

The Federal Governance of Multiethnic Cities in Ethiopia: Urban Policy and Conflict in Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

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Acronyms

AAPO:	All Amhara People's Organization
ADLI:	Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization
AEUO:	All Ethiopian Unity Organization
ANDM:	Amhara National Democratic Movement
APDO:	Afar People's Democratic Organisation
AU:	African Union
BGPDUF:	Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Unity Front
BMNO:	Bulchiinsa Mootummaa Naannoo Oromiyaa
COR:	Council of Representative
CPJ:	Committee for the Protection of Journalists
CSA:	Central Statistical Authority
CUD:	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DDABIPR:	Dire Dawa Administration Bureau of Information and Public Relations
EBA:	Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority
EBC:	Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation
EBS:	Ethiopian Broadcasting Service
EDORM:	Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement
EPDM:	Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
EPLF:	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF:	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESAT:	Ethiopian Satellite Television
ESDL:	Ethiopian Somali Democratic League
ESPDP:	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic
ETV:	Ethiopia Television
EU:	European Union
FBC:	Fana Broadcasting Corporation
FDRE:	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FM:	Frequency Modulation
GDU:	Gamo Democratic Union
GLF:	Gadabursi Liberation Front
GPDM:	Gambela Peoples' Democratic Movement
GPDO:	Gurage People's Democratic Organisation
GTP:	Growth and Transformation Plan
HNL:	Harari National League
HoF:	House of Federation
HPDO:	Harari People's Democratic Organisation
HPR:	House of Peoples' Representatives
ICCPR:	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR:	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
IFLO:	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
IGLF:	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front
IGR:	Intergovernmental Relations

IPDC:	Industrial Park Development Corporation
IZDC:	Industrial Zones Development Corporation
KG:	Kinder Garten
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDS:	Most Different Systems
MoFA:	Ministry of Federal Affairs
MoFED:	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoUDC:	Ministry of Urban Development and Construction
MoUDHC:	Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction
MoWUD:	Ministry of Works and Urban Development
MP:	Member of Parliament
MSS:	Most Similar Systems
NCT:	National Capital Territory
NEBE:	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU:	Organization for African Unity
OBS:	Oromia Broadcasting Service
OECD:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLF:	Oromo Liberation Front
OMN:	Oromia Media Network
ONLF:	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO:	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PASDEP:	Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PDRE:	People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PM:	Prime Minister
SDPRP:	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SEPDM:	South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement
SLM:	Sidama Liberation Movement
SNNP:	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples'
TGE:	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF:	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TV:	Television
TVO:	Oromia Television
U.S.:	United States
UDJ:	Unity for Democracy and Justice
ULGDP:	Urban Local Government Development Programs
UN:	United Nations
UNECOSOC:	United Nations for Economic & Social Council
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USSR:	Union of Socialist Soviet Republic
VOA:	Voice of America
WPE:	Worker's Party of Ethiopia

Glossary

<i>Abba Gadaa:</i>	political leader of the Gadaa/indigenous Oromo democracy
<i>Afaan Oromo:</i>	the Oromo language
<i>Awraja:</i>	a term equivalent to sub-province in previous regimes of Ethiopia
<i>Balabbat:</i>	an intermediary local ruler during the feudal government of Ethiopia
<i>Calfee:</i>	an Afaan Oromo word referring to Oromo Council or Assembly
<i>Damina:</i>	an equivalent to clan leader
<i>Derg:</i>	an Amharic term for committee
<i>Gadaa:</i>	egalitarian socio-political and cultural institutions of the Oromo
<i>Garad:</i>	landowner for whom the community paid homages for land use
<i>Kebele:</i>	an Amharic word referring to the lowest unit of local government in Ethiopia
<i>Kelle ketema:</i>	an Amharic phrase to refer to sub-city
<i>Kelle-Hager:</i>	an Amharic word to refer to province during the Derg regime
<i>Ketema:</i>	an Amharic word to refer to city or town
<i>Medrek:</i>	an Amharic term to refer to Ethiopian Federal Democratic Forum party
<i>Melkegna:</i>	a local authority imposed upon peoples during the Imperial regime
<i>Moggasa:</i>	an adoption system in Oromo people
<i>Naficgna:</i>	an Amharic word literary means gunmen; or feudo-military rule of Ethiopia
<i>Ras Gaz:</i>	an Amharic phrase for special local self-government units during the Derg
<i>Gabar:</i>	Ethiopia's feudal system in which peasants can own no piece of land
<i>Scmayawi:</i>	an Amharic term to refer to opposition Blue Party
<i>Shengo:</i>	the name of parliament during the Derg
<i>Tehadiso:</i>	an Amharic word to refer to intra-party reform in the EPRDF
<i>Teklay-Gizat :</i>	an imperial term for province
<i>Ugaas:</i>	a title of clan heads in Somali people
<i>Woreda:</i>	an Amharic word equivalent to district local government in Ethiopia


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Maps of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa



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Abstract

This dissertation is a comparative urban policy research in contested multiethnic cities. In addition to the nine regional-states, Ethiopia also has two federally governed contested multiethnic cities—Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. By focusing on these cities, this study investigates the causes and dynamics of urban conflicts, the extents of centralization and urban local autonomies, and urban policies/institutions of regulating ethno-national diversities. To this end, combinations of research strategies including comparative, historical, institutional/structural, and multi-ethnic/multicultural approaches have been employed. An integrated analytical lens, through which both primary and secondary data are qualitatively analyzed and interpreted, was constructed from three interwoven variables: group conflicts, local political institutions and cultural policies. Theoretically, urban semi-consociationalism and multicultural policies of multiethnic cities in developed and emerging federations were helpful for comparative conclusion.

The findings corroborate that the causes and dynamics of the ethno-nationalist conflicts to the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are linked to, among others, (1) historically established urban cultural dominations, political marginalization and identity manipulations—in one phrase 'ethno-territoriality factor', (2) the current political institutions/cultural policies imposed from the center perpetuating the same dominations and marginalization, and (3) boundary issues. Secondly, there was no evidence indicating that the residents of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are exercising local autonomy or self-government rights. Various data have instead shown formal centralization of both city administrations largely reducing them to local agencies of the federal government due mainly to their respective geopolitical significances. Thirdly, it is substantiated that combinations of urban policies of regulating ethno-national diversity ranging from cultural assimilation to partial accommodation have been practiced in the cities. In terms of urban power sharing, the ruling party of Ethiopia devised what appears semi-consociational arrangement largely as instrument of hegemonic control in the cities especially in the post-2005 election—the election that it lost in both cities. Accordingly, intra-ruling party ethnic-based grand coalition formulas, known as '25:25:25:25' equal-quota in Addis Ababa and '40:40:20' quota in Dire Dawa, have been implemented; and since 2006, the mayors of the former have been Oromo by ethnic, while the same post in the latter has been rotating between Oromo and Somali.

Further, both cities share local cultural policy differences and similarities. Their cultural policy diverged as Dire Dawa provides school education and broadcasting media services in three languages, and has also revived indigenous cultural institutions—*Gadaa* of Oromo and *Ugaas* of Somali (partial segmental autonomy), which are not the case in Addis Ababa. The study has rather shown a wide range of cultural policy similarity, which is mainly attributed to the extra-constitutional practices that imposed Amharic language—Ethiopia’s federal working language—as the sole administrative working language of both cities. As a result, in both cases, public services in hospitals, courts, cultural arts, administrations, public meetings, legislations and employments are provided only in Amharic at the expenses of non-Amharic speakers and grassroots democracy. Generally, the semi-consociationalism in Dire Dawa seems to have suspended violent group conflicts when compared to Addis Ababa—the city that could not curb, let alone reverse, its cultural assimilationism and thus remained ‘a problem child’ of the Oromo ever since it was conquered and designated as the capital of Ethiopia. Hence, this study recommends urban inclusive peace-building through curative urban policies and democratic multicultural reforms in contested multiethnic cities.

Keywords

Addis Ababa, Conflict, Dire Dawa, Federal Government, Multiethnic Cities, Urban Policy

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Cities are the locus where the challenges of living together, that is, the challenges of diversity, first emerge (Gilbert, 2009). In modern states, they are the seats of governments—local, provincial, national/federal or supranational—set essentially to provide political, economic and social services to the citizens. Thus, today, multiethnic cities and their policies in particular may pose challenges and tensions at the urban level as issues of ownership, political participations, social inclusions, and indigenous cultural rights are increasingly getting importance and public attentions than ever. As a result, it is argued that the real test of building inclusive and democratic national politics and policies starts at the urban local level (Bollens, 2000).

Ethiopia, one of the least urbanized countries in the world, is home to more than 90 million people, of which urban and rural inhabitants constituted 19% and 81% respectively (CSA, 2008). In terms of ethnic composition, Ethiopia is home to no less than 80 different groups, of which the major ones include Oromo (34.5%), Amhara (26.9%), Somali (6.2%), Tigrayan (6.1%), Sidama (4.0%) and others (ibid.). This ethno-national diversity—"nations, nationalities and peoples" as the constitution prefers to call—has been politically essential cultural feature of Ethiopian population (FDRE Constitution, 1995). It was mainly on the basis of this essential feature that the 1995 constitution reconfigured Ethiopian polity into a federation of nine regional states (ibid.).

This cultural diversity is more so in the major urban areas of Ethiopia. However, the ethnic compositions in urban Ethiopia in general do not seem to be reflecting (or representative of) the ethnic composition of the country. For instance, analysis of Central Statistical Authority's (CSA) data on Ethiopian urban population indicates that Amhara constitute 42.4%, followed by Oromo (22.5%), Tigrayan (9.4%), Gurage (9.1%) and the remaining groups (16.6%) (Golini, 2001: 124). In a multiethnic country like Ethiopia, one needs to find possible explanations to the basic question as to why (and why not) the urban population of some ethno-national groups tended to significantly exceed their country level population percentages. This leads to the importance of discussing the notion of 'urban accessibility' in multicultural contexts. It means that all urban public services, be it provisions of transportation, electricity, water, healthcare or housing services; be it mother tongue

education, recruitments to political positions or civil service employments or other urban activities should be equitably accessible to all inhabitant cultural groups in the city (Ponzini, 2009).

In this regard, looking at whether urban policies in multiethnic cities are accommodative to ethnic diversity or hostile to it, Davide Ponzini concludes that, "the city is the laboratory for diversity" (2009: 29). On the one hand, if a multiethnic city, as the laboratory for diversity, fails to promote fairness among groups in local politics, service deliveries or cultural activities, it would cause urban tensions and conflicts. On the other, accommodative urban policy in a multiethnic city is believed to promote healthy and harmonious relations among groups by contributing to build durable urban peace. For instance, as I have argued in an earlier urban research titled "*The Making of Dire Dawa: Conflict, Ethnicity & Power-Sharing*", there is a pattern of causal association among urban ethnic conflicts, identity issues and power-sharing arrangement in the multiethnic city of Dire Dawa (Milkessa, 2013).¹

It has generally been argued that multiethnic cities in Ethiopia, especially those located on ethno-national borderlands, have been contested by ethno-national groups either for ownership claims or inclusions into the cities (Asnake, 2014; Getahun, 2014; Milkessa, 2014). In some cases, according to Asnake Kefale, "the territorial ownership of cities and towns has been contested by neighbouring ethnic regions" in the post-1991 period (2014: 593). Few cases of urban associated conflicts include the Oromo-Somali conflicts over the city of Dire Dawa, Oromo's conflicts over the city of Addis Ababa/Finfinne, Somali-Oromo conflict over Moyale town, Sidama's conflict over Hawasa, and others. Focusing on the multiethnic cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, which have been under the direct monolingual administration of the Federal Government of Ethiopia, this study seeks to ask two questions: (1) what are the root/causes of urban ethno-national tensions and conflicts, and (2) how should multiethnic contested cities be governed in order to build durable urban peace. By way of dealing with, and guided by, these core questions, comparative urban conflict and policy studies have been conducted on Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. In the

¹ Inspired by own research on Dire Dawa, which was first published in the *Ethiopian Journal of Federal Studies* (Milkessa, 2014), I decided to undertake a comparative urban study by considering Addis Ababa. Prof Jan Erk—external advisor to this dissertation, when he gave me a seminar on Federalism in 2013/14, played a massive role in pushing me to take also a look at the capital city politics of Addis Ababa in comparison with urban ethno-politics of Dire Dawa. That was how this PhD dissertation topic evolved into being. Thus, it was found to be a right decision to do a comparative urban policy research on Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, since both cities are multiethnic, conflicted and chartered monolingual city administrations directly accountable to the Federal Government of Ethiopia (see Addis Ababa Charter, 2003; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). Further, it is believed that there is scarcity of studies on urban conflict and policies in Ethiopia within the broader federal studies.

following parts of this section, the genesis of multiethnic cities (cultural foundations of cities) and the emergence of ethnic-federalism in Ethiopia are discussed, literature gaps shown and the study areas briefly described.

1.1.1 The Genesis of Multiethnic Cities in Ethiopia

Modern multiethnic Ethiopia was built mainly through wars of conquest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Teshale, 1995). In order to create homogenous state and society at the expense of the languages and cultures of the subjugated multitude of ethno-national groups, the successive unitary regimes of Ethiopia—the Imperial (1890s-1974) and the *Derg* (1974-1991)—implemented coercive assimilation policies (Markakis, 2011; Merera, 2011). Several garrison towns, which evolved to the present multiethnic cities, were formed as centers of political control and served the national grand mission of cultural homogenization, as discussed in chapter four. Nonetheless, the conquered national groups did not readily accept their military defeats and the subsequent socio-cultural impositions. As a result, the making of multiethnic empire-state of Ethiopia, Donald Levine (2000) contends, was rooted in the wave of ethnic conflicts: ‘Amhara thesis’, ‘Oromo anti-thesis’ and ‘Ethiopian synthesis’. By ‘Amhara thesis’, he was referring to the Amhara leadership and cultural foundations (language, religion, norms, values and other cultural practices) in the process of the Ethiopian multiethnic empire-state building. Though other ethnic groups had fought against what he called ‘Amhara thesis’, it was the resistance put up by the Oromo, the largest ethnic group of Ethiopia, that Levine singled out as ‘Oromo anti-thesis’. ‘Ethiopian synthesis’, that is, the modern multiethnic Ethiopia, according to Donald Levine, was formed as a result of the two opposing waves of ‘Amhara thesis’ and ‘Oromo anti-thesis’ (ibid.). Multiethnic towns were generally formed on ‘Amhara thesis’ to serve Amharic speaking politically dominant group (Bjerren, 1985).

One major deficit in Levine’s dialectical proposition is that the “Ethiopian synthesis” was presented as having already happened (Asmarom, 2000). In reality, it was social change in progress, which has been disrupted by the subsequent political developments in Ethiopia (ibid.). Thus, despite its historical and socio-anthropological analytical significances, Levine’s classic proposition has been disputed on critical ground that ‘Ethiopian synthesis’ survives no more as a final synthesis, but rather, has become thesis itself which has dialectically been under-reconstruction, for example, since 1991 (Alemayehu, 1993). Merera Gudina (2001) claims that

“now, in less than two decades, the Tigrayan anti-thesis, the negation of ... ‘Ethiopian synthesis’... is in its full swing—a far reaching agenda of the remaking of Ethiopia, in a manner that redirects, if not fully reverse the historical evolution of modern Ethiopia” (p. 1).

Sarah Vaughan describes Levine's 'Amhara thesis' this way: "Imperial Shoa myth making had forged Solomonic history, Orthodox religion, Amharic language, and Abyssinian culture into an all-encompassing rationale of empire" (2003: 284). The essence of 'Amhara thesis' was further understood in Knutsson's phraseology –“pax amharica” policy, which was introduced by Menelik II to assimilate all non-Amhara ethnic groups (Knutsson, 1969). The national policy of ‘pax amharica’, which advocated the so-called *Amharization* but with ethnic boundaries maintained as Barth (1969) noted, necessitated north-south mobility of particularly Amharas and to some extent Tigrayans to facilitate the implementation of homogenization policy (Mekuria, 1997).² Major multiethnic towns in the southern half of the country were the offshoots of the establishment of the imperial military command centers for the control of local peoples and the subsequent north-south resettlements and related social mobility (Gutu, 2016). More specifically, the origins of these towns were laid down largely by Menelik's imperial soldiers, for which, many regard them “garrison towns”—military posts turned towns (Merera, 2011; Bjerer, 1985).

Once formed, Merera argues, these towns became the main experiment centers of the imperial project of “one-nation-building” on the basis of Amharic language, Abyssinian culture and Orthodox Christianity.

[T]he creation of ‘one Ethiopia nation’ continued the expansion process under what was then termed *Makinat* (pacification and/or colonization). *Makinat* involved evangelization of the local population, institutionalization of a new system of political control, and imposition of a new political class, culture and language on the indigenous population. Above all, it was an establishment of new centres of political and military control, generally known as *ketemas* or garrison towns (ibid: 11).

Thus, garrisons or *ketemas* in Amharic became centers of administration and political control of the conquered indigenous peoples. They were, by and large, agents of *Amharization*. Similarly, Karl Eric Knutsson (1969) conducted a study on what he called “the polyethnic market villages in Macha”—the then towns in central and western Oromia—where he discovered ethnic-based sector monopolization in such a way that administrators were Amhara, shopkeepers were Gurage and

² Before Menelik's conquests and southward expansions, there were, of course, commonly known forth and back social mobility in northeast Africa such as the rise of Ahmed Grag and the expansion made by pastoral groups among the Oromo community in the sixteenth century (Asmarom, 2000).

grain traders were Oromo. He found that the towns were built on ethnically stratified assimilation policy—what he termed “pax amharica”—which also maintained ethnic boundaries: “*Amharization* does not mean, however, that there is a complete change of a person’s ethnic identity. There is definitely a loss in his original ethnic identity. ...he is not [Oromo] any longer. But he will nevertheless not be accepted as Amhara either by his original group or by the Amhara” (ibid: 98). Knutsson concluded that “it is in these communities that the typical Ethiopian system of ethnic stratification can be observed” (p. 5). Stratified assimilation policy maintains ethnic boundaries. Economically, as compared to rural parts of the country, urban centers acquired lopsided access to resources due to the fact that rulers dwelled in towns which continued to attract different communities. Donald Levine (1992), for instance, argued that the lion’s share of Haile Selassie’s beneficence went to the cities of Addis Ababa, Asmara, Harar, and Dire Dawa.

The *Derg* regime, which came to power in 1974, did not resolve that oppressive urban ethno-linguistic conditions established by the Imperial urban policy. Nothing changed as far as ethno-national diversity governance is concerned across the country for that matter. The *Derg* only changed the overall governing ideology from feudalism to military-socialism (Mulugeta, 2005). It contributed for further north-south (self-initiated and state-sponsored) social mobility in the aftermath of the devastating famines of 1984/85 by way of pursuing a program that advocated inter-provincial resettlement and countrywide villagization. This program was arguably contrived to weaken ethno-nationalist liberation movements where they were strong (Bahru, 2007). Above all, Assefa Fiseha contends, multiethnic cities in Ethiopia evolved through a long process of inter-ethnic mobility which laid fertile grounds for “newly emerging urban centers that are able to attract a large number of youths from different corners of the country” (2007: 254).

In sum, literatures on the political history of multiethnic urban centers of Ethiopia present opposing interpretations: urban ethnic unification thesis, urban ethnic oppression thesis and urban ethnic colonial thesis (Teshale, 1995; Bahru, 2002; Asafa, 2010). What is common in these literatures, however, is the dominant role of Amharic speakers in the modern urban centers of Ethiopia. As a result of the prevailing urban policies, the politically dominant group of urban Ethiopia, in the post-1900, was not white colonial settlers as was the case in other African cities, but was a community of Amharic speakers dominantly following Orthodox Christianity. This is more so in multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa—the study areas of this thesis—which were founded as proto-towns in 1886 and 1902 respectively. In general, most ethnically divided cities in

Ethiopia originated largely as a result of the Abyssinian state's southward conquests, expansion and establishment of military centers, and the subsequent cultural homogenization policies.

1.1.2 Multiethnic Cities and the Emergence of Ethnic-Federalism

With the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)³ restructured Ethiopian state on the basis of ethno-linguistic line by adopting a new constitution in 1995 establishing Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The new constitution generally promised to build multinational democracy and federalism in which inter-ethnic equality and justice at the shared rule, ethno-national/regional autonomy at the self-rule, genuine democracy, protection of human rights, rule of law and inclusive public policies and institutions are realized in Ethiopia. More specifically, federalism—as a means of managing diversity—was formally introduced to mitigate the age-old ethnic dominations in Ethiopia "by rectifying historical unjust relationship" (FDRE Constitution, 1995: Preamble). Put differently, it was introduced as an anti-thesis to what was regarded as 'Amhara thesis'—a system that gave a near monopoly to the Amhara ruling class (Markakis, 2011). To this end, the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia have been guaranteed, in principle, the right to self-determination, including up to the unconditional right to secession (Article 39). On this core self-rule principle, Ethiopia was re-structured into nine Member States (Article 47). However, the multiethnic cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, which are now administered directly by the federal government, have been contested by ethno-national groups and governing them has thus been challenging.

The problem was that as a result of the downfall of the oppressive regime and the ensuing promises of cultural rights and restructuring of the state along ethno-linguistic line, some multiethnic cities had to face ethno-nationalist conflicts led by ownership claims or demands of inclusions. It means that, during and after the transitional period, ethnic groups that claim to be

³ The EPRDF has four member parties including (1) Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)—the ruling party of Tigray Region, (2) Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)—the ruling party of Amhara Region, (3) Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)—the ruling party of Oromia Region, and (4) the South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM)—the ruling party of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' (SNNP) Region. The remaining five regional states of Ethiopia are also run by the EPRDF affiliate parties including (1) Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP)—the ruling party of Somali Region, (2) Harari National League (HNL)—the ruling party of Harari People's Region, (3) Afar People's Democratic Organisation (APDO)—the ruling party of Afar Region, (4) Gambela Peoples' Democratic Movement (GPDM)—the ruling party of Gambela Region, and (5) Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF)—the ruling part of Benishangul-Gumuz Region. Within the EPRDF coalition and the affiliate parties, the TPLF is an influential core party and widely accused of politico-military dominance and hegemonic controls.

indigenous to the areas mobilized conflicts either to control the cities or to demand a system that accommodates them in the cities. Consequently, those multiethnic cities have been plunged in social tensions and political polarizations. Assefa Fiseha claims that the seeds of urban multiethnic governance problems were newly sown by the constitution itself “because of the basic principle enshrined in the constitution that requires regional state boundaries to coincide with at least some of the major nationalities” (2007: 253). He makes a cautious remark on the potential danger of the international manipulability of domestic conflicts over the control of territories particularly nearer to the volatile horn neighboring countries (*ibid.*). For instance, the role of Djibouti in the dispute over, and urban politics of, Dire Dawa, as discussed in chapter five and six, could be cited here. Moreover, where disputed areas coincide with the boundaries between regional governments, the conflicts between local communities tend to transform themselves to conflicts between regional states (Asnake, 2003).

There are many empirical cases of multiethnic cities that are contested by the ethno-national groups in one way or the other. These conflicted cities include, among others, Dire Dawa, Babile and Moyale (Oromia-Somali border conflicts), Addis Ababa/Finfinne (Oromo ethno-nationalist conflicts), and Hawassa (Sidama ethno-nationalist conflicts) (Asnake, 2014; Getahun, 2014; Milkessa, 2014). Particularly Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are still threatened by ethno-nationalist conflicts as witnessed by the recent Oromo protest movements triggered by the so-called Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, and by the attempt of the Somali regional state militias to control bordering territory of Dire Dawa from the north direction (Girum, 2014).

The recent Oromo conflict over the city of Addis Ababa was triggered by a controversial city master plan introduced in 2014. The master plan, which was officially cancelled by Oromia Government in January 2016, had planned to stretch the city’s plan area from its current 54,000 hectares to more than 1.1 million hectares (Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Plan Project Office, 2014). Though the government insisted that it was an integrated infrastructural and development plan, some considered it as expansion; while others found it unconstitutional annexation (Tsegaye, 2014). According to Getahun, the unprecedented expansion of Addis Ababa will have consequences: “Displacement of Oromo farmers from their land, even when compensated, is a violation of their individual rights to life, property, health and housing, and their collective rights to linguistic and cultural freedoms” (2014: 175). The master plan was even accused of plotting to partition Oromia into East and West (*ibid.*). However, the root cause of the

Oromo conflict over the city does seem neither the master plan nor its potential violation of Oromo's cultural and land rights if implemented. As explained in chapter four and five, the Oromo question goes 130 years back, when Finfinne—an Oromo village—was conquered, designated as the capital of Shewa Province in 1886 and of Menelik's empire-state in 1889 and renamed Addis Ababa in 1896. Since then, Addis Ababa has remained 'a problem child' of the Oromo due to the suspensions of cultural and political rights of the Oromo in the city—the city that has rapidly been expanding to the surrounding Oromo territory. Even under the current regime, the Oromo could not own a single school in Oromo language in the city, and continued to be socio-culturally excluded in the federal capital (see also chapter seven). As a way of redressing these deep rooted Oromo problems in the city, the State of Oromia was bestowed with what appear broader special interests as written in the federal constitution. It reads:

The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected. Particulars shall be determined by law (FDRE Constitution 1995: Article 49/5).

However, no particular law is adopted so far to implement this constitutional provision. As a result, the Oromo nationalism that was reactivated by the master plan has rocked the political establishments of the present regime in Oromia Region.⁴

There are not many studies on the impacts of Ethiopian federalism and its subsequent public policies on urban ethno-national stabilities and conflicts. Even at the general level, only few studies were conducted on public policy making in Ethiopia after the introduction of federalism. Those few studies corroborate that Ethiopia's ruling party, the EPRDF, fully centralizes policy-problem identification, defining public policy changes, and managing its executions (Assefa, 2007; Mukugeta et al, 2006; Mulugeta, 2005). An excerpt from Mulugeta's thesis is worth quoting:

The EPRDF's structure virtually represents a party of a Leninist type... Additionally, although its congress holds plenary sessions every two to two and half years, and is ostensibly seen as a supreme decision-making organ of the coalition, in practice key policy decisions are made by the central committee and politburo (2005: 233).

That is the quality of EPRDF's democratic centralism which made Ethiopia a centralized state in practice, an antithesis to policy-making in genuine federal arrangement. The general policy

⁴ State of emergency was declared all over Ethiopia on 30th of September 2016 for six months; but was extended on 30th of March 2017 for more four months due mainly to the Oromo protest movements and other protests in the country.

direction of the country is set by the center—the Central Committee of the EPRDF, which is composed of thirty six members, nine from each of its four member parties. In this supreme organ of the ruling coalition, the TPLF is known to have been the core party to influence policy-making as it dominates defense and other security structures of the country (Asnake, 2009). As a result, it is often claimed that almost all development policies of Ethiopia, ranging from constitution-making process (mega-public policy making) in 1994 and the advent of rural-centered Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) policy in the mid-1990s all the way to the current industry-oriented policy of Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), have been introduced from the center (Dessalegn, 2014). This centralization policy trend is argued to have been the outcomes of (1) the practical fusion of the formal government and the ruling party institutions, (2) the re-inauguration of centralization policies following the split within the TPLF in 2001, (3) absence of multiparty democracy and democratic institutions, and (4) disorganized, underdeveloped and fragile civil societies (Markakis, 2011; Asnake, 2009; Mulugeta, 2005). Finally, the ruling party's core governing ideologies—revolutionary democracy and developmental state⁵—have been widely held responsible to have caused political and policy centralizations by relegating the constitutional federal principles of non-centralization to the background (Merera, 2011). Likewise, Daniel Elazar wrote that “Third World federations, which emerged only in the twentieth century, adopted hierarchal forms [of bureaucracy for policy formulation] as a result of their exposure to modern ideas and to serve what were usually autocratic systems in any case” (1987: 212). Ethiopia's autocratic policy formulation [and execution] was no exception.

On the contrary, the incumbent regime of Ethiopia, the EPRDF, claims that its overall development policies since 1991 are largely democratic, inclusive and accessible to all citizens; and that those developmental policies had no intention to jeopardize Ethiopia's federalism (Bereket, 2008; MoFED, 2007). As a result, it denies the claims of political and policy-making centralization in Ethiopia in general and in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in particular.

⁵ Developmental states generally prioritize economic development through centralized policy-making, which might endanger regional state's autonomy. As a result, developmental state may inevitably contradict federalism that in principle promotes political non-centralization. The classical mode of developmental state is China under its Communist Party. The EPRDF's revolutionary democracy is a Leninist conception which also promotes democratic centralism. Thus, Ethiopia's extra-constitutional practices of revolutionary democracy and developmental policies tend to contradict its federal constitutional principles of self-rule and shared-rule. Since recently, the idea of democratic developmental federalism has been popularized in Ethiopia both by senior officials and in academic circles citing the history of Indian and South African federalism within dominant party system. But the conceptual tensions remain.

Even though the impact of the regime's policy centralization on urban governance could be predicted, it is very difficult to find comprehensive or comparative urban governance studies within the existing Ethiopian federalism literature. Asnake Kefale (2010), for instance, attempted to highlight the evolution of the 'special administration' of Dire Dawa as a politico-administrative way of managing ethnic conflicts to the detriment of the constitution. He has also accounts on inter-ethnic ownership conflicts over Babile and Moyale. Elsewhere, I have discussed the hegemonic control by the EPRDF in Dire Dawa's post-1993 coalition rule (Milkessa, 2014). Getahun (2001) identifies the systematic and institutionalized discriminatory urban policy of Addis Ababa City Government. Assefa Fiseha offers a general view on the constitutional causes of multiethnic urban governance failure as well as presents the opportunities and challenges of Ethiopia's federal capital governance (Assefa, 2007; 2009). Wondwossen Wakene (2010) identifies the limits of self-governance of Addis Ababa as capital city of the Federal and Oromia governments. Dirribi Damissie (2014) briefly questions the very legality of institutional arrangements of Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa, Harar and Awaday.⁶ These studies are fragmented and mostly emphasized on the political administration aspects of contested cities. None of them can claim to have discussed the ethno-national diversity regulation policies in the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Moreover, no systematic comparative urban research was conducted on the dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to multiethnic cities in Ethiopia. Hence, a good deal of research attention should be drawn to fill the gap of comparative study of urban politics within the federal political studies.

Therefore, this dissertation is a comparative urban study designed to investigate the root causes and dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, the status of their respective urban governments' political autonomy, the role of urban policies and power sharing arrangements in accommodating diversities in urban areas.

1.1.3 Setting the Study Areas

The study areas of this dissertation are Ethiopia's chartered multiethnic city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, both of which are directly administered by, and accountable to, the federal government (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). The city of Addis

⁶ Awaday, a town located in eastern Oromia, is believed to be economically lucrative center as it is a commercial hub of Khat in Ethiopia. Khat is one the few agricultural products that Ethiopia exports, generating revenues to the country perhaps after coffee.

Ababa has one more official name, that is, Finfinne. It is also informally called Shegger.⁷ The Oromia Constitution has restored its original Oromo name—Finfinne, whereas the FDRE Constitution continued using Addis Ababa (FDRE Constitution, 1995; Oromia Constitution, 2005). This study dominantly uses the term Addis Ababa, but as for the issues related to Oromo and Oromia it can use Finfinne.

Geographically, Addis Ababa/Finfinne is located at the heart of the State of Oromia in central part of Ethiopia. Covering an area of 540 square kilometers, Addis Ababa is located on an average altitude ranging from 2200 to 3000 meter with mean annual rainfall of 1200 mm and mean annual temperature of 16°C (Emerta Addis, 2015). It is the official capital of the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the State Government of Oromia. Dire Dawa Administration, the largest city in eastern Ethiopia, is geographically located between Oromia and Somali regions. It is bordered by Shinile Zone of Somali Region in the northwest and northeast, and by Eastern Hararghe Zone of Oromia Region in the southeast, southwest and east directions. It is 505 km east of Addis Ababa and 313 km west of Djibouti port. Dire Dawa Administration is estimated to have a total land area of 1,128 square kilometers, of which 97.73% covers rural area, and the remaining 2.27% accounts for the main urban land (DDABIPR, 2009). That is why, territorially, Dire Dawa is twice as big as Addis Ababa. Dire Dawa city lies between 960 - 2,500 above sea level with mean annual temperature of 25.4°C and mean annual rainfall of 604 mm (ibid.). Due to its location amidst desert, Dire Dawa is often dubbed as the *Queen City of Desert* (ibid.).

The present official nomenclatures of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are Addis Ababa City Government and Dire Dawa City Administration, respectively. In this dissertation, the term "city administration" may be used to refer to both cities. Addis Ababa administration has three tiers of local government: city level government, 10 sub-city administrations (*kille-ketema*) and 116 district (*woreda*) administrations. Dire Dawa has 9 urban and 38 rural *kebele* administrations.

The demographic sizes of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, according to the 2007 census, were 2,739,551 and 341,834 respectively (CSA, 2008). Thus, the former city is eight times as populous as the latter one. According to the recent population projections, Addis Ababa's population was estimated to be 3,195,000, while Dire Dawa's population increased to 427,000. The top five ethnic groups in Addis Ababa include Amhara (47%), Oromo (19.5%), Gurage

⁷ The researcher could not independently prove what language is 'Shegger' in as respondents gave different views.

(16.3%), Tigrayan (6.2%) and Silte (2.9%) (ibid.). On the other, the top five ethnic groups in Dire Dawa are Oromo (46%), Somali (24.2%), Amhara (20%), Gurage (4.5%) and Tigrayan (1.2%) (ibid.). The largest ethno-national group, nearly half of the city's population, in Addis Ababa is Amhara and in Dire Dawa is Oromo. In terms of languages, the 2007 census report shows that Amharic is spoken by 71% of Addis Ababa's population followed by Afaan Oromo (10.7%), Guragigna (8.3%), Tigrigna (3.6%) and others. Similar census shows that Afaan Oromo is spoken by 48% of Dire Dawa's population followed by Amharic (26.4%), Somali (19.7%), Guragigna (2.7%) and others (CSA, 2008). The following table may summarize the study areas in comparison.

Table 1.1: Comparative Setting of the Study Areas: Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

Cities		Addis Ababa	Dire Dawa
Establishment year		1886	1902
Legal status	1991-1993	1 of the 14 regions of TGE	Part of Oromia Region
	1994-1997	Administered by the center	Administered by the center
	1997-2003	Federal chartered city	Administered by the center
	2003-present	Federal revised city charter	Federal chartered city
Population size (by 2007)		2,739,551	341,834
Major four ethnic groups		Amhara (47%), Oromo (19.5%), Gurage (16.3%), Tigrayan (6.2%)	Oromo (46%), Somali (24.2%), Amhara (20%), Gurage (4.5%)
Government working language		Amharic	Amharic
Administrator & policy-maker		Federal Government	Federal Government
Major ethnic conflict threats		Oromo nationalism	Oromo and Somali nationalisms
Recent ethnic conflicts	Ethnic groups	Oromo	Somali
	Month	November 2015 -January 2016	April 2014
	Type	Deadly violent	Non-violent
	Presumed causes	Boundary expansion proposal ^a	Border issues
	Actors	Protestors: Students, farmers, civil servants, merchants, teachers, etc.	Somali Regional militia
	Affected areas	Almost all parts of Oromia (both rural and urban) protested	Marmarsa, Ganda Tesfa, Dire Dawa University Campus
	Measures	After months of crackdown of protesters, the master plan was canceled on January 12, 2016.	Federal Government intervened and discussed with Somali Regional and Dire Dawa city officials.

^a According to the document of the integrated master plan of Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone as publicized in 2014, by the end of the plan project within 25 years, the Addis Ababa city's plan area would be stretching from its current 54,000 hectare to more than 1.1 million hectare. This means that the development plan was proposed to be implemented in Addis Ababa and in 17 rural *woredas* (districts) and 35 cities in the surrounding Oromia Regional-State (Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Plan Project Office, 2014).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Much has been said about Ethiopia's ethnic-based federalism; but little is understood about its practice in multi-ethnic contested cities. With the change of regime in 1991, as clearly laid out above, Ethiopia boldly embarked upon its state restructuring mainly on the basis of the principles of multiethnic-federal governance. During the transition period (1991-1994), the Proclamation No. 7/1992 provided for the establishment of fourteen self-governing regions of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in which Addis Ababa was granted self-governing status as Region Fourteen (Article 3/1). Dire Dawa was assumed part of Region Four (Oromia) until it was contested by Issa/Somali forces in 1993. Consequently, the city of Dire Dawa became one of the bones of contention between Oromia and Somali regions of Ethiopia. The fourteen regions of the TGE transformed into nine Member States of the Ethiopian Federation by the new constitution in 1995. As a result, Addis Ababa lost its regional status and Dire Dawa evolved extra-constitutionally. Even though the overall objective of Ethiopian federalism was to accommodate particularly ethno-linguistic diversity of the country, it appears in this study that it did not adequately address urban multiethnic governance problems. These problems, which are the main themes of this dissertation, could be summarized as follows.

The first main problem stems from the constitutional-legal and policy frameworks of urban governances in Ethiopia. Above all, the FDRE Constitution draws little or no attention to the significance of city governances in Ethiopia making semblance with Daniel Elazar's assertion: "thus the original bases for federal arrangements were rural territorial units that gave the system as a whole a particular character" (1987: 255). With the exception of the federal capital city (Art 49), urban and other local units' governances are regional competencies, the Constitution states (Art 50). On the contrary, Ethiopia's developmental policies and practices, which were introduced following the end of the Ethio-Eritrean war and the split within the TPLF in 2001, appeared to have aggressively recentralized many powers of regional states; and urban policy-making power too was entirely centralized (Zemelak, 2014; Tsegaye, 2009; see also chapter six).

As a result of the national development policies and as part of the general recentralization moves, all regional constitutions were revised in 2002, Addis Ababa City Charter was revised in 2003 and Dire Dawa Administration got a charter in 2004. Then, the city administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa started to be legally treated as branches of the Federal Government (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). The Revised City Charter of Addis Ababa (2003)

states that "the City Government is a *component* of the Federal Government. It shall be accountable to the Federal Government concerning security, diplomatic relations as well as policies, laws and standards thereof" (Art 61(1)). Likewise, the City Charter of Dire Dawa provides that "the City Administration shall be *part of* the Federal Government. The City Administration shall be accountable to the Federal Government" (Art 51 (1)). The puzzle is that both urban local governments are centralized by the Federal Government as its *components* or local agencies. As a result, both charters have given no attention to local multicultural governances and self-rule (chapter six). Despite this much centralization, scholars in the circle seem to have been in confusion as they regard both city administrations as "city-states", or "equivalent of regions", or "autonomous cities", or "semi-autonomous cities", as clarified in chapter six.

Besides, the centralized (federal) governance of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is argued to have emerged for different reasons. The main rationales suggested were that the former city was centralized as it was designated federal capital and the latter city was centralized due to the Oromia-Somali regional conflicts to it and its geopolitical significance—proximity to Djibouti seaport. The question was thus where should we locate Ethiopia's federal capital governance model from among the existing models: federal district, capital city-state or capital city in a regional-state? As concrete evidence in chapter six shows, Addis Ababa's governance resembles the federal district model on the one hand for the fact that the administration of Addis Ababa is declared component part of, and accountable to, the federal government; but also resembles with the capital located in a province serving as the capital of both federal and provincial governments. The anomaly is that Dire Dawa is not an alternative Ethiopia's federal capital, but its special federal governance is akin to that of Addis Ababa (see both charters). As already mentioned, the special administration of Dire Dawa came to exist as a politico-administrative instrument of conflict management to the detriment of basic constitutional principles (Asnake, 2010).

A related problem is the misconception that regards Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as 'federal territories'. In Ethiopia, there is no constitutionally recognized territory called 'federal territory'. Tsegaye Regassa clarifies that "no territory is directly the territory of the federal government for domestic legal and political purposes. For international law purposes, the Federal Government represents Ethiopia as a country that claims the territory of its constituent states as its territory" (2014: 5). The FDRE Constitution (1995) proclaims that "the territorial jurisdiction of Ethiopia shall comprise the territory of the members of the Federation and its boundaries shall be

as determined by international agreements” (Art 2). Territorial members of the Federation are limited to nine in number (Art 47). Thus, there is no such thing as 'federal territory' in Ethiopia.

The second major theme of the research problem is associated to the unresolved ethno-nationalist conflicts to both city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The conflicts between Oromo and Somali forces over the control of Dire Dawa during and after the transitional period have not yet been finally resolved in accordance with the constitution. The Federal Constitution of Ethiopia (1995) defines principles and procedures of resolving border disputes between Member States (Art 48). The institution that is constitutionally entrusted with the power to deal with inter-regional border conflicts is the House of Federation—Ethiopia's upper house. As this house has the authority to interpret the constitution, it “shall strive to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between States” (Art 62). Contrary to these constitutional guidelines, Dire Dawa was anomalously put under the Office of the Prime Minister in 1993 and evolved as an extra-constitutional special entity chartered in 2004 to continue under the direct federal administration.

The issue of Addis Ababa appears even more complicated. The Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city administration of Addis Ababa cannot be a two decade phenomena. The underlying causes of Oromo conflicts to the city were sown in the *modus operandi* of the conquest of Finfinne territory and the subsequent exclusion policies of the Ethiopian rulers. As shown in chapter seven, at least culturally speaking, the Oromo continued to be excluded from the federal capital. The 2014-2016 Oromo conflicts against the city's master plan occurred on top of this deep-rooted Oromo national feelings of exclusion and discrimination. The undelivered special interest of Oromia in the city was supposed to resolve that deep-rooted problems though the promise has not yet been materialized, or it was deliberately left in limbo. The suspension of Oromo cultural and political rights in the city in the last 130 years, therefore, could be identified as "the mother" of Oromo conflicts to the city and its master plans. These demands were reflected in the 2004 Oromo protests against the change of Oromia capital from Finfinne to Adama, in the 2014-2016 Oromo protests movements against the so-called integrated development master plan of Addis Ababa. In fact, the master plan largely served as a triggering factor for the Oromo national conflicts to the city's age-old policy of exclusion and marginalization. Moreover, Elazar argues that:

The development of urbanized regions often crossing the boundaries of the constituent politics has led to problems arising from political boundaries... Urbanization has tended to

heighten or exaggerate the tensions that may already be present in federal systems... Since migration seems to be a strong concomitant of urbanization, it contributes to these tensions (1987: 255-256).


Similarly, Getahun's recent publication "A Nation Without a City, a Blind Without a Cane: The Oromo Struggle for Addis Ababa" unflinchingly concurs that "the policy of exclusion of Oromos from participating in the administration, economic activities, and cultural functions of Addis Ababa has had an adverse effect on Oromos and on Ethiopian politics as a whole" (2014: 161). Thus, the cause of the recent conflicts in Oromia regarding the city of Finfinne is deep rooted.

The third theme of the research problem examines the post-1991 urban policies on ethno-national diversities and power sharing arrangements of the multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. In terms of language policy, Amharic has been retained as the sole working language of both city administrations (see Art. 6 of Addis Ababa Charter, 2003; Art. 5 of Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). This monolingual policy is believed to have adversely affected urban social service deliveries since the cities are home to and recipients of various ethno-linguistic groups with varying population sizes (CSA, 2008). The effects of urban language policy on urban education, mass-media, employment and cultural identity are imminent both theoretically (Weinstein, 1983) and practically, as discussed in chapter seven. However, Dire Dawa has deviated from Addis Ababa on its accommodation of language diversity in education and broadcasting media (Milkessa, 2011; Cohen, 2007). The question is, why such, though too little, urban policy variation came about in the cities administered by the same charters adopted by the federal government.

In addition, as political instruments of managing ethno-national diversities in, and conflicts to, the cities, or as a means of hegemonic control, or both, the EPRDF has devised what appears local semi-consociational arrangements in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations particularly after the 2005 contested elections in Ethiopia. In Addis Ababa, the four member parties of the EPRDF share executive and legislative powers of the city administration at all tiers—city center, sub-cities and *woreda*—on 'equal share' formula (25% each), whereas in Dire Dawa, urban local powers are shared among ESPDP, OPDO and the remaining EPRDF member parties in accordance with the 40:40:20 rule (Milkessa, 2014). Since 2006, as part of the power sharing deals, the post of the mayor of Addis Ababa has been manned from the OPDO, while the same post in Dire Dawa has been rotating between the OPDO and the ESPDP. Getahun Benti contends that "in the last six years, for example, three persons have been appointed mayor of the

city [Addis Ababa]. All are ethnically Oromo and members of the OPDO, but none had the power to advance Oromia's 'special interest' guaranteed in the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution" (Getahun, 2014: 172). As a result, these formulas seemed instruments of hegemonic control and further dictated the results of the 2008 and 2013 local elections in both city administrations, as shown in chapter seven.

Fig. 1.1: Themes of problem statements



1.3 Key Research Questions & Hypothesis

This thesis deals with the challenges of governing multiethnic cities where ethnicity has been the basis of social organization, mobilization and competition for urban socio-cultural services, political power and resources. Thus, by focusing more on the post-1991 urban administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, I ask the following questions: (a) What are the causes and dynamics of urban multiethnic conflicts? (b) What are the patterns of urban governances and the statuses of urban local autonomy? (c) What are the urban policies and political institutions of regulating ethno-national diversities? (d) What are their key similarities and differences and why so? (e) How can urban democratic multiculturalism and autonomous urban local governments be built so as to bring about durable urban peace in contested cities?

By way of addressing these key research questions, this study aims to test the following hypothesis. First, the study claims that the major causes of ethno-nationalist conflicts to the cities most likely include, among others, ethno-territoriality, extra-constitutionally centralized urban policies and governances, and border issues. In the case of Dire Dawa, the conflicts tended to have been pretexts for the extra-constitutional centralization, which I refer to as *conflict-led-*

centralization policy; whereas in Addis Ababa, the undelivered constitutional special interests of Oromia—the sustained age-old policies of exclusion and centralization—is likely root factors of the conflicts, which I refer to as *centralization policy-led-conflict*. In both cases, the centralized urban policy and governances have the propensity to regenerate the threats of urban ethno-national conflicts.

Further, the study argues that both city administrations are unlikely to have practiced self-governing or local political autonomy, which leads this study to expect neither accommodative cultural policy nor democratic power sharing in the cities, all of which have causal associations with urban ethno-national conflicts. Finally, despite sharing similarities, the Dire Dawa Administration appears to have partial segmental autonomy in cultural policy introduced in the early transitional period when the city was administrative part of Oromia Region, whereas Addis Ababa is argued to have retained its century-old cultural homogenization policy perpetuating ethno-linguistic assimilations. This cultural policy difference is believed to be the outcome of the OPDO-led Oromia Government's 'presenting absence' (to use Tsegaye's phrase) in its own official capital on the one hand, and the TPLF-led EPRDF's hegemonic interests and influences in Addis Ababa on the other—save OPDO's autonomy assertions/claims in the last one year (Tsegaye, 2015).

1.4 Methods of Data Collection & Analysis

1.4.1 Methods of Data Collection

This study is a qualitative research based on both primary and secondary data. This does not mean that quantitative figures and statistical reports of various sectors of government are not helpful. They have indeed helped the qualitative analysis parts of the study. To this end, the first and the major method of data collection has been document analysis—secondary source. It includes books, journal articles, book chapters, presented papers/theses, newspapers, magazines, commentaries, NGO publications, governmental document and statistical reports, archival and online sources, and others. The other data for this research has been primary source including broadcasting media news and interviews, political statements by party officials, political party documents, legal documents like constitutions, international conventions/treaties, proclamations, plans, programs, strategies, directives, regulations, and individual interviews, group discussions as well as my own observations. All sources have been triangulated and complemented. In order to obtain detailed primary qualitative data, semi-structured guiding questions were prepared in four languages—

English, Amharic, Afaan Oromo and Somali—for interviews and focus group discussions with key informants taking into account the major linguistic aspects of the study areas.

Sampling Technique: In order to have access to primary sources, this research has selected purposive/deliberate sampling technique on the basis of the objectives it has set out to address. The main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a population that are of interest, which are believed to have possessed knowledge authority to answer research questions. As the present research is about urban conflict and policy assessments, stakeholder purposive sampling technique has been enormously helpful. Lisa Given (2008) argues that stakeholder sampling is “particularly useful in the context of evaluation research and policy analysis; this strategy involves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or administering the programme or service being evaluated, and who might otherwise be affected by it” (p.697). This type of sampling provides multiple advantages. For instance, it enhances the ability to focus discussions on issues specific to each sector/group and how research could address them. Deliberately selected key informants were asked to share their specific in-depth knowledge (rich information sources). The major limitation of this sampling technique is related to representativeness of the sample drawn because purposive samples are determined by judgmental which is suspected of being highly prone to researcher’s bias. As a result, while drawing key informants, attempts of striking balances in the concerned governmental and social sectors have been made.

Sample sources and size: Key informants (for interviews and discussions) have been drawn from the following sectors. From the City Administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa: Education Bureaus, Civil Service Bureaus, Legal and Justice Bureaus, Police Commissions, Culture and Tourism Bureaus, Health Bureaus, Major Referral Hospitals, Offices of City Mayors, Offices of City Councils, Government Communication Bureaus, Mass Media Agency, and Urban Planning, Construction and Development Bureaus are included in the sample. From the Federal Government of Ethiopia: Ministry of Federal Affairs, House of Federation, House of Peoples’ Representatives, and Ministry of Civil Service are included. From the Oromia and Somali Regional States: Culture and Tourism Bureaus, Education Bureaus, Civil Service Bureaus, and offices of the Presidents are included. Officials of the ruling political parties—the EPRDF and ESPDP Committees Offices in Dire Dawa, and the EPRDF and OPDO headquarters in Addis Ababa—have served as key sources of primary data. Domestic civil society organizations, cultural

leaders/elders, victims, major opposition political parties were also interviewed both individually and in groups. Moreover, this study has benefited from discussions with historians, journalists, experts and practitioners of federalism and urban policies. Accordingly, fifty (50) interviews were conducted and thirteen (13) focus group discussions (FGD) were held from these purposively selected sample sources. Finally, my own observations and experiences in both cities have been helpful. For instance, large parts of primary data on Dire Dawa case were collected in 2012 while I was lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Dire Dawa University in the city of Dire Dawa.

Moreover, the selected key informants were asked to share their specific in-depth knowledge of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa especially in the post-1991 and thus, their personal values are not meant to play statistical representation, as my aim is to understand varieties of opinions and facts about the dynamics of ethno-national conflicts to the cities, and urban governance—policy and power politics—in both city administrations. Similar values and opinions are systematically grouped under one category for better understanding and analysis. Regarding research ethics, all formal requirements ranging from citation issues to keeping anonymity of key informants who requested so have been reserved.

1.4.2 Methods of Data Analysis

1.4.2.1 Comparative Research Design

This study falls within the realm of comparative politics and policy research. From the very beginning, it is crucial to know “what, when and how to compare and for what purpose” (Pennings et al, 2006: 6). The study compares Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in terms of urban ethnic conflicts, power politics and multiethnic regulation policies/institutions of the city administrations. John Stuart Mill (cited in Timothy Lim, 2010) provides two most general and least complicated comparative methods: the *most similar systems* (MSS) and the *most different systems* (MDS) designs. The most similar systems strategy, Lim explains, “is based on finding two or more very similar social systems... More specifically, it is based on matching up and then comparing two or more systems that share a whole range of similarities (political, social, demographic, economic, cultural, and so on) but also differ in at least a couple of important respects” (Lim, 2010: 34). Differences are crucial in the MSS design: “In a vast sea of similarities, there should be at least two meaningful differences between the systems. One of these differences should be among the many

potential explanatory or independent variable. The other difference must be in the dependent variable” (ibid: 42). The MSS design is not without limitation: “no matter how similar two (or more) social systems may seem, there are bound to be so many potentially relevant differences that it would be impossible...to establish exactly which differences have causal significance and which do not” (ibid: 41).

The city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are selected for binary comparison claiming that they are two “most similar systems”. First, both cities have experiences of urban governance for more than a century, and are now the top two populous cities in Ethiopia. Second, both of them are chartered city administrations directly governed by federal laws and policies (both are legally treated as branches of, and directly accountable to, the Federal Government). Third, these cities are multiethnic and multicultural cities. Fourthly, they are apparently facing active threats of ethno-national conflicts. They do also have dissimilarities. Their primary difference emanates from their geographical locations: Addis Ababa is located at the heart of Oromia Regional State, whereas Dire Dawa is located in between Somali and Oromia regional states. Related to this is their geopolitical significance: Addis Ababa is the capital city of the Federal and Oromia governments, whereas Dire Dawa is the largest city in eastern Ethiopia very proximate to Djibouti State, on whose seaport Ethiopia depends. Moreover, the population sizes and ethnic compositions of both city administrations are dissimilar. The population size of Addis Ababa is close to three million, whereas that of Dire Dawa is no more than half a million; and the largest groups constituting half of the populations of the cities are Amhara and Oromo respectively (CSA, 2008). And, the second most populous group in Dire Dawa was Amhara (27.7%) in 1994, but was surpassed by Somali (24.2%) in 2007; whereas in Addis Ababa was Oromo by both censuses forming about 20% (CSA, 1998; 2008.). Some of the key differences, according to Lim, can be put forward as the potential causal factors or key independent variables. Therefore, this study adopts the MSS design type of comparative analysis.

1.4.2.2 Conceptual & Theoretical Lenses

It was very difficult to find readymade conceptual and/or theoretical urban comparative lenses to study ethno-national conflicts to and governances of multiethnic cities. In this regard, Scott Bollens (2009) has extraordinarily attempted to adopt a conceptual lens useful to measure and learn the effects of government policies on urban ethnic conditions. He classifies these effects into four

variables. The first variable is territoriality or ethno-territoriality (that is group's ownership and control over land paving the way for the exercise of self-government rights) which, in my case, became politically significant following the downfall of the Derg regime. It is the relationship between ethno-national groups and their territories. Territoriality is composed of other variables including "settlement of vacant lands; control of settlement patterns; dispossession from land; return and relocation of displaced and refugee populations; control of land and ownership; demarcation of planning and jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis ethnic settlement patterns" (Bollens, 2009: 6). Especially, the last variables—control of land and ownership; demarcation of urban planning and jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis ethnic settlement patterns—are among the essential factors explaining ethno-national conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Asnake, 2014; Getahun, 2014; Milkessa, 2014; see also chapter five of this thesis). The second variable is associated with marginalization—distribution of economic benefits and costs that measures the extent and geographic distribution of urban services and spending; allocation of negative and positive "externalities" of urbanization. Marginalization of groups in urban economy and social service sectors and the resultant negative externalities of urbanizations have been believed to be the other main causes of ethno-nationalist tensions in my case studies (Getahun, 2014; Shemelis, 2013). Thus, these variables—(1) territoriality and (2) marginalization—are now chosen, in particular, to create an understanding of urban conflict part of the present study.

Thirdly, access to institutions of policy-making and urban governance as a variable is used to measure inclusion in or exclusion from political process; formal and informal participation processes; presence and influence of civil society organizations (Bollens, 2009). This variable can be further broken down into extent of centralization and local autonomy of urban governance, and urban power sharing arrangements—political power, local elections and employment participation. The fourth and final variable is associated with urban policy effects on group identity, under which Bollens lists cultural rights such as maintenance or threat to collective ethnic identity, access to education and official language. These last two variables identified by Bollens are stretched to incorporate other cultural dimensions and employed to frame the analysis of urban governances and ethno-national diversity regulation policies of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This thesis, therefore, adopts the analytical framework by Bollens by integrating other carefully selected variables into it which also benefits significantly from an explanatory approach.

All of the variables are affected by, or outcomes of, political/policy institutions—institutional approach—in which government agencies are central as public policies are determined and implemented by these agencies (Anderson, 1997). The critique is that, instead of taking political institutions as independent forces to investigate their impacts, it is also helpful to approach institutions as dependent variables influenced by social structures (Erk, 2008; Duchacek, 1991). Taking into account the political context/institutions of the present Ethiopia, which has been under a dominant/one party system, this dissertation has rather constructed a model, now, seen as semi-consociational arrangement by mixing power sharing and authoritarian elements so as to assess urban power sharing deals authored by the EPRDF in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

In addition to the state-centric institutional approach of examining effects of contemporary urban policies over urban ethnic conditions by Scott Bollens, historical approach, which is helpful in understanding urban policy change and continuity, has been adopted. In this latter approach, as Moore (1993: 382) comments,

Historical consciousness—how the past is remembered, constructed, and invoked in the present—as well as "event history"—transformations in social relations of production, in state policy, and in the regional political economy—critically influence cultural understandings and, with them, resource politics in the present.

Urban history or political culture and its interpretations shape the present political perceptions and actions (ibid.). In fact, institutionalists/structuralists believe that urban policies are shaped by "historically rooted and materially based processes of distribution, conflict, power, and domination, thought to drive social order and social change" (Lichbach, 1997: 248). The study of "institutions as continuities" approach is known as historical institutionalism, one of the streams of neo-institutionalism (Miller, 2011: 26).

Consequently, a combination of research approaches including comparative, historical/cultural, institutional/structural and multiethnic diversity have been employed—all of which laid foundation for the construction of an integrated analytical lens through which empirical data collected on urban ethno-national conflicts to, and governances of, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are contextualized, explained, analyzed, compared, interpreted and understood. Urban ethno-national conflicts and urban governances/policies are explored to further show if there were any causal associations between them. In sum, Bollens's variables are a bit stretched and complemented by theories, models and concepts of urban and urban formation, ethnicity and ethno-national conflicts over cities, urban institutional autonomy, communitarian urban policies—

multiculturalism, federalism and consociationalism—mixed with hegemonic control or authoritarian elements are explored for the binary comparative conflict and policy study of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Further, general principles and experiences of urban ethno-national diversity accommodation policies in federations are drawn for comparative conclusions. Thus, the following integrated conceptual analytical framework is re/constructed for the analysis of multiethnic urban governances of and conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Fig. 1.2: Analytical Lens of Multiethnic Contested Urban Governances



1.5 Scope of the Study

This research has selected multiethnic chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as its comparative urban case studies. It is limited by objective as it intends to examine post-1991 urban ethno-national dynamics of conflicts to, and political governances and cultural policies of, the cities. The scope of the research thus is confined by issue and cases. More specifically, the study investigates: (1) the root causes and dynamics of major ethno-national conflicts to Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa; (2) the federal governances from above and urban local autonomy from below of the city administrations; (3) urban ethno-national diversity regulation policies (official language choice, education, mass-media, indigenous cultures, group ethnic identity, migration, other social services like health, power-sharing arrangements, local elections and employments). The study also enquires to understand the associations between urban ethno-national tensions (urban conflicts) on the one hand, and urban governances and policies (centralization policies) on the other hand. Therefore, this study does not claim to offer a generalizable comparative understanding of urban

conflicts and urban governances and policies in Ethiopia. However, the explored root causes of conflicts over multiethnic cities and the comparative governance and policy lessons that are drawn could be helpful as far as multiethnic cities or especially contested cities are concerned.

1.6 Relevance of the Study

The emergence of cities is conceived as one of the most important turning points in the modern human progress; that is, city formation is correlated with the emergence of modern states, military conquests and civilizations in general. Subsequently, urban centers (than rural areas) have increasingly become not only important but also necessary for citizens on accounts of better conditions of governance and access to social services, which is regarded as urban pulling factors for diverse peoples. As a result, "the basic political reason for focusing on the urban level is that the city is the laboratory for diversity" (Ponzini, 2009: 29). Everywhere in the world, urban changing demographics, cultural awareness, identity reconfigurations and tensions, and migration and indigenous cultural movements have created situations of concerns for both policy-makers and academic communities. Therefore, modern urban governances need democratic institutions and inclusive multicultural policies. Ethiopia's federal constitution was adopted in 1995 mainly to alleviate the ethno-national problems and thereby promote equality and peaceful co-existence. Ethno-national conflicts, however, remained to be conspicuous characteristic feature of various multiethnic cities in Ethiopia. Hence, this thesis is relevant as it aims to provide a comparative understanding of urban ethno-national conflicts and policies of Ethiopia's multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Furthermore, this research would help solve problems related to building multicultural public institutions, policies and democratic governances in multiethnic conflicted cities. Therefore, the study has public policy implications for the multiethnic city administrations in Ethiopia in particular and for similar cities in Africa or else in general. No doubt, designing democratic multicultural local institutions for multiethnic cities would create equitable opportunity for all constituent communities, promote fair access to urban centers and create urban inclusion, social harmony and durable peace. Moreover, this thesis hopes to produce knowledge that would shed light on the gaps of comparative urban research on ethno-national conflicts to, and governances of, contested cities in Ethiopia by illuminating the relationships between urban policies, conflicts and power politics. Likewise, Scott Bollens notes that "carefully constructed comparative research on

troubled cities allows us to identify key dimensions that display variation across settings and increases our understanding of what is unique and what is universal in a particular city” (2009: 6). Finally, urban governance has increasingly become politically significant since recently as the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government seemingly shifted its national policies from rural-centered development to urban-centered industrial policies. As a result, cities have grabbed the special attentions of the Federal Government of Ethiopia by its recent national development plan called the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which aimed to transform Ethiopia from agriculture-led economy to industry-led economy. Therefore, this study focuses on contested multiethnic cities and the importance of building democratic multicultural local governances in order to ensure sustainable urban development and peace.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The major methodological challenge to this study was imposed by the collection of data in an atmosphere of highly politicized views not only on ethnicity but also on the urban administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa themselves. Many officials of the federal, regional and city governments have lost confidence on, or declined from, commenting on the inclusiveness of urban ethno-politics and governances of both cities due to the profound centralization of information and political power. Even many of those who were able to forward their opinions about the conflicts to, and governances of, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa requested to remain anonymous insisting that they might be sacked by their party/boss if their names are publicized. Lack of political confidence by key informant officials could affect the credibility and completeness of the information they offer. Readers would understand this general limitation and other impacts of the long established political culture that Ethiopia has remained in.

Besides, data collection especially on the case of Addis Ababa was largely conducted while there were active Oromo ethno-national protests and conflicts in opposition to the Integrated Master Plan of Addis Ababa. The protests and the state repressive reactions took place in two phases, first in the early 2014 and second in late 2015 and early 2016. In such environments of state-society relations, the objectivity of the primary data collected from key local informants might be challenged. Subjective views and competing opinions were identified and grouped thematically in an attempt to balance them. And also the researcher, who was brought up in, and belongs to, Oromo ethno-national group, cannot claim to be totally value free, neutral, indifferent

and objective to the Oromo social and political situations; but he will be faithful to the findings. Of course, the traditional objectivity claims of social science research have widely been challenged (Mies, 1983) as researchers cannot be outside the influences of certain social environments: "that the knower and the known are of the same universe, that they are not separable" (Du Bois, 1983: 11). In this regard, some of my non-Oromo informants especially from Somali side tended not to give detailed interviews to the researcher who is an Oromo; and the researcher resolved the suspicion by promising to use the information genuinely and thematized it as a Somali perspective of the issue.

The other limitation of this study was imposed by the lack of access to any "independent" investigations and reports about the victims of inter-group conflicts and protests in Ethiopia in general and related to both cities in particular as these data are often regarded as 'securitized' due to the legacy of highly centralized political culture in Ethiopia. Finally, official figures and statistics produced by the Ethiopian government are often contested by private organizations and academic writers. Despite this contestation, governmental statistical reports and data are widely but carefully used in this thesis. In a nutshell, careful analysis of data collected in a balanced manner through triangulation of primary and secondary data backed by statistical reports have been extremely indispensable throughout the research.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction which has already sketched research questions, problem statements and methods of addressing them. In chapter two, after establishing the relevance of urban studies within the contemporary federal studies, various theories and concepts related to urban formation and urban ethno-national conflicts are explored. Urban concept, scope, and urban formation have been approached from a combination of theories including cities as product of civilization and military centers, cities as product of capital accumulation through labor and urban-rural exploitations, cities as products of political history, cities as products of 'hegemonic' and 'subordinate' cultures, cities as products of federalization, and African cities as colonial and post-colonial products. Then, the evolution of multiethnic cities, in general, was discussed. Finally, chapter two has briefly dealt with the concept of ethnicity and explored urban ethno-national conflict theories —social identity, structural and institutional/policy approaches— and opted for an integrated one.

Chapter three presents theoretical and comparative policies of managing ethno-national diversity in urban areas that are critical for the analysis parts of the study. After briefly outlining urban policy analysis models, the chapter conceptualizes the notion of urban local institutional autonomy. More importantly, urban theoretical policies on diversity—of liberal as well as communitarian—are explored with a great deal of attention drawn to accommodationist policies: federalism, consociationalism and multiculturalism. For better urban policy analysis in Ethiopia, semi-consociational model, a mixture of authoritarian and consociational features, was adopted. The chapter also highlighted general principles of accommodation of diversity, urban language policy and its effects. Finally, governance experiences of bilingual and multilingual cities in developed and developing federations are drawn for comparative conclusions.

In chapter four, the ethno-cultural makings of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have generally been established within the larger Ethiopian political history context. It has first explored the origins and evolutions of multiethnic towns in Ethiopia in general, and then of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, in separate sections, focusing on urban ethno-national policies of Ethiopian regimes from 1880s to 1991. The dynamics of ethno-national conflicts to these cities have been treated in chapter five. The age-old Oromo socio-cultural, economic and political marginalization in Addis Ababa has been approached as the root cause of ethno-national tensions over the city. Moreover, the Oromo resistance to the change of the capital of Oromia Government to Adama, the 2000 and 2005 post-elections protests by the CUD supporters in Addis Ababa, and the Oromo protests against the integrated master plan are discussed. Finally, the post-1991 Oromo-Somali inter-group ownership conflicts in Dire Dawa have been assessed.

In chapter six, the extents of centralization and local autonomy of urban governments of both cities are investigated. First, it has sketched urban legal status in Ethiopia and the extra-constitutional centralization tendencies in the post Ethio-Eritrean war. The choice of Ethiopia's federal capital and the emergence of the "special" administration of Dire Dawa are discussed. Further, urban governments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and their local institutions periodized into two—(1) transitional urban local governments (1991-2008) and (2) the current urban local governments (2008-Present)—are outlined and compared. Finally, this chapter has examined local autonomy statuses of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations.

The goal of chapter seven is to investigate urban ethno-national diversity regulation policies of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Accordingly, the first part of the chapter has dealt with urban

social service sectors that are affected by urban ethno-national policies which include, among others, ethno-linguistic policies and settlement patterns, education and mass media policies, indigenous cultural institutions, language policy effects on other social services such as health, migrations to urban centers and group identity questions in both cities. Moreover, the chapter has discussed the semi-consociationalism found in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa; and analyzed its effects on local elections and civil service employments. The final chapter of this dissertation is chapter eight, which presents general summary, synthesis of theory and practices and conclusions.

Chapter 2

Urban Formation and Ethno-national Conflicts: Concepts & Theories

2.1 Introduction

Cities are the locus where the challenges of living together first emerge... [T]he process of participating in the new society is usually realised at the local level of services, practices and activities. It is at the local urban level that the notion of access, rights, participation and consultation take on an immediate and everyday meaning. It is also at the urban level that the social tensions and spatial conflicts occur in reaction to societal and structural conditions (Gilbert: 2009: 75).

The relevance of urban studies within the broader federal studies of diversity and conflict could be justified, as the opening quote claims, by the various challenges being posed by the rising ethno-national awareness, and the attendant demands pursuant to changing urban demography, state politics and policy. The basic reason for focusing on the urban level, according to Davide Ponzini, is that "the city is the laboratory for diversity: conflicts and potentials are more in evidence, political mobilisation and the gradual struggle of diverse groups is today common at the local level" (2009: 29). Urban research, particularly within the prism of federalism, is believed to generate an understanding of the contexts which may offer broader implication for urban policy governance, urban stability and peace-building.

Comparative urban research is even highly advocated, both from practical and scientific perspectives (Bollens, 2009; Denters & Mossberger, 2006). From a practical perspective, cities have always been viewed as centers of civilizations (Hepburn, 2004). Comparatively, modern cities are heterogeneous gatherings composed of communities which regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as distinct in terms of language, religious beliefs, skin colour or cultural diversities. From a scientific perspective, the research question becomes "how have cities sought to mitigate this potential for conflict?" (ibid: 1). The development of the Western European welfare state, according to Denters and Mossberger (2006), was to a large extent driven by innovative policies introduced by urban governments to ameliorate urban living conditions.

The study of the city in cultural context, John Agnew, John Mercer and David Sopher (1984) observe, is relevant for two reasons. First, urban networks of practices and ideas exist, and

that they are drawn from the shared experiences and histories of social groups. Secondly, these practices and ideas are claimed to be invoked to account for specific patterns of urban life, growth and form. The practices and ideas, the authors refer to as 'culture,' have shaped urban worlds, hence worth investigation. Good comparative urban cultural research is able to provide valid and reliable information useful for governance reforms and will inform policy makers about best practices. This serves the scientific relevance of urban research, which "will help us in providing valid and reliable answers to interesting questions and filling gaps in current knowledge about political phenomena" (Denters & Mossberger, 2006: 550).

In a nutshell, for reasons stated and unstated, federal studies of urban diversity, conflicts and state policy responses have come to be enormously significant today than ever before. By way of introducing the chapter, the relevance of urban studies within the contemporary federal studies has been established. With this remark, in the subsequent parts of the chapter, theories and concepts related to urban formation, urban diversity and ethno-national conflict are explored. To this end, this chapter is organized into four main parts. The first part deals with the urban concepts and scope. In the second part, few theories of urban formation including the emergence of civilization, religious centers and military state formation, Neo-Marxist theory, city in political history context, urban sociological perspective, a federal theory of city formation and an African city formation context are discussed. In order to fully understand city formation, the importance of an integrated approach is discussed. Thirdly, the evolution of urban ethno-national and migrant-minority diversity is briefly pointed out. The fourth part of this chapter deals with the concepts and theories of urban ethno-national conflicts. After defining the concepts of ethnicity and ethno-nationalist conflict, it investigates the causal theories of urban conflict such as social identity theory, Marxist structuralist theory and policy institutional approach. Once again, for better understanding of urban ethno-national conflicts, an integrated explanatory approach is opted for.

2.2 The Urban Notion and Scope

There is no agreed upon definition and scope of what urban exactly constitutes, and thus "the concept of the city itself is problematic" (Agnew et al, 1984: 4). Urban administrative centers, usually referred to as municipalities, are known by several vocabularies –including but not limited to– cities, towns, metropolitans, cosmopolitans and boroughs; and are often general-purpose local governments with directly elected legislative bodies, called councils (Pagano, 2009: 367). For

instance, according to Peter Wells, urban regions were larger communities in which a substantial proportion of the inhabitants were engaged in commerce; and he distinguishes between settlements of up to 1,000 inhabitants as "towns," and those with larger populations as "cities" (1984: 15). Others reject this population based classification arguing that "this distinction between towns and cities is unnecessary, unprofitable and, in certain respects, misleading. Settlement size, whether of area or population, is not inevitably related directly to structure or function" (ibid: 418). The critiques rather pay attention to the role of urban structure or function. This dissertation uses the term urban or urban area interchangeably with cities or towns though they may be understood differently by different scholars on urban studies in different parts of the world.

For Max Weber, urban concept consists simply of a collection of one or more separate dwellings but is a relatively closed settlement, which definition he later refined to add that "the city is a settlement, the inhabitants of which live primarily off trade and commerce rather than agriculture" (Weber quoted in Parker, 2004: 10). What gives the city its special character, then, is principally the existence of commerce and trade, together with all the activities associated with it such as the establishment of markets and exchanges. According to this definition, the city is a settlement dependent on market.

Similarly, John Weeks defines urban as "a place-based characteristic that describes the degree to which the lives of a spatial concentration of people are organized around nonagricultural activities" (2010: 43). He identifies that the urbanness of a place is determined based on a range of elements encompassing population size and density, social and economic organization, and the transformation of the natural and agriculture environments into "a built in environment" (ibid: 43). This definition is partly like the urban definition given by sociologists, which "rested on size, population density, permanency of settlement and social heterogeneity" (Agnew et al, 1984: 17). Sociologists add social heterogeneity as one element of urbanness of an area. Moreover, urban is defined as "a continuously built up land mass of urban development that is within a labor market" and contains no rural land, which means all land in the world is either urban or rural (Demographia, 2014: 2-3). This definition claims that an urban area (built-up city proper area) is different from an urban agglomerate or metropolitan area for the latter is a labor market area and includes substantial rural (non-urban) territory.

In critique to the watertight claim of urban-rural divide, John Weeks notes that because of the spatial and temporal variability of urban essentials, "the degree of urbanness varies across space

and time, suggesting that urban and rural are, in fact, ends of a continuum, rather than representing a dichotomy" (2010: 43). Urban, hence, is a relative concept which upholds that in a given urban-rural spectrum, some areas are more urban than others. The rapid territorial expansion of cities during the modern period, as well as the changing nature of agriculture (e.g., agrobusiness) has blurred the distinction of the physical differences between urban and rural (Chambers, 1990).

Today, urban regions are rather defined by legal boundaries. The United Nations, for example, offers a definition which treats city proper as a locality with legally fixed boundaries and an administratively recognized urban status, commonly characterized by some form of local government (UN, 2005). The UN has further defined the idea of "urban agglomeration" as comprising the city or town proper and also the suburban fringe lying outside of, but adjacent to, the city boundaries (*ibid.*). Michael A. Pagano (2009) explores the structures and institutions of urban local government in the US and observes that townships are local governments where it could assume general-government powers, much like municipalities and have limited powers, typically for the provision of roads, bridges, police services, education and others. Furthermore, the urban and metropolitan region is conceived as an intermediary unit organized for the local service delivery "where the practices of diversity and interventions to recognize pluralism are increasingly present and significant" (Gilbert, 2009: 81).

Therefore, urban regions are characterized with local service deliveries such as road connectivity, business and market centers, political and administrative units, public services (education, specialized hospitals, electricity, water, and cultural centers), public and private-employment opportunities. This study endorses the reality of urban-rural continuum, and to this end, the defining elements of urban centers include a minimum threshold of population size and density, primarily dependence on commerce and labor market or nonagricultural activity, legally defined boundary, and some form of local government for public services. Particularly, the population threshold of an urban area varies from localities of 200 or more inhabitants in Greenland to localities of 50,000 or more inhabitants in US and Japan (Gottdiener & Hutchison, 2011). According to the UN Habitat, by 2010, 50.6 per cent of the world's population was urban (Good et al, 2014). This percentage is not the same across the globe as the West and the rest are not equally urbanized.

The Indian Constitution (1950) states that there shall be constituted in every constituent units "a Nagar Panchayat", an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area. "A transitional

area,” “a smaller urban area” or “a larger urban area” are specified on the basis of the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as may be deemed fit. This definition suggests the existence of urban-rural continuum.

Ethiopia’s definition of urban includes towns as small as 2000 in population size. According to urban land lease law, “urban center means any locality having a municipal administration or a population size of 2000 or more inhabitants of which at least 50 % of its labor force is engaged in non-agricultural activities” (Federal Proclamation No. 721/2011). However, according to the 2014 urban employment survey, “for practical purposes, an urban center includes the following regardless of the number of inhabitants”: all administrative capitals (regional, zonal, woreda, localities with urban dweller’s association), municipal towns, and all localities “having a population of 1000 or more persons, and whose inhabitants are primarily engaged in non-agricultural activities. Note that localities with population less than 1000 persons should be considered as rural” (CSA, 2014: 7). According to the same survey, “major urban centers” in Ethiopia include “those selected urban centers with population of 100,000 and above” which includes federal and regional capitals (ibid: 8). Urban Kebele is an association of urban dwellers which forms the lowest administrative unit in an urban center with its own jurisdiction. The minimum population threshold varied from 2000 in 2012 to 1000 in 2014. This shows that the definition of urban not only may vary from country to country but also from time to time within a country.

