

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**The Impact of Sporadic Local Ethnic Conflict on  
Livelihoods:**

*A Case of the Booran Oromo and the Garri Somali in Moyale  
Woreda Booran Zone of Oromia Regional State*



**BY**

**Tilahun Mulugeta Bayable**

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MOYALE WOREDA, BOORANA ZONE OF OROMIA REGIONAL STATE***

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**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
COLLEGE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

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## Dedication

*To my parents, with love*



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## ACRONYMS

ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
ASALs	Arid and Semi Arid Lands
EAC	Elders' Advisory Council
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HFS	Household Food Security
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MRA	Ministry of Regional Affairs
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ONRS	Oromia National Regional State
UNHCR	United Nation Humanitarian Commission for Refugees
SNRS	Somali National Regional State
SALF	Somali Abo Liberation Front
WAO	Woreda Administrative Office
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

## Glossary

Unless otherwise indicated, these local /popularly used terms or phrases are either in Oromiffaa, Somali and Amharic dialects. Both are qualified on the basis of English equivalents.

### Oromiffaa Dialects

Abba	a senior elder of Booran
Aada Seera	culture, laws & value of Booran
Abba dedha	manager of grazing land
Abba Herega/ ella	manager of water points
Abba konfi	owner of hand dug ponds
Abba warra	household heads
Ardha	localities / villages
Adadi	shallow wells
Banardari	white cloth of Booran women
Boona	dry season
Balbala	door
Butta	military wing of the gadda / war making
Bossa & Gonfaa	social welfare of Booran
Danbalaa	water collected in depression
Deda	equivalent to peasant association
Dyia	blood payment/ compensation
Ella	water wells
Farsa	epic poems
Gadda	cultural institutions
Guttu	hair tuff
Gossa	clan
Ganna	main rainy seasons (March – May)

Gerarsa	boasting songs of a Booran
Gumi- guyoo	a large meeting/ assembling
Haggya	minor rainy season (Sep – Nov)
Hagyuu	wet seasons
Hayyu	gadda councils
Haroo	hand dug ponds
Jallaba	elder
Kaloo	grazing land reserved for calves
Laama mudamudi	death sentences
Lolaa	water provided by rains
Mana	house
Mana buyoo	house of grass huts
Mada	A cluster of kebeles
Madda	sources of water
Nagaya Boorana	peace of the Booran
Ollaa	village
Qallu	hereditary title
Raada jibicha	young bull
Rubaa	age set of Booran
Sheegat tiriso	client list relationship
Toora	name of SALF soldiers
Tulla	deep water wells (up to 30 m. depth)
Warra	household
Warre dasse	people of the mats / camel herders

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### **Somali Dialects**

Dyia	blood payment/ compensation for
Gutti	senior elder of Somali
Ugasi	a status next to sultan
Xeer	culture, laws and values of Somali society

**Amharic Dialects**

Balabat	hereditary noble
Banda	collaborator to a colonial regime
Rest-gult	hereditary land tenure system
Shumi	government appointee

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## **ABSTRACT**

*As its central aim, this study attempts to examine the impact of sporadic local ethnic conflict on livelihoods. This is a case study to show that how conflict between the Booran and the Garri affects their lives and livelihoods. It also tries to critically look different theoretical approaches to assess the genesis, root causes and aggravating factors of the conflict. The methodology used is collecting information from primary and secondary sources, organizing/reorganizing and analyzing this information.*

*The ever growing conflict has resulted in a large number of human casualties and the disruption of social institutions that normalize ethnic tensions and conflicts. Displacement by way of migration to other territories including to neighboring countries, and destruction of property (livestock, residences and wells and pasture), damage on the ecological system are commonly experienced capital impacts of conflict. Recommendations are made as to how conflicts resolved in the long run.*

# **1. Introduction**

## **1.1 Background of the study**

In spite of the fact that the world is in the era of globalization, it has been caught in the turmoil of ethnic strife over political identities and ethnic division. Most dependency scholars, including Amin (2001), asserted that the impact of economic slowdown is most acutely felt by developing countries. It is also in these countries that internal strifes have erupted or are threatening to explode. Hovland (2003) explained the above point stating, "the mere presence of strong state security is not adequate for building sustainable peace." Security without development is hallowed and is likely to lead to a situation of violent conflict.

One of the regions that is affected by economic slowdown, insecurity as well as ethnic conflict is the Horn of Africa. Abdelwahab (2005:10) stated that, "Almost every single country in the Horn has experienced some form of ethnic conflict." As a country located in the region Ethiopia has not been spared from such a scourge.

Knutson (1969) discussed patterns of inter-ethnic relations that existed in southern Ethiopia, which were conquered by Emperor Menilik II towards the end of the last century. The conquest of the southern region was followed by the settlement of the Amhara/ Tigrian soldiers, which has changed the ethnic composition of many small towns and some villages in the rural areas. Increased inter-group mobility, migration from the conqueror's ethnic groups, introduction of the victor's system of ethnic classification and valuation were incidents and circumstances that contributed to the present situation in southern Ethiopia.

Tesfaye (2007: 78), explained this fact further when he stated that “in Ethiopia the objectives of the successive regimes to centralize the state and strengthen the power of the ruling class were facilitated by the marginalization and /or exclusion of minorities.” Both the imperial regime and the military government opted for the process of modernization using force. This aspect was succinctly expressed by Young, 1998 cited in Tesfaye, 2007: 78), who said *“there was little scope in the process for integration of the various ethnic groups, beyond the selective incorporation of individuals who accepted assimilations to the Amhara culture and society.”*

On the other hand, Assefa (1996) attempted to refute the idea that Amhara hegemony had been the root cause of conflict in Ethiopia. However, this historical legacy has left its imprint in present day Ethiopia. Since the conquest, ethnic conflicts have remained rampant in Ethiopia whether in towns or remote areas, in the lush highlands to the harsh lowlands as well as in farming areas and pastoral lands.

With the collapse of the military regime in 1991, Ethiopia has entered a new political process. Federalism was introduced, when the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power and launched the idea of ‘self determination for the nationalities’ up to and including succession. By and large, the government devolved political, administrative and economic powers to ethno- linguistically defined regional states. In line with the devolution of administrative political and economic powers, the 1994 Constitution has enabled the formation of nine regional states and two city administrations, which are directly accountable to the federal government.

In a country which is home of more than 80 ethno-linguistic and religious groups dispersed in a variety of geographical formations and

dotted with previous civil wars and local social conflicts, the process of transitions from the traditionally centralized and unitary form of government to ethnic federalism, poses major challenges.

Some writers (e.g. Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004; Zelalem, 2004 cited in Tesfaye 2007: 83) magnified this point when they said that "... this move (to federalism) have fuelled inter ethnic conflict in some parts of Ethiopia". For instance, Irwin (2001) stated that the regionalization in the 1990s has led to the intensification of conflict between the Borana Oromo and various clans of the Somalis in Liben and Arero woredas. Assefa (1996) on his part asserted that, "Ethnic conflict, proper, he adds, started in earnest only after the fall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991, and the institution of a new policy which recognized ( even imposed ) ethnicity as the legitimate referent of self rule in Ethiopia." Because of the current political process of establishing a new regional order based on 'ethnic' lines, the political rhetoric is rife with competing identity discourses (Kurimoto, et al. 1998)

On the other hand, the boundary conflicts between regional states emerged after the introduction of the new arrangement contributed to the realignment of local conflicts which existed before. Getachew (2001) confirmed this fact when he said: "the conflict between Afar and the Issa communities was left by pervious regimes to pursue its own dynamic course and sadly, the present government has not done better". Ayalew (2001) on his view asserted this fact that "efforts made by government officials of the Imperial and the military Ethiopian regimes to resolve the inter-ethnic (Karrayu and Arsi Oromo) conflicts through arbitration failed to bring about sustainable peace between the groups involved. Multi-ethnic societies are subjected to "the tragedy of the common" as each ethnic group seeks to benefit alone, from common resources.

In Ethiopia, though the basis of conflict is economic, i.e. competition to scarce natural resources (land, water) the conflict between agriculturalist and pastoralist communities as for instance in the east between Issa Somalis and Ittu Oromos, between Sidamos and Gujjis; in South Omo, between arid and low land pastoralists; and in the east central area between Kerreyu Oromo and Afar pastoralists and Amhara peasants has ethnic conflict overtones.

As a result many localities are getting recurrent and intensified conflict in many parts of the country. In Ethiopia even though, there are no systematically gathered and compiled information on the occurrence and magnitude of such conflict at the national level, the prevalence of reported cases of conflicts, in almost all the regions of the country attests to this fact.

The Ethiopian government is responding to the problem in the form of initiating regional conferences of conflict resolution and researches to be undertaken on the problem of conflict as well as conflict resolutions options. As part of these initiatives, the Ministry of Regional Affairs (MRA), has established Elders Advisory Council (EAC) and held a panel discussion forum for a number of times. On the occasion, several scholars presented their research findings on the problems of conflicts. Various NGOs and international organizations are also increasingly responding to the problem especially by initiating and financing research projects on the issue of conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms.

In spite of the above stated efforts, there is a lot to be done in the area with regards to the impact of conflict on livelihoods, on policy reform and researches on various causes of the problem of conflict. In addition, investigation needs to be made the degree to which ethnicity stands as the sole cause of conflict.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The core issue of this study is examining the impact of sporadic local ethnic conflict between Borena Oromo and Garri Somali on their livelihoods. The study was undertaken in a selected study site of Moyale Woreda in Borena Zone of the Oromia National Regional State (ONRS).

Traditionally, the area that is arid and semi-arid is endemic to sporadic local conflicts between rival pastoral groups over resources most particularly, grazing land and water but also, and border disputes. Similarly, experiences attest that, certain level of conflict is endemic to many pastoral areas. Studies have shown that tension, competition and conflict over natural resources are prevalent in the area (Kartli and Swift, 1999). According to Blench (1997), rapid population growth is one of the major driving forces behind the vicious circle of environmental scarcities and rural poverty in the area. It is more likely that, as many people compete over scarce resources, conflict becomes inevitable. Scarcity also leads to complex kinds of access rules and becomes a cause for competition among users. Rules of access to resources varies from making resources open to all users (irrespective of their locality) to exercising complete control over it by limited number of people, such as descent groups, family or individuals (Theband, 1995, Wenstock, 1980).

Multi-ethnic societies are subjected to “the tragedy of the common” as each ethnic group seeks to benefit alone from common resources. Hence, the competition and conflict over resources are expressed in different forms, mainly along ethnic lines. As competition for resources increases among people with different origins and ethnic identities the role ascribed to ethnicity becomes significant and conspicuous.

In the process of competition over resources, ethnicity and ethnic identity are crystallized. Thus, conflicts that arise from resource allocation manifest themselves in ethnic terms (Dahrendof, 1968). Under a condition of fierce competition for scarce natural resources, especially among ethnic groups who co-exist in the same niche and exploit similar resources there would be greater potential for violence and conflict (Cohne.R, 1978, 1984).

As Rahirm and Magia (1991) pointed out in addition to scarcity people's strong emotional and cultural ties to water points and lands could lead to conflict over land rights and resources, such as water and forage. By the same token, in Ethiopia and specifically in the study area, the basis of the conflict could be economic (competition over resources, such as arable land, water and pasture land).

The conflict between Booran Oromo and Garri Somali's has ethnic overtones and is expressed as animosity and hatred. The conflict between the two communities was left unresolved by Imperial regime and the Derg. As a result, the conflict between the two ethnic groups rolled over to the present government. Things have become worse when competition over scarce natural resources was exacerbated by the border demarcation that took place in 1992. It aggravated the already existing conflict between the two ethnic groups with both claiming to take over the whole territory of the woreda.

In order to give solution to the existing conflicts, a committee from Federal, Regional and Woreda levels was formed. Side by side, a referendum was planned for 2005 to decide on the fate of the woreda, i.e. who is going to administer the woreda. The result failed to be conclusive with the town of Moyale falling under a joint administration of the protagonists like what has happened in the case of "Bethlehem" between

Israel and Palestine. Until the final status of the town /woreda is determined by delineating the border between Booran and Garri, there will be a steady and sporadic conflict in the area. This conflict in combination with the prevalence of recurrent drought in the area results in the death of people, livestock and destruction of livelihoods in the study area.

The prevalence of recurrent local conflicts in the agro-pastoral areas of Ethiopia, and more specifically in Moyale woreda, calls for attention of researches to embark upon a study project for multi-factor analysis and diagnosis. The questions on the emergence and the trends of tribal passions and atrocities need to be addressed and historical roots of conflicts and causes should be analyzed. In addition, the impact of conflict on livelihood and debates on boundary demarcation measures in relation to their practicality to match with diversity of production system need to be tested on specific study area. It is against these backdrops that this piece of study likes to analyze the impact of the conflict between Booran and Garri on their livelihoods.

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

The main objective of the study is to analyze the impact of ethnic based sporadic local conflict on livelihoods. More specifically, the study has the following objectives:

1. To assess the occurrence, trend and intensity of the conflict with the geographical coverage in the study area,
2. To examine the impact of conflict on different livelihood assets,
3. To explore different coping strategies taken at times of conflict,

4. To assess the role of ethnic differences and natural resource scarcity on the prevalence of the conflict,
5. To analyze factors that aggravated the conflicts, and
6. To review resolution mechanisms taken to mitigate conflicts in the study area.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

1. What are the major causes, geographical coverage, intensity and actors of conflict in the study area?
2. What aspects of livelihoods are most affected by conflict in the study areas?
3. What is the nexus between conflict and livelihood?
4. What are the different coping strategies of households during conflict situations?
5. What are the major factors that aggravated the conflict?
6. What measures have been taken by external actors to mitigate conflicts?
7. Why have the conflict resolution efforts failed?

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Sustainable livelihood in rural agro pastoral areas requires the prevalence of peaceful co-habitation among different local, ethnic/clan groups. The destruction of livelihoods as a result of conflicts hampers development and intensifies poverty.

Given this state of affair, a study on the impact of local ethnic conflict on livelihood is one important area of development research. As sustainable development is unthinkable without sustainable peace and stability, the study can have the following significances:

- Identifying the determining factors that affect conflict – livelihood linkage can help to work on resolution mechanisms.
- Understanding conflict and then designing resolving options, is a prerequisite to development. Therefore, the study can assist in the current and/or future development programs/ projects in the area to integrate relevant objectives of problem solving.
- The study can also invoke future research issues, gaps and implications in relation to conflict–livelihood linkage.
- The generated data and output of the study can assist government agencies and stakeholders like, Ministry of Federal Affairs, Local governments in Oromia and Somalia Regional States, Researchers, Research Institutions, NGOs, and other concerned bodies who work on the area of ethnic conflict and resolution mechanisms.

### **1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study**

The limitation of the study is its confinement to a single woreda and its focus only on a single element of livelihoods i.e. conflict. Besides, the ethnic biases have clouded the reliability of the information. Besides, there is a financial and time resource constraint.

### **1.7 Organization of the Research**

The discussion presented in this research is organized into six chapters. Following the introduction section, Chapter two critically reviews the relevant literatures. This outlines the concept of conflict, the nexus

between conflict and household livelihoods, Pastoralist livelihood system and the impact of conflict on pastoralist livelihoods. Chapter three deals with the description of the study area and the study population. Chapter four presents methodological procedures of the study namely, sampling technique, method of data collection and analysis. Chapter five provides a synthesis of the results and discussion on the findings of study. Finally, concluding remarks are set out in Chapter six.

## **2. Review of Literature**

The following section presents an overview of the salient issues of ethnic conflict with its concept and definitions. Thereafter, tries to cover perspectives on the theoretical framework for analyzing conflict and highlight nexus between conflict and livelihood (i.e. Pastoral livelihood system). Finally draws its conceptual framework from the theoretical perspectives on the impact of livelihood.

### **2.1 Definition and Concept of Conflict**

Conflict is as old as mankind and general phenomena to be encountered at all levels of human relationships. It emerges as one way in which human society adjusts in the face of scarce resources. Conflicts complicated issue that gets interwoven with other social, economic, environmental and political activities within the society. If not managed well, conflict can have a negative impact on the environment and on the assets and capabilities people require for their survival. Not the existence of conflict needs to be classified as problematic or even threatening to peace but ways of settling conflict promotes violence. An idea similar to zero number games: one side's loss is the other side's gain.

In everyday life, conflict is frequently compared to dispute contrasts of interest, power and the use of violence. The peace researcher Ulrike C. WasMuth, defines conflict as a social 'condition" in which at least two parties (individuals, groups, states) are involved who (a) pursue different incompatible aims intention to the originating point or who pursue the same aim but one which can only be achieved by a single party and/ or

(b) who attempt to use different incompatible means in relation to the originating point in order to achieve specific aim.

Others argue that conflict can be a form of interaction between actors and a form of communications to stakeholders of its causes, consequences and remedies for positive results like new intuitions, new rules empowerment development intervention etc(Matheiu,1995; Bradury et al, 1995; Delaloy, 1993).

The intent of the study is ethnic conflict, and it takes various forms:

Ethnic conflict, according to Yamskov (1999), an ethnic conflict is a “dynamically changing socio- political situations caused by the rejection of existing status quo on the part of significant number of people representing one or several local ethnic groups” While the above definition is too general, Brown’s (1997), notion of an ethnic conflict is relatively specific and clear in that it incorporate a number of factors which do contribute to the rise of this situation. As Brawn views it, “an ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, social, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities. Yet, it is not clear whether this definition includes the conflict that takes place between dominant ethnic groups in power and resources i.e., the “out group” ethnic identities. On his part, Hizkiyas (2001) argued that, to a large extent, what has been called ethnic conflict is elite-driven conflict. When one talks of the Amhara and the Tigre in Ethiopia, or the Arabs and the Africans in the Sudan , for example , it is more accurate to talk about conflict between elite group who come from different ethnic backgrounds than about people -to- people violence among the masses arising from ethnic animosity, as the term “**ethnic conflict**” implies . According to, Burton (1990) ethnic conflict may be defined as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups over resources, identity, border or

against oppression. It is considered by Mesfin (1999), as the most barbaric and the cruelest of all conflicts.

As there is some controversy in the contemporary literature on how ethnicity and conflict should be defined this section briefly explains the key terms used in the proposal.

*Ethnic conflict in this paper captures  
Conflicts between local ethnic/clan groups.*

This definition is broad enough to include ascription (birth based) and culture or identity group. However, it does not include conflicts between religious groups which make the definition of the term narrower than that used in contemporary / literature on ethnic conflict. In Horowitz (2000) and Varshney (2002) work on ethnic conflict, for example, religious conflict are included under a broad category of ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, it is difficult to suppose that religion is always a component of ethnicity simply because religion may serve as one element of ethnicity for some ethnic groups but definitely not for others. That is to say, member of an ethnic community may belong to different religions .In Ethiopia for example, while applicable for the Somali's religion is not a common building block for Oromo's. The member of the later ethnic identity is both Muslims and Christians.

