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SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDI*ES*

FOREIGN MILITARY PRESNCE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: REGIONAL DYNAMICS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

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Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: Regional Dynamics and Security Implications

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A Dissertation Submitted to

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Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that the dissertation entitled: **Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: Regional Dynamics and Security Implications,** submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the award of the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Studies and submitted to the Institute for Peace and Security of Addis Ababa University is a result of my major work. I conducted the research under the supervision of Aaron Tesfaye (Professor) and Ahmed Hassen (Ph.D). This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree or to any other university.

Abebe Alemu

Signature ----------

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This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by Abebe Alemu Melese, entitled: **Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: Regional Dynamics and Security Implications** submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Security Studies complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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List of Abbreviations

AAU	Addis Ababa University
AFRICOM	The United States African Command
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AKP	Justice and Development Party (Turkiye)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, and United States Security Alliance
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiatives
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa
CNN	Cable News Network
CSLs	Cooperative Security Locations
DP World	Dubai Port World
EPLF	Eritrean People Liberation Fronts
EU	European Union
FANSPS	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FOBs	Forward Operating Bases

GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HoPRs	House of People Representatives
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MOBs	Main Operation Bases
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
SNA	Somalia National Army
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SOCs	State Owned Companies
SPLA	Sudan People Liberation Army
TPLF	Tigray People Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UNs	United Nations
US	United States
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front

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Abstract

In recent years, foreign powers have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Such presence has resulted in the projection of externally driven security agendas in the region. The integration of foreign rivalries with the Horn's own rivalries has become a security concern for the regional states. Yet, the literature on the intrusion of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa is limited. First, most of the existing literature focuses on the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to fight non-traditional security threats. There is a gap in the literature in terms of external developments that have increased the importance of the Horn of Africa. Second, the existing literature focused on the intrusion of foreign powers on a case-by-case basis. This research, cognizant of the lack of proper study, aims to answer the following questions. First, why are foreign powers extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa? Second, what are the regional security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa? Third, what are the response strategies of the Horn regional states to this foreign military presence? To answer these questions, data was gathered from both primary (conference participation, key informant interviews, and media releases) and secondary (books, journal articles, and newspapers) sources. The findings of the research indicate that foreign powers have their own justifications for projecting their military forces into the region. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and China extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa to achieve commercial interests. The US, for its part, is working to deter the Chinese presence in the region. All four powers consider the Horn of Africa a staging area to expand their spheres of influence in other parts of Africa. This common interest in the Horn of Africa has led to competitive relations among foreign powers in the region. The presence of competing foreign powers has its own negative regional security implications. The presence of foreign powers has changed the nature of regional conflict and the patterns of regional states' relations. In addition, the presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has complicated the regional security complex. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence. Some Horn regional states have welcomed the foreign military presence. Other states had tried to follow a selective foreign policy strategy. Yet, others securitized the new foreign military presence. Based on the findings, this thesis contributes to the literature on the Horn's relations with extra-regional powers. This study seeks to act as a foundation for further research in the area of Horn's relations with foreign powers.

Keywords: Foreign Military Presence, Horn of Africa, Regional Dynamics, Security Implication

1. **Introduction**

1.**1 Background of a Study**

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Horn of Africa has increasingly attracted the interests of a number of external security actors (Vertin, 2019; Telci, 2021). These security actors have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa and have their own justification to extend their military forces in the Horn of Africa. In the early 2000s, foreign powers projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa to fight terrorism in the region. As Schmidt (2013) noted, the global war on terror increased the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s. In the late 2000s, a number of external security actors extended and consolidated their military forces to fight piracy in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean regions (Chun, 2019), and these foreign power engagements became successful in reducing the threats of piracy in the Horn of Africa.

More recently, several foreign powers have shown a renewed interest in the Horn of Africa (Hersi and Elmi, 2021). Foreign military forces from North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Following the advent of foreign military presence, the Horn of Africa has become the epicenter of foreign military bases, military facilities, and logistics hubs (Solomon, 2019; Seife, 2022). The military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa takes different forms. On land, foreign powers have established military bases, military facilities, and logistics hubs. These land bases have been serving as military training centers and joint military exercises. In addition, foreign actors have been making their presence felt in the Horn's maritime domain (Melvin, 2018b) and have maintained a substantial naval force that operates in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean. They have also established air bases in different parts of the Horn of Africa with the objective of deploying combat aircraft, and it also serves as a staging area (Pamba, 2021).

In addition to the establishment of military bases, foreign powers have been engaged in close security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa (Aaron, 2018; Magu, 2019). As part of close security cooperation, foreign powers have been training military personnel of the Horn regional states. In addition, foreign military powers have been providing professional military education, conducting joint military exercises, and exchanging intelligence information with the

military officials of the states in the Horn of Africa (Magu, 2019). The establishment of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa and the close security cooperation of foreign powers with the states in the Horn of Africa are intricately intertwined. Overseas military bases in the Horn of Africa have provided opportunities for bilateral and multilateral military training and serve as the site for joint military exercises. Scholars such as Lostumbo *et al* (2013) stated that security cooperation benefits the basing powers to work together with the host states. This is important and helps to understand the nature of regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. For example, the American military base in Djibouti has been instrumental in security cooperation by providing training to local military forces (Styan, 2020). The Chinese military base in Djibouti has also been extending security cooperation with selected states in the Horn of Africa by sharing intelligence and providing professional military. The Turkish military base in Somalia has also been training the Somalia National Army (SNA) since its establishment in 2017. In a nutshell, having foreign military bases increases the frequency and range of security cooperation activities.

The physical military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa and security cooperation with regional states have enabled external security actors to project their power and enhance their military intervention capabilities. In so doing, foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa seem to advance the foreign policy objectives of projecting powers. This is explained in the following dimensions. In the first place, foreign powers project their military presence in the Horn of Africa to protect their nations through projecting their power. This can be explained using the following dimensions. In the first place, foreign powers project their power in the Horn of Africa to protect their commercial interests in the Red Sea region (Alao *et al*, 2018). In other words, foreign powers deployed their military forces in the Horn of Africa to ensure the free flow of commondities in the Red Sea region, and this helps them increase political leverage in the Horn of Africa (Heath, 2018). In addition, foreign military bases have strategic functions and used to provide forward defense for the homeland state (Walle, 2023). This indicates that foreign military bases sustain foreign military operations in the Horn of Africa.

Among the states in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has attracted several foreign powers to its territory. Endowed with a strategic location on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Djibouti hosts more foreign military bases than any other state in the world (Styan, 2020). The external powers from different parts of the world established their military bases and facilities in Djibouti. For example, France

has maintained close to 1,400 military forces in Djibouti since 1977 (Styan, 2020). In 2011, France and Djibouti renewed their security relations. As Fakude (2021) writes, France and Djibouti concluded a defense cooperation treaty in 2011, which entered into effect in 2014. The treaty sets out the operational facilities granted to the French military forces stationed in the country. Besides, other European powers such as Germany, Italy, and Spain have maintained their military presence in Djibouti. In addition to the European states, the United States of America (US) established its Camp Limonnier military base in Djibouti in 2002 (Zhixiong, 2018). As part of its military presence, the US established a network of air, naval, and land bases in Djibouti in the early 2000s. Since the early 2010s, the US has expanded its military base in Djibouti at a cost of around one billion US dollars (Vertin, 2019). To better perform its military activities, America expanded its military base in the years between 2013 and 2014. In this expansion process, the size of the base has been expanded from thirty-six hectares to two hundred hectares (Vertin, 2019). Besides, the expansion process incorporated the building of permanent housing units. These expansions have enabled the US to execute its military missions in the Horn of Africa.

Apart from western powers, eastern powers have been extending their military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent times. For example, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 (Vertin, 2019; Styan, 2022). Constructed at a cost of $600 million, the Chinese military base in Djibouti is 0.5 square kilometers (close to one hundred acres) in size and staffed by 400 military forces (Fakude, 2021). The base houses barracks to host unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and eight hangars for helicopters. The base is also equipped with armored vehicles and other military hardware. In recent years, expansion has continued with the construction of a 450-meter dock that can accommodate naval flotillas, including large warships, a helicopter staging area, and underground storage facilities. This expansion enabled the Chinese military base in Djibouti to host more than 10,000 military forces (Wenle, 2017; Vertin, 2020; Wuthnow, 2020). China's growing military presence in the Horn of Africa and its keen interest in expanding its military presence in the western Indian Ocean have become a concern for other Asian powers (Melvin, 2019a). In particularly, Japan has worked hard to balance the Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean region (Su *et al,* 2018). In addition to consolidating its military base established in 2011, Japan cooperated with other powers, such as India and the US to counter the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. As part of this close security cooperation, in 2018, Japan and India negotiated a military logistics agreement that would grant the Indian military access to Japan. Thus, Japan is

consolidating its military presence in the Horn of Africa to counter the perceived and real threat posed by other rival powers (Melvin, 2019a). Considering these external security dynamics, a number of strategic thinkers produced their works on the concentration of foreign military powers in Djibouti. For example, Solomon (2018) stated that Djibouti has become the military real estate for a number of foreign military forces. Besides, Dunne (2021) noted that Djibouti has become a key node for foreign military presence, hosting a number of foreign powers. In addition, Fakude (2021) noted that a number of foreign military forces established their military bases in Djibouti. Accordingly, Djibouti has become the focus for foreign military base establisments.

Apart from western and Asian powers, Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have expanded their security presence in the Horn of Africa. As noted in chapter two, relations between the Arab Gulf states and the Horn of Africa have a long history. However, the recent military presence of the Arab Gulf states in the Horn of Africa is far deeper and broader than their previous military interventions (Vertin, 2019). Saudi Arabia, for example, has been following an assertive foreign policy strategy towards the Horn of Africa in recent years. Its close security cooperation with the Red Sea littoral states and the establishment of military bases at Assab Port demonstrate its assertive foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. The Emirates are also expanding their security presence in Somaliland (Khan and Young, 2022). Qatar, another small power in the Middle East, has long been an influential external security actor in the Horn of Africa. It has played a constructive role in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. From 2010 to 2017, Qatar deployed its peacekeeping military forces between Eritrea and the Djibouti border (Walle, 2023). This was aimed at reducing the regional border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. Apart from the Arab Gulf states, Türkiye has expanded its security presence in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye established its largest military base in Somalia in 2017 (Maziad, 2022; Styan, 2022). Constructed at a cost of $50 million, the Turkish military base in Mogadishu covers four square kilometers, and the base can train more than 1,000 Somali soldiers at a time (Maziad, 2022). By facilitating security cooperation between the two states, the Turkish military base in Somalia has become an important training center for the Somali armed forces (Styan, 2022). On February 8, 2024, Somalia and Turkiye came to an understanding on a ten year Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, and was approved by the Somali's cabinet in the same year (Marun, February 21, 2024). Based on the agreement, Turkiye will build, train, and equip the Somali navy, which is important to remove any fear of terrorism, piracy, and illegal fishing.

The new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a topical issue in contemporary international relations. Pundits, security analysts, and policymakers hold divergent opinions on the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, Alao *et al* (2018) stated that foreign military presence in the Red Sea region ensures smooth resource flows. In other words, foreign powers are playing a critical role in fighting maritime crimes. In doing so, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa plays an important role in the stability aspects of the global economy. Besides, Wuthnow (2020) states that the presence of foreign powers in unstable regions, including the Horn of Africa, has enabled them to understand regional security dynamics. These are important in making diplomatic efforts of conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa.[1] For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE brokered a peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia to resolve their border disputes in 2018 (International Crisis Group, 2019; de Waal, 2019).

However, other strategic thinkers, security analysts, and policymakers have different opinions on the deployment of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa. Some scholars, such as Schmidt (2018) and Solomon (2018) claim that foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has negative security implications. External security actors are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa to secure their self-serving interests. There are several reasons for this. In the first place**,** the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has implications for regional power distribution. For example, scholars such as Frazier and Stewart Ingersoll (2010) claim that foreign military presence in other regions has direct implications for regional power distribution and has implication for regional balance of power. Another scholar claims that foreign powers provide military training to their client states in the Horn of Africa (Verhoeven, 2018). This close security cooperation between basing states and the host states in the Horn of Africa brought about changes in the regional power distribution.

Second, foreign powers have brought their extra-regional rivalries to the Horn of Africa. For example, the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) political crisis has spread into the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). In addition, the Indo-Pacific security dynamics (Sino-Japan and Sino-India regional rivalries) have been integrated with the Horn regional security dynamics. Kabandula and Shaw (2018) also stated that the integration of foreign rivalries with the Horn's own regional

[1] Qatar deployed its peacekeeping forces between the Eritrean and Djibouti borders from 2010 to 2017. These military deployments reduced the escalation of conflicts between the two neighboring states.

conflicts has become a security concern for the states in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the mixing of extra-regional competition with the Horn's conflict dynamics has implications for regional peace and security.

Last but not least, the emergence of competing international security actors in the Horn of Africa has implications for the patterns of relations among the states in the Horn of Africa. As discussed in chapter six, foreign military presence is a bilateral security relation between basing powers and host states in the Horn of Africa. Bilateral relations between basing and host states pose a security threat to the host's neighbors in the Horn of Africa. This indicates that foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has implications for the amity and enmity relations of regional states (Styan, 2020). For example, as noted in chapter six, Ethiopia is not sure about the frequently changing alliance relations between foreign powers and the Red Sea littoral states.

Accordingly, the presence of a new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa requires extensive research. It is important to produce a reliable outcome by carefully understanding the driving interests of foreign powers and the dynamics of interactions among these powers in the Horn of Africa. Based on the interactions of foreign powers, the study provides a detailed analysis of the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. It is because of this that the research examined the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa to the new foreign military presence.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa has attracted the attention of foreign powers in recent times. With regard to the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there are a number of contradictions, inconsistencies, and security problems. First, establishing a foreign military base in other regions is an expensive security activity for projecting powers (Ohtomo, 2012). Basing powers incur substantial financial costs to construct and manage military bases in foreign territories (Gillem, 2007; Cooley, 2008). For example, the US military presence in Afghanistan cost hundreds of billions of dollars (Barash and Webel, 2018). Besides, projecting powers deploy their military forces in conflict-prone regions. These military personnel are vulnerable to various forms of violent attacks. Instead of a direct military presence, foreign powers could achieve their security missions from their home states.[2] As Gillem (2007:270) writes, 'great powers developed hypersonic aircrafts that could attack military targets anywhere in the world within a short period of time.' Despite the costs of foreign military presence and new technological developments, several foreign powers have established their military bases in the Horn of Africa. The states in the Horn of Africa, for their part, welcomed foreign military presence into their territories. Such security relations between foreign powers and the states in the Horn of Africa have implications for the sovereignty and security policies of regional states. Scholars such as Calder (2007) and Peterson (2008) state that foreign military presence in other regions has implications for the sovereignty of the host states. In addition, such presence of foreign military forces in another sovereign state goes against the non-intrusion principles of international law.[3] This does not work in the Horn of Africa. By ceding part of their territories, the Red Sea littoral states have legally accepted the establishment of foreign military bases in their territories.

Second, external security actors have inconsistent foreign policy strategies in the Horn of Africa. While foreign powers claim that their security mission in the Horn of Africa is to ensure smooth resource flows of goods in the Red Sea region. Such foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has presented a major security challenge to the region. This is explained by the nature of foreign

[2] As Calder (2007) stated, technological developments increased the capacity of great powers to attack their adversaries from afar. With the advent of new technologies in the area of long-range aircraft, great powers can achieve their military goals from their home states.

[3] Even some projecting powers have strict principles of foreign military presence in other regions. China, for example, considers the Western military presence in other regions as a clear violation of international law (Sun, 2018). Yet, China has been extending and consolidating its military presence in the Horn of Africa recently.

military bases in the Horn of Africa. While ideally, foreign military bases are aimed at conducting non-combat missions such as peacekeeping, civilian protection, and fighting transnational security threats (Lutz, 2009). The advent of great powers in the Horn of Africa goes against these principles of foreign military presence. As discussed in the introduction, foreign powers established military bases in the Horn of Africa with advanced military armaments. The Chinese military base in Djibouti is equipped with drone facilities. The Turkish military bases in Somalia are well equipped with modern arms. The US has a heavy military presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia used its military base at Assab Port to conduct military operations in Yemen's civil war. This heavy foreign military presence has implications for regional peace in the Horn of Africa.

Third, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has raised the prospect of proxy wars and the further extension of externally driven security agendas in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019b). As indicated in the introduction, great powers have brought their extra-regional rivalries to the Horn of Africa. The integration of the Horn regional conflicts with foreign rivalries has had regional security implications. For example, competing foreign powers are involved in the internal conflicts in some of the Horn regional states in the form of arm transfers, clandestine funding of armed groups, and the sharing of intelligence information (Walle, 2023). As noted in chapter six, the Ethiopian civil war in the years between 2020 and 2022 was exacerbated following the engagement of foreign powers supporting either the Tigray forces or the government.

To make matters worse, the states in the Horn of Africa have different positions regarding the new foreign military presence in the region. Two points stand out. First, there is a dilemma about how to reconcile the interests of each state in the region with the security of the Horn of Africa. The Red Sea littoral states have a sovereign right to welcome foreign military forces into their territories. On the other hand, the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has negative regional security implications. The problem lies on how to reconcile regional interests with the Horn states' sovereign rights (see chapter seven). This leads to the second problem. As already noted, the states in the Horn of Africa have different response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region. The Red Sea littoral states welcomed the new foreign military presence into their territories. This is because, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a real security threat for other states. Ethiopia, for example, securitized the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa making the response strategy difficult.

In their attempt to understand the crux of new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, a number of scholars produced their works. Scholars such as Demessie (2014), Redei (2013), Carmody (2011), Cannon (2017), Alao *et al* (2018), Shaw and Kabandul (2018), Schmidt (2018), Clapham (2017), Magu (2019) and Mason (2022) produced a major contribution to our understanding of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa (a detailed analysis of the works of these scholars is given in chapter three).

Three main reasons could be gleaned from the existing literature on the recent advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa is still thin. First, most of the existing literature focuses on the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to fight non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and maritime crimes. This indicates that the literature on the recent intrusion of foreign military forces and their concomitant security implications in the Horn of Africa is not sufficiently covered. Second, the existing literature focused on the intervention of external security actors on a case-by-case basis. In other words, the existing literature on the new foreign military presence is based on the bilateral relations between basing states and host states in the Horn of Africa. This shows that there is no comprehensive research on the military presence of external security actors in the Horn of Africa. In other words, little research has been done on the dynamics of the interaction between projecting powers and its security implications in the Horn of Africa. Third, the existing literature overlooked the new driving interests of external security actors in the Horn of Africa. In the 2000s, internal developments in the Horn of Africa served as the catalyst for the advent of external security actors. For example, the state weakness of Somalia attracted the attention of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. However, the recent advent of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa is partly explained by new developments outside the region. There is no detailed research on the extra-regional developments that pushed foreign powers into the Horn of Africa.

As noted in this problem statement section, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has regional security implications. Nevertheless, the literature on the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa is thin. Indeed, there is a need to carefully study the problem of new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is important to fill a gap in the existing literature on the influx of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa.

1.3. Objective of the Study

The major objective of this research was to examine the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications. For convenience, the major objective of the research is subdivided into the following specific objectives:

1. Explore the driving interests of foreign military powers in the Horn of Africa.
2. Identify the patterns of relations among foreign powers in the Horn of Africa.
3. Explain the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.
4. Examine the response strategies of the Horn regional states to the foreign military presence.

1.4 **Research Questions**

The new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has been a contentious and poses a security dilemma for the states in the Horn of Africa. Taking the problem at hand, this dissertation, seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Why have foreign powers deployed their military forces in the Horn of Africa?

1.1 What strategies did foreign powers use to extend military presence in the Horn of Africa?

1.2 What are the patterns of relations of between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa?

2. What implications has foreign military presence brought to the Horn of Africa?

2.1 What are the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn's regional dynamics?

2.2 How the changes in the Horn's regional dynamics affected regional security?

3. What are the response strategies of states in the Horn of Africa to the advent of foreign power?

2. Methodology, Research Design and Philosophy of the Study

2.1 Research Philosophy

The present research, as indicated below, is guided by qualitative research methods. More often than not, qualitative researchers make use of constructivism's philosophical position. To better understand and examine the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications, the researcher employed a constructivist philosophical position. There were three reasons why the constructivism philosophical position was selected. In the first place, the area of security studies, the constructivism position deals with the amity and enmity relations of great powers. Scholars such as Li (2009) stated that the amity and enmity relations of great powers are socially constructed. Stated differently, the nature of enmity and amity relations between great powers is based on state identity, historical relations, and the perceptions of one great power towards the other (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014). In this regard, the constructivism assumption answers the following questions: 'Why is the US concerned when North Korea builds nuclear weapons but not when Britain does?' (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014:97). According to the constructivism assumption, the perception of one state towards the other is a key factor in understanding their relations. If two states have shared histories and values, their relations would be peaceful. In this case, one state is not considered to be a security threat to the other. On the other hand, if two states have contradictory interpretations of values and ideology, the relations between these two states become hostile. As Casey *et al*. (2022) noted, shared rules and norms moderate the competitive behavior of states in other regions. On the other hand, two states with different norms and values engage in competitive relations in a strategically important region. For example, Britain is not a security threat to the US in the Horn of Africa. The two western powers have similar ideological values. The military preparation of Britain has no implications for US foreign policy. On the other hand, the US does not have a shared history and similar ideological values with China (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014). As indicated in chapter four, the Chinese military base in the Horn of Africa has become a clear security threat to the US. This indicates that the identity of potential adversaries matters, not just their military capabilities and interests.

Second, in contrast to the mainstream international theories (realism and neo-realism), which define a state's interest as an objective material interest, constructivism theoretical frameworks maintain

that states' interests in other regions transcend mere material need.[4] As Ath (2018:114) wrote, 'constructivism theorists argue that ideas and values are important in international relations.' Besides, Mansbach and Rafferty (2008) contend that the interests of great powers in other regions are not inherent or predetermined, but rather they are constructed and reconstructed. This indicates that international relations do not always arise from an objective social reality. States construct their enemies and allies based on their perceptions and assumptions to which they adhere to.

As indicated in chapter four, the drivers of external security actors in the Horn of Africa are not based on pure material interests. External security actors justify their military presence in the Horn of Africa in terms of humanitarian interventions and systemic rivalry among great powers. As a senior American diplomat noted, 'the US foreign policy towards the African continent should serve the interests of American values' (Bolton, December 13, 2018). The same is true for Chinese foreign policy towards the African continent. China is expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa for both material and non-material interests. For example, China is expanding and consolidating its military presence in Africa for systemic competition with other great powers. Following the Chinese military presence, Japan strengthened its military presence in the Horn of Africa. As discussed in chapter four, the US, Japan, and India created a security alliance to counter the rise of China in the Horn of Africa. The Saudi military presence in the Horn of Africa is intended to thwart the Turkish military presence in the region. Furthermore, Turkiye's military presence is explained by both material and non-material justifications. As Ylonen (2024) contends, Turkiye has used historical narratives and cultural relations to project its military presence in the Horn of Africa. From these analyses, foreign powers projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa for non-material needs. This is explained in the constructivist philosophical position.

Third, constructivist philosophical assumptions contend that regions are not simply geographical objects. Unlike realism and neorealism, which consider regions as objectively given, constructivism philosophical positions consider regions as politically made entities. In connection with this, Farrell (2005) argues that regions are socially constructed and reconstructed in the process of global transformation. Other scholars (e.g., Flint, 2022) stated that regions are the products of the continuous process of construction and deconstruction. Still others (e.g. Soderbaum, 2005)

[4] This does not mean that material factors are irrelevant.

contends that regions are constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. Their (de)construction originates from both the outside and the inside.[5] In a similar vein, the construction of the Horn of Africa as a region is not naturally given. As clearly discussed in chapter two, the Horn of Africa is the result of external military interventions in the late nineteenth century. With the retreat of colonial powers in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the current concept of 'Horn of Africa' was developed. Hence, the constructivist approach guides the present study.

Due to the reasons mentioned above, the constructivist approach guides the present research. This is because making objective and value-free research on the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is not possible. The evidence to support arguments and explanations about foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is affected by the world view of key informants. Key informants, such as foreign policy officials, military leaders, pundits, and academicians have different views on the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on their interests and understandings, some key informants supported a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. However, other respondents opposed the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This shows that law-like regularities do not govern the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Research participants gave their views and perspectives on foreign power rivalries in the Horn of Africa. These key informants analyzed the implications of foreign military presence and the response strategies of the Horn regional states.

Thus, epistemologically, an interpretivist position guides the study of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Because, knowledge and evidence to support knowledge of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa are not objectively given; but rather they are subjective. In contrast to a positivist approach, where the findings are not affected by the personal beliefs of the research participants, the results in interpretive research are affected by the worldview of key informants. In the same way, the aim of the present research is to examine and explain the views of key informants on the new foreign military deployments in the Horn of Africa. Evidences, arguments, and explanations to study foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications are based on the interactions between the knower and the known. In an interpretive research, key informants and the issue under discussion are not independent from one another;

[5] The European Union is a classical regional organization constructed from within.

rather they are intricately intertwined. In this case, the issue under discussion 'foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa,' and the key informants are not independently separated. They are part of the research process. This indicates that the research is affected by the worldview of key informants. As a result, the subjective experiences of research participants and key informants affect the research process.

2.2 Research Design

In the process of conducting qualitative research, academicians and scholars select events, cases, and new developments. The major aim is to conduct a detailed study on the selected issues, cases, and developments. For example, a case study is one of the most popular qualitative studies about certain developments. In other words, qualitative case studies provide a detailed analysis of a particular research problem. Scholars such as Yin (2009) noted that a case study is a qualitative research strategy to explore a specific research problem. The specific research problem is explained by time and activity. Other scholars, such as Kothari (2004) contend that the focus of a qualitative case study is depth. As stated in other way, the focus of a qualitative case study is not both breadth and coverage. A qualitative case study is aimed at describing, explaining and exploring a specific research problem. In his recent publication, Yin (2017) stated that a qualitative case study could be a descriptive study (describe a certain phenomenon), explanatory study (explain why a certain sequence of events happened), and exploratory study (conduct fresh research for further and more detailed research).

From the remarks of Yin and Kothari, it is clear that a qualitative case study provides a complete understanding of a specific research problem by collecting data from different sources. Based on this analysis, the researcher selected the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications. Being exploratory research, the issue of foreign military presence is a recent development that demands a detailed study. Thus, the researcher explores new developments such as the new foreign military base race, the engagement of foreign powers to scramble resources, and the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa. To provide a detailed analysis, the researcher selected four projecting powers (Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, America, and China) as a case study. This is to provide a detailed study on the interests of foreign powers, their intervention strategies, and their relations in the Horn of Africa. Considering the post-2010s military activities (military base establishment, security cooperation, and security assistance) of

projecting powers, the present research is aimed at providing a detailed study of the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

2.3 Research Methodology

The choice of research methodology in a particular study is based on the research questions to be answered. It is also based on the research problems to be solved. To study the frequency of certain social events, researchers employ quantitative research methods (Berg, 2001). On the other hand, to better understand political processes, interpret conceptual meanings, and examine the patterns of social relations, researchers prefer to use qualitative research approach (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Yin, 2011). In the same way, the purpose of present dissertation was to explore the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications. Foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is explained by concepts such as military bases, security cooperation, security relations, regional security complex, and regional security dynamics. These concepts are analyzed and conceptualized in relation to the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, a qualitative research approach was applied to study the new foreign military presence and its regional security implications in the Horn of Africa.

To start the process, a historical literature review was conducted to provide a comprehensive overview of the pre-2010 foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In terms of analyzing and interpreting these sequences of foreign interventions, qualitative research approaches examined a research problem in chronological order. Based on the incidence of events, qualitative researchers pay attention to what happens first, second, third, and so on. Neuman (2007:90) noted that 'qualitative researchers look at the sequence of events based on chronological order.' The Horn of Africa has a long history of external military interventions. Foreign powers extended their military forces in the Horn of Africa in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. For example, in the seventh century, the Arabs extended their military forces in the Horn of Africa. In the thirteenth century, the Chinese projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese engaged in geopolitical rivalry in the Red Sea region. In the late nineteenth century, colonial powers such as Italy, France, and Britain controlled the coastline region of the Horn of Africa (for a detailed analysis, see chapter two). The arbitrary colonial border demarcation sowed the seeds for the emergence of a regional security complex in the Horn of Africa (Woodward, 1996; Clapham, 2017). The emergence of the regional

security complex in the Horn of Africa served for further great power rivalry in the 1970s and 2000s. In these series of foreign military interventions, the origins of external security actors and their interests have shown changes and continuities. As a result, to examine these series of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, secondary sources such as journal articles and books were intensively consulted. This is to place the present research in a historical context.

Then, secondary sources related to the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa were reviewed. As part of the literature review, the findings of previous works on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa were analyzed. More importantly, to find out the gaps in the previous research on the current foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the researcher critically analyzed, interpreted, and evaluated the works of other scholars based on the research objectives mentioned under section 1.3. This is done based on a thematic literature review procedure. A literature review examined the interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, the modes of acquiring military bases, the effects of foreign powers on the Horn's regional security dynamics, and the response strategies of Horn regional states to the new foreign military presence.

After conducting a literature review, a detailed discussion on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa followed. As noted in the introduction, several external security actors from different parts of the world have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent times. The Horn of Africa has been experiencing a proliferation of foreign military bases, facilities, and logistics hubs. The origin of these external security actors and the strategies for acquiring military bases, facilities, and logistics hubs are different from the previous security engagements. To examine the interests of foreign powers, the strategies of acquiring military bases, and the relations of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, a qualitative research approach was applied.

There are a number of justifications why a qualitative research approach is employed. First, the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is hard to quantify. It needs a series of semi-structured interviews with relevant key informants. The sources of data included semi structured interviews with security analysts, media reports, and the speeches of policymakers. This was aimed at collecting qualitative data from these diverse sources. Second, the nature of the study determines the type of research methodology. To study political processes, explore new developments, and

study social interaction between different actors, a qualitative study is best suited (Creswell, 1994). In the same way, the present research investigates the interaction of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, the new alliance dynamics, and the complex relations of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. To study these dynamics, a qualitative research methodology has become appropriate. Third, the advent of competing foreign powers in the Horn of Africa was not extensively researched by other scholars and researchers. The present research falls under the exploratory research category. This indicates that research in the area of foreign military base establishment in the Red Sea region, great power competition in the Horn of Africa, and the responses of local actors in the Horn of Africa are new in scope and breadth. This has to be explored for further explanatory and quantitative research. And finally, the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a sensitive security issue. There are no rule-based and objective answers for the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Research of this kind is flexible and opens up the possibility of exploring a variety of perspectives based on the experiences of research participants. Accordingly, the present research employed a qualitative approach to examine the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Qualitative data were collected, analyzed, interpreted and, finally major findings were drawn. The aim of interpreting and analyzing qualitative data is to examine the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. These discussions went step-by-step. First, the researcher explored the driving interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. This is explained in both external and internal dimensions (see chapter four). Then, relations among external powers in the Horn of Africa were provided. These discussions were aimed at examining the cooperative and competitive relations of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. This is followed by a detailed discussion on how the conflicting interests of foreign powers influenced the security of the Horn of Africa. In these discussions, the researcher placed more emphasis on the changes in the regional balance of power, the changes in the regional security complex, and the changes in alliance relations. To generate qualitative data related to new security developments in the Horn of Africa, as indicated below, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants, including academicians, military leaders, strategic thinkers, and policymakers. This series of activities needed a qualitative approach.

2.4 Methods of Data Collection

The present research is based on a qualitative interpretive research methodology. Researchers who prefer to use an interpretive approach tend to favor qualitative data. To get a deeper understanding on the influx of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa, the present research relied on a range of qualitative data sources. These qualitative data sources are divided into primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources such as books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, and research reports were consulted to highlight the driving interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Consulting secondary sources is aimed at examining the internal and external drivers for the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. This is to answer why foreign powers have been extending their military forces in the Horn of Africa in recent times? Moreover, secondary sources provided a detailed analysis on the strategies of acquiring military bases in the Horn of Africa. This does not mean that the first research question, as mentioned above, is answered by secondary sources. When relevant, primary data sources were employed to discuss external and internal drivers for the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. These data sources are aimed at examining the internal and external drivers of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

On the other hand, primary data were drawn from semi-structured interviews with key informants. As part of the primary data sources, fifty key- informants were selected to conduct semi-structured interviews. Scholars such as Yin (2011) pointed out that collecting data for qualitative research requires interaction and communication with the selected key informants, who have first-hand knowledge of the issue under discussion. In the same way, to examine the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its security implications, a series of semi-structured interviews were held with relevant key-informants. As indicated in the appendix section of the present study, more than forty key informants came from different institutions and disciplines. These key informants included security analysts, academicians, senior diplomats, military leaders, and foreign policy officials. These key-informants are presumed to have a good understanding of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Thus, semi-structured interviews were arranged with these key-informants. Based in Addis Ababa, these key-informants reflected on their knowledge of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Semi-structured interviews with academicians, strategic thinkers, and diplomats were conducted to generate qualitative data on the recent advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on their expertise on the

recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, these key-informants provided a detailed analysis of how the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has influenced the regional security dynamics. In other words, these key-informants elucidated the security implications of an external military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, these research participants analyzed the competing interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, these key-informants elaborated on the constantly shifting alliance relations between projecting powers and the Horn regional states. This is to answer research questions such as how have the conflicting interests among foreign powers affected the Horn regional dynamics? How have the changes in the regional security dynamics affected the Horn's regional stability? How have the competitive relations among foreign powers in the Horn of Africa changed the regional balance of power? Answering these questions is aimed at generating qualitative data on the diverging and converging interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the response of these key-informants is aimed at discussing and elucidating how these competing interests have influenced the formation of new alliance dynamics and patterns of relations among external security actors. In addition, providing proper answers to these questions is aimed to make explanations on the regional security dynamics. Semi-structured interviews would continue until data saturation is reached.[6]

Besides, semi-structured interviews were held with foreign policy officials of the states in the Horn of Africa. As part of these data collection techniques, Djiboutian foreign policy officials such as Abdoulkader Hussein and Abdillahi Aden Omar reflected their government's response strategies to the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. At the same time, Hussein Ali and Hassen Samantar reflected on Somalia's response strategies to the foreign military presence in their country. Ethiopian foreign policy officials such as Fesseha Shawl, Adem Tesfaye, Demeke Mekonnen, and Abiy Ahmed reflected the policy of their administration to the new advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. These kinds of data collection techniques answered the following research questions. First, how have the foreign military presence and subsequent changes in regional dynamics influenced relations among the Horn regional states? Second, what response strategies has each state in the Horn of Africa been taking to promote their own security interests?

[6] Data saturation in qualitative research indicates the repetition of the previously collected data with the new emerging data. After data saturation, I stopped collecting primary data sources. Because, I did not find new themes, ideas and patterns of relations. They are the same with the previous interviews.

Third, how did these response mechanisms affect interstate relations in the Horn of Africa? The result of the semi-structured interviews was aimed at generating qualitative data on the different response strategies and security policies of the states in the Horn of Africa to secure their national interests.

In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of both regional and continental organizations. These key-informants provided a detailed analysis of the influences of foreign military presence on the patterns of relations among the states in the Horn of Africa. Besides, these key-informants reflected on the response strategies that the Horn regional states are taking to secure their interests following the advent of foreign military forces in the region. In addition, these key-informants reflected their concern about the militarization of the Horn of Africa and its subsequent regional security implications. To examine these security dynamics, key-informants from Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) were selected. The result of semi-structured interviews with IGAD and the AU officials were aimed at answering the following research questions. In the first place, what response mechanisms have the regional organizations been taking to protect the Horn of Africa from great power rivalry in recent years? Second, what were the weaknesses of these regional and continental organizations in protecting the Horn of Africa from external interferences? The expected answer to these key-informant interviews revolves around the role of regional and continental organizations in protecting the Horn of Africa from external military interventions. Besides, the response of these key-informants indicates the weakness of these regional organizations to protect the Horn of Africa.

Apart from semi-structured interviews with key informants, the present study benefited from a number of conferences and workshops organized by think-tanks, research institutions, universities, and embassies based in Addis Ababa. This is to generate the required qualitative data on the patterns of foreign powers' relations in the Horn of Africa. In particular, these sources of data were important to generate the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. As indicated below, the views and reflections of both the panelists and participants have become important sources of data to show the security problems of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Three points stand out regarding data sources from conference participation. First, conference participation had become critical in generating qualitative data on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Second, conference participation has become a reliable source of data to understand the views of both the panelists and participants. Both participants and panelists reflected their concern about the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Third, conference participation became a convenient strategy to get senior diplomats, security analysts, and senior government officials to participate in further key informant interviews. Instead of the formal procedure of getting access to key informants, it became easy to attend conferences organized by embassies, institutions, universities, and civil society organizations. Thus, the researcher attended a series of conferences organized by Addis Ababa University, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs, the War College of the Ethiopian Defense Force, the *Andimta* Ethiopian Civil Discourse Association, the Chinese Embassy to Ethiopia, and the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES) in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Security Studies of Addis Ababa University. As a result, the researcher attentively attended these conferences and recorded the remarks of both the panelists and the participants. In general, these workshops, lecture series, and conference participation became an important source of data on the drivers of foreign powers and their regional security implications in the Horn of Africa.

Apart from direct participation at conferences and workshops, the researcher attended a number of zoom meeting conducted among scholars on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The participants of the zoom meeting reflected their views on the geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, the security implications of foreign military presence in the region, and the competing interests of foreign powers. For example, in a zoom meeting conducted on January 30, 2024, Hassen M. Said Samantar, Somalia's former Director General of the Ministry of Defense, reflected his views on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the security implications of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia's (ATMIS) withdrawal from Somalia, and the proliferation of non-state actors in the country. Moreover, on November 28, 2023, the researcher attended a zoom meeting on *Great Power Rivalry in Africa: Ramifications for the Horn of Africa*. In the zoom meeting, a number of scholars, such as David Shinn, Kalewongel Minale, Wegene Mengistu, and Lauren Johnson reflected their views on the implications of great power rivalry in the Horn of Africa. This event was an important technique of

data collection to explain the interests and competitive relations of the US and China in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the researcher participated in the zoom meeting held on December 7, 2023. In this case, Saudi Arabian security experts, including Hesham Alghannam, reflected their views of Riyadh's foreign policy towards rising great powers such as China and Russia. Furthermore, on December 8, 2023, the researcher attended the zoom meeting on: *What Do Middle Powers Think? The View from Turkiye*. A number of strategic thinkers, such as Vessela Tcherneva, Sinan Ulgen, and Pawel Zerka reflected their expertise on Turkiye's role in both regional and international relations in recent years. Zoom meeting data collection techniques became important for two related reasons. First, the participants of the zoom meeting are considered to be key security experts in the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the data source from these participants in the zoom meeting were important to collect recent developments on the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The second is that data sources from zoom meeting became important to reduce the problem of accessing of highly qualified key informants in the Horn of Africa. It is highly unlikely to conduct direct, face-to-face semi-structured interviews with these security experts.

Furthermore, the researcher followed media reports on the current affairs of the Horn of Africa and its relations with foreign powers. These media reports were aimed at generating qualitative data on the most recent security developments in the Horn of Africa. The researcher recorded the speeches of government officials in Ethiopia to examine the foreign policies of the respective states in the Horn of Africa. For example, Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, made a number of speeches on different occasions with regard to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. As a key foreign policymaker, his speech on the recent advent of foreign military powers in the Horn of Africa and its security implications for Ethiopia has become the main source of data. Other Ethiopian government officials, such as then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Demeke Mekonnen, reflected his views on the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, Dagmawit Moges, then Minister of Transport and Logistics of Ethiopia, reflected her views on the problem of port securitization following the advent of foreign powers. These data collection techniques were aimed at generating the most recent developments in the Horn of Africa.

Apart from media reports, the present research relied on online sources related to the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The nature of online sources is grouped into two categories. The first sources of online data were written by scholars and strategic thinkers. These kinds of online data sources were important for two related reasons. First, online data sources were written by scholars and strategic thinkers on the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. These scholars and strategic thinkers reflected their views and perspectives on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. It was important to share their views and reflections so that other people could get access to these data for further reflection. Scholars such as Alex de Waal, Lons Aradi, Gloria Camille, Abdeta Dribssa, Awol Allo and other strategic thinkers pondered the peculiar features of the Horn of Africa and the advent of competing great powers in the region. The second is that many of the strategic thinkers and security analysts who reflected their views on the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa are living in different parts of the world. It is impossible to conduct semi-structured interviews with these Horn experts and strategic thinkers. Hence, the researcher collected and analyzed the views of strategic thinkers which is easily available on the online. The second category of the online data sources were the news released by different broadcasting services. The researcher searched for qualitative data from the news released by different news agency and broadcasting services. In particular, online sources released by new agencies have become essential to examine the competing relations of great powers in the Horn of Africa and their regional security implications. Accordingly, news released by Aljazeera, the Ethiopian National Television, the Ethiopian News Agency, the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Cable News Network, and Voice of America have become important sources of data for the most recent security developments in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, collecting relevant data from online sources became an easy task to examine the current geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

The last method of data collection technique is documentary sources. These data sources include documents issued by government agencies, think tanks, and publications of regional organizations. These documents show the official foreign policy strategies of both basing powers and host states. To safeguard their national interests, host states in the Horn of Africa issued their foreign policy documents. For example, Ethiopia issued the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) foreign policy document in 2002. Following the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa in the recent years, Ethiopia came up with its draft foreign policy document in 2021. This foreign

policy document clearly stipulates the security threats of the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the 2021 draft foreign policy documents clearly indicate the response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, basing powers issued their foreign policy documents towards intrinsically important regions, including the Horn of Africa. For example, to secure its overseas interests, China introduced the White Defense Paper in 2006. In the 2010s, China revised the White Defense Paper based on the changing realities of world politics. In addition, the Department of Defense of the United States issued the New African Security Strategy in 2016 and 2018. The general content of these foreign policy documents is related to the US foreign policy towards the African continent. These foreign policy documents were intensively analyzed to examine the interests of great in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, foreign policy documents have become important sources of data to indicate the official foreign policy of basing and host states in the Horn of Africa.

An analysis of the stated policies of the foreign powers is the starting point for understanding the unstated policies and interests of the foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. As indicated in the introduction, the rhetoric justification of foreign powers' military presence is aimed at escorting commercial ships, fighting non-traditional security threats, and then ensuring smooth resource flows in the Red Sea region. However, great powers extend their military forces to other regions when their interests are at stake. To generate the unstated security policies of external security actors in the Horn of Africa, semi-structured interviews were conducted with security analysts. Accordingly, detailed discussions were conducted with strategic thinkers to uncover the unstated policies[7] of foreign security actors and the broad patterns behind the official statements made by external security actors.

[7] To understand the unstated policies of external security actors, I focused on the activities and actions of great powers in the Horn of Africa. To generate these kinds of data, semi-structured interviews with security analysts were conducted.

2.5 **Methods of Data Analysis**

After analyzing the data thematically, the researcher looked for patterns of similarities and interpreted the patterns of relations among these themes. These series of activities are done to develop concepts, explanations, and possible causal relations between variables. The aim of data reduction and data display is to answer the research question. To answer the main research questions, the researcher found regularities, patterns (similarity and differences), explanations, and causal flows. These require putting the reduced and displayed data into themes, concepts, and similar patterns. This leads to a conclusion drawing.

Data that are collected from both primary and secondary sources have to be analyzed to answer research questions. Qualitative data analysis follows an iterative activity. This indicates that data collection, data analysis, and data interpretation take place throughout the study and influence each other. This does not mean that data collection and data analysis are inseparable. The bulk of qualitative data analysis takes place after the required data are collected. As Willis (2007) stated, although qualitative data analysis follows less standardized procedures, detailed data analysis takes place after the data are collected. This indicates that all forms of qualitative data analysis pass through three interrelated procedures. These are data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusion. Data reduction, the first procedure of data analysis, involves reducing raw data. This is followed by transforming the mass of data into a more condensed and manageable data (Patton, 2002). Data which were collected from secondary sources, key informant interviews, media reports, conference participation, and documentary sources about the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa are generally raw data. Raw data cannot be put as it is. It must be reduced to avoid unnecessary materials. As Singh (2006:223) noted, ‘data reduction is aimed at making the existing complex raw data into simpler parts. This will make data interpretation an easy task.’ Data display involves putting data theme by theme.

In the same pattern, qualitative data on the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa and subsequent changes in regional security dynamics were collected through semi-structured interviews, secondary sources, and documentary sources. Data collected using these techniques have no meaning unless properly analyzed and then interpreted. Hence, to provide structured and ordered data, raw data were analyzed and findings were drawn. The data generated from these

respondents were developed into themes and patterns of similarities and differences. Then a conceptual analysis was derived. Therefore, the findings of the research are based on the perspectives and values of the respondents.

After generating the required data on the advent of foreign powers and their interests in the Horn of Africa, I analyzed and interpreted these data. Data analysis process followed strict procedures (see section 2.4). Following proper data analysis procedures is aimed at giving a clear picture of the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is because the purpose of the research is to uncover the driving interests of great powers, the way these external security actors influence regional security dynamics, and how changes in regional security dynamics influence the patterns of relations among regional states.

3. Sampling Techniques

To conduct an in-depth research on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, data were collected from primary sources. As indicated under section 2.4, these research activities demanded semi-structured interviews with relevant key informants. Security analysts, military leaders, senior diplomats, foreign policy officials, and representatives of regional organizations were important key informants. These research participants were selected purposefully, presuming that they have rich information and first-hand knowledge on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Besides, these key informants were selected based on their first-hand knowledge of the security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the researcher selected these key informants based on their concerns about the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, stakeholder and criterion sampling techniques were applied. Criterion sampling techniques have become an important technique to select key informants who have a deeper understanding of the political dynamics of the Horn of Africa, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, and the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, Patton (2002) stated that criterion sampling techniques are applied to select information rich key-informants on the issue under discussion. For the present study, security analysts, academicians, and military leaders were selected by the criterion sampling technique. Because, these key-informants are believed to have first-hand knowledge of the changes in regional dynamics following the advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The stakeholder

sampling technique involves identifying and selecting major stakeholders believed to be influenced or benefited by foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Since the foreign policymakers of host states, diplomats of both host and basing states, and officials from regional organizations have some concern about the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the stakeholder sampling technique is best suited to select these key informants. Thus, these key informants were selected by the stakeholder sampling technique.

4. Strategies of Keeping the Credibility of the Research

To maintain the credibility of the present dissertation, the researcher considered a number of quality assurance strategies. The first technique for ensuring the quality of the present thesis is applying appropriate philosophical positions in the research process. The objective of this study is to unravel the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications. To give a detailed analysis of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the researcher employed a constructivist philosophical position. Applying a proper philosophical position is important to examine the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. As noted above, the constructivist philosophical position is employed to examine the interactions of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. More importantly, the researcher collected appropriate data from the relevant key informants. Key informants such as diplomats, political leaders, strategic thinkers, and policymakers were purposely selected to collect the relevant data for the research. These key informants were selected based on their advanced knowledge of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The data collected from these key informants were carefully analyzed to come up with relevant conclusions, explanations, and themes about the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

The second method of maintaining the reliability of the research is data triangulation. As Patton (2002) indicated, data triangulation is the use of a variety of data sources in a particular study. This is important for complex research. The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications are complex issues. To understand these complex dynamics, the researcher employed a number of data collection techniques. For example, the researcher employed different methods of data collection. Qualitative data were collected from secondary sources, key informant interviews, media reports, and analysis of documentary sources. This data collection

triangulation increased the quality of the research as it helped to see the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa and its security implications from different perspectives. In addition, theoretical triangulations were employed to examine the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its regional security implications. Theoretical triangulation is aimed at understanding the new foreign military presence from different perspectives. As Patton (2002:247) stated, 'theory triangulation is the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data.' In connection with this, regional security complex theory and regional security order theory were employed. These theories are aimed at understanding the competitive relations of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, showing changes in regional dynamics, and the process of changes in alliance dynamics.

The third method of maintaining the credibility and reliability of research is transparency. To do this, the researcher showed the qualitative research procedures, the evidence to support the findings, and the conclusion drawn from the data analyzed to his colleagues at Addis Ababa University. These scholars gave scholarly criticism. Besides, senior English language professionals saw the final research result for some of the editorial corrections. This strategy was important to improve the language problems of the final research result. On top of this, the researcher presented some of the results of the study at both national and international conferences at different times. For example, the researcher presented the implications of foreign military presence for Ethiopia's national security in national conferences organized by the Ethiopian Policy University on May 12, 2023, and Addis Ababa Academic Leadership on June 12, 2023. Further, the researcher presented great power rivalries in the Horn of Africa in an international conference organized by the Institute for Ethiopian Studies from September 29 to October 1, 2023. These were important events to get essential feedback from the research participants at the conferences. These feedbacks and criticisms were incorporated to ensure the credibility of the research result.

A Proper analyzing and interpreting the data were the last method of keeping the credibility of the present research. In this regard, Yin (2011:29) stated that 'primary data in qualitative studies demand special attention.' As a result, to fully understand the issue under discussion, the researcher continued generating qualitative data from the key informants until data saturation were achieved. Data are saturated when the newly generated data is redundant with previously collected data. This data saturation is based on the three research themes of the present study. The interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, the security implications of foreign military forces, and the Horn

regional states' response strategies required a number of key informants. In these series of interviews, the researcher continued collecting primary data and stopped conducting key informant interviews when no new ideas, opinions, and, themes were coming out.

5. **Significance of the Study**

As indicated in chapter three, regarding the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there is a shortage of literature. The existing literature on the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is very sparse. Therefore, a detailed and comprehensive study is required to show the full picture of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the present research seeks to contribute comprehensive knowledge on the recent advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Hence, the results of this research will add some knowledge on the dynamics of external military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent times. In so doing, the dissertation aims to expand the frontiers of knowledge on the recent foreign military presence and its regional security implications. The knowledge generated after the completion of the research will be available to scholars and researchers specializing in the Horn's relations with foreign powers. Thus, the result of the research will serve as reference material on the recent advent of foreign military presence.

Second, the research will have an immense contribution to the relevant stakeholders. It is clear that the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has short-term benefits. Nevertheless, in the long run, the securitization and the militarization of the Horn of Africa presents security threats to the regional states. The findings of the research indicate the real problems of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, namely how the extension of foreign rivalries fuels the Horn's own regional conflict dynamics. In addition, the research will indicate the uncoordinated response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, knowledge of the dynamics of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa will benefit security officials and foreign policymakers in the states of the Horn of Africa. Thus, foreign policymakers in Ethiopia and the Red Sea littoral states will use the findings of the research to make knowledge-based foreign policy decisions. This is to maintain the security of the region. In addition, officials from regional organizations such as IGAD and the AU will use the result of this study in their efforts to secure the interest of the Horn of Africa and the interest of Africa in general. Thus, the findings of the present research will help the aforementioned stakeholders and policymakers to

gain first-hand knowledge on the militarization of the Horn of Africa. This helps them to make informed and knowledge-based decisions.

6. Scope and Delimitation of the Research

In recent years, the importance of regions has increased as a level of security analysis (Kelly, 2007). This is explained in three dimensions. First, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s removed the principal organizing forces at the systemic level. The remaining great power, the US, reduced its global engagements. This systemic development led to the rise of regional powers in different parts of the world. Scholars such as Hook and Spanier (2016:183) noted that 'regional powers had become free to fill the void left by the superpowers after the end of the Cold War.' As discussed in chapter four, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have become active security players in their respective regions. Second, instead of great power rivalries, the security threats coming from transnational actors such as terrorism, maritime crimes, and drug smugglers have become the main security threats. These security threats are best managed through the cooperation of a number of states at the regional level. This has strengthened the regionalization of (in)security (Verhoeven, 2018). Thus, to fight transnational security threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and maritime crimes, great powers have started to cooperate at the regional level. As noted in chapter two, a number of foreign powers cooperated in the late 2000s to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Thus, after the end of the Cold War, the importance of regions and regional powers in world politics increased. Third, the nature of security studies has increased the importance of regions. Security studies are relational (Buzan, 1983). This indicates that security threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones. This leads to the development of intense security interactions among neighboring states at the regional level. The intense security interactions among neighboring states form what Buzan and Weaver (2003:23) called 'regional security complex.'

In the regional security complex, neighboring states are held by shared rivalries and intense security relations. The security problem in one state has (in)direct implications for its neighboring states. These regional rivalries create a wealth of opportunities for external interventions. To increase their military forces, competing regional states call for foreign assistance and intervention. In other words, the local patterns of rivalry are linked to the global ones (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). For example, the regional rivalry between India and Pakistan provided opportunities for great powers to penetrate the South Asian region during the Cold War (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). In the 1970s

and 1980s, Pakistan made a security alliance with the US and India linked to the Soviet Union (Antizzo, 2010). As discussed in chapter two, the intense security interaction between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1970s created a wealth of opportunities for extra-regional powers' interventions in the Horn of Africa. After the 1990s, the South Caucasus region has been vulnerable to external interventions. The intense security interaction between Armenia and Azerbaijan created fertile ground for external military interventions (Oskanian, 2013). These all indicate that the outcomes and explanations of external military interventions are visible at the regional level.

The regional security problem is a reflection of domestic security challenges (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). The domestic problems of one regional state have their own spillover effects on their neighbors. In turn, the (in)security developments in the region have their own implications for global security. For states, the regional level is important for their relations with neighboring states and extra-regional powers. For the global powers, the regional level is crucial in shaping the behavior of regional states (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). For example, as noted in chapter four, some of the states in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia and Ethiopia are weak. Its weakness created a safe haven for the proliferation of non-state actors, such as terrorism and maritime crimes. These have become a security threat to both the Horn regional states and extra-regional powers, including the US (Magu, 2019). This has created a wealth of opportunities for external military interventions. To defeat transnational security threats in the Horn of Africa, the US deployed its military forces in Djibouti. In addition, the political transition in Somalia has implications for the deployment of foreign military forces. In 2019, America withdrew its military forces during the Trump presidency. However, the Biden administration reversed the Trump administration's foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa (Harper, June 1, 2022). After Hassan Sheikh Mohamud came to power in May 2022, America redeployed its military forces in Somalia (Tingritu, 2022). This indicates that the change in domestic politics in Somalia has implications for the deployment of foreign powers in the country. Accordingly, the patterns of regional states' relations and foreign military presence are best explained when one starts his analysis at the regional level.

The concept of the Horn of Africa is not an indigenous term (Woodward, 1996; Woodward, 2006). The seeds of the idea of the Horn of Africa were sown in the late nineteenth century, when European colonial powers partitioned the region into their respective spheres of influence (see chapter two). With the decolonization of the whole of Africa after the end of the Second World War, colonized

states across the Red Sea region achieved their political independence. The Red Sea littoral states' political independence did not bring regional peace to the Horn of Africa. A number of weak and incoherent states with poorly demarcated borders between them have created intense security interaction and, by extension, a regional security complex among states in the Horn of Africa. Kenya has been drawn into the Horn of Africa by the presence of Somali-speaking ethnic groups in the North Frontier Districts claimed by the Ziad Barre regime of Somalia (Lemke, 2002; Clapham, 2017). This Mogadishu's irredentist claim contributed to the rise of intense security interactions between Somalia and Kenya over the Somali-inhabited north-eastern region. However, direct military intrusion by the Somali government remained limited. Kenya stood firm on its colonially created border. Besides, to deter irredentist claims on its territory, Kenya strengthened its security alliance with Ethiopia and former colonial powers (Woodward, 1996).

In recent times, Kenya and Somalia have had unresolved maritime border disputes over oil-rich areas of the Indian Ocean. Somalia claims that its borderline from semi-autonomous Jubaland should go straight to the section of the ocean, demarcating a huge part of the claimed territory within its territory (Aljazeera News Agency, 2021). In contrast, Kenya claims the border should take a roughly 45-degree turn at the shoreline and run in a latitudinal line. This gives Kenya access to a larger share of the maritime area (Aljazeera News Agency, 2021).This caused intense security interactions between the two Horn regional states. The situation got worse recently as armed groups in Jubaland fought the Somali National Army. The federal government of Somalia officially accused the Kenyan government of interfering in Somalia's internal affairs. Besides, Somalia had taken its border disputes to regional and continental organizations. Even the two states took the case to the International Boundary Commission. However, the maritime border dispute between the two states has not yet been solved.

Instead of the north-eastern part of Kenya, it was the Ogaden region that became the primary focus of Somali irredentism (Lemke, 2002). After it achieved its independence in the early 1960s, Somalia started to pursue an irredentist foreign policy towards the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Woodward, 1996; Lemke, 2002). To achieve its territorial claim, Somalia made a security alliance with the Soviet Union. As indicated in chapter two, with the support of the Soviet Union, Somalia built strong military forces in the Horn of Africa. This irredentist claim over the Ogaden region laid the foundation for Somalia-Ethiopia's continuous security interaction and, by extension, external

intervention. In 1963, Ethiopia and Somalia went into a small-scale war over their borders. In the years between 1977 and 1978, the two neighboring states went to full-scale war (Meredith, 2005; Woodward, 2006). These rivalries between Ethiopia and Somalia created a wealth of opportunities for external military interventions in the Horn of Africa (for detailed analysis, see chapter two). In addition to the role of external security actors, the two regional states supported each other's liberation movements. Somalia supported the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF). On the other hand, Ethiopia supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Front (Meredith, 2005; Woodward, 2006; Markakis, 2011). Both liberation fronts were allowed to set up military bases in Ethiopia. The support of Ethiopia for these liberation fronts was one factor in the removal of Ziad Barre from power.

Regional conflicts were not restricted to Somalia and Ethiopia. It included Sudan. Khartoum started to support the Eritrean secessionist movements in Ethiopia throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Woodward, 2006). Besides, Clapham made a similar point regarding the Sudanese support for the Eritrean liberation fronts. Clapham (1996: 221) writes that 'the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was able to run its lines of communication freely through Sudan under the Nimairi, Sadiq al-Mahdi, and al-Beshir regimes.' The support of Sudan for the liberation movements in Ethiopia has resulted in the birth of a new state in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea. In retaliation, Ethiopia supported the Sudanese People Liberation Army (SPLA), whose aspiration was regional autonomy and secession. The SPLA has been permitted to operate in Ethiopian territory under the Mengistu regime (Clapham, 1996). The continued support of Ethiopia for the SPLA resulted in the birth of a new state, South Sudan. In addition, Ethiopia and Sudan have unresolved border disputes and have been fighting a small-scale war around the Metema region. On October 11, 2022, Salih made an important speech on the intense security relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. He stated, 'there are border disputes between Sudan and Ethiopia. The internal political developments in Sudan in recent times have pushed political leaders to project their military forces into the contested territories of western Ethiopia. These elites have external backers.'

Therefore, the security interactions between Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti give a broader definition of the Horn of Africa. Nonetheless, providing a foreign military presence and its regional security implications in all these regional states are beyond the scope of the present research. Instead, the present research considered a narrower

definition of the Horn of Africa.[8]In a narrower geographical sense, the Horn of Africa refers to the northeastern part of the African continent, bordering the Red Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. States in the narrower sense of the Horn of Africa are Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. The first three states are the Red Sea littoral states. Ethiopia is included in the narrower definition of the Horn of Africa for three important reasons. First, Ethiopia is located at the heart of the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa shares borders with all Red Sea littoral states (Mesfin, 1999). Ethiopia's (in)security has regional implications. For example, after the federal government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) went into a protected civil war in 2020, Eritrea intervened in the Tigray region. Supporting the Federal Government of Ethiopia, the Eritrean intervention exacerbated the regional conflict in the Horn of Africa (Ylonen, 2022b). Mulu Nega, then interim administration of the Tigray region, told the Reporter Amharic version in 2021 that 'the Eritrean intervention exacerbated the war in Tigray. People were treated inhumanly. The TPLF forces exploited these popular grievances. The youth joined the TPLF forces.' These regional conflicts and rivalries have created opportunities for external interventions.

Second, Ethiopia has established legitimate interests in the Red Sea region. As a landlocked state, Ethiopia has depended on the coastal states to access international water bodies. One of the core foreign policies of Ethiopia is acquiring reliable, predictable, and sustainable access to port services from the Red Sea littoral states (The FDRE Draft Foreign Policy Document, 2021). Ethiopia's quest to access international waters is intimately connected to the security of the Red Sea littoral states. The draft foreign policy document (2021:37) asserted that 'ከቀይ ባህር ተጠቃሚ መሆን ለኢትዮጵያ የህልውና ጉዳይ ነው' translates literally as 'access and use of the Red Sea has become a matter of national security to Ethiopia.' To access the Red Sea region, Ethiopia will work with both regional and extra-regional powers. As discussed in chapter seven, Ethiopia has shown its readiness to have access to the Red Sea in recent times. Ethiopia's quest for the Red Sea coast will have regional security implications.

Third, Ethiopia has been trying to become a regional hegemonic power in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia stands first in terms of population size, highest gross domestic product (GDP), and largest size in terms of geography in the Horn of Africa (Gabriel, 2021; Yonas Ketsela, 2020). Besides, as

[8] Scholars such as Adan (2020) consider the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia as 'the Proper Horn of Africa.'

indicated in chapter four, Ethiopia is a pivotal state in the Horn of Africa. It is considered a springboard for foreign powers to extend their spheres of influence in other African states. Thus, a number of regional and great powers are extending their security presence in the Horn of Africa. The recent competition between the US and China in the internal political dynamics of Ethiopia is a case in point. In addition, Ethiopia is building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) across the Blue Nile River. After completion, the dam will have a geopolitical implication in shifting the regional balance in favor of Addis Ababa. This indicates that Ethiopia aspires to become a regional leader in the provision of peace and security. Therefore, foreign powers cannot ignore Ethiopia when projecting their military presence into the Horn of Africa.

Accordingly, this dissertation refers to a narrower definition of the Horn of Africa, comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.[9]Except Ethiopia, all these states are coastal states bordering the Red Sea region. As already indicated, there is an intense security interaction between Ethiopia and the Red Sea littoral states. Thus, the Horn of Africa forms a regional security complex. The idea of a regional security complex shows that security interactions between two or more neighboring states are strongest and most obvious in the military and political sectors. The security challenges in one regional state are closely and sufficiently linked to its neighboring states. As a regional security complex, the Horn of Africa has more than two actors whose security is closely and sufficiently interlinked. Geographically, these states share borders, and external actors recognize the Horn of Africa as a distinct region (for a detailed analysis, see the theoretical analysis of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa under section nine).

Foreign military presence in a particular region ranges from outright conquest and colonization to the establishment of overseas military bases, facilities, and logistic hubs, joint military exercises; arms transfers, aircraft overflight, and supporting surrogate forces (Peterson, 2008). Because of the ever-strengthening norm of non-intervention in other regions, outright conquest and colonization have declined in contemporary international relations (for a detailed analysis, see chapter four). Thus, the types of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa ranges from the establishment of overseas military bases to the provision of technical facilities, arms transfers, military assistance,

[9] The present dissertation also includes Somaliland. It is actively interacting with external security actors. Hargeisa's relations with foreign powers have implications for regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

and sharing intelligence information. Accordingly, the scope of this research is delimited to discuss foreign military bases (naval, land, and air), close security cooperation (joint military exercises, providing professional military education, and military assistance), and the agreements that brought this military presence to the Horn of Africa.

The decision to establish foreign military bases in other regions lies within the realm of foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions have traditionally been explained using a state-centric paradigm. States remain the primary actors in international relations (Kay, 2006). In other words, it is the states that project and establish military bases in other regions (Bitar, 2016), and the present research focuses on the security activities of external state actors in the Horn of Africa. It thus leaves out the roles of intergovernmental organizations and non-state actors. Therefore, selected foreign powers with military bases and external security actors that have been engaged in security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa are taken as the case study.

As has been discussed above, a diversity of external security actors from North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are projecting their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Presenting the military presence of all external security actors in the Horn of Africa is beyond the scope of this thesis. Space does not permit to deal with the military presence of all projecting powers in the Horn of Africa. Instead, the study considers the military presence of four foreign powers. Accordingly, the security presence of China, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa is presented in detail. The four projecting powers are selected based on three criteria. First, these foreign powers are selected based on their physical military presence in the Horn of Africa. Second, these projecting powers are selected based on their security influence on the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Finally, the justification of the four foreign powers in the Horn of Africa was considered.

These four nations, in terms of projecting powers, have their own justification for their military presence in the Horn of Africa. As discussed in chapter four at length, Saudi Arabia justifies its military presence in the Horn of Africa in terms of its close geographical proximity. Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as its own core security perimeter linked to its national interests. Türkiye justifies its military presence in the Horn of Africa in terms of universalized humanitarian values and material interests in the region. China and the US have been rationalizing their security presence in the Horn of Africa in terms of a systemic security dilemma. China is working to change

the current distribution of power at the global level. The US, on the other hand, is working to maintain the existing international system. This indicates that one great power is working to thwart each other's presence in the Horn of Africa (for a detailed analysis, see chapter four).

As noted earlier, the four foreign powers have a deep physical military presence in the Horn of Africa. They have established military bases in the Horn of Africa and have been engaged in close security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa. The military presence of the US has been felt in the Horn region since the early 2000s. The US established Camp Lemonnier military base in 2001 in Djibouti and has engaged in security cooperation with Horn regional states. The Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa has been felt since the mid-2000s. In the late 2000s, China deployed its military forces to fight the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In 2017, China established a permanent military base in Djibouti. Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been extending its military reach in the Horn of Africa. Its close security cooperation with the Red Sea littoral states and the establishment of military bases at Assab Port demonstrate its assertive foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye has expanded its security presence in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye opened its largest military base in Somalia in 2017. More than 200 Turkish military personnel are stationed at its base in Somalia (Maziad, 2022). In addition, the Turkish military base in Somalia has been serving as a source of security cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia. Apart from Somalia, Türkiye has close security relations with Ethiopia.

Because of their deep military presence, the four projecting powers in the Horn of Africa have been affecting the behavior of the regional states. As discussed in chapter six, Saudi Arabia played a critical role in resolving the 20-year 'no war, no peace' stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This has changed the behavior of the two neighboring states. The Turkish engagement in training the SNA has implications for Somalia's internal security system and, by extension, for other Horn regional states. The military presence of China and the US in the Horn of Africa has been affecting regional conflict dynamics. Accordingly, the present research examines the military presence of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, China, and the US.

The Horn of Africa is burdened by a long history of external military interventions. Colonialism, the Cold War, the war on terror, and the recent military intervention epitomize the continuation of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Dealing with all these military interventions is

beyond the scope of this study. The present research considers into account the most recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the temporal scope of this study is limited to the post-2010 foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. There are two related reasons. First, foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa in response to terrorism and piracy in the 2000s has been intensively discussed by other scholars (see chapters two and three). Second, many of the foreign powers have consolidated their military presence since the early 2010s. As discussed in chapter four, following the 2011 Arab Uprisings, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa increased. Saudi Arabia considered the spread of the Arab Spring into the Horn of Africa a national security threat. Besides, the beginning of the Yemeni civil war in 2015 served as a further catalyst for Saudi Arabia's power projection into the Horn of Africa. Thus, starting in 2015, Saudi Arabia consolidated its military presence in the Horn of Africa to deter its rivals. Apart from Saudi Arabia, Turkiye has consolidated its military presence in the Horn of Africa since the early 2010s. In 2017, Ankara built up a strong military base in Somalia. China has strengthened its military presence in the Horn of Africa in the 2010s. In 2017, China established its first overseas military bases in the Horn of Africa. The US has strengthened its military activities in the Horn of Africa in the post-2010s. For example, the US invested close to one billion dollars to expand the American military presence in the Horn of Africa in 2012 (Styan, 2020). As a result, the main focus of the dissertation is the post-2010 foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In fact, the dissertation employed data that were collected until the end of January 2024.

7. Ethical Considerations

When conducting research, there are certain ethical principles that are taken into consideration. These include voluntarism, informed consent, anonymity, and confidentiality. These ethical principles are taken into consideration when the research involves people as key informants. As noted earlier, to study the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, key informant interviews were the main sources of primary data. Military leaders, academic experts, strategic experts, government officials, and senior diplomats were major key informants. Accordingly, the study has taken a number of ethical considerations into account for the protection of these key informants. First, in the process of interviewing, key informants were informed that they could leave research questions that they did not want to answer. They were allowed to leave research questions that had implications for their personal security. Second, key informants were told that

they could opt out of the interview process at any time. They were allowed to remain anonymous when cited. Third, the consent of the key informants was important to conduct the research. Before conducting the interview process, the researcher got consent from these key informants. The researcher did not employ any kind of deceit, cheating, or financial incentives to get the consent of these key informants. Finally, the interviewees were told that they could receive and review a copy of the present research results to examine the ways in which they were cited so that they could be sure that they were comfortable with the ways in which they were referenced.

8. Limitation of the Study

In writing about the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the researcher faced a number of challenges. These challenges have brought some limitations to the study. One of the major limitations of the study was getting access to the relevant key informants. Because, the study of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa needed access to senior diplomats, military attachés, and security analysts. These key informants were supposed to identify security risks, vulnerabilities, and threats of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on their analysis, these key informants would recommend possible policy strategies to reduce the risks of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, accessing these key informants has become a challenging task. This has implications for the quality of the present research. If the researcher had had a chance to access the views of these key informants, the quality of the present research would have improved. To make matters even worse, many of the key informants for the present research are living outside the states in the Horn of Africa. The second limitation of the present study is related to the unwillingness of the key informants to share their views on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Most of the time, diplomats, government officials, and security analysts were not willing to share their views on the negative implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. They usually discussed their states' positive contribution to the states in the Horn of Africa. They did not touch upon the real problem of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, in the discussion with the deputy ambassadors of China, Turkiye, and the US, researcher noticed the secretive nature of their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The Chinese diplomats usually talked about their state's contribution to the economic transformations in the Horn of Africa. The US diplomats talked about the American contribution to facilitate democratic transition in the states of the Horn of Africa. The Turkish diplomats talked

more about Ankara's humanitarian contribution to the people in Somalia. These indicate that key informants, including diplomats and higher government officials did not touch upon the real problem of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. These factors reduced the quality of the present research.

However, the above limitations did not reduce the quality of the dissertation significantly. The researcher took a number of strategies in order to bring a quality research. The first strategy for reducing the challenges of getting reliable data on the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa was searching different data sources. For example, the best way getting relevant data was searching for website sources. These data sources became important to get the views, comments, and reflections of strategic thinkers on the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the researcher recorded the speeches of some the strategic thinkers and government officials to come up with relevant data on the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, the researcher got access to the speeches of US and Chinese senior diplomats from the websites. The researcher got these speeches of senior diplomats and strategic thinkers on the websites and analyzed them properly to bring qualitative data on foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the researcher attended a number of lecture series organized by embassies and think tanks about the current security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Attending these lecture series became a convenient strategy to arrange further key informant interviews with these senior diplomats and higher government officials. These techniques of getting relevant key informants bore fruit. In doing these activities, the researcher finally tried to solve the problem of getting the relevant key informants and qualitative data from these key informants.

9. The Structure of the Study

This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Each chapter will have a logical flow from the earlier one. Chapter one introduces the study of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Besides, chapter one deals with the methodology and methods of data collection and sets out the problem of the research. Moreover, this chapter lays out conceptual frameworks in terms of foreign military presence using appropriate theories.

Chapter two presents foreign military intervention in the Horn of Africa in different historical periods. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the driving interests of external security actors,

the strategies of acquiring military bases, and the role of these foreign security actors in changing the regional security dynamics of the Horn of Africa. For convenience, past foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is divided into four phases. The first phase considers the pre-colonial foreign military intervention in the Horn of Africa. The second phase extends foreign military presence from the late-nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. The third phase covers the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. The fourth phase covers foreign military activities in the Horn of Africa in the 2000s and this section examines the foreign military presence to fight transnational security threats such as terrorism and piracy. Dividing the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa into four different phases is aimed at achieving two goals. First, this categorization is aimed at capturing the changes and continuities of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa in different historical times and enables to understand the strategies of foreign military interventions in different periods. Third, this division will help to clearly grasp the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. These discussions serve as the starting point for the next chapter, chapter three.

Chapter three presents a critical synthesis of previous research results related to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In reviewing earlier research, the emphasis will be on what has been studied, argued, and established regarding the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. To get a clear picture of the previous studies, the literature review was organized thematically. In line with this, published books and journal articles were reviewed to identify the competitive interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Then, detailed discussions were given on the patterns of relations among foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Next, existing literature was reviewed on how foreign powers influenced the regional security dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Finally, a review the related literature was given on the response strategies of the Horn regional states to the new foreign military presence. A detailed and systematic literature review is aimed at identifying research gaps regarding external security engagements in the Horn of Africa. Conducting a literature review serves as a departure from what other researchers have found out with regard to methodology, areas of controversy, perspectives, and coverage.

Chapter four, which follows from chapter three, addresses the renewed interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. This chapter details with both external and internal dynamics that drew the

attention of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. To provide an in-depth analysis on the factors that pushed foreign powers into the Horn of Africa, chapter four takes four projecting powers, notably China, the US, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Selecting these four projecting powers in the Horn of Africa is aimed at providing an in-depth analysis on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Besides, chapter four examines the bases of basing access of these four projecting powers in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter five deals with the foreign powers' relations in the Horn of Africa. This chapter, first, provides a conceptual analysis of foreign powers' involvement in other regions. In other words, a detailed discussion on cooperation, competition, hegemony, and disengagement was provided. Besides, the chapter details the patterns of relations among external security actors in the Horn of Africa. In addition, chapter five provides a critical analysis of the diverging and converging interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Then, based on the relations of extra-regional powers in the Horn of Africa, I distinguished the foreign powers' relations in the Horn of Africa among the four types of external military intervention in a particular region.

Chapter six, a central part of the dissertation, focuses on the regional dynamics and security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The effects of foreign military presence, such as changes in alliance relations, regional security complexes, and geopolitical changes in the Horn of Africa, are critically analyzed. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, is divided into three sections. The first section details the implications of foreign military presence on the domestic attributes of local states in the Horn of Africa. The second section deals with the implications of foreign military presence on the patterns of Horn states' relations. The third section provides an in-depth analysis of the influence of foreign powers on the Horn's regional security dynamics, regional security dilemmas, and regional power structure.

Chapter seven engages with deals with the response strategies of Horn regional states to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on their interests, the Horn regional states responded differently to the new foreign military presence in the region. Thus, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis on the Horn regional states' response strategies to the new foreign military presence.

Finally, chapter eight summarizes the main findings of the dissertation. The chapter covers the long history of external military presence in the Horn of Africa (colonialism, the Cold War, the war on terror, and the recent influx of foreign powers) and outlines patterns of similarities and differences in the interests and opportunities of foreign powers in the region. Based on the results of the study, the research offers policy recommendations to the governments in the Horn of Africa, foreign policymakers, and representatives of regional organization.

10. Theoretical Frameworks

The field of security studies and international relations have been dominated by positivist/ rationalist theoretical frameworks (Cavelty and Mauer, 2010). Theories such as realism, neo-realism, liberalism, liberal institutionalism and functionalism fall under the category of positivist theoretical frameworks. These theoretical frameworks explain the objective material interests of great powers in other regions (Tang, 2010). Besides, the focus of these theories is the influences of international system on regional security dynamics and the regional security complexes. According to positivist theoretical frameworks, regions are subordinated to international system.

After the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, mainstream international relations theories have been challenged by post-positivist theoretical perspectives (Mansbach and Rafferty, 2008). There are three important developments that increased the importance of post-positivist theoretical frameworks. First, the concept of security and secuirity studies have been widened and broadened The origins of insecurity are no longer the competition between great powers for material interests in other regions. As discussed in chapter five, great power compete for some ideological and alternative economic models. Above and beyond, many of the current security discourses are no longer primarily about threats coming from another state. Recently, the world has seen the emergence of non-state actors. The threats coming from terrorism, piracy and violent extremism has become regional and global security problems. To fight these non-state actors, foreign powers extend their powers into other regions. In addition, great powers do not project their military presence in other regions only for material interests. Sometimes, they consolidate their military presence in other regions for non-material needs. For example, some great powers such as China and Türkiye are projecting their military presence into the Horn of Africa to show their status as a responsible great powers (see chapter four).