Ethiopia’s Federal Ministry of Urban Development and Construction (MoUDC) has recently introduced differentiations among urban centers. Accordingly, in order for designing and applying urban planning standards as well as identifying the type and content of urban data, it has distinguished five levels/ grades of urban centers based on population size: Level 1 (small towns with population from 2000 to 20,000); Level 2 (medium towns with population of 20,001 to 50,000); Level 3 (large towns with population of 50,001 to 100,000); Level 4 (cities with population of 100,001 to 1,000,000); Level 5 (metropolitans with population over one million) (ibid: 28). Dire Dawa (with population size of 427,000) and Addis Ababa (with 3,195,000 population size) are Level 4 city and Level 5 metropolitan respectively (MoUDC, 2013). In this study, the term city could be used to refer to Dire Dawa as well for convenience only.

If the notion and scope of regular cities are explored this much, then, what is a capital city? A capital city is commonly conceived of as a seat of government. The capital is by definition “a seat of power and a place of decision-making processes that affect the lives and the future of the nation ruled, and that may influence trends and events beyond its borders” (Gottmann and Harper, 1990: 63). Capitals may include federal/national capitals or provincial capitals or other seats of local government where decision making takes place. Most federations have a single federal capital city with the exception of such country as South Africa which has three capitals: Cape Town (seat of Parliament, the legislative capital); Pretoria (seat of the President and Cabinet, the administrative capital); and Bloemfontein (seat of Supreme Court, the judicial capital), and of course Johannesburg (seat of Constitutional Court) (Steytler, 2009). Capital cities differ from other ordinary cities in that the former function secures strong and lasting centrality and calls for a special hosting environment to provide what is required for the safe and efficient performance of the functions of government and decision-making characteristics of the place (Gottmann and Harper, 1990). Scott Campbell (2003: 28) considers national/federal capitals as part of a larger “class of government cities” which includes “cities with either an unusually high dependence on national government spending and/or cities whose primary function is to serve a larger national military, strategic, administrative or symbolic interest.” Therefore, capital cities should not just be seen as the seat of a national/federal/provincial government, but also as a site where socio-economic interests, cultural ideology and political power converge (*ibid.*).

Cities and suburbs are the sites of cultural diversity—ethnic, religious, racial, and others. Everyday urban life is argued to have been organized according to those cultural symbols and material objects that are part of the built environment: “these symbols and objects are likely to have different meanings to different individuals or groups” (Gottdiener & Hutchison, 2011: 20). The fact that cities are rapidly modernizing in terms of service delivery has greatly augmented the pace of social mobility into urban regions (attraction of peoples of different backgrounds) (Good et al, 2014). Thus, cities are becoming culturally more heterogeneous than ever. As a result, urban areas are multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual by words of the day. According to Elena Besussi (2010), urban policies are normatively contingent upon the interaction of urban socio-cultural structures of the people, the urban economy and the urban political contexts. The nature and evolution of urban diversity would be discussed following the theories on the formation of cities.

2.3 Theory of Urban Formation

Different scholars suggested different ways of understanding urban origin/foundation/formation across the world. This section does not promise to deal with the archeological foundations of cities, but foundations in terms of civilizational centers (religious, military and the state itself), socio-cultural roots, socio-economic structure, political history, federal constitutional regimes and post-colonial African city context.

2.3.1 Cities as Centers of Civilizations and State Formation

The emergence of cities is commonly conceived as one of the most important turning points in human progresses. It means that city formation is correlated with the emergence of human innovations, achievements and transformations, i.e., civilizations. Charles Tilly (1974) argues that “proper cities” first emerged in Mesopotamia about 8000 years ago, and subsequently appeared in various parts of the world. Gradually, urban regions evolved to become centers of “specialized organization, extensive lines of communication, accumulation of wealth, diverse populations, change, complexity-in short, civilization” (ibid: 4). This implies that cities and towns play crucial roles in socio-economic, cultural and political transformations. As a result, Anthony Giddens has written that the city was central to social theory until the advent of the nation-state, which usurped the city’s rights and powers (cited in Mollenkopf, 1988). It means that city formation (and even city-states) precedes state formation. Likewise, Bert Hoselitz has pointed out that, without an urban center, “it is difficult for commerce, financial institutions, industrial establishments, government bureaucracies, and advanced educational and intellectual infrastructures to develop and flourish” (1953: 203). According to Yudhishthir Isar, Michael Hoelscher and Helmut Anheier, “many of the most exciting cultural visions, projects, exchanges and networks and developments of the day are to be found in or generated by cities rather than by nations” (2012: 3). These all show that cities engendered civilization; and human progress is part of city progress.

There appears correlation between urban formations as centers of civilizations and social diversity:

Cities are frequently seen as centres of civilisation, as the cutting edge of human achievement, as cosmopolitan sites where new identities may develop and flourish. In this view, traditional barriers such as ethnic difference are eroded through proximity of living and working. But writers over the past two centuries have been just as likely to characterise modern cities as heterogeneous gatherings composed of communities which regard

themselves, or are regarded by others, as distinct in terms of language, religious belief, skin colour or culture (Hepburn, 2004: 1).

It is possible to deduce from this quotation that as the centers of civilizations, cities had also the experiences of hosting both forces of eliminating differences and preserving distinctiveness. Major cities today are characterized by social heterogeneity.

Moreover, being a center of commerce does not suffice for the formation of a proper city to lead civilization, and as Weber argued “cities must also enjoy a degree of political and administrative autonomy” (cited in Parker, 2004: 11). Cities thus require governance. For Max Weber, self-government and democratic participation is a key feature of urban development (ibid: 12). John Friedman (1973) observes that control of cities by outsiders or tight control of cities by rigid, hierarchic system of power is detrimental to innovations. Innovative cities must therefore be administered by “the people in whose territory they are located” (Getahun, 2014: 161). Due to various practical reasons such as factors of scale, accessibility, participation and others, “a great deal of innovative policy-making is being made at the city level” (Isar et al, 2012: 3). The urban autonomy and policy-making discourses shall be addressed in chapter three.

The correlation between civilization and urbanization: George Chadwick (1987) indicates that urbanization is the process of becoming urban—and hence of ceasing to be rural. Urbanization and industrialization is often taken as part of civilization. These concepts and processes share a root word, meaning, town or city which is a fundamental point; “for civilization, seen as a fundamental cultural process in essence, is the process of founding and enhancing the growth of cities” (ibid: 17). Urbanization is thus explained in terms of “a fundamental cultural process” which is the foundation of any civilization. On the other hand, the concentric urban development model maintains that urban origin and growth is a process of modernization, expansion and reconversion of land uses, with a tendency of each inner zone to expand in the outer zone, which is often criticized for being limited in historical and socio-cultural urban context (Rodrigue, 2013).

Cities as military establishments: This approach raises the link between military state formation and city formation. In ancient societies, urban settlements were formed first and some form of states were then required to protect the security of those cities, as the cases of Greek cities, Chinese walled cities, Mesopotamia and others explain (Parker, 2004). Patrick Gales (2002) observes that medieval cities were characterized by the emergence and development of urban

governments, which played a decisive role in state-making and its subsequent evolution. According to Parker (2004), as settlements grew in size and affluence, it also became imperative to create a means of defence, and history is full of examples of cities that failed to flourish because their wealth and population were too easily confiscated by marauding armies. In early modern and modern understanding of the state and society, war has not only created states and empires but also cities as clearly argued by Charles Tilly (cited in Gales, 2002). The city in the middle ages too, outside as well as within Europe, was formed as a special fortress or garrison city by the nation-states (Parker, 2004). Parker further argues that "the garrison city or fortress city became a common feature of urban settlements across Europe" (ibid: 11). It is also observed that "capital cities of states benefited from the consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level" (Gales, 2002: 58). Furthermore, it is contended that, "capital cities are largely, if not entirely, the product of the era of nation states" because "it is the demise of great empires and the rise of the nation state which we would acknowledge as the driving force behind the proliferation of capital cities" (King, 1993: 251).

The competing approaches, on whether city precedes state in formation or vice-versa, indicate the military roles and ties between state formation and city formation. The major critique to modern state-city interdependence came with globalization: "threats to the monopoly power of nation-states and the rise of a transnational network of global economic cities are challenging the traditional centrality of national capital cities" (Campbell, 2003: 1). This study therefore draws conceptual and practical importance of the establishment of military centers or colonial centers for the development of modern cities in Africa.

The origin of cities as religious centers: There is argument which tries to establish that people started to settle with larger density surrounding the places of rituals. Mumford, for instance, writes: "The first germ of the city, then, is in the ceremonial meeting place that serves as the goal for pilgrimage" (quoted in Gottdiener & Hutchison, 2011: 24). These old urban centers were seen as holy cities which may include Jerusalem and Bethlehem (Judo-Christianity), Varanasi (Hindus, Buddhists and Jains), Mecca and Medina (Islamic), and Vatican (Catholic) (Campbell, 2003). Campbell identifies the relationship between the state and religion in the cities ranging from symbiotic collaboration to competition (ibid.). In short, the earliest urban origins had connections to the state formation and advancement in societal organization and way of life such as in terms of military, political, religious, and modes of productions, commerce and consumptions which all

together were given the civilizational status. Argued differently, the emergence of civilizational centers (cities) gradually necessitated the enforcement of some sort of law and order, which justified the formation of the state, a coercive power; and, the reverse is true in the modern period.

The approach that cities are centers of civilization could be accused of Eurocentric elements. This can be due to the fact that it tends to conclude that “No city, No civilization” as Brian Robson claimed (1994: 131). If the Western industrialization-urbanization is taken as the only holy path to civilization, non-industrialized and less urbanized continents such as Africa would be treated less civilized. This dissertation does not intend to settle this philosophical dispute, but it instead holds that there might have been broader civilizations without some sort of cities. However, the city has remained geopolitically important than rural areas in the contemporary world, due to its significance as military, politico-administrative, religious, commerce and capital accumulation, intellectual production, technology and other service delivery centers.

2.3.2 Neo-Marxist Theory on Urbanization

For the Marxist theory, the questions about urban origins have been explicitly considered to have related to socio-economic problems (Agnew et al, 1984). The contention surrounding the foundation of cities hinges on what is truly the structural basis of city formation and growth (ibid.). Cities in ancient as well as modern times have been centers of capital accumulation and the organizational focus of the state where people concentrate (Barceló et al, 2002). Urban growth required an urban elite or bourgeois class, a group of decision makers and organizers who control the resources, and sometimes the lives of others (ibid.). The basic themes of Marxist theory on the genesis of cities are summarized by Barceló, Pelfer and Mandolesi (2002: 48) as follow:

The social processes towards the ‘origins of the city’ are necessarily the same as those bringing to the ‘origins of the state’, the ‘origins of social division of labour’, or even the ‘origins of capital accumulation’. The urban process is dependent upon the larger social order in which it occurs, and does not operate independently of that order.

It is clear from this excerpt that cities were formed in the same way the state (as ruling class) was formed within the larger social system. The emergence of “social division of labour” symbolizes the formation of social class which is argued as the structural root of city formation. Put differently, Marxists consider “cities as the product of the mode of production and its discontents,” with local politics following the functional imperative of promoting the former and suppressing the latter (Mollenkopf, 1988: p.xvi). Accordingly, the economic base in the form of the emergence of a

sufficient surplus is the fundamental prerequisite for the emergence of cities. Political and other cultural organizations then develop as superstructures on the material foundation. Peter Wells (1984) contends that commerce was the motivating factor in the emergence of "supravillage communities", to mean, urbanites, during the millennium in which iron replaced bronze for weapons and tools, and, finally, for agricultural implements. "The first towns of temperate Europe," he affirms, "came into being as centers for the production of materials to be traded for sought-after imports" (ibid: 25). Thus, classical Marxists uphold that capital accumulation through labour exploitation is the foundation of city formations.

Furthermore, the neo-Marxists elucidate that the development of cities is a function of urban-rural or inter-city exploitative relations (Agnew et al, 1984). Barceló, Pelfer and Mandolesi observe that "in fact, it is the countryside which pays for the city, and not the city which justifies its existence in terms of efficacy, because capital accumulation systematically drains resources and manpower from the periphery into core to establish the conditions for an urban take-off" (2002: 45). The cities that emerged in this way, according to them, become places "where the elites will live, controlling the production but not doing the productive activities" (ibid: 46). It essentially means that a city is primarily dependent upon countryside for its survival in that the former consumes what is produced by the latter. This indicates the historical formation of the urban-rural (or centre-periphery) dependency links. The relationships between the city and its surrounding countryside have been viewed this way: "the city which is a 'central place' is dominant and powerful, exerting force when necessary to appropriate the surplus value generated by the countryside" (Agnew et al, 1984: 16). The urban-rural exploitation and the process of accumulation of capital in the city (capital city or other urban region) require a continuous process of urbanization, because of the search for ever cheap means of production (raw materials, investment land, and natural resources) and higher productivity (Barcelo et al, 2002; Gale, 2002).

Even though the structural analysis of urban formation and evolution offered by Marxists and Neo-Marxists remain strong, it does not go without critiques. Wheatley does not accept the economic base as a sole explanation of urban origins: "Despite the emphasis which has been placed on trade as a primary motivating force in the generation of urban forms, it has not yet been demonstrated clearly" that "a generalized desire for exchange is capable of concentrating political and social power", or, that "it can bring about the institutionalization of such power" (1971:282). In fact, there could, indeed, be other more significant factors shaping the origin and evolution of

cities. The critique says "it is doubtful if a single autonomous, causative factor will ever be identified in the nexus of socio-economic and political transformations which resulted in the emergence of urban forms" (Wheatley, 1971: 318-19). The origin and growth of cities, as one can suggest, should also be analyzed in light of other factors such as the exercise of authority, religion, and ceremony (Agnew et al, 1984). Urban sociologist Scott Greer further argued: "To understand our cities [...] one must know something about the culture and organization of the United States as a whole" (quoted in Agnew et al, 1984: 12). These shortcomings are labelled only to show that the neo-Marxist structuralist analysis is not sufficient to explain the processes of urban formation. Let us see the historical perspective which is also closely related to Marxist analysis of history.

2.3.3 Urban Political History Perspective

In its quest for a stable and peaceful world, humanity today finds itself confronted with a number of political problems, many of which are seemingly intransigent, whose sources lie in conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims arising out of historical experiences (Elazar, 1987: 11).

In this quote, Daniel Elazar expounds the importance of historical experiences in shaping the present urban political culture. He insists for the need to look more closely at "the historical and theoretical roots" of the phenomena, in this case, city politics (1987: 27). For instance, the notion of "thinking federal", he argues, does not only mean constitutional and structural but it means that "true federal systems manifest their federalism in cultural", which literally conveys that without a federal political culture, federations will not succeed (ibid: 78). It further reaps that legal, economics, and structural power analysis do not suffice to explain the city but urban political culture too is of great importance. A political culture is widely conceived to be "consisted of beliefs, symbols, and values that define situations in which political action occurs" (Chilcote, 1981: 8).

Hegelian historical dialectics could be relevant for urban political analysis as well: "It is history whose mode of representation is not really confined by the limits of the time to which it relates, but whose spirit transcends the present" (Hegel translated by Sibree, 2001: 17). Likewise, John Mollenkopf (1988) observed that places certainly result from past choices and contradictions, and thus constrain and encourage future choices and conflicts, producing a distinct pattern of historical development. Moreover, Scott Campbell wrote that "cities are products of particular

national cultures, histories, political structures and ideologies" (2003: 30). Thus, the history and political culture of the state in question would surely affect the origin and evolution of city politics.

Furthermore, Max Weber's account of the formation and development of cities owed much to his understanding of the transition from traditional society to feudalism and from feudalism to capitalism as Marxists also maintain (Parker, 2004). Cities evolved within the larger societal transformation. Political scientists find "early cities" of interest chiefly in relation to their forms of governance (Agnew et al, 1984). The market dominance of the neo-Marxism has now been challenged because of a growing conviction that the processes of land allocation, for instance, are increasingly mediated by new political institutions and processes. However, whether these institutions are subservient to the interests of urban bourgeois class or truly reflect autonomous city interests remains "a troublesome question" (ibid: 13). The institutions now brought to light are humanly devised ideas, rules and practices that aim to affect behaviour, constraining certain actions, providing incentives for others, and thereby making social life more or less predictable (Harriss, 2002). These urban practices and ideas—in short, 'culture'—are not themselves uniquely urban but derive from the social, economic, and political situations that have shaped urban group and individual existence (Agnew et al, 2007).

In a more historical materialist inclination, as argued in the preceding subsection, Simon Parker insists that the bourgeois society was born in the self-governing cities of medieval Europe and with the growth of mercantile capitalism, the city's preeminence and *raison d'être* as a commercial centre is assured (2004.). The rising affluence of the commercial city was identified to have stimulated armed struggles for control of its commercial traffic and territorial possessions. Consequently, the cities lost their independence and are incorporated within a larger territorial authority, highlighting Weberian observation that the monopoly of violence is as important to the development of states as urban commerce and trade (Parker, 2004). In general, the urban political culture approach suggests that all the essential features of the city are developed in past institutions and societies. This approach could be criticized for over dependence on political history, which may undermine the explanatory power of the new socio-political dispensations.

2.3.4 Urban Sociological Perspective

This perspective is also related to the Marxist conceptions of culture. No city was formed, evolved and developed without socio-cultural roots. Simon Parker (2004: 10) wrote that "Weber had been working on the sociology of urban development since 1889" in order to highlight the essential socio-historical characteristics of an urban form. Georg Simmel, another urban sociologist, focused on the modern metropolis and urban culture in general from sociological standpoint (Simmel cited in Parker, 2004: 13). Both Weber and Simmel imaged cities within the broader socio-historical development. Moreover, John Agnew, John Mercer and David Sopher (1984) note that studying the emergence and evolution of a city in sociocultural context requires not only to use a concept of culture that is sensitive to the causes of both cultural continuity and change, but also to insist on the importance of the collective experience of urban national, ethnic, and social groups. It is also argued that 'culture' need not be thought of as super-organic or mental in origin and continuation, but "as practically rooted in material social life"; and, "as collective social experience changes, so must the signifying system that defines a culture" (Agnew et al, 1984: 6). Therefore, the dominant set of meanings and symbols held by an urban social group in any period represents both continuity and change in the origin and evolution of cities.

A city in sociocultural context is thus a product of both "hegemonic" and "subordinate" cultures and, at the same time, the site for their production, as Neo-Marxists too conceive (ibid.). In the same way, Bekele Gutema (2004: 38) discerns "clashes of cultures" as well as "rapprochement and exchange between cultures" which, he says, facilitate the swallowing up of some cultures and identities in the other. Placing cities in the context of the dominant societies will be able to show how the cultural motifs of a society are embedded in the form of its cities and in the lives of its urban population; but also show how city as a socioeconomic and political factor shapes the organization of its society as a whole (Agnew et al, 1984). The advent of industrial capitalism and the ensuing development of metropolis, Parker (2004) claims, loosened the ties that bound the subordinate classes to the land, affecting the traditional form of social organization. The role of cities and especially capital cities in the promotion of national culture and national ideology is expected to be high. Scott Campbell (2003) contends that a capital is a symbolic auditorium for national culture and ideology, and it is a bridge between local culture and the "imagined community" of the nation-state. Urban sociologists, therefore, find not only the sheer influence of the 'hegemonic' and 'subordinate' cultures over the formation of urban society, it also shows the

dominant role of cities in the evolution of the overarching national identity, national culture and national society.

The knowledge of the roles of socio-cultural distributions, processes, relations in the formation of a city is central in urban studies of diversity and conflicts. This approach, however, is not sufficient to give full picture of the roots and processes of city formations.

2.3.5 A Federal Theory of City Formation

The central argument of this theory is that federal political systems --more than unitary systems-- offer the opportunity for the emergence and development of equally important multiple cities simultaneously. Federal theory of city formation is linked to the formation of federations. This is due to the fact that federations need to possess (either choose or newly establish) their own federal and state capitals and sometimes federal territories. In the "coming together federations"⁹, member states do possess their respective capitals, which often predate the newly formed federal capitals. But, if it is a "holding together federation" formation, its member states are provided with the opportunity to newly select or establish their corresponding capital cities. Put differently, federalism, at least in principle, promotes the creation of multiple centers of authorities, i.e., multiple cities or capitals. Daniel J. Elazar observed that "the development of modern federalism parallels to no small extent the development of modern urbanism" (1975: 15). Federalizing therefore was urbanizing in modern politics.

The choice of federal capitals is of great importance in federations, for capitals sometimes play a crucial role in the success or otherwise of federalism (Dikshit, 1975; Davis and de Duren, 2011). In spite of this claim, as Ramesh Dikshit (1975) argues, little attention has so far been given to the study of federal capitals. Among the rare scholars is Daniel Elazar, who highlighted non-centralized urban formation patterns in federations.

Federal polities are notably ones in which no single urban center is dominant. Within the federal matrix there is also a network of cities of relatively equal importance, often specializing in one or more functions. Contrast, for example, France and Germany, two polities of relatively equal size. Life in highly centralized France is centered in Paris whereas no single city can be said to dominate federal Germany. Federal systems generally

⁹ Federations are often formed either by "coming together" approach in which previously independent states come together to form a larger union or by "holding together" approach in which previously unitary states devolve powers to the constituent units through constitutional amendments.

follow the German rather than the French model, while most unitary states reflect the French pattern (1975: 28).

The argument is that federal principles of state organizations (as compared to centralized state systems) greatly contribute for the emergence of multiple comparable cities simultaneously, often specializing in some sectors. The growth and hegemony of one federal capital at the expense of the rest of the cities (or relegating all other cities and towns as satellites) does not signify a genuine federal character. In another words, the type of power relation between the federal capital and the member states' capitals tends to be the replica of the type of power relations between the federal government and states. Elazar put it this way: "there is a clear relationship between the degree of centralization within a particular federal system and the extent to which a single national capital has emerged" (1975: 28); and, for example, "central roles in Germany are divided quite equitably among Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich and Bonn" (ibid: 29). Likewise, Scott Campbell finds de-concentrated urban functions in federations (2003: 5):

Nations — especially federal states — often have large centers of national government employees outside the capital city. The United States has located federal courts, military offices and bases, mints, and many agency offices in various cities throughout the nation. This is increasingly the case in Germany as well. This decentralized pattern creates local dependencies in these towns on national government employment and contracts.

Thus, Washington -the federal capital, is not even the dominant city in the US due to the fact that a city such as New York is a world center.

Before looking at the evolution of federal capitals in more detail, it is helpful to conceptualize the term 'federal territory' which means the territorial areas—inhabited or otherwise—that for certain reasons are left under the direct control of the union government in a federation (Dikshit, 1975). Dikshit identified two categories of federal territories. The first takes the form of newly acquired lands through the blood or treasure of all the federal units, and lands of vast open spaces, which territories are likely to consist of near-virgin areas awaiting exploitation and settlement such as precisely was the nature of the frontier territories in the United States and Canada. Secondly, in the territories forming new federations, as for example India, the federal territories may consist of smaller political units which either for reasons of their separate identity were not considered fit to merge with some neighboring units of the federation, or for strategic reasons (such as disputed territories) the central government and the constituent units agreed to let these areas remain under the direct supervision of the federal government (Dikshit, 1975). In

some cases, federal capitals, such as Abuja and Delhi capitals of Nigeria and India respectively, have taken aspects of federal territory (Indian Constitution, 1950; Nigerian Constitution, 1999).

The territorial administration of federal capitals varies across federations, with at least three patterns: (1) special federal capital district or territory (e.g., Washington, Abuja, Delhi, Canberra, Buenos Aires, Brasília, Mexico City, Moscow, Kuala Lumpur, Islamabad); (2) dual status as capital city and federal member state (e.g., Berlin, Brussels); and (3) located in a federal member unit serving as federal and state capital city (e.g., Bern, Sarajevo, Pretoria, Cape Town & Bloemfontein) (Campbell, 2003; Steytler, 2009). Some capitals in federal countries, such as Ottawa, appear neither special federal districts, nor federal units, nor capitals of federal units. Scott Campbell asks a fundamental question as to what determines which of these models a nation should pursue, and answers himself that “the internal political structure of the nation (including the level of centralization) certainly plays a central role” (ibid: 25). Therefore, it is difficult to label one arrangement as intrinsically better than the other two. Campbell further points out that the territorial location of a capital city as well as its administrative arrangement is “the product of chance, historical legacies, the relative political and economic power of the capital city, and the balance of power between regional and national political force” (ibid: 25).

Ramesh Dikshit classifies the origins of capital cities of all states in the world into ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’, and then categorizes federal capitals in the latter:

Federal capitals are artificial in the sense that they often are not the ‘primate’ cities of their countries, and have often not developed from some original nuclei of the State-area. The reason why federal capitals are usually new creations rather than centres established on some old nuclei, is that, as opposed to most unitary State-structures, a federal structure often means almost a new evolution (Dikshit, 1975: 243).

This assertion was further modified by Dikshit himself that most federations created out of devolved unitary polities retained their ‘primate’ cities or colonial capitals as their new federal capitals. In those federations where the federal structure is more or less a new creation by coming together means, the need for new and neutral capitals does arise; whereas in the formerly more or less centralized unitary systems, as most of the post-colonial federations in Latin America, Asia and Africa were, the former colonial capitals have often continued to serve as the seats of their respective new federations, irrespective of the fact whether they are sited on neutral ground or not (Dikshit, 1975). In unitary state-structures where capital cities are argued to have emerged as

“natural” phenomena as in French and English, Patrick Gales (2002: 47) notes, “the capital city became established in the late Middle Ages as the dominant city”.

It is true that in older federations, as exemplified by the United States, Canada, and Australia—where the new state-structure did not evolve from a somewhat unitary organization—the capital of the new polity had necessity to be built afresh and believed to be neutral to guarantee that member states of the federation have fair access to the capital (Dikshit, 1975). This requires a capital to be founded on neutral territory. Capital cities may also be established as a compromise location between competing blocs as were the cases of Berne and Fribourg in Switzerland (Gales, 2002). Another cross-capital similarity is the distinction shared by Bern, Canberra, Pretoria and Ottawa for they were chosen as capitals because they were not major urban centres (Slack & Chattopadhyay, 2009). In conclusion, the federal capitals or other cites of the classical federations were established largely on a ‘neutral’ or ‘compromise site’.

Ethiopia retained its former empire state (1889-1974) and unitary state (1974-1991) capital city, Addis Ababa, as its new federal capital. According to the new federal constitution of Ethiopia (1995, Article 49), the choice of federal capital resembles with the special federal district model on the one hand, and the one which is located in a federal unit serving as federal and state capital city model, on the other giving way to a fourth model. Wider arguments and controversies over Ethiopian federal capital city administration shall be presented in chapter six.

2.3.6 An African City Formation Model?

One could find small indigenous forts and settlements even before the Pharaohs to the era of slave trade in Africa; however, modern African urban centers, by and large, were the product of colonial and post-colonial eras (Freund, 2007). For instance, the coastal city of Cape Town, which is now home to South Africa’s legislature, was founded by the Dutch in 1652. The colonial history of Durban also shows that while the initial settlement had been open, porous and African, the Dutch managed to implant their frontier mindset upon its design (Swilling, 1991). Ibrahim Abdullah (2002) summarizes that the apartheid socio-political system shaped the making of South African urban than rural regions.

Throughout Africa, the physical legacies of colonialism are evident in the form of military garrisons, churches, hospitals, trading centres, prisons, schools, agricultural and mining barracks as well as urban centres as Fassil Demissie (2007) observes. He adds that “colonial cities in Africa

were designed and built by various European powers along the coast or in the interior to extract rents, crops, and minerals from rural areas and for exporting goods internationally” (p.3). More specifically, the UN-Habitat (2008: 122) posits the state of East African cities as follows:

The location, size and distribution of the major urban centres in East Africa is almost entirely the product of colonial decisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in terms of setting of administrative headquarters; routing of transport lines; and identification of areas of colonial strategic and economic importance.

Therefore, the purposes of the modern city formation in Africa appear to exactly fall within the neo-Marxian explanations of urbanization, i.e., urban development of rural underdevelopment.

In fact, colonial rule had helped pave the way for the rapid expansion of many post-colonial African cities. Some older towns remained important centers of commerce and cultural life, while others were entirely transformed by changing economic and political developments (Maylam, 1995). Still other cities, from Bangui in the Central African Republic to Nairobi, Kenya, and Windhoek, Namibia, began as small settler colonial administrative units that eventually became gigantic settlements (Freund, 2007). The evolution of cities in colonial Africa varied a great deal in literature, especially between settler colonies in southern and eastern Africa in comparison to other areas. What was shared in common was that city planners of colonial administrators were convinced that Africans ultimately belonged in rural locations (ibid.). Despite this commonality, it appears difficult to develop a concise uniform African city formation model.


According to the urban research conducted by the UN-Habitat (2008), Ethiopia and Eritrea did not experience a long history of European colonialism but their urban spatial development strategy has remained heavily top-down. This resulted in “a very high rate of urban primacy whereby Addis Ababa, for example, dominates among the urban centres in Ethiopia” (ibid: 125). Therefore, in the Ethiopian context, the formation and evolution of major multiethnic urban centers were laid down by Menelik II, for example, Addis Ababa in 1886 and Dire Dawa in 1902 (Getahun, 2007). The dominant cultural group in urban Ethiopia, in the post-19th century, were not white colonial settlers as was the case in other African cities, but a community of Amharic speakers and Orthodox Christians with Amhara cultural ethos for Merera Gudina (2011), a community of Amhara colonial settlers for Asafa Jalata (2010), and a community of Amharic speaking ruling class for Teshale Tibebe (1995). What is common in these literatures, however, is

the dominant role of Amharic speakers in the modern urban centers of Ethiopia. The evolution of modern multiethnic cities in Ethiopia is treated in chapter four.¹⁰

2.3.7 The Need for Holistic Approach to Urban Formation

The foregoing perspectives on city formation are not exhaustive; they are selected or constructed on account of their relevance. To understand urban political development better, holistic theoretical and methodological approach is pertinent, as Henri Lefebvre also suggested the need for a “general theory of time-spaces” (quoted in Parker, 2004: 21). Every urban theory deals with one or more aspects of the urban political development: the impact of political culture (political history), the roles of socio-cultural interactions (urban sociology), urban-rural capital exploitation class relations (neo-Marxism), innovative educational, military and religious centers (civilizational), the role of federalism in urbanism, and the African city formation context. These complementary approaches are adopted to understand urban political development in modern Ethiopia. Thus, all of them are embraced as holistic theory of analysis. The theoretical and methodological perspectives identified to explain city politics are also pertinent for the explanation of the emergence of urban social diversity and conflicts thereof, which is broadly addressed in the subsequent sections.

Fig. 2.1 Integrated City Formation Approach



¹⁰ Unlike Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and other towns established by Menelik II, there were towns whose foundation preceded the formation of modern multiethnic Ethiopia. Northern Ethiopian towns such as Axum, Gondar, Lalibela, Bahir Dar, Wollo, and Ankober were established before the rise of Menelik II. Western Ethiopian towns like Nekemte, Saqa, Jimma, Billo, Assandabo, and Dembi Dollo were indigenous settlements developed in the early 19th century (Asafa, 2010). The formation of towns in Eastern Ethiopia, particularly Jaldessa and Harar, has to do with their religious, trade and political links to foreign forces like Arabs and Turks in the medieval ages. However, all of these older towns were incorporated into the Empire State of Ethiopia by the forces of MenelikII by the end of the 19th century, after which, Amharic language speakers were promoted by the state to dominate in those towns and other newly formed ones.

2.4 The Evolution of Urban Social Diversity

Once formed through whatever means as discussed above, cities attract more migrants of diverse backgrounds: ethnic, linguistic, religious, class, sex and/or other social identities. Karl Deutsch (1953) argued that a decisive factor in national differentiation or otherwise was found to be the process of social mobility which accompanies the growth of towns and mass communication. As a result of this social mobility, modern cities have become culturally heterogeneous and “are inherently complex and diverse” (Taylor et al, 2007: 13). Particularly, for the purpose of studying diversity in urban Ethiopia, the classification of minorities by Ted Gurr (1993) would be relevant. Depending on their identity, socio-economic condition, and/or political aspirations, urban social diversity may be classified into five groups, namely, ethno-nationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno-classes, militant or politicized sects and communal contenders (Gurr, 1993).

Ethno-nationalists, according to Ted Gurr, are historically autonomous; and often relatively large and locally concentrated ethnic groups that are committed to achieving or regaining independent statehood. On the other, indigenous peoples are defined as politically conquered, culturally isolated, ecologically endangered and economically vulnerable descendants of the original inhabitants of a city or a region. Cities composed of numerous ethno-nationalists or indigenous groups are considered as multinational cities (Kymlicka, 1995). Thirdly, urban ethno-classes, what Will Kymlicka calls polyethnic groups, are usually composed of descendants of slave or immigrant minorities who play distinct economic roles and socially inferior or politically vulnerable to the dominant group. Frequent examples are black Americans. Fourthly, politicized sects Ted Gurr categorizes are minority communities that are engaged primarily in defence of their religious beliefs (Gurr, 1993). The last groups, urban communal contenders, are culturally distinct groups in heterogeneous cities where no single group constitutes a demographic majority; and all groups are, strictly speaking, minorities. Communal contenders are of two types: (i) advantaged communal contenders, which are culturally distinct groups with political or economic advantages over the other groups in a heterogeneous city; and (ii) disadvantaged communal contenders that are urban groups subject to political and/or economic discrimination (ibid.).

The latter urban communal contenders distinction is often the result of “a condition created by the state to impose the preeminence”, for instance, “of one language over the others, thereby facilitating the migration of speakers of that language to the city” (Getahun, 2007: 19). Ralph R. Premdas (2004) sums up multicultural contexts into two societal structures: ‘ethno-

national' and 'migrant-minority'. The first category supposedly promotes distinct deep institutional internal division which is potentially capable of creating new autonomous or sovereign entities (ibid). The second, which is labelled 'migrant-minority', occurs in host indigenous groups with a dominant cultural core embracing a policy of immigration (ibid.). He remarks that both variants should be conceived as existing along a continuum instead of rigid compartments, with usually migrant-minority groups surviving within numerically large size ethno-national groups or vice-versa (Premdas, 2004). In a multinational country, all nationalities are indigenous but that does not mean there are no local migrant and indigenous groups. Their difference is that while local migrants have to leave their birthplace for various reasons and live in local indigenous group who had to remain in their ancestral land. Bekele Gutema (2004), in his *Introducing Intercultural Philosophy*, indicates cultures to have cross-cultural overlappings. Modern cities in fact are at the cultural cross-roads. In this study, 'urban diversity' refers to indigenous ethno-national and migrant-ethnic groups in cities. Accordingly, the generic term 'communal diversity' is used to refer to both groups; but, as to the entitlements of the groups, indigenous and immigrant groups need to be treated differently.

Urban communal diversity impels the respect of the rights of indigenous and immigrant groups, which may loosely include a wide range of public policies, legal rights, and constitutional provisions sought by groups for the accommodation of their cultural differences (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Put differently, urban groups' claims could range from "multicultural policies to language rights to respecting treaties with indigenous peoples" (ibid: 2). Will Kymlicka (1995) makes an empirical point that many Western states have accepted that indigenous groups are entitled to some form of distinct legal and institutional status, whereas immigrant groups are expected to integrate into common institutions with comparably minor accommodations to facilitate integration. Different theorists use different conceptions to describe these sorts of claims—e.g. 'multiculturalism', 'group rights', or 'differentiated citizenship' or other (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995). Public policy responses to urban diversity are discussed in the next chapter.

The specific type of cities being studied need to be further clarified. That means labels such as 'divided', 'polarized', 'contested', 'violent', and 'conflicted' adjectives attached to the term city must not be confused. Scott A. Bollens (2009) brands cities as 'divided' in numerous contexts, including North American and western European cities segregated by race, ethnicity, and class. At other times, 'divided city' or 'polarized city' alludes to more extreme circumstances of political division and contestation along social cleavages (ibid.). Thus, urban divided societies are not

merely societies which are diverse in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, or culture; “what marks a divided society is that these differences are politically salient—that is, they are persistent markers of political identity and bases for political mobilisation” (Choudhry, 2009: 5). Divided city, which Hepburn uses the term ‘contested city’ to refer to, “is defined as a major urban centre in which two or more ethnically-conscious groups – divided by religion, language and/or culture and perceived history – co-exist in a situation where neither group is willing to concede supremacy to the other” (2004: 2). Furthermore, contested cities, according to Scott Bollens, are cities:

[W]here the very legitimacy of their political structures and their rules of decision-making and governance are strongly contested by ethnic groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power or demand group-based autonomy or independence. Governance amidst severe and contested multicultural differences is viewed by at least one identifiable group in the city as artificial, imposed, or illegitimate. Socioeconomic cleavages and urban questions become bound up with strong political claims; socially “divided” cities at this juncture become politically “polarized” cities (2009: 2).

The notion of contested or polarized or divided city therefore denotes a politicized situation of urban diversity, which also explains some of the urban situations in Ethiopia, such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The status of Finfinne (Addis Ababa) city political structure, representation and public policy have always been contested particularly from the Oromo nationalist side; and the urban governance of Dire Dawa remains bone of contention primarily between Oromo and Somali ethno-national groups. This directs the discussion to the notions of urban group conflicts.

2.5 Urban Ethno-National Conflicts: Concept & Theories

As already argued in the preceding sections, cities are the locus where the challenges of living together first emerged and it is also at the urban level that the social tensions and spatial conflicts occur in reaction to societal and structural conditions (Gilbert, 2009). Cities thus are thought to be the primary epicenters of social diversity and group conflicts. This part of the chapter offers operational definitions to the terms of ethnicity and ethno-national conflict, and then explores causal theory of urban group conflicts.

2.5.1 Defining Ethnicity and Ethno-Nationalist Conflict

Intergroup conflict is a subset of the more general study of intergroup relations, which has its origins in social psychology. Taylor and Moghaddam define the concept of intergroup relations as

"any aspect of human interaction that involves individuals perceiving themselves as members of a social category, or being perceived by others as belonging to a social category" (1994: 6). Ethnicity is one of the most common social category identities that is mostly reinforced by (or arguably emerges out of) such intergroup interactions and competitions. Thus, both ethnicity and group conflicts are studied within the general intergroup relations.

The term "ethnicity" is itself full of ambiguity. This study does not claim to offer comprehensive definition to it. Ethnicity often refers to a collective or group consciousness and behaviour as shaped by inter-ethnic relations and competitions which includes aspects of gain and loss in interaction (Eriksen, 2001). Fredrik Barth (1969) treats ethnicity as an aspect of relationship, not a cultural property of a group, suggesting that in a mono-ethnic setting, there would be no ethnicity. Ethnicity thus is defined as a set of distinct features of a given ethnic group as compared to (or competed with) others laying ground for the emergence of the notion of the "we" and the "they" consciousness.

On the contrary, since "groupness is a variable, not a constant", Rogers Brubaker in his seminal work "Ethnicity without Groups" argues, "ethnicity does not require such groupness" (2004: 4). He rather contends that ethnicity works not only in bounded groups, but in and through constructed "categories". As a result, for Brubaker, "ethnic conflict" is not always a matter of Donald Horowitz's (1985) "ethnic groups in conflict". Of course, it has long been disputed whether ethnic identity is an inseparable part of human character or constructed by elite groups for economic and/or political purposes.

Ethnicity is thus often understood from three angles: primordialism, instrumentalism and social constructionism. Primordialism upholds static objectivism to ethnic identity, and seeks to ground it in stable, inevitable natural and objectively observable patterns of shared culture rooted in common ancestral myth (Smith, 1999; Brubaker, 2009). Isaiah Berlin underscores the view that "just as people need to eat and drink, to have security and freedom of movement, so too they need to belong to a group. Deprived of this, they feel cut off, lonely, diminished, unhappy" (quoted in Premdas, 2004: 7). Berlin rejects the idea of a culturally or ethnically homeless person living in a twilight zone of cosmopolitanism: "I regard cosmopolitanism as empty. People can't develop unless they belong to a culture" (ibid: 7).

Fredrik Barth (1969) rejects this primordialist stance on behalf of social constructionists that ethnic boundaries emerged, rather, in and through categorical "we-they" distinctions drawn by

actors themselves and through the channeling of interaction through sets of prescriptions and proscriptions about who can interact with whom in what sorts of social relationships. The instrumentalists, on the other hand, maintain that whether ethnicity is consciously “constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, appearance or regionality” or ascribed character of peoples, elites (often called ethnic entrepreneurs) manipulate it for gaining political power or economic resources (Fowkes, 2002: 2). Thus, ethnicity involves three interactive dimensions: primordial, instrumental and constructivist (Young, 1998).

An ethno-nationalist group in this study is understood in terms of a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, comprising language and/or religion and/or institutions and/or other cultural features, an association with a specific territory, and finally a sense of ethnic solidarity, in other words a recognition of each other as members of the same ethno-national group (Smith, 1999; Premdas, 2004). Ethnic identities, as Devaraj argues, “if given due recognition by the State, have the potential and power to contribute to national unity” (2006: p.4).

Otherwise, ethnic identities, unless recognized and adequately accommodated, could lead to conflicts. Of course, it is impossible to conceive of a diverse society free of conflicts as a result of real or perceived (or misperceived) incompatible goals. Not all conflicts are violent and destructive. For some, conflicts appear inevitable and may be socially desirable if they result in personal and/or political progress. Charles Webel, for instance, believes that “conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and increase peace and diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to reach solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable” (2007: 8). Similarly, for each thesis, W. Friedrich Hegel idealizes that there must be anti-thesis so that something better, i.e., synthesis, results (Hegel trans by Sibree, 2001). Hence, difference of opinions or disagreement on some issues does not necessarily lead to violence or destruction.

Violent conflict happens, according to Johan Galtung (1969), when three preconditions are present simultaneously: conflicting goals, mis(perceptions) of each other, and violent behaviour. Donald Horowitz defines conflict as “a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals” (1985: 95). Even though the type and nature of conflicts could range from international warfare to intra-personal conflicts, this dissertation is confined to deal with group conflicts related to urban areas. Bjørn Møller (2003) has suggested that most of today’s violent conflicts take place either between different groups within a

society or between the state and a group. More specifically, “most ethnic conflicts are about rights over *homelands* and *national* territory” (Berg & Ben-Porat, 2008: 29). It is further contended that group related incompatibilities have been lumped together under the headings of “government” and “territory”, i.e. as having to do with either the type of political system or with territorial issues such as secession or autonomy (Møller, 2003). When ethnicity is relied upon as a basis of identification in order to rally for political rights, as Berg and Ben-Porat (2008) argue, it becomes automatically an issue of nationalism.

Edward Azar observes that if exclusive claims of territory coincide with ethno-national sovereignty in terms of domination and denial of security, recognition and effective participation of ethno-nationalist groups, these conflicts at times turn into protracted, long-term, ongoing conflicts that permeate all aspects of society (Azar, 1999). This study is aware of the shortcomings of the concept of ethno-nationalist conflict. Bruce Gilley, for instance, warns that ethno-national conflict itself is problematic, for it “tends to homogenise quite distinct political phenomena” (2004: 1155). He further concurs that “for both practical and normative reasons there is a good argument for abandoning the field of ethnic conflict studies” (ibid: 1155). In spite of the shortcomings one may identify, the term ethno-national conflict, in this study, refers to a violent or potentially violent dispute between ethno-national groups or against the regime in power, to accomplish such goals as territorial control, political power struggle, access to basic resource and identity recognition, and resistance to cultural oppression.

Scott A. Bollens develops a useful heuristic model of “urban conflict-stability continuum” as a way to provide a necessary comparative context as well as comparative analytical framework (2009: 8). To this end, he identified a four-category scale to place cities along the continuum “defined by the degree that active inter-group conflict over root political issues has been effectively addressed through inclusive institutional and constitutional means”: active conflict (category-1), suspension of violence (category-2), movement toward peace (category-3), and stability/normalcy (category-4) (ibid: 9). In the *active conflict* urban status (category-1), hostility, antagonism, tension, and at times overt violence, exist between urban groups or against the regime. This is so because, as argued by Scott Bollens, “the root political issues of the broader nationalistic conflict remain unresolved” and in such a circumstance, “the city becomes a flashpoint, platform, and/or independent focus of broader conflict” (2009: 8). He adds that when there is active conflict and a

vulnerability of the urban arena to deeper nationalistic currents, urban policy will likely become rigid, defensive and partisan in efforts to protect the regime in power.

A city placed in the category-2 that is *suspension of violence* is marked more by the absence of conflicts than the presence of peace. Scott A. Bollens argues that after the ending of overt dispute, there will likely remain deep divisions of communal groups in the city. However, “the potential for inter-group differences to inflame violent actions is lessened due to a negotiated agreement between nationalist elites, intervention by a third-party mediator, or even the construction of a wall that physically separates conflicting nationalistic camps” (ibid: 8). In the cities characterized by *movement toward peace*, there are efforts to transform urban conflict situation to peace-promoting ones or intergroup co-existence using urban public policies (Bollens, 2009). The final category of cities is placed in the *stability/normalcy* side of the continuum where there is consolidation of peace-building, public access, equality and democratic participation “with no or little threat of a resort to political violence” (ibid: 8). The model of urban conflict-stability continuum appears helpful for the current urban conflict analysis of contested cities in Ethiopia.

2.5.2 Causal Theories of Urban Ethno-National Conflicts

Urban related ethno-national conflicts are becoming major features of the world posing threats to urban peace and stability. Scott A. Bollens (2000: 3) observes the following:

A disturbing number of cities across the world are susceptible to intercommunal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures. Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Sarajevo, New Delhi, Beirut, and Brussels are urban arenas penetrable by deep intercommunal conflict associated with ethnic or political differences. In some cases, a city is the target or focal point for unresolved nationalistic ethnic conflict. In other cases, a city is not a primary cause of intergroup conflict, but a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims or for tensions related to ethnic groups relations.

It shows that ethno-national conflicts over cities are not uncommon across the world. Theoretical literatures on why violent group conflicts occur generally distinguish between structural factors on the one hand, and accelerating or triggering factors on the other. Structural factors are those which create a potential climate for violent conflict on a long-term (Galtung, 1969). They may include such interrelated political, social and economic factors as group control of state power and policy, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the structure and ethnic make-up of society, and the history of inter-group relations (Vrbensky, 2008).

Likewise, according to Johan Galtung (1969), certain patterns of socio-economic structure can result in a high degree of vulnerability to conflict, which he calls “structural violence”. For instance, ranked societies with sharp patterns of stratification in which a politically-dominant group controls the state and access to wealth, education and status, often suffer from a high-degree of vulnerability to group conflict. Furthermore, Galtung introduced the concepts of positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace he says implies absence of violent conflict, whereas positive peace is achieved when structural violence, inequalities and injustices cease to exist (ibid.).

Accelerating or triggering factors are the events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflicts. Since triggering factors depend heavily upon the specific context, it is not possible to list them all. Some examples include: economic decline, changes in the state policy; shifts in internal control of the central authority, including the military; change in the internal distribution of power, including access to government power and privilege; shipments of (small) arms; interventions of neighboring states, regional powers and organizations; and large movements of people and capital (OECD, 1997).

Conflicts are not static state of affairs; “they wax-and wane, becoming less peaceful and then more peaceful as they move through various stages” (Kriesberg, 2010: 399). While distinct phases can be distinguished, they do not necessarily follow a sequential pattern. A combination of factors generally determines whether a conflict escalates or recedes. Though difficult to exactly separate one phase from the next, as Scott Bollens (2009) also classifies, conflict process may include: situations of submerged tensions, situations of rising tensions, eruption phases of open confrontation and violent conflict, fragile transitional and post-conflict situations (Kriesberg, 2010). This section of the chapter does not delve into the discussion of phases and processes of conflicts; it rather emphasizes on the key urban group conflict theories including social identity, neo-Marxist structuralist and state policy institutions which in combination are believed to be pertinent for the explanation of the cases selected for the study.

2.5.2.1 Social Identity Theory of Urban Conflict

Social identity theory is one of the most pertinent to group conflict analysis which mainly relies on intergroup psychological, communication and competition processes. Ho-Won Jeong (2008) has eloquently observed that the sources of adversarial relationships are not limited to concrete economic interests or control over power, but also rooted in social identity differences. As a take-

off point for identity based conflict, Walker Connor observed that, “scholars associated with theories of ‘nation-building’ have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration” (1972: 319). Thus, such attempt of nation-building for some is an attempt of nation-destroying for other; which often causes nationalistic conflicts.

Diane E. Davis and Nora Libertun de Duren (2011) argue that, contrary to the scholarship which suggests that cities can breed tolerance and respect; cities are and will instead remain incubators of identity-based political conflict as globalization heightens cultural interactions. By exploring correlation between group identities, seats of political power and the urban social environment, Davis and Duren conclude that urban identity-based conflict will arise in the future and shift political arrangements (*ibid.*). They further argue that the urban environment is not just a stage but also an actor in conflicts. According to Scott A. Bollens, “political control of multinational cities can become contested as nationalists push to create a political system that expresses and protects their distinctive group characteristics” (2008: 2). This is to say that nationalists fight to control cities so that their distinct group identity is recognized and protected. Donald Horowitz (1985) observes that especially in developing countries, where the sphere of politics is unusually broad and its impact powerful, collective social recognition is conferred by political affirmation. For this reason, he adds, the prevailing political system is responsible for the “struggles over relative group worth”, which may transform itself into “ethnic identification with the polity” that some ethnic groups may seek, are readily transferred to the political system (*ibid.*: 185).

One form of struggle over relative group worth is inter-cultural competition which can offer a way of counteracting overwhelming dominance in socioeconomic relations in cities. It means that cultural diversity maybe cultural resistance suggesting that resistance to imposed culture as a means of resisting political and economic domination is not always a matter of elite strategy, but can be mass based (Hannerz, 1996). This is the fact that promoting cultural diversity through public policy can be assumed resistance to cultural homogenisation and to the hegemony of mainstream cultural industries. As argued, state-led assimilation policies in multicultural contexts have often been identified as the major factor of ethno-nationalist identity conflicts. No doubt, some assimilation takes place and perhaps in a number of instances permanent integration might have taken place; but in a number of other cases, as Ralph R. Premdas observed “the boundary markers do not melt away but, resistant to absorption, are silently preserved” and re-discovered only to erupt in a new

instigatory context (2004: 10). Due to the ever rising social identity contact, awareness and radicalization in the world, Patrick le Galès similarly argues, cities are becoming the focus of unrest and the sites of the socio-political revolts (2002).

It is often because of the logic of globalization and urbanization, migrants are heading to cities causing social identity contacts and transforming them in a multitude of ways: “since economic and educational opportunities as well as access to services are increasingly concentrated in urban communities, internal migration to cities has accelerated” (Good et al, 2014: 2). Thus, these global logics of migrations are changing the social structure of cities triggering fears of dominations. In Africa, for instance, migration is contributing to the rise in the salience of ethnic politics in communities whose identity politics had previously been focused on nation-building goals (ibid). Good, Triadafilopoulos and Turgeon (2014: 4) further argued that “depending on the nature of contact among groups on the ground, city life can also accentuate divisions and contribute to conflict.” Thus, inter-group relations could turn identity based conflicts.

Furthermore, according to Horowitz (1985), where invidious comparisons and contests are strong and the struggle for relative group worth mentioned above is powerful, the quest for ethnic or cultural value inclusion and exclusion seems to be all the more important in politics, which is the common denominator of identity based conflict among ethno-national groups. Once an inter-communal struggle commences in diverse settings, it often finds expression and becomes embroiled in sensitive cultural symbols thereby rendering intractable the smallest of claims and counterclaims (Premdas, 2004). Unbridled urbanism often causes polarized politics even in the hinterland city when “traditional urbanists” attack “suburb cultures” by conceiving in it “the disintegration of the values they associated with urban culture” (Hall, 1984: 221).

Social identity theory of urban conflict could generally be explained by either primordial or instrumental assumptions. According to primordialists, those with cultural, ethnic, religious or racial differences can no longer co-exist peacefully, as is suggested by the view that there is an unavoidable ‘clash of civilisations’ at the cultural level both in urban and rural (Huntington, 1993). It follows that urban social conflicts are inevitable as modern cities are formed of culturally heterogeneous societal structures. It suggests that “inter-communal group conflict may not be artificially contrived as a situational strategy merely in search of pragmatic instrumental needs to satisfy, but a dialectically driven ritual structure riveted into social and human behaviour that is not amenable to erasure or radical modification” (Premdas, 2004: 9). The primordial idea that identity

differences would inevitably lead to conflict maybe critiqued for undermining the potential peaceful co-existence of groups in urban centers.

Instrumentalists hold ethno-linguistic social conflicts are mere products of political elite manipulation for reasons of power and/or economic resources. Self-interested ethnic group leaders consciously mobilize the social identity for some ends as rational choice theorists too claim (Fowkes, 2002). Hansen points out that “a conflict apparently caused by ethnic or racial divisions has been nothing more than a conflict between competing élites for the control of state power and consequent access to certain material resources” (quoted in McCandless, 2011: 19). As a form of moderate critique to instrumentalists, Jan Erk concedes that “in many instances ethno-linguistic divisions provide political elites with raw material to mobilize and use to their own ends, but this does not mean that elites have full control over these divisions” (2008: 11). He sends the message that political elites had neither created the ethno-linguistic social structure nor did they necessarily instigate social identity conflicts.

Other theories such as frustration-aggression and social equity theories are associated with social identity theory of conflicts. For instance, the frustration-aggression theory explains that socio-psychological cause of group violence can be used by rebel leaders to mobilize peoples along ethnic, religious, social and other identity lines to overcome collective action problems (Bocco & Gilles, 2012). Social equity theory of group conflict is based on principles of social justice and finds group conflict in situations where there is the perception of unfairness between social groups creating the advantaged and disadvantaged groups (Ellis, 2011). In general, social identity theory holds social identity combined with other auxiliary factors to cause urban group conflict.

2.5.2.2 Marxist/Structuralist Theory of Urban Conflict

The Marxist perspective is a socio-economic structuralist analysis part of the systemic explanations often offered to urban conflicts. To conceive of structural cause of conflicts, one needs to first take a structuralist view of the world, where structures and institutions are central to conflict analysis. As a rule, structuralist analysis focuses on the holistic aspects of society, including interdependent relationships among individuals, collectivities, and institutions, and “is interested in the social, political, and economic networks” (Landman, 2006: 45). These networks form structures.

Distinct from rationalism, structuralism asserts that individuals and states do not make decisions solely on the basis of rational choice. Put differently, individual actors are not completely

free agents capable of determining particular outcomes due to their embeddedness in relational structures that shape their identities, interests and interactions (Landman, 2006). This social relational structure is characterized by structural exploitation and inequality. Kathleen Ho observes that "structural inequalities that systematically deny some people their basic human needs constitute a structural violation of human rights" (2007: 1). Marxists/structuralists focus on the categories of urban socio-economic classes formed as the result of labor power exploitation and capital accumulation. The source of Marxist inevitable urban social conflict, more appropriately "urban class struggle," is rooted in the socio-economic structures of the city itself (Tabb and Sawers, 1978). In the introduction to their edited volume on *Marxism and the Metropolis*, Tabb and Sawers (ibid.), for example, observe intensified struggles over urban space as community groups fight for their homes against highways and urban renewals.

Classical Marxism holds that conflicts in the living urban space are mere reflections of the underlying tension between capital and labor: "The surface appearance of conflicts around the built environment--the struggles against the landlord or against urban renewal--conceals a hidden essence that is nothing more than the struggle between capital and labor" (Harvey, 1976: 289). It reduces every urban conflict to the struggle between capital and labor. This is open to critiques.

Several studies in different urban contexts generally discuss the distribution of power and resources among diverse communities in cities (among others, Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974; Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). For example, urban political movements were described as started by disadvantaged community structures in response to the socio-economic exploitation or political underrepresentation of neighbourhoods containing minority communities in city governments. Urban social movements were thus seen as agents of urban change (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995). The other leading urban Marxist since the 1970s and 1980s, Manuel Castells, now perhaps neo-Marxist, does not make the mistake of reducing urban social conflict to a mere labor-capital tension. He criticizes his fellow Marxists because they "have tended to respond (to rival theories) by reducing the city and space to the logic of capital" (Castells, 1983: 297). On the contrary, he inclined to label all urban-based movements as an "urban social movement". For instance, he lumps conflicts over government urban renewal projects with other urban-based movements (religious movements, women's movements, black uprisings). He says that altogether urban-based social movements have three underlying goals: 'collective consumption trade unionism' (urban amenities and housing), the search for cultural identity recognition ('community'), and the

'decentralization of state power' to city governments and neighborhoods (Castells, 1983). Davide Ponzini (2009) accuses Castells of not showing how each movement can be shaped by socio-economic preexisting structures.

Neo-Marxists, on the other hand, contend that inter-city or urban-rural links are characterized by capital exploitation, domination and accumulation relations. As argued, while discussing neo-Marxist theory of the city formation, cities evolved and developed at the expense of the neighboring rural or suburb areas (Barcelo et al, 2002; Gale, 2002). The city searches for an ever cheaper labor and land (means of production) particularly in the adjacent rural or suburbs. Because of this systemic exploitation, according to neo-Marxists, there would be an inevitable center-periphery conflict. Molotch (1988) finds the sources of urban social conflicts as rooted in the role that growth elites play to accumulate capitals. "It is the growth elites who are hegemonic" and "in both ideological and structural terms, their dominance over the development process is felt across a wide array of political, economic, and cultural institutions" (ibid: 42). In a nutshell, the established exploitative relationships between urban and suburbs/surrounding rural areas, according to neo-Marxists, would lead to group conflicts. If cities and surrounding suburban areas are inhabited by different identity groups, the structure of the conflicts may take the form of not only class antagonism but also ethno-nationalism.

2.5.2.3 State Policy/ Institutional Approach

This subsection is a more specific institutional aspect of the broader structuralist political economy theory of urban group conflicts. It is assumed that repressive political culture is one of the factors explaining urban ethno-nationalist conflict. As Pawel Swianiewicz succinctly argues local political culture is itself dependent, among other factors, upon the institutional, social and economic policy contexts (2006). This study therefore does not try to analyze the whole range of issues related to authoritarian political culture. Instead, it concentrates on state institutions or public policy aspects of the broader system of centralized political culture that would explain the concepts of 'centralization-policy-led-conflict' and 'conflict-led-centralization-policy' in the following chapters of this study. If urban conflict has caused political centralization in one city, and equally, centralization policy has caused urban conflict in another city, urban policy problems in both cases seem to have not been resolved as conflicts are being recycled. Ho-Won Jeong (2008: 5) contends that "the comprehension of mass violence and war needs to be based on an understanding of

institutional roles besides the psychological and behavioural elements that instigate aggression". Several literatures establish strong correlations between state policies/ institutions and ethno-national conflicts (Bollen, 2009; Premdas, 2004; Chapman, 1996; Horowitz, 1985). For instance, Scott A. Bollen examines "the role of policy and planning in contested urban environments and the effects these urban strategies have on the magnitude and manifestations of ethno-national conflict" (2009: 1). Moreover, Audrey Chapman identifies categories of state policy sources of group structural conflicts, which are: (1) violations resulting from actions and policies on the part of governments; (2) violations related to patterns of discrimination; and (3) violations related to a state's failure to fulfill the minimum core obligations of enumerated rights (Chapman, 1996).

The world is being threatened, according to R. R. Premdas, by an "ethnic nuclear explosion" (2004: 4) as multicultural groups reach the moment of seeking uncompromising demands. He attributes this to state policy failures to find appropriate mechanisms to manage inter-ethnic coexistence. As already discussed, this multicultural problem arises mainly in two societal contexts: ethno-national and migrant-minority pluralist configurations (*ibid.*).

Lingering social identity tensions are often sharpened by changes in the urban policy environment through mostly authoritarian political structures (Davis and de Duren, 2011). For instance, pressure from ruling political elites to make Beirut a hub of global commerce through Beirut's highway expansion projects instigated the public, reinforced territoriality and delegitimized the ruling elites in the eyes of locals (Deboulet & Fawaz cited Bollen, 2000). Due to this territorial expansion project, suburb dwellers' identities of victimhood were strengthened and to some extent easily manipulated by local political forces offering recourse to residents (*ibid.*). That might be why Peterson concluded that "urban politics is above all the politics of land use" (1981: 25). Therefore, power struggle and public policy-making, rather than urban diversity itself, were the sources of urban conflict in Beirut. In some of his case studies, Scott Bollen observes that "a city is not the primary cause of inter-group conflict, but becomes a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims involving areas outside the urban region or for tensions related to foreign immigration" (2009: 2). In these cases, cities become plethora of extra-urban matters, such as the broader national or regional power struggle between ethno-national groups or conflicts over national identity.

Quite similarly, Daniel Elazar (1987) has argued that urbanization policies, and the concomitant migration, have often exacerbated the kinds of ethnic and racial tensions which may

already be present in federal systems as the result of unresolved political problems. Karl Deutsch (1953) highlighted that modernization in the form of urbanization and social mobility and contacts between culturally diverse people *might* increase antagonisms. Lawrence J. Vale's squabble on the ethno-national representation strategy in capital cities affirms that the planning and architectural design of capital cities can exacerbate tensions between dominant identity groups and minorities (cited in Davis and de Duren, 2011). Daniel Elazar (1975) finds some fundamental contradictions between state policies of federalization and urbanization. "Most federal systems developed at a time when their polities were basically rural in character with cities small and definitely subordinated to the purposes of an agricultural society or agriculturally based commerce" (ibid: 36). If the original basis of federal arrangements were rural territorial units, the subsequent urbanization of those polities, particularly which crosses boundaries of member states of the federation, would lead to conflicts (ibid.). John Kasarda and Edward Crenshaw classified the determinants of urban growth into three categories, which include "boundary redefinition through annexation of surrounding areas", natural population increment and migration (1991: 474). Therefore, territorial boundary controversies due to urbanization policies in federal polities may require constitutional changes, which could cause political conflicts.

The relative deprivation theory as articulated by Ted Gurr (1970) shows that people are bound to rebel against the state when they realize that there is much discrepancy between what by right they are supposed to get and the actual reward (in federations, for example). Therefore, there is a clear association between state policy failures and group conflicts. Likewise, it is observed that "if governing norms are too rigid to be adjusted to new demands and expectations, such inflexibility breeds resentment utilized for the mobilization of groups that are discontent with the status quo" (Jeong, 2008: 5). Particularly in Africa, with weak governance institutions and inequitable accesses to the little social amenities and economic resources, some segments of the population are likely to have better opportunities relatively to others (Ikejiaku, 2012). This discriminatory formula offers a fertile ground for group conflicts.

The authoritarian politics of exclusion and inclusion culture in the third world countries often is the major source of group conflicts. Some groups claim that the country or region or the town is (or ought to be) theirs and that the political system should reflect this fact by being constituted along essentially homogeneous lines, while other groups merely claim the right to be represented on equal terms (Horowitz, 1985). These conflicting group claims, often articulated on

the basis of inequitable public policies, Horowitz writes, may succeed to determine the question as to who gets what, and how much in the state institutions serving as the sources of ethno-nationalist conflicts. Likewise, Eric Austin (2006) concurs that the relationships between ethno-national groups are often characterized by suspicion, instability, inequity, and uncertainty in an imposed political culture.

Moreover, “the fear of domination by ethnic strangers” or “others” are also identified as the sources of ethno-nationalist conflicts (ibid: 188). This “fear of domination” might be fuelled by state policies as the following Nigerian case shows (Horowitz, 1985: 189-190):

The anti-Ibo riots of May 1966, for example, came after a military regime headed by Ibo issued military promotion lists that seemed to favor Ibo officers; promulgated a decree unifying the regional civil services, a move that would open the Northern civil service to an influx of Ibo; and then indicated its intention to abolish the regions altogether. These were policies favored by Ibo, feared by Northerners, and interpreted as an Ibo conspiracy ‘to colonize the North’. Five days later, fierce attacks on Ibo began in Northern cities.

As this case of Ibo ethnic group in Nigeria showed, state policies, if not inclusive in its objective and practices, may induce intergroup violences or battles against the regime. According to Castells, “the city as a political entity of free self-management opposes the reliance on the centralized state as an instrument of authoritarianism and a threat of totalitarianism” (1983: 326). Therefore, authoritarian state policies are thought to be one of the major causes of urban group conflicts.

Horowitz discusses the concept of “asymmetry of group claims” which may considerably explain polarized urban politics: “Some groups seek domination, not the mere avoidance of it. Some seek to exclude others from the polity altogether, and some seek merely to be included on equal terms. If all groups merely wanted inclusion, distrust and anxiety would still make ethnic conflicts serious” (Horowitz, 1985: 196). Thus, if there is a suspicion coupled with absence of faith in the impartiality of institutions and public policies, it becomes inevitable for groups to enter into conflicts. Besides, Scott A. Bollens (1998) observes that the legitimacy of a city's political structures and its rules of decision-making and governance are commonly challenged by ethno-national groups who either seek an equal or proportionate share of power (such as blacks in South Africa) or demand group based autonomy or independence (such as Palestinians in Jerusalem or the Quebecois in Montreal). By the same token, Turgeon and Gagnon (2013) uphold that the exclusion or under-representation of national groups in state institutions can be a major source of conflict and resentment. Cities may become battle grounds between cultural groups, each

proclaiming the city as their own and, since the state machinery is often controlled by one group, as Paterson (1981) argued, it could be used to discriminate against competing groups. Thus, unless inclusively participatory policies are pursued, competing group claims may lead to violent conflicts.

Furthermore, urban public policy, especially decisions “related to housing, roads, schools, and other community facilities” may be practically employed “to consolidate intergroup inequalities across a polarized city’s ethnic geography by distributing benefits and advantages disproportionately to the ethnic ‘in-group’” (Bollens, 2009: 6). This resultant social inequality implies structural violence or structural source of group conflicts. For instance, the British Department for International Development (2003) identified a number of ways in which state policy can add to tensions or fuel interethnic conflicts which include systems of governance as they relate to participation, and policies on such things as the language of instruction, access, curriculum content, and pedagogy (Government of UK, 2003). Conflicts often arise when people are deprived of basic human needs and opportunities as a result of such discriminatory policies, and thereby demand fair access to socio-economic and political participations (Burton, 1990a).


Likewise, Will Kymlicka (1995) holds that minorities and majorities increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays. Often, authoritarian defensive and partisan state policies, in such controversies, result in group violent conflicts including civilian bloodsheds. To sum up, exclusionist institutions or imposed policies appear the frequent source of group conflicts to cities.

2.5.2.4 An Integrated Approach to Urban Ethno-National Conflicts

The foregoing part of the study has proposed most important causal theories of urban conflicts. They could generally fall within two broad categories: a combination of socio-psychological matters on the one hand and issues related to structural and political economy on the other. No doubt, it is generally believed that social identity, psychological and behavioral elements, as well as structural conditions of alienation caused by and maintained through state institution/policy means, all combine to fuel conflict (Jeong, 2008; Landman, 2006; Burton, 1990a). This study adopts an integrated approach to urban group conflict, as Scott Bollens suggests, “a project studying the complex and multi-faceted topic of societal and urban conflict benefits significantly from an interdisciplinary approach” (2009: 3). Accordingly, the study makes use of the insights of social

identity theory, neo-Marxist/structural theory, and political institutional/policy approach in order to understand ethno-national conflicts to cities in Ethiopia. It particularly emphasizes on the knowledge of state institutions/policies affecting urban ethno-national identity recognition and participation, employment, representation and services, urbanization and settlement dynamics. In short, policy-conflict correlations as rooted in the struggle over value and access to social status, power and resources seem most pertinent for the analysis of the issue at hand.

Fig. 2.2: Integrated causal theories of urban-group conflicts



2.6 Summary

This chapter in general has explored theories and concepts related to the urban formation, urban diversity and urban conflict. The chapter has been organized on four major points of discussion. First, the urban concepts and scopes have been operationalized. In that sense, even though the urban-rural continuum may make the distinction difficult, the main defining features of urban or cities include a minimum threshold of population size and density, practice of commerce and labor market, nonagricultural activity, legally defined boundary, and some form of local government for public services. Secondly, some theories of urban formation have been identified. These include, cities as centers of civilization and state formation; cities originated as the product of capital accumulation and class exploitation (Marxist/neo-Marxist theory); the argument that all the essential features of modern city are developed in past societies (political culture/history perspective); a city as a product of both hegemonic and subordinate cultures (urban sociology); federalizing as a multi-centered urbanizing (federal theory of city formation); and African city

formation model. Thirdly, modern cities have evolved to become heterogeneous cities mainly consisting of indigenous groups and migrants. The fourth major point of discussion was the normative debates on urban ethnicity and conflicts. Accordingly, after loosely defining ethnicity as an intergroup relational concept, and then, conflict as disagreement between groups advancing incompatible goals, this last section explored theories of urban ethno-nationalist conflict. Three perspectives were selected to investigate sources of urban conflicts, which include social identity theory, Marxist/neo-Marxist/structuralist theory and state institution/policy approach. These perspectives are taken as interconnected, and not mutually exclusive, in that they identify either socio-psychological or structural sources of urban ethno-national conflicts. For instance, social identity is affected by socio-economic structural domination and imposed state institutions/policies. Therefore, an integrated approach is in order for better analysis. In the next chapter, political and policy strategies of managing ethno-national diversity and conflicts in urban arenas shall be discussed.

Chapter 3
Managing Ethno-national Diversity in Urban Areas:
A Theoretical & Comparative Study

3.1 Introduction

The major theoretical explanations on urban formation and conflicts in the contexts of ethno-national diversity have been established in chapter two. Chapter three is an exploration of theories and comparative lessons on the management of urban ethno-national diversity and associated conflicts. It is difficult nowadays to find a major urban area without one or more cultural minorities, distinct ethno-national, social class, linguistic or religious groups, and networks based around identity affiliation. Jagdish Gundara and Crispin Jones (1998) argue that “States’ responses to such elements of diversity have often been to ignore them or to devise policies to assimilate such groups within the existing apparatus of the state” (p.108). Due to this and other policy factors, some of the urban regions around the world are found under the threats of nationalist conflicts as discussed in chapter two. To this effect, it is argued that “whether in Cape Town, Jakarta, London, New York, Santiago or Tokyo, an important aspect of modern urban life today is the need to recognize, embrace, and benefit from cultural diversity” (Sisk, 2001: 71). Within the context of urban public policy issues, Browning and Marshall (1976) suggested that improving city government services for the poor and minority, and to redress the balance between the culturally advantaged and disadvantaged groups in the city should be part of the city government. Thus, urban diversity, known to some as “*divercities*”, is seen as an asset (DIVERCITIES, Issue No. 8, 2015).

Bearing in mind the two major Ethiopian multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, this chapter is an exploration of theoretical and comparative urban studies on how to manage urban ethno-linguistic diversity and associated nationalist conflicts through accommodative public policy. Duchacek (1991: 26) notes that “major cities and metropolitan areas offer a most useful (also because easily accessible) base for a comparative and in-depth study of federal practices and structures as well as an emergence of what we have tentatively labeled ‘federal political culture’”. Federal political culture is noted by Daniel Elazar as “thinking federal”, which

must be anchored in society, and “a strong will to use federal principles and arrangements” (1987: 192). To this end, this chapter consists of six points of discussions on theoretical and comparative analytical lenses. It, in the first place, defines urban policy in the context of diversity. Second, it briefly presents urban policy analysis models. It then conceptualizes the notion of urban local institutional autonomy. Fourthly, urban theoretical policies on diversity –of liberal as well as communitarian– are explored with greater emphasis given to accommodationist policies including federalism, consociationalism and multiculturalism. Fifth section presents international principles of accommodation of diversity, and urban language policy and its effects on participation, education, conflict and solidarity. The final part of the chapter draws on international urban case studies for comparative purposes. The Swiss model of accommodating diversity at the federal and subnational levels (bilingual cantons of Bern, Valais and Fribourg and trilingual Graubünden) has been discussed. Besides, the experiences of bilingual cities of Brussels and Ottawa, and multilingual cities of Delhi and Cape Town are drawn.

3.2 Conceptualising Urban Policy in the Context of Diversity

Public policy affects each citizen in hundreds of ways, some of them familiar and some unsuspected (Cochran et al, 2009). Urban policy no doubt can influence not only the economic success of a city through spatial planning but it can also affect who should get what and how much of that urban development in a diversity context. Put differently, whether the policy design upholds accommodation of diversity or favors one or few linguistic groups has its own socio-political meaning. Urban policy therefore should guarantee inter-ethnic equitable access to politics, job opportunities, education, media, cultural facilities, and other social services provided by the city. This section briefly defines what public policy in general is in the context of diversity.

The term policy is said to have originated from Greek term, *polis* (city-state) and *pur* (city), which later evolved into Latin *politia* (state) and then *policy* which referred to “the conduct of public affairs or the administration of government” (Dunn, 1994: 33). This hints the interconnection between such disciplines as political science, public administration and the policy sciences, each of which is heavily committed to the study of politics and policy (ibid.). There are many definitions of the term public policy. According to Cochran, et al (2009) public policy is “an intentional course of action followed by a government institution or official for resolving an issue of public concern” (p. 2). Public policy thus is a choice or an action of the government meant to

accomplish public issues. Saasa (1985) discusses that public policy involves public problem identification, selection of goals, and identification of the means for achieving such goals. Therefore, public policy is a political process which involves problem identification, policy formulation, policy endorsement, policy implementation, and policy evaluation (Gerston, 1997; Saasa, 1985). This study adopts Larry Gerston's definition of public policy as its operational definition:

Public policy is ... the combination of basic decisions, commitments, and actions made by those who hold or affect government positions of authority. In most instances, these arrangements result from interactions among those who demand change, those who make decisions, and those who are affected by the policy in question. The determinations made by those in positions of legitimate authority – most commonly, one or more public offices in government – are subject to possible redirection in response to pressures from those outside government as well as from others within government (1997:7).

The politics of public policy in this definition lies in the general questions of the 'who decides what', and 'who gets how much' [policy beneficiaries] of and affected by [victims of] the decisions. Public policy manifests itself in laws, public statements, official regulations, or widely accepted and publicly visible patterns of behavior as well as institutional practices (Cochran, et al, 2009). The terms public policy and policy will be used interchangeably. Policy effects are even more complex in multicultural settings because the "who gets what and how much" questions become so important for cultural groups. Thus, for contested cities, this would imply that public policy is an extremely political due to continuous manifestations of conflict, bargaining and negotiation between groups, and/or between the state and groups (Bollens, 2009).

Policies are designed to accomplish definite results which involve what governments actually do, not just what they intend to do or what they say they are doing (Anderson, 1997). For instance, cultural policy is taken to be mainly what a public institution manifests in terms of cultural affairs (Isar et al, 2012). Similarly, the concept of language policy is mainly related to decisions, rules, regulations and guidelines about the status, use, domains and territories of language and the rights of speakers under question (Schiffman, 2005; McNab, 1989; see section 3.6.2). Regarding ethnicity, it is suggested that "the State should adopt well defined policies to democratize ethnicity by creating equality among ethnic communities and providing them equitable share on ownership and access to the State and its institutions" (Devaraj, 2006: 4). According to Scott Bollens (2007), urban planning and policy can play key formative roles during political and societal transitions

through their abilities to articulate alternative urban futures. With this background on policy, let's briefly outline urban policy analysis models.

3.3 Urban Policy Analysis Models

The main aim of using these models is to simplify and clarify my own thinking of the factors that affect urban policy in the context of diversity. The first model takes policy as an outcome of formal rules and established norms, i.e., old institutionalism, in which government agencies are central focuses since public policy is determined and implemented by these agencies (Anderson, 1997). Federalism and federal institutions could be seen as independent factor to shape the "overarching societal values, norms, and practices that tend to make public policy path dependent" (Pierre, 1999: 391). Likewise, the new institutionalism, which was widely seen as the revival of the old institutionalism in a more explanatory theory, perceives both formal and informal institutions as clusters of factors explaining changes in policy outcomes, state-society exchange processes, and government capabilities (Peters, 1996a). It follows that institutions are "not simply the outgrowth or products of the environment and they are not just dependent variables in the political system. They can be seen as independent forces, which have some effects of their own: once established they themselves come to shape and influence the environment" (Simeon quoted in Erk, 2008: 5).