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## **2.2 Theoretical Frame work for Analyzing Conflicts**

The rise in ethnicity and ethnic violence is an antithesis of the expectation of politics of '**liberal democracy**' that promised to deliver liberty and equality among the individual citizens and to limit to ethnicity to the brackets of private life and to make it irrelevant in political arenas (Freeman, 1998). Also, the social scientist notions that modernization

will turn tribes and ethnic communities obsolete or put them in to larger more centralized organizations such as nations has not worked. (Smith, 1986) rather, there is shift towards ethnic ideology within nations. This is because; ethnicity appears to offer individual security and material well being to groups with common identity where the state failed to provide the same (Horowitz, 2000). Nonetheless, the issue that drives ethnic conflicts cannot easily be explained, simply because there are numerous causes. The literature, however, points out struggle over dispute territory (like Borena Oromo and Garri Somali), competition over resources, economic development and modernization that may increase inequality as some of the causes to ethnic conflict. Besides, marginalization and poverty have also been mentioned.

The diversities of the causes are also reflected in different social science theories for analyzing ethnic conflict. On the other hand, scholars of social science perceive the content and nature of an ethnic group from different perspectives. To some, it is “objective or primordial”; while to others it is “subjective or situational” phenomena that are subjected to change through societal interaction.

Viewed from objective or primordial point of view an ethnic group is a category of human population that shares attributes such as common origin, history, culture, language, territory and the like (Smith, 1997, 1991).

A vital element of an ethnic group is that, its members are generally more closely related each other than to the members of other ethnic groups (Vanhanen, 1999). According to the primordial’s it is due to the assumed primordial ties that individual member of ethnic group support and even risk their life for the collective benefit of the group. The theory emphasizes that it is the strength of the ethnic bond that supersedes

other motives including economic gains as a basis for action in favor of ethnic interests. In this approach conflict is viewed in terms of ethnic differences between “us” and “them” (Smith, 1986). This approach has been criticized for its assumption of fixed identities and the failure to consider the emergence of new or transformed identities that might provoke conflict over time.

Generally, the primordial approach perceives an ethnic identity has something that is unchanging and with destitute boundary of itself, i.e. as a “constant, as an historical cultural heritage on the basis of which an ethnic group must act.”(Babine as cited in Ahmed 2000: 19).

To substantiate the above idea, the Ethiopian experience, even if individuals change their residence and establish contact with members of other ethnic group or class they would retain essential attributes of their ethnic identities. For example, members of the Amhara ethnic group who lived in Oromia for years do feel that they belong to their own ethnic community; regardless of their interaction, including inter -ethnic marriage.

Other theoretical construct for postulating ethnic conflicts are instrumentalism and the constructivism reported by Lake and Roth child (1998). The instrumentalist approach view ethnicity rather as tools by which individual elites or groups achieve material goals. Accordingly ethnic conflict can be stimulated when individuals pursue personal interests through the mobilization of ethnic groups. This view makes ethnicity to appear to lack grounds outside the political arena in which collective goals are pursued.

The constructive approach views ethnicity as a socially constructed through networks of continuous interactions. The constructivists regard

ethnicity not as an individual attribute but rather a social phenomenon and that change in ethnicity can be brought about by change in social interactions. Therefore individuals cannot manipulate their identities at will, but rather, it is dictated by social interactions. According to the constructivist approach therefore, the causes of ethnic conflict can be generalized to other conflicts that are based on socially constructed attributes including clanism, religion, regionalist, nationalist, groupings but not to the conflicts that are based on individual attributes such as material benefits.

Another postulation influential on ethnic conflict debate is the modernization theory, which attempts to explain why ethnic conflicts occur under different circumstances. According to Horowitz (2000) ethnicity can be looked from three perspectives. First ethnic conflict is remnants of traditional practices supposed to be over taken by modernity. The assumption here is that modernization will diminish the utility of allegiance to the ethnic groups. But the strength of ethnic affiliations and the status of those adhering to it have made this not to be practical. Secondly, ethnic conflict is viewed as traditional but a strong obstruction to modernization. This can be seen from pre independence movements that spear headed struggle against colonial rule which used their strong ethnic support based hence setting stage for ethno nationalism. In the post colonial states therefore, ethnicity emerged as superior based for political solidarity and community mobilization (Fukui and Markakis, 1994). Thirdly, ethnic conflict can be seen as parts of or even an outcome of the process of modernization. The distribution of the benefits of modernization, for example, in economic and education opportunities as well as political representation can act as motivating factor for ethnic competition. Horowitz (2000) further pointed out that in many of the so called 'modern' states in Asia and Africa inter-ethnic competition is rife in the post colonial politics, among the goals

being to control the state resources and excluding others from the 'center'. He further continues to argue that, even the modern day democratic politics does not assure ethnic peace. The emergency of multiparty democracies has been known to bring about split along ethnic lines, which sometimes degenerate into violent ethnic strife.

The environmental scarcity theory postulates that the rising demands for key resources and unequal distribution and access of such resources may result in violent ethnic conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991). This theory can be applied to ethnic conflicts in the pastoral region of Ethiopia. As Horowitz (2000) point out in addition to scarcity, the role of cultural pluralism and clash of economic interests as other explanation of ethnic conflict. He posits that cultural identity is among the things used by an ethnic group to distinguish itself from others and can be a source of conflict in multi ethnic settings.

### **2.3 Definition and Concepts of Livelihood**

Looking at livelihoods provide a richer and some detailed picture of how poor families cope with a verity of risks and shocks in meeting their basic needs. Households can have several possible sources of income and other sources that constitute their livelihoods. A range of on farm and off-farm activities which together provides a variety of procurement strategies for food and cash maintain livelihood system.

Young et al (2002) defines livelihoods as follows:-

*“Livelihoods comprise ways in which people access to and mobilize resources than enable them to pursue goals necessary for their survival and long term well-being, and there by reduces the vulnerability created by conflicts.”*

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This definition includes the wide range of livelihood strategies that people apply the resource up on which these strategies depends and the livelihood goals that people peruse ,including survival. Because the context is in situation of conflict, this definition focuses on vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict, rather than the concept of sustainability is emphasized in the sustainable livelihoods approaches common in the development settings

A household livelihood system total resource is based not only on its productive activities and endowments but also on its legal, political social position with in society (Sen.1981; Swift, 1989).

Livelihood system incorporates the present situation, the short term and long term perspective. The objective is not only to preserve current patterns of consumption but also to avoid destitution sacrificing future standard of living. The risk of livelihood failure determines the vulnerability of a household to income, food, health and nutritional insecurity. The concept of livelihood would enable us to broaden our understanding of household food security (HFS) and vulnerability as it also imply a complex web of risk diversification, social networks and coping strategies (Ellis,2000; Degafa, 2005).

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## **2.4 Pastoralists Livelihood System**

Pastoralism is production strategy in which people raise herd animals as a means to earn a livelihood, often in ASALs. Pastoralism relies on the availability of water, pasture and labour to thrive- with water as the determining factor. The inadequate rainfall limits crop- farming activities so that the people are left with pastoralism or nomadic pastoralism as

the most feasible and consistent viable livelihood (Eileen, 2005). Pastoralism is also a highly flexible system. According to Umar (1994) the pastoral resource use –pattern is characterized by risk spreading and flexible mechanism, such as mobility, communal land ownership, large and divers herd sizes, and herd separation and splitting. Pastoral production is mostly subsistence based and aimed at providing a regular supply of food in the form of milk, meat, blood and income earnings for household members.

Pastoralists are characterized by almost exclusive use of family labor for the production process and direct dependency on livestock rearing for subsistence requirements. High dependence for pasture that is found in nature for their animals and less dependence on modern production system (ranching) also distinguish it. However, they have considerable capacity for change and improvement (Rothenberg and Jahnke, 1988 cited in Bezabih, 1992). Such gross classification however is crude to be useful as it treats apparent differences in the livelihood system as closed and homogeneous. Various studies have revealed that the pastoralists' livelihood system is very complex and extremely diverse (Ayalew, 2001). They are exposed to different constraints, hazards and opportunities (Marakis, 2004) Household food security (HFS) and vulnerability as livelihoods also imply a complex web of risk diversification, social networks and coping strategies (Ellis, 2000; Degafa 2005).

Traditional pastoral strategies for coping with described critical trends and shocks while striving to maintain their livelihoods include trying to reduce their resource use, migrating, seizing other resource innovating or trading with others. As coping strategies often involve neighboring communities, these interactions might threaten to explode in to violent conflict.

## 2.5 Impact of Conflicts on Livelihoods

Conflict emerges as one way in which human society adjusts in the face of scarce resources. Conflicts are complicated issues that got interwoven with other, social, economic, environmental and political activities within a society. If not managed well, conflict can have a negative impact on the environment and on the assets and capabilities people required for their survival.

Conflict impacts on human well being, reducing quality of life, the capabilities of people to lose the kind of lives they value and the real choice they have. It results in loss of lives livelihoods and opportunities as well as human dignity and fundamental human rights (Cain, 2004). The general climate of conflict and insecurity deterred investment and generally disputed socio- economic activity.

A study conducted in northern Kenya, southern Sudan, Somalia and Sierra Leone shows that in all the case studies, there has been a decline in the livelihoods of the majority of households, especially in the rural areas; conflict has had a massive impact on the rural assets base and on other factor of production in agriculture (CICS, 2005). For instance in Ethiopia, conflict between Karrayu and Arsi Oromo resulted in the death of 120 people on both sides as well as large quantities of camels and cattle raided by each group (Ayalew, 2001:247)

As depicted in Figure 1, access to arable land has been lost by removals; livestock impatient and seeds have been lost, stole or sold off to survive.

Ethnic conflict has a multiple, long and short term impacts on development, on environmental and human well being. The affects even of internal conflicts are felt at various spatial levels, with in the

immediate area of conflict and often in neighboring area. Conflict undercuts or destroys environmental, physical human, social capital, diminishing available opportunities for sustainable livelihoods.

Livelihood failure can contribute to the emergence of conflicts by weakening the social fabrics of a society, making people resort to violence to obtain necessary resources and increasing individuals vulnerability to those with an interest in promoting conflict for economic or /and political gain( Cain, 2004).

At the same time, conflict is a major threat to livelihoods. Livelihoods are directly affected through decreased access to land water and inadequate access to natural resources. When these happen, people try to find other ways of obtaining those resources or compensate for the loss of one resource by intensifying their efforts to secure another (USAID, 2005).

The direct and indirect effects of conflict and insecurity are among the most important factors contributing to the vulnerability of postural groups in many areas of the world; hindering their development and destruct their livelihoods. Conflict situation are negative in both the short and long terms since violence generates displacement, suffering and death of the most vulnerable, while reversing development problem and undermine trust.

Experiences attest that certain level of conflict is endemic to many postural areas. Recent studies shows that, tensions, competition and conflict around natural resources are prevalent in this land (Kartli and Swiff, 1999) and it is likely that, People whose livelihoods are damaged by conflicts may be motivated to continue to fight or join the fighting in order to seek revenge or restitution for what they have lost. As the effect of conflict are increasingly felt at the community of individual levels, the

original cause of the conflict will frequently be supplanted by others linked to protection or restoration of livelihood(USAID,2005). Hence, motivations for continuing to fight become more personalized and closely tied to livelihoods protection.

During conflict civilians are not only at risk of being killed or injured but also having their livelihoods deliberately undermined. Livelihood destruction can be quick: a village may be burned to the ground in minutes, destroying food store property and productive equipments and hundred or thousands of livestock killed. In situation of chronic conflict and political instability livelihood damage may be protracted with repeated and sporadic shocks gradually breaking down resilience eventually causing destitution n and large-scale human suffering.

## 2.6 Conceptual Framework

Given the critical reliance of pastoral livelihoods up on natural resource access and conditions, and the relevance of transforming structure and process, a sustainable livelihoods perspective offers useful insight into the emergence of violence as a consequence of interactions with in and between the pastoral communities and other land users and economic interests. Livelihoods are “the capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities , assets both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base” (Careny,1999).

The key elements of a livelihoods framework include livelihood **assets** livelihood **strategies**, and livelihood **outcomes** (see figure 1). While these are mostly household or micro –level phenomena, all of these must be

analyzed in the broader environmental, social, political and economic context (certain aspects of which constitute the vulnerability/ conflict context) as well as the institutions, and structures that influence the manner in which individuals, households and communities utilize their assets and how they gain and maintain access to and control over them. Assets may be **natural**- such as land, water, forests, **or physical**- housing, infrastructure; they may be **human**- such as education, skills and capacities, health and ability to work; they may be **financial**- such as livestock, saving in money, or other stores of wealth; or assets may be **social**- kinship, trust, and community participation and **political-assets** such policies, laws, etc.

As depicted in figure 1, the conventional livelihoods framework (as used in stable situation / context) needs to be expanded to incorporate the concept of vulnerability / conflict.

A livelihoods approach is one that takes as its starting point the actual livelihood assets and strategies that people use to achieve the outcomes they seek. Figure 1 presents a version of the DFID livelihoods framework modified for conflict situation, in which vulnerability is placed more central.

**Figure 1. Conceptual Framework**

### 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA


This section presents the communities under the study and a brief description of the study area

#### 3.1 The Communities under Study

##### 3.1.1 The Booran

According to the Oromo elders the Booran original homeland was in *Mada- Walabu* in the southern Bale, from where they departed during the *Gada* Abayyi Babboo (1666-1674). The Booran confederation include the Barentu branch (*Metcha, Tuloma*) who headed west to the Gibe region, the Guji branch who went south to the Ganale river, and the Booran who settled west and south of the Guji between the Ganale and Segen rivers and in to northern Kenya. In Ethiopia, the majority of the Booran inhabit the pastoral areas in triangle between the towns of Telittle, Arero and Moyale ( Helland, 1980, cited in Ayalew, 1993: 24).

Booran society is divided into two exogamous moieties, *Sabo* and *Gona*, which are further divided into 17 clans (*gosa*) and sub-clans called *mana*(house)and *balbala* (door). *Sabo* has five clans and *Gona* has twelve. The two moieties are evenly balanced and evenly distributed over the Booran plateau, and the clans live in villages and have a territorial perception of identifications. Villages (*olla*) are grouped in localities known as *Ardha*, which are named after a natural feature. *Ardha* in turn grouped in clusters called *Deda* and-Deda are grouped in territorial defined *Madda*. Each level is governed by the elders (*Jallaba*) and represented by a senior elder titled *Aba*.



**Figure 2. The Clan of Booran**

**Source: Booran Elders**

It characterized by the failure of Booran institutions to come to grips with developments and triads in Booran society over the past few decades. Markakis (2000) add “all the fundamental decisions mediating and structuring relations between the Booran and the state.


Having settled farthest south from the high lands the Booran were least influenced by Christianity. Likewise, until recently they resisted the spread of Islam in the region. Most important they maintained almost unmodified their traditional mobile pastoralist system of production, though there is a trend of transformation from pastoral livelihood in to a gro- Pastoralism/farming, making little concession to the expansion of cultivation in the low lands. As the result, the traditional culture (aada Booran) and way of life of the Booran changed less than among other

### 3.1.2 The Garri

The Somali society is highly structured anchored in the system of clans and sub clans that bind and divide Somalis. “At the risk of oversimplification” Menkhaus writes, “ One can make the case that (the clan system) forms the basis for most of the core social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society, including personal identity, right of access to local resources, customary law (*xeer*), blood payment groups (*dyia*) and support system.

Hundreds of clans’ sub-clans, sub- sub clans and so on exist and allegiances are complex. Fundamentally, the strongest allegiance is to the lowest clan division (i.e. Allegiance to the sub clan is stronger than the clan). One sub clan generally resides in one kebele, meaning woredas are home to multiple sub clans sometimes of the same over all clan, some times of different clans. Clan life is governed by *xeer* best understood as Somali customary law, which is more or less similar to *aada seera* of Booran.

The Somali groups are in a minority in terms of the number resident in Booran zone (but they out numbered especially in Moyale woreda) they are significant and have a key influence on the natural resource management. The Garri are the most important group in relation to this research. They a Somali groups but they have many cultural links to the Booran( Schlee,1989, Getachew, 1996).



**Figure 3. The Clan of Garri**

**Source: Garri Ugassi**

The Garri occupy the land north-east of Moyale up to the Dawa River. Section of there clan live also in Somali (Foi, Af Maddo) and in Kenya in Northern province. They are multi-lingual in a usual way because they have no distinct language that is spoken by all section of the clan. Some of them speak Oromo dialect spoken by Booran; others speak the language of the Rahaweyn clan, and their neighbor to the south and other yet, speak Gerrih kofar, a language that is distinct but very close Rahanweyen.

The Garri as part of Somali, are traditionally nomadic Pastoralists, and have been so far for centuries. Life and survival revolve around livestock with people constantly moving about in the interest of their livestock.

*“Where I make a living there is my home”* says a Somali popular proverb.

around sizable area in search of water and grazing land, often moving with families, and clan members.


### **3.2 General Description of Moyale Woreda.**

#### **3.2.1 Geographical location.**

The major geographical area central to this study is Moyale woreda, which is found in the southern tip point of Ethiopia in Booran Zone (see Figure 4. for the location of the area referred to in this study).

Following the 1992 administrative restructuring of the country a long ethno-linguistic basis a large chunk of territory in eastern part of Borena that was predominantly inhabited by the Somali speaking people was transferred to Liben zone of the Somali Region. Here also, Somali and Oromo claimed ownership of the town after 1991, and set up rival administration to reinforce their claims. As a result, there are two Moyale woredas a Somali one that belongs to the Liben zone of Somali regional state, and an Oromo one that belongs to Booran zone of Oromia regional state. The first occupies the area east of Moyale- Addis Ababa road, as far as the Dawa river some 300 K.m. away. Mainly Garri and other Somali groups live there. The Woreda, which is selected as a study area is serving as a Woreda for both the Borena Zone of the Oromia Regional State and the Liben zone of the Somalia Regional state.

As figure 4. shows geographically, Moyale district (woreda) is found in Borana zone of Oromia Regional state, located in the southern tip of Ethiopia, 770km from Addis Ababa. It is adjacent to northern Kenya.



