IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT AT WEREDA LEVEL IN TIGRAY AND AMHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATES IN ETHIOPIA

GIRMAY BERHE TSADIK

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GIRMAY BERHE TSADIK

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Abstract

This study set out to examine the extent of decentralization of educational management in terms of scope, intensity and commitment, below the regional level with particular focus at the wereda level in Tigray and Amhara National Regional States. It employed a comparative descriptive method. Data were gathered from wereda education personnel through questionnaire and unstructured interviews, and from documents.

The study revealed that decentralization has begun to occur at the subregional level including the wereda albeit with limited scope in the substantive areas of authority over finance, teacher issues, school construction and educational materials. The intensity level was judged as average in terms of the type of decentralization which was found to be a combination of deconcentration and limited devolution. It was weak, however, in terms of personnel coverage and own revenue as well as regional allocation. The commitment to decentralization at wereda level was found to be mixed, by showing readiness to transfer responsibility and authority in Amhara, and an attempt to develop guidelines for the wereda level in Tigray as well as the creation of mechanisms for popular participation in both regions on one hand, and the poor capacity at the wereda level in both regions, especially in Tigray on the other hand. It was concluded that although there are attempts to decentralize educational management below the regional level, the extent at wereda level is generally weak especially in Tigray.

Greater attention in developing wereda capacity in organizational structure, the number and quality of personnel, clear delineation of responsibilities, authority, and accountability of the various bodies involved, and a united effort for further rigorous research on decentralization are recommended.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANRG	-	Amhara National Regional Government
E.C.	-	Ethiopian Calendar
ESR	-	Education Sector Review
FDRE	-	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GNRST	-	Government of the National Regional State of Tigray
MOE	-	Ministry of Education
RC	-	Regional Council
REB	-	Regional Education Bureau
TEB	-	Tigray Education Bureau
TGE	-	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TTI	-	Teacher Training Institute
UN	-	United Nations
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
WC	-	Wereda Council
WEO	-	Wereda Education Office
WETB	-	Wereda Education and Training Board
ZED	-	Zone Education Department

CHAPTER ONE THE STUDY AND ITS APPROACH

1.1. Background of the Study

Decentralization of education is a global phenomenon in the contemporary world and recently in Ethiopia. Many countries, both developed and developing, undertake educational decentralization (De Vuyst, 1984; Lockhead and Zhao, 1993; Malpica, 1995; Fiske, 1996; Govinda, 1997). It takes different forms and multitude of reasons which can be subsumed as political, educational, administrative and financial are forwarded in favour of it (Malpica, 1995; Fiske, 1996).

The essence of decentralization lies in the transfer of decision making authority to local government or community organizations (Winkler, 1989). Thus, decentralization involves substantial shifts in authority (Fiske, 1996). In a decentralized system, intermediate and local levels of government as well as institutions have freedom to make decisions on various functions such as policy making, staffing, finance (generating funds and spending), curriculum, teaching methods, provision of incentives/penalties, school construction, school organization, and so on depending on the circumstances of the country (Winkler, 1989; Forojalla, 1993; Fiske, 1996).

Educational decentralization has merits as well as demerits and its impacts are mixed. Among the presumed merits are (a) improvement of teaching and learning by bringing decisions closer to the implementation points, (b) administrative efficiency by eliminating overlays of bureaucratic procedures and motivating education officials

to be more productive, (c) financial efficiency by generating additional revenues for the system from local sources and by reducing operating costs, (d) achieving political goals, for example, by being a practical means of gaining legitimacy to the state (Weiler, 1989, 1990; Fiske, 1996).

The demerits of decentralization, on the other hand, include (a) disparity of opportunities between wealthy and poor areas in which the poorer areas cannot do so because of financial crisis (Kai-Ming, 1994); (b) wide spread corruption and abuse of public office, and (c) improper performance or non performance of functions which could be the result of more responsibility than local personnel can carry out (UN, 1962). Hence, there is a need to strike a balance between decentralization and centralization (Hallack, 1990; Werlin, 1992) since "both have potential benefits and liabilities" (Fiske, 1996:8).

For decentralization to succeed there are pre-requisites to be considered. Winkler (1989) mentions these (a) a tradition of self reliance by the local communities, (b) possession of own sources of tax revenue and voluntary contributions, (c) the pressure for decentralization originates with the community rather than ministry planners, (d) participation of all affected political groups, especially teachers in the development of decentralization plans and(e) existence or training of managerial capacity at the local level. Decentralization is likely to be successfully implemented if these and other pre-requisites are fulfilled.

The management of education in Ethiopia had been characterized by high centralization until the beginning of the 1990s. Since the 1960s concerns had been expressed with regard to the management of education being highly centralized and inflexible (Teshome, 1979), and calls were made, though sparingly, to introduce some form of decentralization (ESR, 1972; Teshome, 1989).

Recently as part of the overall decentralization process in the country, decentralization of educational management has been officially adopted through the 1994 Education and Training Policy of Ethiopia in article 3.8.2" to create the necessary condition to expand, enrich and improve the relevance, quality, accessibility and equity of education and training" (TGE, 1994a). Earlier to this, Education Bureaus were established with substantial authority in managing education within regions (TGE, 1993). The role of the central Ministry of Education (MOE) was changed to the provision of technical and professional assistance with regard to the regions (TGE, 1993).

Following the above trends the MOE has revised previous' 'Educational Organization and management' manuals for schools and has come up with new manuals for the wereda and school levels to reflect the principles of professionalization, democratization and decentralization (MOE, 1987 E.C.; 1988 E.C). The new papers indicate that decentralization enables the beneficiary community and implementing professionals to perform educational functions by conferring them with the necessary responsibilities, authority, and creation of

accountability. For the wereda education office (WEO) responsibilities such as the following are outlined.

a) facilitate ways for schools to get the necessary material and financial support and devise means to fulfill the manpower needs of schools and balance its distribution.

b) facilitate ways for and render necessary support to provide training at the school and wereda levels,

c) approve school budget, strengthen services to areas that need special support and to increase girls participation in education (MOE, 1987 E.C:13).

Besides the MOE suggests that a Wereda Education and Training Board (WETB) accountable to the Wereda Council (WC) be established to ensure educational equity, democratization, efficiency and effectiveness, which it appears will have the policy making and controlling authority (MOE, 1988 E.C).

Though there is a clear commitment at the national level to decentralize educational management up to the institutional level (TGE, 1994a, 1994b) and the MOE attempts to facilitate this through the above means, there is no clear specification of the details of operationalizing decentralized educational management. And, since the MOE's materials are suggestive and regional states have legal discretion to devise their own ways, the question of whether they are decentralizing educational management below the regional level remains open to investigation. This study is a modest attempt at finding out whether decentralization

is taking place below the regional level particularly at the wereda level in Tigray and Amhara National Regional States.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Decentralization of education management can be effected at different levels away from the centre (regional, subregional, local and institutional) and for different functions (resource generation and spending, personnel management, curriculum planning e.t.c.) Depending on the country's tradition and circumstances, some functions can be retained at the centre, others can be devolved to the regional level, still other functions can be transferred to the local and institutional levels. There are also possibilities in which some functions are shared among different levels (Winkler, 1989).

Various studies on decentralization in general, and on different aspects of education have found out that decentralization practices do not match decentralization plans or the rhetoric in favour of it, that results of decentralization have been mixed, and at times it has worsened problems it purported to alleviate (Rondinelli, 1981, 1983; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Bray, 1985; Jimenez and Tan, 1987; Malpica, 1995; Fiske, 1996; Govinda, 1997, USAID, 1997). In Ethiopia, studies on educational decentralization are almost non-existent so far. One study in Tigray made in late 1995 (USAID, 1996) found that there were differing conceptions of decentralization among the education officials.

An explanation of the draft of the 1994 Education and Training Policy indicated that problems of educational organization and management in Ethiopia included the following:

a) participation of localities was restricted to implementing only because the system was centralized,

b) there was mismatch of responsibility and authority because the responsibilities expected of localities were far greater than the authority vested in them (TGE, 1985 E.C: 82).

The concern of this study is therefore to examine how far these and other problems in educational management have been addressed and how far conditions are facilitated to solve them through the officially adopted decentralization policy. The MOE's white papers suggest the responsibilities of the WETB and WEO. However, there appears to be less attention to the decision making authority that should go with the responsibilities. Weredas can effectively perform their duties, mobilize human resources, generate finance for effective educational programmes if they are given authority commensurate with their responsibilities. There is, however, lack of clarity on how the principle of decentralization is to be applied. Functions for which weredas have decision making authority are not distinguished. Moreover, it is not clear how the MOE's suggested guidelines are utilized.

The purpose of this study is thus to find out from practice the extent of decentralization of educational management in terms of scope, intensity, and

commitment (Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992) toward the Wereda level in Tigray and Amhara National Regional states. In so doing the study particularly focuses on the decision making authority and responsibility of the wereda as a local government level with regard to certain educational functions. It also examines the managerial and resource capacity of the WEO, the views of WEO officials and staff on commitment to decentralization and mechanisms to promote popular participation in education, and constraints in the implementation of decentralization. It also compares variations between the two regional states in implementing decentralization.

The study attempted to answer the following research questions:

1) Sharing of authority and responsibility
   a) What authority and responsibility do weredas have over the educational functions of planning, finance, personnel (mainly primary school teachers) and school facilities?
   b) What guidelines are available to define the sharing of responsibility and authority among the various levels?
2) Managerial and revenue capacity
   a) Can the existing organizational structure of the wereda education office enable it to carry out its responsibilities?
   b) Do the officials and staff of the wereda education office have the required standard in terms of experience, education and training?

c) What are the main sources of budget for education to the Wereda?

3) Commitment and Participation

a) Do higher officials support transfer of responsibility and authority to the wereda level?

b) Do the wereda education officers and staff show readiness to accept additional responsibility?

c) What mechanisms are in place for popular participation in educational matters?

4) Constraints

What is the degree of seriousness of some problems in the implementation of decentralization?

5) Variations

a) How does implementation of decentralization of educational management vary between the two regional states under this study?

b) What are the areas of variation?

1.3. Significance of the Study

Successful implementation of decentralization requires well informed incremental, cautious approach and the building of capacity (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Werlin, 1992; Govinda, 1997). Decentralization is the order of the day in Ethiopia since 1991. Since then it is enormously taking place in a country which had

highly centralized administrative tradition. Thus, the study of the implementation of educational management's decentralization in a country which had a tradition of centralized system addresses one of the crucial issues. Hence, this study is important in the following respects:

1. Though decentralization of educational management is a major concern in the country, there is no adequate systematized information on how far decentralization has actually reached near the point of implementation of educational programmes-the wereda. The study helps reveal the extent of decentralization of educational management below the regional level particularly at the Wereda level and contribute to understanding of decentralization of educational management at least in the two regional states of Ethiopia.
2. By revealing the extent of the decentralization and constraints faced in its implementation, the study may bring to the attention of decision makers and planners the issues and constraints and may help to take the necessary measures in order to remedy the inadequacies.
3. The study provides suggestions to concerned authorities that would help in the alleviation of problems faced in the decentralization process.
4. There is no study on decentralization of educational management at the wereda level that compares practices in regional states. This study will help the compilation of information on the issue which can serve as an initial source of knowledge in the country. It will also set an agenda for further research. These are expected to be beneficial to some

courses in educational organization and management in the Department of Educational Administration in the Faculty of Education of Addis Ababa University as well as to regional state education bureaus, the MOE, and interested researchers.

1.4. Delimitation of the Study

Decentralization of education can be analysed from various angles: processes, roles, relationships, actors, levels, spheres, functions, and effects (Malpica, 1995). This study, however, limits itself mainly to transfer of responsibilities and decision making authority to the wereda level with regard to certain functions [planning, finance, personnel (mainly teachers), school facilities]. Related issues such as capacity, commitment and participation, and constraints are also addressed. The study was conducted in Tigray and Amhara National regional states. These two regional states were selected based on the assumption that they are relatively better in managing their internal affairs. Practices in these Regional States can enable to see the extent of decentralization. The wereda level was selected as the focus of the study because as a product of the overall decentralization efforts it is a distinct level as a centre of provision of social services (education, health etc). The wereda education office is a new administrative level created to facilitate the provision of education.

The study also does not make comparison of practices in different weredas and zones within the same regional state. It compares practices between the two

regional states. This is because the researcher found out in a preliminary survey he made in Tigray and North Wollo Administrative Zone in Amhara that the practices of educational management are the same within a region.

1.5. Limitations of the Study

Implementation of decentralization at the wereda could be adequately analysed by obtaining actual financial allocations and the views of all actors. Owing to the inaccessibility of financial data, this study did not use hard data in analyzing issues related to finance. In addition, because of severe time limitations on the part of the researcher, the wide physical disparity of the sample Weredas, and the difficulty to reach them, the study did not include wereda Council social sector heads, Wereda Education and Training Board members. It used WEO officials and staff as respondents.

These limitations could have affected the degree of reliability of responses on items that were more appropriately addressed to the above actors in educational management at the wereda level.

1.6. The Research Design

1.6.1. Method

A descriptive method was used in this study to reveal the extent of decentralization below the regional level particularly at the wereda level currently.

The appropriateness of this method in describing what is happening currently and to a great many questions in education has been emphasized by Anderson (1990).

1.6.2. Data Sources

The sources of data in this study were two types. The first were documents (regulations, guidelines, directives, plan documents). The second were wereda education office officials and staff members.

1.6.3. Sample Population and Sampling Technique

Six wereda education offices from three zones in Tigray and eight wereda education offices from four zones in Amhara were selected as samples (Details in Appendix 2). The respondents from the weredas of Tigray were four persons from each education office and those from weredas in Amhara were five persons from each wereda education office which constitute a total of 64 respondents. The respondents were selected based on purposive sampling because (a) the nature of the study obliged the researcher to select those who have direct relation with the issues raised (b) the researcher distributed the questionnaire after ascertaining that the intended respondents are available. Hence, although the sample population is small and the sampling technique is non-probability type, the drawbacks are compensated for by (a) the qualitative data obtained through documents (b) the relatively homogeneous practices of educational management in all wereds of a

regional state as ascertained by preliminary survey the researcher made in November 1997.

1.6.4. Instruments and Procedures of Data Collection

Apart from qualitative data obtained from documents, the questionnaire was used to collect data from respondents. The questionnaire, prepared in Amharic, contained mainly close-ended items, some followed by open-ended questions. The close-ended items contained multiple choice and rank order items that are relevant to the various issues addressed in the research questions. In addition interviews were made with the wereda education officers with regard to issues that required clarification. The interviews were unstructured to enable the interviewees express themselves without inhibition.

The data collection proceeded as follows: at the initial stage, the researcher visited Tigray Education Bureau and North Wollo Administrative Zone Education Department in November 1997 and made preliminary survey on the practices of education management in the two regional states and obtained, however scanty, documents relevant to the study. Then, having made a review of related literature, he developed the questionnaire. Subsequently, the researcher distributed the questionnaire with necessary explanations on how to complete the questionnaire in most of the weredas.

1.6.5. Data Analysis

The data analysis involved content analysis of documents and responses to open-ended questions, counts, percentages, and chi-square test for significance of differences between responses from the two sample groups.

1.7. Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined in the sense they have in the study as follows.

Authority: the right to make decisions and utilize resources for organizational objectives (adapt, Rue and Byars, 1990:22). It is operationalized using several variables such as approval of plan and budget, employment and assignment of teachers, etc.

Capacity: "the ability to set goals, anticipate needs, make informed decisions, and attract and manage resources in order to achieve the goals of education (Parry, Quated by Minga, 1997:213). It is operationalized in terms of the scope of the organizational structure , the number, education level, experience and relevant training of the personnel of the wereda education office.

Commitment: "refers to the level and quality of support for decentralization by the [regional] government and its top policy makers and the degree to which that support manifests itself at vaious levels of

administration and government" (Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992: 476). It is operationalized using different variables as indicated in the model in figure one at the end of Chapter Two.

Intensity: "refers to the levels of the bureaucracy and the [Region's] finance which are formally involved" (Vengroff and Ben, Salem, 1992:476). It is operationalized using different variables as indicated in figure one at the end of Chapter Two.

Responsibility: "the accountability [obligation] for reaching objectives, using resources properly and adhering to organizational goals" (Rue and Byars, 1990:24). It is operationalized using several tasks such as the preparation of plan and budget covering of training expenditures, paying teaching salary as a routine activity etc.

Scope: "refers to the breadth or coverage of the programme of decentralization" (Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992:476). It is operationalized as indicated in figure one at the end of Chapter Two.

Wereda: a unit of local government representing a population of up to 100,000 people (Getachew and Lulseged, 1996).

1.8. Organization of the Study

The research report is organized in four chapters. The first chapter contains the background of the study and its approach. The second presents a review of related literature, and the third chapter deals with presentation and analysis of findings. The final chapter contains summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study. Papers containing important information are also annexed in the appendices.

CHAPTER TWO REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In order to form a broader picture of the issues in the decentralization of educational management, this chapter examines the meaning, forms (types) rationale, functions (areas of focus), impact, and pre-requisites for successful decentralization and trends of decentralization in Ethiopia. Finally, it provides a tentative model to analyse decentralization of educational management at the wereda level. The literature, both theoretical and empirical, tends to be highly descriptive and draws heavily from experience of countries. Since centralization and decentralization are viewed as "opposite extremes of a single continuum" (UN, 1962:4), the review begins with a brief look at centralization.

2.1. Nature of Centralization

Centralization is defined in various ways. From managerial point of view Vande Ven and Ferry (cited by Hall, 1982:115) define it as the "locus of decision making authority within an organization." In a centralized organization most substantive decisions, except those that fall under professional competence in highly professionalized organization, are made at the top and evaluation is made by people at the top.

In education centralization refers to the "policy of concentrating the support and control of education in the hands of the central government of a state or nation" (Rivlin, 1969). In a centralized education system most decision making, monitoring, and management functions with regard to teacher employment and compensation,

students, finance, school construction, curriculum, school organization, examinations and supervision are made by the central government (Winkler, 1989; Florestal and Cooper, 1997). Though local school officials are given some authority, it is limited to day to day management and they have limited scope for initiative (Florestal and Cooper, 1997).

Most countries, except a few, showed the tendency toward a highly centralized organization of education as well as general governance until the 1960s (Hamilton, 1975; Sharpe, 1979). One exception is the case of the Unites States in which the national government exercised little control over education but provided some financial and other assistance (Cramer and Browne, 1956). It has a long tradition of decentralization in the form of local control which has reappeared in different guises at different epochs (La Noue and Smith, 1973) and "was never faced.... with the option of greater decentralization" (Weiler, 1990:434). Despite this tradition, the United States even experienced structural swings to-and-from centralization between the nineteenth century and the present time (Fiske, 1996) "at least at the level of the state" (Weiler, 1990:434). In colonial times, there was decentralized administrative, judicial and political authority to field officials in India (Sanwal, 1987). Another exception to centralized tradition is Pakistan. In Pakistan, unit independence in 1947, the central and provincial ministries of education had limited intervention in education. The education system was made up largely of private and local schools run by district councils and municipal governments (Jimenez and Tan, 1987). Except such sporadic instances of decentralized systems, governance in general and control of education in particular has been highly centralized.

In contemporary contexts, although there are increasing movements away from centralization, there are arguments in favour of centralization.

2.2. Arguments for Centralization

Arguments for centralization are forwarded for equity, efficiency, uniformity, and capacity reasons (Mallinson, 1975; Weiler, 1989, 1990; Werlin, 1992). With regard to local government and community development Werlin (1992:229) argues that communities generally require leadership to develop and the concept of "development from below" is a naive one. He further argues that there is a need for enforcement capacity, control and supervision which all emphasize central government intervention.

Weiler (1989) describing a 'redistribution model' in the discussion of centralization decentralization issues explains that authority of the state is exercised in two ways: regulation and allocation of resources. Both these functions of the state are exercised in rather centralized ways. In the regulatory function the main rationale advanced for centralization is the need for standardization, the need to make curricula, qualification, and examinations to be reasonably similar across the national or sub national levels so as to facilitate the exchange of personnel, mobility, and the mutual recognition of diplomas across different regions.

In the allocative aspect, the argument for centralization has dual forms: enhance equity by reducing or eliminating disparities between subunits in terms of resources, and increase effectiveness by utilizing economies of scale and allowing efficient distribution of resources.

Thus, the arguments for centralization emphasize efficiency, equity, standardization and uniformity in the provision of educational services. Many of the arguments are, however, met with counter-arguments and criticisms (Wunsch, 1994). The arguments against centralization include: (a) it does not encourage local initiative thus hindering the freedom to experiment in adapting education to local needs and conditions; (b) it results in decreased sense of responsibility for education on the part of tax-payers and tends to cause the people to demand more and more educational services, (c) any error or mistake has far reaching consequences and undesirable political manipulation may affect all education seriously (Rivlin, 1969).

From a managerial point of view a UN working group (UN, 1962) mentioned effects of excessive centralization such as these: (a) there may be a need for approval at the highest level before taking even minor actions; (b) inefficiency in the distribution of supplies; (c) there may be excessive prescription from the centre and (b) the possibility of excessive adherence to regulations after changes have made them unworkable.

These undesirable effects point the criticism of inefficiency of centralized systems. Full grasp of centralization is also possible by examining issues of decentralization to which we now turn in greater detail.

