



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
(RLDS)**

**DETERMINANTS OF URBAN POVERTY IN DEBRE MARKOS, ETHIOPIA:
A HOUSEHOLD LEVEL ANALYSIS**

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AUGUST 2006





**CHALLENGES OF PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET
PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AT LOCAL LEVEL:
THE CASE OF KUYU WOREDA, NORTH SHEWA ZONE,
OROMIA REGION**



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STUDIES***

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN *REGIONAL AND
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES***

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
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**By:
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADLI - Agricultural Development Led Industrialization

AGETIP - Agence d'Execution des Travaux d' Interet Public Contrete Sous- Empoli

BoARD - Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development

CFSTF - Community Food Security Task Force

CSA - Central Statistical Authority

DA - Development Agent

DDPC - Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission

Development Groups - Village level Institution locally named '*Garee Misoma*'

DFID - Department for International Development

DS - Direct Support

EAS - Employment Assurance Scheme

EBSN - Employment Based Safety Net

EGS - Employment Generation Scheme

EVA – Estimated Value of Asset

FD - Free Distribution

FFW - Food for Work

FSCB - Food Security Coordination Bureau

FSTF - Food Security Task Force

GoE – Government of Ethiopia

Got –informal community administration below Kebele

JYR - Jawhar Rojgar Yojana

Kebele - Administration Level below woreda (Peasant Association)

MDG - Millinium Development Goal

MoARD - Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

NGO - Non-government Organization

OFSP - Other Food Security Programme

PA - Peasant Association

PIM - Programme Implementation Manual

PSNP - Productive Safety Net Program

PW - Public Work

RRM - Rapid Response Mechanism

RRT - Rapid Response Team

SIF - Social Investment Fund

SNNPR - Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples Region

TGE - Transitional Government of Ethiopia

WARDO - Woreda Agricultural and Rural Development Office

WFP - World Food Program

WFSCO - Woreda Food Security Coordination Office

WFSTF - Woreda Food Security Task Force

Woreda - District level administration equivalent to Canton

ABSTRACT

Social safety net protects individuals/households from transient as well as chronic food insecurity through different mechanisms: free distribution, public works etc. All over the world safety nets are used as a part of social protection though there are differences in the design and implementation issues. Ethiopia has employed different types of safety nets such as Free Distribution (FD), Food-for-Work (FFW), Employment Based Safety Net (EBSN) and currently Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) to avert problem of food insecurity at household, local, and national level. This study therefore attempts to assess the implementation aspect of PSNP at local level (Kuyu woreda). Different issues like targeting process, mode, amount and timing of transfers, public works performance and community participation in the decision making process of the program are analyzed.

Primary data were collected using household survey focus group discussion and key informants in depth interview. Secondary data sources were PSNP implementation manual (2004) and PSNP reports of Kuyu woreda. As to the analysis descriptive statistics were used together with chi-square test to see the difference between Direct Support (DS) and PW (Public Work) beneficiary households view of targeting process fairness.

Overall, the study finds the presence of dilution and beneficiary list rotation in line with targeting process. In addition, poor geographical targeting within the woreda and corruption during the first year targeting (2005) are the challenges of PSNP in Kuyu woreda. On the other hand, transfer and public work activities are rarely demand driven. There has been weak institutional linkage, and lack of active community involvement in the decision making process of PSNP. Nonetheless, gradually implementing agencies at local level have developed better understanding of the program and its implementation.

Finally, the study recommends full family targeting, periodical community need assessment in line with payment and community asset building, strong institutional coordination commitment to wards community empowering, strong on going activities monitoring particularly the public work component.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In every society some individuals are able to take advantage of emerging opportunities better than others, in the same way that some individuals are more vulnerable to *chronic* or *transient* declines in income. Individuals are likely to be at a disadvantage in either situation if they are: most prone to unpredictable, sharp falls in real spending power, least resilient to a reduction in real spending power, least likely to have formal insurance, least likely to be attractive to informal insurance groups (such as reciprocal savings or insurance societies), which seek dependable co-contributors. Thus the poor are most likely to be in need of safety nets. In the absence of publicly supported safety nets the poor are likely to turn their production and consumption behavior toward risk avoidance instead of toward income maximization. In other words, the poor often cannot afford to be entrepreneurial and may remain under productive (Subbarao et al., 1997).

Safety nets are formal and informal mechanisms that protect people against the adverse outcomes of poverty and often they have been important counter cycle interventions in both developing and developed countries. Social policy makers and international organizations are kept in focus primarily with formal programs meant to provide or substitute for income. This includes cash and in kind transfer programs, subsidies, and labor-intensive public works programs among others. The intention is that to benefit individuals and households who are chronically food insecure and as well unable to work, experience sudden, transitory decline in purchasing power (Coates and Rogers, 2000; Subbarao et al., 1997).

Various studies on social protection issue uncover the contribution of carefully designed and implemented safety net programs. A DFID (2006) practice paper in its briefing issue indicates the impact of social transfers to improve human development after surveying rural Brazil and Kenya. Coates and Rogers (2000) tried to shed light on benefits accrue from food-based safety nets and related programs. Others have been trying to assess role and effectiveness of public works, strengthening bottom up public safety nets, targeting effectiveness and related issues (Adato et al., 1999; Tesfaye, 1994; DFID, 2006; Dorosha

et al., 2005; Herring and Edwards, 1993; Ravallion, 1999; Subbarao et al., 1997; Subbarao, 2003).

Like many other developing countries, so far Ethiopia experienced cash/food transfer via FFW, EGS, EBSN and Direct Support programs to its affected population (Sharp, 1997). Very recently, starting from 2005, the country has launched the 'Productive Safety Net Program' that intend to pull out more than eight to ten million individuals from the chronic food insecurity status within 3-5 years. Hence, this program is thought as one contributory factor to achieving the intended MDGs (DFID, 2006). The focus of this study is, therefore, to scrutinize the programs implementation aspect at woreda (district) level.

1.1 Background

Ethiopia has been faced both chronic and transitory food insecurity problems due to wide spread poverty, rapid population growth, recurrent draught, low input and output subsistence agriculture (Samuel, 2006). In the past three decades, millions of households have suffered from food shortage and received food aid on an annual basis. Even in the relatively good harvest years, results show that about half of Ethiopian farm households are food insecure. According to the DFID's August 2006 updated Fact Sheet of Ethiopia, more than 8 million men, females and children are chronically food insecure.

Major droughts in Ethiopia occurred frequently, in 1971-75, 1984-85 1999-00 and 2002-03, but nearly every year since 1980, at least some parts of the country have been affected by drought. Most of them have been concentrated geographically in the central and north eastern highlands and in the southern lowlands. Some droughts have been more severe than others, like the 1984-85, which led to a famine and the 1999-00 and 2000-03 crises (Dorosha et al., 2005; Maxwell, 2002; Hammond and Maxwell, 2003).

During the major famine in the 1984-85, the severity of the production crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the Marxist military regime refused to allow foreign aid into the country, and concentrated most of its budget on a massive military build up. Hence, almost 8 million people were affected by food shortage and at least one million people are estimated to have died (Dorosha, et al., 2005).

In 1993, the government of Ethiopia adopted the National policy on Disaster Prevention and Management, to tackle and reduce people's vulnerability to disaster having learnt a lesson from the 1984 famine. Various reforms were undertaken during the 1990s by Ethiopian government and donor community to minimize the impact of possible drought occurrence and another wide spread famine. Nevertheless, the efforts made could not prevent the 1999-2000 and 2000-2003 crisis (Clay et al., 1999; Dorosha et al., 2005). In 1999-00 the number of people in need of food accounted for 10 million due to the overall drop in production during this period. The government was unable to intervene quickly and the stock reserves had not been replenished. By late 2000, intervention by the government and international community calmed down the situation and averted a crisis of large proportion. Nevertheless, the solution did not last long and once again, in 2003 Ethiopia experienced one of the worst droughts. The annual Multi Agency Pre Harvest Assessment Team lead by DPPC, estimated that 11.3 million people would require food aid in mid 2003. While the food aid response was adequate during this period, the non-food assistance had been inadequate, reflecting a bias partly due to the nature of early warning systems focused on food production (Hammond and Maxwell, 2002; Maxwell, 2002).

Even though, Government of Ethiopia (GoE) averted a major famine in the years before 2003 and per capita food production increased in the last decade, millions of rural populations are affected by chronic food insecurity. In 2004, the government of Ethiopia designed a program that would be thought as a long run solution to food insecurity problem.

Based on the average ten years DPPC'S affected population assessment and three years proxy indicators, PSNP has planned to reach more than 8 million chronically food insecure people within the period 2005-10. Initially, five million people in about 263 woredas of eight regions would be targeted in the year 2005. Eligible households have been targeted using Geographical, Administrative and Community targeting approaches. Other important features of PSNP are beneficiaries' graduation at the end of the project, 80% resource transfer to beneficiaries and 20% covers capital and administrative costs. Mode of payment is food and/or cash (Lind and Terriessa, 2003; Samuel, 2006; MoARD, 2004).

In light of such initiatives, collecting, analyzing and availing data on the current PSNP implementation at local /woreda/ level and scrutinizing the major challenges is significant. This is what this study attempts to do.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

In response to persistence problem of both transient and chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia, reliance on food aid has been taken as a tradition by the government and its partner in the past two decades or so. Free distributions of grain, FFW, and Employment Generation Safety net were some mechanisms used in effect of achieving food security. DPPC has been handling the needs of both acute and chronic food insecure population through its annual crop assessment. However, the commission's appeal did not differentiate between chronic and acute food insecurity either in terms of need or response employment based (Clay et al., 1999; Subbarao, 2003).

Different studies on FFW/CFW programs show the perpetuation of dependency and poverty and problem of targeting that mainly based on '*conventional wisdom*' assisting households in drought prone area (Sharp, 1997). As such, vulnerable households in non-drought areas have not been reached. The reliance on emergency humanitarian aid results in disincentive to work due to food aid on free basis. In addition, ill planned and implemented Food-for-work projects in majority of the sites in the country, lacks of substantial investment on infrastructures and absence of well functioning domestic market are major problems encountered the past interventions (Yeraswork, 2000; Samuel 2006). Indeed, Samuel (2006) indicates dependency of households as well as the government of Ethiopia on western food aid because of the past interventions adverse outcomes.

Hinged upon the major developments in 1990 by FDRE i.e. rural development strategy (ADLI), policies (free market) and directives (like targeted interventions for drought prone and food insecure areas), a new coalition for food security in Ethiopia between partners, and the government has been developed. The renewed commitment of a new partnership established since June 2003 aims at achieving a major turn around of the food security challenges within a time frame of three to five years (2005-2010) (FSCB, 2004).

The issue, on which this study focuses on, PSNP, is the crucial element of the coalition idea. Hence, gradual shift away from a system dominated by emergency humanitarian aid to productive safety net system resources via multi year framework has been developed. PSNP has two objectives: protecting household assets depletion, and community assets building with basic principles of partnership, continuity, predictability, productivity, avoiding dependency syndrome, integrity with other development interventions and flexibility. Public Works (PW) and Direct Support (DS) are mechanisms used to transfer cash/food resource to the chronically food insecure people (MoARD, 2004).

Nonetheless, critics argue that PSNP is inadequately planned and organized to address basic problems that create chronic poverty and dependency in rural areas. In addition, providing relief resource and constructing public works cannot solve the problem of deep rooted and structural chronic poverty. More over, critics argue continuation of inefficient aid utilization, absence of effective mechanism establishment to stop process that has eroded local coping mechanism and resilience to withstand temporary shocks is futile. Moreover, critics argue for the need of building local institutions, involvement initiatives and means to restrain the downturn of farm labor productivity and environmental degradation that have eroded the food security of rural people (Samuel, 2006).

Different studies on social protection interventions appreciated and even recommended a switch from annual emergency response to multi-year resource transfer to chronic food insecure households. Nevertheless, ineffective targeting mechanisms are resulting in substantial leakage, manipulation, corruption, and labor market distribution (Herring and Edwards, 1993; Barrett and Clay, 2001; Deverux, 2000; Dorosha et al., 2005). The mode, level and terms of cash/food transfer affect local market (labor and grain) and often results in disruption of public works, inability to provide adequate resource to the vulnerable and problem of managing resource transfer (Coates and Rogers, 2002). Moreover, the extent of beneficiaries' participation can affect the quality, schedules and cost of public works, and sustainability and maintenance of public works would be under question (Humphrey, 1998). Modruch and Sharma (2002) underscored the importance of bottom up safety net programs i.e. formal and informal risk averting mechanisms integrity.

However, there are various literatures on food security interventions in Ethiopia, they are limited to past interventions: FFW and food aid targeting and impact and determinants of household food security Clay et al., (2001), Jayne et al., (1999), Sharp (1997) and Essete (2001) studied the food aid targeting situation in Ethiopia and came up with prevalence of inclusion and exclusion error. On the other hand Gebremdhin and Swinton (2000) emphasized the reconciliation of FFW and food aid in Tigray. In addition, Barret and Clay (2001) show the less accurate to practice self targeting in FFW program of Ethiopia due to the presence of high unemployment rate. Samuel (2006) focused on the farm households and food aid in Ethiopia. Liz Humphrey (1998) reviewed challenges of FFW in Ethiopia and scope of project evaluation Solomon and Yeraswork (1985) evaluated the impact of FFW the case of project 2488.

Very recently, Sharp, Brown and Amdissa (2006) assessed PSNP targeting in eight woredas of Tigray, Amhara and Oromiya. Amdissa (2006) also assessed the conceptual challenges for PSNP implementation. This study differs from the other spatially, methodologically as well as in variables included. Non-participant households were accessed through focus group discussion in this study while others like Sharp, 1997 Brown and Amdissa (2006), Essete (2001), and Solomon and Yeraswork (1985) employed household survey. Again, issues related to public works of PSNP (included in this study) were not included by those research projects related to PSNP due to their scope of study. The study therefore, attempts to answer the question: what problems encounter PSNP implementation in light of targeting, transfer, institutional arrangements and community participation in the study area?

1.3. Objectives of the Study

1.3.1. General Objectives

The general objective of the study is to assess challenges of PSNP implementation at Kuyu woreda, North Shewa zone.

1.3.2. Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- assess the PSNP targeting process.
- analyze the financial procedure and payment techniques.
- examine the public work execution.
- assess the institutional arrangements for PSNP implementation at the woreda
- identify extent of community participation in the decision making process of PSNP
- suggest additional /alternative means of improving PSNP implementation.

1.4. Research Questions

The following research questions are set for the purpose of this study, which attempts to assess the PSNP implementation challenges at woreda level. Specific research questions to be answered are:

- what targeting mechanisms are followed to identify eligible *Kebeles*, communities and households?
- what are the problems with financial procedures and the payment?
- what factors are confronted public work execution in the woreda?
- what institutional arrangements exist to implement PSNP?
- what is the position of the community in PSNP planning and implementation?
- what alternative means should be instituted for effective PSNP implementation?

1.5. Significance of the Study

This study endeavors to generate relevant data on the implementation challenges of PSNP, aimed at preventing household assets depletion and build community assets at woreda level. As such, issues like targeting, mode and level of the resource transfer level of community participation and challenges of PSNP are analyzed. The results of the study, therefore, are useful to both academicians and practitioners. Researchers and students of local development studies can get first hand woreda's experience in implementing PSNP which they can use for further studies elsewhere in the country where PSNP has been launched. Moreover, local policy makers, planners and non-

governmental organizations working in the area of social protection may use the study together with other related studies for their further commitment.

1.6. Methodology

PSNP has been launched in about 263 woredas in eight regions of Ethiopia, and Kuyu woreda is one of these woredas. The following criteria are taken into consideration while selecting the study area: proximity of the woreda in light with the existing time and financial limitation, and personal acquaintance with the locality, which help the researcher to get access to valuable data. In the following sections, the key process and methods employed in this study for data collection and analysis are briefly described.

1.6.1. Method of Data Collection and Sampling Techniques

The nature of the study necessitates the use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. The main data collection methods employed in this study include beneficiary households (HHs) survey, focus group discussion and key informant in-depth interview. Besides, secondary data sources were used. The quarterly PSNP reports of Kuyu woreda and sample *Kebeles*, PSNP Implementation Manual and PSNP monitoring and evaluation guideline were used.

1.6.1.1. Household Survey

- **Questionnaire**

The Questionnaire that was designed by the researcher contained questions on socio-economic characteristics of the PSNP beneficiary households, targeting process, transfer, public work related issues and community participation in PSNP. After translation to Oromo language, trained enumerators administered it. Five enumerators with 10+ education level were recruited and trained for three days. One supervisor and four enumerators were assigned to collect data in the sample *Kebeles*.

- **Sampling Techniques**

Survey population: PSNP in Kuyu Woreda has been launched in twenty *Kebeles*. The total number of beneficiary households is 2685 (2399 in PW and 286 in DS components). The survey population, therefore, was the beneficiary households.

Unit of Analysis: the unit of analysis from which information was collected is PSNP beneficiary household heads in both Direct Support and Public Work components.

Sampling Technique: At the beginning three *Kebeles* were drawn from the twenty participant *Kebeles* in the woreda using simple random sampling technique. This was followed by sample households’ selection of both Direct Support and Public Works components proportionally using systematic sampling technique from the list of beneficiaries in the sample *Kebeles*. While employing these sampling techniques, an attempt was made to get proportional female beneficiaries representative samples.

Sample size: The required sample size for the study is 269 (about 10% of the total beneficiary households in the woreda) of which 240 households are public work participants and 29 direct support participants. But four questionnaires were not filled, thus the sample size is taken as 265. Accordingly, 236 households of which 66 households are female headed were selected from the PWs participants. Twenty-nine sample households were selected from the DS participants (18 households are female headed).

Table 1.1: Sample Kebeles’ participant households and the sample size

COMPONENTS	PW			DS			TOTAL
	MHHs	FHHs	Total	MHHs	FHHs	Total	
<i>Kebeles</i>							
Wuye Gose	104	25	129 (78)*	5	9	14(9)*	143 (87)
Dire Hacho	148	17	165 (99)*	3	11	14(9)*	179 (108)
Halelu Chari	93	4	97 (59)*	7	8	15(10)*	112 (69)
Total	345	46	391(236)*	15	28	43(29)*	434(265)*

* *Sample Size*

1.6.1.2. Focus Group Discussion

To get access to valuable information with regard to gender aspects in the public work component implementation and non-beneficiaries’ view of PSNP targeting process and public work out puts, focus group discussions were held. Accordingly, three focus groups: women, non-beneficiaries and public work participants were formed in each of the three sample *Kebeles*. As such, each focus group had eight members in order to make the discussions manageable. The information obtained via this method often complemented that collected via beneficiaries’ survey and key informants’ in-depth interview. Checklists in local language were prepared to provide a framework within

which the researcher facilitated discussions to explore in-depth perception of the participants on the program.

1.6.1.3. Key Informant in-depth Interview

Members of Food Security Task Forces (FSTFs) at woreda, *Kebele* and community levels were interviewed. Individuals who were interviewed include Development Agents (DAs) and Community leaders of the sample *Kebeles*; head of the woreda food security coordination office and *got* leaders. Unstructured interview questionnaires as per role and responsibilities of the interviewee were designed and administered by the researcher.

The interview was used to generate data on challenges and opportunities of PSNP implementation at *Kebele* and woreda levels. In addition, issues regarding institutional arrangements and integration of PSNP with other local development works and food security programs were obtained through this method.

1.6.2. Method of Data Analysis

In this study, both qualitative and quantitative tools of data analysis were employed. Data collected using the above instruments were organized, coded and entered into computer. The data were analyzed using SPSS computer software (version 12.0). The results of the analysis were summarized and presented using tables and graphs. Chi-square test is used to test the difference between DS and PW beneficiary households on their view of targeting fairness. In addition, local wealth ranking was used to see resource leakage to the non-poor.

1.7. Limitation of the Study

This study has some limitations in the methodology it employed and in the process of data collection. Methodologically, the non-beneficiary households were not surveyed rather focus group discussion was used. Thus, the results of the non-beneficiary households' discussion can hardly be representative. Besides, wealth ranking was done excluding family size and by including some livestock alone, which may have an impact on the wealth status of rural households.

Major limitations during the data collection period include lack of compiled data on the activity reports of PSNP at the woreda and regional level, inadequacy of financial resource with the objective of the study and time constraint. In addition, beneficiaries' expectation of continuing PSNP might have influenced their response particularly in line with socio- economic aspects. Nonetheless, the data were handled with care and the limitations never made the research result futile.

1.8. Organization of the Thesis

This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one is the introductory chapter which provides back ground information on food insecurity situation in Ethiopia, and it also incorporates statement of the problem, objectives and research questions, significance of the study, methodology and limitation of the study. In addition, methodological issues are also briefly described here under the first chapter.

Chapter two deals with the literature review. It is devoted for conceptual issue inline with safety net design and implementation as well as empirical findings on the public works evidences from cross-country. This chapter also highlights Ethiopian government together with donors' responses against food insecurity in the previous decades (FFW, Free Distribution) and the current PSNP. Description of the physical and human conditions of the study woreda (Kuyu) comes under chapter three. Chapter four presents results and discussion. The conclusion and recommendation part fall under chapter five.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter discusses pertinent works that deal with issues under study. The concept, types and benefits of safety nets and some conceptual issues on the design and implementation of social safety nets are described under this chapter. Besides, cross-country evidences of public work implementation are also reviewed under here. Lastly, the empirical findings on food insecurity issue and their responses in Ethiopia are highlighted.

2.1. What are Safety Nets and who are they for?

Safety net is a concept defined based on its purpose, components, target beneficiaries and ownership of the programs. Accordingly, different literatures define safety nets having economic, social, cultural and political background of countries at stake.