**Figure 4. Map of the study area**

### 3.2.2 Population

Despite the largeness of its physical size, Moyale woreda is thinly populated. According to the 1994 Census, it had a total population of 66,495, of which 55,952 (84.14%) live in rural areas. The average density in the woreda is estimated 10.5p/km<sup>2</sup>

Ethnically the people inhabiting the area are Borana Oromo and the Garri Somalis. Traditionally, the area is endemic to sporadic local conflict between rival pastoral groups over resources. During the 1990s, the frequency and occurrence of conflicts have increased. For instance, in

2000, three major pastoral groups, Booran versus Garri, Degodian versus Merahan, and Booran versus Degodia entered in to conflicts. These conflicts in combination with severe drought resulted in the death of hundreds of people and the dislocation of thousands (Dejene and Abdurhaman, 2002)

### **3.2.3 Climate, Rainfall and vegetation**

The mean maximum and minimum temperatures of the area varies from 25.26°C - 28.79°C and 14.19°C - 18.11°C, respectively (Luseno, et.al, 1998). The average amount of rainfall is less than 600mm (Coppock, 1994). The rain is bi- modal. The main rainy season is called ganna locally (March – May) and the minor one is called Haggya (September – November).

In addition to, being seasonal and small rainfall in the area is erratic. Consequently, particularly over the last thirty years or so, the rains have failed leading to severe drought. The latter usually took a heavy toll on the livestock population of the area, leading to widespread famine that impoverished a large number of people. Their livelihoods are consequently threatened.

A large part of Moyale Woreda is made up of undulating and flat plain, covered with light vegetation of predominantly yod yielding acacia species of low forage value. Based on the recent agricultural zonation of the country, the climate of Moyale Woreda falls under arid/ or semiarid zone. The ecological condition favors pastoralism than farming.

## **4. Research Methodology**

The study employs a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods. This section presents the sampling technique, method of data collections and methods of data analysis.

### **4.1 Sampling technique and procedure**

Exploratory study was carried out before conducting the sampling technique and the formal survey. The exploratory study was helpful to have a better understanding of the woreda in the context of the objective of the study.

During the exploratory study focus was made to identifying the vulnerable kebeles, with regards to conflict occurrence, causalities and intensity as well as the nexus between conflict and livelihoods, socio-economic conditions and access to infrastructure and services. This is done to address the highly conflict prone kebeles, and to also minimize the selection biases among the kebeles.

The study was conducted based on a two stage sampling technique, in order to draw sample households. In the first stage, out of a total of 13 kebeles, six kebeles (i.e. Moyale town 01, 02 , chamuq, maleb, Gooch and El-gof), 4 peasant associations and 2 town kebeles were selected on the basis of purposive sampling techniques based on conflict occurrence, frequency, and intensity in the kebele/ woreda and places where both Booran Oromo and Garri Somali live together and proximate each other.

At the second stage, from the six kebeles a total of 120 household heads (i.e. 60 for each ethnic group) were selected based on proportionate

random sampling techniques from the lists of household heads in the respective kebeles. The sample size is apparently smaller; the reason for this is related to the fluidity of the situation in the study area. There is population confusion, because of claims and counter claims there is duplication in the size of kebeles in the woreda. However, given the relative homogeneity of households in terms of their socio- economic characteristics, sample households were identified using random table (refer to Table 1).

**Table 1. Number of households and sample size**

<b>Woreda</b>	<b>Total kebeles</b>	<b>No. of kebeles in sample</b>	<b>Name of sample kebeles</b>	<b>Total households</b>	<b>Sampled households</b>
Moyale	13	6	01	5616	30(25.8)*
			02	5412	29(24.86)
			Chamuq	4454	24(20.46)
			Maleb	3952	22(18.15)
			Gooch	1629	10(7.48)
			El-gof	700	5(3.21)
			<b>Total</b>	<b>21,763</b>	<b>120</b>

**Source: Computed on the basis of WAO, 2008 and own survey.**

**N.B. \* Number in parenthesis indicate percent of sample population.**

#### **4.2 Methods of data collection**

Different methods are applied to fulfill the information requirements for the study. Accordingly the method applied to gather information on conceptual issues, history of settlement, the relationship between Booran and Garri, commonly shared natural resources, the role of traditional resource use management and conflict in the area are gathered almost entirely from focus group discussion and secondary sources. An unpublished study on the possible causes of conflict in the area by

members of the zonal administrative and security office has also been utilized to supplement information gathered from primary source.

The method applied to gather information on the major causes, nature and occurrence of conflict in the study area was to access the data available in the zone and the Moyale woreda administrative and police offices. In addition qualitative data on perception and opinions are collected on similar issues from sample survey respondents as well as the focus group discussants/ panelists.

Information regarding the situation of natural resource scarcities population pressure and livestock increase include accessing information from woreda and zonal records, utilization of secondary sources(CSA, etc) and interviewing woreda experts. Qualitative data on the situation of natural resources are also acquired from the sample survey as well as the focus group discussions.

The methods used regarding all aspects of perception on the impact of conflict on the livelihoods of the study communities are mainly gathered from focus group discussions and by accessing data available in the Booran Zone and woreda administrative and police offices. Similar issues have also been acquired from the sample survey. In addition focus group discussions and several documents of the woreda, zonal and regional peace committee such as action plans, progress reports and minutes of meetings of the committee are utilized for acquiring information on current attempts of conflict resolutions.

Non-participant observation in the form of observing the conditions of resource scarcity, the trend of transforming the form of livelihood from pastoralism to agro-pastoralism settlement patterns of the population, some assessment of the belief systems and behavior of interaction

between the two communities, the rival administrations and its system of administrations have also been employed.

#### **4.3 Data Source**

Data was collected both from primary and secondary sources. Multiple data gathering instruments were also used.

##### **4.3.1. Primary Data sources**

These included household surveys, focus group discussions, key informant Interviews and non-participant observation. In what follows, a brief discussion of the data gathering instruments will be made.

**(a) Focus Group Discussion (FGD):** - This technique was utilized as a primary source of data collection. Accordingly, a group of panelists were selected to form a focus group. This was conducted with community elders, ethnic / clan chiefs (i.e. Uogase /Qula/ of Somali and Abaa Gadaa of Booran Oromo), Kebele Officials, staff of the woreda and zonal government bodies, cooperative staff and other NGO employees working in the area. One FGD group consisted of eight to ten people. The general direction pursued in those discussion was the researcher conducted discussion with each ethnic group alone, then together (both Booran and Garri) and finally a mixed focus group, which includes government bodies and the two ethnic groups. The researcher posed questions for discussion and promotes active participation. The discussions were recorded in a 180 minutes cassette for later transcription.

**(B) Key informant Interview:** - This technique was applied to selected individuals like kebele chiefs, ethnic/clan chiefs, community leaders, local officials, development workers, NGO workers, town dwellers,

resourceful and knowledgeable members of the community. The interview consists of comprehensive questions (as compared to the group) and took place twice or three times for some individuals.

**(c) Household surveys:** - The sample survey was conducted to supplement the other basic field methods by generating quantitative data, principally attitudinal aspects of conflict, at household level. Accordingly, household survey was undertaken in purposively selected six kebeles. A total of 60 questionnaires were distributed to each ethnic group and translated into vernacular (Oromiffa and Somali) language to facilitate and ease communication among enumerators and sampled households. Prior to conducting the formal Survey (i.e. interview), pre-testing was carried out and accordingly revisions was made and finalized. Ten enumerators were recruited based on their proficiency in communicating and using local language, educational background and prior exposure to similar works. Training was given to enumerators on the content of the schedule and procedures to follow while conducting interview.

**(d) Non participant observations:** The researcher undertook methodical but non participant observation on the study area regarding issues of relations between the different ethnic groups, the situation of the resource under question, the production pattern and trend, relationship between local people and administration etc.

#### **4.3.2. Secondary Data Sources:**

The following data relevant to the research study were collected also from secondary sources.

- Studies made on conflict by various researchers and by administrative staff as well as socio-economic studies by zone.
- Documents and reports available in woreda and zonal administration offices and police department.
- Studies carried out on conflict by the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MFA) and other regional organizations (like African union (AU) and Intergovernmental authority on Development (IGAD)).

#### **4.4 Methods of Data Analysis**

The data obtained for this study was analyzed mainly by using qualitative approach. Thus, qualitative data obtained through discussion, interview and physical observation were analyzed and described through concepts and opinion interpretations after sorting out, grouping and organizing these information. Besides, a narrative Analysis was used after the data were organized under themes that correspond to the objective of the study. Data were arranged in terms of periods to provide an orderly way of understanding the genesis, causes and impacts of the conflicts.


Further, triangulation was applied for cross checking and verification of the information collected from different sources. As part of the triangulation exercise, data generated by various Interview types analyzed through checking, editing, verification, interpretation and generalization.

The data from household survey was analyzed using descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation and percentage with regards to issues related to, reasons for the dispute, management of commonly shared resources and conflict, the number of respondents who suffered

livelihood failure during conflicts, and perception towards whether the conflict in the area is linked to ethnicity, politics (elites) etc.

#### 4.5 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework of this study has five phases as shown below.



**Figure 5. Analytical Framework of the study**

**Notes:** - (-----) indicates paths investigated by the study

- \* Indicates social and human impacts – demographic change; change in traditions and value, cohesion, relationships; kinship, health effects (human casualties, and injuries), change in livelihood sourcing; water supply; Educational effects (school drop outs, distraction of schools) social participation, fear and insecurity, migration and displacement
- \*\* Indicates economic and environmental impacts – Financial (livestock raiding and looting) income, distraction of possessions, distraction of agricultural assets (burning of pasture, damaging water points, market dependence, production- consumption gap, farm input expenditure land holding
- \*\*\* Shows livelihood coping strategies during conflict situations

## **5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

In this chapter, the political, livelihood (socioeconomic) and environmental aspects of pastoralism, with a particular emphasis on the incidence of conflict and its impact on livelihood of the pastoral society under the study, are discussed. This is based on the results of the household survey and focus group discussion supported with relevant literature.

### **5.1 Genesis of the Conflict**

As far as the conflict between the Booran and the Garri is concerned, there are several factors that are hypothesized to know the causes of causing the conflict. Consequently, it is found worthy to revisit the genesis of the conflict so as to have clear understandings on the causes of the current conflicts. Nonetheless, the research did not investigate the chronology of events in depth that led to the conflicts or the types of weapons and strategies used by the opposing groups, but rather dwelled upon understanding the genesis of the conflict by explaining the power relations between the Booran and the Garri and how it has changed over the years. The focus was on local perspectives by comparing the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial co- existence of the two communities in Booran and (mainly in Moyale woreda) as a prelude to better understand the current conflicts in the woreda. This helps in understanding the dynamics of the conflict over time and in pinpointing possible causes. Household's sustainable livelihood depends on the various factors such as, natural resources and their management, which depends on the maintainance of law and order; the historical, cultural and political contexts with internal distribution of power and authority.

### 5.1.1. The Debate on entitlement of Booran land

Based on oral tradition, both Booran and Garri elders' debate on the entitlement issue of the Booran land. Besides, each of them claims that they were the first native settlers in the area. Even though the objective of the paper is not to investigate this debate, it is worth essential to examine the argument of each group so as to understand when and how the current conflict between the groups has started and the many causes behind the conflicts.


According to the focus group panelists, the original homeland of the Booran was *Mada-walabou* in Southern Bale. They departed from there during the *Gada* of Abayyi Baboo (1666- 1674). Then they settled west and south of the Guji between the Gahanale and Segen rivers and into Northern Kenya. The Booran elders claim that the earliest settlers in the highlands - lowland transition zones of southwestern escarpment in the Darrie plateau are the Booran communities. According to the information given by Booran Oromo elders, the initial Booran contact with Somali- the people they called *Warr dasse* (i.e. people of the mats)-they consider these people as camel herders who have tents made of mats, unlike the grass huts (*man buyyo*) of the Booran. Both groups were engaged in trade in a field in which both were active. Garri and *Ajuran* traders, who are originally Somali's, used to bring goods, mainly the white cloth (*banardri*) of the Booran women, beads and cowries from the coast. These goods were exchanged for livestock, rhino horn, myrrh, coffee and salt. The Booran sent trade caravans as far as Lugh, known as *Safar goolo* from the hide bags in which they carried the cloth, the *Warrdasse* traders established client list relationships (*Sheegat, tiriso*) with influential Booran families and clans from whom they received protection

and to whom they gave presents. Because the *Wardasse* used to come in small groups over a widely dispersed area, they were not seen as an immediate threat for the Booran at that time. As long as they did not assert the rights of possession, they were allowed to access the rangeland (pasture) and wells for their camel. The Booran Cattle ventured into the waterless range only during the wet season (*Hagyuu*) and left for well clusters during the dry season (*Boona*). The Somali camels could survive in the vacated dry season pastures for long periods, and the Booran disliked returning there because they believed the pasture was ruined for cattle grazing.

Thus, the Garri and Ajuran were able to establish an increasingly numerous presence on the plateau with no direct challenge on the Booran hegemony. As a result a mix up of socio-cultural traits started emerging on the interface between the first three groups namely the Garri, the Ajuran and the Gabra with a distinct Somali dimension to their identity and their Booran hosts. None of them identified themselves in wider terms as Somali or Oromo, which eventually has surfaced out and has led to the current conflict.

Some researchers, for instance (Markakis, 2006:18) wrote that, "*in modern Booran history, the most defining feature is that the struggle to contain the relentless expansion of Somalis into the Dirre plateau*". The historical confrontation has begun before the occupation of the plateau by Ethiopians and Europeans at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the westwards expansion of Somalis had reached Gahnale and Juba rivers and had begun to intrude into the Booran plateau (ibid). Therefore, according to the Booran Oromo elders, the Booran were the first settlers and were the ones who started to confront against the expansion of the Somali groups.





**Figure 6. Location of different ethnic groups in the study area**  
**Source: Kurimoto and Simon, 1998.**

On the other hand, according to the Garri- Somali elders, it is the Somali clan who were the first settlers in the Dirre plateau in what is now called Booran land. During the focus group discussion one elder narrated the history as follows:

*About 500 years ago, a sub-clan of Garri called Wardai inhabited the Dirre plateau. The Wardai community was the first settlers than the Booran who occupied the area later. Our clan (wardai) was the one who dug the nine water wells (now called tulla saugal). The Booran, who were led by their first Gada leader, Abbanya Bakoo Aaroo, came from Broma and settled in Dadileben, a place nearer to Negehle area. Through time, they (Booran) dispersed into Melkaguba, Hudet, Arero and eventually captured Merer, by attacking the Wardai leader, Malatta Aba Mella, and his families at Arso-oudada. The remaining Wardai groups fled into Kenya: leaving the Booran to become the strongest power of the area. (Interview on April 15, 2008, Moyale)*

They further argued that they have been pushed away from the area during the Derg regime and that they now have re-possessed the land.

Correspondingly, Schlee (1989) supports this statement In the oral tradition, the Proto Rundle Somali (PRS) have initially inhabited the Southern part of Ethiopia before the Booran. However, they were forced to flee from the Booran land, because of the continuous raids by the Booran *Raaba*. He further explains that, by the second half of the seventeenth century, the Booran, Gabbra and the Garri, Ajuran, were under a separate but overlapping territorial system. Later on the Booran have emerged as the dominant group after they have displaced their *Orma* and also their counterpart, the *Wardai*, who had been in control of the dominant power in Dirre plateau for over three centuries.

### **5.1.2 The decline of the Booran power**

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a number of factors led to the decline of the Booran power. The major factors were eruption of civil war among the Booran clans, the epizootic disaster of the 1890's and the invasion of Menelik's force from the north, the British from the south and the Somali expansion from the east. These are briefly highlighted

based on the result obtained from the focus group discussion supported with relevant literatures.

The decline in power began with the eruption of civil war that broke out among the Booran clans during the *Gada* of Diida Bitata (1876-1883), following the dispute between the Karayu and the Oditu clans over the appointment of Gada councilors (Hayyu). Before the end of the Booran inter-clan conflict, the epizootic disaster of the 1890's was set devastating the Booran stock. It was followed by drought, famine and disease which decimated the population. The Booran were devastated, many villages were abandoned, wells fell into disuse, and vast rangelands were left unoccupied. The Somali, whose camels and small stocks fared better, were less affected by the epidemic. With their number on the plateau increased, now they openly challenged the Booran. This was followed shortly by the invasion of the area by Menelik's forces from the north, the British from the south and the Somali expansion from the east. These combined misfortunes reduced the Booran power that had reigned in the area for many centuries. After the decline of Booran power, other former allies such as the Garri and the Ajuran broke away and formed new alliance with other Somali groups-the Degodia and the Marehan. Together, they started encroaching into the Booran land which has resulted in conflict with the Booran. The change in the power relations by the early 1920s had set in motion a shifting alliance along the resource borders. There were reports of worsening relationships between the Garri and the Booran with occasional feuds. Some instances will be discussed in the following section.

### 5.1.3 Outcomes of the Booran Power Decline

The decline in Booran power resulted in the expansion of the Somali groups and the control of the Booran resources. Eventually, it resulted in the establishment of WSLF and/ or SALF which led to a total collapse of all the rules of *Aada seera*.

The resource conflict pitted the Booran against their former Somali allies. With the power of *Gada* on the wane, the enforcement of Hagaya Boorana (peace of Booran) faded, leading to the Somali groups, the Garri, the Degodia and the Ajuran, grouping under the unifying factor of religious commonality. Motivated by the weakened Booran power, the Somali groups began to expand into the well-watered Booran inhabited area of Southern Ethiopia from the harsh lowland they inhabited in the east.

The Italians hired the Somali, irregulars- the *Banda*, which the Garri and Gabbra Migo joined; in order to get influence over the Boorana controlled resources. Bassi (1997) also described the way in which the historical competition between these groups was shaped by, and shaped by the nature of conflict between larger political powers; the Italians recruited Somalis (including Garri) to carry out their invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Through this collaboration, the Somali groups were able to benefit from the supply of arms they received from the Italian and use this superior weaponry to consolidate their access to, and control over, areas which had until then been Booran (Bassi, 1997, Getachew, 1996).

According to the then deputy governor of hudet and later the governor of Moyale woreda , by 1936, the Italians were in control of the frontier and this threw the Booran rights to the frontier wells and control of resources which had been already weakened into disarray by the Abyssinian

Administration, into disarray. The Garri under their leader, Hassan Gababa, grabbed the opportunity to use their influence in the Italian administration through the Banda to seize control of the Booran resources. Hassan claimed the right of entitlement of Booran resources citing that the Garri were the native inhabitants of the Dirre region before the Soddom booro displaced them. Hassan was also appointed as the Shumi (leader) of the Garre by the Italians. He used his power to encourage the encroachment of other Somali clans, such as Degodia and Merehan, which increased their population. This strategy was made to legitimate his claims of the Booran territory. The Booran contested after the Italian defeat by the British led force and the Booran took the matter again before his Imperial Majesty where the Garre lost the claim. Earlier, Hassan Gababa, had almost convinced Ras Desta Damtew, the governor of Booran province, to allocate him the wells in El-lye, Wachille and Uddalle but the entitlement of the wells was reverted to the Booran with the return to power to Ethiopia.

