

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**FOREIGN AID AND DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF TANZANIA**

**BY  
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**JUNE, 2014  
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This is to certify that the thesis entitled: foreign aid and democracy: The case of Tanzania, prepared by Fekadu Handino and submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of master of arts in African studies at the center for African and oriental studies (**citizenship and state in Africa**) and complies with the regulations of the university and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii
ACRONYMS.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	viii
CHAPTER- ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1 Background of the Study .....	1
1.2 Statement of Research Problem.....	3
1.3 Objective of the Study .....	5
1.4 Research Questions.....	5
1.5 The Significance of the Study.....	6
1.6 Research Methodology and Methods.....	6
1.6.1 Research Methodology .....	6
1.6.2 Methods of Data Collection.....	7
1.6.3 Document Analysis.....	8
1.6.4 Interviews.....	8
1.7 Scope and Limitation of the study .....	9
1.8 Structure of the thesis.....	10
CHAPTER TWO .....	11
LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	11
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	11

2.1.1 Foreign aid and Democracy .....	11
2.1.2 Aid Conditionality .....	13
2.1.3 Donor Interest .....	15
2.1.4 Aid for Democracy Promotion.....	16
2.1.5 Democracy Transition.....	17
2.1.6 Foreign Aid, Democracy Promotion and Consolidation.....	19
2.2 Conceptual Framework.....	21
2.2.1 Foreign Aid .....	22
2.2.2 Democracy .....	23
2.2.3 Democratic Consolidation .....	25
CHAPTER THREE .....	28
STUDY AREA BACK GROUND .....	28
3.1 Background .....	28
3.2 Colonial Rule .....	31
3.2.1 German Rule .....	31
3.2.2 British Rule 1919-1961 .....	32
3.3 Post Independence Political Trajectories .....	33
3.3.1 Evolution of a One-Party System .....	34
3.3.2 Ujamaa: Family Hood or Brotherhood .....	36
3.3.3 The A Rusha Declaration.....	37
3.3.4 Selection of the Study Area .....	38
CHAPTER FOUR.....	40
FOREIGN AID, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND CONSOLODATION IN TANZANIA .....	40

4.1. Aid for Democracy Promotion.....	40
4.1.1 Donor Conditionality in Tanzania .....	41
4.1.2 Foreign aid and Multipartyism in Tanzania.....	45
4.1.3 Problems of Aid Conditionality .....	46
4.1.4 Political Reform and Elections .....	48
4.1.7 Donors and Election.....	53
4.1.6 Conclusion .....	56
4.2 Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation .....	58
4.2.1 Introduction.....	58
4.2.2 Horizontal Accountability.....	59
4.2.3 Vertical accountability .....	60
4.2.3.1 Media .....	60
4.2.3.1.1 Donors and Media.....	62
4.2.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY .....	63
CHAPTER FIVE .....	70
CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	70
Bibliography .....	74
Appendix	

## List of Tables

	Pages
Table 1: Total net ODA to Tanzania, Main donors [distribution in millions \$].....	44
Table 2: CCM and other parties' presidential multiparty election results .....	49
Table 3: CCM and other parties' number of parliamentary seats won in multiparty Elections .....	51
Table 4: Seats held by CCM in Parliament.....	53
Table 5: Outcome of presidential elections, 1995-2010 .....	53
Table 6: Contributions to the Donor Basket 2009–2011 .....	55
Table 7: Donor support of political reform, 2000-10(in \$).....	57
Table 8: Press freedom in east African community .....	62
Table 9: Trajectory of political reform in Tanzania.....	68

## ACRONYMS

CCM	Chama Cha Mapidunzi
CHADEMA	Chama Cha Demokrasia Na Maendeleo
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CUF	Civic United Front
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Democratic Governance
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GJD	Governing Justly and Democratically
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNCCR	Mageuzi National Convention for Construction
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SA	Shirazi Association
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program me
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TADEA	Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TSH	Tanzanian Shillings
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TLP	Tanzania Labor Party
TPP	Tanzania People's Party

UK	United Kingdom
UDM	Union for Multiparty Democracy
UDP	United Democratic Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
ZAA	Zanzibar African Association
ZNP	Zanzibar National Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

# ABSTRACT

## **FOREIGN AID AND DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF TANZANIA**

*Fekadu Handino*

*Addis Ababa University, 2014*

*This thesis discusses the role of foreign aid on democratization processes and democratic consolidations in Tanzania; increasingly, foreign aid has become a tool used by western countries in attempts to promote the emergence or consolidation of democracy in other countries. But what is the relationship between foreign aid and democracy? Does foreign aid promote democracy? If so how?*

*Tanzania became independent in 1961 from British colonial rule. While most neighboring states have gone through violent conflicts, Tanzania has managed to implement extensive reforms without armed political conflicts. After independence, Tanzania under the charismatic leadership of Nyerere developed African based socialism “Ujamaa family-hood” which saw independence as a means of self- reliance and not depending on foreign aid. After the policy of Ujamaa failed, Tanzania has become highly dependent on foreign aid for developments. Hence, Tanzania is an interesting case for the foreign aid and democracy research.*

*This study first explores the ways in which Tanzania introduced multi-parties in 1992 and the role of donor countries. The question is residing what role foreign aid has played in this case? The Second part of this thesis has discussed democratic consolidation in Tanzania and the role of foreign aid. The question to what extent is Tanzania moving towards consolidation of democracy and the role of donor’s countries is analyzed. The analysis is based on secondary documents and semi structured interview collected in the period September 2013 to March 2014.*

*The main finding of this thesis is that, foreign aid has brought political reform in Tanzania, which is highly manifested by the founding of multi-party system even though it is difficult to say that foreign aid has brought democratic consolidation in Tanzania, because a democratic consolidation embraces various features in it. There for, Tanzania can do much better in the consolidation of democracy in the country if she depends not largely on foreign aid but on here people, cultural system, experiences and values.*

**Key terms:** *Foreign Aid, Donors, Democratic Consolidations, Bi-lateral, Multi –lateral, Executive, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Sub Saharan Africa*

# CHAPTER- ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study

The standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2008). Foreign aid is defined as financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are: (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (2) provided as either grants or subsidized loans (Radelet, 2007). This means that forgiveness of past loans are treated as new loans and therefore current aid (Easterly, 2007). This measure is called net Official Development Assistance (ODA), and is included in the WDI (World Bank, 2011). The operationalization of foreign aid ODA has two defining characteristics; firstly it includes all transfers from official sources with at least a 25 % grant element, and secondly it has to go fully towards improving human or economic welfare. This excludes aid for military assistance and other forms of assistance that do not have the primary aim of development (OECD, 2005).

The phenomenon of aid began as early as the nineteenth century with countries sending food aid to other countries facing shortages; however, these early aid transfers were largely colonial in nature and focused on direct political control (Moyo, 2009). The phenomenon of aid began as early as the nineteenth century with countries sending food aid to other countries facing shortages, a British aid policy that, although not internationally enforceable, largely changed the focus of aid as whole to infrastructure projects across poor countries (Ibid, 2009).

Since the Marshall Plan, Western foreign aid donors have attempted to use aid to shape the politics and political institutions of recipient countries; foreign aid has almost always been highly politicized, flowing disproportionately to developing countries with great strategic and political importance to donor states. There is a clear link to the Cold War rivalries: the amount of aid was relatively abundant it is generally agreed that a recipient

country's ideological stance and acceptance to participate in a host of strategic alliances directed against the former Soviet Union and its allies were the driving forces of a foreign aid program that led to the transfer of nearly \$500 billion in funds from 1945 to 1995 (Accra, 1995). This aid failure occurred parallel to the rise in neo-liberal global policies, is thought as an entirely new paradigm of structural adjustment programs to words the emphasis on democracy, human rights and good governance (Belloni, 2008) and (Crawford, 2001). The period marked the beginning of the use of conditional aid in Africa through SAPs implemented by the IMF, which was followed by a major reduction in development assistance for Africa.

African nation-states have been some of the largest recipients of this aid and adopted multi-party politics; about 33 African states had held multi-party competitive elections (Wille, 1996). Yet very few have successfully implemented democracy. The Western solution to this has been to maintain, and in some cases increase, funding under the assumption that change will eventually occur, however, while politics has become less personalized and more institutionalized in the past two decades, the shift to multiparty politics has not led to a wave of consolidated democracies (Posner and Young, 2007).

Tanzania was, and still is no exception to this reality; since independence, the country has been relying heavily on foreign aid to finance its various development endeavors. Foreign aid in Tanzania constituted about two-thirds of the national budget in 1992 (Stokke, 1996). Large sums of foreign assistance poured in the country came from diverse sources such as from former colonial powers, Germany and Britain and also from the Scandinavian countries (Ibid, 1996).

Tanzania is one of the largest recipients in Africa of multilateral and bilateral aid, receiving US\$26.85 billion in assistance between 1990 and 2010; in fact, it is the largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) after Ethiopia (Ailimari, 2012). It is regarded as one of the donor 'darlings', and along with Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana, has been rewarded with incentive aid because it has followed through with structural adjustment policies prescribed by international financial institutions (Ibid, 2012) Just like many other

African countries, foreign aid, according to Hyden and Mukandala has become the life-line of the Tanzanian government (Hyden and Mukandala, 1999).

Tanzania was a special favorite of the donor community in the late 1960s and early 1970s because of its policy national self-reliance notably, during this period most of the donors were eager to finance the country's socio-economic undertakings simply because they were 'impressed by the way the country carried its progressive developmental initiatives. It is important to note that, except for some donor countries, aid provided during this time mostly came out of purely unselfish motives' (Hyden and Mukandala, 1999:10).

The donors include a mixture of bilateral and multilateral donors such as Sweden, Germany, Norway IMF and World Bank. It was estimated that between 1967 and 1992, the Tanzanian government received well over \$16 billion in external assistance, was the second largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa (Stokke, 1996). The USA administration has requested \$371 billion in its 2012 funding for governing justly and democratically programs (GJD) in Africa, which the administration has identified as a prior countries for democracies support funding for Tanzania 517,892. And the European union pledged \$62.2 million in 2012-2013 budget year (Alexis, 2013).

Tanzania is a particularly a good country in which to examine the relationship between political reform and foreign aid because one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in Africa from multilateral and bilateral aid. This thesis examined the role of foreign aid for political reforms and democracy consolidation in Tanzania.

## **1.2 Statement of Research Problem**

Many foreign aid donors include the promotion of democratic government as a major goal of their aid programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development alone spends more than \$700 million annually on democracy-related programs, including elections support, the strengthening of parliaments, judiciaries and political parties, and fostering the growth and power of civil society organizations such as labor unions and women's and human rights groups (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000).

Tanzania has been receiving foreign aid for many decades since independence in 1961. It was estimated that between 1967 and 1992, the Tanzania government received over 16 billion external assistance (Selbervik, 1999). Tanzania is highly aid dependent. For example, in 2003-04 donors and international lending institutions contributed 45% of the Tanzanian government budget (Talha, 2006). The country still ranks high among the top aid dependent country in sub Saharan Africa. It is one of the largest recipients in Africa of multilateral and bilateral aid, receiving US\$26.85 billion in assistance between 1990 and 2010. International donors in Tanzania have given support to many aspects of the formal institutions of democracy – the election system, civil society organizations (CSOs), the judiciary and parliament.

Scholars have even argued that foreign aid potentially can contribute to democratization in several ways: (1) through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, and the promotion of civil society organizations, including a free press; (2) through conditionality; and (3) by improving education and increasing per capita incomes, which research shows are conducive to democratization (Stephen, 2003)

Others several authors have suggested that aid could undermine accountability processes essential for healthy democratic government, or even encourage violent conflict and coup attempts can undermine democratic government (Friedman, 1958) has argued that foreign aid is unfavorable to civil liberties and democracy. Because most aid goes to governments, it tends "to strengthen the role of the government sector in general economic activity relative to the private sector." Democracy and freedom, Friedman and others have argued, are less likely to emerge and to survive where most economic activity is organized by the public sector. Other scholars have argued that aid potentially weakens governmental accountability, by retarding development of a healthy "civil society" underpinning democracy and the rule of law. The evolution of democracy and the rule of law in the West were critically related to monarchs' needs for tax revenues, particularly for fighting wars (Tiina, 2008) – yet the real impact of external assistance in the promotion of Africa's democratization processes, Tanzania's included, continues to be an issue of debate (Corey, 2011).

Since there is no comprehensive study carried out on the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania, the distinction in the literature on democracy between democratic transition and democratic consolidation also has consequences for this research. The literature on democracy and foreign aid generally ignores these distinctions and the consequences they might have for general recommendations regarding the promotion of democracy. This situation encourages me to contribute my part in order to narrow this gap. This thesis is, thus, aimed to elaborate and discuss the debates regarding foreign aid and democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania.

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

The main objective of this study is analyzing the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania. In this process, an attempt is made to include the following interrelated specific objectives:

- To identify the role of foreign aid in the process of political reform in Tanzania
- To assess the role of foreign aid on the consolidation of democracy in Tanzania
- To examine the status of the current situation of the Tanzanian Democratic developments in connection with foreign aid
- To assess the indicators of democratic consolidation in Tanzania in connection with foreign aid
- To examine the role of donor play in the movement of Tanzania towards democracy consolidation

### **1.4 Research Questions**

Does foreign aid Promote democratization process and democratic consolidation in Tanzania? This main question leads to a number of relevant sub-questions, according to which the thesis structured. Therefore, the five research questions that have guided the study are:

- 1) What is the relationship between foreign aid and democracy?

- 2) What is the role of foreign aid in the political reforms on Tanzania?
- 3) Did foreign aid consolidate democracy in Tanzania?
- 4) How are indicators of democratic consolidations assessed and identified?
- 5) What role do donors play in the movement of Tanzania towards democracy consolidation?

## **1.5 The Significance of the Study**

This study is significant in many ways first it can provide clear understanding on foreign aid effectiveness on political reforms and democratic consolidation on the part of both donors and recipient countries.

Second the finding can be used as suggestions for both developing countries and donors to reexamine the unique challenges of particular nation faced instead of tagging aid to democratic promotion and democratic consolidations.

Third it contributes as empirical literature on determinants of Democracy, hence serves as a point of reference to stimulate further research in Tanzania and other African countries for students of African and oriental studies.

## **1.6 Research Methodology and Methods**

### **1.6.1 Research Methodology**

Methodology represents the principles, procedures, and strategies of research used in a study for gathering information, analyzing data, and drawing conclusions. There are broad categories of methodology such as qualitative methods and quantitative methods; particular types of methodologies such as survey research, case study, and participant observation, among many others (Michael and Cochran, 2002). In the research process, the researcher decides which theoretical framework is related to the research area.

