


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
**TARGETING IN PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME:  
A CASE STUDY IN IBNAT WOREDA, SOUTH GONDER ZONE,  
AMHARA REGION**



**BY**  
**YITAYEW BIRHANU GEBEYEHU**



**June 2007**



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
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**YITAYEW BIRHANU GEBEYEHU**

**THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES,  
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS IN  
REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (RLDS)**

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
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
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**Declaration**

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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## Acronyms

BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
CSA	Central Statistics Authority
DA	Development Agent
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
DS	Direct Support
EEA	Ethiopian Economic Association
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FFSCC	Federal Food Security Coordination Committee
FSCC	Food Security Coordination Committee
FFSCO	Federal Food Security Coordination Office
FSP	Food Security Program
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
GAA	German Agro Action
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDR	Institute of Development Research
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
KFSTF	Kebele Food Security Task Force
MEDaC	Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation
MoARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
NGOs	Non- Governmental Organizations
ORDA	Organization for Rehabilitation and Development in Amhara
PA	Peasant Association
PIM	Program Implementation Manual
PMT	Proxy Means Test
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
PW	Public Work
RFSCO	Regional Food Security Coordination Office
RFSSC	Regional Food Security Steering Committee
SCF(UK)	Save the Children (United Kingdom)
SNNP	Southern Nations and Nationalities People
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WC	Woreda Council
WFSO	Woreda Food Security Office
WFSTF	Woreda Food Security Task Force
WHO	World Health Organization of the United Nation
WFP	World Food Program of the United Nation

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**Dedicated to**  
**my wife , Tigist Assefa,**  
**and**  
**my Son, Natenael**  
**for the lavish love and kindness they have given me**  
**and the patience they have shown me.**

## ABSTRACT

The aim of this study was to assess the efficiency of Productive Safety Net Programme targeting in Ibbat woreda, in South Gondar Zone, Amhara Region.

For the purpose of attaining objectives of the research and answering research questions, this study employed both quantitative and qualitative data. The data for the study were collected both from primary and secondary sources. The primary data collection method involved the generation of both qualitative and quantitative data. The necessary information was collected using different instruments such as household survey questionnaires, interview with key informants and focus group discussions. The secondary data collection method involved the review of documents and related literatures issued by the Ethiopian Government, implementing/partner donors and from other Sources.

The research found that Productive Safety Net Programme targeting in Ibbat woreda combined administrative and community targets approaches. In principle combining the two approaches creates complementarity and thereby enhances targeting efficiency. However, in practice the efficiency of targeting was impeded by a number of factors and problems such as: quota system, targeting methods practiced, the criteria used to screen participants, and low payment rates.

The targeting criteria to allocate different amounts of resources to different kebeles in the woreda was based on past relief recipients and total production in the recent harvest season. Within the kebeles, the Community Food Security Task Force used oxen ownership as the vulnerability indicator.

The present research has used combining indicators for determining targeting efficiency by comparison of the local selection criteria and across the targeting guideline criteria to identify those who are beneficiary and non-beneficiary for Productive Safety Net Programme. To achieve the PSNP objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest priority. So the researcher from subjective judgment accepts 10 percent error (5 % inclusion and 5 % exclusion error).

The findings on targeting efficiency shows that the local selection factor 'oxen ownership' with 26% exclusion errors but when combining two indicators the exclusion errors were 7 %, 4.3% and 4.3% for ' oxen and land', 'oxen and food aid' , and 'land and food aid' respectively.

To achieve the Productive Safety Net Programme objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest priority. So use of combining two indicators is associated with improved targeting by reducing exclusion error from 26% in 'oxen ownership' to 4.3% in 'oxen ownership and food aid 'and 'land ownership and food aid'.

The recommendations of the study to enhance the efficiency of targeting in Productive Safety Net Programme are community targeting process should be transparent, participatory and well managed; and selection criteria should be based on combination of at least two criterions in order to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. Background

Ethiopia with an area of 1.016 million km<sup>2</sup> (CSA, 1997) and a population of 67 million in July 2002, is the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa (MoFED, 2002a). According to Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) Report on Ethiopian Economy Vol. III 2003/2004, “agriculture is the single largest sector of the economy that its impacts greatly affect the overall performance of the economy. Furthermore, it is the main stay of the rural households that provides employment for 85 % of the population, generates about 90 % of the export earning, and supplies about 70 % of the country’s raw material requirement for agro-based large and medium industries. Beside, about 50 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) comes from agricultural sector”.

The performance of the Ethiopian economy very much depends on the performance of the agricultural sector (MEDaC, 1999a). However, agricultural food production in Ethiopia generally is showing a declining trend. Both food production and per capita food availability have been declining, particularly in the 1980s. Total domestic food production decreased on average by 1.1 % per annum, while the level of per capita food production dropped by 4.3 % and 2 % for the 1980s and mid of 1990s respectively (Debebe and Sisay,1994, MEDaC,1999a).

The deteriorating condition is best reflected in the increasing number of people in need of food assistance and the amount of grain imported and since 1998 the numbers of food aid beneficiaries in Ethiopia have fluctuated between 5 and 14 million every year (Devereux, et.al.2006). For the period 1995 - 2004, the country received 8.81 million metric tones of food aid, the highest being in 2003, where food aid reached 2.0 million metric tones (WFP, 2005).

However, a high proportion of households that receive emergency food aid, every year are not “famine prone” but are “chronically food insecure” – they face predictable annual food deficits caused by agricultural production constraints and poverty. This results in a gradual deterioration of their food security status over time, which decades of large-scale food aid deliveries have done little to prevent. Instead, dependency on food aid has steadily increased over time, as has the number of chronically food insecure Ethiopians (MoARD, 2006)

Cognizant of this fact, the Government of Ethiopia, in close collaboration with its development partners, has developed a Food Security Programme/FSP/. The program has three components: Direct Food Production Interventions/DFPI/, Productive Safety Net Program /PSNP/, and Voluntary Resettlement Programme/VRP/(MoARD,2006).

A new PSNP, which financed through multi-year predictable resources, designed with the objectives of reducing household vulnerability, improving household and community resilience to shocks, and breaking the cycle of dependence on food aid. The PSNP consists of two components: (i) a labour-intensive Public Works/PW/ component; and (ii)

a Direct Support/ DS/ component to ensure support to those households who have no labour at all, no other means of support, and who is chronically food insecure.

The Program Implementation Manual /PIM/ is intended to assist implementers on how to translate this programme into action. The PIM therefore contains details on institutional arrangements, critical implementation issues, programme components, programme management issues, including financial management, accountability and procurement, and the annual programme cycle (MoARD, 2006)

The Safety Net Programme is a component of the larger FSP. Food security line agencies at every level of government will be accountable for the oversight and coordination of the programme, with implementation of programme activities being undertaken by woredas and kebeles, line ministry/agencies and other partners.

Implementation of safety net for reducing poverty requires methods for reaching the poor through providing resources directly to the poor. However, scarce government resources have encouraged efforts to concentrate resources on “target groups” of poor households or individuals (Coady, et.al, 2004).

Targeting involves decision on the selection factor and the targeting mechanism. Selection factor used are identifying which areas and households fall within the target group. Subsequently, the target group can be measured on nutritional status, socio-economic indicators, food balance sheet figures, income indicators and so on (Sharp,1997). The choice of a particular mechanism depends on the program to be targeted, the information available, the administrative capacity of the country or agencies

charged with targeting, and on the cost of the targeting mechanisms (Castanada, et.al. 2005).

To allocate resources for PSNP the government of Ethiopia designed and implements a targeting guide line. This targeting guide line provides two levels of indicative criteria for beneficiary selection: basic criteria and refining criteria. The basic criteria are households who have faced continues food shortage (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last three years and who have received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP program. The refining criteria important to verify and refine the selection of eligible households based on their status of household asset and income from non- agricultural activities and alternative employment and support/ remittance from relatives or community (MoARD, 2006).

The World Bank and International Food Policy Research Institute /IFPRI/, to cite two particularly influential bodies, have tended in recent years to come out strongly in favor of targeted interventions to promote food security and mitigate the social costs of economic adjustments on the poor (Vivian, 1995).

Studies by Jayne, et.al., (2000:887) show that there is a grappling between government and donors on food aid implementation, how to reach those in most need, "Despite the enormity of cross-country food aid transfers, which were running as high as 15 million tons annually during the early 1990s, very little is known regarding how well food aid is targeted to intended beneficiaries".

In the past, the food aid targeting system in many rural parts of Ethiopia lacks efficient procedure and /or practices. Analysis of targeting magnitude and investigation of the root cause of targeting are important because currently one of the challenges on implementing the PSNP was targeting criteria.

Amdissa (2006) on his study on the efforts and challenges of productive safety net programme, one of the challenges on implementing the PSNP was the targeting criteria. The targeting criteria that implement to target households at woreda level has raised a question on the reliability of food distribution list as an instrument of drawing the line between chronic and acute food insecurity.

To meet the PSNP objectives targeting issues deserve special attention. Therefore, this research attempt to assess the efficiency of targeting mechanism implemented, factors which hinder targeting efficiency and to suggest a more effective solution for the future.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Food aid delivers to Ethiopia amounted to 0.8 million metric ton, 11 % of 2004 world wide deliveries and 21 % of the deliveries to SSA (WFP, 2005).

The annual volume of cereal food aid has ranged from 61,000 metric tons to about 1.2 million metric tons or between 3 % and 26 % as a proportion of total domestic food grain production over the 1976-1998 periods. In bad production years food aid can account for up to one - fifth of domestic production and up to 50 % of the total marketed supply (USAID, 2003).

Despite the massive size and duration of this effort there are many unanswered questions about its long-term impact on the population it is designed to benefit. Recently, government and donor concern about Ethiopia's increasing dependence on food aid, coupled with the implicit demand for greater accountability in its use, has spawned great interest and debate about how efficient the food aid targeting system is in ensuring that food reaches those who need it the most (Sharp, 1997).

Food resource targeting is currently an urgent issue for many reasons as explained by Kay Sharp (1997) who conducted an extensive study in food aid targeting in Ethiopia. As Sharp noted , the Ethiopian government policy committed to reducing food aid dependency and cutting free distribution wherever possible combined with the growing scarcity of food aid from donor community made it even more important than before that the more limited quantities of food expected for the future would be effectively concentrated on those who need it most.

When interventions are targeted, there is the very real possibility that some food-insecure households will be missed and some food-secure households will benefit. These errors exist may be due to factors such as lack of knowledge that the intervention exists , due to faulty project design or implementation, the indicators used to screen participants and the resources available to fund participation (Hoddinott, 1999).

The efficiency of the delivery mechanism of the safety net program depends on a number of factors. These include type of benefit, type of beneficiary including direct or public program, beneficiary selection procedure, leakage in the program, level of procedural

complexity, structure of the economy, and state of technology and institution (Ahmed, 2005).

In Ethiopia four factors are identified as principal causes of the high level of targeting error and the resulting low concentration between food insecurity and participation in food programs (Clay, et. al, 1998). These are:

- 1) The needy and well off are both food aid beneficiaries: The impact of food aid to the most vulnerable group has been reduced by the flow of aid to food secure households
- 2) Over emphasis on women and the aged: women and elderly are used as one of the criteria to indicate vulnerability. Irrespective of their food need, a disproportionate number of female headed and aged headed households received aid
- 3) Lack of flexibility: the strongest determinant of food aid receipt is the number of years in the past that households have received food aid. Food aid flows to the same areas and households as it has always gone.
- 4) Regional Concentration: Food aid not only flew to non-eligible household but to non-eligible regions too. Households in the region of Tigray are far more likely to receive food aid, regardless of need, than households in any other region, thereby decreasing targeting efficiency.

Sharp, et.al. (2006) states on the study of targeting Ethiopia's PSNP, the PSNP builds on the pre-existing system of targeting for the annual cycle of "emergency" relief. The problems and weaknesses of the previous system may also be carried over. Such

problems include a tendency to spread or dilute transfers; the variation in effectiveness of community targeting, and the difficulty of standardizing or comparing the selection and needs assessment criteria.

The decision on the end use of PSNP resource is a risky and controversial step in PSNP process and determines its efficiency. The process of planning and resource allocation was from Federal level and Regional level. The woreda divides its resource allocation (quota) its among kebele and the kebele its among "gots". This quota system causes considerable difficulties for targeting bodies, especially those in the kebele and community who are responsible for producing the list of named households who will participate in the programme.

The success and failure of PSNP in meeting its objective is determined very much by the accuracy of the targeting that actually occurs in practice. In practice, the mechanism and criteria used for targeting may a rise targeting errors which affects the decision about whether to target, how precisely to target, and the mechanisms used for targeting.

Amdissa (2006) also shows that one of the challenges on implementing the PSNP was targeting criteria. The criteria that implement to target households at woreda level have raised a question on the reliability of food distribution list as an instrument of drawing the line between chronic and acute food insecurity.

The food aid and safety net program targeting system in many rural parts of Ethiopia lacks efficient procedures or practices. As a result targeting is not efficient.

These vividly indicate that the issue of targeting is relatively untouched and the available body of literature is scanty. Further more, the limited research so far conducted in the

subject reflect a national picture. But studies and analysis conducted at an aggregate level don't reflect the situation at the local level. Most, if not all, of the research conducted in the area tend to concentrate on targeting food insecure woredas. Food insecure households which are important unit of analysis to meet the PSNP objectives have been over looked. This research is therefore an attempt to identify the exact place of error which helps to improve targeting out comes and effects of safety net in saving lives and assets.

### **1.3 Objectives and Research Questions:**

The study aims at examining the targeting efficiency in Ibnat woreda. It assesses the targeting methods, criteria used to distinguish eligible and ineligible households and estimate the targeting accuracy or errors.

#### **General Objectives:**

The over all objective of the research is to assess the efficiency of targeting practices of rural household heads in PSNP in Ibnat woreda.

#### **Specific Objectives:**

1. To examine the targeting mechanism of the PSNP as practiced at the local level in Ibnat woreda in terms of factors such as targeting method, criteria applied and administrative procedures followed.
2. To estimate the targeting accuracy (errors of inclusion and errors of exclusion) against its intended eligible groups.

3. To assess the extent to which the targeting mechanism implemented at the local level corresponds or deviates from the standard set out at the national/ regional level.
4. To assess the local people's perception on targeting of PSNP to the extent whether its implementation was serviced as just and fair.
5. To assess the major factors that affect targeting efficiency.

This research attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the methods used to select PSNP beneficiaries?
2. What are the instruments/ criteria used to distinguish beneficiary households from others?
3. Do the selection criteria and methods have an Error of Inclusion or Error of Exclusion?
4. Do the targeting criteria implemented at the local level comply with the national/ regional level?
5. Who takes part in targeting procedure?
6. How do the communities perceive the targeting fairness?
7. What are the factors that have mostly affected the targeting efficiency?

#### **1.4. Significance of the Study**

A huge amount of government and donor resources have been applied to alleviate the chronic food problem. Unfortunately, if nothing changes the present domestic production, indicates a gloomy future that keeps food imports a continuing feature. In future, on the

other hand the international food resource becomes scarce and the importance of effective targeting is likely to increase.

Several micro level and macro level studies were carried out so far on food resource targeting. Some studies applied qualitative methods to evaluate the general targeting system of the interested area others applied quantitative methods to evaluate areas households or individuals level targeting efficiency. For example, the extensive work of SCF (UK) (1997, cited in Essete, 2001) based its field survey on experience and opinions of individuals and community. On the other had, the Grain Market Research study used empirical analysis particularly nutritional need analysis.

