

**CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING  
OF 2011  
THE CASE OF TUNISIA**

**BY  
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**A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE  
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**CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING  
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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Solomon Tadesse entitled Cause and consequences of Arab spring, case study of Tunisia. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts (State, Citizenship and Government) complies with the regulation of the University and meets the accepted standards with the respect to originality and quality.

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## **ABSTRACT /Summary/**

*The African Arab States entered in to serious of uprisings in December 2010. The revolution broke out in Northern African and Arab state of Tunisia. It is one of the wealthiest states on the continent ranks 36<sup>th</sup> in the world economic competent. It is a country rich in minerals such as Iron, Phosphate, Zinc, Lead, Oil, Petroleum and Natural gas.*

*Besides, Tunisia is one of the leading producers of Agricultural products, such as olives, wheat, barely, tomatoes, citrus, sugar beets, Dates and Almond and goods-textile, Leather and Steel, among others. It is also known for Food and Beverage products. In addition, it is also the second largest tourist destination in the continent next to Egypt.*

*Like Tunisia, the States of Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt are endowed with national resources. They have sizable deposition of Natural gas and Particularly Libya is among the leading producers of petroleum in the world next to Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia even supplied 1/10<sup>th</sup> of petroleum to the world market in 2008.*

*Though the North African Arab States earned huge foreign currency from Natural Gas, oil and other most of their citizens did not benefit from it. They have been living under serious poverty chiefly owing to the dictatorial orientation of the governments. There is no economic, social, and political freedom. They were characterised by unfired distribution of wealth, high rate of unemployment, un equal access to education, lack of housing, lack of transportation, lack of political participation and lack of involvement in public service.*

*The wealth of the state was in the hands of few leaders and western European companies. The leaders of North African Arabians were protectors of their interests as well as Western capitalists.*

*The suppression of problems for a long period of time led to the explosion of violent protests against Arab states governments since 2010. The first protest was seen in Tunisia ending up in ousting of president Zen al-Abidine Ben Ali. Following Tunisian revolution Egyptians moved against the regime and sent Hosni Mubarak in to jail. The revolution in Libya was concluded in killing Muammar Gaddafi and in Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh forced to leave from his power.*

*The tide of uprising from Tunisia spread out to the whole Arab world including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. In Syria the revolution still not concluded. In this study the researcher will not focuses on Arab spring in detail rather to assess the Cause and consequences of Tunisian Arab spring of 2010.*

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First of all I will thank the almighty GOD for facilitating all things in my life. Next to my sister and Love, who are my foundation and have borne the brunt of multiple moves and deployments to support my life and academic goals and pursuits. To all my friends who have grown up in a variety of global locations, adapting exceptionally well to each and every one. Each of you has taught me more about myself and life than you can imagine. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Addis Ababa University for funding my research. More than any one I express my heartfelt thanks for my advisor Dr Mohammed Hassen for his comment, suggestion and his kind advise.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | <b>PAGE</b> |
|---|-------------|
| Abstract /Summary/ .....                  | i           |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS/DEDICATION/ .....         | ii          |
| LIST OF TABLES .....                      | vi          |
| ABBREVIATIONS .....                       | vii         |
| <b>CHAPTER ONE</b> .....                  | <b>1</b>    |
| 1 INTRODUCTION .....                      | 1           |
| 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY .....         | 1           |
| 1.2 STATEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM .....       | 2           |
| 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION .....               | 7           |
| 1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY .....        | 7           |
| 1.4.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVE .....             | 7           |
| 1.4.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE.....             | 7           |
| 1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .....      | 8           |
| 1.6. DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY .....      | 8           |
| 1.7. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY .....        | 9           |
| <b>CHAPTER TWO</b>                        |             |
| 2. REVIEW OF RELEATED LITERATURE.....     | 10          |
| 2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TUNISIA..... | 10          |
| 2.2 TUNISIA UNDER HABIB BOURGUIBA .....   | 11          |
| 2.3 TUNISIA UNDER BEN ALI.....            | 13          |
| 2.4 ANALYSIS OF TUNISIA ONKEY AREAS ..... | 14          |
| 2.4.1 ECONOMIC.....                       | 14          |
| 2.4.2 SOCIAL.....                         | 24          |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| 2.4.3 POLITICAL.....   | 32 |
| <b>CHAPTER THREE</b>   |    |
| 3. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRATION .....  | 43 |
| 3.1 UNFAIRE DISTURIBUTION OF WEALTH.....   | 43 |
| 3.2 CORRUPTION .....   | 44 |
| 3.3 UNEMPLOYMENT .....   | 48 |
| <b>CHAPTER FOUR</b>  |    |
| 4. THE OUT BREAK OF ARAB UPRISING .....  | 54 |
| 4.1 DEFINATIONS OF KEY TERMS.....  | 54 |
| 4.2 THE BEGNING OF ARAB SPRING IN TUNISIA .....                                    | 57 |
| 4.3 THE SPREED OF ARABSPRING.....  | 60 |
| 4.4 THE IMPACT OF ARAB SPRING OUT OF ARABIAN STATES .....                          | 63 |
| 4.5 THE ROLE OF ELECTRONICS MEDIA ON TUNISIAN UPRISING .....                       | 63 |
| 4.6 RESPONSE OF GOVERNMENT AND DIFFERENT NATION TO ARAB<br>SPRING IN TUNISIA ..... | 65 |
| 4.6.1 RESPONSE OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST UPRISING IN TINISIA .....                     | 65 |
| 4.6.2 RESPONSE OF ARAB LEAGUE TO UPRISING .....                                    | 67 |
| 4.6.3 RESPONSE OF WESTERN POWERS TO ARAB UPRISING .....                            | 69 |
| 4.6.4 RESPONSE OF AU ON TUNISIAN CRISIS .....                                      | 74 |
| 4.6.5 RESPONSE OF THE UN ON TUNISIAN CRISIS .....                                  | 82 |
| 4.7 SUCCESS OF TUNISIAN UPRISING .....   | 87 |
| 4.8 NEGATIVE OUTCOME OF THE TUNISIAN UPRISING.....                                 | 87 |
| 4.9 TUNISIA AND NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE UPRISING.....                               | 89 |
| <b>CHAPTER FIVE</b>  |    |
| 5. CONCLUSSION.....  | 91 |
| REFERANCES .....   | 98 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| APPENDEXS .....   | 104 |
| TABLE ONE .....   | 104 |
| TABLE TWO.....  | 105 |
| TABLE THREE.....  | 106 |
| TABLE FOUR:.....  | 106 |
| TABLE FIVE:.....  | 106 |
| TABLE SIX: .....  | 107 |
| TABLE SEVEN.....  | 107 |
| QUESTIONARIES THAT WILL BE DISTRBUTED TO INTERVIEWERS ..... | 108 |
| APPENDX II .....  | 110 |

## **LIST OF TABLES**

### **TABLE ONE**

**POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTATION IN PARLIMENT**

### **TABLE TWO**

**DEMOCRACY INDEX OF TUNISIA**

### **TABLE THREE**

**ECONOMIC CONDITION OF TUNISIA**

### **TABLE FOUR**

**EVOLUTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 1984-2008 (In %)**

### **TABLE FIVE**

**EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BY AGE, 1984-2008 (in %)**

### **TABLE SIX**

**UEMPLOYMENT RATE BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND YEAR (in %)**

### **TABLE SEVEN**

**UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF YOUTH AND ADULTS BY EDUCATION LEVEL,  
2010**

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

|             |  |
|-------------|--|
| <b>AQIM</b> | Al-Qaida Islamic in the Maghreb  |
| <b>APSA</b> | African union Peace and security Architecture  |
| <b>AU</b>   | African Union  |
| <b>AMU</b>  | Arab Maghreb Union   |
| <b>ATI</b>  | Tunisian Internet Agency   |
| <b>CPI</b>  | Consumer Price Index (CPI)   |
| <b>CPG</b>  | Compagnies des Phosphates de Gafsa carried out all phosphate mining and Fertilizer Manufacturing activities in Tunisia |
| <b>CSO</b>  | Civil Society Organization   |
| <b>EU</b>   | European Union   |
| <b>ENP</b>  | European Neighbourhood Policy  |
| <b>GCT</b>  | Groupe Chimique Tunisien which was merged with CPG in 1996, produced phosphate-  |
| <b>HRW</b>  | Human Right Watch  |
| <b>MENA</b> | Middle Eastern and North African   |
| <b>NATO</b> | North Atlantic Treaty Organization   |
| <b>REC</b>  | Regional Economic Community  |
| <b>PSC</b>  | Peace and Security Council (PSC)   |
| <b>RCD</b>  | Rassemblement Constitutionnel d'Émocratique party  |
| <b>S.A</b>  | Privately owned steel mills, such as Intermetal S.A. Produced concrete reinforcing-bar (rebar) (Arab Steel)            |
| <b>UN</b>   | United Nation  |

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Background of the Study

Arab uprisings swept across Northern Africa and Middle East Arab States since December 2010. The uprisings in most of them especially the Northern African was unexpected. The region was regarded as a region of wealthiest states in mineral resources and stability until December 2010 (uprising of Tunisia). Compared with few states under crises like that of Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, with the Jewish States of Israel, Northern African Arabs there had not been any revolt against their government in power<sup>1</sup>.

For many years, indeed for decades aged Arab leaders had maintained their power without any opponent. However, in case of Arab spring, Tunisia became the first country to witness the fall of its leader; Zein al- Abidine Ben Ali, who was forced to leave on January 14, 2011. Following the Tunisia revolt most Arab countries got into a serious problem. Among those leaders of Arab states of Africa was Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was over thrown in February 11 2011 by mass revolution. This uprising that calls for fundamental change on government policies has been gaining momentum in Algeria and Morocco. Finally, Libya freed from Muammer Gadhafi's rule and the revolution was concluded by his death.

The echoes of uprising have spread as far as the Middle East states of Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Farther more the winds of change continued to hover the entire region.<sup>2</sup> While the uprising in Egypt is still on going. Therefore, it's important to analyse the condition of this uprising in order to account for the events that changed the regime, dissolved a long established dominant political party,

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1 Aljazeera Documentary films on Arab spring English program July, 2011, Qatar, retrieved 12/6/2014

2 <http://www.googlecom-etl Arab spring 2011>, retrieved 11/11/2013).

loss of man power and political leaders. Therefore, it's better to know, and identify the cause and its consequences. Depending upon this situation, this paper discussed the Arab uprising in general and the Tunisian revolution in particular. So this thesis focuses on Tunisian revolution of 2010.

The main objective of this research is not to focus detail on issues of each Arab state revolution. It rather focuses on the relevant issues of the causes and the consequences of Tunisian uprising of 2010.

## **1.2 Statements of the Problem**

Arab states in Northern Africa and the Middle East are rich in mineral resources such as, Natural gas, Petroleum and oil. Especially, among Northern African states, Tunisia is rich in Iron, oil fields, phosphate, salt and paraffin. In addition to minerals, the country is known in Agriculture, Tourism, and Chemical Manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, most Northern African Arabs are famous in agricultural products. They also have strong social, political, cultural, and psychological makeup. These qualities can attract the world which reflected by the competition of the super powers before and after World War II on the areas.<sup>3</sup>

During the era of East-West conflict (cold war), the super powers tried to influence one another and compete each other to dominate the region. The Arab states have never kept silent for external super power dominations. Rather they were organized as all Arabic speaking states and Muslim countries followers, under the one entity's of the Arab World or Third Worldism. Using this general name, they were tried to defend themselves from Western super powers domination.

The idea of THIRD WORLDISM was initiated by different leaders like that of, Gamal Abdul Naser of Egypt, under the famous plan of Arab socialism, and other leaders like that of Libyan Gadafi and other scholars.

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2 A country Report Economic Intelligence Unit, London, country profile of Tunisia July, 2008).

They created Arab nationalism and Arab Third Worldism. They depend up on Arabic as a medium of their communication and Islamism as a medium of their main religion and identity.<sup>4</sup>

Apolitical thinkers & writers such as, Muhamma Aziz and, Mahadi Elmandira of morocco, Hasan Hanafi and Galal Amilof Egypt, Rene Habashi of Lebanon initiated & encouraged the idea of Union. According to them the term that, Arab Third Worldism is; a movement of Arab people and Arab intellectuals resist the Western domination. Its aim is;-

- To fight the Western cultural domination on the Arab world
- To strengthen an autonomous and modern Arab culture.<sup>5</sup>Generally the idea of union of Arab did not success on the creation of strong Arab free of Western.

Another challenge to the Arabs after WWII was American became emerging power of the world in the wake of defeating of Nazi Germany. Americans ally of western powers used two main tactics to dominate Arabians.

The first one by creating the state of Israel in the heart of Arab world by help of Western powers in 1948. Second by using of Egypt to fulfilled their interest, as a result of 1973 Arab Israel conflict Egypt pursued to follow an open door policy towards Western power. This was against to the objective of Union. Those are the main tactic used by America and other Western powers to dominate the Arab world.

According to Ibrahim he is a famous scholar of Arab Historian and political analysis stated about domination of Arab by Western as follows, “The West dominate Arabs; politically, socially, culturally, psychologically, and through every aspects by using of Egypt and Israel.”<sup>6</sup>

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4 Arab Nationalism A critical Enquiry (pp 19, 49,97,) 1981, London.

5 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, 2006. Pp236-270

6 Ibrahim, M; Abu-Rabi; 2004.170-178

Another idea which supported these were an Arab politicians, philosophers and theologise thinkers such as Muhammad Aziz of Morocco and Galal Amil of Egypt, Arab Muslims suffer a malicious pragmatic invasion of American modernity whose main goals were to exploit impoverish, demean, and defeat contemporary Arab and Muslims.

American pragmatism has appropriated European secular ideas and affords them in an aggressive new form. There for centre of the Arab world especially, “Egypt, follows an open door policy and permits a new culture and that is consumerism and individualism.”<sup>7</sup> This culture reflects the triumph of the nouveaux riches as a new consumerist class whose main aim is to enrich itself in the fastest and most corrupt way possible.

The main goal of American style pragmatism is to ensure American economic and cultural hegemony in the third world. In order to achieve these fundamental goals, American owned multi-national corporations have ensured their hegemony in three important arenas.

According to Abu Rabi an Arab politicians stated that, “the three important arenas are Media, Politics and Economic.”<sup>8</sup> According to this idea, the indigenou mass media have fallen under the influence of American ideas that promote leisure, consumerism, and a morality. At the economic levels, the capitalist economy has invaded the third world, created debt-ridden economics, and increased the levels of poverty.

The most dangerous result of pragmatic economics in Arab countries has been the creation of indigenou pragmatic elite that serves the interests of American capitalism. The indigenou elites do not aim to modernize the society as much as they care to serve the interests of their American masters. In addition, this economic dependency was in the hands of Israel. Since a country like that of Egypt cannot wage war against Israel, a new form of political dependency is created.

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7 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, 2006.

8 Ibrahim, M; Abu-Rabi; 2004

I argued with those thinkers, because of; According to the above arguments, the elites and leaders of Northern Arabians are made to lead their leisure's life by forgetting the interest of their own people. They are simply the guard of Western interest under the influence of Western powers both externally and internally in the issues of Arab states even more than their Arab citizens to protect their economic interest.

Besides of those plans after WWII, American introduced Marshal Plan to rebuild Western Europe. The American sponsored modernization and rehabilitation plan was extended as far as Arab Gulf states, which include Iran. These were other challenges to Arabians.

At the time, Europe was then too weak to offer any plan for the Arab world. By seeking the co-operation of few but affluent indigenous elites, International capital made elites to reproduce itself on a larger scale and accumulate more wealth and power in a few hands. Gradually, these elites "became the main benefactor of capitalist and defender of Western interests in the Middle East and the whole Arab states".<sup>9</sup>

Most Arab political analysis; they agree similarly on the problems of Arab elites who are ally of Western. They are criticized highly as collaborators of Western powers. Their wealth, power and other interests emanate from illegal action.

"For those Arab elders (collaborator of Western) the definition of government is, protect the right of citizens, maintaining peace and order of the state. However keeping cultural norms of citizens, fair distribution of wealth and, protecting their states from foreign domination are nothing for them"<sup>10</sup>. This criticism in similar way forwarded by Mahammud Amin al-Azim, Samir Amin, Tayyib Tizini and Sadiq Jalal al-Azim.

The rise of military states in Arab world with oppressive policies deny any real measure of democracy, human rights and freedom of thought. These trends have recently been aided by the rise of USA to the position of sole superpower in the world. As a result, the

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9 ibid

10 Ibrahim, M; Abu-Rabi; (2004),pp136-137

Arab World is more connected to the world capitalist system than it has ever been before. The ruling Arab elites such as Military men, top political leaders, and top business men are busy in safeguarding their interests in the context of the new world order by serving the interest of world capitalism in their countries. As a result, due to expansion of poverty, among the poorer, people famine and alienation become common experiences in their homeland vnder their state powers.

Based on the above discussion and arguments, Arab states of Northern Africa are the protector of Western and their interests. The wealth of the state and power are in the hands of those few individuals and their relatives. Power has been retain for nearly half a century in the hand of a few leaders. Those states are internally and externally under the domination of USA. Media and other important communications are under the influence of Western ideas and ideology. The leaders of those states are highly corrupted as mentioned by earlier scholars.

“Due to the states’ power accumulated in a few groups and suppression of mass for a long period of time by leaders the people have revolted on government since Dec 2010 in Tunisia and gradually the move were expanded to other Arabian states of Africans”.<sup>11</sup> This revolt has not got an end in some states like Syria and Egypt. In this revolution, many citizens were evacuated from their home; most demonstrators and opposition participants were killed and wounded by the government troops. The state and individual properties were damaged, school and Mosques were destroyed, and many cultural sites were demolished.

The destruction of all these is due to the fact that, the revolt was not planned, unorganized and unexpected rather the felling aggravation of mass population against the leader. Even if the revolution began in Tunisia it was finally spread to all Arab states. It is now terminated in some Arab states such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia successfully. It is still going on in Egypt and Libya from Africa and Syria from Asia

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11 Country report profile on Tunisian, Egypt, Libya, Algeria & Morocco April 2011.

This is a great event in history of mankind. From such Arabian condition of crises the researcher, as an African and students of African studies inspired to conduct his research on this event. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the cause and consequences of this Arab uprising in North Africa in general and Tunisian revolts in particular. Depends up on this the study attempts to answer the following research questions;-

### **1.3 Research Question**

- 1 How the economic situation deteriorated the life conditions of Tunisians and this situation became cause for uprising?
- 2 What was the main income of Tunisia internally and externally?
- 3 What were the political condition of Tunisia & how became one of the reasons of Arab uprising?
- 4 In what mechanism the revolution was expanded?
- 5 What was the role of Media on Arab uprising?
- 6 What was the response of the government during 2010 uprising?
- 7 What was the negative impact of uprising on Economy of Tunisia?
- 8 What is the impact of Tunisian uprising on other Arab states?

### **1.4. Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.4.1 General Objective**

The general objective of this study was to assess the causes, and consequences of North African uprising and the case of Tunisia.

#### **1.4.2 Specific Objective**

The specific objectives of this study are:

1. To find out the economic condition of Tunisia before 2010 Arab uprising
2. To Explain source of Tunisian domestic and foreign income before uprising
3. To identify the main problem of politics which led to revolution and participation of youth In the Movement
4. To Discusses how the revolution expanded throughout Tunisia

5. Show that how much foreign media and Twitter became tinder of Tunisian uprising
6. Identify the responses of government security force and different international organization to the revolution of Tunisia.
7. Indicate the influence of uprising's on economic development of Tunisia
8. Show that the result of revolution of Tunisian uprising and it's implication for other Arab States'

### **1.5. Significance of the Study**

This study assessed the causes and consequence of Arab uprising in general and Tunisian revolution in particular. Therefore, the research is expected to have the following significances:-

- It gives a simple clue for writers and others about the cause of Arab Spring
- Africans can learn from these events and uses this thesis an input for policy makers and politicians to halt such devastated crises for futures.
- It adds research documents in the department of centre for African and Oriental studies on Arabians issue.
- University of Addis Ababa Library benefited from documenting this thesis
- Other researchers can use this research in similar areas as a reference.

### **1.6. Delimitation of the Study**

This paper would have had more value if it had taken more samples from several areas of Tunisia and other Arab states. Among other things, limitation of money to travel to the areas and other relevant expense, forced the researchers to focus only on the selected written and unwritten reference materials. But it includes interview from a few participants of the revolution of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Algerian citizens who are living here in Addis Ababa on different occupation, like in AU, UN, Embassies and other business men. Generally this research covers the main causes and consequences

of Tunisian revolution since Dec 2010 onwards by emphasises on the major areas of Economic, Social and political situation of Tunisia before uprising of 2010 and how became a cause for revolution.

### **1.7. Limitation of the Study**

Regarding limitation in carrying out this research the researcher faced;-

- ✓ Lack of organized documents which is written on current situation of Arab revolution.
- ✓ The respondents were not fully willing to give the adequate information.
- ✓ Language problem on the communication process with respondents (Arabic and French).
- ✓ Lack of sufficient financial support to conduct the research in detail to go Tunisia.

### **SOLUTION**

Even if the challenge was too many the researcher was used the following mechanism:-

Different primary and secondary sources of such as Books, Internet web pages, Articles, Journals, and other recent publications. Besides of this by using of translator for different written and unwritten materials made a research successfully. In terms of finance by supporting myself for important things.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. Review of Related Literature

#### 2.1 Historical Background of Tunisia

In Tunisia the beginning of democratic political organization stretched for back beyond the colonial period to the middle of the 19 century. The DESTOURE/constitution/ party were formed to curb the power of the Ottoman Bey. It was an active during the early years of French rule but represented mainly the wealthy citizens of the capital in 1934 Habib Bourguiba broke away from the old party to found the **New Destoure** composed of younger, more radical group, with a modern secular policy. Bourguiba proclaimed that, “The Tunisia we mean to liberate will not be a Tunisia for Muslim, for Jew, or for Christian. It will be a Tunisia for all with distinction of religion or race, who wish to have it as their country and to live in it under the protection of just law”.<sup>12</sup>This is a way in which Tunisians developed their political situation by themselves.

