between European Colonial state and lastly between Ethiopia and the Somali nation. The contention is not quit now even though it is hidden (Cooper, 2015).

Ethiopia had stated on the document of foreign affairs and national security strategy policy that "its relations with other states is based on the protection of national interests and security, and as such, is linked to democratization and development goals. The government sees the relations with the Horn from the vantage point of how the relations can foster democracy and development in the state. As a result, it tried to draft the policy on the basis of a sober analysis of

the value and role of these countries vis- a- vis its own interests" (Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, 2002:1).

Independent states have relationships with others in search of certain benefit. In the words of Chandra (1979:5), "three important things relevant to international politics are national interest, conflict and power." For him, national interest is the objective, conflict is the condition and power is the means. Deutsch also pointed out the inter-dependences of any two states what so ever quarrel they are facing, the cooperation of another is needed in one form or another. He further went on his argument that "the government of neither state can get everything it wants without some cooperation whether voluntary or involuntary on the part of the other." This means that, one state cannot go against the interest of another unless the other allows the negative consequences. In such case, the leader of the two states will strive to win from the situation by whatever means which is less costly and better (Deutsch, 1978:165). States have various forms of interactions with each other's. These interactions include diplomacy, war, trade relations, alliances, cultural exchange, and participation in international organizations and in those cross-cutting issue areas. Politicians in one state may behave in a cooperative or conflictual manner, extending either friendly or hostile behavior toward the other nation (Goldstein, 1992).When we see the relationship of Somalia and Ethiopia, it is full of suspicion and fear. And subversion activity is common on both States. Both of them did not trust each other in history for many years. The issue of the Somali-inhabited area in Ethiopia has dominated the history of Ethio-Somali relations.

4.4.1 .1 Somalia's Position towards Ogaden

Ethiopia and Somalia have two different extreme position over the land of Ogaden. For the Somali Republic, the dispute with Ethiopia has nothing to do with problems associated with border demarcation. Rather, it is a question of respecting the rights of the people of the Ogaden to self-determination, and recovering of land, which Mogadisho claims, that it "lost" because of the 19th century treaties that Ethiopia made plots and signed with the various European colonial powers. The Somalis see it beyond border and they argued that the root cause of the conflict was Ethiopian colonization, and the solution to the problem is allowing the people of the Ogaden to exercise their right to self-determination (Mesfin ,1977)

Addressing the Addis Ababa Heads of State Summit of 1963, which created the Organization of African Unity, President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia said:

> *Ethiopia has taken possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants. The Somali government has no claims for territorial aggrandizement, but is asking for the application of the principle of self-determination in exercising his right of reply, Prime Minister Aklilou Habte Wolde of Ethiopia argued that, the statement made by the Somali leader was an outrageous and an unthinkable accusation, without any factual basis. The historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. That is a fact. There is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation. I regret to say it, but that too is a fact. An international treaty regulates the frontiers between the two countries. If the Somali Republic does not recognize the treaty, then it will not even exist. If he is not seeking territorial aggrandizement, then, what is he seeking? On what does he base the claim? On linguistic reason or on religious grounds? (Daniel,2003: 67-68).*

From those two quotes we can understand that there is extreme position on both sides. Ethiopia suggested that it is difficult to consider Somalia as a State before 1960 because there was no settled population in the land of Somalia and it is one of element that did not exist in Somalia prior to 1960's (Cooper, 2015).

Somalia contends that self-determination is allowed on both article 103 of UN and AU charter. So, it said that the people of Ogaden should be beneficial from the right. Charter on self-determination prevails over rights which Ethiopia claims under treaties that it signed with the various European colonial powers. It also accuses Ethiopia by consider it as colonialist state which oppressed the people of Ogaden. Somalian were propagating that the people of Ogaden should be beneficial from all relevant resolutions on de-colonization in order to be able to exercise their rights to self-determination. Somalia contends that it was never a party to these treaties, and as such, it should not be expected to accept them; That such resolutions adopted by the OAU and the Non-Aligned countries refer to new disputes, and not to those which already exist (Daniel, 2007).

Loisel (2004: 4) characterized the African borders as follows: "Borders in Africa would be arbitrary and artificial, delineated by exogenous colonial powers with little knowledge of the local communities, dividing pre-existing and homogeneous ethnic groups and thereby stirring frustrations and conflicts." It appears the UIC, like the preceding Somali governments, is oblivious of the fact that, according to the OAU (now AU), colonial borders in Africa are not to

be tampered with. In their wisdom African Heads of State and Government agreed to keep the sanctity of colonial borders by fearing the likely wave of border controversies and general instability that might have followed any cases of border rearrangement on the continent. Leaders wanted to adopt a conservative attitude towards colonial boundaries. Any rearrangement would pose constituteda precedent, which can allow many others to demand the same. It should be noted here that there is practically no border in Africa free of serious implications for potential confrontation and violent conflicts (Zoppi, 2015:16). There is no way that the UIC will be given a chance to create precedence in breaking this taboo. The only option open to neighboring countries in Africa is to accept the OAU policy and enjoy peaceful coexistence.

4.4.1.2 Ethiopian Position towards Ogaden

The Ethiopians have challenged Somalia's position by contending that, to begin with, a state has to have defined boundaries. Since there was no state in history called Somalia before 1960, they could not have taken land from a non-existent entity. Ethiopia has also referred to Article 62 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which are not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, if the Treaty establishes a boundary. Addis Ababa has also referred to the International Law Commission's Report that was approved by the U.N. General Assembly, which maintains, "that the clean state principle does not in any event relieve a newly independent state of the obligation to respect a boundary settlement and certain other situations of a territorial character established by Treaty" (Daniel, 2007).