The household heads targeting study in Ibnat adds to the knowledge for two reasons. First, not a single study so far has been conducted in this woreda on food aid and safety net targeting. Second, the indicator, which was applied to measure 'beneficiary' and 'non-beneficiary', was not an absolute indicator. This research used proxy indicator of food insecurity, based on targeting guideline indicators of food insecurity, to defined beneficiary and non-beneficiary household heads for PSNP. The 'beneficiary' and 'non-beneficiary' definition is based its ground on basic criteria and refining criteria set on targeting guideline. However at the local level the beneficiary' and 'non-beneficiary' definition is based its ground on relative terms rather than on absolute terms. In the Ethiopian condition, the use of absolute indicators may label the majority of the rural population as beneficiary for PSNP. If everyone is eligible, targeting cannot be applied. The beneficiaries can assisted through non-exclusion or blanket distribution.

However, the ambition of targeting is to distribute scarce resources to the most vulnerable and to exclude the less vulnerable. Consequently the most vulnerable should be defined in the local context. The researcher believes that there is no absolute selection factor that can fit to all situations and all areas. Therefore, targeting efficiency should be evaluated in its context using relative measurement. The past and present experiences would guide responsible government and Non- government agents to allocate funds appropriately and to monitor its delivery. The research would draw suggestions for practical and affordable household heads targeting principles.

## **1.5. Research Methodology**

### **1.5.1. Description of the Study Area**

The Amhara National Regional State is one of the nine member states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). A total of 17.8 million people (2003) inhabit the region and at current population growth rates the figure is expected to reach 37.4 million by 2015 (SCF UK/Canada, 2006).

The Amhara National Regional State borders Tigray Region to the north, the Afar Region in the east, Oromia Region in the south, Benshangul Gemuz Region in the southeast and Sudan in the northwest, and comprises 170,152 square kilometers. It is made up of eleven zones, including Oromiya and Bahir Dar special zone, and 105 weredas (SCF UK/Canada, 2006).

Constituting about 16% of surface of the country and 26% of the population, the ANRS is one of the food insecure regions of Ethiopia (GAA/ORDA, 2004). The food insecurity of

the region is the compounded effect of extensive deforestation, recurring drought and erratic rainfall, lack of sustainable utilization of agricultural land (leading to land degradation), ever-increasing population against the annual increase in food production, etc. Over the centuries, population pressure has pushed the people out of the ideal zones into more marginal lands where the climate is unstable in normal years and the environment is less suited to the highland farming system. At the same time, population pressure in the ideal middle zones diminished the size of household land-holdings and increased the rate of depletion of natural resources. Out of the 105 weredas of the Region, 54 weredas are believed to be food insecure. Since the past two decades, the annual average number of relief beneficiaries of the region is about 1.8 million (GAA/ORDA, 2004).

The study area, Ibnat woreda, is found in the South Gonder Zone administration of Amhara Regional State. It is located between  $11^{\circ} 57'$  North and  $12^{\circ} 42'$  North latitude and  $37^{\circ} 54'$  East and  $38^{\circ} 28'$  East longitude. The capital of the woreda, Ibnat town, is located 44 kms East of the main road to Gonder. The woreda is bounded by North Gonder Zone in the North, Wag Hemaera Zone and North Wollo Zone in the East, Lay Gaint Woreda and Farata Woreda in the South and Libo kemekem woreda in the West.

According to the woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development 2005 annual report, the total area of the woreda is 249,427 hectares comprising of 1 urban kebele and 33 Peasant Associations (PAs). The wereda topography is characterized by flat low lying plains surrounded by steep hills, and also rugged landforms. The lowland (below 1500 meter altitude) holds 45% of the population. The midland (ranging 1501 - 2500 meter

altitudes) holds 44% of the population. The highland (between 2501-300 meter altitudes) holds 11% of the population.

According to the woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development 2005 annual report, the total population and number of households of the woreda is 222,649 and 49,264 respectively. Of the total households, 43,352 (88 %) are male-headed and 5,912 (12 %) are female-headed. About 97 % of the total population lives in rural areas, while the remaining (3 %) dwells, Ibnat town. People in Ibnat get their livelihood from mixed farming, domestic works and petty trade. Those people living in the high land to midland agro-ecology zone highly depend on mixed farming whereas those who are living in the low land mostly depend on livestock production. A significant number of people (10%) get their livelihood through involving in daily labor, petty trade and other off-farm activities.

Mean annual precipitation of the woreda range between 500-600 mm with mean annual temperature of 28o c. Of the total land area of the woreda: 32.5% is cultivated land, 48 % is covered by forest, bush, and unproductive land, 4,5 % is unutilized land and 15 % is grazing land. Rain-fed agriculture is a predominant means to produce the different crops that are used for consumption and sale in the target Woredas. The contribution of irrigation agriculture, according to 2003/2004-crop year record, was only 4 % of the total crop production, which was about 37,605.07 quintals. The midland and the lowland farmers produce sorghum, teff , barley, wheat, broad bean and maize in mhear seasons. Cereals comprise 66% of the total cultivated land and 65 % of production while pulses

comprise 19% of total cultivated land and 20 % of production. The average land holding size is 1.75 ha.

According to the Woreda Council Capacity Building Office 2005 annual report, the Woreda has 90 functional schools. These include 1 kindergarten, 46 primary schools and 18 junior and secondary school, 1 community training center and 24 Alternative Basic Education Centers (ABE Centers) serving those children and adults who have no access to formal schools. Regard to health facilities, there are 27 health posts and 2 health centers owned by the government. The water supply coverage was 29 %, health service coverage was 39.7 % and primary school coverage 63 %. The woreda have a total 309 k.m. gravel road net-work with its neighbor's woreda and kebeles.

Farmers in the Woredas, as is in other areas of the country are organized in Kebele, and Village or "*Gote*" levels. And different transparent committees are established from the Kebele to the "*Gote*" level, to facilitate development efforts to the grass-roots level. Moreover there are civic societies organizations such as Elders Association, Women Association, and The Youth Association that help initiate the community to organize and strive for the betterment of the society. Such social institutions are, therefore, good opportunities to bring a meaning full change in the lives of the community if support is given in building their capacities.

Other types of community-based organizations are those traditional voluntary associations like *Edir/Kire*, *Ekub*, *debo*, etc., which farmers use them to help each other in cases of occurrence of deferent social occasions such as death, birth, wedding, ploughing, crop harvesting, home building, etc. These organizations are sound

opportunities to mobilize the community labor and other resources to initiate their own development by themselves.

The Federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission /DPPC/ categorizes the Ibbat Woreda as chronically food insecure as many farmers can only cover their consumption requirement for six to nine months, even in years of relatively good rainfall distribution. As a result, on average from 1995 to 2004, a considerable part of the population (around 52,444 people or 23% of the total population of the Woreda) depends on relief aid. In 2006, about 77,618 or 35% of the total population is shifted to the mid-term Productive Safety Net Program, which guarantees beneficiaries employment in public works to sustain their livelihoods ((GAA/ORDA, 2004).

### **1.5.2. Research Design**

Targeting inefficiency in social support program can be an out come of multitude of factors. Thus for the purpose of attaining the objectives of the research and answering research questions, both quantitative and qualitative data were used. The data for the study were collected both from primary and secondary sources.

Triangulation of data source has a number of advantages that no single source could have. Carvalho and White (1997, cited in Meatlign, 2005) pointed out that integrating methodology helps in implementing better measurements, confirming, enriching, merging and explaining the findings resulting in better analysis. White (2002) also indicates that using quantitative and qualitative approaches together yields synergy.

### **1.5.3. Methods of Data Collection**

#### **1.5.3.1. Quantitative Methods**

##### **1.5.3.1.1. Household Sample Survey**

The main source of primary data were a sample survey of both "Beneficiary" and " Non-Beneficiary " 100 household heads in one kebele , using a semi-structured questionnaire.( see Appendix 3).

The questionnaire for sample household heads was designed to identify whether the household heads was eligible or not. The main criteria for eligibility in PSNP is members of the community, its food gap for three months in the last 3 years, household heads facing sudden shocks, household heads with out family support and other means of social protection and support and asset.

The questionnaire measures major variables to estimate eligibility for PSNP using:

- A. Household Profile( Household size, Dependency Ratio and Labour Capacity)
- B. Food Security Status ( food aid for the past three years, crop damage)
- C. Income
- D. Land Ownership
- E. Oxen ownership
- F. Production (Crop, Livestock....)

##### **1.5.3.1.2. Sampling Methods and Sample Size**

Ibnat woreda was selected purposively because it is one of the PSNP woredas in the Amhara Regional State. Two stage sampling was used to select the household (unit of analysis). There are 33 rural kebeles in the woreda and at first stage one kebele was selected purposively. Winbroch Wofituma kebele has high population and household size

but low percentage of household participation to PSNP, is one of the integrated food security program kebele for GAA/ORDA project for the past seven years, and accessible with four-wheel drive. The sampling frame for the study was complete list of both “Beneficiary ” and “ Non- Beneficiary “household heads in Woinberoch – Wofituma kebele, obtained from the kebele office.

In the second stage household survey was conducted on a total of 100 both “Beneficiary” and “Non-Beneficiary” household heads, were randomly selected. The proportion of PSNP beneficiary household heads with in the kebele was used to decide on the sample number of beneficiary and non-beneficiary household heads (see table 1.1). Of the total 1923 household heads in the case study kebele, 30%(577) of house heads are PSNP beneficiary. From a total 100 sampled household heads, proportionally 30% (30) were PSNP beneficiary household heads.

**Table- 1.1. Composition of Sample Household Heads**

Category	Total		Sample	
	Household Heads	%	Household Heads	%
Beneficiary	577	30	30	30
Non-Beneficiary	1346	70	70	70
Total	1923	100	100	100

### 1.5.3.1.3. Survey Instrument

Madge (cited in Stacey, 1969) pointed out that the principal application of interview in social science is its use for the purpose of making people talk about themselves. Interview enables to ascertain both subjective and objective facts (Mayntz, et .al., 1976 cited in Metalign, 2005). Furthermore, response rate and flexibility in face-to-face

interview is too high to extract more information. Given the aforementioned merits of face-to-face interview and absence of postal and telephone service in kebele of Ibnat woreda, face-to-face interview is perhaps first to none and the most appropriate method of questioning.

Interviewers are those up on whom the most important task of collecting data rests. Therefore, care was taken in their recruitment. Six interviewers who are professionally competent and participated in different surveys in the past were selected from the Woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development. They attended a one day intensive training about the objectives of the research, how to approach respondents and record responses as well as detailed contents of the questionnaire.

#### **1.5.3.2. Qualitative Methods**

To supplement the primary data, information was collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews.

##### **1.5.3.2.1. Focus Group Discussions ( FGDs)**

The purpose of the FGDs was to assess the communities' attitude/ perception:

- Whether its targeting implementation was serviced as just and fair
- Knowledge of targeting criteria
- Whether there are individuals/households which were non - beneficiary from PSNP although eligible according to the criteria or whether there are individuals/households which were beneficiary from PSNP although non - eligible according to the criteria

- Whether there is a problem on the implementation of targeting PSNP
- Capacity of 'implementing agency'.

Two focus groups which consisted of 11 persons each that are drawn from elder men; women and young men, purposively selected from the total sampled household heads of kebeles. (See Annex 3).

#### **1.5.3.2.2. Key Informant Interviews (KIs)**

To supplement information from the primary data, key informant interview were conducted with representatives of government and communities involved in PSNP including:

- Regional Food Security Coordination Office /RFSCO/ representative
- Woreda Council Chairman
- Woreda Food Security /WFS/ Office Head
- Kebele Food Security Task Force /KFSTF/ representative
- Community Food Security Task Force /CFSTF/ representative

These interviews helped to grasp the targeting methods and criteria used in the area, to select kebele and beneficiary households, problems faced in identifying beneficiary households, the major factors that have reduced targeting efficiency, their knowledge about targeting principles, rationale and Objectives, and other basic issues and facts related to PSNP.

### **1.5.3.3. Secondary Sources**

In addition to the primary methods, the research employed to incorporate several secondary data sources (which includes both qualitative and quantitative data). These includes government records and documents, statistical reports, PSNP documents, evaluation and progress reports, and kebele administration records. The information from documents was important in providing a more further picture regarding the design and implementation of PSNP targeting at the Federal, Regional and local level and cross referenced and triangulated for consistence and accuracy of information.

### **1.5.4. Methods of Data Analysis**

The primary data, collected from the questionnaire, were analyzed by employing Statistical Package for Social Science/SPSS/. Descriptive analysis such as frequencies and cross – tabulation was used.

## **1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study**

Targeting practices exist in the entire operation of PSNP. It starts with the identification of chronically food insecure woredas followed by the selection of food insecure household heads. Studies conducted so far concentrated on targeting food insecure woredas than households. But this paper focuses only on the last stage of targeting food insecure household heads in relation to its targeting efficiency.

On average from 1995 to 2004 in the study woreda, a considerable part of the population (around 52,444 people or 23% of the total population of the Woreda) depends on relief aid. The study conducted in one kebele of rural household heads as case study from

December 5/2006 to January 4/2007. Being confined in one woreda, its external validity could be weak and hence, generalizations from the findings of the study to other areas may not hold water. The research design employed, namely, cross sectional design, collects data at one time, and hence, one can generalize the findings from such one-shot studies to the population only at the time of the survey.

The study if not all, concentrates on efficiency of targeting chronically food insecure household heads in PSNP at rural households in one kebele as a case study.

It was not possible to capture as much information expected through interview-based discussions. This was because the survey period coincided with meetings at the regional capital in which the Woreda Agricultural and Development Office, Woreda Council and Woreda Food Security Office Heads were attending the meeting. So attempt was made to hold an interview with their respective representatives.

### **1.7. Organization of the Research Paper**

The research paper is organized in four chapters: chapter one deals with background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study and research questions, significance, research methodology, scope and limitations of the study. The second chapter reviews conceptual as well as empirical literature pertinent to the study. The third chapter provides the major findings and discussion are presented. The conclusions and recommendations of the study are presented in chapter four.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1. Theoretical Literature

##### 2.1.1. Safety Net Program: Concepts and Principles

Social safety nets gained prominence in development discourse following the 1990 World Development Report on 'Poverty', which included social safety nets - defined as "some form of income insurance to help people through short-term stress and calamities" (World Bank, 1990:90 cited in Devereux,2001).

During the 1990s safety nets became more broadly conceived, and the term is now often used interchangeably with social security or social welfare programmes. According to the World Bank (2000), safety nets are "formal and informal mechanisms that protect people against the adverse outcomes of poverty". The social policy aspect of safety nets is concerned primarily with formal programs meant to provide or substitute for income. These include: cash and in-kind transfer programs; subsidies; and labor-intensive public works programs among others. These instruments are usually intended to benefit individuals and households who are chronically unable to work, as well as those who experience sudden and transitory declines in their purchasing power (Subbarao, et al, 1997).

Ferreira, et al. (1999, cited in Rogers and Coates, 2002) any safety net program must be designed to include mechanisms for determining when the need no longer exists, whether at the national level or at the level of the beneficiary household.