This thesis is based on the qualitative, explanatory and descriptive research methodology. This research methodology is employed “to describe a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and process used to gather data about foreign aid” (McNabb, 2005:341).

This is a qualitative approach (Michael and Cochran, 2002) defined qualitative research the collection and analysis of narrative data in order to gain insights into a situation of interest not possible using other types of research.

The reasons for selecting this approach in this study are first, the study begins without hypotheses but only a general question because its research problem or issue needs to be explained (Dooley, 2003). Secondly, with regard to feasibility this study also uses qualitative research due to the fact that quantitative measures and statistical analyses simply do not fit the problem under the study or the research problem has no adequate measure, or difficult to capture with precise yardstick (Ibid,2003) qualitative researcher is interested in the quality of a particular activity other than how often it occurs, or how it should be evaluated, since the thesis at hand is a qualitative study, it is important that the ideas are considered from many perspectives as to reveal a trustworthy result.

Third, being an explanatory and descriptive research, qualitative approach is selected as pertinent in order to grasp a detailed understanding of the issue in order to explain the role of foreign aid to democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania (Michael and Cochran, 2002).

### **1.6.2 Methods of Data Collection**

The strategy I have used is to collecting information from the multiple sources to validate and construct the analysis.Researcher's found (Joseph, 2005) definition of triangulation clear and useful: collect information from multiple sources aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon. As emerges from the previous paragraph, triangulation was done mainly on the data level and to a lesser extent on the method level. Information collected from the different types of sources was then used to construct the description of the thesis the primary and secondary data will be analyzed thoroughly to address the research questions. The data collected unstructured interview will be analyzed using descriptive analysis.

### **1.6.3 Document Analysis**

Documentation was the main technique employed for collecting data about the role of aid on democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania. Thus, the author of this thesis corroborated evidence from different sources in order to get rid of light on case. In this particular case, the data collected consists of a wide variety of written documents. The method used was to have the research questions, or a special set of research questions depending on the situation. Interview was also used to crosscheck the validity of documents, arguments and conclusions. It also entailed studying secondary data in the form of publications by the government and civil society organizations on various aspects of economic, political and social development in Tanzania.

The benefits of using secondary data in this research correspond largely to the general advantages of its application set out collection of large amounts of primary data is difficult, time-consuming and costly; if relevant data already exists it is logical to make use of it; it can act as a complement to primary data assembled; it can confirm, modify or contradict primary findings; it allows a focus on analysis and interpretation; research should build on what has already been done where this is relevant and finally more data is collected than is ever used.

### **1.6.4 Interviews**

This study also includes a few important interviews. Some difficulties occurred in the interviews 'The overpowering positive feature of the interview is the richness and clarity of the material it turns up' (Seidman, 1991:7).

The interviews are purposely only one interview with officials within head of political and election affairs in African Union .These interviews target particular person based on her expected knowledge of the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania, to obtain the interviewee knowledge of the role of donors in democracy promotion and consolidation, Secondly to evaluate the written material on the relations between foreign aid and democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania. Interviews have been conducted on March 2014.

## **1.7 Scope and Limitation of the study**

The study is concerned with the role of foreign aid on political reform and democratic consolidation in Tanzania. This study has limitations that are worth mentioning in this section.

The concept of foreign aid is multi- dimensional that includes aid for poverty reduction, aid for combating disease, aid for public health and aid for democratic intuitions. Over the past –two decades, donors have been increasingly linking foreign aid to democracy objective in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in order to have complete picture about aid for democratization and democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa, the research would have been more important if it had been conducted in all sub-Saharan Africa. However, due to finical and time constraints, the current researcher typically limited the study on aspects of the role of foreign aid on political reforms and democratic consolidations in Tanzania.

The study is thus not a study on the statistical aspects of the impact of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolations. The roles are rather used as a focal point for studying democratization and democratic consolidation in Tanzania although the study does not aim to assess the economic reforms or public sector reforms per se, but rather the perceived impact on political reforms in the 1990sand how much the country is moving to words democratic consolidations after the introduction of multi- party system in 1992. The exploration of the vertical and horizontal accountability sphere is limited to the study of judiciary, legislature, the media, civil society associations, democratic culture and political party in Tanzania.

The other limitation is the researcher's failure to make any form of contact with both ministry of finance and economic affairs and president's office planning commission whose seats are found in Daressalam, capital of the Tanzania, despite securing a written letter of support from the embassy of Tanzania in Ethiopia. Of course this failure is due to financial shortage, as a result of which I could not got to Daressalam.

## **1.8 Structure of the thesis**

The thesis is a five- chapter thesis structured in two parts. Each chapter is structured to address a particular aspect of the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation in Tanzania and contribute to answering the overall research question: Does foreign aid promote democratization process and democratic consolidation in Tanzania? This chapter (chapter one) presents a brief background on foreign aid to political reforms and democratic consolidation, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study, Research Methods and scope and limitation of the study.

Chapter two proved the review of the literature. It identifies concepts, theories and interpretations of the theoretical body on the study area: the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and democratic consolidation. Chapter three outlines general study area background. Chapter four analyses the reforms of the state and donor in relation to consolidation of democracy through the vertical and horizontal accountability, the balance between the executive, the representative and legislative branches of government, media, civil society and democratic culture. The final Chapter (chapter five) draws concluding remarks.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter will give an overview of the existing literature on the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation, which has often been assessed in relation to only democracy promotion and consolidation; this literature does not address aid for economic growth and poverty.

##### **2.1.1 Foreign aid and Democracy**

Much of the literature on aid and democracy has resulted in contradicting findings. The optimistic view of foreign aid sees aid as holding the power to make dictatorships into democracies. Goldsmith puts forward ‘more aid is associated with more political freedom, civil liberties and economic freedom’ (Goldsmith, 2001) Similarly, ( Dunning, 2004) argues that aid enhances democracy in recipient nations in the post-Cold War period. He points to several channels from side to side that may help aid to be able to do this. The first channel is through providing technical assistance and other support to developing countries that strengthen their judiciaries and legislatures. If a targeted aid can strengthen opposing branches of government in politically centralized developing countries, it can check the executive’s power by diminishing autocratic control.

The technical assistance devoted to helping organize democratic elections and supporting election infrastructure, such as providing security at voting locations, monitoring election-day activities, and providing external observers who can certify the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, may also improve recipient countries’ democracy. Knack observes that aid potentially can contribute to democratization in several ways: through technical assistance focusing on electoral processes, the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries as checks on executive power, and the promotion of civil society

organizations, including a free press as well as through conditionality and by improving education and increasing per capita incomes, which research shows are conducive to democratization (Knack, 2001). Finally, he suggests that foreign aid might make a positive impact on education in the recipient country, thereby increasing the prospects for democratization (Ibid, 2001). Aid may be given with specific political conditions attached that could lead to reform specific institutional impacts. He argues that aid might be used, for instance, for the improvement of civil services in the recipient country, in the strengthening of the country's policy and planning capacity, or in the establishment of strong, central institutions – all of which might result in an improvement of governance (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004).

On the other hands the pessimistic view of foreign aid sees aid as holding the power to make democracies into dictatorships. Boone find that while aid does increase government consumption, this does not typically benefit the poor because money is wasted on white elephant projects, military equipment, and other expenditures that provide opportunities for graft, but do not typically generate any meaningful income to service the loan or to bolster growth (Boone, 1995).

Starting from a policy of self-reliance, Tanzania in the early eighties had become one of the most aid dependent countries in the world (Hayden, 1999). This dependence culminated in 1992, since the beginning of the 'third wave', donors have increasingly attached 'democracy conditionality' in their assistance to recipient countries such as Tanzania. The buzzwords have been democracy, good governance and human rights (Stokke, 1996). The so-called 'democracy fund' has been set aside by various donors to assist those activities that are geared towards achieving those objectives. In Tanzania, donor support in these areas is substantial but remains only a small part of overall donor assistance in the country (Hild, 1999). For instance, FINNIDA's budget for the democracy sector for the period 1998-2005 accounts for only about 18 percent of the total assistance to Tanzania (FINNIDA, 2001)

The small share allocated to the democracy fund is not an exception only to FINNIDA. In the year 1999, NORAD allocated about 6 percent of the total assistance to Tanzania to democracy-related activities (NORAD, 2001) similarly, in the same year, DANIDA's

assistance to democracy in 67 developing countries accounted for only 14 percent of the total assistance (DANIDA, 2000) Despite the small share allocated to democracy sector, donors' support has been the significant source of funding for activities related to democracy, human rights and governance in Tanzania (Hild, 1999)

### **2.1.2 Aid Conditionality**

The practice of donor setting condition for policies in recipient countries in return for aid has expanded over the last three decades. The practice was originally introduced by the IMF, and was conditioned on the recipients' reduction of fiscal and government account deficits. In 1980's, IMF started to tie its aid to structural adjustments, which also included public sector reform and large privatization projects (Daniel, 2005).

During the Cold War, foreign donors prioritized strategic considerations and the spread of their political influence in sub-Saharan Africa; these geopolitical objectives, however, may have diminished the credibility of donors' threats to make the disbursement of further aid conditional on the adoption of domestic democratic reforms. In contrast, the end of the 'Cold War may have reduced the influence of Geopolitical criteria on donors allocation of aid and made the threats of Western donors to withhold aid more believable (Stokke, 1996). Similarly, Crawford states 'the introduction of explicit political conditions to aid was additional to the prevailing economic conditionality that had dominated aid policy in the 1980s, with multilateral lending and much bilateral aid dependent on the adoption of International Monetary Fund/World Bank-led structural adjustment program me' (Crawford, 2001). According to him, a shift from bi- polar system to multi- party, the fall of the USSR and communism paradigm have brought about a new discourse in the international plan development aid.

The year 1989-91 witnessed donors increasingly link foreign aid to democracy, human rights and good governance in sub-Saharan Africa. .For instance in 1990, the British government announced that political freedom have essential for greater economic and social progress in Africa. "Economic development and good governance must go hand in hand in developing countries, economic success depends exclusively on the existence of

honest government, political pluralism and I would like to add respect for law and free and more open market economies”(Hyden,1999(cited, Danielle, 2012)

Similarly, Canadian International Development Agency, for example, says it aims to strengthen local involvement in the exercise of power. ‘That includes helping independent popular organizations to express and channel people’s concerns’ (Jason, 2006). The U.S. Agency for International Development expressly sponsors democracy overseas ‘It has programs specifically designed to help judicial systems, parliaments, local governments, and ‘electoral systems’. By mid 1991 the World Bank was highlighting the importance of good governance for economic development (Gilbert & Vines, 2000). And the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation, ‘the DAC advocates that developing countries lay down procedures whereby ordinary people can help shape the policies that affect their lives’ (Gold smith, 2001).

As Crawford states, ‘the introduction of explicit political conditions to aid was additional to the prevailing economic conditionality that had dominated aid policy in the 1980s, with multilateral lending and much bilateral aid dependent on the adoption of International Monetary Fund/World Bank-led structural adjustment programmes’ (Crawford, 2001). There is widespread evidence that the quantity of aid does not necessarily lead to a change in the quality of policies, even when conditionality has been used. In fact, the fulfillment of aid conditionality has a poor completion and enforcement rate (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The fact is that donors wanted Tanzania to adopt IMF - initiated reform measures as a precondition for receiving aid. The country’s refusal to comply with the IFIs’ conditions led to massive cutbacks of aid from various donors. During this period ODA dropped from ‘US\$ 700 million in 1982 to US\$ 487 million in 1985’ (Bagachwa, 1997).

Currently Democracy promotion has been pursued by donors and aid agencies for a multiplicity of reasons, ranging from beliefs that democracies are less likely to go to war and thus strengthening global peace and security, supporting economic interests and trade, curbing the effect of terrorism, cold war containment strategies and extending local

political ideologies and projecting them at the international level of world politics (Carothers, 2002).

Conditionality in its classical form was an expression of the donor's strategic and economic interest in addition to conditions to ensure that the aid would be channeled to achieve stated goals. From the 1980s the content of the concept has been broadened and partly changed, among other things, on the basis of the economic crisis in many developing countries.

### **2.1.3 Donor Interest**

The direction of aid is dictated by political and strategic consideration, much more than by the economic needs and police performance of the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are the major determinants of foreign aid; certain literature point to the fact that aid is at times given in accordance with donor interest and strategic considerations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000) and (Boone, 1995).

During the Cold War, donors' geopolitical objectives diminished the credibility of threats to condition aid on the adoption of democratic reforms. The end of the Cold War, on the other hand, enhanced the effectiveness of Western aid conditionality. Significant differences between the donors; certain donors notably 'the France and Britain, for example, maintained important commercial and financial ties with their former colonies, largely independently of ideology' (though this generally kept recipient countries pro-Western. Indeed, France almost always supported – sometimes militarily – the autocratic rulers of its client states, regardless of domestic governance issues (Dunning, 2004) and (Corey, 2011). The Nordic countries and the Netherlands 'aid programs were motivated more by social and humanitarian priorities ' aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of economic and political interests alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and the egalitarian principles of the donor countries' (Lumsdaine, 1996).

Different studies concluded that the interests of the donor countries determined bilateral aid more significantly than did the needs of the recipients. The particular forms of democracy pushed by the West in the Third World are specifically modified to serve the

interests of global capital in these countries. Here, “a political economic accepted view of hegemonic power holders is presented as being a matter of natural law, whether economic or developmental, rather than as a specific product of historical conditions, conflict over the pursuit of interests, and class struggle” ( Gills, 2000:235).

#### **2.1.4 Aid for Democracy Promotion**

Aid for Democracy promotion and development aid serve to achieve different objectives, they democracy promotion, Democracy support and democracy assistance and soon. According to cart her are oftentimes administered simultaneously. There is a confusing dictionary of the terms definition Democracy promotion programs ‘consist of aid that is specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in an on democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced opening (Carothers, 1996) Danielle Resnick of United Nations University writers, writes:

By supporting Democracy aid, enlarge the capacities of civil society, reinforcing electoral commissions, and strengthening legislatures and judiciaries, democracy aid aims to reinforce relationships of responsibility between citizens and their governments as well as between different government institutions. In doing so, democracy aid includes the following components, constitutional design and/or reform, electoral process, parliamentary processes, justice and the rule of law, human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of association, civil society participation, and existence of political parties, access to information and transparency, accountable executive and administrative power.