Bourguiba and his supporters had still a long struggle a head of them being generally sympathetic to France and France culture; they wanted to negotiate Tunisia’s independence in a friendly way. But French rejected the idea of independence and arrested Habib Bourguiba following to this disturbance broke out throughout the whole country which the French were unable to control due to increase resistance in Tunisia.<sup>13</sup>

The French government were conducted negotiation with Habib Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef of the New Destoure party. Their failure gave rise to an armed revolution in January 1952 and hardening of positions.<sup>14</sup>On 31 July 1954, Pierre Mendes France unilaterally recognized the internal autonomy of Tunisia and announced the formation of an interim government .The internal autonomy treaty was signed on June 3 1955. On 20 March 1956, French finally conceded total independence of Tunisia.

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12 Thomas Krabacher, Ezekiel Kalipeni, and Azzedine Layachi (2011),pp170-198

13 Ibrahim 2004.

The National constituent Assembly, which was first presided over by Habib Bourguiba was elected. One month later, on 25 July 1957 the Monarchy was abolished and Tunisia became a republic Habib Bourguiba was elected president on 8 November 1957.<sup>15</sup>

According to the above explanation Tunisia to develop her state political foundation passed through many stages and treated to great challenges with Europeans. The role of personality especially leaders of Tunisians were too much on the development of the Tunisians.

#### **2.1.4 Tunisia under Habib Bourguiba**

After independence of Tunisia Bourguiba faced many things to lead the country among those; the long history of French colonization in this country and the bitter struggle for freedom left them in economic shambles. The fight of the poor from the country side to the cities, the enormous difficulties facing and over population were all major challenges to the new regime Bourguiba to solve this problem. He used the Kemal Ataturk model of secularization and national building to mobilize the mass for development.

The state imposed secularism on all aspects of society with double purpose of diminishing the power of religion in a social and cultural spheres and creating a new identity congruous with the demands of modernity. The religious institution of Zaytuna University marginalized and a wall of separation between state and religion,<sup>16</sup> was created Bourguiba's secularism and identity formation through state apparatus, of media. He developed the country in mining, agricultural and manufacturing sector and generally contributed a lot for Tunisia.

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14 Country report profile of Tunisia April 2008,pp 21

14 <http://www.eiu.com> and [www.store.eiu.com](http://www.store.eiu.com)).retrieved 21/9/2014

15 country report profile of Tunisia Dec 2008).Dec pp 27

16 Ibrahim,2004,pp198

The regime of Bourguiba after 1962 “Bizerata crises of military base in which Tunisians clashes with former colonizers of France on controlling of the military base. Finally, the two states reached on an agreement that Tunisia and France became more closely aligned again after colonization they began to working together with not only for France but also with Europeans.”<sup>15</sup> Tunisia opened her door for Western powers companies to invest in mining and agricultural sectors.

Gradually the property of Tunisia was returned back to Western Powers Company and the wealth of Tunisia gets in to the hand of western and a few leaders of Tunisians who are in favour of Europeans. After a long period of time, this condition gradually became the main problem of unequal distribution of wealth among nation of Tunisia.

Bourguiba maintained in power for a Quarter of century. He created through state apparatuses especially the party media, schools; they became the charisma of the leader. After 1970, things did not go as the wish of Bourguiba. “Because of the rise of nationalist citizen and educated generation of young Tunisian who rebelled against the leaders.”<sup>16</sup> Gradually eradicate the powers of Bourguiba and finally Tunisian state powers handed over by Ben Ali.

Then Ben Ali, becomes minister of national security, then minister of the interior. Weeks after 84-year-old President Habib Bourguiba appoints him prime minister, Ben Ali has Bourguiba declared senile and ousts him in a coup. In 1987, Habib Bourguiba by a panel of A-team of Doctors testified that doctors called in by his cabinets. Which declared him too ill senile to continue in office. The place was taken by the Prime Minister Zen al – Abidine Ben Ali. Mr ALI, removed under an Article of the constitution of Tunisia that provides for the prime minister to take over from in incapacitated president.<sup>17</sup> Mr Bourguiba, then he was transferred to residence in monster where he remained, until his death in 2000.

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15 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, 2006 pp 270-286

16 Ibrahim, 2004 .pp198

17 Country Report Profile April 2008 pp 19

**2.1.5 Tunisia under Ben Ali;-** He was born on Sept. 3, 1936 in Hammam-Sousse, a small Mediterranean city in Tunisia. The country at the time was a French protectorate. Ben Ali joined the anti-French independence Neo-Destour movement in his teens, which led to his expulsion and black-listing from French-administered schools. His role with Neo-Destour ironically won him a scholarship to military school in France after independence and a brief stint at Fort Bliss, Texas. He married twice and fathered six children. His current wife, Leila Trabelsi, is a shopaholic who indulges her pleasures with the presidential plane at lavish taxpayer expense.<sup>18</sup>

**Ben Ali Rise to Power:-**Returning from military school, Ben Ali headed Tunisia's military security from 1964 to 1974, rising through the ranks. He was military attaché to Morocco then head of national security at the interior ministry, a post where he learned Tunisia's police-state tools—ruthlessly enacting those tools against political protesters. Made general in 1979, Ben Ali briefly serves as an ambassador to Poland<sup>19</sup>

According to the famous Historian writers ; Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, they stated as follows; “ Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali after 1987 he embarked on a series of seemingly Liberal and democratic reforms Tunisia developed its Tourist industry and doing so became one of the wealthiest countries in Africa. But before long, Ben Ali became much more dictatorial, banning all but not a handful of tame opposition parties, restlessly harassing human rights activities and violently cracking down on Islamic militants. In 2002, he contrived a Referendum amending the constitution to him up to twelve more years in office and Judicial impunity for life”.<sup>20</sup>

The above discussions of Historian and theoretical suggestions shows that how Ben Ali gradually become dictators and suppress the nations of Tunisians, finally Ben Ali became completely an authoritarian type of regimes of Tunisia. According to political analysis of

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18 <http://www.middleeast.about.com/od/tunisia/p/tunisiaprofilebenali.htm>, Retrived 3/3/2014

19 Encyclopaedia Britannica on line leaders profile of Ben Ali of Tunisia. retrieved 12/6/2014

20 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, 2006, PP 99-102

Maghreb region Taylor and Francis stated on their book Mediterranean politics, they stated as follows; “In particular, the idea that authoritarian or semi-authoritarian forms of governments are only temporary stages on the path towards democracy and not sustainable political systems in their own right, as argued in the past. Accordingly, developments in the Arab ‘spring’ are being compared with the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe”<sup>21</sup>

Suppression of political freedom in Tunisia was the legacy of Bourguiba through any mechanism by Ben Ali suppressing the political freedom of citizen in creep silently ways but during the Ben Ali period suppressing of citizen was more severe than the previous period. The political freedom of citizen, economic freedom of citizen, and other freedoms highly suppressed by leaders. All Medias were doing for the leaders and they full fill the interest of leaders Gradually Ben Ali became an Authoritarian regime.

## **2.2 Analysis of Tunisia on Key Areas**

### **2.2.1 Economic**

**Agriculture:-** Agricultural output is central to the Tunisian economy, accounting for 12 to 16 % of the GDP, depending on the size of the harvest. This sector provided jobs for 22 % of the country's labour force in 1998. The 2 most important export crops are cereals and olive oil, with almost half of all the cultivated land sown with cereals and another third planted with more than 55 million olive trees.<sup>21</sup> Tunisia is one of the world's biggest producers and exporters of olive oil, and it exports dates and citrus fruits that are grown mostly in the Northern parts of the country.

The centre of the country is used largely to raise cattle, the Sahel region is famous for its olive groves, and the southern part of the country is known for its date production. Tunisia remains one of the few Arab countries which is self-sufficient in dairy products,

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21 Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, PP, 101-102, 2006 /.

21 <http://www.Ministry of Tunisian Annual Agricultural Report of, 2000>, retrieved 26/7/2014

vegetables, and fruit and almost self-sufficient in red meat. Since the 1980s, agricultural output has increased by about 40 %, and exports of food have risen considerably.<sup>21</sup> At the beginning of 2000 the government entered into talks with the European Union seeking a free-trade agreement for its agricultural goods. The remainder of Tunisia's agricultural production consists of several smaller export products including tomatoes, peppers, artichokes, melons, onions, potatoes, sugar beets, almonds, apricots, and wine.

Annual agricultural production can vary significantly from year to year due to Tunisia's unpredictable and largely irregular rainfall patterns. Almost all of Tunisia's water is used in irrigation, and the government is seeking more efficient methods that will conserve water. Its national plan aims to increase water resources from 2.1 to 3.5 billion cubic meters per year by building 21 large dams, 203 hillside dams, 547 reservoirs, and 1,580 deep wells by the end of 2001.<sup>22</sup> The fishing industry employs 25,000 people and catches an average of 93,000 tons of fish a year. However, coastal fishing has declined dramatically since 1995 due to pollution and the depletion of fish stocks. Fish is Tunisia's second most important food export after olive oil, and the government has made strong efforts to improve processing and storage facilities in order to match European standards.

The government has also invested heavily in the upgrading of its ports and the improvement of its fleets. In Agriculture sector, Ninety-two projects are now underway with foreign partners, including 46 joint ventures those are already operational, for a total investment 116 million TD creating 1145 jobs. In the breakdown of approved investment by branch, large-scale crops occupy first place and cattle- rising followed by fishing and aquaculture.

**Mining and Manufacturing Sector:-**Tunisia a producer of phosphate, and fertilizer, aluminium fluoride, cement, common clay, crude oil, gypsum, iron and steel, iron ore, lime, natural gas, refined petroleum products and salt Minerals in the National Economy

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22 <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Tunisia-agriculture.retrived 23/10/2013>

In 2009, the Tunisian economy grew by 3.1% at 1990 prices compared with a 4.5% growth rate in 2008. The mining sector's share of the gross domestic product (GDP) at 2009 prices hydrocarbon sector decreased slightly to 6.5% of the GDP from 6.7% in 2008.<sup>23</sup> The Government introduced steps to stimulate and sustain exports, including paying 50% of the employer's contribution to the social security fund in case companies were to lay off workers temporarily or reduce their work to part time from full time.

Production Pétrolières (ETAP)] holds a 40% share of the concession. In 2008, in 2009, there were notable decreases in the production of such mineral commodities as iron ore, which decreased, by “28.4%; aluminium fluoride, by 7.0%; crude oil (including condensates), by 3.4%; and phosphate rock, by 3.2%. Production of steel, however, increased, by 89%; that of sea salt, by 31.2%; natural gas, by 22.8%; and manufactured building materials, such as earthenware tiles and mosaic, by 7.1% and 4.3%, respectively, compared with their respective production volumes in 2008.”<sup>24</sup>

No production had been reported for barite, lead, and zinc ores since 2005 owing to waning reserves at existing mining sites. Cement production, which totalled 7.5 million metric tons per year (Mt/yr) in 2009, was at about the same output level as in 2008. Structure of the Mineral Industry Government-owned Compagnies des Phosphates de Gafsa (CPG) carried out all phosphate mining and fertilizer manufacturing activities in Tunisia. Groupe Chimique Tunisien (GCT), which was merged with CPG in 1996, produced phosphate-based fertilizers. Much of the cement sector had been privatized in the 1990s, which resulted in the creation of local companies and the entry of European and regional companies into the Tunisian cement market. State-owned Société Tunisienne de Sidérurgie [Tunisian Steel Manufacturing Co.], which was also known as El Fouladh, was the sole steel-billet producer in the country. Privately owned steel mills, such as Inter metal S.A. and Tunisacier Steelworks, produced concrete-reinforcing bar.<sup>25</sup>

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23 <http://www.Annual report of Central Bank of Tunisia, 2009>. Retrieved 12/9/2014

24 <http://www.Arab Steel, Annual Report of 2009>.retrieved 6/11/2013

25 *ibid*

The Government pursued policies to encourage international companies to work in Tunisia, as well as to help local small- and medium-sized industrial businesses compete with international companies. ETAP expanded its production partnerships with several international oil companies and monitored their exploration and production operations to protect the interests of the Government in the hydrocarbon sector. In July, El-Fouladh, which was the sole steel producer in Tunisia and which was 91% Government owned, increased its operational capability to. In November, El-Fouladh offered up to 50% of the company assets for privatization, and 12 steel producers expressed interest.<sup>26</sup>

**Lead and Zinc.**—Maghreb Minerals plc of the United Kingdom, which held exploration, permits for barite, fluorite, and zinc in Tunisia, did not conduct any drilling programs in 2009 and kept its operations in the country on care-and-maintenance status. The company did not find investors for its Gite de l’Est-BouJabeur lead and zinc project owing to the drop in mineral prices that was a result of the world financial crisis.<sup>27</sup>

**Industrial Minerals Cement.**—More than 85% of the cement produced by Tunisia’s seven cement producers in 2009 was consumed locally; the remaining 15% was exported largely to Algeria and Libya. The value of cement exports was 7.5% of Tunisia’s total industrial sector exports.<sup>28</sup>

The construction of a new green field cement plant at Djebel Ressay, which is located 40 kilo meters (km) southwest of Tunis, continued in 2009 by Les Ciment de Carthage (Carthage Cement), which had been established by Bina Holding and Global Investment House of Kuwait. The plant would have 2.3 Mt/yr of cement production capacity and was expected to

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26 *ibid*

27 Maghreb Minerals plc, annual report of 2010.

28 Central Bank of Tunisia, 2010

begin production in 2012. Bina Holding held about 51% interest in the plant, and the remaining shares were expected to be offered to investors when the company is listed on the alternative investment market of the Tunisia Stock Exchange in 2010.<sup>29</sup>

**Tunisian Indian Fertilizers S.A. (TIFERT)**, which was a joint venture of CPG, GCT (35% interest each), Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. (CFL), and Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. (GSFC) (both of India and each of which had 15% interest), moved forward with building a phosphoric acid plant. TIFERT's plant was being built alongside the existing phosphoric acid plant operated by GCT at Skhira, which is located 50 km north of the town of Gabes in Mid Eastern Tunisia. The plant, which was being constructed by Technip S.A. of France, was scheduled to commence operations in 2010 with a production capacity of 1.3 Mt/yr of phosphoric acid. The plant would use sulphuric acid and phosphate rock to produce phosphoric acid. The entire production of the plant would be exported to CFL and GSFC through a long-term purchasing agreement to supply these companies with phosphoric acid .<sup>30</sup>

**Salt.**—Production of marine salt increased by about 31% in 2009 compared with that of 2008. State-owned Compagnie Generale des Salines de Tunisie (COTUSAL) increased its production of salt by 11.5% to 901,000 t in 2009 from 808,000 t in 2008. Private salt producers, including Saida S.A. and Tunisel Co, increased their share of production to 35% in 2009 from about 24% in 2008. Tunisel produced 395,000 t of salt in 2009, which was a 270% increase compared with the 95,000 t the company produced in 2008.<sup>31</sup>

**Mineral Fuels, Natural Gas and Petroleum.**—Tunisia's natural gas production increased by 23% in 2009 compared with that of 2008, including a 6.6% increase in output from the Miskar field. Production was expected to increase further in 2010.<sup>32</sup>

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29 Tunisia Online News, 2010.retrieved 18/10/2013

30 Technip S.A, annual report of 2008; Acid Plant Database, 2009.

31 Central Bank of Tunisia, Report of 2010,

32 *ibid*

Generally, as discussed in the above about Tunisian mineral resources it has a huge deposition of earth material. Tunisia earns a huge amount of income from its resource from her resources the Tunisians did not benefited from such wealth. Because of under the banner of privatization the state firms and all the property of Tunisia transferred to Europeans capitalist and in the name of state shared the remaining property of the state transferred to Ben Alis Family, Laila Family and a few RCD party leaders.

For Example, in Agriculture sector, Ninety-two projects are now underway with foreign partners, including 46 joint ventures those are already operational, totally 138 they created only 1145 jobs that is, one to ten. They produced a large-scale crops and cattle-rising followed by fishing and aquaculture for export. Manufacture: textile, leather industries, mechanical, electrical and electronic industries are approximately at about, 1549 companies with foreign or mixed capital are currently in operation creating only 157,263 employees. Total Approximately at about 2,000 manufacturing companies have already set up in the country and are either totally or partially producing for the European, American and African markets among others.<sup>33</sup>

More than 50% of these manufacturing companies are joint ventures or foreign-owned in relation with a few Tunisian leaders under the banner of privatization process. Among those, all state owned of cement factory transferred to Kuwait, Fertilizers to Indian, Gas and petroleum for France and Britain, other mechanical, mining, automotive etc industries were in the hand of former colonizer of Tunisia France and Tunisian leaders and RCD party top managers. In July 17, 1996 Tunisia has signed an association agreement with the European Union which provides for the setting up of a Free Trade Area in which almost all the industrial products exchanged between both parties will benefit from a total exemption from

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33 ibid

customs duties. Foreign investors may now hold up to 100% of project capital without seeking authorization Association Agreement with the European Union. This agreement extends cooperation to cover all fields: culture, education, economy, Scientific research, political and social dialogues.

The agreement enforced in March 1st, 1999. It provides for the gradual establishment, over a period of 12 years, of a Free-Trade Zone for industrial products. Foreign investors benefit from the free-trade zone system for totally exporting companies, a system which allows for full exemption from duties on the purchase of equipment and all sorts of inputs.<sup>34</sup>

The Tunisians did not only sign a free trade with Europeans but also with Japan and USA. In Tunisia, Japan and the United States, More than 1,600 foreign firms have direct investments in or joint ventures with Tunisian companies. All of them weather Europe or America they use high advanced machine rather to use Tunisian man power. This is the main problems led Tunisian to unemployment.<sup>35</sup>

According to the above agreement Western powers were highly benefited from such trade and Tunisian became market place of European products. In return Europeans highly benefited by Tunisian resource in a few job opportunities. The majority of Tunisian did not gain anything from such circulation without unemployment.

**Inflation Accelerates;**-The consumer price index (CPI) increased by 6% year on year in April, compared with 5.8% in March 2008 as a result of rising global oil and commodity prices and strong domestic demand. Producer prices have also risen strongly, growing by more than 10% year on year in March 2008. Tunisia imports most of the wheat, sugar and vegetable oil that it consumes, and much of its oil and gas, making it vulnerable to rises in world food and oil prices. Although food-price inflation slowed to 8.1% in April from 9.6% in February, transport costs accelerated from 5.2% to 6.8% year on year as a result

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34 <http://www.Icdt's> member states business guide. Retrieved 22/9/2013

35 <http://www.Icdt's> member states business guide. Retrieved 9/9 2013

of the 4.2% rise in fuel prices in March 2008. Food accounts for over one-third of the basket of goods and services used to calculate the CPI; the retail price of couscous, a staple food, rose by 6% from the start of the year to mid-March, flour by 17% and sugar by 13%.<sup>36</sup>

**Tourism in Tunisia:-**Among Tunisia's tourist attraction sites are its cosmopolitan capital city of Tunis, the ancient ruins of Carthage, the Muslim and Jewish quarters of Jerba, and coastal resorts outside of Monastery. According to *The New York Times*, Tunisia is "known for its golden beaches, sunny weather and affordable luxuries."<sup>37</sup>

The tourism sector of Tunisia represents 6.5% of Tunisia's GDP and provides 340,000 jobs of which 85,000 are direct jobs, or 11.5% of the working population with a high share of seasonal employment. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are the four traditional tourist markets, though Tunisia lost roughly 500,000 tourists from Germany after 9/11. From 2003-2004, it regained tourists, and 2007 saw arrivals increasing by 3 % over that of 2006.<sup>38</sup>

Tunisia's national tourism office (ONTT) is making a concerted effort to capitalize on the millions of people that venture into the country each year. Tunisia offers everything from beaches to Roman and Islamic archaeological sites. Averaging about 4 million visitors annually, tourism has become a principal foreign currency earner accounting for close to 7% of Tunisia's GDP. Such numbers have led to policies that focus on tourism infrastructure development. Since 1980, hotel capacity has doubled to 155,000 beds. Investment in hotel construction doubled between 1990 and 1992, leaving a total of 600 hotels. The government is aiming for 200,000-bed capacity by the year 2000.<sup>39</sup>

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36 Country Report profile on Tunisia April, 2008.pp29

37 [http://www. The New York Times.tunisiantourism.com](http://www.TheNewYorkTimes.tunisiantourism.com).

38 *Central Bank of Tunisia 2009 report*

39 <http://www.Icdt's> member states business guide. Retrieved 16/7/2013

According to Garrett Nagle in his book *Advanced Geography*, Tunisia's tourist industry “benefits from its Mediterranean location and its tradition of low cost package holidays from Western Europe.” The development of tourism dates back to 1960 through the joint efforts of government and private groups. In 1962, tourism, with 52,000 entries and 4,000 beds, had revenue of two million dollars and becomes the main source of foreign exchange in the country. However, it is not popular with American tourists who are wary of Middle East destinations since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Until recently, Tunisia's main attraction was on its North-East coast line around Tunis; however, the Seventh National Development Plan of 1989 created several new tourist areas including the resort at Port-el-Kantaoui.<sup>40</sup>

Besides of USA terrorist attack of 2001 Northern African states were suffered a lot in terrorist action and influenced their tourism activities. Especially in Tunisia the Austrians, a man and women were travelling in the Sahara region of South West Tunisia late Feb 2008 when they were abducted by members of the radical Islamist group calling itself Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM). In recording aired by Qatar based Al-Jazeera TV on March 10<sup>th</sup> AQIM claimed that a squadron of heroic Mujahedin had infiltrated “deep to the Tunisian state” and kidnapped the two Austrians in retribution for Western support for Israel. It warned Western Tourists to stay away from Tunisia. Because “the apostate Tunisian state is not able, and will to protect you”.

