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HOUSEHOLD FOOD AID TARGETING :

THE CASE OF ANTSOKIA GEMIZA WEREDA

Distribution of aid to beneficiary households at Antsokia wereda

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Acronyms

ADP:	Area Development Project
AHHH:	Aged Headed Household
ANRS:	Amhara National Regional State
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DPPC:	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EFSR:	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EGS:	Employment Generation Scheme
ENI	Ethiopian Nutrition Institute
FAO:	Food and Agriculture Organization
GFFD:	General Free Food Distribution
FFW:	Food For Work
GR:	Gratuitous Relief
HH:	Household
HHH:	Head of Household
FHHH:	Female Headed Household
IFPRI:	International Food Policy Research Institute
Kcal:	Kilo Calory
MOA:	Ministry of Agriculture
MOE:	Ministry of Education
MOH:	Ministry of Health
NPDPM:	National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management
PPPD:	Policy, Planning and Program Department
ORDA:	Organization for Relief and Development for Amhara
RRC:	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SERA:	Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities
WDPPC:	Wereda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
WFP:	World Food Program
WVE:	World Vision Ethiopia
WVE-ADP:	World Vision Ethiopia - Area Development Program
ZDPPZ:	Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee

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Glossary

Kebele : It is the fourth administrative hierarchy in Ethiopia.

Wereda: It is the third administrative hierarchy which is equivalent to a district.

Abstract

This study aims at assessing the targeting efficiency in Antsokia Gemiza Wereda, in North Shewa. The study based its objectives on the hypothesis of ***household targeting practices are not efficient in Antsokia due to the failure to exclude the non-eligible beneficiaries at the expense of eligible non-beneficiaries.*** *The specific objectives are (i) to examine different targeting methods used to select beneficiary households of relief, (ii) to examine criteria used to set a threshold among beneficiary households, (iii) to estimate the targeting accuracy (error of inclusion and error of exclusion) against its intended eligible groups, (iv) to compare resource given to households with the 'ideal' ration (error of under supply and error of over supply) and finally (v) to assess major factors that affect targeting efficiency.*

Information gathered by employing a combination of primary and secondary data; the study applied both qualitative and quantitative methods. The secondary data gathered from previously published materials while the primary data based its information on the 200 relief distribution have been collected from the sampled households heads, interviews, and observations. The household survey applied economic vulnerability indicators to identify household's 'eligibility' or 'ineligibility' for relief aid. The major indices, i.e. livestock ownership, land holding, dependency ratio, off-farm income, crop production and oxen ownership, were converted into a standard scale the 'Z-score'.

The study noticed that the current targeting mechanism in Antsokia wereda has proficient procedures, despite actual practices impeded its efficiency. It applied a combined administrative-community targeting method, the combination is advantageous to complement each other. The administrative targeting decided that the eligibility indicator would be asset ownership. However, the community targeting found oxen ownership indicator easier to screen out eligible beneficiary households. The wereda implemented its selection factor (oxen ownership) with 14% inclusion and exclusion errors. Both pair of errors, inclusion/exclusion and over/under supply targeting errors are witnessed in the relief targeting. The findings show that there was 32.5% error of incidence (using economic vulnerability indicator) and 91.3% error of benefit. The major factors which determined the efficiency of targeting are: (a) DPPC approved below half of the wereda's relief request, (b) oxen ownership selection factor genuinely denied some of the food insecure and included the food secure households, (c) the community targeting had been affected by favoritism and discrimination (d) the community refused to participate in the selection and (e) the beneficiary households did not get all their ration.

Identification of the exact problems, tied with the efficiency of targeting systems, is used to suggest practical and affordable methodologies for future intervention in the wereda and other weredas with similar features. The study recommended (a) to balance Pledge and delivery (b) to construct additional warehouse to the wereda (c) to extend the selection factor from oxen ownership to related economic status indicators (d) to encourage the community to participate in targeting and (e)to strictly follow the intended household/individual ration.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Food is the most important need of human beings; the right to food is a human right. Though global food production is sufficient to feed all, it does not promise worldwide food security because of unequal access to food. Agriculture, which is dominant in Africa in terms of output, employment generation and export earnings, grew at an annual rate of 1.7% for the last two scores while population grew on an annual rate of 2.8% in this period. Food import; including food aid in Africa, have increased substantially to offset the deficiencies, and in early 1990s represented about 10% of the food consumed (FAO, 1998). African countries, particularly Sub-Saharans are major food aid recipients in international food transfers.

Food shortage occurs more frequently in Ethiopia than in many Sub-Saharan countries. Agriculture is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy contributing about 45% of the GDP. While 85% of the population is engaged in agriculture, about 50% of the total population is food-insecure. Ethiopia is a long-term food deficit country; for the past three decades local food production failed to feed the nation, and the contributing factors have been economic collapse, inappropriate food policy, unfavorable climate and man made conflicts.

Before the 1950s, Ethiopia had not been just a 'self sufficient' nation but also a net exporter of food grains. In 1947/48, Ethiopia's annual grain export was 150,000 Mt. but eventually declined in the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1970's, though the degree of severity may vary, shortages of domestic food production have been supplemented by food aid

ranging from 0.3 to over 1.1 million tons (Wolday et al, 1997). Inadequate response in the victim areas forced rural households to migrate and to engage in distress sales of assets in coping strategies to the problem. In the areas where food aid was available, the provision of food saved millions of lives, replaced hazardous coping mechanisms, created assets and stabilized local market prices. On the contrary, food aid created dependency and depressed market prices.

However, there is dispute about the use of food aid. Scholars have debated aid's negative effects on grain prices, food production and consumption patterns. On the grappling between government and donors on food aid implementation, how to reach those in most need is getting attention recently. "Despite the enormity of cross-country food aid transfers, which were running as high as 15 million tons annually during the early 1990s, very little is known regarding how well food aid is targeted to intended beneficiaries" (Jayne et al, 2001:887). Literature and past experiences show that the main cause for the food aid disincentive effect is directing food supply to unwanted (unintended) areas and food secure households. The food aid goal is getting food to the needy, but if the needy are not identified well, the goal will not be achieved. To minimize the disincentive effects of food aid and to maximize the impact of food aid, targeting is applied. Food aid targeting excludes the unwanted areas and food secure households; and it includes the needy areas and food insecure households.

Targeting involves decisions on the selection factors and on the targeting methods. Selection factors are used to identify which areas, households or individuals fall within the target group. Subsequently, the target group can be measured on nutritional status,

socio-economic indicators, food balance sheet figures, income indicators and so on (Sharp, 1997). Various methods are used to channel food aid to the needy households, these include market targeting, self targeting, administrative targeting and community targeting. **Market Targeting**: food is supplied in the market to reach people who have purchasing power but due to harvest failure could not find the commodity in the local market. **Self Targeting**: people decide for themselves whether to get food aid through work schemes. **Administrative Targeting**: outsiders (officials) decide the beneficiary households using observable indicators. **Community Targeting**: the community decides beneficiary households among themselves using their knowledge about the community members.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The changeover to mainly employment based relief rather than free distribution and the shrinking of internationally available food aid[1] (Jayne et al, 2001) have increased the importance of targeting in Ethiopia (DPPC, 2000a). Realizing the significance of targeting to achieve food aid goals, the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) in 1993 provided policy guidelines on relief aid distribution. Aid distribution management follows the government's administration hierarchy, decentralizing from federal government /DPPC/ to Regional states /DPPBs/, Zonal administrations /DPPDs/, Wereda council, Kebele level, and finally to community level.

[1] By the late 1990s food aid quantities have dropped almost in half, to seven million tons per year, partially because of changes in General Agreement on Tariff and Trade regulations and domestic policies that have reduced agricultural subsidies and surplus production in some major donor countries" (Jayne et al, 2001:906).

Targeting food aid means identifying needy areas and translating it into beneficiary households. The federal DPPC decides on allocations to regions, zones and weredas based on a multi-agency pre-harvest assessment conducted in November to December (DPPC, 2000a). Need assessments are done on the basis of crop production and food supply to the area. Translation of area targeting into beneficiaries is determined by wereda for all affected regions, however DPPC interferes to adjust figures. Actual distribution is undertaken at wereda level and beneficiary lists are prepared at kebele level.

The decision on the end-use of food aid is a risky and controversial step in food aid system and determines its efficiency. The growing need for food transfers has raised the question as to whether the previous targeting was efficient in reaching the poorest of the poor. In spite of the massive flow of food for decades, the nation's growing demand for aid makes the efficient utilization of food aid doubtful. Studies by SCF(UK) in 1997, Grain Market Research in 1998 and Getenet Assefa in 2000 show that the targeting system is inflexible in area identification and household selection, i.e. it has established habits of targeting and distribution procedures. "Due to unsuccessful food aid targeting [in 1995-96], only 22.3% of the deficit households were selected as beneficiaries" (Clay et al, 1998:26). Resources are wasted by missing their target causing negative effects on the mis-targeted household and economy.

Two pair of errors have determined targeting efficiency: benefit incidence and benefit level errors. Benefit incidence errors include error of inclusion and error of exclusion; benefit level errors include error of over-supply and error of under-supply. Even if there

is no perfect targeting method, targeting efficiency can be improved by *minimizing* the error of inclusion (when food secure households receive food aid) and the error of exclusion (when food insecure households are excluded); also by *minimizing* the over-supply error (receiving more food than needed) and the under-supply error (receiving less food than needed). The food aid targeting systems in many rural parts of Ethiopia lacks efficient procedures and/or practices. As a result the targeting is not accurate. Identifying the exact place of error helps to improve targeting outcomes and effects of food aid in saving lives and saving assets.

1.3 Aim of the Study

The study aims at examining the targeting efficiency in Antsokia wereda. It assesses the targeting methods (market targeting, administrative targeting, self-targeting and community targeting), criteria used to distinguish eligible households; and estimates the targeting accuracy or errors. The research distinguishes the targeting practices into the relief components, i.e. EGS, GR and GFFD[2] and examine their targeting efficiency.

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the research is to assess the efficiency of targeting practices in the study area.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

(1) To examine targeting method used to select beneficiary households

(2) To examine criteria used to set a threshold among beneficiary households

(3) To estimate the targeting accuracy; (error of inclusion and error of exclusion) against its intended eligible groups

[2] EGS (Employment Generation Schemes), GR (Gratuitous Relief), & GFFD (General Free Food Distribution)

(4) To compare resource given to households with the 'ideal' ration, (error of under supply and error of over supply)

(5) To assess major factors that affect targeting efficiency;

1.3.3 Research Questions

(1) What are the methods used to select relief beneficiaries? Are the methods used in translating area targeting into beneficiaries appropriate?

(2) What are the criteria used to distinguish beneficiary households from others?

(3) Do the rations have an over-supply or under-supply error? Do the selection criteria and methods have an error of inclusion or error of exclusion?

(4) Which factors have mostly affected the targeting efficiency?

1.4 Hypothesis

Household targeting practices are not efficient in Antsokia due to the failure to exclude the non-eligible beneficiaries at the expense of eligible non-beneficiaries.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Targeting relief food is more difficult than targeting other food aid programs, i.e. project food aid and program food aid due to its emergency. Relief food aid can be in the form of free distribution or employment generation schemes. In Employment Generation Schemes, (EGS) food is given to able-body persons in return to public work; the vulnerable, who are unable to participate in EGS, get Gratuitous Relief (GR). Government policy states one should distribute relief food in the form of EGS wherever possible. But, if the speed of disaster is overwhelming or if people are already affected by disaster to the magnitude that they are unable to participate in labor intensive aid program (EGS), General Free Food Distribution (GFFD) will be applied in the area.

A huge amount of government and donor resources have been applied to alleviate the chronic food problem. Unfortunately, if nothing changes the present domestic production, indicates a gloomy future that keeps food imports a continuing feature. In future, on the other hand, as the international food becomes more scarce resource, importance of effective targeting is likely to increase. This research, then, tries to identify the exact problems tied to the efficiency of targeting systems in order to suggest a more effective solution for future intervention.

Several micro level and macro level studies were carried out so far on food aid targeting. Some studies applied qualitative methods to evaluate the general targeting system of the interested area; others applied quantitative methods to evaluate areas, households or individuals level targeting efficiency. For example, the extensive work of SCF(UK) in 1997 based its field survey on experience and opinions of individuals and community. On the other hand, the Grain Market Research study used empirical analysis, particularly nutritional need analysis.

The household targeting study in Antsokia Gemiza adds to the knowledge for two reasons. Firstly, not a single study has thus far been conducted in this wereda on food aid targeting. Secondly, the indicator, which was applied to measure 'eligibility' and 'ineligibility', was not an absolute indicator. Nutritional analysis would yield absolute indicator, e.g. based on 2100 k/c of minimum calory intake per day (Sphere Project, 2000). This research used proxy indicators of food insecurity, particularly economic vulnerability indicators, to define eligible and ineligible households for food aid. The

eligibility/ ineligibility definition is based its ground on relative terms rather than on absolute terms. In the Ethiopian condition, the use of absolute indicators may label the majority of the rural population as eligible for food aid. If everyone is eligible, targeting cannot be applied. The beneficiaries can be assisted through non-exclusion or blanket distribution.

However, the ambition of targeting is to distribute scarce resources to the most vulnerable and to exclude the less vulnerable. Consequently, the most vulnerable should be defined in the local context. The researcher believes that there is no absolute selection factor that can fit to all situations and all areas. Therefore, targeting accuracy should be evaluated in its context using relative measurements. The past and present experiences will guide responsible government and non-government agents to allocate funds appropriately and to monitor its delivery. The research will draw suggestions for practical and affordable household targeting principles.

1.6 Methodology

The existing policies, practices and past experiences have been collected from literature reviews. Primary data were collected through a sample survey which included aid received and aid excluded households. To supplement the information, semi-structured interviews and structured interviews were conducted with in two groups. The first group interview addressed aid donors and channeling organizations to perceive what they think are the major problems of targeting. And the second group interview addressed people at the *wereda* level i.e. *wereda* council, ORDA wereda representative, kebele representatives, mengistawe buden and the community. The latter group helped to grasp

which targeting *methods* and *criteria* are used in the area to select beneficiary households, what problems they face in identifying beneficiary households, and the community's perspective about the practices (research questions 1 & 2).

Antsokia Gemiza wereda was one of the targeted areas for the 2000 aid distribution. This wereda is selected as a sample area of the research. Two-stage sampling was used to select the households (the unit of analysis). There are fifteen kebeles in the wereda and at first stage three kebeles were selected purposively. Gishoghe kebele is a 'dega' or a high land where aid was distributed in the form of general free food distribution; Atiko kebele, is a 'weinadega' or a middle land, where aid was distributed in the form of employment generation schemes; and Mekdesa is a 'kolla' or a low land, where aid was distributed in the form of employment generation schemes. In the second stage hundred households, both aid received and excluded households, were randomly selected. The proportion of aid recipient households within the kebele was used to decide on the sample number of aid received households and aid excluded households. The information collected from the sample survey was used to evaluate errors of inclusion \exclusion and error of over supply/under supply (research question 3).

Table 1:1 Distribution of the Sampled Households

Kebele	HHs excluded[3]	HHs included[4]			
		EGS	GR	GFFD	total
Atiko	15	11	4	-	15
Mekdesa	15	11	4	-	15
Gishoghe	10	-	-	30	30
Total	**40**				**60**

[3] refers to households excluded during the 2000 relief targeting
[4] refers to households included during the 2000 relief targeting

Household questionnaires were designed in a way that can address two major purposes.

(i) The main purpose of the questionnaire was to identify whether the household was eligible or not. Eligibility is understood as vulnerable to food insecurity. There are various approaches that are used to determine household food security. But the questionnaire follows the concept of economic vulnerability as indicators of eligibility for aid. Economic vulnerability is selected due to its ability to trace back households' economic status during the pre-aid or targeting period. The questionnaire measures major indices (variables) to estimate household food security using livestock ownership, land holding, dependency ratio, off-farm income, crop production and oxen ownership. Each indicator was converted into a standard scale, the 'Z-score':

$$\text{Z score} = \frac{\text{observation 'a' - average for all observation}}{\text{standard deviation for all observation}}$$

Once the households were identified as eligible /ineligible/ for aid, the next step was to estimate error of inclusion and error of exclusion so as to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis states that household targeting practices are not efficient in Antsokia due to the failure to exclude the non-eligible beneficiaries at the expense of eligible non-beneficiaries. It also used the household data to measure error of over/under supply in the included households.

(ii) The second issue of the questionnaire was to identify factors that have reduced targeting efficiency from the community's (beneficiary's) perspective. Ideally, targeting should be participatory and transparent to the community to improve its efficiency. Thus, the community (beneficiary and non-beneficiary) was asked how the targeting officials conducted beneficiary selection in the area.

Discussions with the wereda council, Agriculture Office, Organization of Relief and Development (ORDA), Area Development Project (ADP) of WVE, 'Mengistawe Buden' and informal interviews conducted within the community complemented the information gathered from the sample survey. The primary data, collected from the questionnaire, is analyzed by SPSS. Descriptive analysis, frequencies, Z-score and correlation were used. All information from the fieldwork was synthesized to identify factors that have affected targeting efficiency in Antsokia Gemiza wereda (research question 4).

1.7 Selection of the Study Area

Antsokia Gemiza wereda is located in North Shewa Zone, Amhara National Regional State, 350 kms Northeast from Addis Ababa. Since 1984, World Vision Ethiopia is operating in the area with the aim 'to enhance food security at the household level'. Ninety percent of the population depends on farming, cropping maize, teff, and sorghum. But unreliable and erratic rainfall, severe environmental degradation with increasing population and falling agricultural production made it difficult for farmers' to even feed themselves. During the 1984/85 chronic famine, 15-20 people were dying per day in the wereda, and food aid is still a long-standing characteristic of the area. Conflicts often arise between wereda and federal DPPC in area targeting and household targeting. In the 2000 drought federal DPPC targeted the area, however, it approved only 40% of the wereda need assessment team's food requests. Officials figures released by the Federal DPPC regarding the number of people affected by the drought were very low as compared to the other weredas of the country. The area appeared to be suitable to evaluate the efforts of household targeting in distribution of scant resources.

1.8 Scope and Limitation of the Study

Targeting practices exist in the entire operation of relief system. It starts with the need assessment, continues in area identification and terminated in actual distribution of the aid. But this paper emphasizes only on the last stage of the targeting process, focusing on the community level due to time and financial constraints. Hence, the scope is limited to rural and non-nomadic community.