Guiding principles of social safety net programs include: to help the poor maintain access to basic social services; avoid social exclusion; minimize the adoption of erosive coping strategies during livelihood shocks; promote adoption of higher-return economic activities; and avoid inefficient informal risk-sharing mechanisms.

### **2.1.2. Targeting: Concepts and Principles**

The term targeting is simple and has little argument about the meaning. Targeting refers to "Identifying eligible (or 'needy') individuals and screening out the ineligible (or 'non-needy') for purposes of transferring resources, typically by defining eligibility criteria"

(Devereux, 1999:16). Coady, et.al.(2004) states that, the motivation for targeting arises from the following three features of the policy environment:

- *Objective*: the desire to maximize the reduction in poverty or, more generally, the increase in social welfare
- *Budget constraint*: a limited poverty alleviation budget
- *Opportunity cost*: the tradeoff between the numbers of beneficiaries covered by the intervention and the level of transfers.

According to Sharp (1997) the basic idea behind targeting in all welfare programs fall under three general heading:

- *Humanitarian reasons: so that the really needy are assisted and the less needy do not benefit unfairly;*

- *Resource and efficiency reasons: so that scarce resources are used in such a way that they have the greatest impact on the problem to be addressed and*
- *Development reasons: so that dependency and economic disincentive effects (at all levels from household to the national) are minimized.*

For those whose primary concern is equity, such targeting holds out the prospects of channeling maximum benefits to the most under privileged groups. For those focusing on saving money, targeting is likely to be considerably cheaper option than blanket distributions or general food subsidies. For those concerned to minimize the production disincentives of food aid, targeting is to keep interference in local economies to a minimum (Sharp, 1997).

In social safety net, targeting issues are frequently among the most difficult problems to deal with during the implementation of such programs. Nevertheless, targeting is almost always a prominent feature of the designs of such programs because the potential benefits of effective targeting are considerable. Targeting can concentrate expenditures allocated to the programs on those who need them most. Hence, it maximize the positive impact of aid on the recipient countries and minimize the negative impact on the economy (Sumarto and Suryahadi , 2001)

The World Bank and IFPRI, to cite two particularly influential bodies, have tended in recent years to come out strongly in favor of targeted interventions to promote food security and mitigate the social costs of economic adjustments on the poor (Vivian, 1995).

Different writers have defined targeting in various terms:

- *"a deliberate attempt to shift the benefits of public expenditure to the poor by means that aim to screen them as the direct beneficiaries" (Yosef,2001:44)*
- *"any mechanism for identifying eligible individuals for transfer assistance and screening out the ineligible" (Devereux,2000:1)*
- *"restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk in order to maximize the benefit of intervention whilst minimizing the cost" (Jaspars and Young,1995b).*

The working definition of the paper was adopted from the PIM of the PSNP: "targeting is the processes by which chronically food insecure households are selected to participate in public works or receive direct support."(MoARD, 2006)

In a program using targeted intervention, the success and failure of the program in meeting its objective is determined very much by the accuracy of the targeting that actually occurs in practice. In practice, program officials do not have perfect information about who is poor because this information is difficult, time consuming, and costly to collect). Thus, when basing program eligibility on imperfect information, they may mistakenly commit errors of inclusion and / or errors of exclusion. In a world of unlimited resources, such errors could be greatly minimized by measuring targeting performance (Coady, et.al, 2004).

According to Coady, et.al.(2004) a common approach to evaluate the targeting performance of alternative transfer instruments is to compare under coverage and leakage rates. Under coverage is the proportion of poor households that are not included in the program (errors of exclusion). Leakage is the proportion of those who are reached by the program who are classified as non poor (errors of inclusion).

These errors exist may be due to factors such as: lack of knowledge that the intervention exists; the presence of constraints (say catastrophic illness or sudden death, which reduces household labor supply); faulty project design or implementation; the indicators used to screen participants; and the resources available to fund participation (Hoddinott, 1999).

In the literature on the targeting of social programs, where the greatest priority is to improve the welfare of the poor, reducing under coverage is more important than minimizing leakage. If the priority is to conserve limited budget funds, measures to reduce leakage are given greater weight (Hoddinott, 1999).

In many literatures related to the problems of targeting, three sets of problems which seem to arise in varying forms in all kinds of targeted programs (Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001). These included administrative, political economy and stigma costs. Accordingly:

1. **Administrative Cost:** administrative costs of identifying, reaching, and monitoring potential beneficiaries. These costs will vary with the degree or fineness of targeting. One might imagine that there are certain fixed costs associated with targeting. As targeting moves below a certain geographical level (say the district) to villages to households, and to individuals, it becomes increasingly costly (Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001).
2. **Political Economy Cost:** It comprises all obstacles arising from conflicting interest over the selection process and competition for scarce and valuable resource (Sharp, 1997). First, people excluded from the distribution of benefits are likely to try to resist or manipulate the selections. A different kind of political problem is the opportunity for corruption by those who control the choice of beneficiary areas, groups and individuals (Subbarao, et .al ,1997 :19)
3. **Stigmatization Cost:** Stigma costs can arise when program beneficiaries lose their self-esteem because they regard themselves as failures that have been

forced to rely on government support. In addition, non-beneficiaries may have negative attitudes toward beneficiaries and treat them as second-class citizens (Sumarto and Suryahadi, 2001).

The intended beneficiary of social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction programs depend upon the objectives of the particular program. A food assistance program will want to target its benefits to those within the community who are having difficulties obtaining food out of their own resources. A health assistance program will aim to provide free or subsidized medical benefits to those with health problems who are also poor or who are unable to access medical services without outside assistance. Meanwhile, a public works program will aim to provide employment opportunities to either all of the currently unemployed or those among the unemployed who are also poor (Castaneda, et.al. 2005)

According to Coady, et.al.(2004) targeting mechanisms all have the same goal to correctly and efficiently identify which households are poor or which are not. According to World Bank (2000) there are a number of different but overlapping ways of classifying targeting mechanisms. The broadest and best known is Dreze and Sen's (1989 cited in Yosef, 2001) division of the mechanisms. These are administrative selection, market selection and self- selection.

According to Sharp (1997) analyzing the food aid targeting practice in Ethiopia classifies the targeting mechanism into market, self -targeting and community targeting. A number of writers discuss the role of communities in targeting, mostly as a sub- category of administrative targeting (Conning and Kevane ,1999).

### **I. Community Targeting**

The community decides on the beneficiaries based on their best knowledge about their neighbors. This channel is applicable in a society whereby the community has a strong social tie. Advantageous of this channel are no costs for household surveys, vulnerability defined in its own environment and community empowerment. Disadvantages are the high cost of monitoring the fairness and the chance that an influential group may be included at the expense of the poorest powerless people (Sharp, 1997).

### **II. Self Targeting**

It applies to an able-bodied person when there is work in exchange for aid. Beneficiaries decide for themselves to get the aid. Low wages, low quality of food and stigma are used to discourage privileged groups. The advantages of self targeting are that it has no individual screening cost and it is free from corruption and biases. But the disadvantages are the possible risk even to discourage the under-privileged groups; the job opportunity depends on resource availability, and the failure to address vulnerable but unable bodied persons (Sharp, 1997).

### **III. Administrative Targeting**

Outsiders from government staff or assistance agencies select the beneficiaries using observable criteria. This includes: nutritional statues, social and economic indicators. The advantage of this method is it reduces the errors of inclusion or exclusion, but at a high cost of screening beneficiaries. The disadvantage is that mis-use or abuses of power. This includes: bias, corruption and favoritism (Sharp, 1997).

### **IV. Market Targeting**

It is the indirect transfer of food aid intervention in the form of program (non-project) food aid. It can not be applicable to for relief aid or direct food targeting. Food is directed to the local market in drought hit areas to people who have purchasing power but could not find the commodity in the markets due to harvest failure. The intervention provides food to the market and subsidizes food or livestock prices. The channel dose not involve beneficiary selection cost, reduces administrative burden and there is no room for favoritism (Sharp, 1997).

The choice of a particular mechanism depends on the program to be targeted, the information available, the administrative capacity of the country or agencies charged with targeting, and on the cost of the targeting mechanisms (Castaneda, et.al. 2005).

## **2.2. Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia**

### **2.2.1. Rationale, Objectives and Principles**

Food insecurity in Ethiopia is normally understood in terms of recurrent food crises and famines, and responses to food insecurity have conventionally been dominated by emergency food-based interventions. In the ten years from 1994 to 2003, an average of five million Ethiopians were declared “at risk” and in need of emergency assistance, and since 1998 the numbers of food aid beneficiaries in Ethiopia have fluctuated between 5 and 14 million every year( Devereux, et.al.,2006).

However, a high proportion of households that receive emergency food aid, or work on public works projects, every year are not “famine prone” but are “chronically food insecure” – they face predictable annual food deficits caused by agricultural production constraints and poverty.

This results in a gradual deterioration of their food security status over time, which decades of large-scale food aid deliveries have done little to prevent. Instead, dependency on food aid has steadily increased over time, as has the number of chronically food insecure Ethiopians.

Recognizing this dilemma, in 2004 the Government of Ethiopia initiated a PSNP, with the objectives of reducing household vulnerability, improving household and community resilience to shocks, and breaking the cycle of dependence on food aid.

The specific objectives of the cash and food transfers provided through the PSNP include:

- ✦ To smooth household consumption: to bridge production deficits in chronically food insecure farming households that are not self-sufficient, even in good rainfall years;
- ✦ To protect household assets: to prevent poor households from falling further towards destitution, vulnerability to future shocks and chronic dependence on external assistance;
- ✦ To create community assets: by linking the delivery of transfers to activities that are productivity-enhancing, in order to promote sustainable developmental outcomes.

The “Basic Principles” of the PSNP are:

- ✦ Predictability: A safety net delayed is a safety net denied. Consequently, resource flows must be predictable;
- ✦ Avoiding dependency: This can be achieved by requiring able-bodied beneficiaries to provide labour in exchange for program transfers.

### **2.2.2. Programme Components**

According to the two main components of the PSNP are:

***Public Works*** – provision of counter-cyclical employment on rural infrastructure projects such as road construction and maintenance, small-scale irrigation and reforestation;

***Direct Support*** – provision of direct unconditional transfers of cash or food to vulnerable households with no able-bodied members who can participate in public works projects.


### **2.2.3. Targeting Design and Mechanism**

The PSNP targeting guideline was developed at Federal level with comments from Regional Food Security Bureaus. The targeting principles of the PSNP are set out in the

PIM which is the basic reference document for implementers. This manual was prepared by a taskforce made up of technical people from Federal and Regional Food Security Coordination Office/FSCO/ and other departments of the MoARD. It was released in December 2004, shortly before the planned start-up of the programme (MoARD, 2006).

Planning figures are sent down the government hierarchy, while needs assessment figures and requests are passed up the system from communities through kebeles, woredas and regions, being compiled into larger units at each stage. For beneficiary selection, they designed to carry out by the WFSTF, Woreda Council, Kebele Council, KFSTF and CFSTF (MoARD, 2004).

Figure 1 : Administrative - Community Targeting Process



Adapted from PIM

They design to use both administrative and community targeting mechanism in combination (Fig.1). Using PSNP targeting guideline the CFSTF under goes a need assessment to identify the households who can participate in public works and direct support in their respective village.

### 2.2.3.1. Targeting Design

According to the PSNP Project Memorandum the primary targeting objective of the PSNP should be to guarantee timely and adequate transfers to the most food insecure people in the most food-insecure areas (DFID Ethiopia, 2005 cited in Devereux, et.al. 2006). In operational terms, the PIM defines these target people at area and household level respectively (Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1. Definition of Target Areas and Households**

**a) Chronically food insecure woredas:**

- For the purpose of the safety net, a woreda is considered chronically food insecure if it (a) is in one of 8 regions( Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, Afar, rural Harari and Dire Dawa), and (b) has been a recipient of food aid for a significant period, generally for at least each of the last 3 years...

**b) Chronically food insecure households:**

- For the purposes of the Safety Net, a household is considered chronically food insecure if it is located in one of the 262 chronically food insecure woredas (as defined above).
- Has been assessed by a mix of administrative guidelines and community knowledge to have faced continuous food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last 3 years and received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP
- This also includes households that suddenly become more vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years).
- Any household without family support and other means of social protection and support.

(extract from PIM section 1.4)

Household level targeting is the lower level structure in the targeting hierarchy which plays a vital role in linking area targeting with the beneficiary households (Mitik, et al, 1998 ,cited in Essete, 2001).

### **2.2.3.2. Targeting Mechanism**

Targeting design provides two levels of indicative criteria for beneficiary selection - basic criteria and refining criteria (MoARD, 2006).

The basic criteria are: households should be members of the community; who have faced continues food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last three years; and who have received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP program. This should include households who suddenly become more food insecure as a result of sever loss of assets and are unable to support them selves (last 1-2 years) and households with out family support and other means of social protection and support.

The refining criteria , important to verify and refine the selection of eligible households, based on their status of household asset and income from non- agricultural activities and alternative employment and support/ remittance from relatives or community (MoARD,2006).

The PIM designed to select eligibility households that will be appropriate for public work activities are: able-bodied adult men and women from households which full fill the selection criteria, and households that will be appropriate for direct support are individuals who ( i) do not have labour to participate in public works, (ii) do not have sufficient and reliable support from sons/daughters or remittances from relatives away from the village and (iii) cannot participate or contribute to other community based

activities. Such individual include some disabled persons and individuals include lactating mothers [in the ten month after birth], pregnant women and orphaned teenagers.

### 2.3. PSNP Implementation in Amhara Region

Constituting about 16% of surface of the country and 26% of the population, the Amhara National Regional State is one of the food insecure regions of Ethiopia (GAA/ORDA, 2004). The food insecurity of the region is the compounded effect of extensive deforestation, recurring drought and erratic rainfall, lack of sustainable utilization of agricultural land (leading to land degradation), ever-increasing population against the annual increase in food production, etc(GAA/ORDA,2004).

Table 4.1 shows that relative to the other three regional states where both chronic and transitory food insecurity is a characteristic feature, the Amhara region ranks second, following Tigray region, in terms of actual and projected population size in need of humanitarian food assistance.

**Table 2.2. Actual and Projected Population Needing Humanitarian Food Assistance**

Region	Population (1995/96)	% Food Assisted Population in 2003	% Population Needing Food Assistance in 2004
Amhara	14,849,410	21	13
Oromiya	21,151,579	18	7
SNNP	12,212,792	12	7
Tigray	3,616,086	55	30

Source: Welfare Monitoring Unit, MoFED ( 2002b) and MoARD,2006.

It is estimated that between the years 1998 and 2003, up to 2.7 million people per year have faced severe food shortages in the Amhara Region alone (SCF UK/Canada, 2006).

Realizing the gravity of the food insecurity problem, and consistent with the country's overall food security program, the Regional State of Amhara in partnership with NGOs and international agencies including The World Bank, World Food Programme, and ORDA is implementing a number of projects and programs in an effort to find a lasting solution to the issue of chronic food insecurity. The ongoing PSNP is part of this initiative. The number of beneficiaries in 2006 was 2,519,529

### **2.3.1. Institutional Structure**

The implementation of PSNP in Amhara Region is more or less similar to that of other regional states in the country. It follows the political and administration structure. The Regional Council/Cabinet is the highest decision-making body. Its major responsibilities related to PSNP are to review and approve food security and safety net annual plans and budgets submitted by woredas through the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) based on the size of chronically food insecure population as well as annual and biannual progress reports on implementation of the regional Safety Net Programme and utilization of its budget.

