



Socio-Economic Security Problems of the Murle and their Neighbours across the Ethiopia - South Sudan Border

TASEW TAFESE GASHAW

A Dissertation Submitted to
the Institute for Peace and Security Studies

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy (Dr. Phil) in Peace and Security Studies, Faculty of Social
Sciences

Addis Ababa University
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
08 March 2019

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School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by **Tasew Tafese Gashaw**, entitled: **“Socio-Economic Security Problems of the Murle and their Neighbours across the Ethiopia-South Sudan Border”** submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Studies complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the socio-economic bases of the Murle and their neighbours across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, in relation to security problems. The borderland people narrated their hostile relations with the Murle by referring their pervasive practices of cattle raiding, child abduction, and violent confrontations. Taking the case of the Murle and their borderland neighbours, following an ethnographic approach and adapting qualitative research methodology, data was gathered from members of the local community, humanitarian organizations, and officials across the border. Pertinent literatures were discussed on three themes, i.e., intergroup conflicts, contemplation of state borders, the socio-economic interactions, and finally assessed the gaps of intellectual discussion regarding the socio-economic security problems across the border. Data analysis and interpretation was situated thematically. For those people across the border cattle, children, and land are the base of their economic asset. However, the borderland people are affected by intrinsic cultural assumptions such as – the Murle people believed that “all cattle in the world belong to them and need to collect cattle from other places and communities and follow a philosophy of enlarging their population to have enough potential to bargain the available natural resources”; the Jikany-Nuer predominantly depend on cattle while the Anyuua believe that land is their sole property. To secure their intrinsic cultural assumption, they developed survival struggle mechanisms – the Anyuua used defensive and preservation mechanisms; the Jikany-Nuer used protection and expansion mechanisms; and the Murle used collection and monopolization mechanisms. These complicated socio-economic interactions of the Murle and their borderland neighbours imply a security problem which is exacerbated by human security threats. The local government is unable to mitigate these threats and security problems due to the challenges of border porosity, South Sudanese instability, state-customary disintegration, and fractured relations. The main predator of the borderland socio-economic threats and security problems are the Murle youth. They infiltrate the Ethiopian border to raid cattle, abduct children, and confront the defenders. The main factors of their instigation are their idleness, widespread poverty, economic deterioration, and socio-cultural disorder. Moreover, the Murle red chiefs’/kings’ traditional system is malfunctioned by stripping its power since the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan colonial period; which eroded their cultural power to manage their youth that they categorized into age-groups.

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Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii
Acronyms	ix
List of Table	xi
List of Figures	xi

Chapter One

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Background of the Study	3
1.2 The Ethiopia-South Sudan Borderland Peoples' Conflict Trajectory	7
1.3 Statement of the Problem	11
1.4 Objectives of the Study	15
1.5 Research Questions	16
1.6 Significance of the Study	16
1.7 Description of the Study Areas and Rationale of the Study	18
1.8 Scope of the Study	23
1.9 Limitations of the Study	24
1.10 Structure of the Study	26

Chapter Two

Empirical Review Literature	29
2. Conflict Experience in Africa	29
2.1 Intergroup Confrontations	34
2.1.1 The Nature of Conflict and Insecurity	34
2.1.2 Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in East Africa	37
2.1.3 Pastoralism and its Violence Interaction	42
2.1.4 Practices of Cattle Raiding Among the Pastoral People	46
2.2 Contemplation of State Borders	50

2.2.1	The Nature of International Border	51
2.2.2	The Pre-Colonial African Borders	54
2.2.3	Colonial Border Design in Africa	57
2.2.4	The Circumstances of Borderland Security.....	60
2.3	Borderland Social and Economic Circumstances	64
2.3.1	Social and Economic Settings of the Borderland People	64
2.3.2	Ethnic Boundaries among the Borderland People.....	68
2.3.3	The Dynamics of Ethnic Polarization	71
2.4	Gaps of Intellectual Discussions	74

Chapter Three

3.	Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks	78
3.1	Conceptual Framework and Operationalization of Key Concepts.....	78
3.2	Theoretical Framework	85

Chapter Four

4.	Research Methodology	91
4.1	Methodology	91
4.2	Research Approach.....	93
4.3	Methods of Data Collection	93
4.4	Sources of Data, Sampling Technique and Size, and Target Population	95
4.4.1	Sources of Data	95
4.4.2	Sampling Techniques and Size.....	96
4.4.3	Target Population	97
4.5	Reliability and Validity of the Data	98
4.6	Procedures of the Study.....	99
4.6.1	Research Ethics	99
4.6.2	Research Materials	101
4.6.3	Contacts with Informants	101
4.7	Data Collection and Analysis	102

Chapter Five

5. Historical Background of Border Delineation.....	103
5.1 The Ethiopia-Sudan Border: Historical Overview	105
5.2 The Gambella Front Border Delineation.....	110
5.2.1 Territorial Expansion of British across the Gambella Front	115
5.2.2 Campaigns to Rescue the Raided Cattle and Captives' People	120
5.2.3 Campaigns to Territorial Rearrangement across the Gambella Front.....	122
5.3 Historical Problems of the Borderland People	128

Chapter Six

6. Demographic and Socio-Economic Background.....	134
Introduction	134
6.1 Demographic Composition of the Borderland People	135
6.1.1 The Murle People	136
6.1.1.1 Origin, Social background, and Geographical Locations	137
6.1.1.2 Social Structures of the Murle People	142
6.1.1.3 Ecology and Economic Base of the Murle People.....	153
6.1.1.4 The Socio-Economic Significances of Cattle to the Murle	156
6.1.2 Neighbours of the Murle People in the Borderland Region	159
6.1.2.1 The Anyuaa People: Geography, Socio-Politics, and Economic Bases	161
6.1.2.2 The Jikany-Nuer: Geography, Socio-Economic Base, Significances of Cattle	171
6.2 Socio-Economic Contact of the Murle with their Neighbours.....	176

Chapter Seven

7. Problems, Manifestations, and Challenges	179
7.1 Problems	179
7.1.1 Cantankerous Relations of the Murle People with their neighbours.....	179
7.1.2 Threats of Human Security among the Borderland People.....	182

7.2 Manifestations	185
7.2.1 Infiltrators' of the Murle Youth	185
7.2.2 Cattle Raiding and Child Abduction	191
7.3 Borderland Challenges	197
7.4 The Governments' Effort to Tackle the Problems and the Challenges	201
7.4.1 Borderland Resource Management and Cooperation	202
7.4.2 The South Sudanese Government Efforts	205
7.4.3 The Ethiopian Government Efforts	207
7.4.4 Security Sector Reform (SSR) of Ethiopia and South Sudan	209
7.4.5 Gaps in Governments' Efforts	211

Chapter Eight

Part I: Analytical Discussions, and Problems and Impact Analysis	213
8.1 Analytical Discussions	213
8.1.1 Colonization and its Influences on the South Sudanese Chiefships	213
8.1.2 The "Beir Patrol" Fierce against the Murle	217
8.1.3 Power Stripping from the Murle Red Chief – <i>Alan ci merii</i>	220
8.1.4 Social Stigma and Actions of the Murle Against their Neighbours	223
8.1.5 Tactics of the Murle Youth Infiltrators to Raiding Cattle	225
8.2 Analysis of the Underlying Problems	229
8.2.1 The South Sudanese Political Instability	229
8.2.2 Borderland Development Challenges	232
8.2.3 Division of the Murle People and their Marginalization	235
8.2.4 Malfunctioned of the Murle Chiefship System	240
8.2.5 Exclusion and Idleness of the Murle Youth	244
8.3 Analysis of the Underlying Impacts	248
8.3.1 Structural Violence Against the Murle	248
8.3.1.1 Socio-Political Violence against the Murle	248
8.3.1.2 Massacres against the Murle Civilians	252
8.3.2 Social Disorder, Poverty, and Insecurity	254

8.3.3	Family Disconcertedness and Social Instability	256
Part II: Critical Understanding to the Ethiopia - South Sudan Border		260
8.4	The Role of Murle during the Sudan Civil War and Onwards	260
8.5	Factors affecting the Borderland People Socio-Economic Security	264
8.6	Socio-Economic Security Dynamics across the Border	266
8.6.1	The Socio-economic Development Gaps from Ethiopian Side	267
8.6.2	The Socio-economic Development Gaps from South Sudan Side	270
8.7	Exogenous Factors to Ethnic Cleavage among the Borderland People	273
8.8	The Current Situations of the South Sudanese Stability	276
 Chapter Nine		
9.	Conclusions, Recommendations, and Policy Options	279
9.1	Conclusion	279
9.2	Recommendations	282
9.2.1	Mitigate the Challenges of Cattle Raids and Child Abductions	282
9.2.2	Alternative Situational Analysis to Understand the Murle Area	287
9.2.3	Develop a Suitable Conditions to Utilize “Soft Border”	289
9.3	Policy Options	292
	References	301
	Annexes	328

Acronyms

ARRA	Administration of Refugee and Rehabilitation Authority
AU	African Union
AUBP	African Union Border Program
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSA	Central Statistics Authority
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAPCCO	East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
ERSPF	Ethiopian Regional States' Police Force
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GPAA	Great Pibor Administration Area
GPNRS	Gambella Peoples' National Regional State
GPNRSAC	Gambella Peoples' National Regional State Administrative Council
GSR	Gambella Security Reform
HIU	Humanitarian Information Unit
HoA	Horn of Africa
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
IBRU	International Border Research Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IES	Institute of Ethiopian Studies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
JSDSSAC	Jonglei State Director for Security and Small Arms Control
LGA	Local Government Act
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NALA	National Archive Library Agency
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PCDP	Pastoral Community Development Programs
PDF	Pibor Defense Force
RECSA	Regional Center on Small Arms

RIV	Rift Valley Institute
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SNNPRS	Southern Nation, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State
SPLA/IO	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLA/M	Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army/Movement
SSNBHS	South Sudan National Baseline Household Survey
SSPS	South Sudan Police Service
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
SUA	Small Unit Administration
TGNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPI	United Nations Department of Public Information
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's and Education Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNODC	United Nation Office of Drug Crime
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II
ZOA	Zoo Outh Asia

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Illustration of Research Methods/Tools	94
Table 4.2: Sample size of the study	96
Table 6.3: Murle's Age-Group with representation and identifiable color	151
Table 7.4: Cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation of the Murle youth	188
Table 7.5: Clashes between Lou-Nuer and Murle in Jonglei, 2009-2012	190

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Rivers distribution across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan.....	4
Figure 1.2: Illustrative Map of the research sites.....	22
Figure 2.3: Illustration of armed conflict in Africa	32
Figure 3.4: The Murle youth infiltrators.....	81
Figure 6.5: The Murle People Chieftainship Structure.....	144
Figure 6.6: Structure of the Anyuaa people traditional institutions.....	166
Figure 7.7: Increment of the Murle youth infiltrators since 2004.....	188

Chapter One

Introduction

People who live across the borderland region of a given country in the Horn of Africa (HoA) can be easily affected by internal economic and political pressures as well as external pressures from their neighbours as they live at the periphery region. They are also often marginalized from economic and political activities of their central government and actively exploited. Their marginalization results not only from negligence of their central government but also from their low potential of economic competition and political participation due to their mode of life. This is true of many borderland people along the Ethiopia - South Sudan border who are least affected by modernity because of decades of socio-cultural and economic marginalization as well as political exclusion by the central government.

Among those borderland people, the Murle and their neighbours across the border – the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer – are one of the major groups of the borderland marginalized people (Arensen, 2015; Dereje, 2009). These borderland people have their traditional peaceful coexistence and interaction mechanisms. For instance, the Murle people have their traditional red chiefs known as *alan ci merii* to administer their people and to manage their youth; similarly, the Anyuua administer their people through traditional institutions such as *Nyieya* (the Royal King), *Kwaaro* (the Land Owner) and *Nyibur* (the Spiritual Leader); and the Jikany-Nuer follow their Leopard-skin chiefs and prophet (*Gok*) to predicate their future and togetherness.

The local peoples are more connected to their traditional rulers and institutions than they are to the central government and its institutions. Such continued existence of significant population groups alienated from and marginalized within the state affects their peaceful coexistence and exacerbates conflicts among the local people. Although the borderland people have close attachment with their traditional leaders and institutions as well as less attention from the central governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan, they move across the border and compete among each other for the available natural resources.

Thus, their mobility and competition affect their interaction due to their use of coercive force to find water and pastureland; which exacerbate their hostile relations. Accordingly, the socio-economic security problems among the borderland people include incompatible natural resource competition that has contributed to their cantankerous relations and aggravated their hostility. The natural resource (water, arable land, and pastureland) distribution across the border is uneven. During dry season, in some places of the borderland region, there is availability of abundant water and pastureland; however, in some places there is scarcity of water and pastureland.

The social and economic structures of the local peoples are more dependent on cattle, thus they need water and grazing land throughout the year. Due to such natural resources disparity across the border, their settlement pattern is scattered and seasonal in that they move from one place to another based on the season. Therefore, to control water and pastureland especially in the dry season, they use coercive power in their competition which renders violent conflicts. Such a tit-for-tat attacking system includes revenge, cattle raiding, and child abductions.

Some studies interlink the problem with global climate change (for example Manyok, 2016); it may be one factor to exacerbate resource scarcity and a push factor for the mobility of borderland people. Thus, in order to gain a better and more holistic understand about the nature of socio-economic security problems among the borderland people of Ethiopia and South Sudan – Murle, Anyuaa, and Nuer – a diachronic approach is required to take into account the trajectories of the various factors.


1.1 Background of the Study

The borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan is covered by the Baro-Akobo River basin. Baro and Akobo are the two big rivers in Gambella that they are serving as a default international border. They have their own tributaries, i.e., the Alwero River is tributary of the Baro River and the Pibor River from South Sudan and the Gillo River in Gambella are the tributaries of the Akobo River. Both the Akobo and Baro Rivers are serving to navigation from Tergol to Burbey throughout a year and confluence around the place called Jingmir, which together form the Sobat River in South Sudan.

These Rivers are subject to sever flooding to the borderland region during rainy season. The flooding is caused by the high amount of rainfall that flows into the rivers of Gambella from the western Ethiopian highlands (Dereje, 2011). The borderland people are severely influenced by this flooding in the rainy time; however, alluvial soil remained in dry time for their shifting cultivation and pastureland. Abundant of fish have also been available in the pools and rivers to supply their food security. For instance, a study identifies 104 diversified fish species in the Alwero, Akobo, Baro, and Gillo Rivers (Golubtsov, et al., 1995). Using the fertility of the right and left banks of the rivers,

agricultural production is fruitful and not affected by either drought or soil exhaustion (see more Kurimoto, 1996).

Figure 1.1: Rivers distribution across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan



Source: Dereje (2009:27)

The Anyuua people using the moisture that rises from the river harvest maize and tobacco during the dry season at the right and left banks of the Baro, Gillo, Alwero, and Akobo Rivers. Though, the floods create a fertile land at the right and left banks of the Rivers, which become an economic basis of agriculture to the Anyuua people and pastureland to the Jikany-Nuer and the Murle people. Dereje (2011) also accentuates that the flooded land is crucial for cultivation and pasture during the early period of the dry season.

Accordingly, the borderland region of Gambella has sources of untapped water (rivers, lakes, and ponds); irrigable land and suitable soil types for crop production; abundant forest; favorable agro-climate for farming and animal husbandry; ideal place for apiculture (honeybee and wax); and untouched and least intact park with abundant wildlife, birds, animals, and amphibians. Mainly, the selected research sites across the

border – Gog, Jor, and Akobo – have resources of arable land, cattle breeding, fishery, honey bee; and thus suitable to crops such as rice, cotton, sesame, fruits, soya bean, Shea butter tree, maize, rubber tree, palm tree, and sugar cane (Samson, 2013). However, these borderland natural resources are not properly managed by the local government.

The Gambella regional investment office announced the availability of 1,280,000 hectares for arable land in the region.¹ The potential land for irrigation is 700,000 hectares and net area of irrigation would be 480,000 hectares. Following this announcement, large number of investors was invited to the region to harvest crops and other agricultural production. The investment office provides 297,843 hectares to arable land to 269 investors, but these investors could not cultivate the land properly due to their weak initiation and commitment, weak expansion of infrastructure, and insufficient government supervision strategies. On the other hand, the local farmers cultivated using hoe through traditional farming system and the majority land remained fallow.

The only means of cultivation in the region, as Dereje (2011) also discusses, sedentary rain-fed cultivation, flood retreat cultivation along the banks of the rivers, and shifting cultivation. According to the study of Ellman (1972), only 0.5 percent is suitable for flood-retreat cultivation, but this does not support a significant percentage of the farming population. Dereje (2011) also pinpoints that sixty-five percent of arable land is covered by savannah grass, thirty percent covered by forest, and 4.5 percent covered by marshland. The majority moisture land for cultivation is concentrated along the Baro

¹ Gambella Investment Office - Information gathered from the Gambella Peoples' National Regional State Investment Office (November, 2017).

River, largely in Anyuua land around Itang. This concentration reveals the shortage of land across the banks of the rivers.

The plain of Gambella is one of the most suitable areas for raising cattle (Dereje, 2006b). However, large population of cattle found in the Nuer zone as the Jikany-Nuer depends upon livestock. To find pastureland and water for their cattle, herdsman move from place to place; as Ellman (1972) categorized as seasonally flooded pasture, pastures on the plain, and pastures on the piedmont and adjoining uplands. According to Dereje (2011), the major sources of livestock feed are the open woodlands, riverine forest, and woodland during wet season, and savannah grassland, riverine forest, and woodland during the dry season. The Jikany-Nuer leave their village in dry season and settle near to the major rivers to access the savannah grassland, riverine forest, and woodland. According to the Gambella Region Conservation Strategy (2000) report, out of 1,804,800 hectares natural grazing area of the region, 64% is utilized by livestock.

Most of this grazing area extended to the present Anyuua land: Gog, Jor, Itang, Gambella zuria, and Abobo districts. On the other hand, the highest cattle density in the region is in the Jikany-Nuer inhabiting districts, i.e., Itang, Makuey, Akobo, Wanthua, and Jikawo (Dereje, 2011). They are continuously moving to a relatively less cattle populated districts. Among the four major Rivers in Gambella except Alwero the other three such as Akobo, Baro, and Gillo Rivers have high overflow capacity and provide suitable conditions of grazing in dry season and large number of cattle found in the field.

This area has also been useful to flood retreat cultivation for Anyuua people. Accordingly, the Baro-Akobo basin mostly inhabited by the Anyuua people, and the

pastoralist Jikany-Nuer and Murle people drive to find pastureland and water towards the Akobo, Baro, and Gillo Rivers. According to the population density of the region, there is no shortage of land but lack of proper natural resource management that exposed the borderland people to common socio-economic security problems.

1.2 The Ethiopia-South Sudan Borderland Peoples' Conflict Trajectory

The HoA is associated with natural and manmade catastrophes, which often have a cross-border dimension once intergroup conflict breaks out (Dereje and Hoehne, 2008). Since large sections of societies across different borderland areas are directly affected, the imperative for stakeholders and broader regional responses has grown. This, however, coincides with a period when different governments are facing capacity and implementation challenges.

Ethiopia shares a border with South Sudan at the western tip across the Gambella Peoples' National Regional State. At the end of nineteenth century, during the period of Emperor Menilik II (r. 1889-1913), the Ethiopian government incorporated Gambella into Ethiopian territory to protect the western region from the colonial territorial expansion of British in Sudan. Accordingly, Emperor Menilik II delineated the western part of Ethiopian territory and eventually under the 1902 treaty they understood their border (Bahru, 1976). However, by that time, Gambella was not strongly integrated with the national center of Ethiopian politics due to environmental hardship of the region and external political pressures along the northern part of Ethiopia.

In 1974, the imperial regime replaced by the military-socialist regime (hereafter the Derg) had undertaken to level out such imbalances between the center and the periphery. To enhance the sense of belonging, some practical measures were taken to increase national identity. For example, social services were expanded, ethnic identity was condemned, literacy campaign was embarked upon, including promoting local languages, and ensuring the representation of local elites as vice-administrators in the regional administration (see Kurimoto, 1994).

However, according to Aleme (1978), local empowerment was overshadowed by modernist zeal; Cultural Revolution ideology which weakened local culture and economic interest. In this case, traditional bases of power that were perceived as challenges to the socialist government and its manifestation at grassroots level such as village chiefs and influential elders lost their power. Despite these measures, the borderland people of Gambella were loosely integrated into the central government of Ethiopia before 1991.

The border area of Gambella (in Ethiopia) and Boma (in South Sudan), has a lowland environment which is affected by human activities and animal husbandry and has resulted in resource competition and overgrazing. People are unable to cultivate their land and grazing in a peaceful environment due to political instability and intergroup conflicts of South Sudan (Gatluak, 2014). The areas affected by the civil war of Sudan since 1955 and the rebel group of Anya-Nya I and II used Bilfam in Gambella as a base of their struggle. With the support of the Ethiopian military regime, the rebel groups established the Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) at Bilfam (the current place of

Pulldeng or Berhane Selam in Itang special district) in Gambella, Ethiopia in 1983 (Regassa, 2010).

According to McCallum (2013), the areas are drastically affected by Sudan's two civil wars; so that the Murle land of Pibor² was one of the main battlefields. Gatluak (2014) also states that the borderland people have a sense of traditional possession such as land and cattle – the Anyuua have close cultural attachment to the land while the Murle perceive that all cattle belongs to them and the Nuer are culturally close with cattle. Regarding all these facts, the borderland region affects by different forms of political and social upsets which exposed the borderland people to stresses such as social and economic instability.

The region also affected by natural factors, for instance drought and famine which exposed the borderland people to food insecurity. According to OCHA South Sudan (2012), the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan is affected by high food insecurity, experiences of seasonal flooding, and limited infrastructure. Unsustainable land use and overgrazing method are also another factor that has destroyed the eco-zone of many parts of the borderland region. Moreover, the borderland people affected by intrinsic cultural assumption such as the Anyuua perceive land exclusively belongs to them and the Murle perceive all cattle in the world exclusively belong to them.

This assumption could devalue their social interaction and exposed the local people to incompatible natural resource competition. All these situations forced the Murle and Nuer

² Pibor County is the residence place of Murle People in South Sudan at Boma State along the border of Ethiopia.

people to move from place to place without restriction of boundaries in order to access pastureland and water for their cattle while the Anyuua preserved their ancestors' land to protect it from the invasion of the Murle and Nuer. Thus, these circumstances exacerbate the socio-economic security problems among the borderland peoples. Through these entire trajectories, the Ethiopia-South Sudan border is vulnerable to intergroup conflicts with economic, socio-cultural, and political dimensions.

Furthermore, they have faced decades of dispute and invariably developed hostile relations which resulted in various intergroup conflicts and adversary of one another. For example, according to the report of Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) (2009), the Murle fighters attacked Lou-Nuer villages in Pibor and Akobo counties of South Sudan along the border of Ethiopia from March to April 2009. In the same year, in March, according to the 2012 Gambella Disaster Management and Food Security Agency Report, in the Gambella Peoples' National Regional State (GPNRS) of Ethiopia, 12,000 Jikany-Nuer and Anyuua people fled their villages due to the menace and attack of the South Sudanese Murle and Lou-Nuer.

Murle's cattle raiding and child abduction from their neighbors has long been a facet of life in Jonglei States of South Sudan and GPNRS of Ethiopia across the border (Martina, et al., 2014). Similarly, the Lou-Nuer fought with their neighbors – Anyuua, Jikany-Nuer, and Murle – as Arensen (2015:6) asserts that "the Lou-Nuer of Akobo have a long history of major conflicts." In this cross-border intergroup conflict, borderland peoples were displaced, migrated, and fled to find sanctuary in the refugee camps in Ethiopia crossing the Akobo River.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

People living around the borders of Ethiopia and South Sudan are subject to various social, economic, and political problems. In the border areas where the two countries meet, frequent conflicts arise, the community is experiencing a widespread social and economic security problem, resulting in a situation of inadequate living conditions that are not conducive to the well-being of most of the border population. In particular, civil conflict in South Sudan has caused a serious economic and social crisis. In this conflict, the most vulnerable groups are people with disability, old ages, infirmities, children, and women. This is due to the fact that those vulnerable social groups are unable to defend themselves or to avoid accidents; rather they are the main victims of the conflict and the displacement. In addition to the psychological stresses and physical injuries, they are easily exposed to infectious disease and malnutrition.

According to data from the WHO in 2018, South Sudan has been displacing more than 4 million people since the beginning of the civil war in 2013, with about 85 percent of children and women being infected (WHO, 2018). According to ARRA as of January 2018 report, 372,500 South Sudanese are migrated to Ethiopia and located in Gambella and Mizan refugee sites. The proportion of refugee population is relative to the population in Gambella, which have high impacts on the host communities in terms of conflict, economic competition, and socio-cultural interactions.

In addition to the peace challenges in South Sudan, central and local governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan have not been able to access social and economic development for all border regions. South Sudan's government has not been able to include the people

of the border region in the country's development plan as a result of political unrest and limited capacity. The Government of Ethiopia has not promoted equitable growth and development provisioning in the border areas. As a result, the people in the border area have suffered in education, infrastructure, health post, pure water, electricity, road, telecommunication, market, and good governance. Therefore, the social, economic, and other government services they receive from the government are very low.

The frequent conflicts between communities across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan have intensified the security situation, resulting in a high rate of food insecurity, economic collapse, infrastructure destruction, as well as pandemic diseases such as malaria and cholera. Conflict, violence and human security problems are the realities in the community, so it is in a situation where people cannot live and work in a stable condition.

There are many situations that highlight the problems mentioned above. For instance, illegal activities throughout the border such as conflicts, harassment, violence, rape, cattle theft, kidnapping, destruction of fishing nets, and village-wide clashes between various border communities. These illegal activities are aggravating the social and economic security problems through the cost of small arms, illegal trades, armed forces, community breakdowns, internal organizing, community isolation and aging based on community organizational structure. Furthermore, UN-OCHA (2008) data show that drought; lack of water, scarcity of vast grazing plains, and livestock mortality could affect the peace and harmony of the people around the border.

The main challenge is that Ethiopia and South Sudan have no border protection; people are able to move freely and open borders. For example, any people cross the border without any travel document. Local governments also did not control the volatile and illegal activities of the border area. Because the border region is not organized by competent governmental institutions; it does not manage the local environment; there is no good administration; and government institutions are not strengthened. As a result, Ethiopia and South Sudan have not been able to investigate the social and economic problems of their citizens living in the same borders.

Instead of finding a solution to the root causes of the problems, government officials and the region's population accuse the Murle of being the cause of economic and social security problems in the region. However, both government officials and border communities have not explained what the Murle community has done for economic and social security issues in the border regions. This has resulted in the escalation of cross-border communities' conflict.

Although Ethiopia and South Sudan have come to understand the security situation in their borders, they have signed various memorandum of understanding (MoU) since 2012, but they have not been able to bring about lasting peace and stability. Indeed, following the agreement, the Ethiopian government identified the armed groups in the border regions and seized their weapon. On the other hand, South Sudan's government has not been able to disarm armed youths because of the political turmoil and the weak governmental institutions. In addition, Ethiopia has not been able to integrate the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) with the security sector reform

(SSR). These general problems have affected the people in the border regions for their endless burglary, cattle raids, child abduction, and conflict.

The problems, challenges, and gaps that described above have created an enabling environment for social and economic security risks. In particular, the local people and government officials seem to have reasonably complained against the Murle, especially in the case of cattle raiding, child abduction, and conflict. Some studies indicate that child abduction and cattle theft has increased since 1993 (Dereje, 2009). Over time, cross-border cattle raiding and child abduction have created an atmosphere of instability, insecurity, confusion, and threats in the community. It is the youth of Murle, who primarily play a role in the cattle raiding and child abduction. These young people use social organization based on age to achieve their goals.

As a consequence, in the area surrounding the borders of Ethiopia and South Sudan, there is a frequent civil conflict and tit-for-tat confrontation between the Murle and the surrounding peoples. In addition, the people of the border are subject to fear, anxiety, instability, non-productivity, and widespread poverty. As a result, this study identifies the underlying nature and dynamics of the social and economic security problems of people living in the borders of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Especially, from the communities around the border, Murle and their neighbours (Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer) were the center of the study and analyzed their social and economic security conditions. In the process of research, the study drew a deep analysis of the reality behind the plunder, child abduction, and conflict. Due to this, due attention was given to the plight of the plunder, child abduction, and conflict. The study further analyzed the impact of the governance

capacity of government officials, the institutional structure of the government, the philosophy of leadership, governance challenges, the application of land use management, and the use of natural resources in the social and economic well-being of society.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to interrogate the social and economic security problems in communities across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan, identify the major causes of the problem, and propose solutions. It analyzes the livelihood of the Murle and their neighbours (Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer) and explains the administrative and development efforts of the local government to address the problem. More specifically, this study seeks to:

1. Examine the underlying social and economic linkages of the Murle, Anyuua, and Jikany-Nuer to realize their basic contributions to their common security problems.
2. Identify the major driving factors that instigate cattle raiding, children abduction, and confrontations by the Murle youth.
3. Interrogate the traditional structure and mechanisms that tend to motivate the Murle “Red Chiefs” to work towards mitigating the borderland security problems.
4. Analyze the existing local and national governments’ efforts and challenges to addressing borderland security problems.

1.5 Research Questions

The following research questions are designed to address the aforementioned research problems, challenges, and gaps.

- 1) How the economic bases of the Murle, the Anyuua, and the Jikany-Nuer are complicated the socio-economic security situations? What are the ways of cultural interactions amongst them? How do borderland people manipulate the natural resources that found along the border?
- 2) What are the major factors that drive the Murle youth into cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations?
- 3) How do the Murle “Red Chiefs” control the Murle youth infiltrators to mitigate the borderland people’s socio-economic security problems?
- 4) Have government efforts been effective in tackling the borderland people’s security problems? What are the challenges? What security and capacity gaps existed to tackle the security problems?

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study aims to signify academic and policy importance which contribute to the peace building process in Ethiopia and South Sudan along their shared border to improve the borderland security situations, peoples’ social and economic interactions, and livelihood approaches.

Theoretically, the study helps to gain a better understanding of the contemporary dynamics between state policies, governance practices and the exercise of political authority along the borderland and the people who live there. Thus, the study seeks to fill

the intellectual and literature gaps that currently exist in terms of state policies towards borderland security issues, all rounded understanding of the Murle people, and their practices of cattle raiding and child abduction. The policy implications of the study include a focus on proposals to tackle the incessant cross-border cattle raiding and child abduction as its findings contribute to the framing of regional and national responses to border security and development process.

Thus, the local communities, specifically women, children, and the aged across the border would be the main beneficiaries of the findings of this research as they are the most at risk from the borderland security problems. The adjacent regional governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan are also major beneficiaries in two ways. First, the study helps them to identify the security gaps impacting the borderland peoples and suggests long-term measures to control the Murle youth infiltrators' acts on child abduction, cattle raiding, and confrontations. Second, it helps them to address maladministration, fill gaps of efforts to tackle the problem, identify major challenges, regulate cross-border trades, control smuggling goods, and circulation of light weapons, and apply effective natural resource management policy.

Moreover, this research will hopefully help the governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan to consider border demarcation and plan joint border social policy to strengthen borderland human security. Then, it gives room for governments to address inequalities, fundamental human rights, education, empower minorities, rule of law, justice, health, and help minority groups to participate fully in civic, economic, cultural life, and peacebuilding process. With these contextual facts, the result of this research provides a

credible pathway to build peace, sustain harmonious coexistence, good governance and softer border relations in East Africa, at large; and Ethiopia-South Sudan border, in particular.

In other ways, the study provides substantial ground for further research across the Ethiopia - South Sudan border.

1.7 Description of the Study Areas and Rationale of the Study

Ethiopia and South Sudan share a border across the Gambella Peoples' National Regional State with a total area of about 34,063 square kilometers (Samson, 2013) and a distance of 874³ kilometers. The total population of Gambella is estimated 306,916, which is one of the lowest population density areas in Ethiopia (Population and Housing Census, 2007). Currently, Gambella is one of the regional states of Ethiopia adjacent to the South Sudan regional states of Eastern Nile, Latjoor, Eastern Bieh, Boma, and Narrorunyang.

Article I of the 1902 treaty regarding the border, split the Anyuaa and Nuer people into two citizenships while the Murle remained in South Sudan – Pibor plains of Boma State with the exception of a few group of Murle in the SNNPRS of Ethiopia. Moreover, the border is open, porous, and not officially delimited and demarcated but uses the natural setting of the Baro and Akobo⁴ Rivers as a default border. Besides this, the border region has no road construction and other facilities to improve the life of the borderland people.

³ The Ethiopian Mapping Authority measured the border distance of Gambella with South Sudan. It covers 874kms or 543 miles.

⁴ The Akobo River is coming from the Ethiopian highland region of Guraferda and flow to the lowland of Gambella to join with the Baro River at the place around Jingmir. The Pibor River is coming from Uganda and cross the Pibor lowland region of Murle and join with Akobo River. Thus, the Pibor River is the tributary of the Akobo River.

The people interacts each other either on foot or water transportation using Baro and Akobo rivers.

Accordingly, different people have similar social, cultural, and economic manifestations with frequent interactions across the border; however, the border area is fragile, volatile, and insecure. Although the borderland people manifested similar socio-economic and cultural significances; their social, economic, and cultural manifestations have no significant contribution for their political participations. Rather they have been socially marginalized, politically exploited, and economically deprived for many years. However, their marginalization is not only due to central governments' ignorance but also because of their low capacity to manipulate their rights and potential to perform economic, social, and political practices. For these reasons, the borderland people are exposed to social and economic security problems as manifested in the pervasive cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations. All these conditions have resulted in social tensions, instability, internal displacement, food insecurity, illicit trade, smuggling goods, proliferation of small arms, and economic deprivation among the borderland people.

The practice of cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation across the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan has been in place since time immemorial. Accordingly, it influences the borderland peoples' cohabitation and socio-economic integration. For instance, according to the report of Majid⁵ in 1932, across the border of Ethiopia and Sudan in the early twentieth century, the traditional king (*Nyieya*) of

⁵Majid Abud was served to the Ethiopian government in the Haile Sellassie I regime and participated on border delineation with British General for second time after 1902. He was assessed the border area of Ethiopia across Gambella in 1915, 1916, 1931, and 1932 and wrote a report to Emperor Haile Sellassie I. He stated in his report about the cattle raiding practices between the Murle and Anyuaa people across the border. To found his report, see Zerai Becurazion (1971).

Anyuua, Akwai Cham who at the time had strong military force, attacked the village of Murle and raided their cattle by crossing the border. In turn, the Murle sought revenge at different times.

The borderland people narrated their hostile relations with the Murle by referring their pervasive cattle raiding and child abduction practices. Besides their narration, I have found five points which inspired to further investigation. They are: 1) the Sudanese civil war and political transformation in Ethiopia in the early 1990s (see Medhane, 2015); 2) the 1991 change of government in Ethiopia which impacted the movement and security situation of borderland people; 3) the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer ethnic groups of Ethiopia submitted their arms to the government and relied on government security forces but which were not yet fully able to secure and protect the borderland people; 4) as a result of the second civil war in Sudan and South Sudanese instability, the Murle people were no longer under government control; 5) the borderland political situation led to the regionalization of the conflict and traditional competition and rivalry between the Anyuua and the Nuer in Ethiopia. All these points illustrate the relevance of this study to the peace building process in East Africa at large and in the area of Ethiopia and South Sudan borderland region in particular.

Thus, to investigate the social and economic security problems of the Ethiopia - South Sudan borderland people, the adjacent districts and county such as Akobo, Gog, and Jor districts from GPNRS of Ethiopia; and Pibor County from the Boma State of South Sudan were purposely selected for this study. These study sites were selected for the following four main reasons: 1) there is a socio-cultural disconnection but have economic


interactions between the Murle and their borderland neighbours; 2) frequent cattle raiding and child abduction practices of the Murle (McCallum, 2013; Gatluak, 2014; Manyok, 2016); 3) high vulnerability of the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer people to internal displacement due to frequent infiltration of the Murle cattle raiders; 4) low infrastructure, high economic potential, high illiteracy, poor economic diversification, and high influxes of refugees.

The 2007 Central Statistics Authority (CSA) National Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia determines the demographic statistics for Akobo (3,830.47km²), Jor (2,488.13km²), and Gog (7,138.6km²) districts with population numbers of 24,671; 8,862; and 16,823 respectively for a total of 50,356 people. In the Boma State, the Pochalla and Pibor counties constitute a population of 66,201 and 148,475 inhabitants respectively (Southern Sudan Center for Census, Statistics, and Evaluation, 2010).⁶

Map of the Study Area



⁶ This is the 5th Sudan population and Housing Census, 2008. There is no official Population and Housing Census in South Sudan after their independent year 2011 due to their socio-political instability and civil war.



This map is sketched by the author for the sake of clarifying specific research sites.

NB: Don't use this map for your reference

Figure 1.2: Illustrative Map of the research sites

The ecological zone of the research sites is lowland plain with Savannah grass which constitutes rivers and ponds that people use for survival with their cattle. In Gambella, the Gillo, Alwero, Akobo, and Baro rivers feed the different parts of the region and the Anyuaa and Nuer people settle along the rivers. The Pibor, Veveno, Lotilla, and Kengen rivers found in the Murle land of South Sudan (McCallum, 2013). The Alwero river is tributary of the Baro river while the Pibor river from South Sudan and Gillo river in Gambella are tributaries of the Akobo river, thus, the Akobo river serves as a natural international border until it joins with the Baro river around Jingmir⁷ to flow to South Sudan; all collectively known as the Sobat⁸ river in South Sudan.

⁷Jingmir is a place that found along the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan, specifically in Wanthua district of Gambella in Nuer zone of Ethiopia. Around this place, the Baro and Akobo Rivers join and create the Sobat River in South Sudan.

⁸ The name “Sobat” was derived from the phrase “Sëbhät Lă Äb” – a Ge’ez Language. King Zärä Yä’ekob of Ethiopia was visited the area when he brought the Cross (which is found now at Gishen St. Merry) and express his admir when he saw the river which cover large area by saying ‘Sëbhät Lă Äb! what kind of river is this?’ Then the Nuer people said “Sobat” by taking the first word “Sëbhät” according to the sound of their language (see Zerai, 1971).

All the borderland people are mobile without boundary limitation; however, their movement is different from people to people. For instance, the Anyuua move into the watershed areas of river banks during the dry season for cultivation and back to the arid land in the summer to avoid the floods (Dereje, 2011); while the Nuer and Murle people move with their cattle to find water and pastureland by providing cattle camps in different places throughout a year.

1.8 Scope of the Study

The scope of this research is delimited in terms of geographical area, population, and related variables. Geographically, the study is limited to the Ethiopia - South Sudan border along the Gambella regional state (in Ethiopia), and Boma State (in South Sudan). Gog, Jor, and Akobo districts in Gambella; and Pibor County in Boma are the specific area of this study. More specifically, the study is limited to address the region by taking sample area such as Pignwudo in Gog, Ujallo in Jor, Tergol in Akobo, and Lekuwangole in Pibor. In terms of population, the Murle, the Jikany-Nuer, and the Anyuua people are the target group of the study. Among those borderland people clan chiefs, prominent leaders, women, youth, and victim families were interviewed during fieldwork research in order to obtain firsthand information. In addition, some important groups, institutions, organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental) and other concerned bodies were selected to obtain secondary data. Some of them are the National Archive Library Agency (NALA), Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) Documentation and Wolde Meskel Archive Center, Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs border security issue department, Illubabor Zone Culture and Tourism Archive at Metu and Gore, GPNRS Council

Archive, South Sudan Embassy of Ethiopia, and Zoo Outh Asia (ZOA)⁹ Gambella branch. In terms of variables, this research focused on the social and economic security problems of the borderland people – Murle, Anyuua, and Jikany-Nuer – and interrogated the sources, nature, and dynamics of security problems in the context of pervasive practices of cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations by the Murle youth.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

This dissertation took four years to investigate the socio-economic security problems of the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland people by taking the Murle, the Anyuua, and Jikany-Nuer peoples as a case. The theme of this dissertation basically focused on the Murle people because they are assumed by many borderland people and local officials as source of the borderland socio-economic security problems and the most aggressive and warlike people. Accordingly, the Murle people became the center of this research. In the entire work of this project, there were some limitations regarding empirical fieldworks with the Murle people.

The research sites, which are discussed in chapter six, are fragile and volatile. Basically, the South Sudanese civil war that started in December 2013 has dramatically changed the peaceful situation of the Pibor lowland area. There was a security problem to physically reach the Murle site in the Pibor lowland. As the research approach of this study is ethnography, to investigate the reality of the Murle people, it is mandatory to stay for long time with them in the surrounding region. However, the security problem makes it

⁹ ZOA is an American international organization participated on community peacebuilding training in Gambella.

difficult for the researcher to fulfill the ethical procedures of ethnographic research approach. Although some security problems appeared in the region, the researcher has tried to find ways to reach to the Murle people in the Pibor lowland plain.

The first attempt was trying to cross the Akobo town in South Sudan which is the adjacent area with the Pibor lowland and possible to find the Murle people in Lekuwangole through that direction. Accordingly, the researcher has attempted to cross the Akobo town to Pibor lowland in October, 2016. However, during this time all the borderland area of South Sudan was under the control of Sudan People Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA/IO) and thus it was hard to travel. The researcher reached the Akobo town through Tergol (Ethiopian border town in the Akobo district of Gambella) with the support of Ethiopian soldier and SPLA/IO border security intelligence (see a picture at appendix “K”). The SPLA/IO understood the interest of the researcher, but told that currently the area is in a danger zone for any stranger as the SPLA/IO and SPLA/M of government were fighting each other. An interview was made with the SPLA/IO officials and commissioner at Akobo town in South Sudan and back to Tergol.

Fortunately, due to the South Sudan civil war, many Murle people from the Pibor lowland area and Boma Plateau fled to Ethiopia and settled at the Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma district of Ethiopia under Mizan Center of refugee site. The researcher heard this information from the SPLA/IO officials and Commissioner at Akobo. Based on this information, the researcher took a step to find permission letter from ARRA to stay with the Murle people at the Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma. At Ukugu refugee camp, according to ARRA as of October 2018 report, 5,850 Murle people inhabited as refugee.

They came from the Pibor lowland region as well as the Boma plateau. Thus, the researcher took this opportunity to communicate with the Murle people who depend on cattle and cultivation at one place.

1.10 Structures of the Study

This dissertation is organized into nine chapters based on the themes that related with its title, “the socio-economic security problems of the Murle and their neighbours across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border.” Thus, the structure of the study is described here to give hints to the readers which may help them to catch up some important points from each chapter.

The first chapter focuses on the background of the study which investigated the socio-economic security trajectory across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. Based on the discussion regarding the borderland circumstances of Ethiopia and South Sudan including the people who are interacted each other, gaps of the study clearly stated under the section of statement of the problem to forward the main objectives and research questions. The second chapter investigates the very pertinent literatures by taking the borderland people socio-economic security problems as a central theme. Thus empirical literatures categorized into three themes, i.e. intergroup conflicts, contemplation of state borders, and the borderland socio-economic circumstances. Under each theme, the most important issues which contributed to the borderland people socio-economic security problems are critically discussed to answer at least fifty percent of the research questions. Gaps of intellectual discussions regarding borderland people socio-economic security

problems also assessed to see the main position of this dissertation as compare with the previous literatures.

To substantially connect the empirical literature with the fieldwork, conceptualization of the key concepts and theoretical discussion is important. To this effect, the third chapter deals on conceptual and theoretical framework. The fourth chapter attempts to develop the roadmap of the entire work through research methodology. This methodology part is important to systematize the gathered information by using tools such as interviews, focus groups discussion, and observation. The observation, interview, and focus group discussions make sense to address the socio-economic security problems across the border and help to see gaps of the stated problems by investigating the real life of the borderland people.

The finding of this dissertation is presented from chapter five to chapter eight. Chapter five is focused on the historical overview of border delineation between Imperial Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. All the discussion of this chapter referred the archive documents to see the early period interaction of the local people and ways of government intervention. This discussion realized that the socio-economic security problems across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border is basically interlinked with arbitrary colonial border design without taking into consideration about the socio-cultural interaction of the local people.

Then by, chapter six is going to focus on the demographic status of the Murle people and their borderland neighbours; which discussed including the empirical nature of the research sites. Throughout the chapter, demographic of the people such as geographical

location, social structures, socio-economic bases, economic significances, and their socio-economic based interactions are discussed to see their intersection and links with the borderland security problems. This demographic discussion helps to see the pragmatic facts of the borderland people. Based on this fact discussion, chapter seven realized the problems, manifestations, and challenges of the borderland people socio-economic insecurity. The Ethiopia and the South Sudan governments' effort to tackle the problems and challenges also assessed in chapter seven.

Based on the facts and problems regarding the Murle people and their neighbours, chapter eight took its position on the substantial analysis of the problems and its impacts. Basic empirical findings of this dissertation interconnected with theories and literatures in this chapter. The last, but not least, chapter nine emphasize on summary of the entire work of this research, conclude the main findings, forward applicable recommendations, and brought options of policy to mitigate the borderland people socio-economic security problems through legal means. After all these discussion, references and annexes come at the end of this research.

Finally, for further understanding and illustration, structured leading ideas for interview, list of informants, some important archive documents, maps, and fieldwork pictures are attached under Annexes I to III, then by appendixes.

Chapter Two

Empirical Review Literature

2. Conflict Experience in Africa

Africa is a multicultural and multilingual continent that constitutes diversified ethnic groups. These diversified ethnic groups engage in different social and economic interactions which traditionally cultivate in the community. However, their social and economic interactions were destroyed by external forces and European colonial powers who were interested in exploiting African human and natural resources. Thus, the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) legitimized the European colonial powers to control Africa; which exposed local communities to different colonial administration policies (Boahen, 1985). For instance, 'indirect rule' or 'divide and rule'; 'direct rule'; 'colonial domination' and 'assimilation' were the major ruling systems of colonial powers.

These colonial rule systems continuously affected different social groups of borderland people and neighbouring states of Africa. In the post-independent period, the problem of colonial rule system manifested in many countries of Africa in the form of civil war and interstate war due to resource competition on the arbitrary border of colonial design (Asiwaju, 1985; Khadiagala, 2010; Manda, et al., 2014).

The administrative nature of African governments in the post-independence era has been exposed African people to chaotic situations, including interethnic and intergroup conflicts. This happens with regard to the continent's colonial border history; such as, the

imposition of the European nation-state Westphalian model and the arbitrary nature of boundary delimitation and demarcation. According to Berhanu (2017), the reason why arbitrariness has become a special issue in Africa is particularly related to how the current states were established by the colonial powers, including the manner in which they transported or, rather, implemented their nation-state model in the continent.

This imported Westphalian state model and arbitrary borders in Africa have contributed to the social, economic, and political turbulence that has existed in post-colonial Africa. Thus, different independent African countries came together to establish an organization to help to stabilize the continent and pursue the process of decolonization. Accordingly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa with 32 independent Member States.¹⁰

One objective of OAU was to co-ordinate and to intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa by focusing on political liberalization and economic integration to sustain peace and security in the continent. To achieve these objectives Member States pledged themselves to harmonize their political, economic, educational, health, scientific, and cooperation policies. However, within a year of its existence, the OAU was confronted with a number of boundary conflicts in North, East, and Central Africa.¹¹ Such periodic border conflicts affected the socio-economic progress of entire African people.

¹⁰Exploring Africa (2018). wordPress. Available at <http://www.exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/about-the-organization-of-african-unity/>


¹¹ ibid

Accordingly, the OAU organized the Cairo Resolution in 1964 to minimize and control conflicts arising from disputes over borders (Okumu, 2009). The Cairo Resolution codified an agreement among African states that each would accept the arbitrary colonial borders to maintain peace among neighbouring African states, and work towards long-term political unity at a continental level (McEwen, 1971). Otherwise, they feared, disputes over borders would destabilize the entire continent and would interfere with the ongoing process of decolonization and the struggle against the scourge of apartheid (Anebo, 2016).

But, this agreement, according to Okumu (2009), did not definitively settle the problems of indefinite, porous, inadequately demarcated, and unmanaged boundaries in Africa. As we have seen today, borders are subject to illegal cross-border activities that are threatening national sovereignties and destabilizing regional peace (Anebo, 2016). Gradually, with efforts of the African Union (AU) and international pressure, the number of border disputes and interethnic conflicts within Africa declined. But, the border area conflicts continued into forms of interstate, non-state armed group, one-sided violence, and intergroup conflicts.

Interstate conflicts are the armed conflict between different neighboring countries by reasons of arbitrary colonial border design, economic and/or political issues, and sense of national interest as well as sovereignty. To understand the intensity of armed conflict in Africa, we can see the recent data from 2001-2010 that produced by Uppsala on the following figure.

Figure 2.3: Illustration of armed conflict in Africa



Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program

Following such state level armed conflict, intergroup conflicts are exacerbated; which is violent confrontation between different ethnic groups, pastoralists, and clans irrespective of national borders due to economic, natural resource competition, and cultural superiority. These combatants fight each other for cattle and child abduction, and focus on acts of revenge; however, they are not well organized, regardless of whether they get support from external forces and have no political mission or relation with states.

Such intergroup conflicts across international border are resulted from the arbitrary colonial border design. Accordingly, many writers perceived that the arbitrary colonial borders in Africa are barriers responsible for social, political, and economic crises. Asiwaju (1985) argues that the dividing lines of states as formal international borders did not recognize the on-the-ground realities of African social, political, and economic

systems. These borders were established to serve the immediate interests of the colonizers; albeit Jackson (1990) argued that borders are socially constructed.

For this reason, many clandestine activities across African international borders, such as illicit trade, human trafficking, and circulation of light weapons, on occasions posed serious threats to state security and a more or less permanent challenge to the formal economy (Anebo, 2016). Consequently, borderlands have long been understood as peripheral spaces inhabited people excluded from state, social and other services who suffer from lack of infrastructure, political participation, and intergroup conflicts (Markakis, 2006).

Due to all these complicated border area situations, the African Union Commission opened the African Union Border Program (AUBP) to investigate the cross-border situation in Africa. The AUBP's aim is to change the conflict situation into cooperation along the border, and is committed to the delimitation and demarcation of borders (AUBP, 2013). However, the AUBP's efforts have yet to fundamentally change the cross-border conflict situation in Africa, and one continues to find conflicts ranging from one-sided violence to state-wars; that affect the whole region.

In this regard, the AUBP illustrates the isolation of border areas from central states which exposed to shortage of basic social services and lacking management of natural resources (ibid, 2013). According to the AUBP, border communities maintain secular, non-political, socio-cultural, and economic links. Local communities along the border share and live by exploiting common natural resources. However, lack of proper resource management and scarcity of natural resources exposed the community to intensive

competition, dispute, insult, and assault; which then becomes a trigger for intensive intergroup conflicts.

2.1 Intergroup Confrontation

Intergroup confrontation across the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan is not a new phenomenon, but a series of attacks and counterattacks with pervasive practices of cattle raiding and child abduction between the Murle and their neighbours that has drawn the attention of the regional and international communities. Underlying causes include illiteracy, economic deprivation, lack of infrastructure, persistent lack of services, increased competition over natural resources, the erosion of traditional leadership structures among the pastoral people, and the unspoken rules of cattle raiding and child abduction.

Local and national level politicians of South Sudan have also manipulated the intergroup confrontation for personal and political gain, while the militia groups and illegal traders have circulated small arms and light weapons within the pastoral people which exacerbate atrocities, anarchy, violence, cattle raiding, and child abductions. The following sections propose to address these complexes of factors to investigate gaps of empirical literatures under the theme of borderland intergroup confrontations.

2.1.1 The Nature of Conflict and Insecurity

Conflict is a natural phenomenon and part of human life; inseparable from daily socio-economic and cultural interactions of human beings. Simon, et al., (2000) argue that conflicts are part of our existence, a fact of life phenomenon, unable to disentangle from

human relations as it is created by humans. In human nature, conflict can be perceived as a negative or as a positive process (Boonsathorn, 2007). Conflict is seen by some as a natural phenomenon; others see it as an alien or abnormal happening in social life, and yet others consider it as a necessary condition for the development and growth of individuals and societies (Jehn & Mannix, 2001).

Conflict is an ambiguous concept in the context of different literatures that it takes different meanings for different groups. In particular, according to Beheshtifar and Zare (2013), conflict tends to be understood as a negative phenomenon, synonymous with violence. In fact, conflict can have a negative and very destructive impact on our lives, while it can also lead to growth and development which indicates conflict itself is *"neutral and harmless,"* if there is no dysfunctional outcome.

Minghi (1991:29) pinpoints that “conflict has not disappeared, but its character is totally different from the pre-World War II days.” In so far, human beings are a social animal that they live through interaction for the purpose of economics relation, social values, identity formation, and cultural integration. Through their interaction, dispute and violence take place which leads in physical conflict. The universe itself revolves through conflict; sometimes in an extreme form of contention. Moreover, competition in the world communities is universal and basic form of interaction in incompatible positions (Jeong, 2008).

