

**Addis Ababa University**  
**School of Graduate Studies**

**Transformation of Land Tenure and  
the Role of Peasant Associations  
in Eastern Arsii (1974-1991)**

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**July, 2008**

**Transformation of Land Tenure and  
the Role of Peasant Associations in  
Eastern Arsii (1974-1991)**

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## Acronyms

A.M.C	- Agricultural Marketing Corporation
A.P.C.S	- Agricultural Producers Cooperatives
A.R.D.V	- Arsii Rural Development Unit
A.V.C.C.C	- <i>Awraja</i> Villagization Construction and Coordinating Committee
C.A.D.U	-Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit
C.P.S.C	- Control Planning Supreme Council
M.L.R.A	- Ministry of Land Reform and Administration
O.N.C.C.P	-Office of the National Council for Central Planning
P.A	-Peasant Association.
P.A.V.C.C.C.	- Peasant Association Villagization Constitution and Coordinating Committee
S.E.A.D	- South East Agricultural Development
S.I.D.A	- Sweden International Development Agency
W.V.C.C.C	- <i>Warada</i> Villagization Construction and Coordinating Committee.

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## **Declaration**

I, the undersigned, declare that this theses is my work and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

**Name:** Tariku Degu

**Signature:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date of submission:** July 28, 2008.

## Transliteration

### A. Amharic

I. The seven sounds of the Ethiopian alphabets are represented as follows:

1 <sup>st</sup>	በ	= Ba
2 <sup>nd</sup>	ቡ	= Bu
3 <sup>rd</sup>	ቢ	= Bi
4 <sup>th</sup>	ባ	= Ba
5 <sup>th</sup>	ቤ	= Be
6 <sup>th</sup>	ብ	=Be/B
7 <sup>th</sup>	ቦ	= Bo

II. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

ሸ	= sh
ቸ	= ch
ኸ	=gn
ዸ	= z
ጀ	=J

III. Glottalized sounds are represented as follows:

ሰ	=q
ጠ	=t
ጨ	=ch
ጸ/ሀ	=Ts
ጸ	=P

IV. Germination is indicated by doubling

E.g.	ደጃዝማች	= Dajjazmach
	ደጃች	=Dajjach
	ከበደ ተሰማ	= Kabbada Tasamma

## B. Oromoo

I. for the Latin script employed in the transliteration of the Oromoo songs and proverbs, the seven sounds are represented as follows:

1 <sup>st</sup>	ቡ	= Be
2 <sup>nd</sup>	ቡ·	= Bu
3 <sup>rd</sup>	ቢ	= Bii
4 <sup>th</sup>	ባ	= Ba
5 <sup>th</sup>	ቤ	= Bee
6 <sup>th</sup>	ብ	= Bi
7 <sup>th</sup>	ቦ	= Bo

III. Regarding the third and the fourth form in the above list, it must be noted that the “I” and the ‘e’ will be doubled only if the letters are stressed

Examples: Laafaa = Soft  
Karaa = Road  
Malkaa= Ford  
Beela = Famine

IV. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

ሸ	=sh
ቸ	=ch
ኸ	=ny
ጸ	=J

IV. Gottalized sounds are represented as follows:

ቆ	=q
ቆ	=x
ጸ/ፀ	=dh
ፍ	=c
ጸ	=P

N.B. It should be noted that Latin script is not only used for the Oromoo proverbs and songs quoted in the thesis. Other Oromoo names, words and phrases in the text also follow the manner of transliteration of the Latin script.

## **Acknowledgement**

Before giving my gratitude to individuals from whom I have received assistance and encouragement from the beginning to the end of this thesis, I want to give boundless thanks to Almighty God who brought me back to life after I ceased to breath and has taken responsibility of my life and made my career a success.

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## Abstract

*Attempts have hitherto been made to study the various socio-economic and political aspects of Arsii's land tenure by Ethiopian and expatriate scholars. In the earlier research works of different scholars the socio-economic and political conditions of Arsii after the land reform and the process of its transformation have not received attention.*

*This work, therefore attempts to examine thoroughly basic feature of man and land relation among the Arsii Oromo and changes that had occurred as a result of the appearance of the new settlers; the eviction of tenants resulted from intensive mechanized commercial farming by tractor cultivation and prerequisites made by Chilao Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) for rural land proclamation.*

*Moreover, problems related with the implementation of the activities endeavored by rural institutions which appeared after the land reform and consequences which led to their disintegration are examined. The study is conducted employing three methods of collecting and analyzing historical sources. Collection of oral interview is the basic method employed to obtain data for this research. Informants consulted represented elders and adults of different ethnic and religious groups possessing rich knowledge on activities of CADU-ARDU (Arsii Rural Development Unit), rural institutions and implementation of the land reform during the period of Darg administration of Arsii with reference to rural population.*

*The second category of the sources employed is archival materials. Considerable amount of variable documents and archives on the Darg regime in Arsii were destroyed during the change of government in 1991 and a few years after. Archives in the awarja and administrative region peasant associations offices were either damaged when the offices were wrecked or deliberately destructed by leaders of rural institutions so as to get rid of rescue of accountability.*

*I only found archival materials in eastern Arsii zone Administration office (the then Arsii Regional Administration office) and ARDU's Library and documentation center.*

*Published and unpublished written source (books, articles, Journals, theses, news papers, publications and proclamations) have been utilized for the research. Most of these secondary sources were obtained from the Addis Ababa University (Institute of Ethiopian studies and J.F. Kennedy Memorial Libraries) and ARDU library and documentation center. Shortage of archival sources and the dearth of written materials has been a challenge in the reconstruction of this thesis.*

## PREFACE

The basic object of this thesis is to reconstruct the history of land holding in Arsii and the transformation of tenure made after the rural land proclamation.

The research investigates and closely examines issues related with land tenure in Arsii and its consequence which had contributed to the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Moreover, the activities which were made by the CADU employees and MLRA in drafting the proposal for the land reform is the main concern of this thesis.

The thesis is presented in four main chapters. The first chapter deals with people and land among the Arsii Oromo which was characterized by communal ownership of land and later changed to private holding as a result of land alienation and grant after the conquest and expansion. Chapter two investigates the prelude to the rural land proclamation and the campaign which was known as *Zemecha* and its repercussions. Further more, explaining how the Darg managed to crush the power base of the imperial regime and erected its rural institutions is the main object of this chapter. The rural land distribution and the post land reform agrarian policy of the Darg as well as the role played by peasant associations will be the central theme of chapter three. Chapter four attempts to display execution of the socio-economic policies and how these were found infamous and unsuccessful as a result of which they were finally disintegrated once and for all.

## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND

#### 1. People and Land among the Arsii Oromo

##### 1.1. Communal Ownership of Land

The province of Arsii which comprised three *Awrajas* (sub-provinces) prior to 1992-93 is now divided into two zones namely, eastern and western Arsii. Eastern Arsii, the larger of the two, is further divided into twenty-four *wäradas*. These are: Inqolo-Faracho, Bekoji, Širka, Sagure, Qarsa, Tiyo, Zeway Dugda, Hetosa, Lode Hetosa, Diksis, Sude, Robe, Serru, Belle, Tenna, Dodota, Sire, Merti, Jeju, Chole, Guma, Gololcha, Aseko and Amigna.<sup>1</sup>(Appendix I)

Before the apportionment of their land by the continuous expansion of the Shawan Christian Kingdom, in Arsii, land was a communal property of the community as a whole. There was not any plot of land which appears to have been possessed by an individual. Everybody had full right to use the land with his clan. Each clan and sub clan were organized independently and occupied a definite geographical area which was recognized by a neighboring clan.<sup>2</sup>

The Arsii Oromo were predominantly pastoralists tending their large herds of cattle, sheep, goats and naturally, the consumption of meat and milk constituted a major part of their diet.<sup>3</sup> Every member of a community has access to arable land as well as land for grazing. Be that as it may, informants state that the Arsii land is suitable both for tillage and cattle rearing. The Arsii Oromo mostly cultivate barley in a place called Sirka and sold it to the markets of Huruta and Sire in northern Arsii.<sup>4</sup> This notion of the cultivation of barley among the Oromo comports with what Tesema Ta'a has stated, "... For instance, a close observation of Oromo traditions reveals that barely was the sacred crop of the Oromo farmers,

used in cultural rituals, in marriage ceremonies, and on various religious occasions.”<sup>5</sup>

Among the Oromo, man and land are non-extricable. There is a belief that it would be impossible to change this bond through force of arms or otherwise.<sup>6</sup> The Arsii Oromo cultural and traditional attitude toward land was maintained by the motto of ‘*laftii lafee*’ (land is bone) since it is central to their life. In his lucid account of the relation of man and land among the Oromo, Tesema has noted, “land has eyes and ears and could act upon men who usurped the rights of the rightful owners even long after the latter had died or moved else where.”<sup>7</sup>

It appears that the south and south-western Arsii people preferred to die than hand over their ancestral land on which their forefathers had lived for ages led by their *Hatis* (wise individuals with deep knowledge of clan ties and customary laws). For instance, Hinsene, who represented the Dalle clan, defied the handover of the land of his clan and he was reported to have said, ‘*laftii lafee jaartiif jaarsaatu qee nahafee*’ which means land is bone, I left elders (females and males) at home and I can not handover any land on their behalf.<sup>8</sup>

From ecological perspective, the Arsii Oromo attitude and acquaintance with forests ascertain their indigenous knowledge of preserving their natural resources. The imprint of the then forest coverage is still surviving in many parts of Arsii to this day. No individual could have a free hand to cut down a tree without the consent of the community.<sup>9</sup>

Strictly speaking, it can be said that land and its products are the backbones of their livelihood and are said to have engine their determined resistance of the conquest waged by Menilek II and his army.

As it has been noted earlier, in the Oromo tradition land was a communal property belonging to the clan descending from the same ancestor real or fictive who was considered as the first occupant of the land. Neither was land an object of individual inheritance, sale and purchase; nor was it the monopoly of the family of the local notables. The territory of each clan was defined in space and communally owned without dividing it into parcels of private holdings.<sup>10</sup>

The most durable impact of the defeat and annexation of the Arsii was the appropriation of their land. Victims of the war and their descendants were made *gäbbars* of the followers and supporters of Shawan as elsewhere in southern Ethiopia during the same period.<sup>11</sup> Consequently, acceleration of privatization as a result of which private tenure became the norm was exhibited. The confiscation of Arsii land assumed two ways, complete and partial. In areas where major confrontations and stiff resistance were staged, particularly Huruta, Sire, Dodota and Hetosa, complete alienation of land by the conquerors was applied. In these areas, the rightful owners, the Arsii, entirely lost their land to the new *naftagna* settlers and the Arsii became *gäbbars* on their own land.<sup>12</sup>

Unlike the chiefs of the areas of strong resistance whose land was confiscated, in areas where resistance was not so strong, chiefs were allowed to retain up to one third of the clan land thus called *balabbat meret* and to submit the remaining two-third to the government which then became crown land.<sup>13</sup> Land appropriation was mostly effected through fictional procedure knowns as *Awäräsu* whereby chiefs bequeathed the land to the conquerors in return for official costumes and low-level traditional titles such as: *Balamabars*, *Gragmach*, and *Qaññazmach* while their clan members became totally landless. Most of the land of the northern and eastern Arsii was bequeathed to the Emperor (Menilek II) or his agent governor, *Fitawrari Zemenfes*.<sup>14</sup> The land of what is today Hetosa district was handed over by Milo Mama and other chiefs and it was accorded by Menilek to *Ras Berru*

Wolde-Gabrel who kept its possession for life and then transferred it to his descendants.<sup>15</sup>

The end of Shawan's war of conquest was followed by the Shawan settlers *en masse* in Arsii land. The Gùlele and Sellale who had served in the army during Menilek's campaign were among the settlers in the region. Likewise, there were also the Gulele Oromo who were evicted by force from Finfinnee area at the time of the foundation of Addis Ababa as the capital of the empire. They were offered by Shawan huge tracts of land to the south of Assella. Some moved to Arsii as late as the 1920s and settled in parts of Munesa district on the land they were granted. About one-third of the entire Gullele are believed to have moved to Arsii abandoning their ancestral land in Shawa.<sup>17</sup> Thus the majority of the Shawan Oromo moved south attracted by the news of plentiful and fertile land in Arsii and the comfortable life there.<sup>18</sup>

The new settlers dwelt in fortified villages like: Tičo, Azule, Munesa and in considerable number in areas like: Huruta, Sire, Tiyo, Širka, Gololcha and Čolle for they were frightened to live in small numbers.<sup>19</sup>

## **1.2. Land Alienation and Grant: Commencement of Private**

### **Holdings**

As a result of land alienation, the majority of the Arsii became *gäbbars*, i.e., one who pays tribute or tax to the state or its assignees from the productive output of his farmland. The appropriated land was allotted to the government employees, soldiers, nobles, ecclesiastics and the *malkañña* (administrators) as compensation for the service they rendered during the war in colonizing or supervising the conquered areas.<sup>20</sup> As it is noted in Addis Hiwot, "About three-quarters of Arsii land passed into the hands of the *näfteñña* and their present settlers." This indicates the degree of the intensity of land alienation in Arsii.<sup>21</sup>

In Arsii according to oral sources and Ketebo's thesis, the government made land distribution by introducing land measurement to attract south-ward movement of people who could assist the effective control of the region and to expand tax payer cultivators.<sup>22</sup> In Arsii it was in 1918 that the *qalad* system (a term for a rope used to measure land) was introduced to facilitate land measurement and to accommodate a growing number of northerners in the region. The unit of measurement was *gašša* (literally shield). In the first place, the measurement was aimed at dividing the land to units of private property which was intended to facilitate administration and a more profitable collection of taxes.<sup>23</sup> The sale of land at very cheap prices also encouraged massive movement of groups of people from the north to the south. Land in Arsii was thus measured three times before the Italian occupation (1918, 1924 and 1930) but not all land became strictly under the region of the *qalad*. The unmeasured *gašša* was referred to as 'eye *gašša*' (*yä ayen gašša*) or 'eye *gamad*' (*ya ayen gämäd*), a reference to the rough estimation of the size of the land by just looking and pointing at it. This was clearly full of inaccuracies since it involved no unit of measurement neither the traditional nor the modern variety.<sup>24</sup>

Land measurement is said to have enabled the government to have systematized division and offer of land to its servants according to their rank and position. Hence, *Tamanja yaž* (gun holders), *malkañña* (the administrative officials) *balabats*, churches, the clergy and others. Nobles got large amount of land on *resta-gult* (hereditary *gult*) tenure. *Ras Beru's* *resta-gult* in Hetosa was by far the largest in the region and in Huruta and Sire much of the land was given to soldiers.<sup>25</sup> In Didaa and Sirka Iyyasu's *resta-gult* was transferred to Zawditu after his downfall and later to Hayla Sellasie; while *Ras Dasta Damtew* was offered the land of the Hella clan in Shirka. The amount of church *gult* could vary from one church to the other based on its status and the number of clergy. There were also

churches established elsewhere but given *gult* land in Arsii. A good example of such churches was the Entoto Maryam.<sup>26</sup>

The major objective of land measurement was to facilitate taxation. The measured land was divided into *läm* (fertile) *läm-täf* (semi-fertile) and *täf* (unfertile). Taxation increases as the fertility of land increases from *taf* to *läm*. The division was based not only on the fertility of land but on the density of human settlement and the degree of cultivation.<sup>27</sup>

It may thus be said that the paramount result of land measurement was the alienation of at least three-quarters of the Arsii Oromo land and its transformation into various forms of land tenure. The *balabbats*, who had at first been allowed to retain the possession of the so-called *sisso* land, were later deprived of much of it for various reasons. As much as three-fourth of the *balabat* land was prone to be transferred into the possession of the church or other service men of the government.<sup>28</sup>

A steady process of privatization was set in the twentieth century with the right to sell and mortgage land. Perhaps, the most dramatic case of land sale in the early twentieth century was that of *Dajjach* (later *Ras*) Berru Wolda Gabrel in Arsii who sharply increased the sale of land in Hetosa, by the turn of the century. He compelled the peasants cultivating parcels of his large estate to purchase them or else to become permanent tenants paying him as much as 25% or more of their produce.<sup>29</sup> The *malkañña* who sold the land have grown in number steadily attracted by the sum of money they received from the land buyers. They sold more land albeit the government laid the upper limit of the amount of land that could be sold.<sup>30</sup>

The Oromo who bought their land were not entirely freed from rendering *gäbbar* service albeit they had achieved permanent tenure right through the purchase of

the land. They still had to maintain the *naftaňñas* with the supply of wood, food and other items they were required to provide. They carried the specified amount of honey, flour and other items to the absentee landlord in Addis Ababa. In May 1935, Hayläsellasie proclaimed the abolition of corvee labour and the old *mar* (honey) tax introducing instead of what was called a fixed tax (*qurt-geber*) of 30 Birr per *gašša*.<sup>31</sup> Despite this proclamation, the old exaction continued unabated till it was abolished during the Italian occupation.<sup>32</sup> After the restoration the land grant made by the emperor had concentrated land in the hands of few resulted in privatization of land. Thus, land registration and privatization had a high priority in Haylasellassie's polity and it was said to have accelerated the process of privatization of land which was started before 1935 in Arsii in the days of Menilek II.<sup>33</sup>

As Bahru explains the process of privatization has three facets, the northern settlers who had acquired tributary right ended up by owing the land; *madarya* land given to those in government service in lieu of salary was made convertible to free hold and the government made extensive land grants from its large reserve which came under government land (*yämängist meret*).<sup>34</sup> The objectives of these government grants were evidently to broaden its basis of support. The main beneficiaries of these grants were patriots, exiles, soldiers and civil servants. In Arsii land grants were made from government land (*yämängist meret*) and from the so called *gebir-tal* as well as *awarasu* procedure. The land of some *balabats* was also liable to the former type through the excuse that the *balabats* had failed to meet their obligations as middle men between the state and the people.<sup>35</sup>

*Dajjasmach* Asrate Kasa, governor of Arsii (1946-52) received letters from the section called *yä restänna wul* (*rist* and lease) of the Ministry of Interior. The grantees were called *Ya Ras Berru sawoč* (the men of *Ras Berru*), members of *mahal safari* who were probably his servants entitled to one *gašša* each. Like wise, there were group of individuals referred to as *ya Dajjač Bäyyänä Wändim*

*Ageññahu Sawoč* (the men of *Dajjazmach* Bäyyänä) who were entitled to one *gašša* each from Arsii in the letter issued on Hamle 7, 1939 (July 14, 1947).<sup>36</sup>

In 1946 E.C. Hayla-Sellassie ordered land grant to 1002 patriots and returning exiles *yäabbat Arbaññoč* consisting of retired officers, soldiers, policemen and members of the Imperial Body Guard. The grant was to be given according to the title and rank of the beneficiary. 700 *gašša* was partly confiscated from native peasants as *gebrä-täl* on which their forefathers had long lived for years paying tax and all other dues.<sup>37</sup>

As informants explain, in 1947 E.C. Hayläsellassie ordered land grant to 1002 patriots and returning exiles *yäabbat Arbaññoč* consisting of retired officers, soldiers, policemen and members of the imperial body guard. The grant was to be given according to the title and rank of the beneficiaries. Tracts of land offered to them, 700 *gašša* were partly confiscated from the indigenous peasants as *gebrä-täl* on which their forefathers had long lived on for years paying taxes and other dues.<sup>38</sup> The *balabbats*: *Girazmach* Ebu Jillo, Woibo Safino. Tuke Hamda, Feko Kubi (of Arboye), Menza Sure, Roba Gunje and Tuja Tose (of Jeju) were among others who bequeathed their land to the emperor. Thus the Emperor made a grant of land of the *balabbats* which was tilled by the *gäbbars*.<sup>39</sup>

Ato Tädla Abäba, the famous pioneer in commercial farming in Arsii, was given 17 *gaššas* on *rist* basis in Zeway Dugda. At the same time, Aklilu Habtewold the then Premier of the country, acquired for himself 10 *gaššas* on *rist* basis in Natile and bought another 10 *gaššas* from Hayläsillassie's *beta-rist* with other six wealthy individuals who bought 50 *gaššas* of land in the same area.<sup>40</sup> The above grants and many others were made against the needs of the landless. The tracts of the land thus granted were generally fertile and long inhabited by local tenants who always hoped that freehold grant according to different government grants would be made to themselves.<sup>41</sup>

Such hopes however, largely steamed from feeble words and verbal proclamations made by the Emperor in reference to Arsii tenants. In a speech he made on Nov. 2, 1966 the Emperor said, “Certain land in Arussi province heretofore administered by our ministry of imperial court be distributed to the tenants working on them.” But this and other promises made by the Emperor were overlooked by the officials.<sup>42</sup>

The land grant policy, which was resumed immediately after the liberation in 1941, attained its zenith a decade before the outbreak of the revolution in 1974. Although the 1952 promulgation seemed to encompass the “landless and the unemployed,” in practice the pattern of allocation made to the *baläwläta* (those who served in war and peace). This appears to be because Hayläsellases’s desperation grew more and more with the steady rise of opposition movements against him. This implies that land grant has always been a political weapon for the regime.<sup>43</sup>

The land grant on *rest* basis was the most widespread means of the expansion of privatization in the south. The northern settlers also grabbed land by an outright coercion or bought the southern *gäbbars’* land upon which they were solely accorded tribute collecting right. Eventually, *madarya* land given to those serving the government in lieu of salary was later transformed into freehold by consecutive orders. Thus, the size of freehold grew sharply after 1941.<sup>44</sup> The expansion of privatization brought about its own results among which land vending was one. This entails the beginning and expansion of large scale mechanized commercial farming and the constant migration of the Amhara and Shawa Oromo into Arsii. Thus, right up to the revolution, land purchase on part of the ordinary local peasants had become difficult. Consequently, this has increasingly widened the gulf between large scale land owners and small scale

owners. Nevertheless, the sale and purchase of land enabled at least a few peasants to own plots of land of their own.<sup>45</sup>

The transformation in the land ownership system necessitated the restructuring of land tax regulation on the part of the state. Hence, tax collection through different channels was halted and after 1941 land owners had to pay their dues to the agents of the Ministry of Finance. The amounts to be paid were decided by the First Land Tax Proclamation of 1942. On measured lands, the rate for forty hectares (a *gašša*) was 15, 10 and 5 *birr* for lam, *läm-täf* and *täf* land respectively. The 1944 land tax raised this amount to 50, 40 and 15 *birr* per *gašša* for the same categories of land.<sup>46</sup>

The *resta-gult* holders, the church or other land grants were not affected by an increase in the land tax but the *gäbbars* were the victims. For instance, the church was fully exempted from taxation while it collected tax from *sämon* land holders in addition to its own church *gult* cultivated by its lower ecclesiastics.<sup>47</sup>

Regarding tenancy arrangements, there were verbal negotiations reached between landlords and tenants. An agreement called *Awčī* was widely practiced in Arsii. According to this agreement, the yield was entirely taken by the tenant for two years (harvests), except for the *asrat* paid to the landlord. This was not an act of special generosity on the part of the landlord, but simply an incentive to bring this land under cultivation and to develop it through the hard efforts of the poor tenants.<sup>48</sup> After the end of the *Awčī* term in two years, the landlord could offer a new sharecropping arrangement to same tenants of which the *erbo* (a quarter), *sisso* (one-third) and *ekul araš* (equal share) were common. Since the value of the land had increased during the last two decades of Hayla-sellasse's regime, *ekularash* became prevalent and gave rise to another level of landholding called *tissañña märet* with the farmers called *tissañña*.<sup>49</sup> The *tissañña* who were non-*gäbbars* mostly lived on the land owner's land and cultivated it for a long time.