The Regional Food Security Steering Committee /RFSSC/ provides advice to ensure the proper implementation of food security strategies and programmes at the regional level. The RFSSC also ensures effective integration of the regional Safety Net Programme into the regional development plan and participates in monitoring and evaluation of Safety Net Programme activities including the Rapid Response Mechanism. The RFSSC is made up of representatives from the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (chair of RFSSC), the Regional Food Security Coordination Committee /RFSCC/

(secretary of Federal Food Security Coordination Committee /FFSCC/, the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (BoFED), the Bureau of Capacity Building, the DPPC, the Bureau of Water Resources, the Bureau of Natural Resources and Land Administration, the Bureau of Cooperatives Promotion and NGO representatives (MoARD, 2006).

At woreda level, the woreda is the key level of government that assesses needs and undertakes planning and implementation of Safety Net activities. The woreda council is the highest decision-making body at woreda level and is responsible for the allocation of safety net resources to kebeles in line with size of vulnerable population and based on the recommendations of the WFSTF.

### **2.3.2. Targeting Mechanism**

#### **2.3.2.1. Targeting Methods**

The process of beneficiary selection is based on a combination of administrative and community targeting. The targeting process starting with the community needs assessment at community level.

Physical work plans were prepared by kebele development committees, which were then submitted to Woredas for appraisal and approval. With some modifications mainly to ensure that the kebele physical plans were in accord with the available resources, the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) review and approve food security and safety net annual plans and budgets submitted by woredas through based on the size of chronically food insecure population as well as annual and biannual

progress reports on implementation of the regional Safety Net Programme and utilization of its budget.

#### **2.3.2.2. Selection Criteria**

In the first year of PSNP operation (2005), Amhara Region took a policy decision to target the safety net on the “middle-class” category of households – i.e. neither the poorest nor the wealthiest, but those with some land and other assets who were likely to be able to “graduate” into food security with the support of the PSNP and other food security programs. Simultaneously, many of those non-beneficiaries from the safety net, particularly the young and landless, were targeted for resettlement.

This strategy has its own logic, but is clearly contrary to the targeting priorities of the PSNP as agreed between the government and donors. In response to pressure from donors and the federal government, and in the face of rising emergency needs and a high level of complaints from excluded households, the region reversed its targeting policy for the second year’s targeting (Sharp, et.al, 2006).

To solve the problem, the RFSC Office produced targeting manual guidance. Targeting guide lines provides two levels of indicative criteria for beneficiary selection - basic criteria and refining criteria which mentioned in the literature review.

## **2.4. Empirical Literature**

### **2.4.1. Targeting Mechanism: International Evidence**

Targeting social transfers to the poor has become a priority in many developing countries in the last two decades as a response to fiscal constraints and policy changes to improve effectiveness of programs in reducing poverty. Targeting involves decision on the selection factors and the targeting mechanism. Selection factors are used to identify which areas, households or individuals fall within the target group. Subsequently the target group can be measured on nutritional status, socio-economic indicators, food balance sheet figures, income indicators and so on (Sharp 1997).

Available evidence on factors that reduced targeting efficiency on social support programs are technical failure, mis-use of political power and resource constraint. In this section an attempt is made to discuss targeting efficiency in relation to technical failure, mis-use of political power and resource constraint on the international evidence.

#### **Technical Failure:**

Technical failure often arises in the selection factors and in the threshold. The criteria used to identify the food -insecure are often inappropriate indicators. Even with appropriate indicators, the cut-off point can also genuinely deny the neediest from the assistance.

To target programs at particular subgroups or individuals requires substantial information. When basing program eligibility on imperfect information and having no clear targeting criteria, they may mistakenly commit errors of inclusion and exclusion

which is important for evaluate the targeting performance of alternative transfer instruments. Studies by Sumarto's and Suryahadi's (2001) on the Indonesian social safety net program shows the capacity of the government or donors to respond to shocks with effective geographic targeting was hampered by a lack of up to date, complete, and accurate data. Another study by Smith's and Subbarao's (2003) studies conducted on the role of safety net transfer in very low income countries shows that in the very low income countries household incomes consist mostly of own production of food grains and are almost never known with any certainty and even the most basic attributes such as age, or landholding, are generally not recorded. In Malawi, for example, even though it is well known that there is a strong correlation between poverty and landholding, it proved impossible to target a program designed to provide free fertilizer to the poor on the basis of landholding, because there is no registration of landholdings.

In most countries transfers are targeted on the basis of criteria such as income, or demographic characteristics such as household size or age. According to Devereux (2001 ) on Namibia case study uses old age as a proxy for vulnerability in non-emergency contexts, but this proxy is seen to have serious limitations. Evidence suggests that demographic categories, such as female-headed households and the elderly, are crude and often inaccurate proxies for poverty. An analysis of household income and expenditure data in Uganda found no correlation between sex of household head and the probability of being poor (ibid).

Literature argues that these demographic characteristics present problems of verification. For example, everyone may suddenly become an orphan, or many households may

suddenly become female-headed, if transfers of free food or money are available only to those groups.

Tabor's (2002) studies in the social assistance (NE) program in Albania shows that, the social assistance program which administered by local social assistance office estimates the household's needs according to its size and landholdings. The poorest deciles of income earners received 36 percent of the total NE expenditures. Studies by the World Bank (2005) suggest that current targeting criteria may themselves not be appropriate. Land criteria, for example, are widely used to distinguish between the poor and the non-poor but evidence suggests these criteria could lead to significant mis-targeting. One criterion used to identify the very poor is to include only people with at most 5 decimals of land. Data suggests that if rural households with less than 5 decimals of land were to be selected at random, over a third of them would be non-poor.

Interventions that use means testing, geographic targeting, and self-selection based on a work requirement are all associated with an increased share of benefits going to the bottom two quintiles relative to self-selection based on consumption (Coady et al. 2004). A recent review of experiences with mechanisms used to target 122 interventions in 48 developing countries finds that targeting can indeed work: the median targeted program provides roughly 25% more resources to the poor than would random allocations (ibid).

Substantial evidences suggest that community participation can lead to improved project performance and better targeting (Conning and Kevane, 2001). Recent work by Ravallion and Galasso (1999 cited on Smith and Subbarao, 2003) on a community-targeted food program in Bangladesh found that on average the poor benefited, but that there was wide

variation from community to community, with-- somewhat worryingly-- more exclusion of the poor in villages that had a wider distribution of income, reflecting the poor's relatively lesser weight in the decision making process. However community targeting mechanisms is vulnerable by the local power dynamics. Conning's and Kevane's (2001) studies states that community targeting does not rely on 'objective' criteria set by distant administrator. However attempts to alter the national targeting equilibrium arising naturally out of a political process may then meet with considerable resistance, and may well be overturned. Studies by Besley (1997) has pointed out that in an equilibrium sense more effective performance by community groups need not translate into larger benefits for the poor; the efficiency gains may be captured entirely by the government or wealthy taxpayers.

The international review by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004 cited in Castaneda et.al. 2005) shows that combining multiple types of targeting mechanisms (e.g., PMT with geographic targeting) can yield higher accuracy. Another study by Coady et.al.(2004) on targeting transfer in developing countries shows the use of more methods is associated with improved targeting; each additional method improves performance by 15 percent. Targeting the beneficiaries of social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction programs requires detailed administrative guidance if it is to be both effective as well as socially and politically acceptable. However Sharp (2000 cited in Essete, 2001) in Tanzania there are no guidelines on targeting food aid. The Prime Minister's office instructed local governments to classify people in according to their drought areas. Lack of guidelines confused officials on how to go about it.

**Mis-use of Political Power:**

The political elite intervene to marginalize the targeting procedure in a way that can fit their personal interest. Tabor's (2002) studies shows when politicians become directly involved in selecting beneficiaries and distributing cash transfers, program costs can escalate and targeting errors increase. One example of this phenomenon is the Sumurdhi program in Sri Lanka. Under that program, some 60 percent of Sri Lanka's nation's population receives a monthly cash transfer of Rs.500 (equivalent to US\$7) or nearly 1.5 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, the program fails to reach nearly 40 percent of the poor. Another study by Maxwell (1991) on Sudan shows that in 1984/85 drought in Sudan USAID allocating large quantities of relief grain. In western Sudan, aid was targeted to reach the poorest area councils, the poorest village, for the poorest household. Unfortunately, aid often went to the richer area councils, to the urban quarters, to the richer village and to the rich household. The two poorest villages, which together had 87 percent of those people seriously affected by the drought received only 8 percent of the sorghum received by Darfur. The major factors that had affected targeting were local political and lobbying power, cultural norms of sharing equal rather than discrimination in favor of the poor and local administrative weakness.

Studies by Smith's and Subbarao's (2003) on the role of social transfer in very low income countries in a program in Rajasthan in the 1970s shows that communities were allocated funds to transfer to the 10 poorest families in each village and were forced to publicly select (and announce) the households that would receive benefits. The program was successful in targeting the poorest, but ultimately collapsed due to erosion of

political support (the very poorest constituting too narrow a political base to be worth supporting on a prolonged basis).

**Resource Constraint:**

To enumerate leakage, it is an important dimension to analyze the importance of benefit and the impact of leakage to the beneficiary. It is important to mention that to allow self-selection and discouraging non-needy person from being attached to the program, benefits in transfer programs are often kept below the equilibrium level. Ahmed's (2005) studies on Jamaica's social safety net programmes provide beneficiaries with a very low level of benefits that do not protect the poor adequately. The Food Stamp programme pays (US\$1.88) per person per month, which can purchase less than two loaves of bread. The average poor relief benefit is slightly higher, but benefits are strictly rationed and eligibility criteria are not rigorously applied. The low level of benefits contributes to the high proportion of poor not applying for the benefit. Smith and Subbarao (2003) studies also shows that to target the poorest with public works it is critically important to get the wage rate right, meaning that it must be set below the prevailing market wage for unskilled labor. On their study in Indonesia, the employment creation programs, the data indicate that 5.6 percent of households have at least one member who participated in a padat karya program. Program coverage among poor households is 8.3 percent compared to 4.9 percent among non-poor households. The lower participation was because of lower wage than the market.

Study by Devereux's (2001) in Burkina Faso and Bangladesh shows lowering the wage rate maximize the participation of the poor in public works wages were set as low as 1/3

of the national minimum wage and in food for work programme, the poorest 25% of households secured 70% of workplaces, respectively.

#### **2.4.2. Targeting Mechanism in Ethiopia:**

Various case studies and cross sectional research have been done on relief aid and PSNP targeting in Ethiopia shows that targeting system in many rural parts of Ethiopia lacks efficient procedure and / or practices.

Studies by Clay, et.al.(1998) on targeting efficiency and determinants of food aid distribution shows that " Due to unsuccessful food aid targeting(in 1995-96), only 22.3 percent of the deficit households were selected as beneficiaries". The study noticed that the food aid targeting concentrated to the extreme deficit households and to high food secure households. The high food secure households are politically powerful; therefore, it might be a threat for local authorities to exclude this group.

These experiences of food aid distribution may also contribute to the problems in PSNP implementation. Sharp, et.al. (2006) states on the study of targeting Ethiopia's PSNP, the PSNP builds on the pre-existing system of targeting for the annual cycle of "emergency" relief. The problems and weaknesses of the previous system may also be carried over. Such problems include a tendency to spread or dilute transfers; the variation in effectiveness of community targeting in different contexts and locations; and the difficulty of standardizing or comparing the selection and needs assessment criteria in a system which based in effect on relative wealth-ranking within communities. The

programme's focus on public works also risks repeating relief experience in which labour-poor households have been relatively disadvantaged and there have been pressures to minimize the number of non-working (DS) beneficiaries.[ibid].

In many literature related to the problems of food resource targeting, **political power is** the machinery used by those who have the political power to benefit some people at the expense of others. Sharp, in her 1997 review of food aid targeting in Ethiopia shows that "in 1994 in Welayta and in 1995 in South Wollo, relief aid was used for political electioneering, a guarantee for those who support their local EPRDF candidates". Clay's et.al. (1998) finding on factors that contributed to targeting error in Ethiopia, shows that a disproportionately large amount of food went to Tigray, the seat of the party in power, regardless of food security status.

In 1985 a socio-economic review of project 2488 was carried out by IDR of Addis Ababa University in 24 PA in eight project catchments in Wello, Shewa, Harrer and Gamo Gofa found that there was no uniform targeting system administered by the project, the PA executives committee and other local leaders played a key role in delivering who participated at each site. "The result showed that 31 % of the total food distributed have been received by the poorest 25 % of household, 29 % by next group (3rd quartile) , 19 % by the second quartile and 21 % by the "richest" 25% of household" (Yeraswork and Solomon,1985:73). Another study by ( GTZ ,1993 cited in Essete, 2001) shows that the evaluation of the same project related that those areas, which are inaccessible, were less attractive to the project. Bias to the existing road network was not only a feature of 2488 project.

The other set of problem regarding beneficiary selection is technical. **Technical problem** often arises in the selection factors and in the threshold. The criteria used to identify the food -insecure are often inappropriate indicators. Even with appropriate indicators, the cut-off point can also genuinely deny the neediest from the assistance.

Studies by Sharp, .et.al. (2006) the survey results on households' perceptions of who had actually decided the targeting in their community shows a range of responses. However, most people thought that the decisions had been made either at kebele or community level: the Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The key role of the development agents, who may be involved in targeting both in their individual official capacity and as members of the KFSTF or CFSTF was mentioned by 21% of beneficiaries and 13% of non-beneficiaries.

WFP (2003) survey on food aid use and impact shows that the most responsible for the selection process were the PA committee (43%), all community members (27%) , traditional leaders (20%) and 10% of the communities reported that the PA chairman was taking part in the beneficiary selection.

According to Sharp et.al.(2006) studies shows t reasons for inclusion or exclusion from the PSNP, were relative poverty was the most frequently reported reason for both inclusion and exclusion: 86% of beneficiary households, and 37% of non-beneficiaries, said that this criterion had been used in targeting (agreeing that the targeted households were poorer than the excluded ones). Food access, farming assets (landholding and livestock), and off-farm income – all valid indicators in line with the PIM and Targeting Guideline - were also among the criteria most frequently reported by both included and

excluded households. However, almost 11% of the non-beneficiaries thought that not having friends or relatives among the local decision-makers was a reason for their exclusion (ibid).

The WFP (2003) study also shows that they practiced to select beneficiaries on some criteria. These are the presence of disabled person in the household, residents of the PA, and the health statuses of household members, a female-headed household, the absence of access to off farm incomes and other types of criteria such as the family size, having a household member who migrated, willingness to work, households abandoning their farms and the land holding size, The maximum land holding size to be considered eligible for food aid is however not known.

Another study by (SOS Sahel 2000), on Kindo Koisha cash for work food security program in Woliyta, shows that the program set a guideline to target the poorest based on low income and consumption level. The evaluation of project shows that 63.3 % of workers were from low income groups, 32.3 % from middle income and 4.4 % from high income groups. Jayne's et.al. (2000) studies on targeting food aid in rural Ethiopia shows household with low current per capital income, a head with out formal education, a high proportion of elderly members and a female head with out a living spouse are all more likely to be chronic food aid receipts.