According to the chief of Booran zone, after the war of 1963, when Booran and Garri- alliance clashed, there were continued guerrilla activities by the Garri in the Booran province of Ethiopia. The general guerrilla activities in Southern Ethiopia became more intense in the 1970s with the formation of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The WSLF organized military training for the Somali clans in Ethiopia who took arms to liberate themselves from the Ethiopian bondage. The Garri and others joined these forces and became actively involved in the guerrilla activities. Later, in 1976, the Somali Abbo Liberation Front (SALF) was formed in the name of Muslim Oromo allied to WSLF and soon the Garri and other Somali groups became activists of SALF force in Booran province. The Booran opposed to the Somali irredentism and backed up the Ethiopian regime against the SALF guerrilla fighters, who were equipped with sophisticated weapons supplied by Somali

government. However, the Booran couldn't resist the attack due to lack of guns and were terribly devastated by this group.

According to the Booran elder's account:

*The SALF force captured the Abba Gada and shaved his Guutu (hair tuff-which is the symbol of being Booran) and forced him to be a Muslim. The act was highly humiliating for the Booran and was a sign of total transgression against all the rules of Aada seera, as the Abba Gada was the symbolic leader of Nagaya Booran. The guutu and Abba gada cannot be touched let alone shaved. The shaving therefore, symbolized the ultimate defeat of the entire Booran and the Gada, which symbolize Booran power and past history. (Interview with the Garri elders April 15, 2008)*

Mournfully, this history is still remembered by the Booran, as *Goof toora* -meaning during the time of *Toora*. Toora was the name of the SALF militia, being led by a Garri man called Hassan Guaro. The Garri and Gabbra miigo were said to be revenging the molestation by the Booran during the muuso raid.

#### **5.1.4 Revival of the Booran power**

The Ethiopian government, trained Booran militias called *Sarawiti* combined with the Ethiopian forces later defeated the Somali republic supported SALF guerillas in 1978. The Booran decision to support the Ethiopian government was due to existing inter-ethnic competition that threatened their water wells and grazing lands. Winning by the Somali supported group would have meant expansion of the Degodia and the Meehan Somali clans into the Liban, Garri into Dirre and Gabbra migo taking command and key Booran wells. The Booran also, stayed loyal and gained favor with the Dergue regime, and once again regained recently lost territory

and water sources in the east. Helland (2002), when asserts this fact, he said that, "The Booran secured state recognition and protection of their territory by adapting to the political demands of all Ethiopian regime until 1991"

The Somali force fled into Somalia with their Somali allies after they suffered loss of stock due to raids and drought. It was in 1988 after Sayid Barre signed peace accord with Ethiopia not to support insurgents against Ethiopia that the Garri returned to the Booran areas with the assistance of the UNHCR. Because the Garri and their allied were claimed that, as they come from Booran land, the returnees were settled in areas depending on their statement of identify and place of origin. This provided the Garri with their allies an opportunity to settle back in Booran areas.

#### **5.1.5 The Relationship between the Booran and the Garri (1991-2008)**

The collapse of the Derg regime in May 1991 created a power vacuum until the establishment of EPRDF in June 1991. This vacuum opened further competition between the Booran and Garri. In the mean time from the Booran side *aada Seera* was used to maintain law and order. Once the EPRDF government has been put in place, the government decided to undertake major changes by mainly structuring of regional administrative units based on ethnic lines. Because of the current political process of establishing a new regional order based on 'ethnic' lines, the political rhetoric is rife with competing identity discourses (Kurimoto et al, 1998)

Following this change in administrative units, nine areas were contested between the ONRS and SNRS. The Garri and other Somali groups gained new control over territory and wells (especially El-goof and El lye) as a

result of the redrawing of the boundaries of the administrative regions. The resources that had been shared between the Booran and the Garri are now used by one of these groups.

This event unleashed chains of measures that led to bloodshed. In 1991, the Booran displaced the Garri and their allies from the entire Booran land. Most of them migrated into refugee camps in Walda, in Moyale district while some to Banissa in Mandera district in Kenya. The conflict resulted in major changes in the relationship between the Garri and the Booran. The Garri's lost access to Booran resources. The conflict further led to rewriting of the whole history of earlier mutual dependence and cooperation in the people's minds, particularly the earlier relationship between the Booran and the camel herders was given negative interpretation. The Garri with their alliances returned from Kenya (Walda and Banissa refugee camp) to Booran land. In 1993, they claimed entitlement of the Booran land upon the resettlement of the returnees, with the agreement of the government of Ethiopia and Kenya and with the help of the UNHCR.

The Garri were awarded the El-gof and El-lye water well complexes where the majority of them have settled after their return. The Booran have lost these water well complexes. The Somali (mainly Garri) still claim Moyale town and other six rural kebeles in Moyale woreda. The sentiment has followed the increase in the number of the Garri- *Gabra miigo* around Moyale after the resettlement, which convinced the Garri and *Gabra miigo* that they will take over the control of Moyale and the surrounding areas from the Booran.


To summarize both the Booran and the Garri have been complaining about ownership right over the Booran land (mainly Moyale woreda) since their encounter. Similarly, since the 1920s their symbiotic

relationship eroded to a stage where one confronting the other and developed ethnic animosity. This issue is still rolling unresolved to the present day and perpetuates the current conflict and affected the livelihoods of both communities.

## 5.2 Livelihood and natural resource bases

### 5.2.1 Major Livelihoods in the Study Area

For this study, based on the mode of production system, the sample households were categorized into pastoral, farming and agro-pastoral. A household is considered as agro-pastoral if it practices both farming and pastoralism as equally important activities for its livelihood. Therefore, no in-depth delineation was done to see which activity contributed more towards the livelihoods of each household. The proportion of households practicing each form of livelihood varied between ethnic groups.



**Figure 7. Occupation of Sample Household heads (Bars show counts)**

Half of the Booran respondents (50.0%) reported they are agropastoralists, while 28.3% of the Booran respondents reported pastoralism as their important form of production system for their livelihood. In contrast the majority of the Garri (66.7%) reported pastoralism as a major form of livelihood. A limited proportion of the Booran 16.7% and 10.0% of Garri respondents reported practicing farming and/or transforming to farming in their formerly pastoral livelihoods (see figure 7).

### **5.2.2 Trend of Occupation/Production transformation and land use change**

The Booran were used to practice cattle pastoralism in the highlands and the Garri to rearing camels in the lowlands. To put differently, pastoralism has been the fundamental way of life for both Booran and the Garri. However, currently due to the increasing resource scarcity and increasing level of resource use conflict, as well as recurrent drought in the area, the adoption of farming as complementary livelihood is included in the portfolio of activities that supports the idea that the pastoral community are in transition.

With regard to conflict, the respondents pointed out the existence of sporadic conflict between the two production systems, farming and pastoralism. The proportion of the respondents from the two ethnic groups who asserted the occurrence of conflict between the production systems is given in Table 2. Both groups were unanimous confirmed that conflict occurred between pastoralism and Farming. In other words, there was no disagreement between the responses among the groups though the proportion has a slight difference.

**Table 2. Conflicts between the grazing and farming communities**

Do conflicts occur between pastoral and farming communities	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	40	66.7	48	80.0	88	73.3
No	20	33.3	12	20.0	32	26.7
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

The most visible manifestation of this transition is the shift from pastoral activities towards more agro-pastoral and sedentary farming activities. From the coping strategy point of view, this transition, at its core, is diversification against risk that came as the result of conflict, drought and other shocks/factors. A good evidence of this transformation is that there has been a trend of converting formerly grazing lands to cultivation land. Both grazing and cultivated land have been expanded to more of previously unutilized and marginalized lands. Accordingly, the majority of the total respondents (83.3 %) from both groups showed a desire to compete and expand towards formerly unutilized and marginalized land. Out of these, 86.7% and 80.0% were from the Garri and Booran respectively (see Table 3).

Another observation from the survey result response was that there is a difference between the two community respondents' in terms of the degree of attitude on the need to expand towards neighboring holdings. Accordingly, out of the total respondents of Garri, 38.3% responded that they "strongly disagree" and 40.0% "disagree" to the expansion towards the neighborhood holdings, whereas 26.7% and 21.7% of Booran respondents reported that they "strongly agree" and "agree" respectively to the expansion towards the neighboring communities (see Table 3).

Communal ownership of land is the most rational arrangement in pastoral society, given the nature of people's individual ownership over discreet plots of land would make little sense with individuals and sub-clans so frequently on influx. Taking this into consideration, that means the traditional livelihood form and the communal land ownership and management system, the transition towards agro-pastoralism and farming activities has set up inevitable conflict over land. There are numerous ways that these competing ideas can lead to conflict. For example, pastoralists could lead their herds to graze on land now owned/rented by agro-pastoralist farmers could claim the right to land temporally used by pastoralists. Finally, the transition towards agro-pastoral and farming activities intensifies competition for the most valuable land and hence is altering conflicts.

### **5.2.3 Natural resource bases and conflict**

The Natural resource base (water, forest, grazing and farmland) is fundamental to the survival and livelihood of majority of the people in the pastoralist area. As indicated in the preceding section, population growth, and increase in the number of livestock coupled with the recurrent conflict in the study area resulted in the decline of natural resources both in quality and quantity. According to the FGD results, regardless of their ethnic base both Booran and Garri have been utilizing the same niche for a long period of time but this is not the case these days. In the following section, the major natural resource bases of the livelihood with the current status of each resource are discussed.



**Figure 8. Water scarcity-Gooch**

**(a) Water**

Water is the most critical and crucial resource in the study area. Water in many ways is the most essential resource in pastoral livelihoods. Out of the total respondents, 94 of them witnessed that water is the most fundamental resource for their livelihood comprising 93.3% and 63.3% of the Booran and Garris respectively (see Table 4).

**Table 4. Critical Natural resource in the study area**

Critical Natural resource in the area	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Grazing land/forest	49	81.7	26	43.3	75	36.58
Water point	56	93.3	38	63.3	94	45.85
Farm land	25	41.7	11	18.3	36	17.56
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	205	100.0

**Note: Multiple response analysis**

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

The major water sources in the Booran land include water provided by flood (*Lolaa*), rain water collected in depression (*Danbalaa*), man made ponds (*Haro*), water wells (*Elaa*) and water catchments developed by NGOs and others. The most important sources of water (*Madda*) in the study area are the following:

(I) **Wells (*Eelaa*)** - are highly regulated wells. They are divided into two, *Adadi* (Shallow wells) and *Tulla* (deep walls). The *Tulla* are famous due to their depth which reach 30 meters. The water is drawn by a group of people (18 to 20) standing in a straight row one above the other and passes jerry cans (containers) of water. In Booran zone, there are nine *Tullas* (*Tulla Sagaalan*) in which supply of water throughout the year.



**Figure 9. Water wells (*Elaa*)**

(II) **Hand dug-shallow ponds (Haroo)** - a pond is usually owned by an individual obtained through direct descendents, who initially excavated it and the person is called *Abbaa Konfi*. The right to use the *Haroo* ponds is obtained through provision of labour for the maintenance of the pond. Although, it is the property of *Abba Konfi*, the pond is administered by local elders.



**Figure 10. Deep walls (*Tulla*) estimated to 30 meter depth**

#### **(b) Grazing and Forest land**

Livestock production plays a prominent role in the pastoral livelihood. The quality and quantity of grazing land on which livestock are dependent determines the wellbeing of the community. Thus, as it is indicated in Table 4, out of the total respondents, grazing/forest land ranked as the second most critical natural resource (36.58%) in the study area.

According to the discussion held with agricultural experts in the Moyale woreda, there are striking differences in vegetation between the northern and southern section of the Booran land due to the differences in altitude and climate. Further, the grazing land can be classified as wood land and savannah interspersed with vast grass land cover, which the largest part of the study area. As has been learned from field observation, pasture is mainly herbaceous (grass and legumes) and woody plants for browsing. Forests in the north and south limit grazing land by inedible bush growth and woody plants (mainly species of *Acacia*) in the rest of the woreda. Depending on the seasonal variation, grazing lands in the study area are divided into wet (*Robba*) and dry (*Bonna*) season pastures. In addition, every village has an enclosed grazing land (*Kaloo*) reserved for calves and other uses.

### **(c) Farmland**

As far as the study area is concerned, farmland are vast semi- arid terrains supporting agro-pastoral groups that practice mixed farming(livestock, rearing supplemented with crop cultivation) in which they are at various stages of transition from nomadic to sedentary livelihoods. In Moyale area, available land is not small by most measures, but usable land for cultivation is limited given the terrain, especially in time of drought. Though at present, a considerable number of Booran than the Garri are currently practicing agriculture, rainfall in the area is both low and erratic, undermining reliable crop cultivation and making the agro-pastoralists vulnerable to famine and drought. Despite an increasing trend of crop cultivation by pastoralist people, this fragile ecosystem is marginally suitable for regular cropping but is ideal for grazing.

Given the potential natural resources discussed above, there were disputes over the use and management of these resources. Likewise, more than half of the respondents (51.7%) of the Booran reported that, water points and grazing land were the type of resources that trigger conflict. For instance, 53.3% of the Garri affirmed that grazing land is the most important natural resource which incites conflict occurred. There were observable disparities, in that; two parties' emphasized different issues as the causes of conflict (see Table 5).

**Table 5. Type of resource which the conflict occurred**

Type of resource which cause conflict to occur	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Water points	10	16.7	12	20.0	22	18.3
Grazing land	5	8.3	32	53.3	37	30.8
Water Point, and grazing land	32	52.4	1	1.7	33	27.5
All	13	21.7	15	25.0	28	23.3
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**


#### 5.2.4 Status of the Natural Resources (past and present)

In comparison with other lowland areas of Ethiopia, the Booran land is considered as exceptionally good pastoralist habitat with adequate water and rangeland (pasture). This is because it was efficiently managed at subsistence level by a well-ordered society (Markakis 2006). However, due to a combination of adverse effects, this is no longer a case due to major events which has reduced the Booran controlled territory over the past decades.

According to the Booran elders, the Booran land comprised a compact unit that stretched from the Southern flanks of Ethiopian plateau- about 300 kilometers to the North of the Kenya border-to the Tana river 600kilometers to the South of the border into Northern Kenya, and from

the Ganale river to the east to the Segen river in the west that separates it from Konso land. It covered 125, 000 sq. k.m (Ibid).

Over a century ago, colonial borders divided Booran land between Ethiopia and Kenya. A century later, the Federal system arrangement in Ethiopia in the mid 1990s hived off a large chunk of territory in the south east between the Dawa and Ganele rivers, known as Liben and was given to the SNRS, which reduced the Booran territory to 95,000 sq. km. A few years later, from the northern and eastern parts of the territory some portion was again hived off to create the Gujji zone with a capital in Negheli, which has further reduced the Booran territory to only 69.373 sq. km.



**Figure 11. Claim of the Booran territory**

**Table 6. Survey response on perception on the prevalence and resource scarcity**

Is resource generally scarce in your area?	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	52	86.7	46	76.7	98	81.7
No	8	13.3	14	23.3	22	18.3
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0
<b>Which resource is generally scarce in the area?</b>						
Cultivated Land	0	.0	5	8.5	5	4.2
Grazing land	0	.0	7	11.9	7	5.9
Water	7	11.7	6	10.2	13	10.9
All	53	88.3	41	69.5	94	79.0
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0
<b>Do you face shortage of fodder and water points for the livestock?</b>						
Yes	56	93.3	51	85.0	107	89.2
No	4	6.7	9	15.0	13	10.8
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

The result from the household survey showed clearly that, there is natural resource scarcity in the study area (refer to Table 5). There was no disagreement about resource scarcity except slight differences between the two communities. The majority of respondents, 86.7% and 76.7% of the Booran and Garri respondents respectively agreed with the presence of general resource scarcity in the area. In addition to that, the great majority of the respondents, (93.3% of Booran and 85.0% of Garri) unanimously asserted that they faced shortage of water points and fodders for their livestock in the study are (see Table-6). Furthermore, Booran respondents emphasized about acute shortage of water points. This is probably because their water well complexes were taken by the Garri's.

The total number of livestock has been increasing from time to time. This can be attributed to efforts in epidemic disease prevention and the pull

of the regional livestock market. The result of this increase in livestock population has been a marked decline in both quantity and quality of feed resources mainly in grazing land and water sources. The majority of the Garri respondents (78.8%) revealed that the increase in the number of livestock resulted in decline in grazing land whereas only 13.8% of Booran respondents reported this as a reason (See Table 7).

Another observable phenomenon for the decline in the grazing land is protracted land degradation. The tremendous population growth coupled with increased number of livestock has put pressure on the current carrying capacity of the grazing land. The results from the household survey revealed that land degradation is given third position (18.5%) for the cause of the decline of grazing land in the area. The consequential relationship between drought and the escalation of conflict is depicted by the contrast of the situation of unprecedented increase of cattle rustling incidences.

**Table 7. Reasons for the declining of grazing lands**

Reason for declining grazing lands	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Land degradation	7	12.1%	10	19.2%	17	18.5
Competition with neighboring community	51	87.9%	2	3.8%	53	57.6
Increasing number of livestock	8	13.8%	41	78.8%	49	53.3
Population pressure	6	10.3%	2	3.8%	8	8.7
Total	51	55.4	41	44.6	92	100

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

To summarize, the increase in human and livestock population in Booran land area, which has been shrinking from time to time, means that natural resources are being exploited at higher rate now than before, which leads to severe land degradation. The general consensus is that the level and trend of resource exploitation can not be sustainable

unless some enormous measures are taken in the areas of natural resource management. Perhaps the most important aspects can be devising and implementing measures that can encompass the traditional resource management institutions supported by modern technologies and innovations in local context.

### **5.3 Traditional natural resource management practices**

According to the Booran elders, the Booran relation with Garri and other Somali groups was mainly based on the culture, laws and value systems of the Booran (*Aada Seera Booran*). Thus, according to these evolving traditions, firstly, traditionally there were no restrictions to movement within the Dirre plateau. Secondly, there were no clan or other boundaries; with both Booran and non Booran groups having right of access to natural resources throughout the Booran land. Thirdly, access to water wells was also free but regulated by an official elected by the people called *Abba Herega/Eella*.

Based on Booran oral history, the Booran were in control of the access to water and grazing land and neighboring communities were allowed to use from these resources. They also claim that it is the Booran who dug the wells.

On the contrary, according to the Garri elders it was the people known as Wardai, who belong to the Garri moiety, who dug the wells. These wells were functional even before the Booran came into the area. Bassi (1997) confirmed by stating that,

*This is based on the fact that, the nine most important deep wells (tulla sugali) in Booran were present before the Booran came to the area and are dug by the Wardai people.*

The Booran institutions which regulate access and use of resources are dominant in the area. Schlee(1989) refers to the powerful position of the Booran as hegemony over lordship. Hence, the Garri raised domination of access and control of natural resources as a cause of conflict in the area a subject that will be discussed in detail in section 5.5.

