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**ACHIEVEMENTS, GAPS AND  
PROSPECTS OF THE PRODUCTIVE  
SAFETY NET PROGRAM IN ETHIOPIA:  
THE CASE OF LEMO WOREDA, HADIYA ZONE, SNNPRS**

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE MASTER DEGREE IN REGIONAL AND LOCAL  
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, SCHOOL OF GRADUATE  
PROGRAM, ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

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Dedicated to my beloved deceased Father;  
Ato Molla Habteyese

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Achievements, Gaps and Prospects of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia:

*The Case of Lemo Woreda, Hadia Zone, SNNPRS*

**Abstract**

Combinations of natural and man-made factors have resulted in a serious and growing food insecurity problem in many parts of Ethiopia. About fifteen million people are facing food insecurity that is either chronic or transitory in nature. The governments of Ethiopia and its development partners have made concerted effort to avert the problem of food in security and vulnerability. To this effect, a national food security strategy was developed in the year 2002, one component of which is the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). This program has been designed and implemented to address the needs of chronically food insecure households in a total of 267 targeted woredas from seven regional states of the country. Meanwhile, in order to ensure an effective implementation of the program, the government put in place a guideline which clearly defines the rules to be applied in its way to achieve the expected outcomes. Specifically, the implementation guideline stipulates, among others, the institutional arrangements, targeting, payments, as well as monitoring and evaluation system.

Even if the PSNP is still in the course of implementation and has brought about encouraging results, there are some evidences that its implementation has also encountered problems. Thus, assessing the achievements and gaps as well as indicating the prospects of the PSNP is, more than any thing, a relevant and timely agenda in Ethiopia.

Therefore, this thesis was conducted to assess the achievements, gaps and prospects of the Ethiopian PSNP taking the case of Lemo Woreda, which is one of the 267 Safety Net Woredas in Ethiopia. The thesis argues that, no matter how a program is properly designed, unless the rules are implemented to the level of expectations, it would be difficult to expect the envisaged outcomes from the program. The thesis tries to examine whether rule are properly applied; i.e. institutions are right, targeting criteria are properly applied, payments are appropriate and progresses are tracked properly vis-à-vis the program documents. Besides, the thesis investigates the expected outcome of rescuing household asset depletion and explores, if there are any, undesirable outcomes of the program. To come up with the research findings, afresh data from household level survey plus face-to-face interview with key informants as well as focus group discussions were supplemented with secondary data obtained through consulting pertinent literatures. Analysis of survey results shows that institutions are not performing well, targeting-related problems are observed, payments are inadequate and mechanism of monitoring and evaluation is practically missing. The findings, however, also revealed that the PSNP, either directly or indirectly, has been successful in terms of preventing the depletion of the human, physical, social, natural and human capitals of most of the targeted beneficiaries. Corroborating with other findings, the study also uncovered that there are also undesirable outcomes like creating and/or aggravating dependency attitude as well as weakening of informal institutions. Hence, scaling-up or out of the specified achievements and redressing the gaps thereof is tantamount to make the PSNP bear a fruit.

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**Key words: Asset (Depletion/ Protection/Prevention), Household, Safety net, Safety net, and implementation.**

<i>Declaration.</i>	
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## Acronyms and Glossary

Asset	Refers to human, physical, financial, social, and natural capitals that are owned and/or possessed by household.
Asset protection	Interchangeably used with asset prevention to refer to rescuing the depletion of a household's assets.
BOARD	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
BPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CBPWD	Community based Participatory Watershed Management Approach
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
CFU	Counterpart Fund Unit
CSA	Central Statistics Authority
DAs	Development Agents
DFID	Department For International Development
DPPA	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency
DPPO	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office
E.C.	Ethiopian Calendar
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FFSSC	Federal Food Security Steering Committee
FFW	Food For Work
FSCB	Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau
FSP	Food Security Programme
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
Headship	Whether the head of household is male or female
HH	Household
Household	Refers to a group of people who are related by blood or marriage and who live together sharing resources.
HZFaEDCD	Hadyia Zone Finance and Economic Development Coordination Department
Livelihood	Comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and access) and activities required for a means of living; a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation.
KAs	Kebele Administrations
Kebele	The lowest administrative unit in the government tiers of Ethiopia
KFSTF	Kebele Food Security Task Force
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFIs	Micro-Finance Institutions
MoARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MOARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

<b>MOFED</b>	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>PASDEP</b>	Plan for Accelerated Sustainable Development to End Poverty
<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>PSNP</b>	Productive Safety Net Program
<b>RFSCO</b>	Regional Food Security Coordination Office
<b>RFSSC</b>	Regional Food Security Steering Committee
<b>SDPRP</b>	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
<b>SERA</b>	Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities
<b>SNNPRS</b>	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollars
<b>WC</b>	Woreda Council
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Program
<b>WFSD</b>	Woreda Food Security Desks
<b>WFSTF</b>	Woreda Food Security Task Force
<b>WOFED</b>	Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development
<b>Woreda</b>	A local government structure commonly referred to as district, and which is immediately next to(above) the kebele administration.
<b>WRDO</b>	Woreda Rural Development Office

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 BACKGROUND

All people live with in some form of social framework consisting of social, economic and political structure (Stan Burkey, 1996:35). Historically, development has always involved changes or transformations of these structures. This change necessarily involves the use of human, social, physical, financial, and natural resources. As many writers argued, the maximum goal of development is improving the welfare of the society. Thus, this can be achieved through public and private role in different developmental activities by targeting the society. Most of the developing countries are resource poor and depend on external aids and transfers.

Ethiopia is one of the poor countries in the world. Regarding poverty, the per capita income of US \$100 per annum, is among the four extremely poor countries in the world. Out of the total population about 43% is below poverty line (MOFED, 2002).

Meanwhile, the problem of food security and vulnerability is increasingly recognized as one of the structural causes of poverty. Combinations of natural and man-made factors have resulted in a serious and growing food insecurity problem in many parts of the country. About fifteen million people are facing food insecurity that is either chronic or transitory in nature. The cause for the former is structural, while the later is usually triggered by short-term emergency situations. About five to six million people are chronically food insecure. These are people who have lost the capacity to produce or buy enough to meet their annual food needs even under normal weather and market conditions. The remaining ten million are vulnerable, with a weak resilience to any shock. Under any emergency circumstances, the likelihood of these people falling back into food insecurity is high (MoFED, 2006).

Cognizant of this fact, the Government, in close collaboration with its development partners, developed a Food Security Program within the framework of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Food security was one of the pillars in the first generation of the PRSP i.e., Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP-1), which covered the period from 2000/01-2003/04. The food security program under the SDPRP-I and has been under implementation in most of the chronically food-insecure woredas since the year 2003.

Food Security Program has continued to be a key strategy for poverty reduction and sustainable development in Ethiopia. This is clearly stipulated in the country's comprehensive development plan named as the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). In fact, Food Security and Vulnerability is recognized as one of the key sectoral policies in the PASDEP, which represents the second phase of the PRSP process. The core objectives of the program are: (i) enable about five to six million chronically food insecure people attain food security within the coming 3 years and (ii) improve significantly the food security situation of up to ten million additional food insecure people within three to five years time. The national food security program has three components: direct food production interventions, a productive safety net, and voluntary resettlement.

The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is found to be the major component of the food security program both for the SDPRP-I and PASDEP. As stated in the PASDEP document (Ibid), the safety net program is intended to serve a dual propose .One is to help bridge the income gap of chronically food-insecure households, and the second to engage such household in community based asset-building in exchange for the income they earn. The program is designed to address the needs of about 4.8 million chronically food-insecure people in 267 Woredas. The overall development objective is to improve the efficiency and productivity of transfers to food insecure households, reducing household vulnerability, improving resilience to shocks; and to provide multi-annual and predictable resources. The program has two components: labor intensive public works and direct support for labor-poor households. A program implementation manual has been prepared; training and awareness creation activities were undertaken at different levels; the communities have identified target groups for public works and direct support, and capacity-building measures have been taken. The government and donors have shown their commitment to the success of the program.

In general, the implementation of the PSNP started in 2005 and it is still underway. As stated in the PASDEP document, the program so far reached 4.8 million people and expected to continue addressing a minimum of 5 million chronically food insecure population between the period 2007/8 and 2009/10 (MoFED, Ibid).

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Government of Ethiopia developed a national food security strategy (2002) in line with the rural development policy and strategy (2001). A targeted intervention for drought-prone and food insecure areas is one of the focus issues among others in the strategy. Subsequently, productive safety net program has been designed and implemented to address the needs of chronically food insecure households. The over all objective of the program is preventing asset depletion as well as creating assets at household and community level respectively. This is realized by addressing immediate human consumption needs and simultaneously supporting the rural livelihood transformation process.

Meanwhile, effective attainment of any program in general and the PSNP in particular necessitates devising appropriate rules that govern the implementation process. Cognizant of this, the PSNP has designed rules at different administrative levels that lead towards the attainment of anticipated results. Specifically, the program document clearly defined the necessary institutional arrangements with their roles and responsibilities as well as the minimum capacity requirements. Household level targeting criteria and the decision making framework for the actual targeting process is also well stipulated. Furthermore, issues related to payments, particularly the modality, amount and timing of income transfers are clearly stated in the document together with procedural issues. Furthermore, the monitoring and evaluation system is devised as part of the effort to properly track progresses. These rules should be implemented properly for achieving the expected objectives.

Lemo woreda is one of the woreda found in Hadiya zone of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) which is targeted for the PSNP. The program intervention is focusing on addressing the problem of vulnerability to shocks through asset protection and has been implemented since February 2005.

As indicated in annual report of the SNNPRS regional council (SNNPRS, 2006), the PSNP has brought about encouraging results. According to the report, the program has been implemented since the year 2005 in 74 woredas, which are targeted by the program in SNNPRS. As stated in the report, the PSNP has made significant contributions in preventing the depletion of assets of chronically food insecure households as well as in building assets at community levels. Albeit the contribution of the program towards achieving the aforementioned outcomes in particular and its

contributions towards improving food security status in the targeted communities in general, the reports also revealed that there are gaps in the implementation process that impede the success of the program to the level of expectation. Specifically, meeting the objective of the PSNP, particularly protecting depletion of assets at household level has not been realized to the expected level.

Meanwhile, the researcher based on review of pertinent literature in the area, held the opinion that the PSNP, like other previous food security interventions, is likely to create undesirable /negative outcomes such as dependency syndrome among targeted households. Furthermore, the PSNP necessitates the existence of better-performing institutions and decision making process for proper application of a set of criteria for example targeting criteria, which is stipulated in the implementation guideline for PSNP in Ethiopia. However, problems associated with institutions and governance are among the well recognized roadblocks for efforts to reduce poverty, ensure genuine decentralization as well as bring about sustainable development in Ethiopia. Therefore, it is more likely that that the program faces some problems in rule application during the implementation processes. However, little or no research work has been done, so far, in relation to the program's moves towards the intended objectives.

Thus, critical assessment of the PSNP more than any thing else, is a timely and relevant issue if the program is to make invaluable contributions for the country's endeavors to ensure food security and reduce vulnerability. Needless to say, therefore, this study tried to assess the achievements, gaps and prospects of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia.

### **1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The overall objective of the study is to assess achievements and gaps of the PSNP, factors that contribute to these, and to suggest intervention measures for better attainment of the intended outcome as well as for mitigating possible unintended effects of the program.

**The specific objectives are:**

1. To assess whether the implementation of the PSNP is in line with the rules that have been put in place in the program document and implementation manual,

2. To assess the contribution of program towards preventing the depletion of assets at household level (intended outcomes);
3. To explore whether expected but undesirable outcomes as well as unintended effects are practically experienced in the course of implementing the PSNP, and finally
4. To draw pertinent recommendations having policy implications.

#### **1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Aiming at attaining the objectives specified before, the study was guided by the following questions:

1. Are there institutional arrangements established for the implementation of the PSNP in Lemo Woreda? If so, are they playing the roles and responsibilities as stated in the implementation guideline? Do they have the minimum capacity requirement for proper implementation of the program?
2. In what way the targeting criteria and decision making, payment related issues, and monitoring and evaluation system that are stated in the PSNP document are implemented?
3. What is the contribution of PSNP to the livelihood of targeted households (HH), particularly in terms of preventing asset depletion?
4. Are there any positive social, economic, political and environmental impacts of the program resulted from the PSNP that indirectly contribute to asset protection at household level?
5. Has the program resulted in dependency attitude and any unintended negative effects in the implementation process? If so, what are the main reasons behind these consequences and concomitants?
6. What measures should be taken for scaling up achievements and redressing challenges encountered in the implementation process?

#### **1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The productive safety net program as a strategy envisages helping households protect assets (physical, human, natural, social and financial) during shock periods. This injection of income transfer alone would only partially address the task of significantly achieving the desired protection of household's asset from being depletion. Thus, such household livelihood improvement can be also achieved

through successive implementation of the program. However, the level of knowledge is found to be inadequate as to whether the PSNP is on the right track or not in its course of implementation. Thus, the study contributes in filling the knowledge-gaps in the this regards. More than this, however, the study has a significance pertaining to its use-value. Assessing the achievements, gaps, and prospects of this ongoing program implementation; specifically, identifying problems related to rules application and determining the negative effects of the program will provide insight for government and its development partners to strengthening the implementation process more and contribute to designing a better program in future. Furthermore, the study is meant to stimulate future research works by providing paramount information in relation to the PSNP in Ethiopia.

### **1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY**

In the first place, the study is delimited to deal with the implementation process taking for granted that the program designing is appropriate. However, design related problems might be raised if the study uncovers that they are underlying causes to implementation problems. Besides, the scope of the study is confined to deal with the implementation process at grass-root level. Consequently, the study deals with woreda and kebele levels rule applications as well as outcomes pertaining to the program implementation.

Another most important delimitation of the study relates to the intervention/component of productive safety net program. The program is aimed at two broad intervention areas, namely; protecting assets depletion of chronically food in-secured households and promoting public assets building at community level. Due to shortage of finance and time this paper emphasized only on the protection of assets depletion at household level without looking at community level asset creation. Nonetheless, in recognition to the interdependence between the aforementioned two components of the program, the study also attempts to assess the effects of community level livelihood promotion activities that have far reaching tones on the household level livelihood protection dimensions of the program. Also, the study tries to address negative effects of the program that resemble extra-household, yet are of paramount importance to household's asset protection on a sustainable basis.

Equally important, the study, in its empirical investigations, is geographically confined to Lemo Woreda, which is one of the 267 safety net woredas in the country. It would have been preferable to include a statistically representative number of woredas in the study. However, constraints of time, resource as well as the issue of manageability forced the researched to be limited to an intensive investigation of the implementation process in Lemo woreda- as a case that represents the 267 safety net woredas.

Another limitation of the study is that there are multi-dimensional socio-economic, political and cultural factors that affect the success of the program in relation to household asset protection. Identifying all these factors and analyzing their effects on asset protection requires longer time and demands huge resources. Furthermore, in the absence of clear cut demarcation of household assets targeted for the safety net program intervention, determining the accurate level of household assets protected due to the safety net program rather than by other programs is also a difficult task. These may lead the researcher to generalize subjectively on determining the level of asset protection at household level.

#### **1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY REPORT**

The study report is organized as follows: Chapter two presents the Research Methodology, which mainly deals with the study design, sampling, data collection methods, instrumentations and methods of analysis. Chapter three summarizes conceptual and empirical literatures on the research topic as well as presents the conceptual framework. Chapter four is devoted for the description of the study area and sample respondents. Findings of the study is presented and discussed in Chapter five. Finally, in Chapter six Summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations are put in order. Addenda to the report are annexes that include tables, sample size determination, instrumentations, list of key informants and map of the study woreda.

## CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 STUDY TYPE AND DESIGN

The study is more of a descriptive research type although it has some element of exploratory research. Meanwhile, the overall approach of the study followed the method of triangulation. It employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. To keep its validity and reliability, the study was guided by the principles of multiple sources and subsequent cross-checking of information as well as applying various data collection instruments.

Generally, combinations of case study, cross-sectional and longitudinal designs have been employed. The rationale behind combining the three is to capitalize on their benefits while minimizing the shortcomings of an individual design type thereby enabling the researcher to achieve higher level of validity and generalizability of the study findings.

To start with, case study design was used for intensive investigation of the implementation process in Lemo Woreda, which is selected as representative of the 267 safety net woredas in the country. Furthermore, attempt was made to administer instruments to a cross-section of households in order to assess the success and/or otherwise of the program in the study woreda. Finally, the researcher was also sensitive to the time dimension, particularly while tracking the effects of the program. In other words, attempt was made to see the changes in household's asset conditions as a result of the PSNP. To this end, the data collection instruments were designed to ask respondents/key informants to answer questions retrospectively. Moreover, reviewing and analyzing secondary sources in their chronological order also allowed seeing changing trends.

In general, the design enabled the researcher to intensively investigate the program implementation in the woreda, while evaluating the achievements and gaps in the eyes of the beneficiary households by controlling important factors that vary by community socio economic settings, which significantly affect household assets in different aspects.

Finally, as far as units of analysis of the study are concerned, the primary data obtained from various sources in the Lemo Woreda was central in critically reviewing the PSNP in the woreda. Specifically, the institutional arrangements established for the implementation of the program as well as households (HH's) in the Woreda were the units of analysis of the study. With regards to HH as a unit of

analysis, the research heavily relied on information generated from those HHs in the woreda who are targeted by or have been benefiting from the program.

## **2.2 TYPE AND SOURCE OF DATA**

The study relied on a fruitful combination of quantitative and qualitative data collected from both primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources of data included sampled households, key informants and discussants of focus group discussions. A fresh data obtained from the aforementioned sources was also supplemented and/or substantiated by secondary data that was generated through review of literature and pertinent documents. Specifically, the National and Regional Food Security and Productive Safety Net Program documents, World Bank reports related to the Program, Government policies and strategy documents, particularly the PRSP, SDPRP, and PASDEP, annual reports at woreda level, and some theoretical and empirical literatures were assessed and reviewed in order to identify the achievements and gaps so far as well as prospects of the program.

## **2.3 SAMPLING DESIGN**

A combination of non-probability and probability sampling techniques were employed to select the study area, survey respondents, key informants and participants of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Presented below is the selection procedure including the sampling techniques and specific tools employed during the actual selection of the study area and aforementioned primary sources of data.

### **2.3.1 Selection of the Study Area (Region, Woreda, and Kebeles)**

The PSNP in Ethiopia has been implemented in eight regional states of the country. SNNPRS is one of these regions accounting for 73 woredas of the total 267 safety net woredas in the country (McRAD, 2004:36-51). The selection of the Region, SNNPRS, was made purposively based on the researcher's familiarity to PSNP in the region as well as his better access to information pertaining to the program implementation process.

As far as selection of the study woreda is concerned, Lemo woreda was selected randomly using simple random sampling technique from among the 73 woredas in SNNPRS that are included in the 267 targeted woredas at national level. Thus, the Program Manual served as a sampling frame for the actual selection of the study woreda

Indeed the researcher, after randomly selecting Lemo Woreda, made attempts to verify the fact that woreda can be considered as a representative of the 267 woredas. Accordingly, Lemo is one of the seven woredas of Hadiya zone, SNNPRS, which is characterized, among others, by high population density, high level of vulnerability and shortage of resources. It is based on this and fulfillment of woreda targeting criteria that Lemo was included as a safety net woreda. In fact, the program started in Lemo Woreda, as else where in the country, in the year 2005 and the implementation is till under way using the same rules and guidelines for the implementation of the program throughout the country. No doubt, therefore, Lemo Woreda is a representative of the country's 267 safety net woredas.

Furthermore, the researcher drew a representative number of Kebele Administrations (KAs) being sensitive to agro-ecological variation in the woreda. According to the woreda council annual report, Lemo woreda has 50 KAs with total population of 211833. Out of these, 42 kebeles are found to be included in the PSNP. From these, 22 kebeles are found in the low land and more vulnerable to seasonal shocks and the remaining (20) belong to the midland altitude climate. Thus, this ecological characteristic was considered as criteria to stratify the kebeles. Consequently, a total of 5 kebeles were selected. Furthermore, the researcher heavily relied on proportionally stratified sampling technique to select 3 KAs from the lowland and 2 KAs from the midland. Regarding the actual selection of the five KAs, the researcher employed systematic random sampling tool using the list of KAs obtained from the Woreda Administration to serve as the sampling frame. The three KAs from the lowlands are Wogile Abara, Homa Agera and Bilagele Ambicho, whereas the two KAs from the mid-land are Leyignaw Kebecho and Leyignaw Fonko. The number of Kebeles is determined based on a combination of rule of thumb and mathematical methods. Whereas the former demands the inclusion of at least 10% of the population (total number of kebeles), the latter suggests a maximum sample size of 5 for a population size below 51. Therefore, selection of 5 kebeles, which is 12% of the total 42 KAs, is reasonably representative (See also Table 1 in the following section on sample size determination).

### 2.3.2 Selection of Survey Respondents/Households

A total of 20,398 household (HH) heads are found to reside in the 42 KAs included in the PSNP under the Lemo Woreda of Hadiya Zone (HZFaEDCD: 12). Out of these, the selected five KAs account for a total of 2,010 HH heads, which is around 10% of the total households in the 42 KAs stated before.

From the 2,010 HH heads in the five Kebeles, 902 HHs are found to be beneficiaries of the PSNP, whereas and the remaining 1,108 are non-beneficiary HHs. As the primary units of analysis for the study are the beneficiary HHs, the researcher gave due attention to draw a representative number of beneficiary households to be included in the sample. However, for the purpose of cross-checking and validation of responses obtained from the beneficiary HHs, the study also allowed surveying the opinion of additional non-beneficiary HHs.

Accordingly a total 125(14% of the total beneficiary HHs) were drawn as respondents of the HH survey. As to the sample size determination, the study used a combination rule-of-thumb and mathematical methods in order to make as representative as possible. The rule of thumb dictates to draw a sample size nearly equals to 10% of the total population. Hence, the recommended sample size is around 90 HHs, which is 10% of the 902 beneficiary HHs. Then, the study relied on the following mathematical method developed by Carvalho (1984), as cited in Zelalem, 2005, and presented in the table- below.

**Table 1: Sample size determination**

Population	Sample size		
	Low	Medium	High
51-90	5	13	20
91-150	8	20	32
151-280	13	32	50
281-500	20	50	80
501-1200	32	80	125
1201-3200	50	125	200
3021-10000	80	200	315
10001-35000	125	315	500
35001-150,000	200	500	800

Note: 1) Population denotes the total number of items, in this case HHs, to be sampled from.

2) The sample size depended up on the homogeneity of the records. Low sample sizes were taken for files that were very similar in terms of content and subject matter while high sample sizes were needed for more divers series.

Based on the mathematical method, taking 902 as a population is falls between 501 and 1200. The lowest size, as indicated in the Table, is 32 whereas the highest sample size is 125. Meanwhile, the population (902 beneficiaries HHs) is with high level of homogeneity, particularly in terms of criteria like targets of the PSNP, residents of same rural woreda and with similar agro-ecological zone at kebele

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level. However, there is heterogeneity in terms of headship; i.e. male headed vs. female-headed households. From the total number of the beneficiaries, 666(74%) are male headed while 236(26%) are female-headed households.

Therefore, taking into account the above facts, the maximum recommended size of 25 was decided to be the sample size for the study. As to the selection procedure, proportionally stratified sampling technique and systematic random sampling tool were used. First, stratification was made to define the number of HHs to be drawn from the five Kebeles which were selected based on agro-ecological characteristics. In this regards, the number of beneficiary households in each of the kebeles as well as the number of female headed in the kebeles was identified from the KAs list of residents, which is the sampling frame.

The distribution of beneficiary population and sampled respondents by Kebele and headship is as presented in table 2 below.

Table 2: Sampled Respondents by Kebele and Headship

Kebeles	Total Population of Beneficiary HHs(P)	Sampled Households		Total Sampled Households
		Male Headed	Female Headed	
Wogile Abare	129	13	5	18(14%)
Homa Agra	211	21	8	29(23%)
Layignaw Kebecho	158	16	6	22(18%)
Bilagele Ambicho	189	22	4	26(21%)
Layignaw Fonko	215	20	10	30(24%)
Total	902	92(74%)	33(26%)	125(100%)

Source: Computed based on review of Woreda and KAs level documents.

As can be seen from the table, a total of 125 households were drawn proportionally across kebeles and headship. The number of female headed HH is 26% of the total sample, which reflects the headship composition stated before (See also Annex-1 Table 3) for further information on distribution of respondents).

In addition to the above sampled beneficiary HHs, non-beneficiary households were also selected for an opinion survey. In relation to this, a total of 51 HHs or 6% of the total of 1,108 non-beneficiaries HHs in the five Kebeles stated before were included in the study. This sample size of non-beneficiary HHs, although not as representative as the size of the beneficiary households, is found to be adequate enough for the study. The main reason for this is the fact that the information to be

generated from this category of respondents was only to cross-check and/or validation of data obtained from beneficiary respondents. Indeed, it has of paramount importance to minimize the risk of excessively depending on some biased-information from the beneficiary respondents, who are the primary units of analysis as mentioned earlier.

It is, however, worth mentioning that the non-beneficiaries were drawn using the same sampling procedure, technique and tools used for the selection of the beneficiary HHs (See also Annex-1 Table 3).

The reasons for deciding this sample sizes are: 1) in case of beneficiaries, the larger size had been taken due to the fact that, the study focuses on the assessment of achievements, gaps, and prospects of the PSNP in relation to beneficiaries HHs. In this case, comparison was made dominantly within the group by taking information before and after joining the program rather than comparing them with non-beneficiaries. This demand deep information from beneficiaries, 2) as indicated in the above table, the lower size had been taken for non-beneficiaries. This is because, the information obtained from non-beneficiaries are dominantly used only to substantiate the basic information obtained from the beneficiaries in the area of rule application and community related issues only and 3) short period of time allocated for the study and limited financial resources available.

#### **2.4. SELECTION OF KEY INFORMANTS AND FGD PARTICIPANTS**

A total of 42 key informants were selected from different institutions for in-depth interviews conducted at woreda and kebele levels. Selection of the informants was based on the criteria that the individuals are responsible in relation to the implementation of the PSNP in the Woreda. In addition to this, individuals who are knowledgeable about the Productive Safety Net Program, community level opinion leaders and experts in different organizations were included as key informants. Please see Annex 3 for the complete list of key informants)

The number and composition of the key informants is as presented in Table-4 on next page.



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Table 4: Number and Composition of Key Informants

Category	Number
Governmental Organizations (Zonal Departments, Woreda and Kebele level institutional arrangements established for implementation of the PSNP, local government administrations, and experts working in woreda offices)	20
Non-governmental Organizations (including local NGOs, Eddir and churches)	12
Community members (opinion leaders and elders)	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>

Source: Prepared based on the study undertaking

regards to FGDs, a total of five FGDs were held in the five kebeles covered by the HH survey. The number of FGDs was judgmentally determined owing to the fact that issues of discussions tended to repeat themselves and new issues ceased to appear time and again. The FGDs were organized in recognition to heterogeneity in terms of headship. Consequently, two of the sessions were made with female-headed HHs, whereas the remaining three sessions were held with male-headed HHs. Finally, the time elapsed for a given FGD session was, on average, 2 hours.

#### METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

In this study, different methods were triangulated for generating both quantitative and qualitative data from the primary and secondary sources. The methods are presented below by source of data:

As primary data is concerned, Household Survey was used to collect the quantitative data, whereas interview of key informants and FGDs were employed to generate supplementary qualitative data. These methods used mainly, focused on gathering afresh data on the demographic, physical and socio-economic characteristics of the households in the study area. Equally important, the methods were used to gather afresh data in relation to the achievements and gaps as well as the effects of the PSNP. To this end, the key informant interviews and FGDs were the most important qualitative data collection methods used in this study. Considering that there may be different views about PSNP, specifically about the timing, payments related issues, institutional arrangements, intended outcomes and unintended/negative effects of the program; the interviews and FGDs were conducted in all of the sampled kebeles.

Furthermore, the study employed the method of reviewing relevant and authentic documents as well as other pertinent documents in relation to PSNP.

collected responses, hence qualified for entry and analysis works. Similarly, from the total of 61 questionnaires administered to the non-beneficiary HHs, 49(80%) were found to be properly filled-in.

Following this, SPSS was used in the analysis of the quantitative data collected through the survey. Descriptive analysis- means, frequencies were used as statistical measures to describe and summarize views of the different interviewees, to make inferences and draw conclusions about the subject of the analysis. The data collected from secondary sources, quantitative and qualitative were analyzed and summarized on theme basis.

Thus, the assessments of issues on the study were based on the analysis of the secondary data, the quantitative data and information gathered through interviews and also the qualitative data gathered from the focus group discussions and in depth interview of different stakeholders. In the analysis of the data and information, reduction method and descriptive statistics were applied to draw inferences and made conclusions about issues and ideas relevant to the study. Tabular and graphics formats were used in the presentation of the data summery along with texts that explain the variables and the parameters.

## CHAPTER THREE :REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter presents a summary of literature on the study topic. The selected readings represent a small sample from a broad range of literature. The literatures were primarily selected for their relevance, accessibility and clarity.

The surveyed literatures that were expected to serve as a reference to which findings that were drawn from the analysis of primary and secondary data were related, so that deviation from or conformity to previous findings were reported. Here, it is worth mentioning that owing to the limited availability of research works on the topic in the Ethiopian case, only some case studies and short description of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme is addressed.

The chapter is organized in such a way that the first section deals with the clarification of conceptual issues and terminologies some of which could be considered as the operational definitions of the study. The second section addresses empirical literatures related to the experiences of some developing countries including Ethiopia. This is followed by the third section, which briefly describes the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme. Finally, the Conceptual Frame Work of the Study is presented in the fourth section, which is developed to serve as the framework for achieving the study objectives in view of the conceptual and empirical literatures reviewed.

### 3.1 CONCEPTS

#### 3.1.1 The Meaning of Safety Net

The concept safety net is so evolving that there is no as such universally applicable definition assigned to the term. Its definition depends upon the types of interventions, country contexts, themes and target groups, as well as current thinking of specialists and practitioners on the role of safety net in the broader development agenda. Based on these realities, some sighted conceptualisation includes the following:

According to World Development Report on 'Poverty', Social Safety Nets is "some form of income insurance to help people through short-term stress and calamities" (World Bank 1990:90). In addition to this, the World Bank itself now favours broader definitions. "Safety nets are programmes which protect a person or household against two adverse outcomes in welfare: chronic incapacity to work and earn

(chronic poverty); and a decline in this capacity from a marginal situation that provides minimal livelihood for survival with few reserves (transient poverty) (Subbarao, 1996 cited by Deverexu, 2001:2). This two-pronged approach is supported by Lipton (1997), who suggests that safety nets should target "poor people whose health or age prevents work, or who are made unemployed by the vagaries of climate or market demand" in other words, both the 'working poor' and non-working 'dependants' (ibid).

The term safety net includes various transfer programmes (direct cash transfer, free food distribution, direct feeding programmes, price subsidies, subsidized agricultural inputs, public works programmes, social health insurance, and micro finance) designed to bring about both redistributive and risk reduction roles in poverty reduction (Michelle Adato, Akhter, and Francle Lund, 2002:2-4).

The redistributive role is intended to reduce the impact of poverty (ibid). Safety nets programmes provide support to individuals, households, communities or regions that would otherwise be forced to subsist at levels below the poverty line, which may not be acceptable by the society and by the international community (Tassew and Eberlei, 2004:6). On the other hand the risk reduction role is to protect individuals, households and communities against uninsured income and consumption risks (ibid). Risks can be household-specific (i.e. death in a family, unemployment of the wage earner), community or regional based (i.e. drought, famine, epidemics) or nation-wide (drought, global financial risk, shifts in terms of trade, etc)(ibid). They said that, safety nets might promote economic efficiency by enabling the poor to manage risk, by preventing the poor from resorting to coping behaviors that undermine their assets, and by facilitating the political acceptability of market-based reforms (Tassew and Eberlei, 2004).

### **3.1.2 A Typology of Safety Net (Formal and Informal)**

According to World Bank, safety nets are formal (public) and informal measures that protect people from the worst effect of low income and poverty. Formal safety nets include a broad range of mechanisms for protecting individuals from acute deprivation or inadvertent declines in income (Smith and Subbarao, 2003:10). These can include, among others, direct cash transfers, food subsidies, feeding programmes, public works and other employment programmes, credit-based self-employment programmes, social funds and related interventions, and child

allowances. Informal safety nets include community-based arrangements and private safety nets that help to mitigate deprivation and temporary income shortfalls (Tassew, 2004).

### 3.1.3 Modes of Safety Net Intervention

The literature reveals that there are various modes of safety net interventions depending on the objectives desired by a given safety net program. According to Devereux, selecting an appropriate social safety net depends on the objectives of the intervention. If the objective is to prevent destitution and death during livelihood crises, then food aid may be essential. If, in a non-emergency context, the objective of a national nutrition policy is to reduce vitamin A deficiency, then macronutrient supplementation is more logical (2001: 10). Depicted below in table 5 are lists of alternative transfer programmes.

**Table 5: A typology of social safety net interventions**

Targeting	Food	Income	Nutrition
Targeted	-Emergency food aid -Food stamps for the poor -School feeding programmes -Supplementary feeding for vulnerable groups	-Cash transfer 'safety nets' -Unemployment benefits -Disability grants -Pensions for the elderly	-Weaning food for low-income families -Vitamin or mineral supplements for specific groups
Untargeted	-General food price subsidy -Overvalued exchange rate for imported food	-Universal child benefit	-Water fluoridisation
Self-targeted	-Food-for-work projects -Price subsidy on 'poor foods'	-Cash-for-work projects	-Iodization of salt

Source: Devereux, 2001, p.10

For policymakers, livelihood protecting and livelihood promoting interventions are quite distinct. The theoretical distinction is between transfers that aim to increase returns to labor, and transfers that aim simply to boost immediate consumption. In reality, this distinction is often blurred. One reason for this is the behavior of transfer recipients. All resources that enter a household's 'endowment set' are fungible. Thus, they are not necessarily used in ways that programme designers intend or would prefer (Ibid).

Another reason for blurring of boundaries is that programme designers may themselves be pursuing multiple objectives through a single intervention. The literatures on 'linking relief and development' reveal that emergency relief

interventions should strive to maximize synergies between livelihood protection and livelihood promotion outcomes (Hay, 1986). The best-known example is labor-intensive public works projects that simultaneously transfer food to the hungry and created infrastructure that would (for instance) reduce vulnerability to future droughts. The argument is that successful entitlement promotion would ultimately reduce the need for repeated entitlement protection interventions (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).

#### **3.1.4 Concepts of Household Assets**

The livelihood framework identifies five core asset categories or types of capital upon which livelihoods are built, described as the asset pentagon. It is important therefore to look at what have been termed these livelihood building blocks to try to understand what is happening at household level. According to Jenden (2002:42), household assets are:

***Human Capital:** The skills, knowledge, ability to labor and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives. It is required in order to make use of any of the four other types of assets;*

***Social Capital:** relationships of mutual trust and reciprocity, networks and connectedness, which increase people's trust and ability to work together and expand their access to wider institutions;*

***Natural Capital:** -is the term used for the natural resource stocks of public and private holding on which livelihoods depend;*

***Physical Capital:** comprises the basic infrastructure and producer goods needed to support livelihoods, and*

***Financial Capital:** denotes the financial resources that people use to achieve their livelihood objectives, it includes income flows and stocks/ saving.*

#### **3.1.5 Food Security, Vulnerability and Household assets**

Conventionally, food security is defined as access by all people at all times to enough food for active and healthy life (World bank, 1986:1). From this definition, the core concept has been identified as secure access at all times to sufficient food. As indicated in the World Bank report, this definition explicitly focuses on four core concepts; 'sufficiency' (defined as the calories required for an active, healthy life), 'access' to food (through production, purchase, exchange or gift), 'security' (defined

by the balance between vulnerability, risk and insurance) and 'time' (where food insecurity can be chronic, transitory or cyclical) (ibid).

From the above definition it is possible to see that, those who have no access at all times to enough food for active and healthy life are food insecure. The level of insecurity may be chronic, transitory or cyclical. Further more, 'securing' access to sufficient food is also associated with the existence of risk, which varies from natural to man made factors. Deterioration in natural resources, disruption in food systems, depletion of assets and distortion in state policies and social ties are some of the vulnerability indicators that contribute to the worsening of food entitlement (Anderson 1989 cited by Debebe, 1995:3).

Vulnerability and asset depletion can determine the livelihood situation of a given country or household. Food insecure households are resource poor, and as such their livelihoods become especially vulnerable to shocks (MOFED: 2005). Since, their livelihoods are excessively reliant on assets (physical, natural, social, financial and human), the impact of weather, related shock; or a household specific shock (such as family member falling ill) on the household is devastating.

### **3.1.6 Targeting and its Rationale**

The term targeting has relatively few definitions: there is little argument about its meaning. It refers to:

- Identifying eligible (or 'needy') individuals and screening out the ineligible (or non-needy) for purposes of transferring resources, typically by defining eligibility criteria. It is a deliberate attempt to shift the benefits of public expenditures to the poor by means that aim to screen them as the direct beneficiaries. [Devereux 1999 cited by Yosef; 2001:13):
- Any mechanism for identifying eligible individuals for transfer assistance and screening out the ineligible (Devereux, 2000:1)
- Restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk in order to maximize the benefit of intervention whilst minimizing the cost (Jaspars and Young, 1995).

The working definition of targeting in this thesis is adopted from the Ethiopian safety net targeting guideline, which is one way or another related to the above meanings of targeting. Accordingly, targeting is the process by which chronically food insecure

households are selected to participate in public works or receive direct support (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2004: 8).

As far the rationale behind targeting is concerned, there are different but interrelated explanations that are put in place as justifications for targeting. The basic idea behind targeting in all welfare programmes according to Sharp (1997) cited by Yosef, (2001) fall under three general headings:

- **Humanitarian reasons:** so that the really needy are assisted and the less needy do not benefit unfairly,
- **Resource and efficiency reasons:** so that scarce resources are used in such a way that they have the greatest impact on the problem to be addressed,
- **Development reasons:** so that dependency and economic disincentive effects (at all levels from household to the national) are minimized.

For the sake of further clarification, one can take a practical example, such as, food aid, the ambition of which is to protect those who are vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition. There are two objectives on how to reach the vulnerable: the non-exclusion objective and the targeting objective. Reaching all the vulnerable individuals refers to the non-exclusion objective through a method of direct and unconditional provision to support everyone in need without distinction. The method of 'universal support' is obviously a rather coarse one, but "it does have the advantage of all together bypassing the various difficulties which any form of selectivity in the provision of relief is bound to entail" (Dreze and Sen. 1989:105).

If the primary concern is saving resources and minimizing the production disincentives of transfers, targeting becomes a more appropriate option than the unconditional provision to support everyone. Targeting holds resources from supporting the less vulnerable groups, to the advantage of the most deprived groups. Most Of the transfers in less developed countries are in favor of the vulnerable population (Vivian 1995 cited in Yosef 2001). That is why today the World Bank has tended to come out strongly in favor of targeted intervention to promote food security and mitigate the social costs of economic adjustments on the poor.

### 3.1.7 Institutional capacity

Institutions, or in other words the rules and norms that make coordinated social behavior possible, are essential for sustainable and equitable development. The role of institutions in facilitating coordination and commitment, thereby shaping the quality and effectiveness of a given program, is indispensable. When they function well, they enable the programs to succeed, but when institutions are weak, the result is distrust and uncertainty- leading to failure in terms of achieving expected results of the program. Local institutions play key roles in shaping and/or regulating behaviors; spreading information and reducing risks (Helmsing, 2001 and Ross-Larson, 2003).

Different authors argue that, an institutional capacity is a potential to perform its ability to successfully apply its skills and resources to accomplish goals and satisfy stakeholders expectations. For Horton, institutional capacity refers to the resources, knowledge, and process employed by the institution. Furthermore, staffing; technology and financial resources, rewards and linkages with other organization and groups are some of the major factors that affect institution capacity (Horton, 2003:27).

## 3.2 REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

### 3.2.1 Countries' experience

Smith and Subarao conducted a case study on six Very Low Income Countries (VLICs), including Ethiopia, and looked at the questions of transfer programmes for the poor. In their study report, examples of public Safety Net Programmes of three selected countries are discussed. In what follows is a brief overview of these cases and the factors that affect the performance of Safety Net Programmes (Smith and Subbarao, 2003: 20).

#### 3.2.1.1 Overview of Safety Net Programs in Mozambique, Malawi, India,

**Mozambique-** the Office for support to Vulnerable population groups (GAPVU) launched a resource transfer programme following the civil war to support destitute groups in urban Mozambique, the object of GAPVU was to raise consumption to a modest 1700 calories per day for (i) households with malnourished children under five, (ii) pregnant women exhibiting nutritional risk factors, and (iii) elderly and disabled in households with no one of working age. Evaluations in general

concluded that the programme had a positive impact on reducing urban poverty. The drawback of course is that it is exclusively urban, whereas 85 percent of Mozambique's population and the vast majority of the poor live in rural areas.

**Malawi-** Following large price increases for fertilizer as the result of subsidy removal and devaluations in 1996-97 the government of Malawi introduced a Pack initiative programme to provide small packs of fertilizer and seeds to all rural smallholder farmers (about 2.8 million households, or 90 percent of the population.) The programme, justified on the grounds of maintaining national-level maize production and soil fertility in the face of a large drop in fertilizer use, was in essence a pure transfer. The drawbacks were the total cost at US\$ 27 million annually, more than Malawi could afford, and the fact that many of those receiving the packs do not need them, for they are not among the very poorest and could afford to buy the small amounts of fertilizer themselves. In 2000, it started targeting selectively using a combination of geographical and community-targeting strategies.

**India-**The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) one of the largest and longest-running public safety net programmes, was introduced in 1973 to provide employment to the poor in rural Maharashtra. The objectives were to reduce the pressure for migration into Bombay and to provide employment especially to women and especially in the slack agricultural season. An innovative characteristic of the scheme was that it provided guarantee of employment within 5 kilometers of a person's home; this, combined with the fact that it was sustained over a long period, allowed the poor to build its income stream into their expectations, modifying behavior and, among other things, putting upward pressure on very low rural wage rates. The wage rate was low enough to target the poor until 1988 when the government by fiat doubled the minimum wage (which equaled the programme wage); the result was job rationing and erosion of the guarantee element of the scheme, as well as limiting the self-targeting effect.

The general lessons that are learned from safety net programmes implemented in the past is that if the emphasis is to shift social protection within overall poverty reduction frameworks, then certain key elements need to be in place (Devereux, 2002). Accordingly, a given safety net programme;

- need to respond to the priorities of the poor,

- need to have effective mechanisms in place to identify and target the vulnerable,
- need to be multi-annual and their scale, scope and impact continuously reassessed,
- should take in to consideration of the fact that resource transfers must be in a form that supports rather than undermines local markets,
- should complement rather than replace informal safety nets important for the poor, and
- need sustainable political and financial commitments.

### **3.2.2 Factors that affect the performance of Safety Net Programmes**

Smith and Subbarao, based on the aforementioned case study on Safety Net Programmes implemented in Less Developed Countries, identified four factors that generally constrain the feasibility of safety net programmes. These include: i) the availability of information, (ii) administrative capacity, iii) political decision, and (iv) fiscal affordability. In what follows is discussion of each of these constraints in their turn (Smith and Subbarao 2003: 14).

#### **The Information Constraint**

An appropriate selection of programme beneficiaries requires substantial information that is often not made available and is extremely expensive to acquire. In most countries transfers are targeted on the basis of criteria such as income, or demographic characteristics such as household size (for example child allowances) or age (e.g. pensions). Besides, specific characteristics such as female-headed households, orphan hood, or disability, can be used to select those who should be beneficiary of a safety net programme. However, this also resents problems of verification.

An alternative in cases where income is not known is to derive "proxy" indicators like household demographic characteristics, educational status, family-planning programme data on household characteristics, or the type of dwelling attributes, which are highly correlated with poverty. Nonetheless, the problem is that even these attributes may not be known in very poor counties, or (and perhaps more likely) the capacity may not be there to assess them accurately.

### **The Administrative Constraint**

In general the capacity to manage complex programmes is limited in VLICs. Management, accounting, logistical, and financial control systems are all typically weak, and skilled human power is poor and rarely available adequately. Where the information base is weak, and there is not a tradition of "playing by the rules," substantial middle-level supervision is needed to avoid leakage, to manage distribution, and to administer targeting. Targeted programmes are also intensive in their use of outreach staff and especially of field-level supervisors.

Finally, in choosing programme, there is a need to explore the scope for using already existing administrative systems. For instance, delivering a nutrition programme through the existing network of health posts and workers may be preferable to establishing a new system; similarly, using the government's existing rural works and maintenance programmes may be more administratively feasible and may be preferable to establishing a new system or public works programme apparatus.

### **The Political Constraint**

Under a programme in Rajasthan in the 1970s in the 1970s, communities were allocated funds to transfer to the 10 poorest families in each village and were forced to publicly select (and announce) the households that would receive benefits. The Programme was successful in targeting the poorest, but ultimately collapsed due to erosion of political support (the very poorest constituting too narrow political base to be worth supporting on a prolonged basis). In a drought recovery programme in Malawi in 1995-1996 the committee decided to give a small amount to every one rather than risk difficult and controversial decisions about who should be included and who left out.

### **The Fiscal Constraint**

Perhaps the biggest constraint to safety nets in VLICs is sheer affordability. Total public spending is already very low in these countries, typically averaging about US\$75 per person per year. At the same time the competing claims for essential development investments are overwhelming; the poorest countries are also typically those with critically insufficient education capacity, the least-developed road networks, and the lowest coverage of water supply or essential health services.

### **3.2.3 Outcomes/Impacts of Safety Net Programmes**

Most recent Safety Net Programmes claim to result in poverty reduction by protecting asset holdings of food insecure households from being depleted in time of shock. Also, many scholars and practitioners argue that social safety net programmes have the potential to reduce chronic poverty through anti-poverty impacts in terms of asset creation (by the project) and in terms of investment behavior (by households) (Devereux, 2001 : 6-9).

Be all this as it may, review of the literature show that there exists different kinds of both intended and unintended outcomes that have been observed as a result of implementing transfer programmes. Some of these are briefly discussed in the sections below.

As far as the intended outcomes and/or developmental impacts of the program is concerned, the following are worth mentioning:

#### **Saving lives and Generating employment opportunities**

The Ethiopian experience shows that safety net programs like Employment Generation Schemes(EGS) and Food Aid programs scored successful results in terms of generating employment opportunities as well as saving the lives of food insecure households(MoARD 2004 and MOFED 2005:52).

Furthermore, a study conducted on an employment safety net programme implemented by SOS Sahel in Ethiopia, Koisha Woreda, Wollaita Zone, revealed that targeted individual households benefited significantly from the programme. Because of the Koisha project and changes in the external factors the young residing in the locality are keen to leave farming behind, to get educated and to find full time employment (Jenden, 2002). As a result of implementing the programme, not only many lives were saved but also the local employment opportunity provided an alternative to seasonal migration in that it allowed household heads to stay with their families and work on their own land. By implication this means that the programme had its own contribution in maintaining the integrity of the household unit, which is clearly a high priority. For these households, the local alternative was critical in allowing them to educate their children and pay back debts in addition to buying food. It is also found out that the employment, created due to the programme, also provided an alternative to those households (often female'

headed), who previously involved in cutting of wood and grass and other socially demeaning forms of casual labor (Jenden, 2002).

### **Building Infrastructure**

At community level, the infrastructure created as a result of implementing the employment safety net programme made a direct contribution for the Peasant Association in general in terms of improving access to healthcare, education, and government services and also facilitating the expansion of social and political networks for certain households. The feelings of greater inclusion in the wider society are also among the positive contribution of the programme.

### **Asset Protection**

However, regarding the impact of the Koisha project in relation to protecting the asset holdings of the most food insecure households; it is found out that the benefits of the employment safety net programme have not been adequate at household or community level. This is due to the fact that the lack of institutional space to operate a project whose objective was social protection rather than relief meant in practice that expanding coverage was achieved at the expense of more effective targeting. Moreover, it is found out that in the context of weakening social support mechanisms and lack of opportunities outside agriculture, improvements in certain capital assets like education and infrastructure cannot at this stage be effectively translated into more positive or sustainable livelihood outcomes.

### **Nutrition**

It is increasingly apparent that forgoing consumption is often the only strategy that the very poor can employ in order to ensure other priorities are met. The findings from Koisha demonstrate that even with multi annual funding and efficient management unless a targeted programme can provide a minimum consumption guarantee it is unlikely to be effective in terms of protecting the assets of the chronically food insecure (Jenden, 2002 :81).

### **Investment Behavior**

Devereux (2001), in his study entitled "Can Social Safety Nets Reduce Chronic poverty?", has thoroughly dealt with issues related to the impact of Transfer Programmes on investment behaviors of beneficiaries. He argues that the impact of transfer income on poverty is a function of the size of the transfer and its

contribution to total income. In Mozambique, one of his case studies, income transferred by SNP was so tiny that its impact on headcount poverty was negligible. In general, it can be said that the contribution of safety net transfers depends on the level of the transfer, the local economy, and existence of other formal and informal transfers as well (Devereux, 2001).

### **Agricultural production and Market**

The Zambian case provides evidence against concerns that rural public works projects might dampen agricultural production by competing for scarce labor. Many cash for work participants used some of their income to hire labor to plough or weed their fields. This behavior had a number of positive features. Firstly, it provided income to a second group of workers- a significant multiplier effect. Secondly, since many employers were women and many laborers were men, this freed women from the most demanding agricultural tasks. Thirdly, if investment in inputs, including labor, increased as a direct result of cash-for-work income, agricultural output might have risen rather than fallen- contra conventional wisdom on the labor-displacing impacts of rural public works (Devereux, 2001).

### **Crowding Out Effect (Informal Safety Net)**

Although public transfers are paid to individuals, they are only the primary beneficiaries of these safety net programmes. Informal redistribution of formal transfers results in significant numbers of secondary beneficiaries being reached, even to those who are not members of the recipient's immediate and extended family. Most of the 'extended family' spending recorded by Namibia's social pensioners is on grandsons and granddaughters, and goes towards school-related expenses and clothing. The contribution of the social pension to human capital formation in Namibia, through the allocation of pension income to various education costs of pensioners' grandchildren, is incalculable. More generally, the social pension sustains entire extended families throughout Namibia, confers status on family members that are often perceived as economic burdens, and reinforces the social role of grandparents in caring for young children.

There was some evidence that the receipt of formal income transfers had resulted in a reduction of informal transfers to programme participants, a 'crowding out' effect. In most cases, programme participants continued both to give and receive gifts and assistance among their social networks, reflecting the fact that such

transactions serve important social as well as economic functions. Besides, the displacement of some informal transfers with formal transfers typically amounted to a reduced burden of support given to the severely poor by the moderately poor, so this remains a positive poverty-reducing effect.

Most informal transfers in Africa occur 'horizontally' among the poor themselves rather than 'vertically' from rich to poor, following norms of reciprocity and mutual insurance rather than inequality reducing redistribution. All three of these social safety net programmes are found to have removed some of the burden of responsibility for dependant relatives and impoverished neighbors from families and communities that are often themselves financially stressed.

The few Safety Net Programme of the Mozambique participants (one in ten) who had themselves been providing support to others used their transfer income to increase the level of that support, suggesting that informal redistribution of the formal transfer had significant 'second round' impacts in terms of reaching other poor households.

Zambia's cash-for-work programme significantly altered patterns of reciprocity and dependence among participants and their social networks. Before the road projects started, more participants had been giving than receiving assistance which provides further evidence of poor targeting; participants may have been poor, but they were by definition able bodied economically active adults. Receipt of cash-for-work income enabled many more participants to begin providing support to their families (Devereux, 2001).

### **Environment**

Regarding the environmental impacts of transfer projects evidences show that in other areas of Ethiopia, farmers are said to do little on their own initiative to protect their landholdings have been interpreted as a symptom of dependency on many years of food for work. There are many examples of past mass-mobilization efforts in environmental rehabilitation in Ethiopia which have failed or have been abandoned, as a result of which the environment has returned to its degraded state, and some projects designed to protect or enhance the natural resource base have ended up doing the opposite (MOARD, 2006).

### **Negative Effects of Safety Net Programs: Dependency and Weakening Informal Institutions**

Albeit the afore-discussed positive contributions made by Safety Net Programmes like EGS and Food Aid, there are also evidences about undesirable outcomes as a result of the programs. A study by OXFAM-GB, (cited in PANE,2006) mainly concerned with assessing the issue of dependency on food aid amongst farmers of the Northeastern highlands, meanwhile concluded that dependency conditions tended to exist when the relief food was mostly supplied freely. The study indicated that households' dependency on food aid tended to make itself manifest through the unwillingness of farmers to work productively on their farms, and instead waited for the relief to come by continuously every year. The study further found that some households even tended to go to the extent of depleting their livestock resources in order to become poor and qualify for food aid distribution. The study concluded that free distribution was the main cause of dependency, and that food aid would contribute to development and generate employment if it is based on programs and schemes that would enable farmers to generate incomes. A study by Fasil( 2005), as quoted by PANE (ibid), meanwhile, argued that dependency on food aid was more rampant in Ethiopia, manifesting itself not only at the national level, but also at the rural household level. He further notes that that many of the participants in food-for-work programs were only interested in the compensation for their work, and showed little interest in other development programs. Indeed, the study by PANE (Ibid), on Food Aid and its Impacts of in Ethiopia, also revealed that food aid has aggravated the problems of dependency on aid in the country.

However, according to the study by Jenden (Ibid) on an employment safety net programme implemented by SOS Sahel in Ethiopia, there is little evidence of negative impact of the project, particularly in relation to dependency.. Nonetheless, the Ethiopian Safety Net Programme recognizes dependency as an expected (undesirable) outcome of the programme (MoARD, 2004).

The negative impact of safety net transfers on informal institutions is also recognized. According to the study by PANE (ibid), safety net transfers (food aid) have seriously affected the community's coping mechanisms and social protection schemes. This, according to the study, is significantly attributed to targeting related problems (errors of inclusion and exclusion).

