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**ETHIOPIA'S PEACE COOPERATION AND MARITIME DIPLOMACY WITH
MARITIME NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SINCE 2018: SUCCESSES AND
CHALLENGES**

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**Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation and Maritime Diplomacy with Maritime
Neighboring Countries since 2018: Successes and Challenges**

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DECLARATION

Hereby, I Tesfaye Tola Wakayo declare that this thesis, title “**Ethiopia’s Peace Cooperation and Maritime Diplomacy with Maritime Neighboring Countries since 2018: Success and Challenges**” is my original work prepared under the close advice and guidance of my advisor. This original work has not been presented for any academic and non-academic purposes. The sources and materials used in this work had cited according to APA citation rules.

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Here, I state Tesfaye Tola Wakayo has carried out this research with the title of "Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation and Maritime diplomacy with Maritime Neighboring Countries since 2018: Successes and Challenges” under my super supervision and the thesis has been submitted for the examination with my approval as a University advisor.

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Acronyms

ASEAN	-----	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	-----	African Union
EEBC	-----	Ethiopian Eritrean Boundary Commission
EPLF	-----	Eritrean People Liberation Front
EMAA	-----	Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority
ESLSEA	-----	Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise Authority
FDRE	-----	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD	-----	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GCS	-----	Global Cooperation Staff
HAC	-----	Horn African Cooperation
IGAD	-----	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NATO	-----	North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
OAS	-----	Organization of American States
PM	-----	Prime Minister
TPLF	-----	Tigray people Liberation Front
UAE	-----	United Arab Emirate
UN	-----	United Nation
EU	-----	European Union

Abstract

This research aims at examining whether Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation and Maritime Diplomacy with maritime neighboring countries mainly with Eritrea since 2018 satisfy Ethiopia's need to get the right to access the sea through Eritrea ports that serve both for commercial and military activities, and the reason why land-locked Ethiopia needs to build a navy and where Ethiopian navy will be based. The field data were collected through key informant interviews and Main findings of the study include, Ethiopia and Eritrea able to end the period of 'no peace no war' after the leaders of the two countries signed peace deal agreements in 2018. But, Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean ports both for economic and military activities. The reasons for the lack of official execution of the agreement signed to implement the boundary decision has not been executed due to internal conflict in Ethiopia, Ethiopia and Eritrea did not sign a package agreement that consists of port utilization protocols, and Eritrean ports are also lacking infrastructures. The study also found out that Ethiopia re-established its navy by Proclamation No. 1100/2019, to protect Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, to protect Ethiopian cargo ships, and to protect Ethiopian national interest in the Horn African maritime region. Yet, Ethiopia did not sign a single treaty with any maritime countries that help Ethiopia to get an operational naval base. Therefore, Ethiopia's peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy made with Eritrea since 2018 did not satisfy Ethiopia's need to get access to the sea through Eritrea ports, which serve Ethiopia both for its economic and military objectives yet. Also, the base of the new Ethiopian navy is still unknown. This implies that Ethiopia needs to work hard to avoid all the challenges that impede its Peace Cooperation and Maritime diplomacy, and to make every possible effort to achieve the objective to get sea access through the maritime domain of Eritrea that would serve Ethiopia both for commercial and military purpose.

CHAPTER- ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

From the Aksumite civilization up to the Italian arrival to the Red Sea in the 1890s, Ethiopia had owned the Red Sea maritime domain along the coastal line of Eritrea. But, in 1890 when the Italians occupied the Red Sea coast and officially declared the Italian colony over Eritrea, Ethiopia had lost the Red sea coastal line until 1941 (Gascoigne, 2001). In 1941, Eritrea and Ethiopia were liberated from Italian occupation simultaneously, and they formed a federation in 1952 that helped Ethiopia to regain its Red Sea maritime domain and began to use it both for economic and military purposes. In 1955, Ethiopia established the modern Ethiopian navy on the Red Sea, which had established its naval bases at Assab, Massawa, and Dahlak Islands (Makeda, 2020a). However, because of the dissolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrean Federation, Eritreans began an armed struggle in 1961, and when Eritrea declared its independence in 1991, Ethiopia lost its previous ports of Assab and Massawa including its naval bases. The Ethiopian navy established in 1952 was also dissolved in 1996 (Sarah, 2020). But, Ethiopia used the port of Assab only for commercial purposes until 1998 without payments (Atom, 2016). In May 1998, when the border war broke out between the two countries, Ethiopia stopped using Assab and Massawa ports and shifted to Djibouti that Ethiopia has been paying heavy port fees since 1998 (Denyer, 2000).

1.2 Problem Statement

The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998-2000 ceased when the leaders of both countries signed Alger's Peace Agreement on December 12, 2000, which established Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)¹. The EEBC investigated the exact boundary of Ethiopia and Eritrea for two years and finally passed the decision that the Badime province belonged to Eritrea. But, since Ethiopia put a pre-condition and further negotiation to implement the EEBC decision², the period of 'no war no peace' escalated between Ethiopia and Eritrea until 2018, and Ethiopia was also unable to use the Eritrean port of Assab or Massawa, since 1998, which are the nearest ports to Ethiopia compared to other ports in the region (Underwood, 2018).

¹ Algeria's Peace Agreement is the agreement signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 in the city of Algiers to end the border war between both countries and to create peace.

² Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission was the Commission established based on Algeria's agreement to investigate the exact boundary demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and to pass binding Decision.

On the other hand, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Article 125 states that even if the landlocked country has the right to access to the sea and freedom of transit, through the territory of transit states, the terms and modalities for exercising such rights shall be agreed between the land-locked country and transit country through bilateral or regional agreement. In this case, the Convention advises landlocked countries like Ethiopia to form peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy with its maritime neighboring countries to enjoy such rights.

As regards to internal politics of Ethiopia, the anti-government protests in Oromia and Amahara regions in 2016 forced the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resign from power in February 2018, and be replaced by the current Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed. Following his appointment, PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed declared that Ethiopia accepted to implement the EEBC decision without any pre-conditions (Stauffer, 2018:3). After Eritrea accepted the offer and sent a high-level delegation to Addis Ababa, PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed traveled to Asmara on July 8, 2018, and signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship with Eritrean President, Isaias Afewerki, (Schemm, 2018). The two leaders also signed the Jeddah Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement on September 16, 2018, in the Jeddah city of Saudi Arabia (Poole, 2018). Both the agreements impose obligations on the two countries to end the military standoff and implement the boundary decision. In addition, PM Dr. Abiy has also tried to make regional cooperation for development with other maritime adjacent countries, including Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan (Kidane, 2019). He also introduced Ethiopia's intention to re-build a modern navy declined during the 1990s (Sarah, 2020).

Then, Ethiopia's PM Dr. Abiy's international peace cooperation with the neighboring countries mainly with Eritrea has recognized by the international community during 2019 and awarded the Noble Peace Prize of 2019 for the success he made in forming peace cooperation and ending hostility and military standby particularly between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Henly, 2019).

Contrary to such international appreciation some politicians criticize and argue that the agreement made between Eretria and Ethiopia cannot meet its objectives due to the absence of public participation in the key issues of the agreements. For instance, Damesse (2018) argues that the agreement made between two countries is characterized by state-centric due to the absence of public legitimacy, consultations, and people to people initiative, and maybe the decisions are taken concerning border security would be doomed to fail, if they are not supported

by the local people. Secondly, even after Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to solve their border dispute by enforcing the Algiers Agreement, Eritrea closed again its border for unclear reasons (Demissie, 2018:5). Moreover, Plaut (2019) also states that the situation along the Ethiopia-Eritrea borders remains tense and there is a fear of a renewal of conflict with Eritrea and the new diplomatic relations between the two countries are not developing because of unclear reasons.

This implies that, if the peace agreement signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea is unable to end the border controversy and bring sustainable peace, it is difficult to negotiate on the port utilization agreement with Eritrea to use Eritrean ports for commercial or military purposes. Also, when Ethiopian leaders announced Ethiopia's plan to re-build a navy, they did not identify why land-locked Ethiopia need to build a navy and where it will be based (Sarah, 2018).

To the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive document identifies first, whether or not the new Ethiopian peace cooperation with Eritrea succeeded in satisfying Ethiopia's aspiration to get a sea outlet through Eritrean ports. Second, whether or not both countries benefited from the new Ethiopian and Eritrea peace cooperation of 2018. Third, the main challenges that prevent Ethiopia and Eritrea diplomatic relations from developing and that may lead to the renewals of conflicts, as well as, its main success. Fourth, the main reason that motivated the Eritrean to close the border between the two countries and finally the reason why landlocked Ethiopia need to re-build navy and on which port or maritime coast the new Ethiopian navy will be based.

Therefore, the study has intended to fill the gaps in the literature by providing a comprehensive study about Ethiopia's peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy carried out with maritime neighboring countries, especially with Eritrea, since 2018 including its success and challenges.

1.3 Core Argument

The core argument of this study is that Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation agreement signed with maritime neighboring countries, mainly with Eritrea, and the ongoing diplomatic relations since 2018 will satisfy Ethiopia's aspiration to get Sea access through Eritrean maritime domains that would serve Ethiopia both for commercial and military activities /for its new naval project/.

1.4. Objective

The overall objective of the study is to examine whether or not Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation Agreement signed with neighboring countries, mainly with Eritrea in 2018, satisfies Ethiopia's aspiration to get sea access through Eritrea maritime domain.

The study also has the following specific objectives;

- To examine whether or not Ethiopia's peace cooperation signed with Eritrea in 2018, bring sustainable peace, gets public legitimacy, recognition, and is properly implemented.
- To examine the main problems that forced the Eritrean government to close the border crossing to the two countries after they signed Peace Cooperation Agreement in 2018.
- To examine the significant achievements and challenges of the Ethiopia Peace cooperation and its maritime diplomacy since 2018.
- To examine whether or not Ethiopia and Eritrea peace cooperation since 2018 enable Ethiopia to use Eritrean transit both for economic, and military objectives and
- To examine the reason why landlocked Ethiopia needs to re-build a navy, on which ports Ethiopia has planned to build a navy and the kind of navy Ethiopia is going to build.

1.5 Research Questions

The overall research question of the study is that, does Ethiopia's Peace Cooperation Agreement signed with neighboring countries mainly with Eritrea since 2018 satisfy Ethiopia's aspiration to get sea access through Eritrea maritime domain?

The study also has the following specific research questions;

- Does Ethiopia's peace cooperation signed with Eritrea in 2018, bring sustainable peace, get public legitimacy, recognition, and have properly implemented?
- What are the main problems that have forced the Eritrean Government to close the border crossing to both countries after they signed Peace Cooperation Agreement in 2018?
- What are the significant achievements and challenges of the Ethiopia Peace Cooperation and its maritime diplomacy since 2018?
- Does Ethiopia and Eritrea peace cooperation since 2018 enable Ethiopia to use Eritrean transit both for Economic /commercial/, and military objectives?
- Why does landlocked Ethiopia need to re-build a navy and on which port Ethiopia has planned to build a navy, and what kind of navy Ethiopia is going to build?

1.6 Research Methodology and Methods

Research Methodology refers to how a researcher systematically designs a study to ensure a valid and reliable result that addresses the research objectives (Warren, 2020). It includes how the researcher went to deciding, what data to collect from the sources and to be ignored, how to collect data through data collection methods, and how researchers analyzed the data through data analysis methods (ibid). There are three different types of methodologies; qualitative, quantitative, and mixed research approaches (Carol, 2016). Qualitative research refers to the approach, which focuses on collecting and analyzing written or spoken words, body language or visual elements, and textual data. The qualitative research methodology is employed when the researcher investigates the real facts to understand the views, perceptions, concepts, attitudes of the research participant (Carol, 2016). Concerning the quantitative approach, it focuses on measurement and testing using numerical data while the mixed-method approach attempts to combine both qualitative, and quantitative methodologies (Warren, 2020).

The study has employed a qualitative approach. Because, the study aims to investigate the opinions, views, relating to research objectives and the argumentative parties raised in opposite sides by collecting quantitative data expressed in words and in written form to examine the new Ethiopian peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy with its maritime neighboring countries especially since 2018 after Ethiopia announced its new naval project.

Concerning the research methods, it is specific procedures and techniques used to collect and analyze the research data to answer the research questions. Research methods help us to guide how the research data will be collected and analyzed, whether such data are qualitative or quantitative, primary or secondary, and descriptive or analytical (Scribbr, 2019).

1.6.1 Sources of Data

The study has aimed to examine the arguments and views asserted from the different sides about the recent Ethiopia's peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy. The sources of the data are both primary and secondary sources of data. A primary source of data has been collected from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority, the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise, and the office of the Ethiopian Navy. The secondary source of the data was also collected from relevant literature, from books, journal

articles, working papers, reports, and relevant written and oral electronic sources, national and international legislation, and from the treaties signed between Ethiopia and other countries.

1.6.2. Instruments of Data Collection

There are various instruments of primary data collection in qualitative research, which include, interviewing, focus groups, observations, while interviews and focus groups are considered the most common instruments used in qualitative researches among others (P. Gill, 2008). Based on the instrument and techniques of qualitative data collection, the study used semi-open-ended interviews with the key informants to collect primary data from the above respondents. Because since the respondents are government officials and workers who hold a high position using unstructured interviews and open-ended questions are more appropriate which are more flexible, and allow the free-flowing of questions and answers between the researcher, and respondent.

1.6.3 Data Analysis

The study has employed qualitative data analysis, which includes content analysis, narrative analysis, discourse analysis, and framework analysis. For the qualitative primary data collected through interviews, the study employed content analysis by categorizing, classifying, clarifying, and summarizing the data. The study also used narrative analysis for the stories responded to by participants through interviews. To analyze written qualitative secondary data collected from different literature, the study applied discourse and framework analysis following its steps.

1.7 Ethical Considerations

The study was conducted based on research methodology ethical considerations principles, which includes obtaining full consent from the research participants, respecting their dignity, protecting their privacy, ensuring the confidentiality of research data, avoiding exaggeration of the objectives of the study, and citing the sources of data properly, conducting the study with honesty and transparency, and avoiding writing misleading information (Dudovskiy, 2018).

Therefore, during the field data collection through interviews, first I requested the consent and the voluntary participation of the respondents. I had also informed them that I would not consume their time and they could withdraw from the conversation if they wished to do so. Second, I have also engaged the participants based on the informed consent by providing sufficient information and assurances to understand the implications of participation. Thirdly, I

also tried to protect the dignity of the respondents and refrained from using offensive or unacceptable language in formulating the interview questions and during the failed works. Fourth, I also assured them to protecting the privacy and anonymity of respondents was of paramount importance. Finally, I had properly acknowledged and cited the works of other authors used in any part of the study and I had carried out the study with honesty and transparency in any communication.

1.8 Scope

The scope of the study is to examine Ethiopian peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy entered with its neighboring countries particularly with Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan, and the self-declared state of Somaliland to use their maritime outlet both for commercial and military purposes especially after Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. It also covers the success and challenges of the new Ethiopian peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy entered with the above-listed maritime adjacent countries since 2018.

1.9 Significance

There are contradicting views concerning the Ethiopian and Eritrean peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy, in maintaining Ethiopian national interests, having public legitimacy, and satisfying Ethiopian desire to get sea access and its achievement and challenges. In addition, it is unclear that, the reason why landlocked Ethiopia needs to build a navy and where the operational naval base of the new Ethiopian navy as long as Ethiopia is currently a landlocked country.

Therefore, firstly, since the study has aimed at investigating the contradicting views and unclear issues, the study would have a significant contribution to politicians, diplomats, academicians, and for the public at large to understand the relevant fact on the ground that helps them make reliable political decisions to maximize the maritime accessibility for Ethiopia that would serve Ethiopia both for economic and military objectives. Second, since the study investigated the success and challenges of Ethiopia's peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy since 2018, it has also a significant contribution in helping government officials' diplomats, and politicians to minimize such challenges and maintain their success for the continuity of peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy with the neighboring countries. Thirdly, the study would also help the students and researchers to understand how the landlocked country conducted maritime diplomacy and formulated its foreign policy towards its maritime neighboring countries to use

their maritime outlet for commercial or military objectives /naval projects/ and how landlocked countries like Ethiopia could build a navy through modern maritime diplomacy.

1.10 Limitations

In the beginning, next to Ethiopian Foreign Affairs, the study also planned to collect the primary data from the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade, and the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa. When I visited the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade, they informed me that, the primary data I wanted to collect from their office is mostly found at Ethiopian Shipping and Logistic Service Enterprises and Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authorities. Based on the information, I was successfully able to collect the primary data from Ethiopian Foreign Affairs, Ethiopian Shipping and Logistic Service Enterprises, and Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authorities, as well.

However, one of the limitations of this study is I could not collect the primary data from Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa since they were not ready to give the information I need from them. When I approached them, they received the letter from the Addis Ababa University Department of Political Science and International Relations and replied that they would call me to give me the data I need. But when I asked them at different times they were not ready to give me the data I need from them until the last call on September 8, 2021. Hence, I was unable to collect the data from the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa. To fill the limitations, I carefully collected primary data from other key informants and secondary data from relevant sources mentioned above.