As discussed above, the commonly shared natural resources (particularly water point, grazing lands and forests) were managed by well organized local rule and regulation of the Booran model of natural resource management system. This system will be discussed for each resource types here under:

**(a) Management of Water Resource:-**Traditionally the Boorans' clearly define the right to water for each of the various sources (wells, ponds, rivers).The Booran model where the dominant water management system and the water manager (*Aabaa Herega*) are appointed by the whole villager elders, the *Aaba Herega* (some time *Aaba Ellaa*), is responsible for drawing the watering rota and ensuring proper mode of water use.

**(b) Management of grazing and forest land:-**Grazing lands are divided into Wet (*Robba*) and Dry (*Bonna*) season pastures. The grazing lands are managed by elected village elders called *Abba Deda*. *Abba Deda* follows the day-to-day grazing land (pasture) rota of the village. Every village has an enclosed land (*Kaloo*) reserved for calves and other uses.

In a multi-ethnic setting, resource use conflicts could occur without necessarily being connected to the resource scarcities. These can be due to competition of resource management systems and when one group has the feeling of being marginalized. By the same vein, one issue under

scrutiny in the study area is that, under this traditional natural resource management systems the identity of the traditional managers assigned has impact on the effectiveness of the system. The fact that from the past practice under *Adda Seera*, the managers (*Abba Herega and Abba Deda*) of water points/the well complexes and grazing lands have been the Booran. The system mentioned above is viewed more in retrospect of the Booran forms of dominance and consider others as secondary users.

One of the figureheads of the Garris' Ugasi Malado depict the situation ironically as follows: \_

*We the Garri have been lived in Booran land like orphans because we are unwanted here... we are regarded like foreigners (Interview on April 16/ 2008.Moyale)*

The above section highlights the general mode of the traditional resource management in the study area. It grasps the major issues on how resource is used and utilized by both groups as a base for further investigation of incidences of conflict and their impacts on livelihoods. Therefore, from the above discussions it can be concluded that access and control over natural resources and the mode of resources management has impact on incidence of conflict but the degree and level of these as a cause of conflict will further be investigated in section 5.5 in comparison with other possible causes as triangulated based on the results of the survey and focus group discussion.

#### **5.4 Pattern and trends of conflicts in the study Area**

Conflict as a variable is usually analyzed in terms of its prevalence as observed phenomenon and the degree, recurrence and intensity in a given area. It was difficult to measure conflict in terms of its prevalence and intensity given the absence of complete data on conflicts that arose

between the two groups. Therefore, in terms of recurrence, the prevalence of conflict in this study is measured in reaction to the composition and the total number of reports and cases over time supported with the results of the focus group discussion. Intensity of conflict on the other hand is measured by comparing the total number of casualties in the selected initial year (i.e. 1991) to the same type of data on latest years of complete annual reports.

As part of the effect of the distraction to assess the situation of conflict in the area the Moyle administration (both ONRS and SNRS), through their section for local militia organization and their clan system have been collecting and documenting data on the occurrence of conflict. However, thorough investigation depicts that the data reported and documented from both administrations is marred with ethnic prejudices. This is because these groups are conflicting parties. Nevertheless, even though the case needs further in-depth investigation, the data provides a general insight on the trend, occurrences and intensity of conflict over time.

#### **5.4.1 The Nature and degree of conflict occurrence**

Conflict between the Booran and the Garri has been taking place in all the case years (i.e. for 17 years since 1991). This clearly depicts the area as a conflict prone zone in which recurrent ethnic conflict occurs. Often conflicts are associated with violent attacks and cattle raiding. However, while it is true that these are the major manifestations of ethnic conflict, as far as the area is concerned, there are few more in evidence of conflict in addition to these. The situation regarding the forms of conflict as gathered in the area from focus group discussion and interview with different subjects are presented below:

**(a) Violent attacks:-**This is a kind of conflict involving human and animal casualties and burning of house and possessions. In most cases, it took place when organized groups who have established prior intentions launch attacks on another group. Triggering events or proximate causes of such attacks are established when a group of either of each ethnic group reports that to member of their community through their own way of clan and sub- clan base traditional communication that an unusual activity or grapevine of attacks of the counter one is witnessed.

**(b) Cattle rustling:-**Mostly individuals or segments of groups have been undertaking cattle raiding in the study area. On the Boorans' side, cattle rustlers carry out their operations with high secrecy. As explained in the previous portion, based on the customary law of *aada seera*, those who reach at certain age groups called *rubaa* are required to undertake cattle rustling, so that a segment of groups of few friends, family or clan members went to the nearby neighboring communities to undertake cattle raiding. On a similar fashion the Garri's take counter measures.

**(c) Damaging water points (ellas and horas):-** One of the major manifestations of the conflict in the case area is damage of water sources (wells and Ponds) that are used as essential ways of their life and livelihoods for the pastoralists communities. According to the Booran elders " whenever there are conflicts, the Garri's in the vicinity of the well reached on a collective decision and took the action of damaging the water well called *tulla* by filling the well with rocks and woods to force away and to constrain the Booran. However, this incidence has contributed to large- scale violence.

**(d) Burning pasture and agricultural assets:-** Such conflict measures are taken mostly at the end of the conflict and when one of the groups flew to or retreat behind. This practice has been taken as a strategy of driving a way and prevents those groups not to come back. Regarding the occurrence of conflict in the study area, Table 8 present summary data

(including the Liben Zone Administrative and Security department head of Somali regional State)

#### 5.4.2 Trends of Conflict

An intriguing debate was conducted during the focus group discussion, with respect to the season in which conflict increased. On the one hand, some focus group participants asserted that the potential for conflict is highest during drought (or “stress period”) when competition over scarce resources is at its peak. The reason is that the dry season constitutes the most critical time as pastoralists are required to move their livestock in search of greener pasture and water, frequently clashing over scarce resource with farmers. Therefore, conflicts with neighboring communities usually become acute during times of drought and when resources become very scarce.

On the other hand, others claimed that the potential for conflict is highest during the rainy season, when there are ample resources to compete with. ***“When the grass grows it is time to fight”*** according to one participant.

A third scenario is in between the above two that the risk of conflict is highest immediately after a drought period when people start reconstruction of their assets and pastoralists and agro-pastoralists restock their herds. Therefore, there is no easy conclusion that can be drawn from the above three points. But it is obvious that these three positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive or contradictory.

Contrary to the focus discussion result, the survey result showed that almost half of the total respondents both from Booran and Garri (58%and 56.7%) respectively agreed with the increase in conflict

occurrence and prevalence both in wet and dry seasons. On the other hand, 30.0% of the Booran and 33.3% of Garri respondents confirmed that conflict increased during wet season, whereas the remaining 11.7% and 13% of the Booran and Garri respondents respectively reported increase in occurrence and prevalence of conflict during dry reason( see Table 9).

**Table 9. Perceptions on seasons in which occurrence and prevalence of conflict increased**

Season in which occurrence and Prevalence of conflict Increased	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wet season	18	30.0	20	33.3	38	31.7
Dry season	7	11.7	6	10.0	13	10.8
Both	35	58.3	34	56.7	69	57.5
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

With regards to the level and trends of conflict between the two groups, an inquiry was made to discern the perception of the local community. According to the focus group discussion results concerning the level and trend of conflict between Booran and Garri, all participants agreed that there were many instances of conflict, in some cases serious and violent, which resulted in the death of thousands of people and animals. Most of the respondents, asserted that such conflicts occurred from time to time. However, few were willing to claim with any degree of certainty that there have been actually no increase. Recent cases on the eruption of large scale violent conflicts were mentioned by some respondents to justify the current concern that the conflict between Booran and the Garri has become “intense and Constant” by 45.5% Booran respondents and 35% Garri respondents while, 26.7% of Garri respondents and 36.4% of Booran respondents reported that the conflict has actually been

“Moderate and constant” in the last 15 -20years, while the remaining 30.0% of the Garri reported that they “can not determine”(see Table 10).

**Table 10. Level of conflict between the Booran and Garri**

How do you rate the conflict level between the Booran and Garri	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Moderate and Constant	20	36.4	16	26.7	36	31.3
Intense and Constant	25	45.5	21	35.0	46	40.0
Intense and Increasing	10	18.2	5	8.3	15	13.0
Can not Determine	0	.0	18	30.0	18	15.7
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

## 5.5. Major Causes of Conflict

As discussed in the preceding sections, with the eruption of violent conflict between the Booran and the Garri, there were several factors that were hypothesized to have a role as a causing factor of the conflict. In the following section these major factors are analyzed before embarking on making judgments on the factor that contributed more to the conflict. The role of ethnic differences in setting the stage for the conflict can not be ignored. Therefore, it is worthy to revisit the role played by ethnic differences.

### 5.5.1. Ethnic differences

Ethnic conflict can have different forms including inter-state conflict, intra- state conflict and at the lower level community conflicts. The theme of this research paper is concerned with the underlying causes of conflict and factors that has given rise to tensions between communities that had previously shared common natural resources and accepted the same customary rule and regulations.

Though insignificant in its nature and the number of causalities, intra-group conflict between the Booran and the Garri can be traced as far back as the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. As suggested by Tim Allen (1994) the conceptions of tribe in post-colonial periods have been changed by the former colonial policies, formal education and politicization of tribes. This can be argued to be true for the Booran and the Garri. The colonial government initiated the change by replacing the traditional leadership system by the colonial chieftain and later by Abyssinian **Balabat** system based on ethnic line. The Italian government appointed **Shumi** (Hassan Gababa) from the Garri and each section of the Garri, which as suggested earlier, initiated ethnic consciousness. The relationship between the Garri and alliance to the Booran center of power, the **Aada seera Booran**, become remote as the Garri looked to the colonial government for political order.

After the defeat of the Italian colonial administration Power by the allied forces of the British and the Ethiopian forces, the Abyssinian system divided the communities based on ethnic lines already created by the colonial policy. This was the turning point in Booran- Garri relationship. According to Garri elders the perception was that identifying with the Booran clan in addition to the Garri identity symbolizes being 'under' the Booran hegemony and lack of independence. One Garri elder said that, *"the Garri want to be an independent unit from the Booran and want to be recognized as a separate entity from the Booran as well as Aada Seera Booran; and to be recognized with their own resources"*. This process was reinforced by the then Saiyde Barre - the president of Somalia regime.

The emergence of separate identities between the two communities has multiple effects on their relationship in respect to issues such as resource sharing and dispute solving mechanisms. The question of identity and resource ownership has led to the dysfunction of *Aada*

*Seera* between the two communities .In this regard a respondent point out, “*Our dispute solving mechanism which used to be one is now separate, which made even solving simple dispute between us a difficult task.*” As the result there has been accumulation of unresolved cases between the two communities that have made them to drift further apart. While the line between the Booran and the Garri has weakened, that of the Garri with other Somali groups strengthened in the base and probably for the reason of religious solidarity.

**Table 11. Causes of conflict**

The prime cause of conflict in the area	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Resource Scarcity	24	40.0	17	28.3	41	34.2
Ethnic Difference	33	55.0	30	50.0	63	52.5
Cultural Difference	2	3.3	13	21.7	15	12.5
Political difference	1	1.7	0	.0	1	.8
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

The majority of the Booran respondents (55%) and Garri respondents (50%) ranked ethnic difference as the principal cause of conflict. The respondents suggested that the current conflict is not solely caused by resource scarcity. This is because the Garri and the Booran communities have been using resources together in former times. Even if there is shortage of resources they have always shared it amicably in the past. They further explained that the causative factor is not scarcity of resources or the failure of the traditional system for regulating resource use -rather the main driving force is ethnic difference that followed the recent and new border demarcation. The Booran strongly point out that, the Garri has taken a very good number of our kebeles namely El- Gof and El-lae, where water well complexes are found. Unless these kebeles

are returned back to us (the Booran) the existing conflict will continue for generation.

During the FGD, the most common response to the question regarding the most important factor causing conflict was that, conflict between the Booran and the Garri is increasing because of two factors, ethnic and cultural difference, exacerbated by the 1991 ethnic based border demarcation which strengthen the already existing demand of expansion to occupy new land (especially on the Garri side), and second competition for access to increasingly scarce resources, especially water points and grazing land.

#### **5.5.2. Resource scarcity and competition**

Resource scarcity and competition has been suggested to be the major cause of conflict next to ethnicity. Though resource scarcity and competition might be one of the contributing factors to ethnic conflicts the aspects of scarcities and competition might not be the main issue in the case of the Booran and Garri conflict. Studies by Schlee (1989) indicated that scarcity of crucial resources like water does not necessarily lead to conflict. Accordingly, this thoroughly researched work suggest that other factors such as the role of traditional resource management (*Aada Seera*) and identity of the managers has more importance as cause than scarcity and competition over resources.

As the livelihoods resources have been becoming scarcer over time competition among various groups has increased correspondingly. Interesting cases of resource conflict were documented between the Booran and the Garri.

According to the survey result, 40 % of the Booran respondents and 28% of the Garri respondents ranked resource scarcity as the first cause of conflict in the area. (See Table 11)

It is worth nothing here that although the water in the area is a scarce resource, scarcity and competition for the resource were not perceived as main factors causing the conflict. This confirms the earlier argument that the Booran and the Garri can amicably share scarce resources, as long as each adhered to the customary regulations.

Most of the reports in the media that appeared after the eruption of the recent conflict between the Booran and the Garri emphasized competition for access and control of scarce resources as the main factor behind the conflicts quoting Zonal Administrative authorities. A very good instance of this is the news report that appeared in *Addis Neger*, Saturday April, 18/2000 E.C. The following is a selected quote from the news paper report regarding the link between the conflict and resources, quoting Ato Abderkeder Abdinur, chief of Booran Zone Administration:

*Control of water point and pasture has been the main causes and hostilities among communities in the area. But other respondents put down the conflicts to disagreement by local leaders over political boundaries.*

The Booran and the Garri were through centuries sharing resources amicably under Aada seera. Respondents suggested that “the current conflict is not over resource scarcity because the Booran and the Garri communities have been using amicably in the past, thus there must be other elements/factors involved. The respondents pointed out issues such as, the new border demarcation, identity and resources

distributions etc are the reasons for tension over resources". In brief scarcity of resources by itself is not a factor to ignite conflict.

The current conflict has a great effect on the resource use between the Booran and the Garri, which was cordial earlier under *Aada Seera*. This is because; the conflict has limited livestock and peoples movements across the administrative borders where each other's ethnic group is the majority. The Garri denied the Booran access to water points at El-gof and El-lye. This denial by the Garri was caused partly by the new border redrawing, which owns the Garr's new land from Booran.

### **5.5.3. Cultural differences**

Culture is the material and psychological manifestation of a society's way of life in its struggle for survival and growth. Any society's culture is shaped by the practical material and psychological needs to survive in a certain environment. Cultural traits contributing to conflict are also developed after a material condition for conflict prevails and conflict becomes one way of survival in a particular environment. Hence, since conflict precedes the development of cultural traits associated with it, culture, cannot be considered as the inherent causes of relationship of conflict between or among groups. When ever competition and conflict happen to be perceived as the most essential and feasible from of relation cultural traits of conflict such as vengeance and social enmity will develop and be manifested. Hence, culture matter, but it is never the entire causes of conflict. As far as the two communities in the study area are concerned there are several manifestations of cultural traits associated with recurrent conflicts.

The survey result showed that 13% of the Garri respondents and 3.3% of the Booran respondents ranked cultural differences as the first cause of ethnic conflict in the area (See Table.11).

There is a culture of initiating, pressurizing and orienting members of the clan to be ready and active in attacking the other and defending one's own community or making up for the losses in the form of vendetta. In addition there is a mutually held tradition of rewarding those members who had been active managed to be active in violent attacks or raids against the other ethnic community.

Booran relations with outsiders have been marked by aggression and violence. War making (*Butta*) was an integral part of the *Gada* system undertaken at least once every eight years where a new age set (*Rubba*) comes to power. This custom required waging war against outsiders. Like all pastoralists's the Booran cultivated martial values that encourage war and warrior worship. Their epic poems (*Farsa*) celebrated famous warriors, and warrior-boasting songs (*Gerarsa*) extolled their prowess.

*I have descended to a narrow valley and I have pulled  
down the horsemen. The beautiful girl will adorn my comp.  
My friends will kiss my mouth. The children will say to me  
'you have killed well (Mohamed, 1994: 12)*

Though, the Booran claim the initial cause of conflict was the violation of *Aada seera*, to the contrary the Garri elders point out that, the initial causes of conflict were the cultural practices of the Booran:



*In the Booran customary law (Aada-Seera Boorana) when a male becomes in a position to have mirage/wife, custom required that he has to kill a male of any age from the neighboring community of Garri, Ajuran, Gabbra and even far from Arsi, and mutilate the male genital and then bring tied on his hand to show for a girl who is the would be wife of him. After this cultural practice his family and clan members welcome him with celebration. And then when Booran man kills ours, the victim's family (clan members) starts to revenge by killing any Booran man. Hence, the Booran cultural practices dragged us in to conflict*

Schlee (1989) point out this cultural practice and its consequences stating that:

*The Gada system of the Booran provided the rule that each new set initiated in to the Raaba grade had to go on a ritual war expedition to produce livestock and the cut-off genitals of male strangers as trophies. As these initiations took place every eight years, the neighbors of the Booran were subjected to a regime of periodic terror” (Schlee, 1989).*

Butta wars were also raiding expeditions that looted the livestock and other property of their neighbors. Although observation in the study area revealed that the significance and frequency of such cultural traits is declining in recent years, remnants of these traditions still exist in the area. For instance, according to the Booran Zone Police Department Report, in May 01/2008, in Konso special Woreda Jarrso peasant association, 50 Booran men armed with Kalashnikov and Bang killed two persons and took the genital of one person. Later the conflict escalated leading to the death of 35 Konso and 1 Booran. Hence this cultural practice occurs seldom. These cultural practices as mentioned earlier has contributed and aggravated the conflict between the Booran and the Garri.

#### 5.5.4. Dominance of the Booran model of resource management

As briefly mentioned earlier, access to and control over natural resources, particularly water points and grazing land, and the traditional system of resource regulation, specially the identity of the traditional resource managers were sources of conflict in the study area.