### **3.3 THE ETHIOPIAN PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION**

This section briefly describes the Ethiopian Safety Net Programme. It is worth noting that the description doesn't cover the whole topics that are put in the programme document. Rather attempt is made to selectively describe those topics that are directly related to the objective of the study. Also the description doesn't go on to the detailed description of the selected topics, but only a shortened description of them. So as to avoid the possibility of distortion while describing the contents of the programme document, apart from minor statements, the author has heavily drawn the description and taken the statements and paragraphs as it is from the programme document.

#### **3.3.1 Rationale and Objectives of the Programme**

The Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programmeme document narrates the problems that lead to the design and implementation of the programme as follows. Food insecurity has become one of the defining features of rural poverty, particularly in drought-prone areas of Ethiopia. Poverty is widespread in both rural and urban areas. However, the magnitude is much greater in drought-prone rural areas than in urban areas. The problem of food insecurity in recent years has worsened with around 14 million people requiring emergency food aid. The major causes of food insecurity in Ethiopia include land degradation, recurrent drought, and population pressure and subsistence agricultural practices characterized by low input and low output.

Cognizant of this fact the Government of Ethiopia has decided that there is an urgent need to address the basic food needs of food insecure households via a productive safety net system financed through multi-year predictable resources, rather than through a system dominated by emergency humanitarian aid. Moreover, the Government seeks to shift the financing of the programme from food aid to cash. On this basis, within the framework of the national Food Security Programme, which emphasizes the three interrelated pillars of food security that address food availability, access to food and utilization, the Government has decided to develop the new Productive Safety Net Programme.

The objectives of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) are to provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure


woredas in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level. The Programme will thus address immediate human needs while simultaneously (i) supporting the rural transformation process, (ii) preventing long-term consequences of short-term consumption shortages, (iii) encouraging households to engage in production and investment, and (iv) promoting market development by increasing household purchasing power.

### **3.3.2 Program approach: Linkages with Other Food Security Programme and broader woreda development interventions.**

Review of the productive safety Net program document revealed that the program is designed in such a way that it is one of the components of the Government's Food Security Program (FSP), and as such, is an integral feature of a coherent food security investment strategy for chronically food insecure woreda of the country. Thus, Safety Net program is objectively linked to the Food Security Program and broader woreda development interventions. Indeed, it is considered to be a way of achieving the food security objectives of the country within a short period of time.

The integration of the Safety Net program with the government's Food Security Program (FSP) is further manifested by the fact that those beneficiaries of Safety Net Program should be the first to benefit on priority basis from other Food Security Program interventions so that the rate and probability of graduation for a household would be improved. Similarly, the link of the program to broader woreda development interventions is evidenced in that the safety net will also be used mostly for activities that lay the foundation for future productivity improvements for the community as a whole. According to the program document, productive safety net program is a short term protection scheme which supports the productivity of other food security options in addition to protecting depletion of HH assets. That is why the word "productive" is used to show the role of safety net program on food security activities (MoARD 2004 and MOFED 2005:52). See also Figure 1 on next page.

Figure 1: Safety Net and Other Food Security and Development Programmes



Source: MOARD,2006

### 3.3.3 Programme Coverage and Beneficiaries

Since Ethiopia's Safety Net Programme is part of its Food Security Programme, it is targeted to those woredas identified as being chronically food insecure. The beneficiaries of the Programme are the food insecure population living in these chronically food insecure woreda; resource-poor and vulnerable to shocks, and often fail to produce enough food even at times of normal rains in the country. This figure is currently estimated to be about 8 million people. The Productive Safety Net Programme is designed to be implemented in rural areas only. For planning purposes a number of woredas have been identified as chronically food insecure. Within these woredas, the focus will be on chronically food insecure households For the purposes of the Safety Net, a woreda is considered as chronically food insecure if it (a) is in one of 8 regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, Afar, Somali, rural Harare and Dire Dawa), and (b) has been a recipient of food aid for a significant period, generally for at least each of the last 3 years. According to the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency's (DPPA) list of woerdas, 262 woredas currently satisfy the two conditions stated above (see the list of woredas in program documents).

### 3.3.4 Programme Components

Public Works and Direct Support are the two components of the Productive Safety Net Programme. Some communities will spend nearly all of the Safety Net

resources on Public Works. However, communities with a high share of widows or female-headed households will inevitably use more resources for Direct Support. For the purposes of implementation, there are no strict criteria for the division of resources that go to Public Works or Direct Support. But, eligibility to Direct Support is guided by strict and narrow selection criteria. (See the targeting section below on detailed selection criteria).

### **3.3.5 Institutional Arrangements**

The implementation manual properly recognizes the importance of institutional arrangements for the proper implementation of the program. In effect, the institutional framework is clearly defined together with the roles, responsibilities and membership composition of the institutions. Besides, the minimum institutional capacity requirements for implementing the Safety Net Programme is addressed in the manual (See Annex-4 on Institutional Framework, Membership, Roles and Responsibilities of the Institutions and Key Capacity Issues).

### **3.3.6 Targeting Beneficiaries**

#### **3.3.6.1 Targeting Methods/Approaches/**

According to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MOARD), administrative, community, self, and combining administrative and community targeting methods have been applied in the selection of eligible participants (MOARD, 2004:10-16). The major points of the manual are stated below briefly.

#### **a) Administrative Targeting**

Administrative targeting is a process of selecting safety net beneficiaries by a specially formed administrative body using objective and standardized indicators derived from reliable database. The criteria used by administrative targeting may be presented in two broad categories. These are direct individual assessment, and Personal or demographic characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, disability or geographic zones. Four bodies are envisaged to decisively take part in the selection process at different levels. These are: Woreda Food Security Task Force (WFSTF), Kebele Council, Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), and Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF).

### **b) Community Targeting**

Community targeting is a method of selecting safety net Programme beneficiaries by the community based on their own knowledge about the food security situation of their locality area and of each other on individual basis. According to the program document, the most important condition for implementing community targeting is the existence of the structure and culture that encourage people to speak freely and openly in its pure form. Community targeting needs little or no intervention from administrative bodies.

Unlike administrative targeting, community targeting heavily relies on local knowledge. Since local knowledge varies from area to area, to this effect according to the Programme document, establishing a single set of national criteria is difficult or may not be necessary.

### **c) Self-targeting**

This mode of targeting involves neither administrative nor community targeting. Able-bodied persons chose to participate in public works. Labor poor households also present themselves for direct benefits. Their decision is based on a comparison of the costs and benefits of alternatives available at a given time.

### **d) Combining Administrative and Community Targeting: A pragmatic Approach to Targeting**

Given the arguments presented above, the pure form of administrative or community targeting are not practical. This calls for a pragmatic approach to targeting that combines the two. The following figure is an illustration how one can visualize the combined administrative and community targeting method. Circle A and B designate administrative and community targeting respectively. Area C is an area where the common features of the two methods are combined.

In practical terms, the combined approach is a demonstration of how the available household data and expertise could enrich local knowledge to make targeting more cost effective and minimize targeting errors.

An illustration of Combined Administrative and Community Targeting Method is presented in figure 2 below, next page.

Figure 2: Combined Administrative and Community Targeting Method



Source: MOARD, 2006(revised)

### 3.3.6.2 Criteria for Selecting Beneficiaries

The identification of eligible households is the responsibility of each community Food Security Task Force which is described in the above section. Beneficiary household are identified on the basis of the following criteria.

#### a) Basic criteria for selection of households

The following basic criteria are used to select households for participation in the Safety Net Programme:

- Households should be members of the community;
- Those chronically food insecure households who have faced continuous food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last 3 years and who have received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP.
- This should also include households who suddenly become more food insecure as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years); and any household without family support and other means of social protection and support.

#### b) Criteria for refining selection of households

- Having made the initial selection based on the basic criteria, the following factors should be examined to verify and refine the selection of eligible households:
  - Status of household assets: land holding, quality of land, food stock, etc;
  - Income from non-agricultural activities and alternative employment;
  - Support/ remittances from relatives or community.

### **c) Updating the list of beneficiary households.**

A more comprehensive targeting exercise was conducted in late 2005 and constitutes the new baseline Safety Net list. Each community FSTF will update and adjust the list of eligible households twice a year (at the beginning of the programme cycle in September/October, and in April/May). In September/October of each subsequent year, the community updates this list so as to correct errors of inclusion and exclusion and to include a household who suddenly becomes chronically food insecure due to bad luck and who does not have other means of support. In April/May of each year the community will undertake a mid-year needs assessment using the above procedures, and for the same goals. At any time during the year, the list can be updated based on a successful appeal process at the kebele or woreda levels.

### **d) Targeting and Graduation**

Graduation is a key goal of the Government to which the Safety Net programme contributes. Consequently, graduation is an overall goal but not criteria for targeting. Households will not be excluded because they face challenges in graduation --- they will be targeted on the basis of their poverty. Graduation is a long-term process that will not be possible if only PSNP resources are available. It requires the same households to receive other food security Programme interventions, and other development interventions. In any given year, the needs of a household as well as its eligibility for Public Works or Direct Support will be affected by births and deaths as well as ageing of individuals. However, there will be households, especially those benefiting from the Direct Support component that will not be able to graduate.

## **3.3.7 Amount and Choice of Reward /Payment Procedure**

### **3.3.7.1 Amount**

Payments to beneficiary food insecure households will be carried out through both direct payments (cash) and coupon on the basis of the following procedures:

**Wages for Public Works:** The wage will be 6 birr per day and may be adjusted according to market conditions. When the delivery is in kind, the payment will be 3 kgs of grain per day plus pulses and oil. The Federal Government to regions and

woredas will communicate any revision to the food or cash wage rate. Seasonality and deferred payments is also possible following certain procedures and the decision is taken after consultation with the community

**Direct Support:** The transfers to direct support beneficiaries can be in food or in cash. The amount transferred to beneficiary individuals is equivalent to those paid to individuals participating in public works. The same payment procedures, including deferred payments, as for the public works component will apply.

### 3.3.7.2 Choice of Payment: When to choose Cash and/or Food as Mode of Payment

The Woreda FSTF makes a request for specific types of resources (cash and/or food as the means of transfers to households), for each Kebele considered chronically food insecure, to the Regional Food Security Steering Committee. The Regional Food Security Steering Committee will then reconcile these requests with resource availability from the federal allocation and allocate resources to each woreda. After approval by the Regional Council, the overall request for resources will be sent to the Federal level as part of the Regional Safety Net budget plan.

It is possible for a single woreda to decide to make payments in cash in some kebeles and in food in other kebeles, depending on the following factors. As a general starting point, cash should be given after the harvest when food is in good supply and food should be given in the hungry period leading up to the harvest when food is scarce.

**Table 6: Factors to Consider when Choosing Cash and/or Food as Payment/Benefit**

Transfer	Factors to Consider
Cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Near food surplus areas (in same or neighbouring woreda)</li> <li>• Availability of active food markets</li> <li>• Preferences of the community</li> <li>• Cash management capacity (presence of finance officers, cashiers, safes, transport, and security at woreda level).</li> </ul>
Food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preferences of the community</li> <li>• Absence of food markets near food insecure kebeles leading to a devalued transfer</li> <li>• Lack of experience in cash management and better food management capacity</li> </ul>

Source: MOARD, 2006(revised)

### **3.3.8 Monitoring and Evaluation**


The programme implementation guideline has clearly sets the M&E system. This system is a component of an integrated system dealing with the entire food security portfolio, which is being developed separately, and for which the detailed specifications will be defined in due course. Accordingly, monitoring of PSNP refers to a regular flow of information on inputs utilization and programme participation, whereas evaluation includes both assessment of the success and constraints of process and analysis of the impact of programme components on outcome measures. Furthermore, while monitoring is the responsibility of each management unit, evaluation is generally undertaken by partners, including independent units, and based on a sub-sample of the overall programme (See also Annex-4 for details on M&E System).

### **3.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY**

Critical review the theoretical and empirical literature reveals that the Ethiopian PSNP, as a component of the broad Food Security Programme, is geared towards maximizing synergies between livelihood protection and livelihood promotion outcomes. In other words, the PSNP has two major thrusts: preventing depletion of assets of chronically food insecure households and asset creation for food insecure and vulnerable communities.

However, as stated in the introductory part, the scope of this study delimited to deal with the livelihood protection i.e. the household level outcome of the PSNP. To this end the programme put in place, in its implementation guideline, rules that govern the implementation process. This is presented in Figure 3, on the following page.

Figure 3: Conceptual Framework of the Study



Source: Prepared based on the PSNP –Implementation Guidelines, 2004&2006

It is in view of the above conceptual framework that the study attempts to identify achievements, gaps, and prospects of the PSNP.

To start with, the Ethiopian productive safety net transfers, as depicted above, intend to rescue household asset depletion. The income transfers target chronically food insecure households, and this could be either through direct support or public works to a household. The concern of the study, in relation to income transfers, is on the effect of the transfer on the household's asset protection regardless of its source; i.e. from public work or direct injections.

Meanwhile, effective attainment of any programme in general and the PSNP in particular necessitates devising appropriate rules that govern the implementation process. Cognizant of this, the PSNP has designed rules that lead towards the attainment of anticipated results. Specifically, the document clearly defined the necessary institutional arrangements with their roles and responsibilities as well as the minimum capacity requirements. Household level targeting criteria and the decision making framework for the actual targeting process is also well stipulated.

Furthermore, issues related to payments, particularly the modality, amount and timing of income transfers are clearly stated in the document together with procedural issues. Last but not least, a monitoring and evaluation system is devised as part of the effort to properly track progresses.

This study investigates whether the envisaged rules are materialized at grass root levels and whether the effects, so far, are encouraging to realize overall developmental objective of the programme. To this end, the implementation guideline will serve as a benchmark for comparing expectations or established rules with realities on the ground.

As far as achievement of outcomes is concerned, the study also tries to assess whether the implementation process is on the right track to best achieve the intended outcome of protecting asset depletion of the targeted beneficiaries. It is to be recalled that the implementation of the PSNP has been underway since the year 2005. Although it is too early to evaluate the long term developmental outcomes at this early stage, the study is based on the opinion that it is possible to assess the immediate outcomes as this stage. Indeed, the intention is not to judge the programme implementation as success or failure process. Rather, based on an assessment of the programme's effect on asset protection, the study can identify achievements and gaps thereby suggesting pertinent strategic ideas for a better and sound implementation of the programme.

Thus, due emphasis will be given if the programme implementation is making invaluable contributions towards asset protection at household level. To this effect, the study utilizes the livelihood framework by DFID 2002 as quoted in Jenden (2002:42), which identifies five core asset categories or types of capital upon which livelihoods are built. These are Human, Physical, Financial, Social and Natural Capitals which are also recognized by the PSNP. Thus, attempt will be made to assess if these asset bases of beneficiary households were protected from depletion or not as an index for tracking the programme's success. Besides, indirect effects, if any, of the programme that are linked to asset protection will also be assessed.

Furthermore, negative effects, though undesirable are likely to result from implementing a programme like the PSNP. Indeed, such undesirable outcomes would be either expected or unexpected at the stage of program designing. In relation to this, the study also assesses these effects that would hinder the success of the programme. In connection to this, dependency syndrome is treated as undesirable negative, but expected, effect of the programme for the mere reason that it is recognized as such in the PSNP document. Moreover, the study will also uncover unexpected effects, if any, that are witnessed in the course of implementation. Finally, the study might come up with issues related to programme design, if the findings dictate it to do so.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA AND SAMPLE RESPONDENTS

### 4.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

#### 4.1.1 Geography and Natural Resources

Lemo woreda is one of the woreda located in Hadiya zone in SNNPR. The woreda is approximately located between 70 23'02" to 70 56'00" North Latitude and 370 50'00" East to 380o7'00" East Longitude is relatively bounded by KambataTambaro zone in the South, Silte zone in the North East, Misha woreda of Hadiya in the North West and Soro woreda of Hadiya zone and Lemo woreda as their capital.

According to the 1:50,000 topographic maps, elevation of the woreda ranges between 1780 m.a.s.l around Bilate River in the south eastern part of the zone. Having this altitudinal range, the whole woreda is divided into three major traditional agro-ecological zones namely, kolla (low land), Woina Dega (midland) and Dega (highland) (Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities (SERA) Project: 2002) (See Annex-2 Map of the study area- Lemo Woreda).


As study indicates months between July and September are the major rainy months for Lemo woreda while May and June are the second rainy months with some amount. Months between Decembers to April are usually dry in Lemo when most people face shortage of drinking water for themselves and their livestock. For the highland farmers mainly depend on Belg rain for their cereal production, absence of rain in March means an indicator of drought probability in the area where as heavy rain at September and October is a symptom of wet shock for the lower Woina Dega(midland) who mainly depend on Maher crops such as wheat and barely(ibid).

#### 4.1.2 Settlement History and Population

Though written documents are not available to indicate the actual time of the first settlement, current population density and settlement patterns witness that the area was settled since long ago. The absence of natural forests as well as highly depleted soils in the area are another evidence that the area has been invaded by human being for considerably long years. The 1985 resettlement program that displaced several thousands to the northwestern part of the country namely to Metekel and Gambela was also the result of long settlement history (SERA, 2002).

Before introducing Lemo, it may be essential to say something about the Hadiya Zone where Lemo is located. The name Hadiya derived from the dominant ethnic group residing in the zone. Hadiya is one of densely populated zones in the southern nation, nationalities and people's Region and also in Ethiopia. According to socio-economic profile study of the zone, the total zonal population projected to be 1209279 in 2005/06. Compared to its total area of 3700.10 km<sup>2</sup>, the crude population density of Hadiya is about 357 persons per km<sup>2</sup> in 2005/06. The zonal capital Hossana is about 230 kilometers to the south of Addis Ababa the Nation's capital (HZFEDMD: 2006).

Map-1 Woreda Map of the Study Area, Lemo Woreda Administration



Source: Lemo Woreda Administration

As can be seen from the above administrative map, Lemo woreda is bordered in the North with Silte zone, and with Shashogo woreda in the east and southeast. There are a total of 52 Kebele Administrations under the Woreda with their own KA councils. (Complete list of these is presented in Annex5, List of Kebele Administrations under the study area-Lemo Woreda)

According to the projection made in 2006 based on 1995 population and housing census result, population of Lemo Woreda is 211833. Compared to its total area of 494 Sq. km, crude density is about 499 persons per Sq. km (Ibid).

#### **4.1.3 Institutions and/or Organizations**

There are different formal and informal institutions that are one way or another contributing to the development and welfare of the communities in Lemo Woreda. With regards to the formal institutions, the local government; i.e., the Lemo Woreda Administration is at the forefront in planning for, coordination as well as implementation of different development interventions in the Woreda. The 52 KAs under the woreda are also with their own KA councils.

The Woreda is led by a Council, comprising of 9 cabinet members. Woreda Council/Cabinet is responsible to play leadership roles, mainly, in relation to the socio-economic activities as well as to ensure the maintenance of peace and order in the area. There are also sectoral/line offices and desks that are dedicated to play different local development activities in general and to coordinate and/or implement various food-security related programs, including the PSNP. These are, among others, the Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office (WARDO) Woreda Food Security Desks (WFSD), Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development (WoFED), Woreda Sectoral Offices (Line Offices). These include woreda offices and desks of Rural Roads, Water, Natural Resource Management, Education, Health, Cooperative Promotion and Women's Affairs. Besides, a Woreda Food Security Task Force (WFSTF) was established, two years ago, as a lead institution for food security program and with central role and responsibility in relation to the safety net program in the woreda. However, the task force is reported to be non-functional.

There are also non governmental-development organizations that are operating in the woreda. There is one international NGO, named as, World Vision, and Ethiopia that is working in areas of food security. Besides, faith-based organizations like the Evangelical Church and Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat that are operating in the area, particularly in service provisions like education, health and water. Furthermore, Love in Action Ethiopia is an indigenous NGO that is currently

HIV/AIDS prevention and control. Besides, Hadiya Development Association, ethnic-based association that is dedicated to contribute for the development endeavors of Hadiya, is also operating in the woreda. Micro-finance institutions, which are government-owned and operated, also exist in the woreda with the primary objective of providing credits and saving services.

As far as informal institutions are concerned, Eddirs, which are indigenous self-help associations, also exist as elsewhere in the country. Besides, church-based self-help institutions also play key roles in transferring resources, particularly in times of droughts and shock periods.

#### **4.1.4 The History of the Productive Safety Net Program and other Food Security Options in Lemo Woreda**

In Lemo woreda starting from 1976/77 E.C. some disasters prevention projects were established and expanded to include the food security projects (FSP) which consisted a Food For work Program (FFW) and Employment Generation Schema (EGS). This examined the underlying food security problems in the area, and explored the relevance of safety net program as a means to address the problem. At the moment Government is trying to cope up food insecurity through giving emphasis to the new integrated rural development packages such as, Agricultural extension, rural social services provision (health), education, water, and telecommunication), feeder road construction, Natural resource management, and Rural credit schemas at woreda level. Hence, the Productive Safety Net Program intervention to address the food insecurity at community and household level has been implemented since 2005 in Lemo woreda is also an integral part of the government rural development packages in general and food security option in particular.

Out of the 52 KAs under the Lemo Woreda, 42 kebeles were identified as chronically vulnerable to shocks, hence have been targeted by the PSNP since the year 2005. As stated in the program implementation manual, the program has two components. These are public work direct supports. In both cases the mode of payment is in cash. The number of beneficiaries and amount of payment at woreda level for the year 2006 are presented in Table 7.

**Table 7: Contribution of Productive Safety Net Program**

Program components	Beneficiary HH heads			Total family members included in the program			Amount Paid (in ETB)
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Public work	3531	1295	4826	10401	8866	19261	3466980
Direct support	375	504	879	594	810	1404	252720
<b>Total</b>	<b>3906</b>	<b>1799</b>	<b>5705</b>	<b>10995</b>	<b>9676</b>	<b>20761</b>	<b>3,114,300</b>

Source: 2006 annual report of Lemo woreda Rural and Agriculture Development Office.


## 4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE RESPONDENTS

### 4.2.1 Basic Household Characteristics

#### 4.2.1.1 Headship

While two-third (74%) of the total respondents are male-headed, the remaining one-third (26%) is found to be female-headed households. This is as presented in Fig-4 below. This is found to be comparable to the national average for headship, one out of four rural households are female-headed (CSA: 1994).

Figure 4 Headship



#### 4.2.1.2 Household size

As presented in the table 8 below, the mean size of beneficiary and non-beneficiary HHs is 6.73 and 8.41 respectively. Comparison of this with national average HH size, which is approximately 5, indicates that overwhelming majority of the residents accommodate household members that exceed the national average.

**Table 8: Household Size by Category of Respondents**

Household category	Household size		
	Maxim	Minim	Mean
Beneficiaries	16	0	6.73
Non-beneficiaries	16	2	8.41
Total	16	0	7.22

Source: Household survey

Comparison of HH size for the two categories of the respondents (beneficiaries and non beneficiaries), however, reveals that the size for the category of non-beneficiaries exceeds that of beneficiaries HHs.

#### 4.2.1.3 Age and Labour capacity

The age of the sampled respondents has also been assessed. Survey results show that the median age for HH heads is 35. Furthermore, the survey result in the following table 9 show that, 94.9% of the household heads are in the productive age interval (15-65) i.e. able to do full adult workload. Only 5.1% are under dependant age category (above 65).

**Table 9: Age category of Household Heads.**

Age category	Household category		Total Count and %
	Beneficiaries	Non-beneficiaries	
	Count and %	Count and %	
15-65	112(67)	47(27.9)	159(94.9)
66 and above	7(4)	2(1.1)	9(5.1)
<b>Total</b>	<b>119(71)</b>	<b>49(29)</b>	<b>168(100)</b>

Source: Household survey

Note- Numbers in the brackets are percentages.

#### 4.2.1.4 Educational status

Educational status of the HH heads show that out of 119 beneficiaries 46% are illiterate, while 10% can only read and write. The remaining 40% and 4% completed elementary and secondary high schools respectively. Similarly, out of 49 non-beneficiaries, only 16% can read and write while 45% are illiterate. The remaining 37% and 2% completed primary and secondary school level respectively.

**Table 10: Educational status of sample Household heads**

Educational Status of HH heads	Household category				Total	
	Beneficiaries		Non-beneficiaries		Frequency	%
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%		
Read and write	11	10	8	16	19	11
Not read and write	55	46	22	45	77	46
Elementary	48	40	18	37	66	39
Secondary	5	4	1	2	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Household survey

In the above table for both HH categories, the number of illiterate and elementary school level take the lion share while those who can read and write, and secondary level are very small in number.

#### 4.2.2 Food Security Status and Livelihood Condition of the Households

Defining the status of food security require deep calculation about direct indicators like calories of food intake. Calculating such figures requires a lot of data besides accurate reporting by the family members regarding their income. For most of the rural households' income sources are intangible and unrecorded. Then, it is very difficult to define the level of food insecurity clearly. As a result, the study forced to depend on indirect figures and qualitative information so as to see the level of food insecurity and livelihoods of the households. Such indirect indicators of food insecurity and livelihood condition include, size of farmland, livestock holding, amount of crop productions, number of meals per day, and family size are the dominant variables which have some implication on food security.

##### 4.2.2.1 Meals per day

Accordingly, majority of the households in the Woreda were found either temporarily or permanently food insecure. The survey result shows that, the household food availability was fluctuating during different months in a year. From month march to august when households faces food shortage, households reduce the number of meals per day for adults and children. This is presented in the table 11 below.

Table 11: Number of meals/day for adults and children during March to August 2006

Household category	Counts	Mean number of meals/day for adults	Mean number of meals/day for children
Beneficiaries	116	1.15	2.20
Non-Beneficiaries	48	1.04	2.04
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>1.13</b>	<b>2.17</b>

Source: Household survey

The above table shows that, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries adult households eat an average of once per day during food shortage seasons. On the other hand, children those who are in school age eat on average of two times per day. This is below the usual average number of meals (3 times per day at normal condition).

##### 4.2.2.2 Land ownership and Engagement in Farming

According to the research conducted by SERA project in 2002, about 12.6% of the total households in Lemo are landless. Even for those with land, the average land holding size is very small. Accordingly, the average land holding size of the household was 0.80 hectare. Thus, as survey result indicated in the following

summary table, out of the total about 70.2% HH respondents' own land while the remaining 29.8% have no land. Further more, about 57% of the respondents are engaged in farming whereas the remaining 43% are not engaged on farming activities (see Table 12).

**Table 12: Ownership of land and Engagement in farming**

Ownership	Household category				Total	
	Beneficiaries		Non-beneficiaries			
	Count	% Within HH category	Count	% Within HH category	Count	%
Have land	84	70.6	33	68.8	117	70.2
Have no land	35	29.4	16	31.2	51	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Engagement in farming</b>						
Engaged	75	63	17	42	92	57
Not engaged	44	37	24	58	68	43
<b>Total</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Household survey

#### 4.2.2.3 Livestock Asset

According to the research result of SERA project, 12.9 % of the total households in the Woreda do not own any livestock and 56% of the households do not have ox (SERA, 2002:150). Scarcity of all these basic resources may indicate that considerable proportions of the households in Lemo Woreda are living under food insecurity. This fact is also strengthened by the household survey information presented below in table 13.

