



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL**  
**RELATIONS**

**The Dynamics of Ethio - U.S Bilateral Defense Cooperation:  
Challenges and Prospects**

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**June, 2019**  
**Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

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**POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Mehari Abraha entitled ‘The Dynamics of Ethio - U.S Bilateral Defense Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects’ submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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## Abstract

*This thesis intends to assess the dynamics of Ethio - U.S bilateral defense cooperation specifically by identifying the existing challenges to be resolved and that of prospects to build upon since 2011 till date. The thesis has mainly focused on revealing gaps on defense relations of the two countries. The study employs a qualitative research design of which case Study method is selected as it gives authority to the researcher to make the required descriptions and interpretations based on the collected data than the other methods. Besides, this design was found appropriate as the data collection tool and method was revisited a number of times based on the clues and information obtained along the way from one respondent to the other due to the secrecy of subject to prepare a comprehensive questionnaire from the very beginning. In so doing, the study makes use of purposive sampling techniques to choose those potential respondents on both parties to respond to an open ended items and document analysis were used as another important source of data. In relation to the document analysis; the MoU signed between the two countries, agreed meeting minutes, annual reports pertaining to the Ethio - U.S bilateral defense cooperation and the like were consulted. So far as the findings of this study are concerned; the bilateral defense cooperation and partnership of fighting terrorism is characterized by provision of finance, trainings, equipment's, military advisory on the U.S. side whereas man power to the extent of sacrificing citizens lives has been contributed more of on the Ethiopia part ever since the agreement was signed. In this regard, the researcher finds it difficult to make comparisons whether or not the bilateral defense cooperation is founded on a balanced amount as the contributions on both sides as they are incomparable in the first place except that they are considered negotiable and made in agreement on both parties. The Ethio-U.S bilateral Defense cooperation still awaits further improvement above all to balance the relationship of the two countries. This thesis has tried its level best by analyzing the existing and possibly retrieved data, given the secrecy of the subject itself, attempted to arrive at concluding remarks in relation to the challenges and prospects of the bilateral defense cooperation.*

**Key words:** *Challenges, Prospects, Bilateral Defense Cooperation, Terrorism, Security*

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## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

BDC – Bilateral Defense Committee

BDC- Bilateral Defense Cooperation

BDA- Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency

DCA- Defense Cooperation Agreement

DoD – Department of Defense

DoS- Department of State

EACTI- East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiation

EC-Executive Committee

ELP- English Language Proficiency

EPRDF – Ethiopian People’s Republic Democratic Front

ENDF- Ethiopian National Defense Forces

EPLF- Eritrean People’s Liberation Front

FDRE – Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

FMF- Foreign Military Sales Financing

FMS- Foreign Military Sales

HoA- Horn of Africa

ICS- Indirect Commercial Sales

IMET- International Military Education and Training

MAAG- Military Assistance Advisory Group

MoND – Ministry of National Defense

MFN- Most Favored Nations

MoU – Memorandum of Understanding

NIFG- National Islamic Front Government

PMAC- Provisional Military Administrative Council

TPLF – Tigray People’s Liberation Front

TWG – Technical Working Group

UIC – Union of Islamic Court

UK-United Kingdom

UN- United Nations

USCDI- United States Center for Defense Information

US- United States

USA- United States of America

USSR- Union of Socialist Soviet Republic

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# CHAPTER ONE

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background to the Study

The contact between Ethiopia and the United States is one of the oldest ties that Ethiopia has established in its diplomatic history. This relationship chronologically holds the fourth place following the relations of four European nations with Ethiopia namely: Italy, France, Great Britain and the USSR respectively as contended by Taye (2010:108). Though it had the fourth place from the start, by now it has a much closer relationship than most of these earliest allies.

Official contacts between Ethiopia and the United States of America dated back to the arrival in 1903 of the Skinner mission, named after the American envoy, Robert P Skinner, and subsequent signing of a treaty of friendship and commerce between emperor Minilik II and the American envoy (Bahru, 2002:184). In this regard, the treaty could be considered the corner stone for the relationship of the two countries, which proved to be one of the most important diplomatic ties and that have played the most crucial role in the Ethio-U. S Bilateral Cooperation for more than a century.

However, in the years that followed, the relations between the two countries did not go well in accordance to the needs and desires of the Ethiopian government. In other words, although the Ethiopian government did its level best effort to enhance the relationship; the response from the American part was not an encouraging one. Even so, Emperor Haile Selassie I had been able to preserve the relationship as much as possible for decades (Negussay, 2003:80).

The mid 1930s was the time at which the Italian Fascist forces were able to invade Ethiopia and stay for five years. Emperor Haile Selassie I, who had been in exile for almost five years in the UK, had made his level best diplomatic efforts to retain the sovereignty of the country and his imperial authority. His endeavor combined with the persistent struggle of the then Ethiopian people, particularly the Ethiopian patriots who were fighting against the fascist forces, brought about the evacuation of the aggressor fascist forces of Italy from Ethiopia. The support of the British forces during this time had also of great importance to the restoration of the power of the

emperor and the sovereignty of the country. Although, the emperor had been able to return home with dignity and to restore his 'authority', the British forces that had helped him were not ready to handover the administration of his country to him. For that reason, he was not an authorized leader of his nation (Marcus, 1995:8).

Being threatened by the brutal invasion of fascist Italy in 1936 and the presence of the colonial powers around Ethiopia; the emperor made a move to establish a modern military force. Accordingly, he was obliged to seek the support of the U.S to materialize his objective. Consequently, he had been able to obtain a positive signal from the United States and re-established the Ethio-U. S relations that had been dismantled by the fascist invasion of Ethiopia (Schraeder, 1996:118). This could be considered the first and important vital move that the two countries had ever been made concerning bilateral defense cooperation.

However, this move which was made by the Ethiopian government was contrary to the interest of Great Britain for Ethiopia. Probably, Britain might ask itself as to why the U.S took such a position against them back then. Although the two super powers were fighting as allies in World War II, the United States was attracted towards the Horn of Africa largely based on its own national interest at the time as its involvement in the war had increased the importance of the region. Therefore, the bilateral agreement between the two countries was extended to other sectors such as education as well and a shift had been made in this regard from the Britain system of education to that of the U.S. Off course, this condition was strengthened as a result of East-West division in the international system as noted by (Schraeder,1996:15).

In this regard, the emperor had used the American assistance to challenge the influence enacted by the British unwillingness to allow him to administer his country as a full-fledged sovereign state. With the passage of time, Ethiopia became more close to the United States through which the emperor's need for American weapons was highly increased; and the request for U.S arms was very much continued. In addition to his request through different diplomatic mechanisms, the emperor had also sent his trusted Vice Minister of finance, Excellency Yilma Deressa, to the United States looking for such military support. At that time Ethiopia was encircled and was also

threatened by the British forces that had been assigned in different areas and parts of Ethiopia after the evacuation of the Italian forces as studied by (Feleke, 2011: 32-33).

Then again Schraeder (1996:117), found out that of the different alternatives that were seen for the future of Eritrea, incorporation of the territory under the Ethiopian sovereignty was the concluding agreement that was reached by the U.S National Security Bureaucracies. This analysis was made by the U.S State Department of the Middle East and African affairs as the study indicated. The state department was worried about it partly because independent Eritrea was assumed to end up a weak state which would eventually be exposed to Soviet infiltration.

In fact, the U.S had also another sounding reason for bringing Eritrea under the Ethiopian administration. It was believed that neither Italian trusteeship nor independence of Eritrea would serve the U.S objective of establishing a military base in Asmara. Particularly, independence was denied by the policy makers of the U.S who had believed that an economically unviable Eritrea would be subjected to or would fall a prey to communist aggression. Thus, the U.S voted for the alternative that could enable them to have access over Eritrea as suggested by (Schraeder, 1996:118).

Consequently, the Kagnew military base became the most crucial factor in determining the Ethio-U.S defense relationships. The base had greatly influenced the support of the United States in the process of incorporating Eritrea with Ethiopia. It had also been a vital source of U.S military assistance to Ethiopia. The incorporation of Eritrea under the sovereignty of Ethiopia was by large facilitated by the support of the United States as noted by (Clapham, 1998:222).

After a series of negotiations between the U.S and Ethiopia though, the Kagnew military base and other facilities in Eritrea were left to the U.S. This agreement was also signed and agreed to be binding for twenty-five years. In exchange, the agreement was accompanied by provision of weapons, other military equipment's and training as assessed by (Lefebvre, 1998:616).

Not long after that, the independence of Somalia in 1960 became a serious challenge to the Ethio-U.S relationship. The philosophy of Great Somalia provoked a threat upon the territorial

integrity of Ethiopia. The concern of Emperor Haile Selassie to this end was heightened when Somalia started to grab arms from both sides of the West and the East as confirmed by (Lefebvre, 1998:612).

In addition to this, another challenge stirred up due to the fact that the Kagnew Station was substituted by the new base in the Indian Ocean namely Diego Garcia, due to the introduction of the satellite technology which made the radio station out of date, and subsequently the U.S navy had shifted its focus to the Indian Ocean, and in 1966 Diego Garcia became the U.S forward base in the region as identified by (Evelyn, 2003).

In the beginning of the 1970's, the overall condition in Ethiopia had shown the inevitability of the socio- economic changes in the forthcoming future. The U.S bureaucracies had also noticed the emerging change in Ethiopia, and lobbied Haile Selassie I to make the necessary arrangements for the inevitable change in his administration. Even so, the U.S had played no significant role in influencing and pressuring the emperor to transform his administration back then. Besides, the emperor himself was not willing and could not been able to make the necessary changes despite the information obtained from the U.S; as a result, the regime was overthrown by the military junta and he was moved out from the palace by his own soldiers in 1974 as stated by (Feleke, 2011: 32). Though, not acted upon by the emperor the timely information provided by the U.S to the government was invaluable.

Consequently, as the new military council assumed the state power and favored to adopt the socialist ideology into play, its relation with the U.S in the course of time became unpleasant. Gradually, the long standing Ethio – U.S relation diminished. Besides, the Military Junta also announced the closure of the Kagnew base and the evacuation of the U.S Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) from Ethiopia. This led the U.S to started supporting neighboring Somalia; and this military support encouraged it to declare a forced invasion upon Ethiopia. Therefore, Somalia invaded Eastern Ethiopia by the time. On the other hand, the Cuban military forces and the Soviet military advisors supported Ethiopia and eventually the Somali forces were driven out by the coalition forces. As a result, the Ethio-U.S defense cooperation was terminated up to the end of 1980s (Feleke, 2011:50).

After the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has come to power in 1991, the defense cooperation got back its original place and the two countries - Ethiopia and the U.S - started working in a closer manner to deter the spread of international terrorism in the Horn of Africa and avoid the harm of international terrorism (Schraeder, 1992:590). In view of this, this study will attempt to assess and investigate the existence, growth, prospects and challenges in relation to the bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries.

## **1.2. The Problem Statement**

United States has developed a new, close and friendly relations with the Ethiopian government since EPRDF overthrew the Derg regime in 1991 by force in collaboration with the Ethiopian people. In real sense, Ethiopia occupies an important position in the volatile and strategically important Horn of Africa. It has used this location to its advantage, offering its required assistance as a security partner to both the United States and the United Nations especially in the fight against the terrorist threat in the region. During the 1990s, Ethiopia cooperated with the U.S on containing the threat posed by the National Islamic Front Government (NIFG) in Khartoum. In return, it has been able to enjoy abundant foreign assistance as assessed by (Lyons, 2007).

Lyons (2007) further illustrated that, Ethio-U. S relationship has made a remarkable improvement since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. The U.S which has always opposed the act of global terrorism has virtually reinforced its determination since the accident. To this end, its alliance with Ethiopia was scaled up. The security assistance to Ethiopia has grown tremendously and the security relationship bolstered as a result. Strengthening this Getachew (2009:100) put it as;

*"After 9/11, Ethiopia has been categorized as an ally in the fight against terrorism, especially in the neighboring Somalia, which has been controlled by war lords since 1991."*

Subsequently, the intervention of Ethiopia into Somalia was pushed forward by U.S assistance. In fact, this intervention had been seen in various ways from different interested groups both inside and outside Ethiopia. Some scholars had considered the intervention as essential and necessary while others saw it with suspicion as if the U.S 'subcontracting' its war on terrorism to

a regional ally. Still others had seen it as if both the U.S and Ethiopia opposed the Union of Islamic Court (UIC) in Somalia but for different reasons. Be that as it may, the U.S had concerns regarding links to Al-Qaeda and other alleged extremist groups and claimed that certain ‘high-value’ targets (notably individuals that the U.S apprehended responsible for the bombing attack on its embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salam) were assumed to be in Mogadishu. In contrast, Ethiopia also framed its interests around terrorism and national security, but its focus was largely on Eritrea insurgent groups operating out UIC controlled areas (Lyons, 2007).

In this regard, Ethiopia would likely have acted with or without U.S tacit approval. The United States, however, created the impression that it was working hand-in-hand with the Ethiopian defense forces when the U.S military command used its aircraft and high-technology capacities to target what U.S regarded as Al-Qaeda leaders based in Somalia (MoND, 2006). So, there is a fragmented view and interpretations so far by some writers by considering the cooperation between Ethiopia and U.S from security point of view only. Nonetheless, this study will try to investigate and deeply understand the cooperation between the two countries focusing on defense cooperation specifically.

Furthermore, none of these studies, either implicitly or explicitly sketch the growth or shallow of the defense cooperation between the two countries. Taking this into account, this study will investigate whether or not the ‘Defense-to-Defense Cooperation’ between Ethiopia and United States is growing making use of the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) by the Ethio-U. S Bilateral Defense Committee as a benchmark. In fact, the MoU was signed on 10<sup>th</sup> February 2011 in Addis Ababa by Minister Siraja Fegessa, the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense (MoU, 2011).

According to, MoU (2011) also stated that, the Ethio-U. S Bilateral Defense Committee has two sub-committees which are known as the Technical Working Group Committee and that of the Executive Committee. The Ethio-U. S Bilateral Defense Committee has to conduct a meeting annually in either country and until now had almost covered "8<sup>th</sup> Annual Meetings" on 15<sup>th</sup> November 2018 in Addis Ababa. Moreover, some of the areas of cooperation mentioned in the MoU includes: Military Relations (Cooperation on Counterterrorism, Sharing Intelligence

Information and Cooperation on Somalia Security Sector Reform); Security Assistance (Support on C-130/L-100 Air Mobility, on Communication Equipment's, on Combat Engineering, and on Peacekeeping); and Training & Education (Cooperation on short and long term International Military Training and Education). However, the researcher could not find any scientific study that is dedicated to assess the status of the defense cooperation implementation, based on the lived in it experience, which is why this study is initiated.

Thus, this study assesses and investigates the implementation of the specific issues mentioned in the MoU and the overall status of the defense cooperation in terms of existing opportunities and challenges. By doing so, the study was able to provide comprehensive information concerning the case of internal and external forces that have shaped the bilateral defense cooperation between Ethiopia and the United States the way it actually is today.

### **1.3. Research Questions**

The study intends to address the following research questions: -

1. What features characterize the present day's defense cooperation between Ethiopia and the U.S?
2. How inclusive are the areas of cooperation mentioned in the MoU?
3. To what extent are those cooperation agreements mentioned in the MoU realized and materialized in the actual situation on the ground?
4. What are the challenges on bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries?

### **1.4. Objective of the Study**

#### **1.4.1. General Objective of the Study**

The general objective of this study was to investigate the characteristic features, comprehensibility, practicality, and facing challenges of the Ethio-U.S bilateral defense cooperation since 2011 onwards.

#### **1.4.2. Specific Objectives of the Study**

This study was meeting the following specifically objectives: -

- To assess the characteristic features of the present day's defense cooperation between Ethiopia and the U.S;
- To check the degree of inclusion of the MoU signed between the two countries in relation to the possible areas of cooperation that may exist; and
- To identify the extent to which cooperation agreements mentioned in the MoU are realized and materialized on the ground.

#### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

This study has significant in pointing out the status of the defense cooperation implementation in comparison to its original plan to both countries. Besides, this study could serve as an input for those researchers who aspire to undertake an in-depth study concerning the diplomatic relations between the two countries who either from Ethiopia or the United States of America.

#### **1.6. Delimitation of the Study**

This study was delimited to the period starting 2011 onwards on Ethio-U.S bilateral defense cooperation. Even so, the study was attempted to establish a body of knowledge concerning the overall diplomatic relations of the two countries since the emperor's time simply with the intent to communicate a complete picture to its readers.

#### **1.7. Limitation of the Study**

This study has limitation in illustrating and answering the research questions framed above in such a way that the issue was found to be very sensitive much more than assumed by the researcher in the process of collecting research data. Due to this reason, the data collection had taken lengthened time and the data collected at the same time was not found to be adequate so as to adequately address the specific objectives of the study.