Authors like Devereux and Wheeler (2004) define safety nets as interventions that protect lives and ensure a minimum subsistence in times of crisis, and typically food based and short term in nature. Based on what they constitute, safety nets are programs that include a broad range of mechanisms that protect individuals or households against poverty. This can be through individuals and/or household risk sharing, social services, social insurance programs, publicly funded transfers and income generation programs (Atkinson, 1995; Subbarao et al., 1997).

Alternative views of safety nets are, for example, those of Barr (1994), where their role is seen in a broader social context to not only increase consumption per capita but also to have a distributive function and create political stability. Accordingly, safety nets are defined as public interventions, which are designed to play a distributive role of resource transferring towards the poorer members of society to bring them out of poverty and provide greater opportunity for individuals to mitigate risks from unforeseen contingencies. On the other hand, Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999) argue that public interventions as a safety net assist in better managing income risks, as well as contributing to social cohesion.

Safety nets therefore do not only protect individuals from transient periods of poverty, say due to loss of employment, sudden illness, or natural disasters, but also serve to protect individuals from lifetime poverty that can arise from, say, lack of education and poor health, particularly in childhood (POST, 2006). In this study the concept safety nets mean the *Productive Safety Net Program of Ethiopia* that aims at protecting the assets of chronic food insecure households and building community assets in localities where chronic food insecurity problem has been prevailing. Public works and direct support are the two components of the program via which food and/or cash are transferred to the able bodied and labor poor chronic food insecure households (MoARD, 2006).

2.1.1. Types of Safety Net

The types of programs that make up safety nets can take the form of cash or income transfers, such as pensions, child allowances, unemployment benefits, or microfinance, or they can be transfers in kind of commodities such as food subsidies, housing subsidies, or energy subsidies. They may provide income indirectly by offering vulnerable groups employment in public works programs or more broadly, by providing services such as health and education. The followings are details of some forms of safety nets.

Cash Transfers

The two most common types of cash transfers are forms of social assistance, targeted to vulnerable groups in society such as the unemployed, children, the disabled, or pensioners, and forms of financial assistance to families. Often these are based upon the number of children living in the household. Some of such programs include family allowances in Hungary, Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic; pensions in India; unemployment benefits in Jordan (the *National Assistance Fund*); the *Janasaviya Program* in Sri Lanka, which pays for two years of basic training for targeted household heads; and a Namibian scheme of transfers to children of AIDS-infected parent (Tabor, 2002). Cash for work has been practiced in Ethiopia (see Table 2.1 p. 30).

In-Kind Transfers

These can involve transfers of commodities, such as rice or kerosene etc. The advantage of such transfers is that they are less susceptible than cash transfers to periods of high inflation, when the value of the latter can be quickly eroded. By their nature, in-kind transfers are less fungible than cash transfers, so they are often argued to be a more cost-effective means by which to raise welfare if they are correctly targeted (Subbarao and Smith, 2002).

Several types of in-kind transfers have been implemented: general price subsidies (predominantly in African and Middle-Eastern countries), quantity rationing (South Asia), food stamps (Latin America), and nutritional interventions such as direct food transfers, which are prevalent everywhere. In addition, there is also extensive use of housing subsidies throughout Eastern Europe (Ibid).

Public Works

These programs are often implemented only during a downturn in the economic cycle. Besides providing employment for the poor, the programs also serve to build a nation's infrastructure, an essential component of any development policy. It is important to keep the costs of participating in such programs low, e.g., by minimizing traveling distances, in order for them to be effective in reaching the poor. Hence, there are non-poor gainers from such programs. Examples of such schemes include the public employment schemes in Argentina (the *Trabajar Program*), Bolivia (*Emergency Social Fund*), Chile, China, India (Jorgenson et al., 1992; Nayyar, 2002) and Ethiopia (FFW, EBSN and EGS).

Informal Safety Nets

In many societies, one also tends to observe the existence of informal networks of support, based perhaps on kinship or community ties, that also seek to mitigate against income shocks. For example, in many Islamic countries such as Pakistan, the informal institution of *zakat* acts as a tax on wealth, collected by mosques and redistributed to the poor. In many Sub-Saharan countries and in India, there is a system of labor transfers within communities. In Ethiopia, risk sharing among kin and relatives via rotating savings and labor transfer and asset, food crop and money lending is known. For instance

Iqub is a rotating financial institution while *Debo*, *Wenfile* and *Jige* are labor exchange arrangements. The indigenous associations take different names in different parts of the Ethiopia (Tegegn and Asfaw, 2002). Finally, in China, there are structural features of the rural economy, such as universal and egalitarian access to land, which help to insure individuals against adverse outcomes (Basely, et al., 2003).

2.1.2. The Benefits of Safety Nets

Safety nets have wide and varied benefits to the poor as well as the non poor at both local and national level. Accordingly, Barr (1994) and Benabou (1996) indicate the redistributive and efficiency of social safety nets. Safety nets aid in transferring resources to the poor, and thus in protecting them from poverty in both the short- and the long-run. It can be argued that this raises the welfare of both the poor and the non-poor if the society is averse to inequality. Redistribution need not be at the expense of growth, and there are cases where redistributive policies have led to growth enhancements.

Safety net expenditures often serve to correct allocation of resources in a sector characterized by imperfect information, missing markets (especially in insurance), public goods, or externalities that are left to market forces (market failure) (Benabou, 1996). In addition, the poor will not have to resort to using short-run coping strategies, such as selling their assets in times of crisis, and so will be left better off in the long run. By becoming less vulnerable to income shocks, the poor will also be able to invest in their human and physical capital, namely they will be more willing to spend time and resources on education and machinery (Barr, 1994).

Sabbarao and Smith (2002) identified the political economy of safety nets. As such, social assistance to the poor may empower them to engage in the policy making process at both a local and national level. This may well reduce the probability of socially inefficient political decisions being made solely for the benefit of elites or certain special interest groups, or other types of political failure. The engagement of the poor in the policymaking process can have self-enforcing effects in that, if a government demonstrates a commitment to reducing poverty, incentives increase for political organization by the poor. The poor are therefore in a better position to place policies

designed specifically for themselves onto the political agenda. This may have the effect of raising support for the government in the long run.

Rodrik (1998) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) asserted that safety nets can play an important role in providing for social cohesion in a number of ways. For instance, at times of macroeconomic crisis or adjustment processes, hard economic decisions often have to be made. By raising social cohesion, safety nets may raise the political acceptability of market-based reforms that often need to be made in the aftermath of economic crisis to enable a country to reach a path of sustainable growth. Sala-i-Martin using cross-country data shows that public transfers have a positive correlation with growth, and serve as input into national productivity.

2.2. Safety Nets Design and Implementation Issues

Some conceptual issues from various studies are compiled for better design and implementation of safety net programs.

A. Targeting

Targeting is a way to reach the poorest /intended households, avoid resource leakage to non- poor and to increase the cost effectiveness of a program, particularly public works (Coates and Rogers, 2002). One question that often arises in the implementation of a workfare program is who should be considered eligible to participate in the program. Some countries have laid down specific criteria. Given a fixed amount of resources available to transfer to a population, what method of screening prospective recipients does one employ to generate the greatest aggregate reduction in income poverty and other in director of choice? The process of selecting effective targeting strategy is debatable by itself as design and implementation issues have a direct relation ship on effectiveness of the chosen targeting mechanisms (Humphrey, 1998; Barrett and Clay, 2001). In Korea, for example, only one member per household, the head of the household (usually male) can participate. When the household head is receiving an unemployment benefit, the spouse (female member of the household) is not allowed to participate.

There are four broad categories of targeting mechanism (Sharp, 1997; Coates and Rogers, 2002; Humphrey, 1998).

Geographic targeting- this is when programs are targeted spatially by state, district, municipality, or community in the expectation that these areas are relatively homogenous according to wealth, income or other indicators of vulnerability. Barret and Clay (2001) commented that this approach restricts participants administratively; it often entails substantial leakage to the non needy within the target sub population.

Administrative targeting- this mechanism applies a specific set of criteria for qualified household selection. It requires documentation of household incomes and assets. However, this mechanism can be accurate relatively in higher income settings to select the most vulnerable households. In low-income settings, it is infeasible and often open to leakage.

Self-targeting- transfers that have no administrative restriction or participate on, but the nature of which is supposed to induce only those within a target beneficiaries group to self-target in participation. Projects offer low level of wage payment that only the needy will want to participate in public works. The problem with this approach is undermining the provision of adequate wage to the most vulnerable due to low enough wage level. On the other hand, in areas where labor market is imperfect self targeting does not prevent the non-needy from participation (Humphrey, 1998; Barrett and Clay, 2001).

Community targeting- allows individuals who feel they should qualify to put themselves forward to participate in the safety nets. The final selection decision rests with a committee made up of community members. However, this mechanism adheres community members' inherent understanding of their neighbors and avoids expensive and lengthy administrative costs. Difficulty may arise in having an appropriate representative in the committee (Humphrey, 1998).

B. Transfers

The mode, level and timing of payment constitute another aspect of PSNP design and implementation. As such, the following are some details of issues related to safety nets resource transfer.

Food based Vs Cash based safety Nets - After reviewing the work of some authors, Coates and Rogers (2002) justified the advantage of in kind provision over cash to chronic food insecure household. Food based safety nets have an advantage over cash

transfers to gain political support for easy transfer, self targeting and supply response to scarce food. Besides, the cost of transporting, handling, and storing the food as well as the institutional and human capital needed to store, distribute, and manage effectively together with market distortion, are some draw backs with food-based safety nets.

Cash transfers are likely to have more positive secondary and multiplier effects than food aid, because cash is spent on purchasing goods and services and this in turn creates employment and income for the providers of these goods and services. "Derived destitution" is likely to be contained. Conversely, food aid does not boost purchasing power or stimulate demand directly, (though some food aid might be sold or exchanged), so it will have smaller multiplier effects.

In Africa, almost all cash transfers tend to be spent (very little is saved), while almost all food transfers tend to be consumed (very little is sold). So the economic multiplier effects of cash transfers are strong and mostly positive, while the economic multiplier impacts of food aid are negligible at best and negative at worst. Nonetheless, the current knowledge supports the trade off based on the ground situation of the program areas.

Level and Terms of Transfers- it has had an impact on implementation of safety nets. Determining the level of the wage rate for public works in relation with market wage rate has an implication for self-targeting effectiveness as well as the general macro economic condition of a given country. There is cross country and intra country variation in level of wage rate. The case of Chile and Indian state of Maharashtra, which determined level of wage rate at 70% minimum wage and below the minimum wage rate respectively, is a success history. In Chile it encouraged the poor to self-targeting and in Maharashtra it drawn vast numbers of poor, especially women to work site (Sabbarao, 2003).

On the other hand, the public works program wage, which was equal to a minimum wage, attracted substantial numbers of the non-poor to the program. In countries like Tanzania and Botswana, where program wage was maintained at higher than the market wage Jobs had to be rationed (Ravallion, 1999; Tesfaye, 1994). In countries where non-self targeting approaches were used, level/amount of cash/food transfer in return to participating in public works or direct support can have a significant macro-economic impact. The low enough the resource transfer may undermine the objective of providing adequate resource

to the vulnerable households. Besides, the higher the resource transfer may result in inflation and/or crop market distortion.

‘Safety Net delayed is Safety Net denied’ as quoted in the PSNP manual (2004) of Ethiopia implies the timings of resource transfer to the needy/chronically food insecure households. Efficient food/cash flow mechanism, therefore, is crucial for implementation of safety net programs. Exclusively, this can be determined by the government financial management system, level of infrastructural development and capacity of implementing agencies together with the punctuality of donor communities. Delays in payment can cause serious disruptions to beneficiaries and undermine project objectives in the case of public works (Humphrey, 1998).




Fig 2.1: Interplay of the constraints that affect Productive Safety Net program implementation.

Source: Adapted from Nelson and Huntington (1976), Sabbarao (2003) and Oyugi (2000; cited in Tegegn and Asfaw, 2002)

C. Community Participation

Participation means different things for different people, and different authors define the concept as having different issues at stake. Some authors define participation in terms of model, kinds, source (initiatives) etc. The following paragraphs provide an insight to participation.

Warner (1997) identified three types of participation models: 'popular' participation, 'selective' participation and 'consensus' participation. The first refers to empowerment (self-reliance and self-mobilization). It is manifested via community facilitated planning and local decision-making. The second model is concerned with institutional stability with key activities of stakeholders' selection on piece meal basis via public consultation and often 'popular' participation. The last on the other hand aims at economic, social and environmental sustainability. In this case, stakeholders targeting is done, negotiation capabilities strengthened through 'popular participation' and awareness rising for policy makers (followed by collaborative negotiations) shared analysis, decision making and implementation. Hence, 'popular' participation is used in all models.

Cohen and Uphoff (1980) cited in Tegegne and Asfaw (2002) divided participation kinds: participation in implementation, participation in benefits, participation in decision making and participation in evaluation.

Local development initiatives seek planning at district level so as to assure the bottom up (participatory) planning that has a significant impact on the locality. To access valuable and reliable information of the targeted locality, for cost reduction through local resource mobilization and to get consent of the beneficiaries as well as for timely completion of the projects in the program, community participation is an important tool (Sharma, 2000; Mwimba, 2002).

Oyugi (2000) cited in Tegene and Asfaw (2002) identified lack of knowledge of the people, lack of ideological support from the government and absence of institutional framework as key constraints to participation. Huntington and Nelson (1976) identified socio-cultural impact of community participation in an intervention (political) in their localities. As such, lack of adequate information and appropriate contacts, time factor, expectation of request and/or pressure and distinctions based on differences from the poor

side are major contributing factors for passive participation. Tegegn and Asfaw (2002) indicated absence of genuine decentralization as a key factor for the constraints to participation. Often, they argued participation by representation is not a substitute for community participation.

Herring and Edwards (1993) witnessed the problems of manipulation and corruption, which affect participation profiles even in seemingly successful Maharashtra's EGS in India. Hence this is the result of loose beneficiaries' participation in decision making process of the project during its implementation.

In effect of active community participation, building local administrative capacity, strong local leaders and officials' commitment, strong horizontal and vertical institutional coordination, and good governance are required. Participation mode has its own impact on inclusion and exclusion rate of individuals. The quality and sustainability of the projects done in the public works are largely affected by level of targeted individuals' involvement in the planning and implementation

D. Capacity

The approaches that have been adopted in recent years to improve the administration of cash transfer programs include automation, the use of modern cash dispenser technology, better record keeping, consolidating program management responsibilities, and contracting out functions that can be done better by the private sector. In industrialized nations, governments have built their institutional capacity to implement cash transfer programs by separating policymaking from program administration, introducing program performance charters, improving program monitoring, consulting with stakeholders, taking active measures to combat program fraud, and using research to guide the reform of the program (World Bank, 2003).

E. Cost Effectiveness

Cost effectiveness of public work programs refers to how big a share the wage bill constitutes of the total cost Subbarao (2003). The share of wages in total cost, the nature of the asset created and the availability of technically and economically feasible labor-based methods of production is issues frequently raised in the public work execution.

Achieving high labor intensity is not easy in practice, even when known labor-based methods of production are available due to a lack of familiarity with labor-based method of production (Adato et al., 1991). Development and dissemination of labor intensive designs for public work programs coupled with quick payments, can encourage implementing agencies to adopt-labor based methods.

F. Integration

Success of local interventions is hinged on critical factors like integration and coordination among themselves. The reasons are the fact that there are several stakeholders in district/ local government or community planning and development, and the diverse and often complex community needs (Mwimba, 2002). In line with this, PSNP requires careful integrated planning with food security programs and local development works to achieve its intended goals. Humphrey (1998) recommended integrity of food-for-Work projects with others to avoid competition for resources and conflict /overlap of objectives. In addition, Hashemi (2006) argued for safety net beneficiaries' graduation to Micro Finance Institutions service to accrue additional income from off-farm activities. Thus, an organized effort is required to graduate food insecure individuals via PSNP. Moreover, graduation alone is not guarantee unless the rural livelihood is diversified.

G. Public Transfers and Private Safety Nets

The intervention of governments and their partners to avert income shock of households in rural areas via programs like safety nets as an ex-post risk management is emphasized. The design of such programs more often than not gives less attention to informal risk coping mechanisms of households. Social policies are emphasizing formal resource transfers in either of the ways believed better counter cyclical program like direct support, public works, employment generation or others (Coates and Rogers, 2000)

Valuable empirical information is now available demonstrating the importance of personal reciprocity and informal safety nets in developing countries and in some economies in transition traditional coping mechanisms reduce economic insecurity. In the absence of formal interventions, households used to practice informal mechanisms such as risk pooling arrangements among kin, friends, neighbors etc, risk sharing across households at a given point of time and across time. Besides, the nature of the informal

arrangements best suited to cope with income shock varies with the type of risk (Morduch and Sharma, 2002). Hence, careful consideration of informal risk coping mechanisms is crucial to strengthen the formal safety nets. Indeed, the social costs/stigma that may arise due to exclusion in the programs, between households would be reduced.

Public transfers, therefore, should complement not only broader developmental activities, but also the prevailing traditional arrangements. The usefulness of public transfers for poverty relief is greatly reduced if public transfers induce reductions in private transfers (remittances, and so on) to the poor. Private transfers could be minimal if an entire country or parts of a country are visited by a drought, or if transfers are made between groups that are poor.

2. 3. Public Works Implementation issues: Cross-Country Evidence

Under this section, experience of developing countries in relation with labor based safety net is reviewed. Some major implementation issues of public works in India, some Latin American countries and Africa are described. The experience of Ethiopia is separately dealt with under section 2.4.

The major implementation issues related to safety nets are the mechanisms of beneficiary selection, financing and flow of funds, project type and site selection and program monitoring and evaluation. All these aspects are influenced by the institutional capacities. Several implementation issues of safety net programs are quite diverse across countries. Indeed, the nature of safety net programs has been related to their implementation i.e. supply driven and demand driven programs are implemented differently. Looking at cross-country evidences of public works implementation is significant for the purpose of this study.

Among the world's largest and best known rural and urban public works are India's Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (JRY) and the Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS), both designed to help ensure gainful employment for poor households and to contribute to community asset creation (infrastructure). The two programs are administered differently (Nayyar, 2002).

The administration of JRY is very complex and of the total fund made available three fourth of it is earmarked for various rural infrastructure schemes. Each state received funds based on the proportion of poor persons residing in them. States in turn allocate JRY funds to district based on population shares and an index of backwardness. From JRY, funds pass down to block and village level strictly according to population share. The village elected local bodies (Panachyats), subject to the basic program guidelines and district Rural Development Authority, administrates work plans and contracts. According to World Bank (1998), JRY generates an estimated one million person days of employment per annum. Some 30 to 40 percent potential beneficiaries were participating in the program. JRY is largely supply driven, implemented by local bodies but subject to pre- determined centrally driven guidelines.

Contrast to JRY, EAS is demand driven in which district authorities apply directly to the central administration for funding and allocations. Unlike JRY, in the EAS the district collector has over all responsibilities for coordinating the work and allocating funds among blocks within a district (Nayyar, 2002).

Participatory assessment of both JRY and EAS programs in one of the India's state of Uttar Pradesh have pointed to poor implementation of the program. Elected officials at the village level make decisions on eligible participants in the program. These often excluded members of some socially deprived communities in some provinces. In addition, participants perceived the main objective of the public works programs poorly. Most poor participants perceived the JRY and EAS as infrastructure projects rather than employment generation and income support to smooth consumption and increase purchasing power. Regardless of the differences in the flow of funds and the deferring approaches of the two programs, participatory evaluations suggest the persistence of implementation problems (Nayyar, 2002).

Nonetheless, the implementation experience of the Argentina Trajabar workfare program has proven to be positive. Several factors have enabled a more effective implementation: clear and transparent guidelines from the central government, leaving implementation details in a decentralized fashion to local and municipality authorities. The project staffs were highly committed, funds were distributed across localities following transparent

poor unemployed distribution, and here was a sharp focus on monitoring and evaluation so that problems could be identified early and dealt with. Proven project evaluation and supervision procedures were adapted from those of social funds and were successfully implemented. Often the selected projects were published to further enhance transparency (Sabbarao et al., 1997).

In countries like Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador, Peru, Panama and Nicaragua, small-scale public works projects have been implemented under the aegis of Social Investment Funds (SIFs). These projects are demand driven i.e. they are submitted by the community. The communities themselves implement the projects after being proven by SIFs. The projects have focused mainly on social infrastructure and often created temporary jobs. For instance, in Bolivia, the targeting and implementation performance have been good. Seventy seven percent of the participants came from the poorest 40 percent of the population. After the intervention, the average worker improved his/her income by 67 percent (Jorgenson et al., 1992). By correcting the deficiency of initial targeting, the program won praise for speedy and efficient implementation and for substantial gains to the economy. Despite the success, major problem confronted SIFs on implementation was lack of responsibility for the execution of the projects. Indeed, this is due to lack of capacity of the very poor community who were in charge of the project implementation (Ibid).

In Africa too, quite a few public works projects have been financed and sponsored by Social Investment Funds. By 1998, there were 19 public works projects implemented through social funds in 12 African countries, including Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Ghana (Frigenti and Harth, 1998). Several donors in addition to the World Bank supported over half of these projects. The principles are the same as in Latin America, with project proposals prepared by communities and submitted to the SIFs for approval and financing.

In Senegal, Agence d'Execution des Travaux d'Interet Public Contre le Sous-Emploi (AGETIP)'s success in implementing public works was largely due to its insulation from clientelistic politics (Marc et al., 1995). In contrast, Ghana's public works project was integrated into government ministries and consequently faced delays in implementation. Line departments of governments in some African countries have implemented public

works projects on a large-scale, albeit with donor funds. In implementing such projects, however, evidence suggests that the public works departments of governments typically favored equipment-based methods because they were perceived to be superior to labor-intensive methods and completed the work faster. It is quite possible that in some countries, equipment-intensive projects may offer greater opportunities for rent seeking (Stock and de Veen, 1996).