**Table 13: Number of Households who own Livestock (As of 2006)**

List of Livestock	Ox	Bull	Cow	Heifer	Calf	Sheep	Goat	Donkey	Mule	Horse	Poultry
<b>Count</b>	27	6	51	26	24	57	26	8	3	2	41
<b>Percent of total</b>	16	4	30	15	14	34	15	5	2	1	24

Source: Household survey

Thus, in Lemo Woreda, as many woredas in Ethiopia, household livestock holding is given more weight in measuring wealth. In the sampled households, ownership of pack animals (donkeys, mules, horses) which owned by less than 10% of the households are less important compared to cattle and productive livestock (cow, calf, ox, goat, sheep and poultry). In the woreda livestock holdings show there is minimal animal husbandry in the area. If we take the ownership of oxen, only 16% of the households have ox whereas the remaining 84% have no ox.

#### 4.2.2. 4 Household Livelihood Activities and Income

As else where in rural Ethiopia, the livelihoods of the households depend on undiversified economic activities, predominantly agricultural production. Information obtained from the secondary sources indicates that over 85% of the woredas inhabitants are directly dependent on agricultural economy (HZFaEDCD: 2006). The HH survey result is also in support of this. As indicated in Table 14 below, income earned from sales of agricultural products like crop production, poultry rearing and animal products, which is the leading source of income both for the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. This is followed by employment (salaried job, food for work, cash for work and domestic service) as the second important source of income. Whereas, safety net income is the third most important for the beneficiaries, it is renting-out (of land, oxen and pack animals) for the non-beneficiaries (see Table 14 in the next page).

**Table 14: Average Annual Income by Sources (ETB) for sampled Households**

Livelihood activities	Average Annual Income				Total	
	Beneficiary HHs		Non Beneficiary HHs			
	Sum (N=119)	Mean	Sum (N=49)	Mean	Sum (N=168)	Mean
Renting	2905	24	1457	30	2181	27
Trade	644	5	323	7	483.5	6
Sales of Natural resources	618	5	309	6	463.5	5.5
Crafts	0	0	76	2	38	1
Services	70	1	95	2	82.5	1.5
Employment	11,095	93	5567	114	8331	103.5
Agricultural income	13,4979	1134	67733	1382	101356	1258
Safety net total	10,0620	846		0	50310	423
<b>Total</b>	<b>250,931</b>	<b>2,108</b>	<b>7,5559</b>	<b>1,542</b>	<b>16,3245</b>	<b>1,825</b>

**Source:** Household survey (**Note:** Agricultural income is computed based on current local price obtained from Lemo Woreda).

Furthermore, average annual gross income of the households was also computed. Accordingly, average annual income of a household is reported to be ETB 1,825. Taking an average HH size of 7.2, the per capita income/day is computed to be US 0.08 cents, which is by far below the poverty line (1USD/day/person). It is, however, important to note that even if households tend to understate their income, the low level of per capita income is attributed to the size of the households, which is higher even when compared with country average.

## CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

This part of the thesis presents findings of the study in relation to the major achievements and gaps that are associated with the implementation of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The findings are presented and discussed under the following two major categories:

- 1] Application of rules that have been put in place for the implementation of the Programme (PSNP), and
- 2] Programme Outcomes

### 5.1 APPLICATION OF RULES OF THE PROGRAMME

The success or failure of safety- Net Programme depends on the proper application of the programme's rules/principles that are set to guide the implementation process. Accordingly, the Institutional arrangements, Targeting (Criteria and Decision Making Process), Payment related issues, and Monitoring and Evaluation system of the programme have been assessed to see the discrepancy (if any) between the intentions and practices on the ground.

#### 5.1.1 Institutional Arrangements

It is increasingly recognized that unless institutions get-right first, any programme in general and the PSNP in particular is less likely to be implemented as planned as well as to bear the anticipated fruits. This is a fact properly considered in Ethiopia's PSNP implementation manual. As discussed in the literature review part of this thesis, the institutional arrangement of the PSNP incorporated three core elements. These are i) Institutional framework, ii) Roles and responsibility of organizations, and iii) Key capacities for implementing the programme.

***Institutional framework:*** With regards to this element of institutional arrangement, it is stipulated in the programme document that the Safety Net Programme is a component of the larger Food Security Programme. Thus, food security line agencies at every level of government will be accountable for the overseeing and coordinating the Programme, with implementation of programme activities being undertaken by woredas and kebeles, line ministry/agencies and other partners. The framework comprises federal, regional, woreda and kebele level institutions. Whereas MoARD, FSCB, FFSSC, DPPA and MoFED constitute the federal level

institutional arrangements, regional council/cabinet, RFFSC, BoARD, RFSCO and Line Bureaus are included as regional level institutions (See also Annex- 3 for details on the institutional framework)

As the scope of the study is confined to woreda lower level, the following institutions comprise the institutional framework, within the aforementioned context, at woreda, kebele and community levels:

#### **Woreda Level**

The Woreda is the key level of government that determines needs, and undertakes planning and implementation of Safety Net activities.

- i) Woreda Council/Cabinet
- ii) Woreda Food Security Task Force (WFSTF)
- iii) Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office (WARDO)
- iv) Woreda Food Security Desks (WFSD)
- v) Woreda Sectoral Offices (Line Offices). These include woreda offices and desks of Rural Roads, Water, Natural Resource Management, Education, Health, Cooperative Promotion and Women's Affairs.
- vi) Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development (WoFED)

#### **Kebele Level**

- i) Kebele Council/Cabinet
- ii) Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF)

#### **Community Level**

- i) Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF)
- ii) Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Donor Agencies
- iii) In addition to the above governmental agencies, NGOs and Donor agencies are recognized with certain roles in the implementation process of the Safety Net Programme.

The program implementation manual (MoARD,2006) envisages that the above institutions, particularly those at woreda, kebele and community levels should be established for proper implementation the PSNP in targeted woredas as well as KAs included in the programme. Empirical findings of study also revealed that these institutions were established in the study area (Lemo Woreda) and kebeles. Nevertheless, some of these institutions are found to be either weak or entirely non-functional. As indicated by key informants of the study, some of the institutions, particularly the KFSTF and CFSTF, which were dedicated to play key roles in the

implementation process, are found only on the papers, hence not practically functional in line with the manual. According to the key informants, members of these malfunctioning institutions are either incompetent or overburdened with other duties and responsibilities. Besides, lack of awareness as well as poor-follow-up and support mechanisms from higher level institutions; i.e. from regional and federal levels also reasons identified by the informants. Consequently, there is lack of transparency in terms of who is actually playing the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, hence a loop-hole for corrupt practices or for deviation from the standards that are stipulated in the implementation guideline.

***Roles and responsibility of the Institutions (Arrangements):*** Apart from establishment of the above institutions, the manual also clearly states the roles and responsibilities of each of the institutions (See also Annex- 3 for details on Membership, Roles and Responsibilities, MoARD, 2006).

The reality on the ground, however, is observed to be different. Findings indicate that some of the institutions are properly playing their roles and discharging their responsibilities, whereas others do not. As elaborated in the following paragraphs, the WFSD, WRDAO, WC and WoFED are among the institutions that are relatively performing well and properly shouldering their responsibilities. Nonetheless, the KFSTF, CFSTF and WFSTF are among the institutions, which are with poor performances in terms of playing the roles and responsibilities assigned to them.

The interviewed experts and other key informants agree that the WFSD, and WRDAO are found to be with better performances. In fact, most of the informants argue that WFSD is performing below its potential. They commented that since the food security offices are well organized, better staffed with skilled professionals and equipped with the necessary sufficient information, it should have been actively involved other than over sighting and coordinating the programme. This, however, is against the manual that the food security offices are vested with various responsibilities in the implementation process. Besides, the WC and WoFED, although over-burdened, are among the woreda level institutions that are reported to play their parts in the programme implementation process.

On the other hand, a number of other institutions are not, currently, in a position to properly play their duties and responsibilities. From among those institutions, the KFSTF, CFSTF and WFSTF are found to be defective. The problem with the KFSTF and CFSTF emanates from their non-existence, as mentioned above. Consequently, there is no KFSTF that is formally established in the KAs. Hence, there is no entity to act and/or function as a decision-making body that oversees all planning and implementation of safety net activities. Similarly, at community level there is no CFSTF, which according to the manual shoulders the primary responsibility of identifying beneficiaries of the PSNP as well as mobilizing the community for participatory planning exercises. It goes without saying that there are no arrangements, as such, to discharge the roles and responsibilities of these institutions as enumerated in the manual. Rather, individual members of the Kebele Cabinets and DAs are observed to act on behalf of the KFSTF and CFSTF. This, indeed, is commonly identified by most of the key informants as creating serious problems in the implementation programme, particularly targeting.

On the other hand, the problem with the WFSTF is non-functioning in line with the implementation manual. In the study areas, the level of commitment of members of this task force is found to be minimal. As a result, the taskforce is rarely observed to make important decisions within its mandates. In fact, this has significantly contributed to the weakening and poor performance of lower-level institutions at PA levels. To this end, discussion held with experts who are being engaged in the implementation process of the safety-net and food security programmes indicated that currently the Woreda Food Security Offices are not actively involving in the implementation process of the PSNP. This, for them, has become an obstacle for other lower level institutions to play their roles.

In general, for the key informants, the actual role-performances and shouldering of responsibilities by most of the woreda and kebele level institutions is far below the standards and/or expectations of the implementation manual. When asked to tell about possible reasons, the key informants largely attribute the problem to lack of equal level commitment among the different institutions, poor supervisions from higher level institutions, and lack of downward accountability to the community.

Meanwhile, the informants expressed that the aforementioned problems coupled with limited or poor coordination and inter-functional integration has become a roadblock to the successful implementation of the programme. The link between the institutions and informal safety net is also an issue of concern for the informants. It was boldly expressed the fact that the institutional arrangement doesn't recognize age-old informal social institutions like the Eddir and Church-based support mechanisms is a serious gap that is identified as a programme design problem.

Furthermore, NGOs and Donors are also among the institutional arrangements with important roles in the implementation process. As the role of donors is more of financing the programme, their role in the local level implementation process is not as such significant. The study, however, assessed the actual contribution of NGOs in supporting the implementation process in the woreda. As stated in the manual, the implementation of the PSNP should utilize and benefit from the participation of non-governmental actors having relevant capacity, experience and expertise. However, findings reveal that none of the international and local NGOs operating in the woreda are involved in the program. According to the key informants, an international NGO named World Vision is working on food-security and there are few local NGOs, predominantly faith-based, which are engaged in service delivery like education, health and potable water supply. But, no one of these non-governmental development actors are providing the envisaged support to the program in the woreda. This, according to most informants is because of the wildly held belief that PSNP is the sole responsibility of the government. Besides, existing poor partnership relationship among all actors of development in the woreda is another factor.

**Key capacities for implementing the programme:** It is stated in the implementation manual that as the PSNP is multi-faceted, proper planning and capacity are essential for its proper implementation. Woredas have different capacities to develop and implement cash management systems. The following is a list of critical capacity dimensions that woredas need to develop in order to implement the Safety Net Programme. The second group of recommended

capacities below will enhance the quality of programme implementation. (See also Annex- 3 for details on capacity issues, MoARD, 2006).

#### **i) Critical Capacity Dimensions of Woredas**

- Presence of food security and DPP desk officers, or an Agriculture and Rural Development Office, at the woreda level;
- Finance officers in the woreda.
- Availability of technical staff in the woreda; natural resource specialists (e.g. soil and water conservation); field technicians.
- Storage facilities such as Rubb Halls and warehouses (DPPA, NGO, cooperative, private storage capacity).
- Sufficient numbers of cashiers at woreda to visit multiple kebele sites for payment
- Presence of sufficient DAs in Safety Net kebeles.
- Availability of store/warehouse keepers at storage sites.
- Availability of means of transport, e.g. bicycles, mules, motorbikes, camels, pick-up trucks.
- Facilitate arrangements for regular and timely repair and maintenance of vehicles.
- Kebele-level participatory plans identifying community priorities.

#### **ii) Recommended Capacities**

- Availability of infrastructure, e.g. rural roads, bridges that link woredas to zonal centres;
- Availability of banks at zonal centre or certified rural micro-finance institutions (MFIs) at woreda level;
- Availability of telecommunications at least at the woreda centre;

As stated in the manual, Woreda and Kebele level staff and safety net personnel need to have sufficient documentation related to safety nets, and necessary planning and technical guidelines. If woredas do not have these minimum capacities they will be assisted to acquire them before the transfer activities start. However, the programme also recognizes, given that woredas have different capacities, and they should implement safety net activities that are appropriate for their level of capacity. As woredas develop more capacity, they will move towards improving the integration of safety net plans into Woreda Development Plans, and implementing

more effective safety net activities and increasing the share of transfers provided to households in cash versus food as appropriate.

In view of the above facts, the study assessed the capacity related issues in an attempt to check whether the minimum capacities and the recommendations for enhanced level of implementation are in place in the Woreda. Findings reveal that the majority of the minimum capacities stated in the manual are available in the woreda. However, there are also bottlenecks in terms of capacity. The highest decision making body- woreda council is overburdened by different activities. In most cases activities related to PSNP were given least priority.

Furthermore, resources particularly vehicles and professionals were assigned to perform other activities. This resulted in delayed decisions and related complications in programme implementation. In addition to this, due to lack of adequate technical staff as well as high staff turnover the programme is not benefiting from the support by technical staff, particularly in the decision making process of woreda council. Consequently, most of the decisions made by the council are politically tuned with less considerations of technical aspect. In other words, sensitivity to political administration is given higher weight by the local officials rather than making technically sound decisions for the proper implementation of the program. Findings also show that although capacity building trainings have been organized and provided, most of the trainings were held for short durations and lack consistency. In relation to this, those key informants who participated in the trainings were asked to evaluate the trainings in terms of the relevance, content, methodology etc. Almost all agreed that the trainings are of relevance, but emphasised that the contents and ways the trainings provided were not appropriate for low level staffs. According to them, the trainings also lack diversity. More importantly, how to mainstreaming cross-cutting issues like gender and environment were not included in the training programs. It was also pointed out that these factors have far reaching implications on the effective implementation of rules and responsibilities by different concerned bodies that are organized at different levels. Moreover, it is likely that they may impede the success of the

programme as well as result in undesirable outcomes, as most of the informants pointed out.

In general, information generated through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and household survey also corroborates with the above facts obtained from the key informants. The discussants did not believe that appropriate and competent persons are represented in the task force. Besides, the problem of representation at the KFSTF level was identified as a serious issue. According to them, even if, is the KFSTF is non-functional, its failure to ensure fair representation of community has resulted in mistrust and/or lack of confidence in the institutions among the community members. Furthermore, respondents of the survey repeatedly mentioned that, in the name of KFSTFs, technical staffs like DAs are dominant and influential in the course of the implementation process (See also Table 19, in part 5.1.2.2 Decision Making Process).

Discussants of the FGDs also outlined that the problem of high turn-over of technical staff among most of the institutions is a serious problem. Besides, administrative instability resulting frequent replacement of kebele council members is aggravating the problem. This, according to them, is a result of the political evaluation and corruption related problems. Furthermore, the level of awareness about PSNP is also a serious issue for the discussants. Members of the Kebele councils, besides, the community at large lacks the knowledge, thus is a, victim of distorted perceptions about the programme.

From the ongoing discussion it is clear that the need for appropriate institutional arrangements for proper implementation of the PSNP is well recognized and clearly defined in the implementation manual. Such commitment and/or action by the government is, indeed, in line with the theoretically and empirically proven roles of institutions. To this end, the fact that '*institutions should get right*' for the success of a program (Helmsing, 2001 and Ross-Larson, 2003) is established in the literature part of this thesis. Albeit the aforementioned efforts by the government, the findings of this study revealed that, even though there are some encouraging efforts, the actual performances of the local level institutions is far below expectations. According to the findings, the problems are largely attributed to poor follow-

up/supervision, inadequate level of awareness, unequal level of commitment, capacity constraints, particularly in terms of human resources as well as lack of downward accountability to the public.

Meanwhile, as stated in the literature, poor performing institutions are likely to contribute to disgusting results of a program. Owing to this fact, it is sound to argue that any possible problems to the success of the PSNP in the woreda is, at least, partly attributed to the unsatisfactory level of institutional performance thereof.

### **5.1.2 Household Targeting: Criteria and Decision Making**

In order to effectively use the limited resources available and to reach the intended beneficiaries a strong consideration of targeting is required. According to the MoARD targeting manual highlighted in the review part, PSNP is a combination of both administrative and community targeting intervention from which the chronically food insecure households are selected to participate in public works or receive direct support. This holds true when people have better awareness about the objective of the programme, and when there is transparency with responsible bodies and community. Thus, Targeting Criteria applied and the Decision Making Process is worth discussing. In what follows; findings of the study associated with the criteria and the decision making process of the household level targeting in the PSNP implementation process.

#### **5.1.2.1 Targeting Criteria**

The implementation manual of the Safety Net Programme put certain criteria that will guide the targeting process and the decision to select beneficiary households. Accordingly the following are some of the basic criteria that are clearly stipulated in the programme implementation manual: i) households should be members of the community; ii) those chronically food insecure households who have faced continuous food shortages (usually 3 months of food gap or more) in the last 3 years and who have received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP programme; iii) households who suddenly become more food insecure as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years); and iv) any household without family support and other means of social protection and support.

Besides, having made the initial selection based on the above basic criteria, there are factors that should be examined to verify and refine the selection of eligible households. These include status of household assets (land holding, quality of land, food stock); income from non-agricultural activities and alternative employment; and support/remittances from relatives or community.

To start with, the survey result shows mixed signals. When asked the beneficiary respondents about the targeting criteria practiced in the Woreda, for the majority (79%) of respondents, as indicated in table 15 below, the beneficiary selection criteria adopted in the PSNP programme undertaken by government in Lemo Woreda was implemented by giving more emphasis for Issues like, absence of family support or remittance, ownership of livestock, having old age, female headed households, and loss of assets and inability to support themselves. Yet, the remaining, 21% of the beneficiaries respond that the criteria and the actual selection process were quite flexible and subjective. Accordingly, participation on other food aid programmes, disabled household members, off-farm income, landlessness and less productivity of land, have not received food aid and emergency, and absence of enough food were given less emphasis than the issues mentioned previously. According to the manual however these criteria are stated as basic and the most influential. These reasons with long list of possible responses are summarized in the table below.

**Table 15: Beneficiaries' responses (multiple) on the most important criterion to select beneficiaries (valid N=119)**

<b>Selection criterion</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Absence of family support or remittance from relatives	116	99
Ownership of livestock	115	98
Age of Household head	113	96
Female head households	106	90
Loss of asset and inability to support themselves	102	87
Participation of other food security programme options	95	81
Members of HH are disabled	87	79
Absence off- farm income	84	71
Landlessness and less productivity of land	79	67
Have not received food aid and emergency	77	65
Absence of enough food	60	51
<b>Total response</b>	<b>1034</b>	
<b>Percentage of respondents who adopted any criteria regarding beneficiary selection (Average of percent)</b>		<b>79</b>

Source: Household survey result, 2006

The other parameter used in this study to assess the rule application of the programme with regard to targeting was comparing the opinion of beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries. To this end, the survey administered by separate question designed to capture information from non-beneficiaries including their views about the reason(s) for not being selected in the PSNP. Accordingly, the data obtained from the non-beneficiaries are summarized in table 16.

**Table 16: Information and Belief of Non-beneficiary Respondents on reasons and criteria for Exclusion from PSNP. Multiple responses**

Reasons	Informed by decision makers that the reasons were criteria for exclusion	Believe that the reasons were criteria for exclusion
Have enough food	10(20%)	1(2%)
Own livestock	13(27%)	2(5%)
Have land	7(14%)	3(7%)
Have better quality land	5(10%)	1(2%)
Receive family support or remittances	2(4%)	1(2%)
Have off-farm income	3(6%)	1(2%)
Did not receive food aid or emergency cash transfer in previous years	2(4%)	2(5%)
Don't have friends or relatives among the decision-makers	1(2%)	29(66%)
Not participating in other FSP	1(2%)	1(2%)
Not registered on the Kebele household list	1(2%)	0(0%)
Not able to work on PSNP projects	1(2%)	0(0%)
Not willing to work on PSNP projects	1(2%)	0(0%)
I don't know	2(4%)	3(7%)
<b>Total response</b>	<b>49(100%)</b>	<b>44(100%)</b>

Source: Household survey result, 2006

Reasons of non-beneficiary respondents, as depicted in the above table, indicate that the most important criteria, included above, were not uniformly communicated to all of the non-beneficiary respondents. In relation to this, 27% of the respondents stated that ownership of livestock was a reason for exclusion as told by decision makers. Furthermore, whereas 20% were told by the decision makers that availability of enough food as a rationale behind their exclusion, 14% were informed about possession of plough land as criteria for exclusion. Moreover, the respondents are not convinced that their exclusion from the program is based on objective criteria fairly applied while selecting beneficiary households. To this end, only less than 7% of the responses agree that their exclusion from the program is on the basis of the aforementioned objective criteria, which were brought to their

attentions by the decision makers. Rather, most (66%) believed that and reason out that absence of friends or relatives in the decision-making bodies excluded them from the inclusion in the programme. Nevertheless, this reason was informed for insignificant (1%) of the respondents by the decision makers.

Owing to the above discorordance in relation to fair and objective application of targeting criteria, the researcher tried to assess other variables to validate the contradictory responses by the two category of respondents i.e., the beneficiary and non-beneficiary HHs.

To start with, according to the programme implementation manual, larger HH size is one of the criteria to be eligible for the programme. In terms of HH size, non-beneficiary HHs have, on average, 8.41 HH members, whereas the figure is 6.73 for beneficiary HHs. (See also Table 8 in Chapter 4, on Description of Respondents). This probably demonstrates that there was a problem during beneficiary selection processes. Comparing the food security status of the two groups also supports the above fact. Taking number of meals/day as an indicator, survey result shows that the beneficiaries on average have 1.14 meals for adults, which is slightly higher than 1.03 for the non-beneficiaries. Likewise, it is 2.2 meals/day for children of the beneficiaries, and this exceeds 2.03 meals/day for the non-beneficiaries (See also Table 11 in Chapter 4).

Furthermore, comparison of land ownership and engagement in farming also supports the above facts. As stated in Chapter 4, the average land holding size of the households in Lemo Woreda is 0.80 hectare. As presented in Table 12 under the same chapter, 71% of the beneficiary respondents own land as compared with 69% of the non-beneficiaries. Despite this insignificant difference in terms of land ownership, there is variation in relation to engagement in farming. Accordingly, 60% of the beneficiaries are engaged in farming, whereas 42% of the non-beneficiary respondents are engaged in farming. This indicates that land ownership is not a powerful instrument that justifies inclusion and/or exclusion of beneficiaries.


However, the targeting practice is found to be gender sensitive. As indicated in the descriptive part of this paper (Figure 4), 26% of the targeted beneficiaries are female-headed households. This is comparable to the national average, which is

25% for rural areas and is near to the woreda's figure for headship i.e. 26% is female-headed households.

From the ongoing discussions, two contradictory responses are observed. The majority of the beneficiaries believe that the selection criteria are in line with the implementation manual. On the contrary, an overwhelming majority of the non-beneficiaries are against this view. In fact the latter group argues that the target group selection criterion was dominantly based on reasons like favouritism and other corrupt practices rather than applying the criteria set in the targeting manual.

The researcher, with the intention to clarify the controversy, assessed and critically investigated the socio-economic characteristics of the beneficiaries to learn if there is any intra-category variation. To this end, five important indicators of socio-economic status of a household were first identified during the survey and FGDs. These include: Dependency ratio, Land holding, Livestock asset, Household Income, and Headship. Based on these criteria, the following diagram shows the distribution of the 119 beneficiaries HHs as Better -off, poor and very poor\*:

Fig-2 Wealth Status of Beneficiaries



**Source:** Survey result

As depicted in Figure 5, 42% of the total beneficiaries are relatively better of in terms of their wealth status, whereas the remaining 58% are either poor or very

\* Indicators used for wealth ranking: HH size = Number of Dependent HH members; Landholding= ownership of farming land; Livestock assets= estimated current price of livestock owned; HH Income= Average annual HH income; and Headship= Female or Male Headed HHs. Thus, a HH is Better of if it is good in terms of four or five of these indicators: number of dependants below five; possesses farming land; Livestock asset is estimated at above ETB 1000; HH above poverty line (ETB=22484), and not a Female Headed HH. If the HH doesn't fulfill 3 of these it is Poor, and if two or only one of these criteria it is labeled as very poor; according to the wealth ranking in the eyes of the woreda community.

poor. This clearly shows that the targeting practice in the woreda is in conflict with the selection criteria, which gives priority to the poorest of the poor.

Furthermore, survey results show that there is also problem associated with benefiting all individual members of targeted households. As presented in Table 23, from the total beneficiary respondents only 33.6% have all their HH members included in the programme, yet the remaining 66.4% are with part of the family members being included in the programme. This can also be seen from the distribution of individual household members who are currently included in the programme or otherwise.

To start with, the beneficiary respondents (119) accommodate a total of 793 individuals. According to the manual, all of the 793 individuals are supposed to benefit from the programme so long as the households are included. Nevertheless, the total number of individuals who are currently benefiting from the programme is 559 or 70% of those who deserve the benefit from the inclusion. In other words whereas the beneficiaries have an average household size of 6.7, the average number of household members included in the programme is only 4.7(see Table 17).

**Table 17: HH Members included in PSNP and Household Size: Descriptive Statistics**  
N=119

	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean
Total number of HH Members included	1.00	11.00	559.00	4.6975
House hold size	2.00	15.00	793.00	6.6639

Source: Household survey result, 2006

Further analysis shows that there is also variation within the beneficiaries regarding the number of individuals included vis-à-vis their statuses. As can be seen in the following table (18), 70% of the better-off households are with HH size of 7 and below as compared with 61% of the worse-off. This implies that the proportion of households above HH size of 7 is 30% and 39% for the better-off and the worse-off respectively. The statistics on inclusion, however, doesn't conform to this. While 10% of the better-off have beneficiaries of 7 and above, disproportionately only 7% of the worse-off fall in this category. Likewise, although the number of poor households below the size of 7 is 61 % ( compared to 70%of the better off), the

number of individual household members in same category is 93 % (90% of the better off).

**Table 18: Distribution of Beneficiaries by Wealth status, Household Size and members included in PSNP**

Wealth status	HH Size		Number of HH members included	
	7 & below	Above 7	7 & below	Above 7
Better-off	70%	30%	90%	10%
Poor or Very Poor	61%	39%	93%	7%
<b>% of Total</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>8%</b>

Source: Household survey result, 2006

For the sake further clarification, the study used information from FGD and key informant interviews. Results of the qualitative data show that the criteria applied in targeting mostly different from what is put in place in the manual. According to the informants and discussants, the decision making body who decides on targeting mostly fail to obey to the implementation manual. As a result of misunderstandings and corrupt practices like favouritism and bribery, the poorest of the poor and neediest households are seldom included in the programme. In fact, the programme is deemed as a hand-out, which the decision making body thinks that it has to be rendered to as many households as possible regardless of the socio-economic status of households in the community. According to the above sources, this problem of misconception is further aggravated by failure of the decision makers to properly communicate the criteria. It was also highlighted that some political administrators use their power to influence the decision of the selection committee members dictating them to favour the formers' relatives in the programme, no matter how they do not fulfil credential criteria to be eligible. Indeed, discussants exemplified this mentioning the case whereby teachers, who were not eligible, were included in the programme.

