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SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDY

THE DILEMMA OF POST-ADWA ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: VICTORIES IN MILITARY BATTLEFIELDS VS. SETBACKS IN DIPLOMACY

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Leul Seyoum

November, 2025

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ABSTRACT

The study attempted to examines the underlying factor behind why successive Ethiopian regimes are constrained in their foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations albeit their victories in military battlefields. Accordingly, the thesis argues that internal, regional and global political dynamics affect Ethiopia's foreign policymaking and executions in post-Adowa period. The study used secondary sources of data; collected from relevant archives, documents, and literature. To substantiate and supplement the secondary data, the study also used primary data collected through key informant interview. Given the data gathered are qualitative, the study employed qualitative data analysis techniques. The finding of the study revealed that there is inseparable connection found between the military engagements of the Ethiopian state and the corresponding diplomatic strategies that have been employed in the post-war diplomacy period. Despite, a shift in orientation and style of foreign policy, domestic factors, and external factors remain the defining factors that constrains Ethiopian foreign policymaking and executions of post Adwa period. Beholding the trajectory of Ethiopian foreign policy post Adwa period, there is continuity amidst change. As a continuity, the core objective of ensuring national survival, territorial integrity, and regime survival remains a constant. Domestic and external factors consistently interact to shape the post Adwa period Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy. As a change, an "inside-out," economic diplomacy-oriented strategy (post-1991) that prioritises economic development and regional economic integration has replaced the military/security-focused "outside-in" approach (pre-1991). The use of military engagements giving way to multilateral diplomacy based on soft power.

Key words: War, Diplomacy, Ethiopia, Military, Foreign policy.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A.D.	Anno Domini
AU	African Union
EPLF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
IR	International Relation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
Ph.D.	Doctor of Philosophy
P.M.A.C.	Provisional Military Administrative Council
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
W.P.E	Workers Party of Ethiopia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Every state develops its foreign policy that defines how it will conduct its relations with other states. The formation of policy revolves around a few basic, essentially self-serving principles mostly guided by the set of objectives that defend and protect its interests. Therefore, a nation's foreign policy is a collection of objectives that specify how the states will engage with other states on an economic, political, social, and military level as well as, to a lesser degree, with non-state actors (Webber & Smith, 2000). Consequently, by the foreign policy of a state mean its behaviour regarding the environment outside its territory. In contrast to international relations, it categorises phenomena from the standpoint of a single state rather than the world or global perspectives. Thus, foreign policy is the outcome of the community's ongoing efforts to either change the external environment to fit its own interests or change its interests to suit the evolving global environment (Dunne, 1997).

Historians, officials, and theorists of international relations characterize foreign policy behaviour in terms of patterned or recurring decisions and actions by governments (Holsti, 1970). In international politics, then, the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) derive primarily from policymakers' role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment (Dunn & Shaw, 2001).

Foreign policy also raises issues of survival and security, which cannot be left to the leaders alone to decide. The traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy is no longer viable in these days. The increasing interdependence of national economies and, specifically, the growing interdependence on economic conditions abroad compel states to address the problems arising from the pressures of conflicting national interests and the need for international cooperation. The broad issues of energy, trade, investment, and monetary and fiscal policy must be defined in an international context. These issues touch all interests, though differently, and cannot be isolated from one another. Foreign policy has become a key factor in every state senator’s or parliamentarians’ re-election campaigns calculations. Thus, Foreign policy is a political decision in which a state identifies and defines its external goals in which national interests to be realized through skilful diplomacy (Dunne, 1997).

Although the terms "foreign policy" and "diplomacy" are sometimes used interchangeably, they are not the same. Diplomacy is one of the vital instruments through which foreign policy decisions are implemented and policy objectives are achieved. It is a purposeful dialogue among states about the business of their interactions (Hurd. 2011). As Barston (2006:1) also asserted:

> *Diplomacy is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors. From a state perspective, diplomacy is concerned with advising, shaping and implementing foreign policy. As such it is the means by which states through their formal and other representatives, as well as other actors, articulate, co-ordinate and secure particular or wider interests, using correspondence, private talks, exchanges of view, lobbying, visits, threats and other related activities.*

In this sense, diplomacy is the art of balancing the diverse and frequently conflicting interests of states to the benefit of the state the diplomat represents, while also, where feasible, maintaining cordial ties with other governments. Additionally, diplomacy is the best means of projecting, defending, and safeguarding national interests and image (Krugman, 1991).

The diplomatic history of Africa, unlike Africa's political, religious and economic history, has attracted very little scholarly attention (Ram, 1986). The same is true of the space allotted to studying international relations in Africa, which stems from the false belief that the continent exclusively experiences humanitarian catastrophes rather than significant politics (Smith, 1973). Western IR theory, as a by-product of modernity, is thus predicated on the essential marginalisation of Africa and other non-Western domains of knowledge. In his seminal work Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau surprisingly said that Africa had no history prior to World War II and was a "politically empty space" (1973: 369). This might enormously have led one to think that Africa did not have a tradition of diplomacy and international relations, negating the true African experience. Next to Egypt, Ethiopia is one of the oldest African states with a long history of tradition of foreign relations and diplomacy (Ram, 1986:1).

Ethiopia had a substantial, if frequently interrupted, lengthy history of diplomatic engagement with the outside world from the Axumite Empire to the Middle Ages (Pankhurst, 1967). Ethiopia's interactions with the outside world increased significantly during the nineteenth century, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and its desire to preserve its political independence and cultural identity became increasingly complex and serious. Ethiopian foreign relations took viable shape during emperor Tewodros II (1855-

1868), although it began to take modern form under Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) (Keller, 1987:78).

Besides its victories over her enemies in battlefields, Ethiopia's diplomacy for much of its existence has served the survival of the nation. The fruits of diplomacy were used to assist the state in maintaining its territorial continuity. But these were not without any constraints (Keller, 1987). Ethiopia struggled continuously and persistently against colonial expansion during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It successfully resisted determined assaults by the Ottomans of Egypt, by the Mahdists of the Sudan, and by the Italian who were engulfing her Red sea coastlines (Rubenson, I976).

Ethiopia's struggle for independence was climaxed in the battle of Adwa in 1896 where she justified herself by beating Italy and nullifying Italian claims of protectorate over her. By so doing, Ethiopia distinguished herself as the only African nation to defeat an imperial power and contain the forward progress of the colonial powers on the Horn, Britain, France and Italy. Signing boundary treaties, although by those same treaties her own expansion towards the sea was being checked (Keller, 1987).

1.2. Statements of the problem

Ethiopia had fought many battles to safeguard its independence against foreign invasions. The battles of Gundat (1875), Gura (1876), Dogali (1887), and Adwa (1896) epitomize this fact, where foreign invaders, Egyptians in the first two cases, and Italians in the last two, were defeated by the Ethiopians. Nor have the battles of Megdela (1868) and Metemma (1889) led to acrimonious debates as to their significance in Ethiopian history (Bahru, 2013 and Rubenson, I976). Besides these important historical facts, in 1978 Ethiopians had beaten the Somali forces demanding to absorb the Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia into the republic of Somalia and defeated Eritrea during the Ethio–Eritrean 1998-2000 war. The fruits of these achievements in battels were assumed to assist its foreign policy and diplomatic endeavour's in maintaining its national interest as military victory is to create fertile grounds for cooperation with other states, besides its destroying and disrupting enemy alliances (Gaddis, 2005). Although Ethiopians had attained such remarkable historical achievements in the theatre of wars against their enemy, there are debates and controversies toward Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy in consummating these achievements and success towards the national interest of the state throughout her history (Opris, 2012 and Healy, 2008).

Ethiopia's constrained in diplomacy, according to some observers, emanated from external factors that linked to regional, global, structural and geopolitical position context especially during the colonial and Post-Adowa period. During this period, besides their divide and conquer policy, European diplomacy either involved trickery treaties with African leaders or refused to comply with the treaties they had agreed upon with the respective leaders. Ethiopia was not exclusive to this one. Good examples for these were the Hewett Treaty (also known as 'Adwa Treaty') of 1884 signed between Emperor Yohannes and Rear-Admiral Sir William Hewett of Great Britain and Wuchalé Treaty of 1889 signed between Emperor Menelik and Count Pietro Antonelli of Italy (Natsoulas, 1985 and Bahru, 2013). Both the British and the Italians refused to comply with the terms they had signed with the respective Emperors, and Italy particularly even went as far as claiming protectorate right over Ethiopia by using deliberate mistranslation of Article 17 of the Wuchalé Treaty. Emperor Hilasselasse too faced a similar fate at the League of Nations, when Ethiopia was occupied by Fascist Italy in 1935. Britain and France had worked out a secret plan pursuant to the 1906 tripartite treaty which was to enable Mussolini to take most of Ethiopia quietly, though they were unsuccessful. Others also argued that Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy throughout its history and extending to the contemporary era have been subject to pressure from the approximate world around it and from geopolitical position of the country itself. Given the depth of historic strategic rivalry with Egypt, and potentially with a militant state in the Gulf, the range of immediate threats from neighbours, and the number of potential flashpoints (Whealey, 1967 and Negussay, 1977)

On the other hand, internal factors stemming from the nature of its political system also played a great role in diplomatic handicapped (Crummey, 1974). The Ethiopian political system is a slowly evolving system with deep roots in medieval times and theocratic traditions. Levine (2013) also described the Ethiopian political traditions characterised by a culture of mistrust. An ethos of deceptive tactical plotting worked well for a social order when obtaining property rights was so important. It was unacceptable for critical opinions to be publicly voiced in a political system where rank and power depended on rigorous obedience to superior patrons; instead, they had to be communicated covertly. People found it difficult to build trust as a result of that order, and they were constantly on the lookout for deceitful tactics and ulterior motives. "Rivalry and disunity were, indeed, prevalent facts in the shaping of Ethiopian politics…. This is a political tradition which in many cases saw

foreign forces as pawns to be used to further one's local interests'' (Rubenson,1976: 404). Because of the lack of democratic governance and participation in the public policy arena, the political system and decision-making processes revolved around the leaders. It was not subject to the arenas of public opinion and debates. Although it had structured institutions for decision-making nothing of any significance was outside the leaders' overriding prerogative. Foreign relations were among one of the political acts that claimed much of leaders' time and energy for the last century and more. Public opinions are rarely incorporated in the foreign policy-making of the state (Negussay, 1977). As a result, foreign policy lacked a firm base (Crummey, 1974).

The contemporary debate among scholars is that one hundred plus years after the Battle of Adwa, Ethiopia again faced another diplomatic constraint. They argued that after its victory in a war with newly independent states of Eritrea, Ethiopia signed the 2002 Algiers Agreement which compromise Ethiopia's right access to the sea (Abebe, 2007). By June 2000, Ethiopia had decisively gained the military upper hand. But rather than pressing home its advantage on the battlefield, the Ethiopian government declared its war aims achieved by signing the 2002 Algiers Agreement and settled for international arbitration on the contested border. The boundary between the two nations had never been clearly demarcated. Ethiopia had the chance to claim to access the sea through Assab by appealing to international body. However, this was a missed opportunity for Ethiopia as the regime in Addis Ababa has adopted an official policy that is contrary to the long-term security and economic interest of the country. Ethiopia has all the historical, legal, economic and national security claims to Assab. Since the country's economic future as a landlocked country is very dismal and unsustainable (Getachew, 2010).

The Algiers Agreement gave life to dead Colonial Agreements between Menelik II and Italy, made in 1900, 1902 and 1908 (Abebe,2007). As Opris (2012) noted, the latter one was the worst of all which divides the Afar People in parallel distance, 60km from the mainland Ethiopia from the Red Sea coast. Many intellectuals and political parties contend that the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties between Ethiopia and Colonial Italy cannot be the basis for resolving the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abebe, 2007).

The purpose of this study was to investigate the underlying factor behind why successive Ethiopian regimes are constrained in their foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations albeit

their victories in military battlefields. The determinants of Ethiopian foreign policy involve a complex interplay of internal and external factors that have evolved across different regimes. Attempts are thus made to examine how internal, regional and global political dynamics affect Ethiopia's foreign policy making and diplomatic negotiations in post-Adowa period. Informed by a conceptual and theoretical perspective of different models (discussed in the next chapter), the study examines the dilemma of post-Adwa Ethiopia's foreign policy corresponding to victories in military battlefields against setbacks in diplomacy.

1.3. The objective of the study

The study seeks to address the following general and specific objectives.

1. 3. 1. General Objective

The general objective of the study is to examine the dilemma of post-Adwa Ethiopia's foreign policy in line with victories in military battlefields against setbacks in diplomacy.

1. 3.2. Specific Objectives

In the light of the general objective of the study, this study seeks to address the following specific objectives.

i) Elucidate the foundation of Ethiopian foreign policy post- Adwa period;

ii) Examines Major Military Engagements and Post-wars Diplomatic Settlements post-Adwa period

iii) Appraise factors that constrained Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy post-Adwa period;

1. 4. Research questions

This study will examine and analyse the following research questions:

1) What were the foundation of modern period Ethiopian foreign policy?
2) What were major military engagements and post-war diplomatic settlements?
3) What were factors that constrained Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy?

1.5. Methodology and Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

1.5.1 Methodology

Qualitative research, as Dawson (2007: 15) outlined, explores "attitudes, behaviour and experiences." This approach is used to address research questions that require explanation or

understanding of social phenomena and their contexts. The question of 'what', 'how' and 'why' can be answered by using qualitative approach (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).

Therefore, methodologically, this thesis relied on the use of the qualitative approach that adopts historical-comparative and explorative approach to analyse of Ethiopia's foreign policy over the past century of post Adwa periods. The qualitative research methodology allowed for a rich, contextual, and nuanced exploration of the historical, political, and diplomatic factors shaping the country's engagement with the international community (Denscombe, 2007; Ritche and Lewis, 2003; Kothari, 2004). Tracing historically Ethiopia's military engagement's and its implications on its foreign relations, the study thoroughly examined Ethiopia's foreign relations legacies and constrains over the past hundred years. It investigated various aspects of the country's diplomatic practices, historical developments, military engagements and relations, and the impact of regime differences on its foreign relations for which qualitative research gives a plant of opportunities to integrate multiple data sources. As a result, it gave due emphasis to the history of the country and make deep analysis to explain comparatively the post-Adwa's Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy to find out why Ethiopia retarded in diplomatic arenas while beating her enemies in military battlegrounds.

1.5.2 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

The study used both secondary and primary sources of data. The primary sources of data such as archives, treaties, and official statements by public bodies, peace accords and news releases. In depth interviews form the basic source of primary data for this research. In-depth interviews enable researchers to explore the feelings and experiences of people in detail. In light of this, semi-structured in-depth interviews employed to explore the views of the selected key informants. Key informants are those individuals who have a privileged social position in the research setting, which in turn gives them specialist knowledge about other people, processes and happenings (Payne and Payne, 2004). Information from key informants is valuable and useful, since it is likely to be more extensive, detailed and privileged than ordinary peoples (Ibid). For this study 2 key informants were selected purposively on the basis of their specialist knowledge and positions they have occupied from Ethiopian Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2 key informants selected from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 1 key informant was academicians and scholars having knowhow on the subject matters totally 5 were selected purposively and interviewed based on the semi-structured questions adopted for this study.

For collection of secondary data, the study was based on extensive library work (secondary source) collected from the archives and public records such as books, journal articles, periodicals, selected internet sources, and other published and unpublished materials, through qualitative documentary analysis.