2.3. Decentralization

As indicated at the beginning of the review, decentralization is analysed in terms of its meanings, forms (types) nationale, functions (areas of focus), impact, and pre-requisites for its success.

2.3.1. Meaning of Decentralization

The term decentralization has several definitions. Many agree that the concept is complex (Brown, 1990) difficult to define precisely and lacks clarity due to its several connotations and interpretations, its reference to a wide range of processes and structures (Bray, 1985; Conyers, 1984; Fiske, 1996, Malpica, 1995; Sanwal, 1987; USAID, 1997). Nevertheless, it essentially addresses itself to the transfer of decision making authority from higher to lower levels (Atchison and Hill, 1978; Florestal and Cooper, 1997). For illustrative purposes the following definitions will be adequate.

According to Bray (1985: 184) decentralization usually refers to "the transfer of decision making powers from higher levels in an official hierarchy to lower ones".

Brown (1990:36) defines decentralization as" the extent to which authority to make decision is distributed among the roles in an organization." These definitions mainly denote decentralization within an organization commonly referred to as administrative or organizational decentralization which is narrower in scope.

In a broad sense, Conyers (1983:101) uses decentralization" to refer to any transfer of authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the national level to any organization or agency at the sub-national level." Florestal and Cooper (1997:2) briefly state to decentralize is "to move decision making from the centre and closer to the users of the service." These definitions include both administrative and political decentralization. In one way or another, definitions of decentralization indicate that it is essentially an issue of transferring decision making authority from the central government down to sub-national units of government or agencies.

In this study the following slightly modified definition is employed to reflect circumstances in a federal system and for clarity in light of the purpose of this study. Thus, decentralization here is used to mean the transfer of decision making authority over educational functions from the central (federal) and regional government to sub-regional levels of government or their agencies. The definition is used in this study because decentralization from the national to the regional level cannot be adequate in large federal countries like Ethiopia if one is thinking about real decision making authority at lower levels or closer to the users of the service. It is observed that "regional government is often highly centralized even in a decentralized federal

system" (Winkler, 1989:5) and there are many instances of "regional centralizms" occurring in countries which advocate decentralization (Malpica, 1995:253).

2.3.2. Forms of Decentralization

Decentralization is classified into different forms depending on to whom authority is transferred (Brown, 1990; Fiske, 1996) and the degree of authority or scope of the functions transferred or shared (Rondinelli, 1983; Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983).

The first distinction to be drawn is between administrative and political decentralization. Administrative or organizational decentralization is basically a management strategy in which the central office may delegate authority for planning, management, finance, and other functions to lower levels in the bureaucracy political authority remaining with officials at the top of the organization. A decision to undertake administrative decentralization can be made without extensive consultation outside the education ministry (Brown, 1990; Fiske, 1996).

Political decentralization, on the other hand, involves transferring authority to make decisions to citizens or their representatives at lower level of government. It implies some form of semi-autonomous local control through boards of elected officials. Authority is shifted to include people outside the system and requires consensus- building (Brown, 1990; Fiske, 1996).

Decentralization is also categorised into other four forms which describe the degree of decentralization which are **deconcentration, delegation, devolution**, and **privatization** (Govinda, 1997; Rondinelli, 1983:1983 Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983, Winkler, 1989).

Deconcentration is the handing over of some amount of managerial responsibility to lower levels within the central government ministries or agencies. It is simply a shifting of workload from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside the national capital (Rondinelli 1983: 189). In deconcentration a central body creates regional offices in different parts of the country. The staff are usually appointed by and responsible to the officers in the capital and they are part of the central authority (Bray, 1985:185). It is the weakest form of decentralization wherein the central ministry remains firmly in control (Fiske, 1996:10)

Delegation is "the transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure" (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema, 1983:19) such as parastatal entities, churches, training agencies and universities (Govinda, 1997; Jimenez and Tan, 1987; Winkler, 1989). Fiske (1996:10) considers a broader interpretation of delegation to include conferring authority to lower levels of government. In delegation, the delegated units or organizations have greater freedom concerning "personnel recruitment, contracting, budgeting, procurement and other matters" (Rondinelli, 1983:189). Thus, delegation is more extensive than deconcentration and takes decentralization further by giving greater leeway for decision making. In delegation the central

authority can withdraw the authority delegated by executive orders without having to pass legislation (Bray, 1985; Fiske, 1996).

Devolutioninvolves the transfer of functions or decision making authority to legally incorporated, autonomous, and independent sub-national units of government such as states, provinces, districts, or municipalities(Jimenez and Tan, 1987:174; Rondinelli, 1983; 189) or to other local bodies that are associated with local governments such as municipal school boards (Florestal and Cooper, 1997). Such units or bodies normally have clear and legally recognized territorial boundaries over which they exercise authority to perform explicitly granted functions with only an indirect supervisory control. They can raise revenues and expend. Devolution, thus, establishes a reciprocal and mutually benefitting relationships between central and local governments (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983 24-25).

Florestal and Cooper (1997:3) point out four key features of devolution (a) the body that exercises the authority is legally separate from the central ministry; (b) the body acts in its own, not under the hierarchical supervision of the central ministry; © the body can exercise only the authority given to it; and (d) the body can act only within the geographic limits set out in the law. Such bodies are often supervised by a board of elected officials by the local population.

Devolution is common in federal systems. It is a "more comprehensive and genuine approach to decentralization" (Govinda, 1997:6) and "the most far reaching form of decentralization in that the transfer of authority over financial, administrative,

or pedagogical matters is permanent and cannot be revoked at the whim of central officials" (Fiske:10).

Privatization involves "shifting responsibilities for activities from the public sector to private or quasi-public organizations that are not part of the government structure (Rondinelli, 1983:189) including private enterprises, industrial and trade associations, professional groups, religious organizations, political parties, cooperatives, and a variety of civic organizations. These are given responsibility to perform functions that were previously carried out by government (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema, 1983 28).

Writers in educational decentralization do not give much emphasis to privatization to be appropriate in education. Govinda (1997:7) Questions whether it can be considered as an appropriate approach for decentralizing the management of an essentially public service such as education in the sense of completely handing over to private agencies particularly at the basic education stage although it has always existed to a small or large extent in all countries. Govinda notes that there are countries where management of primary schools is predominantly in the hands of private organizations. Nevertheless, the government exercises a significant control over them through grants-in-aid, inspection and supervision and other mechanisms.

These forms of decentralization are helpful in analysing the degree of decentralization in a given country. After reviewing nine cases of decentralization of

development programmes in Asia, Rondinelli (1983) found that all four forms were used, with the most frequent being a combination of deconcentration and delegation, in a few cases, of devolution and deconcentration. In Africa, Vengroff and Ben Salem (1992) document a case of firmly institutionalized deconcentration in Tunisia. In Senegal deconcentration was chosen as the most appropriate form (Vengroff and Johnston, 1987).

2.3.3. Rationale for Decentralization

Decentralization is advocated and undertaken for a number of reasons in different countries. Conyers (1983, 1984) provides a good account of how interest in decentralization in developing countries began and continued with fluctuations. Interest in decentralization began in developing countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was manifested in the expansion and development of local government systems. It was seen," as a means of removing some of the burden of providing local services from the central government while at the same time, encouraging political education and involvement at the local level" (Conyers, 1983:99).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a resurgence of interest in decentralization with somewhat different characteristics, mainly with the objectives of improving the planning and implementation of national development and facilitating popular participation in the development process. It was advocated for by governments, international development agencies and academics from a variety of disciplines.

Often decentralization is initiated from above in developing countries (McGinn and Street, 1986; Weiler, 1989). In Africa a USAID (1997) review indicated that decentralization often emerges from crisis such as structural adjustment programmes and changes in government regimes.

Decentralization in education, in most cases, is initiated as part of wider political changes. Occasionally, it is undertaken independently of such changes (Bray, 1985; Florestal and Cooper, 1997).

There are a multitude of reasons why countries undertake decentralization as reviewed by different scholars (Rondinelli, 1981, 1983; Conyers, 1983; Bray, 1985; McGinn and Street, 1986; Fiske, 1996; Govinda, 1997; Malpica, 1995, Winkler, 1989). Bray's (1985) summary of the major rationales for decentralization is inclusive. The rationales include: to maintain national unity, promote the legitimacy of those in authority, strengthen the power base of those in authority; to promote popular participation in decision making; to enhance flexibility and sensitivity to local needs, to reduce top administrators' workload; to reduce the financial burden of education on central governments, and implicitly to avert criticisms of poor performance, and to promote efficiency in operation.

Fiske (1996) uses a variety of case studies to illustrate the multitude of specific reasons for undertaking educational decentralization. Spain used decentralization of government functions including education to neutralize threats of secession by some regions in the 1970s. Brazil in the early 1990s undertook decentralization of

educational management to local communities to promote local autonomy and participation in education. Beginning 1989 New Zealand utilized decentralization to cut out middle management by shifting responsibility for budget allocation, employment, and educational decision making to schools. Mexico decentralized educational management in stages between 1972 to 1988 to improve the efficiency of the system such as paying teachers on time. Zimbabwe after independence decentralized primary school construction and management, among other public services, pursing the spirit of popular participation, self-reliance and democratic decision making. Argentina in 1975 attempted to decentralize financial responsibility to provinces under a cofinancing arrangement believing that they would generate more funds and spend them wisely. India is decentralizing its education as part of overall political decentralization to strengthen its federal system to foster democracy.

Different authors group the various arguments for more decentralization into some general categories with slight differences in perspective and terminology. Winkler (1989) classifies the rationales for educational decentralization into (a) educational finance, (b) efficiency and effectiveness, and (c) redistribution of political power. Fiske (1996) groups them into political, educational, administrative, and financial. Malpica's (1995:7-8) classification of the arguments for more decentralization of education which categories them into five major ones is inclusive, concise and informative. The categories are (modified)

(a) **Ideology:** for instance, as an important part of the overhaul of government and its relations with the civil society, with a view to greater democratization

(b) **Political:**for example, to change the pattern and style of educational governance with the attendant sharing and/or transfer of responsibilities and authority between various tiers of government, and opening broader channels for participation by society.

(c) **Economic**: for instance, to raise additional public and private funds for education and to secure greater economic efficiency.

(d) **Administrative:** such as, to streamline organization of the education system, making it less bureaucratic and more efficient; and

(e) **Pedagogical and cultural**: for example, to formulate and develop a flexible national curriculum which can respond better to the various regional and local needs and situations.

Some argue that the prime intention of governments is, though often implicit, political (Winkler, 1989; McGinn and street, 1986; Weiler, 1989, 1990). Drawing from case studies of Peru, Chile, and Mexico, McGinn and Street (1986) concluded that policies of centralization-decentralization are chosen not so only on their technical merits but also as part of a strategy in which political effectiveness is a primary consideration. They question the validity of the argument of increasing the participation of citizens and distribution of authority. They argue that decentralization is advocated not to increase the participation of all individuals in general but that of certain individuals in or groups, and what changes is not the distribution of power as

such but the locus such as by shifting power from central to local government, from government to the private sector.

Finally, it is worthwhile to look at Weiler's (1989, 1990) alternative conceptions of the rationale of educational decentralization which again fall under the political arguments. Criticizing that the usual efficiency, effectiveness and redistribution of authority models are inadequate in analysing what occurs in education policy, he suggests two other conceptions: conflict management and compensatory legitimation. He argues that decentralization of education is advocated by the state not so much for efficiency, effectiveness and redistribution of authority considerations but for its important "political utilities" as an instrument of conflict management and compensatory legitimation. The argument roughly goes as follows.

Decentralization as conflict management: Conflict is ubiquitous in contemporary society. Education policy is particularly conflict prone, because it cuts deep into the social fabric and values. Resolving conflict over education policy by central control is not promising. Decentralization allows the state to isolate and localize the sources of conflict, insulating them from the rest of the system by for example, creating structures that could be more easily contained and controlled. The ability of the state to create new forms of decentralized governance structures or to use existing ones helps the state to manage and contain the volatile conflicts that arise around educational issues. The cost involved in decentralization as an instrument of conflict management, Weiler notes, is that it reduces "innovation and change to localized phenomena of limited impact" (Weiler, 1990:441).

Decentralization as Compensatory Legitimation: The modern state faces severe challenges of erosion of its own legitimacy due to the volume and nature of demands placed upon it. The basis of its authority has "become increasingly precarious" (Weiler, 1990:441). The state machinery seeks not only efficiency, equity, and effectiveness, but also to gain added legitimacy through decentralization what Weiler has called compensatory legitimation (Weiler, 1989:40). The state tends to be unable to meet the demands through highly centralized arrangements. Thus "any strategy making the state appear less centralized and monolithic, and more attentive to internal variations of needs and conditions could well be seen as a potential source of added legitimacy" (Weiler, 1990: 441). A case in point is Kai-Ming's (1994) observation of what happens to legitimacy of the state associated with devolution of central funding to local funding of schools in China. Prior to the early 1980s, the legitimacy of the state depended on the central government's ability to provide resources to maintain education . After decentralization of finance, at least in part, this source of legitimacy is eroded. In the words of Kai-Ming (1994:267):

> In places where decentralization is successful, where little is handed down from above, the central government is seen as a good government when it is ready to give local governments more autonomy. There is a dramatic change in the source of legitimacy. There is apparently an irony: the more the central government lets loose its control the more it gains support from local governments.

Hence, decentralization reinforces the legitimacy of the state if it is successful.

To recapitulate, advocates of decentralization provide a variety of reasons for more decentralization. Analysts of decentralization categorize the reasons into

financial and administrative efficiency, effectiveness (addressing local cultural variations in the content of education) and political, the persuasive argument being decentralization as a means of conflict management and compensatory legitimation.

2.3.4. Education Functions in Decentralization

Decentralizing a system involves three major decisions, "What to decentralize, to whom, and how to coordinate implementation" (Sanwal, 1987:383). This requires the identification and specification of the functions (decision areas) to be decentralized to the various levels and those to be retained at the centre. According to Govinda (1997: 10-11) "authority to perform certain functions is always held in premium and can become a source of conflict among functionaries at different levels." Thus, any decentralization plan has to decide the level at which different functions are to be performed. Although there is no right formula for the distribution of functions across different decentralized units, settling the question of the distribution of functions among the different points in the structure is crucial.

The classification of educational functions varies from author to author. Drawing from Florestal and Cooper (1997), USAID (1997), and Winkler (1989) the following list of functions and subfunctions are identified for illustrative purposes.

(1) School organization and curriculum:

- Definition of goals, standards and parameters
- Structure: levels, grades, calendar, student school choice

- Textbook and instructional materials production and distribution
- examinations

(2) Personnel: teacher training, certification, deployment (hiring, transferring, promoting, firing), conditions of work (salary structure etc.)

(3) Finance: budgeting, allocation, spending

- Sources of funding, collection

(4) Facilities: standards, construction, maintenance, equipment and furniture

(5) Inspection and supervision

(6) Research

These being the major functions in education, a key concern in discussing decentralization is' who has the authority to determine the various issues related to each function and subfunction. The desirability and feasibility of decentralization in these areas depends on the structure of government finance, political environment, government and administrative structure and the historical and cultural context (Winkler, 1989:1). When one sees the issues in the context of the United States, for example, the question of centralization and decentralization of most of the functions is mainly raised below the district level (Brown, 1990; Morphet, Johns, and Reller, 1982). In England, a recent reform has aimed at giving autonomy to schools (Govinda, 1997).

In the context of developing countries the situation is different. In Africa, personnel management, curriculum development, research remain centralized mostly

at the level of the central government (USAID, 1997). Drawing from case studies in five South East Asian countries Govinda (1997) indicates that personnel management, preparation of curriculum and textbooks are quite centralized activities, with some role given to district authorities in teacher appointment. With regard to finance which is a key factor in decentralization (King, 1988) primary education is almost entirely funded by the state and generally local bodies such as the district education office and the primary school have little scope for decision making.

There are several issues around many of the functions that have bearing on decentralization. It will suffice to look at the issues around finance: the way financial resources are mobilized, the expansion of private schooling, and the allocation and sharing of resources between the centre and decentralized units (Govinda, 1997).

In the first issue, governments tend to depend increasingly on the community to finance primary education. Participation of the community tends to be defined as extraction through various methods. The second issue is the use of private schooling as an alternative to government funding (Jimenez and Jan, 1987). It is increasingly used in many countries. However, it may worsen inequalities if government does not somehow intervene, particularly if it "reduces its investment in education proportionately" (Govinda, 1997):38). Government regulation of private schools is also necessary to promote social goals such as good citizenship, to compensate for lack of information about schools and weedout fraudulent schools and to equalize educational access, among other reasons (Jimenez and Jan, 1987).

In the allocation and sharing of resources for education, many countries tend to use decentralization as a means of shifting the responsibility for funding to decentralized units or the community, voluntary organizations and parents (Winkler, 1989). Since this can have serious impact on the development of basic education "decentralization should necessarily be accompanied by appropriate formulae for sharing of public resources" (Govinda, 1997:38). Here it is important to note the conclusion of Olowu and Smoke (1992) that it is the provision, one way or another, of access to sufficient resources to decentralized units which is a key determinant for success, not whether revenues are raised locally or centrally. Ayalew (1991:41) also suggests that "equalization of school support should be made by directing the national resources mostly to the deprived areas."

Since in reality, education is financed largely by public funds, to mitigate inequality a new concept of decentralizing public finance - **demand side financing** - is being used in many countries (Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997). In this method public funds are given directly to individuals or to institutions on the basis of expressed demand. "In other words, money follows students" Demand side financing uses various mechanisms, which are described briefly, as described by Patrinos and Ariasingam (1997).

Vouchers: cash payments given directly to students to attend at the school of their choice (pp.2-3,19).

Stipends: Cash payments given to students or their families to pay for school related expenditures and to compensate families for the loss of the child's labour (pp.3,18).

Targeted bursaries: cash payments that may go directly to schools, municipalities

or provinces and are earmarked for specific purposes (e.g. improving curriculum).

Public assistance to private schools: (to allow poor children to attend in them) (p.19)

Student loans: used to defray costs to the government and help students receive higher education

Community grants: given to a community of students in a lumpsum but are tied to attending a community-created institution (p.20).

The distribution of educational functions at various tiers of government is an essential measure of the degree of decentralization. There are several issues around the decentralization of each function, the case of finance was taken up as an example here. There is no formula of distributing functions and the context of each country determines the distribution. Generally, in developing countries, personnel management, curriculum development, school organization, research are centralized functions.

2.3.5. Impact of Decentralization

In education and elsewhere the impact of decentralization has been mixed. It has seldom lived up to expectation despite its vast scope (Conyers, 1983; Fiske, 1996; Lockheed and Zhao, 1993; Rondinelli, 1983; USAID, 1997; Winkler, 1989; Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992). The correlation between 'formal' decentralization and successfully implemented decentralization is unfortunately low, or in some cases inexistent" (Vengroff and Ben Salem, 1992: 475). Instances of both positive and

negative impact of decentralization programmes are documented in several case studies.

Fiske (1996) mentions findings from different countries. Decentralization has had a positive impact on student learning in New zealand; test scores of third grade students increased after decentralization in Northwestern Brazil, where the situation of education was poor prior to the decentralization. Decentralization led to increased operating efficiency in Mexico such as paying teachers regularly, and in the Brazilian case, school autonomy, led to lower costs and better services in such areas ranging from maintenance and teacher training to school meals. In Spain, decentralization was a huge success Politically for "peaceful and orderly transition from authoritarian to democratic government that has been described as the Miracle of Spain" (Fiske, 1996:14). In the area of finance, decentralization helped to increase total spending on education from 16.6 percent to 18.7 percent from 1975 to 1986 in Argentina.

There have been also positive impacts on equity though decentralization often leads to disparities in education between rich and poor areas. In Mexico and Argentina it was found that regional differences in pre-school and primary converge, wastage rates decreased, primary-completion rates improved during periods of decentralization, because in Mexico, for example, resources were better targeted through closer management and better information about sub-national needs (Fiske, 1996).

Other researchers also found some positive impact of decentralization. Private secondary schools in the Philippines had greater effectiveness in student achievement because, among other things, they had better material and non-material resources and school level control over decision making (Lockheed and Zhoa, 1993). In Pakistan lifting of ban on private schools resulted in overall increase in enrolment by catering for a pent-up demand for education (Jimenez and Tan, 1987). In Papua New Guinea, decentralization helped to establish and operate new structures, facilitated the management of primary schools, helped to reduce conflict between churches and government by allowing the churches strong influence in their own areas, facilitated experimentation with new forms of education such as vernacular pre-schools by local initiative and several curriculum and teacher support initiatives in some provinces (Bray, 1985).

There are also several instances of negative impact or problems associated with decentralization (Fisken 1996). In Chile, scores on standardized test declined after decentralization. Studies in Jamaica found that school based management did not lead to the anticipated efficiency gains due to lack of training for principals and their lack of knowledge to work with the local community. Decentralization attempts in Venezuela in the 1970s, 1980s and 1991 failed because of lack of adequate and persistent financing, lack of continuity of politics and leadership, refusal of state governors to accept responsibility for all national schools in their areas demanding among other things, guarantee of financial transfers.