From these, it is possible to say that the processes of targeting beneficiaries were problematic. In fact, according to the informants and focus group discussants, this indeed, is a serious impediment for the successful implementation of the programme. This is a finding in line with the available literature. According to the study by PANE (2006), targeting problem i.e. errors of inclusion and exclusion were experienced in Food Aid programs of Ethiopia, which brought about a negative of dependency.

In short, findings reveal that for the beneficiaries targeting criteria are properly applied. Nevertheless, for the non-beneficiaries as well as the key informants and discussants, the criteria are only paper tiger, hence rarely applicable. Indeed, comparison of the basic household characteristics and living status of the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups is a hint to support that the application of criteria is problematic. Moreover, it can be generally said that, the actual targeting criteria that have been used during the selection of eligible households in the study area lacks fairness, clarity, and accountability.

The reasons commonly identified by the key informants, survey results and FGD participants include inefficiency of the institutional arrangements and lack of strict supervision and follow-up by higher-level institutions. Besides, the widely held dependency attitude among the public that every individual deserves inclusion is also stated to be another reason causing and/or aggravating targeting related problems.

#### **5.1.2.2 Decision making Process**

Decision making process of targeting households was also reviewed in an attempt to further investigate as to whether practical application of criteria is in line with the implementation manual. As per the PSNP implementation manual, there are designed institutional arrangements with clearly stipulated roles and responsibilities. In this respect, one of the issues is targeting and beneficiary selections. Administrative and community targeting system is designed to be applied in the selection of eligible participants.

The manual, further, says that the actual selection procedures start at the community level with clear support of CFSTF who are responsible for selecting and forwarding the list of beneficiaries to the KFSTF and through them to the Kebele council for final decision. However, as stated in the previous section on institutional arrangement, the KFSTF and CFSTF are non-existent. Hence, there is no formally established entity to act and/or function as a decision-making body that oversees all planning and implementation of safety net activities. It is also found out that individual members of the Kebele Cabinets and Development Agents (DAs) are observed to act on behalf of the KFSTF and CFSTF.

Survey respondents, both the beneficiary and non-beneficiary, were asked about who makes the most important decision on actual selection of beneficiaries.

According to the responses indicated in table 19 below, 34% of the total respondents mentioned that DAs are very influential, followed by 41% who said that we all decide. The Kebele council with 25% follows this. Out of the remaining, 8% of them said the WFSTF and 5% don't know who decides (see Table 19).

**Table 19: Who decided which households in the community would receive the cash?**

Respondents	The D.A decided	KFSTF	Kebele Council	WFSTF	CFSTF	We all decided together	Don't know
Beneficiaries, No.	40	0	30	10	0	48	6
Percent	34%	0%	25%	8%	0%	41%	5%
Non-beneficiaries, No.	18	0	12	2	0	8	8
Percent	38%	0%	25%	4%	0%	17%	17%

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

The above response also shows that there is inter-category variation in the responses between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary. For the beneficiaries, the community as a whole is the most important decision maker followed by the DAs and the Kebele Council. However, for the non-beneficiaries, the DAs are the most dominant followed by the Kebele council and the community. The implication is clear. DAs and members of the Kebele councils play pivotal role in the actual selection of beneficiaries.

From the total of non-beneficiary respondents, 82% stated that the decision was not fair; whereas only 18% of the respondents rated the decision as fair (Table 20). On the other hand, 57% of the beneficiaries' respondents stated that the decision was fair, whereas 43% of them responded that there was unfair decision. Here, 43% of the beneficiaries are clearly in support of the unfair nature of the decision forwarded by the non-beneficiaries.

**Table 20: Do you think the decision was fair?**

Respondents	Yes	No	Total= N
Beneficiaries	68	51	119
Percent of (N)	57	43	100
Non Beneficiaries	9	40	49
Percent of (N)	18	82	100

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

As can be seen from the above table 20, the proportion of respondents who evaluated the decision making process as unfair is considerably large. These respondents were simultaneously asked to reason out their response for saying that

the process is unfair. As presented in the table 21 below, corruption, predominantly favouritism by Kebele administrators and the DAs is the main reason for 78.2% of the respondents.

**Table 21: Most important reasons for unfair beneficiary selection (multiple response from Non-beneficiary only)**

Problems	Frequency	Percent
Favoritism by decision makers	36	78.2
All households didn't have equal chance to participate	25	54.4
Women didn't equally participate with men	22	47.8
Kebele meetings were not announced properly	18	38.3
No problems regarding beneficiary Selection	1	2.2
Other (poor follow up mechanisms, dependency attitude)	6	14.4

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

Next to favouritism, denial of the rights to equal participation is the most important problem reported by 54.4% of the respondents. Women's limited involvement in the process is another important factor, which is closely linked to gender inequality, identified by 47.8%. Failure of the Kebele administrations to properly convene meetings is also a problem for 38.3% of the respondents. In addition to these, lack of follow-up or supervision by higher government bodies and ever prevailing attitude of dependency account for 14% of the remaining respondents.

FGD and key informant interview results also substantiate the above findings. It is repeatedly mentioned by the key informants that actual targeting was made dominantly by the Kebele council, political cadres as well as DAs. For the informants the problem with the decision making process emanates from the non-existence of the appropriate institutional arrangements at the woreda and Kebele levels for the specified task. Unfair and unjust decisions have been made by non responsible organs without considering the implementation manual. Most of the key informants were of the opinion that decision makers mostly exercise accountability to higher-level government bodies rather than to the community. Besides they are inefficient, corrupt, and undemocratic. Moreover, the programme is commonly considered as a charity for the community and there is no feeling of ownership among the local government as well the community at large. Finally, the informants indicated that lack of strict monitoring and review of the programme is one of the

underlying factors that has caused and/or aggravated the problems of decision making during targeting.

Also a consensus was reached among most discussants of the FGD on the aforementioned fact that the decision making process is problematic. Surprisingly enough, the discussants further expressed that the Kebele Council doesn't want the establishment of the KFSTF and CFSTF. It is also learned that power struggle is not uncommon among the various (existing) institutions that are in principle dedicated for the smooth implementation of the programme. Consequently, the decision making process is defective in terms of ensuring transparency, down-ward accountability, as well as genuine participation of the community.

### 5.1.3 PSNP Payments

Practical implementation of PSNP payments in the study area was assessed vis-à-vis what is stipulated in the implementation manual. In relation to this the survey respondents were asked if they encounter problems associated with payments. Findings show that 58% of the respondents have encountered payment related problems of one kind or another. According to the responses, presented in Table 22 below, failure to timely effect payments and inadequacy of the amount are the two leading problems. Corrupt practices by PA officials and limited alternative mode of payments are also identified as the third and fourth major problems respectively.

**Table 22: Most important problem regarding PSNP payments.**

<b>Payment Related Problems</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Payment were not made on time	119	100
The amount of cash paid is small	92	77
Corrupt practices: by PA leaders like appropriation of payments, benefiting individuals who don not deserve, and less payment for women than men	39	33
Mode of payment not conducive	32	27
<b>Percentage of respondents who encountered any problem regarding payments</b>		<b>58*</b>

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

*\*As computed out of those respondents who have encountered any one of the above problems are 58%.*

#### 5.1.3.1 Timing of the Payments

To start with the implementation manual, it says, "a Safety Net delayed is a Safety Net denied". In recognition to this, those respondents (58%) who encountered problems were asked to specifically enumerate the problems. Accordingly, various

problems associated with payments were identified by the respondents and presented below.

As depicted in the table 22, the fact that payments were not made on time is a common problem for all of the respondents who encountered payment related problems. This show that delay in payments has been a serious concern among beneficiaries. In addition to this, the amount of cash paid is small for 77% of the respondents. Besides, PA leaders tend to take part of the payments; and also some individuals receive payments without involvement in the public works.

As stated during the focus group discussion with beneficiaries, Payments have been delayed sometimes for up to 2-3 months until the cash arrived. This has resulted in negative effect on asset protection and inconvenience on the part of the PSNP participants. According to the Woreda PSNP coordinator, delay in payments was due to the delay of fund release by concerned regional offices, forced utilization of programme's vehicles for other purpose by political administrators and some other administrative bottleneck at woreda level.

#### **5.1.3.2 Amount of Payment**

As far as the amount of payment is concerned, it is indicated in the PSNP manual that wage rate is ETB 6 per day per individual and may be adjusted according to market conditions. When the delivery is in kind, the payment will be 3 kgs of grain per day plus pulses and oil. It is assumed that 6 ETB will buy the daily requirement of 3 kg of grain per working day. The manual says that, any revision to the national wage rate for cash transfers will be agreed in consultation between Government of Ethiopia and the donors through established mechanisms of periodic assessment.

Survey results presented in table 22 before, show that the amount of cash paid is found to be small for 77% of the respondents. For both direct and public work participants, the monthly payment is 30 ETB per individual in reward to engagement in public works as well as for direct support by considering only 5 days /month. This amount was paid constantly for two consecutive years with out considering fluctuations of local market prices as mentioned in the implementation manual. Furthermore, the number of HH members included in the programme is quite different than what was stated in the programme manual. The manual said that, once a given HH is eligible to be supported; all HH members should be paid. This,

according to the survey result holds true only for 34% of the beneficiaries. As presented in the following table 23, for 66% of the targeted beneficiaries, only part of household members are included which resulted in decreasing the share of income when it was distributed to the whole family members.

**Table 23: members of households included in the programme**

HH members included in the PSNP	Beneficiaries respondents	
	Frequency	Percent
All household members included in the programme	40	34
Part of the household members included in the programme	79	66
<b>Total</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

The aforementioned problem in relation to budget rate was substantiated by key informants and focus group discussion. They claim that, daily payment of 6 ETB is not enough to fulfil their consumption need compared to the prevailing high market price of consumer's goods and services. Added to this, since all members of some of beneficiary households are not included in the programme, it decreases the economic value of the earning when it is distributed to each members of the family. As concluded during focus group discussion, the main reason for not including all family members was the unintended reallocation of targeted resources for many people by deducting number of family members from the beneficiaries. Kebele administrators used this mechanisms to avoid opposition raised by community resulted from unfair beneficiaries selection and from the intention to benefit their relatives.

Surprisingly enough the present amount of payment is with insignificant difference compared to the amount ten-years ago, which was subject to the critics of other studies. According to Sharp (1997) the existing FFW payment standard of 3 kilogram grain and 120 gram oil per day per person was set by WFP 20 years ago, based on nutritional requirements for an average family of 6 persons.

### **5.1.3.3 Corrupt Practices**

As indicated in the previous table.22, corrupt practices by PA officials is found to be the most pressing problem for a considerable proportion i.e. 38% of the

respondents who encountered payment related problems. These respondents were asked to identify top priority problems in relation to the corrupt practices by PA leaders. Accordingly, appropriation of payments by PA officials is found to be the first. This is followed by no-working individuals who receive payments as if they participated in the various public works in the communities. Finally, responses indicate that sometimes women receive lesser amount of payments than male counterparts.

Qualitative information obtained from key informants and FGD participants corroborates the above finding. According to the informants and discussants, corruption is a salient problem mostly observed in times of effecting payments by the PA officials and DAs.

#### **5.1.3.4 Choice of Payment Intervention**

Similarly, as stated in the Table before, mode of payment intervention is also identified as another problem area for the beneficiaries. According to the implementation manual of the programme, it is possible for a single woreda to decide to make payments in cash in some kebeles and in food in other kebeles, depending on the following factors. As a general starting point, cash should be given after the harvest when food is in good supply and food should be given in the hungry period leading up to the harvest when food is scarce. Factors considered in the transfer of cash as a form of payment are near food surplus area, availability of active food market, preferences of the community, and presence of cash management capacity. Similarly, preferences of the community, absence of food markets near food insecure kebeles leading to a devalued transfer, lack of experience in cash management and better food management capacity are factors that should be considered for the payment of food as a form of transfer.

However, the findings show that in the study area the type of payment is totally in cash. Therefore, in order to check whether the payment was demand driven or not, the study assessed opinion of the beneficiaries regarding the distribution of food or/and cash as a form of resource transfer.

The result shows that only 42% of the total beneficiaries' respondents are found to strongly agree or agree on distribution of food as a form of payment. The remaining

larger proportion (58%) of respondents disagree, strongly disagree, or indifferent to such mechanism of resource transfer. The response is as presented in Table 24.

**Table 24: Do you personally agree with the distribution of food as a form of payment?**

Response	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative %
Strongly agree	35	29	29
Agree	15	13	42
Strongly disagree	11	9	51
Disagree	56	47	98
Indifferent	2	2	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Household survey result, 2006

Those respondents who are not in favour of food distribution identified their reasons. For most of them food is inconvenient to be used for different purposes. Difficulty of allocation for covering HH costs and fear of out-dated grain/food supply are also identified. On the other hand, those 42% of the respondents who are in favour of food distribution as a form of payment were asked to enumerate their reasons. Accordingly, such mode of intervention reduces transaction cost for purchasing grains, reduces corruption by PA officials, and timely responds to life-savings. Almost all of the respondents also suggested that the mode of payment has to be diversified depending on the reality in their locality.

During the focus group discussions, however, participants suggested that payment of cash equivalent to the food ration as determined by the price of the local market. The concerns about the payment of cash expressed included: the prevention of corruption and its convenience for saving and paying credit. At different angle from the participants of focus group discussion, some key informants suggested the use of both food and cash depending up on local food situations. According to them, food should be provided in times when food is in short supply in the local markets, and cash should be paid in times of good harvest since the crop from own farm can adequately feed households. Therefore, with regard to payment options, payment in the form of cash has been going on the way what the programme implementation manual says. However, had it been the case that payment was made in a demand-

driven manner, it would have had significant and flexible role in preventing asset depletion, according to the informants and FGD discussants.

#### **5.1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of the Programme**

The need for strict and participatory progress tracking mechanism is well recognized in the PSNP programme manual. Moreover, the programme's implementation guideline has clearly set the M&E system. This system, as stated in the manual, is expected to be a component of an integrated system dealing with the entire food security portfolio, which is being developed separately, and for which the detailed specifications will be defined in due course. Accordingly, monitoring of PSNP refers to a regular flow of information on inputs utilization and programme participation, whereas evaluation includes both assessment of the success and constraints of process and analysis of the impact of programme components on outcome measures. Furthermore, while monitoring is the responsibility of each management unit, evaluation is generally undertaken by partners, including independent units, and based on a sub-sample of the overall programme.

Review of the M&E system indicates that albeit its positive elements, little emphasis is given to tracing the progress in relation to outcomes at household levels, specifically asset protection. In fact, from the M&E system presented above, it is clear that the M&E system gives due attention to the tracking of public works, hence community level outcomes of the programme. Besides, the system doesn't seem to address how and who is responsible for ensuring whether the implementation process is in line with the manual as well as on the right track to bring about the intended result. Specifically, as to whether the envisaged institutional arrangements are established and/or are properly playing their roles and responsibilities, whether targeting criteria is applied for beneficiary selection, the decision making process is acceptable and up to the standard, whether payment related and other procedures and properly conformed by the implementers and so on.

Furthermore, review of the program documents uncovered that timing of evaluation is another major gap, which is mainly associated with programme design. According to the M&E system described above, the process review is expected to take place six months after initiation. Besides, qualitative and quantitative assessment will be

conducted two and a half years into the project. Meanwhile, the asset protection dimension of the outcomes can be measured and verified in a year period starting from programme initiation; i.e. a period required for graduation of a batch. Thus apart from the M&E system's bias towards the public work projects, there is no review to be conducted annually to know if the PSNP is successful in terms of asset protection. Moreover, as the evaluation is a sample based, it is very difficult to take corrective actions for redressing constraints and problems observed in the course of programme implementation at woreda level.

The above shortcomings, however, are not without implication to programme's implementation process in the study area. To start with, problems observed in relation to rule application are significantly attributed to the lack of strict and participatory monitoring and/or follow-up exercises in the woreda. According to the key informants and FGD discussants, no external body has so far been in the woreda to know if the programme is being implemented smoothly and to check if it is in line with the implementation guideline thereby take corrective measures to redress deviations observed. Consequently, problems associated with institutional arrangements, targeting, and payments have been allowed to perpetuate. Besides, the programme is increasingly resulting in undesirable outcomes and the danger of missing the intended programme's objectives is becoming a common concern.

Finally, the M&E system also stipulates that lessons learned from the evaluation undertakings will be documented and disseminated to other areas. Such a strategy responds to gaps that result from excluding woerdas not included in the sample. But, according to key informants the study woreda has never been included in the sample for evaluation nor benefited from lessons learned from success stories. (See also the Annex- 3 for details on the M&E system).

## **5.2 OUTCOMES OF THE PROGRAM**

As explained in the program document, the expected outcomes of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program are: Temporary income transfer benefits to the poor at critical times, consumption smoothing or stabilization, asset protection at household level, and asset creation at community level. The PSNP also made certain assumptions pertaining to possible undesirable outcomes of the program, particularly dependency attitude.

Here, the analysis, in the following sections, focuses on the intended outcomes of the program as well as undesirable effects that have been observed in the course of the program's implementation. With regards to the intended outcomes, the focus is made on examining the program's contribution in terms of preventing asset depletion at household level [direct effects of the program] as well as other indirect effects that are one way or another linked to the direct effect/intended outcome of preventing the depletion of HH assets on a sustainable manner. As far as undesirable outcomes of the program is concerned, negative effects of the program, expected or unexpected, is dealt with in the analysis and interpretation of the findings.

### **5.2.1 Intended Outcomes**

As far as the intended outcomes pertaining to preventing asset depletion are concerned, both the direct and indirect effects of PSNP were assessed. The findings are as presented and discussed below.

#### **5.2.1.1 Direct Effects of PSNP on Household Asset Protection**

As discussed in the theoretical literature review section, household assets can be broadly categorized as physical, social, financial, natural, and human capital. An after-before (joining the PSNP) comparisons of households' human, physical, social, natural, and financial asset conditions were made to track trends in asset conditions of the beneficiary households. Attempt was also made to avoid problem of unduly attributing some positive results on household asset protection to the PSNP, yet they actually resulted because of other interventions.

An aggregate analysis of change in the asset condition of the whole sample beneficiaries show that the PSNP have a positive contribution in terms of protecting

the assets of the targeted households. This is indeed true along all dimensions of the households' assets.

In relation to this, the sampled beneficiary households were asked to compare their assets conditions before and after joining the PSNP. In other words, the respondents were asked to relate changes in their asset conditions as a result of the program. In connection with this, the five categories of assets, namely, human, physical, financial, social, and natural capitals that are the building blocks of a household's asset/ livelihood were used. Besides, sets of specific indicators were applied to facilitate respondents' comparison of changes in the assets conditions.

Accordingly, as indicated in forthcoming Table-25 for nearly two-third of the total respondents (69%), the PSNP has made significant contributions to protect HH assets from being depleted. For the remaining one third (31%) of the respondents, however, the PSNP couldn't rescue the depletion of their assets.

It is, nonetheless, worthwhile mentioning that further analysis of the responses shows that there is disparity between those beneficiaries who are relatively better-off and those who are poor or very poor. (Please refer previous section, 5.1.2 Household Targeting on categorization of respondents as better-off and poor).

In what follows is discussion of the specific direct effects of the program as witnessed by the different wealth category of respondents comparing the present asset condition with that of before joining the program.

### **Human Capital**

As depicted in Table-25 on next page, because of the PSNP, 75% of the beneficiaries have been protected from depletion of human capital as shown by some indexes of health and educational statuses. Accordingly, 66% of the total respondents the level of utilization of health care facilities has either improved or remained unchanged, when compared with their status prior to joining the PSNP. Whereas, the remaining 34% of the respondents reported that their status of utilizing health care facilities has deteriorated.

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Table 25: Direct Effects of the PSNP on Household Assets by Wealth Status of Beneficiary Respondents (N=119)

HH Asset Category	Specific Indicators for Effects of PSNP (For comparing current status with before joining the program)	Percentage of respondents whose Assets have been protected by Wealth Status (%With in category and out of Total)					
		Better of (N=50)		Poor (N=69)		Total (N=119)	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
<b>Human Capital</b>							
Health	Utilization of healthcare facilities improved	39	78%	39	57%	78	66%
Education	School enrollment of children increased	36	72%	60	87%	96	81%
	School drop-out reduced	36	72%	69	100%	105	88%
Capability	Ability and readiness to apply skills/knowledge improved	41	82%	51	74%	92	77%
	<b>Average (Category)</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>77%</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>74%</b>
<b>Physical Capital</b>							
Land	Refrained from rent out or share-cropped out of any land	34	68%	31	45%	65	55%
Livestock	Avoided sell of livestock assets to buy food	44	88%	33	48%	77	65%
Crops	Retained own food production to eat than selling	40	80%	41	59%	81	68%
Farm equipments and other HH physical assets	Farm tools/HH equipments prevented from being depleted	39	78%	54	78%	78%	78%
	<b>Average (Category)</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>79%</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>67%</b>
<b>Financial Capital</b>							
Saving	Avoided to use your savings to buy food	34	68%	38	55%	72	61%
	<b>Average (Category)</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>61%</b>
<b>Social Capital</b>							
Social interaction/ Inclusion	Involvement in social institutions like Eddirs, Mahiber etc maintained	36	72%	44	64%	80	67%
	<b>Average (Category)</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>67%</b>
<b>Natural Capital</b>							
Deforestation	Reduced involvement in fire wood collection and sell	45	90%	40	58%	85	71%
Soil erosion	Reduced soil erosion of farm land	40	80%	50	72%	90	76%
	<b>Average (Category)</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>85%</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>74%</b>
	<b>Average (Category)</b>					<b>82</b>	<b>69%</b>

Further analysis of the responses shows that the better-off are in a better status of utilization than the poor. In relation to this, out of the respondents in the category of better-off, the proportion of respondents whose utilization status has been protected is 78%. But, only 57% of the respondents in the category of poor have been rescued from asset depletion in terms of health dimension. These figures, however, indicate that the positive effects of the program are not proportional to the size of respondents distributed across the two wealth categories. For 78% of the better-off, which account for only 42% of the total sampled beneficiaries, the human capital (health) has been protected. Disproportionally, the program has been successful in maintaining the status of health care service utilization for 57% of the poor, which account for 58% of the total beneficiaries. In other words, only 23% of the better-off are with deteriorated level of utilization of the service, which is by far less than 43% for the poor. The implication is clear. Even though the PSNP has scored an overall better success in terms of protecting utilization of health care services, the effects on the poor is not as significant as that on the better-off.

As far as education is concerned, the PSNP has made invaluable contribution for protecting human capital as indicated by level of school enrolment and dropouts of children. As presented in same Table 25 before; due to the program, an increased investment in children's school enrolment and keeping children in school for longer period of time are witnessed by 81% and 88% of the total respondents respectively. For the remaining 19% and 12% of the beneficiaries the program neither ensured

engagement in income generating activities, according to the respondents. In fact, a slight intra-category variation is observed when the responses are viewed against wealth status. As can be seen in the Table 25, the better-off with 82% slightly dominate over the poor with 74% regarding the protection of capability.

### **Physical capital**

Survey result further shows that, for 62% of the total respondents, depletion of physical assets has been protected because of joining the PSNP. Nevertheless, the program has been unable in protecting the depletion of land, livestock, and crop production for the remaining 38% of the respondents.

The PSNP has, for 55% of the total respondents, contributed in mitigating renting-out land and/or share cropping practices for the sake of filling household expenditure gaps. However, the rest 45% of the respondents, predominantly the poor, are still found to rent-out and/or share cropped out to cover the gaps. Meanwhile, 68% of the total respondents also retained own food production to eat than to sell. The remaining 32%, which are predominantly from the category of poor are less protected in this regards.

The PSNP is also of paramount importance in avoiding the sell of livestock assets by HH to buy food for consumption. This is supported by 65% of the respondents. But, livestock asset is being depleted for the rest 35% of the respondents, the majority of whom are once again the poor. Meanwhile, more-than three-fourth (78%) of the respondents, regardless of their wealth status, reported that their farm tools and other household equipments have been prevented from depletion.

Results of asset inventory of the beneficiary respondents also substantiate the above findings in relation to physical capital. According to computations based on the survey results, the sampled beneficiary respondents, on average, possess livestock asset worth ETB 965.4 at the survey times. Comparison of this with the situation a year ago, shows that there is no significant depletion of livestock assets. A year before, the average economic value of the livestock/household is estimated to be ETB 643. In fact, this improvement is attributed to the fact that the number of livestock asset has dramatically increased for 88% of the better-off, although it has

decreased for 52% of the poor. A result of the asset inventory is as presented in Table 26 below.

**Table 26: Number of livestock and Farm Tools/ Household Equipments Possessed Before and After Joining the Program**

Asset	Average number/value	
	Before Joining the program	After Joining the program
<b>Livestock</b>		
Oxen	.2	.2
Bulls	.5	.3
Cows	.3	.2
Heifers	.2	.5
Calves	.1	.2
Sheep	.1	.6
Goat	.1	.2
Donkey	.03	.05
Mule	.02	.02
Horses	.01	.01
Poultry	.4	1.3
<b>Estimated Economic Value(ETB )</b>	<b>643</b>	<b>965.4</b>
<b>Farm Tools/other HH Equipments</b>		
Plough	1	1
Sickle	1.8	1.5
Pick Axe	1	1
Axe	1.5	1.4
Grail Mill/Stone	1	1
Charcoal/Wood Stove	1	1
Leather/Wood Bed	1	1
Spade	1	1
Bee Hive	1	1
Radio	1	1

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

**Remarks:** *the physical assets presented above are only those HH assets that are currently in working conditions and an estimate of economic values is based on current market prices.*

Moreover, as can be seen from the above Table, there is no asset depletion in terms of farm tools and HH equipments. Accordingly, the number of household assets possessed by overwhelming majority of the respondents has either increased or remained unchanged when compared with the number possessed before joining the program. In fact disaggregating the inventory results by wealth status of the respondents showed that there is no significant difference in relation to the afore-stated increment in the number of the assets between the better-off and the poor.

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<b>Livestock</b>		
Oxen		
Bulls	.2	.2
Cows	.5	.3
Heifers	.3	.2
Calves	.2	.5
Sheep	.1	.2
Goat	.1	.6
Donkey	.1	.2
Mule	.03	.05
Horses	.02	.02
Poultry	.01	.01
<b>Estimated Economic Value(ETB )</b>	.4	1.3
<b>Farm Tools/other HH Equipments</b>	643	965.4
Plough		
Sickle		
Pick Axe	1	1
Axe	1.8	1.5
Grail Mill/Stone	1	1
Charcoal/Wood Stove	1.5	1.4
Leather/Wood Bed	1	1
Radio	1	1
Beehive	1	1
Radio	1	1

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006  
**Notes:** the physical assets presented above are only those HH assets that are currently in use and an estimate of economic values is based on current market prices.

As can be seen from the above Table, there is no asset depletion in farm tools and HH equipments. Accordingly, the number of household assets possessed by overwhelming majority of the respondents has either increased or remained unchanged when compared with the number possessed before joining the program. In fact disaggregating the inventory results by wealth groups, the respondents showed that there is no significant difference in relation to the stated increment in the number of the assets between the better-off and

### **Financial Capital**

The effect of the PSNP on the financial resources that the targeted beneficiaries possess is also assessed. Findings, presented in Table 25, show that 61% of the total respondents avoided to use their savings to buy food, hence the program has protected the depletion of their financial capital. However, the remaining 39% of the respondents have reported that savings have been used for consumption purposes. Critical look at the responses, however, indicates that the effect on financial asset varies across wealth status of the respondents. Accordingly, 68% of the better off as compared with 55% of poor have benefited from the positive effects of the program in protecting household savings. In other words, whereas household savings have declined for 45% of the poor, this has been a case only for 32% of the better-off.

