

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

U.S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR  
REGIONAL PEACE

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## **List of Acronyms**

AIAS	American Institute of Afghanistan Studies
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRS	Congressional Research Service
FY	Fiscal Year
GWOT	Global War On Terror
HCID	Holing Center for International Dialogue
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HT	Hizb-ut-Tahrir
IJU	Islamic Jihad Union
ILO	International Labour Office
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PRT	Provisional Reconstruction Team
RSC	Regional Security Complexes
SC	Security Council
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
U.S	United States
UN	United Nation
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nation Office on Drug and Crime

UNSC	United Nation Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTC	World Trade Center
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

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## **Abstract**

*This study examines the implications of U.S military intervention in Afghanistan for regional peace, and the obstacles for bringing peace and stability in the country as well as in the region by analyzing and reviewing different secondary sources. The study found the U.S military intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 is unable to bring (win) the peace in the region. The current problem of Afghanistan is not only confined in it, rather caused serious dangers for the neighboring countries. The intervention in Afghanistan conducted with the aim of eliminating Al-Qaeda and Taliban has brought enormous economic, social and political implications or changes in the region. Due to its geographical proximity and ethnic similarity Central and Southern Asian states were affected by threats of terrorism, religious extremism, smuggling and drug trafficking. The conflict has become a regional one, including the continuing challenges in Tajikistan, the growing conflict led by the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan involving several states, process of political decay in Pakistan, and insurgency in Kashmir.*

*The main factors for the U.S-led coalition's failure in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region are also examined in this study. The failure of coherent strategy among the coalition forces that integrates counter insurgency and reconstruction operations, lack of resource as a result of parallel conflict in Iraq that captured the attention of U.S administration and lack of regional cooperation (regional states inability to combat Taliban and Al-Qaeda in its own border) are some of the reasons. In addition, the legitimacy of the Karzai government affected by incompetence and corruption; perceived marginalization of certain groups; slow progress in reconstruction and development; disregard of Afghans' cultural and religious values and atrocities committed by U.S and NATO forces are the other important factors. Finally, the study concludes that the collective memory of the Afghans about outside intervention and the ignorance of the local people from government positions are the most important factors for the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgency, which is responsible for regional instability. Based on this the study concludes military action alone couldn't bring a real solution for the current problems in Afghanistan and the region. Diplomatic commitments; like power sharing and negotiation among the national government and insurgents should be given priority.*

# **Chapter I**

## **Introduction**

### **1.1 Background of the Study**

The outbreak of First World War (WWI) and the U.S intervention in 1917, after the sinking of her ships (carrying supplies for the Allies) by the German sub-marines had a dramatic impact on international affairs and America's role in them. The war clearly showed the United States full appreciation of its power in the world and reverted its historical tradition of the "1823 Monroe Doctrine", in which the U.S warned the European powers to keep their hands off and isolation of U.S in the western hemisphere (Khanna, 2004:236; Ferrell, 1988:101).

In the Second World War (WWII) United States emerged as the single most powerful nation in the world. Eventually the Soviet Union would rival the United State's military. After the end of the war in 1945, during the Truman years, the United States went through what can only be described as "aggressive" or a "revolution" in both its military and foreign policies. Ultimately, America becomes the spearhead of a vast, intricate design to create a new system of international power that would contain the Soviet Union and its allies. The intensive and extensive competition with the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies, forced the United States to confront radically new environments, like in Korea (1950-1953), Cuba (1961-1962), Vietnam (1965-1975) and Afghanistan in 1979 (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1992: 9; Challener, 1970:1).

Until the overthrow of the Daoud regime in April 1978, the United States had had a limited involvement in Afghanistan's political affair. But, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979 saw the subsequent involvement of the U.S in the country through the channeling of funds and arming of local warlords and Islamic fundamentalist (Mujahedeen) for the aim of bring down the Soviet military and the Moscow backed regime in Kabul. As the Soviet troops ballooned, the Afghan resistance also grew. By the mid of 1980s, the fighting had caused unspeakable suffering on civilian population. With little chances of winning the conflict,

the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan with the signing of the Geneva Accords, which ends a long-decade conflict in Afghanistan (Huria, 2009:5; Stork, 1980).

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the country itself collapsed into virtual anarchy. Different factions of the Mujahedeen struggled for power in the countryside, while the government of Muhammad Najibullah, the last Soviet installed president controlled Kabul. In reaction to the anarchy and warlordism in 1994, a new group the Taliban (a movement of former Mujahideen mostly Pashtuns who were educated in Pakistan) emerged on the scene, which was funded by the U.S, Britain, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. With the aid of those powers, the Taliban captured Kabul, removed warlords and imposed strict form of Islamic government in the country (Gasper, 2001:7-8).

United States initially accepted the Taliban government (which took power in September 1996) with the hope that peace would be restored, considered vital for oil and gas pipeline. Unocal's oil and gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Indian sub-continent was U.S government's most priority. However, the relations between U.S and Taliban began to sour over a number of issues, primarily over Afghanistan's refusal to handover Osama Bin Laden whom the American accused of masterminding terrorist activities against U.S interests including bombing of the U.S embassies at Tanzania and Kenya. This resulted into American missile firing on Afghanistan in 1998 in which Osama escaped unhurt. Continuous support for terrorism, Human Right violations particularly treatment of women and refusal to accept broad-based government in Afghanistan were some of the other impediments to U.S-Taliban relations (Katzman, 2003).

The event of 11 September, 2001 (resulting of the total destruction of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, partial destruction of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C, and the death of nearly 3000 people) were the key symbols that U.S-led international military force publicly intervened in Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of the attack the U.S administration identified the "Failed State" of Afghanistan as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda terrorist groups, responsible for the attack. Subsequently, it launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by declaring "Global War On Terror (GWOT)." The military intervention in Afghanistan was unprecedented, it was a war taken by a state, directed primarily against a non-state actor,

operating within the territorial bounds of and supported by a sovereign state (Huria, 2009:1-2; Barakat, 2002).

America's stated war objectives in Afghanistan were capturing Osama Bin Laden, destroying Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups operating on Afghan territory, removing the Taliban regime, which was supporting the Al-Qaeda, and bringing a more democratic government to protect its political, economical and ideological interests in the country as well as in the region (Barton and Hippel, 2009; Bachar et al, 2010).

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

To further its strategic interests and national security (combating terrorism, arms trafficking and energy development) the United States intervened in Afghanistan twice in less than two decades: in fighting against Soviets and then the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the U.S administration with the support of NATO-led coalition forces launched OEF by claiming 'GWOT.' Subsequently, the operation toppled the Taliban regime and attacked the Al-Qaeda terrorist network hosted in Afghanistan by the Taliban (Huria, 2009; Feickert, 2006:1).

A significant U.S military presence in the country has been continued for a number of years as U.S-NATO forces and Afghan National Army (ANA) attempts to stabilize the country by defeating the insurgency, facilitating reconstruction and combating Afghanistan's illegal drug trade. However, the ability of the U.S-led international forces to achieve victory against Taliban and Al-Qaeda is limited. The intervention left the state for more weakened and conflict ridden. After initial military success, since 2005 the OEF and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have increasingly attacked by the re-emerging Taliban insurgents. In 2006 the international forces became involved in the heaviest combat engagements in Afghanistan since the beginning of coalition operation (Feickert, 2006; Noetzel and Scheipers, 2007)

In the absence of any clear post-intervention strategy the U.S-NATO forces also unable to control corruption in various state institutions, opium production spread in to the regional states and serious state or capacity building were not put in to practice. The military intervention has largely failed to accomplish its major goals: the United States and international coalition forces has been unable to pacify or bring security to much of Afghanistan; it has been unable to

eliminate the Taliban, which is regrouping; and it has alienated a growing number of Afghans, who are becoming impatient with the U.S military presence. The reconstruction effort also has come under criticism. Despite some progress; like ousting of the Taliban from power, adoption of the new constitution, and presidential and parliamentary elections, poverty remains, many children are still not able to go to school, and women still find their lives constrained (Bachar et al, 2010; Huria, 2009; Middle East and North Africa Encyclopedia, 2004).

On the other hand, the U.S-NATO efforts in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have been unsatisfactory. The lack of success results from the coalition's failure to develop and implement a jointly coherent strategy. On the other hand, in attempting to capture or kill Al-Qaeda or Taliban forces, the U.S-NATO military forces inadvertently has caused a number of civilian deaths and dropped bombs on the wrong targets, including as Red Cross house and a UN Ming removal office. This event undermines the U.S and coalitions effort to stabilize the country and region and has resulted in a decline in approval and support for international military force in the country. The death of civilians in the country have led the erosion of public support for U.S and NATO forces and in turn eroded the credibility of the international forces among the people (Their and Ranjbar, 2008; Noetzel and Scheipers,2007).

The U.S administration also faces key strategic and operational dilemmas about its further engagement in the war in Afghanistan. These includes clarifying U.S national interest in Afghanistan; defining clear strategic objectives based on these interests, determining which diplomatic, economic and military approaches to adopt and what resources commits to support those approaches; prioritizing "Afghanistan" versus other national security imperatives; and helping a coordination application of international efforts . For example, president Barack Obama, in a televised interview in February, 2009 admitted that the U.S had lost focus on its goals in Afghanistan and therefore, needed to "set clear policy objectives before coming up with a plan to bring American troops home." The main reason for the lack of attention of America towards the Afghan war has been the parallel invasion of Iraq in 2003, which diverts the attention of the administration from Afghanistan to Iraq (Dale and Bowman, 2009; Huria 2009; Noetzel and Scheipers, 2007).

Despite political, military and financial support from the U.S and international community a number of problems remain in the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA) that has been

slow to gain credibility in the Afghan people, in part because many Afghans believe this government has been externally imposed by the Americans without a natural constituency in Afghanistan. His personality, factionalism within the government, narcotic drug problem, questionable appointments and legitimacy, rampant corruption, slow progress in reconstruction and human development are some of the reasons for the public opposition against the Karzai administration (Middle East and North Africa Encyclopedia, 2004; Lafraie, 2009).

Generally, the study examines the major reasons or motives of U.S military intervention in Afghanistan, the main challenges facing U.S-led international forces to bring peace and stability in the country and the region, and it analyzes the political, economic, and social implications of the intervention for the regional peace in general and Afghans in particular; that means it justifies whether the intervention brings peace and stability in the region or not.

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

The study seeks to address the following general and specific objectives.

#### **1.3.1 General Objectives**

The general objective of this study is to assess and analyze the implications of U.S military intervention in Afghanistan for regional peace.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

In the light of the general objectives of the study, the specific objectives are the following:

- To identify the main factors of the U.S intervention
- To examine the current complex situations in Afghanistan
- To analyze the cost of the intervention
- To understand the implications of U.S intervention to the regional states
- To identify the existing challenges facing U.S military in Afghanistan

## **1.4 Research Questions**

Based on the above general and specific objectives of the study, the following research questions are posed.

- What interests does the U.S have in Afghanistan?
- How much costs that the U.S-led coalition forces and the Afghans' paid for the war?
- Is the U.S wining the peace in Afghanistan and the region?
- What are the challenges facing U.S military in Afghanistan?
- Why the U.S-NATO forces delay to bring peace in Afghanistan and the region?
- Did the U.S intervention in Afghanistan affect the regional states, and how?

## **1.5 Assumptions of the Study**

The U.S military has publicly intervened in Afghanistan since after September 11, 2001 attack of the World Trade Center in New York, and Pentagon in Washington, D.C, by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. The campaign was targeted to bring down terrorists in Afghanistan hosted by the Taliban regime. Concerning to the conflict in Afghanistan the study has made the following assumptions. First, the continued American military engagement in Afghanistan without any real solution on the horizon has changed the global public opinion about the war, and the agenda of U.S foreign policy toward a more realistic approach. Secondly, the peace and security of Afghanistan can not be achieved by military force alone; effective, civilian-directed elements of power should also be needed in abundance.