In Papua New guinea (Bray, 1985) decentralization placed severe strains on financial and human resources. Nineteen provincial governments were created in a country of about three million people. The provincial government structures required greater amount of money for the payroll and more qualified people for the various structures.

Another often observed negative consequence of decentralization is widening gap of educational provision and student achievement between wealthy and poor areas especially when it is successful in increasing the efficiency of the education system (Fiske, 1996). This has been observed in Burkina Faso and Chile. In the Philippines community controlled schools were less effective in student achievement because they were given "an empty opportunity with nothing for local control to control:" (Lockheed and Zhoa, 1993:60) with regard to resources. Financial decentralization to local communities in China also led to disparities (Kai-Ming, 1994).

These instances of the positive and negative impacts of decentralization reveal that success or failure of a programme of decentralization depends on the context, the way it was introduced, the availability or otherwise of and control over resources, the capacity of the decentralized units and other conditions.

2.3.6. Prerequisites for Successful Decentralization

The problems associated with decentralization highlight the importance of having or building pre-requisites for any programme of decentralization. The

literature identifies a number of factors as pre-requisites for successful decentralization especially when top-down approach is followed in introducing it. Studies made at different times in developing countries point out similar factors.

Rondinelli (1981) reviewed the experiences of Kenya, Tanzania, and the Sudan, and eight case studies in Asia (Rondinelli, 1983) and identified similar political, organizational, psychological, attitudinal, and resource capacity factors. Cohen and Hook's (1987) study of decentralized planning in Kenya, Olowu and Smoke's (1992) synthesis of findings of seven case studies of successful local governments in four African countries, Govinda's (1997) synthesis of case studies of decentralization of educational management in South East Asia, Fiske's (1996) analysis of educational decentralization focusing on politics and consensus, all arrive at, one way or another, similar conclusions. The various factors identified are highly interdependent, each factor alone is not a sufficient condition, but in combination with others. The various pre requisites can be categorized under two very broad categories: Consensus and Commitment, and capacity building.

2.3.6.1. Consensus and Commitment

Decentralization is inherently political because it aims at "altering the political status quo by transferring authority from one level of government and one set of actors to others" (Fiske, 1996:7). Education has special affinity as a political affair since it has many stakeholders with a variety of interests and motives. Political leaders and policy makers want the education system to strengthen their power base

and to carry out policies. Educational issues also serve as means of winning public support and gaining power. Employees at the central, regional, and local education bureaucracy seek to protect their jobs and managerial authority in each of their settings. Teachers have a stake in maximizing wages and job security. Not only this, teacher unions as forces in their own right would like to maintain central bargaining arrangements and other practices such as centralized system of collecting dues. Tertiary institutions and their faculty members have an interest in how teacher training is organized and in seeing their ideas carried out in schools. Parents and students have high stake in quality education. Moreover, local communities especially their leaders may set other priorities than education, say, water supply, roads etc. Thus any effort to alter the way education is organized and managed is a political activity (Fiske, 1996). This requires building consensus over the meaning, objectives and ways of decentralization in order to build partnership and commitment (Fiske, 1996; McGinn and Street, 1986). Fiske (1996) suggests useful steps in the difficult task of building consensus (a) identify stakeholders and their interests, (b) build legitimate interests into the model, (c) organize public discussion to create widespread understanding, (d) clarify the purpose of decentralization to create shared vision, (e) analyse obstacles, (f) respect the roles of various actors, (g) provide adequate training for the participants in the programme, and (h) develop monitoring system.

Commitment is essential from both the higher bodies to directly support the decentralized units in planning, financing, and implementing programmes, as well as those in the decentralized units to accept added responsibility, exercise authority and

take initiative. The prevalence or non-prevalence of such commitments were crucial in the success or failure of decentralized development programmes in Asia (Rondinell, 1983).

2.3.6.2. Local Capacity Building

Local capacity is defined as "the ability to set goals, anticipate goals, make informed decision, attract and manage resources in order to achieve the goals of education (Parry quoted by Minga, 1997:465) . Capacity building is a basic pre-requisite for decentralization, and Govinda (1997:44) observes that lack of capacity at the local level has been used as a pretext to withhold decentralization measures in developing countries. However, he argues that they cannot develop capacity if they are not given the opportunity to exercise.

Capacity in broad sense encompasses many conditions which can be subsumed as enabling legal and institutional framework, human resources, and financial resources.

2.3.6.2.2.1. Enabling Legal and Institutional Framework

The development of favourable policy environment including central commitment "to improve national capacities, adequate legal jurisdiction to encourage ownership and operation of the education systems, the various actors involved, and shared commitment and accountability in participation in the management of

education" is an essential component in capacity building (Hallak and Carron /quoted by Govinda, 1997:47). Olowu and Smoke (1992) note that one pre-condition for sustained success is that decentralized units have a clear legal status with well defined authority and responsibilities. They found six of the seven local authorities they reviewed had fulfilled this precondition.

Decentralization, therefore, involves the adoption or modification of existing laws. Florestal and Cooper (1997:16) state

> Various statutes, laws, decree-laws dealing with the establishment of autonomous bodies, teacher status, taxation, labor relations and social security that affect different aspects of the ... education sector may.... need to be modified as part of the decentralization project.

Decentralization legislation ideally specifies the level or body to which decision making authority is conferred, defines the responsibilities of the levels or bodies, defines how much control the higher body will have over the lower ones, establishes appropriate relationships among the various actors in the reform, and identifies areas of shared responsibility (Florestal and Cooper, 1997; Olowu and Smoke, 1992). Where there is no clear legal framework, undesirable conditions may arise such as wasteful redundancy in service provision, competition for productive sources of revenues, and failure to provide services (Olowu and Smoke, 1992:8).

Another important consideration in the legal issues is the potential for conflict among laws. Care is crucial to ensure that the new legislation does not conflict with the constitution or with other laws. It needs to identify potential sources of conflict such as general principles of individual rights and freedoms, inconsistencies between

the decentralization law and other laws such as labour or tax laws (Florestal and Cooper, 1997).

Decentralization measures also require appropriate institutional capacity of the managerial levels that are given new responsibilities to function effectively (Govinda, 1997). At the beginning it is crucial to establish or strengthen local structures in order to avoid the risk that the [decentralization] reforms will be made in an " institutional vaccum" (Florestal and Cooper, 1997:9). The building and supply of physical infrastructure like offices, furniture, transportation, information base, communication systems are all necessary but not sufficient conditions. The creation of positive environment for work and personal development, effective and harmonious internal and external relations are essential. There have been considerable success where such institutional conditions were conductive (Cohen and Hook, 1987; Govinda, 1997; Olowu and Smoke, 1992; Rondinelli, 1983).

2.3.6.2.2. Human Resources

The necessity of human resources is obvious. It has been often the key bottleneck in implementing decentralized management because the reform puts "severe strains on human resources" (Bray, 1985:190). Effective decentralization requires more skilled and experienced staff to the local bodies. These are often not available. This demands the training of local level decision makers and technicians for decentralization tasks such as planning, revenue collection, budget management, personnel management, project implementation and management information system (Cohen and Hook, 1987; USAID, 1997).

The task of training is, however, formidable because of the great number of persons needed to be trained to fill positions starting from the school up the various levels. For example, in Bangladesh the number of persons concerned with planning and management of primary education was nearly 40,000 (Govinda, 1997: 47). The number becomes huge if one considers community representatives in education councils, boards, committees. To add to the problem developing countries do not have adequate institutional facilities for capacity building in educational planning and management. To alleviate the problem Govinda (1997:49) suggests that it is not enough to strengthen the available national institutions but also that it is essential to decentralize arrangements for professional training and orientation with suitable infrastructure.

Training is important. Another essential requirement is the opportunity for managers to use the skills and knowledge they have; that is authority. In many cases this is not a reality. Comments from Pakistani District Officers (in Govinda, 1997:45) express this clearly:

> " What am I? Just a post office, passing on orders from the top".
> "Instructions are issued from Lahore to open schools at this place or that and I simply have to obey".
> "What financial powers? Purchases are made in bulk in Lahore and we have to be content with whatever is shipped to us"

Opportunities for career development and timely promotion for those at the local units are also of paramount importance with reasonable degree of stability in the posts. Rapid turnover of personnel is found to be deliterous to success. In India "the knowledge that posts were temporary gave local officers little incentive to take

responsibility for their functions (Matter, cited by Rondinelli, 1983:205). Similarly in Sri Lanka, district officers knew they would not stay long and "were not willing to take risks or make mistakes that would threaten their promotion or reassignment" (Rondinelli, 1983:205). It is also found out that the structure and regulations governing the civil service place severe handicaps on the development of local civil service adequate to the needs of decentralization. A cumbersome and centralized control over the numbers of civil servants for decentralized management in Indonesia made it difficult to staff new development projects at the district level (King, 1988).

2.3.6.2.3. Financial Resources

Many agree that autonomous financial responsibility is a core concept in decentralization (King, 1988; Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema, 1983; Vengroff and Johnston, 1987). It is used as one of the key measures of the degree of decentralization because systems of decentralization can be compared according to their "powers of revenue raising from their own source rather than central subventions" (Smith, 1979:216). Thus decentralization would achieve little unless there is substantial strengthening of the fiscal capacity of the decentralized levels (Jimenez and Tan, 1987).

Three important issues are raised in the discussion of financial capacity for successful decentralization: the source for finance, the authority to generate and spend, and central government role.

For success in decentralization, independent source of revenue at the local level is important (Rondinelli, 1983). There are different alternatives for revenue generation in the context of local governments: land development tax, property taxes, business taxes, fees, grants, voluntary contributions and local authority enterprises (Forojalla, 1993; Olowu and Smoke, 1992; USAID, 1997). The use of these alternatives to generate revenue from local sources depends, at least in part, on the location of the local unit. Location determines the economic potential and revenue base. Local governments which were located in relatively dynamic urban areas or in rural areas with high agricultural potential and other natural resources were successful (Olowu and Smoke, 1992).

Authority to collect, allocate and spend according to their priorities is another pre-condition (Cohen and Hook, 1987; Olowu and Smoke, 1992; Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). However, in many cases local governments are not given adequate authority or the resources to carry out their responsibilities (Lockheed and Zhao, 1993; McGinn and Street, 1986; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Vengroff and Johnston, 1987).

As noted above financial capacity depends on the economic potential of the local units. The economic potential of local governments is not the same especially in large sized countries (Forojalla, 1993; Kai-Ming, 1994). This situation requires for the central government to play certain roles in adequately supporting local levels through transfer or grants or other mechanisms. As pointed out earlier, in this review, it has been found out that "whether revenues are raised locally or centrally is not a

key determinant of success **per se,** but.... that the central government must - one way or another - provide local authorities with access to sufficient resources" (Olowu and Smoke, 1992:10).

In summary, there are a number of pre-requisites for successful decentralization. They can be broadly categorized into consensus and commitment building among the various stokeholders; local capacity building including the provision of enabling legal and institutional framework; trained human resources with opportunities for promotion and career development; financial resources and the authority to raise, allocate and spend, and adequate central government support. In most cases of attempts at decentralization in developing countries, these are generally lacking.

2.4. The Case for Balance

It appears that there is one consensus among writers and researchers on decentralization. That consensus relates to the idea that even if successful, decentralization cannot solve all the maladies in development efforts and that of education (Conyers, 1983; Fiske, 1996; Govinda, 1997; Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Werlin, 1992). The issue is not, therefore, whether to decentralize or not but to maintain an optimum balance of centralized and decentralized elements (Fiske, 1996: 10-11). In connection to this Hallak (1990:274) suggests "hybrid systems which gradually divide responsibilities between the central systems, the local administration and the users appear the most attractive."

Decentralization also needs time to take root and see its impact. It is indicated that it takes 10-15 years for "new structures to settle down" (Bray, 1985: 192-193). Thus "a cautious approach is usually the best way to proceed in decentralization projects." (Werlin, 1992:227) and incremental methods and changes are beneficial (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Sanwal, 1987; Werlin, 1992).

Although political imperatives make this difficult because they move faster (Bray, 1985) and at times they present a threat (Fiske, 1996) and in some cases decentralization emerged virtually overnight as a means of filling a political vaccum [eg. In Colombia, in the 1980s], there are instances of the incremental and cautious approaches. Kenya attempted decentralization at different times incrementally, and arrived at an accelerated programme of decentralization known as 'District Focus' in 1983 (Cohen and Hook 1987). Senegal adopted a phased time table for the implementation of decentralization reform in seven regions with an interval of two years because of administrative, financial and political constraints. The intention was for the latter regions to learn from the experience of their predecessors (Vengroff and Johnston, 1987). These approaches provide valuable lessons to learn from.

A related issue with the concern for balance and incrementalism is the issue of control. Although it is difficult and tends to make decentralization an "exercise in contradiction" (Weiler, 1990) because reconciling them is difficult, there is a need to balance local bodies' autonomous decision making with some control by the central authority. (Florestal and Cooper, 1997:5) Florestal and Cooper suggest that "A careful balance must be struck between the need to provide safeguards against local

bodies taking arbitrary actions and their need to maintain autonomy." Despite its influence on the willingness of local authorities to undertake new functions" a certain restriction may be justified if local bodies are inexperienced" (Florestal and Cooper, 1997:6).

Finally, related to the concepts of balance, cautious, incremental approach and control in decentralization is the theory of political elasticity proposed by Werlin (1992) in response to the observation of the lack of theory "to explain when, how, and why to decentralize" (Wunsch quoted by Werlin, 1992:232). The theory deserves attention as it is relevant and persuasive. The theory:

> has to do with the capacity of leaders to use 'soft' (basically persuasive and manipulative forms of power" and then to shift, as necessary to harder (more threatening and Coercive) forms of power (Werlin, 1992:223).

Using the theory, Werlin provides two propositions. The first is that "decentralization and community control should always be undertaken" and secondly decentralization requires centralization, and community control, control over the community". The theory suggests that enabling and controlling go together. The one cannot be used without the other. As an example Werlin compares the functionining of administration in Brazil and Switzerland in attempting to help their more impoverished regions.

Brazil was less effective though it provided generous funds due to lack of enough control over municipal fiscal capacity in its distribution formula. Generous

federal funds had allowed some municipalities to underutilise their property taxes and user charges. Werlin (1992:233) further states:

> Because grants are not made conditional on achieving certain objectively verifiable criteria relating to minimum standards and access, they promote administrative inefficiencies without helping the poorer segments of the population.

Switzerland, on the other hand, succeeded in helping its less affluent regions and those facing economic difficulties because the aid was not automatic. The beneficiaries had to present projects that offer strong probability of maintaining or creating jobs and diversifying the economy. There was well developed screening process (Werlin, 1992:233).

This theory appears to be a step forward in providing a framework in handling decentralization. It is desirable that local governments (and institutions in education) are given adequate leeway for initiative and descretion, and provided with financial and capacity building support programmes. But, at the same time there should be appropriate control and supervision as safeguards against non-performance, inefficiency, corruption, which are often undesirable effects of decentralization in developing countries.

2.5. Trends of Decentralization in Ethiopia

This topic may be seen in terms of three periods for the purpose of convenience in this review: the Imperial period, the Derg period, and the Present period (Since 1991).

> ....Administration was highly centralized; flexibility and local community participation were inhibited in curriculum planning, personnel, and budgetary allocation and control.

Furthermore, the education system was criticized that it failed to satisfy the needs of the majority of the people. Pressures for change built up both from internal and external sources. Finally, as Tekeste (1990:9) observes, as a response to different criticism, the government made "one of its boldest policy decisions' to conduct a thorough review of the education sector. The Education Sector Review (ESR) was officially launched in October 1971, and was carried up to August 1972.

The ESR (1972:vi-2) along with various issues recommended that decision making authority be delegated to the organizational units responsible for the operation being made. It recommended that the MOE be considerably altered by decentralization of administrative responsibilities, be less involved in the details of operation. The provincial education office was also recommended to provide a number of services at the provincial level such as educational radio and television broadcasts, curriculum planning and design, inservice teacher training, recruitment of teachers and others (p.6). The responsibility of hiring teachers was recommended to the Awraja office within policies established by the MOE (ESR, vi:12).

The ESR was made official on February 1974 (Teshome, 1979:195). The recommendations of the ESR were not implemented because it developed negative public opinion and the 1974 Revolution did away with the Imperial system. One of the reasons for the negative public opinion was the non-involvement of key interest

groups like teachers and parents and the whole exercise was shrouded in secrecy (Seyoum, 1996).

2.5.2. The Derg Period

During the Derg regime, all decision making authority was concentrated at the central level. Structurally the arm of the government was extended by the creation of peasant Associations and Urban Dwellers' Associations as the lowest forms of local government through elected officials. But the officials remained "defenders of the interests of the government" (Tegegne, 1997:649). Another attempt was the establishment of some "autonomous regions" due to "the increasing instability in some provinces of the country" while others remained under centralized system (Tegegne, 1997:649).

As Cramer and Browne (1956:18) noted the political atmosphere surrounding an education system is one of the most powerful influences in its development. Thus the education system during the Derg was highly centralized. It was the MOE headquarters that had virtually all the decision making authority for every activity. In relation to this the MOE (1980:1) stated that:

> An effective system of administration, evaluation and inspection must be created. This must incorporate mechanisms for the promulgation of central directives which are formulated according to the principles of democratic centralism.

For the above stated reason, the decision making authority such as over the formulation, publication and distribution of policies, preparation of curricula, the issuing of directives, inspection and evaluation of the use of curricula in the schools, preparation of annual budget etc (MOE, 1980:12) were concentrated at the central administration. The provincial offices had the duties to ensure the application of proper procedures of implementing policies, to provide information to the central office, to ensure the implementation of plans related to the allocation for construction of new schools in the provinces (MOE, 1980:33).

Private schools established during the Imperial period were turned to public schools by proclamation NO 54 of 1975. A school committee was established by elected members from parents and Urban Dwellers Association to administer these schools. The Committee had the authority to enter into contract, determine school fees, employ, administer and dismiss staff among other powers (MOE, 1977:15). This is a change from private control to community control. Another proclamation (No 103 of 1976) provided the administration and control of schools by the people (MOE, 1977:25). This proclamation suggested popular participation in school activities. Despite these limited attempts at decentralization, educational management remained centralized until the demise of the Derg.

2.5.3. The Present Trend

Starting with the formation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) the style of government is radically changed. The TGE took measures towards

decentralization along the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination of all the peoples (peaceful and Democratic Transitional Conference of Ethiopia, 1991). Through Proclamation No.7 of 1992 (TGE, 1992) it created 14 Regional Self-governments which had special powers to: levy taxes and dues; issue and implement laws and rules relating to public services; plan, direct and supervise social and economic programmes; prepare, approve and implement their own budgets; employ, administer the personnel of their self-government and others, in accordance with the policies and laws of the central TGE. Now, the Regional Self-Governments are consolidated into 9 Regional States based on settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people and are the members of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (FDRE, 1995a). The regional states have now the authority to:

(a) establish regional administration;

(b) enact and execute regional constitution and other laws;

(c) formulate and execute economic and social development policies, strategies and plans;

(d) levy and collect taxes and dues on sources reserved to them;

(e) administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws;

(f) enact and enforce civil service laws and determine conditions of work;

(g) establish police force and maintain peace and order (FDRE, 1995a).

Ultimately decentralization is an ideological and political principle associated with "objectives of self-reliance, democratic decision making, popular participation in government, and accountability of public officials to citizens" (Rondinelli, Nellis and

Cheema, 1983:13). This is true in Ethiopia. Perhaps the Premier's words most explicitly state it

> In our case, in order to promote participation, we have to be decentralized. Because it is at the local level that people can participate easily. If local authorities have no right to make decisions of fundamental significance of the population, then.... there won't be any real power to talk about; so for us decentralization and meaningful participatory democracy have to go hand in hand. One cannot come before the other; they are sides of the same coin. That is why for us democratization... can only mean decentralization. (In the Ethiopian Herald, December 1997).

As part of the overall decentralization of government, there has occurred decentralization of educational management. First, Proclamation No 41 of 1993 (TGE, 1993) defined the powers and duties of the central and regional executive organs which defined the powers and duties of the MOE and regional education bureaus. Then Proclamation NO 4 of 1995 (FDRE, 1995b) defined the powers and duties of the MOE. Regional states also have defined the powers and duties of their respective education bureaus. The distribution of powers and duties over education between the Federal Government (MOE) and Regional Governments (REB) is summarized in the table in appendix one.

The 1994 Education and Training Policy (TGE, 1994a) also states that primary education will be offered in nation/nationality languages; government priority in financing will focus up to the completion of general secondary education and related training (grade 10) and there will be increased cost sharing at higher levels. With regard to educational management, the policy stipulates that educational management will be "decentralized to create the necessary condition to expand,

enrich and improve the relevance, quality, accessibility and equity of education and training". It also stipulates that educational institutions will be autonomous in their internal management through the coordination of boards or committees composed of community members, development and research institutions, teachers and students.

In addition, the TGE (TGE, 1995) issued regulations for the licensing and supervision of private educational institutions. The regulations provide for the establishment of private educational institutions from kindergarten to higher education by investors. This is indication that private schools are allowed.

All of the above proclamations, policies, and regulations clearly show that there is decentralization occurring at least at the regional level. The only empirical study with regard to decentralization in Ethiopia that has so far appeared is the Beso decentralization study in Tigray made in 1995 (USAID), 1996). It found out that decentralization has not reached the wereda and school levels and that there are differing perceptions about what decentralization is and how it should be approached.