But the land owner could evict them at any moment. Most of the *tissaññas* in Arsi in the 1960s and in the early 70s were Shawa Oromo who failed to buy land or who went there rather in search of a better life.<sup>50</sup>

### **1.3. Mechanized Commercial Farming and Eviction of the Tenant Population**

Arsii region, especially the čilalo *Awraja*, held the highest concentration of commercial farms in Ethiopia. Arsii attained the top position among the commercial agricultural centers of Ethiopia for it was favored by certain conciliations such as favorable climate, fertile soil and above all, the land tenure system with the expansion of privatization and the monopoly of land in the hands of a few rich people.<sup>51</sup> In this regard, some of the notable land owners during the reign of Emperor Hayläsellassie in the 1960s and 70s were *Weizero* Zenebework Berru (the daughter of *Ras* Berru), *Lij* Merid Birru (son of *Ras* Birru), *Woizero* Asalafach Wolde, (the wife of *Dajjazmach* Yilma Mekonen) *Ato* Hagos Fanta, *Ato* Tedla Abäbä and *Ato* Eshetu Wolde Tsadik. *Girazmach* Degiso Bedaso and *Grazmach* Meshesha Ambaye also acquired some tracts of land in what is today Hetosa district.<sup>52</sup>

The idea of reforming the country's agriculture and other related issues were, however, raised and loudly discussed during the same decade. For instance, the first tenancy bill that was formulated to discuss landlord-tenant relationship and passed decisions to improve the condition of the tenants was presented to the parliament in 1964. But it was never successful since the majority of the parliamentarians themselves were landlords.<sup>53</sup> The bill merely assessed landlord-tenant relationship, fixed the maximum rent as high as the cultivator produce, secured tenant holding atleast for accepted period of time and exempted them from a sudden eviction.<sup>54</sup> In reality, however, these improvements encountered certain problems.

In the first, place, agreement between the landlords and tenants were verbal and were never conducted in a written form. This is said to have prevented tenants from bringing their case to the court. The agreement rather enabled land lords to terminate such verbal leases and it has not secured tenants from eviction. Thus, the bill speeded up the process of tenant eviction, as landlords rushed to free their holdings before the ratification of the bill.<sup>55</sup>

Mechanized agriculture during Haylä-sellasse's regime was referred to as commercial farming albeit the two names are not really synonymous. The former name implies large scale farming conducted with modern equipment like tractors, combine harvesters, threshers, trailers and others. But the later comprises the traditional farming method.<sup>56</sup> In defining mechanized agriculture exclusion of animal operating tools is strongly criticized by Green whose definition of agricultural mechanization includes both animal operating and engine power tools.<sup>57</sup>

The major factors that inhibited the development of agriculture are said to be discrepancies in the old land tenure system, inclusion of traditional methods of farming, lack of home tested innovations and the absence of extension schemes.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, the third five year plan which has contained the drafting policy in reference to agricultural development dedicated itself to change the still standing agricultural sector by the institution of mechanization on two fronts. The first focused on commercial production of coffee, cotton and sugar which necessitated huge investment to be run only by expatriate capital or else in collaboration with the Imperial Government. On the other hand, the second was commercial production of cereals in highland areas which could be financed by private Ethiopians, since it did not need as much capital as the first.<sup>59</sup>

Mechanized agriculture which started to expand in the second half of the 1960s rapidly increased its pace towards its end.<sup>60</sup> In Arba Gugu, Gololcha district there was concession farming where a private Italian company had started a coffee plantation since 1956. This company had taken over the farming from the Belgian company which ended its concession only because of small offers it made to the Ethiopian government during the signing of the new concession which the Italian company won.<sup>61</sup> The latter was founded on the basis of an Agreement signed in April 1956, and named *Arba Gugu* plantations Co. Ltd. for a period of 30 years. In 1967, the company used as many as 797 Ethiopian wage labourers, 10 tractors, 5 pumps for irrigation and an irrigation canal of about 20kms long.<sup>62</sup> At Asa-Usman in *Tičo Awraja*, the Belgian Muse Balambilon was growing coffee on 6 *gaššas* and it was run with the concession agreement (1967/68) between the Belgian and the Ethiopian government.<sup>63</sup>

The concession farming in Marti was established by the HVA (Handels Vereeniging Amstardam) Dutch firm in the mid-1960s along the Awash River. This farm launched its sugar cane plantation on 35 *gaššas* of land with the whole holding of the company was 200 *gaššas*. HVA under the Awash valley authority was in fact a financially strong company which also held the Wänji and Matahara sugar factories in Shawa.<sup>64</sup>

Arsii's agricultural mechanization was effected as a result of the presence of this form of farming in Arsii before the 1960s; the involvement of expatriates with huge capital and the fact that it was also practiced outside chilalo in Tičo and Arba-Gungu *Awrajas*.<sup>65</sup>

The *balabbat Grazmach* Ebu Feko Kulu has bequeathed his 60 *gašša* of land to the Emperor and the latter ordered the land to be sold for 1000 Birr for each *gašša*. Thus, Getachew Gebre Yohannes, Mulugeta Gebrewold, Tirunesh Gebre Egziabher, Colonel Teshome Adinew, Takele Wolde Hawariat and Abebe

Gezahegn bought the land and began mechanized farming using tractors, threshers and combiners up to the outbreak of the revolution. During the revolution, the new military government has taken over the land and set up a factory which produces canned fruits and vegetables in the area.<sup>66</sup>

Later on, emperor's *beta-rest* carried out its cultivation on 60 *gaššas* in Tibila, Yaju *warada*, north-east of Čilalo *Awraja*. This farm was brought under the Haylä-sellassie I Prize Trust and in the 1960s and it was known for its production of oranges, bananas, papayas, Tomatoes and other agricultural products, Yearly, the farm attracted as many as 225 wage laborers and possessed 5 tractors.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the Leprosy Patients Organization had its own commercial farm in the same area, on 32 *gaššas* of land in the late 1960s. This organization was under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and in fact, financed by the Swedish Missionaries. The welfare corporation carried out its farming with 6 tractors and 2 treshers.<sup>68</sup> The government had exceptionally favored the introduction and expansion of mechanized agriculture as its policy which was reflected in duty free imports of machineries, duty free fuel and subsidized credit, being generously offered. Hayläsellase posed for official portraits with famous Arsii commercial farmers to express his personal support for the sector.<sup>69</sup>

Prior to the introduction of mechanized agriculture, there was a large scale traditional cultivation of cereals which were primarily produced for commercial purpose. According to informants, *Ato Berru Walda Sadeq* was one of the famous traditional farmers in Sere *wäräda*. This large scale traditional farmer originally had one *gašša* of *rist* land in Borära *qäbäile* in the western part of the same *wäräda*. Gradually, he increased his holding through purchase and began an intensive traditional farming on such land. *Ato Berru* used over 50 pairs of oxen and the labour of the surrounding poor cultivators to conduct his traditional farming. Thus, he was widely known as a model traditional farmer and even praised by emperor Hayläsellassie for his deeds in enhancing agricultural development in the region.<sup>70</sup>

Berru was also well known for his welfare and environmental activities. His plantation of trees on the upland of Borära areas reveals that he was well aware of the dangers of deforestation and erosion. Thus, he adopted the forestation scheme in the area and the planted trees are known today as *Ye Ato Berru Zaf* (*Ato Berru's trees*) and prevented soil erosion.<sup>71</sup>

Commercial farmers who had their own sizeable land and purchased modern farming implements were represented by *Lej Merid Berru* in Hetosa and *Ato Tadla Abäbä* in Zeway-Dugda *wärädas*. Still many others joined the rank of mechanizers in the course of the commercial farming. *Lej Merid* and *Ato Tadla* were considered as pioneers, in adopting mechanized commercial farming in Chilalo. The contract cultivators originally had no major attachment with farming. Most of them were merchants or government employees and settled in the surrounding towns such as: Assella, Iteya Dehera, Bäkoji as well as in the large urban centers like Nazareth and Addis Ababa.<sup>72</sup> *Ato Asras Abay* and *Ato Eshetu Wolde Sadeq* were the best examples of the commercial mechanizers who either leased land or rented cultivating machineries. The individuals had only cultivating machineries which they rented to others but never farmed by themselves.<sup>73</sup>

There were 126 commercial farmers who had been farming on 575 measured *gaššas* of land in the former Chilalo *Awraja* which comprises the major part of today's Eastern Arsii. To this effect, there were 184 tractors and 37 combiners. Among other rich mechanizers, *Ato Tadla* alone held over one hundred and twenty four *gaššas* of land, seven tractors and two combiners in Zeway Dugda, Tijo Digalu, Hetosa and Tiyo *waradas*.<sup>74</sup> Another famous commercial farmer, *Lij Merid Berru* possessed thirty two *gaššas* of land in Iteya and Gonde areas, within the Hetosa *wäräda*. As informants explain, he was the strongest of all the heirs of *Ras Berru*, who was able to defend and hold his inherited land from his father even after the 1966 decree, which abolished all secular *restä-gult* tenure. *Lej Merid*

possessed 1, 280 ha., 5 tractors and 2 combiners in the Iteya-Gonde areas.<sup>75</sup> Because of the rapid growth of mechanization in Čilalo in the 1970s, there were commercial farmers who cultivated thousands of hectares. For instance, in 1971 Tadla was known for holding 4, 980 ha. , 7 tractors and 7 combiners mainly in the Lole, Zeway Dugda and northern *wäräda* areas.<sup>76</sup> Ato Asras, according to informants, possessed significant tracts of mechanized farmland and agricultural machineries next to Tadla. According to them, he was an active commercial farmer in the plains of Zeway-Dugda, Boru in Hetosa district and in Lole Ego among other sites.<sup>77</sup> Tesfaye Rādee in Gonde and Hetosa, Musa Awel and Takelä Ogäto in Lole areas were minor commercial farmers among others. Citrus fruits, vegetables, maize and coffee were also grown by Tadla and Asräs on concession farms in Zeway lowland, particularly in Šetämeta and Dännäba.<sup>78</sup>

#### **1.4. CADU and Agricultural Mechanization**

Later on the government embarked on developing traditional peasant agriculture. To achieve this goal, a package scheme of agricultural development was launched, principally in the central regions. The first comprehensive package project to be established in Ethiopia was the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU).<sup>79</sup> The project jointly financed by the Imperial and the Swedish governments and started its activities in 1967. The first project period covered the years 1967-70 and the second, the years 1971-75. The package programme denotes the coordinated application of the “elements of development” to a specifically identified geographical region or area. This would consist of the provision of transport, credit and marketing facilities. Besides, a properly related set of agricultural actions like the development and the diffusion of information on agricultural endeavors, distribution of improved (selected) seeds, developing the application of fertilizers, better tools, storage facilities, etc. CADU and the minimum package programme are administered through a special department within the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture. The department is called the

Extension and Project Implementation Department (EPID). Its top executives were expatriates notably Swedes.<sup>80</sup>

The key elements in CADU's package which have direct relevance for the peasants are the credit programme and the co-operative promotion programme. CADU gives credit for farmers for purchases of fertilizer and seeds. The credits are given in kind. When the credit programme started in 1968 everybody involved in agriculture was welcome to participate. Tenants had however, to present written lease agreement on their holding signed by the landlord and drawn up in a form which was agreeable to CADU. This regulation was based on security considerations, a tenant without a written lease might be evicted and hence, unable to repay the credit. When CADU started its activities in 1967 there were only a few commercial farms using a mechanized technology. Since then, the number of mechanized farms has increased rapidly and Chilalo has become one of the centers for large scale commercial production of cereals in Ethiopia.<sup>81</sup>

The availability of new agricultural techniques has encouraged large land owners to take up farming themselves and evict some of their tenants. As M. Stahl has put it: "The great lesson of CADU's effort in Chilalo is that, policies intended to foster peasant agriculture, however, correctly aimed they may be, were bound to be efficient in as far as they do not include changes in the political system to which the peasantry was a subject."<sup>82</sup> Thus, the very people intended to be supported by CADU were rather affected by its schemes since its activities entail the eviction of numerous tenants from the area. Stahl also indicated the adverse effects of the project activities in his discussion as follows:

*Although tractorization still may prove attractive to the individual it will lead to the eviction of tenants or labourers. It will presently be impossible to find alternative employment possibilities for this labour if such eviction could take place on a large scale. From the societies point of view, the tractorization characterization has in this*

*case resulted in a substitution of scarce foreign exchange for plentiful labour.*<sup>83</sup>

In order to prevent the negative experiences of CADU its plan of operation would have given priority to the complementation of local self administration in the minimum package area. Further more, the imperial government should have an effort to reserve cultivable government land for evicted tenants. None among these was employed to check the tendency of the eviction of tenants from the region.<sup>84</sup>

As was previously discussed most of the tenant farmers are also to be found on the medium seized holding; and, since mechanized farming proceeded fastest in Arsii, its major consequence on the peasant economy has been the eviction of tenants.

In the following table the number of tenants evicted in 1969 and 1970 due to mechanization is shown. Since the *golmassa* found it difficult to tell the exact date when the tenants left the result for the two years is presented as a sum. Also the number of tenants who were evicted for other reasons and the number of new tenants have been included.

**Table1. Movement of Tenants in 1969 and 1970.**

Movement area	Evicted tenants			Tenants leaving voluntarily	New tenants	Total movement
	Mechanized farming		Own cultivation			
	own	contract				

N. Assella	24	16	-	4	8	15	61
Gonde	17	82	5	2	1	7	114
Itaya	27	57	39	-	8	23	174
Huruta	66	39	29	17	24	22	197
Lole	13	31	-	2	7	12	65
Total	167	225	73	25	48	79	617

*Source:* CADU Publication, “Investigation on mechanized farming and its effects on peasant agriculture”, Assella, March 1972, No.74.

From the above table it can be observed that during the two years, 1969 and 1970, there was a total “movement” of 617 tenants. Of this number 538 moved out of the area and 79 moved into the area. A total of 392 tenants were evicted as a direct consequence of mechanization, 73 because of the start of owner cultivation (using draught animals); and 23 because of disagreements. Another 48 tenants apparently left their own accord.<sup>85</sup>

From the following table, it can be seen that the estimated 1,788 tenants were expected to be evicted in 1971-75 period as a consequence of mechanization. When other member of the household are included, approximately 8,940 will be forced to leave the region in this period. The number of tenants evicted so far (525) and the expected number of tenants that will have been evicted by 1975, gives 68% as the percentage of the tenants population that will have been evicted by 1975 if mechanized farming follows the same trend as in the past.<sup>86</sup>

**Table 2. A forecast of the Eviction of tenants, 1971-75.**

Eviction year	Tenants	Other members of household	total
1971	378	1,512	1,890
1972	449	1,796	2,245
1973	394	1,576	1,970
1974	322	1,288	1,610
1975	245	980	1,225
Total	1,788	7,152	8,940

**Source:** CADU publication, “Investigations on mechanized farming and its effects on peasant agriculture”, Assella, March 1972, No.74.

Eviction went on unabated up to the revolution. In spite of the intensity of the problem, no systematic attempt was done to record the degree of the matter in the study area. Thus, the exact number of those evicted from Chilalo itself where there was so many large scale mechanized farms has not been documented well.<sup>87</sup>

The tenants were often ordered to leave after harvest. This eviction order was mostly accompanied by the mechanical clearing of the land around tenants' homesteads. When tenants hesitated to quite their homes, cultivation was started all around the tenants' homestead. The evicted poor usual destinations were southern Šhawa (Arsii Nagele and Maqi), Darro Labu (Harar) and Bale (Aräna). From 1965 to 1972, the number of tenants depleted from 46% to 12% as a result of such evictions.<sup>88</sup>

The hardship of those tenant farmers who evaded eviction scarcely differed. Tenancy arrangements were changing from (*sisso*, one-third) to *ekul* (half) in the

interest of the landlords. This had been principally because of the boosted demand for land and the subsequent growth in its price which had even risen to 100,000 Eth. Birr per *gašša*.<sup>89</sup> As informants explain, it is evident then that peasant agricultural land continued to shrink in proportion with the expansion of mechanization and this apparently created both unemployment and under employment. Previously, small scale holders hired their pasture land from land lords who by now had no such land for this purpose. Mechanization thus reduced pasture land and forced the small scale holders themselves into crop production which thereby led to dwindling cattle population for which Arsii has always been very famous.<sup>90</sup>

The domestic animals which belonged to the people who settled around the commercial farms were shot and killed out rightly or their owners were obliged to pay high amount of ransom (*affälama*) for their animals trespassing into the commercial farms.<sup>91</sup>

It could be said that mechanized farming marginalized the rural majority and generated general unease and fear among the rural masses in Arsii. According to Henock, who illustrates the subsequent result of mechanized farming, "in their strive for whole profits and lesser expenses, the machine utilizers gave almost no attention to the conservation of soil fertility". In parts of Arsii mechanization thus led to deforestation as commercial farmers embarked on clearing fields to include more land into their estates.

On the positive side, mechanized commercial farming boosted agricultural production in the former Chilalo *Awraja* and improved its quality. It saved time, improved farming standards and allowed deep and timely ploughing that it softened soil very well within the prerequisite period of time. It also saved labour and set free agricultural draught animals.<sup>92</sup>

To sum up, it can be said that the imperial government did not manage peasant and commercial mechanized agriculture within their own perspectives; and the expected change and development from the agricultural sector could not be achieved as a result. Land grants, commercial farming and other related land grabbing by the new comers continued to have their own adverse effects on the people who now turned landless, being removed from their own clan land. The negative impacts of mechanization and other grievances of the rural society contributed to the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORM**

#### **2.1. Prelude to Rural Land Proclamation**

During the last decade of the imperial regime, the focus on land tenure was in part stimulated by the rise of commercial agriculture which had worsened the life of tenants as we have seen in the first chapter. Primitive technology, fragmented market infrastructure and subsistence farming have limited the agrarian economy to provide the society with sufficient production. The imperial government of Haylä Selassie claimed to have recognized that agriculture was central to Ethiopian progress and had declared its commitment to rural change, a policy quite different from the preceding 30 years.<sup>1</sup> But, it was now obvious that significant progress in this crucial sector would not occur until major land tenure reforms were coupled with the provisions of improved inputs, credits, research, extension, market and roads to the vast number of small-scale landowners and tenants who dominate the country side.<sup>2</sup>

Despite of the government's desire to induce efforts for rural change, the situation has brought about a process of polarization in rural agricultural communities in Arsi and the number of poor and landless people steadily increased.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, the Swedes who came to Arssi achieved warm reception by the community of the already established Lutheran Mission school. One further point to be mentioned is that those Swedes who were attracted by the plain environment sought to have set up a project and would certainly involve in water development, forestry, livestock, marketing and agronomy as well. To undertake these operations, they had informed their embassy about the importance of the project and how their state could establish relation with the country.<sup>4</sup>

As we have already seen Haylä Selassie was ready to be concomitant of any progressive change in the sector of agriculture. In 1963 therefore, an envoy of Swedish experts led by a member of the parliament had visited Ethiopia and in due course reported to their government what they had observed in Ethiopia.<sup>5</sup> In

addition to this and more important, letters of correspondences began to circulate between the two governments as a result of which another team of researchers has appeared to study what their government could have done to provide technical support for the country's socio-economic development.<sup>6</sup>

After the two governments had agreed through an exchange of letters dated March 15, 1966, to make a preliminary study of the possibilities and forms for Swedish assistance in co-operation with the Imperial Ethiopian government, a letter was issued from the Jubilee palace sealed by the Emperor designated *Ato* Tesfa Bushen, the then Vice Minister of agriculture as a plenipotentiary representative of the Ethiopian government. He was appointed to sign and conclude the development project agreement in the province of Arsii between the Imperial Ethiopian government and the government of Sweden.<sup>7</sup> (see Appendix II)

The agreement on co-operation in the field of regional agricultural development was signed on September 8, 1967, between the Swedish Government and the Imperial Ethiopian Government.<sup>8</sup>

The project included agricultural experimentation aimed at producing a reasonable number of innovations, programs for the transmission of such innovations to the farmers, creation and improvement of marketing facilities for agricultural products, conservation of natural resources, studies on infrastructure, health and education as well as training of the general extension and education personnel.

Costs other than salaries and related emoluments for the Ethiopian higher and middle level staffs, borne by the Ethiopian government in a proportion corresponding to 33% of the total of such costs while the remaining proportion, corresponding to 67% shall be borne by the Swedish government. As has been decided, the total cost of the first phase three-year project (1967-1970) is estimated at Eth. \$13,862,000 which represents major categories of resources

expatriate and Ethiopian staff, land, buildings and common facilities as well as equipment and livestock. Thus, *Ato Tesfa Bushen* and Mr. Anders Forsee director of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) signed the agreement on behalf of the Ethiopian Imperial and the Swedish Governments respectively (Appendix III).

In support of, but not included in the project, the imperial Ethiopian government shall endeavor to carry out such as land reform and other measures as may be inclusive to improve agricultural productivity in the project area. The task of carrying out the land reform has been vested on the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration that will submit to parliament proposals on nation-wide legislation of land-lord tenant relations and on cadastral survey and land registration.<sup>10</sup> Thus, this is said to have marked the establishment of Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) which by and large changed the rural socio-economic system in Arsii in particular and had contributed to the rural land proclamation in general. In a letter issued on 15/7/90 File No. 3-8125 the Ministry of Agriculture notified the social security agency that CADU was established on the basis of the signed agreement (Appendix IV).