Accordingly, conflict is impracticable to avoid from human relations rather treat it in a positive way for functional outcomes, as Džuverović (2011) clarifies that conflict is an integral part of human lives. Therefore, we have to analyze the conflict situation and its

consequence because the nature of conflict is evaluated and shaped by its outcome. According to Augsburger (1992), conflict is a noticeable sign of human competition as evidence to human importance and it is the result of intensive competition for the same goals, rights, and resources.

Furthermore, Jeong (2008) attests that conflict is related to the history of human nature that will never end. With this understanding, human beings survive by managing the different features of conflict through incompatible competition, interest and value based on antagonistic relation and hostile nature. Thus, conflict has a dysfunctional outcome; if it is a destructive type in human relation due to its violent confrontation within adversarial groups. This kind of conflict always embraces displacement, physical damage, community destruction, loss of life and other negative effects.

In contrast to violent forms of conflict, Gandhi formulated non-violent forms of struggle which is common to hunt different values and limited access to resources. However, in all its understanding, an important value of social change and capable positive community building is unable to restore through force and antagonistic relations. Therefore, human beings have experience to the nature of conflict in different ways from macro to micro level with different causes. This is because conflict is not created in a vacuum.

The causes of conflict depend on the nature of conflict and reflect its level. Accordingly, conflict exists when unequal competition occurs towards the same goals among persons, groups, or nations (Senehi and Byrne, 2006). The nature of conflict related with its life cycle and factors that lead to escalation and de-escalation based on the attitudes, behaviors, situations, goals, and values that influence individuals and groups.

Jeong (2008) suggests that conflict accompanies the constant and invasive nature of intra-group, inter-group, and international competition with unequal interests and values that motivate groups to control power. Accordingly, conflict has its own pushing factors to obtain specific goals of human needs which threatened the security of human beings. Thus, Jeong accentuates that the conflict actors' relationship become antagonistic because of not only economic interest or power struggle but also due to value and identity differences. Thus, Galtung's (1969) structural, direct, and cultural violence concept inspired scholars to evaluate the role of institutions, psychological and behavioral elements of human beings to understand the intersection of conflict and insecurity.

Accordingly, violent conflict is sources of insecurity which affect the cohabitation and peaceful coexistence of the people. For instance, violent conflict deteriorates the relationship of different ethnic cohabitation by making subtle mechanisms of identity differences. In this case, ethnic identity has potential to contribute in-group relation and accelerate hostility towards out-groups (Jones, 1997). Since conflict is involved in varied types of social interactions, its concept has been applied to a variety of situations. Therefore, social, economic, and political interaction of different groups are influenced by the contextual potential of opposing interests, values, and needs which exacerbate human insecurity.

2.1.2 Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in East Africa

Peace, stability, and security are prerequisites for sustainable development. However, according to the United Nations Office of Drug Crime (UNODC, 2009), the easy access of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in East Africa undermines all facts of security

and diminishing the prospects of economic development throughout the region. This is because the region is one of the most conflict ridden and proliferation of SALW areas in Africa. In the colonial period, European colonizers administer their subject people using divide and rule policy and different groups of people armed themselves to protect their community; which exacerbated group conflict and civil war.

On the eve of independence (1955), Sudan entered into civil war which continued until 2005. The state of Somalia also collapsed in 1977; and Ethiopia descended into civil war for seventeen years (from 1974-1991). These situations destabilized the region of East Africa and create fertile ground to the circulation of SALW within the local people. Accordingly, SALW is abundant in Africa and people have access for armament which intensifies armed conflicts among different groups.

The research finding of Salopek (2001) also attest to the availability of SALW in Africa by providing appropriate estimation such as over 100 million. Recent study also argues that the number of SALW in Africa estimated around 2,100 million and growing more (Chelule, 2014). Both research findings assured the availability of large number of SALW in Africa. Such accumulated SALW are circulated in different parts of Africa which produced a wide range of negative political and socio-economic consequences.

According to Farah et al. (2006), the trafficking of SALW is systemic, and has fueled armed conflicts and civil wars in numerous countries of Africa throughout the post-colonial era. Moreover, the HoA and the Great Lakes sub-regions are severely affected by these weapons, which exacerbated and prolonged armed conflicts and contributed to overall human insecurity (Shyaka, 2006). Thus, the major point what we have to

understand and evaluate here is the main expected reasons for the abundant of SALW in Africa.

In accordance to the subsequent surplus of SALW which exacerbated the social, economic, and political instability of Africa, there can be some expected reasons for the availability of abundant SALW. Some of them are: 1) the divide and rule colonial policy of Western powers. In the 1950s, majority of colonial powers have been supported group-fighting in Africa to deflect the intention of the subject people and disorganized their unity for independence. 2) The two superpower competition during the Cold War period. During the Cold War time, Africa became a theater for superpower competition as both the Soviet Union and the United States supplied military equipment to their regional allies (Finlay et al., 2011). 3) Interest of wealth. The Western colonial powers provided some enticement such as weapon, gifts, and money to make easy their entanglement interaction with African chieftaincies, political leaders, and influential persons. This encouraged illicit SALW traders to accumulate wealth by conniving with colonial masters.

Due to the above three major reasons, SALW is easily accessible in Africa which create high threat to social stability. Such threat existed from the actual entanglement civil wars in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia that have ushered in a boom in the illegal market in and illicit use of SALW (Macha, 2006). Thus, instability of states in the HoA is one of the principal sources of SALW. Accordingly, gun traffickers use such state instability to easily

circulate weapons into the grassroots level communities using different means of transportation.

For instance, Wepundi et al. (2012) asserts that the gun traffickers use unemployed youth and animals such as donkey to distribute SALW into the rural community regardless of road infrastructure. They also use cargo and livestock trucks to distribute in the urban centers for sale. To facilitate such circulation of SALW, gun traffickers use their connections in the border towns like Mandera (in Kenya), Tergol (in Ethiopia, Gambella), Garissa (in Kenya), Moyale (at the border of Ethiopia and Kenya), Burbey and Pagak (in Ethiopia, Gambella) and others to subtly move firearms to the targeted destinations.

To tackle the challenges of illicit proliferation of SALW in the region, a number of international, national, and regional measures are in place; which helps to mitigate some of the negative consequences of the illegal trading of firearms (Finlay, et al., 2011). At the international level, the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol and Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects outlines steps that nations should take to prevent illicit trade of small arms. Efforts are also under way to conclude an Arms Trade Treaty, which would put forth international standards on controlling the international transfer of arms.

At regional level, the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the HoA was signed by ten Eastern African nations, which forwarded a political statement against the proliferation of these weapons. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and

Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the HoA was also signed by twelve nations in 2004.¹² The protocol includes provisions regulating SALW possession, manufacture, transfer, brokering, and enforcement of arms embargoes and entered into forces in 2006.

The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA)¹³ in 2008 is charged with coordinating efforts to implement the protocol, including facilitating cooperation among national focal points and other relevant agencies to prevent, combat, and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in SALW. Some current activities include supporting countries in developing national action plans, harmonizing SALW legislation throughout the region, and developing a regional strategy for stopping the use and trafficking of firearms. For this reason, concerned organizations often coordinate their work with RECSA to maximize their impact on the proliferation of SALW. For instance, the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO)¹⁴, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the European Union (EU) have also developed a Code of Conduct and Joint Action on Small Arms (CCJASA) (Whitehead, 2006).

Besides concerned organizations, countries have adapted action plans on SALW, which are often linked to other national-security and development objectives (Finlay, et al., 2011). For instance, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa are trying to tackle the illicit trade in SALW, developing new legislation, defining national

¹² The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 2000, March. [Online]. Available from: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/BUILD%20PEACE/NairobiDeclar00.html>

¹³ RECSA. (2016) Regional Report on the Nexus between Illicit SALW Proliferation and Cattle Rustling: Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Nairobi, RECSA.

¹⁴ Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO),” INTERPOL—Regional Bureaus, 3, <http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/SRB/EAPCCO.pdf>

objectives, and in some cases implementing action plans, and coordinating with the RECSA and Light Weapons and the East Africa Community (Kerry and Hyunjoo, 2007). In 2011, the Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) also launched for Sudan and South Sudan (Leff and LeBrun, 2014).

Efforts to preventing the transit of SALW across international boundaries in East Africa are one of the major underlying steps. Accordingly, arms sales today are documented and comply with national laws and international regulations, but a massive quantity of SALW that end up in East Africa are illicitly traded (Whitehead, 2006). Moreover, international arms dealers have mastered the global supply chain and continued to supply and facilitate transportation of small arms with relative ease to governments, warlords, and modern-day pirates, among others (Campbell, et al., 2010). Regarding all these situations, SALW are a serious threat to the security and development of East Africa.

2.1.3 Pastoralism and its Violence Interactions

Although pastoralists keep livestock whose livelihood depends mainly on the raising of domestic animals, pastoralism is more than a system of livestock production (Pratt, et al., 1997). Pastoral systems are systems of natural resource use in which free-ranging or grass feed animals are the principal means of exploiting the resources. Hence, according to Nori et al. (2005), pastoralism is the finely-honed, symbiotic relationship between local ecology, domesticated livestock, and people in resource-scarce, fragile, and highly-variable regions, often at the threshold of human survival. Mobility is a common feature of pastoralism, but varies greatly in its practice (Pratt et al., 1997). However, their

mobility varies in range and seasonality and in the linkage that is maintained between people and livestock.

In this case, the pastoral people migrate from one place to another in two ways. 1) Seasonal movement – move from one place to another to find water and pasture due to frequent climate changes; 2) Displacement – leave original village due to communal conflict. Accordingly, study findings noticed that Africa contains one-half of the world's pastoral peoples; thirteen million Africans are predominately pastoral and another nine million are agro-pastoral, keeping large numbers of livestock while practicing agriculture (Galaty & Johnson, 1990). This indicates that Africa consists of large number of pastoral people and exposed at least for seasonal movements. This is because, the pastoralists occupy savannah, semi-arid, or arid deserts where rain-fed agriculture is precarious which affected by frequent climate changes (Fratkin, 2001).

According to Small Arms Survey (SAS) (2007), African pastoral communities have been taken to prior in the development-security agenda, which have become synonymous with high levels of armed violence and severe underdevelopment; however, little attention is focused on the environmental dynamics. As a result, Richardson (2011) point out the Jonglei state in South Sudan as an example that can be seen as representative of a far broader pattern of the convergence of climate change, poverty, and insecurity. Pastoralists typically occupy large tracts of communally shared land and utilize kinship ties for mutual herding and defense. Their herds are often large and in poor condition, but hardly enough to survive periodic drought and sparse vegetation.

Environmental degradation is one effect of climate changes which resulted in poverty and insecurity. Across the borderland region of East Africa, for example, in the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland region, the main livelihood systems are agro-pastoralism, pastoralism, and fishing. For these livelihood systems, abundant rainfall and well weather condition is necessary; however, the region has been affected by frequent drought and subsequent crop failures since 2008 (Richardson, 2011). Thus, the pastoral people that depend on livelihoods are vulnerable to environmental shifts and drive violent conflict.

Accordingly, pastoral people have position of adversarial relations with their neighbours, which brought into closer proximity and engaged in conflicts over access to these essential resources (ibid). Leff (2009) also argues that inter-tribal conflicts arise when pastoralists from one tribe enter to the territory of another with limited access to water, pastureland, and competing rights to land. Richardson (2011) also observes accentuates that one of the recurring problems towards the end of dry season are conflicts between farmers and cattle-keepers when cattle are taken to graze on planted fields. Clashes also reported at water sources, where cattle-keepers and fishermen compete for the best spots (Cuvelier et al., 2013).

Climate change is a critical factor to shift the mobility nature of pastoral people. Due to climate change, the average rainfall is decreased which has potential to increase the local temperature. The combination of declining rainfall and increasing of temperature have a cause to reduce pasture and water resources. Such changes are having significant impact on an already fragile pattern of seasonal food production and mobile behavior of pastoral people. Thus, contestation over increasingly limited resources is a key factor contributing

to armed conflict in the pastoral people of East Africa. This is because, during the dry season, pastoral people migrate with their cattle to areas with greater pasture and water.

Besides climate change, political instability and civil war in East Africa is also another factor to affect the life of pastoral people (Leff, 2009). Political instability and civil war can provide fertile ground to proliferation of SALW in the pastoral people, which in turn remove different agents of security sector, devastate civilian law, and intensify mobility and violence. In this case, there are high security gaps without a committed security sector apparatus to prevent civilian SALW ownership, which exacerbate the cultural practice of cattle raiding and violence.

Thus, proliferation of SALW and practices of cattle raids is sources of conflicts in the pastoral people. Accordingly, act of violence coupled with cattle raiding, destroyed the social and economic development of the pastoral people. For instance, violence and civil war increased the levels of malnutrition, decreased opportunities to education and income generation, and socio-cultural festivity and performance. In the absence of social and economic development, the vast majority of pastoral people across the borderland region of East Africa are dependent on livelihoods that meet only the most basic requirements of existence. Accordingly, Richardson (2011) argues that armed violence stemming from conflicts between pastoral communities continues to reduce social and economic development. According to his argument, acts of violence reduce opportunities to education and income through the deaths of the youngest and productive members of a community, whilst the subsequent climates of insecurity inhibit even micro-investment and parents reduce their willing to send their children to school.

2.1.4 Practices of Cattle Raiding Among the Pastoral People

In historical perspectives, cattle raids have been treated as a method of warfare or as social pathology (King, 2017). According to King, while these perspectives are often valid, the now apparent significance of raiding as a meaningful practice for pastoral raiders which encourages a look at the social meaning of raids in the pastoral people. However, according to Evans et al. (2000), cattle raiding have been a problem whenever cattle are run on the range. In this regard, the practice of cattle raiding is one of a critical threat in the pastoral communities due to its forceful act with different range of confrontation between the owners and raiders.

Siele (2014) also pinpoints that the act of cattle raiding has frequently happened among the pastoral African communities. In the early period, cattle raiding have been a customary means of livestock restocking where traditional weapons such as bows, arrows, and spears were used. However, it has transformed to a commercial practice where sophisticated weaponry is used (Osamba 2000). Accordingly, cattle raiding have emerged as a major security challenge across the borderland and hinterland region of East Africa. As a criminal enterprise it has consequences for the socio-economic, political, cultural, and psychological spheres of society (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016). Thus, it constitutes a major economic threat to the livelihood of herders and those who depend on cows for survival (Gray et al., 2003).

Contemporary cattle raiding activities operate as a form of organized crime, motivated by wealth accumulation given that proceeds are never subject to state taxation (Alemika, 2013, Okoli and Okpaleke, 2014). A major impetus for the syndicated criminality is the

presence of what Kwaja (2014) captured as the “underground economy,” which is linked to the political economy of some agrarian societies. An underground economy thrives on secrecy and the accumulation of untaxed wealth. In essence, the shadow economy in this case acts as an outlet for stolen cows and brings in a lot of cash (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016).

Cattle have very strong social significances in the pastoral people across the border region of East Africa. For instance, the youth are trying to find acceptance in their society by getting married and have kids. To get marriage, they have to provide cattle for bride price according to the specific cultural norms. Ngunia (2014) also accentuates that the South Sudanese pastoral people paid 40 cattle for bride price. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005) in South Sudan, men looked to increase their herds and marry as such the payment of bride price is increased (Small Army Survey, 2012).

Due to such increment, among the Lango community in Eastern Equatoria, a wife costs 40-50 heads of cattle, in contrast to the pre-war bride price of 15-22 (Ochan, 2007). The study findings of Sommers and Schwartz (2011), after CPA, the bride-prices in South Sudan are increased by 44%. The bride-price is a crucial economic feature in South Sudanese society and “the need to afford bride-price payments gives men an important motivation to accumulate wealth” (Orly, 2011). Thus, according to McEvoy and Murray (2008), a limited economic environment puts great pressure on young men to conduct successful raids for cattle to pay the bride-price.

Cattle raiding have been occurring in South Sudan since time immemorial (Lacey, 2013). Cattle are integral to the economy and culture of the people of South Sudan, and youth in

cattle-camps have historically fought both to protect their own cattle, and to acquire cattle from their neighbours (Young, 2007). The major factor about cattle raiding which aggravate violence among different pastoral communities is the increment of bride price payment. To acquire cattle for bride price, youths prefer to raid from other places of community. To get the cattle, they kill the owner of the cow; because they cannot take the cow if the owner is around there.

According to Lacey (2013), although in the past cattle raiding was driven purely by a desire to increase wealth and to gain status as a raider, the reasons for the recent violent cattle raids are more complex beyond bride price payment. Raiding of cattle is related to accumulation of wealth. In such wealth accumulation, revenge is a source of fighting and connected to political reason among different ethnic groups. These factors are exacerbated by increased access to weapons, lack of education, limited economic opportunities, and extreme poverty.

Lack of education perpetuates lack of access to both economic opportunities and political engagement. For instance, according to South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2012), only 27% of the South Sudanese population above the age of six has ever attended school,¹⁵ and in 2009¹⁶ there were 84 students per teacher and 169 students per classroom.

The sophisticated nature of cattle raiding is dismantling the peaceful coexistence of the local people and intensifies violence action among youth groups. Accordingly, the use of

¹⁵South Sudan National Baseline Household Survey, 2009.

¹⁶State Educational Statistical Booklet, EMIS, Ministry of Education, Government of South Sudan, 2009.

powerful artillery during raids—including semi-automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades: relics of the war, or acquired from the SPLA/M, from rebel leaders in South Sudan, or from across the porous borders—has elevated raiding to an increasingly destructive practice. According to Lacey (2013), in the warring areas of East Africa, for instance, in South Sudan, everybody has gone militant, so whether they are trained or they are untrained, they have guns. Loneliness plus absence of rule of law are exacerbated the violence of cattle raids in the region. Thus, cattle raiding parties have grown from small groups of cattle-camp youth to large and well organized battalions.

According to Hutchinson and Jok (2002), militarized segments on different ethnic division of Murle, Nuer, and Dinka have sought to rationalize their increasing viciousness as retaliations for abominations earlier experienced. Hence, revenge within the cattle raiding cycle is being part of violence. People want to back their cattle, however, confrontation is expected from both side of groups. According to Aguti Adut¹⁷ – the Jonglei State Director for Security and Small Arms Control (JSDSSAC) – the Murle, they were coming to revenge because the Lou-Nuer went and killed the Murle, so the Murle was revenging the Lou-Nuer.

As the violence of the raids has increased, the victims of attacks have become not just the cattle-camp youth and men as warriors, but the elderly, the women, and the children. However, according to Hutchinson and Jok (2002), the killing of unarmed women and children became standard practice in raids over ten years ago between Nuer and Dinka

¹⁷Aguti Adut, interview with Elizabeth Lacey, Bor, September 10, 2012. In Lacey, E. (2013) *Restive Jonglei: from the conflict's roots to reconciliation*. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 105 Hatfield Road, Gardens, Cape Town, 8001, South Africa. www.ijr.org.za

combatants, who came to think of women not just as assets with inter-ethnic mobility, but as fixed members of an ethnic group and therefore the target of any attempt at ethnic annihilation.

2.2 Contemplation of State Borders

A border is a line or a place that divides two different states or location that are then categorized as different political, economic, and social groups. Thus, the notion of border conveys a sense of imaginary or real lines that divide two pieces of land from one another (Ikome, 2004; Ajala, 1981). The essential functions of a border are to keep people in their own space and to prevent, control, or regulate interactions among them (Martinez, 2015). In all these understanding, border is not only a divide between two states but also different regions and/or locations within a state. For instance, a given country may create different administrative structures like regions, provinces, districts, and “*kebeles*”¹⁸; and each of them has their own borders to differentiate one another to make sense of different administrative structures.

Thus, a border can give service at domestic and/or international level. Domestic border is a border that helps to administer different locations within a given state. It can be considered as a local administrative border that serves to manage at domestic level. International border is dividing two internationally recognized countries/states. This is because the two different states have international involvements; sovereignty; independent political, social, and economic structure; independent power to administer their citizens; and make international treaties. Accordingly, the following sections

¹⁸ Small Unit Administration (SUA) in a town or a village.

emphasize to address the arguments on the nature of international borders, pre-colonial African borders, and circumstances of borderland security including its functions.

2.2.1 The Nature of International Border

The characteristic of international borders has been the changing nature of the functions that they have performed throughout history (Kratochwil, 1986). It has been a useful tool to illuminate the nature and pattern of interactions of different domestic and international systems. According to Ajala (1981) and Ikome (2004), when the border lines run between two national states, they are described as international borders and are usually defined from point to point in treaties, arbitration awards or the reports of border commissions.

From a legal perspective, international borders are the sharp edge of the territories within which states exercise their jurisdictions – the lines that mark the legal termination of the territory of one state or political unit and the start of another (Curzon, 1907; Asiwaju, 1992). In the modern state, a well-defined border has an essential element of statehood; consolidate to build stable states and societies; and help to form state institutions and create national consciousness.

International border making can be influenced by a wide range of historical, geographical, political, economic, and cultural factors. This suggests that the practice of border making has no standard procedure in the world (Ajala, 1981; Ikome, 2004); however, the different practices may help to generate better ways of demarcation. The International Border Research Unit (IBRU) in 2006 also accentuates that in border

demarcation and maintenance, there is no single model of good practice, but sharing experience from around the world can help generate new ideas.

Donaldson (2014) also argue that the range of physical and human border landscapes and of political, economic and social contexts across Africa is significant, and no single set of boundary-making practices and procedures will fit every boundary. According to Vakencia-Ospina (2002), surveying and mapping in general and aerial and satellite imagery in particular, play a major role in establishing the borders physically which is an important fact in the recognition of borders. However, the usual method of border demarcation focuses on natural or geometric and/or artificial border.

According to the argument of Ahmad (2014), natural borders have geographical features that present natural obstacles to communication and transport. As to him, the existing political borders are often a formalization of these historical and natural obstacles. Anebo (2016) also accentuates some of the most usual ways of setting boundary line such as rivers, mountains, marshlands and forests. Some geographical features that often constitute natural borders including rivers such as the Niagara River border (Canada-USA), the Rio Grande border (Mexico-USA), the Rhine border (France-Germany), and the Mekong border (Thailand-Laos); lakes e.g. Lake Tanganyika with DR Congo and Zambia at the West shore and Tanzania and Burundi on the East, and Lake Rudolf with Ethiopia and Kenya; forests e.g. the Amazon rainforest separating Brazil and Bolivia from Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Guyana; and mountain ranges. The Baro and Akobo Rivers also served as an international border between Ethiopia and South Sudan; which do not formally demarcate as a border but by default the two countries use these

rivers as a natural border. Those natural borders are including the hydrological boundaries, or watercourses, dry borders, mountain ranges and other natural landmarks.

Geometric and/or artificial borders are borders marked by monuments. However, the most common method of marking an international border, introduced by the Roman Empire, is by means of erecting monuments from concrete or another durable material available in the region (Claussen, 2009). So, internationally, many borders do not depend on natural characteristics. Many flat areas are appropriate for border crossings and it is not easy to see such a border unless they are clearly defined. There are also several border definitions generally referring to physical and/or ethnic characteristics. However, many artificial borders could be neither physical nor ethnic characteristics. Therefore, as Asiwaju (1985) accentuates, artificial borders are the major source of many disputes in the world.

Accordingly, the determination of an international border involves a multi-step process: allocation of territory, delimitation, demarcation, and ongoing administration (Claussen, 2009). The initial political division of territory is allocation. Delimitation includes the selection of border site and its written definition in words or measures in a treaty or other formal documents. Moreover, demarcation refers to the translation of the delimitation agreement onto the landscape or the construction of the border on the ground, originally conceived as the erection of monuments along the line defined in the delimitation process. However, demarcation is a political act that requires real-time decision-making premised on law. Whereas administration is a continuing project of managing the border

that it refers to the physical maintenance of the border and management of goods and people that cross the border.

2.2.2 The Pre-Colonial African Borders

Most European colonizers based on *terra nullius principle* (*land without masters or no man's land*), assumed that in the pre-colonial times Africans had no states. However, according to Wa Mutua (1995), international law defined states through "basic attributes of formal juridical equality, independence, and sovereignty, a fixed locality or territory, and a political society organized into a government." Of course, pre-colonial African boundaries were porous and had been changing, as tribes, ethnic groups, nations or nation states frequently moved or migrated from one place to other, looking for favorable environments and resources for beneficial life (Anebo, 2016). Moreover, in pre-colonial Africa, borders were not well known and people moved from place to place to find good places for their cattle, hunting, and edible fruits.

However, according to the argument of Ajala (1963), traditional African societies share indigenous type of boundaries that separated private holdings of ethnic and national boundaries, which had been delineated by the natural features of land. Accordingly, rivers, mountains, deserts, forests, watersheds, marshlands, lakes, and sea were some of the dominant method of marking boundaries between tribes, nations, city-states, or Empires. Therefore, the pre-colonial African boundaries often set unilaterally and marked by natural features of land between kingdoms (Anebo, 2016).

On the other hand, regarding boundaries, early African boundaries were zonal (frontiers) in nature (Anebo, 2016). Though porous and periodically changed, African Empires, nations or cities had their own territories and boundaries before European boots landed in Africa (Quashigah, 1999). For this matter it is possible to mention many examples, for instance the boundaries of Axumite Kingdom of Ethiopia, kings were fully aware of territorial limits of the Kingdom. Their expansionist tendencies and even the possibility to lose one's territory cannot lead one to suppose that pre-colonial Africa did not have boundary.

In the pre-colonial time, African societies considered as borderless due to their free movements of life. Nevertheless, such kind of borderless societies were also present in Europe before the formulation of Westphalian concept of linear border in 1648¹⁹. In this regard, McEwen (1971) argues that the concept of linear boundary was alien to Africa due to an absence of centralized state structures or entities. According to Anebo (2016), attempts to devise a clear border line were largely "imported" to Africa by colonial powers. The concept of territorial delineation of political control was by and large culturally alien in pre-colonial Africa (Engelbert, et al. 2002). Thus, different scholars argued that the concept of territorial defined statehood is imported from Europe and this makes colonially imposed boundaries alien to Africa.

Their argument was accentuated to the implementation of a linear border with regard the local African societies of pre-colonial time. The Westphalian formula of linear border in Europe was constructive and considered the culture, linguistics, socio-economic, and

¹⁹ http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Peace_of_Westphalia

living condition of the local people. Despite the fact of European Westphalia, the African colonial border delineation was arbitrary. Thus, the manner in which the Westphalian model had contributed to the encountering challenges of African states with regard to their borders. Berhanu (2017) also argues that, in Africa, the Westphalian System was not only unsuitable but also unsolicited. According to his argument, the circumstances in the continent had been such that Westphalia or its prescriptions had to be superimposed in their entirety, often by force, onto pre-existing indigenous systems.

There are some kinds of debates between scholars that the pre-colonial African kings have close attachment with land or people. Englebert, et al., (2002) argue that the pre-colonial African kingdoms claimed political authority and property rights over people more than land. On the other hand, Dobler (2008) argues that the pre-colonial African Kings, for instance, in Ethiopia, kings had concern to their territorial delimitation and strongly linked to the land; including the people. Besides Ethiopian Kings of Axumite Kingdom, in Ovamboland, Namibia territory did matter for their political administration, even if land as such was plentiful and different polities lay far from each other. In medieval Africa, thus, it is not only the people but also the territory in which authority may be exercised and vital (Anebo, 2016).

Accordingly, the pre-colonial African societies' life practice depends on free movement but their movement is limited either by the nature of their geographical landscape or culture of band of society. In this regard, according to Ajala (1963), the concepts of pre-colonial African borders can be classed into three categories: 1) frontiers of contact for cultural and political groups to coexist. Although the boundaries are served as points of

contacts, as Schengen currently does in Europe, neighboring kingdoms or ethnic groups lived side by side and people passed through territories of each without obstruction and borders did not have to absolutely restrain movement. 2) Frontiers of separation where communities were separated by a buffer zone. In this case, two or more borderland groups were separated by wide border mark, such as a river or dense forest or a desert that was hard to cross. In most cases, these buffer zones were not fall under the authority of either community; means it is free to any community. 3) Enclave frontiers for migratory communities. Enclave frontiers were a kind of overlapping boundaries.

For such border circumstances, the only possible way of boundary setting was individual land boundary, but this becomes complicated when group relations are so integrally connected to seasonal land use. Thus, the nomadic life makes difficult or hard to prove to boundary settings in the pre-colonial African border situation. For instance, according to Green (2012), the migratory nature of the Masaai (in Southern Kenya) and Tuareg (inhabited the Sahara Desert, stretching from far Southwestern Libya to Southern Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) makes it hard to exactly locate their territorial boundaries.

2.2.3 Colonial Border Design in Africa

The Scramble for Africa officially legitimized on the Berlin Conference (1884–85) and ended by the early twentieth century. During this period, European colonizers partitioned Africa into spheres of influence, colonies, and various segments. From their bases in European capitals, they partitioned land, from European capitals, with limited knowledge of the geography, history, and ethnic composition of Africa. As a result, in many African

countries, a significant portion of their population belongs to groups split by colonial partitions.

During the onset of colonization, European powers preferentially dealt with African local leaders and chieftaincies (Boahen, 1985). Colonial powers employed underhand mechanisms in territorial acquisition and boundary making, such as deceit, fraud, intimidation and bribery (Okumu, 2009). Moreover, colonial powers utilized various techniques to influence African leaders and a resource rich land (Herbst, 1989). The Berlin Conference legitimized the partition of Africa, and colonialists focused on designing regional maps without providing any notification to the local African rulers and made treaties among colonial powers to avoid unhealthy resource competition. However, many errors made due to their superficial knowledge of the continent and undeveloped maps in existence.

Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister in 1906, demonstrated this arbitrary and uninformed approach when at the signing of the Anglo-French convention on the Nigeria-Niger boundary in 1906 said, “We [the British and the French] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod: we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediments that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were” (Anene, 1970:3). This statement helps us to understand how colonial powers designed arbitrary African boundaries without knowledge of the land and local communities.

European powers completed cartographic surveys of territories through boundary commissions from 1900-1930 that allowed total control of colonies (Okumu, 2009).

However, these focused solely on land control, and had disregarded ethnic partitioning. Arbitrary colonial borders split many closely related ethnic groups into different colonial regions (Mungai, 2015). In the HoA, for instance, they split Somalis into French Somaliland, British Somalia, Italian Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia, and the Somali region of northern Kenya (Dereje and Hoehen, 2008). Such colonial borders continue to have massive effects on the current Somali people who share a common culture, a similar way of life, and the same religion, but are obliged to live as citizens of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia. Similarly, the Afar people were split amongst Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti; the Anyuua and Nuer split between Ethiopia and Sudan – now South Sudan.

Following the arbitrary colonial borders design, African communities could not move freely as before in their daily activities and nomadic practices which inflicted economic hardship and social inconvenience. Changing the lifestyle and structural systems of African borderland people negatively affected their traditional life, administrative structures, and economic well-being (Anebo, 2016). This deprived African borderland people of economic opportunity by hindering their movements and forcing them to live differently than their traditional life. For example, many Africans are pastoralist and nomadic people and need vast land for grazing and water. However, according to Touval (1972), the arbitrary colonial borders restricted the borderland people to herding on limited land and forced them into resource competition and confrontation with other borderland peoples.

Besides improperly designing borders, the European colonial powers also employed “divide and rule”, “direct rule”, and “assimilation” policies, which forced the loss of people social mores, identity, and social order for Africans. Moreover, these policies instigated conflicts among local people by dividing them even further, and consequently strengthening colonial power. Doing so helped gradually develop hostile relations among borderland people, and post-independent African governments and political elites used this division for political means. This is because, some political elites in Africa affiliate more along ethnic lines, and play crucial roles in fueling tensions and escalating political disenfranchisement.

For instance, the Lou-Nuer of South Sudan and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia belong to the same ethnic group, and live along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, yet they are considered two distinct ethnic groups with different nationalities and have developed hostility through resource competition. Despite the effects of colonization and arbitrary borders on borderland communities, some African political leaders have not alleviated these problems but rather used them as political instruments.

2.2.4 The Circumstances of Borderland Security

One of the spillover effects of arbitrary colonial border in Africa is the problem of border security that the border demarcation fueling conflict on African borderland people. In the post-colonial period, the African States' physical conflicts are related with border economy and affect the border security. For instance, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over their common boundary in 1998, the 2009 stand-off between Kenya and Uganda over the ownership of Migingo Island in Lake Victoria, the 2008 border incident

between Eritrea and Djibouti, the continuing Somali nationalism in the region, and border skirmishes between Uganda and the DRC over the oil-rich Lake Albert region (Okumu, 2009). Thus, OAU organized the Cairo Resolution in 1964 to minimize and control the border case wars, however, according to Okumu, indefinite, porous, inadequately demarcated and unmanaged boundaries in Africa are being used for illegal cross-border activities that are threatening national sovereignties and destabilizing regional peace.

Africa is the most bisected continent in the world, given that 54 sovereign states are divided by over 167 borders. Nana-Sinkam (2000), before the separation of South Sudan from Sudan, also pinpoints that Africa's 53 sovereign states are divided by over 165 borders. However, the borders that separate African countries are largely products of colonial era boundary making, drawn without respect to and in some cases in nearly complete ignorance of the sociological, cultural, and historical characteristics of the peoples they partitioned (Asiwaju, 1985; Hargreaves, 2005). Practically, the colonial power draws the African boundary and split the same people into different citizens without considering their socio-economic nature. Such drawing of boundary and allocation of populations to each political unit is interpreted as having randomly assigned the inhabitants of the border area into different socio-economic and political treatments.

Accordingly, the borderland people demonstrate differences in attitudes, behavioral patterns, and/or other outcomes that attributed to differences in the political institutions, country-level demographics, histories, and public policies to which they have each been exposed. This has made the borderland communities scapegoats for a host of contemporary problems in Africa, ranging from ethnic conflict to civil war which

resulted poor economic performance (Englebert, et al., 2002). For this reason, African colonial borders have the potential to be exposed to the multifaceted nature of conflict and complicated the inter-state and inter-ethnic borderland communities' relation. Thus, the arbitrary nature of colonial boundaries in Africa has potential to cause conflict and threats to peace and security of the borderland people.

The argument of different scholars' pursued to the insecurity of African borderland areas that people along the border become instable due to inadequate arbitrary border delineation. For instance, Blum (2014) argues that the African borderlands are fragile, volatile, insecure, and security hot spots. This is because, according to Ikome (2012), the African borders are drawn arbitrarily and have ill-defined characters. Besides, Africa's governing elites since the 1960s have maintained a status quo of border policy, which have been controversial, emotive and sentimental. Thus, the African border security situation is more complicated during the postcolonial period.

In the post-colonial period, many African cross-border regions became a place of crime and foster a dynamic nature of cultural and socio-economic exchange. Therefore, the porous and unviable African borders have resulted in the regionalization of instability and conflict, producing chaos and even anarchy in areas such as the Mano River in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and the HoA. For this reason, border security is related with features of African States' relation along the border that shared political, economic and social instability.

Consequently, African borderland circumstances portray to arbitrary, contested, and very porous. This is, according to Ikome (2012), because of a lack of proper delimitation and

demarcation which are considered as the most potent source of conflict and political instability. Hence, in many African countries, border conflicts become sources of instability and conflict for the borderland community. Therefore, establishment of stable borders has been identified as a precondition for the building of stable governments and states that ultimately lead to state survival and inter-state relations.

Based on this understanding, Finer (1974), argues that when established a state, definite and defensible territorial border is created to form inter-state relations and compel those who live inside as citizen and obey to implement the rules of a given country. Otherwise, according to the argument of Laremont (2005), unconsolidated borders combined with ineffective political institutions and incomplete nationalist projects, have been procedures for instability and conflict. Therefore, according to the argument of Okumu (2014), the government's ability to control and secure its population and territory is one of the classic international legal criteria to state recognition.

For this reason, the centrality of borders is further underscored by Weber's popular dictum that for a state to be a true state it must claim the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a territory (Weber, 1958). Thus, their arguments conclude that the exercises of state authority can be defined and understood based on definite border unless the legitimacy of the government objectives cannot be clarified or implemented. Accordingly, it is clear that all states are concerned with stable borders in their desire to extend their authority and functions of government over a specific territory.

2.3 Borderland Social and Economic Circumstances

The borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan has economic interactions and socio-cultural similarities. The following three sections are going to investigate debates and gaps of empirical literatures regarding social and economic circumstances of the borderland region.

2.3.1 Social and Economic Settings of the Borderland People

The essence of border is to separate the "self" from the "other" (Newman, 2003). As such, one of the major functions of a border is to act as a barrier, "protecting" the "us – insiders" from the "them – outsiders" (Oomen 1995; Sibley 1995). They prevent the entry of undesired elements; be they people, goods, arms, drugs, and albeit to a much lesser extent than in the past information. The determination of just what can and cannot move beyond the border is a function of how the power elites of a given society or country view the border as an institution which protects those who are on the "inside" or are "here" from the (perceived) negative impact of those who have been excluded and are on the "outside" or are "there."

The protection function takes on many forms at the primordial level protecting the citizens of a country from invasion by foreign armies or from the inflow of illegal weapons across the border (Newman, 2003). The barrier function of borders also protects those inside from other "harmful" elements, such as drugs, migrant labor, competition in the market place and so on. Cultural borders offer protection against infiltration of values

which are not compatible with the hegemonic practices of the majority, be they social and economic status, religious affiliation and/or residential homogeneity.

All borders share a common function to the extent that they include some and exclude many others. This is as true of the hard territorial line which determines the shape and size of the territorial compartments within which people play out their daily lives, as it is the social, religious, cultural, ethnic, and cyber boundaries which reflect the groups to which people belong and affiliate and, for many, determine their various identities (Shapiro & Alker, 1996; Paasi, 1996; Wilson & Donnan, 1998). With the exception of territorial compartmentalization, the bordering process does not have to create inclusion or exclusion contingencies. Belonging to virtual groups and cyber affiliations expresses a global pattern of inclusion, whose boundaries is neither visible nor contiguous, but exist by virtue of the nature of belonging to a common interest group, sharing specific values, social status, economic interactions, and identities (Newman, 2003).

As the essence of border to protect insider from outsider, borders have traditionally been understood as physical barriers, separating lines between territorial spaces rather than cultivating socio-cultural and economic interactions (Manda, et al., 2014). While this notion remains at the forefront for geographers, there has been a general trend towards understanding borders as a process, rather than borders as a physical and static construct per se (Newman, 2003; 2006).

In due course, the borderland socio-economic combination and milieu has unique forces, processes, and characteristics that set borderland communities apart from interior zones including: 1) transnational interaction; 2) international conflict and accommodation; 3)

ethnic conflict and accommodation; and 4) separateness (Martinez, 2015). According to Hansen (1986), infinite variations are to be expected in the borderlands socio-economic milieu because of divergences in cross border interaction as well as the heterogeneity of borderlands, which arises from differences in the size of nation, and their political relationships, levels of development, and ethnic, cultural, economic, social, and linguistic configurations.

A glance through history highlights that the people and countries of East Africa have traditionally been bound by commonalities: colonial heritage, cross-border affinities, common culture, similar socio-economic interactions, and language (Manda, et al., 2014). As the borderland communities are located at the edge of a nation that has places in international environments, there have been a wide range of implications for those who function in or are affected by trans-border socio-economic interchange. Some of these implications are foreign values, ideas, customs, traditions, institutions, tastes, and behaviors that have potential to affect borderland communities in an open international environment (Martinez, 2015).

In this understanding, territory and borders have their own internal political dynamics, creating social, economic and political change in their own right, as well as a physical outcome as a result of decision making. This applies most directly where circumstances permit extensive cross-border movement, as in the case of interdependent and integrated borderlands. Thus, according to Newman (2006), borders can be understood as a process of two contrasting trajectories, in terms of invisibility, permeability, and coexistence between respective groups, or in terms of a barrier of separation and security.

Economically, borderland social milieu is dynamic which faced frictions associated with cross-border trade, smuggling, undocumented migration, heavy cross-border traffic, money laundering, and human trafficking. In contrast to populations in national heartlands, where cultural homogeneity is the norm, people of border regions are more likely to live in heterogeneous environments because of greater ethnic mixing and more extensive migration between contiguous countries (Khadiagala, 2010). In this case, the borderland communities are culturally more diversified and inevitably produce interethnic friction, especially if the groups represented have a history of antagonism.

Along international border, a range of people with different ancestral origins and tribes are living together with socio-economic interaction and build villages of interactive social milieu. Some of the residents are either born there, married into the village, or came as family visitors or trading partners and remained there. Regarding this understanding, the people who live along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, particularly the Anyuaa and Nuer have been developed a common socio-economic interactions and building villages without any feelings of stranger across the border in both sides.

Accordingly, their ethnic, cultural, and social relationships extended and anyone can cross the border by any side to have equal socio-economic chances as their relatives who live on the either side. Even though these diverse socio-cultural and economic interactions flourished in the borderland communities, it has also contributed to the complex and conflict ridden experiences of the borderland people over a century.

2.3.2 Ethnic Boundaries among the Borderland People

Ethnic boundaries assessed by different scholars as such emphasize on ethnic identity that ethnicity is a powerful determinant of collective action because, according to Bell (1971:169), it can “combine interest with an affective tie.” Rothschild (1981:61) suggests ethnicity’s great appeal “lies precisely in its ability to combine emotional sustenance with calculated strategy.” As Nagata (1981) puts that ethnic identity then has a unique power to bring people together with common sentimental understanding and express their character with basic symbol to tie together. Accordingly, the basic symbol that expresses the characteristics of ethnic identity is their loyalty to one another which is an instrument to demarcate ethnic boundaries.

Accordingly, ethnicity is the bold identity to establish boundaries among certain ethnic groups (Barth, 1969). However, different theorists invariably argue about the sources of boundaries in different ethnic groups. Consequently, according to constructive theory, ethnicity is the product of social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth (Hecquer, 2014). This debate has often been framed in dichotomous terms: “primordialism,” which underlined that ethnic membership is acquired through birth and thus represented a “given” characteristic of the social world, which is pitted against “instrumentalism,” which maintained that individuals chosen between various identities according to self-interest (Chandra, 2012c).

Thus, the Murle-Anyuua-Nuer division along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border has been reproduced persistent despite one another by emphasizing to ethnic cleavage. Their ethnic

construction implies the argumentative concept of the primordialist and constructivist and/or circumstantialists theories. With the hatred nature of ethnic boundary, both the Jikany-Nuer and Anyuaa have no daily contact with Murle ethnic group and come to identify with the social imposed category and conclude social classification as a “wild-Murle people”²⁰ due to their cattle raiding and child abduction practices — while Murle youth still vehemently emphasized their ethnic identity to counter the stigma of “wildness” as Rogowski (1974) proposed factors of stigmata in different ethnic groups.

Among those borderland ethnic groups, ethnic boundaries are drawn intentionally, are relevant for many different domains of everyday life, are agreed upon by a vast majority of individuals, and form the basis for collective action and resource mobilization. In an interview²¹ with a Nuer man among my interviewees that a Nuer is a Nuer once we made a *Gar*²² on his forehead even if he born outside of the Nuer ethnic group. The people are classified by their ethnic identity and consume the essence of ethnicity as a means of safeguarding to survival and life continuity in that environment and more interested to have closure with their group. According to Dereje (2011), the Nuer ethnic group is the products of the constructivist theory that assumes and compels other ethnic groups to

²⁰Both Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan categorized the Murle group as a sense of “Wild-People” due to their ruthless act of infant child abduction from the hand of Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer mother and raid cow by killing the owners.

²¹An interview was made with a Nuer man named *Wiyual Nyak Riek* in Akobo, Tergol in November 2016.

²²*Gar* is one of cultural emblem for Nuer people that all Nuer men should involve making long cuts across forehead, which then form scares. The other cultural symbol is withdrawing four of the lower teeth and inculcate their culture in the mind of a small child who born outside of their ethnic once he/she belongs in the Nuer people; eg., Nega is from the Tigre ethnic origin but he grown up in the Nuer people thus he withdrew his four of the lower teeth, changed his name from Nega to Biel Bichok, speak the Nuer language, and married a Nuer woman. He currently perceived and act a Nuer identity and he is lecturer at Gambella University.

have their identity in the form of adoption and assimilation but they do not abduct children.

In contrast to the Nuer, the Anyuua people is processed through primordialist theory that restricted to its own ethnic group and conservative to their identity and thought that they acquire their identity through birth. Among the borderland people of South Sudan across the border of Ethiopia, the Murle people have the same social process with the Nuer that they construct their ethnic identity either through adoption or assimilation by abducting children from different communities in their surroundings. Moreover, ethnicity is a strong way of identity formation for the Murle and their neighbours, which has power to collect together for the same issues; and group members are prepared to incur high costs to defend the culture and honor of their community and the authenticity of its culture.

Hence, across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, the Murle in the lowland plain area of Pibor and the Nuer in Gambella are pastoralist group that livestock is their central livelihood while the Anyuua are agrarian group of people by controlling the right and left bank of the rivers and arid land for shifting cultivation. All these groups of people are seasonal and move from place to place following the dry and wet season. However, they have their own ethnic boundary and territorial division of land to protect their economic resources from invasion or sharing by other groups.

For the reasons of social boundary and ethnic classifications, the borderland peoples' socio-economic interaction is deteriorated through incompatible resource competition and antagonistic ethnic value judgment. Their livelihood has close attachment with their culture, language, and religion; and thus they shaped by their socialization processes and

cultivate under their norms. Besides their ethnic boundaries, their socialization process provides distinct norms and ways of life which restricted their daily contact and thus, they exposed to antagonistic relations. For this reason, the borderland proximity of insecurity such as proliferation of small arms (see Christopher, 2011), commercialization of livestock (see Manyok, 2016), and a sharp rise in bride price (see McCallum, 2013); which made cattle rustling a more violent and lucrative venture across the border (Osman, 2015). Accordingly, to consolidate human power to collect cattle and secure social needs, abduction of children from other community is another mechanism of the Murle youth to have superior power (see section 7.2.1 in Chapter Seven).

2.3.3 The Dynamics of Ethnic Polarization

Violent conflict causes enormous costs for people, and yet we often observe wide support in the population for political elites that initiate conflicts (Alder and Wang, 2014). A recent literature has argued theoretically and empirically that ethnic polarization is an important determinant of the incidence of conflict (see for example Esteban, et al., 2012). In different parts of Africa, ethnic polarization is one source of conflict and obstruction to social and economic progress. With this fact of ethnic polarization, questions bear in our mind, then that, what is the main source of ethnic polarization? How can ethnic groups be so highly polarized on large scale violence? What process of social interaction escalates ethnic polarization and obstacle to economic and social progress?

According to Esteban and Ray (1994), the dynamic process of ethnic polarization results from the interaction of group identity and across-group alienation. Accordingly, cultural differences of the local community are an expected part of diversity in a multicultural

society; however, groups of people induce some cultural identities to differentiate one from another and impede to smooth interactions. As people different in culture and ethnically, they feel socially or ideologically separated from the members of other groups; but differences by itself is not a problem. However, elites or influential groups in a people, exercise the cultural differences to escalate gapes of people and deepen ethnic division for socio-economic and political purposes (Horowitz, 2000).

Moreover, to strengthen their position and to exploit social powers through subtle arrangements of ethnic polarization (see Alder and Wang, 2014), elites use the ethnic division as an instrument of political implementation and cultivate ethnocentric attitude to widen the gap of ethnic differences by creating enmity among neighbours. Based on elite's propagation, the members of ethnic groups are fighting with their neighbors to preserve their identity and cultural superiority. Furthermore, the discrete groups of people more polarize their relation by forming an ethnic boundaries and groups to differentiate their activities within the same environment.

On the other hand, the increment of ethnic polarization produces fertile environment to ethnic conflict. This is because, according to Esteban and Ray (2011), polarization and conflict have direct relations that the level of conflict increases with the level of polarization. Therefore, the increment of ethnic polarization leads to ethnic conflict and then ultimately leads to social disintegration. In this regard, the intensity of conflict is most pronounced with a bimodal destruction of the economic resources (Chai, 1996), displacement and exposed the local community to widespread poverty.

Ethnic polarization is a subsequent process of ethnic boundaries, which indicate a persistent identity bloc, despite the flow of personnel across them (Barth, 1969). However, the ethnic boundary does not mean an absence of mobility, contact and sharing information but there are different mechanisms to entail process of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained to increase their polarization. Accordingly, some important social capital such as tolerance, stability, morality, respect, and support are going to lose their value and in turn, hatred, arrogance, harassment, grievance, and reprisal are likely to dominate the social relations (Horowitz, 2000). Thus, according to Narroll (1964), using such ethnic boundaries that maintained within a discrete ethnic category, participation and membership in the course of individual life histories are despite each other.

Accordingly, by initiating conflict along ethnic lines, elites can deepen ethnic divisions and thus increase polarization (Horowitz, 2000). The polarization in society strengthens the position of the elite and allows it to exploit power (Adler and Wang, 2014). This strategy is well known as “divide-and-rule” (Posner, et al., 2010). In this regard, a key question for such a divide-and-rule argument is how elites can induce people to polarize. Fearon and Laitin (2000:853) also describe this challenge as: “the puzzle for such theoretical arguments is to explain how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs and take actions that the followers would not want to take if they understood what the leaders were up to.” Thus, according to Alder and Wang (2014), polarization is modeled as a lack of trust between ethnic groups.

Regarding the facts of ethnic polarization, the divide and rule colonial policy of British administration in Sudan remains its legacy and engulfed to the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland people. The people confined to their ethnic groups with their distinct culture, less contact with neighbours, control resources through their traditional wealth possession, and restricted to territorial imagination. However, they have many similarities but not identical in terms of color of skin, cultural manifestations, festivity (dance), language, religion, and physical appearance, but no elite or politician could cultivate this commonness of reality for their unity.

Inversely, their elites produced a separate people following the political arena of the time, each with their distinct culture and organized in a society which can legitimately be isolated for description as an island to itself. The classification of persons and local groups as members of an ethnic group depends on their exhibiting the particular traits of the culture. With this discrete ethnic group formation, ascription of a person depends on his/her basic, most general identity, presumptively determined by his origin and background. Such a dynamic nature of polarization creates radical people who focus on one identity and stigmatize external groups; this entails criteria for determining membership and ways of signaling membership and exclusion (DeVos, 1975). Thus, such kind of criteria is creating an ethnic boundary which has a potential to aggravate ethnic polarization and undermines the existing substantial nature of socio-economic system.

2.4 Gaps of Intellectual Discussions

The Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland people are agrarian, pastoralist, and semi-pastoralist. Their livelihood depends on farming and/or livestock husbandry, cattle

herding, fishing, hunting, and collecting edible fruits. Socially, they are interconnected through marriage, religion, language, trade, and other social relations due to open border area. They have free movements and mobility along the border to find pastureland, arable land, and water. However, the region is also one of the most conflict-ridden, where violence and wars are part of life. The area has experienced an unprecedented upsurge in cross-border conflicts, which are connected with cattle raiding, child abductions, and confrontations.

Moreover, the social and economic security situation of the borderland people is dire due to long-term civil war in Sudan and their low levels of political accessibility. According to Ylönen (2010) and Gatluak (2014), the borderland people of Ethiopia and South Sudan are marginalized from social and economic services and have low accessibility to political activities which undermines peaceful cohabitation and the benefits of modernity. Accordingly, the borderland people (Murle, Nuer, and Anyuua) are excluded from access to central governments' socio-economic and political opportunities. Thus, to fulfill their social need, the Murle youth from South Sudan regularly infiltrate and invade the most populated area of their neighbours such as the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia.

On the other hand, the Jikany-Nuer need their expansion to the Anyuua land to have plenty of pasture and water, however, the Anyuua trying to defend the outsiders. This Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer competitions on resources have limited the pastoral movement of the Murle people that they move freely irrespective of international border. The Murle people are alienated from the land of Ethiopia due to the fact that they have less socio-cultural contact with Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer. They are also more excluded from

government services of South Sudan and have few socio-political engagements with the Juba and/or Khartoum governments throughout the Sudanese North-South historical connections.

The alienation and exclusion of the Murle from the socio-economic and political activities by the Sudanese government since the 1955, thus, in turn, created many conditions that typically could lead to conflicts with their neighbours (Ylönen, 2010). What, then, are the borderland people's socio-economic security problems? How have these security problems manifested? What are the major challenges? What efforts have governments taken to tackle borderland security problems? How can we break the cycle of cattle raiding, child abduction, and conflict among the borderland people?

Scholars have devoted their time to the different aspects of borderland issues; for instance, state borders and borderlands exploitation (Dereje & Hoehne, 2008; Krayenbuehl, 2001), cattle raiding, loss of human lives; and the structural and root causes of cross-border conflict, and scarce resources of cattle grazing (Mbugua, 2012; Gatluak, 2014; Arensen, 2015), policing strategies on cattle rustling and identity conflict with cross-border spillovers (Rolandsen & Breidlid, 2012).

