

**HERDER-FARMER CONFLICTS IN THE DAWA-GANALE RIVER
BASIN AREAS: THE CASE OF INTRA CLAN CONFLICT AMONG
THE DEGODIA SOMALI OF DOLLO ADO DISTRICT IN THE
SOMALI REGIONAL STATE OF ETHIOPIA**

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
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
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



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
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Map I Location Map of the Study area



Source: Based on Ethiopian Map Authority, Dolo Odo Wereda map, 2000

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Abstract

This study attempts to explore inter clan resource conflicts and local (basically economic) instability in Somali Regional State. Conflict or insecurity hinders local, community, and regional development by principally affecting rural pastoral and agro pastoral production systems and as a result causes food security. Especially, in conflict endemic areas like that of Dollo Addo district along the Ethiopia-Somalia –Kenya border zone, where the internal and cross border inter – clan and intra – clan conflicts are higher both in terms of frequency and intensity (for the last 40 years) the livelihoods of the pastoral and agro pastoralist clans are extremely threatened to greater extent.

This study in the Dollo Oddo wereda of Liban Zone in the southeastern Somali Regional state has been exposed to natural disasters and conflicts. This study focuses on the inter clan herder – farmer conflicts within Degodia and Degodia and their neighbors with more focus on internal conflicts within the Degodia. The main assumption in the beginning of this study was that as in many arid lowland and river basin lands where natural resource scarcity dictates the relationships among pastoral herders and, herders and farmers sharing a common (shared) production zones, the major cause of conflicts in the study area would be primarily resource scarcity, yet this is without neglecting the socio cultural, political and economic factors.

Accordingly, natural resources scarcity in both predominantly pastoral and agricultural clan lands (within the river basin and its hinterlands) coupled with some other factors like imposition of or lack of clear pastoral land tenure policy, creation of clan based administrative structures (ye gossa yegitosh meret), and the rearrangement of local land boundaries, and demarcation of administrative borders of the new and old Weredas (for example Dollo wereda has been part of Borana wereda), the implementation of decentralized administrative structures, (1994, 2003) and the unchecked influx of large number of drought and internal and external conflict displaced herders with their livestock and Somali refugees (since 1991) and returnees (since 1985, after 1992) from Somalia and Kenya are found to be the inherent cause of conflict in the study area. With regard to its nature, the inter- and intra clan and inter ethnic resource based conflicts in the study area were found to be of higher in their magnitude of occurrences and intensity and their consequences, which worsens , with the aggravation of resource scarcity and absence of conflict resolving formal institutions for sustainable conflict resolution.

Key words: conflict, clan, institutions, river basin, herder, farmer, and transformation

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Acronyms

| | |
|------------------|---|
| ARRA | Authority for Refugee and Returnee Affairs |
| CSA | Central Statistical Authority |
| DPPC | Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| FDRE | Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia |
| NCCR North-South | National Centre of Competence in Research North South |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| PA | Peasant Association |
| RRC | Relief and Rehabilitation Commission |
| SCF-US | Save the Children Fund US |
| SNF | Somali National Front |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |

Glossary of Somali Terms

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| <i>Asal</i> | A red dye prepared from local trees |
| <i>Baan</i> | Hospitalization of conflict casualties |
| <i>Bahweyn</i> | The first wife |
| <i>Bulbax</i> | Compensation paid to healed causality of conflict |
| <i>Burjewasi</i> | Share cultivation |
| <i>Ceel</i> | Hand dug well |
| <i>Dhai</i> | Flood Plain |
| <i>Geed</i> | The place where negotiations take place |
| <i>Guurti</i> | Council of elders |
| <i>Helo/Malka</i> | River water point |
| <i>Ishkin</i> | Larger herds such as camel and cattle |
| <i>Nugul</i> | Lactating herds |
| <i>Sharmo/Hamiir</i> | River bed farm fields for <i>nugul</i> grazing |
| <i>Soof</i> | Herds numbering hundred |
| <i>Subeynxir</i> | An expression of guilt by the group who Elope a young lady |
| <i>Xaraara</i> | First compensation for medicating conflict casualties by the blameworthy group |
| <i>Xir</i> | Young learners of Islamic faith from distant pastoral encampment |

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Inter- and intra-clan level herder-herder and herder-farmer competition and conflicts over access and control of natural resources have become increasingly the heart of problems in the pastoral regions in Ethiopia as elsewhere in the Horn and the Sahel. The Ethiopian Somali region in recent decades has experienced an escalation of violent inter- and intra-clan clashes among Somali clans. This has been very common along the border areas between Ethiopia and Somalia and along the Ethio-Kenyan border. Not only have these clashes increased loss and damage of human lives and property but they have also caused serious resource shrinkages and scarcities.

During the past two decades, the growing problem of internal clan conflicts in pastoral areas of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region has drawn attention from researchers, development planners, politicians, national and regional governments, non-governmental, national, regional and international agencies.

This study attempts to analyze the dynamics that have led inter- and intra-clan resource use based conflicts between the formerly herding and farming Degodia clans or conflicts that result from the adoption of a new production system by the formerly herding clans and the settled agriculture in the Ganale-Dawa river basin lands, specially in Dollo *wereda* of Liban zone.

1.1 Background

There are different national as well as local and regional development constraints experienced by the Somali region's inhabitants whether pastoral and agro pastoral or purely agricultural producer groups. The major development constraints and conflict enticing factors include reduction and degradation of the environmental resource base of the Somali region's inhabitants mainly due to an increase in human and livestock population among both herders and minority farmers, low herd and land productivity,

widespread animal and crop diseases, poor and inadequate provision of public services, lack of development schemes, specifically tuned to the needs of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, and minority farmers, lack of livestock and agricultural development programs, unfavorable marketing policies, lack of human resource development, and inexistence of good governance structures and poor formal conflict management institutions. All these factors have led to the increasing resource based and other conflicts among the Somali region's inhabitants.

The Degodia inhabited river basin area of Dollo Ado district in the Liban Zone has been for decades one of the most under developed and conflict endemic border area in southeastern Ethiopia. To date the area under consideration is among the places where for several decades various forms and levels of resource, underdevelopment and politically induced (liberation and or irredentist) internal conflicts as well as cross international border conflicts have taken place affecting the diverse livelihood systems of Degodia and other inhabitants.

The agro-ecology of the Degodia inhabited river basin lands of Dollo Ado *wereda* is very delicate. The natural resources, the vast flood plain grazing areas, the narrow strip of cultivation lands along the river banks, the diverse but scarce vegetation cover and water resources require good management practices and institutions for regulations of local resources access, and management of the resultant use conflicts, for efficient resource utilization and sustained productivity of the river basin ecology. Conversely, the progressive erosion of community based natural resource use and resource related conflict management institutions, without the introduction of alternative institutions will in fact result increasing level of resource mismanagement, weakening of inter- and intra-clan cooperation and accommodation in resource use and increasing resource use tensions and violent conflicts. This leads to increased levels of rural poverty and food insecurity. Therefore, it requires corrective intervention measures by the federal and regional governments in terms of resource use, tenure rights and human resource development policies and good governance. Effective resource conflict resolution institutions of the Somali communities have to be involved. These have to work with government and non-governmental actors and partners in alleviating local conflict.

In this study, the main focus will be on those issues relating to the inter-clan resource based herder-farmer conflicts within Degodia society and to a little extent between the Degodia and their neighbors; the Garrimarro farmers in the Ganale-Dawa river basin land of Dollo Ado *wereda*. The study area is mainly inhabited by Degodia, Garrimarro, and minority communities whose livelihood is based in pastoralism, agro-pastoralism and settled agriculture.

1.2 The Degodia and Relations with their Neighbors

Degodia Somali inhabit vast rangelands in southeastern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. In Ethiopia, they inhabit parts of the Afdeer and Liban Zones of the Somali Regional State. They are one among the popular pastoral Somali clans in the stated zones. They are very closely related to the Somali clans in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya and their Cushitic speaking neighbors the Boran and Arssi Oromo, and settled river bank farming minorities such as the Garrimarro. The Degodia must have occupied their present homelands in Liban and Afder Zones and northeastern Kenya for several centuries.

The river basin areas the Degodia people inhabit represents an arid environment. In spite of this the area is able to support predominantly transhumant pastoralists as well as minority group of river bank farmers due to the availability of large quantity of water supplied by the Ganale and Dawa rivers. Thus, these river basin natural resources and their mixed livestock herd asset are the living sources for the Degodia, Garrimarro, and other minority basin herding and farming communities. Accordingly, the majority of the basin inhabitants in Dollo Ado *wereda*, the Degodia, derive the bulk of their livelihood from transhumant mixed species pastoralism, while the minority sedentary Garrimarro and other semi Somali minority groups predominantly derive their living from subsistence agriculture and keep few livestock along the banks of the Dawa-Ganale rivers. The Degodia though by and large transhumant herder engage in the river bank agriculture to supplement their pastoral livelihood.

The farming Degodia individuals and families are normally from the same lineages and clans and, as their Degodia pastoral kin, have turned to farming only within the last four or five decades and more in the past decade, these new comers share the same kinship,

descent and political institutions with other Degodias who are either farmers or continue their pastoral way of life.

Until very recently relationships between the Degodia with their pastoral neighbors the Boran Oromo, the Somali Garre, the Ogaden, Marihan and Murule in general and their close neighbors and the minority Garrimarro farmers have been characterized by a mixture of competition and conflicts over river scarce basin pastoral and agricultural resources. Conflicts with neighbors usually become acute during droughts and when resources become scarce. Yet one could generally argue that given the prevalence of resource scarcity competition and conflicts become characteristic of the relations between the Degodia and other inhabitants of the river basin lands. In spite of recurring conflicts between Degodia and their neighbors, they were often resolved by traditional leaders and elders as well as the local government officials and security forces.

To summarize this section, Degodia and other inhabitants in the study area as elsewhere in the Somali region are undergoing radical socio economic and political transformations due to national and regional level political changes, frequent droughts, increasing resource scarcity, the adoption of farming as complementary livelihood systems and increased levels of resource use conflicts. In the face of these quick changes the Degodia society has responded by assigning additional tasks to their traditional governance, resource use and conflict management institutions to manage and deal with the new forms resource scarcity based inter Degodia clans and Degodia and their neighbors' resource based conflicts.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Pastoral production systems occupy an important socio-economic niche in the semi-arid regions of Ethiopia. Based on extensive mobility patterns (internal and cross border mobility) and ecological opportunism, pastoral life capitalizes on its ability to transform scarce resources into economic goods and calories. The strengths of this life are however being eroded and as a production system it is caught in a protracted crisis (Helland 2000b).

The serious problems of pastoral production system in semi-arid and arid lowlands in Ethiopia and the Liban Zone's Dollo Ado area, as elsewhere in East Africa are attributed to

a multitude of causes involving the interplay between several forces: ecological, climatic, political, economic, demographic and institutional. The outcome of these has often increased poverty and destitution and in effect increased vulnerability to drought and other environmental stresses (Helland 2000b, Getachew 2002).

Pastoral lands have been expropriated with the consent of the state for the promotion of non-pastoral activities, agro-pastoral systems of production such as commercial irrigated cash crop farming, settlements and other public and private uses. These have often been located in what has been critical basin dry season grazing and farming for pastoralists' and minority subsistence agriculturalists. In many cases, these transformations have been inevitable and may have been necessary developments but, when they go unchecked, they result in inter- and intra- herder and farmer conflicts. Thus, this must be solved in a planned way which is not often a case with state promoted livestock and agricultural development and settlement schemes in the arid and semi-arid river basin lands in Ethiopia. In state led interventions the focus has always been on the livestock and high potential land and natural resources and very little attention has been given to pastorals and minority farmers and hunter gatherers.

Increase in human population and increased demands for food and cash in the semi-arid and arid river basin region of Dollo Ado *wereda* in Ethiopia necessitated more land to be put under cultivation and settlement. As a result, agriculture is increasingly encroaching into the pastoralists' high potential basin and hinterland wet season grazing lands. This expansion of sedimentary agriculture resource frontiers and consequent loss of critical dry season high potential grazing lands put the traditional communal resource management practices of the pastoralists in disarray. In the case of the study area, as elsewhere in Somali region, basin lands and river water access points have been closed, seasonal livestock migrations have been hampered or restricted. Hence, leading to the deterioration and eventual degradation of the range resources in the river basin lands due to over population (livestock and humans) from within and outside certain high potential areas in the Dawa-Ganale river basin lands. The environmental resource degradation process was aggravated due to the weakening of the traditional community resource management institutions and mechanisms.

The inter- and intra-clan herder-farmer conflict within Degodia and between Degodia and their agricultural and herding neighbors and other new entrant resource users (returnees, Somali refugees and others) over resource use has heightened due to the following. The salient factors are drought, less milk production, poor purchasing power, increased livestock death and diminished capital. When desperate pastoralists opt for more pasture and water resources beyond their traditional terrestrial limits of the clans, the conflict within and between clans, sub clans and lineages of the same group of pastoralists and agricultural groups become inevitable.

The subsequent governments of Ethiopia gave very little attention to the pastoral production sector in terms of public investment allocation. National and local development policies are geared in the direction of increasing production and productivity of agricultural production with the main aim of attaining food self-sufficiency. The contribution of the traditional pastoral sector to the national economy has often been overlooked, and pastoral communal lands have often been converted to either private or state property. Moreover, until recently, Somali pastoralists were least represented in the state structure and other important decision making bodies. Even during the post 1991, though represented in all levels of the state structure, the capacity of pastoralists' representatives for lobbying on a national level for their resource tenure and other rights has been very limited.

The economic, socio-cultural, and political marginalization imposed on the pastoral communities has led them to vulnerability in the last two decades. Lack of appropriate development policies and strong institutions and ecological changes coupled with demographic pressures has been the major loophole in the impoverishment of pastoralists in the semi arid, arid regions of Ethiopia (Getachew 2002, Ayalew 2001, Helland 2000b, Hagmann 2002).

In this study, the resource use based conflicts within Degodia and their neighboring groups in the river basin pastoral areas in Liban Zone's Dollo Ado *wereda* is viewed in the light of the above stated political, economic, ecological, and global syndromes. Attempts at transforming and resolving the herder-farmer resource use problems in the Dawa-Ganale basin and in similar areas in the Somali region of Ethiopia need an in depth understanding. Especially, the dynamic forces and underlying causes behind the resource scarcity, competition and conflict need to be well identified and addressed through discussions. The

research approach used in this study though multi disciplinary; it will primarily emphasize the resource scarcity perspective.

1.4 The Objectives of the Study

This study assesses the resource use based conflict between Degodia herders and farmers and Degodia herders and settled farming minority communities in the Dawa-Ganale basin lands of Dollo Ado *wereda* in Liban zone. It is also meant to shed light on the implications of the conflict for the sustainability of the two production systems - the pastoral and the agricultural ones. The main thrusts of the research will thus be:

- To assess the processes of change in resource use from traditional pastoral production to sedentary farming agriculture and the reasons behind these transformations;
- To analyze the pastoral and agricultural production systems of the Degodia clans and their neighbors;
- To recommend possible ways to mitigating these inter clan and inter group farmer-herder conflicts in the basin.

1.5 Hypothesis

It is argued in this study that currently both the pastoral and agricultural production and producers in the basin area are under crises, which emanated from the resource use conflict between the two.

Inter- and intra-clan conflicts between Degodia and their farming and herding neighbors and internal conflicts between Degodia clans are heightened as the resource base available to the pastoralists and agriculturalists is shrinking. Consequently, the viability of the pastoral and agricultural communities and families is threatened and their production system rendered unsustainable.

1.6 Research Methods Used for this Study

In order to study the resource based conflicts within Degodia society and to come up with a comprehensive understanding of how Degodia society handles their internal conflicts, the researcher focused primarily on the qualitative assessments by focusing mainly on the internal farmer-herder conflicts between the Degodia lineages and the mechanisms used to resolve these conflicts. The data for this qualitative analysis of intra Degodia herder-farmer resource based conflict were obtained through a two-month field research in Dollo Ado *wereda* as well as pre and post library research of secondary source materials.

