

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDERS' DISCOURSES
ON THE ROAD SAFETY PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA

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November 2016

ADDIS ABABA

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDERS' DISCOURSES
ON THE ROAD SAFETY PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA**

GETACHEW TILAHUN WAKENE

**A dissertation submitted to
the Department of Foreign Languages and Literature
in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of
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in Applied Linguistics and Communication**

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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Getachew Tilahun Wakene, entitled: *A Critical Analysis of Stakeholders' Discourses on the Road Safety Problem in Ethiopia*, and submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Applied Linguistics and Communication complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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DECLARATION

I declare that *A Critical Analysis of Stakeholders' Discourses on the Road Safety Problem in Ethiopia* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged with complete references.

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Abstract

A Critical Analysis of Stakeholders' Discourses on the Road Safety Problem in Ethiopia

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A significant step taken to address the road safety problem in Ethiopia was the formulation of a strategic plan/policy based on UN/WHO's recommendation of 2011-2020 as a Decade of Action for road safety. A key notion of the policy was stakeholders' collaboration based on the philosophy of *shared responsibility* and *safe systems approach*, an approach that promoted understanding and addressing the road and its environment, road users and vehicles as a whole instead of targeting road users alone. A crucial issue for ensuring road safety adopting this approach should be communication among the stakeholders.

The purpose of this study was thus to: (1) understand stakeholders' conceptualizations of the road safety problem and ways of addressing it (2) explore which road safety knowledge and practices road safety stakeholders incorporate into/exclude from their daily practices; (3) identify impacts of these incorporated/excluded knowledge and practices; and (4) examine how the stakeholders position themselves and others in relation to their role to alleviating the road safety problem. The research was situated in the epistemology of social constructionism, adopted CDA as a theory and method of analysis, and used in-depth interviews, key documents and observation as instruments of data collection. Fairclough's three dimensional model of analysis (discourse as text, as discursive practice, and as social practice) was the analytical framework employed to explore the stakeholders' social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs.

Stakeholders uniformly conceptualized road safety in Ethiopia as a *serious problem* that had to be addressed through their *concerted* and *collaborative* efforts. However, they had different, mostly narrow and contradictory, pictures of what road safety is and how it should be addressed. The study has thus confirmed that stakeholders' road safety conceptualization was not based on the knowledge/belief systems of the approach that was adopted nationally.

Regarding the recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices, the Ethiopian road safety policy was formulated based on the UN/WHO's recommendation for action. In line with the sources, the central call of key documents and players was stakeholders' *collaboration* to address the problem comprehensively working on the five pillars: road safety management, safe roads, safe vehicles, safe road use behavior and post-crash care. However, the practice was far from the claim; the collaboration, if any, was only among the few government institutions, and in the form of submission to dominant players. Disregarding the other key issues, the practice targeted road users, taking them as sole causes of road traffic accidents.

Stakeholders' construction of the self and others was analyzed to understand their social relations and social identities: how they position themselves and others in relation to their contribution to

road safety. Stakeholders of both government and private institutions raised several issues by which they constructed themselves favorably and others unfavorably. Each claimed to have been devoted to ensuring road safety, and blamed others for the prevalence of the problem in the country. Road users were no different; they put both government and private institutions as aggravators of the problem involving in unethical practices. Hence, there was not any collaboration among road safety stakeholders and road users to cause positive change.

Overall, road safety was framed as the sole subject of a few government institutions that had both historical and political position to policy and practices, but that worked for the perpetuation of the position they held. Despite policy formulations and claims of working accordingly, road safety practice in Ethiopia was influenced by the individual user approach, emphasizing on education and enforcement; as a result, change in road safety knowledge and practice proved to have been so insignificant. On the other hand, although they were not strong enough to influence, emerging road safety discourses/practices were observed; if they were shaped and strengthened, they could positively contribute to change the road safety problem widespread in the country.

Finally, theoretical and practical implications of the study were explained, recommendations for the concerned bodies were provided, and potential issues for future studies have been suggested.

Key words: road safety conceptualization, road and its environment, stakeholders, road user, vehicle, vision zero, critical discourse analysis, safe systems approach, individual user approach.

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List of Acronyms

AAA	American Automobile Association Foundation for Traffic Safety
AACA	the Addis Ababa City Administration
AAPC	Addis Ababa Police Commission
AARSC	Addis Ababa Road Safety Council
AATB	Addis Ababa Transport Bureau
AATP	Addis Ababa Traffic Police
AAU	Addis Ababa University
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DA	Discourse Analysis
DFLL	Department of Foreign Languages and Literature
DST	Driving School Trainers
EBC	Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
FDRE	The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
ERA	Ethiopian Roads Authority
ETA	Ethiopian Transport Authority
EU	European Union
FP	Federal Police
FPC	Federal Police Commission
GI	Government Institution
GCAO	Government Communication Affairs Office
GTP I	Growth and Transformation Plan I
IRSC	Independent Road Safety Consultant
LDOCE	Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English
MADD	Mothers Against Drunk Driving
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoJ	Ministry of Justice

MoT	Ministry of Transport
MoUDHC	Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction
NHTSA	National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NRSC	National Road Safety Council
NRSSPE	National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia
ORF	Office for Roads Fund
PS	Private Sector
RSAM	Road Safety Audit Manual
RSCO	Road Safety Coordinating Office
RSS	Road Safety Stakeholder
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
RTB	Road Transport Bureau
RTI	Road Traffic Injury
RTID	Road Traffic Injury and Death
RTS	Road Traffic Safety
RTSEACD	Road Traffic Safety Education and Awareness Creation Desk
RU	Road User
SFL	Systemic Functional Linguistics
TA	Transport Authority
TB	Transport Bureau
TP	Traffic Police
TPAA	Transport Policy of Addis Ababa
TSPA	Transport Service Providing Associations
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNRSC	United Nations Road Safety Collaboration
WHO	World Health Organization
WB	World Bank

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Road traffic accident is a problem causing considerable death, injury and resource damage all over the world. As it was confirmed by World Health Organization (WHO henceforth), road traffic injuries have remained as ‘major but neglected global public health problem’ (Peden et al., 2004, p.3). As a result, road crashes have become the leading causes of death, injury and disability around the world: each year over 1.24 million people die on the world’s roads, while between 20 and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries. While the problem is escalating in most regions of the world, it is the worst in low- and middle-income countries, with a share of 91% of the world’s on-road fatalities (WHO, 2013).

For Ethiopia, a low-income country that aspires for and claims to be working hard for a rapid economic and social development, the road safety problem has already come among its top concerns. Along with Uganda, Bangladesh and Vietnam, Ethiopia is one of the four countries in the world with extremely high health risk; it has over 1,000 fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles (Elvik, et al., 2009, p.44-45). Road crashes and the accompanied death, injury and resource damage are each day’s tragic reports in mainstream media. In Addis Ababa, where about 60% of the country’s road traffic accidents (RTAs henceforth) occur (Tewolde, 2007, p.8), and where most of the country’s road safety efforts originate, at least a person dies every day. The case in the Regions is no different; road crashes of public and freight transporters (causing mass casualties and/or resource damage) are growing in line with accident aggravating changes (like urbanization due to population growth and migration from rural areas, fast expansion of old roads and construction of new ones, and import and production of cars entering the traffic). Due to RTAs, daily at least ten people die on the roads of the country. Although drivers’ and pedestrians’ road safety awareness is claimed to have been improving (Getachew, 2009; Salmon & Eckersley, 2010), risky road use practice is a usual scene, and but why road users exhibit such a behavior has not been explored. Unless actions that could avert the problem meaningfully are taken based on knowledge gained by exploring why risky road use practices are so common, as WHO’s (2004, 2013) predictions plainly indicate, the problem could worsen severely.

The good thing is that currently road safety has become one of the global health discourses; the fact that the problem is so worrying seems to have been recognized at all levels. Accordingly, the United Nations has declared 2011-2020 as the decade of action for road safety with the “goal of stabilizing and then reducing the forecasted level of global road fatalities by increasing activities conducted at national, regional and global levels” (WHO, Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, p.3). Of course, there are also a number of regional, national and local efforts underway to avert road traffic related deaths, injuries and resource damage.

In Ethiopia, the issue of road safety seems to have been gaining considerable attention in the past two decades since the establishment of the Interim National Road Safety Council (NRSC) in 2002. The initiative was a response to international organizations’ recommendations (UN/WHO in particular) that emphasized the necessity of bringing together safety efforts of governmental and non-governmental organizations that have a stake in the road transport and its safety. Thus, stakeholders working on the road and its environment, the transport sector, the safety of the road and/or transport users are now claimed to be led by the NRSC, a governmental organ which is responsible for planning, coordinating and promoting road safety works in the country, based on systems theory and the philosophy of shared responsibility. Road Safety Stakeholders (RSSs) that are coordinated by the NRSC which is located in the Federal Ministry of Transport (MoT) include: the MoT with its agencies (i.e., the Ethiopian Transport Authority (ETA), the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) and Office for Roads Fund (ORF)), the Federal Police Commission (FPC), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction (MoUDHC), Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Education (MoE) and Government Communication Affairs Office (GCAO).

The Council proclaims to have been working hard to decrease the magnitude of the menace by introducing safety-oriented road use proclamations/regulations and road-engineering, safety-targeted police intervention and enforcement, and safety-focused education and promotion addressing school children, drivers, and pedestrians (NRSSPE, 2011). Accordingly, safety awareness lessons are being given to road users in a variety of ways and means. There are now successive road safety campaigns annually; many radio and television programs of different formats give road safety lessons and on-spot road traffic related information for road users. Since the establishment of the Council, there have been successive proclamations/regulations enacted,

among others, on speed limit, vehicle insurance against third party risks, drink-driving and seat-belt use (NRSSPE, 2011). This might, to some degree, show the government's commitment to ensure road safety.

However, the strength of such road safety policies and practices in bringing about desired change, i.e., safer road use that leads to minimized death, injury and resource damage, relies on, *inter alia*, how they are understood: meanings created, shared and consumed among the RSSs and the public at large. To this end, language use plays a fundamental role. Gee (2011) states that language has more to serve us than just in exchanging information; it allows us to do things – to engage in actions and activities, and also to be things – to take on different socially significant identities (p.2). In order to understand any impact of efforts to achieve desired goals in road safety works, therefore, language use both in (policy) documents, among RSSs and road users requires critical investigation. This is what many applied linguists (Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Tuen van Dijk, to mention few) have shifted to and are arguing for. As van Dijk (1983) affirms, “Language studies should not be restricted to the grammatical analysis of abstract or ideal language systems, but, rather, that actual language use in the social context should be the empirical object of linguistic theories” (p. 2).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Ethiopia, “very little is known ... about the traffic safety knowledge, attitude and behavior of road users and the causes of traffic accidents and their effective counter measures” (UNECA, 2009, p. 9). As Boesen and Brand (2008) lament, “while a lot of attention has been paid to the “hard” aspects of transport (particularly road construction and maintenance), the “softer” parts (transport planning and management, safety and regulatory functions) have not been sufficiently in the picture.” Moreover, from a study by Persson (2008) on the magnitude, causes and possible interventions of road traffic accidents in Ethiopia, although it is not stated explicitly, one could infer problems associated with inter-organizational communication and political commitment as key contributory factors. Persson (2008) listed down the diversified and complex causes of RTAs in the country as: “Poor road network; absence of knowledge on road traffic safety; mixed traffic flow system; poor legislation and failure of enforcement; poor conditions of vehicles; poor emergency medical services; and absence of traffic accident compulsory insurance law.”

However, the country's road safety work and its management system as a whole is not coping with the magnitude of traffic accidents and the worsening situation related to the road network expansion, population, and motorization (UNECA, 2009, p. 9). Thus, to tackle the problem, the country needs not only proper road safety policy with clear and manageable goals and strategies, but also that each player owns the policy to the level it influences their practice and behavior.

In relation to road safety policy in Ethiopia, among others, there is a strategic plan proposed by the NRSC to get implemented in the decade 2011-2020. According to the action plan, the roads in Ethiopia would have a 30% improvement in death toll in 2015 and will have further decreased by 50% by the end of the decade. The plan lists areas to focus on and the necessity of concerted effort of all responsible stakeholders. In order to reach the proposed target, the document states that the stakeholders need to share responsibility and states what is expected from each of them (NRSSPE, 2011). It is important that the policy particularly addresses the very problem in the country and ways of tackling it. However, it is very important that each stakeholder owns the policy, i.e., understand the level of the problem, the goals proposed to achieve and the role that each stakeholder is expected to play in order for them to exert their efforts to that end.

Compared to the scale of health problems caused by road crashes, research and interventions to reducing road crashes is insufficient globally (Eckersley, 2010). In Ethiopia, there is a need for detailed and sustainable research work on road safety (UNECA, 2009, p. 9), but only very limited investigations were conducted so far; moreover, most of them did not go beyond problem description and enumeration, and actual change in road safety has not yet been realized. As a result, due to road crashes, people are still dying and others are being injured, of course some for life. The limited resources of the country are also being wasted unreasonably.

As it was clearly stated in the country's road safety policy/strategic plan (2011), addressing road safety problem entails, from the perspective of shared responsibility, the necessity of working on, among others, road user behavior, vehicle safety and roadway safety. That means the effort demands bringing different stakeholders (e.g. the police, road transport experts, driver trainers, vehicle technical fitness inspection experts, road designers and engineers, etc. and their institutions) together to engage in their respective responsibilities and also in some form of integration. In particular, RSSs' discourses need to get analyzed in order to understand the

underpinning reasons behind the insignificant impact of road safety efforts in Ethiopia. If the road safety problem has to be addressed with concerted efforts of RSSs and road users, they need to have shared understanding and owning of the problem; in this regard, the role of language or communication is fundamental. A significant part of the problem which so far has not been investigated in the context of Ethiopia is RSSs' conceptualization of the road safety problem and the proposed ways of addressing it. While integration among stakeholders was proposed, it could not be observed being practical and of meaningful effect. Instead, miscommunication among the responsible parties and road users could be seen, affecting the overall road safety work; as Nantulya & Reich (2002) confirmed (referring to developing countries in general) a circle of blame is so dominant: "the police blame drivers and the public, the public blames drivers and the police, and drivers blame the police." Thus, the purpose of this project was to analyze RSSs' discourses to understand how they conceptualized road safety, how they position theirs and others' roles of tackling the problem, and why efforts of improving road safety in Ethiopia did not show the anticipated results.

1.3 Research Question

The main focus of inquiry of the project is, therefore: How are policies and practices of alleviating the road safety problem in Ethiopia interpreted, appropriated and/or resisted by the different road safety stakeholders and road users?

More specifically, the following four questions are addressed:

1. How do road safety stakeholders in Ethiopia conceptualize the road safety problem?
2. Which road safety knowledge and practices do the stakeholders incorporate into/exclude from their road safety documents and practices?
3. How do the incorporated/excluded knowledge and practices contribute to/against efforts of decreasing road traffic related death, injury and resource damage?
4. How do road safety stakeholders position themselves and/or others in relation to the role they have to alleviating the road safety problem in Ethiopia?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objective of the Study

This research project set out to critically explore road safety stakeholders' construction of road safety and how practices of alleviating the road safety problem are interpreted, appropriated and/or resisted by the different road safety stakeholders and road users.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives of the Study

More specifically, the research undertaking has the following objectives:

- Understand how road safety stakeholders conceptualize road safety in Ethiopia;
- Explore which road safety knowledge and practices the stakeholders incorporate into/ exclude from their own guidelines and daily practices;
- Understand any impact of these incorporated/excluded knowledge and practices on the overall efforts of decreasing death, injury and resource damage on the roads of Ethiopia;
- Examine how road safety stakeholders position themselves and others in relation to the role they have to alleviating the road safety problem

1.5 Scope of the Study

Addressing the road safety problem has called upon involvement and partnership of stakeholders of diversified sectors: international, regional and national organizations, governments, the private sectors, etc. (Peden et al., 2004). This study has endeavored to explore RSSs' constructions of road safety, and their knowledge and practices of addressing the problem in Ethiopia. Since there are many RSSs working on or using the road traffic system, it was difficult to address them all. The study has focused on NRSC, MoT (and two of its agencies ETA and ERA) of the FDRE, and in Addis Ababa, the police, transport bureau, roads authority, transport service providing associations, taxi drivers and pedestrians/passengers.

Moreover, the project addressed just the discourse, i.e., how RSSs constructed their road safety knowledge and practices. Thus, actual practices related with road safety like road engineering, vehicle standard, and emergency medical services (EMS) are not in the domain of this study. Accordingly, data was compiled from some organizations (through semi-structured interviews, collection of textual policy and other documents, and print and broadcast media texts).

Using CDA, Fairclough's methodology and tools of inquiry, the discourses were examined for evidence of the way road safety was conceptualized, which road safety knowledge and practice

stakeholders de- or re-contextualized in their practices, and how they positioned themselves and others involving in the road traffic system in Ethiopia. In the analysis of the language that the participants used, it was word choice, grammar (passivaization and presupposition in particular), argumentation strategy and intertextuality that the study has stressed.

With regard to road safety documents, a great deal of them could be accessed from the RSSs' archives. However, this was not intended since it was too much for analysis; hence, a selection was made to documents that specifically provide better understanding of road safety knowledge and practices in Ethiopia. Only those considered as policy documents were selected purposively for critical examination. These documents include: the NRSSPE for 2011-2020, the country's GTP I for 2011-2015, ERA's Road Safety Manual, and from Addis Ababa City Administration, the City's Transport Policy. Moreover, as part of the RSSs' efforts to achieving safety in the City, several educational materials (in the form of brochures) and broadcast contents (from Radio Fana, Sheger FM Radio and EBC) targeting the road safety problem have been incorporated. Since most of the Ethiopian documents on road safety are prepared based on international trends, 'best practices' and recommendations (NRSSPE, 2011, p.1), other UN sources pertaining to the issue like: WHO's Road Traffic Safety reports (2004, 2013), the UN's Road Safety Programme for the Decade 2011-2020 and African Road Safety Policy Framework (a document prepared by UNECA) have also been explored. Of course, most of these textual documents were chosen and investigated to help gain background knowledge for better analysis and understanding of the RSSs' discourses that this project has focused on.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This is an academic research for a PhD dissertation; therefore, pursuit of knowledge with regards to the link between a social problem and language use is the main interest of the project. In other words, the link between the road safety problem and RSSs' constructions of the problem and their role to its tackling and/or perpetuating is examined by analyzing their discourses. The role of CDA both as theory and method of analysis has also been explored in relation to road safety as a social problem and by emphasizing on discourses of RSSs. Although some scholars had investigated the road safety in Ethiopia, none of them analyzed language use. They were on: causes of road traffic accidents (Fanueal, 2006; Getu, 2007; Tewolde, 2007), road users' behaviour (Eckersley, et al., 2010), road safety education (Salmon & Eckersley, 2010),

communication strategies to address the problem (Getachew, 2009) and costing of road traffic accidents (Murad, 2011). By analysing RSSs' discourses, this research has mainly revealed one of the reasons behind the mismatch between efforts of ensuring road safety and actual road crashes causing death, injury and resource damage.

Over the past decade, much has been said about the seriousness of RTAs in Ethiopia and their adversarial effects on social and economic development of the country by the NRSC, ETA, the police, the media, and global organizations like WHO. The same institutions have been reporting their efforts aimed at curbing the problem. Despite claims of significant decrease in the number of RTAs and the accompanied death, injury and resource damage, the reality on the ground shows the necessity of working even harder. Some reports categorize the country among of the worst cases in the world, (Getu 2007; Tewolde, 2007; Elvik et al., 2009). Road tragedy, traffic related death, injury and resource damage, is a concern of every single individual. No one wants these 'preventable' crashes to continue taking citizens' lives, health and wealth; they need to get minimized meaningfully. Hence, investigating the problem could result in informed recommendations for change in the country's road traffic system. Above all, the key responsible organ for road safety in Ethiopia, NRSC, could use the recommendations forwarded based on findings of the study and make adjustments on the way it manages the task. The study could also be a good background for related studies to be conducted in the future.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The major strength of the study is that it has explored road safety discourse for the first time in Ethiopia. However, apart from language use, there are many road safety related issues that could have been investigated to explore their impact. A study on safety could not be complete just because the linguistic aspects of the problem are emphasized, particularly for a social practice like road safety which is full of non-linguistic features also. Therefore, a comprehensive approach to investigate the road safety problem was including the road and its environment, the vehicle and its design/quality, EMS and how it is provided, road safety regulations and their implementation, etc. most of which this study did not incorporate. Daymon and Holloway (2002, p. 145) warn against the tendency of over-dependence on a chosen sample of discourse, a failure to consider the wider social, cultural and historical context in which the sample is situated. To overcome such a problem, these authors advise complementing discourse analysis with a

methodological approach that would help gain alternative perspective on the same topic, and observation is one. It helps us see, the authors argue, subtleties that would not have been immediately obvious in an analysis of language use only, but that could then be discovered in the discourses themselves once they are perceived in observations (Daymon & Holloway, 2002, p.145). In this study, while observation has also been used, as a research in the field of Applied Linguistics and Communication, language-in-use is the primary focus; however, since CDA, a transdisciplinary approach that allows examining social issues, has been adopted, attempts have been made to relate textual and discursive practices of RSSs to the wider aspects of the social.

Secondly, Ethiopia is a big country, diversified in a number of its aspects. However, this study is limited to analysing only discourses of key RSSs, i.e., discourses of RSSs at the federal level and in Addis Ababa, which was mainly chosen for investigating actual road safety practices in some detail. Road infrastructure development, land use management, freight and public transport density, and even pedestrians' density could not be uniformly distributed across the country. There is the obvious linguistic diversity also. Hence, road safety knowledge and practices and severity of the problem would have been different and hence the picture across these variables would also be different. On the other hand, the study is limited both in area coverage and in incorporating RSSs. While it is possible to argue strongly that it has focused on the City that could better represent the road safety picture in the country, it still admits its gaps regarding its failure in incorporating other RSSs working in the road traffic system. Therefore, although the findings are strong enough in giving transferable insights and grounds for further investigation, the study is still limited in its breadth and depth.

1.8 Organization of the study

The paper is organized into five chapters. This is the introductory chapter where background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, scope and significance of the study are discussed. Chapter Two is where literature pertinent to the study is briefly reviewed. In Chapter Three, the methodology and design aspects of the research and theoretical framework of the study are explained. It is in Chapter Four that a detailed analysis of the collected data has been done. Finally, in Chapter Five, summary, conclusion and implications of the study are presented, and possible research areas for future study are suggested.

Chapter Two: A Review of Key Literature

2.1 Introduction

In this section a short review of literature pertaining to the research topic is made. The review begins with surveying and delimiting the concepts of discourse, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. Since language is a key instrument in inculcating ideology for legitimizing or resisting power, the link between language, power (particularly hegemonic power) and ideology is discussed next. Then, a brief overview of institutional discourse is made based on the premise that institutions are sites of political/ideological discourses. After that the discourse of road safety by/in institutions addressing the problem is discussed, focusing on road safety conceptualization and systems theory, the approach advocated as best to address the road safety problem. The role of governments in the road safety work is also examined. Finally, researches conducted on the Ethiopian road safety problem and efforts of addressing it are assessed.

2.2 The Concept of Discourse and Discourse Analysis

A number of definitions have been given to the term *discourse*, including the usual phrases like *language in use* (Brown & Yule, 1983:1) and *language-in-action* (Blommaert 2005:2). Yet in the literature, *discourse* is found as variously understood, defined and used. The intent of this section is not to bring all these conceptualizations, but to lay the foundation for a better understanding of the term in the context of this paper. In defining *discourse* in the Faircloughian tradition, two theories are amalgamated: linguistic and social (Fairclough, 1992, 2003). Linguistic theories take language as both structural and functional. While there are various theorizations of the complex interaction between the two, construing them as having a very strong fusion is instrumental. Structural linguistics takes the notion that language is a cognitive object, and focuses on describing the rules or patterns that make up the language, whereas the functional perspective sees discourse as language serving particular purposes (Fairclough, 1992, 2003).

However, language does not function devoid of context. Brown and Yule (1983), for example, stated the necessity of knowing, to the minimum, the speaker, the hearer, the time and the place of production for understanding any discourse. Of the various theories on the link between form and function, Halliday's (1985) systemic functional linguistics (SFL), which positions language as a process of carrying out certain functions as human beings interact in their social context, is

one of the language theories adopted and employed in this paper. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004, p.23) have shown what *system* is and its relationship to *structure* in SFL as follows:

A text is the product of ongoing selection in a very large network of systems — a system network. Systemic theory gets its name from the fact that the grammar of a language is represented in the form of system networks, not as an inventory of structures. Of course, structure is an essential part of the description; but it is interpreted as the outward form taken by systemic choices, not as the defining characteristic of language. A language is a resource for making meaning, and meaning resides in systemic patterns of choice.

A major part of context is, however, the social context in which the discourse is enacted. This leads us to the social conceptualization of discourse which is treated somehow concretely in the Foucaultian tradition of discourse. In a review of one of Foucault's work called the Archeology of Knowledge, Jansen (2008) describes Foucaultian DA as "social linguistic discourse analysis." Foucault sees discourse as a system of statements that repetitively appear in a historical period. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.12) put Foucault's definition of discourse as follows:

We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation [...Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality (1972, p.117).

As is mentioned above, Fairclough (1992, 2003) offers an amalgamation of linguistic theories and social theories to the conceptualization of discourse. He understands *discourse* as "the whole process of social interaction," and a discursive event as "simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice and an instance of social practice" (Henderson, 2005). Accordingly, Fairclough provided "a three-dimensional framework for conceiving of, and analysing, discourse" as discourse-as-text, discourse-as-discursive-practice and discourse-as-social-practice (Blommaert, 2005:29-30).

Therefore, by discourse analysis we mean the analysis of spoken and/or written language used in a social context. In doing so, attention is paid to structure and organization of the language being used; most importantly, language could be used to construct versions of social events in favor of the respective social agent. In other words, since social agents do not function without some level of ideology which they use to either perpetuate their hegemonic position or resist the dominant ideology, there is inherently power struggle among language users.

2.3 Language, Ideology and Power

The link between language, ideology and power is at the heart of any CDA. Blackledge (2005) has clearly stated the central interest that CDA has in language and power, providing three reasons: “it is usually in language that discriminatory practices are enacted, in language that unequal relations of power are constituted and reproduced, and in language that social asymmetries may be challenged and transformed” (p.5). Language is among the means by which one constitutes his/her social position: we use language not just for informing, but also for expressing and preserving one’s identity and being (Gee, 2011). In other words, in any social practice, discourse is one means by which individuals/social groups try to preserve the status quo if it satisfies their interest; or else it is through resistance discourse that individuals/groups struggle for change when they find the system dominating, or is against their interest. Hence, language is also ideological; as is put by Fairclough (1995, p. 73), language is “a material form of ideology ... invested by ideology”. That means, ideology is not just a concept that belongs to the realm of ideas, but it has a material existence in language. Fairclough (1992, p. 87) confirmed this by defining ideologies as “significations/constructions of reality which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.”

Language loaded with ideology is employed for domination though it may not always be coercive. Ideologies are most effective when they become naturalized or are perceived as common sense. Be it coercive or hegemonic, since it is ideologically invested, language helps to maintain or transform power relations within a specific socio-economic context. Therefore there is a continuous struggle to have power on aspects of social goods *via* counter discourses, constructing new ways of seeing the world through a mechanism Fairclough (1989, p.75) calls *communication*; or to continue with the already owned power, or hegemony, through a mechanism Fairclough (1989) calls *inculcation*. Thus, in the process of production, maintenance and change of social relations of power, language plays a pivotal role.

Fairclough (1989) discusses two major aspects of the power/language relationship: *power in discourse* and *power behind discourse*. By power in discourse, he means “discourse as a place where relations of power are actually exercised and enacted,” (p.43). He gives examples of the exercise of power as in the face-to-face discourse with participants of unequal encounters, like

the case of doctor and patient interaction, and media discourse which mostly have hidden agenda and voice for which they stand, and they hide them through the use of nominalization and voice, for example. By 'power behind discourse', "the whole social order of discourse is put together and held together as a hidden effect of power" (p.55); he says it is a focus on "how orders of discourse, as dimensions of the social orders of social institutions or societies, are themselves shaped and constituted by relations of power," (p.43). For example, he discusses institutional discourses of standardization (of language) as part of the wider economic, political and cultural unification. However, Fairclough concludes, "power, whether it be 'in' or 'behind' discourse, is never definitively held by any one person, or social grouping, because power can be won and exercised only in and through social struggles in which it may also be lost" (P.43). He explains:

Power, 'in' discourse or 'behind' discourse, is not a permanent and undisputed attribute of any one person or social grouping. On the contrary, those who hold power at a particular moment have to constantly reassert their power, and those who do not hold power are always liable to make a bid for power. This is true whether one is talking at the level of the particular situation, or in terms of a social institution, or in terms of a whole society: power at all these levels is won, exercised, sustained, and lost in the course of social struggle (Fairclough, 1989, p.68).

In relation to the road safety problem, it is expected that RSSs coming from various social, political and economic backgrounds have their own ways of constructing the problem and hence ways of addressing it. It is their own ideological position that makes their construction peculiar. As Blommeart (2005:29) put it, "Hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent so that 'the articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse [i.e. the Foucaultian regimentation and disciplining of and through discourse] is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle' (Fairclough 1992a:93)". Through analysis and explanation of the hidden ideology, counter discourses that could help change conceptualizations and practices of addressing the problem are enacted. Hence, power is the focus of analysis at the stage of discourse-as-social-practice.

Interviews were conducted with individuals, but their constructions could not be taken as the sole conceptions of their individuality; rather, since discourse is a social practice, they are construed as conceptualizations of users of that language taking part in the social/institutional practices under scrutiny. Since institutions are among the contexts where such social practices are enacted, it is useful to examine institutional discourses in some detail.

2.4 Discourse and Institutions

Institutions are conceived variously, from physical buildings to established organizations like schools or the media (Mayr, 2008). However, the definition found useful for this project, and hence adopted, is the one given by Agar; accordingly, institution is ‘a socially legitimated expertise together with those persons authorized to implement it’ (Agar, 1985, p.164 in Mayr, 2008, p.4). This conception of institution does not just incorporate the expert and non-expert/client groups, it also reveals their asymmetrical relationships. We could see people with the power of formulating policy and guidelines by which the group is to be led, on the one hand, and others who are on the recipient position to implement/abide by the directions sanctioned, on the other. The practice by which such is performed is mostly discursive. Citing Mumby and Clair (1997, p.195), Mayr (2008, p.3) discussed “three strands of research identified in the study of the relationship between discourse, institutions and power. These are:

- (1) the study of how members of oppressed groups can ‘discursively penetrate the institutionalized form of their oppression’;
- (2) how subordinate individuals ‘discursively frame their own subordination’ thereby perpetuating it; and
- (3) analysis of how dominant groups ‘discursively construct and reproduce their own positions of dominance’.

In a similar vein to that of Mayr (2008), the third strand (analysis of how dominant groups ‘discursively construct and reproduce their own positions of dominance’) is what this project focused on in its analysis of road safety ‘experts’ discourses. The dominant groups’ (government institutions in particular) construction and reproduction of road safety practices was central for the road safety conceptualization in Ethiopia today. In other words, road safety players working as, for example, policy makers, educators and enforcers that had the power/responsibility of ensuring safety exercise that hegemonic role by trying to maintain their social position; and “institutions’ power and politics are frequently exercised through the discourse of their members” (Mayr, 2008, p.1). However, elements of the second and the first strands have also been revealed. As for the framing of subordinate individuals confirming their subordination, it was revealed that the powerless subordinate groups, pedestrians in particular, were complying with road safety constructions of the powerful. Finally, in line with the first (the study of how members of oppressed groups can ‘discursively penetrate the institutionalized form of their oppression’), particularly drivers were found attempting to counter the institutionalized discourses of the dominant groups that had positioned them as main causes of RTAs.

In their article entitled *Discourse and Institutions*, Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004) have shown explicitly how discourses and institutions relate. Integrating institutional theory and discourse analysis, they developed “a discursive model of institutionalization that highlights the relationships among texts, discourse, institutions, and action.” According to them, institutions are social constructions constituted through discourse: “institutions both operate within and are produced by specific discourses” (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004). In Ethiopia, it was through discourse that the national, regional and local road safety councils responsible for the country’s road safety work were established. Moreover, most tasks of the councils are also discursive: discourses of planning, consultative execution and evaluation of the overall road safety work at the federal, regional and district or *Woreda* levels.

Another study focusing on discourses from an institutional perspective is by Arts and Buizer (2009) who have made an overview of the literature of various discourse approaches to come up with four types of them, each interpreting discourse in a different way. These are discourse as ‘communication’, discourse as ‘frame’, discourse as ‘text’ and discourse as ‘social practice’. They used the last two, ‘discourse as text’ and ‘discourse as social practice’, for their purpose of analyzing forest policy. As they reported, a combination of discourse and institutional analysis, operationalized by analytical dualism, renders new insights into global forest policy. In this regard, Fairclough could be taken as a model, for he showed the link between discourse and institutions concretely and repeatedly by, for example, examining particular discourses of/in institutions like universities and the media (1992, 1995, 2003, 2005). Regarding discourse and universities as institutions, he observed the commodification and mixing of information-giving and advertising in university prospectuses (Fairclough, 1992).

Put briefly in the context of this project, stakeholders that were supposed to have significant role in the road safety work in Ethiopia were grouped into two as government institutions and private institutions, and their discourses were analyzed accordingly; moreover, in order to see resistance discourses being reproduced, road users were taken as a third or independent institution and their versions were included. Overlaps could be observed between the last two; for example, transport service providers were private institutions, but the same could also be taken as road users since they provide their services being in the streets. As users of the road, their versions of the road traffic system were similar to the individual road users (passengers and pedestrians).

2.5 The Discourse of Road Safety

All causes of death are equal in as much as they cause death. But some are less equal than others by being more overlooked, more taken for granted or more accepted as an inevitable part of life than others, which are more scandalising. Road traffic injuries (RTIs) must be counted among the less equal (Borowy, 2013).

In this section, attempts are made to address two basic concepts in relation to the discourse of road safety: the conceptualization of road safety in general, and the issue of social equity in relation to the road safety problem.

2.5.1 Road Safety Conceptualization

Road safety, a complex global agenda pertaining to public health, social justice, environmental and city planning issues, has already been identified among the national and global discourses. It is a prominent concern because road use, and hence road safety, increasingly play an important part in people's everyday lives. The discourse of road safety and its conceptualization has followed the trend common in public health and in political/war discourse. Accordingly, road safety is commonly heard/read in governments' and organizations' discourses being constructed using health discourse (like as 'epidemic', 'plague', etc.), and political discourse (like 'fight' or 'war' against road crashes) (Nantulya & Reich 2002; Guttman, 2013, p.10). Others, for example Piller (1999), had analyzed extensively metaphorical uses in the automobile discourse. As (Guttman 2013:11) put it:

The language used by governments and road safety organization officials is often the language of combat: They aim to 'fight' against vehicle crashes. Road casualties are also described as an 'epidemic', drawing on medical terminology that aims to underscore the gravity and magnitude of the human toll associated with road use. Individuals also perceive road safety as an important issue that needs to be dealt with by society.

Terms like *traffic accident*, *safety* and *risk* frequently used in the road safety discourse have also been subjects of analysis in the academic context. According to Adams, road traffic accidents are considered by safety experts and campaigners as "the greatest epidemic of our time" (1985, p.2). Vardi (2014), on his part, has construed *traffic accident* as a "necessary evil" of the contemporary society, "a regrettable yet largely unalterable price to pay for the benefits of the automobile." Boholm et al. (2015) also analyzed the concepts of *risk*, *safety* and *security* and their relation based on empirical observation of their actual everyday use. One of the findings of

their study was the three adjectives *safe*, *secure*, and *risky* are so used in comparative form that interpreting them as absolute would be misleading; this finding thus rejects definitions of safety as “no harm” (Miller, 1988) or as “the absence of accidents” (Tench, 1985). Similarly, in his study of *risk* and *causality* in newspaper writing, Boholm (2009) made a useful comment on the grave mistake people made, based on work on causality by the philosopher John L. Mackie (1965, 1974). Boholm (2009) asserted that when we speak of causes we often select some condition and present that as the cause of some event, even though this event would not be possible without a much more complex set of conditions. The same could be observed in the police reporting and media coverage of RTAs; while a number of complex reasons could have been contributing to the occurrence of the accident, the police/media usually frame drivers as causes of RTAs. This was what he confirmed in his study, though his focus was in general on risk communication or media’s reporting of risk; as he put it, “newspaper media often provide simple explanations of risks, referring to single causes” Boholm (2009).

Luria et al. (2014) studied road safety conceptualization of a community using safety-climate concept to road safety based on which they proposed a concept which they called a community road-safety climate. Safety climate is defined as employee perceptions of policies, procedures and practices concerning safety in organizations (Zohar, 1980 in Luria et al., 2014). In their finding on the road safety conceptualization of the community, several points emerged as: (1) road safety was an important issue/concern of the community, (2) road safety information communication was so significant, (3) the community expected road safety was ensured in the neighborhood, (4) unsafe road use behavior needed to have consequences, and (5) community members showing positive road use behavior needed to be acknowledged.

However, over a century has passed since people started experiencing road crashes causing death, injury and resource damage and constructing them as solely road users’ faults. It was in 1896 that the first road victim was registered as being hit by a car which was being driven at a higher speed by a novice driver (Shinar, 2007). Since then, the problem was constructed as irresponsibility of the individual road user, i.e., the driver and/or the pedestrian. Hence, not only were crashes construed as “very early byproduct of the automobile” industry (Shinar, 2007, p.2), but also as prices paid by and/or due to misbehaving road users (Borowy, 2013). Researches on and efforts to alleviating the problem have come too late, after the problem became more and

more threatening. While the century old construction of the road safety problem as a consequence of the individual road user behavior was to the front, the inherent cause of such a construction was economic interest over safety; as Mooren and Grzebieta (2010) affirmed, “the main impediment to reducing road deaths and injury has been a misguided preference of economic advancement over public health risk management.”

Shinar further explains that safety has come a long way only in the past half century. By now, international and regional efforts to curb the problem of road traffic ‘unsafety’ are growing fast in line with the prevalence of the problem, and such efforts are being backed up by academic and applied researches. In the western world, especially the USA, government and non-government organizations like NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration), the AAA (American Automobile Association) Foundation for Traffic Safety, and MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) have made and released extensive researches and reports on road safety. Similar efforts and extensive works could also be found from Australia and Europe. International and regional organizations like the UN with its agencies (and the regional offices like UNECA) and EU are also doing the same. The seriousness of the problem has now pushed the UN to declare 2011-2020 as the decade of action for road safety (Peden, et.al 2004, WHO, 2013). Other academic researches on road safety are also being conducted from a variety of perspectives, but most of them were based on the positivist epistemology; the brief discussion here has focused on only those with theoretical and methodological implication to the present research.

It could also be concluded that the most extensive researches relating to road safety have been conducted in the context of high-income countries, the majority of which were done more with some economic interests than just for safety. Vallieres (2006), for example, lists research conducting institutions like the automobile manufacturing industries and businesses associated with the maintenance and construction of roads mostly from a design or engineering perspective; however, she says they also do it “for marketing purposes so as to be able to claim and sell safer products – a strategic planning exercise in corporate image ... that resembles branding” (p. 14). When economic interests are emphasized, public safety may not be adequately entertained. Moreover, Vallieres (2006) criticizes, most of these researchers “conceptualize the field [of traffic] as objective” that risks encountered in traffic can be remedied through technological changes. She instead argues for exploring traffic safety as not only a science and an objective

field, but also as a social construct: “risks and safety are not only ‘real’ in the realist sense, but are also social constructions. This challenges the notion that research about and practices of traffic and pedestrian safety are neutral, objective and unbiased” (p. 17).

Vallieres’s (2006) theoretical stand (the social construction of traffic safety) and methodology (employing critical discourse analysis) with their applicability to traffic safety establish a starting background to this project; however, the present research has a different context: while Vallieres (2006) centered her critique of pedestrian safety discourse on the grounds of the tenets of neoliberalism against the “system of automobility” focusing on an industrialized country, Canada, I analyzed RSSs’ discourses (of course including pedestrians) in the context of the safe systems theory and the philosophy of shared responsibility in order to explore the reasons for the insignificant results of safety efforts in a developing country, Ethiopia, where social, political, cultural and economic contexts are perceivably much different from that of the western world.

Langeland (2009) has made an inter-organizational study of a road safety campaign called “zero vision” in Norway. Using social constructionism theory that positions change as a consequence of language, he collected data from informants from key road safety organizations and government documents to capture “how the zero vision is given meaning by the key actors, and how this in turn creates the basis for action” (p. 8). He geared his analysis against three interrelated themes: conceptualization, instantiation and change; cooperation and conflicting interests; and competing goals and political pragmatism. While rhetoric has central position in his analysis of the first query, conceptualization, instantiation and change, theory of power is employed in the analyses of the other two. There are basic similarities between Langeland’s PhD work and this project, especially on the adoption of social constructionism and discourse analysis as theoretical framework and on the preference of stakeholders’ discourses for analysis; hence, the present project gains useful lessons from him. The two are different in other aspects, though. One difference is the focus of the studies: while the former emphasizes a campaign against road traffic injury and death, called “vision zero”, this one focuses on the overall conceptualization of road safety policy and practices in the midst of increased fatalities, injury and resource damage. The second difference lies on the research areas: a Scandinavian country Norway and a country in Africa, Ethiopia; accordingly, the severity of the problem, and cultural, social, economic and linguistic contexts of the two countries are different.

2.5.2 Road Safety and Social Equity

A strong association could be observed between road injury and a person's social, economic and environmental disadvantage. Adams (1985) confirmed that, among others, the differences in the likelihood of being killed in a traffic accident between those at the top of the socio-economic ladder and those at the bottom are large. For example, he showed that “an unskilled manual worker is four and a half times more likely to be killed in a motor vehicle accident than a self-employed professional, and sixteen times more likely to be killed while walking” (p.4). One of the most significant elements demanded for timely consideration in the discourse of the UN/WHO on road safety is the necessity of construing road crash injury as a social equity issue. The conceptualization of road safety as an issue of social equity is not a recent phenomenon for WHO; in its 2004 report on road traffic injury prevention, WHO stressed the necessity of incorporating in road safety programs the safety of all road users irrespective of their social, economic or political positions. According to the report, children, the poor (mostly pedestrians and cyclists in low income countries) and those of little influence over policy decision are the main victims of the road traffic system; hence, the “issue of equity is a central one for reducing the global burden of road crash death and injury” (Peden, et.al 2004, p.10).

Since they disproportionately affect these vulnerable groups of road users, among them are children and economically disadvantaged populations, RTIs have been declared a social equity issue as well (Guttman, 2013, p.10). For example, in a study conducted on risk factors for children in deprived communities in the United Kingdom, Christie et al., (2007) confirmed that children of such communities were particularly at risk of RTIs as pedestrians and cyclists especially during leisure time when playing or hanging out in the street; they would be five times more likely to be killed on the road as pedestrians than their peers from the highest social class. Using the example of transport, Woodcock and Aldred (2008) argued that a closer attention on social forms (commodity, corporation, and car) and social processes (capital accumulation and motorisation) would make visible connections between RTIs and other social/health problems. They suggested paying attention to health inequalities as avoidable and inequitable, and encouraged “thinking beyond proximal risk factors to the causes of the causes.” While this is true everywhere in the world, the literature affirms the case as critical for pedestrians/cyclists of low-income countries.

Both local and global literature regarding RTA victims explain the fact that pedestrians and cyclists are sharing disproportionately the lion's share of the burden; the car-holder and the not-car-holder are never equal in the road transport system when they are sharing it. In low-income countries, road users' vulnerability is higher due to the fact that, among others, people of these countries could not afford to use the motorized transport system compared to those of the high-income countries; moreover, since the traffic system of these low-income countries is not vulnerable road user friendly, it could contribute to RTA prevalence. For example, the highways and urban street designs of low-income countries sponsored by international agencies follow international designs or some scaled down versions, making "the lives of local people more difficult by introducing fast transport without facilities for local needs" (Mohan, 2002). Mohan has discussed the problem that people of the low-income countries face when highways divide the landscape into opposite sides, and the risk these people take by crossing the fenced highway because they do not like to go long distances in search of over- or underpasses. The new road safety approach thus needed to change the former perception that favored motorized travel and that construed RTA as a consequence of individual road user's mistake into an approach that adopts an "equal protection for all road users" (Mohan, 2002).

Using discourse analysis, Borowy (2013) explored "how RTIs have been constructed in ways that have served regional and global development agendas and how 'development' has been (re-) negotiated through the discourse of RTIs and vice versa." According to him, perceiving cars as "signs and preconditions of supposed modernisation, progress and development" has been significant, since it further caused construction of RTIs as: "necessary price to be paid for development," "sign of development at an early stage," or "[sign] of an insufficiently coordinated development." However, Borowy (2013) discusses RTIs are also results of constructions of various elements which also determine how the injuries should be prevented, incorporating, among others, economic and political priorities and interests. As he puts it:

RTIs can be constructed as the result of individual misbehavior, corporate irresponsibility, lack of administrative regulation or control, insufficient public maintenance and medical services, misguided transportation arrangements, poverty, fundamentally flawed working and living configurations or just bad luck. ... Depending on how well those respective constructions reflect the reality of deaths on the road, they also determine how many people die or stay alive.

From this discussion, it could be inferred that road safety is fundamentally an issue that needs an in-depth scrutiny, especially in the context of a low-income country, Ethiopia, where, because of a number of reasons related with road traffic/transport management problems, a significant number of people die or are severely injured compared to the small number of vehicles it has. Of course, this is so not only because of the constructions of the problem against the road trauma contributors that Borowy (2013) has listed may be common, but also that ways of and commitment to solving the problem associated with RTIs are so complex. Above all, it deserves local, timely, continuous and critical investigation based on proper data.

Borowy (2013) has affirmed that RTIs have been recognized as an important element of the larger transport/development discourse, and listed several factors that prohibit their prioritization. Economic interest and/or lack of it could be taken as the most significant one. He particularly construed the economic interest of “stakeholders of motorized traffic,” mainly that of the automobile industry as a hindering factor to the prioritization of road safety. Obviously, with vehicle density the number of accidents also increases, or with the promotion of environment-friendly mobility (walking and cycling) the risk of involvement in accidents minimizes. A closely related conceptualization of modernity/technology which McAndrews stated as “the traditional conception of ‘modernity’ as motorisation deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness in high- as well as in low-income countries” (2013) summarizes to what extent the issue is contributing to the prevalence of the road safety problem. In Ethiopia, the lion’s share of each year’s annual budget over the past two decades was for road infrastructure development; this could have been contributing significantly to the growth of the country. However, the more roads were constructed and rehabilitated, the more the risk for the inhabitants to suffer RTAs.

The conceptualization of RTAs as necessary evils a country has to pay at some stage of its development might also take the front position as a reason for the failure of any intervention efforts to controlling the problem. McAndrews (2013) construed this as the “deceptive assurance of a Kuznets curve-like concept that promises a solution of the specific problems of low-income countries once they cease to be low income.” In the context of the Ethiopian road safety work, such a conceptualization was expressed boldly.

The other significant contributor of RTAs, particularly affecting the vulnerable road users in low-income countries is related with class difference between car drivers/holders and non-drivers. According to McAndrews, this difference is significant since it divides road users as “those who are most likely to survive collisions unharmed and those who are most likely to die,” and most significantly, “this difference also effectively excludes the potential victims, who would benefit most from policy changes, from political decision-making processes in their countries” (McAndrews, 2013). Hence, the role of governments in this regard was significant. However, as it was discussed previously, governments in low-income countries would bring a number of priorities and interests before making any changes in favor of the majority victims, letting the problem to continue the way it is.

Interestingly enough, though, the implication of conceptualizing RTAs this way widens the claim that I made: that the problem of road safety is also related to social structures, i.e., it is political and economic as it is behavioral and technological. It has been long since Pratte (1998) and others affirmed an anthropological approach, a focus on social, cultural, political and economic conditions, rather than only on the dominant one (the epidemiological) that could better address the road safety problem in the developing countries, particularly in Africa. As Pratte (1998) put it, “By examining the issue of RTAs in developing countries from an anthropological - and thus qualitative and holistic - perspective, the nexus between the health consequences of behavior and the social and cultural correlates of that behavior may lead to new insights.” Hence, exploring the road safety problem in the context of low-income countries like Ethiopia needs to incorporate whether (and how) such political, social and economic issues might have any effects.

2.6 Systems Approach to Address Road Safety

Safety approaches based on systems theory consider accidents in general as arising from the interactions among system components and usually do not specify single causal variables or factors (Leveson, 2011, p.67). According to Saupe (2010), a shift in the semantic and political dimensions of security and safety of the UN’s program on “human security” resulted in *road traffic safety* to stand as an independent concern. This approach as Saupe argued, “strengthens ...the role of individuals, their rights and their responsibility in comparison to national governments and their mandate to protect social groups and the individual.” The formulation of such a road safety intervention strategy was a result of several grounds in relation to RTAs. The

fundamental and most worrying reason was increase of the RTI-caused death tolls worldwide, across the high-, middle- and low-income countries. Over the past decade, almost all UN/WHO documents and communications on health in general or road safety in particular stated the death of a million people annually, and predicted that the problem would escalate in the decades to come unless actions were taken soon. As the second ground, Saupe (2010) put RTS experiences/examples of high-income countries that low- and middle-income countries could get regarding how risks of modernization could be reduced. Based on this notion, the UN/WHO made successive assessments on the good practice/experiences of high income countries to formulate a recommendation document that could be transferred to middle- and low-income countries. Thirdly, RTS improvement is associated with the “strengthening of civil society with all their stakeholders” (Saupe, 2010). The call for international and national organizations, civil societies, NGO’s, businesses and individuals in WHO’s recommendations (Peden, 2004; WHO, 2013) could be construed as results of this ground. Finally comes improvement in vehicle and/or infrastructure technology to the extent the “individuals are no longer in full control of themselves and therefore no longer subjects of discipline” (Saupe, 2010). In the UN/WHO documents for example, we could observe the call for safety-oriented road design and construction, and safety-furnished vehicle engineering; they encourage the improvement of vehicles and roads to the extent that they could be read by road users and they could also read road users.

Hence, with the UN/WHO being the dominant actor, the new thinking/discourse in relation to road safety has been introduced. This thinking started by challenging the traditional approach that held road users alone as responsible for the safety of the road transport system by employing “preventive strategies directed mainly at improving users’ behaviour and their coping skills, mostly through education, information and enforcement” (Racioppi et al., 2004, p.27). However, behavioral campaigns to road safety are construed as ‘business as usual’ which are unlikely to generate significant improvements rather than maintaining the existing safety level (OECD, 2008, p.107). A further criticism against this approach was that since various components of the road transport system, including legislation and regulations, evolved separately, it was construed as a piecemeal approach to road safety in which different measures have targeted users, vehicles and infrastructure without coherent and systemic approaches (Racioppi et al., 2004, p. 27).

It was particularly in Europe that such ideas emerged, challenging the traditional approaches and in favor of the development of more comprehensive systems approaches. The ideas which acted as “building blocks” and which were suggested to choose from when rethinking road safety strategies were:

1. A systems approach addresses all the elements related to road safety. 2. “First, do no harm” (Hippocrates) – the underlying social values of road safety should be made explicit. 3. “Man is the measure of all things” (Protagoras) – human tolerance of mechanical forces should be at the core of road safety. 4. Road transport systems should be programmed to take human mistakes into account. 5. Road safety is a shared responsibility. 6. Developing a reference model for a safe road transport system allows defining safety criteria and taking steps to attain safety. (Racioppi et al., 2004, p.27-29)

The response of member countries in adopting the recommendations vary considerably though some have taken bold steps; in this regard Sweden (Vision Zero) and the Netherlands (Sustainable safety) could be cited as best examples. It was back in 1997 that the Sweden’s parliament adopted Vision Zero, a bold new road safety policy based on four principles:

ethics: human life and health are paramount; they take priority over mobility and other objectives of the road transport system; **responsibility:** providers, enforcers and users of the road transport system all share responsibility for road safety; **safety:** humans make errors; road transport systems should minimize the opportunity for error and the harm done when errors occur; and **mechanisms for change:** providers and enforcers of the road transport system must do their utmost to guarantee the safety of all citizens; they must work together, and each must be ready to change to achieve safety (Racioppi et al., 2004, p. 30)

The Dutch version of a Safe System approach (Wegman, 2013, p.9) called Sustainable Safety, was set with three objectives for the country’s road transport system, “Infrastructure will be designed to take into account human limitations; Motor vehicles will be designed and equipped to make the task of driving easier and to provide good protection in crashes; and road users will be provided with adequate information and education and will be deterred from dangerous behavior” (Racioppi et al., 2004, p. 31). Hence, in order to achieve a sustainably safe road transport system, applying three safety principles systematically and consistently was fundamental, as Racioppi et al. discussed. The principles were:

achieving functional use of the road network by preventing the unintended use of roads; ensuring homogeneous use by preventing large discrepancies in vehicle speed, mass and direction; and promoting predictable use, thus preventing uncertainties among road users by enhancing the predictability of the roads’ course and the behaviour of other road users (Racioppi et al., 2004, p. 31).

On the other hand, while the UN/WHO generally agrees on the seriousness of the road safety problem, it offers two reasons as to why it received insufficient attention: lack of awareness and information on the scale of the problem, and absence of an independent, responsible body to deal with it. Again, it construed absence of one responsible body as the very reason for the lack of political will to ‘develop and implement effective road safety policies and programmes’:

the problem of road traffic crashes and injuries does not “belong” to any specific agency, either at national or international levels. Instead, responsibility for dealing with the various aspects of the problem – including the design of vehicles, the design of road networks and roads, urban and rural planning, the introduction and enforcement of road safety legislation, and the care and treatment of crash survivors – is divided among many different sectors and groups (Peden, et.al, 2004, p.157).

Accordingly, the endeavor claimed to be successful against RTA-caused death and/or severe injury based on an ethical approach to safety is the Swedish road safety approach, i.e., Vision Zero (Whitelegg & Haq, 2006). This approach aspires to bring road traffic fatalities and serious injuries in Sweden to zero by 2020, based on its principle: “It can never be ethically acceptable that people are killed or seriously injured when moving within the road system” (Tingvall & Haworth, 1999, in Whitelegg & Haq, 2006, p.7). To this end, the approach required rejection of both the traditional economic model that works for reasonable cost for safety, and the traditional transport model that claims for balancing safety against mobility (Whitelegg & Haq, 2006, p.7).

Traditionally, studies which attempted to allocate responsibility for accidents amongst the roads, the road users and the vehicles categories usually concluded that road users deserve most of the blame (Adams, 1985). However, a significant paradigm shift that ‘vision zero’ has made is the sharing of responsibility among system designers and road users, instead of putting the blame on road users alone. This is the basis for the claim of treating road safety as a shared responsibility. The argument in favor of the theory is that “system designers” like the vehicle industry, road traffic planners, road safety engineers, police, etc. “have a shared responsibility to ensure that the transportation system protects all travelers, even when they make mistakes or are at fault” (McAndrews, 2013). However, she concludes even the vision has three underlying limitations:

(1) calling for more intersectoral participation in road safety without creating new institutions through which these sectors include road safety as a formal issue on their policy agendas; (2) assigning causal responsibility to road safety experts without creating a system through which they are accountable for their share of responsibility; and (3) relying on road users to voice political demands for better road safety outcomes without

mobilizing them through a public process, grassroots organizing, or some other mechanism for generating collective action (McAndrews, 2013).

By adopting the Swedish way of addressing road trauma through the sharing of responsibilities among various stakeholders, WHO holds the notion that it is possible to reduce RTIs worldwide. According to WHO, RTAs could be reduced through the commitment, informed decision and collaboration of government, non-government organizations, industry, international agencies, and people from many disciplines (Peden, et.al, 2004, p.158). WHO states the paradigmatic shift made of road safety. In the context of this model, there are key theoretical underpinnings it has listed by which road injury prevention and control should be understood. The most important point of the approach is the construction of road injuries as preventable and predictable, and this could be done if road safety is taken as a multisectoral and a public health issue.

In line with the notion of Vision Zero, WHO asserts that “common driving errors and common pedestrian behaviour should not lead to death and serious injury” (Peden et al., 2004, P.7); thus, the traffic system is expected to be cognizant of the limitations of road users to cope with the demanding conditions of the system. WHO’s claim is that vulnerability of the human body needs to be the limiting design parameter for the traffic system. Since speed is the main determinant in relation to the fallibility of human body, it is asserted that speed management should be central.

Therefore, probably one dominant term used for constructing the new approach that WHO recommended for implementation to mitigate the road safety problem meaningfully is ‘systems approach’. The approach mainly “seeks to identify and rectify the major sources of error or design weakness that contribute to fatal and severe injury crashes, as well as to mitigate the severity and consequences of injury” (Peden, et.al, 2004, p.12). Designed based on a former work by William Haddon, it targets to “identify problems; formulate strategy; set targets; and monitor performance” (Peden, et.al, 2004, p.12). Regarding responsibility, while the traditional approach puts the blame upon individual road users, or the victims themselves, systems approach is holistic and so encourages seeing the entire context of the transport system. Several factors (the roadway and roadside features, environmental factors and vehicle characteristics) are in play as accident causes; however, blaming drivers as causes of accidents is a frequently documented phenomenon. In the developing countries, as Obaidat and Ramadan (2012) noted, it is mainly the driver, regardless of the real cause of accident, that accident number and type are registered for.

Azetsop (2010) has analyzed the uneven distribution of RTID across population groups in Kenya that is “primarily affecting the uneducated and disenfranchised people from lower socioeconomic groups”. To him, although police reports and surveys show pedestrian and driver behaviors as the most important proximal causes of crashes, behaviors and risk factors neither fully explain the magnitude of RTID nor account for socioeconomic gradient in RTID. He instead claims for a social justice approach to RTID for it “highlights the need for emphasizing distal causal factors.” Thus, to address the problem meaningfully, he called for “a broader policy framework that includes the social dimension of injury, a strong political will to address the underlying causes of RTID and an effective partnership with stakeholders” (Azetsop, 2010).

Larsson, Dekker and Tingvall (2010) assessed the two approaches to road safety in light with the systems theory approach. The first one, which they called the road-user approach, puts individual road users as the only responsible ones when crashes occur and measures focus on correcting the users’ behavior to adapt to the transport system. The second, the Vision Zero approach, is based on the two principles: “the system must be adapted to the psychological and physical conditions and limitations of the human being and the responsibility for road safety must be shared between the road-users and the designers and professional operators of the system.” According to them, the basic elements of systems theory are not present in the first approach, but the second one, Vision Zero, has taken steps towards systems theory. Similarly, Vision Zero is construed as a radical policy innovation which is “different in kind from traditional traffic safety policy with regard to problem formulation, its view on responsibility, its requirements for the safety of road users, and the ultimate objective of road safety work” (Belin, Tillgren & Vedung, 2012).

In making a contrast between the two approaches, McAndrews (2013) framed our reaction to a traffic crash as of the former blaming approach’s knowledge and belief system if we construed individual drivers or victims as causes of the accident, raising questions like were they speeding, drinking, or talking on the phone; on the other hand, if our knowledge and belief system construed the road safety problem as systemic and collective, instead of blaming individual victims, we would ask how the transportation system might have failed to protect them from making predictable errors. Taking the perspectives of systems approach, Wegman (2013, p.9) also criticizes many studies of road traffic crashes as wrongly indicating the factors ‘road’ and

‘vehicle’ play only a minor role, putting the entire blame on the road users alone. McAndrews put the appeal against such a framing which she called ‘systemic and collective problem’ as:

The appeal of framing road traffic crashes and injuries as a systemic and collective problem, instead of understanding them as a problem of individual behavior, is that it offers a larger set of ways to organize the infrastructure, operations, and institutions of the road transportation system around injury prevention (McAndrews, 2013).

Shinar (2007) has also put the necessity of seeing the entire system of the road (road users, the vehicle and the environment) for an effective and fuller understanding of the traffic system, and for intervention to mitigate the problem, instead of focusing just on road users. He stated the very reason of such a construction as an historical incident; that is, road users have been viewed as the only decision makers in the driver-vehicle-highway system, though there were a number of other crucial components working together with the users. He put this as:

The roadway environment and the vehicle characteristics are crucial components in the highway traffic system, as are other vehicles and road users, the legal and social environment, and the enforcement that is or is not applied. When a crash occurs it is not necessarily the 'nut behind the wheel' that is responsible for it but many other 'nuts and bolts' in this complex system that may be loose or missing at the critical moment (Shinar, 2007, p.15-16).

Such a radical change challenges governments to making significant changes on, among others, their former conceptualization of safety, crash, and human vulnerability on the one hand, and regulations of roads design and transport service provision on the other. Of course, the necessity and effectiveness of government involvement to decreasing RTI was first applied in the western culture and is recommended for its scaling up worldwide. One example that confirms this is a review conducted by Ozanne-Smith (2004) on selected articles that appeared in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. In her conclusion, she stressed on the necessity of “strategic policy development, implementation and enforcement by government, accompanied by evaluation” in translating the evidence to practice; moreover, she stated that the establishment of RTI on the “public health agenda in Australia [was] a key aim of WHO’s five-year strategy for emulation by developing regions and nations of the world” (Ozanne-Smith, 2004).

Now one key problem is how these organizations with different (sometimes conflicting) interests could be coordinated. Although one claimed approach is governments would play the leading role for road safety management, in practice, this may not always be simple since they could also have other more pressing interests or priorities. For example, among the recent knowledge and

practice regarding how the road safety problem could be tackled is compromising interests related to mobility and the environment. However, this could be against citizens' rights/interests (which is dominantly advocated in the context of the neoliberal philosophy of the western or developed countries), or it could be against economic goals (particularly for the developing countries where economic needs are not yet attained), both of which will have their own repercussion on how the respective governments should handle the case.

Moreover, in both developed and developing countries, it is the economically disadvantaged groups of society (pedestrians, cyclists and motorbike riders) which are usually at risk rather than the economically and socially affluent groups who are more powerful to pressure governments to force them to act the way they like, or who could afford to use the road with the safest vehicles and to have the best treatment if accidents were to happen. It could be for this reason that practices of adopting such innovations were too slow, if not insignificant at all, compared to their urgency.

Despite challenges, it seems that it has worked in the developed countries. For example, Schulze and Koßmann (2010) stated how RTAs have declined in Germany as a result of employing a scientifically based safety management system, comprising strategic elements, tools and measures. They explained, "Such a safety management system includes a political programme containing important fields of action to improve road safety, a scientific research programme targeting the safety issues raised in the political road safety programme and – based on research results – the development and implementation of adequate road safety measures" (Schulze & Koßmann, 2010).

Putting the approach into action in the developing countries, however, could be quite challenging. Pratte (1998) has expressed his doubt on whether road safety researches conducted in the developed countries would apply to the developing ones. Thus, even when adopting evidence based knowledge and practices, before going to any implementation, a great deal of context driven examination, debate and communication is fundamental. This has been the case elsewhere; for example, Corben et al. (2010) have discussed the process for the development of 'Towards Zero', the road safety strategy in Australia; they said it "involved a greater degree of community and stakeholder engagement..., based on the fundamental belief that the community

should be provided with the best evidence about what works no matter how controversial, so that it can debate and consider the options available to improve safety” (Corben et al., 2010). Hence, while systems approach could be of positive impact for universal adoption, it needs critical scrutiny and recontextualizing before it is applied.

2.7 Road Safety and the Role of Governments

The discourse on the role of governments in the management of RTIs reflects conflict of interest that they are faced between culture, economy and public policy concerns. MacLennan (1988), for example, reviewed the continual redefinition of the automotive injury problem vis-à-vis the government of the United States until the end of 1980s dividing it into three phases: “(1) 1920-60, when the automobile manufacturers controlled prevention programs that defined the driver as the cause of accidents, (2) 1960-79, when federal regulations targeted vehicle technology as the best source of prevention strategies, and (3) 1979 to the present, when,... the framework shifted towards defining health and injury prevention as economic commodities.” Throughout the decades, as MacLennan (1988) argued, mainly due to the market ideology of the country, “political solutions to the problem of automobile crashes are fraught with cultural conflict and industrial resistance.” The culture of automobility dominant in high-income countries is being transferred to middle- and hence gradually to low-income countries with its negative effect on the health of citizens and their environment (Goodwin, 2010; Urry, 2004)

Bax (2011) has also examined the role of governments in addressing the road safety problem, focusing on road safety policy debate. In her review of the road safety literature covering over a century (1900-2010), she distinguished between three important debates. The first one was a focus on strategic intervention like infrastructural, behavioural and vehicle measures, and their costs and effects; the second was demarcation between road safety and other policy issues like traffic flow and environment, and whether or not to use an integral approach in making a particular choice; and the third was on organization of the policy, such as the directive role of provinces. While the role of governments would seem to have been strong in terms of policy formulation and finding out better approaches, inherent in each category or debate was conflict of interest between road safety and other economic issues, on the one hand, and interest to address the issue of road safety based on the principle of governmentality, on the other.

Governmentality, according to Foucault (2004, as cited in Henriqson et al., 2014), “is a complex form of power that focuses on the government of populations by connecting the conduct of individuals to administrative standards.” Henriqson et al. (2014) construed safety culture as a form of governmentality which produces modes of subjectivation in which individuals understand themselves as part of an organization; safety culture as part of the safety management discourse engages individuals in self-responsibilization. Hence, in the study they conducted on the discourse of accident prevention, Henriqson et al. (2014) discussed four issues about the constitution of safety culture and its effects as a form of knowledge.

The first effect is organizational culture that implies a normative homogeneity of values, beliefs, and behaviours. According to this notion, safety is not the only aim of an organization, nor is it the main goal; instead, it is a condition for the organization to produce and deliver its products and services. In the context of road safety it would mean that prevention of accidents or safety of road users is not the main concern, but it is only a means for the smooth flow of the traffic system. Hence, the role of governments would be more on facilitating safe flow of vehicles and road users to achieve mobility-related economic and/or social goals rather than on protecting lives and limbs of individual road users.

The second effect of the constitution of safety culture is related with control; it is construed as a disciplinary enforcement of workers’ safety behaviours; this form of disciplining would not be performed by employing sanctions/penalties/fines, etc. alone on anyone misbehaving, but it also includes making use of technological devices like radar camera (with knowledge of the individual being inspected) with the intention of letting him/her behave avoiding any deterrence. This is of significant disciplinary power, since, according to Foucault (1977), the disciplinary effect is the individual’s self-vigilance, for surveillance is more economical than punishment.

The third effect of the constitution of safety culture is a bio-political control of organizations; bio-politics is a concept that Foucault discusses regarding the practice of modern nation states and their regulation of their subjects through various techniques to achieve suppressions of bodies and control of populations (Foucault, 2008, cited in Henriqson et al., 2014). Regarding how the management of population could be observed, Henriqson et al. discuss it may be “in a set of technologies adopted to compare the safety performance of organisations based on their

safety culture characteristics, promotion of industry best practices of safety management, and motivational campaigns that sloganize ‘safety first’.” These discourses/practices could be observed, though to varying degrees of emphasis, in road safety policy/practices of governments.

The fourth effect is safety culture as a form of governmentality that connects the conduct of individuals with organizational norms. As it was discussed earlier, according to this notion, individuals are expected to construe themselves as part of an organization, engaging themselves in self-responsibilization. In doing so, Henriqson et al. (2014) pointed out, citing Ramos do Ó (2005), that “the central issue is not the coercive force exercised over those that are governed, but rather the different exercises of power that are connected in the name of good practice.”

On the other hand, while governments could be engaging in such subtle practices in the name of changing the former safety culture that targeted individual road users (for example, employing individual-based behavior change strategies), they are still expected to play a significant roles to road safety. It might be for this reason that contrary to discourses that positioned governments as having a significant roles in insuring road safety, counter discourses due to suspicion and/or dissatisfaction with their practices are so common. As Elvebakk (2014) clearly depicted, people conceptualize government intervention via safety measures as paternalism, i.e., the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, but defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm (Dworkin, 2010, in Elvebakk, 2014). This is done because, as Elvebakk (2014) plainly put it, “the state does not trust individuals to make the right decisions in order to keep themselves safe.”

In their discussion of RTIs as a neglected epidemic in the developing countries, Nantulya & Reich (2002) listed five reasons for the high burden of the problem: growth in motor vehicle numbers; high number of people killed or injured per crash; poor enforcement of traffic safety regulations; inadequacy of public health infrastructure; and poor access to health services. While the problem was so grave, which they also construed as “the neglected epidemic,” public policy responses were muted at national and international levels. Their policy recommendation for the developing countries was one which was “based on local evidence and research, and designed for the particular social, political, and economic circumstances” of the concerned countries (Nantulya & Reich, 2002). The problem in relation to almost all the listed reasons is the fact that

they are real threats which the developing countries could not escape from. To begin with, as part of the global world, they couldn't escape from the need for (and expansion of) vehicles. Most significantly, though, the reasons mentioned demand good investment for the provision of appropriate resources and manpower for road safety which further necessitates economic strength. On the other hand, compared to economy, the lives and limbs being lost due to RTAs are invaluable. Hence, regarding the role of governments to address the road safety problem, the most important thing should be strong political commitment. The world has model governments that have practically shown their commitment to and engagement in road safety, as we saw some of them in section 2.6 above. The problem is, however, their conceptualization of the problem and commitment to solve it. That was what Ward et al. (2010) called social and political leaders for: beyond simple transfers of knowledge, to engage communities at the macro level to build a safer traffic culture by initiating public discourse and transformational learning.

2.8 Studies on the Road Safety Problem in Ethiopia

Road safety is a big concern for Ethiopia; RTA is a serious but neglected health problem in the country (Damen, 2014; Hailu, Mekonnen and Teshager, 2014). Ethiopia has the most dangerous roads in the world (UNECA, 2009, p.17); although the country's road network density and vehicle ownership is low, its collision record is high (Asefa et al., 2014). As UNECA pointed out, there is no well-established system of intervention and effective institutional management system to address the problem, (2009, p. 9).

Moreover, road safety is a concept not very well recognized by the society; road crashes are not culturally understood as preventable; instead, for most of the citizens, drivers, passengers and pedestrians, they are perceived as inevitable; "an element of fatalism was common, often linked to a religious belief that God is in control" (Salmon & Eckersley, 2010). The problem is rarely discussed as a development issue at the government level. In most of the road infrastructure projects underway, road safety is not given due consideration. Although there are claims about growing awareness on the need for safer road use among the public, government departments and institutions (ETA 2000; Getachew 2009; Salmon & Eckersley, 2010), in the face of many competing health and development needs of the country, the road safety issue has remained low on the list of priorities (Jacobs & Aeron-Thomas, 2000, p. 31; Salmon & Eckersley, 2010).

Of course, recently, following the worsening of the problem year after year, the government has started expressing its concerns; for example, the worsening of RTAs has been one issue included in the Government's 2015/16 semiannual performance report presented to the MPs by the Prime Minister. If the public and the government were of the right cognizance of the seriousness of the road safety problem in Ethiopia, the logical question to raise should be why the knowledge has not led them to actual change in road use behavior (for the road users), and to meaningful road safety work (for the responsible stakeholders). Why does the government not react when people are being killed/injured almost on a daily basis? Or if a driver, a pedestrian or a police officer, for example, is cognizant of the effects of unsafe road use both for themselves and other road users, why do they get involved in risky road use practices? Otherwise, there must have been something different contributing to the prevalence of death, injury and resource damage in the country.

A document by the NRSC put death rate due to road crashes in Ethiopia at 70 per 10,000 vehicles, and accepts it as promising, comparing it to the figure of the past decade, which was almost double of this (NRSSPE, 2011). However, compared to global status, the number of lives being lost and injured due to road traumas in the country is unacceptable. According to WHO's (2015) report, while the world's average road traffic fatality rate of the period was 17.4 per 100,000 population, the rate for the African Region was put at 26.6; only a simple comparison with that of the South-East Asian, the Americas, and the European Regions, which were 17.0, 15.9 and 9.3, respectively could make the claim made clear. Elvik, et al. (2009), also have put Ethiopia as one of the four countries in the world with extremely high health risk, with over 1,000 fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles. Moreover, the disproportionately distributed ratio of road victims among the car holders/drivers, passengers and pedestrians further strengthens the concern being expressed here. The same office, the NRSC, for example, states that over half of the lives lost were pedestrians', whereas the majority of fatal accidents, 76%, were due to drivers' errors. Besides, commercial vehicles driven by professional drivers were constructed as the main causes, involving in 89% of fatal accidents; once the tag 'al-Qaida' was given to the public transport providing midi-buses known by the public as ቅጥቅጥ / *kitkit* and the name ቀይሽብር / *Red Terror* was given to the Chinese made heavy truck *Sinotrak*, relating its color and practices with that of the bloodshed Derg Regime; and recently, the public renamed the truck as አይሲስ /

ISIS, for its repeated involvement in accidents causing crashes resulting in totally unacceptable death and injury in the capital, Addis Ababa, and the country at large. Privately used cars have only a 5% share of the total fatal accidents. Vehicle defect, pedestrian error, and road defects do also contribute, but were construed as of insignificant share of the total, with 6%, 5%, and 2% respectively (NRSSPE, 2011). WHO's (2009) report has also confirmed that the majority of road victims in Ethiopia are pedestrians and passengers; the injured (fatal, serious and slight) people ratio is put at 48% pedestrians, 45% passengers and 7% drivers; and excessive speed was framed as the cause of most of the severe accidents. The implication is that while road users were held responsible for the problem they faced (in the form of death or injury), other players that could have significant contributions were construed as of insignificant role; hence, there is some power imbalance playing in the process.

Another study by Eckersley, Salmon and Mulugeta (2010) addressed the road safety problem in Ethiopia in relation to driving under the influence of *khat*. As they pointed out, drivers are regarded as dangerous due to their use of drugs, and their trucks are commonly referred to across Ethiopia as "*al Qaeda*". However, driver impairment is rarely recorded as a contributory factor. Although driving while chewing, or having recently chewed *khat* is implicitly outlawed in Ethiopia under a federal law banning "driving under the influence of mind-affecting drugs," many police officers are not aware of this law, and there is no readily available technology that tests for *khat* consumption (Eckersley, Salmon & Mulugeta 2010).

Salmon and Eckersley (2010) addressed road safety in Ethiopia focusing on child road safety education. They confirmed the presence of some efforts of safety education, but found contents included and methodologies employed as flawed. They related the underlying reason with direct importing of dominant modes of road safety education from high-income countries without any effort of recontextualization. They construed some of the models adopted as ineffective even in the source countries where they came from. Hence, they concluded, quoting Banerjee (2007), "models can become accepted as 'best practice' without necessarily being well founded. The organisations that introduced these resources were well meaning but misguided, a phenomenon described ... as 'institutional laziness'".

Some studies were also conducted on the road safety problem in Ethiopia by AAU students as their MA/MSc theses. These studies addressed road safety focusing on: RTA causes, temporal and spatial variations and consequences, (Bitew, 2002; Yayeh, 2003; Getu, 2007), costing of accidents involving injuries (Fanuel, 2006; Tewolde, 2007; Murad, 2011), and communication strategies to influence audience behavior in addressing road safety problem (Getachew, 2009).

Bitew (2002) specifically focused on traffic accidents in Addis Ababa caused by taxis. Though taxis provide important public transport service in the city, they are at the forefront of accident incidence, accounting for between 15.6%-26.5% (p.148). His findings indicated that concentration of economic activities and services, negligence of taxi drivers and working for longer hours, older taxi vehicle fleet, and inadequacy of traffic control facilities were among the main causes of taxi traffic accidents, whereas low level knowledge of pedestrians about the traffic rules, the small number of the police working for long hours without incentives, inadequate facilities and the lack of enforcing capacity of the traffic regulation itself were found as main contributing factors to the incidence and magnitude of RTAs in Addis Ababa. He also mentioned absence of coordination among the different offices related with roads and road traffic to have been resulting in a high number of traffic accidents in the city (Bitew, 2002, p. 147-148).

Fanueal (2006) also made an analysis of traffic accidents in Addis Ababa and indicated that most of the accidents in the city were due to operators' mistakes and behavioral errors that could be corrected through education and awareness. He highlighted the presence of only few organizations that are directly involved in activities targeted to address the problem (p. 115).

Getu's (2007) study focused on road traffic accidents and possible counter measures on the Addis Ababa – Shashemene road. According to the study, Addis Ababa and the Oromia Region of Ethiopia accounted for 58% of all fatal accidents and two thirds of all injuries. The study was carried out to identify black spots and possible causes of RTAs, and to identify low cost engineering countermeasures. Among the main causes of accidents at black spots on the Addis Ababa–Shashemene road that were identified include: unavailability of proper pedestrian facilities, high volume of pedestrian traffic, drivers' fatigue, lack of awareness of traffic rules and regulations, and violation of speed limit (p. 81). Getu has further revealed the gap in the institutional structuring of the Roads Transport Authority which is also responsible for road

safety issues, and “absence of activities to regularly update and consolidate the several road transport legislations that were issued from time to time since 1943” (Getu, 2007, p. 6).

Getachew (2009) investigated road safety communication strategies to influence audience behavior in Addis Ababa. The paper confirmed presence of awareness on the prevalence of the road safety problem, and recommended behavior change communication using mass media and interpersonal communication strategies. However, Getachew concluded, “influential segments of the public, government authorities and social institutions’ leaders seem to have insignificant role in the effort of controlling the problem and in mobilizing the public to this effect” (p. 117).

Murad’s study (2011) is different in that he specifically focused on costing economic – human and material – losses due to RTAs. Accordingly, he confirmed that the national economic losses resulting from road accidents in Ethiopia are considerably high: the cost of damage only, slight, serious and fatal road traffic crashes were 327.12, 204.65, 619.38, and 716.02 million Birr respectively for the year 2009/10; the total national economic loss resulting from road accidents for the year was 1.87 Billion Birr which equivalent to 145.07 Million USD, or approximately 0.49% of the GDP of the country in the same year (p. 53). This figure, however, is estimated to increase with the increment of mobility as a result of the fast growing urban population, new road construction and additional cars entering the traffic.

In conclusion, though the above reviewed works and recommendations have so far been made, compared to other social issues (like HIV/AIDS and malaria) and the severity of the problem – that it is escalating year after year, road safety related activities and researches are rare in Ethiopia. Some of the limited works reviewed attempted to focus on the knowledge – cognitive – aspects of the issue, while others were behaviour-oriented. Efforts of creating a standard for identifying, enumerating, and costing RTAs in the country were also made. Overall, as UNECA’s (2009) study concludes:

Although there are limited activities towards combating the problem, it is insufficient by any standard relative to the worsening situation. Very little is known in Ethiopia about the traffic safety knowledge, attitude and behavior of road users, and the causes of traffic accidents and their effective counter measures. (p. 17)

The fact that the studies addressing the road safety problem were so insignificant compared to the seriousness of the case was one thing, but that they were dominantly positivists in their

orientations is another thing. As the computer engineer by profession Nancy Leveson, after three decades of research on safety convincingly concluded even “engineers can no longer focus only technical issues and ignore the social, managerial, and even political factors that impact safety if we are to significantly reduce losses” (Leveson, 2011, p. xviii). If it is necessary to address the problem as social/political/cultural than just technological/epidemiological issue, investigating it with the positivist approach alone could not lead to a comprehensive understanding that would lead to better solutions. Hence, different foci and methodology are mandatory. It is for this reason that the present research has focused on investigating the problem from the social constructionist approach, using CDA as theory and method of analysis.