In 1991 UNDP Report on Human Development introduced a new development index that takes into account such aspects as the degree of freedom in a country (UNDP, 1991). During the same year, the community issued after the OECD ministerial meeting cited a number of factors that should be taken into consideration during the implementation of aid, such as the efforts of recipient countries to promote democratization (OECD). Today this donor co-coordinating organization pays attention primarily to good governance, anti-corruption measures, and conflict prevention.

The theory of transition to liberal democracy, as discussed earlier, presumes the presence or emergence and consolidation of opposition parties and civil society to affect the transition to liberal democracy, as it is a political system rulers usually have to be forced to adopt (Diamond 1990:104). Based on this assumption, Linz and Stepan (1996) have defined the various monolithic regime types and their architecture, which allow or block the emergence of political opposition and civil society groups that are able to contest the legitimacy of the existing regime. One of the main conclusions of the transition to democracy research project is the conceptualization of the modes of transitions to democracy (Linz 1990, Karl and Schmitter, 1991, Huntington, 1991, Linz and Stepan, 1996). The researchers are in agreement in that there are broadly three modes of transition to (liberal) democracy determined by who controls the transition process between the existing regime and the emerging opposition. Linz (1990) and Huntington (1991:114) state that a transformation or *reform* mode of transition occurs when the

159 existing regime is stronger in legitimacy than the opposition (either pre-existing or emerging). In this case, because it is stronger, the existing regime controls and leads the transition process carrying out most reforms at the pace and mode it deems fit. It is important to consider two questions that are fundamental to explaining the political system that emerges from transition. Firstly, do previously non-existent opposition groups emerge during the transition period or does a previously existing opposition consolidate during this time? Secondly, does the regime control the transition period, or is it the opposition that sets the pace of change (Linz and Stepan, 1996)?

### **2.1.5 Democracy Transition**

Following the fall of the Berlin wall, a wave of democracy swept over the world. By the mid nineties one could with surprise conclude that there were hardly any formally nondemocratic states left in the world. Eastern Europe, South America, the former Soviet Union, Africa and Asia; autocracies had fallen everywhere. Since then a large literature has grown out, studying what makes transitions begin, how they work, and then how democracy is consolidated. Simply put, according to Stephen, “democratization entails the process of a shift away from non-democratic forms of government towards

democracy; it may equally refer to the expansion of democratic space or performance within a democratic polity” (Stephen, 2005).

Democratization is understood here as a process of regime change that is directed towards a specific aim: the establishment and stabilization of substantive democracy. The final outcome of democratization, therefore, is more than the establishment of a set of institutions; it is the extension of meaningful rights to all citizens. In that sense, democratization is an ongoing process, In Linz and Stepan’s major study on transitions refer to completed democratic transitions which are defined as ‘ when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure’ (Linza and Stepan’s, 1996).

Thus, the institutional nucleus of the emerging democracy is in the process of being sculpted by a government that was chosen to govern by the people. Central to transition logy, as (Carothers, 1995) had pointed out, is elections. Similarly Huntington argued extensively that elections are the institutional core of liberal democracy based on the principle that government representatives must be chosen through competitive elections in which all citizens are able to participate regards democratization as the expansion of citizenship in society during the course of transition (Huntington, 1991).

Democratization thus refers to processes whereby the basic questions relating to the character of and conduct within the new democratic political sphere are addressed. Different authors divided Democratizations into three phases such as Pre transition, transition and consolidation (Daniel, 2005). The pre transition phase of liberalization refers to the process of growing pluralism in a dictatorial state where the society is going through opening, relaxation and differentiation, which enhances societal pluralism in the socioeconomic and/or the political field; in this phase, liberalization occurs when a non-democratic regime starts loosening up. Liberalization can include both political and economic factors, it should be noted that liberalization does not always take place;

sometimes a regime falls over a night. On the other hand, there can also be liberalization without a following transition. At most times, liberalization starts within authoritarian states with increased socioeconomic freedom and might lead to growing political freedom.

The second phase is the transition from non-democratic rule. Transitions can take many paths. Sometimes the masses or the army take to the streets and pull down the regime, sometimes. The initial transition is negotiated between soft-liners in the regime and the opposition, a so called pacted transition. Another case is when the regime initiates and leads the transition itself; there are many opinions about what constitutes a fulfilled transition from no democracy, the third phase is called consolidation.

Tanzania's transition to democracy can be categorized as having followed a typical *third wave* transition path. As observed by democratization researchers, the typical transition path begins with a liberalization phase mostly in the economy followed by changes allowing for more political rights and eventually a fully fledged democracy with competitive political institutions (Schmitter, 1991, Linz and Stepan, 1996). In Tanzania, The transition period can be divided into two parts. The initial phase was the government's response, led by Nyerere, to the economic crisis of the early 1980s changes in the economic policy regime happened between 1984 and the government led by Mwinyi, the second president of Tanzania, handled the second part of the transition period. Mwinyi was in government from 1985 to 1995, when the first multiparty democratic elections were held and 1999 political changes were affected largely between 1990 and 1992. The first multiparty democratic election took place in 1995, It is important to make this distinction because the two parts of transition not only had different policies, but also the government during the second phase had a different focus from the independence movement ideas and Ujamaa policies which were implemented by Nyerere government.

### **2.1.6 Foreign Aid, Democracy Promotion and Consolidation**

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991 international assistance has focused largely on the spread of democracy to developing nations. African nation-states have been some of the

largest recipients of this aid, yet very few have successfully implemented democracy. Measuring the effect of democracy assistance is complicated in part because various donor agencies have different definitions of what is included in this aid category (Finkel, 2006). Analysis of US foreign assistance to democracy building between 1990 and 2003 finds an effect, and claim that democracy assistance can be effective if it leads to local agency and empowerment. The developmental assistance committee ( ODA )shares similar sentiments when assessing aid for democracy directly contributed to strengthening a country judicial institution, works to educated and empowers voters support; strengthen human rights groups and political parties (Knock, 2004).

The united nation university writer Danielle, however noted ‘The relationship between aid and democracy is especially relevant in Africa due to the regions still high level of aid dependence and it is relatively short experience with democracy’ (Danielle ,2013). Others those supported aid democracy affected that targeted democracy assistance contributing to the establishment of democratic governance in transitioning state, work to educate and empower voters supports, political parties, labor unions and women’s advocacy net works, strengthen human rights groups (carthers,1999).

On the other hand, some studies find opposite result on aid effectiveness, one potential criticism large amount of aid delivered for long periods may reduce accountability and democracy making among recipient states (Ryan, 2008).Knock suggests that aid had enlarged governments accountability by reduces it need for taxes, perpetuated bad government, enriched the elite in poor countries (knock, 2001). He claim that the mechanism by which aid harms democracy is by undermining vertical accountability between governments and citizens.

This argument was supported by World Bank. The bank has often given to much money to ineffective regimes and the process has sometimes undermined their administrative capacity (Andrews and shah, 2000). Certain studies have offered, democracy is conceptualized as a multi- faceted Process that includes both the transitions to multiparty elections as well as the long terms consolidation of democratic gains (Gordon, 2004) at the end of cold war many counties in sub-sahrrian Africa adopted multiparty politics,

But the introduction of Multi Party System has not led to the wave of consolidated democracy; however Democracy depends not only on multi party elections but also on the broader consolidation process (Brown,2001).Consolidation involves maintaining, deepening and reinforcing democratic gains the determinate of transition to multiparty politics may differ from the factors that help democratic consolidation and endure (Simone and Joseper, 2012).

Countries that have recently transitioned to democracy are particularly vulnerable to the breakdown of multi party politics and the gradual loss of democratic gains (Danelle, 2012). However in sub-Saharan Africa, it is commonly observed that ‘democracy has been consolidated in only a few countries, such as South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius’ (Lise, Rocha and Verena, 2007).

Many African politicians acknowledge democracy can quite legitimate take different from depending on the historical and cultural foundation of society. Julius Nyerere 1968 was one of the illustrious proponents of this view he argued that “independence means self- reliance it cannot be real if a nation depends up on gifts and loans from another for its develop pment” (Ibid, 1968). Nwauwa writes:

What is usually considered in the West as democratization of Africa may well be are democratization’ process in which Africans should evoke or draw from their indigenous political traditions replete with democratic ideals. The main problem with Western-sponsored democracy and democratization is that they tend to be culturally biased and insensitive to indigenous political incentives (Nwauwa, 2013).The success of Russia and China in achieving global success despite their authoritarian governments connects the anti-universalism debate with Nwauwa’s above-mentioned idea of allowing African nation-states to choose the system of governance that will work best for their needs (Nwauwa, 2013).

## **2.2 Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework of this research is a conceptual guide developed to show the operationalization of the phenomena that is under study. It will explain the main concepts

and issues in the research in relation to the research question the role of foreign aid on democracy promotion and consolidation, her these three spheres; Foreign aid, Aid for democracy promotion and Democracy consolidation.

### **2.2.1 Foreign Aid**

Foreign aid is an international transfer of resource that would not have taken place as a result of market forces; this excludes military assistance and other forms of assistance that do not have the primary aim of development (Gold Smith, 2001).The standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) which defines ‘foreign assistance as financial flows, the technical assistance and commodities that are designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objectives’ (Riddele, 2007). In most cases foreign aid provided in form of democratic aid, which includes strengthening legislatures, aid for political reform , good governance and human right and aid for constitutional design or reform, electoral process, parliamentary processes, justice and the rule of law, including freedom of expression and of association, civil society participation, and existence of political parties, access to information and transparency, accountable executive and administrative power (Alexis, 2013).

Starting from a policy of self-reliance, Tanzania in the early eighties had become one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. This dependence culminated in 1992, when foreign aid constituted 50.5% of GDP Aid agencies from the West, Soviet Union and China have been strongly involved in the post independence Tanzanian development, supporting the different policies of the country. This ranges from the World Bank’s blueprint for the newly independent country’s first five-year plan, to the large support for the different policies of *Ujamaa*— including Villagisation and the reorganization of the peasant co-operatives into state-led co-operatives in the early seventies. Aid is a double-edged blessing—with the substantial amount of aid that Tanzania was receiving the donor countries directly as well as indirectly had a major influence in policy formulation and implementation (Havnevik, 1988).

With the economy in deadlock and with rapidly growing external imbalances in the economy, Tanzania turned to the IMF in 1979 to apply for extended fund facilities. While IMF emphasized the domestic policy mistakes, the government believed that external factors, in particular the collapse of commodity prices and oil shock were responsible for the crisis (Kiondo, 1989; Campbell and Stein, 1992) Wangwe, 1988). In 1980 an agreement over a standby facility was reached. However, Tanzania could not fulfill the conditions and the credit was frozen. A sharp conflict emerged between the IMF and the Tanzanian government. Nyerere, the symbol of Tanzania's post-colonial development, led the struggle.

While the Tanzanian government and the IMF negotiated, the economic crisis deepened and while waiting for a new agreement other aid agencies withheld further assistance. The IMF/IBRD reduced their aid from 98 million USD, to 28 million USD under the negotiating process from 1982-1985, in order to press Tanzania to accept their conditionality. Likewise bilateral donors pressed for a change, Sweden, e.g., reduced its aid effort with almost 40% during the period. The dramatic decline in the economic conditions had of course a severe impact on the social conditions. Not only were real wages and incomes for peasants drastically reduced but also social services, infrastructure and the supply of consumer goods deteriorated rapidly.<sup>16</sup> The legitimacy for the statist development eroded, in pace with the state's reduced ability to provide free social services—and ultimately development—to the people. Not only the business community but salary earners in the town, public workers in the countryside etc. started to be discontented. As the statist development model had closed most arenas for popular participation outside the state and/or party controlled organizations the discontent never became officially articulated (Kiondo, 1989). However, a number of efforts were conducted within the party and government in order to formulate policies to curb the crises and to meet the conditions from the donors (Lipumba, 1995 cited in David, 2013)

### **2.2.2 Democracy**

It is hard to provide one clear definition of what democracy is. Democracy is an idea associated with numerous different understanding and values given the vast heterogeneity

among the people and the nation of the world (Banki ,2007).The concept of that democracy has meant different things for different people in different periods (Dahl, 1971).in the opposite angle certain scholar argued that Democracy is not only an ambiguous term Suggest it is the word that resonates in people's minds as they struggle for freedom and a better way of life(Carothers,2002) However, democracy does not mean the same thing to everyone it needs precise definition and needs to be understood in its historical and political context.

The term democracy originates from ancient Greece, where it referred to a form of government by the people the term comes from the combination of two Greek words: demos (people) and kratos (rule) (Lise, Rocha and Verena, 2007). In the current usage, however, democracy can refer to a number of other things than the method of rule, such as popular sovereignty, participatory government, or constitutional government thus, a distinction can be made between wide and narrow definitions of democracy.

The classical minimalist definitions of democracy provided by Schumpeter which defines democracy as ‘a system the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions by means of competitive struggle for the peoples vote’ (Schumpeter, 1942). Huntington defines democracy to mean a political system in which the most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote (Huntington, 1998). The definition emphasizes the electoral elements of Democracy.

The minimalist perspective has defined democracy as a procedural system focusing on the institutionalization of politics through free and fair elections. The establishment of free and fair elections has been perceived as the symbol of the establishment of a democracy. For instance Schumpeter stressed a minimal definition on democracy and became the founder of a procedural definition of democracy. He was defined of ‘democracy referred to a procedural democracy where different political elites were competing for power; Democracy was a political method for choosing politicians’ (Schumpeter, 1942). As summarized by Diamond, “Electoral democracy is a civilian

control the military, constitutional system in which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” (Diomand, 1999 ).

In 1990 Tanzania had held a peaceful national election under the one party system as it had done since 1965. This was in the context of the beginning of the *third wave* of democratization in Eastern Europe and Africa when states bordering Tanzania were beginning to experience the effects of these changes. However, up until 1990, Tanzania did not have to deal political protests, and resistance to the regime and political system (Mukandala and Othman, 1994). Even a number of prominent businessmen who had been previously barred from leadership positions by the party’s anti-capitalist and pro-socialist ideology contested for parliamentary seats in this election. They were made eligible by Mwinyi’s decision to welcome business community members to politics. Later some of these businessmen joined the opposition (Kiondo, 1994). One of them Mmosa Cheyo formed his own party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). However, from the end of the 1980s, civil society, members of religious organizations and elements of the emerging opposition became quite vocal against the regime (David, 2013)

### **2.2.3 Democratic Consolidation**

Democratic consolidation refer to ‘ avoiding erosion, guaranteeing human rights and adhering to constitutional division of power,’ other scholars provides a broader inter partitions by equating consolidated Democracy with liberal democracy, ‘Extensive protections for individual and group freedoms, civilian controls the military, inclusive pluralism in civil society and strong rule of law and intuitions to keep office holders accountability’ (Diamond, 1999).That is when no significant actor is trying to block democracy, when a strong majority of the population supports democracy and when conflicts are solved according to laws and institutions decided, as a result a growing number of democratization experts are turning toward a more substantive definition of democracy consolidation .Schedulers defined Democratic consolidation refer to avoiding erosion, guaranteeing human rights and adhering to constitutional division of power (Schedulers, 1998).