In some countries, such as Ghana, the task of implementing public works was entrusted to private contractors. Evidence suggests that contractors have also been reluctant to adopt labor-intensive public works, largely because of the complexities of managing large labor gangs (Stock and de Veen, 1996). In addition, in projects financed by the government, delays in payments often discouraged private contractors from adopting labor-intensive methods. Contractors feared workers would strike if their wages were delayed due to late arrival of government funds. Labor-intensive methods were more favored in donor-funded projects where contractors received prompt payments.

In Zimbabwe, two major programs operated. The Food-for-Works program replaced free distribution of food in 1989. Villagers themselves selected the projects. Local food security was the primary goal, so that other aspects of the program such as quality and maintenance suffered. A second program of public works began a few years later with the primary objective of development. Technically qualified persons have begun the program with materials and tools provided by the government. In Zimbabwe, there has been much greater community participation than is often the case and the demand-driven nature of projects should be commended (Munro, 2005).

The financing arrangements in African countries are different from those found in South Asia and Latin America in three key ways: in Africa, public projects are donor funded; domestic country contributions are negligible, the provision of capital budgets by donors was often tied to technical assistance, implementation of public projects is rested largely with government departments (Tesfaye, 1994). Because programs were implemented largely by government agencies as part of their routine work program, little attention was paid to such details as timing of the program, monitoring, quality of roads built, and so

on. For example, in Tanzania, the timing of works failed to synchronize with agricultural slack seasons. In all programs, wages are set uniformly regardless of type of work, location of work site, and variations in the work force (age, sex, education, experience, and so forth) Ibid. He also notes that the long-term benefits of public works projects are much diminished in Tanzania due to poor maintenance of the assets (Ibid).

Another problem is lack of capacity in many African countries. When programs are donor funded and short-term (typically for three or four months following a drought), domestic capacity is unlikely to be built. In this respect, the experiences of India and Bangladesh are worth contrasting with the experience of African countries. In both Bangladesh and India, most public works projects operate throughout the year, albeit with seasonal ups and downs in coverage. As a result, much domestic capacity is created over time. Projects that rely chiefly on government agencies and ministries for sub-project identification and implementation are most likely to suffer from delays and limited capacities (technical, administrative, financial, and participatory) (Tesfaye and Sisay, 1999).

When many donors implement different public works programs in the same country, lack of coordination unduly stretches scarce administrative capacity, so that the coverage of these programs is often neither extensive nor deep. Most public works projects in Africa do not have clear criteria for initiation, expansion, contraction, or dissolution. Far from being a guarantee, or being there when needed, public works have operated in much of Africa only when donor funding was available. Fragmented coverage and weak capacity to respond in times of need undermine the credibility of public works programs to perform an insurance function for the poor of Africa (Ibid). In all countries, and particularly in Sub-Saharan countries, assured funding, community participation, sound technical assistance, and proper understanding of societal structures and communities where projects are located can vastly improve the effectiveness of the workfare program as a risk-mitigating intervention.

2.4. Response to Food Insecurity in Ethiopia

2.4.1. Food Aid in Ethiopia

The rationale for food assistance was gradually expanded in the late 1980s from famine relief to "rehabilitation", or the use of food aid as a wage pool to recruit labor to build perceived useful local infrastructure (Webb, von Braun, and Yisehac, 1992). By the early 1990s, such efforts to "link relief to development" became popularized and integrated into the food aid programs of both donors and the government.

In 1974, the Ethiopian government established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to monitor the incidence of food insecurity across the country and coordinate food aid activities, including those of international NGOs. In 1985, 48 international NGOs were operating relief projects in the country. In the mid-1990s, 50 were active. Local church and other organizations have also been quite active historically (Webb, von Braun, Yisehac, 1992).

Food aid in Ethiopia has historically taken two major forms: free distribution (FD), which is sometimes referred to as "emergency" or "relief" distribution, and food for work (FFW), sometimes referred to as "development" food aid (Sharp, 1997).

- **Free Distribution (FD)**

Free Distribution (FD) programs in Ethiopia distribute cereals and cooking oil directly to households. Food aid allocations are made in two stages: from federal authorities to weredas and then from woreda authorities to households. The administrative mechanisms used at each level are distinct (Sharp, 1997). In the first stage, the woreda administration determines the number of households "in need" within each woreda. These assessments are forwarded to the zonal, then regional, and subsequently federal-level Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). Based on the supply of food aid pledged by donors, and its own field-level assessments, the DPPC then modifies (usually downward) the number of households to be allocated food in each region.

The second stage of selecting beneficiary households occurs after woreda-level allocations have been determined. According to the Government's National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Management (TGE, 1993), local-level responsibility for

selecting food aid beneficiaries lies with the woreda administration, but implementation is actually carried out by elders and community representatives at the Peasant Association (PA) level. Individual Peasant Associations take on the task of preparing lists of beneficiary households for approval by the woreda council. Peasant Associations (PAs) are urged to use a set of selection criteria to determine which households are eligible, including livestock ownership, grain production, assets, income, and household size (Sharp, 1997), but the control is theirs'; neither the DPPC nor NGOs have control over selection of beneficiaries.

- **Food for Work/ EBSN/EGS**

Ethiopia's official food aid policy states that no able-bodied person should receive food aid (food for work) without working on a community development project in return. This is complemented by work programs used to build community assets such as roads, bunds, and dams, although in principle, they are also targeted to the most vulnerable areas to alleviate hunger.

FFW programs have operated under widely differing rules (Sharp, 1997). In some cases, self-targeting has been used; by which households decide whether to send members to work at the offered food wage. Typically, a given project pays a constant daily food wage, not differentiating by the human capital of workers (Sharp, 1997).

In the past, offered wages have typically been higher than local market wages (Webb, von Braun and Yisehac, 1992; Sharp 1997), which should result in much less income targeting than in a low wage regime. The justification for providing in-kind wages that are higher than local wage rates for manual labor is that poverty is endemic in many rural areas, so that targeting is implicitly not needed, plus a concern that a "livable" wage be paid. However, programs in other areas have targeted FFW opportunities more narrowly to specific types of households. In these schemes, a local community group chooses households who would be eligible for participation based on some underlying criteria, such as land size, livestock, and other asset ownership (Sharp, 1997). In some cases there is de jure rationing of either spaces (restricting the number of eligible participants per household) or time allowed per person. Table 2.1 summarizes the major examples of

FFW/CFW in Ethiopia including project 2488, which is one of the largest projects in Africa.

Table 2.1: Summary of major FFW and CFW projects in Ethiopia

Project and Location	Years of operation	Agencies	Description of Works and Other of comments
Project 2488 Expansions 1, 2 and 3	1: 1980-87 2:1987-94 3:1995	WFP and MoA	Rehabilitation of forest, grazing and agricultural lands Biggest FFW in Africa
Cash for food (CFF) Gonder and Shewa	1984/5 1990	UNICEF RRC	Digging wells and ponds, vegetable gardening. Cash relief for locally purchased grain
Damot Weyda FFW	1985-	Concern	Relief FFW project. Size has expanded according to demand
Peasant Agricultural Development Programme, (PADEP), Shoa	1989	EC and MoA	Works mainly involve soil conservation and forestry. Cash-for-work project
<u>EBSN Pilot Projects</u> Addis Ababa	1991-	WFP/Concern	Slum upgrading, health and socio-economic development, 80% women participants.
Wobera, E. Harrarghe	1992-	WFP/MoA Oxfam UK	Rehabilitation of agricultural lands/rural infrastructure
Merti-Jeju, Arsi	June 1992 to 1994	WFP/MoA	Road construction. Experiment in self-targeting and implementation of EBSN through local government.
Kilte Awlaelo, Tigray	Jan 1993-	WFP/GTZ	Construction of roads, dams and terraces. Mainly for families of ex-servicemen
Employment Generation Scheme (EGS)	1993-	TGE	Various activities
Tekle Haimanot FFW, Addis Ababa	1992-	WFP/SIDA & IHAUDP	Poorest district of Addis Ababa 'Integrated Urban development project'
Koisha CFW, North Omo	1992-	SOS sahel	Construction of local road from Koisha to Bele
Micro project programme FFW, Tigray	1995-2005	REST/31 donors	500 micro-dams
Hinatalo-Wajirat FFW, Tigray		ERCS/ SEART	Dam building

Source: Liz Humphrey (1998)

In relation to the aforementioned food insecurity intervention mechanisms in Ethiopia, different literatures shows more or less similar problems on the implementation that

results in adverse impact on the beneficiaries. For instance, Clay et al., (2001), Jayne et al., (1999) and Essete (2001) found that food aid targeting in the country suffered from some sort of leakage to the non poor. Solomon and Yeraswork (1985) indicated little impact of the FFW (project 2488) on the socio-economic aspect of the beneficiaries due to inadequacy of the payment and unsustainability of the built community assets. In addition, Solomon and Yeraswork found perpetuation of dependency syndrome among the beneficiary households. Humphrey (1998) reviewed literatures on food insecurity interventions and came up with weakly institutionalized monitoring and evaluation procedures. The next section (2.4.2) describes the current intervention i.e. Productive Safety net Program and related literatures.

2.4.2. Productive Safety Net Program

A Food Security program has been put in place which plans to graduate the chronically food insecure in five years. Many poor households are constrained to take advantage of the food security program because of the risks they face and their susceptibility to asset depletion. An emergency program has been in place financed through an annual appeal system with updates; it failed to prevent asset depletion and did not enable the construction of useful community assets. Therefore, the Productive Safety Net Program has been designed since 2003 as an asset protection mechanism for the household level and to create productive community assets. Expected outcomes of the program are household assets build through other programs are maintained so that recipient households come out of the problem of food insecurity. Livelihood opportunities are enhanced through the creation of community assets and reduction in environmental degradation in safety net program areas.

PSNP has two Components: Public Works (PW) and Direct support (DS) (for those chronically food insecure households without labor: disabled, elderly etc.). Geographically woredas in the eight regions identified (see section 1.2) are eligible to the program. Geographical targeting within the woredas is done by the woredas' implementing agencies. A community committee is set up by the *Kebele* to select beneficiary households, and general assembly reviews list, amends and endorses it. A review mechanism is in place to consider other beneficiaries for exceptional conditions.

Appeal committees exist at *Kebele* and at district level to handle targeting complaints (MoARD, 2004)

Based on the average ten years DPPC'S affected population assessment and three years proxy indicators, PSNP has planned to reach more than 8 million chronically food insecure people within a given time period (2005-10). Initially, five million people in about 263 woredas of eight regions would be targeted for the year 2005 and 7-8 million people for 2006 and 2007. Eligible households have been targeted using Geographical, Administrative and Community targeting approaches. Other important features of PSNP are beneficiaries' graduation at the end of the project, 80% resource transfer to beneficiaries and 20% covers capital and administrative cost and resource transfer in food/cash. (Lind and Terriessa, 2003; Samuel, 2006; MoARD, 2004).

Eligibility is based on three years continuous dependence on relief (a proxy indicator). For public work is based on this and on the presence of adult able bodied labor. All household members of a targeted household qualify –but only adults work; and will work for those e.g. children who cannot work. Households with no labor, and no other means of support, are eligible for direct support (MoARD, 2004).

To implement the program multi-agency coordination structure (steering committee) exists in every district comprised of representatives of relevant departments. The government department responsible for implementation varies depending on the type of work. These include Office of Agriculture, Rural Road Office; Water Desk etc. Capacity of implementing agencies would be regularly assessed and capacity building activities are expected to be regularly undertaken (Ibid).

Each household member is eligible to receive a transfer equivalent to 15kg of cereal (in cash/food). At the wage rate set, which was less than the market wage rate, each adult is required to work for five days/month for each member of the household. Those benefiting from the direct support component are also eligible for the same amount as those participating in PWs. The choice of food or cash is mainly dependent of grain availability in the market. The food option will be maintained as long as local markets cannot deliver the required food commodities. The default in the program is cash. Therefore, when markets can provide food will be scaled back. There is flexibility in use of food/cash as

transfer modalities; an additional inflexible factor in food versus cash is the resources provided by the donors. Some donors can only provide one or other resource (Ibid).




Fig 2.2: Relationship between PSNP and Other Food Security Programs
 Source: MoARD, 2004

Cash to be paid brought from bank and physically moved to distribution points. Payments are made on a monthly basis. Community representatives oversee cash payment process. Food process is similar; but distribution points are more limited because the need for storage facilities. A Food Security Program exists with the aim to enable households to build assets and increase income over a five-year period. Public work beneficiaries will benefit from the food security program. PSNP meets current food needs, while participation in other FS programs allows graduation. PSNP would also contribute to food security enhancement through the community assets created (Ibid).

The monitoring aspect looks at outputs and process while the evaluation component focuses on impact. It is one unified system for PSNP and other food security programs. This allows us to capture both asset protection and graduation. The structure of the monitoring and evaluation system is decentralized with both vertical and horizontal reporting. For monitoring, data are collected on monthly/quarterly basis while evaluation data are collected annually Responsibility for data collection is with trained government staff responsibility for monitoring and evaluation rests with trained government staff located within the coordination agency. In order to minimize and address humanitarian risk in program areas; a rapid response mechanism was developed (Ibid).

Nonetheless, Lind and Terriessa (2006) argued that PSNP is inadequately planned and organized to address the basic problems that create poverty and dependency in rural Ethiopia. In addition, they argue that the continuation of inefficient aid utilization and lack of effective mechanisms to uproot the evils have eroded the local coping mechanisms. PSNP implementation challenges are also tied with conceptual understandings of the implementation manual. Amdissa (2006) indicates the need for localizing some concepts unfamiliar with local people (for instance the concept 'Safety net').

On the other hand, results of the study undertaken by Sharp et al., (2006) shows the better PSNP targeting process in the second year (2006) of program implementation compared with the first year (2005). The study incorporated eight woredas in Oromia, Tigray, SNNP and Amhara regional government found the transfer of PSNP is currently reaching the poorest.

Generally, in this chapter, conceptual underpinning of safety net design and implementation together with empirical findings from different countries were discussed. This provides an insight onto the analysis part of the study.

This study differs from the other related studies reviewed above under this chapter in many ways and it also shares similar features in some cases. Firstly, it differs from the cross countries public work implementation in scope and often the programs differ from PSNP by their nature. But, similarity of these literatures with the study is on the public work because it is one of the PSNP components. Secondly, this study differs from various studies undertaken in relation to food insecurity in Ethiopia (Solomon and Yeraswork, 1985; Essete, 2001; Clay et al., 2001, and Jayne et al., 1999; Barret and Clay, 2001) as it focuses on PSNP while the others were studying FFW and other forms of food aid programs. Thirdly, it differs from PSNP related studies (Amdissa, 2006; Sharp et al., 2006 and Lind and Terriessa, 2006) in scope and methodology (see section 1.2). As such this study is guided by the analytical frame work presented under Fig. 2.1 which shows interplay of different variables and constraints of PSNP implementation. There are external and internal constraints that affect the community participation which thus affect the targeting process, mode, timing, and amount of payment and the schedule, quality and gender aspect of public works.

CHAPTER THREE

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY WOREDA

Under this section, the physical as well as human condition of the study woreda is described. As such, the chapter will provide a concise understanding of the general background of the study woreda.

3.1. Physical Settings

Kuyu Woreda is one of the twelve woredas (Kuyu, Wara Jarso, Dera, Hidhabu Abote, Girar Jarso, Wuchale Jida, Kimbibit, Degem, Sululta Mulo, Abichu Gnea, Aleltu and Berch) in the North Shewa, Oromia Regional government. The woreda is located astronomically between $9^{\circ} 36' 34''$ North and $9^{\circ} 56' 56''$ North latitude and $38^{\circ} 05' 00''$ East and $38^{\circ} 34' 13''$ East longitude. Relatively it shares the same boundary with Wara Jarso in the North, Ginde Beret in the west, Meta Robi and Ada'a Berga in the South, Hidhabu Abote woreda in the North East and Degem woreda in South East directions respectively (Oromia Geographic Information System Office). Garba Guracha is administrative center of Kuyu woreda and it is located along the Addis Ababa-Gojjam high way about 156 km far from Addis Ababa in the northern direction. The woreda is divided into 23 rural and two urban *Kebeles*.

Four agro-ecological zones namely *Kur (Wurch)*, *Woinadega*, *Dega* and *Bereha* are found in Kuyu woreda with large proportion of *Woinadega* and *Dega*. About 95% of the woreda belongs to *Dega* and *Woinadega* of which the later constitute 47% of the total area. The woreda constitutes the Northern part of Ethiopian central plateau with other woredas. The area of Kuyu woreda is 97,400 hectare of which 52,844 hectare, 18,321 hectare, 2,416 hectare, 9,995 hectare 7,305 hectare are arable land, grazing land, forest, bush and shrub and construction land respectively. The rest constitutes water bodies and others (CSA, 1998).

Kuyu woreda is characterized by fluctuation of rainfall both in amount and periodicity. Rainfall(77% of the average annual rainfall) is concentrated in three months of June(134.08mm), July (353.95mm) and August (363.60mm) and Belg (March, April and May i.e. 16% of the total rainfall). The annual average total rainfall and annual mean

temperature of Kuyu woreda is 1700 mm and 15⁰C respectively. The annual mean maximum temperature ranges from 31.3⁰c (Bereha) to 21.7⁰c in uplands. On the other hand, the mean minimum temperature of Kuyu woreda is between 6.7⁰c in lowland areas and 16.3⁰c in uplands. The climate is suitable for both crop production and livestock rearing. Majority of the food crops are sown during the first and second months of the two major rainy seasons. According to the woreda FSCO, frost and unreliable/ fluctuation of rain fall are the two major problems to crop production in the highland areas and lowland areas respectively.

Regarding the relief of Kuyu woreda, its altitude ranges from 1200 (?) to 2800 m.a.s.l, of which 91% of the area is found in the altitude greater than 1500 m.a.s.l. The *Dega* part of the woreda is part of the Shewan plateau, and the, *Woinadega* and *Kolla* parts are cut by running water and characterized by several gullies, escarpments, cliffs and resistant rocks. Vertisols is the major soil type in Kuyu woreda. Following the Mogor River basin (tributary of Abay river), there are patches of forests with different species. In the highland areas bushes and shrubs together with eucalyptus tree are prominent (Mesay Mulugeta, 2001).

3.1.2. Human Condition

The total population of Kuyu woreda was 98,753 in 1994. The recent population size of the woreda is projected as 151,095 of which 51.8% constitutes female population. Rural population accounts for 87.1% (131, 665) of which female population share is 51%. The percentage share of female population in the urban areas is 50.3 percent. The computed physiographic density of the woreda is found to be 2.5 persons/ha. On the other hand the crude density is estimated to be 1.6 persons/ha (CSA, 1998).

- **Economic Activities**

Agriculture is the major economic activity in Kuyu woreda and supports more than 87% of the population. Crop production and livestock rearing (mixed farming) is known in the woreda. According to the Kuyu woreda agriculture and rural development office staple crops, oil seeds and pulses are grown in woreda. Accordingly, in the 2006 of the total produce Teff, Sorghum, Wheat, Maize and Niger Seed accounts for 48%, 40%, 5%, 4% and 5% respectively.

The woreda is also known by ox fattening and other products of livestock. In the urban center (Garba Guracha), trade and services of some kinds are exercised. Hotel accommodation and shops are typical in *Garba Guracha* since the town is the breathing space for automobiles from Addis to Gojjam and vice a- versa. The bank service is found about 45 km in the South east direction from *Garba Guracha* (located at *Fitche* town). Other off farm income sources of the rural population of Kuyu woreda are fire wood, cow dung selling and working on the daily labor (Kuyu Woreda FSCO).

- **Food Security Status and Experience of Food and/Cash aid**

Since rainfed crop production is the dependable agriculture system observed in Kuyu woreda, food shortage is prevailing due to fluctuation of rainfall and frost. In addition, shortage of farmland as a result of population pressure, and the prevalence of soil erosion in the highland areas contribute for problem of food insecurity.

In the last decade an average of 9678 populations is affected by natural disasters resulting in food insecurity each year in the woreda (Oromia Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau). Table 3.1 shows the ten years Kuyu woreda food insecured population compiled from Oromia bureau of Disaster prevention and preparedness and Kuyu woreda Food Security Coordination and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office.

Table 3.1: Population affected due to natural disaster (1997-2006) and food aid (1997/8-2003/4)



Year	Male	Female	Total	Year	Food Aid (Quintal)
1997	-	-	6300	1997/8	5618
1998	4394	4596	8700	1998/9	3150
1999	2950	3350	6300	1999/00	5087.5
2000	5287	5488	10775	2000/01	-
2001	5397	5619	10006	2001/02	429
2002	1663	1812	3475	2002/3	22,561.5
2003	-	-	29,500	2003/4	14,496
2004	-	-	3900		
2005	-	-	8913 (chronic)		
2006	-	-	8913 (chronic)		

Source: Kuyu woreda Food Security Coordination Office and Oromia Bureau of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (2007)

The food aid was mainly through FFW program and child nutrition program. In the FFW program the major work was pond construction, which does not currently exist

(destroyed). From the data one can observe that for most of the years distinction did not made between chronic food and transient food insecure individuals. It is only for the last two years (2005 and 2006) that an attempt was made to distinguish the two-food insecurity status. Even as per the data, transient food insecure individuals could not be identified. Generally, Kuyu woreda is one of the woredas that have been receiving food aid for a decade. Despite the past interventions still Kuyu woreda is facing chronic food shortage that necessitates PSNP intervention in the woreda. Thus the next chapter describes and discusses the socio-economic characteristics of households as well as major implementation issues of PSNP in the woreda.