1.11. Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one deals with the introduction of the study. Chapter two illustrates the literature review and conceptual frameworks, while Chapter three overviews the historical process that leads Ethiopia to be a landlocked Country including its past maritime diplomacy. Chapter four discusses the subject matter of the Ethiopia and Eritrea peace deal agreement of 2018 with its implementation, its public legitimacy, and its success, and challenges. Finally, chapter five deals about Ethiopian maritime diplomacy carried out both for economic and military objectives since 2018 including its success and challenges, as well.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1 Definition of the Concepts

2.1.1 Peace Cooperation

The term '**Peace Cooperation**' is formed from two words, *Peace* and *Cooperation*. '**Peace**' is derived from the Latin word 'pax', which means control, or an agreement to end the war, any dispute or conflict between two countries, or two antagonistic groups (Bloomsbury, 1995). **Peace** is a state of tranquility, a state of security or order within a community provided by law or custom in personal relations, or an agreement or state of concord done to end hostilities between those who have been at war or in a state of enmity (Merriam Webster, 2020).

Coming to the term '**cooperation**', it refers to the practice of people or entities working together with commonly agreed-upon goals and possibly methods and the collective activity of two or more agents cooperating to achieve certain end goals (Alaa M. Khamis, 2014:1).

Consequently, peace cooperation can be said that it is an agreement made between two or more countries or groups based on the common goal and benefits to end the ongoing war, dispute, conflict, and hostility, the enmity between the groups or countries or to maintain the existing peace and security between the countries through bilateral or multilateral peace deal agreements.

Because of the increasingly complex environments, an individual state could not achieve the goals of peace and security alone (Rohwerder, 2014). States form cooperation at least in three levels to satisfy their foreign policy objectives and to maintain their peace and security through,

- i) Multi-lateral peace cooperation at the global level,
- ii) Multilateral Peace Cooperation at the regional or sub-regional level and
- iii) Bi-lateral peace cooperation between two countries, as elaborated bellows.

2.1.1.1 Multi-lateral Peace Cooperation at the Global level

Multi-lateral peace cooperation at the global level began after the creation League of Nations which was replaced by the United Nations in 1945. The Charter of the UN states that one of the UN's purposes and principles is the commitment to settle disputes through peaceful means and the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (United Nations, 2020). States have cooperated with the UN in the maintenance of peace and security through multilateral peace

cooperation (ibid). For example, the U.N has conducted peace-keeping activities since its creation to prevent the expansion of disputes in the Middle East and Africa by bringing together its' member states through multilateral peace cooperation (Japan's Foreign Relations, 1977).

After a long year, the international day of multilateralism and diplomacy for peace was also established on December 12, 2018 (United Nations, 2020). Multilateralism means working together to protect and promote peace, universal rights and freedoms, sustainable development, health, security and stability, and the international environment. The theory of multilateralism stated that *'No one is safe alone, no one is strong alone; we are stronger together.* It also states that the international community relies on the commonly agreed rules, effective and inclusive global institutions, within and beyond the UN system, to ensure peace, security, human rights, prosperity, and sustainable development (European External Action Service, 2020).

2.1.1.2 Multi-lateral Peace Cooperation at Regional and Sub-regional Levels

The establishment of international peace cooperation following the creation of the UN provides bases for the foundation of regional and sub-regional organizations that have an existential mission of security building through cooperation (Cottey, 2006). In the decades after World War II, and decolonization resulted in the establishment of multilateral regional organizations across the world, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Current European Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU), the Arab League and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are the best regional and sub-regional organizations (ibid). Among these AU, NATO, and the EU have explicit conflict prevention and management instruments by developing systems of military cooperation based on mutual restraint to reduce dangers from military activity to maintain peace and security. They promote democratic standards, and respect for human rights for nonmilitary activities (Andrew, 2006).

2.1.1.3 Bilateral Peace Cooperation

A bilateral agreement or same tomes a side deal agreement is an agreement or treaty made between two parties or two countries in international relations which can range from legal obligations to non-binding agreements of principle (Institute for Government, 2018).

Based on this definition bilateral peace cooperation can be defined as it is any peace agreement or contracts and cooperation formed between two countries to end the ongoing war, conflict,

violence or to maintain the existing peace between them or any agreement made between two countries or to defend themselves from external aggression, terrorist, or pirate attacks.

For example, Eritrea and Ethiopia made bilateral peace cooperation to end the border war from 1998-2000 at the Algiers peace agreement under the auspices of UN in 2000. But the hostility between the two countries escalated until they signed another bilateral peace cooperation agreement, the Asmara Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship of July 9, 2018, and the Jeddah Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement of September 16, 2018 (The Economist, 2018).

2.1.2 Maritime Diplomacy

The term ‘**Maritime Diplomacy**’ is combined with two words, namely ‘maritime’ and ‘diplomacy’. The term ‘maritime’ comes from the Latin word “*maritimus*”, which means of the sea, or any activities relating to the sea, ships, inside or near the sea, connected with the sea, especially relating to seaborne trade or naval matters (Merriam-Webster).

Concerning the term diplomacy, it most likely derives from the ancient Greek word “*diploun*” (for twofold or double) that was used in connection with diplomas, special documents carried by religious envoys that were supposed to ensure a safe journey (Figus, 2018:1). The term diplomacy also refers to the professional activity or skill of managing international relations typically by a country's representatives abroad which is the art of dealing with people sensitively and tactfully (Oxford Reference). In addition, Figus (2018) has described the term diplomacy as it is the conduct of states government officials used to solve disputes between the countries, form alliances, negotiate treaties, fortify economic relations, stimulate cultural and military exchanges.

When we come to Maritime diplomacy, Le Miere (2014) defines Maritime Diplomacy as it encompasses a spectrum of activities, from cooperative measures such as port visits, exercises, and humanitarian assistance to persuasive deployment and coercion and activity of coast guards, civilian vessels, and non-state groups. He also adds that maritime diplomacy refers to the management of international relations through the maritime domain (Le Miere, 2014:7).

In summary, Maritime Diplomacy is a skillful activity of state and states agents conducting and managing the relationship between countries to use sea, oceans, and coastal lines, and ports of another country for economic /commercial/ or military /naval/ purposes through diplomatic negotiations. Maritime diplomacy is also any diplomatic negotiation made to use the maritime

domain of another country such as international waterways, ocean, sea, maritime outlet, port, or transit to use it for economic or military objectives or both economic and military objectives.

Maritime diplomacy for economic purposes refers to any diplomatic negotiation or agreement concluded to use the maritime domain and transit of another country for export and import of goods, for fishing, for international navigations, and for international commercial activities.

Maritime diplomacy for military /naval/ purposes refers to states diplomatic activities conducted to use the maritime domain or transit of another country to establish a naval base, to deploy naval power to maintain the peace and security of the sea or ocean, to fight pirate or terrorism, and to address humanitarian assistances around the maritime domain or in the seas.

2.2. The challenges of Landlocked Countries in Accessing to the Sea and Oceans

Le Mière (2014) states that the 21st century is a maritime century since the majority of global commerce travels by sea, most of the World's population lives within 200 miles of the coast, the world continues to rely on the sea as a source of proteins and since the states' ability to manage disputes at sea will define international politics in this century. Despite its importance, Le Mière (2014) claims that maritime diplomacy is a poorly conceptualized area of study in the field of international relations. He also explains that maritime diplomacy is serving both for military and commercial purposes by explaining as most global commercial activities travel through the seas.

Concerning maritime diplomacy, made between landlocked states and states that owned transit L. Faye (2004) wrote as landlocked developing countries continue to face challenges to access world markets and as they are lag behind their maritime neighbors in the overall development and external trades. For instance, due to their geographic remoteness, and the lack of direct access to the open sea, the landlocked countries are often dependent on neighbors' infrastructure, dependence on sound cross-border political relations, dependence on neighbors' peace and stability, as well as their neighbors' administrative practices (L. Faye, 2004:31)

According to L.Faye (2007), the political relationship between the landlocked and maritime neighbor will determine the right of landlocked states to access the sea. If a landlocked country is in conflict with its maritime neighboring country, the maritime neighbors can block borders or obstacle to the trade. Even when there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are extremely vulnerable to the political vagaries of their maritime neighbors (L. Faye,2007:45).

For instance, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former republics were divided based on the previous administrative boundaries which are the source of many disputes. The ongoing tensions between the landlocked states and transit states have resulted in the general failure of regional cooperation. Uzbekistan has been suffered from strained relations with four of its five neighbors, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. In the South Caucasus, fighting between the two landlocked countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan has closed the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and led to the closure of the Armenia–Turkey border (L. Faye, 2007:45).

In the case of Ethiopia, Ethiopia has remained as one of the land-locked countries following Eritrean independence since 1991 and it lost its previous Massawa and Assab ports including its operational naval bases to the newly independent state of Eritrea. After Ethiopia remained as a landlocked country it has also suffered immensely from conflict with, Eritrea. The War between the two countries restricted Ethiopia’s access to the Eritrean port of Assab where three-quarters of Ethiopian trade (75%) passed through duty-free until 1997 (L. Faye, 2007:46).

2.3 The Possible Solution to the challenges

The landlocked countries can avoid the challenges by forming regional, sub-regional cooperation based on the international legal bases, by formulating appropriate foreign policy towards their maritime neighboring countries, by developing the infrastructure connecting to the transit states, by engaging public-private cooperation and partnership, and by engaging international organizations to fund the aid project of the landlocked and Maritime countries (United Nation Economic and Social Council, 2002). Among these let us see the formation of cooperation and formulation of appropriate foreign policy towards the maritime neighbouring countries.

2.3.1. Forming Cooperation and Maritime Diplomacy Based on International Law

There are many international legal bases that guarantee the landlocked states the right of access to the sea, which can be implemented through cooperation and maritime diplomacy made with the maritime neighbouring countries. Among them, the UN Convention on the law of the sea of 1982 Article 125 (1) states that the landlocked states shall have the right of access to the sea, freedom of high seas, the right to enjoy the common heritage of mankind, and freedom of transit through the territory of transit states by all means of transports. The Convention articulated that such rights have been exercised based on the agreement made between the land-locked states and transit states through bilateral, sub-regional, or regional agreements. The convention also adds

that the transit states have full right to exercise their sovereignty over their territory and the landlocked states shall in no way infringe the legal interest of transit country (United Nations, 1982).

In this case, the convention advises the landlocked states first to avoid the political conflict, hostility, and enmity that existed between its maritime neighbors, and then to negotiate on the terms and modalities of exercising such right of access to the sea, freedom of transit, and on the other related issues with its maritime neighboring countries through maritime diplomacy.

This is because, if the landlocked states and transit states are not in a smooth relation, the transit states that owned maritime outlets may not be willing to negotiate and may impede on the landlocked states' free transit. The political will and commitment of transit states highly conditioned the rights of landlocked states. This is because the denial of free transit, in turn, affects the rights of landlocked states on the different maritime regimes (Endalcachew , 2015).

For instance, due to the border conflict, and political hostility that existed between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia was unable to use Eritrean transit and shifted to Djibouti ports from 1998-2018 in which above 95% of Ethiopia import and export cargo passes through Djibouti Ports (ibid).

2.3.2 Formulating Appropriate Foreign Policy

The landlocked states always rely on the infrastructure of their maritime neighboring countries. Any political disagreement between landlocked states and transit states may affect the import and export activities of the landlocked country. So that, the landlocked countries should refrain from creating foreign policies that interfere in the domestic political and economic interest of the transit country that may lead to the conflict between the landlocked and maritime country.

In this case, the practice of landlocked countries like Switzerland shows that they formulate a neutral foreign policy towards their transit neighbors since 1515 to balance power in the neighborhood. The neutrality of Switzerland's foreign policy is self-determined, permanent, and armed that has been recognized by international treaties and supported by its capable army. Because of having a neutral foreign policy Switzerland does not suffer like other landlocked countries. For example when Europe experienced by the two World Wars, Switzerland was able to manage it not to be burned in the war directly because of its foreign policy (Mahdi, 2016:31).

On the other side other countries, like Bolivia suffers from a historical dispute with its neighbor Chile, and the neighborhood does not provide a very promising market that could dispense it

from the need to export its goods to other regions of the world. Armenia faces blocked from two sides due to the historical dispute with Turkey and Azerbaijan and at the same time, it suffers from instability in the region. These problems have limited its access to the sea and have no options but to show concession towards countries like Iran and Russia (Mahdi, 2016:33).

Coming to the Ethiopian foreign policy, the FDRE constitution of 1995 Article 86(2) states that the principle of Ethiopian external relations is formulated based on mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. In this case, the FDRE constitution directs that the Ethiopian Government should formulate foreign policy and conduct an external relation that refrains from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, which shows that Ethiopia Constitutionally follows neutral foreign policy towards other countries. Specifically, the study has an overview of what kind of foreign policy Ethiopia had formulated towards Eritrea in the past two decades in the next chapter three.

2.4 Theoretical Perspectives

Among international relation theories, liberal theory, democratic peace theory, interdependency theory, neo-liberalism, and neo-realist theories deal with the importance and formation of peace cooperation, and diplomatic interactions. The study discusses the perspectives of these theories relating to state peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy in international relations.

2.4.1 Liberalist Theory

Liberals argue that the Universal condition of world politics is globalization and states are always embedded in a domestic and transitional society, which creates incentives for economic, social, and cultural interaction across borders. It also claims that state policy may facilitate or block such interactions. Some domestic groups may benefit or be harmed by such policies and they pressure the government for policies that facilitate the realization of their goals (Moravesik, 2010:1, 2). The liberal theory also emphasizes first, international institutions provide a forum to resolve disputes and play a key role in international peace cooperation through international institutions, and economic and cultural exchanges to reduce conflict. Second, when countries' economies are interconnected through trade they are less likely to go to war with each other. Thirdly, as the spread of democracy is well established democratic states do not go to war with one another, and interstate war will be less frequent (Zubok, Shiraev and Vladislav, 2014:78).

2.4.2. Interdependence Theory

Interdependency theory was intensified during the 1950 and 1960s which has been associated with peace, integration, and cooperation. This theory argues that the great extent and rapid increase of international trade and interconnection is a guarantee of the peace of the world (Vries, 1990:42). According to the Interdependency theory, states are vulnerable to different degrees in the various issues as long as recourses are not equally distributed among the states or international actors. So that, states can maintain their mutual benefits by exchanging resources through cooperation and forming economic interdependency (Spindler, 2014: 63).

Furthermore, the Interdependency theory also argues first, the interdependent nations are likely to consider one another's interests, by diminishing the hostile outcomes that may result from conflicting interests. Secondly, when the economic interdependence between the countries is strong, any conflict between the states will have serious consequences. Knowing this state will avoid starting a conflict, and not damage its economy. Thirdly, increasing relations are enhancing integration because each country recognizes the consequences of its policies for its interests. It also argues that supporting trade relations by removing restrictions on trades, increasing scientific and technical exchanges, communications and intensifying diplomatic exchanges or negotiations promote peace and cooperation between the states (Vries, 1990:42)

2.4.3. Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic peace theory is rooted in the writings of Immanuel Kant and it began to receive its contemporary articulation in the early 1980s by the writings of Michael Doyle (Attia, 2016). The Democratic Peace theory argues that democratic states succeeded in maintaining peace and security among each other and they are less likely to engage in wars with each other. On the other hand, democracies are apt to wage and launch wars against non-democracies. Democratic Peace theory also argues that democratic governments focus mostly on maintaining internal stability and satisfying their respective population's social, political, and economic needs (Norwich University Online, 2017). The democratic peace theory also claims that a spread of democracy will result in greater international peace and the democratic political institutions blocked the governments from initiating war without the consent of the electorate. Diplomats and government officials being held accountable by the people they represent or the parliamentary government is an important aspect of maintaining international peace (ibid).

2.4.4 Neo-realist and Neo-liberalist Theories

The foundation of neo-liberalism Keohane and Nye argues that states need to develop strategies and forums for cooperation over a whole set of new issues and areas and as this has also been facilitated by the regimes, treaties, and institutions over the past two to three decades. Neo-liberals are trying to distinguish themselves from neo-realists when including the notion of cooperation. Neo-liberals have concerned themselves with analyzing the extent of cooperation possible under conditions of anarchy. Neo-realists claim that under anarchy, conflict and the power struggle are enduring characteristics of international politics and that because of this, cooperation between states is at best precarious and at worst non-existent. Neo-liberals agree that achieving cooperation is difficult in international relations but disagree with neo-realists pessimism of it not being able to occur effectively in an anarchical system (AkGokhan, 2015:95).

Neo-liberalism also claims that cooperation could be increased through the establishment of international regimes and the exchange of information. They see regimes as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation in the international system. According to neo-liberals, institutions can exert casual pressure on international relations, shaping state preference into cooperative arrangements while neo-realists argue that states must stress security to promote their survival. The neo-liberal argues that institutions can encourage multilateralism and cooperation as a means of securing national interests while the neo-realist argues that achieving cooperation may be difficult if the leaders have no mutual interests (AkGokhan, 2015:97).