## **1.8. Methodology and Methods of Data Collection**

### **1.8.1. Design of the Study**

The study employed the qualitative research design. Of the variety of qualitative research methods, the Case Study method is selected as it gives authority to the researcher to make the required descriptions and interpretations based on the collective data than the other methods (Vanderstoep & Johnston, 2009:223). In fact, the researcher was only made those interpretations within the boundary of the bilateral cooperation made between the two countries on defense matters. Besides, this design was selected as the area of the study is relatively narrow and the method selected was enabling the researcher to go deep into the existing situation concerning the topic of the study. Thus, the selected design and method were assumed to be appropriate to describe the overall status of the bilateral defense cooperation specifically focusing on the existing prospects and challenges.

### **1.8.2. Data Source and Data Collection**

This study is made use of both primary and secondary data sources. Firstly, those individuals who are going to be involved in the face-to-face interview were serving as primary data sources. Secondly, much data was collected from MoU, Annual Agreed Minutes, donation reports, diplomatic note verbal's, and archives as the study covers the period starting from 2011 onwards which literally demands the activities which had been taken place in the last eighteen years more.

### **1.8.3. Population and Target Population of the Study**

The population of the study includes those members of Ethiopian defense forces and diplomats who are directly or indirectly working on the defense cooperation of the two countries. More specifically, the target population includes, but not limited to, those people who are working in the following directorates or departments of the Federal Democratic Republic Ethiopia (FDRE) of Ministry of Defense such as Defense Foreign Relations and Military Cooperation Directorate, Defense Training and Education Main Department, Defense Peacekeeping Main Department, Defense Combat Engineering Main Department, Defense Information and Communication Main Department, Defence Intelligence Main Department, Defense Joint Operation Main Department,

Defense Logistics Main Department, Defense Health Directorate, Ethiopian Air Force and the like on the Ethiopian Side. On the other hand, the specific departments found in the U.S. Embassy to Ethiopia like Defense Attach, Office Security Cooperation (OSC) and Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).

#### **1.8.4. Sample Size and Sampling Techniques**

The representativeness of the sample is not as such a question in this kind of study and yet, the researcher made all the necessary efforts so as to collect as much information as required to fully address the specific objectives of the study. Therefore, the interviewees were selected purposely from the above mentioned Departments/ Directorates and diplomats of the two counties based on their involvement and knowledge in relation to the topic under study. Thus, a minimum of seventeenth (17) staff members from Ethiopian side and seven (7) diplomats' staff from U.S side were used to select for the study.

#### **1.8.5. Data Collection Instruments**

The study employed two major data collection instruments. These are semi-structured interview schedule and checklist. The semi-structured interview was containing questions that were responded by the key informants. The check list was developed by the researcher to be able to take notes of any discrepancies regarding with the area of the study while review of documents, agreements, and bilateral defense conferences/ meeting used as secondary data sources.

#### **1.8.6. Procedures of Data Collection**

In order to realize its intended purpose of this study undertaking was employed variety of strategies in gathering pertinent data.

First, key informants were contacted in order to obtain their agreement to take part in the study. Once their consent is obtained a convenient time and place for an interview was scheduled and the data were collected used notebooks.

Secondly, the secondary data sources was identified and sorted out on the basis of their relevance for the study. The identification of these sources was most likely made based on the information

obtained from the interview participants and other relevant members of the specified departments on the two sides. Once they are identified and sorted accordingly, the necessary data were collected based on the checklist prepared for this purpose.

### **1.8.7. Data Analysis**

The data collected through the series of interviews was thematically arranged based on the themes mentioned in the basic research questions which are framed at the beginning of the study. In the similar fashion, the data collected from the secondary sources were also sorted out.

Eventually, the data is narrated thematically to the extent of meeting the research objectives set for the study. In doing so, the researcher may make use of some descriptive statistical methods to summarize some data obtained from the secondary sources to make it more informative and complete based on the kind of the data collected in this regard.

### **1.8.8. Ethical Consideration**

The researcher is respected the rights, needs, values, and desires of informants. Specially, when the interviewee wishes to remain anonymous for any information, it was respected and her/his consent to participate or not to shall be respected. Besides, the researcher shall make all the necessary effort to duly acknowledge all the sources used in the preparation of this study.

## **1.9. Organization of the Research Report**

This study report has five chapters. Chapter one consists of the background, statement of the problem, objective, significance, delimitation, limitation, methodology and organization of the study. Chapter two presents review of related literature that is relevant to defense cooperation, types and challenges as well as relevant to the problem under study. While chapter three deals with pre-1991 Ethio-U.S Bilateral Defense Cooperation of the study; chapter four presents the analysis and interpretation of the data collected through interviews. Finally, chapter five deals with the summary of the key findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Besides, this research report consists of references, and appendices.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2. REVIEW RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals with literature review and theoretical framework based on relevant previous research publications on defense cooperation. Doing so will help to understand internal and external forces that have shaped the bilateral defense cooperation between Ethiopia and the United States.

#### **2.2. Defining Defense Cooperation**

Defense Cooperation refers to “all defense Departments interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationship that promote specific security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.” (U.S Department of Defense, 2006: 5).

The overall goals of defense cooperation include creating favorable military balances of power (e.g., U.S selling weapons and training to Saudi Arabia to balance Iran), advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements (e.g., U.S collaborating with Japan on missile defense technology), building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and preventing crisis and conflict. The defense cooperation programs tend to work better when mutual interests align with its partner’s (Eugene and Harvey, 1997:5-48).

There are six categories of defense cooperation activities: military contacts, including senior officials visits, counterpart visits, conferences/ seminars, staff talks, and personal and unit exchange programs; nations assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities; multinational training; multinational exercises; multinational education; and arms control and treaty monitoring activities (New York Times, 15, Sep,2008).

According to Derek and Kathleen (2009), defense cooperation programs have broadened the mission set for the military beyond major combat. These mission include: developing bilateral and multilateral military relationships; promoting bilateral and multilateral information sharing and interoperability; providing training and educational opportunities for partners' officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs); planning and executing bilateral and multilateral exercise; providing training and equipment for partners to monitor and control air, land, and sea borders; training and equipping partners for peacekeeping operations; enabling partners to resolve local conflict and addressing underlying conditions that spur violent extremism.

Further, there are different aspects of defense cooperation but the main aspects of include strategic level activities that include defense consultations and strategic dialogues, arms transfers, regional activities, including state to state military protocols, opening of military bases, participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, professional military education exchanges, cooperation in non -traditional security areas, like sending armed forces to counter-terrorism exercises, United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Some of the items in defense cooperation include: exchange of military attaches, visits by military delegations, military study abroad, participation in international arms control and disarmament programs, arms import and export, and military assistance to friendly countries (Rajagopalan, 2015 and Du Plessis, 2008).

After doing defense cooperation there are certain benefits that are expected. According to Rolfe (2015), there nine outcomes that emanate from defense cooperation: Reduction in hostility or tensions; Symbolic positioning by signaling a willingness to work with and trust interlocutors; A more competent armed force with a commitment to accountability mechanisms; Transparency in terms of capacity and intentions; Development and reinforcement of good relationships with partners; Changing perceptions of each other; Confidence building; Encouragement through incentives and rewards; and Building a domestic constituency for the armed forces.

Here the concept of defense diplomacy is very important to enhance the above defense cooperation among states. The concept is a paradox between two extremes defense related to armed force and diplomacy which is related to peaceful means of interaction (Edmonds and Mills, 1998).

According to Hans J. Morgenthau (2003), diplomacy is the promotion of national interest through peaceful means to add on this, Harold Nicholson (1981), defines diplomacy as management of international relation by means of negotiation. Then if diplomacy is all about peaceful negotiation then, defense diplomacy it is also generally considered the nonviolent use of a state's defense apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a government through cooperation with other countries (Winger, 2014). In international politics, defense diplomacy refers to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through the peaceful employment of defense resources and capabilities.

For Community dictionary defense diplomacy is the peaceful application by a country of resources from across the spectrum of defense, for the purpose of developing advantageous bilateral and multilateral relationships. Generally, from the definition we understood that defense diplomacy is a defense corporation between states-to-states and other actors, etc. for peaceful ends.

Moreover, defense diplomacy it is “the use of armed forces in operation other than war, building on their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign policy objectives abroad” (Edmonds and Mills, 1998). Like other regular diplomacy, defense diplomacy instrument or tool in which counties achieve their national and foreign policy goals.

### **2.3. Theories and Perspectives of Defense Cooperation**

The topic of cooperation may be one of the most studied in the area of International Relations. Neo-liberal institutionalist approaches, for example, are largely concerned with understanding what leads to international cooperation and how it is institutionalized (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane , 1985; Haas, 1990; and Keohane, 2005). Realists also discuss the subject, in particular via studies of alliances, although with lower expectations for cooperation from this perspective (Grieco, 1990; Herz, 1950; Hyde-Price, 2007; and Jervis, 1978). Constructivist authors also work on expectations for cooperation, suggesting new forms of socialization (Buzan; Little, 2001; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Hope, 1998; and Wendt, 1992). All these currents, in general, seek to locate the element of cooperation, as a general principle, in international relations. Some authors were more specific in the topic of international defense cooperation, and sought to create theoretical

models that explained post- cooperation in some specific areas (Cottey and Forster, 2004; Donon and Moroney et al., 2007).

Although they have produced important advances, there are significant limits to understand the cooperation in defense that are not deepened in the literature. While International Relations theories are very broad, locating conditions more or less conducive to cooperation, those who have specifically sought to address the element of international defense cooperation are too specific. Being generally constructed to describe the dynamics of specific relationships, these models are not possible to be replicated in any regions of the world. Developing a new theory that seeks not only to locate when cooperation will be more encouraged but also how it should be given is an attempt to overcome these limits presented by literature.

In offensive realism, International Relations theory where cooperation is more difficult to achieve, elements that indicate the possibility of cooperation defense in international, then suggest a rather broad theoretical model and with high expectation of explanatory power since, it could also be adopted, as a starting point, by other theoretical approaches. The construction of a new theory also serves to bring about a greater understanding of the behavior of a unipolar system, since there is still no theoretical theory of how that system operates (Monteiro, 2011). The study, in this sense, is not to bring a single or final answer on the subject, but to show and assess how the systemic pressures in unipolarity serve to encourage cooperation in defense.

### **2.3.1. Realistic Offensive Defense Cooperation in Unipolarity**

First, it is necessary to define what cooperation means in this area. Defense actions are aimed at national states as a way of preserving sovereign integrity. International security is geared towards a more systemic perspective, as a way to prevent the emergence of international conflicts, regardless of their form or origin. Muthanna (2006) differs more substantially from the concepts. According to the author, security cooperation is a more general term, ranging from bilateral to multilateral relations involving both civilian and military. It involves: political-military cooperation, which includes multilateral actions such as United Nations peace operations; civil cooperation in security; and defense cooperation, which includes defense ministries, associated agencies and the Armed Forces of different States, including, in particular, military cooperation. This definition includes other ways of describing post-Cold War military alignments, such as the

Defense Diplomacy of (Cottey and Forster, 2004). The study will adopt the concept of defense cooperation in the assessing of theory with this study.

Next, one must understand the role of relationship with the pole. Although the regional elements are clearer under the unipolarity, the type of threats will not be the same. Since the emergence of unipolarity, the conflicts observed in the international system are much more of an intra-state than an interstate (Sutterlin,, 1995; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). Unipolarity not only eliminates conflicts guided by the global balance of power, but also minimizes disputes over regional balance of power, since states will seek not to challenge the global order maintained by unipolar power. Seeking to change the regional power balance could be seen by unipolar power as an attempt to search for regional hegemon status, thus threatening the global balance of power. The greater the interest of unipolar powers in a region, the greater the possibility that regional dynamics reflect the global power dynamics (Buzan and Waver, 2003).

The closer it is to a region of the strategic interest area of unipolar power, the less likely it is that the defensive dynamics of that region will run counter to the interests of the single pole of the system. This element meets (Monteiro, 2012) expectation of the first two types of conflicts expected in unipolarity - both offensive and defensive domination lead to conflicts between the unipolar power and another state. This means that the greater the interest of unipolar power in a region, the more limited its offensive capacity will be the States. The third element of (Monteiro, 2012), Of disengagement, would lead to conflicts between states other than unipolar power, in line with our expectations of increasing the importance of regional balance of power. And even in these cases, there is always the possibility that the global pole will still act as an offshore balancer. This motivator of defense cooperation is explained by the offensive realism by the calculated character of the aggression.

According to Proença Jr. (2003: 2), "every society, in each time, configures in a particular way the conversion of its resources into forces," which does not make it incompatible that, in order to maximize its power and due to the new nature of the post-1991 threats, States are compelled to cooperate in defense.

### **2.3.2. The Security Dilemma and Cooperation in Defense**

Why cooperate in defense? Traditionally, unless motivated by the emergence of pragmatic state, realistic theories assert that cooperating in defense is to diminish the state's capacity for survival. There are, according to (Mearsheimer, 2001), two types of power: real and latent - composed of elements that can be transformed into real power. According to (Urpelainen, 2012), cooperate in defense is to reduce the external options of the States precisely in the area where it is most sensitive, in real power, responsible immediately for the guarantee of their survival. The basic premise of offensive realism is the security dilemma as an element that leads to self-help and hampers international cooperation.

According to (Mearsheimer, 2001), however, even driven by the security dilemma, states will not want to start an arms race if this is not synonymous with an improvement in their strategic position. Since, under unipolarity, the best option to increase the security of states is not to meet the interests of unipolar power; to cooperate in defense can have multiple motivations:

First, even under unipolarity, States are concerned with the regional and global balance of power, although they may do little or nothing to change them. Even so, Mearsheimer (2001) argues that before worrying about projecting power, the second-tier states will bother to defend themselves against the larger ones. In this sense, cooperating in defense can be a way for these states to maintain, modernize, and eventually even increase their power resources without, however, unchecking an arms race that cannot sustain or arousing disagreement of unipolar power. Unipolarity does not eliminate, but controls, like no other distribution of resources, the effects of the security dilemma (Dyson, 2010).

Second, offensive realism also claims that allies influence spending and types of defense investment. The richer the allies, the less spending they need to make on defense. Taking into account (Wilkins, 2012) change in the post-1991 alliance profile, and recognizing that the current standard of alignment of states is an alignment that takes into account the actors' expectations about the degree of the future-oriented cooperation, unlike the less stable alliances, the maximizing behavior of states, driven by offensive realism under unipolarity, has been directed towards strategic partnerships (Wilkins, 2012 and U.S Congress 1990). In this sense, cooperating in defense can serve to improve the strategic position of the second-tier states

against unipolar power without having to spend as much. Since balancing is not possible under unipolarity, strategic partnerships are a form of alignment that contributes to improving the strategic position of its participants, increasing their ability to survive through the best possible way of maximizing their resources. (Muthanna, 2006) argues that, as long as they are associated with foreign policy, cooperative arrangements in security can contribute to the security and strategic objectives of states.

Third, from the perspective of unipolar power, the elements of the New Defense Diplomacy also justify cooperation in defense by the lens of offensive realism. Strategic engagement with former or potential enemies, the spread of democracy as a way of ensuring the establishment of allied regimes, and the development of capabilities for engaging in peace operations are examples of (Cottey and Forster, 2004). All these elements facilitate the control of possible state threats through cooperation and simplifying the maintenance of unipolar order and justifying cooperation in defense for reasons of offensive realism.

Therefore, then realist literature generally points out, cooperation in defense in unipolarity is not only encouraged to maintain the privileged status of unipolar power, but also to the other states of the system. Because it is more difficult to achieve than other forms of cooperation, since it deals directly with the real power of States, cooperation in defense can also serve as a trigger for other forms of cooperation. (Resende-Santos, 2007: 9) states that states copied the successful practices of others not only in military matters, but also in "economic, regulatory, administrative, and even constitutional practices." There is, therefore, an important normative utility to understand the reasons and conditions for cooperation in defense in unipolarity, since it can serve to broaden the political agenda of the states involved provided that it respects the basic premise of offensive realism, of maximizing the power of the state to better ensure its survival.

### **2.3.3. The Independent Variables of Realistic Defense Cooperation**

If states have defense cooperation as a means of maximizing their power by increasing their survival capacity, they should consider the following variables: the distribution of resources among the units of the system; the type of cooperation; the effect of cooperation on state capacity; and the design of the institutions generated.

The distribution of resources between the units of the system: This is the main element that will interfere in the way in which the cooperation in defense will be organized. This means that military cooperation will be dependent on the political context in which it is inserted. First, the supposed theorist of our model is, for the global system, that there is unipolarity. This means that any form of cooperation in defense must be guided by the maximum principle of agreement, or at least non-disagreement, of unipolar power. Other polarities will have different systemic incentives. In bipolarity, this incentive previously described will exist only for the members of the alliances of each of the poles. In global multipolarity, whether balanced or unbalanced, systemic effects will indicate defense cooperation within the traditional model of alliances, as described by the classical balance of power theory.

This distribution of power can serve as a tool for States engaged in defense cooperation to contain the appearance of a candidate for regional hegemony and increase the degree of general state capacity of the units involved. If, in co-operation, they all increase in a similar proportion to their resources, there is no increase in the security dilemma of these units at the regional level, and their relative position to global unipolar power is increased.