This suggests that the implementation of federal structure and principles by a polity would influence urban governance and policy issues. According to DiGaetano and Strom, "institutional milieus are the complexes of formal and informal political and governmental arrangements that mediate interactions among the structural contexts, political culture, and political actors" (2003: 263). Formal institutional arrangements include the governmental bodies and partnerships "that give visible form to urban governance through rules and organization. Modes of governance are the informal arrangements that define the governing relationships among and within formal institutions implicated in urban politics" (ibid.). The role of the informal rules and arrangements too are so powerful that they cannot be overlooked.

Furthermore, structuralists believe that urban policies are shaped by "historically rooted and materially based processes of distribution, conflict, power, and domination, thought to drive social order and social change" (Lichbach, 1997: 248). Crawford Young argues that in the design of policy to conciliate cultural diversity, "the course of history creates a powerful path dependency; the range of outcomes and menu of choices is shaped by the parameters set by the past" (1998: 5).

The study of “institutions as continuities” is known as historical institutionalism, one of the streams of neo-institutionalism (Miller, 2011: 26).

State ideological orientations such as federalism affect policy making and policy substances. In a federal system, “basic policies are made and implemented through negotiation in some form so that all can share in the system’s decision-making and executing processes” (Elazar, 1987: 6). Robert Hoppe notes that “culture matters in public policy” and more than ever, “governance implies the active creation of shared, or, at least, congruent political and policy frameworks” which pays attention to cultural pluralism and diversity (2007: 289). It means that in ethnically divided society, there must be carefully designed inclusive public policy.

The major critique against new institutionalism, Jan Erk observes, is that it “has problems with explaining not only the direction of change, but also change itself” (2008: 6). As a result, it is argued that instead of taking institutions as independent forces to investigate their impacts, it is also helpful to approach institutions as dependent variables. This brings the idea of institution-society congruence theory to the fore which establishes that the institutions of federalism would gradually evolve “in order to be congruent with the social structure and come to reflect the underlying ethno-linguistic divisions” (Erk, 2008: 8). Such institutional responses to social diversity are often evident in public service institutions, closely linked to language policy areas, like education and media (ibid.). Jan Erk (2008: 9) describes this perspective as follow:

In the absence of formal recognition, the federal society reveals itself through the workings of the system as the ethno-linguistic community becomes the primary collectivity; in other words the *demos*, which demarcates the frame of reference employed by political actors. Tactical decisions concerning public policy are of course constrained and influenced by the institutional set-up, but the broad choices made by political actors emanate from the social structure. This does not mean that the political choices are preset for the linguistic communities, since many political issues deeply divide these communities.

The theoretical implication here is that the governing institutions of urban ethno-national diversity, particularly in the field of urban policy, are influenced by its societal composition. On similar logic, “the size, complexity, tension, and social as well as ethnic (and even ethnoterritorial) heterogeneity of many a metropolis have made quasi-federal –‘federomunicipal’–practices and institutions both inevitable and desirable despite the initially unitary and centralizing intentions of both the city and superordinate governments” (Duchacek, 1991: 26). Ronald Watts envisages a rather unstatic bidirectional influence between forces in a society and federal political institutions:

The pressures within a society may force a particular expression in its political institutions, processes and behaviour; but these institutions and processes, once established, in turn shape the society by determining the channels in which these social pressures and political activities flow. [...]. It is in the interplay of the social foundations, the written constitutions and the actual practices and activities of governments that an understanding of the nature and effectiveness of federal political systems is to be found (2008: 21).

This study, on one hand, takes the Ethiopian multietnic federal experiment as an independent variable to find its urban policy impacts, and on the other, tests the assumption that urban policy institutions as dependent variable might have evolved to reflect urban ethno-national diversity.

The second model, *bounded rationalism*, regards policy as a means of gaining relatively maximum social satisfaction by minimizing costs (Anderson, 1997). A policy based on rational choice is one that achieves maximum societal gain efficiently; that is, governments should choose policies that produce 'satisfying' gains to members of society (Ham and Hill, 1993). Efficiency in rational policymaking requires information about alternative policies, the predictive capacity to foresee accurately the consequences of alternate policies, and the intelligence to calculate correctly the ratio of costs to benefits (Anderson, 1997). There have been considerable criticisms against the rational choice model. Public policy scholars identify the limits to the ability (skill and experience) of policymakers to be all-inclusive in establishing all information, alternatives and calculating costs and benefits (Ham and Hill, 1993; Anderson, 1997).

Urban policy may be consciously designed to the benefit of certain sections of the society (Miller, 2011). Thus, urban policies affect urban ethno-linguistic conditions in a variety of arenas: language policy, education policy, identity issues, planning and housing policy, the structure and boundary of local government, immigration policy, economic and transportation issue (Hepburn, 2004). In this politics of policy choice, Hepburn observes that "one of the strategies pursued by dominant groups has been to exclude rival communities from sought-after areas of work. Non-dominant groups in both contested and multicultural cities have also been constrained in their access to the housing market" (2004: 7). He identifies three policy scenarios in divided cities. First, a dominant group may seek to assimilate a non-dominant group, or marginalize and ghettoize it, or even expel it from the city. Second, a non-dominant group may seek assimilation, or may seek to reverse the balance of power. Thirdly, "either or both groups may seek a pluralist settlement of their competition" (ibid: 227). The final scenario appears a federalist aspiration.

The third policy analysis model is known as incrementalism which views public policy as a continuation of past government activities with only incremental modifications (Lindblom, 1959).

Policymakers often accept the legitimacy of previous policies because of the limited resources and uncertainty about the consequences of introducing entirely different policies (ibid.). The major criticism to incremental model suggests that the most dominant interests in the society will continue to influence policy choices, and thus, 'the demands of the unprivileged and politically unorganized would be underrepresented' (Etzioni, 1967: 387). Incrementalism thus is conservative (disregards basic societal progress) in that existing policies are considered as a base, and that the new policies only slightly modify them (ibid.). If policies are path dependent, then, that would be what incrementalism shares in common with historical institutionalism.

In such policy continuity, the sway of some groups might be more significant than others in "defining or denying problems" (Dorey, 2005: 12). It means, certain sections of society may be so influential that they can effectively ensure that certain 'problems' are not defined as such by policy makers, because that might result in policies being adopted which presumably challenge their interests (ibid.). As a way of demonstrating the regular controversies related to the locus of power in society, Bachrach and Baratz (1962: 948) made the following formulation:

Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.

Unless a new policy is set in motion on the basis of a compromised interest between social forces of A and B, the consequence is obvious that A would continue to dominate B in the public decision making realms. In such situation, "cities as leading loci of cultural policy and governance" requires an investigation due to "a new city nationalism" rooted in inter-group competition (Isar et al, 2012: 2).

The fourth model of analysis is elite theory which views public policy as the preferences and values of governing elites, not of the demands and interests of the people. According to Gaetano Mosca (1939: 50), the society is divided into two classes: "the first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent". Elite theory suggests that the people are apathetic and ill-informed about public policy, that elites actually shape

mass opinion on policy questions more than masses shape elite opinion (Anderson, 1997). Therefore, the primary policy elites particularly in developing states are those individuals or agents who exercise real political power, and thus public policy is their prevailing values and interests. This theory is mainly criticized for it reduces citizens into apolitical clay that can be molded as required (ibid.).

Therefore, a combination of models with their shortcomings may be helpful for the urban policy analysis of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Hence, the role of historical institutionalism (with aspect of incrementalism) and the new institutions of federal structural dispensation, and elite or party maneuver in both multiethnic cities shall be assessed. Moreover, the nature of urban policies on diversity may vary depending on whether city government has autonomy to engage in particular urban actions or whether the city is actually executing policy dictates whose goals and directions are established at higher levels of government (Bollens, 2009).

3.4 Urban Local Institutional Autonomy

Local government is often regarded as “a political sub-division,” which is organized within a national or subnational entity for the exercise of duties and responsibilities granted to it by the constitutions or other legislative enactments (Okotie, 2010: 2). It is further argued that local government unit possesses a defined territory, a population, an institutional structure, also the authority to decide, and the power to administer a range of public policies (de Visser, 2005). Local autonomy, refers to ‘authority to decide’ by Jaap de Visser (ibid.), broadly speaking, is “the rights to be different and to be left alone; to preserve, protect and promote values which are beyond the legitimate reach of the rest of the society” (Côté, 2012: 172). To this end, territorial autonomy needs to include some critical elements, namely: “(1) a locally elected legislative body with some independent legislative authority; (2) a locally selected chief executive with responsibility for the administration and enforcement of state as well as local laws; (3) an independent local judiciary with full responsibility for interpreting local laws; and (4) areas of joint concern subject to power-sharing arrangements between the autonomous and central government” (ibid: 172). Similarly, Zemelak Ayele discusses local political autonomy as the central institutional feature of decentralized development explained by four elements: “certainty of local government’s existence; local democracy; devolution of original, pertinent and suitable functions to local government; and political powers” (2014: 148). Urban local autonomy thus is the capability –existential, democratic,

functional– of a city to govern its own affairs [self-rule]. According to Samuel Huntington (2006), autonomy is one of the bases of institutionalization; and its opposite is subordination.

* The recognition of local government units in federal constitutions vary considerably. In the old federations of the US, Canada and Australia, local governments were granted no entrenched powers; they fall under the competence of state or provincial governments. As there was no mention of local government in the US Constitution, this level of government fell within the residual powers of the states. The Canadian Constitution merely mentions local government as a competence of the provinces. In the Australian Constitution there is also no reference to local government and it thus fell under the jurisdiction of the states (Steytler, 2001).

More recent federal constitutions tend to give greater autonomy to local government units. The German Constitution of 1949 granted municipalities with “the right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws.” The 73rd [the *Panchayats*] and 74th [the Municipalities] Indian Constitutional Amendments of 1992 introduced local self-governance in rural and urban India. The South African Constitution (1996) provides that “a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution”. Likewise, the Swiss Constitution (1999) recognizes local autonomy: “the autonomy of the *communes* is guaranteed in accordance with cantonal law. ... In doing so, it [the Confederation] shall take account of the special position of the cities and urban areas as well as the mountain regions” (Art. 50). In the majority of federations urban local government still falls under the jurisdiction of the states or provinces (Steytler, 2001).

Studies have tried to establish typologies of urban local institutions depending on the degree of local autonomy. The main typology as discussed by Breux and Jacquet (2015) aims to capture the nature of the relations that the local government maintains with the other levels of government based on which, three groups of countries are identified. In the first, the local government represents distinct territorial communities and the mayor represents their interests with respect to other levels of government. Robert B. Hawkins (1991) studied power-sharing in one municipal government in the US, where he observed that “citizens play a critical role as constitution-makers for local political institution” (p. 72), for which he suggested that “we must begin to think of local governments as something more than service providers” (p. 81). The second group includes countries where the local government has a low degree of autonomy while

nevertheless playing a key role in the provision of public services representing upper levels of government. The mayor thus is relatively powerless as a political leader, while the “executive officers” are often strong. The third group of local institutions differs from those of the two other groups in that they have a strong constitutional status with a focus on the provision of public services (Breux and Jacquet, 2015).

The other typology was offered by Wollmann (2008). It demonstrates the separation of local institutions of legislative and administration on the basis of three principal criteria: (1) ‘monistic’ versus ‘dualistic’ types of local government; (2) collegial body versus individual executive; and (3) indirect election/ appointment versus direct election of the executive. The modern municipalities are ‘dualistic’ with an elected mayor and city council [mayor-council model], in which the mayor and its cabinets form city government, or a manager system, in which the council hires a professional municipal manager as the executive (Pagano, 2009).

As to the federal capital autonomy, Nico Steytler identifies three models of capital governances in federations: “(1) local government governs the city but under the control of the federal government; (2) the capital has the status of a state, and local government is subsumed in that structure; and (3) the capital has no special status and is governed by local governments as any other city” (2009: 405). Washington and Abuja are cited as the examples of the federal district or capital territory model. Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, and Madrid possess autonomous city-state statuses. The third model includes Berne in Switzerland, and the two seats of South African Federal Government: Cape Town (seat of Parliament), and Pretoria (Executive) (Steytler, 2009). Delhi is treated as a special case as it is federal capital territory with state status (*ibid.*). There is an elected local authority, two bodies nominated by the Union ministries, and a state government for New Delhi, the capital territory. The Union Government has direct control over the planning and development of land and the maintenance of law and order (*ibid.*). The term ‘governance’ is used in this study as Francis Fukuyama defined it: “government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” (2013: 350). The federal governance and local autonomy of Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa as well as Dire Dawa shall be examined in chapter six.

3.5 Urban Policies on Ethno-national Diversity

Modern cities are entangled in complex contingencies particularly in relationship to regional states, federal government and transnational entities such as the EU. In such complex state organizations, urban policy is a means of urban governance. Crawford Young suggests that “policy options vary as a function of the type of cultural pluralism encountered, and its varying configurations” (1998: 7).

Meron Benvenisti (1986) identifies four urban policy strategies that policymakers are using when addressing issues of ethnic salience in multiethnic cities. A so-called neutral urban strategy employs technical criteria in allocating urban resources and services, and distances itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion. According to this strategy, everyone is promised to be treated as individuals though there are different cultures and political differences which the policy claims not to get involved. It calls itself ‘difference-blind’ urban policy and claims to depoliticize differences. This will be discussed in detail shortly. Second, a partisan urban strategy, in contrast, chooses sides and is a regressive agent of change (ibid.). This one usually done in a way that advantages the group in power, disadvantages the subordinate group. Third, the equity strategy gives primacy to ethnic affiliation in order to decrease, not perpetuate, inter-group inequalities. It treats group differences in a balanced equation. The final model –a resolver strategy– seeks to resolve the root causes of urban conflict and polarization: “In order to attenuate group conflict and advance the prospects for mutual co-existence, a city must be able to affect not only the material conditions, but also the psychological and identity-related conditions, of its different ethnic groups” (Bollens, 2009: 7). This last one is therefore an urban peace-building and multiculturalism policy strategy.

Some limitations of urban policy strategies in ethnically contested cities could be highlighted. Partisan urban planning, Scott Bollens (2000) argues, exacerbates conflict, and even more importantly, constructs through its outcomes an argument for its continued implementation. In contrast, he maintains, neutral policy suspends antagonism in the short term, but buys such abstinence from violence at the expense of reconciling competing visions of nationalists. Equity planning may be problematic and unlikely until the root causes of urban problems are solved (Bollens, 2008). Redistributive policies that would favor members of the materially disadvantaged ethnic groups like Jerusalem Arabs or Belfast Catholics, Scott Bollens doubts, would likely be counterproductive if they occurred outside of broader negotiations over sovereignty and political control. Therefore, “for urban policy strategies to alleviate ethnic conflict, they must seek

coexistent viability of antagonistic groups in the urban setting while at the same time connecting these policies to larger peace and reconstruction efforts" (Bollens, 2008: 333).

From the alternative urban policy strategies identified, let us see in detail the neutral/liberal, the equity and the resolver policies. The equity and resolver policies are subsumed within the communitarian urban policy broader category.

3.5.1 Liberal Urban Policy

This approach often pretends to be ethnically neutral urban policy. It argues that liberal justice requires state institutions to pursue 'difference-blind' rules, set of common civil and political rights of individual citizenship. Right or benefit on the basis of membership in ascriptive groups was seen as morally arbitrary and inherently discriminatory, necessarily creating first- and second-class citizens (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000).

According to Will Kymlicka (1995), the general tendency of the post-World War II movements for the promotion of human rights has been to subsume the problem of national minorities under the broader problem of ensuring basic individual rights to all human beings, without reference to membership in ethnic groups. The doctrine of human rights has been put forward as a substitute for the concept of group rights, with the strong repercussion that minorities whose members enjoy individual equality of treatment cannot legitimately demand facilities for the maintenance of their ethnic particularism (Claude, 1955). Liberal individualism therefore assumed that entrenching individual rights to equality would indirectly protect the rights of members of ethno-national groups.

Many post-war liberals have thought that religious tolerance based on the separation of church and state provides a model for dealing with ethnocultural differences as well. On this view, ethnic identity, like religion, is something which people should be free to express in their private life, but which is not the concern of the state [...]. This separation of state and ethnicity precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups, or any use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties (Kymlicka, 1995: 3-4).

In particular, most post-war liberals repeatedly rejected the claim that group-specific rights are needed to accommodate enduring cultural or ethnic differences. However, the traditional individualistic human rights standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural or ethno-national groups. For instance, the liberal right to free speech does not tell us what an appropriate language policy is; the right to vote does not tell us how political boundaries should be drawn, or how powers should be distributed

between levels of government; the right to mobility does not tell us what an appropriate immigration and naturalization policy is (ibid.). These questions have been left to the usual process of majoritarian decision-making within each state and exacerbate ethno-cultural injustice and conflicts. This invites some of the criticisms labeled against the urban liberal policy.

The major critics view that the 'difference-blind' institutions and policies purported to be neutral amongst diverse groups are in fact implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, and identities of the dominant group. Liberalism presupposes homogeneous nation-state form and thus assimilates diversity through melting pot, Will Kymlicka (2002) says. Charles Taylor in his *Politics of Recognition* contends that "the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture;" and thus, it "is not only inhuman (because suppressing identities) but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory" (1994: 43). Moreover, communitarians have a number of different arguments against the liberal account of individualism, Will Kymlicka (2002) argues, because the liberal view of the self is empty; violates self-perceptions; and ignores embedded-ness in communal practices. When a government opts to use, for instance, a language as its working language, it is recognizing the linguistic identity of the group that speaks the language; and thus that language policy choice is not 'difference-blind' *per se*.

If "state institutions fail to recognize and respect people's culture and identity, the result can be serious damage to people's self-respect" even if their civil, political, and welfare rights are respected (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000: 5). Therefore, urban governments cannot be neutral to ethno-linguistic differences through the so-called "difference-blind" liberal policy.

3.5.2 Communitarian Urban Policy

As opposed to the so-called 'difference-blind' policy, the communitarian urban policy strategy recognizes the distinctive group identities and accommodates collective needs. In democratic multicultural contexts, Crawford Young (1998) argues, "policy outcomes will be the product of political bargaining within civil society and its communal segments, and not simply the calculus of the state managers" (p. 8). This study does not pretend to present the entire school of communitarian thought; it instead casts brief lights on the kind of communitarianism which has recently come to prominence with the writings of Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, Daniel Elazar, Arend Lijphart, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Alasdair MacIntyre, D. A. Masolo and others.

To begin with, communitarianism deals with the ideal of community, which takes many different forms, “from class solidarity or shared citizenship to a common ethnic descent or cultural identity” (Kymlicka, 2002: 208). Methodologically, communitarianism, according to D.A. Masolo (2004), is the antithesis of individualism. It basically regards “group identity as part of how we express our humanity” that needs to be respected and protected (ibid: 496). Communitarians believe that the value of community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice (Kymlicka, 2002). Particularly, Africa’s indigenous socio-political system in general tends toward communitarianism (Masolo, 2004). “Like everywhere else in human societies”, Masolo argues, “African communitarianism is a principle for guiding the practice of everyday life in ways that aim at creating a humane world in which, ...individuals will have the chance of realizing their interests, conceived as being intrinsically bound up with the interests of others in society” (p. 494). Due to this fact, many African leaders such as Nyerere in Tanzania, Senghor in Senegal, Nkrumah in Ghana and others, since their very days of independence in 1960s, have tried to lift African communitarian life into a rationalized and organizing ideology for modern political institutions.

Many critics worry that the promotion of communal rights involve a ‘politicization of ethnicity’ and that any measure that highlights the salience of ethnic identity in public life is seen divisive. This skepticism, Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 11) argue, “has served as a cover by which the majority nation extends its language, institutions, mobility rights, and political power at the expense of the minority all in the name of turning supposedly ‘disloyal’ or ‘troublesome’ minorities into ‘good citizens’.” Thus, as Thomas Fleiner argues, minorities “require political recognition as cultural human beings” (2006: 62). This suggests that cultural diversity needs to be taken seriously through inclusive policy reforms.

The major opprobrium against communitarian ethic has been that it is “non-cognizant of the value and agency of the individual as the creator of knowledge” (Masolo, 2004: 496). It has been contended that promotion of group rights such as ethnicity can lead to the oppression of other peoples if abused just as the liberties of the individual under liberalism have sometimes been (ibid.). There are arguments that defend communitarianism as upholding rather than opposing the rights of individuals for the fact that humans need community for their growth (Wiredu cited in Masolo, 2004). Devaraj (2006) argues that “cultural autonomy is not incompatible with liberal democracy since it is conceived as an ‘extended power’ of community organizations to govern their internal affairs” (p. 2). Thomas Fleiner (2006) adds that in multicultural states people want to have

the same opportunities within their community (individual rights) and then achieve equal opportunities of their community with regard to other cultural communities (community rights). As to the specific African communitarianism, the competitions between collective and individual rights discourses have been harmonized in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986). The Charter uses the terms "human" and "peoples" to address both individualism and communitarianism, respectively.

In spite of its shortcomings, the communitarian urban policies on diversity shall be given special attention in the following parts. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1994) developed eight taxonomies of political strategies of regulating ethno-national diversity and conflicts. The first four strategies (genocide, mass population transfers, partition/secession and assimilation) generally aim to *eliminate* diversity to yield homogeneity, whereas the other four strategies (hegemonic control, arbitration, federalism and consociationalism) are meant to *manage* diversity (ibid.).

Urban settings can be key terrains where policies of eliminating differences can be applied. Examples are urban *ethnic cleansing of entire cities* or urban scale of *forced population transfers* or *political partitioning of urban space* such as Nicosia, Cold War Berlin and Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967 or urban level *assimilation* (Bollens & Seminar, 2008). This study briefly discusses those policy models of managing diversity which uphold collectivity by "letting them choose for themselves what sort of life they want to lead" (Kymlicka, 2002: 212). These include federalism, consociationalism and multiculturalism policies, all of which can roughly fall within the collective power sharing arrangements (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Elazar, 1987).

The idea of sharing power through federalism, consociation or multicultural integration develops a system of accommodation that will reduce insecurities and the likelihood of conflict (Sisk, 1996; Elazar, 1987; Lijphart, 1977). In the post-colonial African perspective, it was argued that "weak states, badly organized armed groups and third parties interested in quick-fix solutions make working power-sharing arrangements a rare outcome" (Mehler, 2009: 8). A major reason for accommodating communal diversities, Daniel Elazar says, lies in the reassertion of ethno-national and regional identities, now worldwide in scope, which remains the major political issue (1987). Such cities have the right to demand greater autonomy vis-a-vis the federal and state governments (Elazar, 1975). Urban communitarian policy study thus cannot adequately be explained without situating it within the wider state or federal policies on diversity.

3.5.2.1 Urban Policy of Federalism

Some form of federalism can be suggested as an alternative way of managing diversity in urban areas. A federal arrangement essentially is one of partnership, established and regulated by a covenant, “whose internal relationships reflect the special kind of sharing that must prevail among the partners; based on a mutual recognition of the integrity of each partner and the attempt to foster a special unity among them”(Elazar, 1987: 5). Federal principles thus are mainly concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared-rule (ibid.).

Broadly, federalism is one instrument of managing divided society (Lijphart, 1979). As a devolution of political capacity to territorial regions, Donald Horowitz (1991) maintains, federalism can give ethno-national groups that are even a minority at the shared-rule level some degree of power over their own affairs at the subnational level which can thwart excessive concentration of power in the hand of central government. Federalism could be approached from multiple dimensions. This urban study briefs on politico-legal/institutional, sociological, and governance and policy strategy approaches to federalism.

Federalism as a politico-legal principle, for instance, has to do with the constitutional diffusion of power so that the constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the processes of common policy making and administration by right, while the activities of the common government are concluded in such a way as to maintain their respective integrities (Elazar, 1987). Jan Erk (2008) also approaches federalism as a constitutional/institutional configuration of a political system. As a result, a federation is “a polity compounded of strong constituent entities and strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people and empowered to deal directly with the citizenry in the exercise of those powers” (ibid: 7).

Second, the sociological approach to federalism highlights that it is a ‘federal society’ nature of an area which in fact invites a formal federalism. William Livingston believed that a federal society, i.e. a territorial community was the *raison d’être* of federalism: “The essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the society itself” (1952: 4). Social structure of the society is very important here.

Thirdly, federalism as a governance and policy emerged as a means of accommodating the spreading desire of diverse communities to preserve (or revive) cultural distinctiveness of smaller communities with the growing necessity for larger combinations (Kymlicka, 2002; Elazar, 1987). As a governance strategy “ethnic federalism arguably provides a sound strategy for promoting national

unity and political legitimacy” (ibid: 6). Hence, federalization policies have the advantage of promoting political union by preserving legitimate internal diversities (ibid.). Federalization in urban areas may be applied through, first, creating self-governing units or communities that would decide on their own local matters; and second, through creating a shared metropolitan sovereign government (Bollens & Seminar, 2008).

There could be several critiques against federalism as a strategic means of governance and public policy. The frequent skepticism is that federalism may promote inter-group rivalry which could hurt the societal unity. As a cautionary note, Daniel Elazar contended that “the record of attempting federal solutions has been mixed at best” (1987: 12). Scholars in the field question many polities that are federal by design but are not federal in practice (Watts, 2008; Erk, 2008; Elazar, 1987). Most attempts to establish federal systems, according to Daniel Elazar (1987), were not successful because of either lack of sufficient will to federate [i.e., lack of ‘thinking federal’ or lack of a sufficiently federal political culture] or perhaps for other reasons. Polities formally federal, without federal practices, might be explained by inadequate ‘will to federate’ among the ruling elites and peoples. As a result, Jan Erk (2008) advises that a deeper understanding of the workings of a federal system can be attained by looking at the field of public policy.

It is noted that in some of the polities in which federalism is the organizing principle, even their bureaucracies were hierarchically structured: “Administrative hierarchies in authoritarian systems are older precisely because they are designed for just the opposite purposes—to support the continuing effort on the part of authoritarian leaders to impose hierarchical control throughout the systems they govern” (Elazar, 1987: 211). More precisely, “Third World federations, which emerged only in the twentieth century, adopted hierarchical forms as a result of their exposure to modern ideas and to serve what were usually autocratic systems in any case” (ibid: 212).

Finally, there is argument against the use of federalism as an instrument of urban diversity governance strategy. The major critique is the difficulty of making urban ethno-national and administrative boundaries overlap. The creation of ethno-national local governments becomes problematic where urban ethnic geographies are intertwined (Bollens & Seminar, 2008). The problem of demarcating urban government units on ethnicity can be alleviated by having an umbrella government for the whole urban area and adopting non-territorial model of diversity accommodation at the sub-city levels.

3.5.2.2 Urban Policy of Consociationalism

Institutional accommodation of ethnic diversity should foster sharing of power amongst major communal segments, provide incentives for intergroup cooperation and assure voice through reasonable representation (Young, 1998). Sharing power usually takes consociation form, which is an alternative tool of urban governance of diversity. Consociationalism is sometimes seen as a dimension of federalism (Elazar, 1987; Lijphart, 1979). Consociational politics are non-territorial federations in which politics divided into religious, cultural, or ethno-national groupings are constituted as federations of “pillars” and jointly governed by coalitions of the leaders of each (Elazar, 1987). Daniel Elazar makes a distinction between consociationalism and federalism, in that, in contrast to the latter, the former represents “far more informal, at most acquiring concrete expression through legislative acts directed at specific issues such as language rights” but “without being anchored in a comprehensive constitutional framework” (1987: 20). There is a general debate on whether power sharing should be formally anchored in the constitution or informally left to political and policy practices. It is difficult to arrive at consensus in this regard. Elazar concludes that federalism is a matter of the form of a polity whereas consociationalism refers to the character of a polity’s regime and then, federalism is primarily territorial and consociationalism primarily non-territorial (Elazar, 1987: 22). The character of a polity’s regime surely means institutions of politics and policy.

Consociationalism, the concept closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart (1977), has four structural features – a grand coalition government, segmental autonomy, proportionality rule, and concurrent veto. The ‘grand coalition’ or ‘executive power sharing’ simply means that leaders of all significant community of society share power and govern together: “Power sharing implies the equitable representation and engagement of all major ethnic national and religious groups in parliament, provincial councils, local authorities, government, and public administration” (Devaraj, 2006: 1). Consociational regimes are based on the agreement of elites, each of which must be capable of maintaining control over its own segment in the grand coalition (Elazar, 1987). In the grand coalition government, important questions are solved with near-unanimity (Lijphart, 1977). That is why parties to a civil war will be especially concerned with executive power (Mehler, 2009). Because of the high levels of distrust and suspicion between the segments, especially after civil war, it is better to be in government together with the counterpart (Lijphart, 2004; Lijphart, 1977). Horowitz (1991) advocates a presidential government over Lijphart’s parliamentary

preferences on the ground that the former provides an opportunity for vote pooling across ethnic divides. Overall, consociational arrangements reject hegemonic claims of one single group and avoid the fallacy of a monocultural 'nation-state' (Linder, 2010).

Moreover, the most common use of the proportionality principle is as an instrument to distribute seats in the legislature and executive. Proportional representation in election means every party gets seats in proportion to its aggregate votes (Wolff, 2005). It contrasts sharply to the winner-take-all character of the Westminster majority rule (*ibid.*). Proportionality is also a means to allocate civil service jobs, judicial appointments, budget/financial resources, and assure an adequate representation within the army and state-owned companies (Lijphart, 2004; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003). In sharing power, genuine statistics on social diversity is imperative. On contrary, statistical blindness to social diversity, Escafre-Dublet and Patrick Simon argue, "is a legacy of the strategy to dismiss race and ethnicity from all legal texts and collective representations" (2012: 213). Therefore, statistical data on ethno-linguistic or religious or other minorities are important not only to monitor discriminations but also to use them for proportionality rule in power sharing.

Thirdly, segmental or non-territorial autonomy refers to devolving as many decision-making powers as possible to the different segments of a plural society (Choudhry, 2009; Lijphart, 1979). Issues of the communities' exclusive concern, among others, questions about religion, language, culture and education need segmental autonomy based on either a personal self-identification or a territorial principle, depending on the demographic concentration of the people. Where the regional cleavages correspond to the segmental cleavages, this might take the form of federalism. The "personality principle" of non-territorial autonomy, which Carl J. Friedrich (1973) refers to as *corporate* federalism, is an aspect of consociational element in federal theory. The idea of non-territorial arrangement for multiethnic urban regions was proposed due to the rising demands for greater self-administration without direct link to a particular territory (Linder, 2010). The most prominent example is Belgium's capital Brussels, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Mutual veto principle accords each segment a share of power at the central political level to outvote any majority when its vital interests are at stake (Lijphart, 1979). The very purpose of the mutual veto, also known as minority veto or concurrent majority or negative minority rule, is to provide such a guarantee to negotiate (*ibid.*). At the urban level, a local diversity accommodative government can be established to materialize consociationalism: city's grand coalition government, ethno-linguistic proportionality in the public sector, community/non-territorial autonomy, and

minority vetoes (Bollens & Seminar, 2008).

Despite all its merits, there are critiques against consociational arrangements. The major ones were made by Horowitz (1999) who sees grand coalition as “motivationally inadequate”, and he says, consociation is more likely where there is no clear majority. The other argument against a consociation is that ethnic entrepreneurs often mobilize communities for economic and/or political rewards (Levitt, 2007). Moreover, grand coalition tends to treat ethnic communities as internally homogenous. Consensus based decision-making quality of consociationalism may result in political deadlocks of polarizing, freezing and institutionalizing politics of ethnic identities (Linder, 2010; O’Leary, 2005a). For Horowitz, individuals casting votes for parties of their own ethnic group in the grand coalition “is not an election at all, but a census” (cited in Choudhry, 2009: 17). Moreover, the quota system has been criticized for its democratic deficit as it heavily depends on inter-ethnic predictable elite power sharing at the expense of unpredictable democracy and professionalism (Roeder and Rothschild, 2005). The counter-argument in favor of quota by Jürgen Steiner—though may not directly relevant for urban politics—is worth quoting:

French-speakers, for example, should have the right to be represented among the top army officers. When a French-speaking three-star general retires, the search for his replacement is practically limited to French-speakers. But what about a German-speaker who may be more qualified than the top French-speaking candidate? The former is indeed discriminated against on the basis of his language affiliation. This is the price that the Swiss are willing to pay for their system of power-sharing. This price, however, should not be exaggerated. In the foregoing example, the highly qualified German-speaker simply has to wait until a three-star general of his own language retires (quoted in Linder, 2010: 36).

This price is paid by Swiss professionals for the common ends of peace and political stability.

There are also regimes that claim to be consociational and are acknowledged as such but that cannot be called democratic such as Lebanon (Elazar, 1987). There are also concerns that consociation can be used by hegemonic groups as a veil to hide the real power process when giving minorities the opportunity to participate but no substantial influence (Linder, 2010). Nonetheless, Elazar maintains that the overwhelming majority of consociational regimes are democratic in character and peace-building in effect (1987).

As an alternative policy model to consociationalism, Donald Horowitz (1999) proposes what he refers to as integrative power sharing (alias *incentivist* model). Incentivist policy design emphasizes that intergroup political accommodation could be achieved by electoral systems that provide incentives for parties to form cross-cutting coalitions before elections which would result in

post-election integrative power sharing. "By acknowledging the plasticity of group identities" of metropolitans which Lijphart might not accept, says Horowitz, "the incentivist approach can prevent the crystallization of identities and the emergence of more severe conflict" (ibid: 15).

In general, as Will Kymlicka (2006) notes, the presence of a functional democracy, a good tradition of rule of law, 'de-securitisation' of ethnolinguistic relations, cross-ethnic consensus on human rights (individual and collective rights) are central to the success of any form of power sharing policy design. Wolf Linder (2010) also endorses the importance of democratic power-sharing in multicultural settings where everybody gains something as opposed to the majoritarian zero-sum game. He proposes that "federalism or decentralization, if combined with other elements of power-sharing, may be more effective for multicultural co-existence" (2010: 199). Contrary to this proposal, there is a practice of imposed power sharing or authoritarian consociation.

By comparing the application of power-sharing in democratic and non-democratic settings of Northern Ireland and Lebanon, Michael Kerr (2005) concludes that consociationalism is nothing but imposed power sharing. His finding is that the external actors with vested interests in the areas largely determine the outcome of the power sharing accords. Semi-consociation, that is imposed power-sharing, contends Kerr, "it is in fact the external actors that are crucial in making or breaking agreements to manage ethnic conflict in divided societies" (ibid: 2). Thus, the success and failure of a consociation depend upon the interest of an external actor or hegemonic elites.

Thus, power sharing arrangement may be manipulated by political groups for hegemonic control. Hegemonic control is common in the Third World power sharing. The term hegemony refers to the processes by which the interests of the ruling elite are universalized through various institutions to be internalized by the rest of the society (Friedman, 1996). It results in "false consciousness," by which the masses are deceived into believing what the elite wish them to believe (ibid.). While the formal institutional roles do not tell the whole story about the hegemonic control, they do define the central rules of the game in urban politics, where breaking those rules is perhaps more common than is often thought (Pierre, 1999). Hegemonic control practices have been common in federations as well.

Very centralized political party system, structure and ideology have centralizing effects on federal arrangements (Riker, 1964; Duchacek, 1970). During the American civil war, hegemonic control was mixed with federalism as the North used the federal system to *co-opt* the leaders of the South (Elazar, 1987). In Nigeria too, Habu Galadima (2009) observes, with fragile structures and no

clear autonomy, local governments are subservient to the state and federal hegemony despite their status in the Constitution as a third order of the federal structure. In the South African case, Jaap de Visser (2009) states that local government is dominated by the same political parties that operate nationally and provincially –the dominance that is changing following the recent local election. In the context of Ethiopia too, despite the ruling party's democratic claims, as Asuake Kefale contends, "the dominant strategy that Ethiopian regimes traditionally use to stay in power has been hegemonic control" (2009: 44). Therefore, non-democratic ruling parties through their hegemonic power structures or party channels could devise and impose what one may prefer to call 'authoritarian or semi-consociational arrangement' in local governments by mixing features of consociationalism and authoritarianism. This concept has been employed to explain the power sharing arrangements in the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Furthermore, Jeremy Levitt (2007) makes a distinction between 'legal peace' and 'illegal peace' outcomes of imposed power sharing deals that could be useful for the analysis of urban conflict governance.

[W]hen democratically constituted regimes are forced to choose between negotiating peace and being violently dislodged from power, peace agreements based on the rule of law should prevail over extralegal arrangements born out of political necessity and expediency. This is so because 'legal peace' has fewer adverse impacts on the political order and is more sustainable than 'illegal peace' (Levitt, 2007: 153).

It means constitutions must constrain the political aspirations of decision-makers and ensure the lawfulness of peace deals. The point being made is that when the beneficiaries of power-sharing acquire political power undemocratically and unlawfully, Levitt says, they "are likely responsible for committing human atrocities" (ibid: 153). This extreme skepticism, which sees power sharing as an imposed and illegal deal is open to critiques. The oldest power sharing in Switzerland, for instance, is both democratic and constitutional.

3.5.2.3 Urban Policy of Multiculturalism

In multicultural societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among groups as well as their willingness to live together and exchange culture. UNESCO (2002) calls for *cultural pluralism* which "gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity" (Art 2). Will Kymlicka (2007) discusses "Multicultural Policy Index" which he and Keith Banting developed to measure the extent of multiculturalism within a multicultural society. He identified nine specific rights to

determine whether there is an indigenous multiculturalism in a society:

(1) recognition of land rights/title; (2) recognition of self-government rights; (3) upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties; (4) recognition of cultural rights (language, hunting/fishing); (5) recognition of customary law; (6) guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government; (7) constitutional or legislative affirmation of distinct status of indigenous; (8) support/ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights; (9) affirmative action for the members of indigenous communities (p.67).

Will Kymlicka outlines eight more rights as the most common or emblematic indices of immigrant multiculturalism: (1) constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism, at the central and/or regional and municipal levels; (2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula; (3) the inclusion of ethnic representation in the mandate of public media; (4) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation; (5) allowing dual citizenship; (6) the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; (8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups (ibid: 73-74).

The difference between indigenous and immigrant multiculturalism is that the rights of the former are grounded in territory and political self-governance, while that of the latter relies on inclusion and representation policies. In an attempt of praising multiculturalism, Eric Hobsbawm warned that "in the absence of a willingness to change languages, national linguistic homogeneity in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual areas can be achieved only by mass compulsion, expulsion, or genocide" (1996: 1071).

Poland, which had a third non-Polish population in 1939, is today overwhelmingly Polish, but only because its Germans were expelled to the West, its Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians were detached to form part of the USSR in the East, and its Jews were murdered. Let me add that neither Poland nor any other homogeneous country can stay homogeneous in the present world of mass labour migration, mass flight, mass travel, and mass urbanization except, once again, by ruthless exclusion or the creation *de jure* or *de facto* of apartheid societies (ibid: 1072).

Thus, in multiethnic societies, the state should be guided by a multicultural policy which is grounded on social justice, access, inclusion, cultural autonomy and equitable representation. Critiques against multiculturalism argue that cultures are not distinct, self-contained wholes; they have long interacted and influenced one another (cosmopolitan view of culture). Liberal individualists are also against multicultural group rights (Kymlicka 1995). Multicultural theorists react that cultures are overlapping and interactive, but still maintain that individuals belong to distinct societal cultures and wish to preserve these cultures (ibid.). They further argue that

individualism does not guarantee against discrimination on the basis of language or culture.

3.6 Principles of Accommodating Ethno-national Diversity in Urban Areas

3.6.1 International Legal Instruments

Many international human rights laws that deal with the protection and accommodation of local ethnolinguistic communities, urban or rural, can be identified (UN Charter, 1945; UNECOSOC, 1983). The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states that “as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature” (Art 1). The Charter of the United Nations is committed to the uphold of the collective rights, from self-determination rights to the importance of cultural diversity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provided for the first time the respect of collective rights which affirms the indispensability of cultural rights for human dignity (Art 22). In 1960, the UN adopted a convention against discrimination in education due to reasons such as language, ethnicity, religion, or other grounds. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is of great importance as well: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities should not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language” (Art 27). Moreover, collective rights of communal groups were guaranteed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). The UNESCO (2005) principles also emphasize the importance of recognizing cultural diversity, which lays good ground for the building of urban multiculturalism.

Fundamental freedom of expression at any level is associated with language rights; which means that the right to express opinion freely implies the right to do so in the language of one’s own choice “either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (ICCPR, 1966: Art 19). In Switzerland, according to Fernand de Varennes (1994), the Federal Tribunal indicated language as a necessary condition to the exercise of all the fundamental rights connected with freedom of expression in written or verbal form. Official bans or censorship on publications such as newspapers, journals, public notices, radios, televisions, private communications, and others for many reasons including the imposition of particular languages clearly violate international norms of freedom of expression. Thus, certain groups in urban areas

may be restricted from the appropriate information if there are, say, no adequate newspapers published in their languages.

The other international instruments dealing with the issue of ethnic diversity has been the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN, 1992). It provides such persons with: “the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference of any form of discrimination” (Art 2 (1)). This enables, particularly, minorities to have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life of the local administrations or at the regional and national level.

Continental legal instruments are also of great importance for the recognition of the rights of communal diversities. In 1992 the Council of Europe adopted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and in 1994, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Besides, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (OAU, 1986) provides that communal groups are entitled with collective rights such as self-determination in terms of politics, culture, language, religion and others. Despite many efforts in the emerging democracies in Africa, this study claims that the status of autochthonous and ‘immigrant’ groups in urban centers is perhaps the most pressing issue in the continent in general and in Ethiopia's Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in particular.

3.6.2 Urban Language Policy Effects

In multiethnic urban localities or society, language is one of the basic symbols of identity, though one may regard it as a mere means of communication (de Varennes, 1996). Thus, language diversity should be governed by an accommodative language policy. A language policy could be designed and implemented with an *overt* legal status or *covert* language practices. The concept of language policy is mainly related to state decisions about the status, use, domains and territories of language and the rights of its speakers (Schiffman, 2005; McNab, 1989). In this study, language policy is the constitutional guidelines, legal provisions as well as informal norms which determine the status and usage of language in a specific jurisdiction.

While it has been highly desirable for a state to remain ‘neutral’ in terms of religion, what is known as secularization of the state, such an arrangement is impractical when one deals with the relations between language and the state (de Varennes, 1996). Therefore, the state is obliged to

select one or more languages for official purposes such as to communicate with the people, to deliver public services including education, health treatments, courts, administration, law-making, mass-media, municipal services, official correspondences, meetings and political debates. The language that is chosen to this end is differently known as “official language”, “national language” or “working language”. The phrase “working language” is used in this study, as it looks more neutral than the other two which have attachments to broader national identity and citizenship.

Languages may compete with one another for supremacy in a multilingual society and the success of a state depends on its capacity to respond “through constitutional accommodation of diversity” (Watts, 1981: 117). To this end, many multinational politics have adopted regulations related to local language choices. For instance, within the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain, Euskara (linguistic minority) and Castilian are to be used by local administrative units in areas where the percentage of Euskara- speakers reaches 20 percent of the population (de Varennes, 1997). Canada has adopted regulations allowing for a complex sliding scale model which “depends not only upon the total number and/ or percentage of speakers of the two official languages, but also upon the type of service provided by public authorities” (Government of Canada, 1991). In India, “whenever the linguistic minority constitutes 15 to 20 percent of the population in an area, government notices, rules, laws, etc are reproduced in the language of the minority in that particular area” (Dhar, 1987: 246). The approach of the bilingual State of Finnish towards the linguistic groups is even more flexible. If the language group (be it Finnish or Swedish) exceeds eight percent or numbers 3000 persons, the municipality is bilingual in its services. Below the municipality is a bilingual commune, which is not declared unilingual until the minority falls below six percent. In Austria, the Slovene and Croat minorities enjoy the individual right to use the Slovene and Croat languages in administrative and judicial districts with mixed populations (de Varennes, 1997; Wikberg, 1997). Article 6 (2) of the Slovak National Council Act (1990) also states that “If the members of a national minority form in a city or village 20 percent of the population at least, they may in such cities and villages use their language in official contact.”

One could discover as many effects of language policy as possible. The main domestic effects of language choice may include participation, education, conflict, and social cohesion. First, language policy has the potential to enlarge participation in political power, professional jobs, wealth and prestige and to restrict it (Weinstein, 1983). Restricted participation eventually means that one group is dominated by another. Specially, imposed language policies prevent people from

participating in the most important activities in their own political system, which infringes their rights and reduce them to the passive objects of government actions. Laura Jenkins argues that political representation and public employment, which are crucial components of ethnic accommodation, are affected by language policy (1998).

Martinez Cobo (1987) observes that official choice of one language in multilingual setting inevitably puts at a disadvantage the people whose mother tongue is not chosen, and privileges those who speak the chosen language. Monolingual language policy in multicultural society can result in domination of one group by the other (de Varennes, 1996). Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka (2003: 16) conclude:

[T]he very process of selecting a single language can be seen as inherently exclusionary and unjust. Where political debate is conducted in the language of the majority, linguistic minorities are at a disadvantage, and must either invest the time and effort needed to shift as best they can to the dominant language or accept political marginalisation.

Likewise, according to Abraham Demoz (1990), as soon as one language is designated the sole working language of a jurisdiction, it thereby gives a major competitive advantage to the native speakers of that language. Fernand de Varennes adds that “by choosing one or a few languages over all others, a state is signaling the dominance of those for whom the official language is their mother tongue” (1996: 4). He further elucidates:

Those whose primary language is not the state's official language will therefore face the following dilemma: success in their society, especially if it is tied in to access to higher education, or to government jobs and promotions, may be dependent on their ability in the official language. Individuals may therefore wonder whether it would not be better to ‘abandon’ any effort to use or maintain their own language and to accept the official language exclusively (p. 5).

Language choice in the context of diversity thus has resonance for the wider issues of participation in political power, education and jobs. In multiethnic urban centers, language policy can “erect or tear down barriers to power, wealth, and prestige at the center of a political system” (Weinstein, 1983: 100). The inability of members of linguistic groups to be served in their own language can lead to serious challenges to the legitimacy of the state (Turgeon & Gagnon, 2013). To sum up, “while promoting the equalization of opportunities among all members of the local population, a territorial regime may make room for some *multiculturalism policies*, understood as policies aimed at preserving or respecting local cultural and linguistic diversity” (Parijs, 2011: 196).

Second, language policy affects access to education of urban and suburb linguistic groups.

Besides public jobs, political representations and freedoms, Laura Jenkins observes, access to education in one's own language choice is a key component of ethnic accommodation (1998). Education is also a tool through which identity, perceptions and understandings, real or imaged, are developed: "The ways in which the dominant cultural majority in any given society frames the educational system and the values that it propagates through schooling (methods of teaching, curricula, and so on) expresses and determines perceptions of its own identity and understandings of the 'other'" (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2012: 145). Thus, just as it can be inclusive and vehicle of social cohesion, solidarity and equality, education can equally be a vehicle of social discrimination. The UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) provides "[I]t is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language" (Art 5.1 (c)). Furthermore, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that:

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language (1989: Article 30).

This lays a foundation for member states to pursue inclusive education policies. Public policy experts argue that "ethnic groups, whether they are minority, majority, migrant, national or indigenous, present education challenges which require sustained political and policy effort, if the educational rights of such groups are to be enhanced" (Gundra & Jones, 1998: 114). They add that "educational policies which deal with these issues not only need to be permanent but also need to be dynamic, to ensure that such groups are able to identify with the state at large" (ibid: 114). Fernand de Varennes argues that "not permitting a linguistic minority to carry on its own educational activities in its language has great potential for destabilization" (1996: 158).

For this reason, it is not surprising that the debate on language of instruction in education has grown sharper as the spread of democratic ideals has opened the schools to all segments of the world populations (Weinstein, 1983). Government educational measures only become meaningful if they are tailored towards the needs of the various diversities that make up the urban society (Gundra & Jones, 1998). If education is to play a significant role in the lives of diverse peoples and assist in their development, then the education of the dominant group should not be imposed

upon minorities (*ibid.*). Moreover, education in the federal (national) capital should be fairly accessible at least to the major linguistic groups of the city as well as the polity so that “access to the city question” itself may partly be resolved.

The third language policy effect is about conflict over language status. A disagreement over urban language choice for a given jurisdiction is “a disagreement about who shall participate in power, wealth and prestige” (Weinstein, 1983: 100). Partisan language policy would inevitably cause inter-group conflicts. In Sri Lanka, Sinhala-speaking politicians made Sinhala the sole language of public services thereby excluding Tamil—the decision that was one of the major causes of the civil wars in that country (*ibid.*). Similarly, black students in the Republic of South Africa revolted against the program of the government which expanded Afrikaans language. In general, the effort by one language group to seek hegemony may contain within it the seeds of a cycle of resistance and repression. Hegemonic policies make compromise increasingly difficult and polarization increasingly extreme. The resulting struggle is not ‘ethnic conflict’ grounded in linguistic or cultural differences, but rather a conflict over power and policy resulting from the effort of one group to establish hegemony over others (Tollefson, 1991).

Fourth, language policy exerts influences on urban social solidarity through assimilation or accommodation. Assimilation is sometimes referred to as social integration or “nation-building” (Connor, 1972; Deutch, 1953). In fact, the object of a language policy may be either assimilation or accommodation or mixed. Therefore, the type of urban language policy pursued in a diverse social context depends on the underlying ideological orientations of the dominant city politics towards linguistic diversity. In the past, Will Kymlicka argues, countries had the expectation that “indigenous peoples would eventually disappear as distinct communities, as a result of dying out, or intermarriage, or assimilation. A number of policies were adopted to speed up this process, such as stripping indigenous peoples of their lands, restricting the practice of their traditional cultures, languages, and religions, and undermining their institutions of self-government” (2007: 66). In this regard, what the hegemonic culture does is to undermine the overt bounds of unity (Gundra & Jones, 1998). The “nation-building” policy was widely condemned as nation-destroying (Connor, 1972).

The modern concept of solidarity and national integration does not require homogeneity of language and ethnicity. Unity is the outcome of mutual respect and cultural equality:

National integration means co-existence of all ethnic communities. As a precondition, they

should be accepted as legitimate entities having powers and rights. Each group should be entitled for adequate political space to operate and no one group should be placed in a position to threaten another. Recognition of individual and group rights is important but that alone is not sufficient. Groups need to have institutional guarantees against violation of such rights as well as mechanisms for their participation in decision-making and governance (Devaraj, 2006: 4-5).

Multinational federations, thus, have adopted accommodative language policies aiming to promote multinational solidarity in diversity (Altermatt, 2004). In multiethnic society, language is a matter of extreme pride, value, symbol and identity for certain group of people and disregarding these may easily cause discrimination in violation of human rights standards (de Varennes, 1996). Today, attempting to eliminate language differences in urban areas through assimilation policy is morally less acceptable as it tends to cause urban instability. To sum up, urban language policy has broader implications for political participation and employment, education, group conflict, and social cohesion in multicultural and multilingual urban environments.

3.7 Comparative Urban Policy Case Studies

In this last part of the chapter, international experiences of urban policies on diversity are explored for comparisons. These case studies include the Swiss accommodation policy models of bilingual cantons and cities of Bern, Valais and Fribourg, and trilingual Graubünden, bilingual cities of Brussels and Ottawa, and multilingual cities of Cape Town and New Delhi.

3.7.1 Swiss Model of Accommodating Ethno-national Diversity

Switzerland is a multilingual, multicultural and multinational democratic federation located at the heart of Western Europe. Of its total population of 7,944,566 by 2013, the German-speakers constitute 63.5%, French (22.5%), Italian (8.1%), and Romansh (0.5%) (Government of Switzerland, 2013). Unlike in the United States, Canada and Australia, the Swiss ethnic diversity is not the result of immigrant groups. It has roots in the ancient history of local communities that have always lived in Switzerland (Fleiner, 2006).

The discussion of Swiss democracy (consociational experience) at the federal and cantonal capitals is relevant to understand the nature of power sharings in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, which I referred semi-consociation in chapter seven. Let's see the Swiss Federal Council structure. The Swiss Federal Constitution (1999: Art 175) establishes a seven-member body, the Federal Council, which is the highest governing and executive authority of the federal state. They are

assigned the same power, with the exception of the President of the Confederation, who, in fact, is assigned a purely representative and ceremonial function (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). The presidency rotates every year among the members of the Federal Council. In terms of federal power-sharing among political parties, the formula (often known as the 'magic formula') goes that the seven seats are distributed among four parties: the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats had two seats each, while the Swiss People's Party was represented by one Federal Councillor (*ibid.*).

The magic formula remained exactly the same between 1959 and 2003. It means that since 2003 the grand coalition of 2:2:2:1 is not totally stable; sometime it becomes 2:2:1:2, other time it took the formula of 2:2:1:1:1. Basically, there is no fundamental transformation of the formula. In addition to party affiliation, a number of other social and political dimensions increase the heterogeneity of the Federal Council. The Parliament observes an unwritten rule to ensure fair representations of minority linguistic groups (at least one from French or Italian-speaking canton), cantonal (the three largest cantons) and women (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008; Linder, 2010). The Federal Constitution of Switzerland also requires that "the various regions and language communities must be equitably represented in the Federal Council" (1999: Art 175 (4)).

Every federal institutions fall under an informal rule of power sharing, mostly quota principle, between linguistic groups (Linder, 2010). The Federal Ordinance on Languages (2010: Art 7) provides that the representation of linguistic communities in the federal administrative units must aim to achieve the following ranges, including for management positions: "German: 68.5 - 70.5%, French: 21.5-23.5%, Italian: 6.5-8.5%, Romansh: 0.5-1.0%". It is flexible for minorities in that representation of the Romansh communities may exceed the upper limit of the ranges, and "where candidates have equal qualifications, priority shall be given to those who belong to a linguistic community that is underrepresented in the administrative unit in question; this applies in particular for management positions" (Art 7). Art 6 ensures equitable opportunities for employees from the various linguistic communities in all government institutions. Thus, proportional representation in Swiss Federal Government applies not only to Federal Council, but also to federal courts, National Council, Council of States, expert committees, all personnel, senior staff and top management (Linder, 2010). As Wolf Linder argues, Swiss power sharing goes beyond formal government: "It would be unimaginable, for instance, that the executive committee of the Swiss Soccer Association would consist of German-speakers only" (2010: 36).

Related to power-sharing is language policy in Switzerland. The Swiss Constitution (1999) emphasizes the obligation of the Confederation to enhance peace and understanding among the different linguistic communities. Accordingly, it declares all four languages, namely German, French, Italian, and Romansh as national languages (Art 4). Three of them (German, French, and Italian) are official languages on equal value. With regard to Romansh, Swiss Constitution (Art 70) guarantees the Romansh-speaking citizens to have official contact with the federal administration in their own language. Switzerland adopted its multilingual language policy in the late 18th and early 19th century when it was one of the poorest states of Europe that had received food aid from Russia (Altermatt, 2004). That is why Swiss experience is relevant for Ethiopia. Many Swiss authors argue that as Switzerland is not ethnically homogeneous, one of the factors which does unify the country is a shared commitment to multilingual policy and value (Schmitt, 2010; Fleiner, 2006).

At the subnational level, of the 26 cantons of the Swiss Confederation, seventeen cantons are German-speaking, four cantons are French-speaking, one canton is Italian-speaking, three cantons are bilingual (German-French), and one canton is trilingual (German, Romansh, and Italian) (Fleiner, 2006). Therefore, “Switzerland’s multilingualism is limited to the Swiss Confederation as a whole (including its institutions) and to the bilingual cantons of Fribourg, Valais, and Bern (German-French), as well as to trilingual Graubünden (German-Romansch-Italian)” (Altermatt, 2004: 16). The four multilingual cantons have constitutional rights to federal financial aids for their “particular tasks” in order to help cover the expenses of public services in multiple languages (Schmitt, 2010; Fleiner, 2006). Accordingly, the Federal Ordinance on Languages ensures that “financial assistance for the promotion of plurilingualism in cantonal authorities and administrations shall be granted to the plurilingual cantons for performing their specific tasks” (2010: Art 17).

In these multilingual cantons, multilingualism finds its expression in largely separated monolingual districts and municipalities on territoriality principle, which means, “no bilingual canton recognizes German and French everywhere on its territory, even in a district” (Schmitt, 2010: 2). In addition, the Swiss court ruled that “the population composition should not be the only criteria allowing to define the linguistic nature of municipality, because it is also necessary to consider its history” (ibid: 12). Accordingly, “the cantons are authorized or even charged to guarantee the traditional language of their regions, so that *no commune* can be forced to change its language for official use” (Linder, 2010: 25).

In the capital cities of bilingual cantons of Bern, Valais and Fribourg, i.e., in Bern/Berne, Fribourg/Freiburg and Sion/Sitten, public services are provided in the language of their choice, German or French: cantonal parliament, administrations, courts, hospitals, newspapers, public posters, city radios and TVs, public education, all function in either language (Linder, 2010; Schmitt, 2010). This is also the case in the formally trilingual canton of Graubünden whose municipalities provide services in either German, Italian, Romansh or mixed (ibid.). Biel-Bienne city in the canton of Bern is also officially bilingual. The experiences of these cantonal multicultural cities have relevant implications for urban governances of multiethnic Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Moreover, Bern/Berne is the capital of the Canton of Bern and of the Federal Government of Switzerland; and hence shares similarity with Addis Ababa/Finfinne, the capital of the State of Oromia and of the Federal Government of Ethiopia.

Furthermore, representations in public institutions of bilingual and trilingual cantons are guaranteed. In this regard, for instance, Bernese Constitution states that “minorities may be accorded special powers” (1995: Article 4). Of the 160 members of the Bern Cantonal Parliament, twelve seats are guaranteed for the French-speaking Bernese Jura region (proportional to their population size) (ibid: Art. 73). The Cantonal Government of Bern comprises seven members in which the Bernese Jura is guaranteed one seat (Art. 84). As to the composition of civil service, Bernese Constitution provides that “an appropriate number of the staff must be French speakers” (Art 92). Maurizio Maggetti and Alexandra Fang-Bar regard such measures as “holding-together measures, applied by the Canton of Bern through positive discrimination” (2015: 355). In multicultural contexts, as they carefully warn, “a numerical representation does not suffice; the talk needs to be walked through a political culture of empathy” (ibid: 362). In the rest of bilingual and trilingual governments of cantons and cities, constituent linguistic groups are entitled to equitable representations (Schmitt, 2010).

To sum up, one of the critiques against territoriality principle is that it tends to fortify the frontiers between language groups and erect barriers between them (Altermatt, 2004). This challenge has been tried to be resolved through a second national language education. Despite the multilingual policy and practice, there is a fear that Romansh-speaking municipalities along the language border were considering switching to German (Council of Europe, 2014). In general, successful democratic power-sharing “has even turned Switzerland into a relatively homogenous society, in spite of its different languages” (Linder, 2010: 195).

3.7.2 Belgian Experience: Brussels

The Belgian State is composed of three ethno-linguistic groups. Of the 11,323,973 population of Belgium (as of July 2015), Dutch-speaking is the majority population (59%), followed by French (39%) and then German (less than 1%) (Government of Belgium, 2015). The Belgian State evolved from a unitary into a federal political system (Weerts, 2012). The restructuring of Belgian state and society has both territorial and non-territorial elements:

Belgium comprises three Communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community. Belgium comprises three Regions: the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region. Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region. Each municipality of the Kingdom forms part of one of these linguistic regions. The boundaries of the four linguistic regions can only be changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic group (Belgian Revised Constitution, 2014: Articles 2, 3, 4).

Therefore, in Belgium, there are two types of overlapping federated entities, with distinct constitutional powers, i.e., three territorial regions and three communities. According to Johanne Poirier (2006), communities were created in response to the Flemish struggle for cultural autonomy in a country historically dominated by French-speaking elite. The communities have competences over issues which are closely related to persons such as education, culture, media and significant aspects of social services (Poirier, 2006; Weerts, 2012). This non-territorial arrangement has allowed the two main cultural communities to have jurisdiction over cultural policies for their respective language groups in Brussels (Popelier, 2015). Sophie Weerts maintains that “each Community is free to implement the educational model it wants” (2012: 52). Belgian judicial branch also functions according to the linguistic composition of the regions: only in Flemish in Flanders, in French in Wallonia (with some provisions for the German minority). In Brussels, there are district linguistic Chambers, although a significant number of judges are required to be bilingual (Poirier, 2006; Linder, 2010).

With more than one million inhabitants, Brussels is one of the three regional constituent units but also the capital of Belgium. It is officially bilingual, although the French-speaking inhabitants are a clear majority (63.2% are native French speakers and 20% are native Dutch speakers) (Pecters, 2007). It is also the unofficial capital of the European Union. Historically a Dutch-speaking city, it has seen a major shift to French since Belgian independence in 1830. Since the founding of the Kingdom of Belgium in 1830, Brussels has transformed from being almost

entirely Dutch-speaking to being a multilingual city with French as the majority language and *lingua franca*. This language shift, the *Frenchification* of Brussels, is rooted in the 18th century and accelerated after Belgium became independent and Brussels expanded its original boundaries. French-speaking immigration to the capital contributed to the *Frenchification* of Brussels; both Walloons and expatriates from other countries, mainly France, came to Brussels in great numbers. However, a more important cause for the *Frenchification* was the language change over several generations from Dutch to French that was performed in Brussels by the Flemish people themselves mainly due to the ban on Dutch language in political, administration, courts, media and culture, army and education in Belgium at the time. This made French the only language of administration, law, politics and education and social mobility in Belgium (Poirier, 2006). The exclusively French educational system played an important role in this changing language landscape. This political history version of Brussels resembles that of Addis Ababa's evolution for the latter was historically an Afaan Oromo speaking territory, called Finfinne until it was invaded in 1886, renamed Addis Ababa and became the capital of an Amharic speaking ruling regime of Ethiopia who officially imposed Amharic upon the rest of the society. As a result, the city of Addis Ababa slowly shifted to speak mostly Amharic (Getahun, 2007). As shown in chapter seven, the monolingual policy of Addis Ababa did not change to this date.

Today, although the majority language of Brussels is French, the city is officially bilingual. "It is 'enclaved' in the territory of the Flemish Region" (Poirier, 2006: 6). Flanders did not want to "abandon" part of their territory, especially since it is often argued that Brussels used to be a town where Flemish were spoken before it was "*Frenchified*" by an elite drawn to the capital (Poirier, 2006; Popelier, 2015). In other words, the Flemish carries a sense of loss with regards to Brussels. For their part, the Francophones of Wallonia, in the South, wanted to maintain strong links with the French speakers of the capital city. Due to this, the solution was to create a third entity, the Brussels-Capital Region, which is officially bilingual (Poirier, 2006).

There are strong institutional measures meant to protect and represent the Flemish minority in Brussels. First, the Flemish minority in Brussels enjoy a guaranteed minimum representation in the Brussels Parliament (Poirier, 2006). That way, even if the number of Flemish residents in Brussels were too small in size, at least 17 out of the 89 members of the assembly would be Flemish (ibid.). Secondly, at least 3 of the 8 Ministers of the Brussels-Region are Flemish and these all measures were designed to protect the Flemish minority in Brussels, just as parity-

based institutions at the federal level were designed to protect the French-speaking minority at the national level (Poirier, 2006; Peeters, 2012).

This sophisticated self-rule policy in Brussels has got some drawbacks. The co-existence of two concurrent sometimes exclusive government actors on the same territory makes it difficult to create bridges between the two communities. Johanne Poirier (2006) found that the two communities run their own schools, and have found it nearly impossible to create bilingual schools or effective bridges between Flemish and French-speaking schools which are sometimes next to one another. The tendency of pure monolingualism in education in a multicultural setting, as Patrick Weerts (20012) argues, may hinder mutual understanding between communities.

3.7.3 Governing Union Territory of Delhi, India

In the Indian urban governance, the idea of union (alias federal) territories is very important. The Union Territory of Delhi is called the National Capital Territory of Delhi (Constitution of India, 1991). In fact the Indian Parliament has the powers to create states and union territories, to merge states and union territories, and to change their boundaries which gave India federalism more unitary characteristics in form (Article 3 of Indian Constitution, 2007). Union territories are seven in number and are directly governed by the Union Government of India just like Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa of Ethiopia even though the later cities are not declared territories of the Federal Government of Ethiopia. The National Capital Territory of Delhi, which has special status as a state, is part of the union territories (Mathew & Hooji, 2009). The union territories “were created for those small and far-flung areas having special colonial and cultural heritage (i.e., Andaman and Nicobar, Dadra and Nagar Havel, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, and Puducherry), as well as for an area coming under interstate dispute (i.e., Chandigarh)” (ibid: 197). Though extra-constitutional measure it was, the city of Dire Dawa was structured as special urban government directly administered by the Federal Government of Ethiopia on the fact that it was a disputed territory between Oromia and Somali States (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004).

The National Capital Territory (NCT) of India is a large metropolitan area in India. As of 2015, the population of Delhi is 18,248,290 (Government of India, 2015). Hindu is the most commonly spoken language (81%), followed by Punjabi (7%) and Urdu (6%) in Delhi. Thus, in addition to Hindi and English, Punjabi and Urdu have official language status in Delhi. The Constitution of India (69th Amendment, 1991) provides that “the number of seats reserved for

Scheduled Caste” in the legislature of Delhi shall be determined by the parliament. Furthermore, the Indian Constitution (2007) establishes democratic but also accommodative urban local governments. Article 243R states that “all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards.”

Article 243T guarantees minority representations:

Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in every Municipality and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that Municipality as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the Municipal area or of the Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal area bears to the total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Municipality.

Moreover, Article 350A of the Indian Constitution (2007) ensures that “it shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups.” There is a Special Officer for linguistic minorities in India whose duty is to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under the Constitution (Art 350B). As far as development policy preparation is concerned, the Constitution requires that every District Planning Committee shall have regard to matters of common interest between the Panchayats and the Municipalities including spatial planning, sharing of water and other physical and natural resources, the integrated development of infrastructure and environmental conservation (Art 243ZD).

India has established Ministry of Minority Affairs in 2006 to ensure the rights of minority communities (UNESCO, 2011). In addition to representations, and educational and other cultural services in mother tongue, the basic numerical thresholds of municipal language services were set in 1956 in a memorandum signed between the Union and individual States: “whenever the linguistic minority constitutes 15 to 20 percent of the population in an area, government notices, rules, laws, etc are reproduced in the language of the minority in that particular area” (cited in Dhar, 1987: 246). Access to language and cultural rights in New Delhi are guaranteed (ibid.). In general, Indian democratic political space, decentralization and its multiculturalism policy have made multiethnic urban local bodies more accommodative, representative and participative.

3.7.4 Ottawa's Experiences, Canada

Ottawa, a territory mainly located in the Province of Ontario except for the areas along the river Gatineau which is de facto part of urban Ottawa but technically within Quebec territory, is the Federal Capital of Canada. Canada's Constitution grants the power over local government to the provinces (Paquet, 2011). This made it far more complicated, which means there are competing interests of Provincial Governments of Ontario and Quebec, City Government of Ottawa and Federal Government in the city. Due to this complicated nature of the city, federal and provincial governments refused to give serious consideration to the idea of a "federal district", and the population was divided on this question (ibid.).

Of the 872,450 population of Ottawa, 62.39% are English-speakers, 14.20% are French-speakers, 0.05% is Aboriginal mother tongues, 3.02% are multiple mother tongues speakers, and the rest 20.42% are foreign immigrant language speakers (Government of Canada, 2012). Interestingly, in terms of language composition and usage, Bern and Ottawa are alike federal capitals because the former comprises German majority and French minority whereas the later consists of English majority and French minority (Rowat, 1968).

Bilingualism in Ottawa became official policy in 2002, making all municipal services available in both English and French (Government of Canada, 2001). The city policy document states that "the City of Ottawa recognizes both official languages as having the same rights, status and privileges. [...] That the City of Ottawa reiterates the bilingual character of the City as well as equality of rights and privileges for both linguistic groups in light of services offered" (ibid: Preamble & R.1). All urban social services (education, courts, health, media, employments, etc.) therefore are rendered in both languages. For instance, it requires that "the English and French languages be accepted as languages of work within the municipal administration. [...] That employees who have the opportunity, and are able to do so, be encouraged to use French on the job" (ibid: R.1.9). The policy obliges the City of Ottawa to establish an Advisory Committee on French Language Services with a mandate to advise the municipal administration and Council with regard to the implementation of the Policy.

In a nutshell, the federal government still has no direct control over its own capital for municipalities are 'creatures of the Province' in Canada (Paquet, 2011). The city administration of Ottawa has become a bilingual entity in policy and in practice and a symbol of multiculturalism.

3.7.5 Urban policies on diversities in Cape Town, South Africa

The post-Apartheid South African Constitution (1996) obliges municipalities that they “must take into account the language usage and preferences of their residents” in order to rebuild inclusive (non-racist) urban administrations as well as multilingual and multicultural urban society (Art 6 (3) (b)). Furthermore, the Constitution provides that:

Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account—(a) equity; (b) practicability; and (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices (Art 29/2).

Accordingly, the Republic of South Africa has eleven working languages (Art 6). Urban or rural, schools are required to promote multilingualism and multiculturalism, and where a certain language is not available, learners may request the provincial education department to make provision for instruction in the chosen language (Education Policy Act No. 27 of 1996). The city of Cape Town, which is the capital of the Province of the Western Cape, for instance, has a comprehensive language policy. The city is further relevant for it is one of the three capitals of the federal government of the Republic of South Africa. It is the seat of Parliament. Article 4 of the city language policy document (2002) aims: to establish the language usage of the municipality's residents and take into account such language preferences; to support impartial service delivery by promoting equal access to municipal services and programmes by removing communication or language barriers; to promote multilingualism amongst the municipality's staff and communities within the City's area of jurisdiction; to promote the use of the three official languages [of the Province of Western Cape, viz. Afrikaans, Xhosa and English] in the affairs of the municipality; to give increasing effect to the equal status of the three official languages [of the Province].

Therefore, the city of Cape Town declares three working languages of the Province of Western Cape as its urban languages on equal basis. Article 4 of the city policy states that:

Any of the three official languages [of the Province] may be used in any debates and other proceedings of the Council and its Committees. The City must make provision for interpreting services for members from and into the three official languages during sittings of the Council, its Subcouncils and Committees. Sign Language interpreting must be provided, if and when considered necessary. All policies introduced/adopted, by-laws, and resolutions of the Council and its Committees must be available in all three official languages.

In general, the policy document requires that the trilingual language policy of the city ensures fair representation of linguistic groups in the city administration and city council, and rendering of

services to the public [health, courts, education, etc] (Articles 8, 9, 10, & 11). Article 12 establishes *Language Committee for the City of Cape Town*. It declares that a multi-party ad-hoc committee consisting of six Councillors (two Xhosa, two Afrikaans and two English speakers) and known as the City of Cape Town Language Committee be established as a sub-committee of the Corporate Services Portfolio Committee, which is entitled to monitor the use of the three languages in the Council; to actively promote multilingualism in the City of Cape Town; to monitor the phased-in implementation of the language policy; to advise and make recommendations on any language matter to the Corporate Services Portfolio Committee; to initiate studies and research directed at the promotion of respect for the working languages; to prevent the use of any language for exploitation and domination. Even, a very small city like Tshwane (found in Gauteng Province) has adopted eight languages as its working languages (Government of South Africa, 2012). In conclusion, urban ethno-linguistic situations in South Africa appear more accommodative in terms of policies adopted to advance multiculturalism and multilingualism.

To conclude this part of comparative multicultural urban policy studies, Switzerland has founded experiences of accommodative power sharing formula and language policy both at the federal and subnational levels. Particularly, the bilingual cantons and cities of Bern, Valais and Fribourg, and trilingual Graubünden are discussed. In the cases of bilingual Brussels and Ottawa cities, there have been clear socio-political interests of competing language groups in the capital. Moreover, Cape Town and New Delhi cities from developing countries appear to have pursued accommodative urban social policies. The major features that these cities share in common include accommodative cultural policies in public services and representations in governments. Scott Bollens (2009) adds that in the cases such as Johannesburg and Beirut, the management of cities holds the key to sustainable co-existence of antagonistic ethno-linguistic groups subsequent to ending of overt hostilities. As to contested cities, he makes interesting points to note: urban ethnic conditions—land control, economic distribution, policymaking access, and group identity— are important influences on the degree of urban stability (ibid.). Movement toward tolerance in a city can be indicated by increased flexibility, lessening of actual and perceived inequalities across ethnic groups, greater inter-ethnic political inclusion and inter-group cooperation, and growing tolerance and respect for collective ethnic rights (ibid.).

3.8 Summary

In this chapter, various political strategies of managing diversity in urban areas have been explored in theoretical and comparative perspectives. Six points of discussions were identified. Urban policy in the context of cultural diversity was conceptualized as government actions (or inactions) which may or may not benefit certain section of society. Secondly, urban policy analysis models including neo-institutionalism, rational choice, incrementalism and elite theory have been discussed. The third section conceptualized the notion of urban local institutional autonomy as the capability – existential, democratic and functional– of a city to govern its own affairs [self-rule]. Fourthly, urban theoretical policies on diversity –of liberal which claims to pursue ‘difference-blind’ policy, and of communitarian which recognizes and accommodates the distinctive identities and needs of different groups– are explored. Special emphasis was given to accommodationist communitarian policies including federalism, consociationalism and multiculturalism.

The fifth section has presented principles of urban accommodation of diversity relying on international human rights laws (conventions, UN resolutions and declarations to AU charter). But also the role of urban language policy in building accommodative urban institutions particularly from civil and political participation, education, conflict and social solidarity perspectives are dealt with. The final part of the chapter has explored international experiences of accommodation policies for urban comparative study purposes. The Swiss model of democratic accommodation of diversity at both federal and subnational levels has been briefed. Experiences of bilingual cantons and cities of Bern, Valais and Fribourg and trilingual Graubünden are presented. Moreover, the cases of officially bilingual Brussels and Ottawa cities become important for the existence of clear competing interests of two language groups to the cities. Officially multilingual cities of Delhi and Cape Town are far more significant for they are from developing countries. The overall lesson is that there are public policy attempts to accommodate urban minorities (from language, education, and cultural policies to administrative and political inclusions) in Bern, Fribourg, Valais, Graubünden, Brussels, Ottawa, Delhi, Cape Town, and Tshwane. This lays theoretical and comparative foundations to the next chapters which critically examine the extent to which Ethiopian urban policies of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are accommodative of diversity particularly since the introduction of a multinational federalization project in Ethiopia.

Chapter 4

The Makings of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa, 1880s-1991

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has explored the theoretical and comparative policy explanations of managing ethno-national diversity in urban areas in general; and now, the study lays the historical foundations of the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The contemporary multiethnic Ethiopian state was formed mainly by wars of conquests in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Teshale, 1995; Levine, 2000). Subsequently, various multiethnic towns were established by imperial soldiers as garrisons to control the newly conquered peoples and territory (Bjerén, 1985); these garrison towns became agents of the imperial project which used "urban space, especially the capital, as the fulcrum of modern nation-building" (Shemelis, 2013: 180). This nation-building project aimed at ethno-cultural homogenization of Ethiopia, which remained the case during the Derg rule, resulting in political suppression, economic exploitation, cultural oppression and language imposition (Mekuria, 1994). This way, many towns including Addis Ababa (1886) and Dire Dawa (1902) were founded during Menelik era and evolved as Amharic speaking garrison towns (Sheferaw, 1987; Asnake, 2014; Getahun, 2014). Despite the cultural policy impositions by the state to create homogenous urban Ethiopian society, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in particular have retained their multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural social structures (CSA, 2008 & 2013). This urban plurality, according to Jan Erk, is regarded as "uncodified social structures indispensable to the analyses of how political systems function" (2008: 11). This chapter therefore highlights the basic intercultural interactions and resulting social structures in urban spaces while exploring the cultural making of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in the Ethiopian political history contexts.