Fig 3.1: Administrative Zone of North Shewa Zone and Relief and Drainage of Kuyyu Woreda



CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents results and discusses the sample households socio-economic characteristics and Productive Safety Net Program implementation in Kuyu woreda. Emphasis is given to the targeting process, transfer, public works execution, institutional arrangement and community participation issues. Major challenges of the program implementation in the woreda are scrutinized.

4.1. Description of Household Characteristics

4.1.1. Demography

- *Age*

Table 4.1 shows that the total number of sample households is 265 of which 68.3% is male household heads and the rest 31.7% is female-headed households. With regard to the age of households about 252 (95.1%) is in the range of productive age group (16-64) and households in the 65⁺ age category accounts for 4.9% alone.

Table 4.1: Age of the sample households

Age	Frequency	Percentage
16-64	252	95.1
65+	13	4.9
Total	265	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

- *Marital Status*

Regarding the marital status, 191 (72%), 16 (6%), 13 (5%), 11 (4%) and 34 (13%) of the respondents are married, unmarried, divorced, separated and widowed respectively (Table 4.2). The unmarried ones are those who are living with their aged and/or disabled family (father/mother). From the data one can observe that the majority of beneficiary households are married.

Table 4.2: Marital status of sample households

Marital Status	frequency	%
Married	191	72
Unmarried	16	6
Divorced	13	5
Separated	11	4
Widowed	34	13
Total	265	100

Source: Household Survey, 2007

- **Family size**

Table 4.3 shows the family size of the sample households. About 106 (39.6%) households have three family size or fewer. This is followed by 78 (29.5%) households with seven or more family size. The average family size is around 4.94.

Table 4.3: Family size of sample households

Family size	frequency	%
One	20	7.4
Two	34	12.7
Three	27	10.2
Four	44	16.7
Five	32	12.0
Six	30	11.5
Seven and above	78	29.5
Total	265	

Source: Household Survey, 2007

- **Educational Level**

As far as educational level of the sample households concerned Table 4.4 shows that of the 265 households 131 (49%) of them have never been to school; 45 (17%) can read and write; 42 (16%) reached first cycle (1-4); 42 (16%) second cycle (5-8) and 5 (2%) above secondary level. Generally, this is indicating low level of education for the woreda.

Table 4.4: Educational level

Educational Level	frequency	%
Never been to school	131	49
Read and Write	45	17
First Cycle	42	16
Second Cycle	42	16
Secondary School and above	5	2
Total	265	100

Source: Household Survey, 2007

4.1.2. Socio-Economic Aspects of the Sample households

4.1.2.1. Asset Ownership

a) House and House type

From the survey results 7 (2.6%) households do not have house; they are leaving with relatives. The rest 258 (97.4%) of the households have house of different types. The house types of 246 (95.3%) of the 258 households are *Tukuls* made from local materials (mud and wood). Only 12 (4.7 %) households possess tin covered house type. About 252 (97.7%) of the floor of those houses is *mud*. The wall is mud wall (249 or 96.6%) and door 232 (89.8%) houses are made from timber, and 22 houses (8.3%) have gate made from tin.

b) Household Assets

The ownership of domestic assets such as beds, tables, chairs, radio etc is very low. Table 4.5 shows that only 61.9% of households have bed with an estimated average cost of 15.00 birr. Sixty five (24.5%) households have chair with an estimated average cost of 7.00 birr. Half of them (32 households) have a chair only. The other domestic material is table, and 27 (10%) households have table and only two of them have two tables. The estimated price of table per unit is 20.00 Birr. As for the radio 47 (17.7%) of households have radio with an estimated price of 75.00 birr per unit.

Table 4.5: Domestic asset of sample households

Type of Asset	Quantity												AEP*/ Unit (birr)
	1		2		3		4		5		Total		
	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	
Bed	161	60.8	3	0.8	-		-		-		164	61.9	15.0
Chair	32	12.1	10	3.8	6	2.3	11	4.2	6	2.3	65	24.5	7.0
Table	25	9.4	2	0.75	-		-		-		27	10.2	20.0
Radio	47	17.7	-		-		-		-		47	17.7	75.0
Television	-		-		-		-		-		-		-
Bicycle	-		-		-		-		-		-		-

Source: Household Survey, 2007

*EVP refers to Estimated Average Price

None of the households reported owning a television and bicycle or other major domestic assets. This indicates that the community is poor as their domestic assets are limited and their estimated price is relatively low.

c) Livestock Ownership

Livestock are like a machine in the fabric factory for rural area households. They are source of income, food as well as factor of production. Indeed, in many rural areas of Ethiopia livestock are taken as wealth measurement hence, it is crucial to indicate the livestock ownership of the sample households.

The households in Kuyu woreda have livestock, which include cattle, sheep, goat etc. Table 4.6 shows that 142 (53.6%) households have ox and 98 (37%) of them have cows. From the data again 110 (41.5%) households have only one ox and 88 (33.2%) only one cow. The average estimated price of ox in the woreda is 1500.00 birr and 1092.00 birr for milk cow. Thirty percent, 2.6% and 17.7% of households have calf, sheep and goat respectively.

Table 4.6: Livestock ownership status of sample households

No.	1		2		3		4		5		6		Total		EAP*/ unit (birr)
	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	fr	%	
Oxen	110	41.5	28	10.8	4	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	142	53.6	1500.0
Bull	34	12.8	6	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	15.1	913.0
Cow	88	33.2	7	2.6	3	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	98	37.0	1092.0
Calf	72	27.2	4	11.5	4	11.5	1	0.4	-	-	-	-	77	29.1	651.0
Sheep	21	7.9	29	10.9	13	4.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	24.2	150.0
Goat	21	7.9	16	6	6	2.3	1	0.4	2	0.8	1	0.4	47	17.7	125.0

Source: Household survey, 2007

*EVP refers to Estimated Average Price

The total estimated asset value (the sum of total estimated price of domestic assets and livestock for a given household) of sample households ranges from 15.00 birr (for households with only one bed) to 21, 651.00 birr (for households with major livestock and some domestic assets). However, such gap is a little bit exaggerated partly because some respondents have only a bed and some have many livestock i.e. the prices of livestock makes such a difference among the haves and have not.

d) Farm land

The fact that high population pressure results in shortage of farmland can be observed in rural Ethiopia. The farm size of the sample households ranges from 0.25 to 4.0 hectare. Nonetheless, of the 265 households, 61 (23.8 %) of them do not have farmland/ landless households/. Seventy two (35.3%) households have less than half a hectare 118 (58.3 %) households have farm size between 0.6 to 2.5 hectares while 13 (6.4%) have farm sizes beyond 2.5 hectare of which only four of them have the maximum farm size i.e. 4.0 hectare.

Table 4.7: Farm size of sample households

Farm Size (ha)	Frequency	Percent
Less than 0.5	72	35.3
0.6-2.5	119	58.3
Beyond 2.5	13	6.4
Total	204*	100.0
Farmland Rented in		
0.05-0.50	43	56.6
0.50-1.00	27	35.5
1.00-2.00	6	7.9
Total	76	100.0
Farmland Rented out		
0.01-0.50	21	84
0.50-1.00	3	12
1.00-2.50	1	4
Total	25	100

* 61 households (23.8% of the 265) do not have farmland

Source: Household survey, 2007

On the other hand, there are about 76 (28.7%) households with rented in farmland. Of these 43 (56.6%), 27 (35.5%) and 6 (7.9%) households rented farmland with 0.05 to 0.50, 0.50 to 1.00 and 1.00 to 2.00 hectares respectively. In addition, 25 (9.4%) households rented out farmland of different size. Accordingly, 21 (84%) rented out farmland with size of 0.01 to 0.50 hectares. The rest 3 (12%) and 1 (4%) rented out with the size of 0.50 to 1.00 and 1.00 to 2.50 respectively.

The crop land /holder for Oromia are 1.41 while it is 1.94 for North Shewa (CSA, 2006). The survey result indicates that the farmland/holders in Kuyu woreda is found to be 1.06 which is less than that of the region as well as the North Shewa zone.

4.1.2.2. Crop Production and Pattern of Consumption

The major crops grown by households include Teff, Sorghum, and wheat. Accordingly, 205 (77.4%), 53 (20%) and 125 (47.2%) of the surveyed households grow Teff (maximum 7.00 Quintal and minimum 0.25 quintal), Wheat (maximum 6.00 quintal and minimum 0.50 quintal) and Sorghum (maximum 8.00 quintal and minimum 0.50 quintal)

respectively. About 39 (14.7%) of the households are also cultivating other types of crops, which are mainly oil seeds. Table 4.8 indicates the amount of crop the sample households produce per annum in Quintal.

Table 4.8: Annual crop production of sample households in 2006 (in Quintal)

Quantity in Quintal	Teff		Wheat		Sorghum		Other	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
0.25-1.00	75	36.6	26	52.0	27	21.6	14	35.9
1.00-2.00	78	38.0	12	24.0	43	34.4	9	23.1
2.00-3.00	14	6.8	6	12.0	14	11.2	14	35.9
3.00-8.00	38	18.6	6	12.0	41	32.8	2	5.1
Total	205	100	50	100	125	100	39	100

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Of the 205 (77.4%) households who grow *Teff* 75 (36.6%) households produce less than one quintal per year. The rest 130 (63.4 %) households reported that they grow annually *more* than one quintal. The amounts of production for other crops are indicated on Table 4.8. Given their farm size the annual crop production of the surveyed households is low. The amount produced by these farm households is largely consumed, and little evidence is found on the amount sold and saved. This is largely because of the in adequacy of the produce even for food.

- ***Off Farm Economic Activities***

Off farm sources of income are rarely found in rural areas, but the able bodied migrate to the near by urban center to work on daily labor. As such about 167 (63%) of the surveyed households are working on daily labor while the rest 45 (17%) and 24(9%) are selling cow dung and firewood. Table 4.9 shows the amount of earnings from off farm activities (i.e. daily labor and others). About 74.1% of the 236 households earn between 350 and 700 birr/year, 11.6%, 8% and 6.3 % of the 236 households generate 700-1050, 1050 and less than 350 birr/year. The minimum income is found to be 120 birr per year. In addition, the other sources of income for households include firewood and cow dung selling, pottery and weaving.

Table 4.9: Annual earnings from non-farm activities

Annual off farm income	frequency	%
120-350	15	6.3
350-700	175	74.1
700-1050	27	11.6
>1050	19	8.0
Total	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Having the socio-economic characteristics of the sample households in mind, the next section (4.2) presents issues related to PSNP implementation in Kuyu woreda. The section attempts to uncover challenges of program implementation. Often, socio-economic background of the sample households complements the further discussion of program implementation.

4.2. PSNP Targeting

Targeting is one of the momentous aspects of social safety net design and implementation. Accordingly, the Program Implementation Manual (PIM) (2004) of Ethiopian PSNP states how to identify the eligible groups/ chronic food insecure household. The mix of community targeting and administrative targeting has been in place. Under this section the practical targeting process, perception of participants and non-participants of the program together with pressures on the process of targeting are discussed.

4.2.1. Geographical Targeting within the Woreda

PIM provides woredas with a right to allocate PSNP resources and beneficiary numbers to *Kebeles*. But no clear guidance has been in place on how woredas do this. In practice, Kuyu woreda selected 17 of the total 23 rural *Kebeles* in the first year (2005). A year later three more *Kebeles* (namely *Sombo Cheka*, *Dubbana Galoo* and *Biriti*) were added and PSNP participant *Kebeles* in the woreda reached twenty and they have a total of 2685 beneficiary households. All *Got* within *Kebeles* are included. Different levels of resources to different *Kebeles* were allocated measured by beneficiary numbers as percentage of population. However, the woreda FSCO asserted they are facing problems

of identifying *Kebeles* with relatively more affected population; because of lack of reliable socio-economic data of each *Kebeles*. This forced them to include almost all *Kebeles* and communities within the *Kebeles*.

The major reasons for poor geographical targeting within the woreda are lack of effective crop, livelihood and socio economic assessment. Often, detailed and organized socio-economic data are unavailable in the woreda. The woreda FSCO head noted that the base line survey of the earliest year (undertaken immediately before PSNP intervention i.e.2004) lacks clarity and reliability. Often, it is not available in the woreda. Once it was reported to region, it has not been documented at the woreda level. An attempt made to include almost all *Kebeles* (except three) and communities within *Kebeles* without an actual increase in beneficiary numbers proved to be a bottleneck in reaching the neediest *Kebeles*. Therefore, pooling the existing budget among *Kebeles* creates dilemma of providing resources to intended beneficiary *Kebeles*. This creates the challenge of achieving the graduation of intended households to food security status.

Moreover, within kebele communities in the lowland areas are favored during the 2007 watershed area selection often; this is attributed to the '*conventional wisdom*' (Sharp, 1997) i.e. concentration of natural disasters in lowland areas. However, this creates a conflict of need between the highland and low land settlers. As a result, some *Got* are excluded from being participant of PW component partly willingly (due to distance) and partly by KFSTF. The study found that two *Got* from *Wuye Gose* and *Dirre Hacho Kebeles* withdrew from the program. Moreover, the woreda FSCO head reported that of the participant 20 *Kebeles*, two of them (namely *Dhahe Wilincho* and *Jila Qerensa*) are currently not participating in PW component. They are offended by the 2007 selection of a given watershed area for PW.

The challenge of implementing the targeting process as per of PIM is observed in Kuyu woreda. In some cases there has been a deviation from PIM and exclusion of some communities. Conflicting of local needs and PIM are what woreda, *Kebele* and community FSTFs currently facing. This implies lack of reconciliation of the principle on the PIM and the ground situation.

4.2.2. Dilution and Full Family Targeting

PSNP implementation manual set procedure of beneficiary household identification. Firstly, a household has to fit the eligibility criteria to the program if they are chronically food insecure. Relief dependent households on the previous three years (base year 2005) and households who face food insecure in the last three months: shock vulnerable households due to illness/death of family members and or natural disasters: lactating and pregnant women, HIV/AIDS infected individuals and disabled people with no support from relatives, daughters and sons (MoARD, 2004).

Based on need assessment, labor poor households are identified and included in the direct support component. Households with labor are eligible to public work components. Family size is taken into account to determine the number of eligible family members to be included in PW (MoARD, 2004). This study did not find any evidence of the participation in PSNP (DS) due to living with HIV/AIDS and lactating and pregnant women. Often about 51 (19.2%) beneficiary households did not participate in any kind of food/cash aid so far.

Sharp et al., (2006) define dilution as sharing of transfer resources among a large number of beneficiaries than budgeted for. This, of course, reduces the amount received by each beneficiary. Thus, high degree of dilution may result in very weak resources transferred to households and minimizes the chance to achieve the intended objective of any social safety net programs.

Dilution is a common tendency in community- managed targeting systems, and has been a widespread feature of past relief distribution in Ethiopia (Sharp, 1997). Community leaders responsible for household targeting often explain openly why and how they have done this, and consider it fairer than selecting only a few people. For instance, Harrison (2002) noted the informal way of food distribution by DAs in the FFW program launched under World Food Program (WFP) in *Wolo* not because of lack of the know how but to meet the need of large proportion of the neediest.

Under PSNP, official policy is indicating '*full family targeting*' in order to maximize the impact of transfer in helping targeted households towards food security. The entailment,

therefore, is calculated on the basis of 5 days/person/month. As such reduction of dilution has been encouraged under PSNP in Ethiopia.

This study found that dilution is still taking place despite the provision of clear instruction to FSTFs. Cutting the family size has been commonly practiced. For instance, the increase in number of *Kebeles* (from 17 to 20) without actual increase in number of beneficiary individuals is worth mentioning. Besides, the survey result show inconsistency of the amount transferred to respective beneficiary and their period of participation.

Table 4.10: PSNP payment by period of participation

Amount Received	2005		2006	
	frequency	%	frequency	%
90.00	3	1.6	2	4.0
180.00	93	51.1	44	88.0
240.00	10	5.5	4	8.0
360.00	76	41.8	0	0.0
Total	182	100.0	50	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Table 4.10 indicates 93 (51.1%) households of the 182 who have been in the program since 2005 but received only a year transfer despite their stay (three years) in the program. About 76 (41.8%) households of the third year participants received 360, and the rest 3 (1.6%) and 10 (5.5%) received 90 and 240 birr respectively. Of the 50 households who have participated since 2006, 44 (88 %), 4 (8%) and 2 (4%) received 180, 240 and 90 birr respectively. Thus, the non-uniform payment to the beneficiaries is due to dilution and beneficiaries list rotation.

In addition, some indication of the extent of transfer dilution can be gained from the survey results of participating family members and able bodied family size. Despite the differences in family size among households, only 52.1% of the surveyed households have two registered members of each families and the rest have only one (see Table 4.13). This situation has been against/contrary/ the PIM. Dilution in the woreda is practiced and justified as fair resource sharing despite the restriction stated on PIM.

In addition, *rotating beneficiary* lists annually has been found in Kuyu woreda. For instance, KFSTFs in the sample *Kebeles* are doing rotation among household members.

Particularly, this has been done between husband and wife. If husband gets chance of participation this year, wife will participate next year. Besides, in all participant *Kebeles*, about 600 DS participants in 2005 and 2006 switched to PW this year (2007). This came up with pre quota setting for DS participants, and the percentage change in DS is 68.2%, 68.2% and 67.7% for *Dire Hacho*, *Wuye Gose* and *Halelu Chari* respectively (see Table 4.11).

Table 4.11: DS Participants of the sample *Kebeles* (2005 & 2007)

Kebeles	frequency		Percentage Change
	2005	2007	
Dire Hacho	44	14	68.2
Wuye Gose	44	14	68.2
Halelu Chari	47	15	67.7
Total	135	43	68.1

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Often, the *woreda*, *Kebele* and community FSTFs noted the ill-targeting of these individuals in 2005. However, these individuals may face labor scarcity, which could not afford for 5 days per month per family members PW participation (Sharp, Brown and Amdissa, 2006).

The *woreda*, *Kebele* and community FSTFs claimed to distribute resources to reach the needy in the *woreda*, without increase in budget. This conflicts with the intention to achieve the PSNP goal (graduation). Let alone the sharing of existing resource (dilution), it has been reported that 180 birr/year/ person is inadequate (Table 4.21). The retargeting process in the *woreda* is found to be beneficiary list rotation among family members, dilution and switching DS participants to PW. In principle, retargeting entails beyond this i.e. exclusion of non-chronic, inclusion of the chronic food insecure households).

Table 4.12: Households Previous aid experience

Previous Aid Experience	DS		PW	
	frequency	%	frequency	%
Yes	25	86.2	189	80.1
No	4	13.8	47	19.9
Total	29	100.0	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

- **Participated Family members**

The other issue of dilution can be observed from Table 4.13. During the 2005 program implementation majority 103 (38.9%) of the sample households register for only one family member and the rest two family members. Compared with the third year participants the second and first year participant households more registered for two family members. No households reported the full family targeting in the *Kebeles*.

Table 4.13: Period of Participation and number of family members participated

No. of participated Family Members	2005		2006		2007	
	frequency	%	frequency	%	frequency	%
One	103	54.2	19	35.2	5	23.8
Two	87	45.8	35	64.8	16	76.2
Total	190	100.0	54	100.0	21	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

There is statistically significant difference in the number of participated family members of the surveyed household among the period of participation. The calculated Chi-square value is found to be 11.4, which is much higher than its table value (5.99) at 5% significance level for 2 degree of freedom (Annex-3.1). This has an implication on the increase in number of participated family members from the first year program implementation to the recent. Evidence to this, Table 4.13 indicates the change in number of registered members of households among the 2005, 2006 and 2007 participants. Among the 2005 participants the proportion of registered households is higher for households with one family member participant. But, for the second and first year beneficiary households' proportion of household with registered two family members is larger. This entails an attempt made to reduce dilution but much has left to be done.

- **Household Labor Distribution**

The PSNP implementation manual distinguishes eligible households into those with labor (who are registered for public works) and those with no labor ('labor poor' entitled to DS). Those identified under PW are entitled to work for 5 days /household member/month. Despite, PIM does not consider households with labor but scarce. Sharp et al., (2006) noted the need to separate households with labor into two categories: the labor

poorest and labor scarce or ‘labor poor’ as they called. According to these authors the former refers to households with no able-bodied adults who qualify for direct support. The later exclusively concerned with households who have one or more able bodied adults (qualify for PW) but can hardly provide enough working days (30 days/ year/ family member) to earn the full family allocation because of high ratio of non-working to working households members.

Table 4.14: Households family size and able-bodied labor distribution

HH Size (H)	Number of Able bodied Adults								Total HHs	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
1	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
2	9	17	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
3	0	16	35	0	-	-	-	-	-	51
4	0	10	28	5	1	-	-	-	-	44
5	0	5	12	4	3	0	-	-	-	24
6	0	11	14	3	2	0	0	-	-	30
7	0	4	10	3	8	2	1	0	0	28
8	0	5	11	0	2	1	4	0	0	23
9	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	4
10	0	0	0	2	0	3	1	1	0	7
Total HH	29	68	108	17	19	9	6	2	2	265

Note: Darker shaded cells: (HX5)/ A> 20 working days; lighter shaded cells (HX5) /A>15 working days; lightest shaded cells (Hx5)/A>10 working days. On PSNP, manual estimated rural household family size is five and 5 days/month/family size is allocated for every beneficiaries of the program.

