

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**



**Kant's Categorical Imperative as the
Foundation of World Peace**

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Addis Ababa

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**Department of Philosophy
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INTRODUCTION

Peace means many things to many people (James Herrera, 2009:1). Since ancient time societies, politicians and scholars made attempts to provide a definition for the term peace. However, the most popular definition of peace is “absence of material violence, especially war” (Ho-Won Jeong, 2000: 7 and David Brash and Charles Webel, 2002:6). This popular definition of peace is too narrow in scope. It ignores other normative aspect of peace. Among other things for example, systematic exploitation of the poor by the rich, discrimination and stigmatization on the bases of sex, skin color, ethnicity, economic status etc. are manifestations of the absence of positive peace (Brash, 2002:24). Most often, they also are causes of material conflict or war. Thus, what I believe and argue is that the popular definition of peace needs redefinition and a right action as well.

Therefore, my aim in this paper is to show that Kant’s theory of categorical imperative, as absolute duty of all men^{*} everywhere and at all times, can perhaps be the basis of world peace. Categorical imperative, as Kant claims, is designed to attain untrammelled human dignity (Immanuel Kant, 1785:96). Yet, it must always be viewed in the context of basic universal law of ethics that considers man as a moral subject and “free lawgiver” in personal and communal action and decision. Thus, the categorical imperative and the recognition of the personal dignity of all men in all human fields of action may be seen as the two sides of the same coin. Categorical imperative regards individual human dignity as a general guideline of human action (ibid). The basic dignity of man encompasses all circumstances that support and surround him and of all his normative manifestations in socio-cultural context.

^{*} *Throughout the paper, I used the term man/men to refer to all human beings or to mean both men and women.*

Kant in his famous second version of the categorical imperative formulated the basic principle of the moral relationship of individual human beings with themselves and with their fellow men. It says *“act in such a way that you use humanity in your own person and in the person of any other at all times as an end in itself and never simply as a means to other end”* (Kant 1785:91). This is to say that the idea of each man is an end in himself, for which the very name of Kant stands today, I believe and argue that has great significance for the cohesion and harmonious relation of human beings.

However, this is an ideal, which has the possibility of being changed in to real. Kant believes human beings have the capacity and urgent demand to act morally. That is to say, each man must treat fellow human beings as ends in themselves. Moral actions and then peace are possible when we all are governed by reason and act accordingly. However, usually some of us are inclined to avoid reason and act from inclination and self-interest. Consequently, violence, conflict, and war are common human phenomena.

Being more realistic Kant admits that people being free and autonomous beings governed only by moral principle would not live in peace. In his 1795 master piece “Perpetual Peace”, like Hobbes Kant argues that in a state of nature, in the absence of common authority besides reason, people may be tempted to act from inclination, not from a sense of duty (ibid, 1785: 84). In such a situation, what follows is chaos, conflict and disorder.

Kant claims that a republic, the state that stands for the people, can protect and promote the interests of its members. It would fulfill the requirements of the categorical imperative, protect and promote the rights and freedoms of its members as ends in themselves, not mere means to its end (ibid: 1795: 109-10). After all, for Kant a state or a republic refers to a politically organized

human society where leaders and citizens, who are fundamentally equal in right and dignity, came into a state for common security and interest.

Kant believes internal peace in a republic is possible where as it is hardly possible in despotic states. In a republic war and civil unrest are less likely to happen because in such a state citizens are free to raise complaints and pose challenges against those in power in peaceful manner.

However, peace in a republic is not a guarantee for inter-national peace. States like individuals with the absence of common sovereign authority that regulates their behavior wrong each other. Parochial and self-interested leaders may wage war against other states.

To limit the unreasoned freedoms of states like that of individuals in a state, and to bring inter-national peace, the formulation of inter-national law that recognizes and promotes the particular existence of each state and their equality is imperative. Such a supreme, international body should be the result of consensus among sovereign states themselves. Kant calls it a federation of states.

According to Kant, a federation of states does not refer to unity of states coming together into one supreme authority (leviathan) rather it is the association of free and autonomous states to address common affairs (ibid :130). In other words, the primary goal of such human institutions, the state, and their federation is to avoid any, either actual or potential dispute or war and to bring sustainable or durable peace as well as to enhance cooperation in a spirit of mutual recognition, equality, and tolerance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether peace is possible through the application of rational principles, the categorical imperative, and public

national and inter-national laws. It addresses at least three central questions: can rational principles bring lasting peace? How peace is defined; is it a natural condition or an artificial construct? Does peace differ at national and international levels?

The thesis is organized into four main chapters. Chapter one provides and examines Kant's theory of the Categorical Imperative. It attempts to outline and examine Kant's theory of unconditional moral imperative. I believe that imperatives as moral commands may have less chance for enforcement since people in moral choice are free, and consequently they may act on the contrary. Therefore, to make moral principles binding, institutionalizing them as public laws of a state/s is an imperative.

The second chapter tries to provide conceptual clarification of the concept peace. Peace has been defined and approached in different ways. However, in this chapter I have advanced the claim that Kantian conception of peace that views peace as the absence of violence and the presence of promising environment for people to develop themselves is the best possible conception of peace.

Chapter three tries to provide an overview of Kant's theory of perpetual peace but with detailed explanations. In this part of the thesis, I have presented Kant's claim for the necessity of establishing republican states that defend and promote the equality and dignity of their members through rational or a just domestic law and as a result of which sustainable peace is possible. But peace in a republic is not enough. To bring world peace devising an inter-national law through the federation of free states is necessary.

Kant conceives of man and the state in aggregate terms as moral and political beings, free and autonomous. Consequently, deserves moral and equal

treatment. As one man has a duty not to infringe upon the rights and freedom of another, states must not arbitrarily interfere in the internal affairs of other free states (Kant, 1795: 13-14). In other words, as each individual is an end in himself, nations must also use another nation not as mere means but as end.

Finally, the fourth chapter, critical analysis, presents the charges against Kant and attempts to defend Kant's position. I argue with Kant that a conception of dignity and equality as imperatives in the part of individuals and nations is essential to the conception of ourselves as 'rational' agents and would result in harmonious relation and co-existence between individual human beings, societies and nations. Kant calls it perpetual peace. Finally, the paper ends with a general conclusion.

Overall, I consider this paper to represent relatively a minor yet, important clarification of the concept of peace with a more complex idea of the dignity, right and freedom of humanity as strongly addressed by Kant. At last, I believe we are able to realize peace (positive), which recognizes the universal value of humanity by moralizing our political and social systems.

CHAPTER ONE

1. Kant's Categorical Imperative

1.1. Kant in General

Before we turn to explore Kant's account of the categorical imperative, as a [possible] foundation for moral action in particular and world peace in general, I believe, it is worthwhile to consider Kant's philosophy and historical context in general.

The main reason why I am trying to put Kant's general philosophical orientation in a nutshell here is that without understanding of Kant's general philosophical vision we may not have clear picture of his theory about moral action and the possibility of world peace.

To begin with, Kant is the philosopher who metaphysically tries to overcome the historically opposing views in philosophy; dogmatism, and skepticism. He attempts to avoid such extreme and opposing epistemological visions in their absolute form and made a synthesis of them by claiming that "human understanding is limited, it is only about things which are in the categories of space and time, in the world of experience" (see H. S Thayer, 1968: 41). In a sense, Kant made a distinction between the sensible (or phenomenal) world of which we can have knowledge and talk about in a meaningful way, and the intelligible (or nominal) world which is not direct possible object of knowledge and meaningful discourse (see P. Strawson, 1966: 249-251).

Thus, for Kant the sole business of science and man in general is [and ought] to apply thought on things in the phenomenal world. Kant by avoiding pure reason and pure experience believes that by actively observing, and analyzing facts we can formulate "what ought to be", so as to make things better.

Therefore, it should be noted that, Kant is not an idealist preacher, if not too much down to earth. Philosophers before Kant like Plato, Augustine, Descartes, and many others made pure speculations that are too theoretical or ideal. However, Kant believes that man's knowledge begins with the phenomenal or the sensible (what is), but it has the possibility to transcend the empirical (what is) and project towards what "ought to be" through the exercise and realization of the unique capacity of man, that is reason (Kant: 1988: 85-86).

From Kant's general philosophical project what arose interest in me specifically, are first, the theory of Categorical Imperative as pointed out especially in his book, "Ground Work of the Metaphysic of Morals" (1785), and second, the possibility of world peace, outlined in his small but influential article, "Perpetual Peace" (1795).