Clay's et.al.(1998) finding on factors that contributed to targeting error in Ethiopia, female- and elderly-headed households tended to receive food aid irrespective of their food security status. Jayne's, et.al.(2000) studies shows that education of the household

head has a negative impact on household receiving free distribution and households with more elderly member are less likely to engage in food for work.

Amdissa's (2006) study on the challenges of implementing the productive safety net programme, that one of the challenges on implementing the PSNP was targeting. The criteria that implement to target households at woreda level have raised a question on the reliability of food distribution list as an instrument of drawing the line between chronic and acute food insecurity. These needs additional more reliable criteria based on household profile data of household economy and other livelihoods which combine with the government threshold of food distribution.

Clay's et.al.(1998) finding on factors that contributed to targeting error in Ethiopia, the food aid system has “settled” into a pattern in which households selected in the past are most likely to receive food aid again, and food aid does not reach new areas outside the historic system. Jayne's, et. al. (2000) revealed that households that received aid only once or twice in the past four years are less likely to receive it now.

Perceptions of local decision-making by region and beneficiary category showing that the role of the community was stronger in the Tigray and SNNPR woredas, while the KFSTF was by far the most important decision-making body in the Amhara and Oromiya sites. Across the whole sample taken, 78% of beneficiary households and 45% of non-beneficiaries considered that the targeting decisions made in their community were fair (Sharp et.al. 2006).

WFP (2003) study revealed that through focused group discussions on their perception about the overall management of food distribution 13% of the communities perceive food aid distributions as totally unfair, 33% as mainly unfair 29% considered food distributions as mainly fair and 25% as totally fair. Explaining why they perceive food distributions as being unfair, communities mentioned the following main three reasons. First, the food ration is reportedly not proportional to the number of family members registered. Secondly, some worst-off households are reportedly not registered in the beneficiary lists. Thirdly, there is reportedly not sufficient quantity of food at the distribution site.

The PSNP builds on the pre-existing system of targeting for the annual cycle of “emergency” relief. The problems and weaknesses of the previous system may also be carried over. These attributes influence the objectives of PSNP. So to achieve the objectives of PSNP factors attributes to targeting inefficiency like criteria used; targeting methods used; administration procedure followed; and information availability, needs further study. So this paper is designed to fill the targeting gaps which have been practiced in the past.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

#### 3.1. PSNP Implementation in Ibnat Woreda

##### 3.1.1. Institutional Structure

In Ibnat at Woreda level, the key institutional structure are (Woreda Council, and WFSTF), at Kebele level (Kebele Council and KFSTF) and at Community/ "Got" level (Community and CFSTF)(See figure 1).

The main responsibility for targeting of the PSNP falls on specially constituted Food Security Task Force /FSTF/ at woreda, kebele and community levels, supported by the Woreda and Kebele Council which have been builds on the previous institution such as the woreda disaster committee. The PIM suggests that FSTFs should not duplicate existing bodies, but where possible should build on Disaster Preparedness Committees which were previously responsible for targeting relief assistance. The composition of the WFSTFs are Woreda Council Chairman( Chair person) and members of woreda council, Head of Agricultural and Rural Development Office, Woreda Food Security Office /WFSO/ representative (Secretary), Woreda Finance Office, Woreda Capacity Building Office, Woreda Health Office, Woreda Education Office, Women's Affairs Office, and NGO (ORDA). The compositions of KFSTF are Kebele Council Chairman (Chair person) and member of kebele council, Development Agent, representatives from elders, women and youth. The compositions of CFSTFs are representative from KFSTF, elected representatives of women, men, youth, and elders.

Woreda Food Security /WFS/ Office and KFSTF key informants interviewed said that, "There was a substantial overlap between the membership of the task force and the woreda or kebele council". This is in line with the PIM instructions, and is perhaps inevitable given the limited pool of local government staff and community leaders.

Adato, et.al.(2004) states that the ability to implement large-scale safety net programs for poor people depends on the availability of resources, the structure of institutions, and the level of political commitment at the national level. To achieve the PSNP objectives in Ibnat woreda the requisite structures have been put in place to ensure the participation of the relevant institutional actors and for coordinating their efforts in the implementation of the program at Woreda, Kebele and Community levels. In spite of these structural arrangements, the findings of the present assessment identified weak coordination as a key limiting factor in the implementation of food security programs in the woreda.

More specifically, some outstanding concerns that WFS Office representative mentioned as manifestations of poor coordination and collaboration during the implementation of the program over the last six months are:

- ✦ The difficulty commonly encountered in carrying out frequent and regular review meetings and monitoring and evaluation visits as a result of poor attendance and/or participation of official representatives from institutions that are members of food security steering and technical committees.
- ✦ Collective decisions on shared responsibilities made in committees/team meetings fail to materialize in practice

- ✦ The critical role of WFS Office in PSNP implementation is undermined in that they have difficulty in accessing common pool services such as office and transportation facilities which are under the control of Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office.

As WFS Office representative put it: “The Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office have exclusive control over the use of PSNP facilities and I have little access to such facilities for carrying out my PSNP duties”. Coordination among institutions is an important issue that should be taken into consideration in safety net program, since its absence can significantly affect the program’s execution and progress. There are three important requirements for effective institutional coordination: 1) develop a communication system; 2) use common language; and 3) define clearly the process to be followed (Ayala Consulting, 2003).

### **3.1.2. Understanding of Program Rationale, Objectives and Strategy among Implementing Partners**

A survey was made whether the availability and use of the PIM as an indicator of the extent to which PSNP implementers were likely to have the capacity to understand and apply the operational modalities of the program.

Information from the Amhara Region indicates that written copies of the targeting guidelines were made available to the WFSTF. But copies of the guideline were difficult to find at woreda, kebele and community levels, partly because there is no system of

ensuring that documents stay with the office when individuals leave and partly because there is little or no system of record-keeping at these levels.

The training of trainers on safety net targeting was provided for experts of line departments. The trainers give training at woreda level for administration personnel, Development Agents, and community leaders and members from each of PSNP kebeles.

Despite the efforts made, there is practical application problem to understand the program rationale, objectives and implementation strategy. One of RFSC Office representative said that, “our experience is that experts from certain line bureaus and offices involved in PSNP implementation have yet to internalize the principles and practices of the program”. The WFS Office representative also said that, “... the PSNP is a recent initiative and it is not surprising that we have more questions than answers to some operational modalities of the program.”

### **3.1.3. Targeting Mechanism**

#### **3.1.3.1. Targeting Methods**

In Ibnat , the process of beneficiary selection is based on a combination of administrative and community targeting. Targeting took place in three steps (i) WFSTF at wereda level (ii) KFSTF at kebele level and (iii) CFSTF at community level.

Woreda Council allocated different levels of resources to different kebeles based on the criteria of past relief recipients and total production in the recent harvest season. The number of beneficiaries varied from kebele to kebele and from village to village,

depending on their crop performances and past relief recipients. Out of 34 rural and urban kebeles, 33 rural kebeles participated in PSNP in 2006 with a total of 77,618 people as beneficiaries (20,383 Household heads). Based on 2006 beneficiaries and budgets, the woreda council representative indicated that the amount of budget received was 180 Birr per beneficiary, which amounted to 13,971,240 Birr for the total number of beneficiaries.

With-in the kebeles the beneficiary selection was based on local assessment of food insecurity and livelihood. The KFSTF familiarizes the CFSTF with beneficiary selection procedures.

The CFSTF uses the personal knowledge about members. Conning and Kevane(2001) states that the community decides on the beneficiaries based on their best knowledge about their neighbors. This channel is applicable in a society whereby the community has a strong social tie. Community targeting does not rely on 'objective' criteria set by distant administrator. However attempts to alter the national targeting equilibrium arising naturally out of a political process may then meet with considerable resistance, and may well be overturned. Studies by Besley (1997) has pointed out that in an equilibrium sense more effective performance by community groups need not translate into larger benefits for the poor; the efficiency gains may be captured entirely by the government or wealthy taxpayers.

The wide gap between the large size of needy population on the one hand and limited resource capacity of the program on the other has led to discontent and frustration both among program participants and implementers. As an interim measure, WFS Office

representative reported that they have taken the liberty of using the contingency funds for inclusion of as many eligible beneficiaries as possible. However, it became apparent from the discussions that they are divided in their views with respect to a strategy for a lasting solution.

One view (held by WFS Office representative) is that a visible program impact is unlikely to be forthcoming under the present quota system whereby limited resources are thinly spread over a large number of beneficiaries. From this point of view it was argued that a well designed targeting system is needed that provides for concentrating time, energy and available resources on a more focused and motivated population and thereby achieve a meaningful impact in reducing food insecurity through asset creation, saving and investment.

The other view (held by KFSTF representative) also want to see the program making a tangible impact in the foreseeable future but maintained that such an impact should be achieved through expanded outreach and increased PSNP inputs.

The quota system causes considerable difficulties for targeting bodies, especially those in the kebele and community who are responsible for producing the list of named households who will participate in the programme. For example in Woinbercoh Wofiyuma kebele, the KFSTF has requested resources for 2456 public works and 239 direct support beneficiaries for 2006, but received a quota of 2395 public work and 200 direct support.

As the KFSTF key informant interview said, "We made the beneficiary list before we knew the quota. First we did a study of who should get public work and who should get direct support and the assessment came from the communities. Then the quota came from the woreda, and the resources were already limited so we prioritized. We couldn't cover all the needy. It was very difficult to distinguish between similar household heads."

Focus Group Discussants noted: "some household who are always food insecure are excluded from the safety net due to limited quota."

### 3.1.3. 2. Selection Criteria

Using their best knowledge about members of the community, the CFSTF classify the community into: 'more vulnerable', 'vulnerable' and 'non-vulnerable'.

**1st group:** most needy household heads: without ox or one ox and without land or less than 0.5 ha..

**2nd group :** vulnerable household heads: with two oxen, and with 0.5 to 1 ha land.

**3rd group :** non-vulnerable household heads: with more than two oxen, and with more than 1 ha.

The CFSTFs called a 'got'-level meeting of all household heads. At these meetings, Development Agents registered all household heads and CFSTF members used livestock ownership as selection criteria and ranked and categorized households in to three groups. Once the beneficiary household heads were selected using the local selection criteria, then decisions were made as to which household heads should get the PSNP resources in return for public work and which household heads to get direct support.

The CFSTF used oxen ownership as the vulnerability indicator. In the first group they included household heads with no or one ox, in the second group included household heads with two oxen and in the third group household with more than two oxen.

Once finalized at the ‘got’ level, the list of beneficiaries was forwarded to the kebele. According to PIM, after receiving the beneficiary list from the CFSTF, KFSTFs have to call a general meeting for discussion and confirmation of the decision made at ‘got’ level. But in practice, because of weak familiarity with the guideline, they didn’t call the community for discussion and confirmation.

Targeting is not costless but targeting using only oxen ownership makes it less costly. The single criterion of oxen ownership can exclude food insecure and vulnerable people or include (non farm income own fertile land, produce crops, have labor and so).

### 3.2. Findings on Targeting Efficiency

As mentioned in the literature review, PSNP beneficiaries are supposed to be targeted in terms of food production, farming assets (land holding and livestock) and family remittances/ supports indicators as better criteria to target eligible people. In light of this, household size, dependency ratio, land holding, number of animals owned, income and food insecurity statuses are described below.

#### 3.2.1. Demographic Characteristics

Table- 3.1. Size of Beneficiary and Non-Beneficiary Household Heads

<b>Household Size</b>	<b>Beneficiaries [N=30]</b>	<b>Non-Beneficiaries [N=70]</b>	<b>Total Sample [N=100]</b>
One Person		1 [1.6%]	1 [1 %]
Two	6 [20%]	9 [13 %]	15 [15 %]
Three	8 [27 %]	10 [14.2 %]	18 [18%]
Four	4 [13%]	6 [8.6 %]	10 [10 %]
Five	4 [13%]	17 [24 %]	21 [21%]
Six	1 [3.5%]	10 [14.2 %]	11 [11 %]
Seven	4 [13%]	7 [10%]	11 [11 %]
Eight	1 [3.5%]	4 [5.7 %]	5 [5 %]
Nine	1 [3.5%]	4 [5.7 %]	5 [5 %]
Ten	1 [3.5%]	1 [1.6%]	2 [2 %]
More than Ten		1 [1.6%]	1 [1 %]

*Source: Own Survey*

Table 3.1 shows that there is a strong inverse relationship in our survey population between PSNP beneficiary and household size. Beneficiary households are more likely to be smaller [Mean =4.4], and non-beneficiary households are likely to be larger [Mean=5.1], than the average [Mean =5.0 members].<sup>1</sup>

While no beneficiary household has more than 10 members, the largest (non-beneficiary) household has 12 members. The modal (most common) beneficiary household comprises only three people [27% of beneficiary households], closely followed by two person [20%]; but the modal household in the sample as a whole has five members [21%], followed by three [18%]. Almost half of beneficiary households [47%] have only 2 to 3 members; while just one in two beneficiary households [53%] have more than three, compared to over half [71%] of the non-beneficiaries .

Table 3.2 compares the average value of these two indicators (household size and dependency ratio) for the beneficiary and non-beneficiary household heads in our sample. According to this data beneficiary household heads, despite being smaller in household size, have higher dependency ratio when actual labour capacity is taken into account the non-beneficiary household heads

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<sup>1</sup> The average rural household size for Ibdat woreda is 5.0(BoFED, 2006).

**Table -3.2. Mean Household Heads Size, Dependency Ratio and Household Labour Capacity**

<b>Demographic Characteristics</b>	<b>Beneficiary (N = 30)</b>	<b>Non -Beneficiary (N = 70)</b>
Household Size	4.4	5.1
Dependency Ratio <sup>2</sup>	0.97	0.81
Household Labour Capacity	2.45	2.59

*Source: Own Survey*

In support of this result the MoFED(2005) shows that, if the dependency ratio increases by one unit, a household's probability of falling in to poverty increases by almost 31 percent at mean values. How ever these findings appear to contradict the common assumption that larger households are generally poorer, mainly due to higher dependency ratios (Devereux, et.al. 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Dependency Ratio is defined as the number of household members aged 0-15 years, plus the number of household members aged 60 and older, divided by the number of household members aged between 16 and 60 years old( Devereux, et.al.,2006)

### 3.2.2. Economic Characteristics

According to MoFED (2005) sources of income for Ethiopian households in order of importance are: own agricultural enterprises in rural areas. Table 3.3 shows that sample household heads derive 91.36 % of their annual income from the agricultural sector, of which the lion's share (43 %) comes from crop production followed by sales of animals 40 %. Sectors outside agriculture account for 8.64 %, of which income from fixed asset; comprising 3.1 % tops the list.

The average annual income of beneficiary and non - beneficiary household heads was Birr 1077.67 and 980.44 respectively.