Diamond provides a broader inter partitions by equating consolidated Democracy with liberal democracy, the consolidation process may begin with an institutionalization process in the development of effective and representative political institutions, legitimate regime performance, civil controlled military, executive, judiciary and legislature branches, rule of law, transparent public administration. This important process is part of the consolidation of a democracy However; the consolidation process also implies including the citizens into these new institutions.

The works of (Linz and Stepan, 1996); approach to democratic consolidation when they posit the conditions under which a liberal democracy becomes consolidated. To achieve consolidation, Linz and Stepan demands that three arenas be in place.

- 1) Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding;
- 2) Attitudinal consolidation where a large piece of public opinion, even in economic or political crisis, consider liberal democracy the most desirable form of government and anti-democratic alternatives carry little public support;
- 3) Constitutional consolidation where Rule of law to ensure legal guaranties for citizen's freedoms and independent association.

There is general consensus amongst the main scholars (such as Linz, Stepan ,schedulers and Diamond) that one may speak of a consolidated liberal democracy when there is consensus that the democracy system is unlikely to break down, in other words, when the people will not accept any other form of rule other than the liberal democratic one.

During the 1990's, most African states have held elections but today, only a few African states could be considered to be consolidated democracies. In a few other countries, changes in party leadership and political successions appear increasingly to be rule-based and routines, *Tanzania* represents a country where many of the institutional building blocks necessary for accountable government are in place and, for the most part, these are respected. Democratic rules and parliamentary processes are observed by stakeholders, a

Public Finance Act is adhered to and relatively robust administrative structures have been developed at both the national and local levels. A recent study on levels of accountability in Tanzania (Lawson and Rakner, 2005) finds that formal rules are relevant *de facto*. Local governments operate as entities which manage resources and deliver services under the supervision of nationally and locally elected officials. These traits stand in contrast to those found in several neighboring countries. Surprisingly perhaps, given the dominance of the party in government, vertical accountability to the electorate emerged as the most powerful check within the Tanzanian system at the national level, mediated in particular through the role of the majority party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, the CCM.

After independence in 1961, and more particularly after the Arusha Declaration in 1967, President Nyerere stood at the forefront of the movement for *Ujamaa* socialism, which nationalized the economy and followed this with top-down reforms of rural institutions. Arguably, the degree of organization and central control necessary to even contemplate such social changes was remarkable and it has left its mark on the structure of state institutions and, perhaps more particularly, on the structure of the ruling party, CCM. An abiding characteristic of the socialist rule of government and bureaucracy under Nyerere was its ability to counteract what might otherwise have been strong political cleavages (David, 2013). When the multiparty system was adopted in 1992, the CCM was formally separated from government. But the transition took place under the guidance of the CCM and the political leadership of the ruling party controlled the process. The main opposition party is the Civic United Front (CUF) with its stronghold on Zanzibar. Observers note that most opposition parties lack a comprehensive political program, are conflict ridden and centered on individuals, have a narrow social base, and are urban biased (Ewald, 2002; Biddle, 2002).

This strengthens the position and standing of the CCM. The incumbent party is considered to have been regenerated by the internal changes which the threat of electoral loss prompted and has largely retained its extensive network into rural areas (ibid, 2002)

## CHAPTER THREE

### STUDY AREA BACK GROUND

#### 3.1 Background

Tanzania, officially the United Republic of Tanzania (Swahili: Jamahiriya Muungano was Tanzania) is a country in East Africa in the African Great Lakes region. It is bordered by Kenya and Uganda to the north; Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west; and Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique to the south and as the country's eastern border is formed by the Indian Ocean, Kilimanjaro, Africa's highest mountain, is in northeastern Tanzania (Paice, 2007).

Tanganyika and Zanzibar amalgamated on 26 April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 29 October of the same year, the country was renamed United Republic of Tanzania ('Tan' comes from Tanganyika and 'Zan' from Zanzibar) (Cooper, 1996). The Articles of Union are the main foundation of Tanzania 30 administrative regions: five on the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar and 25 on the mainland in the former Tanganyika (Jumbe, 1994). Since 1996, the official capital of Tanzania has been Dodoma, where the National Assembly and some government offices are located (Brown, 2010). The country's population is approximately 42.7 million People at growth rate: 2% GDP (purchasing power parity): \$58.4 billion (2010) GDP per capita (PPP): \$1,400 (2010) and Major Exports are: Gold, coffee, cashews, tourism, manufactured products, cotton, cloves. Swahili official language and English used in business, administration, higher education); Arabic (Zanzibar) and about 123 other local languages. Many Bantu-based Religions (indigenous beliefs 35%): Christian 30%, Muslim 35; Zanzibar islands over 99% Muslim (Brown, 2010). The unit of currency is the Tanzanian shilling (TSH), which is divided into 100 cents.

Mainland Tanzania is highly a plural society, with over 120 ethnic groups, most of which have their own language, though about 95 percent are Bantu-people, some of these groups practiced hunting and foraging, some were herders with highly complex social

structures and others were agriculturalists (Omir, 1995). Nilotic pastoralists made up one minority group, and another one is the small Asian minority that has a large economic power. Though it is socially diverse, with different ethnic groups, it has enjoyed general political stability and national unity for about 50 years in a region wracked by civil wars, often with ethnic dimensions, in neighboring Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique. One important reason for the lack of ethnic competition within TANU was the leader of the party and the figurative president, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (Omir, 1995).



Political map of Tanzania

Sources: <http://www.ezilon.com/map/Africa/Tanzania/-maps.html>

Historically, Zanzibar has been a commercial center between Africa and the Arab countries, and a strategic point for both European and Arab countries (Bennett 1978). In the 19th century Christian missionaries began appearing in Tanganyika, bringing with them schools, hospitals, and a burning desire to convert the heathen's tribes of Africa. Many of the missionaries established themselves near Mt. Kilimanjaro (Sibley, 1971). Because of the early presence of European education and the English language, ethnic groups in that area, particularly the Chagga, gained the skills and experience necessary to conduct business with the Europeans (Okema, 1996). To that end, this section briefly examines the colonial history of Tanzania and addresses the unique historical experiences of Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania that have led them on such divergent paths and the post independence and single part politics.

## **3.2 Colonial Rule**

### **3.2.1 German Rule**

The east- African region was divided in to arbitrary region by European colonialists in the mid 1800s. After Chancellor Bismarck changed his attitude from indifference to pro-Colonialism in 1884, Germany played a leading role in the Scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference (1884/1885) (Meredith, 2006).whence control over German East Africa was claimed as a protectorate. This was a simple assertion of her new position among the world powers (Oliver and Atmore, 1994).Under the general act Agreements of 1885 and Anglo German Agreementof1886; Tanzania was under German rule from 1888 to 1919; While Kenya to the north, come under British control (Turner,1967). There follow two decades in which the German authorities make considerable efforts to develop their east African colony railway is built from Dares salaam to Tabor and then on to Ujiji. New crops, such as sisal and cotton, are introduced and prove very successful - as also is the development of coffee plantations on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro (Kopnen, 1994). In the administration of Tanzania, the Germans preferred “direct rule” with everything being controlled by the central government in Dare salaam, at the district and sub-district levels, German officials were in charge.

The German presence is profoundly resented by the African tribes, particularly when the harsh methods of forced labour, the people of Tanzania were treated poorly; moreover, 75,000 Africans were killed due to German military action or lack of food (Miller, 1974). This was resulted, in 1905, is a widespread popular rebellion a local ruler named Mkwawa was strongly opposed to European rule and caused the Maji Maji revolt in 1905 to 1907 (Iliffe, 1996). The outbreak of world war the first altered the political landscape of east Africa; When the German influence began to wane and British forces occupied Tanzania (paice, 2007). After the defeat of Germany in the First World War in 1918, The Allied council decided that German East Africa (present day Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi) should be placed under British and Belgian rule. Rwanda and Burundi were mandated to Belgium while Tanganyika became a League of Nations protectorate under the British rule (Lisowel, 1965). The treaty of Versailles, in 1919, grants Britain a League of Nations mandate to govern the former German East Africa - which now acquires a new name, Tanganyika in succeeding Germany as the colonial power in Tanganyika, on 1 February 1920 (Duggan, 1976).

### **3.2.2 British Rule 1919-1961**

The British were aware, through the Maji Maji rebellion, that the integral state needed to rely on ideological hegemony as far as possible, since coercion was a drain on state resources and the morale of its officers. British policy from the 1920s onwards is to encourage indigenous African administration along traditional lines, through local councils and courts the ruling administration had to maintain a good relationship with the settlers. although British introduced a system of Indirect Rule in 1925 (Ibid, 1976) based on running the country through local chiefs, who had their own courts and were allowed to keep some of the taxes they although the Governor did not want them to have political power, settlers were given support, whilst, rhetorically, a policy of primarily African development (Iliffe, 1979) was maintained. World War II broke out in September 1939, Although Tanganyika did not become a battlefield for this war WWII, the status of Tanganyika changed from being a mandate territory to a Trusteeship of the newly formed United Nations Organization, with Britain maintained as the administrative power (Lisowel, 1965).

During the 1950s a likely future leader of Tanganyika emerges in the person of Julius Nyerere Son of a chief, a convert to Roman Catholicism while studying at Makerere College in Uganda, then an undergraduate for three years in Edinburgh University, Nyerere returns to Tanganyika in 1953(Cooper, 1996).He immediately founded a political party, TANU or the Tanganyika African National Union (evolving it from an earlier and defunct Tanganyika African Association). From the start its members feature prominently in elections to the legislative assembly, Tanganyika's independence on 9 December 1961, Nyerere becomes the new nation's prime minister. The basis of their close historical ties as part of the Swahili trading region, President Nyerere of Tanganyika and President Abeid Karume of Zanzibar negotiated an a union between the two states. On April 26, 1964, The United Republic of Tanzania came into being, with a union government in place to govern both states and a separate, semiautonomous Zanzibar government to deal with island specific issue (Jumbe, 1994).

### **3.3 Post Independence Political Trajectories**

The history of party politics in Tanzania dates back to the 1950s when the colonial administration came under pressure from existing African associations – the Tanganyika African Association (TAA),Zanzibar African Association (ZAA) and the Shirazi Association (SA) to form political parties(Kiondo,2001).

In 1954, Julius Nyerere founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which became the focus of African nationalism and the ZAA and SA merged in Zanzibar to form the Afro- Shirazi Union (ASU) in 1957. Soon after, in 1959, a split within the newly formed ASU led to the formation of the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). This split laid the foundation for the bitter and seemingly unending inter-party, racial polarization still evident in Zanzibar. Those left within the ASU, under the leadership of Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, renamed the party as the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).TANU' s merger with the Afro-Shirazi Party in 1977 resulted in the consolidation of all political forces and power in the country under one party, CCM, as the de jure single party(Bennett, 1978). The country then formally became a one party state and all policy and decision making power was centralized within the party which became the supreme

organ of governance Parliament was then transformed into a committee of the party and there was no distinction between the party and the state (Jonas, 2011).

### **3.3.1 Evolution of a One-Party System**

Democratic regimes afford freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of political association, and individual civil rights. They have a division of power, with autonomous executive, judiciary and legislative branches. Based upon these definitions, the move to pluralist and multi-party politics in Tanzania can be identified as a transition toward greater democracy. However, it must be noted that the democratic nature of a political one-party system has long been argued there; in Africa many politicians and intellectual have argued for one party Democracy, traditionally real alternative for African state (Nyang'oro, 1996).

Julius Nyerere was one of the illustrious proponents of this view. He suggested that political decision making in traditional Africa had involved community participation in decision from which consensus would emerge. one party democracy could be build on this tradition by emphasizing unity, equality and consensus (Nyerere, 1968).Further he was suggested that, in Africa society was based up on the extended family, in which cooperation instead of competition was the core valu.Nyerere saw the multi party system as immoral and instead argued for one party democracy, a speech by Julius Nyerere in 1960, one year before Tanzania's independence: In my opinion there are two basic essentials of democracy. The first of these is the freedom and well being of the individual. The second is the method by which a government of a country is chosen; the method must ensure that the government is freely chosen by the people. If you have a country where the system of government respects and upholds the freedom of the individual and well being of that individual, (Ibid, 1968).

*I am now going to suggest: that, where there is one party and that party is identified with the Nation as a whole, the foundation of Democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community (Ibid, 1968:167).*

This was the case despite the fact that at one point in time the Tanzanian leadership did entertain the thinking that, with the adoption of a one party state, the difference between government and party would disappear. As Nyerere pointed out in his argument for the suitability of one party democracy:

There would be no need to hold one set of elections within the party and another set afterwards for the public. All elections would be equally open for everybody. In our case, for example the present distinction between TANU and TANU government, a distinction which, as a matter of fact, our people do not in the least understand, would vanish (Nyerere 1963: 202).

One of the critics on single party system, the sever restriction on the legislature role of the national assembly, the formal and informal restriction on freedom of movement; speech and Assembly have vitiated the democratic pretention of the one party state . Therefore, he suggested that the absence of change in government in democracies is at best untested what he hope and at worst dictatorial.

Nyerere has innovated what he hopes become an institutionalized system of internal party competition to ensure that the temptation of the single party do not become too great (Nyerere, 1968).The democratic nature of the Tanzanian one-party system was further supported by the fact that, while it prohibited inter-party competition and it allowed competition within the ruling party among individuals or faction for political offices (Immanuel,1975).Furthermore, 'whereas a shift from a single or no party system to political pluralism may be viewed as a prerequisite to reducing inequalities and removing oppression, it does not on its own accord guarantee democracy, i.e. participation, representativeness, accountability, rule of law, safeguard of human rights or transparency.