In conclusion, road safety as a social concern has not come to the forefront until RTAs became so serious, damaging human and material resources considerably. Efforts aimed at alleviating the problem based on the positivist approach, concentrating on technological and behavioral solutions, did not help much. Instead, it further marginalized the social and constructive nature of the problem. More specifically, the road safety problem in Ethiopia has not been investigated from the perspective of the stakeholders’ construction of the problem. An analysis of the RSSs’ discourses could better help us understand their conceptualization of road safety policy and practice and how they position themselves and others in relation to the road safety work in the midst of the escalating road related death rate, injury and resource damage. The number of crashes causing deaths and serious injuries is highly unacceptable for a country having only not more than half a million cars (according to WHO’s 2015 report, the number of registered cars in Ethiopia in 2012/13 was 478, 244). The various enumerating studies and the statistical data that were released by international organizations (like WHO) and by the Ethiopian government, mainly from the Federal and/or Regional Police Crime and Accident Investigation Bureaus revealed the majority of crash victims (in the form of death, severe injuries and slight injuries) were pedestrians and passengers, and in most cases these segments of the population were also frequently blamed for improper road use practices. The implication of all these is that there is the exercise of (political, economic, historical, etc.) power in the handling of road safety in Ethiopia, and this has not been examined by any of the researches reviewed.

The recent approach to address the problem is based on the systems approach that advocates shared responsibility among the various road safety players. Based on this, UN/WHO formulated

a recommendation document to be adopted and implemented by member states so as to curb the problem by 50% by the end of this decade. Ethiopia adopted notions of the approach in its road safety strategy and claimed to have been working accordingly. Prior road safety researches that could show implementation of the safe systems approach and its implication are available in high income countries; however, they are nonexistent in/on Ethiopia. It is in this context that the study attempted, using CDA, to describe, interpret and explain discourses of RSSs and road users to understand the stakeholders' conceptualization of the road safety problem and to reveal the exercise of power that contributed to the perpetuation of the problem, consuming lives, limbs and resources.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter details with methodological and theoretical aspects of the study. It begins with an overall view of the design of the study. After explaining the steps taken in delimiting the research setting and population, procedures taken in data collection are discussed: from where and how data were collected. In-depth interviews, policy and other documents, broadcast and print media contents and observations which were used as key tools of data collection are explained, with arguments for the decisions made for using them. While a number of data sources could have been recruited (since the RSSs are many and from different institutions), selection was made purposively. Thus, in relation to the sampling procedure, issues like which sources were selected, what justifications were considered in choosing them, and how many of them were selected are addressed.

Next, the theoretical framework that the study is located in, *social constructionism*, and the basic justifications for adopting it is discussed, particularly emphasizing on the link between social constructionism and language. This is followed by an elaboration of the main theoretical and analytical approach employed, *critical discourse analysis* (CDA). This is central to the whole endeavor of the project, and hence is given particular emphasis. CDA, also used as a method of analysis, and other theories and analytical tools employed in the work are then treated. After that, explanation of the procedures taken in data collection and transcription, and decisions made on how selection of extracts used in the analysis is provided. Finally, ethical considerations made in the process of data collection and analysis is discussed.

3.2 Research Design

As Marvasti concludes, “Research design refers to the steps that researchers follow to complete their study from start to finish,” (2004, p. 9). For this study, I employed the case study design for several reasons. First, case study is employed to “explore subjects and issues where relationships may be ambiguous or uncertain” (Gray, 2004, p.123) but could also be of a causal relationship. For the prevalence of the road safety problem in Ethiopia, a number of reasons contribute, being of various degrees and in complex relationships. Case study design is also used to answer the *how* and *why* questions (Gray, 2004); accordingly, my interest in this study was to answer how

RSSs conceptualized road safety and why efforts of addressing the road safety problem did not meet expectations. Moreover, “The case study approach requires the collection of multiple sources of data,” (Gray, 2004, p.124) and the analysis of cases based on their situational contexts. It was the same approach that I used in this project: the institutions the RSSs represent/come from are many and these cases were treated independently, based on their social and situational contexts.

Marvasti offers distinctions between quantitative and qualitative researches as follows, “Quantitative research involves the use of methodological techniques that represent the human experience in numerical categories, sometimes referred to as statistics [and] qualitative research provides detailed description and analysis of the quality, or the substance, of the human experience” (2004, p.7). I employed the qualitative interpretative methodology for this project; as will be discussed in some detail in this chapter, the constructionist theoretical framework I adopted has been significant in the search for the various stakeholders’ road safety knowledge and practices, and the inherent ideological grounds these stakeholders had to come up with conceptualizations of the road safety problem and knowledge and practices they employ to address the problem. Had I used the quantitative approach, participants’ thick descriptions of their road safety knowledge and practices and their ideological constructions that helped me reveal the reason for the perpetuation of the country’s road safety problem would not have been unpacked.

Below, as aspects of the design, the research setting, the participants, the sampling procedure, the data collecting instruments, decisions regarding transcription and translation of the collected data, methods of analysis, tools used in the analysis, and ethical considerations, are discussed.

3.3 Research Setting and Population

There are many RSSs working in/using the road traffic system in Ethiopia. These include: (1) MoT with its different agencies: NRSC, ETA, ERA, and ORF; (2) FPC particularly the Police; (3) MoE; (4) MoH; (5) MoUDHC; (6) GCAO; (7) the media – both print and broadcast; (8) driver training and licensing institutions; (9) transport service providers’ associations; (10) independent traffic engineering/safety consultants (11) vehicle drivers; (12) insurance companies, and (13) pedestrians/passengers. The ministries/commissions do also have structures

stretching down to regional, and district level. Of all these RSSs, the leading participants in the Ethiopian road safety work are the federal level government institutions: the NRSC, MoT and its different agencies (ETA, ERA, and ORF), the FPC and the media. MoH, MoUDHC and MoE could probably come next. Moreover, at the Regional/City Administration level, apart from the Regional/City level extensions of the aforementioned Ministries/Commissions (called Bureaus/Commissions), the private institutions like transport service providers' (and their associations), driver training institutions, vehicle inspection firms, garages, insurance companies, etc. could be mentioned. The AATB has included opinion leaders, women's and the youths' associations in the list of stakeholders to get involved in the city's road safety work. The third group of stakeholders includes road users: drivers, passengers and pedestrians though other road/roadside users could also be considered. Thus the population of the study is so wide to that extent.

This study focused on how RSSs working at the Federal level and at the City Administration of Addis Ababa, and road users of the capital conceptualized the road safety problem in Ethiopia, and how they positioned themselves and others engaged in practices of addressing the problem and/or ensuring safer road use. The lead agency for road safety work in Ethiopia is the NRSC, which was set up following the 2011 regulation for its institution; before its establishment, the Interim NRSC had led the country's road safety efforts for about seven years, being coordinated by the *National Road Safety Coordinating Office*, the same office that is serving as Secretariat of the NRSC (of course, the office of the interim body was in the building of the ETA, but now it is situated in the building of MoT).

The council incorporates high-level officials of the FDRE, technical experts' committee, and the secretariat that runs routines. As a lead organization of the road safety work of the country, the NRSC has three basic objectives: "develop road safety strategies, plans and programs; coordinate the collaborative efforts of the concerned government and non-governmental organizations; and promote road safety awareness nationwide" (NRSSPE, 2011, p.3). Apart from the NRSC at the federal level, road safety coordinating committees/councils have also been set up in the Regional States and City Administrations being comprised of representatives of major road (transport) related stakeholders; in some Regions, the structure stretches down to the District/*Kebele* level, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia (NRSSPE, 2011, p.3).

In relation to strategies/policies to road safety provisions, several government documents show the political involvement to tackling the road safety problem in Ethiopia. The most important government document that could be seen as a policy framework is the NRSSPE for the decade 2011-2020. The strategic plan gives details of the road safety efforts in Ethiopia: developments since the establishment of the interim Road Safety Coordinating Office (RSCO), the planned work and the goals to be achieved over the decade. Also, GTP I of 2011-2015 had a section addressing the road safety problem that the country was facing and the goals targeted to have been achieved at the end of the plan period. Moreover, ERA has a Road Safety Audit Manual which it uses for its “safety-oriented road design and construction”. The AACAA has a transport policy document that included the road traffic safety issue as an important component. These are the available but key government road safety-oriented documents that the study investigated.

In conclusion, NRSC is the host of all road safety related works in Ethiopia, from formulating policy options to coordinating road safety works of the various RSSs, government or private institutions. Using stakeholders as an analytical category, and selecting only key documents and players from the various stakeholders working under the leadership/coordination of the NRSC (including their education and media products), this study has attempted to explore how road safety is conceptualized, promoted and practised by these stakeholders and the public at large.

3.4 Data Collection and Sampling

There are a number of data sources to collect road safety discourses appropriate for DA: “interviews, conversations, newspaper articles, media releases, television news broadcasts, company policy documents, letters, reports and even fairly informal chats, such as those involving DJs on the radio” (Daymon & Holloway, 2002, p.140-141). In the following subsections, three data collecting instruments employed by the project (documents, in-depth interviews with key road safety players and road users, and observations) and the sampling procedures are discussed with justifications for employing them.

3.4.1 Documents Analysis

3.4.1.1 Policy/Strategy Documents

Policy documents, strategy plans or government directives are important textual materials in revealing what knowledge base and directions are being followed, on the one hand, and how near

or far practices of the responsible bodies are in their intervention to tackling a social problem, or in promoting societal issues, on the other. For this project, I contacted the key road safety players both at the federal and at the AACA levels. Though, legally, anyone has the right to ask for and access public documents, practically, entry into government documents is a bit difficult in Ethiopia. However, the good rapport that I developed with some key road safety players since I did my Master's Degree in 2008/09 enabled me to have access to documents pertaining to road safety that these offices had. Thus the available policy/strategy documents and guidelines used by the RSSs were collected. Accordingly, the key government documents I found important for the project, collected purposively and used in the analysis were: NRSSPE 2011-2020 published in 2011, GTP I 2011-2015 published in 2010, ERA's RSAM published in 2012, and AATP published in 2011 to be implemented in line with the strategic plan. Since all the documents had English versions, translation was not necessary (in fact, two of the four documents, the NRSSPE 2011-2020 and ERA's RSAM did not have Amharic versions at all).

These texts were specifically selected for critically analyzing how the road safety problem was conceptualized, how RSSs constructed themselves and others with whom they were meant to collaborate in the work of ensuring road safety or tackling the problem. Moreover, intertextual analysis was made to find out discourses that governed choices of the RSSs' approaches to addressing the problem over the available alternatives and why these choices were made; the participants' ideological positions were also inferred from such decisions. Contrasts were also made between contents of the documents the RSSs prepared/quoted and their actual road safety practices, and reasons for inconsistencies and/or impacts of overlaps were analyzed.

3.4.1.2 Road Safety Messages (Print and Broadcast)

Actual media releases are powerful in revealing stakeholders' conceptualizations of social problems like road safety and their practices of intervention by making inferences based on the emphasis in the selection of messages. From the RSSs' constructions of the problem, it was possible to infer their knowledge/belief systems about the road safety problem and their practices of intervention, i.e., how they perform the task of ensuring road safety. The investigation could then be further pushed based on differences/similarities between the constructions and the practices. Moreover, both federal and regional institutions with traffic safety and/or transport interest had print materials, in the form of brochures, though they were very much limited in

their amount and distribution. These materials have lessons and information about the risk of road crashes and the necessity of safer road use. Fliers available in the offices of the ETA, the AATB and in the selected sub-cities' Road Transport Offices' Road Traffic Safety Education and Awareness Creation Desks (RTSEACD) during the data gathering period were collected.

The various mainstream broadcast media in Ethiopia, the private and regional/community FM Radios in particular, have road safety messages with information and lessons on safer road use. Occasionally, RTA related news and current affairs televised programs could also be seen from EBC and Addis Television. The Department for Road Safety Education and Awareness Creation of ETA and the FPC are the main producers of road safety lessons and current information targeting national audiences, whereas TB of the AACA and AAPC are responsible for producing broadcast programs targeting the capital. These programs are transmitted via EBC, Addis Television and the various FM radios in Addis Ababa and the Regions. From these sources, purposively selected broadcast road safety programs were included in the corpus for analysis.

Several road safety programs were selected for the study purposively. The EBC transmits (both by television and radio) a weekly 20-minute long road safety program prepared by ETA called *ጉዞ / Guzo*, meaning *Journey*; four weeks' transmissions of the program were recorded in the months of February and March of 2015. FBC radio transmits RTA news and safety lessons related with the news in collaboration with the Addis Ababa and Oromia Traffic Police (they transmit every 24 hours' accident reports every day in the morning), of which four weeks' daily transmissions of the July – August 2015 were recorded. Moreover, Sheger FM 102.1 has a weekly phone in radio program called, *አገድ አገድ ነገሮች / and and negeroch*, meaning *some pressing issues*; it is a program that raises some hot issues of the country for live discussion. It raised the road safety problem of the country twice during the data collection time, each on average of 45 minutes long. The second one conducted in the morning of 27 March, 2014 was recorded. I have possession of all these and could be presented upon request.

Media materials could have various semiotic elements; for example, visual images are common in televised messages, whereas layout and design, color choice and photographs are usually incorporated in printed materials. For the purpose of this project, only the linguistic elements were analyzed. Data collected from the media, documents and brochures were helpful in

providing the study with insights into RSSs' and road users' conceptualizations of the road safety problem and their practices of tackling it; they discursively revealed the knowledge and belief systems and actual practices of the RSSs that produced them. The RSSs' constructions of the self and of others' revealed not only how they positioned themselves and others, but also what they expected from the practices of other RSSs and road users in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa).

3.4.2 In-depth Interviews

According to Seidman (2006), telling stories through interviewing is essentially a meaning-making process. As he pointed out, the basic assumption in in-depth interviewing research is that the meaning people make of their experience affects the way they carry out that experience. Seidman (2006) equates being human with people's ability to symbolize their experience through language. Moreover, Seidman advises us not to take the purpose of in-depth interviewing as a means of getting answers to questions or testing hypotheses; instead, he states it as a means of "understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience" (2006, p.9). This is in agreement with Fairclough's (2003) conceptualization of the social effects of texts as 'meaning-making' processes. Similarly, Daymon and Holloway (2002) discussed the goal of interviewing for DA as different from that for other methodological approaches. In DA the search is mainly finding out how communication is constructed and what it achieves rather than aiming to understand what people believe or what they really are (p.142).

There are many government institutions, private firms and individual road users that have a stake on road safety. The government institutions that work on road safety are the NRSC, FPC, MoT and its agencies (ETA, ERA and ORF), MoH, MoE, MoUDHC and GCAO. Of course all of the federal ministries/commissions/authorities have extensions called 'bureaus' at the regional or city administration levels. The private institutions include driver training institutions, vehicle quality assuring firms, transport service providers' associations, independent road safety/transport engineering consultants. There are also drivers, passengers, pedestrians, roadside small scale businesses and dwellers. Participants involved in the interviews were purposefully selected institutions of the various RSSs – government institutions, private firms and individual road users, and their positions vary in accordance with where they came from; thus, they are generally grouped into three as RSSs of government institutions, RSSs of the private sectors, and taxi and/or other vehicles' drivers, pedestrians and passengers from the road users group.

As a study that attempted to investigate RSSs' understanding of the road traffic menace, the necessity to and efforts of controlling it, and the reason behind the gap, the RSSs' description of the problem and ways of addressing it should be collected. Therefore, in-depth interviews were carried out to collect data that would help understand how the RSSs – decision makers (authorities), officials (experts), enforcers (the police) and road users (drivers, passengers and pedestrians) – respond to typical questions related to road safety conceptualization or their knowledge and belief systems about the road safety problem and ways of tackling it, and the stakeholders' constructions of road safety related practices of themselves and of others.

There are many RSSs working (or who were supposed to work) in road safety in Ethiopia, and data that would help address the research questions of this project could have been collected from all of them. However, how much data should be collected for analysis depends on the level of the study, both in terms of its theoretical and methodological orientation, and the availability of time and resources. Sampling, as Marvasti explains, is theory-bound; “The theoretical purpose of the project, rather than a strict methodological mandate, determines the selection process” (2004, p.9). Hence, the sampling procedures in qualitative research are sometimes referred to as *purposive*. When the purpose of the study is to do an in-depth analysis of some phenomenon, like the case at hand, a sample needs to be selected so that it maximizes relevant information, i.e., information-rich samples need to be incorporated. The sampling principle in a qualitative study is not about finding a good representative of the population under study, but is about getting diverse sample data for analysis. Specifically for CDA, sample size varies from a focus on just selected few features of texts to many features simultaneously (Fairclough, 2003, p.6). Mason (2010) has, for example, explored sample size of PhD studies that used qualitative approaches. Though he stated that the mean sample sizes of the 560 studies he analyzed was 31, and though he also stated that there could be a number of issues to affect sample size, he confirmed the guiding principle should be the concept of ‘maturation’ (Mason, 2010).

Accordingly, only institutions that have historically and currently been core players in addressing the road safety problem in Ethiopia were selected first, and from among them, I contacted and interviewed experts/authorities working there. By contacting one or two key experts/authorities from the purposively selected institutions/offices which mainly work on road safety, or are of a special interest in road safety, a total of six semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted

with people at the Federal level: (N=2) from the NRSC's Office, (N=3) from two key authorities of the MoT (i.e N=2 from ETA and N=1 from ERA), and (N=1) from the MoUDHC.

In addition to the Ministries, Authorities and Directorates at the Federal Government level, there are participants from Commission(s), Bureau(s), Agency(ies), Directorate(s) and their Woreda Level Office(s) of the purposively selected Region: the AACAA. The City Administration was selected mainly for two reasons: it is the area where the majority (about 60%) of the nation's RTAs occurs; moreover, most of the country's vehicles travel in the city or at least they regularly travel into and out of the city, transporting people and freight. Of course, the city is also the origin for the nation's road safety knowledge and practices to curbing the road safety problem. Hence, a total of 14 informants were contacted and interviewed from the AACAA with the following ratio: from the Road Transport Bureau (N=5 with one RTSEACD officer from five of the ten sub-cities), the Police (N=4), Roads Authority (N=1), Transport Service Providers' Associations (N=1), Driving School Trainers (N=2), Independent Road Safety Consultants (N=1).

From the road users' group (vehicle drivers, passengers and pedestrians) other twelve subjects were purposively selected (five taxi drivers, two other vehicle drivers and five pedestrians/passengers). Of the five pedestrians, two are victims of traffic accidents (one lost his brother and aunt, and the other is a survivor with a minor injury). These sources of data, therefore, summed up to 32. The in-depth interviews conducted with these participants lasted from a minimum of thirty minutes up to four hours, with an average of one-hour-and-a-quarter's length. The interviews were tape-recorded, thoroughly listened to several times, transcribed and read several times before they were analyzed taking extracts from among them.

Finally, for discourse analysts who doubt the naturalness of interview data, Cameron (2001) generally advises them to be cautious about privileging any particular kind of data as the most desirable kind of data; she also advises us to be cautious in our assumption about what makes talk 'natural' or 'ordinary' (2001, p. 21-22).

3.4.3 Observation (field notes)

Observation is a complex combination of sensation and perception involving interpretation of 'meaning' (Gray, 2004, p.238). As part of collecting the necessary documents and interview data

pertinent to the research undertaking, frequent visits to the chosen sites were made to have live experience of some of the practices of the stakeholders and the road users in general. This is in line with Fairclough's recommendation on the necessity of engaging "in social and ethnographic research over significant periods of time in particular institutional settings, gathering and analysing textual samples and information on social and cognitive aspects of their production" (1995, p.212). Collecting such data at their production and distribution sites, while they were being enacted, provided me with a better understanding of the many intricacies of the problem under investigation that could have otherwise been too difficult to pinpoint.

Accordingly, observations were mainly done at the Office of the NRSC where road safety works of the various stakeholders is coordinated, at the Office of the ETA, where most perceived road safety work (education and promotion) for national reception originated, at five of the ten sub-cities' road safety education and awareness creation offices, and at some selected streets, terminals, roundabouts, zebra crossings and over-bridges in Addis Ababa where many road users (taxi drivers, pedestrians, passengers) and the field policemen were available.

The frequent visit to and engagement with workers of the NRSC, the ETA and visits paid to the police, and contacts with drivers and pedestrians at the selected streets enabled me to have better understanding of the practices of these institutions and individuals. This was what Gray confirmed as an advantage of observation; to him, "observation provides an opportunity to get beyond people's opinions and self-interpretations of their attitudes and behaviours towards an evaluation of their actions in practice" (2004, p.238). Moreover, as contact with experts at their places increased, access to their road safety documents and trust to give details when interviews were conducted increased. Likewise, in relation to the other stakeholders, before interviews were conducted, several contacts were made at their work and travel places (like the police at the streets where they frequently worked, and the drivers while they were driving in the selected streets of the city). In all cases, field-notes were taken (recorded on the spot when it was possible and/or just by taking mental notes which later on were developed) and used in the analysis.

3.5 Theoretical Framework of the Study

3.5.1 Social Constructionism

Research methodology is “the framework under which research is conducted,” and as a means of gathering knowledge, it also is based on a branch of philosophy known as epistemology (Ferroff, Mavin, Bates & Murray, 2012). Hence, the choice of research methodology is determined by, above all, “whether the research is inclined towards a positivist, interpretivist, or other perspective” (Gray, 2004, p.25). Gray categorizes interpretivism as a theoretical perspective linked to constructivism (2004, p.17).

From the sociological point of view, constructionism is “an alternative and a reaction to positivism... [which] is predicated on the assumptions that our knowledge of social reality is subjective, situationally and culturally variable, and ideologically conscious” (Marvasti, 2004, p. 5). According to Marvasti, while objectivism focuses on analyzing “information about the social world to reveal a reality or social structure beyond the data itself,” constructionism is “data analysis as a way of showing how the data, text, or talk is organized and created through social interaction” (p. 83).

Ferroff, Mavin, Bates and Murray (2012) define epistemology as ‘theory of knowledge’ and discuss three ‘grand theories of knowledge’: positivism, social constructionism and subjectivism, with positivism at one extreme and subjectivism at the other, (as it is put in Figure 1 below). In showing their distinctions, they defined positivism as a way of seeking “knowledge through observation and experimentation with the complete removal of the human element,” while subjectivism as one contending “that there can be no objective results, as humanity imposes all meaning through societal and personal experience.”

As a theory of knowing, constructionism is based on the idea that knowledge does not exist in an objective world, outside of the “knower.” It is instead constructed by people. Social constructionism is situated in the middle of the model; hence, for constructionists, “observed phenomena are both objective and subjective, thus a relationship exists where meaning is dependent on experience” (Ferroff, Mavin, Bates & Murray, 2012).




Figure 1 Epistemological theories of knowledge (a model by Ferroff, Mavin, Bates & Murray 2012)

As Ferroff, Mavin, Bates and Murray (2012) discussed, social constructionist theories are useful for social, organizational, and human performance research where human activities are studied. In such researches, there is a relationship between the subjects and the objects under scrutiny, with individuals constructing meaning from their experiences and interactions (Crotty, 1998; Silverman, 2001). In this project, the object of study is the road safety problem, a social problem that threatens people's lives, bodies and resources mostly in their practices of mobility; and the subject element is the way RSSs give meaning to, or conceptualize, the problem and practices of tackling it, based on their knowledge and belief system that emanate from their position as political elects with decision power, as road transport/safety officers working in private or public institutions, or as individual road users, as it reveals in their discourses. According to constructionism, Gray (2004) discusses:

truth and meaning do not exist in some external world, but are created by the subject's interactions with the world. Meaning is constructed, not discovered, so subjects construct their own meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon. (p.17)

In the discussion of Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), social constructionism is positioned as an umbrella term used for a range of new theories about culture and society. Burr (1995), cited in Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.5-6), admits the difficulty of giving one description that covers all social constructionist approaches, but tried to put four premises shared by all. The first one construes our knowledge of the world as taken-for-granted, not as objective truth. Thus, "our knowledge and representations of the world are not reflections of the reality 'out there', but rather are products of our ways of categorising the world, or, in discursive analytical terms, products of discourse." The second premise construes us as historical and cultural specifics. Hence, "our views of, and knowledge about, the world are products of historically situated interchanges among people." Thus, whatever we construct, as Fairclough also puts it, is an intertextually linked notion related with the past and of possible transfer to the future. According to the third premise, there is a link between knowledge and social processes; our ways of

understanding the world are created through social interaction and “maintained by social processes ... in which we construct common truths and compete about what is true and false.” The fourth premise construes the presence of a link between knowledge and social actions; thus, within a particular worldview, some forms of action become natural, whereas others are unthinkable; hence, “different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions, and therefore, the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.5-6).

According to social constructionists, human beings’ lives, thoughts and cultures, including their language, are social constructs; put plainly, proponents of the theory claim that our world is socially constructed. Their argument is not against the existence of an external world, but they say “our knowledge of the world is socially constructed and cannot be seen as a representation of this world” Korsgaard (2007, p. 9-10). Particularly in relation to language, they do not see it as necessarily reflecting the individual’s underlying thoughts and feelings; rather they are interested in how people use language to structure things, or to get things done (Barker et al 2002, p.81); they are interested in how it is used to order and manage the world. As Potter and Wetherell (cited in Phillips et al., 2004) say, discourses “do not just describe things; they do things.” Discourse is “a system of statements which constructs an object” (Parker cited in Phillips et al., 2004). Gee is very much straightforward on this matter. To him, language is not used just for informing, i.e., “giving and getting information”; rather, it also allows us “to do things” and “to be things” (Gee, 2011). Gee furthers his discussion to show a good connection among the three:

In language, there are important connections among saying (informing), doing (action), and being (identity). If I say anything to you, you cannot really understand it fully if you do not know what I am trying to do and who I am trying to be by saying it. To understand anything fully you need to know *who* is saying it and *what* the person saying it is trying to do (Gee, 2011, p. 2).

In Barker, Pistrang and Elliott’s (2002) summary, constructionists are those who advocate looking closely and critically at how language is used to construct reality and to accomplish practical purposes (p. 86). From a linguistic perspective, discourse analytical approach takes the claim of structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic philosophy: our access to reality is always through language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). By using language, “we create representations of reality.... Meanings and representations are real. Physical objects also exist, but they only gain meaning through discourse” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, discourse is not just a

device for producing and transmitting meaning; it is also a strategy which people use purposefully to try to create a particular effect. Therefore, the purpose of discourse analysis according to them, is “not trying to discover the accuracy of a speaker’s or writer’s description or whether he or she is distorting ‘what really happened’.” Instead, it is an effort of understanding how “respondents use discourse as a device to construct their version of the world, an event, an organization, or a circumstance” (Daymon & Holloway, 2002, p.143).

However, Fairclough (2003) is cautious in accepting the constructionists’ view. He categorizes many theories of social constructivism as idealist rather than realist, and adopts a moderate version that claims the social world as textually constructed. Although aspects of the social world are socially constructed, he argues, once constructed they are realities which affect and limit the textual (or ‘discursive’) construction of the social. Fairclough argues:

We need to distinguish ‘construction’ from ‘construal’, which social constructivists do not: we may textually construe (represent, imagine, etc.) the social world in particular ways, but whether our representations or construals have the effect of changing its construction depends upon various contextual factors — including the way social reality already is, who is construing it, and so forth (2003, p. 8-9).

He advocates adopting a realist position: “concrete social events and abstract social structures, as well as the rather less abstract ‘social practices’... are part of reality” (p.14). Fairclough asserts that reality cannot be reduced to our knowledge of reality, for our knowledge of reality is just “contingent, shifting, and partial.” Extending this concept to texts, he warns against the assumption that goes “the reality of texts is exhausted by our knowledge about texts.” No textual analysis could be construed as complete and definitive though the transdisciplinary approach that he proposed could enhance our capacity of analyzing and hence understanding by incorporating “social theoretical perspectives and insights in textual analysis” (Fairclough, 2003, p.14).

In this thesis, social-constructionists’ theory is adopted regarding language and the role it has in the construction of social reality. The assertion is that by examining road safety discourses, it is possible to understand the social world in relation to road safety; the social reality of road safety could better be understood by analyzing its discourses. Of course, in relation to road safety texts and the reality that they depict, I follow Fairclough’s cautious position: textual analysis could never give a complete picture of the reality out there. While data collected as texts for analysis could help me reveal the social realities, it does not mean that the texts’ analyses could uncover

everything about the road safety problem, nor does it mean that analyses of such texts were complete enough to reveal the social realities; however, when combined with appropriate social perspectives and theories which I adopted in relation to the problem, they were able to show that Faircloughian CDA could play its role of unpacking the social problem associated with road safety that could further help to propose recommendations for future intervention.

Therefore, my ontological position is that social objects (road safety practices by/at institutions, governments, or private firms) and social subjects (government and private sectors' stakeholders involving in the practices) are co-constructed, with discourse contributes to their construction. As Fairclough put it, "Social relations and 'objects'... have a materiality which is not conditional upon the fact or the nature of human knowledge of them, but they are nevertheless socially constructed" (2003, p.10). With regard to epistemology, I advocate the social and discursive construction of knowledge which recognizes knowledge as subject to certain non-discursive conditions due to the dialectical character of relations between different elements of the social, including discourse (Fairclough, 2003, p.10). In both cases, the role of language is fundamental.

3.5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as a Theoretical Framework

The interest of this paper is to show the relation between language and society, how language is used in relation to social issues of concern and how linguistic features in discourse manifest attitudes and ideologies. CDA is about how discourse represents social realities. As an analytical approach, therefore, CDA provides us both theory and method of investigating language use. In the words of Jørgensen and Phillips, it "provides theories and methods for the empirical study of the relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains" (2002, p.60). Since CDA is an interdisciplinary study incorporating a wide range of frameworks drawn from a variety of fields like linguistics and sociology; it is an approach rich enough to address various social issues; it is an important domain of social research. While there are several theories of CDA developed by different scholars (it is not in the scope of this paper to discuss them all), Fairclough's is adopted for this study and discussed in some detail.

Norman Fairclough is the most significant personality in the development of CDA as both theory and method of analysis. The significance of his approach lies particularly on the reliance he has on texts and the relationship he observed between texts and the wider social practices. For

Fairclough (2003), although “any actual instance of language in use is a ‘text’”, text analysis is not just linguistic analysis; instead, “it also includes ‘interdiscursive analysis’, that is, seeing texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together” (p.3). He argues for employing textual analysis within a framework for discourse analysis, since texts have theoretical, methodological, historical and political implications that they bring into play, (Fairclough, 1995, p.208). Hence, textual analysis involves the analysis of the form or organization of texts and content or meaning. This is so, Fairclough argues, “because contents are always necessarily realized in forms, and different contents entail different forms and vice versa” (1995, p.188). Fairclough takes textual analysis as incorporating “two different, and complementary, forms of analysis: linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis” (1995, p.185). For Fairclough, “intertextuality is a matter of recontextualization” (2003, p.51).

Citing Bernstein (1990) as a source of the concept of recontextualization, Fairclough defined it as “the appropriation of elements of one social practice within another, placing the former within the context of the latter, and transforming it in particular ways in the process” (2003, p.32). According to Wodak (2000), recontextualization can be applied to chart shifts of meanings across semiotic dimensions. The recontextualization of discourse does not refer merely to the repetition of the same argument in a new context; it instead involves the transformation of discourse. As Blackledge (2005) discusses, the repetition or summary of an argument in a new context involves transformation, “with new parts added, and others deleted, so that while it bears many features of the original, it is transformed in ways which comment on, legitimate or otherwise evaluate it” (p.12). In the recontextualization process, events may be represented in ways which foreground or background particular elements, events may be rearranged, so that new elements become salient features, events may be abstracted or generalized, and events may be explained, criticized or legitimated (Fairclough, 2003).

Furthermore, Fairclough discusses, while ‘discourse’ is associated with a particular way of conceptualizing and researching language, critical analysis of ‘discourse’ approaches language as one facet of social life which is closely interconnected with other facets of social life, and is, therefore, a significant aspect of all the major issues in social scientific research (2006, p.8). For him, the theoretical position of CDA emanates from understanding discourse as ‘a moment of social practices.’ He argues, “... we can see social life as interconnected networks of social

practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, and so on). And every practice has a semiotic element” (Fairclough, 2001, p.122-123). According to him, semiosis figures in broadly three ways in social practices: as part of the social activity within a practice, in representations, and in the ‘performances’ of particular positions within social practices (p.122-123). In other words, by combining analysis of formal linguistics with social analysis, a more comprehensive view of the function of language as reflecting social realities can be gained.

Different discourse analysts adopt different procedures for analyzing discourses they focus on. Daymon and Holloway (2002, p.143) list the four commonest as: focusing on whole segments of language; identifying ‘interpretative repertoires’; being sensitive to the way arguments are constructed; and paying attention to the context. Gee also notes the presence of different linguistic approaches to DA that use different theories of grammar taking different views about how to talk about meaning, and advocates an approach that “looks at meaning as an integration of ways of saying (informing), doing (action), and being (identity), and grammar as a set of tools to bring about this integration” (2011, p.8). On his part, Fairclough proposes using SFL, a linguistic theory and associated analytical method which is “profoundly concerned with the relationship between language and other elements and aspects of social life, and its approach to the linguistic analysis of texts is always oriented to the social character of texts” (2003, p.5).

Unlike other approaches of grammar which are inherently formalistic, Halliday’s SFL is significantly valuable in discourse studies since it construes language as a socially regulated practice of communication and grammar as a means of achieving that communication. Halliday looks at grammar as a social construct and describes the functional aspects of language. SFL’s claim to the functions of language is best explained by Chouliaraki and Fairclough as follows:

The functional conceptualization of language in SFL includes the claim that three major types of process are always simultaneously going on in language, the construction of reality, the enactment and negotiation of social relations and identities, and the construction of text. These are respectively the ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’ functions of language. The claim is that you cannot do either without simultaneously engaging in the semiotic activity of making text (1999, p. 50).

For a far better understanding of a social problem under investigation, of course, Fairclough underlines the benefits of combining social research that focus on language with other forms of analysis like ethnography and institutional analysis. For this project, in order to understand the

road safety problem and ways of addressing it, therefore, apart from SFL, various theoretical perspectives and insights, particularly social theories and theories of road safety, have been used for analyzing the collected texts. It is this combination of critical social science and linguistics, specifically SFL, within a single theoretical and analytical framework that makes CDA distinctive (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p.6).

3.5.3 Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method of Analysis

This research project attempted to understand, through the analysis of RSSs' discourses, how the road safety problem in Ethiopia was constructed; hence, discourse analysis was the natural methodology to employ. However, different analysts approach discourse differently. According to Denscombe, DA is an "approach to the analysis of qualitative data that focuses on the implicit meaning of the text or image rather than its explicit content ... to 'unpack' the text or image in order to reveal: what people are trying to do through the talk, text or image; and what background assumptions are needed in order for this to be achieved" (Denscombe, 2007, p.308). It involves "rigorously examining texts, in order to analyze the repertoires of discourse that a speaker is drawing upon, and the kinds of "subject positions" that the speaker is adopting" (Barker et al, 2002, p. 87). Daymon and Holloway (2002, p.140-141) understand discourse as an occurrence within a social context, and conceptualize DA as an endeavor of examining three aspects of language use: "the form and content of the language in use, the ways in which people use language in order to communicate ideas and beliefs, and institutional and organizational factors surrounding the discourse under investigation and how they might shape the discourse."

Fairclough (2004) summarizes the focus of DA into two as those which are typically Foucaultian in inspiration and so limited to "identifying the presence and forms of combination of recurrent and relatively stable and durable 'discourses' in texts," and others that employ "various forms of detailed linguistic analysis (e.g. analysis of grammar, semantics, vocabulary, metaphor, forms of argumentation or narrative, and so forth) and/or detailed analysis of other semiotic features of texts such as their visual aspects." He emphasizes adopting an 'analytical dualism' that "applies to discourse as well as to other elements of the social, which regards 'discourse' as subsuming both linguistic/semiotic elements of social events and linguistic/semiotic facets of social structures, as well as of the 'social practices'." It is the focus on the analysis of social structures that makes his work critical.

Similarly, Gee (2011) classifies approaches to DA as descriptive and critical. While descriptive approaches “look only at the “content” of the language being used, the themes or issues being discussed,” critical approaches “pay more attention to the structure of language (“grammar”) and how this structure functions to make meaning in specific contexts” (p. 8). To him, “language-in-use is always part and parcel of, and partially constitutive of, specific social practices and that social practices always have implications for inherently political things like status, solidarity, the distribution of social goods, and power” (2011, p.68). Cameron also asserts CDA as “an approach to discourse analysis in which the two senses of the term *discourse* ... the linguist’s sense and the critical social theorist’s sense are equally relevant” (2001:123).

In using the term ‘discourse’ to refer to the whole process of social interaction, Fairclough identifies an approach based upon “a three-dimensional conception of discourse, and hence a three-dimensional method of discourse analysis”: discourse-as-text, discourse-as-discursive-practice, and discourse-as-social-practice. Fairclough discusses the method as follows:

Discourse, and any specific instance of discursive practice, is seen as simultaneously (i) a language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice. ... The method of discourse analysis includes linguistic *description* of the language text, *interpretation* of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and *explanation* of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes (1995, p.97).

The discourse-as-text dimension is a focus on the linguistic features and organization of concrete instances of discourse; analysis at this stage includes “choices and patterns in vocabulary (e.g. wording, metaphor), grammar (e.g. transitivity, modality), cohesion (e.g. conjunction, schemata), and text structure (e.g. episode marking, turn-taking system)” whereas the discourse-as-discursive practice dimension positions discourse as “something which is produced, circulated, distributed, consumed in society” (Blommaert, 2005, p.29). As Blommaert further explains, once analysis focusing on the linguistic features and organization is done, “attention should be given to speech acts, coherence, and intertextuality - three aspects that link a text to its wider social context” (2005, p.29). Fairclough made a distinction between manifest intertextuality and constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity, and stated that “an important aspect of manifest intertextuality would be discourse representation: how quoted utterances are selected, changed, contextualized” (Blommaert, 2005, p.29). The third dimension, discourse-as-social-practice, comes last, and it is “the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in which discourse is seen

to operate” (Blommaert, 2005, p.29). This is the stage at which the textual and discursive dimensions of analysis are explained in the context of the social processes.

Fairclough (1989) provided a list of questions “Which can be asked of a text” at the description stage; they are questions that make using the framework easier for analyzing data at the description stage (p.110). As he stated, the set of formal features that could be found in a text are particular choices made by the speaker/writer from among the discourse types available; so it is necessary for the analyst to “take account of what other choices might have been made” (1989, p. 110). The list of questions that Fairclough provided categorizing them into three as vocabulary, grammar and textual structures are put below; however, only questions (1) – (8) were found to have been better applicable for this study and so were employed:

A. Vocabulary: (1) What *experiential* values do words have? What classification schemes are drawn upon? Are there words which are ideologically contested? Is there *rewording* or *over wording*? What ideologically significant meaning relations (*synonymy*, *hyponymy*, *antonymy*) are there between words? (2) What *relational* values do words have? Are there euphemistic expressions? Are there markedly formal or informal words? (3) What *expressive* values do words have? (4) What metaphors are used? **B. Grammar:** (5) What experiential values do grammatical features have? What types of *process* and *participant* predominate? Is *agency* unclear? Are processes what they seem? Are *nominalizations* used? Are sentences active or passive? Are sentences positive or negative? (6) What relational values do grammatical features have? What modes (*declarative*, *grammatical question*, *imperative*) are used? Are there important features of *relational modality*? Are the pronouns *we* and *you* used, and if so, how? (7) What expressive values do grammatical features have? Are there important features of *expressive modality*? (8) How are (simple) sentences linked together? What logical connectors are used? Are complex sentences characterized by *coordination* or *subordination*? What means are used for referring inside and outside the text? **C. Textual structures:** (9) What interactional conventions are used? Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of others? (10) What larger-scale structures does the text have?

According to Fairclough, a formal feature of *experiential value* has contents and knowledge/beliefs representation; he conceived it as “a trace of and a cue to the way in which the text producer’s experience of the natural or social world is represented.” *Relational value* is about relations and social relationships enacted via the text in the discourse, and an *expressive value* is about subjects and social identities; it refers to the text producer’s evaluation of the bit of reality it relates to (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112). Fairclough has provided a diagrammatical representation that shows the relationship among the experiential, relational and expressive values of features

with their corresponding dimensions of meaning (i.e., contents, relations and subjects) on the one hand, and the structural effects they have on knowledge/beliefs, social relations and social identities, respectively, on the other. Below is the diagrammatic representation:

Dimensions of meaning	Values of features	Structural effects
Contents	Experiential	Knowledge/beliefs
Relations	Relational	Social relations
Subjects	Expressive	Social identities

Fig. 2 Formal features: Experiential, Relational and Expressive shown diagrammatically (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112)

The distinguishing features Fairclough made on the experiential, relational and expressive values which formal features may have has an important bearing in the analysis of discourses of RSSs. In relation to experiential value of the texts analyzed, it has been found out that there were two opposite conceptualizations of the road safety problem in Ethiopia; on the one hand, we find road safety as a problem of just road users (road crashes as consequences of irresponsible road use practices of drivers and pedestrians), and on the other, we find the road safety problem being construed as, apart from road users' failure, a consequence of systemwide problem that demanded the necessity of collaborative work of all RSSs, including engineers (responsible for the design and construction of roads and their environment and also for vehicles), enforcers (like the police and vehicle quality ensuring and driver licensing institutions), EMS and post-crash service providers for RTA victims (like health facilities and insurance firms), and policy or decision makers, regulatory bodies, etc. (i.e., commitment of the government/political leaders).

Examples could be provided for relational values also; in most cases, RSSs of GIs had similar constructions of the self, regarding how the road safety problem should have been handled as directing, leading, facilitating, etc. and accuse, blame, criticize, etc. road users and construct them as accountable for almost all crash incidents, standing in opposition to RSSs of PSs and RUs, who also had similarity that revealed in the blaming construction of other stakeholders. The presentations of a positive-self and negative-others of almost all the RSSs both at the vocabulary and grammar levels is thus a clear indicator of how social relations were constructed; it was mainly for ideological/hegemonic purposes that RSSs of GIs constructed themselves and others that way (details are provided in the analysis section). Regarding the expressive values, we could see that almost all RSSs were found claiming to calm the road safety problem. Although their

practices were different, they tried to show their engagement in safety ensuring practices as per the adopted approach by using modal auxiliaries and expressions of categorical commitment.

At the interpretation stage, participants' processes of both text production and interpretation are addressed. Fairclough discussed 'aspects of interpretation' in some detail as "situational context and discourse type; intertextual context and presupposition; speech acts; schemata and the related notions of script and frame; and topic and point," (Fairclough, 1989, p. 146). In the analysis of the data I collected, I employed the first three, *situational context and discourse type*, *intertextual context and presupposition* and *speech acts*, as toolkits; they are briefly introduced here.

According to Fairclough, *situational context and discourse type* is about how text interpreters arrive at interpretations of the situational context, and the way in which this determines decisions about which discourse type is the 'appropriate' one to draw upon. He has provided four questions that relate to four main dimensions of the situation: "what's going on" to "contents" discourse type, "who's involved" to the "subjects" discourse type, "what relationships are at issue" to the "relations" discourse type, and "what's the role of language in what's going on" to the "connections" discourse type. A single RTA report, for example, could have details about fatalities and/or the injured as its content, the reporting police and/or journalists and road users as subjects, the police with their power of constructing road users as, for example, responsible for the occurrence of the accident to the relations, and for the role of language in what's going on, its use in the reporting of the incident could be seen, though, it is also possible to consider its use for blaming the victims and/or if they survived, persuading them to use the road properly next time they were in the street as connections.

Every spoken utterance or written text has traces it originated from. *Intertextuality* refers to the historical series to which discourses belong; hence, "the interpretation of intertextual context is a matter of deciding which series a text belongs to" (Fairclough, 1989, p.154). An important element in the interpretation of texts is that "discourse participants may arrive at the same or different interpretation of a text and it could happen that the interpretation of the powerful participant may be imposed upon others" (Fairclough, p. 154). Seen from CDA's perspective, intertextuality is not just interrelationship between texts, but as a social practice involving particular socially regulated ways of producing and interpreting discourse (Fairclough, 1995). Hence, intertextuality "points to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing

conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 270). Intertextual analysis revealing how the interest of the powerful was imposed upon others could be seen in the analysis of the recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices.

A *presupposition* is “a taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance” (Richardson, 2007, p. 63). The claim is based on prior texts which could have been made by the same person or by others; hence, it is also related with intertextuality. Fairclough asserts that presuppositions have ideological meanings that could be manipulative as well as sincere, (1992, p.121). Therefore, presuppositions are an aspect of text producers’ interpretations of intertextual context, and so have significant implication in the construction of meaning which, for some reason, was geared to satisfy a hidden ideology or masked position, particularly when “what they assume has the character of ‘common sense in the service of power’” (Fairclough, 1989, p.154). When a road safety officer in his talk, for example, stresses on the necessity of awareness work that targets road users, the presupposition in such a construction could be that these segments of the population were the most responsible ones for the prevalence of the problem. On the other hand, if he says, *the work we have been engaged in so far ...*, the definite article *the* presupposes the existence of some kind of work they were engaged in, although, there could have been no significant work at all. Fairclough mentions other forms of presupposition like the use of subordinating clauses, wh-questions and that-clauses after certain verbs and adjectives like *regret*, *realize*, *point out*, *aware* and *angry*, (Fairclough, 1989, p.154; 1992, p. 120-121). Presupposition as a toolkit is employed in the analysis of my data.

Finally about the *speech act theory*. Woods (2006) affirms that in our attempts to convey particular meanings using language, our utterances have a certain force that affects the person we are speaking or writing to. Taking political discourse as an example, Woods lists a variety of speech acts that the discourse could be used to perform: to protest, to legitimize, to intimidate, as well as to persuade, (p.50). Hence, the key insight with regards to speech acts is language as a form of action, like promising, asking, asserting or warning; or, referring to people or things, presupposing their existence or the truth of propositions, and implicating meanings which are not overtly expressed (Fairclough, 1989). Fairclough sees the significance of speech acts in relation to the conception of discourse as social practice. If, according to Searle’s speech act theory, one

of the felicity conditions for issuing order is “having the authority to do so,” power is obviously at play, making speech act theory applicable in CDA also.

Austin and Searle are two authorities frequently quoted in relation to ‘speech act theory’ for their tremendous contribution in the development of the theory in pragmatics (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Woods, 2006). Woods (2006, p. 100) quotes a classic work by J. L. Austin (1962) to explain language as a form of action that has three distinct aspects. These are:

Locutionary act: the act of saying something; refers to the meaningful production of sounds, words and utterances. *Illocutionary act*: the act achieved in saying something; refers to the force of the utterance in a given context. *Perlocutionary act*: the act achieved by saying something; refers, for example, to the consequential effects on the feelings, thoughts or actions of the addressee(s).

Woods has stressed on the necessity of looking into the situated discourse in order to interpret and understand speech acts. She also underscored the role of hierarchical power structures that are represented in interactions as giving the rights to perform speech acts to one but not to the other, though, at the same time, it would be wrong to assume that power is wholly predefined or static in social relationships. Positioning is a concept very much related with the illocutionary force of a speech act; Locke quoted van Langenhove and Harre’s (1999) description of positioning as “the discursive construction of personal stories that make a person’s actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the members of a conversation have specific locations” (2004, p.76). He further discussed that one could both position oneself and be positioned - as powerful or powerless, authoritative or lacking in authority, dependent or independent, and so on. In relation to the road safety discourse, we could observe RSSs of GIs performing such actions. Taking the powerful position, we find them in the illocutionary acts of instructing, ordering and blaming others, or else, on their part, pledging or promising to engage in some road safety related task which they did not perform before.

Finally, in the form of a summary, Fairclough (1989, p.162) provides three questions that could be asked of a particular discourse at the stage of interpretation. These questions are:

(1) Context: what interpretation(s) are participants giving to the situational and intertextual contexts? (2) Discourse type(s): what discourse type(s) are being drawn upon (hence what rules, systems or principles of phonology, grammar, sentence cohesion, vocabulary, semantics and pragmatics; and what schemata, frames and scripts)? (3) Difference and change: are answers to questions 1 and 2 different for different participants? And do they change during the course of the interaction?

At the stage of explanation, “We portray discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them,” (Fairclough, 1989, p.163). Fairclough has developed a model depicting social organization as having three levels (situational, institutional, and societal) and correspondingly three ways of seeing the discourse under investigation, not necessarily looking at different features of the discourse at these different levels, but looking at the same features from different perspectives (Fairclough, 1989, p.164). Hence, taking the road safety policy discourse as an example, we could see the policy document and its content at the situational level, the road safety council/secretariat at the institutional level, and road safety discourse as part of the social practice. This thesis has emphasized on institutional discourses of the road safety problem in Ethiopia categorizing them into three as RSSs of GIs, RSSs of PSs and the general RUs.

As he did for the stages of description and interpretation, Fairclough summarized his discussion on the explanation stage of analysis by providing three questions that could be asked of a particular discourse under investigation. These are:

(1) Social determinants: what power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels help shape this discourse? (2) Ideologies: what elements of MR which are drawn upon have an ideological character? (3) Effects: how is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and societal levels? Are these struggles overt or covert? Is the discourse normative with respect to MR or creative? Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations, or transforming them?

The road safety issue in Ethiopia has for decades been owned by the police and ETA only, and these institutions position individual road users at responsibility for the occurrence of RTAs, preferring education and enforcement as best ways of addressing the road safety problem. The practice could therefore be construed as affecting negatively the emerging discourse from developing and causing change, enabling the two institutions alone to continue with their hegemonic position. In other words, although a new discourse type based on the safe systems approach to road safety has emerged locating the road safety problem as systemic (multisectoral and interdisciplinary) problem, it is being repressed by the traditional/individual/behavioral approach that positioned the problem as sole responsibility of individual road users alone.

3.6 Data Preparation

3.6.1 Data Transcription and/or Translation

Data collected for analysis included both written (policy documents and brochures) and spoken (audio recorded interviews and broadcast) texts. The data in written form were mostly in English, so translation was not necessary, except for the brochures; the data from in-depth interviews, the broadcasted road safety content and the brochures required both transcription and translation. I translated them using the contextual translation method, and employed Kane's (1990) Amharic-English Dictionary. Being involved in transcription and translation not only exposed me with the nature of the tasks and their demand, but also helped me have a deeper understanding of the data.

The decision of transcription is theoretical; it depends on the focus and approach of the study, and hence is of varying degrees of complexity. In their review of transcription in qualitative studies, Oliver, Serovich and Mason (2005) pointed out two main traditions: *Naturalized*, "where utterances are transcribed in as much detail as possible, [which] is most often seen in conversation analysis studies," and *Denaturalized*, which "also attempts a verbatim depiction of speech... [but] has less to do with depicting accents or involuntary vocalization." Denaturalized transcription rather focuses on "the meanings and perceptions created and shared during a conversation," and hence it is employed by ethnographers, critical discourse analysts, including Fairclough, and grounded theorists. Of course, as Fairclough asserts, "no [transcription] system could conceivably show everything, and it is always a matter of judgment, given the nature of the project and the research questions, what sort of features to show, and in how much detail" (1992, p. 229). My focus of analysis in this study was more on vocabulary, grammar, metaphor, clause structure and argumentation strategy than the detailed features like turn taking, overlap, tone, pitch and the like which are commonly used in conversation analysis. Hence, I have not gone to the detailed features; had I included them, the transcription's complexity could have been more a hindrance than a help to my analysis of the features I wanted to focus on.

Accordingly, of the many transcription details and symbols developed by Gail Jefferson and listed in Wooffitt (2005) I used only those which are most significant to my research focus: a dot enclosed in a bracket (.) indicating pause in a talk; underlined fragments under indicating speaker's emphasis; empty parentheses/brackets () indicating presence of an unclear fragment

on the tape; words within a single bracket (guess) indicating the transcriber's best guess at an unclear fragment; and finally, a description enclosed in a double bracket (()) indicating a non-verbal activity, for example ((laughs)).

3.6.2 Data Coding, Selecting Extracts and Getting Ready for Analysis

The road safety policy/plan documents and manuals selected for analysis were four: the NRSSPE, GTP I (2011-2015), the AATP and ERA's Road Safety Manual. All of them have English versions, and only the GTP and the AATP were prepared in Amharic also. Therefore, I did not have to engage in translating these documents. Moreover, the entire texts of these documents were not taken for analysis; only sections pertinent to the research objectives were selected. For ease of reference, lines of the sections selected from the documents were numbered, and the full documents are put as appendices.

With regard to the interview data, once each interview was fully transcribed, a copy was printed out and checked for accuracy of the transcription's content and format, by reading the text and listening to the original data (the recorded interview) simultaneously. Minor mistakes made were corrected in the process. The data was then read critically to find and select themes pertinent to the objectives of the research. In order not to miss the details and the context in which the themes were situated, the extracts selected were quite extended. Finally, each line of the transcripts selected for analysis was numbered for making reference to linguistic features/contents simple at the stage of analysis. Translation of the extracts was made at this stage. Attempts were made to make the translations of the extracts follow the numbered lines of the Amharic transcriptions. However, the reference lines used in the analysis all refer to the English versions since the work is in English. Due to space limit, while the extended extracts (and their English translations) that were used in the analysis are put in the appendices, only shorter but numbered excerpts from these long extracts were put in the main report or the thesis. The audio files of all the research participants' interviews and of all media contents, with their transcriptions, and all the textual documents used in the study are secured and could be provided upon request.

The data were categorized based on where they were collected from. This was done because they showed significant similarities/differences based on their sources. They were thus grouped into three as: road safety stakeholders of government institutions (RSSs of GIs), road safety

stakeholders of the private sectors (RSSs of PSs), and the general road users (RUs). Based on the themes under analysis, extracts could be taken from any of the corpus, but whenever necessary, this was done without missing the groups to which they were categorized.

Attempts were made to make the whereabouts of extracts used in the analysis clear; however, codes were employed to preserve anonymity of the interview participants. Thus, the term *stakeholder* was used for all of them consistently with three general groupings made based on where the stakeholders came from: a Federal Institution, the AACA, or the Private Sector. Therefore, in all cases, S that stands for *Stakeholder* comes first, and it is followed by: FI when s/he was from the *Federal Institutions*, CA when s/he was from *Addis Ababa City Administration* and PS when s/he was from the *Private Sectors*. Finally a randomly given number to each participant was added since numbers were preferred to pseudonyms. Therefore, for example, SFI5 stands for a stakeholder from one of the federal/government institutions and s/he is numbered 5 in the list of all the interview participants. The road users (drivers, pedestrians and passengers) were treated independently as stakeholders; they had a stake as users of the road system and had concerns about their safety. In the Ethiopian road system, they are the main victims of RTAs. Hence, it was expected that they may have their own conceptualizations of the road safety problem; moreover, it was expected that they could have counter discourses that would make them different from the formers. Thus first RU was used for all *Road Users*, with TD for *Taxi Drivers*, VD for *non-taxi Vehicles' Drivers*, and P for *Pedestrians* and/or *Passengers*. The randomly given numbers stated above applied for them also. Hence, for example, RUTD17 could be read as 'this is a road user, a taxi driver in particular, numbered 17 in the list of the interview participants.' Names of persons, specific places or expressions that could have revealed or compromised anonymity of the participants were kept confidential by replacing them with other descriptors enclosed in square brackets, like, [name] in order not to reveal the participants or put any clues that may have disclosed them.

3.7 Data Analysis Procedures

According to Fairclough, "There is no set procedure for doing discourse analysis; people approach it in different ways according to the specific nature of the project, as well as their own views of discourse" (1992, p.225). I already discussed above (in section 3.5.3) that I adopted Fairclough's approach. He proposes an interdisciplinary top-down approach to DA, an approach

advocating beginning with some social ill, the road safety problem for my project, and an interest in and so a move down to properties of texts on the chosen social problem (which includes their production, distribution, and consumption and socio-cognitive processes of producing and interpreting them), social practice in various institutions (institutions related to and/or responsible for addressing the problem, the relationship of these practices to power relations, and hegemonic projects at the societal level (Fairclough, 1992, p. 226).

This study explored conceptualization and practices of mitigating the road safety problem in/by the NRSC's structure in Ethiopia. Text producers, the RSSs, use discourses and genre by which they produce their own versions of the practice (of defining and/or mitigating the problem). Thus, as it was discussed in section 3.5.3 above, Fairclough's three dimensional method of discourse analysis: discourse-as-text, discourse-as-discursive-practice, and discourse-as-social-practice was employed in order to make linguistic description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes. Such linguistic analyses at the micro, meso and macro levels would enable one to make meaningful exploration of the link among each of the three dimensions, in the construction, production, consumption and interpretation of the problem, and whether the exercise of power from above had any role favoring the perpetuation of hegemonic practices, or power from below resisting them was causing change.

With regard to the discourse-as-text dimension, the stage at which the linguistic features and organization of concrete instances of discourse was examined, my analysis focused on choices and patterns in vocabulary (wording, metaphor), grammar (transitivity, modality), and cohesion (argumentation). At the discourse-as-discursive-practice dimension, instances of the production and consumption of road safety discourses (the interviews, print and broadcast road safety teaching/informing materials, and policy discourses in particular) were interpreted, with a focus on presupposition, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and speech acts. Finally, at the discourse-as-social-practice dimension, analysis of the texts focused on revealing the role of power in allowing and/or resisting the perpetuation of historic/hegemonic road safety practices in the Ethiopian context. In other words, the detailed linguistic analysis of the collected data was made focusing on the three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse: social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief, which were used to explore how social identities

were set up, social relationships were enacted and negotiated amongst the stakeholders, and with regards to the ideational function, which road safety knowledge and practices the spoken/written texts of the stakeholders signified.

3.8 Ethical Issues/Considerations

This project used both written documents from- and in-depth interviews with various RSSs; hence, permission of the responsible stakeholders was requested for using their documents and for their involvement as respondents or participants. Thus, subjects were provided with adequate information regarding the nature of the study, what was expected from them and that their anonymity would be assured. They were also guaranteed that whatever information they provided would be treated confidentially, and that if they didn't feel comfortable with the process, that they had the right to withdraw at any time. To gain the maximum cooperation from them and to help them feel comfortable, they were provided with a letter of request for cooperation from the DFLL of the AAU that also confirmed the fact that I was conducting a recognized student research project and that their involvement in the project would very much be appreciated.

Chapter Four: Data Presentation and Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents discussion and analysis of data that led to the findings of the study. The purpose of the study was to examine the road safety problem in Ethiopia and ways of addressing it; to this end, it emphasized on RSSs' conceptualization of the problem and the way they constructed and/or positioned themselves and others in relation to practices of tackling it. This was preferred because most important in intervention to any social problem is how stakeholders understand the problem and define it. To see that better, the chapter is divided into three sections.

First, through linguistic analysis of relevant data extracted from the corpus, particularly focusing on RSSs' use of vocabulary/metaphor, intertextuality, presupposition, speech acts, voice and nominalization, how they defined road safety in general, the problem it had brought on society and the preferred ways of addressing it were analyzed. This was done to get an answer to the first research question: How do RSSs conceptualize the road safety problem in Ethiopia?

Next, the recontextualization of international road safety strategies and practices in the context of Ethiopia and how this was implemented in actual practices of tackling the problem was investigated; in doing so, intertextuality, assumptions, speech act and presuppositions employed in the data by the RSSs and documents were emphasized. This made it possible to get answers to the second and third research questions: Which road safety knowledge and practices do stakeholders incorporate into/exclude from their road safety documents and practices? And: What do these incorporated/excluded knowledge and practices contribute to/against efforts of minimizing the RTA-caused problem in the country?

Finally, social identities and social relations were emphasized: how RSSs constructed themselves and other players in relation to the task of ensuring road safety, and how they constructed road users, the social group the road safety work largely targeted. This was meant to answer the last question of the study: How do road safety stakeholders position themselves and/or others in relation to the role they have to alleviating the road safety problem in Ethiopia? In each case, apart from social relations, social identities and systems of knowledge/belief that governed the RSSs' constructions of the road safety problem and ways of addressing it, whenever applicable, how power/hegemony played its role and the resistance that it faced was explained.

4.2 Stakeholders' Conceptualizations of the Road Safety Problem in Ethiopia

The tools of analysis of this section were the participants' choices of vocabulary/metaphor, their grammar use and ways of linking simple sentences together when they constructed *road safety* or *road traffic safety* and concepts these terms carried in relation to the problem and ways of tackling it in Ethiopia. Therefore, of the ten questions Fairclough (1989) recommended to ask of any discourse data, whenever applicable, eight of them were taken; generally, the questions are about what *experiential*, *relational* and *expressive* values words and grammatical features have, what metaphors are used, and how (simple) sentences are linked together.

In order to better understand road safety conceptualization in Ethiopia, it was necessary to begin the analysis with how participants construed terms they used to refer to the problem under scrutiny: the road safety problem; they used *road safety*, *traffic safety*, and *road traffic safety*. They also used *road traffic accident*, a term that referred to the effect of unsafe road use/system. It was found out from the analysis that participants did not have uniformity both in their choice and definition of terms they employed and on the depth/breadth of the terms they used to refer to the problem; to put it plainly, differences and confusions were observed in the way they conceptualized the terms *road safety* and *road traffic safety*. In general, RSSs constructed road (traffic) safety as *the task of ensuring safe mobility of vehicles and pedestrians on the road which was particularly constructed for vehicles*. Moreover, they construed road safety as: *independent field of study*, *the task of making sure faultless mobility*, *the task of minimizing accidents*, etc. The reason for having varied conceptualizations of the problem is quite visible; they had brought different knowledge/belief systems into their daily practices of ensuring road safety and/or preventing RTAs.

The key documents analyzed in this section constructed road safety in Ethiopia as a *very serious problem* that needed addressing *drastically* on the one hand and *progressively* on the other. The differences could therefore be to the extent of being total opposites, i.e., *drastically* versus *progressively*, making road safety conceptualization of the documents problematic. Similarly, interviewed RSSs conceptualized the road safety problem – prevalence of RTAs (or road traffic unsafety in general) as: *the worst*, *worrying*, *serious* and *unacceptable problem*. However, while prevalence of RTAs was recognized uniformly by almost all the stakeholders as so *serious*, significant differences were observed regarding how it should have been tackled.

4.2.1 Road Safety or Road Traffic Safety: Nomenclature vis-à-vis Conceptualizations

Using various (though related) terms to refer to the same thing may not be of a major problem; however, such a practice could be due to varied conceptualization of the same problem which the stakeholders were supposed to address with common understanding and emphasis. If that is the case, then it is worth investigating it. During my initial observation of practices of the different RSSs in Addis Ababa, I discovered there was not any consistently used term referring to the road safety work that the RSSs were engaged in; stakeholders of the different institutions and/or their departments used *road traffic safety*, *road safety*, *traffic safety* and just *safety* interchangeably.

Hence, institutions like ERA and its departments would prefer the term *road safety*, whereas others like the FPC used *traffic safety* and *road traffic safety* interchangeably. A directorate in ETA responsible for promoting the road safety issue is called *Road Traffic Safety Directorate*, but the Secretariat Office of the interim *National Road Safety Council*, which was housed in the same building of ETA, used to be called *National Road Safety Coordinating Office*. However, the regulation for the establishment of the National Council to address the road safety problem is entitled as *National Road Traffic Safety Council* (Reg. No. 205/2011). Similarly, the regulation ratified by the Council of the AACA for the same purpose is called *Road Traffic Safety Regulation of the Addis Ababa City Government*, (Reg. No. 5/1998). On the other hand, the key plan document on which most RSSs originated their safety discourses was titled as *National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011 to 2020*, and the Council itself was named as *National Road Safety Council*; hence, the term used to name both the strategy document and the council was *road safety* (not *road traffic safety*). However, there was an obvious difference in the naming of the regulation for the establishment of the council and the document that the council endorsed to use throughout the decade. In the strategy document, as a simple search on Microsoft word revealed, while the term *road safety* was used over 120 times, *traffic safety* was used 9 times and *road traffic safety* only 4 times. The issues that needed to address were, therefore, why different nomenclature was used, and what impact, if any, the various terms could have brought on the overall conceptualization of the road safety problem.

Thus, my first inquiry was related with examining how RSSs would define the problem itself. I did this by letting them use the term or terms they preferred to represent the problem: *road safety* or *road traffic safety*. When I was conducting the interviews, I did not want to preoccupy and/or

lead participants to any specific term; whichever they used I decided to accept, but if they made distinctions I was curious to understand why it was so. Hence, I defined my question as: *It is called road safety or sometimes it is also called road traffic safety, so what does it mean to you by road traffic safety or road safety?* Analysis followed extracts of responses given by the RSSs:

Excerpt 1

የመንገድ ደንበኝ ማለት ሰፊ ያለ ሐሳብ ያለው ይመስለኛል ፤ አጠቃላይ መንገዱ ወይም ሰላማዊ የሆነ እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ የሆነ ኑሮ ሰላማዊ የሆነ ህይወት ከሚለው ጋር እሚቀራረጥ ነገር ሆኖ ነው እማየው የመንገድ ደንበኝ ሲባል፡፡ የትራፊክ ደንበኝ ስንል ደሞ ከትራፊኩ ጋር ከተንቀሳቃሹ ጋር፤ ትራፊክ ማለት በመንገድ ላይ የሚንቀሳቀሰው ማንኛውም ነገር ማለት ስለሆነ ከሱ ጋር የተያያዘው ማለት ነው፡፡ ስለዚህ የመንገድ ደንበኝ ሲባል ከተንቀሳቃሹ ከትራፊኩ ከመኪናው ከሰው ከምናምኑ ሌላ ከዛ ውጪ የሆኑ ነገሮች አዲጋ የሚከሰትባቸው ነገሮች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ፤ እና ያንን ሁሉ የሚያጠቃልል ሰፊ ያለ ሐሳብ ያለው ነው፡፡ ስለዚህ አሁን እኛ እየሰራን ያለነው አጠቃላይ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደንበኝ በሚለው ላይ ነው / I think road safety has a bit wider concept; by road safety I see it as related to the entire road or safe mobility safe existence safe life. and when we say traffic safety in relation to mobility, since by traffic it means everything that moves on the road, so it means everything related with it. hence by road safety apart from the traffic the car the people and others there might be other things that could contribute to accident; so it is a concept that could incorporate all that. so now what we are doing is that we are working on the overall road traffic safety (Lines 049-056)

In Excerpt 1, *road safety* was construed as a term that carried conceptually deeper meaning than *traffic safety*. Hence, *road safety* is a concept related to ... *safe mobility safe existence and safe life* (Line50) with *safe* used repeatedly with *mobility*, *existence* and *life*, and the intention for the repetition must have been to emphasize on what was meant by *road safety*. The word *mobility* was also used, implying the concept of *traffic* was incorporated in construing *road safety* as *safe mobility/existence/life*. Moreover, *traffic* was defined as *everything that moves on the road* (Line 052). As it is put in Lines 052-53, *road safety* is a term of deeper concept incorporating safety of the *traffic* (like cars and pedestrians) and safety of other non-traffic objects, i.e., *things that could contribute to accident* (Line 054) for they are near the road. Thus, according to this construction, *road safety* and *road traffic safety* were terms carrying the same concept. Authorities in the field like Elvik et al. have a similar position; they used *road safety* to mean *road traffic safety*, and regarding measures that should be taken to prevent accidents, they included the necessity of addressing both traffic and non-traffic related contributory factors (Elvik et al., 2009).

However, in the concluding remark in Excerpt 1 above, regarding what was done to ensure road safety, the concept was narrower than what was developed earlier; it was put emphatically that the focus was on the road traffic safety: *therefore what we are doing now is that we are working*

on the overall theme called *road traffic safety* (Lines 054-56). This would mean that the focus was not on the one which was claimed to have been carrying the wider/deeper meaning. Therefore, even the experts themselves had confusions on what the terms would mean and where the focus of their work should have been.

Excerpt 2

እሱ ይሄ ኢኩቫለንት ይመስለኛል፤ ለምን መንገዱን ብቻውን ካወራህ፤ ወደ እንትኑ ነው እሚመጣው መንገዱን ልትጠብቀው ነው። የመንገድ ደህንነት ካልከ መንገዱን ስለመጠበቅ ነው፤ አውራጎዳና ወይም የዛ አባል ስለኢንጅነሮች ወይም የመንገዱ ባለቤት የሆነ ሰው የመንገድ ደህንነት ቢል ይችላል። የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ካልን ግን በእንቅስቃሴ ምክንያት የሚመጡትን አደጋዎች ይሆናል ብዬ ነው፤ እኔ ትርጉሙ እንደዚህ ነው እሚገባኝ። ለምን መንገዱን መጠበቅ አንድ ነገር ነው መንገዱን ብቻ ፎክስ ካረክ እንዳይቆፈር እንዳይበደስ እንደዚህ ጎርፉን ሁሉ መከላከልን ልትጨምር ነው፤ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ከሆነ ግን፤ አይ ቲንክ ይሄ ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ የሚሳተፉት እነሱንም ያካትታልና፤ አይ ቲንክ ብሮድ ይሆናል ብዬ አስባለሁ ካሁን በኋላ / I think this (road safety and road traffic safety) is equivalent; because if you talk about the road only it will come to the road protecting the road. if you say road safety it is just about keeping the road safe; one responsible for the road maybe a member of the roads authority it is about the engineers; if a person who is responsible for the road says road safety he can. but if you say road traffic safety I think it is about accidents caused by mobility, I understand its meaning this way. because keeping the road is one thing if you pay attention to just the road like protecting it from being dug or damaged you will also include protecting it from being washed away by flood; but if it is road traffic safety I think since this includes the traffic involving in mobility; I think I will take it as the one broader from now on (Lines 082-92)

In Excerpt 2, we could see vague construction of *road safety* and *road traffic safety*; they were construed as terms of both similar and different meanings. Initially, the terms were taken as if they carried the same concept: *I think this is equivalent* (Line 082). Soon, change was introduced to tell they were different; *road safety* was downgraded as a term referring to the practice of ensuring safety of roads only: *if you say road safety, it is just about keeping the road safe* (Lines 084-85). Road safety was explained as the concern of *roads authority* (Line 085) or *engineers* (Line 086). That construction, however, could lead one to a flawed implication that ERA or road engineers would not have any concern to the safety of road users, and that safety of the road would not concern other RSSs apart from ERA/road engineers. That might be the reason for changing the construing of *road traffic safety* as a broader/inclusive term that included traffic safety in addition to road safety: *but if it is road traffic safety, I think since this includes the traffic involving in mobility, I think I will take it as the one broader from now on* (Lines 090-92).

Overall, the participants' conceptualizations of *road safety* and *road traffic safety* were too illusive, and if the last position were taken, it was in direct opposition to the construction of the

same that was discussed above. If we had to take one of the terms as broader than the other, that term must have been *road safety* (and not *road traffic safety*) since it could better incorporate the environment other than the road, the traffic that uses the road, and appropriate measures that should be taken to minimize death, injury and property damage (Elvik et al., 2009).

Excerpt 3

ይሄንን መንገድ ደህንነት መጠበቅ ስንል፣ በዚህ መንገድ ላይ የሚጠቀሙ የተለያዩ አካላት አሉ፤ አክቶላ ለተለያዩ አካላት ስንል እንደኔ አስተሳሰብ እንዳንድ ነገር ነው እምነትዎ፤ አሽከርካሪም ሆኖ እሚጠቀመው ሰው ነው፤ ደሞ እግረኛም ሆኖ እሚጠቀመው ሰው ነው ማለት ከእንስሳት ውጭ ማለት ነው። ስለዚህ እዚህ መንገድ ላይ የሚጠቀሙት አካላት በሙሉ በሰላም ወተው በሰላም እንዲገቡ፣ ፕላስ መንገዱም ራሱ ከኢንጅነሪንግ ጀምሮ ነው፤ የተሳካና የተሟላ ደህንነት ያለው እንዲሆን የማድረግ ሥራ መስራት ማለት ነው። ሁሉም በተለይ ደሞ ከትራፊክ ጋር ተያይዞ ትራፊክ ስንል እንቅስቃሴ ስለሆነ፣ በመንገድ ላይ እንቅስቃሴ የሚያደርጉትን አካላት በሙሉ ደህንነት መጠበቅ የሚቻልበት ሁኔታ መፍጠር ማለት ነው / when we say keeping the safety of this road, there are different parties who are using this road; actually when we say different parties as to me they are the same because it is a human being who uses the road as a driver, and it is a human being who uses it as a pedestrian which means apart from the animals. so it is the task of making sure all parties using the road go out in peace and return back home safe, plus the road itself beginning from its engineering, needs to be effectively and fully safe such work has to be done. all particularly in relation to the traffic since by traffic it means mobility, it is creating conducive environment in which the safety of all parties moving on the road is ensured (Lines 071-080)

In relation to ensuring the safety of the road system, apart from drivers, pedestrians and animals were counted as users of the road, perhaps due to the fact that they were mobile. Thus *traffic* was defined as: *by traffic we mean mobility* (Lines 079-80), *mobility* applying to the vehicles, animals and pedestrians. Road safety was then defined as *creating conducive environment in which the safety of all parties moving on the road is ensured* (Lines 080-81). It was also defined as *the task of making sure all parties using the road go out in peace and return back home safe* (Lines 076-77). By *ensuring the safety of parties moving on the road*, it could be inferred that it was to mean *making sure road users go out in peace and return back home safe*. Again, it is noteworthy to observe phrases like *different parties* and *parties moving on the road* used repeatedly; that could not be accidental. It was because of the conceptualization of the term road safety as if it were focusing on those in mobility alone, i.e., drivers, passengers and pedestrians. If so, the concept the term carried would not include other vulnerable road users available in the road environment.

A further point in Excerpt 3 in construing road safety is that *drivers* and *pedestrians* were taken as one and the same: *to me they are the same* (Lines 074-75). It is true that they both are in mobility in the road system. It also is true that since they both are *human beings*, they should be

treated accordingly; the analogy used seems to have been convincing, that both needed equal treatment for the fact that both were *human beings*. However, this logic could not work if it were seen from the perspective of power relations they had; a *driver*, the car owner/holder, and a *pedestrian*, the not-car owner/holder meeting on the road are completely different; while the former is so powerful, the latter is vulnerable. Hence, they could not be the same. This is a belief system contrary to the claim that road safety work should focus on the safety of all, but to the vulnerable in particular. We could thus infer that this road safety conceptualization was slanted.

Excerpt 4

መንገድ ትራፊክ ደንብ ስንል ቃሉን እንዲሁ በአጭሩ ማስቀመጥ ይከብዳል፡፡ ግን እንዲሁ ጠቅላላ ባለ መልኩ ሰዎች እንንቀሳቀሳለን፤ ለተለያዩ ማህበራዊም ይሁኑ ኢኮኖሚያዊ፤ እር ለተለያዩ ጉዳዮች በምንንቀሳቀስበት ወቅት በእንቅስቃሴያችን መካከል የሚኖሩ በተለይ ከተሽከርካሪና ከመንገድ ጋር የተያያዙ አደጋዎች ነው፡፡ ዝም ብለን ድፍን ስናደርገው መንገድ መንገድ ነው፤ ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ነው፡፡ ደህንነቱ ደግሞ በዚያ እንቅስቃሴ መካከል በሰዎች ላይ ጉዳት እንዳይደርስ በንብረት ላይ ውድመት እንዳይደርስ የሚኖር የደህንነት ጉዳይ ነው እምናየው / when we say road traffic safety it is difficult to define the term plainly. but to put it generally we people move for various reasons, for social or economic reasons; or when we move for various reasons while we are moving there are accidents we face caused by the vehicle and the road. if we just see it simply road is road; traffic is mobility. and safety is the task of making sure that people are not injured and property is not damaged while they are moving. (L. 095-100)

In Excerpt 4, we see *road traffic safety* as a term that referred to the task of preventing accidents involving vehicles and the road when people moved for social, economic or other purposes (Lines 095-97). In short, *road traffic safety* was constructed as the task of making sure that there would not be any accident that would cause injury on people and damage on resources when people were traveling on the road (Lines 097-100). While road traffic safety as the safety of people and vehicles/resources in mobility was constructed repeatedly and emphatically, so far there was not any mention of non-mobile people and objects locating in the road environment. It is essential to remember that silence over salient issues is of tremendous implication; hence, other road or roadside users were excluded from the general conceptualization of road safety.

Excerpt 5

መንገድ ትራፊክ ደንብን ማለት አ በማንኛውም ሁኔታ ላይ የሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴዎች ከአደጋ የተጠበቁና ሰላማዊ የሆነ እንቅስቃሴን ከመፍጠር አኳያ የሚሰራ አንድ ራሱን የቻለ ሳይንስ ማለት ነው፡፡ የተሳለጠ እንቅስቃሴ እንዲኖር ከሚደረግ አኳያ ነው ምናልባት ባጭሩ ከማስቀመጥ አኳያ ማለቱ ነው፡፡ እና በውስጡ በርካታ ነገሮች ይኖሩታል ... የመንገድ ደህንነት ማለት ቀጥታ ደህንነቱን ማስፈን ማለት ነው ደህንነቱን ማስፈን መቻል ደግሞ አደጋውን መቆጣጠር መቻል ነው፡፡ ምናልባት መላብመላብ ላታጠፋው ትችላለህ መቀነስን፤ የህይወቴም የንብረቱንም ማለት ነው ወይም የአካል ጉዳቱንም ጭምር መላብ መላብ መቀነስ እ መቻል ማለት ነው፤ ደህንነቱን በተመለከተ ወይም የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደንብን ስታነሳው ማለት ነው / by road traffic safety it means em a fully-fledged science that works to make sure that mobility conducted under any conditions is safeguarded from

accident, in order that peaceful mobility is created. it is the task of ensuring efficient mobility, I mean this is perhaps how it is put briefly. and it could also have a number of other things in it... road safety means just ensuring the safety and being able to ensure the safety means being able to control the accident. maybe you can't get rid of it all in all but it is lessening it, it means the ability of reducing all in all lives lost and resources damaged including the physical injury; this is what is meant by road safety or if you talk about the road traffic safety (Lines 110-18)

Here in Excerpt 5 also, *road safety* was conceptualized vaguely as *just ensuring the safety* (Line 114) and *road traffic safety* as *the task of ensuring efficient mobility* (Line 112). However, when we see the details, we find *road traffic safety* being construed as *the ability of reducing all in all lives lost and resources damaged, including the physical injury* (Lines 116-117) though the use of *reducing* and *all in all* at the same time made the point a bit vague. The sequence of the entities treated in the task of ensuring road safety could also be observed; first lives lost, next resource damage, and finally came *physical injury* as if it were not that significant. The introductory section of the NRSSPE also, which will be analyzed in the forthcoming subsections, did not mention anything about *physical injury* as a road safety problem of the country.

Returning back to Excerpt 5, we find *road safety* and *road traffic safety* used interchangeably; taking the two terms together, it was said: *this is what is meant by road safety or if you talk about the road traffic safety* (Lines 117-18). Did it mean the two terms were similar or different? The construction was so vague. Moreover, the effects of unsafety, or lack of safety, were listed as loss of life, physical injury and resource damage, and efforts of ensuring road safety were claimed to be lessening these effects: *maybe you can't get rid of it all in all; but it is lessening* (Line 115). It was true that RTAs could not be halted totally. However, it was not clear how much of the problem was to be tolerated, or what exactly was meant by *lessening it*. Vision Zero makes this quite clear; it asserts that crashes causing death and serious injury are unacceptable. Hence, the effort is to eventually come to a zero level RTA-caused fatality and serious injury.