1.9 Organization of the paper

The paper has six chapters. Chapter one introduces the purpose of the paper; chapter two gives conceptual framework of food aid targeting; chapter three explains the existing guidelines and practices of targeting mechanisms in Ethiopia; chapter four gives information on how targeting takes place in Antsokia-Gemiza wereda. Chapter five presents the targeting efficiency and factors affecting it; finally chapter six summarizes the whole paper and provides possible recommendation for future relief interventions.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptualizing Food Aid Targeting

Achieving a sufficient food supply and keeping pace with growing food needs remain a global challenge. Many developing countries are making efforts to improve their food security as lack of food security is associated with much human suffering. Africa's need for food is accelerating continuously. The causes of food insecurity are related with economic poverty and ecological degradation. In the absence of technological innovation, unlike Esther Boserup's optimistic view, population is a threat to rural development. In many countries domestic food supplies failed to keep pace with growing food needs.

Many developing countries' national efforts in achieving food security have been complemented by external assistance. Food aid is one form of external assistance; its nature and intention are to enhance the recipient's food security. It can be given in the form of direct food transfers, cash loans or grants to purchase food. Food aid is defined as a "transfer from donors to recipient countries of food commodities on a totally grant basis or highly concessional terms" (FAO, 1985:14). It involves about 25 countries as providers and over a hundred as recipients. Major food donors are the United States of America and the European Union; the major food channel is the World Food Program; and major recipient countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly low-income food-deficit countries. Recipient countries receive aid to remove food constraints, to substitute commercial food imports, to build up food stocks and to sustain economic growth.

Food aid in its sixty-year-old history passed through substantial changes. Food aid has become increasingly complex in terms of its process, practices and procedures.

Temporary assistance (in the 1940s) was given for war victims after WWI and the Japanese earthquake, but a broad program of aid was started by the Marshal Plan in the 1950s. In 1954, under Public Law of 480, the USA stated international food assistance. In 1958, the first international food aid forum was held on the 7th session of FAO conference. The forum launched new ideas for utilizing food surplus in food-for-work projects for food stabilization purposes (Thomson and Metz, 1997). The formulation of Food Aid Convention (FAC) in 1967 as a legal instrument generated many donor countries. The convention became a complementary part of the International Wheat Agreement, committing most members to specified levels of food aid (Peter & Henry, 1977). Thus, donors bound themselves legally to provide at least the minimum individual country share of food aid cereals. The original concept of food aid as a surplus disposal program, has become increasingly been re-oriented towards economic and social objectives (FAO, 1985).

The origin of food aid in the 1950s and 1960s was predominantly surplus disposal, however, in the 1970s it was replaced 'with a series of Congressional Amendments which intended food aid to encourage economic development and equity' (Bernstein and Crow, 1990:32). At present the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provides information regarding world food aid programs and monitors world wide food movements.

> The new food aid approaches encourage the use of food resources for developmental goals; a stronger orientation to the needs of the recipient countries; binding commitments of donor countries; multilateral food aid; different types of uses of food aid; local purchases and triangular transaction etc... (Thomson and Metz, 1997:225).

2.2 Types of Food Aid

Types of food aid are determined by their intended intervention. The food aid intervention can be used to improve the capacity of people (i) to gain access to food they need on their own or (ii) to direct food transfer to vulnerable groups. The former intervention involves asset distribution, production support, public work programs (FFW) and targeted food subsides. This intervention is an 'in-direct' transfer of food to target groups such as subsistence farmers, poor urban dwellers, and rural landless people. The expected outcomes are to increase agricultural income, cash income, household food supplies and to increase household food demands. The latter intervention includes relief assistance, supplementary feeding and wet feeding. This intervention is a 'direct' transfer of food to disaster affected people, underweight children, pregnant women, lactating women, elderly and sick persons. The expected outcome is to increase household/individual food security and nutritional status (Thomson & Metz 1997).

The commonly adopted direct types of food aid based on their uses are relief (emergency), project food aid and program food aid (non-project food aid).

(1) Emergency Food Aid or relief food aid is distributed to targeted beneficiaries in response to sudden or immediate food needs, occurring from man made or natural crises. It feeds refugees and disaster affected people in immediate need, but does not address major (long-term) food shortage. Emergency food aid in most recipient countries accounts for 10-15% of the total aid. In Ethiopia according to DPPC, it reaches up to 70% of the total food aid although this is contested by observers. Structural food aid is sometimes categorized as emergency food aid, where the agreement contracted with donors on an annual basis for a long term assistance. Emergency food aid has three

common components: EGS, GR and GFFD.

- EGS: Employment Generation Scheme is distributed to able-bodied persons in return to labor-intensive work. It is the principal tool used for linking relief and development. Works that are taken up by EGS to address the root causes of the problem are soil and water conservation, afforestation, road construction, water resource development and pasture development. The objectives of EGS are to provide income, build up assets, create infrastructure and to reinforce the work ethos among the affected population.
- GR: In areas where EGS is implemented, Gratuitous Relief is distributed to unable-bodied persons without work requirement to protect livelihoods and to prevent malnutrition. Unable-bodied persons include, the disabled, the elders, the pregnant, the lactating, the under age children and the labor poor households. The objective of GR is to save human life in time of disasters.
- GFFD: In areas affected by sudden onset disaster, General Free Food Distribution is distributed to everybody both disabled and able-bodied. EGS cannot be implemented in some situation, i.e. if a shelf project is not ready (EGS activities), beneficiaries are too weak to work, and if beneficiaries are pastoralists who do not settle permanently. In such situations where public works cannot be implemented, general free food distribution is used. GFFD can also be used till EGS program starts to fill the time gap.

(2). Project Food Aid is given for development related activities; food-for-work is its common form. Project food aid is similar to emergency aid in that it is given to target beneficiaries, but it is given to maximize relief aid's limited role on development. "Food-for-work and cash-for-work projects are labor intensive development works usually

located in food-deficit or economically-deprived areas, using regular (non-relief) resources" (Sharp, 1997:81). This type of aid accounts for 20% of the total aid in most recipient countries.

(3). Program Food Aid or non-project food aid is not targeted at specific beneficiaries or groups but provided to the governments of recipient countries, both as loans or grants (Thomson & Metz 1997). Such type of aid is given for bulk sale, budgetary or balance of payment support, price stabilization or for reserve purpose. In most recipient countries program food aid contributes to 60-70% of the total aid. But in Ethiopia it is not common.

(Fig. 2:1) **Types of Food aid**



2.3 Debate on Food Aid

Food aid has been a controversial issue since its origin, though the number of arguers in favor of food aid outnumbered the opponents. The advocates consider food aid as a good form of external assistance since it saved millions of lives. They appreciate the participation and achievement of donors in enhancing food security of the recipient countries. Food aid support food and agricultural production, rural infrastructure, vulnerable group betterment, improvement of income generation and coping strategies for emergencies (WFP, 1993).

On the other hand, the arguments against food aid are that it discourages local production, creates a taste for expensive imports, triggers governments to postpone necessary agricultural reforms and fosters dependency (Maxwell, 1991). The opponents of food aid assistance perceive it as an instrument used to the donors' advantage. It leads to dominant-subordinate relationships and forces the recipient country to go against its own interests on international economic and political matters. It creates psychological, political and economic dependency on the donor nations. Donors give aid tied with various motives. Concentration in favored areas with unpredictable supplies makes it doubtful whether eliminating hunger stands first on their priority list. Food aid as any activity operates in a political environment, involves relation between donors and recipients. US food aid policy is for instance highly criticized for its political ties since its beginning in the 1950's under the Marshal Plan when aid was used to support anti-Communist movement. Food and oil are important aspects of world politics, a weapon to reward 'friends' and to punish 'enemies'. But the argument is that the award of food aid should be on non-political grounds directly to those most in need.

2.4 Impact of Food aid

Food aid is one of the tools to address food insecurity and aims at a better food intake of poor households. The impact of food aid can be assessed on its influence on household consumption, protecting asset, stabilizing markets, preventing stress migration; and on its contribution to avoid starvation, improve nutritional intake, improve physical access to food, avoid depletion of assets, create savings and stabilize food markets (WFP, 1999). Aid has sustained millions of lives and also through short term income transfer supported recovery and future sustainability. Aid replaced poor coping mechanism that would have

resulted in long term negative consequences such as excessive disposal of assets (which increases vulnerability to future insecurity), ill-health and migration. Food aid programs become significant, particularly in rural development; it removes urban-biased development by emphasizing on agricultural strategies designed to increase agricultural production and to increase farmers' income. Its impact should also be evaluated on its long run effect on incomes of the poor.

One of the new approaches to maximize the impact of food aid is to use food aid to stabilize cereal prices through local purchase. It takes regional disparities into account. During a surplus period or from a surplus area instead of exporting food, donors purchase cereals from domestic market. The transaction between surplus areas and deficit areas within a recipient nation integrates the local markets. "Money spent by donors on grain purchase is directed to the local economy rather than to international grain trade companies" (Wolday et al, 1997:4). The transaction directly benefits recipient countries' traders, farmers, grain cleaners and transporters.

In 1972-3 the Government of Maharashta in India achieved impressive success in preventing famine through relief aid. More than fifty million people were living in this relatively 'developed' state. However, the rural population was in absolute poverty; the degraded land and the low agricultural production were a threat to their livelihood. In the early 1970's an acute crisis of food production occurred in Maharashta state. The government distributed food aid to nearly 5 million people through cash-for-work and those unable to work were supported by gratuitous relief. In the peak drought year, the relief work generated one billion person-days of employment and accounted to 50% for

their income. The relief was successful due to its system to avoid the danger of exclusion error (Thomson & Metz 1997).

In Ethiopia since 1959, (when the first food aid arrived) aspects of food aid have been observed on its positive and negative implications to the economy. There is little hard evidence revealing the developmental role or disincentives of food aid on farm labor, farm income, grain prices and on food consumption habits (Alemayehu, 1988). In Ethiopia food for work created assets such as ponds, dams, forests, roads, soil and water conservation, though lack of sustainability or maintenance is its common criticism. Recently, SCF(UK) monitored the impact of food aid in North and South Wollo zones (Ellen and Emebet, 2000). The study focused on relief distribution between January - September 2000. The area was stratified into two Food Economy Zone (FEZ): the North Wollo Highland 'Belg' FEZ and the South Wollo Highland Belg FEZ. Relief food provided 50-75% of the targeted households food requirement in the South Wollo whereas 30 - 55% of food requirements in North Wollo. The direct consumption of aid contributed to the dietary intake of the community (Mathyas & Emebet, 2000). The impacts of food aid in the short term as well as in the long term has been reduced due to inefficient targeting. The findings on the mis-use of food aid are explained in chapter three.

2.5 Targeting Food Aid

The ambition of food aid is to protect those who are vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition. There are two objectives on how to reach the vulnerable: the non-exclusion objective and the targeting objective. Reaching all the vulnerable individuals refers to the

non-exclusion objective through a method of direct and unconditional provision to support everyone in need without distinction. The method of 'universal support' is obviously a rather coarse one, but "it does have the advantage of altogether bypassing the various difficulties which any form of selectivity in the provision of relief is bound to entail" (Drèze and Sen, 1989:105).

The non-exclusion objective can be used when the primary concern is equity; it avoids channeling maximum benefits to the most underprivileged groups. The objective is based on the ethical belief that everyone should get an inalienable and unconditional right to the provision of basic necessities such as health and education. When it comes to famine prevention -'right to food'- universal support would have several disadvantages; it requires huge resources, involves huge administrative and logistic burden and also creates disincentives to the local economy.

If the primary concern is saving resources and minimizing the production disincentives of food aid, targeting becomes a more appropriate option than the blanket distribution. Targeting holds resources from supporting the less vulnerable groups, to the advantage of the most deprived groups. The food transfers are in favor of the vulnerable population. The World Bank and the IFPRI have tended in recent years to come out strongly in favor of targeted intervention to promote food security and mitigate the social costs of economic adjustments on the poor (Vivian 1995 cited in Yosef 2001). "The simultaneous, and to some extent conflicting objectives of 'non-exclusion' and 'targeting' can be persuaded with varying emphasis, depending on the selection procedure adopted to determine the eligibility of different groups of people to support" (Drèze and Sen,

1989:104). The poorest and the vulnerable groups are a very important target group where food aid can make a difference with less local market price and local production disturbance. Targeting answers the questions who those people are and where they are living. Different writers have defined targeting in various terms.

- *a deliberate attempt to shift the benefits of public expenditures to the poor by means that aim to screen them as the direct beneficiaries* (Yosef, 2001:44).
- *any mechanism for identifying eligible individuals for transfer assistance and screening out the ineligible* (Devereux, 2000:1).
- *restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk in order to maximize the benefit of intervention whilst minimizing the cost* (Jaspars and Young, 1995).

The working definition of the paper is adopted from the national targeting guidelines, "targeting is the process by which [eligible] households are selected to receive emergency food aid and then provided with it" (DPPC, 2000b:1).

2.6 Purposes of Targeting

Targeting is necessary for an efficient utilization of resources towards reaching the most needy, to exclude food secure people, and to reduce the dependency syndrome using food resources for development purpose. Famines are typical situations in which time is short and resources are limited, and the penalties of failing to come to the rescue of the most vulnerable by priority can be enormously high (Drèze and Sen, 1989). Targeting maximizes the positive impacts of aid on the recipient countries and minimizes the negative impact on the economy. Kay Sharp categorizes the purposes of targeting into:

(a) humanitarian: attempts to assist the real needy and not to benefit unfairly the less

needy. (b) resource's efficiency: enables to achieve a great impact on the problem.

(c) development: tries to avoid dependency and disincentives effects on the economy.

Targeting households who have effective demand for food aid would maximize its impacts. If food aid is transferred only to households without purchasing power, then there would be a negligible reduction in effective demand resulting from food aid, and no production disincentives (Jayne & Daniel, 1995). Targeting households who lack effective demand for food so complicate the effect by selling out food aid and use the cash to purchase cheaper food items. When resources are not efficiently utilized unpredictable fluctuations occur; in Ethiopia, wheat prices are reduced and sorghum and maize prices rise. Thus, food aid targeting require identifying effective demand for food. But the 1995-1996 households targeting survey shows that food aid is given almost equally to food deficit households (95,000 Mt.) and to surplus households (93,000mt), which provides evidence of poor targeting practices in Ethiopia.

2.7 Who are eligible for relief aid?

The right to food is a human right, but often far from being applied. In most societies, shelter and food consume 2/3 of the household expenditures. However, food is the last thing people would give up, they fight for and insist to get access to it. Food aid programs are designed to reach vulnerable groups. Vulnerability refers to the full range of factors that place people at risk of becoming food insecure (WFP, 1999). The food insecure are not confined to those who have food deficient diets at a given point in time. They include those whose access to food is insecure or vulnerable, those who are in danger of inadequate diets (Thomson and Metz, 1997).

In relief operations, selecting criteria and setting thresholds to identify vulnerable groups have been the most complicated and controversial step. Flawed procedures in selecting eligible people may cause 'leakage' (inclusion) of food secure households or pass by the most in need. Selection of criteria depends on the objective of food aid targeted; who are entitled to benefit from the intervention. For example, for supplementary feeding, children under five, pregnant and lactating women are often targeted. Actual status indicators or proxy indicators can be used to identify the vulnerable.

Different types of approaches are used to assess vulnerability: 'food balance sheet', 'indicator based', 'income source based', 'socio-economic', 'nutritional status', and 'process approach'. Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. The Food Balance Sheet (FBS) measures the quantities of food commodities available for human consumption at the national level. It compiles information from domestic production figures, changes in stocks over the concerned period, imports and exports, amounts of food going to animal feed, seed, food and non-food manufacture and waste (Thomson & Metz, 1997). The advantage of FBS is it provides an initial sense of the magnitude of a national/regional/wereda food deficit in a given year. It is useful in countries with equal income distribution to provide aggregated information about the relation between food supply and demand. But the disadvantage is it does not give a disaggregated information about the food supply at the household level.

The 'indicator based' approach collects vulnerability indicators from factors that can affect households vulnerability. Unlike FBS, the indicator based approach measures households level food vulnerability. The approach relates factors that are often

independent data that are assumed to affect household vulnerability to food insecurity i.e. household dependence ratio, livestock ownership, per capita food production etc.... The use of multi-indicators instead of a single indicator minimizes its errors in estimating food insecurity. The data can be aggregated into zonal and regional level. But its accuracy depends on the availability and quality of data. The indicator based is used in many countries, including Ethiopia to measure household food security.

The third approach, 'Income-Source Based' measures households vulnerability using their income. The information put emphasis on household's income shares or sources i.e. remittance, trading, casual labor, and agricultural production. The assumption of the approach is that the higher the income of a household and diversity of income sources, the less vulnerable the household is. Any change in income for any of sources are used to assess changing levels of vulnerability (SERA et al, 1999).

'Process' approach divides the interested area into food economic regions or zones. "The area of interest is stratified into food economy regions that share broadly similar patterns of livelihood and access to food" (SERA et al, 1999:25). In each economic zone (poor, rich), the households broadly share similar patterns of livelihood and access to food. The process approach analyzes how the households in different economic zone acquire food and respond to food shock. But the approach requires in each economic zone, a continuous and a routine household level data to check whether their conditions are improving or deteriorating. The approach depends on the quality of the data and on the analysis of the experts. The process approach is currently a SC's approach to food security in Ethiopia.

Nutritional status indicator uses the standard daily calory intake measurements to identify eligible households/individuals. Once the data is collected, it is easier to standardize with the help of experts. The nutritional need indicator requires continuos and long-term assessment.

Economic indicators consider economic factors which are assumed to affect household vulnerability in the same way as 'indicator based approach'. Access to enough food implies household's ability to establish access to productive resources such as land, livestock, agricultural inputs and family labor combined to produce food or cash (Markos, 1997). Households who are unable to provide a regular food supply through their means of living such as from their farm production, off-farm incomes or remittance will be eligible for aid. Economic vulnerability and social vulnerability are usually expressed as a single indicator, socio-economic vulnerability indicator. Social vulnerability measures social support of individuals who are unable to support themselves. At the early stage of famine socio-economic indicator with the help of the community are more appropriate form (Thomson and Metz, 1997).

The present research has used economic indicators (socio-economic indicator) to identify those who are eligible and non-eligible for food aid. Economic indicator is a proxy indicator of household food insecurity that can trace back the households pre-aid economic status. The more assets a household has, the less vulnerable and the greater the depletion of household's assets, the greater their food insecurity.