In Dec 2006 at about 29 to 30 men Tunisians and one Mauritanian were arrested after they engaged the police in Gun fights near Soliman 15 of Tunisians and Jan 2007 confrontation in which 12 Gunmen and 2 police men were killed. The Authorities said that, the cell that carried out attack was linked to the Algerian group

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40 <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/tunisia/international-tourism> retrieved 27/92013

Salafiste pour La Predication et Le Combat. Whose leaders have allied themselves to the loose Al-Qaida network and now call themselves Al-Qaida In the Islamic Maghreb.

**Trade:-**From Northern part of African states, Tunisia is the wealthiest in the continent by Iron, Oil, Phosphate, Agricultural food products. In addition to earth minerals Tunisia is the leading state in Production of spare part of Car manufacturing and Tourism industry. The economy of Tunisia was the leading state in 2010 in Africa 36<sup>th</sup> in the world economic competitiveness. Highly exporters of Hydro carbon, Electrical equipment's and Chemicals. Mainly her import and export countries are USA, Germany, Spain, Libya, Italy, China and France. **Major export;** Petroleum oils, crude (11%), Insulated wire; optical fiber cables (8%), Men's suits, not knit (5%), Women's suits, not knit (4%), Mineral or chemical fertilizers, mixed (3%)

**Major imports;**Cars (3%), Woven fabrics of cotton of < 85% weighing > 200 g/m<sup>2</sup> (2%)

**Major trade partners of exports;** France (26%), Italy (17%), Germany (10%), United Kingdom (5%), Spain (5%)

**Major trade partners imports;** France (19%), Italy (19%), Germany (10%), China (6%), Spain (6%).<sup>44</sup>

Mineral Trade In 2009, the balance of trade for Tunisia was negative, as it had been for many years. The value of the Tunisian exports decreased by about 14% in 2009 compared with an increase of 20% in 2008. Similarly, the value of imports decreased by about 9% in 2009 compared with an increase of 18% in 2008. The value of exports of

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41 Country profile on Tunisian April 2008

42 Country profile on Tunisian April 2008.

43 World Bank Reports, September 2010 New York.

44 <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/country/tun/> retrieved 12/12/2013

phosphate rock and phosphate-based products decreased by about 50% in 2009 compared with an increase of about 130% in 2008. The volume of phosphate rock exports, which was 491,000 metric tons (t) in 2009, was 44% less than in 2008. In 2009, the value of phosphate rock exports was about 70% less than that of 2008 but 23% more than that of 2007. Exports of phosphate rock went to Poland (about 43%), Turkey (12%), and New Zealand (about 11%). Exports of phosphoric acid were received mainly by India (57%) and France (about 12%). The decrease in the value of phosphate rock exports was attributable to the reduced demand in world markets.<sup>45</sup>

The share of phosphate rock and phosphate-based products in the country's total exports decreased to 8.1% in 2009 from 13.2% in 2008. Exports of other mineral commodities decreased by 56% in 2009 compared with an increase of about 127% in 2008, and their share in total exports decreased to 0.5% from 0.9% during the same period. Exports of crude oil increased by 2.7% in volume and decreased by 35% in value whereas refined petroleum products exports decreased by 0.4% in volume and by 36.8% in value in 2009 compared with that of 2008. Imports of coke, crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum products decreased significantly in terms of both value and volume during the same period of comparison.<sup>46</sup>

Commodity Review Metals, Iron and Steel.—Iron ore production decreased by 28.4% to 151,000 t in 2009 from 211,000 t in 2008, which was a record low for the country. The sharp decrease in iron ore output was the result of the diminishing reserves of iron ore at the Jerissa and the Tamera-Douaria Mines.<sup>47</sup>

### **2.2.2 Social**

**Education Sector:**-In order to understand the transition from the educational system to employment, it is useful to highlight some specific features of the Tunisian educational system. Following educational reforms of the early 1990s, the national system of education and training is currently as follows;-A first degree involving a

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45 World Geological survey minerals year book-2009, New York.

46 Data from Central Bank of Tunisia, 2010, p. 127, 130-132.

compulsory nine years, called "Basic Education" and consists of a first primary cycle of nine years and period of three years along a specialized track. A 4-year cycle of general secondary education, culminated in a national diploma, the Baccalaurea in preparation for higher education. A system of vocational training at several levels of qualification (Certificate of Professional Competence, Professional Technician Certificate, Certificate of Higher Technician). A higher education divided into two types of institutions: academic institutions and institutes of higher education technology.<sup>48</sup>

In Tunisia, training is provided mainly in schools. The period of transition from traditional school to work often occurs in vocational schools. In the Tunisian system, school and work institutions remain unconnected, implying that often the technical training may not be closely related to the skills needed by employers. The Tunisian education system emphasizes general studies leading to baccalaureate –the ultimate reference in the classification system of qualifications.<sup>49</sup>

Subsequently, to higher education, Students oriented toward vocational studies are most often left out of mainstream education generally. In addition, the Tunisian vocational training system is built on the principle of a formal correspondence between hierarchical levels of employment and levels of training intended to meet these needs. The structure of vocational degrees is such that an individual who achieves one level, (CAP, for example) can then go on to complete the next level of vocational degree (BTP), solely based upon qualifications from vocational school and not work-based qualifications. Students who are relegated to the vocational track are done so early on. The selection method is particularly delicate since the initial "mark"

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47 Annual Report of Central Bank of Tunisia 2010.

48 Ministry of Education of Tunisia 2005 yearly bulletin pp 98-148.

49 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004) / Enquête Nationalesurl' Emploi (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) INS).

Individuals for working life. The possibilities of access to certification during their career are very limited. This articulation by the selection of general education and vocational track based upon a strict tracking system that is not reversible throughout one's lifetime.<sup>50</sup>

After nearly nine years of general education, students who perform poorly on their exams enter the vocational track. Alternatively, a higher-achieving student can enter the vocational track of his own volition (though this is rare). Vocational courses prepare students for diplomas in either two (CAP) or three (BEP) years. These vocational diplomas are designed to prepare young people to pursue an occupation as a labourer or skilled worker, but also try to overcome some of the inadequacies of the primary schooling system to provide all students a high enough quality of education to pass the national standards.

Employers complain that they cannot find enough skilled workers, technical and scientific skills. The curricula of Tunisia allows at about 60% Of students enrolled in humanities, law, economics or management programs. Moreover, expenditure has been directed mostly at buildings, equipment and the quality of curricula teaching staff has been neglected. The resulting high rate of graduate unemployment is a major concern for the government.<sup>51</sup>

Authorities limit academic freedom. While academics may discuss sensitive topics with relative openness in private settings, the government does not allow such discussion in public forums. In July 2009, professor Khedija Arfaoui was sentenced to eight months in

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50 <http://www.tunisianeducation.structure.com> retrieved 16/1/2014

(<http://www.Tunisianeducationstandards.com>).

51 country profile on Tunisia July2006 pp 17-26.

prison for spreading rumours as the weak and low performance of Tunisian Curriculum on Face book, though she remained free at year's end pending an appeal.<sup>52</sup>

**Freedom of Religious:-**Tunisia's state religion is Islam, but the small population of local Jews and Christians are generally free to practice their religions. "The government closely monitors mosques for extremist activity. They receive state funding and may remain open only during prayer time; imams are appointed and paid by the state".<sup>53</sup>

Sectarian dress like the *hijab* (headscarf) is prohibited, and both men and women with conservative religious appearances face police harassment. This led youths for support of Enahada party which inclined to religious.

**Freedom of Civil Society and Association:-**Freedoms of association and assembly are guaranteed in the constitution of Tunisia and in several international treaties to which Tunisia is a party, but the government restricts these rights in practice. Nongovernmental organizations are legally prohibited from pursuing political objectives and activities, and independent human rights groups are routinely denied registration, forcing them to operate precariously as illegal bodies. Public-funding requirements and foreign-funding reporting rules make it extremely difficult for registered associations to maintain independence from the government and benefit from foreign sponsorship. Rights activists are routinely harassed, slandered, and abused. In September 2009, for example, "human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui and her husband were assaulted by plainclothes police following a critical interview with Al-Jazeera."<sup>55</sup>

The government Recognized trade unions, including the only labour federation, the General Union of Tunisian Workers, are pro-government in orientation. Authorities limit independent labour activity, especially when it resembles or threatens to become organized political opposition. "Pro-government forces orchestrated a virtual coup within

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53 [www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/academicfreedomrate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/academicfreedomrate.html)retrived;11/2/2004).

54 [www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofreligious\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofreligious_rate.html)Retrived11/2/2014).

55 <http://www.Aljazeera> documentary report on Tunisian Human right English.programJan2009 retrieved 1/2/2014

the year-old National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists in mid-2009, taking over key leadership positions and endorsing Ben Ali's candidacy in the presidential election."<sup>56</sup>

Despite constitutional guarantees, the judiciary lacks independence, and the executive branch controls the appointment and assignments of judges. Courts do not ensure due process in politically motivated cases and regularly issue convictions, including post-prison terms of "administrative control," or internal exile. Trials of suspected Islamists, human rights activists, and journalists are typically condemned as grossly unfair and politically biased by credible domestic and international observers. Prominent government critic and journalist Taoufik Ben Brik was sentenced in November 2009 to six months in prison following a trial in which his lawyers were prevented from fully presenting his case or cross-examining witnesses.

According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports that other activists have been punished arbitrarily, including human rights defender Abdallah Zouari, who was released from internal exile in August 2009, some two years after his original sentence ended. Even after his release, Zouari continued to be monitored and harassed, and was briefly arrested in September. Suspected Islamists have been subjected to harsh prison sentences and reported ill-treatment in prison. Detention facilities in general are plagued by overcrowding and lack of medical care, and credible local and international sources report that detainees are routinely tortured in prison and in police custody."<sup>57</sup>

This shows that how much Tunisia leaders' were an Authoritarian and dictator government in the area and how much the peoples lived under a serious supervision of the government of Ben Ali. The Tunisians lived without expression of their idea through pressure group, an association group and in every aspect of citizen participation. The accumulation of those and other problems led the mass to revolt against their government inpower.

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56 human right watch report of 2009.

57 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofcivilsociety\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofcivilsociety_rate.html) retrived 11/2/2014).

**Regional Variation:-**Tunisia is divided in to three large Geographical distinct regions, in ‘the **Northern** the Medjerda plains are surrounded by Kroumirie mountains and Mogods hills on side by the Tunisian Dorsal on the other. This region is agriculturally rich.’<sup>58</sup>

In the **Estern** Tunisian’s Middle Mountains are separated by fertile valleys and have semi-arid climate, large olive plains (the Sahel and Sfax region) are located. In the **South** the large depression of the Chott El Djeried and its riparian palm groves (Tozeur, kebili, Douz) mark the threshold to the Sahara. The Tourist island of Djerba is founded near the coast and Matmata Mountains (arid) are located further to the East. Cement plant at Djebel Ressay, which is located 40 kilo meters (km) southwest of Tunis, continued in 2009 by Les Ciment de Carthage (Carthage Cement), phosphoric acid plant operated by GCT at Skhira, which is located 50 km north of the town of Gabes in mid-eastern Tunisia of iron ore at the Jerissa and the Tamera-Douaria Mines. Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa (CPG) carried out all phosphate mining and fertilizer manufacturing activities in Tunisia.<sup>59</sup>

As discussed in the above situation the industrial distributions in Tunisia were evenly distributed. This situation created regional variations within one state. Especially in terms unemployment, income, value of commodity, and living standards. Groupe Chimique Tunisien (GCT), of Tunisians usually calm political landscape has been disrupted with protests over the higher cost of living, a growing problem across North Africa as global prices rise. Dozens of people were arrested for public disorder and damage to property in the mining town of Redeyef in the south-west in April. Sporadic peaceful protests began in January, according to local reports, over the recruitment policies of state owned Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa, the main employer in the region. “Discontent over high levels of unemployment (which exceed 25% locally, compared with the official national average of 14%).”<sup>60</sup>

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58 <http://www.Freeencyclopaedia.of.tunisia.Geographic.area.com>.3/1/2014

59 <http://www.worldencyclopaediayearbookgeographyofTunisia> retrieved 1/2/2014

60 Country report of Tunisia May 2008

Rising living costs, and a belief among locals that the region has been neglected, spilled over into three days of violent street protests at the start of April. Demonstrators clashed with the police and attacked a police station with stones and petrol bombs. The phosphate mining region around Gafsa is traditionally more militant than other parts of Tunisia, and has particular problems of underdevelopment and deprivation. “But many Tunisians, including those in more prosperous regions, are feeling squeezed by rising food and transport costs, despite government subsidies on food and petrol prices, and further minor outbreaks of social unrest cannot be ruled out”.<sup>61</sup> However, they are unlikely to be serious or widespread enough to undermine the stability of the government.

The unemployment rate also varies by region. “In 2004, the East Central saw the lowest average unemployment (10%). This region is denoted as a diversified region in terms of economic activity and has witnessed dynamic growth in recent years. Areas of high unemployment include the North West (18%) (An agricultural region) and southwest (18%) (a mining area).”<sup>62</sup> Thus, the unemployment rate is strongly correlated with area of residence. Mobility and inter-regional migration has not ameliorated this differential rate of unemployment. However, the effect of internal migration to the region of Tunis is significant since the rate of unemployment in this region is quite high (13.3%) despite the dynamism of its economy. With the exception of the region of Tunis, the job market remains regional in nature. The economic development of Tunis and its surrounding cities causes a large influx of job seekers, including graduates to flock to the capital city

**Problem of Basic Needs & Infrastructure Worsen:-**The availability of affordable housing in Tunisia is important for two reasons. First, like many countries throughout the MENA region, Tunisia is experiencing a demographic youth bulge. This type of shift in the proportion of citizens under the age of 30 places additional stress on a state's ability to meet the basic needs of citizens in this stage of life. This growing young population

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61 Country report profile of Tunisia April 2008

62 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment_rate.html) retrieved 3/1/2014

places high demands on educational institutions, public transportation, and the economic requirements needed for a citizen to transition from adolescence to adulthood (employment, independent living/marriage). As evident from recent events across the region, “a government's inability to cope with such demands often engenders a great deal of resentment toward and disappointment with the state and other agents of authority”.<sup>63</sup> This extends what is often called in the Arab world the "wait hood" period, during which youth, particularly young men, have to wait several years to find employment after they complete their education or training in a particular field. Employment is the crucial first step in enabling young people to begin saving money to cover the expenses of marriage. Housing costs are usually the major expense associated with marriage in North African societies.

“Second, as a result of the moderate and stable GDP growth during the previous years in Tunisia, the cost of living, including the cost of housing, began to rise”.<sup>64</sup> This rise in costs exacerbates the challenge for young people looking to start their lives as independent adults. An increase in the cost of living also places similar pressures on older citizens struggling to maintain their families' existing standard of living

Thus, when Gallup asked Tunisians in 2010 whether they were satisfied with the availability of affordable housing, 41% said yes - a sharp decline from 2009 when 74% shared this view. In addition to housing, Tunisians' satisfaction with other public infrastructure, such as public transportation systems, also experienced a notable decline from 2009 (74%) to 2010 (55%). Tunisians were also less likely in 2010 (50%) than in 2009 (59%) to express satisfaction with the quality of the roads and highways they use.<sup>65</sup>

It is important to note that Tunisia, with a relatively well-educated population when compared to neighboring countries, Tunisia also experienced with expansion of local

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63 <http://www.Abudhabigallupcenter.com> retrieved 12/10/2013

64 <http://www.C:/Users/sagni/Documents/Tunisia%20Analyzing%20the%20Dawn%20of%20the%20Arab%20Spring.htm> retrieved 12/10/2013 65 (www <http://www.Abudhabigallupcenter.com>)retrieved 10/12/2013

Schools and educational institutions in a country which accounts in 2010 (67%) when compared with 2009 (73%). Tunisians grew more negative about other basic services, such as satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare in Ben Ali's last year of rule. In 2010, about one-half (51%) of Tunisians expressed satisfaction with the healthcare to which they had access - a drop from the previous year (71%).<sup>66</sup>

### **2.2.3 Political**

According to Freedom of Human Rights report and Amnesty International report, of Jun, 2008, Under Ben Ali: "In the Name of Security: Routine Abuses in Tunisia, reported "serious human rights violations being committed in connection with the government's security and counterterrorism policies."<sup>67</sup> When the U.S. Congress approved \$12 million in aid for Tunisia, it noted restrictions on political freedom, the use of torture, imprisonment of dissidents, and persecution of journalists and human rights defenders are of concern and progress on these issues is necessary for the partnership between the United States and Tunisia to further strengthen.

**Constitutional Experience of Tunisia:**-At the Beginning of 1839 the Ottoman Empire introduced a number of reforms in government of Tunisia .Tunisia's first modern constitution was the Fundamental Pact of 1857. Following the Fundamental Pact, a commission was set up to draft a real constitution; it was submitted on 17 September 1860 to Muhammad III as-Sadiq, the new Bey after Muhammad II. The constitution came into effect on 26 April 1861. It was the first written constitution in Arab lands. This was followed by the Constitution of 1861, which was not replaced, until after the departure of French administrators in 1956, by the constitution of 1959. It was adopted on 1 June 1959.<sup>68</sup>

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66 <http://Users/sagni/Documents/Tunisia%20Analyzing%20the%20Dawn%20of%20the%20Arab%20Spring.htm>.

67 <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/09/29/freedomofhumanrightc-in-tunisair-during-ben-aliera/#sthash.fHFqDzT1.dpuf>

68 <http://www.Tunisian constitution.com> retrived 2/3/2014.

**The Amended Constitution of Tunisia:-**Tunisian constitution was amended in 1999 and 2002, which was the Tunisian constitutional referendum of 2002. On the reform of the constitution Ben Ali abolished limited presidents to 3 five years exceeds to 4, candidates of presidential from 70 to 75 years, he made life presidency of his predecessor and the president have permanent immunity.<sup>69</sup>

**The 2008 Amended Constitution:-**A package of amendments in 2008, effectively barred presidential candidates. Other elected leaders of political parties who had served at least two years or those who obtained nominations from at least 30 lawmakers or local councillors. Other changes to the electoral system for 2009, “include the lowering of the voting age from 20 to 18 and the raising of the number seats in parliament to be distributed among the opposition on a proportional basis from just under 20% to 25% of the total (from 37 seats to 47, assuming no change in the size of parliament).”<sup>70</sup>

President, elected by universal suffrage, for five-year terms; Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who seized power in November 1987; Mr Ben Ali won presidential elections in April 1989, March 1994, October 1999 and October 2004. Next election was due in 2009. Both before and after the 2009 elections, the authorities cracked down on media outlets and human rights activists to minimize public expressions of dissent. Tunisia is not an electoral democracy. President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali has exercised authoritarian rule since seizing power in 1987. “The president appoints the cabinet, the prime minister, regional governors, and the head of the official election-monitoring organization. Members of the 214-seat Chamber of Deputies are directly elected to serve five-year terms. Of the 126 members of Chamber of Advisors, the upper house of the legislature, 85 are indirectly elected by local officials and 41 are appointed by the president, all for six-year terms.”<sup>71</sup>

To protect his own position, Ben Ali has tried to do two things. First, he has worked to prevent state and party officials from developing into canters of power that they became under Bourguiba. He abolished the office of party director -- a position of considerable

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69(Minister of the interior of Tunisia 2009 and country profile of Tunisia 2009).

70 ibid

71 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/ammendementonconstitution\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/ammendementonconstitution_rate.html) retrived 11/2/2014)

power in the 1970s -- and reduced the autonomy of his ministers. His dismissal of Hedi Baccouche in 1989 demonstrated that Ben Ali has no tolerance for a prime minister who shows any sign of becoming a power in his own right. Throughout his cabinet, Ben Ali has carefully selected individuals who are technically competent but come from non-political backgrounds or lack extensive connections in the ruling party or the state bureaucracy. He is involved in the operations of individual ministries much more deeply than Bourguiba ever was, and he has used frequent cabinet shuffles to prevent ministers from establishing lasting clientele bases. Second, Ben Ali has worked diligently to break the tie between elite and popular politics that was so vital in the 1970s and 1980s. Ill-equipped to play position politics, he has tried to ensure that "civil society" remains unavailable as a political weapon.<sup>72</sup>

According to the above discussion Ben Ali made a constitution as he likes within the term of five years. According to the Reformed constitution, in different time, all powers were concentrated in the hand of one person. Ben Ali ruled Tunisia lonely as he like without any interference and without the consent of Tunisian citizen. Mr Ben Ali;-

- President of Tunisia
- Supreme arbiter of events in the cabinet
- Supreme arbiter of events in the government
- Supreme arbiter of events in the military
- Supreme arbiter of events in the Judiciary

Such action was not to keep the interest of the citizens rather to protect the RCD party and especially to elongate the power of Ben Ali and his family. Furthermore Ben Ali was facilitating the way for his parent's succession until they developed enough political experience.

**Calculation of Succession:-**The Arab countries have also adopted systems of hereditary presidencies; in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Libya there were plans for sons or

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<sup>72</sup>[http://C:/Users/sagni/Documents/Authoritarianism%20and%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Tunisia%20\\_%20Middle%20East%20Research%20and%20Information%20Project.htm](http://C:/Users/sagni/Documents/Authoritarianism%20and%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Tunisia%20_%20Middle%20East%20Research%20and%20Information%20Project.htm)

relatives to inherit the presidency. The process had already taken place in Syria with Bashar the son inheriting the presidency after the death of his father, Hafez, and keeping the old system intact with a single party, the Baath, reigning supreme and crushing the slightest sign of protest and political expression. “In Egypt, trying to similar to Syria, Mubarak’s transfer his power to his sons of Gamal and Hasen, In Libya to Gadhafi’s son of Saif Al-Islam”.<sup>73</sup>

In Tunisia Mr Ben Ali is not expected to face any serious challenges to his rule during the forecast period. Although, apparently in good health, at 73 years of age he is likely to begin to groom successor during his current term in office. Ben Ali has five daughters and one five years old son from two marriages. Family succession would probably be attempted through his son-in-law, Mohammed Sakher Al-Materi, who is married to Nesrine, the daughter of Mr Ben Ali and his second wife. Ben Ali was on the facilitating the way for his son-in-law that is Mr Materies, increasing role in politics. He became a member of the 350 committee of RCD in 2008 and Member of Parliament in 2009.