Some have expressed concerns over the feasibility of decentralization of education in Ethiopia before ascertaining or considering necessary pre-requisites for its success (eg. Minga, 1997; Seyoum, 1996). Seyoum for example stressed the importance of having trained managers to handle decentralization. The MOE (1996) among other things, acknowledged the problem of managerial capacity and mentions government is doing what it can do to alleviate the problem. The MOE further states "The hard fact is that the country has very limited resources to train **all its**

professionals. All the same, decentralization cannot and should not be procrastinated due to such teething troubles" (MOE, 1996:105). In many sectors it is true that government does what it can to develop managerial capacity. In education, as the above statement implies a lot remains to be done.

Finally, it is not enough to look at decentralization plan or the rhetoric on paper. One has to examine the practice to evaluate whether decentralization is actually occurring at lower level. To examine the extent of decentralization at the sub-regional particularly the Wereda level, this study utilizes the following guiding framework developed from a synthesis of the review of literature. It is based on the methodological model suggested by Vengroff and Ben Salem (1992) to measure overall decentralization efforts. The model used in this study is a scaled down model adjusted to reflect issues in educational management and the purpose and scope of this study.

According to Vengroff and Ben Salem (192) the quality of decentralization can be measured in terms of three key factors: Scope, intensity, and commitment as defined in the definition of terms part of the paper. The key factors can be operationalized in various ways using a number of variables. In this study, they are tentatively operationalized as indicated in the model.

Figure 1 A Tentative Model to Examine Decentralization of Educaltional Management at the Wereda Level



CHAPTER THREE PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

3.1. Characteristics of Respondents

A total number of 60 wereda education personnel were involved in filling out the questionnaire. These were 20 from Tigray and 40 from Amhara. All respondents from the sample weredas in Tigray were males. There were two female respondents from Amhara. Since the sample respondents were the wereda education office head, the educational programmes and supervision section head (coordinator), the administrative and financial services section head in both regions, the educational programmes and supervision junior expert (in Tigray), the educational statistics and planning worker and the personnel officer (in Amhara), women were rare in these positions.

All of the respondents have served from one to six years in their present positions. The modal service year was two years wherein five of the respondents in Tigray and 16 of the respondents in Amhara have served in their current positions.

Eighteen respondents in Tigray and 36 respondents in Amhara indicated their ages. All were above the age of 30 years. The youngest respondent was 30 years old and the oldest was 53 years old. The average age of the respondents in Tigray was 40.6 years while those in Amhara had an average age of 38 years.

Table II Distribution of Respondents by Age

	Tigray		Amhara	
Age Range	No	%	No	%
26-35 years	6	33.3	12	30.8
36-45 years	7	38.9	22	56.4
46-55 years	5	27.8	5	12.8
Total	**18**	**100**	**39**	**100**

Based on their expected roles, the respondents were categorized into two groups as decision makers and support staff. The decision makers included the wereda education office head, the educational programmes and supervision section head (coordinator), and the administrative and financial services section head. The support staff included the junior expert in Tigray, the educational statistics and planning worker as well as the personnel officer in Amhara. Their job description shows the distinction in Amhara. Thus 60 percent of the respondents in Tigray and 55 percent of respondents in Amhara were "decision makers". The rest were support staff.

With regard to educational level, 65 percent of the respondents in Tigray and 40 percent in Amhara were TTI graduates. Among these, 40 percent of the respondents in Tigray and 25 percent in Amhara were in the decision making positions. Another 20 percent in Tigray and 35 percent in Amhara had diplomas. The remaining had completed grade 12.

The qualification requirements for the decision making posts and the junior expert as well as the educational statistics and planning worker indicate the position

holders should have a qualification of diploma, though there is also consideration of experience which could replace the educational level. In Amhara, the approved structure shows that the educational programmes and supervision coordinator could be occupied by a person with first degree (details in Appendix 4(B)).

Previous experience of the respondents was also examined. Accordingly, all of the respondents in Tigray had previous teaching experience of five to 20 years, 75 percent of them between five to 10 years, and the remaining between 11 and 20 years. More over, 65 percent of them had previous managerial experience (as school vice-principals principals, and Awraja education officials). Twenty percent had previous supervisory experience (as inspectors or supervisors) of five to 10 years.

In Amhara, 75 percent of the respondents had previous teaching experience ranging from five to 10 years, while the other 25 percent served in non-teaching support posts as well as in other organizations. Of those, about 43 percent had previous managerial experience, most between five to 10 years. Moreover, about 23 percent had previous supervisory experience.

In terms of experience most wereda education personnel have had long years of experience in teaching and some in management.

The respondents were also asked whether they had training opportunities relevant to their present positions. Forty five percent of the respondents in Tigray answered they had training opportunity while 55 percent replied to the contrary. In

Amhara 52 percent replied they had training opportunity whereas 48 percent replied negatively. Among those who replied in the affirmative, a few were educational administration diploma graduates. Other diploma holders in technical-vocational and academic areas also indicated they were trained. Among the TTI graduates, a few indicated they participated in three months training in the management institutes in both regions. The management institutes are established to build local capacity in various areas.

In sum, the data on the characteristics of the respondents show that the typical wereda education personnel are males, mainly having TTI certificates and to a lesser extent a diploma, they were at their middle age, having long teaching experience and some managerial experience, with lack of preparation, generally speaking, in educational planning and management.

3.2. Analysis of Findings

3.2.1. Sharing of Responsibilities

The respondents were provided with a list of tasks that show responsibility over educational plan and budget, teachers and principals, school construction and materials. They were asked to identify which body was responsible for each task that is the regional council (RC), the regional education bureaus (REB), the zonal education department (ZED), the Wereda council (WC) including the executive committee and the Wereda education and training board (WETB), and the Wereda education office (WEO). Responses that pointed out the RC, and REB are assumed to indicate centralized task at the regional level, those that indicate the zone refer to

decentralization to the zonal level. And, responses indicating the WC and WEO show a task is decentralized at the wereda level.

Although position (decision making versus support) was assumed to result in difference of responses on the various issues raised, the chi-square test ($P<0.05$) showed no statistically significant difference of responses on the various issues raised, between the responses of the two groups in almost all items. Hence comparison was made between the responses of the two regions to examine variations.

Table IV A Responsibility for Preparation of Wereda Education Plan and Budget

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
		Response	No	%	No	%
1	Preparation of Wereda Education Plan	RC	1	5	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZEB	3	15	-	-
		WC	-	-	1	2.5
		WEO	16	80	39	97.5
	Total		**19**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Preparation of Wereda Education budget	RC	2	10	-	-
		REB	2	10	-	-
		ZEB	12	60	2	5
		WC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	4	20	38	95
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

RC - Regional Council
REB - Regional Education Bureau
ZED - Zonal Education Department
WC - Wereda Council
WEO - Wereda Education Office

As Table IV - A shows preparation of Wereda education plan is the responsibility of the WEO as indicated by 80 per cent of the respondents in Tigray and 97.5 percent of the respondents in Amhara. The Chi-square test for difference between the two regions showed a statistically significant difference at $P< 0.05$, $X^2 = 8.94545$. Interviews revealed that the planning in the WEO in Tigray involves tuning the day to day activities of the office with the target set by the REB. The Tigray Education Bureau (TEB: 1989b E.C.) Guidelines also confirm this. In Amhara the WEO prepares the plan in cooperation with the schools subject to review by the ZED. It could be said then that the preparation of wereda education plan is done at the WEO with significant differences between the two regions.

Similarly 80 percent of the respondents in Tigray replied the wereda does not prepare the education budget. Most indicated the ZED. Interviews and comments to open-ended questions in Tigray revealed that the wereda does not manage a budget of any sort. Supplies for the WEO including stationery are provided by the ZED. In Amhara, 95 percent of the respondents answered that the WEO prepares the budget. The WEO heads of the sample weredas in Amhara confirmed in interviews that the WEO manages the recurrent budget. The Chi-square test ($P< 0.05$, $X^2 = 36.0$) showed a statistically significant difference between the two regions. Thus, the preparation of the education budget is the responsibility of the ZED in Tigray, whereas it is the responsibility of the WEO in Amhara.

Table IV-B Responsibility for Teacher and School Principal Issues.

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
1	Final Selection of Primary school teachers for training	Response	No	%	No	%
		RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	15	75	1	2.5
		ZED	4	20	5	12.5
		NC	-	-	20	50
		WEO	1	5	14	35
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Covering primary school	RC	-	-	2	5
	teachers training expense	REB	19	95	33	82.5
		ZED	1	5	5	12.5
		WC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	-	-	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
3	Paying teacher salary	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	1	5	1	2.5
		ZED	2	10	-	-
		WC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	17	85	39	97.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4	Recruiting School	RC	-	-	1	2.5
	Principals	REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	4	20	7	17.5
		WC	14	70	16	40.0
		WEO	2	10	16	40.0
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

Table IV-B depicts responses on responsibility on a few teacher and school principal issues. In Tigray 75 percent of the respondents identified that the final selection of primary school teacher training candidates is the responsibility of the

REB, 20 percent of the respondents also replied the ZED. In Amhara, however, 50 per cent of the respondents replied the WC, and 35 percent of them pointed out the WEO to be responsible. Thus, 75 per cent have indicated the wereda level although the hand of the WC appears to be stronger. The Chi-square test ($P<0.05, X^2=41.58$) showed a statistically significant difference between the two regions. It could be inferred that the responsibility for selecting candidates for primary school teacher training is probably decentralized to the wereda in Amhara, while it is centralized at the REB in Tigray.

With regard to covering primary school teacher training expenses, most of the respondents, that is 95 per cent in Tigray and 82 per cent in Amhara, answered that the REB covers the expenses for primary school teacher training. The Chi-square test at $P< 0.05$, $X^2= 1.99038$ revealed no statistically significant difference in both regions. From this, it could be said that financial responsibility for primary school teacher training lies at the REB in both regional states. The responses of the wereda personnel in Amhara agree with what is indicated in the Education Sector Development Programme of the region (ANRG, 1997:16) that the REB is directly responsible to implement teacher training programmes.

As item three in table IV-B dipicts most respondents from both regions tend to agree that the routine task of paying teacher salary is the responsibility of the WEO in both regions. The Chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2= 1.99038$) showed no statistically significant difference between the two regions.

With regard to recruiting would be school principals (item four in table Iv-B) the respondents in both regions appear to have exactly the same responses that the responsibility lies at the wereda level. Most respondents in Tigray replied the WC, while those in Amhara seem to be divided on the WC versus WEO issue. Some, 17.5 percent, also indicated the ZED. These variations of emphasis may perhaps indicate zonal variations in Amhara. The Chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2= 6.94545$) revealed no statistically significant difference between the two regions.

The findings in items three and four in table IV-B indicate that the task of paying teacher salary is the responsibility of the wereda. In addition, recruiting would be school principals is the responsibility of the wereda, more of the WC in Tigray.

Table IV-C Responsibility for School Construction and Materials

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
1	Recommending school site	Response	N	%	N	%
		RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	2	10	-	-
		WC	12	60	16	40
		WEO	6	30	24	60
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Covering school maintenance expenditure	RC	-	-	1	2.6
		REB	11	55	3	7.7
		ZED	8	40	23	59
		WC	1	5	6	15.4
		WEO	-	-	6	15.4
	Total		**20**	**100**	**39**	**100**
3	Purchase of educational	RC	-	-	-	-
	materials (chalk, reading	REB	7	35	5	12.5
	materials etc.)	ZED	13	65	26	65
		WC	-	-	3	7.5
		WEO	-	-	6	15
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4	Distribution of educational	RC	-	-	-	-
	materials	REB	6	30	4	10
		ZED	14	70	31	77.5
		WC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	-	-	5	12.5
	Total				**40**	**100**

Responses in the first item of table IV-C show that recommending school site is the responsibility of the wereda according to 90 percent of the respondents in Tigray and all of the respondents in Amhara. The differences observed are between

the WEO and the WC. The Chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=7.54286$) showed a statistically significant difference between the two regions. This could imply the WC versus the WEO dichotomy.

Concerning responsibility of covering school maintenance expenditure (item two in Table IV-C), 55 per cent and 40 percent of the Tigray respondents answered the REB and the ZED respectively. This shows that it is not the responsibility of the wereda in Tigray. As the data show respondents from Amhara seem to be divided on this issue which may indicate the responsibility is shared among the various levels. The Chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=18.166622$) showed a statistically significant difference between the two regions,. Thus while it appears the responsibility of covering school maintenance expenditure rests at the regional and zonal level in Tigray, it is not clear in Amhara.

Data in item three and four in Table IV-C depict that most of the respondents in Tigray replied the responsibility of purchasing, and distributing educational materials (chalk, reading materials etc) rests upon the ZED. As interviews revealed the Wereda purchases nothing in Tigray. Similarly, the responsibility of purchasing and distributing educational materials rests upon the ZED in Amhara. Interviews with WEO heads in the sample weredas in Amhara revealed that the WEO purchases things like stationery, uniforms for employees such as guards. This could be the reason for the relatively dispersed responses.

The Chi-square test showed there is statistically significant difference between the two regions ($P<0.05$, $X^2= 7.875$) in the purchasing task, but no statistically significant difference with regard to the distribution of educational materials. Generally speaking purchasing and distribution of educational materials are found to be the responsibility of the ZED in both regions.

3.2.2. Sharing of Authority

In a similar approach as described in the introduction to 3.2.1, the respondents were asked to identify which level or body has the decision making authority over several issues. The results follow hereunder in Tables V-A to V-C.

Table V-A Authority over the Approval of Wereda Education Plan and Budget

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
1	Approval of Wereda education plan	Response	No	%	No	%
		RC	1	5	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	12	60	8	20
		WC	7	35	32	80
		WEO	-	-	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Approval of Wereda education budget	RC	2	10	1	2.5
		REB	9	45	11	27.5
		ZEB	8	40	-	-
		WC	-	-	28	70
		WEO	1	5	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

Item one in table V-A shows more than average of the respondents in Tigray, 60 percent, replied the ZED approves the Wereda education plan. This is most probable since the WEO prepares day to day educational activities which are more technical. But the WC has also significant role as indicated by 35 pe rcent of the respondents. The WC is involved deeply in mobilizing the community for formal and non formal education in Tigray and it may have some role in the planning process.

In Amhara, 80 percent of the respondents indicated that the WC approves the wereda education plan. The Chi-square test at $P<0.05$, $X^2=12.55383$ showed a statistically significant difference between the two regions, with regard to approval of wereda education budget, 95 percent of the respondents in Tigray replied that the authority of approving wereda education budget rests upon the zone and above, while 70 percent of the respondents in Amhara pointed out the wereda council. The Chi-square test revealed there is a statistically significant difference between the two regions at $p<0.05$, $X^2=36.15789$).

These results show approval of wereda education plan and budget rests upon the ZED in Tigray, while in Amhara it is decentralized to the wereda. It would be recalled from earlier discussion that the WEO in Tigray manages no budget whereas in Amhara. The WEO manages the recurrent budget. It should be noted that the Education Sector Development Programme of the Amhara region (ANRG, 1997:17) states that there is a need to make the "responsibilities of the WEO, the ZED, and REB in preparing the annual current and capital budget" more clear.

TABLE V-B Authority Over Teacher and School Principal Issues

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
1	Assignment of Primary school teachers recruited from the Wereda after training	Response	No	%	No	%
		RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	16	80	3	7.5
		ZED	3	15	34	85
		NC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	1	5	3	7.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Employing primary school teachers	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	19	95	13	32.5
		ZED	-	-	27	67.5
		WC	-	-	-	-
		WEO	1	5	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
3	Approval of teacher evaluation results	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	2	10.5	-	-
		WC	7	36.8	9	22.5
		WEO	10	52.6	31	77.5
	Total		**19**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4	Approval teacher Promotion	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	3	15	-	-
		ZED	1	5	-	-
		WC	9	45	29	72.5
		WEO	7	35	11	27.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
5	Transfer of teachers within the Wereda	Response	No	%	No	%
		RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	2	10	-	-
		ZEB	1	5	-	-
		WC	-	-	1	2.5
		WEO	17	85	39	97.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
6	Taking serious disciplinary measures on teachers	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	14	70	3	7.5
		ZED	3	15	10	25
		WC	2	10	8	20
		WEO	1	5	19	47.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
7	Assignment of school Principals	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	5	25	5	12.5
		WC	12	60	8	45
		WEO	3	5	17	42.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
8.	Dismissal of school principals	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	4	20	3	7.5
		WC	16	80	21	52.5
		WEO	-	-	16	40
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

Items one and two in table V-B show that the authority over assigning primary school teachers after training and employing primary school teachers rests upon the REB in Tigray according to 80 and 90 percent of the respondents in the region respectively for each of the items. In Amhara, 85 percent and 67 per cent of the

respondents for each item respectively indicated the ZED. The Chi-square tests for both items confirmed there is statistically significant difference between the two regions (at $p<0.05$, $X^2=32.85117$ and $X^2 = 25.26563$ respectively for each item).

Thus, it could be very well deduced that employing primary school teachers and assigning them after training are under the authority of the REB, in Tigray whereas they are decentralized to the zone in Amhara. In Amhara, interview revealed that the REB employs personnel for position which provide above the salary of Birr 347, the Zone employs for positions having salary of between Birr 230 and 347, and the Wereda employs up to 230.

Item three in Table V-B shows approval of teacher evaluation results is the authority of the WEO in the two regions as revealed by 52 percent and 77.5 per cent of the respondents in Tigray and Amhara respectively. The role of the WC appears to be greater in Tigray since 36.8 per cent of the respondents in the region selected the option. The chi-square test ($p< 0.05$, $X^2=6.33396$) showed there is a statistically significant difference between responses in the two regions. The results indicate the authority of approving teacher evaluation results lies upon the WEO with greater influence of the WC in Tigray. A guideline set by the TEB (1989 a,E.C:9) for teacher evaluation and promotion indicates that approval of teacher evaluation results is the authority of a committee composed of representatives of school management, teachers, students, and community. The results of this study in the region do not agree with the guidelines. Interviews and informal discussions with WEO personnel and teachers tended to agree with the results of this study.

As shown in item four of table V-B, 80 per cent of the respondents in Tigray answered that approval of teacher promotion is at the wereda level (that is, 45 per cent indicated the WC and 35 per cent said the WEO). All respondents in Amhara also indicated it is that of the wereda level (72.5 per cent replied the WC, and 27.5 per cent said the WEO). The chi-square test showed there is a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two regions ($P<0.05$, $X^2=9.84211$). This could indicate the WC versus WEO issues. Generally approval of teacher promotion is under the authority of the Wereda.

The transfer of teachers from school to school within the same wereda is the authority of the WEO as the data in item five of table V-B reveal. The chi-square test ($p<0.05$, $X^2=6.72321$) showed no statistically significant difference between the two regions.

As item six of table V-B shows, 70 per cent and 15 per cent of the respondents in Tigray replied the REB, and the ZED respectively have the authority over taking serious disciplinary measures upon teachers, while respondents in Amhara seem to be divided over this issue. However 67.5 per cent replied the wereda level. The chi-square test also showed there is a statistically significant difference between the two regions. Although this finding needs further verification, it appears that while the function is centralized at the REB in Tigray, it seems to be decentralized to the wereda in Amhara.

As the data in items seven and eight show, 75 percent of the respondents in Tigray and 87 per cent in Amhara replied that the assignment of school principals is the authority of the Wereda mainly the WC. Similarly, 80 per cent of the respondents in Tigray and 92.5 per cent in Amhara answered that the authority to dismiss school principals rests upon the wereda, mainly the WC in Tigray. The chi-square test ($p<0.05$, $X^2=4.875$) for the assignment showed no statistically significant difference between the two regions. However, the test showed there is statistically significant difference between the two regions on the issue of dismissal of school principals. This could be due to the differences in the WC versus WEO issue.

Table V-C Authority Over School Construction and Maintenance

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
1	Deciding site for new schools	Response	No	%	No	%
		RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	-	-	-	-
		ZED	5	25	8	20
		WC	14	70	31	77.5
		WEO	1	5	1	2.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2	Approval of School construction budget	RC	-	-	2	5
		REB	10	50	6	15
		ZED	10	50	31	77.5
		WC	-	-	1	2.5
		WEO	-	-	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
3	Entering into contract of new schools construction	RC	-	-	-	-
		REB	3	15	2	5
		ZED	15	75	26	65
		WC	1	5	5	12.5
		WEO	1	5	7	17.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4	Entering into contract	RC	-	-	-	-
	of school maintenance	REB	2	10	2	5
		ZED	14	70	19	47.5
		WC	1	5	8	20
		WEO	3	15	11	27.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

With regard to the approval of school construction budget 50 percent of the respondents in Tigray said the REB, while the rest 50 percent replied the ZED. This

is indicative that the wereda has no role in this area and the officials are not clear about it. Most respondents in Amhara indicated that the ZED has the authority to approve school construction budget. There is a difference between the two regions and the chi-square test showed a statistically significant difference at $p<0.05$, $X^2=0.10061$.