Table 2:1 **Targeting implication of different concepts**

approaches of vulnerability	**targeting criteria**	**targeting unit**	**type of distribution**
food balance sheet	• food demand • food supply	nation	• project • relief • program
indicator	• asset ownership • per capita production • malnutrition rates	household	•targeted free distribution •work schemes
income	• total income • source of income	household	•targeted free distribution •work schemes
process	food acquirement	Food Economy Zone/ Region	•targeted free distribution •work schemes
economic vulnerability	•assets/income •dependency ratio •indicators of coping capacity	household	•targeted free distribution •work schemes
nutritional vulnerability	•demographic characteristics (age group, pregnant/nursing mother) • anthropometry	individual	•supplementary/MCH feeding •school feeding
social vulnerability	•people unable to support themselves /or without adequate social support •traditional 'charity cases' old, widows, orphans, disabled, etc.	individual	•targeted free distribution

Source: Information compiled from Jaspars & Young 1995 and Thomson & Metz 1997.

2.8 Targeting Methods

Targeting can involve different methods based on the design of the food aid intervention. The community can select the eligible among themselves, an outsider can select the eligible using observable indicators or the beneficiaries can present themselves as eligible. Self targeting, individual targeting, market targeting, community targeting and administrative targeting are common choices of targeting methods. Some writers put community targeting as a sub-division of administrative targeting.

(a) Self Targeting : It applies to an able-bodied person when there is work in exchange for aid. Beneficiaries decide for themselves to get the aid. Low wages, low quality of food and stigma are used to discourage privileged groups. The advantages of self targeting are that it has no individual screening cost and it is free from corruption and biases. But the disadvantages are the possible risk even to discourage the under-privileged groups, the job opportunity depends on resource availability, and the failure to address vulnerable but unable-bodied persons.

(b) Administrative Targeting: outsiders from government staff or assistance agencies select the beneficiaries using observable criteria i.e. nutritional status, social and economic indicators. The advantage of this method is that it reduces the errors of inclusion or exclusion, but at a high cost of screening beneficiaries. The disadvantage is that mis-use or abuses of power i.e. bias, corruption and favoritism affect the channel.

(c) Community Targeting: the community decides on the beneficiaries based on their best knowledge about their neighbors. This channel is applicable in a society whereby the community has a strong social tie. Advantages of this channel are no costs for household surveys, vulnerability defined in its own environment and community empowerment. Disadvantages are the high cost of monitoring the fairness and the chance that an influential group may be included at the expense of the poorest powerless people. Administrative, community and self-targeting channels are used simultaneously in many parts of Ethiopia.

The above three targeting methods are used for direct intervention (for relief aid and project food aid). **Market targeting** is used for indirect transfer of food aid intervention in the form of program (non-project) food aid. It cannot be applicable for relief aid or direct food targeting. Food is directed to the local market in draught-hit areas to people who have purchasing power but could not find the commodity in the markets due to harvest failure. The intervention provides food to the market and subsidizes food/livestock prices. The channel does not involve beneficiary selection cost, reduces administrative burden, and there is no room for favoritism. But undependable channels due to failure to reach the most needy households; and mis-targeting in terms of time and place risk, to create economic disincentives.

The attractive objective of targeting in reality appeared to be very hard to achieve. David Keen's studies in Darfur, Western Sudan shows that the 1985 targeting emergency food aid was a total failure (Maxwell, 1991). USAID acted quickly in the 1984/85 drought in Sudan allocating large quantities of relief grain. In Western Sudan, aid was targeted to reach the poorest area councils, the poorest village, for the poorest households. Unfortunately, aid often went to the richer area councils, to the urban quarters, to the richer villages and to the rich households. The two poorest villages, which together had 87% of those people seriously affected by the draught received only 8% of the sorghum received by Darfur. The major factors that had affected targeting were local political and lobbying power, cultural norms of sharing equal rather than discrimination in favor of the poor and local administrative weakness.

> The principal conclusion is that if targeting is to be attempted, then aid agencies and, more especially donors, need to give very serious attention to how targeting is to be achieved, particularly in the face of influential local factors who may have interests which run counter to such targeting (Maxwel, 1991:191).

A study on emergency food aid targeting in East Africa funded by FEWS and USAID/REDSO in 1998 shows that targeting needs due attention. In Tanzania there are no guidelines on targeting of food aid. The Prime Minster's Office instructed local governments to classify people in draught areas into three categories: (i) people with no means to buy food and unable to work; (ii) people with no means to buy food; and (iii) people with means to buy food. In spite of a Disaster Relief Co-ordination Act (1990) and accompanying regulation (1991) established, they did not provide specific guidelines on targeting of food aid. Lack of guidelines confused officials on how to go about it. One of the problems was whether to entitle individuals or households for aid. Somehow, local governments registered people into three groups. "In Uganda, the government's Department of Disaster Management had guidelines for the logistical administration of its own operations, but no policy statement on the objectives or principles of disaster management and no guidelines on the use of food aid" (Sharp, 2000:4).

One of the issues on food aid targeting and distributing is whether to channel it through NGO or government. The 1999 Tanzanian Food Aid Targeting Guidelines stated the necessity of partnership by government and NGOs. In Uganda, the previous years targeting and distribution through local governments replaced by through NGOs in 1997 due to poor targeting. In Kenya, government distributed aid purchased from its own budget, on the other hand international food aid was channeled through NGOs. The study of emergency food aid targeting in East Africa noted that 'NGO food aid was better targeted than government food aid (Sharp 2000:7). Because governments tend to pass vulnerable areas and households in each administrative hierarchy. But NGOs direct aid without using the administrative hierarchy from center to the actual beneficiaries.

CHAPTER THREE:

RELIEF AID TARGETING IN ETHIOPIA

There is no absolute targeting system that can be applicable to every country and situation: it depends on the objective of the program, the context of the area, resources available, resources needed and cost benefit options. Targeting is not a single activity; it is a process that involves various steps ranging from country identification to individual screening. Smooth relation and coordination between donors and recipients are central to the effectiveness of food aid. Negotiation takes place in an annual sequence with multilateral and bilateral agencies; firstly, to determine the scale of assistance, secondly, to iron out fluctuations in food availability. Recipients have the responsibility to design food aid usage intelligently to maximize its impact on food security.

To have control over the timing of food aid, Ethiopia established the Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR). Until food can be supplied through the regular appeal, it makes basic food ready for times of emergency. Food is reserved locally for disaster management purposes. The mandate of EFSR is to stockpile a food reserve in its stores at Kombolcha, Mekele, Nazareth, Dire Dawa and Shashemene with a combined capacity of 205,000 MT. "The responsibly of EFSR starts and ends at the gates of its warehouses" (Mitick et al, 1998:19). DPPC also owns three central warehouses in Kombolcha, Dire Dawa and Nazareth with a combined capacity of 128,000 MT. It coordinates the transportation of food from the warehouses to the distribution site stores.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, when external assistance had a minimal role in the domestic food supply, food aid did not require a separate institution to oversee the relief operation. Relief was distributed in times of crises through the Awraja administrators of the affected

areas under a committee of government agencies. Local chiefs had the responsibility to select beneficiaries under the supervision of wereda and sub-wereda administrators. But the flood of food aid to the 1973/74 famine demanded the creation of a separate institution. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was established in 1974 to assist victims of natural disasters only. In 1979, the first RRC guidelines gave peasant associations and wereda administrators a mandate to identify beneficiaries and to distribute aid. In 1983, the revised guideline modified the target group definition to include both natural disaster and man-made disaster victims. In 1993, the old RRC was replaced by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). In the same year, the National Policy Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) was established as part of government policy. Since its ratification, NPDPM has introduced major changes in food aid operations. The NPDPM document has ten objectives and four basic principles. The aim is to link relief and development, to combine disaster prevention with sustainable development. In the 1980s, NGOs distributed 80% of food aid but in the 1990s DPPC handled almost 50% of the distribution. Currently, "NGOs are allowed to handle and distribute only 'development' food aid, which is used as wage payment in labor intensive area development projects" (Yosef, 2001:25).

3.1 Food Aid Requirement

Most developing countries get their food from domestic agricultural production. Some countries like Singapore achieve food security through commercial import without domestic agricultural production. Food security has been defined in various terms. Most of the definition rotates around its three pillars: availability, access and stability. Food and Agricultural Organization defines it as:

> Food security has three specific aims; ensuring production of adequate food supplies, maximizing stability in the flow of supplies and securing access to available supplies on the part of those who need them (FAO, 1989:2).

Food insecurity in Ethiopia has multifaceted causes. Environmental degradation, particularly in the north, is a major cause of poor agricultural performance; the cyclical droughts every ten years -1972/73, 1984/85, 1993/94 in rain-fed agriculture and war are prominent causes of food insecurity in Ethiopia as has been a characteristic feature in many developing countries. The domestic food production lags by 40-70% compared to other Sub-Saharan nations' food production. The accumulation of poor farming technologies, land pressure and an unfavorable climate resulted in very low local food production. On the highlands of Ethiopia (43% of the total land cover), in spite of soil erosion risk, 88% of the population, 90% of cultivated land and 60% of livestock are concentrated. Farming is highly dependent on nature, the main harvesting takes place only following the rainy season which occurs during June-Sept. "A 10% decline in rainfall below the long-term average results in a 4.4% fall in national food production" (Yosef, 2001:22). The rain-fed agriculture is extremely affected by the erratic nature of rainfall patterns in the past three decades. In these years, the food production failed to match the population growth, demand for food has dramatically increased.

The growth of farmer population in highlands and the growth of nomadic pastorialists in low lands with livestock density, led to increasing demand for fuel wood, grazing land and agriculture extension. In the absence of sufficient technological change in Ethiopia, the rural population extracts the natural resources for the day to day survival. The fixed amount of agriculture lands has to accommodate the ever increasing population; there fore, land holdings are fragmented. The same farm plot is splitting in smaller and smaller

fragments, until it can no longer support a household. The average house holding in different regions range from 0.17 ha to 0.10 ha., which is insufficient to provide a living on sustainable basis. The pressure of population density has been accompanied by intensification of land use. As population increases natural resources are over exploited. In many parts of Ethiopia, on of the indicators of severe land shortage is that fallowing as a system of farming has completely disappeared. In addition, absence of sufficient technological change and lack of improved seeds and fertilizer have limited the improvement of agricultural performance.

Lack of adequate food in the nation demands for external food supplies either in the form of food aid or commercial imports. In Ethiopia, the food gap due to poor performance of the domestic food production has been supplemented by external assistance mainly in the past two decades in the form of free food distribution and food for work. "Food aid made up 100% of all grain imports in Ethiopia during the years 1991-1993 when the country made no commercial cereal imports at all and food aid constituted about 10% of total grain supplies" (Thomson & Metz, 1997:198). Based on the 1992/93 food consumption, the FAO and other experts made food production and food availability projections. The projection (1994/95-1999/00) expected food import requirements to fall from 8% to 3% by the end of the period. Unfortunately, at the end of the projection period, 10.5 million people required 1.3 million Mt. relief assistance.

Buoyant growth in agricultural production was assumed which would decrease imports of food. However, the Ethiopian experiences deviates from that assumption. Every year since 1977 food aid has increasingly been supplied to the nation. In the 1970s and 1980s

food aid took the form of emergency aid and food for work. But in the 1990s changeover from relief to development, structural food aid (long term relief contract) and food aid programs (indirect intervention) have been launched. Agricultural production improved at the end of 1990s though food aid availability also increased in these periods. The food aid requirement should be determined by the recipient's food supply. Although the major Ethiopian source of food supply is its crop production, food imports often has weak association with the domestic crop production. The national food aid history raises the question how food aid requirements are determined. The following diagram testifies the weak association between food demand and food aid imports.

Fig 3.1. **Consumption Need Vs Food Aid Imports in Ethiopia**



Source: CSA 2000

Key: Series = Food Consumption Need in MT
Series 2 = Food Aid Imports MT

3.2 Area Targeting

The process of targeting can be broken down into three main stages: federal level area targeting, local level area targeting and actual beneficiary selection. Area targeting refers to the geographic limitation of the needy population (DPPC, 2000b). The area targeting involves the identification of specific areas, the amount of food needed, the number of people in need of food, and the duration of the assistance.

Wereda and Zonal officials take the initiative to hold disaster assessments in their respective areas. Identification of needy areas is conducted administratively using early warning indicators such as direct measures of food production, factors that can determine food production (climate, pests, availability of inputs), availability and access to food in the market. In the pre-harvest time between November and December, a multi-agency team conducts a need assessment with tools of rapid and qualitative methodologies. Information is gathered from interviews (concerned officials and households), group discussions and actual visits to drought suspected areas. The need assessment displays information on 'where', 'how many people' and 'how much food needed'. Accordingly the federal DPPC decides on allocations of aid to regions, zones and weredas.

DPPC, using the early warning system information, appeals to the international community. In response, donors can send their surplus food, borrow from recipient's reserve, purchase from local market or give money to purchase food. The major sources of donation for the 2000 appeal were USA, EU, Government of Ethiopia (GOE), and Italy. DPPC received 70% of its pledge; delivery of relief covered only 85% of the national food requirement. Though there was no record of death due to the drought, the 30% of reduction can have impact on the nutritional status of the affected people. Government in cooperation with non-government organizations dispatched the food to drought affected areas. The total donation can be estimated to an amount of $ 225,000,000 (1MT corresponds to $250).

Table: 3:1 **Emergency Food Aid Pledges and Delivery in 2000 (MT)**

No	Donor	Consignor	Pledges	Delivery		
				Qty.	As % of need	As % of pledge
1	USA "	WFP/DPPC NGOs	379,462 197,300	289.205 170,320		
	USA total				35	79
2	EU " "	NGOs WFP/DPPC DPPC	136,670 75,831 50,000	136,670 50,937 50,000		
	EU total		262,501	237,607	18	91
3	WFP	DPPC	6,019	6,019	0.5	100
4	Canada "	WFP/DPPC NGOs	9,970 8,470	9,000 8,470		
	Cana. total		18,400	17,470	1.4	94
5	UK	NGOs	42,850	34,575	3	81
6	GOE	DPPC	100,000	97,829	8	98
7	Italy "	" WFP/DPPC	4,996 126	4,996 100	8	98
	Italy total		5,122	5,096	0.4	99
8	Netherlands	WFP/DPPC	9,700	4,700	0.3	52
9	France	"	5,970	5,910	0.4	99
10	Norway "	" NGOs	3,130 7,365	3,130 7,365		
	Norw. total		10,495	10,495	0.8	100
11	Japan	WFP/DPPC	12,407	11,331	0.8	100
12	Belgium	"	3,500	1,503	0.1	43
13	Germany	NGOs	5,746	5,746	0.4	100
14	Switzerland	WFP/DPPC	2,835	2,188	0.2	77
15	Ireland	"	1,697	1,130	0.1	66
16	Australia	"	1,783	1,783	0.1	100
17	ICRC	ICRC	3,794	3,794	0.3	100
18	WV/E	WV/E	3,931	3,931	0.3	100
19	Act Network	LWF/EECMY	5,000	5,000	0.4	100
20	Others	DPPC&Others	17,764	16,221	1.2	91
	Grand Total		1,095,156	903,188	70	85

Source: DPPC Appeal 2001

3.3 Household targeting

The food security focus has shifted recently from national food availability to household's and individual's food access and availability. Improving household food security has a tantamount importance to those who are suffering from hunger and malnutrition. In 1994/95, Ethiopian rural households' food availability for consumption

was estimated to be 1142 kg per year with the absence of food aid distribution. Approximately 43.2% of rural households appeared to be food insecure using a minimum calory intake criteria of 2100 kcal/day (Clay et al, 1998).

Area targeting is interrelated with household targeting, getting the most needy households is determined by selection of the area they live in. Once the area is identified it has to be translated into households targeting. The lower level structure, in the targeting hierarchy, plays a vital role in linking area targeting with the beneficiary households (Mitik et al, 1998). Beneficiary selection is carried out by local government, community leaders and field staff of implementing agencies (DPPC, 2000a). They often use socio-economic indicators and subjective cut off points without fixed threshold. The beneficiary households then receive food aid through various programs: EGS, GR and GFFD. The selection for each program follows the same procedure but with different eligibility criteria.

Fig. 3.2 **Targeting Mechanism in Ethiopia**



Key NDPPC : National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EWS: Early Warning System
Source: DPPC 2000b

3.3.1 Targeting for Employment Generation Schemes (EGS)

The national food aid policy states that food aid should be given to able-bodied persons in return to community project work to maximize its limited role in development. Unable persons can be provided by free distribution. The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) in 1993 introduced a shift in the use of food resources from relief to sustainable longterm development. "In the 1980s free food accounted for 70% while work-based food accounted for 30%. The official goal [of NPDPM]... is to expand work-based food aid to the point where it accounts for 80% of all distributions" (WFP 1995, cited in Clay et al, 1998:5). In 1997, to enhance the development role of food aid, DPPC had prepared guidelines for planning and implementation of EGS programs.

EGS targeting is conducted by administrative targeting to facilitate the targeting system and by community targeting to decide on the beneficiary selection criteria. Sometimes community targeting is not seen as a separate targeting method rather as sub-part of administrative targeting. The community and their representatives define the eligibility criteria locally within the framework of EGS guidelines.

Box 3.1: Beneficiary Households for EGS

- Have able-bodied labor available to participate in EGS. The individuals should be between 18-60 years of age.
- Are residents in a disaster affected area at least for one year.
- Are unable to meet their needs due to the effects of disaster or food insecurity.

Source: (DPPC, 2000b)

In most situation administrative targeting and in special cases self targeting are applied. Administrative targeting is used for two purposes. (i) in most disaster affected areas, where alternative employment is minimal, everybody wants to participate in EGS. But the resource constraints provide less job opportunities than the demand. Administrative targeting intervene to limit the number of participants to those most in need. (ii) Administrative targeting involves "the community in the process, helping to develop a sense of ownership of the assets created and thereby, enhancing sustainability" (DPPC, 1997:39). In self targeting, on the basis of first-come-first-served, any able-bodied person gets employment up to the number of jobs available.