In other direction, however, family succession would be unpopular within the RCD party. In addition Mr Materi is only 29 years and despite built up a business empire. He is not closely connected to the military security apparatus. “A successor is therefore, more likely to emerge from among the younger generation of the RCD party with the secretary general, Mohammed Gharians, particularly prominent. Generally speaking Mr Ben Ali tried to focussed in between two alternatives.”<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, the people of Tunisia nothing gain any profit from the ruling party, rather they exchange themselves on the governing of the State. The revolutionary wave currently sweeping the Arab world has targeted regimes that use varying levels of repression against their people, and ill-treat the opposition. For example, the regime in Yemen dealt with the opposition through a network of mutual interests, clientele,

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73 Aljazeera English program 8/6/2008 political analysis on reform of Tunisian case.

74 Country profile of Tunisia Jan 200102.

nepotism, and briber and by relying on the loyalty of relatives and complex tribal relationship.

**Freedom of Speech and Media:-**Ben Ali's Repression of the media:-The constitution of Tunisia guaranteed freedom of media and press. In practice it is denied by government's intolerance of criticism. About 170 local Arabic and French language daily newspapers and Magazines are available. Most of them loyal to the government and deeply respectful of the president Ben Ali. The draft law to punish citizens were obstacle to democracy and harm to economy. Following the Oct 2009 election Ben Ali warned that "Any one spreading lies to damage the country's image" would be prosecuted.<sup>75</sup>

The government suppress dissident media by crossing a recently established opposition Radio station that broad cast over the internet and by banning a number of opposition publication. The online station Radio Kalima, Tunisia's only independent Radio station was founded by Sihema Bensedrine, a founding member of conseil National Pourles Liberte's en Tunisie an unauthorised civil rights group in order to provide an independent voice in the revolution up to the legislative and presidential elections in Oct. A Vienna – based International Press Institution IPI says that, "Tunisian Journalists who are to criticise the regime face imprisonment, physical attack and harassment."<sup>76</sup> To support this idea, For example Taoufik BenBrik jailed for 6 month after he wrote a satirical mock interview in which the president, Zen al-Abidine Ben Ali talked of alleged nepotism, corruption and repression of political opponents.

Reports without Borders notes that, about Ben Ali's regime obsessive in its control of news and information. Journalists and human rights activists are the target of bureaucratic harassment, police violence and constant surveillance by the intelligence services. Control of the Internet has been stepped up in the past year. And visiting foreign

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<sup>75</sup> Country profile on Tunisian report April 2009.

<sup>76</sup> Country profile on Tunisian report July 2010

journalists are constantly accompanied by an official from the Tunisian Agency for External Communication. As an ally of the west in its fight against terrorism, Ben Ali is nonetheless treated very leniently by international organizations.<sup>77</sup>

Tunisia has one of the worst media environments in the Arab world. Despite constitutional guarantees and a press law that promise freedom of expression, the government uses an array of legal, penal, and economic measures to silence dissenting voices. Libel and defamation are criminal offenses, and journalists also risk punishment under laws against disturbing public order. Only a handful of private television and radio stations have received licenses, including one owned by the president's son-in-law that was launched in 2009. "Government-approved media regularly feature praise of Ben Ali and his associates, and criticism of the president is not tolerated."<sup>78</sup>

Tunisian journalists in 2009 were detained, physically assaulted, fired from their jobs, prevented from leaving the country, and subjected to seemingly arbitrary police surveillance. More than 100 Tunisian journalists live in exile, according to Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. "The authorities monitor foreign media, denying accreditation to critical journalists, and foreign publications or reporters can be seized or expelled if they offend the government. Ahead of the 2009 elections, the Qatar-based satellite television station Al-Jazeera was the target of a smear campaign, and its Tunisia-based correspondent was denied accreditation."<sup>79</sup>

Stations that operate without approval via satellite or internet broadcasts face severe repression. For example, in January 2009 the authorities shut down the independent radio station Kalima soon after it began broadcasting via satellite, arresting or detaining several of its employees and confiscating materials from its offices. In February, three journalists for the London-based satellite television station Al-Hiwar al-Tounissi were arrested and charged with working for an "illegal station," according to the Observatoire pour la

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77 ibd

78 <http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofmediarate.html> retrieved 3/2/2014

79 Canadian Journalist for free Expression 2009 report on Tunisian freedom of press

Liberte de Presse, d'Edition et de Creation. "The government bans access to an array of internet sites dealing with topics like democracy and human rights, and opposition media websites are often defaced. Social-networking and video-sharing sites like Face book and YouTube were intermittently blocked during 2009. Online journalists and bloggers are routinely monitored, harassed, and arrested. The Committee to Protect Journalists has ranked Tunisia among the 10 worst places to be a blogger."<sup>80</sup>

**Freedom of Political Party:-**Opposition parties that are genuinely independent of state influence are weak and have almost no role in the formation of public policy. The state strictly monitors and severely curbs their activities. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, "the Ettajdid party's weekly, *Ettarik al-Jadid*, was seized by officials on October 10, 2009, on the grounds that it published presidential candidate Ahmed Brahim's campaign platform before the official start of campaigning on October 11. However, the newly printed edition had not been scheduled to be distributed until that date"<sup>81</sup>

Catherine Petersson is a political analysis on Mediterranean politics stated about Tunisian political party ; the RCD party had a small input in politics. "Ben Ali and the RCD controlled so much of the politics and economics of the country that none of the other parties would have successfully (hypothetically) been able to run the country independently. Under Ben Ali labour unions were also severely restricted. The only union, the UGTT, was at first in opposition to the regime, but the leaders where replaced after time by the regime. Ennahda, the most supported opposition group by the population was banned in the early 1990s."<sup>82</sup>

Ben Ali allowed elections to take place but he controlled which parties could participate. Any true opposition to his rule was not allowed and such parties were banned. King a political analysis on Meddle East region supported the idea of Catherine Petersson. He discusses this phenomenon, which is seen similarly throughout the Middle East and North African region. "The previous president of Tunisia ruled in a complete authoritarian

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80 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofcivilliberty\\_rate.htmlretrived11/2/2014](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/freedomofcivilliberty_rate.htmlretrived11/2/2014)

81 [http://www.indexmund.com/tunisia/freedomofcivillibertyrate.htmretrived\\_12/10/2013](http://www.indexmund.com/tunisia/freedomofcivillibertyrate.htmretrived_12/10/2013)82 <http://www.politicalfreedomofTunisiaunderBenali.com> retrieved 12/10/ 2013).

style, while Ben Ali took over and made reforms that did not benefit the country, and even negatively impacted the people.”<sup>83</sup>

King termed this style of setting up a façade of democracy where the single party rule is supported by the multiparty system and the elections are corrupt “new authoritarianism”. This was a way to make Tunisia appear more liberal and democratic. Ben Ali has always publicly advocated strong human rights values and held elections to legitimize his rule, when from inside the state much of the way he consolidated his power violated the citizens’ human rights. He has been known to publicly speak out for human rights issues such as freedom of speech among other things, when speaking abroad, but in his home country what he said was not reflected in what he did.

One example of this is the fact that he advocated freedom of religion and religious tolerance, while at the same time the repression of any political Islam has been a major threat to any true democracy. Also, he amended the constitution to be able to re-run for president, which promotes the view that Tunisia under Ben Ali was just a façade of democracy. For example, “Ben Ali changed the maximum age for presidency from 70 years to 75 years to be able to run in the last elections. He had claimed to abolish presidency for life but what was done in reality”.<sup>84</sup>

Generally however, Ben Ali made sure that all real opposition parties were banned, making them illegal, only loyal party encouraged, so that when elections came around Ben Ali and the RCD were the only viable option of the parties and presidential candidates to vote for. This was because the other candidates were not in true opposition.

**Anti Terrorism Law:-**Anti terrorism law acted in 2003 aftermath of a terrorist attack on a Synagogue in Jerb the previous years that left 21 people dead, including 15 German and France tourists. This law applied on opposition parties rather on terrorist group. It was too broad and vague, leading to arrests without solid evidence of acts of Terrorism. Internal opposition to the regime will also be suppressed by this law without evidence. Under this

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83 King, and Murphy 2011

84 King, Sanchez, Brown and Catherine Petersson 2011 and The Constitution of Tunisia, 1975, article 40

law about 2,000 up to 4,000 people have been detained, but the government says that does not exceed 400. According to the press reported by the Economic Intelligence Unit suggested that, “at least 86 people were jailed on terror charges in 2008 and 56 in 2009 with a further 19 jailed so far in 2010.”<sup>86</sup>

The fight against terrorism was often used as an argument for limiting freedom of expression, especially for banning political Islam. This argument was even used to crack down on peaceful dissent, showing that the government used pretexts that were not relevant for the freedoms it repressed. Mysterious disappearance and arbitrary imprisonment had been techniques used to hush those in opposition that were at rue threat to the regime. Many politicians in opposition to the regime were imprisoned or sent into exile, which goes against international standards, specifically the convention on forced disappearance.

The current president Moncef Mazouki spent many years in exile, due to the fact that he was a human rights activist, as well as Rached Ghannouchi the leader of Ehnnaahda, a moderately Islamist party with a plurality of seats in the constituent assembly. Ayeb points out that, “while trying to suppress terrorism from radical Islamist groups, the state had succeeded in suppressing Muslim opposition parties and any Muslim political parties.”<sup>87</sup>

According, Catherine Petersson a political analysis of Mediterranean region stated that, opposition, even moderate Islam groups. In fact any opposing views were severely repressed, from individuals or groups, and the media was silenced in its ability to report on relevant issues. A lot of the media merely acted as a propaganda outlet for Ben Ali and his regime. The police force was significant in acting as a repressor of the people, using torture as a method to extract information. As a result, by aiming to suppress terrorism the Tunisian state had effectively become the terrorist of its own people.

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86 Country Report profile on Tunisian July 2010 pp 27

87 BBC News Africa, 2009, 12<sup>th</sup> December, Retrieved 2013, Nov, 27<sup>th</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16149119>

Similar to that other political analysis support the idea of King, Ayeb a political analysis of Meddle East considers the fact that, “ the Tunisian regime had closed down any forum for debate to be an important factor that both minimized terrorism to a negligible level but also created a strong will in the people to fight for change. There was no room for freedom of expression what so ever.”<sup>88</sup>

According to the above explanation and political analysis Tunisia under Ben Ali practised domination of one party rule and get in to a serious suppression of basic human right and democratic right of Tunisians. By using of police and security forces supress the citizen in favour of RCD party and personality of Ben Ali and his Families.

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88 Catherine Petersson 2011

## **Methodology**

The researcher used both qualitative and quantitative data selecting system. The reason for using both forms of data collecting system was that they provides a better understanding of a research problem and used to mix data in a single study or in a multiphase serious of studies. Furthermore the researcher used Narrative procedure from qualitative approach to describe the practices and the contribution of Ben Ali and Bourguiba to their country. Quantitatively In fraternal procedure by scoring data and by assigning numeric codes depends up on information from different reports like that of World Bank, Central Bank of Tunisian and other reports.

Mainly the researcher focused on different written materials by scholars and political analysis about 2010 Tunisian uprising of Articles, African Union and different human right society's reports to the UN, and an individual interview with concerned bodies. Based on this, the researcher made an attempt to address the root causes, consequences, expansion and implication of Tunisian uprising to other Arab states.

The researcher further used selecting purpose full qualitative sampling method, selected an interviewer from Tunisia Embassy, Arab league representatives in Africa, AU Peace and Security Council department, citizen of those Northern African Arab states and other personality who concerned to Arab cases were part of these studies. The main reason to selected this method was to obtain detailed information about a Tunisia uprising and they had a detailed understanding of the uprising of Tunisia 2010.

The data for this research had already came from Library and on line articles of different political analysts, world Bank annual reports, African Development Bank Annual reports, Economic Intelligence Unit which prepared by AU, Reports of CNN, BBC, Aljazeera English Language programme and Different Websites which written on the Arab uprising of 2010 were the main source and part of this research.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3. Data Analysis and Interpretation

#### 3.1 Unfair Distribution of Wealth

In Tunisia the majority of the economic resources of the country were owned by the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan (Trabelsi is Ben Ali's wife's family). Fifty (50%) of Tunisian businesses were owned by Ben Ali and Trabelsi family. Reforms made the country to be privatised and encouraging economic growth, however the government companies which privatised were being connected to the ruling party. Another problem caused was nepotism, to get anywhere in politics one had to have connections to Ben Ali's family. In a sense people have said "it was the Ben Alis and Trabelsis who ruled Tunisia, and even referred to them as a royal family."<sup>89</sup>

El Materi holding within under five years, he has accumulated ownership of a Vehicle distributor, Ennakl (which has the Volkswagen, Audi and Renault Trucks Franchise and now the official supplier to the Tunisian government), a concession to operate a terminal serving cruise ships in La Goulette, in the port of Tunis; an Islamic Radio station, Zitouna FM, a controlling share in Tunisian's biggest –circulation newspaper, Dar Assabah; and interests in pharmaceuticals and real estate. Other projects Tunisian first onshore Islamic Bank (not for the purpose of religion but in the banner of religion to hold a political power), Banque Zitouna, which were opened in the first half of 2010 with a capital of USD\$30 million and USD\$ 50 million Tourist village alongside the course-ship terminal in La Goulette<sup>90</sup>

According to the above discussion the main problem of Tunisians were economic, social and political, even if the majority of population were unable to feed themselves. But, in

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89 <http://nepotism and corruption of ben ali and trabelsi family of Tunisia> retrieved 8/3/2014

90 Country Report, July, 2010

other direction the leaders and the relatives of the leaders were controlled the state property, they monopolized the trade like that of big shapes, super markets, import export trades, car manufactured and assemblers, hotels, and in every aspects. The accumulation of this and others aggravated the people of Tunisia against to the government of Ben Ali.

### **3.2 Corruption**

The most common definition of corruption is:--An inappropriate behaviour or abuse of authority for personal gain by public officials-Guilty of dishonesty especially involving bribery-The abuse of public office for private gain”.<sup>91</sup> etc...are among definition which given by different scholars. In genera corruption is a serious transgression against public morality. It could also be said that corruption is lack of financial, moral and intellectual integrity in business transactions

In the case of Tunisia corruption is closely related with behaviour or abuse of authority for personal gain were the most practiced. Such action was expressed in different ways, by the majority of leaders especially by Ben Ali and his Wife Trabelsi families. Among the most known corruption action were discussed as follows.

Tunis Air, a famous Tunisian State Aviation Company, was affected by illegal deals, trickery, favouritism, and the abuse of power by the family of former President Ben Ali. Indeed, corruption and nepotism were lurking in all sectors of the former regime, especially in the public sector. Following Tunisia's revolution, however, many oppressed employers broke their silence, unveiling appalling conditions and transgressions. As a consequence, many cases of corruption and nepotism became public. Alongside others, Abdelmlek Laarif, Tunisair's former Chief Executive Officer, was allegedly involved in corrupt deals. In 2008, he created Karthago Airlines, now in large part owned by Leila Ben Ali's brother, Belhsan Trabelsi. Supposedly, Laarif provided free and unlimited services to the Trabelsi family, while the latter gave him benefits in return. Employers

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91 Peters, 2004

state that the company afforded the purchase of Ben Ali's personal plane, which costed around £60 Billion. Free travels for the family were also provided.”<sup>92</sup>

Other cases of corruption involved former executives of the company that spent huge amounts of money on their children's education. For example, Tunis air paid for the pilot training of corruption-in Tunisia durind benaliera Mokhtar Tlili's son, which coasted millions. Tlili was responsible for the federation of transportation of Tunisia's trade union canter UGTT and had strong connections to Tuni sair. Employers in Tunis air are fed up with injustices, hoping for the enforcement of law and order within all sectors of the company.

Colin Freeman a political analysis stated on his articles "[Tunisia's](#) First Family". To the people they ruled over, though, president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his clan were known as "The Mafia" - a ruling clique whose greed and nepotism ultimately caused their downfall. Following in the footsteps of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin and numerous other deposed dictators. Mr Ben Ali was granted refuge in Saudi Arabia, starting what will likely be a comfortable, if less than dignified, political retirement.

As millions of Tunisians celebrated the end of his 23-year-long authoritarian rule, it was not just the 74-year-old president they were glad to see the back of. “Far more the property of state and corrupted exercised was more associated with Lila a wife of president disturbed the life of state. She was living a feisty brunette more than 20 years his junior, she was dubbed "The Regent of Carthage" for her power behind the throne”.<sup>93</sup> A former hairdresser from a humble background, she stands accused of using her marriage to Mr Ben Ali to turn her family, the Trabelsis, into the desert nation's most powerful business clique. As of Saturday night, the former first couple were keeping a low profile.

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92 <http://www.tunisia-live.net2011>retrived 22/4/2014

93 <http://www.trabalsi> family of Tunisia profile.com

All President Ben Ali's power and wealth became concentrated in the family, and especially that of his wife. Other politician Said Saad Djebbar, an Arab political analyst expressed about the Ben Ali's family released on his articles of "Tunisian corruption under Ben Ali stated as follows." "He was so arrogant that he undermined his own power base, alienating supporters in the party and the business community."<sup>94</sup>

In public, the country's First Lady had styled herself as one of the Arab world's most progressive female politicians, heading charitable foundations and espousing feminism and women's rights. But critics say that behind the scenes, she pursued an acquisitive agenda that saw her widely-likened to Imelda Marcos of the Philippines

Other report on Tunisian corruption was from Wiki leaks stated that;-Few such criticisms ever emerged in Tunisia's tame and highly-censored media. Much of property which is owned by members of the ruling family. But the government could not prevent Tunisians getting access on the internet. Wiki leaks reports, in which former US ambassador Robert F. Godec penned several vivid snapshots of the elite's pampered lifestyle. He described the astonishing opulence of a lunch date at the house of Mohamed Sakher El Materi, a billionaire businessman who is the president's son-in-law. This guy was sitting in a beachfront compound decorated with Roman artifacts, Mr Godec noted that ice cream and frozen yogurt had been flown from St Tropez, and that his host kept a pet tiger in a cage - a habit also shared by Saddam Hussein's late son, Uday.

When many ordinary Tunisians struggled to even find jobs, he later noted, it was hardly surprising that such bling lifestyles did not endear the ruling family to their subjects. "President Ben Ali's extended family is often cited as the nexus of Tunisian corruption," Mr Godec wrote in a cable to Washington. "Ben Ali's wife, Leila Ben Ali, and her extended family - the Trabelsis - provoke the greatest ire from Tunisians. Along with the numerous allegations of Trabelsi corruption are often barbs about their lack of education, low social status, and conspicuous consumption."<sup>95</sup>

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94 Said, 2010

95 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/Tunisian-President-Zine-el-Abidine-Ben-Ali-and-his-familys-Mafia-r>

While some of the complaints about the Trabelsi clan seem to emanate from a disdain for their nouveau riche inclinations, Tunisians also argue that the Trabelsis' strong arm tactics and flagrant abuse of the system make them easy to hate. The peoples on the demonstrators in the town of Hammamet, an up-market resort on Tunisia's Mediterranean coast, attacked luxury villas identified as belonging to members of the president's extended clan. At one mansion, looters filmed themselves on mobile phones as they gleefully set fire to top-of-the-range sports utility vehicles and did wheelies on motorbikes across pristine lawns.

According to Human Right Watch report of 2011 indicated that, local security forces had even suggested they loot the Trabelsi mansions rather than attack the police station. Since then, rioters have turned their attentions to the Trabelsi's business empire, looting shops and supermarkets identified as belonging to them. There are, no shortage of potential targets. Leila's brother Belhassen alone is said to own an airline, several hotels, two of Tunisia's private radio stations, and a car assembly plant. As Ambassador Godec noted, many foreign investors found it hard to operate in the country without giving a cut of their business to member of the ruling family. The McDonalds burger chain - not often hailed as the champion of ethical business practice - lost the chance of a franchise in Tunisia because of its refusal to grant it to someone with "family connections".

The above expression shows that, Just how much of their empire the Trabelsi family able to hold on to now that their chief patron has gone remains to be seen. The president himself is said to have a personal fortune of around £3.5 billion pounds. Tunisia's old colonial ruler, France, said it had taken steps to ensure "suspicious financial movements" through its financial system would be blocked. Meanwhile, Ben Ali's son-in-law, Mr Materi, was said to have holed up in a £300-a-night VIP suite at hotel at Disneyland Paris, along with his wife Nesrine, 24, and other hangers-on. Four Tunisian bodyguards

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96 ibid

were said to be camped in the hotel lobby. "The Tunisian Embassy in Paris was the first place they stayed, but when expat Tunisians started demonstrating outside they decided to move out to Disneyland," said a source at the theme park. "The problem is that the entourage is so large that people started to notice them immediately. The women are dressed in designer clothes and look like princesses, covered in expensive jewellery, and Mercedes limousines are coming and going all the time."<sup>97</sup> In any case, they may not be able to stay much longer. The French government spokesman said "members of the former ruling family were not welcome on French soil and should leave all their property which holds in corrupt way from soil of France". This shows that how much these families corrupted and even their allies were hatted by their practice.