Excerpt 6

የመንገድ ደህንነት ስንል እ የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት እንደምታየው ነው፤ በሞተር ሀይል በሚንቀሳቀሱ ተሽከርካሪዎች የሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ ነው። ይሄ በሞተር ኃይል የሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ ብቻውን አይደለም፤ እ በእግራቸው የሚንቀሳቀሱ እግሮችን እ ሳይሆን የሚንቀሳቀሱ እንስሳትን እ በሁለት እግር የሚንቀሳቀሱ ጋራዎችን ወይም ደሞ የተለያዩ በሞተር ያልተደገፈ እንቅስቃሴ የሚያደርጉትን ሁሉ የሚያስተናግር ነው የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት። ስለዚህ ይሄ የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ይሄን ያክል ከፍተኛ ሞቢሊቲ ያለበት ከሆነ፤ የእንቅስቃሴ ባህሪያቸው የተለያየ የሆኑ እሚስተናበሩበት ከሆነ፤ ስለደህንነቱ ማሰብ ግዴታ ነው / when we say road safety em road transport is just what you see; it is mobility by vehicles using vehicles powered by motor. this motor-powered movement is not alone; em road transport involves the movement of pedestrians going on

foot animals walking with four legs carts moving with two legs or various non-motorized moving things. so if this road transport has that much mobility if it accommodates moving things of various character, it is a must to be concerned about its safety (Lines 119-24)

In Excerpt 6, road safety was construed with a definition of *road transport* as the movement of *motor-powered vehicles* (Lines 119-120). The use of the phrase *motor-powered vehicles* twice just in a single clause indicates a firm conceptualization of *road transport* as if it were mainly of/for the motorized vehicles' mobility. From *this motor-powered movement is not alone* (Line 120) and the listed *pedestrians, animals* and *carts* as other users of the road, we could infer that they were construed as if they were secondary in the road transport system, perhaps as intruders into the place which was for the motorized vehicles alone. Thus, if the road transport system was for motorized vehicles, it would mean that other users did not have the right to using the road.

Moreover, paying attention to the safety of the road transport system was asserted: *so if this road transport has that much mobility, if it accommodates moving things of various character, it is a must to be concerned about its safety* (Lines 122-24). However, even if it superficially seems to have referred to the safety of all road users, the emphasis was on the *safety* of road transport which was construed earlier as the *mobility of motor-powered vehicles*, not on *safety* of its users in general. Hence, the concern was for the safety of those in mobility: drivers, passengers and vehicles. By emphasizing on vehicles in mobility, not only was the safety of other non-motorized mobile and non-mobile road users excluded, but also that of the road network itself.

Unlike the case in most others, the safety of vehicles was stated in the construction of road (traffic) safety. The verb *check* was used repeatedly to emphasize on the role of making sure the vehicle was technically fit. Although it was first put in general as: *all the technical parts of the vehicles should also be fully checked* (Lines 128-29), as a way of showing their significance, some vehicle parts that needed due emphasis, *the tires, the clutches* and *the lights*, were named. Ensuring the safety of vehicles is one of the three key areas of any road safety work; a significant number of accidents could be prevented as a result of using vehicles which are technically fit. In the context of Ethiopia, documents frame unsafe vehicles' share to RTAs as insignificant. On the other hand, during one of their consultative meetings, a key road safety official of the AACA had uncovered the availability of forgery vehicle's technical quality assurance certificates being sold in the main streets of the city. This would imply that many defective vehicles were in the traffic

system. Albeit not stated in bold, some RTAs that caused mass casualty in Addis Ababa over the past five years were claimed to have been caused by defective vehicles (Lines 1512-1519). Hence, unlike the construction that put their role to RTAs as so trivial, it could be inferred that defective vehicles contributed to the death and injury of people, and to the damage of properties.

Excerpt 7

የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ደህንነት ስንል የተሽከርካሪዎችን ብቃት፣ የሽከርካሪዎችን ብቃት፣ እንዲሁም ደግሞ የመንገዱን ለደህንነት ምቹ መሆን እና የሌሎችንም ደግሞ ተስተናባሪዎች የጋራ መጠቀሚያ ስለሆነው መንገድ የጋራ ግንዛቤ ወጥ የሆነ አመለካከት ነው / when we say road transport safety we mean the fitness of the vehicles, the fitness of the drivers, and the safety of the road, and also of all other users shared understanding of the road about the common share of all users (Lines 131-34).

Excerpt 7 could be taken as an inclusive conceptualization of road safety. The three key elements of the road transport system: the *vehicle*, the *driver* and the *road* and its environment were cited. These constituents are common mentions of the literature elsewhere in relation to road safety. However, although the road is framed as *the common share of all users*, the order of putting the players with regard to their safety had an implication. In a list the thing that usually comes first is the one that is given due priority; here, the vehicle was first, implying that it was the most important; it was followed by the *driver*, next by the *road* and last by *all the other users*. By *all the other users*, if it were to mean pedestrians, cyclists, street vendors and others, who were both the majority road users and the most vulnerable, they were put last in the list; and the worst, they were not named at all. This would imply that their safety was not construed as so significant.

Roads are constructed for road users, and road users would refer to drivers, cyclists, pedestrians, etc. However, the construction of roads as if they were mainly for vehicles could be found in the road safety conceptualizations of many of the RSSs.

Excerpt 8

መንገድ የሚለውን ነገር ስናነሳ በተለይ ለተሽከርካሪ ተለይተው የተሰሩትን የሚያተኩር ነው / when we talk about road it emphasizes on those which are particularly constructed for vehicles (Lines 071-73)

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል እንደምታቀው መንገድ አለ፣ ትራፊክ እሚባል አለ፣ ደህንነት እሚባል ነገር አለ። መንገድ እምንለው ያው ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ አውራጎዳና ነው / by road traffic safety as you know there is road, there is what is called traffic, and the so called safety. obviously by road we mean highway which is prepared for the movement of vehicles (Lines 141-42)

መንገድ ለራሱ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ ነው ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ፣ በዋናነት ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ ነው / road is prepared especially for the movement of vehicles; it is mainly prepared for the movement of vehicles (Lines 145-46)

ሰለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል፣ በዚህ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀ አውራጃና ላይ የሚደረገውን የሰው የተሽከርካሪና የእንስሳት እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ የማድረግ ዲስፒሊን ማለት ነው። በእኔ አረዳድ ማለት ነው / so by road traffic safety, it means the discipline of making safe movement of people, vehicles and animals on a highway that is specifically prepared for vehicles; this is how I understand it (Lines 149-51)

ለዛ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀው መንገድ ላይ የሚደረግን ጤናማ እንቅስቃሴና ፍሰት የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት ይቻላል ማለት ነው / road traffic safety is a healthy mobility and flow on the right way on the road designed for the movement of vehicles (Lines 170-71)

አንዳንድ ጊዜ በጣም ለራሴ አፍራላሁ፤ ማለት ወጣ ብለን ስናይ አስፓልቶቻችንን ከተሽከርካሪው ይልቅ ለእግረኛ የተሰሩ የሚመስሉባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ / sometimes I myself feel embarrassed; that means when we go out and see our asphalted roads, sometimes it seems as if they were constructed for pedestrians instead of for vehicles (Lines 950-51)

In Excerpt 8, roads were construed as if they were *particularly constructed for vehicles* (Line 073) or as if they were *obviously ... prepared for the movement of vehicles* (Lines 142-43). When we examined these utterances, the word *particularly* was used to strengthen the notion of roads that excluded pedestrians and other users of the road; again, the non-hedged adverb *obviously* presupposed and hence made it unquestionable the idea that the road was constructed for the movement of just vehicles. In all the extracts above, by defining *road* and/or *road traffic safety*, participants construed roads as if they were just for vehicles and not for pedestrians also.

Constructing roads this way is of significant implication. If the majority of road users were excluded from the domain of the road and its environment, the entire road safety work would focus on only the few car owners/holders. This construction would also mean that road safety work would not consider the fact that pedestrians and other vulnerable users of the road had a good share of it; as a result, their safety would not be appropriately considered.

Moreover, this construing of roads does not show the real picture, particularly in the context of Ethiopia where roads are normally shared by many and used for various purposes. Even the roads designated as highways in Addis Ababa have spaces for pedestrians, albeit not enough; for example, crosswalks and sidewalks were meant for pedestrians. The environment surrounding the road should also be considered as part of the general road safety conception since the road and its environment could affect one another, both positively and negatively. Practically, in addition to drivers and pedestrians, there were many other users of the road: roadside vendors and their customers, roadside dwellers and beggars, and even people living in the streets shared and used the road in some way; this was a fact much noticeable particularly in Addis Ababa.

In line with the construction of the road for vehicles alone, the presence of many pedestrians in the road system was framed unfavorably; pedestrians were stated as if they were *overcrowding* the road traffic system (Line 148), using a negatively connoted word implying that they were not welcome; however, they crowded there only because they believed they had the right to use it.

However, we could observe that the construction of the road as if it were just for vehicles was strengthened by framing pedestrians' presence in the road system as an *embarrassing* experience: *sometimes I myself feel embarrassed* (Line 950). The presence of many pedestrians in the road, mainly in the lanes constructed for vehicles, might be worrying, because death/injury causing RTAs might occur. However, if the number of pedestrians was so huge to the extent the asphalted roads would seem *as if they were constructed for pedestrians instead of for vehicles* (Lines 950-51), there must have been some serious problem. Normally, it is not logical to think of people of that number were risking their lives, or that they were ignorant of the risk they were taking. The most probable reason could instead be absence of space for their safer mobility.

Road (traffic) safety was not only construed as the mobility of vehicles on the road that was particularly constructed for them, it also was construed as an accident-free or efficient mobility.

Excerpt 9

ሰለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል ... ሰላማዊ እንከን አልባ እንቅስቃሴ የመፍጠር ብቃት ነው / so road traffic safety is ... the capacity of making safe faultless mobility (Line 151-52)

ይሄን እንቅስቃሴ የሰውን የተሽከርካሪን የእንስሳትን የተናጠል የጣምራ እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ከአደጋና ከማንኛውም አስፈጻሚ ነገር ነፃ በሆነ መልኩ እንዲንቀሳቀስ የተሳለጠ የመንገድና የተሽከርካሪ አጠቃቀም ብቃት የሚረጋገጥ ዲሲፒኒን ነው / it is the safety of this individual and joint movement of people vehicles or animals so as to let them move being free from accident and any other risk (Lines 154-55)

ደህንነት ሲባል ሰላማዊ ደህንነቱ የተረጋገጠ የተረጋጋ የሰከነ ጉዞ አርገህ፤ የሰከነ ጉዞ በትራፊክ ደህንነት አንፃራዊ አገላለፅ ነው፤ ፈጥኖ ለመድረስ ዝግ ብሎ መንዳት ነው እንደምታቀው እሚባለው ማለት ነው። ደህንነት እሚባለው፤ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አንድ ጉዞ አንድ እንቅስቃሴ የወጣበትን አላማ፤ በሚፈለገው ጊዜ በሚፈለገው አኳኝን በሚፈለገው ቦታ የማድረስ ብቃት ሲረጋገጥ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ተሰፍኗል አለ ማለት ይቻላል ማለት ነው / by safety it means having a journey that is peaceful whose safety is ensured being of the right pace and slow. a slow journey is a relative description from the perspective of safety; to arrive soon one has to drive slowly as you know it. by safety or road traffic safety it is possible to say that there is or road traffic safety is achieved when the efficiency of making sure a journey a movement fulfill its goal at the right time in the right way and at the right place (Lines 161-66)

አስተማማኝ በሆነ መልኩ ስነልቦናዊ ጉዳት አካላዊ ጉዳት የንብረት ጉዳት ሳታደርስ፤ በሚፈለገው ለዛ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀው መንገድ ላይ የሚደረግን ጤናማ እንቅስቃሴና ፍላጎት የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት ይቻላል ማለት ነው / it is possible to say road traffic safety is a healthy mobility and flow on the right way on the road designed for the movement of vehicles being dependable or without causing any psychological pain physical injury resource damage (Lines 170-72)

አኬ እንግዲህ ያው ደህንነቱ ያለአደጋ በሚኒመም አደጋ፤ ያለአደጋ ትንሽ ይከብዳል፤ ይቻል ነበር ያለአደጋ ግን በሚኒመም አደጋም እንደው ለእኛ አገር ያዋጣል ብዬ ነው። በሚኒመምም ብንለው ግድየለም በሚል ነው እንጂ ደህንነት ማለት ያው እንግዲህ ሴፍ የሆነ ሮድ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም እንዲኖር ማለት ነው፤ መንገድ ደህንነት ሴፍ ሴፍቲን እንግዲህ ፈርስት አድርጎ ሁሉም ሰው የመጀመሪያ አድርጎት ያለ ምንም አደጋ በሰላም ሰራውን እንዲያከናውን ታስቦ ነው። የመንገድ ደህንነት እንግዲህ በእንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ ሰህተቶችን አቫይድ ለማድረግ እሚያስችል ይመስለኛል ደህንነቱ። የመንገድ ደህንነት ያለአደጋ ጊዜዎች አመቶች ሰራዎች እንዲቀጥሉ መታሰቡ ነው፤ ሶ ሮድ ሴፍቲ እሚለው እሱን ይመስለኛል እኔ እሚገልፀው / OK of course not with no accident at all but safety with a minimum accident; it is a bit difficult to have it without accident, though it was possible without any accident but even with a minimum accident I believe it works in the context of our country. I think it is OK even if we take it with the minimum accident; otherwise obviously safety means the safe use of road without any accident. road safety takes the conviction that all people hold safety first and perform their daily tasks safely and experiencing no accident at all. thus I think road safety enables one to continue with the times the years and the works by avoiding mistakes; I think this is what road safety describes (Lines 175-82)

Road traffic safety was construed as *faultless mobility*, using an all-inclusive, generalizing and oversimplifying adjective *faultless*: *road traffic safety is ... the capacity of making safe, faultless mobility* (Line 151-52). This position was further validated by: *being free from accident and any other risk* (Lines 154-55) like *psychological fear* (Line 157), and *being dependable, without causing any psychological pain, physical injury, [and] resource damage* (Lines 171-72). When the reliability (i.e., trustworthiness) of a travel was measured in relation to safety, it was in terms of whether it caused these three problems, and the first (i.e., the most significant) was its being of no *psychological pain*, and the other two (injury and resource damage) were, of course, common mentions of most RSSs also. Hence, *psychological fear* was emphasized; the word *psychological* was uttered repeatedly, both at a time and at various sections of the talk (Lines 157, 172).

In the national driver training curriculum and manuals, behavioral and psychological topics pertaining to road safety were included. Moreover, fear appeal was frequently used in the FTP and ETA road safety broadcast messages and in publicity campaigns (putting severely damaged vehicles and/or their pictures at high traffic areas in Addis Ababa). Hence, fear of experiencing RTAs must have been common for road users in Ethiopia; if they did not involve in or see (traces of) accidents repeatedly, they must have heard of incidents of RTAs or near RTAs from family members, friends or the media. Thus, this might have been the ground for the construction of dependable driving as free from creating any *psychological fear/pain*.

Road safety was further defined as the *efficiency* of making sure a journey fulfill its goal at the right time, in the right way, and at the right place (Lines 165-66). This notion of road safety took

a journey as successful as a product of the *right* working of time, manner and place altogether (it is also important to recognize the emphasis achieved by using *right* in each case). Therefore, a failure of adjusting *rightly* any of the three would mean that the journey did not fulfill its goal, and so would be risky. However, would it be practically possible to make/find all in perfection? This is a second time for *road traffic safety* to be constructed as a product of *faultless mobility*.

Again, although road safety was conceptualized in two ways (as road safety in general and road safety in the context of Ethiopia), the comprehensive construction of safety was related with the construction of road safety as a product of *faultless mobility*. By defining it as *the safe use of road without any accident* (Lines 178-79), and *road safety takes the conviction that all people hold safety first and perform their daily tasks safely and experiencing no accident at all* (Lines 179-80) the notion of RTS was constructed as mobility without any fault; the possibility for the occurrence of RTAs was totally rejected: *without any accident* (Line 176; 179) and *experiencing no accident at all* (Line 180). However, although wishing for no accident was of no harm, having such an absolute safety is unrealistic. Human beings are so fallible that accidents are inevitable; therefore, the effort should have always been to minimize the harm. The concept advocated by Vision Zero is not for no accident experience at all, but for no death and serious injury because of RTAs caused by mobility (Johansson, 2009; Belin, Tillgren, & Vedung, 2012).

This might lead us to the construction of safety in the context of Ethiopia, i.e., *safety with ... the minimum accident* (Lines 175-78). However, a key question to pose here is: what does it plainly mean by *safety with the minimum accident*? This position (*safety with the minimum accident*) is quite convincing if taken at face value; however, how much of the RTAs should be tolerated, or what level of safety was enough for Ethiopia was not stated explicitly. If the target set in the NRSSPE 2011-2020 were taken as the *minimum accident* level, it was planned to reach death rate due to crashes at 30% by the mid of this decade, and 50% by the end, respectively, of the rate at the beginning of the plan period, i.e., 2011, which was 70 persons per 10,000 vehicles. However, the rate declared by the mid of the decade was about 64. This could not be taken as the minimum level of accident. Moreover, Vision Zero, the approach based on which the Ethiopian road safety policy was formulated, would not accept such a position. Of course, the approach admits the possibility for RTAs to occur, but asserts that the death of even a single person should not be ethically acceptable. Of course, we could hear/read a lot of such seemingly convincing

constructions of road safety which were developed based on fallacious arguments; however, when examined critically, they would prove to be ethically unacceptable.

Road safety was conceptualized in relation to the impact of risky driving using disease metaphor: *hypertension, anxiety and agony*, most of which are psychological pains. *Speeding* was construed as the reason for the occurrence of these problems; this was implied in the definition given to safety: *by safety it means having a journey that is peaceful, whose safety is ensured being of the right pace and slower* (Lines 161-62). A proverb was used to emphasize the impact of speeding and the need for slowing down: *to arrive soon one has to drive slowly* (Line 163). The proverb was constructed using paradox, words which are semantically opposite but logically agreeable.

Another proverb was used in the construction of road safety, i.e., carrying the motto of *safety first* (Line 180), a proverb commonly used across disciplines/cultures. It was used to emphasize the role of considering safety beyond and above anything. When *safety first* was called for, it was related with *avoiding mistakes* (Line 182). On the contrary, as it could be evidenced from the increased rate of RTAs, the principle of *safety first* did not seem to have been given due attention in the context of Ethiopia. Of course, whether it was safety, economy or just mobility that was really given the priority is a bit controversial. The claim of the decade of action for road safety was in order not to make mobility/speed at the expense of human injury/death; however, people in Ethiopia were being injured and killed at an unacceptable rate. Similarly, using the health metaphor, RTS was constructed as *a healthy mobility and flow on the right way on the road* (Lines 170-71); vehicles and pedestrians could be construed as of *healthy mobility and flow* when they took the *right way on the road*, or when they took their sides and lanes. Constructions of RTS this way are based on the discourse of road safety as preventable public health problem.

Most of the conceptualizations constructed by the participants could also be observed from road use practices in the capital; for example, the claim made by participants that roads were mainly built for vehicles and not for pedestrians could be observed from the road construction and maintenance practices in Addis Ababa. Compared to priorities and emphases given to lanes of vehicles, sidewalk construction for pedestrians was so limited. The available sidewalks I observed were mostly too narrow, damaged, uncomfortable to walk on or of poor quality and so could easily be damaged before they gave the proper services for the vulnerable road users.

Moreover, they were usually occupied by other mobility blocking people (like street vendors) and objects (like construction materials, electric or telephone poles, uncovered ditches and goods for sale). Repairing and/or constructing roads without paying the proper attention to sidewalks, signposting devices, crossing marks and bridges was quite common. They might be considered eventually, but perhaps pedestrians had already developed the habit of using lanes of vehicles.

Therefore, in agreement with the participants' conceptualizations of what road safety is all about, a simple comparison of what they said with what I observed would strengthen the claim that the road safety practice in Ethiopia was in favor of the minority vehicles (vehicle holders/owners); though it may be a bit difficult to generalize, it is possible to take it as if it were indifferent to the majority road users. Pedestrians and other roadside users were not being treated the way the car holders were. Of course, the interest could have been to facilitate economic development of the nation. However, if the road safety approach adopted nationally proclaimed incorporating the safety of all road users in the road transport system paying particular attention to the vulnerable road users, why did actual practices prefer ignoring the majority road users to the extent that they were injured/killed in the streets of the city/country at such a significant rate? Road expansion in Ethiopia over the past two decades was growing at a faster rate (ERA, 2005, 2012); on the other hand, pavement construction for the majority road users both on roads of the capital and of the Regions was almost neglected. Hence, social equity was compromised.

From the analysis so far, we observed that RSSs construed the terms *road safety* and *road traffic safety* partially and vaguely. In some cases, they construed them in different ways, sometimes oppositely; in other cases, they took them as terms that carried the same concept. There were also cases for a single term to have been construed differently. The terms were also found to be associated with only some of the players in the road system, neglecting the significant others.

The other point from the analysis of this section is the notion of mobility as *faultless* and *of no accident at all*. While the death of even a single person due to RTAs is ethically unacceptable, road safety that runs for zero accident could not be practical; nothing could be perfect, or faultless. The available road safety knowledge does not assume perfection; it underscores the fallibility of users, and seeks a system that complements for this gap, fallibility. The philosophy of vision zero recognizes/accepts accidents that will cause minor injuries and resource damage.

4.2.2 Road Safety Construed as a Field of Study

Road safety was construed as a stream, field of study or discipline on its own.

Excerpt 10

በእንቅስቃሴ መካከል የሚኖሩ ግጭቶች እንዳይኖሩ፣ ግጭት ኢን ኤ ሴንስ ከተሸከርካሪ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር ተሸከርካሪ ይገጨናል ወይ እኛ እንገጨዋለን ብለን ማለት ይቻላልና፤ በዚህ ምክንያት የሚፈጠሩ የመንገድ አደጋዎችን የምናይበት ስትሪም ነው፤ እንደው እንዳጠቃላይ ስናየው ማለት ነው / to prevent crash in the middle of mobility, crash in a sense in relation to vehicle, when a vehicle is moving it might hit us or we could also say that we might hit it; so it is a stream by which we see road accidents which are caused by these crashes, this is how we see it in general (Lines 101-04)

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ስንል፣ ከተሸከርካሪ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር የተያያዙ በዛው ምክንያት የሚደርሱ አደጋዎች ጋር የተያያዘ ዘርፍ ነው ብዬ ነው እምወስደው / by road traffic safety, I take it as a field which is related with accidents caused by mobility (Line 108)

መንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት፣ በማንኛውም ሁኔታ ላይ የሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴዎች ከአደጋ የተጠበቁና ሰላማዊ የሆኑ እንቅስቃሴን ከመፍጠር አኳያ የሚሰራ እንደ ራሱን የቻለ ሳይንስ ማለት ነው / by road traffic safety, it means a fully-fledged science that works to make sure that mobility conducted under any conditions is safeguarded from accident in order that peaceful mobility is created (Line 110-12)

ስለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል በዚህ ለተሸከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀ አውራጃና ላይ የሚደረገው የሰው፣ የተሸከርካሪና የእንስሳት እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ የማድረግ ዲስፒሊን ማለት ነው በእኔ አረዳድ ማለት ነው፤ ሰላማዊ እንክን አልባ እንቅስቃሴ የመፍጠር ብቃት ነው / so by road traffic safety it means the discipline of making safe the movement of people, vehicles and animals on a highway that is specifically prepared for vehicles, this is how I understand it; it is the capacity of making safe, faultless mobility (Line 149-52)

የመንገድና የተሸከርካሪ አጠቃቀም ብቃት የማረጋገጥ ዲስፒሊን ነው፤ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል / road traffic safety is a discipline of ensuring the competence of road and vehicle use (Lines 155-56)

Road safety was construed as a *stream* or a *field* of study; first, it was constructed as a *stream* by which we see road accidents which are caused by ...crashes (Lines 103-04), and next, as a *field* which is related with accidents caused by mobility (Lines 108-09). In these constructions of road safety (as a stream or field of study), *accidents* and *mobility* were emphasized; road safety was construed as a discipline related to or dealing with *accidents* caused by *mobility*. However, while RTA's are key issues to get addressed in the task of ensuring safety, they could not be taken as the only subjects. If RTAs/RTIs are construed as preventable public health concern (Peden et al., 2004), and if road safety is taken as multisectoral and multidisciplinary, there must be other tasks to be dealt with so as to effectively prevent the occurrence of RTAs and ensure safe mobility. Thus, road safety is a term of more general and inclusive concept than just about RTAs/RTIs.

As a field of study, road safety was construed as a fully-fledged science; *it means...a fully-fledged science that works to make sure that mobility conducted under any conditions is*

safeguarded from accident (Lines 110-11). The construction of road safety as a *science* may not be a problem on its own, for *science* by definition is *knowledge about the world, especially based on examining, testing, and proving facts* (LDOCE). The problem was, though, when it was taken as an independent field of study. It was recognized as shared responsibility of stakeholders from diversified disciplines like road engineering, transport planning, traffic engineering, vehicle manufacturing, education, political administration, etc. since it could not address the problem as a *fully-fledged* or independent field of its own. Thus, it was taken as such perhaps because of a misconception, or because of a preference to continue with hegemonic/traditional practices. We could relate this with the framing of the police as the only responsible stakeholder to confirm and get registered incidents of RTAs: *no one has the right to confirm any accident but only the road traffic police can confirm that* (Lines 201-02). These constructions do not recognize involvement of other RSSs in the task of making sure the road and its environment is safe for its users.

In the construction of road safety as a *discipline*, or as an area of knowledge or training that had to be studied, what such a *discipline* would address was discussed, mentioning three but very much related areas. First, it is a discipline of *making safe* (with an emphatic ‘safe’) mobility of people, vehicles and animals (Line 150); it is significant to see the order in the list that the *discipline* would address: people came first, followed by vehicles and finally animals (Lines 150; Lines 154-55). However, it was discussed above that the highway was recurrently construed as if it were for vehicles in the first place, not for pedestrians and other road users. Therefore, there was a fallacy: while roads were built mainly for vehicles, RTS as a *discipline* was for people.

The second area was ensuring that users were free from accident, irrespective of their manner of use. Road safety as a discipline was constructed as *capacity*. As used in this context, by *capacity* it means: *someone's job, position, or duty; role* (LDOCE). Thus, the discipline was of the job, position or role of ensuring safety of *people, vehicles and animals* (Lines 154-55). The emphasis made here is their freedom from RTAs; road safety as a discipline would ensure that users were safeguarded from RTAs while using the road. However, accidents in Ethiopia were common, not an exception; hence, the discipline was not able to address the issue for which it was meant to.

Again, RTS was constructed as a *discipline* of ensuring *the competence of road and vehicle use* (Lines 155-56). This means, since *competence is the ability to do something well* (LDOCE), RTS

would make sure whether road users developed the proper skill of using the road (like, using crosswalks for pedestrians, and observing road signs for drivers) and the right skill of using vehicles (for example, having the necessary driving skill). However, though road users could tell how safely the road should have been used, they mostly used it improperly. If so, contrary to its construction, RTS as a discipline did not ensure that the claimed competence was exercised; otherwise, since the two could not go hand in hand, there was still some confusion.

As has been discussed so far, construing road safety as an independent field of study contradicts with its conceptualization as an issue of multisectoral and interdisciplinary nature. However, the construction of road safety as a *discipline*, a *stream*, or a *field of study* could also be seen in relation to professional background of the participants. For some of them who were engaged in road safety education or driver training, it could be an interdiscursive construction of road safety relating it to that of education. However, for the majority of the participants, this notion of road safety as a discipline could have emanated from the traditional/individual road user approach to safety. The best strategy of addressing the problem according to this knowledge/belief system is, very briefly, teaching/training road users to help them develop the proper road use behavior, and punishing them if they would not abide by what they were told to do. Thus construing road safety as a discipline, field of study or independent science could be understood as an attempt of taking away the task that was supposed to involve a number of stakeholders to give it to the few.

4.2.3 Road Safety Construed as a Serious Problem

4.2.3.1 Documents' Constructions of the Road Safety Problem

In this section, the construction of road safety in four documents pertaining to road safety, i.e., the NRSSPE (2011), the AATP (2011), the GTP I (2010) and ERA's RSM (2012) is analyzed independently. In general, all of them construed the issue as a serious problem for the country.

The NRSSPE 2011–2020 is a key document in the road safety discourses in Ethiopia. Above all, as a policy/strategy document endorsed nationally, it could be taken as the bible of the country's road safety discourses and practices. Almost all RSSs frequently referred to it in relation to their road safety works. This document framed the road safety problem of the country as a *serious problem that demands concerted efforts of all concerned*. Excerpt 11, which was taken from the preamble and body of the document (pp.1, 17), framed road (traffic) safety as a serious problem.

Excerpt 11

Road traffic accident in Ethiopia is a serious problem. (Line 001)

Unless the present trend is arrested, the social and economic problem of road accident is bound to become more and more serious as the number of cars increases (Lines 004-05)

Road safety is a serious social and economical problem of the nation. The fatality rate per 10,000 vehicles in Ethiopia is still one of the highest in the world. Concerted and coordinated effort by the concerned organizations should be taken to drastically improve road safety. (Line 010-13)

The document begins constructing RTA in Ethiopia as *a serious problem*, using a simple present tense that positioned the issue as true, relevant or significant: *Road traffic accident in Ethiopia is a serious problem* (Lines 00); other expressions like *significant* (Line 003) and *serious* with the quantifier *more and more* (Line 005) were also used for the same effect. The seriousness of the problem was justified voicing two of the main consequences of road unsafety: death and resource damage. First, it was constructed as a killer (of people the majority of which were pedestrians), using statistical discourse as supporting evidence: *death rate* (Line 001), *of those killed* (Line 002) and *fatality rate* (Line 010). Next it was framed as destroyer of the national economy, using the discourse of economy as in *economic loss* (Line 003) and *economical problem* (Line 010). Moreover, *social problem* (Lines 004 and 010) was mentioned, maybe to imply other effects of RTAs like physical injury, family breakdown or fear of mobility, and the associated social and psychological burdens caused by RTAs. However, considering the definite article *the* attached with *social* (Line 004), it could be inferred that the word *social* was to refer to the *death* already discussed in the preceding sentences than other problems associated with RTAs. Hence, in the construction of road safety as *a serious problem*, absence of both serious and slight *injury* would make the document of considerable limitation. Elvik et al. (2009) listed ways of describing road safety problem as: a high number of accidents, a high accident rate and a high proportion of serious injuries all of which are expressed numerically. They have admitted the difficulty of describing exhaustively all road safety problems in numerical terms only, citing the feeling of insecurity some road users experience as example. Thus, a full conceptualization of the problem needs to incorporate, if not all these issues, at least RTA caused fatalities and injuries.

As used in the sentence: *Unless the present trend is arrested, the social and economic problem of road accident is bound to become more and more serious as the number of cars increases* (Lines 004-05), the verb *arrested* (Line 004) is significant in the framing of the road safety problem in

Ethiopia: literally to arrest means *to stop* (RTAs) *or make it happen more slowly* (LDOCE); it was planned in the document to decreasing RTAs by 30% in the first five years and by 50% by the end of the decade. The key role of the verb in this context was, however, its metaphorical meaning: it is like *the police keep somebody in control because they thought s/he has done something illegal or unacceptable* (LDOCE). This meaning seemed to fit logically, considering the overall context and the ideas stated earlier: that death rate caused by RTAs was very high, over 50% of the victims were pedestrians (the powerless people being crushed by the powerful car!) of whom 20% were children (who are innocent and unable to defend themselves), and that it wrought serious economic loss. All these unacceptable impacts of RTAs should have led those responsible for the task to exert efforts to the maximum. Hence, any carelessness in discharging such an obligation of calming the trend must have some consequences. Thus it must be *arrested*. Nevertheless, since it said *unless the present trend is arrested* (Line 004), the passivization employed obscured who was responsible for arresting the trend; moreover, this agentless structure made it vague the effect of any inaction on the part of that unidentified but responsible body. If the problem, which was framed as *the present trend* was serious that demanded being arrested, the one that had to take such a responsibility should have been stated clearly.

The *present trend* was also predicted to cause *more and more serious* problem (of social and economy) *as the number of cars increases* (Line 005). The pronounced cause for the anticipated severity of accidents was, however, just *the number of cars*, avoiding other major contributors of the problem (some of them were more significant than number of cars in the context of Ethiopia, for the number of vehicles in the country was insignificant compared to the prevalence of the problem, as it was discussed in Chapter Two). Thus, another problem was the preamble's choice to emphasize number of vehicles, keeping silent about other salient RTA causing or contributing factors. Of course, silence could be used to elude a significant reality.

As it was the case in the preamble, in the body of the document also road safety was constructed as *a serious social and economic problem of the nation* (Line 010); the country's RTA caused fatality rate was positioned as *one of the highest in the world* (Line 011) before how that *serious problem* should have been handled was discussed. The effort of addressing the problem was so as to *drastically improve road safety* (Line 012-13); *drastically* means *extremely* (LDOCE). Therefore, as it was discussed above, road safety could be improved *drastically* if the problem

were arrested. However, contradictory positions emerged with regard to how the problem should have been addressed. The document claimed that the problem had to be improved *drastically* (Line 012). On the contrary, the same document put the goal of road safety work in Ethiopia as if it were to reduce the fatality figure *progressively*: “*The goal is to progressively reduce the 2010 road fatality number by 30% by 2015 and by 50% by the end of the decade (2020)*” (NRSSPE, 2011, p.16). The two words are near opposites: while *drastically* means extremely, *progressively* means gradually; hence, they put the document into a self-contradictory position. When the present RTA rate is observed, it is almost the same as the rate at the beginning of the plan period (RTA caused death rate in Ethiopia in 2011 was near 70 and now, end of mid-time of the decade, it is over 60 per 10,000 vehicles); thus, the work so far was neither *drastic* nor *progressive*.

Below are extracts from another document that constructed RTS as *serious problem*, the AATP.

Excerpt 12

Urban transport serves as veins to accelerate developments in industry, trade, education, health and other services. However, there is no compatible urban transport supply and effective management to meet the increasing trip frequency and mobility needs of the people and goods which resulted in the seriousness of the issue. (Lines 017-019)

Among the challenges of the urban transport include: Poor access to work place, education, health and other services due to lack of public transport service; Continuous increases in transport fair especially for low income groups; Lack of smooth traffic flow; Lack of infrastructure for None Motorized Transport (NMT) (for walking and bicycle); High rate of traffic accidents; Increasing air and noise pollution are the major ones. (Lines 019-24)

Unless these challenges and other associated problems are addressed in time, they will have a negative impact on the socio-economic development of the city and on good governance which directly affects the livelihood of the residents. (Lines 025-27)

Therefore, in order to clearly identify those continuously increasing basic challenges, indicate clear direction and identify measures to be taken and to, optimally, utilize those positive experience, it has been found important to formulate Addis Ababa transport policy. (Lines 031-34)

Different studies witnessed that Addis Ababa, the defacto capital of Africa, and capital city of Ethiopia suffers from inadequate transport service. Above all, day to day transport operation is arrested with complex issues and currently complaints of the service users is vivid. (Lines 036-39)

The AATP used the word *challenge* to construct problems associated with the transport sector of the capital; RTAs were among the problems. Also, we find the phrase *seriousness of the issue* (Line 019) in the introductory section of the document referring to the city’s road transport

problem. The policy construed road unsafety of the capital as an outcome of *inadequate transport service* (Line 37). Using biological metaphor, the policy constructed urban transport in general as *veins to accelerate developments* (Line 016) to imply that there would not be any development if the transport sector failed as there would not be survival for human beings if the veins failed. Hence, a belief system that promoted concern to development than to safety was magnified. The policy then detailed that the city's transport sector as full of *challenges*, some of which were directly related with its road and the environment, traffic system, and transport services: *Poor access to work place, education, health and other services due to lack of public transport service, Lack of smooth traffic flow; Lack of infrastructure for None Motorized Transport (NMT) (for walking and bicycle); and High rate of traffic accidents* (Line 020-23). Hence, while the problem was so critical to the health/safety and mobility of its dwellers, development was framed as being of priority.

When the document discussed transport related problems of the city as *challenges (and other associated problems)* (Line 019, 025) and as *complex problems* (Line 030, 038), it also quoted road users' bold complaints of the inadequate services they were being provided: *Above all, day to day transport operation is arrested with complex issues and currently complaints of the service users is vivid* (Lines 037-39). However, it is unclear what the phrase *complex issues* was referring to; it could probably be used to refer to delays due to traffic jams or injuries and loss of lives or both. In Addis Ababa, observing the traffic stranded for long and involving in RTAs due to competition for a space that was found by chance is a common experience than an exception.

Regarding how the problem should have been tackled, the policy presupposed the necessity of addressing the *challenges timely: Unless these challenges and other associated problems are addressed in time* (Line 025). It listed consequences the city would face if the problem were not arrested in time, but they were problems of *socio-economic development and good governance which directly affects the livelihood of the residents*; they were not related to safety.

Excerpt 13

The loss of life and property inflicted by road traffic accident in our city cannot be overlooked. Traffic accident in African cities is estimated to cost 1.5% to 2% of gross national product. Although a tendency for reduction of traffic accident is observed in our city, the increasing number of vehicles and consequent traffic congestion has still kept the

figure high. The policy is formulated to drastically reduce the loss of life and property caused by road traffic accident. (Lines 040-45)

We could say the RTA issue of the capital was better stated here in the body of the document, under a separate section entitled as *Ensure Traffic Safety* (AATP, 2011, p. 37). This section of the policy was of much resemblance to the NRSSPE in how it constructed the problem and how it should have been addressed. First, it construed the problem as one that *cannot be overlooked*, using a modal auxiliary that mark an expressive modality: *The loss of life and property inflicted by road traffic accident in our city cannot be overlooked* (Lines 040-41). Moreover, since the verb to *inflict* means *to make someone suffer something unpleasant* (LDOCE), this would imply that due to RTAs people in Addis Ababa were experiencing suffering which was expressed as loss of lives and property. However, like the preamble of the NRSSPE, it did not mention anything about injury caused by RTAs. In order to state economic burden caused by RTAs, it took African cities in general (as RTAs consuming 1.5%–2% of their GNP), instead of discussing the case in Addis Ababa in particular. Moreover, contrary to what it was developing, it positioned the RTA rate in Addis Ababa as improving: *a tendency for reduction of traffic accident is observed* (Line 042); this must have been euphemism. It also construed increase in number of cars as keeping the figure high (Lines 042-43), a knowledge/belief system not compatible with the reality in Ethiopia. Although number of vehicles was increasing every year, it was still less than half a million (WHO, 2013). If it is seen by international standards, one of the reasons that made Ethiopian road safety problem among the worst in the world was the ratio of RTAs per 10,000 vehicles was so high while the number of vehicles was so small. Hence, the number of vehicles could not be taken as a reason for the high figure of RTAs in Ethiopia.

Finally, the rationale for formulating the policy was put as: *to drastically reduce the loss of life and property caused by road traffic accident* (lines 044-45), the adjective *drastically* was the same word used in the NRSSPE analyzed above (Line 012). Thus, although there were some attempts made at downgrading the level of RTAs in the city, it is possible to conclude that using the word *challenge* than *serious problem* the AATP also constructed the road safety problem of the city and how it should have been addressed in a more or less similar way as the NRSSPE did.

The GTP I 2011-2015 was another key document that constructed road safety in the country as a serious problem that demanded an *imperative* and *timely* addressing. Moreover, in this grand

plan of the country, *transportation challenges* that the capital was facing were mentioned as it was put in the AATP analyzed above.

Excerpt 14

Private companies were contracted to ensure technical inspection of vehicles. Moreover to address the transportation challenges facing the capital, Addis Ababa, the possibility of introducing mass transport system has been explored (Lines 815-18).

Considering the relatively low vehicle density in the country, the number of traffic accidents is very high. Preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the resulting loss of human life and property, is imperative and timely. (Lines 819-21)

When the number of RTAs was constructed as *very high* (Line 820) against the low density of vehicles in the country, it was implied that the rate was unacceptable. It is also interesting to read in this plan document that *preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the resulting loss of human life and property is imperative and timely* (Lines 820-21). By *imperative*, it means one that is extremely important and so needs to be done or dealt with immediately (LDOCE); the word *timely* also denotes urgency. They were used to construct that the road safety problem in Ethiopia was so serious. However, in the grand plan also, while *loss of human life and property* were stated explicitly, injury was not mentioned at all as a problem associated with RTAs.

ERA's Road Safety Manual is the other key document that addressed the road safety problem in Ethiopia. The summary/abstract section of any document is central for it concretely, but briefly puts what the entire document is all about. Hence, the summary section of the Manual stated the RTA rate in Ethiopia as so *serious* using loaded verbs, adjectives, adverbs and nouns like *increasing steadily, steep increase, worst, tremendous loss, rise enormously, and undoubtedly*.

Excerpt 15

The issue of road safety has already become critical in Ethiopia - a country with low rate of motorization. The number of people killed and injured as a result of traffic accidents has been steadily increasing and the country is experiencing a tremendous loss of life and property each year as one of the leading countries of the world with worst accident record. Recent studies (TRL and Ross Silcock, 2001) reveal that Ethiopia has 170 deaths per 10000 vehicles per annum and road accident is costing the country in the order of 350-430 million Birr annually. (ERA Road Safety Manual, 2012, p.1)

The trend of accident is not in a state of declining; but rather has continued to rise enormously. The continued steep increase in the number of crashes and fatalities indicates that these losses are undoubtedly inhibiting the economic and social development of the

country and adding to the poverty and hardships of the community at large. (ERA Road Safety Manual, 2012, p.1)

Compared to the other documents, ERA's Manual expressed in some detail the RTA-caused loss of lives, injury and property damage in Ethiopia; it framed it as a problem that *became critical* and even *steadily increasing* in the country. LDOCE defines the word *steady* as *continuing or developing gradually or without stopping, and not likely to change*. The next clause was in the present continuous tense: *the country is experiencing a tremendous loss of life and property each year*; it shows the situation's urgency and continuity, hence the seriousness of the problem. The word *tremendous*, meaning *very big, fast, and powerful* (LDOCE), was used to magnify RTA-caused loss of life and property; it had the same purpose of depicting the status of the problem.

ERA's Manual revealed how grave the rate of RTAs in Ethiopia was: *The trend of accident is not in a state of declining; but rather has continued to rise enormously*. The use of the present simple, the contrast between the clauses, and the loaded words employed all constructed the situation as so pervasive and natural. The rate of road crashes and fatalities was not just increasing to *inhibit* economic and social development of the country; it was construed as a *steep increase* and whose impact was *undoubtedly* impeding.

Excerpt 16

Road accident is in a state of rise and recognized as a major socioeconomic concern facing Ethiopia as the country is known as having one of the highest accident record in the world – about 136 fatalities per 10,000 motor vehicles in 2003 (National Road Safety Coordination Office). Every month, around 400 people are killed or hospitalized by road accidents. An estimate by a Study (TRL & Ross Silcock, 2001) reveals that, in addition to the above fatality rate, road accidents cost the Ethiopian economy between 350-430 million birr per year. (ERA RSM, 2012, p.2)

Rapid increases in road network of the Ethiopians and the associated road vehicle ownership, have placed considerable pressure on the road networks, their traffic control devices, and on users of road facilities and road safety measures to be undertaken. In addition, lack of road safety experience and technical skills were also key constraints contributing to the aggravated rate of accident in the country. (ERA RSM, 2012, p.2)

We saw that RTS problem in Ethiopia was constructed as *critical* in the summary of ERA's manual; the introductory section of the Manual developed the issue further as: *Road accident is in a state of rise and recognized as a major socioeconomic concern* of the country and that *Ethiopia is known as having one of the highest accident record in the world*. The manual brought

intertextually findings of researches conducted on the prevalence of the problem in Ethiopia and statistics that helped it develop its position. Thus, compared to the former documents, ERA's RSM seems to have been direct in depicting the seriousness of the problem. However, as could be seen from its discussion in its body, it did not clearly state contribution of poor road design and construction for the road safety problem and the significance of addressing it effectively. Instead, in line with the usual discourse, it blamed road users, the driver in particular, as the primary cause of RTAs and as one that needed due attention: "In Ethiopia, statistics reveal that the primary cause for accident is the driver behaviour that requires a tremendous effort to restore to the level that commensurate with safe driving environment" (ERA, 2012, p.37).

4.2.3.2 Stakeholders' Constructions of the Road Safety Problem

Road safety and *road traffic accident* are terms that collocate; road accidents are the obvious odd consequences of the road traffic system. Shinar observed, "safety in general and highway traffic safety in particular is most commonly defined by its negative outcome: crashes or accidents" (2007, p.3). Shinar further discussed distinctions some researchers and safety organizations make between the terms *crash* and *accident*, and their preference to *crash* for its descriptive meaning and neutrality. WHO (2004) also prefers using *crash* to *accident*, mainly due to its position that crash/accident incident is a *preventable* experience (which may not happen if precautions were taken). I used both of the terms, of course not just to follow Shinar (who did the same), mainly for two reasons: first, in almost all road safety discourses in Amharic, it was አደጋ [*adaga*] i.e., *accident*, not ግፍት [*gitf'it*] i.e., *crash* that was used (as was confirmed from the collected data), so I decided to take the term used dominantly, *accident*. However, and secondly, when I quoted/followed lines of arguments of those that preferred the term *crash*, I did the same.

In the Ethiopian road safety context, as most of the participants put it, compared to the amount of vehicles we had, the number of lives lost and people injured was high and resources that were worth millions were damaged. Construing RTAs in general as consequences of human, vehicle and environment related factors was common among the participants, as is the case elsewhere. Overall, the participants construed RTAs in Ethiopia as *very very bad*, *the worst*, *terribly worrying* and *unacceptable*. Therefore, it could be concluded that Ethiopian RSSs were not that much different from the policy/strategy/plan documents they used in how they construed the problem; hence, documents and practitioners overlap in their conceptualizations of the problem.

The way RSSs constructed their conceptualization of the problem in Ethiopia as a serious problem was analyzed grouping them into various but interrelated themes. Below are some of the constructions of the road safety problem by the RSSs:

Excerpt 17

ባገራችን የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ በጣም በጣም ሲርየስ ነው፤ በኔ እኔ ውስጡ ስላለሁ እኔ በምረዳው ደረጃ በጣም ሲርየስ ጉዳይ ነው፤ ተገቢው ትኩረት ሊሰጠው ይገባል ብዬ ነው እማስበው / in our country the road traffic accident is very very serious to me; since I am one who is involving in it to the level of my understanding it is a very serious issue (Lines 344-45)

በልዩልዩ ጥናቶችም ላይ ስናይ ኢትዮጵያ በአፍሪካ ውስጥ ብሎም በአለም ደረጃ የትራፊክ አደጋ በጣም አሳሳቢ ከሚባልበት አገሮች ውስጥ ነው ተመድባ እምትገኘው / if we refer to different studies we find Ethiopia categorized under countries with a very worrying traffic accident incidents in Africa and the world (Lines 355-56)

እና በጣም የትራፊክ አደጋ ባገራችን ትኩረት ሊሰጠው የሚገባ በጣም ሲርየስ ጉዳይ ነው የሚል ግምት ነው ያለኝ / so I believe traffic accident in our country is a very serious issue that deserves due attention (Lines 357-58)

ሆኖም ግን ከችግሩ አንጻር በኔ ግምት ከችግሩ አንጻር አሁንም የተሰጠው ግምት እሚበቃው ነው ወይም ደም እንደው ጥሩ ነው ሊባል እሚችል ነው ብዬ አልገምትም፤ ገና ገና በጣም ዝቅተኛ ደረጃ ላይ ያለ ትልቅ ግምት ግን የሚያስፈልገው ነው ብዬ ነው እምገምተው / compared to the problem I don't think the emphasis it is given could be taken as sufficient nor could it be counted as good; I think it is still at a very very poor level but one that deserves huge attention (Lines 365-67)

ያገራችን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ችግር ያገራችን እ አሳሳቢ ችግር ነው ተብሎ ሊወሰድ ይገባል የሚለውን ሀሳብ እኔም እጋራለሁ፤ ለምን አሳሳቢ ይሆናል ቢባል፤ መልሱን ማንም ተራ ሰው የሚመልሰው ነው / I agree with the idea that is put as our country's road traffic safety problem should be taken as our country's serious problem; if asked why is it serious the answer any layman can answer it (L. 368-70)

ዝም ብለህ ከዛው ላይ እያወደምክ መሄድ ማለት አሳሳቢ ችግርነቱ አጠያያቂ አደለም ማለት ነው / if you carelessly continue destroying it then the seriousness of the problem is unquestionable (Lines 377-78)

የእኛ ደም በኢትዮጵያ ነባራዊ ሁኔታ ካልከው አንፃር የኛ ደም የከፋ ይሆናል / the case since you asked in the context of Ethiopia ours is the worst (Lines 402-03)

በዚህ መልኩ እነዚህ ነገሮች እ አሳሳቢ ነታቸው ለኔ በደንብ ነው እሚታየኝ ለማለት ያህል ነው / it is to say I could see the seriousness of these things very well (Line 447)

አዎ በጣም ወረስት ነው ወረስት ወርስት ነው / yes the worst yes worst it is the worst (Line 448)

እና የእኛን አገር እንዴት ትገልፀዋለህ ብትለኝ፤ በጣም በጣም ጥሩ አደለም፤ በጣም / so if you ask me how I could explain the case in our country, it is very very bad; extremely (Lines 488-89)

እና እነዚህ ነገሮች ሲደመሩ ችግሩን አሳሳቢ ያደርጉታል / so when all these things are summed up they will make the problem more serious (Line 1340)

ይሄ ነገር ይሄ አደጋ እየከፋ ሊሄድ ችሏል / that is a very serious pain worsening recently (Line 1430)

As could be seen from the extracts above, the participants were no different in construing the RTS problem in Ethiopia. For example, when a participant said it was a *very serious problem*, it

was an echo of the position held by the government, which was put both in the strategic document and in discourses of officers/experts working for GIs. The participant stated his agreement with the strategic plan quoting the expression used there intertextually as: *I agree with the idea that is put as our country's road traffic safety problem should be taken as our country's serious problem* (Lines 368-69) paraphrasing what was put in the preamble of the NRSSPE as: *Road traffic accident in Ethiopia is a serious problem* (Line 001). However, unlike the strategic plan, the participants would explain better (and in depth) as to why the issue should have been regarded as *serious*, sometimes taking very convincing lines of argument.

In the analysis of this section, therefore, detailed discussion of the participants' constructions of RTS as a serious problem is provided by categorizing the themes emerged into seven headings.

1. RTAs and their causes

In the literature about RTAs, factors associated with the occurrence of RTAs are usually called as *causes* or *contributory factors*, and the three main accident causes/factors are human, vehicle and road. In Ethiopia, almost all the factors to the occurrence of RTAs are attributed to human beings; it is stated that 93% of all RTAs involve human factors, with only 5% and 2% share of vehicles and roads, respectively (Getu, 2008). In one construction for example, we could see a list of accident causing factors as: *vehicles' technical defect, drivers' lack of skill or behavioral problem, pedestrians' and others' inappropriate road use behavior, and environmental and natural factors such as flood, rock fall and earthquake* (Lines 195-200). It is interesting to see the list included the three factors that the literature put: road users, the road and its environment, and vehicles. In explaining what the impact of such an experience might have been, it was stated as it could be *injury on a person, damage on a vehicle, and/or destruction of movable and immovable properties* (Lines 185-94). Again, material goods and the environment that could be damaged/destroyed due to RTAs were listed as: *vehicles, animals, bridges, telephone lines, electric poles, road traffic signs, road side houses and farmers' fields*. It could be observed that the things and animals listed were what one could find on/by the road, implying that road safety work in Ethiopia should have considered not only just the traffic, i.e., things on mobility, but also people, material goods and animals that could have been near/by the road.

For some of the participants, RTA was a consequence of mobility using the road and vehicles. For example, it was put as: *because of vehicle* (Line 183), *due to road and in connection with the road* (Lines 183-84), *it happens in the process of mobility* (Line 195), *it occurs as a result of the process of mobility* (Line 196). Hence, RTA was understood as natural byproduct of mobility, as an inevitable experience as long as vehicles run on the road. The goal of any road safety work is to minimize the effect of this evil encounter of mobility. However, it does not mean that mobility at any level would result in RTAs; it is only when the speed of the object in mobility exceeds the threshold of human capacity to resist that experience that the incident would cause the problem.

In another construction, traffic was defined as mobility of human beings *for their daily life, for their job, or for their social life*, and as mobility of vehicles *boarding passengers* (Lines 212-14). Next, RTA was construed as an outcome of *unhealthy interaction* (Line 215) between the vehicles on mobility and human beings. As it was put, *if the travel is unsafe, if it has a risk against returning back home or if he [the traveler] returns being physically injured or unhealthy* (Lines 217-18), that mobility would cause accident. Construing RTA as a health problem using health related words/phrases like *unsafe* and *unhealthy* is in line with the construction of RTA as *a preventable public health problem* (Pedan, 2004; WHO, 2013).

2. RTAs as consuming lives, limbs and resources

As one way of showing the gravity of RTAs in Ethiopia, the verb *consume* was used in *consumes human lives* (Line 370). Normally, we say: *'The car hit him dead,' 'Fire burnt the building,'* or *'Grasshoppers eat leaves.'* However, when the degree of hitting, burning or eating is so severe that the number of fatalities is so high, when the destruction caused by fire is so huge, or a plague of grasshoppers cover the entire plantation of an area and eats everything there, we use the verb *consume*, to show the severity of the problem. Hence, the word *consume* in this context was to show the huge number of lives lost due to RTAs. In agreement with this, reports regarding the rising number of lives being killed due to crashes framed the problem as *mass casualty*: *if you ask how these accidents occur, they are mass casualties; sometimes when buses loaded with lots of passengers fall down, many people die at once* (Lines 787-89).

In terms of injury, the problem was expressed as so significant; using expressions like *causing permanent disability, it affects human body for a long period of time, be it temporarily or forever*

(Lines 371-72). Psychological problem was also mentioned: *it causes very serious psychological problem* (Line 372), with the modifier *very serious*, as a way of showing the gravity of the problem. All these (*lives lost*, *permanent/temporary injuries* and *psychological problem*) were taken from health discourse interdiscursively.

In the construction of RTAs in Ethiopia, a repeated and emphatic *very* was used several times: *very very serious* (Line 344), *very very bad* (Line 488). To strengthen this position, statistical data that would reveal the *unacceptable* number of people who died and got injured of RTAs, and the social and economic burden that followed (Lines 346-57) was employed. Using statistics to reveal the prevalence of RTAs to justify the necessity of urgent intervention was a common practice of most RSSs, both nationally and internationally. Typical examples from the global road safety players are WHO and GRSP, and locally, the NRSSPE and RTA reports of the FPC. In Addis Ababa, in collaboration with the City's TPC and TB, FM radios release every 24 hours' RTA reports *numerically*; some would include important traffic information (like which route was too crowded to take and hence which one was better) and road safety lesson for the day.

It is also important to observe how participants construed severe and slight injuries caused by RTAs. For example, we find: *there are many severe injuries* (Line 347), a clause in the simple present tense that makes the case factual/natural to indicate the deep-rootedness of the problem. The same was constructed in *it means most of those experiencing severe injuries are now facing permanent disability* (Lines 347-48). It is significant to observe the quantifier *most*; we could see the following also: *even the so called slight injury by itself is not that simple*, with *the so called* that revealed the participant's disagreement with the downsizing of the problem. Due to reasons like ignorance, lack of access, inadequate services due to lack of man power and resource, minor injuries could complicate and develop into permanent injuries in Ethiopia. In order to reflect on what was observed regarding treatment of RTA victims, it was constructed as: *at every hospital it is wasting medicine, medical wards, physician's time, wealth, all these, that could have been used for treating other diseases* (Lines 349-50). The verb *waste* was used to show the human and medical resources consumed unnecessarily, just because of the pervasiveness of the road safety problem. Moreover, in the effort of helping the injured, it was construed that human and material resources which could have been used for treating other health problems were all *vanished*.

My observation at one of the hospitals in Addis Ababa in 2014 following a mass casualty due to a crash of a public transport provider called *Anbessa Bus* is a case in point. There were many victims lying in corridors of the hospital, waiting for help anxiously. Those who were given the treatment also were not that much satisfied. The overall implication is that adequate and timely EMSs were not being provided for victims, and though they were given, since RTAs incidents were too many, they were construed as consuming the limited human and material resources of the country. In agreement with this, we could read from ERA's document that around 400 people are killed or hospitalized by RTAs in Ethiopia every month (ERA, 2012, p.2). On the contrary, the NRSC quoted MoH positively, as key RSS contributing its share; it was framed as if it were bringing about positive change in terms of providing EMS for RTA victims (NRSSPE, 2011).

In support of his construction of road safety problem in Ethiopia as so serious, a participant made an intertextual link to *different studies* conducted elsewhere to estimate the amount of wealth the country would waste *when vehicles and properties imported using hard currency are crushed* (Lines 351-52). Thus, *the loss calculated is probably up to zero point eight percent...of our total annual income or...our GDP* (Lines 152-55). Moreover, referring to anonymous sources, the country's RTA record was framed as among the worst in the world: *if we refer to different studies, we find Ethiopia categorized under countries with a very worrying traffic accident incidents in Africa and the world* (Lines 355-57). The adverb *very* was uttered emphatically, to magnify the level of the problem. As a logical conclusion to the internal and external evidences provided to showing the seriousness of RTAs in Ethiopia, it was constructed as: *so I believe traffic accident in our country is a very serious issue that deserves due attention* (Lines 357-58). ERA's Manual (2012, p.2) analyzed above did the same: "Road accident is in a state of rise and recognized as a major socioeconomic concern facing Ethiopia as the country is known as having one of the highest accident record in the world." Thus, the problem was both serious and urgent.

Similarly, a brochure that was prepared by the Addis Ababa Road Transport Bureau asserted that RTAs had become common encounters of the city's residents: *Years have passed since seeing and hearing traffic accident reports become our daily practice here in our city Addis Ababa* (Lines 566-67). The repetitive involvement of vehicles and people in accidents, and the frequent (almost every day) experiencing and/or receiving of accident reports must have resulted in the construction of RTA as a *daily practice* of the city's dwellers, to the extent that it became a sign

of the capital's streets: *traffic accident is being sign of the streets of the capital* (Lines 567-68). It was a usual experience for one to see signs of accidents (like broken glasses scattered over the streets) or to hear from family members, friends or the media about encounters of RTAs that caused death, major or minor injury or property damage. These all could have been reasons for the construction of the problem as *very serious*.

3. Drivers as accountable to RTAs

The literature regarding causes of RTAs, as was discussed earlier, puts road users, vehicles and roads and the environment as key factors. However, in the construction of road safety as a serious problem in Ethiopia, RSSs positioned drivers as the main contributors for the prevalence of RTAs, as was done in the documents analyzed above. Drivers' recklessness was construed as the main cause of *more painful* accidents: *it becomes more painful when the accident happens due to drivers' irresponsibility* (Line 445). Although technical defects of vehicles and problems associated with the road (and its environment) were mentioned as causes of RTAs repeatedly (Lines 183, 184, 186, 196, 198, 206 and 207), only drivers were held responsible when practical interventions, in the form of fines or compensations for RTA victims, were required, which were framed as *with this come boundaries of responsibilities and liabilities* (Lines 208-09). In other words, RSSs like the mechanic who confirmed fitness of the vehicle to be driven while it was basically unfit, or the engineer who designed/constructed the road in such a way that it would contribute to the occurrence of RTAs were all exempted from liability. Above all, what about commitment of the political/administrative body to addressing responsibly this pressing issue? The positioning of road users, particularly professional drivers, as main causes of road traumas in Ethiopia was so widespread that it is a topic of further investigation in the sections to come.

4. RTAs as results of fault of engineering

Although RTAs were dominantly constructed as consequences of road users' faults, they were sometimes construed as results of engineering fault. In some cases, participants construed RTAs as consequences of faults committed by engineers/constructors when roads, pavements and sewerage systems were constructed. As a result, pedestrians, including the physically impaired like the blind, would experience injury/death. A participant, for example, said that RTA included every accident caused by/in relation to using the road, including *pedestrians' sidewalk if there is a ditch for water or a sewerage system which is not covered* (Line 334-35). Two key points in

this construction of RTAs were that RTAs were consequences of *engineering fault* and absence of *safety precautions* when roads were under construction. Both of them were cases observed in the road construction and management practices of Addis Ababa; incidents of people who were injured and who died falling into ditches that were left uncovered due to negligence or absence of construction precautions were reported. Some of the ditches or sewerage systems could totally be forgotten and remain uncovered for years; the Addis Ababa Transport Bureau admitted the presence of over 5000 ditches that were left uncovered in the city, and claimed to have covered over 3000 of them in the first quarter of the 2016/17 budget year (Addis Television, 19 October 2016 morning news). They could be causes of minor/terrible accidents on road users, particularly when children were playing or pedestrians were running due to a sudden rain, or at nights of power blackout.

Regarding *engineering fault*, since roadsides were usually unfinished and uncomfortable to walk on and/or since they were blocked by construction or commercial materials, pedestrians would prefer (or were forced) to take lanes of the vehicles, a practice that would expose them to RTAs. Hence, risky road use behavior pedestrians exhibited could not necessarily be due to ignorance or recklessness; it may also be because they had no other option. Moreover, engineering fault could be on the very design of the road like on curves, steepes, junctions, etc. That would affect drivers' skill of controlling the vehicles they were driving, particularly when they were at speed.

Regarding the absence of *safety precautions*, although road construction was claimed to have been following safety audits during design, construction and use times allocating up to 10% of the budget of road construction/maintenance for safety consideration (ERA, 2012), what was put in practice on roads constructed/maintained did not seem to have been adequate for the majority road users. Except blaming the victims or pledging what has to be done in future, we could not find anyone taking responsibility for the anguish people were suffering because of road mishaps. Details of the problem were given as could be seen in: *so that sewer should be covered; it should be constructed; which is caused; the way road is used; sewers are not closed; the sewerage systems are not constructed; and when roads are constructed* (Lines 337-40); however, passivization that elided agency and obscured responsibility for faulty practices of engineering and for the absence of safety precautions of roads under construction was used predominantly.

In order to strengthen the construction of the road safety problem as consequence of *engineering* fault and absence of *safety precaution*, it was said: *road accident is not something related with transportation only* (Lines 342-43). That means, RTAs became so prevalent since the road safety work did not consider the overall road system; thus, it was necessary to widen the perspective of safety by including issues like engineering and safety facilities. The literature asserts that a comprehensive road safety work is one that addresses at least the three most important players altogether: roadway safety, vehicle safety and road user safety (Peden et al., 2004, WHO, 2013).

5. RTAs and the role of the police

The police are responsible for investigating, recording and reporting of RTA cases in Ethiopia. Participants expressed their doubts regarding whether accident reports being released seasonally reflected the problem on the ground; their responses implied the possibility of many more crashes rather than what was reported. According to them, there could be RTA cases which were not reached at or inspected at all. Participants construed RTAs in Ethiopia as higher in number and as more severe in their impacts than what was being declared (Lines 445-460; 520-536).

For example, when asked whether accident reports in Ethiopia reflected the reality on the ground, a participant immediately responded as: *I have doubt, yes I am very much doubtful* (Line 520); this was more than a simple doubt on the accuracy of RTA reports. The anecdote used to justify this position was both interesting (for it was a convincing account to the position held) and shocking (for it was unusual to hear of a person involved in a crash to become so careless of the condition his victim). Thus, if RTA incidents occurring in the capital were too far from reach or investigation, it would not be that difficult to infer the picture nationwide; that was what I was encouraged to contemplate on: *this is Addis Ababa but there is also a very wide area. Ethiopia is big; imagine the number of such things; they hit on the road, kill and go* (Lines 537-39).

Moreover, it was constructed that crashes that occurred at nights and at places far from the reach of the police were not included in accident reports for they were not registered at all; therefore, since the report *never shows the reality, s/he never believe(s) what is being registered and reported every morning could reveal the whole picture* (Lines 530-31); the participant expressed her/his position using language that was negative but very strong. Moreover, RTA victims that survived for the time being might have died *three days or three months later* (Line 534), but they

were not registered as RTA victims. It is essential to mention here that WHO's (2015, p. 130) estimate of RTA fatalities of 2012/13 (which was 23,837) was over seven times more than the police reported figure. Thus, if the country's real RTA picture was known, the pervasiveness of the problem could have been understood better, and that could have further contributed to meaningful intervention.

As the participant construed, the death of domestic animals like dogs due to road crashes which was not counted as RTA encounter had contributed to the prevalence of the problem; *perhaps the person has got his first experience of hitting (road users) from that very moment* (Lines 543-44). When s/he was uttering this, s/he was laughing as if s/he were joking; it was rather satirical since not only did it reveal RTA prevalence, but also how involving in crashes had eventually developed and reached to the level it became so widespread. As the Amharic adage that goes, *እናቴ፣ ምንው የእንቁላሉ ጊዜ በቀጣሽኝ ኖሮ* / Mum, I wish you corrected me in my first days of stealing would tell, since drivers involving in illegal practices were not corrected early before these practices ruled them, they would adopt the practices to the extent they approved them as normal.

The police were construed as the only responsible entities for handling RTA cases; it was stated emphatically that RTA incidents could be confirmed by the police alone; this was no different from silencing *administrative bodies, politicians, physicians, and others* (Lines 204-06), and most of all, the victims involved, giving decisive power to the police. Hence, only when the police were convinced of crash incidents as RTAs that they would recognize and register them under the *road traffic system*, categorizing them as: *fault of the driver, fault of the vehicle, fault of the environment* or *fault of the road* (Lines 205-09). The problem with such a practice could not be underestimated, as my personal observation in the streets of Addis Ababa confirmed. In the first place, RTAs could occur anywhere in the streets of the city, but it would not be that easy to find the police everywhere. Moreover, car-to-car and car-to-people crash cases whose minor damages were resolved after negotiations of the parties involved were common. At times, a police officer would not register the case as long as the parties agreed on who was to cover the cost for repair or damage. Thus, if it were unlikely to find the police on the spot, if they would not register RTA cases for which the parties involved negotiated to share responsibility, and/or if people other than the police were banned from confirming RTA cases, the real picture of RTAs could not be established. What if, for example, the very cause (of that unregistered accident) was

related with the road? If it is not recognized, corrective measures could not be made. As a result, the road safety work would significantly be impaired.

Moreover, as my observations in Addis Ababa witnessed, vehicle driving was different based on the presence/absence of the police; even at roundabouts, traffic lights, crosswalks, etc., many people did not drive carefully if there were no police nearby. Instead of driving by respecting traffic rules, it seems that they would drive fearing penalties they might be charged by the police officer around. If they had the right understanding of road safety, safer driving could have been part and parcel of their life; hence, they could have given priority to the one that deserved, for example, respecting traffic lights or slowing down at crosswalks for the safety of pedestrians.

6. RTAs as the concern of the government

The road safety problem in Ethiopia was construed as the *worst*, and the government was not seen to be paying any attention to address it. Unlike other social/natural problems of the country, RTAs and their impacts were almost neglected. To justify absence of attention that should have been given to them, a participant used the case of the 2014 tsunami that killed almost a quarter of a million lives as an example. He explained how the media covered the situation and how governments were worried about that issue, and compared it with RTA-caused death of 1.2 million people annually, a figure about which, according to him, no one wanted to talk. As a result, he construed the problem as *silent killer* (Line 469), and cried for breaking the silence; *our planet receives five tsunamis, that means every year* (Line 470) and *if we simply keep silent like this, our world will continue receiving five, five tsunamis every year* (Lines 479-80). He was bold enough to suggest (of course ironically) calling RTAs using the word *tsunami*: *therefore let's rather call the traffic accident as tsunami. I think that is better so that it worries us a bit* (Lines 480-81). His interest in doing so was so that governments, authorities, the media and the public at large could compare the case of RTAs with that of tsunamis, recognize the gravity of the problem and react accordingly, just like the case for the tsunami.

Of course, the participant did not believe that the problem was related with lack of knowledge: *I don't think they are unaware of the case* (Line 477). He mentioned *paper work* which did not come into practice; *I think no hard work has been done on the traffic safety issue. Most of the time, it is just on paper. It happens to be simply talking; it doesn't go down to the ground* (Lines

475-77). The planning and documenting construed as the soft work was too much, whereas the practice, putting the *talk* in action, was missing. The government was blamed for the negligence; *it is the governments that you have to blame* (Line 471). One reason for blaming it was, as was put, it did not commit itself to solving the problem. While there were others like the Government of Sweden which planned and worked for zero level accident (and they were able to reach the death rate between five and eight per 10,000 vehicles), the government of Ethiopia simply compared RTA data of the present month with that of the same month of the previous year instead of working to achieve the targets it aspired for (Lines 488-504). To him, that was unacceptable (Lines 494-95). He also said that all who worked this way had *missed the point: I think they have missed the point, the authorities, the responsible authorities or the traffic office or those working on the statistics* (Lines 500-01). Therefore, according to this construction, the government and authorities under its supervision did not have the right conceptualization of the problem.

On the other hand, the government's role in the work of tackling road safety problem of the country was emphasized; the government was construed as if it were treating the problem by paying *better attention* (Line 359), for example, by establishing the NRSC and by allocating budget from the ORF. Of course, this practice was constructed as *one of the perceivable attentions given to it* (Line 362). However, could the presence of an independent structure alone be everything in tackling the road safety problem? The NRSC's establishment could not (and in practice did not) warrant that the job of ensuring road safety was really done. Among the reasons for the establishment of the council was to coordinate participation of responsible bodies and interest groups in the effort of ensuring road safety in the country. However, whether the Council was really coordinating the concerned RSSs to contribute their share to the safety of road users, roads, vehicles and other resources is doubtful, as will be seen in some detail.

The Addis Ababa City Administration, for example, enacted a regulation for the establishment of road safety councils at its different administrative levels; however, as I observed from my visits to five of the ten Sub-cities, almost all RSCs of the sub-cities (except that of the *Nefas Silk Lafto*) were not functional, and it was only the same Sub-city, *Nefas Silk Lafto*, which established RSCs down at the *Woreda* level. However, the claimed *Woreda* level safety councils were not involved in any perceivable activities. I asked the respective road safety coordinators why the established

Councils were inactive, and they unanimously told me there was not budget allocated from the government to help them implement the tasks that they planned.

The ORF was established to collect the capital, among others, via levy imposed upon fuel prices, to reallocate it for road safety promotion and safety oriented road construction and maintenance. However, *the amount of budget* allocated for road safety was *limited*, even for the federal institutions; as one participant put it, *the limited amount of budget support from the roads fund office is...being used* (lines 363-64). However, if the road safety problem of the country was construed as so serious, it was not logical to allocate just a *limited* amount of budget for it. A national problem which was constructed as *very serious* and for which a strategy was ratified and claimed to have been on implementation needed more than a *limited* amount of budget; it was further constructed that it was only in the form of *support* that the budget was provided. Road safety officials at Sub-cities or *Woredas* were instead expected to generate the capital they needed to implement what they planned to achieve themselves, for example, searching for sponsors who could support the road safety agenda. This could have partly contributed to the engagement of the public and private sectors in road safety practices in Ethiopia. However, unless they were given the floor to participate formally, and unless the government took the leading or exemplary role, it would still create gaps in achieving the desired goals fully. Moreover, since not all sub-cities could adequately find the support/sponsorship they needed to address the problem, the work would largely be disorganized; by the time I contacted them, most of the sub-city road safety offices with promising plans were either working below their capacities or were simply sitting idle, mainly due to financial reasons.

Perhaps it could be for this reason that the participant changed his mind regarding the role of the government in ensuring road safety. Earlier, when he said *we observe the government paying better attention to the issue beginning from recent times* (Lines 359-60), he was in favor of it; however, he eventually took a negative position constructed as: *I don't think the emphasis it is given could be taken as sufficient, nor could it be counted as good. I think it is still at a very, very poor level but one that deserves huge attention* (Lines 365-68). In this construction, the necessity of working hard in order for the problem to be halted was articulated in bold; the participant was so pessimist of how the problem was handled, as could be understood from the repeatedly used negatives: *I don't think* (Line 365); *nor could it be counted* (Line 366); *it is still at a very very*

poor level but one that deserves huge attention (Line 366-67). Thus, we could conclude that road safety in Ethiopia was a serious problem that the government was not addressing meaningfully.

7. Other discourse types in constructing RTA as a *serious problem*

Apart from health discourse, RSSs used other discourse types to strengthen their construction of RTA as a *serious problem*. They used, for example, discourse of economy (poverty, wealth, luxury, prosperity), discourse of social responsibility, human rights discourse, political discourse, numerical/statistical discourses, discourse of corruption and religious discourse. As it is shown below, these discourse types were interwoven together to construct RTA as so a *serious problem*.

The economic loss discourse due to RTAs: RTAs were expressed as worsening the already poor status of the country's economy. For example, to construct the effect of RTAs, the Amharic proverb ቧደንባሪ በቅሎ ቃጭል ተጨምሮ / *a ringing bell tied on the neck of an uncultivated mule* (Line 374) was used; it was to show the devastating power RTAs had on the already *struggling economy* (Line 373) of the country. This discourse of economy was intertwined with that of social responsibility in an argument on the necessity of saving wealth being destroyed due to RTAs so as to use it to change lives of the poor. Of course, the argument was against wasting even one's own resources; for the benefit of others, it was stated that a wealthy person had that social and moral responsibility of using his/her wealth appropriately (Lines 399-403).

Moreover, we could see the metaphor of *money is blood* being used. Thus, *these days it is not just their blood, for Ethiopians by now, even their money is as valuable as their blood* (Lines 436-37) was to mean that blood, which is the most important entity for one's survival, was being poured irresponsibly due to RTAs, but for present Ethiopians, not just their blood being poured due to fatal, serious and slight injuries, even the property that was being damaged could also be counted as their blood. This construction, *money is...blood for Ethiopians*, could be clear if it were seen from the perspective of the capitalism ideology that the present Ethiopia adopted.

RTAs were construed in terms of the economic loss they would bring about using various examples and detailed discussions (Lines 190-95). The implication of the examples used is that crash experience could be counted as RTA when there was some economic loss on the vehicle, the victim or both. However, whether or not *accident* cases that may not have caused significant economic loss were construed as accidents was probably contesting. What if we consider the

time and fuel one would waste being stranded for long due to a traffic jam caused by some minor collisions, or what about the psychological burden one would be in due to fear of involving in accident as a result of risky road use behavior of drivers and pedestrians or because the roads were not readable at all? “*Don’t dare to drive in Addis Ababa*” was among the common discourse heard from the Diasporas and foreigners. Moreover, almost every day and at every quarter of the capital, there were many ‘*accidents*’ or ‘*near accidents*’ that may not have caused any significant injury and economic loss and so were solved by negotiations of the parties involved, sometimes with a piece of advice provided by a witnessing police. Thus, it was vital to incorporate issues of such kind in the conceptualization of RTAs and their impacts in Ethiopia.

Furthermore, although the negative impacts of RTAs on their victims were mentioned, it was the cost on the economy of the country that was construed more than the pains they cause on lives and limbs of citizens. For instance, in *losing such a productive power is the first one* (Lines 221-22), it was not the loss of a human being, but his/her contribution to the country’s economy that was underscored. It is also essential to see that the case was construed as *the first one*, and that was to mean the most important. The second one was the vehicle that was involved in the accident, that it could be damaged, could damage other property or the road on which it was travelling; all these were constructed as *losing property*, a phrase used three times to emphasize the economy issue (Lines 223, 224, 225). After that, any *unintended cost* that would be incurred for repairing damage caused by the RTA was raised; it was also from the economy discourse: *when property is destroyed, there will be unintended cost to repair and correct. It will cause cost which is not planned* (Lines 225-26). Unintended burden on health care provision was mentioned: *when there is health loss, physical injury and when we go to health center for treatment, it would cause pressure on the formal and usual health service. There will be a burden on the health service, as it is unintended* (Lines 222-24) which could be construed as economic pressure though it could also be pressure on health service providers. Thus, the entire articulation of RTAs focused on concern to economy/productivity of the country than on the wellbeing of its citizens. This notion was repeated in bold in the final remark: *when the productive power is lost, there would be gap on the work to be done, and all these would result in failure of productivity* (Lines 229-30).

The problem on economy was undeniable, but a key gap in such a construction of RTAs is the neglect of all, particularly the most vulnerable segments of the public. Due to RTAs, in Ethiopia, annually thousands of lives are lost and injured, families are dispersed or left to lead miserable lives, and RTA victims are thrown to lead physically, emotionally and psychologically affected lives. As Hailu, Mekonnen and Teshager (2014) put it, the number of people killed in crashes in Ethiopia is 30 times higher than in the US. WHO puts its predictions for 2020 as RTIs “will rise in rank to sixth place as a major cause of death worldwide [and] ... become the third leading cause of DALYs lost” (Peden et al., 2004, p.38) if timely and effective measures were not taken. However, the notion of RTA more as an issue of economy than of health or social equity was institutionalized in the context of Ethiopia: *in general since it will have these risks, I understand traffic safety this way, and our institution also recognizes it similarly* (lines 230-31). On the contrary, for Vision Zero, it is unethical to kill and seriously injure human beings in favor of economy or mobility.

The discourse of human rights: The discourse of human rights, specifically the right to survive, was echoed in the mention (and comparison) of *us* (Ethiopians) with *them, the Americans* (Lines 390-93). According to this construction, Americans were wealthy, owning millions of cars (with a ratio of a car for two or three), whereas we were poor, having less than half a million cars for over eighty million people. However, we were a people, a nation and a country just like the Americans. The position in this line of argument was that only the fact that we were human beings, a nation or a country should have been enough to enjoy the material resources that the Americans had. Implied in this construction was the discourse of Americanization, as could be understood from the presupposition employed: wealth and the Americans’ way of life was the standard we should have enjoyed, or it was at least the missed opportunity (this is better stated again in Lines 404-414 and 420-427). Hopes of seeing many Ethiopians owning vehicles and driving them safe was expressed explicitly, with an implicit assumption of number of cars as not a significant factor to the prevalence of RTAs, though not logical. Over 30,000 lives are being lost annually in America due to crashes (WHO, 2013), though the ratio (calculated based on number of cars they have) makes the figure minor. In addition, recent road safety knowledge does not encourage driving for long or having many cars; it is recommended that people develop healthier transportation means like walking and cycling, and if they have to use vehicles, public

transporters like buses/trains are favored more than having/driving vehicles individually (Peden et al., 2004; Borowy, 2013).

The political discourse: Political discourse was the other discursive practice employed, again, to strengthen the argument against lives lost, limbs injured and resources damaged/destroyed due to RTAs. For example, it was stated that Americans planned to destroy Iraq to rebuild it the way they wanted (Lines 420-424); on the contrary, Ethiopians should have used our resources efficiently, even if it were a single pin (Lines 425-427). Again, that we should have used our economy for the betterment of lives of people and for development was expressed (Lines 376-377). Using these and other anecdotes, what the participant wanted to say was RTAs were damaging/destroying the limited resources we had while we should not have allowed that.

Corruption is a practice commonly associated with maladministration and failed politics; hence, the discourse of corruption could also be treated here. A participant talked about the *pain* that the country would experience in the process of *purchasing* vehicle spare parts as substitutes for those damaged/destroyed due to RTAs. When he said, *the problem is not just purchasing, but there is also national pain hidden inside that purchasing system* (Lines 430-31), it was to mean that not only the cost of substituting spare parts damaged/destroyed by crashes would the country cover unnecessarily, but it could also incur extra wealth that would be lost due to corrupt purchasing processes. It was not stated plainly, but wealth being lost via corruption was referred to. Corruption is a practice which people in the road transport sector were claimed to have been involving in (Tigabu, 27 Feb. 2016); for example, it is commonly heard that they would exercise it for having their driving licenses and/or when certifying technical fitness of the vehicles they drive.

The discourse of statistics: It was discussed earlier that using statistics was common in road safety discourses elsewhere: in UN/WHO annual reports, scientific journal articles about road safety or RTAs, road safety education materials or brochures, national road safety policy/strategy documents, etc. One of the recommendations of WHO for addressing the road safety problem efficiently was using scientifically proven methods of intervention that were mostly quantitative, i.e., based on statistical data (Peden et al., 2004; WHO, 2013).

Similarly, participants used statistics, which they brought from different sources intertextually. For example, statistics released by WHO was used to show the possibility for RTAs to progress from ninth to third level as causes of death if there would be no intervention (Lines 380-83). Again, numerical data was used to make a comparison of the rich America and the poor Ethiopia in terms of the number of cars they had and the related accident rates (Lines 384-93).