The opposing opinions of the two groups are presented as follows. On one side, the Booran say, ***“The Garri do not obey the Aada Seera which governs the use of resource in the area.*** On the other side the Garri say, ***“Water is water, the land as well as the pasture is given to us from God/Allah.’ So it is not necessary to practice rule and regulation. On the top of all, why we (Garri) did not mange a certain well (Ella) like the Boorans do. The wells do not belongs to the Booran, but to Wardai”***

As it is depicted in the previous section, the peace of the Booran was extended to the groups, which accept the customs and laws of Booran (*Aada seera Boorna*). One Booran elder says that, violating the *Aada Seera* means, for the Booran, creating conflict. Because of this unusual practice from Garri clashes between us began.” In this case, one can invoke different cultural approaches to resource use and management as another potential cause of conflict, since they lead to different practices that are not compatible when applied up on the current social context of Booran. The Booran clearly were the dominant force in what came to be in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, until colonial penetration (Kurimoto, 1998). As such they exercised a nominal control and regulation on the resources of the study area.

Now a days there is a re-evaluation in the minds of people as to who controls which resource and why; hence the question of legitimacy of the traditional system of management (*aada seera*) and ownership claims for resource previously owned in communally. The causative factor is not scarcity of resources or the feature of the traditional systems for regulating resource use. Rather, the main driving force is the ethnic identity of the resource regulating and owning community/group.

By the same vein there were disputes over access or the right to use resources (Water and grazing land/ pasture) in the study area. Though, the cause of dispute/ conflict varies according to each ethnic group. One Booran man, interviewed said that

*The Garri's always violet the Aada seera Conflicts occurred when they use water/pasture resources... with out the prior permit and consent of the manager of the water wells, abba Herega, and the manager of the grazing land, abba deda, according to the rota of the animals.*

**Table 12. Survey result on community perception about the way resource managed and utilized caused conflict**

Is the way resources are managed and utilized cause conflict	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	48	80.0	42	70.0	90	75.0
No	12	20.0	18	30.0	30	25.0
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Results of the sample survey regarding the perception of the communities as to which the way resource managed and utilized caused conflict between Booran and Garri, revealed that the majority of the Booran respondents (80%) agreed with that violation of *Aada seera* was the main cause of conflict, while 70% of the Garri agreed with the

occurrence of conflict but vary with the reason; according to the Garri, the reason were the traditional way of regulation and the identify of the resource mangers.(see table12). The remaining respondents disagree with that the way resource managed and utilized has caused conflict. According to the focus group, however, this kind of conflict were solved by village elders or gathering of elders from the aggrieved communities.

So far, the natural resource use and management system dominated by the Booran is explained as a cause for conflict. In the following section the use and management of water as cause for conflict is presented in detail. The existence of rules and regulations implies that people value water and would like to mange it sustainably. It could also be that the community has had conflicts over water before, leading to the evolution of rules to suite users; hence overt conflicts with out proper governance, people will use unorthodox means and access water for their livestock's. This is likely to cause conflicts and also bring to surface weaknesses like lack of governing and management system of water.

Once the rule do not guarantee people access, they flout them leading to haphazard use and, eventually, conflicts. For a marginalized group, especially among pastoral communities like the Garri, seeking to redress injustices or inequalities in water resource distribution, conflict becomes an inherent feature of their struggle for change. Conflict provides a justification needed for them to assert their claims.

The respondent reported that conflicts occurred in the management and utilization of water, but the proportion of those who asserted the occurrence of the conflict differed among the various ethnic groups. The main causes of conflict according to the Booran respondents (55%) revealed that, it is the disobeying of the *Aada Seera* system of water

modeled the management system and the managers were also Booran. Traditional resource management and utilization as well as identity of the managers have been the causes of conflict.

## **5.6. Major Aggravating Factors of Conflicts**

### **5.6.1. Redrawing of local administrative borders**

Administrative divisions are meant to bring services closer to the people, but the creation of administrative units in the land of multi-ethnic country like Ethiopia have political and social implications as well. Formation of new administrative units can lead to new ethnic identities and the politicians created new administrative units of lure votes.

The administrative borders by causing exclusion of certain groups from utilization of resource formerly shared can cause ethnic conflicts. It is a concern that even within the same ethnic group the formation of new resource border might bring problem in future, as people tend to exclude outsiders.

The same scenarios are in play in Moyale district. The ethno-linguistic federal arrangement established in Ethiopia in 1991 hived off a large chunk of territory in the southeast and was given to the Liben zone of SNRS. The respondents confirmed that in ethnic based reorganization of regions in our country the Somali group wanted the areas of Moyale and Liben to be placed under SNRS, and so far the Somalis/ the Garri's took a very good number of kebeles from Booran of which El-gof and El lye water complexes were found. As the result Booran, Garri and other Somali groups have been fighting over these resources. Most of this fighting has been concentrated in the area along the border of where ONRS and SNRS.

Almost all those who responded from the Booran's (94.9%) agreed that the newly established ethno-linguistic based border redrawing as a sole aggravating factor of conflict between Booran and Garri. To the contrary, only 17.6% of the Garri respondents revealed that the border demarcation was/is not as such an aggravating factor of conflict in the area (see table 14).

Ironically, the ongoing competition for territory and the scramble for administrative status have not, as one would have expected, clarified group identities and composition or established useful criteria for ethnic definition. In the conflict, the combatants believed the war was for control of pasture and water points /wells/ but for the leaders it was a struggle for representation in the emerging new federal Ethiopia.

The current conflict resulted from the new border demarcation, has greatly affected the resource use between the Booran and the Garri, which were cordial earlier. The conflict limited livestock and peoples' movements across the administrative borders where one ethnic group is the majority. The Garri denied the Booran access to water points at Al-Got and El- Lye. The denial is caused by the 1991, border demarcation, which placed a large chunk of territory to Liben zone of Somali regional state, from Booran land. According to the Booran this border demarcation induced conflict will continue until the status-quantum applied.

#### **5.6.2. Geopolitics and the role of opposition parties**

The Booran and the Garri communities' living in either side of the border between Ethiopia and Kenya consider each other as kin and kith. Therefore, once a conflict starts in one country, it spills into the other

easily. Besides the tribesmen seeking reinforcement from Kenya, there were claims from the Garri's that armed fighters of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) were involved in the conflict. The Kenyan Boorans' were accused for sympathizing with the OLF. There was a claim by the Garri local politicians and the elders at large to the effect that in 1991 the massacre of more than 2300 people was perpetrated by the OLF fighters. The claim might have been for political reasons, particularly for gaining support from the Ethiopian government. However, some members of the Garri community did not agree with the OLF's involvement on the on going conflict. The linking of Booran to OLF originated from the Ethiopian politics after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, which culminated into the Garri conflict with the Booran as explained earlier.

In line with the focus group discussion, as indicated in table14, most of the Garri respondents (94.1%) quoted the involvement of opposition parties like OLF, as major aggravating factors of conflict in the area. As mentioned above, the Booran were assumed to be allies of OLF, only 13.6% replied for the question whether the involvement of the opposition parties (OLF, ONLF) as aggravating factors.

**Table 14. Major Aggravating Factors of Conflicts**

Aggravating factors	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Boarder demarcation	56	94.9	9	17.6	65	59.1
Involvement of opposition party	8	13.6	48	94.1	56	50.9
Population pressure	15	25.4	43	84.3	58	52.7
Land degradation	11	18.6	11	21.6	22	20
Total	59	53.6	51	46.4	110	100

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Although, the reasons for violent local conflict are frequently believed as a form of decline of scarce natural resources of the area as well as lack of good governance, they nonetheless, offered important opportunities for new classes to challenge the existing political power. A very good number of actors have used conflict and violence as a means of improving their mass base and position to build the so called, political mass base to take advantage of potential opportunities offered by conflicts. By the same vein, the OLF right after its withdrawal from the transitional charter due to misunderstanding with EPRDF, flew its soldiers (*Serawiti*) to Southern part of ONRS. Right after the downfall of the Derg regime, the Booran allied with the OLF and former soldiers of the Derg who are not disarmed attacked the Garri. The incident unleashed chains of events that led to blood shed in which the Booran in alliance with the OLF displaced the Garri and other Somali clans from the whole Booran land of Southern Ethiopia in to refugee camps in Walda, and Banissa in Moyle and Mender district respectively, in Kenya. The FGD with the Booran has hinted that the ONLF has been supporting the Garri in their conflict against the Booran. Asked about this the Garri remained silent and the Booran could not substantiate the kind of assistance the ONLF makes to the Garri.

Even today the Garri say, OLF preaches the Booran about territorial irredentism aggravating the conflict between Booran and Garri. Furthermore, OLF propagates the Booran that, EL-Goff and El-lye water well complexes were taken by the Garri, sooner Moyale town will be handed over to them, but the Booran choose to keep silent.

sustainable development. Each of these forms of assets/ capitals are affected by conflict, and the threat are not mutually exclusive to one forms of capital- a threat to natural capital can also represent a threat to financial capital. For example; while these are underlying threats they can be politicized or exacerbated when combined with ethnic, cultural and historical differences.

Livelihoods are directly affected through decreased access to land, inadequate access to natural resources, as the result of exclusion and displacement and the loss of biodiversity (Michael, 2005). During conflict, the local communities are not only at risk of being killed or injured, but also their livelihood deliberately undermined. Usually conflict affects livelihoods through;

- Restricting access to water and other natural resources.
- Destroying infrastructure,
- Destroying or blocking market and trade routes.
- Stripping, burning or looting assets of marginalized or targeted groups.
- Displacing of people.
- Sexual violence against women and girls
- The Breakdown of law and order.

Each of these shocks has a direct impact on livelihoods.

### **5.7.1. Impact on Development and Investment**


The general climate of insecurity has deterred investment and generally has disrupted socio-economic activities. Insecure socio-economic environment has forced vulnerable people in to deprivation and distress. Episodes of violent local conflict have increased insecurity further in the locality. Insecurity resulting from conflict is central to the abandonment of educational institutions, health centers and other service rendering

institutions like NGOs, Agricultural offices and Gadda system. The impact of insecurity has contributed to the decline of business confidence and flight capital.

In other instances, insecurity has discouraged the development of water management infrastructure, such as dams, maintaining pristine areas. It is therefore obvious that conflicts affected the pastoral livelihoods strategies through the varying environmental impact it has created. Conflicts have also contributed to the collapse of social cohesion and disruption of local government system. Violent local conflict has a multiple - long and short- term impact on local development and investment. As one Booran elder stated:

*Conflict did not give birth to a child rather it took ours, conflict hasn't bought livestock but it had ours. In general, conflicts have not brought development Rather it damages what we have, and it brought us to the vicious cycle of poverty. (Interview with Booran elder, on Feb, 14, 2008, Moyale)*

One of the consequences of ethnic conflict is that it has hindered development activities. It has lead to the prohibition of development activities in the area. In a similar fashion, conflicts have been obstacles to implement development, or have lead to total failure of development activities in the study area. Since, 1991 (i.e. for the last 16 years) development and investments (both private and public) activities have stopped in Moyale town and in rural kebeles particularly in places that are contested between Booran and Garri.



**Figure 13. Incomplete constructions due to restriction by the local governments.**

Instead of resolving and forwarding an appropriate and in any cases accepting, and governing solution to the persistent conflict between Booran and Garri, both the ONRS and SNRS officials passed on instruction stating that, “It is believed that development activities carried out by either of the two bodies triggers conflict, Therefore, until the existing conflict is resolved both Booran zone of Moyale and Liben zone of Moyale woreda administrative should not implement any construction activities”. The instruction further restricts investors' or anybody to carry out development activities. Because of this order launched from both regional officials. (i.e. Boron (Oromia) and Gerri (Somali) ) woreda administrative bodies have been keeping silent and idle for the last 16 years with out any tangible or intangible economic and social (Schools, Health centers, Roads, Bridges, Bureaus, Hotels, Peace and Security)

development activities. Private investors are not allowed to sell/ buy and transfer; let alone to construct new infrastructures.

**Table 16. Survey result of households on the perception of conflict hinders development activities.**

Do you believe the conflict hinder development activities	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	57	95.0	51	85.0	108	90.0
No	3	5.0	9	15.0	12	10.0
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Majority of the respondents interviewed about the role of conflict in hindering local development activities in Moyale woreda, unanimously both the Booran 57(95.0%) and the Garri 55(91.1%), confirmed ethnic conflict has been one of the major obstacles to promote and implement development and/or investment activities.(See Table 16)

In a nutshell, although there are different contributing factors for the success of growth and development, but as it is explained above conflict and violence has a paramount negative effect on development. Thus in the absence of peace there will be no development and lack of development will lead to more conflict and poverty.

### **5.7.2. Impact on Human capital**

A violent local conflict affects important determinants of human capital, namely education and health services. The destruction of infrastructures as a result of violence often results in server cut backs in the woreda administrative capacity to provide services, such as health care and education.

The destruction of school which effectively results in the reduction of school enrolment often has long lasting negative impact on the households stock of human capital. Due to security fear of families about exposing their children to violence, they denied their children access to school.

In addition during conflict periods children are needed for other activities. In particular, children above the age of than ten are required to substitute the role of adult males because most adults go to fight; die or get severely injured in the conflict. Furthermore, the winner side in the conflict restricts access to education from the losers by segregating school via ethnic lines.

According to the interviewed households, following "the 2000 conflict between Booran and the Garri, in Arero, Hudet, Moyale and its surroundings, the Booran were reportedly restricting their children from enrollment and schooling in Arerro town until now. These mechanisms are likely to have severe long-term impact on the accumulation of human capital in households in particular and communities in general affected by the conflict.

As depicted in table 17, almost half (31%) of the Garri respondents ranked children school drop out the third position next to death and separation of family members as aspects of Human Capital, impacted by local conflict.

**Table 17. Impact on Human capital**

Human capital	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Death	48	29.6	47	33.1	95	31.3
Sexual violence	22	13.6	11	7.7	33	10.9
Separation of family	46	28.4	53	37.3	99	32.6
School drop out	46	28.4	31	21.8	77	5.3
Total	162	53.3	142	46.7	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Violent conflict has a large and visible impact on health outcomes. More armed violent local conflict often leads to deaths (usually children, women, elders. Most forms of violent conflict cause injuries ill-health and severe psychological damage trauma to those involving in fighting, to those living in conflict prone communities and to displaced population.

The majority of the Garri household survey respondents (53%) reported that violent local conflict resulted in death and injuries in their clans. The focus group discussion held with the Garri elders, affirmed that whenever there is conflict there is loss of children and women/men. To cite, as an example two major events of conflicts that resulted in high human causality in Garri communities were: the 1991 conflict between Booran and Garri resulted roughly for the death of more than 2300 people in the Garri side. Similarly, in 2000 conflict between the Booran and the Garri (in alliance with the Gabramiigo) caused the death of about 2200 children women and elderly. Those who were injured during that time were countless. Considerable numbers of our clan members were separated from their family. These effects further go downhill by a variety of factors; among the chiefs are the transmission of disease and decline in food security in refugee camps and the separation of families, relatives and clan members.

### 5.7.3. Impact on Social Capital

Social capital refers to those net worked norms that provide cohesion and mutual cooperation in society, such as inclusive support network, traditional means of conflict resolutions. Social capital can be a mechanism for maintaining order with in and between communities. The Booran has traditional culture (aada) and norms (Bosaa and Gonfaa) which provide support for those who were displaced in time of conflict.

On top of all, the Booran have relatively democratic and well-structured institution, under *aada seera* called gada a mechanism for conflict resolutions. However, prolonged violent local conflict promotes a change in basic attitudes to neighbors or other communities and ethnic/religious groups, which clearly show most an erosion of trust between the Booran and the Garri.

In the study area violent local conflict has disrupted social capital. This has an impact on livelihoods in a number of ways. Results of the sample survey with regard to the perception of the households as to which aspect of social capital was affected by conflict, the Garri revealed that, the loss of kinship was given the first rank (71.1%) and displacement (23.3%) (See table 18) is in a secondary position where as 48.3% of the Booran confirmed that both loss of kinship, displacement and marginalization were attested by conflict. These differences attributed that, the Garri, usually migrate to Kenya /Somalia when ever there is conflict and hence there would have been loss of kinship.

**Table 18. Impact on Social capital**

What has happened to your social capital	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Loss of Kinship	6	10.3	43	71.7	49	41.5
Displacement	11	19.0	14	23.3	25	21.2
Marginalization	2	3.4	1	1.7	3	2.5
Loss of Kinship and Displacement	11	19.0	2	3.3	13	11.0
All	28	48.3	0	.0	28	23.7
Total						

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Generally, the norms where by kin or community member provide the means to survive in emergencies the Bosaa and Gonfaa (Social welfare) culture of Booran, and the kinship of Garri, have been weakened, largely owing to the destruction of social networks and traditional social protection mechanisms, due to fighting, death, injuries, migration and losses of trust between individuals but still survive in some instance. Nevertheless, on occasions, the experience of violent conflict prompted a community spirit to ensure community security, build peace and provide support for those in needs through the Bosaa and Gonfaa.

#### **5.7.4. Impact on Natural Capital**

Pastoralism as a livelihood survives on frequent and seasonal movement in response to search for water and pasture, demanding the safety of migratory routes. One of the indirect impacts of conflict on natural capital is that restriction of human and livestock mobility. Conflict induced insecurity and fears in the study area of Moyale woreda, has a highly negative impact on mobility of people and livestock and access to some of the best grazing, farm land and water points.

A considerable number of respondents (40.8%) reported their family members do not move freely when conflicts occur and as long as there is no stability. Those who did not have access to water point, grazing and farmland cited fear as the main reason. (See Table 19)

Usually watering points and seldom pastures experience frequent fights, made these places insecure for both the people and livestock. Even sometimes deliberate damaging of water wells, ponds, boreholes and burning down of forests and grazing lands (pasture) is observed.

Regarding capital 40.8% of the respondents asserted, that during the period of conflict both forests, pastures/ fodder was burned down, water wells destroyed and were inaccessible to grazing, farm land and water points, mainly because of fears and insecurity. The remaining 8.3% reported only their pastoral lands and water wells were burned and destroyed during the periods of conflicts.

**Table 19. Impact on Natural Capital**

What has happened your natural capital	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Forest, Pastures/fodder burned dawn	5	8.3	5	8.3	10	8.3
Inaccessible to grazing, farm land and Water	23	38.3	26	43.3	49	40.8
Water wells destroyed	2	3.3	10	16.7	12	10.0
All	30	50.0	19	31.7	49	40.8
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

### 5.7.5. Impact on Financial Capital

Livestock represents the overwhelmingly most important form of financial capital for pastoralists, both in terms of stock and flows. It is the primary source of pastoral income, savings, gift, and social status. Threats to the herds are therefore, serious blows to pastoral financial capital. During the FGD elders reported that:

*It is the livestock which most suffer from conflicts. Animals are not aware of /conscious of what is going on in the locality. During the midst of conflict people ambush, hide and even evacuate, but the animals cannot and consequently a large number of livestock is killed, injured and stolen; there is always a huge loss of livestock.*

As such it is fundamental to each form of pastoral livelihood capital; any threat to livestock such as lack of water and/or feed (pasture), raiding, and disease is therefore, a direct threat to pastoral livelihood.