The authority to enter into contract of new school construction appears to rest upon the ZED, in both regions because 75 percent of the respondents in Tigray and 65 per cent in Amhara replied. The Wereda seems to have some role in Amhara. However, the chi-square test ($p<0.05$, $X^2=4.10762$) showed no statistically significant difference between the two regions. It may be possible to say the ZED has the authority over contracts of new school construction.

Responses with regard to the contract of school maintenance did vary in each of the regions which could indicate varying practices.

Furthermore to know the views of the respondents on the situation of decision making individually and in groups at the wereda level, the wereda personnel were asked to indicate whether or not they have authority to make decisions individually, whether or not they request guidelines from higher bodies, refer issues for decision to higher bodies frequently, and whether or not they have group decision making authority.

With regard to individual decision making authority, the results show that the "decision makers" in Tigray replied they have authority to make decisions individually, while in Amhara only half of the "Decision makers" responded positively but the other half replied negatively. Thus, there are differing replies which may perhaps indicate differences in the zones from which the sample Wereda were taken.

Those who replied they have no decision making authority stated many reasons such as group decision making being better for work, interference of the wereda administration, individual decision making makes one liable to "evaluation", "በግል የሚወሰኑት በስህተትነት ስለሚቆጠሩ ብዙውን ጊዜ ስለሚያስገመግሙ" (emphasis added. The details are annexed in Appendix 5 (A).

Concerning the requesting of guidelines from higher bodies above 70 percent of the respondents in Tigray including 40 percent of the decision makers answered positively while only 30 per cent of the respondents in Amhara gave similar response. The chi-square test ($(p<0.05, X^2=8.68778$) also confirmed there is a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups of respondents. About 33 per cent of the decision makers in the respondents from Tigray also affirmed that they refer many issues for decision to higher bodies. This may be indicative that there is less discretion to the wereda officials in the region for decision, among other things.

Those who responded they request guidelines frequently stated their reasons such as guidelines over many issues are not clear, seeking clarification on new

unclear directives, to safeguard oneself from making mistakes. Such reasons are hints on the unclarity of guidelines and directives and the feeling of insecurity to make decisions.

Most of the respondents in both regions, that is 80 per cent of the respondents in Tigray and 90 per cent in Amhara replied that they make decisions in groups. Appendix 5 (A) contains several statements that reflect group decision making is the norm. Furthermore the Education Sector Development Programmes of both regions (ANRG, 1997; GNRST, 1997) indicate that major decisions at the wereda, zone, and regional levels are made by management committees composed of heads of sections, and departments in each level. The management committee at the regional level includes ZED heads.

Another question asked the respondents to suggest what additional authority would enable the WEO carry out its responsibilities adequately. To this end, 23 respondents from both regions wrote 46 responses (Details in Appendix 5 (B)). The responses are categorized under five major headings as indicated in Table VI with the corresponding frequency each category received in each region.

Table VII Suggestions on Additional Authority to the Wereda Education Office

Category	Frequency of Responses	
	Tigray	Amhara
Authority over budget	9	6
Authority over personnel	9	9
Autonomy (non-interference)	5	6
Given authority adequate	3	1

These suggestions indicate that the WEO personnel perceive their office has inadequate authority.

Generally speaking the Wereda has little authority over many areas, especially in Tigray. This is confirmed by the following statement in the Education sector Development Programme document of Tigray (GNRST, 1997:43):

> Although the competence or powers have not been formally defined power is very well decentralized at the level of the zone. The zonal office administers its own budget, plans its own activities based on key regional targets.... No similar level of decentralization has yet taken place in the zone's relation with the wereda offices except the assignment of teachers to specific school and their supervisory activities.

3.2.3. Guidelines

The availability of clear guidelines that define authority and responsibilities of the various bodies that are involved in decentralization process is essential. The study attempted to find out what guidelines are available in the two regions to facilitate decentralization in educational management. From accessible documents the following sketchy findings were obtained.

3.2.3.1. Tigray

The constitution of the National Regional state of Tigray (1987 E.C.) stipulates that the wereda will administer primary schools. In line with this constitutional provision the TEB has prepared a manual for the management of schools in Tigray (TEB, 1989b, E.C) which is a modification of the MOE's (1987 E.C, 1988 E.C) suggested materials. The guidelines contained in the manual indicate the delineation of responsibilities and authority of various bodies from the Wereda up to the school.

Basically it has divided the authority and responsibility for managing education into two: **constitutional** and **professional**. The constitutional authority rests upon the tabiya/kebele, the wereda, the zonal, and the regional organs of the regional government. The professional responsibility lies upon the school, the wereda, the zonal, and the regional branches of the education bureau. This is a distinction authorities call the political and administrative model of school management (Brown, 1990).

To ensure accountability and participation in the management of education, the guidelines undertake to integrate the constitutional and professional responsibilities. It is stated that the highest body for the management of the school is the wereda. Zonal and regional bodies / both constitutional and professional/are to provide necessary support to the wereda, but not to interfere in the details of managing schools. As many of the findings of this study indicate this is not practised in reality. The structure of school management is designed as follows:

Figure 2. The Structure of Educational Management at the School and Wereda Levels



Source: TEB, 1989b, E.C.P.12

The structure makes the school accountable to the kebele school management board and the WEO. The WEO is accountable to the WETB which is created to serve as the professional organ of the wereda executive committee and the WC. The WC has ultimate authority over primary schools within its territory.

From this structure, it is observed that the mechanism for school management and participation in education has created a number of structures (bodies) which obviously increases and lengthens the line of command and may precipitate in the bureaucratization of the system even at the local level. Another issue related to the accountability situation is that the structure makes schools and WEO accountable to the kebele and wereda bodies. There is also a double accountability situation. These are likely to make the system highly prone to conflict between the professional orientation of the school and WEO and the political orientation of the governance structures. There are hints in the findings of this study that this is already occurring (see statements in Appendix 5(B)).

The guidelines define the authority and responsibility of the various bodies indicated in the structure. For example, the WETB is given the authority and responsibilities among others,

1. to serve as the highest managerial body for the schools in the Wereda representing the executive committee of the wereda;
2. to ensure the availability of favourable condition to learning teaching in the wereda;

3. to coordinate and ensure quality of education, monitor and evaluate implementation of educational plans of the region;
4. to evaluate and approve teachers career promotion;
5. to appoint and dismiss school principals based on briefings of the WEO head;
6. to ensure proper utilization of human material and financial resources;
7. to implement other education related directives by the wereda executive committee; and
8. to report to the executive committee quarterly about its activities.

Most of the above authority statements are very general except number four and five. The WETB is composed of the Wereda council social sector head (chairperson) the WEO head, (member and secretary), WEO educational programmes and supervision section head, representatives of wereda teachers', womens,' peasants', and youth associations.

The WEO, accountable to both the WEC and the ZED is given a number of responsibilities related to preparation of detailed programmes of action, recommending the appointment or dismissal of school principals, providing professional assistance to schools, monitoring activities, assigning teachers to schools, preparing various kinds of reports and submitting to the ZED and WETB.

3.2.3.2. Amhara

Similar to that of Tigray, the constitution of the Amhara National Regional State (1987 E.C.) gives the management of primary schools to the wereda level. The

researcher was unable to find a formalized guideline delineating the authority and responsibilities of the various bodies. The Education Sector Development Programme of the region (ANRG, 1997:72) states the need for more delineation of authority and responsibility:

> The delineation of power and responsibility with clear accountability should also be made more clear in some aspects of the organization and management structures of the education sector in the region. Areas which need attention at the moment are the accountability of the Wereda education office and the zone education department to the zone education department and regional education bureau respectively,...

The above statement indicates that there has already been attempts to delineate authority and responsibility. Job descriptions for the wereda education personnel are developed. What is not clear is the definition of authority and responsibilities of the various levels of educational management structures.

In the education bureau the researcher was informed that there is no generalized guideline that specifies the responsibilities and authority of the WEO. It was explained that many of the activities are carried out according to government finance and personnel management regulations. In addition the education bureau prepares guidelines on specific areas from time to time and sends them to the lower levels such as supervision manual, guidelines for the assignment and transfer of teachers and other staff, and guidelines to raise primary school enrollment (participation). The WETB appears to be established according to the MOE's teacher career promotion guidelines. Generally, there is no consolidated guideline with regard to the management of education below the regional level.

3.2.4. Managerial Capacity

Adequate managerial capacity is essential in any decentralization programme. This study attempted to examine the WEO's capacity in terms of the number and standard of manpower, the scope of the organizational structure of the WEO from available documents and responses from the WEO personnel.

Concerning the standard (quality) of personnel, it was found out in the characteristics of the respondents part of this paper that the typical WEO personnel are males mainly with a TTI certificate and to a lesser extent with a diploma, having long teaching experience and some managerial experience, with no preparation, generally speaking, in educational planning and management.

In terms of the number of manpower, the WEO structure in Tigray provides for a maximum number of **nine persons** at various positions, including the head who is an appointee (details in appendix 4(A)). Although the approved number of WEO personnel is nine, most of the weredas especially those located in remote rural areas did not have all the approved ones. Interviews with the ZED personnel and WEO heads of the sample weredas revealed that the positions of statistics and planning junior expert, and the building controller were vacant.

The organizational structure of the WEO in Amhara provides for a maximum of **26 persons** in 23 positions. The highest grade approved is PS 3 although the position is not occupied at present by persons who have a first degree (Details in

appendix 5 (B)). The structure is much broader than the WEO in Tigray. The position of building construction and maintenance controller was vacant in the sample weredas.

Table VII Views on Capacity of organization Structure and Manpower of the Wereda Education Office.

No.	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
			N0	%	N0	%
1	The WEO structures capacity to enable the office to perform its duties	Adequately enable	-	-	9	22.5
		Fairly enable	7	35	19	47.5
		Not enable	13	65	12	30
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2.	Existing manpower to enable the WEO perform its duties	Adequately enable	-	-	7	17.5
		Fairly enable	7	35	27	67.5
		Not enable	13	65	6	15
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

Table VIII shows that no respondent in Tigray answered the WEO structure and its existing manpower can Adequately enable it carry out its responsibilities while 22.5 per cent of the respondents in Amhara replied that it can adequately enable it. Thirty five per cent of the respondents in Tigray replied "fairly enable" but 65 per cent indicated that the structure can not enable the Wereda carry out its responsibilities.

The WEO in practice is engaged in supervision, monitoring, evaluating, coordinating, the formal and non formal education programmes in its territory, in personnel affairs, modiliazation of the community for education and so on. The structure and manpower of the WEO in Tigray cannot enable it to carry out its

responsibilities. The regions Education sector Development programme (GNRST, 1997:42) acknowledges the seriousness of the problem but it does not specifically indicate what things are to be done to build the capacity of the WEO as what it has described the units at the regional level, for example, vehicles.

In Amhara, 22.5 percent of the respondents replied that the WEO structure can adequately enable it carry out its responsibilities, 47.5 per cent responded 'fairly' while 30 percent of the respondents indicated the structure cannot enable the WEO adequately carry out its responsibilities. These responses reveal that though not as severe as that of Tigray, the WEO staff are not satisfied with the organizational structure of the WEO. They had more or less similar responses concerning the manpower capacity of the WEO. The chi-square tests for both items showed there is statistically significant difference between the two regions at $P<0.05$, $X^2= 8.90077$ for the organizational structure and $X^2= 16.51161$ for the manpower.

To a question that asked the WEO personnel whether they felt overloaded in their present positions, 80 per cent of the respondents in Tigray answered that they were overloaded by the volume of work and 37 per cent of the respondents in Amhara replied the same. The chi-square test for this item also showed there is a statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups ($p<0.05$, $X^2= 9.64405$). Hence the respondents in Tigray felt more overburdened than the respondents in Amhara. The manpower approved for the WEO in both regions explains this. A respondent in Tigray rightly inquired, "**Is assigning not more than five people decentralization?"**

The respondents were asked to suggest what units need to be added to enable the WEO carry out its responsibilities adequately. Twenty seven respondents from both regions provided 43 suggestions (details in appendix 6(c)). The suggestions mainly focus on additional manpower rather than organizational units as such. For simplicity, the suggestions are categorized as instructional (Planning and statistics junior expert, supervisor, adult education coordinator etc) and support (Personnel officer, accountant, records and files worker etc).

Table IX Suggested Manpower for the Wereda Education Office

Category	Frequency of Responses	
	Tigray	Amhara
1.Instructional	9	7
2. support	14	13
Total	**23**	**20**

The number of respondents was 14 in Tigray and 13 in Amhara.

To sum up, managerial capacity, of the WEO is inadequate in terms of the organizational structure, number and quality of personnel. The problem is obviously more severe in Tigray.

3.2.5. Revenue Capacity

Adequate financial capacity of decentralized units is one of the key pre-conditions for success. To get a general picture of the revenue capacity of the wereda for education, respondents were asked to air their views. Table X contains the results.

Table X Revenue Capacity of Wereda for Education

No	Item	Tigray		Amhara	
		No	%	No	%
1	Source of Wereda education budget.				
	- Region's allocation	10	52.6	21	52.5
	- Wereda own revenue	-	-	1	2.5
	- Both	9	47.4	18	45
	Total	**19**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2.	Extent of Wereda education budget covered by regional allocation				
	- 100%	1	5.3	8	21.1
	- over 75%	12	63.2	14	36.8
	- 50%	5	26.3	10	26.3
	- 25%	1	5.3	6	15.8
	Total	**19**	**100**	**38**	**100**
3.	Extent of education expenditure covered by Wereda own sources.				
	-50%	-	-	2	2.1
	-25	1	5	5	12.8
	-10%	1	5	6	15.4
	-5%	1	5	4	10.3
	Negligible	17	85	22	56.4
	Total	**20**	**100**	**39**	**100**

Item one in table X shows that the respondents had almost the same views on the source of Wereda education budget, i.e., regional allocation or from both regional allocation and Wereda own revenue. Wereda own revenue did not receive attention. The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=.49083$) confirmed that there is no statistically significant difference between the views of respondents in the two regions.

Concerning the extent of Wereda education budget covered by regional allocation, the majority of respondents in Tigray 63.3 percent ,answered the regional allocation covers over 75 percent of the wereda education budget. But the

responses of the respondents in Amhara are scattered. It appears that respondents within the same region had differing estimate levels. The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=.30043$) showed no statistically significant difference between the views of the respondents in the two regions. These data do not show a vivid picture. However, data of item three in table X make the issue clear that the wereda education expenditure is covered by regional allocations because most of the respondents in Tigray (85 per cent) replied the wereda's capacity to cover education expenditure from its own sources is negligible.

Respondents in Amhara seem to be divided on the Wereda capacity to cover education expenditure from its own sources, though 65 per cent of them indicated only from five per cent to negligible. Their responses could hint that the wereda somehow generates revenue from its own sources. Revenue from agricultural land rent was frequently mentioned in a supply item in the questionnaire.

Generally the results show the wereda revenue capacity to cover education expenditure is inadequate. It would be recalled that the WEO in Amhara manages the recurrent budget while in Tigray it does not do so. Schools in Tigray generate money from students and their gardens (those that own one) and utilize the money under the control of the finance office of the wereda. This might have perhaps led the respondents to answer from "both", i.e., regional allocation and own revenue.

Despite the above results that the wereda own revenue capacity being negligible, respondents were asked to rank order four assumed sources of revenue

according to their importance in contributing to education budget. Table XI shows the results.

Table XI Rank Order of Budgetary Sources for Wereda Education

No	Source	Tigray			Amhara		
		Response		Rank	Responses		Rank
		N0*	%		N0*	%	
1.	Wereda tax revenue	10	50	4	25	62.5	1
2.	Student charges	19	95	1	10	25	4
3.	Community voluntary contribution	9	45	2	11	27.5	2
4.	NGO** Assistance	10	50	3	5	12	3

* Some respondents avoided the whole item or specific sources in the ranking.
** NGO - Non governmental organizations

As the data in table XI show, respondents in Tigray ranked student charges, community voluntary contribution and NGO assistance as the first, second, and third sources respectively according to their contribution to cover wereda education budget. They ranked wereda tax revenue the last which could imply it is not used as a source. The wereda level collects tax, it does not directly use it in Tigray.

Respondents in Amhara ranked wereda tax revenue, community voluntary contribution, and NGO assistance as the first, second, and third respectively. They ranked student charges as the last. The results show opposite practices between the two regions on wereda tax revenue and student charges. This shows policy variations in the two regions at least with regard to student charges. In Tigray students at the primary and secondary school level pay some amount of charges,

depending on the decision of the school, at the beginning of the year. In Amhara students up to grade 10 do not pay student charges.

3.2.6. Commitment and Participation

Commitment to decentralization on the part of all the key actors in the decentralization process is a necessary pre-requisite to success. Participation of the community is also another important pre-condition. Decentralization is undertaken also to increase popular participation in educational affairs.

3.2.6.1. Commitment

To obtain the general picture of these important issues from the point of view of the WEO personnel, the respondents were provided with a few questions with regard to commitment.

Table XII - Commitment to Decentralization of Higher Officials, and Wereda Officials to Carry out Responsibilities

No	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
			No	%	No	%
1	Expression of the need for Decentralization	-Usually	4	21.1	16	45.7
		-Occasionally	12	63.2	18	51.4
		-Never	3	15.8	1	2.9
	Total		**19**	**100**	**35**	**100**
2.	Readiness to transfer responsibility	-Full readiness	3	15.8	5	12.8
		-Moderate readiness	14	73.7	31	79.5
		-No readiness	2	10.5	3	7.7
	Total		**19**	**100**	**39**	**100**
3.	Readiness to transfer authority	-Full readiness	1	5.3	5	12.5
		-Moderate readiness	14	73.7	31	77.5
		-No readiness	4	21.5	4	10.5
	Total		**19**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4.	Readiness of Wereda officials to carry out responsibilities	-Very satisfactory	8	40	7	17.5
		-Satisfactory	9	45	29	72.5
		-Not satisfactory	3	15	3	7.5
		-Very weak	-	-	1	2.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

In addition to formal guidelines through policies, rules and regulations for decentralization, official's commitment can be inferred from their attitudes in practice through endorsements.

According to the data on Table XII,63.2 per cent of the respondents in Tigray the higher officials (at zonal and regional levels) occasionally express the need for decentralization, and 21.1 per cent pointed out the higher officials usually express the need. At the verbal level, it could be possible to say that there is some attention.

In Amhara the total number of respondents that gave answers to item one in Table XII were 35, that is 87.5 percent of the total sample. Of these 46.7 per cent

pointed out that the higher officials in the region usually express the need for decentralization, and 51.4 per cent replied occasionally. These responses may hint attention is given to decentralization in light of the national policy. The Education Sector Development Programme document of the region (ANRG, 1997:71) expresses that decentralization requires "qualified people at all levels, adequate management and organization structures, appropriate scheme of delegation of authority between levels and accepted delineation of responsibilities, proper communication mechanisms, availability of basic facilities and equipment." This reveals the attention given to decentralization of education management. The similar document of Tigray (1997) acknowledges the problems of capacity at the wereda and that there is no decentralization but it appears not to be explicit about the need.

Item two in table XII portrays that 73.7 per cent and 79.5 per cent of the respondents in Tigray and Amhara view that the higher officials in their respective regions have moderate level of readiness to transfer responsibility to the Wereda level. The data in item two also show similar results. Thus, it can be said that the wereda personnel perceive their superior bodies have moderate level of readiness to transfer authority and responsibility to lower levels. The transfer of recurrent budget management and employment of lower level support staff (with salary of up to Birr 230) to the wereda level can be taken as an example of the readiness of higher bodies in Amhara. In Tigray, the creation of the decentralized structures at the lower level (see figure 2), albeit with limited authority on main functions, may be taken as an example.

Concerning the readiness of wereda officials to carry out responsibilities the respondents had positive responses. Most of the respondents in Tigray, 85 per cent, replied that the readiness of wereda officials is very satisfactory or satisfactory only 15 per cent replied not satisfactory.

In Amhara, 90 per cent of the respondents indicated the readiness of Wereda officials is satisfactory or very satisfactory. The 10 per cent replied not satisfactory to very weak. Therefore, it could be deduced that the WEO personnel perceive the officials at the wereda level have the readiness to carry out their responsibilities. Since this is a matter of largely perception involving their own personal egos, these findings need further verification using more refined instruments.

3.2.6.2. Mechanisms for Popular Participation

Formally, the constitutions of both regional states provide for popular participation in various spheres through elected representatives at the kebele, wereda, and regional councils. In education, since the 1994 Education and Training Policy stipulates that educational management will be democratic, there are attempts to involve the people in the affairs of education through boards of education and training.