1.5.3. Data Analysis and Interpretation

The study utilized an explorative and historical-descriptive analytical approach to thoroughly process and integrate the collected historical qualitative data from multiple sources. This enabled the researcher to develop a pattern for the complex and multifaceted nature of Ethiopia's foreign relations over the past century.

1.5.4. Ethical Consideration

The study used key Informant Interview as a method of data collection. As a result, from the beginning to the end of the data collection process ethical issues were given due attention. The participation of respondents was solely on informed consent. In relation to this, the informants were transparently and duly informed the aim of the study and made sure that no harm would be implicated as a result of the study.

An essential component of research ethics is protecting the identity and privacy of informants. My informants' confidentiality in this thesis is therefore safeguarded. However, my informants' position and length of time in the field locations was mentioned for reference, accuracy, and to give a peek of their profile.

1.6. Significance of the Study

This study will have an academic significance. The study’s dimension will hopefully further enhance the quality of future studies as it pertains to new approaches. So, it can serve as a basis for further research on the issue of Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy. It also has considerable contributions for policy makers to use it as input.

1.7. Scope of the Study

Ethiopia is one of the most ancient countries of the world with a long history of foreign relations. The thematic focus of the study was limited to the post Adwa period by selecting important historical milestones of Ethiopia’s military engagement against foreign invasion, because it was during this period of this military engagements that Ethiopia’s modern foreign relations took root that impacts its vital national interest. Detailed explanation of other

historical events out of Ethiopia's military engagement against foreign invasion were beyond the scope of the study.

1.8. Limitations of the Study

The most apparent challenges faced this study were securing more key informants. This study did not elucidate the view of more key informants as it was expected. There was an attempt to ascertain the view of senior Diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Researchers from Institute of Foreign Affairs and the view of academician.

1.9. Organization of the Study

This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter offered a general background to the problem that this research examines. Specifically, it set out the research problem, the research objectives and questions and the core argument that guides this study. In addition, it gave an outline of the research method in terms of methods and procedures of data collection and data analysis techniques employed in the study. The second chapter provided conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the study.

The third chapter provided the foundation of Ethiopian foreign policy of the modern period. The fourth chapter examined Ethiopia's major military engagements and post-war diplomatic settlements. Five appraised factors that constrained Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy. Data from key informants' interviews and data from other literature was critically analysed in this part of the paper. The last Chapter summarized the main points of the study and focuses on the key findings as concluding remarks of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The key assumption underlying this thesis is that domestic and international political dynamics affect Ethiopia's foreign policy making and diplomatic negotiations in the post-Adwa period. To carefully investigate the factors why successive Ethiopian regimes have been constrained in their foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations notwithstanding their victories in military battlefields need to be carefully investigated. This chapter seeks to understand and explain conceptual and theoretical framework for researching internal and external factors that restrained Ethiopian foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic process in the post-Adowa periods.

2.2 Conceptual Framework: Understanding the Notion of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

2.2.1. Foreign policy

One of the most important political activities a polity, exclusively a democratic polity, engages in is foreign policy (Allison, 1999. The topic of "foreign policy" the subject of debate since the time of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Grotius. With the creation of the first ministry of "foreign affairs" in the eighteenth century, its application grew (Halliday, 1999). It was the focus of an increasing number of commentaries, both political and technical, between around 1700 and 1950. The political is about the goals that foreign policy should pursue, whereas the technical is about the necessary qualities of diplomacy. It is clear from both schools of thinking that a nation's foreign policy is crucial to its existence and success. Hill explained:

> *The term 'foreign', after all, does not mean 'barbaric', 'threatening' or 'remote', all things which have been associated with it by xenophobes, and which tempt internationalists to want to dispense with it. It derives from the Latin 'foris' meaning 'outside' and simply refers to people from another country or to that which is unfamiliar.*

Therefore, "foreign policy" can be described as a state's external politics. It has been defined in a variety of ways since it is a complicated phenomenon with numerous meanings. One IR scholar suggested that "*even the simplest foreign policy action, such as the announcement*

that a head of state will be travelling abroad, can bring multiple interpretations" (Hermann, 1972:58). As such the conceptualisation of foreign policy differs according to different scholars' points of emphasis.

Foreign policy is the primary means of collective coping, not just how a particular group deals with the outside world. According to Hill (2003:233), "*collective coping with the international environment is, in fact, a useful short-hand definition of foreign policy*." Hill goes on to say that collective coping encompasses all official activities, not simply those carried out by foreign ministries and ambassadors.

By contrast Rosenau (1974:6) states foreign policy as,

> *an authoritative action taken by governments or are committed to take in order either to maintain the desirable aspects of the international environment or to amend its undesirable aspects. It is necessarily calculated and goal-oriented, and it has unintended consequences which greatly affect the kind of adaptation that the society makes during a certain period of time; its initiation is purposeful.*

Foreign policy, according to Wilkenfeld et al. (1980:100), is defined as "*official actions (and reactions) which sovereign states initiate (or receive and react to) to alter or create a condition outside their territorial boundaries*." Holsti (1983:97) holds a similar opinion. In addition to activities, he contends that foreign policy includes *"ideas that are planned by policy makers to solve problems or uphold some changes in the policies, attitudes, or actions of another state or states acting in the international system."* Therefore, according to Modelski (1962:6), foreign policy is "*the system of activities that are evolved for communities to alter the behaviour of other states and adjust their own external activities*." Modelski placed particular emphasis on elements of foreign policy that seek to alter states current behaviours as the main objective of foreign policy.

As a conclusion, scholars define foreign policy as authoritative actions of governments of state to achieve certain purposes in their interactions with other state or non-state actors in the international system. It refers to the activities and objectives of individual national governments concerning regions and things that are located outside of state borders (Modelski, 1962, Rosenau, 1974, Winkelfeldetal, 1980, Holsti, 1983). As previously stated, it is impossible to interpret foreign policy precisely. In this study, foreign policy, for the purpose of convenience, is defined as "the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve goals in its relations with external entities. This includes the decision

to do nothing" (Smith, et.al, 2016:14). State's inaction externally also falls in the scope of foreign policy.

States must always be aware of what is happening in the external environment. They use several agencies, not only their foreign ministry, to engage in active diplomacy in a wide range of global forums. Politicians and diplomats at all levels face significant challenges in coordinating this both domestically and internationally (Hill, 2003). In order to gain domestic legitimacy, Hill further argues for a dependable and successful foreign policy that involves the public in continuous discussions and deliberations on all issues affecting the state's national interest. Thus, in a globe plagued by both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, foreign policy is an essential site of action and decision. It entails two-way mediation between external forces and influences and domestic society.

Foreign policy is not separate from domestic politics but is a part of it. It is the continuation of domestic policy because it serves and reflects national interests (Morgenthau, 1978:553). "*Foreign policy begins when domestic policy ends*" (Kissinger, 1971:22).

2.2.2. National Interest and Foreign Policy

National interest is a permanent yet elusive concept in the study of foreign policy. There is disagreement among scholars on the definition of this concept. Although national interest cannot be disregarded, Rosenau (1980) argues that it is not a helpful analytical tool for comprehending foreign policy.

Scholars have been divided into two major schools of thought when it comes to defining national interest: "subjectivists" and "objectivists." Subjectivists are adherents of pluralist doctrine. According to them, national interest is not the objective fact but rather a reflection of the desires of various social groupings. They depend on society's political system (Clinton, 1994). In other words, regardless of whether democratic or authoritarian processes are in place, the decision-making process on foreign policy objectives is the outcome of bargaining among the demands and desires of various groups. As a result, they avoid the difficult task of determining specific interest and provide no impartial benchmark for doing so. From an operational perspective, the substantive content of national interest is determined by policy-making officials (Cook & Moos, 1953).

In contrast to subjectivists, Morgenthau and his supporters claimed that "national interest" could be objectively defined and shared by all states, irrespective of any political "values." According to these scholars, "power" is the primary objective criterion for evaluating foreign policy goals. In other words, foreign policy objectives should not exceed the power that is available, which is a finite essential resource. To succeed, a statesman must make choices that prevent abuse of the state's authority. In the end, abuse of authority would make the state weaker. The politician ought to enquire, "[w]ill this step improves or weaken my power?" A state's policy is rational when its actions maintain its authority (Morgenthau, 1978: 5, 8, 553). The objectivist concept of power was harshly criticised by Rosenau, who pointed out that it is based on ideals that various states pursue for various purposes. He also contends that there was no way to calculate a country's relative power in Morgenthau's definition (Rosenau, 1980: 288-9).

According to Nye, the idea of national interest is both objective and subjective. According to him, traditionalists made a distinction between an interest-based foreign policy and one based on morals (Nye, 2002). "National interest in a democracy is just what people say it is" (Nye, 2002:139). According to Nye, the primary role of national interest is to direct political discourse by giving decision-makers a context for it. Therefore, it appears that both Rosenau and Nye have chosen the middle ground between the opposing subjectivist perspectives regarding the notion of national interest.

Nevertheless, national interest is not a formula that can solve every complicated foreign policy problem. It is an “objective reality” that prompts policy decision-makers to ask a variety of questions, such as,

> *How are current developments affecting my nation’s power? Are hostile forces able to harm my vital interests? Do I have enough power to protect my vital interests? Which of my interests are secondary? How much of my power am I willing to use to defend them? What kind of deals can I get in compromises over secondary interests? (Roskin, 1994:13-14)*

However, decision-makers might not always reach the same conclusion about these issues. This is due to the possibility that the decision maker's subjective assertions or interests could sway their responses. The national interest and the interests of other participants in the global system may be used to support those claims or interests. Therefore, national interest establishes limits on what states may do for one another and justifies leadership (Ibid).

There are two levels of national interest, according to Morgenthau (1962:191): primary and secondary. The fundamental goals of a country, such as its physical, political, and cultural identity as well as its existence (or security), are included in the core interest. There can be no compromise or reluctance to go to war when it comes to these interests. At all costs, all nations must protect them. Secondary interests are those that can be compromised or negotiated over. They usually don't belong in the first category and don't pose a threat to sovereignty. However, they have the potential to develop in statesmen's minds to the point where they appear essential. Deals that benefit both parties can be negotiated on secondary interests.

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2000:25), "no publicist, statesman, or scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of the national interest." Reynolds (1971) accurately states that national interest serves as the foundation for foreign policy formulation.

In conclusion, foreign policy decisions are made with the intention of advancing the interests of the country. Reynolds further contended that the goals typically encapsulated in the notion of "the national interest" should be served by the state's international operations. Therefore, the primary goal of developing a state's foreign policy and managing international relations is to safeguard and advance the state's national interests to the greatest extent feasible. Therefore, foreign policy is a political choice in which a state determines and outlines its external objectives, or national interests, to be achieved using deft diplomatic means.

The formulation of national foreign policy, particularly the selection of workable strategies from available options to promote it, is done by diplomats who, in the course of their work, are constantly in contact with the similar goals of other states. They also study in greater detail how states' interests align or diverge and what incentives could lead to greater alignment (Watson, 2013:148). In this regard, it is crucial to comprehend the deft diplomatic techniques that should be used to further a certain national interest of the state.

2.2.3. The Nexus between Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

In order to examine this, it is crucial to first identify the role that diplomacy plays in governments' foreign policy-making processes (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009:8–9). There are two main phases in foreign policy where diplomacy is crucial. First of all, it is one of the tools used to carry out foreign policy choices and accomplish policy goals. Second, the

government's apparatus for obtaining information and reporting back to the home government on the actual formulation of foreign policy is called diplomacy.

This typically takes the institutionalised shape of a foreign department with talented and committed employees, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, foreign departments are connected to a network of embassies that carry out the entire policy-making and execution process (Berridge 2015).
Diplomats overseas are responsible for obtaining pertinent information from both formal (official) and informal (unofficial) sources. The scope and variety of information needed for policymaking have significantly expanded in the modern era due to the broadened foreign policy agenda. As much of this information is specialized, it is normal for trained representatives called attachés to be attached to the larger embassies (Hocking, 1999).

In reality, it is challenging to distinguish between political reporting and information collecting, as ambassadors are expected to provide policy recommendations to their home governments. The goal of sending permanent representatives overseas is to foster familiarity with the nation where they are stationed. This, together with other knowledge and expertise in information interpretation, is an essential component of the process of formulating foreign policy. Diplomats stationed overseas evaluate potential developments in the nations under their accreditation and report to the home government on policy decisions. The apparent possibilities to effectively frame the political leadership's decisions will undoubtedly be limited by the information gathered and the possible reporting by diplomats. The government and the broader interests of the home state, which extend beyond the strictly political sphere, are represented by embassies and their personnel stationed overseas. Interest representation requires two elements. First, must sustain a network of local elites and positive connections with the government of the host state. The size and standing of the embassy represent the degree of ties to the host nation. The number of diplomats should be increased or decreased to reflect issues (Ibid).

Negotiation with representatives of the host state's government is the second and possibly most crucial step (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009:5). Negotiation encompasses a range of actions carried out through in-depth discussions on a particular matter. When political leaders or

other envoys are involved, professional diplomats take the initiative rather than providing support.

Diplomacy is the strategy used to get consent through persuasion whenever governments need the consent of other states. Persuasion is a key component in the art of diplomacy. Persuasion alone may be adequate in some situations. It could be necessary to exert some pressure on the parties in order for them to agree to compromise and modify their initial positions on other problems. According to Jönsson and Hall (2005), pressure can be applied in a number of ways, such as setting deadlines for the negotiations and attempting to isolate the opposing side by threatening to sever diplomatic ties or even declare war.

2.2.4. Diplomacy

A deliberate conversation between states concerning the matters pertaining to their relations is called diplomacy. According to Hurd (2011:582), diplomacy is the "infrastructure of world politics." Human civilisation has a long history of using diplomacy (Neumann 2012). Diplomacy has been used for thousands of years as a means of communication between territorial entities. The Greeks, Romans, and Byzantine civilisations used rudimentary forms of diplomacy for regular diplomatic connections and talks (Berridge, 2015:2).

While the conventions and machinery of diplomacy have evolved over a long historical period, the contemporary global diplomatic systems have their origins in 15th century Italy, where the Italian city-states were the first to establish permanent diplomatic relations and exchanged resident missions (embassies) with one another. The other states in Europe soon followed their lead. Since then, embassies have become an important embodiment of state interests and linked to specialized foreign departments established within home states (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995: 1, 2).

The process of institutionalising diplomacy both domestically and internationally, professionalising the Foreign Service, and making diplomacy a career (Jönsson & Hall, 2005). This document does not cover procedural rules and standards that have evolved throughout time in the conduct of diplomacy. There are only two key points to remember. First and foremost, ambassadors should be free to carry out their duties without fear or

interference. Protecting the entire international actor communication system is crucial (Jönsson & Hall, 2005:30).

One of the undesirable aspects of diplomacy is when diplomats come under pressure to ‘’get a result’’ whatever the means employed. This prompted Sir Henry Wotton's cynical definition of an ambassador as ‘’an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country’’ (Walsh, 1922: 95). Later on, however, it was soon found that, in order to accomplish goals, diplomatic agents must be honest rather than dishonest. Establishing trust with one's counterparts is crucial in most circumstances, including diplomatic negotiations. While dishonesty has detrimental effects on fostering trust between states, honesty is a sign of mature diplomatic officials who can achieve practice for long-term interest (Barston, 2014). Diplomatic representatives historically represented their individual sovereign rulers; today they represent nation states and their status in the same sense that a flag does (Jönsson, 2018:22).