Second, foreign powers extend their military presence in other regions considering the perception of other projecting great powers, their historical relations and systemic security consideration (Oskanian, 2013). Mainstream international security theories do not consider the importance of historical memories, the perception of one great power towards the other and systemic security competition between great powers (Oskanian, 2013). For example, the recent great power military presence in the Horn of Africa is explained by the perception of one great power towards the other

projecting power. China projected its military forces into the Horn of Africa following the Japanese military presence in the region (Capestan, 2022). As discussed in chapter five, the US-China relations in the Horn of Africa transcend their material interests in the region.

Third, the distinction between high politics and low politics has become blurred. For example, in the current international relations, energy is not just an economic commodity. It has become a strategic resource having significant security implications (Malek, 2010). In order to secure the flow of energy, great powers extend their military presence in strategically important regions. For these reasons, the mainstream international relation theories have been challenged by new theoretical perspectives. These developments have given rise to the emergence of post-positivist /critical/ theories. To explore the advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its security implications, post-positivist theoretical frameworks are employed. There are many post-positivist theories that explain the military presence of great powers in the Horn of Africa, the interaction between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, and the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa. Theories such as base politics theory, geopolitical theories, the balance of threat theory, regional security complex theory, base politics theory, regional security order theory, and new regionalism theory serve as lens to understand and explain foreign military presence in other regions and its security implications.

As advanced by Mackinder in his contribution to *The Geopolitical Pivot of History* and Mahan in his contribution to *The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660-1783),* the geopolitical theories indicate the importance of geography for the political decision-making process. According to geopolitical theories, international relations take place within a geographic context. Great powers extend their military presence in other regions to control strategic sea lines of communication, natural resources, and trade routes. Mackinder (1904) stated that those who control the heartland (Eurasia and Central Asia) control the world. In his analysis, Mackinder explained the importance of land power. In contrast, Mahan (1890) stated that the easiest way to reach resource-rich regions is by sea. Many of the great powers in history, such as the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch, and Britain, strengthened their naval forces to control distant places. This indicates that great powers that built strong naval forces extended their military presence in different parts of the world.

However, the application of geopolitical theories to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has certain limitations. First, geopolitical theorists do not consider changes in military technology. In recent times, great powers have invented military weapons that transcend the importance of geography. For example, new inventions in air power reduced the role of geopolitical theories (Harkavy, 1982). In other words, new military hardware such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles has become important in warmaking (Lutz, 2009). Taking advantage of these modern military weapons, external powers could achieve military missions from their home states.[10]Second, the interests of foreign powers in other regions are not limited to geographical importance (trade routes, fertile agricultural land and minerals). Great powers project their military power into other regions for systemic great power rivalries (Oskanian, 2013; Gunness *et al*, 2022). This leads to the importance of ideas and values in foreign military presence in other regions. Therefore, the application of geopolitical theories to the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has its own limitations.

The second theory that explains foreign military presence and its regional security implications is the balance of threat theory. As advanced by Stephen M. Walt (1987), the balance of threat theory explains that military power is insufficient to explain the behavior of states in other regions. As its name indicates, the balance of threat theory indicates that states balance against perceived threats. These perceived threats originate from the geographical proximity between the two regional states. The closer the two states are, the more likely they perceive each other as a threat. This is exacerbated by the advent of foreign powers in the region. The presence of foreign powers in the region poses security threats to other neighboring states. To respond to these threats, regional states form security alliances with other foreign powers. The security alliance could include the establishment of overseas military bases. The recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is explained by these dynamics. The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is explained by the informal security alliance. The host states in the Horn of Africa form security alliances with foreign powers to balance security threats that come from neighboring regional states. For example, Djibouti has had a security alliance with France since 1977. This security alliance with foreign powers has

[10] As Harkavy (1982) writes, the presence of the Soviet Union in Eurasia was considered to be an advantage. Because it was inaccessible. But now it has become less important for military strategy. Currently, the vast land of Eurasia has become vulnerable to airstrikes from afar.

enabled Djibouti to become a stable state in an otherwise unstable region. However, the balance of threat theory has certain limitations to explain the new military presence in the Horn of Africa. First, balance of threat theory does not consider the importance of geo-economics for the advent of great powers in the Horn of Africa. Second, the balance of threat theory does not show the interaction of great powers and its security implications in the Horn of Africa.

The third theory that explains foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is the base politics theory. Proposed by Alexander Cooley (2008), base politics theory explains the relations between basing states and host states. According to base politics theory, the stability of base agreements depends on the political stability of host states. As Cooley (2008) pointed out, basing agreements between host states and basing states depend on the level of domestic politicization and the opportunities that the basing states bring to the local leaders. In other words, base politics theory serves as the model when base agreements are accepted, rejected, and politicized. Consolidated democracies offer the most credible environment for military base agreements. They respect international laws. Conversely, military base deals between projecting powers and host states in authoritarian regimes are unpredictable. In these states, base deals between foreign powers and the political leaders of host states face opposition from different sections of society.

As noted above, base politics theory to some extent, explains the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, as indicated in Chapter six, military base deals in the Horn of Africa are based on the interests of local leaders. Nevertheless, base politics theory failed to provide the interaction of basing powers and their regional security implications. Besides, base politics theory fails to take into consideration the rise of extra-regional developments that increased the importance of the Horn of Africa. More importantly, the focus of base politics theory is on the domestic contrstrains for accessing foreign military bases. In other words, base politics theory does not take into consideration the systemic distribution of power.

As already indicated, there are a number of theoretical frameworks to explain foreign military presence in other regions. However, two theretical frameworks are applied in order to explain the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. First is the theory of regional security complex. Formulated by Buzan and Waever (2003), the theory of regional security complex explains the

security realtions of states in a particular region, relations between one region and other neighboring regions, and the penetration of foreign powers in the same region.

Before analyzing the applications of the regional security complex theory to the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, a good grasp of what is meant by a regional security complex is important. Scholars such as Buzan (1983:107) stated that 'the regional security complex refers to 'a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked closely and sufficiently so that their national securities cannot be considered apart from other neighboring regional states' security.' From Buzan's definition, it is clear that the regional security complex indicates that the (in)security of one regional state has implications for neighboring states. Besides, Buzan and Weaver (2003:47) elaborated on the regional security complex as 'a group of states possessing a degree of security interdependence. Security interdependence requires substantial security interaction among regional states.' This, in turn, requires certain geographical proximity between regional states. This is because security threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones. In addition, Oskanian (2013) stated that regional security complexes refer to intense security interactions among regional states. In these kinds of intense security interactions, the security problem of one state in the region has its own implications for the security of neighboring states. The regional security complex is not limited to the intense security interaction between regional states. The regional security complex refers to the internal transformation of the region through the addition of state-like, internationally unrecognized units (Oskanian, 2013). The emergence of unrecognized *de facto* states in a particular region further complicates the intense security interaction. The Horn of Africa is a case in point.

Based on the above explanation, Buzan and Weaver (2003) further argue that the regional security complex works when regional states send security threats to their neighbors. In other words, a regional security complex does not exist when the units in the region do not send security threats to their neighboring states. In these kinds of regions, each state does not send security threats to other regional states. Low security interactions between regional states make it difficult for regional security complexes to form. Besides, regional security complexes do not work in mature regions such as Western Europe and the Nordic regions (for a detailed analysis, see chapter four). The reason being, there are no intense security interactions between regional states. Each state in these regions is not a security threat to neighboring states (Hook and Spanier, 2016). If conflict arises,

regional states resolve it diplomatically and politically. Besides, there are regional institutions that provide predicable norms for the pattern of the regional states' relations. In addition, regional security complexes do not exist in heavily penetrated regions. Weaver and Buzan (2003) stated that for a regional security complex to operate, it must not be overlaid by a foreign military presence. If foreign powers overlay the regional states' interactions, the security complex ceases to operate. This indicates that there are no active and operative interactions between the regional states and foreign powers. In short, regional security complexes do not exist in every region.

The regional security complexes work in regions where there are intense security interactions between regional states. The Horn of Africa is one of the best examples of a regional security complex because there are intense security interactions between the Horn regional states and other Red Sea littoral states, forming 'a regional security complex.' As a regional security complex, there has been intense security interaction between Ethiopia and the Red Sea littoral states. As Aaron (2018) stated, the security problems of each Horn regional state are interlinked with other regional states. In other words, security problems in one of the Horn regional states affect the security of neighboring states. This indicates that the regional states in the Horn of Africa are held together by shared rivalries. Djibouti and Eritrea have been in an intense security interaction over the Ras Doumeira (Plaut, 2016; Plaut, 2023b; Magu, 2019). Besides, Somalia is in a state of internal insecurity. The central government of Somalia has become too weak to show its presence in every part of the country. Its failure to deploy security forces in Somaliland has created a self-declared *de facto* state (Kinfe, 2002; Magu, 2019). The internal insecurity in Somalia has regional security implications. In recent times, Ethiopia has been experiencing frequent conflicts in different parts of the country (Plaut, 2023a). As noted in chapter four, the current destructive war between the central government of Ethiopia and the Tigray forces has both domestic and regional implications.

The regional security complex of the Horn of Africa has relations with other neighboring regions and global powers active in the Red Sea littoral. As Buzan (1983) noted, external dynamics have implications for the local distribution of power. At the same time, local security problems have implications for external dynamics. The same is true in the Horn of Africa. For example, the internal domestic problem in Somalia has regional and global implications. Scholars such as Lamin (2008) and Magu (2019) have stated that there are linkages between weak states and the proliferation of non-state actors. These weak states cannot control their porous borders. This state weakness created

fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state actors in the country. As Stadtmuller (2005:114) writes, 'the regional dimension of security cannot be separated from the global order. It is linked to global security dynamics.' As noted in chapter four, the Horn of Africa is populated by weak states resulting in local insecurity and the security problem of a state in the Horn of Africa is not only linked to neighboring regions such as the Arab Gulf region. It is connected with globally acting great powers. The Somali state weakness and the proliferation of maritime piracy in the late 2000s indicated the close relations between weak states and the proliferation of non-state actors, and by extension, external military intrusion. Great powers such as the US and China have projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa to fight non-state actors.

Thus, based on the above analysis, regional security complex theory could explain the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. To apply regional security complex theory, there are a number of points to be considered. First, as noted above, the application of regional security complex theory needs four levels of analysis. These levels are the internal security dynamics of each state in the region, the spillover effect of the internal dynamics into neighboring states, the security relations between two neighboring regions, and the security relations of a region with globally acting powers. Buzan and Weaver (2003) stated that the regional security complex theory examines the internal conditions of a state, relations among units in the region, relations between neighboring regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers. In the same way, the Horn of Africa has four levels of analysis. These levels are the internal dynamics of each state in the Horn of Africa, the patterns of relations among the Horn regional states, the relations between the Horn of Africa and the Arab Gulf region, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers. As Lanfranchi (2021) concluded, the local conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa are linked to both neighboring regions and global powers.

The presence of weak and incoherent states in a particular region is central to regional security complex theory. In general, weak states employ military forces to bring domestic peace and stability (Oskanian, 2013). Sometimes, they invite external security actors to complement their internal weaknesses. As noted in chapter four, the Horn of Africa is populated by weak and fragile states. For example, Somalia has been in a state of insecurity since the early 1990s. It has no capacity to control its borders. In recent years, Ethiopia has been rocked by ethnic civil wars. The internal

political system of Djibouti is characterized by competing interests between the Afars and Issa ethnic groups (Plaut, 2016, Belete, 2023).

Simultaneously, the internal security problem of each state in the Horn of Africa has its own spillover effects on other regional states. Scholars such as Miller (2007) stated that weak states bring security challenges to their respective neighboring states. The problem of state weakness in the Horn of Africa feeds into regional patterns of amity and enmity. This goes with what Buzan *et al* (1998) stated, security interactions are associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbors more than distant powers because of distance of proximity. In the same way, the security problems of each Horn regional state have their own spillover effects on other neighboring states. State weakness has resulted in repeated al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and other neighboring states. For example, al-Shabaab crossed the Ethiopian borders and engaged in protracted conflicts with Ethiopian forces in 2022 (Samira, 2022). The civil war in Ethiopia between the federal government and the TPLF forces drew the Eritrean military intervention supporting the Ethiopian government (Plaut, 2023a).

Besides, the security of the Horn of Africa is closely linked with the security of neighboring regions. For example, the Arab Gulf region and the Horn of Africa are intricately intertwined. Karim (2022) noted that the increased military presence of the Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa indicates security relations between the two regions. The (in)security of the Gulf region has its own implications for the security of the Horn of Africa. As Mabon (2022:298) writes, 'the regional rivalries in the Arab Gulf region have been integrated with the Horn's regional conflict dynamics.' For example, as noted in chapter four, the outbreak of civil war in Yemen in 2015 cast its long shadow in the Horn of Africa.[11]The war in Yemen has exacerbated the regional security of the Horn of Africa.

In addition, some of the states in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, are weak states that cannot control the proliferation of non-state actors in their territories and the internal state weakness has produced threats to to globally acting great powers. Scholars such as Magu (2019) and Carbone (2020) writes that the rise of piracy and terrorism in Somalia drew the attention of external interests in the Horn of Africa. To fight terrorism and piracy in the Horn of Africa, foreign powers extended

[11]To defeat fight the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia and its allies established military bases in the Red Sea region.

and consolidated their military presence. Other states in the Horn of Africa, such as Djibouti and Eritrea have been making security alliances with foreign powers. Ylonen (2022b) stated that to bring peace internally, some of the states in the Horn of Africa, such as Eritrea and Djibouti formed security alliances with foreign powers. Thus, the regional security problems of the Horn of Africa have been linked to global security dynamics (Belachew, 2009). What links the distribution of power among the global powers to the regional conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa is the mechanism of penetration and military interventions (Donelli and Cannon, 2020). Military penetration occurs when outside military powers make security alliances and alignments with regional states within the regional security complex (Miller, 2003). Usually, foreign powers extend their military presence into politically volatile and conflict-prone regions. The Horn of Africa is a conflict-prone and volatile region. External security actors extend their military forces into the Horn of Africa considering this regional quality.

Second, regional security complex theory considers the state as the key variable and the military sector as the main problem to be explored, and the region as the level of analysis (Buzan *et al,* 1998). As the main actor in international relations, Saudi Arabia, America, China, and Türkiye deployed their military forces in the Horn of Africa. Scholars such as Heath, Gunness, and Finazzo (2022) noted that great powers extend military presence towards regions that are important for their future prosperity. This is to exploit resources and maintain their dominant position in the region. The same is true for the recent advent of great powers in the Horn of Africa. These projecting powers are calculating their geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. Besides, regional security complex theory asserts that the regional level is always operative (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). The region is not dominated by external security actors, and it maintains its autonomy. It has to interact with both regional and great powers. In the same way, as discussed in chapter seven, the states in the Horn of Africa interact with foreign powers. Even some states in the Horn of Africa play great power off each other. As a result, the present research asserts that the Horn of Africa is considered to be the level of analysis to explain the effects and outcomes of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Third, the application of regional security complex theory takes into consideration the patterns of amity and enmity relations among the regional states (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). Rather than reflecting on mechanical security relations, the regional security complex theory takes into

consideration values (security discourse among regional states), historical relations, and the perception of one state towards the other regional states (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). The amity and enmity relations among the states in the Horn of Africa could be traced back to the late nineteenth century. As Carbone (2020) noted, the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa arose from past political events and external interventions. As indicated in chapter two, the advent of colonial powers in the late nineteenth century created incoherent and weak states in the Horn of Africa. This arbitrary boundary demarcation resulted in the proliferation of revisionist and secessionist forces in the Horn of Africa in the 1960s. The revisionist states in the Horn of Africa have been supporting secessionist forces in the neighboring states. At times, it projected its military forces to control the region. In the same way, states in the Horn of Africa have been engaged in intense security interactions across their borders. These intense interactions and competition are supported by external security actors (see chapter two for a detailed analysis).

Fourth, regional security complex theory considers the presence of *de facto* state-like units and their implications for the regional security complex. Like the South Caucasus,[12] the Horn of Africa has state-like units that complicate the regional security complex. For example, the existence of uneasy relations between Somalia and Somaliland has presented a major regional security challenge (Mahmood, 2019). Somaliland invited external security actors into its territory to get international recognition. The close economic relations between the UAE and Somaliland have regional security implications. In recent years, Ethiopia is strengthening economic relations with Somaliland which has implications for relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. This indicates that the presence of a *de facto* independent state in the Horn of Africa created fertile ground for foreign military presence. Therefore, regional security complex theory explains the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Besides, regional security complex theory explains how foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa influenced the amity and enmity relations of regional states. In addition, regional security complex theory helps to elucidate the conflicting interests of foreign powers and the subsequent regional security implications in the Horn of Africa.

[12] The existence of *de facto* states such as Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus has been a bone of contention between Armenia and Azerbaijan. These intense security interactions drew the attention of foreign powers.

The second theory that explains the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is the regional security order theory. Proposed by Lake and Morgan (1997), regional security order theory explains the influences of foreign military presence in other regions' security dynamics. According to regional security order theory, the nature of the regional security order, the regional security dynamics, and the significance of the region for foreign powers determine foreign military presence in other regions. For Lake and Morgan (1997), the nature of the regional security order indicates the regional security management system. Some regions manage their political and security relations peacefully. These kinds of security management system is important to resist external interventions. Supporting these kinds of claims, Lake and Morgan (1997) write that some regions with well-developed regional security order can resist external military intervention. They can easily form barriers of protection and develop common response strategies to external security threats. Western Europe is the case in point. As noted in chapter four, member states of the European Union have developed the skills of managing their regional conflicts peacefully. On the other hand, other regional states have hostile relations and engage in intense security interactions. Intra-regional dynamics in these regions are characterized by distrust and hostile relations among regional states (Lake and Morgan, 1997). States in the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the Horn of Africa do not have the culture of settling regional disputes peacefully. As discussed in detail in chapter four, these regions are populated by competing weak states. These local competitions among regional states draw the attention of foreign powers as a result external interventions bring about changes in the regional security management systems as well as security agenda. The changes in regional security order, security threats, and security agenda are discernible in regions where the relations between regional states are hostile. Lake and Morgan (1997) further noted that regions populated by politically volatile states do not perceive common security threats from outside. They do not have common response strategies to the threat of external military interventions. The enmity and distrust among regional states create fertile ground for external interventions. After intrusion, foreign powers complicate the regional security order and change the regional distribution of power. From these analyses, the nature of regional security order paves the way for external military intervention in a particular region.

Such intervention is due to the strategic location of a particular region which attracts the attention of great powers. In other words, foreign powers deploy their military forces in regions with strategic and economic significance. The strategic significance of these regions is due to the presence of sea-

lanes (a trade route across the sea where ships sail), chokepoints (a strategic narrow route providing passage for ships), and their importance for trade and investment (Lake and Morgan, 1997). The economic importance of these regions indicates the presence of natural resources (oil, minerals, and markets for great powers). To secure these strategic places and economic needs, great powers extend their influence. Controlling strategically and economically important regions has direct implications for global power distributions. The Horn of Africa, one of the most strategically important parts of the world, has attracted the attention of foreign powers in recent times. As noted in chapter four, the significance of the Horn of Africa is due to its proximity to the Red Sea, an important sealane and, the Gulf of Aden (a chokepoint linking the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea), and its proximity to the volatile and oil-rich regions of the Middle East. These factors attracted foreign powers to the Horn of Africa.

From the above analysis, the regional security order theory explains the implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. As previously indicated, the states in the Horn of Africa have their own internal security problems. Ethiopia has seen popular protests and ethnic civil wars in different parts of the country in recent times. Somalia has been without effective central governments since 1991. The future fate of Somaliland has regional security implications. These internal problems of the states in the Horn of Africa Horn shape the direction of foreign military presence. The advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has its own security implications for good or bad. The best example of this development is the recent peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The internal dynamics of Ethiopia (the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed as a new prime minister following three years of popular protests) and the role of the external actors (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) in the peace process have changed the security dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Thus, regional security order theory could explain the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

11. Foreign Military Presence: Conceptual Frameworks

11. 1 Foreign Military Presence: A Conceptual Analysis

Defining 'foreign military presence,' in other regions has become a difficult task. In terms of these difficulties, there are a number of points. In the first place, the concept of 'foreign military presence' in other regions takes different forms. Some foreign powers extend their military forces and colonize other regions militarily. In these kinds of foreign military presence, the regional security complexes cease to operate and regional states will lose their autonomy and soverighty. The basing powers extend their military presence to control the economy, political, and security sectors of the host states. In addition, other great powers extend their military presence in other regions with the consent of the host states. These security relations indicate that both the host states and basing powers enagage in close security relations. Furthermore, foreign powers extend their military presence in other regions in the form of security cooperation. Security cooperation involves joint military exercise, provision of military training and sharing security information.

In addition to varying degrees of foreign military presence in other regions, the territory of the host states where projecting powers deploy their military forces brings another ambiguity. Some projecting powers establish land bases on the soil of other states. However, other projecting powers established naval bases on the water bodies close to the host states' territory. On the other hand, other projecting powers build-up air bases and arranges security agreements for air flight rights. Even other projecting powers engage in security agreements with other regional states.

In addition to the above difficulties, the purpose of foreign military presence in other regions has made defining foreign military presence difficult. Great powers claim that their foreign military presence in other regions is to bring peace and stability in conflict-ridden regions. They deploy their military forces in other regions in the name of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. Moreover, foreign powers extend their military presence to ensure smooth resources flows in intrinsically important regions. Other states also tend to project their military presence in other regions to deter the security activities of potential enemies. These ambiguities have made defining foreign military presence in other regions difficult.

In spite of these complexities, a number of scholars have provided a conceptual analysis of 'foreign military presence,' in other regions. For example, Hermann and Kegley (1996:440) defined foreign

military presence as, 'the intervention of one great powers' military force into another states' territory using military force.' In their definition, Hermann and Kegley stressed that foreign military presence indicates the use of military forces to control the territories of other states. Foreign powers employ military forces to control foreign lands to secure their strategic and commercial interests.

Lustumbo and colleagues use the concepts of 'foreign military posture,' to denote the military presence of foreign powers in other regions (Lustumbo *et al*, 2013). They are of the opinion that the concept of foreign military posture indicates temporary or permanent deployment of foreign military forces into other regions. Lustumbo and colleagues (2013) further indicated that foreign military posture includes military infrastructures that make up the projecting powers' footprint and the agreements that brought this military presence. Lostumbo *et al* (2013*)* indicated that overseas military posture is aimed at deterring adversaries, strengthening alliance relations and responding to contingency security threats. In an attempt to execute these security activities, projecting powers provide missile defense and other modern firearms to client states.

Other scholars such as Harkavy (1982) provided a broader definition of foreign military presence in other regions. Instead of foreign military posture, Harkavy prefers to use foreign military access which includes all types of bases and facilities, aircraft over flight rights, port visit privileges and the use of offshore anchorages within sovereign maritime limits. In addition to these security activities, foreign military access includes foreign powers' right to disseminate its cultural values that is important for language dissemination. This is an important strategy to access intelligence information. Furthermore, foreign military access includes accessing to markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities in particular states and regions.

Furthermore, Calder (2007) defined foreign military presence in terms of the security activities of projecting powers in intrinsically important regions. Accordingly, Calder (2007:9) defined foreign military presence as, 'the security activities of external military actors on the soil of other sovereign states.' In his definition, Calder (2007) stressed that foreign military presence is the stationing of foreign armed forces in the territories of sovereign states to conduct security activities. These military activities include, securing the interests of projecting powers in the region, providing security protection to the host states, and influencing the internal political dynamics of the host states.

Similar to Calder, Cooley (2009) tried to define foreign military presence in terms of the purpose and the security activities of projecting power in other regions. Accordingly, to these scholars, a foreign military presence enables the basing states to reinforce alliance relations and deter adversaries and enhances the intervention capabilities of the projecting powers in other regions. This in turn increases the ability and capacity to respond quickly to external security threats. Additionally, foreign military presence enables to secure the flow of overseas trade through the protection of trade routes and sea lines of communications.

Other scholars, such as Peterson conceptualized 'foreign military presence' in terms of the degree of foreign military presence in other regions. As Peterson (2009:186) noted, 'to better conceptualize foreign military presence in other regions, it is better to identify the degree of military presence.' For Peterson, foreign military presence has a variety of degrees of presence in other regions. Based on the declining order of projecting powers' military presence in other regions, foreign military presence takes the following forms: outright conquest and colonization, setting up overseas military bases, offshore naval presence, close security cooperation (joint military exercise, arms sales and transfers, military investments, and steady aircraft over flights) and supporting surrogate forces. Pe terson (2009:186) further indicated that 'the mechanism of foreign military presence indicates the security activities of extra-regional powers in other regions.' To extend and consolidate their military presence, projecting powers employ military forces, and build-up military bases that enable them to enhance their intervention capabilities and control the security activities of the region.

As the preceding discussion suggests, several scholars and strategic thinkers defined 'foreign military presence' in different ways. Some define foreign military presence in terms of the deployments of foreign military personnel in other regions. They employ military forces to extend their security presence in other regions. These military deployments suppress the dynamics of regional conflicts and the regional security complex. Others defined foreign military presence in terms of asymmetrical security relations between the projecting powers and host states. Still, other scholars defined foreign military presence in terms of the establishment of military bases and military facilities in other regions. According to these scholars, a foreign military base indicates the strategic presence of foreign powers in a particular region.

For the purpose of this study, 'foreign military presence,' refers to the military presence of great and regional powers in the Horn of Africa. This military presence is discernible in the establishment of military bases, the engagement in security cooperation, and the provision of security assistance to the states in the Horn of Africa. As already indicated in the problem statement section and provided in detail in chapter four, several foreign powers established military bases in the Horn of Africa. In 2002, the US established a military base in Djibouti. Besides, the US has engaged in security cooperation with the Horn regional states. Besides, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Beyond establishment of a military base, China has security cooperation with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia established a military base at Assab Port in 2015. Besides, Saudi Arabia's military presence is visible in security alliance relations. Türkiye has maintained a strong military presence in the Horn of Africa. In 2017, Türkiye established its largest military base in Somalia. This military base has been serving as close security cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia.

The above discussion demonstrated foreign military presence can be explained in three aspects. These are military footprints (bases and facilities), security cooperation (joint military exercise, military training, and provision of professional military education) and security agreements that brought foreign military presence to the Horn of Africa. Thus, to better conceptualize foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, understanding military footprints (military bases and military facilities) and security cooperation is essential.

External security actors, as part of their military presence in the Horn of Africa, established military bases. This indicates that military bases are the most visible aspects of foreign military presence in other regions. A number of scholars have defined foreign military bases in different ways. For example, Bitar (2016:49) defined military bases as 'an established mechanism of great powers' physical military presence in other regions.' From Bitar's definition, military bases are established in order to build infrastructures of projecting powers in other regions. These military infrastructures are aimed at carrying out military operations. These operations include responses to contingency security threats, surveillance, intelligence gathering, and training of local forces.

Similar to Bitar, Lutz (2009) defined foreign military bases as a physical installation where foreign troops carry out military operations with a high degree of autonomy in the territory of host states. Lutz (2009:6) further noted that, 'military bases are centerpieces and manifestations of great powers'

military presence in other regions.' This indicates that military bases are established tools of military presence in other regions. According to Lutz (2009), foreign military bases represent a confluence of labour (soldiers and civilians), land and capital. Great power, to establish their military bases in other region, deploy their military forces, and send workers, including engineers, contractors, and their families. These deployments need space in the host states. Military facilities, supplies, and equipment are built by engineers and contractors. All these constructions need a significant amount of capital. Other scholars such as Work and Krepinevich (2007) provided a detailed definition of foreign military bases arguing that military bases are settlements, reservations, or installations that shelter military personnel of projecting powers. These scholars further assert that a military base encompasses land bases for ground combat forces, naval bases for naval forces, and air bases for air forces. These military bases contain large concentrations of military supplies and equipment to facilitate power projection beyond the great power's defensive perimeter.

Harkavy (2007) and Calder (2009) provided nearly a similar definition for foreign military bases. The two authors considered foreign military bases as the military infrastructure of foreign powers in other states' territory. This established military infrastructure serves as a means of enhancing intervention capabilities in other regions. Harkavy (2007) and Calder (2009) further stated that foreign military bases are areas on land or at sea beyond the sovereign state's jurisdiction having some number of armed forces, military facilities, and supplies.

Therefore, based on the security threats and the cost of constructing military bases, projecting powers establish three kinds of military bases in other regions. These are main operating bases (MOBs), forward operating bases (FOBs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs). The difference between these three military bases is related to the number of foreign military forces in other regions, the costs of construction of military bases and the missions of foreign military bases. For example, MOBs need the presence of heavy military forces in other regions. Bitar (2016) stated that MOBs are permanent and inflexible military bases with robust infrastructure in the host states. In general, MOBs require the deployment of huge military forces and their families. These soldiers and their families need a constant supply of food, shelter, schools for their children and health services. These supplies and logistics need huge sum of money.

Established in the territories of trusted allies, MOBs are aimed at deterring adversaries (Gillem, 2007). For example, throughout the Cold War, America established its MOBs in Western Europe. Two points stand out in relation to the US military presence in Western Europe. First, the US sought to contain the Soviet expansion into Western Europe (Pevehouse and Goldstein, 2014). Second, America worked hard to ensure the presence of a market-based economy in Europe. Thus, the US established MOBs in Germany and deployed 330,000 strong military forces in the country (Harkavy, 2007; Gillem, 2007; Black, 2008). In addition, the US worked hard to deter the North Korean advance into Japan and South Korea (Lustombo *et al*, 2013). To protect its allies in East Asia, America maintained a huge military presence in the region. For example, the US deployed 40,000 strong military forces in South Korea. Besides, more than 40, 000 troops were deployed on the Islands of Okinawa, Japan (Harkavy, 2007). Hence, during the Cold War, America maintained its MOBs in Europe and East Asia. As Gillem (2007:73) concluded, 'the US military bases during the Cold War were similar to small towns containing military offices, homes, shopping centers, schools and industrial areas.'

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the importance of MOBs declined (Krepinevich and Work, 2007; Bitar, 2016). This is explained in three dimensions. First, in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, projecting powers preferred to use smaller and more mobile military forces in other regions (Harkavy, 2007; Calder, 2009). This is related to the new security threats. Instead of great powers, transnational security actors such as maritime piracy and terrorism have become the main security threats for great powers since the end of the Cold War. To fight these non-state actors, proximity to the sources of security threats has become an important base. This indicates that after the end of the Cold War, a more flexible military presence has become preferable to fight contingency security threats. Scholars such as Lustombo *et al* (2013) noted that forward military presence enables foreign military forces to respond to contingency security threats. Second, following the end of the Cold War, America reduced its huge military forces stationed in its trusted allies such as Western European states (Gillem, 2007). In recent times, America has preferred to deploy flexible military forces in weak and failed states that have become fertile ground for the proliferation of terrorist groups (Magu, 2019). Third, the new technological advancements in the area of military technology changed the nature of foreign military bases. In recent years, great powers have developed bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and nuclear-powered submarines. Taking advantage of this recent military hardware, great powers reduced their heavy military presence in other regions.

These military preferences and technological developments have led to the importance of FOBs. Forward operating bases are expandable and flexible military facilities. Besides, FOBs require limited and flexible foreign armed forces to operate military missions. Based on the requirements, these facilities are easily transferable to transfer from one place to another. Krepinevich and Work (2007) stated that FOBs are aimed at deterring potential rivals, performing reconnaissance, collecting security intelligence, and responding to contingency security threats. Besides, as Pettyjohn and Kavanagh (2016:4) observed, 'FOBs are needed to carry out military operations effectively far from the basing states. FOBs serve as the commitment of the basing power to provide security protection to partner nations.'

In addition to FOBs, foreign powers have preferred a minor military presence in other regions. This leads to the importance of CSLs. The CSLs are valuable in providing access to areas where it might be politically difficult to set up forward military bases (Lustombo *et al*, 2013). These kinds of military bases support security cooperation, special force operations, intelligence gathering, and small-scale military operations. Cooperative security locations are established by mutual consent between foreign forces and the host states. [13] Relations between basing powers and host states are in favor of the latter. In this regard, the host states can determine the types of military operations, duration, and foreign security missions (Enloe, 2014). For instance, host states may order projecting powers not to use destructive weapons and prevent the use of combat operations (Lustombo *et al*, 2013). At times, host states may authorize the projecting powers to use bases on their territories for certain types of operations and prohibit other military missions (Lustombo *et al*, 2013). Thus, the host states have more power regarding the military basing arrangements.

As indicated above, several foreign powers have established their military bases in the Horn of Africa in recent times. As part of their foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, foreign powers prefer to use military facilities to military bases.[14]This is to reduce the negative political implications of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa. For example, China built up its military bases in Djibouti in 2017. Beijing considers its military bases as a naval facility that facilitate smooth resource flows

[13] Other scholars, such as Enloe (2014) consider the low military presence of projecting powers as the lily pad.

[14] Foreign military bases indicate the presence of foreign powers in other regions with heavy military armaments. This heavy military presence has implications for the sovereignty of the host states.

in the Red Sea region (Styan, 2020; Rossiter and Cannon, 2022). The Turkish policymakers prefer to use military facilities to military bases. As Donelli (2020) writes, Türkiye considers its military base in Mogadishu a military facility that provides military training to the Somalia defense force. Turkish scholars also do not accept that Ankara established military bases in Africa. On June 28, 2024, Elem Eyrice stated 'Turkiye do not have a military base in Africa. The one in Somalia is a military training center aimed at facilitating security cooperation between Ankara and Mogadishu.'

Security analysts, pundits and policymakers often use military bases and military facilities interchangeably. They consider military bases and military facilities having a similar meaning. Yet, there are some conceptual differences between military bases and military facilities. These differences are based on the degree of foreign military presence in other regions, the security missions of foreign military bases, and the military armaments that projecting powers are equipped with.[15] With regard to these differences, Harkavy (2007:5) stated that, 'the distinction between military bases and military facilities is based on the relative sovereignty between basing states and host states.' In the case of military bases, projecting powers have complete discretion over the deployments, movements, and operations of their military forces in the host states. Harkavy (2007) further stated that the basing power is not subject to the laws of the host states. The relations between foreign forces and host states in favour of projecting powers. Put differently, there are asymmetrical security relations between basing powers and host states.

In addition, Lutz (2009) stated that military bases require the deployment of foreign military forces in the territory of other states. These military forces need military barracks and staging areas for war making. As indicated above, military bases represent a confluence of labor (soldiers and civilians who facilitate the work of soldiers), land where foreign forces are stationed, and capital in the form of military buildings and military facilities. In these military deployments, there is significant cession of territories by host states to allow foreign troops for their military operations. Furthermore, Lustombo *et al* (2013) stated that military bases are more inclusive of military infrastructure in other

[15] Military facilities indicate that the projecting powers have a loose military presence in the host states. The importance of military facilities is evident in post-Cold War developments. During the latter part of the Cold War, military facilities substituted for military bases to soften the negative political implications associated with military bases in other sovereign states.

regions. They include land bases for ground forces, naval bases for naval forces, and air bases for air forces. In terms of their security activities, military bases are aimed at hard power projection, deterring adversaries, providing security protection to allies, responding to foreign security threats, and providing intelligence information to the basing power. These security activities are aimed at extending the influence of projecting powers in other regions. On the other hand, military facilities indicate the loose presence of foreign military forces in other regions. This indicates that military facilities are not aimed at hard power projections. Work and Krepinevich (2007) stated that military facilities indicate the loose military presence of projecting powers in the host states. They are established for non-combat missions. More precisely, Cooley (1982) stated that military facilities are more likely to be used for peacetime transit operations in other regions.

To better conceptualize the difference between military bases and military facilities, Sun (2018) contributed a book chapter on *China's Military Relations with the Middle East.* Sun (2018) categorized the foreign military presence into hard military bases and soft military bases. In relation to the hard military presence, several points stand out. In the first place, basing powers have the right to free access to their bases built in other states. These bases are constructed for hard power projection. Second, hard military bases have military missions such as combating and deterring the enemies of projecting powers. Third, these military bases enhance projecting powers to contain the military presence of their adversaries (Sun, 2018). On the other hand, soft military presence refers to the loose military presence of foreign powers in other regions. In this case, basing powers do not have a special military zone in the host states. Besides, basing powers do not have institutionalized foreign military arrangements. In addition, the overseas military bases must carry out civil military activities such as the evacuation of nationals, humanitarian relief, protecting expatriates, and logistics supply (Sun, 2018).

In a nutshell, foreign military bases indicate the presence of foreign military forces in certain territories of the host state with a high degree of military control. The basing power has unfettered access to the military facilities in the host states. It has the power to move and deploy its military forces as it wants. Basing power can use its military infrastructure for hard power projection and enhance military intervention capabilities. This kind of military presence in other regions threatens

the sovereignty of host states.[16] As discussed in chapter four, many of the military bases in the Horn of Africa fall under this category. China, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and America established their military bases in the Horn of Africa. These foreign powers are equipped with modern military armaments. Capestan (2020) stated that the Chinese military base in Djibouti looks like a highly fortified castle. It is equipped with watchtowers, drone control facilities, and a fuel storage facility. The US military base in Djibouti is equipped with modern military weapons. It has been serving as a staging area to fight non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye established a forward military base in Somalia in 2017. These forward bases are aimed at widening the Turkish spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. Donelli (2020) stated that the full-fledged Turkish military base in Somalia is equipped with modern military armaments. The Saudi military base at Assab Port has been used as a staging area to fight the Houthi rebels in the Yemen civil war. The base has increased Saudi intervention capabilities in the Yemeni civil wars (see chapter four). From these analyses, it is clear that the military presence of America, Saudi Arabia, China, and Türkiye fall under hard military presence.

In addition to establishing military bases, external security actors engage in security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa. As noted in the introduction, foreign military bases and security cooperation are intricately intertwined concepts. Security cooperation activities such as joint military exercises, military training, the provision of professional military education, and security assistance are held at the already established military bases and facilities. Thus, overseas military bases are important for security cooperation efforts. The deals for military bases and security cooperation are made through security agreements.

Instead of a heavy military presence in other regions, basing powers prefer security cooperation with a few military experts that train the host states' military forces. Lustombo *et al* (2013) stated that to meet national security objectives, basing powers maintain a smaller overseas military presence in selected regions. In terms of security cooperation, three essential points stand out. First, security cooperation reduces financial costs for the projecting powers. Watts and Biegon (2021) stated that security cooperation allows projecting powers to reduce financial and material costs. This is because,

[16] All military infrastructures acquired through outright conquest are considered to be a military base. As Harkavy (1982) writes, the host states had abandoned all control of the territories where foreign forces were stationed. This indicates that, with the retreat of colonial powers, the use of bases was replaced by facilities.

host states share some burdens with the deployment of foreign forces in their territory. Second, projecting powers want to reduce casualties among their military forces. They do not want to deploy their military forces in conflict-prone regions. By extension, projecting powers would save money, reduce causality, and circumvent a bad public image. Third, security cooperation provides opportunities for a greater frequency of foreign military presence in other regions. Thus, many of the projecting powers prefer security cooperation to foreign military bases in other regions.

A number of scholars and institutions have defined security cooperation in different ways. For example, Department of Defense of the United States of America (2016) defined security cooperation as activities undertaken by foreign military powers in other regions to enhance partner states' military capability so that they can conduct military operations by themselves. From this definition, security cooperation facilitates basing states' military missions and operations in other regions. Foreign powers provide military armaments and security assistance to the host states. These military and logistical supports would increase the military capacity of the host states.

Besides, other scholars have defined security cooperation in terms of its activities. For example, Lustombo *et al* (2013) stated that security cooperation activities range from joint military exercises to military advisory missions and classroom military education. This indicates that security cooperation between basing powers and host states includes military exercises, military training, information exchange, and professional military education. Lustombo *et al* (2013) further stated that security cooperation benefits both basing powers and host states. With regard to the benefits of security cooperation, Lutz (2009) stated that projection powers engage in security cooperation to beef-up the capabilities of local militaries. Because of these close security relations, the host states will have the chance to enhance their military capabilities. This enables local security actors to bring peace to the region by themselves. Besides, security cooperation benefits the basing powers. Security cooperation enables basing states to understand the regional security dynamics and the cultural values of the societies in the host states. Lustombo *et al* (2013) stated that projecting powers prefer security cooperation to military bases. Instead of a heavy military presence in foreign territories, basing powers want to maintain smaller military forces in strategically important regions. These limited numbers of military experts train local forces and provide security assistance. The presence of these limited military forces is aimed to facilitate security cooperation.

In addition, Watts and Biegon (2021) wrote a book chapter on *Security Cooperation as Remote Warfare: The US in the Horn of Africa.* The central idea of the book chapter is that the US has been fighting terrorism from remote areas (in the US). To better fight transnational security threats, America has been training and equipping the military forces of Horn regional states. This is to increase their fighting capability and capacity. The purpose of these kinds of security cooperation is to build the capacity of hosts' military forces so that they can fight transnational security threats in their regions. In conducting these kinds of military engagements, the US has been avoiding unnecessary financial wastage and the loss of its military forces in other regions. In an edited book by Alsadair Mckay, Abigail Watson, and Megan Karlshoj-Pedersen, Mckay and Watson (2021) wrote a book chapter on *Remote Warfare: A Critical Introduction.* The central idea of their work is that great powers, to reduce material costs and the loss of their soldiers, prefer security cooperation to deployments of their military forces in conflict-prone regions. Security cooperation is aimed at building the capacity and capability of partner states' military forces to conduct military operations by themselves (Biegon and Watts, 2021). For example, America has considered security cooperation as the main tool to fight transnational security threats in the Horn of Africa.

In recent times, as indicated above, the US has preferred security cooperation to a heavy military presence in other regions. American policymakers understand that security cooperation with the host states has several benefits. First, security cooperation with local forces benefits projecting powers understanding of technical and cultural differences in other regions. As noted above, security cooperation enables basing powers to understand the cultural values of foreign forces involved in joint military exercises and military training. Living and working on foreign soil offers opportunities for the US forces to experience these differences in depth and to extend their smart power in other regions. Second, security cooperation activities comprise a small number of US military presence in other regions. This is to reduce financial and material costs. This low cost leads to a much greater frequency of security cooperation than the deployment of huge military forces in other regions. In a nutshell, having an overseas presence significantly increases the frequency and range of security cooperation activities.

As a result, for the purpose of the present study, security cooperation refers to the security relations between basing powers and host states in the Horn of Africa. Basing powers, to reduce costs and the loss of their military personnel, have been engaged in security cooperation that involves military

training, intelligence sharing, security assistance, joint military exercises, and military diplomacy. As indicated above, all the projecting powers, in addition to the establishment of military bases, have engaged in security cooperation with the Horn regional states.

11. 2. Foreign Military Presence: Schematic Illustration



Chapter Two

2. Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: A Historical Overview

Foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is not a new phenomenon. A number of external security actors expanded their military presence in the Horn of Africa in different historical periods. The degree of foreign military presence and the influence of these foreign powers in the Horn of Africa were different. Sometimes, foreign military engagements were sporadic. In this case, foreign military intrusions were a mere foreign security presence. This indicates that the influence of foreign powers in the regional conflict dynamics of the Horn of Africa was minimal. At other times, the influence of external military interventions amounted to forceful military conquest and direct military dominance (Woodward, 2003; Schmidt, 2013). These intrusions overrode regional security dynamics. In so doing, foreign powers shaped the state formation process in the Horn of Africa. In other cases, some states in the Horn of Africa successfully defeated the European colonial armies and retained their independence. The Ethiopian military victory at Adwa in 1896 is a case in point.

The present chapter considers the long history of external military interventions in the Horn of Africa. To delve into these issues, the chapter is structured into four sections. The first section considers the pre-colonial foreign military interventions in the Horn of Africa. This section analyses the military interventions of the Arabs, the Chinese, the Portuguese, and the Ottoman Turks. The second section analyzes the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa from the late nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. The third section looks at foreign military interventions in the Horn of Africa throughout the Cold War. This section examines the military presence of the Soviet Union and the US in the Horn of Africa. The final section deals with the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. This section examines the efforts of foreign powers to fight non-traditional security actors, such as terrorism and maritime piracy. Presenting the history of foreign military interventions in the Horn of Africa serves as a starting point to provide a detailed analysis of the recent foreign military presence in the region.

2.1 Pre-Nineteenth Century Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

Throughout history, the Horn of Africa has been the scene of the continuing struggle of external security actors (Schmidt, 2013). Originating from different parts of the world, foreign powers extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa at different times. Among the external security actors, the Arabs had long-standing relations with the Horn of Africa. The two regions have centuries-old commercial and religious relations (Erlich, 1994; Schmidt, 2013). For example, in the seventh century B.C., immigrants from the southern parts of the Arab Peninsula began to settle in the Horn of Africa, bordering the Red Sea region (Erlich, 1994; Erlich, 2007). These immigrants imported their Semitic culture to the Horn of Africa. Besides, they influenced the political developments in Ethiopia and played an important role in the birth of the Axumite kingdom. As Markakis (1974:13) writes, 'the superior culture of the Semites contributed to the rise of an empire that became the dominant power in the Red Sea region.'

The interactions between the Arabs and the Axumite kingdoms had both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, the people of the Horn of Africa had benefited from commercial links with the Arabian Peninsula (Marcus, 1994; Schmidt, 2013). For example, Ethiopia, under the Axumite kings, became an active player in international economic relations. Axumite maritime trade flourished from the first to the seventh century AD. As Erlich (1994:3) noted, 'in the third century AD, the trade relations between the Arabs and the Axumite kings were prominent. The Red Sea port at Adulis became the main center of trade relations between the two regions.' Besides, the Axumite kings had trade relations with India and the Far East (Bahru, 1991). In addition to trade relations, the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf exchanged religious practices. For example, the three major world religions spread into the Horn of Africa from the third to the seventh centuries. During the first three centuries, Judaism expanded in Ethiopia, while Christianity spread into Ethiopia and Egypt. In the seventh century, Muslim merchants extended their economic presence in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and North Africa. With them, Islam began to take root in these regions (Schmidt, 2013). Though these commercial and cultural exchanges benefited the people of the Arabs and the Horn of Africa, many of the relations were asymmetrical. In different historical times, power projection came from both directions. At the height of its power, the Axumite state projected its military forces across the Red Sea and controlled large parts of the Arabian Peninsula (Bahru, 1991). To liberate local local Christians, in 524 AD, the army of emperor Kaleb crossed the Red Sea and conquered Yemen. In

702, Ethiopia attempted to invade the Hijaz and tried to occupy the ports of Jeddah and Mecca (Erlich, 1994; Marcus, 1994). Therefore, Ethiopia became a dominant power on both sides of the Red Sea for three generations.

However, in the second half of the seventh century, the regional balance of power began to shift toward the Arabs. After the rise of Islam in the seventh century, as noted above, the Arabs began to project their military power towards the western part of the Red Sea region. In these power projections, the Arabs conquered and controlled the Dahlak Islands in 702 (Mazrui, 2009). In the eighth century, the Arabs projected their power into Zeila and other strategic areas in East Africa. Zeila became a trading port that played a critical role in diffusing the new Islamic faith into the southern parts of modern Ethiopia. This power projection enabled Arabs to extend their influence in the Horn of Africa (Erlich, 1994). The rise of Arabs in the Red Sea and North Africa had cast a dark cloud on Axumite international relations. As Mazrui (2009) writes, the military presence of the Arabs in the Red Sea region prohibited the flow of commercial goods to the Axumite kingdom. To make matters worse, the rise of the Arabs prevented the export of Ethiopian products to different parts of the world. These internal and external dynamics reduced the economic bases of the Axumite kings. Cut off from its link to the Red Sea region, Axumite Ethiopia began to decline [17](Bahru, 1991; Marcus, 1994).

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, external military powers from the Far East extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Among these Asian powers, China, under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), became a dominant naval power. Thus, China projected its military power into the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and the Horn of Africa. In the years between 1417 and 1431, the Ming emperors dispatched three large expeditions to Eastern Africa. In these expeditions, the Ming navy was well equipped with firearms and 250 ships designed for long-range explorations (Kennedy, 1988). In the early 1430s, Zheng He, one of the Chinese naval commanders, traveled to the Horn of Africa to extend the Chinese military presence in the Red Sea region. In order to sustain its overseas presence, China established temporary military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. This Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa was aimed at importing giraffes, big cats, and other commodities to the Chinese kings (Kennedy, 1988; Shinn, 2008).

[17]The power retreat of the Axumite kingdom was facilitated by the internal Bejja rebellion in the northern parts of Ethiopia. For a detailed analysis, see Harold G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia*, 1994.

In these successive military power projections into the Red Sea and East Africa, the Chinese civilizations played a critical role. China, under the Ming dynasty, had progressive and innovative civilizations. These advanced civilizations brought about remarkable economic developments (Kennedy, 1988). One of the most visible features of Chinese civilizations was remarkable technological innovation. For example, China was the first country to invent true gun poweder that facilitated its power projection cababulties in other regions (Kennedy, 1988; Grygiel, 2006). In addition, a centralized Confucian bureaucracy and competitively selected civil servants provide a comparative advantage for Chinese economic performance (Kennedy, 1988) and, by extension, Chinese power projection into other regions.[18]

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European imperial powers projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa. The European power projection into the Horn of Africa was connected with the fifteenth-century period of the Renaissance and Reformation. Characterized by technological innovations, the period of the Renaissance and Reformation marked the divide between the pre-modern and modern eras. These innovations were evident in firearms and shipbuilding technologies (Kennedy, 1988). These technological innovations increased the military capabilities of European states. Accordingly, imperial powers such as Spain, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal employed their military forces to explore and conquer overseas territories for their commercial gains (Raymond and Kegley, 2010). The European imperial powers projected their military forces into strategically and economically important parts of the world, such as East Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean (Kennedy, 1988; Catherine, 2009). This power projection was aimed at importing valuable commodities such as gold, silver, and other precious minerals to their home states. Among the European powers, Portugal became a global military power in the early fifteenth century (Kennedy, 1988). It extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and South Asia. To show their presence, the Portuguese established military bases, oversea outposts, and facilities in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions (Harkavy, 2007). These military bases and facilities assumed commercial functions. Portugal established trading posts in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean to control the sources of gold and other minerals (Harkavy, 2007). These military bases provided protection for trade routes along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. The

[18] As Kennedy (1988) wrote during the Ming dynasty, China had a remarkable culture with a more than hundred million population. Significant sections of the population were engaged in irrigated land lined by a splendid canal system. For further information, see Grygiel's (2006) book: *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change.*

ease with which the Portuguese established their maritime hegemony in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean was the result of better firearms and naval technology compared to other European imperial powers (Abir, 1980).

In addition to the Portuguese, the Ottoman Empire was one of the emerging imperial powers in the early fifteenth century (Curtin, 2000). The Ottoman Turks employed their strength in infantry to expand their military presence in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Red Sea regions (Erlich, 1994; Grygiel, 2006). For example, the Ottoman Turks controlled the Red Sea trade route in 1517 and widened their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa (Abir, 1980; Grygiel, 2006). Moreover, in 1557, the Ottoman Turks projected their military power into Massawa. The military presence of the Ottoman Turks in Massawa was aimed at controlling Ethiopian international relations.[19] In the words of Erlich (1994: 38), 'the military presence of Ottoman Turks in Massawa was aimed at cutting off Ethiopian relations with other European powers.'

Considering the advance of the Ottoman Turks, Portugal strengthened its military presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions. Since these two great powers had conflicting strategic interests, their relations were hostile. Accordingly, they engaged in competitive relations to control the East Africa ports and the lucrative Indian Ocean trade routes (Abir, 1980; Grygiel, 2006). In 1657, for example, the Portuguese controlled the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Aden regions. This was aimed at reducing the power of the Ottoman Turks. Besides, to extend its spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean, Portugal sent one of its naval strategists, Albuquerque (Abir, 1980; Grygiel, 2006). Albuquerque used the persuasion of local allies, coercive diplomacy, and military forces. Applying these policies, Albuquerque controlled strategically important regions, including the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden in the early 1500s (Abir, 1980).

The rivalry between the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese was not limited to the Red Sea region. To widen their respective spheres of influence, the two imperial powers engaged in an intense rivalry in the interior part of the Horn of Africa. The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese were drawn into the Abyssinian-Adal War that occurred in the years between 1529 and 1543 (Rossiter and Cannon, 2022). For example, the Ottoman Turks supported the Muslim Sultanates led by Ahmed ibn Ibrahim

[19] The Ottoman Turks deployed their strong military forces in the Red Sea region until the mid-nineteenth century. For a detailed analysis, see Lewis, I.M. (1988). *A Modern History of Somalia: A Nation State in the Horn of Africa.*

al-Ghazi, commonly known as Gragn Ahmed (Abir, 1980). This substantial military support was important for Gragn Ahmed to get a temporary military victory against the Christian kings of Ethiopia. On the other hand, Portugal supported the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia. In line with this, the Portuguese sent about four hundred soldiers equipped with firearms and artillery. This Portuguese power projection changed the regional balance of power in favour of the Abyssinian kings (Abir, 1980). Therefore, the advent of the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in Ethiopia was considered to be the first great power military interventions.

2.2 **Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa**

From the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of Second World War

In addition to the fifteenth-century Renaissance, Europe saw its Industrial Revolution in the mid-eighteenth century (Strayer, 2013). The Industrial Revolution had a number of implications for European power projection into Africa.[20]First, there was a shift in goods found in Africa. The European powers were anxious to access African raw materials to fuel their industries. Instead of spices, sugar, and slaves, the need for raw materials for industries such as cotton, rubber, wool, and jute increased (Schmidt, 2013). Besides, European power**s** needed the African markets to export their manufactured products. Thus, European powers engaged in competition to find a protected market for their machine-produced goods (Tordoff, 2002; Thomson, 2004). Second, the Industrial Revolution in Europe increased the number of imperial powers (Magdoff, 1978). In order not to be in a subordinate position with other imperial powers, a number of European powers modernized their economies. Economic modernization enabled them to build strong military forces (Magdoff, 1978). Finally, the Industrial Revolution increased the differences in military technology between Africans and Europeans. European armies were equipped with modern military armaments. However, the Africans were armed with outmoded firearms. To make matters worse, the Africans had no professional army equipped with modern military armaments (Uzoigwe, 1985:39). These logistics and military superiority enabled the European colonial powers to control the African continent within a short period of time.

[20] The Industrial Revolution was the transition from hand production to a machine production system. The rapid industrialization stimulated the search for new markets, raw materials, and mineral resources. This in turn strengthened the motivation to control foreign territories rich in mineral and agricultural resources.

The advent of a number of European colonial powers in Africa during the same historical period resulted in intra-European rivalries. The more colonial powers extended their military forces in Africa at the same time, the more intense the geopolitical rivalries between them (Magdoff, 1978:35). To prevent the war among themselves, European colonial powers arranged the Berlin Conference in 1884/5.[21] The conference gave a green light for European powers to extend their direct military presence on the African continent (Tordoff, 2002; Mansbach and Rafferty, 2008). The participants of the conference agreed that instead of informal spheres of influence, projecting powers had to establish an effective military presence in the regions where they extended their security forces. [22] Following the decision of the Berlin Conference, as Schmidt (2013:6) writes, 'by the first decades of the twentieth century, most of the African continent had been conquered, colonized, and placed under European control.'

The three European powers that extended their military forces into the Horn of Africa were Italy, France, and Britain. These European colonial powers extended their military forces to control the trade routes from Europe to Asia that pass through the Red Sea region.[23] Besides, these colonial powers engaged in rivalry to control the entire Horn of Africa region. For instance, France and Britain had competing interests in the Red Sea region. The two colonial powers extended their spheres of influence in the Gulf of Aden, a chokepoint that connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. The rivalry between the French and Britain was aimed at controlling the Nile basin (Magdoff, 1978; Bahru, 1991). It was believed that a state that could control the Nile waters from its sources in Ethiopia would eventually determine who would control Egypt. As Clapham (2017:37) writes, 'the interest of the British in Ethiopia was concerned with the control of the Nile River. During these times, the Nile River was important to Sudan and Egypt. Both states were under effective British control.' Apart from the Red Sea region, the two colonial powers engaged in competition to control

[21] European colonial powers, including France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and the Portuguese mapped out plans to establish effective occupation and formal colonial administration in Africa (Schmidt, 2013).

Before the Berlin Conference, the European presence had been confined to small, isolated enclaves on the coast for trade purposes (Meredith, 2005).

[22] Before the Berlin Conference, European powers had acquired some places in Africa using different strategies. As Uzoigwe (1985) writes, these strategies include settlements and exploration, commercial posts, unequal treaties, missionary missions, and the occupation of strategic areas. For example, in 1839, Britain controlled Aden. In 1869, the Italians purchased Assab Port from local elites.

[23] Markakis (2011) writes, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 turned the Horn of Africa into a prime site of imperialist geopolitical contention.

the interior part of the Horn of Africa. For example, in 1885, France controlled French Somaliland, the area around present-day Djibouti. Britain, for its part, took a portion of Somali-occupied land, the area around present-day Somaliland in 1887 (Lewis, 1988; Woodward, 2003; Thomson, 2004). The British wanted to extend their spheres of influence on the Somali coast for two reasons. First, London had a keen interest in reducing the strategic importance of French Somaliland, which had become a strategic rival to Aden (Cohen, 2015). Second, Britain was interested in securing uninterrupted food supplies (mutton and meat) from the Somali herdsmen for its military personnel stationed at Aden military base (Lewis, 1988; Meredith, 2005). To meet these interests, the British Navy extended its maritime dominance in the Western Indian Ocean.

In 1889, Italy projected its military power into the central and southern parts of Somalia.[24] The Italian power projection was aimed at engaging in agricultural activities across the Shebele River. This was to grow bananas, sugar, and cotton (Lewis, 1985; Cohen, 2015). In addition, in 1882, Italy established its security presence in the northern parts of Ethiopia (Magdoff, 1978; Clapham, 2017). This region is what the Italians called 'Eritrea.' From its bases in Eritrea, Italy projected its military forces into the heart of Ethiopia, which resulted in the Battle of Adwa. In 1896, the Ethiopian forces were successful in defeating the Italian army (Hallett, 1974; Markakis, 2011; Clapham, 2017). Beyond defeating the Italian colonial armies, Emperor Menelik engaged in territorial expansion in the eastern and southern parts of present-day Ethiopia. As Markakis (2011:3) writes, 'beyond defeating the Italian military forces, Ethiopia competed in the imperialist partition of the Horn of Africa.' It was during this expedition that Ethiopia controlled the Somali-populated region of Ogaden.

The influx of European colonial powers in the late nineteenth century into the Horn of Africa brought a number of legacies. First, the colonial military presence in the Horn of Africa disrupted the natural evolution of state formations (Markakis, 1974; Clapham, 1996; Woodward, 2006). By imposing their own systems of artificial borders, European colonial powers overrode traditional political systems. The European colonial powers splitted one ethnic group into different states and forced the cohabitation of different ethnicities in a single state. Woods (1981:15) stated that 'some ethnic groups were split up. Others were thrown into the same nation.' In so doing, colonialism created artificial

[24] Using military force, Italy controlled Libya in 1911 from the retreating Ottoman Empire. This expedition gave Rome a foothold in North Africa. Italy lost Libya and other colonies in Africa after the Second World War. For further analysis, see the book written by Mansbach and Rafferty (2008), *Introduction to Global Politics*.

borders, either cutting one ethnic group into different administrations or putting together different ethnic groups into one administration (Aliboni, 1982). For example, the arbitrary boundary demarcation partitioned the Somali tribe into five pieces (Sorenson, 1995; Thomson, 2004; Markakis, 2011). Some of the Somalis were administered by the British in Somaliland. Others were administered by the British in present-day Kenya. Still, other Somali ethnic groups were administered by the Italians. Some were administered by the French in present-day Djibouti. The rest of the Somali ethnic groups were administered by Ethiopia (Davidson, 1993; Thomson, 2004; Markakis, 2011). Besides, the advent of European colonial powers in the Horn of Africa fragmented the Afar nation, dividing its people under three flags: Ethiopian, Italian, and French (Sorenson, 1995; Markakis, 2011). This arbitrary boundary demarcation resulted in the formation of weak and incoherent states in the Horn of Africa. Besides, arbitrary colonial border demarcation has laid the foundation for future intrastate and interstate conflicts. As discussed below, the Somalia irredentist claims in the 1960s towards the Ogaden region of Ethiopia were sown in the late nineteenth century.[25]

Second, the advent of European powers in the Horn of Africa disrupted the ancient trade routes. As Gaim (2012:85) noted, 'with the advent of European colonial powers in the Horn of Africa, the pre-colonial trade relations between Africa and the rest of the world were adversely affected.' This is explained in different dimensions. First, the advent of colonial powers prevented commercial relations between the Africans, and these foreign powers restricted the movement of pastoralists within the newly established state boundaries. Second, colonial powers reduced the Horn's relations with the external world (Rudney, 1985). For example, Ethiopia became a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa following the advent of colonial powers. This had reduced its trade relations with foreign powers. Third, the advent of European colonial powers reduced the importance of the Indian and Arabian trade routes. As Hallett *(*1974*)* writes, before the advent of colonial powers, Berbera and Zeila ports were busy facilitating the Horn's international trade with India and the Middle East. However, with the advent of European colonial powers, the importance of these trade routes was suppressed. The European colonial powers worked hard to integrate African economies with their

[25] In addition to the Horn of Africa, the effect of arbitrary colonial demarcation is visible in different parts of Africa. For example, the present abnormal maps of Gambia, Namibia, and Angola are the results of arbitrary colonial border demarcations. Besides, arbitrary boundary demarcations resulted in the proliferation of several landlocked states in Africa. Around fourteen states in Africa are landlocked. These landlocked states share borders with many other states, making them economically unviable. For detailed analysis, see Alex Thomson's (2004) work on: *Introduction to African Politics*.

capital cities. As Rudney (1985) indicated, following the advent of European colonial powers in the Horn of Africa, African economies became extensions of colonizing powers. With regard to the introduction of the colonial economy, Clapham writes:

The colonial economy was channeled through mechanisms that duplicated the colonial administration, along roads and railways that penetrated the hinterland from the colonial administrative centers and the principal port cities. Deliberate colonial measures to create and control a cash economy, for instance, the imposition of a head tax and the introduction of produce marketing borders, reinforced the connection (1985:20).

The colonial powers used different strategies to exploit the resources in Africa. For example, as Schmidt (2013:6) writes, 'Africans were forced to provide labor forces and natural resources to the European colonial powers.' This reduced African economic transformation. Second, there were unequal trade relations between European colonial powers and the Africans (Rudney, 1985; Thomson, 2004; Schmidt, 2013). For example, European colonial powers forced African farmers to produce coffee, tea, cocoa, groundnuts, and cotton (Davidson, 1993; Thomson, 2004). In other words, African farmers were forced to be engaged in mining, agricultural activities, and commercial plantations to grow cash crops to be exported to European states. In contrast, the European colonial powers exported manufactured goods at a high price (Rudney, 1985; Thomson, 2004; Schmidt, 2013). Besides, the imperial powers engaged in labor exploitation (Davidson, 1993; Thomson, 2004). For example, the colonial powers did not pay sufficient wages to African workers. Put differently, the African workers were paid below the level of their subsistence needs. [26] In the words of Rudney (1985:343) 'wages were kept abysmally low. In so doing, the European colonial powers extracted a great deal of wealth from their colonial possessions.' These unequal economic relations persisted until today.

Third, the laws and institutions of colonial powers were designed to widen the existing ethnic differences in the Horn of Africa (Lewis, 1988). For example, colonial powers supported previously subordinated ethnic groups. The communities that had suffered from different forms of domination before the advent of colonial powers collaborated with the European imperial powers (Novati, 2009).

[26] As Rudney (1985) writes, unequal international division of labour had weakened the African economic transformations.

On the other hand, to secure their land, political power, and social positions, the previously privileged ethnic groups resisted foreign powers. These external dynamics resulted in competitive relations between different ethnic groups after Africa achieved its independence in the 1850s and 1960s (Schmidt, 2013). To make matters worse, the intrusion of European colonial powers in the Horn of Africa changed the malleable qualities of ethnicity into permanent characteristics (Ranger, 1983). Pre-colonial African societies used to live with shifting allegiance relations (Meredith, 2005). Accordingly, before the incursions of colonial powers, various ethnic groups defined their identities based on contingencies. At one time, they were subject to one chief. At another time, they used to be members of another chief (Ranger, 1983). In addition, African ethnic groups showed varying loyalty to their clans. Sometimes, they showed their loyalty to their clans. At other times, they shifted their allegiance to a professional guild (Ranger, 1983). However, the advent of colonial powers changed these fluid and malleable ethnic qualities into a fixed character. As Novati (2009:236) concludes, 'colonialism amplified the importance of ethnicity in Africa.'

As already indicated, the three European colonial powers controlled the Red Sea region. Schmidt (2013) stated that Britain, Italy, and France conquered the coastal parts of the Horn of Africa. Under these dynamics, one cannot talk about the regional security complex and the role of the Horn of Africa in international politics. Because, the Horn of Africa was under foreign military control. This does not mean that there was no internal resistance against the colonial powers. Woods (1981:18) stated that 'the Somali clan leader, Mohammed Abdullah, tried to unite the Somalis and expel the British colonial forces in a twenty-year guerrilla movement.' Starting in the late 1890s, he led resistance to Ethiopia, Italy, and Britain that lasted for over two decades until his death in 1920 (Hallett, 1974; Lewis, 1988). Although he failed, Mohammed is honored as the national hero of Somalia for the next generation. His vision became an inspiration for the later nationalists to bring all Somali-speaking people under one flag (Ayoob, 1980; Woodward, 2006).

After effectively controlling the Red Sea region of the Horn of Africa, Italy, France, and Britain tried to widen their spheres of influence in the interior part of Ethiopia.[27]For example, the three colonial

[27] Emperor Menelik understood the plan of the colonial powers. So, he took a number of steps to ensure the continuity of the state. First, Menelik exploited the political differences between European colonial powers. For example, many of the military armaments used at the Adwa battle were supplied by the Italians (Markakis, 2011). Second, in 1907, he introduced the ministerial system. Menelik announced the formation of Ethiopia's first ministerial cabinet (Marcus, 1994). This was designed to provide the central government with a stable institutional framework. Third, Emperor

powers concluded 'the 1906 Tripartite Agreements' (Hallett, 1974; Bahru, 1991; Woodward, 1996). According to the 1906 agreement, the Nile basin region was assigned to Britain. France was granted the area through which the railway passes from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. Italy was allowed to make connections between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland (Bahru, 1991). Apart from these territorial arrangements, European colonial powers employed commercial controls to extend their spheres of influence in Ethiopia. As Bahru (1991:85) noted, 'unequal economic relations between the three European colonial powers and Ethiopia continued through trade, commerce, and concessions. Ethiopia and France concluded the 'Klobukowsky Treaty in 1908.' This treaty gave extra-territorial rights and privileges to foreigners living in Ethiopia. The treaty had implications for Ethiopian territorial integrity and sovereignty. Moreover, the 1925 Anglo-Italian Understanding became an obstacle to Ethiopia's sovereignty. Based on their agreement, the British recognized western Ethiopia as an exclusive economic zone for the Italians.[28] In return, the Italians promised to give diplomatic support to the British effort to secure a concession to build a dam on Lake Tana (Bahru, 1991). However, Italy was not satisfied with these gifts. Starting in the late 1920s, Italy pursued a more aggressive foreign policy towards Ethiopia. Benito Mussolini presumed Ethiopia would become a springboard to widen his imperial ambitions in the Horn of Africa, and in the early 1930s, Italy prepared to control the whole of Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991). Besides, the rise of Mussolini to power was not good news for France and Britain. Benito Mussolini wanted to revive the Roman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean region. He wanted to create an East African Empire that served as the springboard to the Middle East (Erlich, 2007; Meredith, 2005). Mussolini's ambition to control Ethiopia and, by extension, the Horn of Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East threatened France and Britain.

The political dynamics in Europe further served as a catalyst for the Italian military projection into Ethiopia. In the late 1930s, the Europeans were on the verge of starting the Second World War. Germany prepared to control the whole of Europe. Italy wanted to make a security alliance with Germany. To avoid this security alliance, Britain and France followed an appeasement foreign policy. As Bahru (1991:153) writes, 'to prevent the security alliance between Germany and Italy, Britain

Menelik nominated *Lig* Iyassu as his legitimate successor. Markakis (2011:108) writes that in 1908, *Lij* Iyasu was named heir to the imperial throne. This was aimed at reducing the succession problem that could lead the country into elite competition for power and, by extension, external interventions.

[28] Building a dam on Lake Tana was aimed at regulating the flow of the waters to Egypt and Sudan.

and France decided to sacrifice Ethiopia for the Italian colonial ambitions.' Italy was allowed to make connections the Tigray region to Eritrea and the Ogaden region to the Italian Somaliland. Besides, Italy was allowed to enjoy special economic rights in the larger parts of the Bale region (Lencho, 2004). Nevertheless, Italy rejected these gifts for two reasons. First, Italy wanted to avenge the defeat of 1896. Second, Italy wanted to control the whole of Ethiopia and, by extension, other parts of the Horn of Africa. To achieve these colonial ambitions, as Hallett (1974:160) writes, 'in early 1935, Italy deployed 120, 000 [29] well-armed military forces.' Besides, Italy had several military bases in Mogadishu and Massawa cities. These military bases served as a staging area for power projection into Ethiopia. These military bases, as Harkavy (1982:73) writes, 'facilitated the Italian two-pronged assault on Ethiopia.' In addition, the widespread use of mustard gas changed the balance of power in favor of the Italians (Markakis, 1974; Marcus, 1994; Meredith, 2005). To make matters worse, close to 100,000 native irregulars from Eritrea and Somalia collaborated with the Italians. Heroic Ethiopian resistance was in vain. After eight months of resistance, the Italians entered Addis Ababa in early May 1935 (Markakis, 1974; Lentakis, 2005; Clapham, 2017).

To consolidate its military victory, Italy exploited the internal power struggle between the central government and the regional forces in Ethiopia. Two points stand out regarding the Italian policy. First, Italy worked hard to weaken the Shoan nobilities. Italia considered the Shoan elites as the guardians of Abyssinian empires who took the imperial rule from Emperor Yohaness's son in 1889 (Lentakis, 2006; Markakis, 2011). The Italians exploited the resentments of the Tigrean elites against the Shoan nobilities. On May 27, 1934, Haile Sellase Gugsa, the ruler of Eastern Tigray, collaborated with the Italians, and he supported the Italian military expeditions into the heart of Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991; Erlich, 2007). Second, Italy exploited territorial differences in Ethiopia. The objective was to cut the peripheries off from the established centers of power. This was aimed at giving the people of the peripheries the illusion of liberation from Abyssinian rule (Markakis, 2011). This had worked in the Somali region of Ethiopia. In the words of Lewis (1988:108), 'the Italians exploited the ancient Somali antagonism towards the Amhara ethnic group.' Apart from territorial differences, Italy believed that Islam in Ethiopia could be cultivated as a centrifugal force (Markakis, 1974; Erlich, 2007; Markakis, 2011). As part of this strategy, Rome restored Islam as a political factor in Harare,

[29] Other scholars, such as Meredith (2005), consider the Italian military strength to be half a million. These military forces were supported by 350 airplanes.

the Ogaden, and the Bale regions (Erlich, 2007). The Italians began to subsidize Islamic institutions. They allowed Muslims to implement Islamic laws. Arabic was declared to be an official language in the regions mentioned above. Arabic newspapers and school text books were published, and radio programs in Arabic were introduced (Lentakis, 2005; Erlich, 2007; Markakis, 2011). Because of these policies, many Muslims welcomed the Italian military presence in Ethiopia (Markakis, 1974; Erlich, 2007). The Italians pursued these strategies to consolidate their imperial control of Ethiopia.

Once the Italians had completed their conquest, they integrated the Ethiopian empire with their colonies in the Horn of Africa. In order to create national homogeneity, the Ogaden region was separated from Ethiopia and merged with Italian Somaliland[30] (Hallatte, 1985). Tigray was integrated with Eritrea. Begemeder, Wollo, Gojjam, and Northern Shawa were grouped under Amhara. Large parts of the western, central, and southern parts of Ethiopia were considered Oromo and Sidama (Bahru, 1991). Addis Ababa was intended to be the capital city of an Italian colony in the Horn of Africa (Lewis, 1988). In so doing, the Italians declared an Italian East African Empire that stretched from Eritrea in the north to Somalia in the south. The purpose was to create *Africa Orientale Italiana* (Clapham, 2017).

In the Second World War, as was expected, Italy sided with Germany. As Marcus (1994:151) wrote, 'in June 1940, Mussolini entered the Second World War, supporting Germany. France and Britain feared that Mussolini would be a threat to their colonies in the Horn of Africa, the North of Africa, and the Middle East.' Hence, Britain extended its military forces to support the Ethiopian patriotic fronts. Britain fought against the Italian forces on different battlefields and became successful in 1941[31](Schmidt, 2013). After removing the Italian military forces from the Horn of Africa, Britain extended its influence over the Ethiopian financial, administrative, and foreign relations. For example, Ethiopia was forced to sign the 1942 and 1944 Anglo-Ethiopia Agreements (Bahru, 1991). In the first agreement, British citizens were allowed to occupy key government positions, such as

[30]As Novati (2009) noted, this border demarcation sowed the seeds of pan-Somali identity that resulted in the idea of a Somali nation-state.

[31] In these military operations, three British generals led the war against the Italian forces to support Ethiopian patriotic fronts. The first British general, William Plat, led military expeditions to Ethiopia from Kassala to liberate Eritrea. The second British general, Cunningham, led military expeditions to Addis Ababa from Kenya. The third British general, Wingate, with Emperor Haile Selasse entered Gojjam from Sudan. In 1941, Halie Sellase entered Addis Ababa.

For further information, see Bahru Zewde's (1991) book on: *The History of Modern Ethiopia*, *1855-1991*.

political advisors and judges and the entire police force was run by the British. Other foreign nationals could be employed by the Ethiopian government only after approval by the British. In addition, the British enjoyed exclusive air flight rights in Ethiopia. The emperor had to seek the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in East Africa (Bahru, 1991). As Bahru (1991:180) concluded, 'Haile Sellase was considered to be a titular figurehead. The British considered Ethiopia an occupied enemy territory.' This eroded Ethiopian sovereignty.

Signed in 1944, the second Anglo-Ethiopia agreement went some way toward restoring Ethiopian sovereignty. For example, getting permission from the British military leaders to assign government officials was lifted. The Ethiopian government gained the freedom to appoint foreign advisers, and there were some improvements in economic and political sectors (Bahru, 1991). Economically, Ethiopia was allowed to conduct its international trade. Militarily, Ethiopia was allowed to import military equipment aimed at bringing domestic peace and security (Bahru, 1991). However, the British still continued to control Eritrea (a former Italian colony) and the Haud region (fertile land in the Ogaden region) (Novati, 2009; Schmidt, 2013). Even the British worked hard to integrate the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with British Somaliland and former Italian Somaliland. Bringing all Somali-speaking populations into one state in the Horn of Africa, these political arrangements were aimed at creating Greater Somalia (Clapham, 2017). To facilitate the idea of Greater Somalia, the Somali Nationalist Movement, dubbed 'The Somali Youth League' was established in 1943 in Mogadishu[32] (Ayoob; 1980; Erlich, 2007; Markakis, 2011). These developments sowed the seeds for Somali-irredentist claims in the Horn of Africa in the subsequent decades.

Regarding Eritrea, the British followed another strategy. The Eritrean lowlands were to be united with Sudan, with which they shared geographical, ethnic, and religious affinities. The British sought to integrate the predominantly Christian highlands with their Tigrean kin in Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991). This was aimed at forming a new state in the Horn of Africa. In effect, the plan was aimed at reducing Ethiopia's territorial integrity in the north. These plans of the British were similar to the administrative divisions established during the Italian occupation. As Bahru (1991:179) concluded,

[32] The British allowed the Somali Youth League to establish an office in Jigjiga and Harare secretly. This was considered to be the Bevin Plan to create a united Somali-speaking people. For further information, see Markakis (2011), *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers.*

'the tripartite agreement among France, Britain, and Italy to control Ethiopia in the early 1900s was replaced by unilateral British domination.'