To examine the implementation of popular participation in education the respondents were asked to rank order eight mechanisms of participation according to their practicality in their weredas. Many of the respondents avoided the item or

refrained to rank all of the mechanisms offered. They ranked only those they believed are observed in practice. Because of this, the respondents especially in Amhara are less than 50 per cent of the total respondents. Table XIII portrays the results,

Table XIII Mechanisms for Popular Participation in Education

No.		Tigray			Amhara		
		Response		Rank	Response		Rank
		No	%		N0	%	
1.	Membership of representatives of public Association in WETB*	6	30	6	10	25	7
2.	Community Conferences at Kebele	6	30	8	9	22.5	6
3.	Elected officials discuss education in councils	7	35	3	14	35	2
4.	Elected officials decide on educational issues	7	35	4	15	37.5	3
5.	Regular evaluation of community on education	7	35	5	12	30	4
6.	Community financial contribution	9	45	2	9	22.5	5
7.	Community labour contribution	18	90	1	13	32.5	1
8.	Community Professional contribution	6	30	7	17	42.5	8

* WETB Wereda Education and Training Board

As the data in table XIII reveal, respondents from both regions ranked community labour contribution as the first way of participation in education. In Tigray 90 per cent of the respondents ranked it as the first and 32.5 per cent of the respondents in Amhara ranked it as number one. The second mechanism according to 45 per cent of the respondents in Tigray is community financial contribution, whereas according to 35 per cent of the respondents in Amhara the second was elected officials discussion on educational affairs in councils. This was ranked as

third in Tigray while community financial contribution was ranked as fifth in Amhara. Membership of representatives of public associations in the WETB and community members professional contribution were ranked as the six and seventh in Tigray, and seventh and eighth in Amhara respectively. This shows the WETB is less active in both regions though it is established to serve as the main decision making body in education at the wereda level. The fact that the WETB is less active was revealed by explanations in interviews that it is not active in many areas as a body except the decision on teachers promotion.

Hence, it can be implied that popular participation in the form of inputs of ideas and decisions tends to be minimal.

3.2.7. Constraints

There could be a number of factors that become obstacles to decentralization and management at the wereda level. The respondents were asked to indicate the degree of the seriousness of some constraints .

Table XIV Constraints in the Implementation of Decentralization

NO	Item		Tigray		Amhara	
			No	%	No	%
1	Limited own revenue of the Wereda	Serious	18	9	40	100
		Moderate	2	10	-	-
		Low	-	-	-	-
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
2.	Delay of budget	Serious	11	55	19	47.5
		Moderate	9	45	15	37.5
		Low	-	-	6	15
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
3.	Shortage of trained manpower	Serious	17	85	24	60
		Moderate	3	15	19	22.5
		Low	-	-	7	17.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
4.	Delay of Decisions from the region	Serious	6	31.6	13	32.5
		Moderate	9	47.4	14	35
		Low	4	21	13	32.5
	Total		**19**	**100**	**40**	**100**
5.	Lack of authority over budget	Serious	17	85	21	52.5
		Moderate	3	15	14	32
		Low	-	-	5	12.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
6.	Many responsibilities limited authority of Wereda education office	Serious	8	60	18	46.2
		Moderate	11	55	15	38.5
		Low	1	5	6	15.4
	Total		**20**	**100**	**39**	**100**
7.	Narrow Wereda education office structure	Serious	17	85	22	55
		Moderate	3	15	9	22.5
		Low	-	-	9	22.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
8.	Frequent changes of officials	Serious	7	35	18	45
		Moderate	6	30	11	27.5
		Low	7	35	11	27.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**
9.	In decision on the part of Wereda official due to fear of accountability	Serious	4	20	15	38.5
		Moderate	7	35	14	35.9
		Low	9	45	10	25.6
	Total		**20**	**100**	**39**	**100**
10.	Delay of books and other educational materials	Serious	13	65	34	85
		Moderate	6	30	5	12.5
		Low	1	5	1	2.5
	Total		**20**	**100**	**40**	**100**

Almost all respondents in both regions, 90 percent in Tigray and 100 percent in Amhara, rated limited own revenue of the wereda as a serious problem as reported in item one of Table XIV. The chi-square test indicated a statistically significant difference between the views of the two groups at $p<0.05$, $X^2=4.13793$. This means respondents in Amhara had considered the problem to be the most serious. They had no unanimous response in the other problems.

As item two in Table XIV shows 55 per cent and 45 per cent of the respondents in Tigray replied delay of budget was serious and moderate respectively. The problem appears to be conceived as less serious to that of limited own revenue. It would be recalled that the WEO does not manage finance in Tigray. Perhaps the respondents were considering the inavailability problem or in terms of the supplies and salary they received on time.

In Amhara, the problem of delay of budget seems not to be felt as serious as what it is in Tigray since 47.5 and 37.5 per cent of the respondents replied "serious" and "moderate" respectively. The chi-square test, however, revealed there is no statistically significant difference between the rating of the two groups.

In item three of Table XIV, the results reveal that 85 per cent of the respondents in Tigray confirmed that shortage of trained manpower is a serious problem, while the rest indicated it is "moderate". In Amhara, 60 per cent of the respondents answered the problem of shortage of trained manpower is a serious problem. In addition 22 per cent replied moderate.

The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=5.09451$) showed no statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups. It could be said from this that the problem is felt as serious in both regions. Although the manpower approved for the WEO in Amhara is much greater than that of Tigray, the respondents in Amhara appear to have evaluated the manpower in terms of its training to be inadequate. Generally the number of respondents (60 percent) implies the problem is not as serious as what prevails in Tigray.

The replies of respondents in both regions to the problem of delay of decision at the regional level (item four in table XIV) indicate that they had differing views on that problem. The chi-square test ($p<0.05$, $X^2=1.09472$) also showed no statistically significant difference between the two regions. Generally it could be taken that the problem of delay of decisions from the regional level is not conceived as serious.

Another constraint could be lack of authority over budget. In Tigray, 85 per cent of the respondents replied it is a serious problem as shown in item five of table XIV. In Amhara, 52.5 percent of the respondents answered the problem is serious, 35 per cent replied "moderate". There were also respondents who rated it to be low. These results show that the seriousness varies between the two regions. The Chi-square test at $P<0.05$, $X^2=6.60604$ showed a statistically significant difference in the responses between the two groups which confirms the variation in the degree of seriousness of lack of authority over budget in the two regions.

As item Six shows, the mismatch between responsibilities and authority of the WEO is 'serious' according to 60 per cent of the respondents in Tigray, and 46.2 per cent of the respondents in Amhara. However, the Chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=2.13582$) showed no statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups. It could be implied that although the problem prevails, it is not conceived as serious as other problems.

The problem of narrow WEO structure was reported to be 'serious' by 85 percent of the respondents in Tigray, and 55 per cent of the respondent in Amhara. The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2= 6.72115$) indicated there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups of respondents' replies. These results confirm that the problem of narrow WEO structure is viewed more serious in Tigray than in Amhara. This result agrees with the findings in other parts of this study regarding capacity of organizational structure.

Item eight in table XIV shows that the problem of frequent changes of officials attracted differing views within respondents of the same region. The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=.59941$) revealed no statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups. The results indicate that instability of officials was not viewed as a serious problem in both regions.

Similarly, as item nine of the table depicts, indecision on the part of wereda officials for fear of accountability was not considered as a serious problem since the responses tend to be spread among the options and the chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=$

2.94071) showed no statistically significant difference in the responses of the two groups.

Finally, item 10 shows that the problem of delay of books and other educational materials is a serious constraint according to 65 per cent of the respondents in Tigray, and 85 percent in Amhara. Thus, the problem is considered to be serious by the two groups. However, it may be more serious in Amhara as the percentage of the respondents who replied serious is much higher than those in Tigray. The chi-square test ($P<0.05$, $X^2=3.15812$) showed no statistically significant difference in the responses of the two groups.

To sum up, most of the problems are rated as serious, some more serious in Tigray, as the percentages and chi-square tests revealed.

CHAPTER FOUR SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Chapter presents the summary of major findings, conclusions drawn based on the findings and recommendations.

4.1. Summary

The study aimed at examining the extent of decentralization in terms of scope, intensity and commitment, of educational management below the regional level particularly at the wereda level in Tigray and Amhara National Regional states. The study employed a comparative descriptive method. It examined the sharing of responsibilities and authority over planning, finance, teacher and principal issues, and school construction and maintenance. It also surveyed the managerial and revenue capacity of the wereda, commitment of officials, mechanisms for popular participation and constraints thought to be obstacles.

Findings

1) Sharing of responsibilities

(a) The preparation of wereda education plan based on regional targets was found to be the responsibility of the wereda education office especially in Amhara. In Tigray the planning focused on tunning the day to day activities of the Wereda to implement zonal plans.

(b) The preparation of the Wereda education budget was the responsibility of the zone education department in Tigray, while the wereda education office prepares, subject to zonal review, and manages the recurrent budget in Amhara regional state.

(c) The final selection of primary school teacher training candidates was the responsibility of the regional education bureau according to the majority of respondents in Tigray, whereas it was the responsibility of the Wereda in Amhara with greater influence from the wereda council.

(d) Most of the respondents in both regions revealed that financial responsibility for primary school teacher training was the responsibility of the regional education bureau.

(e) Paying teacher salary as a routine activity was the responsibility of the wereda education office in both regions.

(f) The responsibility of recruiting school principals was found to be the Wereda education office's task in both regions with greater influence of the Wereda council in Tigray.

(g) Recommending school site was reported to be the responsibility of the Wereda, mainly by the Wereda council in both regions.

(h) Financial responsibility for the maintenance of schools rested upon the regional education bureau and the zonal education department in Tigray, but the results did not show clear delineation of the responsibility in Amhara regional state. Respondents were divided on this issue which is indicative that the responsibility was shared among the various levels.

(i) Most respondents in both regions revealed that purchase and distribution of educational materials (such as chalk, reading materials) was the responsibility of the zone education department. The Wereda education office in Tigray bought nothing. It was reported that the zone education department supplied it with what it needed including stationery. The Wereda education office in Amhara purchases perishable items including uniforms for employees such as guards.

(2) Sharing of Authority

(a) In Tigray, most respondents indicated that the authority of approving education plan and budget of the wereda was the authority of the zone with the involvement of the wereda council. Most respondents in Amhara reported it was the authority of the wereda council.

(b) Primary school teacher employment and assignment after completion of training was reported as the authority of the regional education bureau in Tigray, and that of zonal education department in Amhara as reported by most of the respondents in the respective regions. The wereda education office in Amhara was reported to have the authority of employing for positions having salary of up to birr 230, and the zone above 230 to 347.

(c) Approval of teacher evaluation results and teacher promotion was the authority of the Wereda level in both regions, through the wereda education and Training Board.

(d) Transfer of teachers from school to school within the same wereda rested upon the authority of the wereda education office.

(e) It was reported that the authority to take serious disciplinary measures on teachers was the authority of the regional education bureau in Tigray. Respondents in Amhara were divided on this issue. No clear picture appeared from the results.

(f) The appointment and dismissal of school principals was reported as the

authority of the wereda, mainly the Wereda council (Tigray) in both regions.

(g) The authority to decide on school site rested upon the Wereda, mainly the wereda council in both regions.

(h) Approval of school construction budget was that of the zone education department in Amhara, while respondents in Tigray were equally divided in views between the zonal education department and the regional education bureau.

(i) The authority to enter into contract of new school construction rested upon the zonal education department in both regions.

(j) Responses on the authority to enter into contract of maintenance of schools did not reveal a clear picture in Amhara. They were spread over the four options, that is region, zone, wereda council, wereda education office. This may indicate that the authority is shared in practice. In Tigray most respondents indicated the zonal education department had the authority over contract of school maintenance.

(k) Individually, Wereda education officers ("decision makers") reported they had decision making authority. However, half of the decision makers in the sample weredas in Amhara indicated they did not have authority to make decisions individually. The main reason given was that group decision making is the norm. At

the various levels of educational management, decision making rests upon the management committee.

(l) A sizable number of respondents especially in Tigray replied they frequently requested guidelines from higher bodies.

(m) A significant number of respondents from both regions suggested authority over personnel, budget, and autonomy were needed if the wereda education were to function properly.

(3) Guidelines

(a) Survey of documents revealed that constitutionally the wereda level is given the authority to administer primary schools in both regions.

(b) There were no consolidated and formalized guidelines to delineate responsibilities and authority among the different levels of educational management in Amhara. It appeared that they make use of the MOE'S, 1987 and 1988 E.C. suggested guidelines. The regional education bureau prepares guidelines on specific matters, such as transfer, and provides to the lower levels.

(c) The Tigray Education Bureau has prepared school management handbook for the region, which divided the authority and responsibility of managing schools into two:**constitutional authority** that rests upon the kebele, wereda, zonal, and regional organs of the regional government, and **professional responsibility** which lies upon the school management committee, the wereda education office, the zonal education department and the regional education bureau. The guidelines make the school accountable to the kebele administration and the wereda education

office, and the wereda office accountable to the wereda council executive committee and the zone education department, thus creating double accountability. The guidelines state that ultimate responsibility and authority rests upon the wereda for managing schools, but in practice the findings of this study revealed the wereda had limited or no authority on many areas.

(4) Managerial Capacity

(a) The characteristics of the respondents revealed that the wereda education officials and staff were almost all males, mainly with TTI certificate and to a lesser extent with diploma, having long teaching experience and some managerial experience, mostly with no preparation in educational planning and management.

(b) There were limited short term training opportunities relevant to their current positions.

(c) The organizational structure approved for the wereda education office in Tigray provided for only nine people including the head. Most weredas had not all the nine people.

(d) The organizational structure for the wereda education office in Amhara regional state provided for a maximum of 26 people in 23 positions including the head.

(e) Most of the respondents in Tigray and less than half the respondents in Amhara reported that the existing organizational structure and manpower for the Wereda education office could not enable the Wereda to carry out its responsibilities adequately.

(f) Most of the respondents in Tigray felt overloaded by the volume of work they handled.

(g) Respondents suggested instructional and support staff should be increased for the Wereda education office to carry out its responsibilities efficiently and effectively.

(5) Revenue Capacity

(a) Most respondents in both regions pointed out that the sources of budget for the wereda were regional allocation which covered most of the Wereda education expenditure. The capacity of wereda own revenue to contribute to education budget was negligible in both regions

(b) Although the amount was negligible, the sources of own revenue for education were ranked to be student charges, community voluntary contribution and NGO assistance in Tigray according to their importance. Wereda tax revenue was ranked the last indicating its impracticality.

(c) In Amhara, the sources of own revenue were ranked as wereda tax revenue, community voluntary contribution, and NGO assistance as the first, second, and third respectively. Student charges were ranked last. Primary and secondary school students in Tigray pay some amount at the beginning of the year, and grade 11 and 12 students pay monthly. In Amhara, students up to grade 10 do not pay any charges.

(6) Commitment

(a) Responses from the majority of the respondents indicated that higher officials occasionally express the need for decentralization. Higher level of commitment to decentralization was reported on the part of the higher officials in Amhara.

(b) The majority of respondents in both regions revealed that higher level officials had moderate level of readiness to transfer authority and responsibility.

(c) Most respondents in both regions reported that wereda officials had satisfactory to very satisfactory level of readiness to carry out responsibilities.

(7) Mechanisms for popular participation

(a) Elected officials in councils, participation of representatives of public associations in Wereda education and training board are the formalized mechanism of popular participation in education.

(b) In practice, respondents in Tigray ranked community labour contribution, community financial contribution, elected officials' discussion in councils about educational affairs as the first, second, and third mechanisms of popular participation depending on their degree of practicality. Membership of representatives of public associations in the wereda education and training board was ranked as the sixth mechanism among the eight options.

In Amhara though the respondents were less than 50 percent of the sample respondents they ranked community labour contribution, elected officials discussion in councils on educational affairs, and making decisions by elected officials about education in councils were the mechanisms ranked as first, second and third respectively. Participation in wereda education and training board was rated as seventh among the given eight options.

(8) Constraints

Among 10 assumed constraints in the decentralization process over 80 percent of the respondents in Tigray identified limited wereda own revenue, shortage of trained manpower, lack of authority over budget, narrow wereda education office organizational structure as serious constraints. In Amhara, the same problems were identified as serious although except the first one, the rest were rated as serious by 52 to 60 per cent of the respondents. These show the degree of seriousness of the problems was not equally felt in both regions.

To specifically see what responsibilities and authority the wereda is given, the following points are gleaned from the above findings, using the indicators employed in the study.

The Wereda in Tigray	The Wereda in Amhara
Responsibility	**Responsibility**
preparation of plan	▸ preparation of plan
▸ paying teacher salary	▸ *preparation and management of recurrent budget
▸ recruiting school principals	▸ *selection of TTI candidates
▸ recommending schools site	▸ paying teacher salary
	▸ recruiting school principals
	▸ recommending school site
	▸ *purchase of perishable items
Authority	**Authority**
▸ approval of teacher evaluation results	▸ *approval of budget (WC)
▸ approval of teacher promotion	▸ *employing lower level staff
▸ teacher transfer	▸ approval of teacher evaluation results
▸ appointment and dismissal of school principals	▸ approval of teacher promotion
▸ decision on school site	▸ teacher transfer
	▸ assignment and dismissal of school principals
	▸ decision on school site

4.2. Conclusions

Based on the major findings presented above, and the framework utilized to guide the study, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(1) Decentralization of educational management has been occurring in Tigray and Amhara National Regional states at the zonal level, and to some extent at the wereda level. The extent of decentralization at the wereda level appears to be greater in the Amhara regional state than in Tigray. The decentralization being attempted in the Tigray regional state tends to focus mainly on ensuring the accountability of education personnel to the local population.

(2) The scope of the decentralization of educational management occurring at the wereda level appears to be narrow since the wereda level has in reality little authority over substantial areas such as finance, teacher training, assignment, employment, and school construction, purchase and distribution of educational materials.

(3) The intensity of the decentralization of educational management at the wereda level in both regional states tends to be at an average level in terms of the type of decentralization. The type of decentralization occurring at the wereda level is a combination of deconcentration (the creation of the weredas education office, the responsibility of the wereda mainly on the day to day tasks of managing education) and limited devolution, at least at the verbal level by giving ultimate authority to manage primary schools to the wereda level through regional constititutional provisions and attempts to create educational governance structures such as the education and training board. In terms of personnel that fall under the direct authority of the wereda and the finance from own revenues as well as provided by the region, the intensity of the decentralization appears to be very low.

(4) The commitment to decentralization also appears mixed. On the one hand there seems to be readiness to decentralize in practice as revealed in the Amhara regional state's greater transfer of responsibilities and authority to the zonal and to some extent the wereda over day-to-day tasks and the attempt of the Tigray education bureau to set guidelines that would serve to define the authority and responsibility of the Wereda and subwereda levels. On the other hand, Wereda managerial capacity is inadequate especially in Tigray . The organization structure of the Wereda education is narrow and the manpower provided is inadequate in number as well as quality of the personnel to handle decentralization at greater levels of discretion. Relevant previous training and opportunities for relevant training are almost non-existent. Mechanisms for popular participation are created though their level of activity is not ascertained. Thus commitment to decentralization is mixed, not poor, or not good.

Generally, it may be concluded that although there are attempts at decentralizing educational management below the regional level, the extent at the wereda level is weak especially in Tigray National Regional State.

4.3. Recommendations

It would be difficult to propose greater decentralization to the wereda level in the face of the prevailing circumstances of capacity at the wereda level. However, the researcher proposes a few suggestions to facilitate the ground for decentralization.

(1) It has been found that the capacity of the wereda education office in the two regional states is inadequate in terms of mainly quality of personnel in Amhara Regional State and in terms of the scope of the structure of the wereda education office (narrow), the number and quality of personnel, in Tigray. It appears to be given little attention. Thus, it is recommended that the regional states:

(a) Create training and retraining programmes relevant to the education service (in educational planning and management) as distinct programmes in their endeavours to build overall local capacity. Short training programmes can be designed within the management institutes in the regions.

(b) Include educational planning and management in the in-service teacher training programme, as a separate entity.

(c) The Tigray regional state should reconsider and broaden the structure of the wereda education office and increase the number and type of its staff. This requires a clear policy commitment on the part of the regional education bureau and the regional council. Although there appears to be an underlying principle of acheiving more with limited manpower, the applicability of such principle has its own limits.

(2) There has been significant concerns on the part of wereda education personnel that the wereda administration unduly interferes in the details of educational management. While the magnitude requires further verification, the

concerns already expressed cannot be overlooked. Thus there is a need to clearly delineate the responsibility, authority and accountability not only among the various levels of educational management (school, wereda education office, and zone education department) but also between the governance structures (kebele council, wereda council and their executive committees) and the management structures in the details of education. Hence the regional education bureaus and the regional council need to formally define and delineate, with greater specificity, the responsibility, authority and accountability of the various bodies, having regard to federal and regional constitutions. The Ministry of education should also increase its professional assistance up to the formalization of guidelines.

(3) Finally it should be emphasized that this study was a very limited scratch on the iceberg of the multifaced phenomenon of decentralization. Decentralization is complex with many dimensions, pros and cons, and it is being undertaken in a country which had highly centralized system. There is thus, a need for continued rigorous research on the extent and variety of decentralization, its impact, both positive and negative, on the objectives of increasing access, equity, quality, relevance of education, and on the efficiency and effectiveness of educational management. Hence, those involved in policy making and managing education at various levels in the regional states, the Ministry of Education, the Addis Ababa University research institutes and scholars are called upon to create a united front to engage in timely research endeavour on decentralization.

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በኢትዮጵያ የሽግግር መን ስት የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ፅህፈት ቤት የማህበራዊና አስተዳደር ጉዳይ ዘርፍ (ነሃሴ 1985 ዓ.ም.)፤ አጠቃላይ የትምህርትና ስልጠና ረቂቅ ፖሊሲ ማብራሪያ፤ ጥራዝ ሁለት፤ አዲስ አበባ፤ ት.መ.ማ.ማ.ድ.