The First World War was not avoided by European diplomacy in the 19th century. Due to that failure, two key concepts gave rise to the necessity for "new" diplomacy (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995:137). First, there was a need for public oversight and control over diplomacy. The secrecy and dishonesty of diplomats were now viewed as problematic. Second, the concept of creating an international organisation (the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations) that would serve as a crucial platform for the amicable resolution of conflicts and a collective deterrence to possible aggressors.

States are no longer the exclusive players in international diplomacy as a result of these developments (Leguey-Feilleux, 2009). Instead, they had to coexist with non-state entities, such as intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, on the international diplomatic stage. This increased the complexity and significance of diplomacy. In addition to bilateral state-to-state negotiations, many civil society organisations usually engaged in multilateral negotiations under the auspices of various non-state actors who want to influence state action and accomplish their goals. Therefore, it is more difficult to maintain the confidentiality of a bilateral negotiation process involving state players when multilateral diplomacy is involved. In this sense, it became evident that while professional diplomats are no longer the only "players" in the new diplomatic "game," their level of autonomy is far

lower than that of traditional diplomats. In summary, conventional and contemporary diplomatic practices generally coexist in a mutually constitutive relationship in the shifting geopolitical landscape of diplomacy (Barston, 2014).

As Berridge (2015:1) states,

> *Diplomacy is an essentially political activity and, well resourced and skilful, a major ingredient of power. Its chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law. It achieves this mainly by communication between professional diplomatic agents and other officials designed to secure agreements.*

To put it briefly, Berridge examines diplomacy from two main angles: "macro" and "micro." The macro perspective aims to explain global politics in its entirety. The micro viewpoint seeks to understand global politics from the standpoint of the various non-state players that are involved. States and non-state entities who represent them in international affairs are the main focus of diplomacy.

When viewed through "macro" lenses of international politics, diplomacy is a communication process that is essential to the functioning of the global system. If the only things that define world politics are collaboration and conflict between states, then diplomacy and war are its defining institutions. The two extremes of the diplomatic spectrum are conflict and cooperation. The cooperation end of the spectrum represents communication for the resolution of conflict through discussion and negotiation. The primary goal of diplomacy is to establish stability and order in the international system (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995).

The "micro" view of diplomacy sheds light on how players in the global system behave. This implies that diplomacy is not a global process but rather a tool for policy. Every actor has objectives or ends that guide their foreign policy actions. Actors require policy tools to accomplish these goals. In order for an international actor to accomplish its policy goals, diplomacy is also linked to other tools like economic statecraft and armed force.

2.2.5. Diplomacy and War as Policy Instruments

Diplomacy is a channel of communication and dialogue between states to achieve their policy objectives abroad (Ikenberry, 2001). States also use other policy instruments producing what is called 'mixed diplomacy'. One of such ‘other policy instruments’ is War, the brute use of force as a means of policy (Schweller, 2001).

According to Shaw (1991:10), war is "the mirror-opposite of diplomacy." According to Burchill (2005), war is a tactic used by states to gain an edge in terms of military prowess, economic prosperity, or diplomatic collaboration. States that are losing ground in other foreign policy tools turn to war. States that believe they have a greater relative strength advantage now than they will in the future will also utilise war. Accordingly, the state's choice to fight depends on its access to knowledge and willingness to take risks, since the results of war are unpredictable (Kim & James, 1992).

Conquering or destroying other governments' military prowess is the goal of employing war as an act of combat. This would be challenging since the weapons in question may be used by the target state against the aggressor. According to Lane (1958:10–12), older states were able to grow their absolute stock of power by annexing resources and populations from neighbouring states. But this was only effective when the benefits of conflict outweighed the costs. Both fighting governments will experience a military defeat regardless of the cost-benefit analysis (Kim & James, 1992).

States use war also to create fertile grounds for cooperation with other states, or to destroy and disrupt enemy alliances (Gaddis, 2005: 238). To survive, the state must, first and foremost, avoid attack against its own territory and people, by ensuring any use or threat of force can be physically rebuffed. In short, it should make massive retaliation severely damaging the attacker in a way that surpasses the damage the aggressor caused. This means, a state has to always ensure its military weapons stockpiles are large enough. Military build-up is the mechanism for ensuring a state’s security from externally originating threats. Survival is essential and military force is important to protect national security from unpredictable external threat (Burchill, 2005:55).

It is not sufficient to ensure the state's existence in the event of an immediate attack; it must also be prepared to defend its secondary interests against the possibility of such an attack in the future. As a long-term plan to protect itself from future attacks, the state is consequently interested in developing capabilities. This entails both developing diplomatic ties with foreign nations and making investments in weaponry technology (Gaddis, 1997).

Although states have traditionally employed both military force and diplomacy as a way of foreign policy for centuries, the rising expense of war has prompted states to seek out alternate tools to bolster their negotiating position (Hocking & Smith, 1990:205). As previously noted, one of the most crucial aspects of diplomacy is negotiation. Additionally, states employ "mixed" diplomacy in their negotiations. As Watson (2013:67) puts,

"Those states engaged in using force pay constant attention to relations with the enemy in order to test his willingness to negotiate".

In short, the use of "mixed diplomacy" in negotiations to accomplish policy goals depends on a number of variables, including the goals being pursued, the accessibility of pertinent tools, the type of "mix" employed, and the associated expenses. Although it may need to be complemented by other tools, diplomacy undoubtedly has comparative advantages in terms of selection (Hocking & Smith, 1990).

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This section explores a theory or theories necessary to analyse and discuss Ethiopian foreign policy of post-Adwa periods. Therefore, liberalism and neoclassical realism theories of IR are reviewed. The purpose for doing this is to understand the extent to which each of the theories help to explain Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomatic practice of the post-Adwa period.

2.3.1. Liberalism

Liberalism, defined by the centrality of individual rights, private property and representative government is a domestic theory of foreign policy; it sometimes is termed as *Innenpolitik* approach transposed to the international plane (Smith et al, 2016: 65).

The debates between 'inside-out' and 'outside-in' approach aspects of foreign policy decision making have become an important line of demarcation in modern international relations theory (Waltz 1991a: 667). Smith et al (2016: 63) understand Liberalism as an international relations theory of peace and cooperation.

> *In his Nobel Peace prize lecture in December 2009, President Obama modestly acknowledged liberal theories of foreign policy. He argued that peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as they please; choose their own leaders or assemble without fear (cited in Smith et al, 2016: 63).*

Liberals differ in their beliefs about whether international preferences should be based on property (welfare) and if isolation poses more or fewer risks than internationalism. By concentrating on whether home politics, international politics, or both influence policy, foreign policy analysts aim to identify these trends (Ibid).

Liberalism rejected Realists' view that the international system is a place of rivalry, mistrust, and conflict between states. However, it disputes the definition of anarchy while agreeing with realists that states existed under anarchy. According to Smith et al. (2016), liberals do not consider international anarchy to constitute a "state of war." They contend that "[t]he laws of nature dictated harmony and co-operation between peoples" (Burchill 2005:112) and that collaboration is unlikely in anarchic societies. The realists, on the other hand, contend that conflict is an inevitable part of international politics.

Liberalists prescribe democracy and free trade for peaceful inter-state relations, arguing that "[d]emocratic processes and institutions would break the power of the ruling elites, thereby curbing their propensity for violence" (Burchill 2005: 113). Liberals believe that the global expansion of democracy and free trade is necessary to calm international relations by removing the artificial barriers that separate different governments and uniting them into a single worldwide community (Ibid:112 & 116).

Realism and liberalism differ at considering the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy as we observe from the table below.

Table 1: Comparison of Realist view versus Liberal view

Realist view	**Liberalist view**
● Downplay the significance of domestic politics in foreign policy.	● Values the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy.
● It is the international system (not domestic politics) causing state to adopt certain foreign policy and act in a particular way ● Focus on the power politics, the accumulation and protection of power and states' status in the international system	● Domestic factors (such as politics, economics, ideology, national character, partisan politics or socio-economic structure) determine how a state behaves towards another state beyond its national borders.
● Foreign policy is best understood as and determined by the product of a country's position in international political dynamics.	● Foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country's internal dynamics.
● Consider state as a rational unitary actor.	● Views state as a coalition of interests representing individuals, a variety group of individuals, and the public.
● Argue that domestic structures of states play a modest role in foreign policy.	● Argue that domestic values, variables and institutions have significance on foreign policy.
● ''National interest," is at the heart of their analysis and objectively definable and common to all states	● "National interest'' is ''subjective'' and viewed as the interests of various players-not all of which may coincide.

It has long been maintained that public opinion limitations on leaders contribute to more peaceful foreign policy in liberal-democratic systems. Because it implies and gives domestic legitimacy for the execution of government programs, domestic support in the form of public opinion is an essential tool for state decision-makers (Doyle, 1997). Elections allow democratic states to practise representative administration with a rotation of elected officials. Because failing to do so will result in them losing the next election, this system incentivises elected officials to create appropriate policies. Democracies have the power to both persuade and postpone decision-makers to choose wise policies (Waltz, 1967). Because of this, it is said, elected officials are hesitant to develop foreign policy that goes against popular opinion, which is their primary source of support. This implies that "citizens [public] have some voice in foreign policy," as Jackson (2000:133) puts it.

Scholars from the realist school of thought criticise the aforementioned arguments by arguing that very few studies have tried to dissect democracies and look at how the various

institutional arrangements of democratic states (presidential versus parliamentary systems) might limit the choice of foreign policy. Additionally, they contend that liberalists' conception of democratic states is static and homogeneous (Lobell et al., 2009:9).

Their second argument is that institutionalists, who support systemic liberal ideas, have an even more flawed and limited understanding of the state. It has become a major causal determinant of actors' interests and bargaining outcomes by promoting some behaviours while discouraging others, whether operating at the domestic level or at the international level in the form of international organisations and regimes (Ibid: 12).

The fact that liberalism theory is based solely on unit-level analysis of foreign policy is, in fact, its shortcoming. In other words, realists believe that liberals prioritise domestic politics over the importance of international politics in determining foreign policy. In actuality, though, no state can exist in isolation from the global system. Foreign policy makers' actions are influenced by both levels of analysis. "Unitary, rational states driven by a desire for security make up the international system" (Rose, 1998:145).When faced with worldwide challenges to their foreign policy, even highly capable regimes are frequently compelled to revaluate their policies. Additionally, governments with divergent systems tend to act similarly in foreign affairs, whereas states with comparable systems often act differently. This is because domestic and international factors interact and influence each other (Lobell et al, 2009). Consequently, the Innenpolitik liberal theory looked for alternative theories of which the neoclassical realism theory is pertinent to the subject under study in order to function as an analytical tool of foreign policy.

2.3.2. Realism

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, there has been an increase in interest in the study of foreign policy, which has caused scholars to question the applicability of international relations theories to the analysis of foreign policy (Telbami, 2002). Foreign policy scholars now prefer realism (Mearsheimer, 2005). It is a family of theories, comprising neorealism, neoclassical realism, and classical realism. Neo-realism has two branches: defensive realism and offensive realism. Each has its own interpretation and reinterpretation of neo-realism (Evera, 1996).

Realism explains international relations as an arena of power politics among states, seeing it as a competitive and hostile stage where power is the main currency (Goldstein, 1999:53). After Richard Ashley made a clear distinction between Waltz's Theory of International Politics and the writings of previous realists, neorealism theory became widely used in the field of international relations (Taliaferro et al., 2009: 16). Since then, researchers have worked to identify areas where classical realism and neorealism divide and converge (Ibid).

Classical realism is primarily concerned with the sources and uses of national power in international politics and the challenges state leaders face in conducting foreign policy (Morgenthau, 1956), whereas Neorealism theory emphasises the structure of the international system, rather than the units within it, as the primary determinant of state foreign policy (Waltz, 1979). According to Waltz (1979: 131), "*size of population and territory, natural resources base, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence*" are the main components of the neorealists' materialistic definition of power.

Taliaferro et al. (2009:17) claim that Neorealism attributes the recurrent patterns to the international system's structure and anarchy, which compels states to pursue similar strategies to secure themselves. According to one variant of neorealism theory, nations employ the balance of power or their own capacities to protect themselves.

The other versions of neorealist theory, defensive and offensive realism which emerged in the 1990s as outgrowths of Waltz's neorealism, also make similar assumptions. At the centre of the distinction between defensive and offensive realism is whether states maximize security or power, that is, whether power is a means or an end (Snyder, 1991:12). Defensive realists contend the primary goal that states seek to achieve is survival security. This implies that power is a tool for achieving a goal, and not a goal in itself (Brooks, 1997:453). Offensive realists assume that states seek power as both a means and an end, arguing that in order to maximize power states tend toward aggressive policies (Feng & Ruizhuang, 2006:124). They further argue that states seek power to weaken potential adversaries in order to enhance survival security (Mearsheimer, 1990).

Neither a purely systemic, nor can a purely *Innenpolitik* theory of foreign policy, explain foreign policy the imbalance between the general (systemic level analysis) and the particular (unit level analysis) in a combined manner (Taliaferro et al, 2009). While realism has been often understood to ignore the role of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy,

Innenpolitik approach emphasizes on domestic politics as the main factors that have influence on foreign policy decisions (Rose, 1998). Both approaches have been applied for this study. Therefore, both liberalism (idealism) and realism theory appears to be relevant to explain and analyse the context of Ethiopian foreign policy and its course of diplomacy of the post-Adowa period. Ethiopian leaders during this period were viewed as political realists and idealists. Thus, the Ethiopian state can be analysed based on two theoretical approach as it is indicated above.

CHAPTER THREE

FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF ETHIOPIA

3.1. Introduction

Foreign policy and diplomacy are words that are often used interchangeably, but they are not synonymous. Foreign policy is a political decision in which a state determines and defines its external goals/interests, while diplomacy is concerned with the means by which foreign policy is carried out (Allison, 1999). Diplomacy is a form of communication between states aimed at achieving international goals by negotiation rather than other non-peaceful means (Berridge, 2015:2). Concisely, foreign policy is what a state does with or to other players (mostly states), and diplomacy is how it is done (Jönsson, 2018:22).

It has been established some key theoretical and conceptual frameworks in relation to foreign policy and diplomacy in the preceding chapter. Using these theoretical and conceptual frameworks as a foundation, this chapter will explore the evolution of modern Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy. Those in charge of outlining strategic options available to make optimal foreign policy in the pursuit of the country's national interest must be familiar with previous generations' foreign policy, diplomatic and military strategy (Marcus, 1975).

Therefore, it is important to examine the foreign policy traditions and diplomatic experience of Ethiopia in previous regimes in this chapter. Consequently, this section looks into how contemporary Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy evolved over time. This review is useful because it establishes the groundwork for succeeding chapters, which will explore the Ethiopia's achievements and challenges in foreign policy and diplomacy toward its survival as independent states among African States.

According to Smdit and Abraham (2007), with a long history of independence, Ethiopia has considerable experience in foreign relations and diplomacy. Ethiopia had enjoyed significant periods of diplomatic involvement with the outside world, from the Axumite Empire to the mediaeval kings, albeit sometimes interrupted. The kings of the Middle Ages had an extensive, if often intermittent, diplomatic relationship with European Christendom and had long used foreigners to perform duties for which their own citizens lacked the necessary skills. In the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the use of foreigners was more or

less accepted in Ethiopia, particularly in the fields of medicine, building palaces, and importing, repairing, and sometimes even manufacturing weaponry (Pankhurst, 1967).