Much of the intellectual discussions focus on the nature of conflict, contemplation of international border, cattle raiding and child abduction in the pastoral people, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, stigma, marginalization and ethnic polarization. These problems come from the colonial legacy of British "divide and rule" policy which deteriorate the borderland people relation and equal provision of administration. Besides, the administrative effect of the central governments of Ethiopia

and Sudan are not equally addressed the periphery people that they exposed to social and economic problems. In a cumulative sense, they are very local problems, and they spring from personal feelings of relative deprivation, anger and assault.

Certainly, the existing studies are important to extract knowledge, however, these scholars did not address how the underlying economic, social, and cultural composition of communities cohabiting in that area have short and long term implications for conflict and stability. They also miss critical explanations around how the lean administrative conditions marked by the limited writ of the state continue to play a role in the unfolding security problems in the region. This study aims to fill these gaps by using qualitative research methodology with an ethnographic approach.

Chapter Three

3 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

3.1 Conceptual Framework and Operationalization of Key Concepts

This concept analysis steers the whole dissertation activities and helps to understand the context of socio-economic security problems of the borderland people across the Ethiopia - South Sudan border. The socio-economic security problems interrogated from the context of pervasive Murle youth infiltrators to perpetrate cattle raiding and child abduction across their borderland neighbours and their practices of massive confrontation. These situations assumed to destabilize the borderland people and hinder them from pastoral activities, harvest, and other socio-economic development strategies.

To understand a given context, it is fundamental to show the potential and existing driving factors to the socio-economic security problems, as well as possible factors contributing to peace. Driving factors to the socio-economic security problems are those factors which intensify people's grievances and imbalances of social, economic, power, and status relations. They are considered as causes of conflict which categorized into structural causes, proximate causes, and triggering factors. The borderland people of Ethiopia and South Sudan affects by all-encompassing structural factors that have become constructed into the administrative systems, structures, policies, socio-cultural institutions, and social reformations that may generate a favorable environment to violent conflict.

Such kinds of structural factors intensify proximate conditions (Bollens, 1998). Thus, proximate causes are factors that create a suitable condition to violent conflict which further escalates and sometimes seem indicative of a deeper problem along the borderland people; such as easy access of light weapons, illicit trade, and the porousness of border and maladministration of borderland communities. To exacerbate violent conflicts and complicate the socio-economic security problems, a single act or event, or their expectation that will detach or escalate violent conflict within the different conflict groups are a sense of trigger which divert the condition into physical violence. For example, cattle raiding, child abduction, rape, murder, destruction of fishing nets, scarcity of water and pastureland, and incompatible resource competition have power to mobilize group of people into fighting.

Thus, actors to the socio-economic security problems refer to all those engaged in or being affected by cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations practices. Actors may include any individuals, organized groups, ethnic groups, and social organizations, tribe/clans who have blood relations or kinships and institutions that contribute to the socio-economic security problems. Those actors differ as to their goals and interests, their positions, capacities to realize their interests, and relationships with other actors. Accordingly, dynamics of socio-economic security problems can interpret by identifying the interactions between the causes, contexts, actors, and conflict profiles as they together play roles on intergroup confrontations.

The roles of actors are not limited to contexts and causes of socio-economic security problems but extend to the direct effect on human security problems of the borderland

people by exacerbating the practices of cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation. Thus, analysis of actors' role helps to understand the dynamics of socio-economic borderland people security problems, which in turn, helps to identify windows of opportunity to peace and development.

The borderland communities' life condition is egalitarian and is based on sharing resources equally within a group. As such their social bond is very strong to defend themselves from external groups. Thus, they coordinate each other and form strong group to consolidate their power of resource competition to secure their interest. Furthermore, their social life is interwoven with basic need and touches many extended elements in the life of human beings; as Kennedy and Thomas (1995) express the social value systems to manage natural resources. According to Kennedy and Thomas, human values are shaped by interactions between self-culture and environment, because human values originate in a social system. For this reason, the contexts of socio-economic security problems of the borderland communities include the human values in their social system and useful to prevent contradiction. In this case, people want to strengthen their own social identity by focusing on in-group formation, ethnic sentiments, forming alliance, and ethnocentrism.

On the other hand, weak administrative capacity of the local leaders, inadequate borderland resource management, porousness of border, and weak border policy have potential to accelerate illicit trade, smuggling weapons, human trafficking, incompatible resource competition, assaults and out-group hostilities within the borderland communities. Thus, actors use opportunities to aggravate the structural and proximate

causes by creating triggers to fulfill their interests and brutally affect the human security and development strategies of the borderland communities.

Operationalization of Key Concepts




Figure 3.4 The Murle youth infiltrators

The following words, phrases, and/or concepts are operationalized based on the objectives of this research. These operational definitions are categorized alphabetically.

Anyuaa: are the people who live in the GPNRS of Ethiopia at Anyuaa Zone and Pochalla County of Boma State in South Sudan. In this study, Anyuaa refer to the people who live in the districts of Gog, Jor, and Akobo in the GPNRS.

Borderland People: borderland is a region that lies adjacent to a border (Martinez, 2015). Thus, borderland people are the people who live on the adjacent area of an international border. In this study, it encompasses the Anyuaa, Jikany-Nuer, and Murle people who live both sides of the Ethiopia and South Sudan international border.

Cattle Raid: is the forceful stealing of cattle (Manyok, 2016). In this study, it is mostly carried out by the Murle youth against the Jikany-Nuer and Anyuua people of Ethiopia.

Child Abduction: is unauthorized removal of a child from natural family (The Hague Conference, 1980). In this study, child abductions refer to the forceful removal or stealing of a child under age four from the natural family of the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia by the Murle youth infiltrators.

Confrontation: is characterized by the tactics and strategic actions that the adversaries use for reaching a favorable outcome (Oberschall, 2007). In this study, it is the fighting of the Murle youth infiltrators with Jikany-Nuer and Anyuua people of Ethiopia during cattle raiding and child abduction.

Economic Security: is composed of basic social security, defined by access to basic needs, infrastructure pertaining to health, education, dwelling, information, and social protection, as well as work-related security (ILO²³). In this study, economic security is the livelihood security of the borderland people that help them to have sustained life which include land, water, pasture, fish, cattle, markets, and other economic bases of the borderland people.

Infiltration: is the act of entering a physical location and/or organization secretly.²⁴ In this study, it encompasses that somebody or some group who secretly crossing the

²³ International Labour Organization (ILO); <https://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/definition.pdf>

²⁴ This definition is taken from Oxford Dictionary.

Ethiopian international border to do something for his/her own purpose without the knowledge of the Ethiopian borderland local governments.

Jikany-Nuer: are the people who live in the GPNRS of Ethiopia at the Nuer zone and Upper Nile Region of South Sudan. In this study, Jikany-Nuer refers to the section of the Nuer people who live in the district of Akobo in Gambella.

Murle: are the people who live in the Boma State of South Sudan and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia. For this study, the Murle people refer to the pastoral people of the Murle who live in the Pibor plain lowland area of South Sudan in the Boma State.

Murle Youth Infiltrators: both the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Gambella describe the Murle youth as “thief”, “wild-people”, and “marauder”. For this study, the term “infiltrator” is better to express the age-set group of Murle youth who act on cattle raiding, child abduction and practice of violent confrontation with the people of Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia by crossing the international border.

Murle Youth: the productive age group of the Murle people. In this study, the Murle youth refer to the group who are categorized into age-set system and have potential to ruling their local community, protect their cattle and family, move to remote area to raid cattle, abduct children, and confront rival communities violently.

Security: is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity

against forces of change, which they see as hostile (Buzan, 1991). In this study, security is the pursuit of stable and standard life, economic and social processes of the borderland people that they are free from tensions, displacement, mobility, cattle raiding, child abduction, confrontation, and other threats of security.

Security Problems: The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence (Buzan, 1991). In this study, security problems are the pervasive cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation practices which regularly affect the daily life of the borderland people and exposed them to threat, social tensions, displacement, and instability.

Social Security: is the principle or practice or a program of public provision (as through social insurance or assistance) for the economic security and social welfare of the individual and his or her family.²⁵ For this study, social security is preferred to the peaceful coexistence and social stability of the borderland people to improve their life.

Socio-economic Security: is the peaceful performance of people to manage their stable social and economic condition. In this study, it is the stability of economic and social life of the borderland people with consistent livelihood and activities to use the available natural resources to fulfill their food security and household needs.

²⁵ See at <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20security>

3.2 Theoretical Framework

Theoretical discussions regarding cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation help to inform the study of socio-economic security problems across the Ethiopia - South Sudan borderland people. This discussion underscores factors and events that are judged relevant to the realm of socio-economic security problems which affect the borderland people. For this understanding, conflict theories coupled with resource competition theories are better to interrogate the complex dynamic of conflicts and socio-economic security problems across the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

The Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland region is stuffed with flash-points, ranging from open border, intergroup disputes over pastureland, and resource scarcity to massive confrontations, cattle raiding, and child abductions. Thus, disparity of renewable natural resources over the region affects the human life which includes widespread and indiscriminate intentional killings, long-term displacement of households, and severs livestock depletion (SAS, 2007). Hence, Resource Competition Theory, which developed by Nagel (1995) emphasizes to the critical concepts of ethnic character resource competition.

As such, competition for scarce resources is a basic assumption in many more recent theories: game-theoretic models of international relations (Brams and Kilgour, 1988; Myerson, 1991), human ecology (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Hawley, 1986), and rational choice theory (Banton, 1983, 1985; Hechter, 1987, 1992). Accordingly, the contemporary application of the notion of resource competition to ethnic relations can be traced to the influential work of Fredrik Barth (1969). Barth argues that ethnicity is best conceived as

a system of intergroup boundaries whose strength and salience in interaction are determined, in part, by the extent of contact and resource competition among ethnic groups in the pastoral people; which manifest on the socio-economic security issues.

Scholars have written on the subject of national, regional, and international security issues which basically center on military group by referring to state security. The previous analytical concept of security focused on international conflicts with specific attention to military confrontations, driven by political conflicts, for example, World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII), and Cold War. From the Cold War onwards, the concept of security shifted from military to non-military issues (Buzan, 1983); however, confrontations among the pastoral people that embedded cattle raiding and child abduction have been interlinked with militarized security problems. In a more sensible way, sources of and factors in confrontations among the pastoral groups are resource competitions, economic disparity, devalue the norms and cultures of chieftaincies, and extreme poverty.

Undertake these sources of and factors in confrontation at regional and national level led politicians and scholarly experts to a search for methods of understanding, managing, and resolving conflicts, security problems, and social crises. In most cases, incompatible competition over scarce natural resources and uneven distribution of daily use resources could be sources of conflict and insecurity; which led the pastoral people to antagonistic relations. According to Deutsch (1973), a conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur. In this regard, according to Medhane (2015), competition produces conflict, but all instances of confrontation could not reflect competition.

According to MacArthur (1972) and Grover (1997), resource competition is one of the most fundamental community processes. The work of Alexei and Blasius (2011) also refine that resource competition is a fundamental interaction in natural communities. Thus, competition for limiting resources is one of the most ethnic categorization across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan which inherent to hostile relation and manifested their hostility through confrontation, child abduction, and cattle raiding. For this reason, ethnic categorization become a major division of society across the borderland pastoral people, which characterized by group formation, conflict, and mobilization. Consequently, resource competition theories of ethnicity look for the patterns of economic and political competition in societies that resource is a powerful source of confrontation.

To aggravate resource competition and confrontation among the pastoral people, ecological factors may shape mass mobilization. Pastoral group of people across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border are dependent on livestock mainly dominated by cattle and goat. Cattle are their main wealth; thus they need to have resources such as grazing field and water. In this understanding, overpopulation of pastoralists leads to overgrazing on the limited resources. This implies threats, not only the size of the herd but also to the pose to the very survival of state institutions which mediated and reconcile incompatible resource competition (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016).

Pastoral communities exist in the lowland and plain region which help them to move from one place to another to find pastureland and water. Their movements are depending on season due to scarcity and uneven access of pasture and water. They depend on

livestock and have access large head of cattle that they affected the region by overgrazing. Drought, soil erosion, flood, and environmental degradation also other pushing factors of pastoralists and their animals to move into other areas to find better pastureland and water. Such kind of situation is very complicated and common in the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan that resource endowment is uneven. For instance, in summer time they have abundant of rainfall in all parts of the lowland plain, however, in the dry season some areas have access plenty of ponds and rivers and some parts of the region have no availability of adequate water and pastureland. Thus, during dry season, people who lack adequate water and pastureland start to move from one place to another to find water and grazing land for their cattle.

According to Ives (2001), because of uneven resource availability in the pastoralist communities, the pastoral people life is complicated in the lowland plain. For example, highlanders enjoy relative abundance of rainfall and fertile soil, while their immediate neighbours in the lowland plains suffer from persistent drought. Thus, to have relief from their suffering, they move to another place to save their cattle and family from persistent flood and drought in summer and dry season respectively. This seasonal mobility of pastoral community has potential for intergroup confrontations. Accordingly, mass migration and mobility of pastoral communities across border in search of pastureland and water in an organized manner increased the interest of different groups to cross any controversial ethnic boundary (Fratkin, 2001; Medhane, 2015).

Traditional resource competition is not complicated because pastoralists freely move from place to place without any limitation on controversial ethnic boundaries. In their

movements, rarely cattle theft has been demonstrated using traditional weapons; for instance, bow, arrow, and spear. In this regard, a variety of explanatory models extracted which associated cattle theft with pastoralists' cultural traditions and effects of ecology on pastoralism. Traditional cattle raiding was relatively localized, seasonal, and pursued with mostly traditional weapons, and there was a low level of violence associated with it. Although traditional cattle raiding appeared lawless, it was governed by some sort of acceptable customary rules of engagement among the pastoralist groups involved (Triche, 2014). Some of the literature argued that the foundation of cattle raiding was based on the notion of both scarcities of pastureland or water and the incessant struggle over access to rapidly depleting resources, resulting in conflicts with similarly interested groups (Markakis, 1998). Others also argued that the imbalance of the ecosystem arising from natural calamities such as droughts, diseases, and the like, leading to loss of cattle and motivating the desire to restock lost herd through raiding (Toulmin, 1995).

Now a day, with the availability of modern weapon, violence among the pastoral people extends to organized cattle raiding. In this case, violence is exacerbated to unimaginable dimension including child abduction, murder, rape, human displacement, the burning of entire community settlements and the destruction of livelihoods. For many reasons of regional instability, the two consecutive civil war of Sudan had been exacerbated the activities of cattle raiding across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan; which provide fertile environment to the proliferation of SALW. Moreover, the recent South Sudan civil war; the exclusion of minorities and pastoral people from governance; socio-economic inequity and deprivation; and weak states that are unable to manage normal societal

conflict in a stable and consensual fashion are some essential factors of borderland socio-economic security problems (McCallum, 2013; Medhane, 2015; Manyok, 2016;).

The availability of stolen cattle market also inspired non-pastoralist actors to involve on cattle raiding enterprise. Thus, according to Okoli and Okpaleke (2014), a cattle raiding is inspired by the logic of localized “stock redistribution” among participating pastoralist communities and the practice assumed accumulation of wealth. Accordingly, cattle raiding became a “predatory enterprise” (Fleisher, 2002) with a “vent for surplus,” metamorphosing into highly commercialized and profit-oriented ventures (Manu, et al., 2014; Greiner, 2013). Consequently, raiding became part of an organized criminal “underworld franchise” (Kwaja, 2014; Okoli and Okpaleke, 2014).

All these conditions create a security vacuum that the state, groups, and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence, sometimes in an organized and sustained fashion, and at other times in a spontaneous and sporadic manner. Therefore, the proliferation of modern and sophisticated weapons shifted the tradition of cattle raiding (Mkutu, 2008; Scheffran, et al., 2012; Greiner, 2013) and advanced wealth accumulation through stolen cattle market. Accordingly, cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation are the major aggressive socio-economic security problems across the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Chapter Four

4 Research Methodology

4.1 Methodology

The methodology is the approach taken to the research design as a whole in relation to reaching answers to the research questions. It is the “strategy, plan of action, process, or design” lying behind the choice and use of particular research methods (Crotty, 1998:3). Hammersly and Atkinson (1995) pinpoint that in designing a study, a researcher must develop a sound plan for selecting a sample, collecting data, and analyzing the data. Many different methodologies may have the same underlying theoretical perspective and each methodology may be implemented using different combinations of research methods. The main research methodology employed for this dissertation is Qualitative; which viewed from ontology and epistemology philosophical assumptions of theoretical perspectives (Charmaz, 2006).

Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of reality. It is the study of ‘being’ and is concerned with ‘what is’, i.e., the nature of existence and structure of reality as such (Crotty, 1998) or what it is possible to know about the world (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Thus, the researcher experienced and constructed reality based on social or individual human conception. Epistemology concerns the philosophical study of knowledge and ‘the grounds upon which we believe something to be true’ (Oliver, 2010:35). The researcher is link with the ontological perspective pertaining to the reality of the world and the epistemological perspective pertaining to knowledge of that world.

People use their perceptions to interpret what their senses tell them. As such, knowledge of the world is based on our ‘understanding’ which arises from our reflection on events rather than only on lived experiences (Ormston, et al., 2014). Accordingly, the ontological and epistemological positions of this study are constructionism and interpretivism that are relevant to understand the nature of constructed reality and interpreted knowledge. Thus, chapter five, six, and seven of this dissertation discussed the historical, demographic, and problematic reality that existed across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan among the Murle, the Anyuua, and the Jikany-Nuer communities. Based on the nature of reality that existed among the borderland communities, knowledge is produced by exploring and understanding the social world of the people being studied.

In this understanding about the general arena of this dissertation, according to Merriam (2009), qualitative research methodology is useful to understand and examine the meaning that the local people constructed their existed reality and interpret knowledge that how they make sense of their world and experience. Therefore, the philosophical underpinning of qualitative research methodology of this dissertation explore the ontological and epistemological theoretical perspectives to investigate the existed social and economic realities and interpreted knowledge along the borderlands in the context of pervasive Murle youth infiltrators to raid cattle, abduct children, and confrontations. It is a systematic subjective approach used to describe life experiences and give them meaning.

4.2 Research Approach

The type of this research is exploratory, as qualitative research allows for the exploration of real life of cross-border socio-economic interactions. Thus, based on the research questions and objectives, different research approaches are useful according to the designed research methodology to find reliable data. Accordingly, among the different qualitative research approaches, ethnographic approach is selected for this research. Ethnographic approach is one of the research approaches in qualitative study which allow the researcher to stay with the target population in order to find reliable and relevant information. Thus, it helps the researcher to endeavor to identify the existed reality or nature of reality (ontology) among the local people and study their knowledge (epistemology) that interpreted based on the existed reality to validate the data.

4.3 Methods of Data Collection

Methods are the techniques used to collect and analyze data to provide evidence for the posited knowledge that the research constructs. According to Crotty (1998:3), research method is “the techniques used to gather or analyze data related to some research question or hypothesis.” There are many potential research methods that might be adopted in a particular methodology, although some may be more appropriate than others in adhering to the methodology’s underlying theoretical perspective.

According to Henn, et al. (2006), several methods of data collections are commonly used within qualitative research including field observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, coding, and triangulation. Therefore, in order to collect adequate data, the researcher employed field observation, in-depth interview, focus group discussion,

coding, and triangulation research methods. For more clarification, table 4.1 below illustrates the methods that employed for different research questions.

Table 4.1 Illustration of Research Methods/Tools

<i>No</i>	<i>Research Tools</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Research questions</i>
1	<u>Observation</u> Non-participant observation	It is a technique that can be used when data cannot be collected through other means, or when those collected through other means are of limited value or are difficult to validate. It mainly focuses on social interactions and cultural festivity including quality of life, social composition, and development situations.	The target populations are the Jikany-Nuer, the Anyuaa, and the Murle who are living in Akobo, Jor, Gog, and Pibor. The Pibor plain Murle found at Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma, Gambella and Sudan-Akobo.	Q1. How the economic bases and livelihoods of the borderland people complicated the socio-economic security situations? What are the ways of cultural interactions among themselves? How do borderland people manipulate the natural resources that found along the border? Q4. Have government efforts been effective in tackling the borderland people's security problems? What are the challenges? What security and capacity gaps existed to tackle the security problems?
2	<u>Interview</u> In-depth interview	Interview is the most common qualitative data collection method (Mason, 2002). In-depth interview is typically involving an “interactional exchange of dialogue”, having a relatively informal style, being “thematic, topic centered, biographical or narrative” and operating from the premise that, as knowledge is situated and contextual, the purpose of the interview “is to ensure that the relevant contexts are brought to into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced” (Mason, 2002:62).	From the target population, the prominent leaders, knowledgeable persons, victims, elders, clan leaders, local chiefs, respected and socially accepted persons, women, youths, government officials, and humanitarian workers were part of the interview.	Q1. How the economic bases and livelihoods of the borderland people complicated the socio-economic security situations? What are the ways of cultural interactions among themselves? How do borderland people manipulate the natural resources that found along the border? Q2. What are the major driving factors of Murle to cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations? Q3. How do the Murle “Red Chiefs” control the Murle youth infiltrators to mitigate the borderland people socio-economic security problems? Q4. Have government efforts been effective in tackling the borderland people's security problems? What are the challenges? What security and capacity gaps existed to tackle the security problems?

3	FGD	William and Katz define focus group discussion (FGD) as a “small gathering of individuals who have a common interest or characteristic, assembled by a moderator, who uses the group and its interactions as a way to gain information about a particular issue” (2001). It was employed at different times to obtain reliable data. The discussion was useful to clarify vague responses in time of interview. Questions were flexible, open, and unstructured. The group also homogeneous in terms of age, gender, social status, and education. This helps the researcher to increase trust among each other and simplify the discussions.	The target population were people who participated in the in-depth interview	Q1. What is the economic basis and livelihoods of the borderland people? What are the ways of cultural interactions amongst themselves? How do borderland people manipulate the natural resources that found along the border? Q2. What are the major driving factors of Murle to cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations? Q3. How do the Murle “Red Chiefs” control the Murle youth infiltrators to mitigate the borderland people socio-economic security problems? Q4. How governments’ efforts are effective to tackle the borderland people security problems? What are the challenges? What security gaps of the governments exist to tackle the security problems?
4	Coding	Typically in qualitative research, once the data has been collected, transcribed and read through, the transcripts are then coded (Creswell, 2003). Essentially, coding involves breaking the transcript texts into ‘chunks’ and reassembling these ‘chunks’ in a meaningful way.		
5	Triangulation	Seeking to corroborate one source and method with another, or enhance the quality of the data through some form of “triangulation” of methods (Mason, 2002) is a technique of research to which many subscribe, but few practice (Cohen et al., 2001). Hence, the use of triangulation techniques for the purpose of validating the findings has been as philosophically problematic, but critics of this technique do not dispute its validity for augmenting findings (Silverman, 2000; Mason, 2002).		

4.4 Sources of Data, Sampling Techniques and Size, and Target Population

4.4.1 Source of Data

Two sources of data were applied for this study. The first source of data was primary sources; so as to collect the data from the target population by selecting key informants. Interviews were conducted and information was also gathered from different people around the research sites to clarify and substantiate information gathered from key informants. All the primary data were collected using research tools such as observation,

interviews, and focus group discussions (FGD). The second source of data was secondary information including credible academic sources, reports, agreements, maps, letters, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), previous studies, media, and the Internet. All the secondary information's gathered from individuals, archives, libraries, and government offices.

4.4.2 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

To find the key informants, the researcher employed purposive, snowball/chain-sampling, and critical case sampling techniques to obtain the most important informants. Interviewees were selected purposely; however, some of them were also identified through peer-referral based on the critical cases of the issues. The sample size of interviewees was clarified below.

Table 4.2 Sample size of the study

		Number of Interviewees						
	Research Sites	Elders	Clan Chiefs	Victims	Women	Youth	Officials	Humanitarians
GPNRS	Akobo – Tergol	2	2	2	3	2	11 ²⁶	1 (ZOA)
	Jor – Ujallo	1	2	2	3	2		-
	Gog – Pingwudo	1	2	2	2	2		2 (UNHCR & WFP)
Boma State	Pibor – Lekuwangole ²⁷	6	5	2	2	8	6	-
Total		10	11	8	10	14	17	3
		Total No of Interviewees		73				

²⁶Officials: A Regional Security Expert from the Ministry of Ethiopian Foreign Affairs; president of the GPNRS; administrator, and security head from the Akobo, Jor, and Gog districts, three chairmen from Tergol, Ujallo, and Pingwudo Kebeles.

²⁷ Informants from Pibor – Lekuwangole administrative unit was found at Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma and others at Akobo Sudan. This is because the researcher unable to reach at Pibor due to security problems but many Murle people from Boma and Pibor fled to Ethiopia to find safest place from the South Sudan civil war at Ukugu Refugee Camp in Dimma district of Gambella. Besides, the Great Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) officials attend the joint border security mission at GPNRS capital city, Gambella in 2015 and 2016 and I have an opportunity to meet them and interview regarding the socio-economic situations of Murle in Pibor Plain Lowland region.

4.4.3 Target Populations

This study targeted the population of the local communities, government officials, and humanitarian organizations in the selected research sites. From the local communities, the targeted groups were the pastoral Murle people who live in Pibor County in South Sudan; the Anyuua people in Gog, Jor, and Akobo districts of Gambella; and the Jikany-Nuer people inhabiting in the Akobo district. Among the Murle, Red chiefs (Alan ci merii), youth (generation leaders), women, victims, and elders were taken as key informants while among the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer elders, victims, women, youth, and clan chiefs were included as key informants. Interviewees with government officials included a Regional Security Expert from the Ministry of Ethiopian Foreign Affairs; the Ambassador of South Sudan to Ethiopia; Governor of the Boma State; President of the GPNRS; district and county officials; and *Kebelle* chairpersons in the selected research sites.

Interviews were also conducted with different humanitarian organizations working in the selected research sites. These organizations support people who fled their villages either due to internal conflict or civil war in South Sudan to find safest place in Gambella. Therefore, they are expected to have information about developments and life along the border area and how they transport their materials from one place to another to support the victim civilians.

4.5 Reliability and Validity of the Data

Triangulation is the most useful method to check the reliability and validity of the data that collected through observation, in-depth interview, and FGD. Informants were “misremember” the past, particularly when asked about child abduction, cattle raid, conflict, and others. They were also not interested to see themselves as victims and not interested to discuss about their people who participated in the practices of cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation due to many reasons. Some of their reasons were lack of trust, fear, and hesitation because all the issues were sensitive and they expected that the information they give may exposed them for accountability.

At the first day of in-depth interview, informants from the Murle people did not want to discuss anything with the researcher. They did not offend officially but trying to hide information and gave only short answer such as “Yes” or “I don’t know.” On the second day, the researcher changed his approach and made friendly relationship with them to overcome the challenges. Walk together, discuss other things which are not relevant with the researcher’s standpoint, invite lunch and soft drink, eat together, and thoroughly investigate what they like and dislike. The first week spent by observation and built friendship relations to have trust and intimacy.

Through such ethnographic approach, the Murle youth build trust on the researcher and communicate each other about their life style, weather condition and way of dress, food, marriage, family, war, social instability, culture, language, economic base, and other things. Through time, the researcher starts to spend all the day with them and elders asked him to buy tobacco and alcohol. After all these familiar approach, the researcher

raised each and every question regardless of formality (by avoiding formal way of question and answer strategy).

Throughout the discussion, the researcher gave emphasis to the validity and reliability of the collected data through triangulation. The data that collected through observation were validated its reliability during in-depth interview and FGD. During in-depth interview, individual informants gave vague information and some information has paradoxes and different as compared with other's response. Such inconsistent, different, and vague information were selected thoroughly and reassess the data which created a question during observation. All such points proposed at FGD to clarify and validate the reliability of the collected data.

At the FGD, the researcher used flexible type of discussion and provided open and clear questions. Most of the questions that proposed for FGD were focused on the vague and inconsistent information during in-depth interview and observation to have clarity and good understanding from different perspectives. Here the researcher was trying to cross-check and confirms the correct or more appropriate responses. This increased the level of knowledge regarding the borderland people socio-economic security problems and strengthened the researcher's standpoint.

4.6 Procedures of the Study

4.6.1 Research Ethics

In qualitative research there is significant potential for misleading people, pretending to be genuinely interested using contacts to gain confidential information, betraying

confidences, and consequentiality. Physical harm may arise at any time through the investigation of sensitive issues that may induce stress or anxiety. The researcher must take whatever steps necessary to ensure that ethical conventions are not broken and respecting those who participate in the study. In the ethical understanding, partiality and researcher's position is one of a critical point. In this case, the researcher should take important expected steps to avoid or minimize partiality and positionality. Therefore, based on the above understanding, the following major research ethics have been taken into consideration.

- The researcher introduced himself and where he is from.
- The researcher clarified the objective of the research for officials as well as informants.
- The researcher forward questions to informants by avoiding positionality and partiality. His neutral position is noticed by his questions and way of taking notes; which all questions trying to avoid any leading positions and gathered only the information what the informants said rather than lobbying or pushing the informants to answer the interest of the researcher.
- No one informant was forced to give information without his/her consent.
- A recorder was used after getting the informants' consent.
- Participants have rights to terminate the discussion at any time if something is wrong for them or if they have personal issues and can back at a moment.
- The respondents' contribution remained confidential but based on their consent some informants' name were mentioned in the in-text analysis to present informants' views.

- The data were interpreted impartially and analyzed based on informants' views.
- Last, but not least, the researcher was always demonstrated polite, smile, salute, respect, and thank to the respondents before, within, and after interviews and FGDs.

4.6.2 Research Materials

The researcher used different materials in the study. The main materials were: computer, notebooks, tape recorder, photo camera, video camera, and pen. In the research sites, some materials were not available and accommodation was scarce, thus, extra pen and paper, power-bank, extra flash disk, and dry food were part of the researcher's preparation. In addition, some research sites lacked transportation access. To overcome these challenges, the researcher requested water transportation (a boat) to go to Akobo – Tergol from the ZOA, Gambella branch office and car from the regional government of Gambella to go to other research sites.

4.6.3 Contacts with Informants

Before contacting the key informants, research permission was mandatory from the concerned bodies. Permission was obtained from Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and provided supportive letters to specific authorized offices and organizations which request cooperation during data collection. Thus, letters were written to the Ministry of Ethiopian Foreign Affairs, Embassy of South Sudan to Ethiopia, GPNRS Administrative Council, Administration of Refugee and Rehabilitation Affairs (ARRA) head office – Addis Ababa, National Archive and Library Agency

(NALA), Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) Documentation and Archive Center, and Oromia Region Illubabor Zone Metu and Gore Culture and Tourism Office.

After receiving of the letters that granted the research permission, the researcher selected 3 (three) assistants from the Anyuua, Jikany-Nuer, and Murle (one from each) at the specific research sites. The assistants were selected based on their language proficiency and educational qualification. The Jikany-Nuer's and Anyuua's assistants were degree holders and fluent in languages like English and Amharic, besides their mother tongue; while the Murle's assistant was a high school student and conversant in English. All assistants were conversant with the research sites and familiar with potential respondents as they belonged to the same group. With the help of the assistants, the researcher selected and contacted the key informants to collect data from the targeted borderland people.

4.7 Data Collection and Analysis

Data for the study was collected through observation of social, cultural, and economic institutions in the selected research sites, interviews, and FGD with the help of selected assistants. The interviews were applied through semi-structured questions and the FGD applied through flexible and open questions to collect information from the key informants. Throughout the discussion, the researcher realized to enhance the validity and reliability of the collected data through triangulation. Thus, the validity and reliability of the data ensured through careful structuring and logical sequencing of the questions. The collected data were systematically analyzed using the methods of inductive thematic analysis.

Chapter Five

5 Historical Background of Border Delineation

The 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and Britain has been fixed the border of Ethiopia and the Sudan. Such border delineation made the Anyuua and the Nuer to live partly in Ethiopia and partly in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This is the result of improper border design and the partitioning of ethnic groups; according to Alesina et al. (1996), this contributed to underdevelopment and instability. For instance, according to Zerai (1971), the Anyuua and the Nuer remained in the frontier region without fully incorporated within the political administration of Ethiopia. This made some disconnection between center-periphery relations across the south-western frontier of Ethiopia.

Accordingly, the political and economic distribution of the central government of Ethiopia could not address the periphery area and people across the border have no significant political participation. This happened due to the political encirclement of Ethiopia from the western, northern, and eastern periphery region by the colonial competition. Thus, the Ethiopian government gave much less attention to the administration of Gambella. Using such political pressure as a good opportunity, British subtly secured a portion of land at the bank of the Baro River at the specific place known as Itang in 1904; but later transferred to Gambella and established the British Enclave for the purpose of a commercial station based on Article IV of the 1902 treaty (see the treaty at appendix “D”).

Such less attention to the administration of Gambella left the people for anarchy and politically disconnect from Ethiopian central government. According to the discussion of Zerai (1971), the Anyuaa could buy rifles with ivory and this further undermined Ethiopian claims to authority while permitting them to raid the Nuer and the Murle cattle in the Sudan which particularly became serious in 1906, 1911, and 1931. The Sudanese Nuer also migrated annually to the Ethiopian grasslands in Gambella with their cattle; in turn, the Anyuaa trying to defend them from their ancestors' land. According to Cromer (1906)²⁸ no less than four bands of raiders of between fifty and two hundred men raided the Sudanese frontier territory.

Accordingly, the governments' facility and services do not fully extend to the borderland region even while political elites from the center exploited the borderland people for their political and economic ends; which exacerbates the security challenges. The lack of economic, social, and political development and limited upward mobility exposed the borderland people to a number of socio-economic security problems, including widespread poverty, sporadic disease, lack of infrastructure, and limited education.

Therefore, the following sections of this chapter interrogates the history of the Ethiopia-Sudan border, the border delineation at the Gambella front, the claim of British to civilize the Gambella people, cross-border raiding practices, and finally assessed the main historical points that led to the deterioration of the relationship of the local people. This discussion used the archive information as it focused on historical discussion to provide a substantial background for the subsequent chapters.

²⁸A memo that wrote by Cromer to Grey, Cairo, April 23, 1906; U.K., Foreign Officer Archives at the Public Office (London): FO.401/9

5.1 The Ethiopia-Sudan Border: Historical Overview

Historical evidences indicate that Ethiopia and Sudan has a very long economic and political relation across their common border. According to Wondwosen (2009), their most visible relations in the modern period started in the 19th century. The Egyptians attempted to occupy Ethiopia after conquering Sudan and Massawa area (Bahru, 2002). In the Battle of Gundet (1875) and Gura (1876) Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889) of Ethiopia repulsed the Egyptians attack. The British colonized Egypt in 1882 and assumed responsibility for her possessions including Sudan. In the meantime, the Mahdists of Sudan started a revolt in 1881 against the Anglo-Egyptians and encircled the Egyptians army in Kassala and successfully expelled the Egyptians from Sudan and occupied Khartoum in 1885 (Robert, 1994). Accordingly, the British decided to intervene to free the Egyptian troops from the Mahdists' besieged in Kassala (Wondwosen, 2009). For this matter, the British sent Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett to the court of Yohannes IV to solicit the support of Ethiopian troops to find a leeway for the Egyptian troops and signed a treaty known as Hewett or Adwa treaty on 3 June 1884.

Due to the Hewett treaty, Yohannes IV facilitate the evacuation of the besieged Egyptian troops from Kassala, Amideb and Sanhit towns (The New York Times 25 July 1884). Thus, in the northern front the Mahdist led to occupy Mettema, and latter Dembiya and Gondar; ultimately in 1889 fought with Yohannes IV at the battle of Mattama (Bahru, 2002). After the death of Yohannes IV in 1889 at the battle of Mettema, Menelik II concluded his coronation at Intoto Mariam Church on November 03, 1881 and reigned from 1889-1913 as Emperor of Ethiopia. In his early years as emperor of Ethiopia,

Menelik II wanted peaceful relations with Sudan (Wondwosen, 2009) but the Sudanese Mahdist leaders reluctant to forge an alliance with Ethiopia. After the battle of Adwa, the image of Menelik increased at international level and the Sudanese leaders accepted the peaceful relation with Ethiopia by sent Mohammad Othman as a Sudanese Khalifah in 1897 (Berry, 1968).

Until 1889, Ethiopia and Sudan could not delineate their specific international border. However, they understood the place of their territory. After Sudan colonized by Anglo-Egyptian power, the British provided a border architect. The first architecture of the border delineation between Ethiopia and Sudan was Major (latter General) Charles Gwynn, an Irish explorer (Mesfin, et al., 1975; Wondwosen, 2009). Gwynn (1937) also pinpoints that the region is backward and unprofitable thus it is difficult to demarcate with elaboration of country's customary. He listed four major problems that hindered the Ethiopia-Sudan border demarcation process at that time. These are: 1) Lack of airplanes and motor transport that could be useful for making reconnaissance trips and to transport supplies needed for the laborers on the scene. (2) The shortage of food and water supplies for the laborers since few supplies were obtainable in the border district. (3) The failure of the Ethiopian government to send trained and educated personnel to represent the Ethiopian side. (4) The unwillingness of the Ethiopian government to employ Europeans to represent Ethiopia in the demarcation process.

Due to these four reasons, according to Gwynn, whatever his reason is true or false, he reported his survey to the British government. However, before the arrival of Gwynn, Ras Tessema, the Governor of Illubabor, was moved his soldier to the White Nile – the

marching known as “the White Nile Marching” to fix the south-west border of Ethiopia across Gambella (Zewde Dubale, 1975; Braukamper, 1987) (see appendix “A” and “B”). Braukamper also pinpoints that after the 1880s, Abyssinia, under Menilek II, expanded its ancient heartland to incorporate vast new territories to the south (Braukamper, 1987). In the 1880s, Ras Tessema moved until the present place known as “*Nasira*” and travel to Boma through Sobat River between the Murle and Anyuaa of Adongo area. According to Ras Tessema’s border fix, the Murle people are left in the Sudan area but all Anyuaa are Ethiopian. In the “White Nile Marching”, Ras Tessema was planted the Ethiopian flag and border monument at *Nasira, Akobo and Adongo-Pochalla*. *Nasira* is an Amharic language word that it named by Ras Tessema. The meaning of *Nasira* is – ና እና እዚህ ስራ (come and work here because this is the territory of Ethiopia; thus according to his expression all Ethiopian have a right to come and work at *Nasira*).

The border region is under siege due to colonial expansion; thus, Menelik II had political interest to restrict the colonial expansion using his international image after the battle of Adwa. In due course, the British re-conquered Sudan after defeating the Mahdists in 1897 (Wondwosen, 2009). However, the British had two fears regarding Menelik II (The New York Times 25 September 1898): 1) the reaction of Menelik after they re-conquered Khartoum. They thought that Menelik II would march against their forces in Sudan; 2) the Anglo-Egyptian forces controlled Kassala by conniving with the Italians when the Italian evacuated from the area after they defeat by Menelik’s force in 1896 at Adwa (The New York Times 23 January 1898).

The British used Kassala as a launching pad to counter attack the Mahdists who fortified themselves in Khartoum (The New York Times 21 December 1897). When Menelik learned that Kassala was handed over to Anglo-Egyptian forces after the evacuation of the Italians, he was very much angry and mobilized his army for confrontation (The New York Times 23 January 1898). However, the British rushed a reinforcement army to Egypt due to Menelik's sudden move.

According to Wondwosen (2009), alarmed by the activities of Menelik's forces in the border areas, the British decided to demarcate Sudan's border with Ethiopia and extended their rule in Kenya. Gwynn (1937) also articulates that early 1889, Harrington succeeded in getting Menelik's agreement to a tentative frontier it could only be represented by a blue line drawn on the map without any very definite topographical or ethnographical meaning by ignoring the Ras Tessema's border fix. During 1899, Harrington went back to England with his map and the British decided to further explore the border area to get an idea as to how far effective Abyssinian occupation extended (Gwynn 1937; Wondwosen, 2009). In this case, the British prepared two teams of expedition. The first team consisting Major Austin, R.E., and Captain Bright from Rifle Brigade was assigned to explore the region from the Sobat South to Lake Rudolf (Austin, 1901). The second team was led by Charles Gwynn and Lieutenant Jakson R.E. These teams were assigned to explore the section between the Blue Nile and the Sobat River (Gwynn, 1937).

In the process of border delineation, the British teams that assigned by the team leaders of Gwynn and Austin workout without proper study and in the absence of Ethiopian government representatives. For instance, Gwynn's team arbitrarily decided to give the

area in the Benishangul to Sudan. According to Gwynn (1937), the only criterion that he used to make this decision was the tribal fighting in the area. As to him, the outlying communities were living in fear due to their conflict with the people in Benishangul district which was Ethiopian territory. He said, “I decided therefore to recommend that most of the detached hills should be included in the Sudan as this would correspond fairly well with the position of the blue line” (Gwynn, 1937:154). Thus, there is a fact that Gwynn single-handedly “delimited” the Ethiopia-Sudan border without the physical presence of the Ethiopian government representatives which has created border disputes between Sudan and Ethiopia for many decades (Wondwosen, 2009).

As a similar case of Benishangul front, the Gambella front of Ethiopia-Sudan was also delineated in 1899 following the Rivers of Baro, Akobo, and Pibor by Major H.H. Austin of the British Royal Engineer (Austin, 1901); which was completely denying the border monument that planted by Ras Tesseam during the “White Nile Marching.” As happened in other African colonial border partitions, the British Royal Engineers had no knowledge of the land, its inhabitants, their language, or the traditional border demarcation. They defined an arbitrary border based on the natural flow of rivers rather than taking into consideration the settlement pattern of the local people. They had also tried to separate the Nilotic people from the highlanders around the escarpment land. Such arbitrary border partitions split ethnic groups and turned them into citizens of different countries (see maps at appendixes).

The boundary was consumed in the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902, resulting in an area in the Ethiopian Gambella region called the Baro Salient (Collins, 2002). According to

Wondwosen (2009), the boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan which has 1600 km length is principally the result of the 1902 and 1907 Anglo-Ethiopian delineation treaties which were delimited in 1903 and 1909 respectively (see the maps at appendixes “F” and “G”).

5.2 The Gambella Front Border Delineation

After the British and Ethiopia had agreed on the border delineation in 1902 and 1907, the Anglo-Egyptian exercised to administer the Sudan side of Gambella front. Through their administration, the Anglo-Egyptian delegators were lobbying Menelik II to use the Baro salient as a means of civilization (Hamilton, 1974). This is because, across the border area of Ethiopia and South Sudan, the Baro area is useful for Ethiopia and South Sudan in terms of natural features and peoples’ interactions. Gambella town was also built by Englishmen as enclave of a commercial center for the British and Sudanese (Tajur) merchants (see article IV of the 1902 treaty at appendix “E”). In this regard, in 1907, Menelik II concluded an agreement (orally)²⁹ with British delegator, Sir John Harrington³⁰ (Manuel, 1950). They had an agreement that Harrington to bring an Englishman to civilize the Gambella people, the Anyuua. In turn, the Anyuua would pay 30,000 ETBirr per year in the form of Tax to the British administration of Khartoum (Majid Abud’s report in 1932, see at appendix “H”).

²⁹ F.o.401/10, Mr. Graha to Sir Edward Grey, Ramleh, 15 August 1907; see also Capitain Jennings Bramely to director of Intelligence, Cairo, 28 August 1907. Both dispatches clearly say that Menelik had agreed to let the British administer the Gambella region for him. Thus Captain Barmly was named to come from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to be the administrator of the Gambella. As to the money concession, Bramly to pay him the sum of \$1000 per month. A.W. Jennings Bramly was a Bambashi in the Sudan civil Administration.

³⁰ Sir John Lane Harrington was agent from 1898-1900, Consel General from 1900-03 and Winister from 1903 until he was succeeded by Lord Harvey in September 1908.

Following their oral agreement, Bambish Birammula (Jenninng Bramly), an officer of the Sudanese army, came from Khartoum to Gore (capital of Illubabor) to finalize their agreement to civilize the Gambella people. Bramly stayed in Gore for a while; but Ras Tessema³¹ (Mahteme Silassie, 1969) had objected the essence of the arrangement and Bramly came to Addis Ababa in May 1907. Ras Tessema had also gone to Addis Ababa to mourn the death of Menelik's son prince Wossan Sagad (Gleichen, 1897; Kebede, 1962). At this time, a meeting was held in which nobles and high officials discussed the Gambella issue with Sir John Harrington (served as British minister at Addis Ababa) in the presence of Menelik II. Ras Tessema, Ras Woldagiorgis, Ras Abate, and other Menelik's high Officials opposed the formal agreement; thus, Harrington was displeased. Eventually, Harrington demanded 100,000 ETBirr as compensation that Captain Bramly's expenses for this mission such as expenses of machinegun and ammunitions; and then in 1906 the requested money was paid from the new bank located in the residence of Ras Makonnen to close the issue (Zerai, 1971).

In the meantime, the Anyuua people of Gambella were administered by their traditional king, Nyieya in collaboration with the Illubabor Governor. The Anyuua Nyieya or King of the time was Alimi (Laudgor, 1907)³². Having subjugated the people, they met on their way that the Nyieya reached to Abot and Akobo lowlands of Gambella. They hastened

³¹Ras Tessema was one of the prominent Menelik's generals, who had apparently distinguished himself in the campaign he led himself to the Baro and Sobat river. In this campaign (1898), Ras Tessema, (then Dajjasmach) planted Ethiopian flag at the confluence of White Nile and Sobat, the conquest of Illubabor was attributed to Tessema's great generalissimo. Latter he was appointed regent of Lij Iyasu and served as a regent until his death in 1911. Ras Tessema was one of the strong and prominent figures in the place as well as in the empire particularly after Menelik's paralysis attack. FO.401/12, report by Kelly (Captain) of his journey through South-West Abyssinia and Beni Shangul, Feb. 10, 1903.

³² Alimi was "the son of the greatest chiefs Yambo (Anyuua)." Laudgor added that Alimi was unpleasant, when he met him with his father. Alimi was not a chief by then.

towards the Pibor River and reached to the Sobat and Nassir – all these places are within the Illubabor territory of Ethiopia under the Governor of Ras Tessema. However, the Nuer used to migrate with their cattle through Nassir to the grasslands of the Anyuua every dry season. Thus, the Anyuua king, Alimi, was opened fire on them to defend his fathers' land from invasion. Alimi was a contemporary of Ras Tessema to whom he proved his loyalty by paying an annual tribute. During this time, Nagardas Biru³³ was a supporter of the Gambella lowlands but his residence was in Bure (Zerai, 1971).

Nagadras Biru established good relationship with king Alimi by sending his men to give those rifles and ammunitions which they bought with ivory. In this process, Alimi manipulated the situation very wisely and confronted the Nuer in 1910 across the Baro River. During this time, there were about 10,000-25,000 rifles under the possession of the Anyuua (Gebeyehu, 2014). The Nuer also marched against the Anyuua and ensued to a decisive battle at Jor (an area between Baro and Gillo Rivers). Subsequently, Alimi was surrounded because the Baro area Anyuua betrayed him and rallied to the Nuer and after three weeks desperate fighting he died at the battlefield; which made a complete defeat of the Anyuua (see the Majid Abud's report at appendix "H").

Alimi was replaced by his brother, Akway Cham in 1911. The tribal regalia were soon passed to Akway Cham. During the reign of Alimi, the Beku (the Nyieya's descendents and Alimi's uncles and uncles' sons) had extended their rule over the Baro, Gillo, Abobo, and Karoni regions (Zerai, 1971). The Baro Anyuua who remained under King Udiel (another Anyuua Nyieya or king), however, because of their determined resistance they

³³ A. Henry Savage Laudgor, op.cit., pp.198-199, accounts that Biru was a native of Bulga in Shawa. He was Tessema's appointee governor of Bure.

had remained without subjugation by Akway Cham. Akway Cham had in the meantime succeeded in acquiring a number of rifles and strongly established his power (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). He soon managed to incorporate those people of Akobo into his army. Having done so, he mounted a heavy assault upon the Murle (the Anyuua call Ajuba) in the Pibor area of South Sudan, he raided 1000 cattle, 900 sheep and goats, captured 97 women and children, and looted the country (Hamilton, 1974).³⁴ On his way back, Anglo-Egyptian officers with two hundred soldiers of the Sudanese army pursued him. However, Akway Cham fortifying himself at Abol in Gambella, waited for the Sudanese army. There Akway Cham ambushed the Sudanese army and killed many Sudanese soldiers. Thus, the Anglo-Egyptian officers galloped back to Abobo.

As a result of Akway Cham's raid, the British of Sudanese Government complained to the Ethiopian Government: "Crossing our frontier, your people have attacked our people. Many of our people have been captured, many of them killed, and their property looted" (Hamilton, 1974). Such complaints had been repeatedly made against Ethiopia. Thus, this was agreed that Fitawrari Habta Giyorgis would punish Akway Cham by a joint force that of the British from the Sudan and that of Ethiopia from Gore and Dembi Dollo. Bimbashi Neweomba, a British military officer of the Sudan army, was sent from Khartoum through Gambella to Gore in 1912, during the rainy season, to draw up a plan for punishing Akway Cham. Neweomba came to Gore town intending to discuss the matter with Dajjazzmach Kabada Tessema (Governor of Illubabor, successor of Ras

³⁴The Akway Cham soldiers invaded the Murle due to the following reason according to Majid's report. Such as: "One day the Anyuua of Tuo Walu, crossing the Abot, had made a (commercial) expedition on Murle, Sudan frontier. The Tuo Walu took tobacco to exchange for cattle. Such expeditions were traditional and frequent. This time, the people of Murle attacked the Tuo Walu and many Anyuua were killed."

Tessema). However, Dajjazmach Kabada had gone Gimira to join Lij Iyasu in his Gimira campaign. Neweomba had frequently dispatched message to Dajjazmach Kabada, however, his mission had eventually shorted. Having stayed in Gore for two weeks, Neweomba went back to Khartoum by way of Gambella.

At the beginning of the WWI in 1914, the Gambella front border issue was the main topic of diplomatic correspondence between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Government and Ethiopia. At this time the Ethiopian government has suggested that a man by the name Mr. Ydlibi, a Syrian man, to be sent to the Gambella Lowland to settle the problem in a peaceful way (Zerai, 1971). Majid Abud³⁵ also assigned with him as a supporter. Both of them came to Gore to carry out their mission. However, Dajjazmach Geneme (successor of Dajjazmach Kabada as Inderassie of Illibabor) was very reluctant to cooperate with them.³⁶ Mr. Ydlibi failed to convince Geneme to make him cooperate and get help. As a result, Mr. Ydlibi came back to Addis Ababa while Majid move to his farm area in Gumarro (about twenty-three kilometers south-west of Gore).

A month later, it was said that Mr. Ydlibi was appointed as Nagadras of Dire Dawa. This time about forty “*wochafo*” guns was sent to Majid from Addis Ababa to carry out the assignment of the Gambella lowland campaign. Majid was ordered by Lij Iyasu through telephone to start the campaign of the Gambella Lowland. Having been ordered by Lij Iyasu to put down a rebellion of the tribes in the Gambella Lowland Savannah, Majid went from Gore down to Bure road. With the support of Fitawrari Burayu, landowner of

³⁵Majid Abud is a Syrian Christian, who came to Ethiopia in 1906 and lives for long time and had got Ethiopian citizen by naturalization. Ethiopian also called him as Musse Majid. Ras Tessema gave him 14-hectare farm estate at Gumarro around the rode of Gore and Bure.

³⁶ Majid’s report to Emperor Hailesellase I regarding his campaign. See also Zerai Bacurzion (1971).

Anfilo, and King Udiel, the Baro Anyuua Nyieya who refused to subjugate for King Akway Cham, the Majid force dismissed King Akway Cham at the battle of Itang on March 21, 1916 (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Johanson, 1986; Temesgen, 2014). Eventually, King Akway Cham had crossed the Akobo River and made his way to *Adongo-Pochalla*. Majid was also back to Gore to report the success of his campaign and gone to his farm estate, Gumarro.

5.2.1 Territorial Expansion of British across the Gambella Front

Since 1916 as Majid was back from his campaign, the Gambella front was left without close contact with the Ethiopian central government. In this regard, the Anglo-Egyptian Governor of Sudan expanded their territory by using a pretext of Akway Cham's raid on the Bier (Murle) people of Sudan. In due course, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Governor continued their complaint to the raid of Akway Cham in 1911 to rescue all the captured people, cattle, goat, and sheep. Their complaint was a pretext to control the Anyuua people and expansion of territory (see Majid's report at appendix "H"). Thus, by 1931, the Ethiopian Anyuua from the right side (east) of the Akobo (Nikane, Ugello, Sham, Walu); those along the bank of the Akobo and far beyond to the banks of the lower Gillo River, Jor region all were illegally then subject to the Sudan.³⁷ The Governor of Illubabor at this time was Ras Mulugeta (Hayter, 1936; Sanford, 1946).³⁸ As a result of the

³⁷ Cmd. 4387/1932, p. 147, seem to confirm that the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Government had extended its rule over the trans-frontier grazing grounds (region). This extension was apparently related with the British Nuer administrative policy that had been started since 1914-1917. The chiefs were crossing to Akobo to pay tribute to the District Commissioners. The Adongo chiefs, for instance, were Sudan subjects.