### **3.3.2 Ujamaa: Family Hood or Brotherhood**

Ujamaa Swahili term translated as a family Hood or brother Hood, become the basis of Tanzanian socialism articulated by TANU in 1962 (and reprinted by Nyerere, 1968). The origin of Ujamaa one of the significant landmarks in the history of Tanzania is generally traced back to the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), a mass party founded by Nyerere, TANU asserted that Tanzanians should be free to govern themselves and to determine their own destiny as a people. To achieve this objective TANU mobilized Tanzanians to demand independence from the British Government and in the 1961, Tanganyika became independent with Nyerere as its first Prime Minister (Goran, 1980). Ujamaa was an expression of humanistic ideas while it supported the idea of economic growth; Material acquisition was rejected, where it created economic inequality (Nyerere, 1968). Ali Hassan Mwinyi, write

Tanzania held to the ideology of a substantive democracy (Ujamaa socialism). This political system purported to ensure that the basic needs of all its citizens were met through 'emphasis on qualities such as equality, cooperation and communalism'. Ujamaa socialism, in fact, created a situation in which leaders were judged as essentially honest and were out to serve the masses. Opposing a leader was judged as irresponsible and possibly criminal. Prior to the current [political liberalization] moves, citizen perception about the nature of society and its organization and the nature of politics and its forms was encased in a frame which regarded society as homogenous and united for a common purpose.

The concept of Ujamaa in relation to rural developments spelled out by Nyerere in his pamphlet socialism and rural development. He traces three basic assumptions underlying what he calls traditional Ujamaa living. The first principles of Ujamaa unit related to person, each member of the family recognized the place and the right of the other member varied according to sex, age, even ability and character; the second principles of Ujamaa related to property, The common property, Acceptance that whatever one person has in the way of basic necessity they all have; It was that all the basic goods were held in common, and shared among all members of the unit and the third principles of Ujamaa

related to obligation to work every members of the family and every guest who shares, the duty to join in whatever work needs to be done. He work done by different people was different, no one was exempted (Nyerere, 1968).

### **3.3.3 The Arusha Declaration**

The goals of Ujamaa were not easily achieved, in 1967 Tanzania was witness to a widening gap of the incomes and life style between rural and urban areas; gap between educated and an educated increased; The realization that Ujamaa would not be easily translated in to practice led to TANU to issued a Arusha Declaration in 1967 at the TANU national conference in February 1967 relied on the two tenets of socialism and self-reliance (reprinted in Nyerere in 1968).

The Arusha Declaration was an attempt to make the general ethical principles of Ujamaa more explicit and that provide imperatives for the transition in to practice, has identified eight majored objectives which the new rural development strategy tried to accomplish; establishment of self governing communities, better use of rural development, taking advantage of economic scale to increase production disinvestment of new values ,avoidance of exploitation, increasing the standard of living of the peasants ,mobilization of people for national defense by using the villages are Para military organization and facilitating of national planning (Duggan and Civile, 1976).

The basic idea of the Arusha declaration was emphasis on self- reliance for development rather than, the dependency up on foreign assistance or upon the central government. Independence means-self reliance, it cannot be real if a nation depends up on gifts and loans from another for its developments (Nyerere, 1968).The development of the country is brought about by people, not by money. Money and wealth it represent, is the resulted is not the basis of development (Nyerere, 1968) asserted that the four pre requisites of development are; Land, People, Good policies and Good leadership.

The political ideology of Ujamaa failed in the mid 1980, the Tanzania government under considerable stress from collapsing- Subsistence economy which had pushed the government to look to foreign aid for survival, One way in which regime may

encouraged unity is through the use of an ideology. In Tanzania Ujamaa is put forward as traditional form shared by Tanzanian people which be utilized in mobilizing the nation to achieve higher levels of political, social, and economic development. Despite failure there is evidence that Ujamaa is having an impact. It should however be noted that the policy of peace and national unity was a success. In contrast to early national leaders in many African countries whose first loyalty was to a particular group, Tanzania's "father of the nation" was genuinely a national figure. Mainland Tanzania is ethnically heterogeneous, but has not suffered from any ethnic conflict. This is partly because no ethnic group has been large enough to dominate the political arena and partly because Nyerere was strongly opposed to tribalism; Resulted with Tanzania's 120 ethnic groups, ethnic violence was kept to minimum (Mmaria,1995).

### **3.3.4 Selection of the Study Area**

One of the most difficult aspect of case study as research design is the selection of cases (s) and a common critique is that case studies often suffer from "selection bias" (Lieberman, 2005).

This study will be held in Tanzania; in choosing the case study for this thesis, Tanzania has been selected for this research principally for the following reasons.

First Tanzania has been independence in1961 then led by Julius Nyerere developed a new socio –economic police what would be Ujamaa family hood unique African base. Ujamaa failed in 1980 Tanzania heavily depend on foreign aid and relatively high level of demand, for external democracy assistance, Secondly while most neighboring state has gone through violent conflicts Tanzania have managed to implement extensive reform without armed conflicts.

Third Tanzania is one of the east African counters, where the momentum of the democratic transition in the early 1990s, and multi – party Democracy compare to other east African countries relatively better and the countries move into the wave of democratic consolidation.

The fourth and the most important factors for case selection are; Tanzania is a particularly good country in which to examine the relationship between political reform and foreign aid. It is one of the largest recipients in Africa of multilateral and bilateral aid, receiving US\$26.85 billion in assistance between 1990 and 2010. It is the largest aid recipient in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **FOREIGN AID, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND CONSOLODATION IN TANZANIA**

First an attempt is made to examine the relationship between foreign aid and transitions to multi partyism. If foreign aid can buy liberalizing political reform, the exchange of aid for reform should be more likely when conditionality is enforceable and where the political costs of that reform are relatively low.

Aid conditionality is more likely to be enforceable during the post-Cold War period when the Soviet influence no longer served as a rival to Western donor influence (Crawford, 1997;)(Dunning, 2004), (Wright, 2009) and the second part of this thesis discussed on the role of foreign aid on democratic consolidation in Tanzania to what extent Tanzania moving to words democratic consolidation.

#### **4.1. Aid for Democracy Promotion**

Foreign aid has featured prominently in Tanzania; since independence, the country has been relying heavily on foreign aid to finance its various development endeavors, practice this however led to that Tanzania became one of the world's most aid-dependent states in the world.

Tanzania was in the late 1960s and early 1970s a special favorite of the donor community because of its policy of national self-reliance Hyden(1990) notably, during this period most of the donors were eager to finance the country's socio-economic undertakings simply because they were impressed by the way the country carried its progressive developmental initiatives, secondly in President Julius Nyerere, who had led Tanzania to independence, the country had a widely respected leader – not only in Tanzania but also among donors and generally on the international landscape.

Nyerere policy of self-reliance made him the darling of the donors, were among his admirers and actively supported Nyerere initial policy and in 1970s a special favorite of the donor community because of its policy of national self-reliance. Tanzania was by many seen as a laboratory for testing an original idea that ought to be given kind backing from the, which left the state vulnerable to policy influence from 1960s to 1983 public there was a substantial increase in total bilateral aid to Tanzania by 1965 foreign aid made up 44% of the national budget external donors, in practice this however led to that Tanzania became one of the world's most aid-dependent states in the world (Bagachwa, 1997).

#### **4.1.1 Donor Conditionality in Tanzania**

The practice of donor setting condition for policies in recipient's countries in return for aid has expanded over the last decades. The practice was originally introduced in the 1980's IMF started to tie its aid to structural adjustments, which also included public sector reform and large privatization projects(for farther understanding see chapter,2 aid conditionality).

In this part of the thesis, the researcher's have estimated the potential determinants of foreign aid decisions in the post Cold-War era as a result of massive aid flows, The donor community not only provided assistance but was also actively involved in decision-making structures in Tanzania; however, from the 1980s, the foreign aid disbursed in the country started to be tied with conditional ties. Reasons given for the donors' sudden change of heart are many, however, the major one being the economic instability caused by a mixture of internal and external factors that the country faced economic down turn which resulted internal Ujamaa policies failed and other contributing factors such as Oil shocks in the 1970s strained the economy. The 1972 collapse of the East African Community due to tensions between Nyerere, Uganda's Idi Amin, and Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, hurt Tanzania's hopes for regional trade and prosperity. The Tanzanian economy was also crippling in by its 1978 war with Uganda. It began when Idi Amin sent planes and troops across the border to attack Tanzania's Kagera Salient war, the war cost Tanzania \$500 million USD (Which resulted the period 1970-76, when the annual

growth rate was 5.1 per cent, the growth rate dropped to 1.2 per cent during 1980–85, there was also a decline in the annual growth rate in per capita income from 1.9 per cent to –1.0 per cent (Hyden and Mukandala, 1999). During the same period by 1984 the inflation rate had reached 44 per cent, in addition to rising external and international deficits (Bagachwa, 1997; 167). The failing economy constrained Tanzania's leadership to begin negotiations with the International Financial institution and other bilateral donors also conditioned their assistance upon Tanzania's compliance with.

This marked the period when the in office leadership began to experience the devastating effects of donor conditional ties those two institutions For instance, between 1980-1985, a period of deep disagreement between Tanzania and the IMF, the annual official development assistance (Hild,1997;21).What ensued, however, was a six-year (1980-1986) battle against the imposition of these policies, with Nyerere resisting not only the Bretton Woods Institutions' interference but that of the other donors who had united behind this common development framework and began to tie their ODA) dropped from \$700 million in 1982 to \$487 million in 1985(Ibid, 1997),The World Bank disbursement to Tanzania fell from \$98 million in 1982 to \$28 million in 1985aid transfers to some conditionality(Bagachewa,1997)

Tanzania's major donors had incorporated democratization as an emergency for continued economic assistance. Canada was first to officially integrate democracy into its aid policy, followed by Italy in 1989 (Gyimah, 2001). Others soon followed by making various declarations in support of democracy and human rights as the main objectives of their aid programmes for instance United Kingdom reduced her aid from \$56 million in 1981 to 22.6 million in 1985(Hild, 1999) The Tanzanian government formally agreed to the imposition of a SAP in 1986, leading to levels of aid – which had subsided due to Nyerere resistance to neo-liberal reforms being raised (David, 2013)

The signing of the SAP marks the official turn in Tanzania towards accepting economic solutions from without (Hild,1999).by 1992 all of Tanzania's major donors had incorporated democratization as a contingency for continued economic assistance (Hild, 1999). These donors were listed in order of descending volume of annual average aid

transfer to Tanzania between the pre-transition years of 1987 and 1991: Sweden (US\$112.8 million), Italy (US\$95.6 million), Norway (US\$80.2 million), the Netherlands (US\$75.0 million), Denmark (US\$74.8 million), Germany (US\$63.2 million), Japan (US\$60.8 million), the United Kingdom (US\$50.2 million), Finland (US\$49.6 million), Canada (US\$33.4million), and the US (US\$19.2 million) (Stephen, 2005), (Okema, 1996). With the GDP growth at 0.7%, the period between 1981-86 was perhaps the worst period in Tanzania's economic history (Pinckney, 1997). As a result, in mid-1986, the incumbent leadership had to give up its autonomy in policy-making, and to surrender to donor conditional ties.

Since the compliance with the IMF/World Bank conditional ties, Tanzania was again able to attract substantial amounts of aid and loans. For instance, the volume of external assistance grew by 58.2 percent over six years, from \$670.1 million in 1986 to \$1059.9 million in 1991. In addition, despite Tanzania's policy of self-reliance; the country's dependence on external funding increased significantly year after year (World Bank, 2009). Tanzania is a country that is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Its net official development assistance for the year 1991, the year immediately preceding the transition, totaled US\$1038 million, a sum that amounted to 37.1 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) for that year. In the preceding year, 1990, Tanzania received US\$1155 million in official development assistance (ODA) which amounted to 48.2 per cent of that year's GNP, making its ODA, as a percentage of GNP, the second largest of any state in the world.

During this period, Sweden was the major donor accounting for about 12 percent of all aid, followed by the World Bank, contributing almost 11 percent of foreign aid. The provision of development aid was conditional on Tanzania's acceptance of drastic economic reforms as formulated by the WB and the IMF. As discussed in select orate theory predicts that conditional aid will be less effective in democracies when the condition for aid is seen as a public bad; in Lumsdaine (1996) major study on aid democracy 'Aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of economic and political interests alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and the egalitarian principles of the donor countries.

**Table 1: Total net ODA to Tanzania, Main donors [distribution in millions \$]**

Donors Countries	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Japan	35	46	97	63	41	57	73	89	105	124
Netherlands	61	74	79	71	95	56	51	55	58	77
Germany	45	60	68	52	61	75	69	72	64	67
Denmark's	55	49	78	79	79	89	95	81	77	60
Norway	72	75	79	58	103	86	82	69	50	52
Sweden	106	77	104	90	150	143	93	91	51	45
UK	17	39	59	61	27	65	105	40	44	31
Canada	27	36	30	37	35	29	32	20	11	25
USA	8	1	15	6	39	35	27	24	24	18
Finland	29	34	67	55	51	41	35	16	23	9
Italy	28	196	77	61	106	38	66	22	11	6

Source: World Bank (2009)

By grouping all the 11 major donors in Tanzania into three clusters, she calculates the average annual percentage change in ODA for all 11 donors, which show variations in trends, to explore the possible correlation between aid transfers to Tanzania and the frequency of its political reforms. From her calculations (see Table, 1), three of the donors – Japan, Canada and the Netherlands – displayed the highest average percentage change in their ODA to Tanzania from 1991/92 through to 1994/95. The second group of countries – which includes Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK) and Denmark – exhibited a negative average annual percentage change, and the remaining nations – the United States (US), Finland, Italy and Sweden – averaged the greatest percentage decline over these four years.

Those donors that had insisted on implementing their democracy aid contingency policy and thereby promised to adjust their transfers in accordance with the changing trends in Tanzania's political reforms, had not come close to fulfilling their policy. Countries like Denmark, Finland, Italy, Sweden and the US, which had been impressed by the progress

of Tanzania's democratization reforms, not only left their aid transfers at the same levels but some had reduced their aid levels significantly (See table, 1) Again according to their representatives, budget cuts prevented some from increasing their financial support as a reward to Tanzania implementation of positive democratic developments (Stokke, 1996)

Today, the particular forms of democracy pushed by the West in the Third World are specifically tailored to serve the interests of global capital in these countries. Here, a political economic orthodoxy of hegemonic power holders is presented as being a matter of natural law, whether economic or developmental, rather than as a specific product of historical conditions, conflict over the pursuit of interests, and class struggle.