1.6.1 Field Work and Research Site

The field study was carried out in one of the conflict prone Somali *weredas*, Dollo Ado *wereda* in the Liban zone of the Somali Regional State (see Map 1). The Degodia community was considered for this particular study to collect the necessary first hand qualitative data.

Nine Degodia communities/lineage settlements or peasant associations of Dollo Ado *wereda* that basically lead their life on agriculture and pastoral livelihood are included. Besides, these groups were engaged in recent times in resource access, use and tenure based conflicts with each other.

The nine localities in which the field research was conducted were all along the banks of the Ganale and Dawa River basin. Out of the nine target village communities, six of them are located along the Ganale River banks, these were namely Bur Amino, Kole, Godbakol, Helaweyn, Lugal and Galome and the other three case study villages were situated along the Dawa river banks, these were Kura Masare, Suffu, and Fiqow (Haji Ali) peasant associations (see Map 2) .

The selection of the nine study sites was based on the basis of the researcher's personal knowledge of the study area being born and raised there and with the help of knowledgeable and reputed Degodia clan leaders and elders from the Dollo Ado district.

A principal criterion employed was that they be among the communities considered to represent the Degodia lineages and clans whose members consisted of predominantly pastoral and predominantly agricultural and agro pastoral. Degodia lineages in the district and sites where the farming and pastoralist Degodia lineages were on more frequent basis involved or confronted each other over resource access, use and tenure rights and also where the conflicts between the two categories of Degodia society have successful method of resolving their disputes using both traditional and modern/formal mechanisms.

Thus, the selection of the stated nine field study sites was found as useful by the researcher in terms of gathering qualitative first hand data and to exercise participant observation method as well as to collect case examples of conflict and conflict resolution and thus to demonstrate the internal dynamics of conflicts in Degodia society and the various conflict resolving mechanisms of the studied communities and make suggestions relevant to research and policy making.

1.6.2 Selection of Key Informants and Focus Group Discussions

Different data collection methods or techniques have been employed for the two focus groups of Degodia in the nine research sites to generate the desired primary data. In selecting the above study sites and the 90 key informants representing the two focus groups - the mainly farming and pastoralist/herding - the following procedures have been employed.

The 90 key informants representing both target study groups of Degodia were selected from nine research sites inhabited by mainly farming and herding Degodia lineages. These key informants were selected on random selection basis with the assistance of the reputed elders of the two target study groups' lineages so as to avoid biases. The key informants representing the predominantly agricultural and pastoralist Degodia groups consisted of elders, clan and lineage leaders, *guurti* heads, elderly women, the young as well as peasant association leaders. In depth individual and group interviews were conducted using semi- and unstructured or open-ended interview techniques with the representative key informants.

The interview questions were formulated in such a way that they enable the researcher to generate comprehensive or in-depth first hand qualitative data on the causes of the farmer-

herder/pastoralist Degodia lineage resource based conflicts. Besides they were designed to learn the diverse mechanisms used to resolve the conflicts as experienced by the key informants and their respective lineages and also to gather data from these key informants on how they perceive the interventions by the *wereda* and peasant association officials and security forces in helping the disputing groups to solve their disputes peacefully.

In order to obtain additional field data for this study the researcher has conducted structured interviews with informants representing the Dollo Ado *wereda* administration's council, bureaus of justice, police, *wereda* court, agriculture department, women affairs, capacity building, DPPC and Degodia *wereda* council advisors (district *guurti*) as well as with heads of NGOs operating in the study sites in Dollo *wereda*. These were asked to provide secondary data on the issues of resource based farmer-herder Degodia lineage conflicts in the district, about the causes, ways or mechanisms used to resolve them as well as their suggestions on what should be done to deal with these sorts of conflicts in the future.

The above stated key Degodia informants representing the two focus study groups as well as the third group of informants - representing the *wereda* administration bureaus and some NGO representatives from the study area were interviewed separately on individual as well as in groups in accordance with the pre arranged interview sessions at different research sites and in Dollo, Suftu and Kollo towns, by the researcher assisted by his selected Degodia field assistants.

During the two months field research residence in Dollo Ado *Wereda*, in addition to the primarily data from the selected Degodia groups, the researcher has gathered all relevant secondary data namely written reports found in the police, justice and other departments of the Dollo Ado *wereda* administration office as well as those found in the NGO offices. These secondary source documents were those, which the researcher found as relating directly to his study on the farmer-herder group conflicts within Degodia clan and other groups in the Dollo Ado *wereda*. These documents have been gathered and used to complement and enrich the primary data the researcher has gathered from his key Degodia informants and focus group interviewees in the study area.

The primary data gathered through the above described methods from diverse sources in the studied research sites in Dollo Ado *wereda* were complemented by the researcher's previous and current field observations to analyze and present the nature, causes and resolution mechanisms of the farmer-herder group conflicts within Degodia society.

1.6.3 Data Analysis

The study is mainly a qualitative one. However in order to help to explain some parts of my analysis of the conflicts and where it deemed necessary, I have included some quantitative data collected from the field and secondary sources to illustrate to the readers population number, number of conflicts, causalities and the like in the presentation of this study.

1.6.4 Fieldwork Constraints and Scope of the Study

During the fieldwork, the researcher has faced many constraints. The main constraints he faced included the time of the field study as March-April were the hottest months in the area. Temperature rose up to 41 degree Celsius during the peak hours of the day. So, it was difficult to work more than five hours a day. Moreover, the month of March is the time when farmers and agro pastorals prepare their fields for *gu* rains of April to May. Most of the time they were in the farm field and they would spare less time to their visitors like that of myself. It was therefore a difficult time to meet my informants in their farm fields or the pastoralist group informants in their grazing sites and in watering sites.

The circumstance forced me to arrange most of my interview sessions with my key informants and to conduct my interviews in their homesteads, near their farms or in their pastoral encampments during evenings and early mornings which was inconvenient for my informants and their family members.

Another major constraint faced in the field was the lack of transport facilities in the study area and thus the difficulty faced in commuting from one field site to another in accordance with the time schedule I planned to accomplish the field study. To overcome the problem I have been forced to employ Degodia field assistants to cover the areas in my absence and latter supervision of their collected data on the spot.

Another critical constraint was the research topic of my study - resource based conflicts within Degodia society of Dollo Ado district. The time of my study coincided with election campaigns and the topic of my research was found by most of my informants, especially those representing the Dollo *wereda* administration office, as a sensitive political topic. Yet after I have sacrificed my precious time in explaining to these informants the aims and goals of the research they became convinced to provide me with the necessary information on the topic. But my explanations have resulted in building the confidence of my informants and in generating the necessary data and answers I required for my study.

Besides the explanation of my intent, my Degodia identity as well as my personal acquaintance with the study communities, their leaders including the principal chief representative of Degodia clan, the *weber* (king), the clan leaders and officials in Dollo Ado *wereda* administration was useful in building the trust and confidence amongst my study subjects and especially the various categories of key and focus group informants and informants from the *wereda* administration and also in carrying out and successful accomplishment of the field work for this study.

Despite the above stated logistical and other constraints during the course of the field study the researcher believes that this preliminary field based research on one of the little studied Degodia and especially on the herder-farmer conflict among the Degodia society of Dollo Ado *wereda* of the Somali Regional State will help as a stepping stone for more detailed comprehensive field research to be undertaken in the future by academic researchers and development researchers and practitioners and as an input for academic and action oriented conflict studies as well as contribution for decision makers and planners involved in the peace promoting activities and the development of the pastoral and agro-pastoral and farming Degodia and other Somali clan groups in Dollo Ado *wereda* in the Liban Zone in particular and the Somali Regional State of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in general.

1.7 Relevance of the Research

The proposed research is relevant for a number of different bodies from academia to non-governmental and governmental agencies. The study will provide an assessment of resources related conflicts in the Dawa-Ganale river basin, on which few information is available. Research findings will be of great interest to the regional government, aid agencies working in the Somali region as well as to Ethiopian research intuitions interested in that part of the country.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Farmer-Herder Resource Based Conflicts

There is an enormous body of literature on the study of herder-farmer conflicts in river basin pastoral lands in the arid and semi-arid regions. A comprehensive coverage of this literature is beyond the scope of this study. References have been made to relevant literature in the respective sections of this study. The various arguments raised in this study are compared with the theoretical perspectives and research findings of many other researchers. This chapter will only briefly cover the theoretical aspects of resource scarcity based herder farmer conflicts encountered in pastoral areas with respect to the use of natural resources.

Many scholars (e.g. Babiker 2001; Little 1992; Toulmin 1983) who studied herder-farmer conflicts made little progress so far in capturing the complex issues of resource competition and conflict in the context of an interaction between pastoralists and farming groups. Little (1987) as was equated by Babiker (2001) explained the difficulty in drawing a dichotomy of herder-farmer conflicts along ethnic lines. For instance, in terms of Kikuyu farmers versus Maasai pastoralists (Kenya), Hausa cultivators versus Fulbe herders (West-Africa), Nuba agriculturalists versus Baggara herders (Sudan). In this way the arena for resource competition was entirely confined to those related to “inter-group” rather than “intra-group” competition and land tenure and land use problems in pastoral areas are seen as stemming from processes within the pastoral community.

Other researchers (Toulmin 1983; Mace 1993) believe that in most parts of African dry lands, the herder-farmer distinction is progressively breaking down; meaning farmers are investing more of their surpluses in livestock and herders are relying more on farming, but one wonders if this is an entirely new and recent phenomenon. The same is true for the study area under consideration; more Degodia herders are now investing in cultivation, while the formerly Degodia as well as Garimaro farmers are now turning to be pastoralists

or agro-pastoralists (see Getachew 2005). A recent research (Babiker 2001) unveiled cases in the Sudan where groups and individuals within the same group have shifted between pastoralism and cultivation, when ecological and political-economic conditions allowed. Thus, pastoralism and cultivation on the ground are not discrete (especially in the study area), rather they are dynamically interrelated and it is this very dynamism that determines the forms and outcomes of the processes of transition between pastoralism and cultivation over time and in different socio-ecological setting (Ibid.).

Conceptually, conflict is apprehended as a specific form of interaction between two or more social groups. Different studies on violent conflict in semi-arid Africa provide us with insights on how acute the issue of conflict is and how diverse the causes are.

According to Moorehead (1989) conflicts in Malta's Niger River delta occur between herders and farmers. As the delta becomes drier, local farmers begun cultivating deeper parts of the delta and they even cultivated the stock routes leading to flood plains. As a result herders took crop damaging measures that initiate conflict out of the frustration, that farmers are overtaking their grazing areas. A different conflict scenario, which is becoming more common in parts of the Sudan is, conflict as a consequence of the rapid degradation of the range. According to Mohamed El-Hadi Abu Sin (1998) range degradation has forced pastoralists to extend their movements southward to Nuba mountain areas where agricultural activities and settled populations are more concentrated.

Another researcher (Mugerwa 1995) notes that, in Uganda, population pressure and the scarcity of land led pastoralists to adopt ranching and more sedentary forms of livestock production which, initially, caused major conflicts between Buganda settlers and Buruli ranchers. Lane (1998) describes the situations in Kenya and Tanzania. In the case of Tanzania, he argues that private investment in form of allocating range lands for commercial agriculture is a dominant cause of conflict between herders and farmers, whereas, in Kenya the prevalence of conflict among the Northern tribal communities and their neighbors basically takes place in the form of cattle raiding.

2.2 Review of Pastoral Conflicts in Ethiopia

Pastoralism and agro-pastoralism in the Horn of Africa are among the most important economic activities from which millions of people derive their livelihoods. The sector involves a substantial number of human and livestock population as well as geographical area in each country of the Horn (Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed et al. 2002). Pastoral and agro-pastoral groups in the lowland areas have long suffered from natural and man-made calamities including political isolation, inter and intra-clan conflicts and low level of per capita income (Ibid.). Consequently, pastoralists in the Horn of Africa have more recently started to pursue non-pastoral activities to meet consumption needs and to buttress against shocks caused by climatic fluctuations, insecurity, animal diseases and market failures (Little et al. 1999).

When we come to the Ethiopian situation, we find mainly recurrent droughts, resource degradation, inefficient land use policies and weak conflict mitigating institutions as the underlying causes of resource competition between herders and farmers, and thereby leading to various types and levels of conflict. Scholars like Karim Hussein et al. (1999) agree that resource scarcity coupled with institutional weaknesses and failures, such as land tenure uncertainty, are the main causes behind the general trend of increase in the magnitudes of violent conflicts. According to Getachew Kassa (1997a, 1997b), conflicts in many parts of North-Eastern Ethiopia, notably among the Afar pastoralists, are more or less attributed to a combination of the above mentioned factors, for instance, the case of Malka Warar town in the Middle Awash provides a good example of how a shrinking resource base and ensuing scarcity intensify inter and intra-group competition as well as conflict among pastoralists, over questions of access and tenure rights to land and land resource management (Ibid.). In a similar study made by Markakis (1993), conflicts are thought to begin when one group, usually the mobile pastoralists, are marginalized by the state who favors commercial agriculture. He continues to argue that this process of marginalization usually occurs at the expense of the herders. Accordingly, scarcity remains to be a harsh fact of life in the Horn of Africa due to meager natural resource endowment. In addition, resource endowment in pastoral areas is not only meager but it is also highly disparate in terms of time and location due to high climatic variability (Hagmann 2002). Conflict is inevitable since pastoral production requires mobility.

Usually, authors agree that there are two parallel processes at hand which intensify conflicts. First, shrinking of resource base although empirical data to sustain this claim is often missing. Second, mobility, which is the coping mechanism of pastoralists, is more and more limited by state intervention and other factors. Another dimension of conflict involving pastoral groups is discussed in the work of Ali Said (1997), which distinctly deals with the condition of the environment and with the resource scarcity approach. Ali Seid analyses the multiple impacts of the large-scale mechanized irrigation schemes in the Awash Valley on the availability of pastoral resources by the appropriations of these valley resources by the state and consequential degradation. His work details how environmental vulnerability of the two producer groups coupled with external factors like the state policy eventually caused and aggravated conflict between herders and farmers.

2.3 Conceptual Considerations

Conflict is defined here as “the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals” (Hocker & Wilmot 1985, cited in Vanderlinden 1999). According to many scholars, all competition and conflicts are ultimately over resources, due to their scarcity in pastoral areas. *Scarcity* then is explained by different explanatory models as follows: The adherents of the modernization theories of development argue or share the view that conflict /scarcity is structural (internal) to pastoralism because pastoralism is an irrational and self destructive system of production and land use. Thus they believe that the system has to be modernized for its own sake (Hardin 1968; Hrskovits 1926).

The second model explains pastoral resource scarcities and resource scarcity based conflicts in pastoral areas this model which is called ‘Populist Approach’ generally explains the scarcity and conflict as due to ‘external ‘ (interventions) or disturbances, such as restricted access to grazing resources (Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson 1980), “encroaching farmers” (Helland 2000a; Hogg, 1997; Getachew 2002; Babiker 2001; Ayalew 2001; Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed 2002), cultivating herders and absentee herd owners (Little 1987), increased competition over land (land tenure debate), decreased security (state deliberate neglect or lack capacity to provide physical security) and growing

local conflicts (Hjort af Ornas & M.A. Mohammed Salih 1989), clashing production strategies and resources use regulations (Oba 1992) or demographic growth. The third model “The New Range Ecology“ explains resource scarcity and resource based conflicts as structural to multiple use resource systems, and thus views scarcity as well as conflicts as unavoidable, but not necessarily destructive (Behnke and Scoones, 1993). Each of these explanations suggests that natural resource tenure and management arrangements are an important source of conflict. Yet I will use the combination of the last two, the Populist Approach and the New Range Ecology perspectives to explain the situation in Dollo Ado district.

The purpose of this section is to present, on the basis of Vanderlinden (1999), key elements of the conflict theory approach that will be used hereafter. First, an increasing scarcity of resources often leads to open conflicts that disrupts social, political and economic relations. One major effect of *resource-based conflicts* is to shift the cost structure that the parties in conflict are facing. This shift of the cost structure may call for new institutional arrangements. Conflicts appear when *perceived competition between parties is more important than cooperative* behavior between the same parties (Ibid.). The outcomes of conflicts are linked to the level of cooperation that can be established between the parties in conflict during the conflict. *If cooperation is impeded*, the outcome of these conflicts may be destructive and the adaptation of the institutional environment to the growing resource scarcity may be stalled (Ibid.).