**Table - 3.3. Source and Proportion of Total Household Heads Income**

Source of Income	Mean Annual Income (in Birr)		Contribution By Sector
	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary	
Crop Production	484.00	403.86	Agriculture 91.36 %
Sale of animals	513.67	321.17	
Income from butter and milk	3.33	53.07	
Income from egg production	1.67	10.96	
Income from honey production	46.67	41.96	
Remittances		20.86	Non Agriculture 8.64%
Wage		50.88	
Income from non farm activities		63.39	
Income from fixed asset	28.33	14.29	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1077.67</b>	<b>980.44</b>	

*Source: Own Survey*

### 3.2.3. Access and Ownership of Production Asset

#### 3.2.3.1. Land

The main means of livelihood in rural Ethiopia is agriculture. Thus, land ownership in rural areas becomes an important determinant of welfare. The local unit of measure for farming land is the *timad*, which describes the area that can be ploughed by one pair of oxen in one day, and corresponds roughly to 0.25 hectares.<sup>3</sup>

The minimum, modal and maximum size of household land holdings in Ibnat woreda stood at 0, 0.5 and 3.25 hectares respectively. From the sample household about 95 % of the household heads own land. The average land holding size in the woreda was found to be 1.75 hectare and according to the annual agricultural sample survey conducted by CSA (1999/2000 cited on MoFED,2005) shows that about 63 percent of the households in Ethiopia had holding sizes less than 1 hectare. 6 and 40 percent of the beneficiary's households were found to own less than 0.5 and 1 hectare respectively. These households can't possibly feed them selves from their own production and are classified as beneficiary. 2.8 and 31 percent of the non - beneficiary's households were found to own less than 0.5 and 1 hectare respectively.

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<sup>3</sup>Ministry of Agriculture staff use "4 *timad* = 1 hectare" as a conversion factor throughout the study area.

Table - 3.4. Size - Distribution of Landholdings in Sample Household Heads (in Percentage)

Size (in hectare)	Beneficiary (N= 30)	Non- Beneficiary (N=70)	Total (N = 100)
Landless	10	2.8	5
< 0.5	6.6	2.8	4
0.5 – 1.0	40	31.4	34
1.01 – 1.5	16.7	7.1	10
1.51 – 2.0	6.6	15.7	13
2.01 – 2.5	3.4	21.42	16
2.51 – 3.0	16.7	17	17
3.01 – 3.50		1.78	1

Source: Own Survey

### 3.2.3.2. Oxen/ Livestock

The most important productive animal in highland Ethiopia is oxen, which are used for ploughing. Households that lack oxen typically face problems in farming their land, being dependent on less suitable animals or borrowing or hiring oxen from others.

Table - 3.5. Distribution of Sample Household Heads by Oxen Ownership (in Percentage)

Number of Oxen	Beneficiary (N = 30)	Non- Beneficiary (N = 70)	Total (N=100)
0	27	4.3	11
1	37	21	26
2	23	60	49
3	10	13	12
4	3	1.7	2

Source: Own Survey

Households that lack oxen typically face problems in farming their land, being dependent on less suitable animal or borrowing or hiring oxen from others. Table 3.5 shows that from the total sample households 11 percent owned on ox at all while 26 percent owned a single ox. A crude conclusion that is 11 percent have to be beneficiary. But only 8 percent are beneficiary.

**Table-3.6. Distribution of Sample Household Heads by Ownership of Livestock (Other than oxen) (in Percentage)**

In Tropical Livestock Units	Beneficiary (N = 30)	Non – Beneficiary (N = 70)	Total (N =100)
0	50	5.7	19
0.1 - 1	20	7	11
1 – 2.2	13.3	34	28
> 2.25	16.7	53.3	42

*Note: Since TLU is a continuous variable with no obvious cut-off points, we chose 2.2 TLU –equal to a pair of oxen as defining ‘vulnerability’ (Sharp et.al.2003)*

*Source: Own Survey*

Table 3.6 shows out of 30 sampled beneficiary household heads 30 % have one and more than one livestock (other than oxen) but out of 70 sampled non-beneficiary household heads 12.7 % have less than 1 livestock (other than oxen).

### **3.2.4. Household Food Insecurity**

Table 3.7 shows that of the total sampled household heads 30 % of household heads have been recipient food aid since 2002/03 but only 67 % are beneficiary. This finding have a significant association with the findings of the Grain Market Research Project that the

national targeting system has established pattern; previous years aid recipients tended to be also beneficiary in the following years (Clay, et al, 1997).

**Table- 3.7. Previous Years Food Aid Distribution ( in percentage)**

Years	Food Aid Distribution	
	Beneficiary (N = 30)	Non - Beneficiary (N = 70)
2002/03	67	14
2003/04	67	17
2004/05	87	19

*Source: Own Survey*

Table 3.8 shows that out of 53 household heads only 34% have faced a sudden shock and beneficiary with the PSNP. However, out of 47 household heads, 25 % who have not faced a sudden shock are beneficiary in the programme. These findings were contradicted with the targeting criteria targeting guideline “PSNP beneficiary have faced a sudden shock with in the past three years” (MoARD, 2006).

**Table- 3.8. Crop Damage as Criteria for PSNP Participation (in Percentage)**

Category	Beneficiary (N=30)	Non – Beneficiary (N=70)	Total (N = 100)
Faced Crop Damage	60	50	53
No Faced Crop Damage	40	50	47

*Source: Own Survey*

### **3.3. Perception of Respondents on Targeting**

#### **3.3.1. Respondents Perception on Targeting Process**

Most people thought that the decisions have been made either by KFSTF or WFSTF. The Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary. The result is found consistent with the findings of Sharp, et.al. (2006) and WFP (2003).

The focus group discussants said, "It is the kebele committee who decided the targeting in their community". The key informant interviews also said "it is the kebele council and community representative who involved in beneficiary selection. The targeting process was based on need assessment of food insecurity situation and livelihood resource."

The survey results on household head's perception of the (round) they were included or excluded from PSNP. 70 % of beneficiary and 77 % non- beneficiary household heads indicated they were included or excluded at first round of targeting respectively.

The survey result shows that, 97 % of non- beneficiary household heads and 77 % of beneficiary household heads perceived that the "implementing agency" at the local level did not have the capacity to implement the programs. The focus group discussants also confirmed that "The kebele council has not selected the right persons who need support and most of them are illiterate."

### 3.3.2. Respondents Perception on Selection Criteria

Food production, landholding, livestock, and family size/dependents– all valid indicators in line with the PIM and Targeting Guideline - were also among the criteria most frequently reported by beneficiary and non- beneficiary household heads. However, almost 20 % of the non-beneficiary thought that not having friends or relatives among the local decision-makers was a reason for their exclusion. The findings show that the community has no clear picture about the targeting criteria. The result is found consistent with the findings of Sharp, et.al. (2006) and WFP (2003) survey results. The focus group discussants said that, “selection criteria are not clear. Some times they used oxen ownership, other times total crop production”. The key informants said “KFSTF and CFSTF used vague indicator with out explicit criteria to dichotomize between ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ household heads”.

When asked more specifically about the nature of major selection criteria, the majority of beneficiary respondents said that they are beneficiary because of small or no livestock ownership (40 %). On the other hand, the majority of non-beneficiary respondents indicate that they are non-beneficiary because they have enough crop production (30 %).

The survey results shows 94 % of non-beneficiary and 80 % of beneficiary household heads believe that there were individuals/households who were eligible according to the criteria but excluded from the PSNP although 50 % of beneficiary and 69 % of non-beneficiary household heads believe that there were individuals/households who were ineligible according to the criteria but included to the PSNP.

The focus group discussants said “there are individuals/households which should be beneficiary but non-beneficiary and which should be non- beneficiary but beneficiary.”

### **3.3.3. Respondents Perception on Targeting Efficiency**

The key informants and focus group discussants consider misguided selection criteria and resource constraint are the major constraint to the woreda targeting efficiency. The criteria used to categorize households varied from village to village and from kebele to kebele. The beneficiary household heads were not equal in terms of vulnerability status; eligible households in one area could not be eligible in other areas.

The survey result shows that 77 % of beneficiary and 97 % of non- beneficiary respondents replied targeting practices was not fair. They explain about the targeting efficiency were unfair because of the following main reasons: 12 % political, 55 % administration impositions, 11 % nepotism and 22 % resource constraint. The focus group discussants said “targeting is not fair because there are individuals who should not be beneficiary. Even after their names are approved by the community committee they change their names when they transfer to the woreda”. The result is found consistent with the findings of WFP (2003) survey results.

### **3.4. Targeting Efficiency Analysis**

Targeting efficiency can not be judged from a perfectionist view. “Perfect targeting is an impossible ideal” (Devereux, 2000: 1). Never the less the targeting error should be reduced to an acceptable level. To achieve the PSNP objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest

priority. So the researcher from subjective judgment accepts 10 percent error ( 5% inclusion and 5 % exclusion error).

Targeting efficiency is about including the right household heads, and excluding the wrong ones. When all chronically food insecure household heads are targeted in a safety net program then exclusion errors will be zero. If non- vulnerable household heads are targeted in a safety net program the inclusion errors indicate this.

The complexity of chronically food insecurity can not be adequately captured by any single indicator. The present research has used combining indicators for attaining the targeting guideline criteria to identify those who are beneficiary and non-beneficiary for PSNP.

Targeting guideline indicators used are household food insecurity that can trace back the household pre-PSNP economic statues. These indicators are food security or food aid recipients, land owned and oxen ownership with equal weights as indicating variables for analysis of beneficiary and non-beneficiary household heads.

The PIM doesn't set standardize indicators or thresholds. The cut-off points used for this data analysis based on the knowledge of members of the community and the KFSTF. These cut –off points used to classify the community into: ' most vulnerable', 'vulnerable' and 'non-vulnerable'.

**1st group:** most needy household heads: without ox or one ox and without land or less than 0.5 ha..

**2nd group** : vulnerable household heads: with two oxen and with 0.5 to 1 ha land.

**3rd group** : non-vulnerable household heads: with more than two oxen and with more than 1 ha.

Combining several indicators produces an estimate of food insecurity that reflects its multi-dimensional nature. However, when the single indicators are combined, the number of households satisfying these more stringent criteria for food insecurity obviously fall (Sharp, et. al. 2003).

**Table- 3.9. Comparison of Single Indicators Versus Combined Indicators**

Targeting Indicators	% of Household Heads	
	Inclusion Error (N=30)	Exclusion Error (N=70)
Oxen Ownership	37	26
Oxen and Land Ownership	83	7
Oxen Ownership and Food Aid	57	4.3
Land Ownership and Food Aid	87	4.3

Source: Own Survey

Table 3.9. shows that in the local selection factor( Oxen Ownership) 26% of exclusion error occurred but when combining two indicators the exclusion errors were 7 %, 4.3% and 4.3% for ' oxen and land', 'oxen and food aid' , and 'land and food aid' respectively.

In the literature on the targeting of social programs, where the greatest priority is to improve the welfare of the poor, reducing under coverage (*Under coverage* is the proportion of poor households that are not included in the program (errors of exclusion))

is more important than minimizing leakage (*Leakage* is the proportion of those who are reached by the program who are classified as non poor (errors of inclusion)). If the priority is to conserve limited budget funds, measures to reduce leakage are given greater weight (Hoddinott, 1999).

A PSNP designed with the objectives of reducing household vulnerability, improving household and community resilience to shocks, and breaking the cycle of dependence on food aid.

To achieve the PSNP objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest priority. So use of combining two indicators is associated with improved targeting by reducing exclusion error from 26% in 'oxen ownership' to 4.3% in 'oxen ownership and food aid' and 'land ownership and food aid'.

### **3.5. Factors Affecting Targeting Efficiency**

The empirical results show that targeting was inefficient in Ibnat woreda . The study found there were errors occurred in the sampled kebele where PSNP was practiced.

Various factors have influenced targeting; these factors affected the targeting efficiency are:

#### **1. Setting Quota**

The wide gap between the large size of needy population on the one hand and limited resource capacity of the program on the other has led to discontent and frustration both among program participants and implementers. As an interim measure, WFSO

representative reported that they have taken the liberty of using the contingency funds for inclusion of as many eligible beneficiaries as possible. However, it became apparent from the discussions that they are divided in their views with respect to a strategy for a lasting solution.

One view (held by WFSO representative) is that a visible program impact is unlikely to be forthcoming under the present quota system whereby limited resources are thinly spread over a large number of beneficiaries. From this point of view it was argued that a well designed targeting system is needed that provides for concentrating time, energy and available resources on a more focused and motivated population and thereby achieve a meaningful impact in reducing food insecurity through asset creation, saving and investment.

The other view (held by KFSTF representative) also want to see the program making a tangible impact in the foreseeable future but maintained that such an impact should be achieved through expanded outreach and increased PSNP inputs.

The quota system causes considerable difficulties for targeting bodies, especially those in the kebele and community who are responsible for producing the list of named households who will participate in the programme. For example in Woinbercoh Wofituma kebele, the KFSTF has requested resources for 2456 public works and 239 direct support beneficiaries for 2006, but received a quota of 2395 public work and 200 direct support.

As the KFSTF key informant said, “We made the beneficiary list before we knew the quota. First we did a study of who should get public work and who should get direct support and the assessment came from the communities. Then the quota came from the woreda, and the resources were already limited so we prioritized. We couldn’t cover all the needy. It was very difficult to distinguish between similar household heads.” Focus Group Discussants noted: “some household who are always food insecure are excluded from the safety net due to limited quota.”

WFP (2003) study revealed that through focused group discussions on their perception about the over all management of food distribution 46% of the communities perceives food aid distributions as unfair because of not sufficient quantity of food at the distribution site.

## **2. Targeting Methods**

To understand the effectiveness of different targeting mechanisms, it is useful to see "who" targets and "who" implements the interventions (Coady, 2004). From the survey on household heads perceptions of who had actually decided the targeting in their community most people thought that the decisions have been made by KFSTF or WFSTF. The Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary.

The focus group discussants said, “It is the kebele committee who decided the targeting in their community”. The key informant said, “It is the kebele council and community representative who involved in beneficiary selection. The targeting process was based on need assessment of food insecurity situation and livelihood resource.”

The finding shows that the community participation in targeting beneficiary selection was weak. This affects the targeting efficiency. Substantial evidences suggest that community participation can lead to improved project performance and better targeting (Conning and Kevane, 2001). Recent work by Ravallion and Galasso (1999, cited on Smith and Subbarao, 2003) on a community-targeted food program in Bangladesh found that on average the poor benefited. The evaluation of the South Africa programs also supports this view. Hoddinott, et al. (2001, cited in Coady, 2004) the community participation is generally associated with improved project cost-effectiveness and better targeting.

### **3. Selection Criteria**

Technical problems arose in defining the target group. Woredas allocated different levels of resources to different kebeles based on the criteria of past relief recipients and total production in the recent harvest season.

With in the kebeles the beneficiary selection was based on local assessment of food insecurity and livelihood. The KFSTF familiarizes the CFSTF with beneficiary selection procedures. However the CFSTF based on the personal knowledge about members used oxen ownership as a selection criterion. The main issue here is whether oxen ownership can be an appropriate indicator. Targeting is not costless but targeting using only oxen ownership makes it less costly. Oxen ownership is an observable indicator that can be easily and quickly measured. However a single indicator, particularly oxen holding is an inefficient selection criterion. It cannot measure household's food security directly or indirectly though it can be used as a proxy indicator along with other variables. The use

of oxen ownership can drop-out food vulnerable people or leak-in non farm income own fertile land, produce crops, have labor and so. On the other hand, households can own more oxen (to be eligible) but loose all or many of the above assets. Such practice encourages ox holding households to sell their oxen which then increase vulnerability to future insecurity.

The use of multi-variable indicators instead of a single indicator would minimize errors in estimating the beneficiary.