It is also worthwhile to consider Kant's historical context so as to understand his doctrine of morality and peace. Kant lived in the climax of European Enlightenment, which is otherwise called, 'the Age of Reason'. Its motto was "Sapere Aude", means, "have courage and determination to use your own reason" (Kant, 1784:58). Kant himself publicized such a view on a German Newspaper titled "What is Aufklärung?" or "What is Enlightenment?" In this age of enlightenment, reason as the rightful authority was supposed to govern all human dealings. That is why Kant, as a man brought up in the process, believes and argues that moral action and peace are the possibilities that would come into being not by any means but only by realizing human capacity to 'reason' (Kant, 1785: 22-24,91-93 and 1793: 211-214, and 1795, 138-139).

Likewise, the successful great revolutions of his time, the English, American and French Revolutions, which were the material expressions of the enlightenment discourse, that already had profound influence on humanity in many aspects may also left influence on Kant. Especially, on his strong claim

for freedom, equality, interdependence of men and his hatred of despotism and strong support for republicanism as a rightful and just form of government (Paul Guyer, 2000: 2) and the possibility of world peace through the federation of republican states. To that effect, his masterpiece, 'Perpetual Peace' came into being in 1795, after the successful 'great' revolutions.

Here, even though, I am modest at claiming that Kant's experience and historical context has absolute relevance in the twenty first century, I strongly believe that Kant's theory of morality and peace has something priceless to bear for this generation in particular and the generations yet to come in general.

1.2. Kant's Moral Philosophy: The Categorical Imperative

To begin with, I will present an interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy by giving special emphasis to the second version of the categorical imperative, which is otherwise called the humanity formula that says; "treat humanity in yourself and in others not only as a means to an end but as an end in itself" (Kant, 1785:91).

For Kant, without the negative connotation given to him, irrespective of accidental differences based in culture, religion, gender, skin-color etc. all human beings; the whole human race, is capable of rational thinking which also could be manifested in action (Moral action).

1.2.1. Reason and Categorical Imperative

The classical definition given to man since Aristotle is, "man is a rational animal". That means man is the being or animal who is capable of thinking or reasoning. Kant also argues in the paradigm of this classical definition. For

him human beings have the capacity to reason, which could also be used to distinguish the right from the wrong. However, the reason that enables us to distinguish the right from the wrong is “pure practical one” (Kant, 1988: 85). The “practical reason” allows us to interact with the world of experience and the “pure reason” enables us to make a synthesis of particular experiences into a universal law that could be known there after intuitively.

Intuition is the other name for pure practical reason, a faculty that makes us to know things apriori (Kant, 1797: 227-228 and *ibid*, 233-234). Intuition can make us to distinguish the right principle from the wrong one without making factual observation every moment. That is why Kant believes that morality entails universally valid principles. Like “do not lie”, “do not kill”. Alternatively, in a positive expression, “tell the truth”, “treat each man as a being of its own” and so on.

Unlike empiricists, in Kant’s view a person cannot decide whether an action is ‘right’ or ‘moral’, through empirical means alone rather such judgments must be reached apriori, using pure practical reason. Pure practical reason is the only way to articulate “what ought to be done” without investing much time to investigate empirically contingent factors.

Kant in his famous Book, the “Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals”, contends that two general prescriptive principles command human action, while the one commands hypothetically the other commands categorically (*ibid*: 1785: 39-44). Hypothetical imperatives command to do X if one desires to achieve Y, where X is a suitable means of achieving Y. However, if one does not wish to achieve Y, one is free not to do X. So that, such imperatives are grounded in self-interest and are conditional. They are conditioned by the agent’s desires and wants.

On the other hand, in contrast to “hypothetical imperatives”, “categorical imperative” is unconditional and absolute. It has the general form: Do X. It requires us to do X because doing X is good in itself regardless of its consequence and one's subjective desire. For example, treating a man as an end, with dignity and respect is always good no matter what comes as a result of such an action. Conversely, an act is immoral when one uses a human person as a means only for the agent's or someone else's end. This moral principle is [and should be] a universal principle of action. Kant's argument is that, moral imperatives are always categorical which requires absolute obedience and reverence from us. We as rational beings to act morally and be always consistent in our performance have to act according to the moral law or the categorical imperative, which is (or should be) valued in itself. One thing that should be noted at this point is that Kant does not totally oppose hypothetical imperatives. Doing a thing for its desirable consequence is good. However, such hypothetical imperatives cannot be universal principle for morality, because, they are liable to subjectivity. For example, what is ‘good’ for me may not be ‘good’ for the other person and again what is good for me today may not be so tomorrow. Therefore, subjective considerations finally lead into inconsistency and contradiction.

Accordingly, for Kant to act morally we need to avoid subjective desires or inclinations. In other words we have to avoid all “false authorities” both internal (emotions and inclinations) and external (political, religious, social) forces that may cause us to act contrary to reason. This leads us to consider Kant's first formula of the categorical imperative that says; “*act according to a maxim [subjective principle] whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law*” (Kant, 1785:84). That is, morality manifests in principle (law) which is universal and categorical. To act morally I have to act according to a maxim (subjective principle) that can be accepted by other fellow human beings as rational principle of action. As a result, before doing

something to ascertain that whether I overrule subjective tendencies and act according to reason, I have to ask the question “do other rational beings agree with me on the rationality of the maxim?”, or “Can it be a universal principle of action?” If the answer is “yes”, I have to proceed. If “no”, that means if it contradicts with the universal principle, I have to reexamine it (ibid, 64-85).

According to Kant, an action done with the aid of reason is unlikely to contradict the universal moral principle. It is rather, the action done with a motive to merely address one’s happiness or subjective interest that is more likely to contradict those of others.

2.2.2. Categorical Imperative as a Principle of Humanity

The centrality of the concept of humanity and the absolute dignity of the human person in Kant’s moral philosophy is well known, like the one of the second formula of the categorical imperative, as it is already said, which is otherwise called the humanity formula. It says “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1784:91).

I believe that Kant is not only partly right in his claim that each individual human being regardless of his sex, age, and skin color, culture and religion represents an elementary human existence and because of being a fellow rational being he deserves moral treatment. It is also contrary to reason and morality to treat a human person as a mere means, like a machine or any other object, to further end. Rather, on the contrary he must always be respected as a being of his own. Because each single man is born free and possesses the capacity to reason which is roughly equal to those of all the others.

Moreover, according to Kant not only each individual human being deserves moral treatment from other fellow human beings (ibid, 1785:93) but also he is a legislating being in the moral sphere. As stated in formula one of Kant's categorical imperative and as morality in general prescribes, for man to be responsible for his action first he should be free or autonomous. Because to be responsible the agent has to be free and should be provided with alternative possibilities, to do or not to do the action in consideration. Otherwise, the agent is not responsible. Because he is not free or autonomous to make a choice, to do or not to do the action in consideration.

This leads us to the third formula of the categorical imperative, "the kingdom of ends" that says, "*Every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends*" (ibid). Drawing on the first two formulations of the categorical imperative we have seen so far, this formula urges us to act on laws determined in virtue of their universality and in ways that respect others (and ourselves) as ends in themselves. Every single man as free or autonomous is a being of his own. However, at the same time as a member of the universal class of humanity, he is not free or autonomous in absolute terms. Because, reason requires him to put a limit upon his freedom. By using one's freedom overriding the freedom of others is contrary to reason. Pure-practical reason demands every man to enjoy freedom up to the point that never compromises the reasoned freedom of other fellow-beings. This expression stands as an Ideal, the highest expression of our autonomy, equality and interdependence as rational agents both creating and obeying laws.

As Kant stated in his book (1785), the "Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals", the second formula, or the humanity formula which says, "*Act in such a way that you treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the sometime as an end, never simply as a means to an*

end” (Kant, 1785:91) encompasses all the other versions of the categorical imperative.

All my arguments in this paper revolve around this grand principle, the principle of humanity. The conviction is that man as a rational being is free, a man of himself. In so far as man is so he is not bound by force external to himself. In positive terms, he has the capacity to exercise “self control” in the sense of subordinating “desires” that clamor with him for satisfaction. A “morally autonomous being” in short can impose will on the varieties of his momentary desires that might otherwise over power him (see Ranabir Samaddar, 2004: 19). It is this “will” that also enjoins upon him to act in such a way that he always treats humanity in his own person or/and in the person of another not simply as means but at the same time as an end. Since moral autonomy makes it an imperative on us to “respect” others as equals (since they are free and think/reason like us), not only there is peace born out of mutual respect, but also peace thus born becomes both “universal” and “perpetual”(ibid).

All the above discussion has been primarily concerned with the philosophical/theoretical aspect of categorical imperative; below we will examine its possibility in the real life situation.