## **1.6 Method of Data Collection and Methodology**

### **1.6.1 Method of Data Collection**

To conduct the research the available data is collected mainly from secondary sources, which include books, journals, newspapers, magazines, annual and congressional reports, conventions and expert opinions, which is relevant to the problem.

### **1.6.2 Methodology**

The Methodology that the researcher applied is Qualitative, which is more of descriptive approach. According to Thomas (2005), the aim of the qualitative approach is to describe certain aspects of a phenomenon with a view to explain the subject under study so as to broaden the understanding of the issue involved. The qualitative approach is important for a research that is based on written documents such as books, journal articles, letters, official reports and historical documents. The qualitative methodology of data gathering strategy mainly requires descriptive and analytical tools in bringing the information at hand into meaningful and sound result (ibid). This approach also could be more suitable to address the stated objectives and research questions. This approach also could be more suitable to address the stated objectives and research questions.

### **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The study delimited to the U.S military intervention in Afghanistan mainly since 9/11 attack and its implication for regional peace (South and Central Asia). The challenges facing U.S military and its international partners to bring peace and stability in the country and the region in general is also part of the study.

### **1.8 Significance of the Study**

U.S military intervention in Afghanistan is a serious and current issue. Many civilians were killed by the insurgents (Taliban) and the U.S-NATO forces. Based on this the study have a significance in providing much information concerning to the current situation in Afghanistan and its effects on the regional peace.

### **1.9 Limitations of the Study**

To conduct the study the researcher has faced problems related with reference materials. Since the problem is current and continuing, the availability of books and other materials in the library and other bookstores are scarce .To fill the gap, the researcher was depending more on journals and internet sources. In addition, time, low access to internet, and lack of finance was also part of the problem. The inability to collect primary data through interview, questionnaire and/or observation was the other problem that faced the researcher

## **1.10 Structure of the Study**

The study consists of five Chapters. The first chapter is the introductory part, which includes background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, assumption of the study, methodology and method of data collection, scope of the study, significance of the study and limitations of the study.

The second Chapter is conceptual framework and literature review. The conceptual framework include concept of regional security complexes, which explains how one's states instability affects the region. The literature review part covers the external involvement in the Afghanistan internal affairs, events leading to the present situation, September 11 attack and U.S military campaign, UNSC response to the attack, and NATO command of ISAF in Afghanistan. The third Chapter analyzes the factors for U.S military intervention in Afghanistan, costs and international responses. The geo-strategic and economic interests of the U.S intervention, and human and economic costs of the intervention also addressed in this chapter.

The Fourth Chapter focused on the implications of U.S military intervention in Afghanistan for the regional peace and the challenge facing the intervening powers to promote peace and stability. This chapter gives much emphasis on the political, economical, and social consequences of the intervention on the regional peace. The chapter also assess whether the intervention brings peace and stability in the region or not. The last Chapter is conclusion and recommendation part of the study. It summarizes the main points of the study and focuses the key findings and conclusions that the researcher tried to address, and the possible suggestions being as a means to win the conflict in Afghanistan as well as the region.

## Chapter II

### Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

#### 2.1 Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) as a Conceptual Framework

In the first place and in security terms, a 'region' means a distinct and significant system of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked in to geographical proximity. Such relationships (amity and enmity) are confined in a particular geographical area, which made 'security complex' (Buzan and waever, 2003).

The concept of 'security complex' is a network of linear relationships among multiple components and interactions among system of security at different levels, and dimensions, from which result certain patterns in connections, structures and behaviors, in turn, interact with the internal and external environments of that security network. It also focuses on how parts of a system produce collective behavior of the system and how the system interacts with its environment (Tome, 2010:42).

Buzan and Waever (2003:43) identified security complexes as global and regional level. A global security complex in a holistic sense refers all the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global way of security interdependence. In this sense the glob is closely integrated in security terms.

In contrast, Buzan (1991) quoted in Morgan (1997:25) defined RSCs as:

a set of states with a significant and distinctive network of security relations that ensure that members have a high level of interdependence on security: a "group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities can not realistically apart from one an other. Thus the central element in RSCs is its security relationships and the elements of interdependence that concern security. In this states have intense conflicts, with resulting interdependence on security, yet have few interactions. States conceptualization of their interests and security, therefore, are now more regional in character.

Such complexes are held together not by the positive influences of shared interests, but by shared rivalries. The dynamics of security contained within these levels operate a cross abroad spectrum of sectors-military, political economic, societal and environmental. These security complexes are exposed to four types of threats and their interaction: balance of power contests between great powers; lingering conflicts which emerge between states; intra-states conflicts which are usually spillovers of internal politics; and conflicts which arise from trans-national threats caused, for example, by the rise of Islamic and informal networks (Buzan and Waever 2003).

The central idea in RSCs is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distance than long ones, security independence is normally in to regional based clusters; security complexes. Process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it. In other words, the RSCs, can be seen as a group of security dilemmas concentrated in to certain geographical area, where essential threat perceptions by states (or other actors), are so interlinked and create such strong security interdependence, that of a one state can not be easily separated from security of another (Buzan et al, 1998).

In the same fashion, Lake and Morgan (1997, 11-12) defined RSCs as follows:

a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanates from a distinct geographic area. In such complex, the members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact on the other.

Geography binds most members of a regional security complex together, i.e. Geographic proximity is one condition for a state to be a member of a complex. The formation of RSCs derived from the interplay between, anarchical structure, its balance of power, and consequence, on the one hand, and the geographical proximity, on the other. Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than among states located in different areas (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 12; Buzan and Waever, 2003:45).

As Walt (1987) cited in Buzan and Waever (2003:45) stated:

adjacent is potent for security because many threats travel more easily over short distance than over long once. The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, economical, societal and environmental sectors. Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yield a pattern of regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states in side such complexes than between states inside the complex and the out side of it.

When it comes to the concern of this research, Afghanistan which is located in South Asia is like most other post-colonial security regions came into being as a conflict formation. A long common history, cultural similarities, and ethnic ties on the one hand, and common economic problems and political instability on the other, have made regional states security complex, because each security concerns link them together to the extent that their national security could not be considered separately (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Mashali, 2008).

Afghanistan's politics has largely affected by its location between Central and Southern Asia making the country a zone of conflict. The cold war competition among external powers had a profound impact on the security of Afghanistan. In the contemporary times its RSCs stems from its proximity to some energy rich countries in Central Asia, making Afghanistan as an important rout for transporting energy recourses to multiple markets. Because of this the domestic turbulence in Afghanistan created another RSCs reflecting political fragmentation at the regional level (ibid).

The impacts of terrorist attacks on U.S homeland on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent intervention or 'war on terror' in Afghanistan has undoubtedly raised new security complexes in the region, trigger RSCs, and made many of the regional states worse. This region still fits military-political terms of RSCs. Starting from this Political fate of Afghanistan has always been inextricably intertwined with that of Southern and Central Asian states. These states have never been isolated from the problem of Afghanistan, no matter how strong or weak (ibid).

## **2.2 Literature Review**

### **2.2.1 The Involvement of External Powers in the Internal Affairs of Afghanistan**

Afghanistan's history is full of fighting, foreign interventions and perpetual instability. It's strategic-location at the crossroads of central, and southern Asia, and her economic dependence making the country a zone of conflict among external powers during various periods of history. In contemporary times its importance also stems from its proximity to some energy-rich countries in Central Asia, making Afghanistan an important route for transporting energy resources to multiple markets (Mishali, 2008).

Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Afghanistan's domestic affairs became severely aggravated by the increasing intervention of two imperialist powers-the British Empire and czarist Russia. Throughout this century, the competition between these powerful empires played a major role in shaping the borders of the evolving Afghan state. After realizing that direct control was unfeasible, the two imperialist powers' policies aimed at the formation of an Afghan state as a buffer between Russia and British India, employing both diplomatic and military means, which included three Anglo-Afghan wars. The creation of the Afghan frontiers at the close of the century was guided by the powers' military considerations and formulated by Anglo-Russian commissions, without Afghani participation. It was after the third Anglo-Afghan war, in 1919, that Afghanistan gained formal sovereignty and full control of its foreign affairs (Shughart II, 2002:1).

### **2.2.2 Events Leading to the Present Situation**

In the twentieth century, Afghanistan became an important Cold War battleground, resulting in an increased Soviet influence by the end of the 1970s. The nineteenth-century Great Game was upped with an even greater challenge, and once again, the intervention of major powers devastated the country and catalyzed violent conflict. As in other places in the world, the Cold War context, and particularly the growing Soviet role, which caused the 1979 invasion of the country affected the Afghan internal stability. The ideological rivalry and political competition between the two camps were the origin of the prolonged civil war and turmoil, which directly responsible for the present complex situation in Afghanistan (Maass, 1999; Mishali, 2008).

The Soviets, who lacked legitimacy on the part of the predominantly Muslim population, lost the resolve to crush the resistance. As a result of this the Soviets began to prepare their withdrawal. However, the Geneva Accords of April 1988 marked a turning point by providing a political framework for the Soviet troop withdrawal, but not for a permanent regulation of the conflict as such. The war was, however, soon resumed to receive in the downgraded version of civil war by the internal actors, who continued to receive support mainly from neighboring countries (Maass, 1999:65-66).

After the collapse of the Soviets and its communist-backed regime in Kabul, the Mujahideen based groups struggled to restore a functioning national government, the war sank in to international void. For this reason, the Western countries hardly took notice of the gradually increasing involvement of the country. The conflict reached on other turning point, in September 1996 when Taliban captured Kabul, which had obviously been masterminded with the assistance of external strategists. Reviewing the unexpected developments, the almost forgotten seventeenth-years-old conflict had covertly been transformed in to a highly externalized civil war. Compared to the initial phase, an even greater number of external actors are currently involved in the conflict: the neighboring states in a more direct and international players in an indirect manner (ibid).

In August 1998, as the Taliban was about to take over the entire country, U.S missiles destroyed camps near Kabul aiming for the response of Osama Bin Laden, who was accused of being responsible for the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. At this stage, U.S strategy was aimed not at the overthrow of the Taliban but at pressurizing it to turn over Bin Laden. American diplomatic efforts against the Taliban also led to UN economic sanctions against Afghanistan, starting in 1999. During the Taliban rule, however, up until the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack in the United States against the WTC and the Pentagon in September 2001, the major powers decreased somewhat their levels of intervention in Afghanistan, while regional powers increased their roles in the ongoing Afghan conflict. The U.S-led war on terrorism and its invasion of Afghanistan following the terror attacks of September 11 gave rise once again to the major powers' crucial role-playing in Afghanistan (Mishali, 2008).

### **2.2.3 September 11 Attack and the U.S Military Campaign**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the WTC, in New York, and Pentagon, in Washington, DC, was one of the horrible incidents in the 21st c. The attack drastically changed the whole scenario and the U.S once again revived its policy towards Afghanistan (Jabeen,et al, 2010:143; Woodgood,2002).

After the attack, the U.S decided to go to war against the Taliban regime when the Taliban immediately refused to extradite (handover) Al-Qaeda founder, Osama Bin Lade, whom the administration accused of prime authorship of the attack. The Bush administration decided that friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S forces could battle and search for Al-Qaeda activities in Afghanistan. In Congress, Res. 23 (passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House, P.L.107-40) authorized: all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons. As a result of this the U.S began its operation, OEF on October 7, 2001 after the failure of political and diplomatic efforts for solving the problem (katzman, 2003:8).

The administration's response to the attack was quick, wide-ranging and decisive. A full-scale campaign was launched, using all elements of national and international power. The campaign consisted of U.S air strikes coupled with U.S special operation forces working with the North Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces. A total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance to the U.S, including over flight, landing rights and accommodation. As a result of all these powers and OEF, the Taliban was removed from power, all known Al-Qaeda training sites were destroyed, and a number of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders were killed or detained (ibid).

In the first years after the attack, it became clear that America was going to seek out in the region to assist efforts to destroy the insurgent's bases and net works. Very quickly that objective was expanded to dislodging or crushing the Taliban, who have ruled most of Afghanistan in recent years who have provided Osama Bin Laden safe haven since 1997 (Gossman, 2001:8).