The *ways conflict can be addressed* are capitulation, withdrawal, interaction, negotiation, and third-party intervention. In the course of this study, the *focus will be on negotiation having as a goal a constructive outcome*. In a *conflict situation*, the prerequisite for its negotiation or management, which will lead to its settlement or resolution, is the existence of cooperation. In this study, the differences *among the concepts of negotiation, conflict management, settlement, and resolution* are as follows: “Negotiation is the interaction entailing two or more parties in conflict, who engage in social interaction to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome” (Putnam and Roloff 1992, cited in Vanderlinden 1999). “Conflict management is an attempt to feed learning that can make the conflict more productive and less costly into the process of conflict” (Boulding 1966, cited in Vanderlinden 1999). “Settlement (or conflict-resolution settlement) is the situation in which the outcome of negotiation is accepted by both parties” (Hinde and Groebel 1991,

cited in Vanderlinden 1999). *Central to this feature of conflict interaction* is the importance of the power relationship between the conflicting parties. Balanced power relationships may help conflicts to maintain a constructive direction (Ibid.).

One could argue that the *level of conflict management* will depend on the level of reciprocity/cooperation and competing relationships that exists between the parties (clans) in conflict and the strength or constraints of the Degodia and formal (*wereda* and regional) conflict management institutions and practices. An investigation and analysis on resource based conflict and conflict resolving (local and hybrid) institutions will be useful. The way to analyze this will be to assess the effect of the conflict management institutions (such as the Degodia traditional authority - the *guurti* and hybrid institutions) in dealing with usual traditional and new forms of conflicts over scarce resources and their effectiveness and constraints, so as to come up with propositions that strengthen and promote the positive aspects of these local institutions so as to promote peace and development.

CHAPTER THREE

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DOLLO ADO WEREDA

This research is conducted in the Dollo Ado district. It is one of the districts of Liban Zone in the Somali Regional state. The *wereda* is located in the extreme south-western corner of the Somali region and its headquarter is Dollo Ado town. The *wereda* is bordered by the Dollo Bay *wereda* of the Afdeer Zone of Somali region in the east, by Filtu *wereda* in the north and Somalia's Geddo region and Kenya's Mandera district in the south.

Dollo Ado *wereda* is administratively divided in 41 *kebeles* administrative units (sub-locations). The total population of the *wereda* has been estimated to be about 138,412. Out of the total 39,301 people live in the urban *kebeles* while the remaining 99,111 live in rural *kebeles* (Dollo Ado District (*Wereda*) Administration 2004). SCF-UK (2002) has categorized the *wereda* population as follows: 50% of the people are identified as agro-pastoralists, 30% as transhumant pastoralists, 15 % as urban and 5% of sedentary farmers respectively.

As the Degodia represent the majority of the population of the district, minority farmers, hunters and gatherers such as Garimaro, Guryante, Wardube etc. inhabit the riverbed of the two rivers in the district. Most of the minority groups are farmers while the Degodias are both pastoralists and agro pastoralists.

3.1 Relations Between Herders and Farmers

Until recently cultivation in the river basin was carried out by minorities and some Degodia clans. Degodia as pastoral people used to despise agricultural economy. They considered farmers in general as an inferior and poor people. Thus, all agricultural plots along the banks of the two rivers were owned by the minority (Garimarro) and few Degodia farming clans. Degodia herders used to graze their herds along the river bank during dry seasons and exchanged some of their livestock and livestock products for grain with Garimarro farmers and used farm stables after harvest. The majority of Degodia

remained herders and never competed with the Garimarro over agricultural land along both the banks of the two rivers. The two systems complemented each other. Violent competition and conflicts over agricultural land were less known.

Degodia herders maintained strong economic links with the riverine cultivating minority groups such as Garimarro, Gabaweyn and Guryantes. They exchanged some of their herds and livestock products for food crops, namely sorghum and maize produced by minority farming groups. These minorities also allowed Degodia neighbors to access and use stables on their farm. Such reciprocal economic exchanges between Degodia herding clans and families and the Garimarro and other minority farming clans were strengthened through establishing close friendship relationships. This form of symbiotic and reciprocal relations was crucial to both the Degodia herders and the farming groups.

These relations even resulted in an increased level of interdependence between them not just in the economic field but in forming military alliances against other groups, and cooperated in shared *dia* paying contracts. The Degodia clans respected Garimarro and other minority river bank inhabitant's rights to their lands and the Garimarro and other minorities in turn reciprocated by allowing Degodia's access to their common resources (pastures) and water access points. This mutual respect fostered peaceful coexistence between and among Degodia herders and agro-pastoral clans with the Garimarro neighbors until recent times. But since recently this relation started to change from cooperation to competition and conflict. The factors behind this change are several but I will mention the most important ones in the following section.

3.2 Resource Access and Use by the Inhabitants, Past and Present

3.2.1 Herd Management and Rangeland Resources

The Degodia economy is predominantly based on the management of multi species pastoralism. The herds include camels, cattle, small stock goats and sheep. Every member of the house hold is assigned specific herding duties. The family herds are splitted into different management units to spread the risks and to accommodate the need to exploit the distant pastures while providing a regular supply of food for the household. Accordingly

the family herds are split into different herding units: *dry herds*. This unit of the family herd consists of camels, goats, cattle and sheep. These are kept in distant pasture areas away from the main settlement or camping sites. Lactating herd unit or *milking livestock (nugul)* consist of cattle, sheep and she camels. *Nugul* are kept often around the main settlement - especially on the pasture and rain fed farmlands in proximity of permanent water points, wells, cisterns and the rivers. These herds were looked after by women (the younger wives), children and elderly members of the family. Since such family members engage in tilling farmland, to keep an eye of these herds in nearby ranges is a difficult exercise. As a result, such herds are grazed around the *makados* (strategic herds reserve land for semi sedimentary pastorals).


As in all other pastoral communities, the Degodia value large stock, camels and cattle. The family herds are also sources of social status. Rich *Degodia* herd owners have high reputation. They can influence community leaders political, economic and judicial decision making processes as well as decisions of waging war and management of conflicts. The rich herd owner often advocates for peaceful coexistence between Degodia clans and the Degodia and their minority farming neighbors. They initiate conflict resolution processes and reconciliation of conflicting parties. They voluntarily sponsor mediations and conflict resolution, reconciliation and peace making efforts of the Guurti and the political leaders by covering all the expenses involved. Moreover, they have the power in urging the mediators and the Degodia political leaders in implementing peace agreements reached by the conflict mediators.

3.2.2 Access, Use and Tenure of Common Basin Grazing Resources

Degodia categorize their grazing resources in Dollo Ado *wereda* into two: Dry season and wet season pastures. Dry season grazing land are critical resources where the family members and their lactating herds (*nugul*) and their farmlands are situated. These areas are situated along the flood fed banks of the Dawa and Ganale rivers. The dry season grazing sites along the Ganale River include Bur Amino, Lugal, Helaweyn, Melka Dida and Seblale. Those along the Dawa River are Langarad, Guramasare, Noboy, Fiqow, Bow-bow, Kurawe, Rhamdintu, Ba'adweyn etc.

The wet season grazing lands include those rangelands situated away from the main basin settlements areas, family farmlands and their dry season pasture reserve. The main wet season pasture lands include Sham, Biyole Aw-alin (triangle,) Boqol Mayu etc. These are used during the long rain (from November to January) and short rainy season (from April to June). The mobility patterns of Degodia clans and herds are illustrated in Map 2.

Map 2: Seasonal Pastoral Herd Mobility Routes of the Degodia in the Dawa-Ganale Basin Area in Dolo Ado wereda



Source: Based on Ethiopian Mapping Authority, Dolo Ado wereda map, 2000.

3.2.3 Traditional Pastoral Land Tenure: Access Communal Rangeland Resources, Conflicts and their Resolution

Access to natural resources is acquired by reference to a shared Degodia clan descent and group identity in terms of kinship ties and or by consent of the leaders or elders of the clan, which originally inhabited the area. Pasture and water are communal. Access to all basin grazing resources in both wet and dry season areas described above were common resources of Degodia clans which were traditionally managed primarily by the Degodia traditional leaders and elders. The stated dry season grazing lands along the two rivers were initially inhabited and owned primarily by the minority Garimarro farmers and some three Degodia clans and small minority hunter gatherers and occupational groups affiliated with the Garimarro and the three Degodia clans. These groups were the longstanding inhabitants of the fertile riverbank arable lands. The Garimarro and the three Degodia clan claim homelands, which stretches from Dollo Ado town 90 kms length along the Ganale riverbank and 40 kms along the Dawa River.

Rangelands especially wet season range land resources in the two river basins were collectively claimed or owned by all Degodias and their associates which claim equal rights of access and use to the pastures, browses and water resources. However, the Degodia customary communal (clan) tenure of the rangeland resources permits Degodia families belonging to the clan to own a piece of farmland within the territorial borders of the clan land. These family owned farmlands mainly rain fed, were used to grow food crops for family consumption.

These resources are not free for non-Degodia groups. To access rangeland resources of Degodia clans the non-Degodia herders from the region require prior permission of access and use from the higher authority of the Degodia. If guests are to access the Degodia range resources, they should not exceed ten families. If so, they have to apply to the Degodia traditional leaders, the higher Degodia *guurti*. In case the non-Degodia guests that request access to the resources of the clan are less than ten households the local elders (non-*guurti*) can grant access rights to their clan land pasture and water resources.

In times of serious droughts among the Degodia neighbors, there is a tradition of cooperation and solidarity. Thus, elders of the drought-affected neighbors come to the

Degodia traditional authority to request for temporary rights of access to Degodia clan grazing land and water resources. These elders present their request to the Degodia higher *guurti*. The Degodia higher *guurti* often decide to allow their neighbors' temporary access rights to their range and water resources. During their stay in Degodia land as guests, they are obliged to adhere to the Degodia resource use regulations. They are forbidden from practicing digging wells and cutting trees. They have to also respect the cultural norms and the administration of their hosting Degodia clans and Degodia in general. They are paid due credit for this in time of drought and resource scarcity. This is one of the ways in which the Degodia traditional leadership promotes cooperation and reciprocal relationships and peaceful coexistence with their close and distant neighbors. Such reciprocal resource sharing arrangements are important in managing risks and overcoming the effects of drought and war and in promoting peaceful inter group relations among the Degodia and Degodia and their neighbors.

3.2.4 Traditional Access of Basin Water Resources, Water Use Conflict and Management

In spite of the relative abundance of grazing resources, the rangelands of the Degodia are characterized by serious water scarcity due to prolonged dry seasons and drought years. During such seasons, water points, including traditional water wells and the Dawa River dry up. As a result, most of the pastoral Degodia families and their herds migrate to the Ganale River basin. Yet the river water access points of the Ganale River are fewer than those of the Dawa River.

Traditionally access and use of river water (*malka/helos*) were free to all Degodia herders. But since recently such free access to river water access points have started to change. The Degodia as well as the Garimarro farming groups because of the expansion of farmlands have enclosed them. Thus, communally owned river water access points, or *helos*, were enclosed by the farm owners: Degodia, Garimarro and other users. These new development have contributed to the recent frequent inter- and intra-clan herder-farmer conflicts between transhumant Degodia pastoralists and local agro-pastoral and farming Degodia clans on the one hand and pastoral Degodia clans and the Garimarro farming and agro-pastoral inhabitants along the banks of the Ganale River on the other side.

In the rangelands there are traditional wells that were excavated by the Degodia and Garimarro clans. Herd owners may have access rights to such clan owned wells if they contribute labor and resources for its continued maintenance. Those families who did not contribute to the excavation and its maintenance were excluded from access and use of such clan owned and managed deep-water wells (*ceela*). In addition, individual families may excavate their own water wells. These are owned and managed by the owners. People who want to use family and community owned water wells require the permission and consent of the owners and managers.

Some wells are excavated by several individuals who belong to the same clan or a lineage. These wells are named after the clan. The user group owns and manages the wells. Members contribute labor and resources. These individuals have the primary right of access to the water. Wells can also be excavated by herd owners who belong to different Degodia clans and lineages. But, unlike wells managed by users belonging to the same clan or lineage, wells excavated and managed by herd owners belonging to different clans and lineages are said to be more susceptible to disputes among the users. Disputes over access rights to water resources are very common. They occur when herders use water source (wells and *hello*) without the prior permit request and consent of the individual owners. Such disputes become frequent during the long dry seasons and drought years.

Until recently disputes over access and use of water (and grazing resources) were settled by the *guurti*. But the ability of this traditional resource conflict settling and managing institution has been severely eroded because of increasing interventions by the local government authorities and security forces. They intervene and take measures without asking the *guurti* or traditional leaders of the Degodia. Such external interventions aggravated disputes as these interventions were decontextualised.

Moreover, government officials interfere in some disputes, which take place in some accessible areas, while they often neglect those disputes, which take place in remote or distant pastoral areas. Besides, their attempts are temporary peace and order oriented rather than long term reconciliation due to their vested interest. Some informants argue that the officials intervene with little responsibility, for instance instead of settling the dispute properly by punishing the blameworthy and reconciling the two to ensure peaceful coexistence, they sometimes side with the wrong-doers for their own interest. Other

informants believe that local government officials ignore their customary rules and conflict management institutions, the *guurti*, when they want to prove they are needed. Such catalytic engagements often result in an escalation and increased frequency of resource use conflicts among the Degodia herders and farmers in the study area.

3.2.5 Traditional Access to Basin Agricultural Land Leading to Cooperation, Competition or Conflicts

The Degodia farming groups and the minority Garimaro own the dry riverbed lands (*xamiir*) as well as the arable land of the river plains (*dhai*). The traditional community leaders regulate and manage access to those lands. Individual household heads of the farming communities owned the farmlands. These families inherit the farmlands patrilineally and maintain them for many generations. Both Degodia and Garimarro families are not allowed to sell their farmland to outsiders. Whenever tenure or use disputes occur, these cases are resolved according to traditional customs (*xeer*) of the community by conflict management institutions and traditional authority.

3.3 Recent Transformations in Basin Resource Use and Production Systems

According to the informants recent changes have been triggered as a result of an increase in basin population, loss of herds to recurrent drought and raiders. In effect, this has caused scarcity of basin resources. These socio-economic and basin geo-political pressures have forced some lowland Degodia clans, namely the Abadwaq, Messere and Abrishe to adopt cultivation to supplement their pastoral livelihood. These clans started to cultivate arable flood fed and riverbed lands along Dawa and Ganale Rivers. First, they adopted from their Garimarro neighbors some farming and cropping systems in addition to the use of low technologies. The Abadwake and Abrishe have adopted farming systems long time ago from their client minority groups affiliated with them, who belonged to the Garimarro and the other two minority groups (Gurantee and Reer Barre). Following this tradition, other lowlanders have started cultivating around riverbeds. The latter group (which includes Massare and Raqey) learned the skills of farming from those clan members who lived with the Rahawin as students of Islam in the lower Juba Valley of southern Somalia. These ex-students have become religious clerics (*xir*) to their clans in Dollo Ado *wereda*. They have

been giving Islamic education in a sedentarized environment that paved the way for agriculture.

Other Degodia clans too started taking up farming very recently. These were the hitherto rich hinterland pastoral Degodia clans namely the Fai and Jibrail. They started opportunistic cultivation. The factors which encouraged them to adopt an economic activity are the benefits of irrigated cash crop farming, the abolition of tribal territories and resource shortage in their clan rangelands. Moreover, these two highland Degodia clans who migrated into the lower Dawa-Ganale basin herding and farming areas have relatively larger population than the basin inhabiting clans. The newcomers started to compete with the long time inhabitants for pasture, water and agricultural land. At times they wage war on the local groups to capture their basin resources.