3.3.2 Targeting Gratuitous Relief (GR)

Gratuitous relief is given to assist unable-bodied persons within the same area of work required (EGS) to get the aid. In times of disaster or severe food shortages, the unable-bodied are assisted without any work if they cannot be supported by their household's own means. The 1994 NPDPM stated to use 80% of the national food aid for developmental purpose and the remaining 20% for free distribution. The 80:20 ratio is often understood as a fixed rule; to use 80% of the relief in the form of EGS and 20% in the form of GR. However, the proportion of the GR beneficiaries cannot be pre-determined by quotas as 80:20, rather it should be determined by the local demand. In the 2000 targeting guideline discussion, a new concern has emerged on the definition of who is able bodied and who is not. Currently, the intended target group for GR is extended from just disabled-bodied persons'. It includes able-bodied persons who come from 'labor-poor' households because they do not have spare time to participate in EGS.

Box 3.2: Beneficiary Households for GR

- Not able-bodied (children, sick, disabled or handicapped)
- Women more than six months pregnant
- Lactating women in the first six months after childbirth
- Persons who have to care constantly for young children or incapacitated adults
- 'labor-poor' and cannot spare family members to work on EGS.

Source: (DPPC, 2000b)

3.3.3 Targeting General Free Food Distribution (GFFD)

General free food distribution does not require labor-intensive community work to get the aid. Persons both able and unable bodied -but vulnerable to food insecurity- get aid freely. It is given in an area where relief cannot be channeled through EGS. Once the area is identified, food is usually distributed in blanket coverage (distribute to every one in limited area). To avoid disincentive effects to agricultural production and to reduce the dependency syndrome, DPPC encourages household targeting and discourage blanket distribution. 'Blanket' distribution can be used at a kebele level without the authorization of regional and zonal governments, only if extreme and rapid food needs arise. The targeting guidelines can be overruled in such situations for a limited period of time to save lives.

Box 3.3: Circumstances for GFFD

- Shelf projects not ready for EGS implementation
- Most beneficiaries are too weak to participate in EGS due to food shortage over an extended period of time or an epidemic;
- In areas affected by sudden onset disaster, GFFD may be required on a temporary basis until EGS can be implemented.

Source: (DPPC, 2000b)

3.4 Relief Rations

Food aid is given to the beneficiaries either in the form of food or cash to make up their food deficits. Cash aid is given in return to public work at a rate of slightly below other alternative wages in the area. Food is given in return to public work or freely. The WFP follows the minimum calory requirement as a basis for relief rations. The WHO sets 2,100 kcal/day as a minimum calory requirement for an adult/day to lead a healthy life (Sphere Project, 2000). The ration should contain a variety of culturally acceptable (staple food) and easily-prepared foods including energy rich and protein rich foods. To prevent a palatability problem, the food has to be common or pleasant to eat.

In Ethiopia, the revised targeting guidelines suggest EGS, GR and GFFD rations to provide equal or greater than the required 2,100 kcl. The food basket (general ration) is designed to fill the gap between food requirements and food availability from the household's own sources, when combined expected to ensure an intake of minimum daily requirements (DPPC, 2000b). Supplementary food, 'take home' rations (100grams of cereals) are given in addition to general rations to malnourished children, and to pregnant

or lactating women. In many zones, wereda authorities have control over the distribution and the ration. When little resources are allocated to weredas, problems arise between the zonal DPPC representatives and the wereda authorities on setting the household's ration. The wereda often reduces the household rations and spreads it too thinly over too many people. In some weredas, food aid rations tend to be given on a reduced basis to a smaller household size (Mathyas & Emebet, 2000).

3.5 Targeting Efficiency in the Past

Various case studies and cross sectional researches have been done on relief aid targeting in Ethiopia. The 1997 SCF (UK) report gives extensive information on experiences of targeting in Ethiopia. The study focused on the "methods used for beneficiary selection within kebeles, and the perceptions of them by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the communities" (Sharp: 1997:iv). The study covered Wello and Was Hamra, Wolayta, East Tigray, South Tigray, East Hararghe and West Hararghe. The report covers targeting efficiency of various targeting channels under various relief programs. The results are presented here under the title 'targeting channels' and 'targeting for relief programs'.

1. Targeting Channels : Self targeting, community targeting and administrative targeting are exercised in many weredas. In *self targeting*, the wage is meant to be lower than the standard labor market wage to limit the number of participants. But the EGS payments were not consistent with the standard labor market rate; it failed to target the vulnerable and to discourage the non-vulnerable people. It appeared to be either higher than the standard market-labor or much lower. In *administrative targeting,* outsiders have a limited role in many famine-prone areas in terms of setting criteria or selecting

beneficiaries. Administrative targeting takes place only in the case of supplementary feeding by health-care staff to measure the nutritional need. The supervision of local governments or assistance agency on the targeting system has been minimal and determined by their staff capacities. In *community targeting*, community representatives are responsible for beneficiary selections. Assets, dependency ratio and alternative income sources have been used as beneficiary selection factors. But the threshold highly depends on the available resources; resource constraints tighten the threshold and vice versa. In some areas community representatives used age and sex of the head of households as indicator of vulnerability. But the grain market research (1998) found that adult (young) and male headed households had the same food needs as aged and female headed households. The beneficiary selection established a trend those previous years aid recipient households are most likely to be selected now in spite of their current capacity to cope with food shortage. Reluctant officials distribute scant resources thinly to too many people rather than identifying the most needy. This resulted in a 'thin blanket syndrome'. Thus, the 'thin blanket' distribution could not bring a significant relief to their problems. In the case of EGS program instead of limiting the number of participants to the job available, officials reduced the working hours and included large numbers of beneficiaries. In addition to the reluctance to target, some community representatives misused their power and have been involved in corruption.

2. Targeting for relief programs:

Employment Generation Schemes: The allocation of resources after the declaration of EGS activities should be initialized at early stages of the disaster. But failure to allocate resources on time had impeded its success. In some situations, the relief work period also

coincided with the rainy or hunger season which prevented the activities from being implemented.

Gratuitous Relief:- In most areas GR beneficiaries were mis-targeted due to the selection at an individual level rather than at the household level. Unable-individuals (handicapped, pregnant, elderly, the infirm etc.) were selected as beneficiaries in spite of their household capacity to participate in the EGS program. Lower level targeting officials misunderstood the statement of aid usage to be 80% for EGS and the remaining 20% for GR program as a fixed quota of 80:20 ratio to be implemented in micro level regardless of the need.

General Free Food Distribution: The NPDPM stated to give GFFD to save lives when a disaster is overwhelming, people are too weakened to participate in labor-intensive work or when they start to migrate. But the real practice of GFFD does not always adhere to such conditions. Relief has been freely given to some weredas where the beneficiaries are able to participate in labor-intensive works.

In 1998, a study was conducted by the Grain Market Research on targeting efficiencies and determinants of food aid distribution for the 1995-96 agricultural year. Samples of 4,166 farm households were randomly drawn from rural Ethiopia. The study estimated the extent of error of exclusion and error of inclusion using household level food availability. It shows that in Ethiopia the variation between weredas in terms of food security is higher than the variation within the wereda. This means that failure to target the eligible weredas has a high price in terms of wasting resources and creating disincentive effects.

Table 3.2 : **Percentage of weredas Receiving Food Aid by Level of Food Deficiency in Wereda for the 1995 - 1997 season**

Food aid in wereda	low deficit weredas (*0 - 19% of hhs are deficit*)	moderately low deficit weredas (*20 - 41% of hhs are deficit*)	moderately high deficit weredas (*42 - 70% of hhs are deficit*)	high deficit weredas (*71 -100% of hhs are deficit*)	All weredas
weredas not received aid	59.3%	57.6%	59.3%	57.6%	58.5%
weredas received aid	40.7%	42.4%	40.7%	42.4%	41.5%
total	100 % (n=91)	100% (n=92)	100% (n=91)	100% (n=92)	100% (n=366)

Source: Clay et al 1998

The study noticed that the food aid targeting concentrated to the extreme deficit households and to the high food secure households. The high food secure households are politically powerful, therefore, it might be a threat for local authorities to exclude this group. Four factors are identified as principal causes of the high level of targeting error and the resulting low correlation between food insecurity and participation in food programs (Clay et al, 1998).

1. The needy and well-off are both food aid beneficiaries: food aid beneficiary households appeared to be in an extreme position in terms of household food availability. The impact of food aid to the most vulnerable group has been reduced by the flow of aid to food secure households.

2. Over emphasis on women and the aged: women and elderly are used as one of the criteria to indicate vulnerability. Irrespective of their food need, a disproportionate number of female headed and aged headed households received aid. But the study found that household food availability has nothing to do with the age or sex of the household head.

3. Lack of flexibility: "the strongest determinant of food aid receipt is the number of years in the past that households have received food aid" (Clay et al, 1998:27). Food aid flows to the same areas and households as it has always gone. Always considering an area as a chronic drought area, fails to alter its direction to more deficit households in other areas.

4. Regional concentration: Food aid not only flew to non-eligible household but to non-eligible regions too. "Households in the region of Tigray are far more likely to receive food aid, regardless of need, than households in any other region, thereby decreasing targeting efficiency" (Clay et al, 1998:27).

The 2488 project is the largest single food-for-work project in Africa. It is a huge multi-location project implemented by Ministry of Agriculture with World Food Program resources. The project was established in 1976, and still operates through with adjustment on its scope and tittle. In 1985, a socio-economic review was conducted on the project by the Institute of Development Research of Addis Ababa University. The study divided the households into quartile, to check the targeting concentration. "The results showed that 31% of the total food distributed has been received by the poorest 25% of households; 29% by the next group (3rd quartile), 19% by the second quartile, and 21% by the 'richest 25% of the households" (Yeraswork & Solomon, 1985:73). The evaluation of the same project by GTZ in 1993 noticed that those areas, which are inaccessible, were less attractive to the project. Bias to the existing road network was not only a feature of 2488 project. The SCF food economy survey in 1993 by Holt and Lawerence on 160 villages

in the North-east highlands of Ethiopia found that work scheme food aid programs generally had a road-bias (Sharp, 1997).

Self-targeting is not common in Ethiopia. In Merti - Jeji a self targeting was experimented on the work scheme project in 1992. Maxwell and Herbinger conducted a rapid assessment in the same year. The assessment found that 40% of the aid went to households above the local average level of 'wealth'. The poorest households did not participate in the food for work. "They were too busy on share-cropped land; or could not afford to wait one month for payment, or regarded the activity as too risky, or were too ill to participate (Maxwell & Herbinger 1992:20).

In 1995, SCF(UK) reviewed Wello and Wag Hamra food aid targeting. The review concluded that the targeting was not efficient. The major problem was the conflict that arose between wereda and zone. The zone instructed the wereda to reduce the number of beneficiaries by prioritization. But the wereda refused to prioritize. Instead it reduced the ration per person, reduced the number of rations allocated to each household, encouraged registered beneficiary households to share their rations with others, rotated the beneficiaries lists to cover different kebeles and distributed food pre positioned for August and September during June and July (Sharp 1997). The wereda also distributed the aid to unintended group, urban dwellers, without authorization. In spite of the allocation of huge amount of aid to South Wello, the nutritional status of the children deteriorated due to mis-targeting and the thinly distribution of food.

Soham and Borton evaluated the experience of two NGOs (Redd Barna in Bolosso Sore and Concern in Damot Weyde) on free food targeting during the 1984/6 Wolayta famine. The NGOs used anthropometeric measurements of children to target households. Unfortunately, the NGOs were mis-guided. Some households borrowed malnourished children to get a family ration, others dared deliberately to starve their children (Shoham & Borton, 1989).

3.6 Factors that Affected Targeting Efficiency in the Past

Targeting can be efficient if errors are minimized or if its accuracy in reaching the most vulnerable people is maximized. Based on food aid targeting literature, factors that reduced the targeting efficiency are summarized under three categories; mis-use of power, resource constraints and technical failures. In the competition of getting the scarce but valuable resources, a conflict of interests has led to **mis-use** of political power. The political elite intervenes to manipulate the targeting procedures in a way that can fit their personal interests. In 1994 in Welayta and in 1995 in South Wollo, relief aid was used for political electioneering; a guarantee for those who support their local EPRDF candidate (Sharp 1997). Beneficiaries on the other hand complained that the resources are corrupted and abused by wereda/kebele representatives. Recent evidence in Somali Region showed that, 2,057 quintals of food aid which were diverted from the intended aim, had been caught at check points. Some wereda authorities have been involved in assisting the transportation away from its destination to sale in the open market (DPPC News, 2000b).

A **discrepancy** arises when too scant resources are allocated to the distribution site (explained in section 3.5). Zones not always keep the wereda's request, they sometimes lower the quota if exaggeration of need is suspected. Weredas often fail to achieve the targeting goal in trying to spread the scant amount of resources to too many people. Sometimes they are even unable to narrow the targeting group because all seem needy. As a result quota are inadequate to change their situation. Though beneficiary households are selected fairly, they are forced to share the rations among other unregistered households. **Technical failure** often arises in the selection factors and in the threshold (explained in 3.5). Targeting, which excludes others from the benefit rises complaints. The criteria used to identify the food-insecure are often inappropriate indicators. Even with appropriate indicators, the cut-off point can also genuinely deny the most needy from the assistance. Often, the criteria and the threshold point appeared to be unfair and arbitrary.

CHAPTER FOUR:

TARGETING IN ANTSOKIA GEMIZA WEREDA

4.1 Overview of the Amhara Regional State

The study area is located in the central part of the Amhara Regional State. The total population of the region is 16.5 million and 90% of the people are living in rural areas and are engaged in subsistence agricultural activities. The agro-climatic zones are 'dega', 'weindaga' and 'kolla'[5]; the total regional rain fall, ranges from 500 mm to 1400 mm. The rivers Tekeze, Abaya and Angerbe are potential sources of water in the region. But the use of water resources for irrigation and hydropower is minimal. Only 2% of the total area is covered with forest; protected wildlife are the Walia Ibex, Semien Fox and Gelada Baboon. The Amhara region holds 40% of the national livestock population.

Most part of the region has a rugged topography, vulnerable to erosion. The steep lands have been put into use for farming. Farming on land with a slope above 5% enhances land degradation. Forests are cleared to satisfy fuel and construction needs. The cultivable land is intensively farmed for a long period of time, which in return reduced land fertility and agricultural production. The area has 27% cultivated lands and 30% grazing land. The average land holding of the households is 1.7 ha and 94% of the households have insufficient land holding (ANRS, 1997). Even though there is un-utilized cultivable land in the area, malaria and trypansomiasis epidemics prevented penetration of farming activities in those areas. The extremely poor health facilities and few health staff available have not been conducive to treat the problem of health hazard. Currently, the regional five-year development plan has a central theme of 'self-sufficiency'.

[5] 'dega' refers to the highland, 'weinadag' refers to the midland and 'kolla' refers to the low land.

The economy of the rural areas depends on farming and animal husbandry. The different agro-climatic condition of the region enables farmers to grow different types of crops at different times of the year. Cropping is highly dependent on the *meher* and *belg* rain seasons. "Cereals are the most dominant crops grown in the region on the average accounting for at least 74% and 83% of the total cultivated land and grain production respectively" (ANRS, 1997:7). Major crops produced are teff, maize, sorghum, cotton, wheat, oilseeds and barely.

The region is affected by recurrent droughts more often than other regions. The Amhara National Regional State believes the region is a surplus producing area. But the provision of food aid in drought prone zones has developed a dependency syndrome (ANRS, 1997). The dependency syndrome discourages farmers' efforts in improving their agricultural production and encourages them always to wait for external interventions.

The National Early Warning System information on crop and need assessment, estimated 10.5 million people were in need of food aid in 2000. Table 4.1 shows that the Amhara Region had the largest absolute number of vulnerable persons. In percentile, however, the Somali region was the most seriously affected region, 75% of its population needed assistance.

Table 4.1: **Estimated No. of People Needing Food Assistance (Jul - Dec 2000)**

Region	No. of People needing assistance	% of people needing assistance
Tigray	1,717,758	51%
Afar	272,704	24%
Amhara	3,569,820	24%
Oromia	1,942,825	9%
Somali	1,489,660	75%
SNNP	1,410,008	12%
Benshangul Gumuz	4,201	0.8%
Gambela	46,600	23%
Harari	17,187	12%
Dire Dawa	59,199	21%
Total	**10,529,962**	

Source: DPPC News 2000a

4.2 Relief Operation in the Amhara Regional State

The relief operation hierarchy in Amhara regional state is more or less similar to that of other regional states. It follows the political administrative hierarchy. At the regional level, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) is accountable to the regional council but also report to the federal DPPC. It informs the federal DPPC the region's food aid requirement, negotiate on the region's food aid quotas, receive the approved quota and finally report the regional food aid distribution to the federal DPPC. At zonal level, the Zonal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness committee (ZDPPC) is accountable to the Zonal Council but also reports to the regional DPPB. It informs the regional DPPB the zone's food aid requirement, negotiate on the zone's food aid quotas, receive the approved quota and finally report the zonal food aid distribution to the regional DPPB. At wereda level, Wereda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (WDPPC) is accountable to the wereda council but also reports to the ZDPPC. It informs the zonal DPPC the wereda's food aid requirement, negotiate on the wereda's food aid quotas, receive the approved quota and finally report the wereda food aid distribution to the zonal DPPC (DPPC, 2000b).

Figure 4.1 shows the relation between the political administration hierarchy and the relief operation.

Fig. 4.1: **The Relation Between Relief Operation and Government Hierarchy**



Key:

Direct accountability

Reporting/feedback

Targeted Households

Source: DPPC 2000b

4.3 Background of the Study Area

Location

The Amhara region is divided administratively into 11 zones, 105 weredas, and 3051 kebeles. "Fifty nine weredas are drought prone and 40 of them are frequently affected by drought" (ANRS, 1997:3). Antsokia wereda is one of the Amhara region weredas, located in northern Shewa zone at a distance of 350 km from Addis Ababa. It has a total land area of 595 km^2. The wereda center Mekoy is connected by a 12 k.m gravel road to Addis Ababa-Dessie highway; it is surrounded by Oromoia in the north and east, Efratana Gidem wereda in the south and Gishe and Gera Keya wereda in the west (Appendix II).

Population

In the 1994 population and housing census, the wereda had 80438 people with equal proportion of female and male in the population. At present the wereda has a total population of 92920 people in about 17,095 households. Antsokia-Gemiza has 15 kebeles; 13 kebeles are rural and 2 kebeles are towns. The rural areas hold 89% of the population while the urban areas hold 11% of the population. The dependency ratio is 52% of the total population and the average family size is 5.9. The ethnic composition is dominated by Amhara (80%) who dwell in the highlands and who are predominantly Christians; followed by Oromo (20%) who dwell in the lowlands and who are mainly Muslims.