Is the U.S intervened in Afghanistan really for fighting terrorism? Regarding to the objectives of U.S intervention different views has posed. According to Afghan Study Group report, the U.S has only two vital strategic interests in Afghanistan: its first strategic interest is to reduce the threat of terrorist attack against the U.S. in operational terms; the goal is to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a “safe haven” that could significantly enhance Al-Qaeda’s ability to organize and conduct attacks on the U.S. The second vital interest is to keep the conflict in Afghanistan from sowing instability else where in Central Asia. Such discord might one day threaten the stability of Pakistan state and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. If the Pakistan government were fall to radical extremists, or if terrorist were able to steal or seize either a weapon or sufficient nuclear materials, then the danger of a nuclear terrorist incident would increase significantly. If it is therefore, important that U.S strategy in Afghanistan avoids making the situation in Pakistan worse (Afghan Study Group, 2010:4).

Beyond these vital strategic interests, the U.S also favors democratic rule, human rights and economic development. These goals are consistent with traditional U.S values and reflect a longstanding belief that democracy and the rule of law are preferable to authoritarianism. The U.S believes that stable and prosperous democracies are less likely to threaten their neighbors or to challenge core U.S interests (ibid).

Where as others argued, what ever the U.S government’s current rhetoric about the repressive nature of the Taliban regime, its long history of intervention in Afghanistan has been motivated not by the concern for democracy or human rights, but by the narrow economic and political interests of the U.S. It has been prepared to aid and support the most retrograde elements if it thought a temporary advantage would be the result. Now Washington has launched a war against its former allies based on a strategic calculation that the Taliban can no longer be relied up on to provide stable, U.S-friendly government that can serve its strategic interests (Gasper, 2001:9-10).

#### **2.2.4 United Nations Security Counsel’s (UNSC) Reponses**

The use of force against terrorism was implemented by UNSC after the commencement of attacks on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The U.S claims the right to use force against other states that are associated with international terrorism. Moreover, in the weeks that followed the

September 11 attack, the U.S had more than sufficient time to seek the SC's approval for an appropriate military response, as it has done with regard to actions other than the use of force. Thus, in one subsequent resolution (SC Res.1368 (Sep.12, 2001), the SC declared its condemnation of September 11 terrorist attacks and its continuing availability "to take all necessary steps in response. The SC Resolution 1368 calls all the member states to work together urgently to bring justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supplying or harboring (Charney, 2001:835; UNSC, 2001:1).

In a second resolution (SC Res.1373) submitted by the U.S and unanimously adopted on September 28, 2001, the council acted under Chapter VII to require all member states to prevent and suppress acts of international terrorism, especially by denying terrorists the use of the states territories and access to source of funding. This resolution also calls up all states to cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts (UNSC, 2001).

The passage of these resolutions illustrates the degree of international support at the UN for the opposition to terrorism. But the resolutions also clearly demonstrate that the U.S decided not to seek SC's sanctions of its use of force, preferring to take its own military actions without disclosing the factual basis for them (Charney, 2001:835).

However, on the October 25-27, 2001 symposium on U.S and international law quoted by Charney (2001:839) many answered (primary German international lawyers) that the U.S use of military force against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is not lawful under the UN Charter. They set the following prepositions that demonstrate the alleged illegality of U.S recourse to force:

- It violates the Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibition against use of force except when authorized by the SC under chapter VII.
- Self-defense may be exercised only against an attack by a state. Al-Qaeda is not the government of a state.

- Self-defense may be exercised only “until the SC has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Since the council took such measures in resolution 1373 of Sep.28, 2001, the right of self-defense has been suppressed.
- The right to self-defense arises only upon proof that it is being directed against the actual attacker. The U.S has failed to provide this proof.

Today, most states also seem to support such interpretation of Article 51. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the NATO member states have expressed their understanding that the incident of 9/11 amounted to an ‘armed attack’ against the U.S; the members of the SC, although not explicitly describing the 9/11 as an ‘armed attack’, carefully worded resolutions 1368 and 1373 so as to affirm the inherent rights of self-defense with in a context of broader response to terrorism (Svarc, 2008:35).

Most other states have not objected to the U.S claimed right of self-defense in response to this particular attack. Although many states and legal commentators have criticized the way the U.S military action in Afghanistan was carried out, they tended to limit their criticism in terms of choice of a target and the principle of necessity and proportionality rather than the question of whether an ‘armed attack ‘ by non state actors, triggering the U.S right of self-defense, occurred (ibid).

Others also argued that such a response without the authorization of the UNSC may undermine its mandate, because the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the charter clearly put, use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of another state must be authorized by the SC (ibid). UN Charter (Article 51) stated that:

nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

From the above controversy regarding to whether the U.S intervention in Afghanistan meets the requirements of self-defense, I see the gab from the two sides. First of all the defenders couldn’t show what type’s action should be applied after the attack, how to

use that force and where and when it should be used. On the supporters side (including the UNSC), didn't put the clear measures of the council, whether the U.S intervene or not rather the council criticizes the attack.

The Afghan neighbors were also alarmed about the U.S response. All the governments were attempting, varying degrees, to manipulate Afghanistan's factions and its political structure to their advantage. Pakistan, which was the most defender of the Taliban movement, now allied with the U.S-led coalition forces to extradite Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The central Asian states were highly supportive of the U.S in the wake of the attack and placed military facilities at U.S disposal for the use in the combat against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The reason was during the Taliban rule leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan grew increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements were receiving safe have in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2003).

The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India's goal is to deny Pakistan "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. A possible reflection of these ties is that Tajikistan allows India to use one of its air bases; Tajikistan supports the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance. India saw the Taliban's hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda's association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India (Katzman, 2007:32).

Iran and U.S also have common positions on Afghanistan, despite deep U.S-Iran differences on the other issues. U.S officials acknowledged working with Tehran, under the auspices of Six Plus Two contact group and Geneva group. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the war, and it also allowed U.S humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran (ibid: 21).

A number of considerations might explain why the Russia supported the U.S effort against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, including tacitly supporting- or at least not opposing the use of bases in Central Asia to conduct the war. Russia's main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the

further strengthening of Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. As a result of this Russia supporting the Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance. U.S-Russian cooperation led to the passage of UNSC Resolution 1267 and 1237 on “Harboring Al-Qaeda.” On the other hand, the U.S has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the Taliban or Al-Qaeda (ibid).

China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan Corridor”, and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al-Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in north western China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al-Qaeda ranks in the U.S-led war, China expressed its concern through active membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S military action against the Taliban by believing its strategic considerations, was worry of a U.S military built-up on its door step (AIAS and HCID, 2009; Katzman, 2003).

### **2.2.5 NATO Command of ISAF in Afghanistan**

ISAF was established in December 20, 2001 by the UNSC Resolution 1386. Its mission was initially limited to Kabul, to facilitate the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration. The UN, at the request of Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, asked for NATO’s participation in the operation. As a result of this NATO took over the commands of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan on 11<sup>th</sup> August 2003; in the first NATO deployment outside Europe and North America, with a mandate to disarm militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, provide security for elections and combat the narcotics industry. The ISAF includes troops from all twenty eight members of NATO alliance and has included troops from several non-NATO nations, such as Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Jordan, and Azerbaijan (Belkin and Morelli, 2009:9).

Overtime, NATO commanders’ layout and implemented four stages designed to bring all of Afghanistan under NATO’S operational responsibility. In stage one in 2003-2004, NATO moved in to the northern part of the country; France and Germany forces predominate in these areas.

Stage two began in May 2005, when NATO moved in to western Afghanistan; Italian and Spanish forces are the core of the NATO forces there. ISAF's task in stage three in July 31, 2006 was to bring stability to the southern part of the country, home of Taliban and where the writ of the Karzai government had been limited. In stage four, completed on October 2006, ISAF assumed control of U.S-led forces in Eastern Afghanistan (Bowman and Dale, 2009:14).

From the outset, NATO planned that ISAF operations in Afghanistan would have five phases. The first phase was "assessment and preparation", including operations in Kakbul. The second phase was ISAF's geographic expansion throughout Afghanistan completed in 2006. The final three phases would involve stabilization; transition; and redeployment (Belkin and Morelli, 2009:10).

At the start of 2009, ISAF was operating in phase three "stabilization" and NATO officials were reportedly discussing when to commencement of phase four the "transition" of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some ISAF officials have expressed the concern that an announcement that ISAF has entered "transition" could trigger a rush by some troop-contributing countries to phase five-redeployment." They caution in practice, the shift from stabilization to transition is likely to vary geographically across Afghanistan as the abilities of various ANSF to execute and then lead mission increase ,and to take place in first and starts, rather than at clear single point in time (ibid).

From the beginning NATO's commands of ISAF, political leaders and local commanders have had to deal with several significant issues which have influenced the implementation of the ISAF mission. In the initial two stages of ISAF mission, key issues focused on the use of Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) to stabilize and rebuild the country; overcoming caveats (restrictions) pushed by individual allies on the use of their forces; and managing the counter-narcotics effort. In stage three and four of the ISAF statement; a new organizational structure; security more troops; and the treatment of prisoners. Not all of these issues have been successfully addressed (ibid).

But NATO leaders faced considerable difficulty persuading some member states to contribute forces to ISAF. More importantly, however, significant problems had become and continue to

how some of those forces actually provided would operate once deployed. Many allies committed forces to the NATO operation, and then imposed restrictions- “national caveats”- on tasks of those forces could undertake. National “caveats” or restrictions that allied governments or their parliament’s places on the use of their forces continue to trouble ISAF. Some government’s troops lack the appropriate equipment to function with other NATO forces. Some nations will not permit their troops to deploy to other parts of Afghanistan. Still others prohibit their troops from participating in combat operations unless in self-defense (ibid).

## **Chapter III**

### **Factors for the U.S Intervention in Afghanistan: International Responses and Costs**

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section is factors for the U.S military intervention in Afghanistan mainly since 2001 highlighting the economic, political and security interests. The second section discusses the costs of the war. The human and economic costs considered in this section. The last section outlines the international responses after the war through the Bonn conference.

#### **3.1 Factors for U.S Intervention in Afghanistan**

##### **3.1.1 National Security Interests**

Security has long been by and large a matter of the formulation of foreign and defense policies of the state. Since the end of the Cold War, however, many security issues have become increasingly transnational. At the beginning of the 21st century the nature of security itself is changing on a global basis. Global terrorism together with more obvious risks from the spread of weapons of mass destruction becomes the security agenda of many countries in the world. Like any great power, security problems mainly “terrorism” challenge U.S national security in the same century (Conry and Pena, 2002).

This led U.S interventionism policy again in the world to protect its vital national security interests. The September 11, 2001 attacks of the WTC and Pentagon forced the U.S to conduct its realist approach in Central and Southern Asian states, mainly Afghanistan. The operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-led coalition forces intervened in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban, which supports Al-Qaida terrorist organizations hosted in Afghanistan. The attack reinforced the U.S proactive policy of preemptive military action. In 2003, the Bush administration launched a war in Iraq in the belief that Iraq was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the administration argued that Iraq was a home for terrorists and needed regime change (Jabeen et al, 2010).

During the attack many foreign policy analysts define U.S security strategy solely in terms of the terrorist threat of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. But, such thinking would not examine other day- to- day turmoil around the globe that threatens American interest. Instead of focusing solely on terrorism, the United States needs to formulate a viable national security posture to address the greatly changed strategic environment, of which the terrorist threat is only one component (ibid).

However the America national security is threatened by other security problems, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack was the worst in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To protect its strategic interest and national security the United States targeted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by arguing that national and vital interests were at stake. Since the attack, the former Bush administration has stated that United States policy toward Afghanistan focuses on the promotion of security (anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, combating drug trafficking), strategic interest, domestic reform, and energy development (ensuring reliable and economically viable access to global market and the use of energy to promote sustainable development) (Nichol, 2010; Osman, 2002).

The U.S also seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological and chemical weapon technologies, materials and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional interdependence by Iran. The attack led the administration to realize that it was critical to the national interest of the U.S that greatly enhances the relation with the region (ibid).