³⁸ Mahtama Sellassie, op.cit., p. 223: Ras Mulugeta was one of the men of the old school, brought up as officer under Menelik. After Menelik, he had served in many officers: Minister of Finance, Minister of War (twice), Governor of Kaffa, and Illubabor Provinces respectively. He had accompanied Ras Tafari (Emperor) to Europe in 1924. It was in Huoyo near Amba Alage that Ras Mulugeta died on active service in 1936 (Ethio-Italian War).

repeated Anglo-Egyptian allegations, Emperor Hailesillassie I ordered Ras Mulugeta to settle the problem peacefully.

Ras Mulugeta in turn, ordered those government officials assigned to Gambella Lowland to settle the inconvenience. During all the time from 1916 to 1931 no official had had the courage to go to the Anyuua and to talk with them due to its harsh environment and the officials prefer to live at the highland place (Gore) (Zerai, 1971). Thus, the Anyuua had never seen an Ethiopian official.³⁹ No one knew where or what kind of people they were for about fifteen years. If there was one, he was looked upon as stranger. The British Governor in Akobo, however, used to cross Akobo and collect tax and tribute from the Ethiopian Anyuua. They accepted the governor's orders cross over to show their allegiance. This was because there were no responsible Ethiopian frontiers officials resorted to check the British encroachment.

Restoration of the Sudanese captives seemed particularly impossible due to the Ethiopian political crisis and above all the Walwal issue⁴⁰ which was so crucial that it had led to heated discussion between Ethiopia and Italy. The responsible officials were reluctant to settle the problem because they thought that it was something that could only be settled by the central government. The officials, assigned for Gambella Lowland administration, were even indulged in the illusion that the area under British possession could only be

³⁹ Cmd. 4668/1933, p. 16; Cmd. 4387/1932, p. 147. Yardley John (Captain), "The Ethiopian Tangle", *The Saturday Review*. (London: Feb. 23, 1935), vol. 159. (Microfilm), p. 232-33. The authority of the central government of Ethiopia, apparently in all the remotest corners of the empire, was apparently non-exist. The Nuer and Anyuua of both countries (Sudan and Ethiopia) were ignorant of any international boundary. The Ethiopian Anyuua, as the reports confirm, had never seen a single Ethiopian official since the frontier-agreement of May 15, 1902, between the Sudan and Ethiopia.

⁴⁰ Geoffrey Harnsworth, *Abyssinian Adventure*, (London: 1935), pp.222-3 save that the Italian encroachment from Somaliland to the Ethiopian frontier wells (Walwal) since 1930 was a prelude to Walwal incident of 1934.

taken back peacefully. In addition, Captain Ariskein (E.N. Erskine), British consul in Gore⁴¹, a pester diplomat, determined to aggravate the situation. Captain Erskine was striving to seize the Gambella lowland and annex it to the Sudan (Hamilton, 1974).

On the other hand, he repeatedly nagged and alleged Ras Mulugeta, on the pretext that the Sudan frontier tributes were seized and ruled by the Ethiopian Government. Such complaints had frequently been forwarded to Ras Mulugeta who, for his part sent officials to Gambella Lowland to find out the real causes of this problem. However, these officials returned as was usual, having visited only Gambella proper and its vicinity (the forest areas, food, drink, and invaluable goods were plentiful). Thus they reported: "The country is at peace and there is nothing to fear. All that has been said is rumor." In this way the border issue was being neglected, and unresolved for a year and half.

In June 1932 the Governor-General of the upper Nile⁴² Province together with his assistant, and the governors of Nassira (Nuer region), Akobo district and the Murle/Beir (Anyuua district) came to Gambella in four steamers (Zerai, 1971). When the arrival of these officials was reported, Hailesellase I telephoned Ras Mulugeta to go to Gambella and settle the matter with the Sudan delegates at all costs, so that they should leave

⁴¹ In 1909 an official of the British government came and after two years of traveling widely in area sounding out the commerce possibilities had a British Council built in Gore. This consul left in 1911. Richard Hill, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, (Oxford, 1951), p. 375, mentions Mr. Gravel H. Walker's appointment to Gore as British consul for Western Ethiopia in 1911. Mr. Walker tired from the consular service in 1928 and was succeeded by Captain E.N. Erskine who continued in operation until 1938. In the report, USA, Department of State, Records related to Internal Affairs of Ethiopia (1910-29), Foreign Affairs Branch, National Archives, roll 2, Decimal file No. 884.01/884,1541/1, legation the USA., Addis Ababa, April 2, 1929, Captain E. Erskine is mentioned as the third British consul to Gore. See also, F.E. Heyter, *op.cit.*, p.9.

⁴² Cmd. 4387/1932, pp. 17-18, reporting that A.G. Pawson, Governor-General of the Upper Nile, represented the Sudan Government agreed "the June Gambella Agreement" to pay compensation for those Anyuua killed and to arrange for the reinstitution of the captives and cattle taken by the raiders. The Ethiopian government was represented by Ras Mulugeta, head of the delegation, and Fitawrari Hailemariam, Acting Governor of Wollaga.

feeling friendly. As a result, Ras Mulugeta summoned a meeting of all military and civilian dignitaries. They unanimously affirmed that the only person who had ever subjected the Anyuaa people and made them settled peacefully and who could now resolve the problem was Majid. Thus, Majid was appointed to the Governorship of the Gambella⁴³ Lowland and appointed to deal with the matter (Hayter, 1936). At this time, Majid was at his estate in Gumarro⁴⁴. Ras Mulugeta with his lieutenants and civilian officials set out to Gamella.

The Ras and his officials went to meet the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan delegates at the small English town in the enclave, which is the Gambella town. During the conference on the steamer, the Governor-General of the Upper Nile Province presented a letter which was said to have been delivered by a Lord from London to Khartoum. The contents of the letter as read were: “The Ethiopian Government must pay a reimbursement of 1000\$ for the people captured and killed; 100\$ for each cow and 10\$ for each sheep and goat (killed or captured) and the raiders must be severely punished” (Zerai, 1971:33). Ras Mulugeta was told to sign this letter or the delegates would leave the conference. This maneuver aggravated the situation. At this juncture, Majid and Ras Mulugeta have discussed about the matter alone. At last, Majid told Ras Mulugeta:

If we sign and agree to pay the money requested, we will be accused of supporting the slave trade (for some of the money asked was in

⁴³ Report on the finances, Administration and Conditions of the Sudan in 1929, cmd, 4387/1932 p. 18 (hereafter: Cmd. With number), confirms that Majid was appointed by Ras Mulugeta frontier agent. He was conferred with Qannazmach. His promotion was later confirmed b'y his Imperial Majesty Haile Sillassie I. Majid was at the same time entrusted with administering the Ethiopian Anyuaa and carrying out the terms of the Gambella Agreement. See Frank E. Hayter, *Gold of Ethiopia*, (London: 1936), p. 178.

⁴⁴ A region on the Gore-Bure road. Ras Tessema had given Majid a forty two gasha of land as gift which later confirmed by Lij Iyasu and then His Imperial Majesty. Eventually, the Military regime confiscate and distribute to his tenant.

compensation for captive still alive); and above all it will be alleged that we are not competent to rule our people. To pay compensation for the cattle is alright, but to do so for the captive would be humiliating to our Government. Besides, the people are very poor for us to ask compensation in the form of tax. However, I can arrange for the restoration of the captives if the English will make arrangements to take me up to the border and give me time, at least a year.

(Majid Abud's Report in 1932, see at Appendix "H")

With this in mind, Ras Mulugeta hurried back to the delegates on the steamer. Another conference was held; in which the Sudan delegates eventually agreed to Majid's proposal.

The terms of the Gambella agreement of June 1932 was forthwith telephoned to Hailesillassie I by Ras Mulugeta in Addis Ababa. Hailesillassie I subsequently held a hearing and all the officials who had ever been sent to the Gambella Lowlands to investigate and had brought back groundless reports were chained and severely punished. Thus, in June 1932, Majid was awarded a rank of Qannazmach and entrusted with administrating the Gambella Lowlands and carrying out the terms of Gambella Agreement⁴⁵ (Hayter, 1936). However, Majid found the frontier or territory of Ethiopia reduced its size by the expansion of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Therefore, Majid took two responsibilities from Ethiopian government: 1) rescue the captive people and raided cattle to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Governor; 2) rearrange the border based on Article I of the 1902 treaty. The following two sections illustrate Majid's campaign to discharge his responsibilities.

⁴⁵ Cmd, 4387/1932, P.18, confirmed that Majid was appointed governor of the frontier land, charged with carrying out the terms of Gambella Agreement.

5.2.2 Campaigns to Rescue the Raided Cattle and Captives' People

In November 1932 (after the Gambella agreement in June 1932) a military plan was drafted as to how Majid was to make an expedition, to the Gambella lowland area to rescue the raided cattle and captives' people by Akway Cham in 1911. The plan was drafted by E. N. Erskine, British consul in Gore and approved by Ras Mulugeta from whom Majid received. They told Majid to follow this plan strictly. According to the objective stipulated in the plan, "Majid should attack regions of the Southern Akobo (Ujallo, Nikani, and Tuo-Walo) which setting out from the right side of Gambella. Then Majid brings the Sudanese captives and stock from these regions. Besides, the plan restricted Majid from moving east of the Baro River."

Majid started to study Captain Erskine's plan thoroughly and realized that it had been purposely made to prevent them from meeting the Nuer. By so doing, the Nuer would rebel against their Ethiopian government and will cause bloody fighting. In addition, it was a well-calculated plan intended to keep them from knowing that the border people were paying tribute to the Sudan, ruled by its frontier governors. Having this understanding, Majid redeveloped his own plan of campaign by rejecting the Erskine's plan. Eventually, Erskine and Ras Mulugeta understood that Erskine's plan was being abandoned and sent a letter of warning to Majid. They ordered Majid to turn back to Akobo and advance according to Erskine's plan. Majid was duly dispatched a letter to Ras Mulugeta explaining of his plan:

Erskine's plan is worthless and it will eventually lead to our being humiliated. They cannot capture the Akobo people who raided the Sudan border land unless we surround them from the rear. We can trap this

people and reinstate the captives in order to create friendly relations with the Sudan Government if you allow me to give redress to the captives and to settle the frontier problem. Therefore, please bear with me in my carrying out the plan I have now drafted (see Majid Abud's report at appendix "H")

Ras Mulugeta accepted Majid's plan and Majid continued his expedition and discussion with the Nuer chiefs in Jikawo. However, Mr. Corfield, Governor of Nassira told Majid at Jikawo to stop his discussion with Nuer chiefs and restricted him to pass Jikawo because Jikawo was illegally under Sudanese. Both Majid and Corfield discussed the matter in the Majid's tent for a day with no fruitful conclusions. In the meantime, Majid conclude his discussion with Nuer chiefs around Jikawo and distributed forty Ethiopian flags and recruited two hundred soldiers for his campaign from Nuer to release all the Sudanese captives of Murle by Akway Cham to restore peace and friendly relations with Sudan Government.

Majid have information from Anyuaa that the Murle captives from the Sudan borderland and some of the captured cattle were under-guard in the forest near Tuo. Having gathered all the necessary information, Majid drew a plan of attack to subdue these people. After heavy fighting the Tuo landowners surrendered to Majid, then Majid headed northwards, following the Gillo River, to Chantua where there were many captives. The Chantua landowners heard the Tuo campaign and thus, they willingly surrendered their captives alive and unsold. Having collected the captives, cattle, sheep, and goats, Majid moved southwards and hoist Ethiopian flag at Guraferda. From Guraferda, Majid reached Akobo, Awilo, Sham, Teido, Nazami, and eventually against the Ajilo, a large area around Ujallo in Jor district. Many captives and cattle were hidden on different islands in

Ujallo. Finally, Majid recovered 1000 cattle, 900 sheep and goats, ninety-two women and children – five women short of the ninety-seven claimed by the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Government.

After collected all captives who were alive, cattle, sheep, and goats Majid headed towards the English town⁴⁶, Sudan-Akobo, which was to the west of the Pibor River. A camp was pitched in the Ethiopian town, Tergol⁴⁷, while the captives were kept in Sudan-Akobo. In the morning, Majid crossed the river and handed over the ninety-two captives and the animals. In the meantime, a joint-committee of eight men from Ethiopia and some British authorities sent telegrams to Haileselassie I and Sudan Government notifying them of the peaceful conclusion of the matter. Thus, the long six months' and extensive expedition to rescue the captives' people and raided cattle, sheep and goats came to an end in May 1932.⁴⁸

5.2.3 Campaigns to Territorial Rearrangement across the Gambella Front

The English already had established themselves firmly in the area between Akobo and Abot⁴⁹, the nucleus of the Anyuua region⁵⁰. This area was in King Akway Cham's sphere of rule. Here the English had built a town; established a military post together with a police station; and their power was in full force. They had captured King Akway Cham

⁴⁶ Akobo town is a town along the banks where Pibor and Akobo Rivers join.

⁴⁷ Regarding Tergol, cf. ante., pp.38-41. During Majid's earlier campaign (on a steamer), Majid had built a town in Tergol.

⁴⁸ Cmd. 4668/1933, reports that Majid had left Gambella on February 21, 1933 for the Anyuua regions along the Gillo River. However, Majid says that he left Gambella after celebrating Epiphany, which usually celebrated on January 19th, every year.

⁴⁹ Cmd. 4387/1932, p. 17, confirms that the Ethiopian Anyuua living on the Gillo and on the right bank of Akobo rivers made serious raid on the Beir tribe in March 1932 and not in 1931, which they were living east of the Pibor River – within the Sudan border. The raiding party is reported, to have possessed rifles. They undertook heavy casualties.

⁵⁰ The regions mentioned above were under sphere of rule of Alimi, which later passed over to Akway Sham after his death.

and taken him away to the area of Adongo⁵¹ (see the Adongo area on the map at Appendix “K”).

Qañnazmach Majid started his campaign with the support of steamer from Anglo-Egyptian Governor of Sudan including Captain Tenklief, Governor of Akobo, and a Captain of English army in Khartoum⁵² according to the June 1932 Gambella agreement. Majid’s campaigns include the area of Pibor, the boundary line of the White Nile. The area opposite Pibor (on the right side of the Pibor) belongs to Ethiopia and is known as Tergol; the people are Anyuua surrounded by Nuer in which both tribes used to live in harmony, paying tribute to the governor of Akobo under Sudan. However, the captured people live twenty kilometers away from Akobo in the upper Gillo area. From there Majid started to discharge the political mission (which had been entrusted to him). The border people, Anyuua as well as Nuer had no idea that they were subject to the Ethiopian Government.

These people had never seen the Ethiopian flag for long time. Some of them had heard of the Ethiopian-Sudanese border agreement signed in 1902 by Ras Tessema including the area of Adongo at the time of Menelik II (see appendix “A” and “B”). Yet, this was a rumor (story) to most of the border people. Ethiopian authority had never administered them since the Ethiopian-Sudanese frontier agreement, 1902. Thus, when Majid went there, they expected that he is a stranger or their guest.

⁵¹ Adongo is an Anyuua place currently in the Southeastern part of South Sudan in Puchalla County.

⁵² Cmd, 4387/1932, reported that Majid Abud visited the area inhabited by the raiders travelling on a steamer of the Sudan Government. He was also accompanied by a District Commissioner probably of Akobo of the upper Nile Province.

These people were Anglo-Egyptian Sudan subjects and had to abide by Anglo-Egyptian Sudanese law, government and pay its tax annually. The Governor of Akobo had extended his influence over the Anyuua (the Adongo, the Gillo region, Majang/Massango, and even up to Guraferda) almost all of which belonged to Ethiopia. They were paying tribute to the Governor of Akobo and the governor of Nassira likewise imposed taxes and tribute on the Nuer of Jikawo in the hinterland of Ethiopia. British governor of Sudan recruited policemen from these Ethiopian people to serve the governors and were given police uniforms.

Due to all these political exercise and territorial expansion of the English governor in Sudan, Majid started his border case political work. The Kwaaro⁵³ – Anyuua landowner – whom Majid had sent to the people of Akobo and Gillo was successful in his mission of bring back the Tuo-Walu Kwaaro, who had been the commander of the raiding party. This Kwaaro was sent to stay with the Tergol Kwaaro. Majid immediately sent all the Kwaari and some of the soldiers who had come with him to Tergol to become acquainted with the people there. The Tuo-Walu Kwaaro was given food, clothing and other things in order to make him feel friendly. In the meantime, clothes, ashebo (salt), and tobacco were also sent to the people of Tergol. These gifts were duly distributed to the men, women, children, and elders of Tergol. After this political work across the border, Majid moved to the Upper Gillo, which is the Pugnwudo region to meet the people.

⁵³ The Anyuua landowner known as Kwaaro (singular) and Kwaari (plural)

The people along the banks of Gillo and Akobo Rivers had heard and coming to Chentua⁵⁴ in a large gathering to meet Majid. After Majid arrived, they discussed regarding the whole situation across the border and Majid said “The Ethiopian Government has sent me to solve and settle your problems.” He addressed a kind of indoctrination and respond friendly and then he distributed tobacco, salt, and cloths to the people and Kwaari. After they reached Akobo, Majid had started to contact and exchange views with the Ethiopian frontier people conspicuously. He made clear to the Anyuaa and Nuer on the right side of Pibor that they were Ethiopian subject. However, Captain Tenklief complained about Majid’s activities which were in fact the primary purpose of Majid’s mission.⁵⁵

Majid and Tenklief argued regarding the land and the subject people across the border. Tenklief proposed an option to give a chance for the local community to decide to which government (Ethiopia or Sudan) they want to subject. However, Majid opposed to give freedom for the people to choose their government. Instead, Majid proposed that “let us assemble the people of both countries, who live along the bank on both sides of the Pibor and meet with the landowner and elders of these areas. Let us explain to them about our governments’ stand and decision to set out the boundaries of their respective governments, and pay tribute accordingly” (See Majid Abud’s Report at Appendix “H”).

⁵⁴ Chentua is a small Anyuaa town in Gog district of Anyuaa Zone.

⁵⁵Cmd. 4387/1932, p. 147, accused Majid of interfering in the British Nuer administration. It reported, “For a hundred years the Nuer have grazing in these areas ignorant of any International boundary and without ever seeing a single Abyssinian official.” It added that the attempt to administer them (by the Ethiopian Government) would have unpleasant repercussions throughout the Nuer tribe. According to this report, the British Government had firmly established its rule in these trans-frontier grazing grounds. As a result of this, the district Commissioner had tried to dissuade Majid from undertaking such activities, see also, Cmd. 4668/1933, pp. 15-16.

The two governments representatives agreed to assemble the landowners, elders, and ordinary people who live both sides of the border to present their proposal for decision at Akobo town. On the assembly, Mr. Corfield, the Governor of Nassira district, and his assistant, Mr. Elliot Smith, came to attend. On the conference, Tenklief informed the people that Ethiopian government is claiming the land on the right bank of the Pibor River. Majid also addressed his proposal to the people that “the Ethiopian government has sent me to visit its border people. I was sent from Ethiopian government to listen and understand your problems in order to find solutions for them. In addition, I came here to restore peace and order to enable you to farm your lands peacefully and live in harmony, not only among yourselves but also with your neighbours. The eastern region of the Pibor River is part of Ethiopia and from now on will be ruled by the Ethiopian Government. Hence, those of you who believe that you are Sudanese subjects are asked to leave the land immediately on condition that you pay the tax for this season’s harvest.”

On the discussion at the conference, the Tergol Anyuaa landowners and elders responded that:

Tergol was and is our land and has come down to us from our ancestors. The tax and tribute we paid to the Sudan Government so far were due to lack of any Ethiopian government officials here. We had no idea of the existence of a government of our own. If this land belongs to Ethiopian Government, then we are Ethiopians. There is no reason to move from our land and subjects to the Sudan.

Based to the response of the people, both the Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan delegators accepted the decision and Majid made additional suggestions to Tenklief.

Firstly, both countries should help each other in case their border peoples clashed and caused repercussions; and there a frontier agreement that would strictly be followed and forth with rectified should be signed. Secondly, Adongo⁵⁶, the region between Akobo and Oboth, who's chief was Akway Cham⁵⁷ is Ethiopian. I myself conquered and settled the problem of this region in 1916. However, to my knowledge you have taken Adongo and annexed it to your rule. You have built a town and established a Police Station. Since the time of Ras Tessema (1974), Adongo has been Ethiopian and its people were paying tax and tribute. To cover up your policy on certain turbulent border people you have complained that our Ethiopian Anyuua raid on Beir (the Murle). However, you were governing the people on the Ethiopian side of the border and making them pay tribute and tax. Despite all this, the people now recognized their government and have shown their sincere loyalty and allegiance to the Ethiopian Government. In addition, the Adongo landowners are detained here in Akobo. Now I am asking you to hand him over to me. Thirdly, above all I am asking you to give us back the Anyuua tribal regalia (royal emblem) by which the Anyuua Nyieya legitimized his traditional rule. On border question, both governments had once agreed to a frontier along the Akobo in the south; the Pibor in the west, and Jikawo in the north (interpretation of Article I of 1902 treaty, see appendix "E"). Adongo is on west of Akobo in which you established your rule now repudiating the frontier agreement. Thus Adongo is Ethiopian and its landowner whom you detained in Akobo is our subject and should be given back to us. The Ethiopian Anyuua who had invaded Ajuba (Beir)

⁵⁶ Cmd. 4387/1932., says that the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Government claimed Adongo to belong to it. It adds that many of the chiefs of Adongo and its vicinity came to pay their tribute at Akobo to the District Commissioner. However, Adongo is Ethiopian since it is within the Ethiopian frontier land. See also, Cmd. 3697/1929, pp. 130-132.

⁵⁷ Cmd. 4668/1933, p.36, reports that Akway Sham, who had escaped to Ethiopia, was later surrendered to the District Commissioner of Akobo and imprisoned at Akobo. Furthermore, he had escaped from the prison with forty-nine Anyuua prisoners, in which he participated in the second Beir raid of 1932. Eventually, Akway Sham seemed to have surrendered again to the Akobo district commissioner because he was deserted. Akway Sham was subsequently from his Adongo chiefdom in 1934.

has been severely punished; and the captives and captured cattle were given back to the Ajuba (now Murle) people.⁵⁸

At last they argued that the tribal regalia (royal emblem) should remain with the Adongo Anyuua in Pochalla and then both governments in higher position shall discuss regarding Adongo in terms of the previous agreement because this is beyond our mandate. However, the political situations of Ethiopia could not allow any border case discussion with the British governor of Sudan due to the beginning of WWII. Italy also invaded Ethiopia and thus the whole political condition of the country changed its dimension to patriotic struggle. During the five years' patriotic struggle, the south-west Ethiopian patriot was based in Pochalla, near to the Boma area. Because of all these political situations, still Adongo remained in the Sudanese territory and the Anyuua royal emblem stayed in the hands of South Sudanese Anyuua.

5.3 Historical Problems of the Borderland People

State borders have long been viewed as constraints on the people who live in the area, often arbitrary partitioned by the drawing of the boundary (Dereje, 2010). The 1902 treaty between Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to fix the borderland of Ethiopia and Sudan made many changes on the local people. Article I of the 1902 treaty expressed the agreement of the two governments to the line drawn on the map attached to and forming part of the treaty, and Article II referred to the method by which the line should be demarcated and made known to the frontier officials and public. As we have discussed

⁵⁸ Cmd. 4387/1932, pp. 146-147, reports that Majid, having proceeded from Gambella to Akobo on one the Sudanese steamers, had visited the Ethiopian Anyuua. This report also confirms that Majid had interviewed many chiefs, living on the Akobo and Gillo Rivers and who had participated in the Beir raids. The outcome of this visit was the redressing of twelve women and thirteen children captives and only a few cattle.

above, the Gwynn's one-handed demarcation did not translate the treaty line into reality on the ground and that he did in fact inform the frontier authorities of the location of the line he demarcated. However, a boundary has a problem regarding its quality and location.

The specific boundary that lies on the people as an international border determines the powers and administrative functions of the government. The border was drawn not on the basis of the wishes of the people on the ground; it depends on the interests of Ethiopia and British. The border was arbitrarily divided the borderland people particularly the two largest people living there (the Anyuua and the Nuer). The nature of the division is expressed in terms of the agreement by which the boundary is determined, in part it is a living feature, expressed over the years by frontier events and boundary procedures and general relations between the states not in any immediate way connected with their natural boundary at all (Hamilton, 1974).

Across the Ethiopia-Sudan boundary, there were many desperate factors at work. In the early years there was clear evidence of considerable confidence and trust between the Imperial Ethiopia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Menelik II had confidence on the Gwynn's reports and recommendations, which can be an evidence for their trust relations and they sought to maintain this good-will at the highest level of their governments. However, their trust was not extended to lower level of administration that affected their trust due to incidents, suspicious, and disparaging attitudes of individual officers. Both sides of local officers are tended to undermine the high level government officials' good intentions. Italy also continuously insists to have a "right" in Western Ethiopia. This

encouraged Britain to make proposals and demands derogatory to Ethiopian's powers and administrative functions implicit in her sovereignty (Zerai, 1971; Hamilton, 1974).

The main features of the frontier zone are including incidents such as cattle raiding and child abduction. The British also used such cattle raiding and child abduction as a good opportunity to complain the Ethiopian government and claim the border to expand to Gore. In this understanding, there should be a procedure which, if implemented, would clearly have very materially uttered the nature of the boundary established under Article I and II of the 1902 treaty because it would have involved Sudanese forces ignoring Ethiopian sovereign rights to the east of the Pibor River. The British also established a town and police camp at Adongo (east of Pibor River) on the Ethiopian land which forced the Anyuaa to be the subject of Sudan. Another factor threatening the quality of the boundary line agreed was that inherent in and created by Italy's claims to special "rights" and interests in Western Ethiopia.

The boundary agreement had little immediate effect on the pattern of raiding for ivory, cattle, and slave that was traditional to the region. Although Gwynn had, in his boundary recommendations, sought to keep on the Sudan side a line of possible border posts from which the Sudanese administration could control their side of the boundary, these were in most cases not occupied. Likewise, on the Ethiopian side large sections of the frontier region lay beyond the control of their permanently occupied posts.

Harrington suggested that border raiding might be reduced in the south and some other administrative difficulties resolved if the Emperor was to appoint a British Officer as Governor of the Baro Lowlands (as discussed above), which might be constituted into a

new Ethiopian Province to be called Anyuua Province. Menilik orally approved of the idea and an officer, Captain Jennings-Bramly, was selected for the post. However, the plan was never implemented due to the refusal of Menelik's Officers. This is one of the disappointments for the next serious outbreak of raids in the region.

The Anyuua had acquired rifles and in 1911 launched a series of ghastly attacks on the Beir (Murle) in the western Pibor River of the Sudan territory. These attacks resulting in many Murle dead and 97 women and children captured as well as 1000 cattle and many goats looted, prompted powerful British protests and an immediate Sudanese punitive expedition. The main Sudanese complaint was that the Anyuua were obtaining their firearms through Ethiopia. For the Ethiopian side a more substantial expedition was prepared to punish Akway Cham. However, the expeditions only prevent the Anyuua from gain causing trouble. They, in turn, threatened the peace of the region and in the autumn of 1914, with the scale of violence mounting each year, Governor-General Kitchener sent 1000 men to occupy the Sudan side of the border and disarm the population up to Gore. But this was not successful due to Ethiopia's aggressive opposition to the British attempt and illegally crossed the Ethiopian border.

In turn, during 1916 the Ethiopian Government mounted expedition to attempt to disarm Akway Cham throughout the Anyuua land. However, that expedition could not successfully maintain the Gambella peace and the area continue its existence under the Anyuua king, Akway Cham. Thus the position of Gambella was threatened and the Sudanese government sent a gunboat and fifty soldiers to ensure its protection but they

were also not successful. Accordingly, the British expand her territory by ignoring the 1902 treaty and complain to subject Gambella.

On 21 and 22 of March 1932, about 600 Anyuaa from the Gillo River region (in Ethiopia) attacked the Bier (Murle) tribe, killing 15 men and capturing 27 women and 55 children (of whom 8 women and 7 children were quickly recovered) and nearly 100 head of cattle (Hamilton, 1974). In response to British protests the most insistent messages were sent from Addis Ababa to Ras Mulugeta in Gore to ascertain how this raid happened and to free the people captured. Enquiries were made; a meeting took place at Gambella resulting in an agreement between Ethiopian and Sudanese officials apportioning blame, agreeing losses and fixing compensation. For this matter, Qaṇnazmach Majid was sent by Ras Mulugeta to settle the issue and rearrange the borderland of Ethiopia. The 1932 expedition of Majid was maintaining the borderland problems and recovers the captives' people and raided cattle; however, due to the beginning of the WWII the high level of Ethiopia and Anglo-British governments' officials were unable to discuss on the Adongo-Pochalla land and it remained under Sudan.

The other problem was the low political contact of center-periphery relations of Ethiopia. For instance, the Baro salient was a vast, low, marshy area, supposedly administered from remote garrisons in the Illubabor Mountains, which were they only in irregular contact with Addis Ababa. Sir Harold MacMichael, acting Governor-General of Sudan, felt that the situation of having a population of lowland warriors, for whom inter-tribal raiding is a perfectly acceptable social activity, administrated from the highlands by

people who regard the lowlands as hot, unhealthy and alien, was fundamentally all wrong. He, therefore, argued that the long-term solution for the problem of the Baro-Salient was for the lowland (Nuer and Anyuua) regions to come under a strengthened and permanently resident Sudanese administration. For this matter, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan opened their diplomat office at Gore and made propagation of social instability among the borderland people.

In the intense political competition between the Anyuua and the Nuer in the newly created regional state of Gambella, the Anyuua construct the Nuer as 'foreigners' through the invocation of the 1902 international border.

Chapter Six

6 Demographic and Socio-Economic Background

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the background of the socio-economic security problems of the borderland people by examining their socio-cultural relations, economic bases, and geographic landscape of the Murle, the Anyuua, and the Jikany-Nuer. The discussion focuses on the following themes: background of the study area; the demographic nature of the borderland people – emphasized on the Murle people specifically on their origin, social background, and geographical location; social structures; the ecology and economic basis; and the socio-economic significances of cattle. In addition, the socio-economic conditions and geographical location of the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer are discussed to illustrate their confrontational relationship with the Murle infiltrators in the case of cattle raiding and child abduction.

These discussions establish a foundation for the subsequent chapters to examine the factors behind the cattle raiding and child abduction on the Ethiopia-South Sudan border that is deteriorating the socio-economic security of the borderland people. Moreover, it helps to substantiate the discussion of the critical areas of economic deprivation, socio-cultural marginalization, political exploitation, and isolation from state services of the borderland people.

6.1 Demographic Composition of the Borderland People

Demographically, the border region is constituted by the Anyuua, the Nuer, the Murle, the Kommo, and the Oppo peoples, in addition to other ethnic groups from different parts of Ethiopia and South Sudan who have been settled there. The three main ethnic groups who share the borderland region are the Anyuua, the Nuer, and the Murle people. The Anyuua and the Nuer groups are divided between Ethiopia and South Sudan while most of the Murle people live in South Sudan.

The 2007 CSA National Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia estimate that there are 143,189 Nuer and 64,959 Anyuua in Ethiopia (CSA, 2007). Currently, the Murle are a small group of 150,531 people in South Sudan comprising 1% of the South Sudanese population.⁵⁹ They live in the Pibor lowland plain of the Boma State near the Ethiopian border and neighbor with Anyuua and Nuer people in Gambella. The Anyuua and Nuer are a Nilotic group of people that belong to the Nilo-Saharan language family (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a; Austin, 1957; Kurimoto, 2002) while the Murle are a non-Nilotic group of people and belong to the Surmi-Language family (Lewis, 1972; Arensen, 1992); moreover, they claim that they are originally from Ethiopia. Accordingly, a very small group of Murle people live in the Southern part of Ethiopia (Lewis, 1972; Andretha, 1989) estimated by the 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia as a total number of 1,469. This has potential to substantiate the oral record that the Murle group originated from Ethiopia, the place called *Jen*, to the east of Maji.

⁵⁹ www.joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13882/OD

6.1.1 The Murle People

The borderland people sharing an overarching ethnic identity and then the Murle group may be the one pushing for peace in the region. However, most borderland people and government elites know the Murle as an aggressive group. In fact, this conclusion ignores the underlying issues behind the cycle of cattle raiding, child abduction, and violent of confrontation in the region. The Murle people keep cattle, like other borderland peoples in the lowlands of Pibor, or are agrarian in the Boma Plateau. Accordingly, the Lowland Pibor plain Murle group are the one who participated in cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontations across the border area while the agrarian Boma plateau Murle group are ceased any conflictive behavior with their neighbours due to the advice of their *Alan Ci Merii* (Red Chief). According to the Murle informants, the Boma Plateau Murle Red chief advises the community to abandon cattle keeping because cattle are the source of conflict with their neighbouring people. Thus to avoid conflict with others, he said “it is better to depend on agriculture rather than cattle husbandry.” In this regard, the Boma Plateau Murle is depending on cultivation. Therefore, accusing all Murle of responsibility for cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation may magnify their socio-economic and political marginalization.

Therefore, to examine the social and economic interactions of the Murle with the borderland people – Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer – and their contribution to the borderland people socio-economic security problems, their origin, social and economic base, social structure, and geographical locations should be taken into account. To understand all these situations and realized the sources of insecurity over the region, it is important to assess the following questions regarding the Murle. Who are the Murle? How do they

interact with their neighbours? What socio-economic base do they have? What are the contributing factors to the cattle raiding and child abduction? How are the relations of the Murle and their neighbors beyond the regular cattle raiding and child abduction? How do they contribute to peacebuilding in the region? And how does the lean administration of the border region influence the Pibor Lowland Murle's life?

6.1.1.1 Origin, Social background, and Geographical Locations

A. Origin of the Murle People

The legend of the Murle people claims that they originated in Ethiopia and then gradually migrated to the present region of South Sudan. They have two mythical stories to their creation: the story of *Jen* and stories about the finding of different animals connected with their creation. The latter has little knowledge in Murle people to narrate clearly and considered it as less important mythical stories about their creation. However, they have clear mythological story regarding their creation at *Jen* – to the east of Maji in Ethiopia. According to Lewis (1972), tradition claims that the Murle tribe was created at *Jen*, far away to the north-east of their present country, beyond Maji in Ethiopia. The Murle elders and their generations took back their mind to their creation and origin through the narration of the following mythical story:

Many years ago, three women came down without men from *Tammu*⁶⁰ – heaven – to the earth at the place called *Jen*. They believe that *Jen* is found

⁶⁰ Tammu is a Murle word to refer their creation and associated with God; they also refer to sky, rain, etc while Jok is a common word of Dinka, Nuer, and Anyuaa to refer their creation by associating with God. However, the term Jok has also serve in Murle people to refer to their creator besides to Tammu. Many groups of people from Nuer, Anyuaa, and Dinka remain in the present land of Murle and mixed with Murle before long years ago refer Jok than Tammu.

in Ethiopia, but they cannot refer the specific place, rather they do have knowledge about the direction of *Jen* that it is beyond Maji of the east in Southern region of Ethiopia. The word *Jen* in Murle language refers to the east direction. Those three women built their home and start to live separately. One day they went to the bush to cut wood to fence their house. They went in different direction to find a strong wood and one of them start to bend down the branch of a tree to cut a wood; however, she heard a voice from the branch of the tree – *'it is my place of residence, don't cut it.'* Then she stopped cutting and looked up to see who spoke to her and she saw someone in the branches – later she recognized as a spirit. She took down the spirit and caught it to take it home with her. The other two women had no knowledge about that spirit because she hides into her home. A few days later, she made love with the spirit and slept every night together. Finally, she became pregnant with child and other women asked her 'who had given her the child?' She said 'I have got this child from *Tammu*' – that they associated *Tammu* with God. However, the two women couldn't believe her and they decided to check her home. One day they went into the field to collect their food together but two of them hide themselves from her in the bush and back to check her home. They found the spirit in her hut and took it away. She came back home at the evening; however, she could not find the trace of the spirit. She immediately gone to the home of other two women and asked them about the spirit – one of them who hide the spirit at home is confessed and gave it back to her. At the end of her pregnancy, she labors pain to give birth to a child but could not delivery, thus, the other two women start to cut her abdomen, but neither the woman nor the child survived. The woman who had stolen the spirit and confessed also reached her time of pregnancy and the other woman wanted to cut open her stomach during labour pain but a cow appeared on the scene and told her to shake her for delivery. She did and

so a baby was born; named Murimaan and he became the father of all the Murle.

This story was narrated by the Murle *Alan Ci Merii* (See Appendix “L”)

According to the myth, the first birth of Murle resulted from the union of the maleness of the spirit with the flesh of the woman. The woman is created by *Tammu* in heaven and down to earth and produced Murimaan – father of the Murle people that delivered with the support of cow. In the Murle tradition, cow is an animal that sent from *Tammu* to save Murimaan and his mother. Thus, they believe that cow is the savior of the Murle people.

Linguistic evidence also supports their claim of origin. Ehret (1982) suggests that a proto-Southwest Surma speaking people (Murle, Didinga, Longarim, Bale, and Zilmamu⁶¹) lived on either side of the Maji massif around 2,000 B.C. Sometime in the last millennium, the Murle-Didinga speaking people split from the Bale-Zilmamu speaking people and began a westward migration into Sudan (Lewis, 1972). According to Dimmendaal (1982), extensive linguistic borrowing and considerable overlap in material culture are evidence of long-term contact between Murle-Didinga speaking people and Eastern Nilotes in the Sudan. Linguistic patterns also suggest that these Eastern Nilotes were displaced by the migrating Murle-Didinga speakers (Ehret, 1982).

B. Social Background, Migration, and Geographical Locations of the Murle

After the birth of Murimaan, the number of people increased and they start to move from *Jen* to the river Omo with cows. Gradually, they migrated to Kolobaath – now Toposa –

⁶¹ Zilmamu live in Ethiopia, in the village of Kembu, Bana, and Digia on the River Kari, in Madardur and Belaat the source of the Kuron where it divides from the Kirabo, and in Murilingo on the Muri River, the right bank of the Kirabo (Cerulli, 1956:39).

on to mount Kathiangor (*Kather* in Murle) then to Maruwa hills in the South Sudan. Due to their growing population, the Murle people divided into four clans – Lewis (1972) also called ‘drumships’. They are 1) Kelenya, 2) Ngenvac, 3) Tangajon, and 4) Ngarotti. Each clan has a drum to communicate with *Tammu* and apply for their social administration. Through time, Kelegna merged with Tangajon and Nganvac merged with Nyarotti; and thus they created two big clans named Tangajon and Nyarotti (see appendix “I”).

According to the Murle elders, the Toposa, Jie, and Turkana people are the neighbouring to Murle around the Lake Roudolf Region. Currently, Jie with a small number of populations become one of the neighbouring people to the Murle in the Boma State of South Sudan. These groups of people were forced the Murle to leave the area of Lake Rudolf around the Omo River. Due to their massive pressures, the majority of Murle people move to the Maruwa hills in South Sudan but some of them move to Jinka, the present people known as Bodi (Turton, 1979). Due to this pressure, the Murle become warrior and aggressive, however, they migrate to the Maruwa hills and then to the valley of Lotilla⁶². Previously, the Boma plateau and the Lotilla valley of Pibor were inhabited by Dinka, Nuer, and Anyuaa. Thus, the Murle faced great battle around the Veveno River with Dinka, Nuer, and Anyuaa during their migration.

Their migration was in three directions: 1) The Ngarotti clan moved into the direction of Dinka inhabited area and they fought with the Dinka people. 2) The Kelenya clan migrated into the Anyuaa area and fought with the Anyuaa people. 3) The Tangajon clan migrated into the Nuer and fought with the Nuer people. In a while, the Nganvac clan of

⁶² Lotilla is a place found in the Pibor of South Sudan; which is the place of Ngarotti Murle (see the map at Appendix “J”).

Murle migrated into the direction of Tangajon. The Murle took the superior power on all confrontations and forced to move the Dinka to the west, the Nuer to the north-east, and the Anyuua to the east (see the map at Appendix “I”).

The Murle’s expansion to the north of the Nile River was forced to stop by the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan colonial administration in 1908 (McCallum, 2013). According to Lewis (1972), the small Murle community living on the Boma plateau, in the extreme south-east corner of Murle land, is in close contact with the Suri, known as Dhuak, and other small tribes of the Tirma group, all are originated in Ethiopia. Accordingly, Cerulli (1956) clearly described below about the neighbouring relation of the Murle with the Suri people at the Boma plateau.

In about 1850, Guraro, the chief of a large group of Murle living near the Maruwa Hills, decided to open negotiations with Bolu, the chief of the Suri, for permission to live at Boma. This was granted and the Murle lived on the northern and western slopes, cultivating, and grazing their cattle and hunting in the plains below. In exchange of these privileges Guraro gave his daughter to Bolu as a wife, and this division of the country between the two tribes has remained in peace for at least four decades. However, about 1890, large number of the Suri joined the Meyun clan at Meyun, where they were shortly afterwards raided by the Murle. In this case, the peaceful relations of the Suri with the Murle were gradually changed into unfriendliness.

Cerulli (1956:39-41)

Currently, the Murle are neighbours with the Nuer to the North, the Dinka to the west, and the Anyuua to the east along the international border of Ethiopia (see the map at Appendix “I”).

As we have seen on the map at Appendix “I”, the division of the Murle society into two halves (*Tangajon* and *Ngarotti*) is important for their everyday life – cattle-owning overtones (a man belonging to the red chief) and hunting association (*Celi*). According to Lewis (1972), the Murle people had two traditional beliefs regarding cattle: 1) they had no cattle but used to domesticate wild animals – *abal kelek*; and 2) cattle were created at *Jen* with the origin of Murle. Most of the Murle believe that cattle were created at *Jen* because during the birth of Murimaan, a cow was sent from *Tammu* to save them.

6.1.1.2 Social Structure of the Murle People

Humans are social beings that structurally organized and constructed their different sects to manage a common pact of their life. Their social sects differentiate one group of people from another. The circumstances of their geography, ways of life, cultural festivity, religion, language, and norms have the potential to shape their social domination and play a major role in differentiating one society from another. The Murle people are not identical with their neighbours in terms of origin, social structure, language, religion, clan, traditional institutions, family arrangements, and perceptions to the external world.

The Murle social structure and cultural administration is manifested through three traditional institutions: 1) the Chieftainship, 2) the *Korok* or the family, and 3) the Age-set system. These institutions have some similarities with their neighbours but they are unique to the Murle people according to their mode of exercise and help them to unite their ethnic group. They are associated with religious, gender, and generational identities, influencing power dynamics and authority within the community and causing the local

Murle to have forceful relations with their neighbours. Each of the Murle traditional institutions briefly described below.

A. The Chieftainship System


The Murle people are traditionally administrated by a chieftainship system (see the chart below). Gradually, their systems of chiefship administration divided into two: 1) the traditional chief – *Red King/red chief* from *Alan O Kidongo clans*⁶³ who ruled the communities since the pre-colonial period. The *red chiefs* or *Red Kings* used a symbol to identify them from other ordinary people, such as wear a red colour topper like a cap or put red feather on their head (see the first picture at Appendix “L”). Their chieftainship system is a key to define the Murle as an ethnic group and differentiate them from their neighbouring communities. 2) Appointed chiefs – often referred by the Arabic word *omda*. According to McCallum (2013), these chiefs were appointed by the colonial and post-colonial independence government authorities as part of their system of indirect rule. The *omda* is appointed from any clan of the Murle; however, he is working within the government structure and served as intermediary between the Murle people and the Anglo-Egyptian administration. In addition, there are other traditional and religious leaders who follow the *Nyndit*⁶⁴ cult, who mainly come from the Nyanderech clan and other diviners (*ngaare*) and witches (*Tamarac*) (Andretta, 1985). However, the strongest one is the *red chiefs/red kings* that inherited its administrative power from Murimaan and

⁶³ During my interview the Murle people use the term red chiefs and clans but Lewis (1972) used the term “Bulance” to refer the red chiefs and “drumships” to refer clans. McCallum (2013) also use the term red chiefs and clans rather than “Balance” and “drumships”, respectively.

⁶⁴ Nyndit is a Nuer girl which sinked in the river. According to the narration of the Murle elders’, one day a Nuer man lost his daughter in the river. Her name was Nyndit. He believes that she will come back and always at night he song at the bank of a river. The habit of song to Nyndit continued and the Murle people adopt as culture and religious practice.

have connection with *Tammu*. All ordinary people give value and recognition to the *red chief/red king* and have close relations.

Figure 6.5: The Murle People Chieftainship Structure



Source: Author's field note

As mentioned earlier, the Murle people had been categorized into two big clans called Tangajon and Nyarotti. Each of them further divided into two *red chiefs'* sub-clans: Tangajon into *Letec* and *Kelenya* Red Chief; and Ngarotti into *Ngacimot* and *Ngaloga* Red Chief. The Red Chiefs also divided into *Alan Ci Merii* and *ol coli* clan chiefs to administer their ordinary people. According to the legend of the Murle, *Alan Ci Merii* originated from heaven and has contact with creator – *Tammu* – while *ol coli* were found on earth.

Accordingly, the local people subjected to the *Alan Ci Merii*. One of the Murle chiefs in Lekwangole stated that his grandfather came from heaven with a chair made of gold to

rule the people (Alosio, 2009). The *Alan ci merii* had authority from heaven to rule the Murle community because of the nature of their power were responsible for guarding the clans with their ability to curse and bless. Thus, currently, according to the expansion of the Murle people, different *Alan Ci Merii* found in different places of the Murle people.

The Murle use a drum as a symbol of supernatural power and tribal unity. Lewis (1972) also finds the drums as critical to the *Alan Ci Merii*'s authority. According to Lewis, the drums are the means whereby divine aid is invoked in time of war, when the rains fail, or when tribal unity is threatened by the refusal of one member to accept the considered verdict of chiefs and elders in council over a large dispute. However, in the current times, drums have vanished from the Murle society and no longer physically exist in the community. Zugin Irer, the Murle *Alan ci merii* explained that:

If a drum is available in a room, no one can enter. We use the drum to cure a sick man, elderly women singing and dabbed with butter. The drums protect the people from hunger, drought, famine, enemy, diseases, and other dangerous situations besides to strengthen their unity and power. The elderly women are singing and dancing (*turo*) to the drums in occasion of something that happened in the Murle people.

Thus, the legend of drums is indispensable to the power of *Alan ci merii* to use to lead and to unite the Murle people.

McCallum (2013) explains that the red chiefs – *Alan ci merii* – are believed to be people who have special powers from *Tammu* to be leaders and advisers of the community. People get advice from them and they organize all sorts of activities such as marriage, age mate initiation, and communal policy. Thus, all other ordinary people are subject to the red chiefs – *Alan ci merii*. In the Murle people, the red chiefs operate like a

government. They act as both religious leader and administrator of the community. However, when judgements are needed, they ask *Tammu* to give them a fair ruling from heaven. They have power to stop fighting among the people by crossing a line – what they call red-line – between the quarrelsome parties that no one else is able to cross.

Arensen (2010) describes that the red chiefs have no political roles in the community. According to Arensen, they had special access to *Tammu* and were considered as religious leaders. They had power to bring rain and ability to predict the future as a prophet. They blessed the Murle youth and warriors before they went on cattle raids and child abductions. However, the *Alan ci merii* did play a judicial role in mediating disputes between community members in cases of intentional homicide, and the killer would actually run to *Alan ci merii*'s homestead to be given refuge (McCallum, 2013).

In contrast to Arensen's discussion, there is a political activity in the Murle people but they could not regularly apply their political power and activities with other neighbouring people. For instance, after the heavy ambush, cattle raid, and child abduction by the Murle infiltrators in April 2016, Barichoch – an *Alan ci merii* in Pibor – together with David Yau Yau (Governor of the Boma State) was participated in the 2016 diplomatic discussion at Gambella town regarding the peaceful relation of Ethiopian borderland communities and the Murle people. Some prominent person of the Murle who have Red Chief's background also participated in politics and government structures by lay aside the traditional practice of *Alan Ci Merii*, for instance, Ismail Konyi, David Yau Yau, and Baba Meden.

The power of *Alan ci merii* is accessible not only by birth but also by any adopted child from another ethnic group. This situation made the youth believe that they have power that comes from outside without the bloodline of *Alan o kidongo* clans and they become *red chiefs* based on the acceptance of the local people. This is because the red chief does not necessarily depend upon bloodline but upon the blessing given from *Tammu* through marriage, adoption, or power of bless and curse. The ability of curse and bless is not inherited by birth but as a result of marriage and socialization – that they believe a child can assign by *Tammu* to be a leader as *Alan ci merii* by *getting* a divine power to curse and bless.

B. The *Korok*⁶⁵ or the Family

One of the big institutions in the Murle people is *korok* (singular), *korokjok* (plural) – *immediate family and clan*. Families – *korokjok* – (hereafter *korok* or *korokjok*) have strong linkages with clans and help the people to survive and consolidate their cohesion. In the Murle people, extended family is essential for identity, defense, and food security (Arensen, 1992). *Korok* is the base for the Murle social unit in the immediate family living in a homestead; *tatok* is an extended family on the father's side; and the *drumship* is clan. The Murle people are a transhumant society – annual cycle of mobility with a static social unit – that moves from the wet-season home to the dry season cattle camps.

The *Lotilla* Murle is a pastoral group that cattle are central to their family relationship – people share rights and obligations to each other's livestock. According to Andretta (1985), domestic relationships among individuals within the *Korok* are shaped to a

⁶⁵ *Korok* – refers to the fire hearth to the wet-season homestead or to the family that lives there (Andretta, 1985; Arensen, 1992). It is the basic unit of Murle social culture (McCallum, 2013).

certain degree by their differing roles in acquisition and care of the group's herds. All who live together in the *Korok* are connected by the cattle herd and have various levels of rights and obligations to the cattle (McCallum, 2013). In the *Korok*, sons grow up in the compound, they remain under the authority of the father and bring their wives into the compound while daughters grow up, married out of the *Korok* and the *Korok* gains cattle through their marriages by a means of bride price. When the *Korok* expands and become too large then it breaks up and the resulting *Korokjok* form *tatok*. The head of the *tatok* is called the *abu ci tatok*. Lewis (1972) also explains that the term *tatok* derives from the root word for 'door' – people from the same *tatok* would come to each other's defense, help each other out in time of hunger, and occasionally give cattle towards a marriage.

As mentioned earlier, the Lotilla Murle at Pibor plain cycle between wet season homesteads and dry season cattle camps – they do not traditionally settle in villages. However, during the dry season, the women, older men, and very young children remain in the cattle camp – *miji* in Murle language. The younger people of Murle move to the wet area with the bulk of the cattle and only return to the dry cattle camps during the summer season. The wet season – *Kutur* (high ground or a village/settlement) – is made up of a number of widely spread *korokjok* in a given area (McCallum, 2013). Andretta (1985:149) also states “*kutur* are enduring, named territorial units through which people circulate.” However, *korok* – which changes the wet season residence – the Lotilla Murle do not recognize any long-term rights to land.

The Murle people are very mobile. They move annually following the seasons depending on the availability of land, location of relatives, and access to water and pastureland. The

Murle have no permanent residence and fixed asset – they establish temporary villages or camps – Lewis (1972) uses the term villages – but these are not stable or permanent places of settlement throughout a year. During the dry season, the *korok* is split up and men forming *miji* camps in the area of pastureland along the river to focus on hunting, gathering, and fishing. The unmarried young men and women take most of the cattle into smaller cattle camps – *tiin ci mac*. The *korok* members reunite during the wet season.

Through their lifestyle, according to Gyangout Gurour⁶⁶, the continual movement offers a level of resilience to the community, as they are able to make use of every food opportunity, without losing the social cohesion of the community. The Murle people have group stability with *korok* but they do not have territorial stability – they remain the same but circulate among various locations based on the season and availability of water and pastureland.

C. The Age-Set Systems – the *Buul* or *Generations*

Most of the borderland people have age-based social category or generation which helps to rule and manage their people besides their traditional chiefs. Their traditional chiefs have power to control the activities of age-based youths. Among the neighbouring people of the Murle, the Suri and the Anyuaa have generations which categorized the youth based on their age. For instance, the Suri people divided their youth into age-set in every ten years. According to Lyth (1947), the Suri has eight groups of age-sets namely Buluguso, Banda, Demu, Kamkolu, Bumi, Beeru, Gessi, and Kolu. While the Anyuaa's

⁶⁶ Interview was made with Gyangout Gurour at Akobo town of South Sudan on 26 September 2016. He was coming from Lotilla of Pibor.

people age-based generation depends on the new events of their generation time (Tippett, 1970). Some of their generations are Jopencil or Joqeleme, Jodust, Joplane, and Jogold. Both the Suri and Anyuaa generations have respected by those junior to it and will punish offenders by beating. If the junior group needs the leading position, they should fight with elders to show their strength or capacity to rule their community.