2.3 **The Cold War Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa**

The end of the Second World War was a landmark for the European military presence in the Horn of Africa. Weakened by the war, European colonial powers were not able to sustain their foreign military presence in other regions (Kennedy, 1988; Ofcansky, 1997; Schmidt, 2013). Instead of projecting their military powers, European colonial powers reduced their security presence in different parts of Africa, including the Horn of Africa (Clapham, 1985; Enloe, 2014), and they started to disengage from their colonies in Africa. As a result, many of the colonized African states achieved their political independence in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Nevertheless, the Horn of Africa saw another round of foreign military presence in the 1960s and 1970s. The winners of the Second World War, namely the US and the Soviet Union started to project their military presence in the Horn of Africa. There were a number of factors that drew the US military engagements in the Horn of Africa. First, the 1952 Egyptian revolution forced America to make a security alliance with the states in the Middle East and Horn of Africa (Bahru, 1991). In the revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the most prominent political figure in the Arab world. Scholars such as Cerioli (2019) write that Nasser became the leader of the pan-Arab movement seeking radical changes in the Middle East. To achieve his political and economic objectives, Nasser Nassar strengthened his relations with the Soviet Union. For example, he built the Aswan Dam with Soviet financial support and increased his relations with Eastern European states to get military aid (Woodward, 2006). For these dynamics, America preferred to work with the states in the Horn of Africa Horn, including Ethiopia.

Second, there was a coincidence of interests between the US and Ethiopia in security relations. On the one hand, Ethiopia wanted to reduce the continued British influence in its internal affairs. For its part, the US was eager to have a communication base in the Red Sea region. These developments created a working environment for US-Ethiopia security relations for the next twenty-five years (Halliday, 1977; Lentakis, 2005). To achieve its security interests, America acquired the Italian radio station near Asmara in Eritrea and established its military base in 1953 (Markakis, 2011). The base

was named *Kagnew*[33]Communication Base to commemorate the first Ethiopian battalion that fought as part of the United Nations forces on the American side in the Korean War between 1950 and 1953 (Halliday, 1977; Bahru, 1991). The American military base near Asmara increased US influence in the Middle East and served as the main center for intelligence gathering in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions (Aliboni, 1982; Schmidt, 2013).

Third, America wanted to thwart the growing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, Woodroofe (2013) noted that after the end of the Second World War, the US and the Soviet Union became the two dominant powers in international politics. Both great powers extended their military presence in different parts of the world. The Cold War was a competition for client states in different parts of the world, and the two great powers engaged in an intense ideological rivalry in East Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Horn of Africa (Gaddis, 1992; Woodroofe, 2013). Great power competition in these regions had brought the superpowers closer to war against each other.[34] Fearing mutual destruction, the two great powers fought proxy wars in the regions mentioned above. As Enloe (2014:127) writes, 'regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa were an extension of the US and Soviet superpower rivalries.' These external dynamics made the Horn of Africa part of the international security system.

In return for continued use of the communication base in Asmara, the US started to modernize the Ethiopian army in the 1950s and 1960s. During these years, Ethiopia was the largest importer of American military hardware in sub-Saharan Africa. The jet aircraft, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons, naval craft, and, infantry weapons were imported from America. The military aid of the US in the period between 1953 and 1972 was estimated at $180 million [35](Rothchild, 2009). Other scholars, such as Schmidt (2013) considered the US security assistance to be close to $280 million. Apart from this military assistance, more than 3,000 Ethiopian security forces were

[33] The *Kagnew* military base, named after the Ethiopian contingent that fought in Korea, was leased to the US in 1953 for 25 years. In the mid-1970s, the US began to transfer the function of the *Kagnew* military base to its newly established facilities at Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

[34] The two great powers fought proxy wars in different parts of the world. As Mansbach and Raferry (2008) noted, both sides did not want to use nuclear weapons that would lead to mutual destruction. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was an exception. It was a near-catastrophic confrontation resulting from miscalculations and intense security interactions between these two great powers.

[35] In addition to security cooperation, in the 1960s, the US provided economic assistance to Ethiopia. For example, to construct roads, schools, and universities, the US supplied $350 million in economic aid (Rothchild, 2009).

given military training in the years between 1953 and 1968 (Rothchild, 2009; Markakis, 2011). Because of these close security relations, Markakis (2011) noted that Ethiopia built one of the best-equipped and best-trained military forces in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1950s and 1960s.[36]

In 1960, Somalia achieved its independence from colonial powers. At independence, Somalia had a strong sense of national identity. The new Somali government did not waste time to raise the idea of 'greater Somalia' in the early 1960s (Meredith, 2005). Mogadishu had continued an irredentist foreign policy towards the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, eastern Kenya, and larger parts of present-day Djibouti.[37]This has resulted in intense security interactions between the states in the Horn of Africa. As already discussed, the origin of Somalia's irredentist claims can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when European colonial powers partitioned the Horn of Africa arbitrarily. The arbitrary boundary demarcation had resulted in the division of the Somali-speaking population into different states in the Horn of Africa. This irredentist claim was aimed at bringing all Somali-speaking populations into a single nation-state. Clapham (1996) stated that Somalia emphasized ethnicity as the basis for statehood. Yet, Ethiopia and Kenya accepted colonial border demarcations. These dynamics resulted in intense security interactions among the states in the Horn of Africa.

The idea of Somalia's irredentism threatened not only Ethiopia but also Western powers such as the US, Britain, and France (Ayoob, 1980; Clapham, 1996). These foreign powers wanted to protect their interests in the Horn of Africa (the US wanted to protect Ethiopia, France wanted to protect its colony of present-day Djibouti, and Britain wanted to protect Kenyan territory and British Somaliland). Therefore, none of these Western powers were willing to provide military assistance that might have endangered their own colonies in East Africa (Clapham, 1996; Clapham, 2017). In order to pursue its irredentist claim over the Ogaden region, Somalia needed external allies. Western states, as indicated above, were not supportive of the Somali territorial claim. On the other hand, the Soviets had no client states in the Horn of Africa to be protected (Thomson, 2004; Markakis, 2011). More importantly, the Soviet Union was eager to spread its political and economic influence on the African continent. Thomson (2004) stated that Moscow wanted to promote its political and strategic interests

[36] This enabled Haile Sellase to occupy Eritrea and quell domestic rebels in different parts of the country.

[37]This irredentist claim over the Ogaden region resulted in an intense security interaction between Ethiopia and Somalia. These intense security interactions among the Horn regional states created a wealth of opportunities for extra-regional powers' military interventions in the region.

in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Thomson, Aliboni (1985) stated that the Soviets worked hard to show their presence in the Red Sea region. These dynamics created a coincidence of interest between the Soviet Union and Somalia, and in the early 1960s, the Soviets decided to finance the formation of the Somali armed forces. In 1963, Somalia and the Soviet Union signed military aid and security cooperation agreements (Aliboni, 1985; Clapham, 1996). These agreements established the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa. Somalia offered a military base to Moscow at the port of Berbera. The port of Berbera in the Gulf of Aden became a major Soviet land and air base (Patman, 1990). In addition, the Soviets acquired a military facility at Kismayo. In return, Somalia received nearly $200 million worth of military equipment.[38]This military and economic support enabled Somalia to build the fourth-largest army in Africa, behind three African states, notably Nigeria, Zaire, and Ethiopia (Woodward, 1996).

The internal political developments in Somalia in the late 1960s further facilitated the Soviets' military presence in the Horn of Africa. In 1969, Ziad Barre assumed political power through a military coup. To improve relations between Mogadishu and Moscow, Ziad Barre introduced Scientific Socialism, encouraged supra-tribal nationalism in Somalia, and suppressed clan identities (Aliboni, 1985; Thomson, 2004). Besides, Barre established the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (Erlich, 2007; Clapham, 2017). Because of these developments, Moscow and Mogadishu strengthened their bilateral relations in the early 1970s. As part of these bilateral relations, Somalia and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Based on this treaty, Russia provided modern firearms and engaged in training Somalia's military forces. The main objective of this security relations was to expand the Somali defense forces to 20,000 (Markakis, 2011). Hence, Somalia became the most militarized state in sub-Saharan Africa. In return, Russia acquired the new strategic base at Berbera Port (Ayoob, 1980; Thomson, 2004).

In 1974, Ethiopia saw a violent revolution. The chaos created by the 1974 revolution strengthened the position of a number of liberation fronts. Ethnically organized liberation fronts proliferated in different parts of Ethiopia and challenged the legitimacy of the central government in Addis Ababa. Among these rebel movements, the EPLF became the most dominant force in the northern parts of Ethiopia. Taking advantage of the Ethiopian army engagement in the Ogaden region, the EPLF

[38] In addition to military and security assistance, as Woodward (1996) writes, the Soviet Union supplied an estimated $285 million to Somalia's economic recovery.

captured Keren and threatened to control Massawa and Asmara (Markakis, 2011; Woodroofe, 2013; Schmidt, 2013). Somalia, for its part, continued to support insurgencies that were operating in the Ogaden region. Mogadishu's support for the WSLF was a case in point. Nevertheless, as Clapham (2017:57) noted, 'Somalia was not satisfied with supporting the existing liberation fronts in the Ogaden region.' In 1977, Somalia prepared to control the entire region of Ogaden.

To make matters worse, during these times, America reduced its security support for Ethiopia (Markakis, 2011). Three developments stand out. First, the advent of space-based communication technologies reduced the importance of the *Kagnaw* military base in Ethiopia. The US started to use the Diego Garcia military base located in the Indian Ocean (Halliday, 1977; Ayoob, 1980; Aliboni, 1982). The US reduced its military support for Ethiopia. Second, Saudi Arabia pressured the US to reduce its military support for Ethiopia. During this time, the US sought diplomatic support from Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, to gain legitimacy for resolving Arab-Israeli regional conflicts (Erlich, 2007). And finally, the US did not want to lose many Middle Eastern states to the Soviets. Therefore, America abandoned Ethiopia and started to support Somalia.

The *Dergu*e regime, at this critical moment, tried to increase its security relations with the Soviet Union. However, the Russians were in a dilemma. In the words of Schmidt (2013:153) and Westad (2007:266), 'Moscow's initial response to the Ethiopian revolution had been hesitant.' Moscow wanted to extend its military presence in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Soviet policymakers expected that they could have a military presence in both Horn regional states. To achieve its foreign policy, Russia brought together both Mengistu and Ziad Barre in South Yemen (Aliboni, 1985; Marcus, 1994). The major aim of the meeting was to solve the conflict between the two states in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet political leaders assumed that strengthening socialist ideology in the Horn of Africa could reduce nationalist questions in the region. They proposed the 'Socialist Confederation of the Horn of Africa,' consisting of Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Somalia (Lewis, 1988; Marcus, 1994; Thomson, 2004). But, the proposed political arrangement, for the sake of socialist ideology, failed to consider the regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa. For example, Soviet policymakers overlooked the power of nationalism in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, Aliboni (1985) and Ayoob (1980) stated that nationalism was the dominant force in the Horn of Africa. Guided by irredentist nationalism, Somalia rejected the idea of a socialist confederation and invaded Ethiopia in early 1977. In late 1977, the Somali troops won decisive victories over the Ethiopian army. The Somali forces

captured the eastern Ethiopian town of Jigjiga and threatened to attack other key cities such as Dire Dawa and Harare (Gebru, 2009; Woodroofe, 2013).

Failing to create a socialist confederation in the Horn of Africa, the Soviets continued to support Ethiopia. As Woodroofe (2013:3) writes, 'Moscow dropped Somalia for a bigger price in Ethiopia.' Several points stand out. First, Soviet policymakers believed that Ethiopia, rather than Somalia, was an intrinsically important state in the Horn of Africa (Patman, 1990; Aliboni, 1985; Westad, 2007). Geographically, Ethiopia is almost twice as large as Somalia and in the late 1970s, Ethiopia had about thirty-five million inhabitants. This population number is nine times larger than that of Somalia (Ayoob, 1980; Patman, 1990; Schmidt, 2013). The Soviets sought to ensure that the huge Ethiopian population would create market opportunities for their manufactured goods. Second, the Soviets considered Ethiopia a more strategically important state than Somalia. The Soviets wanted to establish their military bases at Massawa and Assab, which would enable them to control the Red Sea region. In the words of Schmidt (2013:151), 'the Soviets assumed that Assab and Massawa ports were more strategically important than the Berbebra port.' Third, Ethiopia was valued for its symbolic and political importance on the African continent. Ethiopia, unlike Somalia, has a long history of external relations with other powers. Ethiopia played a critical role in the formation of the Organization of African Unity (now the AU) in 1963, and Addis Ababa has become the headquarters of this continental organization. The Russians assumed that controlling Ethiopia would provide a springboard to expand their spheres of influence in other parts of Africa (Patman, 1990). And finally, the nature of the Ethiopian revolution attracted the attention of Soviet political leaders. The Soviet political leaders considered that the Ethiopian revolution was authentic (Aliboni, 1985; Thomson, 2004). The *Dergue* regime took two radical measures to show its commitment to scientific socialism. The first was the 1975 land reform proclamation, which distributed the land to the landless[39] (Bahru, 1991; Markakis, 2011). The second was the execution of pro-Western personalities such as Atnafu Abate and other members of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party in the 1977 palace coup (Bahru, 1991; Aliboni, 1985). Following these political developments, the Soviet Union started to support the Ethiopian revolution. On November 13, 1977, Somalia abrogated the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and ordered the Soviet military advisors to leave the country

[39] The 1975 land reform was an authentic revolutionary act. It eradicated the *gebar* system in Ethiopia. Most of the southern part of the country benefited. This wiped out the economic base of the ancient regime. For further information, see Markakis's book on *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, 2011.*

(Meredith, 2005). Somalia revoked Soviet access to the base at Berbera (Woodroofe, 2013; Schmidt, 2013). On April 23, 1977, the *Dergue* regime, for its part, expelled all US military advisors from Ethiopia, and closed the *Kagnew* communications base and the 1953 Mutual Defense Agreement had been terminated (Patman, 1990; Bahru, 1991). This great power realignment increased security relations between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. As part of these improved relations, on May 6, 1977, then Ethiopian president, Mengistu Hailmariam, visited Moscow and signed the Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (Bahru, 1991; Gebru, 2009). The Soviets launched a huge air and sealift of equipment to Ethiopia (Patman, 1990; Westad, 2007; Woodroofe, 2013). In total, the Soviet Union provided over one billion dollars' worth of arms and military assistance. In addition, more than 1,000 Russian military advisors participated in the Ogaden War (Woodward, 1996; Markakis, 2011; Schmidt, 2013).

In addition to Soviet military assistance, the 15,000 well-armed Cuban military forces directly participated on the side of Ethiopia (Ayoob, 1980; Clapham, 1985; Woodroofe, 2013). This military intervention in the war could not be explained in terms of a need to protect Cuba's national interests in the Horn of Africa. Because, the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia did not affect Cuba's national interests. Cuba projected its military forces into the Horn of Africa to show its commitment to international socialist solidarity (Gebru, 2009). The Cubans assumed that the Somalia invasion was a threat to the Ethiopian socialist revolution. Woodward (1996:23) noticed that 'Cuban military interventions in the Horn of Africa were aimed at protecting socialist regimes in Africa.' The combination of Ethiopian forces, the direct participation of Cuban military forces, and the huge Soviet military supply changed the balance of power in favor of Addis Ababa. As Clapham (2017:46) writes, 'the Ethiopian government's ability to raise a large army, Soviet military support, and the direct participation of Cuban military forces played a critical role in defeating the Somali army.'

In the 1980s, foreign military support for the states in the Horn of Africa continued. For example, the Soviets continued their military support for Ethiopia. Some scholars, such as Schmidt (2013), considered this military assistance to be worth four billion dollars. According to Patman (1990), military support was close to seven billion dollars. Other scholars, such as Cannon and Rossiter (2022) extended the Soviet military support to more than ten billion dollars. The greater part of this military support was intended to crush liberation fronts in the northern parts of Ethiopia. To this end, the Soviet Union was active in supporting the Ethiopian military forces fighting in Eritrea and Tigray

regions (Mueller, 1992; Woodward, 1996). America, for its part, continued to support Somalia in the 1980s. In the years between 1981 and 1986, the US provided Somalia close to $500 million worth of military assistance (Schmidt, 2013). Other scholars considered this security support worth more than half a billion dollars. For example, Meredith (2005) writes that during the 1980s, the US provided $800 million worth of aid. One-quarter of this aid went to military assistance. In exchange, the US acquired a number of military bases in Somalia, including the Berbera military base. Similar to Mengistu, Ziad Barre used this military aid to crush domestic opponents. In so doing, America contributed to the proliferation of violence in Somalia, and this military support weakened the central government in Mogadishu (Woodward, 1996).

In addition to great powers, regional powers from the Middle East projected their security presence into the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. There was a coincidence of interest between the Arab Gulf states and the states in the Horn of Africa. The Arab Gulf states considered the Horn of Africa a springboard to extend their spheres of influence in other parts of Africa (Tekle, 1989; Clapham, 1996). In addition, the Arab Gulf states needed African states' political support in their war against Israel. Clapham (1996) stated that the Arab Gulf states extended their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa to reduce relations between African states and Israel. Clapham (1996) further stated that the Arabs increased their pressure on the African states after Israel occupied Egyptian territories in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Among the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia had become a key player in the Horn of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. There were a number of factors that pushed Saudi Arabia toward the Horn of Africa. First, Saudi Arabia projected its power into the Horn of Africa to ensure its Red Sea policy. Some scholars, such as Erlich (2007:143) and Markakis (2011:212) noted that 'Saudi Arabia worked hard to turn the Red Sea into an Arab lake.' During the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the major actor in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia feared the expansion of communist ideology in the Horn of Africa (Halliday; 1977; Woodroofe, 2013). In particular, Saudi Arabia worked hard to reduce the Soviet presence in Somalia. To achieve its strategic objectives, Saudi Arabia continued to support Somalia's irredentist claims over the Ogaden region in the 1970s. Scholars such as Erlich (2007), Schmidt (2013), and Woodroofe (2013) stated that Saudi Arabia promised to provide $350 million financial support to Somalia. In addition, Saudi Arabia made diplomatic efforts to create a coherent front. Saudi Arabia, with other Arab Gulf states, established an informal intelligence alliance known as 'the Safari Club' to support Somalia in its war with Ethiopia (Erlich, 2007). This

informal association of states organized secret diplomacy to provide arms to Somalia in its 1977/78 war with Ethiopia.

Second, Saudi Arabia continued to support a number of liberation fronts fighting against the *Dergue* regime in Ethiopia. For example, Saudi Arabia supported the Afar Liberation Fronts established by Sultan Ali Mirrah, who resisted the 1975 land reform (Erlich, 2007). In addition, Riyadh provided diplomatic support to the Ethiopian Democratic Union fighting the *Dergue* regime in northwestern Ethiopia. More importantly, in the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia continued to support the EPLF in its fight for the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia (Erlich, 2009). Passing through the Sudanese territories, Saudi Arabia's financial and logistical support for the EPLF forces was critical in changing the regional power balance in favor of liberation fronts.

In the second half of the 1980s, systemic changes at the global level resulted in the end of the Cold War.[40]This systemic dynamic reduced the strategic value of the Horn of Africa (Steel, 1992; Harkavy, 2007; Carbone, 2021). The US and the Soviet Union reduced their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The disengagement of the Horn regime's patrons resulted in changes in the regional political system. In the words of Schmidt (2013:193), 'no longer supported by their patrons, some of the regimes in the Horn of Africa were removed from power.' In Ethiopia, the TPLF forces removed the Mengistu regime from power in 1991. At the same time, the EPLF forces controlled Eritrea and declared its independence in 1993 (Clapham, 1996; Woodward, 1996). In Somalia, rebel movements removed the Ziad Barre regime from power in 1990. However, none of these rebel movements was strong enough to be a dominant force in Somalia. A number of non-state actors, such as armed warlords, tribal militias, and liberation fronts proliferated in Somalia (Daniels, 2014; Elmi and Hersi, 2020). Following these dynamics, Somalia went into a protracted civil war and has become a failed state in the Horn of Africa. Since 1991, Somaliland has become a *de facto* state in the Horn of Africa. As Karim (2022) concluded the creation of Eritrea, the weakening of Somalia, and the resulting formation of an unrecognized *de facto* state complicated the security complex of the Horn of Africa.

[40] The Soviet political leaders understood that the huge military presence in different parts of the world consumed the economy. To reduce overseas economic expenditure, as Misbach and Rafferay (2008) wrote, Gorbachev announced two policies: *Perestroika and Glasnost. Perestroika* was Gorbachev's program of economic restructuring. *Glasnost* was a policy of openness in public discussion that would enhance the legitimacy of Soviet institutions. These two policies of Gorbachev resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Garthoff (1992) writes, his reforms of economic restructuring and openness failed. Instead, people needed liberation. Then the Soviet Union collapsed.

The increased regional security complex further created a wealth of opportunity for external military interventions.

2.4 Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa in the 1990s and 2000s

Throughout the 1990s, the internal political dynamics of the states in the Horn of Africa drew the attention of foreign powers. For example, the state collapse in Somalia created a humanitarian crisis. Mansbach and Rafferty (2008) write that from 1991 to 1993, more than 50, 000 people were killed and 300,000 died due to famine-related factors. Meredith (2005) considered the number of people who died of famine to be close to 238,000. To alleviate the crisis, the international community launched humanitarian efforts in the form of United Nations operations in Somalia in 1992 (Sorenson, 1995; Schmidt, 2013; O'Sullivan, 2018). However, intense fighting between the Somali warlords hindered the delivery of food aid to the drought-affected populations (Woodward, 1996; Cohen, 2015). This demanded a strong military presence in Somalia. To facilitate food aid, the US, along with other states, deployed close to 30,000 strong military forces in the country (Antizzo, 2010).[41]Yet, the US military intervention was not successful. In the battle of Mogadishu on 3-4 October, 1993, eighteen American soldiers, hundreds of Somalia soldiers, and civilians were killed (Kay, 2006; Cohen, 2015; Magu, 2019). To make matters worse, the bodies of the American soldiers were treated inhumanely on the streets of Mogadishu. In the words of Meredith (2005:483), elite units of the world's powerful army were humiliated by a few rag-tag militias.' This is what Antizzo (2010:236) dubbed 'Somalia Syndrome.' The inhuman treatment of the US soldiers became a concern for the American people (Schmidt, 2013; Cohen, 2015). As a result, America was forced to withdraw its military forces from Somalia in 1994.

The failure of 'Operation Restores Hope' and the subsequent US decision to withdraw its military forces exacerbated the internal security situation in Somalia, and, by extension, the internal crisis had regional security implications. The US and the international community looked for other options to solve the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. The first option was the multilateral military deployment of a number of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The mission of the new military deployments was limited to financing, technical assistance, capacity building, and close security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). Second, instead of direct military engagements, the US started to support the development of Africa's own abilities to manage security

[41] As Meredith (2005) writes, other troop-contribution states were France, Belgium, Canada, and Nigeria.
For a detailed analysis of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s, see Martin Meredith's work on: *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (2005).*

problems in the Horn of Africa. This was dubbed 'African solutions to African problems.' Initiated by then American president Bill Clinton in the late 1990s, indigenous conflict resolution was aimed at solving regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As Lamin (2008: 210) writes, the emergence of 'African solutions to African problems' in the mid-1990s was intended to solve regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

However, African solutions to African problems did not bring regional peace to the Horn of Africa. In the early 2000s, the proliferation of non-state actors in Somalia and its implications attracted the attention of foreign powers (Carbone, 2021). The US and other western powers were worried about the state collapse in Somalia and its security implications (Murphy, 2011; Magu, 2019). This goes with what Miller (2007:406) opined, 'the presence of weak and failed states in certain regions has implications for both regional and international security.' Somalia was not an exception. The emergence of threats from transnational actors, such as terrorism and maritime crimes was the catalyst for the consolidation of external military forces in the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s. In particular, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the US projected its military presence into the Horn of Africa. As part of this direct military presence, America established Camp Lemonnier military base in Djibouti in 2002 (Daniels, 2014). The US military presence at Camp Lemonnier was aimed at defeating transnational terrorist groups that posed security threats to Western interests in the Horn of Africa (Belachew, 2009; Daniels, 2014). Moreover, the US military base in Djibouti served as a hub for counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, Camp Lemonnier had become a base for the Combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), and the CJTF-HoA facilitated security cooperation between the US and the states in the Horn of Africa (Rothchild, 2009; Daniels, 2014). This security cooperation involved military training to enhance the capabilities and capacities of the states in the Horn of Africa. Besides, security cooperation enhanced intelligence gathering on possible terrorist infiltration (Rothchild, 2009; Magu, 2019). The aim was to develop a system of regional coordination and cooperation to fight terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa.

America, to better coordinate its security activities in the Horn of Africa, created the African Unified Combatant Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. This was aimed at bringing a more coordinated approach to US security activities in Africa[42] (Lyman, 2009). The African Unified

[42] As part of this security rearrangement, the security activities of CJTF HOA were transferred to AFRICOM.

Combatant Command had three important activities. The first one was direct-action operations. AFRICOM had been busy fighting al-Shabaab and other non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. Nearly all of the direct-action operations were drone strikes targeting senior terrorist leaders and the training camps (Magu, 2019). Second**,** AFRICOM had served as a forum for close security cooperation between the US and states in the Horn of Africa. This close security cooperation was aimed at building the capacity of African security forces to better fight terrorists in the region (Clement, 2018). Third, AFRICOM has taken on the responsibility of managing and coordinating most of the US economic development activities in the Horn of Africa. AFRICOM created opportunities for US economic interests in many parts of Africa (Magu, 2019).

In addition to its direct military presence in the Horn of Africa, the US outsourced (to save money, avoid causality, and reduce bad public image) many of its security activities to both state and non-state actors in the Horn of Africa.[43] Especially, the US used local security forces to fight non-traditional security threats in Somalia. In 2006, America established security relations with some of the warlords in Somalia. One of the warlords created by the US was the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (Daniels, 2014). Led by Basher Ragha and Musa Sude, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism tried to counter the rise of the Islamic Court Union (ICU). However, it was defeated by the Islamic militias and expelled from large parts of Somalia. The ICU controlled the capital city and removed the Somali government from power (Murphy, 2011).

To defeat the ICU in Somalia, America searched for regional security allies in the Horn of Africa (Woodward, 2013; Clapham, 2018). Ethiopia became the best choice. [44] In December 2006, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia, supporting the Transitional Federal Government (Lyman, 2009; Cohen, 2015). The Ethiopian armed forces drove the ICU forces out of Mogadishu and other strategic areas. Following their defeat, the Islamist groups continued their fighting against the Ethiopian forces (Murphy, 2011; Daniels, 2014; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014). Their continued struggle resulted

It became fully operational in 2008.

[43] In addition to US allies in the Horn of Africa, America used its western allies to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Western powers such as Turkiye, Britain, Germany, and Italy have engaged in efforts to fight terrorism and maritime crimes in the Horn of Africa since the 2000s (Melvin, 2019c). This has led to the establishment of a variety of military bases and security relations in the Horn of Africa.

[44] Besides, the US extended its military presence in Ethiopia. For example, to sustain military operations, the US established its air base in Ethiopia in 2003. From 2003 to 2015, America had acquired an air base in Arba Minch, 400 kilometers south of Addis Ababa.

in the rise of a more radical rebel group known as al Shabaab ('youth' in Arabic) (Redie, 2012). Al Shabaab forced the Ethiopian military forces to withdraw from Somalia in 2009. Ethiopia's withdrawal was replaced by the African peace mission known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, now ATMIS). The mission initially consisted of Ugandan forces, but was later joined by the Burundians (Redie, 2012). Nevertheless, these forces were not sufficient to bring peace to Somalia. In 2010, IGAD took a number of measures. IGAD raised the number of troops from 8,000 to 20,000, and the regional organization changed the mission of the deployed forces from defensive to offensive (Redie, 2013). To better perform these security activities, IGAD needed the participation of neighboring states, including Ethiopia.

In the late 2000s, the Horn of Africa saw another round of security challenges from maritime piracy (Cusumano and Ruzza, 2018). Taking advantage of the state weakness in Somalia, pirates established safe havens in the Western Indian Ocean. Before the Somali state collapse, many of the pirates were former Somali fishermen. However, following the Somali state collapse in the early 1990s, these fishermen lost their traditional livelihood to foreign fishing companies (Kemp, 2010; Murphy, 2011; Daniels, 2014). As a result, piracy has become a major source of income for these former fishermen, and they started to capture foreign ships, vessels, and cargoes (Magu, 2019). Armed with automatic rifles and grenade launchers, the pirates captured ships that were loaded with oil tankers and other valuable goods (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014). In 2008, the attack of piracy reached its climax. Kemp (2010:185) noticed that 'in 2008, more than one hundred piracy attacks were committed. In the first months of 2009, more than one hundred-forty attacks were committed.' These figures indicated that piracy threats in the Horn of Africa became a serious security threat for ships passing through the Red Sea region.

To fight piracy in the Horn of Africa, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed 1816 Resolution acts that allowed states to use military forces to fight piracy in the waters off Somalia (Daniels, 2014; Cusumano and Ruzza, 2018). Led by the US, the international community became involved to fight the rise of piracy in the Horn of Africa. [45] This has led to the direct military

[45] The US, to fight piracy in the Red Sea region, came up with the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security. The document emphasized the threats of piracy and recalled the need to protect the freedom of the seas and the right to innocent passage. To fight piracy in the Horn of Africa, the US has provided the greatest number of vessels. America also contributed to the NATO operations shield and the CTF-151.

engagement of several external security actors in the Horn of Africa. In late 2007, Italy, Türkiye, Canada, Denmark, and France sent their military forces to escort ships that traveled across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions (Cusumano and Ruzza, 2015). This has led to multilateral deployments of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa.[46]These included the Combined Maritime Forces (US-led multilateral security mission in the Horn of Africa), Operation Ocean Shield (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led security mission in the Horn of Africa), and Operation Atlanta (European Union (EU) led security mission in the Horn of Africa) (Murphy, 2011; Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014; Daniels, 2014).

In addition to western powers, China participated in fighting against transnational security threats. China, considering itself a responsible rising power, cooperated with the US in the Horn of Africa in the late 2000s. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) began to participate in United Nations-backed anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden (Aaron, 2018; Gunness *et al*, 2022). From 2008 to 2018, the Chinese navy deployed 26,000 personnel to the region and undertook a variety of maritime security operations (Wenle, 2017; Alden *et al*, 2018; Wuthnow, 2020). In 2009, the first deployment of the Chinese PLA took place to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Consisting of three ships and thirty naval task forces, Chinese military engagements escorted thousands of commercial ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. For example, as Thrall (2015) and Chun (2018) write, by conducting close to 900 missions, the PLA has escorted more than 5,000 merchant ships passing through the Red Sea. The Chinese military engagements were aimed at protecting the safety of ships passing through the Red Sea region. The coordinated efforts of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa reduced the threat of piracy.

However, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase in the number of foreign military bases in recent years. In due course, the original counter-piracy military operations have been broadened to include maritime security, protecting sea lines of communication, and protecting commercial interests in the Horn of Africa. To conduct these security activities, deployed their military forces in the region. Besides, external security actors have engaged in close security cooperation with the states

[46] In 2009, the Djibouti Code of Conduct was ratified by the Middle East and the Red Sea littoral states to fight transnational security threats. In 2017, the Jeddah Code of Conduct was ratified to better fight these non-state actors. The cooperative efforts of the international community played a critical role in reducing the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

in the Horn of Africa. Chapter four is devoted to provide a detailed analysis of the drivers of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent times.

Chapter Three

Review of Related Literatures

Chapter two of the dissertation provided a historical overview of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The chapter covered the pre-colonial, colonial, Cold War, and post-Cold War foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In these successive external military interventions, foreign powers changed the regional security dynamics and took part in the process of incoherent state formation. By dividing one ethnic group into different states, foreign powers created artificial borders between the states in the Horn of Africa. This has resulted in intense security interactions among the states in the Horn of Africa. The intense security interaction between the states in the Horn of Africa served to further foreign military interventions in the region under the guise of peacekeeping, conflict mediation, and humanitarian assistance.

Taking the previous research as the starting point, the major objective of the present chapter is to examine the existing literature on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. A number of scholars have written books and journal articles on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, a few scholars wrote their dissertations on the interactions between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The present chapter critically evaluates and identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the previous research. These activities serve as a prelude to finding out the literature gap and provide a starting point for the main research.

To examine the previous works on foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, a thematic literature review was employed. Accordingly, the first theme of the literature review focuses on the drivers of external security actors in the Horn of Africa. The second theme of the literature review focuses on the regional security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The third theme of the literature review deals with the new foreign policy strategies that the Horn regional states are pursuing to protect their national interests. Finally, I offer a brief conclusion on the literature review. This in turn leads to the next chapter, which focuses on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

3.1 Theme One

The Rationale for the Advent of external powers in the Horn of Africa

With regard to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there is little research. In particular, the literature on the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is very limited. This does not mean that there is a total lack of books and journal articles on the recent foreign military engagements in the Horn of Africa. Considering the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, a number of scholars produced their works. The focus of these scholars is on the driving interests of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Other scholars produced their own works on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, some scholars wrote journal articles on the changes in the regional states' relations amid the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, scholars such as Demessie (2014), Redei (2013), Carmody (2011), Cannon (2017), Schmidt (2013), Clapham (2017), Shaw and Kabandula (2018), Schmidt (2018), Magu (2019), and Mason and Mabon (2022) produced a major contribution of the drivers of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

In 2017, Clapham wrote a book on: *The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay*. In this work, Clapham (2017) examines the distinctive origins of the states in the Horn of Africa. According to Clapham (2017), state formation in the Horn of Africa is connected with external military interventions in the region. Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti acquired their present shapes through arbitrary colonial border demarcations in the late nineteenth century. The poorly demarcated border among the states in the Horn of Africa has created weak and incoherent states. This has enabled the proliferation of non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. Foreign powers, to fight the proliferation of non-state actors in the Horn of Africa, have continued their military intervention in the region.

In his book, The Horn of Africa: Intrastate and Interstate Conflicts and Security (2013), Redei provided an excellent analysis of the changes and continuities of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Clapham, Redei (2013) explained that the current foreign military interventions were sown in the late nineteenth century, when European colonial powers carved up the Horn of Africa into colonies, spheres of influence, and protectorates. The arbitrary boundary demarcation has brought about weak and incoherent states in the Horn of Africa, and this state weakness has created a wealth of opportunities for external military interventions in the region in

the 2000s and 2010s. For example, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US and other Western powers renewed their security engagements in the Horn of Africa.

Similar to Redei, Carmody (2011) analyzed the continuation of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa from the late nineteenth century to the present. In his analysis, Carmody (2011) provided a detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between the nineteenth century scramble for the Horn of Africa and the current military interventions. Carmody (2011) stressed that the two phases of military interventions in the Horn of Africa were aimed at securing access to natural resources. As far as the differences are concerned, Carmody (2011) stressed that colonialism was a direct European military conquest, and it was mainly the European powers that projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, the current military interventions are based on political alliances, security cooperation, and economic relations.

Demessie (2014) examined the dynamics and scope of maritime security issues in the Horn of Africa. In his analysis, Demessie (2014) related the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to the internal state structure of regional states. Each state in the Horn of Africa has a weak state structure**,** and they are not protecting their territorial borders from the proliferation of non-state actors in the region. These dynamics created a fertile environment for the advent of foreign powers in the region. To make matters worse, states in the Horn of Africa do not have a coherent strategy to fight the proliferation of non-state actors in the region. In this regard, Demessie (2014) further argued that the states in the Horn of Africa have yet to formulate a comprehensive regional maritime security strategy. This lack of a common strategic plan to fight piracy off the Somalia coastline served as the pretext for a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Stephen M. Magu (2019) wrote a book entitled *Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa.* In his recent book, Magu raised a number of points. First, US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa has seen changes and continuities. From 1884–1945, the US followed an indifferent foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa. In the post-1945 period, the US projected its security presence to deter the Soviet military presence in the Red Sea region. After the end of the Cold War, transnational security threats have become the main concern for US national interest in the Horn of Africa. In the 2000s, America projected its military presence in the Horn of Africa to fight these non-state actors. Second, US foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa has seen changes and

continuities based on the US administration in office. Some have given close attention to the Horn of Africa. However, other US presidents do not give due attention to the Horn of Africa. For example, the Trump administration considered the Horn of Africa strategically irrelevant. However, the Biden administration has given due attention to the Horn of Africa. He redeployed the US military presence in Somalia in 2022.

The five authors mentioned above, including Clapham, Magu, Demessie, Carmody, and Redei provided an excellent analysis of the changes and continuities of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This does not mean that their work is without limitations. For example, Clapham's work has certain limitations. First, it did not provide the foreign military presence of non-western powers in the Horn of Africa. Recently, foreign powers from the Middle East and Asia extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Clapham's work, Redei's work has certain limitations. For example, the focus of Redei's work is on the Western powers' military interventions in the Horn of Africa. He gave little attention to the new entrants, such as the Arab Gulf states, China, and other Asian states. Further, Redei did not discuss the interactions of the foreign security actors in the Horn of Africa. The same is true for Carmody's work. There are a number of limitations to his work. First, similar to Redei, Carmody did not discuss the new external security actors from Asia and the Middle East. These limitations have led to a lack of detailed analysis of the interaction of external security actors in the Horn of Africa. As noted above, Magu (2019) provided a detailed analysis of the changes and continuities of US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. However, Magu's work has certain limitations. For example, he failed to provide a detailed analysis of the interaction of the US with other foreign powers. The same is true for Demessie's work. Though Demessie showed the drivers of foreign military intervention from a local perspective, there are a number of points that he overlooked. For example, Demessie did not touch upon systemic changes that increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. To some extent, the recent advent of external security actors lies outside the Horn of Africa. As a result, the scholars mentioned above overlooked extra-regional dynamics that have pushed foreign powers into the Horn of Africa.

Schmidt conducted two studies on the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Her first study was *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (2013). Schmidt's second work is *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror* (2018). In her first study, Schmidt (2013) found out that

foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa could be traced to the late nineteenth century. These interventions include colonialism, the Cold War, and the war on terror. According to Schmidt (2013), the strategies of foreign powers' intervention were different based on their interests and the regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. In the late nineteenth century, colonial powers used military forces to control the Horn of Africa. During the Cold War, great powers employed alliance relations to secure their strategic interests. In the 2000s, great powers employed security cooperation to meet their goals of fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

In her second study, Schmidt (2018) tried to address new external security dynamics that were not covered in her first work. Taking the new foreign military presence from 1991 to 2017, Schmidt (2018) analyzed the interests, origins, and security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In these military interventions, a number of external security actors (the US, China, India, and the Arab Gulf states) extended their military forces in the Horn of Africa in response to regional instability and insecurity. Besides, this diversity of external security actors extended their military forces to secure access to oil, minerals, agricultural land, and markets for their manufactured industries.

The major findings of Schmidt's work show that foreign military intervention in the Horn of Africa has altered regional security dynamics. Second, foreign military interventions did not solve the current political and economic crisis in the Horn of Africa. Third, there were local collaborations for the advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. According to Schmidt (2018), foreign military intrusions in the Horn of Africa occurred with the support of internal collaboration. To meet their objectives, foreign powers formed security alliances with local actors. Nonetheless, Schmidt's work has some limitations. For example, she gave little attention to the patterns of interaction between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa and their regional security implications. Moreover, Schmidt's discussion regarding the recent systemic developments that increased the strategic value of the Horn of Africa is scant. In addition, Schmidt did not provide the security policy and response strategies that each Horn state has been taking for its national security.

A comprehensive study on foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is the volume edited by Olawale Ismail and Elisabeth Sköns (2014): *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa.* The volume provided a detailed analysis of the military presence of China, the US, France, Russia, and

Britain in the Horn of Africa. One of the most important contributions of the volume is that it identifies patterns of relations among external security actors in the Horn of Africa. At the same time, it acknowledges the differences and interests of several foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The demands for natural resources such as mineral and hydrocarbon resources have increased the economic importance of the Horn of Africa. Foreign powers deployed their military forces to protect their financial investments in the Horn of Africa. In other words, foreign powers have given special attention to protect their interests in the Horn of Africa. This is done through the deployment of military forces in resource-rich regions, including the Horn of Africa.

In the edited book, a number of scholars contributed their works. For example, two of the contributors, Olawale Ismail and Chin-Hao Huang (2014), examined Chinese security activities in the Horn of Africa. According to these contributors, the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa is connected with its economic interests in the region. Chinese economic interests include supplies of raw materials and creating opportunities for trade and investments. China's huge investment in the energy sector and the need for a constant supply of natural resources forced Beijing to extend its military presence in the Horn of Africa. This military presence is aimed at fighting transnational security threats such as terrorism, piracy, and small arms smugglers.

In addition to Olawale Ismail and Chin-Hao Huang, Elisabeth Skons (2014) details US-Horn security relations starting with the Cold War. During the Cold War, relations between the US and the states in the Horn of Africa were dominated by ideological ties. In the early 1990s, the US military presence in the Horn of Africa was aimed at reducing the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. However, America faced difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid to the Somali people. The US military intervention in Somalia in the years between 1992 and 1994 resulted in the deaths of eighteen American soldiers. This incident led to the eventual withdrawal of US troops from Somalia. However, following the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, the US increased its military presence in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the US established its Camp Lemonnier military base in 2002 in Djibouti.

However, the work of the editors and contributors mentioned above has certain limitations. Though the two editors, Olawale Ismail and Elisabeth Sköns, produced a detailed analysis of the advent of external security actors, their work has failed to cover the recent foreign military presence and its

security implications in the Horn of Africa. It failed to include the new security activities of the Middle Eastern regional states in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, it failed to include the transcontinental security dynamics that increased the importance of the Horn of Africa to external security actors. In addition, the works of Olawale Ismail and Chin-Hao Huang are not without criticism. These criticisms have three different aspects. First, Huang and Ismail did not discuss the recent Chinese military base established in 2017. Second, it is not a critical reflection; rather, it is descriptive. Third, the research did not discuss China's relations with other foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Olawale Ismail and Chin-Hao Huang, the works of Elisabeth Skons have certain limitations. First, Elisabeth Skons did not consider US relations with other foreign powers, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye. Second, she did not discuss US security cooperation with Ethiopia. A little discussion is given on recent US-Ethiopia security relations. Third, she did not detail the US-China strategic competition and its regional implications in the Horn of Africa.

A recent book edited by Chris Alden, Abiodun Alao, Zhang Chun, and Laura Barber (2018) gives a detailed analysis of Chinese security activities in the Horn of Africa. Two of the contributors, Alden Chris and Barber Laura (2018), raised a number of issues about the recent Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. These authors examined changes in Chinese foreign policy from non-intervention to a more assertive foreign policy strategy. As a rising power, China is working hard to challenge the existing international system. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is making greater efforts to get the votes of African states to air its new values and norms on the international stage.

Similar to Alden Chris and Barber Laura, Xuejun (2018) wrote a book chapter on *Development Peace: Understanding Chinese African Policy and Security*. Xuejun (2018) gives a detailed analysis of the comparative studies of western and Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. For Xuejun, western security intervention in the Horn of Africa is under the guidance of the liberal peace concept. Xuejun (2018) noted that western military intervention emphasizes peacekeeping, coercive intervention, and sanction. In addition, the West’s military intervention in the Horn of Africa emphasizes immediate democratization and preventive diplomacy. In contrast, Chinese security policy toward the Horn of Africa focuses on the developmental peace concept. The concept of developmental peace is aimed at achieving a sustainable level of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity building and economic development.

In the same edited book, Shen Zhixiong (2018) produced his book chapter, *On China: Military Diplomacy in Africa.* Zhixiong (2018) analyzed the military diplomacy of China with the states in the Horn of Africa. Chinese military diplomacy involves exchanges of military visits, defense dialogue, military education, and logistics supply. Zhixiong (2018) further noted that China has been providing military assistance to many states in Africa. Most of this military assistance has been provided in the form of loans, and these military loans have been used to improve defense ministries, renovate headquarters, and upgrade military communications. The second objective of China is to promote the building of a harmonious world by shouldering international responsibility. China is working hard to show the world that Beijing is a responsible rising power and has been making contributions to regional peace through various security activities, including active participation in peacekeeping and escorting missions in Africa. In addition, Zhixiong (2018) presented a number of challenges to the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. The biggest challenge comes from suspicion from western powers. Western powers are still deeply suspicious of China's military presence in the Horn of Africa. The West considers the Chinese military presence to be the new colonialism of the twenty-first century. To deter China's growing presence, the US and its allies are expanding their military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Another contributor, Aaron Tesfaye (2018), wrote a book chapter on *Ethiopia, China, and the West*. In his important work, Aaron (2018) focused on the interests of the US and China in Ethiopia. The main interest of China in Ethiopia is related to its strategic location. Ethiopia is a pivotal state in the Horn of Africa. Besides, Chinese interests in Ethiopia are related to the status of Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa is a critical entry point into other parts of Africa. Moreover, Addis Ababa is the political capital of the African continent. Thus, Chinese interests in Ethiopia have led to close security cooperation with Ethiopia. On the other hand, US-Ethiopian relations are based on security issues. The US considers Ethiopia an important ally in its war against terrorism.

As already indicated, both the editors, including Alden Chris and Barber Laura, Xuejun, and contributors such as Xuejun, Aaron, and Zhixiong provided an excellent analysis of the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. The three editors analyzed the current Chinese political and security interests in the Horn of Africa. However, their work is not without limitations. They did not discuss the Chinese establishment of military bases in Djibouti in recent years. Besides, the editors failed to examine how the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa changed regional

conflict dynamics. The three contributors, as discussed above, provided a detailed analysis of the Chinese economic interests in the Horn of Africa. However, the works of Xuejun, Aaron, and Zhixiong have certain limitations. For example, Xuejun (2018) did not discuss the details of the military interventions based on empirical data. Besides, he did not discuss the Chinese military base establishment and its security activities in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, he did not discuss the West's and China's intervention strategies in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the coverage is limited to Chinese security activities in the Horn of Africa. In recent years, several foreign powers, such as Türkiye, Japan, and the Arab Gulf states have extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Xuejun (2018) did not discuss the military presence of these foreign powers and their interactions in the Horn of Africa. Just like Xuejun, the works of Zhixiong have certain limitations. First, Zhixiong argued that China has been playing a critical role in regional peace and security. This is very biased. China intervened in Darfur and South Sudan to secure its interests (grab resources and make arms transfers). In other words, Zhixiong overlooked the political economy of peacekeeping missions in the Horn of Africa. Second, leaving China's heavy military presence in Africa, he emphasized the large-scale military presence of the West in the Horn of Africa. Third, the author argues that China respects the sovereignty of African states, implicitly stating Chinese support for autocratic regimes in Africa. He even failed to discuss the negative implications of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-funded projects in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Xuejun and Zhixiong, Aaron's work has a number of limitations. For example, Aaron failed to give a detailed analysis of Chinese security activities in the Red Sea region. Moreover, Aaron failed to discuss the negative implications of the Chinese security presence in Ethiopia. Aaron did not touch upon the Chinese establishment of military bases in Djibouti and its regional security implications in the Horn of Africa.

In 2020, Carbone edited an important work on: *Africa's Thorny Horn: Searching for a New Balance in the Age of Pandemic.* In this edited book, Carbone himself wrote a book chapter on *A New Horn: Still Thorny*? In this book chapter, Carbone (2020) stated that a number of regional and great powers have become increasingly engaged in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Commercial competition among foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has driven the deployment of foreign military forces in the region. These foreign powers are working to protect key strategic trade routes in the Red Sea region. Moreover, the Yemen civil war forced Saudi Arabia to project its military forces into the Horn of Africa. To fight the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, Saudi Arabia established its

military base at Assab Port. In addition, as part of diversifying its economy, Saudi Arabia is working hard to engage in agricultural and real estate investments in the Horn of Africa.

In the same book edited by Carbone, Styan (2020) contributed to the importance of Djibouti's strategic location in the Horn of Africa for both regional and extra-regional powers. First, its strategic location played a critical role in its relations with Ethiopia. Djibouti serves as the main port for Ethiopian imports and exports. Second, the introduction of BRI-funded projects increased the geopolitical significance of Djibouti. China considers Djibouti its natural entry point into other parts of the African continent. To facilitate Ethiopia-China relations, Beijing constructed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway to exploit Ethiopia's growing markets. Ethiopia is also becoming an oil-producing state in the Horn of Africa. China is constructing a pipeline from the Ogaden region to Djibouti.

As stated above, Carbone and Styan contributed to the recent understanding of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. However, the contributions of both Carbone and Styan have certain limitations. In the first place, these two authors did not give enough coverage of the regional security implications of the Arab Gulf states. More importantly, Carbone and Styan did not provide the response strategies of the Horn regional states to the new foreign military presence. And thirdly, the two scholars failed to provide a detailed analysis of information on the security interactions of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa.

Guifang and Jie (2019) wrote an article on: *China's Building of Overseas Military Bases: Rationale and Challenges.* The article details the debates over Chinese overseas military bases in the Horn of Africa. China faced contradictions between its sacrosanct principles of non-intervention and its expanding military presence in other regions. Guifang and Jie (2019) indicated that China established foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa by changing its previous non-intervention policy. The purpose of these military bases is aimed at facilitating logistics supplies and enhancing close security cooperation between China and the states in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, Guifang and Jie (2019) did not give a detailed analysis of the regional implications of the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. It seems that the author wants to soften the Chinese military presence in other regions.

Lei (2020) appears with an article on *China and the US in Africa: Competition or Cooperation?* The article focused on the converging and competing interests of the US and China in the Horn of Africa. Both great powers have been working together in the areas of smooth resource flows, regional stability, and economic developments. However, the US and China have different interests and different models of economic development in the Horn of Africa. China follows state-led economic developments. China focuses on infrastructure investments. On the other hand, the US follows market-led economic models, and America has been engaged in service industries and information technology. The two great powers are also competing for African votes in the international arena. Though Lei provided a good analysis of the converging and competing interests of the two great powers, his work has certain limitations. For example, little discussion is provided about the implications of great powers' interactions in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa to the intense interaction between the two great powers are not provided. In addition, Lei did not discuss other projecting powers such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates that have a significant effect on the Horn's political dynamics.

In addition to the military presence of great powers, there are a number of scholars who have produced their works on the military presence of the Middle Eastern regional powers in the Horn of Africa. For example, *The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order is* a recent work on the Middle Eastern regional powers' military presence in the Horn of Africa. Written by Harry Verhoeven (2018), the focus of the article is on Horn-Gulf security relations. Harry Verhoeven (2018) asserted that the Arab Gulf states are extending their security presence in the Horn of Africa to secure access to arable land to grow wheat, *alfalfa,* and sorghum. To widen their spheres of influence, they have engaged in security cooperation, military assistance, and military base establishments at Assab Ports, Eritrea. These military bases have been serving as staging areas in their war against the Houthi rebels. As a *quid pro quo*, the Arab Gulf states funneled huge resources to Eritrea, Somalia, and Somaliland.

Similar to Harry Verhoeven, Al Maashi (2017) has an article on: *From Security Governance to Geopolitical Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean*. Al Maashi (2017) provided a detailed analysis of the competing interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Horn of Africa. According to Al Maashi (2017), Saudi Arabia considers the Red Sea region its natural sphere of influence. Saudi Arabia has been working to eliminate the growing influence of Iran in

the Red Sea region. To support its military mission in Yemen, Saudi Arabia established military bases at Assab Port. This power projection is to contain the Iranian presence in the Red Sea region. Iran, on the other hand, has been working to support the Houthis in Yemen. Iran has been providing weapons, military supplies, and equipment to the Houthi rebels. Therefore, the two Middle Eastern states extended their power to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions.

Similar to Verhoeven and Al Maashi, Greathead and Feierstein (2017) wrote an article on: *The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry.* The central theme of the article is that the Horn of Africa has become a new competitive arena between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years. Using their soft power, these two Middle Eastern regional powers are looking to expand their presence in the Horn of Africa.

Focusing on Türkiye, Shaw and Kabandula (2018) wrote an article on: *Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa: Conflicting Regionalism*. Shaw and Kabandula (2018) indicated that Türkiye is primarily driven by strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. To further its interests, Türkiye opened its largest military base in 2017 in Somalia. Besides, Türkiye has been engaged in close security cooperation with Somalia. Shaw and Kabandula (2018) related the Turkish foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to the advent of new information technology. Information technologies such as cyberspace and shadow banking systems have weakened the formal state structure, and these dynamics have empowered, strengthened, and sustained the insurgency of non-state actors in Somalia. For example, al-Shabaab and other non-state actors have benefited from the revolution in information technology. The presence of weak states in the Horn of Africa and the empowerment of non-state actors in turn invited great powers military interventions in the region.

As discussed above**,** Verhoeven, Al Maashi, Shaw and Kabandula, and Greathead and Feierstein provided an excellent analysis of the recent advent of the Middle Eastern regional powers in the Horn of Africa. However, the works of these authors lacked an in-depth analysis of the recent advent of external security actors. For example, the above authors did not give a detailed analysis of the security implications of the Arab Gulf states in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the works of these authors do not cover the effects of Arab Gulf states' military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the works of these authors failed to elaborate on the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Al Maashi, Greathead, and Feierstein failed to analyze the

methods and strategies of Saudi Arabia's military interventions in the Horn of Africa. The same is true for the works of Shaw and Kabandula. Despite Shaw and Kabandula indicated new insights on the links between foreign military intervention in the Horn of Africa, information technology, and the empowerment of non-state actors, the works of the two authors are limited to Ankara's military presence in the Horn of Africa. More importantly, Shaw and Kabandula (2018) emphasized the role of non-state actors in the weakening of the Somali state structure. Alternatively, clan politics and the legacy of colonialism have become major factors in the weakening of the Somali state structure. Thus, Shaw and Kabandula overlooked these factors.

3.2 Theme Two

Security Implications of Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

The second category of literature review focuses on the regional security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. With regard to the security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there are few studies in the area. This does not mean that there is a total lack of recent studies on the security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Though limited in their scope and coverage, some scholars produced journal articles and book chapters on the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Scholars such as Elizabeth Schmidt (2018), Olawale Ismail (2014), Elisabeth Sköns (2014), Greathead and Feierstein (2017), Weber (2017), Verhoeven (2019), Gashaw and Zelalem (2016), Shaw and Kabandula (2018), Christopher Clapham (2017), Carbone and Magri (2020), Yirga Abebe (2021), Mason and Mabon (2022), and Elmi and Hersi (2022) produced their works on the implications of foreign military presence for the regional security dynamics of the Horn of Africa.

As part of their recent contribution, Gashaw and Zelalem (2016) jointly analyzed the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and its implications for Ethiopia's national security. Gashaw and Zelalem (2016) concluded that Ethiopia, a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa, has become the most affected state following the advent of foreign powers in the region. According to Gashaw and Zelalem (2016), the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa affected the Red Sea littoral states. These effects of foreign military presence in the Red Sea littoral states are translated into Ethiopian international relations. This, in turn, would influence Ethiopian access to the sea.

Besides, Yirga (2021) wrote an article on *Contemporary Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and Prospects for Ethiopia.* Yirga (2021) contends that the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has both negative and positive security implications for Ethiopia. Yirga (2021) further stated that the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the construction of ports, railways, and smooth resource flows. This, in turn, increased Ethiopia's connection to international markets. However, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has negative implications for Ethiopia's national security. For example, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa presented challenges such as alienating neighbors, threatening sovereignty, escalating tensions, shifting geopolitical alignments, and exacerbating regional conflicts.

In addition, Shaw and Kabandula (2018) wrote an article on: *Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa: Conflicting Regionalism.* The article focused on the recent Turkish military presence in the Horn of Africa and the Turkish security engagement in Somalia has become a concern for Saudi Arabia. To reduce the growing security presence of Ankara in Somalia, Riyadh extended its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. This has resulted in competitive relations between the two Middle Eastern regional powers in the Horn of Africa. The competition for influence among these external security actors in the Horn of Africa exacerbated the internal security of Somalia and undermined the loose federal system. These dynamics have contributed to the fragility of the states in the Horn of Africa, making the region susceptible to both intrastate and interstate conflicts.

Schmidt has contributed her recent work on *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror* (2018). One of the strong points of Schmidt's work is its detailed analysis of the security interactions of the foreign powers and their implications for the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa. Schmidt (2018) argues that the states in the Horn of Africa are held up by security dilemmas, and these security dilemmas are exacerbated by the intense security interactions among the states in the region. The security presence of a number of foreign powers has implications for this regional security complex. Schmidt (2018) concluded that the new external military interventions altered the regional security dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

Greathead and Feierstein (2017) wrote an article on *The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry*. The central theme of the article is that the Horn of Africa has become a new competitive arena between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Using economic statecraft, these two Middle Eastern states are expanding their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. The competitive relations of these Middle Eastern regional powers in the Horn of Africa have regional security implications.

In 2017, Annette Weber wrote a short book on *The Red Sea: Connector and Divider, Disruptions, and Waves from the Arabian Gulf to the Horn of Africa*. Weber (2017) argued that the advent of the Arab Gulf states in the Horn of Africa is guided by their competitive economic and security interests. Weber (2017) further stated that the competitive economic and security interests of the Arab Gulf states and the political rift among the GCC member states (Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one side and Qatar on the other) have complicated the internal politics of Somalia.

Another important work is Verhoeven's (2018), *The Gulf and the Horn: Changing Geographies of Security Interdependence and Competing Visions of Regional Order, Civil War.* The focus of the article is on Horn-Gulf security relations. Verhoeven (2018) asserted that the Arab Gulf states are extending their security presence in the Horn of Africa to secure access to resources and alliances. These Middle Eastern regional powers have been engaged in security activities in the Horn of Africa, established military bases, and played a critical role in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process. As a *quid pro quo,* the Arab Gulf states funneled huge resources to Eritrea and Somalia.

Giovanni Carbone and Paolo Magri edited a recent book on: *Africa's Thorny Horn: Searching for a New Balance in the Age of Pandemic* (2020). One of the contributors, Styan (2020), stated that the war in Yemen increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. To facilitate their military operations in the Yemen civil war, the Arab Gulf states established their military bases in the Horn of Africa. Increased competition for military bases in the Horn of Africa casts a long shadow on the security of the Horn of Africa region, and this competition has contributed to political volatility. To make matters worse, the competition for the Horn ports and political patronage has disrupted regional security. For example, the disputes between the Emirates and Djibouti over the performance of the DP World exacerbated the elite struggle in Djibouti.

Elmi and Hersi (2022) contributed to the positive and negative implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In their analyses, the two authors indicated that the military presence of the Middle Eastern regional powers in Somalia has brought both opportunities and challenges. For example, the involvement of the Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa has brought much-needed financial support for infrastructure. However, the renewed competition and rivalry between Middle Eastern regional powers has had negative implications for Somalia and, by extension, for the Horn of Africa. For example, the recent rivalry between the Middle Eastern states has negatively affected the Somali state-building process and delayed political developments in the country.

As indicated above, a number of scholars have produced their own works on the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. However, these scholars and strategic thinkers did not give enough explanation of the security implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Stated otherwise, previous works on the implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa are fragmented. This indicates that previous scholars did not provide a detailed analysis of the foreign military presence and its security implications in the Horn of Africa. This is explained in the following dimensions. In the first place, the aforementioned writers did not discuss how external military intervention altered regional security dynamics and the regional security complex. The works of these authors did not provide an in-depth analysis of the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, scholars who contributed to the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa did not show the advent of foreign powers and subsequent changes in regional cooperation, regional dilemmas, and regional institutions. Moreover, these authors did not discuss the security implications of foreign military presence on the domestic attributes of local states in the Horn of Africa. In addition, these authors failed to provide extra-regional developments that drew the attention of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the focus of the above scholars is based on the competition of middle powers in the Middle East and their implications for the Horn's security dynamics. This indicates that little research is done on the systemic competition among great powers and its regional security implications.

3.3 **Theme Three**

The Horn of Africa States' Response Strategies to Foreign Military Presence

Regarding the regional states' response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there are few scholarly research works. However, this does not mean a total lack of secondary sources on the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa to the new foreign military presence. Cannon (2017), Carbone (2020), Ylonen (2022), Styan (2022), Cannon (2022), Munene (2022), and Rossiter and Cannon (2022) produced their works on the response strategies of the Horn regional states to the new foreign military presence.

In an edited book, Carbone (2020) contributed a book chapter on: *A New Horn: Still Thorny*. Carbone (2020) contends that the states in the Horn of Africa have been following different policies in response to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. To get free from international sanctions, Eritrea strengthened its security relations with Saudi Arabia. Ethiopia, for its part, has been following a neutral foreign policy strategy towards external security actors. On the other hand, Djibouti played off China against the US in the Horn of Africa. This is to get a considerable economic assistance.

In much of the same vein, Cannon (2017) wrote an article on: *Ethiopia, Berbera Port, and Shifting the Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa.* Cannon (2017) stated that following the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, regional states have made greater efforts to capitalize on their strategic location in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti has started to monetize its strategic location and has welcomed new external powers. Nevertheless, considering the concentration of foreign powers in Djibouti, Ethiopia has been engaged in diversifying its access to ports.

In 2022, Robert Mason and Simon Mabon edited a very recent book on: *The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, Influences, and Instability*. In the edited book, a number of scholars contributed their works. For example, Rossiter and Cannon (2022) wrote a book chapter on: *Patterns of External Involvement in the Modern Political History of the Horn of Africa.* Rossiter and Cannon (2022) stated that Türkiye was interested in Somalia and Ethiopia. The Turkish military presence in these states of the Horn of Africa is aimed at getting access to markets for its factory products, including markets for its arms.

In the same edited book, Styan (2022) wrote a book chapter on: *Djibouti: Bridging the Gulf of Aden? Balancing Ports, Patronage, and Military Bases between Yemen's War and the Horn of Africa.* In his work, Styan (2022) provided a detailed analysis of the response strategies of Djibouti to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. According to Styan (2022), the location of Djibouti in the Red Sea region determines its response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Taking advantage of its strategic location in the Red Sea region, Djibouti is working hard to get more benefits from the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Even Djibouti is working hard to maximize financial and political benefits from rivalries between powerful states seeking ties with Djibouti. Its policy towards DP World and China merchant ports is the case in point.

Besides, Ylonen (2022) wrote a book chapter on: *Managing Foreign Powers for Regime Survival: The Relative Autonomy of Coastal Horn of Africa States in their Relations with Gulf Countries.* Ylonen (2022) stated that the advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa increased patron-client relations between the regimes in the Horn of Africa and external powers. The Middle Eastern powers have sought to use their economic power to promote their security interests in the Horn of Africa. For their part, the Red Sea coastal states have been making relations with external security actors to ensure external resources for regime survival. Eritrea, for example, used its foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to increase its external relations. In 2018, international sanctions were lifted from Eritrea with the support of Saudi Arabia.

As already noted, a number of scholars produced their contributions in the areas of the Horn regional states' response strategies to the new foreign military presence. Nevertheless, these contributions to the response strategies to the new foreign military presence have a number of limitations. First, the contributions of Carbone, Cannon, Munene, and other scholars lacked an in-depth analysis. Stated differently, these scholars failed to provide a detailed analysis of the Horn regional states' response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This indicates that the scope of these contributions is limited to the interests of foreign powers in controlling commercial ports in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, many of the discussions are limited to the Horn states' response strategies to the military presence of the Arab Gulf states. The aforementioned authors failed to include the Horn states' response strategies to great powers such as the US, China, and Russia. In particular, the Horn states' response strategies to the military

presence of the Asian powers did not get enough attention. In addition, the previous works on the Horn states' response strategies failed to provide Ethiopia's diverse response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, these contributions did not give a detailed analysis of the changes in relations between the states in the Horn of Africa and the changes in the domestic attributes of the local states.

In conclusion, chapter three analyzed, interpreted, and critically evaluated the existing literature on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on the research objectives, the chapter examined the related literature to highlight the driving interests of foreign powers, the security implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, and the response strategies of regional states. The findings of the literature review provided a detailed analysis of the justification of the foreign powers' military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, existing literature indicates the security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, some scholars produced their works on the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa to the new foreign military presence.

However, the literature with respect to the recent foreign military presence and its regional security implications in the Horn of Africa has certain limitations. For example, the existing literature has failed to examine systemic changes that increased the geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa. Besides, many of the previous works focused on bilateral security relations between a Horn regional state and another external security actor. There are few systematic studies on the interactions of a number of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa and their regional security implications. In addition, the existing literature missed the new patterns of the Horn regional states' relations following the advent of competing external security actors. As a result, a more systematic analysis is required to examine the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In line with this, the present research provides a critical analysis of competing foreign powers and their security implications in the Horn of Africa. In so doing, this dissertation seeks to expand the reach of the literature on the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter Four

Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa since 2010s

Introduction

In the early 2000s, the proliferation of terrorist attacks were the drivers for the influx of external military forces in the Horn of Africa. Led by the US, a number of foreign powers deployed their military forces to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In the late 2000s, security threats coming from piracy were the drivers for the advent of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The cooperative efforts of foreign military powers became successful in reducing the threats of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Although the threats of maritime pirates had declined in the Horn of Africa, a number of external security actors from North America, Europe, Asia and, the Middle East are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent years. As part of their military presence, external security actors established military bases, facilities and logistics hubs.

Considering the recent external security engagements in the Horn of Africa into account, the present chapter examines the driving interests of foreign powers in the region. For the purpose of these discussions, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines external dynamcs, notably the integration of the Horn security dynamics with other extra-regional security dynamics and internal dynamics such as resource endowment of the Horn of Africa, including hydrocarbon resources, fertile agricultural land, and mineral resources that attracted the attention of foreign powers. Apart from the internal and external drivers for the advent of foreign powers, this section examines the regional quality of the Horn of Africa that created a fertile ground for external military interventions. The second section provides a detailed analysis of the advent of China, the US, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa. The section gives due attention to the interests of these foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The third section presents the patterns of basing access for foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The final section summarizes the main points of discussions.

4.1 Foreign Military Presence in other Regions: General Justifications

Foreign powers have four different justifications for their power projection into other regions. The first justification for foreign military presence is the identification of a specific region with projecting powers. Close to the projecting powers, the region in question is an extension of great powers' territorial identities and a natural sphere of influence for the great powers (Oskanian, 2013). Projecting powers consider the region their natural sphere of influence for two related reasons. First, the region is essential for the security of projecting powers and the region is considered to be a core security perimeter for these powers (Oskanian, 2013). For example, the Russian military projection into Central Asia and the South Caucasus is considered Moscow's close security relation to these regions. In addition to fearing Kyive's NATO membership and the eastward expansion of Western influence, Russia projected its military forces and invaded Ukraine in the early 2022 (Flint, 2022; Mazarr, 2022). Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as one of its natural spheres of influence. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia's military presence has been visible in the Horn of Africa since the 1970s. During these years, Saudi Arabia extended its influence in the Horn of Africa to achieve its Red Sea policy of 'Arab Lake.' In recent times, as indicated in chapter six, Saudi Arabia has established the Red Sea Forum to thwart the presence of rival powers in the region. The establishment of the Red Sea Forum and the concomitant expansion of the security alliance in the Horn of Africa indicate Saudi Arabia's keen interest in controlling the Horn of Africa.

America has considered Latin America its natural sphere of influence. Chabat (2008) and Black (2008) write that the US considers Latin America as one of its backyards and natural spheres of influence. In 1823, the US announced the Monroe Doctrine, which demanded American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere (Bitar, 2016). To thwart the presence of rival powers, the US used different policies. Hook and Spanier (2016) noted that the US has dominated Latin America through alliances with the wealthy, political elites, and land-owning classes. Even sometimes, America employed hard power to protect its interests in Latin America. As Bitar (2016) stated, the US intervened directly or through proxy wars in these regions. During the Cold War, the US intervened (in)directly in Central America and the Caribbean regions to punish communist regimes. For example, the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954, the unsuccessful military coup attempts in Cuba in 1961, and the efforts of America to suppress Che Guevar's attempt to stage a communist insurrection among the Bolivian peasantry were some of the US interventions in Latin America

(Black, 2008). The tendency persists today. Scholars such as Zolov agreed with the US foreign policy towards Latin America. On June 23, 2022, Zolov stated that 'the US considers Latin America as its natural sphere of influence. This is because of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 that opposes European colonialism in the western hemisphere and has been used to deter the presence of rival powers in the region.'

The second justification for a great power's military presence in other regions is to secure access to objective material interests, including strategic minerals such as hydrocarbon resources and rare earth minerals. Besides, great powers calculate the importance of the region for trade and investment opportunities (Oskanian, 2013). In addition, projecting powers extend their military forces in other regions to find markets for their industrial products. Furthermore, other projecting powers extend their military presence in other regions to control trade routes and sea lines of communication. This, in turn, will facilitate the transportation and exploitation of natural resources in other regions. The Chinese power projection into Central Asia is to secure a constant supply of hydrocarbon resources in the region. Moreover, China is making its presence felt in Africa to acquire strategic minerals to sustain its domestic economic growth (For a detailed analysis, see section 4.5 of the same chapter).

The third justification for foreign military presence is systemic security considerations. These kinds of power projections in other regions are not based on the geographic proximity of the region to the great powers. Besides, projecting powers are not interested in the material resources located in the target region. As Sinkkonen and Gaens (2020:23) write, 'systemic power projection transcends the material interests of projecting powers.' These great powers' military engagement in other regions is due to global power distribution and systemic security considerations. Oskanian (2013) stated that the systemic justification of a foreign military presence in other regions indicates the international rivalry between great powers. Projecting powers extend their military forces, considering the military presence of other contending great powers in the same region. This is what Oskanian (2013:57) dubbed the 'systemic security dilemma.' In a systemic security dilemma, the military presence of one great power in an intrinsically important region attracts another great power in the same region. As a result, great powers deploy their military forces to deter the presence of other great powers in intrinsically important regions. This military deployment has a huge financial cost. In fact, in systemic great power projection, the costs of military presence in other regions exceed the benefits, and a huge sum of money is used to sustain a foreign military presence in other regions. For example,

the US, to deter Soviet expansion in Europe, stationed a huge military force in West Germany throughout the Cold War. This US military presence in Western Europe had incurred a substantial number of financial resources. The Soviet Union, for its part, extended its military forces in different parts of the world during the Cold War. As preceding discussions suggest, the Russian military presence in other regions cost Moscow a lot. As Artaud (1992:197) writes, 'during the Cold War, the Soviet Union extended its military presence in client states such as Cuba, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia.' This heavy military presence in other regions had implications for the Soviet economy. For example, as Filitov (1992) observed, the Cold War's great military competition left the Soviet Union economically devastated. In this kind of power projection, imperial grasp exceeds the economic power of the projecting states. For example, during the Cold War, great powers such as the US and the Soviet Union incurred financial costs to sustain their military presence in intrinsically important regions.

Systemic justification of power projection into other regions has continued in current international relations. For example, the recent security alliance and power projection of the US into the Indo-Pacific region are a systemic security competition. The US is working to counteract the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region. The flash points are the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean (Gunness *et al*, 2022; Kepe *et al*, 2023). Indeed, the US and China do not want to go into a direct war. They have deep-rooted economic relations, and they recognize the catastrophic nature of direct war in the modern world. Tensions, conflicts, and rivalries have arisen indirectly. For example, China and the US are backing their client states and non-state actors to meet their interests in different parts of the world. Gunness *et al* (2022) noted that the US and China have been engaged in an intense alliance-building process in the Indo-Pacific region. The US has formed a security alliance with regional powers, including Japan and Australia. In any case, the recent great power competition between China and the US in the Horn of Africa is explained by a systemic security dilemma. Security experts at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have indicated this systemic competition. For example, Adem Tesfaye noted that 'the recent military presence of China and the US in the Horn of Africa is part of their systemic competition at the global level' (October 28, 2022). These two great powers are extending their influence in the Horn of Africa to thwart the presence of their rivals.

And finally, without considering geographical proximity, objective material interests, and systemic security considerations, great powers extend their military forces in other regions for humanitarian and universal values (Oskanian, 2013). Great powers intervene militarily in other regions in order to protect civilians who are under security threats. The US humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the years between 1992 and 1993 was aimed at facilitating food delivery. This was considered a humanitarian intervention. Following the Somali state's collapse in the early 1990s, the country went into intense fighting between warlords. This has resulted in a humanitarian crisis. To ameliorate the humanitarian crisis, foreign powers, including the US, intervened to facilitate food deliveries to the famine-stricken people in Somalia. Projecting powers, under this military intervention, incur both financial and human costs. In this military intervention, the US lost eighteen soldiers fighting with Somali warlords (see chapter two). In addition, external security actors justify their overseas military presence in terms of ideological values. By and large, great powers compete for alternative ideas, values, and different models of economic development, and great powers extend their military forces in other regions to protect their ideological values (Black, 2008; Sinkkonen and Gaens, 2020; Gunness *et al*, 2022). In these kinds of interventions, the discursive linkage between the great power and the region is indirect and weak. The military presence of great powers in other regions is sporadic and short-lived military interventions (Oskanian, 2013). As noted in chapter two in detail, the Cuban military intervention in the Horn of Africa during the Ethiopia-Somalia war in 1977/78 was explained in terms of ideological values. As Havana is far from the Horn of Africa, Cuba's military projection into the Horn of Africa is not explained in terms of geographical proximity to the region. Moreover, the objective material interests of Cuba were not threatened by the war in the Horn of Africa. In addition, Cuba was a small power to engage in systemic security competition. Cuba, a regional power at the time, projected its military force into the Horn of Africa to protect the Ethiopian socialist revolution.

4.2 Foreign Military Presence in Some Selected Regions

There are two lines of argument regarding the foreign military presence in other regions in contemporary international relations. Some security analysts and pundits argue that in contemporary international relations, the use of military forces as a means of securing overseas interests has declined. According to these scholars, states could gain more from economic interdependence than from great power rivalry. For example, Gerace (2004:58) stated that 'economic interdependence has caused military power to lose its importance in the twenty-first century.' Besides, Bert (2011:5) stated that 'high levels of economic interdependence among states have reduced the use of military forces to secure overseas interests.' In addition, Glaser (2017) stated that the increasing cost of modern war has discouraged the use of military forces to secure overseas interests. Sempa (2002) further stated that in an increasingly interdependent world, great powers are less interested in using military forces to achieve their overseas interests. Furthermore, in recent times, great powers have extended their military presence in other regions for the stability of the global political economy. Jie and Guifang (2019) stated that great powers extend their military forces in other regions to combat maritime crimes. This, in turn, ensures smooth resource flows and plays a critical role in the stability of the global political economy. So, international relations would no longer be an arena dominated by great power competition.

However, other scholars and strategic thinkers contend that the behavior of great powers does not change with changes in time. Great power rivalries are visible in trade, arms control, and client states in different parts of the world. For example, Mearsheimer (2001) and Mearsheimer (2007) state that great powers fear each other. There is little room for trust among the great powers. Even other scholars do not believe in economic interdependence. For these scholars, economic interdependence does not prevent great power rivalry in intrinsically important parts of the world. Scholars like Fahadi (2021) state that economic interdependence does not eliminate the desire of great powers to use military force to achieve their overseas interests. Moreover, Paul (2004) contends that contemporary international politics is a struggle for power among great powers. Great powers engage in coercive diplomacy and support their proxy forces. In addition, the return of great power rivalry has become the defining feature of the twenty-first century, and the international system has experienced the return of great power rivalries in different parts of the world in recent times (Gaens and Sinkkonen 2020; Norrlof, 2020). The emergence of great power rivalries is visible between China and America

in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides, the uneasy relations between the US and Russia in Eastern Ukraine demonstrate great power rivalry in contemporary international relations (Flint, 2022; Mazarr, 2022). Therefore, great powers project their military forces into strategically important parts of the world. This is to achieve their overseas interests.

The power projection capabilities of states are based on their motives, military capability, and economic strength (Kepe *et al*, 2023). Based on these criteria, states fall under small powers, regional powers, great powers, and superpowers. Scholars such as Szalai (2019) and Mazarr (2022) noted that small powers have restricted foreign policy strategies to secure their overseas interests, and these powers prefer a ruled-based international system. As Farghen (2020) noted, small and weak states usually favor diplomacy, alliance relations, and international organization for their national security. More importantly, Duffield *et al* (2008:293) noted that security alliances are one of the most valuable instruments for small states to protect themselves from external military threats. This indicates that small powers form security alliances with great powers that provide them with security protection.[47] There is the merging of interests between great powers and small states. Pevehouse and Goldstein (2014:63) noted that for small states, making security alliances with great powers is an important strategy to secure their sovereignty.[48] For great powers, the votes of small states in international organizations are important sources of power to set their agendas in the international arena.