## **2.2. CADU and the Rural Land Proclamation of 4, March, 1975**

The years preceding the land reform had been characterized by the subjugation of the Ethiopian masses under the feudal ruling class. A complete transformation of the country's complex land tenure system as well as its social and political structure would safe-guarded the interest of the toiling masses and would further their continued development. As else where in the country, peasant masses in Arsii had major oppressors and exploiters.<sup>11</sup>

Our sources conspicuously indicate that there was frequent violence by the peasantry in various parts of the region. A resistance led by Melaku Kelecha in Ticho *Awraja* (1968), revolts of the tenants led by Buna Sado and Birmeji Fayissa

in Zeway Dugda (1971, 1972) were held to bring an end of the exorbitant and often arbitrary exploitation.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, in the years of 1962 and 1963, the act of land apportionment through the initiation of *qalad* system was resented by the peasantry since the land was offered to the land lords after the measurement. Opposition movement was staged against the state led by Waqo Tufa, Haji Bune Boru, Kebir Hussien and Balcha Turi.<sup>13</sup>

As a result of the injustices built into the feudal relations of production and forceful occupation of their land, violence of Arsii Oromo flared up against the patriots at Marti, Jeju and Tibila until the outbreak of the revolution of 1974 and the land reform of 1975.<sup>14</sup>

According to the source obtained from the office of the then *bejrod* in Arsii, now the Finance office, the land holding in the region is indicated as follows:

**Table 3. Types of Tenure holding in Arsii**

Type of the tenure	Holding/ <i>gasha</i>
State holding	6389
<i>Semon</i> holding	2891
<i>gäbar</i> holding	14,621
Total	23,901

**Source:** Arsii Administrative region. M.LR.A. File No. 250/65.

Thus, one can easily conclude that the largest portion of the land in the region was held by the *gäbars* who were bound to pay tribute to the landlords. Moreover, the same source has explicitly stated when 60-70 percent of the people of the region were tenants, 30-40 percent were *rist* holders.<sup>15</sup>

More than 90% of the tenants in Arsii were share croppers and the rest were on a cash contract basis. There were a number of forms of land rent arrangements

conditional on the basis of the share of the crop demanded by the land owner and the inputs contributed by him towards production.<sup>16</sup> It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a full description of the whole tenure system and rent arrangements during the imperial regime. It will suffice to say that the main rental forms in Arsii were *Sisso*, *erbo* and *ekul arash*.

I will limit myself to a brief description on the years preceding the revolution and analyze the events associated with the land reform proclamation.

As has already been explained in the first chapter, since mechanized farming has proceeded quite fast in Arsii, land lords were shifting from share cropping to commercial cultivation, with the help better inputs of fertilizer, selected seeds, and farm machinery. While the yields per hectare on these farms were good and much better than the peasant farms, this development had negative social repercussions, because it led to the evictions of tenants from the land. The growing trend towards the development of commercial farms and the expulsion of the tenants had been one of the factors leading to demands for land reform.<sup>17</sup>

Ever since the establishment of CADU in 1968, that organizational and the Swedish government which was responsible for it have been at the center of land reform controversy. As it has already been mentioned, the initial agreement between the Ethiopian and the Swedish governments contained a provision which required the Ethiopian government to implement new tenancy legislation within two years from the commencement of the projects. As the government gave a deaf ear to it and since such legislation was never passed, it became a substantial issue between the two governments when the first agreement expired in July 1970.<sup>18</sup>

When the government resubmitted the agricultural tenancy bill to the parliament in the late 1970s, it was taken as an act of improvement and a second agreement was

signed extending the CADU project from January 1971 to July 1975.<sup>19</sup> Albeit the new agreement contained a provision that the government will implement a reform throughout the project area not later than a year after its promulgation, it was to no avail. The most radical criticism of the land tenure system came from the student movement, which from the middle of the 1960s onwards made the slogan, 'land to the tiller' its main target. The issue of land reform was surfaced and became a political agenda than ever before among academics, government and aid agencies who by and large urged for some kind of reform to be adopted.<sup>20</sup>

By the time the *Darg* took power, demand for land reform was being echoed by demonstrators and Prime Minister Endalkachew's response to these demands was to refer the matter to the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA) which was asked to come up with a draft proposal. Members of MLRA, however, tend to have revived the old proposal of placing a ceiling of 20 hectares on individually owned land and redistributing any thing in excess of that to land hungry peasants.<sup>21</sup>

Immense exploitation of the large masses of the peasantry by a few was exhibited by the pre-land reform land tenure system in Arsii as shown in the table below.

**Table 4. Land Tenure in Arssi before the 1975 Rural Land Proclamation**

No	Name of the warada	<i>gäbbar</i> land (acre)	Land owned by <i>sisso arash</i> (acre)	Land owned by <i>riste-gult</i> (acre)	<i>Maderya</i> land (Acre)	Land owned by <i>quter gäbar</i> (acre)	Semon land	State owned land (acre)
1	Tiyo	679	169	-	19	-	94	132
2	Digelu <i>ena</i> Tijo	740	303	-	25	-	139	22
3	Lemu <i>ena</i> Bilbilo	1260	338	-	75	-	227	20
4	Munesa	1205	338	-	88	-	84	94
5	Zeway <i>ena</i> Dugda	840	379	77	123	128	132	356
6	Hetosa	39	-	1123	-	-	701	22
7	Dodota	849	-	--	7	-	47	88
8	Sire	1172	-	27	24	-	116	13
9	Tena	824	237	72	25	-	134	132
10	Shirka	112	382	-	26	-	108	70
11	Robe	841	386	-	26	-	88	60
12	Sude	889	436	-	22	-	123	45
13	Seru	604	293	15	32	-	82	913
14	Amigna	332	174	-	14	-	41	1277
15	Merti	171	151	-	22	-	67	1423
16	Jeju	789	232	-	51	-	97	387
17	Guna	394	120	-	8	-	92	77
18	Aseko	368	136	-	3	-	51	196
19	Chole	368	123	-	1	-	56	95
20	Gololcha	544	276	-	2	-	11	847
	Total	13219	4443	1244	593	128	2490	6169
	%	42.30	14.21	3.98	1.89	0.40	7.69	19.74

**Source:** Arsii Administrative Region. M.L. R.A. File No. 250/65

Belay Abay and Zegeye Asfaw from MLRA and a group of men who were employed by Swedish sponsored CADU in the then Arussi province, Henok kifle, Mehari Tesfaye and Tamirat kebede had prepared the draft proposal for the rural land proclamation.<sup>22</sup>

The proposed agrarian reform aimed at bringing an end to the subjugation of the Ethiopian masses under the feudal ruling class; provide each Ethiopian desirous of obtaining the livelihood from farming sufficient land from which he/she can obtain adequate income; to prohibit the accumulation of wealth and land by a new class of individuals and to create peoples' institutions that will safeguard the interest of the toiling masses to further their continued development.<sup>23</sup>

Hence, the program has also indicated measures to be undertaken to achieve the objective. These measures are: creation of central agency that will coordinate and provide the general guidelines for the implementation of the program, convening of peasant congresses on the *wärada* level and the establishment of local committees in each 20 or 25 *gashas* area.<sup>24</sup>

It was also proposed that the maximum amount of land an individual can own should be based on the extent of land an individual, using traditional technology, can effectively utilize. In this regard, where cereal production is practiced, the maximum acreage an individual can cultivate is no more than five to six hectares. Hence, if provisions for grazing areas are made, the maximum area a farmer can effectively utilize is no more than ten hectares.<sup>25</sup> It was therefore proposed that the maximum amount of land which a farmer can own should be no more than ten hectares. Land owned by individuals exceeding ten hectares should be expropriated without payment of any kind of compensation.<sup>26</sup>

Those who wrote the drafts also proposed the nationalization of large estates and agro-industrial complexes as a result of which all estates which have crops of a

perennial nature and agro-industrial complexes should be nationalized. Moreover, fragmentation of rural land was prohibited by which there shall only be one inheritor of the land and other descendants must either acquire other land or find alternative employment opportunities.<sup>27</sup>

As it was stated in the draft proposal, all farm machinery owned by individuals shall be nationalized and will be utilized on state farms which will be established in new areas for the purpose of augmenting the production of crops by individual farmers.<sup>28</sup>

The idea of possible armed confrontation from the big and petty landlords as well as their lackeys to impeded the implementation of the land reform was not overlooked by the people who prepared the proposal.<sup>29</sup> They have suggested a provision which have to be made to protect the masses fully during the session of the implementation. In doing so, it has been stated that the creation of local militias along with the local committees or the assigning of regular troops shall be the two forms which would safeguard the masses from being endangered by the landlords.<sup>30</sup> (see Appendix V)

Along with the drafting of the land reform, commercial farmers and land lords in Arsii coordinated themselves to have the activities of the drafters rebuked.<sup>31</sup> To this category belonged heirs of *Ras Berru*: Merid, Zenebework and *Fitawrari* Teshome and as well as Eshetu Wolde Tsadiq, Zeleke Desta and Wubet Bogale among others.<sup>32</sup> In doing so, they sent their representatives to Addis Ababa and negotiated with Premier Endalkachew to have Henok be transferred to A.A. and Merid to be appointed as a governor of Arssi.<sup>33</sup> Consequently, the government which was gripped by multifaceted problems had decided to transfer Henok from CADU so that the idea of the radical land reform could be nipped in the bud. When the news of the expulsion of Henok from CADU reached the progressive elements in Assella, CADU workers of each department rallied to have this act

repulsed and a revolutionary tidal wave of students' demonstration in Assella had shown the commercial farmers and landlords that the reform was inevitable.<sup>34</sup>

Representatives of the progressive elements from CADU's labour union, Assella high school, bank and other institutions went to A.A. and put up their demand for the return of Henok to his former position in CADU. Thus, neither Merid was appointed as governor of Arsii in place of *Dajjazmach* Sahlu nor Henok was transferred from CADU.<sup>35</sup> The draft for the nationalization of rural land was prepared and began to circulate among peasants in Chilalo *Awraja* (the area where CADU was operating) by the extension agents.<sup>36</sup>

Influential officers in the *Darg* were favoring the nationalization of the rural land as opposed to its redistribution in the form of private ownership. It appears that the *Darg* had referred the draft legislation prepared by individuals associated with CADU to a committee made up of several university lecturers who through the decision of the majority, endorsed the draft legislation with one proviso, namely, the rural land should be nationalized.<sup>37</sup> This solution was also upheld by the radical elements within the MLRA who had adopted the draft as their own and who were advocating its adoption by the *Darg*.<sup>38</sup> The MLRA submitted the two alternative proposals, i.e. the old idea of redistributing land in excess of 20 hectares in the form of private ownership and the proposal from CADU to the *Darg*. The legislation to nationalize the land was supported by the radical elements of the *Darg* who were in favour of the poor peasants and on 4 March 1975, that draft legislation was adopted as proclamation 31 of 1975.<sup>39</sup>

### **2.3. National Work Campaign for Development Through Co-operation**

#### ***(Zemecha)***

It was quite evident that the government did not possess administrative resources to implement such a far-reaching land reform proclamation from above. Instead the government has decided to rely on students, whom they had ordered to go out into the countryside in December 1974 to teach the rural population. All university students as well as pupils in the two higher grades of the secondary schools had been ordered to enroll in the *Zemecha*, as the campaign was known.<sup>40</sup> It was known as National Work Campaign for Development through Co-operation, established in October 1975, a year after it was announced.<sup>41</sup>

For this enormous task to synthesize and agitate the peasantry there was no better candidate than the energetic youth of the nation, particularly the students whose long time slogan was “land to the tiller.”<sup>42</sup>

The *Darg* was cunning enough to exploit the exuberance of students. The students, who felt that the campaign was rather designed to drive them out of Addis Ababa the core of revolutionary turmoil, rejected the idea.<sup>43</sup> All students under this category were bound to participate in the campaign.<sup>44</sup> The *Darg* has thus issued a decree on October 30, 1974 and had announced students who failed to involve in the campaign shall not in any way, extend their education in and out of the country; emigrate the nation by any legal means; and employed either in governmental or non- governmental institutions. Hence, any person who obstructed the execution of the campaign shall be guilty of an offence and shall be punished.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, the students were told by the *Darg* that the poor peasants had financed their education and the least they could do to repay their debts to the peasants was to participate in a campaign whose major beneficiaries would be the peasants.<sup>46</sup> Despite students’ protest the preparation for the *Zemecha* continued unabated.<sup>47</sup>

A *Darg* member, Major Kiros Alemayehu, was appointed as a chair person of the *Zemecha*. Four program co-coordinators for health, education; basic engineering and agriculture were appointed from a university. Some 60,000 students, teachers and a few men from the army and the Air Force between the ages of 18 and 40 were mobilized for the *Zemecha*.<sup>48</sup> Even though the initial announcement was made as early as October 1974, it was not launched until December 1975. The intervening period between the announcement and the launching was used for the program and logistic preparation.<sup>49</sup> The campaign was launched with a colorful ceremony in Addis Ababa.<sup>50</sup>

#### **2.4. Agrarian Reform of 4 March 1975: A Land mark in Rural Land**

##### **Transformation**

As it has already been stated, the Ethiopian agrarian reform was aimed at bringing about a complete transformation of the country's complex land tenure system and its social and political structures.<sup>51</sup> The first central point to make about the Ethiopian land reform is that it was, on the whole, carried out successfully, fairly and without an extensive local conflict.<sup>52</sup>

It was recognized that the most fundamental and immediate task was to alter the agrarian relations, so that the Ethiopian peasant masses may be liberated from an age old feudal oppression, injustice and poverty. It was also felt that future development can be assured by avoiding the exploitation of the many by few. But it only by instituting basic changes in the agrarian relations that would lay the basis upon which, the development of one becomes the development of all.<sup>53</sup>

Agrarian reform was not therefore carried out only for reasons of production, but as part of a move towards social revolution in rural Ethiopia which was aimed at revolutions in the social relations of production, technology and ideology.<sup>54</sup>

The basic provisions of the rural proclamation of 4 March, 1975 which has six chapters and thirty-three articles is as follows: its Article 4 contains the most important provision of the proclamation by which it abolished private ownership of rural land and made all rural land, including forest and mineral land, the collective property of the Ethiopian people. Land was prohibited from sale, exchange, mortgage, rent or inheritance. The farm land allotted to a farm household was within a maximum of ten hectares.<sup>55</sup>

The tenancy relationships were abolished and tenants were freed from all kinds of debts to landlords. Furthermore, they were given the right to retain agricultural implements and a pair of oxen, belonging to the landowner for which a reasonable compensation should be paid to the landowner within a period not exceeding three years; provided the landowner with no other agricultural implements was not thereby left without such oxen and farm implements for cultivating the land to which he was entitled.<sup>56</sup> Large scale commercial farms were nationalized, some of them distributed to evicted tenants and landless labourers and the rest organized and managed as state farms.<sup>57</sup>

The provisions of the proclamation were to be implemented by Peasant Associations (PAS). Each Peasant Association (PA) was set in an area of 800 hectares, theoretically involving about 80 farm households. The PAs were authorized to distribute land.<sup>58</sup> The old land tenure system was thus eliminated once and for all, through the radical reform. Concentration of land in the hands of a few was abolished and land was distributed to the tillers. Furthermore, employment was allowed to women with no other means of livelihood and state farms were allowed to use hired labours.<sup>59</sup>

Any person authorized to perform any function enter at any time any land which is or may come under the provision of this proclamation was vested the right to exercise his duties. Any person who obstructs the execution of the proclamation

or who violates its provisions is deemed to be guilty of an offence and punishable under article 35 of the special penal code proclamation.<sup>60</sup>

The proclamation therefore not only aimed at fully redressing the inequality in land distribution and destroying the power base of the ruling classes, but it has also eventually replaced the former system by radically different social relations.

## **2.5. Rural Institutional Development and Implementation of the Land**

### **Reform Legislation**

Every social system creates its own corresponding institution that facilitates the maintenance of its social, political and economic status quo by eliminating the older ones. In view of this fact rural institutions at different levels with distinct economic, political and social functions have emerged in Ethiopia.<sup>61</sup> The rural masses are organized under peasant associations, service co-operatives, youth and women's organizations and agricultural producers co-operatives.<sup>62</sup> So one can hardly find an individual in the rural areas that is not affected in one way or another by the emergence of such institutions except in some areas.<sup>63</sup> Since then, *Zemach* students who sincerely wanted to conduct the implementation of the land reform and resonate the outcries of the peasants explained, "justice had to be restored" through the elimination of inequalities. The nation for the purpose of the *Zemecha* was divided into six regions, 56 provincial units and 505 districts. Each provincial unit had 8 to 12 district stations with 100 to 120 *Zemaches* assigned to each station.<sup>64</sup>

In Arsi, the program of the *Zemecha* was co-coordinated from its headquarter in Assella, the then *Ras Darge* senior secondary school. A certain colonel Zenabu from the Air Force was the coordinator of the *Zemecha*. Each one of the employees of the MLRA from CADU were assigned in each district.<sup>65</sup> The arrival of the *Zemaches* had achieved warm reception from the society and it seems that

the people were glad because they already had in their mind that the advent of the *Zemaches* would lead to an immediate implementation of the “Land to the tiller”.<sup>66</sup>

Progressive elements from the MLRA, *Awraja* and *wärada* administrators and police men had corroborated with the participants of the *Zemecha* to have the peasantry sensitized and repeal dissident movements of the landlords. As of the proclamation of the land reform, the landlords quite openly oiled their guns and announced that no one would ever take their land away. From the beginning of May 1975 onwards, the students and organizers of the *Zemecha* in each *warada* from MLRA who had managed to gain the peasants trust, held an increasing number of general assemblies in their entire region, with the tenants to discuss the best way of applying “Land to the tiller”.<sup>67</sup>

With these efforts by the progressive elements however, the landlords who were armed while the peasants were not began to threaten the peasants hoping that such intimidation would cut off the tillers from the land they acquired by the legislation.<sup>68</sup> As the landlords soon coordinated themselves with the leaders of the police force and the bureaucracy for these were also possessors of land excess of ten hectares, they expropriated the plough oxen of the peasants.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, they intentionally spread rumors such as, the activities of the revolution shall soon be repulsed; land will be restored to the landlords and unchallenged members of the aristocracy were at the get way to enter the capital through Tigray, Gonder and Gojam. They claimed, prince Asfawosen, General Nega Tegegn and *Ras Mengesha Seyoum* were to enter the capital through Gojam, Gonder and Tigray respectively.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, the peasants were told by the landlords not to plough their land since the state was ready to have it inherited before the harvesting season.<sup>71</sup>

Albeit these repercussions had flared, the *Zemaches* organized the rural communities and engaged in activities of giving basic education, building

infrastructure and undertaking persistent political agitation as a result of which the class consciousness of the peasants was heightened.<sup>72</sup>

I couldn't find an aggregate data available to make it possible to answer quantitatively the number of *Zemach* students assigned to each districts. Neither has it been possible for me to enumerate number of *Zemaches* dead, *injured* and compelled to have evacuated their camps.

When the *Zemaches* moved from propaganda into action and started organizing peasant associations among the tenants, serious conflicts were staged between the *Zemaches* on the one side and the landlords on the other.<sup>73</sup> The landlords at Gimbiti Kebele of Lemu Bilbilo *wärada* killed and seriously injured a male and a female *Zemach* students respectively while they were engaged in the task of disarming the landlords.<sup>74</sup>

In their move towards the total rebellion the landlords had got full support from the police force. As they were in an assembly at Degaga, the police force begun shooting at them and chased them from their camp.<sup>75</sup> Likewise, landlords in Huruta who regained their arms after being dispossessed by the *Zemaches* had detonated the camps of the *Zemaches* by throwing grenades and subsequent firing. The most notable among these were: Lieutenant Kassa Dilnesaw who was a member of the *Mähal safari*, Mengistu Aba Daget, Abebaw Belete and Bune Hirpaye. When matters were at their worst stage, the *Darg* members at Assella sent a territorial army to defend the students and maintain order. Landlords escaped into the nearby small towns and Addis Ababa. Consequently, their property was confiscated when half of it was left for the sustenance of their family.<sup>76</sup> Events at Aseko, Tena and Ticho *Awraja* were the same and *Zemaches* were threatened by the landlords.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, conditions were soon brought under control by the coalition of the *Zemach* and territorial army as a result of which the task of organizing the peasant associations was prolonged.<sup>78</sup>

In the summer of 1975, it appeared that landlords were not only disseminating rumors that the government was going to confiscate the harvest from the peasants and harassed *Zemach* students, they had also staged a serious armed confrontation with the army.<sup>79</sup> Among the landlords who had contended the concomitant developments of the pre-revolution, *Fitawrari* Bekele Ogeto the then vice governor of Ticho *Awraja* rose in to prominence.<sup>80</sup> He contended the revolution partly for he was a commercial farmer and was part of the regime as well.<sup>81</sup>

Therefore, Bekele took to the Galema forest east of Shirka *wärada* with other 16 men among of whom Haile Michael Gemedo and Kedir Edo were the most prominent. They had exchanged news with Merid Berru who had also raised a similar insurgence in northern Shawa. In an attempt of maintaining the status quo, he organized his own judicial tribunal where the resident peasants of the area were bound to report to his court.<sup>82</sup>

Incidentally, a son who was harassed by his own father came to his court and appealed for Justice to be done. Instead, he was blatantly rebuffed by the *Fitawrari* as a result of which the plaintiff has decided to do away with the force of the landlords from the area. In due course he went to Assella and reported the whereabouts of the insurgents led by the *Fitawrari* and a detailed account of their possessions to the *Darg* members in Asella.<sup>83</sup> Thereafter, an immense preparation was made by the *Darg* members and Territorial Army in Assella for a campaign of abandoning the post of the *Fitawrari* at Galema. The army was given a complete freedom to track down the dissidents and launch a full scale attack on them. An overriding army besieged the post of the later in July 1975 and requested the *Fitawari* to surrender. The governor preferred to die than surrender and began an exchange of fire. However, his adherents who were only retributive to his cause other than effective military operation were easily outgunned and outmaneuvered

by the army. Hence, the insurgents were destroyed and the army had transposed the corpse of the *Fitawrari* to Assella where it was hanged in public.<sup>84</sup>

Similar moves towards aborting the radical land reform were made by *balabats* of Ticho and Arbagugu. Amano Abdulahi who was elevated to the rank of general at Mogadishu had by and large disturbed the peasantry elsewhere in Arbagugu till he peacefully submitted to the government forces. Albeit these repercussions that were aimed at curbing the rural transformation from the old order organizing peasant associations went on unabated.<sup>85</sup>

The rural land proclamation set up peasant Associations (PAs) and each PA was to be organized on an 800 hectare area, and membership was to be made up of tenants, landless laborers, owners with less than 10 hectares, and after the completion of the land distribution, former landlords who were willing to cultivate personally their holdings. PAs were given a wide range of functions and responsibilities, chief among which were the following: to administer public property; to establish service co-operatives; to build schools and clinics; and to undertake villagization programs. Initially, however, their major function was to implement the land reform.<sup>86</sup>

Their powers and duties were further strengthened in a subsequent proclamation issued in December 1975, some of which were to enable peasants to secure and safeguard their political, economic and social rights; to establish co-operative societies and peasant defense squads (militia) for the fulfillment of its goals and aims and to enable the peasantry to work collectively thus speedup social development and level of production.