The type of cooperation: Urpelainen (2012) shows us that cooperation can be shallow or profound. The closer to the deep one, the more difficult it is to reverse political adjustments, which increases the actors' dependence on continued cooperation, thereby reducing the external options of those involved. If states' objective in offensive realism is to maximize their security, situations in which continued deep defense cooperation may lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their security should be avoided. Deep cooperation may represent a disproportionate increase in dependency, which will weaken the state's ability to act alone when necessary. Cooperating in defense, in such cases, would work against the realistic offensive principle of maximizing survival.

The effect of cooperation on state capacity: The rationality of the state and its desire to survive are fundamental assumptions of offensive realism. In this way, cooperative arrangements that lead to a decrease in state capacity must be avoided unless this is clearly the goal. In this case, however, the state will be acting against the expectations of offensive realism, since it will voluntarily be giving up its desire for survival. Security cooperation motivated by offensive realism must, therefore, contribute to increasing State capacity rather than diminishing it.

Security cooperation, in this sense, must meet the requirements suggested by (Muthanna ,2006: 12) : to increase state security in both the internal and external environment; increase the State's military defense resources; neither impair the capacity of the military of the State to act without the partners, if necessary, nor the interests of national security; that it relates to the resources necessary for the actions of any alignment in which the State is already involved; is compatible and does not threaten other pre-existing multilateral links.

The design of the institutions generated: Offensive realism starts from the assumption that international institutions are an extension of the interest of states. Therefore, as long as they contribute to maximizing the power of states to ensure their survival better, institutions will be important elements in international relations. It is assumed that: (a) international institutions are created by states interested in maximizing their power, (b) institutionalized international cooperation is still complex, (c) concern about unequal relative gains exists, and is independent of (d) institutional design can lessen, but not mitigate, the problems related to the objectives of regional integration and defense cooperation ((Mearsheimer, 2001 and Cepik, 2010 ).

Institutions will contribute to defense cooperation in this sense if: (i) they increase the gains of mutual cooperation and / or reduction of costs if one State cooperates and another cooperates; (ii) reduce incentives for defection by reducing cheating gains and / or increasing costs of non-cooperation; (iii) do anything that increases the expectation of the other to cooperate; (iv) there is a connection between the institutional design and the regional and global balance of power. The greater the pressures of the security dilemma, the greater the possibility of cooperation in defense leading to more formal institutions, based on the logic of alliances. These institutions, however, have an incentive not to remain under the same institutional design if systemic pressures change. The smaller the pressures of the security dilemma, the greater the possibility that the alignments are more institutionally loose (Jervis, 1978 and Wilkins, 2012). In any case, however, the institutions generated must serve to increase the maximization of state power in order to increase its security.

## **2.4. Types of Defense Cooperation**

There are different types of defense cooperation among these are: multilateral defense cooperation (like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Standby Forces or

Regional Standby Force) and bilateral defense cooperation (this type of cooperation is conducted between two countries). Since, this study emphasis on bilateral defense cooperation.

Bilateral defense cooperation or agreements are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCAs) are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states (Buzan, 1997).

This Study focus on Ethio- U.S Bilateral defense cooperation since 2011 challenges and prospects detail will discuss on chapter four.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. PRE-1991 ETHIO-U. S Defense Cooperation**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter aims at examining and assessing the historical perspective of the cooperation between the two countries. In doing so, the factors of the relations between the two countries are examined in order to find out the roles these factors have played in the process of the interactions between the two states. Some factors have played a positive role and others have their negative impacts on the relations between the two countries. In line with these roles and impacts the relationships have been examined and assessed to check whether the relations were either profound and/or shallow. Following this condition, it has also been checked that whether Ethiopia and the U.S. have benefited from their relations over the decades from the military point of view.

#### **3.2. Unofficial Relations Prior to 1903**

The relationship between Ethiopia and the United States is one of the oldest ties that Ethiopia has established in its diplomatic history. This relationship chronologically holds the fifth place following the relations of four European nations with Ethiopia namely: Italy, France, Great Britain and the USSR respectively (Taye, 2010). Nonetheless, Ethio-U. S relationships are the most fundamental and crucial diplomatic contacts that have been playing a central role in the international relations of Ethiopia.

Given the high level of degree that Ethio- American relationships have been playing in the socio-political conditions of the former, it would be very imperative that these relations of the two countries should be examined and analyzed. Hence, that is what this chapter is going to attempt all about. To this end, the first and principal task to be dealt here is to address the query as when these relationships came into existence. In answering this question, Negussay reacts in two dimensions put it as the answer to this timely question invites a nuanced treatment of the subject. If one considers only formal diplomatic track of relations, the answer is December 1903.

However, if one follows informal and people to people, commercial, and even military contacts, the answer is quite different.

The first reaction of Negussay implies the specific time of the commencement of the formal diplomatic bondage between the two countries. Or in other words, he stipulates the time when state to state relationships started and he also lays down the actual timing of the beginning of this contact to December 27, 1903. His second response deals with the informal relationships between the two countries, which refer to people to people, commercial, and other forms of contacts. Nigussay does not provide a hard and fast time to the beginning of these relationships. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among scholars about the occurrence of such informal relationships between the two countries prior to the inauguration of the formal Ethio-U.S. diplomatic ties. The next statement by Negussay explains about the events in this informal relationship particularly the role, belief, and attitude that African-Americans had. The statement reads as follows:

*In the minds of the peoples of African descent at large Ethiopia symbolized their collective entitlement, supplication to God, their eternal redemption as well as their emblem of identity, liberty, and dignity wherever they are (Negussay, 2003:19).*

As it has been associated by the premises above, such perception and attitude found its roots in the presence of the name Ethiopia in the Holy Bible. To this end, Taye (2010: 6) tells that “Ethiopia is a country whose name is mentioned about forty times in the Holy Bible.” Other scholars also share the same notion of this perception, with which African Americans had established a very strong affiliation to Ethiopia.

The following statements clearly uphold this argument and also provide the extension of this belief throughout the centuries when Getachew (2009:13) writes as follows: “*Some African-Americans who profess Ethiopianism have historically looked up to Ethiopia. Its long history, culture, and divination in the Old Testament have made Ethiopia attractive especially to Diaspora.*”

In line with this notion, African Americans had established a very strong affiliation with Ethiopia, first as an idea and later as a reality to which they have aligned their decent and historical ties to the country. Negussay (2003) explains the situation as by the time the Ethiopians developed a set of beliefs and mantra symbolizing redemption, liberty, solidarity, pride and hope for all blacks in Africa and Diaspora. There was extensive and worth mentioning sense of awareness and bodying with Ethiopia by African Americans going back to the days of slavery, and continuing extensively through the 19<sup>th</sup> century and beyond. A few other Americans notably soldiers of fortune did show up in Ethiopia also as a latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. There was some trade going on between the two countries at the threshold of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but no political and diplomatic contacts yet.

In his explanation above, Negussay also mentions that there were some business transactions between the two countries prior to the establishment of the formal diplomatic relationships. Getachew also mentions about the contacts of the American citizens with Ethiopia before the time the formal diplomatic relationships between the two countries came in to effect. Getachew mentioned it as individual U.S. citizens went to Ethiopia for a verity of reasons. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Hennery M. Stanley, a special correspondent for New York Herald accompanied the British expedition under Sir Robert Napier (1868) and witnessed the fall of Makadala and the death of Emperor Tewodros.

There is an important point to be examined here. In addition to his task of disseminating the news of the conflict, the presence of Hennery M. Stanley with the British forces in Ethiopia, clearly shows or asserts that the mission of the British forces was acknowledged by the United States or by its agencies. In other words, it can be said that the illegal and outlawed military operation of the Great Britain against an independent and sovereign Ethiopia had have the blessings of the other super powers- an act that really pains anyone who has got a concern about the rights and sovereignty of nations.

When we come back to our main subject matter, the authors indicated above have tried their best to show the subsistence of the informal relationships that existed between the two countries prior to 1903. As we shall see it in the upcoming pages of this chapter, the unceremonious or informal

relationships of the two countries had profoundly contributed to the commencement of the official diplomatic contacts between Ethiopia and the United States. And it is possible to say that they were the basis in this regard.

The informal diplomatic ties, which found their roots in the years that extended into the times of slavery, are events that must deserve admiration. This is so because; the events took place at the time when the means of communications were at their rudimentary levels, or one can say were very backward. In addition to that, the distance between the two countries was so enormous that it would have been a barrier for their communications. However, regardless of these challenges the informal diplomatic ties had existed for so long. This relationship is a good indication for how much decent and blood ties are so magnetic in the relations of human beings. This argument had been evidenced by such an old contact that had been exercised between the peoples that resided far away from each other in different continents- in the Horn of Africa and North America. Such affiliation of African Americans towards Ethiopia is something to be considered very essential for the present relations between the two. Such an exercise of African Americans has to be cultivated and upheld by the present day formal diplomatic exercise and as well as by people to people relations in order to make the most out of such a practice.

This old notion of progeny of African Americans for Africa in general and to Ethiopia in particular is further accentuated by archeological findings such as Lucy and other similar results of investigations, which are believed to be the ancestors of all humanity. Such archeological findings and others will further underscore the idea that African Americans up held and brought to the scene many years back. In this vein, much has to be done by Ethiopians and Ethiopian Americans to reinstitute that glorious thought and attitude of the past. If such people to people relationship is taken in to consideration and dealt seriously, it can even give a boost to the formal diplomatic ties of the two countries. And this can address the gaps that the formal relationships fail to tackle. Thus, those who have the opportunity to make it must do their level best endeavor to restore and to maintain that idea of African Americans as much as possible.

### **3.3. The Beginning and Move of the Official Diplomatic Relationships**

Just the beginning of the twentieth century comes to lay the basis for the up rise of the formal diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and the United States. As it has been mentioned in the pages over, the informal contacts between the two countries had given incentive to the beginning of the ceremonious relationships to take roots and grow. Most notably, the event that brought Ras Mekonnen of Ethiopia and William H. Ellis of the United States together was a breakthrough for its emergence. Those individuals, who met in London to attend the coronation of King Edward VII, acquainted to each other and eventually during their stay in London Ras Mekonnen advanced his invitation to Mr. Ellis to visit Ethiopia. Mr. Ellis promptly accepted the invitation and arrived in Ethiopia in the mid of October 1903. Although, the United States did not give Ellis' mission affirmation, major contemporary press in New York including New York World, New York Tribune as well as others in the United States and also in Britain covered his trip abundantly (Negussay 2003:42). According to the same author again, Ellis briefed about his trip to Ethiopia and what he observed in the country to one of his friends as the country I had been informed was very rich in its minerals, and agriculturally, and its resources are wonderful, but are vastly in need of development material. The people have governed themselves for hundreds of years and are of religious nature. I believed partially through my efforts I have succeeded in getting the United States to establish connections with the country. Thus, Americans may have an opportunity to assist in developing the country. The president of the United States and Secretary Hay are especially interested in looking to the securing of a treaty between the United States and Ethiopia.

Mr. Ellis, one can argue was an African American who had a positive attitude towards Ethiopia and its people. He had narrated about the independence and self-government of the people. He had also highlighted about the spiritual character of the Ethiopian society. Above all, he had promoted about the resources of the country. He had identified and envisioned the deep rooted desire of development in the country. He had as well urged the United States to assist the development needs of Ethiopia. Furthermore, he also had pushed the U.S. officials to establish ties with Ethiopia.

Most of his words seem to show his high concern for Ethiopia and its interests. Although, diplomacy is a give and take art of interaction, he mainly underscored about the interests of Ethiopia to be served through the diplomatic relationship he envisaged to take place. His view of points seemed very friendly to Ethiopia and sympathetic to the needs that the country wanted very badly. This is why Nigussay (2003:44) asserts Ellis in the following words: “*Ellis puts his finger on the proposition that became the foreign policy linchpin of Ethiopian rulers, vis-à-vis the United States from 1903 throughout the regime of Emperor Haile Silasie.*” To this end, it is likely possible to say that Ellis must be admired and rated as the first architect of the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States. Getachew (2009:14) also commends Ellis for his contribution in the process of forging Ethio-American relations as follows: “In the diplomatic arena, Ellis convinced Menelik to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, which served as a corner stone to forge an official relationship between the two countries.” As mentioned earlier, in spite of the existence of different contacts between Ethiopia and the U.S such as trade and others, there were no state to state relations until the end of the nineteenth century.

The opening of relations between the two countries was actually addressed by another American figure who resided in Europe namely Mr. Skinner. The proposal to ameliorate this yawning gap in relations came from Robert P. Skinner the United States Consul General in Marseilles” (Negussay, 2003). One may wonder how Mr. Skinner who had been positioned in a very far away country from Ethiopia came to visualize the need for the establishment of relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia. Just right from the information available about it, Mr. Skinner was interested in the expansion of the trade of the United States in the Horn region and Ethiopia. Accordingly, he was able to envision Ethiopia as the most favorable country for the accomplishment of that business advantage in the region. Thus, we can safely argue that Mr. Skinner’s insight by large and far was associated with the American business benefit and it was his business mindedness that initiated him to perceive the idea. Strengthening this Getachew (2009) stated that in his letter to David Hill Assistant Secretary of State, Skinner States that, there is a field of study and commerce expansion in Africa that is deserving of consideration. In Abyssinia the US maintained not even the semblance of official representation although there exists, a vast population, politically independent, and capable of absorbing our products.

According to Getachew, Mr. Skinner while proposing the establishment of the friendship and commercial relationships between the two countries, he had associated his idea to the size of the population and as well as to the political independence and sovereignty of Ethiopia. That means the sovereignty of Ethiopia had played a great role in attracting Skinner's perception of establishing ties of formal relationship between the two countries. Had Ethiopia been one of the victims of European colonialism, Skinner's argument might have lacked validity when he was trying to lobby his superiors. Negussay also underscores the deep rooted business interest of Skinner, which served as a pillar for the proposal that he presented to his government. Negussay (2003) puts it as what Skinner wanted to do was to expand and secure such trade between the two countries through legal and political sanction. He argued that business in general and American business in particular in regions astride the Red Sea and that it was essential for the Americans to have official representation there to facilitate and protect American commercial the region will preclude the probability of attaining substantial commercial relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia.

As one can apparently learn from the above premises, Mr. Skinner was highly concerned about the establishment and protection of U.S. trade interests in the Horn Region. He also wanted the diplomatic contacts to take place as soon as possible. His urge was mainly due to the presence of the European factions in the area. He was worried about their being there because; if the actions of establishing relations were delayed, the European colonial powers may take a counter action that could prevent U.S. contacts with Ethiopia.

The point here is that, just as Menelik was threatened by the presence of the European forces that were stationed around his country as a threat to his nation's security, Skinner was also inconvenient about their presence there in the region. Thus, we can make an inference that both Ethiopia and the United States were concerned and worried about the presence of the colonial cabals around Ethiopia. In the final analysis, the immediate establishment of relations between the two nations became a prompt necessity for both America and Ethiopia.

Both Mr. Ellis and Mr. Skinner had made their level best efforts to materialize the formal diplomatic contacts between Ethiopia and the United States. However, there was a difference in

their approach. That means Mr. Ellis mainly related his idea to the Ethiopian interests. That is, the assistance of the U.S. to the development of Ethiopian resources. On the other hand, Mr. Skinner profoundly underscored his reasoning on the American commercial interest that he thought was very essential and basic to the national interest of his country. The other dissimilarity between the two personalities was that, Mr. Skinner's effort was an official exercise for he was an American official who represented his government; whereas Mr. Ellis' endeavor was a private exercise, which was initiated by a privately interest. Nonetheless, both of them hold a very important place in the history of Ethiopian-American relationships.

In addition, when dealing with the history of Ethio-U.S. diplomatic relations, one should not lose of sight Emperor Menelik II who had acted as a trained diplomatic figure in the process of building such an important relationship between the United States of America and Ethiopia. The effort of the emperor was very much associated to his desire to modernize and develop the country. Getachew (2009:20) writes about the Emperor's role in the following manner: -

*“Emperor Menelik had been instrumental in establishing the relationship between Ethiopia and the United States as he wanted the modernization and the protection of his country.”*

Furthermore, the reception and hospitality performed to the American mission of 1903, in Ethiopia was a good case in point that well indicated the diplomatic skill and his enthusiasm in materializing the contact between the two states. Negussay (2003) explained that event as one of the most important and spectacular aspect of this first official American mission was the way it was received by the people and government of Ethiopia. No other foreign mission before or after was accorded such warmth, enthusiasm, lavish, hospitality and color full pomp and pageantry every day of its stay, as was the American mission led by Commissioner Skinner in December 1903.

The above statement clearly shows the high regard and special attention given by Emperor Menelik to the contact that he was to make with the U.S. The point this paper would like to underscore here at this point is, given the time he lived and administered the county, Menelik's diplomatic exercise seemed to be an act that took place ahead of its time.