For Ethiopia, therefore, the right of self-determination cannot have preponderance over the principle of sovereignty. Ethiopia argued that Ethiopian Somalis, who live in the Ogaden Province, are exercising their rights enjoy the right to govern themselves, to establish their own regional constitution, to elect their own representatives to regional and federal assemblies etc. And in this way they exercised the right to self-determination. But the meanings of self-determination is different for the Somalian leaders. The Somalian leaders have decided that the Somalia speaking people in the neighboring countries must have self-determination which is in contrary to OAU and UN charters (ibid).

4.5. The War between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Land of Ogaden

The cause of every war is varied form one another. There are various types of war on the basis of their causes. Such as war of devolution, war of regime change, war of secessionist, war of irredentism etc. The war which took place between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and 1977/78 was war of irredentism (Zeleza,2008:7).

Irredentist wars are generated when a group in one country wants to be united the one who have ethnic or historical affiliation seeks to be united or reunited with the country to which it is ethnically or historically related. The Somalis irredentism known in the Horn of Africa (Carment 2006; Mburu ,2005;Laitin and Samatar 1987; Schraeder 2006). The Somali government often supported Somali rebels in the neighboring countries, thereby turning irredentist claims and conflicts into inter-state wars, as was the case during the Somali-Ethiopian wars over the Somali-populated Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1964-67 and 1977-78 (Dougherty 1982; Gorman 1981; Selassie, 1980).

Among the region's major wars are the three fought between Ethiopia and Somalia. The first, over Somalia's claims to the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia, started in 1961, escalated in 1964 [17]and lingered until 1967 as low intensity conflict. The second Ethiopia-Somalia war, again fought over the Ogaden problem, took place between 1977 and 1978 and involved direct external intervention, including troops and technical advisors from Cuba and the USSR in support of Ethiopia. Defeat in that war largely precipitated the collapse of the Somali state in 1991.The third war between the two countries occurred between 2006 and 2009. After a decade and half of statelessness, Somalia appeared to have re-established the state under the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which brought most of Somalia under its control in June 2006. Ethiopia, however, viewed the ICU's Islamist rhetoric and stated aspirations of uniting all Somalis under one state as a threat to its stability and territorial integrity (kidane, 2011:11).The third war is special because the war was not between internationally recognized government of Somalia and Ethiopia rather it was with extremist groups of UIC.

By mid-July Ethiopia declared publically that Somalia was waging a full scale war against it. The Somali invasion violated Article 3 of the charter of the organization of African unity (OAU)

[17] The cause of the war was irredentism which claim the Land of Ogaden for Somalia. The war had cost a lot in both states.

which prevents the use of force to settle the border dispute and the 1964 Cairo resolution of OAU which sanctifies the frontier established during the colonial era .In the Ogaden war the superpowers were more concerned with their relationships and their interest to be hegemonic power at global level than with the issue at the stake. The US was primarily concerned the need to challenge the soviet presence in the region and paid little attention to the implication of Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia. (Samuel, 1987:11).

The idea of Pan-Somalism, creating a Greater Somalia, had highly affected the peace and stability of the region and its causalities was great both interms of man and materials in 1970's. The war led to huge outflows of Ethiopian Somalis into Somalia. Around 800,000 Ethiopian Somalis, including the Garri, fled into the neighboring Somalia and lived for the next decade and a half in refugee camps (Hagmann, 2006:27).Those Ethiopian Somali who fled to Somalia carried on a guerrilla campaign against the Derg[18] and instability continued in the region i.e. on the corner of Ogaden land.

The five decade old Ogaden conflict along with the Eritrean question has been a perennial concern to Ethiopia. Controlling of the region of Somalia has been a national security priority for successive governments in Addis Ababa. Leaders in Addis Ababa are always ready contain Somali irredentist designs to incorporate Somali Galbeed (Western Somalia) into Somali Weyn (Greater Somalia)[19]; As far as Ethiopia is concerned, the idea of greater Somalia meant losing a large portion of its territory (Tebebe, 1991:5).

Two major wars between the two states over the Somali-inhabited area occurred in 1964 and 1977, with Ethiopia managing to retain its control of the area after both incidents. Although the claim over the Somali-inhabited area of Ethiopia declined over the years partly due to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, anarchic Somalia poses new forms of threats to Ethiopia. In the absence of a central government controlling the entirety of the Somali territory, Islamist extremist groups have got golden opportunity to use Somalia as a safe haven and a launching pad to carry out terrorist attacks in Ethiopia and the region at large.[20]In addition of the threat of terrorist attacks, Ethiopia feels that those emerging Islamist extremist movements and

[18].Interview with Fisseha Shawul. He is the directorate of the affairs of Somalia in the ministry of Foreign affairs. He had 18 years old Experience in dealing with the issue of Somalia .In addition he was leading Ethiopia's 2006 military intervention in Somalia. He attended the Cairo 1997 peace process by taking 29 war lords of Somalia to Egypt.

[19] This idea has disturbed Somalia for a long period of time .It has its own contribution for the fell of Ziad Barre. In addition it is long lasting question of Somalia since antiquity.

[20] Interview with Fisseha Shawul on October 2015.

governments in neighboring states, would have an impact in increasing of religious militancy within Ethiopia (Erlich, 2010).

4.6. The Role of Regional actors and other States

In order to have broad understanding about the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia, it is still necessary to deepen and broaden the approach beyond the military, and particularly to understand how it relates to the Ethiopian socio-political context. The intervention of Ethiopia should be seen in different directions .Furthermore, given the multiple actors involved and the complexity of the scenario, it is necessary to enlarge the understanding from the spatial point of view and broaden the temporal framework to highlight how different political agendas intertwined (Tronvoll, 2009). As it has been mentioned, there were different actors which played their own role for the accomplishment of their interest in the land of Somalia and the region.