2.2.3. Applicability of Categorical Imperative in the Real Life

Situation

As stated above moral life and mutual respect, then universal and perpetual peace are the possibilities of actively exercising human capacity-that is the capacity to reason. When each man consults his reason and acts accordingly, he would recognize the value vested in himself and in other fellow human beings. He would not treat him-self and others as mere means rather as an end

as well. But, the problem Kant himself well aware of is that men usually lack “Courage” and “Determination” to use or exercise their capacity, the capacity to reason (Kant 1784:58). Rather to the opposite men are tempted to live under the domination of “false authorities” both internal and external to them (ibid).

Kant in his article “What is Enlightenment?” states “Man become fond of living in the state of “immaturity” and for the time being is actually incapable of exercising his own understanding, reason, rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use of his natural gift are the shakers of his permanent immaturity” (ibid: 59).

However, in the same text, Kant optimistically states that man lives in perpetual development and has the possibility to obey the order of reason and to lead an enlightened life (ibid: 61).

Nevertheless, being more realistic Kant in his later work “Perpetual Peace” admits that morality alone could not be the cause of orderly society and peace. Even though, some enlightened people act according to rational principles (morally), most are likely to act according to their self-interest, contrary to moral principles.

Therefore, a situation with the absence of coercive governing authority other than reason, where everyone is absolutely free and autonomous; people are in a state of war and violence. Thomas Hobbes describes it as “a state of war” or in worse “a state of all against all” (Hobbes, 1985: 186). Kant also partly shares this idea. Since the moral law is not binding, each is free to act on the contrary. Therefore, given the one aspect of man, immaturity, with the absence of external coercive mechanism (at least in a positive sense), disorder, chaos, and violence would be the marks of man’s existential condition. As such each man to secure his freedom and right against the arbitrary will of others, establishing

external sovereign body or a coercive public law which gets its foundation in reason or morality is an imperative, what we call it a state, in Kant's own term a "republican constitution" (Kant, 1795: 134).

Therefore, according to Kant the state can bring and maintain internal peace by making itself a republic. The conviction Kant developed is that as far as a state derives its coercive public law from the moral principle [categorical imperative] can avoid violence, and bring, and maintain peace in its jurisdiction. However, Kant does not see peace in a state as a sufficient condition for inter-national peace. States, being motivated by narrow "national interest" may use other states as a means to their end. To limit the freedoms of individual states, like that of individual human beings in a state, establishing higher supreme body of law is necessary which is possible according to Kant through the federation of states (ibid :128).

This leads us to the next subsequent chapters that deal with the concept and institution of peace, at the national and international levels, which is consistent to reason, and the demands of the dignity and rights of humanity.

CHAPTER TWO

2. Critical Perspective on Peace: Definitions and the Need for Re-definition

This chapter is intended to present a variety of peace definitions forwarded by scholars and tries to show its scope. Peace theories are discussed into two general categories. The first section provides the most common definitions of peace that connote peace as “mere absence of material conflict or war”. The second section of the chapter provides the Kantian definition that signifies peace as the “absence of violence and the presence of conducive environment for man to develop himself”. This definition of peace is presented as the best possible notion of peace.

Some identify peace as an internal state of a man. Like the harmonious functioning of the three parts of the human soul governed by reason (see Plato: 2006:224). Alternatively, as a state of mind, which is achieved through “Nirvana” (Buddhism). As such, I am not directly addressing the internal state of man eventhough it may most likely have impact upon inter-personal and inter-state relationships. In this paper I am solely concerned with peace that exists among people and states what I call it inter-personal or inter-subjective peace.

2.1. What is Peace?

Peace implies many things to many people (James Herrera, 2009:1). However, Peace has most commonly been defined as “freedom from civil clamor and confusion” (Webel, Chares, and Johan Galtung, 2007:6). In addition, it has been conceptualized as “lack of conflict of any serious kind, especially war” (David Brash and Charles Webel, 2002:6 and Hu-won Jeong, 2000: 19). Most

importantly, peace is also defined as absence of violence of any kind (Kant, 1795: 143). Peace is often determined negatively; as the absence of something violent. (Webel, Charles, and Johan Galtung, 2007: 7). The above-mentioned definitions denote peace in the inter-subjective sense. Furthermore, a point that these and other definitions of peace agree on is that peace is “a background condition for the perception of everything else, a phenomenon affecting all [human beings] and sentient beings, something whose presence or absence is best measured on a continuum or spectrum” (Webel and Galtung, 2007: 11). As such, peace is understood not as mere part of man, rather as a larger horizon, that embodies man himself.

Likewise, eminent philosophers and scholars claimed to define and design procedures to bring peace. For example, Plato (427-347 B.C.) in his famous book, “The Republic” has defined peace as a non-violent situation in a state or a Republic controlled and directed by the “Philosopher Kings” who are otherwise divinely endowed with political wisdom (see Plato’s Republic 2008: 351-354). Saint Augustine (354-430) who was in the line of Plato’s idealist tradition also endorsed the claim that “peace in the earthly “state” “depends on its members’ obedience to the “faith”, the external law of the “state” of God” (St. Augustine, 1958:456). The works of Plato and Augustine exhibit philosophical excellence. However, they are too theoretical or ideal in perspective. For instance, Plato’s idea of peace in the republic is problematic. First, Plato constructed an ‘ivory tower’; it is too far from our common sense understanding. As such, it is not down to earth for practical guidance. It seems his theory of state and theory of peace in general is proposed for theoretical consumption not for practical guidance. Second, it is narrow in scope. It considers the possibility of “peace” in a Republic only. That means it fails short in considering what ought relations be between different states or Republics. Augustine’s theory is difficult if not impossible to be taken as a principle for

practical guidance. His claim is mystical. Since his claim is an article of “faith” it does not depend on what we feel, think or act.

Generally, it could be argued that in ancient and medieval philosophy, peace was a passive concern. Philosophers and other scholars considered peace solely as a subject of intellectual discourse not an issue of practical concern. Ramibir Samaddar in the article “Peace Studies: an Introduction to the Concept, Scope and Themes” argues the following; “...it is only with the advent of modernity that peace ceases to become merely a passive concern and has been made an artifact that can be brought about, engineered and subject to deliberate human endeavor” (2004: 19). Samaddar believes most modern European thinkers were more practical than their classical or medieval counterparts in conceptualizing and pursuing peace. For example, philosophers like Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and John Locke (1632-1704) among others tried to bring ‘peace’ through institutionalizing sovereign power. In one way or the other their political theory have had tangible influence in statecraft in modernity and beyond, still now. Nonetheless, most commentators argue that largely modern and pre-modern philosophers express peace as “mere absence of material conflict or war”. For example most contractual philosophers even if they do not explicitly and directly address the “concept peace” in their works, especially Machiavelli and Hobbes viewed peace as mere absence of war. They demanded the institutionalization of a sovereign to overcome the situation of “war of all against all”. To this end the sustenance of a sovereign body even that of a despotic one, according to them, is justified. Conscious of this fact Samaddar claims;

Predominantly in the political literature peace has been defined negatively, only as lack of direct material violence i.e. war, conflict,

torture etc. This is the very common understanding of peace (ibid, 2004: 17).

Similarly, Matthew Melko recently in his article, “Peace: A Subject of worth Studying, It may be the More Normal Human Condition.” endorsed the idea that “a peaceful society is one without war, revolution, or physical conflict among men.” (1975: 31)

Here, what I come to believe is that since time immemorial peace has been predominantly conceptualized as the opposite of war; that is peace has been defined as the absence of war or armed conflict. This is the most widely used definition of peace. Besides this, more generally what I argue is that many of the theories developed about peace have some deficiencies, either they are state centered means that they promote the good of a particular group of people or/and pursued immediate peace, that is to say they plan to terminate war only and nothing more. The next section tries to make this issue brief.

2.2. Scope of Peace

What I argue here is that the most popular view of peace, as the ‘absence of war’ is too narrow in scope. It is true that war is one of the major and unpleasant human incidents that cause human beings to suffer. It deprives of people from their rights. Most often, in the middle of war laws are silent. Consequently, people live in fear and insecurity. However, war is not the only thing that causes non-peace, nor its absence guarantee peace (Webel and Galtung, 2007: 8). Other factors may equally contribute for the absence of peace. For example, exploitation of the poor by the rich, systematic domination of poor nations by wealthy one, discrimination, and segregation based on sex, gender, color, race and other similar factors make people not to live in peace.

Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian Nobel peace prize winner (2003), rightly contends that;

[...] it would be appropriate to pose a question if a country is not in or at war, do the people of that country live in peace? The answer is probably no, because peace has other normative manifestation besides the absence of material [conflict], war (2007:1).

Moreover, James P. Klein et al in an article “The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry and Peace” argue that the common definition of peace; as the absence of war, has logical flaw. They say “if one wants to explain why some people are “Wealthy” it is not useful and appropriate to define them as being “not poor””, there exist other things at the middle ground as possibilities that are neither of the two in pure form (2008:67).