This section presents the making of the Ethiopian foreign policy in the modern era defined by colonial encounter, resistance and formation of the modern state and state building. The 19th century mainly the second half and the beginning of 20th century could be taken as the foundational period for crafting modern state foreign policy and policy behavior. First the determinants of the foreign policy followed by principles and ethos of it presented. Finally, in light of this the foreign policy of the monarchy the socialist and federal regimes were presented. Changes and continuity were identified using comparative analysis.

3.2. The Formulation of Foreign Policy Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1896

Modern state foreign policy and policy behaviour may be traced back to the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century Basic features of foreign policy during this period were anti-colonialism, anti-expansionism and consolidation king ‘s power at home. European colonial powers including Britain, France, and Italy compete to gain a presence along the Red Sea coast primarily throughout the second half of the 19th century especially with opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The Ethiopian emperors developed an anticolonialism foreign policy to restrain colonial power in light of the threat and growth of colonial powers (Adejumobi, 2000; Teshale, 1995).

Both Tewodros II and his successor Yohannis IV follow ant-expansionism foreign policy. They had to safeguard intensive Turko-Egyptian expansionist policy first by Mohamed Ali and later by his Son Khedive Ismail Pasha to control the source of Blue Nile and strategic location of Ethiopian. Egypt's strategy for Africa has always been to control the Nile, with resources and the market coming secondary. Khedive Ismail’s military engagements with Emperor Yohannis in two major battels at Gundat and Gura totally lost (Behru,1991; Zewde,1975)

Pankhurst claims that Ethiopian history underwent a sea change in 1855. With Tewodors II came to power during this time, the Ethiopian Era of Masafents (Princes) came to an end and Ethiopia's modern history began. The country's political isolation has ended. This is the end of the nation's political isolation. From foreign policy perspectives, his top priorities were the

protection of Ethiopia's traditional borders, the acquisition of contemporary European technology, and, to a lesser degree, Ethiopian rights to the Dar es-Sultan monastery in Jerusalem (Pankhurst, 1967).

Emperor Tewodros had two primary objectives for his foreign policy: first, he sought for advanced European education in order to carry out his modernisation initiative. In order to prevent catastrophic internal rivalries and external threats, particularly Egyptian expansion, he sought out capable personnel to assist him in producing the military equipment and ammunition. He did not want to rely on European countries for military weapons backing, hence he chose technology transfer to such weapons domestically over military aid. Secondly, he used religion (Christianity) as a justification for his intention to form an alliance with European nations in order to oppose the Ottoman Turks and Egyptians, whose power was growing along the Red Sea. By then, the foreign policy goals of the Ottoman Turks and Egyptians were to landlock Ethiopia by controlling the shores of north-eastern Africa (Venkataram, 1973)

In terms of relation with European power, Emperor Tewodros took initiative and action. For example, in his letters of October 1862 to Queen Victoria of England and Emperor Napoleon III of France outlined his foreign policy objectives (Keller, 1987; Adejumobi, 2000).

The Napier mission in 1868 put an end to Emperor Tewodros' ambition to establish cordial relations with Europe. Tewodros took a pragmatic approach to foreign policy, whereas the actions of his successors were mostly responsive to external influences (Crummey,1969)

Emperor Yohannes' ascension to the throne was accompanied by significant events. This was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which increased the Red Sea's strategic importance and in turn increased foreign powers' involvement in the Horn of Africa. This made the Horn sub-region a point of contention for European powers. These important developments had implications on Ethiopia's vital interests along the Red Sea coast and in the Horn of Africa (Keller, 1987 & Crummey, 1969). In terms of his foreign policy goal, he was to ensure the sovereign equality of the Ethiopian state in its interactions with other countries, but he did so with a remarkable sense of patient (tolerant) and cautious (careful) diplomacy. For Yohannes,

order was more vital than the rigid centralisation that had characterised Tewodros's rule. In contrast to Tewodros's audacious attempt to win Ethiopia's respect and recognition from European nations, he took a careful diplomatic strategy. During this time, European ambitions to use Africa as a base for imperial expansion peaked and Sudanese Mahdists near Ethiopia's western border also posed a threat. Therefore, during this period Ethiopia had to defend itself from the Egyptian imperial ambition, the Italian dream of colonisation, and the Sudanese Mahadist movement (Keller, 1987: 79; Paulos, 2011).

Menelik assumed power following Yohannis, who was regarded as a fervent nationalist in terms of foreign policy. Menelik had acquired experience in international relations before becoming office in 1889. As the king of Showa, he had begun to establish diplomatic ties with Europeans and was keen to obtain foreign assistance in the form of diplomacy and armaments in order to assert his claim to the throne. Between 1883 and 1887, he reached several agreements with Italians, with whom he had formed a "special friendship" (Caulk 2002). Caulk further noted that the Italians took advantage of Emperor Yohannes' death at Metemma to reap the rewards of over a decade of hard effort in forging cordial ties with Menelik. Of the three treaties Italy signed with Menilek in succession, the Wuchale Treaty is the most important and has broad implications. The Italian and Amharic versions of the Treaty have equal legal authority, as stated in Article 19. For Menelik, this was insurance against both home and international adversaries. The pact officially ended the state of war between Emperor Yohannes and Italy and recognised Menelik as the emperor of all of Ethiopia.

On the interpretation of Article 17, however, disagreements emerged. In the Amharic version, Article 17 said that Menelik might employ Italy's help for any correspondence with foreign governments if the Ethiopian Emperor so desired. The article's Italian translation, however, asserted that the Emperor had consented to employ Italy's services for all of his correspondence with foreign governments (Teshale, 1995 & Caulk 2002). Before the Wuchale Treaty's disputes escalated into a full-scale international conflict at the Battle of Adwa, Emperor Menilik II used every nonviolent method at his disposal to resolve it. A battle was waged to preserve what Emperor Menelik II loved to refer to as the "God-given country," which diplomacy was unable to defend (Keller, 1987).

When diplomacy fails, states turn to war to defend and further their important national interests. In this sense, war is seen as a political tool that is typically only used in dire situations, such as when diplomacy fails. What Karl Clausewitz would like to refer to as the continuation of diplomacy by other methods is best exemplified by the Battle of Adwa. The Battle of Adwa is the pivotal event that established Ethiopia's size, geography, culture, history, national capacity, social structure, public sentiment, international power structure (global strategic environment), and international public opinion—all of which are important factors in determining foreign policy and diplomacy (Caulk, 2002 & Crummey, 1969).

Ethiopia believed that the Treaty of Wuchale guaranteed Italy's recognition of the Ethiopian Empire in accordance with the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Having defeated in the battle, the Italians "accepted Menelik's interpretation of the Wuchale Treaty." On October 26, 1896, the Wuchale Treaty was revoked and a peace treaty was signed in Addis Ababa. Italy acknowledged Ethiopia's complete independence and sovereignty. Among other things, Menelik gave up Ethiopia's direct access to the Red Sea coast when he acknowledged Eritrea as an Italian colony in the Peace Treaty (Keller, 1987; Teshale, 1995 &Rubenson, 1976).

The boundary agreements have had far-reaching effects. When Britain, France, and Italy reaffirmed Ethiopia's international borders, their imperial aspirations for the country were limited. They hindered Ethiopia's eastward growth as a way to obtain direct access to the oceans and prevented Ethiopia from establishing an outlet to the sea (Rubenson, 1976).

The "expensive job of physical occupation" of the country was replaced by the "neo-colonial policy" of creating indirect influence through economic penetration by the European powers in the post-Adwa era. As a result, they flocked to Menelik's court one after another in the hopes of gaining financial concessions in return for military gear and technical assistance that would enable him to rule and control his realm. Because Ethiopia was surrounded by European dependents on all sides, British, Italian, and French power interests were able to successfully implement the "neo-colonial strategy" with the building of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Line, which connected Djibouti and Addis Ababa (Marcus, 1975 & Rubenson, 1976).

In terms of strategy, he carried on his predecessors' foreign policy, but he took office at a crucial point in Ethiopian history. Menelik was successful in stopping the division of Ethiopia into its constituent parts by European powers, particularly the British, France, and Italy. In essence, he set one European power against another (Teshale, 1995 & Marcus 1966).

From theoretical perspectives basic features of their foreign policy were by one way or another similar that is anti-colonialism, anti-expansionism and consolidation of their power base at home. All the three emperors had distinct personalities and perception of power impacts on foreign policy decision making process. Prior to his passing, Tewodros II, the emperor who is seen as the forerunner of contemporary Ethiopia, employed both war and diplomacy as key instruments of foreign policy and a means of preserving territorial integrity (Teshale, 1995).

When it comes to Yohannis, he was different from Tewodros in terms of personality and leadership. Compared to his predecessor he was less impetuous and more patient. Their strategies differed even though they both aimed for a united, Christian Ethiopia (Rubenson, 1976:301). In his dealing with both domestic and external problems, Yohannis considered as liberal or idealist in the sense that he was accommodative or tolerant towards his vassals and foreign powers. On the other hand, Menelik's quality of political leadership and his ability to "extract" and mobilize different components of the state's power is different from his predecessors. Menelik's past political experience and the psychological makeup had a great impact on his foreign policy formulation over the time. The experience he got from his predecessors and his familiarity with European powers particularly Italy gave him awareness or lesson in dealing with their intrigues (Paulos, 2011; Marcus, 1975 & Rubenson, 1976).

Basically, his diplomacy was based on strategic caution and prudence. His victory against Italian colonialist at the battle of Adowa assumed him to be to be realist. However, it must be acknowledged that political triumph and military victory are not necessarily the same. As it has been seen, Menelik was unable to completely eradicate the Italian presence from the northern Ethiopia. After all, they continued to maintain their colonial presence in Mereb Melash (Eritrea), which was formalised by a border agreement in 1900. Therefore, in this case he is considered to be idealist.

3.3. Foreign Policy of Emperor Haile Selassie to 1974

In the Early period of 20th century, Ethiopia began establishing normal ties with the outside world and solidifying its independence. In order to achieve this, Ethiopia became a member of the League of Nations in 1923, and in 1928 its former ruler, the regent, Emperor Haile Selassie, signed a 20-year "Friendship and Arbitration" deal with Mussolini's government. At a time, Mussolini was getting ready to attack Ethiopia in retaliation for Italy's humiliation at Adwoa (Nugssay, 1977).

According to Nugssay (1977:49), Ethiopian foreign policy during Emperor period is determined by a number of factors (Foreign policy determinants) that include *''the geographical position of the country, the historical self-image of its people, the available human and material resources, the political system and personality of the emperor, the needs and interest of the people, the pressure and influence from external world.''*

One of the main factors influencing the nation's foreign policy throughout the imperial era was the desire to settle international conflicts amicably and without using force. This required a commitment to the ideas of collective security and increased military might. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a backseat in developing and carrying out foreign policy goals as the emperor continued to conduct significant diplomatic operations through charismatic personal diplomacy. The country's foreign policy and the emperor's domestic policies actually ran counter to each other (Teshale, 1995 & Bahru, 2013).

Thus, two of the fundamental principles of Ethiopian foreign policy that the Emperor outlined since the League of Nations' establishment are collective security and support for international organisations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Emperor frequently persuaded the League to reaffirm his steadfast support for the idea of collective security by implementing his ideas in the Congo crisis and Korea's War of 1950s. His views on peaceful co-existence and a robust defence system for his nation have been another significant tenet of Ethiopian foreign policy. Another tenet of Ethiopian foreign policy under the Emperor government was his engagement in the non-alignment movement and his diverse support for the movement (Nugssay,1977 & Bahru, 2013). The establishment of OAU and the idea of pragmatic, moderate pan-Africanism were initiated by the emperor. One of the least acknowledged facets of the previous Emperor's foreign policy may be his

interest in and commitment to African affairs, particularly African unification support (Nugssay,1977 & Teshale, 1995)

Haile Selassie was more vigorous and determined than his predecessors in carrying out his diplomatic and domestic agendas. He was committed to establishing Ethiopia as a powerful, cutting-edge bureaucratic nation. Regarding international relations, he made important policy changes towards the nation's internal and foreign policies (Keller, 1987). In domestic contexts, Haile Selassie actively pursued and expanded his processors' modernisation and centralisation policies, which primarily impacted the political and military sectors of the state machinery. Ethiopia's 1931 and 1955 constitutions were two of the most important reforms, even though no constitutional monarchy was established. Instead, it was intended to serve as a tool for political control and a representation of the Emperor's legitimacy both internally and externally (Clapham,1969).

In order to ensure Ethiopian independence would continue, Emperor Haile Selassie, during his Regent Tafari, sought to join the League of Nations and use its collective security mechanism as a safeguard. However, when Italy attacked and annexed Ethiopia in 1936, the optimism was crushed. There are two ways in which Ethiopia's League of Nations membership has moral symbolic importance. Primarily. Ethiopia's reputation has changed in the eyes of the world. Ras Tafari's reputation as a leader of a modern, sustainable state with a position in the international community also increased domestically and internationally (Bahru, 2013).

In 1924, Haile Selassie embarked on a lengthy tour of more than ten European and non-European nations after impressing the world by admitting Ethiopia as an African member of the League in 1923. The "study tour" is meant to be used for personal diplomacy; that was primarily intended for political reasons. Second, in order to negotiate access to the sea, he tried to get free port facilities from Italy at Assab and France at Djibouti. In reference to the second goal, he came home with nothing but a draft treaty with Italy that never materialised and ambiguous promises from France (Bahru, 1991). He took side excursions to other European and non-European nations in order to expand Ethiopia's network and forge alliances with nations that did not have colonies in Africa or imperial intentions against Ethiopia. With the nations that had no colonies in Africa, he aimed to forge trade ties, sign agreements for military and technical support, and build diplomatic relationship. Making

Ethiopia less reliant on Britain, France, and Italy in its international affairs was another tactic he employed. This marked a significant shift in foreign policy from Emperor Menelik, whose diplomatic interactions mostly involved European nations that had colonies in Africa, especially the Horn of Africa (Sanderson,1969).

All things considered, Ethiopian foreign policy during the 1920s and early 1930s tended to rely on non-colonial countries to balance out colonial powers that shared borders with Ethiopia and to expand the pool of available diplomatic, financial, and technical support. Haile Selassie's conquest of power and centralisation occurred during this time, but the nation also saw notable advancements in its foreign policy and diplomacy (Bahru, 2013).

The Italian Fascists' 1936–1941 occupation of Ethiopia temporarily halted Haile Selassie's endeavours. The constant threat of an Italian invasion of Ethiopia's heartland was undoubtedly the catalyst for Ethiopia's admission to the League of Nations. The monarch fled and set up a government in exile in London when the Italians did eventually invade. He then travelled to Geneva, Switzerland, to passionately appeal for assistance in defending the Ethiopian homeland before the League of Nations General Assembly. Haile Selassie's request was eventually disregarded by the League of Nations, despite the league's charter stating that all members were pledged to defend each other's sovereignty (Haile Selassie, 1976). Apparently, the emperor still believed in the ultimate worth of successful diplomacy and saw the League of Nations' inaction as merely a temporary setback. Additionally, he saw that Ethiopia required a strong outside patron until he could regain the administrative competence of the state to operate independently. Through his diplomatic abilities and Britain's strategic needs in the region, he was able to secure British assistance in the liberation of Ethiopia (Bahru, 2013).