### **3.3 Unemployment**

Unemployment is defined as, when people are without work and actively seeking work or joblessness occurs (Oxford dictionary English language 9<sup>th</sup> edition 2008). In Tunisia the number of jobless people mostly the youth citizen's decreased for few years. Difficult to say decreased because the variation was in few numbers in last consecutive of four years of Ben Ali's regime the unemployment was increased.

The figures of unemployment varies from 15.7% in 2000, to 14.2% in 2005, 14.3% in 2006, 14.6% in 2007, 14.1% in 2008, 18.1 in 2009 and 18.8% in 2010. According to 2010 figures of unemployment rate Tunisia shows that, Jobless at around 500,000 up 6000,000 of whom about one half were under 25 years. Over 20% among university graduates were unemployment.<sup>98</sup>

The figures indicate (Table 4) how much Tunisians youth suffered economically. In addition to those the number of unemployment were vary among regions. The prosperous North were better than the under develop Interior and south of the Tunisian regions. Finally from those high numbers of unemployment region of youth population the movement of revolution was started.

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97 ibid

98 Banque central de Tunisian report annuel 2010

The unemployment was not the only reason to the revolution of Tunisia of 2010 but additional factors for revolutions.

The employed population aged 15 and over reached 3,155,400 in 2008 rising from 2,552,700 in 2000, an increase of 2.6% per year (see Table 5). The accumulation of net new jobs recorded during the period (2001-2007) has reached 532,400 which equal an average of 76,000 jobs per year. The net creation of jobs for young people who have benefited from higher education reached 179,200 during the period 2001-2007, an average of 26,000 jobs per year. The national unemployment rate (calculated among workers aged 15 and over) showed a net decline from 16% in 1999 to 14.2% in 2008. The evolution of the unemployment rate by gender shows that it has declined among men from 15.6% in 1999 to 12.6% in 2008, while it increased among women from 17.2 % in 1999 to 18.6% in 2008.<sup>98</sup>

Over the past two decades, the educational characteristics of the unemployed have changed dramatically (see Table 4). The most important phenomenon reported in 2008 is the high unemployment rate for those who have more than a primary education. Unemployment has become particularly endemic for those with higher education, which is a change from earlier years. The unemployment rate for an individual with higher education has risen from 3.8 % in 1994 to 21.6% in 2008. This is the opposite of the trend for those with less education.

Those with either a primary education only who are illiterate have seen their unemployment rates drop in the past 15 years. However, this may largely be an artefact of the increase in education among youth. Since the illiterate and primary educated are predominately older workers, the inverse correlation between education and age may make the positive relationship between schooling and unemployment look more severe than it truly is. This topic will be explored further when we examine data from 2010<sup>99</sup>

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98 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat & Enquête Nationalesurl' Emploi INS

99 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat & Enquête Nationalesurl' Emploi INS

Graduates Unemployment from higher institutions were First, the university system has continued to train implicitly for the sector of employment in the public sector, which rewards the school level even if accumulated degrees do not improve productivity. Second, job seekers continue to be attracted by the benefits of non-wage public sector such as job security and holidays. These applicants are willing to wait long for their turn to become an official, or leave their jobs in the private sector to apply for employment in the public sector. Finally, these job seekers have job expectations too optimistic, while their actual qualifications do not correspond to the demands of the private sector.<sup>100</sup>

In Tunisia, unemployment is essentially a youth issue (see Table 5). In 2008, the unemployment rate for the age groups below 30 years was nearly 30% that is twice the overall unemployment rate. This situation is typical of countries where the school system and training is not related to the economic environment. Keep in mind that unemployment is largely an issue of search frictions. It is not a lack of jobs, but rather a mismatch between labour market entrant expectations and firm needs that cause persistent unemployment.

Due to the factors cited above, graduates expect wage and benefit packages that are not in consort with the realities of the jobs being created by the private sector. This lack of being able to find 'suitable' employment leads to long unemployment spells upon labour market entry. Note that unemployment rates among 25-29 year olds has increased from 12.6 % in 1984 to 25.2% in 2008. During this time all other groups have seen relatively flat or falling unemployment rates.<sup>101</sup>

From a macroeconomic perspective, it is interesting to examine to what extent the observed unemployment rates are linked to the economic growth. Thus,

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100 Abdelaziz Ben Sedrine, Halleb& Said, 2006

101 Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004) / Enquête Nationalesurl' Emploi (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) INS).

the calculation of the elasticity of unemployment in relationship with the GDP shows that the latter is significant but weak. This elasticity also reflects a positive response of the labour market to a change in aggregate demand. Indeed, GDP growth of 1% was associated with an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.2%, 0.2% and 0.1% for age groups 15-19, 20-24 ,and 25 -29 years.

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies Vol. In14, September 2012 there are 402 Several structural reforms have served to boost the economy, bringing the non-farm average growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) more than 5% per annum over the last decade. However, the unemployment rate remains high. This is partly explained by a high growth rate of the labour force (nearly 2% per year), but also by reducing the number of jobs that are created for a certain level of economic growth. For example, in the early 90s with an increase of 1% of GDP in the service sector has been associated with employment growth of 1.1%. In the late 90s, only half of the jobs have been created for the same level of increase of GDP.<sup>102</sup>

Job creation has increased by 2.8% between 2004 and 2005 and only 0.1% between 2005 and 2006. This helped reduce the coverage of the additional demand of 1.5% during 2004 and 2005 and 2.5% between 2005 and 2006. These modest results may also be explained by the privatization of public enterprises, the upgrading and the decline in the volume of investments. A downturn which has affected all sectors and especially the manufacturing industry, in fact the privatization of public enterprises and the upgrade may also explain these results School-to-work transition.<sup>103</sup>

The current situation of youth in Tunisia can be characterized as follows. A long initial educational period (with more youth spending more time in education) which corresponds to a trend prior to the onset of difficulties in integrating young people into the labour market. The additional time spent in school is in response to the higher

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102 Tunisian Ministry of Employment and Youth Vocational Integration of Tunisia and World Bank, 2008

103 Central Bank of Tunisia, Annual Bulletin, 2007

Wages generally associated with higher degrees. The direct consequence of this process is an elevated level of training: more and more young people are becoming increasingly educated in order to avoid a bad labour market and in hopes of obtaining one of the few good jobs for more educated graduates.

For example, the number of higher education students reached 342,000 in 2006-2007, up from 43,700 in 1987-1988. These values imply a significant improvement in the rate of enrolment in higher education, from 6% in 1987 to 34.6% in 2007. According to forecasts, this growth is expected to continue during the current decade, reaching its peak in 2014 with 449,000 students. Thus, the number of graduates has almost doubled between 2001 and 2006 from 24,500 to 52,300 graduates registering of an average annual growth rate.<sup>104</sup>

**Youth Unemployment in 2010:-** The following section uses micro data from the 2010 Labour Force Survey to estimate the conditions of the Tunisian labour market leading up to the protests of late 2010. The Tunisian labour force survey collected data on education, employment and other demographic factors. According to these figures, the labour market for young, educated Tunisians had continued to deteriorate from the situation at the end of 2008.

The Tunisian youth and adult unemployment rates by education level, as seen in earlier discussion, youth having higher unemployment rates than adults. Using the definition of youth preferred by the World Bank (15-24), (see Table 6) stated that young people have unemployment rates that are between two and four times the unemployment rate for adults. For example, illiterate young men have an unemployment rate (19.2%) that is 4.27 times that of adult men (4.5%). Only groups that experience high unemployment at all ages (such as women with a higher education) have a smaller ratio of youth to adult unemployment. Young women with a higher education have an unemployment rate of 64.5%, which is still more than twice that of women that are over

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104 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment_rate.html) retrieved 126/2014

25 (30.7%) Comparing this statistics with the overall trends presented earlier, it is clear that although the youth are more than proportionately affected by unemployment, that unemployment for more educated<sup>105</sup>

Tunisian jobless are occurring for both youth and adults. The unemployment rate for adult men with a higher education is four times higher than the average unemployment rate for those with higher education back in the 1980s (see tables 4 and 6). Thus, while the youth have experienced the highest levels of unemployment, it is clear that the demand for college graduates is simply not keeping pace with the increased supply of educated workers in the past decade.

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105 [http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/tunisia/unemployment_rate.html)

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4. The out Break of Arab Uprising

#### 4.1 Definitions of Key Terms

**Arab** means, a number of Semitic people originally from the Arabians peninsula and surrounding territories who speaks Arabic and who inhabits much of the Middle East and the Northern Arabia.<sup>106</sup>

**Maghreb** means an Arabic term which means WEST that is region of North West Africa comprising the Atlas mountain and the coast lands of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.<sup>107</sup>

**MENA region** is countries which are found in Middle East and North Africa they are rich in oil economy and others are scarce resources in relation to their population.<sup>108</sup>

**Uprising:-** Uprising is, sometimes limited popular revolt against a constituted government or its policies, the act or an instance of rising or rising up. An uprising is, Organized opposition to authority; a conflict in which one faction tries to wrest control from another.<sup>109</sup> An Uprising is an open clash between two opposing groups (or individuals); the harder the conflict the more glorious the triumph. An uprising is a popular rising against authority or for some common purpose.(The oxford English dictionary.(2005), volume one 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, UK).

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106 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (2000) Fourth Edition 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company Updated in, 2009

107 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (2000) Fourth Edition 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company Updated in, 2009

108 National Geographic Association

109 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (2000) Fourth Edition 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company Updated in, 2009).

## **Arab spring**

The Arab Spring (Arabic: **ربيع عايرلا** ar-rabi' al-'ooarabiy; also known as the Arabic rebellions or the Arab revolutions) is revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests occurring in the Arab world, that began on 18 December 2010. It was sparked by the first protests that occurred in Tunisia and expanded to Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and other Arab countries.<sup>110</sup>

Depend up on the above definition of terms the uprising uses for general, but Arab spring used for the event that occurred in relation to Arabian states in 2010 the people opposed the government. The two terms are not as such as different in their basic definition so, we can use inter changeably.

When we discuss about Arab uprising we can say many things about the causes and its consequences. According to some writers and political analysers even if the revolution was started in Tunisia the process and the cause of revolution of each state are different. Arab states are the leading stats in the world by their natural resources of petroleum, natural gas, and oil production. In addition to this, North African Arab like that of Tunisia are the leading states in Agricultural products, textile manufacturing, Iron and phosphate mining and Tourism sectors. From those all wealth of the state's citizen did not benefited rather the wealth of stats were in the hand of few leaders and their relatives, in countries like that of Egypt and Tunisia the wealth was not equally distributed to citizens, rather the wealth was in addition to the hand of leaders monopolised by Western capitalist companies.

This is among the reason to upraise the mass population against their leaders. The life conditions of Tunisians were suffered a lot from rest of Arabian states. These problems finally lead to the outbreak of Arab spring first appeared in Tunisia at the end season of Spring of December 17/2010.

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110 <http://ww.definition of Arab spring .com>

The cause for Tunisian Arab spring was not only the problem which stated at the above internal problem of unevenly distributed of wealth, but also there are another problems externally encouraged the Tunisians for upraised, among those factors we can divided in to internal and external.

### **Internal Factors**

- Lack of housing, long period of waiting to form family, Poverty and unemployment
- Unequal distribution of wealth -The rise up of the value of commodity
- Lack of transportation -Unequal access to education & weak curricula
- Lack of political participation and involvement in public service

### **External Factors**

- Terrorist activity in Maghreb region -Worldwide economic crisis of 2010
- Interference's of Western powers in Tunisian politics through investment.
- The rise of Fundamentalist Muslim politics in Tunisia and - Anti terrorism operation in Tunisia -secret pressure of Western to protect their interest in Tunisia

Neighbouring Arab states as International Level by USA and Western powers antagonized the fundamentalist Muslims group of Tunisians. This caused Tunisians leaders lost popularity from the Enhad party and most Muslims. Those all conditions came after 1980's onward when Tunisia shifted from Socialism to Western powers and she joined the UMA (Arab Maghreb Union) in 1989. Tunisia clearly joined the West during the cold war after Anwar Sadat became head quarter of Arab League. These and others factors of Tunisian aligned of Western powers and finally Tunisia became the protector of Western inserts in the Mediterranean region. Gradually Tunisia became the military stationed of USA operation against terrorism operation of Al-Qaida. From that time onward Terrorism has also targeted the country. "In 2002 an explosion of outside a

Synagogue on Jerba killed 21 civilians and other military means and wounded 20 others.”<sup>111</sup>

In such all relations of Tunisia’s government with Western powers and redundancy of terrorism attacked, the mass population they began to ask the government for reform in internal problem and external problems of the country. But, the response of the government was suppressed the citizens who asked any question of social, economic, and political rights. These internal and external factors antagonised the mass and finally led to upraised against to the government by addressing their problem. The mass population of Tunisia flow as a flood throughout the region in Dec 18/2010 after the youth Tunisian guys immolated himself in front of municipal of the city of highly unemployed.

#### **4.2 The Beginning of Arab Spring in Tunisia**

Mohammed Bouazizi is a 26 years old young trying to support his family by selling fruits and vegetables in the central towns of Sidi Bouzid, the police women of municipal arrested him and asked a bribe for returned back of his fruits. Many times he asked the administrator for returning his fruits but no one respond him the aggravated guy of Mohammed douses himself in paint tinnier and sets himself on fire in front of municipal office. This condition was aggravated the youth of Sidi Bouzid town. In the next day many unemployment youth make a demonstration by supporting of the idea of Mohammed and they ask a job opportunity for them.

The response of the government was not positive; rather the police killed and arrested many youths. This news disseminated throughout Tunisia. Starting from that time onwards unemployed youth and the majority of Tunisians citizens make a mass demonstration in every corner of the country by opposing the government. The demonstrators first in Sidi Bouzid town but gradually expanded to other towns like that of Menzel Bouzaience, Al Ragab, Miknassi, kairouan, Sfax, Ben Guerdane, towns. The government of Tunisia brutally killed and arrested many Tunisians. At this time, the question of demonstrators changed from reform to change of

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111 Phillip c. Naylor2009

government and general revolution as far as the demonstrators going ahead they get in to a serious clash with police and government security forces. Many people's killed, arrested and torched by government security forces and police.<sup>112</sup>

During the Arab Uprising appeared in Tunisia the mass population make a demonstration by asking the government to make a Reform on the following;

- The authorities respect their rights as citizen rather than arrogantly infantilizing them us subordinate
- A life of dignity rather than one defined by humiliating condescension and Oppression by the security forces and public authorities
- Equality in access to resources and opportunities in steady of clientele rewards for compliance
- Rule of law in place of both despotic rule and special privileges for the elites
- The right to participate in the global trend toward prosperity, progress, education and democratic participation
- Improving the life standards of the citizen,
- The government minimizing the rise up of value of commodity
- The government makes a solution on the problem of unemployment etc...<sup>113</sup>

The Ben Ali government response was increasing his brutality, besides of youth many Tunisians increased their opposition to leave the government and regime change. The security force of Ben Ali continued to arrest the demonstrators. This response was more aggravated the all citizens of Tunisia and neighbouring state of Arabians especially Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt. This event changed the history of Tunisia and the whole Arab states and became turning points for all Arab and became the revolution of others. From that time on wards Egyptians, followed the footstep of Tunisia and the

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112 [www.giga-hamburg-de/giga-focus](http://www.giga-hamburg-de/giga-focus) retrieved 12/2/2014)

113 ibid

Arab spring expanded throughout the Arabian states and still going on in the few states of Arabians.<sup>114</sup>

Any form of protest against the government, in Tunisia at previous time successfully oppressed by government and kept silent and protests would be jailed for such actions. For example, “Hundreds of unemployed demonstration in Redeyef in 2008”<sup>115</sup> In case 2010 the government could not oppress easily like that of the earlier period because of the life situation in Tunisia hits all citizens throughout the provinces and the accumulation of three decades of social and political unrest of the mass populations became the main cause for Arab Spring that first appeared in Tunisia and the masses joined to the revolution.

As a result all citizens of Tunisia; The Elite, politicians, Lawyers, Business men’s, the majority of Tunisians internally and externally participated on the demonstration against the government for that matter Tunisians shows one sounds for their government and for the rest of the world. This condition was gradually become out of the control of government.

According to Stephen Rosiny a political analysis of German Institute of Global and Area studies research centre stated that; This condition frustrates the people and many Tunisians join to the revolution and the opposition were more expanded throughout the countries’ province like that of “Tunis, Gafsa province, Jendouba province, Zaghouan province, city of Thala provincial town near to Algerian state. Finally the government made many promise to the people to make a reform and a promise of other reforms. But, the people of Tunisia did not return back in a simply way of promises which get by the

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114 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timelineretrieved11/12/2013>).

115 (Aljazeera English Reports of Dec 21 2010 Qatar retrieved 7/2/2014 )

Government”.<sup>116</sup> At the conclusion the government of Tunisia fled from the country to Saudi Arabia. This revolution was not yet limited in Tunisia rather expanded to other states of Northern African Arab states like that of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt specially states of Egypt and Libya.

### **4.3 The Spread of Arab Spring**

In Tunis and Yemen when the Arab springs (the social revolution) started in the peripheral cities among the deprived classes, and then moved to the main cities where it was picked up by the middle classes. Others see what is happening in the Arab countries, especially in Tunisia, is very similar to what took place in Eastern Europe after the dictatorships downfall and onset of the democratic transition period. Youths in revolt targeted the weak and strong points of the regime at the same time, i.e. the security services which began to crumble in the face of the youths' resolve, and the main symbols and headquarters of the ruling party, i.e. the Communist Party in power in Eastern Europe at the time.

Calling the revolutions that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere ‘a revolution’ in the singular launches an argument on several levels, including their outcome in each of these countries, their impact on the Arab world as a whole and attitudes vis-à-vis these revolutions. The revolutions' supporters say that “they are indeed ‘a revolution’ and an Arab Spring, and believe that they have already made progress towards a democratic transition. Moreover, despite the potential threat of a counter coup, of degeneration into chaos and of a return to authoritarianism, these achievements could lay the ground for reviving the Arab unity concept”.<sup>117</sup>

As soon as the Tunisian revolution erupted the movements for revolution in Egypt was starting to calling by different Egyptian politicians’ who live in Egypt and outside of

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115 [www.giga-hamburg-de/giga-focus](http://www.giga-hamburg-de/giga-focus)

116 Ziyadeh 2011.

117 Al-Marzouki, 2011

Egypt. The problems were all most shared similar to that of Tunisian citizen's unemployment, unequal distribution of wealth, corrupted government, political freedom and others. The property of the states was in the hand of few Egyptian, the majority of the peoples suffered a lot. According to the 2009/2010 Ministry of Economic development of Egyptian reports; "The private sectors developments contributed to the rise of the business class and increase in their influence on the decision making process"<sup>118</sup>

Privatization creates a job opportunity for citizen but not decides the political fate of the citizens. But in Egypt due to the politician and businessmen goes hand in hand the Business men can decided through corruption or other mechanism not only this but also the wealth of the states were in the hand of few and in the hands of leaders.

According to different international reports of 2008 and 2009 like that of , The report of Freedom of House, World Bank, Transparency International and other Government and Non-Governmental organization; "Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia ranked low in terms of fighting corruption. This shows that how the government negligence to corruption".<sup>119</sup> This shows that, the wealth of the states in directly plundered by government leaders. Global Financial Integrity Organization estimated between 2000-2008 flows of illegal transfers out of Egypt amount \$ 6.4 Billion annually. If the opposition comes against to their agenda in favoured of majority citizens he sentenced to death in other systematic way.

This shows that in Egypt there was no political freedom because the leaders suppress their citizens' as they wish. Furthermore the government by reforming the constitution they expanded the power of police force and government security forces, political

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118 Ministry of Economic development of Egyptian reports 2009/2010

119 Freedom of House, World Bank and Transparency International report 2008/2009

activists, including the demonstrators led to tortured and miss treatment of citizen were wide spread. The security forces did not protect the citizen rather they suppress the citizens' and the main tools of dictator leadership of Egyptian's. Finally the accumulation of those action of the government in Egypt aggravated the peoples of Egypt against their government and initiated for revolution and ouster the Hosni Mubarak from power .

In Libya the problem was more than that of Egyptian dictator government, Muammer Gaddafi lonely lead the states without any competent for 42 years as it is according to Addis Ababa university Prof K Mathews. When he discussed about NATO military intervention in Libya according to his conclusion “ even if there is a problem in Libya similar to that of other Arab states of Libyan case was not a revolution like that of Egypt and Tunisian's. But, a coup de 'tat orchestrated by external forces helped by NATO under the pretext of humanitarian intervention”<sup>120</sup> on similar manner in his discussion, Furthermore, humanitarian intervention has nothing to do with a desire of change of regime. Any how the intervention was the next and the last stapes the main cause was the dictator's hipness of Gaddafi.

The main problem was the corruption of the government, Gadhafi the sol dictator of Libyan's, the unfair distribution of wealth etc...Were the reasons for uprising. More of the Tunisian revolution and its success and Egyptian revolution initiate the Libyan's and provided fresh imputes for revolution. The main cause for Libyan revolution was, deteriorating Living conditions' in Libya, political opponents harassing and killing of citizen by government leaders. One of the examples of dictator's hipness event of Gaddafi was “The Massacred of Abusalim families of Tripoli in June 1996”.

Ghaddafi caged his own people for over 40 years and denied them right. This actions of Gaddafi frustrated the peoples and decided to scarify themselves up to the overthrow of Gaddafi and how the society in one sound revolt against to the government and finally

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120 Prof K, Mathews 211

leads to the over thrown of dictator regime which stayed for 42 years on the shoulder of people of Libya. This revolution was not yet restricted to the Northern African Arab states but gradually transferred to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria till today did not get any solution in states of Syria.