This urban political history chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the origins and evolutions of multiethnic towns in Ethiopia in general. In the second section, the making of Addis Ababa focusing on pre-1991 ethnic politics and policy will be presented. It

includes the establishment of Addis Ababa as a garrison town in the heart of Oromo land, its imperial administration, the multiethnic migration to the city of Addis Ababa and the status of the Oromo, the Italian occupation of the city, and post-1941 Imperial and Derg urban policy of Addis Ababa. In a similar fashion, section three discusses the making of Dire Dawa focusing on pre-1991 ethnic politics and policy which begins by pointing out the arguments on the establishment of the city of Dire Dawa, its imperial administration, the Italian occupation of the town, and post-1941 Imperial and Derg administrations of Dire Dawa. In general, this chapter is devoted to assess the overall ethno-linguistic policies of the Imperial and Derg regimes in urban centers focusing on Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

4.2 The Origins and Evolutions of Multiethnic Towns in Ethiopia

Prior to the formation of modern Ethiopia, the Abyssinian state in the north had existed with its mobile capitals for several centuries (Pankhurst, 1985). The non-Abyssinian peoples and states in the south had also existed with their mobile centers of powers for several centuries (Asmarom, 2000). This north-south classification does not devalue their long-standing socio-economic and conflictual interactions. The analysis in this chapter however is limited to the post-Menelik political phenomena since both study areas of this research were rural villages by then. As Menelik II extended his power from Ankober¹¹ in Amhara land, remnants of older urban settlements in the northern Abyssinian provinces were given new administrative functions, and in the newly conquered southern provinces, his agents facilitated “the settlement of soldiers from the northern provinces on confiscated land” thereby develop a series of garrison towns to keep the conquered peoples under control (Bjerer, 1985: 62). In the latter case, the driving force of town formation during Menelik era was neither the market place nor the church, but the settlements of imperial soldiers (Antonsich, 2002). Thus, defense was the main concern, except for ‘railway towns’ such as Dire Dawa, Adama, Mojo, Bishoftu, Dukam and Akaki, all of which also evolved to become garrison towns (ibid; Markakis, 2006).

Modern multiethnic Ethiopia was formed mainly through wars of conquests in the last quarter of the 19th century. The southward conquest increased the size of Abyssinia by two-thirds (Teshale, 1995). As a result, the “military, political, and economic necessities led to the creation of

¹¹ Ankober (now located in southeastern part of the Amhara Region) was the capital of Shewa Province of Abyssinian state, from where Emperor Menelik launched his Ethiopian empire-state building in the early 1870s.

a stream of new towns and expansion of the old ones in the conquered territories” (Getahun, 2007:

3). Akalou (1973: 1) remarks that:

As the country expanded geographically, garrisons were set up all over newly acquired territories to hold down the conquered people. To maintain the army, part of the conquered land and, indeed, even the conquered people themselves as *gäbars* were assigned to the soldiers. This policy contributed significantly not only to the social mobility of the military elite, but to the growth and functional transformation of the garrisons as well. To be sure many of the garrisons were relatively small, nonetheless they performed a primary service in the urbanization movement of the period.

The argument is that the spread of garrison towns was necessary to install and retain Menelik’s power in the newly conquered territories. If the new garrison was not stationed in a market place, a nearby weekly market was, more often than not, moved to the garrison by the governor’s decrees (Akalou, 1973). Or “such towns first emerged as the settlements of soldiers and then evolved into towns of commercial and administrative importance” (Worku, 2000: 46-47). Commenting on the emergence of towns in the Gurageland in Southern Ethiopia, Worku indicated that the settler soldiers “were called *Merkenie* or Amhara by the local people and the garrisons were referred to as *ketema*” (2000: 49). Garrison towns were known as *ketemas* in Amharic. Similarly, Fekadu Adugna argues that “located at the extreme south on the Kenyan border, the Ethiopian town of Moyale was initially a military post established to control the border of the Ethiopian empire against the British in Kenya” (2011: 782). In general, towns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Ethiopia were formed by military settlements or evolved as garrisons which gradually developed to urban agglomerations. Thus, “garrisons gradually transformed themselves from military bases to urban establishments” (Akalou, 1973: 5). It must be noted that as it was the case in northern Ethiopia, the emergence of indigenous towns in western and southwestern Ethiopia such as Nekemte, Jimma, Bonga, Saqa, Billo and Assendabo predated their conquests by Menelik (Tesema, 1993). However, they gradually started to be dominated by Amharic speaking settler -ruling class.

Some of the confiscated land, on which garrison towns emerged, was given as a reward to members of the imperial troops, from simple soldiers up through the military hierarchy. Bjerén writes that “other Amhara moved south to man the garrison towns established to secure the conquest and to bolster the position of the Amhara landowners” (1985: 70). Thus, the civil administration of the newly structured provinces from the governors down to heads of districts was inevitably in the hands of newcomers (ibid.). One result of the conquest of the south was thus the

initiation of a movement of population from the north to the south on a much larger scale than the commercial and military expeditions of earlier times (ibid.). Amharic speaking settlers of the garrison towns were expanding the language and culture of Amhara to the conquered territories (Minahan, 2002). According to Asafa Jalata (2010: 40), "the Ethiopian colonial structure" limited the access of non-Amhara urban residents to institutions and opportunities, such as employment, education, health, mass media and other public services.

In conclusion, "Amharic, then, was Ethiopia's most important urban language" and even in traditionally non-Amhara areas there were urban centers in which substantial proportions of Amharic mother-tongue speakers were found (Cooper & Horvath, 1973: 227). This means that throughout the Empire garrison towns served as agents for the diffusion of Amhara language and culture into the countryside surrounding those towns. Both secular and religious education that took roots in garrison towns, for instance, in Oromo lands "was aimed at eradicating Oromo identity rather than strengthening it" (Dirribi, 2011: 457). Many observe that typical Ethiopian urbanization model was based on Amhara language, culture and Orthodox Christianity, which altogether were officially sponsored to subjugate non-Amharic speakers (Minahan, 2002; Merera, 2011). In the case of Oromo, Harwood Schaffer and Asafa Jalata (2016: 207-208) conclude that:

Ethiopian settler colonialism was firmly established in Oromia through the imposition of five institutional arrangements in order to tightly control Oromo society and intensify its exploitation: (1) garrison cities and towns, (2) slavery, (3) the colonial landholding system, (4) the *nafxanya-gabbar* system (semi-slavery), and (5) the Oromo collaborator class. The colonialists have been concentrated in garrison cities and towns and formulated political, economic, and ideological programs that they used to oppress their colonial subjects.

The *nafxanya-gabbar* system was Ethiopia's imperial feudal system especially in the southern half of the country including in Oromia in which Amharic speaking soldiers became land owners and non-Amharic speaking nationalities were subjugated to serve as serfs. It was in this process that garrison cities and towns emerged and developed serving as key agents of coercion, control and subjugation of the conquered peoples. After having a broader view on the origins and evolutions of multiethnic towns in Ethiopia, the following sections shall discuss the ethno-cultural makings of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

4.3 The Making of Addis Ababa, Pre-1991 Ethnic Politics & Policy

4.3.1 On the Establishment of Addis Ababa

The conquest of Finfinne, an Oromo village, during the making of Ethiopian Empire by Menelik II, resulted in the birth of Addis Ababa town in 1886 which became the capital of the Empire in 1889 (Worku, 2000; Emerta Addis, 2015). Before the conquest, the Oromo community inhabited the area where Addis Ababa was founded; and it was after fierce resistance that “Ras Gobana, an Oromo warrior in the service of Menelik, defeated the last Oromo chief of the area, Tufaa Munaa” (Getahun, 2001: 156). The birth of Addis Ababa as a power center is observed to have “coincided with Ethiopia's emergence as a modern state” (Assefa, 2009: 82). Thus, the city served as “the birthplace of the modern Ethiopian state and the center of most national processes” (Shemelis, 2013: 165). Before the capital moved downwards to the Finfinne warm spring water and fertile land (*Hora Finfinne* or *Fluha*) which was the land of Habebe Tufaa (the son of Tufaa Munaa), the Emperor and his soldiers had first stationed on Mount Entoto northern tip of Addis Ababa (known to the Oromo as Gaara *Xiixaa*).

Like most other Ethiopian centres of rule of the time, Entoto “was essentially a military town and was established on almost exactly the same pattern as the traditional Ethiopian army camp” (Pankhurst, 1961: 105). Therefore, the hilly topography of Entoto was argued to have been chosen for its military strategic value to ease patrolling the surrounding lands. Prior to the designation of Addis Ababa as the capital of the Empire, Abyssinian capitals were shifting cities in the northern part of the country (Pankhurst, 1961) or as Horvath (1969) calls them “roaming capitals” whose existence hanged on the movement of the Emperor. It is argued that Menelik moved his capital from Ankober southward to Entoto/Finfinne (Addis Ababa) so as to ensure its economic bases for his further southward conquests (Akalou, 1973; Emerta Addis, 2015). On the expansion from Entoto to Finfinne, Menelik’s chronicler, Gebre Sellassie, wrote that Empress Taitu inquired her husband, Menelik, where to build her houses and he responded:

Which my father (i.e. ancestor), Sahle Sellassie, surrounded with a fence: go there and begin your house. Once, in this very place, Sahle Sellassie, like the prophet Mikias, made the following prophecy. ... he said, ‘O land, today you are full of Gallas (sic), but the day will come when my grandson will build here a house and make of you a city’. It was the will of God, that very week Taitu decided to construct the house (Gebre Sellassie quoted in Pankhurst, 1961: 105).

Empress Taitu started constructing homes by either evicting or massacring Oromo farmers after she was told the above "prophecy" that gave the Oromo a pejorative name.¹² This housing and the ensuing settlements on Finfinne territory is taken as the city's first official plan (Emerta Addis, 2015). As stated in the quote, the plan was an ethnic cleansing plan against the Oromo community on the territory. One needs to note that when Taitu was executing the said housing plan, Emperor Menelik was conducting one of the bloodiest campaigns against the Oromo, the Chalanqo battle in Hararge (Getahun, 2001). In such way, she is said to have played great role in making Addis Ababa a "permanent seat" of Ethiopian Government (ibid: 11). Thus, "early in its infancy, Addis Ababa served as a platform to coordinate the Ethiopian army which defeated the Italian invaders at the battle of Adwa in 1896" (Nebyou, 2007: 6). After wars of conquests, Finfinne territory was distributed by the Emperor to his chiefs and followers as per the traditional practice in the establishment of an army camp and accordingly, the leading statesmen were assigned extensive tracts while smaller plots were issued to royal servants and others (Pankhurst, 1961; Zewdu, 2007).

As stated above, prior to its invasion, Finfinne and its surrounding territories were inhabited by the Tulama Oromo clans of Gullele, Ekka, Galan and Abichu (Alemayehu Haile, 2016; Getahun, 2001).¹³ The present Gulele and Yeka sub-cities of Addis Ababa City Government are named after the first two clans respectively (ibid.). Their socio-political governance mode, as that of Oromos in other parts of their territories, was Gadaa system.¹⁴ The capital of Gadaa of Finfinne was Birbirsu Goro, later renamed Piyassa (Caalaa, 2014). In addition to those massacred upon invasion, large part of Finfinne Oromo were forcibly evicted and resettled in various parts of Oromo territories (Getahun, 2001). Upon the establishment of the capital, particularly following the battle of Adwa in 1896, Peter Garretson (2000) claimed that the Oromo migrated voluntarily out of the area. Clearly and simply, this is a wrong conclusion; major sources indicate that upon the invasion of Finfinne, Oromos who resisted were either massacred or forcibly evicted while the

¹² The pejorative name given to Oromo was "*Galla*" which does not seem to have direct meaning both in Oromo and Amhara languages. For now, what one needs to understand is that the Oromo does not call itself "*Galla*". Especially, the Abyssinian chroniclers had widely used the term with emotively negative characters to refer to the Oromo when they wrote 'histories' of Abyssinian kings and churches.

¹³ Alemayehu Haile, an Oromo historian, Interview on OBS TV, January 22, 2016, Addis Ababa.

¹⁴ *Gadaa* commonly refers to egalitarian socio-political and cultural institutions of the Oromo. According to Asmarom, it "is a system of classes (*Juba*) that succeed each other every eight years in assuming military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities. Each gadaa class remains in power during a specific term (Gadaa) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony" (1973: 8). There are five Gadaa political parties, among which political power rotates every eight years. One need to pass through and complete the five Gadaa age-grades (1-8, 8-16, 16-24, 24-32, 32-40), i.e., has to reach 40 years to become an Abba Gadaa. For more, read Asmarom Legesse's (2000) *Oromo Democracy*.

remaining had to assimilate to Amhara (Merab cited in Cooper and Horvath, 1973; Getahun, 2000). For James Minalian (2002), the imperial capital, Addis Ababa, was founded in traditional Oromo territory, “partly to ensure Oromo loyalty to the Ethiopian Emperor” (p. 1470). Addis Ababa “was founded at the location of a previous Oromo village called Finfinne, and was given an Amharic name Addis Ababa, meaning the New Flower. From the start the city grew as a primary city and remained on the top of the Ethiopian urban hierarchy” (Getahun, 2007: 3). Thus, the origin and evolution of Addis Ababa served as a model for the newly created garrison towns.

In fact, Addis Ababa became the capital of Shewa Province in 1886, and since 1889 it has been functioning as the capital of Ethiopian State (Minwuyelet, 2005). Many writers prefer not to consider the capital of the empire as a city during its first three decades; they instead termed it “collection of villages” (Smith, 2011: 65), “rural character of the city” (Fasil and Gérard, 2007: 122), “rural city” (Pankhurst, 1961: 116). The city grew and expanded around the emperor’s residence surrounded by the army settlements followed by churches in dominant positions, in their order of hierarchy (Bjerer, 1985; Antonsich, 2002). The first mayor of Addis Ababa was said to be W/Tsadik Goshu who “was also the Mayor of Gondar at the same time. He held office from 1909 to 1916 both in Addis Ababa and in Gondar” (Atsedo, 2007: 11). The city of Addis Ababa had 23 Ethiopian mayors from 1910 to 1991. The creation of Menelik’s cabinet in October 1907 had a centralizing influence on the Imperial Palace and the administration of Addis Ababa (Garretson, 2000). The newly established Amharic speaking institutions in the fields of administrations, communications, finance, health, education, were all only beginning to affect the traditional structure of not only Addis Ababa but of Ethiopian life (Pankhurst, 1961).

The other consequence of the invasion of Finfinne and its surrounding areas was the change of place names.¹⁵ The renaming of places in Addis Ababa in the early period was discussed by Samson Bezabeh (2011): “The Emperor quarter was surrounded by the camps of his military chiefs which were referred to as *Safar*; and were distinguished from each other by mentioning the names of the chief who were in the area” (p.894-895). The name of the city was changed from Finfinne to Addis Ababa by Empress Taitu in 1896, and several specific parts of the territory were

¹⁵ Many towns in Oromia were renamed to Amharic ones; for instance, Bishoftu was renamed Debre Zeit, Adama Nazereit, Batu Zeway, Adola Kebre Mengist, Chiro Asebe Teferi, Ambo Agere Hiwot, Waliso Ghion, Ejere Addis Alem, etc. All of these towns have restored their original Oromo names following the downfall of the Derg regime.

renamed gradually (Emerta Addis, 2015).¹⁶ Addis Ababa was thus founded on the grave of the Oromo language, culture and indigenous institutions. Shimelis Bonsa (2013) argues that the renaming of the city and places in the city bears possible future group conflicts:

The process refers to the state's capacity for naming a place that it conquered, at the expense of an old one that it had erased. ... the history and politics of naming and erasure would contain the seeds of a future contest over ownership of Addis Ababa or, at least, claims to special privileges in the city between two groups and two narratives—the Oromo, who claimed autochthony and an ethnonationalist narrative, on the one hand, and the state and a statist nationalist narrative on the other (p. 165).

Due to that renaming, a historically rooted conflict, today, the Oromia Regional State calls the city Finfinne, which is its capital, while the Federal Government of Ethiopia continued to use the term Addis Ababa to refer to the same city. This has complicated the issue of Addis Ababa.

4.3.2 The Imperial Administration of Addis Ababa

The Shoan Amhara Kingdom under Menelik II during the last decades of the 19th century extended its hegemony over much of what is today central, southern, eastern and western Ethiopia. During the Shoan expansion, Menelik moved his capital city out of Amhara territory into Oromo territory; and "in 1889, Menelik became Emperor of Ethiopia and his then military camp, Addis Ababa, became the capital of Ethiopia" (Horvath, 1968: 44). Since then, "especially in the larger cities, the dimension of Amhara culture has expanded" and it was the "Shoan Amhara who are important" (ibid: 44). Other authors go as far to write that "from the outset the new towns had the character of Amhara colonial outposts" (Bjerren, 1985: 77; see also Asafa Jalata, 2010). Other sources on Addis Ababa suggest that "unlike many other African cities, it is a city built entirely by Ethiopians" (Nebyou Tefera, 2007: 5). The Imperial and Derg urban ethnic conditions of Ethiopia show that urban centers were characterized by Amhara ethno-linguistic domination. Speaking fluent Amharic was a typical symbol of 'urban-ness' or "*yeketame lij*" (sons of town) (Bjerren, 1985). Consequently, Ethiopian urban ethnolinguistic policies of the Imperial and *Derg* regimes gave the advantage to the Amhara and those who were able to assimilate to Amhara culture and language (Asafa, 2010).

¹⁶ For instance, places like Agamsa was renamed Merkato (by Italians), Birbirs-Goro Piyassa (Italians), Robi Nifas-Silk, Dabbaso Mashiwalakiya, Calcali Sar-Bet, Badda-Ejersa Ras Kasa-Sefer, Caffee-Tuma Sidist-Kilo, Dalati Arat-Kilo, Garbi Sanga-Tara, Caffee-Annani Meksiko, Gullalle Qera, Hurufa-Bombi Jan-Meda, Baro-Korma Tikur-Ambessa, Harbu Shola, and Mujja was renamed Sheromeda.

By 1910, according to Dr. Paul Merab, a Georgian citizen and the personal physician of Emperor Menelik II, the total population of Addis Ababa was estimated at 65, 000 (excluding foreigners), of which the numerical size of ethnic Amhara constituted less than 20% and Oromo was the largest ethnic group (quoted in Cooper and Horvath, 1973: 230). As a result, during the early decades of its existence, fluency in Amharic was not possessed by the majority of the residents of the city (ibid.; see also Pankhurst, 1963). By this time, Amhara minority rule was being imposed upon the local indigenous community of the Oromo. This is akin to Asian urbanizations based on ethnic diversity and antagonism rooted in the migrations and exclusions such as in Jakarta, Bangalore and Karachi where ethno-linguistically non-local (immigrants) rule the city and legislatively resist the urbanization of indigenous groups (Shah, 2012).

By 1952, due to factors such as language, cultural and migration policies of the city which will be discussed shortly, out of the 402, 000 population of Addis Ababa, the size of Amhara rose to 52.7%, Oromo declined to 18.5%, Gurage rose to 17.2%, Walaitta (4.0%), Tigrayan (2.0%) (Cooper and Horvath, 1973). Getahun Benti observed that “in Addis Ababa, the urban environment was economically, socially, culturally and psychologically designed to accommodate the Amharas in more ways than one” (2001: 59). The Amhara who were minority in the capital gradually became majority by similar ethnic policy of unitary Belgium that helped French become majority in the capital, Brussels by minoritizing Dutch majority (Poirier, 2006).

Above all, by 1967, considerable language shift seemed to have taken place in Addis Ababa, inasmuch as 75% of the population sample in the city claimed Amharic as their ‘language usually used at home’ (Cooper and Horvath, 1973: 231). However, the researchers doubted that “respondents from different mother-tongue groups tended to misrepresent themselves as speaking Amharic natively” (ibid: 237). In any case, this significant language shift was mainly facilitated by Amharic schools and occupational language in the city for which, Baye Yimam (2007: 36) notes, “Amharic language became a common language serving as a medium of communication amongst the people of the city.” Another study on inter-ethnic relations in garrison towns focusing on Addis Ababa claims that due to the *Amharization* policy of the regime, by 1966, “the distinction between the Amhara and Oromo is diminishing rapidly in many of the towns” (Horvath, 1968: 44). Tedla Haile had in 1931 advised the role of education policy and of the army to materialize assimilation of non-Amharas to Amhara identity (cited in Bahru Zewde, 2002). The language and identity shifts, Cooper and Horvath add, “can also be attributed to the growth of Addis Ababa as the

administrative headquarters of an empire whose dominant political group is the Amhara" (1973: 231). Despite the dominance of Amhara political elites, non-Amhara members including the Oromo elites had also participated in the politico-military administrations of Ethiopia in the past. In urban centers too, Amharic speaking Oromo elites were also keen in facilitating assimilations of Oromos into Amhara language and culture (Shimelis, 2013a). It is possible to conclude that the ethno-cultural evolution of Addis Ababa strictly represents urban ethnic politics and policy experimentations of the Imperial and Derg regimes in Ethiopia.

4.3.3 Multiethnic Migration to Addis Ababa and the Status of the Oromo

Multiethnic migration to the city of Addis Ababa has been taking place in various phases. The first migrants were imperial soldiers who were brought by Menelik during the southward expeditions and after the battle of Adwa. Part of this movement was that there were those who came to discharge the expanded volume of government activities in the capital. These were mainly Shewan Amharas. Secondly, there were those who were brought in from the conquered territories as "slaves" to provide domestic services to the household of government officials (Akalou, 1973: 11). Thirdly, the gradual upsurge of Addis Ababa as a prime city with the largest concentration of services and opportunities, constituted the major pulling factor for diverse groups (Shimelis, 2013a).

Due to the ethno-linguistic policy advantages, the majority of immigrants were members of Amhara ethnic group from Gonder, Gojjam and Wallo provinces (Getahun, 2001). Hence, "in 1908 to 1910 there was a new infusion of Amhara into the capital" (Garretson, 2000: 85). After the battle of Adwa, Garretson writes, "Tigre immigrants came not only from the province of Tigre but also from Eritrea" for which "in 1907 the Italian legation at the capital complained that too many people were coming from Eritrea" and as a result, "Shawa resentment over the large influx of Tigre into the capital" boiled over (2000: 84). One of the notorious campaigns carried out by Menelik was in 1894 in Walaitta, where the Emperor brought into the capital large number of war captives for labour purposes, in the form of "slaves" as some write (Garretson, 2000; Pankhurst, 1963). The Oromo, who lost their lands to the imperial capital builders, used to come from the outskirts of the capital only to sell their agricultural produces at the marketplaces of the city (ibid.).

The other issue that must be raised here is the process of immigrant groups' integration to urban Amhara ethno-linguistic condition. According to Baye Yimam (2007: 36), "since its early

years, the city of Addis Ababa has been receiving Ethiopians flocking to its hinterland from the various corners of the country. As Amharic was used as a medium of communication and official language of the government, it was mandatory for non-Amhara Ethiopians to learn and speak Amharic.” In this process, Peter P. Garretson (2000) writes that, for instance, because the Dorze¹⁷ minority was not targeted as that of the indigenous Oromos, “they continued to speak their native tongue among themselves at home and ... that the Dorze were, perhaps, one of the least integrated of the minorities under Amhara control in the capital” (p. 79). He adds, “Gurage speaking peoples were more akin to peoples like the Dorze” with regard to the degree of assimilation to Amhara culture and language in the capital (p.81). Worku Nida agrees that members of ethnic Gurage initially came to Addis Ababa forcibly as war captives to serve as “*corvee* laborers in the capital” to the Shewan ruling class; but later on the Gurage gradually developed voluntary urban migration, known as *fanonet*, in search of better jobs (2000: 52-53). Thus, Gurage became one of the most urban-oriented ethnic groups in Ethiopia. This extensive multiethnic migration to the city, backed by the state suppressive policy against indigenous Oromos, altered the demographic structure of the city which gradually minoritized the later in the city in all sectors (Garretson, 2000).

Furthermore, Getahun Benti (2001) attributed the minoritization of the Oromo in the city to “first by eviction and later through systematic exclusion by enforcing socio-cultural conditions that discouraged the presence of the Oromo in the city” (p.155). For the remaining Oromo who assimilated to the dominant urban culture to survive, Getahun adds, “it was not easy for them to live in a city dominated by a single group because the Amhara considered themselves ‘indigenes or hosts [and] regard[ed] all others as outsiders,’ thus discouraging the Oromo from migrating to the city” (2001: 59). The imposition of Amharic as the language of the state institutions in Addis Ababa accompanied by a systematic suppression of non-Amharic languages was the main urban policy instrument by which non-Amharas, especially indigenous Oromos living in and surrounding the city, were excluded from establishing themselves in the city and benefiting from the opportunities created in the empire's capital (Getahun, 2001; Mekuria, 1994). It is therefore right to argue that the city of Addis Ababa was conquered by Amharic speaking soldiers and thus developed to the advantage of Amhara immigrants, and to the disadvantage of non-Amharas, especially the Oromo who are autochthonous to the city.

¹⁷ During the earlier regimes, the name Dorze was used to refer to Gamo ethnic group.

4.3.4 The Italian Occupation of Addis Ababa

In 1936, Italian troops controlled Addis Ababa, causing deaths and destructions in many parts of the city (Fasil and Gérard, 2007). The Italian occupation period (1936-41), however, was marked by expansion of modern urbanization in Ethiopia (Horvath, 1970) that “not only resulted in the emergence of new towns but also the existing towns assumed new urban functions and characteristics” (Worku, 2000: 47). Italy’s modern road construction had helped much in the flourishing of several towns across the country. In order to introduce a new urban planning, “Addis Ababa, as well as all other Ethiopian settlements, were regarded as dirty places without order” (Antonsich, 2002: 329). As a result, the first master plan of Addis Ababa was prepared by Italian colonial mayors of the city: “The effort to prepare the Addis Ababa City Master Plan began during the five-year Italian occupation,” according to which “the settlement of the city was divided according to color, ethnicity and religion” (Matios Asfaw, 2007: 117). With this urban planning, Italians started to destroy pre-existing urban socio-political and physical structures not only in Addis Ababa but across Ethiopia. The Italian Government assigned seven mayors for Addis Ababa within five years of its occupation.

The Italian master plan of Addis Ababa was formulated in 1937 to segregate the city for Europeans and non-Europeans, and “the implementation of the plan resulted in the dislocation of 10,000 natives” (Bezabeh, 2011: 900). Both Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were good samples of urban policy to create separate settlements or quarters for white people and Ethiopians, although Dire Dawa, at the beginning of the 20th century, due to the French presence from Djibouti (French Somaliland) to run the Ethio-Djibouti Railway Company, presented already such a segregative ethnic policy (Antonsich, 2002).

With the new urban plan, the Italian colonial power envisioned to make Addis Ababa the capital of its East African colonies (Bezabeh, 2011). As a result, the Italian commercial activity in the city was able to attract immigrants:

At that period, the Italians established the Merkato as a market center, destroyed the feudal type of labor arrangements based on patron-client relationships and created a labor market with wages payable in money ... These structural changes expanded the existing urban job opportunities and opened new ones for the in-migrants of Addis Ababa including the Gurage (Worku, 2000: 55).

Beyond the economic plans, the Italian ethno-linguistic policy in Ethiopia interrupted the imperial ethno-cultural homogenization policy. The Italian colonial policy also devoted some attention to

questions of language, as widely argued, to reduce the influence of the Amhara ruling class, politically dominant group in the empire (Administrative Ordinance for Italian East Africa, 1936, Article XXXII; Heugh et al, 2006). Mekuria Bulcha (1994) also observes that “they were interested in winning the trust of non-Amhara peoples through the elimination of the Amhara claim to superiority over them” (p.98). Whatever motive the fascist Italian urban policy might have had, indeed it was unholy motive, “in Addis Ababa schools, Afaan Oromo and Amharic were used” (Mekuria, 1994: 98).

Furthermore, as a counter-policy against the official religion of Ethiopian Empire, Italians built new mosques for Muslims in Addis Ababa “as a means to weakening the Amhara power, traditionally associated with the Coptic Church” (Antonsich, 2002: 335). Therefore, as a foreign power, Italians had certainly instrumentalized ethnic and religious identities to establish their colonial power in the city for which they behaved as if they were on the side of the oppressed identities. In general, Italian urban policy “was the super-imposition of the new power over the old power” (Antonsich, 2002: 331), but all their long-term plans remained a wishful dream and in 1941 the old socio-political, cultural and language structures of urban centers were restored with even more repressive institutions.

4.3.5 Post-1941 Imperial & Derg Urban Policy of Addis Ababa

Haile Selassie's regime restored its power in the capital in 1941, and the post-Italian period up to the 1950s was characterized by a sharp decline in urban activity (Worku, 2000; Horvath, 1970). It resumed the pre-1936 language policy of the empire which made Amharic “the only language used in the administration, the only medium of instruction in primary education and the main language used in the printed press until 1991” (Meyer, 2006: 129). In the post-war, the City Municipality of Addis Ababa, which was established in 1915, got an “Advisors’ Council” and started to conduct cosmetic elections every year (Nebyou, 2007; Emerta Addis, 2015). The current building of Addis Ababa City Municipality was constructed by the Emperor in 1950. In 1954, it became a chartered city administration (Imperial Government of Ethiopia, General Notice No. 172/1954). According to Assefa Fischea, “for most of the twentieth century, Addis Ababa served both as the capital of what was then Shewa Province and as the capital of Ethiopia. Prior to 1974 and with the exception of Addis Ababa, town administration in Ethiopia remained within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for all affairs of provincial administration” (2009: 83-84).

It has been widely written that ethno-national oppression, exclusion and domination intensified in the post-1911 period by the homogenization policy of the imperial regime. Subsequently, non-Amharic languages, which were recognized by the Italian colonial rule, were once again banned by an Imperial Decree No. 3/1944, which made Amharic the sole medium of instruction throughout the empire. Bandyopadhyay and Green (2008:6) argue that “perhaps the best example of a regime that promoted religious and linguistic homogenization was Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, where Amharic became the sole language of primary education in 1943 and literature was banned in all other languages”. The regime also required missionaries, who were already predominant in non-Amharic speaking regions, to use Amharic systematically making them the “work horses of Selassie’s national integration project” (ibid: 6).

As discussed above, Addis Ababa took the lion's share of the policy of assimilation to Amhara culture and language, known as *Amharization* (Cooper & Harvath, 1973). From the state point of view, converting to Amharic speaker was considered not so much as a process of becoming Amhara but as one of advancement to full Ethiopian citizenship taking the form of urban identity. Urban identity formation in Ethiopia, on the other hand, was compared to urban colonial identity formation in other African post-colonial towns: “In many ways, Addis Ababa was for the Amhara, the creators of the empire, what Nairobi was for the British, and its growth owes more to the forces of imperialism and the world economy than to any religion” (Getahun, 2000: 144). Amharic was, for more than a century, the most prestigious and dominant language in Ethiopia for which “it still is the *de facto lingua franca* in towns” (Meyer, 2006: 129). On the contrary, according to Lahra Smith (2008), pre-1991 studies showed that there was no *lingua franca* for trade in Ethiopia, based on comparative study of market transactions in eight major towns.

The opening of Addis Ababa University, then called Haile Selassie I University, in 1950s was a landmark because it became the center of revolutionary and ethno-national movements for changes in Ethiopia. Walelign Mekonen, a radical Ethiopian student movement leader, opposed the overall ethnic conditions in Addis Ababa and beyond in the following manner: “To be a ‘genuine Ethiopian’ one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity... In short, to be an Ethiopian you will have to wear an Amhara mask” (1969: 4). This form of Ethiopian citizenship and identity was founded on the old project of creating an “indivisible Ethiopian nation” especially in urban centers by suppressing the

non-Amharic languages (Mercera, 2006: 120), all of which explain what Will Kymlicka (2006: 49) says “dominant-group nation-building”.

Such ethno-linguistic official policy has had far-reaching consequences. For instance, Emmanuel Abraham wrote that “in April, 1947, 4,795 students attended Addis Ababa schools. Of those, 3,055 said they were Amharas and the remaining 1,740 were from the other ethnic groups” (1995: 64). Therefore, non-Amhara student population ratio was no more than 36 percent. The fact that instruction in all primary schools was in Amharic severely hampered the learning capacity of all those students whose first language was not Amharic (Balsvik, 1985). Moreover, “most schools were located in the Amhara dominated urban areas, particularly in the south, putting the indigenous population at a clear disadvantage” (Leenco, 1999: 177). Thus, ethno-linguistic policy of the imperial regime was one of the major factors of the 1974 Revolution and nationalist movements in Ethiopia.

With regard to access to imperial public employments, Cooper and Horvath (1973) write that “the percentages of Amharic, Tigrinya, and other home-language groups who worked as professionals and technical personnel and as administrators, managers, executives, and clerical personnel were substantially greater than the percentages of Oromo, Gurage, and Dorze home-language groups who held such positions” (p.235). Amharic knowledge level limited access to jobs in Addis Ababa, the capital that has been exploiting the rest of the country (Shemelis, 2013). Structurally, Addis Ababa’s significance lies in its evolution and development as “the most unequal city” in the entire country (ibid: 169).

The major ethno-nationalist opposition leaders against the Imperial and Derg regimes were students of Addis Ababa University in the 1960s and early 70s. For instance, Meles Zenawi of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Galasa Dilbo of Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Esayas Afeworki of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), all left the city of Addis Ababa in the early 1970s to the bush to undertake armed struggles (Leenco Lata, 2004). Before the rise of nationalist movements in Ethiopia, educated non-Amharas usually took pride in their mastery of Amharic and tried to speak it as native speakers. However, the late 1960s and early 70s saw a radical change in their attitude towards the official language of Ethiopia as a form of resistance. Mekuria Bulcha put this way: “in order to register their protest against the language policy of the state and show also pride in their own mother tongue, university students, particularly in public, began to speak deliberately broken Amharic with an Oromo accent. At the same time they also began to use their

language on university campuses and school compounds" (1997: 344-45). The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution was hoped to change ethnic domination policies in the country. However, the Derg, which took state power, proved to be another anti-diversity regime all over the country.

As a result of the Derg's seizure of power in 1974, Assefa Fiseha writes that "municipalities were reorganized as Urban Dwellers Association and were politicized as instruments for the enhancement of the regime's socialist ideology and for the consolidation of its powers" (2009: 84). He adds that urban local institutions "were reduced to mere agents of the central government since most of the decisions were virtually made at the central level" (ibid: 84). Therefore, linguistic and cultural assimilation policy of the old order continued everywhere in the country. In the case of Addis Ababa, because the language in which students learn has greater prestige or greater usefulness than their mother tongue, they gradually abandon their mother tongue by speaking the second language at home (Mekuria, 1994), with the result that "their children or grandchildren learn the latter as their first language" (Cooper & Horvath, 1973: 221). Therefore, what happened in the capital was "a situation in which the language of one group is displaced by that of another as mother tongue" (ibid: 224). As a result of the successive Ethiopian regimes' urban language policy, substantial numbers of urban non-Amharas have adopted Amharic as their mother-tongue. Thus, it is argued that the process of urbanization has acted as an agent for the diffusion of Amhara language and culture in Ethiopia (Cooper and Horvath, 1973; Asafa, 2010). Despite several decades of formal and informal diffusion, Lahra Smith argues, Amharic never achieved "nation-wide status" to be a *lingua franca* at least in major towns (2008: 219). In terms of urban ethnopolitics and policies, there was no basic difference between Menelik, Hailse Selassie and Derg governments (Smith, 2008; Mekuria, 1994). So, Addis Ababa as a capital developed on the basis of institutionalized ethno-cultural discrimination and marginalization policies, which appear in many ways to have continued unchecked under the EPRDF regime too, as argued in chapter seven.

4.4 The Making of Dire Dawa, Pre-1991 Ethnic Politics & Policy

4.4.1 On the Establishment of Dire Dawa

Before Dire Dawa was founded as a town in 1902, there was an old town called Jaldessa in the same vicinity, believed to have emerged with the arrival of Arab traders around 9th century A.D.¹⁸ Jaldessa thus might have been the first city-state in eastern Ethiopia predating Harar city. Until its downfall with the rise of Dire Dawa, Jaldessa had served as a trans-shipment town on the route to Zeila port (Pankhurst, 1968). Jaldessa is now located in the northeastern part of Dire Dawa. As a town, the establishment of Dire Dawa is mainly attributed to the Ethio-Djibouti railway construction that was undertaken between 1902 and 1917 (Shiferaw, 1987). Prior to the 1902 development, Dire Dawa was a pastoralist village. Due to the pastoralist mobility characters in the area, it is no surprise that explanations compete as to who really is indigenous to Dire Dawa.

The first narrative identifies Oromo (Nole and Ala clans) as the indigenous community to Dire Dawa. It argues that there were already Oromo villages of Ganda Boyye, Ganda Kafira and Kabrijolle long before the arrival of Menelik's soldiers in the area (Megersa Qiltu, 2005). The age of Dire Dawa, it says, should not be reduced to the age of the railway station in the town. The second claim considers Issa and Gurgura clans of Somali as early indigenous communities to the pastoralist land of Dire Dawa.¹⁹ That was why, it argues, Dire Dawa was under Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* (sub-province) from 1963 to 1987.²⁰ The rationales of naming of administrative structure after a clan or two will be discussed shortly. Somali informants claim that the 1977/8 Ethio-Somalia war caused Somali exodus to Djibouti shrinking their population in the city (Ali Moussa, et al, 1998). The third claim, in fact the regime's opinion, tries to strike balance between the two narratives. It considers the Oromo and Somali as the co-founding ethnic groups of Dire Dawa.²¹ This approach thus appears a conflict resolution, a compromise approach on the history.

¹⁸ Interview, Abdullah Salih Kurre Bonaya (locally known as Giricho), age 92, Gurgura (identifies himself Oromo), on April 28, 2012, Dire Dawa.

¹⁹ Interview, Mohammed Hassan, Somali, Somali Regional State Civil Servant, March 18, 2013, Jijiga.

²⁰ Interview, Abdullahi Sheik Ahmed (Master Abdullahi), Advisor to *Ugaas*, the last Dergue governor of Dire Dawa, Age 60, April 5, 2012, Dire Dawa

²¹ Interviews, Biftu Mohammed, Speaker of Dire Dawa Administration Council, January 21, 2013, Dire Dawa; Abdulahi Adem Yusuf, ESPDP Public Relations Head, Dire Dawa Branch, September 22, 2013, Dire Dawa; Abraham Adula Oge, Head, Dire Dawa EPRDF Committee, February 1, 2013, Dire Dawa. In October 2006, an Oromo opposition member in the HPR demanded the Oromo claim to Dire Dawa be resolved immediately, arguing that "Dire Dawa belongs to the Oromo." In reaction to this, an ESPDP member of parliament, now FDRE Ambassador of Ethiopia to Egypt, H.E. Muhammad Dirir commented in Oromo language, saying "*Nutimmoo Dirree Dawaan kan cennyuuyuu miti; Dirree Dawaan kan Rabbiiti jenna*" which roughly means 'we say Dire Dawa

However, writers observed Issa's 'westward expansion' following the Ethio-Djibouti railway construction (Yasin, 2010; Bekele, 2010). For instance, Getachew and Gebre argue that "wide-scale westward expansion of Issa in the past seven to eight decades has displaced a number of Afar clans (particularly those who belong to the Weima tribe) from their traditional rangelands" (cited in Bekele, 2010:139). Furthermore, as written by Yasin, "in 1984 all Issa employees and officials in Djibouti contributed to a special fund used to finance the conquest of the West. Apart from offering military trainings, arms and medical support for Issa fighters, [...] Djiboutian military commanders participated at times in the so-called pastoral confrontation" (Yasin, 2010:112). According to Henri Baldet (1972), Nole Oromo had fought with their Afar adversaries on Dire Dawa before Issa/Somali reached them. Asnake Kefale (2010) raised pre-1902 frequent skirmishes in the Dire Dawa plain between Afar, Oromo and Somali herders. Megersa (2005) asserts that Issa's approaching to the city proper is no more than sixty years; and Afar instead used to reside in Malka Jabdu (specifically known as Gola Adal) part of the town before they were pushed away. Others argue that though Issa's real involvement in Dire Dawa affairs was mainly a post-1941 phenomenon,²² they started settlements along the railroads and stations right from Djibouti all the way to Adama since 1902.²³

The naming of the town and places in it are also disputed. The term 'Dire Dawa' is an Oromo term which means 'land of medicine' named after the early practice of the railway company distributing medicine to its employees and surrounding population to combat malaria (Getahun, 1997; Shiferaw, 1987). The same term, in Somali media outlets, is written as '*Dirdhaba*' which means 'empty plain' in Somali language to counter the Oromo narratives.²⁴ As a result, Asnake Kefale (2010) wrote that, the claims of the Oromo and the Somali groups to Dire Dawa

belongs to nobody, it belongs to God.' This implies that both ethnic groups, through their representatives, were able to bring their conflicts to the formal parliament.

²² Interview, Mohammed Abdullahi, Chairperson of the Social Affairs Standing Committee of Dire Dawa Administration Council, March 11, 2013, Dire Dawa. In the so-called Greater Somalia Vision, Siad Barre government had caveated that its territories stretched westward to include Afar Region and Wollo areas in the Northeast, Somali areas, Hararghe, Arsi, Bale, part of east Shewa up to Adama (100 kms east of Addis Ababa) from east to central Ethiopia, through Moyale to North Kenya in the south. To accomplish this expansionist agenda, Barre formed five organizational fronts in Ethiopia: Somali *wariya* aimed to control all Ethiopian Somali lands, Somali *abo* to incorporate Oromo areas, Somali *ika* for Afars, Somali *ante* for Wollo, and Somali *enafde* for Kenyans (Focus Group Discussion, Oromo elders in Dire Dawa, May 9, 2012, Dire Dawa). Since all claimed territories in eastern Ethiopia were followers of Islamic religion, the latter was said to have been manipulated by Siad Barre against Ethiopian Government which was officially Christian up to 1974.

²³ Interview, Habtamu Assefa, former OPDO Governor of Dire Dawa (1991-1993), May 30, 2012, Dire Dawa

²⁴ Dire Dawa is also known Dire Dhawa by many Oromo, which means land of conflict.

begin right from the very meaning of Dire Dawa and Oromo place names in the city such as Lagahare (river of donkey), Ganda Qore (village of wood), Ganda Gara (village of mountain), Ganda Boyye (village of pigs), Malka Jabdu (river of the toughs). Linguistic justifications, Asnake implied, may be weak for both Oromo and Somali languages belong to the Cushitic language family (ibid.). It is not the aim of this dissertation to resolve the tensions between the two narratives. It instead systematically studies the ethno-linguistic politics, and associated state policies in the town.

4.4.2 The Imperial Administration of Dire Dawa

Menelik II incorporated Dire Dawa into the Ethiopian empire state after the infamous bloody battle of Chalanqo in 1887 (Chalanqo is about 60 km southwest of Dire Dawa) (Mohammed Hassen, 2008; Bahru Zewde, 2007). In the late 1890s, Dire Dawa villages were structured under the rule of *Melkegna* (local authority, often soldiers) centering in Kombolcha, located adjacent to Harar city (Megersa, 2005). Menelik's *Melkegna* and *Gabar* respectively replaced *Damina*²⁵ and *Garad*²⁶ local institutions that had once served the Turkish-Arabs and Egyptian foreign rules.²⁷ When Menelik's troops arrived in the area, Dire Dawa lands used to be owned by eighteen *Garads*.²⁸ As Kombolcha appeared very distant from Dire Dawa for administrative expediency, Ras Mekonen W/Mekael Guddisa (the father of Emperor Haile Selassie), governor of eastern Ethiopia, restructured the area to be governed by a *Malkegna* in Qarsa. The administration of the

²⁵ *Damina* is believed to have an Arab origin, and now it refers to a clan leader among the Oromos in and surrounding Dire Dawa.

²⁶ *Garad* on the other hand was local landowner for whom pastoralists and sedentary community had to pay homages for land use (Mohammed Hassen, 2008).

²⁷ The Turkish (10th century) and Egyptian (1875-1885) Arab rules of eastern Ethiopia had huge socio-economic and cultural impacts. Turk-Arab foreign rule is believed to have favored clan based social division and relations. Turkish rule imposed its political system [emirate and sultanate system], religion [Islam], culture [Arab culture], land tenure system [*garad* system], clan based traditional local intermediary rule [*Ugaas* and *damina* systems], and other social systems including Arab linguistic influence upon eastern Ethiopian peoples (Mohammed, 2008). *Ugaas* now refers to a clan leader in Somali people (Abdulkhakim, 2011). Thus, the Turkish and Egyptian rules had managed to seriously affect all socio-political and religious systems of the peoples in the area. The *Gadaa* system in the eastern Oromo was not therefore abolished by Menelik unlike in Addis Ababa and other parts of Oromo land.

²⁸ Some of the prominent *Garads* were Musa Ware, Ahmed Adal, Ali Musa Boru, Ahmed Adem, Elemo Mude, Aman Roba, Reti, Giricho, Hasen Roble, Karkarale, and Humbana Roba. All of the eighteen *Garads* were Oromo except for Hassein Roble who was said Gurgura (Interview, Megersa Qiltu, High school teacher, April 29, 2012, Dire Dawa).

latter *Malkegna* stretched up to Dire Dawa to become Gara Guracha *Awraja* (sub-province) centered at Qarsa.²⁹

More specifically, from 1902 to 1929, local government of Dire Dawa evolved into two, i.e. the 'European quarter' *Gezira* and 'indigenous quarter' *Magala* separated by Dachatu River (Shiferaw Bekele, 1987; Akalou, 1973). While *Magala*³⁰ was fully under Ethiopian administration within Gara Guracha *Awraja*, *Gezira* was directly administered by the French Railway Company (ibid.). Pankhurst (1968) writes that the first governor of Dire Dawa representing Emperor Menelik II was Mersha Nahusenay, who was also one of the negotiators during the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway construction. Following the conquest and especially after the railway construction, settlements of ethnic Amhara undertook to place the town under the regime's control (ibid.). The settlers rule promoted the diffusion of Amhara language and culture, and Orthodox Christianity in the town. Dire Dawa was part of the administration of Gara Guracha *Awraja* until it fell to Italians in 1936.

Before we discuss the Italian occupation of Dire Dawa, it would be good to cast lights on the Oromo-Gurgura unique social relations in the town and surroundings. Originally, Gurgura was believed to be one of the Somali clans, but this clan was adopted³¹ and integrated into Nole clan of Oromo, long before Menelik arrived in the area. Gurgura became Oromo and Afaan Oromo speakers. Geographically, their settlement is between Oromo and Issa. In the course of time, it is said that an adopted Gurgura son called Buh Gadide became the head of Nole and Ala clans of Oromo in the early 1940s. The regime appointed him as *balabbat*³² (intermediary local ruler) of Dire Dawa District of Gara Guracha *Awraja*. No sooner had he become *balabbat* than he took *Ugaas*³³ title (Abdulkhakim, 2011), and convinced *Awraja* and *Teklay Gizat* (provincial) authorities for the renaming of Gara Guracha *Awraja*, in which the administration Dire Dawa was one, to Gurgura and Gura Guracha *Awraja* (Baldet, 1972). In the post-Italian decade, Ugaas Buh had

²⁹Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22. Kombolcha and Qarsa towns are in Oromo territories. Gara Guracha is an Oromo phrase, which means Black Mountain.

³⁰*Magala* is an Oromo term which means town or city.

³¹There are various ways of *moggasa* or *gudichifacha* (adoption) institutions in Oromo society. One form of *moggasa* is a collective adoption method (*medhacha*) whereby the process takes place by representation which allows a group of adoptees to settle in contiguous geographic location. Sometime long before the coming of Menelik II to the area, Gurgura as a clan were believed to have adopted to Nole clan of Oromo and became son of Nole. In short, Gurgura is said to be *Noleized*/Oromoized.

³²*Balabbat* was an intermediary local ruler during the feudal government of Ethiopia. Often, local indigenous leaders turn to *balabbats*.

³³As mentioned above, *Ugaas* is a title of clan leader in Somali people.

been suspected of restoring Gurgura's Somali identity to ally with Issa/Somali, though he was chosen to represent Oromo for which some say the Oromo-Gurgura social bond started to fragment.³⁴

4.4.3 The Italian Occupation of Dire Dawa

Prior to the Italian occupation (1936-41), the peoples in the city had already been ethnically and linguistically oppressed by the imperial homogenization policy (Mekuria, 1994). Sources indicate that the feudal and oppressive nature of the Amhara³⁵ rule in and surrounding Dire Dawa was manipulated by Italian rulers for their power ascendancy: "Oromo women had milled sorghum, collected fire woods for women of Amhara; and men built fences and homes for Amhara rulers. Italians taught this system as Amhara colonialism to mobilize against Amhara."³⁶ Consequently, "the white men [Italians], who belittled all, tied Amhara men in yokes as oxen and ploughed land with them [*Amaaraan dachee qotan*]" (ibid.). This suggests that Italian occupation of the town was extremely severe for the Amhara men than others. Italian rule attempted to defend its inhuman crimes against Amhara as a revenge for the oppressed Ethiopian nationalities (Mekuria, 1994). Making their seat in Kazira, central part of the town, the Italians assembled Dire Dawa airport in order to facilitate their colonial centralization of the area.

Furthermore, the Italian colonial government built a mosque for Muslims [known as *Masjid Jumma*] in Dire Dawa (in Magala part of the town) as an anti-thesis to the Christian official religion of the imperial regime. Due to the Italian ethno-religious manipulation policies, the relationship between Oromo and Amhara deteriorated in the town and it lingered with them in the post-1941 years (Milkessa, 2013). Put differently, the Italian occupation of the town launched not only ethnic consciousness and competitions for power and resources between Oromo and

³⁴ During the Haile Selassie regime to the mid-1980s, Gurgura identity was generally seen as Oromo identity, for which reason the frontline leaders of *Afian Qallo* Oromo movement were Gurgura who sacrificed their precious lives for the Oromo cause. And finally, during the EPRDF government, major parts of Gurgura have been officially reorganized with Issa as Somali (conscious shift of ethnic identity) though they continue to speak Oromo language.

³⁵ One must note that all followers of Christianity in eastern Ethiopia in general and Dire Dawa in particular were locally known to Muslims as Amharas regardless of their ethnic or linguistic backgrounds. All rulers were also seen as Amhara. An Oromo who is not Muslim was not considered Oromo. Put differently, Oromo were seen as only Muslims.

³⁶ Interview, *supra* note 18.

Amhara, but sowed the seeds of hostility, enmity and the future conflicts.³⁷ As a result, the situation of Muslim Oromos in Dire Dawa worsened after the departure of Italians.

4.4.4 Post-1941 Imperial & Derg Administrations of Dire Dawa

Haile Selassie reinstalled central rule in the town following the defeat of Italians in 1941. In the following years, the regime strategically caused Oromo-Somali inter-ethnic mistrust, tensions and conflicts for political gains (Megersa, 2005). The Italians were said to have favored the Oromo against what they called 'Amhara colonial government' in the town. Immediately after Ethiopia got its independence from Italians, Dire Dawa, which was then ruled under Gara Guracha *Awraja*, was first restructured as Gurgura and Gara Guracha *Awraja*, and then further renamed as Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* in 1963 (Dire Dawa Government Communication, 2014). The regime systematically replaced Oromo's naming of Gara Guracha by Somali clans' names of Issa and Gurgura. It can be argued that the regime strategically manipulated ethnicity in the town for twin missions. The first motive was allegedly to weaken the Oromo stronghold in the town who were [said] favored by Italian occupation.³⁸ The other mission was related to the claim that Issa/Somali helped Haile Selassie safely escape Italian punishment in 1936. A Gurgura elder in Dire Dawa, aged 96, commented:

After his defeat by Italians, Haile Selassie decided not to die in the battle and escaped through Djibouti. It was the Issa clan of Somali, who then had upper hand on the railway roads from Dire Dawa to Djibouti, and hence arranged Haile Selassie's secret travel from Dire Dawa through Dikil port to Djibouti. They dressed him Issa's cultural attires and shoes. The Emperor safely arrived in Djibouti and further traveled to Hargessa, Somaliland where the British government organized his London trip (ibid.).³⁹

This claim suggests that the life of the Emperor was rescued with the help of Issa/Somali. True, in 1936, Djibouti and Somaliland were French and British colonies respectively, both of which were against Italian aggression. Soon after the liberation of Ethiopia from Italians, *in a quid pro quo*, the Emperor was said to have granted Issa/Somali the right to settlement in Afetesa and Allabade parts of Dire Dawa (Megersa, 2005). Except for this settlement and administrative renaming policies of the regime for tactical reasons, no Somali was encouraged to participate in the civil administration

³⁷ Interview, *Abba Gadaa* Abdumalik Yunis, May 29, 2012, Dire Dawa.

³⁸ Interview, *supra* note 18.

³⁹ Ibid.

of the town (ibid.). Thus, the regime's seemingly ethnic favoritism towards Somali was unholy, which, possibly, the regime used as instrument to create conflicts and retain its political power.

In 1940s and 50s, Dire Dawa town was the capital of Gurgura and Gara Guracha *Awraja* which shared border with Adal and Issa *Awraja* headquartering at Erer, about 20 kms west of Dire Dawa.⁴⁰ The latter *Awraja* was a local government of Afar and Issa peoples who were also hostile groups against each other (Yasin, 2010). Ugaas Hassen Hirsi was the head of Issa clan and Ugaas Almira was the head of Adal (Afar), both of whom were made *balabbats* of Adal and Issa *Awraja*. This *Awraja* was affected by the so-called Greater Somalia movement in the horn of Africa and Issa pushed the Afar and Oromo away from Erer, Mieso and Awash areas (Mesfin, 2006; Bekele, 2010). The imperial army of Ethiopia reinforced an Afar guerilla to counter the pressures of Somalia movement (Seffefe, 1978). Threatened by this irredentist nationalism, the *Inderase* (Emperor's agent) of Hararge Province, eastern Ethiopia, *Lij Workineh W/Amanuel* convened a meeting in 1963 in Dire Dawa, on which meeting seven *balabbats* [*Ugaas* of Issa, *Ugaas* of Afar, *Ugaas* of Gurgura-Oromo, and other four Oromo *balabbats*] and members of imperial parliament representing Hararge Province participated.⁴¹

The meeting finally dissolved Adal and Issa *Awraja*. As a result, Gurgura and Gara Guracha *Awraja* renamed as Issa and Gurgura *Awraja*, and Dire Dawa became the capital of two *balabbats*—*Ugaas* Hassen Hirsi and *Ugaas* Buh Gedide, respectively. The last time *Ugaas* of Issa changed his capital from Djibouti to Erer was in 1933 and after three decades he moved little back to Dire Dawa (Moussa et al., 1998). The old administrative names of Adal and Gara Guracha were paired to become Adal and Gara Guracha *Awraja* with its capital Chercher covering areas like Chiro, Mieso, Habro up to Awash.⁴² Some informants, however, argue that the administrative restructuring was aimed to “appease” Issa for the role they played when the Emperor escaped Italian occupation (ibid.). This claim is not clear due to the fact that the meeting was convened against Somalia movements. The renaming was also believed to be part of the whole project of weakening the Oromo in Dire Dawa.⁴³ It looks therefore the meeting had multiple instrumental drives. Since 1963 (up to 1987), Dire Dawa was a district and political center of Issa and Gurgura

⁴⁰ Focus Group Discussion, Somali elders in Dire Dawa, March 22, 2012, Dire Dawa. Adal referred to Afar people in the past and the imperial regime used the term to organize local administration. It is now seen as a derogative term among Afars.

⁴¹ Interview, Nuriya Sheik Hassein, age 63, Gurgura, August 13, 2012, Dire Dawa.

⁴² Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

⁴³ Interview, Mohammed Musa, May 26, 2012, Dire Dawa.

Awraja. One must note that the naming of the town in history has been used as justifications for the conflicting claims of Oromo and Somali to the city following the collapse of the Derg.

The Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* was one of the 64 *Awrajas* grouped under the 12 provinces of Ethiopia. So, it was part of the Province of Hararge.⁴⁴ In 1950, the Gurgura and Gara Guracha *Awraja* included three *woredas*: Gurgura *Woreda*, Qarsa *Woreda*, and the main Dire Dawa town. *Ugaas* Buh Gadide was Gurgura *Woreda's* *balabbat* (Getahun, 1997). Dire Dawa town has had governors/mayors. Getahun lists 12 successive governors of Dire Dawa from 1941 to 1974. In terms of ethnicity, except for four governors (two Eritreans, one Gurage, and one Oromo), all the rest were Amharas. None of them was ethnically Somali. The system was built to the advantage of Amhara at the expense of local Oromo and Somali groups. This reveals that the tactical naming and renaming of *Awrajas* after local clans served mainly the regime by sowing the seeds of future local competitions, mistrusts and conflicts.

The city of Dire Dawa became so significant after Addis Ababa, for Haile Selassie due to various reasons. First, the presence of sizeable foreign community from early foundation of the town such as Arabs, Greeks, Indians, French, and other expatriate populations opened the appetite of the regime for the town. Second, it was one of the places in the country where the British maintained their heavy presence for some time in the post-1941 period (Getahun, 1997). Third, Dire Dawa, with its developed railway and air facilities, went on servicing an important part of the foreign trade of the country in addition to its growing industrial activities. Fourth, Dire Dawa was something like a second capital to Emperor Haile Selassie. That is why he built his palace and paid occasional and annual visits to the town (Megersa, 2005). Fifth, Dire Dawa's proximity to Djibouti and its strategic importance to Ethiopia, a vital outlet to the Ethiopian economy associated with railway road, and hence, became major foreign policy concern of all the consecutive regimes of the country to-date (Getahun, 1997; Asnake, 2010). As a result, the imperial government of Ethiopia had to use complex strategies to keep its power unchallenged in the town.

The collapse of the Imperial regime through popular revolution in 1974 could not resolve the 'nationalities questions'. National resistances thus continued almost everywhere (Teshale, 1995). In Dire Dawa too, the Derg responded to popular demands by *brute force* as it did in other parts of the country. Administratively, Dire Dawa remained within the Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* up

⁴⁴ The whole eastern Ethiopian regions (which included today's Hararge zones of Oromia, Somali Region, Afar Region, Harari Region, and Dire Dawa) were structured as Hararge Province (named after Harari minority).

to 1987. The Derg only changed Amharic naming of provincial administrations known as *Teklay-Gizat* to *Kille-Hager* in 1979, accusing the former term of conveying colonial and imperial connotations.⁴⁵ On the brink of its demise, the Derg proclaimed a Constitution of People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE, 1987) by which it introduced a facade of restructuring of the country into various administrative and autonomous regions.

Dire Dawa became one of the five *ras gaz* (autonomous regions) of Ethiopia, the others being Ogaden, Eritrea, Tigray and Assab (Asnake, 2014). Dire Dawa *Ras Gaz* comprised six *awrajas* [Aysha, Shinile, Erer, Dembel, Singay, and Asmir and Dire Dawa zuria]; and Muhammad Hassein, a Somali, became the first governor of Dire Dawa *Ras Gaz* in 1987.⁴⁶ Abdullahi Sheik Ahmed, the last governor of the *Ras Gaz*, who was also Issa/Somali, said in an interview "the *Ras Gaz* used to have its own ceremonial assembly known as Dire Dawa *Ras Gaz Shengo* during its three year duration from which Muhammad Hassein was chosen and finally replaced by me. Promotion and demotion was the power of the *Ras Gaz Shengo* upon the recommendation by higher authority" (ibid.). He added that the city was run by a committee composed of three men (Issa/Somali as the governor, Gadabursi/Somali as the Secretary of the ruling Worker's Party of Ethiopia (WPE), and Oromo as the WPE's V/Secretary).⁴⁷ It looks a sort of inter-clan/ethnic executive representation; however, Abdullahi Sheik Ahmed noted that "the committee was not composed of ethnic representations. I, for example, was elected not because of my ethnicity but because of Derg's choice"⁴⁸.

Like its predecessors, the Derg dictatorship had no ethno-cultural diversity accommodation policy. As Haile Selassie regime shrewdly manipulated the naming of *Awrajas*, the Derg too used local ethnicity as instrument to retain its grip on power by assigning Somali governors as nominal heads of Dire Dawa *Ras Gaz*. The Derg assigned Somali *Ras Gaz* governor for Dire Dawa, but it committed summary executions against Somalis themselves and Oromos in the town labeling them sympathizers of Siad Barre and OLF insurgent movements, respectively.⁴⁹ The Transitional Period (1991-1995) Charter of Ethiopia aptly states that "the military dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the previous regimes" (Preamble, Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, 1991).

⁴⁵ Interview, *supra* note 22.

⁴⁶ Interview, *supra* note 20.

⁴⁷ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

⁴⁸ Interview, *supra* note 20.

⁴⁹ Focus Group Discussion, elders of Melka Jebdu, mixture of Gurgura and Oromo, February 23, 2013, Dire Dawa.

4.5 Summary

On their origins as compact urban settlements, while Addis Ababa was definitely founded as a garrison town in 1886, Dire Dawa as a town was established in 1902 as a railway town though military had occupied the area earlier and their settlements took place subsequently. The indigenous socio-cultures in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were conquered and dominated in different times by different forces. This means, when Menelik II and his soldiers controlled Addis Ababa in 1880s, Dire Dawa indigenous pastoralists had already been under the influences of foreign socio-cultures due to the Turkish-Arab (since around 10th century) and Egyptian (1875) controls of the area. Thus, unlike Addis Ababa and its surroundings, Menelik II was not the first conquer for Dire Dawa and its surroundings.

Both cases of urban historical studies have shown that the origins of major multiethnic cities of Ethiopia were laid down by the military conquests and evolved subsequently under the Amhara socio-cultural and language impositions. One of the consequences of this politico-military process under Amharic speaking ruling class was the emergence of socio-culturally stratified cities. Daniel J. Elazar has aptly deduced that “conquest tends to produce hierarchically organized regimes ruled in an authoritarian manner: power pyramids with the conqueror on top, his agents in the middle, and the people underneath the governing structure” (1987: 3). The Amharic language was officially promoted as a symbolic language of “civilized” urban dwellers of Ethiopia; while other non-Amharic languages were relegated to the status of “uncivilized” rural languages. Amharic language was a compulsory course; all students were expected to pass in order to enter higher education institutions. Italians, in their brief occupation period, lifted Amhara cultural and language dominance across the empire, but consciously manipulated ethnicity through their colonial urban policies in both cities.

The history of major urban areas in Ethiopia shows that the Ethiopian imperial rule elevated Amharic language to the sole urban language, Orthodox Christianity to urban religion, Amhara socio-cultural traditions to urban dominant culture. The Derg brought no significant changes to the status of urban ethnic conditions in Ethiopia. It was thus institutionalized for a century in the minds of every citizen in subtle social policy institutions, which still is affecting the urban society in contemporary Ethiopia. One can generalize the pre-1991 urban ethnic conditions in Ethiopia as an era of Amhara ethnicity in cities (or Amhara-ethnic-city). In general, it was argued that local inter-ethnic/clan relations were manipulated by the imperial, Italian and Derg regimes for

their respective political ends which in one way or the other finally resulted in ethno-linguistic and cultural dominance of the Amharic speakers in major multiethnic cities of Ethiopia. The widespread ethno-linguistic suppressions and cultural dominations of non-Amharic speaking national groups was one of the major causes for the rise of various armed ethno-national liberation movements which led to the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991. The next chapters would be dealing with the post-Derg urban conflicts to and governances of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Chapter 5

The Dynamics of Ethno-nationalist Conflicts to Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we have seen the socio-cultural makings of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in the political history contexts of Ethiopia. It has been argued that the political history of major urban areas in Ethiopia witnessed the Solomonic dynastic rule, which elevated Amharic language to the sole urban language, Orthodox Christianity to urban religion, and Amhara socio-cultural traditions to urban dominant culture. The change of the Imperial regime in 1974 brought almost no change to the status of urban ethnic conditions in Ethiopia. The widespread ethno-linguistic suppression and cultural domination of non-Amharic speaking national groups was articulated as the 'nationalities question' in Ethiopia, one of the major causes for the rise of various armed ethno-national liberation movements and civil wars which led to the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991. As a result, both the Transitional Charter (1991) and the Federal Constitution (1995) provided the rights to self-determination including up to secession for "nations, nationalities and peoples" of Ethiopia. Accordingly, Proclamation No. 7/1992 established fourteen national/regional self-governments which were later compressed to nine regional-states by the FDRE Constitution (1995: Art. 47).

Multiethnic urban centers were contested among national groups who claim to be indigenous to the areas. Many writers have observed that the post-Derg conflicts to multiethnic urban centers have mainly taken the form of ethno-nationalist ownership conflicts (Asnake, 2014; Milkessa, 2014; Fikadu, 2011; Dirribi, 2011). Not only ownership claims, this research in this and the next chapters argues, but the practice of very basic constitutional rights of ethno-national groups such as language and cultural rights, civil and political representations (accommodation of diversity) in multiethnic cities especially in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have also become challenging phenomena. In this chapter, one of the major themes of the research problem of this dissertation, urban ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are dealt with.

Before we delve into discussing the major ethno-nationalist conflicts to both cities, this chapter first introduces the governance statuses of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). Secondly, the chapter explores the dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Under the discussion of ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa, the paradox of Oromo's rights in Addis Ababa, Oromia's Capital move to Adama and Oromo's resistance, post-elections protests in the city, and the recent Oromo protests against the Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan are presented. Finally, this chapter assesses the ethno-nationalist conflicts to Dire Dawa which include, among others, the 1991 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) versus Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) conflict, the 1992 IGLF versus Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) conflict, and ethno-nationalist clashes of 1992, 2006 and 2014.

5.2 Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa during Transitional Period of Ethiopia (1991-1995)

The Derg Government was overthrown by armed national liberation forces in May 1991 after protracted civil wars that devastated the country. As a result, the national liberation movements and other political organizations, which toppled the Derg regime, convened a peace conference commonly referred to as the July Peace and Democracy Conference, from July 1 to July 5, 1991, adopted governing charter and established transitional government (Transitional Charter of Ethiopia, 1991). Dozens of political forces, some well-armed and others created overnight, participated in the Conference to have inputs in the Charter (Merera, 2011; Assefa, 2007; Asnake, 2009). The Charter opened that "the military dictatorship was, in essence, a continuation of the previous regimes and its demise marks the end of an era of subjugation and oppression thus starting a new chapter in Ethiopian history in which freedom, equal rights and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic and social life" (Preamble of Transitional Charter of Ethiopia, 1991). Furthermore, the Transitional Charter envisaged that the overthrow of the Derg bestowed "the peoples of Ethiopia with the opportunity to *rebuild the country and restructure the state* democratically" (ibid.). More specifically, Article two of the Charter outlined guiding principles on which the Ethiopian state was reconfigured:

The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality and people is guaranteed the right to: a) Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history and use and develop its language; b) Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the

central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation; c) Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned nation, nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated.

In order to give effect to this right of nations, nationalities and peoples, a proclamation defining and establishing "National/Regional Self-Governments" was issued (Proclamation No. 7/1992). Article 3 (1) of the Proclamation No. 7/1992 lists 65 groupings which the proclamation catalogs as "nations, nationalities and peoples"⁵⁰ who, individually or jointly, established fourteen "National/Regional Self-Governments". Funny enough, Addis Ababa was listed as the 65th nation/nationality and granted regional self-governing status as Region Fourteen. Consequently, "Addis Ababa served both as a regional government and as the seat of the newly established transitional national government" (Assefa, 2009: 84).

Furthermore, the above proclamation provided that "the special national interests and political right of the Oromo over Region Thirteen and Region Fourteen are reserved. These regions shall be accountable to the Central Transitional Government and the relations of these Self-Governments with the Central Transitional Government shall be prescribed in detail by a special law" (Proclamation No. 7/1992, Article 3/4). Region Thirteen was Harari Nationality Self-Government Region. Three points could be made. First, Addis Ababa was one of the fourteen National/Regional Self-Governments of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1992-1995). Second, the special national interests and political rights of the Oromo over Addis Ababa were guaranteed by the Proclamation No. 7/1992. Third, due to the rights of the Oromo over the two City Regional Self-Governments and other associated factors, both cities of Addis Ababa and Harar were made accountable to the Central Transitional Government of Ethiopia. Moreover, it was during the transitional period that Region Four, otherwise known as Oromia Region, chose the city of Finfinne/Addis Ababa as its capital. Senior OPDO official, in my personal interview, implicated that "few leadership in the EPRDF circle, particularly of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), opposed OPDO's choice of Finfinne as Oromia's capital; however, the decisive support was secured from the TPLF top man, Meles Zenawi."⁵¹

When the Proclamation No. 7/1992 was promulgated on the 14th of January 1992, there was no explicit nationalist dispute over Dire Dawa. By that time, the OPDO had already started to

⁵⁰ Article 2(7): "Nation or Nationality' means a people living in the same geographical area and having a common psychological make-up of identity".

⁵¹ Interview, a high-ranking OPDO Official, Headquarter of the OPDO, April 13, 2016, Addis Ababa

administer the city. The Oromo-Somali dispute over the city broke out apparently during the elections that the National/Regional Self-Governments were required to hold in June of 1992. Proclamation No. 7/1992 set three factors on which the borders of national self-government units should be delimited: "(1) The adjacency of territory settled by a nation, nationality and people shall be the basis for the delimitation of the borders of a National Self-Government... (2) Where a *Woreda* is settled by more than one nation, nationality or people, such *Woreda* shall be incorporated in the adjacent Self-Government of the nation, nationality or people of which more than 50% of the *Woreda* is composed. (3) In the absence of a nation, nationality or people which forms more than 50% of the *Woreda*...or where there is a serious disagreement among the peoples of such *Woreda*, its borders shall be delimited by agreement between the two adjacent National/Regional Transitional Self-Governments taking into account the interest of the people" (Article 4).

On the basis of these criteria, it reconfigured Ethiopian state into fourteen regional self-governments (Proclamation No. 7/1992: Article 3/1), and Dire Dawa was assumed part of Region Four (Oromo National Self-Government)⁵²; and the June 1992 election for the National/Regional Self-Governments was to be held accordingly. The Transitional Charter (1991) obliged that "there shall be law establishing local and regional councils for local administrative purposes defined on the basis of nationality. Elections for such local and regional councils shall be held within three months of the establishment of the Transitional Government, wherever local conditions allow" (Article 13). The Proclamation No. 7/1992 established fourteen Transitional National/Regional Self-Governments on 14th of January 1992, and accordingly, the June 1992 regional and local election was held. It was on the final days of this election that Somali forces mobilized opposition to the election held as a part of Oromia. Even though Dire Dawa was apparently contested by this time, the makers of the federal constitution presumed in 1994 that the dispute would be resolved soon, and the constitution thus kept silent on Dire Dawa.

The new Constitution of 1995, which declared Ethiopia a federal republic, reduced the number of national/regional self-governments from fourteen to nine following "the controversial merger of the numerous ethnic and nationality self-governing regions in the southern Ethiopia into

⁵² Not only the first post-Derg Governor of Dire Dawa was assigned by the OPDO, but also, for instance, post-Derg education in mother tongue and cultural policy of the city were launched in 1991 as part of curriculum and policy of Region Four (Oromia Regional State) (Dire Dawa Education Bureau, 2016).

one regional government" (Meheret, 2002: 135). According to the Constitution, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) consists of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harari national regional-states (Art 47). Addis Ababa was deprived of its regional status and designated the federal capital (Art 49), whereas Dire Dawa Administration came to exist extra-constitutionally.

So, it would be logical to ask why the political fate of Dire Dawa could not be determined in the transitional period or later. The answer lies in the dynamics and balance of power among political party elites in that period. According to an OPDO member⁵³ of the transitional Ethiopian parliament (1991-1995) known as Council of Representatives (COR),⁵⁴ the government decided to hold referendum in Dire Dawa and ad hoc committee was formed aiming to facilitate it. The committee visited Dire Dawa in 1992 and observed that the number of Somali within the city bound was no more than 15 percent, while the Oromo easily constituted 50 percent and the remaining population was mainly Amharas, he added. In fact, according to the 1994 census, the number of Somalis in Dire Dawa Administration was only 13.9% (CSA, 1998). Influenced by Somali political elites, who "convinced the transitional central leadership that if Dire Dawa is allowed to fall within Oromia Region, the consequence would be instability", the ad hoc committee recommended not to hold any referendum.⁵⁵ In contrary, Oromos in the city demanded to be carved out into Oromia Regional-State, but "the OPDO which claims to represent the Oromo was too weak to implement the transitional laws and later the constitutional rights of the Oromo".⁵⁶ As a result, the Central Transitional Government of Ethiopia preferred an extra-constitutional political solution to Dire Dawa, which a Member of Parliament (MP) informant dubbed "a cancer to Ethiopian federalism".⁵⁷ He means by "a cancer" an administrative entity structured neglecting,

⁵³ Interview, OPDO member of House of Peoples' Representatives, April 13, 2016, Addis Ababa.

⁵⁴ COR was composed of representatives of national liberation movements, other political organizations, and prominent individuals, to make-up a total of 87 members (Art. 7, Transitional Charter, 1991). Seats in COR until June 1992 were distributed in such a way that the EPRDF had 32 seats: TPLF, EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement which later became ANDM) and OPDO were allotted 10 seats each; and Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) which was gradually replaced by SEPDM (South Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement) had 2 seats. The OLF (the real contending armed force to the EPRDF at the time as some wrote, and an organization labeled as terrorist since 2011 by Ethiopian Parliament) got 12 seats, and the remainders (political and civic organizations) which were 27 in number had 1 or 2 or 3 handouts of seats in COR (see Merara, 2011: p.85). According to many critics, all of the latter dozens of political organizations were created overnight by the TPLF/EPRDF as its satellites (Merera, 2011: p. 88).

⁵⁵ Interview, *supra* note 23.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Interview, *supra* note 53.

and/or potentially in violation of, the federal constitutional principles. Thus, the key problem at the time was the status given to OPDO, a junior partner (Merera, 2011), also infamously called surrogate organization (Asafa, 1993) in the EPRDF coalition. The underlying geopolitical causes of the special federal administration of Dire Dawa are discussed in chapter six.

5.3 Ethno-nationalist Conflicts to Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

The post-1991 ethno-nationalist conflicts to the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa had roots in the 1960s changes and social movements in Ethiopia. The seeds of, for instance, Oromo national movement were sown among eastern Oromo regions by Afran Qallo Association, which was founded in Dire Dawa in 1962⁵⁸ and among central and western Oromo regions by Macha-Tulama Association, which was founded in Addis Ababa in 1963.⁵⁹ Both associations were established by the imperial legal permission as civil organizations (music band club and self-help associations, respectively) which turned to have helped the articulation and development of Oromo nationalism against the regime's national oppression and cultural domination policies (Asafa Jalata, 2007; Mohammed Hassen, 1998).

Both associations were accused of nurturing Oromo nationalism and formally banned in 1966 by the imperial government, which remained the case during the Derg regime too on similar allegation (Mohammed Hassen, 1998). The imperial court sentenced top leadership of both associations to deaths; but it was the Dergue who summarily executed most members and leaders of the associations in both cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Dirribi, 2011). The formal bans of Macha-Tulama and Afran Qallo Associations instead resulted in the birth of new radical Oromo organizations: Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), respectively (ibid.). Following the demise of the *Derg*, both associations were

⁵⁸ *Afran Qallo* Association is senior Oromo national movement among Oromo organizations but little is written and known about its roles in the rise and development of Oromo nationalism in general. For instance, Elemo Qiltu, the first Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) leader, was a member of Afran Qallo; and several personalities who later travelled to Mogadishu and founded Mogadishu Radio Afaan Oromo service [*Radiyoo Afaan Qottuu*] to mobilize eastern Oromo were also members of the Association. Mohammed Qophe observes that: "As a result, Dire Dawa is the cradle of Oromo singers and artists. Sheik Bakiri Saphalo, who tried to invent an Oromo writing script, for which he was expelled from Ethiopia and died in Somalia, was the son of Dire Dawa. Dire Dawa is the pioneering centre for Oromo language, arts, national identity and cultural revolutions" (see below, *supra* note 59).

⁵⁹ Interview, Mohammed Ahmed (also known as Mohammed Qophe), Member of HPR (since 2010), and an artist brought up in Dire Dawa, January 08, 2013, Addis Ababa.

permitted to restore their old civil roles in both cities but once again they were banned one after the other by the EPRDF-led government (Dirribi Demissie, 2011).