#### **4.1.2 Foreign aid and Multipartyism in Tanzania**

Tanzania also faced donor demands to adopt the second main board of the New Policy agenda, liberal multi-party democracy, By 1991 the government appointed jurist Francis Nyalali to head a commission the so-called Nyalali-commission to look into what legal and constitutional changes that were demanded to reintroduce multiparty politics. The commission finished its work in 1992, The Report is unusual; even though over 80% of the more than 30,000 citizens polled at that time expressed support for one-party rule, and a majority also favored a greater participatory role for the public in the one-party system. Only 20% of the population supported multiparty politics, many of who were academics and from the throngs of the political elite. Other opposition members came largely from civic institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce, farmers, workers and cooperative unions (Mark, 2011).

Democratic values are being more and more institutionalized among people, though it is not self-evident to be a supporter of multiparty democracy, Nyerere pushed for its adoption the majority interest, Although Mwinyi and most of the CCM leadership opposed it, Yet Parliament officially adopted multipartyism, along with several other reforms recommended by the Nyalali Commission to move to multi-party democracy and the constitution was amended accordingly in, 1992. Interestingly, government and other ruling party members, perhaps motivated by their political loyalties and/or reflective of their unique insight into the transition process, had a greater tendency to downplay the

role of these external forces. Yet, the country's first president, Julius Nyerere, felt that the country's sovereignty would be compromised. It is important to note that most Tanzanians supported other forms of liberalization that would increase political competition. The domestic factors of CCM self-criticism, opposition within CCM and its awareness of its own problems and failures that were of uppermost importance. However, the external community and its influence cannot be ignored, but accordingly, the IMF and World Bank policies were not overly influential but merely a contributing factor.

The government also decided to wait with elections for another three years in 1992 opposition parties were legalized, In 1992 opposition parties were legalized, but with two restrictions. Parties could not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life (Hayden, 1999) Unlike in neighboring countries Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, the political transition to multi-party politics was relatively smooth. On the mainland, the one-party system gave way quite peacefully to a multiparty system, while in Zanzibar transformation was marked by violent clashes and sustained repression of opposition parties, especially the Civic United Front (CUF)(UNDP,2012).

Challenging the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar is also taboo, even though there are voices for secession within CUF. For the CCM, there has been a struggle of balancing pluralism with national unity. That is allowing political parties and civil society to operate, without seeing the nation falling apart and the party losing power; the level of religious tension has lately increased somewhat in Zanzibar. By 2001, some Muslim groups became dominated by militants, and there has been violence related to religion (Mark, 2011)

### **4.1.3 Problems of Aid Conditionality**

The problems that are typically associated with the realization of democratic aid are in many ways similar to those that tackle the overall institution of foreign aid. A number of assessments to date have maintained that among other problems, foreign aid tends to be selective and unevenly distributed. It is tied to conditions in the donor country, which does not assure that what the donor offers is what the recipient needs. It is distributed

to implement 'blue print' projects, commonly termed as such because they are, by and large, implemented with the intentions of furthering donors' aims and objectives rather than those of the local beneficiaries. These often reflect the bilateral donor priorities rather than the needs of the recipient country. Such projects also maintain a donor-accepted agreement, and its composition of activities follows a consistent implementation course that evidently guarantees impact.

As with foreign aid in general, democratic assistance overall is packaged in such a way that it produces a problematic situation in this business; one where donors end up dominating the process, and recipients become dependent to this process. As a result, in many instances donors tend to disagree on how democracies should be built and what concrete steps need to be taken to bring about democratization. In addition, donors set many aspects of the domestic agenda when promoting a country's democracy. This has had poor consequences. Most extremely it has undermined the talent of recipient countries to design and implement their own autonomy.

Since the beginning of the third wave, donors have increasingly attached democracy conditionality in their assistance to recipient countries such as Tanzania. IMF and World Bank have been democracy, good governance and human rights the so-called 'democracy fund' has been set aside by various donors to assist those activities that are geared towards achieving those objectives. In Tanzania, donor support in these areas is considerable but remains only a small part of overall donor assistance in the country; the government has worked constructively with bilateral and international donors to institute Tanzania's transformation to democracy and a market economy. In Tanzania's case external influence wielded by donors did indeed play an important role in pushing for a multiparty system of government.

Why the Tanzanian government and ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) had initiated measures to liberalize the country politically when they were not being propelled to do so by massive popular pressures. Tanzania was a competitive one-party state up to 1995, thus allowing for comparatively high levels of popular participation and internal competition the transition was not initiated from protest, but rather engineered by the

government itself. As discussed in chapter 2, Most democracy promotion is concentrated on top-down and on the political elite in convincing and training the elite in democratic behavior and in establishing democratic institutions; hence in Tanzania, a multi-party system was initiated by the ruling party in 1992 as a careful strategy to fulfill the conditions for continued aid, since then the political system has this can be explained if we turn to( Linz & Stepan's,1999) Indeed, Tanzania represents a case of 'packed transition'.

First, the funding provided to date raises significant questions relating to democratic accountability. To whom is the Tanzanian government accountable: to donors or to their citizens?, Donors had significant influence and could have imposed direct pressure on the government to move towards multiparty democracy, foreign aid has brought political reform in Tanzania, which is highly manifested by the founding of multi-party system. This first phase of liberalization and democratization ended in 1995 when the established practice of single-party elections yielded to the first multiparty elections after more than 30 years of one-party rule. The process of liberalization put Tanzania in an uncommon position, with political reforms pushed by elites in power and resisted by the masses with minimal popular pressure, Tanzania's in administrative center leadership took a lead in introducing political reforms in the country.

#### **4.1.4 Political Reform and Elections**

In this part I bring together the analysis from the previous chapters on various structural conditions of importance for the democratization process through the elections.

The elections hence are used as one of the indicator of the democratization process and the role of donors in most of the time related with multi –part election. The transition process centers around the event of an election as a competition for office based on the preferences by the population it includes the right to vote for competitive parties in free and fair elections where the electoral turnover is respected (Simone and Joseph, 2012)

In Democratizations theory many transitional states have turned up as vague electoral democracies; they have had free and fair elections, but continued to face political, economic and social obstacles that have had negative impact on the democratization

process (see chapter two Democracy promotion and consolidations). These obstacles have all together created political societies of democratizations electoral democracies influenced by the existence of personal rule and supporter-customer relationships, electoral democracies with the existence of human rights abuses (Carther,2004) (Diamond ,1999) and (Schedler,2001).Tanzania after independence in 1961, a republican multiparty- based constitution was adopted the first post-colonial elections were held in 1962, with several parties contesting TANU won and 99.2% voted for Nyerere for president (Jumbe, 1994).

A one-party system was gradually introduced from 1963 as discussed in chapter three; the main argument for this was to strengthen democratic practice could be build on this tradition by emphasizing unity, equality and consensus and avoid the fraud and dishonesty and conflicts usually connected with multi party politics. As discussed in the above section this first phase of liberalization and democratization ended in 1995 when the established practice of single-party elections yielded to the first multiparty elections after more than 30 years of one- party rule.

**Table 2: CCM and other parties’ presidential multiparty election results**

	CCM	NCCR	CUF	UDP	TLP	CHADEMA	Total
1995	61.82	27.7	6.4	4.0			100
2000	71.74	7.8	16.26	4.2			100
2005	80.3		11.7			5.9	100
2010	61.17		8.06			26.34	100

Sources: NEC 2001, 2006, NEC 2000 and 2006, TEMCO, 2000, 2005 and 2010, UNDP, 2012

**Key**

	<b>Political party</b>
	<b>Percentage of votes</b>

The first multiparty Presidential election was held in 1995, CCM has dominated the elections ever since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992. The CCM candidate Benjamin Mkapa won the presidential election with 61.82 percent compared to 27.7 for the leading NCCR opposition candidate Augustine Mrema and CCM even strengthened its share of the votes in the all elections up to 2010. From table 2 above it can be seen that the opposition was severely undermined as a political force in 2000 and CCM strengthened his edge from 61.82% of the votes in 1995 to 71.74% in 2000 the main opposition competitor in 2000 was the CUF candidate, Professor Ibrahim Lipumba (see table, 5), received only 16.26 per cent of the votes.

In the third Union presidential elections held on 14 December 2005, from table 2 above it can be seen that President Jakaya Kikwete won with 80.3% of the vote, with Prof Ibrahim Lipumba coming second with 11.7% and Freeman Mbove of CHADEMA coming third with 5.9% of the vote(see table,5). Seven other candidates shared the rest of the vote.

In 2010 election the party lost about 20% of its votes compared to 2005, while CHADEMA made substantial gains and became the strongest opposition party with a share of about 26.34% The Party of Democracy and Development (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) became the strongest challenger to the ruling party and seems to garnered strength since the last elections .The results achieved by the popular CHADEMA candidate(see table, 5) are all the more remarkable when looked at in the context of the very difficult circumstances surrounding the election.

**Table 3: CCM and other parties' number of parliamentary seats won in multiparty Elections**

	CCM		NCCR		CUF		UDP		TLP		CHADEMA		Total
1995	186	80.02	16	6.90	24	10.30	3	1.3			3	1.3	232
2000	202	87.4	1	0.43	17	7.36	3	1.29	4	1.73	4	1.73	231
2005	206	89			19	8.2	1	0.14	1	0.075	5	2.2	232
2010	187	78.24	4	1.6	24	10.04	1	0.41	1	0.004	22	9.2	239

Sources: NEC 2001, 2006, NEC 2000 and 2006, TEMCO, 2000, 2005 and 2010, UNDP, 2012

**Key**

	Political party
	Number of parliamentary seats
	Percentage of votes in election

The first multiparty parliamentary election was held in 1995, CCM received 80.02% through the majority election system of the directly elected seats. The parliamentary election results of 2000 showed an even larger defeat for the opposition than in the 1995 election (See table, 3 above). CCM receive 202 seats, but through the majority election system take 87.4%; the CCM candidate Mkapa was re-elected President (see table, 4), and the CCM once again won a large majority in parliament. CCM has dominated the elections ever since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992, and even strengthened its share of the votes in the elections.

On Zanzibar, cheating was reported in 15 constituencies and the opposition demanded a rerun of elections. On 2001, CUF made a protest march on Zanzibar; the opposition demanded a rerun of elections which was resulted CUF leaders and Security forces answered with brutal force, and at least 20 people were killed, most of whom were from the opposition were sent to jail charged for treason. After the killings, about 2000 CUF-supporters fled to Kenya, a unique event in the history of the normally so peaceful

Tanzania .There was hard criticism from the donor community and human rights groups. Eventually, new discussions started between CCM and CUF, and an agreement was reached during in 2001.It is this particular situation that led to donors' suspension of aid to Zanzibar until such times that Zanzibar's CCM government would allow the proper application of the rule of law. Following the CCM and CUF negotiations and reconciliation, the donors have now resumed their aid to Zanzibar (TEMCO, 2010)

In 2005 parliamentary elections held on the same day for a total of 232 contested seats, the ruling CCM gained 206 seats, through the majority election system take 89%, CUF 19 seats, CHADEMA 5 seats, while the Tanzania Lab our Party and the United Democratic Party each won one seat. In 2010 e election the party also got less seats in parliament, winning just 187—a significant drop from the 206 seats it won in the 2005 election. Opposition party CHADEMA, which championed anti-corruption in parliament and in the election, increased votes for parliament seats increased from 5 in 2005 to 23 in 2010 elections(see table,3)

According to the official report published by the Tanzania Election Monitoring Commission (TEMCO, 2010), 2010 General Elections, Tanzania were the country's 4th multi-party elections since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. The elections represented a step forward for the country, with a largely peaceful campaign on both the mainland and Zanzibar, the development of an electronic permanent voter register and acceptance of the result for the Zanzibar presidency despite an extremely narrow margin of victory, However some issues remain to be addressed as Tanzania continues to strengthen its democratic processes and institutions and build confidence among all stakeholders took place in largely transparent, orderly and peaceful fashion, as acknowledged by many international election observers and national NGOs. However, there were one or two isolated incidents, such as in one area of Dar es Salaam where young men blocked the entrance to a polling station and had to be driven off with tear gas. In seven voting districts it was necessary to have a re-run because there were not enough voting slips available on Election Day.

**Table 4: Seats held by CCM in Parliament**

Year	Percentages of Seats Won by CCM in parliaments
1995	80.26
2000	87.4
2005	89
2010	78.24

Sources: Tanzanian National electoral commission

**Table 5: Outcome of presidential elections, 1995-2010**

Year	CCM candidate	% Votes	Top opposition candidate	Votes
1995	Benjamin Mkapa	61.82	Augustine Mrema(Rccr)Ma	27.7
2000	Benjamin Mkapa	71.74	Ibrahim LIpumba(CUF)	16.26
2005	Jawaya Kikwete	80.3	Ibrahim LIpumba(CUF)	11.7
2010	Jawaya Kikwete	61.17	Wibrod slaa(CHADEMA)	26.34

Sources: Tanzanian National electoral commission

#### **4.1.7 Donors and Election**

Donors have provided support for election monitoring, creating a voter registry, the National Election Commission, general election support, electoral sensitization and civic education programmes and other such assistance. The major UNDP-sponsored Deepening Democracy Program focused on electoral processes and building the capacity of elections management bodies, civic education, and strengthening parliament and political parties. Program me directors felt that the Deepening Democracy Program me contributed to more internal debate within the CCM, dialogue between parties, and better performance of members of parliament.

Donors have significantly contributed to the electoral process in Tanzania. The support has consisted of funding for civic education, electoral materials, technical assistance and political dialogue between the National Electoral Commission and political parties. In the 2000 General elections donors contributed a total of USD 8 million through the Basket Fund.

The Election Basket Fund had three objectives, namely, ‘the achievement of an election process that would ensure the attainment of free and fair elections, the provision of higher quality elections at lower costs (improved efficiency), improved voters’ participation and an understanding of their rights and duties (Danielle, 2013).

Donor Support refers to the ability of citizens to monitor and influence the performance of elected officials. Two key mechanisms for vertical accountability are elections and civil society. The seminar highlighted that without democracy aid, many elections in Africa would be significantly less free and fair. Democracy aid has been a critical input for civic and voter education, election monitoring, the provision of ballot papers, cleaning the voter roll, and the creation of biometric voter lists. But, elections are still viewed as an event rather than a process, meaning that resources typically are invested right before elections rather than throughout the electoral cycle. This often prevents long-term capacity-building for electoral commissions, which are the institutions responsible for managing elections. Moreover, the lack of electoral commission autonomy remains one of the weakest elements of elections in Africa but one which donors have found difficult to address (UNU, 2021).