Generally, the central goal of U.S intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 has been to ensure the safety and prosperity of the American people. In practical terms, this means deterring or thwarting direct attacks on the U.S home land, while at the same time maintaining the long term health of the U.S economy, because a sound economy is the foundation of all national power and the ability to shape the global order and preserve their core values and independence over the long term (Afghan Study Group, 2010).

### **3.1.2 Geo-Political (Geo-Strategic) Interests**

Geo-strategically, Afghanistan straddles in between the Central and Southern Asia, in which regional powers (Central Asia dominated by Russia, Pakistan, and India) always had a special interest in the country due to its strategic importance. The interests have made regional players

and China to compete and come in to focus. The presence of U.S forces in Afghanistan is aimed at long desire policy to contain the regional powers and China's influence. The U.S is closely watching the co-operative framework between Russia, China, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (i.e. SCO), that resulted in the establishment of a new block in the region (khan, 2002).

The U.S led war in Afghanistan that deposed the Taliban government in 2001, has led to growing level of military engagement by U.S and NATO-led coalition forces and this in turn is countered by a number of non-state forces resisting domination and marginalization through unconventional strategies both military and economic. In addition to protecting national security that was threatened by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the intervention was targeted to control the region that many regional powers compete (ibid).

After September 11, 2001 attack and the invasion of Afghanistan, Bush introduced his doctrine, which was America's first attempt at a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. This strategy suggested that America has a broader interest in preventing the rise of any regional hegemonic power anywhere, especially one capable of threatening global stability through the use of force. Implicit in this formulation is a retention of the U.S role as the primary security arbiter in Afghanistan and maintenance of the U.S presence there as a symbol of a global American security commitment. In some respects it would be more accurate to describe this objective as a preserving U.S hegemony in the region (Mahdi, 2010).

Afghanistan, which links Central Asia and South Asia, is a strategic bridge of the great geo-political significance. Central Asia and South Asia are intimately connected not only geographically but also strategically. The Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have bordered with Afghanistan, Iran lies to its West and Pakistan to the East and South. With the corner of Afghanistan comes the control of the land routes between the Indian sub-continent and resource rich Central Asia, as well as a potential corridor to Iran and the Middle East. Thus, stability and peace in Afghanistan, and the region are a geo-strategic imperative for U.S interest (Sahgal and Anand, 2004:37).

The intervention enabled the super powers (U.S and its supporters) to plant its flag in the country, and at the same time, to extend its influence over Central Asia-a region of the world

where Russia still carries some weight and which China eyes with some interest. Deploying the United State's massive military might serve to secure its hegemonic power and to assist its allies to enhance their strength which is at the core of the agenda of Bush administration. So, its geopolitical presence enhanced the hegemonic power both regionally and globally (Muzaffar, 2007).

A more effective American policy in Afghanistan has a broad regional cast. The single-minded emphasis on apprehending Bin Laden is too narrow an emphasis. While this objective must be a priority, such as a police approach to dealing with the complicated Afghan issues is wholly inadequate to address the broad range of U.S interests now at stake in Afghanistan. The excessive American concentration on this tactical objective give way to a strategic design incorporating Bin Laden's apprehension inside a much more comprehensive policy framework geared to achieve the range of U.S interests in Afghanistan and the region (Tomsen, 2001:19)

### **3.1.3 Economic (Oil Security) Interests**

A few years ago, energy (oil) security figures prominently in the policy discourse of major governmental officials. In March 2001 President George W. Bush (quoted in Klare, 2008:483-484) said "energy security should be a priority of our foreign policy and it governs key elements of domestic policy." Similar views have been expressed by senior officials of United States, thus highlighting the importance now being accorded the energy issue (ibid).

U.S is the largest consumer of oil in the world and with the passage of time its domestic oil production would be further decreased .To fill the gap the U.S imports oil from the Persian Gulf and Central Asian countries. Unless the U.S increases efforts to develop alternative energy system, its reliance on foreign oil is likely to increase significantly. Security and removing oil from the earth in many parts of the world carries heavy security burden. Much of the world's oil supply lies in politically volatile regions. The U.S plays crucial role in ensuring that oil from foreign sources continues to flow (Sajedi, 2009).

In light of the persistent U.S dependence on foreign oil supplies, the U.S government has shaped foreign policy and enacted measures designed to protect the nation against future supply shocks. Painful lessons learned during the oil crises of the 1970s led to the creation of institutions such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and International Energy Agency (IEA) which would, in

theory, to ensure the continued supply of oil (International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA) (ICTA, 2005).

The significance of energy influenced U.S policy initiatives throughout the Cold War, and even after the Cold War was over. The prominent role of energy resource in the American economic position has affected the America's geopolitical priorities, as many of the world's largest reserves of oil are located in areas that are unstable or rife with internal division and destabilizing factors. The three major wars in recent U.S history, the Gulf war (1991), the war in Afghanistan (2001), and the invasion of Iraq (2003) were in oil producing regions and /or areas vital for energy distribution and transport routes (Mahdi, 2010:10-11).

After the September 11, 2001 attack Bush used the "War on Terror" to implement open door policy and meld priorities. The administration used the military to solve America's economic and energy problems by invading Afghanistan to control vital energy routes and resources, both as an end in itself (due to the economic and corporate benefits to the U.S) and a means to other, greater end (as control over global energy supplies strengthened America's imperial status). The invasion used to establish U.S bases close to Central Asia's oil rich region and held secure the region to build the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline and other important pipeline projects. Similarly the invasion of Afghanistan, and the establishment of U.S bases in the region for the first time, was beneficial for America's energy interests in the Caspian region (Cornell, 2004; Mahdi, 2010).

More importantly Afghanistan's position between Central Asia and South Asia (Pakistan and India) enables it serve as a link between the two. To the north, Afghanistan borders three of the five Central Asian countries that became independent when the Soviet Union broke up. Turkmenistan, its immediate neighbor to the North West, has immense reserve of natural gas. In its regional setting, Afghanistan is an energy bridge linking the gas resource of Turkmenistan and the energy starved economy of Pakistan and India. For more than a decade the U.S has been working towards a pipeline to move natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (Foster, 2008).

The proposed TAPI pipeline follows an ancient trading route from Central to South Asia. It will run from the Dauletabad gas field in Turkmenistan along the main highway through Herat,

Helmand, and Kandahara in Afghanistan, through Quetta and Multan in Pakistan; to Fazilka in India, near the border between Pakistan and Inadia (ibid).

When the Taliban was governing Afghanistan, the American firm led by Unocal consortium supported by the U.S government was negotiating with the Taliban regime to construct a \$ 4.5 billion oil pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan from 1997 to August 2001 during both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. But this would require a stable government in Afghanistan itself. Initially the Bush administration saw the Taliban regime as source of stability for the proposed pipeline, but, later the Taliban's conservative government was not interested for the proposed project. Due to this reason U.S negotiation with the Taliban broke down in August 2001, just before the terrorist attacks of september11, 2001. So, finishing the project and guarantying the stability by avoiding the Taliban regime was the day to day dream of U.S government. This long aim leads the U.S to intervene in Afghanistan (ibid).

Even though oil or gas is not the immediate reason for the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, the country has a long key place in U.S plans to secure control of the vast but land locked oil and gas reserves of Central Asia. Though the primary U.S motivation is to destroy Osama Bin Laden's sanctuary in Afghanistan, another, rather more pecuniary objective is also on the agenda particularly in the search for an alternative government in Kabul, which would cooperate with the U.S and bring stability in the country to protect U.S interest. Removing the Taliban from Kabul and the search for a new Afghan government on central stage was one criteria rich on Washington's mind will be how best to make Afghanistan safe for a couple of billion dollar pipeline investment (Tanter,2001).

The U.S Government Energy Information fact sheet on Afghanistan dated December 2000 as quoted by (Yechury, 2010:2) says that:

Afghan's significance from energy stand point stems from its geographic position as a potential transit rout for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. This potential includes proposed multi-billion dollar oil and gas export pipelines through Afghanistan.

It is chilling to realize that such cold-blooded pursuit of economic interest and profit defines U.S maneuvers in the region and its attacks on Afghanistan. That all this should happen in the name of grieving the death of nearly 3000 innocent American lives is plain cruelty. The world today is

being asked to side with the U.S in fighting against global terrorism. This is only a cover the world is being asked today; in reality to side with the U.S as it seek to strength its economic hegemony (Yechury, 2010).

### **3.2 International Responses and Bonn Conference**

Afghanistan is emerging from a period of several years of successive conflicts: the war against Soviet occupation, factional fighting among different groups after the Soviets withdrawal, and struggle against the oppressive regime of the Taliban that only came to an end in 2001 with the assistance of U.S and other foreign intervention. The intervention, however, did not only come for the benefit of Afghans who has suffered, it was largely motivated by external interests. Thus, removing the Taliban from power was not only the desire of Afghans who suffered from it; it has also become an international priority. With a major international threat being removed, Afghanistan has to be place emphasis on establishing such a democratic system that will guarantee internal stability and prospects for economic reconstruction even when foreign interests are no longer identical with in Afghanistan's concern (Prohl, 2004:2).

After the fall of Kabul on December 5, 2001 the UN sponsored the Bonn conference in November-December 2001 to decide on a plan for governing the country by defeating the insurgents, facilitating reconstruction, and combating Afghan's illegal drug trade. In addition, the participants of the Bonn conference have pledged to end the conflict, to promote national reconciliation, respect for human rights and guarantying peace and stability throughout the country and the surrounding areas (ibid).

The UN brokered Bonn Agreement (participants included representative Afghan opposition groups, and observers from representatives of neighboring and other key countries), which was mainly influenced by the desire of America, established the provisional arrangements for Afghanistan to create permanent government institutions. The Agreement called for establishment of an Interim Governing Structure and setout a time table for a transition to a more 'broad based gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government'. Bonn delegates chose pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai to serve as a head of an Interim Power Sharing Council, who took office in Kabul on 22 December 2001 (Johnson, 2006:3).

The Conference resulted in an agreement that set out benchmarks to establish key institutions of a sovereign and democratic state, including a transitional government, Presidential elections by September 2004, parliamentary and provincial council elections by October 2005, and rebuilding of ANA with members of 70,000. To provide security and to support the new regime, the UN authorized an International Force—the ISAF, with a mandate to maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas (Ayub et al, 2009).

In the Bonn Agreement the constitutional making process was also a core agenda. In his decree of October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2002 President Karzai mandated nine legal scholars, including two women, to form the drafting commission, which would draft the Afghanistan's new constitution. The preliminary draft produced by the Constitutional Drafting Commission was then taken over by a new commission, the constitutional Review Commission, mandated in a presidential decree dated April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2002 (Helal and Oates, 2004).

The Constitution making process which came to an end on January 4, 2004 recognized the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and equal rights and duties of woman and men. In addition to these equality guarantees, the constitution set out to embrace democracy, social Justice, Human rights and to respect international law, including Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHRs) (Prohl, 2004).

Article 35 of the constitution guarantees citizens the right to form political parties and set out basic rules for such parties. However, the constitution does not recognize the role political parties play within the democratic system, nor does it specify the rights of political parties to fulfill such a role. Being subjected to the legislative and executive political parties may not be truly independent and thus not able to contribute to the strengthening of democracy. Competition among political parties is restricted by the constitution to areas that are not based on regions, ethnicity, language, or religion. This also restricts pluralism of the system (ibid).

Even though the 2009/2010 Presidential and Parliamentary elections were considered to be a major step in Afghanistan's political development (it was the first post-Taliban election run by the Afghan government itself in the form of Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission) (AIEC), there were assertions of lack of credibility of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), because of most of its commissioners, including the chairman were elected by and

politically close to Karzai. This election fraud has contributed to the substantial parliamentary opposition to many Karzai's nominees for his post election Cabinet. Regarding to human rights, none of the Afghan government specifically changed Afghanistan's human right practices. Human right record remains poor, limited steps to increase religions freedom, killing of many civilians by Afghan security forces, local factions, insurgents and U.S-NATO forces (Katzman, 2010).