3.3.1 River Bank Land Use Practices

As a result of the pressures explained in the previous section, basin lands which were formerly not cultivated have now been put under cultivation. Such lands include the *dhai* (floodplain land on the river bank). These are fields owned by the Garimarro and Degodia farmers. It was in the late 1970s when irrigation agriculture was first introduced in the river basins of Dollo Ado district by the RRC of the previous regime of Ethiopia. These arable lands on the dry river bed (*xamiir*) and bank flood plain (*dhai*) which used to be dry season grazing and farming areas for cultivators (of both Degodia and Garimarro) have recently become attractive to other groups (new entrant herders and commercial farmers, *burjewassi*). This resulted in land use competition and conflicts among the previous users and the new comers (commercial farmers).

The previous resource users (low land Degodia clans and minority Garimarro) introduced new rules (*xeer*), which state that a farmer who had *xamiir* will also have to be given use and tenure right over the land adjacent to his *xamiir* land. This new rule has further aggravated the traditional conflicts between herders and farmers. The introduction of the stated land use law opened the way for non-local land user groups to encroach upon the otherwise original basin inhabitant herders and farmers dry season grazing and farming fields.

The new rules and the introduction of new farming technology (diesel generators, new crops, fertilizer, etc) by the RRC in the 1970s and more recently by migrant and returnee commercial farmers (through *burjewassi*) results an increased farm yields. These changes in farmland utilization and increased demand for such land attracted increased number of people to take up this new opportunity. Here, newcomers are hinterland herders, refugees and returnees, who are locally organized as smallholder farmers (in *mahbar/iskasheto*) and small scale commercial cash crop farmers who use share cultivation. As a result of these transformations the land between the flood plains and riverbanks, which was basically basin forest and dry season pasture fields, has been utilized for commercial farming, thereby causing deforestation and displacement of the original users.

CHAPTER FOUR

FACTORS BEHIND THE BASIN RESOURCE SCARCITY AND USE CONFLICTS

Dollo Ado is characterized by rainfall variability both in terms of time and intensity. This is accompanied by high evapo-transpiration, wind and low humidity with intermittent increases in temperature. These are the top most factors that make the area vulnerable to recurrent droughts. Hence, these climatic conditions have led to multi-faceted problems including environmental resource degradation, resource use changes and social organization crises.

There is no denying that the losses the recent drought caused were not recorded despite its allegedly debilitating effects. Nevertheless, the informants stressed that there has not been a single household unaffected. Since 1990/1991, the effect of droughts was accentuated by the huge influx of war displaced returnees and refugees and drought affected herders from Somalia and northeastern Kenya. Consequently, the river basins of the Dollo Ado district were overpopulated. This in turn resulted in the basin land resource shortage with subsequent scarcity and competition for the remaining scarce resources. The most affected groups were pastoralists whose dry season grazing areas, water access points and pastures became confined to farming or grazing reserve. The frequency of migration to the dry season grazing areas (situated along the river banks) increased substantially as a result of bush encroachment and insecurity in the wet season grazing lands.

This has increased the magnitude and frequency of competition and conflicts over the utilization of dry season basin land resources between local and new entrant pastoralists and traditional riverbank cultivators. Competition and conflict, which sometimes went out of hand, involved many groups of the basin resource users as indicated earlier. Other aggravating factors include conflict between local basin resource users and guest drought affected trans-border pastoral groups from Somalia and northern Kenya, which can be explained due to the lack of formal mechanisms to control informal migrations into the basin region. The following is an illustrative example for the stated type of conflict.

Case 1: Trans Border Herder-Farmer Intra Clan Conflicts (The Case of Jibrail Herders and Fai Farmers in Sade Kebele)

Mao Ali (38) is a Degodia pastoralist of Jibrail subclan. He recently migrated from Ashabito of Rhamu sub-district in Mandera Kenya, which has a common border with Sade *kebele* of Dollo Ado District (see Map 1). In the following, Mao explains how he was tempted to be involved in a conflict with a Fai farmer along Dawa River in Sade *kebele* and how this incidence involved their respective sub clans in different localities.

“I moved with my family and few herds to Sade area late 2001 when there was severe drought in Mandera District with the belief that the culture of Degodias permits common range resource utilization. I never expected any problem. Within few weeks of my stay in that locality, many pastoralists from Kenya and other hinter land of Dollo Ado district were over grazing the range. So, I shifted to dry season grazing areas close to Dawa River in Sade locality. After a two-month stay in the new locality, I heard a terrible thing happened. On December 2001, I learned that my cattle were confiscated and that my sons were beaten by some Fai farmers for the mere fact that the farmer believed that the cattle were deliberately grazing on the farm. In no time, I found the farm where my sons and cows were. I encountered three men in their early thirties. I nodded in agreement to them when they asked me whether I was the owner of the cows. I also replied politely that I am “Jibrail” when one of them asked me what clan I belong. In fact, he nodded and retreated keeping mum. Nevertheless, thinking about what happened to my sons, I couldn’t control myself and I shouted louder and told them that they are pushing us (herders) by enclosing the herd route to the *helo*. Before I finished with what I wanted to say, one of the three men who were far behind came forward and told me that I am sending my sons to graze my cattle on their land. Ignoring what he said I called my son and started to take the cows out of the farm. I was beaten from behind. My sons screamed with horror when they saw blood oozing from my head. I lost consciousness and fell on the ground immediately. I was taken to the nearest Sade clinic. I was in coma for 18 hours. The news spread along my families. Tension went high. Many of my relatives crossed the border from Kenya for retaliation. But, Fai elders started to approach my sub clan elders who said negotiation would only be possible after knowing my whereabouts. Meanwhile, my subclan organized themselves to attack Fai farmers, but the elders tried every effort to calm the situation. Few elders were constantly following my health condition and they were informing other elders and relatives about my condition. Elders of the two sub clans met and agreed that there are two issues to be addressed; my case and that of the farm. First, they had to settle my case., meaning, I had to get full medication. I got my medication expenses covered by the farmers. The farm case was secondary. But, traditional rule of the Degodia has it that, if the damage is for the first time, warning is given to the herd owner. But if it is repeated, the compensation would be equivalent to the market price of the damaged crops. So, in my case it was for the first time and it was not beyond warning. Eventually, the tension was calmed by the elders’ effort and we now live in peace with our farming neighbors.

This case gives a clear picture on how range resource shrinkage pushes herders to encroach basin land resources leading to competition and conflicts. It also explains how communal

resources have changed to private ownership. This case further elaborates how tribal boundaries do not compromise with international borders in the context of the study area.

In the first place, drought and other ecological changes have caused the range resources to shrink. Besides, it has caused herders to migrate to better range resource whereby agricultural activities are rampant. Such places include the river basin areas. This goes along with Mohamed El Hadi Abu Sin's (1998) argument that range degradation forces herders to migrate to areas where there are agricultural activities and settlements. Such places include the river basin areas.

On top of this, the herders migrating from other places like Northern Kenya and Southern Somalia exacerbated the aforementioned situations. The control of such cross-border herder migration is difficult due to the fact that borderline pastoral communities are culturally affiliated and are socio-economically integrated. So, the international borders between the three countries are not important when we are talking about local inter- or intra-clan resource based conflicts.

There existed a joint Ethio-Kenya border conflict resolving and management committee but its role with regard to local resource based conflict was minimal. Saddening enough, there are no strong modern institutions that replaced the traditional ones. Therefore, the frequency of local intra clan resource based conflict has increased in recent years, especially among the border communities.

To sum up, climatic factors such as inadequate rainfall, recurrent droughts and extreme temperature have negatively affected the pastoral production system. In fact this is concurrent with Getachew Kassa's (1997a, 1997b) idea that conflict among Afar pastoralists are more or less attributed to a combination of the above factors. Besides, these vices are aggravated by the weakening of the traditional institutions and by the absence of modern traditions.

4.1 Demographic Factors: Basin Population Increase due to the Arrival of Refugees/Returnees and Natural Growth

According to the 1994 census the population has increased by more than threefold compared to the last population census. Statistical abstracts also forecast that the trend would continue. The table below shows this fact.

Table I: Dollo Ado Population: Past and Present

| Census year | <i>wereda</i> population |
|-------------|--------------------------|
| 1984 | 44,520 |
| 1994 | 138, 420 |
| 2005* | 174, 346 |

* Forecasted figure by CSA Statistical Abstract

Source: CSA 1984, 1994 and 2005

According to the table above, there is a three hundred percent population increase in 1994 when compared with 1984 and the forecasted figure indicates that there would be a 415% increase by the year 2005. Population experts and local leaders attribute this population boom to a number of factors of which the large number of returnee population from neighboring Somalia is the main one. Besides, in late 1980s and early 1990s, many Ethiopian refugees in Somalia faced extreme security problem as a result of ethnic strife and political instability in Somalia. Thus, large numbers of Ethiopian refugees requested the UNHCR to repatriate to their places of origin in Ethiopia.

But, in fact it is difficult to draw a clear demarcation when we talk about differences between refugees and returnees, especially in this region because virtually every person has crossed the border of the three countries. Again, in the borderline basin region, the inhabitants are pastoralists and agr-pastoralists, whose clan territories stretch across borders of at least two of the three countries and are economically, culturally and geographically tied to either side of the border region. So, the borders of the three countries are more or less artificial as far as the local communities are concerned. Whether returnee or refugee, people cross borders of either side of the countries at their will for they have

properties, relatives and friends on either side of the borders. The recent influx of people is probably unprecedented in scale. When exposed to insecurity, people – especially in the lowlands - have the habit of retreating to their own areas (clan territories). Between 1986 and 1991, close to 200,000 returnees of both Somali and Oromo origin have crossed the border to Ethiopia. Most of the returnees were en route to other destination in Borana and Moyale areas. But, Dollo Ado was the initial reception site. The destination sites of these returnees were decided upon their personal plans, their ethnic identity and place of origin (Bassi 1997).

By the end of 1990, the frequency of returnee movement and insecurity in Dollo Ado region had heightened. According to elders, in early 1991 after the fall of the regime in Mogadishu, there were more than 30,000 returnees and refugees from Somalia that were camped in Malka Suftu under ARRA and another 100,000 were in the outskirts of Dollo Ado town. Such a rise in refugee and returnee population in the region had considerable consequences, which will be discussed, in the subsequent sections. The second important factor, according to the *wereda* experts, is the natural demographic growth of the local population. This increase is attributed to religious and cultural customs of polygamy (see Table II below) and the absence, or rather resistance to, family planning practices.

Table II: Number of Wives of Male Respondents by Tribe

| Number of wives | Tribe of Respondents | | | | | | Total |
|-----------------|----------------------|--------|----------|----------|-----|---------|-------|
| | Degodia | Ujejen | Garimaro | Guryante | Dir | Hawadle | |
| 0 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | - | 12 |
| 1 | 7 | | 8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| 2 | 13 | | 4 | - | 2 | 2 | 23 |
| 3 | 8 | 2 | - | - | - | 1 | 9 |
| 4 | 7 | | | | 1 | | 8 |
| Total | 4 | 3 | 15 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 72 |

Source: Field survey, 2005.

The table above shows that Degodia agro-pastoralists probably introduced polygamy, which is highly practiced by the various Somali groups in the study area. Of the seventy-

two men interviewed, forty of them (55%) have two or more wives. The survey also shows that the farming minority groups do not marry more than two wives.

According to the informants this has cultural implication. Somali tribes such as Degodia, Dir, Hawadle etc. can practice inter-marriage because they are *jileec* (soft haired) but the *jereer* groups (kinky haired) such as Garimaro, Guryante, Gabaweyn etc. were culturally marginalized as they were considered as *adoons* (slaves). Moreover, their “physiological differences” from the pastoral Somali groups have naturally isolated them from intermarrying with other Somali groups. Their settled lifestyle has also limited their interaction with the various pastoral groups. These and other reasons like the economic status of individual farming families could have forbidden the Garimaro, Guryante and Gabaweyn groups to practice polygamy as their counterparts.

Somalis strongly believe that having as many children as possible is preferred to strengthen their community. This, according to the elders, has the advantage of defending oneself, expanding the community’s interest, and securing labor force at household level.

The exposure to modern medicine is the third factor that led to an increase of population of the Degodia and their neighbors. Health care is practiced by most of the riverside populations because they had long time experience of being afflicted by malaria and other waterborne diseases. The operation of a good number of local as well as international NGOs and their provision of health services had helped in raising awareness of good health practices. Moreover, the development of infrastructure, roads, telecommunication, schools and health centers by the regional government and the presence of relief agencies helped in minimizing risks during droughts. All these factors have contributed to the decline of the mortality rate leading to an increase in local population growth.

The fourth factor is the settlement of large number of Somali refugees. In 1991-1992 there were thousands of Somali refugees in Suftu and Dollo Ado localities, but when the UNHCR project phased out in 1995 many Somali refugees (especially those from Gedo region) returned to their homelands while many others from relatively distant southern regions (Banadir, Lower Shebelle and Bakol) of Somalia remained. The majority of these became petty traders and farmers (in the form of *burjiwassi*). Besides, the influx of drought-affected herders from northeastern Kenya had aggravated the situation.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE RESOURCE USE- HERDER FARMER CONFLICTS

5.1 Inter- and Intra-clan Conflicts between Degodia and Garimarro

The purpose of this section is to introduce potentially enlightening case studies. The focus of the case studies under scrutiny is on resource scarcity based inter-clan conflicts, especially between Degodia herders and farmers and between Degodia herders and the agricultural Garimarro and others in Dollo Ado *wereda* in Liban zone of Somali Region. The inter-clan resource based conflict relationship within Degodia herders and the farming clans or communities sharing a same group identity and group jurisdiction over the common resources is emphasized. In this study the term “herders” refers to herd managers or keepers encroaching on the land of clans practicing agriculture while “agriculturalists” refers to the members of the clans or communities practicing basin cultivation.

The focus on basin area natural resource use bears several interesting characteristics. First, conflicts may stem from scarcity and different perceptions of land use. This leads us to a joint analysis of resource scarcity based conflicts and value based conflicts. Second, while a majority of conflicts between herders and agriculturalists in Dollo Ado *wereda* are still resolved at the community/clan level by use of traditional institutions, the use of local government to resolve inter- and intra-clan conflicts related to natural resources seems to be constantly on the rise, especially after the establishment of the Regional State.

In analyzing the relationships between herders and farmers, this study will take into consideration the following two key elements: the land-tenure systems governing the access and use of the natural resources, grazing land, farmland, water and forests resources. In addition, it will analyze the management of herds, grazing and farmlands and water. Most of the Degodia pastoralists practice farming nowadays while most of the Garimarro agriculturalists and other minorities raise livestock. While these neighbors in the river basin lands of Dollo Ado *wereda* are therefore mainly farmers or agro-pastoralists,

they differ from the Degodia in their origin and their level of crop–livestock production integration.

The causes of conflict between Garimaro farmers and Degodia herders in Dollo Ado district could be expressed in two ways: internal and external sources of conflicts. Internal sources of conflict have both economic and cultural roots, while the external conflicts are based favoring or disfavoring the two groups by the then governments (the Haile Selassie and Mengistu governments). The Garimaros were the favored group.

Recently, the most contended farmland by these two groups was the one on the Dawa riverbank and the border between Ethiopia and Somalia. This has been one of the insecure areas because of the military maneuvering it experienced for the last 60 years. Mr. Ali Mohamed (49) whose case was deemed as the cause of the conflict explained it this way. Mr. Ali was agriculturally skillful and economically able returnee. He intended to invest on a fertile fallow riverbed farmland along Dawa River- an area that was not far from the Dollo Ado town and the confluence of Dawa-Ganale Rivers. In the following case (Case 2), the entrepreneur explains tensions over farmlands he encountered.

The Case 2: An Account of Dispute Between Two Farming Clans (Garimaro and Masare).