The root of Issa/Somali nationalist conflict to the city of Dire Dawa, as discussed in chapter four of this study, goes as far back as the 1960s when administrative reshuffling undertook in eastern Ethiopia. In 1963, the seat of Issa's Ugaas⁶⁰ moved from Erer in Adal and Issa *Awraja* to Dire Dawa which paved the way for the renaming of Gara Guracha and Gurgura *Awraja*, an administrative sub-province Dire Dawa town was in, to Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* (Abdulkhakim Mohammed, 2011; Milkessa, 2013). Since then, Issa's Ugaas seating in Dire Dawa has been offering a unifying cultural leadership for all Issa communities in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Somaliland and Ethiopia) which, as Schraeder (1993) observes, paved the way for the post-1991 Issa's nationalist conflict to Dire Dawa to transform into a trans-boundary conflict.⁶¹ Some indicated a strong hand of Djibouti in eastern Ethiopia: "the tiny Republic of Djibouti seems to inherit the responsibility of Mogadishu for the realization of Issa dream if not Greater Somalia dream. After the break-down of Somalia the pan-Issa dream led by Djibouti takes the stage" (Yasin, 2010: 124). Assefa Fischea points out a regional dimension of domestic ethno-nationalist conflicts: "as some of these lowland regions are also located on the borders with neighboring states, local politics is very much interlinked with regional politics, the Somali region being the classic case, and thus subject to manipulation and manoeuvring by internal and external forces"(2012: 449). Thus, post-Derg Somali ethno-nationalist conflicts to the city of Dire Dawa should be viewed in its evolution and wider socio-political contexts in the Horn region.

In general, the post-*Derg* conflicts to multiethnic urban centers have mainly taken the form of ethno-nationalist ownership conflicts (Assefa, 2012; Asnake, 2014; Milkessa, 2014; Fikadu, 2011). Asnake Kefale (2014) and Fikadu Adugna (2011) regard Moyale town as another Oromo-Somali contested urban center. In multiethnic cities, Asnake (2014) argues, ethnic decentralization unleashed contestations and in some cases violent conflicts over local identity and resources such as land. For instance, in June 2002 ethno-nationalist violent conflicts erupted over the status of Hawassa city which is the capital of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region

⁶⁰ The transnational or cross-border unifying cultural symbol of Issa clan of Somali nationality in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia or elsewhere) is rooted in *Ugaas* (Issa clan cultural leadership), who seats in eastern Ethiopia (Schraeder, 1993).

⁶¹ The cultural ties among Issa/Somali in the Horn of Africa have grown to political level: The President of Djibouti State, Ismail Omar Guelleh himself was born and brought up in Dire Dawa.

(SNNPR) and claimed by the Sidama ethnic group on whose land the city was founded (ibid: 592). Dirribi Demissie (2011) argues that "there are no natural or cultural reasons that justify the alienation of Finfinne, Harar, Dire Dawa and Awaday from Oromia national territory", and "in these four Oromo cities, except Finfinne, the Oromo population is a clear majority" (pp. 472-473). It is true that these towns, except Awaday, are deeply multiethnic in social structure. Awaday, an Oromo town located in eastern Oromia, is the busiest Khat commercial hub in Ethiopia for which the Federal Government had to appear in the town to collect its custom duties and taxes. Harar is an anomalous city-state in Ethiopian federalism because the Harari nationality, in whose name the regional-state was designated, comprises less than ten percent of the 183,344 regional population, while the Oromo constitute more than fifty percent (56.41%) and followed by Amhara (22.77%) (CSA, 2007).⁶² This study, however, is limited to discussing few aspects of the post-*Derg* ethno-political conflicts to multiethnic urban centers of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

5.3.1 Ethno-nationalist Conflicts over Addis Ababa

In this section, first, the paradox of rights of the Oromo in Addis Ababa is discussed as the root cause of Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city. Then, the conflict over Oromia's capital move to Adama, post-elections protests in Addis Ababa, and the recent Oromo protests against the Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan are sketched one by one.

5.3.1.1 The Paradox of Rights of the Oromo in Addis Ababa

As discussed in chapter four, Addis Ababa as a capital of Shewa and of Ethiopia was founded and evolved to take its current cultural and geographical shape at the expense of Oromo territorial and ethnolinguistic rights. The origin of Oromo ethno-nationalist conflicts to the city therefore goes back to the conquest and the subsequent violations of Oromo's rights in the expanding capital. As part of resolving this age-old Oromo problem in the capital, the post-*Derg* Ethiopian regime adopted the Proclamation No. 7/1992 which established fourteen transitional national/ regional self-governments and declared "the special national interests and political right of the Oromo over Region Fourteen" be respected (Art.3/4). However, nothing was seen practiced in transitional

⁶² While Harari nationality, whose population size is only 15,858 (8.65%) by the 2007 census (CSA, 2007) owns its own regional state, one of the nine member states of Ethiopian federation, bigger nationalities such as Sidama which constitutes about four million population does not have its own regional state.

period. The same national interests and political right of the Oromo over the city were reiterated in the form of "the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa", worth quoting:

The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected (FDRE Constitution, 1995: Article 49/5).

Before discussing the nature and scope of this special interest clause, it is good to say few words on its rationales. Why is this special interest so important (and thereby constitutionalized) for the State of Oromia? Negaso Gidada, who officially signed the document of the Federal Constitution as he was the chairperson of the Constituent Assembly (who ratified the Constitution) and then became President of the FDRE (1995-2001), outlines the following underlying factual premises of the special interest: (1) Finfinne is an Oromoland, the Oromo are indigenous to it but regarded as "outsiders" in their own city; (2) the city is an integral part, and located in the heart of, the territory of Oromia, and directly transacts with the Oromo people; (3) significant population of Oromo, who pay taxes and land rents as citizens, live in the city; (4) Finfinne is the official capital of the Oromia Region; and (5) it hosts the Federal Government.⁶³ These could be strong justifications for the Constitution to acknowledge special rights for the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa. Other scholars, relying on the same justifications, advised not the reservation of special rights *for* the State of Oromia *in* the city, but the State of Oromia should administer the city itself. Tsegaye Regassa (2017), for instance, fully accepts Negaso's factual premises, but is critical of the notion of reserving special rights for Oromia in Addis Ababa—the notion that he says 'made the host a guest'.⁶⁴ He is of the view that such special rights should have been formulated not for the Oromo but for the non-Oromo Ethiopians and the Federal Government for choosing to seat in the city of Addis Ababa.

Similarly, the Ethiopian Constituent Assembly Minutes of the discussion and ratification of the special interest provision lists more justifications (1994: pp. 21-23): the way the city was

⁶³ Interview, Negaso Gidada, November 6, 2010, Addis Ababa. He was also the former chairman of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ); and Vice Chairman and Chairman of Foreign Relations Standing Committee of the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Forum (Forum). Now, he has retired from opposition parties. I know that the concept of indigenous is very much contested. It is used here to refer to the Oromo who were living in and surrounding Finfinne when Menelik's soldiers arrived; but also as the city continued to expand so is the eviction of the Oromo farmers (original settlers). When they are evicted, their culture is also evicted. Thus, indigenous is an internal autochthony issue. As a country, all groups are indigenous. But within the country, indigene varies from place to place, and from time to time.

⁶⁴ See Tsegaye Regassa (2017) "Commentary: The Interest that is not so special Addis Abeba, Oromia and Ethiopia" <http://addisstandard.com/the-interest-that-is-not-so-special-addis-abeba-romia-and-ethiopia/> published on January 18, 2017, retrieved on January 20, 2017.

founded in 1880s by *Nalicya* soldiers who massacred, evicted and assimilated Oromos over the territory (historical relevance), Oromia's ownership of the city's territory and the city's location in the heart of Oromia and serving as the capital of Oromia (geographical issue), interconnectedness of the city's social service provision, natural resource utilization and administrative matters to Oromia, the city's inevitable expansion endangers the rights of Oromia's farmers surrounding the city, and health consequences of the city's waste disposals dumped into the surrounding Oromo farmlands (ibid.). The Minutes has warned that unless these are settled through constitutional means conflict is inevitable. These were major reasons outlined to justify the special interest clause.

However, there was tiny opposition to the ratification of Oromia special interest clause by some who said "Addis Ababa is a city of nations and nationalities and its growth benefits all" (ibid: p. 22). Listing several factors in support of the clause, another Constituent Assembly's member named Mulugeta G/Hiwot from Region One (Tigray) refuted the claim "Addis Ababa belongs to all and its growth benefits all" which he said is problematic (ibid: p. 23). For instance, he mentioned, as Addis Ababa expands it evicts Oromo farmers as well as its waste disposals flowing to the surrounding Oromia creating health problems to the Oromo farmers and cattle. Hence, the growth of Addis Ababa does not benefit all Ethiopians because it threatens the lives of Oromo. It is undeniable fact that Addis Ababa as a capital was founded in 1880s, and since then has been geographically expanding at alarming rates but at the expense of the individual and group rights of the Oromo in and surrounding the city. Hence, the growth of Addis Ababa did/does not benefit all as it has been practical threat to the lives and culture of the Oromo. As a result, the transitional Oromo's national and political rights and the present special interest of the State of Oromia in the city is absolutely natural, rational and constitutional.

Contrary to the constitutional principles, there are still a group of elites who advance that there should not be an exclusive right to Oromos in Addis Ababa repeating the notion that says the latter is the city of nations and nationalities.⁶⁵ This group raises the claim of "city of nations and nationalities" but resists the idea of opening non-Amharic language schools in the city viewing diversity as a precursor of urban disintegration.⁶⁶ They advocate urban policy of mono-lingualism

⁶⁵ Interview, Addis Ababa Culture and Tourism Bureau expert, Addis Ababa, May 26, 2015. Interview, Opposition Official, All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO), May 17, 2014, Addis Ababa.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

and mono-culturalism.⁶⁷ They also contest the constitutional phrase "the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia" as if it is not clear enough. Ermias Legesse, for instance, writes that Article 49/5 of the FDRE Constitution implies that "Addis Ababa is not body part of Oromia" (ibid: 248). It is true that Addis Ababa is not an administrative part of Oromia, but it is geographically in the territory of the latter as clearly stated in the constitution. That is why Addis Ababa has rapidly been expanding after 1995 too. It is also the territory of Oromia in accordance with Articles 2, 47 and 50/1 of the Constitution (1995). Wondwossen Wakene (2010) explains the special interests of Oromia in terms of the geography and history of the city of Addis Ababa. He puts this way: "In effect, Addis Ababa is part of Oromia. This geographical nexus in turn yielded an historical perspective on the relation of Addis Ababa and Oromia. The original settlers of Addis Ababa were the Oromo" (2010: 93). Likewise, Tsegaye Regassa argues, the constitution recognizes Oromia's special interest in Addis Ababa "owing to its being an Oromo city" (2014: 2). The State of Oromia, thus, is entitled to wider constitutional rights in Addis Ababa due mainly to the historical and geographical reasons.

However, this special interest clause is one of the least discussed and interpreted clauses in the FDRE Constitution. Thus, it would be difficult to demarcate the scope of the rights it may include. The first clarification must be on whether this special interest is of the Oromo or Oromia Government. In order to respond to this question, it is important to see the evolution of this clause starting from the transitional period. First, according to Article 3(1) of the Proclamation No. 7/1997, the Oromo nation formed a national/regional self-government called Region Four (Oromia). Second, Article 3/4 of the same proclamation states "the special national interests and political right of the Oromo over Region Fourteen" to be respected. Both cases show that it is the rights of the Oromo which is found in the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa. Basically, four special rights are unambiguously offered to Oromia regarding: (1) provision of social services, (2) utilization of natural resources, (3) joint administrative matters, and (4) other similar matters. Especially, the first and third rights appear crucial to undertake urban policy reforms so as to accommodate Oromo language and identity in the city as part of the special interests because provision of social services for a given community obviously implicates language of service provisions and cultural identity elements. If one tends to define language of service

⁶⁷ Eng. Yelikal Getnet, head of Blue (*Semayaw*) Party, interviewed on the Ethiopian Reporter (Amharic), May 2014.

provision as referring only to translation rights, that cannot be regarded as special for the fact that other citizens can also claim the same rights. Moreover, the joint administrative matters phrase may offer power sharing opportunity for Oromia or may refer to the administration of certain matters by both governments indicating an intergovernmental relation. This special interest clause (Article 49/5) concludes by stating that particulars of the arrangement shall be determined by a subsequent law, which until now has not been legislated.⁶⁸

Thus, since 1992, Oromo's constitutional rights in the city of Addis Ababa have been neglected at policy level. Many regard this extra-constitutional activity of the government as the 'mother' of Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city (Getahun, 2014; Tsegaye, 2014). Ermias Legese calls it "the unfinished Finfinne agenda" (2014: 240). Hence, one could contemplate that, had the special interests been implemented, it might have affected cultural representations in public service sectors of the city including, among others, language policy (city administration's working language, provisions of schools, hospitals, court services, broadcasting, print media and other), cultural matters (restoration of Oromo cultural and indigenous institutions, theatrical halls), power sharing (sharing of civil service employment, and legislative and executive posts), and natural resources including land administrations. The "other similar matters" phrase, according to Betru Dibaba (2015), could include collecting revenues and taxes, free access to infrastructures, buildings, halls, industry, naming of the city and sub cities, security matters, participation on policy matters concerning matters affecting interests. Major parts of these urban public service provisions from diversity accommodation policy perspectives shall be examined in chapter seven.

There was, of course, a failed attempt to articulate the special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa particularly from the side of Oromia Government. In the aftermath of the 2005 controversial election that brought a total defeat to the EPRDF in the city, the OPDO-led Oromia Government moved back its capital to Addis Ababa from Adama city and prepared a draft law listing the particulars of the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa (Tsegaye, 2014; Negaso, 2014; Assefa, 2009). As a result of the Oromia Government's push on the

⁶⁸ On January 12, 2016, the OPDO promised to conduct a research to determine the special interest in short period of time. By the end of August of the same year, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn said on a press conference that the EPRDF has decided to adopt a federal law determining the special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa within one month. On October 10, 2016, the President of the Republic reiterated the same promise to be realized in 2016/17. In a similar fashion, the Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn indicated that a draft law on the special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa has been prepared, and ready for discussions with stakeholders in January of 2017. In April of 2017, special interest draft proclamation widely believed to be leaked was circulating on social media.

issue, according to Kirubel Tadesse (2010), an official document released to Members of Parliament in October 2009 announced that the bill regarding the particulars of Oromia's rights in Addis Ababa would reach the House in the third quarter of that year. However, he added, the federal government once again failed to legislate a law that would have materialized the Oromia Regional State's rights and privileges in the capital, Addis Ababa (ibid.). The Ministry of Federal Affairs was said to be responsible to prepare draft bill on the Oromia special interests.⁶⁹ Due to the failure of the Ministry to come up with the draft, the third house retired without passing the bill that would have realized Oromia's constitutional rights in the city. The then government whip at the federal parliament (now Prime Minister), Hailemariam Desalegn, told the Capital Newspaper that the bill was supposed to be prepared by the Ministry of Federal Affairs; however, it was not submitted to the House (quoted in Kirubel, 2010). Moreover, the Oromia Government wrote in 2006 a letter of request to the House of Federation for constitutional interpretation of the special interest provision by Ref. No. BMNO1/302/ M1, Finfinne. The House's response and general opinion was that the constitution was clear, and there is no ground for interpretation invoking absence of case and controversy (Betru Dibaba, 2015). Consequently, frustrated by the federal reluctance to adopt a law on Oromia's special rights in Addis Ababa, the Caffee (Oromia council) established a new administrative zone in 2009 for the towns and rural districts surrounding Addis Ababa and named it Finfinne Surrounding Special Zone of Oromia (Tsegaye, 2014). This action by itself was an indication of the rare confidences of OPDO in relation to the remaining EPRDF member parties. However, its boundary with the city of Addis Ababa was not clearly indicated especially on the directions of less settled Oromia territories of the Special Zone.

Due to the reluctance on the side of the Federal Government, some politicians, but also scholars, went on expressing their skepticisms on the possibility of finding a balanced solution to Oromia's special interests deadlock (Ermias, 2014). For instance, Assefa Fiseha argues that, devising an appropriate and balanced urban institution, which should reflect the interests of the three governments of Addis Ababa, Oromia and federal levels, "is difficult to determine given the likelihood that the political elites representing the three governments may be from different parties" (2009: 94). He thus prefers to refrain from hinting at the way forwards saying "it remains to be seen how these issues are going to be dealt with in the future" (ibid: 96).

⁶⁹ Interview, Senior OPDO Official, April 29, 2016, Addis Ababa.

However, there are informants (and literature) who attempt to explain the special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa as being applied by *de facto* political practices in terms of, for instance, having Oromo Cultural Center in the city of Addis Ababa⁷⁰, reserving the post of the city's mayor for authorities from the OPDO (Ermias, 2014), "the State of Oromia shall have the right to make Addis Ababa the seat of its Government" (Addis Ababa Charter, 1997: Article 33/2), and "services provided to the residents of Addis Ababa by the City Government shall be extended to the surrounding residents of the State of Oromia" where such services are accessible to them (ibid: Article 33/3). One may theoretically regard these measures as part of the special interests of the State of Oromia; but the arguments appear weak at best and pretention at worst for several facts and reasons.

First, the construction of the Oromo Cultural Center in the city was finished and officially inaugurated barely on the eve of the 2015 national election, mainly as part of the election campaigns. Recall that the constitution that provided the special interests for the State of Oromia came into effect officially in 1995. However, the Cultural Center started to function in the city after two decades, but also without any federal legislation, which altogether may make it legally vulnerable. Related decision was the promise entered by the Oromia Government in 2006 to reform education policy of the city by launching schools in all of the ten sub-cities of Addis Ababa for Afaan Oromo speakers; however, that did not happen to this date. Second, the mayors of the city administration of Addis Ababa have been from the OPDO uninterruptedly following the deadly violence that erupted in the aftermath of the 2005 election, by which the EPRDF lost the city to the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) party. I shall discuss the post-election conflicts of the 2005 in the city shortly. The EPRDF can assign any official from any of its member parties to run for the post of the city mayor as long as it is the ruling party of the city. This has been the case since 1991. The recent party decisions by which the OPDO seems to have secured the post of the mayor consecutively cannot be seen as the application of Oromia's constitutional right, as it can easily be halted if the EPRDF loses majority seats in the City Council of Addis Ababa. Furthermore, these officials are assigned to the post successively mainly to advance the interests of the EPRDF.

⁷⁰ Focus Group Discussion, Oromia Culture & Tourism Bureau experts, March 2 & 3, 2016, Addis Ababa.

Thirdly, the clause in the City Charter of Addis Ababa (1997), which promised that the services provided to the residents of Addis Ababa be extended to the surrounding residents of the State of Oromia, is not explicit enough. Put differently, the category of the services to be extended, and in which language, was not specified by the charter or elsewhere. Even this charter was revised in 2003 and dropped this clause at all. Thus, both charters failed to articulate the special interests of Oromia in the city. Fourthly, had the designation of Addis Ababa as the capital of Oromia Region been an implementation of the latter's constitutional special rights in the former, the decision in 2003 which moved the capital of Oromia to Adama city would have clearly been unconstitutional. The Addis Ababa Charter as revised in 2003 dropped the clause which talks about Oromia's rights to make the city the seat of its Government. This Revised Charter instead prefers to briefly reiterate the general constitutional clause on the special interest. It reads:

The special interest of the Oromia Region shall be respected in accordance with the provisions of Article 49(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The details thereof shall be set out by the agreement of the City Government and the Oromia Region or by the law to be issued by the House of Peoples' Representatives (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Article 62).

The charter, therefore, chose to postpone the articulation of Oromia's rights in the city. After waves of deadly protests hit the Oromia Region in the early months of 2014 and the last months of 2015 against the implementation of the Addis Ababa master plan proposal, on 12th of January 2016, the OPDO Central Committee issued the cancelation of the Oromia part of the master plan and promised to ratify a bill that will realize the special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa (TVO News, January 12, 2016).⁷¹ Once again the implementation of this promise is yet to be seen. From the preceding discussions, one can argue to conclude that the unaddressed constitutional rights of Oromia in Addis Ababa (i.e., extra-constitutional public policies of the city) appears to be the main, if not the sole, causal factor associated to the Oromo nationalist feelings of exclusion in, and conflicts to, the urban governance of Addis Ababa in the post-*Derg* period.

⁷¹ Oromia Radio and TV Organization (2016) TVO News, January 12, 2016, Adama. The Oromo protests which were triggered by the decision to implement the Addis Ababa master plan proposal did not come to an end on 12th of January 2016; it instead seemed to have declined but continued to the early days of April 2016.

5.3.1.2 Oromia's Capital Relocation & the Oromo Resistance

Addis Ababa has been the capital of Region Four or Oromia Region as a result of the debut of federalization experiment in Ethiopia following the coming into power of the EPRDF in 1991 (Oromia Regional Constitution, 1995: Art 6). The city has also been the capital of the Federal Government as well as that of Addis Ababa Administration. It has also been serving as the seat of the OAU/AU since 1963 and of many international organizations. This proves the possibility of many governments on one territory, but not without tensions. Assefa Fischea, for instance, argues that "Addis Ababa's governance system is subjected to another source of tension, as the city also hosts Oromia Regional State" (2009: 85). Perhaps to ease such tension, and/or as Negaso argues, ordered by Federal authorities, the Oromia Government issued a law revising its constitution in the late 2003 to move its administrative and political capital to Adama city (located 100 km southeast of Addis Ababa) (Negaso Gidada, 2014: 4). This official decision triggered "serious opposition among Oromo organizations and individuals" against whom "violent repressive measures taken by the Federal and Oromia authorities," Negaso Gidada, former President of the FDRE (1995-2001) comments (*ibid*: 4).

Macha-Tulama Association, an Oromo self-help organization, was the leading to formally denounce the decision to relocate the capital of Oromia. Dirribi Demissie, the President of the Association, writes that (2011: 464-465):

Oromia National Regional Government started to implement the decision of changing the capital of Oromia from Finfinne to Adama by moving its employees en mass. Then the Board of Macha-Tulama Association took the stand that Oromo people's ownership right over Finfinne, their capital, cannot be unilaterally cancelled out. The Board strongly condemned the move, continued its opposition, and called a public demonstration in which hundreds of thousands of people participated on January 4, 2004.

Ahead of calling this public demonstration, the Association had repeatedly appealed to the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia to which it wrote a letter condemning, what Dirribi Demissie calls, "humiliating decision to the Oromo " (*ibid*: 465). Similarly, Ermias Legese (2014) discusses in detail the public demonstration summoned by Macha-Tulama Association in opposition to the change of Oromia's capital. Some of the slogans the demonstrators chanted include "Finfinne is the capital of Oromia"; "Oromo shall not be deprived of its ownership right over Finfinne" (Ermias, 2014: 240). The demonstration, according to Dirribi's account, was forcibly dispersed by "heavily armed soldiers" who were accused of "beating, humiliating elders in front of their children" (2011:

465-466).⁷² As a result, the leaders of the Association including its president were detained and accused of terrorism, for which the Association was banned⁷³ and its facilities confiscated by the government (Ernias, 2014).

Another protest was staged by Oromo students of Addis Ababa University on 21st of January 2004 demanding an immediate repeal of the decision that took the capital of Oromia to Adama (Dirribi, 2011: 466; Assefa, 2009). The demonstration was once again met by government security's violent measures; and consequently, many students were detained and said to have been beaten in police training camps, and three hundred and forty seven (347) students were confirmed to have been dismissed for good from Addis Ababa University (Ernias, 2014; Dirribi, 2011; ETV news, March 25, 2004).⁷⁴ The decision that moved the capital of Oromia out of Addis Ababa and the subsequent measures –brutality of the state security forces and dismissals– taken against demonstrators sparked further student protests in schools across Oromia, resulting in civilian casualties (Dirribi, 2011).⁷⁵ Despite widespread mass resistances against the relocation of the capital city of Oromia Region, the government refused to reverse it and Adama city had been able to briefly serve as the regional capital between 2003 and 2005. Threatened by the CUD's landslide victory of the May 2005 election in Addis Ababa (for both City Council and House of Peoples' Representatives), the Oromia Government declared in the same year that its capital is Finfinne:

Although the seat of Oromia Regional State was in Adama/Nazreth between 2003 and 2005, following the May 2005 election and its outcome, the regional government decided to move back to Addis Ababa and indicated clear interests in receiving a share of the revenue collected by the city and in being represented on the City Council and within the city's administration (Assefa, 2009: 94).

The return of the capital of Oromia to Addis Ababa, thus, was mainly associated with the defeat of the EPRDF in the city by the 2005 election, as Wondwossen Wakene (2010) too argued.

⁷² "For instance, elders such as Gutu Marga (82), Mangistu Jalata (73), Bekele Burayu (55) and many other Oromo were dragged onto the ground" (Dirribi, 2011: 466).

⁷³ The *Macha-Tulama* Association was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa as self-help and development association. But it was banned in 1967 on treason charges and its leaders were either sentenced to death or life imprisonments. It was reopened in 1993 following the regime change in the country, but reclosed in 2004. In 2007, Ethiopia's Federal High Court released some of the leaders of the Association and the latter started functioning in Addis Ababa. However, the Association was finally closed in 2010 (see Dirribi Demissie, 2011: 466-478). Recall that the closure of *Macha-Tulama* Association in 1967 led its members to launch in the late 1960s underground movements which gave birth to radical armed Oromo rebel force, the Oromo Liberation Front in 1973 (Mohammed, 1998). The same Oromo movement and nationalism was ignited among Oromo in eastern Ethiopia by *Afran Qal'o* Association which was established in 1962 in Dire Dawa (see Dirribi, 2011; Milkessa, 2013).

⁷⁴ ETV news, interview with Junedin Saddo, the then President of Oromia Regional State, March 25, 2004.

⁷⁵ Dirribi Demissie lists the names of six high school students who were killed in several towns protesting against the state brutalities and the decision to change the capital of Oromia.

First of all, critics argue that the decision to relocate Oromia's capital was basically an order from the federal authorities particularly of the TPLF and the ANDM (Ermias, 2014; Negaso, 2014). The decision by the Oromia Region to move its seat of government to Adama, "some would say it was coerced by the federal government", Assefa Fiseha notes, "has caused a lot of discontent among the ruling Oromo elite" (2009: 100) besides the public and students demonstrations briefed above. Similarly, a high-ranking OPDO informant points out that the same federal authorities who "forcibly sent us to Adama brought us back to Finfinne following the EPRDF's defeat in the city in 2005 at the hand of the CUD".⁷⁶ Ermias Legese (2014) writes his witness (as he was Federal State-Minister of Government Communication at the time) that the OPDO cabinets presiding over the Oromia Region had neither decided to leave Finfinne nor to return. They thus were under political pressure to move forth and back like a pendulum between Addis Ababa and Adama. But also it seems that OPDO leaders somehow consented (perhaps forcibly) because they formally called the Caffee and revised Oromia Regional Constitution in 2003 amending its capital. Ermias regrets that "even though we reversed the decision on the capital of Oromia, we did not find solution for those detained, dismissed from universities, sacked from their jobs for legitimately opposing that decision two years back" (Ermias, 2014: 241). Hence, relocating Oromia's capital to Adama was a waste of time, energy, money and above all brought human costs.

In general, the political developments between 2003 and 2006 in Ethiopia indicate that the Oromo ruling elite in the EPRDF (i.e., the OPDO), who itself felt enormous discontent against the decision that moved Oromia's capital from Addis Ababa, readily accepted a comeback call towards the end of 2005. This evidently suggests the OPDO's "junior" or weak position at best, and its role as agent of the "senior" commanding ruling clique in the EPRDF circles at worst. It was this weak position of the OPDO in the EPRDF (or conversely, the hegemonic interests of the core party in the EPRDF—the TPLF that is accused of the controversial decision that moved Oromia's capital forth and back between two cities thereby causing Oromo nationalist conflicts. Let me be specific.

As to the mechanics of power relations among the EPRDF, from 2003 up to 2006, both Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were run by TPLF mayors who were said to be the architects of the power sharing arrangements still functional in both cities. As a result, as shall be discussed in

⁷⁶ Interview, *supra* note 53. I have asked several OPDO officials as to who actually 'expelled' them from Addis Ababa, and they could only tell me that they opposed the decision of relocating Oromia's capital to Adama, which they say "came from above". What one can understand is that it was not in the full interest of the OPDO to leave Addis Ababa.

chapter seven, the TPLF managed to influence the power sharing policy in Addis Ababa in favor of itself—disproportionate gains. And the same rule seemed to have resulted in disproportionate gains for the Somali party participating in Dire Dawa's power sharing. Aboveall, TPLF's running of both cities in the same period was not an accidental issue. It instead happened in reaction to the 2001 political fractures and splits within the TPLF/EPRDF following the end of Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000). It was in the same year (in 2001) that Ministry of Federal Affairs was established and a TPLF (H.E. Minister Abay Tschaye) was assigned to oversee inter-regional affairs. Consequently, both city administrations were structured to be accountable to this new Ministry through revising Addis Ababa's Charter in 2003 and adopting Dire Dawa's Charter in 2004. It was amidst this recentralization move that the Oromia Government revised its Constitution in 2003 to change its capital to Adama. The overall trend of the post-2001 recentralization policy measures of the EPRDF shall be discussed in chapter six.

5.3.1.3 Post-Elections Protests in Addis Ababa

As we discuss the ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa in the post-1991 period, it would be advisable to raise aspects of the post-elections protests in the city, if not fully as part of the former. Following the 2000 and the 2005 national elections in Addis Ababa, violent protests erupted in the city (some would explain them as ethno-nationalist political conflicts).

Many believe that the EPRDF ruling party was defeated at polls in Addis Ababa for the first time by the 2005 election, but according to Ermias Legese, it was "the 2000 election that expelled EPRDF from Addis Ababa", in his Amharic words "ኢህአዴግን ከአዲሳባ ያባረረው - ምርጫ 92" (2014: 58).⁷⁷ Though less known, the 2000 election in the city resulted in "widespread rioting and violence in the spring of 2001" (Assefa, 2009: 86). Some writers associate this post-election discontents and conflict to the consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000), which was followed by massive recentralization measures of the EPRDF (Ermias, 2014; Wondwossen, 2010). An opposition informant comments that, due to the widespread protests, unemployed youths in the city were labeled by the government as "*adagenya bozone*" (dangerous gangsters).⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ermias Legese, who was a former EPRDF state minister of the Ministry of Ethiopia's Government Communication but deserted in exile and turned an opposition, published his observation and eyewitness account on Addis Ababa entitled "A City without Owner" (2014).

⁷⁸ Interview, *supra* note 66.

This post-election violence, according to Assefa Fiseha, "showed just how inadequate the post-1995 governance arrangements were in the city" (2009: 86). Following the violence, the Prime Minister dissolved the City Council, and the federal parliament subsequently enacted the Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter in 2003 (ibid.). An interim city administration mayor (2003-2006) was assigned by the Prime Minister from the TPLF party to replace an OPDO city governor (1998-2003). However, the youth violence started in 2001 spirally escalated to deadly violent protests in the post-election of the 2005 (Abbink, 2006).

The 2005 controversial election of Ethiopia is mainly remembered for the fact that it had opened brief political spaces for opposition parties to win better number of seats at both levels of governments and in the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Even though the ruling EPRDF party secured its government by winning 371 seats, the opposition parties managed to win 175 seats in the Federal House of Peoples' Representatives (HPR). By this election, the CUD was able to defeat the EPRDF in Addis Ababa for both the federal seats and the City Council. The CUD won 22 out of the 23 seats of Addis Ababa in the federal parliament; and 137 out of the 138 seats in the City Council by the 2005 election. However, the whole process was disrupted and turned violent in Addis Ababa and other cities when the CUD refused to join parliament accusing the EPRDF of rigging the election (Zemelak, 2014; Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009).

As soon as the victory of the CUD in Addis Ababa was declared by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the EPRDF suddenly contrived various measures to further discourage the winning party from taking over the administration of the city, whose "complete submission" to the wills of the federal government was sought (Wondwossen, 2010: 88). The first overnight measure was the political decision of the Oromia Regional Government, which revised its constitution re-designating Finfinne its capital. It is to be recalled that the Oromia Government's capital relocation to Adama faced fierce protests followed by government measures causing casualties, detentions and dismissals from jobs of some of those who were involved in the protests.⁷⁹ It thus appears convincing that the OPDO came back to Finfinne as an anti-thesis to the victory of the CUD. The OPDO widely regarded the CUD as a revived *Naftegna* system, negative connotation of military rule characterizing the pre-1991 Amhara ruling system (ETV, Election

⁷⁹ I know Gaddisa Hirphasa, a student of Addis Ababa University, detained in 2003 and found dead in the hands of prison administration in 2004. See my own B.A thesis "The Role of Macha-Tulema Association in the Rise of Modern Oromo Nationalism," 2008, Addis Ababa University.

Debate, April 17, 2005).⁸⁰ Despite its underlying intentions, the decision to bring back the capital of Oromia Region to Finfinne was welcomed by Oromo nationalists, but was opposed by Amhara elites in the CUD (Wondwossen, 2010). Moreover, the announcement of the CUD's victory in Addis Ababa was soon followed by a rumor widely circulated that Tigrayans will be sent back to Tigray Region and their wealth will be nationalized (see also Tsadkan G/Tinsae, 2016).⁸¹ It caused deep ethnic tensions in the city mainly between Amhara and Tigrayans. The ensuing tensions in the city among the elites of Oromo, Amhara and Tigrayan as emerged in the post-election 2005 demonstrate that the post-election conflict by the CUD and its fans took the form of an ethno-nationalist conflict for the control of Addis Ababa and ultimately of state power.

As a result, the political drama composed for the re-control of the city of Addis Ababa following the 2005 election indicates some pattern of urban ethno-political conflict equation informed by the Hegelian dialectics of history (Yovel, 2005): CUD's victory *thesis*, OPDO's return to Finfinne *anti-thesis*, and EPRDF's restoration of its power in the capital *synthesis*. On a similar logic, Assefa Fiseha commented in an endnote that "the [Oromia] government's return to Addis Ababa from Adama/Nazareth is viewed by some as a counter-strategy to weaken/balance the opposition, which is considered to comprise mainly the Amhara conservative political elite" (2009: 100). As a result, the CUD's Amhara political elites apparently lost in the dialectical equation.

Second, the situation was aggravated when, upon the declaration of the election's result, the outgoing government amended several laws in order to transfer financial power from the city government (won by the CUD) to the federal government (ibid.). According to close observers, some of the significant measures taken during the following summer included the transfer of the Addis Ababa Road Authority and the Addis Ababa Authentication and Registration Authority to the federal government, resulting in an estimated annual revenue loss of 100 million Birr (US\$ 5 million) to the city (Assefa, 2009). The decision to reverse revenue collecting powers, John Abbink sheds light on the possible motives, "hampers the economic possibilities of the new administration

⁸⁰ETV election debates transmissions in April 2005 between oppositions and incumbent politicians. Junedin Saddo, the then President of Oromia National Regional State, on one debate, said that "We have weapons as far as *Naftegna* is concerned". *Naftegna* is a feudo-military Amhara ruling class system imposed upon the conquered nationalities from 1880s to 1974.

⁸¹ Interview, Head of Civil Service Bureau of Addis Ababa, June 18, 2015, Addis Ababa. The ethnic tension in an Amharic expression was "*Tigray wede Mekele, nebretachew wede kebele*", meaning "Tigray shall be sent back to Mekele and their belongings shall be taken to kebele lowest administration" (see Tsadkan G/Tinsae, 2016).

— if it ever materializes — and will in due course have residents shift the blame to the new city government" (2006: 185).

As a result of the demonstrations and violent security responses in June and November of 2005 in Addis Ababa, scores of lives were lost and then state of emergency was declared in the city and a military command post led directly by the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi took over the administration of the city (Ermias, 2014). All the political structures and police commission of the city administration were put under his direct operation (Wondwossen, 2010). The "resulting loss of life and destruction of property led to the imprisonment of the principal leaders of the CUD, who were released only in the summer of 2007 following negotiations initiated by prominent Ethiopian elders" (Assefa, 2009: 89). After the CUD was crushed, the EPRDF formed its own caretaker administration for the city as of May 2006 and held a by-election in April 2008 reversing the ballot results in favor of the ruling party which won 137/138 seats of the City Council, and only one seat went to the former (ibid.). As a result of the EPRDF's urban political dramas and waves of deadly urban violence following the alleged election irregularities and controversies, scored victory slipped out of the hand of the CUD in the city. Some regard it a missed opportunity of democratization.

5.3.1.4 Oromo Protests against Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan

In the middle of April 2014, the Oromia Television (TVO) aired news about the implementation plan of what was called 'integrated development plan of Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Special Zone' (the "Master Plan" for short). It also transmitted, in the same news, fierce oppositions forwarded by urban experts of Oromia Region against the implementation of the Master Plan on an awareness creation training organized by Federal officials. This provoked Oromo protests and resistances against the Master Plan across Oromia Region including in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities. The Oromo protests movements against the plan got two phases. The first phase of the conflict broke out in mid April 2014 and continued up to mid May 2014. The second phase of the protests was extensive in space and time, covering almost all parts of Oromia Region, from November 12, 2015 up to mid March 2016.⁸² The Oromo nationalists strongly believed that the Master Plan was simply a boundary expansion plan of Addis Ababa into the territory of Oromia Regional State (Bekele, 2015).

⁸² Though varying intensity, there were protests in several parts of Oromia up to October 2016, when the state of emergency was declared in Ethiopia.

For instance, according to the document of the Master Plan, by the completion of the plan project within 25 years, the Addis Ababa city's plan area/coverage would be stretched from its current 540 square kilometers (54000 hectare) to more than 11000 square kilometers (1.1 million hectare). The document reads (in Amharic): “በመጨረሻ 25 ዓመታት በአዲስ አበባና ዙሪያ የኦሮሚያ ክልል በሚተገበረው የተቀናጀ ክልላዊ የጋራ ዕድገት ፕላን 17 ወረዳዎች እና አዲስ አበባን ጨምሮ 36 ከተሞች ታቅፈዋል። የፕላን ክልሉ የሚሸፍነው አካባቢ ጠቅላላ የቆዳ ስፋት 1.1 ሚሊዮን ሄክታር ሲሆን ከዚህ ውስጥ የገጠርና ከተማ ክልል ድርሻ እንደቅደም ተከተላቸው 85 እና 15 በመቶ እጅ ይይዛል” (Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Plan Project Office, 2014: p.13). It may be translated this way: “by the end of the next 25 years, the integrated regional joint development plan that will be implemented in Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Region has embraced 17 woredas (rural districts) and 36 cities including Addis Ababa. The plan regional areas will cover 1.1 million hectare of territory, of which the proportions of the rural and urban areas consist 85% and 15% respectively.” In reality, the plan was prepared by Addis Ababa City Government in Amharic only.⁸³ Had it been implemented, the plan territory of the city would have risen to 1.1 million hectare, which is clearly an expansion. The government repeatedly claimed that the Master Plan had objectives of benefiting all including Oromo farmers through modernization of roads and other basic infrastructural developments. In the master plan document, many sectors (e.g. recreational centers, schools, train stations, airports, hospitals, market centers, new villages, etc.) were included. According to the plan, about 40, 000 Oromo farmers were supposed to be evicted. These all were officially presented as positive moves.

However, it is known that the city of Addis Ababa has been expanding with alarming rates. Studies indicate that Addis Ababa's landmass tripled from 80 square kilometers in 1960s to 250 in 1985 and doubled to 540 square kilometers in 2010 (Fentahun Tesfaye, 2012). The new master plan would have stretched the city's area to 11,000 square kilometers (twenty times its current area). In the late 1980s, the *Derg* is said to have prepared a master plan for Addis Ababa in which it was indicated that the city was planned to "extend to Adaamaa/Asalaa, Shashmane, Walisoo, Amboo, Fiche, and Debre Birhan. The transitional government (TGE) rejected this plan and affirmed the present boundary of Addis Ababa” (Negaso Gidada, 2014: 10). According to Negaso, the integrated Master Plan of Addis Ababa had origins in the master plan designed by the *Derg*

⁸³ By the way, the document was not translated into Afaan Oromo, the working language of Oromia Government, the government that pretended to have been equal partner during the preparation of the master plan.

government. The same master plan, which Negaso Gidada says was rejected by the TGE, was reintroduced in the early 2000s but was rejected by Oromia Government.⁸¹

The plan to stretch the landmass of Addis Ababa to more than a million hectares was widely regarded as unconstitutional territorial annexation allegedly planned to divide the State of Oromia into East and West (Tsegaye, 2014). The Master Plan is perceived in a way that “for the Oromos, it is a war about the survival of their children” (Bekele, 2015). A student of Ambo University interviewed by *Fact Magazine* and became a headline: “rather than waiting Oromia divided into two by the Master Plan, I would prefer a bullet (shot) in my head” (Vol. 2, No. 45, 2014). Thus, the Master Plan outraged the Oromo public in general and triggered mass protests.

Exploring four major constitutional-legal arguments against the master plan, Tsegaye Regassa (2014) outlines why the Oromo resisted (and have to resist) it. First, heavy reliance on the Master Plans of cities in a non-federation, namely Paris and Lyon of France in the preparation of the Master Plan, was seen as a wrong lesson for Ethiopia (ibid.). Above all, “imposing a Master Plan designed by” a city directly administered by the Federal Government “on the towns of Oromia and incorporating these towns into Addis Ababa violates the principle of federalism” (Tsegaye, 2014: 4). Daniel Elazar wrote that “the development of urbanized regions often crossing the boundaries of the constituent polities has led to problems arising from political boundaries... Urbanization has tended to heighten or exaggerate the tensions that may already be present in federal systems” (1987: 255-256).

Second, incorporating Oromia towns and *woredas* into Addis Ababa, alters the boundary of the former without a formal constitutional amendment and as such is unconstitutional, Tsegaye adds. According to Negaso Gidada, the EPRDF is often accused of subtly violating and amending the constitution: “The ruling party with its urge to implement its ‘development and transformation plan’ seems to not care about the constitution and violates it at will” (2014: 6). For any purpose, changing municipal boundaries is always difficult, but is particularly more difficult for capitals serving or acting like ‘federal districts’:

For capital cities that are city-states or federal districts, boundary expansion implies overstepping—some might say expropriating –another state’s or province’s territory, with the political resistance that such an expansion would entail (for political, symbolic, and financial reasons). Boundary expansion through municipal amalgamation or annexation might seem easier for federal capital cities located within provinces/ states because there is

⁸¹ Interview on VOA, Juneydi Saddo, former president of Oromia National State (2000-2005), Sept 23, 2016.

no need to cross provincial/ state boundaries, as might occur with a federal district or city-state (Slack and Chattopadhyay, 2009: 307).

Thus, the model that the federal government of Ethiopia is using to administer Addis Ababa does not seem to allow the latter to expand formally.

Third, the Master Plan, which aimed to evict massive farmers, was widely opposed for violating individual and collective rights of indigenous Oromo farmers. Getahun is convinced that the unprecedented expansion plan of Addis Ababa will cause “displacement of Oromo farmers from their land, even when compensated, is a violation of their individual rights to life, property, health and housing, and their collective rights to linguistic and cultural freedoms” and the plan was even accused of aiming to partition Oromia into East and West (2014: 175). Similarly, Assefa has raised “the fast-growing urban population and corresponding demand for land”, for which, “the city’s boundary is continuously expanding at the expense of the surrounding semi-rural places, which Oromia Regional State considers to be within its jurisdiction. This raises the thorny issue of eviction of farmers from their land, compensation, and resettlement elsewhere” (2009: 94). The Master Plan was introduced on top of Addis Ababa's age-old exclusionist problems of monolingual official language, monocultural education and other social policies. Getahun Benti observes that “the policy of exclusion of Oromos from participating in the administration, economic activities, and cultural functions of Addis Ababa has had an adverse effect on Oromos and on Ethiopian politics as a whole” (2014: 161). Therefore, since the city itself originated and developed being a threat to Oromo culture and language, its further expansion plan would be a real threat.

Finally, the design and preparation of the Master Plan, shrouded in secrecy (Tsegaye, 2014), was accused of violating article 12 of (both the FDRE and Oromia) constitution, which requires that “the conduct of government shall be transparent”. Furthermore, Article 15 of the federal law on urban plans sets strict procedures for the preparation and approval of urban plan:

- 1) The process of plan approval shall be preceded by public hearings to be conducted at a convenient location.
- 2) Such processes and hearings shall be transparent and adequately communicated to the public at large, particularly to the kebele councils and community based organizations.
- 3) The relevant suggestions and objections shall be taken up as inputs to rectify the plan (Federal Proclamation No. 574/2008).

This last factor, in the form of lack of good governance, was officially admitted by the government. Likewise, according to Negaso Gidada (2014), the main justifications to oppose the Master Plan includes, inter alia, that the execution of the plan could endanger the identity of the Oromo, that it evicts Oromo farmers without proper compensation, that Addis Ababa should pay for the services

it gets from the surrounding areas (i.e. land, water, construction material) and something be done about the depositions of waste substances (domestic and industrial). "Some people accuse mainly the TPLF but also the ANDM of deliberately enforcing the master plan and that the OPDO, instead of defending the right of the Oromo and Oromia, is submitting to the dictates of the two" (Negaso, 2014: 5).

Triggered by this urban policy, the Master plan, urban centers across Oromia were rocked by waves of Oromo nationalist conflicts which William Davison viewed as "Oromo nationalism on the Rise in Ethiopia" (2014).⁸⁵ Similarly, Solomon Goshu and Asrat Seyoum (2014) argued that the "new city master-plan ignites old controversy" by "digging up old wounds." Despite strong mass resistances even from OPDO leaders, the Ethiopian government uncompromisingly continued defending the Master Plan only on "developmental agenda", and "through the instrumentality of its security forces (such as the Federal and State Police, the Army, and the Special Forces), the Ethiopian government responded with brutal repression of the protests", causing unprecedented casualties (Tsegaye, 2014: 1).⁸⁶ On the side of the demonstrators, following deaths of protestors, sporadic attacks were often carried out against security forces and government institutions. In the late months of 2015 and early months of 2016, the demand of the Oromo protesters in rural and

⁸⁵ The first phase of the protests against the Master Plan was stronger in public universities. The second phase of the protests was much stronger, swift and widespread across Oromia, urban and rural areas. By way of resisting the Master Plan, students and urban residents chanted all of, but not limited to, the following slogans: "We don't sell our lands—Burrayu is not for sale, Laga Tafo is not for sale, Sululta is not for sale, Galan is not for sale, Dukam is not for sale, Sabata is not for sale...etc; The constitutional special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa must be respected; As there are Amharic schools in Oromia towns, there must be Afaan Oromo schools in Addis Ababa; Menelik's monument in Addis Ababa should be uprooted and replaced by General Taddesa Birru; Afaan Oromo must be the other working language of the Federal Government of Ethiopia." See OMN news in November, December, 2015. All "not for sale" slogans targeted the Oromia towns that were planned to be embraced in the Master plan. General Taddesa Birru is celebrated among Oromos for pioneering Oromo nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s. Opposition parties such as Medrak (Forum) joined the protests and conducted public demonstration in Addis Ababa in 2014 denouncing the Master Plan and excessive state security measures. Ethiopian Diaspora's oppositions strongly resisted the Master Plan as well as the government's heavy-handed measures against the protesters.

⁸⁶ The number of casualty is very much contested. The Ethiopian state admitted eleven dead in the 2014 protests. But independent media reported the number of dead more than fifty (50). There were many cases of tortures and detentions in comunicados (Amnesty International, Press Statement, 2014). The number of dead in the second phase of the protests was not established independently. In the early June of 2016, the government admitted only 173 dead and 956 injured. However, foreign-based Ethiopian media collected the lists of protestors found dead which they put as high as more than 600 (Oromia Media Network News, 02 July 2016; see Human Rights Watch Reports, 2016). As a result of the heavy-handed state measures against demonstrators in the phase two Oromo protests, European Parliament adopted a resolution on Ethiopia (see European Parliament Resolution (2016/2520(RSP)). Following the deadly incident on the Irrecha (Oromo Thanks Giving Day) in October 2016 as securities fired on protestors causing a stamped, which claimed scores of lives, the mass protests intensified in Oromia, several investments burnt down by infuriated protestors, more lives claimed with state responses and finally, the Ethiopian Government declared state of emergency all-over the country.

urban centers across Oromia went beyond the cancellation of the Master Plan. They demanded political regional self-rule and land rights in urban and rural areas, ending socio-economic marginalization through inclusion of Afaan Oromo as the other working language of the federal government to enhance genuine participation of the Oromo in the federal institutions, respect for human rights and democracy (Oromia Council of Abba Gadaas, 2016).

In general, the ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa have origins in the marginalization of Oromo political and national rights in the city (1886-2016) – the rights that are still governed extra-constitutionally, the age-old monolingual and monocultural urban policy problems (discussed in chapter seven), the OPDO's or Oromia Government's 'presenting absence' (to use Tsegaye's phrase) and the TPLF/EPRDF's 'strong presence' in the capital as argued above (Tsegaye, 2015). All Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city, in one way or the other, are related to the junior role played by the OPDO in the EPRDF decision-making power structure. In all cases, the OPDO which claims to represent the Oromo ended up serving against the rights of the Oromo which perpetuated their marginalization in the city. Nevertheless, in the last one year (2016/17), it appears that the OPDO is asserting autonomy from the traditional dictates of the TPLF/EPRDF. At times, the president of Oromia Region, Lamma Magarsa made a public speech saying "we don't have other boss; our boss is our people. However, some of our leadership created their own artificial boss and continued to worship; we say to them stop!". This statement was popularized by media and attracted attentions as it suggested at least psychological autonomy assertion. In any case, it implies that the OPDO of today may not be as weak as that of yesterday.

5.3.2 Ethno-nationalist Conflicts over Dire Dawa

The Oromo-Issa-Gurgura alliances and conflicts in and surrounding Dire Dawa may be traced as far back to the early pastoralist confrontations (Asnake, 2010). For instance, the 1934 deadly group conflict (Somali vs. Oromo/Gurgura) was associated to cattle raiding acts in Shinile area, at the northern outskirts of Dire Dawa.⁸⁷ The 1946 Issa-Oromo conflict was instigated in order to control Baraqa farmland in Shinile area; and the imperial soldiers of Ethiopia were accused of siding with Issa/Somali as part of ethnic manipulations.⁸⁸ The Maqu conflict between Oromo and Issa in

⁸⁷ Interview, *supra* note 18.

⁸⁸ Focus Group Discussion, elders of Jeldesa, January 14, 2012, Dire Dawa. See also Interview, *supra* note 43.

Hurso area in the late 1950s was also said to be triggered by cattle raiding.⁸⁰ Historically, Hurso area, located on the western tip of Dire Dawa, was said to have been settled by Afar pastoralists before they were forcibly pushed towards Awash valley (ibid.). These resource based pastoralist and semi-pastoralist conflicts in history, which happened in fact at the outskirts of Dire Dawa, later took the dimension of territorial ownership conflicts following the collapse of the Derg regime.

The Oromo-Somali rivalries in and surrounding the town of Dire Dawa intensified in 1991 and 1992 in particular. According to Asnake Kefale, in the post-1991, "the territorial ownership of cities and towns has been contested by neighbouring ethnic regions," -the rivalries that he said "more often than not lead to violence and protracted conflicts" (2014: 593). The relationships between largely armed political organizations in Dire Dawa during the volatile transitional period of Ethiopia were full of collusions and collisions as dictated by their respective political interests. Local elders tell that there were a dozen of political parties in the city, and as a result, eleven flags (ten flags of political parties and flag of Ethiopia)⁹⁰ were hoisted in fort of the municipality of Dire Dawa during the early first half of 1990s.⁹¹ Short-lived alliances and violent confrontations were common. The first political conflict broke out in early 1991 between the OLF and the IFLO as both disagree over the establishment of a joint leadership, which, Megersa (2005) speculated, was God-sent opportunity for the EPRDF to strategically provide military assistances to the latter party against the former. Local elders observed that the EPRDF was interested to form a short-lived alliance with the IFLO allegedly to weaken the OLF.⁹² Consequently, the IFLO temporarily benefited from the EPRDF's backing in terms of finance and firearms. Moreover, constant clashes between the EPRDF and the OLF in Dire Dawa compelled the latter to withdraw from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in 1992 paving the way for the former to emerge as the sole party to dictate the political developments in the city.⁹³ The EPRDF established control of the city

⁸⁰ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 49.

⁹⁰ These political parties, which had their own offices in the city, were All Amhara People's Organisation (AAPPO), Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), Gadabursi Liberation Front (GLF), Gurage People's Democratic Organisation (GPDO), Harari People's Democratic Organisation (HPDO), Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO). The majority of them were armed fronts and their inter-relationships were full of collusions and collisions.

⁹¹ Interview, *supra* note 37.

⁹² Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

⁹³ Interview, *supra* note 43.

after military confrontations with some of the parties and threatening others to co-opt during the transitional period one after the other (ibid.). Let us see some of the major conflicts.

5.3.2.1 The 1991 IFLO-IGLF Conflict

Few months after the collapse of the Derg regime, Issa/Somali nationalists perpetrated ethnic violence against Oromo refugees in Djibouti killing dozens, according to an interview with the first post-Derg governor of Dire Dawa.⁹⁴ Many Oromos, who escaped the attack by entering into foreign embassies in Djibouti, were brought back to Dire Dawa with the UN assistance (ibid.). Following the violence against Oromo refugees in Djibouti, an armed confrontation was conducted in 1991 between the IFLO and the IGLF in Malka Jabdu area, western part of Dire Dawa (Megersa, 2005). It took the dimension of Oromo-Somali territorial conflict which resulted in bloodsheds on both sides (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). Those who participated in the conflict observed that the EPRDF participated in the conflict by closing the main road to Malka Jabdu to isolate the IFLO from its military as well as popular basis in the main town which in turn helped the IGLF defeat the IFLO (Megersa, 2005). In addition, the IGLF allegedly had the following opportunities. First, it is said to have had received military aid from Djibouti to fight against both the IFLO and the EPRDF.⁹⁵ Second, the IGLF gained both military personnel and weapons from the remnants of Derg armies in Hurso and Cuba military camps in the western gate of Dire Dawa. These all had enormously helped the IGLF in its conflicts with the IFLO and the EPRDF. As a result, it was able to control Malka Jabdu suburbs, including up to Erer Gota, temporarily, until its final conflict with the EPRDF in 1992.⁹⁶ Historically, it is argued that:

On Malka Jabdu direction, Afar used to border the Oromo in Dire Dawa but they were gradually pushed away by Issa-Oromo coalition. A pocket of land Afar used to settle in is now locally called Gola Adal. The three groups –Oromo, Issa and Afar– used to conduct programmed races at Mount Adi in order to name the annual hero group.⁹⁷

An Oromo proverb ‘Qaaniin dhiiraa Gaara Adiitti; qaaniin dubra Odaa Watari’ which literally means that men’s power was tested at Mount Adi, where the three groups compete for annual group prestige, and girls confess about their virginity under Oda (sycamore tree) located in Watar area, where Oromo of the area held their Gadaa assembly (ibid.). Now, in this area of Malka

⁹⁴ Interview, *supra* note 23.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Interview, *supra* note 43.

⁹⁷ Interview, *supra* note 28.

Jabdu, Oromo borders not Afars but Gurgura whose geographical settlement is a transitional territory in between Oromo and Issa in the areas.

Large part of the IFLO-IGLF conflict, which lasted no less than ten days in Erer Gota area, western part of Malka Jabdu, over state-owned fruit and vegetable farmlands, was conducted between farmers of Oromo, Gurgura and Issa.⁹⁸ The conflict to control Erer Gota, geographically closer to Mieso, was seen as part of the Somali-Oromo territorial conflicts over regional borders (Mesfin, 2006; Bekele, 2010). The IFLO was already in conflict with the OLF, when Issa and Gurgura formed alliance in the conflict establishing Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) under the leadership of a Gurgura.⁹⁹ Megersa Qiltu, who personally participated in the conflict on the IFLO side said:

Funny aspect of the conflict was that both leaders of the Oromo and Somali groups in the battle were from Gurgura. Nuraden, the leader of IFLO, the party that had largest involvement in the conflict on the side of the Oromo, was a Gurgura. On Somali side too, the leader of IGLF, Abduwahab Sheik Abduwali, was a Gurgura. Therefore, the conflict claimed more lives of Gurguras on both sides, making them main victims of the conflict.¹⁰⁰

Consequently, the major victims were Gurgura community who participated in the conflict both as Somali and as Oromo. In this regard, Issa/Somali often says '*Gurguradu dagal way adagyin*' which means '*Gurgura are little god in war*' to value their courage ultimately mobilizing alliances.¹⁰¹ Finally, the conflict also exposed Gurgura's shifting ethnic identity whose role has been instrumental to change Oromo-Somali balance of power in the area. As discussed in chapter 4, Gurgura's partial integration into the Oromo culture—as they speak Oromo language and also retain part of their Somali identity—has exposed them to be vulnerable to strategic manipulations by the state or non-state groups (including by themselves) in that particular areas.

5.3.2.2 The 1992 IGLF–OPDO/EPRDF Conflict

In early 1992, three Oromo political parties –OPDO, OLF and IFLO– were called upon by Oromos in Dire Dawa who held demonstration demanding unity among them.¹⁰² At the end of the demonstration, IGLF soldiers kidnapped two Oromos returning from the demonstration and

⁹⁸ Interview, *supra* note 23.

⁹⁹ Interview, Mustefa Hassein, a Gurgura elder, February 23, 2013, Melke Jabdu, Dire Dawa.

¹⁰⁰ Interview, *supra* note 28.

¹⁰¹ Interview, anonymous Gurgura in Melka Jabdu, February 23, 2013, Dire Dawa .

¹⁰² Interview, *supra* note 43.

executed them to provoke conflict. Consequently, soldiers of OPDO and OLF retaliated against IGLF soldiers (*ibid.*). Using this as a pretext, the then governor of Dire Dawa said, the IGLF released its troops from Shinile military camp to control Dire Dawa's Afetesa, Police Maret and Ganda Garada areas. The IGLF briefly commanded these areas for half a day, after which, the OPDO/EPRDF soldiers from Kazira camp were deployed and re-controlled the areas taken by the IGLF (*ibid.*). After the OPDO army managed to establish its control of the town, they were immediately relocated to Harar city where they had to stay for years. The OPDO army in Dire Dawa was replaced by other members of the EPRDF armies.¹⁰³

Subsequently, the central government first urged Oromo and Somali groups to cease their violent way of claiming the city until its fate is finally determined (Markakis, 1994). Despite its defeat, the IGLF negotiated terms with the EPRDF over Dire Dawa which resulted in a centrally appointed power sharing with OPDO since 1993 as shall be discussed in chapter seven. The IGLF was officially dissolved in 1994 when the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) was formed. Then, according to Abdi Samatar, "it [ESDL] sent a delegation to the Republic of Djibouti to solicit financial support from Somali Ethiopians and other Somalis. The group was well received and raised over \$30,000 and obtained several vehicles" (2005: 59). This is a clear evidence of trans-boundary ethno-national mobilization for a shared cause. Put differently, the 1992 conflict between the EPRDF and the IGLF turned into cooperation with the founding of the ESDL, a party later joined by a faction of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to form the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) in 1998.¹⁰⁴ Not surprising, the formation of the ESDL (an affiliate party to the EPRDF which is instrumental in creating it) in 1994 forced the OPDO to close up its office in Dire Dawa and replaced by the ESDL office.¹⁰⁵ As a result, Oromo elites remark that the OPDO won the battle against the IGLF in 1992 but lost the city (*ibid.*). Since then, understandably, the local political role of the OPDO in Dire Dawa was relegated in as much as the Somali party was created as an affiliate organization, both of which in reality serve the interest of the dominant power in the EPRDF political arrangements.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* From among all national liberation movement forces, it was the EPRDF army that was declared national defense army following the July 1991 Peace Conference. Several liberation movements such as the OLF, the SLM opposed the decision and withdrew from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia.

¹⁰⁴ Interview, *supra* note 21. ESDL merged with the ONLF faction to form ESPDP in 1998.

¹⁰⁵ Interview, *supra* note 23.

The 1992 conflict between the IGLF and the OPDO/EPRDF was the major inter-party bloody conflict in Dire Dawa since the downfall of the Derg.¹⁰⁶ The conflict brought destructions of lives and properties, causing intense ethnic tensions and schools' suspension. As a result, Djibouti's Issa/Somali is said to have revenged once more for what happened in Dire Dawa by what an informant termed "xenophobic attacks" against the remaining Oromo refugees in Djibouti.¹⁰⁷ The then mayor of Dire Dawa observes that, for the conflicts they [OPDO/EPRDF] conducted against the IGLF in Dire Dawa, innocent Oromos in Djibouti were massacred.¹⁰⁸ This may be linked to what Schraeder (1993) says that the mainstream Issa government and society lives in Djibouti but their cultural head, Ugaas, lives in Dire Dawa. This, Djibouti's clan/ethnic ties to Dire Dawa has internationalized group conflicts in Dire Dawa to ethnic violence in Djibouti and vice versa as was experienced in 1991 and 1992. More political significance of this clan ties shall be discussed in chapter six. To sum up, following the downfall of the Derg, Oromo-Somali conflicts seem to have the dimension of controlling part or whole of Dire Dawa territory through changing alliances.¹⁰⁹ In the preceding conflicts, even though the actual confrontations were between Oromo and Somali forces, it was the central government of Ethiopia which finally took control of the city.

5.3.2.3 Ethno-nationalist Clashes of 1992, 2006 & 2014

As soon as it controlled the city in 1991, the EPRDF distributed 15 guns for each of the 23 kebele administrations of Dire Dawa intending to restore peace and stability.¹¹⁰ Contrary to its intentions, the weapons were turned to kill each other in late 1992 when a conflict erupted between residents of Lega Hare (Oromo) and Addis Ketema (Amhara) kebele administrations. The conflict was simply an Oromo–Amhara ethnic conflict that was said to have claimed dozens of lives on both sides.¹¹¹ The cause of the conflict was attributed to the transitional period party politics in the city, and the pretext was said to be rumors of ethnic based insult exchanges between members of the two kebeles. It was after this conflict that the EPRDF ordered urban disarmament.¹¹² This conflict is often seen as the last major ethnic conflict in the city of Dire Dawa. There have been local

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Interview, *supra* note 43.

¹⁰⁸ Interview, *supra* note 23.

¹⁰⁹ Interview, *supra* note 28.

¹¹⁰ Interview, *supra* note 43.

¹¹¹ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

¹¹² Interview, Alemayehu Teshome (Amhara), April 4, 2012, Dire Dawa.

rivalries between the two kebeles sometimes taking religious dimension since Lega Hare is a home to mainly Muslims and Addis Ketema is a home to mainly Christians (ibid.). Moreover, there have been occasional clashes over the city's borderlands on the side of Somali Regional State.

In 2006, a conflict was prompted by a group of gunmen from Somali Region who had intentions to control Dire Dawa's Marmarsa and Boran area bordering Somali Region in the north of the city. According to eyewitnesses, Somali armed group crossing from Somali Region to Boran area ordered the Oromos, who are within the boundary of Dire Dawa Administration, to leave the area.¹¹³ In reaction, the Oromo rose up in arms to defend themselves. After brief days of clashes, Dire Dawa Administration security forces, ordered by Fisseha Zerihun (a Tigrayan Mayor of the city), intervened and brought the conflict to an end but a climate of ethnic tensions continued (ibid.). As a result, the Oromo in the city's Boran area were disarmed by the city's Police Commission, while the Somali beyond the border who attacked Boran area were not disarmed since they were from Somali Regional-State.¹¹⁴ Due to this one-sided disarmament, the Oromos residing in the area rightfully complained (ibid.). Since then, Oromo informants are deeply concerned that, the Somali Regional-State militia occasionally crosses the boundary of the city administration to kidnap Oromos in Boran, Marmarsa and Ganda Rige areas and detain them in Shinille Zone of Somali Region.¹¹⁵ The motive of these occasional attacks is argued to have associations with Issa/Somali's desire for the incorporation of Boran and Marmarsa areas, and Ganda Rige part of Malka Jabdu to Somali Region.¹¹⁶ The Somali elites however argue that such frequent incursions are caused by what they say Dire Dawa's illegal expansion into their territory.¹¹⁷

With similar motive, in April 2014, gunmen identified as members of Somali Regional State militia raided the Dire Dawa University campus. This group of gunmen exchanged gunfire with security guards of the university and finally hoisted the flag of the Somali Regional-State in place of the federal flag of Ethiopia in the campus premises which implies Somali nationalist ownership desire and conflict to Dire Dawa University (Girum, 2014). The conflict thus is an extension of the occasional Dire Dawa's border disputes on the side of Somali Region over territories including Ganda Rige (part of Malka Jabdu Kebele 01), Marmarsa, Dire Dawa

¹¹³ Interview, supra note 18.

¹¹⁴ Interview, Dire Dawa Police Commission, May 19, 2014, Dire Dawa.

¹¹⁵ Focus Group Discussion, Oromo youths of Ganda Tesfa (Sabian *Kebele* 02), January 14, 2013, Dire Dawa. Dire Dawa University premises is located within the Boran and Marmarsa border areas of Dire Dawa Administration.

¹¹⁶ Interview, local authority, Sabian (*Kebele* 02), May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa.

¹¹⁷ Interview, ESPDP official, March 19, 2013, Jigjiga.

University campus and Ganda Tesfa (Boran-Marmarsa area of Sabian Kebele 02) and Dire Dawa Airport premises.¹¹⁸ It must be clear that no inter-group clash was reported on the southern side of Dire Dawa's border with Oromia Regional State despite the fact that enormous expansions for industrial development and facilities are mostly taking place in this direction. This might be associated to the fact that the Oromo nationalists regard the city as a cultural continuity of Oromia Region though they feel that they lost the city's territory and politics to the federal government.¹¹⁹

The militias who raided the campus were identified to have been from a village newly constructed by Somali residents within Shinille Zonal jurisdiction of Somali Region in the north of Dire Dawa University campus and Ganda Tesfa, and in the west of Dire Dawa Airport.¹²⁰ Dire Dawa Administration ordered its security forces and re-established its control of the raided areas. The conflict was reported to have resulted in no casualties, no injuries.¹²¹ The newly constructed village by residents of Somali Region on the borderland gave the conflict a regional dimension, which necessitated intervention by the Ministry of Federal Affairs in the bilateral discussions between Somali Regional Government and Dire Dawa Administration to end such occasional border clashes.¹²²

In general, the conflicting claims between Oromia and Somali Regions over the ownership of Dire Dawa have not yet been finally resolved. The Constitution of Ethiopia (1995) defines principles and procedures of resolving border disputes between Member States of the Federation (Art 48, Art 62). Contrary to these constitutional guidelines, the city administration of Dire Dawa has evolved extra-constitutionally as a special federal political entity since 1993. This further shows that the competing interests of Oromia and Somali regional states over the city have been systematically suppressed by the hegemonic power in the EPRDF regime.

¹¹⁸ Interview, Somali member of Dire Dawa City Council, May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa.

¹¹⁹ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

¹²⁰ Interview, *supra* note 114.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Interview, Faajjii Chala, email-communication, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations (Dire Dawa University), May 26, 2016, Dire Dawa.

5.4 Summary

In this chapter, post-1991 dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, one of the themes of the research questions of this dissertation is discussed. The chapter first has shown the governance statuses of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-1995). During this period, the former city was given a regional status (Region Fourteen) being the capital of TGE and Region Four whereas the latter city was assumed part of Region Four until the central government intervened. Particularly, the protections of Oromo's national and political rights in Region Fourteen were promised, but the transitional period ended without implementing them. The fate of Dire Dawa could have been determined in accordance with the rules and procedures of the formation of the transitional regional self-governments. It however evolved extra-constitutionally.

Secondly, the chapter has explored the dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. As far as Addis Ababa is concerned, the paradox of Oromo's rights in Addis Ababa (extra-constitutionality) is identified by many as the mother of Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city. Oromo's sense of socio-economic, cultural and political marginalization in the city due to the suspension of the constitutional special interests of Oromia has served as the root cause of nationalist conflicts to the city on the side of the Oromo. It was on top of this problem that the Oromia Regional State announced the relocation of its capital from Finfinne to Adama in 2003 which ignited waves of Oromo protests and demonstrations in Addis Ababa and other cities in Oromia. However, the decision over the capital was reversed following the landslide victory of the CUD in the city by the 2005 controversial election of Ethiopia. The city was engulfed by post-election protests as supporters of the CUD staged demonstrations against election irregularities. The recent Oromo protests (in 2014, 2015, and 2016) against the Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan are also regarded as part of the unsettled age-old resentments against marginalization of Oromos in the capital. The Master Plan thus was a triggering factor. Politically, it looks the OPDO is yet to be shown a green-light to implement Oromo's constitutional rights in the city. Thus, the case of Addis Ababa has shown that centralization policy has led to conflict.

Finally, this chapter has assessed the ethno-nationalist conflicts to Dire Dawa. The 1991 IFLO-IGLF conflict in western rural part of Dire Dawa, and the 1992 IGLF-OPDO/EPRDF conflict in the city are seen as major signals of the Oromo-Somali ownership conflicts to the city. The federal government used the conflicts as justifications for its direct intervention and the city

administration's extra-constitutional evolution. Today, the Dire Dawa Administration is a politico-administrative body. The Oromo nationalists believe that Dire Dawa city is illegally sliced from the territory of Oromia and put under the federal administration. Similarly, the Somali ethno-nationalism particularly from Somali Region has until recently continued to clash with Dire Dawa's residents bordering Somali Region. In Dire Dawa, these conflicts have led to centralization policy.

In this regard, Canada's federal capital Ottawa, which has been bone of contention among the bilingual federal, English-speaking Ontario and French-speaking Quebec governments, can offer comparative conflicted city similarity to the Ethiopian cases of Addis Ababa—where political interests of the federal and Oromia governments competed—and Dire Dawa—where political interests of the federal, Somali and Oromia governments competed. However, their key difference is that, while Ottawa is officially bilingual city administration accommodating competing socio-cultural interests, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are officially monolingual city administrations serving as local agencies of Ethiopia's monolingual federal government. In a nutshell, the dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts to the cities have shown that the root causes of the conflicts in both urban local cases are not yet settled through ethno-culturally inclusive manner and constitutionally valid procedure. Regional ruling parties are also found too weak to enforce the constitutional principles and procedures. Before we look into the practices of urban policies on ethno-linguistic diversities in both cities, we need to understand their direct federal governance and to what extent they are autonomous from the center to formulate and practice accommodation policies.

Chapter 6

Federal Governance and Urban Local Autonomy of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have outlined the major ethno-nationalist conflicts to multiethnic urban centers of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as caused by intertwined factors including, among others, the unsettled ownership claims, border issues, the extra-constitutional urban governance and hegemonic political interests of the EPRDF. It clearly looks that in the case of Dire Dawa, inter-group conflicts of Oromo and Somali over the ownership of the city supplemented by other factors have invited federal dominance in the city (*conflict-led-centralization policy*), whereas in the case of Addis Ababa, federal dominance and its marginalizing urban policies particularly towards the Oromo have been causing frequent Oromo nationalist conflicts to the city (*centralization policy-led-conflict*). The present chapter explores to build more on the extra-constitutional centralization pattern of urban policy making and governance generally in Ethiopia and particularly in the chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Put differently, by focusing on urban policy making and implementation as well as institutional autonomy frame, the chapter examines legal foundation of federal governance of the cities from above as well as their urban local governments from below.

Thus, it first presents an overview of urban local status in Ethiopia in general manner. It briefly assesses urban policy and governance impacts of the overall development and poverty reduction policies of the country particularly in the post Ethio-Eritrean war. In section two, the choice of Ethiopia's federal capital and the emergence of the "special" city administration of Dire Dawa are discussed separately. The corresponding narrations or justifications behind the federal governance of the cities are also explained. Thirdly, local governments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa periodized into two - transitional urban local governments (1991-2008) and the current urban local governments (2008-Present) -are outlined. The current urban local government

structures, mandates and institutional setups of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are analyzed comparatively. Finally, this chapter investigates local autonomy statuses of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations. To this end, the general scholarly confusions are clarified, and the extent of centralization tendencies of the cities both in principles and practices are established.

6.2 Overview of Urban Local Status in Ethiopia

There is dearth of literature on the impacts of Ethiopian federalism and its public policies on multiethnic urban governances and stabilities. The following part casts lights on constitutional-legal and policy frameworks of the governance of urban centers in Ethiopia. Ethiopia's urban population comprises 19% of about the 90 million population of the country according to the 2007 census report (CSA, 2008). The 2015 urban employment survey report of Ethiopia defines 'urban centers' as all capitals of *Woredas*¹²³, Zones, Regions and Federal Government as well as other municipal towns and urban dwellers' associations with 2000 and more inhabitants (CSA, 2015; see more definitions in chapter two). The number of *Woredas* in Ethiopia by 2013, for instance, was 801 which suggest corresponding number of *Woreda* capitals with the exception of *Woredas* in Addis Ababa (Ayenew Birhanu, 2015). There could be a possibility of two or more urban centers in a *Woreda*. In accordance with the above definition, therefore, one may expect as high as 1000 urban centers in Ethiopia of which, according to Zemelak Ayele (2014), only 98 established urban administrations exist. The same Ethiopian survey declares that 'major urban centers' include the nine regional capitals as well as seven other cities with population of 100,000 and above under which Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are categorized (CSA, 2015: 8).

The FDRE Constitution (1995) lends little attention to the significance of multiethnic urban governances in Ethiopia. According to Asnake Kefale, one of the challenges that "ethnic decentralization reforms encounter is the problem of providing adequate governance structures for multiethnic cities. In the Ethiopian case too, no attention was given to this problem" (2014: 592). Thus, as Elazar claims, "the original bases for federal arrangements were rural territorial units that gave the system as a whole a particular character" (1987: 255). With the exception of the federal capital city, which also showed no improvement of local diversity accommodation in the last two

¹²³ At the regional state level, since region/state represents the second tier of government in the state structure of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), *Woreda* (district) is the fourth tier of elected government after *Zone* which is the third tier of government (Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2002).

decades as shall be discussed in chapter seven, the governance of urban local administration is the competence of regional states, the Constitution provides (Art 50). Likewise, Zemelak Ayele points out that the Constitution authorizes each of the regional states to use its constitution to design and adopt a system and structure of local government "fitting to its circumstances" (2014: 91).

Contrary to this, urban local policy-making exclusive power of the regional states seems to have been recentralized by the Ethiopian federal government through its subsequent development and poverty reduction policies since 2001. This specific year was the year that the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) came to an end, causing split within the TPLF, the core party in the EPRDF, and that the government of Ethiopia declared itself developmental state after an intra-party "*tehadiso*", 'reform'¹²⁴ (Merera, 2011). This was regarded as one of the "changes in political weather at national level" in Zemelak's term (2014: 92) -the change that undermined the role of the regional states and the relevance of their constitutions in creating local government systems appropriate to their circumstances. Many thus have seen the 2001 national political episode as a turning point for the inauguration of recentralization policies in Ethiopia (Zemelak, 2014; Merera, 2011; Mulugeta, 2005). Until this critical time, Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) was the mainstay of the EPRDF's rural-centered development policy in which urban centers were considered important "only inasmuch as they contributed to the development of agriculture and agriculture-based industrialisation" (Zemelak, 2014: 105-106).

Following the crisis within the EPRDF, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) (2000/1-2005/6), often seen as the first five year development plan of Ethiopia was centrally proclaimed in 2000. In this regard, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which was also adopted in the same year, might have motivated the EPRDF regime. The SDPRP pledged to take the following urban measures which include, *inter alia*, to:

formulate urban development policy, design urbanization strategy, mobilization and efficient management of municipal financial resources; strengthening urban planning and management skills, improvement of delivery of municipal services; by redefining their legal

¹²⁴ It was following the split in the TPLF in 2000-2001 that the personality cult of Meles Zenawi emerged in the Ethiopian political landscape. Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister died in 2012. However, his legacy and his party's philosophy seem to have continued unchanged though some regional states started to assert aspect of autonomy. The second *tehadiso* of the EPRDF is undertaking now (in 2016 and 2017) after 15 years. There are commentators who believe that the dominance of the TPLF in the EPRDF and centralization policy started to decline in 2012 and now, states seem stronger than ever. There is some truth in this line of argument. But there are also groups who argue that almost nothing changed and the supremacy of the TPLF remains intact. This line of argument is not also empty. It is open for further research.

framework; rationalization of organizational structure and staffing of municipalities (Ministry of Finance & Economic Development/MoFED, 2002: 126).