Moreover, to position the road safety problem in Ethiopia as *the worst*, as if it were not showing improvement over the past decade, evidence was provided by citing the loss of thousands of lives annually. To strengthen the position held about the road safety problem that was constructed as *the worst*; yes, worst; *it is the worst* (Line 448) and as *it is very very bad* (Line 488), ten years' accident report that showed death of over 23,000 people was used. Next, this figure was equated with, using a hyperbole, the loss of people of a district: *this is almost people of a district* (Line 451). However, the problem was not recognized as a worrying issue since we were accustomed to it by hearing the death of two or three persons a day. We were not able to see the big picture; had it been the case, *we should have...been terrified* (Line 455). We could support this claim taking the daily report of casualties in Addis Ababa; it was only when the number of lives lost was more than two or if there was mass casualty that traffic police would frame the problem as so serious. If not, particularly if only slight/severe injuries and/or death of only one person were registered, that day was a good day for them. No one would calculate how many of the slight and severe injuries would complicate and develop into permanent injury and deaths.

Religious discourse/RTA as wrath of God: Religious discourse was used in the construction of the road safety problem. RTA in Ethiopia was understood as a kind of *curse* or *wrath* from God.

አንዳንድ ሰዎች ጋራው ግንዛቤ ምንድነው ለምሳሌ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን ምንድነው እሚሉት ከፈጣሪ እንደሚመጣ ቁጣ አድርጎ የማሰብ ነገር አለ some people's understanding is that for example they count road traffic accident as wrath from the creator there is such kind of conviction (Lines 509-510)

እኔ ምን ቸገረኝ ፈጣሪ ይጠብቀኝ አይነት ነገር የሚያስብል አለ / kind of thinking which goes like, 'I don't care; let the Creator protect me' (Lines 515-16)

የትራፊክ አደጋውን ከፈጣሪ እንደመጣ ቁጣ አይነት ነገር ይሁን አላውቅም / I don't know if people count traffic accident like a curse that has come from the Creator (Lines 1288-89)

ከአቅም በላይ በሆነ ምክንያት ምንም ማለት አትችልም፡፡ ስለታከምክ አትድንም፤ ትሞታለህ ታከመህም እንኳ፡፡ እግዚአብሔር ሲፈቅድ ሕክምናውም ሲሳካ ነው የምትድነው ማለት ነው / if it is due to things beyond your control you can't make it. you cannot recover because you see a doctor; you could die even though you have taken the treatment. that means, you could get recovered only if it is the will of God and if the treatment succeeds (Lines 441-43)

Among the public there was a belief system of counting RTAs as a *wrath* (Lines 509-10) or *a curse that has come from the Creator* (Line 1288). While the issue was mentioned twice just to comment on previous constructions, it is an indicator of the presence of this kind of world-view among the present road users in Ethiopia. The participants themselves were not sure if the belief was totally eliminated from the thinking of the society. Thus, by criticizing *some people's* construing of RTAs as *wrath from the Creator* or as an *odd order from the Creator* (Line 517), it was indicated that this conceptualization was a *kind of conviction* (Line 510), or *belief system* (Line 518), ingrained in the society, i.e. as a problem that had dominantly been accepted as fact. Such kind of belief about RTAs was constructed as a problem that should have been rejected totally; it was constructed as something which was *wrong* (Line 510), *a mistake* (Line 515), or one that should have been *gotten rid of* (Line 519). Unless averted soon, it was construed as one that could lead people to a wrong notion of the problem, i.e., road users would eventually accept *a kind of thinking which goes like, 'I don't care; let the Creator protect me'* (Lines 515-16).

Religious discourse was used in the construction of accident as an occurrence due to *things beyond your control* (Line 431). It was implied that human beings are limited, unable to handle everything as they wished; there are events for which one would not be held accountable. Thus, these things should be given to God who is able and in control of everything; He just takes care of them. Moreover, one *could get recovered only if it is the will of God* (Line 443), i.e., getting recovered after slight/severe injury may not be possible if that were not the will of God, even if one might have *taken the treatment* (Line 442). By the same analogy, one might not escape from accident encounters even if s/he drove/walked carefully. If we observed the front, side or back of some cross-country passenger and freight vehicles in Ethiopia, we could see pictures of holy persons/angels posted on them with captions like: *Keep me safe, Be with me, Protect me, and Follow me*. And the way drivers of these vehicles drove was not different from the others, so they would still get involved in accidents. A participant told me a story of a driver who used to put expressions of the kind *Follow me ... (with the name of the holy angel/person)* on the vehicle he drove; however, when this driver was not excused from involving in RTAs, he said he eventually changed the expression with: *Let no one follow me*. The fable could tell us that the road safety problem was so prevalent; if people were to that extent angry with God who could protect/save them, that could also mean that they reached to the extent of being so careless of their lives.

To conclude this section, we have seen how the road safety problem in Ethiopia was conceptualized. While it could have been termed differently as *road safety*, *traffic safety* or *road traffic safety*, road safety was construed as *the safe mobility of road users and the safety of wealth like vehicles on roads that were particularly constructed for vehicles*. However, the road with its environment was also occupied/used by others that may not necessarily be in mobility, but who live by the roadside (for example, residents) or who look for commuters (for example street vendors). It is unclear why these major segments of the public were not recognized in the conceptualization of road safety. Road safety was also construed as a discipline of ensuring *faultless mobility*; making sure mobility was perfect in all of its aspects though it is too unrealistic to accept. On the contrary, RTA was constructed as an inevitable byproduct of mobility that occurred due to a problem or failure of the road user, the vehicle, the road, and/or the environment.

The road safety problem was constructed in terms of its effect on the lives and limbs of road users. RTAs in Ethiopia were construed as *very serious*, *worrying* and *the worst* that should have been addressed *drastically* on the one hand, and *progressively* on the other. Property damage/loss caused by RTAs was also emphasized. The impact of RTAs on the lives of people was constructed using various discursive practices. Road unsafety as a social problem was thus construed by documents and RSSs as *(more) serious*, *(very) worrying*, *(very) bad*, *worst*, *challenge*, etc. It was constructed as a problem that challenged safe mobility and existence of road users in general and the vulnerable in particular. The best conclusion of the way the problem was constructed could be captured in the construction of one of the participants: *but compared to what we need, what the country the public need, a lot is still required to be done; so we [had better] conclude putting it as a big challenge that hasn't been touched yet* (SFI2/Lines 806-08).

For the majority of RSSs, road users were the main causes/contributors of RTAs although road engineering was also construed as another cause/contributor. Of course, only the police were positioned with the power of scrutinizing, confirming and recording road crashes; however, they may not all the time be at RTA scenes, and even if they were, they would not register all RTA cases unless they recognized them as serious, or unless the parties involved in crashes did not want to agree. Moreover, drivers might disappear from the spot where they involved in RTAs

and caused minor or severe injuries or property damage. Hence, not all RTAs were registered and investigated properly; the implication of these cases would be so significant. It was observed that most drivers' road use practices were unsafe; they would get involved in reckless driving if the police were not around. They respected traffic rules only when they saw a police officer. Although the traffic police were given the power and the credit for the road safety work in Ethiopia, they also were blamed for the prevalence of the road safety problem.

The impact of these differences in the conceptualization of the problem and the overall practices of ensuring road safety could not be underestimated. Hence, a logical question to pose must be: what is the reason behind conceptualizing the road safety problem and ways of addressing it with all these disparities? It could be related with how the problem was handled in the country since the introduction of vehicles over a century ago. Otherwise, there must be some problem in relation to the knowledge/belief system that governed RSSs' and road users' conceptualization of the problem and ways of handling it. Hence, in the next sub-section, road safety policy/strategy documents and their contexts of execution are subjects of inquiry. Emphasizing on processes of recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices, we will analyze which road safety knowledge and practices were adopted, which were implemented, which were ignored and hence what the gaps were, and, most significantly, why the problem was so pervasive.

4.3 The Recontextualization of Road Safety Knowledge and Practices

According to Fairclough, the question of how the outside of a text is brought into a text is answered by analyzing intertextuality, i.e., 'how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts' (2003, p.17). The most important question we pose in relation to intertextuality is, he added, 'which texts and voices are included, which are excluded, and what significant absences are there' (Fairclough, p.47). Accordingly, two research questions were answered: *Which road safety knowledge and practices do stakeholders incorporate into/exclude from their road safety documents and practices?* And, the related and logical follow up: *What do these incorporated/excluded knowledge and practices contribute to/against efforts of decreasing road traffic related death, injury and resource damage in the country?* To address the questions, attention was paid particularly to how texts/voices of the available international road safety knowledge and practices were recontextualized into the context of Ethiopia, and what impact, if any, these inclusions/exclusions brought upon the overall road safety practices of the country.

RSSs in Ethiopia were expected to base their work on and incorporate the RTA prevention strategy plan recommended by the UN/WHO to be implemented by the decade 2011-2020. As was discussed in Chapter Two, this recommendation for action was designed based on systems approach, the approach that claimed understanding of the system as a whole (the road users, the vehicle and the road and its environment) and interaction between its elements, and identifying where there was potential for intervention (Peden et al., 2004, p.157). In line with *Vision Zero*, the ethical approach to road safety, it was expected that the road system would eventually work to make sure that any incident of accident would not cause death or serious injury on road users.

This section focused on analyzing, first, how the road safety theorization was put in the NRSSPE 2011-2020 (2011), the strategy document for the road safety work of the country; this was done by tracing back and comparing it to its sources. It then continued on examining how the strategy document was similar to/different from other road safety documents and stakeholders that were engaged in addressing the problem. Documents analyzed in addition to the strategy document were transport/road safety related sections of the GTP I 2011-2015 (2010), Transport Policy of Addis Ababa (2011), and ERA's Road Safety Audit Manual (2012). Finally, to examine actual road safety practices, extracts of interviews with key RSSs, and road safety education materials that were prepared in the form of brochures and broadcast reports/programs were investigated.

Analysis of the data corpus (the documents, interview extracts and media contents) revealed that there were attempts made at adopting the safe systems approach to road safety (the road safety knowledge and practice that was claimed to have been implemented and found effective in several countries) into the Ethiopian context. However, when examined, the knowledge/practices incorporated were found to be partial, vague or just rhetorical. And in reaction to the failure to addressing the road safety problem prevalent in the country, other competing/counter discourses emerged.

4.3.1 The Adoption of the Safe System Approach to the Road Safety Work of Ethiopia

The NRSSPE 2011-2020 (2011) clearly stated that it was prepared based on the “safe system approach” that the UN/WHO recommended for global road safety efforts to get it implemented over the decade. Some intertextual clues that would strengthen this position could be found. What follows is analysis that focused on finding traces the strategy document was based on.

Excerpt 18

Considering the importance of road safety the Ethiopian government has requested the WB and its GRSF to review the road safety management capacity in Ethiopia. This review based on comparisons with good practice countries in road safety management and the UN Global Plan guideline are considered in the development of the decade strategy. (NRSSPE, p.1/Lines 005-009)

Excerpt 18 is an account of the conception and/or development of the Ethiopian road safety strategy document, i.e., the NRSSPE 2011-2020. Here is the pattern: first the government of Ethiopia found road safety as an issue that deserved due attention; the clause *considering the importance of road safety* (Lines 005-06) is background to what the government did. Moreover, it presupposed (and so made it factual) that road safety was an important issue to have been considered. Next (or hence), the government asked the World Bank to review the road safety management capacity in the country; then (or so), the review was made based on and comparing to good practice countries. Finally, considering the review and the United Nations' Global Plan guideline (Lines 8-9), the strategy for the decade was formulated. Thus, the NRSSPE was prepared to address the road safety problem of the country after reviewing global road safety knowledge and practices.

Although the plan could have several documents as its sources, the Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020 (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020 or Global Plan henceforth) was the main one; it was cited in the document by name, and there were overlaps between contents of the two documents. As it was discussed in the Global Plan, the United Nations had given the task of planning and coordinating the global road safety work to its several branches (like WHO and the UN regional commissions); these sectors prepared the global recommendation document for the decade of action for road safety, (WHO, GPDARS, 2011-2020, p.3).

Accordingly, it was early in the introduction section of the document that we read the Ethiopian road safety strategy was prepared based on other internationally accepted sources: *“This review (of the road safety management capacity in Ethiopia, and made by WB and its GRSF) based on comparisons with good practice countries in road safety management and the UN Global Plan guideline are considered in the development of the decade strategy”* (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011, p.1). On the other hand, the claim that the NRSSPE 2011-2020 was prepared based on *good practice countries* (Line 009) could be construed as an argumentation strategy called claiming

authority. The intention was perhaps to justify its acceptance. Although names were not mentioned here, Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and Australia are usually cited as the best performing countries in relation to road safety (Peden et al., 2004; WHO 2013). Sweden in particular was the country where *Vision Zero* was declared and implemented for the first time, and *Vision Zero* was cited as the original source for the development of the global road safety approach. However, a strategy that was effective somewhere could not necessarily be the same anywhere in the world. There should be good explanatory ground on how experiences of these *good practice countries* could be recontextualized; this is of significant implication for Ethiopia, a country with very different political, technological, economic and social contexts.

It was not clear why names of these *good practice countries* were not mentioned in the strategy document; if it were so, sensible comparisons could easily be made between the two, focusing on opportunities and challenges, and feasibility of the proposed strategy could be examined. Thus if names of these *good practice countries* were concealed intentionally, the purpose could probably be to avoid responsibility if the recommendations were to fail from functioning as was intended.

Excerpt 19

The new outlook in road safety improvement effort is the “safe system approach”, which emphasizes that the road system be designed to “ensure that in the event of crashes the impact energies remain below the threshold likely to produce either death or serious injury”. It is recommended that all countries, regardless of their level of road safety performance, move to “safe system approach” to road safety. This implies that roads development program of Ethiopia should sufficiently address the road safety issues to overcome the present weaknesses by establishing a functioning road safety unit that will have the authority and capacity to implement regular road safety audits and ensure safety measures are taken accordingly. It also implies that the road design standards consider reducing conflict areas and crash impact forces not to cause death or serious injuries and provide safe infrastructure to vulnerable road users. (Lines 545-55)

In the extract above, we find a direct quote taken from the UN/WHO's recommendation for action on road safety. Though the document did not state the source plainly, parts of the first sentence put in double quotation marks revealed the fact that they were snatches brought from some source; that means, both *safe system approach* (Line 545) and what it generally means, i.e., *ensure that in the event of crashes the impact energies remain below the threshold likely to produce either death or serious injury* (Lines 546-48) were extracts that resemble UN/WHO's guidelines put elsewhere, (Peden et al., 2004; WHO, 2013; UNECA, 2009).

It was also claimed that the NRSSPE 2011-2020 was prepared based on a new approach to road safety: *The new outlook in road safety improvement effort* (Line 545). Hence, the approach was not just an outlook, but *new outlook*, with the adjective *new* that qualified it as if it were different from the former, now old, and so obsolete and outdated; nor was it any *new outlook*, but *the new*, qualified with the definite article *the*. In other words, the *outlook* was presupposed; it was positioned favorably, as one that deserved incorporation into the Ethiopian road safety context. The second sentence made it clear that the approach was prepared and recommended, not just for Ethiopia, but for universal consumption: *It is recommended that all countries, regardless of their level of road safety performance move to “safe system approach” to road safety* (Lines 548-49); hence, Ethiopia could be no exception. However, passivization was employed to make the agent vague. Of course, the agent was not unknown; it is clear that the UN/WHO was responsible in the preparation of the recommendation. The source put the approach as follows:

The guiding principles underlying the Plan for the Decade of Action are those included in the "safe system" approach. This approach aims to develop a road transport system that is better able to accommodate human error and take into consideration the vulnerability of the human body. It starts from the acceptance of human error and thus the realization that traffic crashes cannot be completely avoided. The goal of a safe system is to ensure that accidents do not result in serious human injury. The approach considers that human limitations - what the human body can stand in terms of kinetic energy - is an important basis upon which to design the road transport system, and that other aspects of the road system, such as the development of the road environment and the vehicle, must be harmonized on the basis of these limitations. Road users, vehicles and the road network/environment are addressed in an integrated manner, through a wide range of interventions, with greater attention to speed management and vehicle and road design than in traditional approaches to road safety (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.8-9).

This approach was comprehensive in that, unlike the traditional one that solely put individual responsibility for RTAs on road users, it incorporated all players into the picture of the road safety work and accountability. However, although the NRSSPE positioned the approach as one that had to be adopted by every country *regardless of their level of road safety performance*, the source, which was just a recommendation, did not have such a claim. While evidences could be cited from the document that could show the repeatedly expressed call to applying the approach, we could not find any imposition. Below is a part from the source that confirmed it was just an encouragement to individual countries to adopting the five pillars that the document advocated:

At a national level countries are encouraged to implement the following five pillars, based on the recommendations of the World report on road traffic injury prevention and proposed by the Commission for Global Road Safety. Countries should consider these

five areas within the framework of their own national road safety strategy, capacity and data collection systems. For some countries an incremental approach to including all five pillars will be required. (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.11)

Thus the Global Plan was a recommendation; member countries were advised to *consider the five areas within the framework of their own national road safety strategy, capacity and data collection systems*. We could also find expressions in the document that encouraged countries to *adopt the Plan flexibly*, in a way that suited their needs, existing situations and priorities, as was expressed in the section where the purpose of the document was discussed:

This global Plan serves as a tool to support the development of national and local plans of action, while simultaneously providing a framework to allow coordinated activities at regional and global levels. It is directed at a broad audience including national and local governments, civil society and private companies willing to harmonize their activities towards reaching the common objective while remaining generic and flexible to country needs.(WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.3)

The third and the fourth sentences of Excerpt 19 (Lines 549-55) echoed at least two of the five pillars stated in the source document. While Pillar I (which was about establishing road safety management) was the source of the third sentence in Excerpt 19 (Lines 549-53), Pillar II (which was mainly concerned with safer roads and mobility) was the source of the fourth (Lines 453-55). That means, the third sentence that was articulated in the strategy document as *establishing a functioning road safety unit that will have the authority and capacity to implement regular road safety audits and ensure safety measures are taken accordingly* was a rephrasing of Pillar I that was stated in one of the source documents (in UNECA's document) as: *Road Safety Management which concerns the institutional framework needed to implement road safety activities, and thereby sets the oversight of all other pillars*. Moreover, sentence four, i.e., *...the road design standards consider reducing conflict areas and crash impact forces not to cause death or serious injuries and provide safe infrastructure to vulnerable road users*, was based on Pillar II of the source that was put as: *Safer roads and mobility that deals with road development, the safety of all road users, especially pedestrians and other vulnerable users*. Below I have put the list (of the five pillars) as they were put in UNECA's document, which also was used as a source document in the preparation of the Ethiopian strategy plan.

The African Road Safety Action Plan 2011-2020 is organized under the five pillars of the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011-2020, namely: (i) Road Safety Management which concerns the institutional framework needed to implement road safety activities, and thereby sets the oversight of all other pillars; (ii) Safer roads and mobility that deals

with road development, the safety of all road users, especially pedestrians and other vulnerable users; (iii) Safer vehicles which focuses on standards, entry and exit of vehicles into and from countries; (iv) Safer drivers and other road users that addresses driver training, testing and licensing, driving permits and enforcement of the driving code, awareness and education of the public, and the development of a safety culture, and (v) Post-crash response which deals with onsite care, transport and trauma care of injured. (UNECA, Decade of Action for Road Safety: 2011-2020, African Action Plan)

These five pillars of the UN recommendation for road safety were treated separately (and in varying degrees of depth) in the strategic plan document of Ethiopia. In addition to the NRSSPE, the recontextualization of these pillars and other related concepts of the UN/WHO road safety strategy could be found elsewhere in the Ethiopian road safety discourses. A brochure prepared by the Road Traffic Safety Directorate under ETA/MoT is a case in point. This brochure, which was written under the title of *Let's make our roads safe for all*, had put the five pillars as *five areas of emphasis of the decade of action*, and, although it was implicitly, the brochure acknowledged the UN document that dedicated 2011-2020 as Decade of Action for road safety was what Ethiopia *also approved* (Lines 559-60).

Excerpt 20 was taken from this brochure. As a flier that was prepared by the Road Traffic Safety Assurance Directorate of the ETA/MoT, it was distributed to various RSSs and road users at large. This was the same office where road safety radio and television programs transmitted nationally were also prepared. The brochure began its discussion with a focus on the five pillars the UN/WHO recommended for action on road safety. In its body, however, it diverted its focus to addressing particularly drivers and their employers; it could be argued that the main clients of this office are drivers and vehicle owners who were therefore the first to get the brochure.

The analysis of the brochure concentrated on only a part that discussed the five pillars as five areas of emphases. Whenever the road safety policy was compared with actual practices, the NRSSPE was also seen with the brochure. The purpose was to see in what aspects the Ethiopian road safety policy/practice was similar to and/or different from the UN/WHO recommendation, what the probable reason for the similarity/difference could have been and what its implication could be for the overall road safety practice in the country. The extract is put below:

Excerpt 20

መንገዶቻችንን የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ በሰላም ወትቶ በሰላም የሚመለስበትን ሁኔታ በመፍጠር ለሁሉም ተስማሚ እንዲሆኑ ማድረግ የሁላችንም ሃላፊነት ነው፤ ይህንን ሰላማዊ እንቅስቃሴ ለመፍጠርና መንገዶቻችንን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ

የጸዱ እንዲሆኑ ለማስቻል ሁሉም የድርሻውን መስራት ይጠበቅባቸዋል፤ ለዚህም አገራችን የተቀበለችውን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት የተግባር አስር አመት አምስቱን የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ማለትም፡- የመንገድ ደህንነት አሰራር ለማሻሻል የሚያስችል የአቅም ግንባታ ማካሄድ፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ መንገድ መገንባት፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ እንዲኖር በአሸከርካሪና በአግረኛ መንገድ አጠቃቀም ላይ ለውጥ ማምጣት፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ተሸከርካሪ፤ የትራፊክ አደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ የሚሰጥ ህክምናን ቀልጣፋ ማድረግ፡፡ የሚሉትን አጠናክረን መስራት ይጠበቅብናል፡፡ ይህ የተግባር አስር አመት ይፋ ከሆነ ከ2004 ጀምሮ እስካሁን በእነዚህ የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ላይ ምን ያህል ስርተናል ብለን ራሳችንን መፈተሽ ይጠበቅብናል፡፡ / Making our roads safe by creating the environment in which all road users go in peace and return back safe is the responsibility of us all; in order to create this peaceful mobility and make our roads free from traffic accidents, it is expected that all accomplish their share. Accordingly it is expected that we effectively work on the five areas of emphasis of the decade of action on road traffic safety which our country has approved. That means: Capacity building that enables improve road safety work; Constructing roads with safety standards; Making change on driver and pedestrian road use behavior for safer road use; Safe vehicles; Making the post-crash medical treatment effective. We need to examine ourselves regarding how much we really have done on these areas of emphases since the announcement of the decade of action in 2004 (2011G.C.). (Lines 556-65)

There were many sources this text is related to. To begin with, *Making our roads safe* (Line 556) was one of the expressions frequently used by WHO (2004, 2013), the main organization that declared the decade of action for road safety. In Line 557, we read, *the responsibility of us all*, echoing the principle of shared responsibility and emphasizing that the task of ensuring road safety should be the collective action of all responsible, and that it could not be left to a single body or some group. Expressions like *it is expected that all accomplish their share* (Line 558), and *we effectively work* (Line 559) made the document resonate with the concept of stakeholders' *integration* analyzed in this sub-section/below. In Line 557, we read *make our roads free from traffic accidents*, and this was what Sweden's *Vision Zero* approach to road safety proposed and worked on over the past two decades. It was discussed that one of the sources of WHO's plan for action was Sweden's road safety policy, *Vision Zero*. All the UN/WHO did was scaling up of experiences and best practices of countries like Sweden that did better on road safety.

Next, we read what was expected of us: *we effectively work on the five areas of emphasis* (Line 559); as was mentioned above, the five areas of emphasis were what WHO's documents called *five pillars*. In the brochure, it was put that we needed to work *effectively* on all of them, with no distinctions and/or prioritizations. That means which ones to work on urgently and/or which ones perhaps to delay for the time being was not stated at all. On the contrary, as was discussed, the document was only a recommendation that had encouraged countries to *adopt it flexibly*. However, working on each *area of emphasis*, to the level it was claimed, i.e., *effectively*, was not

of any harm. It is whether the practices went in line with the claims or not that had a bearing implication on the overall road safety work and its impact; hence, that needed further scrutiny.

In the table below, the five pillars put in the UNECA's document and the corresponding *areas of emphasis* that appeared in the brochure were put side by side. The purpose is to examine the seemingly slight (but practically significant) differences between the two; the recontextualization (inclusion and/or exclusion) could show what the road safety work in Ethiopia would look like.

The Five Pillars: As were put in the UN/WHO recommendation documents	The Five Areas of Emphasis: As were put in the context of Ethiopia (a brochure)
Pillar I: Road Safety Management which concerns the institutional framework needed to implement road safety activities, and thereby sets the oversight of all other pillars;	የመንገድ ደህንነት አሰራር ለማሻሻል የሚያስችል የአቅም ግንባታ ማካሄድ / capacity building that enables improve road safety work (Line 561)
Pillar II: Safer roads and mobility that deals with road development, the safety of all road users, especially pedestrians and other vulnerable users;	ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ መንገድ መገንባት / constructing roads with safety standards (Lines 561-62)
Pillar III: Safer vehicles which focuses on standards, entry and exit of vehicles into and from countries;	ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ተሽከርካሪ / safe vehicles (Line 563)
Pillar IV: Safer drivers and other road users that addresses driver training, testing and licensing, driving permits and enforcement of the driving code, awareness and education of the public, and the development of a safety culture;	ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ እንዲኖር በአሽከርካሪና በእግረኛ መንገድ አጠቃቀም ላይ ለውጥ ማምጣት / making change on driver and pedestrian road use behavior for safer road use (Line 562)
Pillar V: Post-crash response which deals with onsite care, transport and trauma care of injured.	የትራፊክ አደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ የሚሰጥ ህክምናን ቀልጣፋ ማድረግ / making the post-crash medical treatment effective (Line 563)

Table 1: A Comparison of the Five Pillars as were put in the UNECA Document and a Beochre of ETA

Pillar I (of the UNECA) and the first area of emphasis (of Ethiopia) did not have any significant difference, except for their wording; however, while the Pillar (of the UNECA) gave details, and hence was clear, the area of emphasis (of Ethiopia) was brief and so was vague. For example, the Pillar plainly stated the necessity of institutional framework for road safety management that had to undergo all road safety related activities. Of course, the *Objective* subsection of NRSSPE put the Ethiopian plan in connection to the first Pillar as: *To promote and coordinate collaboration of the concerned organizations and participation of the public in road safety improvement efforts* (NRSSPE, 2011, p.17). Coordination/collaboration is a topic of investigation in the coming subsection; here, we could see it as an institutional logo by which road safety works of all concerned were intended to get integrated. However, the practice in Ethiopia, as was put in the brochure,

was *capacity building that enables improve road safety work*. By *capacity building*, while the goal was to *enable improve road safety work*, it was not clear whose capacity it was referring to. If it were to mean that of the Federal, Regional/City, Sub-City and *Woreda* level RSSs, they all admitted that they were not capacitated, existing in name only; they also openly exhibited their poor road safety performance. As will be explored further in the upcoming section, the concept of integration envisaged in the strategic document could not be seen when it was being exercised.

Pillar II and the second area of emphasis also appeared to be similar in that they both were about safer roads and mobility. However, while the first made it clear for whom *safer roads and mobility* applied (for all road users, but *especially for pedestrians and other vulnerable users*), the second did not mention that at all, making it vague. It simply said *constructing roads with safety standards*; it did not clearly put the necessity of protecting the most vulnerable road users. The NRSSPE was quite clear and much related with the source document in relation to safer roads. Its objectives subsection of the safe roads strategy reads: *To implement road infrastructure assessment and safety considerations in planning, design, construction and operation of roads to improve the inherent safety (problem) and protect all road users, especially the most vulnerable (pedestrians, bicyclists and motorcyclists)* (NRSSPE, 2011, p. 28). However, over the past two decades in Ethiopia, while we could observe the huge investment on (and the fast growing of) road construction and maintenance, safety consideration was so limited, especially for the most vulnerable road users (ERA, 2005). Most of the so called best streets in Ethiopia (straight, leveled, asphalted and recently rehabilitated or constructed) were blamed for their repeated RTA records (NRSSPE, p.2), and this could be associated with absence of due consideration to safety.

If we saw the third Pillar and compared it with the Ethiopian third area of emphasis, they had visible differences though they both were about safer vehicles. For the Pillar, what was meant by *Safer vehicles* was clear; details of what to focus on were included as on *vehicle standards* and on *entry and exit of vehicles into and from countries*, but the brochure simply put it as *safe vehicles* that obfuscated how the claimed safety of the vehicles could be ensured. As it could be seen from the coming sections, vehicles with technical defects could freely be used in Ethiopia.

The NRSSPE rather addressed the issue of safer vehicles quite clearly. We could find it treated at least in two sections of the document; first a subsection was provided for *safe vehicles* under the

Transport safety strategy section, with the objective of: *[improving] the vehicle safety standards of the nation and [increasing] the efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of the inspection process to reduce crashes due to low vehicle technical standards by 50%*, (NRSSPE, 2011, p.21). Again, under the *Traffic law enforcement strategy* section there was a subsection for *Safe Use of Vehicles and Vehicle Safety Facilities*, which had the objective of *[strengthening] safe use of vehicles and safety facilities to reduce fatalities of drivers and passengers by 20%* (NRSSPE, 2011, p.26). Although statistical evidence regarding the rate of RTAs due to vehicle defects was minimal, the impact of using unsafe vehicles on the safety of road users in Ethiopia could not be that simple. Corrupt practices of transport officers and other stakeholders had resulted in the free mobility of unsafe vehicles in the streets of the country; the NRSSPE itself implied the presence of such a problem when it says *effectiveness and integrity of the inspection process* (2011, p. 21). Moreover, one key road safety officer of the AATB had stated in a consultative meeting of RSSs that forgery vehicle inspection certificates could be found being sold in the streets of Addis Ababa. Hence, the practice was far from the claims put in the strategy document.

Pillar IV and the fourth area of emphasis were both about safer drivers and road users. However, they had significant differences, as it was the case so far. As for the Pillar, what was meant by safer drivers and road users was stated explicitly; details given included *driver qualification, enforcement and public education*, and it called for *the development of a safety culture*. Each of the themes mentioned are so wide, necessitating the responsible sectors to engage in a bit tougher task. For example, driver qualification, which included training, testing and licensing, was an area of complicated problems in Ethiopia, as could be seen in data analyzed in the forthcoming sections. Though enforcement and public education were claimed to have been areas where intensive road safety work was made and it was planned to further strengthen them, practically there had been gaps with regards to making them influence road users, to the extent of developing the anticipated safety culture. Salmon and Eckersley (2010) confirmed that road safety education in Ethiopia is “locally inappropriate and impractical” since it is “frequently based on dominant but ineffective educational models imported from other contexts.” As it could also be observed from their daily road use practices, risk taking is so common among road users in Ethiopia; hence, safety culture was an area of little progress. The practice was too far from the recommendation; by using nominalization, the brochure simply talked in general about *making change on driver and pedestrian road use behavior for safer road use*. Putting one of the five

pillars to addressing the road safety problem this way would greatly minimize the concept carried by the Pillar; how the partly approved/accepted theme should have been handled was made vague.

Like the case for vehicles, the section for safer drivers and road users of the NRSSPE was quite clear and strong. We find the issue of *Safe drivers* treated in the *Transport Safety Strategy*, and in the *Speeding, Drink and Drug Impaired Driving* sections, and *Pedestrian Safety* in the *Traffic law Enforcement Strategy* section of the strategy document. As was put in the *Safe drivers* subsection, *[drivers'] poor skill and low level of safety awareness are identified as the main factors for fatal crashes in Ethiopia (NRSSPE, 2011, p.19)*. It was thus planned to *improve drivers' competency and road safety behavior to progressively reduce road fatal crashes as a result of drivers' negligence and error by 50% (NRSSPE, 2011, p.19)*. As for pedestrians, the document positioned them as the largest category of road users that should have been the central focus of the country's road safety work, and it also planned to *reduce the incidence and severity of collisions involving pedestrians by 50% (NRSSPE, 2011, p.19)*. However, the problem is the disparity between the claim and its implementation. In agreement with the construction of this brochure, the entire road safety practice in Ethiopia did not cause any significant change on the number and types of victims; while causes of accidents could have been different, it was the vulnerable road users, predominantly pedestrians, who were still being affected. It could thus be concluded that the issue was not being treated the way it was recommended.

The fifth pillar focused on post-crash response, and the Ethiopian documents at least mentioned the same. This issue was constructed in the brochure as *Making the post-crash medical treatment effective* (Line 563). However, details were not given how the *treatment* could have been made *effective*; hence, it was vague. On its part, the source document was quite clear about Pillar V; it had given details as: *onsite care, transport and trauma care of injured*. The NRSSPE admitted the fact that *Ethiopia's rescue operation and emergency aid to traffic victims is very poor, and that pre-hospital, ambulance and hospital care services are of very low standards, requiring strong improvement programs (NRSSPE, 2011, p.30)*. It was thus a paraphrasing of what was put in the source document, mentioning the three tasks related with post-crash response.

Practically in the Ethiopian context, due to lack of awareness and even the basic facilities, onsite care for RTA victims had not yet developed (UNECA 2009); an immediate transportation of RTA victims to a health facility by itself was not fully implemented, even in Addis Ababa. Instead of taking victims to a nearby hospital immediately, people would prefer to wait until a police officer arrived and took the map of the accident scene. Moreover, due to lack of access to health facilities and burden on the existing ones, post-trauma care for RTA victims was limited. It was a customary practice to refer seriously injured victims to hospitals in Addis Ababa from the peripheries of the country; however, since the available medical and human resources were limited, most of these people may not get the proper/immediate service they deserved.

Finally, we examined the last sentence of the extract (Lines 563-65), and it encouraged its readers *to examine ourselves regarding how much we have done on these areas of emphases since the announcement of the decade of action in 2004 E.C. (2011G.C.)*. As it is true for any brochure, the text was prepared for public consumption; hence, anyone who read it was supposed to examine themselves. That the brochure started with the five areas of emphasis also would imply its intention of including all readers as its addressees. However, if we were to go further, we would find only road users, drivers and pedestrians in particular, who were constructed as most responsible for the prevalence of the problem. On the contrary, the UN/WHO document which the Ethiopian road safety policy adopted did not encourage such a labeling. It instead called for an approach that was ready for “shifting a major share of the responsibility from road users to those who design the road transport system” (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.9). The main road transport system designers it listed were road managers, automotive industries, the police, politicians and legislative bodies, though others like health service providers, the judicial system, schools and non-government organizations were also included (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.9). The document put all these in a position of sharing the responsibility for the occurrence of road crashes, while expecting road users to use the road observing traffic rules and regulations. Therefore, the brochure was partial both in its coverage of the five pillars and in its positioning of the responsible parties for the occurrence and prevention of crashes; for any failure in the road system, it predominantly put the responsibility and the blame on the most vulnerable road users.

That road users were targets of the road safety work in Ethiopia could be seen in other brochures also. Excerpt 21 was taken from a brochure prepared by the Addis Ababa Road Transport Bureau, and distributed to the public in June of 2014, the first month of the rainy season.

Excerpt 21

በመደናችን አዲስ አበባ የትራፊክ አደጋን ማየትና ሪፖርት ማድመጥ የየዕለት ተግባራችን እየሆነ ከመጣ አመታት ተቆጥረዋል። የከተማዋ ጎዳናዎች መለያ እየሆነ ያለው የትራፊክ አደጋ የራሱ የሆነ የተለያዩ ምክንያትና መንስኤ ቢኖረውም በዋነኛነት ግን በጉዳዩ ላይ በቂ እና ሰፊ ትኩረት ያለመስጠት ችግር እንደሆነ ይስተዋላል። ይህም ሲባል አሽከርካሪ ስለሚያሸከረከረው ተሽከርካሪ ቴክኒካዊ አቅም ጠንቅቆ አለመረዳት፣ ስለሚያሸከረከርበት መንገድ እና አካባቢያዊ ሁኔታ ጠንቅቆ አለማወቅ፣ የአየር ንብረትና የአየር ጸባይ ሁኔታን አለመረዳት፣ ስለሚጓዙበት መንገድ የፍጥነት ልኬት አለማወቅ እንዲሁም እግረኞች ስለመንገድ አጠቃቀም ያላቸው ግንዛቤ አናሳ መሆን ለችግሩ ከፍተኛ አስተዋጽኦ እንዳላቸው ጥናቶች ያመለክታሉ። ስለሆነም የትራፊክ አደጋን ለመቀነስ በሁሉም የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ላይ ግንዛቤ የመፍጠር ተግባር ለነገ የምንተው ሳይሆን ሁላችንም የበኩላችንን ድርሻ በአቅማችን ከዛሬ ጀምሮ የምንወጣበት ተግባር ነው። ይህንንም ግንዛቤ የመፍጠር ሃላፊነት ለመንግስት አካል ብቻ የሚተው ሳይሆን መንግስታዊ ያልሆኑ አካላትም ማለትም የአሽከርካሪና የተሽከርካሪ ማህበራት፣ የንግድ ድርጅቶችና ተቋማት፣ የትምህርትና የሃይማኖት ተቋማት፣ ወላጆችና ሌሎችም የሚመለከታቸው አካላት ትኩረት ሰጥተውና ተቀናጅተው ግንዛቤ የማስጨበጥ ስራ ቢሰሩ የከተማዋ መንገዶች የሞት ሳይሆን የህይወት ተስፋዎች ይሆናሉ። / Years have passed since seeing and hearing traffic accident reports has become our daily practice, here in our city Addis Ababa. While traffic accident is being sign of the streets of the capital, it may have its own causes and contributory factors. It is now observed that the main one is not paying adequate and proper attention. This means the driver does not fully understand the technical fitness of the vehicle which he is driving, does not fully know about the road and environmental conditions of the place where is driving, and does not know about the speed limit of the road which he is travelling on; studies have shown that pedestrians also have immense contribution to the problem since their knowledge of road use is so limited. In order to lessen the traffic accident, thus, the work of awareness creation on all road users cannot be left for tomorrow; instead, to the extent we could, all of us should exert our share of responsibility beginning from today. This responsibility of creating awareness should not be left for governmental stakeholders alone, but non-governmental bodies like associations of drivers and vehicle owners, business firms and organizations, educational and religious institutions, parents and other responsible bodies, if they work on awareness creation paying particular attention and in integration, the roads of the city won't be for death but for hopes of life. (Lines 565-82)

The main objective in preparing the brochure was to advise road users to be watchful of their road use practices during the rainy season of the year. The focus of analysis on the excerpt in this section was to examine the recontextualization of road safety knowledge and belief system in the construction of responsible players for the prevalence of the road safety problem.

As we saw earlier, the source documents recommended addressing the road safety problem sharing responsibility among road users and road designers instead of engaging in any form of blame game. In the brochure, however, responsibility for the problem that was constructed as *sign of the streets of the capital* was immensely assigned to road users; they were positioned as

both causes and contributory factors for the RTAs to occur. Drivers were put in the front: *the driver does not fully understand the technical fitness of the vehicle which he is driving, does not fully know about the road and environmental conditions of the place where he is driving, and does not know the speed limit of the road which he is travelling on* (Lines 570-74). All the clauses used in constructing drivers were negative. If drivers were ignorant to that extent, apart from them there must have been other stakeholders to have been held accountable: for example, what about the office that gave drivers the license for driving vehicles whose technical fitness they did not know, on the road and its environment which they did not know, and at a speed whose limit they did not know? We could not get the appropriate answer for queries of this kind.

Next, pedestrians were held responsible: *studies have shown that pedestrians also have immense contribution to the problem since their knowledge of road use is so limited* (Lines 573-74). This construction also put pedestrians to have had *immense contribution* to the problem due to *limited road use knowledge*. To construct them negatively, authority was quoted as evidence though it was vaguely as, *studies have shown*; of course, this was done in order to convince that the claimed responsibility was unquestionable. The goal of all this blame was to conclude that both drivers and pedestrians were ignorant of the proper road use knowledge or practice, and as a solution, to take the position of training/teaching them on how they should have behaved. However, the safe system approach adopted for application did not encourage categorization. The theory of shared responsibility, as it was put in Peden et al., says: “road deaths and serious injuries can be avoided by adopting a culture of safety involving all the key participants and by implementing important safety measures more widely and systematically” (2004, p.19). However, road users were held accountable for the prevalence of the problem, and were positioned as the only targets for solution.

It was construed in the brochure that responsibility of creating awareness or imparting of safe road use knowledge should have been both urgent and shared; *it cannot be left for tomorrow ... all of us should exert our share of responsibility beginning from today* (Lines 575-77). By all of us, it was to mean RSSs of GIs, and RSSs PS; some of those stakeholders were listed as: *governmental and ... non-governmental bodies* (Lines 578-80). It was interesting that the document recognized that, apart from governments, civic organizations, business firms, individuals and parents had a key role in the fight against RTAs. The brochure had put, though

indirectly, the collaborative work of awareness creation was what the future of road safety work would rely on. When it says: *if they work on awareness creation paying particular attention and in integration, the roads of the city won't be for death but for hopes of life* (Lines 580-82), it was to mean that the decade's road safety goal would be ensured (put as hopes of life) by a collaborative road safety work of the concerned stakeholders. Thus, we could conclude that the road safety policy in Ethiopia was formulated based on the safe system approach while significant gaps were observed in the actual practices and/or implementation.

4.3.2 Stakeholders' Collaboration as Depicted in Road Safety Documents

The necessity of stakeholders' collaboration was explicitly stated in the source documents. The UN/WHO, the leading organization that has been pushing the road safety agenda to the front declaring 2011-2020 as Decade of Action for road safety, had claimed that the collaboration of international, national and local institutions could significantly contribute to the ensuring of road safety. For example, in one of the WHO's report on road safety, we read: "Each country should have a road safety strategy that is multisectoral – involving agencies concerned with transport, health, law enforcement, education and other relevant sectors – and also multidisciplinary, involving both government and non-government stakeholders" (WHO, 2013, p.27). However, in the context of Ethiopia, although collaboration was plainly claimed both in discourses of road safety policy and other documents, the practice was not found being of any collaboration of the stakeholders; hence, the concept of collaboration among RSSs did not go beyond a knowledge base of the road safety work in the country. This was due to vague understanding and hence partial recontextualization of the recommendation. This section pushed the issue to some depth: the discourse of stakeholders' *collaboration*, which in practice did not come true.

Stakeholders' collaboration was the dominant discourse we could observe in the NRSSPE. As it was stated above, the UN could be construed as the first for recommending member countries to implement stakeholders' collaboration to address the road safety problem; when it established the United Nations Road Safety Collaboration (UNRSC), it was "recognizing the need for the United Nations system to support efforts to address the global road safety crisis" (WHO, GPDARS 2011-2020, p.6). The call for the sharing of responsibilities targeting immediate/local road safety related issues and hence the specific duties expected of each stakeholder were stated

in other texts of the UN agencies like UNECA; the inclusion of the collaboration concept in the Ethiopian road safety policy, NRSSPE was, therefore, a recontextualization of this proposal.

Next key government documents pertaining to road safety were examined to discover how the collaboration concept was constructed. The need for *collaboration/integration/coordination* of RSSs, and holding them accountable if accidents were to occur due to their failure, was clearly revealed in the discourses of the key documents. That was an exact fit of the recommendation.

4.3.2.1 The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia

Excerpt 22

Road safety is a serious social and economical problem of the nation. The fatality rate per 10,000 vehicles in Ethiopia is still one of the highest in the world the world. Concerted and coordinated effort by the concerned organizations should be taken to drastically improve road safety.

Objective: *To promote and coordinate collaboration of the concerned organizations and participation of the public in road safety improvement efforts.* (NRSSPE, p.17/Lines 10-15)

If we begin our analysis of this section from Excerpt 22, which was taken from the NRSSPE, we could see the document's bold claim of the necessity of *concerted and coordinated effort by the concerned organizations* (Line 011-12). By *concerted*, it means *intensive* or *rigorous* but it also means *collaborative*, *combined* or *joined* (LDOCE). Thus, organizations involved in the nation's road safety effort were expected to work together. So as to achieve good results, they had to be *coordinated*, implying that they should have worked towards being *organized* and *in harmony*.

However, the word *coordinated* is commonly used in management discourses also with the meaning of managed/led by others, and if we related it with other parts of the document like in the phrase *road safety management capacity in Ethiopia* (NRSSPE, 2011, p. 1/Line 007), this meaning would match better to the context than the former. If this were the preferred meaning, it would have its own implication on the overall road safety practices in Ethiopia: as is confirmed in the forthcoming sections, practices of the leading RSSs in Ethiopia showed their preference of continuing with their historic/hegemonic position, owning/running the road safety work all by themselves instead of sharing responsibilities collaborating with other RSSs.

Above all, the objectives sub-section of the NRSSPE made the recontextualization of the road safety strategies suggested in the UN and its agencies more vivid. It said: *to promote and*

coordinate collaboration of the concerned organizations and participation of the public (Lines 014-15). The council envisaged performing two tasks: *promoting* and *coordinating*, and it was the *collaboration*, or partnership, teamwork, cooperation or working together of the responsible organizations and the public at large that it aspired to *promote* and *coordinate*. The document stated repeatedly the necessity of *concerted* and *coordinated* work to ensuring road safety. Below are phrases/clauses/sentences extracted from the strategy document that contained words like *integration*, *coordination*, *collaboration* and *partnership* (in their various forms), all of which were used for the same effect, i.e., collaboration of RSSs.

Excerpt 23

*The objectives of the NRSC are to develop road safety strategies, plans and programs, to **coordinate** the **collaborative** efforts of the **concerned** government and non-and governmental organizations, and to promote road safety awareness nationwide. (p. 3)*

*Road safety **coordination** committees have been setup in all the regional states and autonomous city administrations comprising representatives of all major road safety stakeholders. (p.3)*

*The regional bureaus responsible for transport also act as their respective Regional Road Safety **Coordination** Offices (RRSCO). (p. 3)*

*The objectives of the regional road safety councils/committees (RRSC) are, similar to the NRSC, to develop road safety strategies, plans and programs, to **coordinate** the **collaborative** efforts of the **concerned** government and non- and governmental organizations, to promote road safety awareness and to ensure implementation of their regional plans in their respective regions. (p. 3)*

*The present strengthened organizational setup of FTA and regional transport agencies creates good opportunities to **coordinated** enforcement of the directives and procedures to improve road safety results of the commercial transport operations. (p. 5)*

*The traffic police of the region had fully **collaborated** in conducting the program. (P. 11)*

*An **integrated** pilot program on community awareness creation, targeted traffic control, hazardous location studies and low cost safety measures in ... **involving** the communities, Oromia traffic police, Oromia transport agency, Ethiopian Roads Authority and the NRSCO is in progress at present. (p. 11)*

*This setup will facilitate better **coordination** in the **collaborative** effort of improving road safety (p. 12)*

***Coordinated** enforcement system between the regions and between the regions and the federal transport agencies should be established to achieve the safety improvements expected. (p. 12)*

*The enactments of the laws establishing these **coordination** councils at federal and regional levels are important for clear directions and visions. (p. 15)*

*The achievements so far gained in **coordination**...are important basis to build upon future activities for accelerated improvements. (p. 15)*

*To develop national road safety strategies, plans and targets and to **coordinate** the **concerted** efforts of the various concerned organizations ... (p. 16)*

***Concerted** and **coordinated** effort by the concerned organizations should be taken to drastically improve road safety. (p. 17)*

*A lead agency to facilitate **coordination**, funding and national ... (p. 17)*

*To promote and **coordinate collaboration** of the concerned organizations and participation of the public in road safety improvement efforts (p. 17)*

*Establish technical committees to enhance **coordination** in the implementation of the national road safety strategies and plans by the concerned organizations (p. 17)*

***Coordinate** and assist the concerned organizations in the implementation of the national road safety plans (p. 17)*

*Strengthened traffic management enforcement **coordinated** between federal and regional transport agencies and traffic police (p. 20)*

*Develop **partnerships** with the health authorities, community groups, NGOs and the alcohol industry to promote public awareness programs (P. 24)*

*Number of **partnerships** established or strengthened with other key stakeholders (P. 24)*

*Develop with **partners** awareness programs to highlight the risk to pedestrians (P. 25)*

*Develop standards for safe road design and operation that recognize and **integrate** with human factors and vehicle design to reduce conflict areas and crash impact force and to cater for vulnerable road users - pedestrians, cyclists etc. (p. 28)*

*In the design standards of highways to **integrate** safe cattle crossings (p. 29)*

*Create a forum to promote and **coordinate** the private **partnership** in road safety (p. 31)*

*Creation and continuity of private **partnership coordination** committee functions (p. 31)*

In the extracts above, the collaboration of road safety players for addressing the problem was claimed; in some cases, the claim has gone to the extent of reporting achievements gained as a result of the collaborative efforts of various RSSs, and in others it was just a pledge to work with the private organizations. However, which organizations were given the floor to contribute their share and how much of their voices were incorporated in the road safety practice is a question for further scrutiny. In most of the extracts above, the players named as participants in the collaborative effort of addressing the problem were governmental institutions: ETA, FPC, and their regional extensions. We could see the mention of community groups and private firms, but each time with some other intention and connotation. When it says: *Develop partnerships with the health authorities, community groups, NGOs and the alcohol industry to promote public awareness programs* (p. 24), the intention was to use the sectors for the purpose of educating the mass (either by using them as opinion leaders or by using their advertisement investments) than a real interest of getting them involve in sharing the responsibility. Again, when it said a *forum*

would be created in *Create a forum to promote and coordinate the private partnership in road safety* (p. 31); it means the opportunity for the private sectors to get involved in some *meeting, discussion* or *debate* would be facilitated, but it was not clear to what extent and for what impact they would be involved. They would not be active contributors to the safety of the road system if they did not own the work, and if they would appear only when they were called for discussion. Moreover, they did not have any power; the clause had an implicit meaning of: *we would create a forum for them*. The other one was too vague to understand: *Creation and continuity of private partnership coordination committee functions* (p. 31). It was about the creation of some committee in relation to the private firms, but what that committee would do was unclear. A very long nominalization which had hidden the fact was used. Both of them were put as bulleted points, which, by carrying the meaning of ‘to the point’, helped prevent any attempt of questioning their significance.

The most important section of the strategy document regarding its claim for the collaboration of the different parties was its mission statement, *the National Road Safety Mission*. It was put as:

Excerpt 24

To develop national road safety strategies, plans and targets and to coordinate the concerted efforts of the various concerned organizations for its implementation and to promote awareness and participation of the public for sustained and drastic improvements of safety on the nation's road networks (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011, p.16/Lines 583-86)

The document first presupposed not only the presence of *various concerned organizations* (Line 584) but also that they had *concerted efforts* (Line 584); then it positioned the Council to the role of coordinating them/their efforts. The document also claimed to have the role of *promoting awareness and participation of the public* (Line 585), which also is a form of *collaboration/integration*. From both of the cases, we could infer that in order to bring about *sustained and drastic improvements of safety* (Lines 585-86), *collaboration/integration* of various players (governmental, non-governmental) and the public was not only anticipated but also emphasized.

In the NRSSPE, seven road safety strategies were endorsed for the implementation of the Decade of Action for Road Safety of the country; they were not only recontextualizations of the *five pillars* of the UN/WHO recommendation document as it was discussed earlier, but also were claims for collaborative effort. Below is the list of strategies:

Excerpt 25

1. *National Road Safety Management Strategy*
2. *Transport Safety Strategy*
 1. *Safe Drivers*
 2. *Safe Commercial Transport Services*
 3. *Safe Vehicles*
3. *Traffic law Enforcement Strategy*
 1. *Speeding*
 2. *Drink and Drug Impaired Driving*
 3. *Pedestrian Safety*
 4. *Safe Use of Vehicles and Vehicle Safety Facilities*
 5. *Road Crash Investigation and Data System*
4. *Safe Roads Strategy*
5. *Emergency Medical Services Strategy*
6. *Road Safety Publicity and Education Strategy*
7. *Road Safety Human Resources Capacity Building Strategy* (NRSSPE, 2011, p.3)

If we examine the first one, the *National Road Safety Management Strategy*, we could find the issue of *collaboration/integration* emphasized more than anywhere else in the document. This strategy is significant since it was designed to address the organizational setup or management aspect and institutional structure of the overall road safety work in the country. The objective it aspired to achieve was: *To promote and coordinate collaboration of the concerned organizations and participation of the public in road safety improvement efforts*. As it can be seen, it is presupposed that there were *concerned organizations*; by *concerned* it means *involved, affected, or worried* (LDOCE). The objective was thus *to promote and coordinate the collaboration* of these organizations, though, as was discussed elsewhere, that promotion and coordination was not seen when it was implemented beyond its discussion in policy papers (in the policy paper and in regulations); if there were any collaborations, it was insignificant for it was limited to only a few government institutions. Besides, though the objective envisaged the *collaboration* of concerned institutions and the *public's participation*, as could be seen in the RSSs' discourses in the coming subsections, it was so difficult to find that *collaboration*, i.e., the working together or partnership amongst them to the extent it contributed to the realization of the goal. Although the NRSC claimed establishment of Regional, Zonal and District level road safety committees (mainly in some Regional States), they were not functioning fully, at least in Addis Ababa.

Again, among the list of activities detailed under the objectives section of the document, we could read almost a third of them as elements of collaboration/integration; they are listed below:

Excerpt 26

Establish National Road Safety Council Office with adequate resources and manpower

Establish technical committees to enhance coordination in the implementation of the national road safety strategies and plans by the concerned organizations

Establish road safety stakeholders forum to strengthen participation

Coordinate and assist the concerned organizations in the implementation of the national road safety plans

Assist the establishment of road safety committees down to kebele level to promote awareness creation and participation of the public (NRSSPE, 2011, p.17)

The NRSC claimed to have achieved most of the activities put in Excerpt 26 above. However, how many of them were established in the first place? Moreover, if some of them were established, what did they practically perform to the realization of the proposed road safety goal of the decade, which was cutting fatalities and injuries by half? The direct/immediate answer to these and related questions would not be better than *not that much*. It could thus be concluded that unlike the document's repeated claim on the necessity of - and engagement in collaborative work, what was being implemented was different. There was information concealment regarding stakeholders that should have been involved in the road safety work. As it was discussed in Chapter Two, the source documents made it clear which stakeholders should have engaged in the multisectoral/collaborative work. If the need/claim for collaboration were real, why did the strategy document not list in bold names of the non-governmental players that had stakes of the road and its safety?

Instead, from their construction of the NRSSPE, key RSSs of GIs had a clear tendency of continuing with the unequal relations of power; the document had strategically maneuvered the concept of collaboration/coordination recommended in the source documents into the concept of management. By doing so, instead of taking the initiative for an engagement in partnership with and sharing of responsibility, the upper hand was reserved for the few GIs which had historically owned the task. Hence, the document could be conceived as a new discourse of road safety that had implicitly been working for the status quo, i.e., the traditional approach that blamed road users and focused on attempting to discipline them as solution. The net effect of this conception and practice of road safety, unlike the repeatedly expressed claims of controlling the RTAs, would therefore be letting them continue as serious problem.

4.3.2.2 The ERA's Road Safety Manual

Collaboration/integration of the different RSSs was stated in ERA's documents also. ERA's Road Safety Manual (2012) in particular underscored road safety as a multidisciplinary and multisectoral issue, as it was the case in the NRSSPE. Below is an extract from the Manual:

Excerpt 27

It is well recognized that road safety is a multidisciplinary multisectoral problem and the Manual recommends that the most effective way of improving road safety is to have the key agencies in the country collaborate and implement a joint and coordinated action plan. Ideally, any project designed to address a nation's road accident problem should examine the current and potential role of key sectors that could contribute solutions. ... Co-ordination is best undertaken by a road safety council with representatives of all key stakeholders or by multisector committee chaired by a lead Ministry or Authority. ... The Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA), RRAs and Wereda's road offices have a particularly important role to play as they provide and maintain the road network for road users. They also contribute to the enforcement in collaboration with the major responsible entities - the Road Transport Authority (RTA); Regions transport Bureaus and the traffic police through creating a very strong influence on driver behaviour and thus enhancing safety of the road network. Badly designed or maintained roads can contribute to driver error and lead to road accidents. Conversely, well-designed and maintained roads, where the needs of road users have been anticipated, can reduce potential risks and result in safer road networks. In the early stages of motorization, the emphasis of most road authorities was toward building and extending the road network and connecting remote parts of the country to open them up for economic and social development. In general, road authorities focus mainly on building the network and often little effort was placed on operational aspects. Such roads, especially in rural areas, generally have poor sign and markings and junctions are rarely channelized. However, in the early years, traffic volumes were usually quite low, conflicts were rare, and the system operated for some time without too many constraints. As traffic levels increase and vehicles and roads improve, faster speeds become possible with the consequence that more conflicts arise resulting in increased safety problems. The concerned parties at present are therefore forced to address road safety and traffic issues from their respective perspectives. The RSA is therefore a formal, systematic procedure that incorporates traffic safety knowledge into the road planning and design process to prevent traffic accidents. (Lines 587-614)

The manual construed road safety as *a multidisciplinary and multisectoral problem* (Line 587), and stated the necessity of *key agencies in the country collaborate and implement a joint and coordinated action plan* (Lines 589-90). The fact that road safety was *a multidisciplinary multisectoral problem* was constructed as something which was *well recognized*, a clause that presupposed the claim was obvious/natural. According to the manual, *collaboration* was not just effective to improve road safety, it was instead construed as *the most effective* (Line 598), being modified by the superlative degree of *much*. Furthermore, the document claimed to have

examined *the current and potential role of key sectors that could contribute solutions* (Line 591), implying that there was a real intention of working in collaboration towards the future's road safety work of the country.

As it was the case for the NRSSPE, the source document for ERA's position also seems to have been the UN/WHO documents. Thus, apart from constructing road safety as multisectoral and interdisciplinary problem, the manual construed it as a consequence of *increased traffic, improved vehicles and roads and faster speed* (Lines 609-10); these factors had repeatedly been mentioned in the documents of UN/WHO also; the implication of such a construction was a claim for working on each of them. Hence, this is another indicator of a direct agreement of the knowledge/belief system of the document with that of the source.

The manual declared *increased safety problems* as the impetus for the *concerned parties* to address *road safety and traffic issues from their respective perspectives* (Lines 611-12). The collaboration of these parties was not just a matter of choice but an obligation of the day; it said *the concerned parties at present are therefore forced* (Line 611) to address the issue. Moreover, it could be inferred that the time constructed as *at present* was the time devoted to push the road safety agenda to the front, both nationally and internationally for fatalities, injuries and resource damage were at the peak at the mentioned time more than ever before. This could be related with the UN's dedication of this decade (2011-2020) as a decade of action for road safety.

When we go further and examine the manual, we read the claims of ERA and its regional agencies that they *have a particularly important role to play, since they provide and maintain the road network for road users* (Lines 594-95). In so doing, the simple present tense that naturalized their role was used. This seems to be logical since they are GIs legally established for the same purpose. However, when we read the sentence that followed: *They also contribute to the enforcement in collaboration with the major responsible entities... through creating a very strong influence on driver behavior and thus enhancing safety of the road network* (Lines 595-99), we would be forced to ask several critical questions: first, why should ERA contribute to enforcement instead of making the road more readable (being of the proper road signs) and friendly for its users so that the chance for them to be involved in unsafe road use practices would significantly be minimized? Enforcement was only for those who did not want to abide by

the rule; it should not be the target of every practitioner. The police themselves were expected not to rush to enforcement. Secondly, why a very strong influence on drivers? While employing some restrictive mechanism against risky driving could be among the considerations of road design and construction to contribute to safer road use, that mechanism should not be to the extent of creating discomfort on road users; however, ERA's role was constructed as *creating a very strong influence on driver behavior*. This emphasis on the individual driver resonates with the traditional approach to road safety. Undoubtedly, the drawback of such a strategy would be more severe than the advantage. Another interesting point we could get right here is which entities the document accepted as *the major responsible entities*; a section that was talking about *collaboration* among stakeholders had at the same time got involved in such a major/minor categorization, for the major responsible entities it listed were the *Road Transport Authority (RTA), Regions transport Bureaus, and the traffic police* (Lines 594-99). As was discussed earlier, although the source document encouraged, among others, "collaboration across a range of sectors, including the health sector and partnerships between public and private sectors" (Peden et al., 2004, p.25), the manual, like the NRSSPE, positioned only government sectors as the major responsible entities, neglecting and/or putting all others at the minor position. This could be evidence for ERA's partial adoption of the recommendation. Since it was historically one of the lead sectors responsible for the road transport system of the country, all it did in its safety manual was an implicit claim for the continuity of the hegemony, i.e., the perpetuation of that same practice.

Moreover, the manual employed discourse which was in contradiction with the claim for collaboration for the safety of road users. It constructed the emphasis of most road authorities in countries which were at the stage of motorization as: *building and extending the road network and connecting remote parts of the country to open them up for economic and social development* (Lines 603-04). While it was not explicit, the implication of this construction is that safety was compromised due to the preference for mobility for *economic and social development*. The marginal position that was held regarding safety at the early stage of motorization was, as it was clearly stated out, due to the assumption that it would not be a big deal: *traffic volumes were usually quite low, conflicts were rare, and the system operated for some time without too many constraints* (Lines 608-09). If we saw this position relating it to the

case in Ethiopia, however, it would very much be clear that the argument was invalid, for Ethiopia is a country of the worst accident rate while being of the least level of motorization.

The sentence that followed did not deny that the problem was not far in time: *As traffic levels increase and vehicles and roads improve, faster speeds become possible with the consequence that more conflicts arise resulting in increased safety problems* (Lines 609-10). Hence, rate of motorization, road improvement and speeding all were so much related to each other that the planning and implementation of one needed to go hand in hand with that of the other. Otherwise, the policy must have been formulated from a different, or perhaps conflicting knowledge/belief system; apart from the claimed collaboration of stakeholders to minimize RTAs, it must have also been developed based on the flawed *development model* which asserted countries should pass through some stages (of sacrificing their citizens) until they developed to some level (McAndrews, 2013).

A further query should be how did even the named government sectors collaborate? If we went deep into the Manual, we could find further construction on collaboration, i.e., a suggestion on how it should have been set up which also was similar to the way the NRSC was constituted: *Co-ordination is best undertaken by a road safety council with representatives of all key stakeholders or by multisector committee chaired by a lead Ministry or Authority* (Lines 592-93). However, if we investigated interviews conducted with players working for the institution (both for ERA and the AARA) we could not find any details on how they were practically working in *collaboration/integration* with the mentioned institutions or with any other party. Of course, the ERA, Regional Roads Bureaus and *Woreda* Roads Offices could have been working on the safety audit work, both on the newly constructed and existing roads, and the police and other responsible organs could have been helping them to find black spots, places where accidents would frequently occur. However, in practice, safety oriented revision works would not be seen being undertaken immediately. For example, black spots in Addis Ababa were identified a decade ago, but reconstruction work on these accident-prone areas had been very much insignificant; compared to the gravity of the problem, such work could be construed as either too slow or none at all. Nor were most of these places demarcated with visible signs; instead, since professional drivers and other vehicle holders who frequently used the routes where the black spots located could identify them just from their experience, they would take the necessary care.

However, the problem would recur when drivers or vehicle holders who were inexperienced or new to the spots appeared, resulting in minor to severe accidents and/or causing lengthened jams on the smooth flow of the traffic.

Therefore, we could conclude that ERA's Manual for road safety incorporated key points that would relate it to the safe system approach to road safety; it had at least recognized road safety as a multisectoral and multidisciplinary problem, and claimed the necessity of collaboration among various stakeholders to address it effectively. However, at the same time it was found mixing concepts which were contrary to the advocated global approach to road safety.

4.3.2.3 The Addis Ababa Transport Policy

Excerpt 28

There is sufficient evidence that other relevant public institutions that have stakes in the city's transportation system are also organized and managed under different institutional organizations. Compounded by lack of skilled manpower and budgetary constraints, many of these institutions have exhibited fragmentation activities and fragmented institutional set-up which have rendered failures to coordinate the transportation system of the city. (MoT, 2011, p.11) The loss of life and property inflicted by road traffic accident in our city cannot be overlooked. Traffic accident in African cities is estimated to cost 1.5% to 2% of gross national product. Although a tendency for reduction of traffic accident is observed in our city, the increasing number of vehicles and consequent traffic congestion has still kept the figure high. The policy is formulated to drastically reduce the loss of life and property caused by road traffic accident. ... Traffic safety council shall be established at different levels involving stakeholders and city residents to coordinate and enhance participation in minimizing traffic accident (MoT, 2011, p.27-28) The private sector has also a wider role in developing transport services, terminals and parking facilities. It has a role to make the service dependable and effective by adopting new systems of transport service provision. Non-governmental organizations are also expected to contribute their part in improving the sector. Educational institutions should be involved in research and provide training in the sector. Other civil societies are also expected to play a crucial role in the efforts of educating the wider public on sectoral laws. (MoT, 2011, p.46) (Lines 035-53)

The Addis Ababa Transport Policy was another important document investigated in relation to stakeholders' collaboration to addressing the road safety problem of the city. In its attempt at conceptualizing the problem, the document constructed the City's road safety problem as impossible to overlook: *The loss of life and property inflicted by road traffic accident in our city cannot be overlooked* (Line 040-41). It also claimed to address this problem *drastically*, the same word used in the NRSSPE: *The policy is formulated to drastically reduce the loss of life and*

property caused by road traffic accident (Lines 044-45). Moreover, the document listed six challenges of the city's transport system that needed addressing timely, three of which were related to safe mobility: *Lack of smooth traffic flow*; *Lack of infrastructure for None Motorized Transport (NMT) (for walking and bicycle)*; and *High rate of traffic accidents* (Lines 022-23).

The policy was no different from the others regarding the call for *collaboration* of RSSs. In order to achieve its goal of addressing the problem in collaboration, thus, several objectives of ensuring traffic safety of the city were set; one of which was: *To mobilize stakeholders working on traffic safety to coordinate their activities and exert effort to minimize traffic accident* (MoT, 2011, p.28). While we may not find the word collaborate, we could sense it from the phrases *mobilize stakeholders* and *coordinate their activities*. One of the policies set in relation to collaboration or stakeholder mobilization was establishment of traffic safety councils: *Traffic safety council shall be established at different levels involving stakeholders and city residents to coordinate and enhance participation in minimizing traffic accident* (Lines 045-46).

Compared to the former two documents analyzed above, the AATP had an independent section that had specifically treated the role of stakeholders. The section begins as: *It is required that all stakeholders play/contribute their part and work together to realize the objectives of this policy* (AATP, 2011, p.14). In the section, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions, the private sectors and other civic societies were listed as stakeholders; however, it was the first, particularly *Ministry of Transport and the City Administration* that were given the lion's share of the task, i.e., power for *leading, coordinating, crafting legal procedures, identifying investment finance*, etc. of the road transport work of the city. Others were accorded only a minor/supportive role.

The private sectors were first constructed as if they had *a wider role in developing transport services* (Line 048) although that did not make it clear how it connected to safety; that role was not more than providing *dependable and effective* (Line 049) transport service, and this could probably mean providing a transport service which was faster and available all the time; hence, the role they could have in relation to ensuring safe provision of such a service was unclear. The non-governmental organizations were mentioned next as if they were *expected to contribute their part in improving the sector* (Lines 050-51) but what in particular they would contribute was not

stated; hence, their mention was vague. Other civil societies were cited in relation to the role they could have; it was constructed as *a crucial role*, but that crucial role was not more than *educating the wider public on sectoral laws* (Line 053). This also is related with educating/disciplining the mass on the safe use of the road instead of engaging them to contribute their share on how the problem could have been solved. It was only educational institutions that were constructed in relation to the real contribution they could have to the sector, involving *in research and ... training in the sector* (Lines 051-52). The problem was, though, safety oriented researches conducted in the country so far were very much limited. Moreover, readiness in involving educational institutions and/or researchers in the road safety work was too far from the claim.

While what was practically done is a topic of further investigation (which is treated in the subsequent sections), it suffices at this stage to conclude that the City's Road Transport Policy claimed the collaboration of various RSSs and road users though it could not clearly be seen when realized in practices of the key RSSs. For example, the same policy document positioned coordination and collaboration of transport institutions as *minimal and ill-coordinated* and so as one key contributor for the aggravated problem of the transport sector (MoT, 2011, p.11).

4.3.3 Stakeholders' Collaboration as Depicted in Interviews of the Key Players

One of the most elaborated discussions in the in-depth interview sessions with the key RSSs was the necessity of collaboration/integration and responsiblization of RSSs in the road safety work of Ethiopia. This section focused on analyzing how two key players, one from the government and another from the private sector, respectively, had developed the concept of integration among RSSs to ensuring road safety.

As it was discussed above, *collaboration/integration/coordination/partnership* among the RSSs to ensure road safety was claimed in the documents of the country analyzed. The same was called for by the key road safety players also; it was a concept repeatedly voiced by most of the participants. According to them, in order to *lessen and eliminate* RTAs, the working together of stakeholders was necessary: *if all these work together in integration, all being combined in such a way that one feeds the other, then it is possible to lessen and eliminate the accident* (Lines 636-38). In Excerpt 29 only, we find the words *integration* and *coordination* (of course in their various forms) about ten times:

Excerpt 29

ከርዲኔትድ ያደረገ ኢንተግሬትድ የሆነ ስራ / work that coordinates and integrates (Line 618)
ኢንተግሬትድ ሆነን መስራት አለባቸው / they have to work integrating with us (Line 631)
ኢንተግሬትድ መሆን አለባቸው / should be integrated (Line 636)
ኢንተግሬትድ ሁነው...በጋራ ከሰሩ / if they work together in integration (Line 636)
እነዚህ ነገሮች ሁሉ ኢንተግሬትድ ሆነው / all being combined (Line 636)
እነዚህ ነገሮች ካልተቀናጁ ግን / whereas if all these do not integrate (Line 637)
ስለዚህ እያንዳንዱ ነገር መቀናጅት አለበት / everything should be integrated (Line 645)
ተቀናጅቶ የሚመለከተው ሁሉ ስራውን ከሰራ / if each responsible body works in coordination (L. 645)
ይሄ ሁሉ ሲቀናጅ / if all these are coordinated (Line 649)

In each line, it was claimed that the road safety work could succeed if and only if RSSs work in coordination. However, that integration was expected to be more in the form of submission to and complying with the office that had initially identified and nominated the RSSs which were called for integration. This could be evidenced from the participant's language use; the stakeholders were mostly put in a passivized or nominalized position, as it could be seen in almost all the places cited above. The same structure could be seen in several other places also:

Excerpt 30

እያንዳንዱ አሁን በዚህ በመንገድ ደኅንነት ዙሪያ አስቴክሆልደር ወይም ባለድርሻ አካል ተብለው የተለዩት አካላት የራሳቸው፣ ባዋጅ የተሰጣቸው የስራ ድርሻ አለ / each of the road safety stakeholders or sectors which are specifically identified for this purpose have their own jobs and duties legally given to them (Lines 628-29)
ለመንገድ አደጋ አስተዋፆ የሚያደርገውን ነገር እንዲያስወግዱ ይጠበቃል / it is expected that they get rid of anything that contributes to road accident (Line 630)
እነዚህም ህጎች መከበር መቻል አለባቸው / those rules must also be observed (Lines 631-32)
እግረኛውም ኃላፊነት፣ አለበት ከሱ እሚጠበቀው ስራ ምንድነው / the share of the pedestrian which is expected of him (Lines 646-47)

In Excerpt 30, we could see that the named/referred to RSSs were identified by an authority that expected them to discharge a responsibility which it had given them. Moreover, pronouns used in the same excerpts could tell us that the participants were all categorized as they/them who were detached from we/us. It was constructed as: the office at the federal level (we/us) *identified*, *nominated*, *expected*, *coordinated*, etc. stakeholders (they/them) to participate/engage/integrate in the road safety work. The tone of the participant's speech throughout the excerpt was the same: we (I and the institution I belong to) expect you (the other stakeholders and road users in

general) to do/act/behave in some way. In both of the extracts above, Excerpts 29 and 30, as a senior officer working at a federal institution, the participant was speaking with power that he and the institution he was representing possessed: *if all these are coordinated, it is possible to lessen the accident; this is the way we see it as an institution also* (Lines 649-50).

Again, only other stakeholders were positioned as both contributors/causes of RTAs and targets of the solution work; they were constructed as having to recognize they were contributing to (the worsening of) RTAs, on the one hand, and they had to work hard to *lessen* it, on the other:

Excerpt 31

አሁን እነዚህ ዘርፎች ሁሉ ስራ መስራት መቻል አለባቸው፤ ለአደጋው አስተዋጽኦ እያደረጉ እንደሆነ ተገንዝበው፤ አደጋውን ለመቀነስ የሚያስችል ስራ መስራት መቻል አለባቸው / now all of these sectors should be able to work recognizing that they are contributing to the accident; they should engage in the work that enables to lessen the accident (Lines 621-23)

የተወሰኑት አንዱ ወይም ሁለቱ ባግባቡ ስራቸውን ሳይሰሩ ከቀሩ፤ እነዚያ ያልሰሯቸው ስራዎች የሚፈጥሩት ችግር አደጋ ሊከሰትበት ይችላል / if some of them, if one or two of them do not properly discharge their responsibilities, the work which they did not accomplish could create some problem; that may cause accident (Lines 639-41)

It was constructed that various stakeholders had to work together and each should at the same time be held responsible for the task it did not accomplish; this was of course in part in line with the source documents. However, in the Ethiopian road safety context, only road users, drivers in particular, were held responsible through enforcement measures for any violations of the safe mobility of the traffic system they involved in; no other stakeholder was held accountable for the task it did not discharge. The management that repeatedly claimed to have been coordinating the work did not plainly state the responsibility of each stakeholder and what the consequences would be if it did not accomplish its share. The source documents did not put the road safety management team as immune from the responsibility. How the self and others were positioned is of course a topic of the forthcoming section.

The following analysis on Excerpt 32 advanced the theme being discussed so far: the discourse on the necessity of adopting the UN/WHO-proposed structure and integration among stakeholders to addressing the problem and how it was constructed and implemented in Ethiopia. While this participant also propounded the collaboration discourse, he framed it differently; he explained in depth how the proposed strategy should have been recontextualized in the context of

Ethiopia in order to bring about positive impact on the daily functioning of the transport sector in general and safety of road users in particular. The reason for the difference in angle could be due to the fact that this participant was not from a government institution; he was from a private transport sector. Hence, the position he developed could also be taken as a kind of resistance discourse propagated against the existing road safety management practice of the country.

Excerpt 32

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነትን ለማረጋገጥ፣ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት እራሱ በተገቢ ሁኔታ መደራጀት መቻል አለበት እሚል እምነት አለኝ እኔ / to ensure road traffic safety, I believe the road traffic management itself should be structured efficiently (Lines 655-56)

እኔ ማኔጅመንቱ እራሱ፣ ከማኔጅመንቱ ብንጀምር፣ ፖሊሲው ይሄንን እሚያበረታታ ይሄንን ፎርም፣ ቅርፅ እሚያሰጥ፣ ተጠያቂነትና ግልፅነት የሰፈነበት በአመራር በሎጅስቲክ በደንብ የተደራጀ፣ የአመራር ክህሎት ብቃቱ እውቀቱ ያለው ሀይል ሊመራው ይገባል የሚል እምነት አለኝ / to me the management itself, if we begin from the management the policy should encourage this having the structure, the design in such a way that it ensures accountability and transparency, well-established in leadership and logistics; I believe people of the necessary leadership skills, quality and knowledge should run it (Lines 656-60)

የትራፊክ ፖሊስ የሚባለው አካል ብቻ ነው ይህንን ኃላፊነት የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነትን የመቆጣጠር ስርዓት የማስያዝ ምን ማለት ኃላፊነት ያለው / it is only the so called traffic police which has the responsibility of controlling the traffic safety, putting things in order and so on (Lines 664-65)

በእኔ እምነት ግን በጣም ለየት ባለ መልኩ ነው የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት፣ የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን የሚመራ እራሱን የቻለ አካል ሊኖረው ይገባል የሚል እምነት አለኝ / but I believe traffic management should be in a quite different form; there should be an independent body responsible for leading the traffic management (Lines 665-67)

ስለዚህ ማኔጅመንት፣ የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት አለ ወይ እዚህ ከተማ ብለህ ብትል፣ በእኔ እምነትና ቅኝት የለንም፣ አለ ሊባል እሚችል አይደለም / if you ask whether there is any traffic management in this city, according to my conviction and observation, we do not have, or it is not in a position to be called we have one (Lines 688-90)

ይህ ሁሉ ብክነት የማኔጅመንት እጥረት ወይም ጠንካራ ማኔጅመንት ያለመኖሩ ውጤት እንጂ ተፈጥሯዊ ችግር ነው ተብሎ መውሰድ አይቻልም / all this wastage is due to lack of management, or it is a result of lack of strong management it should not be taken as a natural problem (Lines 696-98)

ይሄ ማኔጅመንት ጥንካሬ መገለጫ አይደለም፣ አለመኖሩን ነው፣ ቁጥጥሩ አመራሩ በጣም ሥርዓት የሌለው መሆኑን ነው እሚያመለክተው / this is not an indicator of a strong management; it instead shows absence of control; it indicates that the leadership is so disorderly (Lines 704-05)

ስለዚህ ከዛ መጉላላት ጀርባ የምናደርሰውን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ማህበራዊ ቀውስ ግምት ውስጥ ያስገባ አመራር እየተጠቀምን ነው ወይ ቢባል፣ አይደለም ነው፣ እንደውም እያባባስን ነው ያለው ማለት ነው / if we ask whether we are following leadership style that understands the economic and social chaos behind all that suffering, the answer is no; instead, we are worsening it (Lines 715-16)

ደህንነትን ሊያባባስ የሚችል፣ ግድየለሽነት የሰፈነበት፣ ምንቸገረኝነት የሰፈነበት፣ ተጠያቂነት የሌለበት የትራፊክ ደህንነት ማኔጅመንት አለ / there is traffic management that could aggravate poverty, management with no accountability but with much irresponsibility and with lots of carelessness (Lines 719-20)

ሪል በሆነ መልኩ ግን፣ የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን እሚመራው ሪስፖንሲብል አርጋን የትኛው ነው ተብሎ ቢጠየቅ ግን፣ ከጎሳፊነትና ከተጠያቂነት አንፃር እኔ ነኝ እሚልህ አታገኝም / but if you ask which one is practically the responsible organ for the traffic management with respect to accountability and responsibility, you cannot find anyone who would say yes I am responsible (Lines 723-25)

ስለዚህ ጎሳፊነቱን ወስዶ፣ የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን እምመራ እኔ ነኝ ሊልህ አይችልም፤ ቲም ነው፤ ቲም ወርክ ነው የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት ሥራ፤ የሚመለከታቸው እስቴክሆልደርስ በሙሉ ተቀናጅተው የሚመሩት፣ የሚሰሩት መሆን አለበት / so one cannot say I am the leader of the traffic management, taking all the responsibility; it is team work, the traffic management work is team work. It should be one all the responsible stakeholders lead and work in coordination (Lines 728-31)

Pillar I of the five intervention strategies to address the road safety problem proposed a firm road safety management, “a strong institutional framework that also functions as the oversight of all other pillars” (UNECA, Decade of Action for Road Safety: 2011-2020, African Action Plan). It could therefore be taken as the most significant of all the pillars. The participant centered his argument on this theme, calling for a strong traffic management that could efficiently shoulder the responsibility of managing the overall road safety work. He recognized the presence of a road traffic management in the country called *national road traffic safety advisory office* (Line 661), but took it as institution with lots of problems. Thus, it should have been: a structure with *accountability and transparency* (Line 658); leadership equipped with the necessary *logistics* (Line 659) and with manpower of *skills, quality and knowledge* (Lines 659-60). In other words, all the comments about the existing road safety management were negatively constructed.