“I was preparing densely forested river bed farmland along Dawa River which was not far from Dollo Ado town. On the onset of the gu’ rains in March 1992, two middle aged Garimaro men approached me. In fact, I knew the men, they told me to stop what I was doing. I asked them what the matter was. They told me the land I was preparing belonged to their parents; implying that, it belonged to them. I became angry and told them that they should please leave this place if they want to live. I said this because I knew the land belonged to no body. It was a security zone and that no civilian activities were allowed for the last five decades. The two men went to the town, and barely after an hour, a military car full of military personnel landed near where I was deforesting. In few minutes, I was approached by the military from different directions. One of them, probably their commander, told me to stop what I was doing and that I was under military custody. I agreed to follow orders. They took me to the military camp. In the camp, I was asked if I was involved in any ammunition trafficking. I told them I was not. Later, I came to understand that; the men accused me as an ammunition dealer. I was not allowed to see my family and relatives for three days. Nevertheless, there were clashes between my clan (Masare) and Garimaro in the town. Many people were injured and many more were arrested. The wereda administration and the police approached the military officers and requested for my release. The military, before my release, called for security meeting that included the administration and the local elders. In that meeting the police informed the military that I was innocent and I was immediately released. The administration assigned a committee of senior elders that compose both Degodia and Garimaro clans to arbitrate the

case (the land issue) since there was not any government body (institution) that was responsible to intervene in land disputes in the wereda. The elders requested involvement of people who could verify the ownership of the land that include neighbors from that locality and elderly people who could remember the situation of the disputed land over the last five decades. Three elders, two Garimaros (Ugas Hilowle, 91 and Hassan Aden, 71) and a Degodia elder known as Ilkabicir appeared before the committee of elders as area knowledgeable persons. The mediating elders, after hearing the allegations from my side in addition to that of neighbors and the elderly people, passed an impartial decision. This decision matched my innocence. The decision passed was according the customary law (xeer). The Garimaro elders accepted the decision of the elderly committees assigned by the administration, that their men were blameworthy and that they had to pay compensation equivalent to the damage inflicted to me as well as the people who sustained injuries as a result of that dispute. In this way, the dispute between the two clans was settled. Afterwards, there was no problem of that nature in that locality.

This case demonstrates how resource scarcity, which has multiple causes, could lead to agro-pastoral community conflicts. The initial conflicting individuals in this case, have different background. The man, who was the cause of the conflict, was a returnee and local entrepreneur. He was formerly a pastoral from this locality but went to refugee camps in lower Juba area of Somalia proper. He gained agricultural skills in the refugee camps. By the time he returned in early 1990, he had returned with some farm technologies, irrigation pumps, tractor, fertilizer, and herbicides. The other fact we have to admit is, that such entrepreneurs have completely changed their farmer pastoral way of life and have no herds back in remote ranges, as they lost during the wartime before they went to refugee camps. So, the only means they can now survive is through farming in the river basins. Then the entrepreneur thought it was the right time to make use of the opportunity.

The other men (Garimaro) who claimed, the piece of land where the entrepreneur was preparing were traditional farmers. They believed that traditionally all riverbed farmlands belonged to them, and only that, they didn't had the capacity to cultivate, the land belonged to them. This was the background and fact gap of the two conflicting parties. But either of them never knew the condition of the other and as result, conflict ensued. In the actual sense, either of them did not own the land. Constitutionally, the land belongs to the government. But even the later groups, who claim traditional ownership, do not have traditional institution's support for their claim.

The role of the state in determining the land tenure and the land use systems of the pastoralists has been paramount. In 1955, the revised constitutions of the Imperial regime dispossessed pastoralist of their land by declaring it as a state property. The ground for

preparing such policies could only have emanated from a total misunderstanding of the lifestyle of pastoral people and their social system, particularly their customary law regarding land (Fecadu 2000).

During the military regime, all lands were nationalized. The proclamation on pastoral land was suspended. In the mean time, the Derg attempted to reorganize pastoralists using the model used to organize peasants else where in Ethiopia. The new Ethiopian Constitution (1995) maintains land as nationalized for all Ethiopian citizens without exception to the pastoralist. However, the constitution safeguards pastoralists from being evicted from their homeland. Recently (2005) the new rural land administration proclamation has entrusted the power of administering rural lands including those of pastoralists' to the regional states. When analyzing the context of land-tenure systems and their associated property rights, analysts must stress the dual nature of property rights. Property rights mediate the relationships between humans (Lynch and Alcorn 1994), and between the resource and humans (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Therefore, contextual information has to deal with the relationship between humans and resources and with the relationship between humans and humans. The lack of clear land tenure policy has become one of the factors that contributed to increasing level of land and natural resources use insecurity and increasing intra- inter ethnic conflicts.

The traditional institution grants access to river basin resources. An individual could own small plot of farmland along the riverbed, but not tracks of land along the basin lands. So the traditional institutions were not responsible for riverbed farmland allocation and distribution. As a result, no body would have right of claim over ownership of riverbed adjacent farmland. Again, unlike highland Ethiopia, there is no government institution that was (is) responsible for issuing ownership right (little deeds) for riverbed farmland, especially in the study area. So, in this case, conflict does not only give resource scarcity implication but also non-existence or incapacity of institutions responsible for land use. Again, in this case one can deduce how modern conflict resolution and management institutions are weak in resolving local resource based conflict. The traditional intuitions (elders) can perfectly bring temporary solution to local resource based conflict.

The *wereda* agricultural experts associate the increased river basin cultivation to the increased number of the small-holder farmers following the introduction of diesel

generator powered small scale irrigation schemes by the RRC in early 1980s. In this period, peasant associations of the whole Dollo Ado district were organized into producers' cooperatives with the aim of making conducive environment (Nur Abdi 2002). RRC brought and installed three irrigation pumps at selected specific *helas* which were dry season grazing and herd watering river water access points for pastoralists. This includes Helaweyn, Bur Amino Melka Dida (which later become a state farm), Kilimisinge, Melka Suftu, Wadlähube and Sede. During the time, privately owned water pumps were not allowed. However, the local people gained irrigation skills and developed better cultivation know how.

From then onwards, awareness and importance of diesel generator powered irrigation systems were inculcated in the minds of many agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. Moreover, the local people who went to refugee camps in Somalia during Ethio-Somali national wars got the opportunity to involve irrigation schemes in the lower Juba where they acquired basic skills and know how of irrigation system.

During the fall of the central government in Somalia in 1990 and the onset of civil war, many Ethiopian refugees came back with some irrigation pumps and operating skills. Since such returnees did not have livestock, the very chance for survival was to plough the basin land. In this regard, those who were able, bought land from the local landowners, others claimed, their parents basin land. Still others – majority in fact, were forced to farm on free lands along the riverbanks distant from the *wereda's* main town of Dollo Ado.

5.2 Socio-Cultural Sources of the Conflict

As it has been explained in chapter three, Degodia and other Somali groups have been organized in patrilineally descent groups (clans and lineages). An individual clan member is guaranteed with economic, social and physical security for being born to the clan and has to defend the clan's interest. As a result, conflicts between individuals are easily transformed into wider clan conflicts. For example, clashes between individuals such as herders and farmers could lead to inter-tribal, inter-clan or even inter lineage conflicts. The following are accounts of such resource based inter-clan conflicts between a herder from Degodia subclan and some Garimaro affiliate group of Guryante farmers. Ibrahim Warabe

(45), who is Guryante by clan and a farmer at Bur Amino Kebele along Ganale River, narrates what he has come across during recent conflict with Masare herders in his locality.

Case 3: Conflict related to enclosures.

I have farmland along Ganale riverbank near Bur Amino kebele. I grow different varieties of cereal crops and pasture for my livestock feed. The farm is located next to the “helo” (water point). In March 28, 2005, herds (camel and shoats) herded by teenagers who were heading to the water point entered my farm and grazed some cereal crops as well as the pastures. Half an hour later, the teenagers drove the herds to the nearby “helo”. While the herds were still in the helo, my wife and two of my sons saw that our farm pastures were grazed and the herds damaged crops. They discussed on what to do and my wife advised my sons to go to the nearby helo to identify the owners of the herds but she cautioned them not to take any other measure. The youngsters did as they were told to do. They came to the helo, saw the herds but couldn’t find the owners because they hid themselves as they knew that the owners of the farm would follow them. My sons wondered what to do with the herds, but finally agreed to drive the herds to their farm and waited for the owners to come. When the herder discovered that their herds were taken, they started to cry and ran to inform their families. Upon arriving home, they told their mothers and brothers about the incident. Two middle aged ladies and three boys from Masare sub clan of Degodia took axes, machetes and heavy sticks (Garumo) and ran to the direction of the herds. An hour later, they found their livestock grazing around my farmland. They started to shout at my sons. My sons and their mother came out from the farm to respond to the shouts they heard. The herd owners vocally assaulted the Guryante (my clan) in general and my family in particular. My sons retaliated by shouting back to the Massare herd owners. Herd owners were hotheaded and physical clashes started. As a result, two of my sons were wounded on their heads, and their mother ran to the nearby Bur-Kebele to seek support. In the mean time, a Massare lady was also injured in the leg, and her companion tried to run away with the herds. The Kebele militiamen arrived in the area after some minutes and they tried to settle the problem but in vain. The clash escalated and spread to the neighboring families of the two clans. It continued until more militiamen arrived in the scene and controlled the situation. The following day (March 29, 2005), the tension continued between my clan (Guryante) and the herd owners (Masare). Based on this clashes the Dollo-Ado wereda administration and the police force traced the cause of the conflict and formed an arbitration committee from the local elders. Furthermore, they have arrested five persons, both from my family and those of Masare. The elders committed themselves to solve the problem. They visited the farm and estimated the damage inflicted into my farm by the herds. They also asked both parties how the incident happened. Finally, they arranged face-to-face meeting with my clan and Masare clan in the house of Abadwake (a third party clan). Negotiation started and compensation equivalent to the damage inflicted by the herds was paid to me. As a result, we have reached consensus on the decision passed by the elders.

The major factors behind this conflict are resource scarcity in the rangelands especially during dry season and expansion of cultivable lands especially private enclosures along the river basins. During the day seasons the mainstay of herders is the riverbank to find water & pasture for their livestock (herds). In the meantime, due to the absence of land

distribution, agro-pastoralists enclose a land size beyond their cultivation capacity. These enclosures along the riverbanks have different sources.

The first reason is that farmers cultivate to the maximum capacity or even share with other relatives in the form of Burjewasi (shared cultivation). Secondly, they need to obtain pasture for their livestock especially during dry season. Thirdly, they want to generate financial income from the sale of the pasture during drought. Lastly, they tend to sale portion of the enclosed land as the land market increases. This matches with the work of Moorehead (1989) who explained the conflict in Malta's Niger Delta between herders and farmers as due to enclosures by farmers along the stock routes leading to flood plains.

This enclosure along the river basins is a new phenomenon, which is most probably related to the recent trends in the change of land use patterns and the subsequent rise in the values of agricultural lands. These lands (in closures) together with resource shrinkage in the rangelands affect the herder-farmer relationships particularly when it comes to basin rangelands and water points.

The root cause of this conflict is the absence of clearly defined and efficient resource utilization mechanisms among different production systems (herders & farmers). Similarly, due to the absence of institutions responsible for the allocation of local resources (basin land), the farmers are traditionally occupying large size of land and restricting its access to others. This trend of privatizing common lands along with the natural resources restricts the rights of pastoralists (herders) to the access of natural resources in their vicinities.

The local administration together with the elders is doing their level best to calm resource-based conflicts in the area but they may not be lasting solutions. This is because there are two basic problems as far as resource-based conflicts are concerned. The first problem is that there is institutional gap. A responsible institution for distribution and redistribution of agricultural (cultivable) lands is lacking. The absence of this institution causes land to be traditionally held without limit. This affects equal distribution of resources and marginalizes herders. The second problem is a policy gap. In fact there is no clearly defined resource utilization policy. The resources that mostly create conflict are pasture and water. Furthermore, the communal lands and water points are nowadays privatized. This causes shrinkages of resources for herders. Based on this, policies that clearly define

and demarcate equitable access and use of resources for both herders and farmers are paramount of importance in bringing about lasting solutions in the process of conflict management.

Apart from these broader production based inter – group herder farmer clan conflicts, socio-cultural conflicts that result from inter clan marriages are also common and unless resolved rightly by both traditional clan and group leaders and elders such conflicts may become difficult to resolve (Donovan & Tsegaye 2001). Likewise, abduction of girls and raping of women could cause inter-clan conflicts. Moreover, quarrels of teenagers and cultural value based differences have sometimes escalated into inter-clan conflicts between Garimaro and Degodia.

5.3 Post 1991 Inter–Intra Clan Conflicts over Access and Control of Political and Administrative Resources

Recently, there were some major developments that have led to the escalation of the inter-tribal conflicts in the region. The introduction of decentralized local administration and general political instability of the country in 1991 gave way to the outbreak of a new competition and strife among the clans in the study area. The political change of 1991 was in favor of the majority the hitherto extremely marginalized communities especially the Degodia. Immediately following the change of government and establishment of the Somali Regional Government of Ethiopia they gained control over most of the political, administrative and socio economic resources.

Due to the exercise of decentralization the local government's administration was adversely affected by clan favoritism in all fields. There were repeated tribal and clan centered local political clashes that plagued the administration from regional to local *kebele* levels. Locally elected officials ceased to implement regional or federal state development policies because of the pressure made and the inclination towards tribal or clan interests. This affected the impartiality of the local administration officials that in turn led to loss of trust among groups.

Table III: Wereda Administration Leadership Change during the Last Eight Years.

| No | Clans | Position | Number of times changed |
|----|----------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | Degodia | District administrator | 6 |
| 2 | Garimaro | Vice District Administrator | 5 |

Source: Wereda administration report, 2004.

The above table shows the turnover of the two key wereda administration positions over the last 8 years. The administration head and his vice are changed six and five times respectively as a result of political infighting among Degodias and between Degodia and Garimaros. In fact, even if individuals are changed, the positions are reserved for clan nominations. Mostly these are the influential positions at the district level, which sometimes cause tensions among Degodia clans and between Garimaro and Degodia. Degodia are relatively favored after the demise of Dergue whereas the minorities Garimaro do not have any substantial political influence even at the zonal level. Hence, these political gaps dominate the wereda's political power in resource sharing.

5.4 The Analysis of Resource Based Intra-clan Conflicts among Degodia

An inter-clan conflict among Degodia is a recent phenomenon. The inherent causes of such conflicts are basin resource scarcities that are accentuated recently. According to Donovan & Tsegaye (2001), most inter-clan conflicts begin as disputes between two men over land or water point. Minor disputes of this nature can escalate from exchange of blows with whatever tools or solid materials that are at hand. Following this, the slim clash gives birth to huge conflicts that incite the involvement of the whole clan.

Many Degodia pastoralists are transforming their livelihood from that of pastoralist to agro-pastoralist. Besides, due to transformation and recurrent droughts, both the range and other basin resources are shrinking. Initially these led to the decline of productivity at both farmland and herd resources. But, with the introduction of the new farm technologies, more pastorals and agro-pastoral families have settled in large numbers around the basin areas practicing Burjewasi (share cultivation) and cooperative farming (*eskasheto*). Such

production systems have led to increased level of private ownership of basin farmlands and the range. The demand for the riverbank cultivation doubled over the fourteen years.

In effect, conflicts within the Degodia clan members have become very common. The most common sources of such conflicts were disputes over basin land use. In addition, as many respondents indicate, there are considerable conflicts between land renters and share farmers. Conflicts of this nature are not only inter and intra -clan but they were also based on competing production systems of herders and farmers. The occurrence of the latter form of conflict varies with seasons. In some seasons of the year, there is a sharp increase in the occurrences of conflicts between herders and farmers while in other seasons there are natural slacks in the frequency of conflict occurrences.

During summer (Jiilaal), there is a sharp increase in the occurrences of conflicts because this is a dry season where herders migrate to basin areas in search of water and basin pastures. In such seasons the relationship between the two are tense. Farmers usually look for their green and irrigated fields and livestock owners go wherever the herds go. Many times, livestock break through the farm fences and graze the green fields. The farmers confiscate such herds and the herders claim their livestock. As a result, the two get into violent conflicts.

Intra-clan conflicts among Degodia sub-clans are very common in Dawa river basins. The most conflicting sub-clans include: Masare, Abrishe, Jibrail, Fai, Geleble, Idiris Adé and Walajeclé. This does not mean that only these sub-clans among Degodia engage in intra-clan conflicts but basically these are lowland riverine agro-pastorals who are transforming their lifestyle from pastoralism into agro-pastoralism.