In Arsii, peasant associations were being formed at the same time as the landlords 'power was broken, i.e., in the summer of 1975 and 1976. The mobilizers were *Zemach* students as well as employees of the Ministry of Land Reform and

agriculture. Since *golmassa* area an equally parallel method with *chiqa shum* was practiced in the region, PAs were established along with the same pattern. In the former Chilalo *Awraja*, the prospect for creating peasant associations seems bright due to the already existing co-operative movement which has begun by CADU since it was one of the objectives of the organization. With the proclamation of land reform, the incipient co-operatives were dissolved and reorganized into PAs in accordance with the proclamation.

Membership was obligatory and two types of committees had been elected. The executive is the one which usually consisted of the chairman, vice chairman, the secretary, the cashier and one additional member. The other committee dealt with judicial matters and its chief function was to handle conflicts between members, and for this purpose it possessed some judicial powers.

Peasant Associations had been founded every where in Arsii and there were 969 Peasant Associations in 1975 with a population of 33,864. The number of peasant associations had increased to 1,182 with a population of 288,000 in 1976 thus indicating that all farming households in the region were organized into Peasant Associations.

As shown in the following Table, on the basis of proclamations, 969 PAs which were established in Arsii in the summer of 1975 and 1976 are illustrated. It has to be noted that the figure is enumerated after the two *wäradas* of the current Arsii i.e. Gedeb Asasa and Kofele are reduced.<sup>88</sup>

**Table 5. Number of PAs, size of land and population in Arsii**

No	Name of the <i>wärada</i>	Number of PAs	Size of the land		Number of population	
			Minimum/ <i>gasha</i>	Maximum/ <i>gasha</i>	Minimum	Maximum

1	Zeway Dugda	72	15	42	431	3920
2	Dera	45	16	25	280	2520
3	Eteya (Hetosa)	53	16	22	448	3360
4	Bekoji	62	20	26	225	302
5	Sire	52	16	40	448	3360
6	Shirka	71	-	-	-	-
7	Sagure	47	-	-	-	-
8	Jeju	45	20	27	610	2352
9	Chole	31	18	33	610	3119
10	Merti	36	-	-	-	-
11	Guna	25	-	-	-	-
12	Aseko	30	14	22	224	3528
13	Gololcha	56	-	-	-	-
14	Tena	41	-	-	-	-
15	Robe	51	13	30	327	2699
16	Sude	62	-	-	-	-
17	Amigna	36	-	-	-	-
18	Seru	44	20	35	2509	4224
19	Tiyo	42	12	41	3360	-
20	Qersa	68	10	47	302	4480
	Total	969	190	390	10074	30504

**Source:** ARDU Publication, Population and Cooperatives Survey, 1981, No.22

In the initial stage of land reform process, struggle for the local power was fought and won by the people who were supported by the *Zemaches* and the army. The role of the state was to withdraw its support from the landlords and their allies and permit the struggle to be carried out. We can further conclude that the feudal relations of production and eviction of tenants resulted from mechanized

commercial farming which characterized Arsii during the imperial regime had been destroyed. Feudalism in its traditional form did not return at all.

Ultimately, already by 1976 PAs were able to co-operate and had evolved to have new political structure. However, although this would be inclusive of a progressively higher proportion of the increasing population, relations between peasants and the administration unveiled an attempt of the state to have full control of rural institutions per se.

The study of the roles played by the PAs in institutionalizing the rural population along co-operativization process, political relations between the associations and the administration which had enforced political decision making and other related issues will be dealt with in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **POST LAND REFORM AGRARIAN POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE PAS: AN OVERVIEW**

#### **3.1. Land Distribution and Family Holdings**

In the first few years of the revolution, the agrarian policies pursued by the military government, were in the main pro-peasant and had a strong populist flavour since the regime did win a measure of popularity among the peasantry. The rural policy left no room for testing and evaluating individual programs after a while to ascertain their viability and adaptability.<sup>1</sup>

The peasantry came to be regarded not as an active force of the revolution but a passive recipient of ‘Socialist’ directives channeled from above. Rural programs were initiated and implemented without any serious discussion of their merits, not even within the various ministries, responsible for their execution.<sup>2</sup>

Land distribution was an important aspect of Ethiopia’s land reform, but the general social climate in the countryside in 1975 was unsettled and the direct and indirect opposition of the landed classes to the reform had created civil discord among large numbers of rural communities.<sup>3</sup>

The first act of implementation of the reform was the organization of peasant associations since the land reform proclamation endowed them with the function of allotting land to the association members. This task was in the main carried out under the guidance of *Zemetcha* participants who, for the most part, were ignorant of rural life and the complexities of local conditions.<sup>4</sup> Since the first attempt in 1976, PAs themselves have designed and pushed through fresh redistribution of land, partly to correct imbalances, and partly to accommodate new members of PAs who have become eligible to a share of land in the years since the organizations were formed.<sup>5</sup>

The proclamation states that the size of land allotted to farming families would as far as possible be equal and that it would at no time exceed 10 hectares.<sup>6</sup> By such measures it was supposed that class differences based on uneven control of land could be eliminated. An equalization of agricultural holdings could expand the holding of poor peasants if they were provided with the plots confiscated from the land lords by the PAs.<sup>7</sup>

PAs have been pressured to engage in periodic redistribution of land or carryout major measures of readjustment since the legally determined area of each PA, i.e., a maximum of 20 *gashas* (800 hectares) can not be changed without the express

permission of a host of higher authorities and not all land within a PA area is cultivable. Moreover, arable land available to each PA is fixed and limited, but the membership of the association expands from year to year as a resident of a PA community becomes eligible to membership of a PA, and therefore to a share of land, at the age of 18.<sup>8</sup> Since new, unused land is either scarce or unavailable, new members will acquire land only if land redistribution is carried out and some of those with larger plots are made to give up portions of them to the others.<sup>9</sup>

Owing to deficient governmental capacity to control such a nation wide program of equalization of holdings and due to the potential political explosiveness of such a program the government did not push the program in 1975.<sup>10</sup>

In Arsii, as elsewhere in the country, land distribution was not effected until 1976. The land reform proclamation did not spell out explicit guideline for the distribution of land. It did not also define a procedure or a time table for distribution but it prescribed any one was entitled to keep whatever he was cultivating up to a maximum of ten hectares without stating the duration of this interim period. This ambiguity was possibly the deliberate outcome of a compromise between equal distribution and therefore a radical distribution as well as an attempt of its delay so as to avoid a considerable disruption of rural social life.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, until the PAs embarked on the land distribution in collaboration with the members of MLRA and *Zemach* students in 1976, peasants in Arsii remained in their holdings by complying to the proclamation.<sup>12</sup> Due to the fact that the landlords have been eliminated or pushed aside and land was distributed by the PAs themselves it was quite evident that the reform had initiated a trend towards narrowing the disparities in land holding size among the peasants.<sup>13</sup> It must be noted, however, that inequalities in land distribution patterns have arisen from a number of factors which can be stated as follows:

First, the area of 800 hectares within which a PA was established was not actually measured. In contrast a traditional settlement boundaries of *golmassa* area was used. As a result the actual area of PAs have varied, which in turn led to different sizes of land distribution to the association members.<sup>14</sup>

Secondly, population density varied within *waradas* and if we assume that the area held by PAs have a limit of 800 hectares, average holding size would vary because of population density variations. Thus, PAs with higher population size were attached to those with small size population. In connection with this, variations also arise from different levels of fertility of land among the PAs, and even within a PA. Most PAs were aware of this fact, and when they distributed land they took full account of different levels of fertility.<sup>15</sup>

Thirdly, inequalities in holding size also arose from differences in family size and number of cattle one had possessed for which he obtained a quarter of a hectare for each cow and a family member.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, farmers' access to oxen was basic source of inequality. Almost 50 percent of the peasants in Arsii either own one ox or none at all. Albeit the proclamation allowed the peasants to confiscate extra oxen and implements during the implementation of the reform,<sup>17</sup> many land lords managed, however, to hide their cattle before the peasantry took action. When the peasantry gained control over the land, they lacked oxen.<sup>18</sup>

A landlord, Gumero Chamo gave his oxen to his ex-tenants for members of the MLRA led by Haylamikael Yami compelled him to comply with the order stated on the land reform proclamation. Thus he gave his oxen to his ex-tenants and sometimes after he prepared a ritual and summoned them for the observance of the rite so that their oxen shall be blessed. He had generously offered them a full-flavored and strong *tej* as a result of which they were intoxicated and fully a slept

while their oxen which they had confiscated from him were in his own barn. Hence, he has deceived them by sending away their oxen to Soddo, Gurage area.<sup>19</sup>

Although the foregoing factors led to inequalities in land distribution, it can be safely pointed out that land distribution was implemented. In the course of such distribution of land in Arsii, the following songs were popular.

Oromo	Gloss
Lafti kan hunduma taate	Land is given to all,
Ya aqoorquažžii ati nagattee	but you lazy landlord you left
Abbaa lafaa yaa lafaa doomuu	me without my land
Wanni awajiin kennee hin oolu. <sup>20</sup>	what is given by proclamation never remain from being impemented

One way of assessing the pattern of land distribution is to look at the correlation between family and land holding size.

**Table 5. Average land holding and family size in Arsii region.**

Family size	Land holding size					Total%
	1.5 ha.%	1.51-2.0 ha%	2.1-3ha%	3.1-5.0ha%	5.1-7.5ha%	
4	38.5	16.9	22.6	14.0	8	100
4-7	17.1	13.8	28.6	26.8	13.7	100
8-11	8.8	10.1	26.4	31.8	22.9	100
7-11	5.7	11.3	28.3	47.2	7.5	100

*Source:* ARDU Pub. No. 13 Land Utilization, Practices, Rural Population and Livestock Survey, Assella, 1979.

As can be seen from the Table, small households have smaller holdings while with larger family size have obtained larger holdings. This implies that land holding

and family size are positively correlated, which in turn implies that land distribution was fairly implemented in the region.<sup>21</sup>

Another survey taken in Arsii region also revealed that 75% of the farmers surveyed admitted that land was properly distributed in their respective PAS, taking family size cattle holding and land fertility into account; while 30% of the respondents complained that land distribution had not been properly carried out. Be that as it may there was no equalization of holding among the members of the PAS.<sup>22</sup> The boundaries for each PA in Arsii was traditional *golmassa* area which was referred to as *Haya Gasha* literally 20 *gashas* of land which was not actually measured but the *Ya ayen gamad* (eye rope estimation) was used.<sup>23</sup> That is to mean a rough estimation of the size of land. When PAs were established therefore, there was a variation in a land size they occupy. Thus, PAs with a small size of population have but large size of land and have been beneficiaries, while PAs with the large size of population but small size of land were not. Moreover, the task of readjusting PA boundaries was a difficult task since it was strictly prohibited by the authorities.<sup>24</sup>

### **3.2. The Role of Women in peasant Associations**

Women are disadvantaged in many respects since they have less access to and limited control over productive resources than men. This is regardless of their enhanced participation in economic activities. On the average, women have smaller holdings, smaller households, scarcer labour, less access to education and agricultural extension services, fewer oxen, less access to farm implements and other services.<sup>25</sup>

Proclamation No. 71 of 1975 endorsed the PAs with legal powers and duties to establish Women's Associations in its article 5.<sup>26</sup> The objective of establishing women's associations was to secure the rights of its members; establish mobile teams which will follow the political, economic and social problems of its

members; establish professional associations; and be sued to enter into contract and to acquire property and draw up its internal regulations.<sup>27</sup>

Since 1975, public policies in Ethiopia have stipulated that access to rural land depends on one's residence within the territorial jurisdiction of a given PA, as well as membership in such association. In practice the head is registered as a member representing the household. Women become member of PAs only when they become heads of households. In addition, it is necessary to possess land in order to get the attention of PA officials.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, registration of the women in PAs required their landholding. Thus women who were viable to possess land were only divorcee and the widowed ones. But, housewives were not allowed to be members of PAs since they were represented by their husbands.<sup>29</sup>

Women's association had participated in procuring logistic supplies for the army mainly during the Ethio-Somali war of 1977. Moreover, they had also established co-operative shops to supply indispensable materials for the rural population.<sup>30</sup>

Women who were members of the PAs were constrained by number of factors which had apparently influenced their activities in their respective PAs.<sup>31</sup> These were, rearing and nurturing children, preparation of necessary food stuff for the family and sometimes tending the cattle.<sup>32</sup> Be that as it may, few of them have been involved in a task of performing their duties in the PAs. Women were chair persons and members of judicial tribunals and defense squads at Seru, Tiyo and Qersa *waradas* among others. However, efforts made by women to come out of economic influences resulted from absence of a law granting property right to the women and restrictions which hampered them from being attendants of PA meetings was a fact arising from their gender *per se*.<sup>32</sup>

**Table 6. Number of Women Associations in PAs of Arsii**

No	Name of <i>warada</i>	Number of PAs	Number of women Associations	Number members of women association
1	Tiyo	42	32	1000-12,000
2	Tena	41	22	-
3	Sude	62	3	-
4	Sire	44	5	-
5	Hetosa	66	66	Min 80 Max 600
6	Qersa	68	68	100-500
7	Lemu <i>ena</i> Bilbilo	62	62	15,2005
8	Merti	7	7	550
9	Dodota	45	29	4700
10	Guna	26	15	1515
11	Jeju	45	13	845
12	Sire	51	51	8027
13	Aseko	30	13	520
14	Chole	31	27	200
15	Gololcha	56	27	2000
16	Tijo Digelu	47	47	17,800
	Total	723	487	19,502,005

*Source:* ARDU pub, No. 12 *Rural populations and livestock survey*, Assella, 1979

### 3.3. Service Co-operatives

Peasant associations were the basis upon which service co-operatives and agricultural producers' co-operatives were established.<sup>33</sup> The rapid expansion of service co-operatives was the growth of other rural institutional developments. Proclamation No. 71/1975 stipulated that service co-operatives be formed, each with not less than three and not more than ten PAs in its article 7 of chapter 2. Among other things objectives and duties of the service cooperatives included,

procuring crop expansion services; marketing the produce of members at fair prices; providing loans at fair interest rates; supplying consumer goods to the members and supplying important agricultural implements and provide tractor services.<sup>33</sup>

During 1975-1990, Service Cooperatives have shown some strengths and usefulness to the rural population by: linking the state sector with the peasant sector; bringing marketing facilities closer to farms; curbing rural inflation as a result of their rationing of basic goods and developing social and marketing infrastructure in the rural areas. These measures taken by SCs can be explicitly stated as follows.<sup>34</sup>

First, SCs provided a platform for the disbursement of loans to the agricultural sector by credit institutions; facilitated provision of tractor, combine harvester and served as guarantor for the distribution of farm inputs (fertilizer, improved seeds, pesticides, herbicides, etc) to farmers on credit basis; served as outlets for basic goods rationed by the rural population by the state distribution agents.<sup>35</sup>

Secondly, most SCs constructed basic services (retail shops, milling, schools etc) needed by the rural population close to farms and their establishment in grain surplus and inaccessible regions brought marketing services closer to most rural inhabitants.<sup>36</sup>

Thirdly, SCs had contributed to price stabilization and to an equitable rationing of basic goods in rural areas thus protecting their members from exploitation by wholesalers and retailers and they have accelerated the process of rural capital accumulation through membership fees, sales of agricultural products, grants, gifts from various local and foreign agencies.<sup>37</sup>

The system benefited farmers living in remote areas, and those who did not have access to markets and all-weather roads. In the mean time, the SCs promoted the

use of economies of scale in transporting marketed grains from farms to central markets.<sup>38</sup> The fact that SCs were geographically widespread and located in remote areas ensured that important farm inputs reached the hands of thousands of farmers living in various regions. This was a remarkable achievement compared to the pre 1975 period. It is estimated that nearly 3000 service co-operatives representing over 15,000 PAs were formed. Nearly 90 percent of the members of PAs benefitted from the services of the co-operatives, whose total capital of about Eth. Birr 30 million was contributed largely by the peasantry.<sup>39</sup>

These rural institutions also have to face the problems of institutional development. Their activities require planning and financial organization for which they are not adequately equipped. Despite such shortcomings, the fact that they are managed by the peasantry, constitute significant development. The service co-operatives, like the PAs, are to form an important but transient step towards the future institutional development envisaged by the government.<sup>40</sup>

In an earnest attempt of implementing the directive issued in June 1979 so as to organize peasant producers cooperatives at a national level, 155 service cooperatives were established in Arsi up to June 1987.<sup>41</sup> The cooperatives had served the rural population by supplying essential consumer goods from their shops and farm implements from the then established cottage industries. Out of 155 SCs 115 were registered and had legal personality. These SCs have had 1,027 PAs, and a total of 267, 850 users with a capital of 21,977,845.05.<sup>42</sup>

### **3.4. Producers Cooperative Associations**

Since time immemorial Ethiopians had dealt with traditional methods of cooperatives such as; *idir*, *debo Jigi*, *iqub* and the like. It was only in the late 1960s that a new venture for the co-operativization was made when subsequent legislations were issued in 1966 and 1968 as a result of which multi-purpose cooperatives were established. The Limu, Dale, Dilla and Keta farmers cooperative associations were established in Keffa, Sidamo and Shawa respectively. Hence, leaders of the cooperatives were among the land owners who kept the interest of the propertied classes other than the mass of toiling peasantry who joined the associations. Powers and duties of controlling the activities of these associations was endorsed to the Ministry of Social Affairs than the Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>43</sup>

Producers' Cooperatives, as the name implies, are directly involved in agricultural production, and are composed of families within Peasants. Associations pooling their resource to produce in common.<sup>44</sup> While state controlled agricultural collectivization caused economic stagnation and was denounced world wide, the regime followed the path of organizing agricultural collectivization in order to bring about social transformation.<sup>45</sup>

The regime took measures of copying the cooperative models from socialist nations and as early as September 1974, a manual was issued as to how union farms were to be organized. It stressed that agricultural union should be organized on voluntary basis to enable members to pool together land and labour to higher productivity. In order to achieve the targets of co-operativization in the country, the military regime pruned to introduce Chinese model to Ethiopia and preparation was made to introduce it. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian government has got closer to the USSR (which meant abandoning China) for political and diplomatic reasons.<sup>46</sup>

The legislation for cooperative farms goes back to the proclamation No. 71 of 1975 which underlined that farmers would be organized into cooperatives formally allowed peasant associations to organize cooperative farms and proclamation No. 74/1975 in order to serve as one of the mechanisms to socialist transformation.<sup>47</sup> As a result, the proclamation No. 138/1978 divided the cooperatives into four types as producers; service, thrift, credit and housing cooperative societies.<sup>48</sup>

The directives for the establishment of producers' cooperatives were issued by the government in June 1979, four years after the land reform proclamation. A program Known as "Green Book", which was initially drafted in Amharic, but was translated into English and then into Russian to be commented on by the Russian experts. According to the directives which were also stated on the program, the farmers have the right to join cooperatives at will, and the initial state starts with the establishment of elementary producers' cooperative referred to as *Malba*. The basic requirement for the establishment of the *Malba* is to pool land for communal holding, leaving plots of up to 2000 square meters retained for private use.<sup>49</sup> Draught animals and agricultural implements remained private property at this stage and the cooperative will pay rent to the owner for their use. The second stage of advanced producers' cooperatives, known as *Walba*, is realized when all land is pooled for communal holding and when all draught animals and implements are transferred to the cooperative. Land for individual cultivation is limited to 1000 square kilometers. Compensation or rent is paid by the cooperative in return for all draught animals and implements that become communal property. All member of a peasant association or a minimum of 30 of them can initiate a *malba* or can directly reestablish *Walba*.

The final stage known as *Waland* is expected to involve several *Walbas* already associated through the association of producers cooperatives. It would include about 2,500 individual members, under an average landholding of 4,000 hectares. Each *Walba* includes all peasant association members. They were to be

designated as *hibre* or brigade, united under a *Waland*. This stage marks a high level of institutional and technological development and they would be assisted by the government. Article 40 of the proclamation has it that they had the right to choose and take over any site for settlement and cultivation, which they considered the best for them. This was unprecedented by any socialist oriented nations since it was not within the socialist cooperative plan.<sup>50</sup>

The Service Cooperatives are to become associations of producers' cooperatives instead of associations of PAs, when most of the farmers become members of producers' cooperatives. The functions of the new associations are to be similar to those of the institutions they have succeeded. They also become the basis for yet another level of institutional development. Thus, the place service cooperatives will occupy in the process of rural institutional change is unique in Ethiopia; in that the service cooperatives are to be eventually transformed into the commune type (*Waland*) and the PAs will be transformed into their 'brigades' (*hibres*).<sup>51</sup>

The income of the producers' after the cost of production, taxes, reserves for investment and social services are deducted, is divided among the members in proportion to the number of work days contributed.<sup>52</sup>

The principle of cooperativization is rooted in a voluntary basis, although encouragement and incentives are provided for the development of cooperatives.<sup>53</sup> For instance, if a producers' cooperative comes into being within a peasant association area, the leadership is taken by persons elected among the members of the cooperatives. Furthermore, a member can not pull out his/her oxen and implements from the cooperative, if he/she wants to withdraw from the cooperative.<sup>54</sup>

It is, however, left to the discretion of the members of a cooperative to compensate only for implements contributed. Service Cooperatives are also anticipated to

provide loans, amounting to 25 percent of their surplus to producers' cooperatives established in their area, and to give priority to meet the cooperatives' needs for inputs.<sup>55</sup>

Agricultural input prices including fertilizers, improved seeds and related items are also subsidized if they are for the producers' cooperatives. Besides, campaigns of persuasion are conducted; seminars, meetings and observation tours are organized. Some model or pilot cooperatives such as Yetnora in Gojjam and Hurata Hetosa in Arsii were set up in some regions and they received full government support, so that their success may convince other farmers.<sup>56</sup>

It is however, likely that the process of cooperativization demanded time, technical, financial and trained man power resources. The high illiteracy rate prevailing among members, problem of planning and organization, and low level of productive forces were factors which has made the task of cooperativization arduous as shall be dealt within the next chapter.<sup>58</sup>

An attempt of organizing co-operative associations in Arsii has gone back to the early 1970s, when the ministry of Social Affairs and Agriculture endorsed powers and duties of organizing the cooperatives to CADU whose objective was undertaking development initiatives in Chilalo *Awraja* of Arsii zone as mentioned in the second chapter. The Ministry of Social Affairs had organized a flour mill and agricultural multi purpose cooperatives at Sagure and Tiriba of Sire *waradas* respectively.