As to how the traffic management in Ethiopia should have been structured, this participant also brought UN/WHO’s recommendation discussed earlier: the necessity of *coordination/integration* among various responsible bodies. Thus, traffic management was *team work*, and it should have been a task that *all the responsible stakeholders lead and work in coordination* (Lines 730-31). However, the task in Ethiopia was not taken in integration. Although several GIs (ministries like MoT, MoH, MoE) were listed as stakeholders in the road safety work, it was the police that was named as the only/main player in the work of road safety. Of course, there was hedging even in the mention of the police also as *the so called traffic police* (Line 664). It was a way of showing dissatisfaction with or disapproval of the practice. First, that only the police were taking the task was against the philosophy of shared responsibility. Moreover, there were gaps perceived with the practices of the police also. For example, in *although investigating accident when it occurs is among the responsibilities of the traffic management, it should not be taken as its main job*

(Lines 690-92) the background clause presupposed where the police invested their time and energy: just *investigating accident cases*.

The implication is that, since time and energy of the police was consumed by investigating the already occurred accident cases, crash preventive work had not yet come to the picture; on the other hand, the argument of the source documents regarding RTAs was that road safety work should focus on preventive strategies since “road traffic crashes are predictable and therefore preventable” (Peden et al., 2004, p.164). In line with this philosophy, how the task should have been handled was constructed as: *facilitating the traffic flow, improving... enabling the road and the vehicles provide their services efficiently* (Lines 692-93). The three verbs used: *facilitating*, *improving* and *enabling* were all to show that the traffic flow could have been safer had the focus of the police been on preventing accidents via the work of facilitating, improving and enabling safe mobility of road users; that could have helped decrease RTAs observed in the streets of the city. The three areas of collaboration, also called the *3E's* or *Education, Enforcement and Engineering* (Line 670) were mentioned by name; they are among the key areas systems approach recommended to have been the focus of any road safety work.

Part of the problem for the inefficiency of the police in discharging their responsibility was related to lack of budget and logistics: *if you take the existing traffic police it is not fully equipped logistically* (Line 677). Furthermore, some of the basic facilities the police should have been equipped with were mentioned: fit motorbikes and cars for patrolling, garage and spare parts for repairing their vehicles, functional traffic lights for the smooth flow of traffic and camera for controlling. This could also be related to the absence of the claimed collaboration among the responsible players. My observation confirmed the position held regarding how the police would work. They were not supported with the technology that could have helped them address the problem efficiently; they worked in a way that was very much traditional, consuming both their time and energy. They had scarcity of vehicles for patrolling; had they had enough, they could have been available at every direction of the city to facilitate safe mobility of road users. Moreover, traffic lights were not functional for many years though they were being repaired, and new ones also were being erected. They purchased breathalyzers, radar cameras and other facilities, but they were not enough though they did not fully use even what they had.

Finally, in support of his construction regarding the lack of collaboration and organization, the participant mentioned the absence of an organ responsible for the road safety work in Addis Ababa. According to him, everybody would go for publicity by giving press releases/briefings about the road safety work in the city, and there was some power conflict between the Federal and the City Administration: *you might hear the Addis Ababa road transport, the road and transport bureau, briefing that because it believes it is its responsibility; you might hear the Addis Ababa traffic police briefing; even the federal itself* (Lines 720-23). That the different institutions were running for publicity was, as it was constructed, not because of confusion, but because they believed it was their responsibility. Hence, instead of collaboration, there was sense of control. A further reason was constructed as *irresponsibility* of the road safety management itself: it was *management with no accountability but with much irresponsibility and with lots of carelessness* (Lines 718-19). There was a third problem constructed: as absence of *leadership style that understands the economic and social chaos behind all that suffering* (Lines 715-16). It was this same problem that initiated the adoption of systems theory that called for a management system that recognizes and accommodates all elements in the system so that the problem could be addressed holistically. We could therefore conclude that the problem was on either lack of a good understanding of the concept of collaboration or on readiness to implementing it.

Although the analyzed discourses of the RSSs uniformly admitted the necessity of collaboration amongst them, they did not act to the level they discoursed or to the level they claimed. Most of them had their own duties to focus on and to invest whatever they had to address their immediate concerns. Moreover, although they had road safety related issues incorporated in their duties and responsibilities, road safety for them had for long been a minor, or sometimes a *neglected* issue. The Federal and City/Regional Police of Ethiopia, for example, which had for decades been among the forefront players of traffic safety, used to have the road traffic case structurally subsumed under the Department of Crime Investigation. It was only recently that Road Traffic Safety stood as an independent department, following recommendations of the Interim NRSC.

Moreover, although road safety was part of the stakeholders' duty, it may not be of similar level of priority for each of them and hence they may not treat it with matching degrees of emphases. For ETA, it was an issue handled by an independent Directorate; on the other hand, for MoUDH, while road safety was a concern, it did not have any specific department to take it seriously. The

media, particularly the broadcast media, were covering the road safety issue more than ever before; however, there were problems in relation to the time slot they gave to road traffic safety programs. As for MoE, it incorporated road safety in the curriculum for educating the young, particularly at the primary level of education, but for MoH, safety would become an issue only when a road accident occurred. Hence, such problems could affect engagement of stakeholders in terms of time, resource and commitment they had to exert for the most important task, i.e., the preventive task, which could have improved road safety far better.

In addition, most of the RSSs working with the NRSC were GIs; that should have put them at a better position to accomplish the set policy, a policy which the incumbent itself endorsed. However, while the very intention of *collaboration* was to bring divergent views of various institutions for the realization of a comprehensive approach to road safety, it seems they were expected to work more in submission and/or subordination than in deliberation as colleagues of shared responsibility. This could easily be seen from the hierarchical structure of the council's organization, on the one hand, and from the uniformity of the discourses these stakeholders (of GIs in particular) constructed. In this context, it is very much unlikely that the work of only some similar groups of the many and diversified stakeholders would adequately achieve the road safety goal to the level the problem was averted. Contrary to the recommendation that called for the participation of NGO's, civic organizations, the private sector and individuals, these significant groups were excluded from the Ethiopian road safety practices. My field observation confirmed this convincingly: at the federal level, ministries, commission, authorities and agencies involved in/under the NRSC; but no private sector, civic organization or individuals were given the floor to participate. Similarly, at the AACA, although documents declared the necessity of involving stakeholders from the private sector, youth's and women's leagues, the public, influential figures, etc., none of them were seen participating practically.

In conclusion, in this section we examined how international road safety discourses and practices were recontextualized into the context of the Ethiopian road safety knowledge and practices. Using extracts from various data sources and focusing on intertextuality, it was confirmed that the Ethiopian road safety policy and practices were based on safe systems approach and the philosophy of shared responsibility as it was recommended by the UN/WHO and put in the global action for the decade's road safety work. The recommendation was designed based on

experiences gained from best practice in countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, countries which had formally introduced and implemented the safe systems approach to road safety (Peden et al., 2004, p.19). However, huge distinctions could be made between these countries and Ethiopia on the way they implemented the road safety policy they formulated. Economy could be considered as one key reason for the difference; both of them are high income countries whereas Ethiopia is the opposite. While it could be argued that economic strength could help one achieve its targets better, it is also expected to plan targets within the limits of one's human and material resources though being ambitious is also possible. The difference could therefore be due to difference in terms of commitment they had to achieving their targets. In the context of Ethiopia, if there were a real commitment of addressing the problem involving the private sector, non-governmental organizations, civic societies, influential community members, etc., there could have been the possibility of mobilizing resources from these sectors also, and that would have enabled them to address the problem meaningfully and holistically. Although some evidence confirmed that the recommendations were partly adopted and practiced, they were by far more rhetorical than practical; vague, partial and even contradictory references to and practices of the recommended practices were common. Whether these recommendations were intentionally neglected or innocently misunderstood would reveal from the analysis of additional data in the following sections.

According to WHO (Peden et al., 2004), in order to effectively achieve the goal set by the decade of action for road safety, "there needs to be close coordination and collaboration among the various stakeholders, using a holistic and integrated approach, across many sectors and many disciplines" (p.164). From the analysis of the discourses of the Ethiopian road safety documents and practitioners, it was found that there was a very strong claim of adopting the UN/WHO road safety recommendation for action; for example, in the NRSSPE *safe systems approach* to road safety was mentioned twice, and the concept of *collaboration/integration* among the different RSSs was plainly and recurrently called for. In various key documents pertaining to road safety and in discourses of the leading road safety players, terms like *collaboration*, *coordination*, *integration*, *participation* and *partnership* were used; however, the practice was not the same and hence the effect was insignificant.

Therefore, both at the formulation and implementation stages of the strategy plan/policy, it seems that the responsible institution or the government in general did not explore adequately the knowledge base elsewhere in the world, and the existing conditions of the country both in terms of resources and manpower. As it was stated in the introductory section of the policy, attempts of examining road safety conditions of the country were made, but it seems it was not very well understood. It is significant to recall that the study was conducted by a third party, an international organization. Moreover, the concept of addressing the problem with shared responsibility and based on systems theory was either not recognized very well, or readiness to grasping such a new philosophy was very much minimal. Hence, there was huge discrepancy between what was put in the policy, and what was being implemented practically. It is also important that one should plan and implement effectively, and this is not related with the skill of management only, but also with readiness to accepting the introduced change. In other words, readiness to adopt the introduced road traffic/road safety management was so minimal.

It did not seem that people engaged in the front in the road safety work were really committed to minimizing the loss of lives, limbs and resources. Had it been the case, they would have implemented the *collaboration/coordination/integration/partnership* concept they discoursed on to the extent that meaningful changes were registered. It seems that the key players at the advisory/management level did not own the policy which the country had endorsed. Instead, it seems that they were more interested in staying with their hegemonic position, controlling the work just alone, engaging in the *business as usual* kind of practice; as a result, the problem seems to have persisted. The interest was holding the entire task, engaging in the practices of education and enforcement, based on the knowledge/belief system of the traditional approach to road safety.

The next important enquiry should, therefore, be on how the RSSs incorporated the national strategic plan into their day-to-day guidelines and actual road safety practices. Exploring this is significant since in the process of recontextualizing the recommendations of UN/WHO into the national strategic plan and/or in actual implementation of the plan by the responsible RSSs and road users, there could be some significant elements that RSSs did not put into their context the way it was recommended or planned; or sometimes, although they put them, they might not have implemented them due to conflicts with other competing interests; as a result, the vulnerable

road users would have continued being prone to recurring RTAs. This is what we see next taking some extracts from the corpus data, and focusing particularly on how RSSs positioned themselves (their roles) in relation to the road safety work that was claimed to have been addressed in *integration* and through the *sharing of responsibility*.

4.4 Stakeholders' Constructions of Their Role to Road Safety

As has been discussed in the previous chapter, there are three dimensions fundamental to the constructive effects of discourse: systems of knowledge and beliefs, social identities and social relations (Fairclough, 1992). In the analyses conducted earlier, both in sections 4.2 and 4.3, i.e., on conceptualization of the road safety problem in Ethiopia and on the recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices, ideas, systems of knowledge and beliefs conveyed in the discourses of the RSSs and documents were given due emphasis; in the remaining sections of the paper, social identities and social relations will be focused on. In the context of road safety, social identities would mean how RSSs and road users identified and positioned themselves in relation to their role as road safety practitioners and/or road users. Social relations, on the other hand, would mean how RSSs construct relations with or act towards one another in the claimed *collaborative* attempts of addressing the road safety problem.

Recently, road safety work is construed as a shared responsibility, requiring commitment and informed decision-making by government, industry, non-governmental organizations and international agencies and participation by people from many different disciplines (Peden et al., 2004, p.158); this position is being advocated as a new global development in the effort of ensuring road safety, hence constructing the former individualistic approach as *traditional* (Peden et al., 2004, p.10). Vision Zero, which was the source of WHO's road safety policy recommendation that was adopted globally to be executed this decade, states that responsibility should be shared by the system designers and the road users instead of emphasizing just on road users alone (Whitelegg & Haq, 2006, p.8). In relation to taking responsibility to the failure/success of the road safety work in Ethiopia, therefore, the most important question to ask (as the focus of analysis of this section) is: how did RSSs construct their roles?

What the stakeholders said about their role and how they discharged it was seen against two key foundations: the strategy document the country adopted that called for collaboration or sharing of

responsibility, and the question of power, the struggle to continue controlling the road safety work to stay with the hegemonic positions versus the struggle for change. Based on lessons gained from the preliminary stages of the analysis, how RSSs position *the self* both in their constructions of social identities and social relations in their practices of mitigating the problem was analyzed categorizing them into three, taking their groups as units of analysis: road safety stakeholders of government institutions (RSSs of GIs), road safety stakeholders of the private sectors (RSSs of PSs), and road users in general (like drivers, pedestrians and passengers). This categorization had further enabled me to distinguish resistance discourses road users employed regarding their road use practices and what they expected of the responsible bodies to ensuring road safety. Overall, almost all RSSs constructed themselves as if they were working hard to the safety of the road system; each of them positioned themselves as better than any other RSSs.

4.4.1 How RSSs of Government Institutions Construct Their Role to Road Safety

This section starts by analyzing the GTP I 2011-2015, one of the most significant documents that constructed favorably the role of the government in addressing the road safety problem of the country. In its various sections where it discussed the road transport sector of the country, the document explained how committed the government was to address the problem. As is common in a genre of any plan document, GTP I started with a summary of the previous plan performance of each sector, where it explained what the government did on road safety during the 2004/5-2009/10 plan period; next it detailed what it planned to do to handle the problem in the next five years, 2010/11-2015/16. Excerpt 33 was taken from the GTP I's evaluation section of the economic and social sector work performance that discussed the road safety issue. It was in the *Road transport* theme put as a sub-title (Line 810) under the *Rail Network, Dry Port and Transport* section.

Excerpt 33

The GTP: Performance Evaluation

Road transport: During 2004/5-2009/10 a road safety council was established; on main transport corridor areas with a record of high accident levels, traffic control was strengthened; measures were taken to ensure that accident victims receive immediate medical attention and a mass media public awareness campaign was conducted during the plan period. As a result of these measures, deaths due to road traffic accidents decreased from 104 in 2004/5 to 52 per 10,000 accidents at the end of the plan period. Private companies were contracted to ensure technical inspection of vehicles. Moreover to address

the transportation challenges facing the capital, Addis Ababa, the possibility of introducing mass transport system has been explored (Lines 810-18).

As a five-year grand plan addressing all sectors of the country, the document would treat issues in general, and if including details were necessary, it must have been only issues which were of most significance. Accordingly, in the evaluation section of the road transport sub-sector, it was the road safety issue that was discussed predominantly; no other issue of the sub-sector was given space and emphasis as was given to road safety. The section included only two themes other than road safety: *involvement of private companies to ensure technical inspection of vehicles*, and *exploration of mass transport for Addis Ababa*; they were treated just in two sentences put at the end of the paragraph. It could be argued these also were related to the road safety problem.

The first theme treated in relation to road safety was the establishment of a road safety council: *During 2004/5-2009/10 a road safety council was established* (Line 810), implying that of all the plan period's performance in the road transport sector, the council's establishment was of due significance. However, it did not tell anything other than the council's establishment as if the very act of establishing it would contribute to road safety. It was discussed so far that the council that was composed of only RSSs of GIs did not seem to have helped improve the situation.

The clauses that followed dealt with *strengthening of traffic control on main corridors with high accident levels, provision of immediate medical services for crash victims, and mass media use for creating public awareness* (Lines 810-14). They were in line with WHO's recommendations on road safety which were related with enforcement, emergency and education, respectively. However, it is significant to see the document's neglect of the other most significant issue of the road safety work: engineering of the roads and roadsides. There has been remarkable expansion of roads in Ethiopia over the past decades (ERA, 2005; UNECA, 2009, p.6); however, it could be seen from both discourses of the documents and practices of the stakeholders that safety oriented construction of new and maintenance of old roads did not come out prominently.

Engineering applies to vehicles' standards also, whether they were technically fit for use and designed in such a way that they would contribute to minimizing death and/or injury if accidents were inevitable. However, it was the other silenced and/or neglected aspect. In relation to vehicles' technical fitness, it was claimed in a sentence that the private sector was given the

room to participate: *Private companies were contracted to ensure technical inspection of vehicles* (Lines 815-16). However, top level road safety officers blamed the private firms for the poor performance they had; for example, they said forgery of vehicle quality assuring certificates could be found in the black market. Hence, this could not be counted as a success story.

On the other hand, the road safety work of the previous plan period was constructed as quite encouraging; the document claimed that *deaths due to road traffic accidents decreased from 104 in 2004/5 to 52 per 10,000 accidents at the end of the plan period* (Line 814-15), though I had doubts on the accuracy of the figure; for example, while Federal Police reported road traffic fatalities of the year 2012/2013 as only 3362, WHO estimated the figure of the same year at 23,837, which is over seven times more than the police reported figure (2015, p. 130). The strategy plan examined earlier showed the seriousness of the problem more than any improvement. Overall, the document positioned road safety performance of the government favorably.

Excerpt 34

Strategic Direction: *Considering the relatively low vehicle density in the country, the number of traffic accidents is very high. Preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the resulting loss of human life and property, is imperative and timely. Accordingly, an integrated traffic security and modern traffic management system, supported by information technology, will be developed and implemented. (GTP, 2010, p. 79)*

Objectives: *A main objective of the transportation sub-sector is to ensure that the public transport system is efficient and affordable so that the travel time of particularly the rural populations is reduced and they have more time for productive activities. A second main objective is that the urban transport system is efficient, secured and well integrated. A further objective is to build the effectiveness of regulatory bodies by putting in place an improved legal and regulatory framework. An effective institutional framework will help to ensure private transport service providers are competent and provide proper standards of service. The human resource capacity for better management and service delivery will be developed. A national data base for freight and public transport will be created that will reduce the time processing administrative requirements and the costs of freight transport (Lines 819-33)*

The extract above, Excerpt 34, begins with the last (third) paragraph of the strategic directions section of the GTP I. In this section of the plan we read that *preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the resulting loss of human life and property is imperative and timely* (Lines 820-21). However, who was to take the responsibility of achieving this *imperative and timely* duty was not clear; the agent was nominalized as *preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the*

resulting loss of human life and property. Moreover, the sentence that followed it promised the implementation of *traffic security and traffic management system, supported by information technology* (Lines 821-23); these proposed systems were qualified with the loaded adjectives *integrated* and *modern*, but only for exaggeration. None of them was there even a year after end of the plan period. Hence, the claim that the government made did not translate into practice. Furthermore, if we went down to the objectives section and read what was planned to be done specifically in relation to this *imperative* and *timely* issue, we would not find them being of direct significance to road safety: the first main objective was ensuring that *the public transport system is efficient and affordable* (Lines 824-25), the second was making *urban transport system efficient, secured and well integrated* (Lines 826-27), the third was *building the effectiveness of regulatory bodies by putting in place an improved legal and regulatory framework* (Lines 828-29), etc. They were more for improving travel speed and service efficiency than for road safety.

Of course, in the major targets sub-section of the objectives section (that was put in a tabular form), we could see the set target of reducing traffic accident death rate. It was aspired to bring it down from 70 (which was the figure in 2009/10) to 27 in 2014/15 (per 10,000 people). The measurement it said was *per 10,000 people* while it should have been *per 10,000 vehicles*; that the measurement was based on number of vehicles could be inferred from the first sentence that was constructed as: *Considering the relatively low vehicle density in the country, the number of traffic accidents is very high* (Lines 819-20). If we considered it as minor/typing mistake and simply took the figure as if it were *per 10,000 vehicles*, we would still face a further problem. In the performance evaluation section of the same document, we read: *deaths due to road traffic accidents decreased from 104 in 2004/5 to 52 per 10,000 accidents at the end of the plan period* (Lines 814-15). End of the plan period means beginning of the next, which was 2009/10. However, the figure put for the beginning (i.e., 2009/10) was *70 per 10,000 people* (and not *52 per 10,000 accidents*). Why all these varied figures in a plan document which should have been straightforward for ease of understanding? Considering the nature of the document, that it was the grand plan for the nation and one which was at the forefront of the country's political and media discourse over the past five years, it would be so difficult to take it as a simple typing error here also. If we preferred to see just the work performed neglecting all the statistical mess, we would still find it lagging behind, being too far from the proposed figure; as was stated earlier, the rate at present is over 60 per 10,000 vehicles.

Excerpt 35

Implementing Strategies: *To achieve the above objectives and targets for the transport services sub-sector, world-class regulatory and service delivery systems will be introduced. National logistics coordination excellence and information centres will be built, while specialized human resource development in road transport will also be given attention. A rural transport expansion package will be designed and implemented. An incentive structure for stakeholders who participate in the sub-sector will be created. Improvements will be made to traffic management. An organizational system for control and integration of public transport associations will be developed; it will include a system for commercial companies to encourage them to import new automobiles and to address the needs of those who need special assistance. A modern traffic flow operations centre with the latest information technology will be built. A road safety council will be constituted, operational at federal, regional and local levels, to initiate and coordinate road safety projects and programs and build a national road transportation data base. (Lines 834-46)*

Excerpt 35 dealt with the implementing strategies planned to have been used to achieve the objectives and targets that were set for the transport services sub-sector. It started by declaring the plan of introducing *world-class regulatory and service delivery systems* (Line 835). It means that during the plan period the country would have established a transport service sector which could be counted among the best in the world. At least nine specific areas to have been addressed were listed regarding which aspects of the sector the country would have introduced in order to have the claimed standard. Had they been put into practice, most of them would have contributed to improving the nation's road safety. It could have been, therefore, possible to assume that the claimed *world-class regulatory and service delivery system* (Line 835) had come true. However, except for the last one, which was about constituting RSCs at the federal, regional and local levels (Lines 844-46), none of them was performed. Even with regard to the last one, although councils at the federal and regional levels were constituted, effectively working local councils were nonexistent, at least in the capital, Addis Ababa. Hence, the GTP's section which treated the road safety issue could in general be understood as an exaggerated claim which was practically far from the reality on the ground. Maybe it was incorporated in the plan with a very idealistic ambition, just because of a good understanding of the gravity of the problem and with an innocent interest of eliminating it soon. Of course, GTP I in general was frequently cited as an ambitious and expanded plan.

To conclude, several sections of GTP I had treated the road safety problem of the country and what was planned to address it over the plan period; that the issue was given such a prominent

position was quite interesting. In this regard, considering the fact that the GTP was an important top level political document of the nation, it could be implied that the government had some level of commitment to addressing the problem. However, there were several flawed claims one could observe in the document in relation to road safety; firstly, the document contained several claims which did not materialize. Secondly, numbers were used misleadingly, and that could probably have been intentional, as the government's way of presenting the self as a responsible and committed organ. Otherwise, it could be because the system that was responsible for addressing the issue was not competent enough to tackle the problem using the knowledge/belief system by which the policy was formulated, as it was stated by participants whose related constructions are analyzed below. If the last possibility were the reason, why did the system want to stay with a duty it was not able to handle competently? The reason could better be stated as a concern for power, i.e., an interest in continuing with the hegemonic position that people (organs assumed to be responsible for handling the issue) held. Analysis based on additional data regarding government institutions' and officials' claims of positive role they had to addressing the road safety problem will further develop this proposition.

Like the claim made by their documents, the NRSSP (2011) and GTP I (2010) in particular, key officials of the GIs also made establishment of the NRSC and its extensions at the Regional and Local levels as indicators of the positive role of the government to addressing the road safety problem. They positioned members of the council as key contributors of the safety work (of course with varying degrees of emphasis). Moreover, the RSSs of GIs constructed education and enforcement as areas they focused on to addressing the problem. However, in their constructions of their role to road safety, these officials employed a number of fallacious arguments that revealed the reality on the ground was different from the claims. These issues are treated below.

1. The construction of the NRSC and its extensions

In relation to addressing the road safety problem in the country, most RSSs of GIs constructed the role of government offices that were being led by the NRSC, favorably. The discourse participants constructed in support of what the government was doing to road safety includes: the establishment of a NRSC, the necessity of addressing the problem in integration, the efforts of strengthening enforcement and education, and the passing of new rules/regulations and revision of existing ones for traffic control, for education and for other road safety related purposes. As

could be seen in the extracts below, the participants positioned repeatedly and emphatically that, being led by the NRSC, RSSs of GI were engaged in the task of ensuring road safety.

In their comments on practical works these RSSs of GIs did to address the road safety problem, the participants defended almost all RSSs they claimed to have been working under the Council as if they were discharging their responsibilities effectively. This is how some were positioned:

Excerpt 36

ሁሉም ጥረቶች እያደረጉ ነው / all are exerting their efforts (Line 926)

ሁሉም የራሱን ጥረቶች ያደርጋል / each is trying its best - (Line 929)

ሁሉም የየራሱን ኮንትሪብዩት ያደርጋል / each is contributing its share (Lines 929-30)

የበለጠ ለዚህ ጉዳይ ትኩረት ሰጥተው እየተንቀሳቀሱ ያሉ / they are paying even more attention to it (Line 936)

እነዚህ አካላት የበለጠ እየተንቀሳቀሱ ያሉ መሆኑን ያመለክታል / these institutions are on a better move (Line 939)

ቋሚ የመንገድ ደንበኝነትን የሚመለከት አፈሰ አልነበረም አሁን ቋሚ አፈሰ ተፈጥሯል / there wasn't permanent office for road safety but now it is established (Lines 799-800)

ተመጣጣኝ ነው ባይባልም የተወሰነ ለመነሻ የሚሆን የበጀት ድጋፍ አለ / though it couldn't be considered as sufficient there is some budget support that is enough to start with (Lines 800-01)

እነዚህ ሁሉ ሲታይ እንዳጠቃላይ ለውጦች አሉ ማለት እምንችለው በነዚህ መነሻነት ነው / if you see all these, it is based on them that we could in general say there are improvements (Lines 805-06)

It could be observed from the constructions in Excerpt 36 that no distinctions were made of the RSSs of GIs working under the Council; the inclusive quantifiers used in each case (*all, each, more attention*, etc) would not give room for one to cast doubts against the positively constructed roles of the sectors. Hence, the RSSs were constructed as if they were causing positive change.

As is put in a tabular form in Excerpt 37 below, in his detailed evaluation of the RSSs which were involved in the NRSC, a key RSS listed out about seven top level institutions as key road safety players in the country. These offices were construed as if they were sharing the road safety work of the country: *all the seven have been given a share of the entire traffic safety work* (Lines 888-89). It means, if the share of each RSS were summed up, the result was the overall road safety work of the country. A similar construction in relation to the working together of these stakeholders was, *it is impossible to move the agenda forward leaving one of them or the other* (Lines 889-90). However, all of them were from government offices only. Apart from a

favorable construction of these RSSs of GIs, it also would mean that other institutions and individuals were not given the floor to share the task even if they might have something to contribute; thus the room for the private firms and the majority road users was totally closed off.

Excerpt 37

No.	Institutions	What it is (supposed to be) working
1	Federal Traffic Police	የትራፊክ ህጉን የማስፈጸም ሥራ ይሰራል የማስፈጸም ሥራ ይሰራል ... የህግ ጥሰቶችን ይቆጣጠራል ተገቢውን ቅጣት ይሰጣል / has the task of effecting the traffic rule ... works on their implementation ... so it controls violations of the rule and imposes the proper penalty (Lines 891-92)
2	Transport Authority	- የተሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት ያሸከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት እነዚህ እነዚህ የሙያ ክህሎቶችን እነዚህ እነዚህን ... ይሰጣል / offers such things as vehicles' technical fitness drivers' technical fitness ... offers these professional skills (Lines 893-94) - ያው በዋናነት መንገድ ትራንስፖርት አለ / obviously road transport is the main one (L. 924)
3	Roads Authority	መንገዶች ለዚህ ለትራፊክ ደህንነቱ ወይም አደጋውን ከመቀነስ አንፃር ምን ሆነው መሰራት አለባቸው ብለን ሃሳቡን ስናነሳ ይህንንም ጉዳዩ ነው ብሎ ወስዶ ቤቱ እሚሰራ መንገዶች ባለሥልጣን ነው / when we raise issues of roads which are safe from traffic accident or when we say they should be constructed in such a way that they reduce the accident it is the roads authority which takes them as its own responsibility and works (Lines 894-97)
4	Ministry of Health	ድንገት ከዚህ ቁጥጥር ውጭ ወጥቶ አደጋ ቢከሰት የትራፊክ አደጋ ላይ የጤና የአካል ጉዳት ሲደርስ ደግሞ የህክምና አገልግሎት እነዚህን እሚሰጡት የጤና ጥበቃ ሚኒስቴር በስሩ ያሉ ጤና ጣቢያዎች ከሊኒኮች አገልግሎት እንዲሰጡ አሉም ይሰራል / if things go beyond this control and accident suddenly occurs and if there is any health problem or physical injury during this accident then health service is needed this ... is provided by ... health centers clinics ... so it also works (Lines 997-900)
5	Roads Fund Office	አካል ጉዳት ከተከሰተ ደግሞ አንድ ተጠቃሚ ወይም ትራፊክ የትራንስፖርት አገልግሎት ተጠቃሚ ላይ ስለዚህ የኢንሹራንስ አገልግሎት እንዲኖረው ደግሞ ... ይሄ አካል ይሄ ሦስተኛ ወገን ኢንሹራንስ እሚባለውን ተሽከርካሪዎች እንዲገቡ አድርጎ ገንዘቡን የሚሰበስብ አካል ነው ... ይሄ የመንገድ ፈገፍ እሚባለው ድርጅት መንገዶች እራሱ እንዲሰጡ እ ለሰፊቱ ለሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴ ይሄን ኢንሴንቲቭ እሚያረግ ድርጅት ነው / if a physical injury occurs on a road user or... on transport service user...in order for him to have insurance coverage... this office obliges vehicles to have third party insurance coverage and is responsible to collect the money this office... also ... influences roads authority focus on safety by way of offering it incentives (Lines 900-05)
6	Ministry of Education	ለተማሪዎች በትምህርት ቤቶች በከበባት መልክ የትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴን እንዲከታተሉ ከበባ አቋቁመውም ትራፊክ ፖሊሶችንም እንዲያግዙ ተማሪዎች ወደ ትምህርት ቤትም እንዲህ ሲገቡ ሲወጡ ያን ስራ እንዲሰሩ በማድረግ ግንዛቤው በተማሪዎች ደረጃና እዛ ባለው ማህበረሰብ እንዲኖር የማድረግ ሥራ ይሰራል / it has the task of creating awareness of traffic safety in students and the staff working there by establishing traffic clubs and letting them work on traffic safety (Lines 905-07)
7	Government Communication Affairs Office	በሚዲያ ደግሞ ለህብረተሰቡ በሰፊው የትራፊክ ደህንነት መረጃ ወይም ግንዛቤ እንዲደረስ በማድረግ ደግሞ የመንግስት ኮሙኒኬሽን ጉዳዮች ጽሕፈት ቤት ድርሻውን ይወጣል / the media by disseminating traffic safety information widely for the mass this way ... discharges its responsibility (Lines 907-09)

The Simple Present tense was used throughout the construction of these GIs: *controls*, *imposes*, *offers*, *takes*, *obliges*, *influences* and *discharges* implying that the tasks the named RSSs engaged in were habitual/natural to them. Of the many GIs that could have contributed to road safety, only seven were mentioned, neglecting others that could have key contribution to road safety.

For example, MoUDHC should have been included for it could be difficult to get enough space both for pedestrians and vehicle mobility and parking lots; however, it was not mentioned at all. Again, while the police were put first in the list, GCAO, which was able to mobilize at least the public mass media for the dissemination of road safety information and lesson, was put last in the list. On the other hand, of all these players, it was only police and transport authority that were positioned to the front; this would mean that others were lagging behind.

The extracts below are further evidence of the favorable position some members of the NRSC were given in relation to the role they had to addressing the road safety problem in Ethiopia.

Excerpt 38

የፌዴራል ፖሊስ የትራፊክ ህጉን የማስፈፀም ሥራ ይሰራል፤ የማስፈፀም ሥራ ይሰራል፤ ስለዚህ የህግ ጥሰቶችን ይቆጣጠራል፤ ተገቢውን ቅጣት ይሰጣል / the federal traffic police has the task of effecting the traffic rule, it works on their implementation; so it controls violations of the rule and imposes the proper penalty (Lines 891-92)

ቁጥጥሩን በቴክኖሎጂ ለመደገፍ እየተደረጉ ያሉ ጥረቶች መሳሪያዎች የመግዛት፤ ሰዎችን የማሰልጠን፤ እንዲህ እንዲህ የመሳሰሉት ነገሮች፤ አዳዲስ ህጎችን የማውጣት፤ የትራፊክ ቁጥጥሩ፤ ለግንዛቤው፤ ለምኑ ለምኑ የሚጠቅሙ አዳዲስ ህጎችን የማውጣት፤ የነበሩትን ሪቪዬዝ የሚድረግ ስራዎች ሁሉ የተሰሩባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ / there are efforts of strengthening the control through technology, like the purchase of instruments, the training of manpower, passing of new rules and regulations for the traffic control (L. 802-04)

ሁልጊዜ ከፊት እምናየው፤ የትራፊክ ደህንነትን በሚመለከት በቅድሚያ እምናየው ፖሊስ ነው፤ በተለምዶ እምናቀው ይሄንን ነው አሁን በዚህ በኮሚቴ ሥራም የማስተውለው የፖሊስን ድርሻ ጎልቶ ነው እሚያየው ጎልቶ እማየው የፖሊስን ድርሻ ነው / what we all the time see to the front on the issue of traffic safety is the police; this is what we know from experience. even now I observe in the work of this committee the share of the police being superior; I see the share of the police being more vivid (Lines 919-21)

ያን ያህል በነጥብ አድርጎ ከሪፖርት የሆነ ኢቫሎዩሽን ባይሆንም፤ ካለው ከችግሩ አንጻር፤ የትራፊክ ፖሊስ፤ በዋናነት የፌዴራል ፖሊስ፤ የተሻለ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ / though there is no as such critical evaluation conducted based on set criteria in relation to the problem, the traffic police, mainly the federal police is now working with far better efforts (Lines 1242-44)

ፖሊስ በግሉ ለምሳሌ በማህበረሰብ አቀፍ አገልግሎት ላይ የሚሰራቸው በርካታ ስራዎች አሉ፤ ስለወንጀልም አስከፊነት ስለትራፊክ አደጋም አስከፊነት ባገኛቸው አጋጣሚዎች ሁሉ፤ አሁን ታች ድረስ እስከ ብሎክ ወርዶ ተደራጅቶ አቄር በማድረግ ባገኛቸው አጋጣሚዎች ይሄንን ስራ ይሰራል / the police on its part has been engaged in a lot of works like through its community services; using every opportunity that stretches down to block level, it engages in awareness works regarding severity of crime and severity of accidents (Lines 1271-73)

በዋናነት እንግዲህ ለዚህ ነገር ትኩረት ሰቶ እየሰራ ያለው በአሁን ሰአት፤ መንገድ ትራንስፖርትም በተመሳሳይ እየሰራ ነው፤ ፌዴራል ፖሊስም እንደዚሁ / the one working on this issue paying particular attention at this moment (is) road transport; (it) is working hard; in a similar fashion, the same is true for the federal police (Lines 930-32)

የተሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት፣ የሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት፣ እነዚህ እነዚህ የሙያ ክህሎቶችን፣ እነዚህ እነዚህን ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን ይሰጣል / transport authority offers such things as vehicles' technical fitness drivers' technical fitness it offers these professional skills (Lines 893-94)

እንግዲህ አሁን ያው በዋናነት መንገድ ትራንስፖርት አለ፤ ፌዴራል ፖሊስ አለ / well obviously road transport is the main one; the federal police is there (Line 924)

መንገድ ትራንስፖርትም ... ጥሩ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረጉ ነው ያሉትና ከዚህ አንፃር ስንመለከት እነዚህ አካላት የበለጠ እየተንቀሳቀሱ ያሉ መሆኑን ያመለክታል / road transport are also on a good move (.) when we see it with this regard it shows that these institutions are on a better move (Lines 938-39)

In most of the extracts above, the police were given the lion's share of the road safety work. Although their role of educating the public on the safe use of the road was mentioned, most of their role was constructed using the adjectives like *superior*, *vivid*, and *far better efforts*. The other GI that was mentioned next to the police was Transport Authority. It was constructed as if it were *on a good move*, and *the main one*, maybe because of its roles as in licensing of drivers and investigating vehicles' technical fitness. Moreover, while only two of the institutions were singled out as best of all, the one which was constructed as of *vivid* and *superior* role was an institution for enforcing/controlling. Thus to the participants, road safety was a task of the government and its ruling apparatus. Civic organizations, opinion leaders, individuals and private sectors, some of which were listed in the proclamation for the establishment of the Addis Ababa RSC, were not in the list of the key players which the participants mentioned.

2. Enforcement and education as key areas of focus of RSSs of GIs

When participants were asked what the road safety task should have focused on so as to address the problem, they emphasized on the necessity of *education* and *enforcement* targeting drivers and pedestrians. As will be discussed, this was recurrently stated by most of the stakeholders.

Excerpt 39

ግንዛቤው ደግና ደረጃ ላይ የደረሰበት ሁኔታ አለ፤ በተለይ ወደገጠር ወጣ ሰትል በከፍተኛነት ያለው ሕዝብ በጣም ጥሩ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም የምታይበት ሁኔታ አለ / the awareness has reached an encouraging level; especially if you go to the rural area you could see people in the countryside have very good road use behavior (Lines 757-59)

ይሄ ኢንፎርሽን መስጠት ይፈልጋል ተከታታይነት ያለው የግንዛቤ የመቆቆር ስራ ይፈልጋል / this requires enforcement and continuous teaching the task of continuous knocking (Lines 774)

አንደኛው ቁጥጥርን ማጠናከር አለብን የሚል ነው፤ ስለዚህ ትልቁን በጀት ለቁጥጥር ስራ ማዋል አለብን፡፡ ቁጥጥራችን በቴክኖሎጂ ውጤት የተደገፈ መሆኑን አለበት፤ በበቂ የሰው ሐይል፤ በበቂ ስልጠና፤ በቂ ግንዛቤ ተይዞ፤ በቂ ዕውቀት ተይዞ መሰራት አለበት ተብሎ፤ ዋናው ቁጥጥሩ ባንደኛ ደረጃ መጠናከር አለበት ተብሎ የተቀመጠ ጉዳይ ነው፤ ይሄ ትክክለኛ አስተሳሰብ ነው / the first one says we should strengthen the enforcement; so we have to allocate the greater sum of budget for the work of enforcement. our enforcement has to be

assisted with technological products, it is decided that the work has to be done by sufficient man power, with adequate training with appropriate understanding; the enforcement is ranked as an issue of top priority; it is said it has to be strengthened, and this is rational thought (Lines 854-59)

ሰለዚህ ዋናዎቹ የመጀመሪያው ቁጥጥር መጠናከር አለበት፤ ሁለተኛው ደም ግንዛቤው ጎን ለጎን መዳበር አለበት፤ እነዚህ ከተደረጉ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን በከፍተኛ ደረጃ መቀነስ ይቻላል / so the main ones are firstly the enforcement has to be strengthened and secondly side by side the awareness has to be raised; if these are done it is possible to decrease road traffic injuries significantly (Lines 882-84)

ሰዉ ውስጡ እስኪገባ ድረስ የተጀመረው ስለትራፊክ ደህንነት የማሳወቁ ስራ የሚያገባው አካል ማለት ነው፤ በዋነኝነት የሚያገባው አካል ይሄንን ነገር ሰዉ አእምሮ ውስጥ ገብቶ እስኪያቃው ድረስ ሰለቸኝ ሳይል መስራት አለበት / the responsible sector should continue teaching the public the already started traffic safety education until it is inherently absorbed; mainly the responsible sector should continue the work tirelessly until it enters into the minds of the people and alerts them (Line 945-48)

ህግ አስፈፃሚው አካል፤ ማለትም እኛጋ፤ ምክንያቱም እነዚህ ነገሮች ካልተደረጉ በስተቀር ነገሮች ልቅ ከሆኑ መስመር ሊይዙ አይችሉም / in line with this should go the enforcement which is ours unless these measures are taken things could run wild and cannot get the right track (Lines 948-49)

ኢሽን ግን የእግረኛም መንገድ እያለ በዛ ውስጥ ነው እግረኛ እሚሄደው፤ ይሄ ለምን ሆነ ብለን ስንል ደግሞ ኢንፎርሰመንቱ ስለሌለ ነው። ምናልባት ህጉን የማስተግበር ስራው ቢኖር ኖሮ፤ እግረኛውን እምንቀጣው ቢሆን እዛ ውስጥ አይገባም፤ ቀለበት አይዘልም።። ዜርፎር እዛ ውስጥ አልገባም ማለት ሴፍ አረግነው ማለት ነው ሰውዬውን / even in the presence of pavement pedestrians enter the road and if we ask why, it is just because there is no enforcement; maybe if there were enforcement, if we were to punish the pedestrian, he wouldn't enter the road or jump into the ring road. therefore he doesn't enter the road means we have saved him (Line 953-56)

ሰለዚህ እነዚህ ነገሮች ተጠናክረው ተጋግዘው ሲሄዱ ነው ውጤታማ ነገር እናያለን ብዬ እማስበውና እነዚህ መስራት አለባቸው፤ እነዚህ ከተሰሩ ለውጥ ይመጣል። ሰለዚህ ፔድስቲሪያኑም ላይ አሽከርካሪውም ላይ ሳይሰለፉ መስራት መቻል አለበት ህጉን ከማስተግበር ጋራ ተያይዞ / so I believe we could see results if these things are strengthened and coordinated; so these things should be done because there could be change only if they are performed; therefore it should tirelessly be worked both on the pedestrian and on the driver in line with the enforcement (Line 957-60)

የህግ አካባቢ ማስከበር አነስተኛነት ሲባል ደግሞ፤ አሁንም ህግ ማስከበር አቅማችን በጣም ዝቅተኛ ነው፤ የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነው ህግ እንዲያስከብር እሚጠበቅበት፤ እሱ ያለው በብዛት አነስተኛ ነው። በየቦታው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ሊገኝ አይችልም፤ የማስከበር አቅም ራሱ ግንዛቤ እጥረት አለ፤ በቴክኖሎጂ የተደገፈ አለመሆኑ፤ እነዚህ እነዚህ ሁሉ የራሳቸው አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው / by poor capacity of enforcement, we mean our enforcement capacity is still very poor; it is the traffic police who are expected to ensure that the rules are respected, but their number is limited and so traffic police could not be found everywhere, and there is problem of capacity and this lack of awareness and it is not assisted by technology; all these have their own contribution (Lines 1209-13)

ስለትራፊክ አደጋ ኢሺን አደጋዎቹን ጭምር በማሳየት በፊልም በተደገፈ መቀስቀሻ ማለት ነው፤ ለማስጠንቀቅ ለማስጋት በሚል የሚካሄዱ ፕረዶች አሉ / there are efforts of creating awareness about the traffic accident even by using films made on accident scenes in order for them to be careful and to warn them of the danger (Lines 1266-67)

ስለወንጀልም አስከፊነት፤ ስለትራፊክ አደጋም አስከፊነት፤ ባገኛቸው አጋጣሚዎች ሁሉ አሁን ታች ድረስ እስከ ብሎክ ወርዶ፤ ተደራጅቶ አፄር በማድረግ ባገኛቸው አጋጣሚዎች ይሄንን ስራ ይሰራል / using every opportunity that

stretches down to block level, it (the traffic police) engages in awareness works regarding the severity of crime and severity of accidents (Lines 1272-73)

ቁጥጥሩ የላለ ነው፤ የግንዛቤ ማስጨበጫ ስራዎችም እንዲሁ / the control is loose; there are also gaps with the awareness creation work (Lines 1335-36)

ይሄንን ወደዚህ ደረጃ እሚያደርስ ግንዛቤ ይዘዋል ወይ ነው ዋናው ጥያቄ፤ ያቁታል እሚለውን እንቀበላለን / the main question is do they have the awareness; we accept the claim that goes they know it (Lines 1356-57)

Education and enforcement were areas RSSs of GIs claimed to have been working on hard and succeeded in: *the awareness has reached an encouraging level* (Line 757). They emphasized on the necessity of further efforts on road safety that focused on *enforcement* and *education*. In *this requires enforcement and continuous teaching, the task of continuous knocking* (Line 774), for example, the metaphor of *knocking* was employed to magnify this interest of continuing with the practice. A committed person continuously and patiently knocks at a door until it is opened for him/her; likewise, the task of teaching road users about safer road use and penalizing them if they did not abide by it should have been performed continuously and patiently until the intended response was gained. However, it could also be inferred from this construction that despite the continuous effort, the kind of change anticipated was not yet observed; a bold construction of such a claim could be seen in *mainly the responsible sector should continue the work tirelessly until it enters into the minds of the people and alerts them* (Lines 947-48).

In order to emphasize their firm favorable position to *education* and *enforcement* to ensure road safety, participants qualified them using expressions of the kind *the main ones* and *significantly*, and ordinal numbers *firstly* and *secondly* as in: *so the main ones are firstly the enforcement has to be strengthened and secondly side by side the awareness has to be raised* (Lines 882-84). The participants' commitment to imparting a belief/knowledge system that advocated *education* and *enforcement* as the best solution to the road safety problem was strengthened by modal expressions used, particularly *should* and *has to*, and by adverbs like *inherently*, *significantly* and *tirelessly*.

Several approaches employed to creating awareness on the *severity* of RTAs and to causing change in road use behavior were mentioned; for example, face-to-face communication: *using every opportunity that stretches down to block level* (Line 1272); mass media: *using films made on accident scenes* (Line 1266); fear appeal: *to warn them of the danger* (Line 1267). Although

continuous road safety lessons were (being) provided using the media and schools, change in safe road use was so minimal, as could be inferred from the prevalence of RTAs. However, RSSs of GIs preferred to continue with the same practice. If there were any impact due to the education and enforcement work they were engaged in, where could it go? That they were not successful could be implied from their constructions: *there are also gaps with the awareness creation work* (Lines 1335-36); *in the presence of pavement pedestrians enter the road and if we ask why, it is just because there is no enforcement* (Lines 953-54); *our enforcement capacity is still very poor ... there is problem of capacity and this lack of awareness* (Lines 1209-13). RSSs that claimed road users' awareness *has reached an encouraging level* (Line 757) questioned if there were any road safety awareness: *the main question is, do they have the awareness* (Lines 1356-57).

While enforcement was employed on vehicle holders/drivers, its execution on pedestrians was also proposed (Lines 953-55); pedestrians were constructed as if they entered the lane only because they were not punished to prohibit them from doing so. Penalizing pedestrians, while it was among the key areas advocated for effective road safety work in Ethiopia, has been an area of contestation over the past decade. The regulation for fining traffic rule violating pedestrians was enacted, and in 2011 attempts of applying it in some of the streets/highways of Addis Ababa were made. However, it was only for a few weeks; it did not continue due to reasons that were not clear. According to my informal discussion with a police officer the reasons were related with logistics, like that there was no room for holding people for some time if they did not have (or were not ready to pay) the fines they were penalized for violating traffic rules, particularly for crossing the Ring Road by jumping the guardrails. However, in the absence of facilities like wide enough and comfortable sidewalks, accessible crossing bridges, readable zebra markings, etc. which users needed seriously, rushing for pedestrians' penalty could not be ethically acceptable.

The participants mentioned the introduction/application of technology in the road safety work; however, they emphasized on employing it for effective *enforcement: our enforcement has to be assisted with technological products* (Line 855). With the help of advanced instruments they listed, they said, *we could easily control rule violating drivers and the repetitive violators since they couldn't be as they wish, changing their addresses* (Lines 965-66). Hence, the future road safety work of these technology employing institutions was mainly for *disciplining road users*.

The role of the police was constructed as that of effecting traffic rules, only by *controlling violations* and *imposing proper penalty* (Line 892).

Moreover, it was claimed that road users *all need to have shared awareness and uniform attitude toward the rules and regulations ratified to ensure its effecting* (Lines 134-35). In other words, users needed to be informed of the rules and informed of the expectation to abide by them; this was a way of involving them in *a traffic system* which would, as a result, become *free from accidents*. It was asserted that the position *has to be understood in such a broader sense* (Lines 137-38). Working on *education/enforcement* to ensure road safety is undoubtedly essential; however, if it is taken as the only solution for the road safety problem in Ethiopia, the possibility of changing the existing scenario would be very much unlikely. As Elvik et al. explained, “the police cannot enforce all traffic signs at all times,” (2009, p. 495). They further stated that “the current amount of police enforcement is not sufficient to ensure 100% respect for road traffic legislation” (Elvik et al., 2009, p.868). According to them, penalties and imprisonment did not seem to have any effect on the number of accidents. Instead, for better effect of the police enforcement and sanction, they recommended employing combined programs integrating sanction, education and monitoring. This was what road users also expected of the police; as could be seen in the upcoming sections, a major part of the police’s duty should have been educating road users and the public than rushing all the time to punishment. Thus, unlike the claim put in the NRSC (and its extensions), RSSs GIs were exercising dominantly the individual road user approach that targeted on shaping the road use behavior of drivers and pedestrians.

A related concept is the participants’ silence (or giving just a passing remark) about other road safety practices (like road and vehicle engineering and EMS); since they were committed to *education* and *enforcement*, they did not want to emphasize the other key areas road safety work should have incorporated in line with the claims of systems theory. The most probable reason is the other measures were not part of the knowledge/belief system and practices of RSSs of GIs.

3. Engineering as contributor to the road safety problem

As could be seen in Excerpt 40, RSSs of GIs mentioned gaps observed with road engineering as contributor to the problem. However, their construction about its role and their commitment to showing its significance to road safety was not as strong as it was for enforcement and education.

Excerpt 40

መንገዱም ራሱ፣ ከኢንጅነሪንግ ጀምሮ ነው የተሳካና የተሟላ ደህንነት ያለው እንዲሆን የማድረግ ሥራ መስራት ማለት ነው / the road itself beginning from its engineering needs to be effectively and fully safe; such work has to be done (Line 078)

ቱቦች ባለመዘጋታቸው ቦቶች እነዚህ የውሃ ማፍሰሻ እንትኖሩ ባግባቡ ባለመታነፃቸው በኢንጅነሪንግ ፎልት ስተት በተለያዩ ምክንያቶች ወይም ሰዎች የግንባታ ስራ በሚሰሩበት ጊዜ አስፈላጊውን ጥንቃቄ ለሌሎች አደጋ እንዳያስከትሉ አድርገው ባለመጠቀማቸው የሚደርሰውን አደጋ በሙሉ ማለት ነው / it includes every accident that occurs because sewers are not closed or the sewerage systems are not constructed properly due to engineering fault for various reasons or when people on the work of construction if they do not take the necessary precaution in such a way that they won't be causing accident on others (Lines 339-41)

ለምሳሌ አሁን አንዱ ያው ኢንጅነሪንግ ብለን ያነሳነው ነገር አለ። የተሰሩት አልፎ ተሰርተዋል እነሱን ሞዲፋይ ማድረግ እሚቻል ከሆነ ያው የተወሰነ በተለይ ከእግረኛ መንገድ ጋራ ተያይዞ የእግረኛ መንገዶቻችን አጥር ያላቸው ቢሆኑ አንዱ ኢንጅነሪንግ ላይ የሚሰራው ቀጣይ የሚሰሩ ስራዎች ናቸው። አሁን በእርግጥ የሚሰሩ በሙሉ የእግረኛ መንገድ አላቸው፤ በተገቢው የተሟላ እየሆኑ እየተሰሩ ነው ያሉት / for instance there is one which we have mentioned, the engineering part. those which were constructed earlier are already constructed; if it is possible to modify them somehow, especially in connection with pedestrians' pavements like if pavements were with guardrail, this is among the future engineering works. of course all the roads being constructed recently have pavements for pedestrians; they are being constructed fully and properly (Lines 940-45)

ወጣ ብለን ስናይ አስፓልቶቻችን፣ ከተሽከርካሪው ይልቅ ለእግረኛ የተሰሩ የሚመስሉባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ፤ አንዳንድ ቦታዎች በእርግጥ የመንገዱ አሰራር ለእግረኛም የሚሆን መንገድ አለመኖሩ ይሆናል / when we go out and see our asphalted roads, sometimes it looks as if they were constructed for pedestrians instead of for vehicles; at some places of course the way the road is constructed is like there is no path for pedestrian (Lines 950-53)

In the road itself beginning from its engineering needs to be effectively and fully safe; such work has to be done (Line 078), a fully safe road as a consequence of some work of engineering was claimed. However, except for a general call for such a work, details were not provided as to how that could have been realized. Moreover, another participant constructed the issue as: *for instance, there is one which we have mentioned, the engineering part (Line 940)* without any earlier mention and/or further discussion of the engineering issue. Again, *engineering fault* on roads was mentioned as accident contributory factor, like the case of open/poorly constructed sewerage systems. At various places in the city, poorly constructed or totally open ditches of the city's sewerage and/or telecommunication's cable system were observed pushing pedestrians to use the lanes of vehicles, or vice versa (pushing vehicles to pedestrians' sidewalks). However, we could not see any constructions on how they would be targets of the future road safety work. Instead, as a way of detaching the self from responsibility, the passive was used as: *sewers are not closed or the sewerage systems are not constructed* (Lines 339-40). Most of all, the

significance of some revision to the designs of the older roads or roads which were *constructed earlier* (Lines 940-41) to incorporate safety was not emphasized. When revision work was expressed, there was not any commitment; it was constructed as if it were possible to do so only *if* that were *possible* (Line 941) and in *future* (Line 943), pushing it away, denying urgency, making it far in time and focus.

Regarding the *roads being constructed recently*, on the other hand, bold confirmations were given that they all were *constructed with pavements... fully and properly* (Lines 944-45). Practically, though, such a generalization was too hasty to come up with; needless to say, some newly constructed roads in Addis Ababa had pedestrians' pavements; however, it was also common to find pavements which were uncomfortable to walk on compared to lanes for vehicles (because, for example, the former were made of cobblestone while the latter were made of asphalt) or the pavements were occupied by things that obstructed mobility. Moreover, at some places, while lanes for vehicles were constructed, pavements for pedestrians were delayed or were totally neglected: *at some places, of course the way the road is constructed is like there is no path for pedestrians* (Lines 952-53). As a result, pedestrians might be forced to move into the vehicles' tracks, for which they should not have been blamed. Hence, facilitating their safe mobility should have been part of both the rehabilitative work of older roads and construction of new roads.

The NRSSPE made it clear that the work should recognize the complexity of the problem, and that apart from education and enforcement incorporation of other issues like road safety management, engineering (safe roads strategy) and emergency medical services were proposed. The road safety management was for coordinating the overall road safety works, including design and implementation of policies and legislation both at the federal and regional levels. In relation to road engineering, the strategy document commented on the contribution of the previous work on road safety as negligent, "safety facilities for pedestrians and other vulnerable road users are not given sufficient consideration. Road safety in roads development is largely neglected" (NRSSPE, 2011, p.28). The document detailed the significance for safety consideration in the planning, design, construction and operation of roads. Accordingly, the allocation of 10% of the road infrastructure investment for road safety was proposed. However, as my observation revealed, though there were developments when new roads were constructed,

a number of existing streets in Addis Ababa were not in a position to be recognized as safety oriented. They were not designed in such a way that they accommodate their users, especially the most vulnerable road users' travel demand and cultural values. Particularly older streets of the capital did not have pavements that were constructed properly; they were not leveled and wide enough for the safe mobility of their users. On the other hand, these old streets were too narrow compared to the traffic they occupied; they were quite busy with vehicles, pedestrians and other road users like street vendors and beggars. These users were usually forced, as a result, to share the asphalted part of the road with vehicles, risking their lives.

One good example in relation to the rehabilitative work could be the Bole-Mesqel Square-Mexico Street. Wide enough, comfortable to walk on and attractive sidewalks were constructed, and I observed most pedestrians using them properly, though sometimes street vendors and their clients would crowd the Street, preventing pedestrians from using them properly; as a result, they would be forced to use the lanes for vehicles. The ring road could be taken as a bad example; the road had separated villagers who for decades were living together, sharing most of their social, cultural and religious practices. The fact that crossing bridges on this road were not at shorter intervals was among the causes of terrible accidents being registered on this road; when people wanted to go to the other side of their villages, they would cross the highway taking risks; jumping over the guardrail, they would enter the highway on which vehicles traveled at a speed of 80 to 100 kph.

Similarly, participants mentioned the significance of safe vehicles (which also is a case of engineering) to reducing RTAs in Ethiopia; however, that also was not expressed with commitment and determination as it was the case for enforcement and education. The extracts below constructed technical fitness of vehicles and their contribution to road safety.

Excerpt 41

ለተለያዩ ጉዳዮች በምንቀሳቀስበት ወቅት፣ በእንቅስቃሴያችን መካከል የሚኖሩ በተለይ ከተሽከርካሪና ከመንገድ ጋር የተያያዙ አሉ / when we move for various reasons while we are moving there are accidents we face caused by the vehicle and the road (Lines 096-98)

ተሽከርካሪዎች ለሚያጓጉዟቸው ተሳፋሪዎቻቸው ደህንነት ምቹ መሆን አለባቸው፤ ኖት አንሊ አደጋ፣ አደጋን መከላከል ብቻ አይደለም ተሽከርካሪዎቹ ምቹት ያላቸው መሆን አለባቸው፤ መስኮቶቻቸው ንፋስ እያስገቡ ለእንትን እሚያጋልጧቸው መሆን የለባቸውም፤ ዝናብ በሚዘንብበት ጊዜ ዝናብ እያፈሰሱ የተሳፋሪዎችን ደህንነት የሚያሸማቅቁ መሆን የለባቸውም፤ የተሽከርካሪዎቹ ቴክኒካል ፓርቶች ሙሉ መሆን አለባቸው፤ ሴፍቲያቸው የተረጋገጠ ጎማዎቻቸው ሊሾ መሆን የለባቸውም፡፡ ፎር ዛት ማተር፣ ፍሬኖቻቸው ሙሉ መሆን አለባቸው፡፡ ፍሬቻዎቻቸው ሁሉ መልዕክት አስተላላፊ

ሰለሆኑ የተሟሉ መሆን አለባቸው፤ የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ደህንነት ስንል የተሽከርካሪዎችን ብቃት፤ የሽከርካሪዎችን ብቃት፤ እንዲሁም ደግሞ የመንገዱን ለደህንነት ምቹ መሆን እና የሌሎችንም ደግሞ ተስተናባሪዎች የጋራ መጠቀሚያ ሰለሆነው መንገድ የጋራ ግንዛቤ ወጥ የሆነ አመለካከት / vehicles should be comfortable enough for the passengers they board; it is not only preventing accident vehicles should also be comfortable enough, their windows should not allow the entry of wind that exposes passengers to cold; when it rains they should not be leaking and as a result compromise their passengers' safety; all the technical parts of the vehicles should also be fully checked. their safety needs to be checked; their tires should not be so smoothened (to the level of no frictional force). for that matter, their clutches should also be safe; since their lights are message transmitters, they should also be complete; when we say road transport safety we mean the fitness of the vehicles, the fitness of the driver, and the safety of the road and of all other users since the road is a common share of all users; (Lines 127-35)

ኢቭን በቴክኒክ ችግር ይደርስ፤ በተሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ችግር ይደርሳል ተብሎ የሚባለው ነገር እንኳን አሽከርካሪው ግንዛቤው ከኖረው አብዛኛውን ይቀንሰዋል፤ ኢቭን ከዚያም ውስጥ፡፡ ለምን መኪናውን ከማስነሳቱ በፊት ጅክ አርን ከተነሳ፤ በተገቢው ፍጥነት ከነዳ፤ ምልክቶችን አክብሮ ከነዳ፤ በቴክኒክ ምክንያት እንኳን የሚደርሰውን መከላከል ይችላል፡፡ የቴክኒክ ጉድለት እንዳለው ሲያይ አይነዳውም፤ ወይም እየነዳ ሳለ በተገቢው ፍጥነት ላይ ከሆነ፤ እየነዳ ሳለ የቴክኒክ ችግር እንደተከሰተ ሲያውቅ መቆጣጠር ይችላል / one which is said to happen due to vehicles' technical defect if the driver has the awareness he can minimize the majority of it. because if he checks the vehicle before he starts driving, if he drives with the appropriate speed, if he respects traffic signs, he can protect accident that would occur due to technical defect. when he sees that there is technical defect, he will not drive or while driving when he recognizes any technical defect, if he is with the right speed, he can control it (Lines 874-80)

የተሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት፤ የሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት፤ እነዚህ እነዚህ የሙያ ክህሎቶችን፤ እነዚህ እነዚህን ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን ይሰጣል / transport authority offers such things as vehicles' technical fitness, drivers' technical fitness, it offers these professional skills (Lines 893-94)

የተሽከርካሪው የቴክኒክ ጉድለትም እንደዚሁ አስተዋጽኦ አለው / the vehicle's technical failure has also its own contribution (Lines 1199-1200)

ባገራችን ብዙ አደጋዎች እየተከሰቱ ያለው ከዚህ ውጭ፤ ምንም እንኳን ልንከላከለው እምንችል ብንሆንም፤ በተሽከርካሪው ቴክኒክ ጉድለትም ምክንያት የሚደርሱ አደጋዎችም አሉ፡፡ ምክንያቱም አሽከርካሪዎቻችን መኪናዎቻቸውን ከማስነሳታቸው በፊት ጅክ ማድረግ ያለባቸውን የተሽከርካሪዎቻቸውን የሴፍቲ አካላት ጅክ ስለማያረጉ የተሽከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ጉድለት ይደርሳል፤ በቴክኒክ ጉድለት ምክንያት አደጋ ይደርሳል ማለት ነው / the other reason for the occurrence of many accidents in our country though we should have prevented it there are also accidents caused by vehicles' technical defects. because our drivers do not check safety components of their cars before they start driving, technical defects occur and so accident due to technical failure will follow (Lines 1224-25)

One of the key areas that need significant emphasis to ensuring road safety is vehicle engineering that includes their technical fitness and design, availability of facilities like seat belts and child restraint (WHO, 2015). RSSs of GI mentioned the role of vehicle engineering in general and the fitness of vehicles in particular to ensuring road safety (Lines 128-29, 131, 1199-1200). They stated the contribution of *vehicle's technical failure* to the occurrence of accidents and hence that *the vehicles should be fully checked* (Lines 128-29). In one government document, for example, we read as “private companies were contracted to ensure technical inspection of vehicles” (GTP,

2010, p.13-14). However, the practice did not seem to have been in line with the claim; as one of the RSSs of GI put, one of the reasons *for the occurrence of many accidents in our country ... was vehicles' technical defects* (Lines 1224-25). On their consultative meetings also, RSSs of GIs discussed the case as a serious problem in the country. On the contrary, the issue was constructed as a minor one, to imply that it was not that significant to focus on. The strategy document, for example, downsized fatality rate due to vehicle defects at about 4% (NRSSPE, 2011, p.1). Similarly, it was constructed as: *one which is said to happen due to vehicles' technical defect, if the driver has the awareness he can minimize the majority of it* (Lines 874-75) which has the implication of 'others say RTAs could occur due to vehicles' technical defects, but I do not think so'. Thus, the purpose was by undermining its impact, it was to further emphasize the position that RSSs of GIs held, i.e., enforcement and education. This could have significantly affected the overall road safety work of the country. Systems approach encourages "identifying where there is potential for intervention" (Peden et al., 2004, p.157). Experience of high-income countries shows that it is by "adopting a systems approach to road safety that emphasizes environment, vehicle and road user interventions, rather than solely focusing on direct approaches aimed at changing the behavior of road users" (Peden et al., p.138) that helped them decrease crashes and casualties sharply.

4. Revealing fallacious argumentations RSSs of GIs employed

At some points in their favorable constructions of the road safety work they were engaged in, RSSs of GIs seemed to have admitted their gaps and the need to fill in it since the problem was so serious. For example, it was constructed that the road safety work was both successful in some aspects and lacking in others (Lines 755-58). However, even in so doing, it was only not to lose face that they seemed to have accepted the gaps. As could be evidenced from several extracts, there were a number of fallacies in their evaluation of the road safety work they had done so far. One success that was mentioned was that road users' road safety *awareness has reached an encouraging level* to the extent of resulting in accident reduction (Line 757). In support of this position, it was stated that road use behavior of pedestrians, passengers and drivers was showing improvement; pedestrians (especially those in the countryside) were constructed as developing positive road use behavior; passengers were making sure that the rules regarding their rights were observed, though which rules were being referred to was not clear; and, drivers were constructed as driving at the right speed and observing rules for proper road use (Lines 757-61).

It is significant to observe the repetitive claim made regarding road users' positive change, but the interest in constructing them positively was only to take the credit: *as a result, changes to the level of reducing accidents are coming; the situation is that they are being observed* (Lines 761-62). However, road safety problem in Ethiopia did not show any improvement. Although RSSs of GIs positioned the government as if it had given weight to the problem, they repeatedly and emphatically admitted the work was insufficient and the necessity of working hard: *it is not sufficient; a lot yet, a lot is expected compared to the gravity of the problem* (Lines 798-99).

The other ambiguity was regarding road use practices of pedestrians of the urban areas. On the one hand, we could read from the strategy document that the rate of fatalities due to pedestrians' errors was only 2% (NRSSPE, 2011, p.1). Most urban pedestrians were constructed as aware of road safety: *our evaluation is that the majority knows* (Lines 768-69). However, they were constructed as if they were not ready to engage in safer road use practices. They were named as *jaywalker* (Line 483), i.e., *someone who walks across a road at a place where it is dangerous to cross* (LDOCE). However, if the majority of them knew how they should have used the road, how did they become *jaywalkers*? If they were asked why they used the road dangerously, *he* (the pedestrian) *doesn't have the answer* (Line 773). Thus the reality was obfuscated; if the majority of road users were using the road against what was normal, or safe, they must have had some reasons for not observing the rule they already knew (they could not risk their lives for nothing). As will be seen in the forthcoming sections, pedestrians in Addis Ababa complained of the absence of space for walking or that they were occupied by mobility blocking people or stuff.

In Lines 775-84, a participant used a five years' statistic to convince that RTA-caused death was decreasing although the figure was increasing. It was construed as *but this doesn't mean the accident has increased* (Line 778). In support of this argument, we were encouraged to consider the import of cars entering the traffic system over the five years (Lines 779-780), and not just the escalated death rate. However, this was against the concept of how RTA-caused death rate was calculated. While various options could have been used, the preferred (or frequently) used approach in Ethiopia was calculating the number of lives lost per 10,000 vehicles. Therefore, increase in the number of cars entering the traffic system could not be taken as an excuse since the ratio would all the time be the same (it is all about how many people die for every 10,000

vehicles). The numbers game was obviously among the most frequently employed methods used to conceal reality. This strategy was used in the GTP I also, which was discussed in this section.

A further argumentation strategy participants used in favor of their claim for confirming the improvement of road safety in Ethiopia was rationalization (Lines 784-86). Here, a participant talked about a three-step-approach in *the work of decreasing road traffic accidents* (Line 784-85) that would gradually lead to tangible change: first *creating awareness* (of the existence of the problem?), followed by *stabilizing the problem* and finally *decreasing* it. The conclusion given showed at which stage they were: *we believe now it is at least at about the stage of enabling stabilization* (Lines 786-87). The expression *we believe* presupposed the complement; moreover, the pronoun used was an inclusive one, *we*, calling all others to comply with the claim, though it could also be a way of marginalizing those with a different perspective. In the strategy plan, we read: “The goal is to progressively reduce the 2010 road fatality number by 30% by 2015 and by 50% by the end of the decade (2020)” (NRSSPE, 2011, p.16). However, statistics being released periodically made it clear that the accident rate in Ethiopia was not showing any promising improvement; as it was discussed in the analysis of the same document (i.e., the NRSSPE), RTA-caused death rate at the beginning of the decade was 70, and the rate after mid time of the period, is about 60. Had it been in line with the plan, i.e., with a 30% decrease, the rate this time should have been less than 50. However, by using some positive phrases (like *creating awareness*, *stabilizing the accident*, and *decreasing it*) the intention was only to appear good, concealing what was not accomplished. Hence this also was obfuscating the reality; employing erroneous justification is one of the most frequently used argument strategies that powerful structures would employ to deceive others.

Although several government institutions were positioned as key players of the road safety work in the country, they were further put in some order, and the first position was given to the traffic police as in: *what we all the time see to the front on the issue of traffic safety is the police; this is what we know from experience. Even now, I observe in the work of this committee the share of the police being superior; I see the share of the police being more vivid* (Lines 919-21). This construction was paradoxical in that while MoT and its different agencies were given the coordinating role of the road safety work (acting as secretariat of the NRSC), the police was positioned as *superior* and of *more vivid* engagement than all others. Although other RSSs were

put at the secondary position next to the police, it was claimed that the RSSs were committed equivalently: *there is no way for us to say the role of one stakeholder is less or more than that of the other* (Lines 909-10). This is an oversimplification of the range of duties and responsibilities each RSS was expected to engage in and contribute. Moreover, against this claim of equal contribution of the RSSs, the police were construed as better than all the others. Hence, even the positioning of the claimed stakeholders was vague and/or confused.

On the contrary, apart from positioning all GIs at the federal level and the police as the most prominent, we find ETA also being framed as the main player: *obviously road transport is the main one* (Line 924), using the non-hedged adverb *obviously*. We saw earlier that the police were positioned first though it mainly played a controlling and enforcing role. Moreover, both ETA and TP had for decades been the sole partners for the task of ensuring road safety in Ethiopia, long before the NRSC was established with its motto of addressing the problem with the coordinated efforts of all RSSs. Thus, it was the tradition, and not the claimed initiative, that governed the task.

The road safety problem was positioned in line with the discourse of path dependency. From: *since even what we can see from the experience of other countries is they have gone through a path decreasing it from the higher level it was once. First at some time the accident happened to be very worrying; then they have caused change for their countries when all have worked hand in hand. I hope we too will have similar pattern in our country* (Lines 975-79), we could observe a belief system which was in line with the claim that recommended that countries should pass through several stages before they were able to control RTAs meaningfully (McAndrews, 2013). According to this theory, countries like Ethiopia should continue sacrificing their citizens and wealth before they were able to control the prevalent RTAs. The discourse of path dependency was dominant for some time, as was discussed in the literature, but systems approach did not give any room to such kind of rationalization. For some countries, there could have been no other option; they might have gone through the path perhaps because the knowledge that would help them address the issue was not available, but in the present globalized world, where knowledge and good practice transfer is so fast, it would be unethical to wait for some time until the rate could decline after sacrificing lives of many citizens. Vision Zero has emphatically asserted that no one should die or be seriously injured due to RTAs.

Finally, the most important question to ask is: What was the contribution of all these and other claimed measures in minimizing the tragedies in the streets that we see/hear on almost a daily basis? Although RSSs of GIs constructed the positive role of the NRSC-led GIs addressing the road safety problem, and although the presence of some measures that were taken for declining RTAs could not be denied, change was too far from expectations. As one respondent emphatically put the case, *but compared to what we need, what the country, the public need, a lot is still required to be done; so we conclude putting it as a big challenge that hasn't been touched yet* (Lines 806-08). A ten-year plan was endorsed with targets to achieve, and commitment was declared from top level down to localities; however, even after five years' of implementation period, the problem was constructed as *a big challenge that hasn't been touched yet*. If the performance with regards to safety was so poor, why is it so, and who is to take the responsibility for the failure? Further analysis made would answer these questions.

We have tried to see how RSSs of GIs constructed the way they handled their road safety work. Both participants and government documents positioned their road safety work favorably using statistical data that constructed the presence of positive change, the establishment of road safety councils at national and local levels, and work on *enforcement* and *education* as evidence of showing how they improved (were improving) the road safety problem in Ethiopia over the past decade. As to how the work should have been strengthened, they stressed on the necessity of a further focus on *education* and *enforcement*.

WHO's recommendation formulated based on systems approach and adopted for the decade of action did not encourage targeting and/or blaming only one of the many stakeholders; it instead insistently encouraged understanding and consideration of the three players altogether, road users, roads and roadsides, and vehicles and travel speeds, for an effective road safety work. On the contrary, RSSs of GIs repeatedly targeted road users only, using fallacious argument against them, and, preferring silence regarding other important elements in the system. The preference of silence or having just a passing remark about *roads and road sides* and *vehicles and travel speeds* may not be unintentional; it could rather be ideological, the interest of continuing with the power of controlling everything through the different apparatus that the government has had. What if it were due to absence of any significant work in connection with the two areas? RSSs of

GIs had also preferred silence on the role private sectors and NGOs could have if they were given the floor to involve in the road safety work/management.

In the analysis above, therefore, we saw RSSs of GIs positioning the NRSC (and its members, i.e., themselves) favorably; they constructed it as if it were discharging its responsibility effectively. In constructing the council's work, they discussed two key areas which they believed any road safety effort had to focus on: *enforcement* and *education*. This mechanism of controlling everything through *education* and *enforcement* is in line with the concept of governmentality (Fimyar, 2008). The attempt is, like Foucault argues, trying to discipline and behave people the way it was intended by the powerful players using the highest government body, the council in the context of road safety in Ethiopia, and its formal and informal structures like the police, court, media, schools and advertisement as strong weapons. It is important to recall that the council was made up of top-level officials of government structures only. Thus, these RSSs of GIs emphasized enforcement as number one priority: *the enforcement is ranked as an issue of top priority; it has to be strengthened* (Lines 857-58). The force employed could also be seen from the clause that followed: *this is rational thought* (Lines 858-59). It was not a problem if road safety work in Ethiopia targeted education and enforcement. However, as it was discussed, the road safety problem is so complex that it could not be curbed only because of a road safety work that targeted only one/two of the many players in the complex system; it was not just these two that the *systems approach* promoted. One tenet of the approach is recognizing that human error is inevitable, that human beings are fallible; hence, it was asserted that the road transport system should also make allowance for errors that human beings commit and minimize consequences if they were to happen (Racioppi, 2004). Such a problem of fallibility could, among others, be addressed by an appropriate engineering of the road and its environment, and vehicle design and fitness.

It could therefore be concluded that the NRSC, which was made up of only GIs, preferred to continue with the status quo, the culture of working on *education* and *enforcement*. Thus though it was covered and partially shaped by the current philosophy (systems theory), the position that had historically been held by a few government offices and their practices was observed being exercised and contended as, if not the only, at least as best solution to curbing the problem.

Whether it was possible to continue with a structure (i.e., the council which is composed of many stakeholders) and its discourse (i.e., the discourse of collaboration/coordination/partnership/etc. of RSSs) without any significant practice is quite contesting. Although it was not that strong, the fact that resistance discourse was emerging both from the private sectors and the majority road users is a key indicator of the possibility for change. In the following section, we focus on how the private sector positioned itself in relation to the road safety work of Ethiopia.

4.4.2 How RSSs of the Private Sectors Construct their Role to Road Safety

The other important group of stakeholders that involved in the transport sector were private firms like driving schools, transport service providers, vehicle inspecting and/or maintaining garages, road/ transport consultants. These sectors/individuals also had their own contribution to the safety of the transport system; it is the safety of vehicles/roads/users that ensures their survival as private firms in the transport sector or that makes them profitable. Hence, road safety is among their concerns. As was discussed in the literature, the new outlook to road safety recognizes the role of the private sector and civic organizations and calls for their active involvement in the collaborativework of road safety. However, in the Ethiopian road safety context, this was not adequately recognized and/or practically exercised; no private firm or civic organization was included as member of the NRSC or its regional extensions. At the Addis Ababa RSC, though names of many private institutions and civic organizations could be found, they were practically inactive.

Discourses of some private sector organizations were incorporated in this project to find out how they would construct their role in the road safety work and whether this had any impact on their inclusion or exclusion. Hence, purposively selected driving schools, transport service providers and independent transport consultants were contacted and their responses were analysed. These sectors took themselves as key stakeholders in the road transport sector in general. Moreover, they constructed themselves as if they were key contributors to the safety of the road transport system. Some of them claimed that their firms/associations were giving lessons to RSSs of GIs particularly in terms of introducing new ways of addressing the problem and in the implementation of effective road safety practices in Ethiopia. In some aspects, they would prefer to address the road safety problem in Ethiopia in a different way from that of RSSs of GIs. For example, they did not emphasize the role of educating pedestrians on reducing RTAs; they

preferred a focus on drivers, who were fewer in number than pedestrians, and so were simpler to manage and/or address.

Excerpt 42

(የት.ቤቱ ስም) ...ሲመሰረት ይዞት የተነሳቸው በጣም ግዙፍና በርካታ አላማዎች ነበሩት፤ ከነዚህ ብዙ በርካታና ግዙፍ አላማዎች አንደኛውና ዋነኛው አዲጋን ተከላክለው ማሸከርከር የሚችሉ ፕሮፌሽናል ድራይቨርስን ማምረት ነው ዋናው። ባለሙያ አሸከርካሪዎችን ማፍራት፤ ባለሙያ አሸከርካሪዎችን ማፍራት ማለት በጣም ትልቅ ነገር ነው፤ ትልቅ አላማ ነው። ባለሙያ ናቸው፤ ባለሙያነታቸው ደሞ እሚረጋገጠው አዲጋን ተከላክሎ በማሸከርከር ሂደት ነው። አዲጋን ተከላክሎ በማሸከርከር ሂደት ብቻም ሳይሆን ባለሙያነታቸው ቢቃ የታሰበለትን አላማ ማሳካት መቻላቸው ነው። ይሄንን አላማ ይዞ ነው የተነሳው ማለት ነው ትምህርት ቤቱ፤ ስለዚህ ከመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አንፃር የተሸከርካሪ ምርመራ ለማድረግ የመጀመሪያ ይሰጠኝ ብሎ ጥያቄ ያቀረበ ተቋም ነው / it (the driving school) started with many very ambitious goals; one and the main one of these many and ambitious goals was producing accident defensive professional drivers. this was the main one; producing professional drivers, producing professional drivers means a very huge goal. they are professionals and their professionalism is evidenced by the their defensive driving skill. it is not just their accident defensive driving skill, but their professionalism is proved by their ability of accomplishing the task for which they are meant. this was the goal the school has started with; therefore with respect to road traffic safety our school was the first company to take the responsibility of conducting vehicle inspection to raise this question (Lines 983-91)

የሰለጠኑ ባለሙያ አሸከርካሪዎችን የማፍራት ሥራ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አካል ነው ብሎ ነው እሚያምነው፤ እንደቢዝነስ አደለም ይሄ እሚታየው ማለት ነው። ስለዚህ እኛ ይሄንን ተግባራዊ ለማድረግ በእርግጠኝነት ትምርትን በጥራት ለመስጠት ጥረት አርገናል / it believes that the task of producing trained professional drivers is an element of the road traffic safety issue; that means it is not taken as business matter; so to put this into practice for sure we have made the effort of providing quality education (Lines 993-95)

ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ በኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ የአሸከርካሪዎችን የስነምግባርና የስነ ባህሪ ትምህርት በመጽሐፍ ትምህርት አዘጋጅቶ በትምህርትም መደበኛ ትምህርት መስጠት የጀመረው (የት.ቤቱ ስም)ና (የት.ቤቱ ስም)ብቻ ነው / for the first time in the history of Ethiopia it is (the school's name) and only (the school's name) that has prepared driver ethics and behavior lesson in the form of a book and that has offered it incorporating it as one formal lesson (Lines 999-1001)

ባይ ዘ ዌይ ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግ ቢታወቅ፤ ቢታወቅ እንደውም ሌላ ሥልጠናም አያስፈልግም ልትል ትችላለህ፤ ቢቃ አልፎ ይኑሱ ሰዎች ቴስት አርገውታል፤ አግኝተውባቸዋል፤ በጣም ተቀይረውባቸዋል። ደሞ ሌሎች ገና ይሄን እንትን ስላላገኙ እዛው ላይ ያሉ አሉ፤ እና አምታኩ እንግዲህ በሰዎቹ ነው፤ በሰለጠኑ ሰዎች በምታገኘው ፊደባክ ነው እምትሰማው። ግን እንዳልከው ገዥ እንዲሆን ሌላውም ሁሉም በዚህ በንትን ፕሪግሲፕል እንዲሄድ የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግን ጋኬጅ እንደማንዳቶሪ እንደው እንዲገባ እንዲደረግ ያው የመንግስት እንትን ያስፈልጋል፤ መንግስት ማመን አምናበት እንደውም አሸርቴክ ቢያረገው ማለት ነው። አሁን በግል ነው፤ እኔ በግል ነው የምሰራው ብዬሃለሁ፤ ግን ይሄን ነገር እኔ ራሴ እሰራዋለሁ ብሎ ቢይዘውም ጥሩ ነው። ዞሮ ዞሮ አላማው አዲጋን ለመቀነስ ነው እንጂ ቢዝነስ አደለም፤ ባይ ዘ ዌይ ቢዝነስ፤ እኔ እንደውም አንዳንዴ በነፃ እምስጠው ትሬኒንግ አለ / by the way if defensive driving was known, if it were known you might even say no need of other training package, period. people who have already driven have tested it, and they have benefited from; it they are changed greatly. and others since they have not yet got it, they are still there. so with regards to its impact, you could get it from the feedback of people who have taken the training, but to make it compulsory, like you said to train and put all within this principle, to make the defensive driving package mandatory, obviously government's intervention is necessary; the government has to be convinced with it and even should take over it. now as I told you it is by

myself; I run it on my own, but it was good if it took the responsibility and run it. the goal is naturally to lessen the accident it is not business affair; by the way I do not take it as business, sometimes I offer trainings for free (Lines 1021-31)

As owners and/or managers of driver training schools, these RSSs of PIs branded their schools apart from constructing their contributions to safety. This could be evidenced by the repetitive use of their school's name (sometimes emphatically as in Lines 999-1000, a form *it is X and only X*), and its variants: *the company, the school, our school* or the pronoun *it*. Moreover, they repeatedly mentioned their contribution to road safety like in introducing some kind of training (like defensive driving skill) and some more content in the training manuals (like behavioral and ethical issues). In constructing his school favorably in relation to road safety, one of them said it was established to achieve *very ambitious goals*, and *one and the main one was producing accident defensive professional drivers* (Lines 983-84). The phrase *one and the main one* was used for branding the school in relation to its contribution to road safety. Hence, the repeatedly used expressions of the kind *defensive professional drivers, professional, professionalism, accident defensive driving*, and *defensive driving* (we find about eight of them only in Lines 984-94) could show how much the participant was preoccupied with the school's role to road safety in general and a specific type of knowledge in particular; as it was put, *it [the school] believes that the task of producing trained professional drivers is an element of the road traffic safety issue* (Lines 992-94), there was a very strong claim of concern for road safety. Producing professional drivers was not something the schools construed as a business affair: *it is not taken as business matter* (Line 994); *I do not take it as business* (Line 1031), but, according to their claim, it was an issue of safety. On the other hand, as could be seen in the forthcoming section, drivers trained at some of the driving schools constructed the schools as neglecting the road safety issue, partly emphasizing on only technical aspects or on the profit that they made.