Among the above theories, the interdependence theory which promotes the formation of economic interdependences to avoid conflict between the countries is a more appropriate theory that is related to the topic of this study. Because the study deals with the Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace deal Agreement to form favourable conditions for Ethiopia to use Eritrea's maritime outlet for its economic or military objectives. If Ethiopia began to use Eritrean ports for its navy and international trades, Ethiopia's import and export trade and the function of the Ethiopian navy will depend on the Eritrean infrastructure or ports which creates economic interdependence between the two countries and benefits the two countries. Hence not to hurt such common benefits, the tendency to avoid possible conflict becomes high between the two countries, which shows as the Interdependence theory is the most appropriate theory that defines the topics of this study or the Peace Deal Agreement and maritime diplomacy made between Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHIOPIAN PEACE COOPERATION AND MARITIME DIPLOMACY WITH IT'S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

3.1 Ethiopian Early Maritime Diplomacy and the Loss of Red Sea Maritime Domain (1890-1991)

The historical background of the initial Ethiopian maritime diplomacy was, as old as, Ethiopian history, which began during the diplomatic contact between India and Ethiopia through the Red Sea probably dated back to the first century during the Aksumite Civilization (Pankhurst, 1999). Aksum was the name of a city and a kingdom essentially established in the current Regional State of Tigray and Eritrea. It was a major naval and trading power from the first to the seventh centuries and which had developed a civilization extended all over the regions lying south of the Roman Empire, from the fringes of the Sahara in the west, across the Red Sea to the inner Arabian desert in the east. Aksum was trade with Egypt, the eastern Mediterranean, and Arabia across the Red Sea, and along the coastal line of the Red Sea (The British Museum, 2020).

During the Aksumite period, Ethiopia exported gold, ivory, and slaves to India and imported cotton, silk, pepper, and other spices from India through the port of Adulis across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Aksum had also used the Indian Port called '*Ariak*' to trade with India along the Red Sea (Pankhurst, 1999). In the Medieval Age, history indicates that Ethiopia was used the port of '*Aden*' to trade with India and Persia, and other Arab countries. Then beginning from the 16 Century principally Ethiopia owned and used the port of Massawa, Zayla, and Berbera to contact the outside world and export gold and ivory to India, Egypt, and Persia (ibid).

However, following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Red Sea coast, was contested by many powers and became a scene of rivalry among the world's most powerful states due to its strategic and commercial importance. Between 1869 and 1880, the Italian Rubattino Navigation Company purchased the Red Sea coast adjacent to the village of Asseb from the local Afar sultan. In 1882 these holdings were transferred to the Italian state, and three years later in 1885 Italian troops landed at Asseb and Massawa (Gascoign, 2001). As Italian troops move inland towards Ethiopian highlands they meet little resistance from Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes IV who had been confronted with many enemies from Egypt and Sudan, while in the south Menelik-II was waiting a time to claim the throne. Even though Yohannes IV expected to move against Italians

he died in 1889 fighting against an army pressing in from Sudan and Italians were able to settle into Eritrea without much difficulty (Gascoign, 2001).

Following the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, Menelik-II won the throne and was crowned as Ethiopian Emperor. Then, Emperor Menilek accepted Italian occupation of the northern region of the Mereb River in return for weapons to fight possible rivals in the south (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020a). According to Gascoign (2001) Menelik's-II first response to the Italian presence on the Red Sea Coastal line was to ally with Italian in which he accepted the Italian right to occupy Eritrea and cedes the territories of northern Ethiopia around Keren, Massawa, and Asmera to Italy on the 'Wichale' treaty signed between Minilik-II and Italy in 1889. In return, Minilik-II receives about 30,000 muskets and 28 cannons from Italy (Gascoign, 2001).

On May 2, 1889, following Emperor Menilik-II recognition of Italian possessions in the Red Sea on the 'Wichale' treaty, Italian officially proclaimed the Italian colony of Eritrea on January 1, 1890, in which Ethiopia lost its Red Sea Maritime cost to Italy (Gascoigne, 2001). However, Article 17 of the 'Wichale' treaty written Amharic version stated that the emperor of Ethiopia 'could' have recourse to the good offices of the Italian in his dealings with other foreign powers while the Italian text of the treaty had the word 'must'. Based on the Italian own text, Italy proclaimed as the protectorate over Ethiopia. But Menilek repudiated their claim in 1890 and officially dismissed the entire treaty in 1893 (Gascoigne, 2001)

Then Italy responded with an attempt to impose their protectorate by force and declared war on Ethiopia. But, Emperor Menilik who was lead 70,000 fighters defeated the Italian at the battle of Adowa on March 1, 1896. The Italians suffer the bloodiest defeat ever experienced by a colonial power in Africa in which more than 4000 Italian soldiers died, 2000 had been captured and 4000 Eritreans under the command of Italy were also captured and killed (Gascoign, 2001).

On the other hand, Menilek did not pursue the defeated enemy across the Mereb River instead he recognized Italian rule over Eritrea under the Treaty of Addis Ababa on October 23, 1896, to obtain Italian recognition of Ethiopia's sovereignty in return (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020b) that resulted Ethiopia to lost the Red Sea maritime domain and made Ethiopia to be a landlocked Country until Ethiopia and Eritrea form Federation in 1952 (Gascoign, 2001).

3.1.1 The Independence of Eritrea and Ethiopia From Italian Occupation

After the battle of Adowa, the Italian colonial forces, which had remained in Eritrea and Somalia, clashed with Ethiopian troops on November 22, 1934, at Wal Wal in Ogaden Desert. In 1935 Italy had sent 12 infantry divisions consisting of 685,000 troops to the Italian colonies surrounding Ethiopia by using air and vehicles (Ephrem, 2016). Then Italia and Ethiopian war began on October 3, 1935, when General Emilio De Bono marched his troops over the Mareb River into Ethiopia. To stop Italian aggression, Emperor Haileselassie ordered a counter-attack and Ethiopians were successfully won 1000 Eritrean troops at the Battle of Dembeguina (ibid). However, the Italians continued their advance and took the capital Addis Ababa on May 5, 1936, and Emperor Haileselassie fled to Palestine then, to England (Ephrem , 2018).

However, in September 1939, when World War II began Britain declared war on Italy, and the Italian Colony in East Africa was targeted by the Allies powers in the 1940s. Early in 1941, British forces moved from Sudan into western Eritrea and defeated Italian forces at the town of Kerena. On April 1, 1941, British forces able to liberated Eretria from Italian Colonialism (Gascoign, 2001). Then, both Ethiopia and British forces also commanding to the south and accomplish the final defeat of Italian East Africa when they entered Addis Ababa in May 1941. This made Ethiopia to be the first Country liberated from Axis powers in World War II. Finally, Ethiopia was brought back under the rule of Emperor Haileselassie, while Eritrea was temporarily put under the British Military Administration until 1952 (Gascoign, 2001).

3.1.2 The Formation of Ethiopia and Eritrean Federation and the Restoration of Red Sea Maritime Domain under Ethiopian Territory (1952-1993)

In the early year of World War II, in 1941 Italy lost its African colonies of Libya, Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea. Then at the end of World War II the question of the disposal of the Italian colonies was submitted to the United Nation Genaral Assembly. In 1948 at the third regular session of the UN General Assembly, Britain, and Italy submitted the proposal called '*Bevin-Sfoza proposal*', which proposed the western Eritrean province to be amalgamated with Sudan and to incorporate the remaining part of Eritrea into Ethiopia. But, the whole Proposal had not accepted since it did not approved by the majority vote (Andargatchew, 1981:99).

On the Ethiopian side the Imperial Government of Ethiopia claimed, that Eritrea was part of Ethiopia especially waiting to maintain access to the Red Sea maritime domain (New World Encyclopidia, 2017). Moreover, by the memorandum presented to the UN in 1948, the Ethiopian Government had claimed not only the whole of Eritrea but also most of the coastal line of the Red Sea and some part of the Indian Ocean (Ahmed, 2015: 1). On December 2, 1950, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution calling Ethiopia and Eritrea to federate. On March 16, 1952, elections for a 68-member Eritrean representative Assembly were held in Eritrea to vote Eritrea to Federate with Ethiopia. The Eritrean Representative Assembly also adopted a constitution on July 10, 1952. Emperor Haileselassie signed and ratified the *Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation Action* on August 11, and September 11, 1952, respectively. Then Eritrean Assembly elected Tedla Bairu as its Chief Executive (University of Central Arkansas, 2020).

Finally, after Ethiopia made an efficient political commitment and diplomatic effort with Eritrean, UN, and the Victories States of the Second World War, Eritrea legally federated with Ethiopia on September 15, 1952. Following Ethiopia and Eritrea federation, Ethiopia was able to regain its Red Sea Maritime domain that Ethiopia had lost for the past 62 years since Italy officially declared Italian Colony over Eritrea in 1890 (New World Encyclopedia, 2017). Then, Ethiopia began to exercise its international trade through Massawa and Assab Ports, and Ethiopia also able to establish the first Ethiopian Naval Force in the Red Sea (Makeda, 2020a) as follows.

3.1.3 The Establishment of Ethiopian Naval Force in the Red Sea

The formation of Ethiopia and the Eritrean Federation helped Ethiopia to get Sea access and to Re-control the Red Sea maritime domain along the Coastal line of Eritrea, which was Ethiopia had owned before 1890. Following the control of the Red Sea, Emperor Hailesillassie established the first Modern Ethiopian navy, which was called ‘the Imperial Ethiopian Navy’ in 1955, with the assistance of the UK. The Imperial Ethiopian Navy has established its Naval Headquarters in Massawa with a presence in Assab, Dhalak Island, and Asmara (Makeda, 2020b).

In **Massawa**, a naval headquarters and training facility, in **Asmara**, a naval air station and the naval academy, in **Assab**, Naval station, training facility, and repair dock was established. On **Dahlak Island**, communication, signal station, and repair dock had established while the navy’s deputy commander and its naval headquarters situated in Addis Ababa (Lionel, 2017).

In 1958, the Ethiopian navy became an independent branch of the Ethiopian National Defense Force under the command of the Chief of Staff of the Imperial National Defense Force. Emperor Haileselassie appointed Royal Norwegian navy officers to help in organizing the Ethiopian navy. Some of Ethiopian navy officers received naval training at the UN naval academy (Pike, 2021).

The function of the Ethiopian navy was to operate as a coast guard, patrolling the territorial waters of the Red Sea and along with the Ethiopian ports. At its height, the Imperial Ethiopian Navy had a force of 3,500 personnel. The navy operated a mix of patrol boats obtained from the US Navy and the navies of the European countries (Lionel , 2017). This Ethiopian navy declined following the dissolution of Ethiopia and the Eritrean Federation in 1991 as discussed below.

3.1.4 The Dissolution of Ethiopian and Eritrean Federation

Following the simultaneous independence of Ethiopia and Eritrea from Italian occupation, Eritrea federated with Ethiopia in September 1952 as discussed earlier through the referendum and Ethiopia regained its control over the Red Sea coastal line (New World Encyclopidia, 2017).

However, while the Eritrea indicated its willingness to accept a position whereby Eritrea would have a federal autonomous status as an equal partner with Ethiopia, Emperor Hailesilasse eroded federal status constantly from 1952 to 1962 highlighted by the following events (Lobban, 2014).

First, on September 30, 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie proclaimed that the Federal Ethiopian Court to be the final court of appeal in Eritrea. In response on May 22, 1954, the Eritrean Assembly approved a resolution condemning Ethiopian interference in Eritrean internal affairs. In August 1955, the Emperor forced Tedla Bairu the President of Eritrean Assembly to resign and replaced by Idris Mohammed Adam (University of Central Arkansas, 2020).

Third, from 1956-1959 the Emperor Hailesilasse also suspended Eritrean National Assembly, removed the Eritrean flag, canceled Arabic and Tigrinya from being Eritrean official languages, and imposed Amharic as Eritrean working language (ibid). After the Ethiopian Chamber of Deputies voted to abolish the Eritrea and Ethiopian federation on November 14, 1962, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea on November 16, 1962 by dissolving Ethiopia and Eritrean Federation formed in September 1952 by the referendum held by the UN. Then, Eritreans initiated an armed struggle for full independence following the dissolution of federation as discussed bellow (ibid).

3.1.5. The Beginning of Eritrean Armed Struggle for Independence

In response to the abolishment of the Ethiopia- Eritrea federation, by Emperor Hailesillase Government, Eritreans showed serious protests to the UN and Ethiopian Government and began the underground movement in 1958 (Lobban, 2014). In November 1958, the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) established by Mohamed Said, Yasinel Gade, Mohamed El-Hassan, and Said Sabr in Port Sudan while On July 10, 1960, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) also established by Idris Mohammed, Idris Osman Geladewos, and Mohammed Saleh Hamid in Cairo Egypt to initiate armed struggle for full independence of Eritrea (University of Central Arkansas, 2020).

Then, on September 1, 1961, *ELF* led by Hamid Idris Awate initiated a military operation and fired the first bullet, and attacked the government police station at mount Adal in western Eritrea. This day September 1 has been known as '*Bahti Meskerem*' the beginning of the Eritrean armed struggle for independence which has been celebrated by Eritreans annually since 1993 beginning from the time of independence (Eritrea Ministry of Information, 2012).

Following the dissolution of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Federation and the beginning of armed struggle Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Chinese, and Cuba began to provide military assistance to the ELF in 1963. In 1970, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) established by the current Eritrean President Issaias Afewerki, and the EPLF began to receive financial and military assistance from Kuwait, the UAE and Syria (University of Central Arkansas, 2020). Then, within 30 years of armed struggle, from 1961-1991, about 575,000 individuals died, 600,000 individuals internally displaced, and 450,000 Eritreans fled to Sudan and finally Eritreans were able to liberate the entire Eritrea from the '*Derg*' regime of Ethiopia in May 1991(*ibid*).

3.1.6. The Declaration of Eritrean Independence through Referendum

On May 24, 1991, the Eritrean people's Liberation Front captured Eritrea's capital Asmara and liberated entire Eritrea from the Ethiopian forces. On May 29, 1991, the EPLF formed a Provisional Government in Eritrea, while the coalition forces of EPRDF under Chairman of Meles Zenawi formed the transitional government of Ethiopia in July 1991, (Gascoign, 2001).

Then, between July 1-5, 1991 Eritrean and Ethiopian representatives discussed Eritrea's relationship with Ethiopia. After the discussion, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia lead by Meles Zenawi approved the plan put forward by the Eritrean Provisional Government to hold a

referendum that determines Eritrea's status. EPLF also mobilized and organized Eritreans society both inside and outside with committed disciplined, technically skilled, and with a depth of knowledge to get international recognition as a new Sovereign State (Pool, 1993).

According to Awet (2013), when Eritrean representative diplomats were negotiated on the issues of Eritrean independence with the concerned international community, Eritreans had committed themselves as they minimized the negative effects of Eritrea's separation from Ethiopia by allowing Ethiopia's unfettered access to the Red Sea to protect Ethiopia's legitimate interest to access to the sea. They also agreed not to declare unilateral independence until the Post 'Derg' environment was fully stabilized, which was the display of Eritrean 'diplomatic dexterity'³ during the campaign for Eritrean independence (Awet , 2013:15).

In April 1992, the provisional government of Eretria issued Referendum Proclamation no.22/1992' to hold a referendum (Human Rights Watch , 2003). Then, the UN, OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the League of Arab States sent an independent observer to monitor the referendum. On March 21, 1993, after Isaias Afwerki was elected as President of Eritrea by the National Assembly, a referendum for Eritrean independence was held from April 23-25, 1993. Then, about, 99.8% of Eritreans voted for independence (University of Central Arkansas, 2020).

Finally, on May 24, 1993, after Eritrean endorsed the UN-monitored referendum and officially declared their independence and separation from Ethiopia, Eritrean long dream of independence was initiated because of the dissolution of Eritrean and Ethiopian federation become a reality. Four days later, on May 28, 1993, Eritrea joined the UN in which Ethiopia lost its Red Sea Maritime domain to the newly independent state of Eretria including its previous port of Massawa and Assab (Eritrea Constitutional Legal Foundations, 2020). Eretria was also registered as the first and new African state separated successfully from other African states Ethiopia, while Ethiopia remained as the landlocked country in the Horn of Africa (Tekle,2014: vii).

3.1.7 The End of Previous Ethiopian Navy in the Red Sea

After Ethiopia lost its Red Sea maritime domain and its operational naval bases to the newly independent state of Eritrea in 1991, the Ethiopian navy continued to patrol along the Red Sea, by using Yemen Port (Lionel, 2017). In 1993, the operational naval base in Yemen ceased.

³ 'Diplomatic dexterity' means the ability to perform difficult diplomatic activities quickly and skillfully by using mind. The Amharic, language dictionaries defined the word 'Dexterity' as 'ግግግግ ግግግግ'.

Then, the Ethiopian Government attempted to negotiate, with Eritrea, access for its navy to Assab base. But, Eritrea didn't accept such request and the Ethiopian navy moved to Djibouti port (Makeda, 2020b). In 1996, the Ethiopian Navy based in Djibouti ports had fallen behind in paying its harbor dues, and under this pretext, Djibouti seized all of the remaining ships on September 16, 1996, and put them up for auction to pay the back dues. Eritrea purchased only four of them, the Osa-II class missile boat, three swift ships, and a Shipbuilders patrol craft to avoid exacerbating an international crisis with Yemen. The remaining patrol boat GB-21; moved inland to Lake Tana which has survived as one of Ethiopia's military watercraft (Lionel, 2017). Finally in 1996, the Ethiopian navy's headquarters in Addis Ababa disbanded and the existence of the Ethiopian navy ended in 1996 due to Ethiopia's loss of its Red Sea maritime domain and its operational naval bases of Massawa and Assab. On the other hand, Ethiopia's commercial fleet continued to access both the port of Massawa and Assab until 1998 (Makeda, 2020b).