When one examines the role played by Mr. Skinner in bringing his idea to the ground, he was a very much determined and was a dedicated man. In this vein, his relentless lobbying and pressure finally obtained a positive response from President Theodor Roosevelt. The president appointed Skinner as his commissioner for the commercial/ diplomatic mission to the Court of Emperor Menelik. Commissioner Skinner left Marseilles on 25 October 1903 and arrived in Addis Ababa in less than two months. His mission comprised 28 persons and he was a head for the commission. Commissioner Skinner was pleased by the hospitality he was rendered at his reception in Ethiopia. The following explanation describes the Ethiopian feeling that Mr. Skinner sensed concerning the Ethio-U.S. diplomatic ties at that time and Negussay (2003) also puts it as commissioner Skinner noted that the Ethiopian's genuinely appreciated the development of an alliance of friendship of foreign power that was devoid of discussion of frontiers and protectorates. He added that, there was popular conviction that American friendship had no dangers, and would be a source of moral strength to the nation.

The idea of Commissioner Skinner mentioned above mainly focuses on the Ethiopian attitude that they were suspicious of European colonial powers. On the contrast, his opinion indicates that such inconvenience was not attributed to the Americans because; the American history did not show any interest of colonizing other nations.

Skinner's view also mentioned that American friendship with Ethiopia was a source of moral strength to Ethiopians. However, this philosophy which presumed the relations of the two countries to be moral strength and confidence for the Ethiopian people, as we shall see it in the upcoming pages was not fulfilled by the Americans. When Ethiopia was brutally invaded and occupied by the fascist Italy forces in 1936, the trust of the Ethiopian people on the U.S. was lost. Be that as it may, eventually the treaty of amity and commerce was written in Amharic, English, and French and Emperor Menelik and Envoy Skinner signed and affixed seals to the treaty on December 27, 1903. Getachew (2009) stipulates about the signing of the treaty as Skinner's initiative gained support and on December 27, 1903 a treaty of amity and commerce which comprises seven articles was signed between Emperor Menelik and Robert P. Skinner. The treaty regulates commercial relations between the two countries and also accorded Ethiopia

the status of Most Favored Nations (MFN), paving the way, for the eventual diplomatic relationship of Ethiopia and the United States.

In this regard, the treaty of amity and commerce can be said was the corner stone for the relationship of the two countries, which proved to be one of the most important diplomatic ties and that have played the most crucial role in the Ethio-U. S security relationships for more than a century. However, at times the relationships have suffered from some ups and downs in due course. Referring to the attitude of Emperor Menelik in connection to the Ethio-U. S diplomatic ties Getachew (2009) observed it as Emperor Menelik was rightly suspicious of the European colonial powers. This was so because; his trust and belief was betrayed by the Italian fascist rulers in the Wuchalie Treaty of 1889. Negussay also accounts to the point of his distrust that the Wuchalie treaty had brought to the Emperor when he writes something like the fearful fraud committed by the Italian colonialists in the Wuchallie Treaty and its aftermath had made Menelik once beaten twice shy (Negussay, 2003).

As a result, this condition had forced the Emperor and his advisors to go between lines when they were checking the draft of the 1903 Treaty. Consequent to this event, the approval of the 1903 Ethio-U.S. Treaty took its course of event and finally was signed by the Senate of the United States of America. The following statements give the details about the signing and the opening of the U.S. legation in Addis Ababa Getachew (2009:19):

*The U.S. senate ratified the 1903 Treaty (Article 1-7) on March 12, 1904, and it was signed by President Theodor Roosevelt, just five days later, on March 17, 1904. The US legation was opened in Addis Ababa on December 19, 1906, after Frank R. Mower was at the first consul general that August.*

Gradually, although much was expected from the relations of the two countries especially by the Ethiopians, despite the continued growth of trade the progress of the diplomatic relationships was slow and halting. Meanwhile, the three European colonial powers that were not comfortable about the coming of the United States to the region and particularly about her relations with Ethiopia prepared and signed a Tripartite Treaty without the knowledge of the Ethiopian Government. This action of the European powers, which was not made apparent to the country upon which the treaty was to be executed was said to have been associated to the concern of the

European colonial powers regarding the newly concluded Ethic-U. S. relations. Negussay (2003) discloses the assumption behind the formulation of the tripartite treaty as though the tripartite treaty was not publicly acknowledged by the parties in Ethiopia, possibly one of the reasons for their action was some concern as to what was developing American presence in Ethiopia may portend for their hegemony in the regime. For its part the United States did not make any public statement on the tripartite treaty and its consequences to their new found trade and diplomatic relationship in the north east Africa.

As we can learn from Negussay's statement above and from the point of view of sovereign Ethiopia, the tripartite treaty could be measured as the violation of the rights and independence of the country. Since the treaty was prepared and signed merely by the three European colonial powers without the consent of Ethiopia, their action was undoubtedly against the national interest of Ethiopia. The United States, which had signed the treaty of amity and commerce with Ethiopia, would have not looked to this action indifferently. The coldness of the American government on this issue- a matter that was very dangerous to the Ethiopian national security might have induced the later to suspect as if there was a hidden agreement between the United States and the three European powers. The then silence of the United States on the tripartite treaty is an issue that requires further study and examination in order to have a clear understanding about the substance of the theme.

In the years that followed, the relations between the two countries did not go well in accordance to the needs and desires of the Ethiopian government. Although the Ethiopian government did its level best effort to enhance the relationship, the response from the American part was not an encouraging one. However, Ras Teferi had tried to preserve the relationship as much as possible. Negussay (2003:80) states the condition as under: "Whatever the ups and downs of the situation, Ras Teferi continued to campaign for a stable American presence in Ethiopia." Mainly since the 1930s and up until the mid of the same decade, the United States took measures that further weakened the relations. Particularly, in the year 1934, the US made a decision that down scaled the status of the American Embassy in Ethiopia. The following statement given by Negussay (2003:98) well depicts that act as under:

*In fact, as early as 1934 the United States, had downgraded its diplomatic presence in Addis Ababa by withdrawing Minister Addison and replacing him with a charge de affairs (ad interim) there by hinting at terminating American presence in Ethiopia all together.*

The mid 1930s was the time at which the Italian Fascist forces were preparing to invade Ethiopia. The United States as a country that had diplomatic as well as commercial relationships with Ethiopia was supposed to inform and assist the later to defend itself from the upcoming invasion. To the contrary, the U.S. passed a Neutrality Act in August 1935. This resolution was considered by others as an act made by the U.S. to deliberately keep aloof her from the eventually rising problems. Conversely, in the mean-time the United States was selling oil to fascist Italy. (Negussay, 2003) defends the above argument in the following expression: “The United states was in fact selling oil to Italy at this time knowing full well the strategic military importance of the commodity.” That was a good proof of that the U.S. was not deterred by the Neutrality Act from involving in the event that was taking place between Ethiopia and fascist Italy. The statement here under further exemplifies the participation that the U.S. under went in the violence that the Italians were committing some crime against Ethiopia’s sovereignty as Negussay (2003) explained it citing the scenario that Professor John H. Spencer and other Americans were getting prepared to evacuate from Addis Ababa on the eve of 5 May 1936, the professor had also saw the dispatches sent by U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Mussolini urging him to have his forces enter Addis Ababa swiftly.

Now, the point is that if the U.S. preferred to be neutral, why was she worried about the quick takeover of Addis Ababa by the fascist forces? Here, one can argue that the Neutrality Act was just put in effect as a covert act and to dissociate Ethiopia away and not to allow it any appeal to the U.S. government; and thereby to deny any assistance in any form to Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian people were left to be the victims of fascist Italy and to shoulder the repression of fascism for a solid of five years, miserably and helplessly to the worst of its scenario.

### **3.4. Ethio-U.S Relations in the Post 1941**

Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been in exile for almost five years had made his level best diplomatic efforts to retain the sovereignty of the country and his imperial authority. His

endeavor added to the relentless struggle of the Ethiopian people particularly, the Ethiopian patriot's attack on the fascist forces, consequently resulted in evicting the aggressor Italian fascism from Ethiopia. The support of the British forces was also of immense help to the restoration of the power of the Emperor and the sovereignty of the country. Although, Haile Selassie was able to return home with dignity and to restore his authority, the British forces that had helped him to come home were not ready to hand over the administration of his country to the Emperor. For that matter, he was not an authorized leader of his nation. (Marcus, 1995) explains that unfortunate situations as Haile Selassie was an emperor among his people but he was not yet a ruler in Addis Ababa, occupied in April 1941 by the British, who had immediately established a military administration for what they considered occupied enemy territory. This time was a bittersweet moment for the emperor.

The British forces who were close partners with fascist Italy in the scramble for Africa seemed to take the place of the Italian occupation over Ethiopia. This had clearly been manifested through their institutionalization of a military administration and their reluctance to allow the Emperor to exercise his complete power over the entire nation. This condition had created a dual sense of feeling upon the Emperor. On one hand, he was happy for restoring his authority and independence of the country. On the other, he had been resented by the act of the British armed forces for they were not ready to hand over a full-fledged power and authority to him. Nevertheless, the Emperor did not sit idle until the British forces allowed him to exercise his sovereign authority. Since the time he reached in Ethiopia, he had started to take his own measures of reinstating his administration. To this end, Marcus (1995) stated the Emperor's action as it was guided by his own political needs; as soon as he set foot in Ethiopia in February 1941, he started to restore loyal provincial and local governments.

As one can apparently grasp from the actions of the British military forces and Haile Selassie's reaction, the situation was not smooth, rather it could be said was fractious. This condition forced Haile Selassie to find a means to resolve the problem he was encountered by. Thusly, he started to seek support from the United States though he was not helped by the United States during the invasion and occupation of the country by fascist forces. Nonetheless, this time the Americans appeared to sympathize with his problems. Schraeder (1996) explained it as ever since the defeat

of the Italian fascist in 1941 and Britain's establishment of highly resented military administration over Ethiopian territory, the emperor had sought the U.S. support in reasserting Ethiopian national sovereignty. Of greatest importance to Haile Selassie was the creation of the US – Ethiopian security relationship, in which the U.S was to serve as a primary benefactor for the expansion and modernization of the Ethiopian armed forces.

The emperor had been previously scared by the brutal invasion of fascist Italy of 1936. He had also been threatened by the presence of the colonial powers around Ethiopia. For that matter, he was in need to establishing a modern military force. Accordingly, he was obliged to seek the support of the U.S. to materialize his objective. Consequently, his effort resulted in a positive gesture from the United States and was also able to reinstitute the Ethio–U. S relations that had been dismantled by the fascist invasion of Ethiopia (Schraeder, 1996).

The other important point to be noted here at this particular juncture is the prudent diplomatic skill of Haile Selassie. Just to come to the point, he had used the American assistance to challenge the British unwillingness to allow him to administer his country with a full -flagged sovereign authority. That means he was able to play one super power over the other. It is also very important to note that the Emperor was helped by the British to oust the fascist enemy previously.

As regard to the support of the United States to Ethiopia, which could be said was contrary to the interest of the Great Britain, a question could be raised as why the U.S took such a position. Just to reflect to this point, the issue was a matter of national interest. Although the two super powers were fighting as allies in the Second World War, the United States was mainly attracted towards the Horn Region based on its own national interest at the time because, the involvement of the United States in the Second World War had increased the importance of the Horn of Africa. This condition of course came to happen as a result of East-West division in the international system. In this regard, Schraeder (1996) said that strategic necessities associated with expanding involvement in World War II laid the foundation of US foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa. In an effort to oppose military expansionism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the

Roosevelt administration declared Ethiopia for inclusion in military aid program known as “Lend Lease”, in March 1941.

According to Schraeder’s point of view, the foreign policy of the United States was very much induced towards the Horn of Africa and as well to Ethiopia to materialize the U.S goal that she had targeted in the Horn Region. Furthermore, the different interests of the United States that prevailed in Ethiopia had also helped the latter to obtain assistance from the former. From the Ethiopian part the assistance was meant to calm down the tension that Ethiopia was facing from Great Britain. On the other hand, Marcus (1995) explained the situation as if Ethiopia would qualify for “Lend Lease” not only to advertise Washington’s interest in the rehabilitation of liberated countries, but also to facilitate a resumption of trade between the United States and Ethiopia and opening the way for American interest to share in the development of resources in Ethiopia after the war. Finally, permitting Ethiopia to join the United Nations was considered by the state department to be a friendly gesture which might prove a valuable asset after the war to American airlines desiring to operate across Ethiopia which lies in path of probable air route to India and the Far East.

According to the above premises, it is likely possible to argue that the United States sympathized with the problems of Ethiopia and extended her support to the later mainly for the sake of her own interests that were envisaged in Ethiopia to be materialized after the end of the Second World War. Furthermore, the support and encouragement that was rendered by the U.S to Ethiopia to become the member of the United Nations, was believed to be a reward to the later and to strengthen the relationship between Ethiopia and the U.S.

As Ethiopia became more close to the United States, Haile Selasie’s need for American weapons was highly increased; and the request for U.S arms was very much incessant. In addition to his request through different diplomatic mechanisms, the emperor also sent his trusted Vice Minister of Finance Yilma Deressa to the United States. Marcus (1995) further explained this mission as Haile Selasie sent Lij Yilma Deresa, a trusted official to the United States, ostensibly to participate in the international conference on food, but in reality to negotiate a lend lease agreement. After indirectly drawing attention to the British encirclement of his nation, the vise

minister defined his request for armaments as inconsequential to the United States, but for Ethiopia's armed forces it would be a source of moral and material strength in the event of threat of invasion.

At that time Ethiopia was encircled and was also threatened by the British forces that had been placed in the colonies of the latter around Ethiopia. Accordingly, Haile Selassie's request was partly related to this tension and partly to his needs to defy other aggressions. In his address Yilma underscored that the military assistance of the U.S would also be the basis for the Ethiopian armed forces; the phrase that the vice minister applied to motivate the United States towards his country's objectives. A prudent diplomatic approach

Yilma Deressa not only addressed Ethiopia's vital need of arms to the U.S, he as well appealed to the U.S assistance in other areas of the problems of the country. (Marcus, 1995:19) uses the following expression to explain Yilma's request: "Then Yilma invited a peaceful American attack on Ethiopia's many problems." In the communiqué that took place between the officials of the two countries, the issue of an outlet to the sea had been a matter of high concern to Ethiopia. In the contacts and discussions that followed, the incorporation of Eritrea in to Ethiopia was brought to the fore front by Emperor Haile Selassie.

The U.S State Department of the near eastern and African affairs was also concerned about the status of Eritrea. The department was worried about it because, independent Eritrea was assumed to result in the creation of a weak state which would be exposed to Soviet aggression or infiltration. In the final, among from the different alternatives that were envisaged for the future of Eritrea, the incorporation of the territory under the Ethiopian sovereignty was the concluding agreement that was reached by the U.S National Security Bureaucracies. Schraeder (1996:117) makes clear the agreement when he says: "*New consensus within the national security Bureaucracies favored guaranteeing Ethiopian control over the entire Eritrean territory.*" Even though the United States had its own agenda in bringing Eritrea under the sovereign authority of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie's apt diplomatic argument and his persuasive reasoning was also worth noting. (Marcus, 1995) argued that the emperor said from a short term point of view, Djibouti would be the best port because of the existing rail way, but that a long term policy required a port in Eritrea. The memorandum claiming the Italian colony was not based solely upon the ground

necessity for economic reasons or for equally pressing and vital need for access to the sea, but on the history: before record time, Eritrea and its inhabitants have been an integral part of Ethiopia.

Haile Selassie's argument in the last resort brought to the fore the historical bondage of Ethiopia and the Eritrean territory and as well the close ties that persisted among the peoples of the two territories since the time immemorial. Accordingly his argument was so firm that no one could rule it out by a logical and acceptable reasoning. Thus, his argument was well taken and was impressive enough to convince all those that were involved in the matter.

The Americans also had their own sounding reasons for bringing Eritrea under the Ethiopian administration. They believed that neither Italian trusteeship nor independence of Eritrea would serve the American objective of establishing a base in Asmara. Particularly, independence was rejected by the policy makers of the U.S, who believed that an economically unviable Eritrea would be subject or would fall a prey to communist aggression. Thusly, the Americans voted for the alternative that could enable them to have access over Eritrea. Schraeder (1996:118) argues as under to this end: *"The primary driving force behind those conclusions was the firm belief that every effort had to be made to assure the maintenance of essential U.S military rights in Eritrea, particularly in Asmara- Massawa area"*

The Kagnew military base had been the most crucial factor in determining the Ethio-U. S relationships. The base had greatly influenced the support of the United States in the process of incorporating Eritrea with Ethiopia. It had also been a vital source of U.S military assistance to Ethiopia. As it has been mentioned in the pages above, the incorporation of Eritrea under the sovereignty of Ethiopia was by large facilitated by the support of the United States. Had it not been for the support of the U.S, the history of Eritrea would have been written in a different form than it happened to be. Thus, it is likely possible to say that Kagnew's role had been very great in determining the fate of Eritrea after the end of the fascist Italian colonial rule in Eritrea (Clapham, 1998:222).