Analysis of the data of intra-clan conflicts among Degodia clans collected for the purpose of this study show that the conflict in the Dawa river basin is becoming more intense over recent years. This is demonstrated especially by the increase in the number of human casualties involved in the conflicts between the sub-clans in the recent years. Although these do not show consistent patterns in the different case years, there is a clear indication that the conflicts over scarce resources are going from bad to worse. The following table summarizes the major intra-clan conflicts with human casualties experienced by the Degodia sub-clans for the last nine years.

Table IV: Major Intra-clan Conflicts among Degodia Sub-clans during the last nine Years (1997-2005).

| Year | Conflicting sub-clans | Type of conflict | Place | Number of casualties | Source of conflict |
|------|---------------------------|------------------|-------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1997 | Masare with Abrishe | Tensions | Fiqow | 5 | Farm land |
| 1998 | Geleble with Walajele | Tension | Niman | 2 | Farm land |
| 1999 | Jibrail with fai | Tension | Rhana Dintu | 3 | Grazing range |
| 2000 | Masare with Abrishe | Massive conflict | Melka Suftu | 8 | Farm land |
| 2001 | Fai with Jibrail | Tension | Sede | 2 | Farm land |
| 2002 | Fai with Jibrail | Massive conflict | Sede | 6 | Grazing range |
| 2003 | Massare with Abrishe | Tension | Sablale | 1 | Farm land |
| 2004 | Idiris Ade with Walajeele | Tension | Niman | 1 | Political |
| 2005 | Masare with Abrishe | Tension | Hawalhaji | 3 | Grazing range |

Source: Field survey Dollo Ado *wereda*, 2005.

5.5 Dynamics of Change in the Intra-Clan Conflicts

In the past, internal disputes among Degodia sub-clans were very minimal for a number of reasons. In the first place, traditional institutions – the Guurti were very strong in solving intra-clan conflicts. Such institutions had the power to execute their verdicts. External inter-ethnic (Degodia-Borana) and inter-tribal (other neighboring Somali tribes such as Ogaden, Garre, Murule, Dir etc) conflicts were more frequent; in effect, Degodia did not enjoyed peaceful relations with its neighbors. In recent times, inter-tribal conflicts between Degodia and neighbors have reduced substantially. This relative peace coupled with intermittent droughts, population boom and the resultant resource scarcity in the study area have aggravated intra-clan conflicts among Degodia. The consequences of such developments were brought about because there happened to be stiff competition for

resources in the river basin areas. This stiff competition, especially in Dawa basin is between and among Degodia clans, which led to the aforementioned intra-clan conflicts.

Other dynamics are that, initially, Degodia land resources were commonly owned and shared by all Degodia. Degodia belonging to any areas within the Degodia land (Ado, Dirharra, Libin and Dire) had access right to any resource, be it grazing land, cultivable land or water points. But, in recent past, as a result of resource shrinkage in the basin area, Degodia had adopted private ownership of basin resource for agricultural purposes. This matches with Lane's work (1998) which describes situation in Kenya and Tanzania where private ownerships are made on range resources and changed to agricultural lands and is becoming the dominant cause of conflict among herders and farmers.

Basin cultivable fields as well as grazing and water points become either privately owned resources or sub-clan property. The social integrity and cohesion among members of sub-clans and lineages become stronger than the hitherto pan Degodia feelings or unity in the recent years. Strategic alliances and cooperation among sub-clans or small neighborhoods become stronger because of the past 8-year-political transformations, which motivated local political leaders to side towards their clan's interests. This can be observed from the organization of the Burjiwassi system, which many clan or lineage members see, as beneficial and also as a foundation for clan, lineage or neighborhood based farming associations or Eskasheto. Such use of clan and lineage land resources for farming via Burjiwassi and Eskasheto (cooperatives) can benefit the clan or lineage members while at the same time protect their land from being encroached by others. Despite such belief, the system has in fact led to differentiation among members and disputes over the benefits of organizing Burjuwassi.

According to many informants such arrangements of the Burjuwassi system have often led to exploitation among the poor laborers. In such arrangements the shares of the resource pool are not fairly distributed. The ratio of the shares could be 3:3:4. Meaning for every ten parts, the landowner and the laborer get three each and the water pump owner gets four parts. The local people (clan and lineage members) see this as exploitative on the part of the land and the pump owners, because, the two are not those who are responsible for cultivating the land and together they get the greatest benefit of the farm output (70% for that matter). It is the laborer, who gets the smaller share of the yield. In most cases, the

landowner is also the water pump owner. In such a case, it's the worst sort of exploitation to the poor laborer.

According to the same informants, conflicts over Burjewasi occur, when an individual belonging to a sub-clan, rents his farmland to a water pump owner from a different sub-clan because in most cases water pump owners hire workers from their sub clans. According to the tradition, the laborers should come from the landowners' sub-clan because although the land is individually owned, when disputes or difficulties in operating the farm occur; the landowner would often seek the assistance of his sub-clan members. Therefore, ideally, the landowner has to share the benefits of his farmland with his kinsmen. Here, conflicts of interest may arise between the landowner and the water pump owner. Every one wants his sub-clan to benefit. Usually, this is dominant when the two parties are going into contract. Disputes often occur in times of bad harvest or crop failure when the renter could not afford to pay his dues and could not invalidate his contract. Misunderstanding of this type happens often leads to intra clan conflicts.

The second dynamism in intra-clan conflicts among the Degodia is collective cultivable basin farmland shared by different neighboring sub-clans. Again, with the introduction of privately owned irrigation fields, the collective cultivable lands are demarcated by the local administration. When such demarcations are administrated, individual claims over farm borders belonging to their parents may not go with that of their needs due to the existing scarcity of such resources. In their claims and counter claims over farmland borders intra-clan conflicts could arise. The following case of Mr. Mursal Subane explains much of the reality.

Case 4: The case of farmland ownership dispute among families belonging to three Degodia lineages and its resolution through traditional mechanism.

My father and three other two close friends used to farm along the Dawa riverbed at a place called Daytuli. This was in the mid 60s. Three of them were from three different Degodia sub clans (Massare, Abrishe and Gelible). In the mid 70s, though two of my father's friends left the area (the Massare and the Abrishe), and my father continued to cultivate the land. The Abrishe man went to the nearest Mander town of Kenya while the Massare man went to hinterland Ado near Filtu wereda. In early 80's, the Masare man died in the hinterlands. When some of his relatives including his children heard his death, they came together and discussed over the issue of their shared farmland in Daytuli. His sons came to my father to claim the share of the farmland of their deceased father. My father told them that they are welcome any time. They were happy with the response and they went back. During this period, neither the Abrishe elder nor his family returned to Daytuli

Bad enough, the Abrishe elder died in late 1989. His family once again raised the issue of the land as my father reassured them that they could come and cultivate the land at any time. Based on such reassurances, the two families trusted my father and did not come back for almost two decades. Nevertheless, my father died in early 1992. During this time there were crisis in the neighborhood Somalia and there were droughts in both the neighboring areas of Kenya and Somalia. Furthermore, there were numerous returnees from Somalia and displaced people from hinterland within Dollo Ado district. Hence, there were pressures on farmlands along the riverbanks. Many were striving to own a piece of farmland along the riverbank, which was suitable for irrigation. Irrigation was widely exercised as early as 1990 and even those people who could not own a piece of farmland would still share a farmland with others through a system called Burjewassi (share cultivation). In 1992, the family of the two deceased fathers once again came to Daytuli to discuss how we could share the farmland owned by our late fathers, but none of us could recall the exact size of the plots of our farmland. This was so because in the previous years there were no needs of demarcation for there was not any shortage of farmland. As three of us are from three different sub-clans of Degodia, we had different contexts of access to irrigation pumps. Thus, every one of us wanted to hold his own piece of farmland independently. This necessitated the demarcation of our farmlands. Though we agreed in principle the land should be divided among us, there was contention as what the size to each of us should be. In fact, I personally demanded a big share for it was we who took care of it for about four decades. But the Abrishe claimed more plot of land since his clan is a majority. The Massare family similarly claimed a lion's share due to irrigation pump ownership. These claims and counter claims created conflict among us and we failed to settle the dispute. Amidst the dispute, local elders and neighbors intervened to mediate us. The mediating elders decided more land to me. Nevertheless, both the Massare and Abrishe rejected the decision and that rejection led to conflict. Surprisingly enough, they went to court and the court ruled in favor of them. However, I appealed to Dollo Ado court and it ruled in favor of me. Finally, both of us went to the wereda administration claiming the court decision. The *wereda* administration collected the court decision from each of us and assigned highly respected local elder to arbitrate and solve the dispute. The elders assigned the lands equally to all of us and that became the final decision.

As it can be deduced from the speech of the informant, there is institutional gap that was supposed to provide title deeds and distribute lands accordingly. Similarly, there is no legal institution that grants the tenure security in the area under study. The *wereda* court is ignorant of as could be judged from the decisions. The *wereda* administration focuses in giving temporary solutions for chronic problems.

Besides, though it is normal to see deviations on decisions of courts, the cases of these courts are extreme. Odd enough, though the two courts passed different decisions, the wereda administration shifted the decision making to the elders. This shows that the wereda administration interferes in the freedom of courts, which is literally against the constitution. By default, the administration is stronger than the courts. Similar to the above

oddities, the wereda administration never decided by itself. It only reversed the court's decision and sent it to the elders.

This analysis indicates that there is no government institution responsible for rural land allocation in this area. Furthermore, it shows that the modern institutions both legal and administrative can effect negatively and positively in the process of land use conflict management. More importantly the traditional institutions can play greater role in conflict resolution and management but their decisions are not recognized and supported by government laws. Therefore, their local conflict interventions are not lasting solutions but temporary relieves.

5.6 Intra-Clan Conflicts Involving Women

Degodia women are involved in conflicts in several ways. The first sources of conflict are vulgar verses in songs during traditional dances. When youth of two sub-clan members abuse each other for one reason or another during traditional gatherings like weddings or sub-clan cultural meetings during wet seasons. In such gatherings, female participants sing songs that talk of ill of other sub-clans and the offended sub clan retaliates by singing back. These minor issues consequently scale-up into intra-clan conflicts.

The other source of intra-clan conflicts is when women are eloped by a clan that does not endorse the marriage of their daughters. In fact, this is not cultural out casting, but the two sub-clans might have inherited differences from their great grand parents. So, the lady's clan might not accept such engagements. If the lad's sub-clan accepts the case, then traditionally they should do the *Sabeen xir*, the first interaction with the lady's family. It is in such instances that conflict starts with the prospective in-law sub-clans. Meaning, if they turn down the marriage proposal from the lad's sub-clan initially, it is an affair of two households but it leads to intra-clan conflicts, if there were previous prejudices.

The third sources of conflict emanate from the personal integrity of the girls. Though parents decide who the husband of their daughter should be, there are circumstances girls refuse to such predeterminations. The girls may defect to their maternal uncle's family who may belong to another sub-clan. Traditionally, it is the paternal uncles who have the power to accept or refuse marriage contracts of both children (girls as well as boys). But, when the young ladies resist such offers, their maternal uncles have the right to protect them -

especially from harassments by their would-be husbands. But, they don't have the right to reject the marriage proposal altogether. Sometimes, it happens that the same maternal uncle grants marriage contract of the girl to a man of her choice from their sub-clan while the previous contracts of her offers are not closed. Now dispute occurs between the girl's former husband's family and the new husband's family.

Besides they have a traditional role of inducing the male to show warrior prowess, which has a direct link to conflict. Males who are allegedly cowards are verbally abused and they become subjects of ridicule for instance by throwing liquid called *asal*. The most important dynamics in women's roles in intra-clan conflict in the recent times the resource-based conflict. Since recent decades increased number of women became household heads due to the loss of their husbands to internal and inter state wars between Ethiopia and Somalia. After the death of their husbands and fathers, they become custodian of such resources.

Nonetheless, the Somali culture, which is based on patrilineal decent and kinship downplayins women's access to basic resources like farmland and large stock. Mostly, the male dominated culture has that sons and daughters inherit fathers, and if daughters are married, mostly they don't get their share of the inheritance. In case of widowed women the brothers or paternal cousins of the deceased husband should inherit them. The new husband controls and claims all the resources and properties of the deceased brother. If the woman has children, of course the property belongs to them but their stepfather will manage such resources till they grow up. The problem occurs when such children grow up and claim the inheritance rights to their father's land and livestock property.

Remember, the new husband may also have children born from the mother of the children whose father has died. Problems arise when the children from the two fathers demand division of the family property. Intra-clan conflicts may arise when the wife of the deceased husband belongs to a different sub-clan and refuses to marry her in-laws. If such a woman is administering basic resources such as land and livestock, she will be forced to transfer the administration of such resources, especially if she has no children. If she insists that the resource belongs to her (inherited right), then the relatives of the deceased will inform her relatives of the issue and if they fail to take action, the two sub-clans would go into conflict.

5.7 Involvement of Degodia Women in Peace Making

Peace is vital for any community development endeavors and the role of women in any development process is fundamental, as they constitute the bulk of the population. Degodia women play a central role in their families. For instance, they train their children at early ages about the positive cultural values of their community. This early teaching about peace begins at home which demonstrates the good intents of the Degodia women, particularly the pastoral women in remote areas affected by clan conflicts.

In times of conflicts they try to persuade their husbands, sons, brothers and cousins to refrain from involving themselves in bloody conflicts. Habiba Esmail, one of the Mothers that I held discussions with says, “in any conflict, you lose a son but you will not gain one!” for that reason, she continues, “We (mothers) try our level best to convince them to abstain from any bloody conflicts.”

But, for many instances, their husbands and sons who are obsessed with clan or sub clan patriotism do not honor their cry for peace. In times of conflict, Degodia women provide food and the necessary care to their husbands, sons or cousins. They console the mourners and do the entire humanistic role for their families, clans, sub clans and their community at large. Nevertheless, there are many factors that hinder their roles in peace making. The female informants mention the salient problems as follows.

- The patriarchal pattern and other cultures excluded women from taking active part in the communities conflict management and decision making process.
- The women themselves believe that their religious duties and traditional responsibilities confine them to domestic affairs though Islam permits the participation of women in public affairs.
- Lack of awareness about their own rights which is aggravated by the low levels of literacy of Degodia women
- Limited efforts of advocacy work by government as well as NGO’s with regard to the contribution of women in general and Degodia women in particular in peace making for their communities.

To summarize this chapter, the cases demonstrate that the conflict between Degodia clans and lineages especially those engaged in farming and pastoralism are primarily with the issue of access, tenure and use rights. All other cases of conflict between and among

Degodia clans become secondary. This means that, the context of the Degodia conflict supports the proposition of theories of scarcity very well. But, this does not mean that, the theory, which worked in, the context of Degodia may work in other conflict context. This is to mean, there are no grand theories, which apply in explaining conflict universally. Therefore, we have to accept small-scale theories that apply and explain different conflict contexts and their causes. This study utilized the concepts of the New Range Ecology theory in explaining conflict between and among Degodia herders and farmers.

CHAPTER SIX

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS

In these border areas civil administrative engagement is a recent development. During the two previous regimes, it was a military maneuvering area and a security zone. There were minimum applications of modern administrative and judicial conflict resolution mechanisms. Even though the informants argued there were martial laws to silence the conflicts, no such information can be found from the concerned organs. Researchers like Atkilt (2003) share the idea that sustainable conflict resolution and management was not in the policy agenda of the past regimes. They simply relied on the demonstration of higher authorities to deter conflicts, which led to the cropping up of negative outlooks among pastoralists towards the government. For the convenience of analyzing the field informants' views and available data from the research area, the conflict resolution methods are classified as modern hybrid and traditional.

6.1 Modern Conflict Resolution Institutions

Modern means of conflict resolution refers to interventions of different levels of government; local (wereda administration), regional and federal. There have been disputes over border areas that sometimes have involved the administrations and the security forces of neighboring countries especially that of Ethiopia and Kenya. Such disputes have hindered the border movements of pastoralists whose nationalities have been difficult to identify.

There have been frequent disputes in the border areas for a long period of time. To reverse these evil acts, different governments have been using different mechanisms, which have been mainly referred to as modern mechanisms. They have involved different levels of government in the conflict resolution mechanisms. The following are the topmost ones among other things: local administration, regional state and the federal one. The conflict resolution mechanisms have had different natures in the three regimes viz. the Imperial era, the Dergue era, and the EPRDF-led government.