Similar with Suri and Anyuaa, the Murle youth also govern through age-set systems known as *buul* or *generations*. It is the collection of men youth but women can support and admire any group as they like. The age-sets categorize the Murle youth into different groups and help them to bring strong leaders to rule and protect the community. This age based social structure is one of the critical ways of Murle's socialization process which promote their social strength, provide winners and strong warriors to conduct cattle, abduct children, and rule the entire people of the Murle. Thus, the age-set is a core part of their social identity and it has fixed or immutable group character. Their age-set systems have no demarcation on the family level, clan, or other social status. Rather, it depends on peer-age but not limited on it because if he has close friends in a group and accepted by other members of a group, any Murle individual can enter in any age group.

To distinguish one age-set group from another, they choose a unique animal with good characteristics and colors that they choose to represent them, select beads of distinct color combinations, distinct hair styles, and scarring patterns. In choosing a certain animal to represent the age-sets, the specific age group chooses an animal to identify itself with positive attributes and announce the identification color and animal for the rest of the

Murle people. Women wear the beads on their neck to decorate themselves and signify their wonderful age-set group (see in appendix “L”).

According to the information from Murle elders, the age-sets start in Kubal around Gumuruk area and spread to the rest of the Murle people. However, there is no formal grade in the age-sets of Murle; Andretta (1985) also expresses this information. Gradually their age-sets are community-wide spanning all geographic locations, all clans, and families. Therefore, an age-set with a common name, bead color, and identity across a broad geographic scope of Murle people is communicating on foot. The following table illustrates the most known and currently existed age-sets in the Murle people including their names, animal representation, and identifiable bead color.

Table 6.3: Murle’s age-group with representation and identifiable color (see the age-groups’ pictures at appendix “L”)

Generation	Representation	Identifiable Beads Color
Lango	Antelope	 Yellow, pink, and black
Bothoth	Duck	 Black, yellow, and white
Thithi	Bird	 Green and blue with bit of red
Muden	Rat	 Blue, orange, and yellow
Dorongwa	Bird and Hippopotamus	 Orange-red and blue
Marra	Lion and Dove	 Yellow, weak-blue
Nyeriza	Guinea fowl and Leopard	 Blue with white and red spot

Source: Author’s field note

The Murle youth are forming their age-group for significant roles and purposes to rule their community. The roles of age-sets are categorized into three: 1) regulating the access to women and marriage; 2) differentiating labor roles and responsibilities; 3) ruling and protecting their community. These three roles are related to the socialization processes of the Murle people. Their socialization process includes the most important ethics in Murle age-set system; that it emphasizes to give respect to elders and strong age-set group who act of ruling; however, this ethical role only function until a new young strong age-group replaces the previous ruling age-group.

To have role and responsibility in the community, the Murle youth must pass their age-wise social process transition from one stage to another or have to reach adulthood. Their age-wise social process transition is similar to the warrior grade in the Anyuua people such as *Kuac Luak* (see Tasew, 2010). The age-group regulates the community in the early adulthood before they married and have families. However, as they grow older, their significance and potential to rule the community decline as they take on other responsibilities in their homes and communities but their age-group and identifiable color continues throughout their lives.

Accordingly, the senior age-group uses intimidation, bullying, and even violence to control the junior age-groups and keep them submissive. Often the senior age-group tries to block the youth from breaking off and spy the potential and social conditions of the younger age-group. When an age-group is trying to interfere in their ruling position, they try to block the younger age-group from interacting socially with girls. According to their culture, the younger age-groups are ban from courting women until the next senior age-

groups had married and they are morally prohibited from even courting girls as wives until their elder brothers engaged.

They do this using force and coercion, and the younger group must fight back and prove their ability to defeat their senior age-group. According to the Murle's *Alan Ci Merii*, this continued until the younger group is strong enough to defeat the older group and is seen to have formed their own identifiable group. The ruling age-group over the community is the one who defeat the senior age-group. The fighting of a young age-group with a senior one to prove their ability to rule over the community is known as ritual violence⁶⁷ – similar with *agem* (ritual revolution in Anyuua people). Their ritual violence plays an important role in the identity formation of the emerging age-group in the Murle people.

Regarding labor distribution, during the rainy time, the younger age-groups have responsibility to move the *korok* cattle to the area of excess water and pastureland and build a wet season cattle camps; while the older age-groups remained in the dry season cattle camps. Old age-groups have responsibility to participate in hunting, fishing, collecting edible fruits, and guarding the *Korok* homestead.

6.1.1.3 Ecology and Economic Base of the Murle People

The Murle people have no political cohesion; rather they depend on their social structure to have economic benefit for survival. Using their social structure, they move from place to place within their territory due to the volatile nature of their environment and stretched social relations. Andretta (1985) states that in the 1980s, the Murle social structure was

⁶⁷ Such fighting practice also affected the ARRA refuge ruling system in the Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma, Gambella.

based on an economic need for survival, rather than on a need for large-scale political cohesion. Therefore, to understand the livelihood and economic base of the Murle people, examining their environment is the primary step. If we understand their environment, it is possible to find ways to intervene to improve the livelihood of the Murle people by providing alternative income sources. For this and other ends, McCallum (2013) discusses the ecological zone of Murle people.

The ecological zone of Pibor is vast, flat, and plain through which flow a series of shallow watercourses (Lewis, 1972). The Veveno and Lotilla derive their water from the run-off of the Imatong and Didinga mountains to the south (Andretta, 1985). Accordingly, during the rainy season, the water courses from Imatong and Didinga mountains rushed down to the north part of the plains and make the plain full of swampy for part of a year which exposed the Murle epidemics and lose themselves in the featureless plains. The surface rain water, probably increased by this run-off, creeps northwards through the grass and eventually collects to form the Veveno, Nanaam, and Lotilla Rivers, which drain into the Pibor and so to the Sobat and the Nile. Further east the Akobo and Kongkong Rivers and their tributaries drain from the outlying mountains of the Ethiopian escarpment north of Boma, while the Kengen River comes from the Tirma highlands to the south-east of Boma.

At the right and left banks of the rivers, the area is green and covered by grass and bushes. During the rainy season, plain and banks of the rivers cover by bush, thin woodland, and savannah grass and the region become green. In the dry season, the watercourses of the rivers reach the lower course, the savannah grass dry and burn, the

flood water remain in some big pond and people move to the banks of the rivers and pond area to find grass, water, and fish. In the rainy season – July and August – the rivers rise quickly, reaching their peak in September. Most of the Pibor plain is then flooded, and unable to cross easily, people instead settle on the arid land.

The Lotilla ecological zone is suitable to the Murle people's livelihood. The Murle people were divided into two ecological zones and they each established their respective economy based on the environment in which they are found. The majority of the Murle people belong to the group known as Lotilla Murle and lives in the Pibor flood plain, covered by bush and savannah grass. The other small group of Murle, the *Nyallam*, lives in the Boma plateau, which has fertile land and a better climate. The Lotilla Murle's economy in the Pibor plain depends on cattle because the area is more suitable to herding cattle while the Boma plateau is not due to *tsetse fly*, thus the Lotilla Murle call the Boma plateau Murle as *Nyallam* – *which literally means people who have no cattle*. Therefore, the Boma Murle's economy depends on agriculture.

The Lotilla Murle is pastoralist and herd cattle in the Pibor plain and Veveno area in South Sudan. For them, cattle are the base of their wealth, social activity, livelihood, and economic power. As a requirement for raising cattle, the Lotilla Murle needs vast land and a comfortable environment to graze their cattle. Thus, the Veveno area in the west of Pibor is better for cattle herding and the Lotilla Murle in Pibor plain lead a pastoral life. They do not use agriculture to feed them but primarily they depend on cattle; however, in the rainy season, they plant maize, sesame, and pumpkin to supplement their food. They use milk and blood from their cattle, fish, game, and the roots and berries that they can

find locally to feed them and their families (Lewis, 1972). Moreover, they depend on fishing, hunting, and collect edible fruits from forest to secure their food. Some Murle women in Pibor town and surrounding area have also limited participation in some petty trading in the market place to support their economy and home consumption.

The Lotilla Murle move with their cattle from one place to another throughout a year. As mentioned earlier, some of the responsibility of the Murle youth are keeping cattle, building cattle camps, protecting the homestead and korokjok, take cattle to the field under the area of abundant grass and water in the Pibor plain and the surrounding place. As they move, the *Alan ci merii* teach the youth how to use the river banks, big ponds, grazing fields, and land of their territory. Traditionally, land belongs to the red chiefs – *Alan ci merii* – and the land of the clans belongs to each particular branch of the clan. According to their oral history, when the Murle people conquered the Lotilla valley and took it from the Dinka and the Pibor plain from Nuer and Anyuaa people, the chiefs divided the land between them. However, the Murle youth move with their cattle freely for water and pasture and they do not have any rights to a specific land or territory. Moreover, the mobility of Lotilla area Murle is connected to their social structure and lifestyle because they rely on having access to water and pastureland for their cattle.

6.1.1.4 The Socio-Economic Significances of Cattle to the Murle

Socially and economically cattle are indispensable and have great significance to the Murle people. Cattle are their wealth, livelihood, economic base, and their life

philosophy. *Kaka Korkuwang*⁶⁸ – an elder of Murle narrates the following significance of cattle to the Murle people:

From cattle, cow is our savior that sent from *Tammu* – the father of Murle people – *Murimaan* – saved by cow during his birth. Cattle are many things for us such as we marry with them, eat their meat, drink their blood and milk, sleep on their hides, save us from famine and scarcity of food, use for compensation to settle dispute in our community. The Boma mountain Murle do not have cattle and they couldn't give great value like the Pibor plain Murle but we (the Lotilla Murle in the Pibor plain) cannot live without cattle. For us, cattle are our topic of conversation, our wealth, status, and power. Our youth are primarily responsible to guard cattle and live with them throughout a year; they search for grazing area and guarding the herds against harm from man or beast, provide dry and wet season cattle camps. When youth talk about girls, they keep the subject of cattle, make love to marriage and discuss how to transfer cattle as bride price/dwory. Cattle form the basis of the brother-sister relationship; a man uses the cattle that bring as a bride price for his sister to his own marriage. No one Lotilla Murle can marry without cattle; so cattle are our *korokjok*.

An interview with Kaka Korkuwang on 26 June 2017

Moreover, Lewis (1972) clearly expresses the value of cattle for the Murle people in the following way.

The young bloods in the warrior grade, the pride of the race, give up the comforts of home life for a wandering existence in the rudest of temporary shelters, and the entire life of the tribe is bound up with the well-being of its herds to such an extent that, while cattle are an economic necessity and the main source of livelihood, they are also something more, supplying a

⁶⁸ Kaka Korkuwang is an old man estimated from 50 to 55 years of age from Ngarotti clan of Murle who serve as *Alan ci merii*. He is baptized by the missionary to be Christian and his Baptist name is Andrew.

spiritual need of the people whose lives they share so closely. Young boys milk them in the morning and the warriors in the evening, the girls helping on both occasions.

Lewis (1972:31)

In the Lotilla area Murle, cattle, children, and women are central to their economy and power relations. The exchange of cattle in bride price represents the greatest transfer of wealth between families. The word for marriage – *tinkawin* – comes from the root word *tiin* (cattle), representing both marriage and the bride price negotiations (Arensen, 1992; Lacey, 2013⁶⁹). The value of children cannot compare to the value of cattle even though boys have potential to support their parents in old age, inherit cattle, protect *korok* from external enemy, conduct cattle from remote area, and abduct children from other neighbouring community; while girls bring more cattle to the *Korok* when they marry.

The *Alan ci merii* use cattle for compensation to settle a dispute among the Murle communities. The Murle feel that cattle came from heaven with them and when cattle die they believe that they join with the spirits of their ancestors. Every important social event is celebrated by sacrificing cattle to ensure the participation of the ancestral spirits as well as to provide food for the assembled guests and relatives. For Murle, wealth means the possession of many cattle, and poverty is the lack of them.

The Murle people are familiar with cattle and express their love by giving great concern to color and color combination of cattle, use special words for cows and calves, bulls and oxen, at every stage of their growth, and for different kinds of horns. They bleed their

⁶⁹ Peter Guzulu, former Chairman of Human Rights Commission of Jonglei State, interview with Elizabeth Lacey, Juba, September 7, 2012.

cattle at least once in six months using bow and arrow for two reasons: to drink their blood; and to maintain the health of cattle. The blood is collected in a gourd, and sometimes drunk at once, if the need is great; but usually it is allowed to dry into a thick black pudding and mixed with milk into a paste and then eaten after three days.

The Murle graze their cattle in the field and live with them at the cattle camps. They plan their daily social activities around cattle, securing sufficient grazing and water at all times. In some ways, cattle leave one homestead and enter another, and then the head of the new homestead ensures the health of the new coming cattle by providing a ceremonial blessing. The blessing of the cattle is a sign of their identification with their new homestead and illustrates their religious importance to the Murle. The Murle supply their economy by sheep and goats but they do not raid from other places. Indeed, goats and sheep are indispensable for food and minor religious sacrifices.

6.1.2 Neighbours of the Murle People across the Borderland Region

The Murle people have many neighbours around their place along the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Regarding the objectives of this study, the thorough investigation of the Murle neighbours focused only on the Jikany-Nuer and the Anyuua people across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan. As discussed in chapter five of this research, the Nuer and the Anyuua people were split into two citizens due to the improper colonial border delineation under the 1902 treaty. At this treaty, Britain has highly influenced the Ethiopian government to agree on the delineation by sending two expedition teams and it seems a single-handed border demarcation.

Through such border delineation, the majority of Anyuua live in Ethiopia and the minority group live in the Southeastern region of South Sudan in the current Boma state of Pochalla County. In 1932, during the rearrangement of the international border between Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Ethiopian delegator (Qannazmach Majid Abud⁷⁰) requested the Adongo-Pochalla area to back to the Ethiopian Government but due to the beginning of the WWII, no government officials discussed on the issues and thus, still the Adongo-Puchalla area remained in the hands of South Sudan. This was that the Anglo-Egyptian Governor subtly controlled the Adongo-Pochalla area of Anyuua people under their administration.

But in the earlier time, Adongo-Pochalla area was under the Ethiopian territory (see the description in Amharic language at appendix “A” and also see the map at Appendix “K” to realize the Adongo-Pochalla area). Across the border, the Nuer people are divided into clans and the minority group of Jikany-Nuer remain in Ethiopia while the majority Jikany-Nuer and all Lou-Nuer live in different areas of South Sudan. Accordingly, the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia are neighbors and interact economically in different ways with the Murle people across the border.

So, to have more understanding about the socio-economic interaction between the Murle people and their borderland neighbours (the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer), the following sections briefly discuss the social and economic base of the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer. The discussion will clarify factors that connect with the Murle youth infiltrators to raid cattle, abduct children, and confront with their neighbours. This is because the Murle

⁷⁰ See the discussion at Chapter Five in this study.

youth cross the border of Ethiopia for many reasons in the populated area of Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer in Ethiopia. To investigate the major pushing factor of the Murle people which undermine their cohabitation with their neighbours, some basic livelihoods of the Anyuaa and the Jikany-Nuer should be discussed briefly. This discussion helps to see the social and economic connection of the Murle people with their neighbours.

6.1.2.1 The Anyuaa People: Geography, Socio-Politics, and Economic Bases

A) The Name of the People – “Anyuaa”

The Anyuaa people are a riverine people who live following the banks of rivers. They have unique culture, political system, and state-based structure to administer their people and have means of interaction with their neighbours. Their living style is a little bit of egalitarian that they eat, live, work, and fight together in a cooperative manner but they have social differences in their political system. Their name also drives from their way of life and action. Informants attest that they have many names before their current name. Other people also called them “Yembo” (Envans-Pritchard, 1940a) but according to Abula Omot Opiew⁷¹, they were originally called by the name of their landowner Cuai and called as “the Cuai people.” But, based on their legends, after they established their first king, their name was changed and they were called “Dibuwor or Dibuwoch Gillo Ödhei.” This is because they believe and considered themselves as one family and have a culture to call by the name of their leader. Accordingly, Dibuwor means *people*; Dibuwor

⁷¹I made an interview with Abula Omot Opiew on 07 October 2008 during my MA thesis. Abula is one of my key informants of 63 years’ man. He is familiar with conflict and conflict resolution among Anyuaa and other communities around the region. During the Derg regime he served as Youth Conflict Resolution Committee. At the time of this research fieldwork, he lives in Gambella Town, Kebele 01, and worked in the Regional Education Bureau in the Department of curriculum as team leader.

or Dibuwoch Gillo Ödhei means *the people of Gillo*, because Gillo is the name of their first king.

They transferred their name from “the Cuai people” to “Dibuwor or Dibuwoch Gillo Ödhei” because the father of their land, Cuai, was replaced by king Gillo or Gillo-Wa-Korri. However, the name “Dibuwor or Dibuwoch Gillo Ödhei” was changed due to frequent conflict with their neighbors. Their fighting was not in an organized and cooperative manner and they were defeated many times. Thus, their king saw the main problem of their defeat and assembled elders, age-group leaders, and some prominent people to change their tactic in order to defend their neighbouring enemies. During their assembly, the king proposed an idea to fight cooperatively using their cultural practices and call it by the word “*Äñyuääkyi*.” *Äñyuääkyi* is an Anyuua word, meaning come together to cooperate. Through this proposal, they defend their neighbouring enemies and gradually by modifying the word “*Äñyuääkyi*”, they changed their name from “Dibuwor or Dibuwoch Gillo Ödhei” to “Anyuua.”

However, still many people use the name “Anuak” but they insist that this word has no meaning in Anyuua language. Scholars and writers also have different way of spell their name. For instance, Bayleyeng (2005), Dereje (2006, 2009, 2011, and other of his work), Medhane (2015), and others spell “Anywaa”, and other foreign scholars such as Kurimoto (1992, 1994, 1996), Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 1940b, 1947), Lienhardt (1957), and others spell “Anuak.” According to my investigation regarding their name and how to spell it, the word “Anyuua” has meaning in their culture and prefers to use “Anyuua.” For this study and others, I prefer to use “Anyuua” due to the above justification.

B) Geographical Location and Socialization Process

Geographically, the Anyuua society settled in the GPNRS in Ethiopia. In the current political system they classified into six administrative districts such as Gambella Zuria, Abobo, Jor, Gog, Dimma, and Itang. They also live in the Akobo district but their number is small as compared with the Jikany-Nuer. Some Anyuua also inhabited in the Boma state of Southeastern Sudan in the Puchalla County along the border of Ethiopia adjacent to the Jor and Gog districts of Gambella (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a; Dereje, 2009, 2011; Tasew, 2010). Originally, the Anyuua believe that they came from Southeast near Lake Roudolf and Lake Victoria in Kenya and Uganda respectively (Omot, 1996). In Ethiopia there is a considerable ecological variation of Anyuua's people living area along the East-West axis of their land, such as Lul, Wok, and Bap (Kurimoto, 1994; 1996).

According to Kurimoto's description, Lul means an area which is covered by a dense forest. It is found in the eastern part of the Anyuua land between the Baro and the Gilo Rivers, such as the present Abobo and Gog districts. Wok means literally "outside or open area", which is the opposite of Lul. It is an area which is not covered by forest and far from the rivers which covers the area from Tedo village to Adongo-Puchalla area of Anyuua land.

The third ecological zone is Bap, according to Kurimoto. However, my informants said the correct name is Pääp or Päät Openo, not Bap; of course, this is probably due to pronunciation issues but has the same meaning as Kurimoto used previously. Thus, I prefer to use Pääp or Päät Openo instead of Bap. Pääp is the western part of Anyuua land that covered areas along the Baro (Openo) River. It is a flat grassland savannah that is

flooded during the rainy season. In this area, some parts have few trees and others are covered by forest. The soil is black clay or “cotton soil”, which become very muddy when wet but hard and crack during the dry season.

Their settlement patterns are divided into relatively independent villages and have political division with administrative structure. Their administration and political system has been depended upon bloodline through their lineage and kinship. Accordingly, politically they have hierarchy which led by a king (*Nyieya*) and land is owned by landowner (*Kwaaro*).

The Anyuaa people live with different neighbouring people both in Ethiopia and South Sudan. According to Kurimoto (1996), the Anyuaa people settled in the middle of many tribes and surrounded by different settlers. Their settlement and neighbours described as follow.

At the present time the Anyuaa society have shares with a number of ethnic groups, such as the Nuer to the west, the Murle (Ajuba) to the south; the Majanger to the east; the Oromo to the north and East, the Bula, the Olam, and the Dhuok to the extreme southeast; the Opuo, or Shita (Lango), and the Kommo to the North (Kurimoto, 1996:899).

The Anyuaa people have relations and interactions with all neighboring ethnic groups. The relationships of the neighboring communities with Anyuaa also differ from one another according to their geographical locations. According to Evans-Pritchard (1940a) and Kurimoto (1996), the Anyuaa people belong to the Nilo-Saharan language family. As Kurimoto’s description linguistically and culturally, they are closer to the Luo and

Shulluk of the western Nilotic groups, which are the part of eastern Sudanic sub-groups of the Chari-Nile of the Nilo-Saharan language family (Bryan and Tucker, 1948).

Their socialization processes are practiced in the homesteads of their villages. Their villages have several homesteads, each of which is fenced with wood and grass to protect the inhabitants from wild animals and enemies. According to Lienhardt (1957), outside the fence of the homestead are the granaries raised on piles; and outside the entrance to the court yard, there is a hearth – *wic mǎc* – which literally means ‘head fire’. *Wic mǎc* is a place outside of their main dwelling that at night children above twelve years of age came together and makes assembly with old men. The hearth is often marked by two forked branches standing a few feet apart. They are used as spear-rests, and between them fire is kindled each evening. Skins are brought out, and old men sit there until bedtime.


In this place, the old men typically chat, smoke, and watch life of their village. At the time of *wic mǎc* men discuss openly those matters which they choose to make public. The *Wic mǎc* is an important traditional time of Anyuua society to teach their sons and youths. The youth and sons above twelve years of age gather around the hearth every night and the old men teach the young on how to live peacefully and address any dangerous situations, including conflict prevention and hunting through proverbs, legends, songs, and other forms of narrative or real life examples of things that caused prolonged suffering in the past.

C. Traditional Socio-Politics of the Anyuua People

The Anyuua people organized into three traditional political administrative institutions. They are 1) the Nobleship; its administrator is known as *Nyieye* (plural), or *Nyieya*

(singular); 2) the headmanship; its administrator is known as *Kwaari* (plural) or *Kwaaro* (singular); and 3) the permanent representative of the nobleship known as *Nyibur*. Family Councils are also considered as another institution among them; however, it is under the supervision of either nobleship or the headmanship.

Figure 6.6: Structure of the Anyuaa people traditional institutions



Source: Author's field note

In their traditional administrative system, Nyieya is hierarchically the top position of Kwaaro and Nyibur. They were under the supervision of Nyieya; however, they have relatively independent administrative structures in their village. If there is something beyond their capacity, Nyieya will interfere and stable the situation using his supreme power. Although, Kwaaro and Nyibur are equally responsible for Nyieya, their selection systems, power exercise and social service possession are not the same. Hence, Kwaaro is the owner of land and responsible for distributing land in the village to his community while Nyibur serves as the spiritual leader (Tasew, 2016). On the other hand, like Nyieya, Kwaaro has independent position in a village and follow a family bloodline to inherit the position. Nyibur is mainly served as religious leader in each village but sometimes if neither Nyieya nor Kwaaro in a village, it could be assigned as a permanent

representative of Nyieya to administer the community. Opiew Ochudho Gora⁷² said the following to demonstrate this point.

Sometime happen that all eligible candidates to the headmanship die, and then a Nyibur act as representative members which succeed and expel one another as the Kwaaro did before them. When a village become out of either Nyieya's or Kwaaro's administrative system; the Nyieya select his representative from one of the Nyibours who inhabit in the particular village as administrator. The duration of Nyibur, in his position, depends on his performance and social acceptance. If the community of that village needs to change Nyibur, they report to Nyieya and the Nyieya selects another Nyibur from the particular community. For example, out of the Anyuaa's villages Pinywudo village had neither Nyieya nor Kwaaro; it was administered by Nyibur.

Opiew Ochudho Gora, interviewed in February 2008 and he passed away in 2012

Although the Anyuaa had structural oriented socio-political system, the role of Nyieya and Kwaaro shifted to hostility among themselves due to power bargaining and antagonistic competition. To be the winner of one another in their power bargain, they start to create alignment relationship with other powerful group of people outside them. For instance, as mentioned in chapter five, in 1906 King Alimi had strong relation with Ras Tessema. On the other hand, King Akway Cham, who is the successor of Alimi was raided thousands of cattle and captured many people in 1911 from Murle and expanded his power in the region of Gambella by disconnecting any relation with Ras Tessema and

⁷² Opiew Ochudo Gora is 67 years of age old man and Diploma holder from Gambella Teachers' Education and Health Science College. He is well experienced in conflict resolution and peace building among Anyuaa society and around the Gambella region. In his past life experience he served as certificate teacher during Haileselasse regime; district assistant administrator during the Derg regime; and officer of Gambella Agricultural Research Institute since 1998 to 2000. Now he is pensioner.

Ras Kabade Tessema⁷³. However, another Anyuaa Nyieya, King Udiel has refused to give up for Akway Cham and mad alignment with the Governor of Illubabor. Gradually, the power of Anyuaa kings declined due to the joint military pressures from Ethiopian imperial government and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Governor.

Moreover, according to Kurimoto (2002), the Derg forbade the Anyuaa kingdom's traditional governing systems such as the *Nyieya* and *Kwaaro* as they considered them to be "feudal," "backward," or "anti-revolutionary." Henceforth, the Anyuaa resists the government projects in the region and territorial expansions of neighbouring people to preserve their land and identity. This resistance helps them to consolidate their primordialist method of identity formation (see Dereje, 2011).

D. Economic Bases

The Anyuaa people have two socio-economic groups which encompass through their traditional political entity: 1) people of the noble family that are led by Nyieya (king) who follow up bloodline relations through marriage; and 2) people of the headmen that are led by Kwaaro (landowner). They have different political status; however, they are attached to specific villages and to protect their ancestors' land and territory. Thus, the Anyuaa mode of political governance, kinship, and headmanship ties people to a specific village with clear notion of territory, which reinforces their sense of unity (Kurimoto, 1992; Dereje, 2011). Perner (1997) describes that the Anyuaa settlement never ended due to flood or fighting. According to Perner, once they choose a definite site to inhabit

⁷³ Ras Kebede Tessema is the son and successor of Ras Tessema Nadew as Governor of Illubabor.

for several generations, they would never give it up but always try to return and reoccupy their territory.

Economically, they are largely dependent on agricultural, fishing, hunting activities, and gathering of edible fruits (Bizuneh, 2004). They are dependent on arid land and banks of the Baro, Gilo, Alwero, and Akobo Rivers; thus, Evans-Pritchard (1940b) referred to them as riverine people. They use the river banks and arid land for shifting cultivation to supply their household. Accordingly, they have close relationship with land as they established their economic bases on it. As mentioned earlier, they were the people of Cuai, father of their land, and thus they cultivate their stiff relation with land as one of their culture. In this case, they connect their rights of land with their ancestors and obliged by curse to protect from outsiders. Accordingly, they do not leave their land without a good reason; for instance, pressure from neighbours, drought, famine, epidemic, and the like (see also Dereje, 2011).

The Anyuua people have strong cultural relation with land, however, their number of population and area of land that they occupied is not proportional (see the table at Appendix “C” and compare with their total number of population at the 2007 CSA). They have scattered way of settlement and vast land remained without man with abundant pasture and water. Due to such plentiful resources, other neighbouring people such as the Nuer and the Murle were freely moved to the Anyuua area with large head of cattle. The land also fertile and healthy for agricultural production and thus the government of Ethiopia brought different people from the south and north region of Ethiopia for permanent settlement through means of villegization.

All these natural ways of social movement and government administration reduced the traditional political power of Anyuua. However, the Anyuua elites and scholars propagated this condition as land dispossession, limited economic bases, and marginalization. Indeed, this propagation inspired the Anyuua people to have hostile relations with their neighbours to advance their economy. Thus, according to Dereje (2011), this new state-related socio-political process generated anxiety among Anyuua elders and in turn, intensified their sense of territoriality; which connected with their economic base.

E. Social Identity of the Anyuua People

Cattle are not the main livelihood of Anyuua people and they do not ascribe a crucial role to cattle in creating and maintaining social relationships. Hence, their social identity is manifested through land possession under their landowner and farming based on shifting cultivation. In other words, land in Anyuua culture seems as a key manifestation of social identity. Besides land, *dimui* is the other significance to cultivate and maintain their social identity. Their fundamental social relationships are maintained through the medium of *dimui* – the blue glass beads (see Evans-Pritchard, 1940b). The Anyuua people were used to *dimui* as a dowry or bride price during their marriage.

As *dimui* is scarce among the Anyaa people, they circulate in their lineage from one kin-based group to another for the purpose of paying the bride price. However, the numbers of *dimui* that elders possessed in a family also determine their social status and served as a kind of heritage. In the current time, *dimui* has not been commercialized due to scarcity and thus people have begun to pay their bride price with money instead of *dimui*.

Accordingly, the Anyuua make an effort to prevent *dimui* from being lost to their community through bride price payments to outsiders because of its scarcity (Dereje, 2011). In other ways, this practice limits inter-ethnic marriages and creates ethnic boundaries between the Anyuua and their neighbouring people – Murle and Nuer (both of whom have cattle-based bride price system).

6.1.2.2 The Jikany-Nuer: Geography, Socio-Economic Base, Significances of Cattle

A) The Jikany-Nuer and their Geographical Locations

The Jikany-Nuer is one of the sections of the Nuer people. The Nuer people call themselves *Nath* (Jackson, 1923; Evans-Pritchard, 1940a). They originally lived in Bentue in Southern Sudan around the swamps and open savannah that stretch on the banks of the Nile, south of the junction with the Sobat and Bahr el Ghazal (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a; Jal, 1987; Hutchinson, 1996). According to Jal (1987) at the beginning of the 19th Century, the Nuer people settled to the west of the Bahr el Jebel River. The Nuer people were divided into a number of tribes which had no central administration (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a). For instance, the eastern Nuer divided into the Lou-Nuer and Jikany-Nuer groups. Dereje (2011) pointed out that the Jikany-Nuer successively migrated to the east of the Sobat River in the 1830s and end of 19th Century; they eventually advanced to the escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands. The Jikany-Nuer dramatically expanded to the borderland region of Ethiopia and South Sudan, including the territory of Anyuua people.

According to Evans-Pritchard (1940a), the north part of the Sobat River was the land of Anyuua; however, through their expansion, the Jikany-Nuer occupied the southern parts of the Sobat River to the banks of Pibor. Moreover, the 1902 border agreement between Ethiopia and the British colony of Sudan split the Jikany-Nuer people into citizens of two different countries. Accordingly, a few Jikany-Nuer people remained in Ethiopia and were administered by the Ethiopian imperial government while the majority lived in the Sudan (now South Sudan). Currently, the Jikany-Nuer lives in Ethiopia into five districts such as Lare, Jikawo, Wanthua, Makuey, and Akobo. Besides these five districts, they cohabit with Anyuua in the Gambella town and Itang special district.

B) Socio-Economic Bases of the Jikany-Nuer

Economically, the Jikany-Nuer is depending on cattle and semi-agriculture. They are highly dependent on their environment. Excess water during the rainy season and insufficient water during the dry season are their main problems. They are pastoralists, but they also grow millet and maize on a small scale. Their livelihood is dependent on livestock, primarily cattle as their environmental conditions are most suitable to the health of cattle. For the Jikany-Nuer, cattle are their main possessions and they gladly risk their lives to defend their herds or to pillage those of their neighbours (Evans-Pritchard, 1940a). Most of their social activities manifested on their cattle. Thus, cattle are the main economic base of the Jikany-Nuer.

In addition to livestock, the economic base of Jikany-Nuer includes fishing, hunting, and collecting edible fruits. These economic activities are their main occupation during the dry season to supplement their insufficient diet of milk. In summer time they have a

surplus of milk due to the availability of grass and water everywhere and have no need for fishing, hunting, and edible fruits. Accordingly, they move from place to place based on a season. For instance, to protect their cattle and community from flood they move to dry land areas in the summer season while in dry time, there is scarcity of water and they move to ponds and river areas to find pastureland and water for their cattle and fish for their families.

According to the interview with elders of Jikany-Nuer, socially and economically, cattle are the only property for them. Moreover, they believe that cattle are their identity, wealth, social status, economic performance, and cultural and religious values. The Jikany-Nuer people are warlike people who restore any cattle losses by raiding from Dinka, Murle, and other surrounding people. Their attitudes and relationship with their neighbours are influenced by their love of cattle and desire to acquire them. Accordingly, they dislike people who have few or no cattle – such as Anyuua; and they fight with other people who have cattle, for instance, Murle and Dinka to increase their wealth and control pastureland and water.

They need their own pastures and water supplies and get these through aggressive expansions across other ethnic territories. For them, cattle are worth any loss of life as they need to accumulate cattle as a measure of their wealth. For these reasons, according to Jackson (1923), the Nuer local groups pasture their cattle in common and jointly defend their homes and herds. Evans-Pritchard (1940a) also states that during the dry season in their common cattle camp, they consolidate their strength to defend their herds. Accordingly, not a single family tries to protect and herd their cattle and thus their social

cohesion is strong. This indicates that their social cohesion is linked with their livelihood based on their network of kinship ties, often stated in terms of cattle.

C) Significances of Cattle to the Jikany-Nuer

The significance of cattle in the life of Jikany-Nuer is manifested through their names. According to Evans-Pritchard (1940a), men are frequently called by names that refer to the form and color of their favorite oxen and women take names from oxen and milk from cows. Cattle are the most important social asset in Jikany-Nuer and the most cherished possession, essential to their food supply. They purify their religious and socio-cultural activities by sacrificing selected cattle.

The main bride price payment of Jikany-Nuer during marriage is cattle. No one can marry without providing cattle. As a result, the bride price payment used to be forty to sixty head of cattle; however, according to Evans-Pritchard (1940a), this has been reduced to twenty to thirty due to reductions in herd sizes, frequent raiding by Murle and Dinka, rinderpest and other cattle diseases. Thus, their union of marriage depends on the payment of cattle and their ritual activities marked by slaughter of cattle. Their social legal status and their children are determined by cattle rights and obligations. Cattle are owned by families while full rights of the herd belong to the head of the household – husband; however, wife/wives have rights of use and sons often own some of the oxen. When the Jikany-Nuer youth reach to the age of marriage, they use cows from the herd based on their seniority in their family. Relatives also contribute cows to provide bride price and express their sentiment by supporting each other during marriage.

The economic significances of cattle are also related with food security, social and household, and commercialization. They are chiefly used for milk. Milk is one of their food supplies with millet. The combination of milk and millet is the main staple food of the Jikany-Nuer. Sometimes they also depend on fish to supplement their food consumption. In all parts of the region, millet crop is uncertain and severe famines are frequent, during which people rely on fish, wild roots, fruits, and seeds, but mainly on the milk of their herds (see Evans-Pritchard, 1940a). In addition to milk, they utilize their cattle for meat, boiled, and roasted. In time of ceremonies, they frequently sacrifice sheep and oxen.

The Jikany-Nuer people extract blood from the necks of their cattle to supplement their diets during the dry season. They are gently stabbed at the veins of a cow's neck with a small knife. However, blood of cows is not their stable food supply and does not play an important part in their cooking. Instead, bleeding is designed to cure a cow of any disease by releasing the bad blood from the body. Thus, cattle are sometimes bled for medical reason in the rainy season, when people may be so replete that the blood is given to the dogs. On the other hand, in Jikany-Nuer, cattle are considered as raw material and their products are used for different purposes. They can provide milk, blood, meat, and skins. For instance, skins for beds, carrying fuel, cord for tethering and other purposes, flails, and for tympana of drums (see Evans-Pritchard, 1940a).

6.2 Socio-Economic Contact of the Murle with their Neighbours

The Murle people, during their migration faced challenges from different inhabitant people but usually practice their migration through fighting, displacement, and assimilation. Their routine migration was that first they moved south of the Omo River and eventually reached Lake Turkana. They turned west to Kapoeta in Southern Sudan (Arensen, 1992). Kapoeta is a semi-desert region with abundant pastureland and plenty of water for their cattle. However, according to Arensen, the majority group of the Murle people faced hard times and weakened by diseases such as smallpox and pleura-pneumonia. In the area of Kapoeta, they are attacked by the Toposa people and forced to move to the Pibor plain with a united force; thus conquered and routed the Dinka, the Anyuuaa, and the Nuer who formerly lived in the surrounding region of Lottila and Veveno across the Pibor plain (Lewis, 1972).

Gradually, they moved to the north and began to mix with different societies around them. In their movement, the Murle were superior fighters, attacking and taking over new territories. Most of the fighting was done by young warriors on both sides, wanting to show their ability and courage (Arensen, 1992). Eventually, some of the Murle people moved to the Pibor plain with their cattle while others moved to the Boma plateau with a few cattle due to the presence of tsetse fly; however, their Red chief or Alan Ci Merii advice those to abandon cattle herd to avoid conflicts with their neighbours. In this case, at the current time, the Boma plateau Murle have no cattle and depend on agriculture as mentioned earlier.

The Murle migration from their original place to the present area is full of aggressive and war with the nomadic inhabitants of the region. Through their aggressive war, they conquered the area of Pibor plain by displacing the inhabitants and assimilate the weak. For instance, Hutchinson (2000) pointed out that by the end of 19th Century, the Pibor plain Murle supplanted their culture and language on a few Nuer and Anyuua people across the border of Ethiopia. According to Hutchinson, the Murle conquered the original land of the Nuer and the Anyuua along the Ethiopian border and captured many women and children. Accordingly, their movement includes the mechanisms of absorbing and pushing the local inhabitants. Therefore, the processes of the Murle movements absorb many Anyuua's, Nuer's, and Dinka's origin group of people and settled in the new territory.

Consequently, their social relationship is one of hostility that expresses itself through warfare. Thus, they are marked each other as enemies of one and other. For instance, the Murle and the Nuer people are pastoralist groups who continuously compete to monopolize pasture and water. Their incompetent hostile relation is manifested through their practice of cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation. The Pibor lowland Murle also follows their cultural philosophy: "all cattle in the world belong to their ancestors." On the other hand, the Jikany-Nuer depends on cattle, and has hostile relations with the Murle due to competition for graze and water; as cattle are means of wealth and social significance for both people.

Regarding social essence to protect properties, the Anyuua elites have stiff attitude about their land and they mobilize their people through traditional political organizations under

their Nyieya (King). Nyieya and Kwaaro led the people to defend their land from their neighbours – the Jikany-Nuer and the Murle. They have had a centralized traditional administration based on village structure which strengthened their defense. On the other hand, the Jikany-Nuer and the Murle are stiff on cattle, looking for vast field of land, and plentiful pasture and water. Thus, both of them moved to the direction of the Anyuua land; which exacerbate their antagonistic relations with the Anyuua people.

Accordingly, the relationship and contact of the Murle with their neighbor is confrontational due to competition for resources and intrinsic cultural assumption (the Murle believe that cattle are their sole property; the Anyuua believe that land is their sole property; and the Jikany-Nuer believe that cattle are their sole livelihood). Therefore, the Murle habitually raid cattle and abduct children from Jikany-Nuer and Anyuua by crossing the border of Ethiopia for sake of resource monopolization, wealth accumulation, and weakening of target enemy.

Chapter Seven

7 Problems, Manifestations, and Challenges

7.1 Problems

7.1.1 Cantankerous Relations of the Murle People with their Neighbours

The Murle is a neighbouring people with the Anyuua and the Nuer across the Ethiopian border; however, they have conflict relations due to historical hostility and fractured nature of day to day contact. Historically, as mentioned earlier, the Murle people migrated and moved northwest, heading for the Pibor River, pushing the Nuer further northeast, the Dinka toward the Nile River to the northwest, and Anyuua to the east. The Nuer in particular have been angry over the loss of their land, and have made armed conflict over grazing land, cattle raids, and abductions of children (Bahru, 1976).

The Murle, the Anyuua, and the Nuer people are living in the same environment. But they have no good relation; cycles of cattle raiding and revenge attacks between the Murle and their neighbors have long been a facet of life in Pibor and across the border. Before the onset of colonialism, these people shared grazing fields on the lesser arid areas around the Pibor, Akobo, and Gillo Rivers. Though they occasionally raided cattle from one another and have no official tied through intermarriages, they have similar heritages like a common linguistic base, physical structure, and age-set system. In fact, the practice of cattle raid between the communities was only meant to replenish livestock that were either consumed by drought, diseases, or other enemies' raid.

Above and beyond, as Austin (1901) was trying to give some description in his early work of the region, the only weapons available to the protagonists during those earlier raids were spears and shields, bows and arrows, and the fatalities were low. However, such simple antagonistic relation among them exacerbated due to the colonial system across the region. For instance, the colonial system of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan had made the relationship of the borderland people more complicated by introducing new divide and rule system of administration, restricting their free movements, and introducing modern weapons. Such a deliberate divide and rule colonial policy legalized ethnic boundaries and territorial limitation by destructing their traditional administration which restrained their common grazing fields and social contact.

In the pre-colonial time, the pastoralist people of Murle and Jikany-Nuer moved from place to place with simple challenges of confrontation with Anyuua and others; however, they have no serious controversial ethnic boundaries and mission beyond looking for grazing fields and water. But the 1902 treaty of Ethiopia and Britain introduced the boundary of Ethiopia and Sudan which limited the rights of the pastoral movement and fixed their critical differences. This is because the 1902 border delineation distinguished the areas into Ethiopian administration and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan administration; moreover, it split the same ethnic group of people into different administrations.

Previously the local people move from place to place without boundary restriction, however, article I of the 1902 treaty restricted the local people from their movement and forced them to use coercive method to find pastureland and water. These outlying districts and closed districts also helped intensify ethnic consciousness among different

groups by promoting feelings of exclusiveness and separation (Bahru, 1976). The colonial administration has been ensued the ethnic line division among the Murle, the Nuer, and the Anyuua; so as to escalate their hostile relations.

These administrative divisions forced the neighbouring people to develop hostility when they were conscious about the boundaries between them. In due course, the Ethiopia-South Sudan border is not demarcated, rather the Ethiopian government agreed to fix the border in 1902 using the Baro-Akobo-Pibor Rivers to restrict the British colonial expansion. This border is porous and more infect to the socio-economic relation of the local people. Thus, I argued that this colonial oriented border agreement caused a lot of acrimony among the borderland communities to dire their cohabitation and the conflict continued into the postcolonial era by shaping the current socio-economic and political landscape of the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland region.

What Triggers the Murle's Antagonist Relation with their Neighbours?

Limited natural resources, and unequal access to and distribution of natural resources are a major trigger of conflict in the borderlands. Land and cattle are the main sources of wealth for the borderland communities of the Anyuua, the Nuer, and the Murle. The natural resources available are limited and that limited natural resources are unevenly controlled by Anyuua, Nuer, and Murle. Furthermore, the local administrative institutions are not strong enough to administer the borderland's natural resources. Thus, there is limited supply, access to, and regulation of resources from the central and local governments, and disputes over pastureland and water often trigger conflicts among the borderland communities.

Culturally, the agriculturalist Anyuua believes that land belongs to them and wants to preserve their ancestors' property. On the other hand, the pastoralist Murle and Jikany-Nuer require vast land for grazing and water, which means they often encroach on the land that the Anyuua believe land is solely belong to their people. The Murle also believe that all cattle in the world are their ancestors' property, and that they have a cultural mission to collect them, including by cattle rustling from other groups. Besides intrinsic cultural assumptions, environment related stresses such as drought, means that pastoralist groups must more than ever move to find water and pastureland in dry seasons.

Moreover, the reduction of available grazing lands; inadequate local institutions; poor governance; persistent drought; unsustainable land use; and overgrazing methods are the major factors that destroyed the eco-zone of borderland regions. The main inducement of these factors are a lack of security; few economic opportunities for young pastoralists who have lost cattle through drought and raids; the pursuit of economic profits by urban entrepreneurs who have turned cattle raiding into a formalized, albeit illegal, economic venture; the weakening of traditional dispute mechanisms; and a proliferation of small arms and light weapons. All these circumstances plus the traditional resource distribution and intrinsic cultural assumptions can perpetuate hostilities between the Murle people and their neighbours.

7.1.2 Threats of Human Security among the Borderland People

Threats of the borderland people are related with the possibility of state and non-state armed group conflicts and youth infiltrators. According to Buzan (1983), threats are conceptualized in a dual way, as a threat to state institutions by force (capabilities), and

by ideas (ideology); and furthermore, the non-state armed groups terrorize the borderland people to provide rations, information, and support. Then, according to Buzan (1991), based on the traditional narrow concept of security regarding to threat, the referent object of security remained to the state.

However, recently the concept of security changed its dimension from military and political threats to other forms of threats and focused on society as referent object rather than only state. With this understanding, the UN has acknowledged poverty, sporadic disease, environmental degradation, civil war, and physical violence as security threats within states (UN Department of Public Information (UNDPI), 2004). Accordingly, security threats ranges from economical to environmental and/or societal (Buzan, 1991).

In this case, threats of borderland people are extended to intergroup armed conflicts and widespread poverty; which related with the potentials of threats, risks, crises, vulnerabilities, and challenges (Brauch, 2005). Therefore, to understand the security situation of the borderland community from human security perspectives, it is better to realize the communities' vulnerability to multifaceted threats, risks, challenges, and crises.

According to Baishya (2010), the borderland people are vulnerable to threats that it is capability coupled with actors' intent. With this understanding, the basic features of vulnerability can be distinguished as 'exposure' and 'insufficient capacities'. Thus, the borderland people are exposed to different socio-economic security problems and they have insufficient capacities to protect themselves without the support of the government. On the other hand, the borderland people have weak connection with the central

government as they exposed for many social, economic, and political marginalization and vulnerable to rampant human security threats. For instance, the insufficient capacity of South Sudanese government to have inclusive borderland people development strategy and Ethiopia's insufficient use of economic inclusion and diversification has resulted in weak development performance and low skilled labor of the borderland people.

Consequently, people along the border suffer from a lack of infrastructure and education, exclusion from social and state services, and cross border intergroup conflicts. These problems expose the communities to human security problems such as famine, drought, disease, and environmental degradation; moreover, frequent confrontations. Regarding to these interwoven problems, conflicts afflict the borderland people due to resource based confrontations. As mentioned earlier, the borderland natural resources are not properly managed by the local governments, thus, the borderland people exposed for incompatible competition and confrontation.

This incompatible competition and frequent confrontation is enhanced hostility and it manifested through cattle raiding and child abduction. Such a pervasive practices of cattle raiding and child abduction are a long time phenomenon that has been specialized by the Murle youth infiltrators, which is one of the major socio-economic security threats for the borderland people. This is because the borderland people are not well protected by their government, rather they are insecure and exposed to threats.

Moreover, the raiders armed with AK47 machine guns to accomplish their mission of cattle raiding, child abduction, and terrorized the borderland non-armed people during confrontation. Their terrorized confrontation intensified the security problems and

exacerbated the impacts such as death, internal displacement persons (IDPs), maiming, and rape. Accordingly, the borderland people failed into Pandora's Box of security problems. For instance, low income, famine, drought, environmental degradation, unhealthy lifestyles, man-made threats, and loss of traditional relations exposed them to physical violence; and weak political, social, and economic participations. These are the paramount features of human security threats across the borderland people.

7.2 Manifestations

7.2.1 Infiltrators of the Murle Youth

Environmental conflict provides an appropriate lens to explain the traditional aspect of intergroup conflicts across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan. In Pibor and Gambella, cattle and children are crucial assets for the Murle and Jikany-Nuer ethnic groups, while for the Anyuaa land and children are the sole asset. Regarding to their intrinsic cultural assumption, cattle and land respectively are a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status.

The Murle and the Jikany-Nuer used cattle for compensation and the payment of wedding dowries. Roughly 80 percent of the population of Murle and Nuer depend on cattle to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie, 2012; McCallum, 2013). However, neither the government of Ethiopia nor Sudan could provide such opportunity for the local communities and confined them to their livestock without changing to commercialization.

The independence of South Sudan in 2011 has been expected to bring bright future for the borderland pastoral communities; however, the political instability of the South Sudan government forced the Murle people to continue their previous life. For them, cattle are directly related to the survival and life continuity, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle. Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people's lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2012). Even though the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, use of weapons as protection has increased the human lethality of conflicts.

Although cattle grazing require water and pasture land, not all ethnic groups in Pibor have access to those resources due to physical as well as ecological scarcity. Hence, during dry seasons or periods of drought, those who inhabit the arid land of Pibor (Murle people) migrate with their cattle to territories of other ethnic groups to compete for resources, often resulting in violent conflicts (Richardson, 2011). Additionally, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan has not yet stipulated the legal framework for pastoralists' grazing rights in order to reduce the mobility of Murle people (Agbor and Taiwo, 2012).

Cattle raiding, child abduction, and intergroup conflicts have historically been observed in Pibor and Gambella across the border. Particularly when the Murle whose land was often affected by droughts migrated to territories of other ethnic groups, such as the Anyuua in Pochalla and Jikany-Nuer in Akobo, in search of water and pasture for cattle grazing; and ponds for fishing. Moreover, the porous borders coupled with weak local

administration contribute to the intensity of corruption, illicit trade, smuggling of goods, circulation of small arms, and border infiltrators.


Illegal traders profit from open borders by circulating small arms and light weapons. The proliferation of small arms is a serious threat to peace and security in the pastoral areas (Wepundi et al., 2012). Murle youth adopted a “No Gun, No Life” slogan, having arms to strengthen their community, and protect themselves from external enemies this, in turn, has led to an increase in the practices of cattle raiding and child abduction. This is because the proliferation of small arms and external threats driving them to such practice. In this regard, the borderland people have labeled each other as enemies and exercised force to protect their group from attack by other groups.

With the availability of small arms, cattle rustling and child abductions have become more frequent and fatal. Over the years, youth infiltrator groups among the Murle have increasingly killed more civilians, rustled more cattle, and abducted more children, especially from communities that are not well protected such as the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia. Table 7.4 and figure 7.7 below show a dramatic rise in the frequency of Murle’s cattle raiding and child abduction from the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer, highlighting the number of people killed during the confrontation.

Table 7.4: Cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation of the Murle youth

Year	Raided cattle	Abducted children	Killed people
2004	254	11	43
2005	360	17	29
2006	426	25	54
2007	245	32	65
2008	243	28	76
2009	365	47	74
2010	960	72	247
2011	389	62	154
2012	687	65	174
2013	921	44	156
2014	768	53	178
2015	1328	78	189
2016	2000	137	224

Figure 7.7: Increment of the Murle youth infiltrators since 2004



Source: Security Bureau of Gambella Peoples' National Regional State and authors field note data to organize as a table and graph (Border Region Security Report from 2004-2016)

As can be seen in Table 7.4 and figure 7.7 above, the frequency of Murle's youth infiltrator to cattle raiding and child abduction has been increased in 2010 but it seems decreased in 2011, however, the situation is increased in the following years. Most confrontation ends by the superiority of Murle's infiltrators and resulted many casualties from the side of Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer and the Murle youth destroy villages, raid cattle, and abduct children. For instance, in 2015 Murle infiltrators raided 1,328 cattle, abducted 78 children, and killed 189 people (Table 7.4).

Previously, in 2010 the Lou-Nuer attacked the Ethiopian Jikany-Nuer and the Anyuua people in the Akobo district of Gambella, destroyed 21 villages and displaced around 4,000 people; however, after this massive destruction, elders of Jikany-Nuer and Lou-Nuer come together with the support of the Gambella Regional State to settle the root problems of the two clans and they agreed to solve many problems between them by giving a settlement place and pastureland field for the Lou-Nuer in Akobo district at *Kuachar Kebele* around Tergol of Ethiopia.

The data shown above is the attack of the Murle infiltrators on the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia by crossing the international border. Most of the time the Ethiopian people of Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer did not attack the Murle people by crossing the border. The Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer informants⁷⁴ at Tergol attest that they do have no possibility to cross the border to revenge on the Murle people for the following two reasons. 1) The Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer were disarmed by the Ethiopian government in 2012 and thus they have no weapons. 2) They expect that they have protection from the Gambella Regional State of Ethiopia as they are disarmed. But previously, they resist the Murle infiltrators and sometimes cross the border to revenge.