Therefore, peace as the absence of material war in a state or between states is not a satisfactory definition. Hence, this popular concept of peace has failed (ibid: 69).

2.2.1 The Need for Re-conceptualizing Peace

What I claim here is that once we accept that the most popular definition of peace is problematic, we have to reconsider and revise it. It is primarily because, as Milton Rinehart suggested there exists actual relationship between peace definitions and peace actions.

Peace definitions or concepts are the basis on which we decide how to make peace. For example, if I define peace as not war then I would attempt to make peace by attempting to eliminate war, at least to mitigate its severity. On the other hand, if I define peace as ‘social justice’, I would strive to enhance equal opportunity, fair

distribution of power and resources, equal protection, and impartial enforcement of law (see Rinehart 1989:1-2).

I believe Rinehart's claim is worthy of consideration. Inevitably, our peace plans for the most part are derived from the knowledge that we have about peace. Means that our peace efforts are guided by our conception of peace. Thus, if our definition of peace goes wrong or incomplete the results of our peace efforts would also be the same. As the saying goes, "one collects as much as he/she sows and cultivates". The point is that the peace one desires to achieve depends on how he imagines, defines, and conceptualizes it. Thus, reconsidering or revising, our definition of peace is imperative. I believe and argue that reaffirming Kant's definition and theory of peace could be an indispensable apparatus for our peace effort.

2.2.1.1. A More Holistic Conception of Peace: A Kantian

Alternative

According to Kant, absence of war is not a guarantee of peace, though, it is one-step forward. It conveys only a fraction of the true meaning of peace. In a more holistic sense, the term peace refers the unconditional avoidance of violence at global level. For Kant peace (perpetual) is an artificial construct. It implies a movement from the "state of nature" which is full of violence, to a sovereign state and then a world governed by rational beings, where each individual human being is treated as an end, not merely as a means to further end (Kant 1995:143).

Therefore, for Kant the term perpetual peace moves beyond mere absence of war to the idealization of conditions that will prevent violence and its possibility against humanity.

In the next chapter, we will see the conditions necessary for perpetual peace, but here I consider, as Kant argued, peace as the “absence of violence”. Then what is violence? Violence is a very broad term includes many things other than war and material conflict (Jeong, 2000: 19-20 and, Brash and Webel, 2002: 7) which are against man himself and his rational values.

According to Ho-Won-Jeong, there are two general types of violence. Namely direct and indirect or structural which manifest themselves in various social relations. Direct violence is the most obvious and popularly understood form of violence which is to do “physical harm and inflicting pain” on others. “Killing and beating whether they happen in war or interpersonal situation, represent direct violence. Direct violence may also take the form of verbal and psychological abuse” (Jeong, 2000:19).

In a direct violence clear “subject-action-object relationships” are established, as we observe someone hurts other people by a violent act (ibid). Thus, direct violence is established in overt relationships that is why many people consider war as the only factor for the absence of peace.

On the other hand, indirect or structural violence may not be visible and masked in the way society is organized and function. Structural violence usually manifested in practices like political repression, psychological alienation, discrimination, stigmatization etc. (Brash and Webel, 2002: 7) that constitute another way to characterize situation causing human misery. Indirect violence is often “unnoticed and works slowly to erode humanistic values and impoverish human lives” (ibid). Violence in all forms is entailed in peacelessness that denies human dignity” (Jeong, 2002:22).

Generally, peace has to be defined by the insights drawn from the above understanding of violence. One definition of peace drawing from direct violence

is that peace is the absence of violence or war. This has been termed negative peace (David Brash and Charles Webel, 2002:6). The other definition is that peace, is of course, the absence of violence or war but also the presence of justice, equality and opportunity, wherein each individual can seek to achieve his/her ambition, this is called positive peace (ibid).

Briefly, in Kantian view, peace refers to the “absence of violence in all forms that denies human beings the chance to freely develop themselves”. As such, peace perpetuates in a situation where the categorical imperative gets due attention and enforcement both in inter-personal relation and social and political systems at large. Thus, peace has to be achieved by ultimately challenging both direct and indirect or systematic violence which are naturally against the foundational principles of humanity i.e. dignity, equality and freedom of person. Finally, in the next subsequent chapters, we will see the conditions necessary for the avoidance of violence and conversely for the surfacing and preservation of peace.

CHAPTER THREE

3. Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace (An Overview)

In chapter one we have seen Kant's theory of categorical imperative and in chapter two various peace theories and the Kantian notion of peace. In this chapter, we will see Kant's philosophical proposal for world peace through public law.

Kant in his 1795 work, "Perpetual Peace", outlined the required conditions for peace. "Perpetual Peace" is divided into two main parts and consists of six 'preliminary articles' (Negative preconditions of peace) and three 'definitive articles' (positive preconditions of peace). Preliminary and definitive articles together constitute a set of preconditions for perpetual peace among nations. As we will see below these preconditions are derived from Kant's theory of the categorical imperative.

3.1. Kant's "Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace"

Kant's preliminary articles on peace are proposed to point out the negative conditions that should be avoided. However, Kant is well aware of the fact that the avoidance of these negative conditions alone will not lead to perpetual peace, rather affirmative measures pointed out in the 'definitive articles' (positive conditions) should be taken into account too.

Here, I will address the six preliminary conditions for peace first and the definite articles in the next section.

The first article reads, "No treaty of peace shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war" (Kant, 1795: 107). The conviction is that if peace treaty is reached between states to stop the war they had fought,

with the intention to wage war again or with the reservation of a cause that would lead them to war again is contrary to pure practical reason or morality. It could cease to be a moral maxim, because, in such a treaty a contracting state pretends to say, since I am exhausted at war now I need a breathing time and I will continue the war some other time. Means that, I use the treaty not to end the war for good, but to my own advantage. What follows such a treaty is only “a truce, a suspension of war” (ibid, 107). It does not refer to the end of all hostilities or the emergence of lasting peace. But, reason demands a treaty signed between states to aim at ending war and other forms of violence for good.

Nonetheless, as Kant argued in the definitive articles, by its very nature treaty alone could not lead states to peace. With the absence of a common coercive authority, states in the “international anarchy” like that of individuals in the “state of nature” are their own judges. In such a situation, since there is no supreme body that can make judgment between states, individual states who have signed the treaty are free even to act against the treaty contracted. Therefore, treaty alone is not a sufficient condition for lasting [world] peace.

The second article is “No independent state, large or small, shall come under the domination of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation” (ibid: 108). Each state, which has actual independent existence, should not be used by other states as a means only. A state for Kant is a society of human beings.

A state is not a property, as the ground on which its people are settled. Rather, it is a society of human beings over whom no one but the state itself has the right to rule ... (ibid: 109).

Here, Kant viewed the state as free and sovereign being. Therefore, arbitrarily interfering in the internal affair of a sovereign state and using it as a mere object would equally amount to using a moral subject (man) as a mere means or as an object. States represent a legally and politically organized human society. Treating such a being, a state, as a means only contradicts with the moral agency of its members. Therefore, states deserve moral treatment and must not be used as a means only.

Third, “Standing armies (*miles perpetus*) shall in time be abolished” (*ibid*: 110). Kant is too suspicious about an army or military force that gradually scale up in size and strength. He believes that the very existence of a strong standing army is a threat to peace. It is because a military force developed in one nation may make other [neighboring] nations to live in fear, and may lead them to do the same. As we can witness today the arms race between nations would finally lead nations to the possession of more devastating weapons. “Such a situation is more dangerous than a timely [conventional] war” (*ibid*).

Kant argues that, using war as a means to address one’s desire is contrary to reason and “can’t easily be reconciled with the right of humanity in our person” (*ibid*). If countries have disagreement, they should establish other rational means and address peacefully. Kant states, three things are dangerous to peace, especially in their excessive amount; “the power of arms, the power of alliance (especially military) and the power of money” (*ibid*). Usually they are instruments for subjugating others. They serve as a means for imposing ones subjective will upon others. Therefore, states should abstain from having such stuffs in excess.

Fourth, “no national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affair of the state” (*ibid*: 111). Every state as an internally responsible body that represents the public will has a duty to provide protection, construct roads,

schools, health center etc. In brief, a state to effectively and efficiently execute all its duties needs money and other resources. For it to do all these, it should get money from [fair] trade with other nations, taxation and from other domestic means of revenue. According to Kant, a state should not contract a debt with other nations for the reasons of; first, a contract of debt would erode the sense of equality between states and lead to slave-master relation. Second, if the leaders of the nation get money in the form of debt, they would receive money more than the nation can actually repay. The state that receives money in the form of foreign debt may fail to build up and use internal means of revenue that require little effort. Third, consequently, the country in debt would be unable to repay the money in the time frame of the agreement while the lending country/countries/ may demand the former to do things in exchange of the money that it does not want to do otherwise. As a result, in such a situation relations between states would be relations between unequals. For example, the lending country would have more bargaining power in trade and commerce among other things than the borrowing country. The idea Kant capitalized is that such a trend at last leads to “instrumentalism” that negates freedom and dignity of states and their people. Therefore, Kant is against both contracting debt and accumulating excessive treasure because they may lead to one of the three dangerous things, “money power”.