For the mutual benefits that the U.S and Ethiopia had in Eritrea and particularly for the vital interests the United States had on Kagnew and other military facilities, the United States fully

supported the incorporation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Marcus summarizes that historic support to Ethiopia and the interest of the U.S in Eritrea in the following terminology:

*Not surprisingly, therefore, in November 1948, Secretary of State George Marshal offered to support Addis Ababa's claim, to most of Eritrea, in return for unhampered use of the radio station in Asmara and possibly other military facilities such as air fields and ports in the Asmara- Massawa area (Marcus, 1995:84).*

The eventual negotiations that took place between the U.S and Ethiopia, finally, led to the signing of an agreement that asserted the use of the Kagnew station to the U.S and other facilities in Eritrea. The agreement was signed for twenty-five years. The agreement also carried over the grant of weapons and other equipment's from the U.S to Ethiopia. The substance of the agreement is explicated by Lefebvre (1998) as on 25 may 1953, the United States and Ethiopia signed an agreement governing the use of Kagnew station and other facilities in Eritrea until 1978; and a standard military assistance treaty regulating the delivery of weapons and other equipment's and providing for the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Another scholar Schraeder (1996) also provides his brief reflections on the condition of the military agreements of 1953 between the United States and Ethiopia demanded negotiations after the aftermath of Ethiopia's acquisition of Eritrea in 1952 to determine the official status of the US presence at Asmara barracks named Kagnew station in an effort to enforce military assistance. The resolution of all outstanding bargaining issues resulted in signing to U.S Ethiopia military agreement in May 1953.

Despite the signing of agreements to provide an all-round military assistance to Ethiopia, only very little was done in practice by the U.S. Thus, the Emperor on his first visit to the United States made his level best effort to press the U.S Congress in his address in a joint session with the Congress. Marcus (1995) clarifies the appeal of the emperor as he has opened the campaign on his first visit to the United States in spring 1954. In an address before a joint session of congress, he remarked, "we have a profound orientation to the west. We read the same bible. We speak a common spiritual tongue. So great are your power, and wealth that the budget of a single

American city often equals, that of an entire nation. More to the point he declared his intention to remark Ethiopia through the closest possible association with the United States.

Although very diplomatic and inspiring was the emperor in his communiqué to the congress, he made no a difference in substance. So, the U.S military aid process went under the same reluctant due course of action. Marcus stated what the then foreign minister of Ethiopia Aklilu Habte Wold had later discovered about the feature of the American government as it was difficult to move the American government by appealing to its idealism and sense of justice. Washington's bureaucrats might listen intently to Haile Selassie's request for a whooping hundred-million-dollar aid package; they might even be sympathetic to the country's aspirations, but, above all, they were Yankee traders who wanted fair returns and they believed that they already had bought Ethiopia (Marcus, 1995).

As one can see it from his enlightenment, Aklilu was very much annoyed by the stand point that the American government embarked on. Aklilu's only tactic therefore was to threaten his country's withdrawal from the Western Camp. And he pronounced that, "*Ethiopia must ask its self again, just what place does Ethiopia actually hold in the eyes of the U.S?*" Such an exacerbated and frustrated sentiment of the Ethiopian Foreign Minister became a great concern of Washington due to Washington's oversensitivity of the relations between the east and the west. For that matter, the threat of the foreign minister of Ethiopia resulted in a quick decision and forced the U.S bureaucracies to provide assistance to Ethiopia. Accordingly, by March 1954 the Pentagon had shipped \$3,800,000 worth of small arms, vehicles, and other equipment's to Ethiopia (Marcus, 1995:92).

It was really attention grabbing that an official of a small nation making a very tactical move to achieve his country's objective by such a threatening diplomatic maneuver. This condition asserts the idea that claims: it is not only great powers that threaten weak states to incline them towards their own national interest; but likewise weak states also can do it so, albeit that this chance is really available for weak states. If we are on the same line of argument and if we are to share this notion, that was what the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habte Wolde really did.

The independence of Somalia in 1960 became a serious challenge to the Ethio-U. S. relationships. The philosophy of Great Somalia provoked a threat upon the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The concern of Haile Selassie to this end was heightened when Somalia started to grab arms from both blocs of the west and the east. Lefebvre presents the offer of armaments that Somalia had received from the Soviet Union and the opportunity that the USSR rushed in for the Horn of Africa at the moment as if Moscow has achieved an important strategic breakthrough within the moderate African camp in November 1963, when the Republic of Somalia announced that it would accept a \$30 million military aid offer from the Soviet Union, thereby foiling an attempt by the west to preclude Soviet military aid to Somalia (Lefebvre, 1998).

This military aid of the Soviet Union to Somalia, while giving a chance to the Soviet Union to hold its feet on the Horn of Africa, the situation very much intimidated the U.S and its allies. Consequently, the western powers were also obliged to grant a military assistance to Somalia. The statement given by Lefebvre hereunder explains the measures taken by the West to curb the orientation of Somalia towards the Soviet Union and also mentions the antipathy of Emperor Haile Selassie against the provision of arms to Somalia by the West:

*During 1962-63 a consortium of western powers led by the United States has presented a series of arms packages of increasing value to Mogadishu. This was done over the long protests of Washington's longtime ally in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (Lefebvre, 1998:612).*

Eventually, in order to withhold Somalia's threat, Haile Selassie insisted on obtaining increased military assistance from the U.S. However, the response of the United States was not as expected by Haile Selassie, and even was none. It would be very imperative to raise a question and to discuss why the U.S was to take such a position. The question to be asked then is, why did the United States that was considered to be a friend of Ethiopia wanted to provide arms to Somalia and became reluctant in supplying arms to Ethiopia at the time of the arms rivalry between the two belligerent states? As it has been mentioned in the pages above, the U.S had had a strong interest in the Horn of Africa in the latter years of the Second World War. In this vein, the two Horn states: Ethiopia and Somalia achieved greater significance in the foreign policy of the United States for the only reason of their strategic positions. For that matter, the United States did not want to lose of sight either of these countries except in some critical conditions like the

position of the Derg (1974-1991) in Ethiopia; the U.S always tried to balance her relations with the two countries. The reason behind was, a close alignment with one of these states and abandoning the other would undoubtedly result in a loss to the other. That may also bring about an alignment of the abandoned state to the socialist camp. Thus, balancing the relations between the two was a necessity for the U.S.

As the concern of the Emperor was heightened regarding the provision of arms to Somalia by the U.S and her western allies, the American officials were supposed to reason out the matter to Haile Selassie. According to the American officials, the provision of arms by the west to Somalia was to deny the opportunity to the Soviet Union to engage with Somalia. The statement here under, exemplifies the way how the Americans argued to convince the Emperor: “The Emperor had to be convinced that it would be far less dangerous to Ethiopia, for the West to arm Somalia, than unfriendly powers to do so” (Lefebvre, 1998:623). The core purpose of the argument was that the provision of arms by the U.S to Somalia was not an advantage to the west alone but it was as well a benefit to Ethiopia. The substance of the argument was that the American officials were trying to tell the emperor that the coming of the Soviet Union to Somalia in the name of arms assistance was a risk to the emperor himself because; the Americans knew that Haile Selassie was fearful of the communists and that he was oversensitive to the stance of communism.

The different attitudes that prevailed among the policy establishment bureaucracies of the U.S about the Kagnew station sometimes rose up and at others dropped down. Accordingly, the military assistance also scaled up at times and precipitated at others. To this end, in the mid-1960s the rationale for Kagnew was highly augmented and the number of civilians and military officers increased by far. Schraeder’s (1996) expounded this condition as there was expanding number of cold war bureaucratic mission associated with kagnew and related facilities in Ethiopia led to a tremendous growth in the official U.S presence to over 7000 civilian and military personnel including over 3500 at Kagnew by May 1964.

As a result, the military assistance of the U.S to Ethiopia increased from \$8.9 million in 1964 to \$18.2million in 1967, with a similar increase in economic assistance during the same period from \$9.2 million to \$19.0 million. This state of affairs provided a powerful rationale for the

incremental enhancement of the U.S–Ethiopian relationships (Schraeder, 1996). In a similar manner, Marcus (1995) also asserts the positive attitude of the U.S officials in increasing the military and economic assistance to Ethiopia and including the rent to Kagnaw Station as under: *“Washington accepted the embassy views and also agreed to raise the general level of assistance to Ethiopia, in effect accepting an increase in rent to Kagnaw station and the other American facilities in Eritrea.”* Marcus, in his statement above, indicates that the U.S Embassy in Addis Ababa had supported the military assistance to Ethiopia and had recommended the provision of arms.

The security relationships of Ethiopia and the U.S were not only strengthened through financial and weaponry assistance, it was also confirmed by the provision of experts and army officers as well. The army officers were assigned to train the Ethiopian armed forces. Schraeder (1996) explains about the mission of the American officers in the following words:

*Beginning in 1966, approximately 164 U.S army officers were assigned to Ethiopia over a period of two to three years, to train the Ethiopian army in the art of counterinsurgency warfare and instill a sense of professionalism within the officer corps.*

What we can generally comprehend from the above statement is that the U.S military involvement in Ethiopia roofed different areas: provision of arms, training of Ethiopian forces, counterinsurgency training to withhold the secessionists in Eritrea and the Somali belligerents in the Ogaden. In this regard, it is safe to say that Ethiopia had benefited from its security relationships that she had established with the U.S. The U.S. likewise had also benefited from its security relations with Ethiopia by using the Kagnaw communications base and other facilities in Eritrea.

The significance of Kagnaw station that had brought the United States and Ethiopia close together and which had bolstered the Ethio –U. S security relationships for years however, started to diminish during in the late 1960s. Three major factors contributed to the diminishing aspect of the importance of the Kagnaw station. These factors are well stipulated by Schraeder’s statements exemplify the conditions that contributed to the low substance of the Kagnaw military communications base.

*The Vietnam War led to congressionally motivated cuts in the overall foreign aid budget, most notably as concerned Africa, that resulted in ceiling \$12 million in military aid to Ethiopia beginning in 1968. Second, advances in the satellite technology insured that land based telecommunication systems, such as Kagnew and its related stone house project were becoming obsolete as the defense department increasingly looked to outer space. Third, most important, the Pentagon decided in 1966 to construct a military base at Diego Garcia, a lightly populated British possession in the middle of the Indian Ocean (Schraeder, 1996:113).*

The combination of these three new developments belittled the worth of Kagnew station and created a precarious policy towards Ethiopia. In line with this, the U.S military aid was getting lower and lower. Thus, in March 1973, almost all similar operations of the Kagnew Station were taken over by Diego Garcia and the Kagnew Base became obsolete. This situation obliged Haile Selassie to pay a visit to the United States in May 1973. In his visit, the emperor had in mind to obtain approximately \$450 million in military aid. To the contrast, Haile Silasie's request was responded negatively except that he was told that the White House would study the request. Consequently, Pentagon's presence in Ethiopia declined (Schraeder, 1996:136). The other Scholar also writes about the replacement of the Kagnew Station by the new base in the Indian Ocean namely Diego Garcia as under: "Meanwhile satellite technology had made the radio station obsolete, the navy had shifted its focus to the Indian Ocean, and in 1966 Diego Garcia became the U.S forward base in the region" (Evelyn 2003). According to the view of this scholar, the Kagnew Station significance was further ill-fated by the development of satellite technology.

One may doubt whether the emergence of Diego Garcia and the transfer of U.S military services to this new base had completely detached the security relations of the two countries. Schraeder, (1996:136) argues to this end by saying: "*This turn of events did not signify however, the abandonment of either Ethiopia or the Emperor.*" Although Schraeder is right in telling us about the continuity of the relations of the two countries, by analogy the decline in the services of the Kagnew station undoubtedly would have scaled down the Ethio-U. S security relationships. The point to be noted here is that, as Aklilu Habte Wold had clearly stated above, the Americans

want a substantial return for what they provide for their partners. In this vein, the military assistance of the U.S would be subject to the level of the relationship and the interest that the Americans would have in the country. Clapham (1988:223) also forwards his assessment on the then relationship of the two states in brief as under: “Even before the revolution, the Ethio American alliance was already under strain.” According to Clapham, the close relationship of the United States and its military assistance to Ethiopia were at their low ebbs even during the early years of the 1970s.

The 1970s were not good times for the Ethio-U. S relationships. For the reasons that are indicated above, the military assistance of the U.S to Ethiopia was getting lower. However, the incessant request of Ethiopia for increased arms assistance continued with high magnitude. To one’s wonder, on the other hand the Americans were also suspicious about the continuity of the emperor’s rule. This hesitant attitude of the Americans had also become a barrier to obtaining military assistance from the U.S. This was so because, since the end of the 1960’s and the beginning of the 1970’s circumstances in Ethiopia had shown the inevitability of the socio-economic changes in the near future. To this end, the Americans were thinking of their relations with Ethiopia ahead of the regime of Haile Selassie. Clapham’s (1988:223) observation gives the picture of this thought in the following words: “*In addition, the Americans had to make provision for their position in Ethiopia after the demise of Haile Selasie, whose regime by the early 1970’s was coming to an end.*” Marcus (1995) on the other hand, tells the insight that the Americans had regarding the gradual development of factors of change that prevailed in Ethiopia in the following terms:

*When the Ethiopian armed forces deposed the emperor in favor of moderate military government dedicated to political and economic reforms, nearly thirty years of political and military reporting rang true.”*

According to this information, the officials of the United States had envisaged a socio-political change in Ethiopia for long. The point here is that, if the American bureaucracies were aware of the eventually emerging change in Ethiopia, why not they advised and lobbied Haile Selasie to make the necessary arrangement for change in his administration? This point has to be raised here because, the Americans would have been able to influence and even pressure the Emperor to suit his administration to the then rising realities of the country. The logic behind this

argument is that this was possible for the Americans because their might and close relationship that they had with the Emperor could have given them access to do so.

If the Americans had taken this position of lobbying the emperor to make the necessary changes in the socio-political conditions of the country, Ethiopia probably might have been saved from the chaos it had been overwhelmed by the regime of the military administration. Furthermore, the country might have also saved all the human capital and the material resources that she lost during the time of the highly resented, unwise and incapable military administration. Be that as it may, unfortunately the military junta snatched the favorable conditions, which the Ethiopian people sacrificed for years. Otherwise, that favorable and ripe condition would have been put in use by the Ethiopian people to establish the long sought and highly aspired-the people's government of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, the Americans had played no significant role in influencing and pressuring the emperor to transform his administration. And Haile Selassie himself was not able and rather was not willing to make it he faced that unpleasant and bitter consequence and was driven out from the palace by his own soldiers in 1974. It was a miserable loss, that he probably might have averted it by democratizing the socio-economic and political system of his administration earlier than the time of the revolution, by the help of his super power ally, the U.S.

### **3.5. Ethiopia-United States Relations in the Post 1974-1991**

No design of period-sing the relations between Ethiopia and the United States from 1974 to 1991 is completely satisfactory, mainly because of the many and different factors that affected the two states' foreign policies. Nevertheless, three periods may be marked out. The first period begun in 1974 with eruption of the Ethiopian Revolutionary. It ended in 1977 when Mengistu effectively took over power and Carter got elected. These phenomena generated overt and covert confrontation between Ethiopia and the United States that lasted until 1989. This year, which heralded the third period, witnessed a superficial rapprochement between the two states until 1991. This section briefly surveys these three periods.

### 3.5.1. The Period of Co-existence (1974-1977)

In the immediate years preceding and following the Ethiopian Revolution the United States ‘felt it prudent to let events take their course ... [and] followed a hands-off policy’ (Spencer, 1977:35). The fact was that, owing to the Watergate political fallout, “at the top the U.S administration there was evidently very little time to be concerned over what was happening in Ethiopia” (Korn, 1986: 7). Nevertheless, despite its close association with the old regime, the United States sought to establish workable relations with the new Ethiopian regime, which was largely a mystery to the Americans (Korn, 1986: 7). This policy coincided with the need of the Ethiopian regime to consolidate its power and contain mounting internal as well as external pressures.

To this end, Lieutenant General Aman Andom, the Minister of Defence and later chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), visited the United States in August, 1974, holding talks with the Department of State and Defence (Korn, 1986: 7). The general’s visit was worthwhile and productive as the flow of military supplies from the United States to Ethiopia increased substantially. In the early summer of 1974 alone, the United States “approved a new program of credits and cash sales that would allow Ethiopia to obtain \$ 100 million in American military equipment during 1974 and 1975” (Korn, 1986: 8). From 1974 to 1977, the United States “supplied Ethiopia with approximately \$ 180 million in arms, in dollar value approximately one and a half times more than everything it had furnished up to 1974” (Ibid:21).

The large supply commitment of 1974 was rationalized at the time as needed to offset stepped-up Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia (Korn, 1986: 14). However, the main rationale behind this extended assistance was to neutralize the radical elements and bolster the position of the moderates within the new Ethiopian regime. In a memorandum to the National Security Council intended for briefing president Ford, the Department of State declared:

*As long as there exists a distinct possibility that the present situation will result in a strengthened, more moderate state, and a continuation of the traditional Ethiopian ties with the West, we should continue to carry out our program of military aid and sales as agreed. Suspension of these shipments would only*

*strengthen the hands of radical elements among the military and further frustrate the moderates, perhaps leading them to concur in more radical initiatives (Korn, 1986: 8; originally quoted in Peterson, 1986).*

The inadequacy of this rationale was exposed by the summary execution of Lieutenant General Aman Andom and leading officials and dignitaries of the old regime in November 1974. This forced the United States to announce that no major decision on military supply to Ethiopia would be made until the political situation was clarified (Merahehiwt, 1995: 12), and to suspend military assistance in due course. The United States was further estranged by the nationalization without compensation of companies owned by its citizens (Korn, 1986: 13).