Regional powers, on the other hand, extend their military presence in regions close to them. A number of scholars and strategic thinkers produced their works on the roles of regional powers in international relations. Walt (1991) writes that regional powers are sensitive to the security developments close to them. Moreover, Farghen (2020) stated that regional powers project their military forces into their neighboring states. Miller (2007) stated that regional powers have interests and capabilities to extend their military forces in regions close to their territories. Furthermore, Pevehouse and Goldstein (2014) stated that regional powers have a considerable influence in their respective regions. Other scholars consider regional powers to be the middle powers. For example, Fels (2013) stated that the middle powers must have sufficient material and non-material resources to extend their military presence in

[47] Alliance relations provide security protection for small states. However, a security alliance has some negative implications. As Duffield *et al* (2008) noted, alliance relations have some criticisms. In alliances, there are asymmetrical power relations. These kinds of security arrangements result in a loss of autonomy for small states.

[48] In 1991, Kuwait secured its independence from the Iraqi invasion with the support of the UN Security Council. Thus, there are converging interests between great powers and small powers.

regions close to them. The middle powers must be willing to participate in conflict mediation activities in their respective regions. In addition, the middle powers have the potential to become great powers (Pevehouse and Goldstein, 2014). From these explanations, the middle powers rank below the great powers in the international power hierarchy.

The number and importance of regional powers in international politics increased after the end of the Cold War (Hook and Spanier, 2016). This is explained in two related dimensions. First, as indicated in chapter one, after the end of the Cold War, great powers reduced their military engagements in other regions. In recent years, US policy toward the Horn of Africa has become inconsistent. This has created a space for regional powers to assert their influence in the Red Sea region (The Rift Valley Institute, 2021). Regional powers have engaged in projecting their military forces into other regions to fill the gap left by great powers, and have taken the responsibility of managing the security of their respective regions. Second, regional powers are working to show that they are emerging great powers in international politics. They want to take responsibility for regional conflict resolution. 'In different parts of the world, regional powers are making efforts to change the global distribution of power in their favour,' said Istvan in January 2023. This indicates that regional powers have become active players in regional peace and security and have become influential players in international politics. Worldwide, there are many regional powers extending their military presence in regions close to them. In current international politics, there are a number of regional powers in different parts of the world. Cassedy *et al* (2022) consider Saudi Arabia and Türkiye regional powers expanding their influences in neighboring regions. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkiye has been following independent foreign policy strategies towards the Middle East, Africa, and the South Caucasus. In so doing, Ankara has been resisting pressure from great powers and extending its regional influences in the Syrian and Libyan wars. Ankara has been busy supporting Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. For its part, Saudi Arabia has been acting as a middle power. This is reflected in Saudi Arabia's role in conflict mediation efforts in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia is also improving its relations with other regional and great powers. 'We are making relations with both the west and the east. Our recent increased relations with China and Russia indicate Saudi Arabia is balancing its relations with great powers,' commented Hesham Alghannam, a Suadi political scientist on December 8, 2023.

The next category of states in international power distribution are the great powers. The correct category of great powers is difficult to pinpoint. Some scholars consider membership in the UN Security Council to be the criteria for great powers. In this case, France and Britain are great powers. Others consider the possession of nuclear armaments to be the criteria for great powers, which includes, by default, India and Pakistan are great powers. However, for the purpose of this research, great powers project their military forces and exert their political influences in both neighboring and distant regions. This is to bring a profound effect on international politics. As Lake and Morgan (1997) stated, great powers possess a global reach and are involved in the politics of more than one region. To do this, great powers must have a higher level of military capability relative to other regional powers. Great powers have the world's strongest military forces and the strongest economies to pay for them. As Pevehouse and Goldstein (2014) noted, large economies rest on some combination of large populations, plentiful natural resources, and advanced technologies. As Lemke (2002) writes, great powers expand their military presence around the globe. The more economically powerful a state is, the larger the area over which it can exert military force. Buzan and Wæver (2003:35) observed that 'what distinguishes great powers from regional powers is that great powers calculate the present and future distribution of powers, and they consider themselves prospective superpowers.' In the current international system, China and the US fall under great power categories (Kegley and Raymond, 2014; Pierce, 2021).

Superpowers, on their behalf, project their military forces and exert their influence in the whole international system. Superpowers possess both military and economic resources to support such power projection in different parts of the world (Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Westad, 2007). These power projection capabilities enhance the ability of superpowers to provide security guarantees to other states and intervene in other regions to punish rogue states. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US became the sole superpower in the international system. In the early 1990s, as Sahni and Bajpai (2008: 95) wrote, 'the US had military capabilities that could reach any part of the earth accurately and lethally, thereby crippling the adversaries in different parts of the world.' Because of this military strength, the US had become the sole superpower in international politics in the early 1990s. The US's supremacy was visible in terms of its military forces, economic strength, and cultural values. As Kegley and Raymond (2014:99) wrote, 'following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the US had become the sole superpower in the international power hierarchy.'

Regional powers, great powers, and superpowers employ different power projection strategies to extend their military presence in other areas. Strategic diplomacy (the formation of security alliances with other states), economic tools (foreign direct investments, official development assistance, and trade relations), limited military actions, supporting proxy forces, the establishment of foreign military bases, and direct military interventions in other regions are some of the strategies that the projecting powers use to consolidate their military presence in the areas beyond their borders. Importantly, these power projection strategies are not mutually exclusive. Before or after deploying their military forces, great powers conduct diplomatic relations and provide economic assistance to the target state. From these analyses, the degree of foreign military presence in other regions takes different forms. Some great powers occupy other regions using military forces. The US military deployments and its air attacks in Libya in 2011 and the recent Russian military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 are cases of direct military interventions (Flint, 2022; Mazarr, 2022; Kepe *et al,* 2023). Moreover, other great powers establish overseas military bases, military facilities, and logistics hubs in other regions. In addition, great powers extend their military forces in the form of joint military exercises, military assistance, and arms transfers. Furthermore, great powers send unseen aircraft into the airspace of other regions for reconnaissance.

A foreign military presence in other regions is an expensive security activity (Duffield *et al,* 2012; Lustombo *et al*, 2013). The cost of a foreign military presence is explained in different dimensions. In the first place, projecting powers must pay base rents and provide security protection to the host states. Gilpin (1981:156) noted that 'great powers must expend their resources on military forces, provide foreign aid to their client states, and arrange preferential trading relations with their client states.' In addition, basing powers deploy their military forces in war-prone regions. These military forces usually face physical injuries, and sometimes they lose their lives. Furthermore, foreign military presence in other regions requires both material resources and the deployment of military forces in other regions. Basing powers incur financial costs for the construction, administration, and maintenance of military bases in other regions (Grygiel, 2015). These financial costs are one of the major factors in the weakening of imperial powers. For example, in the 1970s, the Soviet Union extended its military presence in different parts of the world. In the late 1980s, the Russian economy could not sustain its overseas military presence. Therefore, Moscow closed many of its military bases in different parts of the world, including the Horn of Africa.

For the reasons mentioned above, projecting powers do not extend their military presence to every part of the world. Instead, great powers extend their military presence in selected regions. As Grygiel (2006:22) writes, 'great powers must choose specific regions to extend their military forces.' By and large, great powers direct their military presence into intrinsically important regions. The intrinsic importance of these regions is explained in three dimensions. First, some regions are endowed with economic resources such as hydrocarbon resources, fertile agricultural land, and rare earth minerals. Second, other regions are selected for their trade and investment importance (Miller, 2008; Kepe *et al,* 2023). And thirdly, other regions are selected for their strategic importance, such as the presence of sea lines (a trade route across the sea where ships sail), chokepoints (a strategic narrow route providing short-cut passage for ships), and a network of land transportation (pipelines and railways). Controlling strategic regions would enable great powers to control events abroad and have a direct implication on global power distribution.

Apart from intrinsic importance, the regional security quality and the regional security management system of some regions attract the attention of foreign powers. Regarding the nexus between external military presence and the quality of a particular region, regions fall into two categories: mature and immature regions. Scholars such as Ieva (2010) and Miller (2007) defined mature regions are populated by states which completed their state-building process. In mature regions, there are no ethnic groups working to secede from the rest of the ethnic groups. Because of this, mature regions have a well-developed regional security order, and regional states tend to desecuritize each other as potential security threats. Intense security interactions are replaced by a shared commitment to the political means of conflict resolution. These dynamics are important to develop amity relations among themselves, so that regional states act as a single actor in their international relations (Ieva, 2010). In other words, regional states in mature regions perceive foreign powers as a common security threat, and this is important to develop common response strategies. These states easily form barriers of protection against external security threats. Ieva (2010) stated that the security agenda of regional states is dominated by external security threats, and regional states together form common security agendas (mostly out of fear of external threats because internal military threats are absent). As a result, it becomes difficult for external powers to penetrate the mature regions. For example,

Western Europe is a mature region.[49]In these regions, as Buzan *et al* (1998:62) wrote, 'mutual military threats have ceased to exist among European powers.' Other scholars also made a similar argument. For example, Fariss and Markowitz (2018:83) opined that 'European Union member states have a high level of interest compatibility. They are in the process of regional integration.' Rather than military confrontations, the EU member states have been solving their disputes politically in recent years. As Kaim (2008) writes, Western Europe is one of the most developed regions where states desecuritize each other. Hence, it is highly unlikely that external security actors will penetrate these regions.

Moreover, a region populated by coherent states is less prone to external military interventions (Miller, 2007). These states are internally stable for two related reasons. First, instead of initiating a war of secession, coherent states maintain the existing boundaries. There is a high level of identification among citizens with their state's territorial boundary (Buzan, 1983). These regional states completed their state-building process. In other words, in coherent states, there are no ethnic groups that prefer to secede from the state, and regional states are less likely to face threats of secession (Miller, 2007). Second, regional states are satisfied with the existing territorial borders (Miller, 2007). There are no irredentist claims in the coherent state populated regions. This indicates that coherent states are less hospitable to separatist movements. With no separatist movements, foreign powers do not find regional conflicts to extend their military presence.

In addition, external military presence is less visible in regions where there are strong regional institutions (Ieva, 2010). Regional institutions play an important role in facilitating smooth relations

[49] As Iriye (2008) writes, European states consisting of Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and other small powers had passed through bitter interstate wars until the Second World War. However, after 1945, these states reduced their intense security interactions. First, they established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. Then, they worked together towards the development of a regional common market. Their efforts bore fruit in 1857, when they established the European Economic Community through the Treaty of Rome. As Pastor (2005) writes, the objective of the Treaty of Rome was to establish a common market. This was aimed at facilitating free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. By transferring much of their sovereignty to the regional organization in 1992, they established the European Union. Pastor (2005) further stated that the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 changed the name from the Economic Community to the European Union. The European Union has now become a mature region in the world. States in the region have collective security policies toward foreign powers.

between neighboring states. By providing a platform for dialogue, regional institutions reduce intense security interactions among regional states. This is important to reduce hostility relations between neighboring states. Importantly, regional institutions facilitate the transition from intense security interaction to a security community. As Stadtmuller (2005) indicated, regional institutions have an opportunity to establish a multidimensional security community. These dynamics are significant for improving smooth relations among regional states. Second, regional institutions can respond to different types of security problems, including interstate and intrastate conflicts. These institutions can participate effectively in mediating regional conflicts. They serve as a platform for dialogue aimed at resolving regional conflicts. For example, regional states in Europe established the EU in 1992, and this regional organization has become one of the most successful regional organizations in contemporary international relations (Hook and Spanier, 2016). It has served as a platform for the states in Europe to protect themselves from external military threats, and the European Union initiated a number of common strategies in the areas of foreign policy, defense policy, and security policy (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014; Hook and Spanier, 2016; Christiansen, 2017). From these analyses, it is clear that regions that establish strong institutions are less prone to external interventions.[50]

Furthermore, some regions have a clearly identified dominant power that protects the region from external military threats (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). The presumed regional power is in a better position in terms of economic and military strength compared to its neighboring states. As an influential actor, the dominant power resolves regional conflicts (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). Regarding the role of regional power, two points stand out. First, regional power protects the region from external military interventions, not only for the sake of its neighbors, but also for its own security. Scholars such as Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) write that regional powers consider the advent of foreign powers in the region a security threat for themselves. Accordingly, the dominant power is ready to protect the region from external intervention. Second, a regional power leads and guides the regional states towards their preferences. For example, North America has a clearly identified regional power that provides security protection to the regional states. In the region, the US is the regional power and protects the region from external interventions (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). In Africa, some parts of the continent have regional powers. In the southern part of

[50] This does not mean that the existence of strong regional organizations guarantees external innervations.

Africa, South Africa is a regional power, extending its influence to neighboring states. In Western Africa, Nigeria is a regional power exercising its influence on neighboring states (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). In the fewest possible words, regions populated by coherent states and regions possessing strong regional institutions and the presence of a dominant regional power are less prone to external military interventions.[51]

In contrast, fragile and conflict-prone regions are vulnerable to external military interventions, and foreign powers exploit these regional disputes and conflicts (Miller, 2003; Ieva, 2010). In this regard, several points stand out. Primarily, conflict-prone regions are characterized by a less developed regional security order. Regional states have a weak regional security management system, and relations between regional states are hostile. These regional states tend to securitize each other as potential security threats (Ieva, 2003). This leads to a mistrust relation between them, and regional states do not perceive foreign security threats to the region and their perception of foreign powers is based on their interests. These kinds of regions are easily affected by external powers, and they are vulnerable to external military interventions (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). The combination of enmity relations among regional states and the resulting regional conflicts create fertile ground for external military interventions. The regional rivalry between India and Pakistan in the 1970s created fertile ground for external interventions in Southeast Asia (Kay, 2006; Antizzo, 2010).

Second, a region populated by weak states is a convenient area for a foreign military presence. These weak states have no sufficient resources to deploy their military forces in different parts of their territories. As Miller observed:

Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and fulfill key state functions. They do not have an effective law enforcement system, and they lack effective control over the means of violence in their territory. They face difficulties in maintaining law and order. Thus, they do not provide security for their citizens. They are not in a position to raise sufficient revenues. This leads to their failure to maintain an effective bureaucracy to provide vital social services (electivity, water, road networks, health, and education). *Exploiting state weakness, other non-state actors will control resource-rich areas to increase their sources of income* (2007:54).

[51] This does not mean that mature regions with strong regional institutions are immune to external interventions. Sometimes, these regions become victims of external military intervention.

The main point of the above argument is that weak states do not have sufficient economic resources to provide public goods to their citizens. Besides, weak states do not have a monopoly on the use of military forces in their defined territories. Their inability to control their borders creates regional instability. For example, following Somalia's state collapse in 1991, a number of non-state actors proliferated in the country. External security actors intervened in Somalia to deter the proliferation of non-state actors. As Clapham (2017) stated, the weakness of the Somali government and the proliferation of non-state actors resulted in external military interventions. Foreign powers intervened in Somalia in the name of peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and fighting non-state actors. Thus, both regional and extra-regional powers (Ethiopia and the West) intervened in Somalia to fight transnational security threats in the 2000s.

Third, external security actors target their military presence in regions populated by incoherent states. There are two related reasons why incoherent state-populated regions are prone to external interventions. First, there are competing territorial and demographic claims among regional states. The control of states over their territory is not complete, and the boundaries are not fully fixed. There are strong revisionist forces that challenge the existing state boundaries in the region. As Miller (2007:121) writes, 'the challenges to the existing boundaries create a sense that the current regional order is temporary. Each state in the region prepares to meet potential threats. This breeds insecurity and a regional arms race.' To secure their current boundaries, some of the regional states prepare militarily and invite external security actors. This leads to the second explanation. In incoherent states, there are regional security dilemmas. Regional states are not sure about the intentions of their neighbors. They consider the military buildup in their neighbors a security threat. To balance this military preparation, they started to build military forces. Besides, to complement their military forces, some of the regional states form security alliances with foreign powers.

Finally, some regions are prone to external intervention because there is no clearly identified regional power that protects the region from external military interventions (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). Materially, the presumed regional power is weak, and it is not in a better position to provide security protection to other regional states. Besides, other regional states do not recognize one state as a regional leader. Even regional states prefer external alliances to regional cooperation in terms of regional security management (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll, 2010). In a nutshell, foreign powers

usually consolidate their military presence in intrinsically important and, at the same time, conflict-prone regions.

Worldwide, there are conflict-prone and intrinsically important regions. Regions such as the Middle East, Central Africa, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus are some of the regions that have drawn the attention of external security actors. Possessing a huge amount of hydrocarbon resources, the Middle East is one of the most intrinsically important parts of the world (Calder, 2007; McFarland, 2020). Besides, the strategic location of the Middle East (the presence of chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and sea-lanes such as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea) has attracted foreign powers. These transit routes and hydrocarbon resources are the magnets that draw the attention of outside powers to the region (Cohen, 2015). In particular, the two sub regions of the Middle East, namely the Levant [52] and the Arab Gulf regions [53] have been the main targets for external military presence. To secure its strategic interests, the US has extended its military presence in the region. Scholars such as Kay (2006), Enloe (2014), and Singh (2021) noted that the US security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and the deployments of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain indicate the American military presence in the Middle East. Besides, Russia has extended its military presence in the Levant region of the Middle East in recent years. Russia has close security cooperation with Syria. Since 2015, the Russian military forces in Syria have been actively supporting the Assad regime (Flint, 2022; Grau, 2021). The Russian military base in Syria, Tartus Naval Base, played a critical role in changing the balance of power in favor of the Assad regime. Lovotti (2019:66) concluded that, 'without Russia's military support, the situation in Syria today would have been different.' The rebels were supported by Sunni majority states such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The military presence of competing regional and great powers has made the war in Syria a matter of global geopolitics (Flint, 2022).

Besides, Central Asia[54] has long been the target of geopolitical struggle between great powers (Cooley, 2012; Shivers, 2021). In the late nineteenth century, Britain and Russia engaged in great

[52] This region represents modern-day Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.
[53] This region represents Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain.
[54] The states in Central Asia consist of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

In addition, extra-regional powers such as the US, Britain, and France supported the rebels.

power rivalries to control Central Asia. Throughout the twentieth century, the region became the backyard of the Soviet military presence (Kay, 2006; Kroenig, 2020). In recent years, the region has witnessed a new great power rivalry due to two related factors. First, Central Asia is populated by weak states that cannot control their porous borders from the proliferation of non-state actors, such as organized crime and transnational terrorism (Kay, 2006). Second, the presence of a huge amount of hydrocarbon resources and its strategic location at the center of the world economy have attracted foreign powers, including Russia, the US, China, and the European Union member states (Sussex and Kanet, 2015; Kroenig, 2020; Shivers, 2021). Russia sees Central Asia as its legitimate sphere of influence. It considers the presence of the European Union and the US in Central Asia as an obstacle that reduces its influence in the region (Sussex and Kanet, 2015; Shivers, 2021). Thus, Russia has been working to thwart the presence of the US and the European Union in the region. To do this, Moscow established military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Enloe, 2014; Pirro, 2015). In 2023, Moscow deployed long-range military armaments such as the S-300 and S-400 at the Kant military base in Kyrgyzstan. China has started to extend its influence in Central Asia. Beijing's interests in the region revolve around exploiting the vast hydrocarbon resources. As Pevehouse and Goldstein (2014) write, China is working hard to control pipeline routes in Central Asia. More importantly, Central Asia[55]has become a core part of BRI (Wenhong, 2023). The US's strategic interests in Central Asia revolve around security. America believes that the porous border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian nations has resulted in the movement of terrorists from Afghanistan to the Central Asian states (Pirro, 2015; Shivers, 2021). The European Union member states have extended their security presence in Central Asia to secure alternative hydrocarbon resources. Because, they have deteriorating relations with Russia-one of the major sources of hydrocarbon resources[56] (Pirro, 2015). As a result, the presence of competing great powers in a volatile region of Central Asia has regional security implications.

Similar to Central Asia, the South Caucasus[57] attracted the attention of foreign powers, and the region have become targets of foreign powers in recent years (Hunter, 2017). The presence of competing

[55] Indeed, Central Asia was the core of the ancient Chinese Silk Road.

[56] The European Union has additional goals of promoting democracy and human rights in these states (Pirro, 2015).

[57] Throughout history, as Cornell (2001) writes, the South Caucasus has been an area over which empires have competed. It was an area in which civilizations and different sects of religion met. It has served both as a bridge and a

weak states in the region attracted the attention of foreign powers.[58] The intense security interaction between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a case in point (Cornell, 2001; Grau, 2022). The two neighboring states have gone into protracted conflicts over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since the end of the Cold War (Hunter, 2017; Grau, 2022). Exploiting these regional conflicts, a few foreign powers are extending their military presence in the South Caucasus. For example, Russia considers the South Caucasus of great importance for its security because the region is close to the North Caucasus[59] (Subrahmanyam, 2010; Hunter, 2017), and Russia does not want to see the military presence of other foreign powers in the region. The interests of European states in the South Caucasus region are connected to hydrocarbon resources. The interests of the US in the South Caucasus region are related to fighting transnational security threats (Oskanian, 2013). Türkiye extended its presence in the South Caucasus region by virtue of its historical ties, ethnic links, and geographical proximity (Oskanian, 2013; Taspinar, 2019). For example, Türkiye has been supporting Azerbaijan in its war against Armenia. Turkish military support, including the provision of drone facilities, played a critical role in changing the regional power balance in favour of Baku in the 2020 war between the two states.

In addition, Central Africa has been the bone of contention for extra-regional powers in recent years. The region is characterized by a low level of state-building projects. To make matters worse, political instability in the form of multiple military coups and an economic crisis have occurred in Central Africa. On top of this regional instability, states such as Chad, Mali, Niger, and the Central African Republic are resourceful. However, they did not employ their resources for the betterment of their citizens. These dynamics have created fertile ground for the military presence of external powers, including France, Russia, and the US. France has a huge military presence and has deployed close to 5,000 strong military forces in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This is to grab resources like uranium and other rare earth minerals. (Kepe *et al*, 2023). For its part, the US built up its military base at Agadez in central Niger at a cost of more than hundred million dollars in 2018 (Voice of America, April 19, 2024). America deployed its military forces to fight non-state actors in the Sahel region. In recent years, Russia has become an influential external actor in Central Africa, and Moscow has been

barrier to contact between the north and south and between the east and west. Moreover, the region is a strategic trade route for hydrocarbon resources.

[58] In addition to the intense security interactions, the existence of state-like, unrecognized entities such as Abkhazia created a wealth of opportunities for foreign military interventions in the South Caucasus.

[59] These regions are part of the current Russian Federation.

extending its military presence in states such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Central African Republic through the Wagner mercenary group (Neethling, 2023). There are a number of factors contributing to the advent of the Russian military presence in Central Africa. In the first place, Russia has been engaged to reduce the influence of western powers such as France and the US in the region (Neethling, 2023; Kepe *et al,* 2023). Moreover, the region is increasingly becoming an important market for Russia's exports, ranging from agricultural products to more sophisticated goods like military equipment. More importantly, Russia has become increasingly interested in restoring its global power status in recent years.

Similar to the regions mentioned above, the Horn of Africa has received international attention in recent years. A number of external security actors have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. There are internal and external drivers for the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa in recent times. The first driver for the advent of external security actors is the strategic location of the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is adjacent to one of the most important trade routes in the world-the Red Sea (Schmidt, 2013). Before delving into the recent importance of the Red Sea region, it is essential to give a brief explanation of its historical importance for international trade. For centuries, the Red Sea has been recognized as an important sea-lane of communication linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean. Besides, the Red Sea region has become a pivot for those who want to have access to the Persian Gulf, Africa, and the Mediterranean Sea (Aliboni, 1985). For these geopolitical reasons, great powers extended their military forces to control the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions in different historical times. In the late fifteenth century, passing through the Red Sea, the Portuguese established trading posts and naval bases in the Indian Ocean (see chapter two). The construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased the importance of the Red Sea region (Hallett, 1974; Cohen, 2015), and European colonial powers such as Italy, Britain, and France extended their military presence in the Red Sea region in the late nineteenth century. This has led to a struggle to control the Red Sea region (Markakis, 2011). During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa had become a theater of rivalries for great powers (Anttizo, 1980). As noted in chapter two, the US established its military base in the Red Sea in the early 1950s. Following the US security presence, the Soviet Union extended its military presence in the Red Sea region. Its close security relations with Somalia were aimed at expanding the Soviets' military presence in the Indian Ocean (Kuniholm, 2008). Throughout the 2000s, as discussed in chapter two, external security actors extended their military forces in the Red Sea region to fight non-traditional

security threats such as terrorism and piracy in the waters off Somalia. In recent times, the Horn of Africa has become a military parking space for foreign military forces.

4.3 Internal Drivers for Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the Red Sea region. The region has been playing a critical role for the global economy. The importance of the Red Sea for global trade was demonstrated by the recent six-day blockage of the Suez Canal by the gaint container ship, Ever Given. The incident led to more than 100 vessels being trapped on each side and to the interruption of an estimated close to ten billion dollars of trade flow each day. Given that about twelve percent of global trade passes through the Suez Canal, the traffic disruption impacted not just the global shipping industry but also countless businesses and value chains, from manufacturers to domestic transport providers to retailers (Narbone and Widdershoven, 2021). By facilitating the movement of goods from Europe to Asia, the Red Sea region has become a vital artery for international trade. 'Every year, an estimated four million barrels of oil pass through the Red Sea,' said Alemayehu on December 30, 2021. For the most part, the importance of the Red Sea region for international trade increased with the rise of China as a great power. China, a rising power in the global political economy, has become the main actor in the Red Sea region in recent years (Su *et al*, 2018; Carbone, 2021). To facilitate its commercial relations with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, China introduced the BRI project in 2013. Following the launch of the BRI, the Red Sea region attracted the attention of other foreign powers. 'The Chinese plan to construct the new Silk Road across the Red Sea region has increased the geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa,' Alemayehu Geda, Addis Ababa University economics professor, noted on December 30, 2021. In the past, the Red Sea was an important trade route for the global economy. Currently, the introduction of BRI-funded projects across the Red Sea region has increased the importance of the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). For years to come, the bulk of energy supplies and consumer goods will be seaborne. Accordingly, the importance of the Red Sea for maritime transportation will continue for years to come. The increased importance of the Red Sea trade routes has increased the importance of the states in the Horn of Africa. The proximity of the Red Sea region to the Horn of Africa increased the strategic importance of the regional states (Donelli, 2022; Walle, 2023). As a result, a number of foreign powers are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa.

In addition to its strategic importance, in recent years, the Horn of Africa has emerged as a source of hydrocarbon resources. Conventionally, the Horn of Africa is considered to be a resource-poor and conflict-ridden region. Markakis (1997) stated that the Horn of Africa is one of the most resource-poor parts of the world. This has resulted in both communal and interethnic conflicts over limited natural resources. However, in recent times, the Horn of Africa has become a magnet for natural resource extraction, including hydrocarbon resources such as oil and gas (McKinney, 2018). For example, both Ethiopia and Somalia have discovered huge amounts of hydrocarbon resources in their territories. The Somali strategic expert remarked, 'my country discovered huge amounts of hydrocarbon resources in the Indian Ocean bordering Somalia. Besides, we have discovered a huge hydrocarbon potential in the interior part of Somalia' (Hussein, July 7, 2022). Other scholars share Hussien's argument. For example, Tassinari and Mehari (2021) contend that natural resources in the Somali-maritime domain include oil and gas reserves. It is estimated that Somalia's offshore oil reserve is around 110 billion barrels. Tassinari and Mehari (2021) further contend that the oil resources will make Somalia the seventh-largest reserve in the world. Besides, Somalia has close to 440 trillion cubic feet of offshore gas. This would give Somalia the fourth-largest gas reserves globally.

Ethiopia is also endowed with a huge hydrocarbon resource in different parts of the country (Melaku, 2023). For example, Ethiopia discovered huge amounts of gas and oil in the Ogaden basin of the Somali regional state. Netherland Sewell and Associates, an energy consulting firm based in the US, confirmed that the volume of reserves stood at seven trillion cubic feet (Fortune English Newspaper, August 28, 2022). This is a huge hydrocarbon resource discovered in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. More importantly, oil has been discovered in the area around Hilala in the Somalia regional state (Rossiter and Cannon, 2022). The discovery of natural resources increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa, and a number of external security actors have been expanding their presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, China has been constructing oil and gas pipelines from the Ogaden region to the Djibouti port (Carbone, 2020).

In addition to Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea is endowed with mineral resources. 'Eritrea is rich in mineral resources such as copper, gold, potassium, iron, and other minerals,' remarked Fisseha-Tsion Mengistu on November 28, 2023. These resources are attracting foreign companies, including companies from Canada and China. Eritrea is also a strategically located state in the Horn of Africa.

‘Eritrea borders the Red Sea region. It is one of the states in the Horn of Africa to have the longest border with the Red Sea maritime sea lines,’ further remarked Fisseha-Tsion on November 28, 2023. These resources and the strategic location of Eritrea have attracted the attention of foreign powers in recent years.

The exploration, transportation, and use of hydrocarbon resources have become important for current international relations. Wubbek (2012) stated that the supply of natural resources such as hydrocarbons and mineral resources has been defining the twenty-first century’s international security relations. This indicates that great powers deploy their military forces in resource-rich regions. The same is true for the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is a resourceful region. External powers have been expanding their security presence in the Horn of Africa to ensure the uninterrupted supply of strategic resources such as hydrocarbon and mineral resources. These resources are transported through the Red Sea ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication. Foreign powers, to protect the security of ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication, deployed their military forces in the Horn of Africa (Ismail and Skons, 2014). This indicates that military interests in the Horn of Africa have become closely intertwined with commercial interests, notably ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication. Therefore, the new military presence in the Horn of Africa is connected to the economic interests of external powers.

Apart from strategic locations and resource endowments, the regional quality of the Horn of Africa has created a fertile environment for external military interventions. With regard to the nexus between external military interventions and the Horn's regional quality, several points stand out. First, the Horn of Africa is home to many regional disputes and conflicts (Carbone, 2020; Plaut, 2023a). The region is one of the most unstable and fragile parts of the world. For example, Kassahun (2013) stated that in both the past and present, the states in the Horn of Africa have experienced intra-state and inter-state conflicts of varying degrees and intensities. Djibouti and Eritrea have had intense security relations over the Doumeira Mountain. There is a border dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over the provinces of Sool and Sanaag (Maziad, 2022). In this regard, Somaliland's deputy ambassador to Ethiopia made an important remark. On November 29, 2022, Kaariye noted that ‘there have been disputes between these two autonomous regions over Sool and Sanaag. We know that Somalia has been backing Puntland to control these regions of Somaliland.’

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa are interconnected and feed into each other. For example, the war in Tigray between the TPLF forces and the Ethiopian government was not limited to Ethiopia. It had regional implications. As discussed in chapter one, the destructive war between TPLF forces and the Ethiopian government attracted other Horn regional states, notably Eritrea. The youth in Tigray joined the TPLF forces following the engagements of the Eritrean forces in the war. This is conducive to external interventions. Foreign powers have exploited these ethnic tensions and rival nationalisms to intervene in the internal affairs of Ethiopia and other states in the Horn of Africa. As Munene (2023) noted, the conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa allowed global powers to dictate what happened in the region. To achieve their strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, foreign powers deployed their military forces in the region. For example, America feared the regional implications of the Tigray War in Ethiopia. The US military base in Djibouti at providing a contingency response that threatens American interests in the Horn of Africa.

Second, the Horn of Africa is populated by incoherent states, and this has regional security implications. Miller (2007) stated that incoherent states are characterized by a mismatch between the idea of the state and the loyalty of their citizens. In other words, incoherent states are characterized by a mismatch between the state boundaries and the national identification of the people. This divergence in the idea of the state among different ethnic groups leads to a growing fissure on essential national values among political elites and the people at the grass-roots level. This difference in the core values of the states leads to the emergence of liberation fronts in different parts of the country. In due course, as Oskanian (2013) writes, powerful indigenous separatist movements would proliferate in different parts of the country. As the secessionist groups are working to establish permanent control over a given territory, they will engage in an armed struggle with the government in power. These characteristic features of incoherent states work for the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is populated by incoherent states. The weakness of the states in the Horn of Africa was caused by the arbitrary colonial border demarcations in the late nineteenth century. This, in turn, created fragile state-society relations in the Horn of Africa. ‘All the states in the Horn of Africa did not complete their state-building process. They are in the early stages of the state-building process. State-society relations are brittle in the Horn of Africa,’ says Handy, a security analyst at the Institute for Security Studies in 2022. Apart from Handy, Munene (2023:4) noted that ‘the states in the Horn of Africa have yet to find an answer to the challenge of people having multiple loyalties. This is because, people at the border have failed to identify with the state in which they live.’ From these analyses, it

is clear that people in the Horn of Africa do not show permanent loyalty to the state they are living in. Loyalty to the state changes based on contingencies. Ethnic groups at the border keep shifting at points of political and economic convenience. In times of conflict, such people export internal conflicts from one state to another.

The problem of the mismatch between the state boundaries and the national identification of the people is observed in Ethiopia, and this state structure has been challenged by a number of organized groups in different parts of the country.[60] Ethiopia has faced a proliferation of liberation fronts in different parts of the country. The recent conflict between the TPLF forces and the Ethiopian federal government indicates the existence of weak state-society relations (Mosley, 2021; Ylonen, 2022b). In the years between 2020 and 2022, the Tigray forces fought a destructive war with the federal government of Ethiopia to gain a more regional autonomy. One of the TPLF senior officials noted that 'we want to establish our own independent state of Tigray. Many problems are pushing us to do so' (Key Informant Three, June 13, 2021). This supports the ambitions of the TPLF leaders. The leaders of the TPLF forces have been working to form a new state in the Horn of Africa. Solomon Dibaba (2022:4) stated that 'the TPLF forces used to call Tigray regional state "the State of Tigray", the Tigray special force "Tigray Defense Force," and it had conducted external relations in the name of the External Affairs' Office.' From these analyses, political and military leaders in the Tigray region are working to maintain their regional autonomy and military forces. These dynamics in Ethiopia will create a *de facto* state in the Horn of Africa. The presence of these kinds of *de facto* states in Ethiopia has regional security implications.[61]In this regard, Assefa (2023) noted that the possibility of the emergence of a new Tigray nation-state in the Horn of Africa seems inevitable. To make matters worse, the Tigray region experience in Ethiopia will pave the way for other ethno-

Similar to the TPLF, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has been struggling to create a separate state in the Horn of Africa. On April 19, 2022, the leader of the ONLF clearly indicated relations between the liberation front and central government of Ethiopia.

Mehadi told the BBC Amharic, 'we want to respect the rights of Somali people. We have a right to secede from the Ethiopian Federation. These are our basic rights. The mistreatment of the Somali people led us to raise the issue of secession.'

[61] Based on the peace deal signed in Pretoria on November 2, 2022, the Tigray forces agreed to dismantle their defense forces. They also agreed to stop external relations. They agreed to recognize the Ethiopian defense forces as the sole national defense force. The whole contents of the peace agreement between the TPLF forces and the Ethiopian government are available at: https://martinplaut.com/2022/11/02/text. Thus, for detailed information, see the website.

national groups to start the liberation struggle. Such political developments in the Horn of Africa will complicate the regional security complex.

The mismatch between the state and society and subsequent presence of incoherent state in Ethiopia is supported by scholars. Asnake (2022) stated that Ethiopia's internal weakness is due to the division of political elites into different categories. The idea of state and state institutions are highly contested in Ethiopia and there is no cohesive national consensus on the issues related to state structure, forms of government, and the future fate of the country. For his part, Semir (2023) stated that elite competition in Ethiopia is complex. We cannot easily predict the unpredictable alliance relations among political elites. These developments created an incoherent state in Ethiopia. Apart from Asnake and Samir, Ethiopian political leaders do not deny these internal problems. During the Ethiopian Nations and Nationalities Day that was celebrated in Hawassa on November 8, 2022, Abiy Ahmed noted, 'the past lies in Ethiopia. The current Ethiopian problem is due to the previous administration's efforts to create a nation-state. Their efforts failed. Thus, we must find a middle ground between fragmentation and a nation-state.' On June 1, 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the second monthly seminar. In the seminar, former Deputy Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs made an important speech. 'The internal conflicts are one factor in Ethiopia's vulnerability to external interventions. Unless and otherwise we work together, foreign powers will continue to intervene in our internal affairs,' Demeke Mekonnen said in 2022. From the remarks of Asnake, Yusuf, and Demeke, there is no consensus among political elites on basic national issues in Ethiopia. These diverging views have made Ethiopia vulnerable to external interventions. Exploiting the weak state structure, external security actors have intervened in Ethiopia. On December 16, 2021, Kassahun noted that 'foreign powers exploited Ethiopia's internal weakness. For example, Sudan and Egypt are supporting the rebel groups fighting against the central government.' These African states are backed by their western supporters. Many of the western powers, including the US are pressuring Ethiopia to secure Egyptian interests in the use of the Nile River. These external actors exploited Ethiopia's internal weaknesses. Therefore, the internal state weakness of Ethiopia has created a good opportunity for external powers to intervene.

In addition to Ethiopia, Somalia is another incoherent state in the Horn of Africa, because state weakness has generated state-like, unrecognized units. For example, the existence of unrecognized state-like entities such as Somaliland in the Horn of Africa has complicated Somalia's relations with

foreign powers (Wagene, November 28, 2023). The unrecognized nature of these state-like entities in Somalia and their efforts to conduct international relations have become a great security concern for the federal government in Mogadishu. To achieve international recognition, Somaliland allowed foreign powers to establish military bases at Berbera Port. As Ylonen (2022a:263) stated, 'Somalia's internal divisions and subsequent domestic conflict have opened space for various foreign actors to extend their military presence in the country.' For example, the Emirates have established military facilities in Somaliland. Deputy Ambassador of Somaliland to Ethiopia did not deny Hargessa's relations with foreign powers. On November 27, 2022, Kaariye asserted:

We have nothing to do with the Somali state in Mogadishu. It was we who first declared our independence from British colonial rule. We were united without the consent of our people. Now, we are a stable state in an unstable region of the Horn of Africa. We are conducting relations not only with the UAE but also with other powers such as Ethiopia, the US, and Taiwan.

Apart from Somaliland, Puntland is trying to conduct external relations in its own way[62]. Somalia fears that Puntland will follow Somaliland's path in conducting external relations. In particular, relations between Somalia and Puntland have become fragile in recent years. Factors such as unfair resource distribution, competition for power, and the 2024 Somalia's parliament decision reduced the relations between Mogadishu and Garowe. The main controversial decision are the increased power of the president, the number of national political parties, and the federal and state level elections (Maruf, March 31, 2024a). The new parliamentary decision gives the president the authority to hire and remove the prime ministers[63] (Maruf, March 31, 2024a). In addition, Puntland opposed the newly adopted legislative plan to reintroduce universal suffrage (one person, one vote electoral system) and the end of the complex clan based indirect voting system (Agence France Presse, March 31, 2024). On March 31, Puntland withdrawn from the Somalia federal government and will govern itself until constitutional amendments passed by the central government are approved in a nationwide referendum (Reuters News Release, March 31, 2024). The rift and uneasy relations between Somalia and Puntland have become another headache for Mogadishu, which is struggling to consolidate the central government.

[62] Based in Garowe as its capital city, Puntland achieved semi-autonomous status in 1998. The region comprises the northern part of Somalia and is endowed with natural resources, including hydrocarbons, and the strategically located port of Bosaso.

[63] Previously, only the parliament of Somalia had the power to remove the prime minister.

Primary sources from the Horn security experts have some words on the intense relations between Somalia and regional states. ‘Somalia has faced problems effectively controlling both Somaliland and Puntland. These regional states are working in their own ways. The loose center-periphery relations between the federal government and regional states in Somalia have implications for the advent of foreign powers in the country,’ said Abdeta, a Horn security expert, on July 7, 2022. Similar to Abdeta, Hussien Ali stated, ‘every president of Somalia has faced problems administering the whole country. In Somalia, center-periphery relations are brittle. For example, the current president of Somalia-Hassan Sheikh Mohamud-has faced problems dealing with the regional states. His relations with Puntland and Somaliland have become another obstacle to bringing peace and security to Somalia' (July 7, 2022). Accordingly, based on the analysis of the Horn security experts, the incoherent nature of Somalia's state structure has created fertile ground for external military interventions.

Third, the Horn of Africa is populated by weak states. Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and fulfill key state functions. They lack effective control over the monopoly violence and an effective law-enforcement system in their territory (Magu, 2019). This lack of military presence in every part of the country creates problems for economic activities, making it difficult to raise sufficient revenues, collect taxes, maintain an effective bureaucracy, and provide social services to the population.

The above analysis of weak states works for the states in the Horn of Africa. The states in the Horn of Africa lack the institutional capacity and military forces to deal with security threats such as terrorism and maritime piracy. Because of weak state structures, local armed forces have posed serious security threats to the governments in power (Neethling, 2023). Even these local armed forces have better knowledge of the military landscape, and they have better-trained military forces than the official armed forces (Neethling, 2023). Somalia is a classical example of a weak state in the Horn of Africa. The federal government of Somalia has no capacity to show its security presence in every part of the country. It is weak in the air force, intelligence, and ground forces (Flint, 2022). For example, Somalia is a weak state in the Horn of Africa. The SNA is not able to extend its military presence in every part of the country. It cannot control its borders from non-state actors such as terrorism and piracy. Some of the Somali security experts do not deny their state’s internal weaknesses. For example, on July 7, 2022, Hussien stated that:

The weakness of the Somali central government has enabled al Shabaab to consolidate its presence in different parts of the country. Close relations between al Shabaab and the people of Somalia exacerbated the internal security of the country. The people in Somalia believe that al Shabaab would bring good administration. They consider foreign military presence to be an occupation. Besides, al Shabaab has been receiving financial support from the diaspora, business classes, and religious institutions. For example, al Shabaab collected close to $123 million in 2013 from different sources.[64]

Moreover, Somalia's state weakness is visible in its internal economic performance. For example, in 2020, Somalia's parliament passed a total of $650 million in annual budgets. From this allocated annual budget, the share of the government was only thirty-one percent. The international community supported the remaining sixty-nine percent of the Somali budget (Elmi and Hersi, 2021). The continued foreign budgetary support for the Somali government has opened the door for external interventions in the name of military assistance and security cooperation. To reduce the problem of dependency on foreign assistance, Somalia has started to exploit its vast hydrocarbon resources. However, there is a fear that these hydrocarbon resources will be a curse rather than a potential catalyst for Somalia's economic transformation. As the Somali security experts noted, 'we have huge hydrocarbon resources. We want to exploit these resources. However, fair and equitable resource distribution will become a serious challenge in Somalia. The extraction and use of oil and gas resources, without any doubt, will lead to a resource war in Somalia (Hussien, July 7, 2022). These developments will create a vicious circle for external interventions in Somalia.

The Somali weak state structure and huge hydrocarbon resources have created a wealth of opportunity for external military interventions in the name of counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations. As Henneberg and Stapel (2021) write, the federal government of Somalia relies on the international community to bring peace and security to the country. To bring peace and stability to Somalia, foreign military forces have been deployed in the country. Since 2010, the ATMIS forces have been deployed in Somalia to bring peace and stability to the country. Among regional states, Uganda contributed around 6,223 troops, Burundi around 4,395 troops, and Ethiopia 4,395 troops

[64] The recent al-Shabaab attack on Ethiopia is a case in point. To defeat the al-Shabaab fighters, Ethiopia deployed its military forces in the Somali regional states. The inability of Somalia to control its territory has created fertile ground for the proliferation of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa.

(Samantar, January 30, 2024). Apart from neighboring states, foreign powers have been involved in Somalia. For example, foreign powers have been funding the ATMIS peacekeeping forces, and external powers have been providing logistical support for the ATMIS (Jemaludin, January 30, 2024). This indicates that foreign powers control the political dynamics of Somalia indirectly. In the words of Munene (2023:4), 'foreign financial support has become an instrument for leveraging geopolitical power and turning the states in the Horn of Africa into proxies. This perpetuates the influence of foreign powers on the states in the Horn of Africa.' To make matters worse, foreign powers directly project their military forces in Somalia in the name of fighting al Shabaab and other transnational security actors. Their security engagements include direct action operations, special force operations, intelligence sharing, and the establishment of military bases.

Fourth, the Horn of Africa does not have well-developed regional institutions. The existing regional organizations are weak, and their activities in facilitating relations between the regional states in the Horn of Africa are insignificant. In a conference organized by Addis Ababa University on May 18, 2022, a renewed scholar, Samatar, noted that 'regional institutions are not well developed in many parts of Africa. They are not in a position to mitigate the influence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa.' Besides, Tekeda Alemu and Wagane Minale made an important remark on the weakness of regional institutions in the Horn of Africa. On September 1, 2022, Tekeda and on November 28, 2023, Wagene noted that 'the existing regional organizations have no institutional capacity to protect the Horn of Africa from external interventions. IGAD, for example, is not in a position to become a regional platform to legitimize the activities of regional states. This weakness has exposed the Horn of Africa to foreign interventions.' IGAD is one of the weakest regional organizations in the world. It did not solve regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. For example, it failed to resolve the border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Because, IGAD is no longer able to to discuss major security developments and conflicts in its member states. It was foreign powers that brought temporary peace between the two neighboring states in the Horn of Africa (The Rift Valley Institute, 2022).

There are several explanations for the presence of weak regional organizations in the Horn of Africa. In the first place, state-society relations in the Horn of Africa are unstable, brittle, and fragile. On November 23, 2022, Dima[65] stated that 'internal state strength and cohesion are the key factors for

[65] Dima Negewo is the chairperson of the standing committee for foreign relations and peace affairs, FDRE House of Peoples' Representatives (HoPRs).

the development of regional organizations. However, states in the Horn of Africa are weak internally. Weak and fragile states do not produce strong regional organizations.' Besides, member states in the Horn of Africa do not have good relations. On November 22, 2022, Gaas stated that 'IGAD member states have cases against each other. The states in the Horn of Africa are held together by shared rivalries, and they do not trust each other.' From the words of Dima and Gaas, it is clear that there exists a sense of misperception and miscalculation among regional states in the Horn of Africa. Each state in the Horn of Africa is working for maximum gain rather than regional win-win cooperation. These regional dynamics have led to the emergence of weak regional organizations in the Horn of Africa. Hence, one of the key explanations for the presence of weak regional organizations is the presence of weak and fragile states in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, regimes in the Horn of Africa are not interested in the presence of strong regional organizations. This is supported by both primary and secondary data. On November 23, 2022, Dima noted that 'the political leaders in the Horn of Africa fear that strong regional organizations will reduce their political power. They assume that regional economic integration through the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers would reduce their economic bases and, by extension, their sources of income that sustain patron-client relations.' Similar to Dima, Gaas (2022) noted that the lack of political will resulted in the low development of regional organizations in the Horn of Africa. Stated differently, the governments in the Horn of Africa do not show commitments to surrender some of their authority to the supranational regional organizations. They do not accept the legality of regional institutions. 'The member states in the Horn of Africa do not show commitments for the existence of strong regional organizations,' says Fisseha on June 01, 2022. For example, in the years between 2009 and 2023, Eritrea was not a member of IGAD. These dynamics reduced the performance of regional organizations in the Horn of Africa. As Redie (2012) noted, in 2009, Eritrea left IGAD for its failure to resolve the border dispute between Asmara and Addis Ababa. Eritrea considered IGAD a tool for Ethiopia to dictate its own national and regional interests, and Ethiopia occupies a dominant position in IGAD's decision making process (The Rift Valley Institute, 2022). Thus, continued violent conflict in the Horn of Africa, widening differences among member states, and Ethiopia's dominant position reduced the performance and legitimacy of IGAD. The intervention of competing foreign powers exacerbated the problem.

In addition, multiple memberships reduced the performance of IGAD. For example, Somalia and Djibouti are members of the Arab League. They are also members of IGAD. Recently, Ethiopia came up with the Horn of Africa Cooperation, consisting of Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Djibouti, a key state in the Horn of Africa, is excluded from the Horn of Africa Cooperation (Henneberg and Stapel, 2020). To make matters worse, the extension of foreign security alliances reduced the performance of IGAD. Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti have become members of the Red Sea Forum. On the other hand, as Abdeta (2020) noted, Ethiopia, a core state in the Horn of Africa, is excluded from the Red Sea Forum. In recent years, Somalia joined the East African Community, and Ethiopia has shown its interest in this economic community (Belete, January 7, 2024). There are two related problems regarding multiple memberships. First, membership in different regional organizations reduced the ability of member states to pay annual contributions. The contributions of member states barely cover administrative costs. It is the foreign powers that have been providing financial support for IGAD. A number of Horn security analysts have some words on the foreign financial support to IGAD. 'IGAD is extremely dependent on foreign financing. It is influenced by foreign powers. This has opened the door for foreign interventions,' noted Abdeta on September 21, 2023 and Wagene on November 28, 2023. Second, member states have shown a lack of commitment to the growth of regional organizations in the Horn of Africa. Their loyalty changes based on their interests. Regional cooperation in the security sphere is limited in the Horn of Africa. Thus, all these factors reduced the emergence of regional institutions in the Horn of Africa. By extension, the Horn of Africa is vulnerable to the advent of foreign military forces in the region.

Fifth, the Horn of Africa has no dominant power that protects the region from external interventions. In North America, the US is a regional great power that protects the region from external security threats. In the southern parts of Africa, South Africa is a regional power. Unlike these regions, the Horn of Africa has no clearly defined regional power that protects the region from external interventions. Some scholars, such as Berouk (2011), Kidist (2014), Clapham (2017), and Yonas Ketsela (2020) consider Ethiopia a regional power shielding the Horn of Africa from external interventions. Clapham (2017) stated that Ethiopia is a dominant state in the Horn of Africa. This is because, the nation has a strong state tradition, a powerful military force, and good diplomatic relations with great powers. Moreover, Ethiopia has been playing a critical role in regional and continental peacekeeping missions in different parts of Africa. Clapham (2017) further stated that

Ethiopia is a single state at the heart of the Horn of Africa, having populations greater than those of Eritrea, Somalia, and Djibouti combined.

Kidist (2014) stated that Ethiopia has been playing an important role in the Horn's regional peace and security. Unlike Ethiopia, most of the regional states are unable to take responsibility for regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa. They are not able to replace the role of Ethiopia in the region, and Ethiopia is playing an active role in regional peace and security. This includes diplomatic engagements, military interventions, and peacekeeping activities. For example, Ethiopia's military interventions in Somalia and the deployment of its peacekeeping forces in Sudan and South Sudan indicate its dominant position in the Horn of Africa. Similar to Kidist, Berouk (2011) stated that Ethiopia has the best-equipped and best-trained military forces in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian armed forces are battle-hardened due to their participation in peacekeeping missions in different parts of the African continent. The country's large population gives its military a further advantage over the neighboring states. For these reasons, Ethiopia is a regional hegemonic power. Yonas Ketsela (2020) considers Ethiopia the regional power, taking its population, GDP, military strength, and efforts for regional integration into account. Yonas Ketsela (2020) stated that Ethiopia has attained the status of a regional power and has been able to shape the outcome of regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. It won the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea. It intervened in Somalia and tried to bring peace to the country. Its peacekeeping role in different parts of Africa is another indicator of Ethiopia's regional status. Ethiopia has been both a peacemaker and a peacebuilder in the Horn of Africa.

However, a critical analysis of the roles and nature of dominant powers indicates that Ethiopia cannot be a regional power for a number of reasons.[66] Scholars such as Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010) listed the three qualities of regional power. In their analysis, a regional power should be a regional leader, a regional protector, and a regional custodian. In the first activity, the regional power should lead the region in a certain direction in terms of security. It has to bring a coordinated set of policies to lead the region in a certain direction. Besides, other small regional states should accept the role of the presumed regional power as a regional leader. The regional custodian role involves the role of

[66]There are criticisms of Ethiopia's role in peacekeeping in other regions. For example, the Ethiopian role in peacekeeping is considered to be selling the lives of soldiers for hard currency and building the political image of political leaders.

regional powers in maintaining the security order of the region. A regional power arranges multilateral diplomacy to manage regional conflicts. This relates to norm creation, which attracts neighboring states. This is important to prevent the regionalization of the conflcits (Clark and Whitaker, 2018). A regional protector implies that a regional power assumes the burden of defending the region from external security threats. Regional powers prevent the intervention of external powers in the domestic conflicts of their respective regions. The presumed regional power has to identify external security threats and take measures by coordinating the regional states. Based on these criteria, Ethiopia does not fall under regional power categories, and Addis Ababa cannot be a regional power for the following important factors.

In the first place, instead of regional cooperation, the Red Sea littoral states prefer security alliances with extra-regional powers. This goes with what Clapham (1996:122) dubbed, 'small states prefer to work with distant powers, and they form a security alliance with these foreign powers. This is because, small states consider working with distant powers less threatening than dependence on a large neighboring state.' In the same way, Ethiopia's neighboring states prefer security alliances with distant powers. Verhoeven (2018) stated that the Red Sea littoral states in the Horn of Africa have preferred extra-regional relations to intra-regional alliances. They are making a security alliance with foreign powers. The recent formation of the Red Sea Forum is a case in point. Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia became members of the Red Sea Forum. This security alliance was formed without the consent and participation of Ethiopia. The propensity of the Red Sea littoral states to work together with distant powers is connected with their intense relations with Ethiopia. As indicated in chapter two, in the late nineteenth century, Ethiopia controlled the Ogaden region. In the early 1960s, Somalia pursued an irredentist foreign policy toward the Ogaden region. Eritrea was incorporated into Ethiopia in the early 1950s. From 1962 to 1991, it fought a protracted civil war with the Ethiopian military forces to achieve its independence (Gebru, 2009). In the years between 1998 and 2000, the two neighboring states went into a destructive interstate war. The intervention of Addis Ababa in Somalia with the support of the US in the mid-2000s complicated Ethiopia's relations with its neighbors. To make matters worse, Ethiopia's recent quest for the Red Sea ports has reduced its regional acceptance. Yonas Ketsela (2020:208) concluded that 'the efforts of Ethiopia to lead the Horn of Africa are met with suspicion and resistance by the Red Sea littoral states.' For these regional developments, the Red Sea littoral states do not want to see Ethiopia's hegemonic role in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, Addis Ababa does not have values, norms, and ideologies that are inspired by the Red Sea littoral states. In other words, Ethiopia did not get consent from the Red Sea littoral states to lead the Horn of Africa. A key informant interview with the Horn security experts depicts this lack of consent from the Red Sea littoral states. For example, on October 28, 2022, Ylonen stated that 'Ethiopia has certain qualities of regional power. It has been challenging Egypt by constructing the GERD.' Even Ethiopia has been challenging great powers in recent years. As Tesfu (2022) writes, like Russia, North Korea, and Iran, Ethiopia has been challenging the policies of the West. However, these qualities do not make Ethiopia a regional power in the Horn of Africa. 'Ethiopia did not get consent from the Red Sea littoral states,' stated Ylonen, on October 28, 2022. Eritrea does not accept Ethiopia's hegemonic role in the Horn of Africa. A key informant interview with Ethiopian military officials revealed the Eritrean viewpoint towards Ethiopia. Fikreyesus (2022) noted that Eritrea does not want to see Ethiopian economic and military dominance in the Horn of Africa. Even Eritrea is thinking of dominating the Horn of Africa, both economically and militarily. In his book chapter *Eritrea, the Horn, and the Path to War*, Martin Plaut (2023a) noted that the political leaders in Asmara have worked to remove the Tigrean dominance in Ethiopia. Besides, Isaias Afewerki considered himself more than the president of a small nation in the Horn of Africa. He considered himself a senior African leader who could exert influence across the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Furthermore, port dependency on the Red Sea littoral states has reduced Ethiopia's relative position vis-à-vis the Red Sea littoral states. Scholars such as Cannon (2017) and Belete (2023) stated that landlocked states, including Ethiopia, are vulnerable to the political developments in their transit neighbors. The 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case in point. Prior to the war, Ethiopia had been depending on Assab and Massawa ports to conduct its international trade relations. Following the outbreak of the war, Ethiopia faced serious problems in international trade, and Addis Ababa was forced to find an alternative port. The Djibouti port has become the best choice for Ethiopian international trade. Ethiopia's port dependency on the Red Sea littoral states has reduced its leadership role in the Horn of Africa. As Daz-Heni and Gouriellec (2019) write, the absence of access to the sea has many constraints on the performance of the Ethiopian economy. Ethiopia has had to rely on neighboring states' ports, primarily Djibouti, for the import and export of goods. The reliance of Ethiopia on the ports of the Red Sea states has resulted in high transportation costs, delays in trade, and limited access to global markets, hampering Ethiopia's full economic potential. This economic weakness is translated into political and security weaknesses. On October 13, 2023, Abiy

Ahmed remarked, ‘lack of access to the sea has reduced Ethiopia’s regional leadership role in the Horn of Africa.’ From these analyses, landlockedness has been an obstacle for Ethiopia to become a dominant actor in the Horn of Africa.

To make matters worse, the advent of competing great powers in the Horn of Africa reduced Ethiopia’s leadership role in the region. Three points stand out. First, foreign powers are in competition to control the Djibouti ports. For example, Dubai Port (DP) World built the Doraleh container terminal in 2006. However, its efforts to develop the port facilities dissatisfied Djiboutian officials. The Djiboutian officials accused the management of DP World of its deliberate slow progress, and finally they terminated the port service and gave it to the China Merchant Port Group in 2016 (Donelli, 2022). The shift in the port management system has implications for Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea. Second, many of the port infrastructures were built with foreign loans. Djibouti is heavily indebted to Chinese loans. As indicated in chapter six, China prefers to acquire strategic ports instead of repaying loans. The Hambantota case indicates China's ambitions to control foreign ports. In the same way, there is a fear that China is going to retake the ports in Djibouti. Third, foreign powers have been extending their pressure on the Red Sea littoral states, and the coastal states are becoming dependent on foreign powers. In particular, political decision-making in Djibouti has fallen under foreign powers (Belete, 2023). This is bad news for Ethiopia’s international trade. These foreign powers could restrict ports and impose measures that hinder communication during diplomatic crises and military confrontations. These foreign powers could extend their pressure on the transportation of critical goods such as military armaments, fuels, and fertilizer. This adds further complexity to Ethiopia’s access to the sea. These dynamics will have implications for Ethiopia’s access to international water bodies. By extension, landlocked Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa cannot be a regional power and protect the region from external interventions.

Last but not least, Ethiopia is a weak power and cannot be a regional leader in the Horn of Africa. Notable scholars have argued that domestically unstable states cannot be regional powers. For example, Clapham (1996) stated that large African states such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan have domestic security problems. They are deeply riven by internal conflicts. The same is true for Ethiopia. The prevalence of internal conflicts in different parts of Ethiopia explains Ethiopia’s weak state structure. From 2015 to 2018, Ethiopia experienced a domestic political crisis. In an international conference organized by Addis Ababa University on

September 29, 2022, three scholars, Fana, Yared, and Tezera, presented their research findings on the political dynamics in Ethiopia from 2015 to 2018. Yared (2022) stated that the repressive nature of the regime in Ethiopia resulted in mass protests in different parts of the country. Particularly, people in the Oromia and Amhara regions engaged in a tactical alliance to show their grievances towards the regime in power. Intra-elite competition in the ruling party and the proliferation of liberation media added fuel to the popular protests in these regions. Fana (2022) stated that one of the structural explanations for the mass protests in Ethiopia is the marginalization of the youth from economic benefits. Ethiopia has experienced mass protests every twenty-five years, with the population doubling. The patterns of 1974 (thirty million), 1991 (close to fifty-five million), and 2018 (close to one hundred million) depict that every twenty-five years, Ethiopia has experienced popular protests. The problem was created because the state did not provide alternative economic opportunities for the youth. In particular, the youth in rural areas did not have access to land. Had the incumbent governments solved the economic problems of the youth, the protests could have been prevented. For his part, Tezera (2022) stated that the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012 has contributed to the development of violent protests in Ethiopia. After his death, Hailemaraim Dessalegn did not get legitimacy to rule the country. The power of the center declined, and the regional states became more assertive and challenged the legitimacy of the federal government. According to the findings of the three researchers, the mass protests and domestic violence were due to elite competition, economic relegation, and the proliferation of liberation media. The repressive state's response exacerbated the problem.

Following these popular protests, Ethiopia saw a change in political leadership. In March 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed assumed political power. [67] However, the internal political dynamics have transformed from popular protests to protracted civil wars between the central government and a number of liberation fronts. Mosley *et al* (2021) stated that Ethiopia has been experiencing ethnic civil wars in different parts of the country in recent years. The recent conflict in the Amhara and Oromia regional states is a case in point. From these domestic conflicts in Ethiopia, it is clear that there is no national consensus on issues related to state structure, wealth distribution, and forms of

[67] The new prime minister took some positive political measures, including the release of political prisoners, widening the democratic space, and removing some political parties from terrorist lists. Besides, Abiy Ahmed showed willingness in revising the civil society law, the electoral law, and the restrictive media law.

government.[68] Regarding this lack of national consensus, a number of the scholars produced their works. Semir (2023) stated that the idea of a state is highly contested, and there has been a contested ethnic nationalism in Ethiopia. Other security analysts shared Yusuf's argument. For example, on August 14, 2022, Handy contends, 'Ethiopia, the presumed regional power in the Horn of Africa, has faced many internal conflicts. This has complicated its leadership role in the Horn of Africa.' A retired Ethiopian ambassador, Girum Abay also noted, 'Ethiopia's domestic ethnic tension and contested state-building ideologies have made the Red Sea littoral states hesitant to work with Addis Ababa' (September 21, 2023). Other scholars also do not accept the Ethiopian leadership role in the Horn of Africa. For example, Clark and Whitaker (2018) stated that Ethiopia has been unable to impose solutions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Even Ethiopia had faced difficulties with Eritrea in the war of 1998-2000. Primary sources with key informants also indicate that Ethiopia has faced difficulties in bringing regional peace in the Horn of Africa. 'Instead of regional power providing security to the states in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has become a source of insecurity for the Red Sea littoral states. Ethiopia has become a security recipient rather than a security provider,' concluded Henok on November 22, 2022. Therefore, protracted domestic conflicts have reduced the regional role of Ethiopia, and the country cannot be a regalia power protecting the Horn of Africa.

[68] Lack of consensus is not limited to these aspects. There are disagreements about the nature of the flag and the capital city.

4.4 External Drivers for the Advent of Foreign Powers in the Horn of Africa

In recent years, regional developments outside the Horn of Africa have increased the strategic importance of the region. These regional developments are linked to the Horn of Africa. For example, the Horn of Africa is integrated with the Indo-Pacific security space. The Indo-Pacific security space is a vast expanse of security space stretching from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). Consisting of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, the Indo-Pacific region has become an intrinsically important part of the world. The Indian and Pacific oceans have some strategically important chokepoints, notably the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Sunda Strait, and the Lomok Strait. Su *et al* (2021) stated that the Indian Ocean is the key trade route between Asia and Europe. It contains a number of strategic sea lines of communication, including the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb Straight, Lombok Strait, Malacca Strait, and Sundak Strait. These trade routes are essential to transporting hydrocarbon resources from Asia to Europe. These straits are vital for the global economy. Besides, the Indian Ocean has become a critical line of communication, leading to potential markets for manufactured goods. In addition, the Indian Ocean is rich in natural resources and, by extension, the blue economy (Su *et al*, 2019). Furthermore, the Indian Ocean is the world's third-largest ocean, covering twenty percent of the global water surface (Su *et al,* 2021). Because of these reasons, the Indo-Pacific region has become the center of great power rivalries and a bone of contention for great powers in current international relations (Dian, 2018; Przystup, 2020; Kepe *et al*, 2023). Therefore, both regional and great powers have extended their security presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

As a rising great power, China is working to change the current international distribution of power in the Indo-Pacific region (Cohen, 2015; Mazarr, 2022; Gunness *et al*, 2022). The 2015 Defense White Paper clearly stated the need for China to extend its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The White Paper further states that, with the growth of China's national interests, Beijing is ready to expand its spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In response to the new requirement coming from the country's growing strategic interests, the Chinese armed forces will actively show their presence in critically important regions (The Chinese Defense White Paper, 2015). To widen its spheres of influence along the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea region, China unveiled its BRI in 2013. The introduction of BRI increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa (Carbone, 2020), and Beijing has been funding BRI projects in the Horn of Africa. The biggest Chinese projects

in the Horn of Africa include the Doraleh Container Terminal, which became operational in April 2017; the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, opened in July 2018; the Djibouti-Ethiopia water pipeline, inaugurated in July 2017; and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, inaugurated in January 2018 (Barber and Alden, 2018). The construction of these projects illustrates that the Horn of Africa has become part of Chinese BRI-funded projects. To protect its expanding commercial interests, China has increased its military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. As Su *et al* (2018) stated, the relations between the construction of ports and Chinese military presence are intricately intertwined. As discussed under section 4.6 below, China has employed the dual-use strategy in the Horn of Africa. The Chinese military forces need logistical hubs that supply food, rest, and fuel in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. The PLA provides security protection to Chinese-built ports and sea lines of communication. This indicates that 'the BRI project serves as the prelude for Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean, and China is becoming a resident military power in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean' (Su *et al*, 2018:34).

China's growing military presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean has become a concern for other Asian powers (Macaes, 2018). Following the Chinese power projection into the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, some of the Asian powers, such as Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, and India started to project their military presence into the Indo-Pacific region.[69] [70]In particular, India considers the Indian Ocean region as one of its natural spheres of influence, and New Delhi has become concerned by the Chinese military presence in the region (Wenle, 2017; Cabestan, 2020). China and India are also rivals in the region seeking to influence nations and secure African resources and markets. The two nations are also rivals in security matters. For example, the Chinese military base in Djibouti has become a concern for India's national interests (Walle, 2023). Hence, India has been taking measures to thwart the Chinese military presence in the region. For example, India has strengthened its security relations with Japan. As Su *et al* (2018) stated, to reduce the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, Japan and India initiated the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. This is an economic cooperation between India and Japan that is aimed at replacing the role of BRI. Moreover, India has formed a security alliance with other powers. In 2017, India, Japan, and the US created an

[69] China considers the American military presence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait as a security threat. Particularly, the security cooperation of the US with Japan and the US military assistance to Taiwan are considered to be a security threat to China. For further information, see *Chinese White Defense Paper*, published in 2015.

[70] Su *et al* (2018) write, a direct military confrontation between China and the US is remote.
Yet, the introduction of the BRI in the Indian Ocean has caused geopolitical tensions between these two great powers.

informal security alliance to thwart China's expanding presence in the Indian Ocean (Su *et al*, 2018; Flint, 2022). This was aimed at addressing Chinese security activities in the Indian Ocean.

Apart from India, Chinese military expansion in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions has compelled Japan to expand its security presence in the Horn of Africa (Cabestan, 2020). The Sino-Japanese rivalries revolve around the competition over oil and natural gas fields in the East China Sea (Raymond and Gregory, 2012). The Sino-Japanese rivalry is not limited to East Asia. It is reflected in the Horn of Africa. Thus, Japan has consolidated its security presence in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). In addition to consolidating its military base established in 2011, Japan cooperated with other Asian powers to counter the presence of China in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. As part of this close security cooperation, in 2018, Japan and India negotiated about a military logistics agreement that would grant the Indian military access to Japan (Melvin, 2019a). In addition, Japan is working to strengthen its security relations with western powers. In 2018, Japan established a permanent mission and designated an ambassador to NATO. Based on these security relations, the Japanese government and NATO have been exchanging high-level visits, and the two parties have been conducting frequent military exercises in recent years (Haoyu, 2023). By triggering new confrontations and unpredictable alliance relations, the close security relations between Japan and western powers have created a more insecure region in the Indo-Pacific region [71] (Haoyu, 2023). The competitive relations between Japan and China are not limited to the Indo-Pacific region. It is integrated with the Horn's regional security dynamics.

Beyond Asian powers, the EU member states are extending their military presence in the Indian Ocean (Su *et al,* 2018). The Indian Ocean is important for the EU member states for a number of reasons. First, the Indian Ocean is strategically located on the maritime route between China and Europe. It connects European states and Asian powers. Su *et al* (2021:22) stated that the Indian Ocean is a key trade route linking Europe and Asia. It contains strategic sea lines of communication, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Lombok Strait, and the Sunda Strait. These routes are essential to import energy needs of Europe and to export industrial products to other parts of the world. Besides, these sea lines of communication lead to huge

[71] Apart from strengthening security relations with NATO, Japan has increased its defense budget in recent times. For example, Japan approved a defense budget for the 2023 fiscal year close to $300 billion (Haoyu, 203). The competitive relations between China and Japan will disturb the region's strategic balance and spark a new arms race.

market destinations where a huge population resides in Asia. Thus, the EU member states have become active in protecting their commercial interests in the Indian Ocean. These powers are extending their military presence in the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea, and the strategic importance of the states close to the Red Sea has increased.

Among the European member states, France has become a major power, extending its military presence in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, France has sought to enhance its security ties with India. This has allowed the French military to be present in the Indian Ocean. In terms of the Interest of France, in the Indian Ocean, two points stand out. First, France has extended its military presence in the Indian Ocean to control its islands, namely Reunion and Mayotte. Second, France is working to reduce the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. As Odgaard (2021:155) noted, 'France seeks to counterbalance the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean.' As a result, France has become the main security actor, expanding its spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific region through the Red Sea. The French Navy conducts annual security cooperation with other European navies in the Indian Ocean. For example, in 2019, accompanied by Britain, Denmark, and Portugal, France deployed its aircraft carrier in the region (Melvin, 2019a). Thus, a number of European powers have engaged in projecting their military forces into the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea. These dynamics increased the geopolitical importance of the Red Sea and, by extension the Horn of Africa.

The US has uneasy relations with China in the Indo-Pacific region. Kirchberger (2012) stated that Chinese naval modernization and its military projection into the Indian and Pacific oceans have become a concern for US policymakers. As discussed in chapter five at length, the US has considered the Chinese power projection into the Indian and Pacific oceans as a key security threat.[72] In particular, territorial disputes between the US and China in the South China Sea and uneasy relations over the future fate of Taiwan have brought these great powers into rivalries (Flint, 2022; Gunness *et al*, 2022). The growing tension between China and America in the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a critical security development in current international relations. The disputes between great powers in the Indo-Pacific region are gradually developing into regional and international problem (Wenle, 2017; Schreer, 2017). This is what Oskanian (2013:57) dubbed, 'systemic great power competition.' The recent systemic great power competition between China and the US in the Indo-

[72] As Gunness *et al* (2022) write, China is working hard to become the undisputed preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. The two great powers also have uneasy relations over the future fate of Taiwan.

Pacific region resembles the Cold War competition between Americans and the Soviets in the Indian Ocean. In light of these security developments, scholars such as Odgaard (2020:149) and Kroenig (2020:213) noticed that 'great power rivalry is returning in the current international system.' As part of this great power rivalry, the US is working hard to deter Chinese power projection into the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea regions. One strategy to deter Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is that the US has been strengthening its security cooperation with Asian allies. As Casey *et al* (2022) write, the commitment of the US to bolster the defense capabilities of its client states in East Asia has exacerbated the intense security relations between Beijing and Washington. For example, China has become concerned by the recent security alliances between Britain, the US, and Australia.[73] [74]Thus, with the rise of China and its power projection into the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, the response of America increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa is not only integrated with the Indo-Pacific security dynamics. It is integrated with the Middle Eastern regional security dynamics (Ulrichsen, 2011). For example, in the 2000s, the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran spilled over into the Horn of Africa. These two Middle Eastern regional powers are also competitors in the religious arena. As well as issues over identity, in the Middle East. As Mason (2022:38) writes, 'the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is rooted in the struggle for political leadership in the Middle East.' Besides, Bahi (2018) noted that the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran revolves around sectarian (Sunni versus Shiite), ethnic (Arabs versus Persian), and their patterns of relations with external powers (since the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia has had close relations with the US). On the other hand, since the 1979 Iranian revolution, relations between Tehran and Washington have become hostile. As a result, Iran and Saudi Arabia have competing relations in the Middle East.

In more recent years, Iran and Saudi Arabia have been on opposing sides in many of the Middle Eastern regional conflicts. Riyadh and Tehran have been supporting different factions in Syria, Iraq,

[73] As Su *et al* (2019) write, in 2019, the US launched the Blue Dot Network to facilitate private investment in infrastructure projects. The Blue Dot Network was considered to be an alternative to the BRI.

56. America, Britain, and Australia formed the US, Australia, and United Kingdom (AUKUS) security alliance in 2018. The main purpose of AUKUS is to increase Australia's defense capability. As part of this security alliance, the US, and Britain would provide technologies for the development of nuclear-powered submarines. This is to contain China's growing influence in the Pacific Ocean.

Yemen, and Lebanon domestic conflicts (Bahi, 2018). The uneasy relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are not limited to the Middle East and have implications for the Horn of Africa. As indicated in chapter two, in the 2000s, Iran extended its security presence in the Red Sea. To widen its spheres of influence, Iran sought to gain access to ports in Eritrea. This was aimed at supporting the deployment of naval forces in the region. As part of this military presence, in 2008, Iran made an agreement with the Eritrean government to establish a naval presence at Assab port. In addition, in 2011, Iran deployed its naval forces and submarines in the Red Sea region (Melvin, 2019a). The major purpose of Iranian power projection into the Horn of Africa was aimed at supplying weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas (Melvin, 2019a; Bahi, 2018). Following the removal of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have become hostile. Stated differently, the onset of the Yemeni civil war in 2015 accelerated the security presence of the GCC member states in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). To thwart the Iranian presence in the Red Sea region, Saudi Arabia has provided financial support to the Eritrean government (Bahi, 2018). Because of these efforts, Saudi Arabia has been able to deter the Iranian presence in the Red Sea region since early 2015.

Nevertheless, Tehran has continued to supply military support to the Houthi rebels and Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in proxy military confrontations in the Yemen civil war. As Dunne (2021) writes, the Houthi rebels continued to attack the Saudi ships passing through the Red Sea. To counter the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in the Red Sea region, Saudi Arabia has extended its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa in recent years. For example, Saudi Arabia increased its security relations with Eritrea. In particular, since 2015, Saudi Arabia has concluded security agreements with Eritrea to fight the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen (Bahi, 2018; Melvin, 2019a). To better execute their military missions against the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established naval and air bases at Assab Port. As Walle (2023) noted, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided Asmara with attractive financial support. Therefore, Eritrea booted Iran out of Assab port. Saudi Arabia and the UAE considered military bases in the Horn of Africa as important staging areas in their war with the Houthi rebels. This has resulted in security integration between the Horn of Africa and the Arab Gulf regions.

In addition to the Saudi-Iran regional rivalries in the Middle East, the intra-Gulf crisis has increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa in recent years. In 2017, the GCC member states

engaged in competitive rivalries with each other. In particular, the rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has disrupted the security dynamics in the Middle East. Qatar, Saudi Arabia's key rival in the Middle East, increased its relations with Iran. Even the close relations between Qatar and Türkiye became a security threat for Saudi Arabia. These regional dynamics have fueled further tension between the two Arab Gulf states. In addition, Qatar's popular broadcasting outlet, *Al Jazeera*, has continued to release news supporting the Arab Spring (Mabon and Mason, 2022). This has implications for the intense relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The rivalries of the GCC member states are not limited to the Middle East. The conflicts and rivalries had their own spillover effects in the Horn of Africa. The political rivalries within the GCC states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Qatar on the other hand, increased the geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019a). The two competing blocks extended their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa to win allies and military bases. Accordingly, as indicated in chapter six and seven, the GCC member states have been engaged in rivalry for allegiance, political loyalties, and military bases in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have used their financial resources to pressure the Horn littoral states to cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar. In exchange for rupturing diplomatic relations with Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia provided financial support to the states in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the Horn of Africa has become an important venue for proxy contests among the Gulf powers.

In brief, the Red Sea area and nations around it have become significantly important to regional and global powers. As Melvin (2019a) stated, with increased trade relations between Asia and Europe, the Red Sea littoral states have gained further significance. Growing commercial interests in states close to the Red Sea have led to the need to establish military bases in the region.