3.1.8 Ethiopia and Eritrea Early Peace Cooperation and Maritime Diplomacy (1993-1998)

From 1993-1998 Eritrea and Ethiopia initially became close partners in social, economic, political, and security matters. The two countries were also initially worked together on bilateral and multilateral peace cooperation and on the Maritime diplomacy (Human Right Watch, 2003).

For instance on the social matters, in the 1993 the two countries signed an earlier agreement to exempt citizens of the other country from entry visa requirements to promote and to strengthen the affinity and bonds of friendship between the two countries. The Agreement on Security and related matters Article 2(3) stipulates that, until the citizens of one side residing in the other's territory are fully identified and the issue of citizenship is settled, the traditional right of citizens of one side to live in the other's territory shall be respected (Human Right Watch, 2003).

On Bilateral peace cooperation: the two countries agreed to promote the uninhibited flow of people and goods across their borders, to conduct joint security training programs, to cooperate police training and operations, to control drug-trafficking, and to enact the motor-vehicle regulation, that articulated under Article 1(3) of Agreement of 1993. Eritrea and Ethiopia also established a high-level joint governmental commission to promote political cooperation and economic integration. In June 1996 President Issayas Afewerki of Eritrea was told to Addis Ababa Newspaper as the border between two countries was meaningless (ibid)

On multilateral peace cooperation: the two countries were also cooperated to work together on regional multilateral economic and peace cooperation mainly in reviving the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to expand IGAD's mandate from environmental preservation to economic integration and conflict resolution. Ethiopia and Eritrea were the driving force behind IGAD's efforts especially to settle civil wars in Sudan and Somalia from 1991-1998 (ibid)

Concerning Maritime Diplomacy, According to Awet (2013:15) during the time of Eritrean independence, Eritrean had granted Ethiopia the continued free and unfettered access to Assab's port. From 1991-1997, Ethiopia used the port of Assab without paying anything for Eritrea (Atom, 2016). However, the issues of management, commission, and local currency exchange rates terminated such relationships in 1997 when Eritrea introduced its currency called 'Nakfa', equal value to Ethiopian birr (Relief Web, 2000). Ethiopia insisted that all transactions between the two countries shall be in hard currency. Such issues of currency initiated tension between the two countries in 1997 (Gascoigne, 2001) and in May 1998, when the border war broke out Ethiopia stopped using Eritrean ports and transferred to Djibouti ports (Denyer, 2000).

3.1.9 Ethiopia and Eritrea Border War of 1998-2000

On May 6-7, 1998 the war had begun between Eritrea and Ethiopia when small-scale clashes occurred between Eritrean military and Ethiopia police patrols in a remote area along the western part of the Eritrean and Ethiopian border near the town Badme (Murphy, 2016). On May 12, 1998, fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea after Eritrean army invaded the town of Badme and the surrounding area. The official explanation for the causes of the war was the border controversy over Badme, and pastoral land in Kunama (Wuhibegezer, 2014:40).

Following the outbreak of war, both Ethiopia and Eritrea were forced to increase the defense budget and the size of their army. For instance, Ethiopia increased the total size of its army from 60,000 to 350,000 troops and increased its defense expenditure from \$95 million in 1997/98 to \$777million in 1999/2000. The cost of the war for Ethiopia was nearly \$3 billion while Eritrea also increased its army to 300,000 through National Service Conscriptations (Awal, 2018:1).

The two years war between Eritrea and Ethiopia resulted in the estimated death of 80,000-100,000 soldiers from both sides while more than 316,000 people were displaced from their homes which many of them lost their livelihoods while they moved away from the conflict area (Wuhibegezer, 2014: 42). And also, in 1998, Ethiopian authorities expelled an estimated 75, 000

Eritreans and Eritrean origins from Ethiopia, while the Eritrean Government took part in the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 70,000 Ethiopians. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia continued until Ethiopia won the large tracts of land in a sudden push in May 2000 and until the leader of the two countries signed the peace deal agreement called the Algiers Peace Agreement of 2000 to end the border war (Human Rights Watch , 2003) as discussed below.

3.1.10 The Algeria's Peace Agreement and The Boundary Commission

Algeria's Peace Agreement was signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia on December 12, 2000, in the city of Algiers, to end the border war lasted from 1998-2000, to terminate military hostility between the two countries, to refrain from scaring or use of force against each other, to release and exchange all prisoners of war and detained persons because of war, and to give humanitarian treatment to each other's nationals within their territories (Algerias Agreement, 2000).

Under Algeria's Peace Agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea also agreed to establish two independent organs, called the 'Claim Commission' which investigates the origins of conflict and assesses the damage caused to the two countries because of the war (Art.3) and 'the Boundary Commission', which delimit and demarcate the boundary between the two countries based on the resolution of AHG/Res.16(1) adopted by the AU Summit in Cairo in 1964, colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, 1908 signed between Ethiopia and Italy, and based on the International laws (ibid, Art 4-6).

Based on the Algeria's Agreement, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea somehow terminated, a neutral body called Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) established (United Nations Peace Maker, 2000). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission investigated the exact boundary demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea and passed a binding decision on April 13, 2002 that states Eritrea broke international law and cause the war by invading Ethiopia, while Ethiopia had advanced into Eritrea and held all the disputed territories, and the main disputant territory called Badime, the flashpoint of conflict belongs to Eritrea (United Nations, 2006).

However, when Ethiopia requested the execution of the boundary decision or to discharge Badime province to Eritrea, Ethiopia demanded further negotiation. Eritrea refused to negotiate unless it was first given Badme (Underwood, 2018). Hence, the failure of Ethiopia to implement the boundary decision led to the situation of 'no war no peace', hostility and enmity between the two countries for the past 18 years (K.Dessu O. S., 2018). Moreover, sometimes there were

clashes between the army of Ethiopia and Eritrea and they were blame each other for a border clash and inflamed political tensions that caused unknown number of casualties (Joseph, 2016).

3.1.11. Ethiopia Foreign Policy of 2002, towards Eritrea

The FDRE Constitution Article 86, which lay down the principle of foreign relations stipulated that Ethiopian foreign policy is formulated based on the mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other country to promote state sovereignty and equality, which indicates as Ethiopia foreign policy follows a neutrality that do not interfere in the internal affairs of other. Based on this when we see Ethiopian Foreign Policy towards Eritrea of 2002 it admitted the contribution of the Eritrean market to the Ethiopian economy and as Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab are more convenient ports to Ethiopia while on the other hand it expressly states that,

- The ruling party of Eritrea becomes an obstacle to friendly relations between Ethiopia and Eretria and it is characterized by rent-seeking and illegal economic activity and as its ruling elite is blinded by chauvinism and autocratic which was one cause for the aggression of war.
- The regime lack transparency, accountability, and it is anti-democratic in character working for the militarization of the entire Eritrean society in believing that it could subdue its neighbors by force against Ethiopia and others driven by its arrogant and jingoist character.
- The regime has calling all the citizens of military age to give military service and created a social crisis, as well as, pitted the highlanders against the lowlanders, those who fought in the liberation war against those who did not (FDRE Ministry of Information, 2002:63-69).

In general, Ethiopia's formulation of a foreign policy that accuses the Eritrean ruling party and failure to implement the Algiers peace agreement and boundary decision, escalated the period of hostility, enmity, military standby, and the period of 'no war no peace' between the Ethiopian and the Eritrean until Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to the office and signed a Peace deal Agreement with Eritrean Government in 2018 (Molla, 2020, interview)⁴.

⁴ Molla Balete is the Director of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interview was conducted on December 10/ 2020 In Addis Ababa

CHAPTER FOUR
ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA PEACE COOPERATION AND RECONCILIATION
EFFORTS SINCE 2018

4.1. The Main Motives of Ethiopia and Eritrea for the Formation of Peace
Cooperation in 2018

Following Eritrean independence in 1993, Ethiopia became a landlocked country surrounded by maritime countries such as Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan that possess sea ports. Ethiopia has good diplomatic relations with all of these maritime neighboring countries except Eritrea, which had border conflict with Ethiopia from 1998-2018 (Anene, 2020, interview)⁵. Among the ports of the neighboring countries, Billal (2018) states that the Assab Port of Eritrea is the best and dependable option to advance Ethiopia's import and export activities compared to other ports in the region. He also emphasizes that as Ethiopian economy is booming, Ethiopia's use of ports has been increasing over the past decade while Ethiopia is undertaking almost all its import, and export activities passes through Djibouti ports since 1998.

Since the border conflict from 1998-2018 Ethiopians were highly motivated to create peace and reconciliation with Eritrea especially to use Eritrean Port of Assab for their import and export commodities (Anene, 2020, interview)⁶ while one of the Eritrean motives to make peace with Ethiopia was to obtain the lifting of UN sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009 (Vilmer, 2019). Furthermore, since the border conflict from 1998- 2018 Ethiopian politicians and researchers had accused the Ethiopian Government of its failure to conduct diplomatic relations with the concerned international community and Eritrea to get a maritime outlet through the Eritrean Port of Assab. For instance, Yakob (2011/12:20) states that the Ethiopian Government failed to conduct sufficient diplomatic negotiation with Eritrea and the international community to restore the port of Assab under Ethiopia territory by using the presence of the UN Economic Commission and AU in Addis Ababa as the best opportunity. He also suggests that, as the Ethiopian population and economic growth increase, the import-export of goods also increase while the port fee at Djibouti ports increases by 25 percent annually. He also identified the distance between Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa and the ports owned by the neighboring

⁵Anene Kejale is an International Maritime law expert at Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authorities, the interview was conducted on December 14, 2020, in Addis Ababa.

⁶ ibid

countries, Djibouti, Somaliland, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya to show as the Assab port is the nearest Port to Ethiopia as follows.

Chart-1: The Assab Port is the nearest Port to Ethiopia compared to other ports in the region.

Ethiopian Capital	Horn African Ports	Distance in Km
Addis Ababa	Kenya, Mombasa Port	1809 Km
Addis Ababa	Sudan, Port Sudan	1696 Km
Addis Ababa	Somali, Moqadisho Port	1520 Km
Addis Ababa	Somali Land, Berbera Port	943 KM
Addis Ababa	Djibouti, Djibouti Port	910 Km
Addis Ababa	Eritrea, Massawa Port ⁷	1162 Km
Addis Ababa	Eritrea, Assab Port	624 Km

Sources: (Yacob, 2011/12:13) and www.distancecalculator.net from Addis Ababa

As we understand from the above chart Assab port is 624 far from Addis Ababa which is the nearest port to Ethiopia compared to other ports in the Horn African region. However, due to Ethiopia's failure to implement the Boundary Decision by discharging the Badime area to Eritrea, and since Ethiopia crafted foreign policy that accused Eritrean Government as an obstacle to friendly relations between Ethiopia and Eretria, characterized by rent-seeking, blinded by chauvinism and anti-democratic in character and practicing illegal economic activities that harm Ethiopia's economic interest, the period of 'no peace no war' escalated between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998-2018. During this period there was no diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Ethiopia was unable to use Eritrean port of Assab (Molla, 2020, interview)⁸.

On the other hand, as discussed earlier, the UN Convention on the law of the Sea of 1982 Article 125, states that landlocked states shall have the right of access to the sea and freedom of transit, freedom of the high sea and common heritage of mankind through the territory of coastal states by all means of transport without infringing the sovereignty and legitimate interest of coastal states. It also states that the terms and modalities for exercising such freedom of transit shall be

⁷ Distance from Addis Ababa to Massawa, www.distancecalculator.net from Addis Ababa

⁸ Supra at No.6 (Anene,2020, interview)

agreed upon between the land-locked states and transit states through bilateral, sub-regional, or regional agreements⁹. This means the convention advises landlocked states like Ethiopia primarily to restore diplomatic relations with its maritime neighboring countries like Eritrea by ending the period of ‘no peace no war’ to reach upon agreement how Ethiopia could use Eritrean ports with all means of transports. In the meantime, in 2018, Ethiopia which is the signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and Eritrea which is non-signatory to the Convention signed the Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement to end the period of ‘no war no peace’ and to resume the diplomatic relations between the two countries as follows¹⁰.

4.1.1 Ethiopia and Eritrea Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Since 2018

As discussed earlier, the failure of Ethiopia in implementing the Alger's Agreement of 2000 and the Decision of Boundary commission of 2002 resulted in the situation of ‘no war no peace’ between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and even both the government of the two countries were engaged with political hostility, enmity, and proxy war against each other until April 2018 (Joseph, 2016).

However, the Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, revived the Ethiopian foreign policy towards Eritrea of 2020 (Molla, 2020, interview)¹¹, and on June 5, 2018, the executive committee of the Ethiopia’s Federal government ruling party also announced the unconditional acceptance of the December 2000 Algiers agreement and decisions of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), to remove the key obstacles of Ethiopia and Eritrea diplomatic rapprochement from 1998-2018 (Abdulkader, 2018:29). Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy also offer the Eritrean government to engage in peace and to end the state of ‘no war-no peace’ situation (Bereketeab, 2019:3a).

Then Eritrea President Isaias Afwerki accepted the offer of the Ethiopian Prime Minister and sent a delegation to Ethiopia on June 20, 2018. A few days later, the Ethiopian delegation led by Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed visited Eritrea from July 8-9, 2018, and signed the Peace and Friendship Agreement with Eritrea on July 9, 2018, in Asmara as follows (Bereketeab, 2019:3a).

⁹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, Article 125, Right of access to and from the Sea and freedom of transit.

¹⁰ Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, Signed on September 16, 2018, and Supra at 2

¹¹ Molla Balete is the Director of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interview was conducted on December 10/ 2020 In Addis Ababa.

4.1.2. Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace and Friendship Agreement of July 9, 2018

Ethiopia and Eritrea signed Peace and Friendship Agreement on July 9, 2018, in Asmara, which marked the start of the normalization of ties and an end to twenty years of border conflict that has five main provisions including, to end the state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to forge intimate political, economic, social, cultural, and security cooperation that serves and advances the vital interest of their peoples, to re-start the transport, trade and communications links and to resume diplomatic ties and activities, to implement the boundary decision of the two countries and to ensure regional peace, development, and cooperation (Bereketeab:2019:17b).

4.1.3. The Jeddah Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement of 2018

Following the Asmara Peace deal Agreement, Ethiopia PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afework signed another agreement called 'Jeddah Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement' on September 16, 2018, in Saudi Arabia at the presence of UN Secretary-General, Mr. Antonio Guterres and King Salman of Saudi Arabia (Bereteab, 2019:3a). The agreement concluded by re-affirming the Asmara Peace agreement as follows;

1. To end the state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Art. 1).
2. To promote cooperation in the political, economic, and social fields (Art .2).
3. To developing Joint investment projects and Joint special Economic Zones (Art.3),
4. To implement the Ethiopia-Eritrean Boundary Commission Decision(Art.4),
5. To promote regional, and Global Peace, Security, and Cooperation (Art.5),
6. To combat terrorism, human and drug trafficking (Art.6), and
7. To establish high-level joint committees and sub-committees required to guide the implementation of the Agreements (Art.7)¹² (Bereteab, 2019:20b).

4.1.4. The implementation of Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement of 2018

Among the above-listed points of agreement, the study has examined the end of the state of war between the two countries and, the implementation of the Verdict of Boundary Commission which is the key for Ethiopia and Eritrean Peace deal Agreement and diplomatic relations.

¹²The Agreement on Peace, Friendship, and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, September 16, 2018, Jeddah City.

4.1.4.1. In Ending the state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea

By signing Asmara peace and friendship agreement on July 9, 2018, the leaders of the two countries declared the end of the period of political hostility, enmity and ‘no wars no peace’, existed between Eritrea and Ethiopia from 1998-2018. Following the agreement the border crossings to the two countries have opened. The sanctions imposed on Eritrea by UN Security Council in 2009 had been lifted, and telecom links and air transport have also been re-connected (Africa-Komitee Basel, 2018:3). For instance, on July 19, 2018, Ethiopian Airlines carrying 315 passengers crossed into Eritrean airspace and landed in Asmara for the first time after 20 years (Abdilatif, 2018a). On September 5, 2018, when the Ethiopian Prime Minister visited Eritrea for the second time, an Ethiopian commercial ship docked in the port of Massawa (Omondi, 2018).

In addition, leaders of the two countries also jointly opened the roads crossing to Eritrea and Ethiopia by removing military standby from their common border on September 11, 2018. Then hundreds of people began to cross the boundary of the two countries, trades between the two countries have begun and families separated since the war have re-united and the state of war between the two countries had been ended according to the agreement (Alfa, 2019)

However, in December 2018, Eritrea border officials have begun to restrict the road crossing to the Zalambessa and Rama from the Eritrean side and began to ask Ethiopian travelers and Ethiopia-licensed vehicles to provide a travel document issued by Ethiopian Federal authorities. In April 2019, Eritrea has shut all free border crossings to Ethiopia and begins to ask all Ethiopian travelers to provide a travel document issued by Ethiopian Federal authorities (ibid).

According to Anene (2020, interview)¹³ the Eritrea government was forced to restrict the free crossing of the Ethiopian and Eritrea border to stop illegal trade activities operated around the common border of the two countries and to prevent possible crimes committed by individual groups against the security and property of the people around the border region and beyond.