Entirely dependent on the United States' military supply and facing increased attacks from Eritrean insurgent groups, the Ethiopian regime requested "for an American airlift of \$ 30 million in small arms and ammunition ... [and] confronted the Ford administration with dilemma (ibid: 14). After some delay, the United States resumed its military assistance because of the intensification of the offensives of the Eritrean insurgent groups, which besieged Asmara (Ottaway, 1978: 163). The United States was wary that, if Eritrea would become independent, it would give the Arab states completely control over both sides of Bab el Mandeb (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 220). Apart from this strategic consideration, the United States wanted to continue using Ethiopia "as a regional counterweight [Soviet-supported Somalia], and as a guarantee of the U.S credibility in the world as whole" (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 220). Secretary of State Kissinger maintained "so long as the Derg retained some pro-Western orientation it was important to back it in the face of the Soviet diplomacy and military build-up in South Africa and Angola" (Ibid:221). He subsequently "approved the provision to Ethiopia of two squadrons of F-5E fighter bombers and agreed to take under consideration a request from the Ethiopian government for approximately one hundred million dollars in additional military supplies" (Korn, 1986: 16).

### **3.5.2. The Failing Period**

Meanwhile, the Ford administration undertook a reappraisal of its relations with Ethiopia. In the first place, the strategic value of the Kagnew base to the United States was basically eroded by the development of new technology satellites and the establishment of large communications

Centre in Diego Garcia (Korn, 1986: 9). The base's personnel were significantly reduced from 3200 in 1974 to 36 in 1976. Yet, the base remained valuable for the reason that the Ethiopian regime "had deliberately decided to alter Ethiopia's previous reliance on the West, and has consequently strengthened its relations with the Socialist countries" (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 222).

After 1976, relations between the United States and Ethiopia continued to deteriorate. The Ford administration was "pressed by members of Congress, the media and human rights organizations" (Korn, 1986: 20), and had to take into account the opposition of conservative allies led by Saudi Arabia (Tekeda, 1983: 16). On the Ethiopian side, the regime radicalized its foreign and domestic policy stances in order to neutralize the leftist opposition movements.

### **3.5.3 The Discrepancy Period (1977-1989)**

The deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and the United States was aggravated by measures taken by both sides. "On February 24, 1977, Secretary of State Vance appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations and announced that the administration planned to reduce foreign aid to Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia because of human rights violations ... Ethiopia would retain its credits but would no longer receive grants" (Muavchik, 1986: 28). The decision came barely three weeks after Mengistu effectively consolidated his hold on power after eliminating Brigadier General Teferi February 3, 1977, reflecting the displeasure of the United States. As a reaction to this measure, the Ethiopian regime ordered in April 1977 the closure of the Kagnew base and the military Assistance Advisory Group office (Ibid).

The Carter administration reciprocated by fostering Somalia as a counterweight to the increasingly hostile Ethiopian regime that flirted with the Soviet Union. The use of the strategic port of Berbera also figured in United States thinking. In April 1977, President Carter issued instructions to Secretary of State Vance and National Security advisor Brzezinski to seek better relations with Somalia (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 226). The signal sent by the Carter administration to Somalia was, at best, mixed. At worst, it can be argued, they were taken by the

Somali decision makers as representing a green light from Washington for Ogaden invasion (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981: 222).

#### **3.5.4 The Ogaden War 1977-78**

Towards the middle of 1977, the Somali decision makers took note of the fact that Ethiopia's post 1974 regime was led by inexperienced and exhausted military officers who faced multiple crises, had their eyes fixed on Eritrea, and feared a two front war. It was also undermined by internal power struggles, was preoccupied by urban and rural unrest, and had alienated almost all its neighbors as well as the United States for different reasons (Ayoob, 1980: 149). It could not get all the weapons it requested from the United States, and its military forces were increasingly short on weapons and spare parts. The forces had lost most of their best-trained and senior officers in the turmoil of the Ethiopian Revolution, and were suffering from weakened discipline and military organization. It was for the Somali decision makers the best possible moment to escalate the long standing conflict over the Ogaden to the brink of war, and launch a full-scale invasion (Gilkes, 1994: 721).

In July 1977, the Somali forces operated a 700 kilometers long advance into Ethiopia, capturing 90% of the Ogaden, which comprised up to a fourth of the latter's geographical area. In August 1977, the Somali forces suffered two setbacks when they tried to capture Dire Dawa, which was Ethiopia's third largest city, an important rail, industrial and commercial center, and the site of a strategic forward air base, and Jijiga, which was the eastern most Ethiopian strong hold, and a tank and radar base. The Somalia troops' principal success of the war came in September 1977 when they captured Jijiga in their second attempt. Then, in October 1977, the Somali forces successfully breached the strategic Marda Pass, which was the gateway to the rugged and dry Amhar Mountains running east west and forming the strongest defensive barrier to the flat Ogaden, thus forcing the Ethiopian forces to fall on Dire Dawa and Harar, which was the Ogaden area's Ethiopian military command center (Nelson, 1981: 245; Gilkes, 1994:725).

By the end of October, 1977, the Somali forces were essentially stalemated at various points along the road to Harar. A shortage of supplies and spare parts reduced Somali forces' fighting

capacity, especially after the Soviet Union ceased the delivery of weapons. In November 1977, Somalia abrogated its Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union and expelled Soviet military personnel. It sought to enlist military aid from the United States, which refused as it was susceptible to the risk that a shipment of arms to Somalia would exacerbate the conflict and perhaps increase the probability of a clash between the superpowers (Dickson, 1985: 109).

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, with the limited objective of expelling the Somalis from the Ogaden, organized after November 1977 one of the largest long-distance military support operations in recent military history. This assistance covered the supply of about one billion dollars' worth of weapons, including hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles; diverse artillery items as well a light weapon. It also involved the launching of a control satellite, and the strengthening of the Ethiopian forces by as far as 1500 Soviet Union advisors and the deployment of 17,000 Cuban troops (Remnek, 1981: 140; Legum and Lee, 1977: 34; Porter, 1984: 201 and Ayoob, 1980: 159).

In 1978, Ethiopia concluded a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. This accord secured for the Soviet Union the use of the Asmera airfield from which maritime reconnaissance flights were made. The Soviet navy was also provided dry dock and other support facilities on, and unrestricted use of, the Dahalk Island. This greatly extended the Soviet naval presence and surveillance in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Dawit, 1989: 104).

The Ethiopian counter offensive was launched in early February 1978, and involved around 40,000 regular Ethiopian troops. The Ethiopian counter offensive consisted largely of slow advances along the entire front, employing artillery barrages and massed columns of armor. In addition, in a carefully engineered maneuver, Ethiopian and Cuban forces crossed the Amhar Mountains bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda Pass. Soviet Mi-6 helicopters airlifted pairs of tanks from Dire Dawa around the Amhar Mountains to Jijiga. This surprise attack on their rear, which was combined with a strenuous frontal assault from Harar, severely mauled the Somali position (Legum and Lee, 1979: 35).

Jijiga was recaptured in March 1978, and the Ethiopia forces swept through the parched Ogaden desert to recover the major towns. The Ethiopian counter offensive scored major successes in a short period of time, roughly five weeks. Among the principal factors that accounted for these Ethiopian successes, the most notable ones were the massive Soviet weapons' transfer and better strategic command. In fact, the strategic command of the Ethiopian counter offensive was taken over by Soviet officers, including General Vassily Petrov who was First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and General Grigory Bariosv whose involvement was crucial because he was in charge of the Soviet military aid program prior to the November 1977 expulsion and thus had intimate knowledge of the Somali Armed Forces (Porter, 1984: 204).

### **3.5.5 Option for the United States**

In the midst of the large scale infusion of the Soviet weaponry into Ethiopia, Carter's National Security advisor Brzezinski called numerous Special Coordination Committee meetings in December 1977 and January 1978. In these meetings, he warned that the consolidation of Soviet influence in Ethiopia, combined with USSR presence in South Yemen, would endanger the security of the Suez and the Arabian oilfields. During two Special Coordination Committee meetings in February 1978, Carter's senior advisors met to consider prevailing conditions and offer recommendations. Brzezinski argued that "the United States could no longer afford to sit idle ... [giving] the Soviets the impression that they could aggressively expand their influence in the Third World". He further contended that American prestige in the Middle East would suffer badly if the United States did not counter the Soviets (Moens, 1990:97).

Brzezinski proposed that the United States allow its allies Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia to supply arms to Somalia and that it send a Carrier Task Force off the Somalian coast in order to counter Soviet involvement in the Ogaden war. Secretary of State Vance and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Moose Objected to Brzezinski's options. They argued that the United States should consider the war as a local conflict, and that the best way to restrain Soviet initiatives in the Horn of Africa was through world opinion. President Carter rejected Brzezinski's idea and instead sent David Aaron, the Deputy National Security advisor, to Ethiopia on February 16, 1978. Aaron sought Mengistu's assurance that Ethiopian forces would not cross into Somali

territory, and stressed that the United States wanted better relations with Ethiopia (Korn, 1968:50).

### **3.5.6 The United States' Reply to the Ethiopian Famine**

The Relations between Ethiopia and United States exceptionally worsened during the Reagan administration's first term, especially after Ethiopia got associated with Libya and South Yemen by the 1981 Aden Treaty. In 1984, a severe famine swept northern Ethiopia overshadowing such strategic concerns. The post-1974 regime, just like the old regime a decade earlier, took almost no action until foreign news agencies reported the tragedy. It was busy organizing the inauguration with great pomp of Workers' Party of Ethiopia. The regime appealed for food aid to the international community as the famine was reaching a disastrous level. Owing to the large level of public concern, the Reagan administration responded positively to this appeal. It contributed the largest amount of relief assistance despite its misgivings about the Ethiopian regime. Assistance Secretary Chester Crocker met Foreign Minister Goshu Wolde in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly and told to Ethiopian that the United States intended to step up substantially its deliveries of food (Korn, 1986: 123-125).

Nonetheless, disagreement notably appeared on the issue of resettlement, which the regime designed to move a large section of people from famine hit areas to unused and more fertile lands. The Reagan administration opposed the resettlement program apparently on the ground that it was politically motivated forcing those families living in the provinces of Tigray and Eritrea to reduce their support to insurgent groups. It also contended that the resettlement program was unplanned, unduly diverted the scarce resources available for relief, and forced numerous peasants to seek refuge in Sudan (Hogos, 1989:152).

Moreover, the Reagan administration opposed the villagization program, which aimed at regrouping scattered villages, claiming that it affected negatively Ethiopia's already frail agricultural production. The Ethiopian regime, on its part, blamed the severity of the food crisis on the West's slow response. It feared that the United States would deliberately use food aid as a means to extract political concessions. I was also angered by the administration's decision to

channel food aid to insurgent controlled areas through Sudan (Duffield and Prendergast, 1994: 63).

The United States basically did not wish Ethiopia's capability to grow beyond a certain level and thereby weaken three of its allies in the Horn of Africa, mainly Kenya and Somalia. Already in 1977, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had prepared a paramilitary unit code named TORCH to assassinate Mengistu in order to destabilize his regime to the extent that it changed its nature and radical commitments (Dawit, 1989:35-36; Yonathan, 2002:25-26). Yet, given the opposition of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) inability to control the variables and uncertainties that might have arisen, it is doubtful the agency would have set out to do it. Thus, the TORCH plan might simply have been a KGB disinformation operation though it provoked the expulsion of two United States diplomats (Bittman, 1981: 33; Pateman, 1995:54).

During the Reagan administration, the CIA mounted a series of covert operations, which obviously cost it little in the way of financial and human resources as well as in the way of direct risk. Despite the sparse and fragmentary information on them, two kinds of operations were undertaken. In the first place, the CIA channeled 500,000 dollars (annually, up to 1990) to the London based Ethiopian People's Democratic Alliance. The Ethiopian People's Democratic Alliance was a conservative dissident group, which was created in 1982, had no military presence within Ethiopia, and organized propaganda campaigns against the Mengistu regime (Pateman. 1995:54; Yonathan, 2002:29-30).

In addition, it recruited well placed civilian government employees and military assignees, who were handled by its officers operating in Ethiopia under the traditional diplomatic cover. Such recruitment was undertaken to penetrate deep into the Ethiopian regime for the purpose of gaining insights on its inner workings, on the motivations and intentions of its leaders, and on the pressures exerted on it by the Soviet Union. In this requirement mission, the CIA was particularly successful as it managed to recruit a senior Ethiopian official, a secret CIA source of such sensitivity that his reports went only to the BIGOT list which denotes Top Secret reports

exclusively given to the most senior United States officials. The Directorate of Operations evaluated him as generally reliable to excellent (Woodward, 1987:167).

### **3.5.7 The United States' Rapprochement (1989-1990)**

After Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985, the Soviet Union cooperated diplomatically with the United States in reducing regional tensions in the Third World. It used its leverage to get Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. In 1990, it pressured the Sandinistas to allow free elections in Nicaragua, which led to the downfall of a Marxist-Leninist regime. The economic cost of providing third world regimes with mounting military assistance in pursuit of apparently unwinnable wars came to be regarded as an increasingly onerous burden on the Soviet economy (Webber, 1992:4).

Furthermore, the Soviet Union wanted to improve relations with the United States in order to conclude arms control agreements on long range nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe. These agreements could improve its worldwide image, lower its military budget and free up resources to bolster its dilapidated economy, which badly needed the financial assistance, technology and investment of the United States. Economy problem would actually inflame nationalist sentiments ultimately tarring the Soviet Union apart in 1991 (Ibid: 22).

Ethiopia appeared to be the most promising area for greater U.S-Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflict. This was true after 1989 considering that Bush administration's priority was to demonstrate active cooperation with the Soviet Union on solving regional problems. The Soviet Union had no overriding interests in upholding the Ethiopian regime, which owed it billions of dollars for arms purchases. It reduced progressively its military commitments refusing to conclude any more weapons contracts, and withdrew its advisors from war zones. The quantity and value of weapons deliveries significantly declined after 1985, with 774 million dollars in that year and 292 million dollars in 1986. In fact, Gorbachev has put the Mengistu regime on notice that Soviet military assistance will be declining and that Mengistu will be well advised to seek a political settlement of civil war (Breslauer, 1990:456-457; Cohen, 2000: 3; and Putting, 1989:10). According Webber (1992:14) remarked that:

*The entry of the United States into the diplomatic process appears to have been taken as an opportunity by the Soviet Union to wash its hands of the Ethiopian problem. Having already began the process of military disengagement, and aware of the inflexibility of Mengistu and the difficulty of reaching agreement between the host of rival movements, Moscow willingly allowed Washington to take the lead role in the moves begin made to promote talks between the Ethiopian regime and its opponents.*

The Ethiopian regime tried to bring about rapprochement in its relations with the United States. It took the first step in 1989, asking for a high level delegation to visit Ethiopia. It also appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Tibebe Bekele (former Permanent Secretary) as ambassador to the United States, a futile exercise as consent never materialized. The regime denounced Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, signed up to the United Nations-imposed economic sanctions, and supported the deployment of the United States' military forces. Its mission to the UN was instructed to take a most helpful line in the General Assembly and in the Security Council (Ethiopia was a member that year) on the Gulf War issue. The regime's overtures to the United Nations were clear signs that it could no longer find cover in Cold War divisions, and was definitely losing ground in the two war fronts (Cohen, 2000:19 and Merahiwot, 1995:17).

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Cohen visited Ethiopia in August 1989, and met Mengistu whom he found "relaxed and informal, chain smoking Marlboro" (Cohen, 2000:24). He raised the issues of the protracted civil war and the Ethiopian Jews' plight. He added that the Bush administration could help to achieve a negotiated peace between the government and its internal enemies (Ibid). An attempt was already underway to mediate between the regime and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) by former president Carter.

The regime delegation, led by Dr. Ashagre Yigletu (the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia) and including Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Tibebe Bekele, held talks with representatives of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in September 1989. The talks were held in Atlanta "under the auspices of an informal group known as the International Negotiating Network, which operates out of the Carter Center" (Kurylo, 1989: 41). At the first meeting in Atlanta, general matters were discussed, and agreements reached on the

issues as venue, working language, co-chairman, observers and agenda for substantive talks. In November 1989 and in April 1990, two meetings were held in Nairobi, Kenya. After the breakdown of these talks, the Department of State became directly involved after October 1990, organizing another round of talks between the two warring parties in Washington. Despite moving from procedural technicalities to substance, the talks failed to produce concrete results (Cohen, 2000; 41-44).

One major policy objective persuading Mengistu to expedite the departure of the Ethiopian Jews pushed the Bush administration towards decisive engagement in the Ethiopian problem. Indeed, mindful of the inevitability of Mengistu's fall, the U.S took the opportunity to press for an agenda that had been foisted upon it by Israel and the Jewish lobby in the USA to arrange for negotiations to stave off a final defeat at the hands of the EPLF and EPRDF, the U.S was talking about something else: arrangements for Ethiopian Jews to leave. In fact, the U.S in the end linked the issues promising to facilitate talks if the Jews (Felashes) were permitted to leave. The departure of the Ethiopian Jews would be the last bilateral issue handled in the maundering and torturous relations between post-1974 Ethiopia and the United States (Merahiwo, 1995:17).