### **Social Capital**

Findings also show that PSNP has brought about promising results in protecting HH assets via safeguarding the depletion of social capital. To this end, 67% of the total sampled beneficiaries indicated that because of the program their inclusion in local level social institutions has either improved. The remaining 33%, however, still face difficulties to cover costs related to their social lives, predominantly contributions to Eddirs and Mahibers(see Table 25).

As indicated in table 25, comparison of responses vis-à-vis the wealth category shows that there is still a variation in terms of the effect of the program on the social capital. Whereas around the three-fourth (72%) of the better off enjoyed the benefit, it is 64% of the poor who have benefited from improved level of social interactions.

It is however important to mention that a relatively less weight is given by the respondents to social capital when compared with other the other assets.

### **Natural Capital**

Eventually, findings show that PSNP has a considerable effect in protecting the natural capital, one of the building blocks of household asset, as indicated by 74% of the total beneficiary respondents. But, for the rest 26% of the respondents the program could not protect the depletion of the natural capital. As presented in Table 25, 71% of the respondents indicated that after joining the program their

involvement in fire wood collection and sell has significantly diminished. The responses, however, indicate that the effect is much more perceived by the respondents who are relatively poor. 90% of the better off, who already had limited involvement in firewood collection and sell, reported that they are not currently involved in such activities that accelerate deforestation. But, the effect of the program on the poor, though appreciable, is still found to be less significant. As indicated in the Table, 42% of the poor are still involved in fire wood collection and sell for generating additional income.

Checking the problem of soil erosion of farmland is also another contribution of the program that has a bearing on household asset condition. In relation to this, 76% of the total respondents revealed that, due to the program, the level of farmland soil erosion has reduced; hence their asset has been protected from depletion. This is an effect, which is perceived by 80% of the better off and 72% of the poor.

Finally, those respondents who constitute 31% of the total beneficiary respondents and whose assets have not been protected from depletion were asked to identify their reasons. The reasons are presented in Table 27 below.

**Table 27: Reason of Respondents whose Assets Not Protected by the Program n= 38(Multiple responses)**

Reasons	Beneficiary Respondent with Asset Depletion (N=38)	
	Frequency	%
Inadequate amount of payment	69	32%
Only part of the HH members included	52	24%
Timing of payments	40	18%
Exclusion form other programs (FSP)	29	13%
Corruption by PA leaders	29	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source:** Household survey result, 2006

A proportionally large number (32%) of the respondents attribute their asset depletion to inadequacy of amount of payment to cover their household expenditures. This is followed by inclusion of only part of the household members in the PSNP and failure to timely deliverer payments are identified as the second and third most important reasons for asset depletion by 24% and 18% of the respondents respectively. Exclusion of household members from other food security

programs and corrupt practices by PA leaders are also reasons that together account for the remaining 26% of the respondents.

Meanwhile, qualitative responses obtained from FGD participants and key informants corroborate the findings; i.e. the success and failure stories as a result of PSNP, which have been discussed so far.

With regard to achievement of outcomes, the positive effects of the program in rescuing household assets of the targeted beneficiaries are the facts supported by key informants and FGD participants. Discussants of the FGDs revealed that the beneficiary households are benefiting more from frequent visits to modern health institutions in the localities. Besides, because of the program their children are enjoying increased level of school enrolments. The discussants also share the fact that the PSNP is instrumental in protecting the depletion of the human, physical and financial assets of the beneficiaries as well as to the prevention of commonly shared natural and social capitals that directly affect the households' livelihoods. Nonetheless, participants of the discussions have reservations concerning these effects of the programs on all beneficiaries are all alike. To this end almost all of the discussants emphasized that those beneficiaries that are relatively poor are still vulnerable to asset depletion. But, for the better-off, which they think were included due to errors of inclusion, the program has become a good opportunity for asset creation. Consensus was reached among most participants that whereas they are not confident enough in confessing the 'asset depletion of the poor, they held the opinion that the payment by PSNP is an additional injection of resources for the better-off.

The key informants boldly explained that PSNP has proven successful in terms of bringing about encouraging results, particularly in protecting the asset depletion of the beneficiaries. However, they identified the specific effects disaggregating along the wealth status of the beneficiaries. On the one hand, the effect of the program on the poor is much more magnificent in areas of health, education, and consumption. Besides, the program is, at least partially, a rescued savings and livestock asset that would have been used by the poor for consumption purposes. Those beneficiaries who are very poor are still prone to depletion for three main reasons. First, the defective institutional arrangement in the area gave a room for corrupt practices, which resulted in the exclusion of some household members of the

beneficiary households from the program. According to the respondents, had it been the case that all members of their households were included in or benefited from the program, the income transfers would become adequate enough to rescue the depletion of their assets. Second, as a result of lack progress tracking in practice, corrective measures were not taken as they occur. Finally, payments made by the program are not sensitive to price fluctuations in the local market.

#### 5.2.1.2 Indirect Effects of PSNP on Household Asset Protection

Respondents were also asked if the PSNP is making indirect contributions towards protecting asset depletion at household levels. Accordingly, the majority (around 90%) of the total beneficiary respondents agree that PSNP has positive effects in areas of social, economic, environmental and political lives of their communities, which in turn contribute for asset protection of households. The remaining (10%) of the respondents, however, disagree that the program has meaningful effects on the respective communities in general and household level asset depletion in particular.

Those respondents who born witnesses to the aforementioned program's contributions were asked to enumerate the specific indirect effects. This is as presented in Table 28.

**Table 28: Social, Economic, Environmental, and Political Effects of PSNP (N=107)**

Indirect effects	Percentage
<b>Social</b>	
Creates social equity/rescues the poor and marginalized	81%
Protects from the exploitation of informal credit	19%
<b>Economic</b>	
Helps to cover costs like tax and contributions	41%
Support to pay inputs credit	36%
Protect land renting-out	15%
Creates employment opportunity	8%
<b>Political</b>	
Creates peaceful environment between government & society	46%
Encourages popular participation	43%
Increase access to be a member of ruling party	11%
<b>Environmental</b>	
Reduced soil erosion	60%
Reduced deforestation	40%

Source: Household survey result, 2006

As can be seen in the Table, creating social equity is the most important contribution of PSNP for social welfare development, which is identified by 81% of the respondents. According to them, the contribution of the program is vital in terms of rescuing the poorest of the poor and marginalized segments of the community. This is in support of other findings on the redistribute role which intended to reduce the impact of poverty (Michelle Adato, Akhter, and Francle Lund, 2002:2-4). The program is also identified by 19% of the respondents as a safeguard from exploitative informal credit services.

Regarding the economic effects, the program's positive contribution for covering expenses for tax and different contributions is identified by 41%, whereas the program helps to pay credits for inputs like fertilizers as noted by 36% of the respondents. Protection of land renting and creation of employment opportunities are also identified as positive impacts by 15% and 8% of the remaining respondents, respectively.

Furthermore, positive effects of PSNP that are associated with politics were identified. According to 46% of the respondents, the program creates peaceful environment between government and society. For nearly equal proportion (43%) of the respondents, the fact that PSNP encourages popular participation is its positive political impact. For the remaining (11%) of respondents, increased access to membership of the ruling party is also due to the program.

Finally, the respondents identified the positive effects of PSNP towards improving natural resource degradation resulted from soil conservations practices by public works program under the PSNP. According to 60% of the respondents, the program is contributing towards controlling accelerated soil erosion. Moreover, the program also contributes towards alleviating the problem of deforestation. The respondents brought to the attention of the researcher that fire wood collection and sell used to be a HH coping strategy during shock time to fill their financial gap in the study area. However, following the PSNP there has been a reduced influx of households in the collection and sell of firewood as identified by 70% of the respondents.

### 5.2.2 Undesirable Outcomes

The PSNP document, in addition to stipulating the intended outcomes, which were briefly discussed in the previous section, recognizes that the program is likely to come-up with some undesirable outcomes that hinder the intended outcomes at household as well as community levels. In this regards, the document pays due attention to such effects as dependency syndrome.

In light of the above, the survey respondents were also asked whether there are negative effects exhibited as a result of the PSNP, which would constrain the program from bringing about long-lasting effects on asset depletion of targeted households. In this regards, the majority of the respondents, both from beneficiary and non-beneficiary categories, stated that the program is not without negative effects. Findings show that the effects of the program on self-reliance, consumption and saving, informal safety nets as well as on the socio-political lives of the people are among the most important negative results that deter the success of the program. The responses are presented in the Table 29.

Table 29: Undesirable Outcomes of the program where n=158

Undesirable Outcomes	Percentage
Creates dependency attitude	53%
Develops bad consumption habit and discourages savings	18%
Weakens informal safety net	17%
Triggers social conflict and discourages political pluralism	12%

Source: Household survey result, 2006

As can be seen from the above table, for 53% of the total respondents unprecedented dependency attitude has been experienced in the localities following the introduction of the PSNP. According to them, the program is reinforcing most households to anticipate support from external agencies, hence eroding out self-reliance at the community level.

In addition to this, for 18% of the respondents the PSNP resulted in unusual consumption habits like alcoholic addiction that are commonly observed among a considerable number of beneficiary households. Furthermore, the program is mentioned to weaken informal safety nets in the community. As 17% of the respondents indicated, the PSNP has dethroned the important role of age-old self-

help institutions. The PSNP completely ignores the community's informal institutions that have been at the centre of past initiatives for coping-up risks and hardships.

Finally, the rest (12%) of the respondents emphasized negative effects of the PSNP through triggering conflict between the included and the excluded. Besides, as a result of implementation problems local level cadres have been capitalizing of the program as a means of securing political support, hence the program seems to discourage political pluralism.

Attempt was made to assess the level of recognition and mitigating strategies put in place by the government to deal with the aforementioned negative effects. Critical review of the PSNP document, however, reveals that undue attention has been given to most of the outcomes and no strategy has been devised to avert the problems. Indeed, with the exception of dependency attitude, none of the above problems were recognized while designing the program.

As far as dependency is concerned, it is indicated in the PSNP document that "the program should be implemented so as to complement, not crowd out household efforts to be tide over potential shocks and large needs.... the program should be designed and implemented in away to discourage the development of dependency attitude and negative effects among beneficiary and the community (MoARD, 2004:4)

Apart from recognizing the problem of dependency as an undesirable outcome of the program, the specific strategies of addressing the problem is missing both in the program manual as well as the implementation guideline.

In the final analysis, participants of the FGDs were given the chance to forward their views and comments on the negative effects of the program. The views and opinions are found to strongly support the above findings, particularly in relation to widespread dependency. Full information gathered from FGDs is presented on Table 30, next page.

Table 30: FGDs on dependency attitude.

Level of Agreement in FGD Sessions	Indicators of Dependency Attitude
100%(5 of 5 groups)	Safety net transfer should not be confined to chronically food in secured households; rather should benefit overwhelming majority of the households.
80% (4 of 5 groups)	The program has to continue for longer years (even under good condition) in order to make their livelihoods sustainable.
60%(3 of 5 groups)	The program develops the attitude towards unwillingness to do their own work on the beneficiaries.
60% (3 of 5 groups)	Beneficiaries' engagement in public works takes more time than times for their own farming activities.
40%(2 of 5 groups)	Households rent out or share cropped out their own farmland by expecting inclusion in the SNP.
40% (2 of 5 groups)	Household sale livestock assets anticipating inclusion in the PSNP.

Source: Author's preparation based on Focus Group Discussions, 2006

The summary in the above table indicates that in all of the five FGD sessions the participants believe that safety net transfer should be for all rather than only for chronically food in secured households. Besides, in most of the sessions i.e. 80% (4 of 5 groups) the participants support the belief held by the beneficiaries that the program has to continue for longer years (even under good condition) in order to bring about sustainable livelihoods. Furthermore, 60 % (3 of 5 groups) of the groups were found to believe that the program is cultivating bad poor work culture as it encourages the attitudes of the beneficiaries towards unwillingness to work on their own farmland. Same level of agreement is also observed owing to the fact that the public works take more time than times for their own farming activities.

Similarly, in three of the five FGDs, the participants agree that beneficiaries of the PSNP are spending much more time on public works rather than on own farming activities. To substantiate this, the survey result shows that the beneficiary respondents, on average, participate on public work spending more than 20 days per month (66%). This is, however, against the implementation manual, which asserts that the beneficiaries should invest around 80% of their work time on their own livelihood activities to avoid dependency. The consequence and concomitant of this, according to the discussants, is asset depletion rather than asset protection.

Furthermore, 40%(2 of five groups) were found to support the statement that households rent-out or share cropped out their own farmland by expecting inclusion in the PSNP. Similarly, the same number of FGD sessions, the participants agreed

that most households sell their livestock assets anticipating inclusion in the program.

Most of the key informants were also asked to comment on the negative effects of the PSNP. Almost all of them share that the program has resulted in most of the aforementioned effects. However, they mentioned that there are households who rent-out land or share cropped-out as well as sell their livestock claiming for inclusion in the program. According to them, inefficient institutional arrangement, misunderstanding about the essence of the program and design related problems are among the underlying causes for the negative effects of the PSNP.

Most of the findings, presented and discussed before, in relation to outcomes of the program also corroborate with findings of other studies. According to PANE (2006), safety net transfers like food aid programs brought about positive and negative impacts. Accordingly, whereas the positive impacts are more on communal levels, the contribution of the transfers is insignificant in mitigating food shortages and household asset development. The positive impacts of the program include: contribution to bio-diversity/ environment and infrastructure development, as well as generating employment opportunities. The study also uncovered that there are a number of negative effects of such safety net transfer programs. Due to targeting-related problems, the program has aggravated the problems of dependency on aid and decreased the productivity of farmers. Also the negative effect on local market distortion is emphasised. Besides, it has a negative impact of eroding informal institutions or coping mechanisms of the aid recipient communities. This is in support of the findings of this study. However, the program did not influence the traditional food habit of the recipients, according to findings of PANE, hence is not in line of the findings of this study.

In general, the findings of this study, particularly in relation dependency attitude as an undesirable outcome of the PSNP is in support of other findings of like PANE' (Ibid) and Fasil( 2005), as quoted by PANE (ibid). However, according to the study by Jenden(Ibid) on an employment safety net programme implemented by SOS Sahel in Ethiopia, there is little evidence of negative impact of the project, particularly in relation to dependency.

Therefore, owing to the fact that the PSNP recognizes dependency as an expected (undesirable) outcome of the programme (MoARD, 2004), it seems that

dependency attitude is resulting from the program. Besides, the findings tend to support the fact that weakening informal institutions such as Eddir, church support (mitswat), remittance, and transfers among the extended families, which are named as common form of informal safety nets by Tassew[2004]. Indeed, review of the program document showed that, the possible effects of the program on informal safety nets was not recognized in the program document. Thus, it is not unsound to infer that weakening informal safety nets is also another undesirable outcome of the program not expected at the stage of designing.

Thus, the findings of the study seem to provide adequate evidence with an implication that the PSNP, in parallel to partly contributing towards protection of asset depletion, has resulted in undesirable outcomes and/or negative effects that are worth considering if the program is to materialize its purpose and objectives.

## CHAPTER SIX- SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Combinations of natural and man-made factors have resulted in a serious and growing food insecurity problem in many parts of Ethiopia. In recognition of the gravity of the situation of food insecurity and vulnerability, the Government, in close collaboration with its development partners, has developed a Food Security Program, one component of which is Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).

The PSNP is intended to serve a dual propose: direct support and intensive public works. The program designed in 2005 intended to address the needs of about 4.8 million chronically food-insecure people in 267 Woredas in different regions of the country.

The implementation of the Ethiopia five years PSNP started in February 2005. As part of the government's effort to ensure effective implementation of the PSNP, program implementation manual has been prepared; training and awareness creation activities were undertaken at different levels; target groups were identified for public works and direct support, and capacity-building measures have been taken.

Meanwhile, regional level official reports described the program's implementation both as promising as well as problematic. Apart from this, however, there is a research gap pertaining to the achievements, gaps and prospects in relation to the PSNP implementation in Ethiopia.

It is against the above background that this study was designed and conducted to identify major achievements, gaps and prospects of the PSNP implementation. Intensive investigation of the implementation process was possible taking the case of Lemo woreda of Hadia Zone, which is one of the 267 targeted woreda in which the PSNP has been implemented ever since the year 2005. With in its scope, the study dealt with safety net transfers aimed at protecting household asset depletion. To this end, issues pertaining rule applications towards the achievement of the program outcomes were assessed vis'a'vis the implementation manual.

The study triangulated different techniques to collect qualitative and quantitative data from primary and secondary sources Afresh data was collected, among others, from a representatively drawn beneficiary households, key-informants, and focus

group discussants. Critical review of pertinent documents further substantiated the first-hand information. Finally, the study employed tools that are appropriate for data analysis and interpretation of findings.

Based on the findings of the study, a number of conclusions are made being classified under the most noticeable achievements and gaps. Albeit the interrelatedness between design and implementation of a program, these are separately outlined, only, for the sake of presentation. In what follows are, therefore, the conclusions along with summary of the major findings:

### **6.1.1 Achievements**

#### **Design level**

- The Government has put in place appropriate policies, guidelines and institutions for effective implementation of the program. The PSNP is well integrated to other food-security programs.
- The rules that guide the implementation process are clearly stated. More specifically, different level (from national to community level) institutional arrangements are clearly defined with their mandates, roles and responsibilities as well as required minimum capacities. Targeting criteria is well established together with the decision making process for selection of eligible beneficiary households. Mode of payment as well as its amount and timing are properly addressed along with procurement procedures. Monitoring and Evaluation Systems is devised for progress tracking. In addition to the aforementioned rules, the envisaged outcomes of the PSNP are articulated.
- Besides, negative outcomes of the program like dependency syndrome and distortion of local market prices are recognized.

#### **Implementation level**

##### **Institutional arrangements**

- The majority of the institutions were established in Lemo Woreda for the implementation process of the PSNP. Most of the institutions, especially the WRDAO and the FSD are with better performances. Besides, the WC and WoFED, although over-burdened, are also exerting utmost efforts to play their parts in the implementation process.

- The majority of the minimum capacities stated in the manual are available in the woreda. Besides, capacity building trainings have been organized and provided for purpose program success.

### **Targeting**

- Targeting criteria set in the implementation guideline are, at least partly, applied by existing institutions in the woreda. Considerations include issues like, absence of family support or remittance, ownership of livestock, having old age, female headed households, and loss of assets and inability to support themselves.
- Some of the targeted households are found to fulfil the criteria in the implementation, hence worth included.

### **Payments**

- The mode of payment is found to coincide with the interest of most of the beneficiaries, which is in the form of cash. Besides, the amount of payments is fixed on the basis of the implementation manual, which is ETB 30 /person/ month.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

- Annual progress reports are prepared by the woreda and submitted to the regional government via the zonal department of agriculture and rural development.

### **Outcomes**

- The PSNP has brought about promising results in a way to achieve the intended outcomes. The program is found to have both direct and indirect effects.
- The direct effects of the program include protecting the depletion of household assets, namely, human, natural, physical, social, and financial capitals in order of relative importance from the highly protected to the least one. In terms of the Human capital, the program has greatly affected the education, health and capability components of most targeted benefactress. The effect of the program in protecting natural capital involves mitigating deforestation and soil erosion that are directly linked to the household asset base. Besides, the effect of the program on protecting physical capital is

evident in its contribution to curb possibilities of land rent-out or share cropped out, sell of livestock, crop production as well as farm tools and household equipments. In addition, the program has also contributed to inclusion of the poor in social interactions as it supported the beneficiaries to involve in local level social institutions. Indeed, by way of reducing possible exclusion of the poor, the program has prevented the depletion of social capital for the beneficiaries. Finally, the financial capital or household savings has been also protected by the program from being depleted.

- Indirectly, the PSNP is also found to contribute to household asset protection through its effects on the socio-economic, political and environmental lives of the people. Among the most important of these are, reducing inequality, covering different costs, promoting peace and stability as well as reducing burdens on the natural resources.

### 6.1.2 Gaps

#### Design level

- The implementation guideline doesn't provide the specific rule as to which organ is mandated to establish which specific institutional arrangement. Also, the tenure for the institutions is not clearly defined in the guideline.
- Targeting criteria is not without loopholes for committing errors of inclusion. A case in point, it takes for granted the appropriateness of selection processes in the past as a justification for inclusion in the program. Specifically, households who received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP are eligible for inclusion.
- Regarding payments, the amount set as a benchmark in the implementation manual is by far lower than existing local market prices. The need for amendments and/or flexibility in relation to mode and amount of payment is recognized while designing the program. Nonetheless, top level institutions are mandated to make the amendments; hence the decision-making power of the local institutions is yet to decentralize.
- Gaps are observed in the monitoring and evaluation system. The timing of evaluation is not properly specified. Moreover, the M&E system is seemingly biased towards the public work projects, with a neglect to establish the

specific mechanisms of periodically tracking progresses in terms of asset protection.

- Finally, apart from duly recognizing negative outcomes like dependency syndrome, no specific strategy for mitigating the outcomes has been devised.

## Implementation level

### *Institutional arrangements*

- Some of the institutions, particularly the Kebele and Community level Food Security Task Forces are found to be either weak or entirely non-functional. Moreover, the WFSTF is not functioning effectively, though it is assigned with key roles and responsibilities. The WFSD is also functioning with under utilized potential. Defects associated with the institutional arrangement is a roadblock for the proper implementation of the program. Specifically, lack of transparency, downward accountability, and existence of corrupt practices were found to be among the salient features of the institutional arrangements. Thus, lack of good governance as manifested by the aforementioned features is among the factors that hinder the proper implementation of the program in Lemo woreda.
- The level of partnership and networking with local level actors, most importantly, NGOs is so weak as the program is perceived as the sole responsibility of the government.
- Capacity gap is also vividly observed. The highest decision making body-woreda council is overburdened by different activities. In most cases activities related to PSNP were given least priority. Resources particularly vehicles and professionals are assigned to perform other activities. In addition to this, due to lack of adequate technical staff as well as high staff turnover the program is not benefiting from the support by technical staff. Consequently, most of the decisions made by the council are politically tuned with less considerations of technical aspect particularly in the decision making process of woreda council. Most of the capacity building trainings are with short durations; lack consistency, not tailored for low level staffs; lack diversity and more importantly, neglect the hows of mainstreaming cross-cutting issues like gender and environment were not included.

### Targeting

- Targeting criteria applied in actual selection of beneficiaries were sometimes found to be flexible and subjective. This, mainly emanating from gaps in institutional arrangement, resulted in an inclusion error. A considerable proportion of the existing beneficiary households do not fulfil the criteria set in the implementation guideline. By the same token, there are households who qualify for inclusion but not benefiting from the program, hence an exclusion error. Equally important, the targeting practice is such that, predominantly, only parts of the household members of the targeted beneficiaries are included in the program to receive the income transfers. The main reason for this is the intention of institutions to equally distribute benefits for all households, regardless of its compliance to the implementation manual.
- The decision making process in the targeting practice lacks transparency, downward accountability and participation of the community though envisaged in the implementation guideline. The dominant perception in the area is that individuals, mostly DAs and PA officials, and not the institutions are influential in deciding over inclusion or exclusion of a household from the program.

### Payments

- The mode of payment doesn't practically entertain requests in the form of food a/or a combination of cash and food depending on realities on the ground. Hence, flexibility is not practically observed. Similarly, the amount is found to be inadequate to cover household's income vs expenditure gaps. Nevertheless, no adjustment has so far been observed during the last two years regarding amount of payments. Consequently, price fluctuations in the local market coupled with the abovementioned targeting problem of not including all household members is posing a serious challenge for the adequacy of payments. Delay in payments is also found to be a serious gap. In most of the cases, the payments were delivered long after chronic food-shortage seasons passed. The problem is further aggravated by corrupt practices by PA leaders that appropriate payments of some beneficiaries. This payment related problem is, indeed, found to be one of the main factors that jeopardize the success of the program; i.e. protection of household asset depletion.

### Monitoring and Evaluation

- No assessment has been undertaken to know whether the program is on the right track especially in terms of achieving the intended outcomes through established rules.
- Intensive follow-up and review has so far been inadequate. The role of the local people and other institutions particularly NGOs are marginal in progress tracking.
- Achievements and gaps observed in the course of implementation are not properly documented. The woreda has never benefited from sharing practices/lessons from other woredas within or outside the region.

### Outcomes

- Notwithstanding achievements of the program within the context of the foregoing gaps, a host of shortcomings are also observed in relation to outcomes.
- There is disparity in terms of the level of achievements witnessed among the household assets. Whereas human, natural and social capitals are areas where the effect is significant, the physical and financial capitals which are key to the households sustainable livelihoods are relatively less rescued. Besides, the direct effects of the program are not equally shared among all households targeted by the program. The success of the program on the poorest of the poor is less satisfactory when compared with the better-off. Whereas the former enjoy protection from depletion of the human capital relatively, the latter are found to use the income transfer for asset creation purpose, which is against the direct intention of the program.
- Negative effects of the program are also uncovered by the study. Most importantly, dependency attitude, development of bad consumption habits and weakening of informal safety net are found to be the major consequences and concomitants of the program implementation. Furthermore, the indirect positive effect of promoting participation and empowerment of the poorest of the poor households sometimes fails to be genuine and practical.

In a nutshell, the PSNP envisages income transfer to chronically food insecure households as a means to protect asset depletions thereby reducing the likelihood of insecurity and vulnerability of the households. The program's implementation process was designed to be guided by well-established rules pertaining to institutional arrangement, beneficiary targeting, payments as well as monitoring and evaluation system. The implementation process has brought about promising results that directly or indirectly contributed for protection of asset depletion i.e. the intended positive outcome of the program. However, there are also a number of gaps observed that impeded proper implementation of the program. As a result of defective rule application in the woreda and partly due to design level gaps, the success of the program, particularly in terms of protecting the most important assets of the poorest of the poor beneficiaries is below expectations. Moreover, no strategy is put in place to deal with the undesirable outcome of dependency. Besides, the program is not integrated to informal safety net institutions and its implementation is weakening these institutions.

Therefore, based on the conclusions, the following recommendations are made for scaling-up the achievements and filling the gaps observed, so far, for a better prospect of the PSNP implementation in Lemo woreda in particular and throughout the country in general:

## **6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **General recommendations:**

- Revision of program implementation manual with due consideration to scaling-up of past achievements by strengthening success areas and redressing gaps observed in the course of implementation. Equally, the government has to ensure that the guideline is communicable and/or understandable to members of the local level institutions.
- Designing appropriate program and implementation guidelines is only one part of the equation. Much more emphasis has to be given to the practical application of rules, particularly at the grass-root levels.
- Ensuring good governance among the institutional arrangements for the implementation process deserves due attention with immediate intervention.

- Partnership and/or participation of local level development actors is of paramount importance to the success and sustainability of the program impacts. Promotion of synergy among different food security programs/projects is also equally important.