4.1.4.2. Implementing the Boundary Decision, and its Public Acceptance and Legitimacy

Concerning the public legitimacy, acceptance, and the execution of the agreement, signed to implement the EEBC decision, at the beginning when Ethiopia announces its acceptance to

¹³ Supra at no.6, (Anene,2020, interview)

implement the decision of the Boundary Commission, no one condemned except Tigray politicians who questioning the procedure of the implementation (Molla, interview, 2020)¹⁴. For instance, when Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy arrived in Eritrea in July 2019, the entire Asmara residents welcomed him and showed their positive feeling and happiness to the Ethiopian and Eritrean peace cooperation agreement (Humadin, 2019:19). Similarly, when Eritrea's President Isaias Afewerki visited Ethiopia the inhabitant of Addis Ababa, Hawassa, and the surrounding cities welcomed him and showed their positive feelings and mass support to words the Ethiopian and Eritrean peace cooperation and reconciliation efforts (Molla, interview, 2020)¹⁵.

During the event of the peace deal agreement, the majority of Ethiopian and Eritrean people were seen when they expressed their support, positive feelings, and happiness that shows their acceptance and recognition of Ethiopia and Eritrean bilateral peace cooperation which requires the enforcement of the EEBC Decisions. Moreover, Ethiopian needs to form economic, social, and political cooperation with Eritrea by ending prolonged border controversy to obtain the right to access to the sea through Eritrean transit and maritime outlet (ibid)¹⁶. And also the Tigray regional state President Dr. Debratsion G/Mikael welcomed Eritrea's President Isaias Afewerki during his first visit to Ethiopia on July 14, 2018, and when the leaders of the two countries opened the road crossing to the boundary of Eritrea and Ethiopia on September 11, 2018 (ibid).¹⁷

However, later the Tigray Regional State Ruling Party the TPLF released a statement that called Ethiopia's decision to accept fully the Ethiopia-Eritrea Algiers Agreement and decision of the Boundary Commission has fundamental flaws. The statement also called for the executive and the council of the Ruling Party, EPRDF to hold an emergency meeting to review the decision and other issues of importance. But, the EPRDF released a statement on June 05, 2018, that will fully accept to implementation of the Algiers Agreement and verdict of EEBC (Oteng, 2018).

Following this, the TPLF's executives committee also attended a two-day emergency meeting in Mekelle city and said that, even though the decision of the Federal Government to enforce the decision of EEBC is appropriate and timely, yet it stressed that its implementation should be carefully carried out considering the geopolitical realities and the need to pledge to support

¹⁴ Supra at no. 11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

¹⁵ ibid

¹⁶ ibid

¹⁷ ibid

veterans and their families who have paid the ultimate scarifies in maintaining Ethiopia's sovereignty during the war (Etenesh, 2018). The statement and the criticism released from TPLF on the enforcement of the Boundary Commission decision inspired peoples in the Tigray region to protest against the Federal Government's decision for its acceptance of the decision of Boundary Commission, which awarded Badime Province to Eritrea (Molla, 2020, interview)¹⁸.

Also, some Tigrayans, who had long been the leading in the EPRDF coalition for more than two decades, were concerned that their interests will be hurt if Badime surrendered to Eritrea (Maashoo, 2018d). Besides, the Erob people in the northeast of the Tigray region expressed their dismay at the EPRDF Executive Committee decision which could cede part of their territory to Eritrea. In this case, about 30,000 Erob people demonstrated in Dawhan town against the decision to accept boundary judgment since they fear that the border demarcation could separate them to Eritrea regardless of their family and cultural ties with Ethiopia (Fantahun, 2018).

The Dawhan Administrator Nigussie Hagos also stated that the protest was authorized by the local *Woreda* since the decision to execute the boundary decision would pose a big threat to the survival of Erob people and if peoples are divided between two countries as their survival would be in question since they are 100 percent Ethiopian. He also adds that they were not against the peace deal, but it should not come at the expense of Ethiopian sovereignty (Fantahun, 2018).

Therefore, it is easy to understand that, the local people who live in the disputed border do not know how the boundary decisions would be implemented, whether they will separate from Ethiopia and put under the jurisdiction of Eritrea or re-locate to another area in Ethiopia. The misunderstanding is created because the Ethiopian Federal Government did not make a discussion with the local people who live around disputed boundary, and the Tigray Regional State officials regarding the implementation of the decision of the boundary Commission.

On the other hand, since the TPLF which was governing the Tigray region was odd at the Ethiopia Federal Government and the Eritrea regime, the Ethiopian Federal Government officials unable to discuss the issues of the implementation of the boundary decision with the concerned local rulers and peoples who live around the disputed border and may be affected by the execution of the EEBC decision (Molla, 2020, interview)¹⁹. Moreover, when the political tension

¹⁸Supra at no. 11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

¹⁹ibid

between Ethiopian Federal Government and TPLF increases day today since 2018, the Ethiopian Federal Government officials began to accuse the TPLF of constraining the execution of the boundary decision intentionally by using public protests as an instrument to weaken the Federal Government and to de-legitimize the peace deal agreement made between the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrean. However, the Eritrean Government who understands such internal Ethiopian political problems did not force Ethiopia to implement the border decision before Ethiopia solves its internal political problems (ibid)²⁰. Moreover the outbreak of internal war between Ethiopian Federal Government and TPLF forces in November, 2020 complicated all political issues in Tigray regions including the issues of the implementation of boundary decision (ibid)²¹.

Therefore, first, even though Ethiopians who live out of Tigray region expressed their positive feelings towards the new Ethiopia and Eritrea peace deal Agreement since 2018, but, the local people in Tigray mainly the District of Erob people who lives in the disputed area and who may be affected by the execution of the Boundary Decision did not recognize and accept the part of the agreement concluded to implement the EEBC decision that passed in 2002 first because of the lack of information how the boundary decision will be implemented, and the political disagreement between Tigray Regional State Ruling Party and Ethiopia Federal Government.

Second, regarding the agreement signed to implement Boundary Decision, Ethiopia did not officially implement the EEBC decision by discharging the Badime area to Eritrea due to the political hostility between the Federal Government and the TPLF and the political hostility between the Eritrean regime and TPLF that governed the Tigray region bordering with Eritrea.

4.2 The Success and challenges of Ethiopia, and Eritrea Peace Cooperation

4.2.1 Success

Ethiopia and Eritrean bilateral peace cooperation made to end the state of war between the two countries since 2018 has succeeded and reached on the following achievements.

1. **Ending the period of no war and no peace:** The failure to implement the 2002 boundary decision was led to a situation of ‘no war no peace’, enmity, and political conspiracy, between Ethiopia, and Eritrea from the period of 2000-2018 (Muller, 2019:3). However,

²⁰Supra at no. 11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

²¹ ibid

Eritrea and Ethiopia's Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement of 2018 have succeeded in ending the period of 'no peace no war' and brought significant political, economic and social cooperation between the two countries. Moreover, after the peace agreement, Eritrea emerged as a strong political ally of Ethiopian Government (Molla, 2020, interview)²².

2. **Resuming Economic and Diplomatic Relations:** Following the Ethiopia and Eritrea bilateral peace cooperation of 2018, the leaders of the two countries ended period of the enmity between the two countries, and telecom services re-connected, Ethiopia Airlines has started a regular flight to Asmara, and the two countries resume their diplomatic activities by opening their embassies in the respective countries (Omar & Meressa, 2018).
3. **Ending the proxy war and political conspiracy between the two countries:** From 1998-2018 there was a proxy warfare policy pursued beyond the boundary issue in which the Rebel movements based in both countries under the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend' principle launched an attacks against the respective countries ruling party (ibid). While the Ethiopian Government was supporting the Eritrean opposition party against President Isaias Afwerki's regime in Eritrea, the Eritrean Government was also supporting the Ethiopian armed groups like Ginbot-7, Oromo Liberation Front, and Ogaden National Liberation Front against Ethiopia's ruling party the EPDRF. However, the peace Cooperation agreement signed in 2018 between the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia succeeded in ending such political conspiracy and proxy war launched against each other (Molla, 2020, interview)²³.
4. **Providing of Regional Peace and Stability:** Eritrea and Ethiopia's conflict have contributed to regional instability. For instance, the Ethiopian Government accused the Eritrean Government of supporting a terrorist group like al-Shabab in Somalia in the 2000s which resulted in political tension between Eritrea and the Somali governments. The bilateral peace cooperation made between Ethiopia and Eritrea also succeed in ending such political tension between Eritrea and Somalia (Molla, 2020, interview)²⁴. However, following Ethiopia and Eritrea peace cooperation, Eritrea and Somalia had agreed to establish diplomatic relations in July 2018. Also, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somalia leaders met in Asmara and signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement (Mules, 2018). Furthermore, the Ethiopian and Eritrea

²² Supra at no.11, (Molla,2020, interview)

²³ ibid

²⁴ ibid

peace agreement also succeeded in forming a new regional bloc called ‘the Horn of African cooperation’ between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia (Henneberg & Stapel, 2020:1)

Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace Agreement also succeeded in urging Eritrea to begin a dialogue with Djibouti to solve their border dispute, which occurred in June 2008 over the Dumeira Mountain and Island along the Red Sea in which Eritrea followed by signing an agreement with Djibouti to end their border disputes on September 11, 2018, (Abdulatif, 2018:2b).

5. **Gaining International Recognition**, Following the Peace Agreement and the end of the state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, ‘the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize of 2019 to Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed for his efforts to make peace cooperation, mainly for his decisive initiative to resolve the border conflict with Eritrea, and to recognize all the stakeholders he worked for peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia and the North Eastern African region at large (Nobel Peace Prize Committee, 2019).
6. **Lifting the UN Sanction Imposed on Eritrea:** As discussed above one of the Eritrean motives to make peace with Ethiopia was to obtain the lifting of UN sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009. In the previous years, the UN Security Council accused Eritrea of supporting the Al-Shabab and for failing to resolve its conflict with Djibouti (Vilmer, 2019). Both Somalia and Djibouti were support the 2009 resolution that imposes sanctions on Eritrea which blocked arms sales to and from Eritrea, placed travel restrictions on Eritrean senior government and military officials, and frozen the assets of Eritreans while Eritrea has denied the allegation and repeatedly called the sanctions as illegal and immoral (Salem S., 2018).

However, following the Ethiopian and Eritrea peace cooperation and the end of the period of ‘no peace-no war’, Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed pushed the UN Security Council to lift the sanction imposed on Eritrea including an arms embargo, travel bans on government officials, and asset freezes. Then, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to lift the sanctions against Eritrea on November 14, 2018 (Security Council Report , 2018).

7. **Eritrea’s Return to IGAD Membership.** Eritrea was a member of IGAD since its independence in 1993 up to its suspension from membership in 2007 following Ethiopia and Djibouti boundary dispute. While Eritrea tried to reactivate its membership in July 2011, Eritrea's representative to the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in August 2011 was informed that he could not sit in the meeting and was escorted out. Eritrea has not

attended IGAD meetings since then (Addis, 2018). However, on September 13, 2018, Eritrea rejoined IGAD, when the leaders of IGAD member countries met in Djibouti which brought a significant change to the Eritrean international diplomatic relations (Addis, 2018).

8. **Economical Aspect**; the end of the period of ‘no peace no war’, as well as military stand by also succeeded in providing positive economic contribution for both Ethiopia and Eritrea. For example, during the state of war, both states prepared for war by training soldier, buying modern weapons such as aircraft and ammunition at heavy costs. And also to provide necessary logistics for thousands of troops deployed along a 912 km of disputed boundary of Ethiopia and Eritrea, both countries spent a million of dollars (Molla, 2020, interview)²⁵.

However, the bilateral peace cooperation made between Ethiopia and Eritrea also succeeded in bringing a significant economic contribution to both countries by alleviating the potential threat of war and stave off such defense expenditure spent for the preparation of war. Currently, both Eritrean and Ethiopian governments can shift such huge defense expenditure for the development which widely benefits the public at large since Eritrea is no threat to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia is also not the threat to Eritrea, rather they would cooperate (Molla, 2020, interview)²⁶. The peace cooperation has also succeeded in creating new market access for Ethiopia’s agricultural products such as coffee, vegetable, and others while getting such product is essential for the Eritrean population (Molla, 2020 interview)²⁷.

4.2.2 Challenges

Despite the above achievements, Ethiopian and Eritrea Peace Cooperation and reconciliation efforts have been challenged both by internal and external political factors discussed below.

First, in 2018, Ethiopia signed a treaty to implement the boundary decision to remove the key obstacle to Ethiopia and Eritrea diplomatic relations since the border dispute (Belete, 2018:36). However, even though the TPLF accepted the agreement signed to implement the Border Decision at the beginning, later it did not agree with the Ethiopian Federal Government's approach on the demarcation of the disputed boundary (Molla, 2020, interview)²⁸.

²⁵ Supra at no.11, (Molla,2020, interview)

²⁶ ibid

²⁷ ibid

²⁸ ibid

While the Tigray regional state ruling party (TPLF) argued that, the physical demarcation of the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea must involve the residents of the borderlands with Eritrea (Goitom, 2018), to identify their consent whether they wish to be under the jurisdiction of Eritrea or Ethiopia, but Ethiopian and Eritrea would not accept such approach on the ground that international borders are decided by nation-states which challenges the implementation of the Ethiopia and Eritrea boundary decision (Berekteab, 2019:37b).

In addition, Ethiopia and Eritrea diplomatic relations lacks public diplomacy that accommodates all stakeholders making sufficient awareness to the people who live around the disputed border, who do not know even how the agreement of the border decision would be executed (Tesfaye, 2020 interview)²⁹. This made the Tigray residents who live around the disputed boundary protest against the implementation of the Boundary Decision to shows their concern that they do not want to be under the jurisdiction of Eritrea (Maashoo,2018d, Belete, 2018). In this case, Ethiopia faces a challenge to address the concern of the Eritrean to implement the boundary decision on the one hand, and to address the concern of the Ethiopian community who lives in the disputed area, and do not wish to be located under the jurisdiction of Eritrean on the other.

Secondly, the political hostility between the Eritrean and the TPLF also challenging the Ethiopian and Eritrea diplomatic relations. Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea were able to avoid enmity existed between them, the political hostility between the Eritrea regime and the TPLF who is ruling the Tigray region escalated. For instance, Eritrea Journalist Michael Wrong told to DW as the current Eritrean regime has seen the TPLF as the enemy since the border dispute of 1998 and that the two regimes hate each other (Frohlich, 2020). Goitom (2018) also stated that the consistent criticism of the TPLF by Eritrean officials will make future Ethiopia and Eritrean peace cooperation and reconciliation effort even more challenging (Yoel, 2018:4).

Thirdly, the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray war would also complicate future Ethiopian and Eritrea diplomatic relations. On November 4, 2020, the Ethiopian Federal Government accused the TPLF, of the allegation of attack against the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National defense force in the Tigray region. The TPLF has claimed that the strike was carried out for self-defense. On November 6, 2020, the Federal Government began to launch a

²⁹ Tesfaye Chalchisa is the Directorate Directors of Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority's Plan, Budget, Preparation, Monitoring, and Evolution, the interview was conducted on December, 14, 2020 Addis Ababa.

counter-airstrike against Tigray forces and destroying many rockets and other weapons controlled by the TPLF (Mules, 2020). During the war, TPLF launched a rocket strike and hit Asmara the capital of Eritrea with the allegation that Eritrean troops participated in the war in support of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and accused Eritrean troops stealing of resources from Tigray, and, for human rights abuses, for killing and rapping (Jovanovic, 2020). The U.S. also claimed that Eritrean soldiers had participated in the Tigray war to support the Ethiopian Federal Government Force, and committed severe human rights abuses in the Tigray region while Ethiopia and Eritrea denied such US claim at the beginning (Phil Stewart, 2020).

However, after the Ethiopian Government denied the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray for months, on March 23, 2021, Ethiopia Prime Minister confirmed the involvement of Eritrean troops in fighting TPLF in Tigray and the human rights abuses and atrocities (Reuters Staff, 2021). And also on March 26, 2021, the Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed traveled to Asmara and he announces that Eritrea has agreed to withdraw its troops out of the Ethiopian border, and Ethiopian National Defense Force would guard the border area (ALjazeera, 2021).

Finally, both Ethiopia and Eritrean governments conform as Eritrean troops fighting TPLF Tigray Region in support of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces. However, the Ethiopian Parliament did not officially permit the Eritrean to send its troops and support Ethiopian National Defense Force to fight TPLF. There is also no clear agreement that permits the Eritrean army to fight the TPLF along with Ethiopian Defense Force. The absence of an official agreement that clarifies how Eritrean troops were involved in fighting TPLF in Tigray indicated that Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President of Isaias Afework agreed through clandestine diplomacy to cooperate in fighting TPLF as their common enemy (Frohlich, 2020). The Eritrean troops were also accused of alleged human rights violations such as mass atrocities, rape, and killing, and property distraction when they fought the TPLF in the Tigray (PhilStewart, 2020).

Therefore, the involvement of Eritrean troops to fight TPLF in Ethiopia Tigray region and the violation of human right by the Eritrean troops tends to escalate the enmity and political hostility between the Eritrean Government and the Tigray community, especially who is the victims of mass atrocities, and the supporters of TPLF, which will complicate and challenge the current and future Ethiopia and Eritrea diplomatic relations since Tigray region shares boundary with Eritrea.