Somalia has constantly been buffeted by external forces, and has itself been considered as a continuing source of instability for its neighbours. Somalia has raised the question of irredentism by inherited it from its colonizer, thus making it a major contagion for regional instability. Since the collapse of the state, regional competition has intersected with clan competition to ensure that no reconciliation process is successful .As it is mentioned, the situation was complex. Many countries, such as Eritrea, Iran, Syria and Egypt, and other groups like the Hezbollah militia, foreign fighters from around the world and Ethiopian rebels, supported by some rich individuals from Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, have helped the UIC. Ethiopia, Yemen and Uganda have assisted the internationally endorsed Government. The aid has ranged from arms, ammunition and financial provision to sending commanders, troops and fighters to the territory of Somalia (Allo, 2010).

4.6.1. Egypt

Egypt has been connected with the Horn of Africa from time immemorial. Mostly its policy in the region is characterized on one hand by Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism, and on the other by its concern about a safe and adequate water flow from the Nile. In Ethiopia there is a conviction that Cairo seeks “to prevent Ethiopia from accessing support for the purpose of obtaining the necessary financial support for hydro-electric projects, even where these projects would pose no

harm whatsoever to Egypt". Ethiopians believe that Egypt's involvement in the conflicts in the Horn, practically on the side of Eritrea and its anti-TFG allies in Somalia, is tied to the Nile issue. But Egypt's internal uncertainties impede its policy to be effective in the Horn currently (Shubin,2011).Somalia was supported by Egypt and Sudan in its claims on Ethiopian territory. Sudan, backed especially by Egypt, stood against its neighbors, Libya and Ethiopia. Therefore, it would not retreat from assisting UIC in its claim of western Somalia if it got a chance to be successful in capturing of power in Somalia. It had long years experiences in assisting of Somalia in the reign of Ziad Barre.

Egypt is always alert in the river of Nile. It seriously follows things which can disturb and threaten the regular flow of the river and the prior activity of any Egyptian government is to guarantee that this water is not threatened. This means ensuring that no hostile power can control the headwaters of the Nile or interfere with its flow into Egypt (Heikal, 1978:715). Accordingly, Egypt repeatedly made it crystal clear that it would resort to military action to preserve its portion of the Nile (the 1959 Egyptian- Sudanese Agreement allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of the river to Egypt). Egyptian had an aim of preventing upper riparian states over the use of Nile river .The policy aimed at preventing upstream states, especially Ethiopia which contributes more than Eighty five percent (85%) of the Nile's water, from claiming their share of the river's total water.

Egypt entertained the larger and long-established ambition of projecting its power into the Red Sea and turning it into an "Arab Lake" because it has a great capacity both politically and militarily (Halliday, 1982; Abir, 1974). Ethiopia was exposed to this power projection, which included support to Eritrean insurgent groups, military logistical support to Somalia during the Ogaden War, and more engaged support to Sudan as previously mentioned. It was also supporting UIC in achieving of its objective (Marchal 2013).

Egypt has maintained an interest in the Somali coast dating back several centuries. She has been a supporter of Somali unity and a strong Somali state that can serve as a counterweight to Ethiopia recently .Around Eighty-six percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam in Egypt emanates from Ethiopia. The Nile River is Egypt's lifeline, and the leadership in Cairo wants to maintain maximum leverage over Ethiopia. A unified Somalia that might one day raises its claims to Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia and has close links to Egypt would give an opportunity for Egypt to add this leverage. Consequently, Egypt supports the Arta process,

opposes an independent Somaliland, and is one of the five countries to extend recognition to the TNG (*Shinn*, 2009).

Egypt's relationship and in interest in Somalia can only be understood vis-à-vis its relationship with Ethiopia. As Jhazbhay states "Egypt has a long historical interest in Somalia and has in the past used Somalia as a pawn to distract Ethiopia" (2007: 246). Egypt's main concern is the Nile River which constitutes the lifeline of the country (Shinn 2002). Moreover Egypt's enthusiastic support for the interim rulers in Mogadishu has "been matched by its hostility towards Somaliland" (Geldenhuys 2009: 142).

Finally, the importance of Ethiopia's geo-political calculus vis-à-vis Egypt and the Arab League needs to be understood in its full context. As Jhazbhay notes

> *The diverse Somali protagonists, Somaliland included, are essentially proxies in what has been a long and protracted geo-political power-struggle between the Nile Basin powers of 'downstream' Egypt – dependent as it is on the Nile in terms of its security interests and its Arab League allies, and 'upstream' Ethiopia. The latter's land-locked status and sense of encirclement by Arab-Islamic forces drives its vested interests in the outcome of the Somali question. Hence Ethiopia's vested interest in a federalist resolution of conflict throughout the Somali region, as a safeguard against any future resurgence of Somali irredentism and Egypt's vested interest in a Somali unitary state throughout the entire expanse of the Somali coast, including Somaliland, as a bulwark against Ethiopia and any possibility that Addis Ababa might disrupt Egypt's access to Nile waters (2007: 259-260).*

Given the depth of historic strategic rivalry with Egypt, and potentially with a militant state in the Gulf, the range of immediate threats from neighbors, and the number of potential flashpoints, it is necessary for Ethiopia to design a security policy and defense posture that includes powerful army. From the above, it is evident that Ethiopia has regularly used military force in order to remove threats, to back up its political efforts and to demonstrate its power. The current EPRDF government is no exception to the pattern established by its Imperial and Communist predecessors. Somalis should be reassured that Ethiopia does not possess territorial ambitions on Somalia, and that its strategy is based upon establishing stability. Whether or not this goal can be achieved is another question, to which we must now turn. In time of interview, Fisseha explained that Ethiopia is always stand in a right position to defend its interest. Some people

blamed unknowingly the case which has been run by different States. So, we Ethiopians have to strive to protect our integrity in which other States were competing to snatch our independence. At the time of interview he said,

> *Egypt had prepared a conference which was known as Cairo peace process in 1997.In that peace process, it wanted to create its own supporter government .It gave even money for the war lords to destabilize the agreement of Sodere process which was held in Ethiopia. It highly favors Hussien Aideed who was in the side of Egypt. At the same time she was blaming Ethiopia by saying Ethiopia disturbed the peace process. In fact, it did not prepare the peace process from the bottom of her heart (Interview, 2015).*