Following the expulsion of the Italians from Ethiopia by the Ethiopian warriors and the British army, Haile Selassie returned from exile to retake his throne with British assistance.
The Ethiopian ruling class was left crippled by the Italian invasion, and some of them were physically destroyed throughout the conflict. Additionally, the Italians attempted to take advantage of Ethiopia's diverse ethnic, religious, and regional groups for their own gain (Bahru, 1991)

Indeed, Haile Selassie's post-war focus was on repeating his pre-war centralisation campaign in order to strengthen his basis of power (Bahru, 1992) In order to accomplish this, he had to rebuild a new administration from the war's wreckage, which required a significant arrangement of contemporary bureaucracy. Without wasting much time, the Emperor established a contemporary military and civilian bureaucracy, first with the assistance of the British, who backed his return to power in spite of some local opposition (Marcus, 1983; Markakis, 1974; Clapham,1969:8).

Ethiopia was heavily reliant on British military, financial, and technological assistance in the initial years post war period. The emperor was concerned that Britain may either make Ethiopia a protectorate or use the argument that Ethiopia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea were all occupied enemy territory and could be divided for administrative reasons. Because of his concerns, Haile Selassie looked for other connections that would enable him to sever Ethiopia's ties to Britain (Markakis, 1974).

The emperor was making new patronage connections with the United States and reducing his ties with Britain at the time of these manoeuvres. After British military assistance was cut off in 1952, Haile Selassie acted swiftly to improve ties with the US. The United States had wanted a base in Eritrea to establish a radio tracking station since the early 1940s. According to Haile Selassie, the United States' use of such an installation would benefit him more than it would cost; that is, he would benefit from having a close relationship with the world's most potent military force while receiving rent in the form of military assistance that could be utilised to bolster the state's military capabilities. To formalise this new partnership, two agreements were signed in May 1953. The United States consequently pledged Ethiopia's security, which significantly increased the emperor's confidence in his ability to tackle the challenge of political unification (Keller, 1987). A Military Assistance Advisory Group was formed in 1954, and its presence assisted Ethiopia's armed forces in addition to the military assistance the United States provided during the following 23 years. These troops trained Ethiopian troops down to the battalion level (Bahru, 2013).

The commencement of Ethiopia-US relation is when Emperor Haile Selassie presented his agenda outlining his foreign policy objectives to US President Franklin Roosevelt during their meeting in Egypt on the way home from the Yalta Conference in 1945, which includes (Spencer, 1984: 159-160).

1. Ethiopia’s ownership over the railway to Djibouti;
2. Free and unfettered access to the sea;
3. Recovery of Eritrea which Ethiopia claimed to be part of its territory;
4. Military assistance to develop a small modern army; and
5. US investments in development projects.

In1951, just six years after his meeting with President Roosevelt, Emperor Selassie sent thousands of his troops to fight as part of the American-led UN force supporting South Korea against the communist North Korea and its ally, China. This was his way of demonstrating his sincere interest in a partnership and support for America (Bahru, 2013).

Under the parameters of the Cold War, the US-Ethiopian relationship was not founded on global alignment or ideological belief. The main goal of Haile Selassie's post-war policy was to thwart the British plan to replace Italy's colonisation ambitions with a British dependency. As a result, the Ethiopian government made a concerted effort to forge deeper ties with the United States in an effort to challenge the colonial-minded British influence (Spencer, 1984:159-160). However, the primary goal of US strategy was to keep communism in check in Europe and prevent it from spreading to Africa. Thus, the US realised that the former Italian-run "Radio-Marina" in Asmara would be a good fit for its needs as it was in dire need of a communication facility in the Red Sea region (Keller, 1987).

By 1954, Haile Selassie had regained administrative authority over all of the land he had claimed through diplomacy. A federation between Ethiopia and the former Italian colony of Eritrea was made feasible by a U.N. resolution in 1952. Haile Selassie was not satisfied with administrative authority alone, and Eritrea was to enjoy regional autonomy within the federation. He was not satisfied until he secured the endorsement of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian Assemblies in 1962, which allowed him to incorporate Eritrea fully into the empire, making it a province of Ethiopia instead of a trustee-ship (Gilkes, 1975).

From this moment on, Haile Selassie realised the importance of leading in support of the voices of moderation as well as taking part in international organisations. He invited the Conference of Independent African States to host its 1963 summit as a result of this thought. There, he suggested that the definition of African unity and its operationalisation should be prioritised. The Organisation of African Unity was established as a result of this summit. Haile Selassie was able to secure the position of patriarch of African unification as a result of

his role. More significantly, he made sure that neighbouring African nations would not challenge Ethiopia's geographical integrity (Keller, 1987). Ethiopia's diplomatic connections were strengthened and its foreign policy was cemented under Emperor Haile Selassie. Emperor Haile Selassie significantly improved Ethiopia's international connections by actively participating in foreign affairs. His diplomatic endeavours to lessen the difficulties the nation encountered while he was in office were equally noteworthy (Amare, 19 89)

From Theoretical framework perspective, Emperor Haile Selassie's ability to take advantage of the League of Nations and persuade the United States to support him against Britain, which in turn had been crucial to Italy's defeat and his triumphant return from exile; his deft use of his recently formed friendship with Washington to secure his country's position abroad and consolidate his power at home; his prompt entry into and active participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as his cultivation of the personal friendship of its founding fathers including Nasser, his skilful manipulation of the pan-African movement and his leading role in the formation of the O.A.U., which elevated the nation's stature and his position in African and global affairs, are all excellent illustrations of how a weak state can adeptly navigate and control the global system by using liberal institutional frame work as pillar ideology in his foreign policy decision making process.

3.4. The Foreign Policy of Military Regime (1974-91)

Like other countries, Ethiopia's foreign policy is based on specific goals and values and is influenced by the dynamic interplay of internal and external factors. Though its formulation has certainly been affected by Marxist ideology about the nature of society and the alignment of forces in the world, there are characteristics of both continuity and change. This is also due to the fact that long before the I974 revolution, Ethiopia maintained its core values while occasionally making a major contribution to the international scene. To put it another way, a shift in orientation has not altered Ethiopia's foreign policy's core objective, nor has a change in style led to a change in essence (Amare, 1989).

As a result, Ethiopia's foreign policy and relationships with other nations were largely shaped by the policies of its forebears, who gave the nation's security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty top priority (Broich, 2017).

Amare Takle (1989) claims closely related foreign policy objectives that have been pursued by the Derg regime such as national security to ensure national unity and territorial integrity; defence and legitimacy of the regime to ensure its continued rule and acceptance both domestically and internationally. The government's immediate objectives after taking power were to win the war with Somalia and the conflict in Eritrea, as well as to establish domestic political stability by establishing a framework for "socialist" development and consolidating its rule. This required a swift commitment to bolstering its military forces, which meant establishing partnerships that would ensure a rapid and significant supply of weaponry.

Proletarian internationalism and non-alignment served as the foundation for the policy framework, which was mirrored in all of the fundamental documents of the government and the ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia (W.P.E.), including the new constitution. They proclaimed sympathy and solidarity with communist proletariats in addition to movements and forces devoted to the struggle against racism, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and Zionism, which were added in I979 and 1981, respectively (Negera, 2018).

According to Amare (1989), Ethiopia is a small, poor nation that has been devastated by conflict and starvation and has always relied on the support of other nations and international organisations for both security and prosperity. Its strategic location has historically influenced its foreign policy, particularly its interactions with the world's great nations. Ethiopia has always had some leeway in its diplomatic manoeuvres due to its strategic location, the structure and distribution of power, and the alignment of forces in the international environment, even though it is only able to play a minor role in the international system.

Mengistu Hailemariam is still in charge of the country's foreign policy as chairman of the military dictatorship and head of the armed forces. The military dictatorship's foreign policy first adopted the highly securitised, western-centric strategy of the Imperial regime, especially when dealing with the United States and Europe (Negera, 2018). However, as a result of the United States' diminished support for Ethiopia, Ethiopia's foreign policy later shifted from the West (European nations and the USA) to the East (Soviet Union and Warsaw pacts). By focussing on building military defence capabilities against Ethiopia's "historical enemies," the military administration's outward-looking foreign policy externalised almost all of the country's problems (Keller, 1987).

Ethiopian foreign policy during the military rule was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, Marxist ideas about society, and Marxist ideas about force alignment. The military regime's foreign relations and policies are totally dependent on the Soviet Union because it sees the USSR as Ethiopia's natural partner, even though the general framework of foreign policy is similar to those of his predecessors (Amare, 1989). In addition, Ethiopia's foreign policy during the military government was centred on socialism and externalising the country's issues. Personal diplomacy was another aspect of Ethiopia's foreign policy during the military government, and like his predecessors, he viewed the country's neighbours as its historical adversaries (Ahmed, 2016).

As previously mentioned, historical legacies, economic growth, the Cold War, political dynamism in Horn Africa, and international system norms all influenced Ethiopia's foreign policy during military regimes (Keller, 1987).

The PMAC's fundamental foreign policy has mostly not changed despite its Soviet-oriented ideology. It continues to strive to be acknowledged for its genuine commitment to the principles of independence, self-determination, and nonalignment. For instance, at Ethiopia's recommendation, the Organisation of African Unity decided in 1974 to permanently relocate its headquarters and annual summit to Addis Ababa. The regime emphasises its top spot in the Organisation of African Unity to further cement its idea of the Ethiopian nation-state (Temesgen, 2013).

The Ethiopian leader has often expressed unity with other African peoples and with all progressive forces around the world, including the West. This small change is meant to raise Ethiopia's profile abroad. The dictatorship proclaims its support for peaceful coexistence and references the charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity to bolster its position. Notably, the discourse places a higher priority on friendship and peace than on proletarian internationalism and class strife (Seifuddin, 1997).

By 1985, despite the difficulties brought on by internal strife, famine, and drought, the PMAC was beginning to temporarily overcome some of its regional foreign policy issues. After President Jafar Muhammad al-Nimeiry was overthrown in April of that year, the dictatorship that took over in Sudan began to demonstrate a willingness to strengthen Sudan's

border with Ethiopia and to increase monitoring of cross-border activities by the regime's opponents in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Tedros, 2015).

It's interesting to note that detente initiatives began simultaneously in Ethiopia and Somalia. Mengistu and Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia had a historic meeting at the inaugural Intergovernmental Authority for Drought and Development. According to a joint statement issued after extensive talks, the purpose of these early meetings was to develop the "conditions for the normalisation of relations and the establishment of lasting peace" between the two countries (Temesgen, 2013).

From theoretical perspective the Derg regime’s foreign policy is concedes with Realism. First, the foreign policy orientation was governed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology and Marxist concepts of society which was weak legitimate in the eyes of the public. Regionally, Ethiopia's foreign policy under the Derg was influenced by political culture that Ethiopia was surrounded by a number of hostile states whose citizens had more differences than similarities and whose relationships were primarily marked by violent animosity and suspicion.

The third is the quality of political leadership and the psychological makeup of Ethiopian leader had a great impact on the country’s public policy formulation by the time. The president's idiosyncrasies determined Ethiopian foreign policy and relations with other countries. He has overseen all of the regime's political operations and approved Ethiopia's foreign policy, which resulted in a reflection of the President's idiosyncrasies. Important foreign policy decisions were made without giving Ethiopia enough consideration. As a result, the President’s monopoly of power has a negative impact on foreign policy's predictability and clarity and makes its methodical development and implementation challenging.

From global systemic analysis the military regime's rule (1974–1991) coincided with the cold war and bipolar system, which shaped national policies worldwide. Therefore, Ethiopia's foreign policy during the military rule followed ideological rigidity, since the USSR and other communist states were the country's natural allies at the time. The establishment of this new special relationship has been aided by a number of causes, including the near complete

reliance on the leaders in Moscow and its Warsaw Pact partners for military and logistical support during the battle with Somalia and the Eritrean struggle.

3.5. Foreign Policy of Ethiopia under EPRDF Regime from 1991 to the Present

The military dictatorship was overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) as a result of the Marxist-Leninist state's inability to address national issues and concerns (Keller,2005). The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of three guerrilla groups with predominantly ethnic and regional basis, overthrew Mangistu. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which had been a separatist organisation since 1961, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were among these armies. Since then, Ethiopia has revaluated its national interest and national security threat, as well as its foreign policy approach and orientation (Schraeder, 1992).

Since then, the EPRDF government has redefined the country's national interest and national security threat. Thus, existential threats were portrayed as conflict, acute and widespread poverty, and general backwardness. According to EPRDF, its government has switched from an antiquated, rigid, and reactive foreign policy to one that is more adaptable and, to a lesser extent, proactive. They contend that because previous integration strategies were unable to effectively manage ethnic or religious variety, this "externalisation" mentality poses the biggest existential threat to the nation (Mehari, 2014).

Among the internal vulnerabilities and problems that have been identified as threats to Ethiopia's national security are political and economic ones. The collapse of the military administration in 1996 led to the adoption of the Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy document for the first time in the country's foreign relations history. This Strategic document redefined Ethiopia's national interest and the primary security risks to its survival, in addition to bringing about a shift in the foreign policy approach and orientation (Negera, 2018).

Economic poverty and backwardness, which impact the great majority of people, as well as the need for democracy and good governance, as well as the establishment of democratic structures and government at all levels throughout the country, have been identified as security threats by both foreign policy and the national security strategy. Without speedy

economic development, Ethiopia would not be able to survive and its very existence would be in doubt, endangering the country's sustainability as a whole. Additionally, Ethiopia's foreign policy has changed from an outside-in (Siege mentality) approach to an inward-looking one, meaning that the country no longer views its neighbours as enemies or a security threat. The achievement of democratisation and fast economic growth are essential to the nation's survival (Mehari, 2014).

Another facet of Ethiopian foreign policy is the EPRDF government's attempts to diversify its allies. Unlike its predecessors, Ethiopia has tried to diversify its alliances with non-Western nations including China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Malaysia, and the Gulf States as part of its post-Cold War foreign policy and strategy. Furthermore, the nation's foreign policy encompassed areas of engagement including foreign direct investment and tackling economic limits through strategic trade agreements, in contrast to the military regime's exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union (Mehari, 2014). In contrast to the Derg government, which prioritised the military sector, aid played a significant role in the nation's foreign policy. The EPRDF's foreign policy and strategic plan seeks to advance local political democratisation while resolving economic constraints through economic diplomacy, which is made possible by aid, trade negotiations, and foreign direct investment (Muzeyen, 2015).

This implies that the objective of foreign policy has changed from hard power (military) to soft power (business) and that the EPRDF government's foreign policy in Ethiopia is centred on economic diplomacy. However, Ethiopian foreign policy's basic objective—maintaining the country's territorial integrity and national sovereignty—remains the same despite changes in strategy and style (Mehari, 2014).

Despite changes in the foreign policy approach and orientation during the EPRDF administration, the nature, style, and objectives of Ethiopian foreign policy are still determined and shaped by the domestic, regional, and worldwide political settings. In particular, the adoption of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy in 1996 and its revision in 2002, which clearly identify the threats to national survival, allowed the EPRDF government to redefine the country's foreign policy objectives, national interest, and foreign policy orientation and approach. Therefore, the political system's features—namely, its lack of democracy and good governance—as well as economic degradation are portrayed as existential threats. Severe poverty, sectarian politics, corruption, a lack of parliamentary supervision, judicial scrutiny, and constitutional responsibility, a significant

democratic deficit, and human rights violations are among the domestic problems that pose a threat to internal peace and security (Negera, 2018; Mehari, 2014).

Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia in 1952 and transformation into an Ethiopian province in 1962 allowed Ethiopia to had Assab and Massawa ports that lasted from 1952-1991. However, it lost them once more in the early 1990s due to Eritrean secessionist movements that began in the early 1960s. As a result, when Eritrea gained independence in 1993, it lost both Assab and Massawa ports. In actuality, Ethiopia has continued to use the Djibouti port due to its landlocked status following Eritrea's independence (Styan, 2013).