The fifth principle is that, “no state should violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another” (*ibid*: 112). In short, it is the principle of non-interference. It represents the direct extension of the second version of the categorical imperative from the individual man to the state. Kant’s argument is that each independently existing state represents a free and autonomous political being. As such arbitrarily interfering in the internal affair of a sovereign state, that may be by supporting factions, a revolutionary group etc, is a violation of its moral agency. Therefore, interference in the internal affair of a nation without the nation’s consent would be a violation of its

autonomy. Even the most corrupted nations' autonomy should be respected. But, Kant, however, says once again that if the nation has already collapsed and divided into two or more independent nations, supporting one would not be an interference, since anarchy already prevailed in the nation and led it in to disintegration. It is no more an integrated and sovereign state (*ibid*: 113). However, it is an imperative to respect the freedom and independence of newly emerging state/s out of the ruins of a disintegrated one.

The sixth and the last condition that Kant pointed out is, “no state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace” (*ibid*: 114). War is morally undesirable and a deadly evil practice. However, once states engage in such a horrible practice they should not lose complete sight in considering the value of humanity. If a state does not put a limit to its military action in the lands of its enemy then the war consumes more than its initial demand. This would make future peace after the conclusion of the war difficult, if not impossible. Kant says; “Breach of contract, the instigation of treason, the employment of assassins or poisoners within the enemy state would make future peace unattainable” (*ibid*: 114).

Furthermore, Kant contends that people in the enemy state should be handled humanely and their property should be protected as well. Because, it is the “state that wages the war not the conquered people themselves” (*ibid*).

All the six aforementioned preconditions pointed-out in the ‘preliminary articles for world peace’ demand the prohibition and elimination of practices that are contrary to the principle of categorical imperative.

3.2. Kant's "Definitive Articles for Perpetual Peace among States"

As stated above, the preliminary articles state about prohibition of some practices. On the other hand, the definitive articles point-out affirmative preconditions that should be done so as to bring and sustain peace. These preconditions of peace that Kant provided will be discussed in detail as follows. First, the civil constitution of each state should be a republican, second, the law of nations should be founded on the federation of free states and third, relations among states and foreign nationals should be based on universal hospitality. Now I proceed to provide the detailed explanations for these three principles of Kant for positive world peace.

3.2.1. Republicanism

In chapter one, we have seen that pure practical reason demands us to act from a sense of duty and respect the rights of fellow beings. However, being motivated by self-interest we usually act contrary to reason and violate the freedom and rights of others.

Kant contends that in the 'state of nature' with the absence of common coercive authority, individual human beings stand against each other. As a result, individuals should leave this 'barbarous' situation and ought to enter into a contract with the view that; "[T]here shall be no war among us, for we shall form ourselves into a state, which is to say a constitution for ourselves that will settle our disputes peaceably" (Kant 1795:135). However, Kant in his 1797 work the "Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part One of the Metaphysics of Morals" contends that;

The original [social] contract is not a principle explaining the [actual] origin of the civil society: rather it is a principle explaining how it

ought to be [...] it is not the principle establishing the state: rather it is the principle of political government and contains the Ideal of legislative, administrative, and public legal justice (Kant, 1797 : xxx introduction and preface by John Ladd, 1965).

Therefore, for Kant republic represents not the actual development of the state out from the state of nature rather the Ideal expression of a rational state – the state that reason prescribes it ‘ought to be’. When individuals exit from the ‘state of nature’, the state they form may not be perfect. Kant believes that it is better than the ‘state of nature’ that they left behind. In view of this, any state, which is partially in accordance with the principle of right, is better than none at all. Even though it may be the case that unenlightened despots govern the people as their subjects, it cannot be denied that they bring relative order and peace in the state. However, Kant says a despotic state must transform itself into a republican one.

According to Kant, the term republic refers to a form of government that represents the reasoned wishes and demands of its people (Kant 1795:134). Furthermore, he believes that a republic is “the only constitution” which could meet the demands of reason, the categorical imperative. To explain the rationality of the republic Kant singled out three points.

First, a republic is a constitution that is in the first place “founded in accordance with the principle of freedom” of its members as human beings. Ideally, individuals before the emergence of state enjoy absolute but senseless freedom. The state by putting a limit upon the freedoms of its members maintains reason governed freedom. Kant calls it liberty (ibid: 135).

Second, a republican state is created in accordance with the “principle of interdependence” of all, as subjects, on a common legislation. That means all

members are required to give their consent to the law of the state and dutifully subject themselves to it, and, third, by this the state governs in accordance with the “law of equality of members as citizens” (Kant, 1795: 120-121).

On the basis of his aforementioned arguments Kant believes that the republican constitution is the “only constitution” which embodies the principle of the categorical imperative. It recognizes and promotes the freedom, equality, and inter-dependence of its members. However, if a republic acts otherwise, it would be a contradiction. That means it stands against its “cause” and “purpose”. Its cause is to provide protection to the rights of its members and its purpose is to bring and maintain peace. That is why Kant states “...*the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right has also the purpose of attaining perpetual peace*” (*ibid*, 121-122). However, we can raise a question; can a republican state bring real and durable peace? The answer according to Kant is “definitely yes”. He has a number of reasons for this.

First, internally the republican government is founded on the principle of equality. That is to say, the state itself should not form, and never allow other parties in its jurisdiction to form pecking order based on race, sex, economic status, culture, religion and other similar factors. Since most conflicts and public disobediences crop up because of violation of rights, people in a republic have no rational cause for such activities. Because of its nature, (since it is founded on the principle of right) a republic is largely free from internal violence, revolution, and civil disobedience and enjoys relative, durable peace than the despotic ones.

Second, externally, republican constitution has less affinity to wage war against another state. The reason according to Kant is that “under a republican

constitution, the consent of citizens is required to determine whether there shall be war with other states or not" (ibid: 122).

What Kant argued is that in republican states citizens have decision-making power. As a result, they weigh the matter well before giving their consent and undertaking such a "destructive business", war (*ibid*). People in a republic as they are the first victims of the incident do not want and allow war with other states. They allow the war means they give their consent to pay the price that the war demands both in person and in property. On the other hand, Kant argued, in a despotic state where people are subjects, not citizens, declaring war is an easy task.

Since the ruler is not a citizen but owner of the state and does not lose a whit the war, while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sports or his pleasure places and [festivity] days. He can therefore decide on war for the most trivial reasons; as it were a kind of pleasure party (ibid: 123).

On the other hand, Kant urges us not to confuse a republican, which promotes and defends the freedom and equality of all its members, with a democratic constitution. The reason is that *[direct]* democracy unlike republican government, accepts, and promotes inequality. Kant calls *[direct]* democracy a "majority tyranny".

In democracy the majority have the right to do whatever they want to do; even sometimes against the minorities. Therefore, 'the whole people' so called, who carry their measure are really not all but only a majority: so that here universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the principle of freedom (ibid: 125).

Kant seems to be in favor of a constitutional monarchy or enlightened aristocracy than *[direct]* democracy. On his view the majority, that does not represent the whole drives *[direct]* democracy. What should be noted is that to be consistent with the principles, causes and goals of republicanism. (i.e. freedom and equality of men) in Kantian sense, the leaders in constitutional monarchy and aristocracy should have limited political power and consider themselves as “servant of the nation” or the people since nation refers a politically organized human society.

However, these days some argue that eventhough Kant rejected *[direct]* democracy, *[representative]* democracy that Kant was not so much familiar with is truly republican. Even, it could be taken as a better alternative to protect the rights and liberties of members than enlightened aristocracy and monarchy. Their argument is that, even though representative democracy demands major decisions to be made with ‘majority vote’, it also respects the rights and liberties of ‘the minorities’ (those who show their difference in the decision making process).

Generally, Kant holds the belief that a republic, since it is founded upon the principle of right or liberty it enjoys relative peace more than the other form of government, i.e. despotism. This is undeniably true, because of the reasons mentioned a few paragraphs above.

However, Kant says, peace in a republic (internal peace) is not a guarantee for peace between states or international peace. Because, at first place, individual states like individual human beings in the “state of nature” have no common coercive external authority. In the absence of common public law between states there exists anarchy among them. As a result, each state in the international anarchy being its own judge may violently attack the other. Kant briefly states:

In a state of nature, under no common external authority the method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by process of law-as it is where there is an external tribunal, but only by war. Though, this means however, and its favorable issue, victory, the question of right is never decided. A treaty of peace makes it, may be, an end to the war of the moment, but not to the conditions of war which at any time may afford a new pretext for opening hostilities; and this we can not exactly condemn as unjust because under this condition everyone is his own judge (ibid: 132-133).