4.5 Foreign Security Actors in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study

4.5.1 The American Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

The recent US military presence in the Horn of Africa could be traced back to the early 2000s. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, America has considered the Horn of Africa as a source of potential security threats. For example, the 2002 US National Security Strategy considered transnational security threats such as terrorism and maritime crimes as the main threats to US national interests in the Horn of Africa. To fight these transnational security threats, America projected its military forces into the Horn of Africa and established Camp Lemonnier Military Base in 2002 in Djibouti. The US military base in Djibouti has three functions. First, Camp Lemonnier military base has become a major US strategic military presence in the Horn of Africa. Camp Lemonnier is the military base for UAVs**,** F-15 fighter jets, P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and various transport aircraft (Aaron, 2018). Moreover, Camp Lemonnier military base has been serving to collect military intelligence so that military operations could be successful (Lustombo *et al,* 2013). In addition, the US military base in Djibouti has been serving as an important link to the US security presence in the Indo-Pacific region (Melvin, 2019c). The base has become a major US military presence for drone operations in the Horn of Africa (Aaron, 2018; Magu, 2019). It has been serving as the hub and jumping-off point for drone strikes in Somalia. In so doing, the Camp Lemonnier military base has enhanced the US's military intervention capabilities in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, Camp Lemonnier military base is aimed at responding to contingency security threats to US national interests in the Horn of Africa (Lustombo *et al*, 2013). The recent remarks by American military leaders indicate the role of the US military base in Djibouti. On November 12, 2021, William Zana, commander in chief of the American base in Djibouti, remarked that 'the civil war in Ethiopia has its implications for the entire Horn of Africa. The American base in Djibouti is ready to provide a contingency response that threatens US interests in the Horn of Africa. US military forces based in Djibouti would be involved in the Ethiopian civil war to protect American interests in the Horn of Africa. We will engage to deter the war from escalating to the regional level. The US base in Djibouti is ready to secure US citizens in Ethiopia and bring peace to the region.' From Zana's remarks, the main purpose of Camp Lemonnier is to give a fast response to the security contingency in the Horn of Africa aimed at securing US interests in the region.

Second, the US military base in Djibouti has been serving as a site for security cooperation between the US and the states in the Horn of Africa (Department of Defense of the United States, 2018). As indicated in chapter two, the purpose of security cooperation is to strengthen the capabilities and capacities of the Horn regional states' military forces. These capacity-building activities are aimed at training African military forces (Daniels, 2014). The 2020 Justified Accords joint military exercise indicated the close security cooperation between the states in the Horn of Africa and America. America has been conducting security cooperation with the states in the Horn of Africa for three related reasons. Primarily, security cooperation saves financial costs and the lives of US soldiers. As Heath (2018) writes, America has employed security cooperation in Syria, Afghanistan, and the Horn regional states to fight non-traditional security threats. This is to reduce the direct deployment of US soldiers in conflict-prone regions. As Watts and Biegon (2021:159) stated, 'the Somalia Syndrome' generated security threats about the direct deployments of huge military forces in the Horn of Africa. Besides, America wants to reduce its bad public image for its military presence in other regions, including the Horn of Africa. For example, as noted in chapter two, the US supported the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in the mid-2000s. Instead of its direct military engagements, America provided logistics support to Ethiopian forces. In addition, security cooperation has become the main tool to fight transnational security threats. Rubinovitz (2015) stated that supporting regional client states has become a cost-effective strategy to defeat terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Instead of direct military presence, as Mckay (2021) writes, America preferred security cooperation such as the provision of intelligence, military assistance, and military training. As a result, the US preferred security cooperation to direct military deployments in the Horn of Africa.

Third, the US military base in Djibouti is aimed at deterring the presence of rival great powers in the Horn of Africa. The US has become very concerned by the presence of new emerging powers such as China and Russia in the Horn of Africa. As Fomako (2022:2) writes, the US has become increasingly anxious about Beijing's growing military presence in the Horn of Africa. The fear of the US has come from two related factors. First, the Chinese base in Djibouti is close to the US base. America has been concerned by the Chinese military base in Djibouti and its preparation to extend its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa.[75]Vertin (2019) stated that America is concerned about

[75] In 2020, the US, under the Trump administration, withdrew its military forces from Somalia. Following this US military withdrawal, the number of al-Shabaab attacks rose from 1771 to 2072, an increase of 17% (African Center for

secrecy, nefarious military behaviors, and the nature of the Chinese military base in Djibouti. Even America accused China of using lazor rays that caused an eye injury to some of the American soldiers stationed in Djibouti (Bolton, December 13, 2018). Second, the US has become concerned about the implications of Chinese debt in Djibouti. 'Great powers such as China and Russia are rapidly expanding their financial influence in the Horn of Africa. They are deliberately targeting their investments on the African continent to gain a competitive advantage over the US,' said Bolton, the US senior diplomat, in 2018. Indeed, the US concern about Chinese economic activities in the Horn of Africa is clear. For example, as discussed below, China is constructing railways, roads, and ports in the Horn of Africa. These are all done with the Chinese loan. Regarding the Chinese loan to Djibouti, on December 13, 2018, Bolton noted, 'Djibouti's external debt increased from fifty percent to eighty-five percent, with most of that debt to China.' These financial loans will have implications for US interests in the Horn of Africa. Concerned with Chinese debt implications, Bolton noted that 'Djibouti may handover the Doraleh Container Terminal to Chinese state-owned enterprises. Should this occur, the balance of power in the Horn of Africa would shift in China's favor' (December 13, 2018). This would have implications for US interests in the Horn of Africa.

China's growing military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a security threat to US national interests. To maintain its dominant position in the Horn of Africa, America has been adopting a number of policies. In his speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation on December 13, 2018, Bolton noted, 'America needs to make adjustments to address the pressing challenges of great power competition in the Horn of Africa.' These adjustments are explained in the following ways. First, in response to the BRI, the US came up with the Prosper Africa Initiative to step up commercial relations between the US and African states (Department of Defense of the United States, 2018). The major aim of the Prosper Africa Initiative is to replace the traditional donor-recipient model with bilaterally negotiated trade and investment pacts. It allows increased trade and investment relations between the US and African states (Gabriel, 2022). Based on the Prosper Africa Initiative, the US is working to increase trade and investment relations with African states. To facilitate trade relations, America hosted the US-Africa Leaders' Summit from December 13-15, 2022.[76] The summit is seen

Strategic Studies, 2022). Following these security threats, the Biden administration ordered the redeployment of US forces in Somalia.

[76] In fact, the US-Africa Leaders' Summit started in 2014. In 2014, the former US president, Barack Obama, initiated the leadership summit.

as an attempt to increase US influence on the African continent. Based on the summit, America promised to provide $55 billion for the promotion of trade and investments[77] (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), November 16, 2022). One of the major results of the US-Africa Leaders' Summit is the establishment of a new special presidential delegation aimed at coordinating US-Africa relations. As part of facilitating US-Africa relations, the Biden Administration nominated Johnnie Carson, who will engage in increasing the roles of civil society, the private sector, and diaspora representatives (Addisallem, 2022).

Second, the US is working hard to keep African states under its sphere of influence. Put differently, America is working to prevent the states in the Horn of Africa from falling into the hands of China. As discussed in chapter six, the US has employed economic statecraft, coercive diplomacy, and hybrid war against regimes working with China. The US policy towards Ethiopia is a case in point. From the above analysis, the US military presence in the Horn of Africa is aimed at deterring, disrupting, and ultimately defeating transnational security threats. Besides, the US security presence in the Horn of Africa is aimed at securing freedom of navigation in the Red Sea region. In recent years, the US has been working to counteract the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. In line with these activities, America is restructuring its security policies in the Horn of Africa.

[77] However, there are claims that these promises are empty. The past lies in these kinds of promises.

4.5.2 The Chinese Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

China has been expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent times. Traditionally, China prohibits foreign military presence in other regions. It considers foreign military presence in other regions as a new type of neocolonialism and imperialism (Vertin, 2020). Chinese foreign policy officials assert these foreign policy continuities. On October 27, 2022, the Embassy of China in Addis Ababa organized a high-level forum on China-Africa relations. In the forum, a number of Chinese diplomats made an important speech. For example, Zhao Zhiyuan, Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, noted, 'we used to follow non-intervention policies in other regions. We will practice these principles in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa. We oppose power politics and great power competition. This is the continuity of our past legacy.' The deputy Chinese ambassador to Ethiopia made a similar point about Chinese foreign relations. In a book launch ceremony that was held on July 15, 2023, Shen Qinmin stated, 'China is not running for hegemonic power in world politics. It opposes great power politics. Its presence in the Horn of Africa is explained in this context.'

However, the reality is different from the rhetoric. In recent years, China has been following an assertive foreign policy strategy towards other regions. As Flint (2022:45) writes, 'China is in the process of modernizing its military forces. This is to project its geographic reach in different parts of the world.' The changes in foreign policy orientation are connected to China's growing interests in other regions. Since the 2010s, China has started to follow assertive foreign policy strategies toward the Horn of Africa. This is seen in successive Chinese foreign policy documents. For example, the 2010 Defense White Paper has given particular focus to China's foreign policy toward other regions. This is explained by close security cooperation with developing states and taking part in peacekeeping operations, maritime escort missions, and counterterrorism. The 2010 foreign policy document further stated the significance of China-Africa security relations. This is to step up Chinese participation in multilateral peace operations in many African states. The 2012 Defense White Paper further reaffirmed Chinese efforts in international military and security cooperation. The policy has its own significance for China-Africa security relations and has become a starting point for Chinese participation in multilateral peace operations in many African states.

In 2013, China unveiled its BRI-economic cooperation plan, which connects Asia, Africa, and Europe. [78]Together, it covers sixty-two percent of the world's population, seventy-five percent of the world's known energy reserves, and thirty percent of the global GDP (Wenle, 2017; Macaes, 2019; Flint, 2022). As part of BRI-funded projects, China has been providing loans for the construction of roads, railways, ports, highways, and large-scale power facilities. In particular, the Horn of Africa has benefited the most from these Chinese investment opportunities. Importantly, the BRI maritime route passes through the Red Sea region. On June 15, 2023, Yanting noted, 'the Horn of Africa has become the litmus test for Chinese economic activities in different parts of Africa. The region has become a core part of the BRI.' Thus, Beijing has been funding BRI projects such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, the Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline, and the Doraleh Multipurpose Port.

In the years between 2014 and 2015, the security relations between the states in the Horn of Africa and China have shown improvements. In 2014, for example, Djibouti signed a military cooperation agreement with China. This has strengthened the security relations between China and Djibouti in the areas of port visits, arms supply, and arms transfers (Wenle, 2017; Styan, 2022). Based on this security cooperation, China has been providing armored vehicles and other military equipment to Djibouti (Dahir, 2018; Kepe *et al*, 2023). The 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper emphasized the importance of foreign military presence in strategically important regions, including the Horn of Africa. This foreign policy document asserts that external security threats, including non-traditional security threats, need response strategies. In response to the new security threats, the Chinese armed forces have started to participate in both regional and international security cooperation. Chinese policymakers believed that it was necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force commensurate with its expanding foreign economic and political interests. This is related to the policies of Chinese political leaders. On November 24, 2015, the Chinese president remarked, 'we must properly deal with the changes in world politics. We have to look at the broader international picture. We have to modernize the organization of the armed forces. This is to build a strong national defense force that is commensurate with China's international status and development interests in other regions' (Jinping, 2017:442-443).

[78] As Ahadu (2019) writes, the total investment to implement the BRI projects is close to eight trillion dollars.

In 2016, the Chinese government passed a national defense transportation law designed to facilitate the smooth flow of Chinese commodities in different parts of the world. Among the provisions, the law obliges state-owned commercial entities to support the PLA forces in the defense of Chinese interests abroad. The law implies that overseas commercial infrastructure development projects could serve dual-use purposes. Stated differently, security forces protect Chinese economic assets such as ports and logistics hubs. These logistics hubs and ports serve as temporary bases for Chinese military forces. Nevertheless, Chinese policymakers were not satisfied with the dual-use port strategies. To better protect Chinese commercial and strategic interests in the Red Sea region, Beijing established its first overseas military bases in Djibouti in 2017 (see chapter one), and for the first time in history, China appointed a special envoy for the region in 2022. The new envoy, Xue Bing, is assigned to follow the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa in close proximity, which is important for smooth resource flows in the Red Sea region. For example, Xue Bing, organized the First China-Horn of Africa Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from June 20 to June 21, 2022[79] (Melaku, 2023). The major motive of the peace conference is to restore peace and stability in Ethiopia and, by extension, in the Horn of Africa. In March 2022, Xue Bing, visited the states in the Horn of Africa and discussed with the relevant stakeholders in the areas of regional peace and security (Tesfu, 2022).

China has been extending and consolidating its military presence in the Horn of Africa to secure its economic interests. As Gunness *et al* (2022:43) wrote, China's prosperity is much more dependent on access to resources in other regions. China needs uninterrupted access to crucial materials such as steel, copper, oil, and other raw materials that pass through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions (Kirchberger, 2012; Donelli, 2022). Scholars such as Heath (2018) stated that historical evidence shows that many of the rising powers fueled their growing economies through trade and investment in other regions. To do this, rising powers projected their military forces to control resource-rich areas and trade routes. Heath (2018) further stated that these rising powers struggled with the security implications of their increasing integration into an international economy. In the same way, as a rising great power, China is expanding its military presence in strategically important regions, including

[79] In 2019, China inaugurated its first China-Africa Peace and Security Forum. Representatives of the Chinese military met with AU officials. Besides, representatives of fifty African states (seven of them were from the Horn regional states) attended the ceremony. This is to increase security cooperation between the Horn regional states and Chinese military forces.

the Horn of Africa[80] (Thrall, 2015). China, to secure investment opportunities, the supply of raw materials, and access to markets for its manufactured goods is expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa. As already indicated under section 4.3, huge amounts of hydrocarbon resources have been discovered in Ethiopia and Somalia in recent years. China seeks a greater supply of hydrocarbon resources to meet its growing demand. Thus, China has become eager to exploit the region's vast hydrocarbon potential (Thrall, 2015). In addition, China is working hard to exploit mineral resources in different parts of the African continent. Africa has forty percent of the world's gold and ninety percent of the world's chromium reserves. The largest reserves of cobalt, diamond, platinum, and uranium are found in Africa (Kepe *et al,* 2023). The presence of these natural resources attracted the attention of Chinese policymakers. To sustain its economic growth, China is working hard to secure a constant supply of these mineral resources.

Apart from natural resources, the Chinese economy is dependent on overseas markets. China has a keen desire to exploit relatively underutilized African markets for its export products. As Huang and Ismail (2014) write, China wants to exploit foreign markets to sustain its economic growth. This is the behavior of rising power. In particular, China has a strong desire to exploit Ethiopia's growing markets. For example, China exported close to four billion dollars' worth of clothing, construction materials, machinery, electronic equipment, and various consumer goods (Ethiopian Ministry of Trade, 2021, cited in Melaku, 2023). In addition, China is working hard to engage in investment activities such as the construction of ports, railways, highways, and industrial parks in the Horn of Africa. Regarding these investment activities in the Horn of Africa, there is a coincidence of interests between the states in the Horn of Africa and the Chinese companies. On October 27, 2022, Adem noted, 'western powers are not interested in infrastructure developments in the Horn of Africa. Their focus is on the provision of some aid. Conversely, China is eager to engage in a huge amount of infrastructure investment in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the Chinese companies have filled the gap left by the West.' This indicates that both China and the states in the Horn of Africa are working to increase their economic relations. These investments in infrastructure have direct ties to accessing African markets. For example, to access the growing Ethiopian market, China constructed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways.

[80] China is not only interested in the Horn of Africa. It has close trade relations with Middle Eastern and European states. As Wuthaw (2020) writes, China's total trade with European states surpassed $500 billion in 2018. These trade relations are conducted through the Red Sea.

The Chinese economic engagements in the Horn of Africa have direct relations with its foreign military presence (Gunness *et al*, 2022). To protect the sources of natural resources, the process of extraction, and trade routes, China has been expanding and consolidating its military presence in the Red Sea regions (Jie and Guifang, 2019; Alden and Yixiao, 2018). Melvin (2019b) noted that a Chinese military base is close to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port. The mix of ports and bases has led to a mix of commercial interests and a military presence in the Horn of Africa. The integration of military interests with commercial interests in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the securitization of ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication. 'External security actors established military bases to protect their commercial interests in the Horn of Africa. They want to secure ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication,' said Tekeda in September 2022. This indicates that military interests in the Horn of Africa are closely intertwined with commercial interests, notably ports, sea-lanes of communication, and access to strategic natural resources. As a result, to protect the security of ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication, China extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Second, the Chinese military base in Djibouti serves as the strategic presence for Beijing's military footprint in the Horn of Africa. There are three reasons for this. First, the base is established to respond proactively and quickly to any regional security challenges in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, in other parts of Africa. The Chinese military base in Djibouti is critical to serve as a staging area in response to security threats coming from terrorism, piracy, and other maritime crimes (Dunne, 2021; Donelli, 2022). Second, the Chinese military base in Djibouti sustains the PLA's power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions (Heath, 2018; Wuthnow, 2020). China's military base in Djibouti supports these operations by providing rest, replenishment, and resupply services for Chinese military forces. A Chinese military presence in Djibouti allows Beijing to deploy its air and naval forces. This is to improve intelligence-gathering abilities. More importantly, China expands its military presence in the Horn of Africa to gain experience for the PLA in other regions. As Gunness *et al.* (2022) write, China has never fought a major war beyond its borders in recent years and the country lacks the capacity to maintain major combat operations in distant regions. The military base in the Horn of Africa is intended to increase the PLA's military operations capabilities on foreign soil. With no prior experience working in other regions, the Chinese foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa will play an important role in gaining real-life combat experience in other regions (Wuthnow, 2020). These overseas military operations could

be seen in terms of working with other foreign powers and conducting joint military exercises with foreign powers. Working together with other foreign powers is important for the PLA to observe how other foreign militaries plan, manage, and conduct forward operations in distant regions (Wuthnow, 2020). As noted in chapter two, in the late 2000s, the Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa with other foreign powers provided a good experience for the PLA to deploy, manage, and sustain deployments to distant regions. Therefore, Chinese military engagements have provided an opportunity for the PLA to learn how to coordinate with other foreign powers.

Third, China is expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa to show that it is a responsible rising power. As Work and Krepinevich (2007) stated, rising great powers want to show their responsibility for international peace and security. Besides, Lutz (2009) stated that foreign military bases show the status of rising powers in international relations. In a similar vein, China has embarked on a path to great power status and has considered itself a rising great power in recent years (Casey *et al*, 2022; Donelli, 2022). Similar to Casey *et al*, Istvan made a similar argument. 'China is working hard to build its image in the international system. It is participating in different security activities in Africa,' said Istvan in January 2023. As a rising great power, China is working hard to shoulder more international responsibility in the areas of peacekeeping, fighting transnational security threats, and conflict resolution efforts. China participated in multilateral peacekeeping military operations in many parts of Africa in the late 2000s. With about 26,000 troops deployed, China has become the single largest troop-contributing state in the UN peacekeeping mission in different parts of the world, including Sudan and South Sudan (see chapter two). In addition, China has made important efforts to resolve the regional conflicts between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023. Midgley (2023) noted that following the execution of a Shia cleric, the Saudi embassy in Tehran was attacked, and Saudi Arabia and Iran broke off their diplomatic relations in 2016. The two states fought proxy wars in Yemen. In 2023, China brought the two Middle Eastern regional powers together. China's successful diplomacy in mediating between Tehran and Riyadh represented a landmark for regional peace in the Middle East [81](Midgley, 2023). As part of this responsible great power, China has been engaged in mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and

[81] More importantly, the Chinese's growing presence in the Middle East has posed a challenge to America's long-held political and diplomatic influence in the region (Jash, 2023).

North Africa. As Donelli (2022:53) concluded, 'China's military base in Djibouti is instrumental to show the status of Beijing as a responsible rising great power.'

Fourth, China is expanding its security presence in the Horn of Africa to protect its citizens from any forms of attack (Gunness *et al*, 2022; Kepe *et al*, 2023). Chinese citizens living in the Horn of Africa are categorized into three parts. The first group consists of officials connected to embassies and state-owned companies. These people stay in the Horn of Africa for a number of years before their departure to China. The second group consists of Chinese laborers brought in Africa for major infrastructure projects. They live in Chinese enclaves and return to China upon project completion. Finally, there are private Chinese citizens and small business owners who are working in Africa. They have been engaged in their business in local markets, farms, or small-scale production (Thrall, 2015). These Chinese nationals are becoming targets of armed robbery, murder, kidnapping, and terrorist attacks (Zhixiong, 2018). To provide security protection to these citizens, China has been expanding its military presence in the Horn of Africa. Following the Libyan crisis in 2011, China withdrew about 36,000 citizens from the country (Melvin, 2019a). Moreover, in 2015, the PLA evacuated 600 Chinese civilians and 225 non-Chinese citizens from Yemen (Dunne, 2021; Flint, 2022). In addition, in 2023, the Chinese military forces played a critical role in evacuating Chinese nationals from Sudan. As Wei (2023) noted, the Chinese military forces evacuated more than 1,300 Chinese citizens from the war zone in Sudan. This was a swift and successful evacuation mission.

For the reasons mentioned above, China has consolidated its military presence in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Djibouti has become the focus of the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is explained in three dimensions. In the first place, China extended its military presence in Djibouti, considering its strategic location at the crossroads of one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. This has made Djibouti an ideal place for the refueling and replenishment of Chinese commercial ships passing through the Red Sea [82](Wuthnow, 2020; Donelli, 2022). Besides, Djibouti has become a core part of the BRI-funded projects. As the preceding discussions suggest, BRI-funded projects stretch from China to the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Mediterranean Sea. China has been providing loans for the construction of ports, railways, and water pipelines. For instance,

[82] As Tull and Akum (2023) noted, a significant percentage of Chinese trade with the EU is valued at over $1 billion a day, and 40% of Chinese total oil imports from the Middle East and Africa pass through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

China built the Doraleh container terminal, the Ethiopia-Djibouti railways, and the Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipelines. In addition, Djibouti and China have common interests in exploiting the growing Ethiopian economy. As noted in chapter seven, Djibouti is working hard to become a commercial hub in the Horn of Africa. In its part, Beijing is working hard to exploit Ethiopia's growing economy. Having a population of 120 million (2022 estimation), Ethiopia offers a huge market for Chinese manufactured goods (Aaron, 2018; Ahadu, 2019). A key informant interview with international trade experts asserts Chinese market interests in Ethiopia. Tadele noted, 'the increased relations between Beijing and Djibouti are aimed at exploiting Ethiopia's growing economy. The Djibouti Port has been the main outlet for Ethiopia. It collects close to two billion dollars from port services annually' (October 27, 2022). To achieve its economic interests in Ethiopia, China has constructed the Addis Ababa-Djibouti electric railway. One of the engineers who participated in the construction of the railway gave an important speech. On October 27, 2022, Huang Yupeng reported, 'the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is a landmark for prosperity. It is the first electric railway in the Horn of Africa.' Its importance arises from two factors. First, the railway connects all industrial parks in Ethiopia, which has economic implications.[83] Second, the electric railways shortened the travel distance between Addis Ababa and Djibouti. 'The electric railway has shortened the travel distance from Djibouti to Addis Ababa from thirty-six hours to twelve hours. This has implications for economic transformations,' noted Yupeng on October 27, 2022. As a result, Chinese engagements with the construction of ports, roads, and railways have contributed to economic transformation in the Horn of Africa.

Relations between Ethiopia and China are not limited to the economic realm. In recent years, the strategic importance of Ethiopia for China's great power ambitions have increased (Zhiyuan, October 23, 2023). This is explained by the strategic location of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. First, Ethiopia is a pivotal state in the Horn of Africa and China's deep presence in Ethiopia serves as a critical entry point into other parts of Africa. Addis Ababa is the headquarters of the African Union and the United Nations (UNs) Economic Commission for Africa, and the city serves as a strategic gateway for the Chinese presence in other parts of Africa. International trade experts have expressed the strategic importance of Ethiopia. For example, on October 27, 2022, Tadele noted that 'Ethiopia is a

[83] Hawassa Industrial Park is the only park that is constructed outside the railway route. For example, the railway passes through the Dire Dawa Industrial Park.

strategically located state in the Horn of Africa. In particular, Addis Ababa is a political capital and diplomatic hub, hosting many regional and international organizations.' The second is that Ethiopia is an intrinsically important state for the implementation of BRI. More importantly, China's plan is to consider the strategic location of Ethiopia for the aviation industry. Ethiopia connects the Middle East, the rest of the African continent, Europe, and Asia. On November 28, 2023, Johnson stated that 'the Chinese ambition to the Horn of Africa is not limited to BRI. It is considering Ethiopia for its plan for the air silk road. China is working with Ethiopia to facilitate its air connections.' For these reasons, China is increasing its relations with Ethiopia.

In addition, China and Ethiopia have future aspirations to be prosperous states in the world. Chinese and Ethiopian government officials asserted the common aspirations of the two countries. For example, on October 27, 2022, Ergoge Tesfaye, Minister of Women and Social Affairs of Ethiopia, noted that 'China and Ethiopia have common historical resemblances. Both states have common historical records of resisting the advance of European colonial powers into their heartland in the nineteenth century.' Apart from Ergoge, the then state minister at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, 'China and Ethiopia have long-standing relations. In recent years, relations between Addis Ababa and Beijing have been improved. It is based on win-win relations. It is based on the interests of the people of the two states,' remarked Tesfaye Yilma, on October 27, 2022. The Deputy Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia supported the views of Ethiopian government officials. In his speech on October 27, 2022, Shen Qinmin noted, 'Ethiopia and China have common ancient civilizations. They resisted western imperialism. Both have a policy of national rejuvenation and renaissance. Both have a lot of potential for future cooperation.' Close economic and political relations between China and Ethiopia have resulted in security relations.[84]Security cooperation between the two states includes military sales, military training, and intelligence sharing. As part of close security cooperation, Beijing has been supplying artillery, light armored military armament,

[84] In recent times, relations between China and Eritrea have been increased. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and other key Chinese officials gave Isaias a major public welcome during his visit to Beijing from May 14 to May 19, 2023. Beijing promised a reported ten billion US dollars in investment in the Red Sea state of Eritrea (Copley, 2023). China is also trying to consolidate relations with Eritrea. As part of the BRI, Eritrea's location in the Red Sea region attracted Chinese interests. China wants to invest in these two ports. The recent visit of Xue Bing to Eritrea is indicative of the strengthening of relations between the two states.

and troop transport vehicles. In addition to arms transfers, a number of Ethiopian military officers have been visiting China for military training (Aaron, 2018*).*

Apart from Djibouti and Ethiopia, security relations between China and Somalia have been increasing in recent years (Ali, 2022). There are a number of points for these increased relations. First, China is working hard to consolidate the state-building process in Somalia. As part of these activities, Beijing and Mogadishu have increased their security cooperation in recent years. For example, in 2021, China provided huge military support to the Somali military forces. These supports include five million dollars in defense aid, twenty road trucks, five field ambulances, and twenty-two mine detectors (Ali, 2022). The second factor for the increased relations between China and Somalia is related to Somalia's unpredictable relations with the US. The US foreign policy towards Somalia is not consistent. It is based on the types of regimes in the two states. For example, the US withdrew its military forces from Somalia during the Trump presidency. After Biden came to power in 2020, the US redeployed its military forces in Somalia (Ali, 2022). Besides, the Somali presidential elections have implications for relations between Somalia and the US. Following delays in the Somali election in 2022, the US expanded visa restrictions on Somali officials. America considered the delay of the election would undermine democratic transition in Somalia (Ali, 2022). Third, relations between Somalia and the US have been reduced following the American tendency to work with Somaliland (Ylonen, 2022a). Even the recent port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland has increased relations between China and Somalia. China opposed Ethiopia’s recent quest for access to the sea considering Somaliland as part of Somalia (The Conversation, February 7, 2024). These developments increased relations between Beijing and Mogadishu.

4.5.3 **Saudi Arabia Military Presence in the Horn of Africa**

As indicated above, Saudi Arabia has been extending its military presence in the Horn of Africa. Its close security cooperation with Red Sea littoral states and the establishment of military bases at Assab Port demonstrate its assertive foreign policy in the region.[85] There are a number of reasons for Saudi Arabia's power projection into the Horn of Africa. First, Saudi Arabia considers the Red Sea region and, by extension, the Horn of Africa its core security perimeter. As Yachyshen (2020) writes, Riyadh considers the Horn of Africa its backyard. In the same way, Dahir (2022) stated that Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as one of its natural spheres of influence. The Saudis national interest in the Horn of Africa is related to the security of the shipping routes in the Red Sea region. Given the proximity of the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea region, it is critical for Saudi Arabia to ensure the security of the sea lines of communication. Walle (2023) concluded that the security of the Red Sea region has become a core foreign policy strategy for Saudi policymakers.

To secure its strategic interests in the Red Sea region, Saudi Arabia has been busy projecting its military presence into the Horn of Africa since the 1970s. As indicated in chapter two, Saudi Arabia has been a patron for regimes and liberation fronts in the Horn of Africa. For example, Saudi Arabia supported the Eritrean liberation fronts and the Ziad Barre regime in Somalia in their war against the *Dergue* regime of Ethiopia in the 1970s. Saudi Arabia's military and logistics support were decisive in changing the regional balance of power in favor of the liberation fronts in Eritrea and, by extension, for the rebirth of a new state in the Horn of Africa (see chapter two). The recent advent of Saudi Arabia is the continuation of its Red Sea policy of the 1970s. Thus, in the post-2010s, Saudi Arabia has become the main security actor in the Horn of Africa. In 2018, Saudi Arabia arranged a meeting that brought together the Red Sea littoral states, including Egypt, Somalia, Yemen, and Djibouti. The primary purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Red Sea governance system. In line with this, Saudi Arabia and Egypt established a Red Sea Forum in 2018. The Red Sea Forum is aimed at discussing shared interests among regional states, identifying emergent security threats, and fashioning common solutions (Vertin, 2020). This is to bring common and proper strategies to maritime security threats in the Red Sea region. On the surface, the Red Sea Forum is aimed at coordinating efforts to combat piracy in the Red Sea region. However, a deeper analysis of the Red Sea Forum indicates that Saudi Arabia is working hard to widen its spheres of influence in the Horn

[85] Saudi Arabia is also negotiating the establishment of military bases in Djibouti.

of Africa (Pamba, 2021). Using the Red Sea Forum, Saudi Arabia is working to thwart the presence of some of its regional rivals, notably Türkiye and Iran, in the Horn of Africa. In doing this, Saudi Arabia wants to continue its Arab Lake policy of the 1970s.

Apart from thwarting Turkiye from the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia has extended its security presence in the Horn of Africa to fight the rise of rival states and non-state actors in the Red Sea region (Walle, 2023). For example, Saudi Arabia extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa following the Arab Uprising in 2011. The Arab Uprising resulted in regime change throughout the Arab world, including Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states have become very concerned by the rise of radical political movements in the Middle East (Jones, 2013). These regional powers were concerned about the possible spillover effects of the radical political movement into their domestic politics. These Arab Gulf states were concerned by the spread of radical movements in the Horn of Africa. In particular, Saudi Arabia has become very concerned by the presence of Qatar and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia accused Türkiye and Qatar of supporting the Muslim Brothers and their political activities in the Horn of Africa (Verhoeven, 2018). Thus, Saudi Arabia extended and consolidated its security presence to thwart the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Türkiye and Qatar.

The Saudis power projection is not limited to thwarting the spread of Muslim Brothers in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia projected its security presence into the Horn of Africa to fight rival regional powers in the Middle East. For example, Iran increased its security presence in the Horn of Africa in the mid-2000s and strengthened its security relations with Eritrea. Accordingly, Eritrea allowed Iran to use Assab Port as its military base. In return, Iran agreed to provide oil and gas at lower prices. Besides, Iran provided financial support for infrastructure developments, including renewing the Asmara airport terminal (Manjang, 2017). Following these dynamics, as noted earlier, Saudi Arabia and its allies made their efforts to thwart the Iranian presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia was successful in changing the Eritrean allegiance from Iran to itself. In 2015, Eritrea changed its position by quitting the Iranian camp and joining the Saudi-led coalition.

Though Iran's direct security presence in the Red Sea region had reduced, Teheran continued its security presence by supporting the Houthi rebels in the Yemen civil war. The Yemen civil war is a proxy battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Bahi, 2018). As the Red Sea littoral states, Saudi Arabia

has become worried about the presence of Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in the region. Following the onset of the civil war in Yemen in 2015, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa for Saudi Arabia has increased (de Waal, 2017). To thwart the security activities of the Houthi rebels, Saudi Arabia searched for client states, military bases, and commercial ports in the Red Sea littoral states. On September 1, 2022, Samira stated that 'the internal conflict in Yemen increased the Gulf's security engagements in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea became the best choice for Saudi Arabia. Eritrea leased the port of Assab to Saudi Arabia.' Thus, the Saudi-led coalition gained a staging area in the Red Sea region to fight the Houthi rebels. This is to enhance their military operations against the Houthi rebels. Besides, the Saudi military bases at Assab Port have been serving to impose blockades against the Houthis. In addition to providing military bases, Eritrea sent its military forces into the Yemeni civil war supporting the Saudi forces (Pamba, 2021). As a *quid pro quo*, Eritrea enhanced its diplomatic relations with some of the Arab Gulf states. In return, it gained some financial support. Besides, in 2018, as indicated in chapter one, Saudi Arabia played a critical role in bringing together Eritrea and Ethiopia to resolve their border disputes. This regional conflict resolution has become a first step towards increased relations between Eritrea and extra-regional powers. By lifting international sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009, the rapprochement increased Eritrean international relations (Michael, 2021).

Second, the intra-GCC political crisis that occurred in 2017 further increased the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa for Saudi Arabia (Styan, 2022). The GCC crisis occurred when Saudi Arabia and the UAE severed their diplomatic relations with Qatar. As indicated above, these two states accused Qatar of supporting Muslim brothers who have been working for radical political reforms that threatened the domestic political system of Saudi Arabia (International Crisis Group, 2019). The conservative regimes in Saudi Arabia have been working to maintain the *status quo.* Saudi Arabia has been working to eliminate the spread of radical Muslim Brothers in the Horn of Africa. To reduce the spread of radical political movements, Saudi Arabia has sought to get an ally in the Horn of Africa. To win allegiance, Saudi Arabia increased its security presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia strengthened its relations with Eritrea and Djibouti. As Dahir (2022) noted, Eritrea provided military staging areas for the Saudi security mission in the Yemen conflict. On the other hand, Qatar and Türkiye tried to strengthen their relations with Somalia. Thus, these developments in the Middle East increased the importance of the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia**.**

Third, the Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are extending their military presence in the Horn of Africa in order to diversify their economies (Mason, 2022). This is explained in two aspects. First, the Arab Gulf states are working to diversify their economies from reliance on hydrocarbon resources to other economic sectors, including real estate and agricultural investments (Zaghlami, 2019; Munene, 2022). As part of economic diversification, Saudi Arabia introduced Vision 2030 in 2016. Based on Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia has a plan to transform its hydrocarbon-based economy into other economic sectors such as construction, real estate, hotels, and tourism. Second, Saudi Arabia is extending its presence in the Horn of Africa to secure its food security.[86] The sectors in which Saudi investors are interested include agriculture, livestock, and energy (Walle, 2023). Thus, Saudi Arabia is extending its economic presence in the Horn of Africa to engage in agricultural investments. This is to secure its water and food needs (Munene, 2022). As part of these agricultural investments, Saudi Arabia invests about two million hectares in a number of African states. A large portion of Saudi Arabia's agricultural investments are concentrated in eastern Africa. Particularly, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Tanzania have become the main targets of Saudi Arabia's agricultural investments (Mosley, 2021). For example, Saudi Arabia leased around 124, 000 hectares of land from Ethiopia to produce rice and maize (Ylonen, 2022b). Saudi economic investments in the Horn of Africa need transportation routes. Djibouti has become the best choice and Saudi Arabia is strengthening its relations with Djibouti. All in all, the regional implications of the 2011 Arab Uprising, the 2015 Yemen civil war, and the 2017 GCC political crisis increased the strategic value of the Horn of Africa for Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has consolidated its security presence in the Horn of Africa. Riyadh has become an active regional security actor in the Horn of Africa.

[86] It is clear that Africa holds 65 percent of the world's arable land and ten percent of the planet's renewable water resources.

4.5.4 Türkiye Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

Türkiye has a number of reasons for projecting its military presence into the Horn of Africa. First, the post-2010s political developments in Türkiye served as the drivers for Ankara's military presence in the Horn of Africa. When the Justice and Development Party's (AKP's) came to power in 2002, Türkiye started to follow an assertive foreign policy strategy towards the African continent (Donelli and Levaggi, 2021). As part of this assertive foreign policy direction, the AKP has increased its economic and political relations with many African states in recent years. To augment the Turkish engagement in Africa, Ankara's foreign policymaking has been transferred to the executive organ of the government. Even from the executive organ of the government, some of the key AKP party members have been playing a key role in initiating Turkish foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa (Donelli and Levaggi, 2021). For instance, the roles of the military, foreign ministry, and other institutions have been reduced, and foreign policymaking has been concentrated in the hands of the president and his close circles (Vertin, 2019b). This has led to the personal preference of President Erdogan in foreign policymaking, and his influence has become visible in Somalia.

In relation to the above analysis, Türkiye is working to show the international community that it is a responsible rising power (Dahir, 2019; Cannon and Rossiter, 2022). For this purpose, Türkiye chose the Horn of Africa to show its foreign policy credentials, and Ankara considered the region a strategic gateway to other parts of the African continent. To achieve its goals in Africa, Türkiye was granted observer status by the AU in 2005 (Ali Onur June 28, 2024). This is to implement 'The 2005 Open to Africa Policy.' Based on this policy, Turkiye has been working hard to boost Ankara's diplomatic relations with many African states. As part of this engagement, Turkiye increased its embassies in Africa from fourteen to forty-three. Orakci (2022) concluded that Türkiye is the fourth most diplomatically represented state in Africa after the US, China, and France. Besides, Türkiye started to conduct Turkiye-Africa submits. To deepen economic relations between Turkiye and the states in the Horn of Africa, Ankara organized Turkish-African economic and business forums periodically. A series of trade forums were held in 2000, 2016, 2018, and 2021 (Orakci, 2021). Türkiye arranged a series of summits in Ankara, and a number of African heads of government attended these meetings. Moreover, Turkish political leaders visited a number of African states. For example, the high-level visit of Mogadishu in 2021 became the landmark. In the words of Ali Onur 'the high level visits and

diplomatic submits have become important to institutionalize Turkish-African relations' (June 28, 2024).

In addition, economic growth in Türkiye necessitated the need for market share and investment opportunities on the African continent (Elem Eyrice, June 28, 2024), and Türkiye is working hard to exploit the African market opportunities. Türkiye considers the African markets as untapped and lucrative sources of income for its growing industry. Shaw and Kabandula (2018) stated that Türkiye needs external markets for its domestic industries to sustain its economic growth. This is related with the rise of new business groups in Turkiye that need market access in Africa. Among Turkish industries, the military industry is searching for African markets. One of the goals of Turkish foreign policy is to become a major global arms supplier to African states. Turkish scholars do not deny the interest of Ankara to export military armaments to Africa. On June 28, 2024, Ali Onur noted that 'Turkish defense industry is growing. In particular, Turkish drones are chosen by their lower prices and their perfection in the war fronts.' In 2021, Türkiye exported close to three billion worth of defense products (Kenez, 2021). In addition, Turkish reduced relations with the West forced Ankara another strategic partner in different parts of the world, including Africa. Turkiye and Africa have shared visions for the presence of fair world at the international organizations. Turkiye wants Africa voices heard at the international organization. Turkiye has been working with the neglected parts of the world (Berk Baran, June 28, 2024). For these reasons, Turkiye has been strengthening its relations with the African states.

Among the states in the Horn of Africa, Somalia has become the best choice for the Turkish military presence on the African continent. Türkiye selected Somalia as a model to extend its security presence in other parts of Africa. Somalia has become the pivot of Turkish policy in the Horn of Africa (Siradag, 2017; Mosley, 2021). This is explained in three different ways. First, in Somalia, competition is low and the gain is high (Orakci, 2021). The reason being, many international companies are not willing to invest in the conflict-prone regions of Somalia. They fear that their properties will be damaged by a number of non-state actors, and they are not willing to invest in Somalia. On the other hand, the Turkish companies are willing to invest in the fragile state of Somalia. Because of these factors, the Turkish investment in Somalia is worth more than one billion dollars (Donelli, 2020; Orakci, 2022). The recent Turkish readiness for Somalia's gas and oil investment is the case in point. In March 2024, Turkiye and Somalia signed a Memorandum of

Understanding to exploit the huge hydrocarbon potential of Somalia in the Horn of Africa (The Washington Post, March 7, 2024; Maruf, March 31, 2024). Second, there are converging interests between Türkiye and Somalia. Somalia is working hard to import arms from Türkiye. It also needs Turkish military officials to train its soldiers (Mosley, 2021). Türkiye, for its part, is searching for markets for its manufactured goods, including military armaments. As Vertin (2019b) noted, Türkiye is working hard to exploit the lucrative potential destination for its arms market. Third, Somalia's location on the edges of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait attracted Turkish policymakers. For these reasons, relations between Türkiye and Somalia are deep-rooted at both the elite level and at the grass-roots level. Mosley (2021:68) concluded that Somalia-Turkish relations have weathered two handovers of power and that the presence of Türkiye will continue in the future, and it's not easily broken up. The Turkish deep economic presence in Somalia increased security relations between Ankara and Mogadishu. Thus, Somalia has become the focus of the Turkish military presence in the Horn of Africa.

Third, Türkiye deployed its military forces in the Horn of Africa to thwart the presence of its rivals. As Mosley (2021) indicated, Türkiye's military activities in Somalia have been framed in relation to tensions in the wider Red Sea region. In particular, Türkiye is working hard to reduce the security presence of Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa. As noted in chapter five, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have uneasy relations in the Middle East. Their hostile relations are due to religious, political, and strategic differences in the Middle East. These regional rivalries have spilled over into the Horn of Africa. A key informant interview with strategic thinkers depicts these competing interests between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa. 'Türkiye wants to play an active role in the Horn of Africa. It is working to thwart the presence of rival powers in the Horn of Africa. For example, Ankara seeks to reduce the Saudis' security presence in the Horn of Africa,' said Henok on September 28, 2022. As a result, Türkiye is working hard to thwart the presence of rival powers in the Horn of Africa.

In addition to Somalia, Türkiye has increased its relations with Ethiopia in recent years. Its close relations with Ethiopia are based on Ankara's strategic interests (Mosley, 2018). Turkiye considered Ethiopia a springboard to widen the Turkish political presence in many parts of the African continent. A key informant interview with strategic thinkers supports this Turkish foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa and, by extension, other parts of Africa. Henok, a security analyst at the Ethiopian

Institute of Foreign Affairs, stated that 'Ethiopia is a strategically located state in the Horn of Africa. It serves as the gateway for Turkish military presence in many African states' (September 28, 2022). In particular, since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, relations between Türkiye and Ethiopia have been strengthened. There are several reasons for the close relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa. First, Ethiopia has become Türkiye's most reliable regional partner in the Horn of Africa. Economically, Türkiye invested close to three billion dollars in the manufacturing and textile sectors in Ethiopia. These investment engagements created more than 20,000 job opportunities for Ethiopian workers (Didone, 2021; Walle, 2023). In political terms, Addis Ababa and Ankara have increased their diplomatic relations. There are converging interests between Addis Ababa and Ankara. Ethiopia needed reliable external partners in its war against the Tigray forces. As Pamba (2021) stated, Türkiye supported Abiy's rule of law operation in the Tigray region. A key informant interview with security analysts indicates the close relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa. 'To escape western political pressure in the war with the TPLF forces, Ethiopia has strengthened its relations with Türkiye,' said Henok on September 28, 2022.

These strong economic and political relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa have led to close security relations. The security relations include arms transfers, arms sales, and security cooperation. As part of these security relations, in August 2021, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Türkiye and discussed the relations between the two states. To discuss in detail the security cooperation between Türkiye and Ethiopia, Berhanu Jula, chief staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, paid a visit to Ankara and talked with his Turkish counterparts (Ethiopian National Television, June 9, 2022). These visits resulted in military agreements between the two states. Based on these military agreements, on March 19, 2022, the Ethiopian Council of Ministers discussed the security relations between the two states. The council of ministers discussed security cooperation (military training), defense complex building, cyber security, and sharing intelligence to fight piracy threats (Ethiopian Council of Ministers, 2022) and passed the result of the discussion to the House of People Representatives (HoPRs) for approval. On May 17, 2022, the HoPRs of Ethiopia approved the security assistance of Türkiye to Ethiopia. Türkiye pledged close to six million dollars in military assistance to Ethiopia (The Ethiopian News Agency, 2022). These military relations between Ethiopia and Türkiye have provisions that the former will buy Turkish-manufactured arms.

As part of this close security cooperation, Turkiye provided combat drones to Ethiopia. A key informant interview with scholars indicated close security relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa. On September 28, 2022, Henok noted that 'the relations between Ethiopia and the West have declined in recent years. Ethiopia searched for an alternative security ally. Türkiye has become a key security ally for Ethiopia. What links the two states is drone diplomacy.' Türkiye provided Ethiopia the necessary military facilities, including the unmanned aerial vehicles that played a critical role in the Tigray war. Plaut (2023b) noted that Turkiye has become an important ally for Ethiopia in supplying the drones in its war with the Tigray forces. These military facilities played a critical role in changing the military balance in favour of the Ethiopian armed forces. As discussed in chapter six, drone facilities became one of the factors for the withdrawal of the TPLF forces from controlled areas of the Amhara region. Accordingly, the security cooperation between Ankara and Addis Ababa was decisive for the outcome of the war in Ethiopia.

4.6 Bases for Basing Access in the Horn of Africa

In recent years, foreign powers have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. These foreign powers employed different strategies to establish their military bases in the Horn of Africa. Before delving into the strategies of basing access in the Horn of Africa, a brief discussion on the previous foreign military basing access is important. This is to provide the changes and continuities of bases for basing access in different historical times. Due to space constraints, major imperial powers are selected. Thus, the basing access of ancient Greece city states, the Roman empires, the Mongol empires, the Ming dynasty of China, the sixteenth-century European imperial powers (Spanish, Portuguese, and the Ottoman Empire), the nineteenth-century European colonial powers, and the Cold War great powers are provided in greater depth.

Many of the imperial powers mentioned above employed military power to acquire military bases in other regions. Using military forces, imperial powers invaded other countries and established military bases and facilities (Heath, 2018; Lutz, 2009). As Gillem (2007:23) writes, 'in the previous era of imperial power projection, there was no agreement between basing powers and host states.' The occupied states effectively ceased to exist. For instance, Greek city states used different forms of alliance formation and the use of force to acquire military bases and facilities in other regions. For example, Sparta and Athens were the strongest competing powers during these times, and relations between them were contentious. In 431 BC, the two great powers of the time went into direct confrontation (Kegley and Raymond, 2014) and war resulted in competition for military bases and alliance systems. During the Peloponnesian war, both Athens and Sparta employed the strategies of military facilities and alliance relations (Gillem, 2007; Barash and Webel, 2018).

The next imperial powers were the Romans. The Roman Empire, at its zenith, incorporated Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Grygiel, 2006; Creveld, 2004). Most of the time, the Romans used military forces to control foreign territories. At other times, the Roman Empire used commercial relations with local administrations (Harkavy, 2007). To extend their spheres of influence in the Mediterranean region,

the Roman Empire employed military forces and practiced policies of assimilation [87](Gillem, 2007). Besides, the Roman Empire built a network of permanent military bases around the periphery of the newly controlled areas. These military bases were used to control further territories. These permanent facilities were supported by a series of smaller and temporary facilities (Work and Krepinevich, 2007). In other words, bases were established along the empire's frontier to consolidate recently controlled areas.

The next imperial power was the Mongol Empire. Arose in Asia in the thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire used military forces to control other regions. Using their military forces, the Mongols controlled Korea, China, and Vietnam in their high days. They used outright conquest and military forces (Harkavy, 2007). Regarding the military base access of the Mongol Empire, Black put the following:

Using military forces, the Mongols created the largest contiguous empires in their time. To be successful, the Mongols avoided overextending their resources (they occupied small chunks of territory). Instead of a large army, relatively small forces were deployed in strategic places. They assigned talented commanders who united the nomadic tribes into a single force. They attacked and then withdrew from the region by creating a buffer zone. Using these strategies, the Mongols invaded and devastated a large region, which allowed them to be the dominant power of the time (2008:26).

In the fourteenth century, China emerged as a new imperial power in Asia. As discussed in chapter two, between 1417 and 1431, the Ming emperors dispatched three large expeditions to Eastern Africa. In these expeditions, the Ming navy was well equipped with firearms and 250 ships designed for long-range explorations. To sustain its power projection, China established temporary military bases in the Indian Ocean and eastern Africa. As Work and Krepinevich (2007) wrote, many of these military bases were achieved through a mix of intimidation, coercion, and the use of force.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, European imperial powers such as the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and the Ottoman Turks used military forces to conquer new lands and territories (Calder, 2007; Gillem, 2007). These imperial powers established military bases in the newly conquered

[87] As Gillem (2007) writes, the Romans used educational policies, religious institutions, and monetary systems to absorb local cultures.

regions. These bases were used to control trade routes and maintain maritime supremacy (Black, 2008). For example, the Spaniards used military forces to conquer South America, the Philippines, and the New World (Black, 2008). The Portuguese extended their military presence in East Africa, the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea regions. The bases associated with Portuguese empires were outright conquests and the use of military forces. In addition, the Portuguese employed local alliances to maintain their security presence (Harkavy, 2007). Similarly, the Ottoman Turks relied mostly on conquest and the use of military forces (Harkavy, 2007). In addition, Ottoman Turks used local collaborators to extend their military control in the Horn of Africa in the 1520s (Abir, 1980; Black, 2008). From the works of Black, Abir, and Harkavy, it is clear that the Ottoman Turks controlled North Africa and East Africa through a combination of military forces and alliance relations with local authorities.

The use of military forces to control foreign territories continued in the nineteenth century. During this time, military base access was a function of colonial control (Harkavy, 1982; Gillem, 2007; Enloe, 2014; Heath, 2018). For example, Britain built strong naval forces to control strategic areas in the Atlantic and Indian oceans and acquired huge basing networks, colonies, and maritime presence using its military forces. These military bases enabled Britain to be a dominant great power in the nineteenth century (Harkavy, 1982; Creveld, 2004). The naval bases at Gibraltar, Mombasa, Burma, Simonstown, Suez, Aden, Singapore, and Hong Kong were critical to maintaining the status of *Pax Britannica* (Harkavy, 1982; Calder, 2007). Harkavy (2007:52) writes, 'for the first time in history, Britain achieved a near global reach in the nineteenth century.' During *Pax Britannica*, France became another colonial power, extending its military forces to different parts of the world. As Harkavy (1982) stated, France built a large army and extended its military forces in North Africa, Western Africa, and South Asia. For example, French armies were deployed in North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa (French Somaliland), Madagascar, and Vietnam (Harkavy, 1982). In addition to Britain and France, Italy projected its military forces into North Africa and the Horn of Africa in the late nineteenth century. In North Africa, Italy acquired Libya from the retreating Ottoman Empire (Harkavy, 1982). Using a combination of its military forces and commercial relations, Italy controlled Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. Its attempt to control the interior part of Ethiopia was resisted by the Ethiopian military forces in 1896. From this analysis, it is clear that the basing system in the nineteenth century was a function of colonial military control. Colonial powers used military forces to control the Red Sea littoral states. There were no legal and administrative

relations between the basing power and the host states in the Horn of Africa. The basing powers had complete freedom of action to move their military forces from one part of the state to another. This total domination of imperial powers resulted in asymmetric relations between the littoral states in the Horn of Africa and the colonial powers.

The end of the Second World War had brought changes in the patterns of basing access in other regions. The ever-strengthening norm of non-intervention in other regions with the formation of the UN in 1945 reduced the use of military forces to control foreign lands (Harkavy, 1982; Grau, 2021). As Galloway and Farhadi (2022:80) noted, 'after the end of the Second World War, great powers used economic and political relations to acquire foreign military bases.' Stated differently, during the Cold War, great powers used economic assistance, soft power strategies, and ideological ties to access foreign military bases. Instead of direct military conquest, great powers negotiated with the host states to establish military bases.[88] It is thus clear that during the Cold War, projecting powers relied on security alliances, arms transfers, and arms sales to client states. For example, the US provided security assistance to its client states in different parts of the world. States such as Türkiye, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the Philippines were the largest recipients of US security assistance (Harkavy, 2007). As indicated in chapter one, other states such as Germany, South Korea, and Japan received US security protection. In turn, America deployed its huge military forces in these regions. In addition, the US acquired a number of foreign military bases through lend-lease agreements. For example, the lend-lease agreement between Britain and America in the early 1940s provided the US with a number of military bases in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean region (Harkavy, 1982). As

[88] This does not mean that great powers did not use military force to conquer other states after the end of the Second World War. Sometimes, great powers have used military forces to control strategic places. After the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union consolidated its military forces in Eastern Europe. In 1956, the Soviet forces controlled Hungary using military forces (Black, 2008). Moreover, in 1979, the Soviet Union worked hard to make connections between Moscow and the Indian Ocean. Thus, it expanded its military forces in Afghanistan. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the Soviet Union controlled Afghanistan using military forces. In this military presence, the Soviet Union established a Kandahar air base in southern Afghanistan (Harkavy, 1982; Black, 2008; Hook and Spanier, 2016). Russia is worried about NATO's expansion to its near abroad. Moscow has been working hard to prevent the integration of Ukraine with NATO member states. This is to safeguard its security interests in the region (Pisciotta, 2018; Grau, 2022). To deter the western expansion towards Eastern Europe, in 2022, Russia invaded the eastern part of Ukraine. In addition, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was another violation of post-Second World War developments (Black, 2008; Bert, 2011). Besides, the American military operation in Libya in 2011 could be mentioned as a clear violation of well-established international practices. As Magu (2019) writes, the US used air power to remove Muammar Gaddafi from power in the early 2010s.

a declining imperial power, Britain transferred the Bahamas, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad, Bermuda, Singapore, and Ascension to the US (Harkavy, 1982). These British military bases became critical for the US dominant position in the 1950s, 1860s, and 1970s.

In addition to the US, the Soviet Union extended its military forces in different parts of the world during the Cold War. In the early 1960s, Moscow extended its military presence in Somalia, North Vietnam, Mali, Ghana, Syria, and Cuba.[89]Many of these bases of access were acquired through security relations and ideological ties between the Soviet Union and the host states. Formal defense pacts, informal security relations, sending military advisors, and providing economic support to the client states became the main basing access for the Soviet Union (Sorenson, 1995; Heath, 2018). In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union acquired the Massawa ports and the Dahlak Archipelago through military support for Ethiopia. Leaving Berbera military base, the Soviets built submarines and missile repair facilities in Ethiopia. Additionally, the Soviets set up electronics, communications, and surveillance equipment at Dahlak (Cooley, 1982). Therefore, Soviet military base access was based on formal defense pacts, informal security relations, and heavy supplies of military equipment to the client states in different parts of the world.

With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the international system saw changes in the missions of military bases in other regions. In the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, the world saw a complex set of threats coming from transnational security actors (Harkavy, 2007). The main purpose of foreign military bases has become fighting non-state actors (terrorism, illegal arms transfers, and maritime piracy). Besides, the proliferation of weak states in different parts of the world has become a safe haven for transnational security threats (Flint, 2022). Accordingly, states that do not control their territories have become the main targets of foreign military presence. In addition, conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Horn of Africa have become the main targets of foreign military presence. Thus, after the end of the Cold War, external security actors extended their military presence in a region populated by weak states marred by regional conflicts.

[89] As Harkavy (1982) writes, Cuba became the major Soviet military infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet military base in Cuba served as an intelligence and surveillance gathering place. These Soviet military bases triggered the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

It is important to note that several regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkiye and global powers, such as the US and China have used different strategies to project their military presence into the Horn of Africa. The first pattern of access to foreign military bases is economic instruments, including trade relations, loans, and economic investments (Solomon, 2019; Walle, 2023). Instead of using military forces, both basing powers and host states in the Horn of Africa negotiated on military base access. In exchange for military base access, foreign military powers provide security protection for the states in the Horn of Africa. Other great powers established overseas military bases through a '*quid pro quo'* arrangement (the basing state provides military support or pays military base rents to the host states). Other projecting powers extended their military presence in the form of security cooperation (joint military training, provision of professional military training, exchange of military information). The US, for example, has used various types of security cooperation, such as bilateral security relations, foreign military sales, joint military exercises, and security assistance to the states in the Horn of Africa (Kepe *et al*, 2023). As indicated in chapter two, the US has continued to provide security assistance for the states in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, the US provides economic assistance to client states in the Horn of Africa. For example, in 2000, the US approved the African Growth and Opportunity Act's (AGOA) trade privileges for many African states. As part of this economic assistance, the US arranged preferential trade relations under the AGOA duty-free arrangements (Meredith, 2005). Under AGOA, the US allowed thirty-eight African states, including Ethiopia, to export their leather and textile products into the US market (Lamin, 2008). For example, to get benefits from AGOA, Ethiopia constructed Hawassa Industrial Park at a cost of $250 million in 2017. It was the trade privileges under AGOA that encouraged these factories to invest in Ethiopia. Up until 2020, it hosted 22 factories (Selamawit, 2022).

As already indicated, the US arranged AGOA trade relations to benefit many of the African states. Nevertheless, the US used AGOA trade relations to keep client states under its spheres of influence. In other words, AGOA trade relations have political implications. When these client states are not willing to secure US interests in Africa, America does not hesitate to apply economic statecraft and its dollar's special status to widen its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa (Midgley, 2023). This is clearly seen in many parts of Africa, including West Africa, Central Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Following the growing presence of Russia and subsequent military cooperation in Central and Western Africa, the US removed Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea from the AGOA trade deal in

2022 (Aradi, 2023). In recent times, US President Joe Biden has revealed plans to expel Uganda, Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic from a special US-Africa trade program (Aradi, 2023). As already noted, these states are increasing their relations with Russia. The same is true for Ethiopia. In recent times, Ethiopia has started to have close relations with other great powers, including China, Türkiye, and Russia. To contain the presence of rival powers, America has applied a combination of economic strategies in the Horn of Africa. The recent move by the US to terminate Ethiopia from AGOA is a case in point. On January 1, 2022, the Biden administration delisted Ethiopia's opportunity to export to the US tax-free (Office of US Trade Representative, 2022). Following Ethiopia's termination from AGOA, thousands of people lost their jobs.[90]By extension, this would put the Ethiopian government under pressure to find alternative sources of income for these people.

Furthermore, the US has the media to defame governments that are not subservient to American interests in Africa. They establish their media, such as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the BBC, to secure their government's interests. The influence of the US media in Ethiopia has become very important. The US has used information warfare to influence the political developments in Ethiopia. In the conference organized by Addis Ababa University (AAU), Abdissa claimed that 'there is a convergence of interest between the media and the political elites in the West. This indicates that the media in the West is serving as a foreign policy tool for their governments. America is not an exception. It used its media to influence political dynamics in the Horn of Africa' (December 16, 2021).

Finally, the US has applied a combination of hard power and soft power strategies to extend its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. The use of soft power and hard power to achieve geopolitical interests in other regions is what Nye (2010: 9) opined as 'smart power.' It is the ability to combine the hard power of coercion with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy. One of the best strategies of the use of smart power is supporting proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. The US has been supporting proxy forces in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Regarding this US support, Nibret (2021) stated that America provides diplomatic and political support to its proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. For example, the US has been providing direct diplomatic and

[90] Working in Hela Indochina Apparel, Best Garment, and Submarine Garment, over 4, 000 workers lost their jobs.

political support to the rebels fighting with Ethiopian governments (Lei, 2020). Security analysts such as Workiye (2022) noted that the West has a tradition of supporting proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. For instance, western powers, including the US supported the TPLF forces during the *Dergue* regime.[91] The same pattern has continued until today. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated that 'foreign powers are supporting the TPLF forces in their war with us. They provided sophisticated satellite data to the rebel groups. Besides, foreign powers were telling me not to attack the rebel movements on the war fronts' (Ethiopian National Television, October 28, 2021). Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed did not name the country that has been providing political support to the TPLF forces. However, it is presumed that Americans have become patrons of the TPLF forces. A key informant interview with American scholars depicts US support for the rebels. On December 22, 2022, Freeman noted that 'America is working to have a client regime in Ethiopia. In the first years of Abiy's rule, the US has been working with the current regime of Ethiopia. However, in recent years, Ethiopia has been working for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa, and the country has been following independent-minded policies towards great powers.' These policies of Ethiopia have created friction between the two states. Because of these new dynamics, America has been extending its pressure to the current administration of Ethiopia. American senior diplomats are not secretive about US sanctions on some of the states in the Horn of Africa. On November 28, 2023, Shinn noted that 'we extended moderate sanctions on Ethiopia for the war activities in the Tigray region. This is to reduce human rights violations in the Tigray region.' Therefore, from the analyses of secondary sources, Ethiopian government officials, and US diplomats, it is true that the US has used both soft and hard power strategies to secure its interests in the Horn of Africa.

China has employed dual-use port strategies, financial assistance, infrastructure investments, and various forms of security assistance, such as arms sales, arms transfers, and high-level political visits. The first strategy that China applies to expand its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa is the dual-use port strategy. In the dual-use port strategy, the ports in the Horn of Africa and Chinese military bases have symbiotic relations. The ports provide service and rest to Chinese naval forces, and the naval forces provide protection to the ports (Su *et al,* 2021; Gunness *et al, 2022*). In the dual-use port strategy, as Heath (2018) noted, China has been constructing logistics hubs in the Horn of

[91] Because of the West's political pressure, the then Ethiopian president, Mengistu Hailemariam, left the country in 1991.

Africa. These hubs have been used for both military and commercial purposes. These ports are used for commercial purposes. Still, they need protection. The protection comes from Chinese military forces. Heath (2018) further stated that a dual-use port system involves the use of logistical facilities that serve both commercial and military operations. The dual ports provide a basic level of logistics supply and limited maintenance to ships passing through these commercial ports (Heath, 2018). China developed a dual-use port strategy to save financial resources, and the use of port infrastructure for military purposes has reduced costs to project hard power in strategically important regions, including the Horn of Africa. This indicates that military bases and commercial ports have a mutual relationship. Heath (2018:30) noted that 'the strategy of dual-use ports is aimed at reducing the costs of Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. Chinese commercial companies construct ports, and then deploy military forces that protect the commercial interests of these companies.'

Second, China has used economic investments to extend its military presence in the Horn of Africa (Kroenig, 2020). The use of economic tools such as loans and infrastructure investments has been serving to expand Chinese political and military influence in the Horn of Africa. This is the application of geo-economics to further Chinese foreign interests in other regions. Sun (2018) noted that China has been using geo-economics (both investments and trade relations) to further its security interests in the Horn of Africa. In particular, China has continued to use economic tools to extend its political influence in other regions, including the Horn of Africa. For example, in recent years, Djibouti has become one of the most important investment destinations for Chinese companies (Kroenig, 2020). China has been constructing airports, ports, and industrial parks in the country. These investment projects are financed by Chinese loans. The substantial flow of Chinese loans to construct roads, railways, and ports has given China considerable influence over the politics of Djibouti.

More importantly, China unveiled its BRI in 2013 as a foreign policy tool. As part of BRI projects, China has been building trade routes in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. As Sun (2018) writes, the BRI is considered China's strategy for extending its soft power to other regions. By extension, these BRI-funded projects are aimed at extending Chinese political influence in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the BRI-funded projects promote financial cooperation between China and the states in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the BRI-funded projects increased the geopolitical position

of China in the Horn of Africa. As Farghen (2020:173) concluded, 'the BRI-funded investment schemes launched in 2013 are aimed at mixing economic investments with territorial expansion.' Beijing prefers acquiring strategic assets such as ports and logistics hubs to debt repayments from its trading partners. By increasing national debt burdens on the states through the BRI-funded projects, China is working to acquire strategic ports and military facilities in other regions. In this regard, Macaes (2019:125) noted that when indebted states fail to pay back Chinese loans, Beijing takes logistical assets instead of loan repayment. In other words, instead of loan repayment, China prefers to control access to military facilities and logistics hubs. As indicated in chapter six in detail, Djibouti owes China about two billion dollars that were spent on road, railway, and port construction. Djibouti is not able to pay back its loans to China. In return, China is considering to control and administer the Djibouti ports.

Third, China has pursued soft power strategies to extend its security presence in the Horn of Africa. Soft power has become an important strategy to build a positive Chinese image in the Horn of Africa. Beijing considered soft power as a necessary strategy to achieve its geopolitical position in other regions. This goes with what Commuri (2013:45) observed, 'soft power tools include cultural dissemination, media presence (both electronic and printed), and humanitarian assistance.' In a similar vein, China has been using cultural relations, media presence, and humanitarian assistance to expand its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. In her book, *Chinese Soft Power: Elements in Global China,* Maria Repnikova (2022) stated that the core of Chinese soft power instruments includes the Confucius Institute, international media, education exchange, and public diplomacy. First, China has used its media presence as a means of increasing its image in Africa. China has started to air its local media presence in many African states. This media presence includes radio and television broadcasts (Heath, 2019). Second, China has established the Confucius Institute in different parts of Africa, including Ethiopia. Repnikova (2022) stated that the expansion of Confucius Institutes presents an opportunity for foreign students, Chinese teachers, and volunteers for other regions' cultural values. This is to promote the Chinese language and culture. Besides, Amharic is being taught in China. These cultural relations are important to increase people-to-people relations. Senior diplomats in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that, 'language is a key tool to increase people-to-people relations' (Tesfaye Yilma, October 27, 2022). A key informant interview with a Chinese Amharic student at AAU indicates the importance of these cultural relations. 'Learning Amharic has helped me to understand Ethiopian cultural values. For example, I appreciate

Ethiopian traditional music and some of the Ethiopian short stories,' stated Zhang Heyi on October 27, 2022. These kinds of communications increase people-to-people relations. More importantly, China provides scholarships to young Africans. On October 27, 2022, Tesfaye Yilma noted that 'Beijing has provided scholarships to African students to study at Chinese universities. Several Ethiopian students are taught and are pursuing their education in China.' These students are required to pass the Chinese language criteria to further their education. As part of these strategies, 'African students have to pass the Mandarin language test before they continue their proper study,' Istvan said in January 2023. In addition, China has been constructing prestigious government buildings to increase its positive image in Africa. For example, China built the AU headquarters at a cost of $200 million and inaugurated it in 2012, and China has been engaged in building stadiums, government offices, and other prestigious buildings in Djibouti (Aaron, 2018; Melaku, 2023). The Chinese application of soft power is bearing fruit. Soft power needs economic resources. These resource allocations are made by political leaders. This soft power, coupled with its growing economic presence, has significant implications for the Chinese military presence in the Horn of Africa. As Repnikova (2022) concluded, Chinese soft power and hard power are inseparable. Chinese soft power increases its hard power.

The tools of the foreign military presence of Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa include diplomatic support in conflict resolution, financial provisions, dollar diplomacy, and the formation of security alliances. In 2018, as noted in chapter one, Saudi Arabia arranged diplomatic support to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflicts. Besides, Saudi Arabia played a critical role in lifting sanctions on Eritrea. With the support of Saudi Arabia, in 2018, sanctions were lifted, and Eritrea has increased its relations with other foreign powers (Michael, 2020). As a *quid pro quo*, Saudi Arabia acquired military bases in the western part of the Red Sea region to enhance its war against the Houthi rebels.

Besides, Saudi Arabia has used dollar diplomacy to extend and consolidate its military presence in the Horn of Africa. A key informant interview with the Horn strategic thinkers indicates the Saudis strategies for military base access. In March 2021, Abebe stated that 'the Arab Gulf states have used dollar diplomacy to extend their military presence in the Horn of Africa. In return, the Horn regional leader provides military bases and diplomatic support in their rivalry with Türkiye and Qatar.' This is a transactional relation between the states in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Gulf states. Considering the transaction relations, Alex de Waal (2015:4) dubbed it a 'political marketplace.' In

the political marketplace, there is a convergence of interest between the Arab Gulf states and the states in the Horn of Africa. The former have financial resources, and the latter are cash-poor states. The Gulf Arab states' financial incentives have been attractive for the governments in the Horn of Africa. These financial provisions are extended without any preconditions for democracy or human rights. Dahir (2019) stated that Arab Gulf states are absolutist monarchies that do not seek to promote human rights and democracy in the Horn of Africa. Instead of democratic reforms, Arab Gulf states expect geopolitical loyalty and military bases from the states in the Horn of Africa. In addition, Saudi Arabia has employed economic statecraft to acquire military bases in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019).

To extend its military presence in the Horn of Africa, Türkiye has applied a combination of soft power strategies, foreign direct investments, and political influences in the Horn of Africa. Turkish soft power strategy includes the provision of humanitarian support, cultural relations, and constructing mosques (Mosley *et al*, 2021; Walle, 2023). Humanitarian strategies include the provision of food aid and medical support to the needy people in the Horn of Africa. As Vertin (2019) noted, Turkiye considers itself a humanitarian power in the Horn of Africa. The post-2011 Turkish presence in Somalia depicts this soft power strategy. One of the Turkish scholars indicated that 'Turkiye provides humanitarian assistance without intermediaries or third parties. For example, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency facilitates Ankara's official assistance. This has been effective way of providing humanitarian assistance in Somalia (Ali Onur, June28, 2024). In addition, Turkiye has been engaged in infrastructure developments that are highly needed in the poverty-stricken society of Somalia. For example, Türkiye has been engaged in constructing roads, hospitals, airports, mosques, and schools in Somalia to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people at the grass-roots level (Mosley *et al*, 2021). More importantly, Turkish firms tend to hire more local workers. This is to create more and more job opportunities for the youth in Somalia (Berk Baran, June 28, 2024). These strategies are politically attractive to host governments in the Horn of Africa.

Apart from economic engagements and humanitarian assistance, Türkiye applied cultural relations to extend its influence in the Horn of Africa. As part of these cultural relations, Türkiye provides scholarships to Somali students. As Mustefa Kemal, Turkish Deputy Ambassador to Ethiopia, noted, 'we provide scholarship opportunities for Somalia students at different Turkish universities every year. This is important for cultural relations between the two states. These students are taught the

Turkish language' (October 23, 2022). The combination of these strategies is aimed at increasing Turkish soft power in Somalia.

In addition, Türkiye has employed submit diplomacy to widen its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. One of the political strategies is a high-level visit to Mogadishu. For example, in 2011, Erdogan visited famine-stricken areas of Somalia and provided humanitarian assistance to the needy people. This political visit became the landmark for future relations between Turkiye and Somalia. In 2015, Erdogan visited Somalia and inaugurated a number of projects financed by Türkiye. This indicates the readiness of Turkish political leaders to solve the Somali humanitarian crisis. And finally, the ruling AKP fuses Islamic principles with electoral politics and market economics, which it presents as a model in the broader region. Allies such as Somalia are critical for Ankara's domestic narrative that Türkiye is a custodian of Islamic solidarity in support of oppressed Muslims worldwide (International Crisis Group, 2018). As a result, Turkish political influence in Somalia is aimed at gaining a major military deal to establish military bases in Somalia. This military cooperation is intended to create fertile ground for arms exports to Somalia.

To summarize, the US, China, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia have their own justifications to extend their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia projected its military presence into the Horn of Africa to engage in real estate and agricultural investments. Moreover, Saudi Arabia projected its military presence into the Horn of Africa for geographical proximity. Türkiye rationalizes its military presence in the Horn of Africa in the areas of humanitarian interventions, material interests in the region, and systemic security considerations. The US military presence in the Horn of Africa has emerged as a systemic security concern. The US is working hard to counteract the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa. The two great powers have been competing for client states on the African continent. Beyond their strategic rivalries in the Horn of Africa, the two great powers have different priorities in the Horn of Africa. The focus of the US in the Horn of Africa is on narrow security interests. China extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa to secure economic interests in the areas of investments, markets, and raw materials.

The four projecting powers have used different strategies of basing access in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has used dollar diplomacy and a transactional approach to get access to staging areas in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, Türkiye has relied on soft power and economic relations to

access military bases in the Horn of Africa. China has used economic statecraft to access military bases in the Horn of Africa. China constructs roads, railways, and ports to transport its factory products into the Horn of Africa. In contrast, the US has employed various forms of military base access in the Horn of Africa. For example, America has threatened the states in the Horn of Africa that are working with rival great powers. Besides, the US has used various forms of economic sanctions on governments working with rival great powers. Even America is not shameless about using surrogate forces to achieve its interests in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter Five

Patterns of Foreign Powers' Relations in the Horn of Africa

As has been demonstrated in the previous chapters, many external security actors are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. These external military powers do not have the same interests. Some of them have security interests. Others have economic interests. Even other foreign powers have a combination of security, economic, and strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. To acquire these interests, external security actors have employed different intervention strategies. Some external security actors have used economic statecraft to acquire military bases, and facilities. Other foreign powers employed soft power strategies such as humanitarian assistance and cultural relations. Still, other foreign powers employ economic statecraft, coercive diplomacy, and the use of proxy forces. These interests and different means of acquiring their interests have led to competitive relations in the Horn of Africa.

The present chapter provides a detailed analysis of foreign powers' relations in the Horn of Africa. To do justice to external security actors' relations in the Horn of Africa, the chapter is structured into three sections. The first section examines the concepts of cooperation, competition, hegemony, and disengagement. Section two analyzes the patterns of relations among the four foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. This section distinguishes foreign powers' relations in the Horn of Africa among these external powers. The last section summarizes the main points of the discussion.

5.1 Foreign Powers External Relations in other Regions: A Conceptual Analysis

Great powers extend their military forces into other regions based on their interests and economic capabilities (Marcowitz and Fariss, 2019; Heibach, 2020). These interests and capabilities determine their relations with other projecting powers in other regions. When a number of foreign powers have common economic and security interests in other regions, they work together. However, great powers do not always have the same interests in other regions. When the interests of great powers in certain regions diverge, they engage in competitive relations that result in proxy battles and constant shifting alliance relations. At other times, projecting powers may have different capabilities for extending their military presence in other regions. In these asymmetrical power relations, a single projecting power has more military and economic strength compared to other projecting powers. The strongest foreign power dominates the region. In other cases, the region in question may lose its strategic and

economic importance, and external security actors consider the region irrelevant. In addition, external security actors may lack the resources to sustain their military presence in intrinsically important regions. In these cases, instead of extending their military forces, the projecting powers disengage from the region.

From the above analysis, relations among foreign powers in other regions fall under four categories: competitive, cooperative, hegemonic, and disengagement. Competitive relations between great powers occur when these powers pursue the same national interests within the same geographic space. The competitive relations among foreign powers in other regions are characterized by intense rivalries (Miller, 2007; Gooch *et al*, 2022). The intense rivalries in other regions arise from different factors. First, projecting powers have strong competing interests in the region. As Fariss and Markowitz (2018) noted, projecting powers with incompatible interests in a particular region engage in higher levels of geopolitical rivalries. Great powers compete to control strategically important regions. The strategic value of these regions is due to the presence of sea-lanes (a trade route across the sea where ships sail), chokepoints (a strategic narrow route providing passage for ships) and network of land transportation (pipelines and railways). Controlling these strategic areas would enable great powers to control events abroad and have a direct implication for global power distribution. Second, great powers compete for client states in other regions. Great powers need the votes of small states in major international organizations, including the UN General Assembly and the World Trade Organization. External security actors, in order to win the hearts and minds of regional states, apply economic incentives aimed at persuading and pressuring them to cut their ties with other rival powers (Oskanian, 2013). For example, recently, America called on the UN General Assembly member states to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the resolution, many African states voted for the immediate withdrawal of Russian power from Ukraine (UNs General Assembly, March 2, 2022). Among the states in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia abstained. Eritrea opposed the US move on the Russian withdrawal from Ukraine. Somalia and Djibouti supported the US move (UNs General Assembly, March 2, 2022). The different policies of states in the Horn of Africa towards the Ukraine war indicated the need of great powers for small powers to get votes and political support in major international organizations. Third, great powers compete for material supplies such as minerals and hydrocarbon resources in other regions. Scholars such as Farhadi (2021) write that great powers compete for natural resources such as hydrocarbon resources and rare earth minerals. Lithium, for example, is one such critical resource found in abundance in Central

Asia. Its presence in Central Asia has attracted the attention of great powers seeking to control these rare earth minerals. A number of foreign powers are extending their economic presence in the region to exploit these mineral resources. Their engagements include intervention in the name of peacekeeping and supporting client states in the region. Fourth, great powers compete in other regions to expand their alternative political and economic systems. This is directly related to the division of great powers into rising power and *status quo* power categories. In this regard, Miller (2007:209) stated that 'competitive great power relations take place when projecting powers are polarized into *status quo* and revisionist powers.' The *status quo* powers are likely to be interested in stabilizing turbulent regions. On the other hand, revisionist powers are not interested in regional stabilization, and they work to upset the existing regional security order. These dynamics lead to uneasy relations and eventually competition among great powers in other regions. Morgenthau (1948) stated that great powers fear each other. There is little trust among them, and one great power does not know the intention of the other. As Harkavy (1982:175) concluded, 'foreign military bases demonstrate the rivalry of great powers in other regions.' These rivalries and misperceptions of one great power toward the other eventually exacerbate regional conflict dynamics.