Although Ethiopia and Eritrea began their relation with good atmosphere, this was only until 1998 when the Ethio-Eritrea conflict broke out. Until 1998, Assab port was the main seaport of Ethiopia handling most of the import-export trade. In relation to this, Styan (2013:53) explained that Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia and with it the consequent latter's loss of sovereignty over the ports of Assab and Massawa had initially limited impact on trade pass through Djibouti port. However, the eruption of the 1998 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea altered this situation.

Pragmatically, the securitization of the Ethiopia's foreign policy continued which led its border conflict with Eritrea and its meddling and intervention to Somalia both politically and militarily. Meanwhile, the Renaissance Dam project has raised tensions with Egypt and Sudan, who fear the project will squeeze their downstream access to the Nile's waters (Mehari, 2014).

EPRDF has strictly dominated and consolidated Ethiopia leadership, first through Meles Zenawi which was the prime minister from 1995 until his death in 2012. Meles Zenawi died on August 20th, 2012. He had effectively been ruling the country since 1991, first as head of the EPRDF since 1991, as President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995, and then as Prime Minister from 1995 until his unexpected death in 2012 He then replaced by his deputy Prime Minister and Minister of foreign affairs Hailemariam Desalegn who is also the chairman of EPRDF and the Prime Minister from 2012 to 2018. Hailemariam resigned on February 15th, 2018 following popular protest and resentment throughout the country and Abiy Ahmed Ali formally and peacefully took the role of Prime Minister on April 2, 2018. There was much discussion and debate during the interim period,

and great uncertainly amongst the general population, about who would take the leadership of the country following the resignation of Hailemariam. The rise of Abiy as Prime Minister was not a foregone conclusion at the time of the resignation of Hailemariam. Despite the change of regime, Ethiopia's foreign policy during the Prime Minster Abiy has not structurally changed, since official policy documents are not yet disclosed (Negera, 2019).

Immediately after taking office in April 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has responded with promises of dramatic political and economic reforms and has shepherded a historic peace deal with neighbouring Eritrea. The new leader’s aggressive approach to change has been met with exuberance among many Ethiopians at the beginning, but later his reform program faces major challenge because of war in Tigray and internal conflict still going on in Amhara and Oromia region that led to economic problem in turn. So, yet it is a challenge a head to follow through on his agenda (Yalemsew,2024).

From all these explanations it can be possible to understand three basic foreign policy orientations that produce diverse strategies and outcomes. Ethiopia's pre-modern imperial background is the foundation of the first and oldest foreign policy approach. Maintaining territorial integrity and pursuing status are its two key foreign policy goals. It is centred on the use of force and the pursuit of a victor's peace. The second foreign policy orientation is Marxist-Leninist, which has an ideological bent towards dependence on the Soviet Union. The "revolutionary democracy" is the third. From 2002 to 2018, Ethiopia's foreign policy was governed by the developmental state approach, which was based on the notion that Ethiopia was a politically and economically vulnerable state that needed to prioritise rapid economic development. Due to its enormous economic expenses, Ethiopia was forced to use diplomatic tactics including co-optation, linkage-diplomacy, and coercive isolation to control adversaries instead of engaging in traditional military conflict.

In conclusion, Ethiopia's foreign policy has virtually been the same over the previous century despite the leadership transition. Protecting its territorial integrity and obtaining international recognition for the nation-state's multi-ethnic character continue to be at the core of the country's foreign policy. The fundamental goal of maintaining national survival, territorial integrity, and regime survival is a constant. A "siege mentality" and a military/security-focused "outside-in" approach (prior to 1991) have given way to an "inside-out," economic diplomacy-oriented strategy (post-1991) that puts development, and regional economic integration first.

CHAPTER FOUR

MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AND POST-WAR DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENTS

4.1. Introduction

The primary objectives of the military engagement that has strategically shaped the Ethiopian state are those related to maintaining the severing status of the Ethiopian state, realising territorial integrity, and exercising influence over the region. The Ethiopian state has been beset by external dangers, which have taken many forms, including regional conflicts and the imperialist aspirations of European nations (Mehari, 2017).

As a result, the Ethiopian state has developed a military capability that is developed in tandem with the application of diplomatic talents to preserve and uphold the state's national interests. The Ethiopian state's military actions were not primarily motivated by combat objectives; rather, they must have been viewed as a component of statecraft, which has enabled the state to establish its supremacy in the area.

The Ethiopian state gained a prominent position on the world scene as a result of the rulers' exploitation of the great victories they had achieved on the battlefield to bolster the legitimacy of their reign. This demonstrates the close relationship between the Ethiopian state's establishment of a strong diplomatic position and the achievements of Ethiopian leaders on the battlefield (Takele, 2023).

The Ethiopian state has utilized post-war diplomacy as a way of making territorial gains, attain a formalized status in the international stage and this shows the inseparable connections that are found between military power and diplomatic instruments (Tesfaye, 2014). Through an analysis of the key military engagements that the Ethiopian state entered into starting from the pre-colonial era all the way up to the mid-20th century, this chapter shows the ways in which Ethiopian's military history dictated the trajectory of the nation's foreign policy.

4.2. War and Diplomacy in Modern Ethiopia's Foreign Policy

4.2.1. Battle of Adwa (1896)

The Battle of Adwa, a pivotal conflict that took place on March 1, 1896, is seen as a symbol of Ethiopia's spirit of independence and the cornerstone of the fight against the European

colonial powers' invasion. By misinterpreting the 1889 Treaty of Wuchale, the Italian state was attempting to establish itself as a protectorate over the Ethiopian state. The Italian and Amharic versions of the treaty had conflicting interpretations of Article 17; the Ethiopian version established the state's territorial sovereignty, while the Italian version upheld the Italian state's protectorate status over Ethiopia (Jonas, 2011).

When Italy attempted to claim that her interpretation of the treaty was the sole valid one, a military conflict resulted. Menelik II, the Ethiopian emperor, used sophisticated planning techniques and access to contemporary weapons to organise a sizable force of warriors from several demographic groups at the Battle of Adwa (Shimeles, 2022). Additionally, Ethiopian leaders exploited their familiarity with the terrain as a tactical advantage, and the Italian soldiers experienced significant logistical difficulties. There was also a numerical advantage for the Ethiopians.

The Ethiopian forces' superior numbers, the establishment of an efficient logistical line, the use of terrain as a tactical tool, and the Italian forces' errors in judgement were some of the key elements that contributed to Ethiopia's victory in the Battle of Adwa. It is evident from the diplomatic fallout from the conflict that the Italians were compelled to engage in negotiations with Ethiopians. The Treaty of Addis Ababa, which was signed in October 1896, affirmed the Ethiopian state's sovereign status by nullifying the Treaty of Wuchale.

It demonstrated that a country negotiating from a position of military might will have more authority (Tibebu, 2018). Because the fight was viewed as a show of strength against imperialist aspirations, it also had enormous international significance. This demonstrated Ethiopia's strong position on the global scene and further positioned the country as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance.

4.2.2. Other Pre-20th century Engagements

The Ethiopian state's military actions extend beyond the conflict with the Italians. Crushing domestic uprisings was viewed by the Ethiopian state as having a significant role in establishing itself as a force on the international scene. The state attempted to establish a centralised system of authority based on an advanced bureaucracy and the presence of a military infrastructure. In the field of diplomacy, this was employed not just to protect the state's borders but also to enhance the state's reputation abroad (Takele, 2023). Through the

deft use of both military might and diplomacy, the state was able to establish itself as the cornerstone of African independence.

Strong Diplomacy: Italy was compelled to engage in negotiations. Ethiopian sovereignty was completely recognised by the Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896), which nullified the earlier Wuchale Treaty. This established Ethiopia as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance and strengthened its international position. However, the loss of Eritrea and avoiding the future war with Italy was the weakness of his diplomacy. His military victory was not pursued politically. It is still a debate why he did not take advantage of the situation and expel the Italian from the northern part of Ethiopia, present day Eritrea. The Emperor might have been wary about overstretching his resources and worried about solidifying his territorial claims in the south. For whatever reason, Menelik permitted the Italians to maintain their colonial presence in Eritrea, causing Ethiopia to face ongoing issues ever since. Forty years later, Mussolini assembled an army to invade Ethiopia using Eritrea as a staging area as retaliation for the Italian defeat at Adwa. The story of Mereb-Mellash's demise had more to it. This historical fact also drove the 30-year civil conflict that resulted in Eritrea's independence in 1993.

4.3. Haile Selassie Era Conflicts and Diplomacy

4.3.1. Italo-Ethiopian War

The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–1936 resulted from Benito Mussolini's expansionist aspirations to create an Italian East African Empire and exact revenge for Italy's devastating defeat at the Battle of Adwa. At the time, Ethiopia was a weak state with antiquated weapons, little automation, and no air force help. However, in order to reduce the Ethiopian forces' resistance, the Italian forces employed chemical weapons, sophisticated artillery, and aircraft (Sbacci, 1979).

The two states had different levels of technology, and even while the League of Nations denounced the Italian state's activities, no penalties were put in place. The Ethiopian state's isolation on the world scene demonstrated that intergovernmental organisations lack the capabilities necessary to prevent wars. Additionally, this demonstrated the commitment to communal security as well as its limitations (Pankhurst, 1999).

As a result, the Ethiopian emperor was banished and the Italians occupied the Ethiopian state. Regarding the function of post-war diplomatic settlements, the Ethiopian state was able to

drive out the Italian forces during World War II by joining forces with the British, and the emperor's authority was reinstated in 1941. This demonstrated that, in the face of external aggression, a state may establish its territorial sovereignty through strategic diplomacy.

4.3.2. Internal Rebellions and Border Skirmishes

Emperor Haile Selassie's reign was characterised by both local and internal revolutions. The rebellions took place as a means of opposing the emperor's centralisation effort, which primarily manifested itself as regionalism and ethnicity-related groups. The imperial government used both military repression and political ploys to put an end to these uprisings. The dictatorship attempted to present an image of a rich country on the international scene by using a strategy that could employ both force and negotiation tactics in order to establish an image of internal stability (Tesfaye, 2022). In terms of its effect on foreign policy, it is evident that the country's diplomatic capacities were constrained since the dictatorship was compelled to concentrate its energies in an effort to quell internal uprisings (Markakis, 1989).

As a result, the dictatorship became dependent on Western nations for foreign aid and attempted to achieve political legitimacy through diplomatic means. Ethiopian foreign policy is determined by the endeavour to create an image of strength through the growth of internal cohesion, as evidenced by the special dynamic that exists between the projection of an image of internal stability and the development of a foreign policy.

4.4. Post-War Diplomatic Settlements

Throughout Ethiopia's history, military conflicts have been followed by diplomatic agreements that resulted in the country's formalised position and consolidation of its sovereign status. Emperor Haile Selassie's rule was reinstated in 1941 as a result of post-war negotiations. During the Second World War, the Ethiopian state, working with the British, was able to drive out the Italian forces.

This demonstrated the use of military strategy in conjunction with diplomatic discussions to gain internal legitimacy. Regarding the function of international recognition, it is demonstrated that the Ethiopian state's independence is made possible by military victories combined with an appeal to the principles of international law (Kebadu, 2021). The Ethiopian state was able to preserve its borders and independence as a result, and it also became a

powerful force on both a regional and global scale. Ethiopia's membership in the League of Nations and then the United Nations is proof of this.

Such a post-diplomatic approach yields various strategic lessons. First of all, it is evident that military victories can be utilised to strengthen the country's bargaining position, giving the Ethiopian state greater clout on the global scene. Second, it is demonstrated that military failures can be made up for by using diplomatic talents, which can be achieved by signing treaties and forming alliances. Thirdly, it is also demonstrated that projecting a better image on a global scale depends more on the realisation of internal coherence.

To such a degree, military engagements have an impact on the sphere of diplomacy in addition to the battlefield. This shows how Ethiopia was not protected by collective security, which should be seen as a diplomatic weakness that calls for more idealism and liberal internationalism.

4.5. Derg Regime Military Engagements and Diplomacy

The Derg dictatorship, which was based on the necessity of putting Marxist-Leninist doctrines into practice, emerged following the fall of the imperial regime. Mass detentions, murders, and human rights violations characterised the violent event that followed the establishment of such a regime. It brought about radical socialist policies like as the land-to-the-tiller policy, nationalisation of industry, collectivisation, and a command economy (Mengistu, 2016).

The Derg was a regime characterised by both internal threats and regional conflicts, and it exploited revolutionary rhetoric to cleanse its opponents. During the Cold War, the Derg regime attempted to identify itself with the Eastern Bloc and was established on an ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

4.5.1. The Ogaden War (1974 -78) and Diplomacy

The Ogaden War was the most important conflict fought under the Derg regime. The war was a response to the Somali government's expansionist aspirations, which were motivated by the notion of a more unified Somali. The Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia was the primary focus of Somali irredentism.

Ethnic ties beyond national borders, historical animosity and grudges, and the geopolitics of the Cold War era all contributed to the war's significance on a regional and global scale (Galgano, 2018). To achieve its objective of establishing a Pan-Somali state, the Siad Barre-led Somali administration attempted to conquer the Ethiopian Somali area. In response to the conflict, the Ethiopian government adopted a policy based on both the use of military force and diplomacy. The Soviet Union's help to the Ethiopian government was what altered the course of the conflict. The Soviet Union provided supplies, weaponry, and advisors. This was created in tandem with Cub's military assistance. Ethiopian army were able to repel the Somali invasion and retake important towns as a result (Tibebe, 1991). Despite the lack of resources, an adaptive military planning process was used. Both the immediate and long-term effects of the conflict must be considered when analysing its diplomatic results.

On the African continent, the Ethiopian government has established itself as a socialist champion. The authority of the Derg dictatorship was challenged by internal armed groups commanded by the Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front (Paulos, 2001)

Human rights were flagrantly violated and displacement resulted from the government's use of torture and murder. Regarding its effect on international relations, it is evident that the Derg government attempted to establish ties on the global arena in order to address the challenges to its authority that arose in both the internal and regional domains. Getting military assistance was its primary goal. Even though the Derg administration violated human rights and severed connections with Western nations, it gained a lot of backing from eastern states. This illustrates how a country's foreign policy can be significantly impacted by its internal security.

Mixed/Weakened Diplomacy: Ethiopia became more reliant on the Eastern Bloc as a result of the triumph, but it also solidified Ethiopia's position as an African socialist champion. Together with the regime's violations of human rights, this led to the country's isolation from a large portion of the world community and the severing of connections with Western countries. Ethiopia's military and foreign policy are totally reliant on the Soviet Union, which is seen as Ethiopia's natural partner, and more realism, ideological rigidity, and an inability to establish lasting peace. Ethiopia's neighbours were viewed by the foreign policy orientation as the country's historical adversaries. The main flaw was its lack of diplomacy.

4.6. EPRDF Era Military Engagements and Post-War Diplomacy

The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power following the overthrow of the Derg dictatorship, and a significant change in military and diplomatic engagement occurred (Belair, 2016). The state was rebranded under an ethnic federalist state structure, and internal displacements and territorial disputes characterised the regime's rule. In an effort to settle disputes, obtain international recognition, and pursue regional cooperation, diplomacy played a more significant role.