Moreover, owners of driving schools positioned themselves as the first in terms of taking the initiative to engage in tasks that would particularly contribute to road safety, to the extent that the government would eventually adopt these safety oriented initiatives for national implementation. A participant, for example, positioned his firm as the first to request the government to offer it the permit for conducting *vehicle inspection*, on top of its role of training drivers; again, it was claimed that the request was not for business purposes, but just because *it [the school] believes that vehicle inspection is a segment of the road traffic safety issue* (Line 991-92). The school was

also constructed as the first to have had a curriculum, even *before...the federal transport authority prepared curriculum at national level and put it into practice* (Lines 995-97). The same school was further constructed as *the first in the history of Ethiopia* (Lines 999-1000) to prepare lessons on *driver ethics and behavior* and to include them in the curriculum, before the government proclaimed it as compulsory in the training of drivers. The school was further positioned as a model for the nation's road safety efforts as a whole; the school was the first to prepare a book on the theme of driver ethics and behavior (which was also used as the main source in the preparation of training manual for would-be-drivers nationally, Lines 1000-05). By constructing the school this way repeatedly and emphatically, not only did the participant claim to have had the leading role with regards to road safety, but also implied that the government was lagging behind on matters pertaining to the safety issue. The school did this because it *understood the main gap of our drivers is behavioral and ethical* (Lines 1005-06), articulating the phrase *the main* emphatically, still to strengthen the point on the problem related with driver behavior and ethics as contributor of RTAs. Finally, as to how the school offered courses, it was constructed as if it were doing it adhering strictly to course contents and period allotments, and employing not just *qualified trainers*, but the *overqualified* ones also, to the extent the owner/manager was criticized by others for doing so.

In a more related way, in a response to my query on how that school was contributing to lessening the road safety problem, another driving school owner/trainer claimed to have been the first to introduce *defensive driver training* approach in Ethiopia; an accident preventive driver training package that was offered specifically for people who had already been driving for some time. Practices the school was engaged in based on this philosophy were also construed as the best means of curbing *the* worst accident scenario in Ethiopia. According to the participant, the *defensive driver training* approach he adopted to train drivers and its benefits for safety was not known by many; in *if defensive driving was known, if it were known* (Line 1021), the repetitions were to strengthen the argument in favor of the assertion, i.e., that it should have been known, or that it was not known was a lost opportunity. The approach was further construed as if no other approach could have competed with it: *if defensive driving was...known, you might even say no need of other training package, period* (Lines 1021-22). That means, other approaches could be counted as inferior compared to the package being advocated, as if they were not that significant to road safety. It is noteworthy to see the emphatic expression, *period* as well. Developing

further the argument in favour of the package, the participant said those trained with it *have tested it, benefited from it and are changed greatly* (Lines 1022-23) with progression of verbs *tested, benefited* and *changed*, and an emphatic non-hedged adverb *greatly*; all of them were used to claim that the change that had come as a result of exposure to the package introduced by the private firm was indisputable.

Moreover, the participants encouraged the government to adopt and scale up the strategy they introduced for a national implementation. For example, regarding the defensive driving training approach, we could read: *the government has to be convinced with it, and even should take over it* (Lines 1027-28); *it is good if it took the responsibility and run it* (Lines 1028-29). However, so far the participant claimed to have been running the package all by himself, and, whatever he did in relation to the package, it was not for profit but to lessen the accident: *the goal is naturally to lessen the accident; it is not business affair* (Lines 1029-30); *I do not take it as business; sometimes I offer trainings for free* (Lines 1030-31). Thus the self was constructed to the extent that the training was offered for free or for the minimum price if people were not able to pay, and the reason was *the goal, the goal of lessening RTAs*; the use of non-hedged adverb *naturally* would further show the strong attitude/position that the participant had regarding his approach.

The goal of defensive driving approach was expressed emphatically as if it were an excellent means of eliminating RTAs. In explaining why he was so devoted to it, the participant discussed about five goals one could achieve as a result of taking the *defensive driving* course, the most important of which was, again, the *goal* of minimizing *the death rate to zero level*, which he further positioned as *the main objective: your goal is so as to make the accident rate, especially the death rate to zero level, period; that is the main objective of defensive driving* (Lines 1035-37); restating the goal of the package as a *primary goal* of avoiding RTAs, the participant said, *if you say I have to avoid road traffic accident, it is the primary goal* (Lines 1045-46). This idea of planning for zero death due to RTAs echoed with the Sweden's long term goal called Vision Zero approach recommended by the UN/WHO for global action (Elvik et al., 2009; Peden et al., 2004), and was thus adopted in Ethiopia. However, the two approaches were totally different; while defensive driving focused on individual road users, i.e., drivers, the focus of vision zero was on all players concerned about the road traffic system.

Overall, by constructing the school through the special kind of driver training package called *defensive driving*, the participant positioned his driving school positively. He claimed only his school knew and applied the approach, and expressed its role of declining RTAs, at least by the drivers who took it. He also expressed his interest for its national adoption. However, although they did not show a total commitment as he did, other driving schools and GIs also mentioned defensive driving as one strategy they employed in the training of drivers.

The participant prepared a flier that listed various types of trainings offered at his driver training school, and one type put in the list was *a special type of training for fatigue management*. It was explained that the *defensive driver training* package was *so wide, incorporating a lot of themes. It has about sixteen modules* (Lines 1067-68), and fatigue management was positioned as one segment of the package. It was claimed that driving vehicles carefully, managing one's sense of feeling tired, or fatigue, was among the skills drivers should develop, and the participant used that to show the role of *defensive driver training* in relation to fatigue management. By bringing intertextually studies conducted elsewhere that estimated fatigue's share to accident at about *twenty per cent* (Lines 1070 and 1071), the participant constructed the role of *feeling dizzy and weary* (Line 1069) to the occurrence of RTAs as: *fatigue has very significant contribution to accident* (Lines 1070-71). The figure was then adapted to the case in Ethiopia as background for constructing the school as one offering the claimed training based on perceived local problems: *since twenty per cent is not that simple, we offer training on it* (Lines 1071-72). Twenty per cent means one out of five accidents. Therefore, situating the offering of fatigue management training on statistical and/or academic discourses enacted elsewhere, the participant positioned his school as one playing pivotal role in the road safety work in Ethiopia. It is commonly heard that due to continuous driving, drivers would feel sleepy while driving. The fact that most professional drivers used drugs like khat could be associated with this fatigue due to their involvement in continuous driving.

In all the cases mentioned in the extracts, privately owned driving schools were constructed explicitly as farsighted, innovative and committed firms devoted to ensuring road safety. It could clearly be seen that the participants were positioning the firms that they were running favorably. However, although the schools were positioned as if they were playing *the biggest role* (Line 1008) to ensuring road safety, drivers were framed as lacking the claimed defensive driving skill

and behavioral and ethical qualities, casting doubt on where everything incorporated in the national curriculum and training manuals and offered by the qualified trainers had gone?

As it was the case with RSSs of GIs, driving schools also advocated the role of *education* in curbing the road safety problem in Ethiopia. However, they had some differences; they preferred to focus on drivers' education to pedestrians' to make the effort more effective and cause change.

Excerpt 43

ትምህርትን በጥራት ለመስጠት ጥረት አርገናል / we have made the effort of providing quality education (Line 995)

በጥራት ትምህርትን በማስተማር ረገድ በደንብ ቢቃ ... ጥራት ያለው ባለሙያዎች እንዲያስተምሩ በማድረግ ትልቅ አስተዋፅኦ አድርገናል / in terms of offering quality education we have contributed a lot by training efficiently (Lines 1013-14)

እኔ ተሽከርካሪውን ይዞት የሚሄደው ሰው እንትን ቢወስድለት ለዛኛው ሃላፊነት ማለት ነው ቢሆን / the person with the vehicle should take the responsibility for the other person (Lines 1114-15)

ራሱን እንዳያንክ ከቆጠርከው ብዙም አይመስለኝም፤ ስለዚህ እኔ ነኝ፤ እኔ ስለአንተ ስላለኝ አስተሳሰብ እንጂ አንተ ፊትህን ስላየሁ፤ ጀርባህን ሳይህ እገጭሃለሁ ማለት ነው እንዴ / if you count much as if you saved yourself, I don't think so. so it is me; it is my thinking about you that matters, not my looking your face (Lines 1121-23)

እኔ እንግዳው እሻላለሁኝ እኔ አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው እምስራው፤ እኔ እንደግለሰብ ማለት ነው፤ ያለምንም እንትን እኔ አሽከርካሪው ላይ አሰራለሁ፤ እናንተ እግረኛው ላይ ትሰራላችሁ፡፡ እንግዲህ ውጤቱ ከመጣ አሪፍ ነው (ሳቅ) / I am better for I am working on the driver; as an individual and without any help I work on the driver and you work on the pedestrian; then if there is any change that would be great (laughing) (Lines 1151-53)

It was found that RSSs of GIs believed road safety would be ensured by educating pedestrians investing a lot on them, but this was contrary to the philosophy the participant from PSs advocated (Lines 1125-46). Put briefly, for RSSs of PSs, the most important, responsible and easy to target in the road safety work were drivers. Hence, educating or training them was the best and cheapest way to cause significant change on the prevalence of RTAs in the country. Size was the main line of argument; since pedestrians were too many to address through education, it was better to focus on drivers, who were smaller in number. A further claim was that all the time *the person with the vehicle should take the responsibility for the other person* (Lines 1114-15). This means drivers should have been given the entire responsibility for the safety of pedestrians (Lines 1115-16). Hence, for example, contrary to the training of pedestrians to take their left sides when they walked, it didn't matter whichever they took; unless the person behind the wheel took the responsibility and reacted accordingly, he could hit them even if they

were on the left side of the road. Thus, pedestrians' role to road safety was underplayed; conversely, drivers were put at a powerful position: *so what was your share, you understand? It is me who is more powerful, who has more speed* (Lines 1120-21), with *you* referring to the pedestrian and *me* and *who* to the driver. When compared to pedestrians, drivers are more powerful, but undermining pedestrians' role to that extent may not be that much helpful to ensuring road safety. However, safety work that targeted drivers more than pedestrians was insistently claimed: *so if you count much as if you saved yourself, I don't think so ... it is me; it is my thinking about you that matters, not my looking your face* (Lines 1121-23).

In some parts of the country (like in Ambo of the Oromia Region and Awi Zone of the Amhara), pedestrians were appreciated for their proper use road practices; such places were usually cited by both RSSs of GIs, PSs, the media and individual road users as typical examples/models for a safer road use culture. However, the argument here was against this claim; *if you tell me like traffic accident has calmed because pedestrians have taken their left, first you will undermine the credit he deserves, the driver's credit. He saved him but here you offer the credit for the pedestrian, the one whom you have trained. You will say, 'since I made him take his left side, I have brought change'; so this one also has some problem* (Lines 1126-30). The positive construction of pedestrians' change in road use behavior was construed as if it were downgrading the role of the driver who would save pedestrians only to upgrade institutions that positioned themselves as trainers of these pedestrians. By using this line of argument, the participant made two points that enabled him construct the privately owned driver training school and its philosophy favorably; first, it was implied that only drivers could save pedestrians from being hit, and so it was claimed that they should have been the focus of training for better change; and secondly, the claim made in relation to training pedestrians was construed as problematic. In order to further strengthen the favorable position given to trained drivers, i.e., the powerful position that enabled them to save pedestrians who were on whichever side of the road, and to undermine the position of trained pedestrians, the metaphor of caregiver was used; *so it is me who is your caregiver. I believe the driver is the caregiver of the pedestrian* (Line 1137-38). Hence, as we could see, not only were drivers given superior positions (as responsible citizens in contrast to pedestrians who were constructed as children/sick people that needed support of the responsible person for their safety), but the self was also identified with the powerful drivers: *so it is me who is your caregiver*. The driver and the trainer were identified as one and the same.

A third line of argument used in favor of training drivers (rather than pedestrians) was the huge difference in number between the two; while there were only about 480,000 drivers, there were about 80 million pedestrians; thus, *you had better give him (the driver) the awareness and do not waste your time and energy with the pedestrian. Why should you get tired with 80 million people* (Lines 1138-40)? Using a line of argument based on cost/time effectiveness (the discourse of economy), the participant was still constructing the self, driver training that he advocated and was engaged in, downgrading the government and/or others of a different approach. Being in favor of the few drivers, the mass was construed as *tiresome* and *consuming*, using words which were negatively connoted. Moreover, presupposing that the population would continue increasing, it was construed that targeting pedestrians would not make the effort realistic: *if you all the time talk about pedestrians, that means you will continue a hundred years talking about pedestrians* (Lines 1144-45). The practice was construed no more than simply talking than engaging for a realistic change. Thus, the direction held by the NRSC was counted as if it were focusing on pedestrian training which could not lead to any solution: *so I think as for solution, there is some problem of direction that leads to solution* (Lines 1145-46). As a result, the participant was not ready to comply with the NRSC. Instead, he positioned himself as one who challenged (i.e., did not submit to) the practices of the Council, particularly standing against *working on pedestrians*, i.e., educating pedestrians on the safe use of the road and neglecting drivers. That position was so firm that when the participant said, *as an individual and without any help, I work on the driver and you work on the pedestrian; then if there is any change that would be great* (Lines 1151-53), he was laughing, and that was sarcastic. It seems that unless the approach was changed, there was not anything positive that the participant was expecting.

Having contradictory positions or misunderstandings among the various RSSs could be a result of being of different knowledge/belief system. And the difference would have negative effect on the overall road safety effort and its impact in the country: if stakeholders of different institutions did not have some level of commonality in the thinking and practices they were engaged in, miscommunication/misunderstanding among the RSSs would prevail; as a result, the problem would continue affecting the lives of many. This contradiction would further strengthen the conclusion made earlier regarding the working together of various RSSs: unlike their claims, RSSs in Ethiopia did not have any collaboration/coordination.

The construing of drivers as key problem areas in the road traffic system and the necessity of a road safety work that targeted them was developed by transport service providers' associations (TSPA) also. For example, we could see how a chairperson of one TSPA in Addis Ababa positioned drivers as lacking the proper skill and behaviour as he explained what the associations could have done to contribute to ensuring road safety. According to him, their association was planning to train/ capacitate their drivers with road safety knowledge (hence a positive construction of the self), though he also complained that there was no recognition and/or floor for their fuller engagement.

The participant construed road safety as the responsibility of all stakeholders involved in the road transport system: *obviously the road belongs to all of us; road safety also belongs to us all* (Lines 1082-83). This could imply that the association he was leading was ready to contribute to the road safety work of the city; his discussion that followed was about the role TSPAs could have to curbing RTAs. Thus, *traffic jam, pedestrians' presence in abundance* and *technical problems vehicles could experience* were expected encounters on the road that belonged to all; which means the traffic, technical fitness of vehicles and pedestrians' road use practice were all constructed as contributors to the occurrence of RTAs. However, what concerned the participant more was road-use-illiteracy of users, mainly drivers and pedestrians. In other words, RTAs leading to injury and death were common because drivers *lacked proficiency* and the society was *uncivilized: it is at this critical time when the society is not civilized properly and developed skillfully that people are being injured and killed* (Lines 1074-75). The intention of the participant in explaining this scenario was to express that they were ready to change it.

Accordingly, TSPAs planned *to train and capacitate their drivers as much as they could* (Line 1076). This could be quite encouraging in a country where drivers were positioned as main contributors to RTAs. Some freight transporters' associations started involving their members in refresher and accident defensive training programs, and, as a result, the trained drivers' road use practice was claimed to have been improved. However, efforts of involving drivers of the public transport service providers in such kinds of capacity building programs were so insignificant. The participant admitted that this move did not go any further; though it was planned, it was not pushed to action: *we have taken this as an objective and are going about it* (Line 1077). Hence,

by using euphemism, the participant was still attempting to situate the association in a favorable position.

However, unlike the construction of driver training schools, the participant from the TSPA did not want to focus on drivers alone; that RTAs could be curbed by teaching pedestrians and the public at large of the seriousness of the road safety problem was also claimed emphatically:

Excerpt 44

ህብረተሰቡን እንዲያውቅ አለማረጋችን በዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ ኋላቀር አርጎናል፤ ይሄንኛው ህብረተሰቡን በደንብ ልናስተምር ይገባል፡፡ ይህንን በሰፊው ልንሄድበት መሄድ አለብን የሚል አቋም ነው ያለን፤ በደንብ መማር አለበት ህዝቡ ማወቅ አለበት / since we have not made the public aware of the problem, this has caused us to lag behind; we need to teach the public very well on this matter. we have the conviction that we need to handle the issue seriously; the public needs to be taught properly, it has to know it (Lines 1092-95)

ያንን ህብረተሰቡ እንዲሰለጥን አላረግነውም፤ አለማስተማራችን ነው ይሄን ሁሉ ያመጣው ችግራችን፡፡ ስለዚህ ይሄን ነገር በሰፊው ብንሄድበት፤ ነገ ተነገውዲያ የለማች አዲሳባቸንና የተማረና አደጋን የቀነሰ ውጤት ልናገኝ እንችላለን / we have not trained the public that way; all this problem has come just because we have not taught them. so if we go about it seriously, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, we could see Addis Ababa as well-developed, educated and with a declined level of accident (L. 1109-12)

The public were constructed repeatedly as if they were unaware of/untaught of the seriousness of the road safety problem; almost all the verbs used about the public would imply that they needed to be *informed, taught, trained, made aware, know* about the problem. Regarding who was to own and discharge this responsibility, the participant claimed it to be TSPAs; however, on their part, they were not doing anything significant so far. Instead, they were pledging to commit themselves to the task sometime in the future. Thus, the construction was more of a plan *to train and capacitate drivers and pedestrians* (Lines 1009-10, 1076, 1093, 1095); it was only a plea to engage in the action. They did not yet participate in any of the claims they made.

This casts doubt on whether the plea was based on a good understanding of and readiness to addressing the problem or whether it was simply a matter of following the fashion. It could be due to the dominant discourse of *education* and *enforcement* that GIs had inculcated in them. Of course, engaging in continuous awareness creation campaigns was not bad; however, it would not be convincing when framed as the main objective of the TSPAs. They could have been involved in forums to discuss critically problems related with transport services of the metropolitan. Their involvement could have given them the opportunity of airing concerns of

their members so that people could get safer transport services. Of course the participant admitted that by participating in such forums, they contributed ideas that could have helped solve the problem. But for their execution, they had set conditions which they wanted them to have been fulfilled first: *so to culminate the problem we as stakeholders also have suggested many things at many occasions, but we have not yet got the proper, the proper things we need* (Lines 1087-89). Although this participant did not want to clarify the *proper things* the service providers needed, taxi drivers mentioned some of their concerns/dissatisfactions as will be seen in the forthcoming section.

In conclusion, the analysis of this sub-section emphasized how RSSs of PSs constructed their role for ensuring road safety in Ethiopia; their use of words, repetitions, presupposition and argumentation strategies were the toolkits used in the analysis; discursive and social analyses were also made. Overall, although they were private firms and thus making profit was the goal of their establishment, they instead positioned/constructed themselves as committed stakeholders interested in contributing to road safety in the country. They framed themselves as stakeholders who were highly worried about the prevalence of RTAs in the country, and claimed to have been working hard, being farsighted (for example introducing/employing new/special approaches of driver training, the defensive driver training approach in particular, and preparing training manuals that were scaled up for national use); they constructed their efforts as better than that of RSSs of GIs. Moreover, they preferred to work more on educating drivers, neglecting other significant areas to road safety. That the number of drivers was so insignificant compared to that of pedestrians could be a convincing ground for their claim for a road safety education that focused the former. However, road safety work should have included the other significant players also, like the road and road sides, and the vehicle and travel speed. Therefore, that they focused on driver education could be construed as consent to the hegemonic discourse, i.e., the dominant discourse of RSSs of GIs that advocated education and enforcement as best ways of addressing RTAs so prevalent in the country.

However, mere claims of engagement in the task were common, or when they tried to present themselves as polite, they pledged for engaging in road safety work of the future. On the contrary, accident caused destructions did not allow one to buy time; citizens of the country, particularly the vulnerable road users, are being sacrificed on a daily basis, and many others are

in agony. In the sub-section that follows, therefore, we will see how road users, the main victims of the road, constructed themselves or their role in relation to road safety in the country. Since they are the main users and victims of the road transport system, drivers, pedestrians and passengers had significant interest in the safety of the road transport system; hence, they had a lot to say about it.

4.4.3 How Road Users Construct their Role to Road Safety

The road transport system operates because there are (and hence it is for) road users. However, it is now functioning as the most risky social and technological means of communication, taking about 1.3 million lives worldwide annually (WHO, 2015); particularly in low and middle income countries, the risk it brings on lives and limbs of its users is so immense. It is for this reason that road safety is of critical concern for people in developing countries. A road safety initiative that does not consider its users as key stakeholders, and that attempts to function without incorporating them could not be successful. The principle of shared responsibility positions road users as “responsible for following the rules for using the road transport system set by the system designers” (Elvik et al., 2009, p.130-131). The philosophy of Vision Zero also recognizes the crucial role road users have for the safety of the road transport system; it states that responsibility for accident should be shared by the system designers and by the road users (Writelegg & Haq, 2006, p.9). However, in practice, road users alone are held accountable for the occurrence of any RTAs; both international and national documents positioned pedestrians, passengers and drivers, the victims of road crashes, as responsible actors for the problems that they faced. Hence, it is essential that we analyze how they reacted to discourses on and practices of the road and its use in general, and the way they constructed their role to road safety in particular.

In this sub-section also, the focus of analysis is on word choice, transitivity, presupposition and argumentation strategies that the participants employed. In their resistance/counter discourses, by constructing themselves/their role favorably, road users attempted to criticize the hegemonic practice/discourse that positioned them as the sole contributors of the road safety problem in the country. Against the discourse that positioned them as main causes of the road safety problem that needed corrective action through *enforcement* and *education*, they constructed themselves as well aware of the problem and chief contributors to the safety of the road traffic system.

Excerpt 45

እንዴት? ምንድነህ? አንተ ማነህ? እንዴ እንዲህ ነው፤ ምንም ሊሰሙኝ አልቻሉም፤ ያልኩት ትዝ ይለኛል፤ ኃጢአት ነው እኔ በማምንበት እና እኔ አላደርገውም አልኩ፡፡ ውረድልን ብለው ጮኹብኝ፡፡ ሰ ስለዚህ ምን ማድረግ ጀመርኩ፤ እሺ ብዬ ፈቀቅ ማለት ጀመርኩ፡፡ እንዳንድ ጊዜ አሁንም አላስቀምጥም፤ የወያላውን ፊት አይቼ እሚፈራኝ ከመሰለኝ አላስቀምጥም እላለሁኝ፡፡ ((ሣቅ)) ... እሚይፈራኝ ከመሰለኝ አስቀምጣለሁ / how? what are you? who are you? like this, they, no one was ready to listen to me. I remember what I said em ‘it is sin according to my religion, so I won’t do that’ ‘get out of the taxi’ they all shouted at me. so what I started then after was I say OK and allow them to sit; sometimes, I still don’t allow; first I will see the conductor’s face and if I guess he is afraid of me, I say no ((laughing))... if I guess he is not afraid of me, I allow them to sit (Lines 1158-63)

ሙሉ ነው፤ ጥቅጥቅ ብለናል፤ የቆመም ሰው አለ፡፡ እጄን አውጥቻለሁ፤ አይቶታል እጄን፤ ግን ዝም ብሎ አለፈ፡፡ ያን የሚሆነውን ነገር አስበው / it was full; we were overcrowded; there was also a person standing. I stretched my hand; he saw my hand, but he kept silent and passed by. imagine what is going on (Lines 1169-71)

በእግሬ ሰሄድ፤ ሁልጊዜ አጠቃቀሙን በስርአቱን ይገኛ ነው እምጠቀመው / when I travel on foot, I adhere to the traffic rules; I respect the rule when I use the road (Lines 1178-79)

ስለዚህ ያንን ነገር እኔ እንደዛ አይነት ነገር ውስጥ ላለመግባት በጣም ነው ጥንቃቄ እማድርገው / on my part, I take care very much in order not to involve in things of that kind (Line 1182-83)

ሃይዌይ ላይ ገብቶ መጠቀም መቻል እንጂ ሃይዌይንም መብረር አለብኝ ብቻ መንገዱ ስለተመቻ መብረር የለበትም የሚል ነው / instead of trying to fly just because the road is comfortable to, we need to use the highway just responsibly (Lines 1761-62)

እኔ ትልቁ ትልቁ የዚህ ነገር መፍትሄ ሊሰራበት እሚችለው አንደኛ በፍጥነት በሚያሸከረከሩ አሸከርካሪዎች ላይ እና ሁለተኛ መንገድ አላግባብ እሚጠቀሙ እግረኞች ላይ ነው / as to me the main thing to work on for a solution is first on speeding drivers and second on pedestrians that use the road improperly (Lines 1767-68)

እና ሁላችንም ለዜጋ ከብር ይኑረን፤ ለዚህ ኃላፊነት እንሸከም፡፡ ሁሉም በንደዚህ አይነት መልኩ ከሄደ ምናልባት እቺ አገርም (ለውጥ ታሳይ ይሆናል)፤ አሁን ብዙ ጊዜ አይ አበሻ ምቀኝነት፤ አሁን ምን አገባው እስቲ? እንደዚህ ነው እሚባለው፤ ከደህንነት አኳያ ያደረኩት ድርጊት ተደርጎ አይታይም / let’s all have respect for fellow citizens; let’s shoulder responsibility for this. if all goes this way perhaps this country (may change); now most of the time they would say this is habesha’s jealousy; does it really concern him? it won’t be counted as an action which I did for the sake of safety (Lines 1848-51)

ሁላችንንም ይሰማን ሁላችንንም ጉዳዩ እንዲሰማን ተደርጎ ቢሆን፤ ውጤቱም ያማረ ነው፤ እና ይሄንንም ግንዛቤ እዚያጋ ቁጭ ብሎ ይንገረን ሁላችንንም ወሳኝ ናቸው ብሎ / let’s all sense the problem and if the issue were made to sense us all, the result would also be better; let him be there take time and tell us this position recognizing all of us as having decisive role (Lines 1861-63)

Road users usually positioned themselves as very much aware of the road safety problem in the country: the case, the accident rate both in Addis Ababa and in every region, is worsening (Line 1676). They claimed to have been well aware of the safety precautions drivers, passengers and the police should have taken for the safety of the road system. On their part, they claimed to have been responsible users of the road: when I travel on foot, I adhere to the traffic rules; I respect

the rule when I use the road (Lines 1178-79). Their claim was to the extent of constructing road safety as if it was their culture; a participant said, *on my part I take care very much in order not to involve in things of that kind* (Line 1182-83), and another one constructed violation of road traffic rule as a *sin*: *it is sin according to my religion, so I won't do that* (Lines 1159-60).

It was by using an anecdote that the participant constructed unsafe road use as sin (Lines 1158-70). Hence, he positioned himself as one who refused cooperating with traffic rule violators; the violators he refused to cooperate with were taxi drivers, their assistants, passengers and the police (Lines 1158-63). The mentioned rule violation was boarding passengers beyond the holding capacity of the taxi. This is significant as the risk of involving in crashes is higher when a vehicle is overloaded, and that if the vehicle is involved in an accident, the number of victims and severity level would be higher. In their arguments on the high number of RTA victims, road safety officials quoted overloading as a reason. They said it was *mass casualty* that had increased the accident figure, i.e., the number of victims per accident was higher since vehicles involving in crashes were frequently these public transport service providers (over)loading many people at a time. However, we could easily observe in Addis Ababa that people were loaded beyond the carrying capacity of the vehicles, particularly in the morning, at noon and late in the afternoon.

The participant constructed himself positively, as one trying to exercise his positive role as a road user, as an important stakeholder in the traffic system. However, he said no one was ready to understand him, let alone to cooperate. When he refused to give room for a third person on a seat that was for two, he was *beaten down* (Line 1156) by everybody in the taxi (it must have been the assistant, the driver and passengers); they also *cried* and *shouted at* [him] (Line 1156) until he felt defeated, to the extent that he accepted the norm: *so what I started then after was I say, 'OK' and allow them to sit* (Lines 1160-61). The questions they raised over him, *how? What are you? Who are you?* (Line 1157) also had the same impact; they presupposed an inferior position to him, a position that pushed him to accept whatsoever the traffic rule violators approved as normal, though, on his part, that was wrong.

The participant tried to resolve the conflict and all the blame on him using strong argumentation strategy, calling an authority; this time, he called the supernatural, *it is sin according to my religion; so I won't do that* (Lines 1159-60). The intention was to calm down his opponents;

since whatever they could have said, they knew at that moment that they were violating the traffic rule for safer mobility. It seems that he thought they would not be stubborn to God as they were to him. His use of the word *sin* also shows his conceptualization of the practice of not abiding by traffic rules and regulations as being of a devastating consequence. However, it was in vain; no one was ready to understand him and the problem he was trying to avoid. He could not find, even a single person, to cooperate with him: *'get out of the taxi!'* *they all shouted at me* (Line 1160). A possible implication is that perhaps the concept of road safety was not given the priority that it deserved; people were more interested in their mobility than in their safety. This was almost the daily experience of every public transport user. From how they used the road, it could clearly be observed that people are obsessed more in accomplishing their individual tasks than in their safety.

Thus, if at all the participant was to react against traffic rules violations, from that time on, he had to see/read taxi conductors' faces first. Hence, the situation was changed from cooperation among stakeholders for the safety of the transport system into a setting of rivalry, if not enmity: *first I see the conductor's face, and if I guess he is afraid of me, I say 'no'... If I guess he is not afraid of me, I allow them to sit* (Lines 1162-63). As a calming strategy, taxi drivers and conductors used not only verbal and nonverbal expressions, they also used proverbs they posted in the interior parts of the taxis they drove, as is discussed in the forthcoming sub-section.

The participant lost a brother and an aunt due to RTAs, and it could probably be for this reason that he was much concerned about road safety. Using another episode, he stated his attempt of looking for help, i.e., one who could cooperate with his fight for the observance of traffic rules (Lines 1164-68); he wanted a police officer to intervene in, and put the violators in order. He failed, though. The force in his argument was quite visible: first the taxi was overcrowded to the extent that there was a passenger who did not have a seat: *it was full; we were overcrowded; there was also a person standing* (Lines 1169-70), and second he stretched out his hand to give a sign for a nearby police officer so that he could see and react, and third, the police turned his face against the direction of what he was pointing at. The participant was sure that the police officer had seen him, as he put it repeatedly: *he saw me like this ((staring at me)) and turned his face* (Lines 1167-68) and *I stretched my hand; he saw my hand, but he kept silent and passed by* (Lines 1170-71). Why was the police officer so reluctant to that extent?

The police are usually in the streets to, among other reasons, be watchful of improper road users. Therefore, this road user not only depicted the prevalence of traffic rule violations, he also revealed lack of cooperation among stakeholders for the common goal of safety though RSSs of GIs repeatedly claimed it to have been practical. He did not use the word *negligent*, but his description positioned all the stakeholders there that way. By being so careless, the driver, the conductor, the passengers and the police were all contributing to the worsening of the problem if any accident were to occur at that specific moment. However, the road user situated himself as one who tirelessly tried to (and did) go long way to make sure that the traffic system was safe.

Several phone-in live radio discussions were run by Sheger FM 102.1 about problems associated with the road transport system in Ethiopia, and one of them targeted the worsening RTA situation in Ethiopia and why it could not be controlled. In that particular discussion, the host started the talk by framing pedestrians' road use practices negatively, that it was *haphazard*, and that they did the opposite of what they were told to do: *when people are told they have to take their left, they take their rights. They also cross the streets at places where crossing is prohibited; there are things like this* (Lines 1172-74); he did that maybe hoping callers would admit any improper road use practices they might have. However, the callers' responses were contrary to his expectation. For example, a caller, who was a pedestrian, put himself at a favorable position, as one who *most of the time* respected traffic rules (Line 1177). He said, *when I travel on foot, I adhere to the traffic rules. I respect the rule when I use the road* (Lines 1178-79). The verbs he used, *adhere* and *respect*, positioned him favorably with regards to complying with traffic rules. In his attempt at justifying his positive road use habit, he mentioned the things he saw and heard; as an example, he named Ambo, a town mostly quoted as a typical example/model for proper road use practices/ behavior of its dwellers. Trying to convince opponents/listeners calling authority is a common strategy employed in most argumentations elsewhere, and that was what this road user did.

Instead, the caller mentioned other pedestrians whom he saw were using the road in the wrong way. He positioned himself as a bit critical of the improper road use habit of these users; for example, he named the elderly who were using the ring road inappropriately (Lines 1184-85); he also commented on ETA (Line 1187). By comparing himself with others whom he said were wrong, the caller constructed himself as a road user that observed traffic rules, and as one who

learnt about road safety from what he saw and heard. Moreover, by participating in discussions on the road safety problem in Ethiopia (at least the phone-in discussion at that particular moment), he constructed himself as one responsible person. It is significant to observe what he said towards the end of the discussion: *we are conducting such discussions [but] if we won't get any result tomorrow, what are we doing now* (Lines 1189-90)? He positioned himself as one who was engaged in discussions on road safety anticipating road use change from the majority listeners. Similar self-positive positioning could be found if further analysis were conducted on other callers involved in the phone-in discussion.

From the analysis so far, we could observe that road users positioned themselves favorably, on the one hand, and blamed other road users as the most responsible contributors of the problem, on the other; they also suggested that other users needed to be targets of the road safety work. However, Elvik et al. listed areas road safety measures may be directed to as “patterns of land use, the road itself, road furniture, traffic control devices, motor vehicles, police enforcement and road users and their behavior” (2009:3), asserting that road users/their behaviors were only one of the many alternatives. In fact, of 128 safety measures they discussed, those related to road users and their behavior were not more than 15. However, in the Ethiopian road safety initiatives, it was only the case of road users that was emphasized by RSSs of GIs, PSs and even by the road users themselves, assuming that due to safety work that focused on road users and their behavior, the prevalence of RTAs in the country could have significantly been decreased.

Even if the participants constructed road safety work as if it were to have been targeting road users all the time, the practice on ground was totally different. As the participants stated, most of the pedestrians I observed in the streets violated basic traffic rules. There might be reasons that pushed them to engage in risky road use, but they would usually take their right side instead of their left, would cross streets anywhere they wished though zebra crossings could have been nearby, or they would walk at an angle when crossing the road, lengthening their stay in the lanes; many road users (children, young, adult, aged, men and women) were also observed jumping guardrails and fences made of concrete or iron bars instead of using over bridges for crossing the ring road and other high traffic areas (like at Arat Kilo). Some were observed conducting greetings or talking on their cell phones while they were crossing streets and/or when they traveled by the side of high traffic streets. Also a significant number of people used

pavements for small-scale street businesses (both as sellers and buyers) at various areas in the city (for example around Tor Hailoch Terminal, Zenebe Work, Ayer Tena, Arat Kilo, Mexcico Square, Megenagna and Kera areas). Street beggars/dwellers, construction materials and/or unfinished/uncovered ditches were in every direction of the city. The facility road users needed for safe mobility was not adequately available; for example, pavements were shared by many others or were of poor standard. However, pedestrians were commonly seen using the existing ones inappropriately. Whatever reasons they could have, it was unacceptable for pedestrians to have been so careless to involve in such risky road use practices; it could thus be concluded that they had very poor and risky road use practices. Though they constructed themselves favorably, most of them acted against their constructions. Hence, while claims for doing so were abundant, one of the five key areas of the road safety work in Ethiopia, i.e., *making change on driver and pedestrian road use behavior in order to have safe road use culture*, did not come true.

In this third section, we have tried to analyze RSSs' constructions of their role to or practices of road safety. RSSs of GIs claimed to have been working hard to alleviate RTAs causing death, injury and resource damage by focusing on *education* and *enforcement*. Discourses frequently heard/read of them were about measures they took to ensure road safety since the institution of the interim NRSC in 2003 (and the positive impacts that followed). Among the measures they claimed were the establishment of road safety management at national, regional and local levels; improvement of existing traffic safety related rules and regulations and enactment of new ones; increment of road safety awareness among the public due to continuous and intensive offerings of road safety information and lessons via the media and road safety campaigns; and introduction of safety oriented road engineering allocating up to 10% of road construction budget for safety.

RSSs of PSs and road users were no different in this regard; they also positioned themselves favorably, stating their efforts of mitigating the road safety problem and/or their involvement in safer road use practices. RSSs of PSs claimed to have been engaged in implementing safety oriented training approaches/packages. There have also been pledges to engage in the future's safer road use practices. Road users, on their part, constructed themselves favorably, as if they were using the road properly, observing basic traffic rules, and urging others to develop safer road use culture. The net effect of all these efforts should have been improvement of the road safety problem that could be evidenced by a decrease in the number and impact of RTAs.

Nonetheless, no statistical data on the death/injury toll and resource damage in Ethiopia support any of these claims; RTA-caused human and material losses are increasing year after year.

The following section reverses the direction of analysis; analysis was conducted on how RSSs constructed the roles/practices of other stakeholders instead of how they constructed themselves or their roles. It is worth scrutinizing RSSs' and RUs' constructions of others since, if *concerted and integrated work* was advocated, the way one stakeholder positioned efforts of the other is of significant implication on the success or failure of the entire road safety work in the country.

4.5 Stakeholders' Constructions of Other Players' Role to Road Safety

In the previous section, we saw how RSSs and road users positioned themselves in their discourses on the road safety problem in Ethiopia. They may have admitted the fact that the problem was so critical, and that it deserved immediate and practical intervention. Against what could be observed on the ground, however, they claimed that they were in the lead, or on the right track, causing, if not a total change, at least contributing some for the improvement of the road safety problem. Hence, we concluded almost all RSSs and RUs positioned themselves favorably.

In this section, we reversed the direction of analysis, looking at how RSSs and road users constructed others with whom they were (supposed to have been) working for the same goal. Our attempt in doing so is to answer the question: How do stakeholders construct and/or position the road safety work/role of others? Since the participants' constructions were different based on their categories, the analysis was conducted independently, as was done before, categorizing them into three as RSSs of GIs, RSSs of PSs, and RU, particularly drivers and pedestrians.

Understanding how RSSs would construct road safety works of others is significant since the very nature of the NRSC begs the question of whether stakeholders were working together and/or in coordination. It was discussed repeatedly that the Council claimed to have been coordinating the road safety efforts of the various stakeholders. However, we find them working not only in a disorganized/fragmented way, but also undermining/diminishing efforts of each other. In the work of ensuring road safety, if there is such a framing of *us* and *them*, if only a specific group of the many RSSs claimed to have been the main (or perhaps the only) one addressing the problem responsibly, it would mean the practice was contrary to the adopted

philosophy of systems theory; thus, the anticipated change would become more a nightmare than a reality. That would also mean that the vulnerable group of society would continue experiencing the evils of the road transport system for unpredictable period of time to come. This is what we could see and confirm from the analysis below.

As it was the case so far, the linguistic analysis in this sub-section also focused on word choice, grammar (presupposition, passivaization, nominalization and modality in particular), and argumentation strategies that the participants employed. The discursive analysis focused on intertextuality and speech acts that were employed. The social analysis also is not different from the previous ones; in particular, social and political theories were used in order to see the practices at the macro level. The exercising of hegemonic power in the interest of groups that had for decades been dominant in the road safety work was confirmed from the social analysis conducted. Moreover, a mix of opposing discourses had revealed from the road users' group, the group that was blamed for the prevalence of road crashes in the country: the first is the discourse that complied with the dominant one which is in agreement with the hegemony, and the second could be construed as an emerging resistance discourse.

4.5.1 How RSSs of GIs Construct Other Players' Role to Road Safety

For most of the participants, commenting on others' role plainly was a bit difficult since they mostly did not have anything positive to state about the efforts of other RSSs and road users, and saying something negative about others is culturally and morally unacceptable; hence, in their reactions, they were very much careful, hesitant and/or hedged around the topic. In order not to be boldly unfavorable about others, some would say that they were not in a position to comment on others' works. The issue was a challenge to me also; upon noticing my interviewees' reluctance from reacting straightforwardly to my query, I found myself in a conflict of whether to raise/push it further or not. Since I am of the same cultural background as my participants, had it not been for my role as a researcher, I do not think I would have felt comfortable asking people their comments about others' works/roles. It was for this reason that I sometimes tried to cover my bold questions, presupposing my point of interest from what the interviewees had said (obviously as a face-saving strategy) by using expressions like, *the point you mentioned earlier* (Line 1230) or *you mentioned this earlier* (Line 1232). On the other hand, this strategy helped me push my query since I would usually find confidence-booming responses like *exactly* (Line

1233) that developed my confidence to asking for further evidences. Eventually participants would answer the questions straightforwardly though they might have hedged initially.

The extracts analyzed first were institutional responses of top level safety officers about the causes and/or contributory factors to RTAs; when the question was crafted, it was expected that participants would mention some stakeholders as contributors of RTAs, but the main interest was which of them they would put as the most responsible ones and why. Thus analysis here focused on how the key RSSs of GIs positioned RSSs working with the NRSC and/or under its leadership in relation to their role/contribution to the road safety problem. Each time they constructed other players, power could be seen being at play; they either categorized the other players as if they were not contributing anything, or were aggravating the problem, or at least they would dictate to them explaining what they should have done in the past or should do in the future.

Almost all the stakeholders working with/under the NRSC were positioned as contributors or causes to the prevalence of the road safety problem, though with varying degrees of severity. Based on their contribution to the problem, they categorized the players into two as those of *very high contribution to the problem* (Line1239), and others as *institutions with minor contribution* (Lines 1240-41). Road users and enforcers were blamed as the main contributors of the problem: road users did not respect the rules for safer road use, and enforcers did not work for their observance. Moreover, a number of other players were positioned as being of minor contribution.

Excerpt 46

ላደጋ ምክንያት የሚባሉ ብዙ ነገሮች አሉ፤ ትልቁን ቦታ የሚይዘው የህግ አለማከበር ነው፤ ተጠቃሚው ህግ አያከብርም ህግ አስከባሪው ደግሞ ህግ የማስከበር አቅሙ ዝቅተኛ ነው / many are said to be causes of accident, but the one that takes the biggest share is disregarding the rule; the user does not observe the rule whereas the enforcer has limited capacity of ensuring observance of the rule (Lines 1194-96)

ለችግሩ መነሻ ለሚሆነው እንግዲህ የአሽከርካሪዎች ፋልተኝነትና በግረኞችም የግንዛቤ ማነስና ፋልተኝነት / the very cause of the problem is... drivers' negligence; there is also pedestrians' negligence due to lack of awareness (Lines 1197-99)

ከመንጃ ፈቃድ አወሳሰድ ይጀምራል፤ ስልጠናዎችን ባግባቡ ሳይወስድ በቂ ስልጠና ሳይወስድ ይቀራል አንዱ ነው፤ ወይም ደግሞ ንግሊጂንሲ ወይም ደግሞ ግዴለሽነት እሚባለው አለ፤ በልዩ ልዩ እ ነገሮች ተጽዕኖ ስር ሆኖ ማሸከርከር አለ ጠጉቶ ጫት ምንምን እያደረጉ መንዳት አለ እ እና ባጠቃላይ ህግ አለማከበር ደግሞ ትልቁ ነገር ነው / it all begins with the way driving license is taken; the driver may not have trained appropriately; he may not have enough training this is one. or else there is this negligence or the so called carelessness; there is also driving under the influence of different things; drunk driving chewing chat and others (Lines 1202-06)

የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነው ህግ እንዲያስከብር እሚጠበቅበት እሱ ያለው በብዛት አነስተኛ ነው በየቦታው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ሊገኝ አይችልም፤ የማስከበር አቅም ራሱ ግንዛቤ እጥረት አለ እ በቴክኖሎጂ የተደገፈ አለመሆኑ እነዚህ ሁሉ የራሳቸው አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው / it is the traffic police who are expected to ensure that the rules are respected, but their number is limited and so traffic police could not be found everywhere; and there is problem of capacity and this lack of awareness and it is not assisted by technology; all these have their own contribution (Lines 1210-14)

በተለያዩ አቅጣጫ ማለት በሚዲያው ማለት እንችላለን በቴሌቪዥንም በሬዲዮም በሚገኙ የተለያዩ ፓምፕሌቶች ጭምር ሳይቀር ኢቪን አዲስአባ ላይ እንግዲህ በየመቱ የትራፊክ ሳምንት ይከበራል፤ በነዚህ ሁሉ ስለትራፊክ አደጋ ኢቪን አደጋዎቹን ጭምር በማሳየት በፊልም በተደገፈ መቀሰቀሻ ማለት ነው ለማስጠንቀቅ፤ ለማስጋት በሚል የሚካሄዱ ፕረቶች አሉ። እነዚህን ሁሉ አልፎ ሰናይ ግን ሰው እስቲል እዛው ሁኔታ ውስጥ ነው ያለው፤ ማለት እኔ የሚመስለኝ ስነምግባር ፕሮብሌም ይመስለኛል። ወይም ደግሞ ስለጉዳዩ ችላ፤ ችላ ማለት ይመስለኛል፤ ሁለት ነገር የባህሪይ ጉዳይ፤ አሊያም ደግሞ ለጉዳዩ ተገቢ ትኩረት ካለመስጠት / there are various outlets; we could say the media the television and the radio including various pamphlets, even a traffic week is celebrated in Addis Ababa every year; using all these there are efforts of creating awareness about the traffic accident even by using films made on accident scenes in order for them to be careful and to warn them of the danger, but against all these efforts, the public is still in the same situation; this means I think there is an ethical problem, or else it seems to me it is carelessness about the issue; two things either behavior related problem or not providing the attention that the issue deserves (Lines 1264-71)

ስለዚህ የእውቀት ችግር ነው ብሎ መደምደም እንደግሌ ያስቸግረኛል፤ ምናልባት አሁን ያልኳቸው የባህሪና የኢግኖራንስ ጉዳይ ወይም ደግሞ የቸልተኝነት ምክንያት ካልሆነ በስተቀር / so I personally find it difficult to conclude it as lack of knowledge; unless maybe it is related to like I said behavior and ignorance or due to carelessness (Lines 1275-77)

ከዚህ ተነስቶ እንደውም ሞዴል መሆን እሚገባው የከተማው ሰው ነው፤ ለምን ይሄንን አላደረገም ብንል፤ ስንል እኔ እንደሚመስለኝ ቅድምም ላይ እንደ ጠቀስኩት አንዱ ፕሮብሌም ስነምግባር ነው። ሁላችንም ለህሊናችን እኔ አስፈልጋለሁ፤ ምናልባትም ለራሱም ዋጋ የሰጠ አይመስለኝም አንዳንዱ / as a result the people in the city should have been a model; if we ask why they didn't perform that task as to me and as I have mentioned earlier one problem is ethical; all of us do not convince our conscience that we all are important. I doubt if some of us value our lives (Lines 1280-83)

ግን ከፍተኛ የሆነ ቸልተኝነት አለ። የእውቀት ችግር አይደለም፤ የእውቀት ችግር ካልሆነ ደግሞ የስነ ምግባርና የቸልተኝነት ችግር ነው ብዬ ነው እምደመድመው ይሄንን ጉዳይ / there is very serious negligence, it is not lack of knowledge and if it is not lack of knowledge I conclude the issue as ethical problem and carelessness (Lines 1289-91)

አንዳንዱኑ በጣም ትልቅም የሚባለው ሰው አንዳንዴ ምንድነው እስከሚያስብል ድረስ ተሽከርካሪ መንገድ ላይ ገብቶ ዜብራውን ለመልቀቅ ራሱ እንትን እሚል አለ፤ ጅንን ይላል። ምንም እኮ አይደለም በቃ ፈጠን ፈጠን ብለን ለቀን ፍሰቱ ደግሞ ይቀጥል፤ እኛም ወደ እምንቀጥልበት መቀጠል ነው። እና ቆመው እሚሰዳደቡም አሉ ያንተ መሰለህ ወይ የሚል፤ ይሄ ምንድነው የውስጣዊ የስነምግባራችን ችግር የባህሪያችን ነው። ስለዚህ የባህሪ ለውጥ ጭምር መምጣት መቻል አለበት የሚል አሳብ አለኝ / some people who are even considered as matured would enter into the vehicles' lane and walk so clumsily on the crosswalk not to leave it to the extent we say what happened to him; it is not a problem if we walk as quickly as possible and allow the flow to continue ... and some also insult to each other uttering do you think the road belongs to you? so this is ethical problem within us it is our conduct, so I think we need to bring about change of behavior (L. 1291-97)

ስለዚህ ጥሩ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ነን ወይም ጥሩ የመንገድ ደህንነት ሰፍኗል ማለት አይቻልም እውነት ለመናገር፤ይሄ የማይሰቸልበት ምክንያት ደግሞ ያለው የራሳችን ከሌላ ጋር ሲነጻጸር ያለው የትራፊክ አደጋው ነው። ከዛ ውጪ

በየመንገዱ ያለው ደንብ ተላላፊውን ብዛት ስናየው ህግ አከብሮ የሚያሸከረከረው አሸከርካሪ በጣም ጥቂት ነው ማለት ይቻላል፤ ይልቁንስ የትራፊክ ፖሊሱን ሲያከብሩ ነው የምናየው እንጂ የትራፊክ ህጉን የሚያከብሩበት ሁኔታ የለም፤ እና ጥሩ ጥሩ የመንገድ ደህንነት አለን ብለን ማለት አይቻልም... እና የትራፊክ አደጋ ምክንያቶች ተብለው ይቀመጣሉ፤ የአሸከርካሪ ስህተት ከሰማኒያ ፐርሰንት በላይ ነው / so to tell the truth it is impossible to say that we are good road users or that good road safety is ensured; the reason not to say so is the existing road accident we experience compared to others; apart from that when we see the high number of rule violators on every road it is possible to say drivers who observe the law when they drive are very few; instead, we see them respecting the traffic police and there is no way that they observe the traffic rule. so we cannot say we have had good road safety ... so accident causes are listed and the share of drivers' fault is over eighty percent (L. 1298-04)

አብዛኛው የአሸከርካሪዎች ስህተት ነው፤ ምንድነው የአሸከርካሪዎች ስህተት የሚሆንበት ምክንያት አንዱ ህግን ተከትሎ የሚያሸከረከር አሸከርካሪ በተለይም ሲማር አደጋን ተከላክሎ የማሸከርከር ብቃት የተላበሰ አሸከርካሪ ስህተቱ የሌለውም ሰው ቢሆን ስህተቱን ወደ ራሱ ወስዶ ተጋርቶ አደጋውን አያደርስም፡፡ ይሄ ዲፌንዲቭ ድራይቪንግ ትምህርቱ አንዱ ይሄ ነው፤ ዲፌንዲቭ ድራይቪንግ አንድ አሸከርካሪ የሌለውን ስህተት ተጋርቶ አደጋ ላለማድረስ ጥረት ያደርጋል / so the majority of the problem is the driver's fault; the reason for drivers' fault is one who drives observing the rule, especially when he is trained, a driver who is acquainted with accident defensive driving skill even if there was fault by the other person, he takes the fault for himself, shares it, and does not cause the accident; this is one of the lessons of defensive driving, by defensive driving it means a driver shares the faults of the other one and tries not to cause any accident (Lines 1306-11)

ቸልተኝነት ነው ቸልተኝነት ነው፤ ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ብታነጋግራቸው በጣም እንደው እሚያስደንቅ የትህትና አቋም ያላቸው ሰዎች መንገድ ላይ ሲያሸከረከሩ ብታገኛቸው የማይከሮ ሰከንድ ትዕግስት አጥተው ሲሳደቡ ታገኛቸዋለህ፤ ከተጓዳኝ አሸከርካሪዎች ጋር ጎን ለጎን ሲሄዱ ወይ ምን ሲሉ በጣም ተናደው ከፍተኛ የሆነ ብስጭት ተሰምቷቸው የማይገባ ነገር ሲያደርጉ ታያቸዋለህ፡፡ ለምን ? የትራንስፖርት ሥራ በጣም ከፍተኛ የሆነ ትዕግስት የሚጠይቅ፤ በመንገድ ትራንስፖርት የሚደረግ ማናቸውም እንቅስቃሴ፤ እግረኛም ይሁን፤ አሸከርካሪም ይሁን፤ ተሳፋሪም ይሁን፤ ሌላም ሌላም አካል በሙሉ በትዕግስት መመላት አለበት፤ ፍፁም በሆነ ትዕግስት ነው ትዕግስት ስንል ይቺ ጊዜያዊ ትዕግስት አይደለም፡፡ ምክንያቱም ትዕግስት ማጣት እሚያስከትለው ጉዳት ህይወት እስከማጣት ነው፤ ንብረት ቀላል ነገር ነው እሚተካ ነገር፤ ህይወት ግን እሚለካ አይደለም በምንም አይነት ገንዘብ ሊለካ እሚችል አይለም፡፡ የሴክንድ የማይከሮ ሰከንድ ትዕግስት ማጣት እሚያደርሰው ጉዳት መመለሻ የሌለው ስለሆነ አሸከርካሪዎች በሙሉ፤ እግረኞች በሙሉ፤ በፍፁም ትዕግስት ነው፤ ፍፁም ትዕግስት፤ አብሰልዩት ትዕግስት ነው፤ በዚህ ላይ መቀለድ አያስፈልግም /carelessness it is carelessness; if you ask them about this issue you will find people who were amazingly humble insulting others when they are driving lacking a micro second's patience; while they are driving being by the side of their colleagues, you will see them involving in nonsense stuffs being extremely angry and feeling exceptionally upset. why? the transport sector demands high level of patience; every mobility of the road transport, be it pedestrian, driver, passenger or any other sector, it has to be filled with patience. by patience, we mean absolute patience, not this temporary patience; because the effect of lacking patience may cost one's life. wealth is so simple; it could be substituted but life is not. it could not be measured by any standard of wealth. since the impact of lacking a second's or a micro-second's patience could never be reversed. all drivers, all pedestrians, need to have absolute patience; I mean absolute patience. there is no need of kidding about this (Lines 1345-56)

መንጃ ፈቃድ የማውጣት ፕሮሰስ ያደረገ ሁሉ ግን ስለትዕግስት ካሸከርካሪዎች ስለሚጠበቅ ብሄቭየር በዛ ማሰልጠኛ ውስጥ በሚያልፍባቸው ቢያንስ ካምስት ያላነሱ ቀኖች / everyone who has gone through the process of having their driving certification has got the lessons about patience, behavior expected of drivers, from a classroom course (Lines 1362-64)

ስለዚህ ሳይወድ በግድ ፈተናውን ለመፈተንና ለማለፍ ሲል ለዚህ የተዘጋጁትን መጽሐፍት ማኑዋልስ ማንበቡ አይቀርም፤ ሁሉም በዚህ እስቴፕ ውስጥ ያለፈ ከሆነ ደግሞ፤ ሂ ኖውስ ሳምቲንግ ማለት ነው። አሁን ችግሩ ምንድነው የባህሪይ ለውጥ አለማምጣት ነው፤ የባህሪ ለውጥ፤ ያንን አምኖ ተቀብሎ የባህሪይ ለውጥ አለማምጣት ፋልተኝነት ነው / so whether he like it or not, in order for him to take the exam and pass, he has to read the books and manuals that are prepared for this purpose; if all has passed through this step which means he knows something. now the problem is absence of change in behavior; if one does not admit accept and change his behavior, then it is carelessness (Lines 1368-71)

ስለትራፊክ ደንቦችና ምልክቶች እንዲሁም ስለሚያስከትሉት ቅጣት ያለውቀ የለም፤ እኔ አንድ ኤግዛምፕል ልንገርህ አንድ በጣም ጥሩ ሰው እሚባል የተቀጣውን ቅጣት፤ ሂያ ስድስት ሪከርዶች በአምስት አመት ውስጥ በአንድ መንጃ ፈቃድ ስም ተመዝግቦ ኮምፒውተር ላይ አይቻለሁ። ሂያ ስድስት ቅጣት ሪከርድ ያለው አሽከርካሪ አለ ይሄ በጣም ትንሹ ነው፤ እንግዲህ በጣም ትንሹ ይመስለኛል / there is no one who does not know about traffic regulations and signs, and the penalties for violating them; let me tell you one example about the number of penalties of somebody who is recognized as a very good person. he has a record of about twenty six penalties just in five years' time; I have seen it recorded on the computer just under one driving license. there is a driver with twenty six penalty records and this is the least; I think it is the least (Lines 1375-80)

በግልጽ የማይታየው ከሆነ፤ አካባቢው በደንብ በግልጽ የማይታይ ከሆነ መብረር የለበትም፤ ቀስ ብሎ መሄድ አለበት / if he couldn't see clearly if the road could not be seen properly he mustn't drive fast he should drive slowly (Lines 1316-17)

ሞያተኛው ምንድነው ሞያውን ሲያሸከረከር ሙያውን በብቃት እንዴት ተወጥቷል የሚሉ ነገሮች አሉ፤ ያን ተወጥቷል አልተወጣም ነው አሁን ዋናው ጥያቄ / there are queries regarding how effectively he discharged his responsibility; now the main question is whether he has discharged his responsibility or not (Lines 1320-22)

ትልቁ እንደውም ዋናው ነገር እኔ የማሰበው ሰው በተፈጥሯችን ሳየው ሰው ሰልፊሽ ነው፤ ምንም ጥያቄ የለውም እራሳችንን እንወዳለን። ግን የኛ አገር ደግሞ ከዚህ ከዚህ ከተሸከረከሪ ጋር በተያያዘ ጉዳይ በጣም ነው የሚገርመው / the biggest problem or rather the main one to me is by our very nature I see human beings as selfish; there is no question that we love ourselves, but the case in our country in connection to the issue of vehicles is so shocking (Lines 1323-25)

አሽከርካሪውም ያንን ህግ ያውቃል፤ ያንን ህግ አከብሮ ቢሄድ ምንም ችግር አይፈጠርም። ግን ሁሉም እኔ ልቅደም፤ እኔ ልቅደም፤ ቢቃ የኔ፤ የኔ፤ የግል ኢንተረስት በጣም ስለሚብስበት ተቆላልፎ ሁሉም ሳይሄድ ይቆማል። አንዱ ትልቁ ችግር እራሳችን ነን፤ የግንዛቤም እጥረት ነው ብሎ ማለት ይከብዳል። ለህይወትህ አንተ ዋጋ መስጠት አለብህ / there won't be any problem to be created if he were to obey the rule and travel, but everybody says let me be the first, let me be the first, it is mine it is mine; personal interest dominates extremely, and eventually they will be stranded there being locked up to each other. one big problem is prioritizing ourselves; it is difficult to consider it as lack of awareness. you need to value your life (Lines 1328-32)

አሽከርካሪዎቻችን ምን ያህል ብቁ ናቸው ዲሲፕሊኑ እውቀቱ ባህሪው የሚለው ነገር ሌላው ኢምፖርታንት ነገር ነው / how much efficient are our drivers in terms of discipline, knowledge and behavior is the other important thing (Lines 1338-39)

ከጊዜ ወደጊዜ ለውጥ እየመጣ ቢሄድም አሁንም ብዙ መስራት እንዳለብን ነው ብዬ የማምነው፤ ምክንያቶቹ ያው ይታወቃሉ የአሽከርካሪ ስህተት የእግርና ስህተት ሌሎች ደግሞ ዲቴይል ስትገባ፤ ቅድሚያ አለመስጠት፤ ህጎች፤ ቢቃ ጥቅልል ብለህ ስትመጣ ህጎችን አለማክበር ነው / though change is coming from time to time, I think we still have to work a lot; the reasons are obvious, driver's fault, pedestrian's fault, and if

you go further to details, it is just not yielding to the traffic; the rules. when you summarize it, you will arrive at disrespecting the rules, but there are rules (Lines 1341-42)

As could be seen from these extracts, almost all the stakeholders that the participants cited directly (naming) or indirectly were positioned negatively. However, it was road users (drivers and pedestrians) and enforcers (the police) who were openly and repeatedly construed as most responsible for the occurrence of crashes; they were constructed as: *the user does not observe the rule whereas the enforcer has limited capacity of ensuring observance of the rule* (Lines 1195-96) using the definite article *the* in *the user* and *the enforcer*. The construction is categorical; it implies that users and enforcers in general did not discharge their responsibilities as safe users of the road and as enforcers of the rules, respectively. Again, expressions like *observe*, *observance of the rule*, *rule violator*, *disregarding the rule*, *negligence* were used repetitively; they revealed what knowledge/belief system these RSSs of GIs advocated; it was the behavioral approach to road safety that provided the few stakeholders with the power of controlling the mass.

The participants would first talk about efforts of creating road safety awareness which were exerted by some responsible sectors (they mentioned several GIs which they claimed were participating in the effort); however, regarding the public the efforts targeted, they were most of the time construed negatively: *against all these efforts, the public is still in the same situation* (Lines 1268). By *still in the same situation*, it was to mean they were not changed at all. If we listed the words, phrases or clauses used in constructing road users, we would find them all negatively connoted: *ethical problem* (three times in Lines 1269, 1291 and 1296), *carelessness* (three times in Lines 1269, 1277 and 1291), *behavior related problem* (Line 1270), *not providing the attention that the issue deserves* (1270-71), *ignorance* (Line 1277), *all of us do not convince our conscience that we all are important* (Lines 1282-83), *I doubt if some of us value our lives* (Line 1283), *very serious negligence* (Line 1290), *walk so clumsily on the crosswalk not to leave it* (Lines 1292-93), and, *some also insult each other* (Line 1295). Furthermore, to emphasize the negative construction of road users, some of the expressions, like *ethical problem*, *carelessness*, and *very serious negligence*, were used more than once.

Drivers and pedestrians were labeled as road users *disregarding the* (traffic) *rule* (Line 1195). The phrase *disregarding the rule* was qualified by *the one that takes the biggest share* (Lines 1195-96), a clause constructed using the superlative degree of the adjective *big*. The other

adjective used to construct drivers and pedestrians negatively was *negligence* (Line 1195), as in: *the very cause of the problem is... drivers' negligence; there is also pedestrians' negligence due to lack of awareness* (Lines 1197-99).

Apart from negligence/carelessness, other problems of drivers were mentioned; one was related with insufficient or inappropriate training: *it all begins from the way driving license is taken; the driver may not have trained appropriately; he may not have enough training* (Lines 1202-04), and the other was about driving under the influence of drug/alcohol: *driving under the influence of different things ... drunk driving, chewing chat and others* (Lines 1205-06). Thus, all the constructions about drivers were negative, locating them as people who did not feel responsible for the safety of themselves and that of the traffic system. If vehicle drivers were *disregarding, negligent, poorly trained, addicted*, it would not be difficult to imagine how in chaos the road system as a whole would have been.

Furthermore, pedestrians were constructed as if they were involved in risky road use practices not because they did not have the knowledge, but because they wanted it to be, i.e., *intentionally*. Such a critical comment was sometimes expressed hedgingly as in: *I personally find it difficult to conclude it as lack of knowledge* (Lines 1275-76), but it was also constructed committedly as in: *it is not lack of knowledge* (twice in Line 1290). People in Addis Ababa were particularly construed as if they had access to road safety knowledge and information; thus *the people in the city should have been models* (Lines 1280-81) for proper road use behavior. However, they were not seen showing change in road use practices: *I think we need to bring about change of behavior* (Lines 1296-97). The reason provided was, as mentioned above, *recklessness*; it was being irresponsible both for themselves and for others. The problem was constructed as common to all road users; *some people who are even considered as mature* (Lines 1291-92) were found behaving inappropriately, i.e., using the road in a way contrary to road traffic rules; they would *enter into the vehicles' lane and walk so clumsily on the crosswalk* (Lines 1292-93) to become hindrances to the safe/smooth flow of the traffic. Overall, even though doubts over pedestrians' real conceptualization of RTAs was expressed as *or else I don't know if people count traffic accident like a curse that has come from the Creator* (Lines 1288-89), the very cause of the road safety problem was construed as *recklessness*; this was expressed strongly and repeatedly as in: *but there is a very serious negligence* (Lines 1289-90). We could thus conclude that road users

(particularly pedestrians in Addis Ababa) were constructed unfavorably; they were taken as people who engaged themselves in risky road use *intentionally*.

Constructing road users as improper, unsafe, against the traffic rule, etc. was common amongst most of the RSSs; road users in general were construed as *impossible to say that we are good road users* (Line 1298), with *we* referring to road users, vehicle drivers in particular, and using euphemistic language instead of saying *they are bad*. In doing so, *the existing accident* (Line 1299) rate of the country, which was constructed as high, and *the high number of rule violators on every road* (Lines 1300-01) were used as proofs for the negative construction of road users.

Similarly, road users were construed as extremely careless: *carelessness, it is carelessness* (Line 1345) and as having no patience at all, *lacking a micro second's patience* (Lines 1345-46). To show the disregard road users would exhibit to each other, they were construed as *you will find people who were amazingly humble insulting others when they are driving* (Lines 1345-46). Although the reason for the road users' extreme change from being *amazingly humble* into one who *insults others* was not mentioned, we could infer that it was due to the inappropriate/risky road use behavior of other road users with whom they shared the road. Road users (drivers, pedestrians and passengers) could have a number of contacts with each other in their mobility; these contacts could not be smooth all the time. Some pedestrians would like to cross the road at prohibited places. Some drivers might block mobility of other drivers coming from behind, for example, driving too slowly. Sometimes a sudden pulling over of a vehicle without giving any sign or the parking of vehicles at places where they could not clearly be seen from a distance might upset upcoming drivers; worrying about the probable crash, some drivers might be nervous and could react abnormally. It could however be inferred that if such experiences persisted, the situations would cause the *amazingly humble* person to become so aggressive.

The negative impact of impatience on the safety of the road transport system was underscored; lack of patience was among the most frequently heard problems in relation to the road safety problem in Ethiopia. Whatever the reason could have been, if an accident occurred, the affected road user, be it a driver or a pedestrian, would usually be blamed for lacking a (micro) second's patience. Hence, there was a plea not just for patience, or *temporary patience* (Line 1351), but for *a high level of patience* or for an *absolute patience* (Line 1351). Patience was called for

repeatedly and emphatically: *lacking a micro second's patience* (Lines 1346-47); *the transport sector demands high level of patience* (Line 1349); *be it pedestrian, driver, passenger or any other sector, it has to be filled with patience* (Line 1350); *by patience we mean absolute patience, not this temporary patience* (Lines 1350-51); *lacking patience may cost one's life* (Line 1352); *since the impact of lacking a second's or a micro-second's patience could never be reversed, all drivers, all pedestrians need to have absolute patience; I mean absolute patience; there is no need of kidding about this* (Lines 1353-56). All these constructions were to position road users as lacking patience that they needed to have badly.

People who got their driving licenses were expected to have attended lessons on patience (Lines 1362-64). Drivers were also assumed to have the proper knowledge about traffic rules: *there is no one who does not know about traffic regulations and signs, and the penalties for violating them* (Lines 1375-76). Thus, knowledge gap was not expected; *the problem is absence of change in behavior* (Line 1370). Not only were road users construed as lacking the required change in road use behavior, absence of the expected change in road use practice was further construed as if it were due to *carelessness: if one does not admit, accept and change his behavior, then it is carelessness* (Line 1371). In order to strengthen this position, an example was cited about a driver who was *recognized as a very good person* (Line 1377) who had a record of *about twenty six recorded penalties just in five years' time* (Line 1378). Hence, the person's case was construed as *the least, this is the least, I think it is the least* (Line 1380); this would imply that a number of many other drivers were involving in worse traffic rule violating practices. What is more perplexing in relation to such an extreme violation was absence of any corrective measures by the responsible GIs. When drivers involved in repetitive violations, legal sanctions must have followed. In practice, though, some road traffic regulations (or articles in them) that could have contributed to the safety of the road system have not yet been realized, because of associating them with just '*administrative reasons*'.

It was claimed that road safety elements had been incorporated in the curriculum for driver training, but drivers were constructed as if they were taking the course only to pass examinations and to have their driving licenses rather than to gain the knowledge/skills necessary for safer driving: *so whether he likes it or not, in order for him to take the exam and pass, he has to read the books and manuals that are prepared for this purpose* (Lines 1368-69). Moreover, doubts

were expressed regarding whether all those with driving licenses had really passed through this training program: *if all has passed through this step, which means he knows something* (Lines 1369-70). Could that mean some had got driving licenses without passing through the training process? It was common to hear the presence of forged driving licenses in the hands of some drivers.

Drivers' road use practices were particularly construed as so poor: *drivers who observe the law when they drive are very few; instead, we see them respecting the police and there is no way that they observe the traffic rule* (Lines 1301-03). This was not to mean drivers would really respect the police more than the rule; it was to say they seemed to respect the traffic rules only when they saw a police officer. This was a common practice in Addis Ababa; traffic rule violations were common at places where police officers would not be available, and early in the morning, at noon and late in the evening when the police officers could not be seen in the streets.

Thus, in the road traffic system, while there were a number of parties that could have contributed to RTAs (drivers, pedestrians, the road, technical fitness of vehicles) drivers' faults were constructed as the main reasons to the occurrence of RTAs. For example, statistical data was used to construct them negatively: *accident causes are listed and the share of drivers' fault is over eighty percent* (Line 1304), and: *the majority of the problem is driver's fault* (Line 1306). Moreover, their problem was associated with the inadequate training they might have gone through; it was claimed that the driver who *drives observing the [traffic] rule* (Line 1307) and was *acquainted with accident defensive driving skill* (Line 1308) could prevent accidents, because such a driver *shares the faults of the other one and tries not to cause any accident* (Line 1310-11). However, that over 80% of RTAs were caused by faults committed by drivers would mean that they were not trained appropriately. This would imply that drivers were responsible for the occurrence of many RTAs since they were not trained in such a way that enabled them prevent would-be-accidents.

There were other factors that could have contributed to the involvement of drivers in RTAs: *pedestrians entering the high way* (Lines 1311-12) and *the environment like inadequate lighting* (Lines 1316-17). However, it was still drivers who were held responsible. In relation to holding stakeholders accountable, any professional's violation of responsibility and its implication was

discussed interdiscursively quoting some articles and sub-articles from the penal code. Accordingly, *there are queries regarding how effectively [a driver] discharged his responsibility* (Lines 1320-21). However, it seems that the query on drivers was emphasized more; in Ethiopia, making queries on most of the other stakeholders (like on health professionals, teachers, and engineers) was unusual, even if they might have failed from discharging their responsibilities. However, we could find many drivers who were held accountable and hence imprisoned (Line 1431-32). This could be construed as the exercising of power on those who were thought to be of lesser social and political capital.

Drivers, or vehicle holders in general, were also construed as people who always run only for their own sake, disregarding traffic rules and smooth mobility of others; derogatory words like *selfish* (Line 1324) were used in constructing such vehicle owners or drivers. While being *selfish* was constructed as human behavior, the case *in our country in connection to the issue of vehicles* was construed as *shocking* (Lines 1324-25). Several reasons were provided in support of this claim. First, road users were not seen observing traffic rules unless a police officer was around; they all needed to take the first chance though the traffic rule which they *knew* obliged them to give way for the one on the right. To construct every driver in the traffic system as self-centered, how they behaved was put as: *let me be the first; let me be the first; it is mine; it is mine* (Lines 1329-30). The immediate effect as a result was, if not an accident, at least staying for long due to the jam they caused: *they will be stranded there being locked up to each other* (Lines 1330-31). The *big problem* was not just *prioritizing ourselves* (Lines 1331); hence, the second and main problem was related to the competence of the drivers in the city which was questioned as: *how much efficient are our drivers in terms of discipline, knowledge and behavior* (Lines 1338-39)? Thus, not giving way and inefficiency were construed as the main problem of drivers in Ethiopia.

Drivers were further questioned if at all they were ready to discharge their responsibility: *now the main question is whether he has discharged his responsibility or not* (Lines 1321-22). The phrase *the main question* was used more for rhetorical purpose than to present an important point, for it could be argued that their share of traffic rule violation could not have been over 80% had there been any critical question on whether they discharged their responsibilities. The reason for drivers not to comply with these expectations could have neither been because they did not have the knowledge nor because the rule was so complex; in spite of such a positioning

(of drivers as the leading contributors to RTAs) and the accompanying practices of controlling them, there was no significant change observed over the past decade; statistics all the time would put them as main contributors of the problem. Thus, while there were educational (defensive driver training program) and legal (enactment of laws and traffic rules) efforts to adjust driver behavior, practically they were still framed as contributors to many of the RTAs. While it is also possible to cast doubt on why the claimed efforts did not result in any significant change, drivers were still construed as responsible for the prevalence of RTAs in Ethiopia.

In the decade's road safety strategy document, drivers *are identified* as of a *poor skill* (must have been poor driving skill) and as of *low level of safety awareness* (Line 1653). The verb *are identified* is passivized, making it unclear who the agent of the process was, and that might be intentional. But, considering the fact that it is used in a policy document, we could assume that authorities (like researchers or other responsible bodies) must have identified that. If that is so, they must have analyzed all of the possible causes of RTAs in the country, and that they finally discovered drivers' *poor skill* and *low level of safety awareness* as *main factors of fatal crashes* (Line 1653-54). Thus drivers were positioned as liable for the prevalence of RTAs in Ethiopia, and since *commercial vehicles and/or professional drivers involved in 89% of fatal collisions* (Line 1658), they were the first to blame.

Therefore, in the Ethiopian road safety context, whatever the cause could have been, the media and the police would mostly declare drivers' fault as the cause/contributor of the RTA, holding them responsible. In every 24-hours police reported RTAs in Addis Ababa, for example, there was almost no accident recorded and declared as caused by parties other than drivers' fault. In four weeks' time of the rainy season in Ethiopia (*Nehassie*/August-September of 2015), it was reported that there were a total of 167 RTA victims (of which 24 died, 101 severely injured and the rest (42) were slightly injured). The report included causes of the registered accidents, and drivers were held responsible for 139 of the 167 accidents (which is over 83% of the total). The causes for the death/injury of 6 people were not known, and that of the remaining 22 was not stated at all. Hence, drivers could still have been held as causes for some of the unknown/unstated cases also. The report included what the errors of these drivers were as follows:

Error types committed by drivers (the way it was reported)	No. of victims as a result	Share in % of the total victims
<i>Not giving way for pedestrians when they were crossing the road</i>	79	56.8
<i>Improper use of the wheel: pulling to the right</i>	18	13
<i>Careless driving</i>	16	11.5
<i>Vehicles hitting each other</i>	15	10.7
<i>Driving/going off the road</i>	6	4.3
<i>Crash with inanimate objects</i>	2	1.4
<i>Pulling backwards with no care</i>	2	1.4
<i>Vehicle off its track</i>	1	0.5
Total	139	100

Although the report was a bit detailed (it was with comments and lessons) in relation to driver errors, it did not include anything about other accident causing/contributing factors; the road and its environment and the vehicle were not constructed as causes of accident. Therefore, in the context of Ethiopia, the media and the police were engaged in practices that contributed to slanted conceptualization of the road safety problem to the extent that such distorted construction could be discoursed across the players. As Zein and Navin (2003), cited in Larsson et al. (2010) confirmed, this kind of construction of RTAs is common elsewhere in the world: “simplistic representations of traffic safety disregard the dynamic interactions among the road environment, the vehicle, and the road-user.” Larsson et al. (2010) further stated that police reports that attributed over 90% of all RTAs to driver error would lead to “the incorrect conclusion that improving driver behavior is the only effective road safety strategy.”

RSSs of GIs that mostly positioned drivers as accountable did not want to see problems related with them as they did with road users; they might have admitted that a lot had to be done to improve the situation which they construed as very serious: *though change is coming from time to time, I think we still have to work a lot* (Lines 1341-42). If they were to mention any problem associated with GIs, it was only in the form of its failure/incapacity to effecting safer traffic flow. Hence, the government was criticized for its failure to address or at least pay attention to the problem from two perspectives: enforcement and education; *control is loose* (Line 1335), *there are also gaps with awareness creation work* (Lines 1335-36). However, there were other problems related with *infrastructure* (Lines 1337) and with how *driving licenses* (Lines 1328-29) were offered. This would therefore mean that several GIs also were accountable: the police, legal institutions, ETA, ERA and driver licensing institutions. The gaps observed (with vehicle

holders, GIs and PSs) could have their own contribution to the worsening of RTAs in the country. However, the impact of the gaps in all these RSSs was not emphasized. Instead, the case was summarized as: *when you summarize it, you will arrive at disrespecting the rules* (Lines 1343-44). The reasons for the occurrence of RTAs in Ethiopia, which were listed as *obvious reasons*, were associated with road users alone: *the reasons are obvious: driver's fault, pedestrian's fault, and if you go further to details it is just not yielding to the traffic rules* (Lines 1342-43). Hence, only road users were held accountable even if GIs and PSs were constructed as contributors to the problem. For example, the same RSSs of GIs, i.e., politicians/officers at higher policy/directive issuing and execution positions could be watched/listened to (on consultative meetings they held) admitting in bold that they did not work to the level expected of them. However, none of them would be held accountable for the lives lost or limbs injured and for the crisis family members of RTA victims and the country at large faced. The reason was obvious; RSSs of GIs and PSs had political and social capital that prevented them from being held accountable. Therefore, such a construction could not be different from what the Amharic adage that goes *አህያውን ፈርቶ ዳውላውን* / *fearing the donkey, beating the sack* would imply.