The rapprochement between Ethiopia and the United States heavily relied on personal diplomacy in which three United States officials were central players. Assistance Secretary for African Affairs Herman Cohen kept contact between Derg officials and the EPLF leadership from breaking off and at every juncture prodded all parties to a commitment to limit further violence (Henze, 1991:11). Robert Frasure, the National Security Council's Africa Director (1990-1991), went to Sudan and Ethiopia in October 1990 to talk frankly both to insurgent leaders and Mengistu. He took full advantage of the exceptional leeway permitted to him by President Bush's normally cautious and self-effacing National Security advisor Frasure had served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Crocker's chief of staff on conflict resolution from 1981 to 1988. He was also Deputy Chief of Mission in Ethiopia from 1988 to 1990, and was thus well acquainted with the Ethiopia predicament (Ibid: 12).

In Ethiopia Robert Houdek (the Charge d' Affairs) steadily increased the pressure on Mengistu to convince him of the hopelessness of his situation and the desirability of extricating himself in

time to save his life. On that account, Mengistu's exit was neither planned in detail nor fortuitous. Starting weeks before, Houdek and Frasure had talked to him frankly about stepping down and departing. U.S officials encouraged Mugabe to be forthcoming and in early May suggested that the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister visit Ethiopia to pin down final arrangements. He came the weekend before Mengstu fled (Ibid: 13).

The political occurrence altered the manner in which the country related with the United States, especially after the regime's alignment with the Soviet Union in 1977 after the Ogaden war. Its ideology and policies openly became incompatible with the strategic interests of the United States, which was mainly concerned with keeping secure the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the West by way of the Red Sea. The United States accordingly perceived Ethiopia, "the most strategically valuable regional actor" (Dickson, 1985:12) in the Horn of Africa, in terms of the cold war need of countering the Soviet Union threat to its interests in and the Persian Gulf, and of meeting head on pro-Soviet radical regimes nearby. It followed that, between 1974 and 1991, four successive administrations of the United States adopted in varying degree a confrontational stance towards Ethiopia.

### **3.6. Ethio-U.S Relations Post 1991**

In the year 1990, the Derg was said had improved its political and human rights conditions. This situation gave a chance to the U.S to play a mediation role between the Ethiopian government and the opposition forces. However, the mediation efforts were not genuine, but to facilitate the condition for a smooth transfer of power from Derg to the EPRDF. Accordingly, the military government was overthrown and the EPRDF took over the state power in 1991.

The fall of the Derg regime and the ascent of the opposition forces to the state power had made possible the condition to reinstitute relations with the United States. Schraeder describes it as under: "The down fall of the Mengistu regime facilitated the renewal of an historical relationship as well as the promotion of an Eritrean policy that recognized local African realities" (Schraeder 1996:175). The U.S, that had been critically supporting the Ethiopian territorial integrity in contrast to the objective of the Eritrean guerrilla fighters, then came to acknowledge the secession. Getachew also holds the same notion about the fall of the military regime and its

resultant outcome regarding the relations between Ethiopia and the United States. In other words, he mentions the normalization of the relations between the two countries in the aftermath of the fall of the Derg. He writes in the following words: “With the overthrow of the military regime in 1991 and at the end of the Cold War, the Ethio- U.S relationship was again normalized” (Getachew 2009:71).

The end of the Cold War and the success of the Eritrean secession group also brought about a change in the U.S foreign policy towards Eritrea. Evelyn states the changes that underwent in the U.S policy towards the Eritrean secession as follows:

*U.S policy underwent a transformation from a Cold War opposite to Eritrean secessionist movement, to offering to critical diplomatic and political support to Eritrean leadership. The result constituted the first successful secession in Africa (Evelyn, 2003:47).*

The U.S Center for Defense Information also states the eventual progress and improvement of the relations between the two countries as under:

*The transfer of power from the military administration to the EPRDF, in addition to reinstating relations with the U.S, it also initiated the U.S to lift its restriction on the assistance to Ethiopia. Diplomatic relations were also upgraded to an ambassadorial level in 1992 (U.S C.D.I., 2007).*

Ethio-U. S security relationships have been very cordial through the 1990's, and during this time Ethiopia has been provided with substantial military assistance by the United States. The U.S Center for Defense Information, (U.S.C.D.I., 2007) summarizes the assistance in the following manner:

*In recent years Ethiopia's support for “war on terror” and the actions it has taken to preserve regional instability-although somewhat controversial in the case of the recent military action in Somalia- have cemented its relations with the United States. Throughout the 1990's the U.S provided Ethiopia with substantial military assistance. Between Fiscal Year 1990 and Fiscal Year 2001, Ethiopia concluded nearly \$10 million in Foreign Military Sells (FMS), and approximately*

*\$269,000 Indirect Commercial Sells (ICS). During the same period Ethiopia received over \$7 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and more than \$2million in International Military Education Training (IMET).*

The U.S had also supported Ethiopia during the border conflict with Eritrea. In addition to its political support to Ethiopia, the U.S had provided defense articles during the same period. The Center for Defense Information states that Ethiopia had received over \$11 million in U.S defense articles, consisting of dozens of cargo trucks and four cargo air crafts. The U.S had also provided Ethiopia with specific counter terrorism financing and training. Although, Ethio-U. S relations in the 1990s and 2000s is said to be very cordial, some restraints have also taken place between them. One of the factors for their disagreement was the use of Humvee military vehicles. The statement here under stipulates the reason of their dispute in the following terms (U.S C.D.I., 2007):

*Humvee military vehicles sold to Ethiopia by the U.S for the counter terrorism operation were used by the government to fire on civilian protestors during the riot followed the May 2005 elections, during which 85 people were killed. As a result, the U.S government has banned future sell of Humvees to Ethiopia, but other forms of military assistance continue.*

The concern of the United States about the misuse of the Humvee vehicles is worth mentioning. However, as far as other weapons are operated upon the bear handed civilians, the ban on the Humvee vehicles seems something that makes no difference but it only becomes the source of ambiguity and debate. Ehtio-U. S relationship has made a remarkable difference since the September 11, 2001 accident. The U.S which has always opposed the act of international terrorism has virtually reinforced its determination since the accident.

To this end, its alliance with Ethiopia is scaled up. The military assistance to Ethiopia since then has grown tremendously and the military security relationship is well bolstered. In this vein, Getachew (2009:100) argues as under: “After 9/11, Ethiopia has been categorized as an ally in the fight against terrorism, especially in neighboring Somalia, which has been controlled by lords since 1991, and is referred to as failed state.” According to the statement above, the security

relationship between Ethiopia and the United States is further strengthened as a result of the collapsed statehood of Somalia.

This condition may lead us to ask a question about the future of the relationship of the two countries; and the question may revolve around the following idea: would this relationship between Ethiopia and the U.S, which is grounded on the bad luck of another state, continue with the same tempo or would it, take a different path? This quest may remind us the situation that took place between Ethiopia and the United States during the time of Haile Selassie. That means when the significance of the Kagnew station appeared to decline in the face of the strategic interest of the U.S, the United States started to reduce its military assistance to Ethiopia and the general trend of the relationship was shocked. What we can see here is that, in the process of decreasing the military assistance to Ethiopia, the interest and the attitude of Ethiopia regarding the resulting effect was not taken into account. It was only the interest of the United States that was thrown on the weight scale. With this frame of mind, if the crisis in Somalia is resolved successfully and if the threat of international terrorism is put away in the Horn of Africa, it would be likely possible to expect that the security relationship between the two countries may not continue with the same time; even if the issue might be open for debate. Nonetheless, the military assistance of the U.S to Ethiopia has ever increased since 9/11.

The following comparative statement made by the U.S Center for Defense Information on the military assistance of the U.S to Ethiopia prior and after the September 11, accident indicates the degree of the difference and the profound attention given by the U.S to the security relationship between Ethiopia and the United States. The statement given by (U.S C.D.I., 2007) exemplifies the difference as under:

*U.S military assistance to Ethiopia in the five years since September 11, 2001, is nearly two and a half times more than the amount received prior to September 11.*

*U.S military sales to Ethiopia in the five years since September 11 have roughly doubled, when compared with the previous five years.*

In addition to the military assistance that the country obtains from the United States, Ethiopia also participates in East Africa Counterterrorism Initiation (EACTI), launched in 2004 (U.S C.D.I., 2007).

## **CHAPTER FOUR:**

### **4. DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The study data are collected from twenty-four officials working on both the Ethiopian and the U.S. sides through open ended items. To do this, seventeenth of the Ethiopian officials gave back completing the questionnaire whereas only seven officials were available from the U.S. who completed the questionnaire. Even so, the way the questions are responded was not found adequate so as to base the findings of the study fully. Moreover, the responses obtained are more or less similar and narrowly framed. It is so somehow the issue is sensitive as it relates to the security issues of the region in which case revealing the whole information may put the cooperation vulnerable in one way or the other.

The researcher, therefore, make use of his own personal experience working as one of the experts on the Ethiopian side (insider view) in the implementation of the defense cooperation in some ways or the other to strengthen the findings of the study. Even so, there are some issues that should have been remained secret for security reason in which case the data conveyed in this regard is limited to partial truth but believed to be adequate to make the required statements and conclusions so far as the specific objectives of the study are concerned. As the data collected through the open ended items is purely qualitative, a thematic narration is applied in presenting and interpreting it in the following sections. Moreover, the secondary data obtained from document analysis as well are going to be presented thematically here in this chapter.

#### **4.2. Presentation and Interpretation of Data**

##### **4.2.1. Responses Obtained from the Ethiopian Officials**

The Republic of Somalia worked as factor of relations that resulted in changes in the relations between the two countries during the time of Haile Selassie. Somalia as well became a factor of relations that seriously affected the Ethio-US relations at the time of the Derg. With the fall of the Siad Bare regime and as a result of the disintegration of Somalia, Somalia became a factor of relations to strengthen the relations between the U.S and Ethiopia. As Somalia turned into a

collapsed state the territory become as a hide out to international terrorists as safe place. The terrorist group developed as an enemy to both Ethiopia and the U.S. This condition aligned the two countries to fight this common enemy and they started to work hand in hand. Consequently, the U.S offered substantial assistance to Ethiopia and their relations was heightened. Thus, the friendly relations between the two countries are characterized by continuity.

Following this event the Ethio – U.S. Defense Cooperation was established since 2011 up until today. In this regard, there were only diplomatic and security relationships between the two countries before the above mentioned date. But with the occurrence of global terrorism, the defense cooperation is established and began to flourish as most of the respondents indicated from the Ethiopian side. One of the respondents even went on saying and put it in the following words:

*“... to strengthen the Ethiopian army to fight the common enemy terrorism. This is the Alpha and Omega of USA cooperation with Ethiopia with many political preconditions.”*

However, the cooperation had been already there even before 9/11 as contended by another respondent. What difference that 9/11 has brought up was only a change in focus according to this respondent in the sense that afterwards the center of attention had become a fight against terrorism i.e. counter terrorism. The counter terrorism or the anti-terrorist endeavor have been handled through a bilateral defense agreement/cooperation mainly through joint operation and sharing of information in their intelligence ventures as revealed by this same official of the Ethiopia side. These respondents perceived the cooperation as being at good level and adequate expressing it in the following way:

*“Concerning the adequacy of the cooperation, it is satisfactory and as expected by both sides.”*

The respondent went on saying that the initiation of the cooperation largely depends on the national interest of both sides. It is being done in a give and take approach taking into account the demand for issues of security and the globalization forces prevailing in the Horn of Africa in particular and the region in general.

According to the views of the respondents, the defense cooperation wouldn't exist if Ethiopia hadn't been capable enough in its military power and arrangement. To put it the other way, it is the military strength and experience of its soldiers that enable Ethiopia to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism in the region. Besides, Ethiopia was found to be committed and effective in fighting terrorism as the responses obtained from both parties indicated.

The other respondents also confirm that the areas of defense cooperation extends to supporting the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) (both the Ground Forces and Air Forces) in terms of intelligence, logistics, information and communication, education and training of Ethiopian Forces with the believe of strengthening of the Ethiopian army to better handle the counter terrorist attacks.

When it comes to organization of the bilateral defense agreement or/ cooperation; the respondents revealed the fact that the cooperation is handled in two ways. More specifically, it is being done through the technical committee and the executive committee levels within the framework of the MoU signed between the two countries in 2011. The daily routines are handled by the technical committee and the executive level committee acted upon the big and strategic issues through its annual meetings officially held in either of the two countries (in Addis Ababa and/or Washington DC).

One of the respondents from among Ethiopian officials explained the comprehensiveness of bilateral defense cooperation in the following way:

*“The functionality depends on the Ethiopian side requests, needs, and demands as well as the U.S. side offer of education., training slots, donation of equipment's and materials.”*

The response obtained from above sounds as if Ethiopia is the one who is always receiving while the U.S. is the one who is always giving. In such as case, one cannot accept the existence of balance between the two countries in terms of maintaining defense cooperation and military relationship. These same respondents revealed the fact that it is the U.S. which shows dedication and consistency to maintain the relationship through staging a regular meeting as compared to that of Ethiopia which lack consistency for the most part. This may be true in the sense that the

U.S. is committed and smart in what they want but not make Ethiopia as contributing less as it sacrifices its citizens in the counter terrorist attacks both inside and/or across boarder.

Be that as it may, the military relations and security assistance is held as prescribed within the framework of the MoU, said the respondent, the training and education offers of the U.S. are not fully utilized and even cancelled by the Ethiopian side mostly when the training and education package is the one organized abroad. Even so, the respondents didn't make the possible reason behind this scenario which in fact may emanate from lack of best fit candidates in the army to attend those high standard trainings.

Of the many possible challenges that the bilateral defense cooperation and agreement have faced so far, the following were enumerated by the Ethiopian officials: -

- Doctrinal or interest differences with regard to East and West background of military doctrine.
- Difficulty of most Ethiopian nominees in passing the test so called English Language Proficiency (ELP) test.
- The Ethiopian side nomination criteria for education and training participants are another setback which is largely amenable to period serving in military than competence.
- The U.S. side security clearance background, and other related requirements are always not acceptable in the Ethiopian side and this is a mandatory law with U.S which also called stiff criteria as "Leahy vetting". In other words, request for Bio-data of ENDF personnel to attend short, medium, and long term training and education in the U.S. is not among the requirements of other powerful countries.
- The major challenges is then failure to compromise and being able to flexible in those qualitative criteria's of assessments to push forward the cooperation among the defense forces of the two countries.
- Political preconditions to be fulfilled in order to obtain support of materials and training in which case the interest of the country would get compromised.
- Interference in internal affairs of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) fields and deployment.

- Wanting to control and check the deployment of equipment's and materials delivered to ENDF.
- Donations of unrequested (unwanted) / old or outdated materials and equipment's and as well as delayed delivery of the requested or needs item on time.
- From Ethiopian side looking spare parts and maintenance equipment's for C-130 transport air craft and Harris Radios communication. This subject associated with difficulty of acquiring for C-130 transport air craft and Harris Radios communication parts. I.e. which are too expensive to purchase and congress approval problem related with high bureaucratic.
- Lack of maintenance and assembly skills of ENDF personnel for different machines and equipment's donated by U.S.
- Financial shortage to support/Train Somalia Security Forces. This issue related to Ethiopian operations in Somalia. The ENDF have given training to Somalia Security Forces with no international community support. ENDF expressed an urgent need to enhance progress on this front with the international community.
- The recent decision of the U.S. so as to minimize the budget allocated for peacekeeping is a challenge to maintain the ongoing defense cooperation.

#### **4.2.2. Responses Obtained from the U.S. Officials**

There are three areas of cooperation as explained by the respondents from the U.S. side such as military relations, security assistance and trainings and education. The characteristic of the cooperation is balanced between the two countries as contended by these respondents. As the cooperation is rated successful in bringing about fruitful results, said the respondent officials, it was expanded to bring in more security and defense cooperation to light in terms of quality and quantity. Both parties are found to be benefited fulfilling their own interests in which case the defense cooperation seems to be promising to flourish in the coming years as well, the respondents' suggested.

Both countries have signed the "Status of Forces Agreement" on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2002 which was focused cooperation on security matters and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on "TRIDEMNT REACH PROJECT" on 22 July 2009 which deals on used of base for U.S.

military at Arbaminch but currently the Arbaminch base closed by the request of Ethiopia. Such military cooperation and assistance had also been continued until the current MoU was signed by the Ethio-U.S. Bilateral Defense Committee 10<sup>th</sup> February 2011.


The Ethiopian-United States Bilateral Defense Committee (BDC) was established by Ministry of Defense of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America for the purpose of facilitating defense cooperation. The committee coordinated the defense relations of the two countries in accordance with each party's national policy goals through regular communication and consultation. The committee has had held its 8<sup>th</sup> official meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 15<sup>th</sup> November 2018 so far. In other words, the committee has had a face to face meeting for 8<sup>th</sup> time.