4.6.2. Eritrea

Eritrea was part of Ethiopia as one administrative regions during the reign of Emperor Hailesellassie and dergue regime. It was part of Ethiopia until 1993.After five years stayed time of independence, two states entered into bloodiest war of 1998-2000. Since the end of the war the government of two states started to blame each other in any security related things. It maintained that Eritrea trains, arms, and hosts Ethiopian opposition armed groups, such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), with the manifest desire to destabilize the stability of the Ethiopian state (interview, 2015). To that effect, it was indirectly using, at the relevant time, the UIC controlled territories of Somalia as a launching pad and alludes to the United Nations Report to corroborate its allegations. Another terrorist group called ONLF, had been committing terrorist attacks against civilians and foreign citizens and aid organizations working in the area, repeatedly (ibid)[21].

The structure of this organization constituted a chair person, two vices, and nine specialized committees. The nine committees are: Diaspora affairs, finance department, information department, internal affairs, organizational affairs, legal affairs, foreign secretary, community desk, and military affairs. According to the former leader of this group, the main financial sources of this group were: remittances of the Somali Diaspora, some Arab countries, and later on the Eritrean Government (Salehadin, 2010). According to him, especially, Eritrean Government was assisting ONLF in different ways such as arms supplies, giving various

[21] Ibid

training to the armed members of the ONLF, providing an office in Eritrea and giving different moral and material supports, and preparing operational plans. More specifically, the Ethiopian government contended that Eritrea was preparing for another round of armed confrontation as the UIC foreign "jihadists", and other forces displayed their unflinching desire to attack Ethiopia. Ethiopia contends the existence of ever mounting threat by pointing to the repeated declaration of "*jihad"*by the UIC and the increasing offensive capability of this force with the material and military support from such countries as Iran, Egypt, Saudi- Arabia and others (Allo,2010).

Ethiopia's contention that the UIC is acting as a proxy for Eritrea and that it is providing a safe heaven to the Ethiopian rebel forces operating within Eritrea and Somalia is supported by the findings of the UN Monitoring Group. Accordingly, the official view holds that the only feasible recourse available is to take a self-defensive measure against the forces that host and infiltrate what Ethiopia deems as anti-peace elements into its territory and the stationing of foreign jihadists on its border.


4.6.3. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia was also in the side of UIC. As being the ally of Egypt and member of Arab league it was assisting UIC tacitly. It tried to give diplomatic assistance for UIC (Marchal, 2013). While the interview period Fisseha stated that 26 countries of citizens has been captured while they were fighting in the war with the side of UIC. And he said we brought them to Addis Ababa to reveal for their embassies. They were from different parts of the world .For instance from England, South Africa, Japan, Canada etc. Generally, he explained that Somalia mostly raises the irredentist question of Ogaden with its part. As a result, she always accuses Ethiopia by treating it as being aggressive state which snatched the land of Ogaden from Great Somalia by the assistance of former colonizer. He added also if the question of Somalia is reasonable, Sudan have also a right to ask the land of Gambella which is illogical. The question of Somalia is impossible in the time of 20st century as I mentioned before.

By promoting religious extremism or providing the territory for religious extremists, our neighbors could sorely test our young democracy which is based on the separation of state and religion and religious tolerance. Believing that we are vulnerable, they could seek to gain undue benefit from our country, or to disturb our peace directly or indirectly by falling under the influence of other forces (Interview, 2015). Berouk added that Ethiopia have legitimate security

interest in the region .As a state one can secure the surrounding which it lead. The state have to use its effort in times when external threat is coming to country. Unless it protect its national integrity, what is the role of the government (Interview, 2015).

Figure 3.Alignments and Antagonisms of organizations and states in Somalia from 2006-2008



Sources: Different texts that have been used for explanation of the role other actors.
(Compiled and developed by Author December, 2015).

The diagram shows that how different actors were competing each other in the side of both UIC and TFG. The biggest arrow shows how Ethiopia and Somalia were in great competition to assist their respective allies on the land of Somalia.

4.7 .Unsuccessful Strategies and Options of Managing Insecurity in Somalia

4.7.1. International Intervention

Even though there were many intervention by international communities for creation of peace in Somalia, they could not bring visible and useful change for Somalia .The first was by UN. UN operation in Somalia(UNOSOM I).Its aim was to oversee cease fire agreement , provide security for UN Personnel, and deliver humanitarian assistance but it failed to achieve the desired objective. It was authorized by Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992 (Ted, 2009). As a result, the UN Security Council authorized a US-led unified Task Force (UNITAF).[22] The idea was to provide security along the lines of the UNOSOM I. Eventually, UNITAF's mandate was expanded under UNOSOM II in May 1993 to include establishing transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions, according to Security Council Resolution 814. It was not again successful and left in March 1995 without having accomplished their mission.

4.7.2. Peace Talks

Since the Somali state collapsed, there have been around fourteen conflict resolution efforts organized by different states, as well as regional and international organizations. Some of the major conferences supported by the regional states and the international community include: the Djibouti Conference in 1991; the Addis Ababa Conference in 1993; the Cairo Conference in 1997; the Arta Conference in 2000; the Eldorate Process in 2002, which gave birth to the first Transitional Federal Government(TFG) in 2004; and the recently held Djibouti Peace Process in 2008, which led to the establishment of the second Transitional Federal Government (TFG II) by combining the TFG I with ARS-D (Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia-Djibouti) (Dagne ,2009). The last fourteen resolution efforts failed to establish a functioning government in Somalia and the results of the most recent one remain to be seen. A confluence of factors contributed to unsuccessful peace talks. A deep rooted sense of loyalty to clans, which has worsened over the years by the protracted conflict in Somalia, and the presence of groups that have benefited from the protracted conflict undermined the success of peace processes (IGAD, 2003: 11). External intervention in terms of sponsoring competing or parallel peace conferences,

[22]Ibid

and providing military and financial support to various warring groups aggravated hostilities (ICJ, 2004).