4.6.1. Ethio-Eritrea Border War (1998-2000)

The Ethiopian-Eritrean boundary resulted from unresolved territorial issues following Eritrea's 1993 declaration of independence. Nationalist rhetoric on both sides exacerbated the armed conflict that began near the town of Badme. As the border dispute escalated into a full-fledged war, it was perceived as a mirror of conflicting narratives about statehood, resource scarcity, and regional security (Wuhibegezer, 2014). Massive losses on both sides and widespread population relocation were the outcomes of this large-scale conventional conflict. The battle demonstrated how territorial disagreements may escalate into fatal wars and resulted in food hunger, forced migration, and infrastructure destruction. The signing of the Algiers Agreement in 2000 marked the end of the war in terms of the diplomatic agreements that followed (Abebe & Melakou, 2008). A two-decade period of no war, no peace resulted from the realisation of a cessation of hostilities, yet border judgements became increasingly contentious. The Ethio-Eritrea war led the EPRDF leadership to create a foreign policy that prioritised border security, the necessity of forming strategic partnerships with others, and the necessity of concentrating on both military preparedness and diplomatic relations.

Weak/Unresolved Diplomacy: The peace accord resulted in a two-decade "no-war, no-peace" impasse. The disputed boundary ruling, which was first overly idealistic, exposed the nation to aggression, and failed to resolve the conflict with Eritrea, produced an ongoing foreign policy dilemma.

4.6.2. Interventions in Somalia and Regional Security Engagements

The Ethiopian state's military operations are not restricted to its boundaries; when the country's security was in jeopardy, the Ethiopian army also entered Somalia. Ethiopian military conducted cross-border incursions into Somali territory as part of operations against

Al-Shabaab, with logistical backing from AMISOM troops. This demonstrated Ethiopia's dedication to achieving regional security and the importance of taking preventative measures in order to achieve a secure border (Daniel, 2015). These actions were carried out in collaboration with other nations and were seen as a component of a regional stabilisation process that required finding a balance between security and stability. These actions were crucial because they helped Ethiopia establish its diplomatic standing in the area.

Strong Regional Diplomacy: The justification for these actions was to advance regional security. Ethiopia was able to increase its influence by stabilising its borders and solidifying its diplomatic position as a regional security supplier. did not, however, address the long-running conflict, insecurity, or regional contradiction. Ethiopia seems to be suing liberal institutionalism and realism.

4.7. Patterns and Strategies in Ethiopian Military-Diplomatic Engagements

It was demonstrated that armed conflicts throughout Ethiopia's history were used to both affirm the country's independence and realise its autonomous status in the face of internal and external threats. The state has used both military force and diplomacy in this process. The Ethiopian state was able to develop a strong position in the field of diplomacy thanks to triumphs like the Battle of Adwa (Seife 2025). The state also turned to international organisations in response to aggressions, although as was shown during the Italians' second attempt to colonise the country, these organisations were unsuccessful. In order to achieve its objectives, the Ethiopian government has increasingly employed soft power tactics such as appealing to foreign investment and economic diplomacy. From the Battle of Adwa to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, military action and diplomacy have been used in tandem to achieve national objectives.

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Ethiopia's Wars & Diplomatic Outcomes by Regime

Type of regime	War	How ended	Type of diplomacy	Assessment
Menelik II	Adwa	Victory	Strong Diplomacy (Mix realism and Idealism)	Italy was forced to negotiate. The Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896) nullified the previous Wuchale Treaty, fully recognizing Ethiopian sovereignty. This established Ethiopia as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance and strengthened its international position.in this case it was realist. War was not avoided, Eritrea lost, no guarantee for Ethiopia's future, Ethiopia's diplomatic weakness, it is more of idealist
Haile Selassie I	Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-1936	Finally, Italy defeated	Idealism/ Liberal institutionalism	How collective security did not protect Ethiopia should be seen as weakness of diplomacy that means more idealism and liberal internationalism was the weakness of the diplomacy
Derg / Military regime	Ogaden war 1974	Victory	Mixed/Weakened Diplomacy	The victory cemented Ethiopia's role as a socialist champion in Africa but made it dependent on the Eastern Bloc. This, coupled with the regime's human rights abuses, severed ties with Western powers and isolated the nation from a significant part of the international community. More of realism ideological rigidity and could not create sustainable peace for Ethiopia, lack of diplomacy was the major weakness
EPRDF	Etho-Eritrean war (1998-200) Interventions in Somalia and Regional Security Engagements	 Victory	Weak/Unresolved Diplomacy Strong Regional Diplomacy	The peace agreement led to a "no-war, no-peace" stalemate that lasted two decades. The contested border ruling created a persistent foreign policy challenge and a major national security preoccupation, limiting regional diplomacy. It was too idealist first and exposed the country for aggression and did not solve the contradiction with Eritrea. These interventions were framed as promoting regional security. This allowed Ethiopia to consolidate its diplomatic stature as a regional security provider and stabilize its borders, enhancing its influence. However, did not address the regional contradiction and elongated war and insecurity. Ethiopia appear of realist and suing liberal institutionalism.

CHAPTER FIVE

FACTORS THAT CONSTRAINED ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

5.1. Introduction

The foreign policy of Ethiopia has been motivated by the need to uphold the territorial sovereignty of the nation, realization the status of territorial integrity and also realize national interests. In such an effort to realize the diplomatic goals of the Ethiopian state at the international stage, a host of challenges that have emerged in the domestic, regional, global and structural sectors have emerged (Negera, 2018). As a result of this, the foreign policies that have been implemented by different Ethiopian regimes have mainly concentrated on the need to develop a policy that is founded on the thwarting of the threats that are being posed from the outside. The extent to which the Ethiopian state has succeeded in developing effective tools of diplomatic strategy has thus been limited by the constraints that have emerged in the domestic and the international fronts (Quinn and Akyol, 2021). This demonstrates that Ethiopian foreign policy is taking place within a space where there is a complex dynamic that is found between the posting of factions and internal pressures on one hand and threats that are emerging from the outside on the other hand.

In terms of the domestic constraints that have been emerging throughout different regimes, one can identify a host of factors related to the existence of political instability, changes in regimes, diversity that is seen in the ethnic and the linguistic levels and also the underdevelopment of the nation. These factors have placed a considerable form of limitation on the extent to which the nation is able to develop a holistic foreign policy (Takele, 2023). One of the most important factors that can be raised in this regard is the rapid changes in leadership that have been made and the fact that the ideological orientations that successive regimes have experimented with have led into varying visions of state making that are also being reflected at the international stage. During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian state's foreign policy was shaped by the theme of modernisation. In light of this, the country pursued a foreign policy that sought international cooperation, as evidenced by its membership in international organisations such as the League of Nations (Zenebe, 2024). This contrasts sharply with the Derg era, when the government prioritised domestic power consolidation over the development of international cooperative ties and the focus was on

aligning with the goals of the socialist camp. Ethiopian foreign policy has been influenced by both ideological interests and regional forces.

Ethiopia exists in a region that is defined by a web of complex relations where there are interstate rivalries, disputes on borders and ethnic ties that are not just limited to one nation. As a result of this, the Horn of Africa is defined by conflicts among countries and also tensions over the access to resources. Taking this into account, the Ethiopian state tried to develop a policy that tried to strike a balance between the realization of security imperatives on one hand and the need to commit oneself to broader diplomatic objectives on the other hand (Teshome, 2020). The Ethiopian government was compelled to create a defensive or reactive strategy that was primarily focused on achieving immediate security goals due to the unstable character of the area. The course of the Cold War and the ideological inclinations of the Ethiopian state during this time were two examples of the reality of the global political order that had a significant impact on the formation of foreign policy. This limited the areas in which the Ethiopian state could function and the country's capacity to establish connections on the global scene.

Geographical and structural limitations also have a significant impact on how Ethiopia develops its foreign policy. Due to its landlocked status, Eritrea's 1993 independence prevented the Ethiopian state from accessing international markets and partners. As a result, surrounding states became dependent on one another for business dealings. The Ethiopian state is vulnerable to regional instability since it is located in a geographically sensitive area (Getachew, 2022). Due to all of these problems, the Ethiopian government has always had to devise a strategy that blends military readiness with the use of diplomatic initiatives. Because of this, any study of Ethiopian foreign policy must be based on a comprehensive analysis that can account for the various variables that have restricted the country's options.

5.2. Domestic Constraints

One of the main issues that have limited the nature and the trajectory of Ethiopian foreign policy are the power struggles and the factions that have emerged in the domestic front. Some of the hosts of issues that are arising in this domestic space include the occurrence of political

instability, poverty and underdevelopment and the lack of strong and effective institutions.[1] As a result of the domestic front, Ethiopian leaders were not able to introduce a coherent and stable foreign policy that is able to realize the goals of the nation on the international stage (Wubu, 2025). Based on this, there is an absence of a long-term process of planning that led into the development of reactive policies rather than a proactive policy (Ibid). One main factor that is of a greater importance is political instability and regime changes. The downfall of the imperial regime led into a major ideological shift in the policies of the government. The policies of the imperial regime at the international stage were oriented towards the realization of modernization, multilateral diplomatic relations and gradual integration into the global community. Such an insistence is seen in the commitment to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).[2] The coming to power of the Derg regime in return led into the introduction of a Soviet ideology and the militarization of the foreign policies of the Ethiopian state.

The Derg regime mainly focused on the consolidation of its power and this led into a little attention that is given into the area of diplomatic engagement at the international stage.[3] The regime wasted much of its resources trying to crush internal rebellions and this hand in hand with the exclusive focus on fostering relations with the Soviet Union, led into the diminishing role of the state in the international level (Belete, 2014). The process of decision making was highly centralized and as a result of this, a reactive foreign policy that was mainly motivated by the survival of the state was introduced.[4] A host of changes were also presented by the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991. The nation tried to introduce a stable foreign policy although there were still conflicts, economic stagnation and regional instability. Thus, the new regime concentrated on the need to obtain foreign aid and military support.

A second issue that is of a greater importance is ethnic and internal conflicts. At the domestic front, the development of policies has been challenged by the existence of an ethnic and

[1] Interview with Zerihun Megersa, Diplomat and BIRICS Secretariat Coordinator at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 05 October 20205

[2] Interview with Henok Getachew (PhD) a Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute for at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2025.

[3] Interview with Abdi Zenebe (PhD) Deputy Director General at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 2025

[4] Ibid

linguistic diversity that is serving as a cause of conflict. This has forced the state to develop a policy that is aimed at the need to strike a balance between national unity and the meeting of increasing demands for autonomy. The state focused on the need to deal with internal rebellions and there was more focus on internal security when compared to the development of foreign policies.[5] The state developed a militarized approach to diplomacy and the maintenance of internal control was seen as a model towards the development of a foreign policy (Clapham, 2018). The state did not have the resources that need to be invested in the international stage and the kind of negotiations that the state tried to enter with neighbouring states have also been affected by ethnic disputes and tensions. The nation failed to establish its legitimacy as a formidable diplomatic actor as it had an internal image that was characterized by conflicts and destruction.[6] The state lacked the diplomatic flexibility that was needed in order to establish meaningful engagements at the international level.

Thirdly, economic limitations are also of a greater importance. Poverty and the lack of a thriving economy limited the capacity of the Ethiopian state to exert its policies beyond its own borders. The diplomatic priorities of the state were limited and the state tried to develop an approach that was focused towards trade agreements and the attracting of investment from abroad. During the Derg regime, there was a dependence on the Soviet Union in both the military and the economic areas and this had a huge limitation on the autonomy of the nation (Shimellis, 2024). The nation no longer had policy autonomy because of the ideological commitments of the nation. According to Henock Getachew the economic vulnerabilities of the state had an impact on the foreign policy of the nation throughout different regimes. The absence of a strong economic background also limited the extent to which the state was able to participate in prolonged military campaigns and also participate in regional security initiatives. Because of this, underdevelopment led into the creation of a cyclical limitation in Ethiopian foreign policy where the resources of the state were used in the development of a reactive form of diplomacy that limited the possibility of developing external partnerships that are founded on positions of equality.[7]

[5] Interview with Henok Getachew (PhD) a Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute for at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2025.

[6] Interview with Abdi Zenebe (PhD) Deputy Director General at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 2025

[7] Interview with Henok Getachew (PhD) a Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute for at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2025.

Fourthly, there is also a need to take into account the role that is played by governance deficits and institutional weaknesses. The development of an effective form of foreign policy in Ethiopia has also been limited by the existence of a weak governance system, corruption and limited institutional capacity. There is an absence of an effective coordination among institutions and this led into the absence of a coherent form of planning.[8] There is the absence of an effective form of bureaucracy, overlapping authorities and this led into the lack of a coherent foreign policy.[9] The disruption of foreign policy that resulted when there was a move from one regime into the other led into the absence of an institutional memory that is need in order to mount a policy in times of crisis like the existence of droughts and times of war (Berouk, 2012). New leaderships tried to introduce new policies by completely ignoring the past and this coupled with the absence of a transparent form of leadership, radically altered the trajectory of Ethiopian foreign policy. Within the host of factors that limited the foreign policy of the Ethiopian state, one sees the intersection of governance and domestic constraints where the lack of political instability led into the existence of ethnic conflicts and this is taking place in the background of weak institutions and a foreign policy that is founded on the prioritization of security issues over the development of sustainable relations.[10]

Professor Paulos further claim that when it comes to institutionalization of foreign policy decision-making process, it was the sole prerogative of the emperor, president or Prime Minster by this day. For example, during Haile Selassie period the decision-making process for public policy, including foreign policy, was not subject to ideology or the whims of public opinion. Despite having established organisations for making important decisions, the emperor's supreme authority was inviolable towards decision-making. He could approve or veto any significant decisions. Under the military regime too, Mengistu Hailemariam has controlled all political power. The president's idiosyncrasies determined Ethiopian foreign policy and relations with other countries. He has overseen all of the regime's political operations. Significant foreign policy decisions were made without giving Ethiopia enough consideration. He continues his argument by stating this trend was continued during the EPRDF regime in compromising Ethiopian national interest access to the sea when in Algiers

[8] Interview with Zerihun Megersa, Diplomat and BIRICS Secretariat Coordinator at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 05 October 20205

[9] Interview with Dimiru Bekele, Sinior Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 03 October 20205

[10] Interview with Paulos Milkias (PhD) Professor of Humanities and Political Science at Marianopolis College/Concordia University, 28 February 20 23

Agreement Prime Minister Males agreed to accept defunct Italian colonial treaties as valid that played a crucial role in deciding the fate of Ethiopia's access to the sea. And many of us can recall during and following the Algiers negotiations, many Ethiopians expressed their outrage with protest marches and some even appeals to the UN, the Ethiopian prime minister, the Ethiopian parliament, international leaders, and anyone who would listen.[11]

It is important to consider democratic governance, public participation in the policy formulation. The absence of democracy governance at the domestic level constrain policy implementation. This is clearly elucidated in Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy of 2002; as lack of democracy and good governance is the source of our inability to work together in a spirit of tolerance and cooperation forged by a common belief in our national destiny (Negera, 2018). According to an interview conducted with Professor Paulos domestic political system which lacks democratic governance and popular participation in public policy arena in one way or the other limit the style, approach, and orientation of country's foreign policy because the realisation of democratic principles and good governance are the foundations for the nation's perpetual existence.[12] Abdi Zenebe argued without a democratic system, national and religious divisions would inevitably widen, human rights violations will lead to conflict, and poverty will worsen—a formula for disintegration and devastation. Professor claims that this type of governmental structure has kept the nation's ethnic, regional, religious, generational, and other elements in a delicate balance.[13] The political system has little predictability and visibility, mostly due to the dominance of one personality and the primitive institutionalisation in turn weaken international stature of a nation.