While drivers were held accountable for most of the road safety problems in the country, participants mentioned the impact of not taking proper measures on the repetitive traffic rule violators, i.e., as one of the reasons for the perpetuation of the road safety problem. They discussed some of the reasons that would push drivers working in the transport sector to involve in the traffic rule violations repeatedly: the market competition they would always engage in, their interest for earning too much, and the loose enforcement practices that traffic enforcers employed. The analysis continued following the extracts below.

Excerpt 47

አሁን አሽከርካሪዎች፣ በተለይ በንግድ ሥራ ላይ የተሰማሩት፣ ለትራፊክ ደንቦችና ሕጎች መጣስ ምክንያት የሚሆናቸው፣ ይመስለኛል ኮምፒዩተር ነው፣ አንደኛ ኮምፒዩተር ነው፣ በንግድ አለም ውስጥ ያለው ገቢ ለማግኘት የሚደረገው ሩጫ የሚፈጥረው ነው፤ አንደኛ ትልቁ ኮምፒዩተር ሽሚያው አለ፤ ገቢያውን የመሻማት ነገር አለ / the very reason for them to violate the traffic rules and regulations is I think the competition. The first one is competition in the business world which is created due to the strive for money, the strive, the competition is the main one the strive for the market (Lines 1381-84)

እዚህ ጋር አምስት ሰው ደርቦ ጭኖ ቢሄድ እሚፈለገው አስራ ሁለት ሰው ሆኖ፤ እሱ በዚህም በዚያም አጠጋግቶ ከርሲ አስቀምጦ አስራ ሰባት ሰዎችን ጭኖ ቢሄድ ያቺን ሰማኔያ ወይም አርባ ብር የተቀጣትን ወዲያውኑ እሚመልሳት ከሆነ፤ በሕጉ በመቀጣቱ በእሱ ላይ እሚያሳድረው የመማር እትን ይሄን ያክልም አይደለም / while he should have loaded twelve passengers if he loads seventeen with five more letting them sit elsewhere or

on a stool and if he regains that fined eighty or forty birr instantly then there won't be anything significant he could learn from the law or the penalty (Lines 1394-96)

ገበያ ላይ ያለው ኮምፒቴሽን በአለት ገቢ ለባለሀብቱ አስረከቦ የአሱን ድርሻ ከፍ ለማድረግ ያለው ፍላጎት፣ ሕጉን ለመጣስ እንደ ዋነኛ ምክንያቶች ይሆናሉ ብዬ እገምታለሁ / so the competition for market and his interest to increase his share of income after he has handed over that of the owner em I guess these are the main reasons for the violation of the law (Lines 1400-01).

Professional drivers in the transport sector, taxi drivers in particular, were construed as the main contributors to the road safety problem violating traffic rules partly because they involved in extreme market competitions that would eventually lead them to traffic crashes; *the very reason for them to violate the traffic rules and regulations is I think the competition. The first one is competition in the business world... due to the strive for money... the strive for the market* (Lines 1381-84). The loaded verb *strive* could clearly depict the level of competition they were engaged in; it was not the normal/ethical market competition that they were in, but an abnormal kind of competition. Such an extreme zeal for more profit was further constructed as: *the competition for market and his interest to increase his share of income after he has handed over that of the owner* [was so high] (Lines 1400-01). Taxi drivers in particular were construed as if they were in the competition not just to take their *share of income*, but to *increase* [their] *share of income*. Moreover, they would board passengers beyond the seat limits of their vehicles in order to compensate for penalties they were fined for involving in some traffic rule violation: *while he should have loaded twelve passengers, if he loads seventeen with five more, letting them sit elsewhere or on a stool, and if he regains that fined eighty or forty birr instantly...* (Lines 1394-96). This would mean that fines charged against traffic rule violations were not solutions to the problem; instead, they were reasons for further violations, implying that the strategy employed for controlling them did not work.

The construction of road users negatively (as contributors to RTAs) is a common practice among the advocates of the traditional approach to road safety. As McAndrews (2013) asserts, although the new approach to road safety insists on “a social process seeking to redefine system risk and influence roles and responsibilities,” road safety has traditionally been considered as the task of transport sectors only, and RTAs were taken as responsibilities of individual road users alone.

Although they also were in the GIs, we could observe that the police were constructed in almost similar fashion as road users, i.e., unfavorably. Below are some of the constructions about them:

Excerpt 48

የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነው ህግ እንዲያስከብር እሚጠበቅበት እሱ ያለው በብዛት አነስተኛ ነው በየቦታው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ሊገኝ አይችልም፤ የማስከበር አቅም ራሱ ግንዛቤ አጥረት አለ እ በቴክኖሎጂ የተደገፈ አለመሆኑ እነዚህ ሁሉ የራሳቸው አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው / it is the police who are expected to ensure that the rules are respected, but their number is limited and so traffic officers could not be found everywhere; there is problem of capacity and this lack of awareness, and it is not assisted by technology (Lines 1210-13)

ላዲጋ ምክንያት የሚባሉ ብዙ ነገሮች አሉ፤ ትልቁን ቦታ የሚይዘው የህግ አለማከበር ነው፡፡ ተጠቃሚው ህግ አያከብርም ህግ አስከባሪው ደግሞ ህግ የማስከበር አቅሙ ዝቅተኛ ነው / many are said to be causes of accident, but the one that takes the biggest share is disregarding the rule; the user does not observe the rule whereas the enforcer has limited capacity of ensuring observance of the rule (Lines 1195-96)

ሁለተኛ በአስተዳደር አካሉ፤ በሕግ አስከባሪው አካል ያለው ንዝህላልነት ወይም ደግሞ ሪከርዶችን ይዞ ቅጣቱን ከደረጃ ወደ ደረጃ እየሳደገ አለመሄድ ሳንክሸን በመንጃ ፈቃዱ ላይ አለማሳረፍ እና የሕግ ክፍተቱን የሚያመለክት ነው፤ ለምን ብትለኝ በመጣ ቁጥር የቅጣት ፓድ እየተቆረጠ እሚሰጠው ከሆነና ይሄ ሪከርድ ተደርጎ ሁለተኛ ዙር አጥፍቶ ሶስተኛ ላይ ሲመጣ፤ አንተ መንጃ ፈቃድህ መነጠቅ አለበህ፤ ለሰድስት ወር ሳስፎንድ መደረግ አለብህ፤ ዳግም ስልጠና ገብተህ ችሎታህ መረጋገጥ አለበት እማይባል ከሆነ ዋይ ኖት / the second one is that of the administrative body, recklessness on the part of the enforcer of the rule, or a problem of not keeping records and not increasing the fines stage by stage, or absence of sanction on the driving license; every time he comes, if he is simply given the penalty pad, and if this is not recorded, and when he comes second or third round, if he is not warned of, like 'your driving license should be banned' or 'you should be suspended for six months' or 'you should go for a retraining and your competence has to be confirmed,' then why not (Lines 1384-91)

የትራፊክ ፖሊስ፤ በዋናነት የፌዴራል ፖሊስ የተሻለ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ / the traffic police, mainly the federal police are now working with far better efforts (Line 1244)

In most constructions of the police, we could see RSSs of GIs positioning them as if they were not working to the level expected of them: *it is the police who are expected to ensure that the rules are respected, but their number is limited and so traffic officers could not be found everywhere* (Lines 1210-12). Here, although they were constructed unfavorably, it seems that only their number was the reason for them not to discharge their responsibilities; however, other problems were mentioned like *limited/poor capacity, lack of awareness and technology* that were essential for the effectiveness of the road safety work of the police: *the enforcer has limited capacity of ensuring observance of the rule* (Lines 1195-96); *there is problem of capacity and this lack of awareness, and it is not assisted by technology* (Lines 1212-13). It was discussed earlier that the capacity the police were expected to have was that of *educating and enforcing*; hence, the problems mentioned here could also be construed as affecting these functions.

In the clause *the second one is that of the administrative body, recklessness on the part of the enforcer of the rule* (Lines 1384-85), we could see *enforcers* being constructed as contributors to

the road safety problem; these *enforcers* were also equated with and/or named as *administrative body*, taking the two phrases as equivalent or as terms that stood for one entity. Thus, enforcers and/or the administrative body were *reckless* with regard to accomplishing their duties; it was further constructed that *recklessness on the part of the enforcer of the rule, or a problem of not keeping records and not increasing the fines stage by stage, or absence of sanction on the driving license* (Lines 1385-87) as contributing to the prevalence of RTAs. The legal framework for the road traffic related problem in Ethiopia had been improved several times, and the recent one which was ratified in 2010 was regarded as the most comprehensive regulation to road traffic safety in Ethiopia; if it were implemented by the responsible institutions of which the police was the main one, the regulation was considered to be a significant means of tackling the country's road safety problem. However, the reason for the enforcers and/or the administrative bodies not to implement the regulation was not clear; *every time he comes, if he is simply given the penalty pad, and if this is not recorded, and when he comes second or third round, if he is not warned of, like 'your driving license should be banned' or 'you should be suspended for six months' or 'you should go for a retraining and your competence has to be confirmed,' then why not* (Lines 1388-91). Hence, so far, record based fining, to the extent of urging for the retraining of driving license holders if they engaged in repeated traffic rule violations had not been fully practiced in the road safety works of the traffic police in Ethiopia, though the Amhara, SNNP and Tigray Regions have initiated it (Tigabu, 27 Feb. 2016). If they did not increase the measures based on repetitive involvement in traffic rule violations of the drivers, it would seem that the police were interested more in the fees they collected than the safety of the traffic system; this conclusion would be more appropriate if we related it to the fact the the traffic office had annual plans of collecting specified amount of income from the fine tickets. Of course, the attempt at implementing the regulation in Addis Ababa as of 22 February 2016 was seriously opposed by the city's transport service providers; due to the massive strike of the city's taxi drivers against the plan, the government was forced to suspend its implementation for some time.

On the other hand, the fines road traffic rule violators paid were construed as so insignificant compared to the severity of accidents which could occur due to the violators' improper road use behavior. In other words, the fines the rule violators paid were not high enough to give them (and others) the lessons intended, or to deter them from involving in traffic rule violation. These penalized drivers would, as a result, continue doing the same in their efforts of compensating for

the amount they lost by the fines they paid. For example, they would board passengers beyond seat limits of their vehicles (Lines 1394-98). Thus, the road safety related law was construed as *ineffective*. If mass casualties were the main reasons for the high number of crash victims as it was frequently heard or read from the road safety officials and their documents, the preference of keeping silent instead of reacting to such risky practices would therefore be, as was repeatedly construed by the participants, *recklessness* (Lines 1385 and 1392) of the responsible body.

Overall, *drivers* (due to their extreme interest to making money) and *enforcers* (due to their loose enforcement practices) were constructed as key contributors to the prevalence of accidents; furthermore, this problem was taken as the main one: *I guess these are the main reasons for the violation of the law* (Line 1401), the law that was enacted to ensure safe mobility of the traffic.

In Addis Ababa, it was a common practice to travel in crowded public service vehicles, particularly in the mornings, in the evenings and on holidays, seating seventeen to nineteen passengers in a taxi that could not accommodate more than twelve. Passengers would usually be forced to sit in threes on seats that were prepared for twos; moreover, many taxis had a kind of bench or several stools that were used for the extra passengers they loaded. In order not to be caught red handed and penalized, drivers of these taxis would usually speed involving in a hide and seek game like practice with the police. I had seen some policemen taking the number plates of the vehicles when they found these rule violating drivers. However, since the police did not regularly engage in such controlling/patrolling practices, the practice would recur.

On the other hand, there were some participants who positioned the police as better than other RSSs. Thus, we could observe the performance of the police, especially the police at the federal level, being constructed as better than any other stakeholder that worked to ensure road safety in Ethiopia: *the traffic police, mainly the federal police are now working with far better efforts* (Line 1244). Details were not given about what ways they were performing better, but their duty was facilitating the safe flow of road users, and, whenever necessary, enforcing the traffic related rules and regulations. The necessity of emphasizing on enforcement as a key area of intervention for future road safety work in Ethiopia, which we saw in the previous section, is in agreement with the position participants took here. In other words, if road users were positioned as responsible for the road safety problem in Ethiopia, and if enforcement was recognized as

solution, then the work of the police should naturally be positioned favorably. On the contrary, as we have seen above, the same were also constructed negatively, as if they did not discharge their responsibilities to the level expected of them. This fallacious construction could have been due to an erroneous conceptualization of the road safety problem and ways of tackling it. Had there been a balanced outlook of the problem and ways of addressing it, the participants' constructions would have included other RSSs also. RSSs of GIs, therefore, constructed road users unfavorably, but their constructions of enforcers, i.e., the police and other administrative bodies, were mixed. The interest of constructing them favorably was to continue with the tradition, educating road users and controlling/punishing them when they committed mistakes.

As has been discussed so far, RSSs of GIs blamed mainly road users and enforcers; however, they constructed other stakeholders also negatively though that was a bit indirect. Thus, when roads were constructed as contributors to the road safety problem of the country, this would mean that ERA was responsible for the problem. That road design and construction was counted as contributor to RTAs was in line with the mainstream road safety discourse; hence, their mention of the road was quite encouraging since this would imply that one more issue was considered instead of targeting road users alone. If roads also are construed as contributors of the problem, appropriate safety measures could be taken. However, compared to the repeatedly named and blamed road users, the mention of *the roads* as a problem was rather vague:

Excerpt 49

መንገዶች በግባቡ የመንገድ ደኅንነትን ታሳቢ አድርገው ዲዛይን የተደረጉ አይደሉም፤ በኮንስትራክሽናቸውም ጥገናቸውም ወቅት ባጠቃላይ የመንገድ ደኅንነትን በበቂ ሁኔታ ያካተቱ አይደሉም / the roads are not designed well with safety in mind, both during times of construction and maintenance; generally they do not adequately incorporate road safety (Lines 1214-16)

መንገዶችን ... ስናይ መንገዱ በግባቡ ባለመሰራቱ ሴፍቲን ግምት ባለማስገባቱ ያልሰራው ስራ አለ እንላለን / when we see roads authority, we could say it may not have constructed the roads properly with safety in mind (Line 1251)

የኢትዮጵያ መንገዶች ባለስልጣን፣ ምንም እንኳን ችግሩ ሰፊ የሚጠበቅበት ሰፊ የሚሰሩዋቸው ሰራዎች ያን ያህል ጎልተው ለመውጣት ገና ያልቻሉ ቢሆኑም ካለው ተነሳሽነቱ እያደረገ ካለው ጅምር ሁኔታ አንጻር ጥረት እያደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ / the Ethiopian Roads Authority, though their efforts couldn't be seen boldly since the problem is wide and what is expected of them is deep their initiative and small beginnings indicate that they are also trying their level best (Lines 1245-47)

In the roads are not designed well with safety in mind, both during times of construction and maintenance; generally they do not adequately incorporate road safety (Lines 1214-16), which

stakeholder was to take the liability for the problem associated with the inanimate entity, *the roads* was not clear; passivization was used as in *the roads are not designed well* which obfuscated responsibility. In *they do not adequately incorporate road safety*, the active form also had the same purpose; it avoided responsibility since the pronoun *they* referred to *the roads*, not the stakeholders responsible for the problem. As it was done with driver trainers and vehicles' technical fitness ensuring institutions, it was possible to name some of the players behind the poor construction/design of the roads (like ERA and its regional extensions, road designers, constructors and consultants). However, that was not preferred; since the majority of them were connected with the government, doing so could reveal its failure from acting accordingly.

ERA was mentioned in another context where its contribution to road safety was constructed vaguely: *we could say it may not have constructed the roads properly with safety in mind* (Line 1251). This construction of ERA was full of hedging: both *could say* and *may not have* must have been used to lessen ERA's liability. It is significant to relate this to what was said about *the roads*, where passivization was used to obscure responsibility, *the roads are not designed well with safety in mind* (Line 1214). Moreover, in: *though their efforts couldn't be seen boldly ... their initiative and small beginnings indicate that they are also trying their level best* (Lines 1245-47) ERA was positioned favorably. It was to mean that they had some efforts of alleviating the problem; nevertheless, it was not bold enough to get noticed. Moreover, whatever they did was no more than an *initiative*; it was just a *small beginning*. ERA was further constructed as an institution from which a lot was expected: *the problem is wide and what is expected of them is deep* (Line 1246). This means ERA did not go deep into the task of incorporating safety in the design, construction and maintenance of roads. All these would imply that ERA was supposed to have been an institution of *very high contribution to the problem*, but it was not found working to the level expected of it; however, unlike that of road users, its construction did not plainly put it that way. Euphemism was highly employed, maybe due to conflict of interest, i.e., the need to continue with the power that ERA held jointly with ETA and FPC; compared to the powerless individual road users, ERA is a GI of historical and political capital to get positioned favorably.

The other key RSSs in the road safety work in Ethiopia were ETA and MoE. However, constructions regarding ETA's contribution to road safety were both negative and positive. For example, in *others like transport authority and other responsible stakeholders like ministry of*

education, on their part, are contributing their share in a limited way (Line 1257-59), the language used was not only general, categorical and exclusionary like in the *others* and *other responsible stakeholders* (Line 1258), but the role of ETA and MoE to road safety was construed as just *limited*: *[they] are contributing their share in a limited way* (Line 1259). Therefore, although they could have been better than RSSs whose names were not quoted at all, they still were at a position of insignificant role compared to the police and ERA which were mentioned repeatedly. The paradox is that though education was one of the two focal areas by which most participants repeatedly claimed road safety work in the country succeeded, ETA, the institution responsible for road safety education preparation and dissemination, was positioned unfavorably. Moreover, MoE was the other key institution to provide road safety education to the young; for example, road safety lessons were incorporated in the primary education curriculum, “Road safety subjects have been sufficiently included in the National basic education syllabuses for grades 1 to 8” (NRSSPE, 2011, p.5). However, the role of MoE was also construed as *limited*.

Ministry of Health is the other important stakeholder mainly due to its role of providing EMS for RTA victims; the NRSSPE framed the contribution/involvement of MoH quite favorably as “the Ministry of Health has recently taken far reaching steps in emergency medical services system” (2011, p. 7). Similarly, MoH was construed as if it were not accountable for the prevalence of RTAs in Ethiopia: *it is not responsible for the accident ... for the accident does not occur because there was something the ministry has not done* (Lines 1250-53). Three negative structures were used to locate MoH at a safer position; hence, it was categorized in the group of institutions *with minor contribution*.

MoH could not be held responsible for any RTAs to occur, but the problem was how it reacted to RTA victims once the accident occurred. If RTAs were to occur, it was constructed as: *because of our limited capacity to offering emergency care and continuous treatment* (Lines 1253-45), people would continue dying and/or experiencing severe injuries. It means, for reasons of capacity, both emergency and continuous treatment provisions were limited, and road victims were not getting the immediate and appropriate attention they deserved; capacity problem was used as an excuse for the death and injury of citizens. Hence, it could be concluded that while it may not have been the immediate cause of RTAs, MoH was still contributing to the death and serious injury of people, but it was constructed to the contrary, i.e., favorably: *ministry of health*

is...extending its efforts (Lines 1247-48), and *it is on the right understanding ...moving to the level expected of it* (Lines 1256-57). The verbs like *extending*, *understanding* and *moving* would imply that there were some developments observed in the practices of MoH. Therefore, although there were some elements of hedging, the construction MoH was still positive.

The other RSSs constructed negatively were driver training and licensing institutions (*the driver may not have taken the training appropriately he may not have taken enough training* Lines 1202-04), and vehicles' technical fitness ensuring institutions (*there are also accidents caused by vehicles' technical defects; because our drivers do not check safety components of their cars before they start driving, technical defects occur and so accident due to technical failure will follow*, Lines 1225-27). In both cases drivers were the immediate targets of the unfavorable positioning for they were not trained properly, and did not check technical fitness of the vehicles they drove; however, it could also be implied that the negative construction included driver training and vehicles' technical inspection institutions as contributors to the problem since they were responsible for qualifying incompetent drivers and defective vehicles, respectively.

However, if *our limited capacity* applied as an excuse for MoH's failure for not offering EMS for saving lives and preventing severe injuries, and if *the problem is wide and what is expected of them is deep* applied for understanding ERA's failure from constructing safety oriented roads, why did *lack of awareness on safer road use* not apply for road users also? The answer for this and similar challenges must be related with the need to continue with the hegemonic power that the few 'responsible' bodies held; while the named GIs were liable for the problem they caused, the historically constructed position they occupied, i.e., being departments of the government, gave them the amnesty from being held responsible. Therefore, the Amharic adage that goes *ሰማይ አይታረስ፣ ንጉስ አይከሰስ* / *as the sky cannot be ploughed, a king also cannot be questioned* must have been working effectively behind all these constructions.

To conclude this sub-section, we have tried to analyze how RSSs of GIs constructed the road safety works/roles of RSSs working under the NRSC's leadership and those who used the road. We could see that almost all the RSSs they mentioned, road constructors/designers, road users, road traffic flow facilitators/enforcers, road safety educators/promoters and driver training/licensing institutions were constructed unfavorably; some were constructed totally unfavorably

whereas others were taken as if they were engaged in their duties though it was not to the level expected of them. Some of the RSSs like the police were located ambiguously, sometimes favorably and at other times unfavorably. Others like ETA, MoH, MoE were not different from the others in terms of commitment and discharging their responsibility. However, since they were GIs, locating them negatively was too difficult for the RSSs of GIs. Regarding these stakeholders, while the problem the participants raised could have been somehow a reality, blaming RSSs in general or road users in particular was not in line with the foundation the road safety work of Ethiopia was based on. The principle of shared responsibility by which the country's road safety policy/strategy was formulated proposed that each player in the road transport sector, the police, and others with a stake of the safe existence and mobility of citizens were meant to work together in coordination/collaboration. However, contrary to this principle of shared responsibility, the key road safety players, i.e., those working in GIs adopting this same principle were found engaging in such a self-positive and others-negative dichotomy.

In the subsection to follow, we will see how RSSs of PSs constructed the road safety work/role of other players: RSSs of GIs, other RSSs of PSs and road users.

4.5.2 How RSSs of PSs Construct Other Players' Role to Road Safety

In this sub-section, data collected from RSSs of PSs is analyzed with the aim of examining how they constructed the role/works of other RSSs and road users. As was the case in the previous section, analysis here focused on *social identities*, how stakeholders identified and positioned themselves in relation to their work, and on *social relations*, how they constructed relations with or act towards others, though the ideas, *systems of knowledge and beliefs* that were conveyed in their discursive events could also have been touched upon (Fairclough, 1992). Thus vocabulary, intertextuality and grammar, mainly modality, presupposition and passivization that participants used in constructing other RSSs were examined. Put briefly, RSSs of PSs constructed road users and other RSSs involving in the road traffic system unfavorably. The details are presented as follows.

1. Drivers lack the skill of driving and were negligent of safer driving

Drivers were constructed as *negligent* and so *ignorant* of the basic precautions for safer driving.

Excerpt 50

ለምሳሌ ውሲድ አሽከርካሪዎችን በቀላሉ ማየት ትችላለህ፤ እኔ ግርም ነው እሚለኝ፤ እዛ አሁን እፊትህ እግረኛ ምናልባት ያካል ጉዳተኛ ሊሆን ይችላል ወይም ነፍሰጡር እናት ልትሆን ትችላለች፤ በምን ያህል ስፒድ ያንን መንገድ እንደምታቋርጠው መገመት የማይችል አሽከርካሪ ነው ያለው። ሄደህ ሄደህ ሄደህ አጠገቧ ስትደርስ ፍሬን ሴኮ ያዝኩ ብለህ አውቶማትክ ፍሬን ተጠቅመህ፤ አደጋው ግን ላይቀርልህ ይችላል ማለት ነው / take drivers you can observe simply, it really surprises me, there in front of you a pedestrian is crossing; maybe he is a disabled person or she could be a pregnant woman. the driver at present is one who couldn't even guess at what speed she is crossing; you drive and drive and drive until you arrive at her and then maybe you say I have applied the brake using it automatically just by her side, but the accident may still be inevitable (Lines 1405-10)

አሁን (የአንድ አለማቀፍ መ.ያ.ድ. ስም ጠቅሰው) አንድ ሰው ሲያጫውቱኝ ስልጠና ስንሰጥ፤ ምንድነው አሉ ሰውዬው ይችን አህያ ልትገጭ ነው መሰለኝ እያሉ ሄዱ አሉ፤ ሾፌር ናቸው እሳቸው፤ ከዛ በኋላ፤ ኢማጅን አህያዋን አይተው እንደምትገጭ ከገመቱ ፍጥነታቸውን እየቀነሱ እየቀነሱ መጠጋት ሲገባቸው እና አህያዋን ማሳለፍ ሲገባቸው፤ አላዩዋትም እንዳይባል ድንገት ገባች እንዳይባል አይተዋታል፤ ከዛ በኋላ ሄዱ ሄዱና አሉ እንደተባለው ገጫት። አላልኳችሁም! አሉ አሉ አየኸው ((ሣቅ)) እኔ አሁን ምንም በምንም ታዕምር የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ግንዛቤ የሚባለው ነገር በጭራሽ፤ በምንም በጎናቸውም አላለፈም ማለት ነው፤ እንኳን ውስጣቸው ምናቸውም የለም። እንግዲህ አላልኳችሁም?! እየህ እየፎከሩ ሄደው እንደገጫት ቁጠር እንግዲህ አየኸው / once a person from (name of an international NGO) was telling me a story when we were offering training for his staff; he said the driver was saying this donkey is to be hit while he was approaching it; he is a professional driver. imagine if he saw the donkey and suspected that it would be hit, he should have approached it reducing his speed bit by bit and he should have let the donkey cross. it is impossible to say he didn't see it, or it entered the street accidentally; he saw it. after that he went on and on and like he said he hit it, and he said haven't I told you as the man told me. you see ((laughing)) now as for me, no way has this driver had road traffic safety awareness. never at all did it pass by his side; leave alone in him, it does not exist anywhere with him. haven't I told you? you see count it as if he hit it declaring to do so (Lines 1412-21)

አሽከርካሪውንም እንዳትወቅሰው ግንዛቤ የለውም። እንግዲህ ፐርሰንት ዘጠናም ስጠው መቶም በለው ግን ምን? ምን አፄር ምንድነው የሰጠኸኝ ግንዛቤ ይልሃል፤ መንጃ ፈቃድ ብቻ ነው ያለው። ከዛ በኋላ ስለአደጋ፤ እንዲህ ተከታታይነት ያለው በየሰዓት ወሩ፤ በየሰዓት ወሩ፤ ምናምን ብለህ አምስት ሳንቲም በጅት ላሽከርካሪው ስልጠና፤ አምስት ሳንቲም የለም፤ እኔ አይቼ አላቅም / you can't blame the driver for he doesn't have the knowledge. as to the rate it doesn't matter whether you give it ninety or say it a hundred percent, but what? 'what knowledge,' he asks you, 'what knowledge have you given me?' all he have is only the driving license. Then after I have never seen a penny's budget allocated for the driver, for a continuous, like quarterly or semiannual training about the accident (Lines 1463-67)

ስለዚህ አሁን እኔም እንግዲህ አንተ ላይ ብጨርስ ኖሮ፤ እንዲህ አይነት ተሽከርካሪ አልይዝም ብትል፤ እዛ ላይ ዲፌንሲቭ ላይ ብጨርስ ያኛውን አትጠቅሰልኝም ነበረ፤ አሁን ግን እድል አገኘህ፤ ከዛ ለምንድነው ስልህ የንጅራ ጉዳይ ነው ትላኛለህ። ለምን እንደዚህ አይነት መኪና ትይዛለህ? ስትለው ታዲያ ልጆቼ ምን ይብሉ ይልሃል፤ አሁን ወደ ማኔጅመንት ፓርት ነው። ሴፍቲ እና እንትን ስትቀላቅለው ልክ አይመጣም፤ ሴፍቲና ይሄ እለታዊ፤ ይሄ መኖር፤ እንትን እምታወራ ከሆነ እሱ ልክ አይመጣም / so as to me if I had done on you...if I had finished it there, the defensive training, you wouldn't have mentioned that, but now you have got the chance and so when I asked you of the reason you tell me that you have to make your living; when you ask him why he drives such kind of vehicle, he says so what would my children eat? this is an aspect of management; it won't be right when you mix safety and...daily bread, or if you talk about survival, that won't be right (Lines 1523-29)

አሁን አየህ አበላሽኸው፤ እንትኩን ዲፌንድ የሚለውን እዚህ ጋር ቢቃ፤ ዩ አር ኖት ዲፌንዲቭ! ዲፌንዲቭ ብትሆን ኖሮ ሴፍቲ ላይ ድርድር የለውም / at this moment, you see, you have spoiled the defense concept. You are not defensive; that's all! If you were defensive, there would be no deal [with you] with regard to safety (Lines 1531-33)

ስለዚህ ከኋላ ስለሚሆነው አትንገረኝ ነው፤ ከኋላ ባለቤቱ ተጽዕኖ እንደሚመጣ ያውቃል፤ ግን ደሞ ማስቆም እሚችለው አሽከርካሪው ነው ቢቃ! / so don't tell me of people from behind. He [the driver] knows the owner could exert pressure from behind but it is the driver who could resist it; that's all! (Lines 1537-38)

እንግዲህ፤ እኔ፤ በጣም ሲሞጥል የሆነ ሎጂክ ከሄድን መተኮር ያለበት አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው፤ ለምን ያው ጥፋተኛም እሱ ስለሆነ / well, to me, if we follow the simplest logic, the focus should be on the driver, because he is the obvious violator (Lines 1549-50)

እስኪል ያጥረዋል ብዬ አላስብም፤ እስኪል አለው ግን አቲትዩድና ኖዎሌጅ እነዚህ እነዛን ማዳበል ስላለበት፤ እነሱ ሊመለሱለት የሚችሉት ደግሞ በዲፌንዲቭ ድራይቭንግ ፓኬጅ ውስጥ ያገኘዋል ብዬ አስባለሁና፤ ሞር እሱ ላይ ቢሰራ ጥሩ ነው / I don't think they lack the skill; he has the skill but he should also incorporate the attitude and knowledge aspects. since these could be found in the defensive driving package, I think it is good if more emphasis is provided there (Lines 1557-60)

Drivers were construed as speeding, to the extent of finding it difficult to control their vehicles when something unexpected were to happen. As a way of illustrating the unexpected incident that would occur, the possibility that *a disabled man and a pregnant woman* (Lines 1406-07) crossing the road was mentioned, both of whom were too weak to protect themselves, and if drivers were incompetent, the accident would be so severe. An anecdote was used, the story of a donkey that was attempting to cross the street and how an approaching driver reacted to it; of course he hit it. This story was used to position the driver as *ignorant* and *careless*; he was constructed as, *if he saw the donkey and suspected that it would be hit, he should have approached it reducing his speed bit by bit, and he should have let the donkey cross* (Line 1415-16). Implied in this construction was lack of the basic driving skill that the driver should have had. In the concluding part of the story, we find, *as for me, no way has this driver had road traffic safety awareness; never at all did it* [i.e., road safety awareness] *pass by his side; leave alone in him, it* [i.e., road safety awareness] *does not exist anywhere with him* (Lines 1419-21). It was not just ignorance of the driver that was expressed, but a total ignorance; *count it as if he hit it declaring to do so* (Line 1421) was added, locating the driver as if he went for involving in the RTA intentionally, which was revealed in *declaring to do so*. It could probably be due to the pervasiveness of terrible RTAs in Ethiopia that drivers were constructed in such an extremely unfavorable way.

Moreover, paradoxical language was used to position drivers as lacking the knowledge they needed for safer driving. In *you can't blame the driver for he doesn't have the knowledge* (Line 1463), *you can't blame the driver* would seem that it was in favor of drivers, locating them at the innocent's position, but the clause that followed made it clear that the intention was the opposite: that they held their driving licenses having no knowledge/skill at all. The clause *all he has is only the driving license* (Line 1465) would make the assertion clear. A question could be posed here though it would further hold them guilty in relation to the prevalence of the problem: if they did not have the knowledge/skill of driving, how did they get their licenses in the first place?

Therefore, drivers were construed as if they did not have the training that would have capacitated them with safer driving skills. Apart from lack of proper training, poverty and the blame game (displacing one's responsibility to another one) were mentioned as factors that caused drivers to involve in risky driving experiences. In framing drivers as responsible for crashes they would involve in, lack of appropriate driver training package, i.e., *accident defensive driving skill* was taken as a key problem. Drivers were blamed for their reluctance to using the chance of being trained: *so as to me if I had done on you...if I had finished it there, the defensive training, you wouldn't have mentioned* (Lines 1523-24) others as causes. Since drivers did not take this course, or did not give the chance for the trainers to qualify them with the advocated skill, they would construct other reasons to help them rationalize their involvement in risky driving that would eventually result in RTAs; they would, for example, say they could not feed their family unless they complied with the order/pressure coming from owners of the vehicles they drove.

Professional drivers in particular were blamed for involving in practices of displacing their own responsibilities to others; while they should have been the chief players of ensuring road safety, they would simply engage in blaming others: *so don't tell me of people from behind. He [the driver] knows the owner could exert pressure from behind, but it is the driver who could resist it; that's all!* (Lines 1537-38). However, drivers who were at the bottom of the economy and social ladder (compared to vehicle owners), drivers who did not have strong associations that could have protected their rights and that could have empowered them with knowledge of their rights and responsibilities, drivers who did not have the job security and legal frameworks for the protection of their job rights, drivers who had not taken proper training that would have armed them with the basic safety precautions, they would find it so difficult to resist such pressure.

Two reasons were mentioned regarding why drivers could not be strong enough to resist the pressure that was exerted from vehicle owners; they were fear of being expelled from their position as drivers, and the economic burden they would face as a result: *but now you have got the chance and so when I asked you of the reason you tell me that you have to make your living* (Lines 1525-26). Thus there were two options for the driver: accepting the risky practices to earn some money for himself and his family, or refusing the risky practices resulting in his being expelled from his job and thus putting himself and his family into the risk of not having anything to survive on. If it is seen critically, the options were the same for the driver; it was a matter of making a choice between two evils. However, safety was construed as something different from such a conception: *this is an aspect of management; it won't be right when you mix safety and...daily bread, or if you talk about survival, that won't be right* (Lines 1527-29). It was emphatically added that if a driver could not see safety differently from economy/survival, which means he *spoiled* the very concept of defensive driving: *at this moment, you see, you have spoiled the defense concept. You are not defensive; that's all! If you were defensive, there would be no deal [with you] with regard to safety* (Lines 1531-33). In other words, a driver who was not ready to resist pressures of vehicle owners that put him into the practice of risky driving to the extent of losing his trade as a driver and starving his family was a driver who spoiled the defensive driving concept. Theoretically speaking, there should be *no deal with regard to safety*; however, in real life, a number of issues are considered before any decisions were made. It could not be that simple to see safety and survival separately. The challenge would be tough particularly for people living in poverty, for it is only when people are sure of their survival that they could think of their safety. Thus, in the context of road safety, it is noteworthy to consider and incorporate the concept of social equity in order to have the big picture that could have helped curb the problem meaningfully. However, in this context, we could simply conclude that drivers were found involving in risky driving and so they were constructed unfavorably.

A further unfavorable construction was made using statistical data in support of the argument on the necessity of work that targeted drivers. Although other contributors like pedestrians and the roads themselves were mentioned, compared to drivers, they were positioned as of minor or of insignificant effect; hence, wasting time and resource on such players was not of any help. In *if we follow the simplest logic, the focus should be on the driver, because he is the obvious violator* (Lines 1549-50), we could see a totally unfavorable positioning of drivers. Moreover, the

concept of logic was brought interdiscursively in order to inculcate the knowledge/belief system that has taken the road safety problem was mainly a result of drivers' faults and that intervention should have focused on them. It was discussed earlier that statistics was frequently used in most road safety discourses, and the intention could be related with the interest of addressing the problem using scientifically proven approaches (WHO, 2013). Hence the argument here was based on this knowledge: if the data revealed the share of drivers' fault as contributor to RTAs was more than 80%, logically an equivalent level of work should have targeted them. Therefore, according to the data, drivers were not just violators of traffic rules, but *the obvious violators*, with a presupposing article *the*.

The discourse of education was employed in the unfavorable construction of drivers as having only the skill, but lacking attitude and knowledge which were what they could have found from some training package. In construing them as, *I don't think they lack the skill; he has the skill but he should also incorporate the attitude and knowledge aspects. Since these could be found in the defensive driving package, I think it is good if more emphasis is provided there* (Lines 1557-60), the claim was, therefore, not just the necessity for drivers to taking training, but that the training should have been a special kind which added elements that drivers lacked.

Hence, the reason for using negative expressions repeatedly and emphatically in the construction of drivers was to show how they lacked the most important component of their profession: *safety*. However, while they could not be free from responsibility, drivers would also experience problems originating from other sources: poor safety standard of the vehicles they drove, poor design and quality of the roads, unsafe road use practices of other drivers, pedestrians, street vendors and buyers, unfriendly treatment of enforcers, extra pressure from their employers like by forcing them to drive ceaselessly, and the interference of unexpected encounters in the traffic system. To address the problem meaningfully, all these factors need to be considered. The case could have been different if these contributors did not worry drivers in some way.

2. Pedestrians were constructed as careless and irresponsible

The road safety problem was associated with total consciousness problem of the society. Hence, in *it is at this critical time when the society is not civilized properly and undeveloped skillfully that people are being injured and killed* (Lines 1074-75), by *society*, if it were to mean the larger

group of road users, it would include pedestrians also. Pedestrians particularly in Addis Ababa were positioned as *careless and irresponsible* users of the road.

Excerpt 51

ቅድም በጥቅል መልኩ የህብረተሰቡ ማህበራዊ ንቃተ ህሊና በሚፈለገው መልኩ አላደገም ብያለሁ፤ እዚህ እስፔስፊክ የሆነውን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አኳያም ሲታይ፤ እውነት ለመናገር ከሆነ የመንገድ ደህንነት ግንዛቤያችን ዜሮ የገባ ነው ቢባል ስተት አይደለም፤ በእኔ እምነት ማለት ነው / I said earlier in general that the society's social consciousness has not grown to the level expected; if we see here specifically in relation to road traffic, to tell you the truth, if I say our road safety awareness is at a zero level it is not wrong according to my conviction (Lines 1402-04)

ጠዋትና ማታ ግራና ቀኝ ህዝቡ፤ ያዲሳባ ህዝብ፤ መንገዱን ጠብቆ ግራ ጠርዙን ይዞ አይሄድም፤ ባገኘው ነው እሚሄደው / in the mornings and evenings the people in Addis Ababa are not using the road properly, taking their left and being on the extreme sides of the road; instead, they walk as they wish (Lines 1098-1100)

ሌላው፤ ዜብራ አጠቃቀማችን በጣም እኔ ከፈረንጅ አገር የመጡ ሰዎችና የኛን አገር ሳይ ግርም ይለኛል፤ እኛ እጃችን ኪሳችን ከተን፤ ሞባይል እያወራን፤ እየተዘናናን ነው እምንሄደው / the other thing is the way we use zebra crossings. It really surprises me when I see foreigners and compare them with our people; we cross the road relaxing, putting our hand in our pocket and talking on the cellphone (Lines 1102-04)

እጃችን ኪሳችን ከተን በሙባይል እያወራን ስንሄድ፤ የግድ ዜብራ ሙብታችን መሆኑን ማየት የለብንም / but we cross the road putting our hands in our pockets and talking on the cellphone; we should not consider the zebra crossing as our right (Lines 1106-07)

የተጠቃሚውን የመንገድ አጠቃቀም ስናየው፤ በጣም በጣም የወረደና በይበልጥ ካዲሳባችንጋ አብሮ እማይሄድ ያጠቃቀም እንትን ነው ያለው፤ ያንን ነገር በማስተማር በብሮሽር በምኑም ቢሆን ማሰልጠንና ማሳወቅ ነው ያለብን፡፡ አስፈላጊ ሆኖ ከተገኘ ወደህግም ተገብቶ በህግም ማሳወቅ አለብን የሚል አቋም አለን / we have a very very poor road use culture, especially the case in Addis Ababa, it doesn't go with the city; we have to train and let them know using brochures and other means. we have firm standing that if need be, we have to go to the rule and let them know by effecting the rule (Lines 1448-51)

አሁን ሁሉም እንደፈለገው ነው እሚራመደው እንደፈለገው ነው መንገዱን እሚያቋርጠው፤ ያ ነገር በግድ ቢቃ ህግና ስርዓት ተባብሮባለት መሰራት ያለበት ይመስለኛል፡፡ ተጠቃሚውም ሹፌሩም ሁሉም የማወቅ ግዴታ፤ የማወቅ ግዴታ ያለባቸው ይመስለኛል / now everyone walks as they wish. They cross the street wherever they want. I think that has to necessarily be taken into consideration; the work needs to be done after legal systems are formulated, and I believe the user, drivers and all others, have the duty of knowing the duty of knowing it (Lines 1459-62)

The social consciousness of the public in general was construed as immature, or *not grown to the level expected* (Lines 1402-03); this is brought intertextually from the discourse of north-west countries that categorically and negatively locate people of the south-east. Such a discourse positions people not educated by the western standard as if they did not act/ behave properly even if that could cause risk against their safety or survival. The analogy was used to strengthen the unfavorable construction of the majority road users' safety awareness (Lines 1403-04). However,

Borowy (2013) and others confirmed that behavior related problem in the road safety sector is common everywhere; that means, it is not related with one's level of *social consciousness*. The use of the inclusive possessive pronoun *our* used here was euphemistic; it was an attempt of making neutral the negative assertion made of the bigger society mentioned earlier. Again, the rhetorical expression *to tell you the truth*, and the two negatives *not wrong* must have been used intentionally; both of them were used to emphasize the unfavorable position given to road users.

Accordingly, pedestrians were named and framed as *reckless*; they were construed as if they were in the streets as they wished instead of *taking their left and being on the extreme sides of the road*, and unlike foreigners who did it so quickly, as they crossed the road *being relaxed* and even *putting [their] hand in [their] pocket and talking on the cellphone*. In all of the extracts above, pedestrians in general were categorized as reckless users of the road; they were positioned as if they did not have the slightest concern both of their own safety and of the safety of other users of the road system. They were totally positioned unfavorably.

For example, road use culture of pedestrians was constructed as *very very poor* (Line 880). In *we have a very very poor road use culture, especially the case in Addis Ababa, it doesn't go with the city* (Lines 1448-49), the use of the non-hedged and generalizing adverb *very* twice and emphatically was to show the depth of the problem associated with road use practices of pedestrians; they were further constructed negatively as not up to expectations of the city. The use of the pronoun *we* in *we have a very very poor road use culture* could seem inclusive and positive, but was euphemistic; if we see the next clause, *we have to train and let them know using brochures and other means* (Lines 1449-50), it would be clear that it was pedestrians that were categorized as *them*; and *we* was thus distinguished as knower/doer, i.e., as an active and powerful provider of knowledge, and *them* as ignorant/receiver, i.e., as passive, powerless and lacking knowledge.

Employing enforcement against pedestrians who did not observe the rule for safer road use was suggested: *we have firm standing that if need be, we have to go to the rule and let them know by effecting the rule* (Lines 1450-51). This means, in order for pedestrians to observe traffic rules, education by various means had to be offered first, and if that would not be successful, the rules had to be effected. It is necessary that traffic rules should be implemented on pedestrians also.

However, the tone of this utterance was more than that: since road users did not seem to comply with traffic rules, they had to be made aware of- and abide by them using enforcement.

Road use practice/habit of pedestrians in general was construed as full of chaos: *everyone walks as they wish. They cross the street wherever they want. I think that has to necessarily be taken into consideration; the work needs to be done after legal systems are formulated* (Lines 1459-61). That means, although pedestrians' road use habit was so risky, the problem had not yet been taken seriously. Regarding how it should have been addressed, employing enforcement was suggested, of course *after legal systems were formulated*, implying that the legal systems were not yet formulated. The rules suggested to have been formulated and then employed had to be communicated to road users first: *I believe the user, drivers and all others, have the duty of knowing the duty of knowing it* (Lines 1461-62). The necessity of communicating road safety related rules and regulations to all users was expressed emphatically (uttering the phrase *the duty of knowing* twice). Hence, we could imply that there were gaps in the communication of rules and regulations pertaining to road safety. Thus traffic rule-violating pedestrians, inappropriate traffic rules and gaps in communicating the rules were reasons for the prevalence of the problem.

My observation on pedestrians' road use practices would largely agree with these constructions: most pedestrians walked as they wished; they crossed the street wherever they wanted, and some of them jumped fences or guardrails. Our difference is on how the problem should have been addressed. While formulating traffic rules and communicating them to road users was vital, before any actions were taken against risk taking pedestrians, they should have been provided with enough and relatively comfortable space to walk on; for example, apart from pedestrian pavements, zebra crossings and over bridges should have been made available at proper distances.

3. RSSs of GIs did not work on drivers by involving other stakeholders

In constructing their own road safety works, RSSs of GIs positioned enforcement and education as their key areas of engagement. However, we find RSSs of PSs constructing them unfavorably:

Excerpt 52

ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ ብዙም ሩቅ አደለም እንደው አንዳንዴ እስኪ እዚህ አካባቢ እኔ አሽከርካሪዎች ላይ ስለምሰራ በጀት ካለ እስኪ እነሱ ከኪሳቸው ከሚከፍሉ ብዬ ቼክ ለማድረግ ሄጃለሁ፤ እና የለም፡፡ ሶ አንግዲህ አሁን ዝም ብለህ ጣት መቀሰር ሊሆን ነው / since transport bureau is not that far from here, I as a trainer I went several

times to check if they allocated training budget for this issue so that they wouldn't pay from their pocket, and none at all. if so it would simply be pointing one's finger (Lines 1467-69)

አየህ፣ ምንም ሳትሞክር፣ ሰውም እንዲሻሻልም ሳትነግረው፣ መንስኤነቱን በቁጥር ብቻ ቁጭ አርገህ / you see, without making any effort, and without telling them to improve, by simply putting in number (Lines 1470-71)

ዝም ብለህ ግን እንደው ለመወንጀል፣ ቢቃ ሰማኒያ ፕሮሰንት እሱ ነው የያዘው ብለህ እያመጣህ፣ ሁሉንም ችግር ወደሱ እምትወረውር ከሆነ መፍትሄ አታገኝም፤ እንደውም ማደንቆር ይሆናል፣ ማሰልቸት፡፡ እንደውም ይውጣላቸው፣ አንዳንዴ ሲበዛበት ይውጣላቸው ይላል፤ እልህ ውስጥ ታስገባለህ / but if you are simply just for blaming say he has held eighty percent share and if you bring all the problem and throw upon him then you won't get any solution; instead, you will let him be deaf to the issue getting him bored. sometimes you might cause him be in a grudge and even involve in the problem intentionally (Lines 1477-81)

እንግዲህ፣ እኔ በጣም ሲምጥል የሆነ ሎጂክ ከሄድን መተኮር ያለበት አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው፣ ለምን ያው ጥፋተኛም እሱ ስለሆነ፤ ሰማኒያ አንድ ፕሮሰንት፣ ከሰማኒያ በላይ ነው ቀጥታ ከዳታ ስትሄድ፣ ከመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ዳታ፣ ሰማኒያ አንድ ፕሮሰንት የአሽከርካሪ ስህተት ስለሚል ስትሰራም እንደዛው ነው / well to me if we follow the simplest logic the focus should be on the driver, because he is the obvious violator; eighty one percent, it is over eighty percent if you go and see the data from the road transport database (L. 1549-51)

እንደ እድል ሆኖ ግን እሱ ላይ አይደለም እየተሰራ ያለው፣ ባለፈውም አንስተነዋል እግረኛው ላይ ምናምን ላይ በሰፊው በጀት የዋለ ይመስለኛል / and yet it is unfortunate what is being worked on is not that one; as we raised this issue earlier, I think a huge amount of budget is being used on pedestrians and the like (Lines 1554-56)

ግን ለብቻ፣ አንድ ወገን ብቻ አንድ ህግንና ደንብን አፅድቆና አርቅቆ እሚመጣ ሆኖ ወደመተግበሩ እሚገባ ከሆነ፣ አሁንም ቢሆን ባለድርሻ አካላትን ያላከለ ስራ እሚሰራ ከሆነ፣ አሁንም ቢሆን እዛው ሞላ እዛው ፈላ ነው እሚሆነው፡፡ ያው ሲጀመር መንገድ የጋራችን ነው፣ የመንገድ ደህንነትም የጋራችን ነው፡፡ እና እንደባለድርሻ አካላት እኛንም ይመለከታል / but if it is one, if only one sector takes it; the sector which only drafts rules and regulations ratifies, then any work without the involvement of stakeholders, such effort will still be in vein. obviously the road belongs to all of us; road safety also belongs to us all; so as stakeholders, it also concerns us (Lines 1080-83)

በፈተና ለማለፍ ውጤቱን ለማምጣት ካልሆነ ምናምን ምን ይጨምርላታል? / except for passing the exam earning some grades, what benefit could it add to him? (Lines 1572-73)

ኖርማሊ ለመንጃ ፈቃድ ለሚያወጡ ሰዎች እንትን አለን ካሪኩለም አለ በዛ መሰረት ታስተምራለህ፤ ኢት ኢዝ እኬ ያው ያችን እንትን ፕሮፎርም ለማረግ፣ ላይሰንሱን እንዲያገኝ ያግዘዋል፡፡ ጥሩ ነው የቴክኒክ ግንዛቤ ስለተሸከርካሪው ያገኛል፤ ስለመንገድ ስነ-ስርዓት ምልክት በለው ህጎችን ትነግረዋለህ፡፡ ግን እስቲል ይሄ ስልጠና አፖርቼኒቲ እንትን ታሰቦ አደለም፤ አደጋን ለመከላከል አደለም፡፡ ቢቃ ስልጠናው ነው ይሄን ያገኛል፤ አሁን እኔ ግን እማውራው አደጋን ለመከላከል፣ አደጋን ለማስቀረት የሚያግዝ ምን ሌላ ሌላ ሪሶርስ አለ ከመንግስት፣ እሱ የለም፤ ምንም የለም / normally for those having their driving license, we have the curriculum you teach based on that. it is OK just to perform that, it helps him to get the license. it is good it helps him to have basic knowledge on the technical aspects of the vehicle, about regulations of the road and the signs; you tell him about the rules, but still this training opportunity is provided not putting accident into consideration; it is just the basic training and he gets that, but what I am talking about now is about other resources from the government that could help prevent accident to stop accident there is no; none at all (Lines 1596-1602)

We could see RSSs of GIs being constructed as always engaged in blaming drivers, instead of involving them in trainings that could have capacitated them with the necessary road safety skill/knowledge. Accordingly, GIs were constructed negatively particularly for not allocating budget for on-the-job trainings of professional drivers. For example, the question *what knowledge have you given me?* (Excerpt 50, Line 1465) was framed to hold the government to be culpable. That the government blamed drivers persistently, assigning responsibility on them for the occurrence of the majority of RTAs was construed negatively. When statistical data cited elsewhere was quoted, *as to the rate it doesn't matter whether you give it ninety or say it a hundred percent* (Excerpt 50, Lines 1463-64), it was disapprovingly, and exaggerating, for emphasizing the unfavorable position. The most significant gap observed of the government was its failure from creating awareness on drivers about the problem, in the form of on-the-job training. Therefore, the answer for the rhetorical question that was put as if it were posed by drivers to the government: *'what knowledge,' he asks you, 'what knowledge have you given me?'* (Excerpt 50, Lines 1464-65) would be negative, not necessarily because there was not any awareness work provided, but because of the very nature of the question; it was crafted in such a way that it had to be supported. The discussion that followed answers the question, constructing the government negatively: *all he have is only the driving license. Then after I have never seen a penny's budget allocated for the driver, for a continuous, like quarterly or semiannual training about the accident* (Excerpt 50, Lines 1465-67). There was no budget allocated, *none at all* (Lines 1467-69). The neglect could have eventually led drivers to involve in illegal practices *intentionally: sometimes you might cause him be in a grudge and even involve in the problem intentionally* (Lines 1480-81).

The expressions used in constructing the government were not just negative; they also were critical. For example, by *you can't blame the driver for he doesn't have the knowledge* (Excerpt 50, Line 1463), it means it was unethical for the government to blame drivers who did not have the skill/knowledge of safer driving in the first place, and for whom it did not have *a penny's budget allocated...for a continuous...training about the accident* (Excerpt 50, Lines 1466-67).

The practice of blaming the victim was construed as of no help to address the road safety problem; *if so, it would simply be pointing one's finger* (Lines 1469-70), pointing *one's finger* is a phrase used to express one's critical comment against the freeing of the self by positioning

others into the responsibility. In other words, for the government that did not work anything significant for improving drivers' road safety awareness, its engagement in blaming them would not make it free; whenever one's one or two fingers were pointed to others (as a way of holding them accountable), the remaining three would point toward the person her/himself, implying s/he was more responsible for the problem than anyone else. Thus, instead of involving itself in the blame game, a lot was expected from the government, in terms of commitment to the allocation of the proper budget and human resource.

Using the share of drivers to accident, it was said *it doesn't matter whether you give it ninety or say it a hundred percent* (Excerpt 50, Lines 1463-64). According to this construction, talking about figures only was not that significant; the most important thing which was not yet realized was not referring to statistics, but practical intervention that was taken based on the statistics. Regarding the government's focus on figures alone, it was commented as: *without making any effort and without telling them to improve, by simply putting in number* (Lines 1470-71), implying that it did not make any significant effort of curbing the problem. A further expression quoted in constructing the government as simply blaming drivers by employing statistical figures was: *but if you are simply...for blaming and say he has held eighty percent share* (Lines 1477-78). Thus, RSSs of GIs were constructed as if they were not with any effort of addressing the problem but that they were simply talking about it (it must have been including using statistics): *talking about the problem only, but not showing the solution* (Line 1472).

The government was further positioned as annoying to drivers, to the extent that drivers would eventually become indifferent to road safety: *you will let him be deaf to the issue getting him bored* (Lines 1479-80) and when things got worse and worse, *you might cause him be in a grudge and even involve in the problem intentionally* (Lines 1480-81). It is important to observe that in both of these constructions, the pronoun *you* was used to refer to the government, and that in both cases, again, the government was the agent of the actions performed by the drivers. The government was held responsible for the faults committed by the drivers. Hence, not only could we infer the extremely unfavorable position that was held against RSSs of GIs, but also the wide gap among the RSSs in general to understanding each other, let alone to work together.

In *if you go and see the data from the road transport database* (Lines 1550-51), we could see that a GI was quoted for some *data*. The interest was not just for claiming authority; it was to construct RSSs of GIs negatively. The sector was positioned unfavorably for its reluctance in paying particular attention to the training of drivers, and for its commitment to tasks of minor impact, investing time and resource unnecessarily on pedestrians which were not significant contributors to the road safety problem in Ethiopia. It could be implied that road safety work of GIs and the source of the problem were unrelated, and so they were positioned as responsible, *and yet it is unfortunate what is being worked on is not that one... I think a huge amount of budget is being used on pedestrians and the like* (Lines 1554-56). For ensuring road safety in Ethiopia, it was constructed that drivers should have been the main targets of the work. However, that was not found, and the effort that did not focus on drivers was construed as *unfortunate*.

The government was further constructed as if it were committed to engaging in enforcement alone, by ratifying and imposing regulations. Its readiness to listen to and/or let other RSSs involve in the safety work was constructed unfavorably. That it took the whole work all by itself was frowned on: *but if it is one, if only one sector takes it* (Line 1080); apart from a contrastive connector *but*, a repeated and emphatic *one* as, *if it is one, if only one* was used to disregard only one sector, i.e., the government, controlled the road entire road safety work. Moreover, the work that did not have any room for others was construed as *work in vain: then any work without the involvement of stakeholders, such effort will still be in vein* (Lines 1081-82).

Perhaps it may not have been a serious problem if RSSs of GIs controlled all road safety related work and resulted in safe mobility, though that could still be against the approach adopted. The problem was, however, that the government emphasized on only enforcement and regulatory functions: *the sector... only drafts rules and regulations, ratifies them and tries to implement* (Lines 1080-81). Thus, not only did the government deprive other RSSs of room for involvement, but it also focused on just one element of the big picture, and the worst of all was its preference for and engagement in *enforcement* alone. This is another indicator of the interest that the government had to stay with its hegemonic position: governing the work by punishment. Otherwise, others should have been included; hence, a metaphor that put RSSs of PSs at an equal share of responsibility for road safety was employed: *obviously the road belongs to all of us; road safety also belongs to us all; so as stakeholders, it also concerns us* (Lines 1082-83).

In Ethiopia MoT/ETA is construed as the key agency for tasks pertaining to road safety; it is responsible for the design and preparation of driver training curriculum and/or training manuals; it is the same agency that drafts rules/regulations for safer mobility and road use in the transport system to be implemented nationally. However, both the materials and the institution that produced them for use were constructed unfavorably. The contribution of training manuals to the general preparation of driving was not denied; they could help would-be-drivers learn the basics of driving. The benefits trainees could get from training packages were listed: *normally for those having their driving license, we have the curriculum [and] you teach based on that. It is OK just to perform that, it helps him to get the license. It is good; it helps him to have basic knowledge on the technical aspects of the vehicle, about regulations of the road and the signs* (Lines 1596-99). However, they were constructed as if they did not have anything to provide the trainees with accident defensive driving skills. To undermine manuals' role to RTA prevention, a rhetorical question was asked: *except for passing the exam earning some grades, what benefit could it add to him* (Lines 1572-73)? Among others, rhetorical questions are employed to strengthen one's position and to implicitly force addressees comply with one's claims.

The government (particularly MoT/ETA) was constructed as if it did not provide resources to stakeholders it should have worked with; by *OK no, as to me, from here, from this stuff, I have got nothing to help me as a resource* (Lines 1595-96), in the first place, the RSS, i.e., the GI called ETA, was not called by its name; it was called as *this* or *this stuff*; the expressions in this context depicted a very strong but negative attitude. *I have got nothing to help me as a resource* is another clause expressing the same position. ETA might have enacted road transport related rules/regulations, prepared curriculum and course materials for driver training, designed road safety lessons for mass consumption, etc., but these were not construed to have taken *accident into consideration* (Line 1600), the materials and their source did not *help prevent accident* or *stop accident* (Line 1602). The government was thus positioned as careless to the safety of road users, and as ignorant of the approach that could have better addressed the problem in particular.

4. The police/enforcers used their power for their own personal gains

As was discussed in the previous section, RSSs of GIs in particular located the police at the forefront of the road safety work in Ethiopia. On the contrary, we find RSSs of PSs constructing the police negatively, as if they were using the power bestowed upon them for enforcing road

traffic rules just for their own personal gain. As a result of these contradictory constructions, we would be doubtful of whether the police were really the way they were constructed earlier. In most of the extracts below, road traffic safety enforcers were constructed as unethical.

Excerpt 53

ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች ማለት ነው፤ እነሱም ስልጠና ያስፈልጋቸዋል፤ በጣም ጀንዩን መሆን አለባቸው። ባይ ዘ ዌይ፤ አንዳንዶቹ ትራፊኮች ለእንትን እሚሰሩ አይመስለኝም፤ ለሴፍቲው ሳይሆን ለኪስ፤ ስላጡ ለራሳቸው እሚሰሩ ነው እሚመስለው / the traffic police also need training; they should really be genuine. By the way, some of the traffic police, I don't think they are working for safety; instead of for safety, it seems they work for themselves, just for their pockets because they are hard up (L. 1488-90)

አንዳንዶቹ እንትኖች፤ ኢንፎርሰመንት ላይ ያሉ ሰዎች፤ ሁሉም ማለት አደለም ግን፤ በጣም እሚሰሩት ነገር አሳዛኝ ነው፤ እና ሪሊ እነሱስ ወይ የትራፊክ ደህንነት ለማስፈን ነው ብዙም አደለም፤ ተደብቆ፤ እንዴት ተደብቆ ከዛ አካባቢ ይወጣና ድፍን መስመር ጥሰሃል፤ አሁን ድፍን መስመር ላይ ሄደሃል ይልሃል፤ ይሄ ሶሊድ ላይን እምንለው ማለት ነው። ወጥቶ እንዲህ ሲልህ አሁን ምንድነው ለማቆም ነው እምትርበተበተው / what some of the people on enforcement do is so disappointing, but it doesn't mean all of them; so are they really there to ensure traffic safety? not that much; how staying being hidden somewhere and coming out to accuse you of violating the observance of the so called solid line. and that time, when he said so, you will try to stop the vehicle being terrified (Lines 1505-07)

በጣም ነው እሚያሳዝነው፤ አንዳንዱ የተጫነውን ተሳቢ የተጫነ ያዘሉትን ማለት ነው ሊሾ ነው ጎማው ብለው ይቀጧቸዋል። አሁን የታዘለ ተሳቢ ምንድነው ታዝሏል እኮ ... እዛ ድረስ እንትን ጫና ይፈጥሩባቸዋል / it is really disappointing; some of them would penalize drivers for damaged tires of the trunk while it is loaded on the truck ... it is to that extreme that they put pressure upon them (Lines 1492-96)

ድንገት ወጥቶ እንዲህ ሲል፤ ለመቆም ኢቭን ትክክለኛ ቦታ እንኳን ይዘህ አትቆምም፤ በመሐል አደጋ ይደርሳል ... ምንድነው ችግርህ አይ ይቀጣኛል ነው ፍርሃቱ / if he orders you to stop coming out from somewhere unexpectedly, even in your attempt to obey, you may not park at the right place; as a result, accident could arise ... what is the problem, well the fear is like he will penalize me (Lines 1508-10)

ኮልፌ ላይ የደረሰው የትራፊክ አደጋ ታስታውሳለህ? እዛ ላይ እኮ የአሽከርካሪው ጓደኞች፤ ያው እኔ ስልጠና ላይ ብዙዎቹን ስላሰለጠንኩ፤ መኪናው የቴክኒክ ችግር ነበረበት፤ ፌይል አርጓል ቴክኒክ፤ ፍሬን ማለት ነው። ስለዚህ አቆመው፤ አይበቃም? ቦታ አቆመው፤ ማለት አደጋ አይደርስም ማለት እኮ ነው። ግን ያቆመበት ቦታ የትራፊክ እንትን አይፈቅድም፤ ስለዚህ እዚህ መቆም አይቻልም አንሳ ነው። ይችን ተፅዕኖ እንግዲህ መቋቋም አቃተው ማለት ነው፤ ስለዚህ አሁን ዳይሬክት አደጋው ላይ እምታገኘው ሾፌሩን ነው። ቢሃይንድ ግን፤ እዚህ መቆም አይቻልም፤ የቴክኒክ ችግር አለበት እያለው ነው / you remember the traffic accident happened at Kolfe? friends of the driver (have told me) since I have trained most of them, the vehicle had some technical defect; it has technical failure which means the brake, so he parked the vehicle is that not enough; he parked it means there won't be any accident, but the place where he parked is prohibited for parking; since it is forbidden here you have to move the vehicle; that means he was not able to resist this pressure; therefore, the one you would get direct on the accident scene is the driver but behind he was urging him not to park there even if he was telling him that the vehicle had technical defects (Lines 1512-19)

The police were constructed as unpleasant encounters in the road traffic system; they were not welcome to the extent that drivers were afraid of seeing them. The rhetorical question about their

role: *are they really there to ensure traffic safety* (Line 1504), was employed expecting a negative response which was given immediately as: *not that much* (Line 1505). Of the evidence provided in support of this position, that they were not found honest enough was the first one: *they should really be genuine* (Lines 1488-89); some of them were further constructed as *(really) disappointing* (Line 1492, also 1504) for they were *immoral* or *unethical*.

One of the various ways by which their immorality was expressed was that they abused the power they were given to ensure road safety; they were constructed as if they were using it only to satisfy their personal (economic) needs. Since they were *hard up*, they would fill their pockets accusing drivers both when they violated traffic rules and when they were innocent; *it is to that extreme that they put pressure upon them* (Lines 1495-96). Other factors like the high rate of penalty fees of some Regions and the time one would waste due to unfriendly bureaucracy when one went to pay the fines were also constructed as additional reasons for drivers to involve in the illegal practices that could have contributed to the road safety problem (Lines 1496-1504). That means, drivers would use whatever means at their disposal in order not to get penalized; for example, *you better not be penalized* (Line 1497) means one would try to avoid any encounter with the police by hiding from them (like travelling at odd hours of the day) or by attempting to rush upon seeing them. Otherwise, the option remained, and which was constructed as *what is better is making a deal there* (Line 1503), i.e., cooperating with corrupt practices of *some* police.

The police were normally expected to stand at places where they could be seen from a distance and every direction so that road users seeing them or assuming their presence would behave. However, a police officer *orders you to stop coming out from somewhere unexpectedly* (Line 1508). The argument was that if a police officer *stays hidden somewhere and comes out to accuse you of violating the observance of the so called solid line...*(Line 1505-06), it could be concluded that the intention was not to ensure safety, but just to punish drivers in case they were involving in some rule violating practices; hence, *even in your attempt to obey, you may not park at the right place; as a result, accident could arise* (Lines 1508-09). The technique that the police employed could thus be another reason for the occurrence of RTAs. Moreover, targeting punishment by itself is more of a drawback than of an advantage; punishment should have been the last resort and only for those who did not want to abide by the rule (Peden et al., 2004).

In connection to their unexpected appearance, the police were further construed as terrifying to drivers. The relationship between drivers, particularly professional drivers, and the police could be construed as unfriendly (this is further discussed in the next subsection). Normally, the police have the power/duty of fining rule violating drivers; whatever traffic rules they perceived as violated they have the right to react accordingly. On the other hand, even if drivers were trained and so were informed of the traffic rules, they could still be with some gaps due to forgetting, the introduction of new regulations, or due to some other external factors, like technical failures of the vehicles they were driving, or conditions of the road, or the traffic, or the environment; thus, drivers could not be perfect in terms of observing traffic rules, and so would not feel secure all the time. It is so difficult particularly in the streets of Addis Ababa, where a lot of users of the road usually compete for space. If that is so, instead of rushing for punishment, the police should also have been ready to fill such gaps, understanding the situation the rule violating drivers were in and educating them. However, since the police were not ready to understand the situation they were in, drivers would not be comfortable with their encounters with the police. Sometimes they could even be frightened just upon seeing/meeting a police officer. When a police officer showed a sign, for most of the drivers, it usually was more a norm than an exception to stop immediately, at any place and in whatever situation they could have been, rather than to pull over slowing down the vehicle and searching for appropriate place. Such a moment was construed as: *at that time, when he said so, you would try to stop the vehicle being terrified* (Lines 1506-07). The plain answer for the rhetorical question of why drivers would be frightened by their encounters with the police was provided as *fear of being penalized: what is the problem, well the fear is like he will penalize me* (Line 1510). However, this unfriendly communication between the key players of the road traffic system, like the anecdote of the terrible car accident that occurred in Kolfe would clearly show (Lines 1512-19), could be a cause of severe RTAs.

It could be inferred from the anecdote that there was not a win-win communication between the driver and the police. The driver was so influenced by the pressure of the police (fear or respect?) that he was not able to convince the police that some technical defect of the vehicle was the reason that forced him to park it at the wrong place. Although the driver knew that the vehicle had some technical failure, he accepted the command of the police; as a result, he moved the vehicle only to involve in the accident which took the lives of many street venders, their customers and pedestrians. That incident was so terrible that it is still commemorated every year

by gatherings of people and the police at the place where it occurred. Thus, while the police were expected to contribute to road safety by facilitating the smooth mobility of the traffic and by enforcing the rules against violators, they were constructed unfavorably for their engagement in RTA aggravating practices n being behind the scenes.

5. Road traffic safety related rules/regulations did not contribute to safety

The contribution to road safety of road traffic related training manuals, proclamations/regulations and enforcement measures taken against rule violating drivers was constructed unfavorably. The implication of this construction was: if training manuals, proclamations/regulations to road safety and enforcement codes being used to punish irresponsible drivers had nothing to contribute to road safety, the institutions that produced the guidelines/codes had nothing to contribute either.

Excerpt 54

አሁን ለኔ ደግሞ አዋጅ ወይም እንትኖች ፊትሌሽን ምናምን ብታወጣ፤ ለሥልጠና ለዚህ ለመንጃ ፈቃድ ለሚያወጣ ሰው ብዙም እንትን የለውም፤ በፈተና ለማለፍ ውጤቱን ለማምጣት ካልሆነ፤ ምናምን፤ ምን ይጨምርሉታል? እንዳይቀጣ ከሆነ አዋጅ ብታወጣ እንዳይቀጣ እሚያደርገውን ነገር ልትነግረው ትችላለህ፤ ነገር ግን አደጋ እንዳያደርስ አዋጁ አያግዘውም / to me even if you ratify things like proclamations regulations it doesn't have much help for a person who is being trained for his driving license; except for passing the exam earning some grades what benefit could it add to him? in order for him not to get penalized using the proclamation you enact you might tell him but the proclamation doesn't help him (Lines 1571-75)

ምንም ትርጉም የለውም ለእኔ፤ ትርጉም የለውም፤ ስለዚህ ቅጣት ሰውን ይቀየራል፤ ብዙም አላምንም / to me it doesn't have any sense; it is nonsense. So whether penalty changes human beings, I don't believe in it that much (Lines 1590-91)

ባይ ዘ ዌይ ምን ቅጣት (ሳቅ) ቅጣት እንዴት የእኛን አገር ካወራን እንደውም ብዙ እንትን፤ ቅጣት ያለው ሰው ለመቀየር ያለው ድርሻ በጣም ኢምንት ነው፤ ለምን እንደውም ጊዜ ማጥፋትም አትፈልግም ወይ ሲደብኸው፤ ሲደብኸው ጭምር ነው ትራፊኩን፤ አንተ አዋቂ ብትሆን ኖሮ ምናምን ምናምን ብለህ፤ ጣል አርገህ፤ ከዛ ቅጣ፤ ዓፍ፤ ዓፍ እንጂ፤ እንትን ብለህም አደለም፤ ኮንቪንሲንግም አደለም፤ እና እሱ አደጋን አያስቀርም፡፡ ባይ ዘ ዌይ ቅጣት ከእንትን በኋላ ነው አይደል፤ ካደጋ በኋላ እኮ ነው፤ አደጋን አያስቀረውም ማለት ነው ካደጋ በኋላ ስለሆነ ... ካደጋ በኋላ ነው እምትቀጣው፤ ስለገጨ ትቀጣዋለህ፤ ወይም መቆም የሌለበት ቦታ ስለቆመ ትቀጣዋለህ፡፡ ለሚቀጥለው ካልሆነ፤ አሁን እንዳያጠፋ አያደርገውም፤ ስለዚህ እንትን አደለም፤ ፕሮኦክቲቭ አደለም፤ ሪአክቲቭ ነው ቅጣት እኮ፤ ከሆነ በኋላ ነው፤ አይደል / by the way penalty (laughing), if we talk about penalty in our country, the role of penalty to change is very insignificant, because you don't want to waste your time; you might even insult the traffic police dropping words like, if you were considerate you may not penalize me but now, go on, write it down it doesn't matter; so it is not convincing it doesn't help to stop the accident. by the way, penalty is after the incident, after the accident, is that not? since it is after the accident, which means it doesn't stop the accident... you penalize after the accident, because he hit something you penalize him, or maybe because he parked at a prohibited place you penalize him; unless for the next one, it doesn't help him not to violate now; so it is not proactive, penalty is obviously reactive. is it not after the incident (Lines 1577-88)

የትራፊክ ደህንነቱ ዋናው ችግር ሆኖ ያገኘነው እንደባለድርሻ አካላት ባሁን ሰዓት መንጃፈቃድ አሰጣጡ፤ ሲጀመር አዲስ የመጣው በጣም ጥሩ ያልሆነና የህብረተሰቡን ግንዛቤ ያላማከለ በጣም አደጋን እየጨመረ የሄደ ህዝብን እየጨረሰ ያለው ይሄ ያሁኑ ሰዓት ያለው የመንጃፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ችግር ነው / one thing we as stakeholders have found out as the main problem of the traffic safety is the current way of offering driving license; from the very beginning this newly introduced driver certification is not good. it has not put the public's awareness into consideration (Lines 1423-25)

ያ ችግር ባንዴ ከመሬት ተነስቶ አራተኛ ይሰጠዋል አምስተኛ ይሰጠዋል ሶስተኛ ይሰጠዋል፤ ያ ስለሆነ ልምድ በሌለው አይምሮው ሳይበስል ኃላፊነት ላይ እናመጣውና ህብረተሰቡን ላደጋ እና ራሱንም ላደጋ እንዳርገዋለን፡፡ ያ ትልቅ ጉዳትና ትልቅ በጣም በጣም ትልቅ ችግር የሆነ፤ አሁን ባሁኑ ሰዓት ከርቶሌና እስርቤትን ያጨናነቀው ይሄ ነው፤ መጀመሪያ ይሄ ነገር ከመወሰዱ በፊት ባለ ድርሻ አካላትን ሳያማክል፤ በተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ብቻ የተወሰነ በመሆኑ ነው፤ ያ በመሆኑ የተነሳ ይሄ ነገር፤ ይሄ አደጋ እየከፋ ሊሄድ ችሏል / the problem related with current way of certifying, it has extremely increased the accident rate and caused death of many people anyone standing from a scratch is now offered at once label four label five label three driving licenses; as a result, we bring a man without any experience and while yet immature to a responsibility, we expose the public and the driver himself to accident; that is a very serious pain and problem recently; it is the very cause of crowds in Kerchelle and other prison houses. firstly the action was taken just by limited individuals without consulting with stakeholders; for this reason, the accident is worsening (Lines 1426-33)

ደረጃውን ጠብቆ እንደዱሮው ቢሄድ ኖሮ ይሄ ሁሉ ነገር እሚመጣ አይመስለኝም ነበር፡፡ ሌላው እንደዚሁ አደጋ ያባብሳል ብለን እምናስበው ያው እኛ ሲጀመር ታዳጊ ነን፤ አንድን ህግ እንደመጽሐፍ ቅዱስ ቃል እምንይዛት ህግ አለች፡፡ ለምሳሌ የመንገድ ስነስርዓቱ ጠዋትና ማታ ላይ በብዛት መኪናዎች የሚወጡበትና የሚገቡበት ሰዓት የተወሰነ ሰዓት ነው / if it were offered like it was in the past, step by step and to the level of one's ability, I don't think all this would happen; the other thing which we believe could aggravate the accident is, obviously we are developing nation; we have a rule, and we take the rule as if it were the word of the bible, for instance the road system in the morning and in the evening is so crowded, the time for all vehicles to go out and to enter is the same (Lines 1437-42)

In constructing proclamations/regulations enacted for road safety as of no help for preventing RTAs, it was said: *to me even if you ratify things like proclamations regulations, it doesn't have much help for a person who is being trained for his driving license* (Lines 1571-72). We could see that the role of rules/regulations to road safety was undermined. If these rules and regulations had anything to offer the trainee, it was only *for passing the exam earning some grades* (Lines 1572-73); a rhetorical question was also employed to emphasize the point that there was not benefit from them, *what benefit could it add to him* (Line 1573). The argument was that except for *telling* the trainee of the consequences (i.e., the *penalty*) of improper/unlawful driving, the proclamations did not have anything to offer driving trainees regarding accident preventive skills: *in order for him not to get penalized using the proclamation you enact, you might tell him but the proclamation doesn't help him* (Lines 1573-75). In other words, the training materials did not have anything significant other than their help for passing the test in order for being licensed.

The role of penalty for not observing road traffic codes/rules/regulations also was not recognized as being of any significant help; enforcement was construed as if it were very much ineffective to cause people to change for the better. It was framed as: *to me it doesn't have any sense; it is nonsense. So whether penalty changes human beings, I don't believe in it that much* (Lines 1590-91). It is significant to observe the total denial of penalty's role, using the negative repeatedly.

Overall, the unfavorable position held of enforcement/penalty was mainly, as it was construed, because *it is not proactive* but that *it is reactive*. A person could be penalized for some violation, but, as could be seen in *unless for the next one it doesn't help him not to violate now*, it did not have any contribution to the deterrence of the road traffic rule already violated. The reason for holding such a conception was penalty's inability to stop the accident which caused it; naturally one is penalized only after violation. Moreover, the role of penalty even for calming future violation of the traffic rule was very much constrained: *the role of penalty to change is very insignificant*. The expressions used repeatedly: *it doesn't help to stop the accident, it doesn't stop the accident, it doesn't help him not to violate now, it is not proactive it is reactive, and if it is penalty obviously it is after the incident* all would indicate that the reaction could never reverse the incident that happened before the measure was taken. Thus, penalty was a *nonsense* action whose contribution to change was not something to *believe in... that much*. Enforcement was one of the five pillars the WHO-recommended road safety work was founded on. In the context of Ethiopia in particular, it was one of the few key areas RSSs of GIs advocated for and insisted on, aspiring to emphasize it in the future road safety work of the country. However, proclamations/regulations ratified and enforcement measures taken by RSSs of GIs to help ensure road safety were positioned unfavorably, as if they did not have any contribution.

The disparity in focus and philosophy among the RSSs in Ethiopia could be attributed to the different knowledge systems they brought from different sources, and the gap they had as a result of working independently. As has been discussed repeatedly, the road safety work in Ethiopia has been under the sole control of RSSs of GIs, particularly by FPC, ETA, ERA and the Regional/City Administration extensions of these institutions. RSSs of PSs which were working for the same goal but with divergent points of views and practices were not given the floor to engage in a collaborative road safety work and contribute to decreasing the RTAs in the country.

The recently introduced regulation for driver certification was commented on as contributor to the road safety problem in Ethiopia: *one thing we as stakeholders have found out as the main problem of the traffic safety is the current way of offering driving license* (Lines 1423-24). This certification procedure was not constructed just as a problem, but as *the main problem* with a higher degree of commitment that was qualified by the adjective *main*. The definite article *the* also was used to presuppose the phrase *main problem*. Since this certification was a recent development, it was blamed using time expressions like: *the current way* (Line 1424), *newly introduced* (Line 1424), and *current way of certifying* (Line 1426) implying that it was contrary to the former. Moreover, *from the very beginning this newly introduced driver certification is not good* (Lines 1424-25) indicates that the procedure was totally rejected early before it was tested.

The certification procedure was criticized for two reasons: it did not have social and knowledge ground and it was not rewarding. Thus, in the first place, *it has not put the public's awareness into consideration* (Line 1425), and *the action was taken just by limited individuals, without consulting with stakeholders* (Lines 1431-32). Both of these lines of argument would tell us that the driver certification had gaps in terms of incorporating understanding and voices of concerned stakeholders and the larger population; hence there was a real problem in the recontextualization process of such an unfamiliar knowledge and practice into the Ethiopian context. The intention of introducing the certification procedure could have been positive, for it would save the 'extra' time and resource that could be consumed for acquiring the license one wished to have. However, there were complaints against this practice, and this is related with the second concern.

The second concern was related with absence of any positive impact. It was not found rewarding; rather, it was found worsening the accident rate: *the problem related with the current way of certifying, it has extremely increased the accident rate and caused death of many people* (Lines 1426-27). The word *extremely* was used to indicate the extent to which the road safety problem escalated due to this new practice. With the exception of few RSSs of GIs, almost all RSSs blamed this approach and categorized it among the main causes of RTA prevalence in Ethiopia.

Moreover, it was stated that high responsibility seeking driving licences were being provided for people of no experience, readiness or maturity only to cause them involve in RTAs. It was for *anyone standing from a scratch* (Line 1428); for *a man without any experience* (Lines 1428-29),

and for one who was *yet immature to a responsibility* (Line 1429) that the license was being provided. In short, it was for the young generation that the certificate was being given, and in all cases, derogatory language was used to construct these young people; the intention was to imply that they were not matured physically, psychologically and socially. The result of such a practice was, therefore, *exposing the public and the driver himself to accident* (Lines 1429-30); people were in *very serious pain and problem recently* (Line 1430). This practice of certifying the inexperienced was further construed as *the very cause of crowds in Kerchelle and other prison houses* (Line 1431). *Kerchelle* was a prison in Addis Ababa known by the public as a site of suffering for many Ethiopians; hence, it must have been used here for its metaphoric/symbolic meaning. By evoking *Kerchelle*, the negative effect of the current driving license provision was magnified: the young who got their license through this procedure would get involved in RTAs that could injure/kill people, and if they survived from the RTAs they involved in, drivers would be jailed in their youth to stay there for long with lots of sufferings, as if they were in *Kerchelle*.