Ecology and Land

The wereda's topography is characterized by flat low lying plains surrounded by steep hills, and also rugged landforms. The lowland (below 1500 meter altitude) holds 45% of

the population. The midland (between 1501 - 2500 meter altitude) holds 44% of the population. The highland (between 2501-3000 meter altitude) holds 11% of the population. Mean annual precipitation of the wereda range between 800 - 1200 mm with mean annual temperature of 20.10^{0}c. The total land area (59501 ha) has different land cover and land use: 37.4% of the land is cultivated land; 40.1% is covered by forest, bush, and unproductive land; 19.7% is unutilized land; and 2.8% is grazing land.

Table 4.2 **Land Coverage in Antsokia Wereda**

Land use/cover	Area coverage in %	Area coverage in ha
Cultivated land	37.4	22,283
annual crops	(36.6)	(21,778)
perennial crops	(0.8)	(506)
Grazing land	2.8	1652
Forest & bush land	9.6	5715
Currently unproductive land	30.5	18125
Currently unutilizable land	19.7	11725
Total	100%	59501

Source: WVE-Antsokia I., 1997.

Economic Situation

The main economic activity of the towns is petty trading. The 13 rural kebeles are engaged in agricultural activities, which suffer from poor farming, poor technology, unpredictable climate, low productivity and environmental degradation. The average land holding per household is decreasing from time to time. "The decline in the production of agricultural yield on the one hand and the rapidly growing population on the other has become a challenge in an endeavor to fight against poverty" (WVE-Antsokia I., 1998:38).

Agriculture

The farmers produce during *belg* and *meher* harvest seasons. The short rainy season *belg* falls between January to mid May and the major rainy season *meher* is between June to September which also has the highest share of the wereda crop production. The high dependency on rain-fed cultivation, small land holding and fragmentation of land holding are the major constraint of the agricultural sector. The average farmland holding is 0.75 ha. per household. *Belg* is the main harvest season for the highland farmers who produce barley, beans and lentils. The midland and the lowland farmers produce sorghum, teff and maize in both seasons. In the crop pattern, cereals comprise 83% of the total cultivated land and 92.8% of production; pulses comprise 15.5% of total cultivated land and 6.7% of production. Table 4.3 shows that the share of major crops in terms of land coverage, yield and total production.

Table 4:3 **Major Crops Production in 1996/97 in Antsokia**

Crop Type	Area Coverage ha.	Yield qt.	Total Production qt/ha
Cereal Crops	15287	170243	11.5 average
teff	7076	67237	9.5
barely	2085	19885	9.5
wheat	1303	10839	10.6
maize	1839	28070	15.3
sorghum	2984	44212	14.8
Pulses	1903	11098	5.8
faba ban	730	4680	6.4
field pea	474	2950	6.2
chick pea	282	1800	6.3
lentils	417	1668	4
Oil seed	236	1057	4.47
----	2	8	4.0
linseed	164	654	3.9
sunflower	5	15	3.0
seane	65	380	3.8
Total	17426	18239	21.44

Source: WVE-Antsokia I., 1997.

The wereda's economy is characterized by subsistence agriculture and lack of diversified income sources. Off-farm activities are minimal in Antsokia-Gemiza wereda, only 10% of the total population is engaged in activities such as petty trade, bamboo crafts, tannery, blacksmith, and weaving.

Status of Food Security

A base line survey conducted in 1995 by WVE-ADP shows that 75.1% of the wereda farmers do not fulfill their food requirement from their own produce. They run out of food stock before the next harvest season. The wereda food balance in the 1994/95 - 1997/98 indicates that the average food availability from production was 98621 qt.. The average food supply in these years raised to 103213 qt. including other sources of food including food aid. The wereda food demand during these years was 172366 qt., which means there was a deficit of 69744 qt.. "It is mysterious how humans can survive..." (WVE-Antsokia I, 1998:17).

The farmers have their own coping mechanism, they earn money from other than subsistence crops. In 1995/96, the wereda farmers source of income apart from crops production were: sales of cash crops birr 942,896, sales of vegetables & fruits birr 234,706, sales of honey birr 114,498, sales of fuel wood birr 26550, others birr 656,213 and total of birr 1,974,863 gained from the sales. The earnings enabled the farmers to purchase food from the market. The income earned can purchase 7899.5 quintals of food from Mekoy and Majete towns at a cost of birr 250/qt (WVE-Antsokia I, 1998).

The goal and purpose of WVE-Antsokia I is to enhance food security at household level and the project has focused on increasing agricultural production and improving access to food. However, the farmers' food requirement is also filled by relief. In 1984 - 85 when 15 - 20 people died everyday, 68,000 people got relief aid, including wet feeding, medical assistance, grain, supplementary food and clothing (WVE-Antsokia I, 2000). Food aid resources, since the end of 1990s, served as a tool to implement development activities by linking relief and development.

Table 4.4: **Food Aid in Antsokia (1998 -1999)**

Year in E.C	Beneficiaries	Cereals in quintal	Supplementary feeding
1998	10,735	8,051.25	-
1999	25,380	9,908	1,525 litter oil

Source: Field Survey 2001 (Interview with the wereda council)

4.4 Relief 2000 in Antsokia-Gemiza

In Antsokia, the wereda DPPC committee along with experts of the wereda and kebele representatives regularly assesses crop performances. In the pre-harvest season, for early warning purposes each kebele's crop production is estimated. At the end of 1999, experts from the wereda Agriculture Office with kebele representatives estimated the crop production for the year 2000. Each kebele crop performance was estimated by direct measures of the crop production minus factors that can determine crop production such as climate, pests, and availability of inputs. The expected net crop production of each kebele is then divided by the kebele total population to calculate the per capita production. Thereupon, the estimated per capita production was compared with individual annual food consumption. Ethiopian Nutrition Institute (ENI) estimated 225 k.g or 2.25 qt.

(equivalent to wheat) annual food consumption per individual. But in the study area 200 k.g. of cereal was used as the average individual annual food consumption. The wereda DPPC reported to the zonal DPPC those kebeles where the per capita food production was below 200 k.g. as food deficit kebeles. It requested aid for 30,896 beneficiaries.

There is no consensus on the wereda food security between DPPC and the wereda officials. The federal DPPC argues that Antsokia is a food secure wereda, but the wereda officials argue that the wereda is food insecure. On that account, the north shewa zone DPPC approved aid assistance only for 12,633 beneficiaries and rejected the 'exaggerated' food request for additional 18,263 beneficiaries.

The approved number of beneficiaries were assisted by government and an NGO, World Vision Ethiopia. WVE with the support of Germany, UK, Australia, Canada and USA WVI offices covered 50% of the relief distribution. The remaining 50% was distributed by government. The relief was given in the form of EGS, GR and GFFD. On top of these, WVE distributed supplementary feeding for malnourished children.

Failure of *belg* rain for 1998 and 1999[6] and excessive rain in the 1999 *meher* seasons declined the agricultural production of the wereda. The wereda 2000 relief aid distribution addressed drought affected people due to crop failure in three consecutive harvests; failure of the 1998 *belg*, the 1999 *meher* and the 1999 *belg*. The 1998 *Belg* performance showed that 21,000 beneficiaries needed food aid, in 1992 *Meher* 7,399 and in 1999 *belg* 12,633 beneficiaries. Thus, the ZDPPC approved victims of 1998 and 1999

[6] belg 1991 E.C. = belg 1998, belg 1992 E.C. = belg 1999, meher 1992 E.C.= meher 1999

crop failures to be assisted for eight consecutive months in the 2000 relief. In each month the relief food was transported from Kombolcha, one of the central warehouses, to the wereda warehouse. The WDPPC stored the relief in WVE's warehouse and some in rented private houses. The adjacent wereda, Gisherable wereda also stored its relief in Antsokia wereda's warehouses. The number of beneficiaries varied from month to month depending on the resources allocated to the wereda. According to the wereda council, on average 18417 beneficiaries were assisted during the 2000 relief distribution.

Table 4.5: **Relief Beneficiaries for the 2000 Assistance**

Month	Beneficiaries	Cereals in quintals
January	34520	4315
May	9720	1215
June	23328	2916
August	1168	146
October	2820	352.5
November	27660	3457.5
December	29704	3713

Source: Field Survey 2001 (Interview with the wereda council)

There are 15 kebele administrations in the wereda and 13 of them received the aid. The two towns, Mekoy and Majete, did not receive aid but served as distribution sites or 'tabia'. In Mekoy, 11,712.5 quintal and in Majete, 4402.2 quintal cereals (wheat and maize) were located. From Mekoy distribution site, on average 3504 beneficiaries per month received free food aid and 9527 beneficiaries per month received aid in return to public work. From Majete distribution site, on average 1242 beneficiaries per month received free food aid and 4969 beneficiaries per month received aid in return to public works. The ration was 12.5 k.g cereals per person per month. Family sizes up to 5 received this ration per month, but family members beyond 5 were not counted.

Table 4.6: **Average Number of Beneficiaries per Month in the Wereda**

Forms of Aid	Beneficiaries	Cereals in Qt.
EGS	14,496	1812
GFFD/GR	4,746	593.25

Source: Field Survey 2001 (Interview with the wereda - ORDA)

A high proportion of the relief was distributed in return for community work (Table 4.6). Community work is implemented through shelf projects which are prepared during normal times. The projects include labor-intensive activities as part of long-term development plans to be implemented when resources are available. The wereda Agriculture Office already had such shelf projects when the disaster strike. On that account, it handled the overall wereda EGS activities. A total of 15,670 beneficiaries participated in the work scheme. Each participating household was represented by one person to work eight days per month.

Table 4.7: **Asset Created Through EGS Program in 2000**

Activities	Performance	Participants		
		Male	Female	Total
farm terrace	22.351 k.m	2082	891	2973
soil bund	4.743 k.m	233	99	332
stone bund	17.608 k.m	1849	792	2641
hill side terrace	11.1 k.m	1166	499	1665
terrace maintenance	4.125 k.m	43	19	62
check dam construction	0.84 k.m	588	252	840
check dam maintenance	0.9 k.m	126	54	180
pitting	9.3973 ha.	3289	1409	4698
feeder road construction	2 k.m	318	136	454
feeder road maintenance	1 k.m	87	38	125
cut off drain	2.25 k.m	630	270	900
irrigation cannel	2 k.m	560	240	800

Source: Field Survey 2001 (Interview with the wereda Agriculture Office)

4.5 Characteristics of the Sampled Households (Mekdesa, Atiko and Gishoghe)

The ethnic composition is dominated by Amhara 98% and followed by Oromo 2%; 60% of the population are Christians and 40% are Muslims. The majority of the households are male headed (88%) and few are female-headed (12%). Almost every child in each household goes to school but many of the heads did not get that chance; 58% of the head of households are illiterate and 35% are able to write and read. The age of the head of households ranges from 23 to 88 years. Out of the respondents 95% are farmers, 2% are potters, 2% are local brewers and 1% are weavers.

(a) Household asset

Observable asset ownership including the building and the compound plus household furniture was used to compare households. Three categories were identified, i.e. good, average or poor. The comparison was made on the subjective judgment of the data collectors; each household's living condition was compared with other households in the villages.

Table 4.8: **Living Condition's of the Sampled Households**

Category	good	average	poor	Total
Included	7%	29%	24%	60% (n=60)
Excluded	13%	26%	1%	40% (n=40
Total	20% (n=20)	55% (n=55)	25% (n=25)	100% (n=100)

Source: Field Survey 2001

In most rural areas, the house roofing material can be an indicators of the household's wealth. 'Wealthy' people construct their houses using corrugated iron; it is costly. 'Poor' people use grass because it is cheaply available in the surrounding. But this cannot be

used as a wealth indicator in all conditions. When conflict arises between two groups in rural villages, burning of houses is often used as a weapon to punish enemies. If households are involved in such conflicts, they build their houses using mud and corrugated iron to reduce the damage. In spite of that, most of the houses in the surveyed area were constructed using grass.

Table 4.9: **Roof Materials of the Sampled Households**

Category	Corrugated Iron	Grass	Total
Included	5%	55%	60% (n=60)
Excluded	13%	27%	40% (n=40)
Total	18% (n=18)	82% (n=82)	100% (n=100)

Source: Field Survey 2001

Ninety five percent of the households own land[7] and five percent do not own land. The households' land size ranges from 0.1 - 2.7 hectares. Some of the households' land is fragmented into four plots. Respondents ranked the quality of their plots in the following manner (Table 4.10). Many of the plots in the three kebeles are fertile and few of the plots are infertile. In Gishoghe due to its steep feature of the land arable land is fragmented in to many pieces.

Table 4.10: **Fertility of Plots in the Sampled Kebeles**

Kebele		Fertile	Moderate	Infertile	Total
Gishoghe :	included	28	29	2	79
	excluded	6	13		
Atiko :	included	10	7	1	45
	excluded	18	9		
Mekdesa:	included	14	15		69
	excluded	18	14	1	

Source: Field survey 2001

[7] They owned the land: 70% since the 1974 land proclamation, 20% since the 1992/93 land re-distribution, and 10% inherited (field survey 2001).

In Antsokia, as in many weredas in Ethiopia, households livestock holding is given more weight in measuring wealth. In the sampled households, ownership of pack-animals (donkeys, mules, horse) is less important compared to cattle and productive livestock (cow, calf, ox, bull, goat, sheep and chicken). In Table 4.11, the households livestock holding shows there is minimal animal husbandry in the area.

Table 4.11 **Livestock Ownership by Sampled Households**

Livestock	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. dev.
chicken	0	12	1.24	1.95
cows	0	3	0.52	0.72
calves	0	2	0.33	0.53
bulls	0	2	0.2	0.43
oxen	0	4	0.96	0.89
sheep	0	13	0.61	1.70
goat	0	6	0.4	1.09
donkey	0	4	0.4	1.09
mules	0	1	0.02	.14
beehives	0	3	0.08	0.39

Source: Field Survey 2001

(b) Agricultural production

Agriculture is the major economic activity of the community, off-farm activities are almost negligible. Subsistence agricultural activities are the most common occupations of the households. Dependency on rain-fed cultivation and a lack of diversified income sources have affected household food insecurity.

Major food sources of the households are crop production, animal products and products bought from local markets. In Gishoghe, where food aid is given regularly, food aid is also one of the major sources of food. Crop production stands first as the major source of food and source of income. The food insecurity increases when the poor rural dwellers

become more dependent on the market for their food. If they are farther away from direct food cultivation, they suffer more than the rural farmers. The direct producers of food are safer than those who have to go to the market to convert resources into actual consumption.

The household food availability, since they highly depend on their crop production, fluctuates during pre and post harvest seasons. In lean seasons, between June - September, they eat a minimum amount of food on average twice a day. In good seasons, between November - February, they eat three times a day on average.

Table 4.12: **Household's Average Number of Meal per day in Good/ Bad Seasons**

Average meals per day	Gishoghe		Atiko		Mekdesa	
HH. ⇒	Inclu.	exclu.	inclu.	exclu.	inclu.	exclu.
In good season	3	3	2.7	3	3.1	3.2
In bad season	2	2	1.9	2	2	1.9

Source: Field Survey 2001

Application of better agricultural technology can directly improve food security for farmers. But in Antsokia, use of modern technology and agricultural inputs are minimal due to financial constraint and misconceptions. Some farmers who owned swampy plot resisted to use fertilizer, they commented that the fertilizer would burn their land. Table 4.13 shows agricultural inputs in the society is not widely applied; among the sampled 100 households, only 56 (56%) of the households apply agricultural inputs.

Table: 4.13 **Households Applying Agricultural Inputs in the Sampled HHs**

Agricultural Inputs	Gishoghe	Atiko	Mekdesa	Total
Fertilizer	6%	3%	8%	17% (n=17)
Improved seed	2%	5%	2%	9% (n=9)
Manure	13%	10%	4%	27% (n=27)
Pesticides	-	1%	2%	3% (n=3)
Total	21% (n=21)	19% (n=19)	16% (n=16)	56% (n=56)

Source: Field Survey 2001

(c) Off-farm Income

Rural towns serve as marketing centers for their hinterlands. Rural towns export rural products to others and also supply imported products to their hinterlands. Integrated market systems could make local food markets more robust and reliable. But in Antsokia, the local market is not integrated with others. First of all the farmers' subsistence products were not sufficient for export purposes. Secondly, the poor road network forced the products to remain within the wereda; the poor roads make marketing too costly. So it discouraged off-farm activities. The wereda's non-agricultural activities are performed mainly in the two rural towns, Majete and Mekoy. Farming is the main source of income and food for the rural areas, diversified source of income is minimal. On average, households with off-farm income earn birr 22 per month from handicrafts, petty trade, daily labor and remittance. Table 4.14 shows 63% of the sampled households have off-farm income. Most of the households, with off-farm income, are concentrated in Gishoghe kebele.

4.14 **Concentration of Households Having Off-farm Activities by Kebeles**

Gishoghe	Atiko	Mekdesa	Total
28%	18%	17%	63% (n=63)

Source: Field survey 2001

(d) Causes of Food Insecurity

In spite of the food assistance, DPPC now acknowledges Antsokia as one of the food secure weredas in the Amhara region. During the 1980s famine, 15-20 people were dying per day in the wereda. WVE, with its goal 'enhancing households food security', has some what improved the wereda food security. However, the environmental degradation resulting from previous droughts has still impact on the current crop performance.

In general, the wereda faces food shortages due to erratic rainfall. The wereda DPPC announced that the 2000 *belg* harvest was a 100% failure. The field survey also testified that the complete stoppage of the *belg* rain terminated the harvest to almost nil production. But the current *meher* harvest (2001 production) is better than the previous meher harvest (2000). The individual households faced food insecurity because of many reasons. The respondents ranked the first three main causes of food insecurity to their households. Reduction of crop performance and erratic rainfall are marked as the major causes of households' food insecurity among the sampled households. Table 4.15 also shows that there is an awareness on the negative effects of family size on household food security.