**Table 6: Contributions to the Donor Basket 2009–2011**

Donor Committed	US\$ Actual Disbursed
Canada	983,284
Denmark	955,778
EU	3,365,974 3,353,844
Finland	2,839,409
Netherlands	1,300,000 1,215,000
Norway	1,023,716
Sweden	6,151,645 6,
Switzerland	1,000,000
UNDP	1,000,000
United Kingdom/DFID	9,447,565 9
Total	28,107,371

Source: UNDP, 2012

The donor influence in this area has been minimal, largely due to their own restrictions on funding party activities. Donors have, however, provided for a party to engage one another, such as the Tanzania Centre for Democracy, and other forms of training that are open to all parties. Although there have been 18 parties formed since the country introduced multipartyism, they have found it difficult to work together due to the country's laws prohibiting the building of coalitions. Most surprisingly, they have been able to set much of the agenda in the parliament around corruption, sitting allowances and other issues. In February 2012, the main opposition party, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), and the CCM came to an agreement after a major argument regarding appointments to the Presidential Constitutional Review Commission that will run the writing of the new constitution by 2014. So, even if a lot of progress has been made, the challenge to build up believable parties based on competing visions still has a long way to go. The challenge now is to what extent the democratic processes will deepen in the election in 2015?

#### **4.1.6 Conclusion**

Tanzania has enjoyed continuous political stability since its independence; from 1961 to 1992 the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ruled the country in a one-party system and in particular, followed African socialism until 1985. In 1995, the first multi-party elections took place; however, politics continue to be dominated by CCM, at least about 60% of votes seats and two-thirds of the elected official positions in all parliamentary elections, I asked the Tanzanian citizen and head of democratic and election officials in African union, she said that the reason for the superior position of the party is its policy and strong history. She told me about how Nyerere and the independence are both strongly associated with the party. She said that the Ten Cell Leaders knew who had the right to vote and that they sometimes gets asked to identify who will vote for CCM and who will vote for the opposition.

The election results of 2010 underlined the continued stability of the mainland, although the opposition parties gained a substantial amount of votes vis-à-vis the ruling Revolutionary Party (Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM), the party which has ruled the country now for 52 years. One of the important things here must be understand; Tanzania is a country where power is not personalized, but rather is wielded by the ruling party, CCM, in a party dominant system. Political control is structured around the ruling party and not a single leader as much power full. This means that even though the executive is strong and the CCM is dominant, presidents change regularly every ten years.

Another factor for party dominance the president is also the chairman of the ruling party and, as stated above, the ability of the party to keep tight control of their MPs mean that the party, to a large extent, controls the legislature due to its overwhelming majority and use of party discipline.

The opposition is fragmented and weak, and lacks resources to be able to balance the ruling party election campaigns and to recruit election observers at poll stations, Number of regulations from the single party era remain and limit the opposition in various ways. The division between the ruling party and the state and local government apparatus is still

fluid, or at least perceived to be so by the opposition. The threat to security regulations is used by the police to limit opposition parties during election campaigns. The media, in particular the state owned Radio Tanzania, which has the largest audience, still gives an un-proportional coverage of CCM during elections (Jonas, 2011).

**Table 7: Donor support of political reform, 2000-10(in \$).**

Types of aid	US\$	Percentage (%)	Donor
Good Governance	109,249,097	22.36	World Bank, AFDF, UK, Denmark, Germany Netherlands nor away
Public society	95,942,0910	19.64	World Bank, UK, The Netherlands'
Civil society	84,716,531	17.37	Norway, Finland, US, Germany ,The Switzerland, Canada, Australia and UNICEF
Legal reform	55,418,884	11.34	World Bank, Canada, Sweden, Denmark
Advocacy; Childerns rights	35,948,633	7.36	UNICEF, US, Norway, The Netherlands
Democracy and civic education	34,077,393	6.98	Denmark, EC, Canada, UK, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, UNDP, Switzerland's, Finland's and Irelands
Advocacy: gender	32,045,446	6.56	Sweden, The Netherlands, Norway, UK UNFPA, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium
Local governance reform	30,743,453	6.29	UK, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Sweden, UNICEF
Human right	27,310,476	5.59	Sweden, Denmark, UK, Finland, Germany, EC, Norway, Ireland
Media	18,776,151	3.85	Sweden, Switzerland, Norway
Peace	2,223,309	0.46	UNDP, Norway and Sweden
TOTAL	488,646,475	100	

Source: Ailimari, 2012

Sweden and the Netherlands have been particularly focused on women's rights while UNICEF and the US have focused on children's rights(see table,7) Such reforms have been funded by many of the same donors, including the UK, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands. The table should be refers to, The most significant concerted initiative in this regard was UNDP's 2007-10 Deepening Democracy Program me, which gained the support of nine donors and the government of Tanzania through a basket funding arrangement to the agreement of US\$17.7 million. With respect to deepening democracy, democracy aid appears to play a direct role in Enhancing vertical and horizontal accountability and constitute key elements of deepening democracy.

USAID may want to expand on the strategic partnerships modeled on DfID parliamentary capacity building in other core areas, particularly media education, advocacy and constitutional reforms. Without having to be overexposed in the constitutional reform arena, there is no reason why the DG office cannot develop more visible links with other donors directly funding activities relating to constitutional reforms. While such low-key, low-cost engagement may not make an immediate difference on the tenor and course of constitutional change, it realigns USAID's primary objectives to the substantive debates about enhancing competition and political space. Reaching out to other donor is equally central because of their extensive involvement in the decentralization arena. The FY2012 budget request would increase GJD funding in several key countries compared to FY2010, while decreasing it in others. Notably, the Administration proposes increases in GJD funding for Tanzania (+202%), Ghana (+150%), Mali (+82%), and Mozambique (+57%), which the Administration has identified as priority countries for democracy support (Alexis, 2013).

## **4.2 Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation**

### **4.2.1 Introduction**

The idea of Democratic consolidation is highly challenge in the democratization literature; scholars provides a broader inter partitions by equating consolidated Democracy with liberal democracy, 'Extensive protections for individual and group

freedoms, civilian controls the military, inclusive pluralism in civil society and strong rule of law and institutions to keep office holders accountable' (Diamond ,1999) ( see chapter two, democratic consolidation).

Tanzania that did experience a multi-party transition in 1992 and the first multi-Party election was held in 1995; the introduction of Multi Party System has not led to the wave of consolidated democracy in Tanzania; Democracy depends not only on multi party elections but also on the broader consolidation process. The role of aid in Democratic consolidation in this thesis mainly focuses on the analytical purpose the researcher's have chosen to use these two spheres, horizontal accountability which includes Judiciary and legislature and vertical accountability; under this category such as media, civil society and political culture discussed in depth.

#### **4.2.2 Horizontal Accountability**

Horizontal accountability is defined as the ability of state institutions to provide oversight of, and possibly level sanctions against, other state institutions and actors. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition in democracy studies the balance and separation of powers between the executive, the legislative/representative and the judiciary is a fundamental principle in a democratic society, based on Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers. The two key institutions of horizontal accountability are Judiciary and Legislature.

The judiciary has asserted its independence from the executive in recent years through a series of landmark rulings, but the executive clearly dominates; Tanzania's political system is characterized by a strong executive and a weak legislature and judiciary. The separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches is fundamentally assured, but the executive clearly dominates. Despite its absolute majority in parliament, the CCM government does not always recognize the legislature in its constitutional role; instead, parliament takes a back seat to party committees, as seen in the debate on the report of the presidential constitutional commission. On the other hand, parliament has also decisively voted down bills proposed by the government (BTI, 2012).

The Tanzanian parliament is heavily dominated by the ruling party, which held 84% of all parliamentary seats in 2005-2010. Another constraint on judicial independence has been the establishment of quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals that perform functions similar to those of the courts, such as the Land and Housing Tribunal. These bodies were established to provide quick, accessible and inexpensive ways of resolving civil law suits. However, they are also even more susceptible to executive pressures than the courts (Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2010).

The institutions of the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary are established, but the executive is stronger than the other two branches of the government. In the legal framework a clear division between the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary has been made, the challenge is, however, that the capacity of the parliament and the judiciary still is lagging behind the executive. Hence, both the parliament and judiciary need to be further empowered in order to be able to exercise their democratic mandate. We have also pointed at some of the challenges for a strengthening of national democratic decision-making that international development cooperation brings about on a local level, the reforms have brought about decentralization, despite a number of reforms, Tanzania is still I would argue, in transition from a one-party on the way to move consolidated democracy.

### **4.2.3 Vertical accountability**

Vertical accountability is the formal interaction between politicians and the people that guarantee transparency through all phases of policy making or Vertical accountability, which refers to the answerability of the state to its citizens as well as mechanisms that are used by citizens and non-state actors to hold institutions of the state accountable A free media, civil society, are the important elements of vertical accountability discussed one by one in the following section.

#### **4.2.3.1 Media**

The media can a help build peace and social consensus, without which democracy is threatened, the media can provide warring groups mechanisms for mediation,

representation and voice so they can settle their differences peacefully, can although play a positive role in democracy only if there is an enabling environment that allows them to do so (They need the requisite skills for the kind of in depth reporting that a new democracy requires; there are one of the strongest drivers of domestic accountability. Newspapers, TV and radio are growing increasingly active in reporting on cases of corruption they play an important role in the social dynamics of demanding accountability from the government are also becoming more interested in budget processes and are providing greater coverage of budget-related discussions. This has created opportunities for the general public to find out how their government is performing and what commitments the government has made to donors (Gerster, 2009). The Freedom House also includes the Annual Survey of Press Freedom, monitoring press freedom throughout the world as well as the Nations in Transit, focusing on democratization in newly independent states (NIS).

Tanzania's constitution provides for freedom of speech, but does not expressly provide for freedom of the press; in practice, the government occasionally limits these rights while the semi-autonomous government in Zanzibar limits rights more often. There are approximately 13 daily newspapers on the mainland (two owned by the government; one each by CCM and CHADEMA), but only one newspaper is owned by the government on Zanzibar. The law limits the media's ability to function effectively. Print media has been subject to considerable government restrictions, including the enforcement of a code of ethics. However, the mainland government allowed political opponents access to the media e.g., the newspaper of the major opposition party, CHADEMA's Tanzania Daima, is published daily as are some other resistance papers in Zanzibar the media's access to government information is much more shortened (BTI, 2014)

Today Tanzania has over 18 daily newspapers, 41 weeklies, 60 radio stations and 15 television stations (African Media Barometer, 2011) with the introduction of multiparty elections there has been a dramatic increase in privately owned newspapers, radio-stations and TV-channels, private channels to cover more than 25 percent of the country.<sup>75</sup> This gives the government radio and TV a national monopoly over the only mediums that cover all Tanzania, Printed media has difficulties in distribution, because of

the poor infrastructure. Thus, few people in rural areas read newspapers; the high cost of a newspaper is also a major obstacle to any greater popular impact of this media. For example, The African costs 200 Tanzanian Shillings (TSH) while the minimum daily salary is 500 TSH.

**Table 8: Press freedom in east African community**

Countries	Ranking(N=139)	Ranking(N=167)	Ranking(N=175)	Rankin Africa N=54
Tanzania	62	74	62	10
Uganda	52	80	86	
Kenya	75	109	96	
Burundi	72	90	103	
Ruanda	107	122	157	

Sources: African media Barometer, 2011

#### **4.2.3.1.1 Donors and Media**

In 1990s, particularly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening up of East-central Europe, media assistance is now considered vital in the development of democratic societies. Media aid has progressed from fairly small projects providing computer equipment and educational visits for journalists to long-term, complex programs with multi- million dollar budgets usually there are two ways the donors support media. The first one is indirect support through activities such as civic and health communication programs that make use of the mass media. The second is the direct support aimed at the media sector. Media sector support includes training for media professionals and students, reforming media laws, removing barriers to access, strengthening reform efforts, and funding initiatives. Some organizations support media through providing legal consultations and defense to the media outlets or individual journalists.

In Tanzania donors remain supportive of programmes to enhance the independence of the media, they have given funding to the Media Council of Tanzania, a variety of media

related NGOs, especially those involved in advocacy, and towards efforts to improve the standards of media workers. Countries like Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway funded US\$ 18,776,151 (see, table 7). At the same time, many Tanzanians say President Kikwete should be credited for fostering a new kind of openness and freedom of speech in Tanzania; freedom of speech was very limited during the Mkapa era (1995 - 2005) but today, educated people are discussing political issues and trying to challenge the government in debates on TV (Interview, 1)

To conclude, media can be an important part of a democratization process, and have a very strong potential for that. Depending on a donor organization and on the moneys available, the media assistance can be found either as a separate sector of the organization's activities, or as a subgroup or as an element of a bigger program. As a rule, media support projects are covered by governance, civil society, democratization, or similar sections. Even if a number of the above mention challenges also exist in Tanzania, not the least the dependence on donor fund, it must be looked at in the context of the small formal economy, and the relatively small economic and political elites—and hence much less alternative markets than in a more diversified economy and society.

#### **4.2.3.2 CIVIL SOCIETY**

Civil society is defined as the 'aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities and who serve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressure or controls upon state institutions' (Ngaware, 1999). It comprises 'all forms of social organizations – except political parties – between the state and the individual family including religious organizations, various independent professional and student associations, women's groups, sports clubs, youth clubs, various disabled groups, independent labor unions, burial societies, etc. In other words, civil society is a special type of community-based organization' (Ibid, 1999).

In democratic theory, the civil society plays a fundamental role in the democratization process; its role is to voice issues and concerns from the citizens and to monitor the government, and in that way contribute to keeping the government accountable. Abrahamsen conceptualized the linkage between civil society and democracy by

asserting ‘that economic liberalization, decentralizes decision-making, leading to the development of a civil society that is capable of limiting the power of the state and providing the basis for liberal democratic politics. In addition to countering an oppressive exercise of state power, civil society supplies the key values that inform the political sphere’ (Abrahamsen, 2000). (Diamond,199) argues that civil society is an integral part of checks and balances within a democracy, as it allows citizens to participate with government while creating an atmosphere of compromise and representation; he conclude that democracy fares better in a country where there is a strong civil society .

Essentially, in the post cold war era, the issue of democracy has been placed within the context of civil society. It is argued that democracy fares better in a country where there is a strong civil society. Ideally with democratic structures and pro-democratic norms; for instance The Ford Foundation, for example, has a unit dedicated to “Governance and Civil Society” whose goal is “to strengthen the civic and political participation of people and groups in charting the future of their societies (Ishkanian, 2007). The good governance agenda was the attempt to instill the institutions, procedures and norms of multiparty liberal democracy, as part of the World Bank good governance agenda, which included a substantive role for civil society organizations in the institutions (Nelson, 2000)

Civil society in Tanzania expanded at the end of the 1980s, partly in response to the opening of political space, a new donor emphasis on NGOs, and the changing stance by government towards civil society; the government is still somewhat careful of NGOs, and suspects that they are a cover for opposition parties, donors and other political interests as well as competitors for donor funding. They are frequently accused of being brief case organizations created with the sole intent of raising funds. ‘The 2002 NGO Act that provides a legal framework for the registration of NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) is regarded by civil society as falling short of guaranteeing adequate freedoms of association and expression(Corey,2011).