Despite the achievement of some major political milestones including ratifying a new constitution and holding presidential and parliamentary elections, progress to date in extending rule of law, establishing effective governance, and furthering economic development has been relatively limited. Mean while, for several years, practitioners and observers have expressed concerns about a worsening security situation on the ground, including the greater frequency and sophistication of attacks exacerbated by the ability of insurgents to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan. The consistent failure to ensure security and rule of law has undermined the publics trust in the Afghan government and its international partners (Bowman and Dale, 2009).

The Karzai government has always been confined to Kabul, and the power of the Central government has been dependent on constant negotiations with regional and local power holders. The state building process also brought with it new challenges: corruption is on the rise, linked to organized drug-related crime is undermine the integrity of Afghan institutions, and the abusive behavior of Afghan security force is undermining the legitimacy of Afghan government. In addition, the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan may not have been of international design, political decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the U.S-led international military have decisively contributed to the obstacles faced to day. For example, not fruitful attempt was made to broker a peace agreement between the working factions in Afghanistan (Ayub et al, 2009).

Creation of new Afghan National Army was also conceptualized at the international conference in Germany in December 2002. At the conference, sometimes referred to Bonn II, the new interim government of Afghanistan and participating donor nations "agreed that the new Afghan army should be ethically balanced, voluntary, and consists of no more than 70,000 individuals. At these conference the participants agreed up on an initial force structure and primary roles for the ANA with the mission of provide security for the central government and protect the political process as defined by the constitution; replace every other militia and organized military forces

in the country; fighting insurgents and terrorists; and work closely with coalition and other international forces (ibid).

### **3.3 Costs of Afghan War**

The war in Afghanistan, titled “OEF”, is one critical response of the United States to the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S committed itself to a military operation with the initial objectives of destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, capture of Al-Qaeda leaders, cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan, and prevent Afghan chaos from destabilizing its neighbors and economy (Biddle, 2009; Afghan Study Group, 2010).

According to National Council of Churches Governing Board (NCCGB), despite the high profile spins in Washington and Kabul about progress made in Afghanistan, the Afghan people and the international community witnessed and suffered on intensifying armed conflict over the past years. Now a time the war continues on several fronts due to a growing resurgent presence by Taliban forces in the country. The cost of the war to the United States, the coalition forces as well as to the Afghans itself is measured in terms of human life and economy (national resources). The costs on both resources have been staggering (NCCGB, 2010).

#### **3.3.1 Human Costs**

The war (2001-present ) has caused the deaths of thousands of Afghan civilians directly from insurgents and foreign military action, as well as the Afghan civilians has been died indirectly as a consequence of displacement, starvation, disease, exposure, lack of medical treatment, crime and lawlessness resulting from the war (Gines, 2010).

As Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM) (ARM, 2010:2) verified and figure out:

1,074 civilian people were killed; over 1,500 were injured in armed violence and security incidents only from 1 January to 30 June 2010. This shows a slight increase in the number of civilian deaths compared to the same period in 2003 when 1,059 deaths were recorded. Unsurprisingly the numbers of civilians killed by the insurgents were significantly higher than those killed by pro-government Afghan and foreign forces....Civilian deaths to insurgents who have been accused of showing little or no respect to the safety and protection of non-combatants in their armed rebellion against the government and its foreign supporters. The indiscriminate and widespread use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) caused more deaths and miseries to

Afghan civilians than any other fighting tactic....Suicide attacks were the second most deadly fighting incident.... The June 9th purported suicide attack during a wedding ceremony in the Arghandab District in Kandahar Province, was the deadliest incident in the first six months of this year in which dozens of civilians, many of them children and women, were killed and wounded.

Similarly, reports from UN Agencies (cited in American Friends Service Committee) (AFSC) (AFSC, 2009:3) showed that:

after eight years of war the number of civilian deaths, kidnappings, car bombings and raids is at the highest point since 2001.... In 2008 the number of civilian deaths increased by 40% over 2007. Airstrikes are particularly lethal, causing two-thirds of casualties by pro-government forces. Civilian deaths occur as a result of violence on all sides of the conflict. While the U.S and NATO are responsible for many Afghan deaths, the Taliban and other insurgents are responsible for as many or more civilian deaths.

In the war, not only Afghan civilian had lost their lives. The U.S -led coalition members also killed due to the continuing attacks of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups. The continuing strengths of insurgents mainly since 2005 caused coalition casualties in Afghanistan. A number of the NATO- coalition forces in Afghanistan was killed, taking the total number of foreign troops killed in 2010 to 700, by for the deadliest year of the war since the Taliban was toppled in 2001. In 2010 was the most violent year in Afghanistan with more than 600 Coalition fatalities (of which more than 400 were U.S. service members, and more than 90 were UK service members) (Hoehn and Harting, 2010; Korski, 2008).

Apart from billions of dollars the U.S has spent on the war in Afghanistan since 2001, the cost in terms of lives has been staggering. More than 2,070 coalition members were killed between 2001 and 2010, with American accounting at least 1,275 of those deaths. Afghan troops and civilians, U.S troops, coalition troops, contractors and journalist accounts at more than 19,600 (NCCGB, 2010).

### **3.3.2 Economic Costs**

Even though opinions may differ on whether the war in Afghanistan is justified from moral, political or environmental viewpoints, the economic impact of the conflict is undeniably significant. American economy has been suffering from effects of the war, and there is

tremendous concern arising from the huge sums of money spent every month financing the war. The war has also sparked debate on how war time spending really affects national economic prospects? Does it help the economy in the way that WWII arguably ends the Great Depression? Or does it hurt the economy through wasteful spending as has been said of the first Gulf War? Here the war has negatively impacted U.S, coalitions and Afghan economy, which can be seen by examining its effects on individual elements of the economy (CSUB, 2010).

One reason the war in Afghanistan has negatively affected the U.S economy is because of their significant impact on the Federal Budget. When the war began, the Bush administration severely underestimated the enormous amount that would be spent toward the war effort. The conflict is not only hurting the economy by way of Federal Budget, but through decreased household spending as well. The warfare is taking a toll on imported crude oil prices which has negative impact on the economy. Crude oil prices have spiked since the beginning of the conflict. The American economy continues to suffer from financing the “war on terror.” Many aspects of the economy have been negatively affected, including the government budget, house hold spending, oil prices and national debt. Left unchecked, the enormous spending on the war effort will create a monstrous national debt that will have to be paid off by the future generations (ibid).

With the Afghan surge, the U.S will spend almost \$ 100 billion per year in Afghanistan with a stated primary purpose of eradicating the Al- Qaeda. This amount of dollar per year is more than the entire annual cost of the Obama administrations new health care plan. The money that could be used to better counter global terrorist threats, reduce the \$ 1.4 trillion annual deficit, which may used to repair and modernize a large portion of U.S infrastructure, radically enhance American educational investment, launch massive new projects-like efforts on energy alternatives research or be used for other critical purposes. As a result of this, the U.S military budget has grown from \$ 370 billion 2000 to \$ 707 billion in 2011, and the current Middle East war is now the second most expensive war in U.S history behind only WWII. The Afghan war is more expensive than Vietnam and Korean wars combined, and it is the longest war in U.S history (Afghan Study Group, 2010).

The cost of Afghan war has risen dramatically since FY 2006 as troop levels and the intensity of conflict has grown, increasing from \$ 19 billion in FY 2006 to \$ 60 billion in FY 2009. Assuming administration requests are approved, total war funding will rise to \$105 billion in FY

2010 and \$ 119 billion in FY 2011. The cost increases reflect not only higher troops levels and more intense operations, but also substantial increases in amount to train Afghan forces, more expensive transportation cost for equipment and supplies, more difficult terrain, and establishing new facilities (Belasco, 2010:16).

**Table 1:** Estimated war funding by Operations, Agency, and Fiscal Year (FY):FY2001- FY 2011 Request (CRS estimates in billions of budget authority in Afghanistan)

Operation and source of funding	FY 01 & 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08	FY 09	FY 010	FY 2011 request	Com. Enacted: FY01-FY010	Cumulative total: FY01-FY10 including request
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	37.2	40.6	56.1	99.5	113.5	314.8	428.4
State/ USAID	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	2.7	3.1	4.9	4.6	20.2	24.9
Medical	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.0	2.1
Total	20.8	14.7	14.5	20.0	19.0	39.2	43.2	59.5	104.9	119.4	336.0	455.4

**Source:** (Belasco, Amy, 2010: 14). The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11

**Remember:** CRS combined funds for FY 2001 and FY 2002 because most were obligated in FY 2002 after the 9/11 attacks of the end of FY 2001.

The war in Afghanistan did not only endanger the U.S economy rather it led the collapse of the Afghanistan economy. To survive and provide their basic needs many of Afghan farmers were forced to grow opium for export. Cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan have skyrocketed since the Taliban were toppled, such that Afghanistan now supplies 92% of the world’s illicit opium. The expanding opium trade is threatening to destabilize the Afghan

government and in turn the conflict ridden countries back into a safe haven for drug traffickers and terrorists, this also weakens its economy (Glaze, 2007; Wall, and Byrd, 2001).

To day Afghanistan's economy is in a state of collapse. The drought and resulting famine, the ban of opium production, the choking of trade via Pakistan, and the massive displacement of population have exhausted what coping capacity was left among families and civil societies. Basic infrastructure- roads, bridges, irrigation, canals, telecommunications, electricity, and markets-have been destroyed. This economic situation has significant regional spill- over effects through unofficial trade, narcotics, terrorism and extremism, financial flows, and movement of people (Wall, and Byrd, 2001).

## **Chapter IV**

### **Implications and Challenges of U.S Military Intervention in Afghanistan for Regional Peace**

This chapter examines important issues concerning U.S military intervention in Afghanistan and its implications on the peace and stability of the region (South and Central Asia). It discusses the political, social and economic consequences of the intervention. Finally, the chapter explains the challenges facing the U.S-led coalition forces in promoting peace and stability in the country as well as the region.

#### **4.1 Regional Implications of the Intervention**

In the conceptual framework part, as Buzan and Waever argued security concerns mostly travel short distance than long ones. Threats are therefore occur in the region. One's states instability and insecurity are not restricted into internal struggle. Rather, it spreads to other states in the region, i.e. instability inside one country (for instance, Afghanistan) may possibly spillover and raises challenges in neighboring states (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Based on this analysis (premise) this chapter mainly focuses how the conflict in Afghanistan after the U.S military intervention affects the peace and the security of Southern and Central Asian states.

Thought the Taliban regime was ousted in 2001 by the coalition forces, the continued instability and interethnic conflict throughout the country are still there. The intervention once again pushed Afghanistan in to a new phase of insurgency, civil war and insecure state, where Taliban and Al-Qaeda loyalists continue to launch attacks against government and coalition forces, and the new government struggles to restrain the influence of regional warlords (Mishali, 2008:473).

But this unstable and troubled situation would not remain confined with in Afghanistan itself; rather it has caused new security problems in Central and Southern Asian states. As a result of the account of a number of factors, like geographical proximity and ethnic similarity (kinship ties), the long standing conflict in Afghanistan has had spillover effects in these region. In fact, the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan has assumed a regional character. What appears now in

regional states is escalating of conflicts among states and Islamic groups allied with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The impact has not only regional dynamics and their bilateral relations, but also, most significantly on their domestic politics as well (Mishali, 2008:473; Jabeen et al, 2010).

As unstable state sharing largely porous borders with Pakistan (2,400km), Turkmenistan (744km), Uzbekistan (137km), and Tajikistan (1,206 km), the war in Afghanistan necessarily affects all these states, particularly in threats of terrorism; religious extremism; smuggling and drug trafficking; refuge movements; migration, security, and also faltering commitments to democratic and economic reforms (Tamang, 2009; Nichol, 2006; AIAS and HCID, 2008).

Broadly speaking, the U.S-led coalitions' intervention in Afghanistan with the aim of promoting peace and stability by eliminating Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces has brought enormous political, economic and social consequences in the region. The conflict forms the core of a regional conflict formation, including the continuing challenges in Tajikistan, the growing conflict led by the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan involving several states, process of political decay in Pakistan, and insurgency in Kashmir (Rubin et al, 2001).