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Table 4.14 shows the cross tabulation of the household size with the able bodied adults in the households. By adding up households in the shaded cells one can get the percentage of households with their capability of working days per month. Accordingly, 25 (9.4%), 33 (12.5%) and 45 (17%) households must work more than 20, 15 and 10 days per month in the case of full family targeting. Thus, households in the darker, lighter and lightest shaded cells can work a maximum of 20, 15 and 10 days but not more than these days because of labor shortage. Nonetheless, in Kuyu woreda issue of households’ capability of working lays has not been taken into account as dilution is practiced and all participants of the public work program are working on public work programs five days per month.

Focus group discussions of public work participants conducted during the study found little evidence on the difficulty of covering the workdays assigned to individuals. Since, in Kuyu woreda only participants have been entitled to work 5 days per month regardless of their family size (due to dilution). Many focus group participants suggested for additional work days per month. Moreover, 138 (52%) of the surveyed households have two registered family members; the rest including DS beneficiaries (11% of the total sample HHS) have only one registered family member in the program (see Table. 4.13).

In the study woreda therefore, deviation from PIM (full family targeting and entitlement based on family members) have been observed. This in fact results in inadequate resource transfer to the households that would have been otherwise.

4.2.3. Appeals on Targeting Process

In theory, PIM asserted that individuals, households and groups have the right to appeal against targeting decisions. The *Kebele* cabinets and the woreda FSTF are the first and second tire of appeal respectively. The former is responsible for hearing any complaints, claims or appeals on the beneficiary selection process and for taking appropriate corrective measures in consultation with the WFSTF (MoARD, 2004). It is also noted that appeals process should be simple and efficient. It should be handled without emulating a formal judicial process (an informal manner). Ideally, appeals should be resolved at the *Kebele* level, and review and response to an appeal should be done within two days at *Kebele* level and three days at woreda level (FSCB, 2005).

Community, *Kebele* and woreda FSTFs have the right to appeal to the higher administrative levels in case when they are receiving inadequate resources to cover the targeted beneficiaries. The contingency fund, which is equal to 5% percent of the base programme costs, exists largely to respond to such appeals (MoARD, 2004). The procedure is CFSTF- KFSTF- WFSTF- BoARD (regional level).

Practically, the study found that there is a lack of strong mechanisms institutionalized for appeals. To various degrees non-beneficiary (excluded) individually appeal to *Kebele* and woreda. More often than not *Kebeles* are blamed of referring every appeal to the woreda than dealing with the case and taking their own corrective actions. Community and

Kebele FSTFs lack awareness of how to appeal to woreda. Non-beneficiaries during the focus group discussions complained against the *Kebele* cabinets and the woreda FSCO for their delay in reviewing cases and response. The commonly used response to the non-participant appeal is “*the community excluded you*” i.e. it is the community who identified the beneficiaries. However, the decision makers are local leaders and DAs. In addition, the WFSCO head noted that people at *Kebele* level are less committed even to solve minor issues raised at community level, rather they prefer to refer appellants to the woreda.

On the other hand, each year since 2005, the WFSCO said that they appeal to BoARD for additional budget to reach the excluded chronic food insecure households due to the quota, but, the issue has been less addressed. Indeed, justification by the woreda for practicing dilution comes here. Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in the woreda is often loose and the Rapid Response Team (RRT) has not been organized well.

The study found different types of appellants on the targeting process. Firstly, those who believe they were wrongly excluded from beneficiary lists. Those individuals are those of highland settlers who are unable to participate in PW component not because of their socio-economic status but the concentration of activities in lowland areas in 2007 (which are far away distance). Secondly, the head of Kuyu woreda FSCO said that appellants who were switched from DS to PW complain of the scarcity of labor in the household to participate in PW component (reached 600 individuals in 20 *Kebeles* and see Table 4.11 for the sample *Kebeles*). The third appellants are those who claimed a full family member targeting due to partial targeting and need additional workdays.

Barrier to appeals are found to be the lack of awareness on the part of appellants (individuals), quota system and low rate of taking corrective action by *Kebele* cabinets and woreda FSCO. Indeed, FSCO head revealed that the rates of appeal are in a decreasing trend from 2005 on wards. On the other hand, the appellants (focus group discussion) reported that they have been discouraged by absence of efficient responses. Thus, strong corrective action at community, *Kebele* and woreda level must be taken so as to make the appeal mechanism efficient and responsive.

4.2.4. Perception on the Targeting Process

Under this sub section the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries' view on the targeting process is discussed. Besides, an attempt was made to test the difference between the DS and PW participants view on the targeting process.

The targeting process follows the procedure of allocating quotas to *Kebeles* by the woreda, and the *Kebele* FSTF called an assembly on which every one can vote as poorest of the poor. The list of identified households is submitted to KFSTF and *Kebele* cabinet then to woreda FSTF. The woreda cabinet lastly refined who would be the beneficiary of the program and submitted to the regional bureau (MoARD, 2004).

Nonetheless, the major complaint in the study woreda during the focus group discussion is that the mechanism of targeting allows some kind of nepotism and corruption. Voting for kin, relatives and the same tribe is prevalent according to the discussion. In addition, about 117 (44.3%) households reported that the decision made in relation with targeting is by *Kebele* cabinets. Indeed, they do not know who has to undertake beneficiary households' identification and selection. The other 108 (40.8%) households reported that the selection of beneficiaries is by CFSTF. Others 11 (3.8 %) and 29 (11 %) has the perception of being identified by woreda cabinets and DAs respectively (see Table 4.15). This simply indicates that the beneficiaries are less informed about the targeting process of PSNP.

Table 4.15: Households' view of targeting decision maker

Decision Makers	frequency	%
CFSTF	108	40.8
Woreda Cabinets	11	3.8
DAs	29	11.0
Kebele Kabinets	117	44.3
Total	265	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Moreover, in the households targeting mechanisms 141 (53.2%) of the 265 reported that generally the poorest are targeted. This is followed by political attitude of the household heads 65 (24.5%). About 40 (15.0%) households reported that family size is the major selection criteria. The other 14 (5.3%) and 5 (2%) households reported that they were

selected based on their farm size and for being aged and disabled respectively (see Table 4.16)

Table 4.16: Households' perception on the major criteria of targeting

Criteria	frequency	%
Poorest	141	53.2
Political Attitude	65	24.5
Farm Size	14	15.0
Family Size	40	5.3
Aged and Disabled	5	2.0
Total	265	100

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Regarding the targeting fairness 168 (64.4%) of the respondents reported that the process is unfair. In addition, non-beneficiaries noted the process include the non-chronic food insecure (nearest and dearest of the CFSTF and KFSTF) households. On the other hand 97 (36.6%) of the sample households reported that the targeting process is fair.

Table 4.17: Households view of targeting fairness

Fair Targeting	PSNP Component				Total	
	DS		PW		Freq.	%
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%		
Yes	20	69.0	77	32.6	97	36.4
No	9	31.0	159	67.4	168	67.4
Total	29	100	236	100	265	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

There is a significant difference between DS and PW in their view of targeting fairness at 5% level of significance. The calculated value of Chi-square is found to be 14.69, which is by far greater than the table value (3.84) at 5% confidence interval for 1 degree of freedom (see Annex-3.2). The difference may be due to the return of the program. Hence, DS participants are paid the same amount of transfer with PW participants and they may be happy for being beneficiary of the program. In addition, those in the DS component were hardly participating during the targeting process, as most of them are aged and disabled to go to *Kebele*.

Participants of focus group discussion pointed out the quota program exclude many needy households who could fulfill the criteria set by PSNP manual (i.e. three years relief recipient and food in secured in the previous three months, labor poor disabled and without support from kin, relatives).

- **Inclusion Ratio**

It is obvious that quota system results in high exclusion ratio of the chronic food insecure households in PSNP. Of course, this issue was seriously noted by Kuyu woreda FSCO and the subject of the study via qualitative and quantitative method of data collection employed. But for the inclusion ratio additional approach (local wealth ranking system) to the information obtained from the stakeholders was used. As such estimated price of household assets and size of farmland were included to rank PSNP beneficiary households into *rich*, *medium* and *poor* wealth category. In fact, the local wealth ranking technique in this study missed some variables like *family size* crucial to the wealth status of a given household. With this limitation, the study attempted to identify the households into aforementioned wealth category. A farmer is *rich* locally if s/he has two or more ox, two or more cow and farmland 2.5 or more hectares, *Medium* with one to two oxen, one to two cows and between 0.6 and 2.5 hectare of farmland: *poor* with less than half hectare farmland, one or no ox and a cow or none. Thus, it is found that the estimated value of a given household's asset exceeds 2000 if his or her oxen and/ cow is more than two. As such the ranking system took into consideration the price of livestock as well as domestic assets together with farm land size (see Table 4.5 and 4.6 for unit price of domestic assets and livestock of the sample households).

Table 4.18: Wealth Ranking on the basis of local criteria

Category	Rich	Medium	Poor
Farm Size	2.5	0.6	<0.5
EVA (birr)*	4000	2000-4000	<2000
Frequency	23 (8.7%)	81 (30.6%)	161 (60.6%)

*Includes estimated value of households assets (bed, chair, table, Radio), livestock (Ox, cow, bull, sheep & goat) as told by the respondents.

Source: Household Survey, 2007

According to this wealth categorization, 161 (60.6%) households of the 265 fall under *poor* wealth status. The PSNP resource might be leaked to about 39.4% of the surveyed households. Hence, the inclusion ratio of non poor households is found to be 0.39 (for every 100 beneficiary households there are about 39 non-poor households participating in the program). This is slightly larger than one can expect. The finding becomes true with the evidences from the non-beneficiary focus group discussion participants, surveyed

households views and information obtained from Kuyu woreda FSCO; however, the finding has its own limitation. Nonetheless, there has been a difficulty of concluding as high ratio of non chronic food insecure households' inclusion. It needs a detailed study of targeting using both inclusion and exclusion ratio approach.

As any targeting mechanisms are never perfect, targeting error can occur to some tolerable extent. Under PSNP, households targeting includes both administrative and community targeting mechanisms. These mechanisms have their own shortfall in principle like local level corruption and lack of community participation due to administrative and socio cultural factors (see section 2.1). Anyway the targeting error in Kuyu woreda will be reduced if the implementing agencies together with the community become devoted during the retargeting process.

4.2.5. Political pressure on targeting

Large scale programmes such as the PSNP are political, economic as well as social resources. In all countries whether developing or industrialized, safety net and social welfare programmes are subject to political promises and campaigns. Moreover, programmes through which resources such as credit, fertilizer, and food or cash are allocated can be used as mechanisms for rewarding political supporters or punishing factors (Subbarao et al., 1997; Sharp et al., 2006).

The inception as well as the launch of PSNP in Ethiopia coincided with legislative election campaign of 2005. More often than not the local leaders were busy and largely pre occupied with the campaign. The situation made possible to use PSNP as a tool for election campaign by both the ruling and the opposition parties (Sharp et al., 2006). As such the study woreda was where the ruling party faced one of the strongest opposition parties. Indeed, a re-election was held there due to complaints between the political parties. Though it needs a further study on those who were excluded due to political reasons, this study found that 65 (24. 5%) of the surveyed households reported that their inclusion is due to political support. Information obtained from women focus group discussions noted the presence of some political elements during the first year (2005) targeting process. At the same time they revealed that currently such political issue is

rarely noticed. Nonetheless, about 141 (53.2%) households reported that the program targets exclusively the poorest (Table 4.16).

- **Challenges of the Targeting Process**

Respondents rank problem related to the targeting process as follows. About 68 (25.7 %) households ranked the participation of non-chronic food insecure first, 52 (19.6%), 51 (19.3%) and 37 (13.9 %) households ranked corruption, exclusion of the poorest, which is mainly due to the quota system and lack of community participation first respectively. The other 44 (16.6%) and 13 (4.9%) households reported that the major problem with targeting process is less consideration of the aged and disabled and female headed households. However, limiting quota to the woreda restricts inclusion of all chronically food insecure households; even with the presence of some allowed quota inclusion of relatives in the program is reported. The issue of good governance can be raised here. Cabinets at grass root level lack accountability and misperceive their position not to work with the poor rather decide on the fate of the needy. In the first year of PSNP the *Kebele* cabinets included themselves and their relatives as noted by the woreda FSCO head. Later in 2006 and 2007 some measures like calling general assembly for the identification of eligible households by the community has been implemented. Nonetheless, no measure has yet been taken to deregister the corruptors in the 2005 targeting process. The only thing done is to switch the DS participants to PW component in case where they are found to be able bodied.

Table 4.19: Major problems prevailing in the process of households targeting

Problems	Frequency	%
Non-poor inclusion	68	25.7
Exclusion of the neediest	51	19.3
Corruption	52	19.6
Lack of community participation	37	13.9
Less consideration of aged and disabled	44	16.6
Less consideration of female headed households	13	4.9
Total	265	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Complaints from the non-beneficiaries' focus group discussion pointed out that there should be a review on targeting. According to the non-participant households, rather than keeping the two family members in the program, the given quota (however small) should be distributed among the neediest. The community was less informed about the program since the time of identification and selection of beneficiaries (2005) had coincided with the election campaign period. Given the time (2005), the chance of participation might be given to those households nearest to the implementing agencies at the local level. Cognizant to this fact some participants of the non-beneficiary focus groups related the issue of targeting with the then political situation. Of course, the ruling as well as the opposition parties was using safety net for political purpose (Sharpet al., 2006).

The Kuyu woreda FSCO head asserted that, during 2005 there were many problems with respect to beneficiary identification and selection. *Kebele* cabinets and members of the *Got* leaders made a bias towards themselves, kin and relatives. But, according to the office head, there has been some changes including switching off some able bodied households from DS to PW component. Despite this effort, still no big measures have been taken to identify the better off and exclude them from the program.

4.3. Financial Procedure and Payments

4.3.1. PSNP Financial Procedure

PSNP is a government owned program co-financed by both donors and the Ethiopian government. The financial procedure for cash beneficiaries follows the already established government financial system (MoARD, 2004). As such PIM depicts the financial flow chart summarized as follows.

Funds from donors deposited in the account of PSNP at the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and lump sum from donors and GoE transferred to bank account opened under Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). This is followed by down transfer of fund with the requisition of MoARD to Food security Coordination Bureau (at federal Level), Regional Agricultural and Rural Development Bureau and Woredas' Finance offices. Finally, it reaches *Kebeles*, and the financial statement report is prepared at all levels of government tier and submitted to the higher body (MoARD, 2004).

Of the funds made to woredas based on the allocated quota, 15% is for capital and administration cost and 5% contingencies. The transfers to each woredas are deposited at Zonal bank and only less than 5000.00 birr is allowed to be at hand of the woreda PSNP accountant (Ibid).

4.3.2. Transfer Mode, Amount and Timing

According to the PSNP manual (2004), every registered individual in the family is entitled to 180 birr annually be it in the DS or PW component of the program. The transfer is also intended to be paid on monthly basis, and deferred payments are made in the period between August and December. Even the manual points out that flexibility will be made on the mode of the transfer based on the local need.

Currently, in Kuyu woreda cash is the mode of transfer but almost 210 (89.1%) of the public works participant households are complaining that the transfer should be in kind/ food. According to them, the amount of cash transfer (6 birr/day/person) could not support/ smooth the consumption level of their households. Moreover, it is a year later that the payment has been made. Indeed, the total (180 birr/person/year) has not been transferred at a time; rather, it is late and erratic. Since the place of payment is woreda, which is too far from some *Kebeles*; the beneficiaries are vulnerable to time wastage as well as unnecessary expense to collect the resource. Of course, PW and women focus group discussion participants complained that they have to stay two or more days at a town during the payment.

On the other hand, the fragmentation of the payment discourages them to buy food crop just during relatively better grain market. They argued further that timing of payment does not consider the grain market situation of the locality. Mostly it is during September and October that the transfer has been made. In these months the market is somewhat with scarce grain because the produce of agriculture comes to market after a harvest. Table 4.8 indicates the mismatch of the payment and the period of chronic food shortage. The payment is not demand driven as it gives little attention the period of households' food shortage period. As such, 195 (82.5%) households reported that they faced food shortage between March and August as well 206 (87.3%) revealed it is during the months between March and August that they have been working in public works. Nonetheless, all

surveyed public work participants reported they have been receiving the payment between September and January.

Table 4.20: Periods of food shortage, public work and payment

	March-August		September-January	
Food Shortage Period	195	82.5%	41	17%
Working in PW	206	87.3%	30	12.7%
Payment period	0	0%	236	100%

Source: Household Survey (April, 2007)

On the perception of the mode, amount and level of payment, there has been dissatisfaction from the beneficiary households' side. From the DS program 9 (31 %) households reported the amount is not fair. From the PW participants' side 114 (48.3%) households complained the unfairness of the transfer amount. The difference in the perception of participants may be mainly because of the difference attitude towards the program. Direct support participants may perceive PSNP as charity. Differently, PW participants are complaining as a wage earner.

Accordingly, information obtained from the PW focus group discussion noted the mismatch of the labor applied with the payment. The reason for the PW participants is that in the town of Kuyu woreda (Garba Guracha) the labor wage rate is currently between 12-15 birr/day/person (though types of activities and the wage needs further investigation in the area). Despite the study did not find the beneficiary withdrawal due to the inconvenience in relation with the payment.

The amount of payment for DS and PW beneficiaries and male and female beneficiaries household concerned is the same. The amount set (6 birr/day/person) is transferred to all beneficiaries regardless of gender and PSNP component. However, there are households (12.5%) who do not know whether male and female are paid equally. Mainly the respondents came from DS participants who are aged and disabled to meet other persons. Table 4.21 shows that 6 (20.7%), 14 (48.3%) and 9 (31%) of the total 29 direct support households reported that the amount of payment is fair, moderate and unfair respectively. On the other hand, 39 (16.6%), 83 (35.2%) and 114 (48.2%) of the total public work beneficiary households reported the amount of payment is fair, moderate and unfair

respectively. Thus, the large percentage of beneficiaries reported that the payment amount is unfair.

Table 4.21: Households views on amount of payment

Transfer Amount	PW		DS	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Fair	39	16.6	6	20.7
Moderate	83	35.2	14	48.3
Unfair	114	48.2	9	31.0
Total	236	100.0	29	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

On the issue of to whom the payment made/who receive the payment, the majority of the respondents i.e. 255 (96.2%) said that a person who participates in the program is paid. More often than not, 10 (3.8%) have a representative to whom the payment is transferred. Generally, challenges with the financial procedure and payment are identified as absence of demand driven approach on the mode and timing of payment, late and erratic payment and in adequacy of the amount of payment in Kuyu woreda.

4.4. Public Works

Chronic food insecure households with able bodied adult are eligible to participate in the public works (MoARD, 2004). In the study woreda different public work projects have been done (Annex -1). In principle labor scarce PW eligible households are required to perform activities like child rearing and others indicated in PIM. But, practically, in the study woreda all PW participants are engaged in community asset building.

However, from the field observation and information obtained from DAs, a large proportion of the public work is bunds and water way construction (Table 4.22). Previously PW were done at different villages within *Kebeles*. For instance, in the previous two years (2005 and 2006) irrespective of the ecological zone difference, participants were doing PW near their homes. Just beginning from this year (2007) critical watershed area is identified in each *Kebeles* and all participants of the PW component are doing together. But it seems difficult for community groups far from the identified area, and creates dissatisfaction.

Table 4.22: Major Activities done under PW in the sample Kebeles (2005-2006)

2005							
Activities	Unit	Haleleu Chari		Dire Hacho		Wuye Gose	
		Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Check dam	m ³	21	-	330	-	15	270.1
Bunds	km	-	-	-	-	15.6	18.5
Water Way	m	942.2	-	-	-	33	-
Road	km	1.45	-	-	2.3	3	-
Pond	No.	3	3	-	-	3	4
Well	No.	3	-	-	-	-	-
2006							
Activities	Unit	Haleleu Chari		Dire Hacho		Wuye Gose	
		Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Check dam	m ³	21	-	330	-	15	270.1
Bunds	km	-	31	33.8	44.3	-	0.42
Water Way	m	942.2	-	-	-	33	-
Road	km	-	1.8	-	-	-	1
Spring cleaning	No.	-	5	-	-	-	-
School fencing	No.	-	1	-	-	-	-
DAs house fencing	No.	-	1	-	-	-	-
Well	No.	3	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Kuyu woreda Food Security and Coordination office (2007)

Table 4.22 shows the 2005 and 2006 public work outputs, but the first year (2005) outputs are less known and not found in the report. This indicates lack of well documented data on the area and the available data lacks clarity. Annex-1 presents the output of public work projects for the year 2006. Still the data is hardly readable, because a column that shows the percentage of actual accomplishment lacks clarity. Thus, the outputs of public works are less recorded and documented though DAs, beneficiary households reported that there are activities done in the area.

Some planned activities were not done and often there lacks planned activities in some cases. This implies the problem of planning at local level and the lack of plan implementation. Since DAs are responsible by and large for the planning activities at *Kebele* level, they may be over loaded as every program implemented down there. In addition, the PSNP planning at *Kebele* level takes into consideration the contribution of non-beneficiary households. It was reported that in most cases non-beneficiary households are not willing to contribute to public work activities.

a) Public Works Site Selection

In principle it is the local people with the auspice from DAs and experts who identify problem areas and select work site. According to the survey results the community has been less informed and involved in the problem identification and site selection. About 194 (82.3%) households reported that the DAs and woreda experts together with the *Kebele* cabinets decide on what is to be done and where it must be done. Only 52 (22%) of the public work beneficiary households reported they were at the place when the site was selected. Actually, the watershed area was mapped by DAs with approval from woreda experts. Nonetheless, about 184 (78%) households are contributing labor and tools alone to the PW activities.