The Ethio – U.S. Bilateral Defense Committee (BDC) has two main bodies: Technical Working Group (TWG) is the one responsible to function on the routines of the defense cooperation within the auspices of the committee. It is through this responsible body that both parties continually being able to incorporate their needs, interests and requests that the cooperation entertains. Moreover, TWG is the one which draws the boundaries and roadmaps for new areas of partnership and cooperation through discussions of the BDC i.e. the highest executive body of the defense cooperation of the two countries. Be that as it may, the other respondent revealed that the working group implements within the boundary which is already set-up in the defense cooperation agreement of the two countries i.e. in accordance with the MoU.

Based on MoU Ethio- U.S. Defense cooperation the Ethiopian military received over \$ 53.8 (fifty three million and eight hundred thousand dollars) and its assistance has been growing from time to time as evidenced in the graph below:

# US Security Assistance by Year

FY 2009 - 2015



(Source: Office of Security Cooperation from U.S. Embassy 2015/16)

Figure 1: Office of Security Cooperation from U.S. Embassy 2015/16

Moreover, there are donations made in kind after the above mentioned budget years as well. For instance, the one made on 7<sup>th</sup> June 2018 which is so called C-130 Hercules transport air craft to Ethiopian Air Force is among the major donations. Mike Raynor, Ambassador of the U.S to Ethiopia makes the following statement concerning the donation of C-130 by the time:

*“The C-130 will further enhance Ethiopia’s capacity to play a vital role in regional peacekeeping mission, enabling Ethiopia to move humanitarian supplies where they are needed in a timely manner and protect the lives of civilians in conflict areas.”* (retrieved from: et.usembassy.gov)

Even though, such bilateral defense cooperation is still growing up; the U.S. officials mentioned the existence of challenges as well. Among these difficulties, the major one revealed by the respondent U.S. officials is lack of the required personal information of trainees identified by the Ethiopian side for which training opportunities had been repeatedly cancelled either due to poor data storage experience or for not known reasons.

Moreover, the budget allocated for such purpose is fixed in which case no substitutes are usually made in which case the scarce resource allocated in this regard had been wasted due to failure of the Ethiopian military officials to recruit the capable and fit training prospects.

In addition, the other respondents revealed the fact that there are a significant technical shortcoming of ENDF in skills of maintenance and assembly of different machines and equipment's that donated from the United States. This unexpectedly increased the budget allocated to support the bilateral defense agreement in the form of short term trainings. Even so, there is still a shortage of personnel who do have a high level English language proficiency to attend the trainings in U.S. training centers. Moreover, delay in delivery of the requested or needed items to ENDF somehow due to issues related to the Ethiopian custom clearances make most contributions made in kind to remain non-functional for years.

Respondents from the U.S. side also explained that it is inherent that programs of cooperation such as this one do have a fixed and complex nature as most congressionally approved programs of the U.S. do. In other words, any substantial changes and improvements, if there are any, towards the exiting BDC may require extensive review and no guarantee thereof. Which sound opposite to the case in Ethiopia as sacrifice of citizens in wars against terrorism are not even reported to the highest level of authority found in the country i.e. House of Representatives.

### **4.3. Discussion**

The overthrow of the military administration and its replacement by the EPRDF in 1991 heralded the revival of the relations. The U.S. lifted all the sanctions that were imposed on Ethiopia. The diplomatic relationship was also raised to ambassadorial level. Consequently, Ethiopia began to obtain substantial financial and military assistance from the U.S. The September 9, 2001, accident and the disintegration of the state of Somalia, boosted the relationship. Today, Ethiopia and the United States are working hand in hand to tackle the problem of international terrorism particularly, in neighboring Somali under the motto known to as “fight against terrorism.”

Although many have seen the intervention by Ethiopia into Somalia as an example of the U.S. "Subcontracting" the war on terrorism to a regional ally, Ethiopia likely would have acted with or without U.S. tacit approval. The United States, however, created the impression that it was

working hand in hand with Ethiopia when the U.S. military command used its aircraft and high-technology capacities to target what U.S. regarded as Al-Shebab forces in Somalia.

Ethiopia was found to be committed and effective in fighting terrorism in the region as the officials in the Ethiopian side had responded. Ethiopia had also enforced an anti-terrorist law to strengthen the fight against terrorism. In relation to this, however, the country has made the advent of the global issue terrorism to attack its own citizens whose political ideology was somewhat different from those in power as members of the public commented.

Due to this reason, the Ethiopian parliament as well had labeled opposition's parties which were residing in neighboring states in Eritrea and Somalia as terrorists' organization. Consequently, the federal court had also passed judgments' and sentenced to death the war leaders of those opposition groups. More specifically, Arbegnoch Ginbot 7, Ogaden Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front and similar other organizations' has been labeled as terrorist groups. Consequent to the advent of the Terrorism Law, the House of Parliament had condemned those organizations and their leaders as terrorists and accused them in treason. However, all of these groups are identified as innocents and admitted to enter into the country to continue their differences in political, economic, and social ideology independently and freely within the country by now.

When it comes to the question of appropriate use of and balance between the military cooperation of the two countries, the researcher doesn't find it balanced in some ways. For instance, the U.S. supported the military relationship in terms of finance, equipment donations for Ethiopian Defense Forces in Peacekeeping Missions, providing education and training slots and supply of different logistics equipment's that would strengthen the fighting capabilities of the Ethiopian defense forces.

On the other hand, the military cooperation could not be considered balanced in such a way that the 'lives' are dedicated from the Ethiopian side while largely finance and equipment's are dedicated in the USA side. For example, the terrorism war undertaken by Ethiopia in Somalia had cost the lives of thousands of Ethiopians in which case the U.S. had only involved in the war

in supply of logistics (donation of equipment's), participating in Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV), sending very few Special Forces, and military advisory.

On the one hand, the country has used this capability of the defense forces not only for the fight against terrorism but also to maintain internal security as well as suppress the oppositions arise from the general public at different times. This is true during 2005 national election.

The Ethio – U.S Bilateral Defense Committee is also indicated as a responsible body to maintain the defense cooperation going on between the two countries. Be that as it may, how could one conclude that the committee is doing so well in this regard while making an official meeting in an average of more than one year's interval? In fact, it was mentioned that the committee functions through its technical working group to handle the detailed cooperation issues and yet, this working group could only report the issue to executive committee or officials of either parties but not to all of them at once as the face to face meeting is held in more than one year.

On the other hand, the respondents from the U.S. side revealed the fact that the prospects sent to the U.S. for short/medium or long term training and education have lack of English language proficiency. In this regard, it sounds that the selection had been done based on some other criteria's rather than competence. Otherwise, the Ministry of Defense has been developing lots of Engineers' in variety of areas through its Defense Colleges and Academic Institutions like Defense Engineering College which is found in Deberzeyit. The engineering college stays in operation for more than a decade is known for its relatively high level of trainings' and competency of its trainees which is somehow equivalent or much better than most public universities' found in the country in the sense that the trainees have a better opportunity to have a practical work experience through the very many manufacturing and construction companies that the Ministry of Defense already has.

The Ethiopian officials mentioned the stiff assessment strategies of the U.S. upon those nominated on the part of Ethiopia to attend short, medium, and long term trainings and education abroad as a challenge. This may sound a challenge for them in the sense that it may hinder them to send the ones that are loyal but not competent in terms of the qualities required as a prerequisite. Otherwise, language proficiency cannot be at any cost that determinant as long as

the candidate is found qualified in all other matters as the language difficulty can easily be solved so long as the candidate is willing to commit and dedicate its time and energy. On the other hand, the authorities may see the opportunity as a reward for those who have served long in military; but when seen from the best interest of the country, it shouldn't been treated that way as the former won't serve afar once obtained the training.

## **CHAPTER FIVE:**

### **5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMANDATIONS**

#### **5.1. Summary of Findings**

The purpose of this study was to assess the characteristic features of Ethio – USA defense cooperation which is part of the diplomatic relation between Ethiopia and that of the United States of America. More specifically, the study set out to achieve the following specific objectives in the course of the research:

- To assess the characteristic features of the present day's defense cooperation between Ethiopia and the U.S.
- To check the degree of inclusion of the MoU signed between the two countries in relation to the possible areas of cooperation that may exist.
- To identify the extent to which cooperation agreements mentioned in the MoU are realized and materialized on the ground.
- What are the challenges on bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries?

To achieve this objective, the study employed a case study research design which largely involves a qualitative method for collecting data and analyzing it in a way that the research finds appropriate and meaningful. Consequently, two types of data collection tools have been developed for the study; one open ended questionnaire and the other document analysis checklist. Even so, unforeseen reasons have made collection of data difficult for security reasons and due to that the study has taken much greater time than expected in the academic schedule. Be that as it may, 24 officials working on the bilateral agreement on both sides i.e. 17 on the Ethiopia side and 7 on the U.S. side are involved in the study by responding to the open ended items. Besides, a document analysis has been made making use of meeting minutes, the MoU, performance reports, the equipment's, vehicles and so on to accumulate secondary data with regard to the bilateral defense cooperation.

Making use of the data that has been able to obtain from both parties; the following findings have been substantiated in the study:

- The disintegration of Somalia has still made Ethiopia important to the U.S strategic interests and has helped to the boost of friendly the relations between the two countries in the name of combating international terrorism. Particularly the defense cooperation strengthens consequent to the 9/11 attack upon the U.S.
- The Ethio – USA Defense Cooperation was established since 2011 onwards until today. Ethiopia is then found to be committed and effective in fighting terrorism which is considered the center of the bilateral defense cooperation nowadays.
- The areas of defense cooperation to be supporting the Ethiopian Ground Force, Air Force, Joint operation, intelligence, information and communication, logistics, combat engineering, peacekeeping, legal, health, education and training of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) with the believe of strengthening of the Ethiopian defense forces. Subsequently, the defense cooperation between the two countries has potential benefits in enhancing the security capability of Ethiopia on the one hand; and on the other hand, it creates a suitable scenario to mitigate the terrorist movement and attack in the Horn. More specifically, the financial, training, advisory, equipment and similar other supports mentioned above that can be obtained from the U.S. enables Ethiopia to build a strong and modern army both in land and in the air to maintain its sovereignty in general and terrorism in the region at the same time.
- Of the many possible challenges that the bilateral defense cooperation faced, the following were enumerated: doctrinal or interest differences with regard to East and West background of military doctrine, difficulty of most Ethiopian nominees to pass English Language Proficiency (ELP) test, political preconditions to be fulfilled in order to obtain support of material or equipment and training, wanting to control the deployment of equipment's and materials delivered to ENDF, request for Bio-data of ENDF personnel's to attend short/medium or long term trainings in the U.S. academic and training institutions which is not the requirement of other powerful countries, financial shortage related to Ethiopian defense forces operation in Somalia, as well as financial shortage to support/train Somalia security forces, fixed fund, donations of unrequested and old or

outdated materials and equipment's, delayed to delivery items or equipment's to ENDF this issues related with custom clearances, the recent decision of the U.S. so as to minimize the budget allocated for peacekeeping and as well as delayed delivery of donation equipment's and lack of associated with spare parts and so on were mentioned by the Ethiopian and U.S officials as the major ones.

## **5.2. Conclusions**

Based on the data collected for this study, the researcher arrives at the following conclusions to each research questions which were formulated at the beginning of the study:

- As Somalia turned into a collapsed state, the territory become as a hide out to international terrorism. The terrorist group developed as an enemy to both Ethiopia and the U.S. This condition aligned the two countries to fight this common enemy and they started to work hand in hand. Consequently, the US offered substantial assistance to Ethiopia and their relations has been heightened ever since 2011. Thus, the friendly relations between the two countries are characterized by continuity.
- The only and major initiation of the collaboration had been the advent of the issue of global terrorism some eighteen years back. Even so, the scenario has been used inappropriately for some years to silence the public opposition towards the political situation of the country until recently when all the armed opposition parties are invited to come home for peaceful political participation by overthrowing the label as terrorist groups by the current EPRDF chairperson and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia.
- The partnership of fighting terrorism is characterized by the U.S. supplying finance, training, equipment, military advisory and in some degree the U.S army also participates in war against to terrorism whereas citizens lives has been mainly contributed on the part of Ethiopia in war fields against terrorism in which case the researcher finds it difficult to make comparisons between the two as they are incomparable in their very nature. Even so, those are the two important aspects of the defense cooperation as identified during the course of the study.

- The study finds it difficult to evaluate the MoU to be exhaustive enough as it prescribes only the main areas of cooperation in a crude manner which somehow is difficult to really understand what it refers about given those simple statements.
- In realizing and manifesting the major areas of the bilateral cooperation, there seems a lot have already been done. Even so, the study indicates the existence of a lot more desire for support of material and trainings on the Ethiopian side even the absence of the required standard and competent personnel.
- Doctrinal or interest differences with regard to East and West background of military doctrine from Ethiopian side.

### **5.3. Recommendations**

Ethiopia needs to revisit its usage of the war heads obtained from the U.S. to the fight for terrorism from using them with its own citizen in any way. Usages of equipment's obtained through military cooperation's cannot be acceptable in any human, moral or diplomatic laws functioning at this particular time in the history of the world.

On the other hand, the U.S. it self should make the necessary follow ups as to how the country make use of the war heads obtained through the bilateral defense cooperation very closely as that had been partly used to suppress its own citizens and dictatorship prevails or for its internal mission.

The prospects sent to the U.S. to attend short/medium/long term training nominees should be selected based on their competence and language proficiency rather than making it in terms of military service period. Further, the Ministry of Defense have different defense colleges and institutions so it should have establish English Laboratories in these collages to give language training for Members defense forces in order to improve language proficiency.

The FDRE of the Ministry of Defense should have closely to work with Ethiopian Customs Authority on transporting and facilitating the donation equipment's in order to get on time.

The FDRE of the Ministry of Defense should have developed its own clear Military doctrine as well as Defense Policy. Further, the Ethiopian defense forces should be not depending on external assistances should have to be capable by itself like expansion of defense industry to cope up with new technology and actively participating in international peacekeeping missions to get revenue.

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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix I**

**Addis Ababa University, College of Social Science**  
**Department of Political Science and International Relations**  
**Masters of Art in International Relations and Diplomacy**  
**Interview Guide... General Framework**

**To be answered by Ethiopia Officials**

1. What are the current characteristic features of Ethio-U.S. defense cooperation? (in-terms of area of cooperation, adequacy of cooperation, initiation from the U.S. side, and balance of the cooperation in qualitative terms)
2. How inclusive is the bilateral agreement in communicating on defense and security issues in a consistent manner? (Considering the regular meeting of the committee and functionality of the steering group and working groups as depicted in the general framework of the MoU.)
3. Do you think that those specific issues assigned to the working groups have been implemented optimally from both parties? (Areas such as military relations, security assistance and trainings.)
4. What challenges are there in the journey of this bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries? (In relation to those three major areas of cooperation.)

## **Appendix II**

**Addis Ababa University, College of Social Science**  
**Department of Political Science and International Relations**  
**Masters of Art in International Relations and Diplomacy**  
**Interview Guide... General Framework**

**To be answered by U.S. Officials**

1. What are the current characteristic features of Ethio-U.S. defense cooperation? (in-terms of area of cooperation, adequacy of cooperation, initiation from the Ethiopia side, and balance of the cooperation in qualitative terms)
2. How inclusive is the bilateral agreement in communicating on defense issues in a consistent manner? The functionality of the steering group as depicted in the general framework of the MoU?
3. Do you think that those specific issues assigned to the working groups have been implemented optimally from both parties? (Areas such as military relations, security assistance and trainings.)
4. What challenges are there in the journey of this bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries? (In relation to those three major areas of cooperation.)

### Appendix III

**Addis Ababa University, College of Social Science**  
**Department of Political Science and International Relations**  
**Masters of Art in International Relations and Diplomacy**

**Document Analysis Check List for Ethiopian Side (Check all that apply)**

1. Assistances obtained through Military Relations

- Information in counter terrorism and others
- Regional security issues
- Cooperation in regional peacekeeping mission
- Equipment's
- Machineries
- Others \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. Assistances in Security Issues

- Foreign Military Sales
- Foreign Military Financing
- Financial Management Review
- Others \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. Training Assistance

- International Military Education
- African Contingency Operations
- Defense Institute for International Legal Studies
- Conferences, Seminars and Symposiums
- Others \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix IV

**Addis Ababa University, College of Social Science**  
**Department of Political Science and International Relations**  
**Masters of Art in International Relations and Diplomacy**

### Document Analysis Check List for the U.S. Side

#### 1. Assistances obtained through Military Relations

- Information in counter terrorism and others
  - Regional security issues
  - Cooperation in regional peacekeeping mission
  - Equipment's
  - Machineries
  - Others \_\_\_\_\_
- 

#### 2. Assistances in Security Issues

- Foreign Military Sales
  - Foreign Military Financing
  - Financial Management Review
  - Others \_\_\_\_\_
- 

#### 3. Training Assistance

- International Military Education
- African Contingency Operations
- Defense Institute for International Legal Studies
- Conferences, Seminars and Symposiums
- Others \_\_\_\_\_