The Booran proverb **“When the herd dies so does the village”** shows this fact clearly.

During the focus group discussion, elders of the two ethnic groups pointed out that. According to the Liben Zone Moyale Weredo Administrative Office Report (2008); during the 1991 conflict it was estimated that, about 200,000 livestock were killed, injured and stolen. Similarly in the conflict of 2000 it was estimated that 2269 livestock were killed of which 269 livestock loss was for the Booran.

Hence, a chance of loss of total livestock in the midst of conflicts is very high. A good number of respondents (58.3%) said they lost livestock during conflict. The numbers that they forward range from 2 to 500. A reduction in livestock, even by small number, is very critical to a people to already living at the verge of poverty.

**Table 20. Impact on Financial capital**

What has happened to your financial assets	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Looting of Livestock	34	56.7	36	60.0	70	58.3
Robberies	10	16.7	11	18.3	21	17.5
Looting of livestock and Robberies	16	26.7	13	21.7	29	24.2
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Loss of livestock in pastoralist livelihood, is an obvious cause to create conflict, as those affected will try their best to get more livestock from someone else, and the cycle of conflict will continue.

#### 5.7.6. Impact on Physical Capital

Pastoral communities often have limited access to and ownership of physical capital, especially compared to sedentary communities, as the result of their mobility and their economic marginalization.

During violent local conflict it is clear that physical assets can be lost or destroyed. Apart from the raiding of animals, conflicts have involved the loss of large amount of property. According to the focus group discussion, there were loss of farmlands; distraction of homesteads and agricultural assets (crops) burned down. In major three incidents of the 1991, 2000 and 2003 conflicts between the Booran and the Garri in Moyale Woreda it was estimated that more than 40,600 homesteads were looted and burned; uncountable possessions destroyed (Liben zone of Moyale woreda administrative and Booran zone of Moyale woreda Police office report, 2008).

Results from the household survey regarding which aspects of the physical capital was affected during conflict times, more than half (51.7 %) of the Booran said, there was loss of farms (crops burned), destruction of homesteads and possessions during the conflict. On the other hand 55.6% of the Garri agreed with the destruction of homesteads and possessions. Since the majority of the Garri are pastoralists the loss of farm was not given due attention. (See table 21).

**Table 21. Impact on Physical capital**

What has happened to your physical assets	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Loss of farms	5	8.3	3	5.0	8	6.7
Destruction of homestead	6	10.0	20	33.3	26	21.7
Destruction of Possessions	7	11.7	14	23.3	21	17.5
Loss of farm and Destruction of possessions	11	18.3	10	16.7	21	17.5
All	31	51.7	13	21.7	44	36.7
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

### 5.8. Coping Strategies of the Households

A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base (Carney, 1999).

In conflict situation, any livelihood strategies that have persisted are operating at much reduced levels (Ibid). People affected by Shocks (particularly by conflict) have two over raiding concerns: first surviving immediate physical treats, and second overcoming long-term threats to their livelihoods.

In the study area the livelihood strategies (i.e. diversification, intensification and migration) are directly affected by the ethnic conflict. The effects are mainly the result of different level of insecurity and the restricted movement of people, livestock and trade. Income earning opportunities are limited for majority of the population affected by conflict.

On the other way conflict may create new opportunities for the very poor. In many instances, becoming a fighter may be seen as a rural livelihood coping strategy. Conflict and subsequent times of insecurity and fear may impact also on the ability and individuals and household to fall back on known survival strategies. For instance, in the study area households did not generally sell cattles/camels in response to conflict as they would do as response to other shocks. This is because according to interviewee lack of safety on the roads prevented those household most targeted by violence from increasing market where cattle could be sold, at the same time the cattle were seen as an insecure assets, likely to be targeted by violence.

Traditional pastoral strategies used to cope with described critical threats and conflicts while striving to maintain their livelihoods includes migrating, reducing resource use, seizing other resources, innovating and trading with others.

#### **5.8.1. Migration and internal displacement**

A large proportion of conflict, typically violent led to the migration and/or displacement of large number of individuals and their families. By cutting off vast number of people from economic opportunities, internal local conflict can lead to a vicious cycle of displacement and poverty. Refugee from conflict areas and displaced populations are found

amongst those living under most difficult forms of socio-economic exclusion and deprivations. In the study area dealing with violent local conflict, migration/or displacement has been one of the methods to survival in the face of direct violence, which has direct and in some case long-term poverty implication for the displaced. During the focus group discussion with the Booran and the Garri, elders stated that

*One of the most coping strategies taken by both Booran and Garri has been migration. To cite the major example, the 1991, conflict resulted in the migration of all the Garri clans from the Booran land into two refugee camps (walda and Banissa) in Kenya, and internal migration of the Booran to the North West part of Moyale.*

Like wise, the result of the survey confirmed that almost all the respondents (60.8%) commonly responded that migration/or displacement as a major means of coping strategies, rather than destocking and selling animals.

**Table 22. Coping Strategies of the Households**

Coping strategy	Ethnic groups					
	Borena		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Destalking	7	8.4	3	3.4	10	5.8
Selling asset	9	10.8	7	7.9	16	9.3
Migration	45	54.2	59	66.3	104	60.5
Changing activity	22	26.5	20	22.5	42	24.4
Total*	83	48.3	89	51.7	172	100

**Note:\* Multiple response analysis Source: Field Survey, 2008**

However, in the study area there are other manifestations of coping strategies, which are listed below:

### 5.8.2. Counter attack

In addition to the above mentioned strategies, people whose livelihoods are damaged by conflicts motivated to continue to fight or join the fighting in order to seek revenge or restitution for what they have lost. According to the focus group discussion both Booran and Garri elders stated that “when there is ferocious war/conflict, we retreat/evacuate and after a while we reorganize, bring our clans/relatives, from our side and from abroad (if necessary Kenya) and start attacking”. Hence, retreating, evacuation and reorganizing to attack or ambush are usual coping strategies of the area.

### 5.8.3. Bossa and Gonfaa

The Booran have peculiar coping strategy based on their culture (*aada*) during conflict situation. The Booran have traditionally cultivated and inculcated humanitarian social welfare institutions called *Busaa* and *Gonfa*, a kind of rehabilitation/rejuvenation institution established to support the displaced clan member. A person who is in need of immediate survival assets, appeal to *aaba eda*, a clan village leader that determines a victim of the war. The *aaba eda* calls a meeting (*koora*). The *koora*, investigates the loss during conflict and if the loss is 100 livestock, according to the *aada seera* Booran of *Busaa* and *Gonfaa* he gets 99 livestock.

The Garris' also have coping strategies accustomed in the area, that is to stay at relatives or clan kinships home, as an immediate survival mechanism until peace prevails.

## 5.9. Efforts of conflict resolution - past and present

Before the advent of the modern state, conflicts among local communities were resolved using indigenous mechanisms. In most traditional systems, the elders act as a mediator in intra or inter-ethnic conflict. The traditional methods of conflict resolutions have undergone changes with the introduction of the state powers and with judicial system. Since conflict resolution was not a central theme of the thesis, the details of conflict resolution theories is not discussed, but rather the study attempts to recap briefly the conflict resolution methods during pre-colonial, post colonial periods and current attempts to resolve the conflicts between the Booran and Garri.

### 5.9.1. Before the advent of the modern State (*Aada Seera*)

In the period prior to the advent of the modern state and administration the Booran and the Garri lived under the rule of *Aada seera*, which guided personal behavior and community relations. The Somali groups such as Garri, Ajuran and other Somali clans have their own customary law (*Xeer*). The set of rule, regulation, and values are derived from the foundation of Somali society. However, they adhered to the *aada seera* to maintain the Booran peace (*nagaya Booran*). This was because the peace of Booran extended to any group, which accepted the customs and laws of the Booran (*aada seera Boorana*).

For the Booran the violation of *Aada seera* was a punishable offence. The punishment varies depending on the gravity of the offence from simple in terms of livestock such as a young bull (*Raada Jibicha*), about 30 livestock (*Karamata*) to infinite number (*Qakhe*) or even death penalty (*Laama mudamudi*) in offences receiving or gross transgression against the *Aada*.

The *aada seera* stipulated approaches of settling disputes putting various levels with gradation from the household conflicts which are solved by village elders to inter-ethnic conflicts which are mediated by gathering of elders from the aggrieved communities. The *aada seera* is orally transmitted and it is revised every eighth years in the pan Booran meeting of Gumi Gaayo. The *aada seera* system maintained peaceful co existence of allies till the beginning of colonial rule.

### 5.9.2. After the advent of the modern States

The Booran hegemony on the plateau ended with the Ethiopian conquest of the region. Menilik's soldiers came during the *gada* of Liiba Jaldessa (1891-1899). The Booran had no firearms, and knowing the damage they could cause, they submitted to the Ethiopians with out any resistance. Booran land was given to the victorious general, Fitawrari Habte Giorghis, as **rest- gult** until 1924, and then to Ras Desta Damtew who, governed through a hierarchy of appointed Booran representatives (*Balabat*).

The establishment of modern state administration led to the collapse of Booran power in the area and weakened the application of the *aada seera* with the introduction of formal judicial system. The modern administration replaced the Gada at apex to which the communities made allegiance. After this decline in the Booran power other alliance such as Garri, Ajuran which were previously adhered the *aada seera* Booran broke away, and formed a new alliance with other Somali groups such as Degodia, Merchan with religious commonality and encroached the Booran territory.

### 5.9.3. Imperial regime

The post-liberation Ethiopian government unlike the colonial relied mainly on the *Balabat* system. In 1944/45 to resolve the conflict and restore peace and stability in the area, Western parts of wachille and border of North East part of Kenya were given to the Somali groups from Booran land.

The attainment of political power by the *Qallu* and the introduction of the hereditary principle were contradictory to the *gada* system of governance and were the first step towards its decline. The position become hereditary and was kept by the families of the *qallu* until 1975.

### 5.9.4. Derg regime

During Derg regime, management of conflicts was considered as a burden on the state because the Derg was under stress with internal and external issues. Hence heavy deterrent measures like applying severe punishment on suspected individual killings and heavy military action were taken on both communities. For instance the Derg launched an order stating that "**A person who killed, will be killed, and who committed theft will loose all his possessions**". To show its applicability and how the government was strong, Derg sentenced three Booran fellows by death penalty on a market day.

During the Derg regime many Booran were offered employment in the state administration and became members of the regime's political party. A military officer, Major Jaatani Ali, emerged as a leading Booran spokes man. Although the Balabat system was abolished, the *gada* was not attacked, and the Gumi Guyoo assemblies were allowed by the regime and used for propaganda purpose.

### 5.9.5. EPRDF regime

In the period of EPRDF, the new government once in place decided to undertake major changes in creating regional administrative units along ethnic lines. Following the change in administrative unit nine areas were contested between the Oromo and Somali who formed two separate regional states in the emerging federal Ethiopia. The Garri and other Somali groups gained new control over territory and wells (especially El-gof and El lye) through the redrawing of the borders of the new administrative region. The transfer of kebeles (water points) caused new conflict. The incident unleashed chains of events that led to bloodshed in which the Booran displaced the Garri and their alliance from the whole of Booran land of southern Ethiopia in to refugee camps in walda, Moyale district and some to Banissa in Mandera district in Kenya.

The government proved incapable to adjudicate the conflicting claims and resolve the conflict in the year that followed although many attempts were made by the federal government. Chief among the attempt was, during the then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne, in 1994/95, an independent committee consisting of 7 members was established. The committee studied 28 kebeles, which were contested by both parties. The committee presented its decision that, among the 28 kebeles 17 kebeles were decided to Booran whereas 11 kebeles to Garri. Soon after the Garri refused the decision and continued claiming for control of Moyale town and other four rural kebeles.

The 2005 referendum was the latest attempt and was unsuccessful. It was proved impossible to hold the referendum in Moyale town and woreda mainly because of the failure of the rival regional administrations to agree who should be eligible to vote. There are two urban and six (Chamuq, Mado-miigo, El-gof, El-lye, Bede Buladi) kebele in Moyale

district. The first attempt at voter registration was blatantly manipulated by the officials of both regions and was declared invalid by the National Election Board. A second attempt was also discounted, because each side tried to flood the town with voters from the surrounding areas even from Kenya. In the end, the attempt to hold referendum in Moyale was abandoned. In a large meeting (*Gumi Gayoo*), a Booran elder asked the officials whether history is measured differently in the north, where they went to colonial maps were used to back territorial claims (Bademe) before the referendum.

Moyale town has two rival administrations including two Mayors, two Police Stations, two Courts, etc. According to a Booran elder

*If the Booran are found 9:00 p.m at night in the so called Garri territory, he will be arrested without any question and vise-versa... here in Moyale we are still in a kind of apartheid administration. Each rival administration tries to take care of its own ethnic group in separate schools and clinics and each collects taxes from those under license (vehicles, shops, traders, etc). The conflict is continuing and there are frequent clashes between Booran and Garri.*

Results from the household survey with regard to the role of higher officials to resolve the existing conflict showed that the majority of the Booran (75 %) revealed that the role of higher officials in resolving the conflict is "very inefficient" and "inefficient". The Booran for instance, have feeling of dissatisfaction over the action of authorities to strictly delimit and regulate the Garri activities in disputed areas, as well as the failure of authorities to return back the water wells /Ella to Booran. As the result of these the Booran were found to high degree of dislike of the authorities of each clan (Booran and Garri). To the contrary a good



number of the Garri 49(81.7%) reported that the role of the higher official in resolving the conflict is “very efficient” and “efficient”.

**Table 23. Rating on the role of Higher Officials on conflict resolution by sample households**

With Regard to conflict resolution how do see the role of Higher Officials	Ethnic groups					
	Booran		Garri		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Very efficient	8	13.3	16	26.7	24	20.0
Efficient	7	11.7	33	55.0	40	33.3
Insufficient	23	38.3	7	11.7	30	25.0
Very inefficient	22	36.7	4	6.7	26	21.7
Total	60	100.0	60	100.0	120	100.0

**Source: Field Survey, 2008**

Accordingly, as it is disclosed in the focused group discussion the Booran have feeling of dissatisfaction over the inaction of authorities to strictly delimit and regulate the Garri activities in disputed areas, as well as the failure of authorities to return back the water wells /Ella to Booran. As the result of these the Booran have high degree of dislike and distrust of the authorities of each clan (Booran and Garri).

In recent years the state has made a concerted effort to institutionalize traditional conflict management mechanisms by placing *Guuti* elders on the government pay roll on the Somali side and conflict advisory committee from Booran. The apparent idea is for these *Guuti* to "serve as a bridge between state and communities, the process started in 1999 with a conference of 700 *Guuti* elders, from which 100 have been elected to be "Government *Guuti*" This strategy can be back firing through, as "local communities have no confidence in elders such as the *Guuti* who are advisor for government resolving local conflict. This means that legitimacy remains with the traditional mechanism that is being used to resolve the vast majority of conflicts.

In the focus group discussion elders from both the Garri and the Booran has strongly argued that the best remedy for the conflict in Moyale Wereda is to place the town as well as the adjacent districts of the Wereda under federal administration like Dire Dawa town. Both groups are hopeful that federal administration will ease tensions and conflicts.

Currently, other stakeholders with different methods of conflict prevention and resolution are involved in the conflict resolution process. The government has incorporated the NGO's to take in conflict mediation and in founding negotiation meetings. For instance in Moyale (from 15th-17th December 2005, from 10-14 October 2008) were founded and facilitated by NGO's further it was through the advocacy of NGOs and international donor agencies that the woreda peace committees were established in 2003 Apart from the woreda peace committee a cross border peace committee was later established to deal with cross border conflicts and negotiate sharing of water and grazing resource across the border between Ethiopia and Kenya.

## 6. Conclusion and Recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusion

Prior to the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Booran and Garri ethnic groups of the Liban/Borana zone, Moyale Woreda had lived in relative peace. During those times conflicts between the two ethnic groups were not totally none existent. Conflicts were very rare and when they occur they were resolved through traditional mechanisms and with relative peace. The *adda seera*, which is a conflict resolving system of the Booran, had been instrumental in maintaining peace in the study area. It helped both the Garri and the Booran to utilize resources of the same niche. The *adda seera* has also created a sense of alliance and ritual exchange between the Garri and the Booran enabling them to co-exist. The Garri did not question and challenge the Booran authority over the water and pasture resources of the region largely owing to the fact that the Booran were by then the most powerful ethnic groups of the area.

The study has found that the harmonious and peaceful relationship between the two ethnic groups began to change with the drawing of the political boundary between the present day states of Ethiopia and Kenya and following this the establishment of modern administrative structures. In the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Emperor Menelik's forces incorporated the area where the Booran live into the Ethiopian state. The British had incorporated the southern part of the Booran territory in to their colonial empire. The division of the vast territory of the Booran territory in to two contributed for the decline of their power. In addition to this the new administrative structure that was put into action transformed the *gada* system of the Booran. Since then the *gada* elders of the Booran became political representatives and appointees (*balabats/shums*) of the Ethiopian state and government. This had the

effect of reducing the role of the *gada* and Booran elders in their community making the traditional institution not to work properly. These developments contributed farther to the decline of Booran power in the study area. After the decline of the power of the Booran, their former allies particularly the Garri and the Ajuran clans broke their alliance with the Booran and formed new alliances with other Somali clans such as the Degodia and the Marihan. Then, they began to encroach the territory of the Booran initiating conflict.

The late 1920s was the turning point in Booran-Garri relationship. With the coming of the Italian colonial authorities the Garri moved in large numbers to Booran territories coming from the east. They collaborated with the Italians and by taking advantage of the colonial administration expanded their control over the resources of the study area and began to make more claims in terms of resource ownership and control. This has created a threat on the livelihood of the Booran forcing them to respond to the situation in violent conflict.

The modern state structure and apparatus, which distorted and undermined the traditional institutions and mechanisms of maintaining and resolving conflicts, did not work properly. To the contrary it fueled conflicts between the Garri and the Booran. The drawing of administrative borders in the study area with the advent of the modern state has created a contest and rivalry for resources between the two ethnic groups that are the subjects of this study.

Though the conflict between the Booran and the Garri encompasses several interrelated factors the study concludes the following.

- The drawing of modern state administrative borders and in recent times the federal administrative system which was principally based on ethnic identity that the Ethiopian government followed

has made both the Booran and the Garri to emphasize their ethnic differences. As both sides emphasized their ethnic differences the old traditional harmony and coexistence between the two rival groups is breaking apart and failing to preserve peace and resolve conflicts whenever they occur. At present the underlying factor for the conflict between the Booran and the Garri is the growing ethnic consciousness, which is exacerbated by the ethnic based administrative structure.