The Tanzanian Government enjoyed a good and cooperative working relationship with NGOs

The freedom to form NGOs was guaranteed by the 2002 Non-Governmental Organizations Act. Currently, 3,704 NGOs were registered in the country, a number of which had formed coalitions or associations in which the Government enjoyed observer status; An NGO website launched recently would help strengthen the relationship between NGOs and the authorities” ( civil and political right report,2008,187).

In Tanzania donors have engaged in social engineering, through shaping and controlling which elements of civic life can (and which cannot) participate in debates concerning national policy formulation and weak in terms of organization, advocacy and lobbying skills. Their relationship with political parties is very fragile, mostly because the law forbids members from politicking. Most organizations are involved in issues concerning human rights, democracy, women and gender, civic education, environment and so on.

Civil society in Tanzania was characterized as weak because of state intolerance towards oversight and criticism of its policies on the part of associational groups numbers most organizations Tanzania was the attempt to open up the policy-making process to the mass participation of citizens in the institutionalized context of civil society organizations, leading to increased accountability on the part of the state. Civil society organizations have had a certain impact on Tanzanian politics, in spite of the fact that there are only 4,000 of them; for example, Advocacy NGOs (women’s rights, children’s rights, environmental watchdogs, business associations, etc are most directly relevant to the DG program. These include the most influential NGOs participating in the NGO Policy Forum, which is the semi-formal coalition of NGOs representing Tanzanian civil society in the annual CG meetings. These NGOs are useful partners in policy lobbying and in research, as well as functioning as catalysts for civil society support and coordination at the local level.

The USAID-funded Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program (TAPP) implemented by Pact Tanzania is primarily focused on developing the capacity of organizations of this type (see table,7) Hakiardhi [‘Right to Land’] played an important role in shaping land legislation in Tanzania; the Legal and Human Rights Centre has brought human rights perspectives into many pieces of legislation, as mentioned earlier; Hakielimu has

influenced education policy; and Tanzania Women Lawyers Association, Tanzania Media Women's Association and Tanzania Gender Networking Program me have had a significant impact on gender policy and legislation. Policy Forum is made up of 106 civil society organizations that focus on public expenditure.

To conclude the discussion on the civil society a strong and plural civil society is necessary to guard against the exercises of state power and sometimes even the mere existence of autonomous organizations is seen to strengthen the institutional arena and widen citizen participation as well as empower local communities.

It is clear from this research that civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is being reconstructed as an independent variable, largely through the influence of multilateral and bilateral donors. These external donors view of civil society in Tanzania based on a vision of a wide variety of freely-formed organizations taking part in national policy-making processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the state. This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, avoiding dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens. In reality, however, the donors have managed a situation where civil society input to national policy-making processes comes overwhelmingly from a few, largely Dar es Salaam-based, NGOs, which are externally funded and composed of well-educate.

#### **4.2.3.3 Political culture in Tanzania**

Even if there has been a dramatic change towards a more democratic culture since 1992, there is concern that the culture inherited from the single-party era still prevails in parts of the ruling party and the administration from 1992 on word CCM control the political atmosphere. This tension between rigid and a substantive democracy is not the least prevalent at the local level.

A change is taking place; more people are exposed to democratic ideas, to media, operation of political parties and CSOs, networks at national, regional and international level. Internet, mobile telephones and TV have created new channels for exposure and interaction and exchange of information.

Another reason why Tanzanian politics is less volatile than that of many of its neighbors—although it has experienced political violence in recent years—has to do with its political history. Political configurations are largely devoid of ethnic dynamics and the ethnicity of the president is largely irrelevant. This is due to the legacy of its founding president Julius Nyerere and some of the cultural and institutional policies he introduced, such as Swahili as a lingua franca, suppression of chiefs and ethnic leaders, and egalitarian social policies. Presidents also alternate between Christian and Muslim leaders, and this helps diffuse many of the factors that add to volatility in other countries in Africa. This ethos of not politicizing ethnicity and religion is widely shared throughout society, even among political parties like the Civic United Front (CUF), which has a strong perceived Muslim affinity.

In 1992 opposition parties were legalized, but with two restrictions. Parties could not have an ethnic or religious base, and they had to be active both on Zanzibar and on the mainland, in order to prevent separatist elements to enter the political life. The country's three largest political parties are secular, but include the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) party, often associated with Zanzibar's Muslim community, and the opposition Chama cha Mapinduzi na Maendeleo (Chadema) party, often associated with the Christian majority on the mainland or Tanzania. International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Laborer Even if there has been a dramatic change towards a more democratic culture since 1992. This thesis argues that the social and political policies adopted by the post-independence government have created a political culture that is largely responsible for Tanzania's peace in the five decades since independence.

A self-perpetuating set of norms, values, and institutions has fostered widespread acceptance of national identity and rejection of political violence as being Tanzanian the rapid political and economic liberalization has left the political culture in change .How the political culture is reconstituted over the coming years will determine whether or not Tanzania continues on its peaceful path.

**Table 9: Trajectory of political reform in Tanzania**

Year	Political Liberty	Civil Liberty	Overall score	Overall rating
1975	6	6	6	Not free
1980	6	6	6	Not free
1985	6	6	6	Not free
1990	6	5	5.5	Not free
1995	5	5	5	Not free
2000	4	4	4	Partial free
2005	4	3	3.5	Partial free
2010	3	3	3	Partial free
2012	3	3	3	Partial free
2013	3	3	3	Partial free

Source: Freedom House 2013

Freedom House is a non-profit organization, which was established in 1941 and has since 1972/73 developed yearly evaluations of political rights and civil freedoms in the world. The Freedom House also includes the Annual Survey of Press Freedom, monitoring press freedom throughout the world as well as the Nations in Transit, focusing on democratization in newly independent states (NIS).

Freedom House Scores measure political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7. A score of 7 signifies that a state is “least free” with few Political and civil rights and A score of 1 a state that is “most free (Silander, 2005).

The *Freedom House Survey* is based on two checklists on political rights and civil liberties based on international comparative indicators in order to measure the progress on democracy. The political rights enable citizens to participate in the political life. The political rights concern the political system of a democracy, the procedures as well as the institutional set up and the freedoms that enable citizens to participate in the political life; what is often referred to as elements of an electoral democracy.

The checklist of political rights concerns: free and fair elections of head of state or head of government, free and fair elections of legislative representatives, fair electoral laws and fair campaigning opportunities, possibility to endow elected representatives real power, rights to politically organize interests and ability to vote down competing parties, possibility to act as opposition and have real chance to gain power, absence of undemocratic domination of military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies and freedom of minority groups to reasonable self-determination and self-government, autonomy or participation in the political system.

- Political Rights: 36-40 rating 1, 30-35 rating 2, 24-29 rating 3, 18-23 rating 4, 12-17 rating 5, 12-17 rating 6, 0-5 rating 7.

The checklist of civil liberties concerns: existence of free and independent media, existence of independent judiciary and the rule of law prevailing in civil and criminal matters treating everyone equally under the law, existence of free religious institutions and the possibility of private and religious expression, freedom of assembly, to demonstrate and to hold open discussions without political terror or oppression, freedom of political and quasi political organizations, existence of free trade unions or other interests groups, freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption, existence of personal autonomy and social freedoms in travelling, parents hood, employment and residence and existence of secured property rights and allowance of private businesses(Freedom house,2001)

- Civil Liberties: 53-60 rating 1, 44-52 rating 2, 35-43 rating 3, 26-34 rating 4, 17-25 rating 5, 8-16 rating 6, 0-7 rating 7.

Tanzania has after independence developed an interesting political culture that has facilitated peaceful development, Tanzania is considered one of the better performers in Africa with respect to democratic governance ;freedom house index marked Tanzania as a "Partial free state", an improvement from 2000 the year before.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In concluding the major findings of this thesis, let me try to sum up some brief answers to the research questions I set to answer at the beginning of this research.

Tanzanian government and ruling party Chama Cha Mapidunzi (CCM) had initiated measures to liberalize the country politically when they were not being propelled to do so by massive popular pressures, hence Donors had significant influence and could have imposed direct pressure on the government move towards political reform, Tanzanian governments would be accountable to aid donors in the sense that they must implement certain reforms, but the focus of these reforms would be centered on developing long-term local accountability through the creation of efficient government systems. In working on this thesis the researchers have also come to see the importance of way aid to the individual needs and values of each recipient nation-state. It is important for aid donors to recognize that their own needs and values differ from those of the recipient nation-states and that what has worked in one country may not work in every country.

The researcher demonstrates the main problem with Western-sponsored democracy and democratization is that they tend to be culturally biased and insensitive to indigenous political incentives. This thesis argues that the social, political, and economic policies adopted by the post-independence government have created a political culture that is largely responsible for Tanzania's peace in the five decades since independence.

Researchers believe the latter to be of the greatest importance, as it would serve to prevent some of the aid dependency and rent-seeking while encouraging aid recipient governments and institutions to become accountable to the people they serve rather than to the countries and institutions giving them aid, also from the views expressed above, it can be inferred that the fundamental need for assistance in Tanzania, at least partially, from three separate waves of Western intervention – first colonialism, second economic reform and third democratization.

Democratic assistance should ideally be a product of the donor's normative beliefs not the realistic agenda. By avoiding the hypocritical and undemocratic practice, the liberal value of democracy can be promoted through the instruments of western aid however if realistic objectives gain too much priority in the discussion –making of the donors, democratic goals might not only be compromise.

First phase of liberalization and democratization ended in 1995 when the established practice of single-party elections yielded to the first multiparty elections after 34 years of one-party rule. The process of liberalization put Tanzania in an uncommon position, with political reforms pushed by elites in power and resisted by the masses, and then a multi-party system was initiated by the ruling party in 1992 as a careful strategy to fulfill the conditions for continued aid.

With the legalization of opposition parties in 1992 and the first multiparty elections held in 1995, however, politics continue to be dominated by CCM, at least about 60% of vote's seats and two-thirds of the elected official positions in all parliamentary elections. The election results of 2010 underlined the continued stability of the mainland, although the opposition parties gained a substantial amount of votes vis-à-vis the ruling Revolutionary Party (Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM), the party which has ruled the country now for 53 years. One of the important things her must be understand; Tanzania is a country where power is not personalized, but rather is wielded by the ruling party, CCM, in a party dominant system. It went from a one-party regime to one which today has six parties represented in parliament with the opposition holding 22 per cent of the seats.

Tanzania that did experience a multi-party transition in the 1992 as discussed. It went from a one-party regime to one which today has six parties represented in parliament with the opposition holding 22 per cent of the seats Repression of civil society organizations has diminished in recent years as have limits on the media. The legislature is no longer regarded as a rubber stamp of the executive, and opposition parties have been driving much of the agenda in the national body.

Constitution provides for freedom of speech, Tanzanian media is by African standards quite free with the introduction of multiparty elections there has been a dramatic increase in privately owned newspapers, radio-stations and TV-channels, but does not expressly provide for freedom of the press; in practice, however legal restrictions on the broadcasting of both radio and TV, prohibiting private channels to cover more than 25 percent of the country, 75% under government monopoly.

The availability of a strong civil society is the prerequisite of democracy; in Tanzania donors have engaged in social engineering, through shaping and controlling which elements of civic life can (and which cannot) participate in debates concerning national policy formulation and development in post-liberalization Tanzania. Therefore, a civil society based around the extensive engagement of associational groups in national policy-making processes, is not emerging; which reflects the power of external donors to influence the state, concerning which groups it includes (and which it marginalizes) within the sphere of civil society, as it has been reconstituted in post-liberalization Tanzania.

The Tanzania government and its organs as well as civil society, both of which are state and non state actors, largely depend on foreign aid for their activities, although foreign aid is importance for developing countries, such foreign aid may although have negative impacts on such countries. Just to mention one example of such negative impacts is that Tanzania may be forced to more loyal to the will of foreign aid donors than to what their peoples may require from their governments as a result of which the full sovereignty of such countries as Tanzania may in questions.

Tanzania has after independence developed an interesting political culture that has facilitated peaceful development; she is one of the better performers in east Africa with respect to democratic governance, freedom house index marked Tanzania as a "Partial free state", an improvement from 2000 the year before.

Issues relating to democratic consolidation in, it are clear that what Tanzania has done to date in consolidating its democracy has been insufficient, the thesis assessment exposes

that each of the understudied institutions, such as political party, media, civil society, and election, have continued to face numerous challenges and weakness, yet the researcher identifies Tanzania's democracy as an electoral democracy that is consolidating, even if and despite the numerous challenges it continues to face, In fact Tanzania is far better among east African countries on the multi- party democracy and the wave consolidation of democracy in east Africa. This being the truth, Tanzania can do much better in the consolidation of democracy in the country if she depends not largely on foreign aid but on her people, cultural system, experiences and values, more is required to systematically make and sustain its democracy beyond where it is now.

Finally, I also welcome more studies that describe democratization from local people's perspective since it in my opinion is a shortage of this type of studies.

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**2024**

**Appendix 1: List of Person Interview**

Shumbana Karume, Head of election and democracy affairs in AU

**Appendix 2: Questions Used to Guide and Structure the Interview Sessions**

- 1) What are your views on the relationship between the foreign aid and democracy promotion in Tanzania?
- 2) What are your views in democracy assistance aimed at achieving democratic governance per se or is there an economic pre-requisite underpinning any attempt at democratizing the Tanzanian political sphere?
- 3) What factor(s) brought about the creation of the Nyalali Commission and the subsequent Transition from single to multi-party politics?
- 4) Foreign aid and Democratic consolidation in Tanzania: is there a connection?
- 5) To what extent has a civil society that can contribute to a consolidation of democracy?
- 6) To what extent is Tanzania moving to words consolidation of Democracy?
- 7) How would you describe the obstacles and opportunities for democratic consolidation in Tanzania?
- 8) Anything that you would like to add?

## Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that the contents of this thesis constitute my own original work, which has not been previously presented to another institution, either in part or whole for the purpose of obtaining master degree. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

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Fekadu Handino

May 2014.

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

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Mohammed Hassen (**PhD**).  
May 2014