Table 4.15: **Causes of Household Food Insecurity (N=100)**

Causes of HH food insecurity	Rank 1st	Rank 2nd	Rank 3rd
reduction of crop performance	78 %	13 %	2 %
reduction of income	3 %	8 %	11 %
absence of food in the market	-	-	2 %
increase of cereal price in the market	1 %	3 %	14 %
erratic rain fall	13 %	53 %	19 %
increase of family size	-	4 %	19 %

Source: Field Survey 2001

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Source: Field Survey 2001

(e) Coping Mechanism

The coping mechanism of households during the food shock varies depending on the extent of the food crisis. The coping mechanism in the area tells that there is transitory food insecurity. Transitory food insecurity is temporary or cyclical food crisis that occurs for a limited period of time. In such situation, the coping mechanism could be categorized as insurance response, i.e. crop and livestock adjustment, diet change, famine food use, grain loans from relatives/ friends, migration and small stock sale. But if there is chronic food insecurity, the coping mechanism could be categorized as final response. i.e. disposal of productive asset, farm land sale and out migration (Thomson & Mete, 1997). Chronic food insecurity is a continuously inadequate diet caused by inability of households to acquire food. The households' response in the survey to the food shock does not indicate destitution. Many of the households reduce number of meals per day and amount of food per meal as coping mechanisms. The following table shows coping mechanism of the households, each household can have more than one coping mechanism.

Table 4.16 **Coping Mechanism of the Sampled Households**

Coping Mechanism	**Gishoghe**		**Atiko**		**Mekdesa**	
HH. ⇒	Incl.	Excl.	Incl.	Excl.	Incl.	Excl.
reduce number of meals / day	30	10	12	15	15	14
reduce amount of food /meal	30	10	12	15	14	14
sale productive livestock	8	4	2	8	5	6
borrowing money to buy food	1	0	4	2	0	2
migrate to look for work	0	1	2	0	0	0
migrate to beg for food	2	0	3	0	0	0
participate in EGS/FFW	0	0	4	0	6	2
sale assets	0	0	0	0	2	0
wait for food aid	2	0	1	0	0	0
work on daily labor	0	2	1	0	2	0
change cropping pattern	0	0	1	2	0	1

Source: Field Survey 2001

4.6 **Targeting Methods** (research question 1)

In relief distribution, the common targeting methods are self-targeting, community targeting and administrative targeting. In Antsokia wereda, the targeting used a combined administrative-community targeting mechanism to select beneficiary households. Self-targeting could not be used because of scarcity of alternative employment opportunities compared to the overwhelming number of people who wanted to participate. This combined administrative-community targeting system is suggested by the targeting guidelines in the Ethiopian context. The combination of the two methods is meant to complement each other. For instance, lack of baseline data and lack of administrative capacity to monitor the selection to be covered by the community targeting. The subjective selection of the community should also be balanced by the administrative standardized targeting indicators. Community targeting exploits the personal knowledge about the members. But the risk is that the community representatives are elite who do not prioritize the interest of the poorest, but instead divert the benefits of the poorest to their families and friends.

In Antsokia, household targeting took place in three steps (i) wereda administration, line offices and WVE at wereda level (ii) *mengistawe buden*[8] at kebele level and (iii) community meeting at community level. The administrative targeting was implemented at wereda level by a committee composed of individuals represented from various line offices and community: WVE-Area Development Project, wereda Agriculture Office, wereda Health Office, wereda of Education Office, kebele and 'mengistawe buden'. The

[8] the lowest local administration in rural areas

administrative targeting made crucial decisions on quota, selection factors, threshold, and on the form of relief. The number of beneficiaries in each kebele was determined by the extent of its crop failure. The community targeting involved community representatives, _kebele and mengistawe buden_ and the community as a whole. The community's representatives did the actual targeting, decided which households should receive and which should be excluded from food aid. The targeting system followed the same procedure for all forms of relief.

The number of beneficiaries varied from kebele to kebele, likewise, from village to village, depending on their crop performances. Each mengistawe buden in the kebele, which administers 50 households, listed down their vulnerable members with respect to the pre-set quota and presented the list to their kebeles. The thirteen kebeles' representatives, then, submitted the lists to the wereda committee for approval. The eligibility of households on the list were not taken entirely on the trust of kebele representatives and mengistawe buden. The wereda targeting committee called the community to discuss the list. The lists were implemented with minor corrections(explained in section 5.2).

4.7 **Selection Factors** (research question 2)

The wereda administrative committee decided that the eligibility indicator would be asset ownership. The administrative targeting instructs the 2nd level targeting officials (community representatives) to register all households in 'form number 08'. These forms requested the size of household, members by sex, and head of household by age and sex. Using their best knowledge about members of the community, the administrative

targeting instructed community representatives to classify the community into:

- 1st group: most needy households, without ox or livestock and without land
- 2nd group: vulnerable households, with one ox, sheep or goat with small land
- 3rd group: non-vulnerable households with adequate asset ownership

The kebele representatives and the mengistawe buden categorized the registered households into three groups. In principle, the administrative targeting committee accepted group 1 and partially group 2 based on the resource available to be targeted. In the 2nd level targeting stage the mengistawe buden, that operated directly under the kebele office in the relief operation of the wereda did the major and actual beneficiary selection. They used in many of the kebeles livestock ownership as a selection factor and in rare cases (when the wereda received more resources) household size to distinguish eligible households. Households with no oxen or one ox and households with a large family size were assumed to be vulnerable. Beneficiary households for GFFD were selected by area targeting, not on an individual household case. All beneficiary households in the two highland kebeles received aid in the form of GFFD. In the lowlands and the middle lands aid beneficiary households received the aid either in the form of EGS or GR. Once the beneficiary households were selected using the local selection factor in EGS kebeles, then it was decided which households to get the aid in return to labor and which households to get freely. The GR beneficiaries were households headed by unable-bodied persons. The GR beneficiaries were mainly aged headed and female headed households.

In the sampled three kebeles, aid was distributed in the form of EGS, GR and GFFD. In Mekdesa and Atiko beneficiaries received aid in the form of EGS and GR, in Gishoghe beneficiaries received aid in the form of GFFD. In these three kebeles, the mengistawe budens used ox ownership as the vulnerability indicator. In the 1st group they included households with no ox, in the 2nd group included households with one ox and in the 3rd group included households with two or more oxen.

The main issue here is whether oxen ownership can be an appropriate indicator. Targeting is not costless but targeting using only oxen ownership makes it less costly. Oxen ownership is an observable indicator that can be easily and quickly measured. However, a single indicator, particularly oxen holding is an inefficient selection criterion. It cannot measure households' food security directly or indirectly, though it can be used as a proxy indicator along with other variables. The use of oxen ownership can 'drop-out' food vulnerable people or 'leak-in' non-vulnerable people. Households with no ox can own other productive livestock, have off-farm income, own fertile land, produce crops, have labor and so on. On the other hand, households can own more oxen (to be eligible) but loose all or many of the above assets. Such practice encourages ox-holding households to sell their oxen which then increases vulnerability to future insecurity.

4.8 Impacts of the 2000 Food Aid

Food aid is given to enhance household food security either through direct intervention or indirect intervention. It can be evaluated from its contribution to avoid starvation, improve nutritional intake, protect assets, improve physical access to food and stabilize markets. Evaluation of impact of food aid on Antsokia is not the aim of the study,

nevertheless, the rapid assessment shows that it had negligible effects on local production and local market prices.

Usage and ration of relief show variation among the sampled kebeles. Gishoghe kebele received 63.6% of the total ration freely, Atiko received 23.3% and Mekdesa received 13.1% of the total relief ration through work schemes. Aid recipient households in Gishoghe received aid for at least six consecutive months. According to the respondents, food aid had filled their food need to a great extent; they were all grateful about the relief assistance. Food aid in this kebele had a great impact on the households' food availability. In Atiko and Mekdesa, the households received aid on average for five consecutive months. These two kebeles' sampled households received 36.4% of the total sampled households' relief. The impact of food aid on the households' food availability was minimal compared to the Gishoghe's. Though the respondents complained about the insignificance of relief on their food requirement, they were happy about the assets created through the EGS program. The work of EGS was perfectly timed and they believed that the assets would enhance their agricultural activities.

According to the respondents of the three kebeles, they used food aid ration only for consumption purpose. If food aid is transferred to households with effective demand, then there would be no local market distortion and production disincentives. The crop production between 2000 *meher* (before the aid was distributed) and 2001 *meher* (after aid was distributed) shows a great variation. The local production improved in 2001 which means the disincentive impact of food aid on domestic production was negligible.

The following table shows the comparison total crop production in the two years, i.e. sorghum, maize, teff, barely and lentils.

Table 4:17 **Total Crop production in the Sampled Kebeles**

Crop production	Gishoghe		Atiko		Mekdesa	
	included	excluded	included	excluded	included	excluded
2000 'meher'	260 k.g.	320 k.g.	333.6 k.g	536.7 k.g.	580 k.g.	633.3 k.g.
2001 'meher'	340 k.g.	362.5 k.g.	316.7 k.g.	783.3 k.g.	490 k.g.	727.13 k.g

Source: Field Survey 2001

The weekly market survey conducted by WVE-ADP on average market prices on major crops and livestock in 1999 and in 2000. The result shows that food aid (in 2000) had insignificant impact on the local prices. The fluctuation of prices in the sampled months in 1999 and 2000 had to do with the agricultural production rather than with the availability of food aid. Normally after September, crop availability increases in the market because farmers release their *meher* products in to the market. The price trend decreased in both 1999 and 2000 during post harvest seasons. Increase in livestock price indicates a better food availability in the market. The farmers demand the livestock for farming activities. An increase in livestock prices indicates better food availability in the market. In the slack period of cultivation (September - October) the price of livestock slightly declined, which again and reversed in Nov. The increase in the livestock price indicated that the food situation improved in the area. During the post harvest seasons the crop price decreased. In pre-harvest seasons, farmers sold more animals and less crop. This is a factor which also increased crop prices and affected the price of livestock negatively (WVE-ADP 2000).

CHAPTER FIVE:

FINDINGS ON THE TARGETING EFFICIENCY

The wereda council chairman considers misguided selection criteria as the major constraint to the wereda targeting efficiency. The criteria used to categorize households varied from village to village and from kebele to kebele. The beneficiary households were not equal in terms of vulnerability status, eligible households in one area could not be eligible in other areas.

According to the wereda ORDA representative, the wereda major targeting efficiency constraint is resource discrepancy. In 2000 relief distribution, in the first place the resource allocated to wereda was not sufficient. Secondly, even the approved amount of and duration of assistance was not implemented. The amount of resources drawn from the Kombolcha warehouse fluctuated from month to month; in addition, there was a delay of resources allocation. The wereda did not get its September relief ration at all (wereda ORDA office). The unpredictability of resource allocation directly affected the targeting systems.

The household respondents had different perceptions on the efficiency of relief targeting. Some respondents could not even see the necessity of targeting at all. They argued that erratic rainfall has affected all households' crop production equally. Relief should be given in blanket distribution form without discrimination. Others acknowledged the usefulness of targeting, but their concern was on appropriate practices of the targeting. Heads of included households were inclined to favor the targeting practices, of course with some exceptions. On the contrary, heads of excluded households' complained that

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the targeting was not fair due to nepotism and favoritism. Still both groups agree that the most vulnerable households had been targeted. But the controversy was on the 'leakage' that better off households were included in the assistance. Only 5% of the respondents understood the selection factor was oxen ownership. The included/excluded households have their own perception why their households were defined as eligible/ineligible for food aid: 39% thought the selection factor was aggregate indicators, 24% thought it was a crop production, 17% just discrimination, 6% family size, 3% land ownership, 3% disabilities and 3% did not know what the selection factor was.

Among the previous targeting practices (explained in chap. 3) some are still the characteristics of the Antsokia wereda targeting practices. The study has found that some of the previous weaknesses are by no means history. The Grain Market Research of 1998 shows that there were misguided selection criteria in many drought affected areas; the targeting favored female headed households (FHHHs) and aged headed households (AHHHs).

In Antsokia wereda, many of the households are male headed; in the same way many of the sampled households appeared to be male headed. Among the sampled 100 households, 88 (88%) of them were male headed and 12 (12%) of the households were female headed. There was no special criterion in targeting to female headed households, however, the effects show they were favored. Out of the 12 FHHHs, 10 of the households were targeted; while out of the 88 of MHHHs 50 were targeted (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 **Association of Sex of HHHs with Aid Distribution**

Households	Female HHHs	Male HHHs	total
Included	10 %	50 %	60 % (n=60)
Excluded	2 %	38 %	40 % (n=40)
Total	12 % (n=12)	88 % (n=88)	100 % (n=100)

Source: Field survey 2001

Aged headed households (AHHHs), as female headed households, was not used as a screening criterion, however, the effects show that they were favored. The young and the old age group are disproportionately represented in the targeting. Out of the 18% of the youngest age group 13% of them were included and also out of the 11% of the oldest age group 9% were included (Table 5.2). AHHHs and FHHHs have two common features; firstly, the targeting criteria did not favored them but the effect shows they were disproportionately included; secondly the gratuitous relief given entirely for female headed and aged headed households.

Table 5.2 **Association of Age of HHHs with Aid Distribution**

Household	Age of Head of Households				total
	21 - 35	36 - 50	51 - 65	66 - 88	
Included	13 %	19 %	19 %	9 %	60 % (n=60)
Excluded	5 %	14 %	19 %	2 %	40 % (n=40)
total	18 % (n=18)	33 % (n=33)	38 % (n=38)	11 % (n=11)	100%(n=100)

Source: Field survey 2001

The grain market research also found that the national targeting system has established a pattern; previous years aid recipients tended to be also beneficiaries in the following years (Clay et al, 1997). Table 5.3 shows that the number of beneficiaries increased over the past five years; and also previous years aid recipient are most likely to be targeted in the following years. In Gishoghe where aid was given in the form of GFFD, the targeting has followed the previous years targeting trends. For instance, out of the 29 beneficiary

households in 1999 relief, 24 of the same households have been recipient since 1995. But in Mekdesa and Atiko, where aid was given in the form of EGS, has not established a trend. Because in these kebeles, aid was not given in regular form during the past years.

Table 5:3 **Previous Years Food Aid Distribution**

Year	Gishoghe		Atiko		Mekdesa	
HH ⇒	Incl.	Excl.	Incl.	Excl.	Incl.	Excl.
1995	24	-	3	-	0	-
1996	28	-	3	-	0	-
1997	29	-	4	-	2	-
1998	29	-	10	-	6	-
1999	29	-	14	5	10	4

Source: Field survey 2001

Literature also shows that work schemes targeting was affected by household distance from main road. There was a concentration of work scheme targeting on proximity of households to the existing road network (GTZ, 1993, & SCF(UK), 1993). Also in Antsokia, the EGS program was road biased. Gishoghe kebele is inaccessible to the wereda town where the government line offices, including Bureau of Agriculture, NGO and the wereda DPPC are located. There have been no work schemes in the kebele, beneficiaries were assisted through free distribution.

The 1997 Kay Sharp (1997) study shows that households near to the kebele offices were more privileged for targeting than households at more distant. But this study on Antsokia wereda shows that inclusion or exclusion of households had nothing to do with the distance either from the main road, kebele office or distribution sites. Head of households traveled from 5 minutes up to four hours to get the aid. Table 5.4 shows distance of households' location from the main road, kebele offices and the distribution sites.

Table 5:4 **Households Location Vs Households Inclusion/Exclusion**

	Household Average Distance		
Category	Main road	Kebele office	Distribution site
Included HHs	0.23 hour	1.50 hours	1.40 hour
Excluded HHs	0.20 hour	1.30 hour	1.50 hour

Source: Field Survey 2001

5.1 Empirical Results of the Targeting Efficiency (research question 3)

Targeting efficiency cannot be judged from a perfectionist view. "Perfect targeting is an impossible ideal" (Devereux, 2000:1). Nevertheless, the targeting errors should be reduced to an acceptable level. The research from subjective judgment, accepts 10% error, 5% inclusion and 5% exclusion error. The two pair of errors measured in this study are benefit incidence (error of inclusion and error of exclusion) and benefit level (error of under supply and error of over supply).

5.1.1 Accuracy of the 'Benefit Incidence'

The targeting accuracy of benefit incidence was evaluated against two factors: using the wereda's selection factor and using the researcher's selection factor. The former was evaluated to estimate to what extent the wereda followed its own selection criteria. The wereda used oxen ownership and in rare cases family size as selection factors. The latter evaluation was conducted to estimate how the actual beneficiaries deviated from the 'ideal' beneficiaries set by the researcher. The researcher selected economic vulnerability indicator as a better criterion to target eligible people.

(A) Evaluation Based on the Local Selection Factor

Household's oxen ownership was used in the sampled kebeles to select eligible beneficiaries. The common problem of community targeting is setting a threshold for the selection factor. The same problem occurred in Antsokia. Eligibility of households with one ox is conditional; 'eligible' if the wereda gets adequate food resources, and 'ineligible' if there is a food aid constraint in the wereda. Therefore, eligible households in one month may not be eligible in the next month. The first evaluation, using the local criterion, demonstrated that there was a minor inclusion and exclusion error. Households with no ox were defined as 'eligible' for food aid. But 6% of the 'eligible' households did not get aid. Households with two or more oxen were defined as 'non-eligible' for food aid. But 8% of the 'non-eligible' households received food aid. Households with one ox holding could not be rightfully defined as 'eligible' or 'ineligible'. A total of 38% of the sampled households own one ox. However, 23% of them were included and 15% of them were excluded (Table 5.5). A total of 14% (6% exclusion and 8% inclusion) errors occurred in the community targeting; this level of errors cannot be acceptable.

Table 5:5 **Oxen Ownership of the Sampled Households**

HHs oxen ownership	Included	Excluded	Total
0	29%	6%	35%
1	23%	15%	38%
2	8%	17%	25%
4	-	2%	2%

Source: Field Survey 2001

(B). Evaluation based on the Economic Selection Factor

The second evaluation was conducted using economic vulnerability indicators. Dependency ratio, 1999 crop production, oxen ownership, land size, productive livestock

ownership, and off-farm income were used with equal weight as indicating variables. Tropical Livestock Unit[9] was used to calculate cattle and productive livestock ownership (UNECA/FAO, 1995). In the southern part of Ethiopia where the agricultural system is very labor-intensive, households with smaller number of family members seem to be more vulnerable and less advantageous to take other income-generating opportunities. But in Antsokia the agricultural system and lack of off-farm activities make households with large family size more vulnerable. Family size and dependency ratio of the sampled households has r=0.969, which means there is a strong association. Thus, instead of using both variables, dependency ratio is used in the economic analysis. Each indicator converted into a standard scale, the 'Z-score':

$$\text{Z score} = \frac{\text{observation 'a' - average for all observation}}{\text{standard deviation for all observation}}$$

Table 5:6 **Economic Status of the Sampled Households**

Variables	mean	std. deviation
productive livestock (in TLU)	0.22	0.29
Oxen	0.96	0.88
land size in hectare	0.90	0.80
1999 crop production in k.g	421.8416	254.94
family size	5.85	2.30
dependency ratio	1.11	0.99
off-farm income in birr	21.54	26.70

Source: Field Survey 2001

[9] One TLU = 250 live weight, therefore 1 camel = 1TLU, 1 horse = 0.8 TLU, 1 Cattle = 0.7 TLU, 1 mule = 0.7 TLU, 1 ass = 0.5 TLU and 1 sheep/goat = 0.1 TLU.