#### **4. Wage Rate**

The wage rate for PSNP public works is fixed at 6 Birr per day or 3kg grain in food. This rate was determined on the basis of minimum consumption needs, rather than prevailing wage rates. Nevertheless, there is an expectation that the low payment rate will discourage the less needy from participating (or in other words, act as a partial self targeting element combined with the administrative community targeting system).The study found that 47 % of beneficiary respondents argue that 6 Birr is too low in comparison with other employment and with the work required.

Smith and Subbarao (2003) on their study in Indonesia data on the employment creation programs, program coverage among poor households is 8.3 % compared to 4.9 % among non-poor households. The lower participation was because of lower wage than the market.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **SUMMERY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATON**

#### **4.1. SUMMERY AND CONCLUSION**

The study focused on the appropriate use of resources in PSNP. One of the methods to maximize the impact of PSNP is efficient targeting. In principle targeting serves three purposes: it directs resources to the most needy, it uses resources efficiently by excluding the less needy, and it reduces the disincentive effects of food aid on the local economy.

In Ethiopia PSNP targeting is based on emergency aid and public works programmes, and on several years of multi-agency work to develop and disseminate guidelines for the implementation of “administrative–community” targeting. The PSNP targeting guideline was developed at federal level, with comments from regional Food Security Bureaus but no input from the frontline implementers at woreda and kebele levels. The PIM does not set standardized indicators or thresholds. WFSTFs are empowered to set criteria for beneficiary selection to suit the particular conditions of the Woreda within the spirit of the general guiding points. However, in the targeting process the trickiest and controversial step is the actual selection of beneficiary.

Targeting sounds good in theory but difficult to put it in practice in efficient and effective manner.

To achieve the objectives of PSNP factors in targeting inefficiency like criteria used, targeting methods used, and administration procedure followed need further study. So this paper is designed to fill the gaps in our understanding of targeting in PSNP with the objectives of assessing the criteria used to distinguish eligible households and administrative procedure followed, estimate the targeting accuracy or errors, to investigate and assess whether its implementation was serviced as just and fair, and factors that hinder targeting efficiency. For the purpose of attaining objectives of the research and answering research questions, this study employed both quantitative and qualitative data. The data for the study were collected both from primary and secondary sources. The primary data collection method involved the generation of both qualitative and quantitative data. The necessary information was collected using different instruments such as household survey questionnaires, interview with key informants and focus group discussions. The secondary data collection method involved the review of documents and related literatures issued by the Ethiopian Government, implementing/partner donors and from other Sources.

The major findings of the study are:

### **1. Targeting Methods, Criteria and Administrative Procedures Followed:**

In Ibnat , the process of beneficiary selection is a based on a combination of administrative and community targeting. Targeting took place in three steps (i) WFSTF at wereda level (ii) KFSTF at kebele level and (iii) CFSTF at community level.

Woredas allocated different levels of resources to different kebeles based on the criteria of past relief recipients and total production in the recent harvest season. The number of beneficiaries varied from kebele to kebele and from village to village, depending on their crop performances and past relief recipients. Out of 34 rural and urban kebeles in Ibnat woreda 33 rural kebeles participated in PSNP in 2006 with a total of 77,618 people as beneficiaries (20,383 Household heads).

With-in the kebeles the beneficiary selection was based on local assessment of food insecurity and livelihood. The CFSTF uses the personal knowledge about members to classify the community into: 'more vulnerable', 'vulnerable' and 'non-vulnerable' and called a "'got"'-level meeting of all household heads. At these meetings, Development Agents registered all household heads and CFSTF members used livestock ownership as selection criteria and ranked.

Once the beneficiary household heads were selected using the local selection criteria, then decisions were made as to which household heads should get the PSNP resources in return for public work and direct support.

The CFSTF used oxen ownership as the vulnerability indicator. Once finalized at the "'got"' level, the list of beneficiaries was forwarded to the kebele. According to PIM, after receiving the beneficiary list from the CFSTF, KFSTFs have to call a general meeting for discussion and confirmation of the decision made at "'got"' level. But in practice, because of weak familiarity with the guideline, they didn't call the community for discussion and confirmation.

The main responsibility for targeting of the PSNP falls on specially constituted FSTFs at woreda, kebele and community levels, supported by the Woreda and Kebele Council which have been builds on the previous institution such as the woreda disaster committee.

WFSTF and KFSTF key informants said that, "There was a substantial overlap between the membership of the task force and the woreda or kebele council". This is in line with the PIM instructions, and is perhaps inevitable given the limited pool of local government staff and community leaders.

To achieve the PSNP objectives in Ibnat woreda the requisite structures have been put in place to ensure the participation of the relevant institutional actors and for coordinating their efforts in the implementation of the program at Woreda, Kebele and Community levels.

In spite of these structural arrangements, the findings of the present assessment identified weak coordination as a key limiting factor in the implementation of food security programs in the woreda.

As Woreda FS Office representative put it: "Woreda Agricultural and Rural Development Office have exclusive control over the use of PSNP facilities and I have little access to such facilities for carrying out my PSNP duties". Coordination among institutions is an important issue that should be taken into consideration in safety net program, since its absence can significantly affect the program's execution and progress. There are three important requirements for

effective institutional coordination: 1) developing a communication system; 2) use common language; and 3) define clearly the process to be followed (Ayala Consulting, 2003).

Despite the efforts made to create awareness, there is practical application problem to understand the program rationale, objectives and implementation strategy. Regional FSC Office representative said that, “our experience is that experts from certain line bureaus and offices involved in PSNP implementation have yet to internalize the principles and practices of the program”. The WFS Office representative also said that, “... the PSNP is a recent initiative and it is not surprising that we have more questions than answers to some operational modalities of the program.”

## **2. Targeting Efficiency**

Targeting efficiency can't be judged from a perfectionist view.” Perfect targeting is an impossible ideal” (Devereux, 2000: 1). Never the less the targeting error should be reduced to an acceptable level. To achieve the PSNP objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest priority. So the researcher from subjective judgment accepts 10 percent error ( 5 % inclusion and 5 % exclusion error).

The complexity of chronically food insecurity can not be adequately captured by any single indicator. According to Devereux (2001) on Namibia case study shows use of proxy indicators like old age, female headed household and elderly have serious limitations and they are crude and often inaccurate proxies for poverty.

The present research has used combining indicators for determining targeting efficiency by comparison of the local selection criteria and across the targeting guide line criteria to identify those who are beneficiary and non-beneficiary for PSNP.

The findings shows that the CFSTF( local selection factor) “Oxen Ownership” with 26% exclusion error but when combing two indicators the exclusion errors were 7 %, 4.3% and 4.3% for “oxen and land”, “oxen and food aid” , and “land and food aid” respectively.

A PSNP designed with the objectives of reducing household vulnerability, improving household and community resilience to shocks, and breaking the cycle of dependence on food aid.

To achieve the PSNP objectives increasing the proportion of poor households those who are not included in the program should be the greatest priority. In the literature on the targeting of social programs, if the priority is to conserve limited budget funds, measures to reduce leakage are given greater weight (Hoddinott, 1999). So use of combining two indicators is associated with improved targeting by reducing exclusion error from 26% in ‘oxen ownership’ to 4.3% in ‘oxen ownership and food aid ‘and ‘land ownership and food aid’.

### **3. Community Perception of Targeting Process and Fairness**

To understand the effectiveness of different targeting mechanisms, it is useful to see "who" targets and "who" implements the interventions (Coady, 2004). From

the survey on household heads perceptions of who had actually decided the targeting in their community most people thought that the decisions have been made by KFSTF or WFSTF. The Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary.

The focus group discussants said, “It is the kebele committee who decided the targeting in their community”. The key informant said, “It is the kebele council and community representative who involved in beneficiary selection. The targeting process was based on need assessment of food insecurity situation and livelihood resource.”

The finding shows that the community participation in targeting beneficiary selection was weak. This affects the targeting efficiency. Substantial evidences suggest that community participation can lead to improved project performance and better targeting (Conning and Kevane, 2001)

From the survey 97 % of non- beneficiary household heads and 77 % of beneficiary household heads perceived that the “implementing agency” at the local level did not have the capacity to implement the programs. The focus group discussants also confirmed that “The kebele council has not selected the right persons who need support and most of them are illiterate.” How ever Adato, et.al. (2004) administering safety net programs require skills in management, accounting, logistics, and financial control.

About the selection criteria perceived by the respondents, 20 % of the non-beneficiary thought that not having friends or relatives among the local decision-makers was a reason for their exclusion. The findings show that the community has no clear picture about the targeting criteria. The result is consistent with the findings of Sharp, et.al. (2006), and WFP (2003).

The focus group discussants said that, “selection criteria are not clear. Some times they used oxen ownership, other times total crop production”. The key informants said “KFSTF and CFSTF used vague indicator with out explicit criteria to dichotomize between ‘eligible ‘and ‘ineligible’ household heads”.

When asked more specifically about the nature of major selection criteria, the majority of beneficiary respondents said that they are beneficiary because of small or no livestock ownership (40 %). On the other hand, the majority of non-beneficiary respondents indicate that they are non-beneficiary because they have enough crop production (30 %).

From the survey 94 % of non-beneficiary and 80 % of beneficiary household heads believe that there were individuals/households who were eligible according to the criteria but excluded from the PSNP although 50 % of beneficiary and 69 % of non-beneficiary household heads believe that there were households who were ineligible according to the criteria but included to the PSNP. The focus group discussants said “there are individuals/households which should be beneficiary but non-beneficiary and which should be non- beneficiary but beneficiary.”

On the fairness of the overall targeting out comes, 77 % of beneficiary and 97 % of non- beneficiary respondents replied targeting practices was not fair. They explain about the targeting efficiency were unfair because of the following main reasons: 12 % political, 55 % administration impositions, 11 % nepotism and 22 % resource constraint. The focus group discussants said “targeting is not fair because there are individuals who should not be beneficiary. Even after their names are approved by the community committee they change their names when they transfer to the woreda”. The result is consistent with the findings of WFP (2003).

#### **4. Factors Affecting Targeting Efficiency:**

The empirical results show that targeting was inefficient in Ibnat woreda. The study found there were errors occurred in the sampled kebele where PSNP was practiced.

One of the problems associated with targeting inefficiency was setting quota. The wide gap between the large size of needy population on the one hand and limited resource capacity of the program on the other has led to discontent and frustration both among program participants and implementers..

The WFSO representative noted: “the quota system makes a limited resource to spread over a large number of beneficiaries. So a well designed targeting system is needed that provides for concentrating time, energy and available resources on

a more focused and motivated population and thereby achieve a meaningful impact in reducing food insecurity through asset creation, saving and investment”.

The KFSTF members and CFSTF representative noted: “they want to see the program making a tangible impact in the foreseeable future but maintained that such an impact should be achieved through expanded outreach and increased PSNP inputs”.

The quota system causes considerable difficulties for targeting bodies. For example in Woinbercoh Wifituma kebele, the KFSTF has requested resources for 2456 public works and 239 direct support beneficiaries for 2006, but received a quota of 2395 public work and 200 direct support.

As the KFSTF key informant said, “We made the beneficiary list before we knew the quota. First we did a study of who should get public work and who should get direct support and the assessment came from the communities. Then the quota came from the woreda, and the resources were already limited so we prioritized. We couldn’t cover all the needy. It was very difficult to distinguish between similar household heads”. Focus Group Discussants noted “some household who are always food insecure are excluded from the safety net due to limited quota.”

The other problem was targeting method practiced. To understand the effectiveness of different targeting mechanism, it is useful to see "who" targets and "who" implements the interventions (Coady, 2004). From the survey on household heads perception of who had actually decided the targeting in their

community most people thought that the decisions have been made either by KFSTF or WFSTF. The Kebele FSTF was the most frequently-mentioned body among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary.

The focus group discussants said, “It is the kebele committee who decided the targeting in their community”. The key informant said, “It is the kebele council and community representative who involved in beneficiary selection. The targeting process was based on need assessment of food insecurity situation and livelihood resource.” The finding shows that the community participation in targeting beneficiary selection was weak. This affects the targeting efficiency.

Technical problems arose in defining the target group. Woredas allocated different levels of resources to different kebeles based on the criteria of past relief recipients and total production in the recent harvest season. Within the kebeles the beneficiary selection was based on local assessment of food insecurity and livelihood. The KFSTF familiarizes the CFSTF with beneficiary selection procedures.

However the CFSTF based on the personal knowledge about members used oxen ownership as a selection criterion. The main issue here is whether oxen ownership can be an appropriate indicator. Targeting is not costless but targeting using only oxen ownership makes it less costly. Oxen ownership is an observable indicator that can be easily and quickly measured.

The use of oxen ownership can drop-out food vulnerable people or leak-in non farm income own fertile land, produce crops, have labor and so. On the other hand, households can own more oxen (to be eligible) but loose all or many of the above assets. Such practice encourages ox holding households to sell their oxen which then increase vulnerability to future insecurity.

The use of multi-variable indicators instead of a single indicator would minimize errors in estimating the beneficiary.

The final problem was wage rate. The wage rate for PSNP public works is fixed at 6 Birr per day or 3kg grain in food. This rate was determined on the basis of minimum consumption needs, rather than prevailing wage rates. Nevertheless, there is an expectation that the low payment rate will discourage the less needy from participating (or in other words, act as a partial self targeting element combined with the administrative community targeting system). The study found that 47 % of respondents argue 6 Birr is too low in comparison with other employment and with the work required. Smith and Subbarao (2003) on their study in Indonesia data on the employment creation programs, program coverage among poor households is 8.3 % compared to 4.9 % among non-poor households. The lower participation was because of lower wage than the market.

## 4.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this case study on targeting efficiency in PSNP suggest the need for practical and affordable methodologies for future intervention at woreda level. The recommendations can also be used in other woredas with similar features:

1. The Federal and the Regional government bodies have to allocate resources based on the size of vulnerable population requested by WFSTF.
2. Efforts should be continued to ensure that community targeting process are transparent, participatory and well managed.
3. The knowledge and skills of those involved in the implementation of the program, particularly WFSTF and frontline development workers, should be enhanced through the provision of focused and regular training input.
4. To achieve the PSNP objectives the selection criteria should be based on combination of at least two criterions in order to reduce errors of inclusion and exclusion.