The competitive relations between great powers in other regions have two implications. First, the competition between great powers for influence and allies in other regions allows local states to get more economic benefits and security assistance. As Miller (2007) writes, in a situation of great power competition, local states manoeuvre external security actors to increase their own interests. They have more options to make security alignments with different great powers. Scholars such as Cassedy, Conway, and Ryan (2022) noted that great power competition brings a lot of benefits to regional states. The ability of regional states to play great powers against each other is seen in Central Asia. Cooley (2012) stated that Central Asian states are not passive actors in their relations with foreign powers. Political elites in Central Asia played one external power off the other to extract increased economic benefits. In the same way, some of the states in the Horn of Africa have played great powers off each other to get more benefits, base rents, and security assistance. For example, as discussed in chapter seven, America demanded Djibouti to limit its security relations with Russia. Djibouti accepted the American demand with increased military base rents.

Second, the presence of competing foreign powers reverses, encourages, and deters the activities of regional states (Frazier and Stewart-Ingrossol, 2018). External security actors provide economic and

security support to their clients. Through inducement (economic and military assistance) and punishment (economic and military sanctions), foreign powers change the regional balance of power in favor of their client states. In so doing, foreign powers change the regional distribution of power and the regional conflict dynamics that would result in changing the patterns of regional states' relations. Miller (2007) stated that the competitive relations of great powers in certain regions aggravate regional conflicts.[92]This competition would result in regional tensions, proxy wars, and even direct wars among great powers (Pierce, 2021). For example, in the 1970s, the two superpowers (the US and Soviet Union) and their respective allies engaged in competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. The US, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt supported the Somali government. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Yemen supported the Mengistu regime of Ethiopia. These competitive relations among foreign powers in the Horn of Africa exacerbated regional conflicts.

In some other cases, foreign powers have common economic and security interests in the region and work together. This is what Miller (2007:55) considered 'cooperative relations of great powers in other regions.' In cooperative security relations, instead of competition, great powers agree on common goals in the region and work together to promote regional peace and security. As Markowitz and Fariss (2018:82) contend, 'when projecting powers have compatible interests in a particular region, they work together for regional peace and stability.' In cooperative great power engagements, there is active policy coordination and joint diplomatic and economic activities in a particular region (Miller, 2007). Besides, the cooperative engagement of several great powers in the region is visible through their presence in multilateral military peacekeeping, the presence of informal decision-making, and coordination mechanisms regarding the security of the region (Oskanina, 2013). Because of great powers' cooperation and policy coordination, regional states do not have rooms to manoeuvre foreign powers. In this regard, Oskanian (2013) stated that the presence of cooperative external security actors in a certain region limits the ability of regional states to manoeuvre external powers. Oskanian (2013) further stated that 'regional states have limited options to play great power off each other.' These activities deny the regional states a realignment option and thus make them more amenable to moderating pressure from the great powers.

[92] In contemporary international relations, direct war between great powers is decreasing. This is related to the increasing cost of war and the destructive nature of modern militaries. As Pierce (2021) writes, great power competition is usually carried out through proxies to avoid direct confrontation.

Foreign powers work together in a particular region for a number of reasons. First, great powers work together when they face common security threats in the region. A number of scholars, such as Miller (2007), Oskanian (2013), and Mazarr (2022) stated that great powers cooperate and work together to resolve regional security threats such as terrorism, piracy, and illegal arms transfers. For example, as indicated in chapter two, a number of foreign powers cooperated in fighting the threats of piracy off the coast of Somalia in the late 2000s. Second, great powers cooperate when they have converging interests in other regions. As Oye (2007) writes, 'great powers cooperate in the region when they have mutual interests.' Great powers cooperate to fight common global problems such as climate change, the Covid-19 pandemic, nuclear proliferation, and the protection of some *endangered* species (Farhadi, 2022). Last but not least, significant great power cooperation takes place between ideologically similar and *status-quo-oriented* powers (Miller, 2007). The *status-quo-oriented* powers are interested in stabilizing turbulent regions. These external security actors have converging interests in the stability of the region. They work together to prevent regional conflicts from escalating (Miller, 2007).

Cooperative and competitive relations are not the only great power relations in other regions. Sometimes, a single foreign power extends its military presence in a particular region. This single power, as Gunness *et al* (2022) write, dominates the region economically, politically, and militarily. This kind of great power engagement is hegemony. The dominant presence of one great power vis-à-vis other foreign powers in the region is due to its superior military capabilities and its strong stake in the region (Gunness *et al,* 2022). From these analyses, it could be argued that regional states have less room to manoeuvre the single hegemonic power. Miller (2007:220) stated that 'the dominant power has a clear-cut advantage to control its client states in the region.' There are asymmetrical power relations between a dominant projecting power and states in the region. All regional states make security alignments with a dominant great power. Oskanian (2013) stated that the security of regional units is entirely, willingly or unwillingly, subordinated to the interests of the hegemon. The hegemonic power not only dominates the region, but it also prevents other foreign powers from extending their military presence to the same region. The dominant power uses different strategies to thwart the presence of other foreign powers in the region (Miller, 2007). For example, the dominant power extends its pressure on regional states to reduce their relations with other external powers. These pressures could be both hard power and soft power strategies. Moreover, the dominant power extends its pressure to other projecting powers not to extend their military presence in the region. For

example, America deployed its huge military forces in Western Europe during the Cold War to deter Soviet expansion. In short, other external security actors may extend their military forces in the region. However, their influence is insignificant.

In some cases, the presence of a dominant power in the region transcends mere military interventions (Miller, 2007). That is, the dominant power can use superior military and economic resources to resolve regional disputes and conflicts. Because of the severe impairment of regional anarchy, the regional security complex ceases to operate. The amity and enmity relations of regional states are overridden by the dominant presence of the hegemon (Oskanian, 2013). Such unilateral arbitration corresponds to the military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Asia and the South Caucasus regions during the Cold War, whereby regional states were tied to Moscow (Kay, 2006). After the end of the Cold War, states in these regions achieved their independence. However, Moscow has continued to extend its spheres of influence in these regions. The difference is that regional states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus interact with other foreign powers, including China, the EU member states, and the US.

The concepts of competition, cooperation, and hegemony indicate the military presence of foreign powers in other regions. Sometimes, foreign powers withdraw their military forces in other regions. Some scholars, such as Miller (2007) and Patman (1990) consider this military withdrawal from other regions as disengagement. Different from competition, cooperation, and hegemony, disengagement involves the retreat of projecting powers from other regions. Oskanian (2013:62) contends that 'the targeted region is irrelevant to great powers. Disengagement amounts to the great powers' indifference to the region.' Accordingly, great powers retreat from the region. The security relations between the region and great powers become minimal. These retreats are manifested in reducing military assistance, closing military bases, and withdrawing military forces.

Great powers disengage from certain regions for three related reasons. In the first place, great powers may lose strategic interests in the region (Woodward, 1996). For example, after the end of the Cold War, the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa became no longer a threat to the US's dominant position in the region. The US reduced its military presence in the Horn of Africa in the late 1980s. Second, great powers may not have the economic capabilities to sustain a long-term military presence in other regions. As Oskanian (2013) stated, great powers are not willing to bear

significant material costs when projecting their military forces in other regions. For example, Moscow provided economic assistance and military support to its client states during the Cold War. In the late 1980s, as Magu (2019:38) and Westad (2007:402) wrote, 'close to twenty-five percent of the Soviet budget accounted for arms production. This military expenditure had implications for the Soviet economy.' The Soviet Union had to import agricultural goods in bankruptcy from ideological client states. For example, to keep Havana in its own sphere of influence, Moscow imported sugar from Cuba (Kennedy, 1988). These all weakened the Russian economy. This is what Kennedy (1988:515) dubbed 'imperial overstretch.' The Russian economic base could not sustain its imperial ambitions. Thus, Russia reduced its military presence in other regions, including the Horn of Africa. Third, projecting powers may lose both strategic interests and capabilities. As a result, they withdrew their military presence in the region.

As it has been clear from the preceding discussions, external security actors prefer to extend their military forces in intrinsically important regions. The Horn of Africa is one of the most intrinsically important parts of the world. This could be summarized into three categories. First, China unveiled its BRI in 2013, and the Red Sea region has become a core part of the BRI projects. This has increased the strategic importance of the Red Sea region. Second, the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in Somalia and Ethiopia drew the attention of foreign powers. Third, the regional quality of the Horn of Africa has attracted the attention of external security actors. For these reasons, external security actors such as Saudi Arabia, the US, China, and Turkiye cannot ignore the Horn of Africa. Otherwise stated, instead of disengagement, the four projecting powers are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. To distinguish the competitive and cooperative relations of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa, a brief discussion on the dynamics of interactions between the four projecting powers is important.

5.2 Foreign Powers' Relations in the Horn of Africa

5.2.1 China and America Relations in the Horn of Africa

As indicated in chapter two, security relations between China and the US in the Horn of Africa are the post-1945 developments. Since then, relations between China and the US in the Horn of Africa have passed through different phases. As Xing (2020) observed, relations between the US and China have passed through a mixed period of forward movements (smooth relations) and periods of backward movements (uneasy relations) in the Horn of Africa. For example, the presence of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa in the 1970s brought the two states to work together. This cooperation was aimed at reducing the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa (Schmidt, 2013; Pevehouse and Goldstein, 2014). Both foreign powers provided diplomatic and military support to Somalia in its war against Ethiopia. China provided some military training to the leaders of the Eritrean Liberation Fronts. The leader of EPLF, Isaias Afewerki, obtained military training in China in the late 1960s (Clapham, 2017). In the late 1970s, China and the US supplied some military armaments and diplomatic support to Somalia in its war with Ethiopia (Thrall, 2015; Aaron, 2018).

Since the end of the Cold War, the US and China have had common interests in the Horn of Africa in fighting transnational security threats. Particularly in the late 2000s, America and China worked together to fight piracy and maritime crimes in the Red Sea region. In 2008, as indicated in chapter two, China joined the international community to fight the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The Chinese military engagements were aimed at protecting the safety of ships passing through the Red Sea region. Security cooperation between the two great powers in the Horn of Africa played a critical role in reducing the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia. By extension, the cooperation of the two great powers in fighting transnational security actors was aimed at ensuring smooth resource flows across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This has contributed to the stability of the global economy.

In the post-2010s, the US and China have worked together to solve regional economic problems in the Horn of Africa. Both great powers have been working to improve the economic performance of the Horn region through aid, investment, and trade. Both great powers engaged in the infrastructure developments needed to facilitate trade and investment (Aaron, 2018). These great powers assumed that investments in infrastructure would have indirect implications for regional peace and security in

the Horn of Africa. The two great powers have also been working in terms of regional peace and security. As Wuthnow (2020) stated, the US and China have been working to avoid a broad escalation of conflicts that could threaten the stability of the global economy in the Red Sea region. From 2012 to 2014, the Chinese and American navies joined forces in patrolling the Gulf of Aden (Lei, 2020). For example, China and America have been working together to bring internal peace to Somalia. In this regard, Shinn (2016) stated that the US and China have supported the Federal Government of Somalia. As part of this support, Magu (2019) noted that both China and the US have provided financial assistance to the ATMIS forces deployed in Somalia. For example, in 2012, China provided the ATMIS forces with close to five million dollars worth of equipment and materials for use in combating terrorists in the Horn of Africa (Alao and Alden, 2018). The US extended its security assistance to Ethiopia. The military assistance of America to Ethiopia is aimed at enhancing US security activities in fighting terrorist groups in Somalia. For example, in 2020, the US donated military equipment estimated at three million dollars to the Ethiopian military forces in Somalia (The Reporter Amharic Version, September 20, 2021). The equipment includes military vehicles, training materials, computers, land cruisers, transportation vehicles, and night vision equipment tools.

In addition, the US and China have close economic relations. 'China depends on the US market for its factory products. On the other hand, Washington borrowed a huge sum of money from Beijing. China is financing the US deficit,' said Zoltan in January 2023. Besides, the two great powers have different interests in the Horn of Africa. The US has narrow security interests in the Horn of Africa. Stated differently, the US military presence in the Horn of Africa is to deter and defeat transnational security threats in the region. In addition, the US is not interested in the Horn's hydrocarbon resources.[93] In this regard, Thrall (2015) stated that Chinese hydrocarbon investment in the Horn of Africa does not threaten US energy interests in the region. Instead, Chinese oil investment in the Horn of Africa brings new hydrocarbon resources to the market. This will reduce the price of hydrocarbon resources indirectly (Thrall, 2015). This indicates that the potential for Sino-American conflict over African hydrocarbon resources is extremely remote. In addition, Chinese and the US companies generally operate in different economic sectors in the Horn of Africa (Lei, 2020). For example, China is interested in infrastructure investments, markets, and raw materials. Chinese firms

[93] American interest in African hydrocarbon resources has been reduced following the shale revolution. Unlike the Cold War great power rivalry, current relations between the US and China are less guided by ideology (Thrall, 2015).

tend to pursue opportunities in less capital-intensive industries using low-skilled labor, such as construction, mining, and manufacturing. On the other hand, US firms are involved in service sectors such as banking and insurance companies (Scobell *et al*, 2018). Besides, the focus of the US is on sophisticated economic activities such as information technology. As Cohen (2020:249) noted, 'the US and Chinese companies have been collaborating on projects in Africa, each contributing their own special talents' This indicates that the two great powers have different preferences and interests in the Horn of Africa. By extension, competitive relations between the US and China in the Horn of Africa are remote.

However, a critical analysis of China-US relations in the Horn of Africa indicates that the two great powers have competing strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. These dynamics are explained in the following dimensions. First, the US and China have diverging models of political system, and the two great powers are working to introduce their unique economic models to the Horn of Africa. Beijing discredits western model of economic development and promotes state-led economic activities (Lei, 2020; Macaes, 2018). These state-led economic activities have provided China with a comparative advantage in the Horn of Africa. As a senior American diplomat noted, 'China has devoted considerable state-directed and state-supported financing and investment activities in different parts of Africa' (Bolton, 2018). Several points stand out. First, China provides continuous financial support to its state-owned companies (SOCs) and private Chinese companies investing in the Horn of Africa. These companies have access to government loans and other forms of support. On June 15, 2023, Guobao noted that 'the Chinese government provides support to private companies investing in the Horn of Africa. The support includes access to credits and other services. They provide fifty percent of the revenue to the Chinese government, we encourage these sectors to invest in other regions.' In addition, the Chinese state-led economic model gives political leaders the ability to intervene in economic activities (Thrall, 2015). This leads to the second factor. Chinese companies offer lower contract agreements for investment projects in the Horn of Africa. A key-informant interview with an international trader depicts these Chinese strategies. 'To replace other foreign companies, China offers lower contracts to the host states in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia. These measures have enabled Chinese companies to win project contracts at lower costs than Western companies,' said Belaineh on April 5, 2022. Third, China has engaged in constructing roads, railways, and power plants at lower costs. These economic activities are making a tangible difference in economic transformations in the Horn of Africa (Gavin, 2021; Melaku, 2023). To construct these

projects, China incurs short-term losses for long-term gains. Fourth, China does not consider the issues of human rights and democracy as the criteria for conducting business in Africa. China works with autocratic governments and provides financial loans to any governments in Africa (Magu, 2019; Kepe *et al*, 2023). This, in turn, strengthened the Chinese economic presence in many parts of Africa. And finally, Chinese companies are ready to invest in conflict-prone regions of Africa. Scholars such as Heath (2018) and Thrall (2015) write that China accepts a higher degree of risk in some resource-rich regions. China does not consider peace to be a precondition for investing in conflict-prone regions. Beijing, in the name of peacekeeping, provides security protection to Chinese companies in conflict-ridden regions. These measures have provided China with important leverage to extend its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa (Macaes, 2018).

America, on the other hand, has no economic card to play in the Horn of Africa. Vertin (2020) stated that in economic terms, the US cannot match the kind of loans, trade relations, or commercial investments in the Horn of Africa. Instead, America considers China a predatory commercial actor in the Horn of Africa. America accused China of conducting mercantilist trade relations with Horn regional states that violate international economic laws (US National Security Strategy, 2018). In terms of Chinese economic comparative advantage, three scholars, including Heath, Gunness, and Finazzo (2022) wrote on: *The Return of the Great Power War: Scenarios of Systemic Conflicts between the US and China* in 2022. These scholars noted that China is in a better position to offer a broad array of benefits to its client states on the African continent. On the other hand, the US has no economic benefits to be disbursed to its clients in Africa. US foreign policy officials are not secretive about resource shortages. In his speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation on December 13, 2018, then US National Security Advisor, Bolton remarked, 'resources from the US government are constrained; there is no doubt about that. This has eroded American position on the African continent.' Moreover, US economic investment activities in the Horn of Africa are at their lowest level. Two points stand out. First, American businessmen do not want to invest in conflict-prone regions such as the Horn of Africa and Central Africa. They fear that political instability and corruption would put their investments in bankruptcy. The second is that the US government does not support American business firms in their efforts to find a favorable environment to conduct business in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, Sabala clearly noted, 'instead of supporting its private companies to invest in Africa, the US is concerned with who is investing in the Horn of Africa' (March 26, 2024). From these analyses, it is clear that the US is not interested in economic

investments in the Horn of Africa. The US is very concerned by the presence of rival powers in the Horn of Africa.

Second, the US and China have different means of achieving their interests. China has the natural advantage of working with any political party in power regardless of human rights records. Shinn (2016) observed that China has cooperated with and supported the existing political system as long as its interests are secured. China's investments in Africa, compared with those of the United States, often come with fewer political constraints. China invests in countries with poor human rights records. African partners often side with China on human rights issues at the UN and have sometimes supported China's attempts to dodge criticism for its human rights record and weaken international norms on human rights protections (Kepe *et al*, 2023). Its close relations with the Abiy administration of Ethiopia are the cases in point. Before he came to power, China used to have a good relation with the TPLF-led government in Ethiopia. As Fantu and Arkebe (2019) noted, the TPLF and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used to have close relations and there were reciprocal visits. Meles Zenawi, then Ethiopian prime minister, visited China in 1995 and Jiang Zemin, then Chinese president, visited Ethiopia in 1997. These reciprocal visits strengthened political relations between Beijing and Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, China has good relations with the incumbent Prosperity Party in Ethiopia. This indicates that China follows a pragmatic foreign policy. To facilitate its relations with the regimes in the Horn of Africa, China used to follow high-level contacts run by political elites. This is reflected in regular visits by Chinese political leaders. For example, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, made his first overseas visit to Africa. In addition, other senior Chinese Communist Party officials paid a visit to Africa. The recent visit of Qin Gang to some selected African states indicates the close elite relations between China and Africa. Qin Gang, the new Chinese foreign minister, started his work by visiting five African states. From January 12–25, 2023, Qin Gang visited Ethiopia, Gabon, Benin, Angola, and Egypt (Ethiopian News Agency, January 11, 2022). Ethiopia was one of the five African states visited by the Chinese foreign minister.

Conversely, the US applies a combination of coercive diplomacy, alliance relations, economic sanctions, and political pressures. As Xing (2020:63) clearly stated, 'the US follows securitization-driven foreign policies. It has been implementing a unilateral regime change.' It did this in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. The same is true in the Horn of Africa. It has followed a hard power strategy to achieve its interests. Without solving the root causes of regional conflicts, the US has been

responding to the never-ending conflicts in the Horn of Africa. As Abdi (2021:22) stated, 'the US has failed to present a consistent foreign policy option towards the Horn of Africa.' America has used domestic surrogate forces to achieve its security interests in the Horn of Africa and these strategies have perpetuated violent conflicts in the region. A key informant interview with US scholars depicts US foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. For example, Freeman noted that 'America is busy extending political and diplomatic pressure towards the states in the Horn of Africa.' This is to achieve its geopolitical interests in the region' (December 23, 2022).

Third, the US and China are working to win an ally state in the Horn of Africa, and they are making efforts to seek the votes of African states at the UN and other international forums with the aim of making the institutions of international governance more amenable to their interests (Gunness *et al*, 2022; Kepe *et al*, 2023). Like the Cold War competition for client states (the US supported Somalia and the Soviet Union supported Ethiopia), Washington and Beijing have been seeking client states in the Horn of Africa in recent times. Both great powers seek to get African votes in wider international diplomatic relations (Thrall, 2015; Lei, 2020; Gavin, 2021). In other words, the voting patterns of African states have become important for great powers in international organizations, including the UNs.[94] Besides, the US and China are working to get political support from the African states rotating in the Security Council (Lei, 2020). Even beyond the Security Council, the two great powers are competing for African votes in other international conflicts. The recent US move to get African votes in the UN General Assembly that condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine are a case in point. As already noted under section 5.1, at the UN General Assembly, America called for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. On February 2, 2022, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution. The votes of the African states were mixed. Some of the states in the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia and Djibouti supported the American agenda. In contrast, Ethiopia and Eritrea resisted the US move to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In so doing, the two great powers seek to peel away African states for their own purposes.

Fourth**,** China and the US consider the Red Sea region to be their own spheres of influence, and the two great powers have been competing for strategic alliances and geopolitical positions in the Horn

[94] African states make up the largest portion of the UN membership. As Taylor (2006) writes, African states provide a large support base for great powers in the UN. Each state possesses one vote at the UN decision-making system, no matter how small or large the state is.

of Africa (Odote, 2023; Bartlett, 2022; Kepe *et al,* 2023). Since the early 2000s, the US has considered the Horn of Africa a source of non-traditional security threats. In recent years, the US has recognized the Red Sea as a strategically important region to extend its influence in the Indo-Pacific region (Melvin, 2019a; Kepe *et al*, 2023). Hence, it has been working to counter the rise of China in the Horn of Africa. China, for its part, considers the Red Sea region a core part of BRI. This is because states bordering the Red Sea region are seen as important staging areas for projecting Chinese spheres of influence into the region. The rise of China and its security engagements in the Horn of Africa presents a major challenge to US interests in the Red Sea region (Vertin, 2020; Grant, 2010). Indeed, owing to its economic size and the scale of its military presence, China has become a real challenger to US interests in the Horn of Africa (Casey *et al*, 2022). For example, the Chinese naval presence in Djibouti has been challenging American geopolitical interests in the Red Sea region. As Macaes (2018:5) noted, 'China has become a threat to American hegemony in the Horn of Africa.' The recent relations between the US and China are strategic great power rivalries in the Horn of Africa.[95]

Fifth, the US and China have different orientations. China, a rising power, is challenging the current distribution of power in the international system. America, on the other hand, is a reigning power working to maintain the existing international power distribution (Barash and Webel, 2018). This goes with what Lemke (2002:24) dubbed, 'the reigning powers work to maintain the *status quo*. It maintains the current distribution of power. On the other hand, the rising powers are revisionist powers.' Dissatisfied with the existing international system, the rising powers work to change the current distribution of power.[96]The same is true of the current international distribution of powers. China and the US are the two rising and *status quo* powers, respectively. The two great powers engaged in uneasy relations in different parts of the world (Mazarr, 2022). The recent geopolitical rivalries in the Indo-Pacific region are cases in point. Established in the early 1940s, the Indo-Pacific security space has been dominated by American hegemony (Schreer, 2018; Fanell, 2019). The US is working to counter the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China has been

[95] The US, in order to thwart the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, has been using different strategies. The Prosper Africa initiative is a case in point.

[96] They are dissatisfied for several reasons. In his book, *Regions of War and Peace*, Lemke (2002:24) lists a number of points. First, the existing international rules are constructed to isolate the dissatisfied power. Some states are dissatisfied because they have made little contribution to the construction of existing international relations. Second, other states are dissatisfied because they employ different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in their relations with other powers.

challenging the existing power distribution in the Indo-Pacific region (Su *et al*, 2021; Mazarr, 2022). In particular, China considers the South China Sea as one of its natural spheres of influence. Flint (2022:65) opines that 'Beijing considers the South China Sea as a core maritime region for its prosperity.' China is modernizing its naval force and expanding its security presence in the South China Sea. China's strong interest is not limited to the South China Sea. China is expanding its security presence in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. Macaes (2022) stated that the rising powers need overseas trade relations with other regions. In a similar vein, China has been expanding its spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions. As part of this expansion, China came up with BRI-funded projects. Chinese scholars such as Zhexin (2018) consider the BRI China's major international cooperation strategy to serve its economic development. As part of BRI-funded projects, China has started to invest in the Horn of Africa. Much of these investments are made on loans. For example, two-thirds of Djibouti's debt is owed to China. To protect its commercial interests in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea regions, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. The Chinese military base is close to the US military base in Djibouti. It is just six miles away. The US is worried about proximity, secrecy, and the nature of the Chinese military base in Djibouti (Vertin, 2020). In brief, the Chinese military presence in Djibouti is seen as a strategic concern for US interests in the Horn of Africa.

From these analyses, the US and China have engaged in uneasy relations in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the Horn of Africa has become the bone of contention between the two great powers. Opportunities for cooperation between China and the US in the Horn of Africa are limited. The potential for cooperation between China and the US in the Horn of Africa is further limited by fundamental differences in values and norms between the two great powers (Vertin, 2019). The US prefers to follow a liberal political order. For its part, China supports authoritarian political models and state-led economic developments. To reduce Chinese influence, the US is pressuring the Horn regional states to cut their ties with China. China, for its part, is aggressively expanding its economic, political, and security presence in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, into other parts of Africa.

5.2.2 **The American and Saudi Arabia Relations in the Horn of Africa**

Relations between the US and Saudi Arabia are post-Second World War developments. Replacing the British role in the Middle East, during the early years of the Cold War, the US began to protect the Arab Gulf states (Cerioli, 2019). Following the oil boom in the Arab Gulf region in the early 1970s, the US and Saudi Arabia increased their commercial relations[97] (McFarland, 2020). Both states were interested in an uninterrupted flow of oil from Saudi Arabia to the US. This indicates that they have had converging interests in the free flow of oil from Saudi Arabia to the US (Mahmood, 2019). The US interest in Saudi Arabia's oil has implications for the American dominant position in the Middle East. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis in the Middle East in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and the US agreed to maintain the dominant position of the US dollar in the international monetary system. The deal set up a US-Saudi alliance based on oil exports paid in US dollars in exchange for security support. The petrodollar system paved the way for the US's dominant position in the Middle East.

Besides, throughout the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and America worked together to reduce the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa (Cannon and Rossiter, 2022). Ideologically, the US and Saudi Arabia follow different political systems. The US claims to be a liberal democracy, while Saudi Arabia has been a conservative monarchy. However, the common threat of the spread of socialist ideology in the Horn of Africa in the 1970s forced them to work together in the region (Khan, 2018; Cerioli, 2019; McFarland, 2020). As discussed in chapter two, in order to thwart the Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia and America provided military assistance to their client regimes and liberation fronts. The US provided diplomatic and military support to Somalia in its war against socialist Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s. Saudi Arabia, for its part, provided financial assistance to the Ziad Barre regime of Somalia in its war with Ethiopia. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia poured huge sums of money into the northern parts of Ethiopia aimed at supporting the EPLF (Woodward, 1996). This was aimed at evicting the Soviet-backed regime in Ethiopia.

[97] After the 1979 Iranian revolution, relations between Washington and Tehran has been reduced. The US has strengthened its relations with Saudi Arabia.

Since the end of the Cold War, relations between Saudi Arabia and the US have been increased[98] (McFarland, 2020). For example, Saudi Arabia was a key ally of the US in the Gulf War in 1991. Saudi Arabia provided vital military bases for US military activities in the region. McFarland (2020) stated that in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the US deployed more than half a million troops to defend Saudi Arabia.[99]For its part, Saudi Arabia hosted the American military base that enabled the US to project its military forces into Iraqi cities. These security activities have become the basis for the US military presence in the Middle East. Close security relations between the two states have continued until today. Saudi Arabia and the US have been working together in the Horn of Africa in the 2000s, 2010s, and 2020s. The continued US-Saudi Arabia relations are based on the security support of the former to the latter in its policy towards the Red Sea region. This is explained in four different dimensions. Primarily, Saudi Arabia is the largest recipient of US military hardware (McFarland, 2020). Between 2013 and 2023, the US exported close to $100 billion in military armaments to different states in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia was by far the biggest market for US arms transfers. Importing close to twenty billion dollars' worth of military armaments, Saudi Arabia was one of the first importers of US military hardware (Midgley, 2023). Moreover, the US and Saudi Arabia have close security relations and Saudi Arabia and the US have been working together in the areas of military sales, arms transfers, and sharing intelligence information (Bahgat, 2022; Mason, 2022). Importantly, the US has armed and trained the Saudi military forces in their war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen (McFarland, 2020). Second, Saudi Arabia and America have cooperated to fight non-traditional security threats in the Red Sea region. Some scholars, such as Cerioli (2019) and Yachyshen (2020) stated that the US has maintained strong bilateral military relations with Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This indicates that the two states have close security ties. Third, the support of the US for Saudi Arabia is critical to Riyadh's power projection towards the Horn of Africa. Scholars such as Mosley (2021) and de Waal (2017) stated that Saudi Arabia considers the US as its key ally in its policy towards the Horn of Africa. This indicates that Saudi Arabia needs American continuous political and military support in its policy towards the Horn of

[98] This does not mean that relations between the two states are always smooth. There are a series of disagreements on American policy towards Israel, the human rights records in Saudi Arabia, and their negative implications for relations between the two states. The Saudi regime's assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

[99] Besides, the US deployed its US Fifth Fleet military base in Bahrain. For a detailed analysis, see Sean Kay's (2006) book on: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and Search for Peace.

Africa. And finally, the US considers Saudi Arabia's military presence in the Horn of Africa as a useful partner (Lons, 2021). Saudi Arabia and America have been working together to reduce the military presence of Turkiye and China in Somalia and, by extension, in the Horn of Africa. As noted under section 5.2.1, the US has no resources to invest in the Horn of Africa. Washington has assumed that Riyadh has the necessary financial resources to invest in the Horn of Africa. The US encourages Saudi investment in the Horn of Africa. As Lons (2021) further noted, western powers consider Saudi Arabia's investments in the Horn of Africa as potential partners to counter the influence of China and Turkiye in the Red Sea region. Thus, Saudi Arabia and America are working together to reduce the Turkish deep presence in the Horn of Africa.[100]

However, Saudi Arabia has increasingly pursued its own path in recent years. On December 8, 2023, one of the senior security researcher at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Alghannam remarked 'in recent years, we have started to follow an independent foreign policy strategy with many global actors to secure Saudis economic progress.' There are a number of factors contributing to the deteriorating relations between the two long-standing friendly states. A security expert, on condition of anonymity, stated that 'the Saudis have recently understood US strategic policy in the Middle East. The US is working to aggravate relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is to facilitate its military sales to Riyadh (Key Informant Five, May 1, 2022). Considering US policy, Saudi Arabia is working to improve its relations with Iran. In recent times, Tehran and Riyadh have improved their diplomatic relations. The two Middle Eastern regional powers sent diplomatic representatives to each state's capital city (Amare, September 23, 2023). Second, Saudi Arabia is improving its relations with China. For example, Saudi Arabia welcomed the BRI projects in the Red Sea region (Alghannam, December 7, 2023). More importantly, in January 2024, Saudi Arabia has become a member of a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). These dynamics have led to uneasy relations between Saudi Arabia and America. Security experts at the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs remarked, ' membership in the BRICS is aimed at reducing Saudi Arabia's reliance on US dollars, and Riyadh is working with other BRICS member states to create currency multipolarity' (Amare, September 23, 2023). Despite these uneasy developments, relations between Washington and Riyadh will not be easily broken up. Although Saudi Arabia is

[100] Relations between Washington and Ankara have deteriorated in recent times. Besides, Saudi Arabia has uneasy relations with Türkiye.

working with other rising powers, Saudi Arabia and America will continue working together in areas of regional peace in the Horn of Africa. In the absence of alternative options, a stable Saudi-US relationship seems essential for both countries' foreign policy. For Saudi Arabia, dependency on Washington for regime security is a determinant factor. For the United States, working with one of the strongest allies in the Middle East is mandatory to exert regional influence (Cerioli, 2019).

5.2.3 China and Saudi Arabia Relations in the Horn of Africa

Relations between China and Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa could be traced back to the 1970s. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and China worked together to thwart the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa (Magu, 2019). Both states supported the Somali government in its war with Ethiopia. Besides, both states supported the EPLF in its war with the Ethiopian army in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, Saudi Arabia and China improved their relations in the Horn of Africa after the 1990s.[101]Beijing and Riyadh have high stakes and interests in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as one of its natural spheres of influence. As indicated in chapter four, geographical proximity and its keen interest in engaging in agricultural investments are the two driving factors for the Saudis military presence in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, China considers the Horn of Africa as the source of raw materials, hydrocarbon resources, and investment destinations. To meet these interests, China has been constructing roads, railways, and ports. These infrastructure developments are important to transport commercial goods from the Horn of Africa to both Riyadh and Beijing. Therefore, the two states consider the Horn of Africa an intrinsically important region.

From 2000 to 2010, trade relations between Saudi Arabia and China increased fifteenfold (Benabdallah, 2018). In 2017, for example, China overtook the US as Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, mostly because of crude oil imports (Benabdallah, 2018). Currently, more than half of China's crude oil imports come from the Middle East, with the leading suppliers being, based on their order, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (Anderson, 2018). For example, in 2018, Saudi Arabia exported up to seventeen percent of China's total crude oil imports.[102]A constant supply of

[101] Prior to 1980, Saudi Arabia had close relations with Taiwan. Despite their political differences, their common policy in the Horn of Africa was aimed at thwarting the presence of the Soviet Union in the region.

[102] In early 2022, Moscow continued to export huge amounts of oil and gas to China below market prices (Hoskins, June 20, 2022). Following the Russian-Ukraine war, Chinese imports rose by 55%. This means China imported nearly 8.42 million tons in May 2022. The Russian hydrocarbon supplies are pumped through the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline and shipped by sea. This indicates that Moscow has become China's biggest supplier of oil, as the country sold

hydrocarbon resources from Saudi Arabia to China guides the relations between these two states in the Red Sea region. This represents the marriage of the dominant player in the global oil supply and the world's second-largest consumer of hydrocarbon resources (Calabrese, 2008). 'Our economic well being is based on our trade relations with China. For example, in 2022, the bilateral trade relations between China and the US were more than one hundred billion. Chinese foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia is more than thirteen billion,' remarked Alghannam, Director General of the Security Research Center at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, on December 7, 2023. Accordingly, Sino-Saudi relations are based on China's keen interest in importing Saudi Arabia's hydrocarbon resources. Oil from Saudi Arabia is transported to China across the Red Sea region. Therefore, Riyadh and Saudi Arabia have been working together to secure smooth resource flows across the Red Sea region.

In addition to trade relations, China and Saudi Arabia have converging interests in the BRI-funded infrastructure projects in the Horn of Africa.[103] The BRI-funded projects across the Red Sea region have been facilitating trade relations between China and Saudi Arabia. China is working hard to increase its relations with the BRI partner states, including Saudi Arabia (Gunness *et al,* 2022; Pierson, 2023). As Scobell (2018:22) writes, 'networks of roads, railways, pipelines, and sea lanes connecting China and Saudi Arabia have increased the smooth relations between the two states.' In other words, the infrastructure investments under the BRI-funded projects have contributed to accelerating Chinese oil imports from Saudi Arabia (Benabdallah, 2018; Macaes, 2022). Besides, the Arab Gulf states considered the BRI-funded projects important to their economic engagements in the Horn of Africa (Diabat, 2023). In particular, the BRI-funded projects have provided an opportunity for Saudi Arabia's economic activity in the Horn of Africa. This is because the BRI-funded projects are considered to be a key trade route for the Saudis' post-2030 economic activity in the Horn of Africa. As indicated in chapter four, Saudi Arabia started to invest in agricultural sectors in the Horn of Africa. These products are transported to Jeddah and Riyadh via the Djibouti port, which is constructed by Chinese companies.

discounted crude to Beijing amid sanctions over the Ukraine war. This pushed Saudi Arabia, formerly China's biggest source of crude oil, into second place with 7.82 million tons (Hoskins, June 20, 2022).

[103] Through BRI, the Chinese want to emulate the ancient caravan trade relations between Saudi Arabia and China. Many Arab Gulf countries were central to these ancient trade routes.

The increased commercial relations between Riyadh and Beijing, as indicated above, have created fertile ground for their diplomatic relations in recent years. Several points stand out. First, Saudi Arabia is on good terms with the principles of Chinese foreign policy of non-intervention in other states' internal affairs. 'Saudi Arabia has been conducting smooth relations with China. We want to develop close relations with rising powers in the east. Unlike the West, which intervenes selectively in the name of the international notion of human rights values, China does not intervene in other states' internal affairs,' remarked Alghannam on December 8, 2024. Second, China has been working to bring regional peace to the Middle East. The Chinese role in mediating the regional conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a case in point. As Scita and Hahirian (2023) noted, the role of China in mediating Saudi Arabia and Iran has become one of the most fruitful diplomatic engagements in recent years. These diplomatic efforts fit China's broader interests in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. More importantly, China and Saudi Arabia have a common authoritarian political system. Saudi Arabia has been ruled by the same dynasty since the early 1930s. Scholars such as Daz-Heni and Gouriellec (2019) contend that the political decision-making power in Saudi Arabia is in the hands of a few personalities structured on a horizontal dynastic model.[104] Moreover, Cerioli (2019:184) writes, 'the decision-making process in Saudi Arabia is in the hands of the king and his small circle of trust.' This indicates that political decision-making is limited to a few political elites. As indicated above, China has been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party since the late 1940s and both Riyadh and Beijing oppose the Western view of human rights and democracy. Saudi Arabia and China are working to emulate their authoritarian political culture in the Horn regional states.[105]The Saudis and Chinese relations with the Eritrean president are the cases in point. Isaias Afwerki has uneasy relations with the US (Plaut, 2023b). For example, he was not allowed to attend the US-Africa Leaders' Summit held from December 13-15, 2022 in Washington D.C.[106] Nevertheless, Eritrea has good relations with both Saudi Arabia and China and Isaias Afeworki visited China in 2023. In conclusion, Beijing and Riyadh have cooperative relations in the Horn of Africa.

[104] These political elites have shared and equal decision-making power.
[105] To facilitate its relations with Saudi Arabia, China came up with the Arab Papers in 2016.
[106] Other African states that were not allowed to attend the meeting are Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Burkina Faso. These states do not have good relations with the US.

However, this does not mean that there is no competition between Saudi Arabia and China in the Horn of Africa. The current good relations between China and Saudi Arabia, at some point in time, might be changed into competitive relations. This is explained in three dimensions. First, as noted in chapter four, Saudi Arabia and China have strong economic interests in the Horn of Africa. Both projecting powers need market access and investment opportunities in the Horn of Africa. This may lead the two projecting powers to engage in competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. As Benabdallah (2018) stated, China's and Saudi Arabia's increased investments in the Horn of Africa could lead the two foreign powers into competitive relations. Second, Saudi Arabia and China need military bases and client states in the Red Sea region, and they are working to widen their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. As noted in chapter four, Saudi Arabia needs the states in the Horn of Africa for its war against the Houthi rebels. In the same way, China needs the states in the Horn of Africa for its one-China policy. This competition for client states in the Horn of Africa may turn into hostile relations. Third, both Riyadh and Beijing understood the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa its natural sphere of influence. On the other hand, the Horn of Africa has become a core part of Chinese BRI-funded projects. Thus, they have competing and overlapping interests in the Horn of Africa. These competing interests will bring the two states into tense relations in the Horn of Africa. This will have negative regional security implications.

5.2.4 China and Türkiye Relations in the Horn of Africa

Relations between China and Türkiye have begun since the early 1970s, when the two states officially recognized each other (Ath, 2018). The relations between the two states have increased with the coming power of the AKP in 2002. 'The new Turkiye administration has been working to take advantage of the new emerging multipolar world,' stated Sinan Ulgen, director of Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies on December 8, 2023. Thus, in the 2000s, trade relations between China and Türkiye increased, and China has become the largest trading partner with Türkiye (Ath, 2018). This connected with the domestic political development in Turkiye. The foreign policy of the AKP government prioritizes export-oriented economic policy and Türkiye has been making efforts to increase its relations with states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Ath, 2018). For example, in 2015, the trade volume between these Beijing and Ankara was close to thirty billion dollars (Ath, 2018). In recent years, the trade relations between China and Turkiye have shown some

improvements. ‘In 2022, trade relations between China and Turkiye reached at thirty-nine billion dollars,’ remarked Sinan Ulgen, director of Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies on December 8, 2023.

In addition, the BRI initiatives increased relations between the two states (Kozanhan, 2022). Türkiye has welcomed the BRI for a number of reasons. First, the Chinese BRI-funded projects have brought investment opportunities in infrastructure networks stretching from China to Southern Europe. Turkiye is a country of critical importance for the BRI projects due to its geopolitical location between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Some of the strategic places, such as Kumport and Candari ports are key parts of the BRI (Kozanhan, 2022). These common interests in port developments have led China to cooperate with Turkiye on maritime security. To bring regional stability to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Turkiye and China have been working together, the two states are also working to strengthen naval diplomacy in the region (Kozahan, 2022). The second is that Beijing and Ankara have converging interests in infrastructure investments in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye considers Chinese-growing infrastructure investments as a positive economic opportunity to expand its presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, the BRI-funded projects have facilitated their relations in the Horn of Africa. Third, China and Türkiye have been working together for the stability of some states in the Horn of Africa. For example, Ankara and Beijing are working for the stability of the Somali central government. As discussed in detail in chapter four, both Türkiye and China are providing security assistance to Somalia.

As indicated above, the current relations between Türkiye and China in the Horn of Africa have been cooperative. However, the relations between China and Türkiye might turn into uneasy relations soon. China and Türkiye are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The two states have overlapping commercial interests in the Horn of Africa. Both states need markets for their manufactured goods and lucrative investment opportunities in the Horn of Africa. ‘Turkiye and China are competing over concessions and projects in the Horn of Africa’, stated Donelli on February 10, 2024. Besides, as indicated in chapter four, Ankara and Beijing consider themselves the rising great powers. As the rising great powers, Turkiye and China are working to extend their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, in other parts of Africa. Türkiye considers the Horn of Africa as a critical entry point into other parts of Africa. In the same way, China considers the Horn of Africa as a critical entry point into other parts of Africa. In

addition, both states need client regimes in the Horn of Africa. These overlapping interests would lead to hostile relations with security implications in the Horn of Africa.

5.2.5 America and Türkiye Relations in the Horn of Africa

Türkiye and the US have long-standing diplomatic relations. The bilateral relations between the US and Türkiye could be traced back to the end of the Second World War. The arrival of a US naval ship in Istanbul in 1946 signaled the formation of long-term relations between the two states (Mahmood, 2019). Besides, formal security relations between the two states were established in 1952, when Türkiye became a member of NATO. Throughout the Cold War, Türkiye and the US worked together to thwart the Soviet expansion in southern Europe. As Mahmood (2019:86) noted, 'Türkiye acted as a buffer state against the Soviet expansion into NATO's southern region.' After the end of the Cold War, relations between the US and Türkiye passed through different phases. Sometimes, it has become friendly relations. At other times, relations between the two states have become uneasy. For example, during the First Gulf War in the years between 1990 and 1991, relations between Ankara and Washington were cooperative. In 1991, Türkiye was America's key US ally and provided military bases for US security missions in Iraq. Besides, the US and Türkiye had close security relations in the Horn of Africa in the 2000s. The two states worked together to fight transnational security threats in the Horn of Africa. Harkavy (2007) stated that the US and Türkiye worked together to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s. As indicated in chapter two, Türkiye joined the multilateral efforts to fight piracy in the Horn of Africa in the late 2000s. In addition, the US and Türkiye provided security assistance to the Somali federal government in Mogadishu. Magu (2019) writes that the US and Türkiye have been working together in the state-building process in Somalia. Both foreign powers have been providing security assistance to the federal government of Somalia.

However, a number of developments outside the Horn of Africa have reduced Turkish-American relations in recent years. In terms of cooling of relations between the US and Türkiye, three points stand out. First, Türkiye refused to allow its military bases for US power projections in the Second Gulf War in 2003 (Kay, 2006). Besides, the US's support for the Iraqi Kurds frustrated Türkiye. For example, the no-fly zone of the US enabled the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to establish a military training center and continue to attack Türkiye (Taspinar and Tol, 2019). The resumption of PKK attacks in Türkiye from its bases in northern Iraq has become a security concern for Ankara and these dynamics reduced relations between the US and Türkiye (Mahmood, 2019). Second,

following the rise of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, relations between Türkiye and the US have been strained. Because of this, the US has become dissatisfied with the Turkish political support for the radical groups, including Muslim Brothers, in Libya and Egypt (Mosley, 2021; Walle, 2023). Besides, the conflict in Syria further complicated American-Turkish relations. For example, in 2014, the US provided military hardware to the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Unit (Ankara considered this unit a PKK-affiliated terrorist organization). This was a turning point in Turkish-American relations [107](Taspinar and Tol, 2019). In addition, Turkish-American relations have become strained following the efforts of Ankara to increase its relations with the rising great powers. 'Turkiye is working for the multi-alignment. It has been working to follow pragmatic foreign pociy strategy,' remarked Vessela Tcherneva, head of the European Council on Foreign Relations head of Sofia Office, on December 8, 2023. This indicates that Turkiye is working with the existing blocks or centers of powers to advance its interests. Its geopolitical location between Asia and Europe is a plus for this balancing relations with the west and east. In particular, recent security relations between Moscow and Ankara has worried the US. Despite its NATO membership, Türkiye bought sophisticated military armaments such as S-400 advanced missile systems from Russia. This is the turning point in the relations between Turkiye and the US. To make matters worse, the domestic political developments in Ankara in 2016 further complicated US-Türkiye relations. For example, in 2016, Fethullah Gulen attempted a military coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Taspinar and Tol, 2019). Following the coup attempt, Türkiye suspected the involvement of the West (Hunter, 2017). In particular, Türkiye accused the US of supporting the Gulen movement. Ankara demanded the US for his extradition to Türkiye. The US has refused the request so far (Taspinar and Tol, 2019). This has reduced their relations in recent times.

The above strained relations between the US and Türkiye in the Middle East have been reflected in the Horn of Africa. The two foreign powers engaged in winning client states and proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. This is explained in three different dimensions. In the first place, the US has close relations with Saudi Arabia in the Horn of Africa and the two foreign powers are working to reduce the Turkish military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is because, the US and Saudi Arabia accused Türkiye of working with Qatar and Iran in the Red Sea region (Gurbuz, 2018). Iran and Qatar have

[107] In recent years, Türkiye increased its military relations with Russia. For example, Türkiye bought S-400 military armaments from Russia. This has frustrated the US. Relations between the two states have been strained.

records of supporting radical Islamist elements, including Muslim Brothers. As noted below under section 5.2.6, Saudi Arabia accused Türkiye of supporting Muslim Brothers in North Africa and the Middle East. This has implications for their relations in the Horn of Africa. Hence, Saudi Arabia and America are working together to reduce the Turkish military presence in the Horn of Africa. As Vertin (2019) noted, the US has been supporting the Saudi military presence in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has uneasy relations with Türkiye in the Horn of Africa. Second, the US and Türkiye are supporting different regimes and non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. As discussed in chapter six in detail, Türkiye has been supporting the current Ethiopian government. On the other hand, the US has been supporting the TPLF forces. These kinds of foreign alliance relations in the Horn of Africa cast a dark cloud over the regional peace and stability. Therefore, Türkiye and America have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. These have regional security implications.

5.2. 6 Saudi Arabia and Türkiye Relations in the Horn of Africa

As described at length in chapter four, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have extended and consolidated their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The two regional powers have competitive relations in the Middle East (Key informant four, May 1, 2022). The diverging positions and competing interests of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Middle East guide their relations in the Horn of Africa. First, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have competing strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. The two Middle Eastern regional powers are working to be a single dominant power in the Horn of Africa (Mosley *et al,* 2021). Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as its natural sphere of influence. It wants to secure its privileged interests in the region. To thwart the presence of Türkiye in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia is extending and consolidating its security presence in the Red Sea region (Key informant four, May 1, 2022). This is observed in terms of the governance of the Red Sea. To reduce the Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia came up with a regional forum. In 2018, for example, it convened a meeting consisting of Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Bahrain, Somalia, Yemen, and Egypt. The major aim of the meeting was to establish the Red Sea Forum that secures Saudi Arabia's interests in the Red Sea region. On the surface, the forum is aimed at bringing maritime stability to the Red Sea region. However, a deeper analysis of these activities of the Red Sea Forum indicates that Saudi Arabia is working to reduce the influence of Türkiye in Somalia and other parts of the Horn of Africa. As Mosley *et al* (2021) stated, Saudi Arabia used the new security alliance to thwart the presence of its rivals in the Red Sea region. Telci (2021) stated that Saudi Arabia has been

creating close relations with the states in the Horn of Africa to create a maritime trade route under its control or with states of its choice.

Conversely, Türkiye considers itself the regional rising power. Miller (2007) stated that regional rising powers aspire to become great powers exerting a profound influence in international politics. To widen their spheres of influence, regional powers extend their military presence in other regions. In the same way, Türkiye is working hard to become a great power, playing a critical role in world politics. In fact, Turkiye is working to revive the sixteenth-century Ottoman Turks spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. As Mosley *et al* (2021) noted, Türkiye considers the Horn of Africa as one of its historical spheres of influence. Its recent military presence in the Horn of Africa indicates Türkiye's ambition to play a critical role in global politics. To achieve great power status, Türkiye is making greater efforts to widen its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, into other parts of Africa. As part of this power projection, Ankara has been strengthening relations with Somalia and Ethiopia. In projecting its military forces into the Horn of Africa, Türkiye has become a regional power to rival Saudi Arabia's presence in the region (International Crisis Group, 2019). Hence, the two Middle Eastern regional powers have been competing for their dominant position in the Horn of Africa.

Second, both Saudi Arabia and Türkiye assert that they are working to bring peace and stability to the Horn of Africa. As indicated in chapter one, Saudi Arabia claims that it has brought regional peace to the Horn of Africa by mediating the Ethiopia-Eritrea border disputes. For its part, Türkiye claims that it has worked for regional security in the Horn of Africa by mediating the regional conflict between the Somali federal government and regional states. For example, the Turkish ambassador to Ethiopia noted that 'Türkiye is mediating the conflicts in Somalia between the central government and the regional states' (Yaprap, November 17, 2022). This has its own contribution to regional peace and security. The Turkish First Counselor repeated Yaprap's argument. 'Türkiye is working hard to bring peace and stability to Somalia. It is working to improve the military capability of the SNA so that Mogadishu can extend its presence in every part of the country,' said Mustefa Kemal in 2022. In addition, as discussed in chapter four in detail, Türkiye is working to create apolitical and strong institutions in Somalia. As part of these efforts, Türkiye has been training the SNA, which will play a critical role in the state-building process in Somalia. However, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye consider each other's security presence in the Horn of Africa as destructive._For example, Saudi Arabia

considers the SNA to be Turkish proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia considers the Turkish role in training the Somali defense force as a means of widening Ankara's spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa (International Crisis Group, 2018). Thus, the Arab Gulf states have been working to thwart the Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa. Türkiye, for its part, considers Saudi Arabia's security activities in the Horn of Africa as divisive. Türkiye has accused Saudi Arabia of working for its short-term interests, which benefit political leaders and elites.

Third, the difference between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa reflects their internal ideological and political systems. This is explained in terms of two related dynamics. In the first place, Saudi Arabia is a monarchical *status quo-oriented* regional power. Riyadh considers itself a conservative *status quo* country. On the other hand, Türkiye is a rising power and fuses Islamic principles with electoral politics and market economies (International Crisis Group, 2019; Vertin, 2019). Indeed, relations between a rising power and a *status quo* power are competitive. The rising power wants to change the existing system in its favor. In contrast, *status quo* power works to maintain the existing distribution of power (Lemke, 2002). In a similar way, Saudi Arabia is working to maintain the existing political system run by patrons in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia has supported strong central governments with no democratic character. This indicates that Saudi Arabia works with African autocratic leaders. Saudi Arabia's close relations with the Eritrean government are the case in point. For its part, Türkiye is working to change the existing political system in its favour and Ankara has been working to see democratic elections with Islamic values in the Horn of Africa (International Crisis Group, 2019). From these analyses, it seems Ankara and Riyadh have been supporting different styles of political systems in the Horn of Africa. This has resulted in competitive relations between the two Middle Eastern regional powers in the Horn of Africa. This leads to the second difference between the two Middle Eastern regional powers. Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have been supporting different non-state actors in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa regions. Saudi Arabia is run by kings and follows a personalized and monarchical government system. Saudi Arabia has been opposing civil unrest, popular uprisings, and new political reforms (Dahir, 2019). The country has been working to maintain the short-term stability imposed by strong security states. For example, it has been busy resisting changes after the Arab Uprisings and the 2017 intra-GCC crisis (Cerioli, 2019). The political and ideological differences between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia widened following the 2011 Arab Uprisings. For example, following the removal of long-term rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, Saudi Arabia took decisions to resist the popular

demand for change (International Crisis Group, 2019). Saudi Arabia's political decision to resist popular uprisings was not limited to the Middle East. It has been reflected in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia extended its presence in the Horn of Africa to contain the role of radical Muslims in politics, and Riyadh opposed the presence of Muslim Brothers affiliated groups in the Horn of Africa (Cerioli, 2019). On the other hand, Türkiye is working for popular uprisings to empower groups such as the Muslim Brothers (Mason, 2022). Türkiye cemented ties with Islamist forces during the 2011 Arab uprising and continued to back them financially and through media coverage (International Crisis Group, 2013). In addition, Ankara supported and hosted a number of Muslim Brotherhood-linked figures that sought to build political influence after Arab Uprisings (International Crisis Group, 2019). From these analyses, both Riyadh and Ankara are working to extend their unique political model in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, they have exported their rivalries to the Horn of Africa. This has resulted in competitive relations between the two projecting powers in the Horn of Africa.

To summarize, external security actors have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. For example, the US and China have been competing for client states and strategic positions in the Horn of Africa. The advent of China in the Horn of Africa has become a strategic concern for US policymakers in recent times. Thus, US is extending its military presence in the Horn of Africa to outpace the Chinese presence in the region. Second, the relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have become competitive. The two Middle Eastern regional powers consider the Horn of Africa as their backyard and have shown intent to deeply influence it. Saudi Arabia has been working to overshadow the presence of rival powers in the region. For its part, Türkiye considers the Horn of Africa a springboard to expand its presence in other parts of Africa. Thus, the two regional powers have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. Third, China and Türkiye have smooth relations in the Horn of Africa at present. For example, Beijing and Ankara have been working together in the Somali state-building process. Nevertheless, the two foreign powers will have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa in the future. Because, they have competing interests in the region. Recent relations between the US and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa have been deteriorating. Developments external to the Horn of Africa have reduced their relations in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, competitive relations between external powers in the Horn of Africa have regional security implications. This will be examined in the following chapter.

Chapter Six

Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: National and Regional Implications

By and large, foreign powers with capabilities and economic resources could extend their military forces in intrinsically important regions. External security actors could play a significant role in reducing regional conflicts. At other times, the presence of competing foreign powers in unstable regions exacerbates regional conflicts. Foreign powers provide economic and security assistance to their clients in the region. These financial and military supports empower one regional state and weaken the other. In doing so, foreign powers change the regional balance of power and the regional distribution of power. The advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa is seen in this context.

As already discussed in chapter five, foreign powers have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. The competitive relations of foreign powers have implications for the Horn's regional security dynamics. These implications are seen in three different dimensions. First, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has influenced patterns of relations among regional states. Second, the foreign military presence has affected the nature of regional conflicts in terms of the regional balance of power and regional alliance dynamics. Third, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has influenced the domestic politics of local states in terms of regime types, elite security, the process of state building, and state-society relations.

The present chapter carefully examines the implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. To discuss these issues, the chapter is structured into four sections. The first section elaborates the implications of the foreign military presence on the domestic attributes of the local states in the Horn of Africa. This section investigates the nexus between foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa and elite security, state-society relations, and the state-building process. The second section gives a detailed analysis of the implications of foreign military presence for the patterns of Horn regional states' relations. The third section analyzes the implications of foreign military presence for the nature of regional conflicts (territorial, hegemonic, security dilemma, and alliance dynamics). The last section summarizes the main points of discussion.

6.1 **Nexus between Foreign Military Presence and Security Implications: Some Explanations**

In a highly networked world, there can be no wholly self-contained region immune to outside influences (Miller, 2007). Great powers, having capabilities and interests, extend their military forces in these regions. These foreign powers, because of their superior military and economic capabilities, are in a better position to influence regional conflict dynamics. The influence of external security actors varies from region to region (Oskanian, 2013). For instance, mature regions are less prone to external military interventions. Conversely, regions populated by weak and incoherent states are easily affected by foreign military presence. Hence, the influence of foreign military presence in other regions ranges from simple interaction with minimal influence on regional security dynamics to active interaction between foreign powers and regional states and total domination of the region by external security actors.

In simple interactions, relations between external security actors and the regional states are minimal, and the effect is less visible. The region maintains its autonomy. This is what Oskanian (2013:54) dubbed, 'sporadic interventions.' In these kinds of foreign military interventions, the region maintains its integrity and autonomy through diverse response strategies, including the formation of regional institutions (Ieva, 2010). Regional institutions mitigate the negative effects of a foreign military presence. By doing these activities, regional institutions ensure predictable relations between regional states, and regional institutions ensure that the current boundaries are permanent. This is a very important guarantee for the territorial integrity of regional states (Miller, 2007). Accordingly, the states in the region desecuritize each other and resist external interventions. Western Europe falls under this category.

In the second case, the regional dynamics are operative, and the region in question continuously interacts with external security actors. Though foreign military forces penetrate the regional security complex, the region in question maintains a substantial degree of autonomy (Weaver and Buzan, 2003). The external security actors make their efforts to extend their influence in the regional states. Regional states, for their part, interact with foreign powers continuously. Sometimes, regional states are active and play great power off each other to get more benefits, and regional states change their allegiance from one external power to another. At other times, foreign powers extended their influence and dominate the region.

In the third case, the foreign powers have a substantial military presence in the region. The region in question is economically and politically subordinate to foreign powers. This leads to asymmetrical relations between foreign powers and regional states (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). In some rare cases, external security actors totally dominate regional security dynamics, leading to a loss of sovereignty, and regional states cease to exist as independent states. This is what Buzan and Weaver (2003:34) dubbed 'overlay.' In overlay, external powers extend their military presence in other regions and dominate the local security dynamics (Buzan *et al*, 1998). The region in question is subordinate to foreign powers. In the late nineteenth century, Britain took over South Asia and overlaid the local security system. Moreover, the Soviet military presence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia during the Cold War resembled an overlay.

The effects of foreign military presence are visibly seen in a weak state populated region. Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies. They lack effective control over the means of violence in their territory. This will create difficulties for them to collect sufficient revenues, maintain an effective bureaucracy, and provide vital services to the population, such as regular water supply and transport infrastructure. These state weaknesses eventually produce regional instability. Regional instability, in turn, creates a wealth of opportunity for external military interventions. The Horn of Africa is populated by weak states.[108]For example, Somalia has become a failed to provide social services to its citizens since the early 1990s. Somalia failed to collect taxes from its citizens that are necessary for the provision of social services (Kinfe, 2002; Murphy, 2011) and to build strong defense forces. For these reasons, the central government of Somalia has failed to show its security presence in every part of the country (Flint, 2022). Exploiting this state weakness, terrorism and piracy have proliferated in Somalia. These dynamics, in due course, created a wealth of opportunity for external military interventions in the name of counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Related to the presence of weak states, the presence of incoherent states in the Horn of Africa facilitated foreign military interventions. As carefully indicated in chapter four, state incoherence in the Horn of Africa is due to the mismatch between the state boundaries and the national identification of the citizens. Ethiopia is an incoherent state in the Horn of Africa. A number of liberation fronts

[108] As Yonas Ketsela (2020) writes, national borders in the Horn of Africa are contested, and nation-building projects are unfinished. In addition, cross-border interventions in support of insurgencies are prevalent.

have been engaged in protracted ethnic civil wars with the central government. Somalia is another incoherent state in the Horn of Africa. Since the early 1990s, Somaliland has become a *de facto* state in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland's effort to conduct relations with other states added another layer to the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa.

Apart from the presence of weak and incoherent states, the influence of foreign military presence in other regions is visible in intrinsically important parts of the world. As discussed in detail in chapter four, the Horn of Africa is one of the most intrinsically important parts of the world. The Red Sea is a vital artery for international trade. It facilitates trade relations between Europe and Asia. More importantly, the Red Sea is close to the oil-rich and yet conflict-prone region of the Middle East.

Due to the already stated reasons, foreign powers cannot ignore the Horn of Africa, and they have been competing for natural resources, spheres of influence, and geopolitical positions. Several foreign powers are trying to maximize their gains at the expense of their rivals (Donelli, 2022). A key-informant interview with strategic thinkers indicates these competitive relations. On January 15, 2021, Getachew stated that 'projecting powers in the Horn of Africa are not altruistic. They have their own agenda. They are extending their military forces in the Horn of Africa to secure their national interests. To secure their share in the Horn of Africa, they have been engaged in competitive relations.' These competitive relations have regional security implications. The Saudi-Turkish uneasy relations and the US-China strategic competition are just some of the foreign rivalries that have security implications in the Horn of Africa. The competitive relations of foreign powers affected the internal security of the states in the Horn of Africa, the patterns of relations among regional states in the Horn of Africa, and the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. This goes with what Miller (2007:25) opined, 'the foreign military presence in other regions affects the three qualities of the region, notably patterns of regional states' relations, regional dynamics, and domestic attributes of local states.' The external military presence affects the patterns of relations among regional states (the amity and enmity relations of regional states), the nature of regional conflicts (territorial, hegemonic, security dilemma, and regional alliance), and the domestic attributes of the local states (the nature of regimes, state-society relations, elite security, and the state-building process). The military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has affected these three qualities of regional security dynamics.

6.2 The Implications of Foreign Military Presence for Domestic Attributes of Horn Regional States

The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has affected the domestic attributes of local states. Put differently, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has been affecting the nature of regimes, state-society relations, elite security, and the state-building process. These effects of foreign military presence on the domestic attributes of local states in the Horn of Africa are explained in both positive and negative dimensions. On the positive side, the military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has contributed to regional conflict resolution efforts. For instance, foreign powers arrange diplomatic forums for warring groups so that they can solve their regional conflicts. In 2018, the UAE and Saudi Arabia successfully mediated the twenty-year 'no war, no peace' stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These two Arab Gulf states have provided diplomatic and financial support to both Eritrea and Ethiopia so that they could solve their border disputes (Zaghlaami, 2019). These two GCC member states were able to fund agreements more quickly than most of the African regional organizations. To bring Eritrea and Ethiopia around the table, Saudi Arabia and the UAE employed different forms of economic incentives and diplomatic support. The UAE, for example, provided three billion dollars to Ethiopia, which has played a critical role in reviving the economy (Dahir, 2019). Following the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UNs lifted the international sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009. This has increased Eritrean relations with both regional and extra-regional powers (Michael, 2021). For example, Eritrea became a member of the Horn of Africa Cooperation. It has also improved its relations with other states, including Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia.

For its part, Türkiye has been engaged in mediation activities to resolve disputes between the federal government of Somalia and the regional states. In the early 2010s, Ankara tried to resolve regional disputes between Somalia and Somaliland. In recent times, Türkiye has shown a keen interest in reviving the peace deal between the federal government of Somalia and different regional states. Ankara's role is not limited to regional conflict resolution between federal states in Somalia. In fact, Türkiye is working hard to strengthen security institutions in Somalia. As Donelli (2020) writes, Türkiye has launched a series of initiatives aimed at modernizing the Somali defense force. The purpose of training is to increase the capacity and the number of the Somali defense force. It is aimed at training up to 22,000 members of the Somali national army (Siradag, 2017; Cannon and Rossiter, 2022; Orakci, 2022). By improving the capability of the Somali defense force, Turkiye is planning

to enhance the central government's ability to effectively extend its power beyond Mogadishu and eventually reducing the presence of foreign military forces in the country (Cannon and Rossiter, 2022). In so doing, the military training is aimed at transcending the politics of clan loyalty and creating a truly national army. This is the first step in the state-building process in Somalia. As Vertin (2019) noted, Ankara assumed a leading role in shaping the state-building agenda in Somalia. One of the strategies is to build strong defense forces in Somalia. Therefore, the Turkish military presence in Somalia has its own contribution to bring peace and security to the country.

In addition to Turkiye and Saudi Arabia, the US has been engaged in conflict resolution efforts. As a great power whose interests are based on the peace and security of the Horn of Africa, the US has been making efforts to bring regional peace and security. The recent remark of the then US diplomat indicates the role of the US in regional peace in the Horn of Africa. On November 28, 2023, Shinn noted that 'the US has made great efforts to settle the Tigray War in recent years. The US was behind the Pretoria Peace Agreement.' In fact, the US pressured both the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF forces to resolve their differences. The peace deal has born fruit. In recent times, the people of Tigray have received some humanitarian aid, and other infrastructure is being constructed.

Moreover, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a direct source of income for some of the poorest states in the region. This is explained in two dimensions. First, the Red Sea littoral states have capitalized on their strategic location in recent years. Djibouti, for example, has monetized its strategic location in the Horn of Africa. Foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a source of income for some of the poorest states in the region. Djibouti, for example, earns close to $300 million annually from military base rents (Dahir, 2019; Mulualem, 2021; Dubey, 2021). For Djibouti, foreign military base rents have become an important source of income. As discussed in chapter seven, Djibouti has been using the revenue from military base rents to improve the capacity and quality of the ports. Second, the engagement of foreign powers in investments has a spillover effect on regional peace and security. In recent times, external security actors have been engaged in constructing roads, railways, and water pipelines. For instance, China has been funding huge infrastructure projects, notably the Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline, the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railways, and the Doraleh Multipurpose Ports (for a detailed analysis, see chapter four). These huge infrastructure investments in roads, railways, and ports have brought economic transformations to the states in the Horn of Africa (Arkebe and Fantu, 2019). Economic transformation in the Horn of

Africa will have indirect implications for regional peace and stability. This goes with Xuejun's (2018:74) concepts of 'developmental peace.' The concept of developmental peace emphasizes that economic investments in constructing roads, ports, railways, and other infrastructure investments in the least developed states, including the states in the Horn of Africa, will have a spillover effect on regional peace and stability. In terms of 'developmental peace', economic investments are the starting point for bringing sustainable regional peace to the Horn of Africa. China, for example, has been constructing roads, railways, and ports in the Horn of Africa. On October 27, 2022, the Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia organized a high-level forum on China-Africa relations. In the forum, the leader of the diplomatic delegation offered their views on the role of Chinese infrastructure investments. 'China has been constructing railways, roads, and ports in the Horn of Africa. These infrastructure investments will have security implications in the long term. It is through infrastructure integration that peace will prevail,' says Zhao Zhiyuan, the Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia in 2022. Chinese political leaders are optimistic about their engagement in infrastructure investments on the African continent. For example, on May 14, 2017, Xi Jinping noted that 'we introduced the BRI-funded projects in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to ensure regional peace and stability. Instead of alliance relations, political confrontation, and coercive diplomacy, we build roads, highways, and seaports that facilitate economic integration.' This is to bring peace and security to conflict-prone regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

It should also be noted that the military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has positive implications for the smooth resource flows in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean regions. The foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is fighting non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, maritime piracy, and illegal arms transfers. As indicated in chapter two, external security actors projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa to fight terrorism and maritime piracy in the early 2000s. In the late 2000s, a number of external security actors projected their military forces to fight piracy off the Indian Ocean. In fighting non-traditional security actors, foreign military powers have been playing a critical role in the stable flow of goods and commodities across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden regions. On January 15, Getachew Mekonnen (2021) stated that we cannot deny the role of external military powers in reducing the threat of maritime crimes and other non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. In recent years, the US and other western powers have been engaged in fighting the Houthi rebels that caused security threats in the Red Sea region. On November 28, 2023, Shinn concluded that 'the US has been positively acting to fight maritime crimes

in the Red Sea.' Thus, it is an undeniable fact that foreign powers have been fighting terrorist groups and maritime pirates in the Horn of Africa. In so doing, foreign powers have been playing for the smooth flow of goods and services in the Red Sea region. By extension, the military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has a positive contribution to the stability of the global economy.

Last but not least, the recent advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has become an alternative patron for some of the states in the region. This is connected with the rise of emerging powers in different parts of the world. As Clark and Whitaker (2018:322) noted, 'in the current international relations, African states are far less vulnerable to western political pressures and economic sanctions. The advent of emerging powers in the Horn of Africa give the regional states more space for maneuver in international relations and when necessary African states can turn to the emerging powers for economic benefits and political support.' Stated differently, the presence of competing foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has enabled the regional states to find a more alternative option in their foreign relations. Unlike previous foreign interventions, the states in the Horn of Africa have been leveraging and even influencing competitive relations among great powers in recent years (Lanfranchi, 2021; Ylonen, 2022b; Kepe *et al*, 2023). This attempt seems to maximize their benefits. For example, as indicated in chapter four, sanctions were lifted against Eritrea because of foreign powers' competition in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea became free from international sanctions with the support of foreign powers such as Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia. Besides, as noted in chapter seven, Djibouti is playing great powers against each other to get more economic benefits. Ethiopia, for its part, escaped from western diplomatic, political, and economic pressures with the support of other great powers. During the two years of civil war (from November 2020 to November 2022) between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF forces, the UN Security Council met more than ten times to condemn the humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region. Raised by the US, the UN Security Council brought the Ethiopian domestic conflict for repeated discussion. The intention of such a move was to condemn the Ethiopian federal government but not the TPLF forces, who had equally committed human rights violations in the Amhara and Afar regions. However, Ethiopia received strong and consistent diplomatic support from Russia and China at the UN Security Council. Thus, none of these meetings were successful due to the combined vetoing power of Russia and China at the UN Security Council. In his book, *Africa-China Relations: Ethiopia as a Case Study,* Melaku (2023) noted that Ethiopia has been protected from unnecessary western diplomatic,

economic, and political intervention with the continued support of China and Russia at the UN Security Council. Besides, in his book chapter, *Diplomacy and Protest,* Martin Plaut (2023b) noted that Russia and China became key security actors to block sanctions against Ethiopia at the UN Security Council. A key informant interview with the Ethiopian senior diplomats depicts the positive role of China at the UN Security Council. 'China has been Ethiopia's key security partner at the UN Security Council in the years between 2021 and 2022. It protected Ethiopia from Western diplomatic pressure under the guise of humanitarian interventions,' said Fisseha on October 24, 2023. Other Ethiopian senior government officials repeated the words of Fisseha. For example, Ergoge Tesfaye noted that 'China has become a key foreign power to protect Ethiopia's integrity and sovereignty from western interventions in recent years. It was China that supported Ethiopia at the UN Security Council' (October 27, 2022). This indicates that China's continued diplomatic support has become critical for Ethiopia's integrity and sovereignty. Scholars such as Tull and Akum (2023) have positive views on the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. According to these scholars, the emergence of a multipolar international order has shifted the global balance of power to rising powers such as China, India, Brazil, and Russia. These rising powers are competing for access to resources, regional dominance, and partner states in different parts of the world, including the Horn of Africa. The advent of competing great powers in the Horn of Africa is important for some of the states in the region. First, most of the states in the Horn of Africa consider great power competition as favorable dynamics to secure their interests in international relations. In other words, the increasing engagement of foreign powers has allowed African states to multiply and diversify international partnerships (Tull and Akum, 2023; Ylonen, 2024). The emergence of many great powers in different parts of the world will reduce African states' dependence on western powers. More importantly, the emergence of a multipolar world provides alternative development policies for many African states. It is clear that the West has been interfering in the internal politics of African states under the guise of conditionality policies. In contrast, the advent of rising powers such as Russia, China, and Turkiye in the Horn of Africa will provide alternative policy options to the African states (Ylonen, 2024). This will indirectly strengthen the sovereignty of African states. Strengthening sovereignty is a precondition for increased political autonomy. This increased autonomy has provided African states with more choices in terms of economic policies. Considering the increased political autonomy, scholars such as Tull and Akum (2023) have observed that multiplication and diversification in international partnerships would provide African states with alternative economic and political

opportunities to advance their strategic interests. The advent of a number of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa would increase the position of the regional states.

Nevertheless, the new military presence in the Horn of Africa has several negative regional security implications. The negative implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa are explained in different dimensions. First, foreign powers have been engaged in resolving regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. However, a critical analysis of the roles of foreign powers in regional conflict resolution indicated that foreign military forces did not solve the internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This is reflected in the Somali internal conflict resolution process. As noted in chapter four, the Somali state's weakness resulted in persistent internal conflict in the country. This in turn drew the attention of external security actors in the name of the conflict resolution process. Nevertheless, the presence of many foreign powers (the ATMIS forces, Ethiopia, the US, and Türkiye) did not solve the internal security problem of Somalia. As Al Ghwell (2022) writes, the endless struggle against al-Shabaab has resulted in needless civilian casualties from US drone military operations. This has fueled the extremist groups to recruit the youth and continue their struggle against the Somali federal government and foreign forces. Moreover, there is a lack of coordination among foreign military forces in Somalia. On January 30, 2024, Samantar noted that 'Somali has no unified army. There is division and fragmentation, and there is no unified command structure.' The engagement of different foreign powers in training the Somali defense force exacerbated the problem. Troops trained by a particular foreign power are aligned with a particular political group.[109]The dividing line between regular armies and clan-based militias is thin. A soldier can act in the interests of Somalia, and another day he acts in the interests of his clan (Harper, June 01, 2022). For example, in April 2022, fierce fighting erupted between different factions of the security forces in Mogadishu. This has sparked a fear of a return to the civil war similar to the 1990s (Harper, June 1, 2022).

Related to the above analysis, the Turkish military activities in Somalia have negative security implications. On the surface, the Turkish security engagements in training the SNA have positive security implications. As indicated in chapter four, the main mission of the SNA is to become a strong apolitical institution that transcends clan politics. This is important for internal peace in Somalia.

[109] The US trained elite commandos, known as the Danab or the Lighting Brigade. The Turkish trained the Eagles Unit.

However, a close analysis of Türkiye's role in training the SNA has negative security implications. In this regard, three points stand out. First, Türkiye is working hard to extend its influence to Somalia through the SNA. As Cannon and Rossiter (2019) argued, the SNA in the future will become a proxy force to expand the Turkish interests in Somalia and, by extension, in the Horn of Africa. Ankara, in this regard, is working hard to find markets for its military logistics and armaments. It is already established fact that Somalia has become a major client for the Turkish-manufactured military armaments. These will militarize not only Somalia but also the entire states in the Horn of African. Second, the SNA is not able to transcend clan factionalism in Somalia. Scholars such as Khan (2018) stated that transcending Somali clan politics seems to be a difficult task. Some of the regional states, such as Somaliland and Puntland, do not accept the legality of the SNA. For that matter, they accused the SNA of serving the interests of certain clan groups. To make matters even worse, Somaliland and Puntland do not accept the role of Ankara. They consider Türkiye a biased external security actor working to impose its will and interests on the peace deal process. This is reflected in Ankara's role in conflict resolution efforts. As indicated above, Ankara arranged a diplomatic forum to settle the disputes between Somalia and Somaliland in the years between 2013 and 2015. Türkiye's efforts for a peace deal between Somalia and Somaliland did not bring results, and in 2015, the peace deal failed. Still, Türkiye has shown an interest in reviving the peace deal. In 2018, Türkiye appointed a special envoy to facilitate the peace process. Nevertheless, Somaliland considered Türkiye a biased foreign power supporting the Somali federal government (Mahmood, 2020). Therefore, Somaliland has been engaged in security cooperation with other foreign powers, such as the UAE and Taiwan. Third, the strengthening of the SNA will become a threat to other states in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet military training in the early 1970s emboldened the Ziad Barre regime. Taking advantage of close security cooperation with the Soviet Union, Somalia invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In much of the same vein, a strong SNA would raise the idea of 'Greater Somalia' in the future. Cannon and Rossiter (2019) stated that a revitalized and well-equipped SNA might project its force outside Somalia's territorial limits. Such move might have regional security implications.