This federal policy document pledged to go as far to redefine the legal framework, organizational structure and staffing of municipalities which clearly reversed the powers granted to regional states by the constitution (Art 50/4). The policy-making powers of the federal government cannot be *too specific* as this case shows, but it should be *general* according to the constitution: "it shall formulate and implement the *country's* policies, strategies and plans in respect of *overall* economic, social and development matters" (Article 51/2). This poverty reduction federal policy, the SDPRP, was said to have introduced in 2001 the so-called district-level decentralization in Ethiopia (Zemelak, 2011). So as to execute this district-level decentralization, all of the nine regional states revised their respective constitutions in 2001 and subsequently enacted statutes to restructure their urban local governance systems within the policy period (ibid.). The whole process resulted in centralization by the federal government and to some degree decentralization (blessing in disguise) in favor of local governments. Then, regional states were disadvantaged level as the policy aim was to weaken regional president's power in favor of the PM. As part of this policy, the federal government revised Addis Ababa's charter in 2003 and adopted a new charter for Dire Dawa in 2004.

Following the end of the SDPRP period, the EPRDF induced another five year national development policy called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/6-2010/11). It states that:

The Ministry of Federal Affairs completed the development of a national Urban Development Policy. It was approved by the Council of Ministers in March 2005. The implementation of the Urban Development Policy has formed a key starting point for development of the two PASDEP urban Packages. By mid-2007 all nine Regional States had passed proclamations establishing urban local government authorities with decentralised powers (MoFED, 2007: 7).

According to this policy document, the powers not only of directly making urban local policy but also of indirectly "establishing urban local government authorities" appear centralized, which once again showed reversal of the powers of the regional states over urban local matters. Hence, regional states thus far seem to have been relegated to implement urban local policies as formulated by the federal government. Moreover, the PASDEP policy document criticizes the previous two regimes' centralist urban governance strategies: "Municipal structures were established in some cities, but the mayors were centrally appointed and municipalities were

basically treated as branches of central government” (2007: 4). This policy document however failed to mention that the urban administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have continued to be treated akin to old ways (see charters of Addis Ababa (Art 61) & Dire Dawa (Art 51)).

For instance, a federal law on urban planning that was enacted in 2008 tended to confirm that pre-2008 urban policies in Ethiopia were continuation of the unitary system.

[T]he existing laws on urban planning, due to their enactment by the unitary system of government, lack in conformity with the prevailing spirit of decentralization and therefore it has become necessary to replace them with a comprehensive legislation which takes into account the federal structure of government and the central role of urban centers in urban plan preparation and implementation (Preamble of the Federal Proc. No. 574/2008).

In line with the new "spirit of decentralization" and federal structure, "urban administration" was defined as "an autonomous administrative structure established with a view to rendering services of municipality in urban centers other than chartered cities" (ibid: Art 2/7). Urban administrations are mandated to prepare their own master plans and related urban policies, but their autonomy are limited in the sense that "a regional state or the federal government as may be appropriate, shall have the power to suspend an approved plan which does not comply with the basic principles of urban planning stipulated in this Proclamation" (Proclamation No. 574/2008: Article 16). Though this law aims to attain decentralized urban policies as quoted above, it in negation sets hierarchy of plans that looks unitary system: "based on the national and regional development strategies and schemes the following hierarchy of plans shall be considered: 1/ National urban development scheme; 2/ Regional urban development plan; 3/ Urban plans" (ibid: Article 7). The Ministry of Works and Urban Development is set to "oversee and follow-up as to whether urban plans are in conformity with this Proclamation" (Article 55/3).

Contrary to the "spirit of decentralization", the responsibility for urban governance and policy making was conferred to the Ministry of Federal Affairs (MoFA), which was created in 2001, but with the creation of Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MoWUD) in 2005, that responsibility was transferred to the latter (Federal Proclamation No. 471/2005: Article 18/2). Remarkably, the MoFA was formed in 2001 overlapping the end of Ethio-Eritrean war and the inauguration of recentralization policy of the EPRDF. The federal government further legislated urban land lease policy in 2011 which it states is "applicable to all urban centers within Ethiopia" (Art 3) and the MoWUD empowered to "follow up and ensure the proper implementation of this Proclamation in all regions and city administrations; prepare model regulations, directives and

manuals to be issued for the implementation of this Proclamation" (Art 32) (see Federal Proclamation No. 721/2011). This law declares that "regions and city administrations shall have the powers and duties to administer land, in all urban centers, in accordance with this Proclamation" (ibid: Art 33). Thus, urban land policy making, to the extent of preparing directives and manuals, is centralized by the federal government, and regions and the two chartered cities are only entitled to execute it. Similarly, the federal parliament passed a bill on urban landholding registration in 2014 and required all urban administrations in the country to report about the registered urban landholding information to the Federal Urban Real Property Registration and Information Agency; and the MoWUD is entitled to "follow up and ensure the proper implementation of this Proclamation and regulations, directives and standards issued pursuant to this Proclamation all over the regions; and cause corrective measures to be taken where problems exist" (Art 49). This is also part of land administration centralization.

But also, various urban policy decentralization promises were entered though. One of the short-term objectives of the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty, for example, was to make cities in Ethiopia "models of *participatory democracy*" (PASDEP, 2007: 20). Similarly, the third development policy document, the Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP-I) (2010/11-2015/16) envisaged "participatory engagement of the urban populations in development and governance... and establishing effective decentralized administration systems that *ensure self-rule of cities and towns*" (MoFED, 2010: 83). These promises of building urban participatory democracy and ensuring self-rule of cities and towns in Ethiopia are yet to be materialized. And the current development policy of Ethiopia is the Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP-II) (2015/16-2020/21), which is continuation of GTP-I. Aimed at urban institutional capacity building, the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction (MoUDHC) has been running Urban Local Government Development Programs (ULGDP) in two phases totaling ten fiscal years (2008/09-2018/19) financed by International Development Association of the World Bank. In this process, the mandates of the regional states and urban administrations have been to execute the programs (MoUDHC, 2014).

As part of the general trends of the EPRDF's centralized development policies, the Growth and Transformation Plan I (GTP-I), which aimed to transform Ethiopian economy from agriculture-led to industry-led economy, was approved by the federal parliament in 2010 to be implemented across Ethiopia. To this end, urban land lease law, which limited access to urban

lands only through competitive land lease auctions, was passed in 2011. Since then, the federal government has increasingly been interested in urban centers, established "network of cities" under the control of MoUDHC and designated 23rd of October as *Ethiopian Cities Day* which has been celebrated since 2009. In this regard, Zemelak writes that:

[I]n the past five or so years the federal government has paid special attention to cities, as evidenced by the massive infrastructural projects in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and regional capitals to do with roads, industrial zones, housing and the like. The colourful celebrations of 'Cities' Day' (there is no such a thing as a '*woredas*' day) that recently have been held every year are sponsored by the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction (MoUDHC) and are a further sign of the attention the federal government is now lavishing on the country's urbanites (2014: 108-109).

In general, within the phase of GTP-I, the ruling regime has enacted urban related laws such as urban land lease, investment laws, industrial park developments, urban landholding registrations, and so for, which caused massive centralization of urban administrations. For instance, Ethiopian Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012 states that "in order for the industrial sector to have a leading role in the economy of the country, the Federal Government shall establish industrial development zones in regions" (Art 33). For a regulatory function, the federal government established the Ethiopian Industrial Zones Development Corporation (IZDC) in 2012 under the Ministry of Industry.¹²⁵ However, in December 2014, the Council of Ministers issued Regulation No. 326/2014, establishing the Ethiopian Industrial Park Development Corporation (IPDC) to replace the Ethiopian Industrial Development Zones Corporation by expanding the latter's responsibilities.¹²⁶ The IPDC develops and administers industrial parks.

The foregoing federal policy discussions show that Ethiopia's urban policy making tends to have been centralized after 2001, due to which regional states and urban administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are relegated to execute policies. Why is urban (and non-urban) policy making of Ethiopia so centralized overriding the constitutional principles of decentralized and democratic policy making? Studies on public policy making in Ethiopia corroborate that the ruling party fully centralizes policy problem identification, defining public policy changes, and managing

¹²⁵ See <http://addisfortune.net/articles/the-newly-re-established-industrial-park-gets-ceo-from-moi/> accessed on March 03, 2016.

¹²⁶ The Federal Government planned to build 11 industrial parks, and it has finalized only two: (1) Addis Industry Village (operational), (2) Bole Lemi I (operational), (3) Bole Lemi II, (4) Kilinto, (5) Hawasa, (6) Dire Dawa, (7) Jimma, (8) Adama, (9) Mekele, (10) Bahir Dar, and (11) Kombolcha.

its executions (Zemelak, 2014; Merera, 2011; Asnake, 2009; Assefa, 2007; Mulugeta & Cloete, 2006; Mulugeta, 2005). An excerpt from Mulugeta's PhD thesis is worth quoting:

The EPRDF's structure virtually represents a party of a Leninist type... Additionally, although its congress holds plenary sessions every two to two and half years, and is ostensibly seen as a supreme decision-making organ of the coalition, in practice key policy decisions are made by the central committee and politburo (Mulugeta, 2005: 233).

It looks a very centralized quality of the Communist regime in Soviet Union, which by no means is a quality of policy-making in democratic federations. Moreover, it is often claimed that almost all development policies of Ethiopia, ranging from its constitution-making process (mega-public policy making) down to the advent of rural-centered Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) policies in the mid-1990s followed by all successive policies including the current development policy of Growth and Transformation Plan II (GTP-II), have been introduced from the center by the ruling party (Assefa, 2012; Dessalegn, 2014; Zemelak, 2011; Mulugeta, 2005). This trend of policy centralization has been arguably an outcome of (1) the fusion of executive and ruling party institutions, (2) absence of democratic institutions and (3) disorganized underdeveloped society and fragile civil societies, in one word –authoritarianism (Asnake, 2009; Mulugeta, 2005). In other words, the ruling party's democratic centralism guiding ideologies – revolutionary democracy and developmental state– appear to have promoted political and policy centralization, which in practice tended to relegate the constitutional federal principles of non-centralization to the background (Merera, 2011). In the last couple of years, however, it looks that some regional states such as Amhara, Somali and lately Oromia started to assert autonomy, though extensive research should establish this view. Similarly, Zemelak Ayele observes that

[A]ll levels of government in Ethiopia are controlled, directly or indirectly, by one party; the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF). Not only does it control all levels of government, it has a highly centralised decision-making system founded on the principle of 'democratic centralism'. Under this system, the party's regional and local structures, which also control government institutions at those levels, are involved only in the execution of decisions passed by the centre (2014: 91).

Likewise, Daniel Elazar argues "Third World federations, which emerged only in the twentieth century, adopted hierarchal forms [of bureaucracy for policy formulation] as a result of their exposure to modern ideas and to serve what were usually autocratic systems in any case" (1987: 212). Autocratic policy formulations and executions inevitably contradict principles of democratic federalism in general and urban local policy decentralizations in particular.

However, the incumbent EPRDF regime, the author of all policy documents discussed above, claims that its national policies and strategies have so far been largely participatory and the resulting public institutions are also equitably accessible (Bereket, 2010; Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, 2007). As a result, it denies those claims of political authoritarianism and policy centralization tendencies associated with urban policy and governances in Ethiopia. Now, let me discuss urban governances of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa from above.

6.3 Federal Governance of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

6.3.1 Ethiopia's Choice of Federal Capital

The choice of Addis Ababa as the federal capital city of Ethiopia takes us back to the debates over the making of federal capitals that was briefly outlined in chapter two of this dissertation. To reiterate, federal capitals are commonly established on three models: (1) city-state model where the capital city enjoys regional state status, (2) cities in provinces, and (3) federal district model which establishes federal capital territory controlled by the Federal Government (Slack & Chattopadhyay, 2009: 7). The federal constitution of Ethiopia (1995) proclaims "Addis Ababa shall be the capital city of the Federal State" and the city administration is "responsible to the Federal Government" (Art 49). Due to this accountability matter, many writers tend to see Ethiopia's federal capital city as a federal district (Assefa, 2009; Slack & Chattopadhyay, 2009). Assefa Fischea, for instance, argues that "the federal-district model in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which was established after the 1995 Constitution, albeit after a series of legal/constitutional reforms, seems a step in the right direction" (2009: 80). It in fact resembles a federal district due to the provision that requires the accountability of Addis Ababa city administration to the federal government. In principle, it is known that being a creation of the national government, "a federal district lies outside the territory (and thus the jurisdiction) of any state or province" (Slack and Chattopadhyay, 2009: 297). It means that federal districts are federal territories (see also Indian Constitution, 2007; Nigerian Constitution, 1999). Likewise, Shimels Demissie wrote that "the FDRE Constitution clearly makes the city [Addis Ababa] a federal territory" (2010: 46). However, this dissertation maintains that Addis Ababa could not be a full-fledged federal district on the following grounds.

First, Addis Ababa has been the capital of multiple governments: its city government, Oromia Government, Federal Government, African Union and international organizations. The Oromia Government officially calls the city Finfinne. Assefa Fischea sees this phenomenon of

multiple governments in one territory as “one of the challenges facing Addis Ababa’s administration” (2009: 93). The general view has been that all governments except one are without a territory. Is Addis Ababa a federal territory, resembling Abuja or Delhi or Canberra? The answer appears convincingly negative in accordance with the FDRE Constitution (1995) which proclaims that “the territorial jurisdiction of Ethiopia shall comprise *the territory of the members of the Federation* and its boundaries shall be as determined by international agreements” (Art 2). And Members of the Federation are nine States (Art 47). Moreover, the Constitution states that “the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia comprises the Federal Government and the State members” (Art 50/1). As a result, there could be no constitutional territory beyond the territories of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. The constitution obliges the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa be located in the territory of Member State/s. Article 49/5 of the Constitution clearly states “the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia”. Addis Ababa therefore is part of the territory of the State of Oromia according to the territorial principles in the Constitution.

The federal government may not own a specific territory called federal territory in Ethiopia for domestic purposes. Tsegaye Regassa emphasizes that:

Finfinne is an Oromo city that is also serving as the seat of the federal government. It should have been clear by now that the city is not a designated federal district or federal territory. In fact, no territory is directly the territory of the federal government for domestic legal and political purposes. For international law purposes, the federal government represents Ethiopia as a country that claims the territory of its constituent states as its territory (2014: 4-5).

This is related to the second argument that says Ethiopia's federal capital apparently tends to fall within the model of capital cities in regional states because Addis Ababa, which was originally an Oromo city (see chapter four), is now geographically found in, and serving simultaneously as the capital of, the State of Oromia (Article 6 of the Constitution of Oromia, 2005). In terms of administrative jurisdictions, the State of Oromia had constitutional privileges to influence federal governance of Addis Ababa which counters the federal district model arguments. For that matter, the States, not the cities, are constitutionally entrusted with the powers and functions “to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws” (Art 52/d). In a seemingly violation of this provision, both city charters (adopted by the federal legislature) extend the same powers and functions to the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa within their jurisdictions (Proclamation No. 721/2011; Dire Dawa City Charter, 2004: Art 9; Addis Ababa City Charter, 2003: Art 11). But it could be convincingly argued that it was part of the territorial State's

constitutional mandate that Oromia was given privileges in Addis Ababa: "the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the *provision of social services* or the *utilization of natural resources and other similar matters*, as well as *joint administrative matters* arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected" (Article 49/5). Thus, the State of Oromia holds constitutional privilege and rights to influence urban governance of Addis Ababa regarding social service provisions, utilization of natural resources, joint administrative matters as well as other similar matters.

However, Ethiopia's political and policy practices show that, unlike what is theoretically written in the constitution, no law has been promulgated so far to effect the special interests of the State of Oromia, and Addis Ababa is governed in a federal district style in all except for the ceremonial seating of Oromia Government offices in the city.¹²⁷ This comes true when one looks at the Addis Ababa City Revised Charter which states "the City Government is a component of the Federal Government" and "it shall be accountable to the Federal Government" (2003: Art 61/2). The federal government has full power to dissolve the city government (Art 61/3). Therefore, the choice of Ethiopia's federal capital resembles in practice the federal district model on the one hand, and the one that is located in a federal unit serving as federal and state capital city on the other, giving way to a birth of hybrid model. Nico Steytler has once aptly written "the lack of fit between the reality of metropolitan cities and the legal and political structure in which they must operate could impact adversely on the functioning of federal systems" (2001: 60).

What could be the rationales of governing Addis Ababa as a federal district in practice or why not as a city-state or a city governed by Oromia? Why has the special interests of the State of Oromia in the city been neglected in an extra-constitutional way in the last two decades? For the first question, Gebrehiwet Tesfai writes that "the making of the City Administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are more of political decision. Addis Ababa is a melting-pot metropolitan city where there is no centripetal ethnic force and it is a seat of the Federal Government" (2013: 235).¹²⁸ This quote centrally claims that no single ethno-national group owns the city of Addis Ababa which tends to suggest that multiethnic ownership or "melting-pot" character of the city

¹²⁷ In fact, Oromia Government continued to hold much of its major meetings including all of the meetings of the Regional State Council, *Chaffe*, in Adama since 2005. Since then, Adama has been *Chaffe's* conference hall center (*Galma Abbaa Gadaa*) as well as Oromia Television and Radio Organization headquarter.

¹²⁸ Gebrehiwet argues that "since the City is *encircled* by Oromia State, the Constitution stipulates that the latter has special right on the metropolitan city" (p.235). It is not clear why he used the term "encircled by", while the Constitution states "the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia".

pushed its governance to a federal district style. Likewise, Asnake Kefale argues that "the two large multi-ethnic cities of the country (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa), which could not be claimed by a single ethnic group, were not even spared from this process" (2009: 100). This view regards both cities as federal territories –no man's land or "everybody's land" –as is the case for Abuja, Nigeria's capital which was carved out of three states (Elaigwu, 2009: 202). However, Oromo nationalists do not accept the idea that denies Oromo ownership of Addis Ababa, the idea that dispossesses them of their traditional farmland in and surrounding Finfinne (Asafa, 2010; Tsegaye, 2014). Dirribi Damissie (2014) adds that the federal government often prefers to directly control Oromo cities, among others, Finfinne, Dire Dawa and Awaday in violations of its own constitution mainly for political-economy reasons.

Likewise, the federal government justifies its federal district governance style of Addis Ababa "in view of the fact that it is the capital of the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the seat of the African Union and of a variety of international organizations as well as it is a reflection of a large and growing residents representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" (Addis Ababa Charter, Proclamation No. 361/2003: Preamble). Shimels Demissie argues this way: "Members of almost all Ethiopia's ethnolinguistic communities live in Addis Ababa. For this reason it is answerable to federal government" (2010: 52). The conventional understanding that views the residents of Addis Ababa city as 'representative' of the ethno-linguistic diversity of Ethiopia is widely taken for granted uncritically.

Scholars in the circle dispute this view by asking "which one of the major Ethiopian cities is a monoethnic city: Mekele, Bahir Dar, Gonder, Adama, Hawasa, Shashamane, Jimma, Harar, Dassie, Nekemte?"¹²⁹ Strictly speaking, the answer is none; and all are multiethnic to some degree. Faajjii suggests, in an interview, that Addis Ababa could have better administered by a regional-state akin to the South Africa's capital cities (Pretoria, Cape Town and Bloemfontein) which are governed in "exactly the same manner" as the other metropolitan municipalities (Steytler, 2009: 228). Further, though Addis Ababa is usually regarded as a city representing Ethiopian diversity, its urban cultural policies, *inter alia*, language of administration, health, education, and media policies do not reflect it, as will be discussed in chapter seven; and it in fact looks a monoethnic city in cultural policy. Contrary to the practices in Addis Ababa, Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009) argue:

¹²⁹ Interview, *supra* note 117.

Capital cities are unique, in large part, because they are seen as an important symbol of the whole country. This symbolism has special meaning for federal countries, which tend to be diverse or large, or both. Consequently, in federal countries the choice of a capital city, its monuments, and its governance arrangements have to reflect this diversity while also being as neutral as possible with respect to individual states or provinces (p.3).

For the second question I raised above, about the disregard of the national rights of Oromo (or rather extra-constitutional practice) in Addis Ababa in the last quarter a century, almost all sources I consulted attributed it to the junior position of Oromia's ruling party, the OPDO, in the Ethiopian authoritarian decision-making power structure, i.e., in the EPRDF which is dominated by the interests of the TPLF (Getahun, 2014; Merera, 2011).¹³⁰ OPDO's junior position within the EPRDF has also been the major factor for Dire Dawa's extra-constitutional evolution (ibid.). Implementation demands of Article 49/5 on the sides of Oromia Government, at some time, and of Oromo nationalists, almost all the time, have been discussed in chapter five. Now, let us see how the special federal governance of the city of Dire Dawa evolved.

6.3.2 The Emergence of Special Federal Administration of Dire Dawa

The city of Dire Dawa, as discussed in chapter five, became a bone of contention between Oromia and Somali regional states during the transitional period (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). By the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia, no provision was dedicated to Dire Dawa presuming that the conflicting interests of Oromia and Somali regions would be resolved in accordance with the new constitution. Instead of resolving the dispute, the Prime Minister's Office intervened in 1993 and began to directly administer the city by assigning its own lists of authorities (Minutes of HPR on Dire Dawa Charter, 2004).

The new Constitution (1995) defines the principles of resolving any border dispute or misunderstandings that happened between regional states. The institution that is entrusted with final power to settle such dispute is the House of Federation (HoF) (Articles 48 & 62/6). Article 48 of the Constitution proclaims that:

1. All State border disputes shall be settled by agreement of the concerned States. Where the concerned States fail to reach agreement, the House of the Federation shall decide such disputes on the basis of settlement patterns and the wishes of the peoples concerned.

¹³⁰ Interview, *supra* note 53; Focus Group Discussion *supra* note 70; Interview with Oromo Federalist Congress official, June 20, 2014, Addis Ababa.

2. The House of Federation shall, within a period of two years, render a final decision on a dispute submitted to it pursuant to sub-Article 1 of this Article.

Besides, according to Article 46/2 of the Constitution, regional-border making criteria include "settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned." Without prejudice to the powers of the HoF, the Ministry of Federal Affairs is also empowered to "facilitate the resolution of misunderstandings arising between Regional States" (Proclamation No. 471/2005: Article 21/2). The Minutes of the House of Peoples' Representative on Dire Dawa Charter (2004) mentions as the Oromia Region have sent formal letter to the House of Federation requesting final decision in accordance with the constitution (BMNO 1/269/Mg, February 2004), whereas the Somali Region did not (Minutes of HPR on Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). The final mechanism to determine the fates of contested territories, as commonly practiced, was a referendum. It means Oromia called for a referendum as Oromos were majority in Dire Dawa but the Somali Region feared that it would lose the city if a referendum was considered as Somalis were minority.

Contrary to the constitutional principles, the city of Dire Dawa unexpectedly evolved as a 'special' city administration. Many inter-regional border disputes have been fixed pursuant to the constitutional-institutional principles and procedures from bilateral negotiation to referendum. Many Somali-Oromia border disputes such as on Babile and Erer were resolved through means of referendum, which appear successful at least in attaining relative stability. However, referendum in pastoralist and semi-pastoralist areas such as in Moyale town tended to have failed because of seasonal social mobility in general, and Somali's westward mobility in particular as many argued (Fekadu Adugna, 2011; Asnake Kefale, 2009). Whatever the case, the House of Federation was unable to render a final solution to Dire Dawa, a city that has been under the Prime Minister's Office since 1993. Instead, the House of Peoples' Representative (HPR) in an extra-constitutional manner adopted in 2004 the City Charter of Dire Dawa Administration "until a lasting solution is secured" (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Preamble). In the last two decades, no lasting solution is secured. Instead, in the same way as Addis Ababa, the administration of Dire Dawa is centralized and regarded "part of" and "accountable to" the Federal Government (ibid: Art 51). The Charter of Dire Dawa further declares that "Ministry of Federal Affairs shall, as an agent of the Federal Government, follow up the performances of the city administration" (ibid: Art 51). That is how the special federal administration of Dire Dawa gradually but extra-constitutionally evolved.

The Federal Constitution (1995) provides no legal ground for local government's accountability to the Federal Government except Addis Ababa; and the mandate to establish and administer local government units is the competence of the regional governments (Article 50/4). Dire Dawa's extra-constitutional administrative and accountability structure exhibits aspects of political authoritarianism where local governments are mere agents of the centre. The political and policy centralisation tendencies enshrined in the Charters of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa administrations shall be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

The special (or 'extra-constitutional') administration arrangement of Dire Dawa has its origins in the volatile political context that accompanied the demise of the *Derg*. The first and official factor is the Oromia-Somali ownership conflicts over the city (See Preamble of Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). Such conflicts were frequent in the transitional period of Ethiopia. Particularly, political parties¹³¹ claiming to represent the Oromo and Somali in the area resorted in 1991 and 1992 to armed confrontations over the control of rural and urban part of Dire Dawa, respectively. During this time, the OPDO established control of the city, until a coalition arrangement (with the Somali party) was introduced in 1993 under the direct intervention of the Ethiopia's Prime Minister Office (Milkessa, 2013). This coalition and other subsequent power sharing arrangements shall be discussed in chapter seven.

According to the Preamble of Dire Dawa Charter (2004), this territorial dispute between Oromo and Somali in the transitional period, which later transformed to an Oromia-Somali regional conflict, was the sole reason for the federal government's intervention. The most common rationale given as an explanation for the federal administration of Dire Dawa is the multi-ethnic nature of the city,¹³² and this is not only the official line adopted by the federal government. Local sources indicate that the most important factor for the city's special arrangement was indeed related to its ethno-linguistic diversity. Critiques however argue that the multi-ethnicity reason appears a pretext for the fact that there are Ethiopian cities no less multi-ethnic but being administered by regional states.¹³³ According to the ex-governor of Dire Dawa (1991-1993) Somalis'

¹³¹ In the conflicts, while the IFLO, OLF and OPDO/EPRDF were ethnic-Oromo forces, the GLF, IGLF and ONLF were Ethiopian-Somali forces.

¹³² Interview, Tsegabrhan Tadesse Berhe, Intergovernmental Relations Institutionalization Directorate, Director, FDRE Ministry of Federal Affairs, June 07, 2012, Addis Ababa.

¹³³ Interview, *supra* note 117. For instance, Harar, Adama, Hawasa, Bishoftu, and other cities are no less multiethnic.

claim to the city was evident during the June 1992 regional election.¹³⁴ At that time, the city was to hold elections as part of Oromia; the National Electoral Board had finalised electoral registration of political parties for this election. But a day before the election, Somali forces led by Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) mobilised in opposition to the elections held as a part of Oromia. The ensuing tension led the National Electoral Board to announce suspension of Dire Dawa elections, which remained the case until 2008 (ibid.).

According to government officials, the Oromos strongly demanded the city to remain in Oromia while the Somalis wanted the city be part of Somali regional-state of the Ethiopian federation. In fact, 'in 1993, when the new Somali regional state was established, it sought to make Dire Dawa its capital' (Asnake, 2014: 595). The rivalry resulted in fierce inter-ethnic competition for power in the city.¹³⁵ Some viewed ethnic federalism as the source of the conflict: "the case of Dire Dawa shows the difficulty of clearly delineating the country along ethnic lines. It also reveals how ethnic federalism could lead to territorial claims and competitions with the possibility of precipitating into conflicts" (Asnake, 2010: 215). Others argue that it was the junior position of the OPDO within the EPRDF that made Dire Dawa fall under the direct administration of the federal government (Getahun, 2014).

The other critical reason for the extra-constitutional federal governance of Dire Dawa is said to be the city's geopolitical-economy significance. Asnake Kefale argues that "a number of other factors might have also influenced the decision of the federal government to establish a special administration for Dire Dawa, which is directly controlled by it", among others, "the geographical significance of Dire Dawa and its adjoining areas to Ethiopia's linkage to Djibouti's port services" (2010: 210). Thus, Dire Dawa's proximity to Djibouti seaport combined with Ethiopia's desperate quest for access to the sea after its loss of Assab port seems to have augmented the strategic-geopolitics of the city for the federal government.¹³⁶ Since 1998, Ethiopia has exclusively been dependent upon Djibouti port. One might thus argue that Dire Dawa became special administration partly as a result of "Djibouti's pressure on landlocked Ethiopia".¹³⁷ Asnake Kefale adds that "the geographical significance of Dire Dawa as a transit to Ethiopian exports and

¹³⁴ Interview, *supra* note 23.

¹³⁵ Interview, *supra* note 21.

¹³⁶ The port of Asab, which used to be Ethiopia's, now belongs to the Eritrean state. The port had been used by Ethiopia up until the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000.

¹³⁷ Interview, *supra* note 23.

imports through the port of Djibouti undoubtedly influences policies of the Ethiopian Government about the governance of the city" (2010: 210-211).

As a city, Dire Dawa owes its very origins to the Ethiopian-Djibouti railroad. And since then the city has occupied a strategic location on the import–export flow path. In the early 1990s, it was the second largest lucrative economy after Addis Ababa. This might have been an additional factor for the federal intervention.¹³⁸ In more recent years, Dire Dawa has been selected as 'industrial development corridor' for four neighbouring regional-states in eastern Ethiopia: Oromia, Somali, Afar, and Harari (Charter of Eastern Ethiopian Regions' Congress, 2009). On the other hand, Dire Dawa is geographically proximate to extremist movements in the Horn of Africa, particularly from Somalia, which might have invited the direct federal control for security concerns (Milkessa, 2013).

There is yet another, but lesser known, factor that explains Dire Dawa's unique extra-constitutional status; and that is the Issa/Somali clan ties between Djibouti and Ethiopia's Dire Dawa. The Issa clan of the Somali inhabits three different countries in the Horn of Africa: in Djibouti, the Somaliland autonomous region of Somalia, and Shinille Zone of Somali Region and the city of Dire Dawa in Ethiopia. In addition, there has been a "wide-scale westward expansion of Issa in the past seven to eight decades" (Bekele, 2010:139). All Issa community in the Horn are led by one *Ugaas*, headman, whose seat is in fact in Dire Dawa. Since its independence in 1978, the Issa/Somali-led Djibouti state has had a consular office in Dire Dawa to protect the rights of Issa in the city. The headquarters of Issa/Somali's clan *Ugaas* has been Dire Dawa since the town was made part of Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* (sub-province) of Ethiopia in 1963. Before this year, Dire Dawa was the centre of Nole clan of Oromo and Issa's clan centre was in Erer, some 20 kms west of Dire Dawa (Milkessa, 2013). Many Djibouti state leaders such as the current Issa-President, Ismail Omer Guelleh, were born and brought up in Dire Dawa. Thus, these ethno-cultural and political ties have made Dire Dawa so significant for Djibouti, on whose port Ethiopia depends. Due to clan ties, "one who irritates Issa in Dire Dawa irritates Issa in Djibouti as has indeed been revealed during the early 1990s Oromo–Somali conflicts".¹³⁹ The collapse of the state of Somalia in the 1990s, and the subsequent civil war, has strengthened the Issa clan's power in the Horn region. As pointed out in chapter five, Djibouti State has shown interests in eastern Ethiopia. Issa

¹³⁸ Interview, ANDM Member of Dire Dawa City Council, November 14, 2012, Dire Dawa.

¹³⁹ Interview, supra note 23.

informants reject this territorial expansionist view as groundless accusations.¹⁴⁰ Of course, all these explanations listed above are interlinked to a certain extent; and with varying degrees, they have paved the way for the extra-constitutional arrangement for Dire Dawa. Before investigating the impact of federal governance on the urban local autonomy of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, it would be good to look at the institutional setups, mandates, and organizations of their local government units.

6.4 Urban Local Governments of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

The establishments of urban local administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa have been posited within the decentralization wave of the early 1990s Ethiopia and consequently the two cities were accorded administrative status on the basis of 'special considerations' (Tegegne G.E. & Kassahun B., 2007). These 'special considerations' have been discussed above. Between 1991 and 2008, both cities did not establish their urban legislative organs from where mayors are formally chosen. During this period, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa local governments did not have speakers and mayors from elected city councils. Put differently, all their urban local administrative entities were centrally crafted and their local authorities were assigned by the Office of Prime Minister (Asnake, 2014; Milkessa, 2013; Addis Ababa Charter, 1997). Therefore, in both urban cases, I regard their urban local arrangements before 2008 as transitional or interim local governments.

6.4.1 Interim Local Governments (1991-2008)

The Dire Dawa local government was administered as part of Region Four (Oromia) from 1991 to 1993. In 1993, Ethiopia's Central Transitional Government imposed an interim local coalition administration which was replaced in 1995 by another centrally assigned entity called Dire Dawa Administrative Council (1996-2003). From 2003 to 2008, another temporary local government known as Dire Dawa Provisional Administration was instituted by the federal government during which period the Dire Dawa Administration Charter (2004) was adopted. This Charter provided for the establishment of a council elected by the people within one and half a year; but the government failed to implement and it instead amended the Charter in 2006 extending the provisional administration "by one additional year" (Amended Charter, 2006: Art 2). The first local

¹⁴⁰ Interview, supra note 20.

election for Dire Dawa City Council was held in 2008 and established the Office of Dire Dawa City Council, the city's legislative body (Dire Dawa Administration, Proclamation No. 1/2008). This local legislative body began to serve as the local higher authority from which local administration is formed. The current administrative name of the city is Dire Dawa Administration (2008-present).

The city administration of Addis Ababa was given a regional status as Region Fourteen from 1991-1994. In 1995, Addis Ababa lost its regional status and an interim local administrative unit accountable to the Prime Minister was established as the city was chosen as the federal capital. This urban local administration got its legal personality by its first charter in 1997: "the Addis Ababa City Government, the Woreda and Kebele Administrative units and organs and institutions established by Regulations of the City Government as autonomous bodies shall have their own legal personalities" (Art 34, Addis Ababa City Government Charter, Proclamation No. 87/1997). This charter established the accountability of the city administration to the Prime Minister (see Art 3/3, Art 7, Art 10, Art 12/2). It further recognized rural local units as well: "Addis Ababa includes the existing urban areas and the twenty three rural localities falling under the jurisdiction of the City Government" (ibid: Art 2). However, these rural local units were seen as urban areas by the Revised Charter of Addis Ababa Proclamation No. 361/2003. An interim urban administration was established in 2003 to implement the revised charter and thereby hand over urban local government of Addis Ababa to elected mayor and city council (Assefa, 2009). Accordingly, there took place the 2005 election by which the EPRDF lost the city to the CUD. It was then followed by post-election crisis which once again brought an interim local administration called Addis Ababa City Caretaker Administration (2006-2008). A by-election for the city was held in 2008 reversing the election result in favor of the EPRDF and created the current Addis Ababa City Government. One can thus say that local administration of Addis Ababa was in transitional period even up to 2013 for the fact that the 2008 election was a by-election (not regular one) and the office of the Speaker of the City Council was established in 2012. Assefa Fiseha also comments that "the by-elections of 2008 also created another interim administration" (2009: 89).

For Addis Ababa local government, the year 2008 was a landmark as it was for Dire Dawa, because the "Addis Ababa City Council was established in 2008"¹¹¹ in accordance with Article 12 of its Revised Charter (Federal Proclamation No. 361/2003). This Charter declares that Addis Ababa City Council is the highest local authority in the city. Since 2008, the name of the local administration of the city has been Addis Ababa City Government.

6.4.2 Contemporary Local Governments: Institutional Setups (2008-Present)

Local governments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa drew their legal personalities from their respective charters despite the fact that the latter came to exist extra-constitutionally. Put differently, the current local administration of Dire Dawa was established not in accordance with the constitution but by a charter extra-constitutionally adopted by federal parliament (Dire Dawa Charter, Federal Proclamation No. 416/2004). The charter declares that:

The City Administration shall have legal personality. Organs of Power set out by this Charter and other bodies to be established by the City Council in accordance with this Charter shall have their own respective legal personality as representative of the City Administration (See Art. 3 of Dire Dawa Charter).

Addis Ababa, on the other hand, is constitutionally "the capital city of the Federal State" and the residents of the city were promised to "have a full measure of self-government" (FDRE Constitution, Art 49/1&2). The Revised Charter of Addis Ababa (2003) provides that "the City Government shall have legal personality" (Article 3). Article 4 of this Charter declares that "the name of the City is Addis Ababa". By doing so, it formally disregarded the original name of the city—Finfinne—the name that the Oromia Government and Oromos prefer to use to refer to the city. Recall that the 1997 Charter of Addis Ababa did not raise the naming of the city.

Furthermore, the Charter of Dire Dawa Administration (2004), in its Preamble, sets out the rationales for adopting it. Accordingly, it lists five justifications. First, it reiterates that Dire Dawa City was accountable to and directed by the federal government since 1993 as per the decision thereof until such a time that the claims of the Somali and Oromia would be finally resolved. Second, it says the necessity of legal foundation that enables self-administration to ensure good governance and development in the city. The third is the need to create conducive situations

¹¹¹See Addis Ababa City Government, www.aacc.gov.et accessed on December 12, 2015. As we will be discussed in chapter seven, there have been local elections for the City Council of Addis Ababa since 1995, but it was dysfunctional until 2008 when it started to appoint its speaker and mayor of the city.

which capacitate the city to render trade, industry and other services for the eastern parts of Ethiopia. Fourth, it outlines the necessity to clearly legislate conditions that enable Dire Dawa to be governed as a modern and competitive city in which the entire wellbeing of its residents is ensured; and efficient and cost-effective municipal service is equitably delivered. Finally, it states the need "to confer self-government power on the residents of Dire Dawa and to legally determine the organizational structures and operations of the city in conformity with democratic principles, good governance order and contemporary trends of growth and development" (Preamble, Dire Dawa Charter, 2004).


Except the first rationale, the remaining four rationales are mentioned in, and shared by, the Preamble of the Addis Ababa City Charter (2004). In fact, the first rationale set out in the Preamble of Addis Ababa Charter is about making Addis Ababa "a suitable urban space ... in view of the fact that it is the capital of the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the seat of the African Union and of a variety of international organizations as well as it is a reflection of a large and growing residents representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples" (Preamble, Addis Ababa Charter, 2003). As a result, in both urban cases, issues of ethno-linguistic diversity have been tangentially touched upon in their rationales set out first. In general, both charters in their preambles aim to build urban local self-administrations on democratic principles, equitable development and good governance.

As to the mandates of urban local administrations, both charters of Addis Ababa (Art 11) and Dire Dawa (Art 9) have identically listed powers and functions, among others, to issue and implement policies as well as adopt economic and social development plans concerning the development of the city; establish municipal and non-municipal bodies of the city; constitute public enterprises as legal entities; establish lower units of local government and demarcate their borders as well as allocate budgetary subsidy to it; determine the administration and working conditions of its employees; identify, determine and organize municipal services; administer land and natural resources located within the bounds of the city; administer, lease, develop, sale and collect incomes from government houses; prepare, approve and administer the budget of the city; determine and collect taxes, duties and service charges in the city; and borrow money from domestic sources with authorization by the federal government. These competencies are in fact extensive, almost equivalent to the constitutional powers and functions of regional-states. In practice, however, the federal government has centralized powers, especially decisive ones granted to both urban

administrations. As would be argued, both cities charters give certain powers to urban local governments in one clause and reverse them in another clause.

Depending on their demographic, geographic and administrative decentralization factors, both urban administrations have organized their own tiers of local governments (Minutes of the HPR on draft law of Dire Dawa Charter, 2004). The Revised City Charter of Addis Ababa (2003) establishes three tiers of urban administration at the City, Sub-City and *Kebele* levels (Art 10). It amended Article 4 of the previous Charter (1997), which had established local units of urban administration at City, *Woreda* and *Kebele* administrations. In practice, Addis Ababa local government was structured at City, Sub-City and *Woreda* levels by the end of the Caretaker Administration in 2008. Therefore, the main organs of Addis Ababa City Government is organized at three levels including at the City level (City Council, Mayor, City Cabinet, City Manager, sector bureaus), Sub-City level (Council, Chief Executive, Standing Committee, Manager, sector offices), and *Woreda* level (Council, Chief Executive, Standing Committee, Manager, Social Courts and sector offices) (Addis Ababa Civil Service Bureau, 2016). Contrary to the Revised Charter of Addis Ababa (2003) which states *Kebele* is the City's lowest unit of local governments, the lowest administrative unit of local government in Addis Ababa after 2008 is *Woreda* administration (Addis Ababa Finance & Economic Development Bureau, 2013: 14). On the other hand, the urban administration of Dire Dawa is organized only at two levels: City Center and *Kebele* (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Article 10). Unlike Addis Ababa city, local government of Dire Dawa has no administrative Sub-city and *Woreda* units. The organs of powers of the City Center include City Council, Mayor, City Cabinet, City Manager, and sector bureaus. The main organs of *Kebele* administration, which is the lowest unit, include *Kebele* Council, *Kebele* Chief Executive, *Kebele* Standing Committee, and *Kebele* Social Court (ibid.).

Fig. 6.1 Tiers of Local Governments of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa



Note: On the left side is of Addis Ababa and on the right side is of Dire Dawa

In accordance with the cities charters, a mayor-council model of urban governance, which requires a mayor to be elected by and from among the members of the City Council, has been established in 2008. The 1997 Charter of Addis Ababa used the term 'Governor', not 'Mayor', to refer to the chief executive officer of the city. Both City Councils of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are regarded as local legislative bodies and the highest local political authorities (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Articles 11-18; Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Articles 12-17). Dire Dawa City Council has 189 seats, whereas Addis Ababa City Council has 138 seats, and the members are elected by the residents of the city for a term of five years. Major powers of the City Councils include, among other things, to establish the municipal and non-municipal organs of the city; approve the budget of the city administration; issue the master plan of the city; adopt policies on matters falling within the purview of its power; elect the city mayor and the deputy mayor from among its members; approve the appointment of the members of the city cabinet upon the nomination by the mayor; approve the appointment of the president, vice president and the judges of the city courts and the appointment of the chief auditor, and others (Dire Dawa Charter, 2014: Art 12; Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 14). Both charters have chosen Amharic as the working language of local administrations in Dire Dawa (Art 5) and Addis Ababa (Art 6).

As stated above, the City Councils of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa were established in 2008 (Dire Dawa City Council, 2008; Addis Ababa City Council, 2014). However, while the Office of Dire Dawa City Council was established in 2008, the Secretariat of Addis Ababa City Council

was established late in 2012 (Dire Dawa Administrative Council Proclamation No. 1/2008; Addis Ababa City Council Proclamation No. 34/2012). Both City Councils are strangely accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs and their dissolutions may be effected by the House of Peoples' Representatives and by their own decisions (Articles 15 & 51 of Dire Dawa Charter; Articles 17 & 61 of Addis Ababa Charter). Even though both cities have had elected City Councils since 2008, they could only enact administrative laws, and in effect, their respective three branches of local governments are paralyzed because of the hegemonic presence of the EPRDF through the federal government.¹⁴² According to one of my focus group discussions, both city administrations are mere agents of the centre preserving the status quo at the expense of local autonomy.¹⁴³

Local executive organs of the two urban administrations, according to their charters, are formed by the political party occupying the majority seats of the councils or, where such does not exist, the coalition of political parties (Art 19 of Dire Dawa Charter; Art 13 of Addis Ababa Charter). However, this majoritarian government formation rule is not working in Dire Dawa due to the power sharing arrangement applied in the city which shall be discussed in chapter seven. In both cases, mayor, who is chosen from city council for a five year term, is the chief executive officer of the city and is responsible for the management of the city's political, municipal and non-municipal undertakings (Dire Dawa Charter, Art 20; Addis Ababa Charter, Art 21). He is accountable to the city council and the Ministry of Federal Affairs. City cabinet is also one of the executive bodies of the cities and ensures the implementation of laws and policies adopted by the city council and the federal government (Dire Dawa Charter, Art 22; Addis Ababa Charter, Art 23). The city manager is the executive of municipal services. Other local executive bodies in both cities include the Office of the City Chief Auditor performing its functions independently; Police Commission, whose commissioner and deputy are appointed by the Ministry of Federal Affairs but accountable to the Federal Police Commission; the Public Prosecution Office; and Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (see both charters).

Both urban administrations have two level local courts including the city courts having jurisdiction over civil, criminal and petty offense cases, and the social courts. The city court, which is composed of first instant courts and appellate court, is directed by the Judicial Administration

¹⁴² Interviews, Dire Dawa City Council, Dec 2014, Dire Dawa & Addis Ababa City Council, April 5, 2016, Addis Ababa.

¹⁴³ Focus Group Discussion, Dire Dawa City Council, April 27, 2012, Dire Dawa.

Commissions of the cities. The other bodies entrusted with judicial powers are Labour Relations Board, Civil Servants Court and Tax Appeals and Urban Land Clearance Appeals Commission (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 31-41; Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 39-50). Several clauses are also devoted to stipulating the budget and financial administration such as fiscal powers, revenue generations, borrowings, federal government grants, foundations, decentralized finance systems and administrations, and budget preparations and administrations (Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 42-48; Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 51-59).

The city councils may either establish new levels of local government below the city, or reorganize the existing ones taking into account the opinions of respective residents, suitability of service delivery, urban development plan at stake and the size of the population (Dire Dawa Charter, Art 29; Addis Ababa Charter, Art 30). Accordingly, Addis Ababa has been subdivided into 10 Sub-Cities and 116 *Woredas*.¹⁴⁴ Unlike the City Council, the Sub-City and *Woreda* Councils cannot legislate even theoretically; but they follow up, oversight and support their respective executive bodies (Addis Ababa City Council, 2014). The City Council has the power to dissolve Sub-City and *Woreda* Councils as they are accountable to residents of their respective jurisdictions and to the City Council (Addis Ababa Charter, Art 32). In Dire Dawa, *Kebele* administration is the second and the lowest unit of local government. It is accountable to the residents of its respective *kebele* and the city administration (Dire Dawa Charter Article, 30). The existing 47 *kebele* administrative units –9 urban and 38 rural peasant associations– of Dire Dawa were established in 2004.¹⁴⁵ The main function of *kebele* administration is the implementation of urban policies at grass root level.

¹⁴⁴ The Sub-Cities of Addis Ababa include Addis Ketema, Akaki, Arada, Bole, Gulele, Kolfe, Kirkos, Lideta, Nifas-Silk, and Yeka.

¹⁴⁵ While urban *kebele* runs from *Kebele* 01 up to *Kebele* 09, the 38 rural *kebele* peasant associations include Legadol, Mudhi Anano, Gende Gebere, Bake Halo, Gelo Balina, Harla, Ija Anani, Lege Birra, Oda Mirga, Biyo Awale, Awale, Adada, Bishan Bahe, Wahel, Koriso, Lega Oda Gununfeta, Dujuma, Hululmojo, Halo Busa, Aseliso, Hula Hulul, Gedenser, Adigafelema, Ganda Rige, Boren, Gola Adel, Gerba, Chiri Miti, Dini, Malka Kero, Debeley, Kulayu, Jeldessa, Kortu, Kalicha, Elihamer, Ayale Gungum, and Belewa.

Fig. 6.2 Organs of Urban Administration of Addis Ababa





Fig. 6.3 Organs of Urban Administration of Dire Dawa



6.5 The Status of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa Urban Local Autonomy

6.5.1 General Confusions

Literatures on the status and extent of autonomy of the two city administrations of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are full of confusions. As will be discussed in the following, different writers regard the cities either, among others, as "city states"; or as "self-governing/autonomous administrations"; or as "federal territories"; or as "semi-autonomous". Let me reflect on the extreme approach which regards both cities as "city states". Fekadu Adugna argues that "in 1994, the Provisional Charter was refashioned into the constitution of the country. According to that constitution, the country was reorganized into nine putatively autonomous regional states and *two city states*" (2011: 776). Other Ethiopian writers also argue that both city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa amount city-states *by practices* (Tamirat, 2013; Fasil, 1997). Garcia and Rajkumar put this way: "the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have different structures but are considered the equivalent of regions" (2008: 13). Similarly, the UN-Habitat writes that "it [Addis Ababa] has the status of both a city and a state under a charter endorsed by the national government" (2008: 127). The *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations* misunderstands that "Dire Dawa is the capital of Dire Dawa state" (2002: 1468). Some also regarded Dire Dawa as "one special region" (Gulyani et al, 2001: 3). Valentina F. Linares says that "the city of Addis Ababa has the dual status of a city and state" (2013: 19). As a result, a certain policy document of Addis Ababa City Government asserts that "it has the status of both a city and a state" (2013: 14).

Secondly, there are writers who identify both cities as somehow self-governing or autonomous urban administrations. Yonatan T. Fessha (2011), for example, maintains that "the federation [Ethiopia] is divided into nine states and two self-governing administrative cities" (p.116). Likewise, Zemelak Ayele (2014) writes that "Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are autonomous federal cities which are outside the political jurisdiction of a regional State" (p. 144). Zemelak further clarifies that both "are cosmopolitan cities and melting-pot of all ethnic communities. On account of their unique position, these two cities are structured as autonomous federal cities" (p. 145). These writers need to explain evidently the extent to which both city administrations are self-governing or autonomous. In fact, Zemelak has attempted to explain that "each of these cities has its own government which has a *direct relation* with the federal government" (ibid: 145); but he did not establish what this "direct relation" exactly denotes. I shall clarify this "direct relation" shortly.

Thirdly, there are writers who wrongly treat Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities as federal territories. For instance, Fransen and Kuschminder remark that "the constitution established Ethiopia as an ethnic federalist state with nine regional states based on the predominant ethnic groups, with the exception of two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa" (2009: 6). It is common to hear from government or opposition officials referring to both cities as federal territories (Milkessa, 2011). I have already discussed above that this conventional usage of "federal territories" in the discourse of Ethiopian federalism has no constitutional ground.

Finally, some scholars regard both city administrations as semi-autonomous. Assefa Fiseha, for instance, explains them as follows:

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are specially administrated semi-autonomous cities directly accountable to the federal government. The two cities do not enjoy the same level of constitutional autonomy as the nine regional states, as both may be subjected to federal intervention when the need arises. Their position, therefore, is less autonomous than that of the constituent states (Assefa, 2009: 81).

As a result, some believe that "Dire Dawa's semi-autonomous status" has helped its administration, for example, to experiment in intra-city roads construction by cobblestones which it introduced for the first time in Ethiopia in 2005 by learning from Holland old metropolitan urban centers. All towns and cities in Ethiopia were then directed by the federal government to follow Dire Dawa's cobblestone success story (Addis Fortune, 2013). It must be clear that Dire Dawa's diplomatic relation cannot be conducted without federal government's supervisory role (Dire Dawa Chater, 2004). So, the cobblestone story can hardly be indicator of the city's semi-autonomy. Assefa adds that "following the adoption of the federal Constitution in 1995 and the establishment of nine autonomous regional governments, Addis Ababa lost the status of a full-fledged regional government" (2009: 85). True, Addis Ababa's transitional period regional status degenerated into a city administration which is legally treated not only as part of, but also accountable to, and dissolvable by, the federal government. The "semi-autonomous" status some attribute to the city administrations needs further qualification in terms of, for example, local political autonomy, decentralized fiscal and legislative powers, local multiparty democracy, judicial powers, and existential security of urban local government units as discussed in theoretical chapter three of this dissertation. Thus, whether these city administrations are semi-autonomous could be disputed.

Perhaps, these academic confusions might have been created for the fact that both city administrations and the nine regional states participate as co-equals on federal events such as,

among others, on national sports, administrative meetings, Nations & Nationalities' Day, national mourning, and other national ceremonies. Even some federal laws use the term 'regional state' to refer to the nine regional states and the two city administrations for definitional conveniences which might have confused writers: "In this Proclamation unless the context requires otherwise 'Regional State' means any State referred to under Article 47 of the Constitution and includes the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations" (Proclamation No. 471/2005: Article 2). Similarly, the Ethiopian federal electoral law (2005) states that "'Region' means a region established in accordance with Article 47 of the Constitution including Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa" (Proclamation No. 438/2005: Article 2/1). The usual usage of the term region in the law for convenience does not imply the actual autonomy of these city administrations. The participations of the two cities as co-equals of the nine regional states on federal events or execution of federal laws, and the scholarly uncritical portrayal of the two city administrations, can be disputed by a simple look at the FDRE Constitution (1995), other federal laws and the cities' respective charters. Put differently, both cities are in fact neither city states nor federal territories nor autonomous city administrations in the Ethiopian federal legal frameworks. Let me explain this.

6.5.2 Centralization in Principles and Practices

As already discussed, the overall post-*Derg* urban policy making and governances in Ethiopia have been centralized particularly after 2001. This trend is more so to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa urban administrations because the so-called Ethiopia's "first phase of decentralisation" (1991-1995) (Zemelak, 2014: 99) ended by ending the regional autonomous status of the former city and also causing extra-constitutional evolution of the latter. In the preambles of the charters of Addis Ababa (2003) and Dire Dawa (2004), the rhetoric of conferring self-government powers on the residents of the cities was highlighted. Addis Ababa Charter reiterates constitutional provision (1995: Article 49/2) which offers that "the residents of Addis Ababa shall have a *full measure* of self-government," and Dire Dawa's Charter is in fact a reproduction of the former one. Despite the self-government promises set out in the preambles of the charters and in the Constitution, the federal government's relations to the city administrations both in principles and in practices have made the latter mere urban local agents of the former. The nature of power relationship of the former to the latter is explicitly stipulated across their respective charters and especially under the intergovernmental relations (IGR) clauses.

First, both charters declare in similar wordings that the city administrations are legally treated as component part of, and accountable to, the federal government (Charters of Addis Ababa, 2003; Dire Dawa, 2004). The Revised City Charter of Addis Ababa (2003) states that “the City Government is a *component* of the Federal Government. It shall be *accountable to* the Federal Government concerning security, diplomatic relations as well as policies, laws and standards thereof” (Art 61(1)). Likewise, the City Charter of Dire Dawa provides that “the City Administration shall be *part of* the Federal Government. The City Administration shall be *accountable to* the Federal Government” (Art 51 (1)). It is puzzling to arrange urban local governments as *component parts* of a federal government. The FDRE Constitution (1995) too requires the accountability of the City Administration of Addis Ababa to the federal government (Art 49/3). Slack and Chattopadhyay (2009) identified two roles in conflict while governing federal capitals –the federal capital role and the local role– and suggested the need to strike balance between federal intervention and urban local government autonomy founded on elected councils with sufficient revenue-raising authority.

However, instead of striking balances between intervention from above and autonomy from below, both urban local administrations became fully subordinate to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. Article 61/5-6 of the Addis Ababa City Charter (Proclamation No. 311/2003) states that:

The Ministry of Federal Affairs shall, as an agent of the Federal Government, follow up the performances of the City Government and shall support the capacity-building undertakings of the City. The City Government shall submit to the Ministry of Federal Affairs annual and periodical reports concerning its plans, budgets and the overall status of the city.

Likewise, Article 51/2-3 of the Dire Dawa City Charter is copied almost verbatim from this paragraph (Proclamation No. 416/2004). Besides the provisions that merged both urban administrations to the federal government, these ones establish a complete subordination of the city administrations to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. As a result, both city administrations are far from enjoying autonomy or semi-autonomy. In terms of urban planning and development policies, the Ministry of Works and Urban Development is mandated to “follow up the activities of the city administration accountable to the Federal Government” (Proclamation No. 471/2005: Article 18/1/m). That is why the UN-Habitat observed that strong centralized urban governance is exercised in Ethiopia and Rwanda over functions, control mechanisms and services, albeit to different degrees (UN-Habitat, 2014). However, the Federal Constitution of Ethiopia (1995)

requires that "guided by democratic principles, Government shall promote and support the people's self-rule at all levels" (Art 88/1).

Second, the federal government can dissolve elected city councils and city mayors of both cities. This creates total existential dependence of urban local institutions upon the center. The cities' charters provide that: "the City Council shall be accountable to the Federal Government and to the residents of the City. The dissolution of the City Council may be effected by the House of Peoples' Representatives or by its own decision" (Addis Ababa Charter: 2003: Art 16/1-2; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 15/1-2). According to the 1997 Charter of Addis Ababa, the City Council and Governor were accountable to, and dissolvable by, the Prime Minister. As some argued, "the time when the Revised Charter was made coincides with the centralizing trend Ethiopia witnessed after the split in 2001 of the TPLF" (Wondwossen, 2010: 85). As a result, the federal government is empowered by the charters to dismiss the city administrations and organize transitional local governments; and the Prime Minister ensures the implementations of the decisions of the House of Peoples Representatives (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 61/4; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 15/3). If the federal government dissolves elected bodies of the cities such as the city councils, it not only threatens the existential security of local governments, which contradicts local democracy and political autonomy, but it foundationally violates the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution of Ethiopia (Art 8). The intention of this federal power dominance becomes very clear and problematic when oppositions control the city councils.

Thirdly, Article 27 of Addis Ababa Charter (2003) centralizes the administration of the City Police Commission:

- 1) The City Police Commission, being accountable primarily to the Federal Police Commission and by delegation, to the City Government, shall: (a) be established by Regulations the Council of Ministers issues in accordance with the Federal Police Commission Proclamation; (b) prepare and submit its plan and budget proposal to the Mayor and implement same upon approval. It shall also submit periodical performance reports to the Mayor, which shall be examined and decided by the City Cabinet and by the City Council. 2) The City Police Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner shall be appointed by the Minister of the Federal Affairs. 3) The responsibility to follow up the daily operations of the City Police Commission shall be of the Mayor.

Article 26 of Dire Dawa Charter (2004) is a copy of Article 27 of Addis Ababa Charter (2003).

Particularly, the establishment and accountability of, and appointments in, the City Police Commission in both cities clearly show that the city administrations are mere local agents of the federal government. It appears difficult to think of even marginal autonomy since the urban local

institutional arrangements are made in a very centralized authoritarian way. If opposition parties take over the administrations of either or both cities, there would inevitably be conflicts over the accountabilities and appointments in the City Police Commissions.

Fourth, federal laws go as far to regard both city administrations as the executive organs of the federal government. For instance, a proclamation adopted in 2001 for the reorganization of the executive organs of the federal government provided that “the following executive organs shall be accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs: (a) Federal Police Commission; (b) Federal Prisons Administration; (c) National Urban Planning Institute; (d) Addis Ababa City Government; (e) Dire Dawa City Administration” (Proclamation No. 256/2001: Article 5(6)). Recall that the year 2001 was a turning point for the recentralization trends in Ethiopia. As a result, both urban administrations of Addis Ababa (2003) and Dire Dawa (2004) were chartered as component parts of the federal government following the above centralization law. As argued in detail in section one of this chapter, federal laws and practices of the EPRDF’s urban development and governances since 2001 have ensured political and administrative recentralization across the country. Thus, as Slack and Chattopadhyay correctly observed, “single party dominance has reinforced federal influence in the capital city” where the “tension between the federal and local roles has been minimized in the past because of the dynamics of the party system—the same ruling party has... been in power at both levels of government” (2009: 304). Now, let me briefly outline the implication of the centralized urban governance of the EPRDF on the financial arrangements of the city administrations.

Fiscal power sharing arrangements especially in federations have had real impacts on the practice of self-government issues. In this regard, the charters of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa define identical fiscal powers of the city administrations (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 52; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 43). Consequently, the city of Addis Ababa in particular has shown “better revenue collection performance than any of sub-national units in the country” (Shimels, 2010: 67). According to various sources, both cities are now able to finance their expenditures from internally collected revenues (MoFED, 2016). The higher revenue collection performance of Addis Ababa, according to Shimels Demissie, is “more related to other factors than revenue autonomy of the city” (2010: 67). That is, Addis Ababa is “a primate city” in which large concentrations of capital, commerce, manufacturing, finance, real estate and insurance, skilled labor, infrastructure, and communication and information services are available in “relatively better

quality than other cities in the country” (ibid: 67). Helen Degemu also attributed the revenue raising capacity of Addis Ababa to what she called “the unevenly concentration of economic activities in the city as well as better capacity to mobilize the existing revenue sources” (2010: 81).

The logic follows that, the wider the revenue raising capacity of an urban administration is, it is always expected, the higher its expenditure responsibility would be. Due to this and other factors, Addis Ababa City Government in the fiscal year of 2016/17 has received the second largest sub-national budget in Ethiopia (about 35 billion Birr or US\$ 1.6 billion) preceded by Oromia—Ethiopia’s most populous regional state. However, in the same fiscal year, the budget of Dire Dawa City Administration is only 0.8 billion Birr (or US\$ 36,364) (MoFED, 2016). This shows that the federal capital, Addis Ababa, has received lopsided developmental attentions than any of the regions and towns of Ethiopia.

Furthermore, in addition to the fiscal powers listed under their jurisdictions, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations are legally entitled to “be assisted by the Federal Government with respect to expenditures for programmes having countrywide developmental impact;” which gave the latter government the “power to audit and make sure whether the loans and financial supports granted by it have been properly utilized” (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 55; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 46). According to different sources, the city of Addis Ababa so far has received insignificant fiscal transfers of the federal government than any of the nine regions and Dire Dawa due mainly to the revenue capacity factor discussed above (MoFED, 2016; Helen, 2010; Shimels, 2010). However, since recently, the federal financial supports to Addis Ababa have mostly been in the form of big capital investments and projects such as on road, light railway, water and housing constructions (ibid.). The cumulative effects of economic activities and opportunities created recently in the city seem to have caused unbalanced progress in Ethiopia which is said to have pulled more youth migrants to the city in search of better livelihood. Finally, unlike Brussels, which receives a special fiscal support from the European Union for hosting it (Wynsberghe, 2013), Addis Ababa so far had no special fiscal arrangement from the African Union for hosting it.

Even though Addis Ababa has increasingly become a giant entity in revenue raising capacity than any other sub-national government in Ethiopia, it remains that the city administration (including Dire Dawa) does not enjoy fiscal autonomy in legal and political terms. It means that each of the urban administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is accountable to, and dissolvable by, the federal government; and is also legally obliged to “submit to the Ministry of

Federal Affairs annual and periodical reports concerning its plans, budgets and the overall status of the city” (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 61/6; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 51/3). Thus, the federal government can take any measure in order to re/centralize those fiscal powers it has arranged for the city administrations. For instance, following the election victory of the CUD in Addis Ababa in 2005, “two significant measures taken during the intervening summer included the transfer of the Addis Ababa Road Authority and the Addis Ababa Authentication and Registration Authority to the federal level, resulting in an estimated annual revenue loss of 100 million Birr (US\$ 5 million) to the city” (Assefa, 2009: 88-89). Therefore, the powers and functions of the city administrations remain subordinate to measures (to be) taken by the federal government if needed.

In conclusion, as both city administrations are organized as component or executive organs of the federal government, the latter can exercise unlimited interventions to the extent of dissolving elected local governments. Hence, the city administrations are far from enjoying local autonomy both in principle and practice. Let alone these urban local administrations, as Asnake Kefale observes, “with the exception of linguistic and cultural autonomy, so far the constituent members of the ethnic federation cannot exercise administrative and political autonomy” (2009: 261). The rhetoric of regional autonomy including urban ‘full measures’ of self-government promises have totally been shattered by what Asnake says “the emergence of a dominant one-party system under the EPRDF” (ibid: 261). On top of the legally centralized systems discussed above, the ruling party's structure has changed these urban administrations into mere local agents of the center. Despite the ruling party's authoritarian centralization practices he points out, Asnake suggests Dire Dawa's extra-constitutional federal governance model as a good lesson to “defuse conflicts in such localities like Moyale town” and in Afar-Issa border areas (2009: 279). Another writer explains the EPRDF's vested interests in the contested Oromia-Somali dual administrative town of Moyale located on the strategic Kenyan border which often “is a centre of activity for insurgents or other political dissidents” (Fekadu Adugna, 2011: 783). It is not controversial that temporary political solutions from above for every contested local territory could endanger the constitution as a whole and further entrench political authoritarian cultures.

As a result of their direct administration by the federal government, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations are neither regional-states nor autonomous urban governments. Also, unlike all other cities in Ethiopia, these chartered cities do not have representations in any State Council and the FDRE Constitution states that “members of the House of the Federation shall be elected

by the State Councils" (1995, Art 61/3). It means that residents of the two cities are indirectly precluded from participating in the House of Federation which represents nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and determines the federal grant formula (Art 62/7). The centralized governance imposed upon the cities have adverse effects on the management of cultural diversity in urban administration, education, mass-media, courts, healthcares, employments, power sharings and local democracies, all of which are the key urban policy discussions in the next chapter.

6.6 Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to investigate the legal and/or extra-legal foundations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa's urban governances from above as well as their local governments from below. First, though the constitution grants regional states the mandate to establish and govern local governments in their own contexts, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has increasingly centralized the processes as well as the outcomes of urban policy making as the results of the EPRDF's consecutive developmental policies implemented since 2001. Evidences have indicated one-party's top-down policy making and governances in Ethiopia in general and in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities in particular. Second, the federal governance of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa emerged for different reasons, for the former city's chosen as the federal capital and for the latter city's regional ethnic-politics and geopolitics. Ethiopia's federal capital resembles the federal district model for the fact that urban administration of Addis Ababa is component of, and accountable to, the federal government; but also resembles the capital located in a province serving as the capital of both. Thus, Ethiopia's mixed federal capital style could be seen as a fourth model in addition to the existing models: federal district, capital city-state and capital city in a regional-state. Though Dire Dawa is not designated as Ethiopia's other federal capital, its special administration by the federal government is akin to that of Addis Ababa.

Thirdly, it has been outlined that local governments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa had been in transitional period from 1991-2008; after which, in both cities, councils elected by the people were established. In terms of institutional setups, both city administrations are chartered cities; are accountable to the federal government; have established city councils only in 2008; have adopted mayor-city council fused model; and are given similar powers and functions. On the other, while Addis Ababa has three tiers (City, Sub-City and *Woreda* levels), Dire Dawa has two tiers (City and *Kebele* levels). Finally, it is established that these urban local administrations are

centralized both in principles and practices despite their misconceptions as city-states or autonomous or semi-autonomous cities or the rhetoric of the “full measures” of self-government promises entered for the residents in the preambles of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa charters. In the next chapter, we shall assess the effects of this centralization of urban governances on the management of local ethno-linguistic diversity, that is, urban cultural policies in both cities.

Chapter 7

Urban Ethno-national Diversity Regulation Policies of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

7.1 Introduction

In chapter six, I have discussed whether or not the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have local autonomy both in legal and practical terms. By extending the discussion on local autonomy issues, the present chapter assesses urban policies on ethno-national diversity in both cities. The Constitution of Ethiopia (1995) adopts federalism as instrument of managing ethno-national diversity of the country. Accordingly, the rights of ethnic groups, formally known as “nations, nationalities and peoples” in Ethiopia, are enshrined in the constitution. The general principles and policies of cultural diversity accommodation range from language rights to self-determination including up to secession rights (see Art 39). The constitution guarantees publically funded social services are accessed not only as collective rights, but also as individual rights: “Every Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to publicly funded social services” (Art 41/3). This chapter analyzes whether the residents of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, regardless of their cultural differences, are exercising the right to equal access to publicly funded social services including education, health, public power and employments, mass media, indigenous culture and urban identity, and language of urban administrations. Zemclak Ayele (2014) examined legal statuses and practices of representation, language and cultural rights of ethnic migrants and autochthonous communities in major cities of Ethiopia short of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

The main objective of this chapter thus is to assess the effect of Ethiopian federalism as instrument of managing diversity in urban centers of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. To this end, the major points of discussions have been classified into two broad parts, against which urban policies of the cities are compared. The first part of the chapter deals with social service sectors in the cities affected by urban language and cultural policies which include, among others, ethnic settlement pattern and policy, education and mass media policies, indigenous cultural institutions, language

problems in other social services such as health, migrations to urban centers and assimilations. In these sectors, the study identifies the modes of cultural diversity regulation policies. In the second part, urban local semi-consociational arrangements of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are discussed. In this part, power sharing arrangement in the absence of multiparty democracy and its effects on local elections and civil service employments in both city administrations are analyzed.

7.2 Urban Ethno-national Policies of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

One of the major achievements of Ethiopian federalism is often associated with the decentralization policy of language and cultural rights (segmental autonomy). However, the Federal Government of Ethiopia has adopted identical city charters and chosen its working language, Amharic, as the sole administrative language of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. In the following, the effects of this urban language policy imposition shall be assessed.

7.2.1 Ethnic Settlement Pattern and Policy

Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are multiethnic urban centers. The demographic size of Addis Ababa rose from 2,112,737 in 1994 to 2,739,551 in 2007 and that of Dire Dawa rose from 251,864 in 1994 to 341,834 in 2007 (CSA, 1995, 2008). Thus, the former is eight times as big as the latter demographically. Geographically, the latter city (1,128 square kilometers) is twice as big as the former (540 square kilometers). This roughly shows that the population settlement in Addis Ababa is densely populated than in Dire Dawa. According to the 2007 census, five of the ethnic groups in Addis Ababa include Amhara, Oromo, Gurage, Tigrayan and Silte constituting 47, 19.5, 16.3, 6.2 and 2.9 per cents respectively (CSA, 2008). Similarly, five of the ethnic groups in Dire Dawa are Oromo, Somali, Amhara, Gurage and Tigrayan constituting 46, 24.2, 20, 4.5 and 1.2 per cents respectively (ibid.). Thus, both cities are multiethnic in social character. The largest ethnic group, nearly half the city's population, in Addis Ababa is Amhara whereas in Dire Dawa is Oromo.

In terms of languages, the 2007 census report shows that Amharic is spoken by 71 per cent of Addis Ababa's population followed by Afaan Oromo (10.7%), Guragigna (8.3%), Tigrigna (3.6%) and others. Similar census shows that Afaan Oromo is spoken by 48 per cent of Dire Dawa's population followed by Amharic (26.4%), Somali (19.7%), Guragigna (2.7%) and others (CSA, 2008). The reasons why the demography of Amharic speakers skyrocketed in Addis Ababa is associated with its ethnolinguistic policy, the origin of which is rooted in urban political history.

Table 7.1: Mother Tongue & Ethnic Distributions in Addis Ababa, 1994 & 2007

Mother tongue distribution					Ethnic distribution				
Language	1994		2007		1994		2007		Ethnic groups
	No	%	No.	%	%	No.	%	No.	
Amharic	1,534,758	72.64	1,944,775	70.99	48.26	1,019,729	47.05	1,288,306	Amhara
Afaan Oromo	211,438	10.00	293,741	10.72	19.24	406,518	19.51	534,255	Oromo
Guraginya	136,194	6.44	229,394	8.37	13.53	286,014	16.34	447,521	Gurage
Tigrinya	114,346	5.41	98,693	3.60	7.64	161,524	6.18	169,152	Tigrayan
Silte	48,401	2.29	49,939	1.82	3.98	84,143	2.94	80,660	Silte
Gamogna	11,601	0.55	28,128	1.02	0.94	19,855	1.67	45,985	Gamo
Welaitegna	5,560	0.26	12,021	0.43	0.50	10,649	0.69	18,824	Welaita
Hadiyigna	3,860	0.18	11,251	0.41	0.37	7,972	0.61	16,863	Hadiya
-	-	-	-	-	0.63	13,496	0.75	20,724	Mixed
Others	46,579	2.20	71,609	2.61	4.86	102,837	10.91	299,014	Others
Total	2,112,737	100	2,739,551	100	100	2,112,737	100	2,739,551	Total

Source: CSA, 1998; CSA, 2008

Table 7.2: Mother Tongue & Ethnic Distributions in Dire Dawa, 1994 & 2007

Mother tongue distribution					Ethnic distribution				
Languages	1994		2007		1994		2007		Ethnic Groups
	No.	%	No.	%	%	No.	%	No.	
Afaan Oromo	116,081	46.08	163,920	47.95	48.00	120,896	46.08	156,958	Oromo
Somali	34,413	13.66	67,479	19.74	13.91	35,046	24.24	83,069	Somali
Amharic	83,508	33.15	90,459	26.46	27.71	69,798	20.09	68,962	Amhara
Guragigna	4,070	1.61	9,511	2.78	3.11	7,851	4.54	15,543	Gurage
Tigrigna	2,866	1.13	2,108	0.61	1.76	4,451	1.23	4,226	Tigrayan
Hararigna	4,222	1.67	3,564	1.04	1.67	4,222	1.08	3,720	Harari
Hadiyigna	794	0.31	1,075	0.31	0.51	1,283	0.52	1,791	Hadiya
-	-	-	-	-	0.07	195	0.29	1,004	Mixed
Others	5,910	2.34	3,718	1.08	0.03	8,122	1.91	6,561	Others
Total	251,864	100	341,834	100	100	251,864	100	341,834	Total

Source: CSA, 1995; CSA, 2008

The settlement patterns of ethnic groups in Addis Ababa show that Amhara and Amharic speakers are concentrated in the city center whereas Oromo and Afaan Oromo speakers have concentration mainly in the suburbs. According to the 1994 census, 70.5 per cent of suburb population of Addis Ababa was Oromo (CSA, 1995). The census recognized 23 rural kebeles to form suburb population: (1) Bole Bulbula, (2) Bole Warra Ganu, (3) Bole Lammi, (4) Bole Arrabso, (5) Labu, (6) Hana Mariam, (7) Dartu Mojo, (8) Ankoricha, (9) Luke, (10) Ekka Araddo, (11) Ekka Xafo, (12) Mari, (13) Ekka Bole, (14) Bole Kotobe, (15) Galan Gura, (16) Qarsa Tullu Mute, (17) Galan Adero, (18) Koyye, (19) Fiche, (20) Qilinxo, (21) Sariti, (22) Abba Caffee, and (23) Sal'o Gora

(ibid.). The Addis Ababa Charter of 1997 gave existential recognition to all suburb kebeles: “Addis Ababa includes the existing urban areas and the twenty three rural localities falling under the jurisdiction of the City Government” (Article 2). Paradoxically, even if 70 per cent of the suburb population of the city was Oromo, there was/is no Afaan Oromo school in the city. Amharic has been imposed upon them. The Federal Government revised the Charter in 2003 and designated all rural kebeles of the city as urban. As a result, there was no urban-suburb distinction in Addis Ababa by the 2007 census. The Oromo continued to be the dominant group in those suburbs (CSA, 2008).

At the sub-city level, the population settlement pattern of ethnic groups and their density vary. The following table offers a glimpse of understanding about it.

Table 7.3: Settlement Patterns of Ethnic Groups by Sub-City, 2007

Sub-cities	Sub-city's population	Ethnic groups per sub-city					
		Amhara	Oromo	Gurage	Tigrayan	Silte	Others
1. Akaki	181,270	41.65	36.71	8.53	6.03	1.81	5.27
2. Lafo	316,283	46.13	23.60	11.38	8.57	2.22	8.10
3. Kolfe	428,895	33.56	18.67	30.34	3.03	6.42	7.98
4. Gulele	267,624	57.76	15.93	7.62	3.00	1.83	13.86
5. Lideta	201,713	40.01	17.61	23.05	9.64	3.42	6.24
6. Kirkos	221,234	53.19	16.50	12.61	10.53	0.88	6.29
7. Arada	211,501	55.34	13.77	13.63	7.48	3.46	6.31
8. Addis Ketema	255,372	29.42	16.87	37.26	3.68	5.89	6.86
9. Yeka	346,664	63.33	18.47	5.91	5.35	0.72	6.19
10. Bole	308,995	51.38	20.17	9.34	7.60	1.33	10.81
All ¹⁴⁶	2,739,551	47.04	19.51	16.34	6.17	2.94	8.00

Source: CSA, 2008

As indicated in Table 7.3, Amhara is the largest ethnic group in nine sub-cities of Addis Ababa with its population share ranging from 33.56 per cent in Kolfe to 63.33 per cent in Yeka. In Addis Ketema, Gurage is the largest ethnic group forming 37.26 per cent of the sub-city's population followed by Amhara (29.42%). In Kolfe, the most populous sub-city of Addis Ababa, Gurage is the second largest with 30.34 per cent preceded by Amhara (33.56%). In the remaining sub-cities, the percentage of Gurage can be as high as 23.05 in Lideta and as low as 5.91 in Yeka. The largest

¹⁴⁶ In Gulele Sub-City, Gamo ethnicity is ranked the third forming 8.89 per cent of the sub-city's population. In Bole Sub-City, Somali ethnic group is the fifth comprising 2.05 per cent of the sub-city's population. In Kirkos Sub-City, the number of people from different parents (mixed) is ranked the fifth constituting 1.24 per cent of the sub-city's population.

concentration of Oromo is found in Akaki in which it constitutes 36.71 per cent preceded by Amhara (41.65%). In the rest of sub-cities, the percentage of Oromo ranges from 23.60 in Lafto to 13.77 in Arada. Tigrayan's population ranges from 10.53 per cent in Kirkos Sub-City to 3.00 per cent in Gulele, and that of Silte's ranges from 6.24 in Kolfe to 0.72 in Yeka Sub-City. It is possible to find minorities concentrated in certain localities below the sub-city level. For example, Gamo minority dominate in the locality commonly known as Shiromeda in Gulele Sub-City. Members of ethnic Somali are concentrated in Bole Rwanda area of Bole Sub-City.