#### **4.4 The Impact of Arab Spring**

The impact of the Arab Spring concerns protests or by the way attempts to organize growing protest movements that were inspired by or similar to the Arab Spring in the Arab-majority states of North Africa and the Middle East, according to commentators, organisers, and critics of Middle East politicians. “These demonstrations and protest efforts have all been critical of the government in their respective countries, though they have ranged from calls for the incumbent government to make certain policy changes to attempts to bring down the current political system in its entirety. In some countries, protests have become large or widespread enough to effect change at the national level, as in Armenia, while in others, such as Djibouti, were swiftly suppressed.”<sup>121</sup>

Protests considered to be inspired by the Arab Spring have taken place on every inhabited continent, with varying degrees of success and prominence. On 15 October 2011, the subsidiary Occupy and Indignant movements inspired protests in 950 cities in 82 countries.

This is worldwide condition but, within the Arab states loss of productive man power, especially youth population, stagnation of economic development, damage of personal property and state owned property like that of police station, Mosque, shops, super markets, schools, etc...

#### **4.5 The Role of Electronics Media on Tunisian Uprising**

**Media and Arab Spring:**-Many national media outlets did not cover the revolution: the only regional news channel to cover it was Aljazeera. After Boazizi’s sacrifice, people

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121 <http://www.arab> impacts of spring.

nearby began to protest and spread their dissent through social networking. Ben Ali could control a lot of the media; news, television, the press, Internet, and to some extent social networking. But when so many people in the country had shared all their experiences through social networking, instead of through news broadcast, it became essential in uniting and spreading the revolution so fast.

The revolution started out in the town of Sidi Bouzid, which is a small rural city, in the centre of the country. The use of Internet, Internet Medias, and social networking systems by mass youth were contributed for expansion of uprising to the whole countries, that the state could not control the revolution spread. Most of the photographs and video footages posting on the Internet by activist people to other Arab states and neighbouring of Tunisians. This situations were more and more motivated other Tunisians and Arabians states for uprising. The long-time repression of journalists, human rights activists and opposition parties under Ben Ali's regime victims join with youth up risers by opposing the regime and dawn fall of Ben Ali.

Access to the Internet and social media sites was a major facilitating factor in sparking the December 2010-January 2011 protests. An estimated 18 % of youth had a Face book account, and since the fall of the former government, Internet sites were no longer blocked. The government took several steps during the year to end official Internet censorship. In May a case was brought to court requesting the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to filter pornography. A high court overturned the lower court ruling requiring the ATI to filter pornography, ruling that there could be no censorship of Web sites, including those with pornographic content.

At year's end the case was being appealed. Web sites that were previously blocked, such as Reporters without Borders and You Tube, were no longer censored. There were no government restrictions on access to the Internet or credible reports that the government monitored e -mail or Internet chat rooms. Individuals and groups engaged in the free expression of views via the Internet, including by e -mail.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events. The new opening for freedom of speech also allows.<sup>122</sup>

#### **4.6 Response of Government and Different Nation to Arab Spring in Tunisia**

Different nation of the world gave a response for Arab Spring of Tunisia 2010. Most of them gave after devastating of property and man power. A few of them gave a response as soon as the revolution erupted in Tunisia. Among those Nations were starting from Tunisian neighbouring North African Arabian states up to the Union of the world like that of;- African Union, United Nation, European Union, Arab League and United States of America and Arab Maghreb Union. According to their national interest their responses were different.

##### **4.6.1 Response of Government against Uprising in Tunisia**

During uprising the Government of Tunisia and other Arab states were directly trying to crush the uprising rather than to make a reform. For example in state of Egypt when Tunisians upraised against the government Mubarak make a meeting with his security forces and evaluated the condition of Tunisia and Egyptian. They reached on an agreement of “Egypt is not Tunisia we can easily control the problem if it happened in Egypt”<sup>123</sup>

According to the agreement, Egyptian right were not considered. Rather than to making reforms on the main issues of citizen’s problem, the leaders were preparing themselves to crush a revolt through force.

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122 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour

123 <http://www Google BBC news, report of Jan 2010>retrieved 12/12/2013

The Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, has condemned the uprising in neighbouring and the unrest in Tunisia. In a speech of Gaddafi, an ally of the ousted president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, not only during popular revolution but after Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabian Gaddafi said he was "pained" <sup>124</sup>by the fall of the Tunisian government.

During the revolution break down in Egypt and Libya, The condition in Egypt and Libya their condition were very serious than that of Tunisia. Because in this countries the government take a harsh measure against the demonstrators. Police and security forces killed so many peoples. In addition the upraising time taken more than the revolution of Tunisian. These and other factors increased the dead and wounded persons in Egypt and Libya.

In case of Egypt, Mubarak Made speech in Feb 10, 2011 over the course of the 8 days leading up to the last date of his reign. Suleiman the security general of Mubarak negotiated with different political factors including with Egyptian youth. The main concern were in an attempt to reach an agreement regarding the transfer of presidential powers. But late, finally the people did not accept the idea rather they saidon their slogan "THE PEOPLE WANTS THE REGIUME TO FALL" the so called in Arabic word (al-sha'byuridisqat al-nizam)."<sup>125</sup>

In case of Libya Gadaffi used a military Air plane against the demonstrators. The demonstrators were unique when we compare with that of Tunisian because they were directly confronted with the government forces and fighting each other and Gadaffi considered the demonstrators not as Libyan's rather as Terrorist who came from other states. In addition to this when the condition in Libya deteriorated and many people are killed in both sides the force of NATO interfered under the pretext of humanitarian intervention. Finally the revolution of Libya concluded by the death of Gaddafi and defeated by mass revolution.

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124 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprisingretrived 11/10/2013>)

125 Country report profile 2011 Mar

#### 4.6.2 Response of Arab League to Uprising

After the Arab spring intensified throughout Arabian states, the Arab Maghreb Union made a Summit in Malta from Jan 08-10-2012 on Regional crisis. Not only AMU but, the European Union is responding to key challenges highlighted by the upheavals of the Arab Spring, the need for deep democratization and the need to stimulate growth and job creation to open up opportunities for young people across the Maghreb, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso has told with western Mediterranean states in Malta.

The 5+5 summit brought together the leaders of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, along with European partners Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal. On the other hand, the EU commissions, President Barroso attend the summit as an observer. He said that, “this approach has primarily focused on supporting the ongoing transition process and the promotion of political and economic reforms, both by increasing our financial assistance up to €2.8 billion Euros for the period 2011-2012, by mobilizing international financial institutions, in particular the EIB and the EBRD, and with new offerings in the areas of mobility of people and trade.”<sup>126</sup>

The crises challenging the Maghreb countries domestically were presented and discussed by the conference. In fact, there was a discussion about the problems of the Berbers and other minorities whose situations seem likely to become worse after the Arab Spring. The fall of some regimes revealed that these groups were severely affected in the previous era and had suffered from a systematic blockade that affected their social and cultural life, as was the case in Libya. Some speakers advised “Maghreb rulers to give attention to these challenges the attention in terms of care and justice, and also to prevent losing their citizens to foreign or extremist agendas.”<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> <http://google.EU Neighbourhood Info>)

<sup>127</sup> <http://www.summit of AMU on current arabspring.com>).

Some stressed that the Islamist movements were neither a crisis nor part of one. They argued that rather, the movements represented the key elements of a resolution. It was also said that participants should convince others to accept Islamist movements as partners for the realization of stability. The conference portrayed the pressing necessity to distinguish between Salafi trends based on violence and that calls for or instigate it, and those that believe in a framework of law and order. Others warned that Islamist parties in power could end in the same manner nationalist movements had previously ended. They could drown in ideological conflict rather than achieve social, economic, political and security support for their people, and thus fall into the talons of dictatorship.

The Mali crisis and its repercussions on the security of the Maghreb countries received particular attention in the conference. Due to a long history of cultural, religious and linguistics relations with those countries, including the geographic proximity and the common two major ethnic groups of Arabs and the Tuaregs. Most importantly, “the common threat of armed cross-border Islamist groups in the region and beyond were the common problems of an areas”.<sup>127</sup> Most of the armed Islamist groups in Mali originate from Maghreb countries or are linked to them, especially Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

At a national level, Maghreb countries face several challenges including, “the shift from their current systems to open democratic systems, and transition from yield-based economies that are centrally managed and non-competitive to productive and competitive economic systems. They also have to search for solutions to issues of identity, religion, language, human rights and citizenship in a participatory manner that will strengthen the principle of tolerance and acceptance of others, fight corruption, consecrate good governance, and provide and strengthen the elements of social, political and economic security that they need urgently”.<sup>128</sup>

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127 <http://AMU> on current arab spring .com) retrieved 12/2/2014.

128 Al Jazeera center for studies retrieved and Shafee qchoucair 2013Retrived 25/11/2013

### 4.6.3 Response of Western Powers to Arab Uprising

The EU's political response to the uprisings in the Arab world is primarily contained in two documents. "The joint communication of the High Representative and the European Commission."<sup>129</sup>

This communication was followed in May 2011 by a comprehensive review of the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), work on which had already started in early 2010. A new responses to a changing Neighbourhood. Both documents set out an incentive approach based on the principle of "more for more", whereby partner countries will be granted more support from the EU depending on the progress made with building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. More and faster reform will be rewarded with more EU support. The incentives on offer are contained in a framework known as the 'Three Ms'—Money, Mobility and Markets.

European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A partnership for democracy they reached on an agreement to support an Arabs and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. A budget for loans to the region was also increased from time to time. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expanded its mandate to include the region and to invest in emerging Arab democracies. In addition, the EU is party to the Deauville Partnership— an initiative launched by the Group of Eight (G8) countries to support the transition process in the MENA region. Incentives with regard to Mobility entail facilitated mobility for citizens of partner countries, especially through more university scholarships and exchanges between the region and the EU, as well as easier access to visas to enter the EU. Finally, the Markets component aims to facilitate the integration of partner countries into the EU single market. This process is mainly offered by way of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), which among other things entail

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129 The European Investment Bank's (EIB) report of 2010

the removal of tariffs and easing of other trade restrictions.<sup>130</sup>

These shows that, Europeans focused only on protection of their interest's especially the market place for their commodities, investment facility for their citizens and their companies. Generally there was no win-win and mutual relation among Western states and Arabians. The benefit was more inclined to the Western not equally benefitted from this relation. On this relation the Arabian leaders nothing dell about their citizens interest without facilitating the way for their wealth, jointly looting the state resources with Europeans.

The ENP is to a large extent based on the neighbourhood policy of enlargement. Accordingly, it is based on an incentive model developed for Central and Eastern Europe during its period of transformation after the Cold War. According to Mikael Eriksson an Arab Maghreb politician analysis stated that "However, there are of course a number of differences between the countries of Central Europe and today's MENA region. Whereas the prospect of EU membership was a strong carrot for most Central European states, states in the MENA region are less inclined to campaign for future EU membership".<sup>131</sup>

Indeed, many of these countries identify themselves more with the Arab World or the African continent. In the case of the EU's southern neighbours, the incentives currently on offer are less clear, and differ considerably between countries. This undermines the notion of conditionality and the ENP's policy of "more for more", whereby progress with reform is to be rewarded by increased support from the EU. If such conditionality is to work, the incentives must be seen as attractive to the partner country. Unclear incentives combined with conditions are likely to raise the question of the degree to which the new regimes are interested in carrying out externally prescribed reforms. After all, the EU's conditions strike at the heart of these states' sovereignty.

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130 European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security  
Policy, report 17 December 2012

131 Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund (2010)

The authoritarian Arab Mediterranean governments in place before the popular uprisings did not consider the incentives sufficiently attractive to undertake comprehensive reforms. The positions new more democratic regimes, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, will take in their dialogue with the EU remain unclear, although some signs can be identified. Tunisia is keen on deep collaboration with the EU. In Egypt, the desire for a closer relation with the EU is not overwhelmingly strong. Egypt is aware of its role as a pivotal state both in terms of its market size and its political clout in the MENA region.

The slogans of the Arab revolts were about freedom and dignity rather than any aspiration to join forces with the West this indicated that how much the gap were wider between the leader and citizens of Arabians. This touches on the conflicting perspectives from the different sides of the Mediterranean. In Europe there is sensitivity to the past, a realisation that it did little if anything to support the democratic forces that full fills their interest. Now, there is an eagerness to build partnerships with the neighbours in the south, without patronising and without being overly self-interested and without halting of European interest.

The three Ms will only become reality if the member states fulfil their commitments. This comes at a time when the EU is already under strain from the economic and financial crisis. Moreover, the EU's weight fades somewhat in comparison with bilateral relations with particular EU member states. The assistance provided under the ENP framework is reportedly less than half of that offered by the three largest bilateral EU donors, which admittedly account for almost 90 per cent of European bilateral aid.

Looking at official development assistance provided in 2009-2010, France was a bigger donor than the EU in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Germany gave more aid to Libya and Egypt than Brussels did. In addition, Spain gave more assistance to Tunisia and the United Kingdom more to Libya than did EU institutions.<sup>132</sup>

This indicated that how much the Western focuses on Maghreb states to full fill their interests. Aiding of Maghreb is the assignment of their life and the means of survival

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132 <http://www.enpi-info.eu/mainmed>

of their future life and destiny even if they are under serious crisis they continue to aid the Maghreb region because of the benefit will more than they spent on aid. This is not only a challenge when it comes to coordinating efforts in the field, but also seems to indicate member states' preferences for bilateral approaches. Both factors are likely to undermine the EU's influence in the region.

The benefits of facilitating mobility, for example, "by way of easier access to visas, are likely to be limited to a small category of citizens, such as business people, students and for cultural exchanges. Increased market access is primarily offered by DCFTAs".<sup>133</sup>

This shows that mobility programme was allowed not for all Maghreb citizens rather restricted for persons who facilitators of Europeans market places and youth generations who served Europeans in the future. In the light of the fact that half the exports of these countries go to Europe, the incentives provided by opening up markets could be considerable

A recurrent criticism in analyses of the EU's response to the Arab uprisings is the organisation's lack of an overall strategy. The EU was quick to respond crisis in Libya because of their interest not to protect the Libyan's. In case of Tunisia they prefer silent when the citizens suppressed by force of Ben Ali, rather they were tried to facilitated the way for evacuating of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia in peace full way. No one did say anything from international criminal court and other human right protectors about the crime done by Ben Ali against the citizen of Tunisia because of the best friend of Western powers.

A recurring criticism of the EU's response to the Arab uprisings is that it has failed to take the opportunity to outline an overall strategy for its relations with the MENA region, instead only tweaking existing instruments. Other politician criticized the Western power stand on Tunisian uprising was,

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133 <http://oecd.org/countries/tunisia/aidstatisticsrecipientaidataglance.htm>

“The explanations for this tools-based response can be found in the cumbersome bureaucracy of the EU structures, the divergent views of member states and, possibly, a lingering sense of unease about having been partly complicit in the survival of the authoritarian regimes.”<sup>134</sup>

The failure of the EU to carry out a comprehensive strategy review ultimately means that it is unclear what its objectives are in the region— what does the EU want to achieve? As is noted above, this lack of overall strategic goals is arguably all the more curious when the response is one based on incentives. At the same time, there is a sense in Brussels and the capitals of the EU member states that the EU must be sensitive to the needs of partner countries. Recent history and the EU’s complicity in the autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East make for an uncomfortable setting. It is now essential that the EU listens to partner countries and that its policies and programmes are demand-driven rather than externally imposed. This creates something of a dichotomy. On the one hand, the EU needs to identify and convey its interests and objectives in a cohesive strategy while, on the other, the EU must be mindful of the demands of partner countries.

However, it is important to bear in mind that the new governments in these post-revolutionary countries are still trying to gain an understanding of foreign support and reach consensus on their need for outside support. In addition, many are unfamiliar with the EU’s often complicated structures and instruments, and are consequently still learning what they can ask for. Beyond this policy intricacy, what then are the EU’s interests? A regional strategy of the EU is likely to need to address issues such as energy, immigration, and security—including areas such as counterterrorism and non-proliferation.

Human rights and governance are also high priority questions for the EU. It might also be advisable to address the issues of external actors in the region and engagement with political Islam. Even if today the EU focusing on political Islam and any group a

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134 Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund 2010

collaboration of religious extremists. Because these will a dangerous treat for their interest. They didn't give any attention for democratic, human right, economic and the benefit of Arabian citizens. The Western power agenda of Political Islam and Terrorist action in the region pursuing through a dialogue with the League of Arab States (LAS). A ministerial meeting was held between the EU and the LAS on marking a "new intensified relationship".<sup>135</sup>

#### **4.6.4 Response of AU to Tunisian Crisis**

Government actors outside MENA region were reluctant to immediately support citizen's demands for democratic change. The AU unlike EU has not adopted any policy instruments or financial tools to address the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In fact the AU's engagement with the new governments has been finally fair and passive. The principal reason for this is that the AU has neither the capacity nor the capability to engage itself in democratic reform.

As is noted above, the AU has over the years developed a number of policy instruments to tackle unconstitutional changes of government. Some of the most important ones are: the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the Common African Defence and Security Policy, and the Constitutive Act. The latter is the most important for these purposes. It sets out a number of guiding principles on how the AU should respond to member states in violation of their obligations on human rights, democratic principles and governance, the sanctity of human life and unconstitutional changes of government. The AU also has a well-defined procedure on how to behave if such a situation occurs within a member state, that is, what form of political sanctions is to be implemented. Both the definitions and the political responses are found in the African Union Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration (2000), the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Union (2002), and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance (2007).

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<sup>135</sup> A review of European Neighbourhood Policy (2011)

The AU's impotent reaction to the revolts in North Africa can in some respects be explained by the fact that it had not developed a rigorous policy on how to deal with popularly driven changes of government. Instead, it only had a general idea of what constituted an unconstitutional change of government and what responses such a situation required. The latter was at the time defined as follows: The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly define an unconstitutional change of government as:

- (a) A military or other coup d'état against a democratically elected government;
- (b) An intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government;
- (c) The replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movements;
- (d) Refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after a free and fair election; and
- (e) The overthrow and replacement of a democratically elected government by elements assisted by mercenaries.

Moreover, Article 23 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance defines an unconstitutional change of government as: "Any putsch or coup d'état against a democratically elected government, or any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government; or any replacement of a democratically elected government by The AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 2002"<sup>136</sup>. African Union, the Solemn Declaration on the African Common Defence and Security Policy.

The AU responded quickly to events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. For example, in early 2011 the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) early on supported "the legitimate aspirations for democracy", and also "condemned violence and violation of international humanitarian law against civilians in Libya" which action used by Gaddafi. However, the

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<sup>136</sup> Constitutive Act of the African Union, (2010)

policy response did not involve a powerful political reaction beyond expressions of solidarity. This inability to respond more concretely to the Arab revolts has led to strong criticism of the organisation, not only from within the institution, but also from some of its member states and the NGO community. In particular, two negative judgements were put forwarded.

The first is linked to the AU's members having been ambiguous in its response to the uprisings in North Africa. After releasing the above statement, it was not entirely clear what the AU's position was or meant. Did it still recognise the incumbent regimes or did it favour the democratic aspirations of the citizenry?

The second criticism was the AU's institutional structure –that the inability to respond forcefully to democratic transformation displayed the weakness of the AU's entire peace and security architecture. The lack of clear Supervisor of Peace and Security Council Communiqué of the 260<sup>th</sup> meeting on (2011-02 -16) and the 261<sup>th</sup> meeting on (2011 -02-23). A Country profile of Tunisia Jan 2011, Compass suggested that no political instrument was at hand that could guide AU institutions in responding to events that should have been anticipated by, for example, the AU Commission. In retrospect there were different reasons for the lack of clarity in the AU's response to the revolts.

According to Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, “One challenge for the AU was linked to power relations inside the organisation. The fact is that these Arab states had for a long time been the financial backbone of the entire AU project. At the time of the uprisings, Egypt, Libya and Algeria each contributed about 15 % each of the AU's general budget”.<sup>137</sup>

These states therefore held a relatively strong way in the AU. For the AU or any of its member states to side with the opposition in these countries could have proved very

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137 Country report of Algeria Dec 2009

costly. At the more conceptual level, the principle of sovereignty became a major issue and challenge when considering how the AU should tackle political developments. How could it react without interfering in the domestic affairs of a sovereign country facing major political breakdown? Most post-colonial states are highly sensitive to overstepping this sacred principle.

The other challenge and a partial explanation for the AU's weak reaction, related to the AU's political and instrumental orientation only to handle so-called unconstitutional changes of power. The AU and its Heads of State had been developing far-reaching principles on how to tackle unconstitutional changes of government. However, the AU has only recently been able to overcome differences among the African leaders and codify its position on such attempts, including punitive responses. The AU's position on unconstitutional changes of government assists out in the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in 2000. Coincidentally, the act left unattended the question of popular changes of government, which was the essence of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

The popular uprisings in North Africa to date have on the one hand been unconstitutional according to the definition in the Constitutive Act, but, on the other hand, have been led by the people. Prior to the revolts, three of the five largest contributors to the AU were Arab states (in addition to South Africa and Nigeria). They were tried to settle the situation but, it became beyond their capacity internally by mass up risers and an excess used of action by government power over the citizens and externally by interference of NATO powers in Libya and silent feature EU on Tunisian case.

A related obstacle also had to do specifically with Libya's Gaddafi. His influence on African affairs and vision for the continent affected the AU member states' attitudes to the position the organisation should take. States taking a position that engaged in criticising Libya risked being perceived as traitors by Gaddafi. A number of African states were also in close alignment with Gaddafi. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo). It entered into force in 2001. There were simply no instruments to guide the AU on this matter. As Kathryn Sturman

notes, the constitutionalism on which the AU's democracy promotion founded on does not provide an adequate response to popular uprisings. The AU principle was only meant to apply to challenges to 'democratically elected governments'.

The AU's reaction to the unconstitutional change of government driven by the Tunisian people was quick but cautious support for the popular protests. At the 257<sup>th</sup> meeting of the AU PSC in Addis Ababa on 15 January 2011 it stated: "The Council strongly condemned the excessive use of force against the demonstrators, resulting in loss of life, and stressed the need to spare no efforts to avoid any further loss of life". The Council expressed its solidarity with the people of Tunisia, and conveyed its condolences to the families of the victims and wished early recovery to the injured.