5.3. Regional Constraints

The development of Ethiopian foreign policy is to a larger extent a manifestation of the regional environment within which the nation is operating within. The nation is found in a geo strategic important position and such an importance has implications on the options that are made available to the nation, the development of the security imperative and the

[11] Ibid

[12] Interview with Paulos Milkias (PhD) Professor of Humanities and Political Science at Marianopolis College/Concordia University, 28 February 20 23

[13] Ibid

completion over resources.[14] In terms of Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours, one comes across a complex relationship that is characterized by both relations of cooperation and conflicts. The nature of the foreign policy has particularly been limited by Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea ((Paulos, 2004). After gaining independence in 1993, there was a peaceful relationship among the two nations although a full-scale war son revolted over unresolved border issues. The nation exerted vast amounts of resources in such a war and this constrained the role that the Ethiopian state is able to play in the area of regional diplomacy. The relations that the Ethiopian state developed with other neighbouring nations were also influenced by the outcomes of such a conflict. Additionally, the relations that the Ethiopian state has tried to develop with neighbouring nations like Sudan were shaped by a completion over resources like the Nile River.[15] The state has always developed a cautious stance towards the Sudanese state being fuelled by border disputes and the occurrence of internal instability in the nation. This constrained the policy autonomy of the Ethiopian state over the region.

There are also challenging relations that are being developed between the Ethiopian state and Somali which presents a serious regional challenge. The engagement off the Ethiopian state in Somali has been defined by both military and diplomatic relations and Ethiopia made interventions being founded on the need for stability in the region against the threats that have been posed by insurgent groups[16]. This made the Ethiopian state to be committed to long military commitments and also engage in a regional diplomacy that is motivated by the maintenance of peace and security. There are also opportunities and threats that are presented by the need to have an access to the Red Sea as it presents a main aspect of Ethiopia's foreign policy in the region. Ethiopia is forced to be dependent on Djibouti and any deterioration on relations with such a nation, presents a huge challenge on the economic and strategic interests of the state.[17] Moreover, there are tensions with the Egyptian state caused by the building of

[14] Interview with Dimiru Bekele, Sinior Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 03 October 20205

[15] Interview with Henok Getachew (PhD) a Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute for at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2025.

[16] Interview with Henok Getachew (PhD) a Senior Researcher of African Affairs at the Institute for at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 7 October 2025.

[17] Interview with Abdi Zenebe (PhD) Deputy Director General at Institute of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 2025

the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and Egypt sees this as a threat to the water security of the nation (Henok, 2023). Moreover, there are security threats that are being persisted on the Ethiopian state in the form of cross-border insurgencies. The Ethiopian state has been forced to securitize its borders because of the threats of terrorism and there is also a focus on military preparedness in reference to the actions of states that are experiencing political instability. The existence of instability for a longer period of time in the region has made unilateral actions risky.

There are also regional alliances and rivalries sharing the success of Ethiopian foreign policy. The nation plays a key role in the African Union and it is dealing with competing interests from other states. The nation is trying to develop an approach that is able to situate itself as regional leaders while at the same time forge strategic alliances with powerful nations like the United States of America, China and Russia. The nation rather than utilizing independent strategies opted for the usage of cooperation with Kenya and the African union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in dealing with security threats in the region. There are also negotiations over borers with neighbouring nations like Sudan that are actively taking place. This shows that there is an inseparable connection that is found between security issues, the struggle over resources and the pursuing of diplomatic goals. [18]

5.4. Global Constraints

In addition to the pressures that the Ethiopian state is dealing with at a regional level, the nature of the global dynamic's also dictated the essence of Ethiopian foreign policy. One of the issues that need to be mentioned in this regard is the nature of the Cold War dynamics. [19]In an age of competing interest between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Ethiopian state was aligned with the U.S.A during the imperial regime and during the Derg period there was a shift towards an alliance with the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc. This although it led into the provision of military and economic support, still led into the constraining of Ethiopia's diplomatic immunity. This led into a superpower rivalry in the region and stood against the development of an independent Ethiopian foreign policy. There were also pressures in the post-Cold War period where the new EPRDF regime was criticized

[18] Interview with Dimiru Bekele, Sinior Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 03 October 20205

[19] Interview with Zerihun Megersa, Diplomat and BIRICS Secretariat Coordinator at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 05 October 20205

for its gross violation of human rights and this constrained the role of the state at the international stage (Negera, 2019). The Ethiopian state tried to boost its intentional status through a participation in peacekeeping and efforts that are aimed at the stabilization of the region. This allowed the state to have an international influence and required the development of a delicate relationship with international actors. The demand of acting in accordance with international norms and standards was not strictly met by the Ethiopian state. This was seen in the area of the commitment to human rights. In other areas like border disputes and disputes over the boiling of the GERD, the state appealed to international dispute resolution mechanisms. Hence, attempts were made to balance military preparedness with the exerting of regional influence.

5.5. Structural and Geopolitical Constraints

Both internal and external factors play a role in the development of Ethiopia's foreign policy. Some of the issues that need to be taken into account include the landlocked nature of the country, geographic location and the struggle over limited resources. When one looks at the landlocked nature of the country, it is shown that after Eritrea gained independence in 1993, Ethiopia lost its only access to the sea. [20]This limited Ethiopia's involvement in the regional economy and the flexibility of its foreign policies. The nation is also situated in a geographical location which is highly volatile and as a result of this; there is a chronic instability in the region (Yeshiwas, 2024). The superpowers are interested in the region because it gives an access to maritime strategic areas, energy routes and allow them to have an influence over the entire region. To such an extent, because of its strategic potion, the state has been forced to navigate a very complex dynamic. There is also a competition for scarce resources in the region especially over the Nile River. The Ethiopian state resorted to negotiations with other countries and this is especially seen in the case of the GERD project.[21] This has implications for stability in the region and shows that there is a need to develop a diplomatic engagement with others in a way that is able to affirm respective national interests.

[20] Interview with Paulos Milkias (PhD) Professor of Humanities and Political Science at Marianopolis College/Concordia University, 28 February 20 23

[21] Interview with Dimiru Bekele, Sinior Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 03 October 20205

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The thesis has explored Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy by looking at different historical epochs and gave a particular focus to the connections that are found between the realm of military engagements and the essence of post-war diplomacy. Through the study of the different areas covering the time from the imperial periods into that of the EPRDF, it has been shown that strategic issues alongside domestic imperatives, the volatile nature of the region and issues of a global nature have dictated the foreign policies that have been introduced by the Ethiopian state. This demonstrates that there is an inseparable connection that is found between military power and engagements, the utilization of diplomatic tools and the limits that have been placed on the foreign police of the Ethiopian state.

One of the main findings that the study came across is that there is an inseparable connection found between the military engagements of the Ethiopian state and the corresponding diplomatic strategies that have been employed in the post-war diplomacy period. The nation had utilized military power as a way of establishing a formidable place at the intentional stage. Decisive victories were not only used as a way of consolidating the sovereign status of the nation but also as a way of charting out new territories in the global diplomatic arena. One historical example that is taken as a paradigmatic example of the ability of the Ethiopian state to use military victories as a foundation of diplomatic endeavours is the victory of Adwa. It was not just the preservation of national identity that resulted out of such a battle but the positioning of the nation as symbols that is taken as a foundation of anti-colonial resistance and the resilience of the African state. This also led into the centralization of the process of state making and allowed the state to prevail over internal dissent and it was also able to consolidate its political power and authority. This in return was used in order to project the power of the state in the international level.

During Haile Selassie era, there were both internal and external threats that were being posed. The limitation of the military capabilities of the Ethiopian state was seen during this period and the failure of the intentional mechanisms like the League of Nations was also emphasized. The connections that are found between military vulnerability and the necessity of diplomatic relations were seen in such a period. It was the dynamics of the Second World

War and the diplomatic relations that the state was able to establish with the British that led into the liberation of the Ethiopian state during such a period.

During Derg Regime period, a remarkable shift in Ethiopian foreign policy was seen and the regime was ideologically aligned with the Socialist camp. The regime was internally trying to crush the rebellions and it was dependent on the Soviet Union in economic, political and military sectors. This severely limited the flexibility of the state and it was not able to develop sustaining relations with western powers. It relied on ideological commitments as a way of justifying its power and also prevailing over the regional dynamics.

EPRDF Era was defined by the Ethio-Eritrea Border War, military interventions that the Ethiopian state has made in Somalia and tensions that arose over the building of the GERD. In such an era, one saw the appeal to the usage of military engagements alongside diplomatic relations as a way of meeting the goals of the state. The border conflict with Eritrea culminated in the Algiers Agreement and although a partial resolution was attained, there are still tense relations among the two states. the Ethiopian state also made incursions into Somali in collaboration with other states as a way of establishing regional stability and this showed how multilateral diplomacy cold be used in order to gain a strategic advantage in the region.

From pre-colonial and early colonial times to the present, the aforementioned governments' foreign policy paths demonstrate both continuity and change. Consolidating their internal power base and resisting colonialism and expansionism were the main goals of their foreign policy during the pre-colonial and early colonial periods. Each of the three emperors had a distinct personality and sense of power that affected their foreign policy decisions. Tewodros was cognisant of the potentially lethal actions of European imperialism, especially French imperialism. Yohannis was calm and less impetuous than his predecessor. Because he was understanding and tolerant of his vassals, Yohannis is seen as liberal or idealist. Menelik's political leadership style and capacity to "extract" and mobilise various aspects of the state's authority set him apart from both of his predecessors. Over time, his psychological makeup and prior political experience greatly influenced how he formulated foreign policy. In essence, his diplomacy relied on guile and shrewdness. It was considered that he was a realist because he defeated Italy at the Battle of Adowa. His inability to remove the Italian presence

in northern Ethiopia and his agreement with Italy to maintain their colonial presence in Mereb Melash (Eritrea) that confirmed by a border agreement in 1900 considered him idealist.

Haile Selassie's views on peaceful coexistence, support for the non-alignment movement, steadfast support for the OAU, and pragmatic, moderate pan-Africanism led him to lean towards idealist theory when it came to his regime's collective security and support for international organisations like the United Nations and the League of Nations. Ethiopia's standing as an African socialist champion was cemented by the Dreg administration's victories, but the government also made Ethiopia more dependent on the Eastern Bloc. This, along with the regime's human rights abuses, caused the nation to become isolated from much of the world community and cut ties with Western nations. His lack of diplomacy was the primary shortcoming of his foreign policy; he was more realist, uncompromising in his ideology, and incapable of bringing about enduring peace for Ethiopia.

The peace deal reached by the EPRDF resulted in a "no-war, no-peace" impasse that persisted for twenty years. In order to settle the territorial disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, EPRDF accepted the 1900, 1902, and 1908 treaties between Ethiopia and Colonial Italy in the Algiers agreement. Ethiopia's access to the sea was determined in large part by the out-of-date Italian colonial treaties, which EPRDF acknowledged as legitimate. It became a realist as a result of the contentious border ruling, which created an ongoing foreign policy dilemma. It was first overly idealistic, exposed the nation to aggression, and failed to resolve the conflict with Eritrea. In terms of the theoretical framework, it is challenging to categorise any regime under a single theory; instead, they are overlapping and hazy.

This study showed that domestic, regional, global, structural and geopolitical factors are constraints that have been placed on the foreign policy of Ethiopia.

In the domestic terrain, the existence of political instability coupled with radical changes in regimes that are accompanied by different ideological orientations and the occurrence of ethnic conflicts severely limited the scope and the policy autonomy of Ethiopian foreign policy. There were always power struggles and this led into the absence of institutional

memory and the lack of a proactive form of diplomatic engagement. The political elites' perceptions of the state's formation and the nation-building initiatives that followed throughout Ethiopia's modern history have contributed to the country's internal dilemma. Deviating historical narratives on the state-cum-nation building endeavour that dominates the country's political scene continue to be a source of contention between elites from various political backgrounds. The state's desired role is therefore determined by these factors and as a result the real difficulties facing foreign policy change. The state was forced to concentrate on the management of diversity and the controlling of factions and rebellions and this limited the scope and the essence of Ethiopian foreign policy.

Regionally Ethiopia's existence in the Horn of Africa has presented both prospects and contests for its foreign policy and national security over the last century. As a result of the volatile nature of the horn of Africa, there are more obstacles than opportunities. In fact, the state did suffer political, diplomatic, and economic handicap as a result of the regional geopolitical dynamics. Ethiopia frequently finds itself in a fragile security environment because the regional structure is subordinate to the Middle East power competition and the intrusion of extra-regional players. The state's vulnerability to outside shocks and the ensuing strain on its foreign policy have persisted. This limited the possibility of a unilateral action and there is always the possibility of conflict in the region. The region is also defined by a completion for limited resources and this led into the absence of holistic and long-term strategic objectives. This also limited the possibility of regional interdependence.

The nature and the trajectory of Ethiopia’s foreign policy have also been limited by the nature of global politics. Ethiopia's national interest was either positively or negatively impacted by a state assuming the global hegemonic position during the last significant shifts in global power. For example, in the early decades of the mid-20th century, the Imperial government had the chance to recover the historical yearning for access to the sea and redeem the lost territory by forging closer diplomatic ties with the USA, the newly rising superpower. In contrast to this historical situation, Ethiopia's attempts to protect its national interests were jeopardised by the shift in global power from a bipolar to a unipolar arrangement. During the final ten years of the Cold War, Ethiopia strengthened its military connections with the former Soviet Union in order to counteract perceived and real challenges to the government and the state. However, the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world reduced the military

government's support, which contributed to the strain on the nation's foreign policy and the ensuing regime change. Subsequently, in the post-Derg period, the state tried to appeal to intentional lows and norms in order to settle disputes and conflicts and this was mainly seen in the case of the border war with the state of Eritrea and that of the building of the GERD. Structurally Ethiopia's geographical location in the horn of Africa and its status as a landlocked country also placed limitations on the nature of its foreign policy. It tried to prevent escalations into conflicts through the usage of diplomatic means.

When one looks at the trajectory of Ethiopian foreign policy post Adwa period, there is continuity amidst change. As a continuity, the core objective of ensuring national survival, territorial integrity, and regime survival remains a constant. Internal and external factors consistently interact to shape policy. As a change, there has been a significant shift from a "siege mentality" and a military/security-focused "outside-in" approach (pre-1991) to an "inside-out," economic diplomacy-oriented strategy (post-1991) that prioritizes economic development and regional economic integration. There is a shift towards multilateral diplomacy grounded on soft power rather than the usage of military engagements.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Overview of Key Informant Interviewees

NO	Name of the Interviewees	Place of Work	Position	
1	Paulos Milkias (PhD)	Concordia University, USA	Professor of Humanities and political Science	The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa
2	Abdi Zenebe (PhD)	Institute of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Director General	
3	Henok Getachew (PhD)	Institute of Foreign Affairs	Senior Researcher of African Affairs	
4	Dimiru Bekele (Mr)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior Diplomat who work in UK, Ireland, Iceland	
5	Zerihun Megarssa (Mr)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior Diplomat and BRICS Secretariat Coordinator	

Appendix 2. Interview Guide for Key informants for Scholars and Diplomats

1. How do you explain Ethiopian foreign policy post-Adwa period given domestic, regional and geopolitical position of Ethiopia?
2. How do you see military engagements and diplomatic settlements of post-Adwa period Ethiopia given internal, regional global dynamics of the region.
3. What are possible factors that constrains Ethiopian foreign policy given internal, regional and global positions of Ethiopia?
4. Oher possible questions based on the discussion with interviewees