CHAPTER FIVE

ETHIOPIAN MARITIME DIPLOMACY BOTH FOR COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

5.1. Ethiopian Maritime Diplomacy for Commercial or Economic Objectives

5.1.1. Ethiopian Maritime Diplomacy with Eritrea Since 2018

As discussed in Chapter four above, one of the motives of Ethiopia to make bilateral peace cooperation with Eritrea was to end the period of ‘no peace no war’ and then, to access the sea through ports of Eritrean by resuming the diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Moreover, when Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s leaders signed the Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement in 2018, Ethiopian’s believed that the agreement would satisfy Ethiopia's desire to get access to the sea mainly through the Eritrean port of Assab (Anene, 2020, interview)³⁰.

However, the Ethiopian and Eritrean Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement of 2018, does not expressly state the terms and modalities of Ethiopia's right to get access to the Sea through the Eritrean maritime domain. Furthermore, currently, no port use agreement had officially signed between the leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia that would enable Ethiopia to use the Eritrean ports legally. And also Ethiopia has not begun to use Eritrean ports even after the leaders of the two countries signed the peace deal agreement (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)³¹.

When Ethiopian Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed visited Eritrean road's link to the port of Assab with President Isaias Afework of Eritrea on September 5, 2018, Ethiopia's commercial ship known as *Makkele* arrived at Massawa Port of Eritrea. However, since then, there is no Ethiopian ship that accessed Eritrean ports, and currently, about 99.1 percent of Ethiopia export and import goods pass through Djibouti ports, while the remaining 0.9 percent of Ethiopia’s import and exports passes through Barbara Port of Somaliland and Port Sudan (Sisay, 2020, interview)³².

³⁰Supra at no.5 (Anene, 2020, interview).

³¹Supra at no.29 (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)

³²Sisay Neda Publication and Documentation officers at Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise, the interview was conducted on December 11, 2020, in Addis Ababa

5.1.2. The Reason why Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean Ports for Commercial Purposes after 2018

Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Peace Cooperation Agreement and able to end the period of ‘no war-no peace,’ Ethiopia has not begun to use Eritrean ports officially because of;

- i. The delay of Eritrea in signing package agreement that also consists of port use agreement.
- ii. The infrastructures problems of Eritrean ports and the lack of transportation networks
- iii. Ethiopia’s delay in implementing the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission,

5.1.2.1. Delay of Eritrea in Signing the Package Agreement

Following Ethiopia and Eritrea entering into the peace cooperation by signing peace deal agreements in Asmara and Jeddah, in 2018, Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s leaders established a high-level joint committee at the ministerial level organized from both countries to discuss how Ethiopia would use Eritrean ports for commercial purpose (Molla, 2020, interview)³³. The high-level experts organized from, Ethiopian Foreign Affairs, the economic adviser of the Secretary Office of Ethiopian Prime Minister, the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority, the Ethiopian Road and Transport Authorities, the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority, Ethiopian former Ambassadors and diplomats led by Ethiopian Foreign Affairs discussed and prepared the initial draft called 'Package Deal Agreement' that contains eight identified protocols that include,

1. Protocol on the freight road transport services; which regulates the road transportation crossing to the border of Ethiopia and Eritrea carrying different import and export goods.
2. Protocol on the passenger road transport services, which regulates transpiration, related with Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s passengers crossing to the border of the two countries,
3. Protocol on the customs operation, which is related to revenues Authorities (*Gumuruk*),
4. Protocol on the port utilization, which deals with the terms and modalities of how Ethiopia will use Eritrean ports and maritime domains for economic or commercial purposes.
5. Protocol to regulate border trade agreement, which regulates the cross-border trade taken place between Ethiopia and Eritrea governments and Ethiopian and Eritrean nationals.
6. Protocol on the cargo, transit, and shipping services, which intends to regulate the cargo, transit, and shipping service when Ethiopia begins to use Eritrean ports,

³³Supra, at no. 11 (Molla,2020, interview)

7. The Agreement on general Ethiopia-Eritrean cooperation, which aims to regulate the general economic, political, social, and cultural cooperation between the two countries
8. Protocol on the establishment of joint commission at the ministerial level for the execution of the agreements signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Anene, Molla, 2020, interview)³⁴.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Trade and Industry sent such a draft package Agreement to Eritrea for approval and signature through the office of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately at the time when Ethiopia is waiting for Eritrean response, the COVID-19 Pandemic spread to both Eritrea and Ethiopian in March 2020, and the two countries were forced to stop discussion on the package agreements. When the leaders of the two countries began to exercise their diplomatic contact in September 2020, the political tension between Ethiopia's Federal Government and the TPLF escalated, and the war has breakout between the Ethiopian Federal Governments and TPLF which is ruling Tigray Region (Molla, 2020, interview)³⁵.

Besides, even though Ethiopia sent the Package Agreement to Eritrea, which consists of the port utilization agreement for approval and signature, Eritrea did not approve and sign the agreement hence Ethiopia could not begin to use Eritrea's ports. Therefore, one of the reasons why Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean ports is because Eritrea did not sign and approve the package agreement, which contains the port utilization and related issues that would also enable Ethiopia to use Eritrean ports based on the international legal frameworks (Anene, 2020, interview)³⁶.

5.1.2.2. Lack of Infrastructure

Even though Eritrea signed the Package Agreement and allowed Ethiopia to use the ports of Assab and Massawa, they could not accommodate the current Ethiopian cargo ships which are large since their poor infrastructures are not modernized (Anene, 2020 interview)³⁷. For instance, in the pre-1998, the Port of Massawa was one of the leading Ports both for Eritrean and Ethiopian cargo services, which were able to accommodate small and medium Ethiopian cargo ships. Nevertheless, currently, its transport networks and infrastructures have been destroyed through neglect and as a result of the war of the 1990s. Massawa Port has only six general

³⁴ Supra at no.6 and no 11, (Anene, and Molla, 2020, interview)

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ Supra at no.29, (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)

purposes, with the length of 907 meters, and four specialist berths³⁸. Two of the berths contain oil, one berth contains cement and the remaining one contains salts (Anene, 2020, interview)³⁹.

Regarding the Port of Assab, it was constructed in 1964, and Ethiopia invested to develop the Port during the pre-1998, which served as the main export and import gateway for Ethiopia's cargo. Assab Port has seven general purposes berths with an overall length of 1,025 meters, and four specialized berths; three oil terminals and one salt loading terminal (ibid)⁴⁰.

However, both ports of Assab and Massawa lack adequate operating facilities to provide efficient services to the current Ethiopian cargo ships. Eritrean ports have also no specialized container terminal, which is mandatory in the shipping industry. With such infrastructural problems, both Assab and Massawa ports cannot accommodate the modern Ethiopian cargo ships, and it is difficult for Ethiopia to use these ports before expanding and specializing its infrastructures.

Therefore, due to the lack adequate infrastructure and transportation networks at the Eritrean ports, Ethiopia did not begin to use these ports even after the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement in 2018 (Anene, 2020, interview)⁴¹.

5.1.2.3 Ethiopia's Delay in Implementing the Decision of Boundary Commission

As discussed above, Ethiopia's PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed agreed to implement the EEBC decision both under the Asmara Peace and Friendship Agreement and Jeddah comprehensive Peace Cooperation Agreement signed in 2018. On the other hand, the land (Badime area), which the Ethiopian Government agreed to implement for Eritrea is found in the Tigray region which is governed by TPLF bordering with Eritrea. The TPLF is hostile to both the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Eritrean Government and it opposes the implementation of the EEBC decision by claiming that the border issue could only be resolved through negotiations between the local populations affected by the border demarcation ignoring the fact that international borders are decided by Central Government. In addition, the reality of the demonstration in Tigray was to oppose the execution of the EEBC decision that resulted in the delay of execution of the fifth point of the Jeddah Peace Agreement of September 2018 (Bereketeab, 2019:37b).

³⁸ Berth means fixed place and narrow place which assigned to a ship at a mooring.

³⁹ Supra at no.5 (Anene,2020, interview)

⁴⁰ ibid

⁴¹Supra at no.32 (Sisay 2020, interview)

The political controversy and ongoing war between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray regional state ruling party (TPLF), forced to delay the official implementation of the boundary decisions (Molla, 2020, interview)⁴². Since Eritrea was interested to end the border issues by executing the decision of EEBC before Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a port utilization agreement, Ethiopia's delay in implementing the EEBC decision resulted to the delay in signing the port utilization agreement from the Eritrean side (Anene, 2020, interview)⁴³.

5.1.3 Ethiopia Maritime Diplomacy with Djibouti for Economic Objectives

International Strategic Studies Association (2015) states that Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia leased Djibouti to France for 99 years, in 1894 and France built a port city in Djibouti. After Ethiopia lost its Red Sea outlet to the Italian Colonial Force in 1896, Ethiopians began to conduct maritime diplomacy with Djibouti under the French colony in 1897 to use Djibouti port for import and export of goods for the first time in history. Djibouti under the French colony also allowed Ethiopia to import duty-free transit of weapons through Djibouti ports and recognized as the Djibouti port was an official sea outlet of Ethiopia. To link Ethiopia and Djibouti, Emperor Menelik authorized French companies to build a railway extending from Djibouti to Addis Ababa that was constricted from 1897-1917. Since then the Djibouti Port was only Ethiopia's sea outlet until Ethiopia federated with Eritrea in 1952 (Endalcachew & Kidanu, 2015:3).

However, Djibouti as a sovereign and independent state began to conduct diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in 1984 after Djibouti declared its independence from the France colony in 1977. Also, the relation between Ethiopia and Djibouti has begun to develop after the two countries signed a trade protocol in 1996 and military cooperation protocol in 1999 that can protect their economic interaction (Endalcachew & Kidanu, 2015:3).

Moreover, Ethiopia-Djibouti maritime diplomatic relations have been transformed to a higher level after the war arose between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998-2000. Hence, since 1998, Ethiopia became one of Djibouti's trading partners (Pike, 2017:2). In 1998, when the war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ethiopia stopped using Assab and Massawa ports and shifted to use Djibouti ports without signing a port utilization agreement, until 2002. On April 13, 2002, Ethiopia and Djibouti signed the port utilization and cargo transit service agreement, which was

⁴²Supra at no 11 (Molla,2020 interview)

⁴³Supra at no.5, (Anene, 2020, interview)

ratified by the Ethiopian parliament under Proclamation No. 2841/2002. Since 1998 above 95 percent of Ethiopian import-export goods pass through Djibouti ports (Sisay, 2020, interview)⁴⁴.

On April 28, 2018, Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, arrived in Djibouti, which was his first foreign visit since he took office to strengthen the diplomatic relation between the two countries and discuss the mutual interest of both countries (Alfa, 2018). When Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed began the peace deal with Eritrea, Djibouti feared that Ethiopia and Djibouti maritime diplomacy would cool down and Ethiopia may shift towards using Eritrean ports from Djibouti. PM Dr. Abiy who realized the fear of Djiboutian made a continuous diplomatic deal and assured that Ethiopia would keep on using the port of Djibouti as the main entry and gateways of Ethiopia's import and export even when Ethiopia will begin to use Eritrean ports and assured as Ethiopia and Djibouti economic integration will be continued (Molla, 2020 interview)⁴⁵.

Furthermore, the Ethiopian and Djibouti governments agreed to make joint investment and development projects on the Djibouti port utilization and its infrastructural development while, in return, Djibouti would have the option of taking stakes to invest in state-owned Ethiopian firms on Ethiopian Electric Power and Ethio-Telecom (Maasho, 2018a). For instance, Ethiopia's and Djibouti's previous port utilization agreement signed in 2002, continued as a binding rule after Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed come to the power in 2018. The data collected from the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority and Ethiopian Shipping Logistic Service Enterprises indicate that, currently, Ethiopia uses three main Djibouti ports Tajura, Dorale, and Djibouti. The total shares of import and export goods pass through these ports are covering 99.1 percent even after Ethiopia forms peace cooperation with Eritrea in 2018 (Tesfaye,2020, interview)⁴⁶.

Furthermore, on January 20, 2021, Ethiopia and Djibouti reached another agreement called the 'Joint Cargo and Freight Transportation Agreement'. According to the new agreement, Ethiopia airlines and the Djibouti ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) have agreed to launch a freight transport service. The agreement aimed to facilitate a smooth and efficient transaction of goods in Africa. The agreement anticipated expanding the Cargo and freight transportation of more than 400,000 tons of items from China to African countries which also helps Ethiopian Airlines double its existing cargo service (Ethiopian Monitor, 2021).

⁴⁴ Supra at no.32, (Sisay, 2020, interview)

⁴⁵Supra at no.11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

⁴⁶Supra at no.29, (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)

However, due to the increase in import-export trade, Ethiopia pays close to one billion dollars for port service every year at Djibouti Port (Anene, 2020 interview)⁴⁷. This forced Ethiopia to seek alternative ports from other neighboring countries from, Somaliland, Kenya, and Sudan. Now, Ethiopia has planned to decrease the import and export share of Djibouti ports from 99 percent to 60 percent while it has a plan to increase the share of Barbara port of Somaliland from 0.7 percent to 30 percent and Port Sudan from 0.2 percent to 10 percent (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)⁴⁸.

5.1.4 Ethiopia's Maritime Diplomacy with the Somaliland for Economic Objectives

Somaliland is a de facto state, which declared its independence unilaterally following the outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1991. Even though Somaliland managed to Promote peace and stability in its territory it has not recognized by any state of international community as a sovereign state (Rudincova, 2016:1). Based on a new political settlement reached at the Borame Conference held in Somaliland in 1993, Somaliland succeeded in establishing a governing institution that protects the security, promotes stability, and safeguards the welfare of its citizens, as well as, established successful democracies in Africa. However, Somaliland has not been recognized by any country yet and forced to develop favorable partnerships with Europeans and Africans (Farah, 2020).

Ethiopia shares a significant border with Somaliland. And also Ethiopia and Somaliland have cross-border trade and security cooperation which is the foundational factor for their diplomatic relationship for the last three decades. For Somaliland, Ethiopia is its gateway to the rest of the world, and a silent ally for its quest for international recognition (Hersi, 2020).

Concerning Ethiopian maritime diplomacy with Somaliland, the Ethio-Somaliland joint ministerial meeting on the use and development of Berbera Corridor for the handling of Ethiopian Cargo was held from July 6-8, 2009 in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a minute that permitted Ethiopia to use and develop of Barbara Corridor for the handling of Ethiopian cargos on July 8, 2009⁴⁹. Following the agreement, Berbera Port of Somaliland began to serve as an alternative port for Ethiopia's import and export goods. Currently Barbara port covers 0.7 percent of Ethiopia's import and export shares. After Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, came to power, Ethiopia has planned to increase the import and export share of Barbara

⁴⁷ Supra at no.5, (Anene, 2020 interview)

⁴⁸ *ibid*

⁴⁹ Agreed Minutes of understanding of Ethiopia-Somaliland Joint Ministerial Meeting on the Use and Development of Berbera Corridor for Handling of Ethiopian Cargo, 6-8 July 2009 Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

port from 0.7 percent to 30 percent (Tesfaye, 2020 interview)⁵⁰. Ethiopian PM also concluded new port utilization and infrastructure expansion agreement with Somaliland, and the United Arab Emirate (UAE)⁵¹ in March 2018, to expand and invest in Barbara port of Somaliland. According to the agreement, Ethiopia agreed to invest in Barbara Port infrastructure and its transport network to link with Ethiopia. And also according to the agreement Ethiopia will acquire a 19 percent stakeholder in the Barbara port while UAE's DP World Company will acquire 51% of its shares and the remaining 30% will be acquired by Somaliland (Olewe, 2018).

However, the Somalia Federal Government in Mogadishu has declared that Somaliland, which is part of Somalia had no authority to enter into an international agreement, and the agreement reached between Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Logistics Company DP World is 'null and void' and it claimed that the Agreement violates the unity, sovereignty, and the constitution of Somalia (Daniel, 2018).⁵¹ Somaliland responded to such declaration that it amounts to a declaration of war and unacceptable. Yet on February 21, 2019, Ethiopia and Somaliland also concluded another agreement to strengthen Security Cooperation and improving cross-border trade, and to strengthen the Port utilization agreements over the expansion of Berbera port and corridor that links Ethiopia and Somaliland (East African Business Week News, 2019).

Meanwhile, Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's Federal Government led by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo agreed to cooperate on the development of infrastructure mainly to build the roads linking to the two countries, to expand visa services, promote cultural exchanges, and invest in logistics and service provision especially to leading ports in the continent, that can serve both the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Ethiopia and Somalia also agreed jointly to invest in four seaports to attract foreign investment. But the statement and agreement did not identify the port they plan to develop (GCS , 2018).