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ቢሮ ትምህርቲ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስቲ ትግራይ (ነሓሰ 1989)፤ "ሀንፃ ምምሕዳር ኣብያተ ትምህርቲ ክልል ትግራይ"፤ መቐለ። (ያልታተመ)።

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.....(ሰነ 1987) ሕገ መንግስቲ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስቲ ትግራይ። መቐለ።

..... (መስከረም 1988)፤ "የትግራይ ብሔራዊ ክልል መንግስት ቢሮዎች ስልጣንና ተግባርን ለመወሰን የወጣ አዋጅ"፤ ነጋሪት ጋዜጣ ትግራይ 1ኛ ዓመት ቁጥር 9

..... (መስከረም 1988) "የትግራይ ብሄራዊ ክልል ወረዳዎች ለማቋቋም የወጣ አዋጅ" ነጋሪት ጋዜጣ ትግራይ 1ኛ ዓመት ቁጥር 10

ትምህርት ሚኒስቴር (ሰኔ 1987 ዓ.ም.) "የትምህርት አደረጃጀትና አመራር/ፅንሰ ሀሳቦች፤ መርሆዎችና ተግባሮች"፤ ክፍል 1 ፤ አዲስ አበባ (ያልታተመ)።

..... (ታህሳስ 1988) "የትምህርት አደረጃጀትና አመራር" (ያልታተመ)።

የአማራ ብሔራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት ምክር ቤት (ሰኔ 1987 ዓ.ም.) የአማራ ብሔራዊ ክልል ሕገ መንግስት፤ ባህር ዳር።

APPENDIX I

Table I Distribution of Powers and Duties over Education in Ethiopia

Federal Government (MOE)	Regional State Government(REB)
- Devise ways and means to expand education - Determine education standard and supervise implementation - Determine curriculum for secondary schools -Determine type and standard of certificates -Determine teaching qualifications train teachers and other personnel - Cause the preparation of national examinations and award certificates -Ensure availability of textbooks and materials - Establish higher education institutions and determine their internal administrative organization - Determine admission criteria to higher education -Licence private education institutions established by foreigners -Prepare and implement projects for enhancing quality and expansion -Devise ways of providing special support to minorities, women, children and adults - Provide technical assistance to regions -Collect, compile and disseminate information - Devise ways of encouraging the provision of student services -Coordinate educational and training institutions run by other Federal government organs and accredit. - Promote foreign cooperation -Classify degrees, diplomas and certificates awarded by foreign education institutions	-Prepare and implement the educational plan and programme of the region - Devise means of providing education to all children and adults -Ensure the quality of education meets national standards -Prepare and implement curricula for primary schools (grade 1-8) -Ensure teaching standards have been met Train and cause the training of teachers -Follow up the execution of national examinations in the region -Ensure provision of books and other materials -Organize, administer schools, junior colleges established by the region. -License private Schools up to secondary level established by domestic investors -Prepare educational projects and implement -undertake studies to improve education -provide special support to minorities, women, children and adults. -Support studies undertaken at the national level -Collect, compile, disseminate statistical data -coordinate student services in the region -Coordinate the public to provide assistance for education

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF THE SAMPLE WEREDAS

1. Tigray National Regional State

Name of Wereda	Zone
Tahtay Maichew	Central
Adwa	Central
Ganta Afeshum	Eastern
Wukro	Eastern
Endamehoni	Southern
Alamata	Southern

2. Amhara National Regional State

Wereda	Administrative Zone
Weldya Town	North Wollo
Gubalafto	North Wollo
Debretabor Town	South Gondar
Farta	South Gondar
Bahir Dar Town	West Gojjam
Jabi Tehnan	West Gojjam
Debre Markos Town	East Gojjam
Dejen	East Gojjam

APPENDIX 3

General Background of Tigray National Regional State

Population:	Ca.3,530,000
School-age population:	781,872
Primary GER in 1996/97:	41.2 Per cent
Primary student population in 1996/97:	314,231
Secondary student population in 1996/97:	16561
Literacy rate:	Unestablished
Annual Demographic Growth:	3 Per cent
Area:	80,000 Sq.Km
Population Density:	44/Sq.Km.
Socioeconomic Characteristics:	agrarian
Per capita income:	About US$ 150
Current level of registered private Capital investment:	Birr 3.3 billion
Infant mortality rate:	123/1000
Child Mortality rate:	167/1000
Maternal mortality rate:	12-16/1000
Topography:	rugged highland
Road density:	15.4/1000 Sq.Km
System of government:	Elected officials
Administrative divisions:	Five zones, 35 weredas, and over 600 tabiyas/kebeles
Official language:	Tigrigna
Religions:	Christianity and Islam

(Source: GNRST, 1997:7)

General Background of Amhara National Regional State

Estimated population:	14.49 millions
Population growth rate:	2.8 Per cent
Population Groups:	Amhara 91.2 Per cent
	Oromo, Awi, Himira
Urban population:	9.1 Per cent
Dependency rate:	92 Per cent
Primary GER:	28 Per cent
Secondary GER:	6 per cent
Adult Literacy rate:	18 Per cent
Health Service:	est. 36 Per cent
Access to safe water:	12.7 Per cent
Area:	170, 152 Sq. Km
Economy:	Mainly subsistence peasant agriculture
Development Strategy:	Conservation based, agriculture-led industrialization
Administrative divisions:	11 zones, 195 weredas and 2711 kebeles
System of government:	Elected officials

(Source: ANRG, 1997)

APPENDIX 4(A)

በትግራይ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግሥት
ለወረዳ ትምህርት ቤቶች ፅህፈት ቤት
የተፈቀደ የሰው ሃይል

ተ.ቁ.	የስራ መደብ መጠሪያ	ብዛት	ደረጃ	መነሻ ደመወዝ
	<u>ወረዳ ጽህፈት ቤት</u>			
1.	የወረዳ ፅህፈት ቤት ኃላፊ	1	ሹመት	
2.	ሴክሬታሪ ታይፒስት 1	1	ፅሂ. 6	347
3.	የፕላንና ስታትስቲክስ መለስተኛ ኤክስፐርት	1	መኘ. 7	500
4.	ህንፃ ተቆጣጣሪ	1	መኘ. 5	347
	<u>የአስተዳደርና ፋይናንስ አገልግሎት</u>			
5.	የአስተዳደርና ፋይናንስ አገል ሎት ኃላፊ	1	አስ. 3	600
6.	የንብረትና ገንዘብ ያዥ	1	ፅሂ. 5	285
7.	ዘበኛና አትክልተኛ	1	ጥጉ. 2	105
	<u>የትምህርት ፕሮግራሞችና ሱፐርቪዥን ክፍል</u>			
8.	የትምህርት ፕሮግራሞችና ሱፐርቪዥን ክፍል ኃላፊ	1	መኘ. 9	710
9.	የትምህርት ፕሮግራሞችና ሱፐርቪዥን መለስተኛ ኤክስፐርት	1	መኘ. 7	500

APPENDIX 4(B)

በአማራ ብሄራዊ ክልላዊ መንግስት ለወረዳ
ትምህርት ቤቶች ፅህፈት ቤት የተፈቀደ የሰው ሃይል

ተ.ቁ.	የስራ መደብ መጠሪያ	ብዛት	ደረጃ	ደመወዝ
1.	የወረዳ ፅህፈት ቤት ኃላፊ	1	ሹመት	710
2.	የትምህርት ማበልፀጊያ አስተባባሪ	1	መኘ. 7	500
3.	መለስተኛ አዲተር	1	መኘ. 6	420
4.	የትምህርት መረጃና ኘላን ሠራተኛ	1	መኘ. 8	600
5.	ህንፃ ስራና እድሳት ተቆጣጣሪ	1	መኘ. 6	420
6.	ታይፒስት	1 (2)	ፅሂ. 5	285
7.	አስተዳደርና ፋይናንስ አገልግሎት ኃላፊ	1	አስ.2	500
8.	ፐርሶኔል አፊሰር	1	አሲ1	420
9.	ፐርሶኔል ፀሐፊ	1	ፅሂ.5	285
10.	ሪኮርድና ማህደር ኃላፊ	1	ፅሂ.6	347
11.	የእቃግዢ ሠራተኛ	1	ፅሂ.4	285
12.	የእቃ ግዢ ሠራተኛ	1	ፅሂ.4	230
13.	ሒሳብና በጀት ኃላፊ	1	አስ.1	420
14.	ሒሳብ ሠራተኛ	1	ፅሂ.6	347
15.	ገንዘብ ያዥ	1	ፅሂ.5	285
16.	ደመወዝ ከፋይ	1	ፅሂ.4	230
17.	ዘበኛ	2	ጥጉ.2	127
18.	ተላላኪ	2	ጥጉ.2	127
19.	ፅዳት ሠራተኛ	1	ጥጉ.1	105
20.	የትምህርት ኘሮግራሞችና ሱፐርቪዥን አስተባባሪ	1	ኘሳ.3	835
21.	የመደበኛ ትምህርት አስተባባሪ	1	መኘ.8	600
22.	የስልጠና የትም/መገናኛና የጎልማሶች የትም/አስተባባሪ	1	መኘ.8	600
23.	የጤናና የሰውነት ማጎልመሻና የተማሪዎች አገልግሎት አስተባባሪ	1	መኘ.8	600

APPENDIX 5(A)

"ካሉዎት ኃላፊነቶች አንፃር በግል ውሳኔ ለመስጠት የሚያስችል ስልጣን "የለኝም" የሚል መልስ ከሰጡ ዋና ዋና የሚሉዋቸውን ምክንያቶች ይጥቀሱ" ለሚል ጥያቄ በፅሁፍ ከተሰጡ መልሶች በከፊል።

<u>የመላሽ ኮድ</u>

4 የሚላኩት መመሪያዎችና ደንቦች በግል ለመወሰን የሚፈቅዱ አይደሉም።

11 . ባለሙያ ከሚወስነው በአስተዳደር የሚወሰን ስለሚበልጥ በወረዳው በኃላፊነት
. የሚቀመጡ ሰዎች የትምህርት ደረጃና ስልጠና ስለሌላቸው የጠበቀ ማእከላዊነት ስለሚያበዙ።

12 . በአሁኑ ጊዜ ኮሚቴያዊ አሰራር የተሻለ በመሆኑ
. በግል መወሰን የዲሞክራሲያዊ አሰራር ስላልሆነ በጋራ በመተማመን ስለሚሰራ
. በግል የሚወሰን ስህተት ስለሚከሰት ነው
. በቡድን በኮሚቴ የሚሰራ ውጤቱ አመርቂ ስለሚሆን ነው።

21 . ምንም እንኳ የምንከተለው አሠራር የጋራ መርህ ቢሆንም
<u>የመስተዳድር ጣልቃ ገብነት</u>
. አብዛኞቹ ስራዎች የጋራ አሠራርን የሚጠይቁ በመሆናቸው
. አንዳንድ ባለጉዳዮች ከእውነታ ውጭ የሚያቀርቡት ችግር በመኖሩ
. አንዳንድ ችግሮች ከአቅም በላይ ሊያጋጥሙ ስለሚችሉ

22 . ሙያዊ ድጋፍ ሰጪ በመሆኑ ውሳኔ ሰጪ ክፍል ባለመሆኑ
. በአብዛኛው በጋራ ስራ የጋራ ውይይትና ውሳኔ ስለሚሰጥ

26 . አብዛኛው ስራ በኮሚቴ የሚሰራ በመሆኑ
. ከፅህፈት ቤቱ ኃላፊ በአንድ ደረጃ ዝቅ ያለ ቦታ በመሆኑ
. ትምህርት የጋራ ስራ የሚጠይቅ በመሆኑ

28 . በግል የሚወሰኑት በስህተትነት ስለሚቆጠሩ ብዙውን ጊዜ <u>ስለሚያስገመግሙ</u>
. ብዙውን ስልጣን በወረዳ ም/ቤት ስራ አሰፈፃሚ ኮሚቴ ስለሚወሰን
. ትክክለኛ እንኳ ውሳኔ ሲሰጥ ካልመሰላቸው ስለሚሽሩት
. ኃላፊነትም በሹመት መሆኑና በስራ መተማመንን ስለማይፈጥር በስልጣን ለመቆየት ስለሚፈለግ

29 . የስራው ባህርይ ከብዙ ዘርፎች ጋር በጋራ የሚወሰን በመሆኑ ብቻ ነው።

35 . ስራ ማህበራዊ በመሆኑ በግል ለመወሰን ባለመቻሉ

36 . ከኃላፊዬ ጋር ተነጋግሮ በጋራ ሀሳብ ላይ መድረስ ስለሚያስፈልግ በሁለታችን የማያልቅ ከሆነ በማኔጅመንት ኮሚቴ ስለሚታይ ከአንድ አእምሮ ይልቅ በኮሚቴ ቢታይ የተሻለ ውሳኔ ሊሆን ስለሚችል።

49 . በአብዛኛው የሚሰራው በኮሚቴ ስራ ስለሆነ የስልጣን ሰንሰለት ተዋረዱ ስለማይፈቅድ
በዝርዝር ስራ ላይ ግል ውሳኔ የሚገልፅ ባለመኖሩ በተወካይነት ስለሚሰራ

51 . የሚከሰቱ አስተዳደራዊ ችግሮች የጋራ ውሳኔን የሚጠይቁ በመሆኑ

APPENDIX 5(B)

"የወረዳው ትምህርት ቤቶች ፅህፈት ቤት ምን ስልጣን ቢሰጠው በወረዳው ለትምህርት ቅልጥፍና መሰፋፋትና ጥራት ያግዛል?" ለሚል ጥያቄ መላሾች በፅሁፍ የሰጡዋቸው መልሶች።

<u>የመላሽ ኮድ</u>

1 . የራሱ የሆነ በጀት ቢኖረው
. ክፍት ለሆኑ የስራ ቦታዎች ራሱ የመቅጠር መብት ቢኖረው
. በራሱ ወረዳ ለሚኖረው እንቅስቃሴ ራሱን ችሎ ያለተፅእኖ እንዲሰራ ቢደረግ

2 . የወረዳውን በጀት ራሱ ቢያስተዳድር
. የሰው ኃይል ራሱ ቢቀጥር

3 . ሁሉም ሊሰጠው የሚችል ስልጣን ተሰጥቶታል

4 . በጣም ወሳኝ ከሆኑ ጉዳዮች በቀር ሁሉም ኃላፊነት በወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ቢፈፀም ለስራው ጠቃሚ ይሆናል

6 . በጀት የመወሰን (የማፅደቅ) ኃላፊነት ቢሰጥ

8 . ራሱን የቻለ በጀት ቢኖር
. የሰው ኃይል የማሟላት ስልጣን ቢኖረው
. አካባቢውንና ስራውን በማገናዘብ ራሱ የስራ እቅድ ማውጣት ስልጣን ቢኖረው

9 . በተሰጠው ኃላፊነት ማንም ጣልቃ ሳይገባ ቢሰራ

10 . የወረዳው የሰው ኃይል የማሟላት ስልጣን
. ለጎደለው የሰው ኃይል የመቅጠር ስልጣን

11 . ቴክኒካዊ ለሆኑ ጉዳዮች ራሱ አጥንቶ ራሱ ቢወስን
. ለስልጠናና ለትምህርት ቦርድ የተሰጠው ስልጣን ካለው የሰለጠነ የሰው ኃይል (የቦርድ አባላት) በላይ ስለሆነ ቢስተካከል
. ተጠሪቱ ለወረዳው አስተዳደርና ለዞኑ ትምህርት መምሪያ ከመሆን· ለዞኑ ትምህርት መምሪያ ቢሆን

13 . ችግሩ የስልጣን ማነስ ሳይሆን በወረዳው መሟላት ያለበትን የሰው ኃይል በአግባቡ ያለመሟላቱ በስራው ላይ ከ ተኛ ተፅእኖ ይታያል።

16 . ወረዳው የራሱ የሆነ በጀት ቢኖረው
. በጽ/ቤቱ ያለው የሰው ኃይል ጉድለት ራሱ እንዲያሟላ
. ትምህርት ቤቶችን ለማሳደግ ስልጣን ቢሰጠው

17 . መንግስት ባወጣው መመሪያ መሠረት ተግባራዊ ቢሆን የሰው ኃይልና በጀት ቢሟላለት የያዘው ስልጣን በቂ ነው

18 . የበጀት አወጣጥና አመዳደብ በተመለከተ

. የሰው ኃይል ምደባና ድልድል

19 . የሰው ኃይል ራሱ ቢቀጥር

. በጀት በራሱ ቢያንቀሳቅስ

20 . ለበታች ሠራተኛ እንደዘበኛ፤ መዝገብ ቤት ወዘተ ... የመቅጠር

. ቀላል በጀቶች የማፅደቅ ስልጣን

21 . የወረዳው ም/ቤት በዝርዝር አሠራሮች ጣልቃ ባይገባ

. በትምህርት ጉዳዮች ላይ ሕዝብን ከማሳተፍ ውጭ ሙሉ የመወሰን ስልጣን ቢሰጠው

22 . የመምህራን የደረጃ እድገት ላይ ወሳኝነት ስልጣን ቢኖረው

. ለወረዳው የትምህርት ስራ በጀት ምደባ የወሳኝነት ስልጣን ቢኖረው

. የመምህራን ምደባና ዝውውር ሙሉ በሙሉ የወሳኝነት ስልጣን ቢኖረው

. የትምህርት ቤቶች ኃላፊዎች ላይ የማውረድ ስልጣን ቢኖረው (ኃላፊነትን በማይወጡ)

23 . ሙሉና ወጥ የሆነ ኃላፊነት

. ተጠሪቱን ለትምህርት መምሪያ ያደረገ ተጠያቂነት

24 . በየአመቱ የሚሰሩ ስራዎችን እቅድን የማቀድና የማፅደቅ

. በከባድ የዲሲፕሊን ጉዳዮች ላይ የወሰን ስልጣን ቢኖረው

. በወረዳው የሚሰሩ የትምህርት ባለሙያዎችና መምህራን መቅጠር ቢችል

. ለመማር የሚመለመሉ መምህራንን መልምሎ ማፅደቅ ሲችል

27 . እንደተሰጠው የኃላፊነት መጠን ስልጣኑም ተጣጥሞ መስጠት አለበት

28 . በትምህርት ስራ ላይ ከወረዳ መስተዳደር ወሳኝነት /ጣልቃ ገብነት/ ባይኖር

29 . ራሱን ችሎ መምህራንና ሠራተኞችን ቢያዘዋውር

32 . በወረዳ ደረጃ መምህራንን የመቅጠር ስልጣን

. ለወረዳው የሚያስፈልጉ ለትምህርት የሚያስፈልጉ የጽህፈት መሣሪያዎችን በት/ቤቶች ብዛትና ፍላጎት ለማዳረስ እንዲቻል በወረዳ በኩል ተገዝቶ የሚቀርብበት

APPENDIX 5(C)

"አሁን ያለው የወረዳው ትምህርት ቤቶች ፅህፈት ቤት ለፅህፈት ቤቱ የተሰጡትን ሃላፊነት ለመወጣት የማያስችለው ከሆነ በመዋቅሩ ምን ክፍል ቢጨመር ሃላፊነቶቹን በሚገባ ለመወጣት ያስችለዋል?" ለሚል ጥያቄ መላሾች በፅሁፍ የሰጡዋቸው መልሶች

<u>የመላሽ ኮድ</u>

3 . ሊሟሉ በሚገባቸው ክፍሎች ኘላንና ስታትስቲክ ክፍል፤ ህንፃ ክፍል፤ መዝገብ ቤት፤ ፐርሶኔል

4 . ሂሳብ ኃላፊ፤ መዝገብ ቤት ኃላፊ፣ ፐርሶኔል (በአስተዳደር ዘርፍ)
. ኘላን ስታትስቲክስ ኃላፊ ኤክስፐርት (ትምህርት ክፍል)

5 . የሰው ኃይል ማሟላት
. የተመደበ ሠራተኛ መጀመሪያ ስልጠና ቢሰጠው

6 . የተሟላ የሰው ኃይል ማሟላት

7 . የተሟላ የሰው ኃይል፤ ቢሮ ለእያንዳንዱ ሠራተኛ
. የትምህርት ኘሮግራሞች ሂሳብ ሠራተኛ የኢንስፔክሽን ሠራተኛ

9 ንብረትና ገንዘብ ያዥ፤ ሂሳብ ሠራተኛ፣ ሱፐርቫይዘር ስታትስቲካል ክፍል

12 የሚፈልገው የሰው ኃይል ቢሟላ (አሁን ካለው የሰው ኃይል በ3 እጥፍ ቢታከልበት)

13 በወረዳው የተሟላ የሰው ኃይል መኖር አለበት፤ ለምሳሌ ስታትስቲክስ ክፍል፣ ህንፃ፤ አዲት ወዘተ... የመሳሰሉት ቢሟላ የተሻለ ነው።

14 ፋይናንስና አስተዳደር፤ መዝገብ ቤት፤ ሂሳብ ሹም፤ ፅዳት ሠራተኛ፣ ተላላኪ

15 በሰው ሃይል ቢደራጅና በበጀት ቢታገዝ
መዝገብ ቤት፤ ተላላኪ፤ ፐርሶኔልና ደመወዝ ከፋይ ዘበኛ ወዘተ.