Ethiopia hosted the Sodere peace process in 1996. It was given recognition by the IGAD heads of states and governments. Many political actors including twenty-seven faction leaders—participated, although a few boycotted the peace talks. The participants of the peace process established a National Salvation Council "as part of a preparatory course of action leading to the establishment of a Provisional Central Government of Somalia" (UNSC, 1997). Before the Sodere agreement could be implemented, however, the Egyptian government convened another meeting of the same Somali faction leaders and those who boycotted the peace process. The Cairo process (1997) also collapsed when several Somali allies of Ethiopia withdrew and convened another peace process in Bossaso, Somalia in 1998 (Dagne, 2009). Even though there were many attempts to create secured and capable government in Somalia, all were not fruit full in achievement of their objectives .All options did not bring observe able change which is not relevant for Somalia as well as for Horn of Africa

Fisseha Shawul stated the attempt of Ethiopian government before its interference in the following ways .According to him,

> *Even though there were a number of unsuccessful attempts, states have diverted the direction of the peace process for their interest. The typical example was 1996 Sodere process .In the process, there were around 29 war lords groups and almost all were on way to be agreed. Unfortunately, Egypt had called one of the opposer of the peace process Hussien Aideed and it conspired that Ethiopia is attempting to create its own idea supporter government on the land of Somalia. In contrary to Sodere government, it had called another peace process in Cairo which is known as Cairo peace process. In that process it was doing against the process of Sodere. And it was giving Money for the leader of war lords not to accept the Sodere peace process .So, such unfruitful reconciliation process had invited Ethiopia to think another peace process. In 2002 Prime Minister Melese had prepared Somali National Reconciliation process. EU had also assisted the peace process with 60 million Euro. It was all inclusive and without out any precondition. Around 3000 delegates participated on the conference and some members from Somaliland even though their government was reluctant to attend the peace process. In 2004, TGF*

has been established and Abdulhai Yusuf had been assigned as President. (Interview,2015)

After such process UIC strengthened itself and started preaching the people that TFG is representative of Ethiopia. And the court called it the messenger of infidels. They started propagating of the people to get acceptance .They were saying that we will pray or we will have "solate" on Anuar Mosque after 3 days .In order to reverse the situation Ethiopian government entered in Somalia at the end and as a last option(ibid).

Fisseha Shawul stated the attempt of Ethiopian government before its interference in the following ways .According to him it was last option to protect their integrity. Even though there were a number of unsuccessful attempts, states have diverted the direction the peace process for their interest. The typical example was 1996 Sodere process .In the process there were around 29 war lords groups and almost all were on way to be agreed. Unfortunately Egypt had called one of the opposer of the peace process Hussien Aideed and it conspired that Ethiopia is attempting to create its own idea supporter government on the land of Somalia (Interview,2015)

CHAPTER FIVE: CONSEQUENCES OF ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

5.1. Introduction

Any kinds of intervention comes with risks, costs, and potential benefits to the political leadership in the intervening country. The tangible costs are human and material resources expanded in the pursuit of the foreign policy goals (Regan, 2002).There is still controversy upon the result like its initial time of interference in the case of Ethiopian intervention. Some observe that Ethiopia had allowed for the strengthening of Alshabab and others view it as Ethiopia diverted serious threats which were posed by UIC. Actually, difference is always there in perceiving of things especially in the interpretation of subjective issues which can be seen in various ways by different observers. In this chapter the intervention of Ethiopia will be seen at regional and international level. Some of the results have been discussed below.

5.2. Regional Outcome

5.2.1 Weakening of UIC and Aborting of creating Greater Somalia

The remnants of the UIC had been fractured into three major groups by early 2007; the moderates, the extremists in exile and those who remained in Somalia to fight the insurgency. The moderates entered into peace negotiations and eventually joined the TFG after the signing of the Djibouti agreement in August 2008, with Sheikh Ahmed actually becoming President in early 2009 (Menkhaus , 2009; Shinn 2011). The exiled radicals regrouped themselves in Eritrea and launched the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) with other aspects of Somali society opposed to the Ethiopian intervention (Harnisch, 2010). The ARS again groups and many of them entered into peace process in the side of moderates (Ted, 2010; Le Sage, 2010).So, they have been fractured into many groups and the stand of the groups have been disintegrated.

Even though there is no unanimously consensus upon the results of the intervention, it had brought fundamental result in weakening of UIC which was regional threat in the Horn of Africa. If there was a possibility to get power for it, there would be instability and chaos in the region. As I mentioned before, UIC have their own clearly stipulated agenda and they would not retreat back in implementing it. But it could be too much destructive for Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's response by military means in Somalia, for the moment, appears to have achieved the goals in Mogadishu such as: removing Eritrean influence in the region for some time; preventing the ONLF and OLF from establishing a base in Somalia; and removing the UIC that provided anti-Ethiopian separatists with a platform. The problem is a legacy it left that some extremists in Somalia further escalated transnational terrorist threats to Ethiopia. But the intervention might not be long lasting solution unless the people of Somalia get strong government which lead the people with their interest.