#### **4.1.1 Political and Security Implications**

The U.S intervention in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks serves new security problems in South Asia, particularly on Pakistan and India. The two countries have found difficulty in the U.S war on terrorism. Since then the South Asian security calculus changed in unexpected ways, and brought serious consequences (Raghavan, 2004:147).

The U.S-led 'war on terrorism' has affected Pakistan as much as Afghanistan. Military sweeps in Afghanistan have pushed Taliban and Al-Qaeda across the mountainous areas straddling the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan (north-western Pakistan). This massive infiltration of insurgents has caused several major consequences in Pakistan. One has been that it brings Pakistan forces in to conflict with tribal population in regions traditionally off limits to Pakistan officials. Pakistan-based radical Islamic groups with Al-Qaeda links use violent methods in surrounding areas in the pursuit of a theocratic and Islamic state in the country. The presence of large pashtun population on both sides of the border offered the country as a safe haven for the

Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters running from Afghanistan. The prevailing religious extremism and the large chain spread the mujahedeen with open arms. This creates domestic tension among the government and militants in Pakistan (Nichol, 2010; Musarrat, 2007; Nayak, 2005).

After the fall of the Taliban, many of them and their Al-Qaeda allies retreated in to Pakistan and linked up with their supporters there, creating further prospects for domestic instability. In addition there were ongoing instability in the southern provinces of Baluchistan and Sind that sometimes looked like civil wars and growing securitization religious identity by open violence between Pakistan's dominant Sunni Muslims and its Shia and Christian minorities (Buzan and Waeber, 2003:107).

Pakistan has been a front-line state in the 'war on terrorism' since the tragic September 11, 2001 attacks. Musharraf initially cast his lot with the U.S mainly as a result of deep fears about what U.S enmity might imply for Pakistan's long-standing rivalry with India, efforts at economic revival, nuclear weapons program, and equities in the conflict over Kashmir. Describing to protect Islamabad itself in the campaign against terrorism, Musharraf reluctantly cut loose Islamabad's ties with the Taliban- a force it had nurtured, trained, and equipped for almost a decade in its effort to secure control over Afghanistan. The U.S inauguration of the GWOT forced Musharraf to make good on his "principled" decision on to join the U.S-led coalition (Tellis,2008:8).

This inevitably required him to confront the source of terrorism that had developed with in Pakistan, most of which ironically resulted from his own army's previous decisions to nurture radical Islamist organizations because of their utility to Islamabad's military campaign in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Four different terrorist groups were implicated in this regard: domestic sectarian groups, anti-Indian terrorist groups, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which were engaged in violent bouts of bloodletting within the country and caused serious challenge to domestic order. The groups violence in Pakistan is staggering, with hundreds of people killed or injured in such attacks each year. In one incident, for example, sectarian hostility in the town of Parachinar in the Kurram Agency involved a five-day war, where small arms, mortars, rocket

launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles were all used in a convulsive spasm that claimed hundreds of lives and injured many more (ibid:9).

In turn, Pakistan's government cooperation with the coalition forces gave rise to popular resentment and hatred of the Pashtun population against the army and the Musharraf regime. According to a survey conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), cited in Ahmad, about 18% of Pakistan Madrassas have affiliations with Jihadi and Sectarian groups, 78% of Madrassas are against Pakistan's role in the war on terror and 81% against military operations in tribal areas; and 20% consider the current insurgency a direct reaction to Pakistan's role in the War on Terror. These factors have resulted in the local Taliban gaining strength. They consider it a war against Islam and against the Pashtuns. All these events created internal extremism and terrorism, which destabilize the country (Ahmad, 2010:107).

Pakistan launched military operations there in response to U.S. pressure but intensified them only after several assassination attempts on the president in December 2003. The concentration of militants in Pakistan threatens its domestic stability, which results in law and order breakdown in the country, and risks making it the new regional center for terrorism. Terrorism and Islamist factional violence in Pakistan, of course, predated 9/11, but the 'war on terrorism' evidently has spurred new cooperation there between domestic Islamist groups and foreign terrorists. Domestic controversies over the country's regional policy shifts also encouraged some part of the Pakistan establishment to keep Islamabad's option open by discreetly retaining ties to Taliban remnants and to military groups operating in Kashmir, and to turn a blind eye to activities by all these elements in Pakistan (Nayak, 2005:5).

Warlordism is also another political consequence (impact) of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. However, the problem dates back during the war against the communist regime and its supporting Soviet army, the current problem of warlordism is a result of U.S. policies in its 'war on terror'. Since 2001 the U.S. had relied on the former local commanders for dislodging the Taliban. In doing so, the commanders were able to re-establish themselves with the help of American financial and military assistance. The absence of international forces and weak central government in Kabul encourage them to assert their power and influence and occasionally

engaged in wars with each other. In this time the Karzai government controlled only one-third of the country. The remaining two-third of the Afghan territory was under the control of tribal leaders and the Taliban forces (Lafraie, 2009:104).

The power vacuum, which was immediately filled by hundreds of commanders as well as tribal and religious leaders together with the Taliban and other regional movements, like IMU and IJU, the local warlords destabilize large part of the region and stressed the major security threat, because a failure to stabilize Afghanistan in turn destabilize Pakistan, India and Central Asian states, emboldening jihadists and weakening their military and intelligence service to take on Islamic militancy (Schetter, 2007).

According to Human Right Watch (HRW) annual report political repression, human right abuses, and criminal activities by warlords are the main problems that Afghan and regional states has faced. Such crimes include rape, murder, illegal detention, forced displacement, and human trafficking in women and children. All these have severely damaged the legitimacy of the Karzai government and its foreign supporters and have contributed the resurgence of Taliban and other regional insurgency groups (HRW, 2005:240-241).

The Islamic groups that fled north wards from Afghanistan to neighboring countries after the U.S-led international military action increasingly restrict cross-border movements and trade and their clamping down on religious and political freedoms, which exacerbate the regions vulnerability to crisis. Adding to this, the intervention discouraged foreign investors and impede the domestic economic activity in the regional states due to the political uncertainty (ILO, 2003).

Suicide bombing in Pakistan is also another impact of the U.S intervention. Pakistan had suffered by suicide bombing incidents since January 2009, killing at least 465 and injuring more than 11201. Not surprisingly, these incidents far exceed those in 2008, when 28 attacks occurred over a longer period, from January to the end of August. While the average death toll was reported to be 24 a week and 83 per month during the first 100 days of the year, it has now increased to 90 deaths a month. Pakistan is indeed facing an unprecedented wave of suicide attacks for a couple of years now. The tactic first appeared in 2002 in Karachi, in a controversial suicide bombing

that led to the killing of 14 people, including 11 French engineers of the state firm, involved in the sale of Agosta submarines to the Pakistani army (Lanche, 2009:1).

On the other hand, India might seem to present a similar picture, with unstable government's serving as a backdrop to ethnic and religious domestic political violence. The long running insurgency in Punjab, which was costing several hundred lives per year, peaked since 2001, because the U.S presence in Afghanistan after the attack gave India an expected opportunity in its own war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The violence in Kashmir, which was more closely tied in to Indo-Pakistan relations rumbled on with high casualties, and periodic crises. Also wording was the florining up of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims, and its association with the so called Hindu Nationalist Parties, BJP (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

The Indian government joining with the U.S-led international forces brought the country to be the target of Pakistan-based Islamic groups in Kashmir. The Kashmir insurgents whose connection with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda caused a serious problem in India. For example, on December 13, 2001 attacks on the Indian's parliament and the subsequent January 2002 attack on the Kaluchak army camp (Raghavan, 2004:149).

The attack, facilitated by Kashmir insurgents supported by Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces not only caused internal instability, rather it opened conflict with Pakistan, because the Indian's parliament attack ordered the government mobilization its military along the Indian-Pakistan border. In light of each country's possession of nuclear weapons, the Indian mobilization raised the prospects of war between India and Pakistan spiraling toward a nuclear exchange. Given its new regional relations, the proximate cause of India's 2002 military mobilization essentially landed the U.S in the middle of zero-sum contest between India and Pakistan, making one of the most irreconcilable conflicts in the world. This clearly indicated that the U.S intervention in Afghanistan created new security problems between the two countries (ibid).

During the war in Afghanistan since 2001 Central Asia is experiencing challenging times. It is still in the midst of a problematic transition towards democracy and a market economy. The deteriorating socio-economic and political situation, affecting in particular employment, social

protection, social dialog and governance. One of the negative repercussion of U.S military intervention in Afghanistan since 9/11 is that Central Asian governments, under the pretext of the security threat posed by Islamic radicals, which attempts to stop cross border movements and suppress religious and political expressions. This can be destabilizing the internal and regional security at a time of high unemployment, economic disillusionment, breakdown of law, corruption, and political tensions (ILO, 2003:19).

Following the intervention there was considerable growth scale of 'Islamic' threat in the Central Asia. It is currently embodied in two radical Islamic organizations, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party). The IMU, a militant fundamentalist group, declared that its goal was to overthrow the Central Asian governments and established Islamic states, is supported by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. It is active in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and also responsible for regional destabilization. The IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) have become even more closely allied with international terrorist groups, particularly, Al-Qaeda, which have expanded their activities beyond Central and Southern Asia to other areas of the globe (Nichol, 2010; ILO, 2003).

Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), another radical Islamic group in Central Asia, active in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan seeks to unite all Muslim countries in a unitary Islamic state ruled by Shariah law and thereby challenges the secularism and even existence of Central Asian states. The group supported by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces presents a more complex problem. It seeks to replace the regimes of the region with a supranational Islamic caliphate. The groups have experienced terrorist or insurgent attacks in the recent past. Most activists come from radical groups based in the Fergana Valley, a region split between the three countries. Governments in the region claim that attacks in 2006 were perpetrated by affiliates to the IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Hill, 2003:11).

If we elaborate further, the Afghan conflict has posed a challenge the Central Asian countries-Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan-to deal with the practical aspect of coping with possible spillover of turbulence into the region. The Afghan conflict negatively impinging on their security includes: (i) the threat of religious ideology affecting the domestic political

cleavages; (ii) the threat of Central Asian states getting drawn into the “narco-corridor” originating from Afghanistan; (iii) the threat of trans-border terrorism, especially in the wake of Wahhabi activists’ presence in Afghanistan; (v) the threat of refugee influx. They have found themselves being encircled by an arc of crises in the immediate neighborhood torn apart by internal conflicts-encouraged by religious extremism, drug trafficking and external pressures of different kinds (ibid).

For example, on April 1, 2004 serious bombings and armed attacks were launched in Uzbekistan reportedly forty seven people killed. In this the Islamic Jihad Groups of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a break way part of IMU) claimed responsibility and subsequently attempt to overthrow the government. This group was trained and aided by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The same is true for the 2005 violence and 2009 bombing in Uzbekistan by Islamic groups, which results the death of dozens or hundreds of civilians, were trained and supported by the international terrorist group, Al-Qaeda (Nichol, 2006:6).

#### **4.1.2 Economic Implications**

As its history demonstrates, opium production and its trade have played a central role in the politics and geopolitics of Afghanistan. It is not a new trend. In 1970’s Afghanistan has positioned themselves as the main source of opium poppy (Corti and Swain, 2009).

The U.S-led military intervention campaign in Afghanistan that collapsed the Taliban regime initially pledged and promised to destroy drug trafficking (‘war on drugs’), but the situation has not changed. Since 2001, Afghanistan has become synonym with “narco-state” and the world’s largest producer of opium. The power vacuum in Kabul following the overthrow of the Taliban regime has enabled Afghan farmers to replant opium poppy. So, cultivation and production of opium have significantly increased since the intervention. In addition, opportunities for drug trafficking has diversified since the intervention. There is evidence that more narcotics are being produced in the north of Afghanistan and trafficked to Central and Southern Asian countries (ILO, 2003).