Apart from Somalia, close security relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa have exacerbated Ethiopia's domestic conflicts. This is due to Turkiye's military and political support for the Ethiopian government in its war with the TPLF forces in the Tigray region. Plaut (2023b) noted that Türkiye has become an important ally for Ethiopia in supplying military drones in its war with Tigray forces. These military facilities played a critical role in changing the military balance in favour of the federal

government of Ethiopia. On December 23, 2021, Tsadkan Gebretnsae, one of the prominent leaders of the TPLF forces, made an important remark on the role of Turkish drones in the war fronts. He communicated with the BBC news hour, 'drone facilities were one of the factors for our withdrawal from controlled areas of the Amhara region. We have been moving huge forces and logistics from the Tigray region towards the capital, Addis Ababa. However, our movement of army and military vehicles became vulnerable to the drone strikes.' In addition to Tsadkan, some strategic thinkers at the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs have made arguments that, 'relations between Addis Ababa and Ankara are guided by drone diplomacy. This is because drone military facilities supplied by Ankara played a critical role in changing the military balance towards Addis Ababa' (Henok, September 29, 2022). This indicates that external arms and technological transfers in Ethiopia's domestic conflicts have exacerbated regional conflicts. These alliance dynamics of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa indicate that external powers are extending their military forces in the Horn of Africa to secure their interests.

In addition, the role of foreign powers in conflict resolution has been criticized as non-transparent and non-inclusive. In the conflict mediation process, foreign powers legitimize their client states and non-state actors to secure their strategic and resource interests in the Horn of Africa (Duffield and Stockton, 2023). By and large, external security actors conduct their relations with political leaders, elites, and government officials. Key stakeholders such as civil society organizations, people at the grass-roots level, and the elderly are not involved in the regional conflict resolution process. For example, the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal mediated by the UAE and Saudi Arabia has been criticized as non-transparent and non-inclusive. In April 2022, Belete noted that 'the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not deep-rooted. It is on the surface. A peace deal was made between the leaders of two states. What will happen when one of the leaders is removed from power in the future?' A key informant interview with the IGAD officials supported Belete's concern. On January 26, 2021, Abebe noted that 'the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not made public. People have no knowledge of the issues that the two leaders discussed. The peace deal involved only political elites. Other stakeholders, such as political parties, trade unions, and people at the grass-roots level were not involved.' For his part, Awet (2018) stated that no details of the agreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been fully and formally disclosed to the public. Second, the peace deal has been criticized for its lack of institutionalization. The peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea was made without the knowledge of the HoPRs of Ethiopia. It was not approved by the Ethiopian HoPRs, and

no details were made public (Awet, 2018; Assefa, 2023). On February 14, 2021, Christian, a strategic analyst for the Horn of Africa, noted 'the details of the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain a mystery and have not yet been institutionalized.' The lack of transparency about the terms of the agreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea has implications for Ethiopia's domestic political system. For example, the non-transparent peace deals between Asmara and Addis Ababa generated threat perceptions on the part of TPLF forces. Scholars such as Michael and Verhoeven (2022:21) noted that 'the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea was designed to reduce the role of the TPLF in Ethiopian politics. The peace deal was aimed at consolidating the power of the central government vis-à-vis the TPLF forces.' To make matters worse, foreign powers have been involved in the regional peace resolution process to secure their self-serving interests (Mahmood, 2020). To do this, they provided financial gifts to the contending parties. The Ethiopia-Eritrea peace deal is a case in point. Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided financial incentives to the Eritrean and Ethiopian political leaders. As noted in the previous discussions, Saudi Arabia provided some financial support to Eritrea. The UAE, for its part, deposited close to one billion dollars in the Ethiopian National Bank. The same is true for US security activities in settling the destructive war between the TPLF forces and the Addis Ababa government. However, the engagement of foreign powers in conflict resolution did not bring permanent peace to the Horn of Africa. Recent relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are fragile. The two neighboring states have reduced their diplomatic relations in recent times. From the above analyses, one can summarize that external security actors did not solve domestic conflicts in Ethiopia, and foreign powers are not working to bring permanent peace to the Horn of Africa.

Second, following the advent of competing foreign powers, the Horn of Africa has become a venue where external security actors are playing out their rivalries (Melvin, 2019b; Handy, 2022). The extension of foreign rivalries in the Horn of Africa has negative security implications for the internal politics of the regional states. On November 28, 2023, the two participants in the Zoom meeting noted that 'there has been a renewed great power competition in the Horn of Africa for geopolitical positions and strategic resources. Foreign powers have often engaged in rivalries that have had destabilizing consequences for the states in the Horn of Africa' (Kalewongale and Johnson). For example, the 2017 intra-GCC political crisis has spilled over into the Horn of Africa and undermined Somalia's weak state structure (Kabandulla and Shaw, 2019). The competitive relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Qatar and Türkiye on the other hand, have had negative security implications for the internal politics of Somalia. These competing blocks have

backed different national and regional forces in Somalia. On November 22, 2022, Tekeda Alemu, former Ethiopian envoy to the United Nations, noted that 'the Arab Gulf states, to secure their self-serving interests, have worsened the Somali internal domestic politics.' For example, Qatar and Türkiye supported the federal governments of Somalia. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supported the Somali regional states, including Somaliland and Puntland. This competition has undercut the state-building process in Somalia. As Mahmood (2020) writes, the Arab Gulf states in the Middle East bypassed the Federal Government in Mogadishu and continued to conduct relations with regional states. These dynamics exacerbated center-periphery tensions in Somalia. For the most part, the UAE's military base at Berbera Port has become a significant source of tension between the governments of Somalia and Somaliland. To get international recognition, Somaliland has been conducting relations with regional and extra-regional powers. Somaliland's diplomats do not deny their state's relations with foreign powers. On November 29, 2022, Somaliland security expert, Kaariye stated that 'we are working with a number of foreign powers to acquire international recognition. Moreover, we want to become a commercial hub in the Horn of Africa. As part of this, in 2018, we allowed the Emirates to construct a $442 million port development.' After completion, it will have a significant positive implication for strengthening relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

The effect of Middle Eastern regional rivalry is not limited to Somalia. The Arab Gulf states are extending their security alliances that have implications for other states in the Horn of Africa. For example, the extension of the Red Sea Forum in the Horn of Africa has become a security concern for some states in the Horn of Africa. Particularly, Ethiopia has become vulnerable to the formation of a new security alliance in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's vulnerability due to the formation of the Red Sea Forum relates to the criteria for membership which has been a very contentious issue (Vertin, 2019). Some nations within the Forum have sought to limit participation to the Red Sea littoral states only. Nevertheless, others sought a more inclusive membership in the security alliance. Considering a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea littoral states denied Ethiopia's membership in the Red Sea Forum. As a landlocked state whose imports and exports depend on access to the Red Sea, exclusion from the Red Sea governance system has implications for Ethiopian national security. This is explained in different ways. First, the new security governance in the form of the Red Sea Forum extended foreign security alliances in the Horn of Africa. The extension of the foreign security alliance in the Horn of Africa has negative security implications for Ethiopia. This is because, behind

Saudi Arabia, Egypt has become a key regional power in the Red Sea region and Cairo is working to thwart Ethiopia's presence in the region (Amare, September 23, 2023). Because of these regional dynamics, Ethiopian foreign policymakers are worried about the exclusion of Addis Ababa from the Red Sea Forum. Reporting his office's nine-month activities on May 17, 2022, then Ethiopia's Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Demeke Mekonnen, informed the HoPRs, 'we reject the new Red Sea Forum without Ethiopia's membership. We need to have an inclusive membership in the Red Sea Forum. Bystander will not be the policy of Ethiopia.' Besides, Markos Tekle, then deputy foreign minister, made an important remark. On December 20, 2019, Markos Tekle remarked, 'the formation of the Red Sea Forum is designed to contain the presence of Ethiopia in the Red Sea region.' In addition, on February 22, 2022, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed briefed the law-making body about the threats of Ethiopian exclusion from the Red Sea Forum. He stated, 'we will not sit idly on the Ethiopian exclusion from the Red Sea Forum. After settling our domestic security problems, we will project our power into the Red Sea and other regions vital to our security interests.' From the analysis of the Ethiopian higher political leaders, it is clear that the advent of Arab Gulf states in the Horn of Africa has negative security implications for Ethiopia.

As already indicated, Ethiopia was excluded from the Red Sea Forum because of its geographic location. In 1991, Ethiopia became a landlocked country in the Horn of Africa. Depending on the Red Sea littoral states, the bulk of Ethiopian export products are shipped through the Red Sea destinating to different parts of the world. Particularly, the Ethiopian import and export trade pass through the port of Djibouti. In recent years, Djibouti has been under the influence of foreign military forces. A substantial foreign military presence and the huge foreign direct investments have given foreign powers considerable power to influence the port services and the internal politics of Djibouti (Belete, 2023). The presence of competing international powers in the Red Sea region has implications for Ethiopia's international trade. These foreign security dynamics in the Horn of Africa is directed at Ethiopian external interests. In this regard, the new draft foreign policy document pinpoints the following:

በቀጠናችን በቅርብ አመታት የተከሰቱ የጂኦፖለቲካዊ ለውጦች እና በቀይ ባህር ዙርያ ያለው ሁኔታ እና የሃይል አሰላለፍ የባህር በር ለሌላት ሃገራችን እና በአጠቃላይ ለቀጠናው ደህንነት ከፍተኛ አንደምታ አለዉ።በመሆኑም በቀጠናው ዙሪያ የሚታየው ለውጥ የሃገራችን ደህንነት እና ብሄራዊ ጥቅም ሲጋት እንዳይሆን የሚያደርግ ሰራ መሰራት ያስፈልጋል።በመሆኑም ቀጠናዊ ጂኦፖለቲካዊ ለዉጥ የውጭ ግንኙነት ፖሊሲያችን መነሻ ሆኖ ይቀጥላል (Draft FDRE Foreign Policy Document,

2021:5). *The literal translation is that 'the recent geopolitical dynamics in the Red Sea region and subsequent change in alliance relations have implications for Ethiopia's national security. To reduce the negative implications of the geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia needs to implement new policies in the region. Thus, the new geopolitical dynamics serve as a starting point for Ethiopia's foreign policy strategy.'*

Accordingly, based on the new FDRE foreign policy document, it appears that the new foreign military presence in the Red Sea region has negative implications for Ethiopia's national security. The security threats arise from the following developments. First, there are geopolitical changes following the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. These geopolitical changes have implications for Ethiopia's national security. Second, amid the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, there are changing alliance relations. These changing alliance relations between external security actors and the Red Sea littoral states have brought security threats to Ethiopia. Third, Ethiopia's vulnerability to the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is further exacerbated by its landlockedness. Indeed, foreign powers are posing an indirect military threat to Ethiopia. These external threats include port blockades, attacking vital strategic sea lanes, and hindering the movement of import and export products.

Apart from the extension of the Middle Eastern regional rivalries, the Horn of Africa has become a venue where great powers play out their foreign conflicts (Melvin, 2019a). For example, the Indo-Pacific regional rivalries between the US and China are exported to the Horn of Africa. This extension of the Indo-Pacific regional rivalry in the Horn of Africa has implications for regional states (Lei, 2020; Kepe *et al,* 2023). Similar to the Cold War great power rivalries, the recent great power competition between China and the US is exacerbating regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. China is working to deepen its relations with the states in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, with the rest of other African countries. Relations between Ethiopia and China have been increasing. Considering these increased relations, Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zhiyuan remarked, 'relations between China and Ethiopia are considered to be all weather strategic partnerships. Ethiopia is the first African state and the fourth in the world to have close relations with China' (October 23, 2023). The increasing relations between China and Ethiopia have become a threat to US national interests in the Horn of Africa, and America is working hard to thwart the Chinese presence in the region. Scholars in the China and US relations in the Horn of Africa have some words.

For instance, on March 26, 2024, Kizito Sabala remarked, ‘the US is not interested in the Chinese deep economic presence in the Horn of Africa.’ The competitive relations between China and the US in the Horn of Africa have implications for Ethiopia’s national security. ‘The competition between the US and China has exacerbated the ethnic-based disputes and political instability in Ethiopia,’ said Tekeda Alemu on September 1, 2022. This is related to American support for some of the proxy forces in the Horn of Africa. To thwart the Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, America has been supporting proxy forces, including the TPLF forces. Scholars such as Walle (2023), Seife (2022), and Tesfu (2022) write that America has been using surrogate forces to achieve its narrow security interests in the Horn of Africa. As part of this political support, America has brought up the Tigray region matter before the UN Security Council. This has exacerbated Ethiopia’s internal conflicts. A prominent Ethiopian scholar, Beyene Petros, criticized US policy towards Ethiopia. In the October 2022 edition of the *Zemen* magazine, Beyene stated, ‘at the beginning, the Americans were supporting the Abiy administration. Later, they shifted their policy toward the current administration. The US needs loyal proxy forces in the Horn of Africa.’ Beyene (2022) further underlined that America put pressure on Ethiopia to accept the binding rules with respect to the use of the Nile River. Ethiopia, however, did not accept such intension. The American personnel involved in the case were frustrated. They started to isolate the current administration and favoured the loyal proxy forces. The current western support for the TPLF forces is similar to the 1991 regime change in Ethiopia. To remove the Mengistu regime, the foreign powers supported the TPLF forces both materially and politically. In the same way, the main intention of the West is to remove the current administration and replace it with their loyal surrogate forces. Considering the US foreign policy under his administration, the Ethiopian Prime Minister made an important speech about foreign intervention in his administration. On July 7, 2022, Abiy Ahmed addressed the HoPRs about the destructive role of foreign powers in his administration. He stated,'አሁን በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ የተቀናጀ ግራጫ ጦርነት እየተካሄደ ነው። የውጭ ሀይሎች ሳይበር ዋር፣ የውክልና ጦርነት፣ የመረጃ ጦርነት እየተካሄዱብን ነው። ይህንንም ለማከናወን በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ የሚገኙ ልዩነቶችን በማባባስ ሀገሪቱን መበታተን ነው። የውጭ ሀይሎች ስራቸውን ለማቃለል በመንግስት ውስጥ ወኪል አላቸው።’ translates literally, ‘external security actors employed hybrid wars to weaken the current Ethiopian administration. These hybrid wars include information wars, cyberwars, and proxy wars. These are aimed at replacing the existing government with their loyal forces.’ From these remarks, a number of points are clearly visible. First, the US is working to make domestic problems worse in Ethiopia. Second, the hybrid war is aimed at widening domestic grievances. These two strategies

have created schisms in relations between the government and the people at the grass-roots level. To facilitate their gray war, foreign powers have been exploiting domestic grievances. Third, western powers have local proxy forces in Ethiopia. These are aimed at weakening Ethiopia and, by extension, controlling the Horn of Africa. Scholars such as Bert (2011) contend that war among great powers has declined in current international relations. These great powers do not go into direct confrontation. Instead, they have been fighting proxy wars in different parts of the world. The recent rivalry between China and the US in Ethiopia has all the earmarks of a proxy war. 'Systemic competition between great powers has implications for Ethiopia's internal politics,' says Adem, an Ethiopian foreign policy expert at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2022. The US supports the TPLF forces, and China supports the Ethiopian government. To achieve its interests in the Horn of Africa, as Munene (2022) concluded, the US legitimized insurgencies and delegitimized legitimate governments in the Horn of Africa. From these analyses, one can summarize that systemic rivalry between China and the US exacerbated local conflicts in Ethiopia.

Third, strategic competition between foreign powers has implications for the foreign policy choices of the states in the Horn of Africa. Following the advent of competing foreign powers, the states in the Horn of Africa have been pressured to align with one state and cut ties with other external powers (Styan, 2022; Mahmood, 2020). Foreign direct investment and economic assistance to the governments in the Horn of Africa have given foreign powers a source of leverage to advance their strategic interests (Khatib, 2013; Munene, 2023). For example, following the intra-GCC crisis, Saudi Arabia solicited the states in the Horn of Africa cut their ties with Qatar and Türkiye. Eritrea sided with the Saudi camp and provided military bases to Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthi rebel groups in Yemen. Moreover, Eritrea sent its military forces to support the Saudi military forces in the Yemen civil war. Other than Eritrea, Somalia has been pressured to take sides in the GCC political crisis. For example, in the year 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE used financial aid to put pressure on Somalia to cut ties with Qatar and to stand against Turkiye. They offered eighty million US dollars for the country to cut diplomatic ties with Qatar (Ylonen, 2022b; Munene, 2023). However, Somalia preferred to follow a neutral foreign policy towards the intra-GCC rivalries. These dynamics eventually forced the UAE and Saudi Arabia to cut their ties with Somalia and they started conducting diplomatic ties with Somaliland. Furthermore, in the year 2018, the Emirates signed a thirty-year contract to lease the Berbera Port in Somaliland. This port development deal was done against the consent of the federal government of Somalia. On the other hand, Qatar and Türkiye tried

to convince Somalia to change its neutral foreign policy stance in the Middle Eastern regional rivalries. In order to achieve these objectives, both Qatar and Türkiye attempted to employ various economic and diplomatic supports for Somalia. For example, Qatar and Türkiye provided substantial humanitarian assistance to Somalia to maintain their relations with the federal government of Somalia (Kantack, 2017). This indicates that pressure from the Middle Eastern states has complicated the federal government's relations with regional states.

Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are not alone in extending their political pressure on the foreign policy direction of the states in the Horn of Africa. Other great powers are pressuring the foreign policies of the states in the Horn of Africa. For example, the US is pressuring the states in the Horn of Africa not to form a security alliance with rival great powers. This indicates that the US policy of "either you are with us or against us" does not offer neutrality as an alternative foreign policy option (Gabriel, 2022). For example, in 2014, the US pressured Djibouti not to allow the Russian military base establishments in the country. To achieve its objectives, as indicated in the previous discussions, America increased a military base rent from thirty million dollars to sixty million dollars. Its effort to thwart the Russian security presence in Djibouti was successful. To reduce Chinese security in the Horn of Africa, the US tried to dissuade Djibouti from forming security relations with Beijing. However, Djibouti has resisted the US diplomatic pressure and allowed the establishment of a Chinese military base in its territory in 2017. This competition between the US and China to control Djibouti has regional security implications.

In addition to Djibouti, the US has been extending its political pressure to Ethiopia. The US political pressure on Ethiopia is related to the increased relations between Beijing and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia is a pivotal state in the Horn of Africa and serves as a springboard for foreign powers to extend their spheres of influence in other parts of Africa. Indeed, in terms of population, geographical size, and potential for economic growth, Ethiopia is an intrinsically important state in the Horn of Africa (Michael and Verhoeven, 2022). For these reasons, China is increasing its relations with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's expanding cooperation with China and the geopolitical shift towards Beijing have become obstacles for US interests in the Horn of Africa (Michael and Verhoeven, 2022; Plaut, 2023b). To thwart the Chinese presence in Ethiopia, the US is extending its pressure on Ethiopia. Such external pressure is explained in the following ways. First, America has employed economic tools to achieve its geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. As Gabriel (2022) has noted, the US has employed

economic sanctions in order to achieve its geopolitical interests in Ethiopia and, by extension, in the Horn of Africa. As noted in chapter four, America terminated Ethiopia's access to the AGOA preferential trade opportunity. The US policy of terminating Ethiopia's AGOA preferential trade agreements has negative security implications. US economic sanctions do not solve domestic conflicts in Ethiopia and sanctions have even exacerbated the problem. As Robel (2022:8) noted, 'the AGOA suspension has cut hopes, not conflicts in Ethiopia. It is innocent women who have become victims of the AGOA termination.' International experiences indicate that sanctions did not bring peace. It is innocent people who are suffering from sanctions. In this case, Kegley and Raymond (2014:226) write that 'sanctions are seldom effective in bringing about changes in the policies of target states. Besides, sanctions are rarely successful in preventing war.' Other scholars also made a similar argument about sanctions. For instance, Staibano (2005) writes that western unilateral sanctions have become less successful in meeting their targets. For example, the sanctions against Iraq in 1991 affected civilians. The same is true in the case of US sanctions against Ethiopia. The effect of the US sanctions has exacerbated the internal conflicts in Ethiopia. The US punitive action against Ethiopia over alleged human rights violations during the Tigray War had negative implications for Ethiopia's domestic political system (Handy, 2022; Walle, 2023). It is innocent women who have become vulnerable to the US sanctions on Ethiopia. The US economic sanctions did not solve the human rights situation in Ethiopia. It even exacerbated the lives of innocent women working in industrial parks. Over 3,500 workers have lost their job opportunities (Lakachew, 2022; Gabriel, 2022).

Beyond economic sanctions, the US has employed political pressure and coercive diplomacy to persuade the states in the Horn of Africa to reduce their relations with rising great powers (Gavin, 2021). The motivation of American policymakers to extend political pressure on the governments in the Horn of Africa is aimed at changing the loyalty of governments in the Horn of Africa. Gavin (2021) stated that the US has been extending its political pressure on some of the governments in the Horn of Africa that are working with other great powers. As Addisalem Mulat (2022) writes, western powers have been trying to meet their interests under the guise of human rights values in different parts of the world. Ethiopia is not an exception. In 2022, the USA introduced H.R. 6600 and S. 3199 bills. The content of these bills is aimed at halting financial support for Ethiopia from both the US and other international financial institutions. The US move to come up with these kinds of bills has become a concern for Ethiopian political leaders. While presenting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'

nine-month report to lawmakers, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Demeke Mekonnen, remarked, 'western powers have used human rights as a means of extending their influence in Ethiopia. They introduced HR 6600 bills. We are making our efforts to reverse the ratifications of this bill' (May 17, 2022). These bills were presented under the pretext of human rights violations in Ethiopia. Lakachew (2022) stated that the US has extended its economic pressure on Ethiopia under the guise of humanitarian interventions. However, these bills have a number of problems. First, the bills did not work for the TPLF forces that equally mistreated people in Afar and Amhara regional states (Getachew Minas, 2022; Gabriel, 2022). Second, the US adopted these bills to weaken the government in Addis Ababa and install its loyal proxy forces in Ethiopia. Almariam, who is one of the popular contributor to the Ethiopian Herald noted, 'the purpose of H.R. 6600 is to weaken Ethiopia economically and trigger an uprising in Ethiopia to overthrow the current government and restore the TPLF to power' (2022, May 13).

Furthermore, the American military presence did not bring long-term regional peace to the Horn of Africa. These have resulted in continuous regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Several points stand out. Abdi (2021) stated that American foreign policy towards Ethiopia and, by extension, the Horn of Africa is designed to perpetuate violence. This is related to US intervention strategies. Sometimes, the US does not accepted international norms. Kassahun, the late professor at AAU, noted that 'the US is acting as activists. The US embassy in Addis Ababa is doing undiplomatic activities that contradict the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic relations between states. The embassy is pressuring US citizens to leave Ethiopia as soon as possible, provided that there is an imminent civil war' (December 16 , 2021). At other times, US foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa is unpredictable and lacks consistency. Quite a lot of scholars have produced their own works regarding the unpredictable US foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. For example, Abdi (2021) stated that instead of having a comprehensive and a consistent foreign policy strategy for the Horn of Africa, and America is working to respond to short-term security crises. Considering these unpredictable US foreign policies, scholars such as Rakov (2020), Guzansky (2020), and Kepe *et al* (2023) concluded that the US lacks a coherent and comprehensive long-term strategy and vision towards the Horn of Africa, and the US has faced difficulty synchronizing its interests in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Second, the engagement of the US to reduce regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa does not consider the existing reality. As Jemaluddin (December 7, 2023) noted, 'the US role in conflict mediation does not take on the peculiar features of the Horn of Africa. It does not take

into consideration the fluid character of clan dynamics in the Horn of Africa.' The role of the US in mediating the Addis Ababa government and the TPLF forces could be mentioned as a good example. The US facilitated the Pretoria Peace Agreement between the Addis Ababa government and the TPLF forces. Yet, the Pretoria Peace Agreement did not bring permanent peace to Ethiopia. The recent clash between the Amhara militia forces and the TPLF forces in the contested areas of the Raya and Tslemt regions indicates the continuation of domestic conflicts in Ethiopia.

Last but not least, the US has narrow security interests in the Horn of Africa. The US has been working with non-state local actors and states in the Horn of Africa based on its short-term interests in the region. This is seen in the area of the Ethiopian peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Under ATMIS, the Ethiopian defense forces have played a crucial role in supporting the Somali government's efforts to combat terrorism, including al-Shabaab. By fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia, Ethiopia has been playing a great role in maintaining regional peace in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, Somalia is working for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces by the end of 2024. Following the decision, the US tried to settle the dispute between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. On June 1, 2024, the US Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, spoke to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud about the role of Ethiopian forces under ATMIS. The two officials discussed shared security interests in the Horn of Africa, including the importance of Ethiopia army in Somalia (US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, 2024). The recent remake of the US ambassador is also another indication of US narrow national interests. On May 15, 2024, the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ervin J. Massinga, delivered a speech that reflected the US policy towards the states in the Horn of Africa. Massinga (May 15, 2024) noted, 'Similar to the 1937 fascist massacre in Addis Ababa, bandits, armed groups, and government forces killed innocent people in Ethiopia. These include extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and conflict related sexual violence.' Massinga further sent a message to the *fano* forces in the Amhara region. He reiterated (May 15, 2024) that 'it is believed that the *fano* forces have popular support, and many in Amhara are passionate that their cause is just.' The remarks of the US Ambassador to Ethiopia have many problems. The first is that the US accused of the *fano* forces committed genocide in the Tigray War, which occurred in the years between 2020 and 2022. The second is that the remarks of the US Ambassador to Ethiopia are pushing the idea that the *fano* forces have popular support, indicating that they have to continue their struggle. The third is that the remarks of the US Ambassador to Ethiopia did not indicate the crimes committed by the TPLF forces. Gabriel (2022) noted that the US

has been working with subservient governments in the Horn of Africa. This is to secure its narrow security interests in the Horn of Africa. Sometimes, it supports autocrats. At other times, the US imposes sanctions on governments in the Horn of Africa for their close relations with China and Russia. From these primary and secondary data sources, it is clear that US foreign policy oscillates based on the readiness of the governments and non-state actors in the Horn of Africa to serve American short-term interests in the region. Hence, the US military intervention in the states of the Horn of Africa has negative security implications.

Fourth, military base deals between projecting powers and host states in the Horn of Africa are done without considering the formal state structure. In other words, instead of a formal state structure, military base deals are done informally between foreign powers and a few political elites in power in the Horn of Africa. As Melvin (2019b) stated, military base agreements are executed between political elites in the Horn of Africa and foreign security agents. Melvin (2019b) further stated that military base agreements are concluded in non-transparent and informal ways, often involving political elites. Some of the Horn strategic experts, such as Handy Paul, Hussein Ali, and Samira Gaid have similar views on the nature of basing access in the Horn of Africa. On November 22, 2023, Handy noted that 'political leaders in the Horn of Africa decide their relations with foreign powers. The formal state structure is overlooked.' In the same way, on July 7, 2022, Hussein stated that 'relations between external security actors and Somalia are done outside the formal state structure.' On September 1, 2022, Samira noted, 'relations between foreign powers and Somalia are conducted outside the formal state structure. Regional actors and clan leaders are becoming influential agents in Somalia's external relations. They have been involved in international relations in recent years.' This indicates that the foreign policy of the states in the Horn of Africa falls into the hands of the private interests of politicians. Relations between foreign powers and the political leaders in the Horn of Africa have negative implications for regional states. This is supported by the Horn strategic experts. 'In the Horn of Africa, foreign policymaking remains in the hands of a few political elites. The personalized relations between the external security actors and political leaders in the Horn of Africa cast a dark cloud on the Horn of African politics,' said Handy on November 22, 2022.

To make matters even worse, foreign powers are working to create their own decentralized peripheries and very decentralized systems of political administration (Harasta, 2024). To create dependent peripheries, foreign powers have been working with weak state and non-state actors. This

is to take national power from capital cities to small regional leaders and dependents (Harasta, 2024). Working with non-state actors and weak states is the best strategy to exploit national resources in the Horn of Africa. Schmidt (2018) noted that foreign powers make deals with African governments and local strongmen that give them direct access to desired resources.

Beyond working with non-state actors, foreign powers have been working to create regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa (Duffield and Stockton, 2023). The continuity of violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa is a good opportunity for foreign actors to create and engage with weak and decentralized political administrators. Scholars such as Duffield and Stockton (2023) noted that transactional extractive economy links the states in the Horn of Africa and the Arab Gulf states. Foreign powers could intervene in the name of conflict mediation and even support their client states and non-state actors in the region. These strategies of foreign powers are important to import goods at a lower price. This is done when they work with non-state actors. For instance, the Horn's livestock exports, predominantly sheep, increased during violent conflicts in Somalia. These sheep are exported to the Arab Gulf states (Harasta, 2024).

From the above discussions, it seems that external security actors are working with governments that are not accountable. This is because political leaders in the Horn of Africa continuously prioritize their short-term financial and political interests when dealing with military base agreements with foreign powers. As the International Crisis Group (2019) reported, the advent of competing foreign powers in the Horn of Africa created a playground for local politicians seeking to advance their personal interests. Bilateral military base agreements between the states in the Horn of Africa and foreign powers have become a source of income for the governments in the region (Neathling, 2023; Mulaku and Sabala, 2024). Economic benefits from military base rents, port revenues, and returns from foreign direct investments have empowered the Horn regional leaders. As Lons (2021) noted, the governments and the political elites in the Horn of Africa accepted foreign financial support to better achieve their political objectives. They calculate their short-term interests and think about their re-elections and the extension of their term limits (Handy, August 14, 2022). This indicates that there is a coincidence of interests between the political leaders in the Horn of Africa and the basing powers. The common interests between the basing powers and the Horn political leaders have promoted patronage-based politics. As Abdeta (2020) noted, the military base deals between the Horn regional leaders and external security actors have created patron-client relations. Patron-client relations have

implications for the democratic transition in the states of the Horn of Africa. This goes with what Peterson (2008:195) dubbed 'foreign military presence in other regions constitutes as a pillar of support for non-democratic regimes in the host states.' This is clearly visible in the internal politics of Djibouti. Styan (2022:233) stated that 'political power has taken on patron-client relations in Djibouti. The internal politics of Djibouti are controlled by the president, and his power rests on patronage.' Besides, scholars such as Vertin (2020) and Donelli (2023) write that the highly personalized rule of President Ismail Omar Guelleh has used a patronage system to control political power in Djibouti. Moreover, scholars such as Lanfranchi (2021) and Ylönen (2022) noted that the Djiboutian political leaders have used foreign military base rents to consolidate their powers. More importantly, Donelli (2022:54) noted that 'Djiboutian domestic politics is highly personalized and based on the president's figure and the patronage and family network built around him.' After two terms of office (in 1999 and 2005), President Guelleh wanted to amend the constitution for his re-election for a third term in 2011. Despite the repeated political tensions, Guelleh was elected for a fourth term in 2016 (Styan, 2021). He was even re-elected for a fifth term in 2020. It is highly likely that he will be elected in the coming 2025 election. The financial resources from the port revenues, military base rents, and foreign direct investments have been used to recruit political loyalty. As Styan (2021:74) noted, 'the presidential patronage networks have sufficient funds to deliver the 100,000 votes needed to ensure Guelleh's re-election.' From this analysis, it is clear that foreign powers have become a stumbling block for democratic transition in Djibouti. Political leaders in Djibouti have taken advantage of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

In addition to Djibouti, patron-client relations between the leaders in the Horn of Africa and external security actors are reflected in Somalia. In order to secure political influence, lucrative investment opportunities, and military bases, the Middle Eastern regional powers have used dollar diplomacy (see chapter four). Samira, a Somali security expert, stated that 'the relations between Somali political leaders and the Arab Gulf states are transactional. The Arab Gulf states have financial resources, and the Somalia leaders provide military bases and political loyalty' (September 1, 2022). On the same day, Samira further stated, 'local actors are important in Mogadishu's foreign relations. Relations between the Arab Gulf states and the Somali local actors are transactional. Instead of fulfilling the interests of the Somali people, foreign military base deals are based on the interests of foreign powers and local actors.' Hussein, another Somali expert, shares Samira's argument. On July 7, 2022, Hussein stated that 'the relations between the foreign powers and the Somali political leaders are

based on personalized connections. It seems to be transactional relations.' Key informant interviews with strategic experts at the IGAD regional organization made a similar point. For example, Ylonen (2024) stated that the Arab Gulf states have employed their economic resources to gain political loyalty in Somalia. This is a transactional relation. In these relations, foreign powers have extended their influence and dominated the political developments in Somalia. The role of foreign powers is visible in the Somali electoral process. In general, foreign powers want their proxies to win the election. In this regard, on September 1, 2022, Samira came up with an essential point. She remarked, 'different foreign powers backed different candidates based on their interests. For example, Egypt supported the current president. The US deployed its military forces after the current president came to power.' Thus, it seems that Somalia's internal political developments and electoral process have implications for foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

As indicated above, relations between the governments in the Horn of Africa and foreign powers are informal and based on patron-client relations. The patron-client relations between foreign powers and the Horn regimes have promoted unequal relations between basing powers and host states. This has resulted in asymmetrical relations between foreign powers and the governments in the Horn of Africa. Wagene (November 28, 2023) noted that asymmetrical relations have implications for the sovereignty of the states in the Horn of Africa. In particular, the relations between the Horn regional states and the Arab Gulf states are characterized by unequal power relations. This has led to the domination of the Arab Gulf states in the political decision-making process in the Horn of Africa. As Alex de Waal (2019) stated, the Arab Gulf states have financial resources. On the other hand, the states in the Horn of Africa are cash-poor states. To secure financial resources, the governments in the Horn of Africa provide military bases and political loyalty. Therefore, the leaders in the Horn of Africa are executing the interests of their foreign patrons in the Middle East.

Last but not least, foreign powers have been engaged in infrastructure investments. These foreign direct investments and connections to international markets have implications for the economic transformations in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, a critical analysis of foreign direct investment in the Horn of Africa has indirect negative security implications. This is explained in three different dimensions. First, the new infrastructure in the Horn of Africa is built on debt. For example, two-thirds of Djibouti's debt (close to two billion dollars) is owed to China (Styan, 2020). However, the states in the Horn of Africa are not able to pay back their debts. The Horn regional states' failure to

pay back their loans is subject to selling their strategic resources. Macaes (2019:125) noted that 'when indebted states fail to pay back Chinese loans, Beijing takes logistical assets instead of loan repayment.' In other words, instead of loan repayment, China prefers to control military facilities and logistics hubs. China has a tradition of acquiring strategic assets for failures in debt repayment. For instance, in 2017, Sri Lanka handed over Hambantota port to the Chinese state-owned companies on a ninety-nine-year lease following the failure of Sri Lanka to pay back its loans. Pakistan handed over Gwadar port on a forty-year lease in an arrangement where the Chinese companies retained ninety percent of their revenue (Nantulya, 2019; Su *et al,* 2022). Similar to Hambantota and Gwadar ports, China is deliberately expanding its influence through debt in the states of the Horn of Africa. This is to bring the states in the Horn of Africa under its sphere of influence. For example, Djibouti owes China about two billion dollars that were spent on road, railway, and port construction. Nevertheless, Djibouti is not in a position to pay back its loans to China. In return, China is considering to control Djibouti ports. This is what America did after the Second World War. As Shivers (2021) noted, the US embarked on the Marshall Plan in 1948 to rebuild Western Europe. A number of scholars, such as Hook and Spanier (2016:53) noted that 'America poured close to thirteen billion dollars into the reconstruction of the European economy.' The US economic policy in Europe had two purposes. First, as indicated in chapter two, America wanted to deter the spread of communism in Western Europe. Second, the US wanted to widen its market share in Western Europe so that its factories would operate at high capacity. To achieve these objectives, the US extended its spheres of influence and established heavy military bases in Western Europe during the Cold War.

In much of the same vein with the Marshall Plan, China introduced the BRI in 2013. As already indicated, many of the BRI-funded investments are financed by Chinese loans. Nevertheless, the states in the Horn of Africa are not in a position to pay back their loans. Beijing prefers acquiring strategic assets such as ports and logistics hubs to debt repayments from its trading partners. By increasing national debt burdens on these countries, China is working hard to acquire strategic ports and military facilities in other regions, including the Horn of Africa. These dynamics will have political implications. China is working hard to expand its spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, in other parts of Africa. In doing these economic activities, China is working hard to introduce new political systems, regional norms, and values to the African continent (Su *et al,* 2018). In addition, as Ahadu (2019:41) remarked, 'the Chinese economic investments in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, in Africa are intended to reshape the global geopolitical balance of power.'

The states in the Horn of Africa that are included in the BRI-funded projects are sovereign. However, a close analysis of Chinese economic relations with the states in the Horn of Africa has negative implications. For example, China has been engaged in foreign direct investments in the Horn of Africa, and this will increase its geopolitical position in the region. Chinese economic investment is a soft power strategy with political implications. Scholars such as Fomenko (2022) and Macaes (2019) stated that China saddles African states with debt to leverage its geopolitical position. China has been providing financial loans to fragile states in the Horn of Africa. This is to gain a strategic advantage in the region. Economic power has put the states in the Horn of Africa under Chinese influence. The Horn states' dependence on Chinese economic activities has increased Beijing's political leverage (Su *et al,* 2018; Mulaku and Sabala, 2024), and heavy financial dependence has brought Chinese political influence to the states in the Horn of Africa. This is what Farghen (2021:165) opined, 'expansion of territorial sovereignty.' In addition, China's debt has put the states in the Horn of Africa under financial pressure. Their hard currency reserves are depleting. This reduced their ability to import goods and services and limited their power to compete on the global market, impeding their economic growth and hindering their capacity to overcome poverty (Walle, 2023). This has by itself security implications in many ways. In the first place, there are direct correlations between poverty and security. The prevalence of poverty in Djibouti will create domestic instability and, by extension, chaos and crises. Second, the prevalence of poverty and unequal resource distribution will create ethnic conflicts in Djibouti between the Afar and the Issa (Belete, 2023). These kinds of domestic conflicts are not limited to Djibouti. It will have regional implications.

Second, there is a lack of transparency surrounding BRI-funded projects in the Horn of Africa. The BRI-funded projects are deliberately intended to be informal, unstructured, and opaque (Macaes, 2018). There is no rule regulating BRI-funded projects, and China does not report project lending systems in a transparent manner. The Chinese companies that provide loans to the political leaders in the Horn of Africa do not fully disclose loan information such as the nature of the loan, its interest rates, and the modes of repayment (John *et al.*, 2018). To make matters worse, people in the Horn of Africa are excluded from the contract agreements. 'Local interests are not considered in project construction. There is a problem with the prioritization of interests. These Chinese projects are elite projects,' said Biruke Terrefe on March 26, 2024, an expert in the geopolitical implication of Chinese infrastructure investment in the Horn of Africa. This relates to Chinese relations with governments

in the Horn of Africa. As Getachew Tsegaye (2022:20) writes, 'the terms of Chinese loans are not disclosed to the public. It remains a secret between the signatory African heads of state and Chinese political leaders.' In other words, the reports of BRI projects are not properly disclosed to the people at the grass-roots level. There is a lack of transparency in tendering, procurement, project contracts, and feasibility studies (Ahadu, 2019; Gabin, 2021). The problem of lack of transparency is exacerbated by the nature of the governments in the Horn of Africa. The political leaders in the Horn of Africa are authoritarian and are not accountable to their citizens. In a Zoom meeting held on November 28, 2923, Fisseha-Tsion stated, 'political leaders in the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea, are authoritarian. The current president of Eritrea has ruled the country for the last thirty years. People have no power to ask about the cost and benefits of foreign direct investments. There has not been accountability in Eritrea.' This is what Chinese companies need when conducting business in the states of the Horn of Africa. China's investments in the Horn of Africa come with fewer political constraints. As Schmidt (2018) noted China backed corrupt African elites in exchange for unfettered access to resources. Chinese companies do not have limitations on investing in countries with undemocratic African leaders and poor human rights records (Kepe *et al*, 2023).

Apart from Djibouti, Chinese investments in Ethiopia have been criticized for their lack of financial transparency. The lack of transparency in the projects has been translated into project delays, and then the Chinese construction companies require additional payments. The Adey Ababa International Stadium in Addis Ababa is a case in point. The Chinese construction company asked for close to $230 million to complete the project. The Ethiopian Ministry of Sport and Culture wanted to provide close to $200 million. With no agreement reached, the Ethiopian government terminated the contract (Istvan, 2023). Besides, the Addis Ababa Light Railway has a number of problems. It did not solve the transportation system in Addis Ababa, and it is not working at its full capacity. Evidence from the Addis Ababa Transport Bureau indicates the problem with the light railways. Worku Desta (2023:4), Deputy Head of Addis Ababa Transport Bureau, told the *Addis Zemen Amharic* weekly newspaper that 'from forty light trains, only half of them are working. There are no spare parts. There are no well-trained human resources. Train technology is not well developed in Ethiopia. The damaged trains are sent to China for repair. These problems reduced the capacity from 200, 000 to 70, 000 passengers per day.' These two cases of Chinese infrastructure investments in the Horn of Africa demonstrate that Chinese companies lacked feasibility studies and did not solve the infrastructure gap in the region. The Chinese security experts do not deny the problem of some

Chinese companies in the Horn of Africa. Yanting, Deputy Director of the China-Africa Security Institute, noted that 'some private Chinese companies commit misconduct in Africa. They affect the environment. In particular, some of the beginner companies delay projects in Africa' (June 15, 2023). Added to the problem of lack of transparency is exacerbated by the nature of the Horn regional governments. In this regard, Getahun (2022) and Bartlett (2022) noted that the Horn leaders are authoritarian. They are not accountable to their citizens. They have used foreign financial resources to further strengthen their power. The best example is the Djiboutian political leaders, and the Djiboutian president has used foreign financial resources from investments, base rents, and port revenues to but political support from the electorate.

The third and final point, there is a growing imbalance in trade relations between China and the states in the Horn of Africa. This indicates that the trade relations between the states in the Horn of Africa and China are in favour of the latter. In recent years, China has been exporting more products to African markets than Africans have been exporting to Chinese markets. This has created a trade imbalance between China and Africa. International trade experts share these unbalanced trade relations between China and the states in the Horn of Africa. On October 27, 2022, Tadele remarked, 'there is a large trade imbalance between China and the states in the Horn of Africa. Even some of the domestic products, such as plastic industries, textile products, and spare parts in the states of the Horn of Africa are replaced by Chinese products.' Chinese sources do not deny the trade imbalance between China and Africa. For example, one of the contributors to the Chinese Daily Newspaper, Gert Grobler agrees with the trade imbalance between China and Africa. Grobler (2023) stated that in 2022, total trade between Africa and China reached $282 billion. Totally, China's exports to Africa reached $165 billion in 2022. Chinese imports from Africa rose to $116 billion in 2022. These trade imbalances and unequal economic relations will have political and security implications. Kepe *et al* (2023) indicated that by creating a trade imbalance with the states in the Horn of Africa, China is creating a strategic dependency relationship between Beijing and many of the African states. By creating new dependencies, the states in the Horn of Africa will begin to execute Chinese political interests. In January 2023, Istvan noted that 'unequal economic relations between the states in the Horn of Africa and China are creating new dependencies. Economic dependency is translated into political dependency.' From the views of Grobler, Tadele, and Istvan, China's relations with the states in the Horn of Africa have become hierarchical and asymmetrical. Sooner or later,

asymmetrical and hierarchical relations between China and the states in the Horn of Africa will be translated into unequal political and security relations.

6.3 **The Implications of Foreign Military Presence for the Horn States' Regional Relations**

The new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has been affecting the amity and enmity relations of the states in the Horn of Africa. For example, foreign powers resolved the twenty-year border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Since the early 2000s, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been in a 'no war, no peace' situation. The hostile relations between the two states in the Horn of Africa were due to the failure of Ethiopia to accept the Algiers Peace Agreement, which awarded Badme and its environs to Eritrea. These uneasy relations had implications for the Horn of Africa. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were involved in Somalia's internal politics in the 2000s. In mid-2006, backed by the US, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to defeat the ICU**.** Eritrea, for its part, continued to support the ICU (Markakis, 2011; Murphy, 2011). In 2009, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea for its proxy activities in Somalia. To break this diplomatic isolation, Eritrea tried to find an alternative ally and Iran became its best choice. Since 2008, Asmara and Tehran have increased their security relations. Tehran provided security assistance to Asmara. As a *quid pro quo*, Iran built its military infrastructure at Assab Port. The close relations between Eritrea and Iran had implications for the interests of Saudi Arabia and America in the Red Sea region. The two states worked hard to reduce the Iranian presence in the Horn of Africa. To thwart the Iranian presence in the Red Sea region, Saudi Arabia tried to find an ally in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia tried to find alternative means of penetrating the region. One strategy of intervention in the Horn of Africa was conflict mediation between the states in the Horn of Africa. Thus, Saudi Arabia engaged in settling the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The domestic political development in Ethiopia further facilitated the role of Saudi Arabia in conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa. In 2018, Abiy Ahmed assumed political power and initiated a peace deal between Addis Ababa and Asmara. This has become the turning point in relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Ylonen, 2022). However, the peace deal became successful with the support of foreign security actors. These external security actors have been engaged in conflict resolution processes and regional conflict mediation efforts. For instance, foreign powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have played a critical role in reducing the twenty-year 'no war, no peace' relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 2018, the two Arab Gulf states mediated to resolve the border

disputes between the two states in the Horn of Africa. These two GCC member states provided financial incentives to both Eritrea and Ethiopia so that they could resolve their differences. Accordingly, as noted in chapter one, the UAE offered three billion dollars to Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia, on its part, provided diplomatic support to lift sanctions imposed on Eritrea.

The improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have regional security implications. Ethiopia, under the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, played a critical role in the increased relations between Eritrea and Somalia. Carbone (2020:28) stated that 'the increased relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia have enabled Somalia to improve its relations with other Horn regional states in recent times.' In 2018, the three states established an alliance that facilitated political, economic, and security cooperation. The improved relations among these three states resulted in the formation of 'Horn of Africa Cooperation.' After the formation of the Horn of Africa Cooperation, there were reciprocal visits. Isaias Afewerki visited Somalia in 2019, and Formajo reciprocated in 2019. Besides, Eritrea trained Somalia's troops on its soil (Abebe, 2021). From 2019 to 2022, Eritrea trained close to 5,000 Somali soldiers to facilitate the formation of the Somali National Army. At his inauguration ceremony, Hassen Shake Mohamed stated that he would bring the 5,000 soldiers to their country[110] (Sheikh Nor, December 21, 2022).

Conversely, the improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have implications for the relations between Djibouti and Eritrea. Djibouti was not happy with the improved Ethiopia-Eritrea relations. Because, Ethiopia's close relations with Eritrea were done with little or no consultation with Djibouti. Djibouti considers Eritrea to be a major security threat (The Rift Valley Institute, 2022). This is explained in two dimensions. First, following the improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the UN Security Council lifted the international sanctions imposed on Eritrea. Djibouti opposed the lifting of UN sanctions against Eritrea (Styan, 2020). The fear of Djibouti is connected with its border disputes with Eritrea at Doumeira Mountain. According to Djiboutian policymakers, the lifting of sanctions would complicate its border dispute with Eritrea (Styan, 2020). Second, Djibouti dissatisfied with the peace deal in relation to the use of ports. The Djiboutian policymakers showed their dissatisfaction in connection with the readiness of Ethiopia to use Assab port for its international trade (Styan, 2020). On June 1, 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized its monthly seminar.

[110] Supporting the Ethiopian government, there were claims that the Somali military forces trained in Eritrea participated in the Tigray War. These military forces had been accused of committing human rights violations.

In the meeting, Fisseha Shawl noted that 'Djibouti has a keen interest in the Ethiopian port service. It needs to exploit hundred percent of Ethiopia's import and export trade. It does not want to see its share reduced' (June 1, 2022). Thus, based on primary and secondary data, it would seem the peace deal would reduce Djibouti's economic dominance of the Horn's maritime trade. As a result, Djibouti worried about the potential reduction of port revenue from Ethiopian international trade.

In addition, the current foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has direct implications for relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Following the advent of foreign military forces in Djibouti, Ethiopia's import and export trade faced significant obstacles. This has forced the Ethiopian government to find alternative port services. As discussed in chapter seven, one of the available ports for Ethiopian international trade is Berbera, Somaliland. Ethiopia, a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa, has shown its keen interest in using Berbera Port as an alternative access to the sea. In addition, Ethiopia acquired a nineteen percent stake in the Berbera Port developments in 2018.[111]The role of external security actors in port investment and the keen interest of Ethiopia in using the Berbera port have created friction in relations between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia. The interest of Ethiopia in diversifying its access to the sea has its own regional security implications. For instance, Somalia fiercely opposed the tripartite port deal among Ethiopia, Somaliland, and DP World. Considering Somaliland as its own territory, the central government of Somalia in Mogadishu opposed this port deal (Cannon, 2017). The Somali federal government, in addition, sent a clear message to Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa that the port deal must pass through Mogadishu. To make matters even worse, on January 1, 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland to acquire access to the Red Sea ports. The text of the memorandum of understanding further indicated that Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland as an independent state in the Horn of Africa. In return, Ethiopia will acquire twenty kilometers of sea access around Berbera to facilitate its international trade and the establishment of a military base in the Gulf of Aden region (Donelli, February 10, 2024). These dynamics have exacerbated relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia, for example, rejected the port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, recalled its ambassadors from Ethiopia, and searched for an ally state to block the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. In recent times, Somalia has expressed its

[111] Recent reports indicate that Ethiopia lost 19% of the Berbera port development for unknown reasons.

grievances about the presence of Ethiopian troops in the country and showed its interests for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian peacekeeping forces from the country. There is a fear that following the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, local forces would unable to fill the security vacuum. These dynamics will destabilize Somalia (Paravicini, 2024) and mess up the regional security complex. In a nutshell, the port deal, coupled with the securitization of the ports in the Horn of Africa, complicated relations among the states in the Horn of Africa.

To make matters even more challenging, the port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland was agreed upon amid extremely complex regional and international dynamics. Because of these complex dynamics, the port deal between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa was rejected by both regional and international powers. For example, Djibouti opposed the port deal, claiming that it would erode Somalia's sovereignty and integrity. However, the reality is related to the fear of a reduction of port revenue. Ethiopia's use of the Berbera port will deprive Djibouti of the advantage of being the main sea outlet for Addis Ababa's import and export trades (Belete, 2023; Mohamed, 2024). In addition to Djibouti, close relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland cast a dark cloud on the relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. The Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has led to mounting tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, leading to new coalitions involving regional and extra-regional players (Donelli, February 10, 2024). For example, the increasing relations between Egypt and Somalia in recent years indicate the new alliance dynamics in the Horn of Africa, and these dynamics have implications for Ethiopia's relations with foreign powers. A good example is China's policy towards the Memorandum of Understanding. China is not interested in the port deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This is connected with the heavy Chinese port investments in the Djibouti ports. For example, China built the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway. This is one of the major transportation trade routes that has been playing a role for Chinese economic interests in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's readiness to use Berbera port will reduce the role of the railway and the trade volume between China and Ethiopia. Beyond the reduction of trade volume, Somaliland has good relations with western powers such as the US and Britain. Even Somaliland has good relations with Taiwan (Ylonen, 2023). China has opposed these kinds of alliance dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, Ethiopia's recent quest for access to the sea will have implications for Ethiopia's relations with Djibouti and other external powers.

6.4 **Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa: Regional Dynamics Implications**

The military presence of external forces in other regions makes regional processes more fragmented, disbalanced, and disordered. In other cases, a foreign military presence may strengthen the regional security management system. Foreign powers may complicate the natural evolution of regional security order, speed up or slow down regional security dynamics. Foreign powers can impact the development of regional order back towards the previous stages, or these powers may lead the region towards the higher institutionalization of regional security order. External forces may change the regional power structure, which would have implications for relations between regional states (Ieva, 2010:205).

From the above quotation, it would seem that foreign military presence in other regions has both negative and positive regional implications. On the one hand, foreign powers strengthen the regional security management system and speed up the development of the region towards a higher security community. In other cases, the military presence of foreign powers in other regions makes the regions fragmented, disbalanced, and disordered. The new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is explained in these contexts. The military presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has affected the regional balance of power, the regional security dilemma, regional cooperation, the emergence of regional power, and the regional security complex. To start with, foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has implications for the regional balance of power. Miller (2007) stated that the presence of foreign powers in other regions has implications for the regional balance of power. Foreign powers could provide economic and military support to their client states in the region. These developments have implications for the regional balance of power. In a similar manner, Lemke (2002) stated that foreign military presence in other regions has implications for the local distribution of power. Foreign powers engage to change local hierarchies in favour of their client states. For example, the US military presence in Iraq in the early 2000s had regional security implications. It reduced the role of Bagdad and increased the role of Riyadh and Tehran in Middle East politics (Hinnebusch, 2007).

In the same way, the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has changed the regional balance of power. By providing incentives, among others financial and diplomatic support to their client states in the Horn of Africa, external security actors changed the regional balance of power. In other words, the presence of foreign militaries has empowered one state vis-à-vis the other state in

the Horn of Africa. Littoral states in the Horn of Africa have invited foreign powers to establish military bases, facilities, and logistics hubs. These foreign powers, in turn, have provided economic assistance and, more importantly, military hardware to the Red Sea littoral states (Verhoeven, 2018). The local states in the Horn of Africa have used foreign security assistance to strengthen their positions in the region. For instance, to change the regional balance of power in its favor, Eritrea invited foreign powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to the Red Sea region. The advent of external security actors has enhanced the position of Eritrea vis-à-vis its neighbors, particularly Ethiopia (de Waal, 2017). To get more benefit, Eritrea improved its relations with these powers. There was a coincidence of interests between Eritrea and some of the foreign powers. In 2015, the Houthi rebels removed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the Saudi-backed president of Yemen from power (Plaut, 2023b). Then, the Houthis continued to rule the country. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and its allies have become concerned by the presence of Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the Red Sea region. The Saudis, to better fight against the Houthis, needed military bases in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea provided military bases for Saudi Arabia and these dynamics have changed the regional balance of power in favor of Eritrea. In this regard, Verhoeven stated the following:

The nature of the regional balance in the Horn of Africa before 2015 was not clearly visible. External powers have no intention to change the Horn regional balance. However, the war in Yemen started in 2015 attracted the attention of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia tried to get military bases on the western side of the Red Sea. The advent of Gulf powers in the Red Sea region has become a game changer. The Saudis and emirates money and military investments in Assab Port strengthened the Eritrean position vis-à-vis Ethiopia. It changed the regional balance of power in favor of Eritrea (2018:34).

Considering the changes in the regional balance of power in the Horn of Africa in 2018, Ethiopia accepted the Algiers Peace Agreement[112] that awarded Badme and its environs to Eritrea.[113] This has

[112] To resolve the border disputes, the Algiers Peace Agreement established the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission. The commission gave Badme to Eritrea. Ethiopia did not accept the decision. So, relations between the two states from 2002 to 2018 passed through many difficulties. Both states maintained large armies along the border (Plaut, 2016). In 2018, Ethiopia accepted the boundary decision. But, future relations between the two states are unpredictable.

[113] In the years between 2000 and 2018 (close to twenty years), Ethiopia and Eritrea were in 'no war, no peace' hostile relations. The two states fought war by other means. Plaut (2016) stated that Somalia became a battle ground on which

facilitated the 2018 Jeddah Peace Agreement. Following the Jeddah Peace Agreement, Ethiopia has normalized its relations with Eritrea. The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has become a good opportunity for Ethiopian national interests. In this regard, three points stand out. First, the improved relations between the two neighboring states reduced the influence of external security actors backing Eritrea. Second, the improved relations between the two states would give Ethiopia additional port alternatives (Allo, 2018). In recent times, Ethiopia has considered using the Assab and Massawa ports as an alternative to Djibouti ports. Third, the improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea would facilitate regional cooperation among the states in the Horn of Africa.

However, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have become precarious in recent years. The intense security interactions between the two neighbouring states have become difficult, even dangerous for the security of the Horn of Africa. National, regional, and international developments have reduced relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As noted in the previous discussions, supporting the Ethiopian government, Eritrea played a critical role in defeating the TPLF forces in the Tigray War. Even the Isaias government in Asmara worked hard for the total defeat of the TPLF forces. But, the Pretoria Peace Agreement between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF did not include the Eritrean government. Since the signing of the agreement, relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have been deteriorated. Second, the Eritrean government was not happy with the involvement of foreign powers such as the US in the peace deal between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF forces. Supported by the US, the TPLF forces escaped from total defeat and even controlled the administration of the Tigray region (Yared and Atrsaw, 2024). These dynamics have reduced the relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara. There are signs of supporting local proxy forces on both sides. For example, there have been rumors that some of the Amhara *fano* militia are being backed by Eritrea, either through funding, the provision of weapons, or training (Yared and Atrsaw, 2024). These dynamics created a sense of mistrust between the Eritrean and Ethiopian political leaders. To make matters worse, Ethiopia's recent quest for access to the sea has created a difficult situation for the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea has increased its relations with Egypt and other Red Sea littoral states. These dynamics have become a security threat for Ethiopia.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought proxy wars. Eritrea supported radical Muslim movements in Somalia. Ethiopia, for its part, supported the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.

Moreover, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has resulted in a regional security dilemma. The concept of security dilemmas refers to security relations whereby measures that a state adopts to increase its own security are seen as a threat by others. Scholars such as Bitar (2016:44) stated that 'the establishment of foreign military bases in other regions is considered to be a military preparation.' This military preparation poses security threats to other neighboring states. For his part, Nye (2007) supplements Bitar's point by stating that the hosts' neighbors usually consider the establishment of military bases as an integral part of preparing for the imminent war. In the same way, the establishment of foreign military bases in the Red Sea littoral states has become a concern for some of the states in the Horn of Africa. These foreign security activities in the Red Sea region have resulted in perceived security threats to some of the states in the Horn of Africa. In particular, the military presence of competing great powers such as the US and China in close proximity has regional security implications. Any uncalculated move by either great power could trigger a military confrontation between the US and China (Walle, 2023). These external security dynamics in the Red Sea littoral states sent security threats to the states in the Horn of Africa and, by extension, neighboring states got themselves in a security dilemma. Ethiopia, for example, has found itself in a security dilemma following the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. According to Verhoeven (2018), the Red Sea littoral states allowed external security actors to establish military bases and make security alliances with foreign military forces. These security developments have put Ethiopia in a security dilemma. Some of the Ethiopian government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have become concerned by the presence of external security actors in the Red Sea region. On June 1, 2022, Fisseha Shawl stated that 'our neighboring states in the Red Sea region have become the focus of foreign powers. The Red Sea littoral states leased their territories to foreign powers. This has become a clear security concern for Ethiopia.' Because, Addis Ababa is not sure about the intentions of foreign powers and the establishment of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa. In particular, Ethiopia is very concerned by the military presence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Red Sea region (Ibrahim, August 5, 2022). These two Middle Eastern regional powers are working together in the Red Sea region to secure their respective interests. For example, Egypt has been working to weaken Ethiopia. This is to secure its monopoly on the use of the Nile River (Ibrahim, August 5, 2022; Amare, September 23, 2023). To achieve its security policy in the Horn of Africa, Egypt has been busy in searching for its military presence in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Egypt is forming security alliances with some of the states in the Horn of Africa. In 2018, for example, Egypt

and Saudi Arabia established the Red Sea Forum. Excluding Ethiopia, the Red Sea littoral states such as Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia became members of the new Red Sea Forum. Thus, the military preparation (foreign powers' military engagements in the Horn of Africa) and close security cooperation with the Horn littoral states (the formation of security alliances with the Red Sea littoral states) have put Ethiopia in a security dilemma.

Second, as discussed in chapter five, the relations between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa have become competitive security interactions. These competitive relations among external security actors resulted in constant shifting alliance relations between foreign powers and Red Sea littoral states. Tekeda (2019) further stated that relations between foreign powers are less managed and regulated. There are no institutional mechanisms to regulate the relations of external powers in the Horn of Africa. These shifting alliance relations deepened the regional security dilemma. Apart from Tekeda, Leuleseged (2022:13) noted that 'there are no institutional instruments to prevent the regional security implications of the rivalry between external security actors in the Horn of Africa.' Officials at the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs have some words on the constantly shifting alliance relations between the foreign powers and the Red Sea littoral states. For example, Getachew indicated that 'instead of a security dilemma, it is better to describe the situation as an alliance dilemma. Ethiopia has been concerned by unpredictable shifting alliance relations between the Red Sea littoral states and foreign powers' (January 15, 2021). Ethiopia is not sure about the dynamics of relations between the Red Sea littoral states and foreign powers. Getachew (January 15, 2021) further stated that 'we are not sure which side to support and which side to oppose because relations are unpredictable.' The Ethiopian senior diplomats also made a similar argument. Tekeda (2019) stated that the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa put a dark cloud on the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, for obvious reasons, is the most affected state in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, constantly shifting alliance relations and the lack of institutional mechanisms to regulate the interactions of external security actors in the Horn of Africa have put some of the regional states in a difficult position. Ethiopia, a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa, has become very vulnerable to these unpredictable alliance relations.

In addition, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the growth of foreign security interests in the region. The rise of foreign security interests is related to their commercial interests in the Horn of Africa. These commercial interests include the protection of

ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication. To protect the sources of extraction, trade routes, and investment destinations, foreign powers deployed their military forces in the Horn of Africa. 'Foreign powers are extending their military forces to control the ports in the Horn of Africa, staging areas, and logistical hubs,' stated Abenezar in 2022. The use of military forces to secure commercial interests in the Horn of Africa has resulted in competition for ports, logistics hubs, and sea lines of communication. This has resulted in the securitization of the ports in the Horn of Africa, logistics hubs, and the sea lines of communication (Melvin, 2019b). Great powers have considered the lack of a military base in the Horn of Africa an existential security threat. As a result, a number of regional and international security actors established military bases with heavy military armaments in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, the US, and China deployed their military forces with advanced military armaments. Thus, the Horn of Africa has witnessed a heavy military presence. As noted in chapter five, foreign powers have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. The military deployment of competing foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the militarization of the region. As the Amani Study Center (2019) contends, the trend in the militarization of the Horn of Africa has regional security implications. On June 1, 2022, Fisseha stated that 'the advent of foreign military forces to secure commercial interests in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the militarization of the region. Foreign powers deployed their military forces to meet their competing commercial interests in the Horn of Africa.' The securitization and militarization of the Horn of Africa have implications for the regional security complex. This is explained in three different dimensions.

First, the influx of external security actors in the Horn of Africa has disrupted the regional security complex. As has been discussed in chapter four, the states in the Horn of Africa have cases against each other. The existing relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea are based on the interests of the leaders of the two countries, and lack institutional frameworks. To make matters even worse, Ethiopia's quest for access to the Red Sea ports seems to have reduced relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa in recent times. Ethiopia has strong economic relations with Somaliland. This has implications for relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. Eritrea and Djibouti have uneasy relations over the Doumeira Mountain. The advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has had implications for these regional security relations. Second, the use of overseas bases to carry out military operations in the Middle East has further exacerbated the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa. For example, some of the states in the Horn of Africa, such as Eritrea allowed their

portion of territories to be used for military operations in the Yemen civil war. It has become clear that by participating in the regional conflicts of the Middle East, the states in the Horn of Africa are cultivating their future enemies. The involvement of Eritrea in other regions' wars has made Asmara an enemy of Iran and the Houthis (Tana Forum, 2019). This will further exacerbate the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa. Third, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has resulted in the creation of new states in the region. Compared to other regions, the Horn of Africa has experienced the rebirth of new states in recent times. This is a continuation of the past foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The advent of foreign powers in the late nineteenth century created incoherent and weak states in the Horn of Africa. The result of the presence of incoherent and weak states in the Horn of Africa was reflected in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1993, with the support of external security actors, Eritrea became a separate state in the Horn of Africa. In 2011, with the support of regional and extra-regional powers, South Sudan became an independent state in the Greater Horn of Africa. These dynamics have implications for the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa. In recent years, foreign powers have been working to increase the number of states in the Horn of Africa, and this will have implications for the regional security complex. Senior Ethiopian diplomats have concerns about the rebirth of new states in the Horn of Africa. For example, Demeke Mekonnen (2022) noted that by increasing the number of states in the Horn of Africa, the military presence of foreign powers complicated the regional security complex. Another Ethiopian senior diplomat shares Demeke's argument. On November 22, 2022, Fisseha Shawl remarked that 'the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has increased the number of states in the region.' Foreign powers are working to increase the number of states in the Horn of Africa by working with unrecognized entities in the region. On March 26, 2024, Biruke Terrefe remarked, 'foreign powers work with non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. They are making treaties and contracts with non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. The making of contracts and treaties are the first stage of international recognition.' On their behalf, these internationally unrecognized entities have taken advantage of the presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa (Lanfranchi, 2021; Ylonen, 2022). For example, the breakaway region of Somaliland welcomed foreign powers such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the US to establish military bases. In addition, foreign powers are working with the TPLF forces in Ethiopia. As noted in chapter four, political leaders in the Tigray region are working to achieve more regional autonomy in the Horn of Africa. To this end, external security actors have been supporting their agendas. The security presence of these foreign powers in Somaliland and

external military support for the Tigray forces have implications for the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa. As a result, by increasing the number of states in the Horn of Africa, foreign military forces complicated the regional security complex. On top of this, Ethiopia's recent quest for access to Somaliland's coastlines and the response of Somalia and its allies, such as Egypt and the Arab Gulf member states, have exacerbated the regional security complex of the Horn of Africa (Mosley, February 19, 2024).

Furthermore, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has been affecting the emergence of local regional power. As indicated in chapter four, the Horn of Africa has no regional power. Ethiopia has been trying to become a regional power in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, its efforts to lead the Horn of Africa have not been successful. One of the explanations for Ethiopia's weak leadership in the Horn of Africa is the presence of foreign military forces in the region. Scholars such as Lakachew (2022) and Mangistu (2020) noted that the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa reduced Ethiopia's regional role. There are a number of explanations. First, the Red Sea littoral states do not recognize Ethiopia's leadership role in the Horn of Africa. Instead, the Red Sea littoral states prefer security alliances with foreign powers, and they conduct their relations with these powers to achieve their economic and security interests (see chapter four). For example, Eritrea and Djibouti capitalized on their strategic locations in the Horn of Africa. As a result, they allowed external security actors to establish military bases in the Red Sea region. Second, Ethiopia is a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa and Addis Ababa relies on the Red Sea littoral states for its international trade. External security actors have been engaged in strategic rivalries to control the ports in the Horn of Africa. In particular, the Chinese commercial presence in Djibouti has been felt in recent years. Many of Djibouti's infrastructure investments have been financed by Chinese loans. As already indicated under section 6.2 of the same chapter, Djibouti owes about two billion dollars in loans that were spent on road, railway, and port construction. The substantial Chinese foreign funds have given Beijing considerable influence over the politics of Djibouti. These dynamics have complicated Ethiopia's access to international water bodies. Cannon (2017) stated that landlocked states, such as Ethiopia, are vulnerable to political developments in their transit states. To make matters worse, the establishment of military bases in the Red Sea littoral states and economic investments in these states have shifted the balance of power towards foreign powers. These dynamics have implications for Ethiopia's leadership role in the region. As Mangistu (2020) noted, the presence of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has reduced the role of Ethiopia in the region.

Therefore, the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has undermined the emergence of regional powers in the region. Ethiopia's unsuccessful effort to lead the Horn of Africa is explained in these contexts.

Apart from preventing the rise of a regional power in the Horn of Africa, foreign military presence has presented major challenges for the existing regional security structure (Melvin, 2019b; Wagene, 2023). Stated differently, the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa has undermined the roles of regional institutions. This is because, the building-up of military bases in the Horn of Africa has taken place without consultation on the strategic implications for regional security. Key informant interviews with some of the IGAD officials indicate the implications of foreign powers for the existing regional organizations. For example, Abebe (2021) stated that we are not consulted on the relations between external security actors and the Horn regional states. For instance, IGAD was not consulted on the strategic implications of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This indicates that a military base agreement is made between basing states and host states in the Horn of Africa. Foreign military base deals between the states in the Horn of Africa and a foreign power are done on a bilateral basis. This has undermined the role of regional and continental organizations, including IGAD and the AU. This is because, many of the base deals have bypassed the regional security architecture (Melvin, 2018b).

Instead of working with regional institutions, projecting powers have preferred to work with the states in the Horn of Africa on a bilateral basis. In this regard, Naidoo (2020) stated that external security actors such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the US prefer to work with each state in the Horn of Africa. A key informant interview with the Horn scholars indicates such bilateral relations between the states in the Horn of Africa and the foreign powers. For example, on March 26, 2024, Kizito Sabala noted that 'foreign powers engage with the states in the Horn of Africa bilaterally. Multilateral relations are overlooked.' To make matters worse, basing powers do not prefer to conduct relations with the formal state structure. Instead, they conduct their relations with local forces, non-state actors, and a few political elites (Lanfranchi, 2021). The 2018 peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a case in point. Saudi Arabia, for example, mediated the twenty-year 'no war, no peace' stalemate without the involvement of regional and continental organizations, including IGAD and the AU. In this regard, the International Crisis Group (2019) stated that the Arab Gulf states reduced the regional tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, the peace deal has shown the incapacity of the

African regional and continental organizations to solve regional conflicts. These foreign powers overlooked the importance of multilateral arrangements. Foreign powers are willing to work outside the security frameworks of regional and continental organizations in the Horn of Africa (Neathling, 2023**).** Instead of promoting regional institutions, Saudi Arabia preferred to work with political elites in power (Mason, 2022). From these analyses, one can see that Saudi Arabia's foreign policymakers prefer personalized relations with political elites. The International Crisis Group (2019) concluded that Arab Gulf states prefer personalized relations to formal state structures. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Eritrea are cases in point.

In addition to Saudi Arabia, the security engagements of the US in the Horn of Africa have weakened the process of regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. Rather than supporting regional institutions, the US has preferred to work with each state in the Horn of Africa on a bilateral basis. In 2020, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia agreed to form a new regional block, the Horn of Africa Cooperation. Based on common economic and security interests, the regional block has been working to increase relations between these three states. However, America was not happy with these kinds of initiatives and the improved relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. Some of the US-based scholars are not secretive about American foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. On December 23, 2022, Freeman noted that 'America is working to have a client regime in Ethiopia. In the first years of Abiy's rule, the US has been working with Ethiopia. However, in recent years, the US has reduced its relations with Ethiopia. This is because, Ethiopia is working for regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa.*'* A key informant interview with officials at the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense indicated the role of the US in suppressing regional institutions. 'Ethiopia initiated the Horn of Africa Cooperation with three states, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. America was not happy with these kinds of regional arrangements,' says a senior Ethiopian military official on condition of anonymity (Key informant one, June 25, 2022). Other scholars, such as Baldar, Tingirtu, and Gabriel supported the views of the Ethiopian military officials. Tingirtu (2022) noted that foreign powers do not want to see autonomous regional institutions in the Horn of Africa. They want to extend their influence through financial support to the regional institutions. For example, the Horn of Africa Cooperation is the case in point. America has been working to undermine the role of this regional initiative. As Baldaro (2018:262) writes, America prefers to conduct bilateral relations over collective approaches at the regional level in the Horn of Africa. For his part, Gabriel (2022:22) noted that the US prefers to work with individual states rather than adopting a comprehensive regional

strategy in the Horn of Africa. The US foreign policy officials are not secretive about the bilateral relations between the US and African states. For example, on December 13, 2018, Bolton noted that 'we engage in bilateral security relations to protect US interests in the Horn of Africa.' From the analysis of secondary sources and key informant interviews with US officials, it has become clear that America conducts bilateral relations with the states in the Horn of Africa to secure its interests. By conducting bilateral relations, the US military presence in the Horn of Africa has been affecting the regional cooperation process and, by extension, the regional integration process.

Similar to the US and Saudi Arabia, China prefers to conduct bilateral relations with each state in the Horn of Africa. As Gunness *et al* (2022:88) wrote, Chinese overseas relations are centered on bilateral relations. The Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia is not secretive about Beijing's bilateral relations with the states in the Horn of Africa. In his press statement at the Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia, Zhiyuan (October 23, 2023) remarked, 'we are conducting bilateral relations with the states in the Horn of Africa.' Indeed, this is the strategy of many great powers. Chinese military relations with its client states in the Horn of Africa are a bilateral interaction. China prefers to work with political elites rather than working with formal state institutions (Key informant two, June 13, 2022). These efforts are reflected in its regular diplomatic visits to the Horn of Africa. Especially, relations between China and the states in the Horn of Africa are based on the relations between the CCP and political parties in the Horn of Africa. China has made consistent efforts to develop elite-to-elite relations. Because, China supports political elites working with Beijing (Gunness *et al,* 2022; Kepe *et al* (2023). China provides military armaments to increase client regimes' capabilities, and the CCP has been working with African incumbent parties (Kepe *et al,* 2023). The close relations between the CCP and the Ethiopian Prosperity Party are the case in point. From these analyses, one can conclude that the advent of foreign powers in the region has reduced the performance of regional organizations. In conducting bilateral relations, foreign powers have undermined the role of regional institutions and efforts at regional cooperation.

The bilateral relations between foreign powers and the states in the Horn of Africa have implications for the emergence and growth of regional institutions. With regard to the effects of foreign powers on the emergence of new regional institutions, three points stand out. First, the extension of new security alliances, such as the Red Sea Forum in the Horn of Africa, has hindered efforts to establish new regional security governance (Melvin, 2019b). Instead of regional cooperation, the Red Sea

littoral states are working with foreign security alliances. One of the major explanations for the presence of weak regional institutions in the Horn of Africa is the membership of the Horn regional states in other regional organizations. For example, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea are members of the Red Sea Forum. This has reduced the close relations between the states in the Horn of Africa. Second, foreign powers brought their regional rivalries to the Horn of Africa. The extension of foreign rivalries in the Horn of Africa has become a stumbling block for the promotion of regional integration in the region. The advent of extra-regional rivalries, tensions, and conflicts undermined regional cooperation (Mosley, 2021). To make matters worse, external security actors compete for client states in the Horn of Africa (see chapter five). This has undermined regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. Scholars such as Miller (2007) stated that a highly penetrated region cannot achieve a viable regional integration process. Apart from Miller, Gunness *et al* (2022) write that intense competition between foreign powers polarizes relations among the regional states. Stated differently, regional states are forced to take sides. In a similar vein, the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has disrupted the process of regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. In a regional conference organized by the FES on November 22, 2022, Gaas noted that 'to better meet their interests, external security actors are working with each state in the Horn of Africa bilaterally. The relation is one external power to another state in the Horn of Africa.' This has undermined the growth of regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. All in all, foreign military presence has become an obstacle to the emergence and growth of a new regional security alliance in the Horn of Africa.

To summarize, the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a double-edged sword. In the first place, foreign powers have been engaged in infrastructure developments. These infrastructure developments have positive implications for regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. In addition, foreign military presence has played a critical role in reducing transnational security threats in the Red Sea region. Furthermore, the recent advent of external powers in the Horn of Africa has become an alternative patron for some of the states in the Horn of Africa. For example, the competitive great powers' relations in the Horn of Africa were important to prevent external interventions in Ethiopian internal affairs.