In Dire Dawa, the suburb areas with 108,610 population stretching over 38 rural kebeles are inhabited by Oromo (73.52%) and Somali (26.02%) (CSA, 2008). The city center's population of 233,224, which is subdivided into 9 urban kebeles, is composed of members of ethnic groups including Oromo (33.06%), Amhara (29.46%), Somali (23.50%), Gurage (6.65%), Tigrayan (1.80%), Harari (1.59%) and other minorities (ibid.). In both urban and suburbs of Dire Dawa, Oromo are the largest group.

Now, let us see urban policy legislations regarding ethnolinguistic diversity regulation in both cities. Seemingly a guideline of urban accommodation package, the charters of the cities pledge to make both cities centers "where *equitable municipal services* and reliable security and social harmony are ensured...where Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples reside in *equality and express their cultures*" (Addis Ababa Charter, 2003: Art 9; Dire Dawa Charter, 2004: Art 8). Contrary to these objectives, the same charters selected only Amharic as the working language of both administrations of Addis Ababa (Art 6) and of Dire Dawa (Art 5). Promising equality and equitable services for all linguistic groups of Ethiopia on the one hand and choosing only Amharic language contradicts each other as the chosen language favors those who are competitive speakers. For that matter, Amharic is spoken by 29.6 per cent of Ethiopian population surpassed by Afaan Oromo which is spoken by 33.8 per cent (CSA, 2008). It is more contradictory in Dire Dawa as the chosen (rather imposed) language is spoken only by a quarter of the city's population. The consequences of urban ethnolinguistic policy in social service sectors of education, mass media, indigenous institutions, healthcare, migration and assimilation are presented one by one.

7.2.2 Urban Education Policy

One of the most important policy instruments of regulating ethnolinguistic diversity in society is education policy. Ethiopian education and training policy (1994) states that students can choose and learn at least one nationality language and one foreign language for cultural and international relations. It also guarantees, in principle, the basic rights of individuals to learn in their mother tongue everywhere in Ethiopia, urban and rural (ibid.). This section shall show that though Amharic was the sole administrative language of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, language diversity has been accommodated in education in the latter city and not in the former one.

As it appears part of the power sharing arrangement in the special administration of Dire Dawa, local languages have been promoted in public education and media policies reflecting segmental autonomy. Evidences show that public education in Dire Dawa clearly represents multicultural education. First, public primary schools in the city are shared among three languages: Afaan Oromo, Amharic and Somali, either solely or jointly. Of the 66 public primary schools in 2013, 34 (51.5%) are teaching in Afaan Oromo, followed by Amharic schools totaling 11 (16.6%) and Somali schools 8 (12.1%). Primary schools using two or more media of instruction are 13 (19.7%), of which 9 (13.5%) are teaching in Afaan Oromo and Amharic, 1 (1.5%) is teaching in Somali and Amharic, and 3 (4.5%) are teaching in three languages (Milkessa, 2014). By the same year, there were 40 governmental Kinder Garten (KG), of which 23 teach in Afaan Oromo, 8 in Amharic, 2 in Somali, 6 in both Amharic and Afaan Oromo, and 1 in Amharic and Somali. This shows that in one school, two or more media of instruction has been possible. Students are differentiated by their learning classrooms, not by their schools. The proportion of public primary and KG schools per language tends to reflect the linguistic composition of the city. Second, language education as a subject in high schools (grades 9 & 10) and preparatory schools (grades 11 & 12) has been very important in Dire Dawa. By 2013, the City Administration runs ten public high schools, in all of which Amharic is given as a subject since it is Ethiopia's federal working language; Afaan Oromo is taught in seven; and Somali language is delivered in three. In all of the three government preparatory schools in Dire Dawa, only two languages, Amharic and Afaan Oromo, are taught as course subjects depending on the free choice of students (ibid.). According to sources from Dire Dawa Education Bureau, Somali language is not being taught as a subject in those preparatory schools mainly due to students' choice, not absence of choice (Milkessa, 2014). There are also private, community and religious institutions schools with diverse media of

instruction in Dire Dawa. In sum, Dire Dawa has been granted language autonomy in education.

In order to prepare student textbooks for the three language groups, the cultural contents of the curriculum and language subject education syllabus were determined by Dire Dawa Education Bureau in collaboration with Oromia, Somali and Addis Ababa Education Bureaus in the presence of the Ministry of Education.¹⁴⁷ In fact it was during the early transitional period when the city was acting as administrative part of Oromia that the latter regional government reformed schooling language in Dire Dawa from solely Amharic to Afaan Oromo and Amharic just similar to other towns in Oromia (Dire Dawa Education Bureau, 1994). Somali language was gradually embraced in the schools after the federal intervention to calm down the disputes over the ownership of the town (Milkessa, 2014).

Unlike schools in Dire Dawa, schools in Addis Ababa have once again failed to become multilingual and multicultural during the EPRDF regime. In Addis Ababa, there are 1,092 KGs, 797 primary schools (1-8), 200 secondary schools (9& 10), and 110 preparatory schools (11& 12) owned by private, government, community and religious institutions (Addis Ababa Education Bureau, 2016). In none of them, non-Amharic local languages are being taught as subjects let alone becoming media of instruction. Conversely, except for international schools, the city's education law has chosen Amharic as the sole medium of instruction in all KGs and primary schools up to grade seven (*ibid.*). Despite the fact that Addis Ababa is a multiethnic urban center, it provides monolingual education. Yonatan Fessha examines the status of minorities within majorities at the subnational level in Ethiopia and concludes that discrimination against minorities has created a sense of exclusion amongst the latter, “relegating millions of individuals to second-class citizens in their own country” (2012: 281). The linguistic and sociocultural status of non-Amharic speakers in the federal capital is no exception.

According to sources from Addis Ababa Education Bureau, all private, community and government primary schools under the jurisdiction of Addis Ababa Education Bureau teach with similar curriculum and textbooks; and their syllabus, except for English subject, are prepared in Amharic.¹⁴⁸ However, few schools such as School of Tomorrow are accused of extra-legally using English language as medium of instruction.¹⁴⁹ It means that these schools informally translate the

¹⁴⁷ Interview, Authority, Dire Dawa Education Bureau, September 21, 2016, Dire Dawa.

¹⁴⁸ Curriculum Expert, Addis Ababa Education Bureau, January 27, 2016, Addis Ababa.

¹⁴⁹ Focus Group Discussion, Addis Ababa Education Bureau curriculum experts, January 27, 2016, Addis Ababa.

textbooks into foreign languages to provide urban education services. The argument against such practices shows that it is pedagogically wrong to teach KG and primary schools students in the language that they cannot speak. Due to the same pedagogical reasons, the same argument can be advanced against Amharic medium of instruction in the city's primary schools where non-Amharic speaking students enrolled. However, in Addis Ababa, there are international schools which are authorized by Ministry of Education such as Sanford, British, Lyce G/Mariam, where children of diplomats are enrolled. Here media of instruction are foreign languages among which English is the most common (*ibid.*). Likewise, there are Arabic schools in Dire Dawa.

Urban education policies of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have resulted in divergent consequences. That of Dire Dawa can be characterized by multilingual and multicultural education system; whereas monolingual education in the federal capital has had the following negative effects. First, the imposition of Amharic medium of instruction upon primary schools where non-Amharic speakers are dominant has been causing low enrollment and sociocultural inequality. All non-Amharic speakers had to face language problems in Addis Ababa, but the Oromo had to face more complex problems as the city, ever since it was founded as a capital, has been expanding to the territory of Oromo farmers without accommodative language and cultural policies. A research conducted by Addis Ababa Education Bureau, which assessed the causes of low enrollment in primary schools in the peripheries of Bole, Akaki, Kolfe, Gulele and Yeka sub-cities, concluded that "the presence of language difference between the medium of instruction of the school and the mother tongue of the student was found to be one of the causes of low enrollment" (Berhan, *et al.*, 2009: 62). Amharic is the medium of instruction but the mother tongue of the student is Afaan Oromo in those suburb schools of the city. They are forced to learn the science that they do not know in the language they do not understand which experts say caused low enrollments. This urban education policy violates not only the language and cultural rights and Oromia's special interest provisions in the Constitution (1995), it also disregards mother tongue education rules of international norms (UNESCO, 2005). If a child learns in its mother tongue, it can easily understand its sociocultural environments: sources of consciousness, curiosity and education.

Similarly, according to Wondimu Gaga (2005), the imposition of Amharic as medium of instruction in Gamo schools in Shiromeda, Gulele Sub-City, has resulted in high dropouts, low academic achievements, and self-denying or self-denigration. In the first half of the 20th century in the US, according to Carter Woodson, schools for blacks were regarded as "places where they

must be convinced of their inferiority" (1990: xiii). Thus, it looks that schools in Addis Ababa continued to serve partly as the subtle agent facilitating non-Amharic speakers' assimilation to Amharic language and culture (the detail of the policy shall be discussed shortly). One particular emphasis of the education system during the Imperial and Derg regimes was "to increase the number of people who could speak Amharic" (Leenco, 1999: 177). Regarding the relations of primary school's language to identity, Gedion Cohen (2007) observes clear relationship:

In Harar and Dire Dawa, primary schools provide primary education in Adare, Somali, Afaan Oromoo, Arabic, Amharic and English. In Addis Ababa the choice is between Amharic and a range of foreign languages of which English is the most prevalent. In these areas the choices parents make about what language to have their children educated in reflects their perceptions of identity and opportunity. The choice of a language for primary education is a choice about identity, it says something about who we are, and it is also a choice about who we want our children to be and the opportunities that we hope will be open to them (14-15).

Thus, the language of education carries with it culture and identity, and itself is a symbol of identity. The preceding arguments therefore show that non-Amharic speaking students in Addis Ababa have been subjected to discriminations in terms of using and developing their languages, cultures, histories and national identities. Contrary to these urban sociocultural practices, a law legislated by Addis Ababa City Council entrusts the City's Culture and Tourism Bureau with the power to "maintain and protect the cultural relics and values of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples who are residents of the City" (Addis Ababa City Council Proc. No. 1/2008: Art 14).

The other negative consequence of education policy of Addis Ababa is that it caused unequal access to the federal capital situation among Amharic and non-Amharic speaking ethnic groups of Ethiopia. Because the language of primary education in the capital is Amharic, students who are being enrolled in Amharic primary schools in other regional states of the country have advantage to come to the city and restart their education from where they stopped. Those students who are being thought in non-Amharic languages do not have that advantage, and if they happen to come to the capital they have to go back and begin education from grade one. For instance, parents who came to the capital with their grade four and five children from Gonder town of Amhara Region (more than 600 kms from Addis Ababa) have advantage because their children can continue their education from where they stopped; but non-Amharic speaking children with similar grade four and five from Burayu town of Oromia Region (a town neighboring Kolfe Sub-City of Addis Ababa) should go back and begin education from grade one. Imagine the resources,

time and energy already consumed for nothing that non-Amharic speaking families who have the chance to migrate to the city have to incur. On top of these retrospective costs, these latter children will have to undergo language and cultural shifts.

The problem is worse regarding students from Oromia as Addis Ababa is also the seat of Oromia Regional Government which is expected to cause more flow of Afaan Oromo speaking employees with their children to the city than others. Mainly as a result of the city's education policy, many senior civil servants of the lower echelons of Oromia Regional Government, whose children are non-Amharic primary school students, often paradoxically refuse to accept promotions to the regional level because it requires them change their residences to the seat of the regional government (i.e., to Addis Ababa) which in turn forces their children go back to grade one.¹⁵⁰ Too costly to accept the promotion! Therefore, Ethiopia's federal capital is not equitably accessible to all ethnolinguistic groups in the country. Recall that one of the core objectives of the administration of the capital, according to its charter, is to "make the city a centre where Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples reside in equality and express their culture" (2003: Art 9/4). The same charter proclaims that "residents have the right to get services to be rendered by the City Government in accordance with the principles of equality, transparency and equity" (Art 7/2). However, the city's primary education policy has been an instrument of exclusion of non-Amharic speakers from the capital. Furthermore, while the city's horizontal development and schools expansions into the suburbs attract Amharic speakers from every corner of the country, it has been evicting Afaan Oromo speakers from time to time. For instance, the Federal Resettlement Action Plan of Kilinto Industrial Zone (Ministry of Industry 2015: 18-19) aimed to evict the following population of the suburb of Akaki Sub-City:

The population in Gelan Gura (Woreda 10) is predominantly of Oromo ethnic origin speaking Afaan Oromo... It is only when it comes to Woreda 9 (Kilinto), which is closer to the Sub city centre, that one observes a mix of religion, ethnicity and language, although the majority of the population is still of Oromo origin speaking Oromifa.

The Kilinto Industrial Park development and for that matter all industrial parks being built in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and in other towns of regional-states are governed by the Federal Government whose working language is only Amharic. Unless non-Amharic languages are considered in such centers of federal development activities, it may replicate access problems to

¹⁵⁰ Interview, Authority, Oromia Civil Service Bureau, March 1, 2016, Finfinne.

non-Amharic speakers.

As a response to the continuous demands on the side of Oromos, the Oromia Regional State planned in 2006 to “open 10 schools that use Afaan Oromo as a medium of instruction in the 10 sub-cities of Addis Ababa” (Gedeon, 2007: 51-52). However, the Oromia Government failed to realize its plan as there is no Afaan Oromo school in the city after a decade. As part of the election campaign of the May 2015, the OPDO renewed its plan to open Afaan Oromo schools in few sub-cities. In May 2016, state-run Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) Radio made news about two Afaan Oromo schools to begin in September 2016. As the same Radio reported in October 2016, these two schools could not begin in the 2016/17 fiscal year in general.

There are group of elites who strongly oppose the idea of providing primary education in non-Amharic languages in Addis Ababa. For instance, public relations authority of All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), an Amhara opposition, views that any rush to open Afaan Oromo schools in the city is unreasonable.¹⁵¹ If separate Afaan Oromo schools are allowed in the city, he says, other groups will follow suit, which means no unity. Multilingual education in the capital is seen as national disintegration for this group of old elites. Moreover, the same informant states as he doubts the citizenship of non-Amharic speaking ethnic groups who demand separate schools of their own in the capital (ibid.). For this group, education right in the federal capital refers to individual's access right minus language right (Ermias, 2014). They suggest that all members of ethnic groups have to learn in Amharic not only in Addis Ababa but also in all regional-states of the country which clearly violates mother tongue education rights.

The difference in medium of instruction between Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa happened mainly because education in mother tongue started in the latter city during the transitional period when its education policy was part of the Oromia education policy. The federal intervention in Dire Dawa's governance in 1993 did not reverse Afaan Oromo schools; it instead embraced Somali language schools in the city allowing multilingual education to flourish.¹⁵² Despite language policy reform of the county in 1991, multiethnic city of Addis Ababa retained its very old monolingual education. Thus, except for Addis Ababa and Tigray Regional-State, all regional states and the city of Dire Dawa provide primary educations in more than one nationality language (Heugh et al., 2007). For instance, the Oromia Government, which could not open an Afaan

¹⁵¹ Interview, *supra* note 66.

¹⁵² Interview, *supra* note 147.

Oromo school in its capital city, opened one thousand and six (1006) Amharic schools in the region (7% of all schools) (Oromia Education Bureau, 2015). In general, “there are twenty one languages, excluding Amharic, which are currently used as media of instruction at primary school level” in Ethiopia (Alelign, 2013: 3). As Assela Fiseha (2007) suggested, the greater the diversity in a federation, the greater the need maybe to find inclusive institutions as a means of articulating such diversity.

7.2.3 Urban Indigenous Cultural Institutions

The “preservation and restoration of historical and cultural heritages” in urban centers is one of the basic principles of accommodative urban planning in Ethiopia (Federal Proclamation No. 574/2008, Art 5/8). Moreover, there are provisions in the Constitution such as Articles 39/2, 41/9, 91/1 as well as other specific cultural laws which provide legal foundation for the restoration of indigenous cultures and institutions. As far as Dire Dawa city is concerned, because there is contestation between Oromo and Somali ethnic groups over the city, two competing indigenous cultural institutions of Oromo and Issa/Somali have been recognized and promoted by the city government mainly for conflict management purposes (Asnake, 2014; Milkessa, 2013). According to local Oromo elders, Abba Gadaa Waday Qarsa was the governor of eastern Oromo when Menelik II invaded the area in the late 1880s.¹⁵³ That is why, they say, Oromo cultural institution in the city was named Gadaa, whereas that of Issa’s was Ugaas (ibid.). Abba Gadaa and Ugaas in the city are cultural heads of Oromo in Dire Dawa and East Hararghe Zone of Oromia, and of all Issas in the horn of Africa, respectively.

According to Asnake, a new Oromo council of elders, Gadaa, was established in 2004 “in an attempt to give a coherent voice to the different Oromo groups within Dire Dawa and thereby counterbalance the Issa” (2014: 596). This reorganized Gadaa institution of Oromo in the city of Dire Dawa was legalized in the form of association known as *Gaaddisa Aadaa Lammii Oromoo*. Leaders of the association were chosen from major Oromo moieties [or clans]. Article 9 of the Gaaddisa Constitution (2004) states that “the organizational structure of the association shall follow the organizational structure of the early Gadaa system.” The term of office of members of the executive committee of the association including Abba Gadaa, the leader, is one Gadaa which is 8

¹⁵³ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 22.

years; and they are elected by the *Gumii* (general assembly) (Asmarom, 2000). *Gumii* is the ultimate law maker and supreme power holder of the renewed Gadaa. The Issa's Ugaas cultural administration is composed of *Gande* (cultural parliament) and the *Guddi* (representatives of Issa sub clans and the seat of the Ugaas). The *Guddi* supervises and announces the selection of the Ugaas (Moussa et al., 1998; Abdulhakim, 2011). Unlike Abba Gadaa, the term of office of Ugaas is lifetime.

Though these institutions are bestowed with the mandate to restore cultures and norms, the major activity they achieved is said to be related to inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes resolutions through mediations.¹⁵⁴ Abba Gadaa Abdulmalik of the city compares indigenous dispute resolution mechanism against modern court of law: "*Dhaabattu mataakee baasi teessu dhugaa baasi*"-"defend yourself when standing, but find truth when sitting."¹⁵⁵ It means that people stand before the modern court of law aiming to defend themselves; but they culturally sit down under the tree to find the truth and resolve the disputes. Local people are loyal to, and often prefer, indigenous institutions for cultural legitimacy. An Oromo-Somali inter-personal or inter-ethnic conflict resolution which starts by co-meeting of Abba Gadaa and Ugaas is followed by *guma* (reparation payments) and *araara* (reconciliation) ceremonies and feasts. Both cultural institutions obtain financial assistances from, submit annual reports to, and functionally complement, the Legal and Security Bureau of Dire Dawa Administration.¹⁵⁶ This has affected the traditional autonomy of both cultural institutions of Somali and Oromo, elders complain.

Unlike Dire Dawa Administration, the administration of Addis Ababa has restored no particular indigenous cultural institution. Before Finfinne was invaded by Menelik's soldiers in 1886, it was administered by the Gadaa system of Tulama (Oromos occupying central Ethiopia). The Gadaa institutions in the city disappeared during the last 130 years. The 125th anniversary of the establishment of Addis Ababa as a capital was celebrated in 2011; but, not surprising; nothing was addressed about the Oromos who used to occupy the territory before the arrival of Menelik.¹⁵⁷ Addis Ababa is yet to restore its Oromo indigenous cultural institutions.

Very lately, in March 2016, the Oromia Council of Abba Gadaas restructured Finfinne under Tulama/Oromo cultural sphere whose Gadaa's seat is *Odaa Nabe* located near Dukam

¹⁵⁴ Interview, *supra* note 21.

¹⁵⁵ Interview, *supra* note 37.

¹⁵⁶ Interview, Legal and Security Bureau of Dire Dawa Administration, May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa.

¹⁵⁷ Alemayehu Haile, *supra* note 13.

town 10 kms southeast of Addis Ababa. The Council also declared the Hora Finfinne (the city's *Iluha* or hot water spring) found near Addis Ababa Stadium to restore its traditional function of *Irreecha* (Oromo Thanksgiving Day) for Finfinne people by 2016/2017 (Council of Abba Gadaas, 2016; Caalaa Soorii, 2014).

Following the defeat of the EPRDF in Addis Ababa by the 2005 national election, the Oromia Government quickly planned to build an Oromo National Cultural Center at the city level and ten cultural centers in all sub-cities of Addis Ababa. The Oromo Cultural Center at the city level was built as an Oromo museum and inaugurated in early 2015. The Speaker of the Federal House of People's Representatives of Ethiopia, Abba Dula Gammada remarked on the inaugural day that the Center was built in the central part of the city where the first displacement of Oromo began.¹⁵⁸ However, the remaining cultural centers are yet to be built. Note that the city of Addis Ababa has had several longstanding cultural and theatrical centers but used mainly for Amharic language and cultural services. The Oromo Cultural Center in the city was built presumably to bridge that gap.¹⁵⁹

Critics state that building a single Oromo Cultural Center in the form of Oromo museum, which since its inauguration is serving as conference center, cannot be seen as special restoration of Oromo culture and identity in the city. Moreover, as there is no specific law which protects its existence, there is also no law which prohibits other Ethiopian nationalities from opening its cultural center in the capital of the federation. In Dire Dawa, Oromo and Somali cultural centers are being built side by side. The other critique is related to the potential contradiction between family law-making and the cultural compositions of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The power to legislate family laws in Ethiopia has been decentralized to regional states, and because of the cultural differences across regions, the laws may vary. However, the Federal Government directly makes family laws for Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa without clearly mentioning on which specific local culture the urban laws are based.

¹⁵⁸ TVO news, Speaker of the HPR, Abba Dula Gammada's speech on the inaugural event of Oromo Cultural Center, March 25, 2015, Finfinne.

¹⁵⁹ Interview, Office of the President of the Oromia Region, April 5, 2016, Addis Ababa.

7.2.4 Urban Mass Media Policy

Certain mass media policies can serve as cultural policy instruments of regulating diversity. Put differently, the languages of mass media for instance could indicate either cultural accommodation or domination policies. In this section, mass media culture –print (newspaper and magazine) and broadcasting (TV and Radio) - in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa shall be analyzed. Both private and state-owned media are assessed. First, with regard to state-owned print media, Addis Ababa Administration publishes a weekly newspaper called *Addis Lisan* and a magazine known as Addis Metropolitan Journal published once in two months, whereas Dire Dawa Administration owns a weekly newspaper called *Maliekte Dire* and a magazine referred to as *Dire* published once in three months. All are Amharic publications (Addis Ababa Mass Media Agency, 2015; Dire Dawa Mass Media Agency, 2014).

In addition to the above urban governments-owned print media, there are few private print media circulating in major cities in Ethiopia, mainly in Addis Ababa. The following table offers the general picture of private print media culture in Ethiopia.

Table 7.4: Private Print Media Circulating in Major Cities in Ethiopia

No.	Language	Newspaper		Magazine		Both	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1.	Amharic	12	70.58	14	66.67	26	68.42
2.	English	5	29.48	2	9.52	7	18.42
3.	Amharic & English	-	-	4	19.04	4	10.52
4.	Amharic & Afaan Oromo	-	-	1	4.76	1	2.63
5.	Total	17	100	21	100	38	100

Source: Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority (EBA, 2016)

By March 2016, as this table shows, there is a total of 38 private print media circulating in major cities in Ethiopia, predominantly in Addis Ababa. In terms of media language, out of the existing 17 private newspapers, 12 are published in Amharic and the remainders are in English (EBA, 2016). No private newspaper is published in non-Amharic Ethiopian language. Furthermore, the above table shows that there are 21 private magazines on circulation, of which 14 are published in Amharic, 2 in English, 4 in both Amharic and English, 1 in both Amharic and Afaan Oromo. There is no private magazine in local languages other than Amharic except *Safinu* which used to publish in both Amharic and Afaan Oromo before January 2016 (since January 2016 *Safinu* has

disappeared from circulation) (EBA, 2016). The private print media cultural policy in Ethiopia appears to have resulted in the dominance of Amharic, which cannot reflect language diversity and the needs of the country, home to about 90 million populations.

In the 1990s, a number of non-Amharic language newspapers and magazines flourished and circulated particularly in the city of Addis Ababa. For instance, as I have elsewhere assessed the rise and fall of Afaan Oromo publications in the city, “*Coqorsa* newspaper started in 1991 but was shut down unceremoniously in 1997. A well read newspaper called *Finfinne Post* was banned in 2004. Afaan Oromo magazines such as *Madda Walabu*, *Gadaa*, *Innikka*, *Ichima*, *Biftu*, *Odaa*, *Risaa*, *Ujji* and others could no longer exist after 1997” (Milkessa, 2011: 128). This shows that non-Amharic print media including politically critical newspapers in Amharic disappeared from circulation as a result of the centralizing effects of the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000). In the post-war period, not only non-Amharic publications disappeared, Amharic publications also sharply declined in general. Recently, the number of Amharic publications, which were 96 (46 newspapers and 50 magazines) in 2010, declined to 44 (24 newspapers and 20 magazines) in 2011 (ibid.). In March 2016, this number further declined to 26 (12 newspapers and 14 magazines). The decline of Amharic publications as well as the disappearing trend of publications in non-Amharic local languages since 1997, according to multiple sources, are mainly associated with the declining status of press freedom, the rising level of censorship and the continuity of urban sociocultural policy in Ethiopia (Amnesty International, 2016; Merera, 2011; Milkessa, 2011; Asnake, 2009).

Secondly, the number of broadcasting media in Ethiopia has been increasing since recently. Thus, there are various government-owned federal and regional TV and Radio stations broadcasting in various local languages. The targets of this study are Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Addis Ababa municipality, for instance, has state-owned broadcasting stations including Addis TV (6.5 hrs daily) since June 2000 and Addis 96.3 FM Radio (18 hrs daily), both of which transmit in Amharic only (Addis Ababa Mass Media Agency, 2015). Despite this monolingual service, the Addis Ababa Charter has promised “equitable municipal services” (2003: Art 9/1). Two federally owned FM Radio stations also transmit to Addis Ababa and the surrounding: FM 97.1 (24 hrs daily in Amharic) and FM 97.6 (18 hrs daily in English, French and Arabic). There are also two community radio transmissions to the city of Addis Ababa owned by Addis Ababa University that is FM 99.5 Radio (18 hrs daily in Amharic) and by Civil Service University that is FM 100.5 Radio (6 hrs daily in both Amharic and Afaan Oromo).

There are six private/commercial FM radio stations transmitting to Addis Ababa and the surrounding, and none of them broadcasts in non-Amharic local languages. However, sources from the EBA show that there is no private TV station registered to transmit in Ethiopia by March 2016. There could be several foreign based private TV stations broadcasting to Ethiopia in local languages.¹⁶⁰ The following table shows both state-owned and private broadcasting media which specifically transmit to Addis Ababa and the surrounding.

Table 7.5: Broadcasting Media Transmitting to Addis Ababa & Surrounding

No.	Name of Media	Estab. Year	Language	Daily Hrs	Ownership
1.	Addis TV	2009	Amharic	6.5	Government
2.	FM 96.3	2006	Amharic	18	Government
3.	FM 97.1	2002	Amharic	24	Government
4.	FM 99.5	2012	Amharic	18	Government
5.	FM 100.6	2010	Amharic, Afaan Oromo	6	Government
6.	FM 97.6	2014	English, French, Arabic	18	Government
7.	Sheger FM 102.1	2006	Amharic, English	18	Private
8.	Zami FM 90.7	2006	Amharic	18	Private
9.	Fana FM 98.1	2006	Amharic	18	Private
10	Afro FM 105.3	2008	English, French, Arabic	18	Private
11	Abay FM 102.9	2013	Amharic	24	Private
12.	Bisrat FM 101.1	2013	Amharic	12	Private

Source: EBA, 2016

As this table shows, the broadcasting media in Addis Ababa in general have been dominated by Amharic language. Thus, government-owned and private mass media landscape in the capital city remained predominantly an Amharic cultural phenomenon.

Unlike Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa Administration has trilingual state-owned broadcasting media. These are Dire FM 106.1 Radio since 2005 and Dire TV since 2008 transmitting in three languages: Amharic, Afaan Oromo, and Somali. Dire FM Radio has 13 hours of daily air time, of which 43.6% is in Amharic, while the rest of the hours are equally shared between Afaan Oromo (28.2%) and Somali language (28.2%) (Milkessa, 2014). Dire TV broadcasts daily for six hours in three languages, two hours each (ibid.). There is no private broadcasting media station in Dire

¹⁶⁰ Some of these foreign based TV stations such as Ethiopian Broadcasting Service (EBS), Nahoo TV, Oromia Broadcasting Service (OBS), and others which are believed to focusing on socio-cultural issues, do have official permission for journalists to operate in Ethiopia including possession of studios. OBS is closed in October 2016 following Ethiopia’s declaration of state of emergency. Other media that are believed to be owned or influenced by oppositions such as ESAT and OMN do not have official permission for their journalists for reporting from Ethiopia. Ethiopian Government is often accused by Freedom House, CPJ and independent civil societies of suppressing press freedom causing censorship.

Dawa. Despite the extra-constitutional evolution of Dire Dawa Administration, multilingual broadcasting media and education policies, which symbolize cultural decentralization (segmental autonomy), have been witnessed. Though this multicultural policy evolved in the absence of multiparty democracy, it tends to prove Jan Erk's assertion: "In federations designed without a formal recognition of the federal society, public policy will bypass the constitution and function asymmetrically based on the constituent ethno-linguistic communities" (2008: 10). Particularly, as he correctly indicates, "the operation of education and media policy should display the inner workings of the federal system based on these divisions. That is, pressures on public policies to correspond to the constituent linguistic/cultural communities should be expected" (ibid: 12).

The preceding urban mass media cultural analysis shows that Dire Dawa's government-owned broadcasting media policy is far more accommodative than that of federal capital, Addis Ababa. In terms of print media policy in both cities, while publications in non-Amharic local languages have disappeared, publications in Amharic itself have been sharply declining.

7.2.5 Language Policy Problems in Other Social Services

Urban social services are provided by sectors such as, among others, hospitals, schools, courts, media, sanitations, youth and sports, housing, policing, banking and cultural centers. There is no provision of social services without a certain medium or working language/s. In multiethnic urban centers, there would inevitably be language problems in public service deliveries if only one language is chosen. In this part of the study, language policy consequence in healthcare in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is emphasized as the sector deals with saving human life.

Researches on health services in the U.S. have underlined the language needs of patients (cultural accommodation) in healthcare organizations:

The collection of data on the language needs of patients is important to improving health and healthcare. Collection of these data is necessary to meet legal obligations based on federal funding aimed at ensuring equitable access to health services and preventing discrimination based on national origin or limited ability to speak English...Evidence on variations in health outcomes, medical errors, and receipt of quality healthcare as a function of English-language ability is persuasive that disparities exist... Lack of English proficiency is a barrier not just to effective communication with individual healthcare providers, but also to accessing care in the first place. A review of the evidence base in this area convinced the subcommittee that the collection of data on language and communication needs is essential to safe, accessible, and effective, quality healthcare (Ulmer et al, 2009: 93).

Therefore, language is very important in healthcare system. In order to assess language needs of patients in health institutions, the researcher has visited patient population in major public hospitals, among others, *Yekatit 12 Hospital Medical College*, *Menelik II Referral Hospital*, *Zewditu Memorial Hospital*, *Trumesh Beijing Hospital*, *St. Paul Millennium Medical College* in Addis Ababa, and *Dil Chora Referral Hospital* in Dire Dawa. All of them provide services in Amharic and they do not have formal professional translators for non-Amharic speaker patients. Hence, non-Amharic speaker patients face language problems, right from the receptions all the way to clinical treatments and medical prescription rooms.

In principle, all patients are entitled to receive services without any discrimination. In the compound of *Yekatit 12 Hospital*, there is a billboard in Amharic and English which lists seventeen *Rights of Patients* among which the third entitlement states that “patients are entitled to receive services without any form of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, sex, and disabilities.” However, the major discrimination in hospitals happens as a result of the medium of communication between patients and physicians. Oromo patients in *Trumesh Beijing Hospital* complain that only few lucky patients meet physicians who speak their language and able to explain their pains unrestricted.¹⁶¹ As a result, it is true that “language barrier correlated negatively with patient satisfaction” (David & Rhee, 1998: 393).

Likewise, Somali and Oromo patients in Dire Dawa’s *Dil Chora Referral Hospital* regret about the absence of language translation services for non-Amharic speaker patients. A patient told me that he was in doubt whether the medicine prescribed to him meets his pain because, he said, “the doctor did not seem to have understood me as I could not fully explain my pain in Amharic.”¹⁶² Therefore, the medicine itself is problematized as the patient is already in psychological doubt about the quality of the examination process. Language problem can affect the psychological readiness of patients to recover. Several medical researches indicate that language of the patient is part of the medication of the patient (David & Rhee, 1998).

What is more appalling is that non-Amhara patients flood both cities from the surrounding and other regional states due to the concentration of referral hospitals with modern health facilities

¹⁶¹ Focus Group Discussion, Oromo patients in *Trumesh Beijing Hospital*, April 7, 2016, Addis Ababa.

¹⁶² Focus Group Discussion, *Dil Chora Referral Hospital*, December 2014, Addis Ababa.

and relative service qualities, but all hospitals officially treat them in Amharic.¹⁶³ In general, there are no professional bilingual interpreters for patients to accommodate diversity in both urban administrations. Unless the patients are lucky enough to find a physician who knows their language, family members of the patients or any recovering nearby patient or anybody in the area who speaks non-Amharic language often assist physicians in translation. Research on patients who cannot speak the working language of hospitals reveals that:

Patients' quality of care is inferior, and more interpreter errors occur with untrained ad hoc interpreters. Inadequate interpreter services can have serious consequences for patients with mental disorders. Trained professional interpreters and bilingual health care providers positively affect patients' satisfaction, quality of care, and outcomes. Evidence suggests that optimal communication, patient satisfaction, and outcomes and the fewest interpreter errors occur when patients have access to trained professional interpreters or bilingual providers (Flores, 2005: 255).

Therefore, absence of professional interpreters has negative impacts on the quality of healthcare. Contrary to the healthcare practices in the cities, the FDRE Constitution (1995) urges that every citizen has the right to equal access to public social services and "the State has the obligation to allocate ever increasing resources to provide the public health, education and other social services" (Art 41/3&4). Without protecting language rights of the patients in hospitals, it would be difficult to materialize citizen's right to equal access to health services. However, the working language of public healthcare institutions in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is only Amharic. Unlike hospitals, courts in the cities offer free legal translators for the defendants who do not speak Amharic.

7.2.6 Migration to Urban Centers of Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa

One of the factors of urbanization in Ethiopia is related to migration affected by language policy. In Dire Dawa, the number of migrants constitutes as high as 101,316 (29.64%) of Dire Dawa's total population by 2007 census (CSA, 2008). Of these migrants, 45,842 people (45.24%) influxed to the city from their previous residence of rural area, whereas 55,474 people (54.75%) migrated to the city from other urban areas. In Addis Ababa, 1,302,964 population (47.56%) of the city's 2,739,551 population by 2007 census are identified as migrants (ibid.). It means that nearly half of the inhabitants of the city are born outside of Addis Ababa and have subsequently moved to the city. World Bank research (2010) has indicated that migration is likely to contribute substantially to

¹⁶³ Interview, Addis Ababa Health Bureau, April 7, 2016; Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 157.

the growth of Addis Ababa's population. Unlike Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa receives more migrants from rural areas (54.89%) than from other urban areas (45.11%) (ibid.).

Why do certain groups (than others) migrate to urban centers? Some argue that in Ethiopia, social mobility to urban centers is mainly attributed to the tradition of urbanness, commerce and poverty.¹⁶⁴ As indicated under education policy, a study by World Bank affirms that “it is educational opportunities offered by the city that is the most important reason for migrants to come to Addis Ababa” (2010: 6). It substantiates that “43 percent of recent migrants came for education – and most of these were successful in enrolling” (ibid: 6). The study further shows that “employment opportunity is the second most important reason for migrating – listed as the primary motive for moving by 31 percent of migrants (excluding migrant domestic workers and guards)”; taken together with domestic workers and guard, “80 percent of all recent migrants moved because of the education or employment opportunities in Addis Ababa” (ibid: 6). Only less than 2 percent moved because they were displaced for various reasons (ibid.). As shown, access to education in the city has been influenced by its language policy, and so does access to employment opportunities. This leads to the question, who are the migrants to Addis Ababa?

Successful urban migration and integration depends on attractive urban language and cultural policies. Since the administrative language of the city is Amharic, primary education and employment opportunities in the city attract mainly Amharic speaker migrants. That is why it is argued that “migrants come for education and jobs – and are, after a lag, successful in both” (ibid: 9). Other things remain constant, since Dire Dawa offers multilingual education, migrants to the city in search of better education would be of diverse background. As it is difficult for non-Amharic speakers to easily find jobs in the cities due to language requirements, the study by World Bank (2010) shows, 50.7% of the migrant servants or guardians in Addis Ababa are from Amhara Region. Moreover, ethnic identity requirement has become one of the necessary criteria that employers want domestic servants to fulfill in Addis Ababa.¹⁶⁵ It is indicated that urban householders want domestic servants of their own ethnicity. Besides the city's overall ethnocultural conditions, which favor migrants with Amharic language background, “most of the recent migrants state that a personal contact in Addis Ababa was decisive for their choice of Addis Ababa as the destination” (World Bank, 2010: 7).

¹⁶⁴ Interview, Office of Addis Ababa Mayor's Urban Development and Construction, January 2016, Addis Ababa.

¹⁶⁵ Focus Group Discussion, Brokers & domestic workers, February 2014, Addis Ababa.

Thus, Addis Ababa's language policy (in education and employment) as well as social condition have influenced who should migrate to the city. As a result, though one may certainly expect more Oromo migrants as the city is located at the heart of Oromia, Getahun Benti (2001) argues, migrants to the city are mainly Amharas:

[I]t was not easy for them [the Oromo] to live in a city dominated by a single group because the Amhara consider(ed) themselves indigenous or hosts... and regard(ed) all others as outsiders, thus discouraging the Oromo from migrating to the city... A very important mechanism by which the Oromo was excluded from establishing themselves in Addis Ababa and benefiting from the opportunities created in the empire's capital was the imposition of Amharic as the 'national' language. The subtle policy of imposing Amharic was accompanied by a systematic suppression of Afaan Oromoo (p. 159).

Because of this, in the last half century, the number of Amharic speakers and Amharas in the city remain almost constant, i.e., about 70 and 48 per cents, respectively which continued to minoritize the demography of non-Amharic speakers (Golini, 2001). Gurages are also over represented in Addis Ababa mainly due to their *fanonet* trade culture (explained in chapter four) and language of primary education of Gurage Zone in the SNNP Region which is Amharic (ibid.).

In Dire Dawa, if one compares the two post-Derg censuses of 1994 and 2007 (see Table 7.2), there is significant change of the demography of some ethnic groups. For instance, while the population of Oromo and Amhara declined by 1.92 and 7.61 per cents respectively, that of Somali extraordinarily rose by 10.34 per cent. The sudden Somali population explosion in the city was attributed, for some, to population migration to the city and for others, to ethnic identity reconfiguration of Gurgura (from Oromo) to Somali (Asnake, 2014; Milkessa, 2013). Contrary to the case of Somali, many attribute the decline of the population of Amhara to emigration from, or at least no Amhara immigrants to, the city due to the conflict and security risks following the demise of the Derg (Asnake, 2014). This shows that the demographic dynamics in the city is a function of Dire Dawa's post-1991 politics of ethnicity and associated conflicts.

7.2.7 Urban Policy Effects on Identity: Accommodation or Assimilation?

In Addis Ababa, all public institutions provide monolingual services, only in Amharic. Language carries culture and is seen as a symbol of identity (Fishman, 1977). Due to its monolingual and cultural services, Addis Ababa continued to be an island in Oromia. Despite the fact that the city of Addis Ababa is located in the heart of the State of Oromia and also regarded as a city "of diverse

nations and nationalities with a multitude of cultures and languages,” non-Amhara nationalities in the city in general had no better option than accepting marginalization and making efforts to assimilate to the dominant Amharic language and identity (Nebyuo, 2007: 6). As the language-ethnicity comparison in Table 7.1 shows, half of Oromos in Addis Ababa (i.e., 240,514) are not Afaan Oromo speakers; they speak Amharic. Similarly, half of the populations of Gurage and Tigrayans in the city have lost their respective languages to Amharic (see Table 7.1). In fact, all minorities in the city (Silte, Gamo, Walaita, Hadiya and others) have been exposed to the same problem of assimilation to Amharic. Gabre Hishe (2008) conducted his thesis on *Language Use and Identity of Children Born to the Tigrigna Speaking Community Living in Addis Ababa* and found that more than half of youth members of ethnic Tigrayan in the city do not speak Tigrigna and many of them do not care about their ethnic identity. As I have argued else, the same linguistic and cultural assimilation analogy is true regarding Oromos in the city (Milkessa, 2011). Comparable conclusion was drawn by a research conducted on Gamo students whose assimilation reached the level of changing Gamo names to Amharic names for fear of ethnic discriminations in schools (Wandimu, 2005). Such stereotyping views against non-Amhara personal names in Addis Ababa schools look akin to the US preschool white children’s stereotyping responses to African-American personal names (Daniel & Daniel, 1998). Furthermore, the school system in Addis Ababa seems to have inherited the pre-1991 condition of non-Amhara children who, according to Leenco Leta (1999), “were ridiculed by their Amhara classmates on account of their names and Amharic accents” (p.177). Thus, non-Amhara children in Addis Ababa are exposed to hegemonic socio-cultural system to which they are expected to conform.

Gedion Cohen (2007) argues that the cities administered by the Federal Government are facing some problems with current language policy since they are home to different ethnic groups. He observes that “Amharic is the official language of the administrations by justifying the practical impossibility of recognizing all the languages spoken by the residents in these cities. Thus in such circumstance the linguistic, cultural and ethnic identity of the residents is likely under question” (p. 14-15). Thus, the dominant urban language and cultural systems in Addis Ababa, masked in the so-called de-ethnicised urban identity, have resulted in prejudicial sociocultural conditions. Moreover, evidences show that there are cases when members of non-Amhara ethnic groups in

urban areas convey themselves as members of Amhara due to the legacy of the past.¹⁶⁶ In the past, ethnic groups everywhere in Ethiopia were not free to identify and organize themselves in their own ethnic identity (Smith, 2008; Mekuria, 1997). Though some insist the role of Amharic purely from instrumentalism (Mesfin W/Mariam, 1999), many linguists strongly believe that “in most societies a person is what he or she speaks” (Abraham, 1990: 71). In the last 130 years (1886-2016), regimes in control of the state power have been pursuing assimilation policies in Addis Ababa. As a result, as has been indicated, the percentage of Amharic speakers in the city has remained constant since 1960s, i.e., about 70 per cent of the city's population. Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka put this way:

In some situations, convergence on a common language and identity has been the intended objective of the policies selected, as when the state insists that all public education shall be in a single language medium or when it refuses to offer public services in other languages ...These nation-building projects are sometimes perceived as expressing an attitude of cultural imperialism and ethnocentric prejudice (2003: 16).

As a result, a high ranking official of the Oromia National State regrets that “we all have lost our children in Finfinne. Our children cannot speak our language, Afaan Oromo. Alas, all non-Amhara children are facing similar problems; the difference is that ours is facing in our home.”¹⁶⁷ This official did not hide the fact that it was primarily the weakness of the OPDO, which is responsible for the linguistic assimilation undertaking in the city. Likewise, Dirribi Damissie argues that the OPDO officials, whose government is entitled to special rights in Addis Ababa and who also have their seat in the city to administer Oromia Region, are committing suicide as their own children are assimilated to Amhara language and culture.¹⁶⁸ It is self-contradictory that the Oromia Regional Government, whose working language is Afaan Oromo, designates Addis Ababa—the city that provides all public services in Amharic—as its capital (Oromia Constitution, 2005: Art 6). Oromia Government has no school in its working language at least for its employees in the city. The OPDO is to blame for not fighting at least for cultural rights in Addis Ababa. It could not open an Afaan Oromo school and its officials have no formal reason when asked for justifications. That is partly why it is depicted as a 'government in exile' by Dirribi¹⁶⁹ and 'presenting absent government' by Tsegaye (2015). Tsegaye Regassa (2017) further wrote that “administratively, it

¹⁶⁶ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 65; Interview, *supra* note 70.

¹⁶⁷ Interview, *supra* note 159.

¹⁶⁸ Interview, Dirribi Damissie, President of *Macha-Tulama* Association, August 12, 2016, Burayu, Oromia.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

[Addis Ababa] was an enclave falling outside Oromia while also housing the Government of Oromia as its capital. In a sense, Addis Ababa is *in* Oromia, but not *of* Oromia. Oromia was a State governing *from* Addis Ababa *without*, however, governing Addis Ababa itself.¹⁷⁰ Thus, it is not that difficult to predict the ethnolinguistic conditions of Oromos and other non-Amhara nationals in the city. This cultural marginalization of the Oromo in the federal capital is linked to, and sustained by, urban policies formulated by Ethiopia's Federal Government in which the Oromo have been kept marginalized (ibid.). The Federal Government, for instance, imposed its own working language, Amharic, as the working language of city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

On the contrary, there are elites who are against the collective rights such as language and cultural rights in Addis Ababa as raised above. For instance, Baye Yimam views that “once everyone enters the city, he/she begins speaking Amharic as far as the person finds it easy to practice it... As Addis Ababa is a symbolic city of nations and nationalities, Amharic is also a reflection of this fact” (2007: 37). In reality, Amharic is not a neutral language in Ethiopia as it is spoken by certain section of the society, and it does not serve every nationality on equal basis. Therefore, the claim by Baye is so weak as the city cannot be a symbolic reflection of nations and nationalities from language policy viewpoint. Furthermore, an informant from Addis Ababa Education Bureau is against education in non-Amharic mother tongue in Ethiopia in general because, he believes, it damages students' national-feeling (*hagerawi-simnet*) (cited in Milkessa, 2011). A group mostly of Amhara elites, who see no urban language policy wrongs in the past, have continued to advance that only Amharic language promotes urban unity and national integrity of Ethiopia (Mesfin W/Mariam, 1999). This is an imperialistic ethnocentric view (Tabor, 2014) because it suggests that non-Amharic languages are threats to urban unity and national integrity.

Moreover, they claim that residents or “native Addis Ababians” are organized on individual rights (Ermias, 2014; Mesfin, 1999). Ermias discusses the problem of implementing Oromia's special rights in the city and argues that since politics in Addis Ababa is centered on individual identity and that of Oromia is founded on collectivism, there would be “inevitable ideological confrontations” between the two jurisdictions (2014: 251). According to him, during the 2005 election, “majority” of the residents rejected ethnic based political organizations because, he says,

¹⁷⁰ See Tsegaye Regassa (2017), *supra* note 67.

liberal individualism prevailed over collective identity (ibid.). Critics argue that the residents of Addis Ababa have predominantly been an Amharic speaking people. Amhara culture was fused to the city particularly between 1908 and 1910 as elaborated in chapter four. Since then, children of non-Amharic speaking families are expected to assimilate to Amharic language and culture. The Constitution of Ethiopia (1995) provides all ethnocultural groups with “the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture, and to preserve its history” (Art 39/2). Contrary to these collective rights, members of non-Amharas in the city have continued to lose their languages, cultures and histories. Language policy plays significant role in shaping urban cultures. Benedict Anderson (1983) has indicated the importance of print capitalism (education and media cultures) in the formation of cultural homogeneity or “imagined community”.

That inequality between Amharic native speakers and non-native speakers (Getahun, 2001), and that deep rooted assimilation strategy (see Table 7.1) being practiced in the city cannot be regarded a liberal policy which guarantee individuals to equal right. Not only public institutions, but also private ones such as popular music shops, nightclubs, the market, media and education in Addis Ababa favor Amharic speakers and their culture. Are individual rights of non-Amharic speakers protected then? Absolutely not. As Will Kymlicka (2002) and Charles Taylor (1994) eloquently observed, the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of individualism is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture, which was founded and sustains on discriminations.

Unlike Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa's ethnolinguistic policy did not result in big difference between the demography of ethnic groups and their corresponding languages (see Table 7.2). This is the result of partial multicultural reform in public education and media in the city. Actually, except Afaan Oromo and Amharic, the populations of all minority languages spoken in the city are lower than their corresponding ethnic groups. The number of those who spoke Afaan Oromo (47.95%) are greater than those who call themselves Oromo (46.08%). The difference is 1.87% which seems minor. The numerical size of Amhara (20.09%) is much less than the number of Amharic speakers (26.46%) in Dire Dawa. The difference, which is 6.35 per cent, is related to the official status granted to Amharic in the city. Ethnic Somali has lost 4.50 per cent of its population to non-Somali languages either to Afaan Oromo or to Amharic. In this regard, Asnake observes that “the issue of fitting into the new ethno-federal structure became controversial to the Gurgura because they share both Somali and Oromo identities. They by-and-large speak Afaan Oromo (Oromo language), while they trace their genealogy to Somali” (2014: 596). The traditional socio-

cultural relationship between Oromo and Gurgura has been discussed in chapter four.

A final remark on urban ethnocultural policy is related to what is often called metropolitan de-ethnicised identity. First of all, what does Ethiopian “metropolitan identity” mean in terms of culture? Or alternatively, what constitutes “Dire identity” or “Addis Ababa identity”? Historically, as argued in chapter four, it was measured against one’s fluency in Amharic, experience in Amhara culture, music and pursuit of Orthodox Christianity which were extensively used by previous regimes for Ethiopian “nation-building” project (Merera, 2011; Teshale, 1995; Knutsson, 1969). There is a common belief among some urban youths that there is distinct urban identities in Ethiopia, for instance, “*ye Dire lij*” (son of Dire/ Dire identity) or “*ye Addis Ababa lij*” (son of Addis Ababa/ Addis Ababa identity) (Asnake, 2014). Particularly, the concept of “*ye Addis Ababa lij*” evolved and often understood in relation to “*ye kille ager lij*” (son of province/ provincial identity) (Bjeren, 1985). “Addis Ababa identity” not only claims to denote distinctness, it suggests relational connotation of cultural and ‘civilizational’ superiority over “provincial identity”.¹⁷¹ Asnake Kefale assesses post-1991 Dire Dawa’s political status, as a result of which, he says, “the identity of the city itself became a subject of contestation” (2014: 596). He puts it this way:

[T]he other issue worth discussing is how Dire Dawa’s (urban) cosmopolitan identity was affected by the ethnic decentralization process. As discussed above, Dire Dawa, right from its inception, was a meeting place of people from different cultures—European, Asian, Arab, and Ethiopian. Over the years, there has been a feeling that unlike other Ethiopian cities/towns, Dire Dawa developed a unique urban/cosmopolitan culture. Among other things, in popular parlance *ye Dire lij* (Dire Dawa’s sons and daughters) are known for their welcoming, easygoing, flexible, and tolerant attitudes (ibid: 597).

Despite mentioning multicultural and tolerance foundation of the “Dire identity”, Asnake seems to have declined to pay attention to the role of specific local languages or cultures in shaping the notion of “Dire identity” and how exactly the ethnic decentralization process affected it. Amharic and Amhara culture were part of “Dire identity” in history; however, since recently personal bilingualism or trilingualism has evolved to mark the identity of the sons of the city.¹⁷² Pre-1991 education policy in the city was accused of excluding non-Amharic speakers and Muslims of Dire Dawa (ibid.) which may not be glorified as symbol of urban tolerance and multicultural attitudes.

Sources from Addis Ababa Education Bureau claim that, unlike in regional-states, students

¹⁷¹ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 149.

¹⁷² Interview, *supra* note 59.

in Addis Ababa do not learn one specific cultural value and history.¹⁷³ As a result, he adds, the students often prefer to identify themselves as *ye Addis Ababa lij* (son of Addis Ababa) or they simply tell their identity as “Ethiopian”. Likewise, Ermias Legese (2014) has argued that the residents of the city who identify themselves with “Addis Ababa identity” do not like to hear ethnic based groupings. However, Amharic textbooks of the city are prepared by Amhara Regional-State Education Bureau. Primary school medium of instruction in Addis Ababa is also Amharic. The city has been under similar language policy in the last 130 years and remains hostile to non-Amharic languages and cultural values. Therefore, the so-called Addis Ababa identity has origins in ethnic identity founded on Amharic language and culture (see cultural evolution of the city). It could be concluded that in Addis Ababa or elsewhere in urban Ethiopia, there is no de-ethnicised metropolitan identity as urban identity has links to certain (hegemonic or indigenous) ethno-linguistic identity.

To sum up, in terms of the post-1991 cultural policies (education, media and indigenous cultural revitalization), multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have evolved dialectically. Meaning, Dire Dawa has been experiencing aspects of multicultural policy or segmental autonomy (linguistically), whereas Addis Ababa remained culturally centralized and unaccommodative (assimilation) despite being Ethiopia’s Federal as well as the capital of Oromia. Alas, the usage of indigenous languages in urban public institutions may not guarantee genuine segmental autonomy as “the dominant groups are against mental liberation, and they use institutions such as schools, churches or mosques, the media, and other formal organizations to inculcate their oppressive worldviews in our minds” (Schaffer & Asafa, 2016: 226). Slack and Chattopadhyay suggest that “capital cities in federal countries also differ from capital cities in unitary countries because federal countries are more diverse, which means that federal capitals have the added responsibility of reflecting this diversity while also being as neutral as possible with respect to individual states or provinces” (2009: 292). Addis Ababa’s urban policy however is not reflecting its cultural diversities due to policy continuity (historical institutionalism model). This study has also shown both cities’ urban policy similarities in terms of monolingual administrative language, monolingual social services (e.g. hospitals) and unbalanced inter-group urban migrations. In the following, ethnic representations in public employments, in executives and legislatures, put simply power sharing

¹⁷³ Interview, *supra* note 147.

arrangements in both cities shall be analyzed.

7.3 Urban Local Semi-Consociational Arrangements

Political parties play a key role in classic consociational politics for the fact that “on their shoulders fall the duty to control their followers, and at the same time to mediate conflicts prevalent in society” (Sciarini & Hug, 1999: 135). Divided societies such as Switzerland have invented the so-called *magic formula* which is an arithmetic formula employed for dividing the seven executive seats of the Swiss Federal Council between the ruling parties. It was 2:2:2:1 ratio (1959-2003) and since 2003 it has taken the formula of 2:2:1:2 or 2:2:1:1:1 (Linder, 2010). The role of parties in Switzerland is raised here not to claim that Ethiopia is a multiparty democracy, but to show that the one party rule of the EPRDF has centrally devised and imposed various formula-based distribution of local political positions in the multiethnic cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. In both cases, the EPRDF crafted informal power sharing arrangements.

7.3.1 Intra-Party Power Sharing & Local Elections in Addis Ababa

7.3.1.1 Intra-EPRDF Power Sharing

Urban power sharing in Addis Ababa is now an EPRDF affair. The four member parties of the EPRDF (TPLF, ANDM, OPDO and SEPDM) share executive posts and legislative seats in local administration of Addis Ababa on 'equal share' formula, according to official sources.¹⁷⁴ The formula was developed following the 2005 election, and each of the member party begun to share 25 per cent of urban powers which established an equal quota (25:25:25:25) shortly named “25% each”. It is a grand coalition within the ruling EPRDF. This informal intra-party arrangement was fully enforced in 2008 when the seats in the City Council of Addis Ababa were distributed according to the formula. Since then, the 'equal share' formula applies to all executive appointments and seats in the councils of the urban government in the city-center, 10 sub-cities and 116 districts/woredas.

The power sharing at the executive level was introduced first in 2006, when an Oromo took over the post of the mayor. The formula works that if the head of an office is from the ANDM, its deputy will be from one of the remaining EPRDF member parties. The posts of mayor

¹⁷⁴ Interviews, Wondemagegn Tesema W/Giorgis, Addis Ababa City Government Office of Mayors & Cabinets Affairs, March 28, 2016, Addis Ababa & Office of the Central EPRDF Committee, February 2016, Addis Ababa.

and deputy mayor of the city appear very important in the deal. Following the establishment of Addis Ababa City Council in 2008, the two successive mayors of Addis Ababa Administration have also been from the OPDO. And their deputy mayors have been from the ANDM. From 1991 until 2008, Addis Ababa had mayors directly appointed by the central government (ibid.). Accordingly, between 1991 and 1998, Addis Ababa's post of the mayor was held by the ANDM. Following the adoption of a charter for the city in 1997, the OPDO succeeded and held the post up to 2003. An interim city administration was formed when the TPLF took over the post of the mayor and revised the charter of the city in 2003 with the objective of establishing an elected city government. Due to the 2005 controversial election and the protests that ensued in the city, another caretaker city administration was created in 2006 and an Oromo was assigned to the post of the mayor. In 2008, a by-election was held in the city which established the City Council, formally elected the mayor and brought an end to the city's caretaker administration.

Table 7.6: Post-1991 Governors/Mayors of Addis Ababa

No.	Governor/Mayor	Period of Rule	Ethnic Identity
1.	Mulalem Abebe	1991-1993	Amlhara
2.	TeferaWaluwa	1993-1998	Amlhara
3.	Ali Abdo	1998-2003	Oromo
4.	Arkebe Oqubay	2003-2006	Tigrayan
5.	Berhane Deressa	2006-2008	Oromo
6.	Kuma Demeksa	2008-2013	Oromo
7.	Dirriba Kuma	2013-Present	Oromo

The City Council of Addis Ababa as the city's legislative arm was established by the 2008 local election and its last election was held in 2013. In both terms of office, while the speaker of the City Council was from the ANDM, the deputy speaker was from the TPLF.¹⁷⁵ The posts of the speakers and deputy speakers of the lower councils at the sub-city and district levels are also filled by a permutation of officials from the four member parties. Furthermore, the “25% each” power sharing principle within the EPRDF applies in the distribution of seats in the councils of the city at all levels as shall be shown shortly.

¹⁷⁵ Interview, Public Relations Department of the City Council of Addis Ababa, April 05, 2016, Addis Ababa.

7.3.1.2 Urban Local Elections

Before directly delving into the assessment of local elections in the city, it would be good to see the results of the national/federal elections in the city in order to arrive at certain observations.

Table 7.7: Results of Federal Elections in Addis Ababa (1994-2015)

Parties	1994/Constituent Assembly	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
EPRDF	13	21	19	1	22	23
Private	9	2	1	-	-	-
CUD	-	-	-	22	-	-
Medrek	-	-	-	-	1	-
EDP	-	-	2	-	-	-
AAPO	-	-	1	-	-	-
GDU ¹⁷⁶	1	-	-	-	-	-
Total seats	23	23	23	23	23	23

Source: NEBE, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015.

Few observations can be made on this table. First, the 1994 election to the Constituent Assembly, that approved the 1995 Federal Constitution, appears participatory than even now in Addis Ababa when one looks the number of seats won by the EPRDF. The 2005 federal election in the city, which was won by the CUD, failed as the winner party did not enter the parliament. The last opposition Member of Parliament (MP) in Ethiopia (2010-2015) was from Addis Ababa representing the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum. Moreover, the 2015 election result shows that the EPRDF found itself the sole winner party, not only in the capital but also all over the country along with its affiliate parties. Official sources indicate that the last two elections were effected in accordance with the 'equal share' formula within the EPRDF.¹⁷⁷ According to the political order in changing societies, as Samuel Huntington (1968) puts it, the pattern of federal elections results in the city shown above suggests that the ruling EPRDF party has been entrenching authoritarianism by the day.

Besides the federal elections, Addis Ababa has been holding local elections since 1995; but the city's legislative body, the City Council was established only in 2008 in accordance with Article 12 of the 2003 Revised Charter of Addis Ababa. Thus, Addis Ababa's City Council as well as its 10 Sub-Cities and 116 Woreda Councils are only serving their second terms of office: (1) 2008-2013 and (2) 2013-2017. The Sub-City and Woreda Councils cannot legislate unlike the City Council;

¹⁷⁶ Gamo Democratic Union (GDU) and other dozens of parties merged to the SEPDM.

¹⁷⁷ Interview, Wondemagegn Tesema, *supra* note 174.

but they oversight, follow up and support their respective executive bodies (Addis Ababa City Council, 2014). Let us see the effect of the power sharing arrangement within the EPRDF on the recent two elections to the councils at all tiers of the city's local governments.

Table 7.8: Results of Addis Ababa City Council Elections (1995-2017)

	1995	2000	2005	2008	2013
EPRDF	92	101	1	137	138
CUD	-	-	137	1	-
AAPO	-	19	-	-	-
EDP	-	15	-	-	-
Private	-	3	-	-	-
	92	138	138	138	138

Source: NEBE, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013

According to the reports by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, except the 2005 election which was won by the opposition CUD, the EPRDF has been the winner all the time since 1991. The 2005 election result shows that, except for one seat which went to the EPRDF, all the remaining 137 seats of the City Council of Addis Ababa were swept by the CUD. Following the alleged election rigging by the EPRDF in the rest of the country, CUD rejected the results, violent protests erupted and CUD leaders detained leading to the formation of “a provisional caretaker” administration in 2006 for Addis Ababa (Atsede Wudneh, 2007: 14). As a result, a by-election was held in 2008 which reversed the former election results in the city in favor of the EPRDF.

Table 7.9: Addis Ababa City Council Members by Ethnic/Party (2008-2017)

No.	Ethnic/ Party	2008-2013		2013-2017		Average
		Members	%	Members	%	
1	Amhara	36	26.08	38	27.53	26.80
2	Oromo	35	25.36	35	25.36	25.36
3	South	39	28.26	35	25.36	26.81
4	Tigrayan	28	20.29	30	21.74	21.01
	Total	138	100	138	100	100

Source: Addis Ababa City Council, 2009 & 2014

Except one seat which went to the CUD by the 2008 election, in both terms of office, the Addis Ababa City Council has been controlled by a single party, the EPRDF. This implies that since its establishment, the City Council has been politically homogenous. The ethnic/party compositions

of the City Council indicate the application of the power sharing arrangement within the ruling party. Accordingly, seats in the City Council were distributed in both elections among the South (SEPDM), Amhara (ANDM), Oromo (OPDO) and Tigrayan (TPLF). On average, they shared 26.81, 26.80, 25.36 and 21.01 respectively. South denotes not one ethnic group but it is a shorter name of the SNNP Region which embraces no less than 56 ethnic groups.

Sub-city council is the next level of local council below the City Council of Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa City Administration is subdivided into ten sub-city administrations. Each of the sub-cities has its own sub-city council whose seats range from 300 in Lideta and Gulele sub-cities to 450 in Kolfe Keranio sub-city. There are total of 3,480 seats in all sub-city councils of Addis Ababa. The results of the 2008 and 2013 elections show that all sub-city councils have been controlled by single party, the EPRDF. The following tables illustrate that the EPRDF has distributed the seats in the sub-city councils among its ethnic based member parties.

Table 7.10: Members of Addis Ababa Sub-City Councils by Ethnic (2008-2013)

Sub-City	Amhara		Oromo		Tigrayan		South		Total Seat
	Seat	%	Seat	%	Seat	%	Seat	%	
1. Lideta	106	36.3	62	20.6	82	27.3	50	16.6	300
2. Bole	124	29.5	105	25	112	26.6	79	18.8	420
3. Kolfe	144	32	105	23.3	96	21.3	105	23.3	450
4. Gulele	156	52	58	19.3	38	12.6	48	16	300
5. Nifas-Silk	124	34.4	98	27.2	77	21.4	61	16.9	360
6. Arada	95	31.6	63	21	76	25.3	66	22	300
7. Yeka	173	44.3	85	21.8	76	19.5	56	14.3	390
8. Kirkos	110	33.3	81	24.5	101	30.6	38	11.5	330
9. Akaki Kaliti	139	42.1	89	26.9	46	13.9	56	16.9	330
10. Addis Ketema	78	26	57	19	48	16	117	39	300
Total	1249	35.9	809	23.2	752	21.6	676	19.4	3,480

Source: Addis Ababa City Council, 2009

According to the 2008 election results, on average, while the ANDM shares 36 per cent of the seats in the ten sub-city councils, whereas the OPDO, the TPLF and the SEPDM apportion 23, 22 and 19 per cents respectively. At a general level, therefore, it looks the power sharing formula has influenced the distribution of seats at the sub-city council level. More specifically, in some sub-city councils such as in Gulele which has 300 seats, the ANDM has controlled as high as 52 per cent, and this per cent falls as low as to 26 in Bole Sub-City Council. The per cent of the OPDO ranges from 27 in Nifas-Silk Lafto Sub-City Council to 19 in Gulele. The TPLF is able to obtain as high

as 30 per cent in Kirkos Sub-City and as low as 12.6 per cent in Gulele. The SEPDM, which has the lowest percentage of the overall seats at the sub-city level, shared 11.5 per cent in Kirkos Sub-City Council and 39 per cent in Addis Ketema Sub-City Council.

Table 7.11: Members of Addis Ababa Sub-City Councils by Ethnic (2013-2017)

Sub-City	Amhara		Oromo		Tigrayan		South-Gurage		South-others		Total
	Seat	%	Seat	%	Seat	%	Seat	%	Seat	%	
1. Lideta	78	26	77	25.6	75	25	70	23.3	0	0	300
2. Bole	117	27.8	107	25.4	101	24	95	22.6	0	0	420
3. Kolfe	127	28.2	117	26	96	21.3	110	24.4	0	0	450
4. Gulele	80	26.6	80	26.6	62	20.6	52	17.3	26	8.6	300
5. Nifas-Silk	103	28.6	95	26.3	82	22.7	40	11.1	40	11.1	360
6. Arada	87	29	76	25.3	76	25.3	61	20.3	0	0	300
7. Yeka	124	31.8	96	24.6	86	22	46	11.8	38	9.7	390
8. Kirkos	87	26.3	84	25.4	78	23.6	45	13.6	36	10.9	330
9. Akaki Kaliti	89	26.9	107	32.4	62	18.7	72	21.8	0	0	330
10. Addis Ketema	85	28.3	67	22.3	56	18.6	75	25	17	5.6	300
Total	977	28	906	26	774	22.2	666	19.1	157	4.5	3,480

Source: Addis Ababa City Council, 2014

By the 2013 local election, the EPRDF seems to have narrowed the variations observed in the distribution of seats in the sub-city councils among its member parties. Accordingly, the average seats shared in all sub-city councils show that the ANDM, the OPDO, the SEPDM (mainly Gurage) and the TPLF are represented by 28, 26, 23.6 and 22.2 per cents respectively. Thus, the equal quota formula has shaped the 2013 election results of the sub-city council than the 2008. In the above table, the total 157 seats lumped under “South-others” are distributed among Walaitta (57 seats), Hadiya (28), Gamo (21), Silte (16), Kambata (14), Sidama (10) and other groups (11 seats). The Gurage shares 81 per cent of the 823 seats allocated to the SEPDM in all sub-city councils. Gurage’s dominance in the SEPDM in this regard could be associated to its population proportion in the city which is ranked the third preceded by Amhara and Oromo.

The lowest unit of local government in Addis Ababa, to which election is held, is Woreda councils. In 1995, Woreda and Kebele level elections were held in the city, but no legislative body of the city was established (NEBE, 1995). Since the offices of Woreda councils were established along with the City and Sub-City councils in 2008, only the 2008 and 2013 elections results are assessed. There are 116 Woreda administrations having their own councils. Woreda council has 300 seats on average, and all 116 Woreda councils have a total of 34,800 seats.

Table 7.12: Woreda Council Members by Ethnic (2008-2013)

Sub-City	No. of Woredas	Amhara	Oromo	Tigrayan	South	Total
1. Lideta	10	989	776	651	584	3000
2. Bole	14	1571	1044	873	712	4200
3. Kolfe	15	1345	1008	697	1450	4500
4. Gulele	10	1113	610	550	727	3000
5. Nifas-Silk	12	1255	1077	654	614	3600
6. Arada	10	1100	544	664	692	3000
7. Yeka	13	1900	848	619	533	3900
8. Kirkos	11	1480	668	615	537	3300
9. AkakiKaliti	11	958	1266	477	599	3300
10. Addis Ketema	10	907	630	352	1111	3000
Total	116	12618	8471	6152	7559	34800
Percentage by Ethnic		36.25	24.34	17.67	21.72	

Source: Addis Ababa City Council, 2009

Table 7.13: Woreda Council Members by Ethnic (2013-2017)

Sub-City	No of Woredas	Amhara	Oromo	Tigrayan	South Gurage	South others	Total
1. Lideta	10	849	694	604	493	360	3000
2. Bole	14	1264	1091	952	893	0	4200
3. Kolfe	15	1444	1013	715	1306	22	4500
4. Gulele	10	1067	705	474	352	402	3000
5. Nifas-Silk	12	1224	990	702	410	274	3600
6. Arada	10	1101	649	602	648	0	3000
7. Yeka	13	1407	990	834	376	293	3900
8. Kirkos	11	1092	859	640	395	314	3300
9. AkakiKaliti	11	967	883	758	692	0	3300
10. Addis Ketema	10	950	698	414	772	166	3000
Total	116	11365	8572	6697	6337	1831	34800
Percentage by Ethnic		32.65	24.63	19.24	18.21	5.26	100

Source: Addis Ababa City Council, 2014

According to the 2008 election results at the Woreda level, the 34,800 seats in all Woreda councils were distributed among the member parties of the EPRDF, and on average, the ANDM, the OPDO, the SEPDM and the TPLF shared 36.25%, 24.34%, 21.72% and 17.67% respectively. By the 2013 election, the percentage shares of the seats in all Woreda councils among the EPRDF were reformed to 32.65, 24.63, 23.47 and 19.24 respectively. It shows that the influence of the power sharing formula within the ruling regime remains significant.

This 'equal share' formula in the capital and its influence on local elections is not free from

criticism. First, the “25% each” formula appears to have ignored the ethnic composition of the city’s population. Nearly half of the population of Addis Ababa is ethnically identified as Amhara followed by Oromo (20%), Gurage (16%), Tigrayan (6%), Silte (3%) and Gamo (1.6%) (CSA, 2008). Therefore, the arrangement is not on the basis of proportionality rule. If the ANDM is supposed to represent Amhara ethnic group in the city as it claims, it would have shared almost half of urban political powers and thereby take the post of the mayor. The parties that claim to represent Oromo and Gurage in the city would have gained 20% and 16% respectively. The TPLF, which claims to represent Tigrayans in the city, would have shared no more than 6% of the powers. However, the practice shows that member parties’ equal quota at all levels of the city government is filled by party cadres often directly assigned from regional-states (Ermias, 2014; Bereket, 2008). The EPRDF officials justify equal quota principle among EPRDF member parties in Addis Ababa from “fair representation” of Ethiopian nationalities.¹⁷⁸ Despite the regime’s claim, neither nationalities in Addis Ababa nor in Ethiopia are fairly represented in the power sharing.

In this regard, opponents argue that the formula was designed to maintain the hegemonic interests of the ruling regime especially the TPLF (Ermias, 2014). Indeed, the members of the city’s councils or head of an office certainly represent the interests of the ruling EPRDF party. Opposition parties rebuff the EPRDF’s distribution of political posts and legislative seats in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa among its member parties as an “authoritarian tactic” to deceive the people.¹⁷⁹ The power sharing within the EPRDF or with its affiliates is neither democratic nor representative (ibid.). Moreover, the application of the power sharing formula in the city councils presupposes election victories. Pre-election distribution of seats takes for granted a post-election victory which means if some seats are won by an opposition, the formula would be disturbed. As Yash Ghai aptly advises, “autonomy arrangements which have been negotiated in a democratic and participatory way have a better chance of success than those which are imposed” (2000: 18).

Also critics suspect that the EPRDF manipulates ethnicity as it assigns Oromo/ OPDO mayors in the post-2005 election in the city, following CUD’s victory, to counterbalance Amhara socio-cultural and political influences (Ermias, 2014). In 2008, even OPDO and ANDM were said to have competed over the post of the mayor, and the former was guaranteed the post mainly due to the TPLF backings (ibid.). Ermias says that the successive appointments of the OPDO mayors

¹⁷⁸ Interviews, *supra* notes 174 & 175.

¹⁷⁹ Interviews, Opposition Officials of *Medrek*, February 2, 2016 & Blue party, March 27, 2016).

undermine the rights of Amharas in Addis Ababa who constitute half of the city's population. Sources from the EPRDF Office suggest that assignment of OPDO mayors is associated with the enforcement of Oromia's special rights in Addis Ababa.¹⁸⁰ However, OPDO succeeded TPLF in 2006 after an electoral threat posed by the CUD. Thus, the ruling party's tactics cannot be equated with the special interest of Oromia in the city. The EPRDF holds ultimate prerogative to assign anybody to the post of the mayor as it has been doing since 1991.

Finally, there are a total of 38,418 seats in all local councils of Addis Ababa at all tiers: 138 in the City Council, 3,480 in the 10 Sub-City Councils and 34,800 in the 116 Woreda Councils. This extremely inflated number of seats suggests that, in the foreseeable future, if an opposition wants to win local elections at all tiers of the city administration, it must be able to register large number of candidates as high as 38,418 or at least more than half of this to form a majoritarian city government. One may think of the number of candidates the EPRDF has been registering for local elections across the country.¹⁸¹ Opposition parties repeatedly accuse the EPRDF of deliberately inflating the number of candidates required to win local elections (Merera, 2011). Indeed, it is difficult for the oppositions to get this much candidates for local elections to compete against the ruling regime. The number of seats in the Addis Ababa City Council, which is 138, may be fairly feasible for oppositions to compete for, but the number of seats at the sub-city and woreda levels curtails any possibility of winning local elections by the oppositions. Generally, local elections in Ethiopia could fall within the continuum of electoral authoritarianism in nondemocratic countries.

7.3.2 Power Sharing & Local Elections in Dire Dawa

7.3.2.1 Power Sharing Arrangements

Following conflicts over the city in 1992 between Oromo and Somali, towards the end of 1993, an administrative entity known as Dire Dawa Transitional Administration (1993-1995) was formed by the Prime Minister's (PM) Office, who crafted a grand coalition of two Somalis (Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL)) and one Oromo (OPDO) with Somali city-governor. It was a 2:1 coalition formula. This ended Oromia's brief rule of the city. This imposed coalition could no longer stay due to the conflicting interests of the two groups. The second imposed arrangement

¹⁸⁰ Interview, Authority of EPRDF-Addis Ababa Office, March 29, 2016.

¹⁸¹ For instance, by the 2008 local election in Ethiopia, the EPRDF and its affiliate parties won all of the 3,585,646 seats of local councils in the nine regional-states and two city administrations of Ethiopia (NEBE, 2008).

was known as Dire Dawa Administrative Council (1996-2003) established by the same PM Office (Asnake, 2010). It was composed of five men: two Oromos, two Somalis, and one Amhara (2:2:1). Even though the mayor's post was assumed by Amhara (ANDM), there was an attempt to strike ethnic balance between Oromo and Somali. After a year, this power sharing formula was reduced to three men—one Amhara, one Somali and one Oromo —1:1:1. An Amhara continued to lead the Council in addition to assuming the posts of the two dismissed cabinets.¹⁸² The two competing ethnic-groups were given marginal representations in this imposed power sharing.