In 2009 the Afghan drug economy reached the highest level in the history of modern drug trade (92 percent of the global opium poppy cultivation, especially the world's deadly drug-heroin). This opium production shifts to Central and South Asian states. These countries have already become key smuggling routes for opium and heroin that comes from Afghanistan. Many heroin laboratories have emerged on the border with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, India, Pakistan and in other neighboring countries. Approximately forty percent of Afghan's heroin trafficked in to Pakistan, and twenty five percent flows in to Central Asian states. Surprisingly, the human cost of addiction in consuming countries is higher than the number of soldiers killed in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2009; Brown, 2010).

According to American Institute of Afghanistan Studies and the Hollings Center for International Dialogue (AIAS and HCID) drugs from Afghanistan not only supply a domestic market but also are traded onward to Turkey and Europe. Many smuggling routes run through the tri-border areas of Baluchistan, which demarcate Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. The trade helps fund a secessionist Baluch insurgency that is opposed to the Islamic Republic (AIAS and HCID, 2010:8).

The overthrow of the Taliban has had an impact on trends in drug production and trade. Central Asia become a more important smuggling route , and the impact of drug trade in the region is expected to grow due to the fragility of the local economy and weakness of governance structures required to tackle the problem. Tajikistan's economic dependency on drugs trafficking makes economic reform more difficult. In an environment controlled by criminals and penetrated by the drug trade, economic activity becomes embedded in violence and crime. The illicit drug in Central Asia, with drugs trafficking groups taking advantage of ethnic ties to promote opium poppy cultivation. Although the Tajikistan government has taken important steps to challenge drug smuggling, the political and law enforcement establishment itself is undermined by involvement in the trade (I LO, 2003; Glaze, 2007).

The presence of large scale drug production in Afghanistan and other neighboring countries threaten the security and economic interest of the region. The anti-American Taliban strengthens its insurgency campaign by driving both vast financial profits and great political capital from

sponsoring the illicit economy. The strengthened insurgency in turn threatens the vital U.S objectives of counter-terrorism and the regional stability. The large scale trafficking of drugs undermines these goals by fueling wide spread corruption, encouraging crime and violence (Brown, 2010).

It also increases insecurity in the form of drug addiction (especially of heroin) and the spread of HIV AIDS in the regional states. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are easy targets for drug traffickers, and the spread of illicit drug trade had had serious implications in the region. It expands organized crime, exacerbates political and social instability, contributing to institutional decay, and failure of economic productivity. The significant drug related informal economy also undermines the democratic process in Central and Southern Asian states, and causes serious law and order challenges. It is argued that the drug trade has increased ethnic rivalries and armed conflict in the region. For example, the drug had played a great role for the 2005 revolution in Kyrgyzstan (Corti and Swain, 2009; UNODC, 2005:147).

After the intervention the economic situation in Pakistan becomes shaky. Moreover, the infrastructure of these areas is also damaged due to the continuous bombing and militancy, and thus everyday life has become miserable. Local business suffered, especially in Mingora and some settled areas of Swat and Dir. Some developmental projects could not be initiated due to security issues. The terrorist and counter-terrorist actions in the tribal areas also have badly hampered the educational system of this area, which is already facing high illiteracy rates. The minimal educational infrastructure existing in these areas has been damaged by the militants. This persistent uncertainty stops students from attending educational institutions (Ahmad, 2010: 108-109).

#### **4.1.3 Social Implications**

Migration is part and parcel of the Afghan social and cultural land scape. Although Afghan migration has occurred since the 1970s, the recent attacks against the United States and its allies have rendered the situation of Afghan refugees one of primary international concern. The attacks of the WTC and Pentagon in September 2001 and the subsequent intervention of international coalitions led by the American forces, bringing the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of a

government in Kabul backed by the international community in winter 2001-2002 set the stage for a new era filled with hope for peace and prosperity. But, following a new deterioration of the security situation, the migration of the people has increased (AIAS and HCID, 2008).

Increased civilian casualty as a result of U.S-NATO forces produced displaced populations, many spilling into neighboring countries or oscillating within border areas. The increasing magnitude of forced displacement as people escape from violence (which in many instances resulted from a state's failure in conflict resolution) critically challenges the security and stability of the region. The increased socio-economic and political instability following the intervention generated large outflow of Afghan refugee. However, after the attack against the United States, the situation in Afghanistan 'spun out of control', with refugees largely trapped inside Afghanistan because of closed borders in neighboring countries. Intense fighting during the intervention forced many flee to their neighboring countries (Tamang, 2009; AIAS and HCID, 2008).

According to the Office of United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2009) (quoted in international Crisis Group (ICG) (ICG, 2009:1) stated that:

on the eve of the Taliban's ouster in 2001 as estimated one million Afghans were internally displaced; almost six million had sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran, the main refugee hosting countries. Other Afghanistan migrants opted to get refugee in Central Asian countries, and more than hundred thousand migrated beyond the region.

With the increased political, economic and security challenges facing the karzai's administration and the international community in Afghanistan, the impact and implications-negative of Afghan mobility on domestic and regional stability have a great concern. The migrations of many Afghans into neighboring states caused instability by way of rapid urbanization, that contributing to poverty, unemployment and criminality. In addition, the mass migration of Afghan refugees caused serious problems includes; economic burden, law and order problem, aggravated drug trade and increased unemployment (de Bree, 2008; ICG, 2009).

## **4.2 Challenges to Bring Peace and Stability in the Region**

### **4.2.1 Lack of Domestic Public Support**

After September 11, 2001, the U.S policy emphasized bolstering the security of the regional states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, arms trafficking and energy development. The administration's policy also aims to integrate these states in to the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of fundamentalist and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. However, its initial 'successes' in ousting the Taliban from power, American post-intervention policy has challenged by different factors. The Taliban has regrouped and regaining its influence among the local population and across the states border, in Central and Southern Asia (Huria, 2009; Nichol, 2006).

The Taliban now holds a permanent presence in 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent in 2008. The main reason for the failure and growing public disillusionment was the increasing of civilian casualty. The U.S and NATO forces have used massive, mostly disproportionate air power and ground troops in their fight against the insurgents in Afghanistan. The use of aerial bombings, especially unplanned air strikes, has caused massive civilian deaths, exacerbating the problem and fueling a public backlash (Huria, 2009:2).

The insurgents also have done their bit to contribute to ballooning civilian casualty figures. They often deploy their forces in populated villages with specific aim of using human shields toward off U.S and NATO attacks. Indiscriminate bombings and a hapless civilian caught in cross-fire between the insurgents and foreign forces, has led to a significant diminishing of support for U.S forces and alienated the people from Karzai government (ibid).

The U.S-led NATO force's carless bombardment and shootings are not the only problem. Those mistakes as well as their abuse of human right and treatment of prisoners and their lack of sensitivity to Afghan cultural and religious values have certainly played a central role to public opposition. The Afghan's collective memory about outside intervention is also contributed for the public opposition. Afghanistan has been subjected to foreign invasion through out its history. The Russian invasion is not even an old and still fresh in Afghan minds. The British invasions

may be more than hundred years in the past, but not totally forgotten. With such collective memory, the Afghan people see the U.S intervention as aggression; and the U.S intervention has been far from benevolent (Lafraie, 2009:111).

The lack of legitimacy of the Karzai administration is also another reason for the Afghans' distrust to the U.S and coalition forces. Wining the presidential elections in 2004 with 54 percent of the vote seemed to enjoy wide spread popularity and legitimacy. Unfortunately that image did not last long. The level of public participation in the parliamentary elections in 2005 decreased to a little over 50 percent compared to over 75 percent in presidential elections. This showed that the Afghan people losing faith in Karzai administration (ibid: 108-109).

The intensification of the Taliban insurgency in the South and East part of Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 raised further questions about Karzai government's legitimacy. In addition, the newly introduced 'freedoms' together with the presence of a large number of foreigners in Kabul and other major cities have resulted in the presence of alcohol consumption, prostitution, satellite television and even domestic television programs contrary to the Afghans religious and cultural norms. All these factors forced the people to side with the Taliban, which is responsible for regional instability together with IMU and IJU. So, without the support of Afghan people it is difficult for U.S and international forces to bring peace and stability in the country and in the region (ibid).

The international community insisted on the presidential elections in 2009, allowing them to take place. However, their free and fair character was highly doubtful in the view of many Afghans and the international community and the UN ended up being blamed for their flaws. The effect of these elections may well be that the country is going to be more than ever politically divided into two parts: Pashtun and non-Pashtun. Furthermore, this could very possibly unite all groups of Pashtuns behind stronger elements, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e- Islami and jihad groups -even those who are secular nationalist and progressive democrats (Masadykov et al, 2010).

#### **4.2.2 Lack of Coherent Strategy and Coordination among U.S-Led Coalition Forces**

The U.S-led international force's mission in Afghanistan currently found difficulty. The shortage of troops and resources for combat operations is a serious issue facing the mission in Afghanistan since it has intervened in the country. The primary reason for this was the parallel conflict in Iraq, which diverts the War on Terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq that captured the attention of Bush's administration, other policy makers and the public. Yet the operation is hampered by a more fundamental difficulty, the actors involved in the coalition failed to develop a coherent approach concerning the question of how to achieve Alliance and coalition objectives in Afghanistan. This lack of coherence among coalition partners manifests itself at various levels in different forms (Noetzel and Scheipers, 2007).

Since France and Germany had vocally opposed the invasion of Iraq, and European public opinion was also against it, the United States could not obtain the same security commitment from them for the war in Afghanistan as it might have secured in the absence of Iraq war. The national interests and respective public opinion of Germany, France and some other European NATO members have prevented them from proactively participating in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The Bush administration unilateral invasion of Iraq, collateral damage in NATO operations and the rising death-toll of NATO troops in Afghanistan have influenced public opinion and state policies of NATO's major European allies, creating the continuing NATO troops shortage problem in Afghanistan (Ahmad, 2009:3).

However, the coalitions' initial success in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, in achieving a satisfactory level of security in Afghanistan and throughout the region remains limited. The lack of success results from the coalition's failure to develop and implement jointly a coherent strategy for Afghanistan that integrates counter-insurgency, counterterrorism and stability and reconstruction operations. The coalition's internal cohesion regarding the development of the Afghan operation is becoming increasingly fragile. The willingness to share risks has become a key issue. National caveats are increasingly disputed. Not all NATO member states are prepared to send their forces into combat. This puts the fundamental principle of alliance solidarity on the line (Noetzel and Scheipers, 2007).

The decision-making disagreement among NATO members provides an opportunity for insurgents to influence NATO's strategy-making process. In particular, insurgents selectively target individual member states in their attacks in order to affect public opinion and make it more risk-averse. Thus, the Afghanistan operation clearly demonstrates the limitations of NATO's consensus-based decision making process. It places clear limits on NATO's ability to successfully develop and implement a coherent strategy. The evolution of the Afghan operation shows that NATO is ill prepared to conduct a large-scale and complex stability and reconstruction operation that requires its forces to be capable of sustaining counter-insurgency campaigns. These difficulties are multiplied by the coalition's inability to agree on a joint perception of the conflict in Afghanistan. Overall, the multi-faceted nature of the Afghanistan operation makes it difficult for coalition members to generate the necessary political will to raise the necessary resources to make progress towards agreed operational objectives (ibid:8 ).

This lack of a joint strategy enables coalition partners operate on the basis of different legal frameworks, which are reflected in their respective national mandates for military operations in Afghanistan. A large gap exists between the coalition's ambitious stability and reconstruction objectives on the one hand and its limited willingness to devote resources on the other. In the initial planning stages for the war in Afghanistan, coalition member states agreed that a sound strategy had to include and combine combat operations, stability and reconstruction efforts and humanitarian relief (ibid).

When under the mandate of OEF American and British forces entered the military campaign on 7 October 2001, policy-makers and the armed forces had prepared for initial combat operations and also for short-term humanitarian relief. However, it remained unclear how the long-term issue of sustaining a stability and reconstruction operation for Afghanistan was to be addressed. Efforts towards developing a comprehensive strategic approach that would involve stability and reconstruction operations started only months after the military operation already had begun. Right from the start, reconstruction efforts lacked the necessary degree of coordination and political support. As a result, the coalition forces' initial military successes could not be translated into sustainable degrees of security and stability throughout the country and the region (ibid: 2- 4).