17 የሰው ኃይልና በጀት ቢሟላለት

18 የሰው ኃይልና በስራው የሰለጠነ ሰው። ኘላንና ስታትስቲክስ፤ የውስጥ ቁጥጥር፤ ሂሳብ ሹም
. የመጓጓዣ ችግር መፍትሄ ቢሰጠው

APPENDIX 6

አዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ
ድህረ ምረቃ ትምህርት ቤት
መጠይቅ

በ1986 ዓ.ም የወጣው የትምህርትና ስልጠና ፖሊሲ የትምህርት አደረጃጀትና አመራር ያልተማከለ እንደሚሆን ይገልፃል። ከፌዴራል መንግሥት ወደ ክልል መንግሥት ያለው ሃላፊነትንና ስልጣንን የማውረድ (ያለማማከል) ሁኔታ በልዩ ልዩ አዋጆችና በተግባርም ከሚታየው ግልፅ ነው።

የዚህ መጠይቅ ዋና ዓላማ የትምህርት አመራር (ማኔጅመንት) አለማማከል ከክልል በታች ባሉ እርከኖች በተለይ በወረዳ ደረጃ ምን ያህል መተግበር እንደጀመረ ለማወቅ በድህረ ምረቃ ተማሪ ለሚደረግ ጥናት መረጃ መሰብሰብ ነው። የጥናቱ ውጤት ትምህርታዊ ለሆነ አላማ የሚውል ሲሆን የእርስዎ መልሶች በስምዎ አይገለፁም። ለዚህ ጥናት ውጤታማነት ለያንዳንዱ ጥያቄ የእርስዎ ግልፅና እውነተኛ መልስ እጅግ ወሳኝ ነው።

መጠይቁን በጥንቃቄ በመሙላት ለሚያደርጉልኝ ትብብር ከልብ የመነጨ ምስጋናዬን አቀርባለሁ።

ማሳሰቢያ

ሀ. በመጠይቁ የርስዎን ስም መፃፍ አያስፈልግም

ለ. ለያንዳንዱ የመጠይቁ ክፍል በተጠቀሰለት መመሪያ መሰረት መልሰዎን ያስፍሩ።

ሐ. አማራጭ ላላቸው ጥያቄዎች መልስዎን በተሰጠው ሳጥን የ"✓" ምልክት በማስቀመጥ ያመልክቱ።

መ. መልስ መለወጥ ከፈለጉ የመጀመሪያውን በደንብ ያጥፉ።

———— // ————

1. ክልል _____ ዞን _____
   ወረዳ _____
2. የመሳተፍ ሀ) ዕድሜ _____
   ለ) ፆታ ወንድ ☐ ሴት ☐
   ሐ) የትምህርት ደረጃ ___ _____ _____
   መ) የሰለጠኑበት መስክ _____
3. በያዙት ሃላፊነት የአገልግሎት ዘመን _____

4. አሁን ከያዙት ሃላፊነት በፊት በምን በምን ስራዎች አገልግለዋል?

የስራው ዓይነት	ያገለገሉባቸው አመታት

5. አሁን በያዙት የሃላፊነት ደረጃ ዋና ዋና የሚሉዋቸውን ሃላፊነቶች (ተግባሮች) ይጥቀሱ::

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

ሐ) _____

መ) _____

ሠ) _____

6. አሁን የያዙትን ሃላፊነት ለመወጣት የሚያስችል ስልጠና ወስደዋል?

አዎን ☐ የለም ☐

7. ካሉዎት ሃላፊነቶች አንፃር <u>በግል ውሳኔ ለመስጠት የሚያስችል ስልጣን</u> አለዎት?

አዎን ☐ የለም ☐

8. ለጥያቄ ቁጥር "7" መልስዎ "የለኝም" ከሆነ ዋና ዋና የሚሉዋቸውን ምክንያቶች ይጥቀሱ::

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

ሐ) _____

መ) _____

9. <u>ለብዙ ጉዳዮች</u> ከበላይ አካል <u>መመሪያ</u> ይጠይቃሉ?

አዎን ☐ የለም ☐

10. <u>ለብዙ ጉዳዮች</u> ከበላይ አካል <u>ውሳኔ</u> ይጠይቃሉ?

አዎን ☐ የለም ☐

11. ለብዙ ጉዳዮች መመሪያና ውሳኔ የሚጠይቁ ከሆነ ከየትኛው አካል ነው?

_____

_____

12. ለብዙ ጉዳዮች ከበላይ መመሪያና ውሳኔ የሚጠይቁ ከሆነ ዋና ዋናዎቹ ምክንያቶች ምንድናቸው?

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

ሐ) _____

መ) _____

13. ካሉዎት ሃላፊነቶች አንፃር <u>በጋራ ውሳኔ</u> ለመስጠት የሚያስችል ስልጣን አለኝ ይላሉ?

አዎን ☐ የለኝም ☐

14. አሁን በተሰጠዎት የትምህርት ስራ ሃላፊነት የስራ ብዛቱ መጠን ሊያከናውኑ ከሚችሉት በላይ ሆኖ ይሰማዎታል?

አዎን ☐ አይሰማኝም ☐

15. የወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት ምን <u>ስልጣን</u> ቢሰጠው በወረዳው ለትምህርት ቅልጥፍና፣ መሰፋፋትና ጥራት ያግዛል?

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

ሐ) _____

መ) _____

16. አሁን ያለው የወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት <u>መዋቅር</u> ለጽ/ቤቱ የተሰጡትን ሃላፊነት ለመወጣት ያስችለዋል?

በሚገባ ያስችለዋል ☐ በመጠኑ ያስችለዋል ☐ አያስችለውም ☐

17. ለጥያቄ ቁጥር 16 መልስዎ "አያስችልም" ከሆነ በመዋቀሩ ምን ክፍል ቢጨመር ሃላፊነቶቹን በሚገባ ለመወጣት ያስችለዋል?

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

18. አሁን በወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት ያለው የሰው ሃይል ለጽ/ቤቱ የተሰጡትን ሃላፊነቶች ለመወጣት ያስችለዋል?

በሚገባ ያስችለዋል ☐ በመጠኑ ያስችለዋል ☐ አያስችለውም ☐

19. ከዚህ በታች በትምህርት የተወሰኑ ተግባሮች ውስጥ የሚጠቃለሉ ጉዳዮች ተዘርዝረዋል። ጉዳዮቹ <u>የሚፈጸሙት</u> ወይም <u>ውሳኔ</u> <u>የሚሰጥባቸው በየትኛው አካል</u> እንደሆነ በሚከተለው አኳሃን ያመልክቱ

ጉዳዩ <u>የሚፈጸመው</u> ወይም <u>ውሳኔ የሚሰጠው</u>

- በክልሉ ምክር ቤት ደረጃ ከሆነ 1ን ይክበቡ
- በክልሉ ትምህርት ቢሮ ደረጃ ከሆነ 2ን ይክበቡ
- በዞን ደረጃ ከሆነ 3ን ይክበቡ
- በወረዳው ምክር ቤት ከሆነ 4ን ይክበቡ*
- በወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት ከሆነ 5ን ይክበቡ

(* የወረዳ ትምህርትና ስልጠና ቦርድን፣ የወረዳ ስራ አስፈፃሚ ኮሚቴን የወረዳ ምክር ቤትን ያጠቃልላል)

ጉዳዩ	የሚፈፀመው ወይም ወሳኔ የሚሰጠው				
	በክልል ም/ቤት	በክልል ት/ቢሮ	ዞን	በወረዳ ም/ቤት	በወረዳ ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት
የትምህርት እቅድና በጀትን በተመለከተ					
1. የወረዳው የትምህርት ዕቅድ ዝግጅት	1	2	3	4	5
2. የወረዳው የትምህርት እቅድ ማፅደቅ	1	2	3	4	5
3. የወረዳው የትምህርት በጀት ዝግጅት	1	2	3	4	5
4. የወረዳው የትምህርት በጀት ማፅደቅ	1	2	3	4	5
መምህራን የወረዳና የት/ቤቶች ሃላፊትዎችን በተመለከተ					
5. ከወረዳው የሚመለመሉ የ1ኛ ደረጃ እጩ መምህራንን የመጨረሻ ምልመላ ማካሄድ	1	2	3	4	5
6. የመምህራንን ስልጠና ወጪ መሸፈን	1	2	3	4	5
7. ከወረዳው ለስልጠና የተመለመሉ እጩ መምህራን ስልጠና ጨርሰው ሲመለሱ መመደብ	1	2	3	4	5
8. የ1ኛ ደረጃ መምህራንን መቅጠር	1	2	3	4	5
9. የመምህራንን ደመወዝ ክፍያ መፈፀም	1	2	3	4	5
10. የመምህራንን የግምገማ ውጤት ማፅደቅ	1	2	3	4	5
11. የመምህራንን ደረጃ እድገት መወሰን	1	2	3	4	5
12. በወረዳው ውስጥ የመምህራንን ከት/ቤት ወደ ት/ቤት ማዘዋወር	1	2	3	4	5
13. አስፈላጊ ሲሆን በመምህራን ላይ ከባድ* የዲስፕሊን እርምጃ መውሰድ	1	2	3	4	5
14. የ1ኛ ደረጃ መምህራንን በስራ ላይ ስልጠና የመጨረሻ ምልመላ ማካሄድ	1	2	3	4	5
15. የት/ቤት የትምህርት ሃላፊዎችን መመልመል	1	2	3	4	5
16. የ የት/ቤት የትምህርት ሃላፊዎችን መመደብ	1	2	3	4	5
17. የት/ቤት የትምህርት ሃላፊዎችን ማውረድ	1	2	3	4	5
የት/ቤት ግንባታ እድሳትና የትምህርት መሳሪያዎች በተመለከተ					
18. በወረዳው አዲስ ት/ቤቶች የሚገነቡበትን ስፍራ መምረጥ	1	2	3	4	5
19. በወረዳው አዲስ ት/ቤት የሚገነቡበትን ስፍራ መወሰን	1	2	3	4	5
20. በወረዳው የአዲስ ት/ቤቶች ግንባታ በጀት ማፅደቅ	1	2	3	4	5

ጉዳዩ	የሚፈፀመው ወይም ወሳኔ የሚሰጠው				
	በክልል ም/ቤት	በክልል ት/ቢሮ	ዞን	በወረዳ ም/ቤት	በወረዳ ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት
21. የአዲስ ት/ቤቶች ግንባታ ኮንትራት መዋዋል	1	2	3	4	5
22. የት/ቤቶችን ጥገናና እድሳት ወጪ መሸፈን	1	2	3	4	5
23. የት/ቤቶችን ጥገናና እድሳት ኮንትራት መዋዋል	1	2	3	4	5
24. የትምህርት መሳሪያዎች ግዥ	1	2	3	4	5
25. የትምህርት መሳሪያዎች ስርጭት	1	2	3	4	5

(*ከባድ የዲሲፕሊን እርምጃ ከአራት ዓመት ለማይበልጥ ጊዜ የሚቀጥለውን የደመወዝ ጭማሪ ማዘግየትን፣ ከስራና ደመወዝ ዝቅ ማድረግን ከስራ ማስወጣትን ያጠቃልላል)

20. እስከአሁን ካስተዋሉት ወረዳው የሚያዘጋጀው የትምህርት እቅድ ወደ በላይ አካል ከቀረበ በኋላ ምን እርምጃ ይወስዳል?
እቅዱ እንዳለ ይፀዳቃል ☐
በእቅዱ ላይ መጠነኛ ለውጥ ተደርጎበት ይፀድቃል ☐
እቅዱ በአብዛኛው ወይም በሙሉ ተለውጦ ይፀድቃል:: ☐

21. የወረዳው የትምህርት እቅድ ለውጥ የሚደረግበት ከሆነ የሚደረገው ለውጥ በበለጠ በየትኛው ላይ ያተኩራል?
ሊሰሩ በታቀዱት ስራዎች ላይ ☐ በበጀቱ ላይ ☐

22. የወረዳው የትምህርት በጀት የሚገኘው ከምን ምንጮች ነው?
ከክልል የሚመደብ ☐ ከወረዳው የሚሰበሰብ ☐
ከሁሉቱም ☐

23. ክልሉ ለወረዳው ትምህርት የሚመድበው በጀት በምን መልክ ነው?
በጥቅሉ (በአርእስት ሳይለይ) ☐ በአርእስት ተለይቶ ☐

24. ክልሉ ለወረዳው ትምህርት የሚመድበው በጀት ምን ያህሉን የትምህርት ወጪ ይሸፍናል?
ሁሉንም (መቶ በመቶ) ☐ ሃምሳ በመቶ ☐
ሰባ አምስት በመቶ ☐ ሃያ አምስት በመቶ ☐

25. ከክልሉ ለወረዳው ትምህርት የሚመደበው በጀት ብዙውን ጊዜ በየትኛው ሩብ ዓመት ለወረዳው ይደርሰዋል?
በአንደኛው ☐ በሦስተኛው ☐
በሁለተኛው ☐ በአራተኛው ☐

26. ከወረዳው ለትምህርት የሚሰበሰብ ገቢ የሚገኘው ከምን ምንጮች ነው? እንደመጠኑ 1ኛ, 2ኛ, 3ኛ, 4ኛ, በማለት በደረጃ ያመልክቱ

የገቢው ምንጭ	ደረጃ
ሀ) ከወረዳው ለወረዳው በግብር ከሚሰበሰብ	
ለ) ከተማሪዎች የሚሰበሰብ	
ሐ) ከህብረተሰቡ በፈቃደኝነት የሚሰበሰብ	
መ) መንግስታዊ ያልሆኑ ድርጅቶች ከሚያደርጉት እገዛ	
ሠ) ሌላ ካለ ይጥቀሱ _____	
_____	

27. ወረዳው ከራሱ ገቢ ምን ያህሉን የትምህርት ወጪ ይሸፍናል ብለው ይገምታሉ?
ሃምሳ ከመቶ ☐ አምስት ከመቶ ☐
ሃያ አምስት ከመቶ ☐ ከቁጥር የሚገባ አይደለም ☐
አስር ከመቶ ☐

28. ለወረዳ የተሰጡትን ሀላፊነትና ስልጣን ለመወጣት በወረዳ ባለስልጣናትና የትምህርት ሀላፊዎች ያለው ዝግጁነት ምንያህል አጥጋቢ ነው?
በጣም አጥጋቢ ☐ አጥጋቢ አይደለም ☐
አጥጋቢ ☐ በጣም ደካማ ☐

29. ለጥያቄ ቁጥር 31 መልስዎ "አጥጋቢ አይደለም" ወይም "በጣም ደካማ" ከሆነ ቢርስዎ አስተያየት ምክኒያቶቹ ምንድናቸው?
ሀ) _____
ለ) _____
ሐ) _____
መ) _____

30. የበላይ ሀላፊዎች (በዞን፣ በት/ቢሮ፣ በክልል ም/ቤት ደረጃ ያሉ) ያልተማከለ የትምህርት አመራርን አስፈላጊነት ይገልፃሉ?
ብዙ ጊዜ ይገልፃሉ ☐ አልፎ አልፎ ይገልፃሉ ☐
አይገልፁም ☐

31. በእርስዎ አስተያየት የበላይ ሃላፊዎች ለወረዳ ተጨማሪ ሃላፊነት የመስጠት ዝግጁነት አላቸው?
ሙሉ በሙሉ አላቸው ☐ በመጠኑ አላቸው ☐
የላቸውም ☐

32. በእርስዎ አስተያየት የበላይ ሃላፊዎች ለወረዳ ተጨማሪ ስልጣን የመስጠት ዝግጁነት አላቸው?
ሙሉ በሙሉ አላቸው ☐ በመጠኑ አላቸው ☐
የላቸውም ☐

33. ለጥያቄ ቁጥር 31 ወይም 32 መልስዎ "የላቸውም" ከሆነ ምክንያቶቹ እንደክብደታቸው ቅደም ተከተል 1ኛ, 2ኛ, 3ኛ ..... በማለት በደረጃ ያመልክቱ

ምክንያት	ደረጃ
ሀ) በወረዳው በቂ አቅም ስለሌለ ስራ እንዳይበላሽ በመስጋት	
ለ) ከክልል በታች አያስፈልግም ብሎ በማመን	
ሐ) ለፍትሃዊ የሀብትና የትምህርት ስርጭት አመቺ አይሆንም ብሎ በማመን	
መ) ለሙስና በር እንዳይከፍት በመስጋት	
ሠ) ሌላ ካለ ይጥቀሱ _____	
_____	

34. የሚከተሉት መንገዶች በትምህርት ጉዳዮች ላይ <u>የህብረተሰቡን ተሳትፎ</u> ለማረጋገጥ የሚያግዙ ናቸው። ሁሉንም መጀመሪያ ካነበቡ በኋላ በወረዳዎ በተግባር ከሚያዩት በመነሳት <u>እንደተግባራዊነታቸው ደረጃ</u> 1ኛ, 2ኛ, 3ኛ ..... በማለት በደረጃ ያመልክቱ

የተሳትፎ መንገድ	ደረጃ
ሀ) የተለያዩ ህዝባዊ ማህበራት ተወካዮች በወረዳ ትምህርት ስልጠና ቦርድ በአባልነት በመሳተፍ	
ለ) ህብረተሰቡ በየቀበሌው በኮንፈረንሶች በመወያየት	
ሐ) የህዝብ ተመራጮች በቀበሌ በወረዳና በክልል ምክር ቤቶች በትምህርት ጉዳዮች በመወያየት	
መ) የህዝብ ተመራጮች በወረዳና በክልል ምክር ቤቶች በትምህርት ጉዳዮች በመወሰን	
ሠ) ህብረተሰቡ በትምህርት ስራ ላይ መደበኛ የሆነ ግምገማ በማካሄድ	
ረ) ህበረተሰቡ <u>የገንዘብ</u> አስተዋፅኦ በማድረግ	
ሰ) ህበረተሰቡ <u>የጉልበት</u> አስተዋፅኦ በማድረግ	
ቀ) ህበረተሰቡ <u>የሙያ</u> አስተዋፅኦ በማድረግ	

35. ቀጥሎ የተዘረዘሩት ሁኔታዎች ያልተማከለ አሰራርን ተግባራዊ ለማድረግ <u>ችግር የሚፈጥሩ</u> ተብለው የተገመቱ ናቸው። በተግባር ካስተዋሉት <u>የችግርነታቸው ክብደት ምን ያህል</u> ነው? ይህን ለማሳየት ለእያንዳንዱ <u>ከፍተኛ</u>, <u>መካከለኛ</u> ወይም <u>ቀላል</u> ከሚሉት አማራጮች አንዱን በመምረጥ ያመልክቱ።

<u>ማብራሪያ</u>

<u>ከፍተኛ</u> ሁኔታው በስራው ላይ እንቅፋት የሚፈጥርና <u>በወረዳ ደረጃ የማይቃለል</u> ሲሆን

<u>መካከለኛ</u> ሁኔታው እንቅፋት የሚፈጥርና በወረዳው ምክር ቤት ደረጃ ሊፈታ የሚችል ሲሆን

<u>ቀላል</u> ችግሩ በወረዳ ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት ደረጃ ሊፈታ የሚችል ሲሆን

	ሁኔታው (ችግሩ)	የችግሩ ክብደት		
		ከፍተኛ	መካከለኛ	ቀላል
1	የወረዳው የራሱ የገቢ ምንጭ ውሱን መሆን	☐	☐	☐
2	በጀት በወቅቱ ተፈቅዶ አለመምጣት	☐	☐	☐
3	የሰለጠነ የሰው ሃይል እጥረት (በእቅድ ዝግጅት ወዘተ)	☐	☐	☐
4	ውሳኔዎች በአብዛኛው በክልል ደረጃ ስለሚወሰኑ የመዘግየት ችግር	☐	☐	☐
5	ወረዳው በበጀት ላይ ስልጣን የሌለው መሆን	☐	☐	☐
6	የወረዳው ሃላፊነት ብዙ ሆኖ ስልጣኑ ውሱን መሆን	☐	☐	☐
7	የወረዳው ት/ቤቶች ጽ/ቤት መዋቅር ጠባብ መሆን	☐	☐	☐
8	የአመራር ሰዎች ቶሎ ቶሎ መቀያየር	☐	☐	☐
9	በወረዳው ያሉ ሃላፊዎች ተጠያቂነትን በመፍራት ውሳኔ ከመስጠት መታቀብ	☐	☐	☐
10	መሣሀፍትና ሌሎች የትምህርት መሳሪያዎች በወቅቱ አለመድረስ	☐	☐	☐
11	ሌላ ካለ ይጥቀሱ _____			

_____

36. አጠቃላይ አስተያየት በክልሉ ያልተማከለ የትምህርት አመራር ከክልል በታች በተለይ በወረዳ ደረጃ ተግባራዊነትን በተመለከተ አጠቃላይ አስተያየት ካለዎት ይጥቀሱ።

ሀ) _____

ለ) _____

ሐ) _____

መ) _____

ለቀና ትብብርዎ በድጋሚ ከልብ አመሰግናለሁ።

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work done under the guidance of Dr. Seyoum Teferra. All relevant sources used for the thesis are duly acknowledged.

Name: Girmay Berhe Tsadik

Signature:

Place: Addis Ababa University, Faculty of Education
Department of Educational Administration

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as university advisor

Name SEYOUM TEFERRA, Assoc. Prof.

Signature 

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