As it has been mentioned earlier, CADU's socio-economic objectives were aimed at maintaining economic growth of the rural population by providing fertilizers, selected seeds, herbicide spraying, medium level farm implements and grade cattle on the one hand and creation of marketing centers on the other.

In regard to its activities related with social services, it has mobilized the rural community to undertake social services in the form of self-help activities which includes road construction, power and water supply to towns, schools and clinic construction, and cover the salary of workers assigned to these social service centers.<sup>59</sup>

As a result of these, eleven multi-purpose associations were established in the *Awraja* and these were cooperatives of Bilalo, Assella, Sagure, Gonde, Itaya, Golja, Ego, Lole, Lemu, Boru Jawi and Gofer among which the Bilalo multi-purpose Peasant Producers Cooperative was promoted to a level of achieving a legal personality.<sup>60</sup>

A number of factors were considered as impediments for the progress of these cooperatives were said to have been: Problems related to tenant-landlord relationship; lack of an organization to control prices of grain produce of the farmers, absence of a philosophy on the basis of which it was organized and lack of an organization in charge of undertaking this task.<sup>61</sup>

As it has been mentioned earlier, the task of organizing cooperatives was vested in PAs and the policy directives issued by the *Darg* have encouraged the cooperatives by and large with full government incentives. As a result, 155 PC's were established in 1027 PAs with a total population of 267,850 in Arsii as shown in the table below.<sup>62</sup>

**Table 7. Peasant Producers' Cooperatives in Arsii Administrative Region.**

<i>Awraja</i>	Number of APCs	Number of PAs	Population of APCs			Capital	
			Male	Female	Total	Birr	Cent
Chilalo	86	582	142,887	17,517	160404	15,301,006	73
Ticho	31	231	53,186	4,217	57403	4,051,225	96
Arbsagugu	38	214	47,193	2,850	50043	2,625,621	36
Total	155	1027	243,266	24,584	267,850	21,977,854	056

*Source:* ARDU Pub, Rural Population and Cooperatives Survey 1981, No. 22.

### **3.5. Villagization**

Villagization, the concentration of scattered homesteads into centralized villages was already underway in 1985. The argument given for the program was a wish to provide modern services such as schools and clinics for the rural population. The full-scale movement began in 1985 in the midst of famine and resettlement.<sup>63</sup>

Although it is new to Ethiopia, the policy of villagization and cooperative villages in rural area was not new in other parts of the world. A number of states had embarked on villagization for political and socio-economic reasons. Villagization had been attempted by socialist and non-socialist countries.<sup>64</sup>

In colonial Africa, drives for collectivization were attempted to deny the peoples access to the liberation struggles fought in their name. In the states that pursued the socialist path villagization was then regarded as a means of promoting rural development. Even in the former USSR, the people's republic of China and North Vietnam maximum potentials were utilized to make villagization a success but non of which were able to have fully achieved their ultimate goal.<sup>65</sup>

In May 1979, Mengistu Haile Mariam had referred to villagization as a necessary step in providing government services to peasants'. Producers' Cooperatives were

encouraged to build villages for their members, following the Somali war of 1977/78, almost all of the highland of Bale region was villagized, partly for security reasons and partly from a policy of settling shifting cultivators, many of whom had in any case been displaced during the war. The model for villagization was drawn largely from the Wabe villages set up in Arsii and Bale to rehouse Peasants evicted from new state farm sites in the Wabe Shebelle valley. These well-publicised showcase settlements were influential in presenting a picture of the ideal new socialist agricultural community, but their cost alone would prevent them from being effectively copied across the whole country.<sup>66</sup>

The campaign had extended to the national level when Mengistu Hailemariam visited Hararghe region in early June 1985 and gave directives to create conditions conducive to the expansion of Peasant Producers Cooperatives in the region.<sup>67</sup> Since then, villagization was accepted as national policy, and became the goal of a major government campaign from the end of the rainy season in October 1985 onwards.<sup>68</sup> A set of official guidelines were circulated, drawing on the model of the Wabe villages, and a National Coordinating Committee for Villagization (NCCR) was set up, with equivalents at regional, provincial, *warada* and PA levels.<sup>69</sup>

The government began a nation wide campaign in late 1985 designed to move some 33 million rural people into consolidated settlements by 1995. Particular attention was given to its impact on land use patterns, agricultural productivity, marketing practices, and human services. The official objectives and rationale for the campaign were given in an Amharic document entitled villagization guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1985.<sup>70</sup>

Its major aims were identified as enhancing extension services aimed at increasing agricultural productivity; promotion, more rational land-use patterns and conserving natural resources; facilitating access of rural people to schools, clinics,

water supplies, and service cooperatives; and strengthening security and self defense.<sup>71</sup>


The articles describe this gigantic program, and outline its organization and implementation in the Arsii region. The region is selected for comprehensive villagization during the first phase of the campaign since Arsii farmers and new villagers live in one of the major surplus grain-producing areas of the country.<sup>72</sup>

The movement of the peasants began after the harvest in December 1985 and continued during the next two months. At the end of this phase some 75 percent of the region's population, or nearly one million people, were living in 856 villages.<sup>73</sup>

At the time of the villagization campaign, 7 percent of the peasants in Arsii were organized in to the producers' cooperatives, and they worked on at the most of 10 percent of the region's cultivated land.<sup>74</sup>

As it has been shown in chapter two, since 1967, the Arsii region had been assisted by a Swedish funded integrated rural development project, initially concentrated in the Chilalo *awraja* where it helped to double the Yields of farmers between 1967 and 1974 by its adopted 'green revolution packages'.<sup>75</sup> The services of the project were extended to the whole region after the revolution, when it was renamed the Arsii Rural Development Unit (ARDU). Thus Arsii led Ethiopia's administrative regions in crop production per capita and yields per hectare. As a result, Arsii became the major area of producing wheat, the second largest for cereals, and the third largest for pulses in the country. Given this productivity Arsii was a test case for judging the effects of villagization program on land use, agricultural production and marketing patterns.<sup>76</sup>

**Figure I: Government Plan of layout for ideal village**



Source: Jhon M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isaksson, *Villagization in the Arsii Region of Ethiopia* (Sweden: Uppsala), p.450

**Key:-** Mass organization office; 2, Kindergarten; 3, Health clinic; 4, Government cooperative shop; 5, P.A. office; 6, Reserve plots; 7, Primary school; 8, Sports field; 9, Seed-multiplication center; 10, Handicrafts center; 11, Animal-breeding station; 12, Enlargement of compound sites; 13, Two sites in greater detail; 14, Neighborhood latrine.

What distinguished Arsii from other regions was its physical and agricultural differences. The holdings of the PAs in Arsii are not so fragmented, and the topography affecting farming is not so far tortured. Moreover, aside from the *ensete* areas of Southern Chilalo, there are no permanent tree crops and most farmers are growing grains and pulses on an annual basis.<sup>77</sup>

Eighteen years of CADU – ARDU assistance has given Arsii’s farmers sufficient surplus to lower the risk of disrupting production by establishing villages but also stimulated extensive tenant evictions as shown in the first chapter, there are many flat areas that are well suited for constructing large settlements covering up to 80 hectares, and the local wood-sided and straw-roofed huts (takuls) are ideal for the rapid dismantling and reconstruction demanded by villagization guidelines.<sup>78</sup>

The ministries operating in Arsii were more effective than those of elsewhere, largely because of the CADU-ARDU heritage. Swedish financed vehicles and roads greatly assisted South East Agricultural Development Zone (S.E.AD)'s staff and members of the *Awraja* and *warada* villagization committees to ensure the campaign's effective implementation.<sup>79</sup>

To sum up, Arsii's historical background which was characterized by extensive migration and inter-farm resettlement, physical and agricultural characteristics, communications and road network, administrative system, and technical ministry infrastructure of the Ethiopian government created the best conditions for successfully implementing the villagization programme.<sup>80</sup>

### **3.6 Agricultural Marketing Corporation**

The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) was established in 1976 in order to buy agricultural produce for domestic consumption, and from 1978-79 onwards became the key government agency regulating domestic food trade.<sup>81</sup> It has set the price for agricultural produce, invariably below market levels, and then forced peasants through their PAs or cooperatives to sale predetermined amounts of cereals to the AMC below the official price.<sup>82</sup>

AMC however, lacked the capacity to acquire a monopoly over agricultural marketing but coexisted with private traders. This created two parallel systems, one regulated by the state and the other by the Market. In these circumstances, the state system would collapse unless the state power was used to sustain it, because of great flexibility, market awareness and general efficiency of private traders, and because the AMC had as a basic objective of the provision of cheap food to the cities and government institutions (including schools and hospitals, as well as the army). Therefore, it paid the producers less than the current market rate.<sup>83</sup>

State farms and producers' cooperatives were brought directly into the system by requiring them to sell all their produce to the AMC, at prices higher than those offered to ordinary peasants.<sup>84</sup> One among the objectives of CADU was the

establishment of marketing centers for agricultural produce as a result of which a department of grain board was established. Hence, it was organized as agricultural Marketing Corporation independent of CADU in 1977. It possessed grain stocks which were confiscated from ex-commercial farmers in the region and workers in CADU under this department were transferred to the new corporation.

Since the government had initiated national economic development campaign to improve marketing and distribution of farm products by providing favourable prices to farmers the corporation was controlling prices elsewhere in Arsii where cooperatives have been developing faster and were performing better than any where else in the country.

AMC prices had been centrally established by the Central Planning Supreme Council (CPSC) or office of the National Council for Central Planning (ONCCP). This was done without taking into account the objective conditions of each *warada* and *Awraja*. In addition, the fixed price was lower than the price offered by private traders, which harmed the peasant's interest.<sup>87</sup>

Traders had to be licensed and obey AMC regulations, including restrictions on the movement of grain from one *warada* to another. They also had to deliver a proportion of their purchases, amounting to at least half to the AMC at official prices.<sup>88</sup> Eventually, they were required in the major surplus producing *awraja* i.e Chilalo, to sell all of their purchases to the AMC, thus converting them into AMC agents or driving them out of business altogether.<sup>89</sup>

As it has been shown in a study of the APCs and individual farmers relation with AMC in Arsii, APCs enjoy a price differential of 4 or 5 *birr* in selling their out put to the AMC relative to the individual peasant sector. Individual farmers have a possibility of selling their produce in open markets after they hand in their quota to the AMC at a price which in general is higher than the price paid to the APCs.<sup>90</sup> Individual peasant producers' were forced into the system by the establishment of

quotas, allocated by the grain purchase task forces at regional, *Awraja* and *warada* levels. These in turn successively gave quotas for service cooperatives of Peasants Associations, and individual households.<sup>91</sup>

On the one hand, individuals who were engaged in trading cereals were alleged by the government as they were saboteurs and intentionally hoarding and/or holding grain anticipating sky rocketing price in the future. Thus, AMC had pulled out from purchasing agricultural produce from individual traders. The peasants were therefore left with no options thus sold their produce to the AMC.<sup>92</sup>

As shown in the following tables, peasants sold their produce to the AMC and purchased items of consumer goods from SCs after they met their quotas.

**Table 8 AMC prices which were centrally established by CPSC/ONCCP in 1988.**

Types of crops	Price-pre-1988		Price – post 1988	
	producer price	CPSC/AMC price	Producer price	CPSS/AMC price
Teff				
1 grade	45	50	48	53
2 <sup>nd</sup> grade	38	43	41	46
3 <sup>rd</sup> grade	34	39	37	42
Wheat				
1 <sup>st</sup> grade	34	39	36	41
2 <sup>nd</sup> grade	30	35	32	37
3 <sup>rd</sup> grade	29	34	31	36
Barely				
1 <sup>st</sup> grade	28	32	30	34
2 <sup>nd</sup> grade	26	30	28	32
Maize	20	24	22	26

*Source:* Arsii Administrative Region A.M.C Office File No. 244/88.

**Table 9 Prices established by SPCs for consumer goods distributed to the members of PAs and APCs who have met grain quotas.**

<b>Industrial products</b>	<b>1986</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1988</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>1990</b>
Salt/kilo	0.15	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Sugar 1 kilo	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Blanket Lazaradis			8.85	8.85	8.85
Wol Blanket 2.30x1.60				22.35	22.35
Debre Birhan 1805		19.00	19.00	19.00	19.00
Debre Birhan Zenbaba		20.15	20.15	20.15	20.15
Debre Birhan 1801		20.15	20.15	20.15	20.15
Bed sheets /number					
Diredawa Horse brand		14.80	14.80	17.50	17.50
Bahir Dar elephant brand		14.25	14.25	14.25	14.25
Bahr Dar		9.10	9.10	9.10	9.10
<b>Canvas shoes/women</b>	<b>1989</b>		<b>1990</b>		
35x38 canvas and plastic	4.00		4.00		
39x42	4.00		4.00		
39x44 male	6.95		6.95		
Plimso canvas	3.20		3.20		
Plimso fanscy	3.60		3.60		
Plimso Male					
40/44	6.00		6.00		
31/33	5.05		5.05		
39/45	8.00		8.00		
Female					
35x39	5.25		5.25		
39/45	7.40		7.40		

*Source:* ARDU Pub. No. 22 Rural Population and Cooperative Survey, Assella, 1981 No. 22.

As it is quite evident from the above Table, it appears that a peasant who sold a wheat/*quintal* at 34 or 36 birr was being able to purchase salt, sugar, blanket and bed sheet at a price of 30.15 birr which was 88.6% or 83.7% of his income from his gain if the price of wheat.

No doubt, the over whelming majority of peasants in Arsii had large family sizes. So the rationed goods allotted to them were not sufficient. Therefore, they were obliged to buy other items including food stuffs from merchants at inflated prices. Besides, the distribution was said to have been unfair. Thus, provisions from SCs did not protect the peasantry from the speculative prices of merchants.

Furthermore, the failure to meet the distribution date in most cases meant the denial of ration goods. Occasionally, the goods that were to be distributed to the peasants might not be necessary for the needs of the members. Thus, the services by SCs were not that much impressive as proclaimed by the legislation and propagated by the regime's cadres.

Thus, despite the relatively fair price of the consumer goods by the SCs the peasants resented the activities of the main agents of the government since they were subjected to grain exactions. A number of factors which had exacerbated rural poverty had and contributed to the disintegration of PCs and SCs as well as villages will be dealt with in the next chapter.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**POST LAND REFORM RURAL INSTITUTIONS WERE FOUND**  
**INFAMOUS AND UNSUCCESSFUL: WHAT WENT WRONG?**

**4.1. Militia and Military Conscription**

Proclamation No. 71 of 1975, added one institution, the peasant defence squad in its article 11, to hand over persons arrested in *Flagrante delicto* to the appropriate authorities, hunt down wanted persons upon order; to institute criminal cases that are under the jurisdiction of the judicial tribunal of a peasant association. These are among the powers and duties of the defence squads of the PAs.<sup>1</sup>

The militia was given the function of maintaining order within the association's area and guaranteeing that decisions made by the committees were enforced. It could also defend the association against outside enemies.<sup>2</sup> In 1977, the Ethio-Somali war had resulted in the growth of the size of militia who were trained at Tateq Military Training Center. Physically strong men were nominated and sent to Tateq for training because the government had won a measure of popularity in the countryside. Once the significance of the land reform became clear to the peasantry, most peasants who were recruited by the association members welcomed the task of defending the country.<sup>3</sup>

Many of the militia men recruited in Arssi were either without plough oxen or had less interest in agricultural activities.<sup>4</sup> Thus, they went to the training center without looking back to the fate of their families since PAs were ordered to look after their families (*Zemach beteseb*).<sup>5</sup>

The returnees from military service went back to their own Peasant Associations and worked with its leadership. They often escorted the peasant association leaders as they moved from place to place to hunt criminals and force the peasants to pay their taxes or give their grain quota, literacy campaign fees, or additional

contribution fees. The peasants in Arssi were ordered by their PAs to work on the farm land of the militia men in mass.<sup>6</sup>

Since 1984, recruits took a three month military training and political indoctrination in the nearby military camps in their respective *awrajas*. This time the peasant association leaders alone began nominating militia men. This was partly because the peasants resented militia nomination for it was adding others who could harass them to provide forced labour and partly for the nominees need to be faithful recipients of the regime's coercive fiat. Others who wished to be government functionaries by abandoning agricultural activities to the cultivators joined the militia men.<sup>7</sup>

Mengistu Hailemariam announced National Military Service in 1981 May Day speech and all Ethiopians aged between eighteen and thirty were required to undergo six months military training followed by two years active service, remaining on the reserve until the age of fifty.<sup>8</sup>

In principle, the commissariat had to decide whom to recruit after each PA forwarded eligible young men. But in practice, inevitably, much of the judgment had remained in PAs hands, while they in turn had been responsible for delivering a given quota of recruits on the due date.<sup>9</sup> As the war was intensified, peasants were, of course reluctant to join the army. Consequently, when the moral and number of peasant recruits dwindled, *Darg's* demand for soldiers became too high. Peasant association leaders who by then metamorphosed into bureaucrats before the very eyes of their fellow peasants were fully empowered to conscript soldiers based on the quota allotted to each PA. They were backed by the village militia and took coercive measure to capture youngsters to fulfill the quota allotted to them.<sup>10</sup>

Local officials had also pretended to recruit peasants into military in order to extract bribes or simply harass the people. More often, the family of the rich peasants for the sake of bribes and those men who antagonized PA leaders or any militia were the best choices. For a peasant and his son to escape recruitment there was only one way, bribing the PA leaders and the militia.<sup>11</sup> A lady who is member of Kitibe PA in Hetosa Wārada had bribed the PA leaders thrice a year to have her son released. Enraged by her continuous bribing, she said, “ልጄን መግዛት ስለቸኝ” literally, I am getting fatigued by purchasing my own son from time to time. On the other hand, poor peasants who were unable to bribe the PA leaders and the militias had nothing to do but hand over their sons, and, if they are young, go themselves. Such sons of poor peasants were not safe even when they were attending schools in the nearby town. The militia men were surrounding the school compound till the shift ends and had captured the students while they were back from the school. PA leaders, the militia and even the regular army swarmed into the villages and ambushed the peasants in the bushes or came during nights to round up youngsters for conscription into the army.<sup>13</sup>

There was a great tendency for able bodied peasants to be captured to fulfill the quota as they went to towns for shopping and other private affairs.<sup>14</sup>

Relatives of the captured youngsters were mournfully lamented to show their grievances gathering around the concentration camps when the recruits were taken to training centers in the distant parts of the nation like Shawe, Tolay and others. Hence, such military conscription had been a show case for the infamous and unsuccessful defense squads established by the PAs.<sup>15</sup>

## **4.2. Bringing Together small Rural Settlements into Larger Villages: An Attempt which failed where it had Started**

Mengistu's derive for villagization in Ethiopia was copied from the Tanzanian example by which Nyerere proposed the gathering together of Tanzania's mass of small remote rural settlements into larger and more effective villages. This could have provided better roads, clean water, and health and education facilities by the policy known as *Ujamaa*, which is variously translated as "family hood", 'self-help' or 'mutual cooperation'.