The Intervention of Ethiopia to the side of TFG in 2006 had changed the balance of power in the Somali conflict. Its intervention had led to the overthrow of the legitimacy of the UIC and checked its influential position. However, according to some scholars, its intervention had inflamed Somali nationalism and intensified religious extremism and radicalism (ICG, 2005). This political outcome offered a nice opportunities for regional and extra-regional actor's intervention in the civil war. It enabled them to facilitate the situation for peacemaking efforts since the power of UIC had been weakened. The role played by IGAD and AU was the best instance in this regard

Mr. Fisseha stated that Ethiopia achieved its aim properly. He said,

> *Many States of Europe and America warned us not to attempt the intervention. They said you have to learn from America intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq and still America is not fruitful .They highly opposed that by saying Ethiopia is entering into great trouble which could not be escaped latter. We achieved our goal in contrary to this catastrophic expression and we got great thanks from Djibouti, Kenya and even from America. In addition, there was an attempt of killing in some places such as Jemma by extremists in Ethiopia. This could have a possibility of creating instability in Ethiopia with additional effort of UIC. So who will be guarantee unless we find solution by ourselves? (Interview,2015*)

The war was merely between UIC on the onside and Ethiopian forces and TGF on the other side. It implies that the Somali people were welcomed with the coming of Ethiopia force .So, treating of Ethiopian force as aggressive is unacceptable as explained in the above interview. Ethiopian government had reduced such security threat now even though threats are not totally eliminated. She can at least aborted the ill conception of UIC i. e creating of Greater Somalia which is not realty rather myth.

5.2.2 .Deployment Of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The government of Ethiopia was blamed for its stayed time of three years in Somalia. The Ethiopian government strongly pushed for the deployment of the AU peacekeeping force in order to be able to withdraw its own troops from Somalia. The US also lobbied and gave incentives to the African countries to contribute to AMISOM (ICG, 2008).Berouk also states that AMISOM is the result of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. It initiated the region to think about their security around the region. It can be used as base. But AMISOM may not be effectively discharging its responsibilities since African soldiers lack profession and materials which are needed for soldiers (Interview, 2015)

The defeat and elimination of the threat of al-Shabaab is the primary prerequisite of securing Somalia. Even though there are sporadic acts of terrorism, the militant group has been pushed out of the main towns of Somalia. It is currently dispersed and present in the rural areas of the country. On a positive note, we can state that Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in 2006 opened a window of opportunity for the deployment of AMISOM, which in turn gave some hope for the consolidation of the peace process and state building in Somalia. Additionally, AMISOM and TFG are doing coordinately to improve their activity and the international effort in building up the Somali Police Force (SPF) and a National Security Force (NSF) has contributed to the city's security provisions. AMISOM contingents are basically composed of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Djibouti. Ethiopia is the third largest contributor next to Uganda and Burundi; it has deployed 4, 395 troops (Kidist, 2010).

Security Council Resolution 1744 of 20 February 2007 on Somalia (which was unanimously adopted to acceptthe establishment of AMISOM in Somalia. It states that this establishment can avoid security vacuum in Somalia.The Resolution reaffirmed the Council's 'support for Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions by condemning all acts of violence and extremism inside Somalia. The security council suspected there would be threat unless this deployed force is stand in Somalia to protect that threat which could have a possibility to affect international peace and security (Yehidego, 2007).

The existence of AMISOM by itself cannot bring concrete changes and improvement for Somalia .Increasing AMISOM's strength may fail if there is no coherent political process, no common regional approach and continuing divisions within the international community.

External interventions have not enhanced the prospects of a durable solution in Somalia and will not be able to do so under existing circumstances (Institute Of Security Studies, 2010). Since there are multifaceted causes for the failure of Somalia, and there must be coordinate efforts among different stakeholder to solve the problem in the state.

5.2.3. Disprove false Assumption of Being Ignored by Muslims Neighbors (No Opposition)

Ethiopia had never political problem even though its neighbors are Muslims. It does not have a problem with the fact that the Sudanese government has implemented Islamic law. The Al-Qaida website, the Reform Forum (*Muntada al-tajdid*) is full of articles and responses demonizing and blaming Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. Ethiopia is portrayed as a vengeful, crusading state that has collaborated with European imperialism against Islam from the days of Menelik. Al-Qaida had forgot that more than one third of its citizens are Muslims. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden's deputy, declared a Jihad against Ethiopia and invited all interested Muslims from the whole corners of the world to participate and join forces in the side of Somalia. The EPRDF has been resolutely secular and during its armed struggle it enjoyed support from both Sudan and Somalia. In fact, the EPRDF leadership has often expressed its admiration for Somalis, and its dismay with the collapse of the Somali state (Abdul, 2007).

Fisseha stated that the assumption that proposes Ethiopia will be ignored by Muslims neighbors does not hold water. Ethiopia has a sizable number of Islamic religion follower which can be counted in millions. Thus how could it be hated by Islamic followers of its neighbor? Even the number of Ethiopian Muslim population is greater than the Sum of Islamic religion follower of Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya and Djibouti. So, this assumption is simply naïve. According to 2007 Census the number of Ethiopia's Muslim population is 25,045,550 or 33.88% out of the total population.

As a regional power, Ethiopia has been increasingly willing to take on responsibility for peace and security endeavors in the Horn of Africa (Kidist, 2009).International communities suspects that it might be ignored by Muslim Communities with its interference in Somalia, but in contrary Ethiopia used as Negotiator of Muslim communities in South Sudan civil war .The suspicion of some communities was failed because it is creating surprised intimacy with its Muslim neighbor

countries. The relevant question should be to what extent has Ethiopia been able to influence regional security issues? And, what were the implications of its actions for regional stability?

The continuing Ethiopia's involvement in the peacekeeping activities in Darfur, Sudan and the hosting of Somali peace process in Sodere, shows that its foreign policy is shaped towards peaceful co-existence and co-operation. War and instability in any of her neighboring country is perceived by Ethiopia as a danger to it, too. In the same vein, economic growth and peace in other country will help Ethiopia to have larger market for its products (Moi, 2009).

5.2.4. Improving regional integration

Ethiopia is situated in the center of the Horn and she is trying to improve regional integration and encouraging other states to have coordination in the fight of terrorism. Despite its war with Eritrea (1998–2000) and its high profile intervention in Somalia at the end of 2006 to fight Islamic fundamentalists, Ethiopia has enjoyed mostly sound relations with countries in the region. It encouraged regional security cooperation, as Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Djibouti joined AMISOM.It is also playing an important role in establishing regional and local administrations in liberated areas, although the progress on the ground appears to be slow. The agreements and meetings that led to the establishment of the South West region and the Juba land region were facilitated by Ethiopia. Cooperation is used here as a series of actions takes place between political and economic entities aiming to increase mutual benefit for all included actors (Kidist, 2010).