### **4.2.3 Ethnic Similarity and Lack of Regional Cooperation**

Afghanistan contains many ethnic groups, which also exists in Central and Southern Asia. From its population of 26 million, 200,000 ethnic Kazakhs, 3.5 million ethnic Tajiks, 1.6 million ethnic Uzbeks and smaller groups of ethnic Kyrgyz and Turkmen, and others the Pashtun ethnic groups which also found in Pakistan (Gasper, 2001; ILO, 2003).

The closed society (shared identities and aspirations) and strict adherence to cultural values and socio-cultural affiliations of Central and Southern Asian countries forced the local people on the side of the insurgents rather than the coalition forces. The regional governments have faced a broad-based political backlash against their counter-terrorism cooperation with the United State. People of the region criticize their government's support for the U.S-led coalitions in Afghanistan; because they fear that the Western based international intervention would threatened and disapprove their culture and religion (Lafraie, 2009; Nayak, 2005).

Pakistan's tribal border regions have become a safe haven for Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other insurgents, which has become the most potent danger to the NATO-U.S mission in Afghanistan. The same Pashtun tribes straddle between Pakistan and Afghanistan helped for the growth of Taliban-led insurgency, which has increased its influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan's tribal regions, and in the frontier province (Ahmad, 2009).

The unrecognized and porous nature of the border between the two countries, the mutual ethno-tribal affinity of Pashtun populations living across it had served as a sanctuary for Taliban. Due to this reason it is unthinkable to stop cross border trafficking of Taliban and their allies to Pakistan. So, it is difficult for U.S- led coalition forces, Afghan and Pakistan governments to alienate the Taliban insurgents from the Pakistan pashtun ethnic group. Security problems become worse in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of cooperation between the two ethnic ties (ibid).

Similarity of ethnic identity is not the only problem; rather the lack of coordination among the regional states would be the main. The western frontiers of Pakistan with Afghanistan, known as the federally administered tribal areas, that are vastly unpoliced region are now a sanctuary for

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other interconnected militant groups. Using sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, Taliban and Al-Qaida have been able to maintain and directing the organization's operations around the world, because the Pakistani government has never effectively controlled its autonomous tribal territories. As a result of Pakistan's failure to combat Taliban insurgency in its own border, U.S-NATO mission in Afghanistan find difficulty to destroy the insurgents (CATO Institute, 2008).

Although under the influence of U.S-NATO forces Pakistan tried to prevent its tribal regions bordering Afghanistan from acting as a major sanctuary for Taliban-led insurgents, the action against them was unable to harboring Al-Qaeda terrorists, because there is no serious action taken against the Taliban by the Pakistan government. Since the present civilian government came to power in March 2008, it has intensified security operation in tribal and frontier areas, and adopted novel strategies such as launching local tribes against Taliban insurgents. However, due to public opposition, because of the instances of collateral damage from these attacks and growing public concern about the violation of country's sovereignty, the Pakistan government was unable to neutralize the local people from Taliban threat (Ahmad, 2009).

The coalition's failure to address economic distress, drug trafficking, forced migration and insurgent's movement inside their countries and through out the region are reasons for the decline of public support for the coalition's intervention. Due to this opposition, regional governments reduce their attention to fight insurgents on their border. The regional conflicts and tensions had also played a great role for decline of cooperation among each other against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Some regional governments support insurgent movements, war lords and local militias, which had linked with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Such kind of competition among regional powers further damage the security and stability of the region by strengthening the power of the insurgents, particularly Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and other groups (Ahmad, 2010; Nichol, 2006).

#### **4.2.4 Geographical Barrier and Suicide Bombing**

U.S-led coalition forces find it difficult to combat terrorist tactics, such as suicide bombings being employed by Taliban and other insurgents in recent years. Because, Taliban and their

insurgent-terrorist allies essentially pose a tactical rather than a strategic threat to the Afghan government and NATO mission in Afghanistan. They are opting at guerilla warfare, which is facilitated by Afghanistan's unique rugged mountainous terrain. Currently the U.S-NATO coalition forces unable to prevent or preempt the terrorist tactics adopted by Taliban and their insurgent allies, such as suicide bombings targeting troops as well as people, international or Afghan security forces (Ahmad, 2009).

The primary aim of suicide missions in Afghanistan is to terrorize the international security forces, and the Afghan people, so that the troop-contributing nations can be dissuaded from making additional military commitment to the war in Afghanistan and the wider Afghan populace can be forced to opt for a political settlement in Afghanistan conducive to politically pragmatic or religiously regressive ambitions of Taliban and their affiliates. Obviously, the forces of insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan capitalize upon NATO's internal strife about the mission in Afghanistan. Suicide bombings have military and human costs on NATO mission and the Afghan government (ibid).

Broadly speaking, insufficiency of NATO troops, especially for combat operations; relative failure of security-sector reforms; crisis of leadership and governance in post-Taliban Afghanistan; Taliban's resort to terrorist tactics like suicide bombings; drug trafficking acting as a major source of insurgent financing; Taliban's resurgence in Pakistan's tribal and frontier regions and its linkage with Afghan insurgency; Pakistan's inability to combat its own Taliban insurgency in its tribal regions; and negative public perceptions about NATO mission in Afghanistan, and Pakistan are the main obstacles confronting U.S-led international forces to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as in the region (ibid:3).

## **Chapter V**

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

#### **Conclusion**

To further its strategic interest and national security, the United States intervened in Afghanistan twice in less than two decades. First in fighting against the Soviets and its backed government, then the Taliban. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 attack the U.S administration identified the failed state of Afghanistan as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda terrorist group. Subsequently, with the support of NATO-led coalition international forces, the U.S launched OEF to capture Osama Bin Laden. Despite, its initial success in ousting the Taliban from power, American post-intervention policy has floundered terribly in the country. It left the state more weakened and conflict ridden.

Within ten years of the U.S-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan the regional states continues in turmoil, insecurity, violence, civilian casualties and failure of efforts to build stable political system. The country has witnessed a growing Taliban insurgency and expansion of guerillas that has gained momentum in the border areas that destabilize the country and the region. At the present time Afghanistan is the greatest challenge to the international community. Pledges made by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan political structure, transform its economy, and liberate the masses were not put into practice. The country continues to be confronted by a weak, ineffective and corrupt government and increasing opium trade.

Huge amount of money have been given to rebuild Afghanistan's shattered infrastructure and economy, however, most of the money allocated for Afghanistan has been spent on military operations whereas reconstruction and development has been slow. The escalating conflict and unresolved concerns with in Afghanistan caused new security challenges for the regional states. The Taliban forces fled from Afghanistan and have sanctuary in the border tribal areas destabilizes the peace and security of the region. Threats of terrorism, religious extremism, refuge movements, smuggling and drug trafficking are some of the problems that regional states has faced.

This study concludes that the U.S-led military intervention in Afghanistan has never benefited neither for the intervening powers nor the Afghans themselves, because the intervention is unable to bring peace and stability in the country as well as in the region. However, in the present case, in the absence of a well thought withdrawal plan by foreign intervening powers, instability and chaos will continue in Afghanistan. The condition in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew clearly indicates how the country was in turmoil and civil war. If U.S and international forces will do the same, it is easy to assume what will happen in Afghanistan.

So, the administration needed clear policy objectives before withdrawal of the troops. The new Obama administration must clearly define its policy in Afghanistan by addressing key issues that the Bush administration ignored. Strengthening the Afghan government, accelerating training of the Afghan forces, reducing corruption, working with friends and increasing economic development and negotiating with Taliban and other local warlords will be given priority.

Lessons learned from the Soviet defeat clearly showed that military action alone couldn't bring real solution for the current problems in Afghanistan and the region. Once the military option was adopted, how ever, there was no way to end the conflict. This was due to the Afghans collective memory about outside intervention, which is the main important factor for the resurgence of the Taliban insurgency responsible for regional instability. No military campaign can be successful without the support of the masses. In such situation, it is important for the U.S government to switch to other policy options along side the case of force. As a result of this, the real solution to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as in the region should not have been only military force; rather it needs diplomatic commitment (reconciliation) between local warlords, insurgent groups and the Karzai government.

In addition, making a sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan needs greater regional diplomacy and a regional approach. So, United States should learn the value of working with friends in settling the conflict and promoting peace in the country as well as in the region. Military engagement alone therefore, will not promote the country and region's future security and stability, the interest of its neighbors also played a great role in ushering instability in

Afghanistan and the region, because building a stable region will depend upon building Afghan security capacity, a credible Afghan government, and stable life of the people.

In doing so the Karzai government must share governmental powers for local people, insurgents and local warlords. All those groups must be able to participate in their government at all levels. This should be done through creating more avenues for Afghans to influence local bodies, through elections rather than appointment, informal consultations with different communities, and the empowerment of lower bodies through greater budget control.

The elected provincial councils, for example, should be given greater authority to provide and determine their affairs within their provinces. And at the district level and below, until elections occurs bodies such as the community councils should be consulted and empowered. To make it fruitful and to control corruption and lack of responsiveness to the public, the international community will take a highly centralized system of governance and the U.S-led international forces continue to engage in primarily short-term crisis management rather than long-term planning for a politically and economically sustainable Afghan nation state, despite Afghanistan and the region needs long-term stability.

Finally, the Afghan leadership may not have the political will to disrupt the current system, and the international community may not have sufficient strategy, policy coherence, or political will to implement significant reforms. But local, accountable, civilian-based and effective governance is the only means for the success of peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region-not tactical military victories. The Taliban recognize this reality and are already waging a political war, not just a military one. So, the international forces must do the same to reform the Afghan government and building its capacity and legitimacy.

## **Recommendations**

The security in Afghanistan is currently deteriorating. This situation has had negative political, economic and social repercussions for the region and thus has created hatred among the people. As a result the study proposes the following recommendations being as a solution to the problem.

- The study agreed that future efforts to rebuild stability in Afghanistan should be addressed in a regional context. The country should insist that it has a place at the table because its importance to the region and the region's importance to it are no longer in question. So, U.S administration should move from fighting with Iran and other regional players. Working with regional players interested in Afghan stability, particularly the Central Asian states, Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran and China should be given priority.
- The international actors should develop a coordinate plan for development that ties the whole region together economically. The most effective investments for improving Afghanistan's economy may be achieved by assisting its neighbors and giving them a stronger stake in Afghanistan's successes. Economically, the Afghanistan's long-term economic prospects will only improved by tying more closely to a regional economy.
- By the time the Karzai administration had lost the public trust. So, to get the heart of the mass people the civilian based government should be established in Afghanistan. That means the Afghan people should engage in any serious state or capacity building in their own country.
- To mitigate the current problem the international community should attempt to stripe away the pashtun tribes from the Taliban support base through national reconciliation program.
- In regarding to drugs the U.S policy should not be totally alienating the Afghan farmers from the opium production. Since the farmers are so poor alienating policy will turn many people towards the Taliban for the protection of their opium crop. So, to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan as well as in the region the U.S administration should re-think its policy with regard to opium production that has unable to control.
- The international actors involved in the re-construction efforts should be cognizant of indigenous system. For instance to get the trust of many citizens the Afghan administration system should incorporate their cultural and religious aspects in all political activities.
- The international community should meet the immediate needs of the Afghan people. This may includes launched several projects in the affected areas; like schools, clinics, hospitals, infrastructures and others.

- Expanding the opportunities for the Afghan people to participate in their country's reconstruction should be given priority, because building a stable Afghanistan will ultimately depend up on its security capacity, a credible Afghan government, and viable life opportunities for the people with sufficient stakes built in for them.
- Greater regional diplomacy and a regional approach to Afghanistan have become imperative, especially since Pakistan's tribal areas have become a sanctuary for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

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## **Declaration**

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all source of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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Birku Adugna

April 2011

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

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Prof. K. Mathews

April 2011