Therefore, states to secure their sovereignty and to have a predictable future should get out of this 'barbaric' condition. According to Kant, this is possible only through the establishment of a rational common body of law among states-that is the law of the "federation of states".

3.2.2. Federation of States

Above, I have presented one of the three public laws that Kant pointed out, namely the republican constitution. Such a republican law brings peace in a state. To bring peace at global level devising another constitution, which is more inclusive in coverage and enforcement, is necessary. Kant calls it, the constitution of the federation of nations. This constitution regulates relations and interactions between and among nations.

Nations, as states can be judged like individuals who in their natural conditions (that is, in their independence from external laws) already wrong one other by being near one another; and each of them for the sake of their security, can and ought to require the others to inter with it in a condition similar to a civil constitution in which it can be assured of its rights (Kant, 1795:128).

Kant like other social contract theorists used the “state of nature” to refer the ideal condition of lawlessness. In a lawless situation, each being completely free can abuse the other. The logic is that the state is a necessary condition for people to get out of this “barbaric” condition. Analogously, Kant contends that states that lack a common coercive authority, in the inter-national anarchy, are necessarily wrong and injure one another. For that reason, states for their own security should leave the ‘inter-national anarchy’ and enter into a condition similar to republican constitution. Kant however, argued that this international authority does not intend or demand the dissolution of sovereign states into a world state. He rather asserts;

This would be a federation of nations, which however would not have to be a state of nations. That would involve a contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of one who rules to those who obey-that is to say, of law [maker] to the [citizens] of the state - but a number of nations in one state would constitute only one nation and this contradicts our hypothesis, since we have to consider the rights of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are so many separate states and are not to be fused in to one state (ibid: 129).

A thing that we should have to note here is that, Kant is not considering a world state as a thing contrary to reason, rather he believes that it is demanded by pure practical reason. Pure-practical reason tells us that human beings regardless of some accidental differences have essential, non-hierarchical qualities, i.e. freedom. We are born free and have roughly equal capacity that is the capacity to reason. The idea of right itself is derived from the sense of freedom (ibid: 122). Therefore to uniformly protect the rights and freedoms of a human race as a whole institutionalizing or devising one sovereign political body, *a world republic*, is a positive idea and in accordance with reason.

However, according to Kant a world republic is practically impossible for the following major reasons. First, the state of nations has to be extended too far over vast regions. Therefore, it is too difficult for a world republic to protect all of its members from violence and war. Second, the existing states that already developed religious, cultural, social, political etc. identity may “consider such a world state a threat to their independent existence” and accordingly may develop a negative attitude to it. Third, if the leaders of such a world state appear to be despots by some accident they may lead the world republic into disintegration. Therefore, as a result it may take humanity back to the original “state of nature” (Kant, 1795: 136-137).

Therefore, Kant rejected a world republic in hypothesis and believes that the moderate alternative that is the free association of several sovereign states into a world federation can take us to perpetual peace.

Unlike a world state, in the federation of states members without losing their sovereignty and identity establish an international constitution or law through their will. This law by putting a limit on the unreasoned freedoms of states establishes peaceful and friendly relationship among states. Kant also distinguished the federation of states from a mere treaty of peace.

Hence there must be an alliance of a particular kind called covenant of peace [Foedus pacificum] which would differ from a treaty of peace [Pactum pacis] in the respect, that the latter puts an end to one war while the former would seek to put an end to war [and violence in general] forever. This alliance doesn't aim at the gain of any power whatsoever of the state, but merely at the preservation and security of the freedom of the state for itself and other allied states at the same time. The latter do not however, require for this

reason, to submit themselves like individuals in the state of nature to public laws and coercion (ibid: 134).

A treaty aims at fostering the demands and interests of contracting states for a definite time, sometimes against the needs and well-being of others. If it is a treaty of war aims at ending the war up for a moment that the states fought. However, the constitution of a federation of states, as Kant argues, aims at maintaining the identity and sovereignty of states. In doing so, it brings durable peace by avoiding violence between or among sovereign states.

This constitution of the federation of world states is somehow similar to the republican constitution in content. As the republic stands for the freedom and equality of its members, the federation of nations recognizes and endeavors for the freedom, sovereignty, and equality of states. However, we may pose a question here; who can and/or should initiate and advance the establishment of such a federation of states? According to Kant, some enlightened republican governments should form the federation at first and others will follow. However, those states joining the federation should be all republicans. It is because, “republicans are by their very nature pacific states” (ibid). The idea is that, other states even despotic ones will be attracted by the peaceful nature of republican countries and their federation. Finally, the federation will include all the nations of the world (*ibid*).

Generally, the constitution of the federation of states regulates the relation between sovereign nations of the world. The law of the federation avoids those negative conditions stated in the preliminary article that are against the freedom and sovereignty of states and provides positive conditions as well. However, international law that regulates relations between states is not a sufficient condition to bring holistic and perpetual peace. As to Kant, we also need another form of public law, cosmopolitan law.

3.2.3. Cosmopolitan Law

Cosmopolitan law refers the third form of public law, other than republican and federal constitutions. According to Kant, establishing a law that regulates the relation between a sovereign state and people of other states and vice-versa is an imperative. Because they, like individuals and states in a lawless condition, may wrong each other. For example, Kant states that, “the civilized people [individual citizens not a state] of *[Europe]* conquered” foreign lands and their people. “This is injustice and fills us with horror” and equivalently “the inhabitants of certain sea coasts plunder ships in neighboring seas and makes strangers [or foreign nationals] a slave to them”. Such a relation is contrary to reason and morally unjustifiable whatsoever (Kant. 1795:138-140).

Rather, when foreign nationals and hosting sovereign states make contacts should be respectful of each other and develop the culture of hospitality. Kant contends that

Hospitality signifies not philanthropy but of a right, the claim of a stranger entering a foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility [...] so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy (ibid: 137-138).

On the one hand, so long as the planet earth as a whole, the common property of all human beings, is concerned interaction and communication among peoples of different states is inevitable. Since we share the same planet, movement from one part to the other should be understood as a right (ibid).

On the other hand, right is limited by social or political arrangements. Since we are not living in a world state, a stranger arriving on a foreign territory may not

claim some rights that nationals of the state enjoy, like the right to take part in the political affairs of the state, possessing land etc. However, a foreigner has the right to visitation and to request asylum as far as his approach to the state and its people is peaceful. The state has the right to refuse the entrance of the stranger if it finds the stranger to cause danger beyond reasonable doubt to the identity and needs of its people. Otherwise, states should not perceive and treat foreign nationals as enemies and vice versa. When put into practice this cosmopolitan law, according to Kant, would lead mankind to wider conception of humanity and then perpetual peace. This is what pure practical reason demands of man to do- to respect the inherent values and dignity of man (ibid).

In conclusion, what Kant argues in “Perpetual Peace” is that true peace is possible only when states are organized internally according to “republican” principles, when they are organized externally into a voluntary federation of states that promotes peace, and when they respect the human right not only of their own citizens but also of foreign nationals. Kant regards these three main requirements as derived from the categorical imperative and internally connected rational principles of action. Therefore, perpetual peace is possible when the three principles are jointly enforced.

The above public laws are founded on the notion that “humanity” is an end in itself because of its potential for freedom and reason. The ultimate source of value according to Kant is human freedom, as an end in itself. Other values are and should be derived from this ultimate principle. For that reason, the ultimate goal of any public law should be to preserve such ultimate values, the dignity of man. Therefore, true peace can only be derived from actions that obey and respect such rational principles of action (public laws).

CHAPTER FOUR

4. Discussion and Analysis

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section addresses some objections raised against Immanuel Kant's theory of peace. The critics object that the hypothesis of the federation of states negates the very idea of a state (its sovereignty). Some others say, Kant's argument for the federation of states is inconsistent and unKantian. Rather, pure practical reason demands a world republic. Their reason is that mere federation would not help to bring about peace because, there is no practical difference between the presence of a non-coercive federation of states and no federation at all. These are some of the major objections raised against Kant.

The second section defends Kant against some of the charges. In this section I have tried to show that advocating a voluntary association, federation of states instead of a world republic, is not inconsistent with Kant's doctrine of categorical imperative. As long as Kant's theory of the federation of states is founded on the principles of civil liberty and legal equality is not in contradiction in terms with his theory of ethics.