On the other hand, the Murle attacked by the Dinka and Lou-Nuer in South Sudan, destroyed their villages, raid their cattle, and abduct their children. For instance, from 5 to 13 March 2009, thousands of well-armed and well-equipped Lou-Nuer youth from Akobo, Wuror, and Nyirol Counties launched retaliatory attacks on 17 Murle villages around Lekuwangole, killed 450, abducted 120 women and children, and displaced over

⁷⁴ Interview was made with the elders of Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer from 29 June 2016 to 2 July 2016

6000 (ICG. 2009; HRW, 2009). Moreover, the HSBA (2012) illustrated the major conflictive relations between Lou-Nuer and Murle in Jonglei based on the data in table 7.5 below; which clarify the situational problems of the Murle people.

Table 7.5: Clashes between Lou-Nuer and Murle in Jonglei, 2009-2012

Date	Attacking tribe	Location of Attack ⁷⁵	Deaths (approximate)	Cattle stolen (approximate) ⁷⁶
January 2009	Murle	Akobo County	300 (Lou-Nuer)	Unknown
5-8 March 2009	Lou-Nuer	Lekuwangole, Pibor county	450 (Murle)	600
18 April 2009	Murle	Akobo county	250 (Lou-Nuer)	Unknown
6 February 2011	Murle	Uror county	8 ⁷⁷ (Lou-Nuer)	1000
18-24 April 2011	Lou-Nuer	Lekuwangole, Pibor county	200 (Murle)	(138,000)
15-24 June 2011	Lou-Nuer	Gumuruk, & Lekuwangole, Pibor county	400 (Murle)	(398,000)
18 August 2011	Murle	Pieri, Uror county	750 (Lou-Nuer)	38,000
23 December 2011-9 January 2012	Lou-Nuer	Lekuwangole, Pibor county	1000 (Murle)	100,000
27 December - 4 February 2012 ⁷⁸	Murle	Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror counties	276 (Lou-Nuer & Bor Dinka) ⁷⁹	60,000
2 March 2012	Murle	Nyirol county	15 (Lou-Nuer)	15,000 ⁸⁰
9-11 March 2012	Murle	Ethiopia (wandeng payam) ⁸¹	225 (Lou-Nuer)	20,000

Source: Sudan issue brief Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA), No. 2, Oct., 2012:3

As we have seen in the table 7.5 above, the conflictive situation of revenge attack between Murle and Lou-Nuer is frequent; which is detriment to their cohabitation and failed into survival questions. Thus, the Murle *Alan ci merii* (red chief) mobilized their

⁷⁵ Locations are approximate. In all cases, attackers entered towns and moved through the environs.

⁷⁶ Figures in parentheses were obtained from a single source; all others reflect information from at least two or three sources

⁷⁷ Three of the eight killed were chiefs

⁷⁸ The UN recorded 44 Murle attacks during this period (UNMISS, 2012b)

⁷⁹ The vast majority of those killed were Lou-Nuer

⁸⁰ The local government provided vehicles to the Lou-Nuer, who recovered the cattle within a few days

⁸¹ The attack took place in Romeiri, Ethiopia, across the river from Wandeng payam, Jonglei

youth to revenge the Lou-Nuer in April 2009 and attacked 13 Lou-Nuer villages near Nyandit, killed at least 250 people, abduct 30 women and children, burning villages, and displaced approximately 16,000 people (HRW, 2009).

However, the Murle youth are more interested to infiltrate to Ethiopia by crossing the border rather than making frequent confrontation with Lou-Nuer in South Sudan for three reasons: 1) to replenish their lost and accumulate wealth, they have easily access cattle and children from Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia; 2) they consider that the Lou-Nuer and Jikany-Nuer are the same people and possible to easily retaliate either of them; 3) they know that the Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia have no weapon to protect themselves and they have an opportunity to back without sacrifice at the confrontation. Therefore, they succeeded in their operation for many times, however, their repeated cross-border attack costs the lives hundreds of people, resulted in the loss of thousands of cattle, separated children from their families, and increased the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Gambella.

7.2.2 Cattle Raiding and Child Abduction

Cattle raiding and child abduction is the cultural manifestation of the Murle people. For them cattle and children are the main assets of their social status. Thus, in their culture, marriage requires a considerable exchange of resources. A Murle young man, who wants to marry, first should accumulate fifty cattle to pay bride price. According to McCallum (2013), since 1980s the bride price of Murle reached around forty head of cattle.

However, in recent years it steadily increased beyond the red chief – *Alan ci merii*'s decision in 2005 that they try to reduce to forty-two but still some people required higher numbers (Osman, 2015; Manyok, 2016; McCallum, 2017). In contrast to the Pibor Plain Murle, the Boma plateau Murle bride price is not dependent on cattle, as the reputation of the groom was based more on his ability to provide for his wife and in-laws, which required access to land. Thus, cattle hold a much greater significance amongst the Lotilla Murle in Pibor plain. During fieldwork interview, regarding bride price, Kaka Kermajok, a Murle elder from Lekuwangole (he was in the Akobo town of South Sudan at the time of interview), forwarded the following points.

The Murle youth should accumulate at least fifty cattle to marry a girl. So, to have enough cattle, they accumulate either one of the following ways: 1) inherit from the core family; 2) collect from relatives and friends; 3) raid cattle from other neighbouring communities; or 4) abduct children and exchange with cattle – a girl can exchange with fifty cattle and a boy with hundred cattle. Due to the significance of cattle, the value of children is not the same such as boys have potential to support their parents in old age, inherit cattle, protect family (in his word – “*Korok*”) from external enemy, raid cattle from remote areas, and abduct children from other neighbouring communities; while girls only bring fifty cattle to the family when they marry.

An interview with Kaka Kermajok in Akobo town of South Sudan on 02 July 2016, he is from Lekuwangole County.

Now a day, the youth prefer to raid cattle and abduct children from other communities to have enough cattle to marry and to increase their social status and wealth. To fulfill their interest, organize their age-group, armed them, spy the available area of large number of

cattle and security gaps, and raid many cattle and abduct children together every three months of a year (February, March, and April).

The Murle youth cattle raiding practice also connected with childlessness in the Murle society. According to McCallum (2013:164), “childlessness is one of the greatest fears and curses amongst the Murle families.” Lewis (1972) also states that the Murle families faced low birth rates in the 1960s due to the widespread of Sexual Transmitted Disease (STD) by the army of Sudan Armed Force (SAF) at the end of the first Sudan Civil War in the Pibor Murle. As Andretta (1985:75) quoted the World Health Organization’s (WHO) statement “by the end of 1972, venereal disease widespread in Pibor area and the fertility level dropped dramatically among the Murle.” Arensen (1992) and Young (2010) explain that there was low birthrate in the Murle people between 1950s and 1960s.

There have been no new medical studies regarding the fertility rates of the Murle women and men, other than anecdotal evidence from medical teams and the research findings of the above writers. Moreover, the prevalence of STD in the Murle people has evidence from WHO; however, as of the WHO report STD recovered in 1970s. Akuei and Jok (2010) also investigated the UNICEF report that undertaken by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) which tried to associate childlessness, child abduction, and low fertility rates in the Murle people. According to their investigation, there is no connection among low fertility, childlessness, and child abduction practices in the Pibor Murle people.

During my fieldwork, I had met the Murle women who have more than eight children and elders attest that the low fertility rate is reduced by the support of WHO to cure the STD that spread four decades ago in the Pibor plain Murle. They are more exemplified Ismail

Konyi that he has 43 wives and 147 children. However, the Anyuaa, the Nuer, and the Dinka are perceived and assumed that the Murle abduct children due to their infertility. The above mentioned medical and fieldwork evidences have power to disprove the assumption of other neighbouring people regarding the Murle practices of child abduction. Of course, naturally, just like other ethnic groups, some Murle women are infertile and they become childless. Thus, to address their problem of natural infertility and wealth, they open the practice of adoption.

Accordingly, child adoption could be obtained in a number of ways: 1) abduct from neighbouring communities; 2) buying from neighbouring communities, eg., from Dinka and Anyuaa; 3) exchange with cattle; and 4) willingly taking orphans either from legal concerned body or from parents who want to give a child in legal way of adoption. Therefore, child adoption is not a new phenomenon in the Murle people. They have philosophy to enlarge their number of population to monopolize the natural resources over their surroundings. Thus, they construct their population by adopting children from other communities.

According to Lewis (1972), the Murle buying *unwanted children*⁸² from Dinka people in the 1960s. Andretta (1985) also documents the 1980s traditional practice of individual Murle to acquire Dinka or Nuer ‘incest babies’ who were unwanted in their own society and exchange them with cattle. However, every abducted or bought children adopted into

⁸²In the culture of Dinka, if a girl pregnant without official marriage, the family does not like that child and take it secretly and throw into the river. But when they knew about the Murle people, they would give them to the Murle by exchange with twelve cows and the child will be raised as a Murle. So that things has given room for the Dinka, Nuer, Anyuaa, and Murle and has continued for long. The Murle need to enlarge their number of population to monopolize the surrounding natural resources and incorporate any child from their neighbours either by buying from their family or forced abduction.

the Murle families and given full status as Murle community members. For instance, children those adopted into the *Alan ci merii* clan would inherit all the powers and authority of the royal clan including the ability to curse and bless. Arensen (1992) states so as to an abducted child could not treat as slaves rather eventually gained rights as a Murle.

The Murle people become very conscious to the Murle identity; accordingly, they need early age children to adopt in their family – between two months and four years of age. As to them, children are very important to the identity and the continuation of the Murle community. For Murle, children are the source of social status –relatively high status of elderly male comes from their control over key social transactions and can be attributed to their position as brokers in the maximum number of cattle and women exchanges that are made.

Regardless of their biological origin, the abducted children adopt in the Murle families to illustrate the fluidity of Murle identity to be full member of the Murle society. The Murle perceive their willingness to adopt into their culture as a strength and important aspect of their identity. Then, the Murle have been absorbed and assimilated many people, take care of those within their territory, give them cattle and they can become part of the Murle, and supplant their culture.

However, in recent time, according to the Official of Gambella Regional State at Akobo district and Anyuua elder⁸³,

The Murle youth consider a child as means of income for their wealth. In this regard, they use the abducted children to the increment of wealth in their community and commercialize in the surrounding market of Pibor and Bor town. This commercial practice of abducted children is not only manifested in the Murle people but also in their neighbours (Anyuua, Nuer, and Dinka) who saw a ready market for abducted children.

Interview on 15 October 2016

According to Burns-Mackenzie and Buchanan-Smith (2005), due to the economic incentive, forced abductions become a growing, profitable criminal trade, and another underlying perpetuator of conflict in the region. Accordingly, adoption of children through means of abduction is a normal phenomenon for Murle people. Regarding child adoption, the Murle have historic-cultural connection with their neighbours based on their philosophy to enlarge their number. They have experience to bought any unwanted children from Dinka, Anyuua, Jie, and other conservative neighbouring communities and also abduct from other remote communities.

Nonetheless, the outsider judged the Murle's child abduction practice as a crime although they believe that child abduction is a normal practice for adoption in the Murle culture. Their socialization process and social values forced them to abduct or buy children from neighbouring people in order to adopt in their family. McCallum (2013) also states the efforts of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration and subsequent government of

⁸³ Ojullu Adeng Akuay is an Anyuua elder from Gog district of Pignwudo area. Official from the Akobo district of Tergol also attest the current situations of Murle's youth practices of child abduction.

Sudan to suppress and criminalize the practice of selling and buying children with cattle, however, the practice has continued.

7.3 Borderland Challenges

As mentioned earlier, the borderland people socio-economic security problems across Ethiopia and South Sudan are manifested through child abduction and cattle raiding. The problems are also compounded by different challenges which need the collaboration works of governments, regional organizations, and international communities to solve. These challenges critically affected have the borderland region local administration and beyond their capacity. Some of the major challenges that discussed briefly in this section are four: 1) border porousness; 2) South Sudanese political instability; 3) colonial legacy and fractured interactions of the borderland people; and 4) disintegration of state-customary institutions.

Challenge 1: Border Porousness

The Ethiopia and South Sudan border is porous and open. According to Daniel (2009), border porous is source of insecurity for civilians across the borderland region of Africa. The porousness of the border encourages some in the borderland communities to participate in different illegal activities, including perpetuating the flow of small arms and light weapons, cattle raiding, child abductions, and intergroup conflicts. Border porosity also means that it is difficult to counter illicit trade or security threats as people regularly cross borders without the requisite of legal documents. Both the Ethiopian and South

Sudanese governments have faced challenges in their efforts to implement border policies and to control illegal movement of people and goods.

Challenge 2: The Impacts of South Sudanese Political Instability

South Sudan's political instability manifests itself in the border regions in couple ways. First, it has hindered the implementation of development plans and economic infrastructures along the border. Nationally, 51 percent of people live below the national poverty line, 73 percent of men and 84 percent of women are illiterate, 60 percent of roads are inaccessible during rainy season, only 1 percent of the population has access to electricity, and 4.1 million people are food insecure⁸⁴ — conditions which extend to the border regions. Second the government does not have capacity to address the needs of security, good governance, and justice due to political instability and civil war. As a result, the borderland people are left without government protection, creating a fertile ground for the proliferation of small arms in that environment and light weapons across the region, and the resulting armed groups further the borderland conflicts.

Challenge 3: The Colonial Legacy and Fractured Interactions among the Borderland People

The “divide and rule” colonial policy of British undermined the norms, culture, and legitimacy of traditional institutions of the local communities. This policy divided the borderland people into different sects, destroying their common understandings of their

⁸⁴ “South Sudan statistics January 2014, ” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/SouthSudan/South_Sudan_Media_Briefing_Pack/South%20Sudan%20humanitarian%20and%20development%20statistics%20-%20December%202013.pdf

culture and creating competition among the various groups. Gradually, the borderland people lost their sense of commonality and the social capital of their cultural values, and deference to norms related to tolerance, respect, and support decreased. Nothing has been developed to replace these lost norms, and today, interactions among the borderland people remain largely fractured and focused on ethnic identity, in-group and out-group formation, and the limited daily social contact with external communities. Thus interactions are largely organized around ethnicity as a means of safeguarding their lives and livelihoods to the exclusion of any other groups.

Challenge 4: Disintegration of State and Customary Institutions

The customary institutions that govern the borderland people tend to lack formal integration into or articulation with, government structures. In many ways, government institutions have overruled customary institutions and the authority of elders and traditional leaders by making unilateral decisions about local affairs without consulting community elders.

In so doing, government administration has excluded the traditional institutions by degrading their decision making power. For example, the Ethiopian military regime forbade the Anyuua kingdom's traditional governing systems such as the *Nyieya* and *Kwaaro* as they considered them to be "feudal," "backward," or "anti-revolutionary" (Kurimoto, 2002). Where the institutions still exist, there are no longer strong enough to control youths' participation in conflict. The central government and traditional institutions have no common working agenda regarding local affairs.

After the government institutions diminished the value of traditional institutions, elders could not control the increment of dowry or social disorder and the communities felt that their traditional cultural values were lost. These challenges led youths to disobey elders and weakened the elder's roles in conflict resolution. For example, the Anyuua people previously had strong relationships with their traditional institutions and everyone respected the ruling system of their king and landowner. However, after the military regime of Ethiopia forbade their traditional governance and rule of law mechanisms and attempted replace them with formal institutions, the youth lost deference for their elders, further weakening traditional mechanisms.

At the same time, government institutions do not have adequate representation and legitimacy in the borderland communities, and thus it is legally futile for them to try to control conflicts and implement the rule of law. This has created a void where neither the modern government institutions nor the traditional governance institutions are working effectively, and no one is able to resolve conflict when it arises. Therefore, insufficient attention to existing customary institutional arrangements has significant implications for security. However, conflict resolution through traditional mechanisms has the potential to contribute to borderland stability and security.

Many customary institutional systems today remain widely respected, and trusted by the societies in which they operate (Lewis, 1972). Despite the Government's attempts, they could not totally destroy their legitimacy with borderland communities. In some critical cases, the Government has agreed to use traditional institutions to solve local problems. For instance, the Gambella Peoples' National Regional State cooperated with the Anyuua

customary institution, *Nyieya*, in 2003 to resolve security tensions that arose between the Anyuua and other communities over land possession (Tasew, 2010).

Furthermore, the age-set customary institution of the Murle provides young people with significant tribal decision-making power and helps unite them. This institution has power to consolidate the group relations of youth and bring new leaders to the top. This has increased the Murle's mobility and fighting strength in Pibor and across the border due to low elders' potential to control the youth. However, if it manages well, the age-set traditional institution of Murle has potential to bring youth for peace and security and able to mitigate cattle raiding, child abduction, and violent conflicts across the region.

7.4 The Governments' Effort to Tackle the Problems and the Challenges

The governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan made efforts to solve the borderland security problems by providing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) since 2012. However, there are several reasons that make it possible for cattle rustling and child abduction to thrive along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border in Gambella and Pibor. The utterance of many interviewees attested that lack of infrastructural development, low level government presence, weak borderland resource management, lack of education, and inadequacy of livelihoods are some of the major influential challenges to tackle the problems. The following sections briefly discussed the governments' efforts on the borderland resource management, security reforms, and gaps of their efforts to resolve the security problems across the border.

7.4.1 Borderland Resource Management and Cooperation

The cooperation of Ethiopia and South Sudan is not a smooth talk of the borderland community. It needs an official attention of the two governments to mitigate the borderland people socio-economic security problems and to manage the available resources in organized and cooperative manner. In other words, the two governments' border cooperation helps to reduce infighting behaviors of the borderland people and their poor relations. South Sudan became a sovereign independent state in 2011 and started diplomatic relations with other states of Africa and the world. Previously, Ethiopia had good diplomatic relations with Sudan and this diplomatic relationship continued with the new Government of South Sudan (GoSS) after 2011. Thus, Ethiopia and South Sudan signed a number of MoU; which opened a new chapter in their cooperation.

In March 2012⁶, Ethiopia and South Sudan signed an agreement on a Joint Ministerial Commission in Juba to advance economic and political ties. The agreement addressed transit, communications, transport, exports, education, and capacity building at the border. Then by, on 4 April 2012, representatives of the regional governments agreed to undertake a range of joint activities along the shared borders to address the issues of border security to ensure sustainable peace and stability.

These agreements paved the way to recognizing the security problems along their shared border and using their collaboration process to solve the problems. Based on the higher officials' account, the local governments of Upper Nile, Maiwut County, and Gambella Peoples' National Regional State made a joint border agreement from 3-4 October 2012⁷ on a few common issues: illegal armed forces and criminal matters; human capacity

building/scholarship; trade, investment and custom duties; and personal relations. The aim of the agreement was to create smooth borderland relations and increase the benefits of borderland people through development.

The agreement would transform the overall ties between the two countries including construct of roads, railway, refinery, security, capacity building, media, and health among others. Such cooperation has the potential to foster economic development and enhance personal relations. Constructions of roads can also help to improve the accessibility of natural resources of the two countries. For instance, South Sudan can export oil to Ethiopia while Ethiopia can also provide electricity to South Sudan.

Their agreements are likely to enhance cooperation on cross-border issues to help foster peaceful cohabitation, and social and economic development by unlocking the economic potential of the region. This cross-border agreement for sustainable peace and socio-economic development is expected to boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and promote business activities between Ethiopia and South Sudan. Such agreements have also the potential to build the capacity and resilience of local communities, identify and implement sustainable livelihood projects and help to develop conflict management strategies. The cooperation can help facilitate legal trade, enhance the economic potential of the borderland people, and promote inclusive and sustainable development.

Based on their cooperative agreements, local administrators can create conditions to facilitate effective management of natural resources, improve infrastructure, and facilitate cross-border movement of their citizens. In addition, this helps to diversify economic development, addressing the inequality and poverty that are associated with the two

countries' borderland citizens. The signing of the cross border deal effectively mobilizes resources to enhance disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) with effective security sector reforms (SSR).

The signed MoU can help the regional organizations such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Africa Union (AU), AUBP, and international organizations such as United Nations take the two governments' effort into consideration as they rigorously work on international borders. Moreover, the MoU is useful to provide a room for the interference of regional and international organizations across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border to enhance their assistance in the area of instability, irregular migration, displacement, and mobility of people.

In October 2016, Ethiopia and South Sudan signed another MoU in Addis Ababa. This agreement focused on bilateral trade, borders, and military cooperation. The agreements could have benefits both countries and specifically the borderland people. This kind of state agreement can change many things for ordinary people and local administrations. The critical issues that were discussed in their bilateral agreement were security and the construction of roads and bridges between Ethiopia to South Sudan in four important sites: Gambella to Jekawo-Nasir-Malakal road; Dimma to Rad-Boma-Bor road; Pagak to Maiwut-Paluocho road; and Tergol to Akobo-Ayod road. South Sudan also will build a refinery in the future and Ethiopia will benefit from the oil. Their MoU is useful to reconnect the two countries in terms of economic, social, political, and security relations.

However, implementation will be the main challenge for both countries. For instance, the South Sudan instability, lack of engineering data and any relevant information for

implementation of their common project are the main challenges. The economy of South Sudan has deteriorated and the 2014 South Sudan development statistics shown that 73% of men and 84% of women in the country are illiterate, which indicates skilled human power can be a critical challenge for the South Sudanese government in addition to their political instability. The signing of the MoU alone is not enough and the two countries will need to work on the underlying challenges that hindering implementation of these projects.

7.4.2 The South Sudanese Government Effort

The frequency of interethnic conflicts in South Sudan that viewed through the lens of ethnic security dilemma was spillover to the everyday life challenge of the borderland communities. On the aftermath of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the SPLA/M took the responsibility to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) the local armed people to reduce the security tension of the region. In this regard, in 2006, the GoSS and SPLA/M conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, targeting the Lou-Nuer first (Young, 2007b).

The Lou-Nuer groups refused to disarm because they believe that the disarmament program targeted them to weaken their fighting capabilities and left them for insecurity. This would increase the Nuer's relative insecurity as compared to that of other ethnic groups (ICG, 2009). The GoSS was trying to make negotiation with the Nuer people but failed to succeed. Consequently, the SPLA/M turned to coercive the disarmament of the Lou-Nuer, in which the SPLA/M engaged in a serious fighting with the Luo-Nuer youth militia commonly known as the White Army (Rands and LeRiche, 2012). This coercive

disarmament plan was implemented on Luo-Nuer and then more than 3,000 arms were conducted; however, around 1,600 soldiers and hundreds of civilians were killed (Garfield, 2007).

Similar disarmament plan was trying to implement on Murle militia but the plan was not implemented due to concerns of the international community regarding potential casualties following the disarmament (ICG 2009). Subsequently, another round of disarmament, led by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and targeting Murle militia, resulted in the collection of a small amount of arms, suggesting that people were successfully hiding some of their weapons to prepare for potential armed conflicts (Leff, 2009).

The failure of the GoSS and SPLA/M to disarm all ethnic groups in Jonglei exposed the Lou Nuer extremely vulnerable to the Murle which regarded themselves as the Nuer's victims and claimed to have the right to get revenge against the Lou Nuer (Rands and LeRiche, 2011). The Lou-Nuer and Murle developed hostile relations throughout their contact history and thus uncertainty regarding their fighting capabilities exacerbated the security dilemma. The forceful disarmament process was weakened the Lou-Nuer fighting capability and using this opportunity, the Murle attacked the Luo-Nuer in Akobo County in January 2009, killing about 300 Lou-Nuer (SAS, 2012).

This attack followed by revenge of the Lou Nuer in March, which resulted in the deaths of 450 Murle (see table 7.5 above). Thus, after the completion of the first round of the disarmament campaign in 2006, the Lou-Nuer eventually rearmed themselves by looting collected arms (UNMISS, 2012). The intergroup conflict between the Murle and Lou-

Nuer in 2009 were the most fatal in the post-CPA period, and there is no doubt that the two ethnic groups are trapped in the spiral of an ‘action-reaction process’.

Although another disarmament campaign targeting both the Lou-Nuer and the Murle was conducted between August 2009 and March 2010, both groups resisted and apparently succeeded in hiding some of their weapons. The security dilemma was clearly an essential source of resistance to disarmament. Thus, the 2006 disarmament campaign is the primary reference point of escalation of the security problem between the Murle and their neighbours, which erupted into a cycle of brutal attack and revenge.

7.4.3 The Ethiopian Government Effort

The Governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan recognize the security problems along their border and have collaboration to try to solve problems as mentioned earlier. According to the Gambella Peoples’ National Regional State Security bureau’s information, implementation of the agreement soon followed and the Ethiopian government with the collaboration of Gambella Regional State, constructed roads, disarmed all armed groups along the border, established an illicit trade control station, regulated the cross-border trading system, provided scholarship opportunities for South Sudanese students, organized an information exchange network, and established a joint elders’ reconciliation committee.

In 2012, the total number of police force in Akobo, Tergol of Ethiopia was 18; however, the Regional Government of Gambella with the cooperation of Ethiopian National Defense Force increased the security forces into 218 from the regional special police

force (Gambella Security Report (GSR), 2012). This force along has supposed to protect the borderland communities of Akobo, Gog, and Jor from anti-peace armed force and Murle infiltrators around the border. However, the security institutions were restricted into the Tergol town in Akobo of Ethiopia, and they have lack of transportation, ration, and other military logistics to cover the Akobo, Gog, and Jor districts across the adjacent regions of South Sudan.

In 2016, there was an interethnic conflict in Gambella Region between the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer people, and then the special police force and Regional police involved into the conflict by supporting their ethnic group and aggravate the conflicts. This is because the police forces are established based on ethnic line and lack national sense of unity which has violated ethics of police. The regional police force did not fully comply with their responsibilities. As a result, the regional government has been working with the National Defense to engage the regional 'liyu Hail' and police force in training by disarming their weapons. But in place, neither the federal police nor the national defense was assigned to safeguard the region's security. Using such security gaps, a band of Murle infiltrators crossed the Ethiopian border from Pibor and abducted 137 children, raided more than 2000 cattle, killed 224 people, and internally displaced around 22,000 people from three districts of the Nuer Zone and the Gog district of the Anyuua zone (the 2016 GPNRS security report).

With the agreement of the South Sudan Government, the Ethiopian troops crossed into Pibor in search of the abducted children but could only rescue 93 children in that operation. The rest have not yet been repatriated. The 2016 child abduction and cattle raid

stands out for the number of children taken and cattle raid, but child abductions and cattle raids have been increased in the previous years, and neither the central government of Ethiopia nor the GPNRS has taken steps to actively protect its citizens along the border.

Following the 2016 incident, according to the information of Othow – the then time Head of Regional Security Bureau in Gambella – the Ethiopian government established extra three security camps along the border at the specific place of Ujallo in Gog, Pochalla in Jor, and Rad in Dimma districts of Gambella. In these four camps (including Tergol), the Defense Force in collaboration with the Regional Special Police Force took their responsibility to protect the local community from the Murle youth infiltrators and external enemies; however, they could not stop their infiltration due to different pushing factors.

7.4.4 Security Sector Reform (SSR) of Ethiopia and South Sudan

The security sector reform (SSR) is a concept to improve the security situation of the community by mobilizing the security sector to strengthening the government power. However, in most regions across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, the governments' capabilities to provide security to their citizens are weak because of weak security institutions. Thus, the lack of government capabilities to provide security to its citizens created a state of anarchy and atrocity in the border region and also made the ethnic groups resist disarmament and feel responsible for their own security.

Ethiopia is relatively stable country than South Sudan and able to reform her security force by integrating all ethnic based government armed force into national sense

structure. The Gambella Regional Government Police and Special Police Force organized from all ethnic groups of the region and command under the regional President. However, in time of conflict within the local communities of different ethnic groups, for example in 2016 between the Anyuua and the Nuer, the regional special police force showed bias towards their ethnic group and escalate the conflict situation, rather than discharging their responsibility.

Besides ethnic line bias, the security sectors institutions of the region could not accelerate the transportation system, there was inadequate access of ration, unable to gather information for early action, and difficulty of other logistics to upgrade its deterrence effect due to lack of infrastructure, and inadequate human and financial resources. All these indicates that the security sectors of the GPNRS need reformation and rebuild those deliquescent polices under a unified army structure to be guard of peace by avoiding irresponsibility and partiality. In addition, security institutional reform should also take into consideration to address the borderland region security problems.

In South Sudan, the security sector institutions are very weak. For instance, according to the UNMISS (2012) report, both the national police and the security forces lacked capacities to provide security because of inadequate logistical, human and financial resources and the difficulty of accessing many of the regions which lack functioning roads. The two major security apparatus of South Sudan: the SPLA/M and the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) have weak quality to discharge their responsibility (ICG, 2009). The SSPS was often outnumbered and outgunned by armed pastoralists, it failed to stop interethnic, communal, and intergroup conflicts. The local communities have

expressed their grievances against the SSPS, which always failed to arrest the Murle and the Lou-Nuer youth militia fighters who conducted cattle raiding, child abduction, and murder (UNMISS, 2012). In addition, many personnel are old and lack proper training and education.

7.4.5 Gaps in Governments' Efforts

The presence of international actors in South Sudan has not successfully improved the security situation or consolidated peace of the region. In sum, ethnic groups along the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan are reluctant to disarm because 1) they need arms to protect their communities and cattle from other ethnic groups, 2) disarmament has not been conducted in all ethnic groups simultaneously, making disarmed groups insecure, and 3) in Pibor along the Ethiopian border, there is virtually no security apparatus that can equally and effectively protect citizens and maintain internal stability. All three reasons were the causes and effects of the security dilemma on the borderland peoples' socio-economic security.

The two governments' area of concern is the fact that the attempts focus on addressing the manifestations of conflict rather than the root causes. Whereas, the Ethiopian local government successfully disarmed the people, they could not provide corresponding mechanisms for protection the population, making them vulnerable to attack by the Murle youth infiltrators. Similarly, South Sudan's government efforts have consisted of collecting weapons from armed borderland groups. However, in some cases they have taken the form of aggressive crackdown operations by military and police forces.

Moreover, the Government conducted the disarmament initiative without intensive dialogue with the community, and a lack of alternative solutions for protection or uniform disarming system worsened the growing ethnic tensions. Thus, the South Sudan government failed to meet its commitment due to lack of social consensus, weak institutional capacity, internal political instability, resistance from Murle deviance group known as the “Cobra Faction” that led by David Yau Yau, and ethnic conflict tensions.

All the Governments’ efforts highlighting on disarmament, but disarmament alone is not a solution by itself. The inability of the Governments’ efforts to integrate the DDR process with SSR processes also minimized their ability to achieve long-term, sustainable results because DDR and SSR are mutually reinforcing; one cannot succeed without the other. Thus, the governments should plan, allocate resources to, implement, and evaluate both the DDR and SSR in a coordinated manner. Conversely, the governments’ effort failed to gain traction due to security gaps, South Sudanese political instability, lack of strong institutions, and lack of a coordinated and comprehensive implementation that addressed and sequenced security, governance, and economic elements.

Chapter Eight

Part I: Analytical Discussions, Problems and Impact Analysis

8.1 Analytical Discussions

8.1.1 Colonization and its Influences on the South Sudanese Chiefships

South Sudan is a land locked area and had no contact with the outside world until the late 1930s, when the Egyptians' desire to discover and control the source of Nile (Arou, 1982). Ethnically the South Sudan people fall into three wide linguistic categories: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic speaking groups (Bryan and Tucker, 1948). Accordingly, the Nilotic group comprises the Dinka, the Nuer, the Shilluk, the Anyuua, the Pari, the Acholi, the Bor-Belanda, and the Jo-Luo; while Nilo-Hamitic group consists to the Toposa, the Latuko, the Bari, the Murle, and related tribes.⁸⁵ Zande and related groups such as the Bongo-speaking: Baka, Moru, Madi, and others belong to the Sudanic tribe.

With such diversified traditional “tribes” of South Sudan, some of them have traditional kingship governance structure, e.g., the Anyuua, the Shilluk, and the Zande; while others have a military chiefship structure, e.g., the Dinka, the Nuer, and the Murle (McCallum, 2013). All these people had different livelihood strategies and local administrative rules with varied and complex forms of self-government (Leonardi, et al., 2010).

⁸⁵ First population census of Sudan 1955/56 report. <https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/7594>

Since the early of the 19th Century, Sudan was controlled under colonization and administered the diversified societies of the Northern and Southern region with different political and social strategy. Sudan was conquered by Egypt in 1820 by the commander of Mohammad Ali; having subdued the Nubian riverine tribes and the once-powerful Funji Kingdom of Sennar founded Khartoum in 1824 (see Albino, 1970).

According to Arou (1982), exploration of Sudan was followed by four waves of ‘outsiders’; such as the slave trades, the Turco-Egyptian rule, the Mahdiya (the Mahdist movement), and the Anglo-Egyptian Colonial rule. From 1820-1884 the Turco-Egyptian administration focused on Northern Sudan with little interaction of Southern Sudan societies; moreover, the Southern region was used as a source of slaves, gold, ivory, and other natural resources to strengthen their economy (Robert, 1994). The government services and political structures of the Turco-Egyptian rule were more affiliated to the North; thus the Southern societies were not incorporated to the political and socio-economic participation of the North.

Consequently, the Mahdist movement captured Khartoum in 1884 from the Turco-Egyptian (Wodwosen, 2009); however, they also had little impact upon the governance structure of the Southern traditional groups. The Mahdist rule which ended in 1898 had little interest in interacting with local governance structure of Southern societies (Burton, 1985). They only focused on government structures to collect tax revenue and sourcing slaves.

The Mahdist movement was defeated by the Anglo-Egyptian administration in 1898 (McCallum, 2013). In contrast to the Mahdists, the Anglo-Egyptian administration

adopted two different approaches to administering the North and South Sudanese people by giving recognition to their historical and cultural differences. Based on their differences, the British adopted the Indian model of colonial rule to the North such as used Arabic as government language and assigned local Sudanese to the key government's positions.

To the South, according to Burton (1985), the British imposed the “divide and rule” policy. To do that, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Governor made survey on the Southern people of Sudan and realized that the local communities have a close relationship with the natural environment – land, tree, rivers, ponds – all mediated through their traditional chiefs. They also understood that the local communities rely on their traditional chiefs as they have power to communicate with their creator, make rain, and predict the future. Thus, they have the ability to curse and impose social sanctions against harmful behaviors within the communities. Accordingly, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan inspired to work with the traditional chiefs by providing some enticement such as weapons, gifts, and money to make easy their entanglement interactions with the local communities.

However, the local traditional chiefs were not interested to work with the new government system and resist the British soldiers by mobilizing their local people. Accordingly, the British approaches were not successful and changed their tactics by appointing the pro-governor ‘chiefs’ with some sort of colonial order (Sharkey, 2002). Schomerus and Allen (2010) also state that those appointed ‘chiefs’ acted as ‘traditional chiefs’ but they did not have spiritual power of rain-making and other traditional ritual

capacities. By destructing the traditional chiefship system of the local communities, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan substituted the ‘appointed chiefs’.

The appointed “chiefs” were responsible for serving as local traditional leaders and playing government roles such as collecting taxes, performing local administration and judicial duties, and liaising with the British administration. Consequently, the British colonial administration established community leaders to detach the local people from traditional leaders and assigned ‘appointed chiefs’ to the interlocutor role. This system continued until the independence of Sudan.

In 1956, Sudan had got her independence and appointed Ja’afar Nimeiri as a president but Nimeiri abolished the system of ‘appointed chief administration’ in 1971. However, according to Leonardi, et al. (2010), some of the ‘appointed chiefs’ continued to act as principal government intermediaries, tax collectors, village administrators, and court presidents. Nevertheless, during the first civil war, the role of the ‘appointed chiefs’ of South Sudanese communities were complicated and lost their trust from the Khartoum government due to the emergence of the Anya-Nya I rebel group. This is because the Khartoum government suspected the appointed chiefs that they may have connection with rebels.

Accordingly, the appointed chiefs required working to the government in one hand and to the Anya-Nya I rebels on the other hand which more complicated their role and trust in the community. During the second civil war (1983-2005), militias were formed in the local communities by the government under the leadership of the ‘appointed chiefs’ to fight the SPLA/M. In some areas, the SPLA/M and the Khartoum government set up

parallel chiefs, causing further conflict within the communities and divisions along political lines (McCallum, 2013).

Since the colonial period, the roles of traditional chiefs were not respected by the government; however, the local communities have disenchantment on the ‘appointed chiefs’ which served as intermediators. Rather, the local communities have strong social and cultural alliance with their traditional chiefs. Lack of government interest coupled with Sudanese civil war, the roles of traditional chiefs have been eroded and youths remained under rebel leaders. The ‘appointed chiefs’ also lost government trust and people also disrespected them. Due to all these challenges, the local youths found themselves neither under the rules of traditional chiefs nor those of the government; thus they took over the role of protection and rule the local people. Even though youths took the roles to protect their people, traditional chiefs have power to shape the roles of youths.

8.1.2 The “Beir Patrol”⁸⁶ Fierce against the Murle

The Pibor plain Murle people were not incorporated under the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan colonial administration during the early time of their colonial expansion in the Southern Sudan. For instance, the Anglo-Egyptian controlled Sudan in 1898 from the Mahdist rule and expanded their administration to the Southern region but they had trying to incorporate the Murle region around 1908. According to Lewis (1972), the Murle were isolated from the Anglo-Egyptian colonizers’ socio-economic and political interactions

⁸⁶ “Bier Patrol” is the Dinka troops which established by the Anglo-Egyptian in collaboration with the Dinka elites. The term “Beir” is a Dinka word referring to an “enemy”; and the early colonial power used the Dinka terms and adopted the Dinka attitudes towards the Murle (Arensens, 1992).

due to two reasons: 1) the geographical landscape nature of the Pibor plain; and 2) their aggressive and war-like behavior. The British first made a peace with the Dinka people and later transfer their control position to the Nuer with less success and plan to turn their attention to the Murle in Pibor.

The intention of British was to create a stable environment for the administration of their indirect rule. Thus the priority was placed on controlling these communities which led the British to support those that sided with the colonial government. For the British peace-making process, the “Beir Patrol” of Dinka troops launched attacks in collaboration with the British soldiers against the Murle. This effort was to pacify these communities, thus solidified divisions between communities that would reemerge later as conflicts.

According to McCallum (2013), the Beir patrols were initiated by the Anglo-Egyptian administration to bring the Murle community “under control” of the government, and also to punish their continued cattle raiding upon their Nilotic neighbours, particularly the Dinka. Regarding cattle raiding and punishment perspective, Kelly (1912:499) describes the patrols as “punishment of the repeated raids on the peaceable Dinka of Bor district.”

The British organized the Dinka troops to launch the Beir Patrols in 1908 against the Murle people who lived near the Veveno River, east of Bor district. However, the Beir Patrols were unable to capture the Murle *Alan ci merii* or red chiefs but took over 1000 cattle and burnt the Murle villages (McCallum, 2013). Cattle raiding practices of the Murle people from their neighbours had continued, even if, the British believed that they have taken an effective measure against the Murle red chief that would result in the desired tractability. But this attacking measure on Murle was not adequate and the Murle

took revenge on the Dinka group by killing 101 people, wounded sixty, and captured large number of cattle within six months (Kelly, 1912).

In accordance with the divide and rule policy of the British administration, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium need to protect the subject people so that they could pay tax to the government from the predation of pastoral cattle raiders. This required a strong punitive expedition in the winter of 1911-1912 to force Murle to cease their raiding practice (Collins and Herzog, 1961). The secular power of the Murle traditional leaders – *Alan Ci Merii* or *Red Chief* – were deplumed by the British Patrols in 1912. Then the British established a military post at Pibor and assigned an ‘appointed chief’ by substituting him in place of *Alan ci merii* who were more accommodating the interest of the Anglo-Egyptian rule (Lewis, 1972; Andretta, 1989).

In their traditional political system, the Murle did not have centralized kingdoms, their leaders, *Alan ci merii*, were religious rather than political. Thus, according to the expression of McCallum (2013), their loss of political sovereignty did not significantly influence their ethnic continuity. The intervention of British administration against Murle *Alan ci merii* stopped the Murle’s expansion to the territory of Dinka and Lou-Nuer into the west of White Nile River and Anyuaa to the east (Andretta, 1989).

In the Pibor Post, British established missionary schools to teach the people of Murle. The mission was to civilize and bring the Murle people into contact with Western style education which intended to help stabilize the local administration (Albino, 1970). According to Swart (1998), Dr. Glen Reed, a United Presbyterian missionary Reverence, walked to Pibor Post in 1940 to survey the potential of a mission station amongst the

Murle and appealed to the incumbent governor for permission, which subsequently approved by the Anglo-Egyptian government in Khartoum. But Glen couldn't implement the expansion into Murle land due to the World War II. This interruption left the Murle people isolated from politics, social interactions, and economic connections with their neighbours due to less socio-economic interest of the British administration on the Murle area.

8.1.3 Power Stripping from the Murle Red Chiefs – *Alan ci merii*

The devastating nature of Sudan's civil war changed every aspect of the Murle communities' relation with their borderland neighbours. The two successive civil wars of Sudan (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) disrupted the pre-civil war bonds that existed among the borderland tribes and eroded their common identity which exacerbated their hostility. Making the matter worse was a political rift within SPLA/M ruling elites (McCallum & Okech, 2013).

The civil war of Sudan in the Pibor region had impact on how the people of Murle viewed the power of *Alan ci merii*. During the civil war, they exposed to external leadership style which was affected by the 'appointed chiefs'. Since the colonial period, the Anglo-Egyptian rule destructed the Murle traditional chiefship system and the civil war took place on the Pibor lowland area; all these dismantled the Murle youth from *Alan ci merii*. The Murle youth were militarized through their involvement with the various armed groups such as Anya-Nya I and II, SPLA/M, Pibor Defense Force (PDF), and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF); thus they have opportunity to have guns.

However, accessibility of guns for the Murle youth couldn't protect the Murle community from displacement and insecurity. Thus, the Murle frequently moved and displaced from their village during the two civil wars. In their displacement, they keep their age-system and traditional chiefships of *Alan ci merii* to maintain their social structure. But, the *Alan ci merii* had complex relationship with the different military actors who at various points had control of the country at Pibor region.

The Murle people in the Pibor lowland had supported the SPLA/M and many Murle youth joined the rebel movements. However, due to the Dinka and the Nuer domination in the SPLA/M, the Murle youth were suffered more which connected with their historical hostile relation rather than political unity. Moreover, unlike the Pibor lowland Murle, the Boma Murle supported the Khartoum government which politically split the Murle people into two. Discrimination against the Murle community by SPLA/M plus internal political division of the Murle people undermined the power of *Alan ci merii* and deteriorated the relationships of the Murle people with the SPLA/M.

The appointed chiefs lost their trust with the government but in some cases obliged to gather information for the government. This was happened that the British colonial administration and the Khartoum government tried to disconnect the *Alan ci merii* from the people and substituted the 'appointed chiefs' to work with the government. Accordingly, the Khartoum government did not interact much with *Alan ci merii*, particularly in the town. The only *Alan ci merii* who had interaction with the Khartoum government was Ismail Konyi from the *Ngarothi* clan. He had good relation with the Khartoum government and established the PDF to give protection for the Pibor Murle

against the SPLA/M. Thus, unlike SPLA/M, the Arab militia leaders in Khartoum treated the Murle people in a good manner, and they did not raid their cattle and burnt their village.

The *Alan ci merii* who joined the movement also left their traditional role behind and incorporated into the wider Southern Sudan society (McCallum, 2013:129). However, the Murle *Alan ci merii* could not discarded its power because the Murle people believed that its power is given from *Tammu* and thus functional within the ordinary people of the Murle. In the SPLA/M, the Murle youth had exposure outside of the Pibor area and a few of them received education through missionaries. However, the majority of the Murle people joined neither the SPLA/M nor Khartoum, they moved from side to side as a survival strategy across the border of Ethiopia.

During the civil war, the SPLA/M's dominant group was the Dinka and the Nuer; both of them are not interested to have good contact with the Murle's *Alan ci merii*. They need to replace all red chiefs by non-red chiefs to destroy the system of the Murle people. This is because they worried that the Murle *Alan ci merii* has power to mobilize the Murle people against the SPLA/M, if the Khartoum government revitalizes the Murle chiefship system. For instance, Ismail Konyi – a paramount red chief from Ngarotti clan – has good intersection between the customary and divinely appointed authority of the *Alan ci merii* with the routine authority given by government and military sources. Ismail Konyi was able to negotiate the Murle local people with the Khartoum government by capturing traditional, military, and political power.

Besides government's political practices and SPLA/M disinterest regarding the Murle red chiefs, religious practices such as Presbyterian Church also weakened the power of *Alan ci merii*. The Presbyterian Church affects the Murle *Alan ci merii* and complicated the power of Murle traditional red chiefs and their popular acceptance. According to Obilio during fieldwork interview, the Murle elder, the *Alan ci merii* who joined the church could no longer use the curse to rule their clans: either not allowed to curse because of the teaching of the church, or they had lost their ability to curse when they converted to Christianity. However, the *Alan ci merii* still is a key marker of the ethnic identity of the Murle people but they are unable to control youth from conflict, cattle raid, and child abduction.

8.1.4 Social Stigma and Actions of the Murle Against their Neighbours

The Murle people feel under siege (McCallum, 2017) as they are constantly condemned by the government officials and local Nilotic neighbouring communities because of their frequent cattle raiding and child abduction. As a result of their reputation, any violent acts in their environment are automatically attributed to the Murle people. They cross the Ethiopian border and fight with their borderland Nilotic neighbours to raid cattle, abduct children, collect weapons, and monopolize pastureland and water, including fishponds.

During fieldwork interview, the Murle elders repeatedly told me that they feel unsafe outside of Pibor and Boma, fearing to go to Akobo and Bor town; it is too easy to go to the Ethiopian side to easily access pastureland, water, possible to confront with the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer. Another elder also narrated that “the Lou-Nuer and Dinka are well organized and armed; they are supported by SPLA/M, we fear them for our life,

they attacked us and loot our cattle, burn our village, kill women and children; thus we cross the Ethiopian border to revenge the Jikany-Nuer, use the land of Anyuua, abduct their children to compensate what we loss by Dinka and Lou-Nuer...this is because we could not survive in this environment without cattle and children.”

Because of the rough relation with their Nilotic neighbours in South Sudan and Gambella of Ethiopia, they harassed and oppressed not only by members of other ethnic groups, but also by the police, army, and other government institutions. Thus, they practiced child abduction by developing their own thought or cultural philosophy to enlarge their number of population in order to resist any oppression and monopolize the available natural resources. Besides child abduction, they practiced cattle raiding to enhance wealth and restock their ancestors' cattle by collecting from others. The Murle perceived and believed that all people outside of them are their enemy and they want to confront by taking military power. To do this, enlarging their number is their philosophy; however, their practices of cattle raiding and child abduction exposed them to be viewed by their neighbours as 'wild people', 'marauder people', 'thief people', 'boorish people' and the like. Such social stigma affects the Murle people and they vehemently abduct children from others and killed women and old people ruthlessly.

In the political environment, they have little representation at the state level and have few in the Diaspora. Such socio-political marginalization and economic deprivation hide the reality of Murle people and they have no one to respond for the negative discourse about Murle and then all external worlds understood the Murle as wild and fierce people. International organizations also fear to engage in their territory and consider it to be

insecure to work with them. Thus, blind fear and insecurity about Murle left Pibor and the area in a state of insecurity and under development; thus, the Murle youth are illiterate, and unable to go abroad through political or economic clout. They are idle and have restricted knowledge about development and wealth.

Likewise, the history of Murle people is part of the wider South Sudan history, one that also shaped by the colonial history, the North-South division, the introduction of Christianity through the work of missionaries, and the experience of civil war which all divided the Murle people as well as isolated them from their Nilotic neighbouring people – the Dinka, the Anyuaa, and the Nuer. Most of the Murle elders with whom I spoke during fieldwork research had a unique experience of the civil war; however, regarding the Murle people the surrounding political elites and people perceived a discourse that as a unique segment of people and isolated to indispensable cattle herdsman, change resistance, and unique ‘wild people’. All these perceptions affect the social, economic, and political relations of the Murle people with their neighbours.

8.1.5 Tactics of the Murle Youth Infiltrators to Raid Cattle

Cattle raiding and child abduction across the international border of Ethiopia and South Sudan has been a major source of borderland people socio-economic security problems. The phrases “cattle raiding” and “child abduction” refer to the forceful acquisition of livestock and children; which is quite common among the pastoralist communities of the Murle in South Sudan. Traditionally, according to Manyok (2016), cattle raiding occurred on a small scale, involving theft of the best cattle with minimal violence and no one abduct children or worried children who keep cattle. Historically, Murle is an adversary

group with the Anyuaa and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia, however, in the 19thc the weapons used by them during cattle raids or other disputes only included spears, sticks, maces, clubs, bows, and arrows which did not cause mass killings.

Although the cattle raiding and child abduction problem across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border has been existed for many decades, the purpose and tactics for cattle raiding and child abduction have changed. For instance, cattle raiding have grown into a large scale activity, involving dangerous weapons, machine guns, and massive loss of human lives by Murle youth infiltrators. The value of cattle increases for the Murle youth; they need cattle to have marriage, social capital, social status, wealth, and asset. If they don't have enough cattle, they couldn't marry because cattle are the sole bride price of marriage in the Pibor plain Murle people. If they have plenty of cattle, they can marry many wives as they have wealth and good social status in the local people; this is because the number of cattle is an indicator of their wealth and social status.

Accordingly, the Pibor lowland Murle youth raid cattle and abduct children from different neighbouring people but they do not have conflictive relation among themselves; however, sometimes they abduct children from the Boma plateau Murle community. During conflict with their neighbours, they support each other whether they are in the same clan and administer by the same *Alan ci merii* or not. They use "Murle" as a common identity which has enough ground for their collective mobility to defend against their enemy. However, during cattle raiding such kind of collective mobility is not important as such. Cattle raiding are a practice which depend on age-group and close friendship relations among the youth. This is because they want to support one another if

someone injured during confrontation. For instance, if a person is wounded, his friend will support him due to the fact that they belong to the same age-group either under the same *Alan ci merii* or not; otherwise if he is outside from his age-group, to give support the unwounded man may ask the wounded person to share his cattle when they arrive home, unless he leave in the bush.

Thus, to raid cattle from the remote area across the border, the Murle youth infiltrators used a type of cyclone tactics; which briefly discussed as follow. Firstly, they choose the dry season particularly three months of a year (February, March, and April) but they are not limited on these months. Before they move, they are blessed by their *Alan ci merii* and prepare their provision. The raiders and/or abductors typically spend several weeks or months in the surrounding areas outside the village and sometimes stay there throughout the dry season until they are able to collect the necessary number of cattle from the field. They eat fish, edible fruits, wild animals, and black soil to prevent starvation when they stay there. They raid cattle from distant cattle camps and confront the owners, and compelling the inhabitants.

Their tactic including spy to find the inhabiting place of large livestock and security gaps; build cattle camp in remote place of a forest/bush; collect cattle from the field without any confrontation and gather to bundle in their cattle camp; and militaristic guard. Based on their spy result, they also planned to raid large head of cattle from the camp of the Jikany-Nuer. At this time, all the member of infiltrators has different strategic tasks or assignments to accomplish their mission cooperatively such as some of them open the cattle camp or cattle stock and release the cattle into the field, some of them collect and

maneuver all the cattle, some of them ambush and open raid to confront the defenders, and some of them forcefully abduct children from the hand of a family (mostly from mothers).

To ride all collected cattle together, they used a unique stick known as *Nyibuk*. This stick is prepared from cattle skin and wood and they dabbed it with a lion fat. When they beat a cow, all cattle smell the lion odour and realized that a lion is approaching to them, thus they run away to escape from the lion. Using such unique stick, an individual raider can collect large head of cattle and ride them into any direction he wants. If someone or group tries to defend the Murle youth cattle raiders, they lay-about in massive with cyclone attack, and the defender lay-ahead as the Murle youth's infiltrators power is high and well organized. Besides *Nyibuk*, their riding tactics include cluster the cattle into two or three bands and maneuvered in different direction separately. They also change the direction of their shoes to leave a deceptive path.

From the Murle people, the most dangerous and tactical sub-clans in the Pibor plain are *Kumkum* and *Kien* who are more engaged in cattle raiding and child abduction. Both of them belong to the Ngarothi clan; they are the strongest and warrior group of the Murle and changed their tactics in different times. For instance, in 2016 the Anyuaa and the Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia were attacked by the Kien sub-clan from Ngarothi. This sub-clan raided 2000 cattle, abducted 137 children, and killed 224 people (see table 7.4). During their infiltration, they used a cyclone type of tactic to raid cattle, abduct children, and confront the defenders. They encircled the April 2016 raided cattle and abducted children in the place called *Jom* in Pibor.