The Council urgently appealed to the Tunisians for calm and an end to all acts of violence and Destruction of property. The Council also appealed to "the political stakeholders and the Tunisian people to work together, in unity, consensus and respect for legality, towards a peaceful and democratic transition, which would allow the Tunisian people to freely choose their leaders through free, open, democratic and transparent elections."<sup>138</sup>

In this context, it is worth noting that there is no internationally established definition of an unconstitutional change of government. This is because each Sovereign State has its own constitution that States how legal changes of government should be carried out and what are considered crimes against the constitution. An unconstitutional change of government has therefore traditionally been regarded as the internal affair of a state. To gain an understanding of the AU's policy on and behaviour towards the erupting revolts, it is important to recognise that it did not view the Arab Spring revolts in Tunisia and Egypt as unconstitutional changes of government in the strict sense, and so did not react to them as such. As is noted above, there are formal AU guidelines on how to conclude that an unconstitutional change of government has taken place, including what formal responses to take, but the AU will have to develop its policies with regard to popularly driven changes of government. The motives for the AU to intervene should arguably be

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138 Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund (2010)

the same in cases of unconstitutional changes of government as in popularly driven changes of government: to improve the security climate for the people, states and regions. A good security climate is normatively associated with democracy and respect for human rights<sup>139</sup>

One is whether a situation exists in a country that is undermining the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, such as the rule of law, social order, popular participation and electoral processes. Another could be the way in which protesters are mobilised and the type of protest. Despite its call for an end to the violence, the AU did not confront the existing regime in any profound way. Nor did it challenge with threats of exclusion rather Isolation or concrete support for the opposition. During its 268th meeting on 23 March 2011, the PSC welcomed the revolution in Tunisia.

The above section provides a brief overview of how the AU responded to the revolts in early 2011. It is still too early to assess the AU's post-revolt engagement with the three states, but an examination is made below of how it reacted and on what basis. The AU's responses to the revolutions will have significance for its future political development. The main problem for the AU in its early management of the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya was that the organisation treated the revolts inconsistently. The AU provided only general support for the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, but in the case of Libya backed the principle of non -violence, which had the de facto effect of keeping Gaddafi in power.

The main reason seems to have been the failure to treat the revolts in the region differently from that of military coups or any other unconstitutional change of government, a lens through which the AU has traditionally operated. However, "South Africa did note its differing position at the time of voting. As noted by the PSC department proposal for a political solution before military options is a consistent approach of the AU in all conflict situations."<sup>140</sup>

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139 African Charter, Chapter 8, Article 23. 2000: Article 4.1.

140 Statement by the Peace and Security Council's 257<sup>th</sup> meeting (2011)

Rules and Procedures of the Assembly of the Union, armed dissidents or rebels; or any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.

The instruments and recommendations on how and when to act are mainly located in the Constitutive Act, which states that the AU has the right: to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. In addition to responding to an unconstitutional change of government by military means, the AU and its PSC have other means to their disposal, for example, “targeted sanctions and good offices, including mediation and the sending of high-level representatives such as the Panel of the Wise”.<sup>141</sup>

In all direction the AU did not made any solution for the MENA region during the Arab spring of 2010 even if there were torched in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya besides of crimes against humanity. According to his vision the union did not goes far as expected from its aim. Another problem of AU was the consideration of the level of popularity of the uprising, and whether it is non-violent, or involves the military or external actors.

All these considerations could form part of determining the legitimacy of an uprising. Such considerations are important for the AU’s continued policy development, not least because popularly driven changes of government could spread beyond the MENA region to sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Sudan experienced demonstrations during 2012). Attempting to separate popularly driven from other unconstitutional changes of government presents a number of challenges though. If the AU is to go beyond expressing declaratory support

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141 These instruments are detailed in the Modalities for the Panel of the Wise, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (2002) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007)).

or condemnation to providing concrete support or imposing sanctions, who or what should it target? This was especially the case as it is difficult to know not only who to target in an intervention, but arguably also when to do it. The AU reacted to developments in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia once the protests had reached a high level of intensity and the incumbent regimes had resorted to violence. The AU, however, did not react to the massive protests witnessed in the same period in Algeria and Malawi (and Morocco, although it is not an AU member state).

The question is, then, whether the AU should intervene in the process of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government or instead wait until it has actually taken place? What if, for example, a general strike in a country is mistaken for a popular revolt? The question of how the AU could and should react or intervene in the event of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government must also be posed. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the AU responded to the political crises after the event instead of taking a proactive approach. What is more, the AU did not actively or substantially intervene in the developments, but chose to stop at official support or condemnation. What could have been done differently?

First, if the regulations and mandates needed had been in place, together with a definition of an unconstitutional change of government, the AU could have applied non-violent measures such as targeted sanctions against the incumbent regime in order to support popular demands for regime reform.

Second, in addition to placing sanctions on the incumbent government, the AU could have offered support for the democracy advocates. This might, however, have posed huge problems as there are financial barriers to the AU engaging in such activities. The majority of AU member states have their own legitimacy problems and it would almost certainly infringe the sovereignty of the state in question. In sum, the AU is in need of an enlarged definition of popularly driven protest aimed at democratic reform.

As argued above, this is needed to ensure that the rights of citizens in Africa are not sacrificed to protect its governments. The current definition of unconstitutional change of government is understandable since the cases that the AU has had to deal with hitherto

have been limited to coups d'état and the illegal elongation of tenures. However, as the events of the Arab Spring have amply demonstrated, there comes a time when the constitutionally provided mechanisms for change of government through elections become inaccessible to citizens (as was the case in Gaddafi's Libya) or when they become so flawed that they are unable to produce political change (as in Ben Ali's Tunisia).

For such situations, the AU must develop definitions and instruments for responding to popular but unconstitutional changes of government. The AU is also in need of regulations on which tools to apply when such circumstances arise; and, of course, although this is beyond the scope of this paper, the capacity to implement them. Without a definition of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government in situations of illegitimate incumbency, however, there is a risk that the behaviour of the AU will continue to lack consistency –in addition to the severe security risks at the human, state and regional levels.

Finally, the need to develop a definition of a popularly driven unconstitutional change of government, as well as efficient response mechanisms, would be in line with the AU's envisioned Peace and Security Architecture. An important aspect of APSA is the setting up of credible capabilities to act promptly on various security threats on the continent, including political crises such as those in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. During the revolt in Egypt, the US provided democracy support. This led to a major political crisis between Egypt and the US as the SCAF considered the US to overstep its mandate in the context of democracy support.

#### **4.6.5 Response of the UN to Tunisian Crisis**

The large scale pro-democracy protests that continue to occur throughout the Arab region began in Tunisia in December 2010. The UN and international community largely failed to respond in timely and collective manner to the large-scale protests and subsequent government attacks against protestors. A variety of factors contributed to this failure including the sudden and unexpected nature of the situation.

However, a lack of political will among governments, and determined efforts by the Arab League in previous years to ensure international impunity for authoritarian governments throughout the region, were also significant factors. Within the UN framework, only independent human rights experts, Special Reporters in the Special Procedures branch of the Human Rights Council (HRC), and officials of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), provided a pro-active response and relatively timely condemnation of violent attacks against Tunisian protestors. On 12 January, after the deaths of 21 protestors the previous weekend, the High Commissioner for Human Rights (High Commissioner), Madam Navanethem Pillay, issued a press release addressing attacks against the Tunisian civilians.<sup>142</sup>

For a more detailed overview of human rights issues within UN mechanisms during 2011 see, Human Rights Monitor Quarterly, Issue 1, 2, 3, 4 (2011). The High Commissioner urged that, the government to ensure that its security forces cease using excessive force against demonstrators and to launch transparent and credible investigations into the deaths that have taken place during recent protest. According to the UNs report also expressed concern about alienation of human right, widespread arrests, including of human rights defenders and bloggers advocating fundamental human rights principles such as freedom of expression, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Tunisia was sever. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR). A year after revolution press release by a group of Special Reports entitled “Words must become reality, excessive use of force must end,”<sup>143</sup> made a similar demand of the government of Tunisia.

Numerous press releases, statements, and strong engagement by the OHCHR and Special Procedures, has played a critical role in focusing attention on, and strengthening the demands of protestors in the Arab region throughout 2011. These responses by independent UN rights experts to government attacks and repression toward the

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142 <http://www.unrepot.tunisianarab.spring2010> retrived 10/3/2014)

143 <http://www.ishr.ch/publications> ) retrieved 12/3/2014).

pro-democracy movement. “In the states of Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere, greatly aided by some UN member states. These situations, at least to some degree, within a legalistic human rights paradigm, and not simply as political phenomena”<sup>144</sup> In so doing, they demonstrated just how important a role that independent rights experts at the UN, free from strong governmental interference, can play to ensure the centrality of human rights within international affairs.

The member states of the HRC did take a positive step to ensure attention for the situation in Tunisia during its 16<sup>th</sup> Session (March, 2011), but only well after the transition in the country was underway, and after ensuring the acquiescence of the Tunisian interim government. On 24 March of 2011 the HRC passed a resolution put forward by the EU on “Cooperation between Tunisia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.” The resolution was congratulatory and shallow in substance. Nonetheless, it was the first instance of an Arab government supporting a resolution specifically addressing the situation in their own country at the HRC, and the first time a resolution addressing a North African state had been passed by the HRC. As such, it set an important precedent, and On 19 January, 2011 five days after the departure of former President Ben Ali, the High Commissioner took the bold step of announcing a bi-lateral agreement with the “national unity”.

Government of Tunisia to send a human rights assessment team to Tunisia to gather information and help formulate human rights recommendations for its transitional phase. This mission took place one week later from 26 January – 2 February, 2011. Its assessment confirmed “Human rights were at the root of the Tunisian people’s calls for freedom, dignity and social justice. Furthermore an epoch marked by respect for human rights and freedom from fear and want to the cooperative approach the Tunisia government was adopting toward the international human rights system”<sup>145</sup>.

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144 <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.as>

145 *ibid*

One of the assessment mission's recommendations was for the Transitional Government of Tunisia to enhance cooperation with the UN human rights system, including collaboration with OHCHR; "issue an open invitation to Special Reporters; and ratify and review reservations of human rights treaties".<sup>146</sup> This is a key indicator for judging the political will and commitment of a government to enact genuine human rights and democratic reforms. It is a positive sign that the government of Tunisia has greatly increased its cooperation with international human rights mechanisms, and its legal commitment to human rights standards over the last 2013 year, in a manner that exceeds the original recommendations of the OHCHR.

On 10 February 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the High Commissioner with a request for the opening of an OHCHR office in Tunisia. In this letter, the Ministry conveyed the determination of the Transitional Government, whose essential task is to organize free, democratic and transparent elections, to place human rights at the centre of its daily action and its future programs. The office was opened in July 2011, and becoming the first OHCHR office in North Africa. Throughout the year the OHCHR has provided expert assistance and advice in Tunisia for several reforms including on the National Human Rights Institution, transitional justice and security sector reform.

Moreover, on 1 March 2013, at the request of the interim Tunisian government, the United Nations deployed a high-level electoral needs assessment mission to Tunisia. Subsequently put in place a program within the country that assisted with measures to support the electoral management body. Besides of these to help on the and promote of inclusive participation in the electoral process on the part of women civil society groups in particular. The Tunisian government also ratified several international human rights treaties in June 2011, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (which authorizes the UN Subcommittee on

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146 [http://www.unOHCHR\\_Assessment\\_Mission\\_to\\_Tunisia](http://www.unOHCHR_Assessment_Mission_to_Tunisia).

147 <http://.ohchr.org/en/News/Events/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx>).

the Prevention of Torture to visit places of detention and examine the treatment of individuals held there); the First Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which enables the examination of individual complaints); the Convention on Enforced Disappearances; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Tunisian government has recently issued a standing invitation to all Special Procedure mandate holders. However, despite the issuing of this open invitation, and potentially due to the recent elections and extensive internal reform occurring within the country, no Special Reporters visited Tunisia during 2011.

During 2012 it is hoped that visited to Tunisia by the Special Reporters on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Human Rights Defenders, Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association and Assembly (many of which have longstanding requested to visited the country) they facilitated by the new government. “In contrast to the proactive commitment of the interim government of Tunisia to strengthen its cooperation with and commitment to the international human rights system. The behaviour and policies of Tunisia at the UN towards human right violation in the context of pro-democracy protests in other Arab countries has been relatively weak”.<sup>148</sup>

Concerning the situations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, the Tunisian UN delegations in New York and Geneva have been passive for the most part. Tunisian diplomats appear to have adopted a “wait and see” approach to human rights violations in these countries, an approach that is neither obstructionist nor pro-active. Significantly, Tunisia did not co-sponsor the resolution or sign-on to support any of the three HRC Special Sessions on Syria that occurred in April, August, and December of 2011. While Tunisia is not a member state of the HRC, observer states have the ability to co-sponsor resolutions and sign onto requests for Special Sessions in order to build consensus and lend political support. Libya, Jordan, SaudiArabia, Qatar and Kuwait have

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148 <http://un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc.doc.Resolution>

all co-sponsored and supported one or more Syrian HRC Special Sessions. It is important moving forward that Tunisian policies within the UN begin to more strongly reflect the aspirations and principles that the Tunisian revolution was inspired by, especially in relation to struggles for democracy within other Arab countries.<sup>149</sup>

#### **4.7 Success of Tunisian Uprising**

Citizens of Tunisia increased opposition in one sound dying and night. As their number increased, the revolutions further more expanded to all provinces of the country. As a result a number of demonstrators increased and number of Tunisian who lost their life increased from time to time and generally the condition become deteriorated. Finally this condition forced to leave the president of Tunisia, Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali on Jan 14/ 2011 and fled from country to Saudi Arabia. In place of him Mohammed Ghannouchi the prime minister assuming the role of interim president under chapter 56 of Tunisian constitution.

The Tunisian's had succeeded in their objective of reform. They changed the dictator leader and ban of sol party of Ben Ali Constitutional Democratic Rally who stayed in power for a long period of time. In return of the revolution; The new government promised the wide spread reform on old regime bad habit, promising press freedom, the lifting of a ban on human rights groups operating in Tunisia and the release of political prisoners.

Tunisians new government established the commission of inquiry which composed of many members and from different society to investigate the case of human right abuse of Tunisian citizens by Ben Ali and his security forces, and allotting of Tunisian property by RCD members and their relatives.

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149 [http://un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp](http://un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp)

## 4.8 Negative Outcome of the Tunisian Uprising

Over the next several days of Arab spring of Tunisia Dec 16, 2010. Security forces continued to arrest, torture, and disappear dissenters, including bloggers, journalists, lawyers, and activists. The toll of protesters killed continued to increase as demonstrators and police continued to clash in the streets. "In Dec 17 2010 one civilian has been killed and several others wounded in Tunisia following a clash with police who opened fire on protesters in a central Tunisian town. An interior ministry spokesperson said police in Bouziane, 240km south of the capital Tunis, had been forced to "shoot in self-defence" after shots into the air failed to disperse scores of setting protesters who were setting police cars and building ablaze on Friday 18, 2010."<sup>150</sup>

According to human right watch report, "when the popular apprise against their corrupted government of Tunisia, the government was not voluntary to response the mass question rather suppress the upraises through force. In Tunisia on Dec 22, 2010 Mohamed Ammin an 18 Years old protester, is shot and killed by police during violent demonstrations in the central town of Menzel Bouzaiene. Similar to this a 44 years old protesters among those shot by police at same protests. A hundreds of protesters rally in front of Tunisian Labour union head quarter over rampant unemployment, clashing with Tunisia security forces. In the central towns of Al-Ragab and Miknassi Skirmishes break out when security forces stage overnight crack down campaigns. According to HRW, the majority of the 78 demonstrators in Tunis reported dead in January 2011 were killed by police fire."<sup>151</sup> Those measures of the government were more aggravated the people to upraise and they were asking the fall down of the government.

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150 <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010> retrieved 11/12/2013

151 <http://www Google Aljazeera TV English program, CNN, BBC, Human right watch, Dec 2010> retrieved 13/12/2013).

According to UN committee report stated that, Tunisian government uses Excessive Force and Other Abuses over protesters. Police were deployed to disperse the protests during demonstrations that began in mid-December 2010 and continued into early 2011. According to the UN, at least 300 civilians were killed and approximately 700 injured during the unrest, which include individuals who died during prison riots.

According to Tunisian Investigations committee which established “after revolution by the Fact Finding Commission on Abuses during the Recent Period revealed that, approximately 350 people were killed between December 17, 2010, and January 14, 2011, by forces operating under Ben Ali’s command”.<sup>152</sup>

#### **4.9 Tunisia and North Africa after the Uprising**

In terms of threats to peace and security in the whole region, there are currently two main radical violent Jihadist groups operating in North Africa Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Previously the Group Salafiste pour la Predication et le Cmbat (GSPC) and the Libyan Salafist Fighting Group (LIFG). “Most of Northern African states have faced Jihadist challenges. At the moment, Libya is the country in the region most overtly troubled by the presence of AQIM”<sup>153</sup>. AQIM members across its territory and the arms and drugs trade is heavily related to its presence. Not only AQIM the presence of Jihadist in the region other terrorist groups have a chain like that of Movement for Openness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

This situation of mission could cause negative spill over effects in countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. Those states had already politically and socially fragile. Armed groups may take refuge in those states. The turmoil in Mali, Nigeria, Chad, Libyans and Egypt itself could also cause refuge flows in these states. In case of Tunisia even if the revolution was over in success way there is other problems internally unresolved. Former Ben Ali loyalists had a number of repercussions for the future of the political reform process. By using their political skill and experience has led to criticised by

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152 <http://www.committee.fact.finding> on tunisan uprising of 2010.retrived 1/2/2014).

153 <http://http.www.aljazeera.english.com> 22/9/2013/ retrieved 12/3/2014).

opposition for lacking the required skills to govern Tunisia. This is one of a treat for the development on the democratic development on the Northern African states as well as a Negative impact of on the Tunisian government future reform process and ability to govern.

In terms of security there is little trust in the police force, because it had bad reputation linked to its previous loyalty to Ben Ali. In addition to this not currently working effectively to prevent crime. Allegedly acting to undermine the government policy. “Absence of functioning police force has made life uncertain for many Tunisian leading to rising crime and increase lawlessness. Informal power structures, often with a religious character are growing Religious groups are becoming increasingly prevalent and are expanding their influence at the expense of the absent state. Higher food prices and coast of living in general the main challenges for the government”.<sup>154</sup> Those all require Democratic and Economic reforms.

Besides the above explanation, the condition in Egypt become worse from day to day. Similar to that, in Libya the government in power was not capacitated enough to control the state, and unable to protected the state as well as him selves from terrorist activities in which the prime minister hanged by the unknown rebel group. The crisis in Mali, Chad, Nigerian through military activities confront with the government and the mass flow of African unemployment youth to Europe especially the area of Northern Africa found in the gate way of Europe. Those migrants of Africans going to Europe have a probability to join to the terrorism groups. The accumulation those internal and external factors are the main challenges to Northern African Arab states.

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154 Mikael Eriksson and Krisstina Zetter, (2010)

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5. Conclusion**

The Arab uprising against their incumbent governments began in all Northern African Arab states since December 2010. The uprisings in most of these Arab states happened suddenly. The region was regarded as the wealthiest in mineral resources; especially the state of Tunisia is rich in mineral resources. This state is also suitable for Agriculture, Tourism, and Chemical Manufacturing Technologies. In addition to this most Northern African Arabs are famous in social, political and cultural sectors that attract the world super powers before and after World War II.

Despite all resources the citizens of Tunisia lived under serious problems. This is because of the incumbent government is corruption. Wealth of the state was not equally distributed to the citizens rather they were in the hand of a few political leaders and their relatives as well as on Western companies. As a result of this unbalanced wealth distribution, the majority of the population remained poor and lead miserable life. Thus, the above mentioned problems triggered Tunisians especially the young to rise up against the Ben Ali's government in 2010.

#### **5.1 Economic**

The Agricultural sector owned by foreign investors aimed at producing different items for European markets at expense of local food supply to Tunisians. This resulted in food shortage and sky upping the price for food in Tunisia.

In terms of Mining & Manufacturing Tunisia is endowed with rainouts minerals and manufacturing industries. But all those were remained controlled by Trabalsi clan, RCD party leaders and Europeans. We can conclude that the firms of state and wealth of the state were in the hand of the above personalities. That means the majority of Tunisians nothing gain from the wealth of their country.

Tourism and Trade in Tunisia controlled by few. That is Hotels, Resorts, super Markets, importers and exporters of different goods controlled by Lila's brother Belhassen and

Alis son in Law Mr Materi. Thus, the concentration of wealth in the hand of few Tunisians were contributed for increasing the number of unemployment, this led to increase the number of Tunisian poorer population.

In addition to the above challenges the 2001 USA situation in relation to terrorist action, decreased the number of tourists flow to Tunisia. Because of Tunisian interlinked in trade Tourism and other bilateral relation with Western. Furthermore Tunisia was continuously attacked by terrorists. Thus, resulted in decline of income from tourism and trade sector, hence exacerbated crisis.

## **5.2 Social**

Curriculum of Tunisia was weak because of school and work place were unconnected. The technical training not closely related to the skill needed by employers. Employers complained that cannot find enough technical, scientific and skilled workers. European investors obliged to employ skilled and well trained man power from their country. These led to students after graduation to became unemployed.

Freedom of religion and Civil society were other problems. Although the Tunisians constitution guarants freedom of religious and civil society, the government restricted these rights and oppressed the civil societies by prohibiting their activities, denied registration and forcing them to operate precariously as illegal bodies.