The third arrangement was the Dire Dawa Provisional Administration (2003-2008), which was once again centrally imposed committee composed of seven men: three Oromos, two Somalis, one Tigrayan and one Amhara (ibid.). It produced a 3:2:1:1 inter-ethnic coalition. A Tigrayan (TPLF) was assigned to the post of the mayor (2003-2006) while his deputy was Amhara (ANDM). None of the two leading figures were from the competing Somali and Oromo ethnic-groups (ibid.). Dire Dawa became a chartered city administration in 2004, and for accountability, the Ministry of Federal Affairs replaced the PM's Office. For the remaining one year, an OPDO took over the post of the mayor until the first locally elected mayor of Dire Dawa who was from the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) assumed the post in 2008.

Table 7.14: Post-1991 Governors/Mayors of Dire Dawa

No.	Governor/Mayor	Period of Rule	Ethnic Identity
1.	Habtamu Assefa	1991-1993	Oromo
2.	Usmael O. Adem	1993-1995	Somali
3.	Damtew Damissie	1996-1996	Amhara
4.	Solomon Hailu	1996-2003	Amhara
5.	Fisseha Zarihun	2003-2006	Tigrayan
6.	Abdulaziz Mohammed	2006-2008	Oromo
7.	Adem Farah	2008-2010	Somali
8.	Assad Ziad	2010-2015	Oromo
9.	Ibrahim Osman	2015-Present	Somali

It is fair to say that though it resembles a power sharing arrangement, all of the above grand coalitions were essentially crafted and imposed by the central authorities, and thus had neither constitutional basis nor any legal foundation. It came through political practices without being anchored in formal laws. Asnake puts it this way: “by far the most frequently used instruments in

¹⁸² Interview, *supra* note 28.

managing conflicts in federal Ethiopia are politico-administrative to the detriment of constitutional institutions and principles” (2010: 213). The residents of Dire Dawa were administered by centrally imposed unelected committees until its first local election in 2008 (Milkessa, 2014). It therefore appears largely that the centralized party structure was determining the substance of power sharing in the city, as was also the case in Addis Ababa.

The current administrative structure of Dire Dawa is known as Dire Dawa Administration (2008- present). In 2008, Dire Dawa tested the first voting for its local leaders. Before discussing local elections, the nature of the current power sharing deal shall be presented. Following its defeat in the city by the 2005 national election, the ruling EPRDF party re-opened its office in the city (which was closed in 1993) and introduced the so-called *40:40:20 power sharing deal* that was signed in 2006 between the OPDO and the ESPDP under the auspice of the federal authorities mainly the TPLF.¹⁸³ The ESPDP is an affiliate to and supervised by the EPRDF in which, the role of the TPLF is believed to be decisive (ibid.).

According to the deal, each of the ESPDP and OPDO share 40 per cent of urban political positions, and the last 20% is reserved for the remaining EPRDF member parties. The 40:40:20 power sharing is also referred to as the 40:60 formula because EPRDF's political dividend makes 60%. The formula strictly applies to the seats in the City and Kebele councils, city cabinets, kebele executives and other posts packed by appointments. As per the deal, the posts of mayor and deputy mayor, speaker and deputy speaker rotate between OPDO and ESPDP. It goes that if the mayor is from the ESPDP, the speaker will be from the OPDO. The same holds for their deputies. Some Amhara key informants express their discontents against the 40:40:20 because, they say, they are under-represented in urban politics as compared to their population in the city.¹⁸⁴ Many believe that the deal is simply an authoritarian "predetermined formula" (Asnake, 2014: 600). According to OPDO and ESPDP informants, the formula is a “win-win approach” to conflict managements (Milkessa, 2014). Critics argue that this power sharing is too informal (for the fact that both the FDRE Constitution and Dire Dawa Charter require majoritarian government) and is not also proportional representation of ethnic-groups in the city.

Ethnic-based quota system of power sharing in Dire Dawa resembles with that of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. It was in early 1977 that “the French manipulated and designed the total

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Interview, *supra* note 112.

number of seats for each ethnic group—thirty three for Issas, thirty for Afars and two for the Arabs” which “enabled the Issas to hold majority seats in the parliament when Djibouti proclaimed her independence” (Seffefe, 1978: 12-13). Thus, Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa, Harari (between Harari and Oromo) and Djibouti share in common a pattern of ethno-political quota based power sharing system basically crafted by hegemonic third party.

7.3.2.2 Urban Local Elections

Dire Dawa’s special arrangement and its imposed quota system have affected several sectors. One of such effects is electoral problems in the city for which some residents have been “electing without choosing” (Milkessa, 2014). Residents have been voting for national/ federal elections since 1994 and for local elections since 2008. Elections in the city are characterized by bi-party politics mostly between the EPRDF and ESPDP. The city has two seats in the Federal Parliament.

Table 7.15: Results of Federal Elections in Dire Dawa (1994-2015)

Constituencies	Winner Parties					
	1994/Constituent Assembly	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Dire Dawa 1	OPDO	ESDL	OPDO	CUD	OPDO	OPDO
Dire Dawa 2	OPDO	ESDL	OPDO	ESPDP	ESPDP	ESPDP

Source: NEBE, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015.

First, by the June 1994 election to the Constituent Assembly, the two constituencies of Dire Dawa were won by OPDO, which had briefly administered the town as part of Oromia. Second, both seats of Dire Dawa in the 1995 federal election were swept by ESDL, a party later reformed to ESPDP. According to OPDO informants, the ESDL controlled both seats due to the complete closure of the OPDO/EPRDF Office in the city.¹⁸⁵ Besides, sources from the Electoral Board of Ethiopia shows that the OPDO, along with Oromo elders and a private candidate, accused the ESDL of rigging votes, but the Board rejected the allegation (NEBE, 1995). Surprisingly, in 1994, the demography of Somali in Dire Dawa was only 13.9 per cent of the city's population on which the winner party claimed to have had relied; but the Oromo constituted 48 per cent followed by the Amhara (27.7%) (CSA, 1995). By the 2000 election, both seats went back to OPDO. By the 2005 contested election, both seats slipped out of the OPDO/EPRDF hand, and entered in the

¹⁸⁵ Interview, OPDO official, March 11, 2012, Dire Dawa.

hands of opposition CUD and the affiliate party ESPDP respectively. Shocked by this defeat, the EPRDF quickly re-opened its office in the city in 2006 and introduced the 40:40:20 formula.¹⁸⁶ The 2010 federal parliamentary election in the city was organised so as to fit into the formula, and accordingly, the two seats were shared between the ESPDP and OPDO. The May 2015 election repeated the same result. There have been no electoral competitions between these two parties; and the political space itself is getting narrower and narrower by the day. Not only in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, Ethiopian elections in general are often accused of being authoritarian elections.

The first local election for the local administration of Dire Dawa was held in 2008 and as a result, the city's law-making body, the City Council comprising 189 seats, was established (Dire Dawa Proclamation No. 1/2008). Since then, the 40:40:20 power sharing deal has been dictating the results of local elections of the City and Kebele Councils (NEBE, 2009; 2014).

Table 7.16: Dire Dawa City Council Election Results of 2008 & 2013

Winner Party		2008				2013			
		Seats Won		%		Seats Won		%	
EPRDF	OPDO	75	114	39.68	60.32	75	114	39.68	60.32
	ANDM	24		12.70		24		12.70	
	SEPDM	12		6.35		12		6.35	
	TPLF	3		1.59		3		1.59	
ESPDP		74		39.15		75		39.68	
Private		1		0.53		-		-	
Total		189		100		189		100	

Source: NEBE, 2009 & 2014

Table 7.17: Dire Dawa's Kebele Councils Election Results of 2008 & 2013

Winner Party	2008		2013	
	Seats Won	%	Seats Won	%
EPRDF	7,017	56.07	6,734	53.45
ESPDP	5,497	43.93	5,865	46.55
Total	12,514	100	12,599	100

Source: NEBE, 2009 & 2014

As can be observed from Table 7.16 and Table 7.17, seats in the City Council (189) as well as Kelebe Councils (12,599) of Dire Dawa are shared among the EPRDF and ESPDP largely in accordance with the 40:40:20 formula by the local elections of 2008 and 2013. They share the

¹⁸⁶ Focus Group Discussion, Office of Mayor of Dire Dawa Administration, May 09, 2012, Dire Dawa.

residents in the pre-elections, and then do not compete against each other. As a result, some Oromo and Amhara electorates were forced to vote for Somali party's candidates, electing without choosing (Milkessa, 2014). The city is divided into electoral constituencies: Federal, City Council and Kebele Councils. There is no proportionality between ethnic-based party candidates and ethnic composition of the voters. The major paradox is that the Somali constitute 24% of the population of Dire Dawa but the ESPDP, the party that claims to represent Somali, grabs one of the two federal seats, and about 40% of political posts at both levels of local governments in the City. In her *Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia*, Sarah Vaughan discusses "the ways in which well-placed elites sought to utilise the dynamics of *realpolitik* to win unusual or disproportionate advantages for small or marginal populations" (2003: 288). Absence of proportionality is also the case in Addis Ababa as especially the TPLF, which claims to represent Tigrayans who are 6% of city's population, controls about 20% of urban powers. As a result, semi-consociational deals in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, as Asnake correctly suggested, "may not however work in a multiparty setting" (2014: 600). The number of seats in the kebele councils would successfully discourage oppositions from election participation.

Moreover, the EPRDF controls 60% of the seats in the City Council of Dire Dawa, but 'generously' does not form the executive to lead it. Thus, ESPDP apportions 40% of the seats and other political posts as per the formula. More importantly, the first elected mayor of the city in 2008 was from the ESPDP's members of the City Council. EPRDF's negligence of the majoritarian government formation rule in Dire Dawa is an extra-constitutional and an extra-charter activity. It is sometimes good that power sharing deal is informal, but critics of the power sharing arrangements in both cities accuse the EPRDF of manipulating ethnic identities and relations for its hegemonic control. Thus, like in Addis Ababa, it looks that local elections are held in Dire Dawa only to rubberstamp what is already determined by the EPRDF to the detriment of the will of voters. This diametrically contradicts Daniel Elazar's two faces of democracy: "one, the use of areal division to ensure neutrality and equality in the representation of the various groups and interests in the polity, and the other, in the use of such division to secure local autonomy and representation for diverse groups within the same civil society" (1987: 167).

7.3.3 Urban Civil Service Employment Sharing

Multi-ethnic federations are expected in principle to promote ethnically more representative public institutions. It is however unlikely that the present civil service institutions of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa reflect the ethnic diversity of the cities. According to federal sources, most of the civil servants in both cities are born and educated outside the cities and migrated to them in search of better jobs which might make the issue of representation even more problematic.¹⁸⁷ In addition to individual job seekers, the government of Ethiopia often assigns civil servants. For instance, on the eve of the 2005 election, the EPRDF mobilized massive civil servants from cities in all regions of Ethiopia and employed them in Addis Ababa City Administration, Bereket Simeon writes, aiming to bring about what he calls "renaissance of Addis Ababa" (2011: 44). Critics however argue that those civil servants were in fact "regime's cadres" who were transferred to the city to change urban bureaucracy into the ruling party's bureaucracy so that it would win the 2005 election (Ermias, 2014: 138). Whatever the reason might have been, the EPRDF was defeated at polls in 2005 but it retained the power to administer the city. Since then, during and after the employment of civil servants not only in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa but also everywhere in Ethiopia, the EPRDF has been widely criticized for requiring political memberships of, or supports to, its member parties or affiliates. This has led some writers to conclude that the state institutions in Ethiopia have been fused to the ruling EPRDF party or even overwhelmed by the party channel (Getahun, 2014; Merera, 2011; Asnake, 2009; Assefa, 2007). Let us see the working of ethnic representations in the civil service institutions of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa by taking government employment reports of ten consecutive fiscal years for each city.

¹⁸⁷ Interview, Authority in the Ministry of Federal Civil Service, Addis Ababa.

Table 7.18: Dire Dawa Administration Civil Service Employees by Ethnic (2004-2014)

Ethnic Group	Employee Percentage by Fiscal Year										Average
	2004	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
Amhara	60.46	59.75	61.19	57.63	42.75	42.54	43.98	45.43	44.95	46.80	50.55
Oromo	30.74	27.17	25.83	28.76	36.34	35.46	36.14	38.14	37.53	37.75	33.39
Somali	0.91	3.05	2.98	3.05	2.97	4.96	4.86	5.65	4.63	4.79	3.79
Gurage	2.76	4.13	4.08	4.58	4.41	4.67	4.34	4.68	3.54	4.53	4.17
Tigrayan	2.64	2.89	2.62	3.03	0.45	3.06	3.20	3.26	3.47	3.43	2.80
Others	2.49	3.00	3.26	3.31	13.06	9.31	7.40	2.85	5.88	2.70	5.33
Employee	3409	4460	4528	5438	5487	6250	6324	6384	7284	7448	5701
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Dire Dawa Administration Civil Service Bureau, (2004-2014)

Particularly, Dire Dawa's extra-constitutional administration by the Federal Government has resulted in imbalances of sociocultural representation in local civil service institutions. On average, from 2004 to 2014, members of ethnic groups employed in Dire Dawa Administration include in descending order Amhara (50%), Oromo (33.39%), Gurage (4.17%), Somali (3.79%), Tigrayan (2.80%), and others (5.33%) (see Table 7.18). Moreover, according to the above table, from 2003 to 2008, about 60% of the total civil servants of the City were Amhara, while Oromo on average shared 28%; Gurage was employed by 3.7%; the Somali improved from 0.9% to 3%; Tigrayan increased from 2.6% to 3% (see table 7.18).

Dire Dawa's anomaly is that the two ethnic-groups in conflict over Dire Dawa are Oromo and Somali; and the single largest ethnic-group constituting half of the city population is Oromo; but the largest civil service employees are Amhara (compare Table 7.2 and Table 7.18). Why? The dominance of Amharas and the under-representations of Somalis and Oromos are largely explained by the legacy of the historically Amhara-dominated bureaucracies backed by the current federally imposed Amharic working language for the city administration. Recall that modern Ethiopian state institutions were formed on Amhara culture, language and Orthodox Christian values (Merera, 2011, Markakis, 2011).

However, since 2008, slight changes in the representation of ethnic-groups in Dire Dawa's public institutions have been seen which might be the influence of the 40:40:20 power sharing arrangement. By the 2012 report, Amhara's employment declined to 45.4%, and that of the Oromo and Somali rose to 38.1% and 5.6% respectively. Proportionality rule in the civil service representation is yet to come, though.

Table 7.19: Addis Ababa Administration Civil Service Employees by Ethnic (2006-2015)

Ethnic Group	Employee Percentage by Fiscal Year										Average
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Amhara	45.99	46.10	40.15	44.07	35.47	35.13	32.20	44.26	35.87	44.50	40.37
Oromo	15.93	16.78	16.11	18.33	14.49	14.90	18.42	20.53	18.92	21.63	17.60
Tigrayan	10.07	10.05	7.99	11.10	7.23	7.47	12.22	8.68	6.78	9.57	9.11
Gurage	5.29	8.97	5.14	6.02	5.41	5.26	3.55	5.88	4.79	6.22	5.65
Gamo	-	-	-	0.66	0.42	0.39	0.56	1.12	0.97	1.21	0.76
Welaita	-	-	-	0.24	0.63	0.48	0.52	0.82	0.85	0.83	0.62
Silte	-	-	-	1.16	0.35	0.39	0.35	0.68	0.46	0.57	0.56
Hadiya	-	-	-	0.56	0.47	0.39	0.51	0.77	0.63	0.62	0.56
Not stated	20.12	17.67	26.14	7.78	29.66	30.38	29.25	15.40	29.30	9.81	21.55
Others	2.60	0.43	4.47	9.33	4.56	5.21	2.42	1.86	1.43	5.04	3.22
Employee	30557	33933	36177	33007	39554	40690	56341	62952	78682	85942	49783
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Addis Ababa Civil Service & Good Governance Bureau, 2016

As the civil service employment statistics of Addis Ababa show, the power sharing formula within the member parties of the EPRDF did not seem to have affected the city's civil service employments. As a result, from 2006 to 2015, on average, Addis Ababa's civil servants are composed of Amhara (40.37%), Oromo (17.60%), Tigrayan (9.11%), Gurage (5.65%), unstated identity (21.55%), and other minorities (5.72%). It is possible to understand from Table 7.19 that the percentages of the members of ethnic groups in the city's civil service have shown some annual variations, and particularly the rise of the percentage of employees with unstated identity has frequently caused the decline of the percentage of Amharas and vice versa (see the reports of 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). This means that some members of the Amhara civil servants of Addis Ababa are sometimes unwilling to state their ethnic identity which resulted in the rise of the percentage of the unstated identity and decline of the percentage of the Amhara. Therefore, the total number of Amhara employees in the civil service of Addis Ababa could be 50 to 45 per cent. From the viewpoint of the city's population percentage of ethnic groups, on average, the Tigrayans are over represented by 3 per cent; whereas the Gurage and Oromo are underrepresented by about 10 and 2 per cents respectively (compare Table 7.1 and Table 7.19). Thus, it is difficult to claim that the civil service of Addis Ababa is ethnoculturally representative.

In addition to the widely accused ruling party membership requirements, the legacies of the old regimes, i.e., the preservation of Amharic as the sole urban administrative language has been identified as the main factor determining access to civil service jobs in the cities. In the past,

"fluency in Amharic was made an essential pre-requisite for entry into government services and institutions of higher learning" (Leenco, 1999: 177). Today, Somali elders of Dire Dawa continued to explain that Somalis are excluded from the city's civil service jobs for they could not speak Amharic.¹⁸⁸ This shows that the working language of both city administrations has tended to serve Amharas (or those who are able to speak competitive Amharic) than any other ethnic-groups.¹⁸⁹ If Addis Ababa looks partly better than Dire Dawa in terms of ethnic representations, the difference might have happened for there is sizable non-Amharas assimilated to Amharic in the former than in the latter city (see Tables 7.1 & 7.2).

To sum up, the exclusion or under-representation of ethnic groups in their government (local or national) can be a major source of conflict and resentment as witnessed in the 1960s Canada (Turgeon & Gagnon, 2013). Likewise, one of the major causes of Oromo protests and movements in the early 2014, the late 2015 and 2016 was identified as the marginalization of the Oromo in the Federal, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations; and as a result of which the protestors demanded designation of Afaan Oromo as additional working language of the federal administrations parallel to Amharic (Tsegaye, 2015; Milkessa, 2015). As Brian Weinstein rightly argues, "official language has the potential to enlarge participation in power, wealth and prestige and to restrict it. Restricted participation eventually means that one group is dominated by another" (1983: 79).

7.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to examine the extent of urban accommodation of ethnolinguistic diversity in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The major urban policy points of discussions have been classified according to their associations, on each of which comparative urban analyses are made. In summary, the following findings are substantiated. I chose the term "regulation" in the title of this chapter because policies of eliminating as well as managing ethnolinguistic diversity such as assimilation, hegemonic control and aspects of consociation are found to have been practiced in the cities. It is from this perspective that Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are compared and their

¹⁸⁸ Focus Group Discussion, *supra* note 40.

¹⁸⁹ Some informants are of the opinion that due to their work cultures, the Somali and some Oromo do not want formal employment regarding it "as prison" (Interviews, *supra* note 112; & Rebiru Kebede, Dire Dawa Administration, May 25, 2012, Dire Dawa). The informant opinion suggests that these groups prefer private commercial activities than government civil service jobs. The latter opinion is akin to the justification rendered for the underrepresentation of Gurage in the civil service of Addis Ababa.

urban policy similarities and differences identified. First, though they are contested multiethnic urban centers (see chapter five), the Federal Government of Ethiopia adopted identical charters and designated its working language, Amharic, as their sole local administrative language. Hence, both cities share similar working language of public administrations. In spite of administrative working language policy similarity, education and broadcasting media services in Dire Dawa are provided in three local languages, Amharic, Afaan Oromo and Somali; whereas in Addis Ababa, all social services including primary education and media are provided only in Amharic.

Furthermore, the study has examined the effects of monolingual public services in health sector, rehabilitation of indigenous cultures, urban migrations and linguistic assimilation issues. Services in key hospitals in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa show that non-Amharic speaker patients are not accommodated as they could not be treated in the language they can explain their pain, and do not even have access to professional translations. It is indicated that the mismatch between language of patients and language of health service delivery negatively affects the quality of medical treatments, the healing. Moreover, indigenous cultural institutions, *Gadaa* of Oromo and *Ugaas* of Somali, have been restored with limited cultural functions in Dire Dawa, whereas in the capital Addis Ababa, except for building an Oromo Cultural Center, the imperial urban cultural policy and institution has been retained. As a result, the language and cultural policy of Addis Ababa has created inequitable access to education, employment and other social service opportunities, i.e., access to the city. It is because of especially the education and employment opportunities that the dominant migrant group in Addis Ababa has remained ethnic Amharas, who on contrary is said to have left or at least stopped migrating to Dire Dawa in the post-1991 due to the urban conflicts and uncertainties. In the latter city, the number of Somalis unusually doubled between 1994 and 2007 primarily as a result of immigration and identity reconfiguration of Gurgura to Somali.

The other key effect of monolingual public services is linguistic assimilation. It is indicated that nearly half of the members of each of the non-Amhara ethnic groups in Addis Ababa are linguistically assimilated to Amharic. However, assimilation to Amharic did not happen that much in Dire Dawa because of its multicultural education and media policies (segmental autonomy). As a result, urban population, who assimilated to Amharic, usually incline not to identify with certain ethnic identity; they instead prefer to call themselves 'sons of urban centers' or simply Ethiopian.

Furthermore, the EPRDF has devised what appears a semi-consociational arrangement in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations particularly after the 2005 contested election in

Ethiopia. In Addis Ababa City Government, the four member parties of the EPRDF share executive and legislative powers at all levels of city administration on 'equal share' formula (25% each), whereas in Dire Dawa Administration, urban powers are shared among the ESPDP, the OPDO and the remaining EPRDF member parties in accordance with the 40:40:20 rule. Since 2006, as part of the power sharing deals, the post of the mayor of Addis Ababa has been manned from the OPDO, while the same post in Dire Dawa has been rotating between the OPDO and the ESPDP. As these formulas are imposed from the center, they have also dictated the results of the recent two elections at all tiers of both city administrations. Finally, according to the government employment reports, Amhara continued to share the largest chunk, nearly half, of the civil service employments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa mainly advantaged by Amharic working language.

Chapter 8

Synthesis & Conclusions

In the preceding chapters, urban policy and conflict in the context of multiethnic diversity have been examined in theory and practice by focusing on Ethiopia's contested cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa that are under the direct federal administration. More precisely, in chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have established the conceptual lenses, theoretical backings, comparative lessons and historical-cultural foundations of the cities which have laid the ground for the analysis, interpretation and comparison of the empirical data. In the main finding chapters, I have attempted to investigate the post-1991 urban ethno-political conflicts (chapter 5), the status of urban self-governances (chapter 6), and regulation policies of ethno-national diversities in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (chapter 7). In this concluding chapter, I restate the research questions, hypotheses and methods to offer the summary of the major findings and key conclusions.

This dissertation has thus attempted to present a perspective of Ethiopian urban conflicts, governances and policies. Relying on the multiethnic cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa, key research questions were set to: (a) explore the root causes and dynamics of urban ethno-national conflicts; (b) examine the extent to which urban political institutions are autonomous or self-governing; (c) investigate urban ethno-national diversity regulation policies and impacts; and (d) suggest ways of building urban local democratic multiculturalism so as to bring about durable urban peace in contested cities. By way of addressing these questions, a binary comparative urban research on Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa has been conducted.

As potential explanations to these research questions, the study has also set out a couple of hypotheses, all of which have been proved and established right. First, the study claimed that the main causes of nationalistic conflicts to both cities most likely include, among others, ethno-territoriality, centralized and exclusionist urban policies and governances historically rooted, and the boundary issues. It further argued that both city administrations are unlikely to have self-governing institutions or political autonomy, which may lead one to expect neither accommodative cultural policy nor democratic power sharing, all of which have causal associations with urban ethno-national conflicts. Finally, despite sharing vast commonalities (discussed in chapter one),

Dire Dawa Administration tends to have segmental autonomy in cultural policy mainly introduced in the early transitional period when the city was administrative part of Oromia Region, whereas Addis Ababa is argued to have retained its century-old cultural homogenization policy perpetuating ethno-linguistic assimilationism due to the hegemonic interests of the EPRDF in the federal capital.

In order to address the research questions, a combination of urban research strategies including historical, institutional, multi-ethnic/cultural and comparative approaches have been employed by specifying but also extending the analytical lenses offered by Bollens (2009). Precise variables are established for the analysis and comparison of local conflicts and policies in multi-ethnic urban contexts: (1) group conflicts (territoriality—disputes over the ownership of land, urban planning and boundaries, marginalization, historical contexts), (2) political institutions (policies of centralization vis-à-vis local autonomy, political power-sharing, elections and employments), and (3) ethno-national policies (official language, indigenous cultural institutions, education policy, other social services, mass-media policy, urban migration, group identity maintenance). Moreover, causal associations between these variables have been indicated. As I search for similarity and difference between the two urban cases, their geographical and geopolitical differences/significances have emerged as the key variables affecting the conflicts over, and the governances of, the cities. At a theoretical level, communitarian urban policies of multiculturalism and consociationalism without multiparty democracy, or what I prefer to call "semi-consociational arrangements" have deductively been helpful in explaining urban politics of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

By way of reiterating the explanations given to the research questions, the major findings of this dissertation are summarized and concluded by briefly synthesizing or linking the theoretical and empirical arguments as follows.

8.1 Urban Ethno-political Conflicts

8.1.1 The Making of Multiethnic Cities and the Conflicts

The seeds of the contemporary ethno-political conflicts over multiethnic cities were historically sown when the Abyssinian troops led by Menelik II invaded the territories and the peoples in the late nineteenth century as part of the making of modern multiethnic Ethiopia and as a result of the subsequent urban ethno-national policy of impositions and urban cultural evolutions (see chapter 4). Let us see how urban history affected the present urban conflicts and policies. First of all, the establishments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as main towns of Ethiopia could be placed within

the theoretical debates on whether or not city formations preceded state formations as discussed in chapter two. The Abyssinian government, seated in Ankober—the capital of Shewa Province in Amhara—launched southward conquest, occupied Finfinne territory, designated it as a new capital of Shewa Province in 1886 and of Abyssinian Empire in 1889 and renamed it Addis Ababa in 1896. Addis Ababa as an imperial capital played a pivotal role in Menelik's further expeditions to the south, east and west of Ethiopia. As a result, it has been a primate city serving as a center of 'modernization' in the country. This indicates that city formation of Addis Ababa procedurally preceded the empire-state formation of modern Ethiopia with its present geography and demographic diversity. That is why the city is often referred to as the “birth place” of modern Ethiopia (Shemelis, 2013; Assefa, 2009). Unlike Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa is a railway town formed in 1902; but the area (its land and people) was controlled by Menelik's troops after the bloody battle of Chalanqo in 1887.

Therefore, the formation of multiethnic cities in Ethiopia has origins in the conquests by the imperial soldiers and in the impositions of Amharic speaking local administrations particularly in the conquered territories. Military garrisons turned towns—*ketemas* in Amharic. Meaning, military posts, which were established in the conquered peoples as a means of political control, evolved to become urban local authorities (Merera, 2011). Pre-existing indigenous towns also evolved to take garrison feature as they were exposed to similar rule of imperial soldiers. As a result, the essential urban dominant cultural features were developed in the twentieth century in Ethiopia with the elevation of Amharic language to the sole urban language, Orthodox Christianity to urban religion, Amhara socio-cultural tradition to urban dominant culture (cities as products of history). Ethiopia's major towns evolved in this way and thus are products of 'hegemonic' and 'subordinate' cultures as urban sociology theory explains. The formation and development of urban dominant culture in Ethiopia could therefore comparatively be placed within the study of colonial and post-colonial African city formations in which European colonial language, culture and religion were dominant in the post-colonial era as well. For instance, Amharic language was officially promoted as a symbol of “civilization” in Ethiopia in the same way that English was promoted in British colonies in Africa (Getahun, 2007).

It should be noted that when Menelik conquered Finfinne in the 1880s and imposed the hegemonic cultural system—Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity and Amhara culture—upon the indigenous clans of the Oromo, the pastoralists in and surrounding Dire Dawa had already

been under the legacy of the socio-cultural systems—Arabic language, Islamic religion and Arab culture—of the Arab and Egyptians who had long been in control of the area (Mohammed, 2008). In a nutshell, almost all of the older indigenous towns, the new imperial military posts and the twentieth century railway towns became dominantly Amharic speaking urban centers which laid the foundations for the formation of stratified multiethnic cities in Ethiopia (Knutsson, 1969). The Derg regime, which took power in 1974, did not bring any cultural reform to the status of urban as well as rural ethno-national oppressive conditions. That is why urban ethno-nationalist conflict in Ethiopia is rooted in history.

Furthermore, as discussed in chapter four, local ethno-national inequality and relations were manipulated in the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa by the Imperial, Italian and Derg regimes for their respective political ends (instrumental theory of identity). Critics of the present power sharing arrangements in both cities also accuse the EPRDF of manipulating identities for its hegemonic control. The pervasive ethno-national oppression and domination—social identity theory's explanation—was one of the key factors of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and ethno-national liberation movements leading to the downfalls of the Imperial and Derg rules. Moreover, the development of Ethiopian cities especially the capital city did not come without the exploitations of the surrounding rural lands as well as the labors brought to the cities. This center-periphery or capital-land relations of exploitations—as explained by Neo-Marxism—is identified as a factor for particularly the Oromo national conflicts over the master plan of Addis Ababa.

In conclusion, the city of Addis Ababa, ever since it became the capital of the empire-state of Ethiopia, has been expanding and growing at the expense of the cultural rights of the Oromo. As a result, the Oromo has been marginalized in, and feels that it has lost parts of, its own territory in the last 130 years, in a similar way that the Dutch speaking group of Belgium feels towards the federal capital, Brussels. Amharic language was promoted and evolved to take a dominant status in Addis Ababa and in the rest of the towns in Ethiopia like that of French language in Brussels. Hence, the cultural evolution of Brussels and Addis Ababa are to a greater degree comparable. Thus, the origin of Oromo national conflicts to Addis Ababa is greatly associated to ethno-territoriality factor firmly grounded on the exclusionist Ethiopian state policies in the capital city. Further, Dire Dawa was structured in the late 1890s as administrative part of Kombolcha *Melkegna* local rule, and then restructured under a *malkegna* in Qarsa—the then capital of Gara Guracha *Awraja* rule in Oromo localities. As Dire Dawa swiftly grew due to the French-managed

railway company in the town, it was designated as a new capital of the Gara Guracha *Awraja*. Following the independence of Ethiopia from Italian occupation, the town was granted *woreda* status and its *awraja* was renamed as Gurgura and Gara Guracha *Awraja* in the early 1940s and again renamed, all-in-all after Somali's clans, as Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* in 1963. Then, the town continued as a *woreda* and capital of Issa and Gurgura *Awraja* up to 1987, when it was reformed as Dire Dawa *Ras Gaz* in the final years of the Derg regime. This naming and renaming of the administration of Dire Dawa has been used as justifications for the territorial claims over the city following the end of the Derg. In general, the genesis of Ethiopian multiethnic cities, as the seeds of the present urban ethno-national conflicts, goes back to the military conquests in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent urban cultural dominations, economic marginalization and identity manipulations through imposed urban institutions/policies which have continued to affect the present urban ethnic conditions and policies—as historical institutionalism theory suggests.

8.1.2 Federal Restructuring and the Conflicts

During the transitional period, the city of Addis Ababa was granted regional status as Region Fourteen being also the seat of the Central Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and of Region Four (Oromia). Thus, it took the form of a city-state capital of Ethiopia until it lost that status by the 1995 constitution. From the outset, it looked that there were political complications and conflicts of jurisdictions as a region (that is Region Fourteen) was a capital city of the other region (that is Region Four), without establishing clear inter-governmental relations. Above all, the political autonomies of these interlocked transitional regions were overshadowed by the central government whose seat was Addis Ababa. On the other, Dire Dawa was curved as administrative part of Region Four until it was clearly disputed in 1993 by Somali forces—the dispute that triggered the intervention of the center to directly administer the city.

Despite the marginal role of the Oromia Regional Government, transitional law (Proc. No. 7/1992) had promised to ensure the protection of the national and political rights of the Oromo in Region Fourteen (Addis Ababa), but the transitional period ended without implementing them. The same rights of the Oromo in the city was stipulated in the FDRE constitution in the form of the special interests of the State of Oromia but never articulated into laws (extra-constitutionalism). This undelivered special rights, it is widely held, was meant to rectify those historical wrongs. As a result, the historical marginalization of the Oromo in Addis Ababa continued unabated which

created fertile ground for the development of Oromo ethno-nationalist conflicts over the city. These underlying factors of conflicts can be sorted out as structural, institutional or path-dependent and social identity causal theories of conflicts (chapter two). Likewise, the fate of Dire Dawa could have been determined in accordance with the transitional regional boundary making principles and procedures or by the constitutional mechanisms of regional border dispute settlement. However, the Issa/Somali-Oromo disagreements (inter-ethnic/regional disputes) over Dire Dawa and Ethiopia's reliance on the Issa/Somali-led Djibouti seaport (geopolitical factor) have consummated to affect the political status of the city in an extra-constitutional means.

In their seminal work *Why Nations Fail*, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argued that the outcomes of events during critical juncture or transitional period are shaped by the weight of history and the resulting balance of power: "The exact path of institutional development during these period depends on which one of the opposing forces will succeed, which groups will be able to form effective coalitions, and which leaders will be able to structure events to their advantage" (p. 110). Thus, Ethiopia's centralized urban governance history on the one hand and the transitional period political power imbalance—the OPDO's junior positions within the TPLF-led EPRDF coalition—especially as far as Oromo's rights are concerned, on the other, are identified as contributing factors for the extra-constitutional urban governances of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa.

It was against this political history background that the Oromia Regional State announced the change of its capital from Finfinne to Adama in 2003 which ignited waves of anti-government protests and demonstrations in Addis Ababa and other cities in Oromia. However, the decision to change Oromia's capital was reversed and OPDO-led Oromia Government came back to Finfinne merely as antithesis to the landslide electoral victory of the CUD in the city in 2005. Then, the city was engulfed by post-election protests by the supporters of the CUD against election irregularities. The recent widespread Oromo protest movements (of 2014, 2015, and 2016) triggered by the so-called Integrated Master Plan of Addis Ababa—imposed state policy as a cause of conflict—are integral parts of the unresolved historically rooted marginalization of the Oromo in the federal capital and by extension in the federal government. Therefore, ethno-political conflicts to Addis Ababa may be identified as *active conflict* (category-1) in the heuristic model of urban conflict-stability continuum developed by Bollens since "the root political issues of the broader nationalistic conflict remain unresolved" (2009: 8).

Likewise, the IFLO vs. IGLF conflict in western rural part of Dire Dawa in 1991, and the IGLF vs. OPDO/EPRDF conflict in 1992 in the main city are commonly regarded as the major signals of the Oromo-Somali ethno-territorial conflicts over the city of Dire Dawa (inter-group conflict theory). The TGE used these conflicts as an opportunity for its intervention in 1993 forcing the city administration to become an extra-constitutional politico-administrative body (hegemonic control). Oromo nationalists advance that the city of Dire Dawa is illegally sliced from the territory of Oromia and put under the federal control. Similarly, the Somali ethno-nationalists continued to clash with the residents in the outskirts of Dire Dawa over border issue. As the recent border clashes were not violent, the decision to centralize the administration of Dire Dawa backed by certain cultural policy decentralization has debatably placed the city within group of cities characterized by *suspension of violence* (category-2) marked more by the absence of conflicts than the presence of peace (Bollens, 2009). As there are clashes over border issues, one could also place Dire Dawa within *active conflict* (category-1).

In general, the dynamics of ethno-national conflicts to the case study areas show that the root causes of the conflicts are not yet resolved through inclusive and constitutionally valid procedures. As Alex De Waal correctly observes in his *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa*, “political disputes are not resolved by institutional rules and procedures (law is subordinate to political contingency)” (2015: 19). It is very important to understand the marginal roles assigned to and played by the ruling parties of Oromia and Somali regional states in Dire Dawa and the political dominance of the TPLF/EPRDF in the decision making federal structures running both cities. Particularly, OPDO's presenting absence, as Tsegaye (2015) correctly observed, in Ethiopian politics in general, and the resulting perpetuation of Oromo's marginalization in Addis Ababa, is the direct reflection of the centre's [that is Oromo's] peripherization in the national politics of Ethiopia (Markakis, 2011). This further indicates that the status of the Oromo in the national capital and by extension in the national politics has not changed so much, ever since they were incorporated into Ethiopian empire in the late nineteenth century.

It is not fair to regard OPDO as always weak or agent of the TPLF because for instance it demanded the articulation and implementation of the special interest clause in 2006, but the Federal Government became reluctant; and, frustrated by it, the OPDO-led Oromia Government established Finfinne Surrounding Oromia Special Zone in 2009 as protectionism against Addis Ababa's expansion. It also promised several times to open Afaan Oromo schools although it could

not materialize one. More importantly, there seems new development in the EPRDF in the last couple of years. Meaning, its member parties seem to have started to claim autonomy in the regions they administer. As far as the OPDO is concerned, there was leadership change in Oromia in 2016 following the recent protests in the region and the resultant *tehadiso* (reform) within the party. The new leadership tends apparently to assert its administrative autonomy and self-rule. As a result, for instance, it is influencing the Federal Government to enact a law on the special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa which is hoped to be promulgated by the end of 2016/17 Ethiopian fiscal year. At this stage, it is difficult to regard OPDO as entirely weak and meek as was often portrayed.

Moreover, as Addis Ababa has been under the direct control of the center, marginalization of the Oromo in the city tends to indicate its marginalization in the central government (Milkessa, 2011). Thus, Oromo's demand for fair inclusion in the capital has been integral part of the broader Oromo's quest for democracy and genuine federalism in Ethiopia. Therefore, as Bollens argued, in some cases, a city may not be a primary cause of group conflicts, but "a platform for the expression of conflicting sovereignty claims or for tensions related to ethnic groups relations" (2000: 3).

Moreover, the boundaries of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are not clearly demarcated as urban expansions have intensified causing massive evictions and counter ethno-national tensions and conflicts. In addition to border issues, as the federal government directly governs both urban administrations, it has imposed Amharic upon them as their sole working language. Recall that Afaan Oromo, the language that is spoken by half of the population of Dire Dawa, was effectively excluded, whereas a language spoken by a quarter, that is, Amharic, was anomalously chosen for municipal services. Especially, in Addis Ababa, all public services including education, health, media, jobs, courts, legislations, administrations and other services are provided in single language, Amharic. It was on top of this urban cultural policy problem that the so-called Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan was introduced back in March 2014 igniting protracted Oromo protests movement. Finally, as the special federal city administration of Dire Dawa emerged extra-constitutionally in response to Oromia-Somali border conflicts (*conflict-resulted-in-centralization*), the federal city administration of Addis Ababa has ignored the constitutional special interests of the State of Oromia in the city causing Oromo nationalist conflicts (*centralization-resulted-in-conflict*). In conclusion, the major causes of ethno-nationalist conflicts in both cities are historically rooted

factors of ethno-territoriality (ownership conflicts), imposed urban policies and institutions perpetuating socio-economic and political marginalization, and boundary issues.

8.2 Contested Urban Governance

8.2.1 Political Centralization of Urban Governance

The political tendencies of centralizing urban governances of Ethiopia in general and of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa in particular have been shown in chapter six. Theoretically, the constitution grants regional states the mandate to establish and govern local governments (urban and rural) in their own contexts. Nonetheless, Ethiopia's Federal Government has increasingly centralized the processes and outcomes of urban policy makings and governances due to the centralization measures by the EPRDF mainly through its consecutive developmental policies. As a result, the federal government revised Addis Ababa City Charter in 2003 and extended the same charter for Dire Dawa in 2004 by which the center clearly opted, in an authoritarian fashion, to administer them directly with an upward accountability structure as was the case during the Imperial and Derg periods. However, different sources identify different justifications for the federal administration of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa including, among others, federal district model, multiethnic social structure, inter-regional ownership conflicts and regime manipulation of geopolitics.

Federal theory of city formation and governance regards principles of federalism as engines for the development of parallel multiple cities for the fact that component units of federations establish and develop their respective capital cities. Many authors argue that federal capitals can be chosen and governed on three models: federal district, capital city-state and capital city in a regional-state. Ethiopia's federal capital administration resembles the federal district model for the fact that urban administration of Addis Ababa is component of, and accountable to, the federal government; but also resembles the capital city in a province since Addis Ababa is located in the State of Oromia and serving as the capital of both Federal and Oromia governments with the latter government entitled to special rights. Thus, Ethiopia's federal capital context seems a hybrid model that could be classified as a fourth model. If one observes the charters of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, both cities are politically centralized and governed as local federal agencies.

More specifically, urban governments of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are found to have been in transitional governance from 1991 until 2008. During this period, mayors/governors of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were directly assigned by the Office of the Prime Minister. In 2008,

both cities established their respective urban legislative organs and elected mayors in accordance with their charters. Since then, both city governments share similar urban political institutional setups: they are chartered cities accountable to the federal government; adopted mayor-city council fused model; and are granted similar powers and functions. Addis Ababa has three tiers of urban administration: the City-Center, Sub-City and Woreda levels, and Dire Dawa has two tiers of administration: the City-Center and Kebele levels. Finally, it is clearly indicated that the governance of both cities is incredibly centralized in a way very akin to the previous unitary systems (historical institutionalism). Urban administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa can hardly fulfill the criteria set-forth to measure urban autonomy or self-government. In general, the EPRDF and its political philosophies (of democratic centralism, revolutionary democracy and developmentalism) have overridden the federal principles and ideals in the constitution resulting in centralized urban local administrations as William Riker (1964) empirically suggested: centralized political party system had centralizing consequences on the practice of federalism. In conclusion, there is no evidence indicating that the residents of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are exercising their promised “full measures” of local autonomy or self-governments.

8.2.2 Urban Multiethnic Diversity Regulation Policies

Urban ethno-national diversity regulation policies of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations have been explored and compared in chapter seven. The study has substantiated that both cities have practiced combinations of strategies of regulating ethnic diversity ranging from cultural assimilation to partial accommodation policies. First of all, the incumbent regime has informally designed and been practicing some sort of power sharing deals in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa particularly in the aftermath of the 2005 election after being defeated in both cities. The timing, the intentions, the key actors and above all the practices of these power sharing arrangements have proven the idea of hegemonic control and elite theory of urban policy analysis models. In the case of Addis Ababa, each of the four member parties of the EPRDF shared 25% of the cabinet posts and legislative seats at all levels of the city administration—an 'equal share' grand coalition formula; whereas in Dire Dawa, urban powers are shared among the ESPDP, the OPDO and the remaining EPRDF member parties in accordance with the 40:40:20 grand coalition formula respectively. Both formulas were introduced informally at the executive level in 2006 (though Dire Dawa has been under grand coalitions since 1993). Recall that mayors in both cities between 2003

and 2006 were from the TPLF, who were said to be the architects of these power sharing formulas. As Asnake (2009) closely observed, intra-party power relationships within the EPRDF have been asymmetrical in that "the TPLF remains the primary mover and shaker within the 'vanguard' party and its central leadership uses authoritarian Marxist-Leninist principles of democratic centralisation and self-criticism to stifle internal dissent" (p. 271).

That is why both power sharing arrangements are regarded as imposed/authoritarian ones or seen as hegemonic control outcomes of inter-group conflicts in both cities. For instance, the OPDO led-Oromia Government, which changed its capital in 2003 to Adama, instrumentally came back to Addis Ababa in 2005 as antithesis to the electoral victory (thesis) of the CUD in the city, and the final outcome (synthesis) of this inter-group contradiction was restoration of the hegemonic control by the TPLF-led EPRDF in the capital. As already mentioned, the Somali's counter claim over Dire Dawa was seen as antithesis to the Oromo's ownership thesis, and the synthesis of the conflict dialectics was the restoration of centrally imposed control in the city.

As a result, the imposed power sharing formulas have dictated the results of federal elections, the 2008 and 2013 local elections and been applied in the legislative organs of the cities. In both local elections in Dire Dawa, the EPRDF, which controlled 60% of the seats in the City Council as per the formula, did not form a majoritarian urban government. It instead preferred to instrumentally share power informally with the ESPDP in order to bring about what Jeremy Levitt termed "illegal peace"(2007: 153). Since 2006, as per the power sharing accords, the post of the mayor of Addis Ababa has been manned from the OPDO, while the same post in Dire Dawa has been rotating between OPDO and ESPDP.

Second, in terms of cultural policy, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations have shown certain degree of similarities and differences. Their key difference is that, in Dire Dawa, the education and broadcasting media services are provided in three languages—Amharic, Afaan Oromo and Somali (partial cultural segmental autonomy); whereas in Addis Ababa, all social services including education and media are provided in one language—Amharic. However, the usage of indigenous languages in education and mass media may not guarantee total linguistic segmental autonomy for such institutions, if controlled by non-democratic regimes, could serve to inculcate oppressive worldviews in societies. The other difference is related to the revival of indigenous cultural institutions in Dire Dawa—*Gadaa* of Oromo and *Ugaas* of Somali have been restored with limited cultural autonomy—as part of the city's partial cultural segmental autonomy,

whereas in Addis Ababa, except for the construction of an Oromo Cultural Center in 2015, no particular indigenous cultural institution was restored nor any reform was introduced to ensure that urban symbols in the federal capital reflect the diversity of the city or of Ethiopia (such as national heroes, naming of streets and squares, etc.).

Both cities have experienced wide area of urban policy similarities due mainly to their direct control by the federal government and the resulting cultural policy impositions. In an extra-legal framework, which disregards not only Ethiopia's constitutional principles of accommodating diversity but also international legal regimes, the multiethnic city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa retained Amharic as their sole working language. This continued adversely affecting social service deliveries; or put differently, public service provisions such as in hospitals, courts, meetings, administrations and legislations turned to be non-accommodative to non-Amharic speakers. The effect of monolingual healthcare services in hospitals in both cities was identified as devastating because of the absence of at least translators for patients.

Further, though the role of political membership in the access to civil service employment is enormous in both cases as the ruling party has been fused to government bureaucracy, one's fluency in Amharic has rather remained the key. As a result, about half of the civil service employees of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are reported to be members of ethnic Amhara. Thus, neither civil service employments nor political power sharing in both cities show proportional representations of the ethno-national groups in the cities (and in Ethiopia in general).

In addition to the inter-group unequal access to public services, cultural policies in both cities have resulted in assimilations. In Addis Ababa, as substantiated in chapter seven, nearly half of the members of each non-Amhara ethnic groups of the city are assimilated to Amharic language and cultural activity—comparable to the Anglo-conformity 'melting-pot' theory of assimilation in the US. Despite the choice of Amharic as the sole administrative language of Dire Dawa, the Amharic-conformity policy of melting-pot was not that massive mainly due to its partial multicultural urban policies in education and broadcasting media. As a result, urban people, who assimilated to Amharic, tend not to identify themselves with one ethnic identity; they instead prefer to call themselves 'sons of city' or simply Ethiopian. Especially, the case of Addis Ababa has shown that the traditional Ethiopian urban dominant culture has been maintained in another name. Urban language policy of Addis Ababa not only encouraged assimilation, it also created inequitable access to urban education, employment, administration, health, court of justice, music and arts, and other

opportunities. Combinations of these urban opportunities continued to pull dominantly Amhara group of migrants to Addis Ababa. As a result, the ever expanding national/federal capital city of Ethiopia could not be equitably accessible to all ethno-national groups of the country. On contrary, in Dire Dawa, as the population of Amhara declined due largely to the urban conflicts and uncertainties (Asnake, 2014), the population of Somali nearly doubled between 1994 and 2007 mainly owing to Somali's immigration and Gurgura's revival of its Somali identity.

Critics of ethno-national decentralization in Ethiopia try to rationalize urban monolingual policies and services in Addis Ababa not only from the preservation of the traditional dominant role and status granted to Amharic, but also from the liberal urban policies relying on individual rights approach which claims to pursue 'difference-blind' laws (see chapter three). In reality, Amharic speakers and non-Amharic speakers do not enjoy equal individual rights in such urban monolingual social services, and one can indeed contend that urban institutions of Addis Ababa are serving mainly Amharic speakers and preserving Amhara cultural tradition. As imposed social policy has the effect of discriminating certain groups thereby trigger conflict and instability, Addis Ababa's ethnocultural policy and its exclusion effects in education, participation, media and identity—partisan urban policies—have mostly continued to serve as one of the major factors of the Oromo conflicts. Though there are still ethno-nationalist clashes on Dire Dawa's border issues, it is not violent as that of Addis Ababa; because, the former city has allowed partial multicultural policy leading to suspension of conflicts (or relative urban stability) than the latter.

In conclusion, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's single largest multiethnic city, primary national economic hub and capital city of the federal and Oromia governments, has always been expanding horizontal to the Oromo farmlands but has never initiated urban multicultural policy reform. The constitutional promises of accommodation of diversity in the city even in the form of the special interests of the State of Oromia were left in limbo. As a result, with regard to the practices of the cultural rights of the Oromo in Addis Ababa, there is no fundamental difference between the EPRDF, the Derg and the Imperial regimes. Dire Dawa too has retained similar monolingual municipal services, except for its partial segmental autonomy in education, broadcasting media and restoration of indigenous cultural institutions. Even the practice of multilingual education in Dire Dawa started in the early transitional period when the city was administrative part of Oromia Region. As the central/federal government of Ethiopia continues to be monolingual, it could be

difficult to expect multilingual policy reforms in the cities it directly controls.¹⁹⁰ Besides, the power sharing arrangements introduced in the cities following the defeat of the EPRDF at the polls in 2005 are widely accused of serving as instruments of hegemonic control. As Ethiopian history repeatedly witnessed, for instance, the 1960s Ethiopian student movements, the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and the subsequent ethno-national liberation wars, all of which led to the demises of the Imperial and Derg governments, were mainly caused by the hegemonic state policies of ethno-national oppression and cultural marginalization. So, oppressive or exclusionist state/urban policies would continue fueling ethno-nationalisms in Ethiopia.

8.3 Urban Democratic Multiculturalism: Towards Drawing Lessons

This study has revealed that the major structural and cultural problems in the multiethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are directly related to ethno-territoriality (ownership conflicts), sustained long established marginalization, boundary issues, centralized governances/hegemonic controls by the EPRDF regime, imposed power sharing arrangements and exclusionist cultural policies. These urban governance problems, unless democratically and inclusively addressed on legitimate basis as soon as possible, the situations may spirally deteriorate further to the worst.

Views on the potential way outs of these multiethnic governance problems vary from a group of respondents to the other. For instance, the Oromo elites warn the risk of riding vicious uprisings, conflicts and political instabilities in Ethiopia unless both cities are restructured as administrative parts (some say special zones) of the Oromia Regional State on the basis of the constitutional principles and procedures. Specifically, with regard to the political status of Dire Dawa, Oromo elders and elites have continued to suggest referendum, as per the constitution, as a final solution, which would make it, as they hope, the other city of East Hararghe Zone of the Oromia Regional State. On contrary, the Somali elites continued to recommend the city of Dire Dawa to be administered by the Somali Regional State. Moreover, as a way of balancing the competing political interests over the cities, a set of views suggests a more political autonomy, that is, a city-state status for both cities that would require constitutional amendments. Within this

¹⁹⁰There are informants who have argued that if the residents of the most populous and economically lucrative cities of Ethiopia are precluded from participations or representations in the House of Federation in any way, the latter then looks an agrarian house. Thus, official monolingualism in major cities of Ethiopia may disclose the type of linguistic federalism that the ruling party wanted in Ethiopia that could largely be characterized as either rural linguistic federalism (if at all) or instrument of securing ethnic/regional political loyalty and control (Interview, *supra* note 168).

group are those who wish to see Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa to be officially either bilingual city-states (akin to Ethiopia's Harari City-State) or multilingual city-states, and those who insist for the maintenance of Amharic as their sole working language. Finally, there are opinions, especially of the ruling party officials who desire to maintain the present urban status quo with cosmetic 'reforms' in the capital. The most difficult task therefore is to strike reasonable balance between these competing policy implications on the basis of the empirical findings and comparative lessons.

First of all, the following undeniable urban reality is worth re-quoting: "whether in Cape Town, Jakarta, London, New York, Santiago or Tokyo, an important aspect of modern urban life today is the need to recognize, embrace, and benefit from cultural diversity" (Sisk, 2001: 71). In multiethnic cities, therefore, even if individual rights could successfully be upheld regardless of the cultural differences as neo-liberalists concur, that is not enough in the urban peace-building long-term objectives. It means, urban cultural identities and group rights need equal respect, protection and promotion through equitable and democratic representations that would shape urban policies and power structures, as state-society congruence theory suggests. This study pays great attention to the significance of urban democratic multiculturalism and genuine consociational arrangements in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Therefore, the Oromo-Somali territorial conflicts over the city of Dire Dawa and its extra-constitutional arrangement should finally be settled in the first place either by referendum in accordance with the constitutional inter-state border dispute resolution mechanisms or by granting the city a regional-state status through constitutional amendment. It is known fact that referendum for a divided city like Dire Dawa is a very difficult recommendation. But the city needs constitutional recognition. At the end of the day, whether the city is democratically curved into Somali or Oromia regions or becomes the tenth regional state of Ethiopia, Dire Dawa should reform its urban institutions to fully becoming trilingual institutions (of Amharic, Afaan Oromo and Somali languages) by mainly drawing on urban multiculturalism and consociationalism [coalition rule, proportionality and non-territorial autonomy]. In addition, the territorial boundaries of contested cities in Ethiopia or elsewhere in Africa should better be clearly demarcated so that farmers or indigenous cultural groups surrounding such cities feel secured against the rapid urban expansions and subsequent displacements. Otherwise, it could be predicted that contested multiethnic cities would continue, or even may worsen, to be the battle ground among the competing groups.

Similarly, the ethno-nationalist conflicts to Addis Ababa could be eased mostly by the implementation of the special rights of the State of Oromia in the city. Had the Oromo as a group been included into the city's main culture, economy, politics, society and other services in the last 130 years, the present ethno-national conflicts would not have been mobilized and the city's expansion plans might not have been contested. Therefore, coming to terms with Ethiopian urban political history is a key to finding possible solutions. Even since 1991, had the promised transitional period political and national rights of the Oromo and the present constitutional promises of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa—provision of social services, utilization of natural resources, joint administration and other similar matters—been implemented, that long established socio-political marginalization problems of the Oromo in the city could have possibly been redressed. Therefore, now, affirmative urban policy actions may be imperative not only for the rights of the Oromo, but also for the rights of all historically disadvantaged non-Amharic speaking groups in the capital city (curative urban policy). This would require especially the OPDO-led Oromia Government to fundamentally transform itself from what some called 'presenting absent' or 'government in exile' in its own capital city, Finfinne. At the same time, the urban local government of Finfinne should politically be autonomous enough to exercise local self-rule which needs legal revision of its current political status that made it a mere local agency of the federal government. The influences of the Federal and Oromia governments over the city administration on the one hand and the local political autonomy of the city administration on the other hand should be balanced. If the federal government is allowed to continue its dominance in the capital city's politics, economics, society and culture at the expense of the Oromia and Addis Ababa governments, the problems will continue unabated that may breed vicious ethno-national conflicts.

Therefore, as part of the implementation of the special interests of Oromia and the general public demands for multilingual municipal services in Addis Ababa, urban multicultural policy reforms should start first by solving the language policy problems. As the Federal Government of Ethiopia retained its predecessors' language policy of speaking only Amharic and imposed the same policy upon Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa city administrations, nothing has changed in terms of cultural policy in Ethiopia's capital city ever since it was conquered and designated as a new capital of Shewa Province in 1886, and of the Ethiopian empire-state in 1889 and then renamed Addis Ababa in 1896. Hence, any genuine cultural reform in the city should fully restore the original name of the city and its specific parts at least for parallel use. In this regard, the Oromia

Government officially use the original name of the city, Finfinne; whereas the Federal Government of Ethiopia, which administers the city, continued to use only the imposed (some say colonial) name of the city, Addis Ababa. Since Ethiopia's capital city politics has been under the influences of the national politics, language policy reforms at the national/federal level may therefore help revise language policy of the capital city administration. Many have suggested for more working languages for Ethiopia's Federal Government in order to resolve the official language problems (Milkessa, 2015; Mengistu, 2014; Abera, 2009). Thus, the possibility of federal multilingualism would certainly increase the potentials of establishing multilingual city governments for Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa.

Moreover, the special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa especially regarding "the provision of social services" and "joint administrative matters", if fully implemented, would require Afaan Oromo to be the other working language of the city's municipal services, which leads to the establishment of a bilingual city administration of Addis Ababa. Consequently, it would fundamentally change the extra-constitutional monolingual social services of the city to a more inclusive bilingual social services, among others, in education, mass media, courts, healthcare, music and arts, administrations and city councils at all levels, and other cultural activities. This would further influence the corresponding private social service sectors in the city.

In addition, minority groups in Addis Ababa should be able to get major social services such as education, mass media, hospitals, courts and others in their respective languages. Because of the lopsided Ethiopia's federal government economic and other investment activities in the capital city, the physical object of the city has been in transformation since recently. Thus, the federal capital and its investments should equitably be accessible to all citizens of Ethiopia through multicultural policy reforms suggested above. Genuine multicultural policy reform should also be applied in the city of Dire Dawa by expanding the social service sectors in which cultural/segmental autonomy of groups has partially been practiced.

As a federal capital, Addis Ababa should become a unifying true symbol of Ethiopian diversity by reforming its monolingual urban governance and policies. Thus, a multicultural reform in Addis Ababa should not be limited to social service sectors, it should also include the renaming of streets and squares in the capital so as to ensure equitable and democratic representations of Ethiopia's ethno-national diversities in the physical as well as cultural structures of the city. It could also be argued that Addis Ababa should reflect other African cultures as it is the headquarters of

the African Union (AU). But efforts of domestic inclusions should precede continental African considerations. Such measures are vital elements of urban democratic multiculturalism and consociationalism. Therefore, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa can draw comparative multicultural lessons from the experiences of multiethnic cities in federations since some are officially bilingual (e.g. Bern, Valais and Fribourg in Switzerland, Brussels in Belgium, and Ottawa in Canada), and others are officially multilingual (e.g. Graubünden in Switzerland, Cape Town in South Africa, and New Delhi in India).

Furthermore, genuine power sharing arrangements based on democratic local elections may further help in building democratic multiculturalism and durable peace not only in multiethnic cities but also in multiethnic societies of Ethiopia. The grand coalitions in multiethnic cities should emerge democratically, and the details of representations in the executive, legislative, courts and civil service jobs should be genuinely negotiated by, and proportional to, ethno-national groups. Besides, one of the constitutional special interests of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, the clause on "joint administrative matters", provides the necessity of representation of the Oromo in all branches of the city's administration, among others, in executive, legislative, judicial and civil service organs which suggests some sort of power sharing terms.

Finally, democratization of state-society relations in Ethiopia in general is a key since urban policy-making and its governance has been centralized to-this-date through hegemonic control by a dominant one-party system of the EPRDF. As has been repeatedly contended, urban policies and power sharing arrangements imposed upon Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa administrations have less chance of success than those democratic and negotiated ones. Therefore, Ethiopian urban policy reforms that intend to transform the governance problems of multiethnic cities and urban conflict situations certainly call for general multiparty democratic transition and rule of law in Ethiopia. Urban democratic multiculturalism thus should aim to develop local institutional autonomy, peace-building, public access, equality and democratic participations "with no or little threat of a resort to political violence" (Bollens, 2009: 8).

Thus, Ethiopian federalism in general has to be backed by political pluralism. If "Ethiopian federalism is still an unfolding work-in-progress" as Andreas Eshete (2012: 46) asserts, it has to be able to give birth to local competitive democracy and multiculturalism in multiethnic cities and beyond. The urban local democratic multicultural reforms can also contribute to the achievement of the broader objectives of Ethiopia's multinational democratic federalism. "A pluralist and

democratic urban space and public sphere that accept the diversities of the city and gives form to their voices are critical to the larger project of nation-building and the process of democratization" (Shimelis, 2013: 189-90). Similarly, Bollens has suggested that "where local policies promote inter-group tolerance and accommodation, the city will help to anchor larger national peacemaking and building" (2007: 2). This has implications particularly for Ethiopia's federal capital city of Addis Ababa, whose urban policies are still unfriendly to its own multiethnic realities. Therefore, as the city politics of Addis Ababa has been under the influences of the national politics of Ethiopia, successful urban political reform for democracy and multiculturalism in the federal capital can decisively contribute to the achievement of the general aims of building multinational federalism and democracy in Ethiopia.

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Appendix I: Persons Interviewed

1. Abba Gadaa Abdumalik Yunis, Abba Gadaa of East Hararghe (since 2005), May 29, 2012, Dire Dawa.
2. Abdulahi Adem Yusuf, ESPDP Public Relations Head, Dire Dawa Branch, Sept 22, 2013, Dire Dawa.
3. Abdullah Salih Kurre, Gurgura/Oromo elder, age 92, April 28, 2012, Dire Dawa.
4. Abdullahi Sheik Ahmed (Master Abdullahi), Advisor to Ugaas, the last Dergue governor of Dire Dawa, Age 58, April 5, 2012, Dire Dawa
5. Abraham Adula Oge, Head, Dire Dawa EPRDF Committee, February 1, 2013, Dire Dawa.
6. Addis Ababa Mayor's Office, Urban Development and Construction, Jan. 2016, Addis Ababa.
7. Alemaychu Teshome, Amhara, retired civil servant, age 65, April 4, 2012, Dire Dawa.
8. ANDM member of Dire Dawa City Council, November 14, 2012, Dire Dawa.
9. Authority (Tigrayan) of EPRDF-Addis Ababa Office, March 29, 2016.
10. Authority, Addis Ababa Health Bureau, April 7, 2016, Addis Ababa.
11. Authority, Dire Dawa Education Bureau, September 21, 2016, Dire Dawa.
12. Authority, Dire Dawa Police Commission, May 19, 2014, Dire Dawa.
13. Authority, Central EPRDF Committee, email communications, Feb 2016, Addis Ababa.
14. Authority, Oromia Civil Service Bureau, March 1, 2016, Finfinne.
15. Biftu Mohammed, Speaker of Dire Dawa City Council (2008-2013), Jan 21, 2013, Dire Dawa;
16. Curriculum Expert, Addis Ababa Education Bureau, January 27, 2016, Addis Ababa.
17. Dirribi Damissie, President of Macha-Tulama Self-help Association (Oromo non-governmental organization), August 12, 2016, Burayu, Oromia Region.
18. Elder (Gurgura) in Melka Jabdu, February 23, 2013, Dire Dawa.
19. ESPDP official, Jigjiga, March 19, 2013.
20. Expert, Addis Ababa Culture and Tourism Bureau, Addis Ababa, May 26, 2015.
21. Faajjii Chala, Email-communication, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations (Dire Dawa University), May 26, 2016, Dire Dawa.
22. Federal authority, Ministry of Civil Service, January 2016, Addis Ababa.
23. Habtamu Assefa, former-Governor of Dire Dawa (1991-1993), May 30, 2012, Dire Dawa
24. High ranking official, Oromia National State, April 5, 2016, Addis Ababa.

25. High-ranking Official, Headquarter of the OPDO, April 13, 2016, Addis Ababa.
26. Legal and Security Bureau of Dire Dawa Administration, May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa
27. Local authority (Amhara), Sabian (Kebele 02), May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa.
28. Megersa Qiltu (Oromo), High school teacher, Age 49, April 29, 2012, Dire Dawa
29. Member of Addis Ababa City Council, April 05, 2016, Addis Ababa.
30. Mohammed Abdullahi (Somali), Chairperson of the Social Affairs Standing Committee of Dire Dawa Administration Council, Age 60, March 11, 2013, Dire Dawa.
31. Mohammed Ahmed/Qophe, Member of HPR, Age 56, January 08, 2013, Addis Ababa.
32. Mohammed Hassan (Somali) Somali Regional State Civil Servant, March 18, 2013, Jijiga.
33. Mohammed Musa, Age 86, May 26, 2012, Dire Dawa.
34. Mustefa Hassein, a Gurgura elder, February 23, 2013, Melka Jabdu, Dire Dawa.
35. Negaso Gidada, former president of Ethiopia, November 6, 2010, Addis Ababa.
36. Nuriya Sheik Hassein (Gurgura), Age 63, August 13, 2012, Dire Dawa.
37. OPDO member of HPR, Age 48, April 13, 2016, Addis Ababa.
38. OPDO official, Office of Dire Dawa EPRDF Committee, March 11, 2012, Dire Dawa.
39. Opposition official, All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO), May 17, 2014, Addis Ababa.
40. Opposition official, Blue (Semayawi) party, March 27, 2016, Addis Ababa.
41. Opposition official, Medrek/Forum, February 2, 2016, Addis Ababa.
42. Oromo Federalist Congress official, June 20, 2014, Addis Ababa.
43. Oromo member of Dire Dawa City Council, December 2014, Dire Dawa.
44. Public Relations Department, City Council of Addis Ababa, April 05, 2016, Addis Ababa
45. Rebira Kebede, OPDO authority, Trade and Investment Bureau, Dire Dawa Administration, May 25, 2012, Dire Dawa.
46. Senior OPDO Official, Oromia Government, April 29, 2016, Addis Ababa.
47. Somali member of Dire Dawa City Council, May 22, 2014, Dire Dawa.
48. Head of Civil Service Bureau, TPLF cabinet of Addis Ababa City Administration, June 18, 2015, Addis Ababa.
49. Tsegabrhan Tadesse Berhe, Intergovernmental Relations Institutionalization Directorate, Director, Ministry of Federal Affairs, June 07, 2012, Addis Ababa.
50. Wondemagegn Tesema W/Giorgis, Head of the Office of Mayors & Cabinets Affairs, Addis Ababa City Government, March 28, 2016, Addis Ababa.

Appendix II: Focus Group Discussions

1. Case-1, elders of Jeldesa, January 14, 2012, Dire Dawa.
2. Case-2, Somali elders (advisors of Ugaas), March 22, 2012, Dire Dawa.
3. Case-3, Dire Dawa City Council (by mixing groups), April 27, 2012, Dire Dawa.
4. Case-4, Office of Mayor, May 09, 2012, Dire Dawa.
5. Case-5, Gadaa Council (Oromo elders) in Dire Dawa, May 09, 2012, Dire Dawa.
6. Case-6, Oromo youths of Ganda Tesfa (Sabian Kebele 02), January 14, 2013, Dire Dawa.
7. Case-7, elders of Melka Jebdu, mixture of Gurgura and Oromo, Feb. 23, 2013, Dire Dawa.
8. Case-8, Brokers & domestic workers, Gulele Addisu Gebiya, February 2014, Addis Ababa.
9. Case-9, Dil Chora Referral Hospital, December 2014, Addis Ababa.
10. Case-10, Addis Ababa Culture & Tourism Bureau experts, May 26, 2015, Addis Ababa.
11. Case-11, Addis Ababa Education Bureau curriculum experts, Jan. 27, 2016, Addis Ababa.
12. Case-12, Oromia Culture & Tourism Bureau experts, March 2 & 3, 2016, Addis Ababa.
13. Case-13, Oromo patients in *Truncsh* Beijing Hospital, April 7, 2016, Addis Ababa.

Appendix III: Guiding Questions for Interview and Group Discussions

A. Guiding Questions in English

1. Multiethnic cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are directly administered by Ethiopia's Federal Government. Why so? Or what makes them special?
2. How do you examine the historical and ethno-cultural foundations of the cities?
3. What are the post-1991 ethno-national conflicts in and surrounding the city administrations? Explain the causes and dynamics.
4. To what extent are the city administrations politically autonomous or self-governing?
5. What is your opinion about the post-1991 urban policies on multiethnic diversities in the cities and their effects on social service deliveries (administration, education policy, media policy, health services, courts, employments, group identity, and social mobility)? Explain change and continuity?
6. Do you find revival of any ethno-cultural indigenous institutions and identities in the cities?

7. Is there any established formula of power sharing especially in the legislative and senior executive posts of the city administrations and its effects on local elections? Explain.
8. What do you suggest on the future of the city administrations of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa as political entities?

B. Guiding Questions in Amharic

1. ህብረ-ብሄራዊ ከተሞች አዲስ አበባና ድሬደዋ በቀጥታ በፌዴራል መንግስት ነው የሚተዳደሩት። ለምን? ምን ልዩ ያደርጋቸዋል?
2. የከተሞቹን ታርክና ብሄር-ተኮር ባህላዊ መሰረታቸውን እንዴት ይገመግማሉ?
3. ከ1983 ወደህ በከተሞቹና አካባቢያቸው የተከሰቱ የብሄር ግጭቶች ከመንስኤዎቻቸውና ሁኔታዎቻቸውን ያብራሩ?
4. ምን ያህል ሁለቱ ከተማ መስተዳደሮች በፖለቲካ ነፃ ሆነው ራሳቸውን በራሳቸው እያስተዳደሩ ነው?
5. በከተሞቹ ህብረ-ብሄራዊ ወይም ልዩነቶች ላይ ከ1983 ወደህ የከተማ ፖሊሲዎችና ተፅዕኖቻቸው በማህበራዊ አገልግሎት አሰጣጥ (የአስተዳደር የስራ ቅንቆ፣ ትምህርት ፖሊሲ፣ ሚዲያ ፖሊሲ፣ ጤና አገልግሎት፣ ፍርድ ቤት፣ ቅጥር፣ የቡድን ማንነትና ወደ ከተሞቹ የምደረጉ ማህበራዊ እንቅስቃሴ) በተመለከተ ምን ይላሉ? በከተማ ፖሊሲ ላይ ምንስ ተለወጠ?
6. ነባር የብሄር ባህላዊ ተቆማትና ማንነቶች በከተሞቹ ተመልሶ እውቅና አግኝቶ የተደራጁ ካሉ ይጥቅሱ?
7. በከተሞቹ በተለይም በህግ አውጪና በከፍተኛ የስራ አስፈጻሚ የፖለቲካ ቦታዎችን በተመለከተ የስልጣን መጋራት አሰራሮች ካለ ምን ይመስላል? በአካባቢ ምርጫዎች ላይ ምንስ ተፅዕኖ ነበረው? ያብራሩ።
8. የአዲስ አበባና ድሬደዋ ከተማ አስተዳደሮች ለወደ ፊት እንደ ፖለቲካ ተቆማት ምን እንድሆኑ ነው የምመከሩት?

C. Guiding Questions in Afaan Oromo

1. Magaalonni saboota baay'ee ofkeessaa qaban kanneen akka Dirree Dawaafi Finfinne kallattiidhaan Mootummaa Federaalaa Itoophiyaatiin bulaa jiru. Kun maaliif ta'e? Maaltu jara adda godhee?
2. Seenaafi buu'uureffama eenyummaa-aadaa magaalota lameenii akkamitti ilaaltuu?
3. Bara 1991 as walitti bu'insa ykn mormii sabootaa magaalota kana keessaafi naannawa isaaniitti ta'e ibsaa. Sababootaafi jijjiirama bifa mormii jirus ibsaa.
4. Bulchiinsi magaalota kanaa hangam siyaasaan ofdanda'anii ofiin ofbulchaa jiruu?
5. Bara 1991 as garaagarummaa saboota magaalota lameenii irratti imaammata magaalaa dhiibbaa inni dhiyeesii tajaajila hawaasummaa (afaan hojii, barnoota, miidiyaa, tajaajila

fayyaa, mana murtii, qacharii, cenyummaa garee, godaansa magaalatti godhamu) irratti qabu ibsaa. Maaltu jijjiirame.

6. Bulchiinsoota magaalalee lamaan keessatti keessattuu mana mareefi hooggansa olaano keessatti hirmaamaan aangoo yoo jiraate maal fakkaataa; bu'aa filamoo isaanii irratti dhiibbaa qabaa?
7. Dhaabbileen aadaa dur dhorkamanii turan amma deebi'anii beekkamtii argatanii hundeeffaman yoo jiraatan ibsaa?
8. Fulduree bulchiinsota magaalaa Finfinnefi Dirree Dawaaf maal himtu?


D. Guiding Questions in Somali Language

1. Diridhaba waa mid kamid ah labada magaalo ee kumaamula xeer qoraal ah. Federal Charter takalena waa caasimada Addis Ababa- maxaa kadhigay diridhaba khaas ama gaar?
2. Maxaad kugaranay sa asal ahan dadka (historical & cultural roots) Diridhaba?
3. Wamaxay luqada aykushaqeyan maxkamadah iyo hospitalad magaalada?
4. Ilaa heerke ayay ismamulka Diridhaba ay siyasad ahan madax barantahay?
5. Wamaxay raygaga kusaabsan luqada lagushaqeyo ee Islamamulka magaalada marka loo eyo cadaalada ama taariikhihi hare ee laqadal magaalada?
6. Maa waxajira wax dariiq ah oo loo as aasay iskaashiga awaada siyaasada gaar ahaan sharci dajinta iyo baasaska maamulka sare (legislative & executive) ee is maamulka magaalada? Hadii ujjiro qeex?
7. Ma waxa jira hirgalinta dib usonolaynta ama babadinta dhaqamad kala duwan ee magaalada (sida Ogaas iyo Gadha) hadii uu jiro qeex?
8. Wa maxay aragtidada kusaabsan jiritanka siyasad ee magaalada Diridhaba?

Mayors of Addis Ababa, 1910- Present



ከንቲባ ወ/ሳድቅ ገሹ
1892 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ኃ/ጊዮርጊስ
1909 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ወሰኔ ዛሚኔሰ
1910 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዶገዙ በሠብቲ
1910 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ሣሳተቤ
1910 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ሀረድ ወ/ሐሳብ
1910-1914 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ነሲቲ ዛሚኔሰ
1914-1923 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ መኮንን አንደሰኛው
1924-1926 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ጤና ጋሻው
1926-1928 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ አበበ ሰረገዳ
1933 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ታክሰ ወ/ሣሞርያት
1933-1934 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ከበደ ተሰማ
1934 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ መስፍን አሰሸ
1934-1938 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዶገሥል ወ/ሐሣኑሰ
1938 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዘውዴ በሳይነህ
1947-1948 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ትፎሬ ሾምዬ
1948-1950 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዘውዴ ገ/ሐሳብ
1950-1952 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዘውዴ ገብረሐይመት
1952-1961 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ኃ/ጊዮርጊስ ወርቀነህ
1961-1966 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ መኮንን ሙሳት
1966-1970 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዓለሙ አበበ
1970-1973 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ዘውዴ ተክሱ
1973-1981 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ገዛው ገንብ
1981-1983 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ መቼለሰም አበበ
1983-1985 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ተፈራ ዋሳጥ
1985-1989 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ አሲ አብደ
1990-1995 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ሰርከበ ዑቀባጽ
1995-1998 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ብርሃነ ዴሬሳ
1998 ዓ.ም ...



ከንቲባ ኩማ ረመቶስ
ከ2000 ዓ.ም - 2005 ዓ.ም



ከንቲባ ኗሪባ ኩማ
ከ2005 ዓ.ም ...

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this PhD dissertation entitled *The Federal Governance of Multiethnic Cities in Ethiopia: Urban Policy and Conflict in Addis Ababa & Dire Dawa* is my own original work, and has not been presented for a degree in any other university or academic institution, and that all source of materials used in the dissertation are fully acknowledged and properly referenced.

Milkessa Midega Gemechu

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M. M. Gemechu', written over a horizontal dashed line.

Signature

June 22, 2017

Date