However, the recent advent of external security actors in the Horn of Africa has negative security implications for two reasons. First, foreign powers influenced the internal political systems of the

Horn regional states. For example, external powers supported their client regimes in the Horn of Africa. This has implications for state-society relations. Besides, competing foreign powers are working with different actors in the Horn of Africa. This is reflected in Somali internal politics. In Somalia, local actors are too powerful to conduct external relations. This has reduced the power of the central government, and by extension, the foreign military presence has hindered the state-building process in Somalia. The second is that the advent of competing foreign powers casts a dark cloud on the regional distribution of power. For example, the advent of some of the Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa empowered the position of Eritrea vis-à-vis Ethiopia. This leads to the second implication. The advent of external powers and their security relations with some of the Red Sea littoral states put Ethiopia in a regional security dilemma. Ethiopia is not sure about the unpredictable relations between foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. The problem of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is exacerbated by the lack of unified response strategies. The Horn regional states have different interests and response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region. This will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter Seven

Horn Regional States' Response Strategies to the New Foreign Military Presence

In response to these security implications, the states in the Horn of Africa have been adopting different response strategies. These response strategies are different based on their interests, vulnerabilities, and the threat of external security actors. Accordingly, some states in the Horn of Africa welcomed external security actors into their territories. These states capitalized on their strategic locations in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, other Horn regional states pretended to follow a neutral foreign policy strategy. However, other states in the Horn of Africa considered the new military presence an existential security threat.

Taking these response strategies into account, the present chapter looks at the new foreign policies that the Horn regional states are taking to safeguard their national security. To discuss these issues, the chapter is structured into three sections. Section one examines a conceptual analysis of the response strategies of regional states towards foreign powers. These analyses are aimed at grasping the concepts of bandwagoning, pragmatism, security alignment (alliance relations), and securitization of foreign military presence. Section two presents the recent foreign policy of the Horn regional states towards foreign powers. The final section provides a summary of the three sections.

7.1 **Analysis of Response Strategies: Alliance, Securitization, Bandwagoning and Pragmatism**

The response strategies of states to the advent of foreign powers in their respective regions are different based on their interests, vulnerabilities, and the threat of external security actors to the states. Scholars such as Oskanian (2013) stated that foreign military presence in other areas has varying influences on regional security dynamics. Accordingly, the response strategies of regional states are different based on their interests and vulnerabilities to the foreign military presence. For example, following the advent of foreign powers in the South Caucasus, regional states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia followed different response strategies towards external security actors. Armenia, among others, securitized the Turkish military presence in the region as an existential security threat. As a result, Armenia expected Russian military support in its war with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, for its part, made a security alliance with Türkiye. In contrast, Georgia securitized the Russian military presence in the South Caucasus region by looking for western security support

(Mayer, 2017). The response strategies of the states in the South Caucasus demonstrate that regional states have different response strategies to external security actors. The first response strategy of regional states to foreign security threats is a possible and promising alliance. As Nye (1990) opined, alliances are (in)formal security arrangements that sovereign states interact with each other to ensure their mutual security. Besides, Walt (1991) stated that weak powers prefer to form security alliances with other states to reduce security threats. In addition, Kegley and Raymond (2014) write that states form alliances with other states to offset the military threat of their enemies. This is because, political alliances are important to balance the presence of a dominant power so that it will no longer be a threat.

Alliances are divided into two categories. The first one is bandwagoning. In bandwagoning, the weak states make security alliances with powerful states. Stated differently, bandwagoning is the strategy of seeking national security by aligning with the strongest state (Kegley and Raymond, 2014). Three points stand out regarding bandwagoning. The first point, small states bandwagon to buy time and avoid invasion (Larson, 1991). The interwar period of alliance relations in Europe was a case in point. Fearing the German invasion, some of the weak states in Eastern Europe rushed to align with Hitler (Larson, 1991). Nevertheless, bandwagoning is a risky security policy. As Larson (1991) and Walt (2007) wrote, bandwagoning can also be an alignment with the sources of danger. The last point, the weak and small powers bandwagon with a great power when they do not have other alternatives (Walt, 1991; Walt, 2007). There are no other great powers in the international system that provide security protection. Instead of making alliances with small powers, states prefer to bandwagon with the existing great powers. For example, with the retreat of the Soviet Union from the Middle East in the late 1980s, most of the regional states bandwagoned with the US (Miller, 2007).

In any case, states use a balancing strategy to reduce external security threats. Unlike bandwagoning, as Walt (1991:53) and Walt (2007:98) noted, 'balancing is alignment with the weaker power to counter threatening power.' In other words, balancing is making a security alliance with other states against major security threats. In 2021, as indicated in chapter four, Australia formed a security alliance with the US and Britain to deter the growing Chinese presence in the Pacific Ocean. Based on the security alliance, the US and Britain agreed to support Australia in developing modern defense capabilities. Additionally, India has become concerned by the growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. To deter the Chinese presence, India has made a security alliance with the US and

Japan. Based on this arrangement, in 2017, the US, Japan, and India made an informal security alliance to address the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean (Su *et al,* 2021).

In addition, other regional states could pretend to follow pragmatic foreign policy strategies to ensure and secure their interests. Although this seems similar to bandwagoning, the difference is that states bandwagon because they have no other options. In pragmatic foreign policy, states have alternative options, and they change their foreign policy strategy based on the changing realities. A key informant interview with scholars indicated that pragmatism is adopting policies based on new developments in world politics. 'Pragmatism is understanding global dynamics. Based on this process of change, states adopt new policies and strategies,' said Istvan in January 2023. The global distribution of power is not static. Rather, it is ever-changing. Thus, states should go in line with these changing realities. Other scholars also support the changing nature of international dynamics. For example, in January 2023, Zoltan noted that 'to achieve their interests, states should understand the changing global realities. For example, after the end of the Cold War, Hungary maintained close relations with the US. In recent times, Hungary has been looking for other options.'

Furthermore, other regional states will play great powers off each other as much as they could. Based on their interests, regional states form a security alliance with one great power and reduce their relations with other great powers. Put differently, regional states change their allegiance based on their interests. For example, some of the states in Central Asia have been playing great powers off each other. Cooley (2012) stated that the Central Asian political leaders played one external power off the other to extract more benefits, economic assistance, and political support. The presence of multiple foreign powers in Central Asia has allowed regional states to leverage their relations. Besides, some of the states in the South Caucasus have played extra-regional powers off each other. For instance, Azerbaijan has been conducting relations with both regional and great powers (Oskanian, 2013).

The recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a double-edged sword. For some, a foreign military presence is a windfall gain. These states are amassing a lot of money from military base rents and foreign direct investments. For instance, Djibouti earns close to $300 million per year from military base rents. For other states in the Horn of Africa, the recent advent of external security actors has increased their position vis-à-vis their neighbors. The advent of foreign powers in

the Red Sea region increased the position of Eritrea in its relations with Ethiopia. However, foreign military presence has become a security threat for other states in the Horn of Africa. In deed, based on the interests, vulnerabilities, and personalities of political leaders, the states in the Horn of Africa have been following different response strategies to the new foreign military presence.

7.2. Ethiopia's Response Strategies to the Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa

In comparison to the Red Sea littoral states, Ethiopia has become vulnerable to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The arrival of diverse external security actors in the Horn of Africa has become a strategic security concern for Ethiopia. The Ethiopian vulnerability is explained by its strategic location (landlockness), incoherent state structure, and internal security problems (see chapter four). Hence, there is a real and perceived security threat coming from a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Experts at the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not deny the security threats of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For instance, on August 5, 2022, Fisseha clearly stated, 'the new commercialization of the Horn ports has become a security threat for Ethiopia. The Red Sea littoral states have leased their ports to foreign powers. This has its own security implications for Ethiopia's access to international water bodies.' Besides, the draft foreign policy document considers the security implications of a foreign military presence on Ethiopian national security. It asserts:

ከቀይ ባህር ተጠቃሚ መሆን ለኢትዮጵያ የህልውና ጉዳይ ነው። በቀይ ባህር አከባቢ የሚነሱ ከስተዶች ከሃገሪቱ ብሄራዊ ጥቅም ጋር በቀጥታ የሚያያዙ በመሆናቸው፣ እንዲሁም የቀይ ባህርና የኤደን ባህረሰላጤ ከአፍሪካ ቀንድ ሃገራት ጋራ ካላቸው ትስስርና ጠቀሜታ አኳያ ኢትዮጵያ በተጠቀሱት አከባቢያዊ ጉዳዮች የሚኖራትን ሚና ከሌሎች የሚመለከታቸው አገሮች ጋር በትብብር ትሰራለች። ስለሆነም በቀይ ባህር ዙሪያ ሀገሪቱ ያላትን ዘላቂ ብሄራዊ ጥቅም ለማስጠበቅ በቀይ ባህር ዙሪያ የጋራ ጥቅም ካላቸው ሀገሮች ጋር በጋራ ተጠቃሚ የሚደርጋትን የባለብዙ ወገን መድረክ በመፍጠር ትኩረት ተሰጥቶ ይሰራል (Draft FDRE Foreign Policy Document, 2021:37). *The equivalent English translation is that 'Ethiopia's access to and use of the Red Sea is a matter of national survival. Ethiopia works with the Red Sea's littoral states and other extra-regional powers to better protect its national security. One of the best strategies to protect Ethiopia's national security is the use of multilateral diplomacy.'*

The main point of the above quotation is that access to the Red Sea is related to Ethiopia's national security. New developments in the Red Sea region are highly connected with Ethiopia's national interests. To ensure its national interests, Ethiopia will work with both Red Sea littoral states and

foreign powers. Moreover, to secure its permanent interests in the Red Sea region, Ethiopia will use diverse strategies, such as multilateral relations. From the above provisions of the 2021 draft foreign policy document, it is clear that Ethiopia has big concerns regarding the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Securitizations entail existential threats needing response strategies. This goes with what Maoz (2004:29) stated, 'when states feel threatened by foreign military presence, they tend to take actions that are intended to meet these challenges.' Maoz further stated that 'such actions may include increased military allocations and searching for allies that provide them with military assistance' (2004:29). In a similar vein, Ethiopia has been taking new response strategies to avert the risks of foreign military interventions in the Horn of Africa. With the advent of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is looking for new options, opportunities, and searching for new external allies. For example, Ethiopia is working to diversify partner states and Addis Ababa is working to be a member of loose economic associations. 'We have been facing unnecessary western intervention. To reduce this external intervention, we are working to diversify our allies. We are looking for new allies in both the east and west. Our relations with the East are not based on ideology. It is based on mutual benefit. Our recent membership in the BRICS indicates our efforts to diversify partner states,' stated Fisseha Shawl, director of African Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, on October 24, 2023. These indicate that Ethiopia is following a pragmatic foreign policy strategy based on changing realities at the global level.

The second response strategy that Ethiopia has been taking to reduce the effects of the new foreign military presence is to diversify its access to the ports. With the advent of foreign military powers in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's import and export trade have faced obstacles. The substantial flow of military base rents and foreign direct investments have given foreign powers a considerable influence on the ports of Djibouti (Bolton, 2018). Such foreign powers have been engaged in controlling and managing the ports in Djibouti. To minimize the problems associated with the securitization of Djibouti ports, Ethiopia has been engaged in securing alternative port access. Carbone (2021) stated that Ethiopia tried to acquire alternative trade routes to access international water bodies. On May 17, 2022, Demeke Mekonnen, the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, told the lawmakers, 'Ethiopia is working to find alternative port access. We have a huge economy in the Horn of Africa. To facilitate our international trade, we are looking for other alternative ports, including Assab, Berbera, and Mombasa.' Presenting the ten-month performance of her office report to the HoPRs, then Minister of Transport and Logistics, Dagmawit Moges said,

‘we are working to reduce the burden on Djibouti port. We are making preparations to use ports such as Tadjoura, Berbera, and Mombasa. Currently, these three ports together take up fifteen percent of Ethiopian international trade. We want to increase their share in the near future (25 May, 2022). From the reports of the two Ethiopian government officials, Addis Ababa has strong interests in Berbera port developments. For example, in 2021, DP World and Ethiopia signed an agreement to develop the road linking Ethiopia to Somaliland. Based on the agreement, DP World has planned to invest close to one billion dollars in the next ten years along the Ethiopia-Somaliland borders (Elias, 2021). As the major logistics corridor for international trade routes, DP World’s corridor development will include dry ports, silos, warehouses, containers, cold chain depots, and cargo activities. These port facilities are equipped with modern information technology infrastructure (Harper, June 2, 2022). These activities of port diversification are aimed at reducing over-reliance on Djibouti ports.

It seems that Ethiopia is not satisfied with diversifying port access. In recent years, the Ethiopian policymakers have been thinking of having direct access to the sea. This could be the ownership of ports in the Red Sea region. To get access to the sea, Ethiopia is looking for different strategies, such as diplomacy, confederation, and even federation with the states in the Red Sea region. On September 21, 2023, the Ethiopian Defense War College and the Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs jointly organized an international conference in Addis Ababa. The conference was attended by several scholars, government officials, military leaders, and senior diplomats. These participants reflected on their views on the geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa. For example, Girum Abay (September 21, 2023) noted that ‘to secure access to the Red Sea, diplomacy, amicable negotiation, and mutual equity will be Ethiopia’s approaches.’ On top of these kinds of policy strategies, senior Ethiopian political leaders have shown a keen interest in securing access to the sea. For example, on October 13, 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed noted that ‘Ethiopia has been depending on the Djibouti ports for its international trade. We are paying a huge amount of money. This has implications for our economic transition. We will work to have free access to the sea. It could be through purchase, offering a stake from the Ethiopian airlines, or the Ethiopian Telecom Company. Thus, we will work to have direct access to the sea, short of war.’ From the viewpoint of Ethiopian political leaders, one can concluded that Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea is aimed at reducing its security vulnerabilities in terms of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is explained in two aspects. First, having access to the sea is important to build a strong economy in the Horn of Africa. This will be translated into political and security strength. Second, access to the sea will be

important for Ethiopia to establish its strong military base in the Red Sea region. This is to reduce the impact of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.[114]

Third, since it had lost access to the Red Sea coastlines in 1991, Ethiopia revealed a new plan to re-establish its naval force in 2018. The new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has brought security threats to Ethiopia. To reduce these security threats, Ethiopia is ready to re-establish its own naval forces. Waletsa (2021) stated that a number of external security actors established military bases in the Red Sea region. These foreign powers have brought security threats to Ethiopia and to protect our national security, we are preparing to establish a naval force in the Red Sea region.[115]As part of Ethiopian efforts to establish a naval force, Waletsa stated the following:

We are doing a number of activities. These preparations could be explained in terms of academic program preparations, selecting training officers, and searching for external allies that provide the training. As part of these activities, we imported fast boats in 2021. Second, we have finished selecting the sites for training. We have laid the foundation for a training center in Bishoftu city. Besides, to train naval officers, we selected a site in Bahir Dar city, and we laid the foundation for technical training. In the 2021/2022 academic year, more than 200 trainees were admitted to get basic military training (2021:8).

A number of scholars, strategic thinkers, and military leaders at the Ministry of Defense consider preparation to establish a naval force as a positive step to protect Ethiopian national interests in the Red Sea region.[116] For example, Yonas, Markos, and Getachew contend that landlocked states can establish their naval forces. On January 13, 2022, Yonas Ashine stated that 'landlockedness does not prevent Ethiopia from establishing a naval force. Many of the projecting powers in the Horn of Africa established their naval forces in the Red Sea region.' In addition, Markos Tekle (2019, December 20) commented that, let alone Ethiopia, other foreign powers such as China, Japan, and many

[114] Yet, Ethiopia's imperative to secure access to the Red Sea has a number of problems. First, Ethiopia has to deal with foreign powers supporting the Red Sea littoral states. These geopolitical dynamics will complicate Ethiopia's access to the sea. Second, the Red Sea littoral states are closely working with foreign powers to deter Ethiopia from having access to the sea. Third, Ethiopia has domestic fault lines between ethnic groups.
Ethiopia has an incoherent state structure in the Horn of Africa. These will reduce Ethiopia's effort to have access to the sea.

[115] Waletsa (2021) stated that 95% of Ethiopia's imports and exports are by sea.

[116] Some scholars, such as Berouk stated that the establishment of naval forces for landlocked states has no meaning. The questions revolve around where to establish the naval forces? How have landlocked states established naval forces? How does Ethiopia conduct its relations with the Red Sea littoral states?

European states built-up their naval forces in the Red Sea region. Ethiopia is only sixty kilometers from the Red Sea. Hence, to protect our interests, we need to establish naval forces in the Red Sea region. In addition, Getachew Mekonnen (2021) stated that we need to establish our naval forces in the Red Sea region. Other foreign powers are establishing their naval bases in these bodies of water. A key-informant interview with Ethiopian military leaders indicates the importance of naval forces in the Red Sea region. For example, on November 29, 2022, Brigadier General Bulti Tadesse, the Ethiopian Defense War College commandant, stated that 'access to the sea could not be a criterion for the establishment of naval forces. Landlocked states in different parts of the world have established naval forces to protect their commercial interests in international water bodies. Uganda, for example, has best trained naval forces to secure its commercial trade in the Indian Ocean. In the same way, we are making efforts to establish Ethiopian naval forces.' Foreign policy officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported these kinds of military preparations. In a conference organized by FES at the Hayat Regency Hotel on November 22, 2022, Fisseha remarked, 'we do not oppose the new foreign military presence in Djibouti. We cannot order a sovereign state in the Horn of Africa not to allow the establishment of foreign military bases. Nevertheless, we are doing our homework. We are closely watching the security dynamics in the Horn of Africa, and we are working with the Red Sea littoral states.' As part of these kinds of preparations, Ethiopia has been working hard to strengthen its military capacity. For example, Ethiopia established a Defense War College in 2021. The Defense War College graduated its first batch of military officials and intelligence experts in May 2022. These military officials are trained in the regional politics of the Horn of Africa. The training is aimed at producing military officials who can realize, explain, and critically analyze the new developments at the regional, continental, and global levels (Ethiopian News Agency, April 21, 2022).

Fourth, Ethiopia is working to revise the 2002 foreign policy document. As indicated in the preceding discussions, the Horn of Africa has experienced an increase in the number of foreign security actors in recent years. Both regional and great powers are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the 2002 foreign policy document did not consider the advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Instead of foreign threats, the 2002 foreign policy documents asserted that domestic threats such as a lack of democracy and the prevalence of poverty were the main national security threats to Ethiopia (Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy, FANSPS, 2002). Accordingly, the 2002 foreign policy documents asserted that promoting good

governance, widening democratic space, and tackling the prevalence of poverty could solve security threats coming from external forces. For example, one can look at the following assertion:

Our main security threat is of an internal nature. Poverty, backwardness, and the infancy of our system of governance and democracy are the main security threats. Widening poverty may lead to our collapse. The absence of democracy and good governance may result in bloodshed and destruction. Our strength is based on the domestic performance of the economy. All external issues are secondary. External threats are extensions of national or domestic challenges. Likewise, our foreign and national security policies need to be essentially based on the promotion of economic development and democracy (FANSPS, 2002:23-25).

As it is clearly indicated from the above quotation, the 2002 Ethiopia's foreign policy documents emphasized that domestic problems became a fertile ground for external intervention in the country. Nevertheless, scholars and foreign policy experts, as well as officials usually in the area of international politics, assert that both domestic and international dynamics are equally important in securing the national interests of a given state. In this regard, Maoz (2004:26) stated that 'foreign policies are not made in vacuum. They could be designed in response to external security threats. They could be made in a dynamic international system. States, even the most powerful powers, do not control the fast-changing global system.' Other scholars also forwarded a similar point. For example, Nester (2010:134) stated that 'foreign policy is a grand plan to effectively overcome foreign security challenges.' Thus, in designing foreign policy, government officials have to consider the changing nature of the international system.

It is undeniable that domestic economic strength is a key variable for power projection into other regions. Otherwise stated, domestic economic strength augments the implementation of states' foreign policy in other regions. However, solving domestic problems alone does not guarantee the national security of a given state. As a matter of fact, states live in an unpredictable and dynamic international system. Thus, solving domestic problems does not guarantee the security of a given state. Accordingly, following the changes at local, regional, and international levels, the draft FDRE foreign policy document (2021:6) asserted the following:

ነባራዊ የዓለም ሁኔታ በእጅጉ የተቀየረ ነዉ፡በአንድ በኩል አለም አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ሚዛኑ ከምዕራቡ አለም ወደ ምስራቁ አለም እየተሸጋገረ ነዉ፡ በሌላ በኩል አለም አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ሚዛኑም በአንድ ሃይል ስር የተከማቸ ከመሆን አልፎ ወደ የተለያዩ የኢኮኖሚ

ሃይሎች የሚቆጣጠሩት ወደ መሆን እየተሸጋገረ ነው በተጨማሪ በሃገሮች መንግስታት የበላይነት ተይዞ የቆየው አጠቃላይ ሃይል ሂደት እየተለወጠ መንግስታዊ-ያልሆኑ ተዋንያን አቅም እያካበቱ የሚገኙበት ሁኔታ ይታያል።

The central argument of the above idea is that the world is changing. Besides, global economic power is shifting from the west to the east. Moreover, many economically strong states are emerging, and powerful non-state actors are rising. In addition to the changing dynamics of the global power distribution, the recent internal political dynamics in Ethiopia made the 2002 foreign policy document completely irrelevant. In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed replaced the then prime minister Haile Mariam Desalegn. The new administration of Ethiopia tried to resolve the twenty-year 'no war, no peace' hostile relations with Eritrea. Following the year 2018 Jeddah Peace Agreement, the two states settled their border disputes. The improved relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea also made the 2002 foreign policy document not functional. The 2021 draft foreign policy document (2021:2) asserts, 'ከጐረቤቶቻችን ጋር ያሉንን ግንኙነቶች ወደ በጎ አቅጣጫ እየተቀየረ ሲመጣ ይህንን ተከትሎ የሚቀየሩ መነሻዎች መኖራቸው እርግጥ ነው' Translates literally as 'as our relations with neighboring states become peaceful, we need to change our foreign policy direction.' For example, the 2002 foreign policy document considered Eritrea an enemy state. Following the rapprochement between the two states in 2018, the 2002 foreign policy document lost its relevance. Even some experts in a different way opposed the leveling of a particular state as an enemy state in foreign policy documents. In this case, Markos (2019), then deputy foreign minister, stated 'in any foreign policy document, it is not advisable to mention states as enemies and friends. Rather, foreign policy documents have to incorporate general principles of interstate relations.' Getachew, an expert at the Institute for Foreign Affairs, asserted:

Instead of leveling one state as an enemy and the other as a friend, we have been following rational foreign policy strategies in recent times. We follow a principle-based foreign policy toward the external powers. Our assumption is that there are no friends or enemies. We want to balance these states to secure our interests. We want to increase our friends and reduce our enemies. The strategies are economic diplomacy, investment, and aid with external security actors (January 16, 2021).

The last response strategy that Ethiopia has been taking to reduce the effects of foreign military presence is working together with the states in the Red Sea region. In this regard, Ethiopia has been working with these states in the areas of infrastructure development, regional cooperation, and energy integration. Ethiopia and Djibouti have common interests in infrastructure developments (roads,

railways, and water pipelines). Through these roads and railways, Ethiopia facilitates its import and export trade. On the other hand, Djibouti collects annual port revenues. Besides, Ethiopia has been providing pure drinking water to Djibouti from the Somali National Regional State of Ethiopia (Styan, 2021). More than one hundred thousand cubic meters of water have been reaching Djibouti in recent years. Mulualem (2021) writes that Djibouti has started to import close to 100 thousand cubic meters of pure water from Ethiopia per day since 2017. The water is transferred to Djibouti without payment. The supply of pure water is important in enhancing relations between the two neighboring states.[117]These developments in infrastructure will have spillover effects on regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration.

In addition to the construction of roads and railways, Ethiopia has been making efforts to integrate the Horn of Africa through hydroelectric power (Mosley, 2020). There are converging interests between the Red Sea littoral states and Ethiopia's readiness to export hydroelectric power. These states are energy-starved. Ethiopia has huge hydroelectric potential. Ethiopian senior diplomats made an important speech on the common interests between Ethiopia and the Red Sea littoral states. 'Our neighboring states are making efforts to buy electricity from Ethiopia at optimum prices,' said Fisseha, a senior diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, on June 1, 2022. Based on this common interest, Ethiopia has been exporting electricity to Djibouti and Sudan since 2020. In the first nine months of 2022, by exporting 254 megawatts of electricity, Ethiopia collected close to forty million dollars from these neighboring states (Ethiopian News Agency, May 5, 2022). In addition to Djibouti, other states in the Horn of Africa, such as Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan showed their readiness to import hydroelectric power from Ethiopia (Mulualem, 2021). To secure the growing hydroelectric power demand from its neighboring states, Ethiopia is constructing the GERD hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile. On February 20, 2022, during the inauguration ceremony of the first unite of power generation, Abiy Ahmed to the national television, 'የኢትዮጵያ ፍላጎ ታይል በማምረት የጎረቤት አገር መጥቀም ነው፤ ኢትዮጵያ በከፍተኛ ቦታ ላይ ያለች ፤ ከፍተኛ የዝናብ መጠን የምታገኝ እና ብዙ ዎንዝ ያላት አገር በመሆኗ በርከት ያሉ ግድቦች በመገንባት ለሌሎች አገሮች የሚተርፍ ታይል ማምረት እና መሸጥም ነው ' The literal translation is that, 'Ethiopia is constructing the GERD hydroelectric dam to export electric power to neighboring states. This is to collect additional foreign currency. Ethiopia, located in the highlands, receives a good amount of rainfall. Exploiting this huge annual rainfall, Ethiopia is ready to build

[117] This water supply is channeled through the Ethiopia-Djibouti water pipeline constructed by China in 2016.

other hydroelectric dams across the Blue Nile. This facilitates energy integration in the Horn of Africa.'

Apart from energy integration, Ethiopia is working to promote political cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. In this regard, the political change in 2018 was a landmark in the efforts of regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa. After he came to power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed initiated regional cooperation with the Red Sea littoral states. He rekindled the hope of synergy and integration (Awet, 2019). To facilitate regional cooperation, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited both Eritrea and Somalia. In 2018, the Prime Minister proposed the 'Horn of Africa Cooperation Progam,' which is intended to facilitate regional cooperation. Since then, the three states, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia have improved their relations (Henneberg and Stabel, 2020). They finally signed a tripartite agreement in September 2018 and agreed to build closer political, economic, and security ties. In 2019, the leaders of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea met each other and discussed common issues. Neamin (2021) stated that on January 27, 2020, the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia held their trilateral meeting. In the meeting, the three leaders proposed to form a new regional block, which has been referred to as the 'Horn of Africa Cooperation.'

The importance of regional cooperation to maintain Ethiopian national security from foreign military interventions is well understood. Some of the Ethiopian foreign policy officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have some words on the role of Ethiopia in regional integration. 'Regional integration brings peace and security to the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia believes that close regional integration benefits all regional states. Ethiopia is second to none in bringing peace and security to Somalia,' noted Ambassador Jemaluddin on January 30, 2024. The assumption of Ethiopian policymakers is that regional cooperation reduces the effects of foreign military presence on Ethiopian national security. This is described in three different categories. One category is that regional institutions could serve as a platform for dialogue on the negative implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This will help the states in the Horn of Africa to come up with collective response strategies to the new foreign military presence. These regional states come together and solve their disputes by themselves. They will act as a single actor within the international system and they could develop indigenous conflict-resolution mechanisms. This is important to develop close relations with each other and resist external interventions. The second category is that regional cooperation will help to create a common identity to legitimize the activities of the states in the Horn of Africa. The

final category is that regional cooperation could reduce the intense security interaction between the states in the Horn of Africa. Stated differently, the Horn regional states desecuritize each other and come up with a common security policy for the new foreign military presence in the Red Sea region. Thus, it is assumed that collective approaches to the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa would reduce Ethiopia's vulnerability to external military interventions.

7.3. The Response Strategies of Somalia to the New Foreign Military Presence

The foreign policy of Somalia towards the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is based on a combination of pragmatism, neutral foreign policy and security alliance. For example, Somalia tried to become a neutral actor in the regional conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Qatar that occurred in 2017 (De Waal, 2018; Dahir, 2022). In 2020, when Saudi Arabia and Türkiye put pressure on the Somali Republic to take sides, Mogadishu tried to follow a neutral foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of Somalia's foreign policy strategy indicates that Mogadishu has been following selective and pragmatic foreign policy strategies towards foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. Mogadishu has welcomed some of the foreign powers into its territory and lowered its relations with other foreign powers. For example, as indicated in chapter four, Somalia welcomed the Turkish military presence into its territories. The relations between Somalia and Türkiye are categorized as those of close alliance relations. Somalia allowed the establishment of a Turkish military base in its littoral territory. Türkiye, for its part, has been working to improve the capacity and capability of the Somali defense forces (Telci, 2021; Maruf, 2024b, March 31). Türkiye's military presence has been vital to the internal security of Somalia. As indicated in chapter four, irrespective of regime changes, Türkiye has been providing security assistance to the federal government of Somalia. The Turkish efforts to build a strong military force in Somalia generally indicate their all time close relations. Importantly, Türkiye engaged in humanitarian assistance, building roads, schools, and hospitals in Somalia. Therefore, both the government and the people of Somalia have welcomed the Turkish military presence.

Moreover, the Somali political leaders have played external security actors against one another. As part of this policy, the Somali political leaders played the Arab Gulf states against each other to maximize their benefits. This is because, several converging interests between the Somali political leaders and the Arab Gulf states. The Gulf monarchies' preference for personalized ties rather than institutional foreign policy one has created a wealth of opportunity for Somali politicians seeking to

advance their personal interests (International Crisis Group, 2019). To get political influence, lucrative investment opportunities, and military bases in Somalia, the states in the Middle East have employed dollar diplomacy (Cannon and Rossiter, 2019). On the other hand, the Somali political elites provided political loyalty and military bases. Several Horn security experts, such as Samira, Hussien, and Abdeta made important remarks on the nature of relations between Somali political leaders and external security actors. On September 1, 2022, Samira remarked, 'there are transactional relations between Somali political elites and foreign powers.' Besides, Hussein stated that 'there are patron-client relations between Somali political leaders and foreign powers in the Horn of Africa' (July 7, 2022). In particular, the Arab Gulf states have used their financial resources to widen their respective spheres of influence in Somalia. The Somali political actors (both at the federal and regional levels) made themselves ready to provide military bases and political loyalty to foreign military powers. This is what Abdeta (2022) dubbed 'transactional relations between foreign powers and Somali political elites.'

Nevertheless, the Somali Republic is not successful in responding to the new foreign powers in the Horn of Africa. In other words, the efforts of Mogadishu to play great powers off each other have not been successful. As Walle (2023) noted, a number of regional and global powers are vying to expand their military presence in Somalia. This has made the response strategy quite difficult. Besides, Munene (2022) stated that Somalia is vulnerable to the great powers' manipulation to serve their interests in the Horn of Africa. Due to its weak internal state structure, Somalia is under foreign powers' pressure and is not able to pit one foreign power against another. As Pamba (2021) writes, the weak state structure of Somali Republic and the presence of powerful local actors have eventually reduced Somalia's position vis-à-vis foreign powers. In addition to Pamba, Lanfranchi (2021) stated that local political dynamics in Somalia have created problems in Mogadishu's relations with foreign powers. This is explained in two ways. One way is local political actors in the states of the Horn of Africa have the power to leverage the military presence of foreign powers according to their interests. For example, Somaliland's external relations with foreign powers have become a challenge for the Somali political leaders in Mogadishu. Second, geopolitical tensions at the international level spill over into the internal politics of Somalia. There has been heavy influence from foreign powers in Somali domestic politics and competing foreign powers have been dominating political developments in Somalia. These dynamics have made the response strategy difficult for Somalia.

7.4. The Eritrean Response Strategies to Foreign Military Presence

The response strategies of Eritrea to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa are not clearly visible. This might be due to the secretive foreign policymaking process in Asmara. As Rossiter and Cannon (2022:22) noted, 'the opaque nature of the regime in Asmara has made the Eritrean response strategy difficult to predict.' A key informant interview with scholars indicates the difficult nature of the Eritrean response strategy to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. On November 22, 2022, Tekeda noted that 'the response strategies of Eritrea to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa have been difficult to determine.' However, several diplomats, security experts, and scholars have noted the Eritrean response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Michael (2021:77) noted that, 'despite a more hospitable regional and international climate, the Eritrean government is working to have restrictive relations with external security actors.' In addition, Berouk (2022) observed that the Eritrean government has preferred limited international relations. It has been following an autarky foreign policy strategy, particularly, its relations with the West are limited. Ylonen (2022a:259) also opined, 'President Isaias Afewerki emphasized self-sufficiency and he has preferred limited international relations.' In the conference organized by the *Andimta*-Ethiopian Civil Discourse Association, Yonas Ashine (2022) stated that Eritrea has been following ambivalent foreign policy strategies in relation to the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. From the remarks of the key informants, Eritrea has limited relations with foreign powers, and its relations are based on the unpredictable personal behavior of Isaias Afewerki.

However, a close look at the Eritrean relations with foreign powers does not mean that Asmara does not have external relations. Eritrea has been maintaining selective relations with foreign powers having military bases in the Horn of Africa. This is based on political dynamics in the Horn of Africa. First, the border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea had implications for Eritrean response strategies. Following the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the years between 1998 and 2000, the two states tried to resolve their disputes using international arbitration. However, Ethiopia failed to transfer the disputed region to Eritrea. The international community failed to extend pressure on Ethiopia. Rather, the West backed Ethiopia. In 2009, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea for its failure to withdraw its military forces from the disputed region around Doumiera Mountain. This has forced Eritrea to find possible alternative security allies for its external relations.

Eritrea sought to mitigate the effects of sanctions by strengthening its relations with non-Western powers, including Iran, Russia, and China (Ylonen, 2022a).

However, relations between Iran and Eritrea deteriorated following the onset of the Yemeni civil war in 2015. The new security dynamics in the Arab Gulf region increased the strategic importance of Eritrean ports. Saudi Arabia needed military bases on the Eritrean coast to use as a launching pad and attack the Iran-backed Houthi rebels (see chapter four). To get military bases at Assab port, Saudi Arabia provided direct financial assistance and budgetary support to Eritrea. Eritrea reciprocated by sending its military forces supporting Saudi Arabia in the Yemen civil war. This was accompanied by changing its close relations with Iran. The change in allegiance of Eritrea from Iran to Saudi Arabia benefited Asmara in different ways. In 2018, Saudi Arabia played a critical role in resolving Eritrean border disputes with Ethiopia. The peace deal benefited Eritrea for a number of reasons. One is that Eritrea increased its relations with Ethiopia and became part of the 'Horn of Africa Cooperation.' Another is that Eritrea became a member of the Red Sea Forum (Mosley, 2021). Membership in the Red Sea Forum is quite important to improve its relations with many Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. The close relations between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia were a turning point for the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009. As Michael (2021) stated, Eritrea used its improved relations with Saudi Arabia to escape from international sanctions. More importantly, the recent quest of Ethiopia to have access to the sea has implications for Eritrean relations with foreign military forces. To deter Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea, without any doubt, Eritrea will work with foreign powers. The recent increased security relations between Eritrea and Russia are the case in point. On September 21, 2022 Abdeta noted that 'Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea will force the Red Sea littoral states to work with basing powers in the Horn of Africa. The Eritrean policy will fall under this category.' All these indicate that Eritrea has been maintaining selective relations with foreign powers**.** Asmara welcomed some foreign powers and lowered its relations with other external powers.

7.5 Djibouti and Foreign Powers in the Horn of Africa: Pragmatism or Security Alliance?

Compared with other states in the Horn of Africa, Djibouti has a wide range of foreign policy options vis-à-vis external security actors. It has been following pragmatic foreign policy, alliance relations, and balancing relations with arriving foreign powers. As Donelli (2022:54) noted, 'Djibouti has been able to diversify its international relations and ensure a security umbrella in one of the most vulnerable regions of the world.' Djibouti follows these types of foreign policy options due to its privileged strategic location in the Horn of Africa. For one thing being endowed with a few natural resources, Djibouti capitalized on its strategic location at the entrance of the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea (Munene, 2022). Djibouti is conducting a creative way of monetizing its strategic location. It has allowed its coastline to become a parking space for a number of external security actors (Fakude, 2021). Djibouti has allowed the establishment of foreign military bases, military facilities, and logistics hubs on its soil. It has been leasing a piece of land to collect annual base rents close to $300 million every year. The Djiboutian foreign officials are not secretive about the importance of foreign military presence in their country. A key-informant interview with the Djiboutian security experts indicated the importance of foreign military bases in their sovereign territories. On November 24, 2022, Abdillahi noted that 'we are pleased to see foreign military presence in our country. We want to be the eyes of the world. Scholars like you consider the $300 million annual military base revenue as an important source of income. This financial income accounts for only eight percent of Djibouti's GDP. We want to see the spillover effect of the new foreign military presence in the country.' Other senior political officials in Djibouti supported Abdullahi's arguments. For example, Abdoulkader Hussein (September 21, 2023), from the Djiboutian Centre for Security Studies, noted that 'the primary threat of the Red Sea is not the presence of the US, China, or other foreign powers. The Chinese military base in Djibouti is aimed at securing Beijing's investment in the Horn of Africa. The US military in Djibouti fights terrorism. Their activities are aimed at securing the major resource flows in the Red Sea region.' According to the remarks of Abdillahi and Abdoulkader, Djibouti has welcomed foreign military forces into its territories.

Moreover, Djibouti has craftily been playing great powers off each other (Su *et al,* 2018, Munene, 2022). The intention is to maximize financial and political benefits from projecting power. To do this, Djibouti skillfully exploited foreign powers' rivalry in the Horn of Africa. As Styan (2022:237) noted, 'the Djiboutian political leaders have been playing rival foreign powers off each other to

increase their material interests in the region.' For example, to get more economic benefits, Djibouti played off Russia against the US (Styan, 2020). In the early 2010s, Russia had been considering establishing military bases in Djibouti. In 2014, the United States directed Djibouti not to allow the establishment of a Russian military base. Djibouti did what the US wanted. This was compensated by an increment in annual military base rents. According to Vertin (2019), the US increased its annual base rents from thirty million dollars to sixty million dollars. In 2017, Djibouti showed its ability to m*anoeuvr* external powers against each other. The US pressured Djibouti to reduce its relations with China. However, the government of Djibouti did not accept the American plea. It resisted American pressure and has continued to conduct close security relations with China. Thus, as noted in the previous discussions, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. In addition, in 2018, following the slow progress of Doraleh Multipurpose Port, Djibouti unilaterally terminated the DP World port service and transferred it to China Merchant Port Groups [118](Donelli, 2022b; Styan, 2022). Though DP World sued the government of Djibouti at the London International Court and became successful, the Djiboutian government persisted with its decision [119](Styan, 2022). This indicates that Djibouti has skillfully leveraged its strategic location to avoid overdependence on any one of the foreign powers (Carbone, 2021). Djibouti security experts have a few words to say. On November 24, 2022, Abdillahi noted, 'Djibouti has the skills to manage the relations of great powers in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti has tried to maintain relations with every foreign power. It does not want to be caught in a new great power rivalry and has no interest in choosing sides.' Even other Djiboutian security experts repeated what Abdillahi remarked. 'We are working with all foreign powers in Djibouti. We have the skills to manage foreign powers equally', says Abdoulkader on September 21, 2023. Thus, Djibouti is willing to welcome foreign powers into its territory.

In addition, Djibouti has close security relations with some of the great powers based in the Horn of African. This is to protect itself from neighboring states. Djibouti is bordered by Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia to the west, and Somalia to the south. These states in the Horn of Africa have some strategic

[118] As Macaes (2019) writes, China Merchant Port Group has emerged as a core company of the BRI.

[119] Disagreements were due to three main reasons: unequal voting rights, low transshipment volumes, and obscure clauses that allegedly gave DP World exclusive control of Djibouti's overall port development. For a detailed analysis, see a book edited by Rober Mason and Simon Mabon (2022) on: *The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, Influence and Instability.*

interests in Djibouti (Lewis, 1988). In the 1970s, for instance, Somalia claimed a larger part of Djibouti populated by Somali ethnic groups. However, foreign powers provided security protection to Djibouti. In particular, its close security relations with France were critical to deterring Somalia's irredentist claims in the 1970s. Munene (2022:4) concludes, 'Djibouti has a security treaty with France, mainly against its neighbors, and this external support has become an important policy for the country.' Security protection from Paris has continued until today. In recent times, France has become a major external power to protect Djibouti from external military interventions. Even Djibouti security officials do not deny this French support. 'We are peaceful in a volatile region of the Horn of Africa. External powers have been providing security protection to our country,' said Abdillahi on November 24, 2023. Above all, following the withdrawal of Qatari troops in the Doumeira region in 2017, Eritrea claimed the area and deployed its military forces (Gurbuz, 2018). The expanding Eritrean forces were deterred by foreign military forces stationed in Djibouti. Lanfranchi (2021) writes that a long-standing defense treaty with France has become a key strategy to secure Djibouti from its powerful neighbors, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Therefore, France has become the ultimate guarantor of Djibouti under a bilateral defense accord.

And finally, Djibouti has been strongly engaged itself in modernizing its ports. Djibouti follows this strategy to stimulate its economic development in the Horn of Africa. In so doing, Djibouti is working to accommodate more ships and earn more revenue (Borowicz, 2017). For example, as discussed in chapter four, the Chinese built the Doraleh Multipurpose Port in 2018. The ports have been playing a critical role in facilitating international trade. In 2020, Djibouti inaugurated the regeneration project to turn the historical port of Djibouti into an international business district. The regeneration of the port of Djibouti is the natural continuation of Djibouti's recent developments. This project implements the port-park-city concept. This transformation of the historical port marks the final step in the implementation of the port-park-city concept. This is the integration of ports, industrial parks, and service sectors (Donelli, 2022b). International free trade zones will attract industrial and manufacturing investors. These new ports and industrial zones are intended to facilitate the development of service sectors (hotels, banks, and insurance companies). The full integration of Djibouti's ports, industrial parks, and service sectors is aimed at advancing Djibouti's Vision 2035 (Capital English Newspaper, October 11, 2020).

Based on Vision 2035, Djibouti is working hard to capitalize on its unique geographic location in the Red Sea region. Djibouti wants to become a major commercial hub for international trade in the Horn of Africa. By becoming a center for global logistical hubs, Djibouti is working hard to repeat the success story of Singapore (Vertin, 2020). As part of this ambitious plan, Djibouti has been constructing ports, economic zones, airports, commercial hubs, hotels, exhibition centers, and conference rooms (Vertin, 2020; Donelli, 2022b). Most of these investments are financed by Chinese loans. Beijing is working to fuel Djibouti's economic transformation and its aspiration to become a commercial hub for international trade. By doing this, Djibouti is working hard to build a competitive, productive, and diversified economy in the Horn of Africa.

From the above analyses, the states in the Horn of Africa do not have unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region. To some extent, the states in the Horn of Africa are working together to fight pandemics, environmental challenges, and drug trafficking. However, their position towards the foreign military presence is divergent. States in the Horn of Africa do not have common security policies for the new foreign military presence in the region. A number of security analysts produced their works on the lack of coherent response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, Munene (2022) stated that there are no common response strategies to the advent of foreign military powers in the Horn of Africa. Munene (2023) further noted that the states in the Horn of Africa are not able to withstand the negative implications of a foreign military presence in the region. In addition to Munene, Khan (2018) noted that the states in the Horn of Africa do not attempt to organize a cooperative block to protect the region. Khan (2018) further stated that the lack of common response strategies left the Horn of Africa vulnerable to foreign rivalries, tensions, and conflicts. In addition, the Amani Study Center (2019) contends that the establishment of foreign military bases is a bilateral agreement between foreign powers and the states in the Horn of Africa. The states in the Horn of Africa do not have a coherent strategy in line with the existing continental and regional organizations in Africa.

Three major reasons stand out that explain the lack of coherent and unified policies for the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. This can be justified that the states in the Horn of Africa have different interests and positions regarding the new foreign military presence in the region. Ylonen (2022) stated that some of the states in the Horn of Africa have taken advantage of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. For example, the Red Sea littoral states (Eritrea, Somalia,

and Djibouti) have capitalized on their strategic locations in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019b). Because of their strategic locations, there are coincidences of interest between the Red Sea littoral states and foreign powers. In particular, Djibouti and China have complementary economic interests. Djibouti seeks to become a commercial hub in the Horn of Africa. China, for its part, is working hard to expand its economic investments in the Horn of Africa. For these reasons, Djibouti and China are strengthening their economic relations, and the establishment of foreign military bases has become a significant source of income for the Djiboutian political leaders (Belete, 2023; Donelli, 2023). This indicates that the Red Sea littoral states are making efforts to get more economic assistance, military base rents, and security protection and they have welcomed foreign powers into their territories. For example, as indicated in chapter six, Djibouti amasses close to $300 million from military base rents. Other states in the Horn of Africa are working to strengthen their position vis-à-vis their neighbors. Scholars such as Melvin (2019c) and Neamin (2021) stated that the Red Sea littoral states are trying to leverage the new foreign military presence to promote their own interests, and they tried to bolster and strengthen their position vis-à-vis their neighboring states. To bolster their geopolitical position, some of the states in the Horn of Africa have made security alliances with foreign powers. Eritrea, for example, to change the regional balance of power in its favor, has made a security alliance with Saudi Arabia (Munene, 2022). Furthermore, the states in the Horn of Africa have many powerful non-state actors. In fragile states such as Somalia, powerful non-state actors are working with foreign powers. These non-state actors are powerful because they control arable land, mineral resources, and even people and clan groups. These non-state actors use their resources to prop up their foreign relations (Ylonen, 2024). Other non-state actors use their strategic location in the Horn of Africa. For example, Somaliland controls the Berbera Corridor and has been conducting external relations. Capitalizing this strategic location, the breakaway region of Somaliland has allowed the establishment of foreign military bases in its territory as part of its efforts to achieve international recognition (Melvin, 2019c; Styan, 2022; Ylonen, 2022a). Thus, it has become difficult to have a common collective response to the new advent of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Second, there is no consensus on the states' interests and regional interests in the Horn of Africa. As Neethling (2023) noted, there is a lack of regional consensus among the African states on the modalities for regulating foreign security and military activity on the continent. On the one hand, the states in the Horn of Africa are sovereign. They possess a right to allow foreign powers' military presence in their territories. Foreign military base deals are bilateral relations between the basing

power and the host states in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the presence of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa has become a concern for the security of the region and, by extension, for other parts of the African continent. This divergence between sovereign states' rights and the security of the Horn of Africa has become an obstacle to coming up with coherent and unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence. The second is that many of the states in Africa tend to build closer ties with foreign powers than neighboring states on the security front (Amani African Study Center, 2022). This is to secure their interests. 'The states in the Horn of Africa have different positions towards the foreign powers. Instead of collectively protecting the Horn region, each state in the region is working in their own way,' concluded Kizito Sabala on March 26, 2026.

Third, local, national, and regional security problems in the Horn of Africa have become an obstacle for the lack of unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region (Key informant two, June 13, 2023; Sabala, March 26, 2024). For example, the nature of the regimes in the Horn of Africa has implications for the lack of common response strategies. States in the Horn of Africa do not have visionary leaders who have the capacity to know the dangers of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. They lack economic resources, technological expertise, and political stability to handle the shifts of the new geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa (Munene, 2023). To make matters even worse, the Horn's political leaders are authoritarian. Eritrea has been ruled by a single person for the last thirty years. There might be a problem of succession after President Isaias Afewerki (Henneberg and Stapel, 2021). The same is true for Djibouti, as the country has been ruled by a single person for the last twenty-four years. The foreign military presence has enabled Ismail Omar Guelleh to rule the country without any problems. He has been in office since 1999, making him one of the longest-serving rulers in Africa. The undemocratic nature of the leaders in the Horn of Africa has exacerbated internal conflicts in each state in the region and the states in the Horn of Africa are busy with their internal domestic problems. Djibouti has been a stable state in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, in recent times, relations between the Afar and Issa ethnic groups have had implications for the domestic politics of Djibouti. Ethiopia is troubled by many domestic problems. As indicated in chapter four, power rivalry among political elites, contested ethnic nationalism, and inter-ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country are some of the domestic problems in Ethiopia. To make matters even worse, Ethiopia, the largest state in the region, is landlocked and does not coordinate the Red Sea littoral states on key security issues. Even the Red

Sea littoral states do not accept Ethiopia's leadership in the Horn of Africa. These dynamics have become an obstacle for Ethiopia to protect the Horn of Africa from external military interventions. For their part, the Red Sea littoral states are too weak to secure their borders from the proliferation of maritime piracy. As Neethling (2023) noted, the states in the Horn of Africa have gaps and weaknesses in their ability to respond to the proliferation of non-state actors in the region. As Mahmood (2019) stated, the Red Sea region suffers from a gap in managing the threats of piracy off the Somalia coastline. For example, Somalia has been a failed state since the 1990s, and its weakness has contributed to the proliferation of piracy in the Horn of Africa. The weak internal state structure has attracted foreign powers to the Horn of Africa, and foreign powers have found ways and spaces to operate in the region. The recent ten-year Maritime Security Agreement with Turkiye that granted Ankara full authority over Somalia's territorial waters demonstrates the weakness of states in the Horn of Africa and foreign military presence in the region.

The domestic problems of the states in the Horn of Africa have regional security implications. These regional states in the Horn of Africa have cases against each other. Regional competition among the states in the Horn of Africa has become a major factor for the lack of unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence. Some scholars such as Buzan (1983) stated that in conflict-ridden regions, states usually securitize each other as potential security threats. They are not able to come together to withstand common security threats. Even they do not trust each other. In the same way, the states in the Horn of Africa have experienced uneasy relations and there have been intense security interactions between these regional states. The recent peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea is fragile, and lacks institutionalization. The border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti has not been settled, and relations between the two states have been unstable. Owing to strong economic relations between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa, relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have become brittle. To make matters worse, the states in the Horn of Africa have a tradition of intervening in other states' internal affairs. As Getahun (2022) writes, the states in the Horn of Africa have a tradition of intervening in each other's internal affairs. Domestic security in each state of the Horn of Africa is linked to other neighboring regional states. The recent Eritrean intervention on the part of the federal government of Ethiopia against the TPLF forces has further complicated regional security in the Horn of Africa. To make matters worse, Ethiopia's quest for direct access to the Red Sea ports will have regional security implications. As a result, the states in the Horn of Africa are trapped in their domestic politics, and they are not working to come up with coherent and unified response

strategies. This lack of collective action, combined with an internal weak state structure, will continue to attract foreign military presence in Africa.

In sum, the states in the Horn of Africa do not have common and unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region. Each state in the Horn of Africa is working in its own way. The Red Sea littoral states have more room to manoeuvre external security actors, extending their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti capitalized on its location at the entrance of the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Eritrea is working to strengthen its position vis-à-vis neighboring states in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, the largest state in the Horn of Africa, securitized the advent of several foreign powers in the region.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion and Recommendations

8.1 Conclusion

In recent years, a number of foreign powers from North America, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. As part of their military presence, external security actors established military bases. These bases are equipped with modern military equipment. Moreover, external military powers have engaged in security cooperation with their client states in the Horn of Africa. In addition, foreign powers have provided security assistance to the Horn regional states. Considering these external security activities, the present thesis examined the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Based on a qualitative case study, the research examined the drivers of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Besides, the thesis examined the regional security implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In addition, the research analyzed the response strategies of the states in the Horn of Africa to the new foreign military presence.

The recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is the continuation of previous foreign military interventions. Throughout history, the Horn of Africa has been the target of foreign powers. The pre-colonial imperial powers, the colonial powers, and the great powers of the Cold War extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa. In recent times, a number of foreign powers have extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has differences and similarities with previous foreign military interventions. The first difference between the previous military interventions and the recent foreign military presence is the intrusion mechanisms. In the past, foreign powers used military forces to extend their security presence in the Horn of Africa. These foreign powers dominated the Horn of Africa under their spheres of influence. After the states in the Horn of Africa achieved political independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the pattern of basing access changed. Unlike the colonial interventions, the recent foreign military presence is based on the consent of the states in the Horn of Africa. To access military bases in the Horn of Africa, foreign powers employed trade relations, loans, investment opportunities, and security cooperation.

The second difference is that the previous foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa was dominated by western imperial powers. Throughout history, the Horn of Africa has experienced military interventions from then European colonial powers. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Portuguese and the Ottoman Turks extended their presence in the Horn of Africa. In the late nineteenth century, European colonial powers such as Italy, France, and Britain consolidated their military presence in the Horn of Africa. The advent of these colonial powers sowed the seeds for the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. However, the recent advent of foreign powers in the Horn of Africa is not limited to western powers. In recent times, foreign powers from the Middle East, Asia, and North America have been extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Thus, foreign security actors, modes of intervention, and the international system in which foreign military presence operates have seen changes.

Third, the previous foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa was considered to be a total domination of foreign powers over the sovereignty of regional states. Save Ethiopia, the nineteenth-century foreign military presence totally overlaid the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa. In the same way, during the Cold War, foreign military presence cast a dark cloud on the regional conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the states in the Horn of Africa have achieved a more regional autonomy and a stronger position in their relations with foreign powers in recent years. The recent great power military presence in the Horn of Africa lacks the same level of strong ideological motivation, and the states in the Horn of Africa increased their leverage with regard to the foreign military presence in their territories.

However, there are continuities between previous foreign military interventions and the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. In the first place, in the past and in recent times, foreign powers have been extending their military forces to secure their self-serving interests. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Portuguese and the Ottoman Turks vied for maritime supremacy to control the Red Sea trade routes. In the nineteenth century, colonial powers projected their military forces into the Horn of Africa to achieve their strategic and economic interests. Britain needed the Somali mutton production to feed its military forces deployed in Aden, Yemen. Italy tried to engage in agricultural investments in fertile regions of the Shebelle River in Somalia. France worked hard to control the Ethiopian import and export trade. In recent years, foreign powers have extended their military presence in the Horn of Africa to find markets for their factory products, fertile agricultural

lands, and investment opportunities. Saudi Arabia, China, and Türkiye need African raw materials to sustain their domestic economies. These economic resources are transported through the Red Sea. Thus, the importance of the Red Sea region for the global economy has continued until these days.

Added to the above realities, the foreign powers have had collaborators and opponents. In the past, tribal leaders and kings collaborated with external powers. In recent times, political leaders, presidents, and political elites have cooperated with external powers to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa. This has resulted in the continuation of patron-client relations between foreign powers and the political elites in the Horn of Africa. To meet their interests, foreign powers supplied military arms and material resources and extended their political support to their client political elites in the Horn of Africa. In turn, political leaders in the Horn of Africa provided military bases and resources and served as security agents.

Above all, the function and character of foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa have continued until today. In the nineteenth century, the military bases of European colonial powers were equipped with modern military armaments. In recent times, foreign powers have been equipped with modern military armaments. In both cases, foreign military presence has furthered the intervention capabilities of projecting powers. For example, in the mid-1930s, Italy used its military bases in Massawa and Mogadishu as staging areas to project its military forces into the heart of Ethiopia. During the Cold War, foreign military bases served as the infrastructure for war making. The same has continued in recent times. Foreign powers have used their military bases as staging areas to facilitate their military operations in the Red Sea region. The Saudi base at Assab Port served to execute its military operation against the Houthis. The US base in Djibouti has been serving to fight non-state actors in the Horn of Africa. China and Türkiye have a heavy military presence in the Horn of Africa. This is to project their spheres of influence into other parts of Africa.

Now and then, in the course of history, external security actors exported their foreign rivalries into the Horn of Africa. These dynamics have exacerbated regional conflicts and changed the regional power distribution. For example, a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa in the late nineteenth century resulted in arbitrary boundary demarcations and landlocked states. These external military interventions have brought weak and incoherent states to the Horn of Africa. The Cold War proxy wars between the US and the Soviet Union took advantage of these regional qualities of the

Horn of Africa. These weak and incoherent states have continued to create fertile ground for the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's recent landlocked status is a legacy of European colonialism in the late nineteenth century. Ethiopia's quest for access to the sea forced the Red Sea littoral states to work with foreign powers. Thus, one of the explanations for the present foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa is the regional quality of the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, the presence of natural resources, the beginning of extraction, and the utilization of these resources in the Horn of Africa significantly increased the strategic importance of the region. For example, the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the Horn of Africa attracted foreign powers. In deed, a number of external security actors are extending and consolidating their military presence in the Horn of Africa. Examining the military presence of all foreign powers in the Horn of Africa is beyond the scope of research. As a result, instead of dealing with all the projecting powers, the focus of the present research is delimited to the military presence of America, China, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia. These foreign powers are selected based on their role in changing the behavior of the Horn regional states, their deep military presence, and their justification of power projection. These four powers have their own justifications for military projection into the Horn of Africa. Their justification generally falls into three categories: commercial interests, maintaining hegemony, and getting client states in the Horn of Africa. China extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa to achieve its commercial interests (investments, raw materials, and market access). For China, its deep military presence is due to the economic opportunity to export its reserves, laborers, and even factory products to the Horn of Africa. To facilitate its economic activities, China introduced the BRI project in 2013. With the introduction of BRI, the security presence of China in the Horn of Africa has increased. Türkiye extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa to secure its commercial interests (export military hardware and other factory products). Besides, Türkiye justifies its military presence in the Horn of Africa to show that it is a responsible rising great power. In addition, Türkiye projects its military presence in the Horn of Africa to deter the presence of rival foreign powers. Türkiye applies humanitarian policy in the Horn of Africa. This soft power strategy is aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people at the grass-roots level in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has a number of justifications to extend its military presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia considers the Horn of Africa as its natural security perimeter. Riyadh does not want to see the presence of rival powers such as Türkiye and Iran in the Red Sea region. Besides, Saudi Arabia extended its military presence in the Horn of Africa to exploit the region's agricultural potential. In

addition, Saudi Arabia has considered the Horn of Africa a staging area to fight the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia applies economic statecraft such as dollar diplomacy and direct financial support to access military bases in the Horn of Africa. The US is working strongly to maintain its existing dominance in the Horn of Africa. It is working to thwart the presence of rival great powers such as China and Russia in the Horn of Africa. America uses economic statecraft, political pressures, and proxy forces to maintain its dominant position in the Horn of Africa.

As already indicated, the four listed foreign powers have common strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. All projecting powers consider the Horn of Africa a natural gateway to other parts of Africa. This is because, China, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are working to expand their presence in many parts of Africa. Moreover, they consider the Horn of Africa as the pivotal point for expanding their presence in other parts of the African continent. America, on the other hand, is working hard to maintain a dominant position in the Horn of Africa. From these analyses, it is clear that the projecting powers have competing interests and different means of achieving their interests in the Horn of Africa. There is competition for clients' votes, ports, bases, resources, and markets. Thus, America and China have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. Besides, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have competitive relations in the Horn of Africa. Currently, China has smooth relations with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the matters of regional peace in the Horn of Africa. However, their relations could be turned into competitive relations in the Horn of Africa soon. Three of them need natural resources and client states in the Horn of Africa. Three of them are working to widen their spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa making competition inevitable. To make matters even worse, the US's relations with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye in the Horn of Africa are unpredictable.

The competitive relations among external security actors in the Horn of Africa have negative security implications in many ways. One thing is that foreign powers changed the conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia, for example, mediated the Ethiopian and Eritrean border conflicts in 2018. Yet, the procedure to settle the Horn regional conflicts has several criticisms. It was elite-based, non-transparent, and exclusive. It did not take all the concerned bodies around the table. For example, the exclusion of the TPLF from the peace process has resulted in uneasy relations between the Tigray forces and the Ethiopian federal government. This has regional implications and has created fertile ground for external interventions. Second, foreign military presence has resulted in the extension of extra-regional rivalries into the Horn of Africa. For example, the extension of the Middle

Eastern regional rivalries and the Indo-Pacific great power competition in the Horn of Africa exacerbated the regional conflict dynamics. Still another way seems that the extension of foreign security alliances undermined the Horn's regional security governance. For example, the extension of the Red Sea Forum security alliance in the Horn of Africa has hindered regional security governance and regional cooperation. In other words, instead of promoting regional cooperation, all the basing powers preferred to work bilaterally with each state in the Horn of Africa. These bilateral relations between foreign powers and the host states in the Horn of Africa hindered the growth of indigenous security governance. And finally, bilateral relations between basing powers and host states in the Horn of Africa promoted patron-client relations. This has led to asymmetrical security relations between Horn regional states and foreign powers. Thus, the Horn regional governments have started to execute foreign interests in the region.

The negative implications of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa are exacerbated by the lack of common response strategies. The regional states in the Horn of Africa do not have unified response strategies to the new foreign military presence in the region. Based on their interests, some states in the Horn of Africa welcomed a foreign military presence into their territories. While other states in the Horn of Africa tried to follow a selective foreign policy strategy. The new foreign military presence has become a source of income for the Red Sea littoral states. For example, Djibouti collects close to $300 million in military base rents. Accordingly, Djibouti welcomed the foreign military presence on its soil. Eritrea and Somalia tried to follow selective foreign policy strategies. However, other states in the Horn of Africa securitized the new foreign military presence in the region. Ethiopia, a landlocked state in the Horn of Africa, securitized the new foreign military presence. As a result, the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has become a security concern for some states.

The present research has a number of contributions. The first contribution is to fill the gap in the existing literature on foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. The focus of the previous studies was on bilateral security relations between a Horn regional state and another foreign power. Besides, most of the previous studies were based on Western military interventions in the Horn of Africa. The military interventions of Asian and Middle Eastern powers did not get enough attention. In addition, the previous studies focused on the role of foreign powers in fighting transnational security threats in the Horn of Africa. There are few studies on the recent foreign military presence

in the Horn of Africa. Taking the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, the present research fills a gap in the existing literature. Accordingly, the original contribution of the present study lies primarily in terms of expanding the frontier of knowledge on the relations between the four foreign powers and their regional security implications. In doing so, this study seeks to act as a starting point for further research on the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Another benefit of the present research is its policy contribution. A comprehensive study of the new foreign military presence is important for the relevant policymakers. Hence, the result of the present research will benefit state and military leaders, foreign policymakers, and regional organizations. These entities will use the results of the present research to come up with a collective response strategy and proactive policies aimed at protecting the Horn of Africa from the negative effects of foreign military presence in the region.

Though the present dissertation examined the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa, it has certain limitations. These limitations are explained in three general categories. First, the issue of foreign military presence is a sensitive security development in the Horn of Africa. Getting relevant key informants to answer research questions was a major challenge. This has resulted in a lack of appropriate data. Had I accessed the senior diplomats and military attachés been communicated, the result of the study would have been complete. Second, the study was conducted in Addis Ababa. However, the research needs field visits in the Red Sea littoral states, where external security actors have established their military bases. This field visit needs a significant amount of financial resources. Nevertheless, I faced a shortage of financial resources to conduct field visits in the Red Sea littoral states. My failure to conduct field visits in the Red Sea littoral states reduced the quality of the study. Third, the focus of the present research is on the four projecting powers in the Horn of Africa. Apart from Saudi Arabia, the US, China, and Türkiye, there are other foreign powers projecting their military presence into the Horn of Africa. Had one conducted all the foreign powers, it would have been possible to capture the full picture of foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

While this research has its limitations, there are a range of issues to be explored, too numerous to mention here, on which further research is warranted. For example, a rigorous study could be conducted on the implications of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa from a social perspective. These scholars could conduct an in-depth study using a mixed research design. This is

aimed at determining the impact of a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Using a quantitative research approach, other scholars could also conduct the correlation between the prevalence of violent conflicts and the engagement of foreign powers in natural resource extraction in the Horn of Africa. Besides, other scholars could conduct research in the areas of violent crimes committed by foreign soldiers, land loss, and environmental pollution. In addition, other researchers could study the military presence of Japan, the Emirates, and the European Union member states in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, security analysts, military attachés, and diplomats who have access to first-hand data on the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa could bring new insights. In so doing, knowledge of the recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa could be broadened. This would give the full picture of the foreign military presence and its negative security implications. By extension, based on the full picture of the research findings from different perspectives, the Horn policymakers would issue appropriate policies for the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa.

8.2 **Recommendations**

The recent foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa has brought major security challenges to the region. To reduce the negative influence of external military presence, there are a number of issues to be considered. First, one of the major contributing factors to the advent of foreign powers is the domestic problems of the states in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, the states in the Horn of Africa must work on resolving their internal security problems. They must solve the grievances among ethnic groups. If not properly resolved, the domestic problem will have regional security implications. Accordingly, regional states must work hard to bring peace and security to their internal affairs. Besides, the states in the Horn of Africa have to strengthen their smooth relations. This leads to regional cooperation and, by extension, regional integration. In addition, the Horn regional states have to take greater responsibility for tackling non-traditional security threats. This will reduce the need for a foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa. Strengthening regional security capacities is, therefore, a means of reducing external security intervention.

Second, states in the Horn of Africa should follow a multilateral and collective approach to the new foreign military presence in the region. Instead of bilateral relations, the Horn regional governments have to come up with comprehensive regional policies to conduct their relations with foreign powers. This is done by the regional security alliances. These security alliances should be repeated to strengthen commercial relations. In particular, infrastructure investments, such as the construction of roads and railways are important for regional cooperation. The recent initiative to establish the 'Horn of Africa Cooperation' is a good move to protect the Horn of Africa from external military intervention. Besides, the Horn regional states have to work together to strengthen the capacity of the existing regional organizations. For example, the Horn regional governments have to strengthen IGAD. The Horn regional governments have to transfer and surrender some of their sovereign rights to this regional organization. This enables IGAD to have supranational organizational status.

Third**,** the Horn of Africa's leaders, and African state leaders in general have to understand that Africa is placed at the center of contemporary global political economy. Africa is rich in hydrocarbon resources, mineral resources, and fertile agricultural land. This is a huge asset for the continent. Thus, to become an important international player in world politics, four points have to be taken into consideration. To begin with, African states should follow a pragmatic foreign policy strategy in current international relations. This is to respond based on the changing realities at the regional and

global levels. African leaders still must work hard in the areas of accountability, transparency, and governance. A mere resource endowment will not take Africa anywhere. African resources should be effectively and efficiently used for the betterment of Africans. The states in the Horn of Africa must establish an independent think tank that conducts research in the areas of military strategy, national security, and international relations. To be more successful, staff assignments in these institutions should be based on meritocracy. These professionals have to be trained in the areas of international security, international relations, global political economy, and other related fields. The result of the research is aimed at providing policymakers with information about the origin of security threats, patterns of security threats, and their trends. This enables policymakers to make informed security policy decisions and take proactive measures. More than anything else, African leaders should arrange African leaders' summits in Africa. Instead of going to Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow, and Ankara, African leaders have to arrange summits in Africa.

Last but not least, the governments in the Horn of Africa have to separate their personal interests from their states' interests. In other words, the articulation and communication of national interests should consider the interests of the people. Each state in the Horn of Africa has to come up with a transparent and inclusive foreign policy towards external military forces. Two points stand out. First, military base agreements have to be transparent to the general public. It should not be secretive. Second, the Horn regimes should promote participatory foreign policymaking strategies. The recent move by Ethiopia to revise the 2002 foreign policy document is a positive step. However, issuing a very smart foreign policy document is not enough. In the revision process, the government must include professionals trained in foreign and security policies. Essentially, attention has to be given to the implementation of foreign policies. In the implementation phase, rather than regime security, the security of people has to be given a top priority. Moreover, the appointment of diplomats should be merit-based instead of based on political loyalty.

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Appendices

List of Key-Informant Interviews

No	Name	Position	Work Place	Interview Date	Interview Place
1	Key Informant One	Security Expert	FDRE, Ministry of Defense	June 25, 2022	Addis Ababa
2	Key Informant Two	Security Analyst	African Union	June 13, 2023	Addis Ababa
3	Key informant Three	Senior TPLF Official	Lecturer, Mekele University	June 13, 2021	Addis Ababa
4	Key Informant Four	Middle Eastern Security Analyst	Private	May 1, 2022	Addis Ababa
5	Abdillahi Aden Omar	Director of IEPS	Djibouti, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	November 24, 2022	Addis Ababa
6	Abebe Muluneh	Security Sector Program Director	Expert at IGAD September 23, 2023).	January 26, 2021	Addis Ababa
7	Ali Onur	Security Expert	Ege University, Turkiye	June 28, 2024	Addis Ababa
8	Amare Kenaw	Security Expert	Institute of Strategic Studies, Ethiopia	September 23, 2023	Addis Ababa
9	Belaineh Sergualem	Export and Import Trader	Private	April 22, 2022	Addis Ababa
10	Biruke Terrefe	Scholar	Oxford University	March 26, 2024	Addis Ababa
11	Bulti	Commandant	FDRE,	October 29, 2022	Addis Ababa

	Tadesse	War College	The War College		
12	Adem Tesfaye	Security Expert	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	October 28, 2022	Addis Ababa
13	Donelli, Federico	International Relations Expert	University of Trieste, Italy	February 10, 2024	Addis Ababa
14	Berk Baran	Diplomat	Turkish Ambssador to Ethiopia	June 28, 2024	Addis Ababa
15	Gaas Mohammed	Horn Security Expert	Private	November 22, 2022	Addis Ababa
16	Dareskedar Taye	Security Analyst	Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia	July 3, 2023	Addis Ababa
17	Elem Eyrice	Security Expert	University of Ankara, Turkiye	June 28, 2024	Addis Ababa
18	Fesseha Shawl	General Director, African Affairs	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	October 24, 2023	Addis Ababa
19	Fesseha Shawl	General Director, African Affairs	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	July 28, 2022	Addis Ababa
20	Fikreyesus Hailu	Military Expert	FDRE, Ministry of Defense	June 20, 2022	Addis Ababa
21	Getachew Mokonnen	Strategic Expert	FDRE, Institute of Foreign Affairs	January 15, 2021	Addis Ababa
22	Hussein Ali	Somalia Strategic Expert	Somalia Security Studies	August 7, 2022	Addis Ababa
23	Handy	Director,	Institute of Security Studies	October 26, 2022	Addis Ababa

	Paul	East Africa Region			
24	Henok Getachew	Strategic Expert	FDRE, Institute of Foreign Affairs	September 29,2022	Addis Ababa
25	Ibrahim Idris	International Law Expert	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	August 5, 2022	Addis Ababa
26	Istvan Tarossy	Expert on Asia-Africa Relations	Private	January 27, 2023	Addis Ababa
27	Jemaluddin Mustafa	Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	December 23, 2023	Addis Ababa
28	Jemaluddin Mustafa	Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	January 30, 2024	Addis Ababa
29	Kurtz Gerrit	Security Expert	Researcher for Africa and the Middle East	October 24, 2023	Addis Ababa
30	Lawrence Freeman	Political Economy Analyst	US Based Political-Economy Scholar	December 23, 2022	Addis Ababa
31	Markos Tekle	Former Deputy Foreign Minister	FDRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	December 20, 2019	Addis Ababa
32	Kaariye M. Barkhad	Deputy Ambassador	Somaliland Embassy in Ethiopia	November 29, 2022	Addis Ababa
33	Mustefa Kemal	Deputy Ambassador	Turkish Embassy to Ethiopia	October 23, 2022	Addis Ababa
34	Sabala, Kizito	Scholar from the Horn of Africa	Senior Researcher, The University of Nairobi	March 26, 2024	Addis Ababa

35	Salih Mohammed	African Scholar	Emeritus Professor, University of Leiden Netherlands	October 11, 2022	Addis Ababa
36	Samira Gaid	Horn of Africa Security Analyst	The Hiraal Institute Executive Director	November 29, 2022	Addis Ababa
37	Tadele Mulat	China and Africa Economic Expert	Debre Markos University	October 27, 2023	Addis Ababa
38	Tekeda Alemu	Private	FDRE, Retired Senior Diplomat	October 22,2022	Addis Ababa
39	Wang Burd	China Embassy Chief Officer	Chinese Embassy to Ethiopia	October 23, 2023	Addis Ababa
40	Yanting Deng	Security Expert	China Africa Security	June 15, 2023	Addis Ababa
41	Ylonen Alexis	Senior Security Analyst	The Center for International Studies University of Lisbon	September 29, 2022	Addis Ababa
42	Zhang Heyi	Amharic Student from China	Addis Ababa University Confucius Institute	October 27, 2022	Addis Ababa
43	Zoltan, Voros	Private	Expert on China -Africa Economic Relations	January 27, 2023	Addis Ababa
44	Yonas Ashine	Scholar	Addis Ababa University	January 13, 2022	Addis Ababa

Interview Guide Questions

Interview Guide Questions for Ethiopian Policymakers, Scholars and Strategic Thinkers

How has Ethiopia considered the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa?

What implications did foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa affect the Ethiopian security?

How has the new foreign military presence in the Horn region affected Ethiopian relations with the the states in the Horn of Africa?

How is Ethiopia responding to the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa?

What are the new foreign and security policies that Ethiopia has been following to protect its national security? How do you see their effectiveness?

Interview Guide Questions for US Policymakers, Strategic Thinkers and Scholars

How do you evaluate the performance of US security activities in the Horn of Africa?

What are the patterns of US relations with other basing states in the Horn of Africa?

What are the patterns of US relations with the host states and other Horn regional states? What strategies the US used to extend its military presence in the Horn of Africa?

In the 2000s, the US projected its military power into the Horn of Africa to fight terrorism and other non-state actors. Now, the threats of terrorist actors have been declined. Why has the US maintained its military forces in the Horn region in recent times?

What will be the future fate of the Horn of Africa amid the concentration of foreign powers from different parts of the world?

Recently, the US withdrew its military forces from Somalia. What are the factors for its withdrawal and what will be the implications of the US withdrawal to Somalia and to other Horn regional states?

Interview Guide Questions for Turkish Scholars and Diplomats

Why has Türkiye selected Somalia for its military presence?

What foreign policy strategies you employed to extend military presence in the Horn of Africa?

What are the patterns of your state's relations with Somalia and other Horn regional states?

What are the main interests of Türkiye in the Horn of Africa in general and Somalia in particular?

What is the role of Turkish military presence for the regional peace of the Horn of Africa?

Interview Guide Questions for Chinese Scholars, Diplomats and Strategic Thinkers

What is the role of China in the regional peace and security of the Horn of Africa?

What are the patterns of Chinese relations with other basing states in the Horn region?

What are the patterns of Chinese relations with the host states and other Horn regional states?

What are the main interests of the Chinese military presence in the Horn region?

What are the manifestations of the Chinese military presence in the Horn region?

What methods and techniques has China been using to deploy its military forces?

Interview Guide Questions for the Djiboutian Scholars and Diplomats

What is the implication of a foreign military presence in Djibouti for regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa?

How has the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa affected your state's relations with other regional states?

What is the contribution of the foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa to regional peace and security?

What are the strategies the foreign powers have used to deploy their military powers in Djibouti?

What policies and strategies do the Horn states together take to reduce the negative impact of foreign military presence in the Horn region?

How has the presence of foreign powers helped Djibouti in terms of security and economic development?

Interview Guide Questions for Somalia and Somalilnads' Diplomats

How do you consider the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa?

What is the implication of the Turkish military presence in Somalia for regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa?

What is the implication of foreign military presence on the Horn regional states relations?

How has the new Turkish military presence in the Horn region affected your state's relations with other regional states?

What new foreign policy is your state following to avert the new security risk in the Horn region?

What policy strategies do the states in the Horn of Africa together take to reduce the negative impact of foreign military presence in the Horn region?

Interview Guide Questions for Scholars, Strategic Thinkers, and Horn Security Analysts

How do you consider the new foreign military presence in the Horn region? What explains the new dynamics? What are the driving forces that push foreign powers to establish military bases?

What is the implication of the multiplicity of external security actors in the Horn of Africa regional security dynamics?

What is the implication of foreign military presence on the Horn regional states relations?

With its strategic location and a significant decrease in non-state actors, why are both great and regional powers extending their military presence in recent times?

What new foreign policy should each state in the Horn of Africa follow to reduce the negative impact of the presence of contending great powers in the region?

What theories and concepts explain the new advent of foreign military forces in the Horn of Africa?

Interview Guide Questions for both Regional and Continental Orgnizations

How do you consider the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa?

What is the implication the presence of foreign powers in the Horn's regional security dynamics?

What is the implication of foreign military presence in the Horn regional states' relations?

How has the new foreign military presence in the Horn of Africa affected regional conflict resolution, regional process integration, and the Horn states 'relations with other states?

What new foreign policy are these regional organizations taking in order to protect the Horn region from external influences?