According to wereda ORDA representative, on average 19,242 beneficiaries received aid per month; beneficiaries were selected from the 13 rural kebeles. There are estimated 80000 people in these kebeles, and 19,242 beneficiaries means about 1/4 of the total population was assisted during 2000 relief aid. On that account, the aggregated economic indicator variables were used to categorize households into four in descending order of economic vulnerability; 'most vulnerable', 'vulnerable', 'less-vulnerable' and 'food secure' households. The assumption is that the assisted population (1/4 of the total population) should fall to the 'most-vulnerable' group.

Table 5.7 shows that each vulnerable group is represented in the targeting, the households were selected from all 'wealth' groups. But the number of included households reduced in each category as the level of food security increase. In a similar way, the number of excluded households increased as the level of food security improve. Depending on the availability of resource the eligible group can be stretched from 'most vulnerable' up to the 'vulnerable' group. At the first 25% of economic status contains 17.5% of the targeted households; the second 25% contains 16.5% of the targeted households.

Table 5:7 **Targeting Concentration by Level of Vulnerability**

Vulnerability	Z-score	Included	Excluded	total %
most vulnerable	-6.32 - -1.53	17.5%	7.5%	25%
vulnerable	-1.50 - 0.42	16.25%	8.75%	25%
less vulnerable	0.46 - 1.92	11.25%	13.75%	25%
food secure	1.94 - 8.91	5%	20%	25%
total		50%	50%	100%

Source: Field Survey 2001

The shaded figures show the households which should be included and should be excluded in the assumption that most vulnerable and the vulnerable are 'eligible' for food aid. Among the included 50% of the household, the first two groups 33.75% (17.5% + 16.25%) are accurately targeted; and among the excluded 50% of the households, the last two groups 33.75 (13.75 + 20%) are accurately excluded. The remaining 32.5% are error of inclusion and error of exclusion, which means the level of errors is unacceptable.

A comparison is made between the local selection factor and economic vulnerability factors. Table 5.8 shows the deviation of eligible households in the ox-holding criterion from the eligible households in the economic vulnerability criteria. As the number of household oxen ownership increase, the average z-score increases. However, individual cases have different z-score. For example, 35% of the households do not own ox and these households' z-score range from -6.31694 (most vulnerable) to 4.77127 (food secure). Ox ownership could not estimate household's food vulnerability; the 'drop-out' of food vulnerable people and the 'leak-in' of non-vulnerable people can be clearly seen in Table 5.8. Use of multi-indicators or aggregate variables maximize the accuracy in measuring food security.

Table 5.8 **Ox Criterion Vs Economic Vulnerability Criteria**

Ox Ownership	HHs ox ownership in %	Minimum Z-score	Minimum Z-score	Average z-score Econ. Vulnerability
0	35%	-6.31694	4.77127	-1.49398 (Vulnerable)
1	38%	-4.5528	4.57222	-0.33087 (Vulnerable)
2	25%	1.3737	8.91078	2.165077 (food secure)
4	2%	6.43575	9.16019	4.580095 (food secure)

Source: Field Survey 2001

5.1.2 Accuracy of the 'Benefit Levels'

In principle, the wereda DPPC approved 12.5 k.g. of cereal per individual to be distributed per month to beneficiary households up to a family size of five. But due to discrepancy between resources available and number of beneficiaries, the ration was not kept. The relief ration has no association with family size (r = 0.2) nor with oxen ownership (r = 0.1). The relief ration, as stated in the guidelines, aims to provide more than or equal to 2,100 kcl combined with the household's own food availability. The major source of food in the area is crop production, though the relief ration did not use crop production to compliment household's food availability. Figure 5.1 shows an association between crop production and relief ration distributed to the sampled 60 included households. The figure shows a pattern; as the level of household crop production increases the household relief ration decreases. However, scientifically the two variables have weak association (r = -0.3).

Fig. 5:1 **Relief Ration Vs Crop Production in the Sampled Included Households**



Source: Filed Survey 2001

The field survey indicated that the wereda relief ration was not applied according to distribution principles. First of all, not all households received the ration for the eight consecutive months. Some households received only for one month, and others received

for up to eight months. The ration per month also varied from month to month. The fluctuation was more significant in the kebeles where aid was given in the form of EGS than in the kebele where aid was given in the form of GFFD. The ration evaluation was made by comparing the total actual ration given to the household with the 'ideal' ration. 'Ideal' ration calculated using the approved monthly ration 12.5 k.g. per individual (family size of 5) multiplied by 8 months. Eight-month is the approved period of assistance by DPPC. Therefore, the ideal ration was manipulated by number of family size (maximum 5) x 12.5 k.g x 8 month. The results are presented in table 5.10. Over supply refers to **any** over-supply of relief to the household throughout the eight months, under supply refers to **any** under supply and appropriate refer to **exact** ration given to the household based on 12.5 k.g per month to every household for eight consecutive months. Table 5.10 shows that there were errors (91.3%); under supply error (88%) and over supply error (3.3%) in the sampled kebeles.

Table 5:9 **Relief Ration in the Sampled Kebeles**

Kebeles	Over Supply	Appropriate supply	Under supply	total
Gishoghe (GFFD)	3.3%	6.7%	40%	50%
Atiko (EGS)	-	2%	23%	25%
Mekdesa (EGS)	-	-	25%	25%
total	3.3%	8.7%	88%	100%

Source: Field Survey 2001

As explained earlier, targeting efficiency cannot be judged from a perfectionist view; rather the errors should be reduced to an acceptable level. Both pair of errors, inclusion/exclusion and over/under supply targeting error is witnessed in Antsikia household relief targeting. The findings show that there was 32.5% error of incidence and 91.3% error of benefit.

5.2 Factors Affected the Targeting Efficiency (research question 4)

The empirical results show that targeting was inefficient in Antsokia wereda. It makes the hypothesis, *household targeting practices are not efficient in Antsokia due to the failure to exclude the non-eligible beneficiaries at the expense of eligible non-beneficiaries, a* true statement. The hypothesis states the targeting is not efficient; the community failed to include the most vulnerable and exclude the less vulnerable. The study found that the error is not only inclusion or exclusion. After screening 'eligible' households, there was serious error of undersupply in distributing relief ration to the 'eligible' households. The errors have occurred in all the kebeles where aid was given in the form of GFFD and in the form EGS. Various factors have influenced targeting; these factors affected the targeting efficiency on incidence level and benefit level.

Types of Intervention

One of food aid decisions is choice of food aid intervention: relief, project food aid or program food aid. In most famine prone areas including Antsokia, food aid was channeled during the 2000 drought in the form of relief. Relief has three common forms of intervention; employment generation schemes (EGS), gratuitous relief (GR) and general free food distribution (GFFD), explained in section 2.2. In the study area, relief distributed through the three common forms of relief. The shift from relief to development encourages use of food resources for more productive purpose. Decision whether to distribute the relief through labor intensive work or freely generally depends on situation of the target area and condition of the beneficiaries. The NPDPM states that "wherever possible all able-bodied persons should receive relief food assistance only through participation in EGS" (DPPC, 2000b:25).

The disable-bodied persons should be assisted without a work requirement (GR). In special cases (explained in section 3.3), if relief cannot be channeled through EGS, then GFFD can be implemented with special authorization.

In Antsokia, all food aid 'eligible' households in the highlands received relief without any work requirement. The WDPPC authorized the highland kebeles to receive relief through GFFD. The Gishoghe kebele did not qualify the preconditions for GFFD. According to the kebele respondents 77% of them who were able to work at the time of the 2000 relief, received the assistance freely. Only 23% of the respondents claim that they were unable to work if they would had been requested. GFFD is implemented if:

- shelf projects are not ready for EGS (but Agriculture Office had the EGS shelf projects)
- most beneficiaries are too weak to participate in EGS (but 77% were able to participate)
- affected by sudden onset disaster (but experts predicted the disaster)

History shows that in Gishoghe kebele, relief has been distributed for years in the form of GFFD; on the other hand, in Atiko and Mekdesa have been distributed in the form of work schemes. Because Gishoghe is inaccessible to the wereda center or other rural kebeles, its location has discouraged the use of food resources for developmental purpose. The bias against road-inaccessible areas prevented it from owning assets created through EGS projects. The EGS activities which are designed to halt root causes of food insecurity have improved the agricultural performance of Atiko and Mekdesa. These two kebeles have better crop performance than Gishoghe. Other indicators show that the three kebeles have similar socio-economic status (Table 5.10). Nevertheless, Gishoghe kebele has received special treatment than Atiko and Mekdesa.

In the 11 kebeles of the study wereda, relief was given in return to EGS work. Not all the relief beneficiaries in these kebeles participated in the work. Some of the beneficiaries received relief without work (GR). Gratuitous relief was distributed to vulnerable households but who were unable to participate in the EGS program. In general, the 'unable' should refer to (i) the disable-bodied (pregnant, children, the firm, the elderly) and (ii) labor poor households. The gratuitous relief beneficiaries in the study area refereed only to the first group. It did not include labor poor households who could not spare time on EGS activities. The reason was that EGS activities had minimal labor requirement in Antsokia, it demanded a single individual from each participating household. On top of that, the duties were scheduled only for eight days per month. The major weakness on the GR targeting was eligibility determined by inability of heads of households. It did not consider abilities of household members to participate in the EGS.

Setting Quota

Beneficiaries are selected based on pre-set quota. The administrative targeting committee, which is composed of different parties including the community representatives, determine the extent of assistance to the kebeles. The kebele along with the mengistawe buden figure out effects of the disaster in each village. On this ground, the number of beneficiaries in each village and kebele are pre-determined. But the beneficiaries should not be determined on pre-set quota. It can encourage the mengistawe buden to deny the vulnerable people or to include the less-vulnerable people in order to meet the fixed quota.

Politics

The use of food aid to reward 'friends' and to punish 'enemies' internationally is also practiced at the local level. Instruction was forwarded from the wereda to favor households who sent their children to the Ethio-Eritera war. They were rewarded food aid for their national contributions. Some of the respondents agreed with such benefit though some disagreed. The relief aid was also used to punish the previous government's party members, called 'bureaucrats' by the community. They lost part of their land which was redistributed to other land claimants. The 'bureaucrats' are excluded from any benefits including food aid in the community.

Community Targeting

There is a mis-use of power particularly in the community targeting. The community representatives -mengistawe buden- were highly criticized of nepotism in Antsokia. Their relatives and themselves were included in the 2000 relief target group. The targeting system at its third stage involves the community to comment on the screening. But the community often did not impose their view in order to sustain the social cohesion. The success of community targeting depends on custom of the society to express themselves fully. However, to keep the social relation the community decided to be voiceless. Their inclusive knowledge about the members of community would have been used to minimize the error of inclusion and error of exclusion. Thus, the community targeting could not play a complimentary role in the combined administrative-community targeting practices, its role was insufficiently performed.

Selection Factor

Technical problems arose in defining the target group. In spite of the administrative targeting decision to use asset ownership, the selection used a single criterion in most villages. The wereda heard many complaints about the screening. There were several occasions where they had to go to the village level to oversee the complaints. The wereda council faced a major problem in solving the variation of 'eligibility' and 'ineligibility' from area to area. Though not captured in the sampled kebeles, according to wereda officials, some kebeles used vague indicator without explicit criteria to dichotomize between eligible and ineligible households. Most of the mengistawe buden used oxen ownership as a selection criterion but it is a misguided criterion. The use of multi-variable indicators instead of a single indicator would minimize errors in estimating food insecurity. The oxen ownership criterion can be easily used by community targeting. However multi-variable indicators is more complex, it requires base line data and experts to interpret the data.

Relief Ration

The number of beneficiaries from the beginning sparked conflicts between wereda and federal DPPC because there was a huge difference between the need assessment expert's request and the DPPC decision. The wereda resource discrepancy can partially be traced back to the national level resource discrepancy. The federal DPPC received 70% of its 2000 relief pledges (table 3.1). A total of 30% reduction at a national level reflected on 60% reduction at the wereda level. The wereda pledged aid for 30896 beneficiaries, however, federal DPPC approved only 12,000 beneficiaries to be assisted for eight consecutive months. Such trend of disparity between pledge and delivery requires

attention and action of government, donors, and NGOs.

The wereda received its food resources from Kombolcha, one of DPPC's central warehouses. However, the flow of resource was unpredictable in terms of time and amount. There was delay of resources and the amount transported to the wereda varied in each month. The fluctuation directly affected the targeting practices. The threshold on the selection factors tightened or loosened depending on resource availability. Households holding one ox became 'eligible' when the wereda received relatively adequate resources in the wereda and 'ineligible' when there was scarcity. The discrepancy of resources also affected household ration. Each targeted household was intended to receive ration of 12.5 k.g of cereal per month per individual (family size above 5 are not included). But the practice was far from the intended monthly ration. A sack of cereal which holds 50 k.g. was given to one household in adequate time, but when scarcity occurred, it would be shared among four 'eligible' households. This means, beneficiaries received from 12.5 k.g. up to 50 k.g relief per month per household in spite of the family size. The picture shows households sharing their portion from a sack of wheat in front of the distribution site.

Included households sharing their portion from a sack of wheat.

Warehouse

One of the major problems of the relief distribution was inadequacy of storage. The existence of WVE warehouse in Antsokia, imposed the wereda to store the neighboring wereda's stock too. The WVE warehouse can hold only 2000 quintals, so the wereda rented 'spacious' private houses for additional storage. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the houses endangered the relief to rats and termites. The storage problem then forced the wereda DPPC to disseminate resources promptly without spending time on screening.

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Summary and Conclusion

Food aid is one of the coping strategies of food insecurity. The study has no dispute on the necessity of food aid in famine prone areas, though it encourages a replacement by other coping strategies. The nation should strive towards achieving self-sufficiency through buoyant growth and development on the agricultural sector. Food aid has been always in the domestic food supply since late 1970s, but the correlation between domestic food production and food aid import has weak association; the weak correlation is also noticed in household level. Experiences show that there is a need to re-consider the role of food aid in the domestic food supply. Pragmatically, there should be a negative strong correlation between food production and food aid supply.

The study focused on the appropriate use of food aid. One of the approaches to maximize the impact of aid is efficient targeting. Targeting serves three purposes; it directs resources to the most needy, it uses resources efficiently by holding resources from the less needy, and it reduces the disincentive effects of food aid on the local economy. Targeting sounds good, but the real practices sometimes make it inapplicable idea. Realistically speaking, here is no perfect targeting, but efficient targeting can minimize its errors.

In Ethiopia, food aid has been supplied for decades, but emphasis given on targeting is a recent phenomenon. "The lack of rigorous monitoring assessments had impeded the ability to learn from past experience and to develop improved systems for allocating food aid in the future" (Jayne et al, 2001:905). Targeting guidelines were established in 2000

by the federal DPPC, based on the 1997 SCF(UK) cross sectional targeting study. The guidelines have been distributed to regional DPPBs and other line organizations. The guidelines give a general framework for relief operation and detailed procedures are designed at a local level. In the targeting process the most tricky and controversial step is the actual selection.

In Antsokia-Gemiza wereda, the study area, food aid was distributed in the form of relief during the 2000 drought. Targeting relief aid is more difficult than targeting the other types of food aid, i.e. project food aid and program food aid, due to its emergency. The wereda received relief aid in the form of general free food distribution, employment generation schemes and gratuitous relief.

In Antsokia-Gemiza wereda in general followed the national targeting procedures; yet has its own practices. The current targeting mechanism in the wereda has relatively proficient procedures than the 1980s and early 1990s targeting systems when eligibility was determined exclusively by the peasant associations without any supervision and evaluation. Despite, implementation of the procedures impeded its efficiency. Some of the wereda targeting weaknesses noticed too in other areas and studies.

With respect to the first research question (to examine the targeting methods used to select beneficiary households), the wereda applies a combined administrative-community targeting method and use asset ownership as a main selection factor. The targeting has three levels: (i) administrative targeting at wereda level (ii) community targeting at kebele and village level and (iii) community meeting at the whole community level. Both the

wereda officials and the community have reservation on faithfulness of the mengistawe budens that they do not prioritize the need of vulnerable households, instead divert the benefits to their families and friends. The administrative targeting, thus, do not take the selection entirely on the trust of the community representatives. At the final stage of targeting, to cross-check the selection, the community discusses on the beneficiary list. However, the community's reservation last year brought only minor correction on the list. Community targeting can make a difference in a society where the community has a culture of discussing things openly. So, in the absence of openness, community targeting has minimum role on targeting efficiency. In such close society, then the options are to creating community participation or replacing the community targeting role by administrative targeting.

The administrative targeting estimates number of beneficiary households in each kebele. The kebeles, in turn, determine number of beneficiary households in each village based on their respective kebele pre-set quota. But this should be replaced by first screening beneficiaries then request resources based on the number of beneficiaries. It can encourage the mengistawe buden to deny the vulnerable people or to include the less-vulnerable people in order to meet the fixed quota. If there is a scarcity of resources the mengistawe buden should apply prioritization or re-targeting.

Regarding the second research question (to examine criteria used to set a threshold among beneficiary households), in spite of the administrative targeting instruction to the community targeting to use asset ownership as a selection factor, the community found it easier to use oxen ownership. It is an observable indicator that can be easily and quickly

measured with less cost. However, ox ownership selection factor has two disadvantages. Firstly, it cannot measure or can maximize errors in estimating household food security by itself. It can only estimate household's food security along with other aggregate variables. Secondly, in spite of the food aid objectives to avoid depletion of productive asset, ox ownership targeting encourages ox-holding households to sell their oxen, which then increases vulnerability to future insecurity.

The use of multi-variable indicator rather than single indicator would minimize errors in estimating food security, though it is more complex. It requires base line data and experts (administrative targeting) to interpret the data.

Regarding research question three (do the targeting has errors of inclusion/exclusion and over/under supply?), the 2000 relief targeting had errors. The Antsokia wereda relief targeting shows that there was 32.5% error of benefit incidence (inclusion/exclusion) and 91.3% error if benefit level (over/under supply). The community criterion, ox-ownership, shows 14% inclusion and exclusion error. The oxen ownership criterion appeared to be convenient yet inefficient selection factor. Moreover, the threshold on the criterion is determined by the wereda food resource. Tighten the threshold when inadequate resources are allocated to the wereda, and vice versa. The criterion plus the flexible threshold can escape 'eligible' households and leak 'ineligible' households.