However, Somaliland announced that the port utilization agreement made between Ethiopia and Somalia does not change the previous agreement made between Ethiopia and Somalia (Daniel, 2018). It should be stressed that, when Ethiopia agreed on the port expansion and utilization with Somaliland, the Somalia Federal Government in Mogadishu declared as such agreement is null

⁵⁰Supra at no.29, (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)

⁵¹ United Arab Emirate (UAE) is not Ethiopia's Maritime neighboring countries but the UAE Company called Dubai Port World (DP World), Somaliland and Ethiopia signed an agreement to develop Barbara ports in 2018. According to the Agreement, DP World will hold a 51% stake in the project, Somaliland 30%, and Ethiopia the remaining 19% source. <https://addisstandard.com/news-ethiopia-acquires-19-stake-dp-world-berbera-port/>

and void. When Ethiopia concluded similar agreement with Somalia's Federal government, Somaliland declared that such agreement is unacceptable over Somaliland. The disagreement between Somalia and Somaliland over the port expansion and utilization caused diplomatic difficulties and challenges for Ethiopia, in balancing the interest of the Somalia Federal Government in Mogadishu, and the Somaliland Government in Hargeisa (GCS , 2018).

On the other hand, in September 2018, a tripartite cooperation agreement was signed between PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki, and Somalia's President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo. The tripartite agreement has produced new concerns among neighboring countries about Ethiopia's plans for regional peace cooperation and integration (Mehari, 2019). Furthermore, in January 2020 Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, proposed to form a new regional block occasionally referred to as “The Horn of Africa Cooperation (HAC)”, to address security and the respective domestic political challenges they face (Henneberg & Stapel, 2020:1).

Consequently, as pointed above, Ethiopia's previous diplomatic strategy towards Somaliland has created diplomatic difficulties between Ethiopia and Somalia's Federal Government. It has also affected the new regional peace cooperation and regional block formed between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia lead by Ethiopian PM. Dr. Abiy Ahmed (Farah, 2020).

To avoid such diplomatic difficulties, the Ethiopian Government came with a new diplomatic strategy towards Somaliland called a non-formal diplomatic relationship, which had operated without appointing a diplomat to Somaliland in Hargeisa. But, Somaliland felt that the new Ethiopian diplomatic strategy has abandoned them and sided with its rival Somalia Federal Government, which has become another diplomatic challenge to Ethiopia again (Hersi, 2020).

On the other hand, since Somaliland unilaterally declared itself as a state and began to look for international recognition, Egypt has been known for its opposition to Somaliland's quest for international recognition to counterbalance Ethiopia's hegemonic regional ambitions in the Horn of Africa. For instance, in 2005 when the AU fact-finding mission, presents the case of Somaliland to be seen from a historical perspective as a remarkable African issue, Egypt blocked it to take preventive measures against Ethiopia regarding the Nile issues (Farah, 2020).

However, in 2020, following Ethiopia's announcement to fill the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam reservoir, Egypt came with a new diplomatic strategy towards Somaliland to challenge Ethiopia's plan to fill the GERD Reservoir since Egypt's position is that ‘the Dam will not be

filled without reaching on a binding agreement’(Mbaku, 2020). Then, in July 2020, a high-level Egyptian delegation arrived in Hargeisa for talks with Somaliland authorities and it was reported that Egypt and Somaliland had agreed to set up offices in Hargeisa and Cairo that will help Egypt closely watch Ethiopia's activities. This Egyptian presence in Somaliland indicated that Ethiopia’s Somalia Federal government-focused policy makes Somaliland unhappy, which created diplomatic difficulties for Ethiopia after 2018 (Farah, 2020). Furthermore, Egypt has been interested to lease a naval base in Zaila, ostensibly to safeguard the sea outline of communication to the Suez Canal, which is deterrence to Ethiopia's growing influence in the Horn of Africa. In this case, Ethiopia has long been interested to have a naval base in Zaila, which serves Ethiopia as an alternative export and import trade gateway next to Djibouti's ports, and that serves to prevent Egypt from having a physical presence on its doorstep (ibid).

Within this serious diplomatic rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt over Somaliland, Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, has realized that Ethiopia's gross strategic mistake in following the Somalia Federal Government focused policy by neglecting Somaliland's interests would endanger Ethiopian maritime diplomacy and its regional dominance (Farah, 2020). This forced Ethiopia to revise its diplomatic strategy towards Somaliland and Ethiopia sent a high-level delegation to Somaliland led by Ethiopian Finance Minister, Ahmed Shide on July 21, 2020. Ethiopia also agreed to resume its normal diplomatic relationship with Somaliland by appointing diplomats to Hargeisa to balance the interest of Somaliland and Somalia since Somaliland's location cannot be ignored and Ethiopia's interests lie more with Somaliland (Farah, 2020).

5.1.5 Ethiopia Maritime Diplomacy with Kenya for Economic Objectives

Kenya is another maritime neighboring country, which approximately shares the boundary of 535 miles with Ethiopia (International Boundary Study, 1975:2). Ethiopia began maritime diplomacy with Kenya when late Ethiopia PM, Meles Zenawi, visited Kenya and launched the Project of Lamu port in 2012 which is found in the south East of Kenya. In 2016, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to build an oil pipeline from the Lamu Port to Addis Ababa (Okanga, 2012).

From April 6-7, 2018, when the Ethiopian Prime Minister visited Kenya, both the leaders of Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to strengthen cooperation that inspires the prosperity of the peoples of the two countries. They also committed to the development of the highway of Northern Corridor including the road network between Isiolo, Moyale to Addis Ababa, and the railway

from Addis Ababa to Nairobi, and to finalize the Ethiopia-Kenya interconnection transmission line. They also agreed jointly to supervise and inspect the Lamu-Garissa-Isiolo-Moyale and Moyale-Hawassa-Addis Ababa road networks. From the Kenyan Government side, it will facilitate the formal acquisition of land in Lamu Port, while Ethiopia agreed to develop the land for logistical facilitation (Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

However, until now, Ethiopia and Kenya have not signed a binding port utilization agreement and Ethiopia has not begun to use Kenyan ports. Currently, Ethiopia is conducting a study to use Kenyan ports that can serve the southern parts of Ethiopia. At present Ethiopia and Kenya are working to solve the conflict that happens sometimes around the border of two countries and to work on the trans-boundary roads that link Ethiopia and Kenya (Anene, 2020, interview)⁵²

5.1.6 Ethiopia Maritime Diplomacy with Sudan for Economic objectives

Sudan is Ethiopia's maritime neighboring country Ethiopia that shares a boundary of 1,600 kilometers with Sudan. Ethiopian and Sudanese diplomatic relations has historically been founded on national foreign policy objectives for maintaining peace and security, economic development, and access to the water resources of the Nile River. Ethiopia has developed a strong connection with Sudan to promote its security and economic progress (Doop, 2013:123).

Coming to maritime diplomacy, Ethiopia began to conduct maritime diplomacy with Sudan following the outbreak of border war between Ethiopia and Eritrean from 1998-2000, to use Port Sudan and to reduce heavy port fees at Djibouti ports by diversifying its maritime outlets (Maasho, 2018a). Ethiopia and Sudan signed the first port utilization agreement on March 5, 2000, in Khartoum to promote and expand the economic cooperation between the two countries. According to the agreement, Sudan guarantees Ethiopia the permanent right of access to the sea and unhindered freedom of transit through its territory in respect of goods or cargoes originating from or destined to Ethiopia; the right of exclusive of any extra-territorial right; and the right to use the installation and equipment of the Port Sudan with the right to have free zone facility within the port premises. The agreement also guarantees Ethiopia to invest in Port Sudan to promote Ethiopia's foreign trades (Protocol signed between Ethiopia and Sudan, 2000)⁵³

⁵²Supra at no.5 (Anene, 2020, interview).

⁵³Protocol Agreement on the Port Sudan Utilization between the Government of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Government of Republic of Sudan, Signed on March 5, 2000, in Khartoum Sudan.

On January 24, 2003, Ethiopia and Sudan amended this protocol and signed another amendment protocol, which adds new provision as the previous protocol shall not be granting sovereign or dispositive rights on the issues of dwelling time of cargo, monthly report, delivery of goods, and the joint determination and treatment of dangerous goods that passé through Port Sudan(ibid).

After Ethiopia PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, came to power in 2018, he also conducted maritime diplomacy for economic purposes with Sudan's former President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, intending to diversify port outlets and reduce port fees at Djibouti (Olewe, 2018). In May 2018, the leader of both countries agreed to develop Port Sudan together, which entails Ethiopia to be a shareholder of the port. But during the agreement, they did not disclose details of the agreement to the media (Maasho, 2018b). According to the agreement Ethiopia can invest in the development and administration of Port Sudan (Wanted in Africa, 2018). Currently, Ethiopia's import and export goods that pass through the Port of Sudan covers 2 percent while, Ethiopia has a plan to increase the share of Port Sudan to 10 percent (Tesfaye, 2020 interview)⁵⁴. Ethiopia uses Port Sudan when the importer/exporter requested Ethiopian Shipping and Logistic Service Enterprise to import or export the commodities through Port Sudan (Sisay,2020, interview)⁵⁵.

However, after Ethiopia and Sudan reached the above agreement, the border disagreement emerged between the two countries since December 2020, which may threaten and complicate the diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Sudan, especially if they are unable to solve the border controversy through dialogue. The border was delimited based on the treaties made between Ethiopia and the colonial power of Britain and Italy. But, this boundary lacks clear demarcation. Sudan's al-Fashqa region that covers about 600 kilometers is rich in fertile land conducive for agriculture in which Ethiopian farmer's plant crops there for decades (Mwakideu, 2021).

Therefore, the border disagreement between Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as, the military deployment to the conflict area from both sides will create military tension and affect their diplomatic ties if they are unable to solve the disagreement through negotiation.

5.2 Ethiopia Maritime Diplomacy for Military /Naval/ Objectives

In the 21 century, different countries are conducting maritime diplomacy to use the maritime domain of other countries, to establish their operational naval bases at the foreign maritime

⁵⁴Supra at no. 29, (Tesfaye,2020, interview)

⁵⁵Supra at no. 32, (Sisay, 2020, interview)

coasts, and to deploy their naval forces through the sea or oceans. For instance, currently, China, France, the U.S.A, Japan, Germany, and Italy have established naval military bases at Djibouti maritime cost after they made maritime diplomacy with the state of Djibouti (Melvin, 2019:1).

In the chapter three, it has been discussed that the Ethiopian navy, which was built in 1955 was disbanded in 1996 following Eritrean independence and the absence of a naval base at the near maritime costs. When Ethiopia PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed met with senior military officials in Addis Ababa on June 01, 2018, he announced Ethiopia's plan to re-build a navy, which should take into account the current fast-changing world, social, economic, and political situation in Ethiopia, and the surrounding. However, Ethiopian Prime Minister didn't explain at which particular cost or Ethiopian naval vessels would be based since Ethiopia is a landlocked country that does not share a maritime boundary with the international water like oceans or the seas (Maasho 2018c).

Although landlocked states cannot easily establish a sea-going blue-water navy over the coastline of the sea or oceans, they can still develop a navy, which would be deployed on major lakes and rivers when a river or lake forms a national border with other countries to protect and patrol their border with naval force. In some regions, roads are unreliable and a river or lake may be the easiest way to move military forces around the country. For instance, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, Paraguay, Rwanda, Serbia, Turkmenistan, and Uganda are landlocked countries that developed a navy over major lakes and rivers in their territories (The World Geography, 2009).

In the case of the current Ethiopia naval project, Ethiopian authorities did not explain what kind of navy they intended to build; whether it is a blue-water navy deployed on the international water on the seas and oceans or a navy deployed on the domestic water on the river and lakes. The Ethiopian Government also did not articulate the reason why landlocked Ethiopia needs to re-build a navy. In addition, building a navy is not as easy since it requires massive financial investment, to find naval bases, purchase ships, and train naval officers (Olewe, 2018). If Ethiopia intends to build a '*blue-water navy*'⁵⁶ that would be deployed on the international water like oceans and seas or domestic navy deployed on the lakes or river it is not clear on which port or lakes or river Ethiopia navy vessel will be based.

⁵⁶ Blue water navy: the U.S.A [Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency](#) has defined the **blue-water navy** as a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans. A blue-water navy allows a country to project power far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. Smaller blue-water navies can dispatch fewer vessels abroad for shorter periods

In this section, the study intends to examine the kind of navy Ethiopia is going to build, on which port or lakes Ethiopia navy will be based, the reason why landlocked Ethiopia needs to build a navy, and how Ethiopia would build a fully-flagged navy without having a maritime outlet, strong economic performance, and trained human power as discussed below.

5.2.1. The Revival of Ethiopian Navy through Modern Maritime Diplomacy Since 2018

Following the announcement of Ethiopian authorities that Ethiopia's plans to revive its navy, the new Ethiopian navy has re-established by the FDRE Defense Forces of Proclamation No.1100/2019. As per Article 4 of the Proclamation, the FDRE Defense Force shall consist of Ground Force, Air Force, Naval Force, a Special Operations Force, and Space and Cyber forces (FDRE House of Peoples Representative, 2019). Based on the Proclamation, the Ethiopian naval Force has already been established as one branch of FDRE Defense forces next to the ground and air force which has opened its head office in Addis Ababa (Kendu, 2021, interview)⁵⁷.

5.2.2. The objective and the Kind of Navy Ethiopia Intends to Build

Different landlocked states can be established a navy, which is deployed on the domestic water such as on the major lakes and rivers, as well as, a blue water navy, which is deployed on the open seas and oceans. According to the Commander of Ethiopian Navy General Admiral Kindu Gazu, Ethiopia is building both domestic navies, deployed on the domestic water such as on the natural and manmade lakes and blue water navy, which is deployed on the international water on the sea and oceans, for the following major objectives (Kendu, 2021, interview)⁵⁸.

- 1. To Protect the Safety and Security of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).** Since 2011, Ethiopia is building the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa on the Blue Nile River in the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State that will have the capacity to generate 6,000 MW of electricity. It costs about five billion dollars, which is located 40 kilometers from the lower stream of Sudan. When it has been completed, it will have the capacity to contain 74 billion cubic métiers reservoir water on the 1,874-kilometer square of land with normal height of 145 meters (International Hydropower Association,2020).

⁵⁷ General Admiral Kendu Gazu is the Commander of the Ethiopian navy, the interview was conducted on February 9, 2021, in Addis Ababa at his office

⁵⁸ ibid

Currently, Ethiopia is protecting the GERD by using ground, and air forces. However, when the Dam is filled with water it is difficult to protect it only by ground and air forces. This compelled Ethiopia to establish a domestic navy that can protect the safety and security of the Dam by using the navy deployed on the GERD reservoir water (lake).

Therefore, one of the reasons why Ethiopia decided to establish a domestic navy is to protect the safety and security of the GERD by patrolling a navy on the lake formed by the reservoir water of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Kindu, 2021, interview)⁵⁹.

2. To protect the security of Ethiopian international Maritime Trade and Cargo Ship.

Even though Ethiopia is a land-locked country that has no boundary with the seas or oceans, Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, initiated to revive Ethiopia's blue water-navy disbanded in the 1990s to protect the safety of Ethiopian maritime trade operated in the North-Eastern African maritime region (Anene, 2010 interview)⁶⁰. Because, geographically Ethiopia is found in North-Eastern Africa and its maritime trade passes through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and in the Indian Ocean were mostly characterized by regional maritime insecurity and illegal activities such as pirate attacks, terrorism, human and drug trafficking, weapon smuggling, a water-born explosive device, and illegal economic activities, which are treating the maritime safety and the security of the commercial ports, ships, and cargos that directly affect Ethiopian maritime trade (Anene, 2020, interview)⁶¹.

Furthermore, according to Demessie (2014), piracy groups operating along the Somali coast, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean have attacked ships and hostage crews, cargos, and vessels until the payments of a ransom. According to Demessie, the first reported attack occurred in the 1990s, and over the years, the number of attacks has increased (Demessie, 2014:14). For instance, in February 2010, CNN reported that two pirate skiffs attacked Ethiopian Vessel in an attempt to force the ships to stop (CNN World, 2010).

Therefore, one of the reasons why landlocked Ethiopia needs to re-build its navy is to protect and secure Ethiopian commercial ships from a pirate, terrorist attack, and any other forces in the North-Eastern African Maritime region (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁶². For instance, Roba

⁵⁹ ibid (Kindu, 2021, interview)

⁶⁰ Supra at no.5, (Anene, 2020, interview)

⁶¹ ibid

⁶² Supra at no. 57, (Kindu, 2021, interview)

Megerssa Head of Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise Authority stated that the Ethiopian navy to be re-built would protect Ethiopia commercial ships in a very volatile Red Sea area where Ethiopia has economic and political interests in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, China, Korea, Japan, Singapore, South Africa and Indonesia (Olewe, 2018).

3. **To Challenge the Effect of Foreign Militarization in the Region through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Joint Stand Force:** the Horn of Africa maritime domain has been challenged by a regional diplomatic competitor and the presence of the external military bases including China, the USA, EU, NATO, Turkey, Iran, France, UAE, Qatar, Japan, Israel, and Russia that have military bases in Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somaliland. Egypt is also interested to establish a military base in the Horn of Africa to influence the regional power of Ethiopia due to the water politics of the Blue Nile (Anene, 2020, interview)⁶³. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey are using the maritime cost of Horn Africa for military purposes and they are stepping up investments in seaports along the Red Sea, the strategic corridor that is vital for shipping lanes and oil routes (Maasho, 2018c).

According to Menlvin (2019), such militarization of external powers in the Horn of Africa, which includes the proliferation of foreign military bases and building up of naval forces poses major questions for the future security and stability of the Horn African region.