A vital aspect of *Ujamaa* was thus the promotion of the 'African socialist' principles of communal labor for the benefit of the commune by way of self help at times of communal need such as harvest or the clearing of the new land. Nyerere believed that this would increase agricultural productivity enabling communally cultivated fields to produce a surplus for sale to towns or for export. *Ujamaa* would also ensure that greater rural prosperity would be communally shared.<sup>16</sup>

As it has been mentioned in the third chapter, the Ethiopian answer for its derive to villagization was the same as the *Ujamaa* justification of the programme. To provide the basic essential services, such as extension, marketing, clean water, access to roads, education, and health were the major counts on the basis of which the success of the programme shall be judged. However, though the theory fine, Tanzania's *Ujamaa* and Ethiopia's villagization schemes were imposed from above as we shall see it next. Arsii's regional officials commenced the villagization campaign as soon as they received the government order, for they recognized that the move had to be completed before the next ploughing and planting period began.<sup>17</sup>

The peasants and their local leaders had three months notice to form Peasant Association Villagization Construction and Coordinating Committee (PAVCCC) and its sub committees for restructuring their houses and compounds after selecting sites, demarcate and distribute plots and dismantling their former houses as well. Along the process of undertaking villagization programme in Arssi, each P.A.V.C.C.C., was required to send a daily progress report to the W.V.C.C.C., which in turn sent a summary every three days to the A.V.C.C. massive information were given from small towns to Asella. Thus, since the guidelines were formulated centrally at the National Planning Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture, under the direction of the country's senior government and party leadership, neither the peasants nor regional committee members were involved in conceiving, justifying, or designing the overall programme.<sup>19</sup>

The regime had tried to overcome this immense task of mobilizing the peasantry and rural infrastructural changes by channelling its objective through the villagization propaganda committees. In spite of that however, peasants were less and/or not interested to learn the rationale of villagization and to be given an insight about how to build a better life on the basis of new village settlements. The implementation of the village directives would have better been carried out according to local level experience. Centrally determined directives which were proved inadequate were resented by the peasants.<sup>19</sup>

Thus the peasants were either pressured or forced by political cadres and PA leaders who coerced them to live in the new sites without proper planning. All of my informants in Arbagugu unanimously agree that villagization as a whole was undertaken forcefully, mostly at gunpoint in that *awraja*. The administrator of that *awraja*, Ketema Desta had already shown his merciless measures to the people by burning the houses of those peasants who had asked an adequate space and time to be relocated in the new villages. A certain Ahmed Fata, who had exercised the

high handed rule of the regime in Arbagugu told a peasant to destroy his compound. He gave him a week for demolishing the wood walls and the roof. A week after when he came back to inspect the progress, the peasant was found in his former compound without joining the new village. Ahmed ordered an outright burning of the *tukul*. The *militia* man, however, pleaded for an additional time of a week thus the peasant shall reconstruct the new one. But Ahmed himself burnt the *tukul* while the whole families of the victim were wailing in front of their house which was put on fire.<sup>20</sup>

In Hetosa *Warada* and Amiinña as well, similar measures were taken by leaders of the A.V.C.C.C and P.A.V.C.C.Cs. Samuel Bekele who was a junior high school director at Ligaba and a party cadre had coerced the peasants around Ligaba to join the new villages at Kitibe, Arendema and Quchira. Elders who were labeled as *adharii* (reactionary) were forced to carry a trunk of tree from one PA to another and were also punished by digging pitlatrins. Any one who resented the action will be tortured brutally by the *militia*. Those peasants who were prone to acquiescence or quasi-voluntary were the only exceptions.<sup>21</sup>

In Amiinña, there was project and post project villagization. The first was taken from an example of Wabe project and a certain Damenu was sent from the council of ministers and forced the peasants to the new villages by abandoning the old settlements in Amiinña and Seru. Two PAs were merged in to one and villages of Habe Burkitu, Medfo, Malaqicho, Bamo, Teji, Tege and Kushma were established from 1979-1981. These had primary schools and water supply.<sup>22</sup>

In 1981, Mengistu Hailemariam had visited Amiinña and Seru thus had ordered the R.V.V.C. and A.V.C.Cs to have converted the thatched roofed tukuls to corrugated houses. Hence, the implementation took some four years. By then, Asrat, Gabisa

and Negash were the political cadres who had coerced the peasants to be willing to join the villagization programme.<sup>23</sup>

To the Ethiopian case alike, the Tanzanian government turned to compulsory ‘villagization’; after its attempted persuasion was found unsuccessful. Between 1973 and 1976 some five million people were moved into *Ujamaa* villages and there were 8000 such villages by 1977.<sup>24</sup> As the Ethiopian party officials and V.C.C.C leaders had done, in due course of *Ujamaa* implementation, government and party officials portrayed peasants as backward and ignorant. In addition and more important, peasant cultivators were reluctant to move from areas where their ancestors were buried and their families had successfully grown crops for generations in both cases of villagization.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, despite the government’s statement that the major reason for promoting villages is to make it easier for rural people to get basic human services, in Arssi, these plans had never achieved their objective. The most immediate services needed were community pitlatrines and water systems which were conspicuously absent in most of the new villages of Arssi.<sup>26</sup> The new villagers were also compelled to go to the same town based clinics they used before leaving their farmsteads, and most of their children walked to the schools they attained before they were villagized and the SCs remained where they were before villagization.<sup>27</sup> Tanzanian *Ujamaa* villages however had succeeded in providing the mass of rural people with vastly improved welfare services: Clean water, free health and education facilities. Despite all these effects, Nyerere’s regime had already apologized for such an attempt.<sup>28</sup>

Perhaps the most important reason given for moving the villages was to hold meetings more often. Could have a positive effect on the social well being of the peasantry which is not a human service per se.<sup>29</sup>

In Arsii, villagization was found infamous since it made easier for the government to enforce its strategy of using A.M.C quotas set at low prices and squeeze peasant producers to the advantage of the state. The more that the central regime strengthens its implementation price, marketing and tax policies, the less likely the new villagers will have the higher disposable incomes needed to improve their houses and compounds and contribute to financing their community's basic human services.<sup>30</sup>

Likewise, villagization had affected agricultural production since long walking distance to fields is said to have left less time for essential husbandry practices. It also gave birds, monkeys and other wild animals more opportunity to destroy crops on farms and made pests and diseases more difficult to discover quickly. From the perspective of productivity, it is better for a primary school children to walk three kilometers for their education or people travel 10 Kilometers to a clinic than for farmers to find their fields at a long distance away from their homes.

Villagization had several negative environmental effects in Arssi. Every scrap of wood at old farmsteads was transported to the new village compounds for use in reconstructing houses. As the new villagers began to improve their new houses their search for trees and soil had created environmental stress.

Moreover, overgrazing in the area surrounding the villages is also a threat, since it gave rise to sheet erosion and gully formation.

The people were promised by the government which had announced 'peasants will be provided with educational, health, communications, mill-shop, water, roads, electricity and telephone services if they volunteer for new settlement under the new villagization programme' was far from reality.<sup>31</sup>

As a result when it was quite evident that the regime was at a brink of collapse, the villagers dismantled their settlements and began to repatriate to their ancestral homesteads as quickly as possible as a result of which the new villages were depopulated.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the end result of the attempt at collectivization of small rural settlements into larger villages ended up in a total zero-sum game.

### **4.3. Disaster of the Rural Structures Created after the Land Reform**

There are many open questions about the economic success of the new structures created in Ethiopia following the land reform. The producers' cooperatives had greater incentive to use modern inputs at the same price levels than small individual farmers.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, as it has been shown in chapter three, they had the right to choose and take over any site for settlement and cultivation if they considered were the best for them.<sup>34</sup> Hence, individual farmers were marginalized from their plots when it was taken by the cooperative farmers. Cooperatives were also in a better position to aggregate savings since the income of the producers was divided after the cost of production, taxes and reserves for investment and social services are deducted. However, they do not offer their members the incentive to those who work harder than others.

The differences between the minimum and maximum earnings of the cooperative members are not very great however. Figures which illustrate dividend among members of cooperatives by taking into account *Amiñña Seru awraja* for two cooperatives, i.e. Mala Abiot Fire and *Amiñña Mazeza*, has shown, the maximum and minimum earnings of the years 1986/1987, 1987/1988, 1988/1989 at Mala Abiot Fire APC was 228.85 birr, 169,87 birr and 111.65 birr respectively. Like wise, 138,51 birr 173, 14 and 76.66 birr was the difference between the maximum and minimum earnings at *Amiññ Mazeza APc* for the same years.<sup>35</sup>

As the forgoing figures illustrate, it is quite evident that there was limited gap between the minimum and maximum earnings. Thus, in the APCs hardwork *per se* was not a factor to receive much compensation.

Albeit the APc were to provide better answer for Ethiopian problem in agrticultural the sector than cultivation by individual small peasants along with the development of large modern farms, they were brought under government control and were forced to produce and sell quotas at fixed prices to the A.M.C.<sup>36</sup>

The land tenure system created by the land reform and the political line had pulled the APCs tight together which would have contributed to more productive farming economy.

In addition, the SCs and APCs were constrained by multifaceted problems such as inefficiency in planning, embezzlement, fraud financial management and the power exercised by authorities contrary to the principle of cooperativization.<sup>37</sup>

I will limit myself to the inadequate financial management and how the earnings of the cooperatives was embezzled since this had pushed the peasants to have gallantly rejected the institutions despite the regime's pressure and coercive measures, as we shall see next.

Organizers of cooperatives were less vigilant in their duties of planning, implementing and controlling financial activites of cooperatives which was rudimentarily exercised by the local officials. Hence, income generated by the SCs and APCs was vulnerable to wastage which had resulted either from intentional embezzlement or ignorance of financial management.<sup>38</sup>

Due to lack of a formal periodic examination and checking of the financial records of the SCs, the loss of the accounts of 76 of them had shown 1, 144, 163 birr when

it was checked by legal auditors. The loss would have reached 2,000.000 birr had the other 79 SCs were also checked. 281.146 birr was reduced from the loss of the SCs when 849,016 birr had been misappropriated.

Like wise, due to constraints mentioned earlier, when the accounts of 33 APCs of Arssi to July 7/1987 were checked by legal auditors, it had shown loss of 127, 465 birr of which 24,334 was reduced from the loss and the rest 103,211 had vanished.<sup>39</sup> There is no doubt that this money wasted due to the problem mentioned earlier borne by the sweating peasantry to improve its livelihood. Thus, many other complex factors had brought the grievances of the peasantry to its boiling point as it shall be dealt with in the next topic.

#### **4.4. Short-term Pain for Long-Term Gain: Promises Proved Futile**

The revolution did create peasant associations but controlled them through its political organs, which it formalized in 1984 as the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). As the ruling classes had constrained the rural population, peasants' decisions within their associations were constrained by the party and the state. In spite of the suffering of the peasantry the party officials and political cadres repeatedly told the peasants as there was a long term gain only after a short pain. When and how to grab that long term gain became the critical question of the peasants which remained unanswered.<sup>40</sup>

As has been mentioned earlier members of the Service Cooperatives and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives were compelled to various obligations which they could not escape since the party itself was omnipresent. Each association organized by the regime had exacted dues from the peasants. In addition, the government had controlled the market for agricultural produce through a monopoly which it had granted to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC). It set the prices for agricultural products, invariably below market levels, and then

forced the peasants to sell pre determined amounts of cereals to the AMC below the official price as it has been shown in chapter three.<sup>41</sup> As the guerrilla war against the regime was escalated, and armed insurgency had gathered momentum, the government implemented a universal military service by which its subjects were forced into other forms taxing their children *yalej geber*.<sup>42</sup>

As it has been mentioned in chapter three, proclamation No. 71 of 1975 and a decree of June 1979, had organized and set out a three stage process for achieving collectivization. In the 1980s thus the government channelled most of its resources in support of the promotion of the producers' cooperatives or collectives. Albeit this was done by the government, it was a lost opportunity since the members of the cooperatives were not beneficiaries as we shall see below from the case of 46 APCs in Arssi administrative region.<sup>43</sup>

#### **4.4.1. The Plight of Agricultural Producers cooperatives:**

##### **The case of Lemu *ena* Bilbilo *Warada***

Party officials of Lemu *ena* Bilbilo *warada* were said to have reported to Arssi region workers party of Ethiopia (W.P.E) office that some of the APCs under their jurisdiction had already made dividend of their oxen which they had pulled into their *walba* when they joined the cooperative. The WPE of the region set up a group of men to investigate the case and report to the office of the party as quickly as possible.<sup>44</sup>

The group had comprised members from: Arsii region administration office, revolutionary police, and ministry of fainance, ministry of agriculture, Arsii peasant association and regional police office. Thus, Nigusse Asfaw from Arsii administration office was appointed as a leader of the group. Investigation of how and why the number of the members of APCs began to dwindle and the role played by the organizers and party cadets of the *warada* to find alternative

solutions to the problems was the mission of the group. Thus, the group had mobilized to Lemu *ena* Bilbilo Warada on 17/03/1988. The *Warada* administrator had informed the group that members of the APCs were dispersed and fled their PAs after they took their plough oxen and farm implements. Officials who were sent by the party were belated in their measures since the peasants had already sold their plough oxen and evicted their area to Genale *awraja* of Bale administrative region.<sup>45</sup>

*Warada* authorities had tried to conceal major constraints which had compelled the peasants and the only reason they had tried to mention was the draught which had affected the Gebecho, Qersa, Wonqe, leqa and Kula Jebi PAs.

Concerned with what they called ‘spread of anti-production and producers activities to other APCs in the region,’ the group of officials who were sent by the regional office of the party had made an immense exploration to find out those peasants who fled the area. Before the reach of the peasants, their example was inevitably followed by others thus it affected beyond its borders. So others naturally followed what happened there. When the groups had visited Inqolo Billo, Gura and Gebecho APCs, they found only old people, women and children. Members of the cooperatives were far off the area with plough oxen. Thus, they assembled individual farmers and tried to investigate reasons for the withdrawal of the members of the APCs. The *amraachiis* as the elders called the producers’ were in constant dispute with them (individual peasants) mainly over the grazing areas. Since the administration had employed a number of strategies in order to attract the peasantry into *amraachiis*, individual farmers were discouraged by the imposed higher taxes on them and were threatened by the cadres. In addition, individual farmers told the group that they were forced to pay unbearable ransom to release their cattle captured in the grazing area of the *amrachiis*. Individual farmers had also complained as they were dislocated from their plots and

marginalized into rugged, stony and uncultivable landscape within their PA jurisdiction.

Therefore, since the distributed land to individual members on the basis of equity tempered by a host of social and political considerations there was never full equality of holding within the individual farmers themselves. Thus, individual farmers were alleged by the party cadres as they had contributed to the disintegration of APCs. Besides, the group of officials ascertained that the remnants of the landlords who were stripped of their former holdings were astute enough to propagate the peasants who had destroyed their respective APCs. Be that as it may, officials began searching for the plough oxen taken by the *amrachiis* elsewhere in western Arsii which were already sold.<sup>46</sup>

The leaders of the APCs had collaborated with the members in sharing the plough oxen and farm implements. In this regard, when members of APCs had unanimously decided to put an end to their APCs leaders made a pretentious act of writing a letter to the *warada* officials as if they had refuted measures taken by the members. An outright division of plough oxen and farm implements took place the night after the letter was sent. A certain Hussien Sikosa who was the chairman of Gebecho APCs refused to come to Bekoji when he was summoned by the party officials and the *warada* administrator. This act was also followed by many others who were chairmen of the APCs.

Hargesa, Moche Ejersa, Samera Kolba, Shenan, Gora, Inqolo Belo, Farchu Micael and Bura were the nine APCs which came to an end by their members. The group of the officials brought into its catchment some 16 plough oxen while it was searching in and out of the *warada*. At a time when it was probing for members of the nine APCs, it had met with few of them since others left the area in the pretext of finding pasture for their cattle at a far distant area.<sup>47</sup>

In a discussion held between the members of the groups of the officials and the peasants, the latter had come out with the reasons that had triggered them to flee their areas by putting an end to the cooperative associations. In this regard, members had stated out the problem which had turned to famine, diminution of the income divided among the members year after year, an insufficient 1,000 square meters plot of land for individual cultivation and an equal earning obtained by hard working and feeble peasants due to partial recordings of the work days in the cooperative association. In addition to these impediments, the lion's share of the produce was assumed by the leaders who were frequently absent in ploughing, weeding and harvesting sessions in the pretext of meetings in *Warada* towns and the capital was resented by the peasants. More over, peasants complained that they were heavily taxed for higher taxes and the grain quota they gave to the AMC through the service cooperatives. The peasants came with their testimonies to reveal the facts as to how the leaders of the cooperatives were abusing the gains of their cooperative associations. For instance, while the peasants of the Gebecho APC were starved due to the famine, the chairman claimed contribution of fees to bribe the members of *Warada* administration, police officers and others officials so that they could facilitate aid to the starved members of the peasantry. Thus he had collected 2,200 birr and other 3, 228 birr in the pretext of infrastructure and additional tax.<sup>48</sup>

As all these were emphasized by the peasants, the officials of the group falteringly explained, "You need to be in a short term pain for a long term gain". The peasants therefore envisioned that the officials were in the guise of the former landlords who had exploited their resources. Hence, in an attempt of reorganizing the APCs in *Limu ena Bilbilo warada* the group which was sent by the party had never saved the cooperatives from disintegration.

#### **4.4.2. Higher officials of the Darg Failed to Save the Agricultural**

##### **Producer cooperatives from disintegration:**

##### **The case of 37 APCs in Amiin seru Awraja**

Members of the Gobesa APCs in Amiin gathered together from Yekatit 13-17, 1981 E.C and unanimously decided to put an end to their APCs. Hence, they met with other neighbouring APCs when they had venerated the *tabot* at *Kidane Mihret*. Thus, all made an oath to put an end to their respective APCs what ever comes from the regime.

The Gobesa APC members outlined a five point strategy which was later known as Gobesa strategy. Among these closing the office of the APC, did away with its leaders and organizing a committee which could divide land, farm implements and plough oxen of the organization were preeminent.

The Gobesa APC members therefore divide, the wood from which the barn of the oxen was made and later the oxen as they have designed in their strategy. Then they sent a report to the *warada* party office as a result of which the latter appeared to discuss the issue with members of the APC.<sup>49</sup> Unlike their counter parts of Lemu *ena* Bilbilo *warada*, they had waited for the coming of the officials and raised issues which were similar with the APCs of Lemu *ena* Bilbilo but they had critically pointed out problems related with escalation of their poverty and embezzlement of their resources by their leaders. As usual the *warada* party officials told the peasants it was a short term pain for a long term gain and promised them that they will find a solution soon. But the peasants refused to reorganize their producer cooperative by returning their oxen which they had already taken.

They told other APCs in the *awraja* about their strategies thus others followed their example and launched measures alike the Gobesa APC. The office of

ministry of Agriculture of the *awraja* reported to South East Agricultural Development (SEAD) office as a result of which the latter made its own report to the head office of agricultural development. Thus, Wolenso Rebu, the then leader of the department of the cooperatives in the ministry came to Arsii and discussed with Yosef Ferede cooperatives leader of the same department at a regional level.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, the vice minister of Agriculture, Getachew Worku came to Arsii and gave directives for officials at the regional level that reorganization of the disintegrated APCs was a task which required an outright action. Hence, a group of party officials of the region led by Solomon Gebre, the then chief secretary of the party in Arsii and Tesfaye Shafo administrator of the region went to Amiñña seru to discuss the matter with the peasants. Surprisingly, while the chiefs were talking about the future gain they need to anticipate, female peasants brought body louse full of a basket work disk (*gundoo*) to the officials and told them that what they have profited from *amrachiis* (APCs) was this. My informants told me that all members of the cooperatives of Gobesa, Herota, Bamo, Seru, Mazeza and Medfo Gora had contributed the louse which was to be presented as a gift to the officials. When the party cadres and the police force attempted to use coercive power and detained a few of the peasants alleged by the *warada* and *awraja* officials as they had instigated the peasants, others had violently rose to save their fellow peasants. A group of party officials from Arssi regional WPE office, Arsii S.E.A.D office and *awraja* party and office of the ministry of agriculture went to Addis Ababa and discussed the matter with Dr. Alemu Abebe member of W.P.E Polite buro and Vice Prime Minister of Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Republic and Geremew Deble Member of the Central Committee of the W.P.E and Minister of Agriculture. The highest officials of the Darg told the regional officials that producers' cooperatives have to be maintained again by taking all necessary measures since these were the backbone of the regime.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, the vice prime minister appeared in Arsii's regional office of W.P.E and gave order to alleviate the problems of the APCs. Then, the vice minister of agriculture, comrade Sisay Gebre Giorgis and other officials at a regional level prepared a strategy on how to reorganize these APCs in the *awraja*.

Amidst the preparation of this plan, Fasika Sidele the son of a priest in Robe, i.e the capital of Ticho *awraja* who was an alternate member of WPE polite buro and Geremew Debele went to Amiinna seru to settle problems raised by the peasants. Perhaps Fasika was sent to the area for he was from Ticho. The peasants raised the same problems as they did to their predecessors and made the same gift they gave to Solomon Gebre's group. The highest party officials promised the peasants as usual and told the peasants about the long term gain after a short pain. When to reach that long term gain was only hope than reality. While the officials were talking about the importance of the producer cooperatives to the peasants, an old man rose and began to tell an Oromo saying about a donkey and a heyna and he retorted to the officials

### **Oromoo**

*Mammaaka tokotu, Jirraa, yeroo tokoo hareenii lafaa irra jiraati warabessi, imo waqaa irraa turee, enaa waraabessi yuusuu, hareenii maloo ya rabii issaa sagaleeni issa mi'awuu kana na ergii jete yeroo sadifi ghafatee. Rabii imo inii ergee fii. Waraabessi waqaa irraadhufeti ishi nyatee Numoo akanaa tanee yero Cadreenii amrachi sennaa nun jedhaniisanii ya rabii amrachi sanii nufidhii jeneetii khadane. Kunoo inniss dufetii nu nyatee.*<sup>52</sup>

This can be read as follows:

*Once a donkey was living on earth when the hyena was high in the sky, then when the hyena began to howl the donkey had prayed to her God to send her a creature with such an attractive sound. Then God sent her the hyena by which she was eaten. Likewise, when the cadres told us merits of the amrachiis we prayed that these soon come and solve our problems. But when it came to be true we were eaten by it as the hyena did to the donkey.*

An attempt made by the Darg officials was to no avail. They went back after they ordered the regional authorities to allocate budget for human and material essentials and investigate problems related with embezzlement and poor leadership within the APCs.

Hence, the region had allocated a budget of 40, 363, 95 birr for allowance and 54,558.01 birr for transport cost and materials. The sum total of the expense was 94. 921.96 birr. Albeit a group sent to the area had wasted this amount of birr from the region's capital, it came back with nothing other than recommendation to the officials at a regional and national levels.<sup>53</sup> Thus, the APCs of Amiñña Seru were destroyed not to come back again.

#### **4.4.3. Disintegration of Rural Institutions which Ended up in Looting and Vandalism of SCs**

As the higher party officials had predicted, measures taken by APCs of Limu *ena* Bilbilo Warada and the Amiñña Seru *awraja* was immediately followed by other PCs in the region. The forms of resistance were ranging from silent non-compliance to outright rejection as it has been shown earlier. Hence, peasant production stagnated or seriously declined and their destabilization had extended and deepened rural poverty. The disintegration of rural institutions which were

main agents to exploit and suppress the rural population was positively related to the profound peasant discontent.<sup>54</sup>

The immediate factor responsible for the disintegration of PCs, SCs and villages was the economic reform of March 5, 1991 by which the Darg had announced mixed economy which was intended to give some individual rights in the economic sector. The new economic policy had made provision for the peasants to disband the PCs if they had preferred their cultivation on an individual scale. It had also decisively changed the centralized command economic policy. Thus, following the announcement of the mixed economy, the first and most decisive act of the peasantry was decollectivization. They had disbanded the APCs and divided their assets to return to individual farming. The task was accomplished very rapidly, efficiently and equitably in less than three months in all parts of the region. As a result, plough oxen, farm implements and other assets were distributed among members of the cooperatives fairly and smoothly.<sup>55</sup>

The second measure taken by the peasants was to abandon their new villages and return to their former homesteads. This process of devillagization was not accomplished as rapidly as decollectivization was undertaken. Reconstruction of new homesteads was an arduous task for peasants who at a time were descending a steep slope of economic crises. Thus, many peasants moved to their former places in no less than a year after the reform was announced. Many other remained where they were since they have got enough space to expand their compound and garden because of the peasants who left the villages.<sup>56</sup>

Others also believed that they could get facilities such as pure water, electricity, health and education if they remain in their villages. For these peasants, villagization had the merit to get basic facilities.