5.3 .International Outcome

This intervention has also an outcome internationally. Internationally, this intervention makes Ethiopia something of vital importance. It assisted her the opportunity to present itself as the core country in the Horn of Africa rather than a new source of trouble, taking advantage of the political contrast with its two neighbours, Eritrea and Somalia. Indeed, Ethiopia tried between June and October 2006 to bring the TFG and UIC to the same table, and negotiate with the UIC, and resorted to the military option when it became clear that they were not reaching any common view. But the way Al-Itihad and Al-Shabaab were depicted as a threat, also helped to reinforce the Meles Zenawi regime at a critical moment as a last option to enter into Somalia. (Lyons,

2009).As a result, at a broader international level, it served to reassert the country as the key to the Horn's order and stability and by extension as a protector of the international order.

Western powers often perceived Ethiopia as the second most populous country in Africa and strategic ally in the Horn. Both the US and the European Union (EU) observe it stable state which can combat extremism and terrorists because they saw her capacity in 2006 in Somalia. The US State Department has took Ethiopia as one of the four pillars of US foreign policy in Africa, along with South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt .Even tough Ethiopia is criticized on the issue of human rights ,it has good diplomatic relations with both hemispheres. Some analysts attribute Ethiopia's increasing visibility to its military strength, comprising the third largest army in Africa. It is one of the few armies in the continent with recent conventional, anti-guerrilla and peacekeeping experience. Ethiopia has therefore the most experienced, potent and best-equipped military in the region .

5.3.1. International Acceptance in Fighting of Extremism

Although Alshabab tried to have some assassination, it was not effective until it joined with UIC as elite militia in 2005. (Menkhaus, 2005; McGregor 2008, 254).Shocked by the potential of radicals controlling Somalia via UIC,USA had planned to form Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC) despite mainly consisting of local warlords (Bruton ,2010; Stevenson ,2007). Its overt US support immediately caused a public backlash ensuring that many of those that had previously been reluctant joined the UIC. By June 2006, the expanded UIC had soundly defeated the ARPC, established order over Mogadishu and began to provide basic government services (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009; Stevenson, 2007). This success attracted considerable national enthusiasm, which subsequently led to many other groups allying themselves with the UIC allowing for its governance model to spread throughout southern Somalia (Bruton 2010, 7; Menkhaus 2008, 2). This victory encouraged it to amass greater influence over the organisation' s policy. As such, the UIC began to implement strict and harsh measures and introduce radical laws such as bans on music and the popular local stimulant *qat* (Bruton , 2010; Dagne, 2010). Radical Islamists also gained several key positions in the ICU, most notable being Hassan Dahir Aweys.

Ethiopian and TFG forces then proceeded to reverse all of UIC's recent gains and captured Mogadishu on the 28th of December, 2006 (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009; Stevenson, 2007). Despite

initially calling for an insurgency, the UIC effectively was forced to disband. Much of ICU's leadership fled the country while its weapons and militia largely reverted to the various clans that had supplied them (McGregor , 2008; Menkhaus ,2008).

The victory of UIC over Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC had paved the way for thinking of members to be winner by any means .Different states were forwarding that Ethiopia will not be capable in defeating this group which had got victory over Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC).And it created another image for Ethiopia by International communities .It shows that it has a capacity to fight extremisms in different place. Ethiopia has got international acceptance after it defeated the UIC in Baidoa. Different states such as Kenya and Djibouti gave recognition for it. For instance American president of Obama is one instance who gave thanks and recognition for Ethiopia (interview, 2015).

5.3.2. Assisted to get material and finance from Abroad (being beneficial from assistance)

Because of its active counter terrorism roles and its military intervention, Ethiopia is able to secure substantial amount of assistance in all forms from its global counterparts like USA and UNO. The UN and other regional and sub-regional bodies are willing to provide necessary capabilities to states struggling to eliminate terrorist threats. From such organizations, Ethiopia is beneficial.

A better technical, material and financial support to Ethiopia comes from the US government who has strongly aligned its counter-terrorism efforts with Ethiopia in the East African region. Ethiopia's large size armies, its relative strength and the government's active and vigilant counter-terrorism roles have led the US to view Ethiopia as a key and viable ally in this turbulent region of the Horn (US Department of State, 2010 and 2011).As a result it helps Ethiopia to become one of the largest receiver of the US aid in the sub-Saharan state, and the assistance has increasingly focused on the country's capacity to counter insurgencies, improve regional security and deter terrorism (Ploch, 2010). In this respect, following the September 2001 incident, the US aids (largely military assistance) to Ethiopia increased from $16.7 million $1 billion in 2008.It highly increased after 2006 military intervention because she was successful in case US failed

to do so (Ibid). Especially the reign of Bush gives higher attention for War on Terror and Ethiopia get benefits from it.

According to Ploch, the US has assisted the Ethiopian National Defense Force's ongoing transition to an all-volunteer professional military force since military ties with Ethiopia resumed in 2001 (2010: 51). Under EACTI (East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative), Ethiopia received $13 million in Peacekeeping Operations and FMF funds for border security training and related equipment, (Ibid).

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Regional impacts have mostly emanated from internal conflicts in several aspects. Internal conflicts often pose serious threats to the other neighboring states. Refugee problems, socio-economic and military problems etc. are some of these security threats, with a potential of provoking neighboring states to be involved in internal conflicts of others. Refugees have security, economic and social results in the hosting countries, and local conflicts have a spill over potential in creating military problems for neighboring states. In the case of Somalia its long stayed question of irredentism is/was highly disturbing the relationship with its neighbors. And UIC publically disclosed that it is easy for it to achieve such agenda i.e. annexing the land of Ogaden from Ethiopia. She knew that such claim cost her a lot during the reign of Ziad Barre and she is always alert at any time.