All these foreign powers established military bases in the Horn of Africa in the name of combating piracy, terrorism, and coast guard. But, in reality, they based their military to control the geopolitical strategic position of the region, to satisfy their economic, security, and political interests. However, their position is hostile and considered as rivalry states, which may lead to a hybrid war between countries of the region, which would directly or indirectly affect both Ethiopia Sea born trade and political interest in the region. In addition, private port facilities that are financed by foreign countries are also emerging in the area which makes economic difficulties on the landlocked countries like Ethiopia (ibid)⁶⁴. Furthermore, the major external powers who have established their naval bases in the Horn of Africa in the name of coast guarding are currently conducting surveillance of goods in

⁶³ Supra at no.5, (Anene,2021, interview)

⁶⁴ ibid

transit, which is against international maritime law and forms a security treats to countries where cargos are originating from and destined including Ethiopian maritime trade (ibid)⁶⁵.

Considering all these situations, the IGAD member states who identified such maritime insecurity and the presence of foreign military powers in the region propose the military alliance of member states, a joint operation of military engagement, establishing IGAD security standby force which used maintain the maritime security of North-Eastern African region which helps to avoid such problems. Furthermore, the IGAD member states also proposed to replace foreign military powers based in the Horn of Africa in the name of coastguard by establishing their joint military, power which would include naval, air, and infantry forces, and to establish security initiatives and information sharing centers (ibid)⁶⁶.

On the other hand, Ethiopia is known for its strong military in the region which is efficient in peace-keeping operation under the UN and AU mission by using its infantry and air forces. However, to participate in the future IGADS's Joint Stand Force Ethiopia's Military lacks naval forces. Therefore, Ethiopia aims at establishing strong military power in the Horn of Africa that will operate its mission on the ground, through the air, and on the sea by adding strong naval power in the region that will play an active part in the coast guarding and in protecting maritime security of North-Eastern African region where Ethiopian maritime trade is operating in cooperating with IGAD's member countries (Molla, 2020, interview)⁶⁷.

4. **To Participate in the Regional Military Integration with full Military Capacity:** Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed proposed regional economic and political integration between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. The political integration will include military integration. Since Ethiopia's defense force has no naval force, Ethiopia will only join such military integration by ground and air forces which will create an imbalance of power that may affect the political interest of Ethiopia. Thus, to join the regional military integration with a full military capacity, with the ground, air, and naval forces, Ethiopia decided to build a strong naval force in the North-Eastern African Maritime region (Kidu, 2021, interview)⁶⁸.

⁶⁵ ibid

⁶⁶ ibid

⁶⁷ Supra at no.11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

⁶⁸ Supra at no.57, (Kindu, 2020, interview)

5. **To Protect the Territorial Waterline of the North-East African Regions:** International maritime law mainly the UN Convention on the Law of the sea of 1982, Article 3-5 stipulates that every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines (United Nations,1998). The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breath of the territorial sea, while the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal states. The territorial sea extends to a limit of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. Within this zone, the coastal state exercises full sovereignty over the air space, the sea, and over the sea bed and subsoil (ibid).

However, since the North East African maritime countries such as Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya have become weaker and weaker through time, the Arabian states began to control the territorial maritime limit of Africa beyond their territorial water limit, which is against the Horn African maritime interest and the right attributed by international maritime law, which affects the Horn of African maritime economy and political interests. Therefore, by building strong naval power, Ethiopia is also intended to protect the maritime boundary of Horn Africa in cooperating with maritime adjacent countries (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁶⁹.

6. **To attract foreign investors:** Despite the loss of its maritime domain and its previous navy, Ethiopia is still considered an African heavy-weight power in East Africa. To reassure investors as the waters around the Horn of Africa are secure, especially considering the incidents of piracy, Ethiopia decided to re-establish a maritime force that will encourage Foreign investors through modern maritime diplomacy as discussed below (Malhotra, 2020).

On the other hand, since Ethiopia has no territorial boundary with the sea or ocean, as well as, strong economic performance, and trained human powers, the country is trying to rebuild its navy through modern maritime diplomacy, mainly to get financial and material assistance, to purchase the military equipment and to get operational naval bases as discussed below.

⁶⁹ ibid

5.2.3. Ethiopia's Maritime Diplomacy made to get Material and Financial Assistance

As long as constructing a navy from the beginning is an expensive undertaking Ethiopia was forced to conduct maritime diplomacy with different countries. For instance, Ethiopia and France concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 12, 2019, when French President Emmanuel Macron visited Ethiopia. The agreement has provides a framework for the new Ethiopian navy and notably opened the way for France to establish Ethiopian naval components. President Macron also stated that his country was helping Ethiopia to re-establish its naval footprints (Malhotra, 2020). The agreement includes air force cooperation, joint operations, opportunities for training, and the purchases of military equipment (Bryant, 2019) and other defense corporations seeking to capitalize and liberalize the Ethiopian economy (Malhotra, 2020). Currently, Ethiopians sent thousands of naval officers to different countries for training. Among them, France has begun to train the majority of Ethiopian naval officers after the leaders of the two countries signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁷⁰.

On June 29, 2021, Ethiopian Federal Parliament approved Defense Cooperation Agreements signed with France and Italy, which includes the agreement made for the formation of Ethiopia's naval force, for air cooperation, joint operations, and opportunities for training and equipment purchases without disclosing its details since it is a military matter (Seleshi, 2021).

However, on August 13, 2021, French Press Agency (AFP) reported that France has suspended such Military Cooperation Agreement signed between Ethiopian PM, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, and France President Emmanuel Macron in which France would lend 85 million Euros (\$100 million) to support Ethiopia's ambition to build a navy. According to AFP, France has suspended the Agreement at the beginning of July 2, 2021, due to the ongoing internal conflict and the concern of the international community as the conflict intensifies in the northern part of Ethiopia Tigray Region, since November 2020 (French Press Agency, 2021). Yet, both France and the Ethiopian government did not comment on the news.

⁷⁰ Supra at no.57, (Kindu, 2021, interview)

5.2.4. Ethiopian Maritime Diplomacy made to get Operational Naval Base

Since Ethiopia is a landlocked country, Ethiopia would need international partners through modern maritime diplomacy to get naval bases for its naval project from the following countries.

Djibouti, Djibouti is a host for the military of numerous countries including France, the U.S. UK, and China (Malhotra, 2020). Currently, 99.1 percent of Ethiopia's import and exports passé through the ports of Djibouti, which shows Ethiopia and Djibouti maritime diplomacy for commercial purposes succeeded (Tesfaye, 2020, interview)⁷¹. Regarding Ethiopian maritime diplomacy conducted for military purposes, since 2000, Ethiopia is investing in Djibouti ports to boost its export and export trade passed through Djibouti ports. This helps Ethiopia to establish an operational naval base in Djibouti easily through rent or lease (Molla, 2020, interview)⁷². However, Ethiopia has not yet signed any treaty with Djibouti and with any other maritime neighboring countries that enables Ethiopia to get a naval base (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁷³.

Eritrea: Following the Peace Cooperation of 2018, Ethiopian and Eritrean diplomatic relations are highly developing and Eritrea emerged as one of the close alliances and collaborators of the current Ethiopian Government. Currently, Ethiopia is working to establish its second or first naval bases at the Eritrean maritime domain through rent or lease based on international law. Nevertheless, until now, Ethiopia has not signed a single treaty with Eritrea to establish its operational naval bases at Eritrean Coastline (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁷⁴.

Somalia: Somalia is another alternative maritime neighboring country for Ethiopia that can provide naval bases since it holds the ports of Kismayo and Picasso, which are well suited for large navies. However, the activity of Al-Shabaab and the lack of infrastructure development at Somalia port will challenge the activities of the navy in Somalia's coast (Malhotra, 2020).

5.3. The Succeed and Challenges of Ethiopian Maritime diplomacy

After the Ethiopian Government established, the Ethiopian navy by the FDRE Defense Forces Proclamation No.1100/2019, Ethiopia is currently succeeded in opening its naval office in Addis Ababa in training human power collaborating with those countries that acquires naval

⁷¹ Supra at no.29,(Tesfaye, 2020, interview)

⁷² Supra at no.11, (Molla, 2020, interview)

⁷³Supra at no.57, (Kindu, 2021 interview)

⁷⁴ ibid

technology, and experiences. For instance, France which signed Defense Cooperation Agreement with Ethiopia had accepted to train naval officers for Ethiopia even though it has suspended the implementation of the Agreement due to internal political challenges (Kindu, 2021 interview)⁷⁵.

On the other hand, the presence of the foreign military power in the Horn of Africa, the poor infrastructure development at the port of Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland, the internal political instability in Ethiopia, foreign political interference in the region are challenging the ongoing Ethiopian maritime diplomacy conducted for military purposes with adjacent countries like Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland (ibid)⁷⁶. Furthermore, the escalation of internal political crises, in Tigray, Oromia, Afar, and the Somali region and the recent boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan also challenges Ethiopian maritime diplomacy made for military purposes, since Ethiopia is considered as an anchor in the Horn of Africa, and any internal political crisis and unrest in Ethiopia have serious implications for regional stability (Mahari, 2019).

Moreover, despite the same progress being made in Ethiopia, Ethiopia did not sign any treaty until now that enables Ethiopia to establish operational naval bases for the current Ethiopian navy and currently Ethiopia is building human powers and technology which helps Ethiopia to establish and have a modern navy of 21 century. Additionally, the internal ongoing war between Ethiopian Federal Governments and Tigray Regional State Ruling Party (TPLF) challenges Ethiopian naval projects that have been built through maritime diplomatic and cooperation with foreign countries. In addition, the internal political unrest and the domestic political situation have also challenged the Ethiopian naval project since it will damage the political image of Ethiopia (Kidu, 2021, interview)⁷⁷. For instance, according to APF News (2021), one of the reasons why France had suspended the Defense Cooperation Agreement signed with Ethiopia was, because of the internal conflict between the Ethiopian Federal Government and the Tigray Regional State Ruling party (TPLF) and due to the concern of international community as the conflict has intensified. So that, beyond the obvious geographic shortcomings for the blue water navy of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Federal Government expected to stabilize its internal political crises to achieve the objectives of its maritime diplomacy and naval ambition (Malhotra, 2020).

⁷⁵ Supra at no.57, (Kindu, 2021, interview)

⁷⁶ ibid

⁷⁷ ibid

6. CONCLUSION

Ethiopia is a landlocked country that is expected to form cooperation and maritime diplomacy with the maritime neighboring countries to get the right to access the sea. Among the ports found in the neighboring countries, the Assab Port Eritrea is the nearest Port to Ethiopia. But, due to the Ethiopian and Eritrean border conflict of 1998-2000, which was followed by the period of 'no war no peace' from 2000-2018, Ethiopia could not use the Port for the past 20 years. In 2018, when Ethiopia and Eritrea entered into peace cooperation and Ethiopia introduced its plan to re-build its navy, the Ethiopian community believes that Ethiopia would get the right to access the sea through Eritrean ports that would serve Ethiopia both for economic and military objectives.

Then, the study mainly aimed to examine Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace Cooperation agreement signed in 2018 whether it enables Ethiopia to perform maritime diplomacy with Eritrea and satisfied Ethiopia's need to access to the sea through Eritrean transit that can serve Ethiopia both for economic and military activities, and the reason why landlocked Ethiopia need to re-build a navy after it forms peace cooperation with Eritrea and where new Ethiopian navy will be based.

Then, the main findings of the study include Ethiopia, and the Eritrean peace agreement signed in 2018, which succeeded in ending the period of no war no peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea and, achieving regional peace between Eritrea and Djibouti, and Eritrea and Somalia. Eritrea closed the free crossing to Ethiopia to monitor the illegal trade activities in the border region and to control the possible crime committed against property and its peoples. Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace Cooperation of 2018, succeeded in gaining international recognition, in lifting the UN Security Council sanction on Eritrea, and in returning Eritrea to the membership of IGAD. However, the agreement signed to implement border decision did not officially implement since it was challenged by the political disagreement between Ethiopian Federal Government and Tigray regional state ruling party (TPL). Moreover, the involvement of Eritrean troops to fight TPLF in the Tigray region intensified the hostility between Eritrea and the Tigray regional Government, which would challenge the current and future Ethiopia and Eritrean relations.

As to Ethiopian maritime diplomacy for economic objectives, the study found that following Ethiopia's and Eritrea's restoration of their diplomatic relations in 2018, Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean ports for the import and export of commercial goods. Because Ethiopia and Eritrea did not sign port utilization protocols and other related agreements that would enable Ethiopia to

use Eritrean ports legally, and Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa lack infrastructure, and currently 99.1 percent of Ethiopia's import-export goods pass through Djibouti ports while the remaining 0.7 percent passes through Somaliland and Port Sudan (Tesfaye,2020, interview)⁷⁸.

The study has also found that Ethiopia has already re-established its navy by the FDRE Proclamation No.1100/2019 intending to protect the safety and security of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, to protect Ethiopian commercial ships, to challenge the effect of foreign militarization in the Horn African region, to participate in the Regional Military Integration with full military capacity, to protect the territorial waterline of the North-East African Regions, and to attract foreign investors. However, Ethiopia did not sign a single treaty with maritime neighboring countries that would enable Ethiopia to get an operational naval base for its new navy, and currently, Ethiopia is developing its naval project by training naval officers inside and outside of Ethiopia. Nerveless, Ethiopian maritime diplomacy performed for military objectives has been challenged by domestic political instability. For example, Ethiopia signed a military cooperation agreement with France in March 2019 to get financial and material assistance for its navy. Although in July 2021, France has suspended the agreement due to the war between Ethiopian Federal Government and Tigray regional state ruling party the TPLF.

Therefore, even though Ethiopia and Eritrean bilateral peace cooperation were able to create peace between the two countries and make Eritrea be a close partner and strong ally of the Ethiopian Government, Ethiopia didn't sign a single protocol with Eritrea that enable Ethiopia to use Eritrean maritime domain both for economic and military purposes and the peace agreement made between the two countries could not satisfy Ethiopian desire to get sea access through Eritrean ports of Assab or Massawa that would serve Ethiopia both for economic (import-export) and military objective (for the Ethiopian naval project). Moreover, even though Ethiopia re-established its navy in 2019, Ethiopia did not sign a single treaty with maritime neighbouring countries to have a naval base and it is still unknown where the Ethiopian navy will be based.

This implies that Ethiopian Governments need to avoid all the challenges that obstacle Ethiopia's Peace cooperation and maritime diplomacy, and to make every possible effort to achieve Ethiopia's objective to get sea access through the maritime neighbouring countries mainly through Eritrea that would serve Ethiopia for commercial and military purposes.

⁷⁸ Supra at no.29, (Tsfaye, 2020, interview)

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APPENDICIES

I. List of Key Informants

No	Name	Name of Institutions	Position	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
1	Anene Kajela	Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority	International Maritime law expert of the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority	December 14, 2020	Addis Ababa
2	General Admiral Kindu Gazu	The FDR of Ethiopian Navy office	The Commander of Ethiopian Navy	February 9, 2021	Addis Ababa
3	Molla Belete	Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Director of IGAD at Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	December 10, 2020	Addis Ababa
4	Tesfaye Chalchisa	Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority	Director of Plan, Budget Preparation, Monitoring, and Evaluator	December 14, 2020	Addis Ababa
5	Sisay Neda	Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprises	Public Relations and Documentation Officer	December 10, 2020	Addis Ababa

II) Interview Guideline/ Check List/

Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. What do you think about the public acceptance and legitimacy of the Ethiopia and Eritrea Peace deal agreement signed to implement the Boundary Decision?

2. Did the Ethiopian and Eritrea Peace Cooperation signed in 2018 satisfy Ethiopia's desire to get a maritime outlet through Eritrean ports?
3. Why Ethiopia was unable to use Eritrean ports after the peace Agreement of 2018?
4. What are the main success and challenges of Ethiopian and Eritrean peace cooperation?
5. Why did Eritrea close its border after both states signed a Peace Agreement?
6. Why does landlocked Ethiopia want to build a navy?
7. On which port Ethiopia is going to build a naval base?
8. What is the achievement and challenge of Ethiopian maritime diplomacy since 2018

Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority

1. After Ethiopia and Eritrea rapprochement in 2018, did the Eritrean Government allow Ethiopia to Use Eritrean transits for Economic or military purposes?
2. Why Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean ports to import and export its goods?
3. Why does Ethiopia need to build a navy?
4. What is the major problem seen around the Horn African maritime Domain?

Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics services Enterprises

1. What are the import and export shares that pass through Eritrea ports after Ethiopia and Eritrea form peace cooperation?
2. Why Ethiopia did not begin to use Eritrean ports after a Peace Deal Agreement?
3. What are the import-export share that passes in Djibouti, Somaliland, Sudan, and Kenya?
4. What are the major problems that prevent Ethiopia from using Eritrean Ports?

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian Navy

1. Why did land-locked Ethiopians decide to re-build their navy?
2. What kind of navy Ethiopia is going to build?
3. How can Ethiopian build a navy without having strong economic capacity, and maritime outlet or operational naval base, and trained human power?
4. Where is the operational navy base of New Ethiopian navy?
5. Which maritime neighboring countries permitted a naval base for the Ethiopian navy?
6. What are the main achievements challenges of the Ethiopian Naval Project and Ethiopian Maritime Diplomacy made for military purposes?