In the sample *Kebeles*, however, the DAs reported that they are doing soil and water conservation in the identified water shed area, what the researcher observed is mostly not community asset building but it is the farm land of individuals which is subject to PW schemes. Though, there is exceptional case in the safety net implementation manual regarding individual asset building (in case when the farmland is found in the selected watershed area and vulnerable to degradation), what really observed is that the DAs jump over community land between farmlands but exposed to erosion.

Information pertaining to this issue from the focus group discussion indicates that problem identification and site selection is not demand driven (rather supply driven). Firstly, the major problem in the project area (*Wuye Gose, Halelu Chari and Dirre Hacho*) is potable water. Both non-beneficiary and beneficiary members of the focus group discussion prioritized highly solving drinking water problem. This does not mean that what has been currently done i.e. bund construction, check dam construction rural road maintenance are of less importance, rather in priority area selection there has been mismatch between the people's need and the implementing agencies due to lack of community participation in the decision making process.

In addition, in many sites the activities have been done on farms and often near the houses of the non-beneficiaries and/or on their farms. Despite this the non-beneficiaries are not well informed/consulted. Indeed, the researcher eye witnessed the action that was taken by one non-beneficiary household head. This happened while PW participants

began to construct flood way near his house. The implication is that the farmers have their indigenous knowledge of construction of water way, and the challenge came when the DAs tried to use the science. Thus, accommodation of indigenous knowledge is to some extent lacking in this field.

Respondents of PW program reported that however the mechanism of constructing particularly bunds and check dams are good but they have to accommodate indigenous knowledge. The lack of non-beneficiaries consultation and beneficiary individuals' involvement during problem area identification and site selection will result in lack of maintenance. For one thing soil and water conservation that has been done on non-beneficiaries farms needs the involvement of the owners to have knowledge of how to maintain in case of destruction.

The issue of sustainability is a crucial one among others that has to be taken into consideration while building community assets such as PW projects under PSNP. During the field observation, the researcher observed some destroyed bunds, which were constructed this year (2007). Once PW participants construct the bunds, it is up to the owner of the farm or the whole community to maintain the resource. Nevertheless, the situation observed in Kuyu woreda needs caution in relation with sustainability. There is no provision for the maintenance of PW particularly those in the area of water and soil conservation.

b) Timing (schedule) and Quality of Public Works

In all *Kebeles* of Kuyu woreda there are three DAs with college level education (diploma) who are responsible at the grass root level for implementation of programs. The survey result 212 (90%) of the public work participants indicates that most of the times DAs provide technical support to the PW participants beside controlling and taking attendances.

There are many problems related to schedule and quality of the outputs. In the *Kebeles* near the town (Garba Gurracha), DAs are living in the town, but in the project areas of the sample *Kebeles* are far away from the town (it takes 1-2 hours walk). What the researcher observed is that the actual time of beginning and finishing the daily work is not known and conditional. The DAs are reaching the site mainly between 10:00 and

11:00 am. The public work is done only for an hour or an hour and half. The rest of the time is spent on taking attendance (not less than 45 minute). This has its own implication on delay of the project compared with the plan. But, in the case of *Dire Hacho Kebele*, PW participants attend adult education from 8:00 am to 10:00 am. This is appreciated and has to be strengthened.

Moreover, since the current *Kebeles* of Kuyu woreda are the previous two and/or three *Kebeles* (merged together) and their area is larger. But, beginning from 2007 the PW project site for all participants in a given *Kebele* is the same (in the identified watershed area). There have been households who are forced to walk about two hours to get to the work site. According to the non-beneficiary focus group discussion, two *Got* each from *Wuye Gose* and *Dirre Hacho Kebeles* currently withdrew from the public work program due to distance of the work site. Still no action has been taken by the woreda and it has noted that the problem will be dealt with in the near future (WFSTF). For the delay of PW, there is also miscalculation during *Kebele* level planning i.e. lack of popular participation, which is manifested by one of the sample *Kebele* DAs claim.

We have taken into consideration the contribution of non – beneficiaries, while planning because, activities may be done on their farmland in the watershed area and we hope they help us. In reality, some are even not happy with the works like construction of bunds on their farmland. Thus, we fail to accomplish what we have planned. –DA from Wuye Gose Kebele

Table 4.23 shows that 186 (79%) of the public work participant households reported that the public work duration is incompatible with what they have been told during the beginning or annual plan implementation.

Table 4.23: Public work duration compatibility with plan

Timeliness of PW activities	frequency	%
Yes	50	21.0
No	186	79.0
Total	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Regarding the problems with public work execution about 97 (41.1%), 24 (10.17%), 71 (30.14%) and 25 (10.50%) of the 236 households reported the problem of non-priority area selection, lack of maintenance, delay and poor quality and lack of technical support from experts (Table 4.24).

Table 4.24: Major Problems related to public work projects

Problems	frequency	%
Non-priority area	97	41.1
Delay	71	30.1
Lack of technical assistance from experts	25	10.5
Lack of maintenance	24	10.2
Poor Quality	19	8.1
Total	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

Development Agents have said that there is flexibility, and even the work (particularly biological activities like compost making) can be done during autumn and ‘less popular angles’ day’ if the participants are happy. Again they reported that a given beneficiary can accomplish his annual work budget within a day if s/he comes with excess labor /relatives, kin, friends etc/. According to beneficiary focus groups some times the duration of public work lasts for more than six months and overlap with farmers own agricultural activities not due to burden of workdays rather failure of implementing plans.

c) Gender Aspect of public works

Female and male participants are entitled to the same work. Even some public works need high energy which may be difficult for women due to their work burden inside and outside home. Women focus group discussion and PW focus group discussion said that no consideration has been given for women.

We are equally performing with male participants, but their presence is some what good because they back us while facing activities that need high energy. The reason is that we come here from different work burden in the home and outside like cooking, water fetching, and other social commitments. ~Women participants of the focus group (Dirre Hacho Kebele)

Ironically, maternal leave has not been well known in the study area. Development Agents said that they have the right to provide a leave but do not know for how many days. Indeed, women focus group discussion stressed that they do not know if they have a right to ask maternal leave. What they are still doing is that representing somebody from kin, children etc if available. In the case where representation is impossible they cannot spend more than one to two weeks. However, still there are no women punished for being off the public work activities due to birth. Proclamation No. 377/2003, in its article 88 sub article 3 (part Six, chapter one) points out that maternal leave is allowed for 90 days (60 day prenatal period and 30 days postnatal period) (FDRE, 2004).

The other complaints of women participants are the burden of the works. It has been observed most women came with firewood and cow dung to the work site and leave for town after work to sell it. In the sample *Kebeles* the work crew, the *got* leaders, the *Kebele* cabinets are all male. The exceptional case is that there is one woman representing women affairs in each *Kebele* but in reality their role is insignificant. Information obtained from women focus group discussion entails that they rarely participate meetings arranged especially for women at *Kebele* and even wereda level, and indeed nothing has been said in relation with PW women participant reduction of work burden. This is attributed to lack of education. In this aspect what the government currently doing is appreciable particularly in educational sector (increasing the participation of women students).

d) Work Norm

Public works differ from one area to another area in the country and even within woredas. But, what currently observable in Kuyu woreda is almost similar. Thus, an attempt was made to come up with the difficult work norm (see Annex 2) from the beneficiaries' point of view. Accordingly, of the total 236 households participating on public works 125 (53%) said that bund construction, 49(21%) road maintenance followed by pond construction 38 (16%). About 24 (10%) households reported that check dam construction has difficult work burden.

Table 4.25: Difficult work norm

Activities	frequency	%
Bunds	125	53.0
Road con. & maintenance	49	21.0
Pond Construction	38	16.0
Check dams	24	10.0
Total	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

However, currently pond construction does not exist and even the constructed ponds in 2005 and 2006 were destroyed. The reason goes beyond lack of maintenance; it includes wrong site selection and fear of malaria prevalence.

e) Public Works Monitoring and Evaluation

The PSNP manual (2004) and the PSNP monitoring and evaluation guideline (2004) identified the role of federal, regional, woreda, DAs and community FSTF. Accordingly, at woreda level experts from woreda, *Kebele* cabinets including DAs and CFSTF have a role of planning and monitoring and evaluation. Let alone the CFSTF even the researcher hardly found the annual monitoring and evaluation report of the woreda and *Kebele* as well as the mid year revision.

On the other hand the woreda FSCO head said that payment is made based on the quality of PW (which is contrary to PIM payments to beneficiaries which do not depend on technical approval of the works by a woreda / zonal / regional expert (MoARD, 2004). However, the monitoring and evaluation report was not available at the woreda. Thus, still the issue of monitoring and evaluation is left on paper. In cases where experts visit work sites they rarely report the frequent community complaints of priority need, timing of transfer and proximity of PW projects. Less attention is given to indigenous knowledge in activities like waterway construction and flood prevention. Not only for public works but also the other aspects of PSNP have been loosely monitored and evaluated. No semi-annual review of the program report was found at the woreda.

f) Child Labor

The Ethiopian constitution article 36, 1(d) indicates “*Every child has the right not to be subject to exploitive practices, neither to be required nor permitted to perform work which may be hazardous or harmful to his or her education or elsewhere.*” PSNP

implementation manual also allow able bodied adults to work on the public work activities though there is no age restriction on the implementation manual. The researcher encountered with children less than 15 years old in two of the sample *Kebeles* (*Halelu Chari* and *Dire Hacho*) working on public work activities. The researcher counted 13 and 10 children in *Halelu Chari* and *Dire Hacho Kebeles* work sites respectively during the field observation. Cognizant to this fact some members of PW focus group discussion as well as the DAs confirmed that some households send children to the work site. They claimed its negative impact on the work to be done rather than the children's right. The reality came after the children told that they were working there due to various social problems: labor shortage in the household, maternal leave, problems related to health of participant family member, absence of participated family member due to different personal problems.

I am living with aged grand families and I am working not only here also other agricultural activities too. ~ Child in PW participant Halelu Chari Kebele.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that child labor exploitation is prevailing in the woreda.

g) Environmental Impact aspect of Public Works

In principle public works should take into consideration the side effects there of. PIM noted the need to undertake environmental impact assessment in cases when public work projects are thought to cause mass displacement (MoARD, 2004). Actually there has not been specification for which activities an impact assessment should be done.

In the study woreda, frequent complaints come from non beneficiary households. During the field observation about 53 household heads in the *Halelu Chari Kebele* came to the work site and presented their dissatisfaction with the water way construction. They asserted that the frequent appeals they made to the *Kebele* councils and DAs but do not get remedy.

The constructed water way and flood diversion is going to displace our village when the summer comes. Unless any solution is found by the DAs and Kebele councils, we will be forced to leave for the Garba Guracha town. ~Non-beneficiary appellants in Halelu Chari Kebele

In the same *Kebele* one household head with his family members warned and stopped public work participants from constructing a flood diversion near his home. The following is what the farmer angrily told to the DAs, the workers and the researcher.

I leave you while digging my farm, but now you are doing against my children lives by diverting flood to my farmland, look you are diverting flood to my farm). Oh! I do not let you to do so...~Non- beneficiary household head with 10 family members in Halelu Chari.

The aforementioned challenges from the community where PW projects are executed has an implication of lack of commitment from the *Kebele* and community FSTFs as well as inadequacy of accommodating indigenous knowledge from the DAs side.

4.5. Institutional Arrangements

The implementation manual of PSNP (2004) proposed a framework for institutional arrangement from federal to community levels. Of course, the manual stressed building on previously existing institutions to launch PSNP with strengthening and/ or formation of food security task forces or steering committee in cases where they do not exist. The idea is to strengthen different sectors towards overall development as PSNP alone can not assure food security. The manual tries to assign roles to each institution, but for the purpose of the study, emphasis is given to the woreda institutional arrangement (Kuyu Woreda).

The presence of most of the institutions like the woreda cabinet, woreda food security coordination office and other supportive sectors like financial, education, health, water resource, transport and communication is not surprising. These institutions have already been built with respect to their line ministries. Ironically, some proposed institutions are either non-existing or dysfunctional (WFSTF) and others like KFSTF and CFSTF are loosely built. Indeed, an overlap of other administrative institutions with FSTFs is also the other aspect in the woreda. The existence of institutions alone could not assure PSNP planning and implementation. The question of integrity and exercising the role assigned to each institution is indispensable to answer.

A) Woreda Level Institutions

The woreda cabinets, the higher decision making body in the woreda, is responsible for the revision of beneficiaries' list, planned activities and budget with the woreda FSCO. Final decision at the woreda is also made by this body before submitting to the region.

Nonetheless, head of the woreda FSCO indicated that since the beginning of PSNP (2005), the woreda cabinets have been changed at least three times. This has created the problem of accomplishing their duties not only in PSNP, but in the woreda as well. The head of Kuyu woreda FSCO pointed out that the now and then change of cabinets is negatively affecting the timely revision and approval of PSNP annual plan. Thus, the delay in annual PSNP plan execution is attributed to this fact. Often, frequent changes of Kuyu Woreda's cabinets are beyond the woreda's PSNP implementation agencies. Moreover some newly appointed cabinets are new for the situation and unfamiliar to PSNP.

- *Woreda Food Security Coordination Office (WFSCO)/ Woreda Food Security Task Force/ WFSTF/*

In the study woreda, there is no clear distinction between WFSCO and the WFSTF. The WFSCO are exercising both roles assigned/ to itself and the dysfunctional WFSTF. Confusion between the need to follow the PSNP manual and performing the other food security program activities has been observed. The field observation witnessed that the Kuyu woreda FSCO is poorly organized. Monthly, quarterly and annual reports are not well documented. Even the office lacks human resource like its own secretary, and the other staff members are new to the office.

For instance, only the head of the FSCO could provide the researcher with information about PSNP in the woreda. The other three members of the office hardly explain the situation of the program implementation. One of them claimed that he was new to the office. The other two pointed to the office head while asked for more information about the need assessment and early warning situations. In addition, the listed FSTF (by PIM) members like the head of Agricultural and Rural Development Office and others from

different sectors are new to the woreda/office. This implies the lack of strong coordination/horizontal relation, which is recommended in the PIM in the woreda.

The absence, misplaced and ill compiled monthly, quarterly and annual PSNP reports of kebel and the woreda levels are partly attributes to absence of secretarial service in the office. There is one computer covered/ dressed by plastic, but no secretary. According to the information obtained from the WFSCO, the secretarial budget of the bureau was used for another purpose by the woreda. It is noted that this is due to instability of the woreda cabinets (job turn over).

On the other hand, integrity of other sectors with PSNP implementing agencies in the woreda is found to be poor. For one thing, *Kebeles* do not timely submit their plans due to lack of technical support from sector offices. Secondly, the contribution of educational, health, transport and communication, financial sectors has been inadequate. Representatives from different sectors are participating in meetings but hardly implement what agreed upon. Often, these sectors are expected to prepare their own annual safety net plan and request a budget. In practice the sector offices may not go beyond a mere participation, during the annual *Kebeles'* safety net plan approval, and occasional supervision of the public works output with the WFSCO request. Hence, regular monitoring and evaluation is left to the WFSCO and agricultural experts alone what ever asset built in the community by public work participants. This in turn questions the quality of outputs and its sustainability. Therefore, loose vertical and horizontal integration of institutions is a difficulty that PSNP implementation is currently facing in Kuyu woreda.

Moreover, the poor integration of PSNP with other food security programs in Kuyu woreda is best realized when (2005 and 2006) PSNP beneficiaries were not allowed to participate in credit system called '*Hula Misoma*' (under Other FSP). The FSCO head said that the presence of confusion on either to allow PSNP participants or not to the credit service in 2005 and 2006. This reflects lack of understanding of the PSNP implementation manual. Of course, training was not given for experts and some members of the office. Only two individuals were participating on the training, so as to train others at woreda level (though not adequate as told by FSCO head).

- ***Woreda Sector Bureaus and Finance Office***

The sector bureaus including the finance office have different responsibilities stated in PIM. The former bureaus (education, water supply and sanitation, health etc) are expected to support *Kebeles* technically in PSNP planning and implementation. Indeed, they are given an authority by the manual to prepare their own plan on safety net and request budget (integrate their plan with PSNP). In practice, they are hardly exercising it. For one thing, they are not trained on PSNP (Integrated District Level Planning) except the mere information (orientation). Secondly, conservativeness on their routine works has been observed. On the other hand, it could not be ignored that water and soil conservation experts (though few in number) occasionally supervise PW activities together with DAs. Focus group discussion participant of the public work component and 212 (90%) households reported that they have *Got* technical support by and large from DAs. The information obtained from the KFSTFs also supported this idea.

The woreda finance is always complained of being untimely in resource transfer. Despite, the office PSNP accountant told the untimely submission of the woreda PSNP budget requisition due to the high rate of job turn over. In addition, the fund is not timely released to the woreda from the region. Besides, the financial report of the woreda lacks clarity. There is a problem of record keeping i.e. lack of automation in the governmental financial management system. Together with the high job turn over of cabinets of the woreda, the financial procedure contributes for payment delay. For instance, in 2007 PSNP, participants had not yet collected their payment (up until April, 2007).

B) Kebele and Community Level Institutions

At *Kebele* level and community level of Kuyu woreda, it is difficult to identify KFSTF from *Kebele* cabinets and CFSTF from *got* leaders. However, in principle members of *Kebele* cabinets and *got* leaders can be members of FSTFs at the locality, other individuals (teachers, DAs, *Kebele* Youth Association, Women Affairs etc) can participate too (MoARD, 2004). In reality, the researcher found *got* leaders alone while trying to interview CFSTF. Often, at community level CFSTF is loosely institutionalized in the sample *Kebeles*. *Got* leaders are acting as the task forces, but their role is limited to

information dissemination to the farmers when there is any meeting at the *Kebele* and serves as work crew in the public work.

The public work focus group participants and about 141 (53.2%) households (Table 4.27) reported that everything is done by the *Kebele* cabinets and DAs. This partly contributes for abuse (corruption) during the targeting process. Moreover, *Kebeles* are accused of untimely PSNP plan and participants' list submission to the woreda. Since no and/or inadequate support is given by woreda sector bureau experts, it is up to DAs to prepare PSNP plan at *Kebeles* level. Here, the role of community in PW projects priority areas identification and site selection has been given little attention. Community appeals on targeting and prior needs (PW) are rarely solved at *Kebele* level rather referred to woreda.

In 2007 another institution formed at local level is the *Watershed Committee* from the *Got* where the identified site of public work is found. This committee has 11 members including DAs and cabinets in the *Kebele*, and intend to participate in the decision making process in relation with public works. Actually, the members are not well organized as the committee is formed recently. Thus, such significant impact of the committee is observed and often it was individuals among the *got* leaders that participated in the site selection of PW.

Lack of periodical community need assessment by Rapid Response Team in the woreda is prevailing. Further more, WFSCO office said low awareness of the *Kebele* level implementing agencies despite frequent orientation and training. Indeed, *Kebele* level implementing agencies are accused of being corrupt and less committed. This shows the *Kebele* cabinets and *got* leaders are trying to use their administrative position than what would have been otherwise.

In 2006, due to lack of harmony among decision makers at the woreda level in line with PSNP on what to be purchased (tools), the budget had to be transferred to 2007. Despite the need for additional tools (PW) and other office facilities, lack of financial management is clearly observed here. The woreda head of FSCO noted that the issue of lack of timely and appropriate uses of the annual budget is mainly related to the job turn over. New comers are much sensitive to deal with financial aspects before taking the

ground. Lengthy bureaucracy in government financial procedure and absence of automation also contribute there.

The woreda PSNP implementing agencies face shortage of vehicles and security to pay beneficiaries at *Kebele* level. It is from other sectors that sometimes vehicle service has been provided. This and the regulation (not to have more than 5000 birr at hand) become bottle necks to transfer resource to the beneficiaries at *Kebele* level. Often, the budget limit does not allow sending tellers to each *Kebele*. However, it is still possible to have one site at least for three or four *Kebeles* together. This reduces the chance of beneficiaries unplanned and unnecessary cost.

Nonetheless, at the woreda level different attempts are being made to enhance awareness in the *Kebeles*. Different training programs and meetings are planned and are underway in 2007. The situation of PSNP implementation in 2007 is relatively better compared with 2005 and 2006. As time goes different institutions at woreda and *Kebele* levels are somewhat accustomed to PIM. But, still much is left to be done in line with vertical and horizontal linkage of institutions. In addition, the woreda's frequent request for mode of transfer (flexibility of food and cash) has not been given attention by the region. The region often claims that the issue is linked to donors and federal level institutions. Less attention is given to grain and livestock market situation of the woreda to respond to the need of the beneficiaries on aspects like the mode, timing and level of payment.

4.6. Community Participation

The concept of participation is elusive, and different authors define it differently. Indeed, participation is defined from different angles: source of the initiation, level of participation, mode of participation, participation as a means, participation as an end etc. In this study the community participation in the planning and decision making process of PSNP at the woreda level is used. Hence, PSNP is implemented at the grass root level; the success of the program requires active community participation. Though, the program is supply driven (not initiated locally), there are many junctures where the local people contribute towards achieving the intended objectives. Under this section the level of community participation in PSNP planning and implementation at Kuyu woreda will be discussed.

To begin with the targeting process, the role of the community does not go far beyond voting for the poor during the general assembly held at *Kebeles* level. The survey result shows that about 131(49.4%) households participated during the vote for PSNP eligibility. It is up to the KFSTF to refine the lists and send to the *woreda*, and the *woreda* come up with the final list of the beneficiaries (eligible households). Though, the role given for the community is not underestimated, the favor for 'nearest and dearest' household head results in the poor quality of beneficiary households' selection particularly during the first year program implementation (2005). In addition, prevalence of relativism among the community is reported by non-beneficiary participants of the focus group, DAs and head of Kuyu *woreda* FSCO. Indeed, the local mechanisms established like swearing by 'God' to check such problem do not result in significant impact.