Regional variation:-Industrial distributions in Tunisia were unevenly distributed. This situation created regional variations within the state these situation led to flow of people from poor area to the better area of job opportunity. North West and South West of the regions had high unemployment. Tunis and its surrounding cities cause a large influx of job seekers, including graduates to flock to the city.

## **5.3 Political**

President Ben Ali controlled all state powers in his hand by manipulating the constitution periodically in a way that serves his interest. He was the supreme Arbiter of the cabinet, the government, the military and judiciary.

Freedom of speech and media in Tunisia allowed in constitution, but it became impractical. Because of The Ben Ali regime highly controlled them. There were a private Radio, Magazines, TV station and News papers all of them were doing for the personal cult of Ben Ali and RCD party. Even if those firms owned by Ben Alis son-in-law and RCD members. In Tunisia there were a sample of opposition political parties, but they were not real opposition parties rather they were loyal to RCD party. The government suppressed any opposition parties, suppressed opposition medias, block and jam internet any criticism of government. At the Eve and during the revolution of Tunisia all opposition and unemployment youth and aggravated population of Tunisia were erupted as flood on the street by communicating each other through foreign media of Aljazeera TV, CNN,BBC, Twitter and SMS Messages . So media were played a great roll in Tunisian revolution of 2010.

Furthermore the enactment of anti-terrorism law of 2003 Tunisia more and more squeezed the political land scope for opposition political parties and to public involvement in politics. Thus, led to one party and one man rule in Tunisia.

Corruption and Unemployment, As discussed in the previous chapter in Tunisia the major business firms such as Car Assembly, Ship services, port services, Radio stations, Air Lines, Hotels, Banks, Insurances, Manufactories, import and export goods were controlled by the Trabalsi family of Ben Ali Wife, RCD leaders and Western capitalists at the expense of citizens. From those discussion concluded that RCD party and Ben Alis families were high corrupted but, the citizen of Tunisia were highly suffered by economic suppression.

In terms unemployment, the Tunisian government due to lack of attention to reduced unemployment and to create a new job opportunity for Tunisian educated and non-educated youth, especially for University graduates along with regional variation in economy (poorer and wealthiest region) with the state contributed to high unemployment in Tunisia.

Thus the study concluded that due to lack of interest by the incumbent government of Tunisia to address the above challenges, the popular uprising began and culminated in the

overthrow of Ben Ali government. Furthermore the revolution transferred to the neighbouring Arab states and caused heavy human and material distraction

During the Tunisian revolution erupting the response of Ben Ali was brutally killing the demonstrators and continued to arrested the demonstrators, rather than to make a resolution and a reform even if made some reforms by Ben Ali it was too late. Besides of this the neighbouring states of Libya and Egypt were trying to crush the uprising through force full. The response of Arab League and AMU was fizzle or weak beyond the meeting with EU noting in practiced.

The response of AU similar to that of AMU nothing made early and during the revolution of Tunisia without condemned the violation of humanitarian activities. Even if we can concluded that AU had lack of full information on the condition of Tunisian revolution. Because of North Africans does not have a functioning RECs it is nominal not strong as like that of other West, South and East African Economic communities. In case of Libya the AU was simply side-lined by NATO and the Arab League similar to AU because of lack of hard power.

EU and UN most of time they did not give any attention about Africa, until their interest full fill whatever the government is dictator or Democrat nothing for them . In case of Northern African especially Tunisia and Libya they had different stands. Generally during Ben Ali on Power they were best friend of Tunisia but the government was dictator for Tunisian but democrat for them , the case of Libya different from Tunisia due to their interest and hate of regime so generally both Unions are stand to full fill the interest of Western capitalists.

Tunisians had succeeded in their objectives of reform. Because of they can change a dictator leadership of Ben Ali and Ban of the dominant party RCD. Even if the revolution was concluded there is a problem in terms of threats to peace and security in the whole regions of Tunisia and neighbouring states. Most of North African states have faced jihadist challenges and AQM movements in the region. Armed groups take a refuge in those states.

## **6 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **6.1 Economy**

In terms Economy the government in power if it had facilitated equally distributed of wealth of the state was made, it may have reduced the disturbance. Not only the past one now the new government of Tunisia it is better to focuses on production of basic foods rather than producing of export cash crops. Besides of this the government initiates the youth to participation on production of Agricultural sectors and increase the number of Tunisian in Agricultural activities.

The government of Tunisia shall stabilized the market by taking different initiatives mechanisms to reduces the sky rocketing of value of basic food like that of wheat powder by increasing productive of agricultural products rather than focusing export based.

In terms of Mining and Manufacturing the new government shall imbalances its uneven distributions of manufacturing sites among the regions equally. Not only had its distribution but also gradually facilitated the mechanism in which the citizens participate on mining industries.

The new government in power made some ale nation of properties from former leaders of RCD to allocate for small business by share holding.

Tourism and trade of Tunisia which monopolised by former leaders and their relatives so now the government shall privatised gradually for small business men's by facilitating credit and saving system for the majority of citizens. Generally open the door for poor Tunisians without segregation and encourages on how citizens to join in fields of Hotel and Tourism.

### **6.2 Social**

The curriculum of Tunisia needs reforms that school and work places must interlink each other. Higher institutions become solution makers of the problems of the state by training skilled man power which needs for markets.

The new government facilitates an open debate on political Islam is to be welcomed. However, it should be recognised that engagement with Islamists groups must be on the basis of mutual understanding. Islamist groups are part of these countries' societies and should, accordingly, be supported, monitored and criticised as much and according to the same standards as other groups in society. Moreover, there should be a clear distinction made between Islamists and extremists (Muslim religion followers and Fundamentalist politicians).

Supporting civil society is commendable, but also requires skill and thought. Backing CSOs in other countries inherently infringes state sovereignty and does not always involve obvious partners/recipients. There is a fine line between support and interference and it is important that the provider's objectives are clear and transparent. The supporter must also be aware of the fact that its support can endanger the personal safety of people who work for CSOs.

The government of Tunisia balances the gap between regions in terms of Economy and unemployment by distribution of wealth between the citizens and reducing the unemployment man power by creating job opportunities for citizens.

### **6.3 Political**

Tunisian new government established the commission of inquiry to investigate the case of human right abuse of Tunisian citizens by Ben Ali and his security forces, and allotting of Tunisian property by RCD members and their relatives

Tunisian government must applies equal share of power among governmental bodies, encourages other opposition parties, freedom of media and other public participations without any division. Tunisians must facilitate real multi party system in a country by discouraging one man and one party rule.

The new government it is better to recognize trade unions, Labour Federation and independent human rights which denied during Ben Ali's. Besides of these the committee of fact finding commission was established by new government on abuses of human right

and property during revolution shall activated and speed up his activities this is the better solution to end for violence and to control illegality in the country.

#### **6.4 Corruption**

One of the headache of Tunisian problem was corruption because of this the wealth of state is in the hand of a few individuals. The government in power makes a serious measure on fighting against the corruption. The previous RCD party members, Ben Alis and Trabelsi families they must returns back the property of the state to the Tunisian people. These creates a new job opportunities for poorer Tunisians and uses for country infrastructures.

#### **For AMU**

The member state of AMU rather to conflict each other on border and other trade relation they must strengthen their relation in terms of trade, peace and security, cooperation among each other in socially, culturally and connecting in communication and infrastructures of road and free movement of man power and free trade relation. Furthermore it is better to participates in AU actively specially concerning to their regions and other relevant issues of African cases.

#### **FOR AU**

The AU lacked proper instruments to solve the revolutions and violation of human right by government in power of Northern African states. Although in the case of Libya offered mediation initiatives, the AU did not react as forcefully as it could have done if it had been equipped with the necessary policy tools. Hence, developing tools and mechanisms that could better respond to the governance issues arising on the continent would be a valuable exercise.

The AU has the instruments to penalise with sanctions and isolation those who take power by force, or those democratically elected leaders that cling to power, but similarly tools are needed for those who are beating down calls for democratic change. This, in turn, demands that the AU further develops its guidelines on what constitutes a popularly driven constitutional change of government. In Tunisia Ben Ali changed constitutions

many times in favour of his interest but the AU did nothing, so the Union must evaluate the mechanism in which to settle such kind of events for future.

Finally, it is worth noting that the AU also lacks more far-reaching instruments for dealing with security and stabilisation programmes in the above -mentioned states. The AU must develop a better capacity to manage local security and stability operations that could ease the transformation from authoritarianism to democracy. The AU has so far been a relatively passive actor with regard to either country-by-country support or regional democracy support. It remains to be seen whether the AU's future responses to the democratic transformations that have occurred will prove more effective. Some initiatives have been launched, for example, towards Libya in the form of border controls, but there have been no major new initiatives.

Another important factor is the AU's general lack of strong economic community in North Africa. North Africa does not have a functioning REC. Without an REC in North Africa, the AU was almost inaudible. Last but not least, in the case of Libya, the AU was simply side lined by NATO and the Arab League, due to its lack of so -called hard power. The lack of military might and financial capacity to sustain a military effort is key to understanding the AU's behaviour.

When comparing the EU and the AU, however, there were clear differences in their responses to developments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. While they were both quick to respond, the EU delivered concrete measures to support democratic forces while the AU largely limited itself to issuing statements and did not want to side with either the government or the rebels. It should be underlined though that the instruments available to the two organisations are very different. Moreover, the three countries are members of the AU, while the EU is an external actor. There are a number of issues that both the EU and the AU should address in order to be able to respond better to future developments in the region and beyond.

Responding to popular uprisings requires good timing. The AU needs to adopt clear and formal guidelines within its existing instruments on when to react to popularly driven changes of government. Otherwise, there is a risk that the AU will be perceived as

interfering in the internal affairs of member states or as responding too late. The AU needs to develop a framework for responding to popularly driven changes of government. The AU needs to develop clear and coherent policy guidance on how (including the choice of instruments), when and to what standards it responds to situations like those of the Arab Spring.

The AU's different response to the revolt in Libya, in comparison to those in Tunisia and Egypt, attracted much criticism. This study identifies a number of considerations that could be useful to consider in developing such criteria. Considerations would advisably focus on the nature and local context of the popular revolt. It is essential that the AU develops a policy toolbox for responding to popularly driven changes of government. In contrast to what some critics have claimed, the AU was quick to respond to events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. However, it fell short and only issued statements without taking any concrete measures.

This study finds that beyond existing instruments such as mediation and good offices, the AU lacks the institutional mechanisms to respond more concretely to violations of human rights and undemocratic governance in times of popular revolt. Some instruments that could be used include sanctions, regime isolation, recognition of opposition actors and support to civil society. International coordination is key for success.

The AU lacks early warning assessment on peace and stability among the regions. This indicated that when the Arab spring erupted in Arab states of Northern Africa, no body predicted and no one gave any suggestion on what comes next in Northern Africa. So, the African Union must develop his assessment program in terms of peace and security among the region.

Both EU and UN stands to full fill the interest of Western capitalists Besides of these as much as possible it is better to fund the Northern African states financing and militarily assists to fight against illegality and terrorist action in the region.

The EU should develop its regional approach to its southern neighbourhood. Until now, the EU's response to the Arab revolts has mainly been within the framework of the ENP,

entailing individual responses to each country. There is, however, a need for both sound bilateral policies and a solid regional approach. Such a multilateral strategy would encourage a coordinated approach by the EU. Moreover, it would facilitate integration in the MENA region. It is crucial that EU member states deliver on their pronounced intentions. If the EU is to have a role to play in the MENA region, its member states must be sincere in delivering on what has been promised. Otherwise, the new regimes in North Africa are likely to look elsewhere for support. Many of these countries identify themselves more with the Arab World or the African continent, and other actors are also increasing their presence in the region.

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## Appendixes

### Political Participation

**Table One**

**Table Shows Political Parties Representation in Parliament**

| Name of parties                   | Seat won in lower house by year 1999 | Seat won in lower house by year 2004 | Seat won in lower house by year 2009 |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Government party                  | 148                                  | 152                                  | 161                                  |
| RCD                               |                                      |                                      |                                      |
| Loyal opposition                  | 29                                   | 34                                   | 51                                   |
| Movement des Democratic socialist | 13                                   | 14                                   | 16                                   |
| Party De l unite populaire        | 7                                    | 11                                   | 12                                   |
| Union Democratic unioniste        | 7                                    | 7                                    | 9                                    |
| Parti social liberal              | 2                                    | 2                                    | 8                                    |
| Partyi vertpour le progress       | Not formed                           | Not formed                           | 6                                    |
| Dissident opposition              | 5                                    | 3                                    | 2                                    |
| Harakhat Ethtajdid                | 0                                    | 3                                    | 2                                    |
| Party Democratic progress site    | Not formed                           | Boycotted                            | Boycotted                            |
| Forum Democratic popular          | Not formed                           | Boycotted                            | 0                                    |
| Le travail et less liberties      |                                      |                                      |                                      |

Source: - Country report profile of Tunisia 2009

Note: - Ben Ali took 99.44 % of vote in 1999 and 94.4% of votes in 2004

### DEMOCRACY INDEX OF TUNISIA UNDER BEN ALI

The category scores are characterised in the following manners:-

- Whether national elections are free and fair
- The security of votes
- The influence of foreign powers on governmental and
- The capability of civil service to implement policies
- The index values are place countries within one of the four type of regime
- Full Democracies scores of 8 to 10
- Flawed Democracies scores of 6 to 7.9
- Hybrid regimes scores of 4 to 5.9
- Authoritarian regimes scores below 4

# Note: - Over all and component scores are on a scale of 0 to 10;

Over all rank is out of 167 countries

**Table Two**

**Table Shows Democracy Index of Tunisia**

| Overa<br>ll<br>score | Overa<br>ll rank | Elector<br>al<br>process | Government<br>al funding | Political<br>participatio<br>n | Politic<br>al<br>culture | Civil<br>libertie<br>s | Regime<br>type    |
|----------------------|------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 2.96                 | 141              | 0.00                     | 2.86                     | 2.78                           | 5.63                     | 3.53                   | Authoritari<br>an |

SOURCE:-[www.eiu.com/Democracy Index 2008](http://www.eiu.com/Democracy Index 2008)

**Table three****Table shows economic condition of tunisia**

| Country                 | 1999 | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <a href="#">Tunisia</a> | 16.5 | 15.6 | 15.4 | 14.3 | 13.8 | 14.2 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 13.3 | 14   | 18   |

Source: [International Monetary Fund](#) - 2011 World Economic Outlook**Table four:****Table shows that evolution of the unemployment rate, 1984-2008 (percent)**

| Years | 1984 | 1994 | 1999 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Men   | 16.9 | 15,3 | 15.6 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 12.6 |
| Women | 14.8 | 17.5 | 17.2 | 17.1 | 17,3 | 17.3 | 17.8 | 18.6 |
| Total | 16.4 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.1 | 14.2 |

Source; Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004) / Enquête Nationale sur l'Emploi (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) INS.

**Table Five:****Table Shows That Evolution of Unemployment by Age, 1984-2008 (Percent)**

| Age    | 1984 | 1994 | 1999 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|--------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 15-19  | 41.6 | 29.1 | 37.2 | 32.4 | 31.0 | 32.5 | 34.1 | 32.4 |
| 20-24  | 41.1 | 25.4 | 31.2 | 26.9 | 30.5 | 30.5 | 30.2 | 30.9 |
| 25-29  | 12.6 | 17.4 | 21.0 | 20.1 | 23.4 | 23.0 | 23.9 | 25.2 |
| 30-34  | 8.0  | 12.5 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 12.6 | 13.3 | 13.3 |
| 35-39  | 6.2  | 10.1 | 8.5  | 8.6  | 7.2  | 7.7  | 7.0  | 6.6  |
| 40-44  | 6.0  | 9.0  | 6.7  | 7.1  | 5.5  | 5.7  | 4.7  | 4.2  |
| 45-54  | 6.7  | 9.5  | 5.7  | 5.8  | 4.2  | 4.5  | 3.3  | 3.7  |
| 55 & + | 7.9  | 10.0 | 5.2  | 5.6  | 2.5  | 3.4  | 2.5  | 2.4  |
| Total  | 16.4 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.1 | 14.2 |

Source; [http://www.Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat \(1984, 1994, 2004\) / Enquête Nationale sur l'Emploi \(2005, 2006, 2007, 2008\) INS](http://www.Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004) / Enquête Nationale sur l'Emploi (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) INS) retrived:12/3/2014.

**Table six:**

**TABLE SHOW Unemployment Rate by Level of Education and Year (percent)**

| YEAR       | 1984 | 1994 | 1999 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Illiterate | 15.2 | 16.8 | 11.9 | 12.7 | 7.8  | 8.0  | 5.9  | 5.7  |
| Primary    | 22.4 | 19.2 | 18.9 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 15.2 | 13.5 | 12.3 |
| Secondary  | 11.7 | 13.0 | 16.4 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 15.3 |
| Higher     | 2.3  | 3.8  | 8.6  | 10.2 | 14.8 | 17.5 | 19.0 | 21.6 |
| Total      | 16.4 | 15.8 | 16.0 | 14.2 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.1 | 14.2 |

Source; Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (1984, 1994, 2004) / Enquête Nationale sur l'Emploi (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) INS.

**Table Seven**

**Table: Shows Unemployment Rates of Youth and Adults by Education Level, 2010**

| ILLITERATES | ILLITERATES | PRIMARY | SECONDARY | HIGER | ALL   |
|-------------|-------------|---------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Youth men   | 19.2%       | 23.4%   | 56.4%     | 28.4% | 28.4% |
| 15-24 women | 20.2%       | 24.6%   | 28.3%     | 64.5% | 33.9% |
| all         | 19.7%       | 23.7%   | 28.7%     | 61.4% | 30.0% |
| Adult men   | 4.5%        | 6.3%    | 8.1%      | 13.8% | 7.6%  |
| 25+ women   | 6.4%        | 10.6%   | 12.6%     | 30.7% | 16.1% |
| All         | 5.2%        | 7.0%    | 9.1%      | 21.4% | 9.8%  |

Source: Authors' calculations from 2010 Labor Force Survey, INS

## **Questionnaires that will be Distributed to Interviewers**

### Questionnaires for users

The objective of these questionnaires is to obtain information about the Arab spring specially the case of Tunisia cause of uprising, consequence of uprising, expansion of the uprising and success of uprising. Thus your genuine response will be paramount importance for the success of this study. In addition, there might not be exact answer for each question and you are expected to give your real personal opinion about each item.

As such you have to be based on your personal experience of the Arab Spring of 2011 and associated political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological influence, the success of Arab spring and its success. You should also be Sur that your response will be confidential and no need of writing your name in this questionnaire

### **Tank You In Advance for your Co-Operation**

- 1 According to your opinion what is the main cause for Tunisian 2010 upraising?
- 2 Why Mohammed Bouazizz immolated himself? Is there any mission behind his personality? If your answer yes what is that mission?
- 3 During upraising what was the response of the government?
- 4 During upraising in what mechanism the peoples communicated with one another?
- 5 During the first weeks of uprising what was the question of the mass people?
- 6 For this upraising was there any other foreign power to initiate the people to revolt? If your answer yes which state initiate the people to revolt?
- 7 During uprising what was the intention of Religious Fundamentalists politician?
- 8 At the beginning of the Revolution and during the revolution what was the response of the government?
- 9 What concrete measure has the government taken to ensure the revolution list some of the measure?
- 10 According to your opinion, in what mechanism the uprising had expanded in Tunisia as well as to other parts of Arabian states?

- 11 After the revolution what measure has a new established government taken to ensure fair and effective investigations of police and military officers accused of committing human rights abuses in Tunisia?
- 12 According to your opinion is it the Tunisian uprising successfully concluded? If your answer is no what is that?
- 13 According to your evaluation what did the Tunisian gain from uprising of 2010?
- 14 According to your suggestion what did the Tunisian loss from uprising of 2010?
- 15 What was the impact of Tunisian uprising on other Arabian states?
- 16 During Tunisian uprising what was the role NGO? If your answer yes please list the name of that NGO and the action used by that NGO
- 17 During Arab Spring of 2010 and 2011 what was the response of western powers specially England, USA, France, Germany, and Italy
- 18 During Arab Spring of 2011 what was the response of African union
- 19 When the Northern African states get in to crisis as an African as well as member states what role played by African Union?
- 20 According to your opinion is it the Tunisian people had a program to uprising against their leaders? If your answer yes mention it.
- 21 What are the implication of Arab Spring for other African leaders as well as peoples of Africa?
- 22 Comparatively which problems sever? The problem in Northern African Arabs and other Arabian peoples during and after revolution?

## APPENDX II

### List of key informants

The research ethics and topic of this study made the researcher to represent key informants as interviewee-1(I-1), Interviewee-2 (I-2), Interviewee -3(I-3), Interviewee-4(I-4) Interviewee-5(I-5) and Interviewee 6(I-6)

The following interviewee have been conducted and interviewed.

| No. | Interviewee        | Organization                    | Position  | Date of Interviewee |
|-----|--------------------|---------------------------------|---|---------------------|
| 1   | Interviewee-1(I-1) | African Union Peace& Security   | Officer of conflict resolution                      | March 12/ 2014      |
| 2   | Interviewee-2(I-2) | African Union Finance           | Finance Officer                                     | March 16/2014       |
| 3   | Interviewee-3(I-3) | African Union Culture & science | Researcher& representative of Tunisia               | March 22/2014       |
| 4   | Interviewee-4(I-4) | Arab League                     | Representative of Tunisia                           | April 1/2014        |
| 5   | Interviewee-5(I-5) | Embassy of Tunisia              | Ambassador of Tunisia in Ethiopia                   | April 8/2014        |
| 6   | Interviewee-6(I-6) | Embassy of Tunisia              | Secretary general Ambassador of Tunisia in Ethiopia | April 19/2014       |

## **DECLARATION**

I the undersigned declare that this Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that all sources of material used for the Thesis have been dually acknowledged

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Solomon Tadesse

Oct 2014

This Thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate

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Mohammed Hassen (Phd)

Oct 2014