The third section tries to present and examine the process of peace through the United Nations Organization (UNO), which drives some of its major principles from Kant. In light of Kant's arguments, an attempt has been made to recommend what states and their federation should do so as to bring about perpetual peace. An attempt also made to show in brief the gap between the Kantian theory and the current peace effort through the United Nations. However, I am not intended here to address all the weaknesses and strengths of the United Nations Organization. Rather to point-out that the United Nations

having the same objective and goals with the Kantian model differs in substance and practice.

4.1. Contesting Kant

The major critic against Kant's theory of world peace through international public law comes from his immediate successor Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In his "Philosophy of Right" Hegel argues, that each state is an '*absolute being*', or a free being of its own. There shall be no judge above it. The very idea of *absolute spirit*, the state, as to Hegel hinders the international institution that is the federation of states;

The fundamental proposition of 'international law' is that treaties as the ground of obligation between states ought to be kept. But, the sovereignty of a state is the 'principle' of its relation to other states; states are to that extent in a state of nature in relation to each other. Their rights are actualized in their particular will and not in a universal will with constitutional powers over them (Hegel, philosophy of Right: paragraph (§): 333, in S. W. Dyde trans, 2001: 264).

Here, the conviction Hegel developed is that the state is the highest and most developed form of human association. It is the manifestation of reason. It is the highest and final social and political being. Interfering in it is irrational. If sovereign states are in conflict with one another, no one shall have the right to solve the problem other than the states themselves. However, according to Hegel a third party may take the role of a mediator. The mediator is not to judge the states and decide for them. Rather, as its very name implies the mediator is a third party whose role is to facilitate an environment for the states in disagreement to come into agreement through deliberation (ibid).

Thus, Hegel objected the very idea of the federation of states at the ground. As already stated Hegelian state is an absolute organic being. In Hegelian sense establishing a law above the state means threatening its identity. Therefore, for Hegel, it is better a state of nature between states prevail than states subject themselves to external law above them.

The other critics come from Hedley Bull. He is largely Hegelian in his conception of the state. In his book, "The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics" (1995), Bull objected Kant's claim "individuals and states" in the "state of nature" live in a constant insecurity and brutality. Bull's argument is that even if we agree that the existence of a sovereign in a state is important and necessary for securing the liberty of individual members, it is not necessarily true for political order between states, because, states are qualitatively different from individual human beings (Bull, 1995:44).

Bull provided three arguments for his thesis. First, once the states of the world have come into being the situation among them could not be characterized as a state of nature. Because the military force of states provide both internal and external security. The army is one (major) means to secure and defend the survival and identity of the state.

Second, other instruments that do not compromise the sovereignty of states can overcome 'lawlessness' between states. Factors like family ties, religious, moral, and cultural values shared by people in different states can promote understanding and friendly relation among them. Therefore, cultivating and expanding shared values, he calls them "unwritten rules" which have "allowed international order to exist across the ages", can lead to cooperative and peaceful relation among states.

Third, since (most) states are relatively huge in territory and large in population they could not be threatened in to *[absolute]* destruction. Therefore, “States are less vulnerable to violent attack than individuals; it is far easier to kill a single person than to eliminate an entire state, even in the nuclear age” (Bull, 1995: 44-48). Because of the above reasons, Bull believes that states and individuals are qualitatively different, and as a result, states need special analysis.

Both Hegel and Bull believed and argued that, introducing a super-national law contradicts the very idea of the state. For them state refers a supreme body that makes and enforces law. Subjecting it to a higher law is a contradiction.

The other critique to Kant’s theory, it is also a counter response to the Hegelian charge against Kant, comes from Jochen Rauber. In his article, “Philosophical Perspectives on the Constitutional Legitimacy of the World Organization” argues, “Kant should have argued for the necessity and rationality of a world republic”, rather than a federation of states (2009:65). Rauber claims, a “world republic is consistent with Kant’s theory of categorical imperative and public law” (ibid). The idea is, as individual persons overcame lawlessness in the ‘state of nature’ by coming into a state, international anarchy can only be escaped when individual states submit themselves to a world republic. He explicates such a view as follows;

Kant’s position is inconsistent on the ground for saying “the only way to fully overcome the state of nature among states is for them to inter into the federal association of states”. As such, states transfer part of their sovereignty to the federal level, but only that part that concerns their external relation to other states while retaining their internal sovereignty. The internal sovereignty of states that is the principle of non-interference poses a problem for the federal authority to fully overcome violence (ibid).

According to Rauber's view, a world republic is the right option to fully overcome violence, bring, and maintain global peace. This is because, in a world republic sovereign individual states dissolve themselves into a world republic as a consequence there could be no the so called the 'principle of non-interference' that hinders the inter-national body of law from overcoming violence.

These and other similar objections have been raised against Kant's doctrine of world peace. I addressed some of the issue I considered most relevant to the discussion of Kantian peace in the immediate forthcoming section.

4.2. Defending Kant

Most importantly, a positive credit that we should have to owe to Kant is for his conception of man. Kant rendered man intrinsic worth, a 'value that is above all price and admits of no equivalent' (Kant, 1797 translation from the German, introduction and preface by John Ladd 1965: ix). According to Kant, it is neither mere experience nor pure reason alone that tells us the value of man. The synthesis of the two, i.e. pure-practical reason, is the authority. Nonetheless, no matter how we know it (regardless of the methods of recognition), almost everybody roughly agrees on the freedom and the moral worth of man. Our conception, especially of the Kantian understanding, of man imposes a duty upon us to respect and treat fellow members with dignity. For Kant freedom and dignity are attributes of every single man. It is because of his conception of the freedom of man, Kant is usually called one of the early defenders of "per excellence" of the rights of man (ibid).

Therefore, Kant's moral and political philosophy is derived from his understanding of the 'right' and 'dignity' of man. Kantian moral law demands us to treat humans as ends. However, moral laws are not binding; rather their

application depends on the will of the moral agent. Because in moral sphere the agent is autonomous. He is 'free' even to act on the contrary.

To protect the rights of man from violence reason demands the establishment of a coercive body of law that requires acceptable and uniform performance among people. Kant contends republican constitution is the best and rational option. Because, the governing principles of a republic are derived from the moral imperative that recognizes the inherent value and dignity of man. In such a state citizens make laws on equal bases and equally subject themselves to the laws they made.

A republic, because it is according to the principle of right is naturally more stable and peaceful (Kant 179: 134). It is true, as we can witness today, states that give more freedom to their members and treat them as equals and source of law are more stable and peaceful than despotic states in which leaders consider members of the state as subjects.

However, justice and peace in a state is not enough. For international justice and peace, states should commit themselves. This is, as I would argue in defense of Kant below, possible through the association and cooperation of states.

For me, the critics Hegel and Bull forwarded against Kant sounds less convincing. Hegel's doctrine is state centered. I believe that Hegel gives less emphasis for inter-state relation. He fails to take into consideration the aggressive nature of some states against another. Besides, Hegelian conception of a state as an 'organism' is subject to further criticism. Among other things, the emergence and development of African states after colonialism is contrary to Hegelian conception. As Kant argued, states are artificial constructs. I will not deal with all the criticism against Hegel's theory of state. However, the

undeniable fact is that people in a state form common identity. This identity of people is the foundation for their harmonious and peaceful co-existence in the state. The state since it provides the necessary environment for secured and orderly life within its jurisdiction deserves respect and should be sovereign in its internal affair. Reason demands each state to be sovereign. As Kant claimed the federation of states is not designed to bury the sovereign state, to deprive its identity, to change its domestic constitution or to take responsibilities which could best be handled by the state. On the contrary, it would offer an ability to act in circumstances in which individual states could not act alone. If states voluntarily give up part of their sovereignty for such federation for their common security could not be contrary to reason.

The claim of Hedley Bull “once states come into being relation between them could not be regarded as state of nature” (Bull, 1995:45) does not hold sufficient water when we examine it in relation to the reality. Bull’s theory stands in opposition to the material fact. As long as we are living in a “state of men” not in “a state God”, as Augustine says, individual states do/and may be tempted to get advantage over other states by disregarding moral and sentimental values. Unless there is legally binding international agreement that regulate the behavior of states, they may act as they wish. What will perpetuate between them is not peace but the opposite, i.e. insecurity and violence. In such a situation states use military means as an excellent remedy to address disagreements, even minor ones. This is true especially, when one is more powerful than the other. Therefore, to avoid violent relations between states a common, strong, agreed upon and binding international law is not an option rather both a moral and legal imperative.

Hegel and Bull are in favor of international anarchy. Eventhough they affirm the necessity of national sovereign authority, they have failed to acknowledge the necessity of a sovereign body that regulates the relation between states.