**Specific recommendations:**

- Institutions should, in practice, get right. Particularly, the government should ensure that woreda and kebele level institutions are performing well or in line with the implementation guideline. Special attention should be given to making the institutions transparent, participatory, and accountable to the beneficiary communities and the public at large. Capacity building trainings for members of woreda, kebele and community level institutional arrangements should be provided with a focus on good governance, the how of mainstreaming the very purpose of the PSNP, targeting criteria, and decision making as well as on how to mainstream cross-cutting issues like gender, environment, HIV/AIDS etc. Sensitization and/or popularizing the program document and its implementation guideline to all members of the institutions is also of paramount importance. Furthermore, awareness raising sessions should be organized for the community at large.
- Reconsideration of gaps observed in relation to targeting. Possible revision of implementation guidelines should refine the rules stipulated in relation to beneficiary targeting criteria and the decision making process. There has to be a strict targeting criteria and a transparent decision making process especially for beneficiary targeting. Care must be taken in defining criteria as some of them are found to encourage and/or reinforce dependency attitudes.
- Payments, particularly the amount, should be amended and need to be practically flexible to reflect realities in relation to local market prices. To this end, the woreda level institutional arrangements need to be empowered to make decisions pertaining to the amount and mode of payments.
- Monitoring and evaluation systems has to participatory and more than any thing practical. In deed, as most of the problems in the implementation process are, at least partly, attributed to lack of follow-up and supervision, this has to be boldly defined and implemented. Besides, possible revisions of the implementation guideline should address lack of mechanisms to track



progresses in terms of the effect of the program in preventing asset depletion.

- Strategies should be put in place to mitigate negative effects like dependency syndrome and other undesirable outcomes like the effect of the program on informal safety nets.
- Strengthening networking and partnership among different actors, particularly local level institutions like NGOs/CBOs in the implementation process as well as during progress tracking is of paramount importance.
- Finally, action-oriented research works should be encouraged to draw and/or replicate good practices that have implications to effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program.

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## ANNEXES

*Annex-1 Table-3 Sample Size Distribution*

*Annex-2 The Study Process*

*Annex-3 Instruments and List of Key Informants*

*Annex-4 Institutional Framework, Membership, Roles  
and Responsibilities of the Institutions, and Key Capacity*

*Issues of the PSNP*


*Annex-5 List of Kebele Administrations under the study  
area-Lemo Woreda*

Annex-1 Table-3 Sample Size Distribution

S. n	Sample Keble	Population (HH)									Sample Size (HH heads)								
		Beneficiaries			Non- Beneficiaries			TOTAL POPULATION			Beneficiaries			Non- Beneficiaries			Total Sample size		
		M	F	Tot	M	F	Tot	M	F	Tot	M	F	Tot	M	F	Tot	M	F	Tot
1	Wogile Abara	93	36	129	142	62	204	235	98	333	15	7	22	8	4	12	19	9	28
2	Homa a Agera	153	58	211	137	58	195	290	116	406	22	10	32	7	3	10	25	10	35
3	Leignaw Kabecho	119	39	158	135	56	191	254	95	349	18	7	25	7	3	10	21	8	29
4	Bilagele Ambicho	158	31	189	235	101	336	393	132	525	23	6	29	13	5	18	31	10	41
5	Leignaw Fonko	143	72	215	128	54	182	271	126	397	20	12	32	6	3	9	22	13	35
<b>Total</b>		666	236	902	777	331	1108	1443	567	2010	98	42	140	42	18	60	140	60	200

Source: Author's computation based on woreda council reports

**Annex-2 The Study Process**



# Annex 3 Instruments and List of Key Informants

Survey Questionnaire Designed to Collect Fresh data on Household Asset Protection and Related contributions of PSNP in Lemo Woreda, Hadia Zone, SNNPRS

Regional and Local Development Studies

Addis Ababa University

## INTRODUCTION

- 1) Greet the person you are interviewing, and introduce your self.
- 2) Explain where you are coming from.
- 3) Explain the purpose of the study.
- 4) Ask if the person you are speaking to has any questions for you before continuing.
- 5) Ask if the respondent is willing to be interviewed. If they agree, start the interview. If the respondent is not willing, do not ask any of the questions and move to the next household.

Hello, this survey questionnaire is prepared by Tefera Molla who is attending masters degree program in Regional and Local Development Study in Addis Ababa University. Your household has been randomly chosen to participate in this study. The primary objective of this study is for academic purpose and secondly to learn more about how families are improving their livelihoods through productive safety net programs. The survey is a confidential exercise and your name will not be disclosed anywhere. Please feel free to answer these questions as they will help in future community development. Would you be willing to have a discussion with me?

Questionnaire Code: -----

Enumerator: ----- Date of Enumeration: -----

Name of Peasant Association (PA)/ Kebele -----

Respondent: 1. Included in the PSNP 2. Not included in PSNP

If included in the PSNP, Year of start ----- Month -----

Agro ecological location of P/ Kebele (circle as appropriate)

1. High land      2. Lowland      3. Midland

## Household identification

1. Name of the respondent (Household head) \_\_\_\_\_

2. Age \_\_\_\_\_

3. Marital status

1. Married

2. Single

3. Separated

4. Divorced

5. Widow

4. Family size \_\_\_\_\_

5. Level of education

1. Illiterate

Can read and write

Primary (1-8)

4. Secondary (9-12)

6. Tertiary

A. Household Profile

1) Do you have more than one wife? (Circle one)

2) Is this a female-headed household? (Circle one)

3) When was your year of marriage? (Write year)

Yes: 1	No: 2
Yes: 1	No: 2
F.C.	

ID Code	Name of the member	How related to head of household? (Write code)	Male [M] or Female [F] (circle one)		Age (Age in complete years)	Can he or she read a letter or newspaper? (Circle one)		Highest grade of school completed (write number or oo if none)	Labour capacity (write code)
			(5)	(6)		(7)	(8)		
			M	F		Yes	No		
1			1	2		1	2		
2			1	2		1	2		
3			1	2		1	2		
4			1	2		1	2		
5			1	2		1	2		
6			1	2		1	2		
7			1	2		1	2		
8			1	2		1	2		
9			1	2		1	2		
10			1	2		1	2		
11			1	2		1	2		
12			1	2		1	2		
13			1	2		1	2		
14			1	2		1	2		
15			1	2		1	2		
16			1	2		1	2		
17			1	2		1	2		
18			1	2		1	2		
19			1	2		1	2		
20			1	2		1	2		

Codes: How related to head of household?

- 01- household head
- 02- wife
- domestic chores- children etc. may be hired or fostered out
- 03- son/daughter of head or wife
- 04- son-in-law/daughter-in-law
- workload
- 05- grandson/granddaughter only
- 06- father/mother of head or wife (physically or mentally disabled or non-working elderly)
- 07- brother/sister of head/wife (the past 3 months or more)
- 08- other relative of head/wife
- 09- adopted
- 10- non- zsewātāte

Codes: Labour capacity

- 1- young child (too young to work)
- 2- working child (herding livestock)
- 3- adult (able to do full adult workload)
- 4- working elderly (not able to do full adult workload)
- 5- partially disabled (able to do light work)
- 6- permanently unable to work
- 7- chronically ill (unable to work for

B. Livelihood Activities and Income (To assess Graduation)

Please tell us about all the work that members of your household are doing to earn a living, and how much income they earned from doing that work during last year.

Livelihood Activity	Code	Did anyone in your household do this activity during last year?  <i>(Circle one only)</i>	How many months in the last year did your household earn income from doing this work?  <i>(Circle one only)</i>	Total monthly income earned while doing this work?  <i>(Birr per month)</i>
		(1)	(2)	(3)
AGRICULTURE				
Production for consumption and sale	01	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
Raising and selling animals (cattle, etc.)	02	Yes No	1 2 3 4	

Livelihood Activity	Code	Did anyone in your household do this activity during last year? <i>(Circle one only)</i>	How many months in the last year did your household earn income from doing this work? <i>(Circle one only)</i>	Total monthly income earned while doing this work? <i>(Birr per month)</i>
(e.g. donkeys)				
<b>FOOD AND DRINK PROCESSING</b>				
Selling tea, coffee, cake, bread, soft drinks, etc.	37	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
Selling alcoholic drink (e.g. tella, tej, shameta, borde)	38	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
Selling Cooked food	39	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
<b>OTHER</b>				
Begging	40	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
Moneylending	41	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
Other (specify) _____	42	Yes No	1 2 3 4	
			1= up to 3 months 2= 3-6 months 3= 7-11 months 4= all 12 months	

**C. Land Ownership and Access**

(14) Do you (or any other member of your household) own any land *(Circle one)*

(15) Did you (or any household member) farm after joining the SNP? *(Circle one)*

Yes: 1	No: 2
Yes: 1	No: 2

If NO, go to section D

(16) If yes, please tell us about the land you used for farming, and land you rented or shared with others *(Note: Count land for all household members)*

Access to Land	Yes	No	If " ", how much land? (hectares)	Land given to Other	Yes	No	If " ", how much land? (hectares)
Farmed own land	2			Sharecropped out land	1	2	
Sharecropped in land	1	2		Rented out land	1	2	
Rented in land	1	2		Gave land to someone for free	1	2	
Free access to someone's land	1	2			1	2	

(17) Did you sell, rent out or sharecrop out any land in the last farming season?

Yes: 1 No: 2

(18) If Yes, why? [Circle all that apply]

Reason	Yes	Reason
1 We needed cash to buy food	6	We have more land than we need
2 We needed cash for family health expenses	7	We don't have enough labour to farm the land
3 We needed cash for schooling expenses	8	We don't have access to plough and oxen
4 We needed cash for social obligations (e.g. wedding)	9	The land is poor quality
5 We needed cash for other reasons (specify):-----	10	Other (specify): ----- -----

(19) Is there any change in land holding size after joining the safety net program?

Yes: 1 No: 2

(20) Put your answer to question number 19

Access to land	Increased: 1	Decreased: 2	Reason for increase or decrease
Farmed own land			
Sharecropped in land			
Rented in land			
Free access to someone's land			
Sharecropped out land			
Rented out land			
Gave land to someone for free			

D. Crop Farming

(20) Did you use fertilizer in the completed year to improve your farm's productivity?

(22) Last farming season, did you use oxen to improve your farm productivity?

(23) Last farming season, did your household have enough land for farming?

(24) For each crop grown, how much was harvested last farming season, and what did you do with the harvest following table

Yes: 1	No: 2
Yes: 1	No: 2
Yes: 1	No: 2

Crop	Total kilograms harvested	How many Kilograms were:			Price per kg sold (Birr)
		Eaten at home	Given away	Sold	
Maize					
Sorghum					
Millet					
Barley					
Wheat					
Teff					
Beans					
Sesame					
Tomatoes					
Onions					
Chat					
Other (specify):					

**E. Self- Assessment**

	Better off	Worse off	The same	If you are better off or worse off, why? [Circle all that apply]									
(25) Compared to this time before SNP, is your household better off, worse off, or the same?			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
(26) Do you think you are better off, worse off, or the same as an average household in this village?			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**Codes: Better off**

1. We have access to more land
2. We have more food
3. Someone in our household who was ill got better
4. We received assistance from the safety net programme
5. We received assistance from other Government programmes or NGOs
6. the rains are good this year
7. someone in our household has a job
8. Other (specify):

**Codes: Worse off**

1. We have less land (or no land)
2. We have less food
3. Someone in our household got ill or died
4. We were not included on the safety net program
5. Government and NGOs programmes stopped providing assistance to us
6. the rains are not good this year
7. other (specify)

**F. INFORMAL TRANSFERS**

(27) Has your household received any of the following types of assistance from any friend or relative living outside the household?

Type of assistance received	Before safety net Program		After safety net Program		Reason for not receiving assistance after inclusion in safety net program
	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Remittances (from relative living elsewhere)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Other cash gift	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Cash loan (no interest)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Food or grain gift	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Grain loan (no interest)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Seed gift	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Seed loan	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5

Type of assistance received	Before safety net Program		After safety net Program		Reason for not receiving assistance after inclusion in safety net program
	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Free labour	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Free use of oxen or oxen or plough (for farming)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Free use of pack animals (for transport)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5
Other (specify)	1	2	1	2	1 2 3 4 5

Codes: Reason for not giving assistance after inclusion in safety net program

- 1-Being impoverished
- 2-Due to drought/bad harvest
- 3- being informed about the inclusion of the household in safety net program
- 4- Refused to receive b cause of inclusion by the safety net program
- 5- Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

### G. Formal Transfers

(28) In the last year, what assistance did your household receive from government or aid agencies?

Type of assistance received	Amount	Programme/ Provider
Free food aid	___(Kg)	1 2 3 4
Free cash	___(Birr)	1 2 3 4
Food- - employment	___(Kg)	1 2 3 4
Cash- - employment	___(Birr)	1 2 3 4
Free seeds or tools	___(Kg)	1 2 3 4
Free fertilizer	___kg___Birr ___(kg)	1 2 3 4
Credit/ Loan	___(Birr)	1 2 3 4
Livestock	___(Number)	1 2 3 4
Other (specify)	___	1 2 3 4

Codes: Programme/provider

- 1- Safety Net Programme (SNP)
- 2- Food Security Programme (FSP)
- 3- Other Government Programme
- 4- Don't know

## II. Asset inventory

(29) How many of the following assets does your household own? (if none, write 0)

For livestock, include any animals that belong to you, but are being raised by other households. Do not include any animals that you are rearing for someone else but do not belong to you.

Asset	Number Owned to day	Number Owned before inclusion in SNP	Cost of Replacing One (Birr)	If the number owned today is increased or decreased compared to before inclusion in SNP, why? <i>(circle all that apply)</i>
	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)
Livestock				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Oxen				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Bulls				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Cows				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Heifers				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Calves				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Sheep				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Goats				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Donkeys				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mules				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Horses				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Camels				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Poultry				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Productive assets				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Plough				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Pickle (machid)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Pick axe (doma)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Axe (metrebia)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Loe (mekotkocha)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Spade (akefa)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Traditional beehive				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Modern beehive				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Water pump (hand/foot)				1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

I. Food Security

(34) During last year (1998 E.C), did your household suffer any shortage of food to eat? (Circle one)

Yes 1	No 2
-------	------

Which months in the last year did your household have problems satisfying its food needs? (Circle all that apply)

2005					2006									
May	Apr	Mar	Feb	Jan	Dec	Nov	Oct	Sep	Aug	Jul	Jun	May	Apr	Mar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

(35) During the worst month last year, how many times a day did the adults and children in your households eat?

		Number of meals per day (Circle one for each row)				
Adults		0	1	2	3	4
Children (-School- / non- infants)	working.	0	1	2	3	4

Code: 0- sometimes passed a whole day without eating anything.

(36) Household Expenditure Indicate the average household expenditure in one month for the following lists of items

	Items	Average household Expenditure in One month before joining the PSNP (amount in Birr)	Average household Expenditure in One month after Joining the PSNP
1	Household consumption (food and related items)		
2	Industrial commodities		
3	Social services (such as for children, education, health etc)		
4	Expenses related to social institutions (Iddir, mehaber, etc)		
5	Saving		
6	If other (specify)		

K. Targeting

(38) Has your household received any food or cash from the Government Safety Net Programme since March 2005 (Circle one)?

Yes 1	No 2
-------	------

If the household has received food or cash but does not know the source of Programme, circle here DK

If Yes, DK, continue to Section K1

If No, go to Section K2

I. Food Security

(34) During last year (1998 E.C), did your household suffer any shortage of food to eat? (Circle one)

Yes 1 No 2

Which months in the last year did your household have problems satisfying its food needs? (Circle all that apply)

2005					2006									
May	Apr	Mar	Feb	Jan	Dec	Nov	Oct	Sep	Aug	Jul	Jun	May	Apr	Mar
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15

(35) During the worst month last year, how many times a day did the adults and children in your households eat?

	Number of meals per day (Circle one for each row)				
Adults	0	1	2	3	4
Children (-School- / non- infants) working.	0	1	2	3	4

Code: 0= sometimes passed a whole day without eating anything.

(36) Household Expenditure Indicate the average household expenditure in one month for the following lists of items

	Items	Average household Expenditure in One month before joining the PSNP (amount in Birr)	Average household Expenditure in One month after Joining the PSNP
1	Household consumption (food and related items)		
2	Industrial commodities		
3	Social services (such as for children, education, health etc)		
4	Expenses related to social institutions (dddir, mehaber, etc)		
5	Saving		
6	If other (specify)		

K. Targeting

(38) Has your household received any food or cash from the government

Safety Net Programme since March 2005 (Circle one)

Yes 1 No 2

If the household has received food or cash but does not know the source or Programme, circle here DK

If Yes or DK, continue to Section K1.

If No, go to Section K2.





(44) Why do you think your household was selected to receive food or cash from the government Safety Net Programme?

Circle all that apply	Reason
1	We have no labor
2	We are landless
3	We have a small landholding
4	We have poor quality land
5	We don't produce enough food
6	The household head is female
7	There were no clear selection criteria
	We don't know

Circle all that apply	Reason
9	We own no livestock, or only a few livestock
10	We have no source of off-farm income, or very little off-farm income
11	Members of our household are disabled or mentally challenged
12	We have no family support or remittances from relatives
13	We have not received other government assistance (e.g. food aid)
14	Our household is participating in other food security programmes
15	Political commitment
16	Size of family or number of dependants

(45) Who decided which households in the community would receive the food or cash?

Circle all that apply	Reason
	The D.A decided
	Kebele Food security Task Force
	Kebele Council or Administration
	Woreda Food Security Task Force
	Woreda Council or Administration

Circle all that apply	Reason
6	Community Food Security Task Force
7	The community (We all decided together)
8	Don't know
9	There was no selection- everyone in the village received something
	Other (specify): _____

(46) Do you think the decision was fair? (Circle one)

Yes 1	No 2
-------	------

L. Use of PSNP Cash or Food

(47) If you received free cash from the safety Net Programme, or worked on a cash-for-work project in the last years, what did you do with all the money you received?

*(Circle all that apply)*

Consumption items	Yes	No	Birr
Bought staple food (e.g. grain)	1	2	
Bought other food (e.g. meat)	1	2	
Bought groceries (Salt, sugar, coffee, soap, kerosene, etc)			
Bought clothes or cloth	1	2	
Gave some cash to help others	1	2	
Lent some money to others	1	2	
Paid taxes	1	2	
Met social obligations (specify):	1	2	

Investment items	Yes	No	Birr
Debt repayment	1	2	
Bought seeds for farming	1	2	
Bought fertilizer for farming			
Paid for health costs	1	2	
Paid for education costs	1	2	
Used for business (e.g. trading)	1	2	
Bought livestock (Specify):	1	2	
Other (specify):	1	2	

(48) If you received free food aid from the safety net Programme, or worked on a food-for-work project, what did you do with all the food you received? *(Circle all that apply)*

Consumption items	Yes	No
Sold all the food for cash	1	2
Sold the food to buy other food	1	2
Sold some of the food and ate the rest		
Gave all the food away to others	1	2
Needed it more		
Gave some of the food away and ate the rest	1	2

Investment items	Yes	No
We ate all the food	1	2
We gave it to livestock for feed	1	2
We gave all the food to others as a payment for something		
We gave some of the food as a payment, and ate the rest	1	2
Other (specify): _____	1	2

**M. Asset protection and Building**

	Trends in Assets	Yes- because of PSNP	Yesfor otherthan PSNP	No
(49)	Have you enrolled more of your children in school	1	2	3
(50)	Have you kept your children in school for longer after than before the SNP?	1	2	3
(51)	Have you used healthcare facilities after the SNP than before?	1	2	3
(52)	Have you consumed more food or better food after than before the SNP?	1	2	3
(53)	Have you avoided having to sell household assets to buy food after SNP?	1	2	3
(54)	Have you avoided having to use your savings to buy food after SNP?	1	2	3
(55)	Have you retained your own food production to eat yourselves this year, rather than selling it?	1	2	3
(56)	Have you acquired any new household assets (e.g. livestock, roof, bicycle, radio, plough, land)?	1	2	3
(57)	Have you acquired new skills or knowledge?	1	2	3

(58) Within your household, who actually collected most or all of the food or cash from the safety Net Programme? [Copy ID Code from A2.]

(59) Within your household, who decided how to use the cash or food from the Safety Net Programme?

[Circle one only]

Codes: 1 = I decided alone

1      2      3      4           

2 = I consulted with my spouse

3 = my spouse decided

N. Payments

(60). Was there any problem regarding payments [Yes 2. No 3. I don't know]

(61). If yes, what do you think was the most important one?

(Circle all that apply)	Problem regarding payments	yes	no
1	Payment were not made on time	1	2
2	The amount of cash paid is small	1	2
3	The quantity of food ration was small	1	2
4	The quality of ration was low	1	2
5	Some non-union individuals have received cash	1	2
6	PA leaders took part of the payments and used for other purposes	1	2
7	Women were paid less than men	1	2

(62). Do you personally agree with the distribution of food as a form of payment? (Circle one only)

1. Strongly agree      2. Agree  
 3. Strongly disagree      4. Disagree      5. Indifferent

(63). If you agree, why? (Max. of 2 responses on order of priority)

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
 2. \_\_\_\_\_

(64). If you don't agree, why? (Max. of 2 responses on order of priority)

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
 2. \_\_\_\_\_

(65). If you don't agree, what alternative form of payment do you suggest?

1. Cash payment      2. Payment in food      3. Mix of half food and half cash

(66). If you suggest cash payment, what do you think should be the rate?

1. Wage equivalent to the local rate for daily labour  
 2. Wage equivalent to the minimum government wage  
 3. Cash equivalent to the food ration (as determined by the prices in local market)  
 4. I have no idea

5. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

(67). If you suggest payment in kind, what kind of goods or services do you expect?



K2. Ask if the respondent is from Excluded (Non- ) Households

74. Why was your household not selected to receive food or cash from the government Safety Net Programme? [Circle all that apply]

no	Reason	What we were told	What I believe
1	We are not so poor as the selected households	1	2
2	We have enough food	1	2
3	We own livestock	1	2
4	We are landless	1	2
5	We have some land/enough land/ or better quality land	1	2
6	We receive family support or remittances	1	2
7	We have other income	1	2
8	Our household did not receive food aid or emergency cash transfer in previous years	1	2
9	I don't know - Friends or relatives among the decision-makers	1	2
10	We are not participating in other food security programs	1	2
11	We are not registered on the Kebele household list	1	2
12	Our household is not able to work on PSNP projects	1	2
13	Our household is not willing to work on PSNP projects	1	2
14	We are not committed to be a member of political party	1	2
15	I don't know	1	2
16	Other reason (Specify): _____	1	2

(75). Who decided which households in the community would receive the food or cash?

Circle all that apply	Who decided?
1	The DA decided
2	Kebele Food security Task Force
3	Kebele Council or Administration
4	Woreda Food Security Task Force
5	Woreda Council or Administration

[Circle all that apply]	Who decided?
6	Community Food Security Task Force
7	The community (we all decided together)
8	Don't know
9	There was no selection - everyone in the village received something
	Other (specify): _____

Yes 1 | No 2

(76) Do you think the decision was fair? (Circle one)

(77) If No (not fair), did you complain? (Circle one)

(78) If YES (complained), who did you complain to the concerned person or office?

Circle all that apply	Reason
1	Kebele authorities
2	Woreda authorities
3	Zonal authorities
4	Regional authorities
5	Rapid Response Team
6	Community meeting
7	Church or mosque leaders
8	NGO, WFP or another organization (specify: _____)
9	Other (specify: _____)

[Circle all that apply]	Reason
10	There is no one to complain to
11	We don't know who to complain to
12	It would not do any good to complain
13	I am too frightened or intimidated to complain
14	
15	The decision-makers are the same people who hear the appeals Other reason (specify):

(79) If YES (complained), was your complaint successful? (Circle one)

Yes 1	No 2
-------	------

End of interview for non-households

Thank the interviewee for their time.

Thank You Very Much.

## **1. Check List For Key Informant Interview**

1. What are the achievements and gaps on institutional arrangements? With relation to arrangements, frame work, and roles and responsibility and key capacities starting from woreda to community level.
2. Is there any problem related to targeting process (in relation to beneficiary selection criteria and decision making process? If so, why?
3. Do you clearly know the selection criteria and decision making body at Kebele and community level?
4. Explain the problems, causes and alternative measures related to payment (amount, timing, mode and others)?
5. Do you have information or suggestion on monitoring and evaluation? When and how is going on?
6. Can you explain the contribution of safety net program on household asset protection?
7. Can you describe the negative and positive effect of the PSNP in respect to social, economical, political and environmental?
8. What measures do you recommend to scaling achievements and overcome the problems prevailing in the implementation process?

## **2. Issues For Focus Group Discussion**

1. Beneficiary selection criteria: *the implementation guide line Vs the practice.*
2. The decision making process: who decides and how?
3. Inclusion and exclusion of household from the program.
4. Payment related issues (timing, amount, and choices)
5. Contribution of the PSNP for household asset protection.
6. The relationship between productive safety net program and informal safety net.
7. Productive safety net program and dependency attitude.

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7. Productive safety net program and dependency attitude.

**List of Organizations/Institutions represented by Key Informants by Category**

Category	Institutions/Organizations	Remarks
Governmental Organizations	Hadiya Zone Agriculture and Rural Development Department	
	Hadiya Zone Finance and Economic Development Department	
	Lemo Woreda Administrations	
	Lemo Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office	
	Lemo Woreda Food Security Desk	
	Lemo Woreda Finance and Economic Development Office	
	Kebele Administration Councils	In the five kebeles
Non-Governmental Organizations	Love in Action Ethiopia	Local NGOs
	Hadiya Zone Dev'ty Association	
	Churches	
	Eddirs	
Individuals	Opinion leaders like Teachers, Elders, etc	
	Local level political party members	

# **Annex-4 Institutional Framework, Membership, Roles and Responsibilities of the Institutions and Key Capacity Issues)**

## **I. Institutional Framework**

The Safety Net Programme is a component of the larger Food Security Programme. Food security line agencies at every level of government will be accountable for the oversight and coordination of the Programme, with implementation of programme activities being undertaken by woredas and kebeles, line ministry/agencies and other partners. Within the aforementioned context, the following institutions comprise the institutional framework:

### **Federal Level**

- (i) The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD)
- (ii) Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB)
- (iii) Federal Food Security Steering Committee (FFSC)
- (iv) Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA)
- (v) Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)

### **Regional Level**

- i) Regional Council/Cabinet
- ii) Regional Food Security Steering Committee (RFFSC)
- iii) Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD)
- iv) Regional Food Security Coordination Office (RFSCO)
- v) Regional Line Bureaus

### **Woreda Level**

The Woreda is the key level of government that determines needs, and undertakes planning and implementation of Safety Net activities.

- i) Woreda Council/Cabinet
- ii) Woreda Food Security Task Force (WFSTF)
- iii) Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office (WARDO)
- iv) Woreda Food Security Desks (WFSD)
- v) Woreda Sectoral Offices (Line Offices) These include woreda offices and desks of Rural Roads, Water, Natural Resource Management, Education, Health, Cooperative Promotion and Women's Affairs
- vi) Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development (WoFED)

### **Kebele Level**

- i) Kebele Council/Cabinet
- ii) Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF)

### **Community Level**

- i) Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF)
- ii) Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Donor Agencies
- iii) In addition to the above governmental agencies, NGOs and Donor agencies are recognized with certain roles in the implementation process of the Safety Net Programme.