8.2 Analysis of the Underlying Problems

8.2.1 The South Sudanese Political Instability

The civil war in Southern Sudan caused thousands of Southern Sudanese to flee the country and seek refuge in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia (Regassa, 2010). The heavy burden of the South Sudan civil war was taking place on the borderland region of Gambella, which creates unstable conditions on the local people. After the attainment of independence by South Sudan, many regional states remain lawless. For instance, Jonglei Regional State's peace largely remains elusive; amid relentless efforts to quell the violence by the South Sudan government, the international community, religious movements, and other South Sudan national organizations. To many, this does not come as a surprise because the peace restoration quest has been disjointed, full of conflicting and self-driven agendas, devoid of major strategic and visionary plans, and seldom reflective of the needs of the local people, who are the most afflicted.

The grievances put forth have been driven by a variety of assumptions. They are including the perceived state's inability to avail protection, security, and justice in an equitable manner, the disarmament exercise. Since 2006, inequities perceived in terms of development and distribution of national resources, as well as unequal or imbalanced political representation in the national government. Those massive problems of South Sudan affect the borderland peoples who were marginalized in every aspect of life from the government service and experienced to administer them through individual gun fighter and embedded in anarchy (Mbugua, 2012). Thus, the South Sudan central political

problems engulfed to the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland people and exposed them to social tensions that the gun holder is the only one who survive and protect from problem makers.

These problems further exacerbated by unfriendly environmental conditions and poor infrastructural facilities which, in turn, put undue stress on livelihoods and food security. Consequently, cross-border resource management along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border is not capable to secure the livelihood of the borderland people. The natural resources such as land and water control by some groups of people through the lens of tradition – intrinsic cultural assumption of resource possession. Besides, there is no infrastructure to satisfy the social and economic interest of the borderland people, unable to provide trans-border services, like electricity, power generation and distribution; and more difficult to increase societal safety and resilience.

Thus, the Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland region remains plagued by high violence, inadequate governments' authorities, and absence of civilian's law. The criminality and violence are meted out by various actors, cattle raiders, and child abductors top the list. Accordingly, the people who live along the border are thought as niches to that lowland ecological environment and cultivate polarization. They are ecologically interdependent and take several different forms and construct their boundaries of ethnic identity. The Murle ethnic groups are firmly closed themselves off against outsiders and could have less positive contact with their neighbours; regardless of whether they belong to the same ecology zone.

They occupy clearly distinct niches in the natural environment following the Veveno and Pibor Rivers in Boma and bargain to monopolize natural resources across the border. This place is strategic to defend their ethnic boundary and contact with their neighbours; the Anyuua and the Nuer. They, despite their surrounding residence, have limited contact through trade, ritual ceremony, and farming rather they confined to herdsman. They thought that they are the exclusive people with a right to have cattle and want to monopolize separate territory and this leads them to conflict with their neighbours.

Since independence of Sudan (1956), the Sudan Arab militia was closely worked with the Murle appointed 'chiefs' to detach them from the Anya-Nya I and II rebel groups using subtle forces and also encouraged the Murle youth to arm them to defend the rebel groups by supporting the Khartoum government. But, such propagation was pretext that the Khartoum government needed to use the Murle ethnic group as political instrument to fight the armed rebel group of Anya-Nya I and II. During subtle propagation of the Khartoum government, the Murle ethnic group was misleading by the Sudan's political elites; however, they had good opportunity to get modern weapon and strengthen their social power.

Regarding demographic balance and the effect of population size in multiethnic groups; Barth (1969) illustrates that a group's adaptation to a niche in nature is affected by its absolute size, while a group's adaptation to a niche constituted by another ethnic group is affected by its relative size. This illustration conceived that where one ethnic group has control of the means of production utilized by another group, a relationship of inequality and stratification obtains and this leads to hostile relations.

8.2.2 The Borderland Development Challenges

Following the 2005 CPA, South Sudan has enjoyed a relatively peace period, but recently, political instability has increased in different areas, including the Ethiopian borderland region. Their political instability manifested itself through an uprising in the prevalence of intergroup and inter-communal conflict, and cattle raiding; particularly across the adjacent borderland region of Boma and Gambella. This violence impacted more people and deteriorating the socio-economic situation of the borderland region. Accordingly, the borderland people of Boma and Gambella are vulnerable to widespread poverty because their economy is dependent on pastoral and/or agro-pastoral life that engaging in livestock keeping and subsistence agriculture.

The borderland region of Pibor and Jonglei in South Sudan is affected by long time civil war – from 1955 to 2005 – resulted in the expulsion and evacuation of outsiders from the area, including the missionary groups who were doing literacy education. For this matter, in the Pibor area there are a few schools and it is rare to find educated Murle person. A few Murle men from Pibor plain are educated in the Military of SPLA/M or at a missionary school at an earlier time, and outside of the Murle homeland in Kenya and Uganda.

They are unable to educate their people and have no enough potential to write an article to introduce their people to the external world. They do not engage in political participation and unable to take over the leading position to create one political people. Because of all this, the Murle are perceived by others as a people who resist any kind of development and change. In this case, they are more excluded from socio-economic

interactions which pushed them to depend on pastoral life as their main livelihood is cattle.

For the Murle, cattle are an indicator of wealth and social standing, often used in restorative justice, spiritual activities, and bride price of marriage. Thus, the engagement of Murle in successful cattle raiding demonstrates the transition of the male youth from adolescence to maturity. On the other hand, the Anyuaa people are agrarian and culturally possessed the arid land including the right and left banks of the rivers which strongly connected with their ancestors. Culturally, they believe that Gambella is the land of their ancestors and want to preserve this land possession for both cultural assumption and shifting cultivation.

The cultural significance and importance of cattle for Murle and Jikany-Nuer, and land to Anyuaa people have placed them at the epicenter of confrontations and conflicts in pursuit of ethnocentric attitude of social status and superiority in the community. Both Murle and Jikany-Nuer need pastureland and water for their cattle and move from place to place following the season without border restriction; however, the Anyuaa possessed plenty of pastureland and water area for their shifting cultivation, at the same time they have close cultural attachment with land.

Besides this intrinsic cultural assumption towards resources, the lack of infrastructure and pervasive economic deprivation of the borderland people are the major socio-economic security problems that have led to the deterioration of their development conditions. The legacy of infighting and war among the different political parties, tribal and military factions of South Sudan devalue the development prospects for the borderland people.

Furthermore, the Murle, the Anyuaa, and the Nuer along the border face many significant challenges, especially in the development of the political, social, and economic infrastructure.

According to Kuek, et al. (2014), the education system in South Sudan as being disorganized, fragmented, and consists of a patchwork of schools that are seasonal and temporary, with a disjointed mission and vision. The Murle area is heavily affected by the lack of schooling, trained teachers and support staff, and the lack of an organized and proven education curriculum for its children.

In the Murle community, education is very low and has limited employment opportunity for their youth. Most of them work from homes or are idle. Their main responsibility is to take care of cattle, owned by the family. This lack of means for acquiring wealth makes them vulnerable, especially the male youth, to join cattle raiding groups with the objective of acquiring more wealth for them to have marriage. The relationship between limited education and cattle raiding is mutually perpetuating. While the low level of education instigates and enhances cattle raiding, this affects the provision of quality education and the attendance of children and youth in the schools.

Moreover, during cattle raid and child abduction, the Anyuaa and the Jikany-Nuer people lost their lives, thus they individually develop a craving for revenge for the lives they lost by Murle's youth attacks. Thus, most of the attacks are vengeance due to the wrongdoings of Murle's youth infiltrators across the border. The growing cycle of violence that exists between Murle and their neighbours along the border is not mainly seeking material gain, but motivated by a desire for vengeance. Richardson (2011)

explained that without acceptable forms of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms or security agents to prevent the criminal activities, cattle raiding and child abduction has for years entrapped these communities in a loop of retaliation.

The rate of youth unemployment is extremely high in Pibor, possibly explaining why most of the Pibor Murle involved in the numerous conflict-related activities along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. The politicians and rich businessmen in South Sudan have become one of the main groups instigating cattle raiding in the region (Rolandson, 2011). They assisted the raider groups by acquiring guns, ammunition, and ready market for the stolen cattle. Poor leadership in the country has enabled the Murle raiders, creating a gap used as an opportunity to gang upon and successfully conduct the raids.

8.2.3 Division of the Murle People and their Marginalization

Socially, economically, and politically – the Murle people are insecure in the Pibor plain area. They are marginalized from government services and public interactions. The neighbouring people such as the Dinka and the Lou-Nuer; the SPLA/M; the government administration; Diasporas; and others blame the Murle people as a source of unrest in the region. They pressured them in different ways and then Murle youth retreat to the borderland region to take refuge and use the Ethiopian side of the border as a leeway.

The Murle people in the Pibor plain suffered more by the SPLA/M due to the domination of Dinka and Nuer in the SPLA/M soldiers. As a result, to protect the local Murle people, Ismail Konyi formed the Pibor Defense Force (PDF) with the support of Sudan Armed Force (SAF) and Khartoum government (McCallum, 2013). The establishment of PDF

forced the Murle people to split into two groups – people who support the PDF and people who support the SPLA/M movement. The division of the Murle elites during the civil war created a dire situation for the Murle local people and aggravated their socio-economic marginalization and political disillusion.

With their division in the period of the civil war, they are oppressed by the SPLA/M on one hand and SAF/Khartoum on the other hand, which exacerbated their social instability. To mitigate such social and political instability, different organizations – such as PACT-Sudan, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), and the Presbyterian Church – made an effort to reunify the Murle elites. Their effort includes intra-Murle dialogue by addressing the suffering of the local Murle.

Accordingly, first they tried to make negotiation between the Nasir Faction and Torit Faction with a peace conference in Wunlit in 1999 (McCallum, 2013). Following this conference, according to McCallum (2013), the Liliir East Bank Conference was held in 2000 to bring together the Murle people with other neighbouring people – Dinka, Anyuaa, Nuer, Jie, Kachipo, and others. This conference aimed to minimize the social gaps among the neighbouring people, more specifically to reduce tensions between the Murle and Dinka by returning the abducted children and raided cattle. This encouraged the local neighbouring people to cooperate and share the available grazing field and water; furthermore, to improve their social harmony.

In doing so, the Murle Peace Committee organized an inter-Murle conference to bring the Murle group who supported Khartoum – Ismail Konyi – and those who supported the SPLA/M in 2003 by the support of PACT-Sudan to reduce the suffering of the Murle

local people. The meeting was recommended with the goal of narrowing the political distance between the PDF and the Murle SPLA/M (PACT, 2006). However, their plan was resisted by the two Murle Faction leaders – Ismail Konyi (the PDF leader) and Commander Kennedy (the leader of the Murle group in the SPLA/M). Ismail needed to hold the meeting in Lekuwangole while Kennedy needed it to be in Boma.

According to the historical narration of the Murle elders, the Murle peace committee members had a discussion with Ismail and Kennedy in Lekuwangole and Boma respectively; both of them promised to attend the meeting. They had a plan to organize the meeting in Lekuwangole; however, the 2003 intra-Murle peace meeting in Lekuwangole failed because Kennedy did not attend the meeting rather delegated another person. Though the intra-Murle dialogue was no longer pursued, the situation paved the way to reunify the two factions of Murle community by making a basic agreement among the Murle leadership.

All groups' activity in the area could not bring a lasting solution to the dire socio-economic and political situations of the Murle people in Pibor. In spite of the CPA in 2005, the Juba Declaration in 2006, and the effort to reunify the Murle community, the situation in Pibor did not change much (Large, 2012). The interactions between the Murle and their neighbours continued to degenerate and the relationship between Murle and the state government in Bor town also deteriorated. The Murle traditional leaders also undermined and lost much of their moral authority during the civil war and the subsequent period. Religious authorities, government officials, Humanitarians, Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGO), and other international communities have failed to penetrate into the remote areas of the Murle land.

The Murle youth have lost trust with their neighbours and government bodies. Those problems paved the way for violence to continue in the area. To reduce their dire situation, the South Sudan government undertook a disarmament campaign in 2007. Ismail Konyi led the first civilian-led voluntary disarmament campaign and collected 3,210 guns from Murle armed civilians (McCallum, 2013). Due to the traditional antagonistic relations of Murle with their neighbours, the disarmament campaign created a security gap between Murle and their neighbours.

The political deterioration of Sudan also affected the Murle people but no Murle fled abroad and none had an opportunity to get modern education. On the other hand, many Dinka and Nuer groups fled to abroad and have gotten modern education. This social activity and socio-political exposure make a difference between Murle and their neighbours in the post-CPA political activity in South Sudan. This by itself exposed the Murle people to others to consider them as ‘savage’ and ‘wild’ people. The Diaspora communities of Dinka and Nuer began to publish damaging reports about the Murle community. The “Save Yar” campaign to end child abduction which spearheaded by effective use of the media and Internet for anti-Murle rhetoric is also part of it.

Due to their lower economic and socio-political activities in South Sudan, in the dominant discourse, they are often viewed as aggressors and wild. They are blamed by politicians and other group of their neighbours for the insecurity of the region. However, due to their acceptance in the politics of South Sudan, their political leaders are unable to

win in their political elections. For instance, in 2010, David Yau Yau⁸⁷ loses his election and established a new Murle militia to show his necessity and power balance.

According to the report of the SAS (2011), David's militia attacked on SPLA/M convoys and soldiers' camps, and raid cattle from Ethiopian community by crossing the international border and rumors that he supported from George Athor's rebellion in Upper Nile and Khartoum Government. However, he entered in a peace talk and ceasefire agreement with GoSS in September, 2010. Accordingly, in 2011 he got an official pardon by SPLA/M officials to integrate his militia with SPLA/M military. However, the SPLA/M leaders could not ally with David's militia and did not treat him as a positive influence on South Sudanese political stability.

In due course, David formed and equipped a new Murle militia force in April 2012 in Pibor County. Of course, his deviant activity was not continued more than a year before he made an agreement with the SPLA/M government by making political arrangement of administration. On this political administrative arrangement, the Murle people were separated from Dinka and Lou-Nuer (Jonglei State) and established the Great Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). The Murle soldiers under David Yau Yau also joined with SPLA/M and David become the governor of GPAA. Later, when the GoSS restructured the Regional States of South Sudan from 10 to 28, GPAA was changed into the Boma State. However, this political and administration arrangements could not solve the root socio-economic problems of the Murle people.

⁸⁷ David is from alan ci merii Ngaroti clan. He had received theological training in Kenya during the war. According to McCallum (2013), David run for member of parliament of the Boma-Gumukur constituency in Jonglei state with the United Democratic Front (UDF). He lost the election to the SPLA/M candidate, Judy Jongeli, subsequently formed a militia group in May 2010.

8.2.4 Malfunctioning of the Murle Chieftainship System

The age-set system is “a means of control and resolution, stating that within pastoralist societies there is the basic dichotomy between their individual autonomy and their simultaneous need for cooperation” (Lamphear, 1998:79). McCallum (2013) argues that the age-set systems provided an outlet for young men’s aggression and expressions of independence within their societies. In other words, age-class systems emerged as institutions to moderate and control the potential violence of the younger men, who, somewhat ironically, are entrusted with the security of the society. Therefore, based on scholars’ argument, the age-set systems provided a role which the young men could take in relation to their elders and the rest of the society, although the elders often provided staunch opposition to the younger men breaking free from their religious and socio-economic control.

According to Kurimoto (1998), age systems provide a social framework to institutionalizing both stratified relations between seniors and juniors and egalitarian relations among peers. Moreover, the age-sets are a vital factor in inter-ethnic relations between pastoralists, both in times of conflict and in peace with significant interactions between the age-sets of different ethnic groups. According to Simonese (1998), among the pastoralists in South Sudan, as well as parts of Kenya, age-sets between pastoral groups often had a lot of interactions, both in peace and war, as well as influence on the development of the age-set systems of other groups.

The Murle have no strong political institutions and leadership, however, they have three traditional institutions that serve as ‘courts’ and socio-cultural leaders and they are

important to the continuum of Murle unity and identity. They are: Red chief – the *Alan ci merii*; *Korokjok* – the extended family and clan; and *buul* – ‘generations’ or age-sets. These three institutions also maintain the role of the government in the community affairs, however, they are affected by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration, the civil war, and the Presbyterian Church with some changes and subtly forced those institutions to adapt and incorporate the changes into their system.

Within this social structure, power and authority has been concentrated at *korok* level. This seems like centralized political leadership but it is not the same as political administration. However, power is linked with resource access and control such as women and cattle at a household level (Andretta, 1985). The red chiefs or *Alan ci merii* do provide a form of leadership, which is not political but moral and spiritual nature. The *Alan ci merii* power that exercises a hold over the Murle people is derived from their ability to curse, the lineage system, and respect that the community holds for them as individuals. However, the *Alan ci merii* do not involve themselves in the day to day dispute and problems of the people; and leave these issues to be solved by the age-sets and *korok* elders.

But, due to amorphous nature of Murle’s social structure, there is no specific category of youth; however, they do have a strong age-set system that forms a core part of their identity as a community. The Murle refers to the age-set system as a generation – *buul*; however, it is not based on a grade that a cohort passes through and no clearly identified age-sets. In the Murle age-set system, there is no socially or ritually demarcated grade of elder and a man’s socially status does not primarily emerge from the criterion of age. As I

observed during fieldwork, the Murle youth generations have their own distinction to identify one from another that they have different names, wear different bead colors, and use different hairstyles.

Those institutions are central to the Murle identity to resist the increased external social, economic, cultural, and political pressures. The Murle people are surrounded by a complex history of discursive practice and evolving power dynamics in South Sudan, which reduced the power of Murle red chiefs or *Alan ci merii*. The socio-economic and political dynamism of the region duly affects the role of Murle *Alan ci merii* and empowers the ‘appointed chief’ as it served as intermediary for the government administration. This indirectly cultivates the colonial legacy that was biased toward the ‘appointed chiefs’ and shifted the power dynamics of the Murle *Alan ci merii* by eradicating and destructing the legacy of the Murle traditional chiefship system.

Thus, the Murle people are fractured; the local patterns and authority of the red chiefs was undermined during the civil war and the subsequent period. Accordingly, the Murle red chiefs or *Alan ci merii* lost much of their power and moral authority which render their ability to control the Murle youth. In this case, the essence and power of the Murle red chief eroded gradually and then the Murle youth do not recognize the spiritual authority of the *Alan ci merii*. They do have more attachment with age-set groups that they have access to gun to raid cattle and abduct children, which deteriorate the socio-economic security of the borderland people.

Currently, a number of age-groups are competing to have various levels of primacy, which is also reveals in the Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma. In time of the Sudan civil

war and the subsequent period, the age-groups are strong and influential to rule the Murle people. Consequently, informants put forth their influences and how they validate the Murle red chiefs' power in the Murle people.

The Murle age-sets remain strong throughout the two civil wars and even after South Sudan independence. A member of age-group remains in the specific age-group whatever he goes to the highest level of education and strongly participate. The age-group come together to dance, sing, and discuss on their affairs – family, cattle, child, security, and other internal affairs of the age-group. They have access to gun from rebels and thus they have close attachment with rebel leaders which gradually eroded the power of *Alan ci merii*; compete to each other, the winner age-group rule the community and exercise their traditional power.

Interview on 13 July 2018 at Ukugu refugee camp in Dimma

Among the different age-groups, Bothoth and Lango are the two youngest age-groups in the Murle people. They are too strong to rule their community and had interest to listen the *Alan ci merii*. According to the Murle culture, no one depends on his biological father after he reached to rule the community and ready to fight with enemy. Those strong age-groups are interested to make alignment with rebels and gradually apart the *Alan ci merii*. This is the legacy of the Sudanese civil war and they have more access to light weapons and able them to live out of rule. As such, some *Alan ci merii* encouraged the rebels and deviance age-groups due to their complicated social, economic, and political matters.

Before the civil war, the *Alan ci merii* were seen as the ultimate authority because of their ability to curse, even to death. However, the SPLA/M killed many of the *Alan ci merii* during the civil war, and the younger age-groups have seen that a gun is more effective than a curse. Accordingly, the Bothoth age-group listen to and aligned with Ismail Konyi,

the leader of PDF because he gave freedom to them to move and do what they want, and they respect him as the paramount chief of Murle.

Youth in the Pibor plain Murle are very frustrated, have no option for other livelihood, and are hopeless for their future. They depend on cattle and always stay at the cattle camp to control the environs. To manage their life, they need strong warrior and leader who have access to gun. For this reason, they have less interaction with the Murle *Alan ci merii* unless the *Alan* himself should part of gun finder. This situation makes the Murle *Alan ci merii* to feel powerless; however, the system is still functional in the ordinary people.

8.2.5 Exclusion and Idleness of the Murle Youth

After the Murle red chiefs/kings – *Alan ci merii* substituted by “appointed chiefs”, the Murle youth are neither under the Murle *Alan ci merii* nor the “appointed chiefs.” They were confused and exposed for different armed fighters and conflict actors such as SPLA/M, PDF, SAF/Khartoum, and Arab Jabal Militia. They are also excluded from social and political structures of any armed groups while all use the Murle youth for fighting. On the other hand, they are idle in the community but they couldn’t marry if they have no at least forty to fifty cattle for bride price.

Accordingly, throughout this research investigation, the following driving factors are identified that the exclusion and idleness of the Murle youth resulted them to the practical engagement of infiltration for pervasive cattle raiding, child abduction, and violent confrontations. They are: the availability of guns and other types of dangerous weapons

among members of the communities; increasing commercialization of the looted cattle; incitement from political leaders and self-serving businessmen; high rates of poverty and the need to accumulate wealth; idleness of the youth and lack of other means to generate income; traditional values and a long history of cattle raiding encouraged by the community leaders; high rates of illiteracy; and increasing bride price.

Ease of access to guns and other weapons was considered as the main cause of the intense frequency of cattle raid and child abduction. Besides availability of guns, Murle youth participate in the “Cobra Faction” of Murle soldiers led by David Yau Yau and have more skills that had now given them power and ability that allows them to overcome any resistance; and enable them to move away with massive numbers of cattle during raid.

Most people in South Sudan and Ethiopia along the border live in the rural areas where livestock is the main source of livelihood. In response to increased cases of cattle raiding and child abduction, the civilians keep weapons and light arms to protect their livestock herds from cattle raiders. The failure of the South Sudan and Ethiopian national governments to provide security to their people along the border exposed the borderland people to access weapons, compete to each other, defend them, and protect their households and communities. These self-protection mechanisms devalue their social interactions due to imbalance natural resource distribution and over-grazing. The people, therefore, keep weapons as a form of deterrence power against attacks on the occupied territory. Moreover, since South Sudan has been torn by many forms of ethnic and political violence, the anticipation of renewed violence is a major reason for the people feeling the need to arm them.

The other issue is food insecurity which is a major cause of anxiety and violence among the borderland communities both in Ethiopia and South Sudan. Droughts, violence, and displacement of inhabitants all disrupt the planting season for most of the people and cut off access to food markets all through the borderland area. Accordingly, along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border food insecurity crisis affects different groups of people in different ways. For instance, internally displaced persons are trying to find safe place and move to the area that not affected by war. They are affected by malnutrition which is widespread among the people from displaced communities and worsens as time passes and war continues. This drives the displaced people to seek food for themselves and their livestock in those parts of the country that have not yet been affected by war and displacement. The result becomes a continuous confrontation between the earlier settlers and the internally displaced people.

In the practice of cattle raiding and child abduction, traditional values had a minimal role in the decisions of the people to participate in conducting activities. The main traditional element that incites cattle raiding and child abduction is the requirements of bride price to marriage. These requirements gave high value to cattle. For them, cattle remain the most valued animal because they are their main source of livelihood.

The number of cattle that one has determines his social position in the community. Moreover, as Wassara (2007) emphasizes, people use cattle to pay fines for the mistakes and crimes they have committed against the community, e.g. statutory rape fine and blood restitution fine in the case of accidental killing. Cattle represent not only wealth for the people of Murle and Jikany-Nuer, but also their social status and actual source of

existence in the society. Thus, possessions of cattle give men prestige and wealth; and are used for purification during religious ceremonies by members of the communities.

From the interpretation of interviews and researcher's field notes, it is clear that the value of cattle in the Murle and Jikany-Nuer provide the young men with powerful incentives to engage in cattle raids. Because raiding cattle from other communities is a way to establish their reputation within their community and build their own herds, young men are the main participants in the raids. The culture of Murle community has a major influence upon their frequent use of cattle raids and child abductions. As described by Kennedy and Thomas (1995), culture includes socially acquired knowledge, beliefs, arts, laws, morals, customs, and habits. It is a system of life that influences and determines the lives, activities, and behavior of people.

This deep-seated belief in raiding is then encouraged and perpetuated by the political leaders who have either an economic or a political interest in promoting the same beliefs and cultural system that places them in those powerful positions. In today's world, the outcome is that, largely through self-interested, powerful individuals, warrior herdsmen who for generations have conducted the raids with simple, traditional weapons have now acquired strong, dangerous weapons which make today's raids deadly. In time of fieldwork research, I observed that there are guns everywhere at the hand of youth most probably 16-25 years of age – the situations seem that “Gun is Life” or “Gun is Food” – which indicate that gun helps them to survive in that environment. Even women are armed and it is easy for anyone who wants to kill more people because of the guns. So, cattle raiding and child abduction has been a cultural practice by the Murle youth for

different generations. This leads to a continuous cycle of violence against Jikany-Nuer and Anyuua along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border.

8.3 Analysis to the Underlying Impacts

8.3.1 Structural Violence Against the Murle

Many significant battles were carried out in the Murle land and some red chief background of Murle *Alan ci merii* involved in the Anya-Nya rebel groups and later in the SPLA/M movement. On the other hand, since colonial period to South Sudanese independent, the Murle people involved neither in politics nor in economics of the region. However, either due to isolation or lack of Murle political elites in South Sudan politics, the Murle involvement in the Sudan civil war is not adequately documented. The following sections discuss structural violence against the Murle regarding socio-political violence and massacre.

8.3.1.1 Socio-Political Violence against the Murle

The majority battles of Sudan's civil war took place in the Southern region, particularly in the areas of Murle residence. However, the Murle community was isolated and had little interaction with the wider political dynamics ongoing in Southern Sudan until 1962 (McCallum, 2013). This limited political activity hindered Murle from actively participating and involvement in the first civil war of Sudan. According to McCallum (2013), only fifty Murle left Pibor to join Anya-Nya I, and only eleven were given rank in the movement. Informants told me that large numbers of Anya-Nya supporters in the

Pibor town were imprisoned by the District Commissioner, Hassan Ngachingol⁸⁸, who was against Anya-Nya I because of accusations of Murle collaboration with the rebels.

Of that period, according to the oral narration of Murle, only two Murle gained reputation within the Anya-Nya I movement namely John Tholomuthe and John Kireru. As one former member of Anya-Nya II from the Anyuaa people at Pochalla stated during the interview “the Murle didn’t have political elite to help them. They have been seen by others Anya-Nya members as lower class and lacked education. However, a few Murle such as Tholomuthe, Kireru, Ngakavera, Arani, and some others were educated. Among them Kireru was injured in the fighting at Boma and withdrew from Anya-Nya I.” This lowest visibility of participation of Murle in Anya-Nya I and the pro-Khartoum actions of Hassan Ngachingol affected the Murle’s political position and they were viewed as Khartoum sympathizers during the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, which closed the first civil war.

This agreement gave a chance for Southern Sudan self-rule but a campaign started against the Murle to punish them for what Hassan Ngachingol had done in support of Khartoum. After the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement, Abel Alier Kwai, from Dinka, played a significant role in negotiating and became Sudan’s first vice President from 1972 to 1981, and then he established the South Sudan autonomous region under his leadership. But the Murle were excluded from positions within the new government of

⁸⁸ Hassan Ngachingol (1918-1965), originally called David Ngachingol Arut, a Murle educated man at Khartoum, on conversion to Islam took the Muslim name Hassan. He was sent as the District Commissioner to Pibor Post after independence – an interview with Murle elders – Baaba, Kaka, and Oleo at Akugu Refugee Camp of Dima, Ethiopia on 04 September 2016.

Southern Sudan region due to suspicions that their previous limited involvement in Anya-Nya I meant that they favored the Khartoum government.

At the beginning of the Anya-Nya II movement, students from the South region at Khartoum University saw the direction in which the Khartoum government was moving with regards the South (McCallum, 2013). Thus, a politically conscious Murle man called Nyachigak Ngachuluk and Pagan Amum began to hold rallies for students in Upper Nile. In 1982, they “went to the bush”⁸⁹ in Bilfam, Ethiopia with 600 Murle who had joined the Anya-Nya II movement (McCallum, 2013). According to Ryle, et al. (2012), Pagan Amum is from the Shuluk community in Upper Nile who joined the second rebellion against Khartoum, initially with Anya-Nya II and later with SPLA/M.

The SPLA/M⁹⁰ was established at Bilfam, Ethiopia in 1983 – in the Itang special district of Gambella; currently known as Berhane-Selam (Puldeng) – with the support of the Ethiopian government. The establishment of SPLA/M had an objective to lead the rebellion groups in unified form to fight the Khartoum government; due to this reason they sought to incorporate the Anya-Nya II rebels into the new political groups. This strategy aimed to bring all the South Sudan rebel groups together under one leader. However, at this time, the Murle rebel group under Lukuronyang and Nyachigak Ngachuluk with more than 500 soldiers was located at Raat along the border of Ethiopia in Dimma district. The Murle group that belonged to Anya-Nya II had no option to get weapons and external support but they had good team spirits. Then in 1983 they fought

⁸⁹ The Murle informants refer the rebel group of Murle by the phrase “went to the bush”

⁹⁰ This information gathered from the SPLA/M members regarding to the establishment of SPLA/M and Murle’s activity to the movement.

with SAF and captured the Boma town in Pibor County for two weeks. However, they could not sustain themselves in Boma more than two weeks because of their weapons constraints and lack of external support. With their weak position in terms of weapons, the SAF attacked them and recaptured Boma town; then the Anya-Nya II rebels of Murle group went back to Raat, Ethiopia.

According to the narration of Murle elders, the new political group, SPLA/M, led by Dr. John Garang had established relationships with Ethiopian Government to get support in the form of guns and other logistics. The SPLA/M new leaders need to encourage the leaders of Murle rebel group in Anya-Nya II – Lukuronyang and Nyachigak Ngachuluk – to join the SPLA/M. For this reason, with the support of an Ethiopian Government helicopter, Garang with two other SPLA/M officials flew to Raat in October 1983 to convince Lukuronyang and Nyachigak Ngachuluk to join the movement. Lukuronyang resisted the interest of Garang's team and was unwilling to join the SPLA/M movement while Nyachigak Ngachuluk accepted their request. The Murle group lacked guns and Nyachigak Ngachuluk needed to join with SPLA/M to solve this problem but Lukuronyang do not want to find guns through this way. Eventually, the Murle rebel soldiers sided with Nyachigak to join the SPLA/M and went to Bonga, Gambella and Lukuronyang also put into prison and killed in Bonga.

8.3.1.2 Massacres against the Murle Civilians

The Murle rebel group of Anya-Nya II in Raat came to Bonga under the leader of Nyachigak Ngachuluk for training. At the end of the training, Nyachigak Ngachuluk was made the commander of the Agarab battalion by the nick name of “Scorpion” with 280 Murle soldiers under SPLA/M (McCallum, 2013). However, other SPLA/M troops settled in Pibor area – elements of Lou-Nuer and Dinka Bor troops – using their access to guns took the advantage of military power on the local people of Murle. The Dinka SPLA/M troops took revenge on their traditional enemies of the Murle for their practices of cattle raiding and child abduction. Using their modern weapons, the SPLA/M troops of Dinka and Nuer menacing the local Murle people and took their cattle and food. The Murle people around Pibor suffered a lot.

The SPLA/M fought with SAF and PDF militia in Pibor area. In 1985, the SPLA/M attacked the Boma in eastern Pibor for three days and able to capture the town. After this victory, Nyachigak Ngachuluk was lifted into high military command of the SPLA/M. Nyachigak was the only Murle in the SPLA/M high command throughout the Sudan civil war. According to the narration of the Murle informants, Ngachigak was killed during fighting in Kapoeta in 1988 and no one Murle replaced his position in the SPLA/M. Many Murle joined the SPLA/M movement under Ngachigak’s role and the relation of Murle local people with Dinka Bor and Lou-Nuer was improved; however, after his death the Murle situation was deteriorated and created big gaps between the local Murle people and the movement (SPLA/M).

According to McCallum (2013), a number of massacres against the Murle civilians for their role in supporting the PDF were made in the late 1980s by the SPLA/M. Some Murle prominent elders also narrated the situation that the SPLA/M attacked a number of Murle villages such as Nanaam, Lekuwangole, Gumuruk, Veveno, and Kongor around the Nanaam River with tanks; what they called it as Nanaam Massacre. The Murle elders remembered the massacre and explain as follow.

The Nanaam massacre was made by SPLA/M force, which led by Salva Kiir, a Dinka ethnic, to revenge Murle people through the SPLA/M military power because the Dinka is the typical enemy of Murle. In this massacre we lost many people. Besides, the SPLA/M force attacks the Murle people at Marwuo (a Murle place between Pibor and Boma) in 1989, what we call the Marwuo massacre. During this time, the SPLA/M force also killed large number of Murle people. Thus, the Nanaam and Marwuo massacres were exacerbated the hostile relations of Murle people with their Nilotic neighbours.

Interview with the Murle elder on 25 June 2017

McCallum (2013) also discussed the Nanaam and Marwuo Massacre as she was worked in South Sudan based on the military explanation of the Murle situations. Given that the SPLA/M force was dominated by Dinka and Nuer, the Murle had no social interaction with them due to the contentious South Sudan political circumstances. The high command of the SPLA/M was reluctant to recruit Murle to their cause, and instead revived the historical enmity concept of the Dinka word “Beir” – the Murle is the people who create social tension on the Dinka and the Lou-Nuer through cattle raiding and child abduction. In this understanding, neither Khartoum nor SPLA/M tried to have access to negotiate and harmonize the Murle people with other Nilotic neighbours to create one

political people rather they remained isolated from political and economic activities; which exposed them for socio-political structural violation.

8.3.2 Social Disorder, Poverty, and Insecurity

Some impacts are increased poverty among the borderland communities, loss of lives during the raids and abduction, more killings in confrontation, destruction of the social order and relationships among the borderland people. Ajalla Obuya⁹¹ explained that the increased cases of cattle raids and child abduction have discouraged the borderland people from making investments in the area, due to fear that such investments would attract thieves and cattle raiders, leading to the destruction of what they have worked for. In the opinion of majority interviewee, cattle raiding and child abduction have become the main source of confrontations and clashes between Murle and their neighbours.

The impacts of cattle raiding and child abduction are wide spread and affect not only the lives of people in those involved communities but also the entire borderland region. Extensive poverty and destruction of property during cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation have direct linkage. Cattle are the main source of wealth and children are the main part of human power that become source of poverty for whom lost cattle and children by raiders and abductors. Another consequence is that most of the youth die during their productive ages since they are the ones who are mainly involved in the raids and abduction. This greatly hinders development among the communities where borderland peoples' life depends on youths.

⁹¹ Ajalla Obuya is a young man lives in Gog – who displaced from Ujallo Village and made an interview on 17 January 2017.

The practice of cattle raiding and child abduction has led to despair and extreme poverty among the participant communities. The massive losses of both property and livestock, as well as the tendency of affected communities forced to flee seeking refuge during the clashes. Today, pastoral communities have continued to face great financial hardships, due to their persistent marginalization and the escalation of raiding and abducting activities. The practice has continually impoverished the pastoralist communities and with the recent commercialization of cattle raiding activities, it is only the self-serving traders and political leaders that continue to benefit at the expense of the involved communities.

During confrontations, due to the availability of modern weapon, a number of innocent people are killed. For instance, women and young children seem to be the main group that is heavily affected by these clashes and the main victims of the ruthless search for wealth. Contradictory to the traditional and cultural norms, the women and girls are hardly ever secure. In fact, there are widespread violations of the fundamental human rights of women and girls during clashes, including rape, murder, torture, mistreatment, and neglect. Furthermore, one respondent pointed out that war and violence leave women in situations where they cannot make ends meet and succeed in their lives.

Another main pervasive impact of cattle raiding and child abduction is its tendency to break down and destroy the social order. This, in turn leads to other confrontations for vengeance. It is believed that the borderland people along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border have negative perception of each other, which have intensified popularized due to the intense competition for dominance in the region. When each community believes

itself to be superior over the other communities, they believe that they have the right to take cattle and occupy the land held by people in the other communities. This produces uncertainty which each community, as well as the external parties, wants to exploit to their advantage.

8.3.3 Family Disconcertedness and Social Instability

Families of the borderland people are disconcerted due to the frequent child abduction; which gradually created social instability. Child abduction is unauthorized removal of a child under the age of legal adulthood from the child's natural family either by force or steals. The child abduction practice can be classified into parental child abduction – abduct by members of child's family or relatives; and stranger child abduction – abduct by stranger outside of family members.

To prevent such parental and stranger child abduction, international convention on the right of the child, as a standard setting accomplishment of the United Nations in human rights concern, would make a positive contribution to protecting children's rights and trying to ensure their well-being. However, stranger groups of people abduct children from other communities for criminal purposes including extortion, illegal adoption, human trafficking, and murder. Parental child abduction is regarded by law, however, stranger child abduction has no full attention by law because it is rare in the world but it is common along the Ethiopia-South Sudan international border.

The stranger of Murle infiltrators cross this international border and abduct children from the borderland communities of Ethiopia. Murle infiltrators are the most dangerous child

abductors in the region and across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. Their motivations for child abduction are two-fold: (1) to increase their population and therefore be more competitive in the region and gain more control over resources; (2) to later trade the children for cattle.

These infiltrators prefer to abduct very young children, mostly between two months and four years old, due to the children's early stage in physical and cognitive development and language acquisition. Because children from two to seven years old can learn any language as a mother tongue, the Murle prefer to teach young children their language, cultural values, and norms and supplant their cultural background.

The Anyuua and Nuer people are the primary victims of these abductions. In 2016, a band of Murle infiltrators crossed the Ethiopian border from South Sudan and abducted 137 children from three districts of the Nuer Zone and the Gog district of the Anyuua zone. They locked the children alone inside a hut surrounded by heavily armed men, and gave them only milk during their captivity in the place called *Jom* in Pibor. Ethiopian troops crossed into South Sudan looking for the abducted children but could only rescue 93 children in that operation. The rest have not yet been repatriated. The 2016 abduction stands out for the number of children taken, but child abductions have been increasing in previous years, and neither the Ethiopian government nor the local administration has taken steps to actively protect its citizens along the border.

The Murle's child abduction practice has disturbed every family of the Anyuua and the Nuer along the border, and even the local administration could not take any measures to rescue the abducted children. Previously, the Murle infiltrators avoided casualties while

carrying out their raids as to not draw attention to their activities, sometimes combining the abductions with cattle raiding. Thus, the central governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan did not pay the situation much attention.

Nevertheless, child abduction represents a serious human rights violation that, under international law, should be condemned. Murle youth infiltrators' activities tear apart families, typically from the Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer people. Child abduction across international borders is the most heart-wrenching of all, and it violates family law and fundamental human rights. The Murle infiltrators are stranger who removes a child, usually a baby, from Anyuua, Jikany-Nuer, and other people across the border with the intent to bring up the child as their own and inculcate the children with their cultural practices and values.

In some cases, South Sudan should be responsible to enforce her rule of law and restrain the Murle from child abduction and cross-border attacks against civilians and to ensure respect for human rights. The 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction⁹² at The Hague establishes legal procedures for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained, and it is the most significant international treaty pertaining to the prevention of international child abduction. However, Ethiopia and South Sudan are not a party to The Hague Convention. The failure of both countries to agree to the convention is becoming one of the challenges to follow the rules that outlined about child abduction and thus their legal institutions are unable to support the return of abducted children.

⁹² https://www.unicef.org/protection/hague_on_child_abduction.pdf

On the other hand, both Ethiopia and South Sudan could not ratify the African Charter for the Rights and Welfare of the Child⁹³ and the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child⁹⁴, which exacerbate the challenges to combat child abduction practices in the region. Regarding their limited practices of international and regional Child Rights Convention, the borderland people child rights violate and they unable to provide adequate security for vulnerable groups and not able to allege child abductors by law.

⁹³ https://www.unicef.org/esaro/African_Charter_articles_in_full.pdf

⁹⁴ http://www.tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx

Part II: Critical Understanding to the Ethiopia - South Sudan Border

8.4 The Role of Murle during the Sudan Civil War and Onwards

The first period of the South Sudan movement was from 1955 to 1972. This movement was called Anya-Nya. Anya-Nya means a poisons snake; in the intention that they want to poison the Government of Sudan to respect the rights of the South Sudan people. The movement had intention to establish Great Sudan by giving equal rights and powers for both the South and North Sudan people regardless of color and religion but gradually changed its objective to independent of South Sudan. Anya-Nya I was started as an official war by South Sudanese including the Murle people. The war took seventeen years. So, peace agreement was signed in Addis Ababa in March 1972. The Murle people were not fully engaged to the agreement. This is because the forefront position leader of the movement was the Nuer and the Dinka; which intensified the hostility of Murle with their neighbor.

The 1972 agreement was concluded in 1983 when things were not going well because the Khartoum government under Jaefer Neimeri (the Sudan President) was abrogated the agreement. In 1975, after three years of peace agreement, some of the South Sudanese were discontented about the agreement and some of minor groups abandon the South Sudan region. These minor groups were rebel again by calling themselves as Anya-Nya II in Akobo near the border of Ethiopia and they came in Gambella. They established Anya-Nya II at Bilfam, which was a base place of the rebel groups in Gambella. The Anya-Nya II stayed at Bilfam until 1983 because things falling apart about the establishment of the 1972 peace agreement and the revolution were galvanized inside the country.

When the revolution escalated inside, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) using battalion 104 and battalion 105 attacked the deviance group of South Sudanese in Bor on May 16, 1983. When these two battalions dislodged the deviance group of the revolution in Bor, they came to Bilfam and join with the rebel group. At this time SPLA/M was established to lead all rebellion into one front. From 1972 to 2005, the first battalion of Murle was called Cobra. They formed in Boma at the town of Pibor as part of Anya-Nya II and established their base at Raat in Dimma district of Ethiopia. Names of the Anya-Nya I and II or SPLA/M battalions are Cobra, Tiger, Lion, Hippo, Crocodile, Buffalo, Elephant, etc to encourage their fighting as a means of brave.

The Murle people participated in the civil war; however, Khartoum influenced the local Murle people using the paramount chief Ismail Kony, a Murle person and they gave him Islamic name. Ismail Kony was able to mobilize Murle against the SPLA/M and established the Pibor Defense Force (PDF). However, the Murle rebellion group from the section of Anya-Nya II was joined with other Anya-Nay II rebellion groups after the establishment of Sudan People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) in 1983 at Bilfam. The Murle commander in the SPLA/M was Nyachigak Nyachiluk, who died at Kapoeta in 1989. Some other Senior Officers of the Murle in SPLA/M were Commander Kennedy Gayin, Commander Logochock (who died in the war), and Commander Kiechner in the Blue Nile.

Ismail Kony established the PDF with the support of Khartoum in order to protect the Murle people from the SPLA/M attack. The PDF forces were punitive, when the SPLA/M coming attack the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and government groups, those

local Murle militias that led by Ismail Kony were sent behind to attack the SPLA/M. According to Brigadier General Jok Angok Deng⁹⁵, the Khartoum government provides these effective weapons for the Murle local militia, PDF. So, from 1983 to 2005, the Murle have no any longer friendship relation with SPLA/M. When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was sign in 2005, all the Murle militias that trained and armed by the Khartoum government were incorporated into SPLA/M and some of them are taken to police force, others to SPLA/M defense military. All are organized into forces to work together with SPLA/M.

After the CPA, in 2009 the South Sudan Region election was prepared for 2010. From the Murle ethnic group, David Yau Yau was contested to the Greater Jonglei but he was failed to win. When he failed, he stayed to the rebellion against the government. He lost his competition by Baba Meden. David accused the election process because he perceived that it has been fault due to the deception of the election board and the result did not accepted by his group. Then by, David organized the Murle youth that named as Cobra Faction. His rebellion action was continued until the independence period with little impact on the SPLA/M autonomous administration of the South Sudan region. In 2011, during the South Sudan independence, David Yau Yau was made alliance with SPLA/M and participated on the referendum.

In 2012 he rebel against South Sudan for the second time; then Khartoum was immediately started to supply weapons to him by air. He established contact person in

⁹⁵ Brigadier General Jok Angok Deng is a defense attaché of South Sudan at the Embassy of the Republic of South Sudan, Addis Abbaba, Ethiopia. Interview was made on 26 November 2018 at the Embassy in his office.

Khartoum and South Sudan was not capable to control their air corridor. Khartoum drops weapon and other supply to David during security gaps either night or early in the morning in Pibor at the border of Ethiopia. There were so many political backgrounds why Khartoum is supporting the Murle. According to Brigadier General Jok Angok Deng, the South Sudan needs to construct alternative pipeline from Jonglei through Pibor to Lamu port in Kenya. Accordingly, South Sudan made an agreement with Ethiopia and Kenya. However, Khartoum opposed the agreement and want to destabilize the construction of the pipeline; that's why Khartoum was supported the Murle deviance group under David.

During the beginning of South Sudan civil war in December 2013, Riek Machar sent a message of proposal to the Murle leader, David Yau Yau to join the Machar's group, SPLA/IO to kick out the government. David Yau Yau responds to Machar by saying that "we are not interested to kick out the government but we need to have regional administration to address the socio-economic and political problems of the Murle people." At this time the South Sudan government made a good approach to fulfill the interest of David by sending envoys. David accepted to negotiate with the South Sudan government which was a very good political decision of him to gain the right of the Murle. David claimed the government to break away from Jonglei and establish a regional state for Murle together with Anyuua. Under this negotiation, Pibor was given to the Murle and Anyuua as a special administration by the name of Great Pibor Administration Area (GPAA) and David assigned as Governor of GPAA.

Then by, South Sudan established 28 regional states in the country; at this time GPAA was turned into state and call as the Boma State. The Boma state constitutes different ethnic group such as Murle (60%), Anyuua (30%), Kachipo (5%) and Jie (5%) from the total population number of the Boma State.⁹⁶ During the establishment of the GPAA, David was assigned as a Governor but the government later promoted him as General and transferred to Juba as Defense Minister, then later removed from Defense Minister and assigned to Labor Minister. Baba Meden was assigned as Governor of GPAA when David transferred to Juba and later to the Governor of the Boma State. Next to Baba, Ismail Kony brought to the Governor of the Boma State but things are going to bad against their neighbours like Kapoeta, Anyuua, Dinka, Nuer, etc, thus Ismail was removed and brings David Yau Yau as Governor of the Boma State. Currently, David Yau Yau is the Governor of Boma State.

8.5 Factors Affecting the Borderland People Socio-Economic Security

Security threats are depicted as an enduring phenomenon in the borderland areas of Ethiopia and South Sudan as a result of multifaceted factors. Some of the major factors that exacerbate the borderland people socio-economic security threats are:

- Low economic diversification across the border;
- Poor infrastructure and development implications;
- Inadequate government protections;
- Proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- Absence of sustainable economic programs;

⁹⁶ Interview was made with Brigadier General Jok Angok Deng at South Sudan Embassy, Addis Ababa.

- Limited education access;
- Porousness of the border; and,
- Political instability of South Sudan.

Related to all these borderland development problems, there are additional factors that undermine the socio-economic security of the borderland people. They are: sense of retaliation, lack of employment for the youths, poor or low level of education, intrinsic cultural assumptions, marginalization from socio-economic connections and state services, cultural philosophy and traditional practice to enlarge number of population, lack of early warning-early response security network, lack of border social policy, and lack of central government attention to the borderland people. Each of these factors draws a specific dynamic and will need to be addressed by the local and central governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Apart from the Murle youth infiltrators confrontation, these factors are largely beyond the control of the borderland people they are suffering from socio-economic security problems.

Therefore, due to all these factors, the major pillars of peace in the region are devastated. For instance, there is no well-functioning government, unequal distribution of resources, lack of free flow of information, no sound business environment, low level of human capital, lack of respect for the rights of others, high level of corruption, and lack of good relations with neighbours. These pillars of peace are fundamental to harmonize the borderland peoples' relations and helpful to build peaceful coexistence. However, the political instability of the South Sudanese government plus border porosity, fragility, and

volatility together reduce these fundamental peace pillars across the border and diminish the socio-economic security situations of the borderland people.

8.6 Socio-Economic Security Dynamics across the Border

The South Sudan civil war started in December 2013 under the leaders of Salva Kir (SPLA) and Riek Machar (SPLA in Opposition). Their political instability and civil war engulfed to the borderland people. Most of the borderland region across Gambella was controlled by SPLA in Opposition (SPLA/IO), which exacerbated the socio-economic security problems. For instance, the Upper Nile, Miwut County, Fagag, and Jonglei regions including Akobo along the border was under SPLA/IO; Pochalla, Pibor, Boma, and Raat areas were in the government hand but they were instable due to the civil war. Accordingly, peaceful cohabitation and people-to-people connection was too weak, and governments lack a strong strategy to tie the borderland peoples' in-group relations. Although local governments had different agreements to harmonize the borderland peoples' relations and to minimize the socio-economic security problems, they could not implement their agreement.

Due to volatile, fragile, porous, and hot-spot nature of the border, the socio-economic development cooperation is weak, and both governments (Ethiopia and South Sudan) cannot develop their common border development plan. To do this, the two governments should have equal opportunity and a better administrative system to manage their people and natural resources along the border. However, the South Sudanese government lacks the necessary experience to administer the border area as a young country in Africa and due to its short period of experience as a state. Moreover, within its infant stage of state

experience, there is no strong institutional reform and thus political instability devalued their diplomatic relations with their neighbours. Thus, South Sudan is unable to accomplish any development cooperation that agreed with the Ethiopian government. In this case, the South Sudanese political instability affects the socio-economic security condition of the borderland people across the Gambella and the Boma Regional States.

For borderland development cooperation, the two governments should be stable and well equipped to manage the people as well as establish equal development strategies. There is opportunity along the border to work together in the areas of education, water, health, trade, agriculture, and good governance. To implement those development projects along the borderland community, the governors and provinces on the two sides should come together and create peaceful cohabitation among the borderland people. However, from 2014 to 2018, the South Sudan borderland side was remained under SPLA/IO. This situation also affects the Ethiopian government to address the borderland people. Small arms and light weapons also highly circulated across the border and thus, the government of Ethiopia trying to control it rather than giving attention to development strategy.

8.6.1 The Socio-economic Development Gaps from Ethiopian Side

The borderland region is vulnerable to circulation of light weapons due to instability in the region, which contribute to the pervasive cattle raiding and child abduction practices. The Government of Ethiopia established customs stations at Fagag in Lare districts of Gambella to control illicit trade and circulation of light weapons, which all obstruct the socio-economic development diversification across the border. Contrabandists carry out illicit trade and goods smuggling across the border. The GPNRS President discusses the

situations of illicit trade and government's effort to control circulation of light weapons, illegal movement of people, and contrabandist activities across the border. According to him:

The Gambella regional state shares large international border with South Sudan. The borderland region provinces and small unit administrations split the same people into different citizens; for instance, Nuer, Anyuaa, Oppo, and Kommo group of people live on both sides of the Ethiopia-South Sudan border and have close socio-cultural and economic interactions. However, people dramatically affect by illegal circulation of weapon and contraband goods which intensify in Gambella and consider as sources of borderland security problems. Thus, the Ethiopian government has strategy to control the circulation of small arms and contraband goods across the border by establishing custom stations on the main routes. One of the main illicit trade routes and circulation of small arms are from Juba via Malakal, Nassir, and Longchuk to Fagag in Lare district of Gambella. To control small arms and light weapons, the government established two custom stations: 1) Fagag custom station; 2) Burbey custom station. Two other custom stations have planned to establish at Pochalla and Raat.

Interview with Gatluak Tut Khot, president of GPNRS, in October 2016

However, these custom stations are not well equipped and are unable to control the illegal movements due to security gaps and complicated socio-cultural and economic similarities of the borderland people. For instance, members of the small unit of Jikany-Nuer clan in Fagag are known as Thiang; they were divided into citizens of two separate states at the border. They have close relations: they work together, marry each other, and have daily contact. In this case, no one stranger can identify who is Ethiopian and who is South Sudanese but they know each other.

On the other hand, the development situations of the borderland region are very low and the people are affected by widespread poverty. The regional government could not fulfill the needs of the local people. Of course, the regional government demobilized and reintegrated the borderland people through “villagization” process and settled the scattered people in villages. Following “villagization” process, the government implemented some development packages such as agriculture (established a farming training center (FTC), water, school, health, and good governance to facilitate state services. These development institutions could not bring change to the people due to their low performance of human power and equipment. There is no transportation access and other infrastructures. Similarly, the district development plans are focused on office administration services rather than community service development strategies and infrastructures; moreover, government’s workers spend their time in the office.