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**Annex 1. Total Population and Safety Net Beneficiaries of Ibnat Woreda**

S.No.	Kebele Name	Total Population	Total Household Heads	Safety Net Beneficiary Household Heads	Total Safety Net Beneficiaries
1	Ababikila	6137	1312	789	2286
2	Abegeldi-Aquashmoch	6747	1491	609	2500
3	Aderseg-Abina	12358	2746	1331	4410
4	Adiabona-Qurqura	8122	1762	649	2647
5	Adisgie-Seqonko	6886	1419	657	2939
6	Agissa	5116	1284	476	1985
7	Aiha-Aquha	5916	1362	503	2056
8	Ajana-Zekelimoka	8238	1856	622	2771
9	Amestyia	6297	1364	606	1843
10	Balarb	7734	1811	938	3145
11	Birkoch-Aquachmoch	7328	1648	649	3288
12	Chebergiena-Niquara	6314	1461	546	2407
13	Deber-Teklehaymanot	5493	1268	502	2059
14	Debir Abajalie	4487	938	413	1688
15	Emachiko - Gunaguna	7972	1724	596	2705
16	Eyadana-Wulha	4278	936	472	1606
17	Gedey	4832	1044	364	1826
18	Gelamatebia	5053	1208	739	2208
19	Gibtsawit	6770	1533	603	2730
20	Jeman - Deregha	9077	1827	850	2640
21	Kita	4438	962	499	1988
22	Mechena	5116	1086	861	1904
23	Menadik	4257	975	424	1855
24	Mena-Medhanialem	4339	953	488	1853
25	Selamya-Lanko	8436	1811	777	2754
26	Serwudi	3266	702	306	1250
27	Shungie-Sarniko	8405	1759	658	2905
28	Tarasemba	6146	1331	541	2289
29	Tegagie	3467	769	558	2041
30	Wagina - Woregaja	6897	1479	710	2568
31	Wariba	4378	954	481	1642
32	<b>Wonberoch - Woftoma</b>	<b>9045</b>	<b>1923</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>2595</b>
33	Zeha	6700	1460	589	2235
34	Ibnat Town	12604	3106		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>222,649</b>	<b>49,264</b>	<b>20,383</b>	<b>77,618</b>

Source: WFS Office Records

## Annex 2. Tropical Livestock Unit/TLU/ Conversion Factors

<i>Species</i>	<i>Factor</i>	<i>Class of Cattle</i>	<i>TLU Equivalent</i>	
			<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Camel	1.1	Calves	0.25	0.25
Buffaloes, Horses, Mules	1.0	Weaners and Yealings	0.34	0.34
Cattle, Asses	0.8	2 - 2.5 years	0.8	0.75
Pigs	0.2	2.5 - 3.5 years	1.0	1.0
Sheep, Goats	0.1			


Source: FAO (1974) and Hunting Technical Services (1974) cited in Williamson and Payne, 1978.

## Annex 3. Composition of Focus Group Discussions

<i>Type of Focus Group</i>	<i>Total Number of participants</i>
Women	10
Elder Men	6
Young Men	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>


# Appendix 1. Map of Amhara Region

የአማራ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት ካርታ በዞንና ስድስት



Appendix 2. Map of Ibnat Woreda

**Anlage 5: Karte Ibnat**



Source: Ibnat – Belessa ORDA Project Office Document

### Appendix 3. Household Survey Questionnaire

Dear Respondent,

As you are well aware, food insecurity are the daily experiences of most Ethiopians. Therefore, to tackle these problems the governments of Ethiopia design different approaches to address the food security through access and availability of food resources to the poor in form of various programs. However, these resources aren't reaching to the poor. Any effort to design strategies aimed at targeting the poor must start with identifying the factors that affect targeting mechanisms. This questionnaire is, therefore, designed for a study whose overall objective is to identify and analyze targeting rural household problems and targeting effectiveness in productive safety net program in Ibnat woreda respectively. The output of the study is beyond doubt important for the success of food security program in the woreda. Therefore, you are kindly requested to give genuine responses. I would like to assure you that the information you are going to provide will be exclusively used for academic purpose and will remain confidential.

Thank you

**INSTRUCTION: 1.** Respondents should be Household Heads

**2.** The **Data year 1997 E.C.**

#### Section 1: Identification

1. Name of household head: \_\_\_\_\_
2. Household Code 

--	--	--
3. Peasant Association: \_\_\_\_\_ Code: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Village: \_\_\_\_\_ Code: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Name of Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_ Code: \_\_\_\_\_

**Section 2: Household Composition and Characteristics**

Serial Number	Q01	Q02	Q03	Q04	Q05	Q06
	Name of household members	Sex	<i>Relation to the household head</i>	Age	Educational status	Dependency
		1 = male 2 = female	1= Head 2=wife 3=Son/Daughter 4= Mother/Father 5=Brother/Sister 6=Niece/Nephew 7=Uncle/Aunt 8=Grand parent 9=Servant 10=other relative 11=non relative	Age in completed years	0 = can not read and write 1= read and write  (For the rest write grade of formal education completed)	0=pregnant 1=Lactation 2=sick person 3=children < 5 4=elderly 5 = handicap 6 = others
01						
02						
03						
04						
05						

## Section – 3: Socio -Economic "Statues" of Sample Household Heads

### 3.1. For Excluded Household Heads

#### 3.1. 1. Food Security "Statues"

Q7. Had your household received aid in the past 3 years

1 = Yes                      2 = No

Q8. If yes, show the years (E.C.) and the forms of aid

Years	1995	1996	1997
Forms of Aid			

Code : 1 = EGS      2 = GR      3 = Supplementary Food      4 = 1 + 3      5 = 2 + 3

Q9. Had your household face sudden shocks between 1995(E.C.) and 1997 (E.C)

1 = yes                      2 = No

#### 3.1. 2. Access/ Ownership of Productive Asset

##### A. Land

Q10. Do you have land of your own? 1 = Yes    2 = No

Q11. If your answer to question 10 is "yes", how many timad allocated?

Q12. Do you cultivate all your land allocated?    1 = Yes    2 = No

Q13. If your answer to question 10 is "No", what are the reasons?

1 = Shortage of oxen

3. = Shortage of agricultural inputs

2 = Shortage of labour

4 = others (Specify it)

---

1. *Timad*, a local unit equivalent to a quarter of hectare

**B. Livestock/ Oxen**

Q14. Do you have Oxen? 1 = Yes 2 = No

Q15. If your answer to question 14 is "yes", how many oxen do you have?

1 = One                      3 = Three                      5 = more than four

2 = Two                      4 = Four

Q16. Do you have Other Livestock? 1 = Yes 2 = No

*If your answer to question 16 is yes,*

<i>Type of livestock</i>	<i>Q17 Number of animals at the beginning</i>	<i>Q18 At the end</i>
1 = Cows		
2 = Steers		
3 = Heifers		
4 = Calves		
5 = Sheep		
6 = Goats		
7 = Mules		
8 = Horses		
9 = Donkeys		
10 = Chickens		

**3.1. 3. Production and Income**

*Information on total yield obtained in 1997 E.C*

S.No.	Sources	Unit	Q19 Total Yield Obtained
1	Crop production	kertite <sup>2</sup>	
2	Livestock Bi-products	"	
3	Honey production	"	
	Total		

2. *kertite* , a local unit equivalent to half a quintal

*Information on total Income from Different sources obtained in 1997 E.C*

Ser. No	Sources	Q20 How much income did the household receive? (in Birr)	Ser. No	Sources	Q20 How much income did the household receive? (in Birr)
01	Crop production		08	Remittance/transfer received	
02	Sale of animals		09	Wage of head	
03	Milk, butter and cheese		10	Wage of spouse	
04	Egg production		11	Wage of children	
05	Honey production		12	From Non-Farm activities	
06	Sale of durables		13	Others (Specify)	
07	Received from Equib				

### **3.1. 4. Perception on Targeting Procedure**

Q21. Who decided to ("included" and "excluded") household heads from the productive safety net program?

1. Woreda Food Security Task Force
2. Kebele Council/Administration
3. Kebele FSTF
4. Community FSTF
5. Community( We all decided together)
6. Don't know

Q22. In your opinion what do you think are the main criteria for selection in PSNP?

Q23. Was your household excluded in the initial screening or at the last re-targeting?

1. Excluded from the initial selection
2. Excluded in the last re-targeting

Q24. What do you think made your households to be non-eligible for PSNP?

- |                             |                   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Livestock ownership      | 5. Family Size    |
| 2. Crop Production          | 6. Discrimination |
| 3. Land ownership           | 7. Don't know     |
| 4. Other politics supporter |                   |

Q25. Do you think that there are individuals/ household heads who were non-beneficiary in PSNP although eligible according to criteria?

1 = Yes      2 = No      3 = I don't know      4 = No Answer

Q26. Do you think that there are individuals/ household heads who were beneficiary in PSNP although non-eligible according to criteria?

1 = Yes      2 = No      3 = I don't know      4 = No Answer

Q27. What do you think the Capacity of "implementing agency" at the local level?

- 1 = have the capacity
- 2 = Lack the capacity
- 3 = I don't know

Q28. Was the targeting fair?

1. Yes      2. No

Q29. If the targeting was not fair, what are the reasons?

- 1. favoritism to party affiliation
- 2. the powerful pressurized ( forced) to be targeted
- 3. relativism to PA officials
- 4. food/ cash amount not proportional to the number of family members registered
- 5. others \_\_\_\_\_

Q30. Do you think that there were problems in the implementation of targeting PSNP?

1 = Yes      2 = No

Q31. If your answer is "Yes", what are the problems? **(Tick ✓ in the Dash)**

- 1. Lack of up to date household information      -----
- 2. Weak administration capacity      -----
- 3. Complexity of targeting criteria      -----

4. Unnecessary interference from local leadership -----  
 5. Lack of awareness at kebele level -----  
 6. Others -----

### 3.2. For Included Household Heads

#### 3.2. 1. Food Security "Statues"

Q32. Had your household received aid in the past 3 years

1 = Yes                      2 = No

Q33. If yes, show the years (E.C.) and the forms of aid

Years	1995	1996	1997
Forms of Aid			

Code : 1 = EGS      2 = GR      3 = Supplementary Food      4 = 1 + 3      5 = 2 + 3

Q34. Had your household face sudden shocks between 1995(E.C.) and 1997 (E.C)

1 = Yes                      2 = No

#### 3.2. 2. Access/ Ownership of Productive Asset

##### A. Land

Q35. Do you have land of your own? 1 = Yes 2 = No

Q36. If your answer to question 35 is "yes", how many timad (*allocated*)? \_\_\_\_\_

Q37. Do you cultivate all your land allocated? 1 = Yes 2 = No

Q38. If your answer to question 35 is "No", what are the reasons?

- 1 = Shortage of oxen                      3. = Shortage of agricultural inputs  
 2 = Shortage of labour                      4 = Others (Specify it)

**B. Livestock/ Oxen**

Q39. Do you have Oxen? 1 = Yes 2 = No

Q40. If your answer to question 39 is "yes", how many oxen do you have?

1 = One            3 = Three        5 = more than four  
2 = Two            4 = Four

Q41. Do you have Other Livestock? 1 = Yes 2 = No

If your answer to question 41 is yes,

<i>Type of livestock</i>	<i>Q42 Number of animals at the beginning</i>	<i>Q43 At the end</i>
1 = Cows		
2 = Steers		
3 = Heifers		
4 = Calves		
5 = Sheep		
6 = Goats		
7 = Mules		
8 = Horses		
9 = Donkeys		
10 = Chickens		

**3.2. 3. Production and Income**

*Information on total yield obtained in 1997 E.C*

S.No.	Sources	Unit	Q44 Total Yield Obtained
1	Crop production	kertite	
2	Livestock Bi-products	"	
3	Honey production	"	
	Total		

*Information on total Income from Different sources obtained in 1997 E.C*

Ser. No	Sources	Q45 How much income did the household receive? (in Birr)	Ser. No	Sources	Q45 How much income did the household receive? (in Birr)
01	Crop production		08	Remittance/transfer received	
02	Sale of animals		09	Wage of head	
03	Milk, butter and cheese		10	Wage of spouse	
04	Egg production		11	Wage of children	
05	Honey production		12	From Non-Farm activities	
06	Sale of durables		13	Others (Specify)	
07	Received from Equib				

### **3.2. 4. Perception on Targeting Procedure**

Q46. Who decided to ("included" and "excluded") household heads from the productive safety net program?

1. Woreda FSTF
  - 1 Kebele Council/ Administration
  - 2 Kebele FSTF
  - 3 Community FSTF
  - 4 Community ( We all decided together)
  - 5 don't know

Q47. In your opinion what do you think are the main criteria for selection in PSNP?

Q48. Was your household included in the initial screening or at the last re-targeting?

1. Included from the initial selection
2. Included in the last re-targeting

Q49. What do you think made your households to be eligible for PSNP?

- |   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. Small / no Livestock ownership           | 4. High Family Size |
| 2. Crop Production failure                  | 5. don't know       |
| 3. political supporter of the current party |                     |

Q50. Do you think that there are individuals/ households who were non-beneficiary in PSNP although eligible according to criteria?

1 = Yes      2 = No      3 = I don't know      4 = No Answer

Q51. Do you think that there are individuals/ households who were beneficiary in PSNP although non-eligible according to criteria?

1 = Yes      2 = No      3 = I don't know      4 = No Answer

Q52. What do you think the Capacity of "implementing agency" at the local level?

1. have the capacity
2. lack the capacity
3. I don't know

Q53. Was the targeting fair?

1. Yes      2. No

Q54. If the targeting was not fair, what are the reasons?

1. Favoritism to party affiliation
2. The powerful pressurized (forced) to be targeted
3. Relativism to PA officials
4. Food/ cash amount not proportional to the number of family members registered
5. Others \_\_\_\_\_

Q55. Do you think that there were problems in the implementation of targeting PSNP?

1 = Yes      2 = No

Q56. If your answer is "Yes", what are the problems? (*Tick ✓ in the Dash*)

1. Lack of up to date household information -----
2. Weak administration capacity -----
3. Complexity of targeting criteria -----
4. Unnecessary interference from local leadership -----
5. Lack of awareness at kebele level -----
6. Others -----

Q57. In what program your household beneficiary in PSNP?

1. Direct Program
2. Public Work Program

***A. Targeting in Public Work Program***

Q58. How many people participated from your household?

- |        |          |         |
|--------|----------|---------|
| 1. One | 3. Three | 5. Five |
| 2. Two | 4. Four  | 6. Six  |

Q59. Were all able-bodied in the household participated in public work?

1. Yes
2. No

Q60. If not participated, why?

1. payment was provided for limited number
2. they did not have time, engaged in other activities
3. did not want to participate
4. the available jobs were limited

Q61. What do you think about amount of benefit (wage) from PSNP compare with other alternative wages in the area?

1. below other wages
2. Equal
3. above other wages
4. no alternative job

***B. Targeting in Direct Program***

Q62. Why did not participate in the work program?

1. unable to work
2. the jobs were only for few people
3. the program was given for free
4. not requested to work

Q63. If the household representative was unable to work, what was the reason?

- |             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 1. Handicap | 4. pregnancy or lactation                     |
| 2. Sickness | 5. household members were busy to participate |
| 3. Elderly  | 6. lack of labour in the household            |

Q64. If the household did not participate because not requested to work, would you been able to participate if requested to work?

1 = Yes                      2 = No

*Thank you very much!*

#### **Appendix 4. Checklist for Focus Group Discussion**

1. What do you think the criteria used for selection of beneficiaries for PSNP?
2. Do you think that there are individuals/ households who were non-beneficiary from PSNP although eligible according to criteria?
3. Do you think that there are individuals/ households who were beneficiary from PSNP although non eligible according to criteria?
4. Does the community participate in the targeting process?
5. What do you think the Capacity of "implementing agency" at the local level?
6. Was the targeting procedure fair? If not fair, the reasons for perceiving targeting as unfair?
7. Do you think that there were problems in the implementation of targeting PSNP?  
If yes, what are the major problems

#### **Appendix 5. Checklist for Key Informants**

1. What are the key aspects practiced in implementing household targeting mechanism in relation to data collection and management, Institutional Responsibilities ?
2. Which targeting methods practiced to select beneficiary households?
3. What are the criteria used in the area to select beneficiary household?

4. Who decide the eligibility indicators for selection of beneficiary?
5. Who involved in selecting beneficiary households?
6. What problems they face in identifying beneficiary households?
7. To what extent the targeting mechanism correspond or deviate from the National Guide Line set out at the national / regional level?
8. What are the major factors affecting targeting efficiency?