Regarding the issue in consideration, the intensity of their failure is not tempting to point out looking back our past that states lived with the absence of common international law is enough. History tells us the fact that before the emergence of the united nations organization (UNO) and other several regional federations there were more war and violence among states than today (Rauber, 2009: 61). Because of these and other reasons the above stated claims of Hegel and Bull for “international anarchy” could not have empirical weight to refute Kant’s theory of peace through international law.

On the other hand, Jochen Rauber’s idea of ‘a world republic’ that Kant ruled out is not the authentic and best alternative. Rightly, in the article “Perpetual peace” Kant argued that because of the largeness of its territory, a world republic, even though its cause is just and rational, causes trouble for administration. Moreover, actually existing states are not mere associations of individual human beings. People in a state develop common identity that may be political, religious language, cultural, economic etc. Deconstructing states and forming a single world republic means making people to lose their well-developed common identities. Moreover, the other issue counted as a reason for disfavoring a world republic is that if such a world state falls into the hands of unenlightened group or despot we will lose the value we ascribe to, peace. Even to worse, Kant says, human race as a whole would get back to a situation of lawless , a state of nature (Kant 1795: 135).

I found Kant’s argument the most convincing one. Kant himself acknowledged that subjecting the human race into one coercive sovereign power that is a world republic is “the best and positive” idea (Kant 1795: 136). However, because of the above-mentioned reasons Kant prefers taking “the best possible” alternative, federation of free states.

Kant's position is more rational because it aims at possible durable peace and is far more likely to yield a durable global peace. States that come into the federation are required to reform themselves into a republican constitution and limit their "absolute freedom" and subject themselves to the common law of the federation that they themselves made.

4.3. The Process towards Peace: A Practical Point of View

In the inter-national anarchy, states live in unpredictable situation. In such an environment every state is so insecure even the most strong one. Therefore, states must take a move to join a federation out of self-interest if not from a nobler motive (Kant, 1795:135). Getting out of "inter-national anarchy" is both the duty and interest of every state.

Only after a century and few decades since the time Kant's "Perpetual Peace"(1795) was published the federation of states, League of Nations (1919-1920) and then United Nations (1946) came in to being. The objective and goal behind these international organizations were by overcoming "international anarchy" to bring, and sustain peace and security among and between states. According to Jochen Rauber, "the 'architects' of the United Nations Organization (UNO) build up the organization from a Kantian perspective, even though, they did not give explicit reference to Kant" (2009: 50).

Rauber argued, the United Nations is not a world republic, rather gets closer to the Kantian federation of states. As one looks at the structure of the United Nations and its principles may seem to embody Kantian requirements. The prohibition of intervention in article 2(4) of United Nations' Charter presents the right of states, their equality and territorial integrity. Moreover, in terms of structure the organization has established, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and International Court of Justice that might be said to form a

system of separated legislative, executive and judiciary powers. However, a closer look and examination at the United Nations reveals the fact that it is not a truly democratic institution and exactly a Kantian model.

The United Nations unlike the Kantian federation is non-discriminatory in membership (Rauber, 2009: 63). The Kantian model allows only republican states to become members of the federation. In the United Nations, even the most despotic states can be members. However, this United Nations' principle should not be regarded as irrational since one of its goals is to encourage and assist states to become republican, or in modern sense, representative democracy (United Nations' Charter Article 1(2)).

In the general assembly of the United Nations one-member state one-vote rule is applied. This fundamentally recognizes the legal equality of member states. However, the unKantian and unrepresentative element manifests in the arrangements and practices of the Security Council that is one of the most powerful organs of the organization. The Security Council has fifteen members, among them ten are chosen by the general assembly for not more than a two years term of office. The other five states, United States of America, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and People's Republic of China have permanent representation (United Nations Charter article 23(1)) and they have assumed absolute power over all decisions. Therefore, even if the general assembly agrees on something a member in the Security Council has the power to veto the decision of other states in the general assembly (ibid article 27(3)).

Furthermore, the major problem in the United Nations is that it allows unilateral intervention. As such in its practice, United Nations, is inconsistent and in a contradiction with its principle of equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. For example, when the United States of America invade and bombard sovereign states including those in Panama (1989), Haiti (1949), Iraqi

and Afghanistan (2003) (Robert, J. Delahonty and John Yoo, 2010:3) the United Nations did noting rather than giving its approval and diplomatic support to the invading state.

Eventhough, the United Nations able to bring relative peace today, the organization itself allows violence by allowing a bigger state to invade and destabilize a smaller one.

I argue that the United Nations to be truly representative of member states, as Kantian federation of states prescribes and to attain sustainable peace, constituting states whether they be small or large, poor or wealthy should have equal access for representation in the executive, judiciary, and legislative organs. Moreover, member states should equally subject themselves to the laws of the federation they themselves made.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have argued that peace, as inter-subjective state is not mere absence of war or direct material violence rather it has other normative manifestations as well. It is because, besides war and direct material conflict, practices like political repression, social alienation, and discrimination based on sex, skin color, religion, economic status and similar others constitute a situation of peacelessness.

As it has been discussed in the second chapter among the various notions of peace the views of David Brash and Charles Webel (2002) and Immanuel Kant (1795), that envisages the concept peace “as absence of violence and the presence of a fertile environment for people to develop and actualize themselves” is the best possible definition. To this effect, I have argued that Kant’s categorical imperative that arises from consciousness of human right and dignity can be a founding block of lasting peace. However, given one aspect of man, immaturity and selfishness, the categorical imperative as a purely moral code may not be a real cause of peace. Because, in moral choice the agent is autonomous or free even to act contrary to universal moral principle or law. Nonetheless, I believe that incorporating Kantian moral law as guiding principle into binding and coercive public laws can lead humanity to more harmonious relation, peaceful and secure life.

Perpetual peace is a standard or goal that can be attained through gradual and continuous process. Kant argued that prior to the emergence of the state people live in a state of lawlessness. It is in the state (in any form) people began to enjoy relative peace. A state in principle is supposed to provide protection to its citizens. However, some states most often act against their citizens. Reason demands states, according to Kant, to become republican and respect, and promote the inherent value of their people.

A republican state because of its founding principle does not engage in war with other states and internally the citizen of such a state have no rational ground to violently act against the state and its cause. Any perceived or/and actual disagreement in a state has a chance to be resolved through peaceful means alone. However, peace in a republic is not a guarantee of inter-national peace. In the “inter-national anarchy” states, like individual human beings in the “state of nature”, are free to do whatever they want to do. To limit the unreasoned freedoms of states and regulate their relation with other states and foreign nationals establishing a commonly agreed universal and international law is an imperative.

Kant believes these are tasks or standards imposed by the moral legislation of reason; hence our conduct as individuals and collectively states must be governed and directed in accordance with the public law/s that are derived from moral imperatives.

Kant advances the idea that states to get out of “inter-national anarchy” they ought to establish “federation of states”. He described the proposed federation of states in various ways. In reason, it is an international body of law analogous to the union of individuals under a law within a single state and issuing from the social contract. But many difficulties hinder the establishment of such a political body. A world-state especially in the form of a single world government would tend to despotism and eventually to anarchy. Its extent would obstruct the processes of government and the protection of members in the remote distance. Individual states would also be unwilling to accept the alteration of sovereignty involved and the submission to a single world state. The absolute union of many nations into a single state (world republic) is even declared to imply a contradiction, since it is the relationship among separate states that is under consideration. What is required is rather a voluntary union or federation of free states.

However, one can think how the scientific, philosophical, economic, moral, religious, and social developments of the time when the essay “Perpetual Peace” was written differs from our own. It is certain, nevertheless, that in spirit Kant would have sympathized with the later movements towards established peace. Kant's federation of free states may in certain respects be compared to the United Nations Organization and the international agreements which resulted from it. United Nations in essence corresponds to the Kantian programme. At first glance it seems to be all Kantian. But a closer look reveals that it has unkantian elements too, some of which are even contrary to the principles that Kant considers very essential for peace. For example, in principle the United Nations recognizes the sovereignty and equality of states. This is in line with Kantian doctrine. But in practice within the United Nations structure some states enjoy more power than others. In the Security Council, the five states, United States of America, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and People’s Republic of China, have absolute power to “veto” the decision of other states. This is special privilege to the five states and unfair to those who constitute the majority. The other and more devastating shortcoming of the United Nations is that it allows unilateral intervention. For instance the United States of America, the most powerful nation in the world in terms of economy and military power, has been allowed to invade and bombard sovereign states including those in Panama (1989), Haiti (1949), Iraqi and Afghanistan (2003). This is against the United Nations Charter that states about the equality and sovereignty of member states and the real interest of less powerful states.

To be in accordance to reason and bring peace the republican law should advance the needs of members with equal consideration and the federation of states also should recognize the equality and sovereignty of all “independent” nations. If decision on global concern and actions are to be made, they should be made with the participation of all nations on the bases of equality.