- The scarcity of resources such as water and grazing/farm land that are crucial to the livelihood of both the Garri and the Booran is also a fundamental factor that generates conflict in Moyale Woreda. Though resource scarcity is not a new and recent phenomenon its magnitude is growing at an alarming rate owing to ecological and demographic factors. There is a relation between resource scarcity and conflict in that the more resources became scarce the more the extent and frequency of conflict between the two ethnic groups is growing.
- The cultural difference between the Booran and the Garri is also another factor that induces conflict. Particularly the *Butta* culture of the Booran, which is conducted every eight years, is causing conflicts and feuds between the two ethnic groups. Moreover, various cultural practices related to marriage and blood feud practiced on both sides are sources of conflict though not as important as the *Butta* cultural practice.
- The management and control of the resources of the area, which favors the Booran and does not include the Garri is a conflict-generating factor. The *adda seera* system of the Booran is no more working properly and the Booran at times use it deny the Garri access to crucial resources for their livelihood.
- The redrawing of local administrative borders along ethnic lines has made the issue of control and ownership of resources such as

- On the part of government authorities there is lack of due attention and dedication to resolve the problem. The local administrative authorities of both the Booran and the Garri had opted to use attempts of resolving the conflict to their advantage leading to their failure.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

To mitigate and eventually solve ethnic conflict between the Garri and the Booran ethnic groups of Moyale Woreda and their impact on the livelihood of the people several measures need to be taken on a short-term and long-term basis. Short-term measures should focus on reducing the impact of the conflict on the livelihood of the people by strengthening and diversifying coping strategies. Long-term strategies on the other hand should focus on resolving conflict-generating factors between the two ethnic groups that are the subject of this study. Given the growing tendency of the conflict and its impact on the livelihood of the two groups short-term measures need to be given priority. Thus based on the conclusions of the study the following recommendations are suggested.

### **Short-term**

- Establishing and strengthening various mechanisms of coping the social and economic effects of conflict is crucial and essential. Existing traditional mechanisms of coping like the Bussa and Gonfaa traditions of the Booran need to be strengthened. The government and philanthropic organizations such including NGOs should provide multidimensional support to the people affected and displaced as the result of conflict.
- Traditional and administrative mechanisms of non-violent dispute need to be reinforced. Both the Booran and the Garri should give

respect and emphasis to the traditional methods of resolving conflicts through non-violent mechanism that they used for several years. The local administration on its part should arrange a platform on which elders from both sides should meet and discuss on possible conflict generating factors on a regular basis.

- Creating a resource management and regulation system that allows the participation of both the Booran and the Garri. The current resource management and regulation system has its origin from the Booran and does not allow the participation of the Garri. Therefore, the Garri like the Booran need to be represented by making modifications in the Adda Seera Boorana.
- The local administration should exercise some degree of control over scarce resources particularly water wells to ensure equitable utilization by both groups. This could be achieved through setting up a body that comprises elders and local administrative authorities from both the Garri and the Booran.

#### **Long-term**

- A concentrated effort should be made to diversify the livelihood options of the two groups. Alternative livelihood strategies will have a crucial role both in terms of reducing the competition on ownership and access to scarce resources and the socio-economic impact of conflict. The recent trend of transforming some pastoralists communities to farming need to be pursued with grater emphasis. Moreover, poultry production and urban-based income-generation needs to be implemented as alternative livelihood strategies.
- Conflict generating cultural practices on both sides should be in the short run discouraged and in the long run abolished. On the side of the Booran the Butta tradition of waging war and on the

side of the Garri the tradition of feud need to be discouraged. To this effect the role of the elders and the proper functioning of the law enforcing bodies of the local administration must play an important role.

- The redrawing of local administrative boarders should give due consideration to past demographic conditions and ownership of resources instead of concurrent claims and recent demographic and political conditions. Local administrative borders must not be a means to prohibit mobility of people and livestock as well as legitimizing sole ownership of crucial resources for the livelihood of both ethnic groups.
- The government should intervene in terms of prohibiting political groups such as the OLF and ONLF that aggravate the conflict between the Booran and the Garri.
- Social and economic infrastructures need to be constructed in the area. The lack of social and economic infrastructure has hindered the social and economic integration of both the Garri and the Booran. The expansion of infrastructure in the long run will have the effect of social, economic and cultural integration resulting in a harmonious relation.
- The government and concerned non-governmental organizations should give due attention to resolving the conflict and reducing the impact of the conflict on livelihood. Given the growing frequency of conflict and the resulting impact on livelihood the government as well as NGOs had not given the attention the issue deserves. Thus the government and NGOs should give attention and try to solve the problem with more dedication.
- A lasting solution for the conflict in Moyale Woreda and its impact on livelihood is to make a comprehensive referendum. Based on the referendum and a through study of demographic history of the area in terms of who lived where at what time a lasting redrawing

of local administrative boundaries need to be done. The placement of the town and its woreda environs under a federal administration as suggested by elders of both sides will have the effect of opening the Pandora-box, i.e. other areas and towns with similar problems will opt for the same solution which will challenge the federal government as well as the federal system itself.

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#### **PERORDICALS**

Addis Negar News Paper day, Apr.18/20008

Booran Zone Moyale Woreda Administrative Report on the Estimate of Population and Number of Kebeles. Feb, 2008.

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about 11 Woredas which proximate ONRS and SNRS. June,  
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**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH**

**A. Questionnaire prepared for the household survey on assessing the impact of local ethnic conflict on livelihood:**

*The case of Borena Oromo and Garri Somali in Moyale woreda  
Borena zone of Oromia*

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Respondent's Name \_\_\_\_\_

Ethnicity 1) Borena      2) Garri      3) Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Woreda \_\_\_\_\_ kebele \_\_\_\_\_


Date of interview \_\_\_\_\_

Name of the enumerator \_\_\_\_\_

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*To Enumerators: Please, tell the respondent that the objective of this questionnaire is to acquire first hand information about the impact of local ethnic conflict on the livelihoods of those population who are directly affected by the conflict in the area.*

*All the questions to be asked are purely for research/ academic purpose. Therefore assure them that the information collected will remain confidential. Besides, the name of the respondent will not be included in the report.*





- a) Yes                      b) No
- 5) If yes why \_\_\_\_\_
- 6) Is there a trend of converting formerly cultivated land to grazing?  
 a) Yes                      b) No
- 7) If yes why \_\_\_\_\_
- 8) Has cultivated and grazing land expanded to more of formerly unutilized or marginalized land?  
 a) Yes                      b) No
- 9) How is the condition of water resources (rivers & wells) over the past years?  
 a) Increased in volume  
 b) Remained constant  
 c) Decreased in volume
- 10) What is your wet and dry season grazing area?  
 a) kiremt    b) bega    c) belg    d) meher
- 11) In what season is the occurrence and prevalence of conflict increasing?  
 a) In wet season    b) In dry season    c) In both wet & dry
- 12) How was the grazing resource managed in the past?  
 a) Communal    b) private    c) by kinship    d) others specify
- 13) What rules and regulations are applied to ensure the proper use of resources?  
 \_\_\_\_\_
- 14) Do you have your own separate land for grazing?  
 a) Yes    b) No  
 i) If yes, how many hectares? \_\_\_\_\_  
 ii) If no, where do you graze your livestock (sheep, goat...)? \_\_\_\_\_

- 15) What resources are commonly shared by Borena and Garri?  
a) Grazing land b) water points c) forests d) others specify
- 16) For how long have the Borena and the Garri been sharing the same resources?  
a) 10 - 20 years b) 21 - 30 c) 31 - 40 d) 41 - 50 e) more than 51
- 17) Is there any restriction in access to resources (water point, grazing...) use?  
a) Yes b) No
- 18) If yes, how are the restriction enforced? \_\_\_\_\_
- 19) Which are the most critical resources in the area?  
a) Grazing land b) water points c) farming land d) others specify & rank
- 20) How is this resource managed?  
a) By local rule & regulations b) By kinships c) others specify
- 21) Does the management and the utilization of resources cause conflict?  
a) Yes b) No
- 22) If yes, explain the reason a) scarcity of resources b) your community disadvantaged c) population increase d) others specify
- 23) Do you face shortage of fodder and water points for your livestock?  
a) Yes b) No
- 24) If yes, does this lead to conflict between the Borena and Garri?  
Explain
- 
-

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### III Farming

- 25) When did you start farming? \_\_\_\_\_
- 26) How many hectares of cultivated land do you own? \_\_\_\_\_
- 27) Is this cultivated land sufficient to feed your household members?  
a) Yes b) No
- 28) How are farm lands allocated in your area?  
a) By Kebele Administrators b) By own c) By possessions d) others specify
- 29) Is resource generally scarce in your area?  
a) Yes b) No
- 30) If yes, which (multiple answers possible)  
a) Cultivated land b) grazing land c) water d) all
- 31) Is there good relationship between the Borena and Garri?  
a) Yes b) No
- 32) Do conflicts occur between the farming and grazing communities?  
a) Yes b) No
- 33) If yes, what are the main causes of the conflict between the two systems?  
\_\_\_\_\_
- 34) Have you heard about any resource conflict between Borena and Garri during Imperial and Derg times? a) Yes b) No
- 35) If yes, narrate the major ones \_\_\_\_\_
- 36) Is there a recent conflict between Borena and Garri?

a) Yes    b) No

37)      If yes, what are the possible major causes?

- a) Resource scarcity
- b) Ethnic differences
- c) Cultural difference
- d) Political differences
- e) Others specify

38)      What are the aggravating factors?

- a) Boarder demarcation    b) Involvement of oppositions (OLF, ONLF)
- c) Population pressure    d) Land degradation    e) others specify

39)      Is your community disadvantaged by the over taking over use of resources by your neighboring communities?

a) Yes    b) No

40)      If yes, explain how? \_\_\_\_\_

41)      Do you believe your community should expand to the land of the neighboring community?

- a) Strongly believe    b) Believe    c) Strongly disagree    d) Disagree

42)      If you “believe or strongly believe” explain why? \_\_\_\_\_

43)      What do you think are the causes of conflict in your area?

(Rank)

- a) Resource scarcity      b) Ethnic differences
- c) Cultural differences    d) Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

44)      Have you ever faced any type of resource conflict?

a) Yes    b) No

45)      If yes, for what type of resource has the conflict occurred?

- a) Water point b) Wood for fuel energy c) Grazing land d) Cultivated land e) other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

46) How do you rate the conflict occurred?

Resource type	Level of conflict	Possible causes	Resolution Mechanism
Water point			
Wood for fuel energy			
Grazing land (own)			
Crop land			
Grazing land (communal)			
Other (specify)			
<b>Range land</b> 1.Low 2.Medium 3-High <b>Possible causes</b> 1.Scarcity of the resource 2.Population growth 3.increased Livestock number 4.increased demand for resource <b>Resolution Mechanisms</b> 1.unresolved (still persist) 2.local elders 3.conflict resolving advisory council 4.legal court			

47) How do you rate the conflict level between the Borena and Garri?

- a) Moderate and Constant b) Intense and Constant  
c) Intense and increasing d) cannot determine

48) Do you think the conflict will increase in the future?

- a) Yes b) No

49) Do you think ethnicity is the sole cause of conflict between the Borena and Gari?

- a) Yes b) No

50) If yes, why do you think so \_\_\_\_\_

51) How many times have conflict occurred annually from 1994/95 - 2007? \_\_\_\_\_

52) What were the total numbers of casualties?

- a) Human \_\_\_\_\_ b) Animal \_\_\_\_\_

53) How does the current conflict affect your resource use pattern?

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#### **IV Livelihood Aspects**

- 54) What is the impact of conflict on livelihoods?
- 
- 55) Is there asset stripping during the time of conflict?  
a) Yes b) No
- 56) If yes,  
a) What has happened to your financial assets?  
1- Looting of livestock 2 - robberies 3 - others
- b) What has happened to your physical assets?  
1 - Losses of farms 2 - Destruction of homesteads  
3 - Destruction of possessions 4 - Others
- c) What has happened to your human capital?  
1 - Violent death & disabilities 2 - Separation of families  
3 - Sexual violence against women 4 - School drop out
- d) Which Social capital aspect is impacted?  
1 - Losses of Kinship 2 - Displacement  
3 - Marginalization 4 - Others
- e) What has happened to your natural capital?  
1 - Forests, Pastures/ fodders burned dawn  
2 - Inaccessible to grazing, farm land & water  
3 - Water wells destroyed and others  
4 - Failure to access natural resources  
5- Others specify

- 57) Has insecurity resulted from conflict limited your activities?  
a) Yes b) No
- 58) If yes, what activities (Rank if more than one answer)  
a) Cultivation of land  
b) Seasonal livestock migration  
c) Trade and access to markets for buyers and sellers  
d) Labor migration and return of remittances  
e) Collection of firewood, fodder and wild foods  
f) Others (Specify)\_\_\_\_\_
- 59) Do you believe the conflict hinders development activities, such as the establishment of social and economic infrastructures?  
a) Yes b) No  
If yes, cite an example \_\_\_\_\_
- 60) What coping strategies have you taken during conflict situations?  
a) De stocking b) selling of assets c) migration d) changing of activities e) others specify
- 61) With regard to conflict resolution how do you see the role of higher officials?  
1. Very efficient 2. efficient 3. Inefficient 4. Very inefficient
- 62) In your opinion what responsible bodies to resolve the conflict should do? \_\_\_\_\_
- 

Thank you

## B. Key informant Interview guide

The following are some guiding questions for the interview with the key informants.

Date of the interview-----

Village/ kebele -----

Name -----

Ethnic group -----

Age -----

Social status-----

Occupation-----

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## I. Socio-Cultural Relationships

a) Explain the relationship between the Borena and the Garri, during the Imperial and Derg times.

b) What resources have been commonly shared by the two communities?

c) Why have been the relationships between the two communities eroded over time? (if it happens)

a) Is conflict an everyday phenomenon between the two ethnic groups?

Yes ----- No -----.

b) If yes, what are the major causes? \_\_\_\_\_

c) Explain the history of conflict between the two groups since the imperial regime?

d) What are the major root causes of conflict?

e) Who are the conflicting parties and who is fighting whom and why?

f) Does ethnicity stand as the sole sources of conflict in the area?

Yes -----No -----

g) How /why do local people draw the distinction between friends / alliances and foes do?

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h) If no to Qn.h, what are the causes of conflict? \_\_\_\_\_

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## II. Resources Sharing

- a) During the Imperial and Derg times, how was resource access and use regulated?
  - b) How has this regulation changed in present day? (If there is any change)
  - c) Are shortages of resources increasing? Yes ----- No -----
  - d) If yes, were shortages of resources and uses cause of conflict among the two communities during the past three regimes?
  - e) How has the nature of the conflict changed from the past two regimes to the present government?
  - f) Is natural resource scarcity the root cause of conflict between the Borena and Garri? Yes ----- No -----
  - g) If no, then what is the root cause of the conflict?
- 

## III. Political alliance

- a) How were the constituencies of the communities divided during the past two consecutive regimes?
- b) What is the role of the post 1991, ethno- linguistically based administrative borders to the present conflict?
- c) What are the aggravating factors to the current conflict between the two ethnic groups?

- d) Is there any aggravating role by the two local administrative bodies?  
If yes, mention how?
- e) Is there any aggravating role by oppositions like OLF and ONLF?  
If yes, mention how? \_\_\_\_\_

#### **IV. Livelihoods aspects**

- a) What is the Impact of conflict on livelihoods?
- b) Has livelihood failure contributed to the emergence of conflict?
- c) What aspects of livelihoods are the most affected by the conflict?
- d) Has conflict situation contributed to any change in activities?
- 

#### **V. Coping Strategies**

- a) What are the coping strategies during the time of conflict?
- b) What measures have been taken to overcome the situation?
- 

#### **VI. Conflict Resolutions**

- a) What measures have been taken to resolve the conflict by internal and external actors such as by community elders, woreda, zone, regional and federal government bodies as well as by other NGOs / organizations?
- b) Why do think efforts in the present conflict resolving mechanism are not successful?
- c) How do you think the current conflict can be solved, any suggestions?

**Thank you**

### C. Focus Group Discussion Guide

The following are some guiding questions for the focus group discussions.

#### General Information

- a) What has been the history of conflict since the imperial regime up to now?
  - b) What are the major roots causes of the conflicts?
  - c) Who are the conflicting parties and who is fighting whom and Why?
  - d) Is ethnicity a source of conflict in the area / and how /why, do local people draw the distinction between friends/ alliances and foes ?
  - e) What is the role of post the 1991, ethno- linguistic based administrative borders to the present conflict?
  - f) What are the aggravating factors to the current conflict between the two ethnic groups?
- 


#### Natural Resources Sharing Relations

- a) What are the traditional resource use rules and regulations between Borena and Garri?
- b) Are these rules and regulations currently functional? Yes ----- No
- c) If yes, which party is more favored? Borena -----Garri-----
- d) If No, why? \_\_\_\_\_

- e) Is there shortage of resources? Yes ----- No -----  
If yes, does this shortage cause conflict?
- f) Have there been resource use conflicts between the two communities during the last 50 years? If Yes Mention them chronologically
- g) How has the nature of the conflict changed from the past two regimes to the present government?
- h) Is natural resource scarcity the root cause of conflict between the Borena and Garri?
- i) What is the geographical coverage and intensity of the current conflict?
- j) How do you rate the magnitude and intensity of the current conflict?
- 

### **Political Alliances**

- a) How were the constituencies divided during the past two consecutive regimes?
- b) What is the role of the ethno- linguistically based administrative border demarcations on the conflict in the area?
- c) What is the role of local administrator to the present conflict?
- d) Are there any aggravating interventions from opposition groups such as (OLF and ONLF)?



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### **Livelihoods aspects**

- a) What is the Impact of conflict on livelihoods?
- b) Has livelihood failure contributed to the emergence of conflict?
- c) What aspects of livelihoods have been most affected by conflict?
- d) Has conflict situation contributed to any change in routine activities?

### **Coping Strategies**

- a) What are the major coping strategies during the time of conflict?
  - b) What measures have been taken to overcome the situation?
- 

### **Conflict resolutions**

- a) What measures have been taken to resolve the conflict by internal and external actors such as by community elders, woreda, zone, regional and federal government bodies as well as other NGOs / organizations?
- b) Why do you think the present effort in conflict resolutions mechanism not successful?
- c) How can the current conflict be solved, suggestions?

Thanks

## Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that the thesis is my original work, has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

**Declared by:**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Candidate

**Confirmed by:**

*Respage Tafesse*  
\_\_\_\_\_

*[Signature]*  
\_\_\_\_\_

Advisor