The 'eligible' household is approved by DPPC to receive 12.5 k.g. of cereals per individual per month for eight consecutive months. However, the 2000 relief distribution was very far from the 'ideal' ration. Firstly, households did not receive relief throughout

the months. Some households received their ration for each month while others received only for few months. Secondly, most of the households did not receive the appropriate monthly ration. The ration did not consider their family size; the monthly 'ideal' ration states to distribute 12.5 k.g. of cereals for each family members (family size up to five). Thus, almost all households received under-supplied ration; resource constraint was the major determinant of the supply.

Assessing factors that affect targeting efficiency in the wereda brings the final research question. The factors are ranged from need assessment to distribution. The wereda requests food based on crop production and need assessments. But DPPC did not use the estimated figure for resource allocation. It denied the accountability of the wereda need assessment team due to an assumption of overestimated need. The survival of people with scant resources last year encourages DPPC to do the same decision in the future. The wereda survived the drought without any death, but the nutritional status deteriorates through time. In the future, the DPPC action might affect the efforts of need assessment team in estimating the accurate number of beneficiaries. The wereda on the other hand does not have enough warehouse capacity to keep its resources. The rented private houses are inappropriate and still inadequate to keep its scant resources. Yet, the wereda is appointed to store its neighbor's food resources too.

EGS and GFFD beneficiary households were identified by their kebeles. For instance, all the Gishoghe kebele beneficiaries received GFFD while all the Atiko and Mekdesa kebele beneficiaries received relief in the form of EGS. The features of individual households have nothing to do with selection of the relief programs (EGS or GFFD). In a

time of shifting from relief to development, Gishoghe kebele received the relief freely without any developmental work. The area has same conditions with other beneficiary kebeles, however, obtained special attention to receive more relief ration with no labor intensive work.

In the EGS beneficiary kebeles, GR beneficiary households are targeted due to individual disabilities not household disabilities. Heads of the GR beneficiary households were disabled-bodied to participate in the work schemes, but the family members were able to work on behalf of them.

The targeting is also affected by the political environment. Food aid has missed its purpose due to the political pressure. It was used to reward households who sent their children to the Ethio-Eritera war; the wereda council had forwarded instruction to include those households. Food aid was used on the other hand to punish the previous government's party members; those households were excluded deliberately.

Finally, the hypothesis 'household targeting practices are not efficient in Antsokia due to the failure to exclude the non-eligible beneficiaries at the expense of eligible non-beneficiaries' appeared to be a true statement. Yet, along with the eligibility screening error, the allocation of scant resources to the wereda affected the household food aid targeting efficiency.

To sum up the points, the presence of WVE in Anstokia area has brought tremendous change since 1984/85 on the infrastructure, environmental protection as well as rehabilitation, and on enhancement of household food security. But in food aid targeting, only supplementary feeding exclusively undertaken by the organization. In the remaining relief components (EGS/GR and GFFD), WVE plays a facilitating role; while many of the responsibilities are on the wereda DPPC and the community. The role of 'mengistawe buden' or 'kebele representatives' cannot be underestimated in household-level targeting. Yet, to reduce the misuse of power, to greater their commitment and responsibility they should be accountable to outsiders, be it the government or NGOs. The targeting systems can take the advantage by exploiting the potential of an NGO, a joint administration and management by government and NGO. The intervention of government or NGOs as a monitoring agent in targeting practices would increase accountability and transparency of information. In Antsokia wereda the existence of an NGO (World Vision Ethiopia) is an opportunity for future intervention to maximize the targeting efficiencies.

6.2 Recommendations

Identification of the exact problems those tied with the efficiency of targeting systems is used to suggest practical and affordable methodologies for future intervention in the wereda. The recommendation can also be used in other weredas with similar features.

1. DPPC has to acknowledge the efforts of wereda need assessment expert team and follow their pledge to deliver resources.
2. The wereda needs additional warehouse, or extend the existing warehouse.
3. The community should be encouraged to participate in targeting.
4. The selection factor should not be oxen ownership; it should be aggregate variables

that can estimate households' food insecurity better, i.e. per capita production, dependency ratio, land ownership, and off-farm income.

5. The inefficiency of community targeting should be supported by additional responsibilities of administrative targeting. The administrative targeting needs additional assessment on households survey. The 'form number 08' request only the size of HH, members by sex, age of HHH and sex of HHH. If the form incorporates detail information on the households' soci-economic status, it enables the administrative targeting to evaluate the selection made by mengistawe buden without a community meeting. Then, the administrative targeting can standardize the variables.
6. The administrative targeting should revise its selection criteria for GFFD; GFFD beneficiary areas should suit to the preconditions set by the guidelines.
7. GR beneficiary households should not be targeted by individual disabilities -head of households. It should consider the abilities of household members to participate in EGS.
8. Food aid should be free from any political influence.

Further Study

- The targeting mechanism in Ethiopia, commonly uses household as a unit of targeting. However, in some famine prone areas households within same village may have similar features which make screening very difficult: village targeting might suit better in such areas. Thus, finally, the study calls for further research on a unit of targeting.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.



ALL BOUNDARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND APPROXIMATE
GRAPHIC BY WFP VAM UNIT (4/96)

APPENDIX II.


NORTH WELLO ZONE
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MEKOY
ATIKO
GISHERBE WEREDA
GISHOGE ZURIA
AFISO ZURIA
HORBU WOLDE
OROMOIA ZONE
ASSELEEL & K/WENBER
CHECKECHEK ZURIA
MUACHERA H/MARIAM
WASH & NEGATE
GETEM GJOWHA
SARAMBA & DEGUTCHE
GERA KEYA WEREDA
ANKAR & KOBEKOB
MAJETE
AGLA & MAJETE
EFRATANA GIDEM WEREDA
KEY
= SAMPLED KEBELES

APPENDIX III.

Population of Antsokia-Gemiza Wereda

Kebele Administration	Total Population	Male	Female
1. Afiso	8080	4041	4039
2. Majete (town)	8080	3779	4301
3. Asseleel & K/wenber	7023	3576	3447
4. Agla & Majete	6659	3411	3248
5. Getem Gjowha	5877	2902	2975
6. Muachera H/mariam	5851	2885	2966
7. Kobekob & Ankar	5333	2771	2562
8. Mekdessa	5323	2644	2679
9. Saramba & Degutche	4948	2444	2504
10. Wash &Negate	4717	2316	2401
11. Gishoghe zuria	4714	2366	2348
12. Checkeckek zuria	4475	2261	2214
13. Mekoy (town)	4197	2004	2193
14. Atiko	2350	1214	1136
15. Habru Wolde	1906	901	1005

Source: Ansokia I. WVE 1998.

APPENDIX IV.

Food Balance of the Wereda (1994/95 - 1997/87)

No	Particulars	Year			Average
		1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	
1	supply; production	120,284	151,407	98,566	123,419
2	less 15% post harvest loss	18,043	22,711	14,785	18,513
3	less 6% seed	6,134	7,722	5,027	6,294
4	net production [1 - 2 - 3]	96,107	120,974	78,754	98,612
5	food aid channels by DPPC/NGO	1,894	-	3,326	3,326
6	total grain available [4 + 5]	98,001	120,974	82,080	100352
7	other food sources in cereal equivalent (meat)	2,966	3007	2611	2861
8	total supply [6 + 7]	100,967	123,981	84,691	103,213
9	population census & estimate	74,715	76,573	78480	76,589
10	total demand at 2.25 qt	168,109	172,289	176,580	172,326
11	food balance [8 - 10]	-67,142	-48,308	-91,889	-69,113
12	self sufficiency ratio % (4+7/10)	58.9	72.0	46.1	58.9
13	food availability ratio % (8/10)	60.1	72.0	48.0	59.9

Source: WVE-Antsokia I, 1998.

APPENDIX V.

Addis Ababa University

RLDS, Regional and Local Development Studies

Questionnaire Food Aid Excluded and Included Households During the 2000 Relief Distribution

Interview No.: _____ Interviewer: _____

PA: _____ Date: _____

Village _____ Time: _____

Respondent _____

Introduction: The study would like to understand targeting procedures and implementation in Antsokia-Gemiza wereda and to identify major problems that needs resolution for future interventions.

Instruction: Respondent should be head of the household.

Description of the Household (HH)

1. estimate the household distance from main road _____
2. estimate the household distance from kebele office _____
3. estimate the household distance from distribution site 1 _____
4. estimate the household distance from distribution site 2 _____
5. the house's roof is made of 1. corrugated iron 2. grass
6. the household status seems 1. same 2. better than others 3.less than others

Part One: For Aid Excluded Households

1.1 Food Aid Targeting (2000)

1. Who decided households to receive aid or to exclude from aid?
    1. Government organization (Ministry of Agriculture)
    2. Non-government organization (World Vision)
    3. Kebele representatives
    4. Mengistawe Buden
    5. The community
    6. 3 + 4 + 5
2. Were your household excluded in the initial screening or at the last re-targeting?
    1. Excluded from the initial selection 2. excluded in the last targeting

3. What do you think made your households to be non-eligible for aid?

1. livestock ownership
2. crop production
3. land ownership
4. did not send their children to war
5. family size
6. discrimination
7. their living standard
8. Does not know

4. Was the targeting fair?

1. yes 2. no

5. If the targeting was not fair, what are the reasons?

1. favoritism to party affiliation
2. favoritism to households who sent their children to war
3. the powerful pressurized (forced) to be targeted
4. relativism to PA officials
5. relativism to 'Mengistawe Buden'
6. other _____

6. Had your household ever received aid in the past 5 years?

1. yes 2. no

7. If yes, show the years (E.C.) and the forms of aid

	1991	1990	1989	1988	1987
Forms of Aid					

Code: 1 = Employment Schemes 2 = Free Food 3 = Supplementary food

4 = 1 + 3 5 = 2 + 3

Part Two: For Aid Excluded Households

1.1 Aid Targeting during 2000 distribution

1. Who decided households to receive aid or to exclude from aid?

1. Government organization (Ministry of Agriculture, WDPPC)
2. Non-government organization (World Vision)
3. Kebele representatives
4. Mengistawe Buden
5. The community
6. 3 + 4 + 5

2. What do you think made your households to be eligible for aid?

1. Little/ no livestock ownership
2. Crop production failure
3. Small/no land ownership
4. Send children to the war
5. family size
6. Does not know
7. Other _____

3. In which selection round was your household identified?

1. selected in the 1st beneficiary selection
2. in the last re-targeting

4. Was the targeting fair?

1. yes 2. no

5. If the targeting was not fair, what are the reasons?

1. favoritism to party affiliation
2. favoritism to households who sent their children to war
3. the powerful pressurized (forced) to be targeted
4. relativism to PA officials
5. relativism to 'Mengistawe Buden'
6. other _____

6. Did you share your ration with other households? if yes why

1. forced to share
2. the other household were in sever need
3. the culture pressurized them
4. just wanted to share

7. In what form did your household receive aid?

1. EGS 2. GR 3. GFFD

* Ques 8-16 for aid received in the form of EGS

1.2 Aid Received in the Form of EGS

8. How many people participated from your household?

1. one
2. two
3. three
4. four
5. five
6. six

9. Were all able-bodied in the household participated in EGS?

1. yes 2. no

10. If not participated, why?

1. intensive/payment was provided for limited number

2. they did not have time, engaged on other activities

3. did not want to participate

4. the available jobs were limited

11. Did you assign individual from out side to work for your household?

1. yes 2. no

12. If yes, why did you assign?

1. the household was 'poor labor' 4. wanted additional ration

2. to assist the household labor on partial bases 5. they were forced to work

3. to be included in the aid

13. Was the timing of EGS caused inconvenience to your agricultural activities?

1. yes 2. no

14. What impact has brought EGS program on your agricultural activities?

1. positive impacts on the area

2. has no impact on the area

3. negative impact on the area

15. How do you compare the EGS wage with alternative wages in the area?

1. below other wages 2. equal 3. above other wages 4. no alternative job

* Qes 16 to 18 aid received in the form of GR or GFFD *

1.3 Aid Received in the Form of GR/GFFD

16. Why did not you participate in the work schemes?

1. unable to work 3. the aid was given for free

2. the jobs were only for few people 4. not requested to work

17. If the household representative was unable to work, what was the reason?

1. handicap 3. elderly 5. household members were busy to participate

2. sickness 4. pregnancy or lactation 6. lack of labor in the house

18. If the household did not participate because not requested to work, would you been able to participate if requested to work?

1. would be able to work 2. would not be able to work

1.4 Effective Demand for Aid

19. Had your household received aid in the past 5 years?

1. yes 2. no

20. If yes, show the years (E.C.) and the forms of aid

	1991	1990	1989	1988	1987
Forms of Aid					

Code: 1 = EGS 2 = GR/GFFD 3 = Supplementary food 4 = 1 + 3 5 = 2 + 3

21. List down the amount of aid you received in each distribution during 2000E.C

	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jly	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Cereals/wheat (kg)										
Oil (lit)										
Other										

22 Was supplementary aid given to your households? If yes in which form?

targeted individuals	commodity in kg or lit	per day	per month	frequency
Children under five				
Pregnant				
Lactation				

23. How significant has been the food aid against your need?

1. filled all their food gap 2. filled the gap significantly
3. little contribution to their needs 4. no contribution to their needs

24. How did you use the aid given to you in 2000?

1. only for consumption 2. both for consumption & for sale 3. only for sale

Part Three: Household Vulnerability

2.1 Household Identification

1. Ethnicity of head of household 1. Amhara 2. Oromo 3. 1 + 2 4.other _____

2. Religious affiliation of head of household 1. Orthodox 2. Protestant 3. Muslim 4. __

3. List down members of household

No	name	relation to the HHH	age	sex	Education	occupation	Dependency
1		HH					
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							
10							
11							
12							

Code for educ.
1= illiterate
2= writing and reading
3= elementary level
4=high school
5=above

Code for depend.
1= pregnant
2= lactation
3= sick person
4= children <5
5= elderly
6= handicap

Code to relation to HHH
1= spouse
2= son/daughter
3= grand child
4= parent
5= parent-in law
6=relative
7=non-relative
8=employee

Code for Main occupation
1= weaver
2= potter
3= black smith
4= petty trade
5= brewery
6= daily labor
7= farming
8= handicrafts

2.2 Land Holding

4. Do you own land? if you own how many 'gemed' do you own?_____

5. How did you get your land?

1. 1974 land reform
2. land redistribution after 'derg'
3. inherited from family
4. other _____

6. List down your plots quality

	size in hector	fertile	moderate	infertile
plot 1				
plot 2				
plot 3				
plot 4				
plot 5				

2.3 Crop Production

7. What did you produce on your plots in 1992 Meher , Belg and 1993 Meher?

Crops	Area (gemed)			Production (local unit)			Sold (1992)	Income in birr
	Meher	Belg	Meher	Meher	Belg	Meher		
Sorghum								
maize								
barley								
teff								
wheat								
horse bean								
lentils								

* Local Unit

a = Tq. Madaberia c = Akumada e = Qunna

b = Ts. Madaberia d = Inqib f =

8. Had your household applied any kind of inputs to improve the crop production?

Input	From Donation	On Credit	On cash	Home made
Fertilizer				
Improved Seed				
Manure				
Pesticides				

2.4 Livestock Ownership

9. What did you possess in the beginning and at the end of 2000 E.C

Livestock	In the beginning	At the end
chickens		
cows		
calves		
bulls		
oxen		
camels		
sheep		
goats		
mules		
donkeys		
horses		
beehives		

10. If you had sold your livestock during this period, why?

1. to purchase cereals
2. for repayment of loan
3. due to animal epidemics
4. due to the food crisis
5. without reason
6. other _____

2.5 Off-Farm Income

11. What are the major food sources of the household? (rank them)

__ crop production
__ hunting
__ animal product
__ food aid
__ begging
__ buy from market
__ remittance friend/relative
__ borrow from friend/relative
__ other _____

12. Average households income from the following activities in the last 12 months?

Activity	Earned per month
sale of arake/tella	
sale of grass	
sale of cereals	
sale of charcoal/ wood	
weaving	
pottery	
black smith	
transport (pack animal)	
sale of labor	
remittance	

2.6 Coping Mechanisms

13. What causes food shortage in your household? (rank them)

___ failure of crop production
___ lack food reserve in the household
___ reduction of household income
___ human epdimics
___ other _____
___ absence of food in the market
___ increase of household size
___ increase of grain market price
___ erratic rain fall

14. How do you prepare when you suspect famine-strike in your area (rank them)

___ reserve grains
___ reserve money
___ migrate temporarily
___ no preparation
___ wait for aid
___ other _____

15. Which months (seasons) are bad season interms of food availability? _____

16. How many times do you eat per day on average in the bad season? _____

17. Which months (seasons) are good season interms of food availability? _____

18. How many times do you eat per day on average in the good season? _____

19. Which mechanisms do you mostly use to cope with food shortage?

coping mechanism	Frequency in the last two years
eating less preferred food	1. frequently 2. rarely
sale productive livestock	1. frequently 2. rarely
borrowing money to buy food	1. frequently 2. rarely
migrate to look for work	1. frequently 2. rarely
migrate to beg for food	1. frequently 2. rarely
participate in EGS/FFW	1. frequently 2. rarely
sale assets	1. frequently 2. rarely
reduce number of meals per day	1. frequently 2. rarely
reduce amount of food per meal	1. frequently 2. rarely
change cropping pattern	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely
.....	1. frequently 2. rarely

APPENDIX VI.

Organization and Individuals Consulted During the Field Work

Government and Non-Government Organizations

1. Antsokia Wereda Council
2. Antsokia Wereda Agriculture Office
3. Antsokia Wereda ORDA Office
4. WVE-Antsokia I ADP
5. Kebele Administration and Mengistawe Buden

Individuals

Ato Giram ..... Wereda Council

W/t Yeshi ..... ORDA Office

Ato Kifetwe ..... WVE-ADP staff

Ato Yeshetila ..... WVE-ADP staff

Declaration

I declare that this is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any university and all the sources of materials used for the thesis are duly acknowledged.

Name: Essete Solomon

Signature: _____

Date: May 28th '01

Place: Addis Ababa University

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university advisor.

Mr. Wim Olthoff

_____