Moreover, the anarchy in failed state of Somalia has been a fertile ground for various criminal elements such as piracy. Besides, Ethiopian separatist groups, such as OLF and ONLF of the Ogden which were highly supported by Eritrean government had involved themselves in the proxy war. Hence, Ethiopia wanted to manage and crush it shortly. The report of UN Monitoring Group on Somalia assured that Eritrea had provided political, financial and logistical support to UIC (armed groups) in Somalia. There have been a number of Attacks in Ethiopia from the domestic as well as from external. It faced so many attacks before 9/11 attack of America. Especially AIAI was notable one. In order to defend itself, Ethiopia had used two approaches i. e military as well as peace process.

The study found that the deeds of different regional actors and states were for their own interest. Especially, the deeds of Eritrea and Egypt were the most pushing factors for Ethiopia to enter to Somalia. They competed for their national interest. It is difficult to get genuine solution from international community. We have seen this fact from different states such as Libya, Syria, Yemen etc. Therefore, Ethiopia's intervention had changed the plan of uniting of Somali. And the regional competitors such as Egypt to be dominant actor and only user of River of Nile

The study examines that in such undesirable and difficult situations, it is very natural for the threatened state to get involved in the conflict of in pursuit of defending its national security. In

other words, external actors are often threatened by internal conflict of other states that spread over international borders affecting regional and international security. Hence, external actors find it imperative to act against the posed threats using diverse national and international instruments .In this context, it seems natural for Ethiopia to interfere in neighboring states to protect her security.

The study examined the military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia from the theoretical perspective of Regional Security Complex, which best fits to analyze the problem under the study because it is argued that the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of the neighboring states. Ethiopia's being of the largest receiver of Refugees from its neighbors such as from Sudan and Somalia is one instance which shows that there is spillover effect in the Horn of Africa. To this end, the study analyzed the nature, course and consequence military intervention .The study also found this interwoven nature of each states in the Horn invites Ethiopia to enter in Somalia by fearing the spillover effect.

The finding of the study has shown that As far as the conflict in Somalia is linked to the complex conflict system in East and the Horn of Africa, there is spillover effect. Hence, Conflict in Somalia is likely to result into a crisis in the region that could serve as a breeding ground. This would also bring about a shift in the balance of power in the region and reshape the regional security architecture and Ethiopia was successful in averting such issue.

Ethiopia shares the most volatile border with Somalia, and its intervention is borne out of insecurity of cross border infiltrations, terrorist elements who bombed many places in Ethiopia and other military problems. Therefore, Ethiopia's involvement in the Somali conflict should be seen from the context of defensive intervention. Ethiopia as the most populous country in the region cannot afford ignoring the troubling situation in the neighboring states; it should play its role to safeguard its peace and that of the region. Therefore, she played its role to safeguard its peace and that of the region. Therefore, Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia is necessary evil.

However, military intervention alone cannot sustain peace; in fact it can only quit the problem for a certain period of time. It is therefore crucial that the international community (AU, IGAD, the UN, and others) should carry out a combination of measures including promoting dialogue among factions, taking serious humanitarian measures to reduce vulnerability of the population,

and helping the extremely weak government in rebuilding Somalia and its institutions as well as its security apparatus.

The study found that military intervention Somalia is continued to have far reaching consequences to the neighboring countries such as Djibouti and Kenya. Those states are included in the plan of irredentism, and they could have a possibility to be affected by the claim. This claim does not only has Ethnicity question but also economical question which aimed to be beneficial from the rich land of Haud. The intervention also encouraged other states such as Uganda and Burundi to participate in Somalia via AMISOM.

The study also found that a prolonged civil war in Somalia would result in undermining the security of Ethiopia. As far as the long term interest of the states in the region was concerned to maximize their power, the study had used the theory of realism which states about maximization of power. Ethiopia had suspected that the impacts of the conflict in Somalia is not only confined to it but also to the surrounding regions including Ethiopia .The agenda of UIC would have a far reaching consequences for the countries of the Horn peoples.

Overall, the study found that civil war in Somalia was a result of various actors which have the aim of securing their interests. This have far reaching consequences to Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Therefore, Ethiopia as being vulnerable to the threat, have to be active over reversing of worst security threatening episode. Ethiopia has to react in advance to this incident and assess carefully its security implications to its national security interests cognizant that the conflict in Somalia between UIC and TGF would also destabilize regional security. Hence, Ethiopia's decision was right.

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Additional and essential websites

Conciliation Resources – Somalia: http://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia

The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies: http://www.heritageinstitute.org/


Annex 1 Interview Guide

1. How do you see the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Transitional Federal Government (TFG)?
2. How do you see Ethiopia's 2006 intervention in Somalia? or its ground for interference and other related issues?
3. How do you perceive the assumption of international communities in relation to its interference?
4. What were the role of other regional states in Somalia during Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia?
5. How do you see the stand of America and Ethiopia on UIC?
6. How do you see self defence and its component in relation to Ethiopia's interference in Somalia?
7. How do you evaluate the outcome of Ethiopian intervention i,e regionally and internationally?
8. How do you see the role of AMISOM in Somalia?

Annex 2.list of key informants

No	Name of key informants	Institution	Position	Place and date of interview
1	Berouk Mesfin	Institute for security studies	Senior researcher	February December 02, 2015 at Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office
2	Fisseha Shawul	Ministry of Foreign affairs	Somalia affairs General Director	October 8, 2015 at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa

Annex 3



Map 1.which shows Somali regions that are found under the control of UIC and TFG



Map 2: Distribution of clans in Somalia



Map 3: Map of Great Republic of Somalia

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

_____

Woldyie Tigneh Begashaw

January, 2016

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as advisor of the candidate.

_____

Zafar Alam (PHD)

January, 2016