The situation of rural community participation in Ethiopia is briefly stated by Tegegn and Asfaw (2002) as follows.

Participation in rural Ethiopia is limited because it does not involve major kinds of participation such as decision making, not voluntary because it is mostly focuses on mobilizing resources, a process which is easily susceptible to coercion, and it is selective because if it happens at all it involves only those selected individuals and is not used as a means to create self reliance but more to extract information from farmers.
Tegegn and Asfaw (2002:39)

The fact that pre information (popular mobilization) was inadequate during 2005 (due to the election) about PSNP, some people were and still are not clear about the program. Information obtained from non beneficiaries focus group discussion revealed that the difficulty came as PSNP coincided with the 2005 legislative election campaign. In addition, the exclusion of chronic food insecure households was partly due to their absence during the assembly to identify eligible households. The survey results in relation to households' perception on who made decision shows by and large DAs and *Kebele* cabinets (Table 4.15 under section 4.2.4). Often, the major complaint noted in the *woreda* is that of inclusion of the better off households while the neediest are left. According to the focus group discussion of the non beneficiaries, DAs with the *Kebele* cabinets as well as *got* leaders favor 'nearest and dearest' during the targeting decision

making process. Moreover, the information obtained from the women focus group discussion reveals that some sort of political element has been observed to be eligible in the program. They revealed that they were selected because of their membership to ruling party. The non-participant focus group discussion also complements this idea.

Table 4.26: Households level of participation in public works

Level of Participation	frequency	%
Priority area identification	26	11.0
Site selection	26	11.0
Labor and tool	184	78.0
Total	236	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

In the public works component, 184 (78%) participants of the 236 contribute labor and tool alone while 52 (22%) of the households were participating in the process of priority area identification as well as project site selection (Table 4.26). The later are mainly *got* leaders and participants of the PSNP; because DAs highlighted that mostly *got* leaders in watershed area were participating in the watershed committee. However, this issue reflects the 2007 cases. During the first two years of implementation of PSNP no clear criteria was in place for site selection and plan for public works. Different activities were done in different villages in places where the *Got* leaders and the DAs thought problematic.

The other factors contributing to lack of community participation in the decision making process of PSNP are ranked by beneficiaries as follows. Table 4.27 shows that 141 (53.2%) of the 265 households reported that it is all done by DAs and cabinets followed by 90 (33.8%) households who said lack of information and appropriate contact. The other 12 (4.5%), 14 (5.5%) and 8 (3%) households reported that lack of time, lack of pressure and/or request and being aged and disabled are the major challenging factors inhibiting them to participate in the decision making process of PSNP.

Table 4.27: Perception of households on the challenges of participation on major decision making process of PSNP implementation

Challenges	frequency	%
Done by DAs & Cabinets	141	53.2
Lack of information & appropriate contact	90	33.8
Lack of request and/or pressure	14	5.5
Lack of time	12	4.5
Aged and Disabled	8	3.0
Total	265	100.0

Source: Household Survey, 2007

This implies lack of local leaders' commitment and less community awareness of the program. Often, the implementing agencies rarely read the manual and are often less committed to participate in the community's local decision making process. Probably this is attributed partly to the previous regime's lack of willingness to encourage popular participation in the country, and partly the shallow understanding of local leaders local level community participation issues.

4.7. PSNP Integration with other Food Security Programs

The very aim of PSNP is to pull out households with chronic food insecurity together with Other Food Security Programs (OFSP) and local development programs to food security status. To this end, PSNP participants are entitled to the benefit from OFSP, which may vary from woreda to woreda (MoARD, 2004).

In this study, it is found that credit service (locally named as component of *Hula Misoma*) has been in place. The credit provision is aimed at livestock fattening and 1500.00 birr is the maximum amount one can get (no interest rate is in the system). Despite PSNP beneficiaries were kept off the service in the previous two years (2005 and 2006). The WFSCO head admitted that this was a big mistake committed so far. Partly, the problem is from the implementing agencies' ignorance of the implementation manual, and partly due to the misguidance from the regional food security steering committee.

Moreover, the situation (when PSNP was launched, 2005) did not permit to have a concise know how of PSNP as it coincided with the legislative election campaign. Nonetheless, corrective measures have been put in place this year, and the PSNP beneficiaries are now allowed to participate on the credit service. The survey result

indicates that only 73 (27.5%) households of the surveyed 265 are currently participating in the credit service. This implies that though there is a green light for PSNP beneficiaries to get the service, much still needs to be done on the implementation aspect. Often, information from the PSNP participants' focus group discussion indicates the fear of livestock death, and lack of diversification on what the money has to buy as limiting factors of beneficiaries' participation in the scheme.

The integrity of PSNP with other local development programs is found to be weak, as observed from the view of non-beneficiary focus group discussion participants. The non-beneficiaries underlined that the payment has to be made for them to build community assets (*'the beneficiaries are paid for what they are doing'*). Besides, the Development Groups (*Garee Misoma*) leaders are member of the PSNP and little attention has been given to community asset building locally by the non-beneficiaries.

Finally, integrity of PSNP with OFSP and local development works needs strong integrated local level planning, which is observed as weak in Kuyu woreda. Nonetheless, some corrective measures though lack effective implementation, have been taken like allowing the beneficiary households to participate in credit service under food security program.

4.8. Out Come

To assess the overall impact of PSNP is difficult because of many reasons. Firstly, the program lasts only for about two and half years and is left with another two and half years to look at its overall impact. Secondly, the methodology followed in this study does not allow assessing impact. However, some outcomes of the program can be assessed from the beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries point of view. As such, the following sections try to overview PSNP outcomes in Kuyu woreda.

4.8.1. Household Asset Protection

This study tries to establish whether the households are still selling assets or not, the number of months a year PSNP payment support households, perception of households on whether the transfer increase their purchasing power or not and issues related to public work outputs. These are discussed below.

The grievances in relation with the mode and amount of payment among PSNP participants are indispensable to consider. About 165 (67.6%) of the 244 households (21 households are the 2007 participants who have not received the transfer since April 2007) reported that the transfer is too low to enhance their purchasing power. Often, they noted that it does not consider the market situation of the locality (currently in Kuyu woreda 1kg *Teff* costs about 4 to 5 birr) in *Garba Guracha* town. The urban wage rate ranges from 10-15/day birr. Public work participants expressed dissatisfaction with 6 birr/day/person compared to the urban unskilled wage rate. But, off-farm activities can hardly be found in their vicinity, and even then there are many costs tied to the urban ones and also the type of activities often varied.

Information pertaining to the number of month that beneficiary households are supported by PSNP transfer comes from both survey and the focus group discussion. The survey result indicates about 204 (83.6 %) of the 244 (see Table 4.17) respondents said that the transfer could not support their household beyond a month. About 30 (12.3 %) households reported it supports them for one to two months. While the other 10 (4.1%) households reported that they consume for more than two months.

The study also reveals that the previous in the previous 12 months 254 (95.8 %) of the 265 households were not food secured. Besides, 75 (28.2%) households sold out their domestic assets (particularly livestock like sheep and goat) so as to cover the household food shortage. About 180 (67.8 %) households have not sold assets because they do not have anything to be sold. The rest 11 (4%) households reported that they did not sell assets because of the PSNP payment. Thus, the transfer could not put off households from selling their assets. This is mainly attributing to the pooling of resources among households (dilution and list rotation) rather than full family targeting (see section 4.2.2).

On the other hand, both DS and PW participants proposed different suggestions in line with PSNP implementation: increase the amount of payment, additional work days and sustainability of the program. Of course, some sort of dependency syndrome was observed particularly from the focus group discussion participants' side as they frequently underlined the sustainability of the program, and additional work days for those with labor households. The implication is that participants of the program have

been less informed about the *graduation* issue of PSNP. This is often supported by one of the public work focus group participants:

We do not know for how long the program lasts, but I think it should cease not in the near future if the aim is to support the poorest. Hence, things have to be reconsidered and often improved from their previous status, particularly the payment amount, timing and mode.

~Wuye Gose Public work Participant

4.8.2. Community Assets

Community assets are those assets which are communally used and accessible to every individual in the community without any discrimination. Accordingly, PSNP manual (2004) mentioned some activities included in the community asset to be built: development of water points, construction of bunds, check dams, schools, health centres, rehabilitation of grazing lands etc. (see Annex-1). Under this section major community assets built in the woreda are dealt with.

Different types of ‘community assets’ are built in the woreda (Annex-1). They ranges from DAs house and school maintenance to road and bund construction (water and soil conservation). In the first year of the program implementation (2005), different activities at different communities were attempted (though much has been unknown about them). According to the focus group discussion of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, ponds, bunds and check dams were and still the later two are constructed. The scattered and poorly organized monthly reports from kebele to woreda reveal to some extent public works activities done.

I came here since late 2005, and I did not find any information about the activities done so far. Still I have not found activity report of 2005 in the Kebele before my arrival. ~DA from Halelu Chari Kebele.

I am new to the office, and do not have any hint about annual/quarterly activity reports of the woreda in 2005. Probably you can get it from the woreda. ~Member of Oromia safety net team.

In the second year (2006) of program implementation some problematic areas were identified by DAs and *Kebele* cabinets, and projects were begun at different places. Unlike the previous two years, recently (2007) a given watershed in each beneficiary

Kebeles is selected by DAs (after being trained how to go about it) and experts from the woreda. Every member of PW component is doing together in the watershed. From the field observation in the sample *Kebeles* the majority of the projects are bund construction. The bunds are constructed on individual farms irrespective of their susceptibility to degradation. Indeed, the shift from one farmland to another without considering the eroded communal land in between is observed.

According to PW focus group discussion little attention has been paid to identifying female headed labor poor households so as to institute conservation activities on their farm. This is often recommended by the PSNP implementation manual (MoARD, 2006 under section 4.3.1). In addition, PIM indicates cases when conservation activities can be done on individual farmland.

About 97 (41.1%) households of the public work participants (236) reported that their priority problem is potable water. In line with this, some people initiated locally and attempted to make use of ground water a year ago in *Halelu Chari Kebele* (but not in place currently). Under PSNP fencing and cleaning the surrounding springs have been done so far. Still the springs found in the locality (sample *Kebeles*) are not well developed. They are also seasonal and more often than not dried during winter season.

We had started to extract ground water last year, but we did not get any support from the Woreda. The Woreda claimed that they do not have budget for that because it needs huge capital. Finally, we stopped it and are still facing the water problem.

~PW focus group discussion participants of Halelu Chari

What is currently being done on farms is good, and it is one of the various problems we are currently facing. But, priority should be given to potable water, and still we are appealing to the woreda and government to give us remedy"

~A non- participant focus group discussion members of Dire Hacho

Together with the aforementioned points, issues related to lack of experts and sustainability questions were raised in the *Kebeles*. About 212 (90%) of the public work participants indicated that only the DAs provide them with technical support with rare supervision from the woreda. Often, in *Halelu Chari Kebele* the absence of technical

support during the project work resulted in re-doing of the work after completion (Because the output was under qualified by experts from the woreda visit once after project completion to approve for payment). Such re-doing of works results in over exploitation of labor of the poorest and misusing of their time that would have been used for other activities otherwise.

The sustainability of community assets built under PSNP is questionable. For one thing, the program creates the perception of doing such community assets by payee among the non-beneficiaries, and they may need wage for maintenance of schools, roads, check dams etc. Secondly, the skill of water and soil conservation mixes the science and some what the indigenous knowledge. But, some non-beneficiary households may not be consulted and/or lack initiation and even unwilling to participate on activities done on their farms.

Nonetheless, 209 (78.9%) of the 236 surveyed households reported that they are satisfied by the community assets built so far. Besides, they did not ignore the problem of priority area selection. For instance, in the two sample *Kebeles* (*Halelu Chari and Dire Hacho*) their prior problem is potable water, but less attention has been given from PSNP implementing agencies.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. Summary

The very aim of this study is to shed light on the major problematic areas of PSNP implementation at local level i.e. Kuyu woreda. Accordingly, the following points are findings of the study.

- ✓ The surveyed households vary in their socio-economic characteristics. Accordingly, 29.5 % households have seven and more family size. The asset ownership status of the households is manifested through their domestic assets, livestock ownership and farmland which are more often than not cheap (for domestic assets) and few in numbers and little in size for most of the households. The size of farmland for majority of the households is small, and the annual production could not support the family for most of the months.
- ✓ The geographical targeting within the woreda was poorly practiced and an attempt at including almost all the rural *Kebeles* (except three) have been observed. Beneficiary identification and selection in the first year of the program implementation suffered from corruption by the *Kebele* cabinets and *Got* leaders. In addition, from the community some sort of segregation by tribe during the vote for PSNP was observed. In line with this still no measure of deregistering the non-need participants has been taken, and attempt of reducing relativism among the communities using strong local mechanisms have had little impact during the targeting process.
- ✓ The other issues in line with the targeting process are beneficiary list rotation and dilution. This is manifested by family cutting and the action taken on the DS beneficiaries (reducing by 68.2% in each *Kebeles* of *Wuye Gose* and *Dire Hacho* and 67.7% in *Halelu Chari Kebele*) i.e. switching to PW component due to the preset quota system.
- ✓ The execution of public works at specified watershed areas resulted in the withdrawal of some *Got* in the sample *Kebele* and other two *Kebeles* in 2007

(*Dhahe Wilincho and Jila Qerensa*). In addition, priority areas like potable water in *Dire Hacho* and *Halelu Chari Kebeles* have been given little attention. In addition, environmental impact aspect of the public work has also been given little consideration as it was demonstrated by the appeals of 53 household heads and others in Halelu Chari woreda. Gender aspect of the PW recommended by the PIM has been less practiced (no formally announced maternal leave in the woreda and no response to potable water problem that would reduce women work burden). There are also children under 15 participating in the public works (DAs are not aware of child labor issue). Monitoring and evaluation of the public work outputs are rarely practiced though the woreda FSCO head claimed the delay of payment is due to the need to undertake outputs evaluations by experts from the woreda.

- ✓ Regarding the institutional arrangements at the woreda level FSTF is almost dysfunctional due to the periodical job turn over of the cabinets. Rather the WFSCO have done both its own role and the role assigned to the FSTF. In addition, FSTFs at *Kebele* and community level is overlapped with administration role of the cabinets and *got* leaders. Role confusion, lack of commitment and corruption in 2005 was noted. Coincidence of the 2005 legislative election campaign and PSNP launching time also creates a gap of knowledge about the program in the woreda. Loose vertical and horizontal integration among the program implementation agencies is prevailing. Evidence to this, the sector bureaus do not have their safety net plan and rarely provide technical support to kebles while preparing their annual plan. In addition, the misguided action of not including the PSNP beneficiaries in the credit service from region to the woreda reflects their loose relationship. Moreover, there prevails serious problem of data recording on the activities done within the program at *Kebele* as well as woreda level. Monthly, quarterly and annual reports of PSNP were either not available or scattered.
- ✓ Mode and amount of payment is not demand driven; and the timing of payment has not been taken into consideration during the period of food shortage in the locality. In addition, at the woreda level there is untimely issuance of the transfer

(delays after announcement to the beneficiaries). Beneficiary households in *Kebeles* far from the woreda administrative center, Gabra Guracha (where the payment is made), waste their time that would have been invested on their own agricultural activities otherwise.

- ✓ The other point must be raised is the community participation in the decision making process of PSNP. Accordingly, lack of community mobilization during the first year of the program implementation is observed. This is due to the legislative election campaign that made the cabinets busy. Often, about 78% of the surveyed households contributed tools and labor to the PW while the problem identification and site selection were left to *Kebele* cabinets, DAs and some *got* leaders. As such prior need of the community has been given little attention due to lack of local level implementing agencies ignorance.
- ✓ The other side of the program may reflect some sort of dependency syndrome as many beneficiary households frequently suggest the continuity of the program and additional workdays and increase in amount of payments. In addition, sustainability of the community assets is under question as non-beneficiaries are not cooperative due to lack of consultation the view of the non-beneficiaries is that they have to be paid too so that they can build community assets.
- ✓ Currently at the woreda and *Kebele* level, little awareness is observed regarding the program. Though no such appreciable retargeting activity has been done so far, the attempt made in this year (2007) is not ignored, particularly with respect to appeals.

5.2. Conclusion

Local level implementation of large scale programs like PSNP may face different challenges particularly in developing countries where financial and skilled human resources are scarce and decentralization is not deep rooted. In line with this the study attempts to come up with some concluding remarks on the challenges of PSNP implementation at woreda level in Ethiopia specific to Kuyu woreda.

Regarding the targeting process, there is a mismatch of theory and practice in the study woreda. The PIM do not allow dilution rather it states full family targeting. Nonetheless, the implementing agencies at local level intentionally rotate list of beneficiaries and there has been dilution to overcome the large number of the neediest excluded due to the quota system. In addition, some sort of corruption and lack of targeting review is prevailing in the study woreda. Since PSNP launch and the legislative election campaign coincided, confusion was created as both the ruling and the opposing parties used it for political mobilization during the first year of program implementation.

Moreover, some aspects of the program like amount and level of payment does not consider the local need, and in Kuyu woreda beneficiaries of the program prefer food to cash. The public work projects also rarely address the community prior problems and have not been well organized in the previous two years (2005 and 2006). This does not mean that what has been done in this area is futile, rather the problem is on planning which comes first.

As to the implementing institutions, some are weakly established and others are dysfunctional. For instance the woreda FSTF members are frequently changed due to the job turn over in the woreda (*'cabinets are changed every two or three months'*). Besides, the *Kebele* and community FSTFs are inseparable from the other administration bodies as well hence they are over loaded since every aspect of different programs is implemented down there. Thus, role confusion among the *Kebele* cabinets and *got* leaders are observed. On the other hand weak linkage (vertically as well as horizontally) among the institutions is manifested by lack of technical support to the *Kebeles* from the sector offices, misinformation from region to woreda on PSNP beneficiaries participation to Other Food Security Programs (OFSP) in 2005 and 2006. Evidence from the woreda also indicates lack of integrated local level planning i.e. sector offices have given the responsibility of integrating PSNP into their annual plan and request budget. Practically in Kuyu woreda PSNP implementation is by and large left for Food Security Coordination Office.

The issue of community participation still needs greater attention as it is observed to be too weak in Kuyu woreda. Mostly the community has been participating on material and

labor contribution rather than decision-making process. In addition, during public works problem area identification and site selection non-beneficiaries are not consulted even from the beneficiaries only some *got* leaders assigned as the watershed committee are participating in 2007. For the previous two years (2005 and 2006) DAs and *Kebele* cabinets selected the work site at different villages within the *Kebeles*. Lack of community participation is observed as two *Kebeles* (*Dhahe Wilincho* and *Jila Qerensa*) from the beneficiary twenty *Kebeles* and two *Gots* in *Wuye Gose* and *Dire Hacho Kebeles* withdrew from the public works being dissatisfied by the project site selection.

Nonetheless, there are some positive aspects of the program implementation. The previous erroneously done activities like not allowing beneficiaries to participate in other food security programs have given corrective measures. In addition, gradually the implementing agencies are aware of the program, and it seems the program implementation is relatively better this year (2007) than the years before. However, still much need to be done to solve the currently observed challenges at the woreda.

5.3. Recommendations

Inline with challenges raised some recommendations are given as follows.

Targeting

- Revision on how to practice geographical targeting within the woreda should be made at the woreda level and often some criteria has to be set on the targeting guideline to select *Kebeles* and communities based on periodical local need assessments.
- Dilution and beneficiary list rotation has to be discouraged, and if possible a way of increasing the quota to the woreda has to be designed. Thus, full family targeting through targeting revision must be practised.
- During the retargeting process local mechanisms to avoid bias towards relatives must be strengthened. For instance, the problem of voting for the same tribe among the community must be discouraged, and the essence of good governance should be penetrated to the village level to deny the corruptive activities at the *Kebele* and community level during the retargeting process.

Transfer

- The amount, mode and timing of payment must be reconsidered, and has to take the local grain market and wage level into account. The beneficiaries must get the payment when they are in need of it i.e. food shortage period.
- The payment site should be added so as to save the time as well as financial resource of the beneficiaries. Some *Kebeles* are at a distant place from the place where the payment is made (woreda), and they are forced to spend at least a night in the Garba Guracha.
- Often at the woreda level corrective measures in line with the timing of payment must be taken. For instance, specifically announcing the date of payment and pay it on the date. Besides, making sufficient payment days to avoid crowd during the payment.

Public Works

- Communities' prior problems areas must be identified and solved first; however, what is currently done is also appreciable.
- Much attention should be given to community assets though individual farm households' farmland in the watershed and vulnerable to degradation is also not ignored when the soil and water conservation activities are done. In addition, female-headed labor poor households' farmlands conservation should be re considered.
- Awareness on women maternal leave should be given, and the same to child labor issue.
- Effective plan implementation should be developed among DAs. On going activities supervision and monitoring of PW activities has to be adapted so that the quality of the output goes with plan. Often, this reduces the chance of outputs under qualification and re-doing of the activities. To this end horizontal institutional co-ordination is very crucial.
- Awareness on the maintenance of community assets must be built among the community. This is expected from DAs mainly and they have to consult, convince and involve the non beneficiaries on how to maintain the community assets built.

Institutional Arrangements

- Woreda level institutions must be well organized and strengthened. For instance the woreda FSTF members should be identified and carry out their role accordingly. This may be done when the high job turnover (frequent changes in the cabinets is reduced). Sector offices must integrate PSNP and their own annual plan, and should provide *Kebeles* with technical support while they are planning and implementing the plan.
- KFSTF must be identified from *Kebele* councils and DAs; teachers and women and others should actively participate by being members of the task forces. In addition, members of community FSTF should be any individuals in the communities rather than *got* leaders alone.
- Some proposed and/or weakly established institutions like *watershed committee* must be strengthened and include individuals even out of the watershed and also non beneficiaries. This is crucial in public work site selection as this minimizes negative impacts on some communities.
- Rapid Response Team (RRT) must be strengthened and institutionalized at the woreda level. Of course, in the woreda one can hardly find the members of the RRT. As such, the local need assessment and performance monitoring and evaluation of the program in the woreda lacks by the team.