6.1.1 Conflict Management during the Imperial Era

There is a general consensus by senior citizens and other knowledgeable informants that interventions to manage inter clan conflicts during the Imperial regime were very ineffective, especially with regard to decision execution. Besides, the police forces were confined to towns; and hence, conflicts were rampant in areas where state apparatus was weak, if not non-existent. It was the armed forces who were involved in the management of the inter group/inter clan conflicts. The rational way of resolving local conflicts by the state apparatus was inadequate. Some energetic attempts by the military forces led to inter state tensions, as it was difficult to identify which pastoral clans among the Degodia caused the problem. The notion that if a Degodia causes the Degodia a problem has to be punished was a wrong premise for the Degodia belongs to three states namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

The armed forces were applying strong military pressures to bring under control the occasional complex conflicts between the main Degodia groups, or Degodia-Ogaden, Degodia-Garre and sometimes Degodia and Garimaro. But, when conflicts are not complex they usually pressurized elders of both conflicting parties to hand over the initial instigators of the conflicts. Elders, who fail to bring culprits, were liable to punishments. Such punishments were in the form of detention, confiscation of properties and, if instigators escaped or were unwilling to surrender; elders were to pay compensation charges of up to two thousand Ethiopian Dollars.

In cases, when conflicts had no casualties but robbery of a herd, the offenders were obliged to return the livestock. There was comparatively less local administration involvement of conflict management in the Imperial era. The military officers worked in close cooperation with traditional leaders but sometimes there were misunderstandings between the military and local elders. The consequence of such a misunderstanding was seen when pastoralists retreated to their remote hinterlands and the military began keeping an eye on pastoral movement by camping strategic locations at border and water points, with occasional arrests of traditional leaders and some elders. According to Atkilt (2003) during the imperial regime, conflicts were seen as historical and cultural realities depicting the backwardness of traditional societies and modernization was considered as an alternative remedy of transforming primitive societies. Hence, there were prejudices that

the pastoralists and herders were conflict addicted. Odd enough, the regime tried to solve this “traditional” nature through “modern” mechanisms that were strange to the society. The heart of the problem, thus, was this negative bias. Prescribing wrong medicine to a wrong disease.

6.1.2 Conflict Management Policy during the Military Rule

During the Derg much attention was not given to inter clan and intra clan conflicts. The focus of the military regime was at inter ethnic conflicts between Degodia and Borana. Nonetheless, the government was not impartial. In fact, it showed its unconditional affection to the Boranas. So, every attempt to promote peaceful settlements of inter ethnic and inter tribal or inter clan conflict was futile. This is evident from the strained relationships between different ethnic groups: Degodia Borana, Gari-Boran and between the different Somali tribes, Degodia- Ogaden, Degodia Gari, Degodia Dir etc.

Specifically speaking, the Degodia were considered as untamed and pro-mainland Somaliland irredentists. Hence, the Degodia were facing socio-economic and political punishments. This way of thinking from the government side aggravated the already hostile situation of the groups. On the other hand, the Garimora and the Borana were highly sympathized and favored which added fuel to the turmoil.

Generally, the Derg had inconsistent and biased conflict management policies. Such policies forced the local communities to side to the opposing forces; as a result of which the region remained insecure for a longtime. Injustice, banditry and inter clan conflicts remained day-to-day happenings. Occasionally, the military regime conducted security patrols on the border areas between Ethiopia and Somalia. In early 1980s, pastoral as well as agro pastoral movements were limited as a result of these policies. Under such policies, the people were required a special kebele permit to travel to other kebeles or to the main town.

But, as of 1988 the government signed a peace agreement with the Siad Barre regime and allowed the Ethiopian refugees in Somalia including those from that locality to return to their homeland. On the other hand, there was a civil war in the North that changed the direction to Eritrea. The Derg came up with new reconstruction policies. It started small irrigation and basin resettlement schemes. Though it was limited, it also initiated basic

social infrastructures such as health station and some adult literacy campaigns. It built few schools in the main peri-urban areas and peasant associations neighboring the military camps such as Bur Amino, Hela Weyn, Boqolmanyn, Malka Dida and Sede kebele.

To sum up, the Dergue had vague and biased policies that marginalized one group while favoring another one. The regime had classified one group as loyal and others as pro-separatists, which gave rise to ethnic hatred and government insecurity. Thus, the policies were more of a disaster than a solution.

6.1.3 Conflict Management Efforts in the Current Government

After the fall of the military regime in may 1991, the present government introduced decentralized ethnic based federal administration set up that devolved some of its powers to the regions. Such conditions enabled the peripheral societies to participate in the decision making processes of their own affairs. The EPRDF government has facilitated and made conditions suitable for the revival of customary laws through constitutional amendment of the country. For the first time in the Ethiopian history, the traditional conflict resolution mechanism got constitutional recognition in the area of civil and family affairs (see article 34/35 of the constitution of FDRE).

Apart from such legal back up, the government also entertained interventions in inter ethnic or inter clan conflicts through sponsored peace conferences such. For instance, there were as consecutive peace conferences between Oromia and Somali, Berta and Gumuz' etc. Its structures, such as courts, justice offices, police and the administration focused on lasting dispute resolution means. In fact, the government institutions except the administration are very weak. This is so because the administration in close cooperation with armed forces managed local inter or intra clan conflicts. They play the role of immediate mediators in time of armed conflicts between clans. As we noted in the different cases, their intervention role is to separate the conflicting groups temporarily. Mostly in the study area, the elders and traditional leaders such as the Weber or the ugases undertake lasting peace and conflict resolutions.

6.1.4 The Role of the Wereda Administration in Conflict Management

Besides its formal conflict resolving offices (the court, office of the prosecutor and the police), the District administration is also involved in local conflict mitigation by other means that include, good office enabling to attain peace coordination, peace committees that are composed of elder advisors, the armed forces and some officials from two Wereda administrations. In addition, some of the Wereda officials (the chairman and peace coordination office head) are members of cross-border peace committees with their Kenyan counterparts. The strategic location of the wereda are a cause to most of the trans border clan conflicts as well as their managements. The Wereda shares borders with Kenya and Somalia through Dawa- Ganale rivers and local borders with the Afer zone national regional state.

The joint Ethio-Kenyan border committees' effort in the prevention and control of border clan based herder-farmer conflicts cannot be under estimated. Such joint committee have the role of overseeing the utilization of pastoral and agro-pastoral common pool resources; river, water, farmland and pastures. Issues like trans border human and livestock diseases, drug and arms trafficking are also jointly discussed and controlled by such committees. The committee is accountable to border administrators and committees in their respective countries (Getachew 2003). With regard to conflict and cooperation, the Somali's side of the border is not as steadfast as that of Kenya. The neighboring Gedo region and Somalia are occupied by the Militia and administered by the traditional leadership of ugages and militia loyal to the SNF leaders- one of the Somalia factions. SNF have no strong central leadership. They divided into sub-factions; some have relation with the Ethiopian forces. Others are with Salbalaar -a south Somalia's coalition led by Hussain Aideed. Relatively, the traditional leadership of ugages is stronger. Most border conflicts with Somalia are resolved through traditional means rather than legal ways. According to Abdi Hirab, the head of the Dollo Ado district peace coordination office for the last eight years, Degodia and Marihan have never been in good terms because of their shared cross border natural resources use (pasture and water). But they have good relations with regard to trade and cultural exchanges (inter marriage and traditional festivities). Having these in mind, the wereda administration used to caution all Ethiopian pastorals and agro pastorals and the Degodias in particular, to avoid seasonal migration to Gedo region of Somalia. On the

other hand, they allow the Merihan and other Somalia pastoralists who cross the borders not to go further than twenty Kilometers deep into the Ethiopian territories.

To conclude, even though it is quite clear that conflict is inevitable, given the vulnerability of the area, reducing the degree of interaction with the neighboring Somalis minimizes the magnitude of the conflict.

6.2 The Role of Hybrid Institutions in Conflict Management

Hybrid institutions are those that have the characteristics of both modern and traditional ways of resolving conflicts. These institutions have emerged in the study area in connection with the dynamics of the resource based conflicts. They include the following institutions; the Sharia courts, the government established Guurti institution, and the more recent agro pastoral rural co-operatives. In the subsequent sections, I will explain their nature of emergence and their level of involvement in resolving resource-based conflicts.

6.3 The Sharia Courts

In the past, elders and Ulamas used religious approaches to solve both inter and intra clan conflicts. But, pastorals and to some extent agro pastorals had little knowledge about their religion-Islam. Recently with the expansion of settlements their knowledge about their religion increased. They don't have to make long journeys any more to seek Islamic education. As a result; more people have the chance to gain the spiritual and philosophical understanding of the religion. Moreover, in urban and sedentary villages, that are located along basins have adopted Islam to be part and parcel of their life. They believed and practiced to act according to the socio-economic and political direction of the holy Koran.

The new FDRE constitution granted the rights of Muslim families to resolve their family related (marriages, divorce etc) disputes through the Sharia courts. This is so because in some Muslim individual cases, plaintiffs are not able to support their appeal by witnesses. In such cases the plaintiffs require the defendant to swear whether s/he has committed the crime or not (Southern Tiers 2000). But, the pastoral and agro-pastoral are adapted to the Sharia courts to solve land conflicts without witnesses. So, such institution is gaining

popularity especially in solving intra clan conflicts among Degodias and also other clans including Garimaro and Dir.

The shortcoming of such institution according to informants, are that the staff and the judges (sheiks for that matter) are nominated from the regional headquarters and their selection is not based on merits. As a result, some of their rulings are impartial. In addition to this, the institution's capacity is very weak. It runs out of office facilities and infrastructures to reach the distant villages. It almost does not have vertical and horizontal linkage with the administration with administration is almost non-existent. It does not seek or get the support of NGOs. But, as an institution - religious for that matter, it has wide acceptance by the general public and if these self-inflicted weakness are done away with, it is believed that it would be one of the most important institution in managing local conflicts.

6.4 The Guurti Institution

This is an umbrella organization composed of clan elders and ugages, who are known traditionally to perform mediation between conflicting clans and sub clans. These are the caaqils (experts) of traditional Somali laws (xeer). I categorized them along with the hybrid institutions because they are organized and mobilized by the regional government. According to Donovan and Tesfaye (2001) the institution of Guurti were formalized by the Somali regional government in November 1999. A conclave of seven hundred of the most prominent clan elders were summoned at Jigjiga and out of that, a group of hundred elders was elected as regional and zonal Guurti. The members of the Guurti institution are paid conflict mediators of all Somali clans. An elder from this district, who is a member of the Guurti could be sent to other zones (say *Gode* or *Afder*) to mediate conflict resolution among clans. When appointed to the office each member of the Guurti swears on the Quran that he will represent the community as a whole not his clan only.

Whenever conflicts arise the elders are sent. These elders try to investigate the ones who provoked the conflict. They summon neighbors that were not part of the conflict and the administration is always on their side if they recommend intervention.

After acquiring all information related to the conflict from neighbors, the disputants are called turn by turn to air their complaints. Next, they disclose all the information gathered to the elders and neighbors that were not involved in the dispute. Then, they identify the wrongdoer and pass their judgment. As part of the conflict resolution mechanism, they do not leave the sites before the fined wrongdoers start the first payment for the compensation.

In fact, it is the process and decision made after identifying the blameworthy party that one notices the weakness of such institutions. Most conflicts that these institutions deal with are land conflicts. The disputants are poor agro pastorals or farmers and borderline dwellers. In cases that involve loss of life, the blameworthy group has to pay Diya. The traditions of the area and that of Somali in general declare that the murderer's clan or sub clan should pay. So, it takes years for the poor families to pay hundred camels if the victim is male and fifty camels in the case of a female.

In essence, elders have to stay in the conflict area until the Diya is paid. But, in most cases, the blameworthy group cannot support elders that long period; and hence, they immediately depart after passing a decision. But, mostly the blameworthy do not pay the Diya within the time frame agreed due to bad seasons or because of dishonor to the obligation (Diya). If the Diya is not paid within the agreed period, then, the victimized party will obviously retaliate. The elders would again come together for yet another complex case. As a result, the trend will form a vicious cycle of the conflicts; hence, leading to the weakening of the institution. The cause of such weakness is that members of the Guurti since paid regularly had to report to the wereda or zonal administration or even sometime while resolving a conflict; they would be called for peace conference in Jigjiga-1637 km away. This is one stumbling block in solving the conflicts.

Here, the point is the Guurti have not been provided with the necessary infrastructure to accomplish their assignment. This shows that they need strict follow up to resolve any conflict as per the requirement of the local administration. The administrators could easily incriminate the Guurti members as agitators of local conflicts and hence insecurity. Nowadays local communities have no confidence on elders who are government advisors on local conflicts. Communities have branded them negative names like *Afarkujebele* (the four picketers) *Afmiishaar* (hacksaw mouthed) etc. This has brought the effect of each clan

crowning new ugas branding the former as a betrayer of the clan interest (*Caloo shii U shaqeyste*).

In sum, though the Guurti have a tremendous contribution in tackling conflicts, there are a couple of areas that should be given more emphasis. First, the necessary infrastructure has to be fulfilled to make communication easier. Besides, much has to be done to redress the already defamed character of the elders. Finally, the Guurti should be modified to keep abreast with the changing world.

6.5 The Involvement of Agro Pastorals Cooperatives (Iskaashato) in Local Conflict Management

With the emergence of small-scale irrigations at riverbanks more pastorals and rain fed field cultivators (returnees) have joined riverbank cultivation. Initially they have joined in the form of Burjewasi (share cultivators). Not only have they comeback with some irrigation water pumps, but also with farm administration skills like group organizations-Iskaashato. In fact, what makes these institutions hybrid is their system of administration. On one hand they have formal organizational structures such as a chairperson, a secretary, a treasurer, and a bank accountant. On the other hand, they do not have a central planning office. Farms are individually owned and their products are individually marketed. Resource ownership has individual orientation.

Interesting enough, they are very systematic in resolving basic resource conflicts. First, the cooperatives are location based. That is to say that they are composed of neighborhoods that come from the same or different clans. Those who form cooperatives are agro pastorals who lived together for long time and that is why they are not categorized under a specific clan or sub clan. During the formation of the cooperatives they have their own by-laws, with which each and every member has to comply. The by-laws define the interactions and set alternative solutions.

Iskaashato institutions provide many benefits that an individual farmer or agro pastoral would have not got. First the size of the *Iskaashato* ranges from twenty individuals to five hundred persons (a population size of small village in the Somali context). So, in times of individuals' conflict, all these people will witness in front of elders and traditional leaders

and this will help identify the wrong doers, especially in land conflicts, which are very common in the river basins. Hence, it acts as protection against claims over ones basin farm land by others. Second, in time of grants (farm machinery and farm tools) by governmental and non-governmental development organizations, the sole beneficiaries of such grants are *Iskaashato* (agro-pastoral cooperatives). The members of *Iskasashato* have registered economic development and they have avoided conflict to sustain their advantages of peace.

However, *Iskaashatos* are not with out limitations. In principle, the *Iskaashato* are not organized as formal cooperatives. They do not have any links with the region's bureau of the cooperatives. The majorities have no formal education and therefore their stride towards development is slow. Worst of all, their internal organization is weak. These negative factors bring up questions concerning their common cause and purpose of existence. In short, although these cooperatives have played an important role in minimizing river basin resource conflicts, their organization and nature of existence have never been imperative to many development workers that have followed them closely.

6.6 Traditional Institutions and their Role in Resolving Conflicts

Traditional institution is an organization by which conflicts are resolved by elders. According to the tradition of the area, conflicts basically the pastoral ones were used to be solved through the council of elders- the traditional institution of the Somali. Members of this institution were selected by the community based on their cultural knowledge, ability of speech (*cod kar*), honesty and experience.