These circumstances created a situation in which borderland peoples participate in illicit activities in order to subsidize their livelihood. The borderland region government institutions are also non-functional due to budget constraints and low staffing. The civil servants lack adequate budget to implement their fieldwork development plan; even the annual budget that is assigned by the regional government to borderland districts is not enough to cover expenses for a year. The assigned budget is consumed only by salary and per diem. All these low level borderland administrative conditions reduced the efforts of the government to bring change and implicitly forced the borderland people to practice illegal business.

8.6.2 The Socio-economic Development Gaps from South Sudan Side

South Sudan came to exist as a state in 2011 and officially shares an 874 km long border with Ethiopia along the Gambella Regional State. The Murle people are South Sudanese citizens. Since Sudanese independence in 1956, South Sudan has no socio-economic development and people suffer from dire economic conditions and widespread poverty. The South Sudan ambassador to Ethiopia at Addis Ababa explains the socio-political and economic situations of the Murle people and their relations with their neighbours under the Khartoum government during the British colonial period.

Historically, the politics of South Sudan was under Khartoum. There was no much effective development strategy to South Sudanese and no one able to reach there because the British centered their administration from Khartoum. Under British, all South Sudanese were part of Sudan, so the Murle people like other South Sudanese community are marginalized from any government services. All South Sudanese people were not effective; they were sideline to the Sudan politics. That is the result of political and military resistance that took almost fifty years for South Sudan to be independent. The Murle people are nomadic so they move within the region of Boma and Pibor areas across the border of Ethiopia. They hated by others and never want to live peacefully with their neighbours. This affects all the people who border with them. For instance, the Toposa in Kenya; the Nuer, the Dinka, and the Anyuua in South Sudan are neighbouring people to the Murle but no one interested to live with them. They become a threat to their neighbours due to their regular practices of cattle raiding and child abductions. So this kind of neighbour has no good relations and all have negative attitude regarding Murle. Because wherever they have cows or cattle the Murle will be there to take their cattle by all

means, they took their children. Previously they took their women that had been a nature of this ethnic community in South Sudan.

Interview in December 2016 with James P. Morgan (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ethiopia and Djibouti Permanent Representative: AU, IGAD and UNICEF)

The dynamic socio-economic conditions of the borderland people affect the Murle and their neighbours. The situation is not the fault of the Murle people; they use self-protection mechanisms and find ways to survive in that “non-state” environment. “Non-state”, because the formal administration of the Sudanese government and state services could not formally reach the Murle region, and they have suffered civil war for such a long time that a major battle took place in their region – Pibor. In the subsequent period of South Sudanese independence, the local government could not harmonize the socio-economic conditions of the Murle people through diversified development projects such as good governance, education, agriculture, water, health, and other infrastructures.

The Murle people not only practice cattle raiding and child abduction but they also terrorize their neighbours and destabilize the area. Throughout the civil war, the Murle youth armed and subdued their neighbours through the power of gun. To stabilize the borderland region, the GoSS after 2011 initiate the disarmament campaign with the support of SUDD⁹⁷. But, the disarmament campaign was met by stiff resistance from the Murle rebellion groups such as the “Cobra Faction” led by David Yau Yau. Due to this resistance and political instability of South Sudan in the late 2013, the disarmament campaign was not successful.

⁹⁷ The first program of South Sudan government to disarm the Murle youth

Moreover, the area became a no man zone and nobody lived around Boma and Pibor, which create security gaps in the region. The Murle live across the border and control the region without government; their youth cross the border to raid cattle and abduct children from Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer of Ethiopia. They have close attachment with cattle, and it takes time to change their intrinsic cultural assumptions about cattle. This is because they have lack of education and are unable to utilize the available resources except herding cattle. They use cattle for all means of life and have significant meanings to them. However, there are different resources which help the local people to change their life besides to cattle herding. For instance, oil, gold, arable land, big forest and wild animals that migrated in different season and are useful to attract tourists. These resources may not be able to be utilized by the local people but the governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan have an opportunity to exploit them for development and educate the borderland people.

During the British colony of Sudan, no one exploited the natural resources that they lived along the border. The Khartoum government assigned different governors to South Sudan in different times; however, they had never tried to see the available resources across the border. Besides, no one is able to disarm the Murle people that they have power to threaten their neighbours using modern weapons. The current GoSS also could not yet explore the natural resources of the borderland region. On the other hand, the governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan had an agreement which was signed in 2016 to construct road across the border to exploit the available natural resources. There agreement has potential of business and different activities to generate income for

borderland people and connect Juba and Addis Ababa. However, their agreement is not yet effective due to political instability and socio-economic insecurity of South Sudan.

8.7 Exogenous Factors to Ethnic Cleavage among the Borderland People

Ethnic boundary and ethnic polarizations that discussed in this dissertation diminished the borderland peoples' social capital and increased intense hatred and misbehavior in the day to day social relations of every neighbouring people. One exogenous factor of ethnic cleavage is ethno-politics. The contemporary political alliances of the world are either ethnic-based (eg., Ethiopia) or non-ethnics (eg., Switzerland) (see Wimmer, 2002). Hence, the majority of political alliances across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border are likely to be formed between co-ethnics than between individuals. Currently, the politics of Ethiopia and South Sudan is conceived as a matter of ethno-linguistics power relations, and political loyalties rarely cross the ethno-linguistic division. Many system of ethnic classification are of a multilevel character: they comprise several nested segments of differentiation; in contrast, for example, to gender classification or ranked social estate; all of which might become the main focus of political loyalty (Zdaniuk and Levine, 20001).

Since the eve of Sudan independence, the Khartoum government was challenged by the opposition group from the South: SPLA/M – the combination of Nuer, Dinka, Anyuaa and other black Christian groups of South Sudan region. To minimize the political movements and position of black Christians, the Sudan government prefers to organize the Murle ethnic group through their ethnic identity and incorporate to participate in armed conflict with the support of SAF, give training in how to fight with their

neighbours. Gradually, they established the PDF under the leader of Ismail Konyi – a Murle *Alan ci merii* (red chief). On the other hand, Ethiopia hosts a refugee to Nuer, Anyuua, Dinka, Uduk, and left space of land in Gambella for the base of SPLA/M struggling position at Bilfam. Post-1991 Ethiopia also reorganizes the political system of the country on ground of ethnic lines and the Anyuua and Nuer ethnic groups who live in Gambella become part of this political salience and get political power in their region on the basis of their identification with their ethnic group rather than on the basis of some other identity. Such potential lines of ethnic cleavage have political relevance and construct ethnic boundary across the borderland people.

The salience of ethnic cleavage has been made to address the political interest of elites by different attempt. According to Okamura (1981), the Situationalist approach developed in the plural societies points out that the salience of the various levels of differentiation depends on the logic of the situation and the characteristics of the persons interacting. Thus, across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, the Sudan government supports political activists who emphasized to outshine the Murle ethnic identity when struggling with the opposition group (SPLA/M, being the Nuer and Anyuua are part of it) to divert the attention of political power using the ethnic line of division. In some respects, this resembles the British colonial method of divide and rule, in combining a local level tension with the South Sudan government's strategy of using the Murle as a proxy in its battle against its political opponents.

However, there are social forces beyond those emerging from specific social contexts that make certain levels of categorical distinction more important than others for a person's

overall life chances. For instance, the situation is relevant to Murle to use opportunity for ethnic cleavage, but the concept of Nilotic group is more important to make sense of understanding. Thus, rather than using the out shed identity of Nilotic group, the Murle ethnic group processed their ethnic cohesion to have power to monopolize the available natural resources (pastureland and water); which is related with the proposition of ethnic competition theory that an ethnic group could have power to monopolize a particular economic factor (Banton, 1983). Thus, the Murle ethnic group uses this ethnic cleavage as an advantage to protect their people, sole possession of cattle, and monopolize resources from their neighbours. Moreover, according to Despres (1975) and others in the pluralist school, categorical cleavages are the most consequential and salient for the overall structuring of political relations in a society.

Besides politics, economic competition is another dynamic that emphasizes the ethnic cleavage of the borderland people. An ethnic boundary that corresponds to groups in resource competition is more relevant to economic interest. Indeed, regardless of a shared poor economic structure across the border, the most salient responsibility lies in the ethnic landscape; independence of South Sudan and establishment of Ethiopia-South Sudan cooperative agreement at regional and national level and others did not address effectively the salience of ethnic cleavage among the Murle-Anyuaa-Nuer ethnic boundary. Furthermore, most of the violence was/is directed by Murle's youth infiltrators against Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer by crossing the border of Ethiopia to raid cattle and abduct children. Although the South Sudan government gives political power and economic structure for the Murle to administer GPAA, they couldn't stop to cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation. Moreover, they are too organized and fight

with Ethiopian Regional Special Police Forces (ERSPF) to raid cattle and abduct children to enhance their social wealth.

By ignoring the principle of *ceteris paribus*⁹⁸, de rigueur ethno-politics create uneven economic competition among nested segments of ethnic groups and establish institution of the nation-state by providing strong incentives for elites and non-elites. Using the name of nation-state institution, elites and chieftaincies are alike to emphasize ethnic rather than other types of boundaries with various strategies. In this regard, power is considered as another salient of ethnic cleavage to entail ethnic identity boundaries. Actors who politically assigned prefer to make ethnic cleavage that is perceived to further interests, given their endowment with economic, political, and symbolic resources. These political actors also offer new opportunities for forming alliances and thus provide an impetus to redraw ethnic boundaries. Exogenous processes may also shift the power base of actors. Political networks no longer extended from the centers of power to the indigenous hinterland.

8.8 The Current Situations of the South Sudanese Stability

There is a peace implementation that signed peace agreement in Addis Ababa on 12 Sep. 2018. The main rebel group under Reik Machar accepts the peace agreement but other opposition group did not sign the peace agreement. The name SPLA/M is no longer serves to the South Sudan government national army now and then after but the opposition group of Riek Machar used as SPLA/IO. The Government of South Sudan

⁹⁸ The Latin phrase *ceteris paribus* – literally, “holding other things constant” – is commonly translated as “all else being equal.” Read more on: <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ceterisparibus.asp#ixzz5LW8rEiFj>

changed the name of their national defense force from Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) to South Sudan People Defense Force (SSPDF). It was decreed in September 2018. SSPDF is the son of SPLA. Other armed militia groups will be incorporated into SSPDF to establish and strength the national army of South Sudan but currently they used different name for their own. The government of South Sudan has an agreement to screen, train and integrate the rebel militia groups into SSPDF and police force according to their interest and capability. Some of the opposition group who did not sign the September 2018 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement are:

- South Sudan National Alliance (SSNA) under General Thomas Hirello – SSNA was established by the coalition of the National Army for Salvation (NAS) and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA);
- People Democratic Movement (PDM) under Hakim Darriwos;
- National Democratic Movement (NDM) under Emanuel Abang;
- United Democratic Republic Alliance (UDRA) under Gatwich; and
- South Sudan National Movement for Change (SSNMC) under Zakindi Onuvu.

These five opposition groups are not signed during the September 2018 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement but their exact interest and objective is not clear. According to the September 2018 Peace Agreement, the federal system will adapt after consultation. But they refused and need a federal system to implement immediately after the peace agreement. The difference is that the government said “first we have to consult for which type of federal structure we prepare ourselves; either ethnic based or territorial or others. To decide we have to investigate experiences of other countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria,

South Africa, India, USA, Switzerland, or any others.” However, they said that the federal system should implement immediately after the peace agreement. These groups attack either the SSPDF or SPLA/IO. There is no any territory occupied under them but they live in the people and some of them in Addis Ababa. For instance, the leader of SSNA, Thomas Hirello is stayed in the Addisinia Hotel in Addis Ababa.

IGAD made a meeting regarding those groups who did not sign the September 2018 Peace Agreement. IGAD sent envoy to consult the group to sign the agreement. If they do not agree, they will be designated as peace spoil and then the government of South Sudan will has a position to fight them. This is the stand of IGAD according to Brigadier General Jok Angok Deng.

Chapter Nine

9 Conclusions, Recommendations, and Policy Options

9.1 Conclusions

The Ethiopia-South Sudan borderland is known as one of the least developed regions in the Horn of Africa, lacking basic infrastructure due to decades of civil war in Sudan and marginalization by the central authorities of Ethiopia and Sudan (now South Sudan). Because Gambella and Pibor across the border lack functioning roads and bridges, most parts become inaccessible during the rainy season and even sometimes in the dry season, which hinders timely security response. The underdevelopment has also contributed to persistent poverty in the region.

Thoroughly, the borderland people are pastoral, semi-pastoral, and riverine agrarian; so land and cattle are their main source of wealth to fulfill their basic needs, social interest, economy, and livelihood. Besides, they depend on fishing, hunting, and gathering edible fruits to supply their food. In due course, they move from one place to another without border restrictions and compete over the available natural resources. With this economic interaction, they have been tied through ethnic, social, and religious networks. Accordingly, the colonial boundary fixed by Imperial Ethiopia and British under the 1902 treaty have so far failed to become lines of human divide. However, the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan have ignored these social networks and have been reluctant to manage their movements. Moreover, people cross the border without any legal travel documents due to border porosity and the same people are also split into citizens of two

administrations; awareness campaigns by the governments have been ineffective in realizing citizenship, sovereignty, international borders, and in differentiating the essence of citizens and relatives.

The natural resources that are available to the borderland area are limited and unevenly distributed to local people; rather, they use a traditional resource controlling system through their intrinsic cultural practices. For instance, the agriculturalist Anyuua believes that land belongs to them and wants to preserve their ancestors' property. On the other hand, the pastoralist Murle and Jikany-Nuer require vast land for grazing and water, which means they often encroach on the land that the Anyuua believe solely belongs to them. The Murle also believe that all cattle in the world are their ancestors' property, and that they have a cultural mission to collect them including by cattle raids from other groups and child abductions carried out to enlarge their population in order to monopolize cattle and natural resources. Besides, the Murle youth cross the border to find pastureland and water for their cattle, and practice the activity of hunting, gathering edible fruits, and fishing. Moreover, persistent drought, unsustainable land use, and overgrazing methods have destroyed the eco-zone of borderland regions.

Due to their survival struggle based on their intrinsic cultural assumption, the Anyuua use defensive and preservation mechanisms to protect and preserve their ancestors' land from invaders and children from abductors; the Jikany-Nuer use expansion and protection mechanisms that they trying to protect their children from abductors and cattle from raiders but they want to expand to the land of Anyuua to have pastureland and water; and the Murle people use collection and monopolization mechanisms that they want to collect

their ancestors' cattle from the other area and interested to enlarge their number of population to monopolize the natural resources in the region.

The limited natural resources and unequal access to and distribution of natural resources are major triggers of confrontations and affect the socio-economic activities of Anyuaa, Jikany-Nuer, and Murle. The local administrative institutions are not strong enough to administer this limited borderland natural resources; moreover, it creates some socio-economic security problems for the borderland people. Thus, there is limited supply, access to, and regulation of resources from the central and local governments; and disputes over pastureland and water could be occurred as survival competition. Although the borderland people have hostile relations and socio-economic security problems, Ethiopia and South Sudan have no border disputes at the national-level. However, the porosity, fragility, and volatility of the borderland region have effects on the social and economic interactions of the local people. All these borderland circumstances heighten socio-economic security problems among the borderland people. Thus, stable and mutually agreed boundaries are a major pre-requisite for a peaceful cooperation across the border of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

In view of that, the Murle youth are not a threat to the politics of the Ethiopian government but they are a threat to the borderland people of Anyuaa and Jikany-Nuer regarding their socio-economic security. On the subject of these complicated situations, the borderland peoples are vulnerable to multifaceted challenges, and further develop hostile relations due to weak management of border security and resource scarcity. Thus, they suffer from lack of infrastructure and education, exclusion from social and economic

development, and cross-border intergroup conflicts. These problems are aggravated by South Sudan's instability and weak security sectors and insufficient economic diversification by Ethiopia.

9.2 Recommendations

As discussed in the entire part of this dissertation, the borderland people socio-economic security problems are very complicated and critically affect the borderland people of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Based on the findings of this research and points of the conclusion, the following applicable recommendations are forwarded to the governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

9.2.1 Mitigating the Challenges of Cattle Raids and Child Abductions

Youths, chieftaincies, and prominent elders across the Ethiopia-South Sudan border are part of a solution to the pervasive socio-economic security challenges. The majority of interviewees agreed that the socio-economic security problems across the border are worsened by cattle raiding and child abduction. If they are not tamed in a timely manner, it could rapidly grow to become a major cause of death, poverty, and low economic growth across the border. Then by gradually erode the political, economic, and socio-cultural diplomatic relation of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

For this reason, the stability of South Sudan is one of the major steps for the long-run solution of the borderland peoples' socio-economic security problems. The South Sudanese government is currently insecure and has an intensive assignment to stabilize their political system. The Murle community is marginalized from social, economic, and

political involvement of the government since the independence of Sudan in 1956. They have weak or absent institutional services and formal administration for long time. They adapted a pastoral life and stick with cattle. It is difficult to separate them from cattle, and they have no knowledge about other systems of significant livelihood.

In 1955, on the eve of independence, Civil war started in Sudan and the Murle youth became involved in military services on both sides of fighters'. They have no political mission, rather support who influences them. Some of them support the Sudan Arab militia and others to SPLA/M. Thus, they have good skills with military services, and it helps them perpetuate the recurrent practices of cattle raiding and child abduction. In other words, the Murle youth live with the gun for long time and have power to collect cattle, abduct children, and protect their community from external enemy to lead their traditional life.

So, to mitigate the borderland people's socio-economic security challenges, the current South Sudan government should:

- Stabilize and reform all government institutions, and
- Stop the legacy of political infighting behavior.

By doing these, the Government of South Sudan should initiate implementation of DDR with integrated process of SSR. The demobilization strategy is one of the ways that the government creates suitable conditions to pave the way of development programs. To do this, the highly scattered and mobile settlers of Murle people should collect in some places based on their traditional institutions, i.e., chiefship system (Murle red chief/red

king); family/clan or Korokjok; age-set system – generation or bull. This helps the Murle people to maintain their culture and traditional system. Thus, possible to establish small unit administrations and carry on all sections of government development projects such as education, water, health, agriculture, and good governance. Gradually, shift the pastoral Murle people into semi-pastoral and agriculturalist group of people through pastoral community development programs (PCDP).

Accordingly, the GoSS creates dialogue with the local people across the border of Ethiopia, not only with Murle but also with different people of their neighbours. The government should work in collaboration with the traditional customary institutions and prominent leaders of the people. All groups of people in different levels, for instance, youth, women, educated people, pastoralists, clan leaders, prominent leaders, and old military members should come together to discuss about the issue of peace building process with the government. The government delegators, politicians, and elites should show their real commitment and able to implement what they promised to the people and build public trust. They have to guarantee that the government protects its citizen and show how government is responsible to bring security and peace for the people. Accountability, transparency, and commitment should be the major ethics of the political elites, government delegators, and politicians.

After convincing the people how they harmonize their relation and visualize the coming bright future, the next step of the government should be disarm all armed groups of people in South Sudan. Now that they have a government, thus, all weapons should be strictly forbidden to remain in the hands of ordinary people. Through their clan leaders,

prominent elders, chieftaincies, and other influential people, the government should collect all arms from the people and followed by controlling policy of illegal circulation of light weapons from smuggling traders within South Sudan and other border country. However, the process of disarming all armed groups can be a challenge to the South Sudan government alone, and needs support from regional and international organizations.

Accordingly, the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan governments are the main partners of South Sudan. This is because the borderland communities across these countries are predominantly pastoral and SALW are highly accessible to them. One group is enemy of others as they rustle cattle each other. Of course, the Ethiopian government managed the borderland people by disarming since 2012 but its disarming process exposed them for security problems. In this case, all the borderland people of the neighbouring countries should disarm unless it is difficult to have protection from the government. Thus, disarming all people helps to build trust within the society and avoid frustration. If the government tries to disarm only the disturbance group, it can aggravate vengeance among the different tribal groups across the border and thus, uniformity of disarmament is the best solution to develop trust among the neighbouring people.

Then by, development strategies should be applied step by step within the society. The government should keep the promise it gave in time of social dialogue. Education, infrastructure, business enterprise, and other means of development programs should expand into the people. An awareness campaign is another way to the Murle community to understand the availability of different ways of acquiring wealth and livestock other

than of cattle. The government also helps the pastoral Murle group to stay at one place and subsidize their income with agriculture and business besides cattle husbandry.

Livestock is one means of income generation, but other economic opportunities would help them to change their life and commercialize their cattle to build fixed assets. Changing their cattle into money helps them to improve their life, send their children to school, and have enough space for agriculture, pastureland, and residence. Land policy also should apply to them and provide evidence of land owner identity for every family and youth above 18 years of age to use for purposes like harvest, vegetable, and fruits. Side by side, the government should educate people on paying taxes and the purpose of tax collection before applying the rules and regulation of tax collection.

Legal trading systems should also be implemented in the region to help to control the movement of goods and smuggled materials, and illicit trade, which are going to hurt the country and the people. Besides, the government should collect taxes and control corrupt to support its annual budget. These activities help the government to pursue the national development strategies within all section of the society across the border.

The other serious challenges for the Ethiopia and South Sudan borderland people is child abduction, which causes great suffering to the families of Anyuua and Jikany-Nuer. So as to stop the Murle's child abduction practices, the Governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan should take the first steps to protect children from child abductors in accordance with international human rights laws. To be effective and provide legal instruments of prevention, both governments should ratify The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and invite the support of the international community if the

situation worsens beyond the regional government's capacity to deal with it. They should also ratify and fully implement the African Charter for the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the Child to further combat child abduction practices in the region.

Moreover, the two governments should work with international partners and HRW. The HRW has potential to play international roles to expose the stranger child abduction practices along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border to international communities. The two governments should take all appropriate measures to protect children from abduction. Their measures can include providing adequate security for vulnerable populations and opening dialogue with Chieftaincies of the Murle and the Governor of Boma with the aim of securing the release of abducted children and seeking an end to future abductions. Besides government officials, the Murle chieftaincies have the power to influence the child abductor groups and potentially to stop such practices. Chieftaincies should, therefore, include in these efforts to reduce child abductions and increase security in the region.

9.2.2 Alternative Situational Analysis to Understand the Murle Area

Since David Yau Yau came to Boma as Governor for second time, things have been going well. He talks with the people of Murle and with their traditional leaders. Because the life of the Murle is depends on gun power. They go to raid cattle everywhere, otherwise they couldn't get wife. First of all, they have group age. The youth are divided into different groups. They need cattle to wealth and social purposes like marriage. Expedition of the Murle youth to raid cattle and abduct children from other area is a

cultural practice and normal for them. So David Yau Yau consulted those age groups to mitigate cattle raiding and confrontation with their neighbours. David has power to stop the youth by consulting them. But consult is not a solution by itself; the government should provide another alternative of income for them. The area is bushy, grassy, and swampy and difficult to move in the region either at the dry or summer season using military convoys and car. Their geographical location is also an advantage for them. They know how they move around and hide themselves in the bush or savannah grass.

The government has a policy to disarm the pastoral people. But the disarmament is difficult. The strategy should extend to Ethiopia and Kenya. The South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya together should conduct a concurrent disarmament. If they disarm only the Murle, it exposed them to other attack. Currently almost 70% of the Murle people have understanding with the government and interested to have good relation with David's administration. The rest 30% of the Murle people are very strong and resist the government who live in the bush with cattle. If they wrongly approach those people, they will fight and be unable to control the situation. It needs two approaches. 1) Local community through administration of the state and then to consult Ethiopia also. 2) Comprehensive disarmament with the cooperation of Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Kenya.

The cattle keepers always raid each other across the border of Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. So, all the Pastoral people should disarm unless it creates big fear for one another. In this understanding, South Sudan alone couldn't disarm the people who live in South Sudan. There are also trans-border cattle raiding and confrontations. For instance, Toposa and Turkana speak the same language but raid and confront each other across the border of

Kenya and South Sudan. For these reasons, it needs a comprehensive disarmament of all pastoral people at the border.

9.2.3 Developing a Suitable Conditions to Utilize “Soft Border”

The three ethnic groups in the borderland region—the Nuer, the Anyuuaa, and the Murle—are ethnically polarized. These groups have built systemic ethnic cleavages and ethnic boundaries that define their interactions with each other, including conflict over the already limited resources in the region. Ethnicity is a salient identity used to establish boundaries between certain ethnic groups, and it creates the basis for some of their conflict.

The people that live along the international border have an opportunity to establish a “Soft Border.”⁹⁹ The concept of a “Soft Border,” or one regulated but not physically separated, is promoted by the AUBP¹⁰⁰ to incentivize smooth interactions among international borderland people based on: a) cooperation and coordination, b) capacity building, and c) community involvement. In this regard, “Soft Border” has potential to encourage the borderland communities to have smooth contact and build trust among them by legalizing their socio-economic interaction through rules and regulations.

Thus, the AUBP Soft Border mission can be a good instrument to change the dynamics of the borderland peoples’ interaction by facilitating their contact in responsible and accountable manner and possible to reduce their hostile relations. This is because the borderland people have similar cultural practices and have the same social, economic,

⁹⁹<http://www.siue.edu/GEOGRAPHY/ONLINE/Vogeler/TypesBorders.htm>

¹⁰⁰<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/AU-DSD-WORKSHOP-MARCH-2013/Border-Programme-docs/AU-BM-Strategy-Revised>

and political exposure. Therefore, the “Soft Border” approach is a better tool to mitigate conflict and improve relationships at the international border of Ethiopia and South Sudan.

However, along this international border, ethnic identity is constructed in different ways by various groups, and some groups augment their population size through increased births and/or by abducting children from other groups. For instance, the Nuer utilizes adoption while Murle utilizes abduction to bring children from other ethnic groups to assimilate into their culture for the purpose of increasing their population size.

The Nuer has a practice of marrying women from other ethnic groups in order to increase the population and monopolize resources. They say that someone becomes Nuer once they make a *Gar* (a cultural marker for the Nuer consisting of long forehead cuts that form scars) on their forehead, even if they were born outside of the Nuer ethnic group. The Murle abduct children from their neighbors for two purposes: 1) to strengthen and enlarge their tribe by assimilation and adoption with full socio-cultural rights and 2) to gain wealth by exchanging children with cattle – a girl can be exchanged for 50 cattle, while a boy is worth 100 cattle. The Anyuua people, on the other hand, are more rigid and conservative in their culture and prefer to preserve their identity but not intermixing with other groups; their identity is acquired only through birth within their own group. Such ethnic constructions of Murle and Nuer reflect the constructivist theory that ethnicity is the product of social processes rather than a cultural given. Culture then is made and remade rather than ascribed by birth. The construction of the Anyuua people’s ethnic

identity is more characteristic of the primordialist theory¹⁰¹, whereby ethnic membership is acquired by birth only.

The economic activities of these three major ethnic groups reflect their intrinsic cultural assumptions. The cultural outlook of the Murle regarding cattle differs from that of the Nuer. The Murle believe that they own all the cattle in the world, and they have a strong predilection to gather cattle from other places. The practice of raiding cattle is normal to them and they believe that they are justified in collecting “lost” cattle. However, the Nuer people also have a close attachment with cattle, associate their identity with cattle, accumulate wealth from cattle, and need to have vast pastureland and plenty of water for their cattle. They are, however, conscious that other groups derive their livelihoods from cattle, and typically only raid cattle from the Murle people as a means of revenge in times of intergroup conflict.

These borderland people suffer from cross-border crime. Some of the underlying causes of borderland problems are cross-border criminal activities ranging to cattle rustling, child abduction, automobile theft, smuggling of weapons, and illicit trade. This criminal cross-border interaction makes peaceful interactions difficult. However, it is possible to turn borders from barriers into bridges by allowing borderland people to easily and conveniently cross them, engage in productive cross-border trading activities, and carry out their socio-cultural responsibilities.

Therefore, peaceful borders are important for enhancing the borderland pastoralists’ interaction in search of fertile grasslands and water by facilitating and easing socio-

¹⁰¹ <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qd6hw>

cultural and ethnic relations. In other words, “Soft Border” can provide rooms for borderland communities to have socio-cultural and economic contact, coming together to discuss their common issues, engage in conflict resolution, and build trust and honesty among them. This encourages mutual border administration and flourishing legal trade and movements. With this understanding, hard borders such as walls, fences, or North-South Korea type division are not feasible along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. The concept of “Soft Border” focuses on pacifying the interactions of borderland people through cooperation, coordination, community involvement, and people-to-people relations. In this regard, Ethiopia and South Sudan have the possibility to develop effective and sustainable border management via a “Soft Border”, which would help them to minimize ethnic polarization. “Soft Border” management can enhance stability and peace by easing the interactions between the ethnic groups living in the border region.

9.3 Policy Options

The Horn of Africa is affected by poor human security, conflict, and terrorism and is one of the most insecure regions in Africa. In addition, international borders in the region are porous, contested, volatile, and fragile. All of these factors heighten the socio-economic security problems among the borderland people in the region. A prime example of border porousness and fragility can be found along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. These two countries share an 874km (543 miles) open and fragile international border along the Gambella Regional State of Ethiopia. The local people on the border consist of the Murle

in South Sudan and the Nuer, the Anyuua, and other communities on both sides of the border.

People along the border suffer from lack of infrastructure and education, exclusion from social and economic development, and cross-border intergroup conflicts. These problems are aggravated by South Sudan's instability and by insufficient economic development and diversification in Ethiopia. The problems manifest through the intensity of corruption, illicit trade, smuggling of goods, circulation of small arms, and border insurgents. With the increasing availability of small arms, civilian deaths at the confrontation during cattle rustling and child abductions have become more frequent and fatal since 2010. For instance, in 2010 the Murle infiltrators raided 960 cattle, abducted 72 children, and killed 247 people. Recently, in 2016, the Murle infiltrators killed 224 people, rustled 2,000 cattle, abducted 137 children, and displaced 22,000 people from the populated area of the Jikany-Nuer and the Anyuua people (see table 7.4). These borderland people socio-economic security problems are exacerbated by high levels of illiteracy, poverty, and weak connections between central governments and the borderland regions, and weak inclusion of customary institutions in conflict resolution efforts.

Accordingly, stability of the government is vital to enhance development projects and the government's ability to enforce rules and policies within the people to control and eradicate cattle raiding and child abduction activities of Murle. Thus, it is important to note that the current situation in South Sudan does not allow for the prioritization of anyone's concerns. The major disconnection that the citizens feel from their government,

competition among the communities for resources, the absence of representation on behalf of the communities, the lack of credible strategies for social and communal reconciliation – all are part of a synergistic phenomenon that perpetuates cattle raiding and child abduction along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border in particular. The simultaneous actions of forming a stable and effective government, the process of delivering services to the borderland people, promotion of civil education, and implementation of economic development programs to ensure security may seem uncertain and lack power to convince the people to stop violence.

Thus, underlying the socio-economic security problems between the Murle and their neighbours across the border, the South Sudan political instability complicated the situation more. For this reason, to reduce the problems, South Sudan and Ethiopia should pay attention to the root causes of borderland people socio-economic security problems. Moreover, the stability of South Sudan is one of the major steps to find a long term solution to the borderland socio-economic security problems. In this regard, finding a long-lasting solution to South Sudan's political instability are more crucial to the peaceful coexistence of the borderland people and the solution should also extend to the borderland people to alleviate the underlying socio-economic security problems that manifested through cattle raiding, child abduction, and intergroup confrontations.

Consequently, to mitigate the cattle raiding, child abduction, and confrontation problems between the Murle youth and their neighbours across the border; regional and international actors can support and encourage the national governments of Ethiopia and South Sudan in different ways. The support can focus on critical issues to address the

security sector reforms, to integrate their borderland development strategies, to minimize security gaps and strength their security institutions, to enhance DDR with integrated process of SSR, to demarcate their border, to develop borderland social policy, to control the proliferation of small arms, to revitalize the customary institutions, to encourage traditional conflict resolution methods, and to improve their borderland resource management.

The borderland pastoral socio-economic security problems are also the other issues that exacerbate intergroup violence across the border. Thus to alleviate their problems the concerned body should recognize the pastoral livelihoods that are a fundamental element of rural economies and find ways to integrate them into the formal economy while strengthening the capacity of these communities to adapt to changing environmental and social conditions. Therefore, education, animal health services, small arms control activities and support for local dispute resolution processes have been the principal tools to address some of the underlying sources of borderland people violence. Yet these efforts have been limited and ad hoc, without grounding in the lessons learned from other pastoral regions. This lack of learning and of priority makes existing pastoral initiatives inadequate to the urgent needs of affected communities, and while development agencies increasingly recognize their role in conflict prevention, they still lack appropriate analytical and intervention instruments.

Implications to Policy Options

One of the key factors impacting the socio-economic security problems is the South Sudanese political instability. Long-term resolution of this problem cannot be achieved

without the country's stability. However, even as long-term peace building efforts in South Sudan continue, additional steps can be taken to reduce borderland conflict. These steps should aim to mitigate conflict, encourage peace building, and provide sustainable development in border regions, and will require reforms and support from the national governments of South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as international partners.

1. For Regional and International Organizations

a) Increase pressure on South Sudan to fix the political instability: The political instability of South Sudan and lack of clear development strategies for the borderland regions directly contribute to cross-border intergroup conflicts. Therefore, regional and international organizations should consider increasing their pressure on South Sudan to address political instability. In particular, the AU could play a leading role in strengthening the capacity of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) to implement the ceasefire and provide transitional security arrangements through monitoring mechanisms, economic and institutional reforms, and political reconciliation. The recent, September 2018 Peace Agreement at Addis Ababa should also be enforced by AU and IGAD to sustain the peace situation in the region.

2. For Ethiopia and South Sudan

a) Increase collaboration between the governments and traditional institutions: Customary institutions in the borderland regions lack formal integration into and articulation with government structures. As a result, there is a lack of community representation in, or contributions to, formal government structures and institutions.

Meanwhile, many customary institutions remain widely respected and trusted by the societies in which they operate and offer mechanisms for peace and conflict resolution. Therefore, governments can help to revitalize customary institutions, by recognizing their legitimacy in the community, and by granting them the ability to govern their people with government support. More importantly, both governments could consider the creation of a forum or ad hoc committee for the state and customary institutions to work together on issues related to social, economic, and security in the borderlands. This will have the added benefit of helping to mend the disconnect center-periphery relations.

b) Develop a uniform disarmament and protection policy: The cooperative agreements signed between Ethiopia and South Sudan since 2012 to address marginalization faced by borderland communities was a good first step. However, its implementation was not sufficiently resourced or coordinated to achieve the desired results. Through this agreement, Ethiopia successfully disarmed borderland people but could not provide an alternative source of protection as South Sudan was unable to disarm the borderland population on its side, which led to an imbalance in the perceptions of security and insecurity on different sides of the border. Thus, while implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in the conflicting communities, both governments would do well to coordinate timelines and efforts, and also work on security sector reforms (SSR) to help to fill security gaps. To do this, it is important for the governments to develop a uniform disarming policy by consulting clan leaders, prominent elders, chieftaincies, and other influential people in the borderland communities. This could help the governments to proceed with implementing the disarmament policy by convincing the communities to cooperate through their local

leaders. The government could also consider creating protection measures and policies to protect disarmed individuals who still need security. Moreover, both governments could possibly consider implementing a policy to control the illegal circulation of small arms across the region to further enhance their protection policy.

c) Demarcate the border and develop borderland management social policy:

Ethiopia and South Sudan should consider formally demarcating their border with support from the African Union Border Program (AUBP). Demarcation will be an effective tool in alleviating components of this cross-border conflict, but in order to be effective it should be supported by soft actions on border social policy to control the movement of smuggling goods, illicit trade, and circulation of small arms, in addition to regulating cross-border trade.

d) Public awareness campaigns: Borderland communities share similarities in culture and kinship. For such blended communities, it is better to mend people-to-people relations through soft border social policy and legitimize their interactions based on rules and regulations. Therefore, public awareness campaigns that focus on citizenship and adherence to the rule of law should follow these controls within borderland communities. Such campaigns will help borderland communities to respect international borders regardless of kinship ties.

3. For the South Sudanese Government and International Partners

a. Incorporate the Murle youth into socio-economic and political development: The Murle people are one of the most disadvantaged groups in South Sudan in terms of social,

economic, and political development. Poverty and illiteracy are major factors that have propelled the Murle into conflict, worsening the cross-border instability, and pursuing in the pervasive practices of cattle raids and child abductions. The livelihood of the Murle centers on cattle as the sole basis of their economic activity. Youth have little to know education and are often idle rather than participating in economic activities. The lack of representation in the workforce and limited educational opportunities could be alleviated by the Government of South Sudan and international partners through the implementation of integrated development plans focused on education, job training, and infrastructure in the borderland areas of Pibor in Boma State.

b. Design and implement sustainable economic development programs: The Government of South Sudan and development partners could empower traditional leaders, youth, and women of the Murle through education, and political participation. Besides, long term sustainable economic development programs such as agriculture, PCDP, support local people to establish traditional court and train local judges, and vocational training programs for the idle youth can implement by working hand in hand with international non-governmental and humanitarian organizations to build secure infrastructures. Alternative adult education to the adult group of Murle also possible to provide to shift their focus from only cattle to other means of income and livelihood. This will help the Murle to enhance their economic livelihoods and reduce the impetus for turning to infiltrators.

4. For the Ethiopian Government and International Partners

a) **Provide protection from child abductions and cattle raiding:** The people of the Anyuua and the Jikany-Nuer in Ethiopia suffer from child abductions and cattle raiding by the Murle infiltrators. In 2016 an organized group of Murle fought with the Jikany-Nuer in three districts of Nuer Zone and the people of Anyuua in Gog district at Ajirenga village, killed a total of 224 people, raided 2,000 cattle, and abducted 137 children. Child abduction is a serious human rights violation and worsens insecurity in the region. The Ethiopian government and international partners should consider paying attention to these human rights violations and address it with the government of South Sudan and other regional and international organizations. Additionally, the federal government of Ethiopia with the GPNRS could protect the borderland people by reassessing their security gaps among Regional Special Police Forces, Regional Police, and National Defense in terms of information exchange, immediate decisions to take action, coordination, budget allocation, and transportation.

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Anexes

Annex I: Leading Ideas for Interview

1. Livelihoods of the Murle, the Anyuua, and the Nuer people across the borderland of Ethiopia and South Sudan.
2. Economic and socio-cultural linkages and interactions among the Murle, the Anyuua, and the Jikany-Nuer
3. Geographical locations, economic bases, social identities, and manifestations.
4. Dynamics of ethnic polarization
5. Exogenous factors of ethnic cleavage
6. Sources, nature, and dynamics of socio-economic security problems across the border.
7. Cattle raiding, child abductions, and violent confrontations.
8. Sources of violent confrontations.
9. Factors that instigated youths to practice cattle raiding and child abductions.
10. Governments’ effort to address the socio-economic security problems across the borderland people.
11. Center-periphery interactions in terms of economic, social, and political Services.
12. Problems, manifestations, and challenges among the Murle, the Nuer, and the Anyuua.
13. Life of the Murle youth and their roles in the Sudan civil wars.
14. Spillover effects of the Sudan civil war and political instability on the borderland people.
15. Basic problems and its impact on the Murle people and their neighbours.

Annex II: List of Informants

Some Names of Interviewees are withheld for confidentiality reasons

Code to Key Informants Interviewee (CKII) for whom names are withheld:

KII G = KII Gambella

KII P = KII Pibor

KII H = KII Humanitarians

<i>Key Informants</i>	<i>Origin/Place</i>	<i>Number of Interviewee</i>	<i>Date of Interview</i>
<i>Government Officials</i>			
<i>Federal Officials</i>			
<i>KII 01</i>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1	21 January 2017
<i>KII 02</i>	South Sudan Embassy	1	24 December 2016
<i>Regional Officials – GPNRS (G) and Boma State (P)</i>			
<i>KII G 01</i>	GPNRS President Office	1	8 October 2016
<i>KII P 02</i>	GPAA Governor Office	1	15 October 2016
<i>Districts/Counties</i>			
<i>KII G 01</i>	Akobo – Tergol	2	January –August 2016
<i>KII G 02</i>	Jor – Ujallo	2	January –August 2016
<i>KII G 03</i>	Gog – Pignwudo	2	January –August 2016
<i>KII P 01</i>	Pibor - Lekuwangole	2	January-March 2017 July-September 2017 January-August 2018
<i>Small Unit Administrative (SUA) Chairperson</i>			
<i>KII G 01</i>	Tergol	1	January –August 2016
<i>KII G 02</i>	Ujallo	1	January –August 2016
<i>KII G 03</i>	Pignwudo	1	January –August 2016
<i>KII P 01</i>	Lekuwangole	2	January-March 2017 July-September 2017 January-August 2018
<i>Local Communities</i>			
<i>KII G 01</i>	Tergol		
	Elders	2	
	Chieftaincy	2	
	Victims	2	
	Women	3	
	Youth	2	
<i>KII G 02</i>	Ujallo		
	Elders	1	
	Chieftaincy	2	
	Victims	2	
	Women	3	
	Youth	2	
<i>KII G 03</i>	Pignwudo		
	Elders	1	
	Chieftaincy	2	

	Victims	2	
	Women	2	
	Youth	2	
KII P 01	Lekuwangole		
KII G 01	Elders	6	
	Chieftaincy	5	
	Victims	2	
	Women	2	
	Youth	8	
Humanitarian Organizations (H)			
KII H 01	ZOA – Gambella	1	
KII H 02	IOM – Pignwudo	1	
KII H 03	UNHCR – Pignwudo	1	
Named Interviewees			
Mr. Gatluak Tut	GPNRS President	-	8 October 2016
Mr. Othow	Head of GPNRS Security Bureau	-	
Mr. Kaka Korkuang	Pibor, Lekuwangole	-	February 2008
Mr. Opiew Ochudho Gora	Gog, Pignwudo	-	26 June 2017
Mr. Kaka Kermajok	Akobo town of South Sudan	-	02 July 2016
Mr. James Pitia Morgan	South Sudan Embassy	-	24 December 2016
Mr. Wiyual Nyak Riek	Akobo, Tergol	-	23 November 2016
Mr. Gyangout Gurour	Pibor, Lekuwangole	-	26 September 2016
Mr. Abula Omot Opiew	Gambella Town	-	07 October 2008
Mr. Ojullu Adeng Akuay	Gog, Pignwudo	-	15 October 2016
Mr. Zugin Irer	Lekuwangole, Alan Ci Merri	-	26 July 2018
Mr. Ajalla Obuya	Jor, Ujallo	-	17 January 2017

Annex III: Appendixes

Appendix A: የነጭ አባይ ዘመቻና ድንበር መካለል

ጋምቤላ በኢሉባቦር አውራጃ ስር ትተዳደር ነበር። ራስ ተሰማ ኢሉባቦርን ከ1875 ዓ.ም እስከ 1902 ዓ.ም አስተዳድረዋል።

...በራስ ተሰማ የሚመራው ጦር ከሸዋ በመጓዝ ኢሉ አባ ቦራ ደርሶ ግዛቱን ካስተካከለ በኋላ...በጠረፍ ሀገር የሚኖረውንም ህዝብ ለማሳመንና የጠረፉንም ዳር ድንበር ጎብኝቶ ወሰኑን ለማስከበር ወደ ነጭ አባይ /ሶባት/ እንዲዘምት ተደረገ። ራስ ተሰማ ከከፍተኛ የጦር አለቆቻቸው ጋር በመሆን የዘመቻውን እቅድ አዘጋጅተው ካጠናቀቁ በኋላ ለአዝማችቹ የጦር አለቆች መመሪያ ከመስጠታቸውም በላይ ሰራዊቱን በመምራት ወደ ጠረፍ ሀገር አመሩ።


ሰራዊቱም እሺ ያለውን በሰላም ተቀብሎ ለማስገበር እንቢ አልገብርም በማለት አምቦ የሚያስቸግራውንም በጦር ኃይል አስገድዶ ለማሳመንና የተለያየውን አንድ አድርጎ ለመመለስና ግዳጁን ለመወጣት ብልህና አስተዋይ በሆኑት አለቆች እየተመራ ወደ ጠረፍ ሀገር ጉዞውን ቀጠለ።

በዘመኑ የነበረው ጉዞ አብዛኛውን በእግር ስለነበር ጫማ የለሹ ሰራዊት ረጅሙን ጉዞ በእሾህና በኩርንችት እየተወጋ በአሸዋም ግለት እየተቃጠለ ከመሰቃየቱም በላይ ዘመናዊ ህክምናና መድኃኒት በሌለበት ዘመን በፌጦና በነጭ ሽንኩርት የወባን በሽታ ቢከላከልም በበሽታው ከመጎዳቱም አልፎ በእባብና በጊንጥ እየተነደፉ ያለቀው ሰራዊት እጅግ ብዙ እንደነበረ ዘመቻውን ተካፍለው የነበሩት አበው ይተርካሉ።

በዚህ አኳኋን ተጉዞ የአኘዋንና የኑዌርን ህዝብ ከማሳመኑም በላይ የፒውቦር ምንጭ ውሃ እና የአኮቦን ወንዞች በመከተል እስከ ነጭ አባይ ድረስ ዘልቆ የሀገራችንን ዳር ድንበር በመከለል ውብ የሆነችውን የኢትዮጵያን ሰንደቅ አላማ በወሰኑ ላይ እንድትወለድበት አድርጎና በድንበሩ ላይ ለምልክት የተተከለው የብረት ም ሰሶ እስካሁን ይገኛል።...

ምንጭ፣ ዘውዴ ዱባለ (1976፣ ገፅ 156-157)

Appendix B: Ras Tessema confront the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to fix the Gambella front



Source: IES MS 5619

Appendix C: Map of Illibabor Province



Source: IES MS 2164 – Illibabor Province

የጋምቤላ የቆዳ ስፋት

አውራጃና ወረዳ	ስፋት በኪ.ሜ	ስፋት በጋሻ	ስፋት በሄክታር
ጋምቤላ	24276.21	60690.54	2427621.42
ጂካም	2406.72	6016.81	240672.25
ኢታንግ	2030.96	5077.39	203095.65
ጋምቤላ	3022.60	7556.51	302260.35
አበባ	2403.76	6094.39	243775.63
ጎግና ጆር	9904.96	24762.41	990496.48
አኮቦ	4473.21	11183.03	447321.06

ጋምቤላ አውራጃ አስተዳደር

ጋምቤላ አውራጃ በስድስት ወረዳዎች የተከፈለ ሲሆን እነሱም፤ 1ኛ) ጋምቤላ ወረዳ ከተማው ጋምቤላ 2ኛ) የኢታንግ ወረዳ ከተማው ኢታንግ 3ኛ) የጂካም ወረዳ ከተማው ጂካም 4ኛ) የአኮቦ ወረዳ ከተማው ቴርጎል 5ኛ) የአበባ ወረዳ ከተማው አበባ 6ኛ) የጎግና ጆር ወረዳ ከተማው ጎግና ናቸው። የጋምቤላ አውራጃ የሚዋሰናቸው ሀገሮች፤

ሀ. በምስራቅ ከጎሬ አውራጃ

ለ. በደቡብ ምስራቅ ከሞቻ አውራጃ


ሐ. በሰሜን ከወለጋ ክ/ሀገር ከቄሌም አውራጃ

መ. በደቡብ ከከፋ ክ/ሀገር ከጊሚራ አውራጃ

ሠ. በምዕራብና በደቡብ ምዕራብ ከሱዳን ሪፐብሊክ መንግስት ከአፕር ናይል ፕሮጀክት /ከአባዮች በላይ ክፍለ ሀገር/ ይዋሰናል።

ምንጭ፤ ዘውዴ ዱባለ (1976፤ 60)

Appendix D: Ethio-Sudan Periphery Region



Source: IES MS 1874 – Ethiopia and Sudan border map

Appendix E: The 1902 Treaty between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Imperial Ethiopia

No. 100.—*TREATIES between Great Britain and Ethiopia, and between Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, relative to the Frontiers between the Soudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Signed at Adis Ababa, 15th May, 1902.*

(Signed also in the Amharic text.)

[*Ratifications delivered at Adis Ababa, 28th October, 1902.*]

HIS Majesty Edward VII by the Grace of God, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty Menelek II, by the Grace of God, King of Kings of Ethiopia, being animated with the desire to confirm the friendly relations between the two Powers, and to settle the frontier between the Soudan and Ethiopia, and His Majesty King Edward, having appointed as his Plenipotentiary Lieutenant-Colonel John Lane Harrington, a Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, His Majesty's Agent at the Court of His Majesty Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, whose full powers have been found in due and proper form, and His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, negotiating in his own name as King of Kings of Ethiopia, they have agreed upon and do conclude the following Articles, which shall be binding on themselves, their heirs, and successors :—

Frontier between Soudan and Ethiopia.

Art. I.—The frontier between the Soudan and Ethiopia agreed on between the two Governments shall be : the line which is marked in red on the map annexed* to this Treaty in duplicate, and traced from Khor Um Hagar to Gallabat, to the Blue Nile, Baro, Pibor, and Akóbo Rivers to Melile, thence to the intersection of the 6th degree of north latitude with the 35th degree longitude east of Greenwich.

Boundary to be Delimited and Marked on the Ground.

Art. II.—The boundary, as defined in Art. I, shall be delimited and marked on the ground by a Joint Boundary Commission, which shall be nominated by the two High Contracting Parties, who shall notify the same to their subjects after delimitation.

* See map (No. 2 in Atlas or Pouch) showing frontier as actually demarcated. Annexed to Description of the Frontier, p. 434.

Construction of Works on Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, and Sobat.

Art III.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana, or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan.

Lease to Soudan of Territory on Baro River as Commercial Station.

Art. IV.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself to allow His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan to select in the neighbourhood of Itang,* on the Baro River, a block of territory having a river frontage of not more than 2,000 metres, in area not exceeding 40 hectares, which shall be leased to the Government of the Soudan, to be administered and occupied as a commercial station, so long as the Soudan is under the Anglo-Egyptian Government. It is agreed between the two High Contracting Parties that the territory so leased shall not be used for any political or military purpose.

Railway to connect Soudan with Uganda.

Art. V.—His Majesty the Emperor Menelek, King of Kings of Ethiopia, grants His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the Soudan the right to construct a railway through Abyssinian territory to connect the Soudan with Uganda.

A route for the railway will be settled by mutual agreement between the two High Contracting Parties.

The present Treaty shall come into force as soon as its ratification by His Britannic Majesty shall have been notified to the Emperor of Ethiopia.

In faith of which His Majesty Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, in his own name, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Lane Harrington, on behalf of His Majesty King Edward VII, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Sea, Emperor of India, have signed the present Treaty, in duplicate, written in the English and Amharic languages, identically, both texts being official, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Adis Ababa, the 15th day of May, 1902.


(L.S.) JOHN LANE HARRINGTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel.



(Seal of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II.)


* Itang having been found unsuitable, the present commercial station at Gambela was substituted for it.

Appendix F: Anglo-Egyptian Sudan illustrating article I of the 1902 treaty



Source: Hertslet (1967:437)

Appendix G: The 1907 Border Design between British and Ethiopia



Source: Hertslet (1967:446)

Appendix H: Majid Abud's Report to Emperor Haile Sillassie I

[illegible][illegible]


These pictures are of Qannazmach Majid and his barsha zababina of about 1932 when His Majesty Haile Sillasse I ordered him to go down to Gambela to put down the rebellious Annuaks. This was the time when Majid had been promoted Qannazmach and governor of Gambela.

[illegible]

The above text constitutes a letter of approval, addressed to me, by Günther Mach Majid Abud to me, ~~by~~ regarding the use of his document for presentation in my Fourth Year Senior Essay at the Department of History. The letter is dated, Core, Tiquit 6, 1963 E.C.


B. TERA1 Bocure

Appendix I: Geographical Location of the Murle Migration into the Southwestern Sudan




Source: Lewis (1972:25)

Appendix J: Map of the Pibor Region in the context of South Sudan



Source: McCallum (2013:26)

Appendix K: Geographical Location of the Murle, the Anyuaa, and the Nuer



Source: Kurimoto (1996:30)

Appendix L: The Murle Red Chief/King - *Alan ci merii* and Age Groups





Age-Groups with Alan ci merii



**Muden (two of the right side),
Alan Ci Merii (the Red Cape),
Omda (left side), and the author (who stay put)**



**Author with the Lango age group, who is
the current strong age group**



Women and girls decorate them by age-groups' identifiable beads

Appendix M: Group discussion and some other pictures



The Murle *Alan ci merii* and
Age-group leaders



The Anyuua elders with Nyieya



The Jikany-Nuer elders



The Murle elders



The Anyuua elders



Women after discussion



Gambella Security Head



District Officials



Kebele Chairmen



Discussion with SPLA/IO officials at Akobo town



Gambella Regional "Liyu" police at Sudan Akobo; who
guard the author in the middle beside to left side of the
blue t-shirt



Cattle Camp



Cattle in the field



Cattle at pastureland and water area



Fishpond area in the dry season



Fish Pemmican



SALW, which circulated in the region

Source: All, except SALW, are author's field photo.

SALW photo is taken from Ethiopian Federal Police Office, Gambella. It is captured from illegal traders