## **2. Membership, Roles and responsibilities are envisaged for key government agencies at each level.**

### **3.2.1 Federal Level**

#### *(i) The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD)*

The MoARD is responsible for oversight and coordination of the Safety Net Programme through the Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB). Its roles include:

- provide technical support for planning and implementation of Safety Net activities, including the development of technical guidelines, and training, including for specific public works and based on request from FSCB and the regions;
- liaising with other line ministries (water, social affairs, etc) and development partners for technical assistance, for example, with respect to pastoral areas, joint integrated efforts, training and technical guidelines, as necessary and based upon request.

*(ii) Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB)*

The FFSCB reports directly to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Its duties and responsibilities are to:

- Coordinate and oversee the Safety Net Programme to ensure that the programme meets food security objectives of the country;
- Allocate PSNP resources to regions and ensure that funds reach implementing woredas, and that they are properly utilized.
- Ensure appropriate linkages of the Safety net Programme with other Food Security Programme Interventions.
- Hold quarterly meetings with regional food security offices to review progress of the Safety Net Programme and discuss related safety net issues;
- Review and provide feedback on reports submitted by regional food security offices on the implementation of regional Safety Net Programmes;
- Provide technical support to regional food security offices on coordination and implementation of Safety Net projects;
- Mobilize technical assistance as needed from sectoral agencies;
- Monitor overall capacity to implement PSNP activities. Identify gaps. Ensure mechanisms are in place to address any gaps in capacity.
- Facilitate regional implementation of the Environment and Social Management Framework
- Facilitate information exchange and document experiences and lessons learned across regions;
- Submit periodic progress reports on implementation of the Safety Net Programme to MoARD.
- Allocate safety net resources to regions, and ensure that they are properly utilized.
- Implement the Rapid Response Mechanism described in Annex 4.
- Monitor and evaluate adherence to PSNP procedures and guidelines, effectiveness of utilization of resources, and programme impact;
- Update PSNP guidelines and operational mechanisms in response to M&E findings, RRM and emerging issues, & disseminate as necessary

*(iii) Federal Food Security Steering Committee (FFSSC)*

The Federal Food Security Steering Committee (FFSSC) provides overall advice to ensure the proper implementation of food security strategies and programmes, including the Safety Net Programme. The FFSSC is made up of representatives from MoARD (chair of FFSSC), the Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau (secretary of FFSSC), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), the Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency (DPPA), the Ministry of Water Resources Development, Office of Women's Affairs, the Regional Food Security Coordination Offices, and the representatives of the donor community (currently at 4). Its duties and responsibilities are to:

- Offer overall advice to meet food security objectives;
- Provide periodic recommendations to the MoARD;
- Hold quarterly meetings, with a specific agenda for safety net issues;
- Assess the resource contribution of the Government and donors;
- Liaise closely with the agricultural and natural resources main divisions of the MoARD with regards to the provision of technical support to regions (e.g. training, development of technical manuals, and guidelines), and
- Perform annual review of the Food Security Programme and forward recommendations for implementation;
- Assess performance of monitoring and evaluation system including the Rapid Response Mechanism

*(iv) Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA)*

*The DPPA's primary mandate is to respond to food and other basic needs of people affected by acute, unpredictable disasters under emergency appeal circumstances. However, given its substantial logistic*

capacity and experience with management of food aid, as well as the relevance of some of its regular activities such as the EWS to the safety net program, it will provide the following additional support: -

- Provide National Early Warning Information;
- Participate, when conducted, in Food Security Needs Assessments for the Safety Net Programme;
- Assist on logistic issues for food resources when needed. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will give instructions to the DPPA to fulfil this function. The logistics responsibility of the DPPA will include warehousing, tendering, awarding, and contracting transporters and effecting payments.
- Participate in annual reviews conducted by MoARD to identify areas where coordination needs to be improved;
- Coordinate with FSCB to ensure no gaps emerge between the PSNP and emergency assistance.

v) *Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED)*

In the context of the Safety Net Programme, MoFED is responsible for disbursing safety net resources to regions based on the size of the targeted food insecure population and in line with requests submitted by FSCB. In addition, MoFED assumes the usual financial responsibilities under the normal government financial system (e.g. reporting, auditing, etc.).

### 3.2.2 Regional Level

i) *Regional Council/Cabinet*

The Regional Council/Cabinet is the highest decision-making body at the regional level. Its major responsibilities related to the Safety Net Programme are to review and approve:

- Food security and safety net annual plans and budgets submitted by woredas through the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD) based on the size of chronic food insecure population; and
- Annual and biannual progress reports on implementation of the regional Safety Net Programme and utilization of its budget.

ii) *Regional Food Security Steering Committee (RFSSC)*

The Regional Food Security Steering Committee (RFSSC) provides advice to ensure the proper implementation of food security strategies and programmes at the regional level. The RFSSC also ensures effective integration of the regional Safety Net Programme into the regional development plan and participates in monitoring and evaluation of Safety Net Programme activities including the Rapid Response Mechanism. The RFSSC is made up of representatives from the Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (chair of RFSSC), the Regional Food Security Coordination Bureau (secretary of RFSSC), the Bureau of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), the Bureau of Capacity Building, the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Bureau, the Bureau of Water Resources, the Bureau of Natural Resources and Land Administration, the Bureau of Cooperatives Promotion; and NGO representatives.

iii) *Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development (BoARD)*

Its duties include:

- Overseeing the integration of safety net activities into the Food Security Programme and the regional rural development strategy;
- Providing overall guidance to the Regional Food Security Office and line bureaus to ensure coordination on planning and implementation of the regional Safety Net Programme;
- Disbursing periodic safety net budget to woredas and line bureaus based on the annual allocation approved by the Regional Council;
- Providing technical support to regional food security offices on implementation of Safety Net and related activities;
- Ensuring efficient procurement where applicable (see Section 5.8).
- Reviewing and providing feedback on reports submitted by Regional Food Security Coordination Offices on implementation of safety net interventions.

iv) *Regional Food Security Coordination Office (RFSCO)*

The Regional Food Security Coordination Office (RFSCO) reports to the Regional BoARD. However, it is also technically accountable to the Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau within the Safety Net framework. The RFSCO acts as secretary of the RFSSC. Its responsibilities also include-

- Developing and consolidating annual implementation plans and budgets for regional Safety Net Programmes in line with proposals from woredas and line bureaus;
- Mobilize technical assistance as needed from the regional line bureaus;
- Identify and monitor capacity to implement PSNP activities at regional, woreda and kebele levels. Ensure mechanisms are in place to address any gaps in capacity.
- Ensuring implementation of the Environment and Social Management Framework
- Holding quarterly review meetings with government and non-governmental agencies involved in implementation of the Safety Net Programme in the regions, to monitor and coordinate safety net interventions;
- Approving NGO plans of safety net activities, budget and beneficiaries, and consolidating these into regional safety net plans;
- Collecting and reviewing progress reports from woredas, line bureaus and other agencies engaged in safety net interventions, and providing feedback to those organizations;
- Coordinating monitoring and evaluation; and
- Preparing quarterly and annual progress reports on implementation of the Safety Net Programme for submission to the Regional BoARD, as well as to the Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau.
- Ensuring to the extent possible a co-ordinated use of emergency resources for public works.
- Establish and implement the Rapid Response Mechanism described in Annex 4.

#### v) Regional Line Bureaus

These agencies:

- Incorporate PSNP activities in their yearly programmes/action-plans based upon the specific opportunities PSNP resources represent in terms of labour-based activities, capacity building and availability of supplementary non-wage costs.
- Initiate woredas LOs to include PSNP plans in their yearly programme activities/plans, including capacity building, and training in particular.
- Coordinate with RFSCO the timing of various capacity efforts and ensure timely technical support and procurement of essential items.
- Provide technical assistance to Regional Food Security Coordination Office and woreda line offices in planning, implementation and monitoring of Safety Net projects; and
- Undertake annual reviews of technical specifications and work norms of Safety Net activities to assist in enhancing the safety net technical manual.

### 3.2.3 Woreda Level

The Woreda is the key level of government that determines needs, and undertakes planning and implementation of Safety Net activities.

#### i) Woreda Council/Cabinet

The Woreda Council is the highest decision-making body at woreda level and is responsible for the allocation of safety net resources to kebeles in line with size of vulnerable population and based on the recommendations of the Woreda Food Security Task Force.

#### ii) Woreda Food Security Task Force (WFSTF)

This committee will not duplicate existing similar structures, but will build upon previous institutions such as the Woreda Development Committee or the Woreda Disaster Prevention Committee, where relevant, and will be strengthened as necessary. Where such committees do not exist the WFSTF should be made up of the head of the Woreda Rural Development Office or the Woreda Administration (who acts as chairperson), and representatives from the Woreda offices of: Food Security (who acts as secretary), Finance, Natural Resource Office, Capacity Building, Agriculture and Rural Development, the DPPB, Women's Affairs, and NGOs. Inclusion of women in the committee is encouraged. The Woreda FSTF's duties within the Safety Net Programme are to:

- Review and recommend kebele annual Safety Net plans for approval, including the total number of beneficiaries of the Safety Net Programme;
- Consolidate annual woreda safety net plans and budget and prepare proposals for resource allocation to be submitted to Woreda Council.

- Ensure close collaboration with Regional and Woreda Food Security Offices and Woreda Council;
- Participate in monitoring and evaluation of safety net activities, including the Rapid Response Mechanism.
- Provide direction and assistance to kebeles in establishing and training KFSTFs.
- Hold quarterly progress review meeting on safety net activities and provide implementing agencies with feedback; and
- Review monthly progress reports on safety net activities.

#### iii) Woreda Rural Development Office (WRDO)

The Head of WRDO acts as chair of the Woreda Food Security Task Force. Other functions of the WRDO are to:

- Oversee integration of Safety Net activities into the Food Security Programme and the woreda rural development strategy;
- Manage and organize activities for both safety net beneficiaries and additional beneficiaries due to emergency (the latter in conjunction with DPPB).
- Coordinate implementation agencies involved in the Safety Net Programme;
- Receive and review monitoring reports from Woreda FSTF, and forward to the Woreda Council;
- Ensure provision of technical input from Woreda sectoral offices to the safety net implementing agencies.
- Submit monthly progress reports to the Woreda FSTF; and
- Maintain accurate records of kebele safety net activities and beneficiary lists.

#### iv) Woreda Food Security Desks (WFSD)

The WFSDs are responsible for coordination of Safety Net activities and are technically accountable to the RFSCOs. Their duties include:

- Act as Secretary for the Woreda FSTF and for the Early Warning Committee, and as a focal point for all Safety Net issues in the woreda;
- Ensure that a pipeline of projects is prepared (including those to be implemented during the annual programme cycle and those to be implemented in case of emergency) in consultation with the Kebele Food Security Task Force;
- Mobilise technical assistance as needed from woreda sectoral offices;
- Undertake regular monitoring and evaluation in coordination with woreda sectoral offices;
- Hold quarterly technical review meeting with implementing agencies;
- Submit monthly progress reports to the Woreda Rural Development Office;
- Maintain accurate records of kebele Safety Net activities and list of beneficiaries; and
- Provide information on target areas and selected beneficiaries to sectoral offices and other agencies involved in planning and implementing Safety Net activities.

#### v) Woreda Sectoral Offices (Line Offices)

These include woreda offices and desks of Agriculture, Rural Roads, Water, Natural Resource Management, Education, Health, Cooperative Promotion and Women's Affairs. The responsibilities of these agencies include:

- Incorporate PSNP activities in their yearly programmes/action-plans based upon the specific opportunities. PSNP resources represent in terms of labour-based activities, capacity building and availability of supplementary non-wage costs.
- Provide technical assistance and training to technical personnel and Kebele staff in planning and implementation of Safety Net activities;
- Consolidate and compiling the proposals of the Kebele Food Security Task Force to incorporate into the woreda Safety Net plan;
- Undertake project screening in accordance with the Environment and Social Management Framework;
- Prepare activity implementation plans and request budget for implementation;
- Implement safety net activities at kebele and community levels;
- Conduct monitoring and evaluation of activities, in collaboration with other relevant woreda level stakeholders; and
- Prepare and submit quarterly progress and financial reports to WRDO.

#### VI) WOREDA OFFICE OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (WoFED)

The WoFED is responsible for ensuring that:

- The budget for the Safety Net Programme is received in a timely manner at the woreda level to guarantee smooth implementation of approved plan and activities; and
- Timely disbursement of the safety net budget is made to sectoral offices for safety net activities and the purchase of relevant equipment and materials, and to the implementing bodies.

#### 3.2.4 Kebele Level

##### *Kebele Council/Cabinet*

This body is the highest political decision-making body in the kebele. The kebele council/cabinet will have the following responsibilities:

- Approve kebele Safety Net beneficiaries; ✓
- Identify people eligible for public works and direct support;
- By participating with the people, identify activities for Safety Net purposes;
- Approve the kebele Safety Net plan;
- Visit shelf projects and adapt them to the Safety Net plan as required;
- Create an appropriate atmosphere for proper payment to the beneficiaries;
- Ensure that the Safety Net programme is linked, and consistent with, other food security interventions;
- Ensure that each Safety Net beneficiary household participates in other food security interventions as appropriate;
- Maintain records on the status of beneficiary households and keep the community informed;
- Develop monthly reports to the woreda cabinet;
- Oversee food security activities in the kebele, including those of the Safety Net programme;
- Hear and consider individuals' complaints or appeals regarding Safety Net matters;
- Participate as required in the monitoring and evaluation system for the food security programmes.

##### *Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF)*

The KFSTF is a decision-making body that oversees all planning and implementation of safety net activities. It is formed in each Peasant Association (PA) or Kebele and builds upon previous institutional structures such as Kebele Development Committee or Kebele Disaster Prevention Committee. KFSTF members include the Kebele Administration, Development Agents, Community Based Health Workers (CBHW), Teachers, Youth associations, etc. The minimum composition of the KFSTF includes: a Chairperson of the Kebele council, a member from the Kebele Council, one or more Development Agents (DAs) as available in the PA; three elected representatives of women's groups; and two elected representatives from elders and youth (one from each group).

The KFSTF, in the context of the Safety Net Programme, is responsible for:

- Agreement with the woreda on the general implementation procedures and roles and responsibilities of concerned individuals;
- Community mobilisation to identify and prioritize community needs;
- Plan prioritised activities with community members;
- The KFSTF will support DAs planning work with identified communities following participatory watershed planning guidelines (MOARD) and Line Bureaus specific proposals (schools, etc)
- Based on such comprehensive local/community based development plans, specific activities will be selected to constitute the safety net plan.
- The KFSTF will strive to advocate for complementary resources and additional support for the activities indicated in the overall development plan, including mobilizing self-help efforts, and other FS and development programmes.
- Target beneficiaries and participants for public works and direct support based on community targeting exercises;
- Prepare Kebele Safety Net Plan in consultation with woreda sectoral offices, including proposed activities, and identify needs for technical assistance;
- Maintain minutes of KFSTF meetings on Safety Net issues, Kebele Safety Net activities, list of participants and progress reports;
- Establish and train of Community Food Security Task Force; and
- Participate in monitoring and evaluation of safety net activities including the Rapid Response Mechanism

- Following review of the results of monitoring and evaluation, the membership of the KFSTF may be reviewed and modified in accordance with the normal government procedure.

### 3.2.5 Community Level

#### *Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF)*

The Community Food Security Task Force's primary responsibility is identification of beneficiaries of the Safety Net Programme. Its functions also include mobilisation of the community for participatory planning exercises. It is composed of a representative from the Kebele FSTF; a Development Agent (if available in the village); two or three women's representatives (elected); two or three men's representatives (elected); a youth representative (elected); and an elder's representative (elected). The responsibilities of the CFSTF are to:

- Identify the names of participants in the Safety Net Programme in their respective villages according to selection guidelines and local community knowledge;
- Undertake a needs assessment, and identify those households who can participate in public works and those without sufficient labour (particularly female-headed households), or other support who will need direct support;
- Have the proposed list of participants commented on and endorsed by the general meeting of the village residents;
- Finalize the list of participants and submit it to the Kebele FSTF for verification and action;
- Prepare a pipeline of projects, including those to be implemented during the annual programme cycle and those to be implemented in case of emergency, with technical assistance from implementing agencies and NGOs; and
- Monitor periodically the public works to ensure that they are undertaken as prioritised.
- Participate as required in the regular review of safety net beneficiaries.

### 3.2.6 Role of NGOs

Implementation of the Safety Net Programme should utilize and benefit from the participation of non-governmental actors having relevant capacity, experience and expertise.

- The Safety Net Programme is a social security intervention and typically the government has the primary responsibility for implementation of such programmes.
- Given that the nature of the Programme is to guarantee transfers to chronically food insecure households, it is important that Programme capital and administrative cost is kept to the programme norm of a maximum of 20%.
- NGO resources should be additional to government safety net resources.
- NGOs should abide by the Government's Programme Implementation Manual.
- The government welcomes NGO participation in the Safety Net Programme if NGOs meet the above criteria.

NGOs should consult the government to discuss potential options for their involvement in the Programme, within the above guidelines.

### 3.2.7 Role of Donors

The Government's financing partners have several roles in the Safety Net Programme, including:

- Providing resources at the appropriate time;
- Supporting capacity building and providing technical assistance at all levels, when requested by the government;
- Documenting and disseminating lessons learned and international experience;
- Organizing joint review meetings with Government to review progress on implementation;
- Providing advice by participating in the Federal Food Security Steering Committee; and
- Participating in review missions, including site visits, monitoring and evaluation and the Rapid Response Mechanism.

## 3. Key Capacities for Implementing the Safety Net Programme

The Productive Safety Net Programme is multi-faceted. When implementation occurs at such a scale, and especially using a full cash-based system, proper planning and capacity are essential. Woredas have different capacities to develop and implement cash management systems. The following is a list of critical capacity dimensions that woredas need to

develop in order to implement the Safety Net Programme. The second group of recommended capacities below will enhance the quality of programme implementation.

#### i) Critical Capacity Dimensions of Woredas

- Presence of food security and DPP desk officers, or an Agriculture and Rural Development Office, at the woreda level;
- Finance officers in the woreda.
- Availability of technical staff in the woreda; natural resource specialists (e.g. soil and water conservation); field technicians.
- Storage facilities such as Rubb Halls and warehouses (DPPA, NGO, cooperative, private storage capacity).
- Sufficient numbers of cashiers at woreda to visit multiple kebele sites for payment.
- Presence of sufficient DAs in Safety Net kebeles.
- Availability of store/warehouse keepers at storage sites.
- Availability of means of transport, e.g. bicycles, mules, motorbikes, camels, pick-up trucks.
- Facilitate arrangements for regular and timely repair and maintenance of vehicles.
- Kebele-level participatory plans identifying community priorities.

#### ii) Recommended Capacities

- Availability of infrastructure, e.g. rural roads (RR10), bridges that link woredas to zonal centres,
- Availability of banks at zonal centre or certified rural micro-finance institutions (MFIs) at woreda level.
- Availability of telecommunications at least at the woreda centre;

As stated in the manual, Woreda and Kebele level staff and safety net personnel need to have sufficient documentation related to safety nets, and necessary planning and technical guidelines. If woredas do not have these minimum capacities they will be assisted to acquire them before the transfer activities start. However, the programme also recognizes, given that woredas have different capacities, they should implement safety net activities that are appropriate for their level of capacity. As woredas develop more capacity, they will move towards improving the integration of safety net plans into Woreda Development Plans, and implementing more effective safety net activities and increasing the share of transfers provided to households in cash versus food as appropriate.

### 4. Monitoring and Evaluation System

#### Monitoring

The safety net programme is expected to monitor the following information:

- Community needs (number of households and individuals deemed eligible for both public work and direct support) in annual assessments
- Public works participation and types, quality and quantity of community projects undertaken
- Direct transfers delivered and participation in community activities designed for individuals receiving the support
- Food price monitoring
- Food stock monitoring
- Overall budgetary flows including administration and procurement as well as wages and transfers as indicated in the section on financial management

The steps and activities needed for this monitoring may include:

- The number and composition of household deemed food insecure need to be reported annually. This reporting includes details on the assignment of households into public works and direct support categories, in the latter case, households, which are expected to participate in alternative programmes, should be indicated. This should be prepared by each Kebele and aggregated at the woreda level for reporting onwards.
- In the second and subsequent years woredas, need to report on the trends in levels of food security and reasons for progress or lack of progress in overall levels of food security.
- Site managers at each public work project need to provide regular lists of participation to Kebele officials as part of operation and payment procedures. For the purpose of monitoring, this information should be compiled and reported to woreda and subsequently regional offices on a monthly basis. This report should include both data on participation, as well as on numbers of projects initiated and completed and the labour days for each completed project.
- Monitoring should include price data.
- In those woredas where food is provided to beneficiaries, the number of monthly food stocks in woreda storerooms should be reported to the regional offices.
- Financial reporting follows standard government procedures.

#### 3.3.5.2 Evaluation

Evaluation differs from monitoring in that the latter is a regular flow of information on inputs utilization and programme participation while former includes both assessment of the success and constraints of process and analysis of the impact of programme components on outcome measures. Monitoring is the responsibility of each management unit, while evaluation is generally undertaken by partners, including independent units, and based on a sub-sample of the overall programme.

#### Process Evaluation

Process evaluation is expected to cover a sub-set of beneficiary communities selected on a sample basis from each woreda. It is anticipated that it will start within 6 months of programme initiation, in order to ascertain the effectiveness of the process of beneficiary selection and project prioritization. This includes an understanding both the role of the woreda council as well as of the general population.

Topics to be taken into consideration may include:

- How the needs assessment was undertaken; was gender given consideration?
- Was any pressure applied to include or exclude households on criteria other than food security?
- Did the appeals procedure operate as intended: how were projects selected; are the selected projects designed to create public assets?
- Were the project documents submitted by the kebele to the council technically sound?
- How was the technical assessment undertaken?

It is expected that terms of reference for this evaluation will be drawn up by federal and/or regional authorities, so that the evaluation team can perform this task within the 6 month target. These terms of reference should indicate the procedures to collect candid information from the wider community (including individuals not directly participating in the project) as well as from local authorities. Procedures to include women as well as any minorities within a woreda should be outlined in these TOR. Each team of evaluator assigned to specific regions will prepare a report based on this process evaluation, to be circulated to the federal government and all contributing donors.

#### 3) Technical Assessment of Public Works Projects

Annual visits will be carried out by regional/zone and woreda experts to a sample of public works sites to monitor technical compliance and to contribute to technical lesson learning and exchange of experience. These visits should include an assessment of:

- Allocation of activities to the different categories by the woredas
- Implementation of environmental management procedures
- Adequacy of technical designs
- Adequacy of supervision
- Adequacy of maintenance plans
- Level of interaction between FSCB and woreda experts, and between woreda experts and regional level bureaus, in the implementation of the works

The visits should follow up on aspects technical issues identified during the RRTs' routine visits to the woredas. The FSCB should similarly organize an annual assessment of public works either in conjunction with the zonal/regional visits stated above, or apart to ascertain the quality of implementation of public works and to propose any remedial actions that may be necessary or to encourage lesson learning across woredas and regions.

#### 4) Quantitative and Qualitative assessments of Project Impact

A beneficiary assessment will be undertaken two and a half years after the programme initiation. This will use qualitative assessment methodologies to document how beneficiaries from a sample of food insecure woredas view the project, in terms of the contribution of the projects undertaken to the community welfare, as well as contribution of the employment and the transfers to food security. The assessment will also solicit suggestions for improvements in project design and modifications of procedures from these communities. The assessment of project benefits should be ascertained from both direct participants and other community members. This beneficiary assessment will explore the impact of components such as adult education as well as the larger public works component.

Two and a half years into the project a sample survey will be undertaken, based on data collected prior to programme implementation. This has two objectives. First, it will determine the incidence of benefits by tabulating the benefits obtained (both in terms of labour days provided and in direct transfers received) by level of welfare (assets and expenditures). This will indicate errors of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, analysis of this survey can be used to distinguish the net increase of labour for a household as well as reveal the impact of public works on other activities in a household. Second, the survey will assist in tracking overall trends in food security, although it will not be possible to isolate the impact of specific public works or the Safety Net projects from the general food security strategy.

*Annex-5 List of Kebele Administrations under the study  
area-Lemo Woreda*

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1	አጃ ጣኢሳ	31	ሀቀገላ ሠንጪ
2	ሊሳና ሴና	32	የሪግ
3	ታችኛው አምቢቻ	33	ጭንጎ
4	አምቢቻ ጉዳ	34	ቦንደልቻ ቆምቦጣ
5	ቃልሻ	35	ደቡብ በሌላቀበርቡያ
6	ላይኛው ኮዴ ዳና	36	ወገላ አበራ
7	ሊሳና ቁሳ	37	ሸሽ ግምባ
8	ሐይሴ	38	ሆሳዕና ከተማ
9	ሸቻና ሮማ	39	ቦቢቻ አሰላ
10	ሰራሳና ሮማ	40	አሾ ኩብሌጋ
11	ፎንቶ ከነማ	41	ክድግሳ
12	ሊሳና ከነማ	42	ጃባ
13	ታችኛው ከቤቻ	43	ሰዳማ ማርያም
14	ሰማን በሌላ ቀበርቡያ	44	ሸርግ ዳባንቻ
15	ታችኛው ኮዴ ዳና	45	መሰና ባቹ
16	ላይኛው ፎንቶ	46	ድግባ
17	አናሌግ	47	ጉራ ጠማ
18	አና በሌላ	48	ሸርግ ዳራ
19	ዳርሻ	49	ሸከቤራ
20	አና ጠጉ	50	ዲጃ ደማላ
21	ቢኤልገላ አምቢቻ	51	ቡቱና ቸቸዴንቻ
22	አገባ ላናቹ ሌንታ	52	በሌላ ከነማ
23	ታችኛው ፎንቶ		
24	ዳማላ ባልቡላ		
25	ፎንቶ ጠታ		
26			
27	ላይኛው ከቤቻ		
28	ሰማ አገራ		
29	ዳላንቻ በሌላ		
30	ሚንቻ አቱባ		
	AJO TAISSA		HAKAGALA SENFE
	LISANA SENA		YARIM
	TACHIGWAW AMBICHO		CHINGO
	AMBICHO GODE		BANDALICH KONBOIA
	KALISHA		N'BELESA K.B
	LAYIGWAW KODE DUNA		WOGILF ABERE
	LISANA KUSSA		SHASHAGIMBA
	HAIYSE		HOSSAANA
	SHACH ROMA		BOBICHO AIAIA
	LEREBA ROMA		ASHE QU BAEGA
	FONKO U.D		QEDIGISSA
	LISANA U.D		JAWE
	TACHIGWAW KEBELICHO		SADAMA MARIYANCHO
	N'BELESA K.B		SHURMIO DE FANCHIO
	TACHIGWAW K.D		MESENA BARO
	LARINAW BOWKO		DIGIBA
	ANA LEMO		GORATI MI
	ANA BELESA		SHURMIO DACHIO
	DARISH		SHOKBIRA
	ANA TIGO		DHO DAMALA
	BIHEGELA AMBICHO		BUQU NACHICHEVENCHIO
	ENTO LAF TO LENKA		BELESA U.D
	TACHIGNAW FONKO		
	DAMALA BALBUTA		
	FONKO FUKA		
	LAIYGNAW KABELICHO		
	HOMAGERA		
	DULANCHO BELESA		
	MENTO AKEBELI		

## Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in other university, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of several loops and a horizontal line, positioned above a dashed line.

**Tefera Molla Habteyess  
(Researcher)**