Traditional institutions are characterized by less government interference. They are also unique in administering conflicts. As can be read from the different cases in section five, the traditional conflict resolving mechanisms include a stage whereby, if a disputant is not satisfied with the decision passed by the elders at the first reconciliation, he has the right to request the involvement of other elders or increment of the number of elders or change the *geed* (rescheduling the peace conference). This is done to find more impartial elders. In the case of Degodia intra clan conflicts, the disputant could go up the ladder of authority up to the Weber. This can be seen as the analogy of taking appeal from lower to higher courts. But it is not part of the procedures undertaken by the hybrid court. In the district,

traditional method of conflict resolution has been a widely accepted practice. The following table summarizes the views of respondents about the role of different institutions involved in conflict resolution.

Table V: Summary of views of conflict resolving institutions.

| | Successful | Satisfactory | Not satisfactory | Exacerbating | Total |
|--|------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|-------|
| Role of elders in traditional mediating conflicts | 50 | 6 | -- | - | 56 |
| The role of courts (hybrid) elders in mediating conflicts | 15 | 3 | 1 | - | 19 |
| Role of local authorities in mediating conflicts | 3 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 15 |
| Total | | | | | 90 |

Source: Field survey, 2005.

The above table shows that 51% of the respondents have confirmed that the traditional elders successfully resolve conflicts, while only 13.5 % of the respondents have the view that the recently formed Guurti elders could successfully resolve conflicts in the area. But, it is disappointing to see that only 2.7% of the respondents agreed that the local administration could successfully resolve local conflicts. From my informants, I have deduced that, the modern administrative conflict resolving institution is not that much popular because of their location effect (towns), which are far from the conflicting pastoralist and agro pastoralist peasant associations. The weakness of such institutions like court, police is manifested in delayed decision over cases. Sometimes such institutions demand payment, when processing cases (these are the corrupt acts of government officials) and worse of all, pastoralists prefer group or consensus decision rather than an individual decision (the judge). To summarize this section, great majority of informants who represent the pastoralists as well as agro pastoralists prefer the traditional institutions in resolving their disputes to the modern and hybrid institutions. It is conspicuous here that many of the peoples opt for traditional ways for they have close contact and faith on them. It sounds pretty good that the traditional values should be given high respect and account.

6.7 Learning from Modern Hybrid and Traditional Conflict Resolution Methods

Conflicts were viewed as communal concerns, their resolution being followed by step-by-step patterns that are either modern or traditional. The different government institutions undertake modern conflict resolutions. Among these are the armed forces, the police, and office of the prosecutor, the local administration and the court. In theory, these government institutions were expected to operate without religious attitudes and to some extent without traditional influence. But, the observation of the research shows that religion and customs of the community in Dollo Ado district have significant influence on the operation of government institutions. Accordingly, after identifying that the modern system could not work properly and the tribal conflict are increasing, the Somali regional state has introduced the Guurti system in 1999. This system tried to intertwine the modern system of administration with that of the traditional system through elders' council, who are assumed to be advisors of the Somali culture (Southern tier, 2001).

In Dollo Ado district the traditional method of conflict resolution has been popular and widely accepted. Consequently, the traditional methods have entertained a lot of cases when compared to the modern ones. The traditional way of solving conflicts follows eight steps.

- Recognition of the conflict as a problem since conflict is inherent in the pastoral Somali culture and sensed as a problem when it involves death. In such times, the shared desire to change the hostile relations of the conflicting parties emanates from either of the two, probably, the party that has upper hand. Such a party approaches a third party who is a neighbor but not involved in the conflict. The latter takes the responsibility as a mediator. The parties in conflict accept the role of the mediator. They tolerate each other's presence after acknowledging that each of them has some right and responsibilities in settling issues arising from the conflict.
- The mediating party (clan or sub clan for that matter) establishes communication between the parties, facilitates the exchange of views and concerns about the conflict.

- The mediator expedites the establishment of a platform (Geed) for discussion through which the contending parties exchange grievances related to the conflict. Such dialogue allows the development of understanding of each other's situation.
- While in discussion, individual elders from the conflicting sides develop understanding of each other's perspectives and empathies with each other.
- Through further discussions a solution is forwarded. The solution depends on compromises and understanding

Specific census agreements, of the conflict issue at hand, are reached. Objective modalities of implementation are agreed upon and cooperation around these is developed. In case of Degodia intra clan conflicts, Diya, which is hundred camels for male causality and fifty for female causality are required as a payment. Recently (1992) Degodia has amended these traditional laws. As far as the Garimaro is concerned the blame worthy group have to offer a young lady in marriage to the offended group. In addition, the blameworthy have also to pay 25 camels. This has two implications; In one hand, the Garimaro population is too small which is about 10,000 (see Getachew 2005) and if they adopt traditional law similar to that of Degodia with the current trend of conflict with others and among themselves, it may risk their existence as a community. So, they have to address the problem through the analogy of "cut a tree to plant two". The other implication is that, Gariamros are riverbed cultivators and they do not have much livestock resource especially camels; and hence, they fail to afford to pay hundred camels.

If conflicts are inter clan such as Garimaro-Degodia, resolving arrangements are set. This includes promotion of partnership and creation of mechanisms in dealing with tensions and difficulties jointly. This could be through informing the local government as to the progress of peace initiative between the two clans.

The reconciliation and peaceful coexistence processes are finalized by the elders based on the principles of just and equitable resolution of conflict situation. Antagonistic identities that include "us and them" are done away with before the peace process is over and new sense of common cause and community togetherness emerges.

To sum up, modern conflict resolving institutional mechanisms have no popular acceptance by the local communities of Dollo-Ado district due to the following reasons.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study reveals that basin resource conflicts have multi-dimensional causes like ecology, demography and technology. Nevertheless, the pastoral lowland, and agro-pastoral societies have contributions to the peculiarities of the conflicts observed. In addition, the geographic location of the area has a tremendous contribution to the aforementioned problems.

The growing demand of the ever-increasing basin population is believed to deplete the river basin natural resources. This has resulted in decline to the riverbank resources; farms, forests and hinterland range. Distribution of traditional land use patterns and lack of appropriate basin land use plans by the weak local and regional governments have also aggravated the conditions of the already scarce basin resources. This has led to competition and conflicts among various clans and sub-clans of the communities.

It is a common knowledge that the war between Ethiopia and Somalia caused a flux of migrants to Somalia. Worse enough, the repercussion of the war was tough because when people came back to Ethiopia they came empty handed except farming skills and know-how. Farms expanded from riverbed fields to the flood plains. Manual cultivation continued through water pump irrigation. With ever increasing pressure of basin farmlands and range degradation as a result of over congestion aggravated by recurrent droughts, conflicts over scarce basin resources such as farmlands and water points ensued.

The post 1991 era is marked by the influence of international and national issues; the international being the demise of the Somali government while the national one is the exercise of decentralization. Hence, the devolution of power has favored the formerly alienated groups, which embedded retaliation and conflict of interests.

In the past, pastoral conflicts of inter tribe and inter clan were common but that of intra clan was very minimal. Nevertheless, the scenario nowadays is totally different for intra clan conflicts are getting momentum in the area. The reasons can mainly be traced to the scarcity of resources.

First, the institutions are located far from pastoralists and agro pastoralists. Second, they do not decide cases quickly. This has cost and time implications for agro-pastorals as well as pastorals. Most of the office workers are also corrupt. Finally, pastorals do not prefer a one-man decision (the judge). This may be against the constitution but, pastoralists have little knowledge about the constitution and for that matter group decision (like that of elders) is more acceptable.

Even though there were attempts to solve the internal resource based intra clan conflicts seen through three different mechanisms viz. the traditional, the hybrid, and modern, all the mechanisms except the traditional have proved to be futile. Almost all informants have proved that they have confidence in the traditional one for the mechanism involves quality elements like honesty, articulation and impartiality among other things. Contrary to this, many of the informants consider the modern one as irrelevant because it is based in the main town which is located far from the areas of conflict and that the officials fail to understand the contexts of the situation mainly due to their ineptness. Besides, the society considers the modern institutions as rigid. A substantial number of informants have also been in favor of the hybrid institution because it has some traditional elements in it.

Taking the above conclusions into consideration, the following recommendations are forwarded. Proper local development policy that addresses better land use strategies be enacted by the Regional Council and implemented at Wereda levels. Such development policies should be able to consider the cultural norms and institutions of the local communities and the conditions (opportunities and constraints) of the local environments;

The rehabilitation of the river basin farmland, forests and the hinterland range through environmentally and socially appropriate development programs are very essential. In addition, addressing population pressure through culturally appropriate family planning schemes and other programs that help raise the community awareness about the negative impacts of over-population are some of the major options for the interventions strategies in the study areas as well as other similar lowland areas in the regional state.

Enacting laws, which recognize the customary and the religious Sharia courts by determining their duties and responsibilities as well as their accountabilities, is crucial.

Building the capacity of the local administration and justice system through human resource development. This may include education and training in areas related to community development and conflict resolution and management.

Designing and implementing development programs that have contribution to peaceful coexistence among the various borderland communities. This should include the control of uncontrolled influx of people across borders; implementing policies that promote cross border trade; and flow of illegal arms through joint border land security commissions in close cooperation with the borderland communities from the three countries. Besides, the participation of women in peace making and basin resource utilization should be given due consideration.

Finally, further research needs to be conducted on the dynamics of resource based herder – farmer and herder –herder, cross –border conflicts in the region and elsewhere in the horn countries with similar problems.

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Annex I

Agro-pastoralists (farmers) interviewed along River banks

| Name | Sex | Age | Clan/sub clan |
|---------------------|-----|-----|---------------|
| Hassan Sheik | M | 64 | Degodia |
| Ibrahim Warebe | M | 45 | Garimaro |
| Mohammed Issak | M | 62 | Leisan |
| Mohammed Abdile | M | 30 | Degodia |
| Abdulahi Sheik | M | 58 | Garimaro |
| Gure Hassan | M | 77 | Degodia |
| Daud Mula | M | 68 | Garimaro |
| Nurto Isse | F | 43 | Garimaro |
| Kuresha Dima | F | 40 | Garimaro |
| Bisharo Dore | F | 28 | Garimaro |
| Habiba Hassan | F | 30 | Garimaro |
| Habiba Ismael | F | 33 | Degodia |
| Sugai osman | F | 40 | Garimaro |
| Rokia Muhamud | F | 48 | Degodia |
| Rashi Nur | M | 37 | Degodia |
| Mohammed Ali | M | 57 | Garimaro |
| Halima Ali | F | 22 | Dir |
| Omer Bule | M | 42 | Degodia |
| Amina Ibrahim | F | 35 | Degodia |
| Abdi Saman | M | 28 | Degodia |
| Hussen Bilow | M | 53 | Degodia |
| Aden Hassan | M | 52 | Degodia |
| Abdullahi SH Hassan | M | 60 | Degodia |
| Mursal Subani | M | 41 | Degodia |
| Jelle Hassan | M | 65 | Degodia |
| Fatuma Muhamed | F | 32 | Degodia |
| Diriye Abdulahi | M | 30 | Degodia |
| Abukar Aden | M | 48 | Degodia |
| Omar Muhamud | M | 63 | Degodia |
| Rashid Afey | M | 32 | Degodia |
| Muhamud Jimale | M | 28 | Degodia |
| Ibrahim Nur | M | 49 | Degodia |
| Rashid Ibrahim | M | 42 | Degodia |
| Gedi Abdi | M | 53 | Garimaro |

Annex II

Pastoralists (herders) interviewed along River Basins

| Name | Sex | Age | Clan/sub clan |
|-------------------|-----|-----|---------------|
| Dekow Muktar | M | 44 | Degodia |
| Aden Hassan | M | 21 | Degodia |
| Mallen Abdi | M | 38 | Degodia |
| Shukria Hassan | F | 31 | Degodia |
| Rashid Sugo | M | 42 | Degodia |
| Mahumd Abdulahi | M | 26 | Degodia |
| Abdukadir Kureish | M | 18 | Hawadle |
| Muse Mahmud | M | 22 | Hawadle |
| Barded Sugul | M | 38 | Hawadle |
| Arda Ibrahim | F | 29 | Hawadle |
| Gedi Osman | M | 50 | Degodia |
| Ibrahim Ali | M | 40 | Garimaro |
| Ahmed Abdule | M | 48 | Degodia |
| Muhammed Aden | M | 75 | Degodia |
| Dahir Hassan | M | 42 | Degodia |
| Mussa Mahmud | M | 27 | Degodia |
| Mahat Salat | M | 28 | Degodia |
| Mahmud Hirse | M | 23 | Degodia |
| Abdukadir Nur | M | 62 | Garimaro |
| Aden Sheik | M | 31 | Dir |
| Mao Ali | M | 38 | Degodia |
| Gedi Sheih Abdi | M | 55 | Degodia |
| Abdia Samater | M | 45 | Degodia |
| Yusuf Mumin | M | 50 | Degodia |
| Yusuf Ahmed | M | 61 | Degodia |
| Buley Subow | F | 29 | Degodia |
| Hashim Abdile | M | 40 | Degodia |
| Hassan Aden | M | 35 | Garimaro |
| Ibrahim Sheik | M | 23 | Degodia |
| Kenan Yusuf | M | 33 | Degodia |
| Adem Roba | M | 49 | Garimaro |
| Muhammed Subo | M | 28 | Garimaro |
| Rokia Kossar | F | 46 | Hawadle |
| Zeineba Jibril | F | 31 | Degodia |
| Abdurashid Dakat | M | 22 | Degodia |
| Agane Ibrahim | M | 48 | Degodia |
| Korar Ahmed | M | 63 | Hawadle |
| Abdi Guhad | M | 19 | Degodia |
| Kalsuma Harun | F | 57 | Degodia |

Annex III

Discussions with senior elders

| Name | Age | Clan/sub clan |
|------------------|-----|---------------|
| Abdi Ali | 71 | Degodia |
| Hussein Yusuf | 73 | Degodia |
| Muhammed Hassan | 68 | Degodia |
| Bile Mualen | 68 | Degodia |
| Isack Amin | 61 | Leysan |
| Ugaz Salad Hared | 69 | Dir |
| Muhammed Amin | 66 | Garimaro |
| Madobe Adem | 70 | Garimaro |
| Kassim Hassa | 62 | Degodia |
| Hassan Ahmed | 67 | Garimaro |

Annex IV

Discussion and expert interviews with Dollo-Ado District officials

Chairman of Dollo-Ado District Administration Council Sheik Hussein Ifin
Speaker of Dollo-Ado District local representatives Ato Abdi Hirab
Dollo-Ado Community participation coordination office head, Mrs. Kamilo Nur
Dollo-Ado District court head Sheik Mahmud Ahmed
Dollo-Ado District prosecutor Ato Abdurashid Nur Isack
Dollo-Ado District Police commanding officer Meto Aleqa Aden Jir
Dollo-Ado District office head Ato Aideed
Dollo-Ado District pastoral and agro pastoral pilot project head Ato Mustafa Bule
Dollo-Ado District education office head Ato Surow Muhamed
Dollo-Ado District Women affairs office head Mrs. Habiba Mohamed

Annex V

Discussions held with some members of Dollo-Ado youth

| Name | Sex | Age | Clan/sub clan |
|-----------------|-----|-----|---------------|
| Guliye Dore | M | 23 | Degodia |
| Hashim Mohamed | M | 25 | Degodia |
| Hassan Mohamed | M | 21 | Garimaro |
| Kedir Mohamed | M | 24 | Waqdhowr |
| Abdisamie Adem | M | 19 | Marihan |
| Farhiya Mohamed | F | 24 | Degodia |
| Fatuma Madobe | F | 18 | Garimaro |
| Sadiya Koriyow | F | 21 | Hawadle |

Annex VI

Plates



Elders in discussion over clan conflict in Bur Amino




Herds in Fiqow (Haji Ali) Helo/Malaka in Dawa River



Enclosures around Dawa basin (Daytuli)



Commercial farms in Dawa River (Fiqow)




A herd boy watering livestock around commercial farms along Dawa river



Pastoral encampment in Godbakol along Ganale basin



Camels in Bur Amino Helo



Degraded ranges along Ganale basin




Nuguls in Malka Lugal

Declaration

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all the sources of the material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Signature _____



Date _____

25/11/05

Ahmed Ali Gedi

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university advisor

Signature _____

Date _____

Dr. Getachew Kassa(Advisor)