PA leaders and party agents who were responsible for the administration of the peasantry kept neutral through out these decollectivization and devillagization processes. This was partly they themselves were victims of coercive measures of the higher authorities and had also observed the global situation which had brought an end to Socialism in Russia and Eastern Europe.

In the last week of May 1991 and first week of June, as the military regime had completely disintegrated, there was power vacuum which gave rise to a considerable rural disorder. Unpopular rural agents who were members of WPE were potential targets for attacks which might be launched by the new forces of E.P.R.D.F. Thus, they went into their hiding when public property was looted and destroyed as a result of the breakdown of law and order.<sup>57</sup>

The only living rural institutions were SCs. The money available in their treasury, fertilizers selected seed in the store, and consumer goods in the shops were pillaged and infrastructures and buildings of SCs were wrecked. Some people died while they were taking part in plundering seeds and fertilizers while they were rushing to have taken their booty.

Albeit many peasants had participated in the pillage of SCs, the main actors were: returnee soldiers who were sent to war fronts by the PA leaders as has been discussed earlier, PA leaders who wanted to ruin records and evidence so as to be free of financial debts and other poor peasants who needed to benefit from what they had plundered. In *Hetosa Warada*, the house of Ras Birru which had served as the office of SC was ruined with the archives which were kept there. Had it not been for that violent measure taken by the peasants, it would have been a historical heritage for the reminiscence of the *gäbbar* system of the *Hetosa Warada*.<sup>58</sup> Thus, destruction of the SCs brought an end to the rural institutions and their economic pillar once and for all.

## Conclusion

Nothing is more critical than the tenure issues in Ethiopia since it occupy pivotal position in a country of great majority of Peasants. It is indicated in the text of the paper that the Arsii Oromo who had experienced communal ownership of land lost their land because of land alienation and grant resulted from conquest and expansion. Thus, the indigenous people turned land less and became *gabbar* on their own land.

Since land was the medium through which the state ruled its subjects, it has used its reversionary right to grant land in perpetuity or temporary usufructuary right. The rapid development of commercial agriculture and the introduction of the new technology, as it has been shown, have brought about several adverse effects on the condition of tenants in particular and on that of small scale farmers in general. A large number of tenants have been evicted as a direct consequence of this development and for the remaining tenants and small scale farmers, many new problems have been created that render doubtful their continued existence in the region. Hence, tenants were under certain insecurity since landlords had full power to evict their tenants.

The text of this paper has indicated that a group of people at CADU had prepared the draft proposal for the agrarian reform since that Swedish sponsored organization was a center of land reform controversy ever since its establishment. The agrarian reform has laid the foundation for further progress in rural development. Overall it has paved the way for more efficient utilization of the means of production, allowing an improved division and specialization of labour and better rationalization of scarce resources.

Despite of all these provisions made by the reform for agrarian transformation, provisions of its article 3 and 4 has reinstated the reversionary power of the state which gave rise to absence of justice, lack of autonomy, good governance and socio-economic crises in Arsii. Under the *Darg* administration Peasants were passive recipients of socialist directives channeled from above when collectivization, grain requisitioning, and villagization programs were tried by the regime through its cadres.

The cadres were able to alienate individual farmers from their former possession and relocate them in marginalized plots in the guise of cooperativization using the state's reversionary right as a weapon. Thus, since the state replaced the landlord as the owner of land and because the agrarian reform gave the state ultimate rights over the disposition of land, the problems of rural institutions indicated in the text had emanated from insecurity of tenure.

The extreme socio-economic crises introduced to Arsii through what the regime claimed developmental programs are also developments found out by this thesis which had turned out to be the most infamous and unsuccessful.

There is no doubt that Article 40(3) of the current constitution (1995) which states, "the right to ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as natural resources, is exclusively vested in the state and peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of Nations, Nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sell or to other means of exchange" is a simple extension of Article 3 and 4 of the land reform proclamation of 4 March 1975 which made all rural lands collective property of Ethiopian people and allowed any form of transfer. This had also reiterated the reversionary power of the state which has great impact in insecurity of tenure.



By taking in to account the importance of cooperatives for the development of agricultural sector, the government of Ethiopia had issued a new proclamation which encouraged establishment and development of agricultural cooperative societies by the proclamation No.85/1995. Reorganizing and strengthening of the already existing cooperatives and establishment of the new one's along with the principle of cooperativization is endorsed to independent Department of Cooperative Promotion department in agricultural bureau.

Thus, as it has been shown in this thesis, ever since the communal ownership of land had turned into private holding, tenure insecurity was the major constraint of the rural economic development. Expected developments in the agricultural sector could be maintained where there is security of tenure which will be guaranteeing land holding and boost the morale of the peasants to develop their economy. However, since the state was given the right to control land these expected developments shall be far from reality. Hence, community ownership of land by which all members are to be under the surveillance of their leaders while using their land will have a considerable significance to up-life the out put expected from the agricultural sector.

## Notes

### Chapter One

- <sup>1</sup> A map in Eastern Arsii Zone Administration Office.
- <sup>2</sup> Informants: Hadji Abubeker Jibo and Hadji Gameda Hedeto
- <sup>3</sup> Abbas Hadji, "A History of Arsii (1880-1935)," B.A. Thesis (Addis Ababa University, Department of History, 1982), p. 5.
- <sup>4</sup> Informants: Sheik Mohammed Hadji, Hadji Abubeker Jibo; Abbas Hadji, "A History of Arsii..." p. 5
- <sup>5</sup> Tesema Ta'a, "Bribing the land": An appraisal of the farming systems of the Maccaa Oromo in Wallagga," in *North East African Studies*, Vol. 9 No. 3, 2002, p. 100.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>7</sup> Informants: Aliye Tolola, Hadji Gameda Hedeto. The term stemmed from the people strong attachment with their land as there were instances where by some of the people had been buried on their ancestral land. Parley aimed at demonstrating their association with their ancestors.
- <sup>8</sup> Tesema Ta'a, "Bribing..." P. 104; informants; Sheik Mohammed Hadji, Hadji Gameda Hedeto.
- <sup>9</sup> Katabo Abdiyo, "A Historical Survey of Arsii Oromo (1910-1974)" M.A. Thesis Addis Ababa University, Department of History, 1999), p. 19; Abbas Hadji, "A History of Arsii..." P. 46.
- <sup>10</sup> Informants: Hadji Abubeker Jibo, Sheik Mohammed Hadji. They Maintain that The Arsii Oromo have an old custom of planting trees on the graves of deceased persons. In so doing they contributed substantially to the region's forest coverage.
- <sup>11</sup> Informants; Aliye Tolola, Hadji Abubeker Jibo; Abbas Hadji, "A History of Arsii..." p. 6

<sup>12</sup> R. H Kofi Darkwah, *Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813-1889* (Heinemann ed. Books ltd., 1975), P. 191; Katabo, p. 18.

<sup>13</sup> Katabo, P. 18; Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Addis Ababa University Printing Press, 2002) pp. 62-63. *Gabbar* was a term referring to tribute paying peasants while tenant was someone who pays one quarter to half of the total of his produce in return for the land they utilized.

<sup>14</sup> Getachew Regassa, “A Historical Survey of Chilalo Awraja (1941-1974)” M.A Thesis (Addis Ababa University, Department of History, 2006) p. 19; Katabo, p. 19.; J. M. Cohen, “Rural Change in Ethiopia: A study of land, Elites, power and values in Chilalo Awraja,” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation (University of Colorado, 1973) p. 22; J.M Chen and D.Weintraub, *Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia: the social Background to the Revolution* Van Gorcum and Comp. B.V. Assen, 1975), p. 28.

<sup>15</sup> Informants: Ato Kebede Fesese, Hadji Abubeker Jibo, Hadji Gemedo Hedeto; Katabo, p. 19., Abbas, p. 6., Getachew, p. 20. Through this procedure, the *Hattis* of this area lost most of their clans’ land except retaining a few *gaššas* for their own personal use.

<sup>16</sup> Sisay Kinfe, “Historical Review of Agrarian Life: the Case of Ligaba and its Surrounding Until 1991” B.A. Thesis (Dilla University), Department of History, 2004) p. 5; katabo, p. 19. Getachew, p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Katabo, pp. 24-25; Informants: Hadji Gemedo Hedeto, Aliye Tolola

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Abbas, P. 7

<sup>20</sup> Bahru *A History of Modern Ethiopia.....*, p. 1991; Katabo, p. 38.

<sup>21</sup> Addis Hiwot, *Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution* London: 1975, pp. 82-84.

<sup>22</sup> Informants: Hadji Aliye Tolola, Usman Hamda, Adam Bulle and Ganna Hamda; Katabo, p. 26; Abbas, p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 26; p. 19; *Gasha, qalad* was a standard land measure used for land measurement and redistribution. It was measured by a rope (usually made of leather) 67 meters long. For a rough comparison of size of a *qalad Gasha* see Gebrewold Engidawork in *Ethiopia Observer*, S (1961) p. 303.; Tesema Ta’a, “the Basis of Political Contradictions in Wallega: The land Apportionment Act of 1910 and its consequences,” in *North East African Studies*, Vol. 5, No..2, 1984, p. 184; See also Bahru, *A History of Modern Ethiopia*, p. 90.

<sup>24</sup> Katabo, pp. 26-27

<sup>25</sup> Informants: Hadji Abubeker Jibo, Sheik Mohammed Hadji and Ato Kebede Fesese. The later informant has served in the office of Ministry of land reform and Administration of Arba Gugu *Awraja* since his employment till his retirement.

<sup>26</sup> Katabo. P. 27.; Arne Lexander, *Land Ownership and social organization in Wajii area CADU Publication*, No.50 (March, 1970), pp1-7.

<sup>27</sup> Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern...*, pp. 192-193.; Patrick Gilkes, *The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Moderation in Ethiopia*. London, 1975, p. 585; Katabo, p. 46.

<sup>28</sup> Informants Usman, Mamiyo and Kedir; Bizuwork Zewde, "land Grant and Tenancy." A Case study of Arsii," *The 12<sup>th</sup> International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (East Lansing, Septemebr 5-10, 1994), p. 533.

<sup>29</sup> Bahru Zewde, *A History of modern...*, p. 90; Katabo, p. 29

<sup>30</sup> Katabo, p. 30

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern.....*, p. 87.

<sup>33</sup> J.M Cohen and D.Weintrab, p. 139; Katabo, p. 27

<sup>34</sup> Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern...*, p. 191.

<sup>35</sup> Katabo, p. 39.; Getachew, p. 35.

<sup>36</sup> Archieve, Wolde Mesqel Tariku Research Center, Folder No., 2237, File No. 6961; Dated: Hamle 7, 1939 (July 14, 1947).

<sup>37</sup> Informants: Ato Kebede Fesese, *Mamere'* Yergu Astemer (A Priest in Sere town), *Megabi Mister* Mesert Tesema (former government Servant who served in the Ministry of Education as Clerk and now retired, but actively involved in teaching the orthodox *Tewahdo* doctrine).

<sup>38</sup> Katabo, p. 42; Informants: *Ato* Kebede Fesese, and *Ato* Getu Assafa

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Informants: Adäm Bullé, Hadji Aliye Tolola

<sup>42</sup> Katabo, p. 44.

<sup>43</sup> Informants: Haji Aliye Tolola, Usman Hamda, Adam Bulle and Gänna Hamda.

<sup>44</sup> Kofi Darkwah, *Shoa, Menelik ...*, p. 102.

<sup>45</sup> Katabo, p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> Bahru, *A History of Modern...*, p. 193; Getachew, p. 43. Katabo, p. 46.

<sup>47</sup> Informants: *Megabe Mistir Meseret Tesema, Memere Yirgu Asteemer.*

<sup>48</sup> Katabo, p. 47. Awči is an Amharic term by which the landlord could offer a new sharecropping arrangements to the same tenant if he wished to. This was not an act of special generosity on the part of the landlord, but simply an incentive to bring this land into farming and to develop it through the hard efforts of the poor tenant.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, *Sisso* is Amharic term for one-third. Regarding the *Blabbat sisso* it did not stand for what it actually meant (one-third) instead it remained a misnomer. See Tesema Taa “the Basis of Political...”, p. 186.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Tidenekialesh Asfaw, “Mechanization of Agriculture and its Impact on Peasant Farms; With Particular Reference to Chilalo and Ada Awrajas,” BA Thesis (HSIU, Economics, 1973), p. 4; Getachew p. 49.

<sup>52</sup> Katabo, p. 51; Informants: Kebede Gebre, Masresha Teferi, Gebeyanech Eshete, Kasso Abdulreshid.

<sup>53</sup> Katabo, p. 58.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Getachew, p. 48.

<sup>57</sup> David, A Green, “Agricultural; mechanization in Ethiopia: An Economic Analysis of Four Case Studies,” Ph.D. Thesis (Michigan State University, 1971) p. 1.

<sup>58</sup> Katabo, p. 49.

<sup>59</sup> Katabo, p. 50.

<sup>60</sup> Getachew, p. 50; Dessalegn Rahmato “Moral Crusaders and Incipient Capitalists: mechanized Agriculture and its Critics in Ethiopia.” *In the Proceedings of the Third Annual Seminar of the Department of History.* (AAU 1986), p. 64.

<sup>61</sup> Katabo, p. 52

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 63.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid* .

- <sup>64</sup> Getachew, p. 48
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>66</sup> Informants: Kebede Fesese, *Memere Yirgu Astemer*
- <sup>67</sup> Katabo, p. 53.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> Getachew, pp. 50-51.; Katabo, p. 51.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>72</sup> Tidenekialesh Asfaw, “Mechanization of Agriculture and its..”p. 5.
- <sup>73</sup> Katabo, p. 51.
- <sup>74</sup> Henock Kifle, “Investigation on Mechanized Farming and its effects on peasant Agriculture”, *CADU Publication*, no. 74 (March 1972), p.1.
- <sup>75</sup> Dessalegn, “Moral Crusaders and ...,” p. 74.
- <sup>76</sup> Katabo, p. 52. Getachew, p. 52.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>78</sup> Henock, “Investigation of Mechanized farming...” p. 27
- <sup>79</sup> M.Stahl, *“Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in Agricultural Development*, (Stockholm, 1974), pp. 80-81.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*; Katabo, p. 54-55
- <sup>81</sup> M.Stahl, P. 103.; informants: Haji Aliye and Andargachew
- <sup>82</sup> Katabo, p. 55.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>84</sup> Stahl, p. 106.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> Henock, “Investigation of Mechanized Farming....” P. 29.

<sup>87</sup> Katabo, p. 56.

<sup>88</sup> Katabo, p. 57.; Dessalegn, “Moral Crusaders and ...” p. 77.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*; p. 58

<sup>92</sup> Henock, “Investigation of mechanized Faming...”. P 29.

## Notes Chapter Two

<sup>1</sup>Andargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1987 A Transformation From an Aristocratic to a totalitarian Autocracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1993, p. 97; Ottaway Marina “The Ethiopian Land Reform: From Political Change to Economic Development” *Proceedings of the 8<sup>th</sup> International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*, A.A.U, 1984, p. 559.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid*, pp. 98-99.

<sup>3</sup>Henock Kifle, “Investigation on Mechanized Farming and its Effects on Peasant Agriculture”, *CADU Publication*, No. 74 (March 1972), p. 73.

<sup>4</sup>Informant: Asefa Woldemicael, Tadele Nigatu. The Former Informant was an elementary school teacher in Lutheran Mission School when the Swedes had visited the area. He had served in CADU and the Later ARDU in Various Capacities as oprganizer of cooperative as well till his retirement.

<sup>5</sup>*Addis Zaman*, “Ethiopia ena Sweden Ye’ersha Sememenet Teferaremu, “(Ethiopia and Sweden Signed an Agreement of Co-Operation for Development) 27<sup>th</sup> Year, No 819, Pagume 4, 1959 E.C.

<sup>6</sup>Archival Source from CADU, A Letter of Meskerem 12, 1960 E.C. Ref. No. 433/60 from The Ethiopian Imperial Government Ministry of Agriculture to CADU which Consists the Plan of Operation and the Signed Agreement. The Letter is attached as appendix I.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>8</sup>Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit Plan of Operation for Regional Agricultural Development in Chilalo *Awraja*, Arussi Province, Ethiopia, 1967-1970. Annex to the Agreement of September 8, 1967, between the Swedish Government and the Imperial Ethiopian Government on Co-operation in the Field of Region Agricultural Development. This Document is attached as Appendix II.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>10</sup>Archival Source from CADU, a Letter of megabit 15, 1990 E.C. Ref. No. 3-8/12 from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Social Security Agency.

<sup>11</sup> Andargachew Tirunch, *The Ethiopian Revolution...*, P. 98; Bengt Nekby, *CADU an Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming*. Sockholm: Prisma Publishers, 1971, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Informants: Hadji Aliye Tolola, Usman Hamda, Adam Bulle and Ganna Hamda; A.R.D.U. and MLRA “General Survey on Arssi,” Assela, 1976.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid*; Table 3 is obtained from Arsii Administrative Region(M.L.R.A.,1965E.C)

<sup>16</sup>J.M Cohen, “Rural Change in Ethiopia: A Study of Land, Elites, Power and Values in Chilalo Awraja, “Unpublished Ph.D Dissertaion (University of Colorado, 1973)p. 345.

<sup>17</sup>Henock Kifle, “Investigation on Mechanized ...” p. 73; Ottaway Marina, “*The Ethiopian Land Reform...*”, p./ 567.

<sup>18</sup>Ottaway Marina, “*The Ethiopian land Reform...*”, p. 559; Informant Asefa Woldmichael, Tadele Nigatu., the Later Informant has Served in MLRA in Wallagga and Arssi till his retirement.

<sup>19</sup>Informants: Asefa Woldemichael and Tadele Nigatu

<sup>20</sup>Andargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution...*, p. 98.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup>*CADU Publication*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 1975, pp 1-9; Kiflu Tadesse, *Ya Tewled*, (That Generation), p. 304; Henock Kifle was the Managing director of CADU after he was educated in U.S.A and Graduated in Comparative Economics. He was a leading figure in drafting the propped agrarian reform with his close associates in CADU. He was one among the radical militant students in the Ethiopia Student Association in North America (ESANA) and the later Ethiopian student Union in North America (ESUNA) till he returned to his country and joined CADU. His farther was *Dajazmach* Kifle Dadi this might have protected him from any assault attempted by the aristocracy. Belay Abay of the MLRA was also the son of *Dajjzmach* Abay Kassa who was the governor of the then Arussi at Ticho thus had exploited his father’s background like Henock. Both were sentenced to Jail by the *Darg* though they were released soon.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, land Tenure center *News letter*, University of Wisconsin Madison, number 47, January-March 1977, p.6.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>Informant; Tadele Nigatu, Asefa Wolde Michale, Arega Guda and Zebene Wubshet who was active participant among the students in Asalla.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>Andrargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution...* pp. 99-100

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid*,p.99.

<sup>39</sup>*Nagarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 31 of 1975 Chapter 2 and 3 Addis Hiwet *Ethiopia from Autocracy to Revolution*. London, 1975, P.98. Lapiso G.Dilebo, Land Tenure underlying cause of Ethiopian Revolution; *Proceedings of the fifth International Conference of Ethiopian studies*, Chicago, 1978, p.426.

<sup>40</sup>Tefera Haile Sellassie, *The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974-1991: from a Monarchical Autocracy to A Military Oligarchy*, London, 1997, p,150; Eetana Habte ‘Administration of Wallagga under the Dergue’ MA thesis A.A.U, 2007 .pp.26-27; *Nagarit Gazeta* proclamation No. 11. A proclamation to provide for Development through Cooperation Enlightenment and Work Campaign. The *Zämecha* or development campaign was launched before the land reform as a literacy and development effort spurred by high school and university students sent out in the country side while schools remain closed. After the land reform was proclaimed, the main task of the Zemach students became its implementation. The campaign officially lasted until the fall of 1976, when schools were reopened, but in reality it started winding down by late 1975, as many students deserted their posts, or were pulled out by the government either for trying to stir up opposition among the peasants or simply for causing friction through their lack of understanding of local conditions. For more detail, see Marina Ottaway, ‘Land Reform and Peasant associations: A preliminary Analysis,’ *Rural Africana*, 28, Fall 1975, pp. 34-54.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>*Addis Zäman*, “Sile edget Behbret Yetsete Wusane, Mezmet Gedeta Selemehonu, (A Resolution made about Zämecha: Particiupation in the Campaign is Mandatory), No. 542, Tikimt 19, 1967 E.C.

<sup>46</sup>Tefera Haile Sellassie, *The Ethiopian Revolution....*, p. 150.

<sup>47</sup>Etana Habte “Dergue Administration....”, p. 27.

<sup>48</sup>Tefera Haile Sellassie, *The Ethiopian Revolution....*, p. 150.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Christopher, Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, Cambridge, 1988, p. 161.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup>Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern....*, p. 241.

<sup>54</sup>Neguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development in Ethiopia,” *ARDU Publication* No. 25 (Febtruary 1984), 9.22.

<sup>55</sup>*Nägarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 71 of 1975....., Chapter 2-6.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup>Neguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian...., pp. 24-25; Ottaway Marina, “The Ethiopian Land Reform...., pp. 562-565.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup>Informants: Arega Guda, Moges Alemayehu and Ermias Wolde Amanuel. The former was an employee of MLRA and Coordinator of the Campaign at a *Warada* Level.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup>ARDU, Report on General survey on Arsii...., p. 8. Informant: Aräga Guda.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup>Informants: Asefa Woldemicael and Ermias Wolde Amanuel.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup>Informants: Eskinder Amare and Shanko Muda

<sup>77</sup> Informants: Muhedin Ogeto, Asefa Woldemicael. The former is the brother of the Fitawrari and now is a Government employee in Asella

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup>A.A.U and MLRA “General Survey on Arssi..., p. 9.

<sup>86</sup>Desalegn Rahmeto, *Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia*, Uppsala, 1984, p. 39.

<sup>87</sup>ARDU, “General Survey on Arssi..., p. 13.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*

## Notes Chapter Three

<sup>1</sup> Dessalegn Rahmeto, “The Land Question and Reform Policy: Issues for Dehte”, *Dialogue* Vol. I. No. 1. 1992, pp.44.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, pp 44-45.