Community Participation

- Awareness about the retargeting and role of the community should be strengthened through clearly notice of the program and its objectives, how to make an appeal in case of dissatisfaction and controlling of the local leaders to minimize the corruptive actions during the targeting decision-making.
- Detailed community needs assessment regarding the payment mode and timing by RRT at the woreda (*Kebele*) should be done periodically. In case of public works, both non-beneficiary and beneficiary households must participate on the public works decision-making process that may affect negatively as well as positively their socio economic aspects. The community rather than DAs and local leaders must set priority area of PW projects.

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APPENDIX 1-A

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED TO SURVEY THE BENEFICIARIES OF PSNP IN LIGHT WITH

CHALLENGES OF PSNP IMPLEMENTATION AT LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF KUYU WOREDA

INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

Identification

Participants

Kebele _____

Village _____

Serial Number _____

Dear participant,

I am a graduate student in the Institute of RLDS at the University of Addis Ababa, and currently working on a research project on *Challenges of PSNP Implementation at Local Level: The case of Kuyu woreda*. Therefore, I would like to invite you to participate in the study. This questionnaire is designed to collect data relevant to the study. I hope you shall provide me with accurate and reliable information as per the following questions. Finally, I would like to appreciate and thank you in advance for giving me your precious time. The information you shall provide should be treated confidentially.

Enumerator's Name _____

Date of Enumeration _____

I. Beneficiaries Background data

1.1 Demography

1.1.1 Sex of the HHH

01. Male 02. Female

1.1.2. Age of the respondent

01. < 15 02. 16-64 03. >64

1.1.3. Martial status

01. Married
 02. Not married
 03. Divorced
 04. Separated
 05. Widowed

1.1.4. Educational status

01. Non-literate
 02. Read and write
 03. Grades 01-04
 04. Grades 04-08
 05. Grades 09-10
 06. Grades 10+1 and above

1.1.5. Family size _____

Able Bodied Adult family size _____

1.2. Household Assets

1.2.1. House characteristics:

1.2.1.1. Type of roof: _____

1.2.1.2. Type of floor _____

1.2.1.3. Type of walls _____

1.2.1.4. Type of door _____

1.2.1.5 Types of asset	No. owned by HH	Estimated price/unit
Bed		
Chair		
Table		
Radio/cassette		
Television		
Bicycle		
Motorcycle		
Etc		

1.2.2 Farm land

1.2.2.1. What is your farm size _____ (hectare?)

1.2.2.2 What is the pattern of your landholding?

01. Single blocked 02. Fragmented

1.2.2.3 Have you rented land?

01. Yes 02. No

1.2.2.4 If yes, specify the size of rented land _____ (hectare)

1.2.2.5 For how many years you rented land? From _____ to _____

1.2.2.6. Why have you rented land? _____

1.2.2.7 Have you rented out land?

01. Yes

02. No

1.2.2.8. If yes, specify the size _____

1.2.2.9. For how many years you rented in land? From _____ to _____

1.2.2.10. Why have you rented out? _____

1.2.3 Livestock

Type of animal	Number owned by HH	Price/unit
Oxen		
Cow		
Bull		
Calf		
Goat		
Sheep		
Etc.		

1.4. Household Activities

1.4.1 Agriculture

1.4.1.2. Please indicate the amount of crop you produced last year.

Crop	Area Cultivated (ha)	Yield (Quintal)	Amount Consumed (Quintal)	Amount Sold (Quintal)	Amount Stored (Quintal)	Price/ (Quintal)

1.4.1.3 For how many months could the production support your family? _____

1.4.1.4 Indicate months of food shortage

January	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.

1.4.2 Non farming Activities

Activity	Months per year	Estimated income per month
Working on daily labor		
Cow dung selling		
Sell charcoal/ firewood		
Others		

1.5. Food/ Cash Aid

1.5.1. Did you participate in any food/cash aid programs previously?

01. Yes

02. No

1.5.2. If yes, specify the programs

- 01. FFW
- 02. Fee distribution
- 03. Employment Generation Scheme
- 04. Others (specify) _____

1.5.3. For how long did you participate (Years) ? From _____ to _____

1.5.4. How many members of your family participated? _____

1.5.5. How many kg /birr you and your family members receive per month? _____

2. PSNP Related Data

2.1 Targeting

2.1.1. How long have you participated in PSNP? _____

2.1.2. In which PSNP component you have you participated?

- 01. Direct support
- 02. Public works

2.1.3. Why do you participate in the component you choice under 2.1.2? _____

2.1.4. How many members of your family have participated in the program? _____

2.1.5. What was the criterion used to select the participants?

2.1.5.1 Direct support

- 01. Poorest of the poor and labor poor
- 02. Political commitment
- 03. Ownership of asset
- 04. Land holding size
- 05. Household's family size
- 06. No clear criteria
- 07. I don't know
- 08. Others (specify) _____

2.1.5.2. Public works

- 01. Poorest of the poor and labor poor
- 02. Political commitment
- 03. Ownership of asset
- 04. Land holding size
- 05. Household's dependent family member's size
- 06. No clear criteria
- 07. I don't know
- 08. Others (specify) _____

2.1.6. Who is in charge of beneficiary selection?

- 01. PA leaders
- 02. Woreda council
- 03. Community committee
- 04. DAs
- 05. Others (specify) _____

2.1.7 The targeting process was air

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.1.8. What do you suggest to improve the targeting mechanism?

2.2. Public Works

2.2.1. List community assets and/or household assets built in your community?

No	Names	
01	Road (km)	
02	Schools	
03	Health centers	
04	Hillside Terraces	
05	Check dams	
06	Structures	
07	Schemes	
08	Land Reclaimed	
09	Seedling Production	
10	Micro basins	
11	Others	

2.2.2. Have you participated in all projects implementation listed under 2.2.1?

01. Yes 02. No

2.2.3. If No, why? _____

2.2.4 Indicate months of food shortage

January	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.

2.2.5. The community assets and households' assets built by public work projects are priority areas of the community?

01. Yes 02. No

2.2.6. The public works equally involve male and female participants.

01. Yes 02. No

2.2.7. Are the public works projects timely and with standard quality completed?

01. Yes 02. No

03. I don't know

2.2.8. Which public works have difficult work norms? Put it in descending order.

- 01. Water harvesting schemes
- 02. Range land development
- 03. Small scale irrigation
- 04. Road Construction
- 05. Water and soil conservation
- 06. School and health Centers Construction
- 07. Others (Specify) _____

2.2.9. Who gives you technical support? _____

2.2.10. Do your indigenous knowledge is accommodated during the public works project execution? 01. Yes 02. No

2.2.11. If No, why _____

2.2.12. If yes, in which types of public works project? List them _____

2.3. Resources Transferred

2.3.1. What is the mode of resource transferred?

01. Cash
 02. Food
 03. Food and cash in combination
 04. Others (Specify) _____

2.3.2. What is the amount of resource transferred (Kg/Birr) per month? _____

2.3.3. From where do you collect the transfer? _____

2.3.4 How far it is from your home? (Kms) _____

2.3.5. Is there a difference in mode and level of resource transferred between direct support and public works beneficiaries?

01. Yes 02. No
 03. I don't know (why?) _____

2.3.6. If yes, specify the mode resource transferred for both components.

2.3.6.1. Direct Support

01. Food 02. Cash 03. Food and cash in combination
 04. Others (Specify) _____

2.3.6.2. Amount collected (kg/birr) _____

2.3.6.3. Public works

01. Food 02. Cash 03. Food and cash in combination
 04. Others (Specify) _____

2.3.6.4. Amount collected (kg/birr) _____

2.3.7. Are both male and females in public works earning equal wage?

01. Yes 02. No

2.3.8. If No, what are the reasons?

2.3.9. Have you received food/cash per month on time?

01. Yes 02. No

2.3.10. If No, why? _____

2.3.11. Indicate months of payment

January	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.

2.3.12. For how many months per year you have received food/cash since your participation in direct support/ public works? _____

2.3.13. How do you spend the cash food you received?

2.3.14. The payment is

01. Fair 02. Moderate 03. Unfair

2.3.15. If you unfair why? _____

2.3.16. If you don't agree, what alternative mode and amount of payment you suggest?

2.4. Participation

2.4.1. Have you participated in the process of beneficiaries' selection in your community?

01. Yes 02. No

2.4.2. If yes, at what position?

- 01. Criteria setting discussion
- 02. Community committee election
- 03. Elected community committee
- 04. Community leader
- 05. Elderly
- 06. *Kebele* council member
- 07. If others (specify) _____

2.4.3. If No, Why?

- 01. Lack of adequate information and appropriate contact
- 02. Lack of request/ pressure
- 03. Lack of time
- 04. Done by DAs and *Kebele* Cabinets
- 05. If others (specify) _____

2.4.4. The targeting mechanisms used to select beneficiaries is fair

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.4.5. Why do you agree / don't agree?

2.4.6. At what level of public work projects have you participated?

- 01. Priority areas identification
- 02. Solution identification
- 03. Site selection
- 04. Time allocation
- 05. Tool contribution
- 06. Labor contribution
- 07. Monitoring and evaluation
- 08. Wage determination
- 09. Others (specify) _____

2.4.7. List other assistance programs in which you are participating being PSNP beneficiary? _____

2.4.8. Why you participate in the programs you listed under 2.4.7

2.5 Challenges and Opportunities

2.5.1. Please identify major problems related to beneficiaries' selection?

- 01. Inclusion of non-needy households
- 02. Exclusion of chronic food insecure households
- 03. Low emphasis to female headed aged and disabled
- 04. Corruption
- 05. Relativism
- 06. Others (Specify) _____

2.5.2. What are the problems related to the mode and level of resource transferred?

- 01. Not consider grain market
- 02. Low level
- 03. Untimely payment
- 04. Others (Specify) _____

2.5.3. What factors hinder the execution public work projects efficiently in your locality?

- 01. Lack of experts
- 02. Non priority areas selection
- 03. Un sustainability
- 04. Others (Specify) _____

2.5.4. What major factors are denying you to participate in local PSNP planning?

- 01. Low educational level
- 02. Low local leaders' commitment
- 03. Lack of training and workshop
- 04. Lack of time
- 05. Others (Specify) _____

2.5.5. What do you suggest to curb the prevailing problems? _____

2.6. Out comes

2.6.1. How many months of food shortage covered by PSNP entitlement pre annum?

2.6.2. Are you food secured for 12 months after participating in PSNP?

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.6.3. Are you distressed to sell assets of any kind to feed your household?

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.6.4. Have you used community assets built under PSNP?

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.6.5. If yes, of what kind?

- 01. Water harvesting schemes
- 02. Range land developed
- 03. Small scale irrigation
- 04. Road access
- 05. Others (specify) _____

2.6.6. Are you satisfied with the direct benefit from infrastructures?

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

2.6.7. If no, why? _____

2.6.8. How many resource/ cash transferred during safety net program period?

2.6.9. Has the payment increased your purchasing power?

- 01. Yes
- 02. No

Thank You!

APPENDIX 1-B

Focus Group Discussion

I. Female Focus Group Discussions

Theme 1: General Questions

- What social position do women assume in your community in relation to men?
- What informal coping mechanisms do women use during chronic food insecurity periods?
- How often have you participated in food/cash transfer programs in the past?

Theme 2: PSNP Targeting Process

- Is PSNP targeting giving special attention to women during beneficiaries?
- What other targeting mechanisms do you think better pull women to the program?
- What major problems are encountered by the targeting mechanisms in relation to PW and DS?

Theme 3: Public works Projects

- Are the projects considering women participants in terms of solving their burden?
- What major problems prevail in PWs projects as far as women are concerned?

Theme 4: Participation

- To what extent do you participate in the planning and implementation of PSNP at your community?
- What factors make it difficult for women's participation in PSNP?

Theme 5: Cash/food Payment

- Who receives the cash/food transfer due to your participation in PSNP?
- Who decides the pattern of consumption/ expenditure of the transfers?
- Is there a wage difference between women and men for equivalent work?
- Do you think the mode of payment is relevant?

II. Focus Group Discussion of Public Works Participants

Theme 1: Selection Process

- How did the process work? Who made decisions?
- What was the nature of community involvement? Transparency of decision-making?
- Fair? Why were they chosen and others excluded? Are there many deserving households excluded? Why?
- Social conflict due to inclusion/ exclusion? Why? How resolved?

Theme 2: Work experience

- Leadership of work crews.
- Timing and duration of work requirement.
- Safety and Security.

Theme 3: Assistance/ Compensation

- Timeliness of receipt of wages
- Adequacy and appropriateness of compensation.

Theme 4: Public Works Products

- How are work activities selected/designed?
- Community role and issues for inclusion/participation/
- Do they respond to needs? Would other activities have been more appropriate?
- Have there been environmental impacts? How mitigated?

Theme 5: Other Assistance Programmes

- Description of other forms of support in community (i.e. 'Other FS programmes')
- Who is included/ excluded in those other programs? Overlap with PSNP?
- What benefits derived from other programmes.
- Problems encountered in delivery of other programmes

III. Focus Group Discussion of Non-Beneficiaries

- How did the process work? Who made decisions?
- What was the nature of their involvement? Transparency of decision-making?
- Fair? Why were they not chosen and others included? Are there many deserving households excluded? Why?
- Social conflict due to inclusion/ exclusion? Why? How resolved? Stigma?
- Are there non-beneficiaries who were selected for the program but chose to leave? What are the circumstances?
- For women: does the nature of the program make it difficult for women to participate? Are there women who left program because of unique constraints?
- How do you get the community assets built in your surroundings?

Thank You!

APPENDIX 1-C

Key Informants Unstructured Interview

I. Community Food Security Task Force

1. What mechanisms were used to select eligible households to participate in PSNP?
2. How often members of the community are informed about the selection criteria of the beneficiaries and the overall PSNP activities?
3. What modes of participation are used to involve the members of the community in the selection of eligible households?
4. What techniques are used by the community to oversee implementation of PSNP components?
5. How often indigenous knowledge is accommodated in PWs projects execution?
6. What mechanisms of appeals are built?

II. Kebele Food Security Task Force

1. What mechanisms were used to identify eligible communities to participate in PSNP in your *Kebele*?
2. When planning exercise and project identification is undertaken at *Kebele* level?
3. Who are the stakeholders at *Kebele* level annual safety net planning exercise and project identification?
4. How the work teams of public work projects are organized?
5. How often public works projects are supervised? Who are the stakeholders?
6. What major challenging factors prevail in relation with beneficiaries' selection, projects site identification and public works execution and procurement administration at the *Kebele*? What measures are taken in the mid year revision?
7. Do annual monitoring and evaluation are undertaken? For how many months per year? Who are the stakeholders?
8. What major problems are observed while monitoring and evaluating the PSNP in the *Kebele*? What measures are taken?
9. What mechanisms of appeals are built?

III. Woreda Food Security Task force

1. When do *Kebeles* report their regular activities?
2. Do the *Kebeles* accomplish their monthly regular activities timely?
3. What major problems prevail in relation with *Kebeles*' monthly report?
4. Who are the stakeholders of woreda level planning exercise, projects identification and annual safety net planning and procurement planning?
5. Do final list of beneficiaries, tools and materials are prepared timely? Who are the stake holders? What major problems prevail to prepare the lists?
6. What lessons are learned from the mid year review? What measures have been taken?
7. What challenging factors prevail to launch projects and report statement of expenditure timely? What measures are taken?
8. How often site staffs are trained (profile)?
9. Do monitoring and evaluation are undertaken annually at woreda level? What lessons are learned? What measures are taken?
10. What modes of participation are used to involve the communities at woreda level PSNP planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation? Who are the stakeholders?
11. What mechanisms of appeals are built?

Thank you!!!

Annex-1

Public works output of Kuyu woreda (Year 1998/99 (2006))

No	Activity/Output	Unit	Annual Plan	Actual	%
1	Stone bund construction	km	443.25	669.89	150.09
2	Water way	m ³	1000	921	92.18
3	Check dam	m ³	1000	1000	100
4	Cut off drain	m ³	450	455.7	101.2
5	Seedling preparation	no	200.00	211.782	105.8
6	Pitting	no	190.00	211.782	111.0
7	Compost making	pit	3333	3393	101
8	Gully development	ha	15	16.5	101
9	Gabon construction	m ³	500	-	-
10	Planting and bunds	km	240	8	3.33
11	Grassland imperilment	ha	50	30	60
12	Live tenting	ha	5	5	100
13	Grass strip	no	100	-	-
14	Road construction	km	30	5	100
15	Spring development	no	-	-	-
16	Pond construction	no	-	5	100
17	Hand dug well	no	5	2	100
18	Animal health post	no	2	-	-
19	Spring development	no	10	-	-

Source: Kuyu Woreda FSCO, 2007

Annex - 2

Work Norms

	Water and soil conservation	Work norm (interim)
1	Bund stone spill way apron	2 PD/1 spill way 7 apron
2	Bund stabilization (grasses and legumes)	30 PD/km
3	Hillside terrace + trench construction	330 PD/km
4	Water way construction (stone paved)	1 PD/0.75 m ³ earth/stone work
5	Water way check and drop and apron structure (CDA)	1 PD/3 CDA
6	Brushwood check dams construction	1 PD/3 linear meters
7	Stone faced (soil bunds construction)	250 PD/km
8	Cully re-vegetation	500 PD/ha
9	Sediment Storage dam (SS dam)	1 PD/0.75 m ³ earth/stone work
10	SSdams spill way construction	1 PD 0.5 m ³ spill way
11	/gully cut and fill treshaping/leveling	1 PD/1m ³ earth work
12	Compost making (pit: 4ml X 2MW X1.5 X1.5 MD)	10 PD/pit
13	Compost making (heap: 4ml X 2MW X 1.5 MD)	1 PD/linear meter
14	Eyebrow basin construction (EB)	1 PD/2 EB
15	Trench Construction	2 PD/3 trenches
16	Herrng bone construction	1PD/4 HB
17	Improved pits for dry areas	1PD/5 improved pits
18	Micro-trenches	1PD/ 3 micro- trenches
19	Mulching of degraded land and long fallows	250PD/ha
20	Alley cropping	10 PD/km
21	Mulching of trenches (eyebrow basins)	1 PD/50 structures
22	Zi pits	1 PD/ 50 pits
23	Grass strips	30 PD/km
24	Grassland improvement	20 PD/ha / year
	Infrastructure	
25	Road construction (Mpe 2. surface paved)	4000 PD/km
	Supplementary measures	
26	Manuring of planting pits	1 PD/200 pits
27	Cow dung collection and dist	6 PD/ 1m ³
28	Gabion structure	1 PD/0.25 m ³ of Gabon check
29	Vegetative Fencing and stabilization	40 PD/km
30	Stone Shaping (SS and rock fill dam walls, large gully checks)	40 PD/0.5 m ³ shaped stones
31	Stone collection and transport	1 PD/0.5m ³ transport to site
32	Check dams (soil + stone)	1 PD/4m

Source: Kuyu woreda Food Security Coordination and Disaster Prevention and preparedness Office (2007)

Annex-3

3.1. Chi-Square (χ^2) test of the difference among households' period of participation and size of family members participated in the program.

Year	Participated Family Member Size		Total
	1	2	
1 st	5	16	21
2 nd	19	35	54
3 rd	103	87	190
Total	127	138	265

Observed (O)	Expected (E)	(O-E) ²	$\frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$
5	10.06	25.62	2.54
19	25.88	47.33	1.83
103	91.06	142.60	1.57
16	10.94	25.62	2.34
35	28.12	47.33	1.68
87	98.94	142.60	1.44
265	265		11.4*

Note: degree of freedom (d.f) = (r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (2-1) = 2

Table value of $\chi^2_{0.05}$ (Chi-square at 5% significance level) for d.f=2 is 5.99 while the calculated* value is 11.4

3.2. Chi-Square test of the difference between Direct Support and Public work beneficiary households' view on targeting fairness.

Fair Targeting	Direct Support(HHs)	Public Work (HHs)	Total
Yes	20	77	97
No	9	159	168
Total	29	236	265

Observed (O)	Expected (E)	(O-E) ²	$\frac{(O-E)^2}{E}$
20	10.62	88.03	8.29
9	18.38	88.03	4.79
77	86.38	88.03	1.02
159	149.62	88.03	0.59
265	265		14.69*

Note: d.f = (r-1) (c-1) = (2-1) (2-1) = 1

Table value of $\chi^2_{0.05}$ for d.f=1 is 3.84 while the calculated* value is 14.69

List of Key informants

Ato Moges Eshete	Head of Kuyu Woreda FSCO
Ato Hailu Lema	DA Wuye Gose <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Teferi Bogale	DA Dire Hacho <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Sime Kitila	DA Halelu Chari <i>Kebele</i>
W/rt Zeneba Demboba	Kuyu Woreda Accountant of PSNP
Ato Diriba Ijara	FSTF member Wuye Gose <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Bote Gaddisa	FSTF member Halelu Chari <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Ayele Belachew	FSTF member Dire Hacho <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Ketema Kebede	FSTF member Wuye Gose <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Gameda Lali	FSTF member Halelu Chari <i>Kebele</i>
Ato Tolasa Defar	FSTF member Dire Hacho <i>Kebele</i>

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in other university and all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Fekadu Nigussa



August 2007

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University advisor.

Ignatious Mberengwa (Ph.D)



August 2007