<sup>3</sup> Dessalegn Rahmeto, *Agrian Reform in Ethiopia*. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1984, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity.....*,p. 157.

<sup>6</sup> *Nagarit Gazeta*, Proclamation NO. 31 of 1975, Chapter 2.

<sup>7</sup> J.M Cohen, “Rural Change in Ethiopia....”,p. 116.

<sup>8</sup> Dessalegn, *Agrarian Reform....*, p. 42.

<sup>9</sup> Informant: Tadele Nigatu. He was member of MLRA and was leading Zemach Students of Arsii in their Campaign of Land Distribution; Archival Source from Arsii Administration Office, a letter of Miazia 16, 1967 E.C. from Peasant Associations in Hetosa *Warada* to Arsii Administration Office informing the latter details of the problems they encountered in an attempting of distribution of land to family holdings.

<sup>10</sup> Ottaway Marina, “The Ethiopian Land Reform....”, p. 560.

<sup>11</sup> J.M. Cohen, “Rural Change in Ethiopia....”, p. 117; Dessalegn, *Agrarian Reform....*, p. 42; Informants: Feleke Haile Mariam. He was the Chirman of Arsii Administrative Region Peasant Association during the Distribution of Land.

<sup>12</sup> Niguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian....”, p. 32; Informants: Fikre Hailemariam, Tadele Nigatu, Worqneh Fetene. The Later had Served as Chairman of Auditing and Controlling Department in Arsii Administration Peasant Association.

<sup>13</sup> Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity.....*, p. 158.

<sup>14</sup> Niguse Wolde Micael, “A review of Agrarian....”, p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> Informants: Asefa Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrian....”, p. 34.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, Niguise Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian....”, p. 34.

<sup>17</sup> *Nagarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 31 of 1975, Chapter 2.

- <sup>18</sup> Informant: Feleke Hailemariam.
- <sup>19</sup> Informants: Feleke Hailemariam, Asefa Woldemicael.
- <sup>20</sup> Niguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian..., p. 35.
- <sup>21</sup> Informants Sheik Mohamed Haji, Asefa Degefa, Tafa Debele.
- <sup>22</sup> *ARDU Publication*, “Land Utilization, Practice, Rural Population and Livestock Survey,” Assella, 1979, No. 123. p. 12.
- <sup>23</sup> Niguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian..., p. 35.
- <sup>24</sup> Informant: Tadele Nigatu, Asefa Degefa, Tafa Debele.
- <sup>25</sup> Yigremew Adal, “Land Redistribution and Female-Headed House Holds: A Study in Two Rural Communities in North West Ethiopia”, *Institute of Development Research, FSS Discussion Paper No. 5*, Addis Ababa, Nov. 2001, p. 5.
- <sup>26</sup> *Nagarit Gazeta*, A Proclamation No. 71 of 1975 Providing for the establishment of Women’s Association ; Alula Abate and Fasil G.Kiros, « Agrarian Reform, Structural Changes and Rural Development in Ethiopia, » in A.K. Ghose (ed), *Agrarian Reform in Contemporary Developing Countries*. London: Room Helm, 1983, P. 416.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, Article 10 of Chapter Two.
- <sup>28</sup> Yigremew Adal, “Land Redistribution...,p. 14.
- <sup>29</sup> Informants: Feleke Haile Mariam, Tadele Nigatu, W/ro Bedbab Bantiwalu.
- <sup>30</sup> Informants Feleke Hailemariam; *ARDU Publication*, “Rural Population and Livestock Survey”, Assella, 1979, No. 17. p. 5.
- <sup>31</sup> *Report on rural Transformation,*” in “Measures for Rural Transformation,” Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia Ministry of Agriculture and Settlement, 1978, p. 15.
- <sup>32</sup> Informants: Feleke Hailemariam, W/ro Aseter Mamo. She was Chairman of Women’s Association in Arsii Administrative Region.
- <sup>33</sup> *Nagarit Gazeta*, A Proclamation No. 71 of 1975 Providing a Legal Personality for Peasant Associations for the Service Cooperative Societies Article 6 of Chapter Two; A.K. Ghose, “Transforming Feudal Agriculture: Agrarian change in Ethiopia Since 1974, “*Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 128; Neguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian..., p. 27.

- <sup>34</sup> Neguse Woldemicael, “A Review of Agrarian...., p. 28.
- <sup>34</sup> *ARDU Publication*, “Land Utilization...., p. 14 Informants: Wondimu Teshome, Ayele Dadi. The former was the Chair Man of Service Cooperative which had Comprised 13 PAs in Hetosa *Warada*. The later was the secretary of Workers party of Ethiopia in the same service Cooperative.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, p. 15.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.
- <sup>37</sup> Etana Habte, “Darg Administration in ...., p. 109.
- <sup>38</sup> ARDU Publications, “Rural Population....., P. 19.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21.
- <sup>40</sup> *ARDU Publication*, “Rural Population and Cooperatives Survey”, Asella, 1981, No. 22, p. 12.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.
- <sup>43</sup> *ARDU Publication*, “Rural Population...., p. 17.
- <sup>44</sup> Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity*..., p, 172; Cooperative is an association of persons which have Voluntarily Joined together to achieve a Common economic goals by making equitable contribution to the Capital needed and getting benefits and takings risks of the under takings. It is from this Definition that Seven Principles of Cooperatives, Voluntary Association; Open to any one’s Membership who is Volunter to Join; Democratic Control of Business transaction, Participation; equal beneficiary of the Product; Participation in election and Democratic Taking over of Leadership were taken. For more detail see *ARDU Publication*, “Rural Proclamation...., p. 18.
- <sup>45</sup> Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity*....., p. 173; Etana Habte “Darg Administration in...., p. 128.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p. 129
- <sup>47</sup> *Nagarit Gazeta*, Proclamation No. 71 of 1975, Chapter Two; Proclamation No. 74 of 1975 formally allowed Peasant Associations to Organize Cooperative Farms in order to Serve as one of the Mechanisms to Socialist Transformation.

<sup>48</sup> *Annual Report PMAC*, Ministry of Agriculture, June, 1987, *PMAC, Directives on Agricultural Producers Cooperatives*. Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1979.

<sup>49</sup> J.M. Cohen, "Small holder Vs Agricultural Collectives: Agricultural Strategies Debates in Ethiopia Since Revolution." Paper Presented to the *Conference on the Problems of the Horn of Africa*. Washing DC. Woodrow Wilson Center, Smith Sonian Institute, June 1987, p. 5; *PMAC, Directives...*, 1979.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Niguse Woldemicael, "A Review of Agrarian....", p. 28-29.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, P. 29; Alemaychu Lorenzo, "Ethiopia's Experience with Rural Cooperatives: Case from Arsii Region, *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research* Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1990, p. 68.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>54</sup> Niguse Woldemicael, "A Review of Agrarian....", p. 29.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>56</sup> Alula Abate and Fasil Gebre-Kiros, *Agrarian Reform...*, p. 417; Ethana Habte, *Darg Administration in...*p. 129.

<sup>57</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity*, p. 174.

<sup>58</sup> *ARDU Publication*, "Rural Population....", p. 18.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, p. m18.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p. 19.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.

<sup>63</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity*, p. 175; Etana Habte, "Darg Administration in....",p. 142.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 143

<sup>65</sup> John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isaksson, *Villagization in the Arsii Region of Ethiopia*. Uppsala: Swedish University of Applied Sciences, 1987, p. 4.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 26-32.

- <sup>67</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity*, p. 176.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>70</sup> John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Iskasson, *Villagization...*, p. 5.
- <sup>71</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity*, p. 177.
- <sup>72</sup> John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Iskason, *Villagization...*, p. 6.
- <sup>73</sup> Etana Habte, “Darg Administration in ...”, p. 143.
- <sup>74</sup> John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Iskasson, *Villagization.....*, p. 7.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>78</sup> Bengt Nekby, *CADU an Ethiopian Experiment...*, p. 85-86.
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>80</sup> John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Iskasson, *Villagization...*, p. 10.
- <sup>81</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity...*, p. 168.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 169; Etana Habte “Darg Administration in..., p. 103; *Nagarit Gazeta* proclamation No. 112 of 1977. A Proclamantoion to Provide for the Establishmenbt of Ethiopian Grain Agency.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>84</sup> Informant: Belay Mandefro. He has served in Various Branches of Arsii Administration Region AMC Branches.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>86</sup> Etana Habte, “Darg Administration in..., p. 105.
- <sup>87</sup> Clapham Christopher, *Transformation and Continuity...*, p. 170.
- <sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> *Informants*: Belay Mandefro, Wondimu Teshome.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

## Notes Chapter Four

<sup>1</sup>*Negarit Gazeta*, proclamation No. 71 of 1975 Articles 11, 12 and 13.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Informants: Hailu Gebre Amlak, Deggo Doyyo, Almaz Belete and Semegn Yimami.

<sup>4</sup>Informants: Amare Tadesse, Kebede Fesese, Ejigayehu Adugna; Etana Habte, “Darg Administration...”, p.99.

<sup>5</sup>Informants: Wondimu Teshome, Ayele Dadi, Hailu Liben and Abera Abbaa eree.

<sup>6</sup>Informants: Yemane Tilahun, Kedir Hamda, Hailu Gebre Amlak and Ejigayehu Adugna.

<sup>7</sup>Etana Habte, “Darg Administration...,” P. 100; *Nagarit Gazeta* Proclamation No. 238 of 1983. A Proclamation to Provide for Establishment of Military Service. Informants: Hailu Liben, Wondimu Teshome and Ayele Dadi.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Informants: Ejigayehu Adugna, *Memre* Feyissa, Amare Tadesse, Asefn Woldemicael and Tadele Nigatu.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>Informants: Arega Guda, Eskinder Amare and Belay Madefro.

<sup>12</sup>Informants: Almaz Belete

<sup>13</sup>Informants: Teshome Kassa, Kurabachew Felek, Ejigayehu Adugna. The first two were directors of senior high schools of Huruta and sire respectively.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Sheik Abubeker Jibo, Sheik Mohammed Hadji and Yemane Tilahun.

<sup>16</sup>Shillington, Kevin, *History of Africa*, Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2005, p. 429.

<sup>17</sup>T.K.Omari, “Ujamma Policy and Rural Development,” in C.K. Omari (ed), *Towards Rural Development in Tanzania Arusha: East Africa Publication*, 1984, p. 146;

John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isakson, *Villagization in the Arssi....*, Uppsala: Swedish University of Applied Sciences, 1987. p. 438.

<sup>18</sup>John M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isakson, *Villagization*, pp. 448-449.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid*; Dessalegn Rahmeto, “The land question and reform...., p. 45.

<sup>20</sup>Informants: Kebede Fesese, Getu Engida, Asefa Degefa.

<sup>21</sup>Tadesse Woldehane, Tolla Gebeyehu, Tollo Ketebo, Debebe Aba Defar.

<sup>22</sup>Informants: *Memere* Feyisa, Ejigaychu Adugna.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>24</sup>Shillington, Kevin, *History of Africa*, p. 429.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid*, M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isakson, *Villagization in the Arssi....*, p. 451.

<sup>26</sup>M. Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isakson, *Villagization in the Arssi....*, p. 457.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid*; Informants: Ayele Dadi; Worqneh Fetene and Wondimu Teshome.

<sup>28</sup>Shillington, Kevin, *History of Africa*, p. 429 T.K. Omari, “*Ujamma* Policy and Rural...., p. 147.

<sup>29</sup>Informant: Tafa Debele, who was Vice Chairman of P.A.V.C.C.C. in Quchira, Arendema and Kitibe PAs of Hetosa *Warada*.

<sup>30</sup>M.Cohen and Nils-Ivar Isakson, *Villagization in the Arssi....*, pp.456-457.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid*, p. 459.

<sup>32</sup>Informants: Ejigayehu Adugna, Hailu Liben, Feleke Hailemariam and Tafa Debele.

<sup>33</sup>Dessalegn Rahmeto, “ The land question and reform...., p. 49.

<sup>34</sup>*Nagarit Gazeta*, A Proclamation No. 138/1975 Providing for the Establishment of Cooperative Farms in Ethiopia.

<sup>35</sup>ARDU “Be Amigna *ena Seni Awraja* ye Geberewoch Amrachoch Hibret Siraa Mahberat Lematenaker Yetewosedede Ermija Report, Nehase, 1981,” (Report on the Measures Taken to consolidate APCs in Aminna Seru *Awraja*, August, 1981 E.C.). p. 27.

<sup>36</sup>Dessalegn Rahmeto, “The land question and reform...., p. 48.

<sup>37</sup>*Negarit Gazeta*, A Proclamation No. 31/1975; Informants: Asefa Wolde Micael, Tadele Nigatu.

<sup>38</sup>Informants: Asefa Woldemicael, Arega Guda and Tadele Nigatu.

<sup>39</sup>ARDU, “Bemegeb Sebel Rasen Mechal Be Arssi Keflehager Yemahberat Inqisiqase *ena* ye 1980 Eqid,” (Activities of Cooperative associations in Arssi Administrative Region, Food security and the 1980 E.C. Plan). Pp. 16-17.

<sup>40</sup>Dessalegn Rahmeto, “The land question and reform..., p. 50; Informants: Tafa Debele, Wondimu Teshome and Ayele Dadi.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid*, p. 49; Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity...*, p. 169.

<sup>42</sup>Crummey, Donald, *Land and Society in the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century*, A.A.U. Press, 2000, p. 248.

<sup>43</sup>*Negarit Gazeta*, proclamation No. 71 of 1975, Chapter Two; proclamation No. 74 of 1975 formally allowed peasant associations to organize cooperative farms in order to serve as one of the mechanisms to socialist transformation; Dessalegn Rahmeto, “Land, peasants and the Drive for Collectivization in Ethiopia,” In *Land in African Agrarian System*, ed. Thomas Bassett and Donald Crummey (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 288.

<sup>44</sup>ARDU, Belemu *ena* Biubilo *Warada* Ye Gebrewoch Amrachoch Hibret Siraa Mahberat Lematenaker Yetewosedede Ermija Report, Megabit, 1980” (Report on the Measures Taken to consolidate APCs in Limu *ena* Bilbilo *Warada*, Megabit, 1980 E.C), p. 2.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>46</sup>Informants: Abera Asefaw, Asefa Woldemicael, Hadji Mohammed.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>48</sup>ARDU, Belemu *ena* Bilbilo..., pp. 12-13.

<sup>49</sup>ARDU, Be Amigna *ena* Seru *Awraja* Ye Geberewoch Amraschoch Hibret Siraa Mahberat Lkematener Yetewosedede Ermija Report, Nehase, 1981” (report on the measures taken to consolidate APCs in Amigna Seru *Awraja*, August, 1981 E.C), pp. 2-3.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid*, p. 5.

<sup>51</sup>Informants: Asefa Woldemicael, Tadele Nigatu, Ejigayehu Adugna, Sheik Mohammed Hadji. The first two were attendants of the meeting with both groups of Solomon and Fasika. The former was organizer of cooperatives and the second was head of Ministry of agriculture of the *awraja*.

<sup>52</sup>Sheik Mohammed Hadji, Asefa Woldemicael., Both were with the groups since the former was chairman of Chilalo Awraja PA of Arssi region

<sup>53</sup>*ARDU*, Be Amigna *ena* Seru...p. 23.

<sup>54</sup>Informatnts: Ejigayehu Adugna, Kebede Fesese, Dereje Wube, Tafa Debele, Wondimu Teshome and Worqneh Fetene.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, *Negarit Gazeta*, A Proclamation No.178/1990 providing for the admittance of mixed economic policy.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

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## List of Informants

No	Name	Age	Date of interview	Place of interview	Remakes
1	Abera Abaeree	48	25/7/2007	Huruta	Chairman of APC in Hetosa <i>Wärada</i> Quichira.
2	Abera Asfaw	54	27/7/2007	Asella	Member of Arsii Administrative Region Police and who went to Lemu <i>ena</i> Bilbilo <i>Wärada</i> with the groups sent by the party.
3	Abubeker Jibo (Sheik)	72	2/8/2007	Huruta	Farmer well informed in Oromo custom and traditions.
4	Adem Bulle	76	20/7/2007	Dhéra	He was a lawyer at various <i>Wäräda</i> courts in Arssi.
5	Aliye Tolola (Hadji)	71	19/6/2007	Asella	He is a retired lawyer in Asella who has better knowledge on the various historical experiences of Arssi.
6	Amare Tadesse	74	2/7/2007	Huruta	Trader and well known narrator on the land tenure system in Northern Arssi.
7	Andargachew Chekol	87	10/6/2007	Ligaba	He knows more about <i>Ras</i> Birru and his family.
8	Arega Guda	62	3/3/2008	Asella	He has served in various capacities in MLRA, CADU and ARDU.
9	Asefa Degefa	58	16/7/2007	Huruta	Now retired teacher and well informed about the rural institutions.

10	Asefa Wolde Micael.	70	14/4/2008	Asella	Had served in various capacities in CADU and ARDU and was organizer of cooperatives.
11	Aster Mamo	58	5/7/2007	Asella	She was chair person of Arssi women association.
12	Ayele Dadi	54	17/7/2007	Ligaba	Secretary of WPE in SC of Hetosa <i>Wärada</i> and an eye witness during the change of government
13	Bedbab Bantiwalu	73	15/7/2007	Huruta	She was chairperson of women Association in PA of Hetosa.
14	Belay Mandefro	42	16/4/2008	Huruta	He had served in various offices of AMC in Arssi.
15	Debebe Abadefar	69	14/7/2007	Ligaba	He is a retired teacher who gave information about events related with the proclamation of land reform.
16	Deggo Doyyo	84	15/7/2007	Ligaba	He is among the Shawa Oromo who came to the area before the Italian occupation. He has also a good knowledge on tenancy.
17	Dereje Wube	82	10/7/2007	Huruta	He is one among the land owners and has also a good knowledge of tenancy.
18	Ejigayehu Adugna	58	24/7/2007	Bele	She is knowledgeable on the rural institutions and had also served as chairperson of women association in Amiñña Seru.

19	Ermias Wolde Amanuel	44	3/4/2008	Asella	Participant of <i>Zemecha</i> in Arssi and served in CADU and ARDU still.
20	Eskinder Amare	46	24/4/2008	Humta	A trader who knows more about the process of the establishment of the rural institutions.
21	Feyisa Roba	48	12/7/2007	Bele	Priest who knows more about the APCs in <i>Aminña Seru Awraja</i> .
22	Fikre Hailemariam	54	1/6/2007	Asella	Chairman of Arssi Region PA.
23	Gebeyaneh Eshete	107	5/6/2007	Gonde	He is one among the Amhara settlers who had participated in the battle of segele (1916).
24	Gemeda Hedeto (Hadji)	84	5/6/22007	Gonde	He is one of the notable elders in <i>Hetosa Wārada</i> .
25	Gena Hamda	77	12/5/2007	Habura (Zeway Dugda)	He was a balabat of <i>Hétosa</i> clan in <i>Zeway Dugda Wārada</i> .
26	Getu Asefa	47	11/7/2007	Abomsa	He is a teacher who knows well about the rural institutions in Arbagugu.
27	Getu Engida	42	15/4/2008	Eteya	He is a worker of AMC in <i>Hetosa Wārada Eteya</i> .
28	Hailu Gebre Amlak	73	5/7/2007	Ligaba	He had served as a <i>chiqashum</i> until the revolution.
29	Hailu Liben	59	6/7/2007	Ligaba	He was chairman of <i>Arendema</i> APc and knows well about the rural institutions.
30	Kasso Abdul Reshid	55	10/7/2007	Asella	He is the current administrator of <i>Tiyo Wārada</i> .

31	Kebede Fesese	73	12/7/2007	Abomsa	He was worker in MLRA in Arbagugu and transferred to <i>awraja</i> administration office he knows well the land tenure system of the Imperial regime.
32	Kebede Gebre	84	6/6/2007	Gonde	A dweller of Gonde town since 1957 and he has a good knowledge about the eviction of tenants.
33	Kedir Abdo	74	11/5/2007	Abura, Zeway Dugda	He was a tenant who told me about the misery of the poor cultivators.
34	Kedir Hamda	72	11/6/2007	Ligaba	He is the grandson of Millo Mama. He has a deep knowledge about land alienation and grant.
35	Kurabachew Felek	54	17/7/2007	Huruta	He has been a director of Sire Senior Secondary School during the revolution.
36	Masresha Teferi	58	7/6/2007	Gonde	Knows well about the eviction of tenants and he is now serving as extension agent of Gonde unit.
37	Mekonen Abebe	70	7/6/2007	Gonde	He is among the well known elders in Begejo village in Gonde.
38	Meseret Tesema (Megabi Mistir)	7	11/7/2007	Assella	He is retired clerk who has better knowledge on both church and secular matters.

39	Moges Alemayehu	57	6/6/ 2007	Huruta	He was one of the organizers of APCS.
40	Mohammed Hadji (Sheik)	72	7/2007		He is from Hetosa clan and had served as chairman of PA of Chilalo <i>Awaraja</i> .
41	Muhedin Ogeto	68	12/6/2007	Assella	A retired teacher who is a younger brother of fitawrari Bekele Ogeto.
42	Nure Sultan (Hadji)	81	7/7/ 2007	Dherra	He knows more about eviction of tenants in Arsii
43	Shanko Huda	67	7/6/ 2007	Huruta	He knows well the land tenure system in Arsii and the establishment of normal institutions.
44	Tadele Nigatu	66	12/7//2007	Assella	He was worker of MLRA, then, CADU and administrion of bureau of agriculture at Ticho <i>awaraja</i> .
45	Tadessese Woldehane	74	11/7/2007	Huruta	He had suffered during the villagization program of the <i>darg</i>
46	Tafa Debelle	53	16/8/2007	Huruta	He was organizer of APCS at <i>ligaba</i> and vice chairman of WVCCC of Hetosa warada.
47	Usman Hamda	73	21/7/2007	Sire	He knows more about the historical experiences of the area.
48	Wondimu Teshome	57	12/7/2007	Huruta	He was chairman of the SCs of Hetosa warada of 13 PAS
49	Worqneh Fetene	52	12/7/2007	Huruta	Chairman of auditing and controlling committee of Arsii PA office
50	Zenebe Wubshet	54	4/2/2008	Assella	Liberarian in ARDU library and documentation center he knows more about Ethiopian students' movement in Assella.

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