Therefore, the solution for the procedure was suggested: *if it were offered like it was in the past, step by step and to the level of one's ability, I don't think all this would happen* (Lines 1437-38). As a possible solution for averting what was happening, the former practice was claimed: a gradual or *step by step* certification of drivers, driver certification based on the trainee's physical, psychological and social readiness. By suggesting another way of certification (the former one), not only was the current driver certification/licensing procedure positioned unfavourably, but also a knowledge system that was contrary to the current one was constructed.

When constructing a claim for changing the new driver certification procedure, metaphorical expression against the notion of *rule is binding* was employed; Ethiopians were construed as taking *the rule as... the word of the bible* (Line 1440). It was only the Word of God which should be copied word for word and implemented, without making any change/recontextualization. However, rules for mobility or road safety should have been adopted based on existing realities of the country. Thus, as it was constructed, since we are a *developing nation* (Line 1439), we should not have copied everything applied elsewhere. The comment was on movement of people and vehicles at the same time: vehicles transporting business people, civil servants and students would enter the traffic system at the same time both in the mornings and late in the afternoons, causing rushes and crowds that would cause RTAs. As a solution, having separate lanes for

privately used vehicles, businesses and public service providers, and allowing heavy trucks' entry only for a limited period of time was suggested, all to lessen RTAs (Lines 1440-47). In doing so, while the existing practice was constructed unfavourably, a different knowledge system which was considered to have been compatible with the context in Ethiopia was constructed.

6. The role of the road to road safety was construed as insignificant

Excerpt 55

መንገድ ላይ ቢሰራ አልልህም ለምን ብዙም አይደለም እንደዚህ ግሉዝ የሆኑ ነገሮች ላይ ጊዜ ማጥፋት ብዙም አደለም ጥቅም / I wouldn't say it should be worked on the road because it is not that significant; wasting time on such physical things is pointless (Lines 1561-62)

ያየሁት እንትን ሰልሳ ስምንት ነጥብ ምናምን አራት ነው እንደዚህ ፐርሰንት አደጋዎች የሚደርሱት ለጥናት ቀጥ ያሉ መንገዶች ላይ ነው ይላል እና ለምን መንገድ ላይ ይሰራል / the data that I have seen says sixty eight point some number I think it is four percent (68.4%) of the accidents is on roads which are straight and leveled. so why should it be worked on the road (Lines 1562-65)

እምላው ገብቶሃል? ለጥናት ቀጥ ባለ ላይ ከሆነ እሚወድቀው ከሆነ እንግዲህ አስተሳሰቡ ላይ ነው (.) ችግሩ ያው አሽከርካሪው ነው እሚሆነው አይደለም እንዴ / have you understood what I am saying? if the car wrecks on a road which is straight and leveled, if it is so, then it is on the conceptualization. The problem should obviously be the drivers, is that not? (Lines 1565-67)

Any comprehensive road safety work needs to consider the road and its environment, the road user, and the vehicle, as was discussed in Chapter Two. In the road safety strategy document of Ethiopia, we read that “Road safety in roads development is largely neglected” NRSSPE 2011, p.27. Similarly, safety work that targeted roads was construed as unimportant: *I wouldn't say it should be worked on the road because it is not that significant* (Lines 1561-62). In doing so, statistical data that stated most RTAs (68.4%) occurred in Ethiopia were on good roads was used to position poorly constructed roads' contribution to RTAs as insignificant. The usual discourse heard about where accidents would occur was on roads which were comfortable to drive on, i.e., roads that were straight, leveled, recently rehabilitated or constructed: *the data that I have seen says sixty eight point some number I think it is four percent (68.4%) of the accidents is on roads which are straight and leveled* (Lines 1562-63). While roads should be comfortable enough to drive, they should also be safety oriented; they need to have the proper engineering work during times of design, construction and use. There should also be enough road signs and marks that inform their users clearly of their conditions. However, this was not part of the discourse.

The necessity of road safety work on roads in ensuring safety was constructed as no more than a simple *wasting time* (Line 1562). If RTAs on straight and leveled roads also were results of just

the drivers' fault (it was constructed as *the problem should obviously be the drivers, is that not?* (Lines 1566-67)), it means it could be due to like speeding/driving while feeling drowsy. If that were the case, working on roads could perhaps be pointless. On the contrary, the problem could be due to engineering failure. However, the construction was not seen in that way; the blame was on the driver, not on the design of the road: *if the car wrecks on a road which is straight and leveled, if it is so, then it is on the conceptualization. The problem should obviously be the drivers, is that not* (Lines 1565-67)? That could be the reason for constructing work on roads to ensure road safety as *not significant*. The unfavorably constructed position taken against the role of engineering to safety could also be seen from the repeatedly used negatives: *but..., I wouldn't say...; it is not that significant...; wasting time...* and from the emphatic expressions: *so why should it...; have you understood what I am saying...; and ...is that not* (Lines 1560-67).

7. Vehicle owners, driven by profit making, contributed to RTAs

Excerpt 56

እንግዲህ፣ ይጠገንልኝ ይሄ ነገር ብዬው ነበር፤ ጎማው ይቀይርልኝ አሮጌ ነው ብዬው ነበር። እንደ ሁለት ቢያጅ ደርሰህ ትመጣለህ አለኝ፤ በዚህ ምክንያት በረረና ይሄው ሰዎች አለቁብኝ፤ ስልሳ ሰው ይልሃል። አይ፣ ቢሃይንድ ከፊት ለፊት አታገኘውም ባለንበረቱን / I told him let this stuff be repaired; let the tire be changed for it was worn out, but he insisted I had to go for one or two rounds and for this reason, the tire went off and behold, I lost sixty passengers; no it is behind, not to the front, that you get the owner (Lines 1520-22).

እንዲህ አይነት መኪና አልይዝም ቢል ሌላውም እሚቀጠረውም ሰው አልይዝም ቢል ሌላውም አልይዝም ቢል እንግዲህ ከቻይና ካላመጣ በስተቀር ይሄ ሰው አሽከርካሪ አያገኝም / if he says he won't drive such kind of car, and if the other one to be hired says he won't drive, and the other also says he won't drive, then, unless he imports from China, this person could not get any driver (Lines 1539-41)

ወደ ከኋላ ስላለው ስለባለንበረቱ ያደጋ መንስኤነት፣ እስቴክሆልደር ነው፣ ልክ ነህ ይመለከተዋል፤ ተሽከርካሪው የእሱ ስለሆነ ማለት ነው። ወደፊት እነሱንም አጭር ማረግ ጥሩ ነው / with regard to the owner who is at the back as contributor of accident, yes he is stakeholder; you are right it concerns him also since the vehicle belongs to him. so in the future it is good to aware him also (Lines 1541-44)

ስለሴፍቲ ቅድሚያ ሰተው፣ ተሽከርካሪው የራሳቸው ነው ለረጅም አመት ቢሰራላቸው ተጠቃሚ ይሆናሉ። ግን እኛ አገር ደሞ ባንድ ጊዜ፣ እሚፈልገው ረጅም አመት ተሽከርክሮለት ሳይሆን በሶስት ወር የባንኩንም ምኑንም መልሶ ሌላም ሌላም። ስለዚህ ጫናው ምን ላይ ይመጣል አሽከርካሪው ላይ ይመጣል / the vehicle belongs to them, so by giving priority to safety, if it serves them for a long time they will be benefited; but in our country, what is needed is all at once, not its service for a long period of time but its return of the bank loan and even many more just in three months' time. so where will the pressure go? It will be upon the driver (Lines 1544-47)

Although drivers were still positioned at responsibility for the prevalence of the problem, vehicle owners were constructed as accident aggravators by forcing their employed drivers to engage in

continuous driving; they could even force them to drive vehicles which were technically unfit. The economy was the main factor for living with the pressure, both for vehicle owners and for employed drivers: owners were construed as keen to make excessive and early profit, and drivers as staying with the pressure for the survival of themselves and their family members.

Generally, vehicle owners were construed as being against the philosophy of *safety first*, running all the time for making more money to pay back their loans and to make huge profits; as a result, they would push their employed drivers to take risks of driving vehicles which were technically unfit, or had worn out tires. In support of this argument, an anecdote citing what a driver witnessed was brought intertextually as: *I told him let this stuff be repaired; let the tire be changed for it was worn out, but he insisted I had to go for one or two rounds and for this reason, the tire went off and behold, I lost sixty passengers* (Lines 1520-22). In *for this reason, the tire went off and behold, I lost sixty passengers*, it is unlikely that the driver witnessed causing death of sixty passengers; instead, it was a hyperbole to show concretely the severity of RTAs that would occur as a result of driving technically unfit vehicles. Although it was not stated clearly, it could be the cost of repairing vehicles or buying spare parts like tires which would cause owners to urge drivers to drive technically unfit vehicles for the extra one or two round trips. It could also be not to waste time; if the vehicle had to stay in a garage for some time, the immediate revenue awaiting might be lost. Whatever the reason could have been, safety was compromised, and though drivers were held responsible for the occurrence of such accidents, owners were acting powerfully in the background.

This was how it was put: *with regard to the owner who is at the back as contributor of accident, yes he is stakeholder; you are right it concerns him also since the vehicle belongs to him. So in the future it is good to aware him also* (Lines 1541-44). In this utterance, the fact that vehicles damaged or destroyed due to RTAs could have direct impact on owners' profitability or survival in the business of the transport sector was construed. However, their role in road safety was not taken as so significant; they were detached in time from now: *so in the future it is good to aware him also*. Moreover, they were construed as obstinate to change: *training them a bit is also good, if at all they would change* (Line 1548). Although vehicle owners were constructed unfavorably for their contribution to RTAs, their position as *contributors of accidents* was behind the scene: *the owner...is at the back as contributor of accident* (Line 1542).

Vehicle owners were further constructed as if they were ignorant of the advantages of giving priority to safety; they were particularly positioned as unable to see the lasting advantages they could have gained, i.e., being more profitable as a result of the extended services their vehicles could have provided them by keeping them safe. In: *the vehicle belongs to them, so by giving priority to safety, if it serves them for a long time they will be benefited; but in our country, what is needed is all at once, not its service for a long period of time but its return of the bank loan and even many more just in three months' time. So where will the pressure go? It will be upon the driver* (Lines 1544-47), the background clause carried negative connotation; by *the vehicle belongs to them so by giving priority to safety if it serves them for a long time they will be benefited*, it was to mean that though they owned the vehicle, they did not prioritize safety; thus they would not have the long term benefit out of their investment. We could infer this from the contrasting clause that followed beginning with *but: but in our country what is needed is all at once, not its service for a long period of time* (Lines 1545-46). They were not framed as safety oriented, but as money oriented, to the extent of exerting excessive pressure on their drivers, urging them to drive vehicles which were perhaps technically unfit, beyond the speed limit and continuously, without having enough rest and/or sleep, and all this was done only to collect much to pay *the bank loan and even many more just in three months' time* (Lines 1546-47).

A metaphor was used in the argument against being in the pressure of vehicle owners; it was the irony that goes: *unless he imports from China*. It was expressed as *if he says he won't drive such kind of car, and if the other one to be hired says he won't drive, and the other also says he won't drive, then, unless he imports from China, this person could not get any driver* (L.1539-41). It was discussed earlier that due to their repeated involvement in RTAs, some vehicle brands being driven in Ethiopia were positioned as more dangerous than others. The Chinese made heavy truck called *Sinotruk*, which is nick-named variously as *ቀይ ሽግር / Red Terror* (identifying it with the bloodshed of the *Derg* Regime), *Al-Qaida* and *ISIS*, is a case in point. The frequent involvement of this truck in RTAs was associated with technical problems it could have, though that was not proved. If we interpreted the expression *unless he imports from China* putting it in this context, the analogy was as the owners imported technically unfit vehicle from China, let them also import drivers for their defective vehicles from the same country and allow them to drive, but only to continue consuming lives and limbs. As for the Ethiopian drivers, they were encouraged to resist the pressure they were experiencing from the irresponsible vehicle owners.

Due to their extreme attempt of exploiting the labor force (the driver and his assistant) and the capital (the vehicle even if it was technically unfit and hence risky), vehicle owners would contribute to the occurrence of lives and resource consuming RTAs. Regarding the exercise of power by vehicle owners and the necessity of resistance from the drivers, it was emphatically said: *the owner could exert pressure from behind, but it is the driver who could resist it; that's all!* (Lines 1537-38). However, for both of them, that could not be quite simple.

8. Road safety stakeholders did not discharge their responsibility

Finally, we could see RSSs of PSs constructing stakeholders in general unfavorably; they took them as if they were not contributing *their share* to road safety.

Excerpt 57

መንገድ ደህንነቱ አስቸጋሪ ደረጃ ላይ ደርሷል፤ ዋናው ይህም ሲሆን፤ ባለድርሻ አካላቱ የራሱን እሚገባውን አስተዋፅኦ አላረገም / the road safety problem is at a very difficult level this is the main one, the stakeholders have not contributed their share to the level expected (Lines 1085-86)

ሁሉም ባለድርሻ አካላት ያን ባለማረጉ የተነሳ፤ ይህ አሁን እምናየው ውጥንቅጡ የወጣ የመንገድ ስርዓት አገራችን ላይ ሊሰፍን ችሏል / since all the stakeholders have not done that, we have now reached to such a messy road system widespread in our country (Lines 1086-87)

In the first extract, stakeholders were not found contributing *their share*, and that was the main problem; we could see the clause *this is the main one* as given, acting as background, and the most significant point was the foregrounded clause, i.e., that *the stakeholders have not* [yet] *contributed their share to the level expected* [of them]. In the second extract, that all RSSs had not contributed their share became background for the *messy road system* widespread in the country. The inanimate term *messy road system* was used to mean disorderly or chaotic road use culture, which was also construed as *widespread* across the country. Hence, all RSSs were categorized unfavorably, as if they were not discharging their roles responsibly.

In this sub-section, we have tried to see how RSSs of PSs constructed the role of stakeholders that were supposed to have been working on road safety. The analysis was conducted focusing on the participants' language use, like word choice, metaphor, argumentation strategy, modality, presupposition and intertextuality. RSSs of PSs positioned others negatively, as contributors for the perpetuating of RTAs in Ethiopia. They framed the RSSs (drivers, pedestrians, the police, government institutions, vehicle owners, roads authority, and others) as if they were not discharging their responsibilities towards the safety of the road system. They particularly

construed road users (vehicle owners, drivers, pedestrians) as using the road system in such a way that intensified the prevalence of RTA. For some of them, training manuals, proclamations/rules and enforcement measures also did not have anything to contribute to road safety. Next, we will see how road users, on their part, positioned the works/roles of other RSSs and road users.

4.5.3 How Road Users Construct the Role of Other Players to Road Safety

As it has been discussed in the literature, road users are the main victims of RTAs in Ethiopia. Hence, their construction of the road safety work/role of RSSs and road users is quite significant. If there were any counter discourses promoting change against the perpetuation of the dominant one, they should mainly be from the majority users and victims of the road traffic system. Accordingly, focusing on their word choice, argumentation strategy and grammar use, the way drivers and pedestrians construed and/or positioned the practices of RSSs of GIs, PSs and other road users is analyzed as follows.

It could be observed that discourses of road users were not strong enough to cause significant change on road safety practices of the country; however, they have shown their dissatisfaction with the road safety works of RSSs and other road users, constructing them negatively. They mentioned a number of issues in their unfavorable constructions of the practices of several RSSs and road users, touching upon the three components that should have been addressed to ensuring road safety: road users, the road and the vehicle. Below is a summary of what they said:

- *transport service providing drivers did not respect traffic rules; they did not yield to pedestrians; instead, they violate speed limit, load beyond seat limits etc.;*
- *drivers, pedestrians and the police did not respect and listen to each other; sometimes they insulted one another;*
- *the police did not enforce the rules for safe mobility; they mostly rushed to punishing than to teaching, and some of them involved in corruption that would have further aggravated the road safety problem in the traffic system;*
- *driver training institutions did not qualify trainees to the level they became skilled and safety oriented;*
- *driver licensing institutions did not discharge their responsibility; both the driver licensing procedure and the way would-be-drivers were certified had problems;*
- *the claimed collaboration among the RSSs did not come true; individual gain was more important than societal safety;*

- road construction was so infected with corruption that roads were built to contribute risky road use, for example, absence of crossing bridges on the ring road pushed pedestrians to involve in risky crossing;
- pedestrians involved in risky road use behavior since pavements were damaged or were not properly prepared and so were uncomfortable to walk on or were occupied by street vendors;
- rules and regulations in relation to road traffic safety were enacted without the involvement of road users, nor were they accessible to road users; hence, they were usually ineffective;

1. Drivers' road use practices are unsafe

Professional vehicle drivers, particularly taxi drivers in Addis Ababa, were constructed as people who usually run after money, are addicted and irresponsible (lacking a sense of belonging); hence, contributing to the occurrence of RTAs, or to the gravity of the damage if accidents were to occur. Below are some unfavorable constructions about drivers:

Excerpt 58

እንዲሁ ዝም ብዬ ሳስበው፣ የትራፊክን አደጋ የሚያበዙት የግል ተሽከርካሪ መኪናዎች አይደሉም፤ አብዛኛውን ጊዜ እኔ የታዘብኩት ታክሲዎች የህዝብ ማመላሻዎች በህዝብ ትራንስፖርት ውስጥ ያሉ የግለሰብ መኪናዎች ናቸው / when I simply think over it, those aggravating traffic accident are not privately owned vehicles; as to my observation, most of the time they are taxis public transporters (Lines 1623-25)

ሁሉ እሚሯሯውት ታክሲ ከሆነ ለባለቤቱ በቀን ሶስት መቶ ብር ያስገባል፤ ይችን ሶስት መቶ ብር ምን ማድረግ አለበት በላጭ ብር ማግኘት መቻል አለበት። ሶስት መቶ ሰጥቶ፣ ከሶስት መቶ በላይ ኪሱ መክተት አለበት፤ እንደውም ሁለት መቶ እና ከዛ በላይ ከሱ ከባለንበረቱ በላይ ያስገባል ነው ያለኝ፤ ስለዚህ ይችን ለማስገባት እማይገባ ቦታ ውስጥ ምን ያደርጋል ይገባል። አሁን ወደ እንትኖቼ ወደ ህዝብ አሽከርካሪዎቹ ታክሲዎቹ ስንመለከት ለዚህ ሲዋከቡ ሲሯሯው ምን ሲሉ እንመለከታቸዋለን / the reason for taxis to be so hurried all the time is, if it is a taxi he has to hand over three hundred birr for the owner per day, so he should be able to collect more than this three hundred birr; after handing over the three hundred birr, he has to collect another three hundred to put in his pocket. to your surprise, he even collects two hundred or more than the sum he does for the owner as he told me; so to collect this sum he goes to unbearable places. we see the public transport drivers, we see the taxis as they rush for this and the like; we see them doing so (Lines 1628-32)

ነገ አደጋ ቢደርስ በኔም ላይ ነው እኔ ገንዘቡን ምን አደርገዋለው / if accident is to happen tomorrow it is on me too, what could I do with the money then (Lines 1636-37)

እኔ መንግስት ለምን ዝም እንዳለው አላቅም፤ ጫት ይቅማሉ ወያላውም ጫት ሲቅም ታያለህ ሹፌሩም ጫት ሲቅም ትመለከተዋለህ፤ እንዲህ እንዲህ አይነት ነገሮች ሲያደርጉ ትመለከታቸዋለህ። በእንደዚህ አይነት ህይወት ውስጥ ፉዞ ነገር ውስጥ እያደረገ ባለው ሰውዬ ምክንያት አደጋው ምን እየሆነ ነው / I don't know why the government has preferred to keep silent on this matter; they chew khat you could see the conductor chewing khat and the driver also chewing khat, you see them doing things of this kind and being in stuffs of such kind; due to a person involving in such dizzy stuffs, you know what is happening to the accident (Lines 1639-43)

በተለይ በተለይ እኔ አላውቅም እነዚህ አሁን አይሰዙ እና እነዚህ ይሄ ከነጻ አይምሮ ውጪ እየተጠቀሙ ይሄ ጫት ምናምን ለእንቅልፍ ማባረሪያ እየተባለ ተብሎ በቃ እሚነዱት አነዳድ ያስደነግጥሃል፤ ኃላፊነት የሰደለው አካሄድ ነው።

ብዙ ጊዜ አንዳንዴ የህዝብ ተሽከርካሪ ህዝብ ህዝብ ግጥም አርጎ ጭኖ አካሄዱ ያስጠላሃል / I don't know especially these especially these Isuzu drivers and those who drive without taking additional things like khat which is said to be a way of getting rid of feeling sleepy and the way they drive is so frightening; it is driving irresponsibly (Lines 1646-48)

አሁን እኔ መኪና መጥቀስ ባይገባኝም ይሄ አይሰዙ ሃይገር ምናምን አኑዳቸው ራሱ እኔ ቢቃ አንዳንድ ጊዜ መሪዬን ያስለቅቁኛል ፍጥነታቸው፤ በፍጥነት እየመጣ ከላይ ይገባቸዋል / you really hate the way they drive them - many public transporters which are fully loaded with passengers ... now though I shouldn't have mentioned names, the way they drive these higher isuzu and the like, their speed is so terrible; they sometimes push me to the extent of taking my hand of my wheel, he would come with speed and enter before you (Lines 1651-52)

የመንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጡ እኔ፤ ያሰራ ስምንት ዓመት ሃያ አመት ልጅ ዛሬ ሲኖትራክ ሲኑዳ ገና ላዳ እንኳን ሲይዙ እንዴት እንደሚበሩ ይታወቃል፤ ፍሬሽ ነው፤ መሮጥ ነው፤ ቢቃ መታየትን ነው የሚፈልገው፤ ስለዚህ አራተኛ መንጃ ፈቃድና አምስተኛ መንጃ ፈቃድ ይዞ እዛ ላይ ሲንጠለጠል ምን ያህል ነው? አሁን አዲስ አበባ ላይ አደጋ እያደረሱት ያሉት እነሱ ናቸው በብዛት / imagine a very young man aged eighteen or twenty driving the sinotruk today; it is obvious how fast they drive the moment they begin driving lada (the smallest taxi). he is fresh and he runs fast since all he needs is being appreciated by others that is all, so when he holds that vehicle with level four or level five driving license imagine how much it would be? by now they are causing many accidents in Addis Ababa (Lines 1664-68)

ፍጥነትማ፣ በተለይ በዚች ከተማ፣ በዚች በተጣበበች ከተማ ላይ እንደው ፍጥነትን ተጠቅሜ ነገሮችን እቆጣጠራለሁ ማለት፤ ኔቨር እሚሆን ነገር አደለም፡፡ እና በተለይ ባሽከርካሪዎች እሄ ግንዛቤ ቢኖር እና ወገንንም እንደራሰ ብናስበው፤ አንዳንድ ጊዜ እንደው ዘመድንም ስንጠይቅ ጥቁር አንበሳ፤ በዚህ አደጋ እሚሰቃዩትንም እኔስ ብሆን ብሎ ራስን በዛ ቦታ ማስገባት፡፡ ሁላችንም የኃላፊነት ስሜት ነውና፤ ይሄ ቢሆን በግረኞች ላይ፤ በፍጥነት ላይ በሁለቱ ላይ የበለጠ ቢሰራ ጥሩ ነው ብዬ አስባለሁ / as for speed, especially in this city, this very narrow city, assuming I could control things being in a speed, never, it won't be at all, so it is good if especially drivers have this awareness and if we consider our folks as ourselves; sometimes when we go to Black Lion to visit relatives, let's also see those suffering from this accident. it is good to imagine like what if I were in his position (Lines 1776-80)

Taxi drivers in Addis Ababa were construed as *aggravating* (Line 1624) the road safety problem; which means they were making it worse. One key reason provided was their excessive desire for money; while they were expected to hand over Birr 300 every day for owners of the vehicles they drove, they needed another 300 Birr or more for themselves. Hence, they would drive at an abnormal speed, i.e., being so *hurried all the time* (Line 1629); speeding is generally positioned as the main cause of RTAs that would cause deaths and injuries (NRSSPE, 2011, p.2). Secondly, they were constructed as people who lacked *sense of belonging* (Line 1636), i.e., concern and love for others, as people who were not able to *think properly* (Line 1636), and as if they were not ready to count themselves as victims taking a position of the kind, *if accident is to happen tomorrow, it is on me too* (Lines 1637). Thirdly, they were construed as addicts; both drivers and conductors chewed *khat* and took *other stuffs* (Lines 1640-43); what *other stuffs* referred to was not stated out clearly, but it could be inferred that it was to mean other kinds of drugs. Driving

under the influence of drugs would cause them feel *dizzy*. Their need for extra income (mentioned above) could also be related with their addiction to *khat* and the *other stuffs*. If so, the reason for them to *rush* (L.1634), or to be *so hurried* (L.1629) all the time, even at places and in situations which were *unbearable* (Line 1633) could be to collect the money they needed for satisfying this desire; the effect of speeding by an addict sitting behind the wheel of a vehicle was constructed as something known to everyone: *you know what is happening to the accident* (Line 1643). In a way, it was to imply that the situation, the worsening of accidents, could not be a secret for anyone. It was also plainly put as the *aggravating of traffic accident* (Line 1624).

In Addis Ababa, drivers and conductors could be observed taking drugs boldly, and the way the government handled such a serious problem carelessly, or that it kept silent, was construed as a puzzle. From *I don't know why the government has preferred to keep silent on this matter* (Lines 1639-40), it could be inferred that the government was well-informed of the fact that drivers and conductors were engaged in drug taking practices, but that it preferred to ignore it. Thus, in the unfavorable construction of taxi drivers and conductors, the government also was blamed for its reluctance to reacting to what was perceived as a contributor of accidents.

It was not just taxi drivers, but drivers of other types of public transporters who were also positioned unfavorably. How they drove was constructed as a puzzle: *I don't know, especially these, especially these Isuzu drivers* (Line 1646); particularly how *Isuzu 'kitkit'* and *'Higer'* buses were driven was framed as so *frightening*; it is construed as *driving irresponsibly* (Line 1648). Some of the practices these drivers would engage in were listed as: they took *khat* and other drugs which made them drive *being out of a freer mind* (Line 1647); *their speed is so terrible* (L.1652), and they did not overtake or change lanes safely, *he would come with speed and enter before you* (L.1652). Drivers would take drugs to get rid of *feeling sleepy* (Line 1648) and would drive the vehicles *fully loaded with passengers* (Line 1649). Due to their involvement in risky road use practices, derogatory words like *frightening*, *irresponsible* and *terrible* were used in constructing them. Very strong emotion was also expressed: *I don't know* (Line 1646), *you really hate the way they drive them* (Lines 1649-50) and *they sometimes push me to the extent of taking my hand of my wheel* (Lines 1651-52); they were used to magnify to what extent these drivers violated the norms of safe driving, or that they were *driving irresponsibly* (Line 1648). Hence, they were construed as responsible for the prevalence of the problem.

The fact that drivers would take *khat* and other drugs was what any road user could observe. For most of the drivers and their assistants, the terminals where they would stay until it was their turn to depart, were the places they would gather in one of the minibuses to take drugs as a group. Others would chew *khat* in front of the public, even while they were providing services; others would prefer taking drugs while parking their taxis at some hiding places or offering them for other drivers, mostly for an hour or two after lunch. When they finished taking enough of the drugs, they would start their afternoon services that could last until late in the evenings.

Once at about noon, I was travelling down to *Mexico Square* from *Sidist Kilo*, sitting by the side of the driver. I then overheard him telling another person on the phone (and he was on the phone while driving!) to get *the bread* ready for him in thirty minutes time. I was so curious to know what *the bread* he ordered emphatically meant. Since there were many bakeries by the street we were passing through, I thought he could have bought it himself if what he meant was what he said. When I asked him indirectly as, ‘*why don’t you buy it yourself from one of these bakeries,*’ he smiled at me and kept silent. Several days later, a taxi conductor told me that the word *bread* was a code name that they used for *the leaf*, or *the drug*.

Young drivers in particular were framed negatively especially for their driving of heavy trucks at unacceptable speed. Their ages were mentioned as *eighteen* and *twenty* apart from the phrase *very young* (L.1664), all to show emphatically that they were too young/inexperienced to take the responsibility of driving heavy trucks. They were construed as if they sped for no more than to show off: *he is fresh and he runs fast since all he needs is being appreciated by others, that is all* (L.1666). According to my informants, some affluent people investing in the construction sector imported heavy trucks to offer them to family members, relatives, or friends even if these people were too young and/or inexperienced to drive these trucks. Since the returns were realized so fast and in huge amounts, heavy truck drivers were well-paid. On top of the good salaries, they were given attractive incentives based on their overload works; that also would encourage them to stay long on the job, without taking the rest they needed. This would cause them to involve in RTAs.

Again, drivers who attempted to drive at inappropriate speed were also constructed unfavorably. Speeding was framed as being too difficult for Addis Ababa; since it was a narrow city, one could not control the speed in case something went wrong: *as for speed, especially in this city,*

this very narrow city, assuming I could control things being in a speed, never, it won't be at all (Lines 1776-77). Using negative expressions repeatedly, i.e., like *never* and *it won't be at all*, any attempt of controlling a speeding vehicle was constructed as a totally futile effort. However, drivers were found to be unaware of this problem and thus would involve in driving at an abnormal speed. Such were construed as unable to adjust their speed to the situation they were in, and would need education for attitudinal and behavioral change: *so it is good if especially drivers were with this awareness* (Lines 1777-78); moreover, they were advised to consider their folks as themselves: *what if we consider our folks as ourselves* (Line 1778), and to visit people admitted to hospitals due to RTAs: *sometimes when we go to Black Lion to visit relatives, let's also see those suffering from this accident* (L.1778-79). By observing the pains of those being treated in hospitals, and by considering folks as themselves, drivers were expected to get lessons that would help them sympathize with their victims: *it is good to imagine like what if I were in his position* (L.1779-80). Hence, speeding was constructed as one significant cause of RTAs.

We could observe both similarities and differences between road users and the road safety strategy document in the way they constructed drivers; while road users related the problem with drivers' *excessive economic drive, immaturity, lack of belongingness and drug use*, the document associated it most with drivers' *poor driving skill and low level of safety awareness* (NRSSPE, 2011, p.19). Of course, most taxi drivers in Addis Ababa were not criticized for any lack of driving skill; instead, they were frequently criticized for speeding, overloading and misbehaving. And this is in agreement with what the document listed as traffic rule violation: *speed, not respecting pedestrian priority, hazardous overtaking, unsafe use of freight vehicles to transport passengers and overloading of passenger buses* (NRSSPE, 2011, p.19). Road users added drivers' drug use, economic drive, lack of sense of belonging to the citizens they would hit, and government's negligence (silence) as contributing factors in addition to what the NRSSPE listed. However, the issues stated by road users were more critical than those listed in the document.

Drivers were thus construed as careless to the safety of the road transport system; if they were seen respecting traffic rules, it was only because they feared the police. They were constructed as *fearing the hat* (Line 1609), the white colored *hat* that police officers wore, not the traffic rules. As a result, in the absence of that white hat, they did whatever they felt was right for them, violating the basic traffic rules: they would involve in speeding, risky overtaking, over boarding

passengers, and pulling over at places where they should not have. Therefore, we could conclude from the analysis so far that vehicles drivers in Addis Ababa that provided both public and freight transport services were constructed unfavorably.

2. Pedestrians are reckless users of the road

Road users construed pedestrians also unfavorably; pedestrians were constructed as people who used the road both inappropriately and carelessly; they would risk their lives by crossing the highway at dangerous places. Excerpt 59 collected some constructions of pedestrians:

Excerpt 59

አሁን እግረኞች ላይ በተለይ፣ በጣም በጣም እግረኞች ላይ ደሞ ስንት አይነት ህብረተሰብ ነው ያለው፤ ሱሰኛ ህብረተሰብ አለ / now specially pedestrians, pedestrians are very very serious problem, and how many kinds of them are there; there are addicted people (Lines 1773-75)

እያንዳንዱ ነገር ኮሰት ይፈልጋል፤ ኬክ መብላት ትፈልጋለህ፤ እውነቱን ነው እኔ አንዳንድ ጊዜ በብር ከሃምሳ ሄዶ ራሱን ሴቭ አድርጎ እካ እሚፈልግበት ቦታ ላይ ቢደርስ ይሻላል፤ አይ ምን አላት ከዚች እዚች ብሎ ለጤና ጥሩ ነው ግን ኤኒርጂ፣ ያጠፋኸው ኤኒርጂ ልትተካው ግድ ይልሃል፤ መተኪያ ግን ከትራንስፖርቱ ((እየሳቁ)) አይገናኝም፡፡ እና ብዙ ጊዜ አንደኛ፣ ሰውም ደካማ ነው፤ ያንን ያለውን ድልድይ ከሚሻገር፣ እዚሁ አቋርጬ ልሂድ ይላል፡፡ በዛ መሃል ላይ ሲንደረደር ዘሎ ሮጦ መኪና ውስጥ ይገባል፤ ያ ከፍተኛ ፍጥነት ላይ እሚሄድ መኪና ለአደጋ እየተጋለጠ / everything costs; one may want to eat cake. I am telling you the truth it was good if he were to travel by one birr and fifty cents and arrive at the place he wanted, saving himself; if he says it is too short a distance, well it might be good (to walk) for health, but the energy you wasted must also be substituted. But the substitute is never comparable with the transport cost ((laughing)) so most of the time people are weak; instead of using the available overpass they say let me cross it here; he jumps into the road and runs into the car in the middle exposing himself to the vehicle travelling at such a speed (Lines 1734-41)

እና ባብዛኛው እግረኛ ለመንገዱ የሚሰጠው ክብር ሳይሆን ስለራሱ ጠቀሜታና ጉዳትና ጥቅም ነው አስቦ እሚሻገረው፤ አደጋ ይደርስብኛል ብሎ አይደለም፡፡ እካ ድረስ ሄጄ ከምደከም ለምን እዚችጋ ለምን አላቋርጥም ይላል / so most of the time the pedestrian does not give due respect for the road; he doesn't think of the accident he might experience; he simply calculates his benefits and loses. he says why not I cross it here instead of going that all distance and get tired (Lines 1743-46)

ሁላችንም የኃላፊነት ስሜት ነውና፣ ይሄ ቢሆን በግረኞች ላይ በፍጥነት ላይ በሁለቱ ላይ የበለጠ ቢሰራ ጥሩ ነው ብዬ አስባለሁ / since this is the responsibility for all of us I think it is good if the work were done more on pedestrians and on speed, on these two (Lines 1780-81)

Pedestrians were framed not just as a problem, but emphatically as a *very very serious problem* (Line 1774). In what aspects they were a *serious problem* was stated, and one of which was addiction: *there are also addicted people* (Lines 1774-75). Which means pedestrians who were obsessed by the desire to take drugs, or who were possessed by the effect of the drugs they took could not think properly; hence, neither could they use the road properly. If the worst were to come, these could be reasons for the occurrence of RTAs.

How pedestrians put themselves into the risk of involving in accidents when they were crossing the ring road was explained. The expression used in constructing them: *everything costs; one may want to eat cake. I am telling you the truth it was good if he were to travel for one birr and fifty cents and arrive at the place he wanted, saving himself* (Lines 1734-36) was both ironic and philosophical. It was ironic in that they crossed the road riskily for a reason that was so silly, just for having a piece of cake from a café located over the other side of the road. Moreover, they could have taken a taxi to travel until they arrived at a place where they could cross the road safely, and all they would spend for that purpose was only *one birr and fifty cents*. However, they practically did the opposite, risking their lives to save that *one birr and fifty cents*. Thus, the risk-taking choice that pedestrians made was constructed negatively.

Another ironic expression was employed in the unfavorable construction of pedestrians, constructing their act of crossing the road jumping over fences made of concrete as an intentional involvement in some physical exercise for their health: *if he says it is too short a distance, well it might be good (to walk) for health, however, the energy you wasted must also be substituted. But the substitute is never comparable with the transport cost ((laughing))* (Lines 1736-38). That means the benefit these pedestrians could get as a result of involving in the risky crossing of the highway was death or injury, which was too expensive to compare with the transport cost or the physical fitness they could have gained; in other words, they put themselves in an environment which was very dangerous while the benefit they could get as a substitute was so insignificant. It might be for this reason that they were framed as weak: *so most of the time people are weak* (Line 1739); by people it was to mean pedestrians, and the adjective *weak* was used with the intention of constructing them as unable to make the right choice with regards to their safety. This was made clear in: *instead of using the available overpass, they say 'let me cross it here,' he jumps into the road and runs into the car in the middle, exposing himself to the vehicle travelling at such a speed* (Lines 1739-41). For a vehicle that was travelling with the maximum speed permitted, it would naturally be too difficult to slow down all of a sudden to save a crossing pedestrian, and the pedestrian hit by a vehicle travelling at such a speed could not be that strong to survive. The position given to pedestrians was clear: they were mostly responsible for not respecting the traffic rule, and hence for the occurrence of RTAs that would harm themselves: *so most of the time the pedestrian does not give due respect for the road; he doesn't think of the accident he might experience* (Lines 1743-45). Thus pedestrians using the ring road

improperly were constructed as naïve, as people who could not think and work out thoroughly for their own safety.

3. RSSs and road users have unfriendly communication

Another problem constructed about drivers and pedestrians was improper behavior one would show towards the other; verbal insults and non-verbal mistreatments were common particularly between taxi drivers and passengers/pedestrians. The extracts below could show such a practice:

Excerpt 60

እኔ ትልቁ ትልቁ የዚህ ነገር መፍትሄ ሊሰራበት እሚችለው አንደኛ በፍጥነት በሚያሸከረከሩ አሽከርካሪዎች ላይ፣ እና ሁለተኛ መንገድ አላግባብ እሚጠቀሙ እግረኞች ላይ ነው፤ በተለይ እግረኞች እንደው ሁ ኬርስ ምንም ነገር ታላራነት፣ እሱ ጠብቆት እሚሄደው የለም፡፡ ከላክስ ስታደርግ፣ ዛሬ ነወይ ያስገጠምከው ይልሃል፤ ዝም ስትለው፣ ከላክስ የለህም ወይ ይልሃል፤ ከዛም ይሰድብሃል፡፡ ይሄ አንዳንድ ጎረምሳ ደሞ፣ ውጣ፣ ይሄ ያንተ መንገድ አደለም ይላል፤ ምን ታርጋ እስከትለጥፍ ወደዳር ውጣ ይለዋል፤ ከዛ ጽብ ይፈጠራል፡፡ አሁን መኪና አይደለህም ለጊዜው ዳር ያዝ ነው / as to me the main thing to work on for a solution is first on speeding drivers, and second on pedestrians that use the road improperly; mainly pedestrians are like ‘who cares’ and are not ready for any responsibility when you blow your horn he says, ‘is that just today that you get it fixed?’ and if you keep silent, he says, ‘don’t you have a horn?’ and then he insults you ‘get out! This is not your way,’ he says, ‘get out of the road until you get your plate number,’ and then conflict follows. it is to say now you are not a vehicle so take the side of the road for the time being (Lines 1767-73)

እና ብዙጊዜ ብዙጊዜ እኔ ትራፊኮች ከመቅጣት ይልቅ ሰዎችን፣ ለአደጋ እሚጋለጡበትን መንገድ ቢያስተምሩ ምናለ? አንዳንድ ጊዜ አንተን አይቶ፣ አሁን ኦሮሚያ ክልል ባለፈው ሚዲያ ላይ ነው ምናምን አደጋው እየበዛ ሄደ፤ ፔንሽን ይሄ ቅጣቱ በጣም ከፍተኛ ነው፣ ያን ቅጣት ሽሽት ሰዎች በከፍተኛ ፍጥነት እየሄዱ ለአደጋ እየተጋለጡ ነው እየተባለ እየተወራ ነበር / so to me the traffic police, instead of tending to punish most of the time, what if they teach the people about how they are exposed to accident? sometimes upon seeing you, for example in the Oromia Region, the accident is worsening since the penalty fees are so high that people drive so fast to avoid them, and as a result they are being exposed to more accident (Lines 1798-1802)

Improper road use practices could cause miscommunication among road users that would worsen the problem; for example, pedestrians could be the reasons for the conflict due to reckless road use they exhibit: *mainly pedestrians are like who cares and are not ready for any responsibility* (Lines 1768-69). Here, we could see a very strong but negative positioning of pedestrians from *mainly* and *not ready for any responsibility*. Next, *they are like who cares* was used to construct them as *irresponsible*. In addition to the repetition, an example was used to further strengthen the point: *when you blow your horn he says, ‘is that just today that you get it fixed?’ and if you keep silent, he says, ‘don’t you have a horn?’ and then he insults you* (Lines 1769-71). The example was not about a single day’s experience of a pair (of a driver and a pedestrian); it was crafted as

if it were a usual experience of many pairs, as it could be understood from the use of the present simple tense that naturalized the actions. Thus the dialogue explained both the irresponsible road use practices of pedestrians and the unfriendly communication between pedestrians and drivers.

In the unfriendly communication constructed, it was expressed how *some but young drivers* would harshly react to pedestrians who walked in the vehicles' lanes or to those who crossed the road slowly: *'get out! This is not your way,' he says, 'get out of the road until you get your plate number,' and then conflict follows* (Lines 1771-72). It was to mean that if you use the path constructed for vehicles, you are no better than a vehicle, so come with a plate number first to be recognized as such. This is an annoying communication that might grow to the worst, as it was expressed in *then conflict follows*. When drivers and passengers/pedestrians who frequently met on the road used impolite (and sometimes immoral expressions) in their interactions, it could grow into a conflict that would eventually be a reason for the occurrence of RTAs.

Mistreating passengers was among the common practices of road traffic rule violating drivers working as public transport service providers. I observed this both as a frequent taxi user and as a researcher during my observation sessions. In the mornings and evenings of the working/school days in particular, overboarding passengers and involving in the hide-and-seek-game-like interaction with enforcers was more a norm than an exception for most taxi drivers. One reason could be that passengers preferred to arrive at their work places/schools in time. There was also a very serious transportation problem: perhaps transport service providers were so limited compared to the number of their users; or that road users' mobility direction was one way which did not encourage service providers to fully engage in their duties; or that the roads were too narrow and too limited in area coverage to accommodate and give alternatives to their users, so they were overcrowded at peak hours; moreover, pavements were totally absent or were not well constructed in such a way that encouraged people to travel long distances on foot. Whatever the reason could have been, public transporters could not satisfy the transportation needs of their users. With the majority of travelers under these pressures, however, anyone who dared to stand against the rule violating culture, if not insulted, s/he would be criticized. At times passengers themselves could be more aggressive; if one were to stick to standards, being against the overloading of passengers, for example, the commonly heard comments against him/her were: *'It*

is a matter of minutes, why don't we sympathize with each other?' or 'You'd better take a contract taxi!' or if things went wrong, it would be 'Why don't you buy the taxi instead?'

Most taxi drivers had written/posted messages in the interiors of the taxis they drove by which they sometimes humorously and at other times embarrassingly told their passengers to comply with the rule violating practices they engaged in. These warning-like expressions had very strong power of urging passengers to accept whatever they were asked, at least until they left the taxis. However, the impact of this unfriendly communication could not be underestimated; most of them would encourage unsafe road use. Below are some of the posted quotations that I observed:

- “*ጭቆጭቆን ትተን ምናል ብንፋቀር፤ ሁሉም ቅርብ ወራጅ ነው ከፈጣሪ በቀር፤ What if we stop nagging and love to each other, For everybody gets off shortly except for the Creator*”
- “*መብታችሁ ታከሲ ውስጥና ዜብራ ላይ ብቻ ትዝ አይበላችሁ፤ Don't remember your rights only when you are in a taxi and on the zebra crossings*”
- “*ዜብራ ነው ብለህ እንዳትተኛ፤ Don't lay down only because it is a zebra crossing*”
- “*ሲያዩት ያላማረ ሲጫን ያስቸግራል፤ One whom you don't feel like upon seeing becomes troublesome when you let him on.*”
- “*ቆንጆ ሴትና ታከሲ በባህሪያቸው ትርፍ መጫን ይወዳሉ፤ A beautiful lady and a taxi, by their very nature, would like to load/add more*”
- “*ተሳፋሪ ጠጋ ጠጋ በሉ የአባይ ቃል አለብን፤ Passengers give more room (for more passengers) for we also have pledged to contribute for the Abbay Dam*”

It could be seen that almost all the quotations cited above were so powerful to silence road users from making any comments against the wrong practices of these taxi drivers/conductors. Instead of asking for their rights or for the observance of the rules, pedestrians/passengers would yield to whatever the taxi conductors wanted them to be/to do. On top of these highly negative comments and connotations, it was not uncommon to hear insults and derogatory remarks from drivers and their assistants, against passengers who would not comply with their interests, and against pedestrians in conflict with the taxi drivers (like those who dared to cross the road first or those who walked closer to the vehicles). This unfriendly communication could affect negatively the claimed collaboration among the RSSs and road users for the safe mobility of all.

4. The police are too strict or too loose

We could see road users constructing the police unfavorably. Normally, road users (drivers in particular) and the police are in frequent contacts; thus, it is expected that one would know the other very well. Below are extracts to help us see how road users constructed police officers:

Excerpt 61

ቆቡ አለ፤ የትራፊክ ቆብ አለ። የትራፊክ ቆቡን ለሚመለከተው ለማንኛውም ሰው የመንግስቱ መርህ ምንድነው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነውና ህግን ከጣስክ ይይዝሃል ነው ቆቡ የሚያመለክተው። ቆቡ ውስጥ ደሞ ያለ ሰው አለ ህጉን ያስፈጽማል ተብሎ የታዘዘ ነው፤ ግን ቆቡን የለበሰ ህጉን የሚያስፈጽም ሰው ነው። ቆቡን ይፈሩና ያስፈጽማል የተባለውን ሰው ባክህ እክሌ ነው ብለው ሲያልፉት እንመለከታለን፤ ሲያልፉት እንመለከታለን፤ ምንም የሚመጣ ነገር የለም / there is a hat of the traffic police; for whomsoever looks at the hat the principle of the government is that since he is a traffic police if you violate the rule he will arrest you that is what the hat shows. then there is a person under the hat who is ordered for effecting the rule, but he is one who is simply wearing the hat without effecting the rule; we observe them fearing the hat and as to the person assigned for effecting the rule, they say that is mister x forget him and they pass him; we see them avoiding him, and nothing will happen (Lines 1605-11)

መገናኛ ነው፤ ውስጥ ለውስጥ ማንን አልፋለሁ ብሎ፤ ያኛውን አልፋለሁ ብሎ ገደላት፤ እንደውም ልጄ ከትንሽ ልጄ ጋር ነው ትንሽ ልጄም እግሯ ተቆርጧል፤ እሚባል ነገር ሰምቻለሁ። እና እማዩኮ እንደዚህ ሆነችብኝ እያለ ሰቆቃ ውስጥ እየገባ ነበር፤ በጣም አዝናለሁ / it was around Megenagna; as he was passing the street under the bridge, he hit and killed her under the bridge. whom did he want to run away from? it was to run away from the other one, I also heard she was with her daughter, her little daughter, and her daughter's leg was cut off? he was grieving calling his mother; I was terribly disappointed (Lines 1615-19)

ትራፊኮች እራሳቸው እያዩ መኪናዎች እራሳቸው እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ አቁመው ካፈቴሪያው እዛ እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ ነው ያለው፤ መኪናውን እሚያቆሙት እዚያ ነው። በየቦታው እንደዚህ አይነት ችግሮች አሉ፤ ያን ሁሉ ነገር ትራፊኮች አይቆጣጠሩም። ሁለተኛ ነገር ቢያዩና ያንን ነገር ቢፀዳኩ ሰውም የእግረኛ መንገዱን አይቶ አካሄዱን በራሱ ያስተካክል ነበር፤ እና አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውና በየክፍለሃገር ያለው ሁኔታ ያደጋው ሁኔታ እየከፋ ነው / the traffic (policemen) themselves are observing that cars are parking on pavements even the cafeteria is there on the pavement; they also park vehicles there while there are problems of this kind everywhere, the traffic police do not control all these. if they watched that all mess and cleared, people could see the pavement and could have corrected their road use accordingly. the accident rate both in Addis Ababa and in every region is worsening (Lines 1671-76)

ያው እነሱ ትራፊኮች ሲጀመር እኛ አሸከርካሪዎች ስንሆን ያው ብዙ ጊዜ እኛ እናጠፋለን፤ እነሱ ደሞ ህግን ለማስከበር ነው እሚቆሙት እዚያ። ሲጀመር እኔ አሁን አደጋ ለምን ይደርሳል ብልህ፤ ትራፊክ ቆሞ ትርፍ ልትጭን ትችላለህ፤ ወይ ትርፍ ጭነህ እንዳይይህ አንድ መኪና ደርበህ ስትሄድ አንዱን ልትገጭ ትችላለህ። ያ ያ ነገርም እኛ ላይ ተጽዕኖ አለ፤ ትራፊክን ባየን ቁጥር፤ በጣም እንዴ፤ ወፍራም ከሆንን ራሱን እንከሳለን እነሱን ስናይ ውጥቴን ነው እምነግርሁ። ነጭ ኮፍያ ካየን በጣም ነው እምንደነግጣው ለምን ትርፍ ልትጭን ትችላለህ፤ ጥፋት ቦታ ቆመህ ሊሆን ይችላል። ስለዚህ እነሱን ስናይ እንደውም እኛ አደጋ የማድረስ ቻንሳችን በጣም የሰፋ ነው፤ ሳይኖሩ እንደውም ደህና ነን እንሻለን / well, in the first place we as drivers usually disobey and the traffic police, they stand there for the enforcement of the rule. you might have loaded extra passengers and if the traffic police is standing there while you are loading extra passengers, you will try to go hiding under the cover of another vehicle and at that time you might hit somebody ... every time we see a traffic police alas if we were fat we would be tinnier when we see them (.) I am telling you the truth we will be very much terrified when we see a white hat (.) because maybe you have loaded extra or you might have pulled over at a prohibited place (Line 1782-89)

ስለዚህ እነሱን ስናይ እንደውም እኛ አደጋ የማድረስ ቻንሳችን በጣም የሰፋ ነው፤ ሳይኖሩ እንደውም ደህና ነን እንሻለን። ለምን ባይኖሩንም ስለምናይ፤ አይ ቢቃ የሉም ብለህ ራሱን ዘና አርገህ፤ ጠንቀቅ ብለህ ትሰራለህ። ድንገት የመንገድ ክራውድድነት ሊጨምርብህ ይችላል፤ ለምን እዚህ አንድ መኪና ከተጋጨ፤ ትራፊክ የለም ማለት መንገድ ተዘጋጋ ማለት ነው፤ ያ ያ አይነት ነገር አለ / so the chance for us to involve in accident is so wide when we see them; we are rather better when they are not around because since we could see our

environment you would say OK they are not around and you would relax yourself and work carefully. perhaps though the road could be more crowded because if there is an accident and there is no traffic police that means the road is jammed; things of that kind could happen (Lines 1789-94)

አሁን ተሰሟ መሆኑ እያሳሰበን ነው እኛ፣ የት ሄደን እንደምንጮህ እኛ አናቅም፤ እና ብዙጊዜ ብዙጊዜ እኔ ትራፊኮች ከመቅጣት ይልቅ ሰዎችን፣ ለአዲጋ እሚጋለጡበትን መንገድ ቢያስተምሩ ምናለ? አንዳንድ ጊዜ አንተን አይቶ፣ አሁን አሮሚያ ከልል ባለፈው ሚዲያ ላይ ነው ምናምን አደጋው እየበዛ ሄደ፤ ፔንሽን ይሄ ቅጣቱ በጣም ከፍተኛ ነው፣ ያን ቅጣት ሸሽት ሰዎች በከፍተኛ ፍጥነት እየሄዱ ለአዲጋ እየተጋለጡ ነው እየተባለ እየተወራ ነበር / we doubt whether we could be heard; we don't know where we should go and cry. so to me the traffic police, instead of tending to punish most of the time, what if they teach the people about how they are exposed to accident? sometimes upon seeing you, for example in the Oromia Region, the accident is worsening since the penalty fees are so high that people drive so fast to avoid them, and as a result they are being exposed to more accident (Lines 1798-1802)

እና ብዙጊዜ ትራፊክ ፖሊሶችም በጥሩ ስነምግባር እንደው እንደላላማ ይዘው፣ አሁን አሁን ቀረ፣ እኔ ትዝ ይለኛል አሁን በሰማኒያ በሰማኒያ አምስት ኮፍያውን እዚህ ስር አርጎ ቆሟል፤ ትራፊክ የለም ብለህ ስትመጣ እዚችን አለ የሆነ ነገር ይዞ ብቅ ይላል። ምን ትለዋለህ ይሄን፣ ከምን ስነምግባር ትመድበዋለህ? ቢቃ ተደብቆ ድንገት መውጣት ሰዎችን ለመቅጣት፣ ግልጽ ሆኖ ቢመጣስ ያም ወንድሙ ነው፤ ቢያንዳንዱ ቤትኮ አለ፣ ትራፊክ እንዳለ ሁሉ ሾፌር አለ እዛ ቤት ውስጥ፣ መምህር አለ፣ ዶክተር አለ / so the traffic police should also have the ethics; they need to carry it as an emblem. it is no more practiced these days but I remember in the eighty eighty-five he would stand somewhere putting his hat here ((showing to his back)) and when you come assuming that there was no traffic police, he is here and he emerges holding something; what would you say this? under what ethical standard could you categorize it? that is all; after staying at a hidden place, he suddenly appears to punish people. he should be in open, that person is his brother; at each home as there is a traffic police, there is a driver; there is a teacher; there is a doctor. (Lines 1803-10)

አዲጋን ለመቀነስ እኔ የትራፊክ ጉዳይ ነው አዲጋን የሚቀንስ እምለው / to minimize the accident, I believe it is the traffic police who could minimize the accident (Line 1813)

አዲሳባ ውስጥ፣ እንዲህ አይነዳም፣ እንዲህ አይደረግም ብሎ እሚመክርህ የለም፤ ከስ ብቻ ነው፣ ትከሰሳለህ። አንተ ተከሰሃል በንዴት መንዳት ነው፤ በንዴት ስትነዳ ደሞ ሌላ ቦታ አዲጋ ማድረስ ነው / in Addis Ababa, 'don't drive this way,' 'don't do that,' no one advises you. It is only punishment; you are penalized, when you drive being annoyed, you will cause another accident somewhere (Lines 1825-27).

እንደው እኛንም ቢመክሩን፣ ህብረተሰቡንም እንደዛ ቢያስተናግዱ አደጋው ይቀንሳል ብዬ አምናለሁ / I believe the accident will minimize if they advise us [i.e., drivers] and facilitate mobility of pedestrians (Lines 1831-32)

As could be seen from the extracts above, two types of police officers were constructed in connection to their relationship with drivers. First, officers who were corrupt, not respected and so were disregarded by drivers also; when such an officer was assigned to enforce traffic rules, they would construct him/her as: *'that is mister x; forget him,' and they pass him* (Lines 1609-10). The police who were positioned this way did not work for the safety of the traffic, but maybe just for his own personal gain. A police officer had to make sure that the rule for safe mobility was observed. In *there is a hat of the traffic police; for whomsoever looks at the hat the*

principle of the government is that since he is a police, if you violate the rule he will arrest you. That is what the hat shows (Lines 1605-07), the hat was symbolic to represent the government and its principles, that power was bestowed upon the one who wears it. However, from *he is one who is simply wearing the hat without effecting the rule* (Line 1608-09), we could observe that the person wearing the hat did not discharge his/her responsibility. Conductors and drivers were sometimes open enough to call such officers with pejorative nick names like *ሃያ ሴት / the twenties* to mean that they could be silenced/bribed by a sum of cash not more than thirty birr. It was also common to hear taxi conductors telling drivers to offer some amount of money when they were caught red handed engaging in some rule violation practices by such police officers; they would say, *ቢጫ አሸገው / seal him with a yellow* to mean give him a fifty birr note (which is yellow in color) so that he would not say anything even if he was about to fine them. Of course, in relation to taxi drivers, the police would mostly attend to overloading of passengers while other more serious violations like speeding and risky overtaking should have been dealt with.

The other groups of police officers constructed negatively were those who all the time tried to enforce the rule; policemen/women of this group were not ready *to leave* (Line 1615) rule violators at all. Since they were so strict to the observance of the rules, drivers would fear them very much. As the anecdote about a taxi driver who killed a mother and injured her baby when he was attempting to run away from such a police officer would tell, accidents could also occur when drivers attempted to avoid policemen of this kind (Lines 1615-19).

Traffic police were further held responsible for not facilitating the safe mobility of the traffic: by *if they watched that all mess and cleared it, people could see the pavement and could have corrected their road use accordingly* (Lines 1674-75), it means *they (the police)* did not observe the mess, and did not work to facilitate the smooth flow of the traffic; though it was their responsibility, they did not work for the safe mobility of road users. The construction of the police as indulging in insignificant practices instead of targeting accident preventive measures could also be seen/read from documents of GIs also. In the NRSSPE (2011), for example, traffic enforcement targeting accident causes (like speed) and accident locations was constructed as weak, implying that there were gaps in terms of targeting causes and places of accidents. In contrast to the police, pedestrians were construed as of insignificant responsibility. Although their unsafe road use practice was implied, they were framed as if they could have corrected their

unsafe road use practices if they were provided with clear pavement: *if...that all mess... was cleared, people could see the pavement and could have corrected their road use accordingly* (Lines 1674-75). However, such progress was framed as very much unlikely; hence, the road safety problem in the country was so prevalent: *the accident rate both in Addis Ababa and in every region is worsening* (Line 1676).

On the other hand, the police could not be found controlling *all* road (side) users that acted against the safety of the road and its environment: *there are problems of this kind everywhere, the traffic police do not control all these* (Lines 1673-74). This problem was constructed as a problem that could be seen *everywhere*, and in this extract in particular the intention was to refer to street businesses that crowded the road all the time and hindered road users' smooth mobility.

Taxi drivers in Addis Ababa would construct the police as unfriendly or so terrifying to them; due to fear, taxi drivers could involve in accidents when they saw the police in the area where they worked. It was constructed that while violating traffic rules was common for taxi drivers, the duty of the police was *enforcing traffic law* and *facilitating the smooth flow of vehicles*; *well, in the first place we as drivers usually disobey and the traffic police, they stand there for the enforcement of the rule* (Lines 1782-83). Hence, drivers' involvement in rule violating practices was construed as natural, and the presence of the police as reasonable. Some of the traffic rules that taxi drivers might have violated were listed as: *you might have loaded extra passengers...* (Line 1784; 1785 and 1789), and *you might have pulled over at a prohibited place* (Line 1789).

However, these traffic rule violation practices of the taxi drivers were not construed as inherent causes of the road safety problem; rather, it was the presence of the police on the road which was constructed as a problem and a cause for the occurrence of RTAs: *if the police is standing there while you are loading extra passengers, you will try to go hiding under the cover of another vehicle and at that time you might hit somebody* (Lines 1784-86), and *...maybe you have loaded extra or you might have pulled over at a prohibited place; so the chance for us to involve in accident is so wide when we see them* (Lines 1778-90). In both cases, it was not drivers' traffic rule violations that were construed as causes of RTAs, but the presence of a police officer to react to drivers' rule violating practices. Although it was not stated here, the reason was clear: taxi drivers would usually violate rules and they did not want to be corrected; instead, they

preferred to continue with the practices. Hence, they could not have the slightest confidence of driving in the presence of the police; that was stated clearly in: *every time we see a traffic police, alas, if we were fat we would be tinnier when we see them. I am telling you the truth we will be very much terrified when we see a white hat* (Lines 1786-88), and *...the chance for us to involve in accident is so wide when we see them; we are rather better when they are not around* (Line 1789-91). The expressions used in constructing drivers' reactions upon their contact with the police were hyperbolic (transforming from being *fat* into *thin* the moment they saw the police), satirical (why would they involve in illegal practices if they were *terrified*), and symbolic (the use of *white hat* for the police). The intention was to strengthen the construction against the presence of the police in the road system. The only reason their presence seemed to have been accepted was for fear of traffic jam or crowd caused by RTAs: *perhaps though the road could be more crowded because if there is an accident and there is no traffic police, that means the road is jammed* (Lines 1792-94). However, this role was made insignificant by hedging using *perhaps* and *though*. Thus, the police who were supposed to be among the key road safety players were positioned unfavorably.

The police were also construed as lacking the professional ethics expected of them; *the police should also have the ethics* (Line 1803), and *they need to carry it as an emblem* (Line 1804). An emblem is *a picture, shape, or object that is used to represent a country, organization etc.* (LDOCE); hence, it is a means of representing one's identity. *Emblem* was used in this context to mean moral standard or ethics as a typical representation of the professional quality of the police. Details were not provided in which aspects they lacked the claimed ethics, but it was asserted that they needed to have it, i.e., *to carry it as an emblem*. For example, the police used to hide somewhere and *come out unexpectedly* to stop and penalize drivers for some rule violations they could have been in. However, that practice was questioned as: *what would you say this? Under what ethical standard could you categorize it? That is all, after staying at a hidden place, he suddenly appears to punish people* (Lines 1807-09). Thus, a past habit was used to talk about current unethical practices the police were involved in; verbs used in the utterance, *should be*, *is* (used several times), *should work* and *can be* all indicate present/future actions, not the past.

Although the chance of being heard was suspected, some efforts of appealing for improvement were implied from the part of drivers: *we doubt whether we could be heard; we don't know*

where we should go and cry (Lines 1797-98). Absence of institutions that would recognize drivers as key stakeholders and listen to their cries, and hopelessness that followed as a result could be inferred from the expression. The police were framed as being so harsh/cruel to drivers.

To get the RTAs minimized, the role of the police was claimed to have been facilitating; instead of punishing uninformed or rule violating road users, it was pleaded that they focused on training or advising them. However, they were construed as if they all the time rushed to punish rather than to teach: *instead of tending to punish most of the time, what if they teach the people about how they are exposed to accident* (Lines 1799-1800)? Although they were expected to teach people first about how they could have prevented RTAs, they were construed as engaging in punishment. They were observed *tending to punish*, and this was a practice they performed *most of the time*. By *people*, it must have been to mean road users, typically drivers who were mostly accused of/penalized for violating traffic rules. However, the consequence of tending to punish people all the time was found to be contrary to the intention of minimizing the prevalence of RTAs. The case in Oromia was mentioned as an example: *accident is worsening (there) since the penalty fees are so high that people drive so fast to avoid them* (Lines 1801-02). Thus, the police may not have been responsible for the tougher penalty fees which were framed as contributing to the increment of accident rate, but they were held responsible for their preference for punishing to that of teaching since that had caused further risk – *speeding to avoid them*, i.e, to avoid the high penalty fees. Thus the net effect of this practice was being *exposed to accident* (Line 1800).

There was strong belief that the accident rate could be minimized by the role the police could play; *to minimize the accident, I believe it is the police who could minimize the accident* (Line 1813). How they could have minimized it was expressed repeatedly and insistently: they should have focused on advising and training rule violating drivers and pedestrians, and they should not have rushed to punishment: *I believe the accident will minimize if they advise us [i.e., drivers] and facilitate mobility of pedestrians* (Lines 1831-32). Emotional pleas made by taxi drivers for being understood; pleas directed to the police that they would engage in advising than punishing.

Although emotional pleas were used instead of stronger expressions, practices of the police were still positioned unfavorably; almost all the requests made with the expression *what if...* (*try to calm down, advise, give advice, send*) were what the police were supposed to have performed.

On the other hand, the negated actions in the second column (fining drivers, paying penalties or punishment in general) were practices that the police forced drivers to get engaged in; the central issue was *let's not focus on only fines* (Line 1822). In relation to penalizing/fining drivers, the police in the Oromia Regional State were compared with those in Addis Ababa and the former were appreciated for their engagement in practices of advising drivers. Practices of the police in the capital were constructed unfavorably: *in Addis Ababa, 'don't drive this way,' 'don't do that,' no one advises you. It is only punishment; you are penalized* (Lines 1825-26).

As is put in the table below, the first category of pleas for the police were pleas to advise, train or calm down unaware, rule violating and/or confused road users, and the second category of pleas for the police were pleas not to punish (but give advice to) traffic rule violating drivers.

Pleas to the police for giving advice, training, helping and calming down road users, (mostly using what if...)	Pleas to the police for not preferring penalizing to advising rule violating drivers, (mostly using a negated verb for penalty)
• ለምን የተመደበበት ቦታ ባግባቡ አሸከርካሪውም ሆነ እግረኛው የተደናገጠ ሲኖር አረጋግቶ ቢያሻግር? / at the place where he is assigned, if there is anyone who is confused, be it drivers or pedestrians, what if he tries to calm them down and help them cross? (Lines 1814-15) • ሾፌሮችም ስሜታዊ ይሆናሉ ብዙ ጊዜ እነሱ እነሱን እንኳን ቢመክሩ? / what if they advise drivers who most of the time become emotional? (Lines 1815-16) • ምናል እኛ...? / what if we ...? (Line 1816) • የሰው ልጅ ስትመክረው ነው ብዙ ጊዜ ትምህርት የሚወስደው፡፡ ይሄ ይሄን ነገር እየመክሩ? / most of the time, it is when you give them advice that human beings learn. What if they give advice on issues of such kind? (Lines 1817-18) • ያ ያ ነገር እንዲሁም ትራፊኮች በተቻላቸው አቅም የተደናገጠ ሰው መሻገሪያ ላይ ሲኖር እሱን እሱን ቢያረጋጉ? / to prevent things of that kind, what if the traffic police try to calm down the person who is confused, standing at a crosswalk? (L. 1827-29) • ሹፌሩም ቢናደድም እነሱ ህግ አስከባሪ ስለሆኑ ብዙ ነገር ስለሚገጥማቸው አረጋግተው ቢቃ አይዞህ እንዲህ መሆን አለበት ብለው መክረው ቢለቁ? / the driver could be annoyed, but since they are enforcers of the rule and since they encounter with a number of things, what if they calm him down, give him advice on what should have been done and send him? (Lines 1829-31)	• ገንዘብ ቅጣትኮ እኛን አያስተምረንም / I don't think paying fines would help us get any lesson (Lines 1816-17) • እኛ ራሱ አሁን ትርፍ ጭነት ብታጠፋ፤ ለምን እንዲህ ታረጋለህ ብለህ ብትመክረው እንኳን፤ ያ ሰውዬ ውስጡ ይነካል፡፡ ነገ ሲታገኘው በጣም ነው እሚደነግጠው / even for us, when we are found guilty of loading extra passengers, if you give us advice saying, 'why have you done that?' then the person will feel sorry deeply, and if you find him another time, he will very much be embarrassed (Lines 1818-21) • ያ ያ ነገር ስላለ ወደገንዘብ ወደቅጣት ብቻ አናተኩር እስቲ / so ... let's not focus on only fines (Lines 1821-22) • አዲሳባ ውስጥ፤ እንዲህ አይነዳም፤ እንዲህ አይደረግም ብሎ እሚመክርህ የለም / in Addis Ababa, 'don't drive this way', 'don't do that' no one advises you. It is only punishment; you are penalized (Lines 1825-26) • አንተ ተከሰሃል፤ በንዴት መንዳት ነው፤ በንዴት ስትነዳ ደም ሌላ ቦታ አደጋ ማድረስ ነው / when you are fined, you will drive being annoyed. And when you drive being annoyed, you will cause another accident somewhere (Lines 1826-27)

In conclusion, the police were engaged more in fining drivers for which drivers got annoyed; when you drive being annoyed, you will cause another accident somewhere (Lines 1826-27).

5. Roads authority did not discharge its responsibility

Road users construed the governmental institution ERA and its regional extensions unfavorably; they believed it did not meaningfully incorporate road safety during both road construction and maintenance. Below are some of the ways they positioned the government:

Excerpt 62

እኔ እንደው መንግስትም ትልቁ ትኩረት እማይሰጥበት ነው፤ አሁን በከረምት እንዲህ አስፋልቶች ብዙረዜ ይበላሻሉ፤ ቢጋም ዘልቀው ብዙረዜ ይሄዳሉ። እየሄድክ እያለ ልክ ጉድጓድ ጋር ስትደርስ ፍሬን ትይዛለህ፤ በሃሳብ ላይ እያለ፤ ከኋላህ መጥቶ ይገጭሃል / to me the government does not give it priority; now at such rainy seasons, the roads are usually damaged and they stay in the same condition during the dry season also. when you find a hole while you are driving, you will suddenly brake; the one coming from behind may not be focused and so he will hit you (Lines 1711-13)

እና ብዙረዜ አሁን እንደዚህ ሳያውቅ ቀና መንገድ ነው ብሎ ይሄድ ይሄድና፤ ልክ ድንገት ጉድጓድ ሲያይ፤ ንብረት ነው ብሎ ከገባም እንዳንዱ በንብረቱ ላይ ይወስናል፤ ይሄም ትልቁ ችግር ነው / so most of the time it is unknowingly he simply travels assuming the road was fine, but when he suddenly sees a ditch he might decide against the vehicle since it is just a property; this is the other big problem (Lines 1716-18)

ትልቁ አሁን ትራፊኮች በብዛት እዛች ቦታ ላይ በብዛት ኢንፎርም እያረጉ ነው መሰለኝ በከረምት እንኳ ሁለቴ ተሰርቷል፤ አግባብ ያለው አሰራር ባይሆንም። እና ሲቆም ስትሄድ ስትቆም ስትሄድ ምን ትሆናለህ ፌድ አፕ እያደረክ ትሄዳለህ። ከዛ በኋላ አኑዳድህም እየተለወጠ ይሄዳል። እና መጨረሻ ላይ እየተዘናጋህ መምጣት ነው፤ ትመታለህ። እና እንዲህ አይነት ነገር፤ መንገዱም የራሱ ድርሻ፤ ሾፌሩም የራሱ ድርሻ እንዳለው መንገድም የራሱ ድርሻ አለው / what is significant there is I think the traffic policemen are informing repeatedly; it has been repaired twice even during this rainy season though it was not repaired properly. so when you stop and drive and stop and drive you will eventually fade up; after that the way you drive will also change, and finally you will be careless; so thing of this kind, the road itself, as the driver has his own share, the road also has its own share (Lines 1724-29)

ያ እንግዲህ ትልቁ አሁን መንግስትም ያልቻለው ጉዳይ ቢሆን እሱ ነው፤ ለምን ብለህ ብትል አላቅም። ይመስለኛል እንግዲህ እንዳንድ ነገር በኢንፎርሜሽን ደረጃ ነው እምትሰማው፤ አግሪመንት ሲያረግ ከቻይና መንግስት ጋር፤ ቀለበት መንገዱ ሲሰራ ድልድዮችን በመቶ ሜትር ላይ ሊሰሩ ነበር የተነጋገሩት እሚባለው፤ አሁን ባምሳሌ መቶ ቀርቶ፤ ባንድ ኪሎሜትር በላይ ርቀት ነው ያለው / well that is a big problem which the government itself has found it so difficult; if you ask me, why I don't know. when the ring road was constructed, they said they agreed overpasses were to be constructed at a hundred meters' interval. now it is not at a five hundred, but is located at over one kilometer distance (Lines 1730-34)

መንግስትም አሁን ፖሊስ ሁላ ትራፊክ አቁሞ ወደዚህ ወዳጠና ተራ አልቻላቸውም፤ እዚህ ሲከለከሉ፤ እዛጋ ይዘላል / the government now assigns traffic police at the area around Atana Tera, but that couldn't stop them; when they are prohibited here, they jump over there (Lines 1741-43)

እንደመፍትሄ ያው መንግስት ሊያስቀምጥ የሚችለው ይሄ የብረት መሽጋገሪያ፤ እንደዚህ አይነት ነገሮችን ሊያደርግ ግድ ይላል / as a solution the government should put bridges made of iron or other kind; that is a must (Lines 1747-48)

እና በዛ ነገር ላይ ተቆጣጣሪ ሆነው እሚሾሙ ሀገር ትበልጥበታለች፤ ብሩ ነገ ያልቃል። ብዙዎቹ እንደዚህ አይነት ነገሮችን ሲሰሙ እምንስማቸው ጥራት ተቆጣጣሪ የሆነ ነገር ይደረግላታል ነው። ግን ስንት ህዝብ ስንት ሀገር ስንት ወገን እንደሚያልቅበት በዚያ ነገር ላይ፤ እና የትም አይደርስበትም፤ ካንድ እንጂ በላይም አይበላም። ከባረከለት እሚያገኘው በቂ ነው / so those assigned as supervisors should have prioritized their country; the money will be done by tomorrow. when such things are heard we hear quality supervisors are benefited with something, but imagine how many people how much of the country how many folks are lost there, so he won't have the slightest progress; in fact he won't eat more than one injera. if He blesses it for him what he gets is enough (Lines 1703-08)

First, the GI ERA was criticized for not repairing roads that were damaged in time; *to me the government does not give it priority... the roads are usually damaged and they stay in the same condition* (Lines 1710-12). It was constructed that damaged roads usually stay for long without any rehabilitative work; ERA did *not repair* them soon. Through time, the small holes formed by the rain and floods could grow wide and deep and become causes for minor/severe accidents. How they could be causes of RTAs was explained: *when you find a hole while you are driving, you will suddenly brake* [to prevent the vehicle or passengers from damage or pain]. *The one coming from behind may not be focused and so will hit you* (Lines 1712-13). The holes were thus construed as unexpected experiences in the road which would lead drivers to apply the brakes suddenly. This measure taken by the first driver may not be perceived by the one following from behind being at a closer distance. As a result, accidents which could even be so severe would occur. Such accidents were construed to have been common since drivers would not expect obstacles of this kind, and since there were not signs put warning of their presence: *most of the time it is unknowingly, he simply travels assuming the road was fine* (Lines 1716-17).

On the other hand, some drivers may decide not to take any action upon facing the potholes, preferring the damage of their vehicles instead of involving in RTAs with vehicles coming from behind: *when he suddenly sees a ditch, he might decide against the vehicle since it is just a property* (Lines 1717-18). However, this sudden action could also damage the vehicle. Therefore, whichever action drivers took, the accident was unavoidable, for if there was no injury, there could be resource damage. Thus, the encounter with damaged/unrepaired road was construed as: *this is the other big problem* (Line 1718). ERA and its regional extensions were responsible for putting signs at such places; hence they were construed as contributors for the occurrence of RTAs.

The impact of damaged roads and how they could affect smooth mobility of the traffic was explained further. First, there could be jams; due to severely damaged roads, the speed and flow of vehicles could be impaired. As an example, the road *around Asra Simint approaching Atana Tera* (Line 1723) was mentioned; it is one of the sites in Addis Ababa where the road was mostly blocked, causing vehicles to stay stranded for long. Such an experience could result in the second problem, *fading up: so when you stop and drive and stop and drive you will eventually fade up* (Lines 1726-27). The problem would not stop there; fading up would change how one would drive, leading him/her to become careless: *after that the way you drive will also change, and finally you will be careless* (Lines 1727-28). In other words, one, who was faded up, due to the repetitive stopping could not concentrate; s/he would be careless, and the carelessness would be a reason for getting involved in RTAs. Hence, the concluding remark was on the contribution of poorly constructed or unrepaired road to RTAs: *the road itself, as the driver has his own share; the road also has its own share* (Lines 1728-29).

The problem that was highlighted in connection with roads' contribution to RTAs was a problem of the GI, i.e. ERA, which was responsible for repairing them properly. Since roads were not repaired in a timely and properly manner, they became causes for the prevalence of RTAs. The ring road around Asra Simint/AtenaTera, for example, was repaired several times; however, since it was not repaired up to the standard, the problem persisted: *it has been repaired twice even during this rainy season though it was not repaired properly* (Lines 1725-26). The road was repaired twice (actually after repetitive informing) just in one rainy season's time; however, the problem persisted since it was not up to the standard. If the repaired roads could not last for some time serving optimally, it could be suspected that quality was compromised. It was expressed earlier that the government was reluctant to give priority to road safety: *to me the government does not give it priority* (Line 1710).

The ring road was construed as a big problem area of the city's road system: *well that is a big problem which the government itself has found it so difficult* (Line 1730). It was not for the government alone that it was too difficult to solve; it was constructed as a puzzle for the participants also: *if you ask me why, I don't know* (Lines 1730-31). Corruption and incapacity were constructed as two main reasons for the ring road to have been of poor standard to ensuring the safe mobility of its users. Though there were agreements for the construction of overpasses at

appropriate distances, it was not realized (Lines 1731-34). The Chinese government (or the Chinese road construction companies?) was positioned to construct the road with significant disparity between claims and practices: *when the ring road was constructed, they said they agreed overpasses were to be constructed at a hundred meters' interval. Now it is not at a five hundred, but is located at over one kilometer distance* (Lines 1732-34). The gap between a hundred meter and over a kilometer is so huge, which was used to indicate that the practice was too far from the plan; that means, the agreement for constructing the road was safety oriented, with at least overpasses erected at reasonable intervals, but the actual construction was far from the pledge, causing many villagers to take the risk of crossing the highway instead of traveling long distances in search of the overpasses. Whether there were any failed agreements of the claimed kind could be quite controversial; however, irresponsibility of the government could be the most probable reason for approving the road with all these problems for service. It could be a problem of quality or standard controllers, or it could be just lack of capacity. Whatever the reason, ERA could not escape from being held responsible.

Furthermore, what the government did to solve the problem was construed as not more than a simple attempt of preventing pedestrians from crossing the highway by stationing the police at some places, and this was constructed as problematic. In the first place, it could not solve the problem from its foundation; the result was construed as involving in a hide-and-seek game of children: *the government now assigns police at the area around Atana Tera but that couldn't stop them; when they are prohibited here, they jump over there* (Lines 1741-43). The best way of addressing the problem was stated as widening pedestrians' access for safer use of the road; for example, *as a solution the government should put bridges made of iron or other kind; that is a must* (Lines 1747-48). The government was not provided just a simple suggestion, but a strong recommendation; the expression *that is a must* was used for conveying not a necessity, but an obligation. The reason was the road safety problem that was constructed as to be so pervasive; lives and limbs being lost were more important than the cost to have been incurred for improving the road. By constructing the contribution of roads' condition to RTAs, the government and/or ERA and its extensions that did not address the roads' case seriously were constructed unfavorably.

Involvement in *corruption* was construed as a common experience of the metropolitan's road construction practices, and hence contributing its share to the worsening of RTAs. For the corrupt practices, how the ring road was constructed and the consequence was cited as typical example; when the participant heard of the ring road as if it were constructed with a twenty years' service guaranty, he *was so glad* (Line 1702). However, the road did not stay safe even after it was finalized. The quality of roads being constructed by corrupt firms was so poor that the roads would begin *damaging* early before they served for the intended duration of time, even before their construction was completed: *when they completed only a part of the road and moved to the next it started damaging* (Lines 1702-03). Quality assuring supervisors were assigned to interfere with any problem in the process of road construction, but they also were constructed as irresponsible. These people were blamed as having been involved in bribery, *whenever such things are heard, we hear quality supervisors are benefited with something* (Lines 1704-05). Again, they were constructed as: *they should have prioritized their country* (Line 1704); the implication was that they did not. They instead ran after the money they got and so approved roads that were with defects as if they were up to standard. The depth of problem associated with roads which were not constructed or repaired properly could be inferred from: *but imagine how many people, how much of the country, how many folks are lost there* (Lines 1705-06).

Religious discourse was used in the critical comment made against corrupt practices of road constructors and/or road quality assuring engineers: *so he won't have the slightest progress; in fact, he won't eat more than one 'injera'. If He blessed it for him, what he got could have been enough* (Lines 1706-08). When construed from the perspective of the spiritual world, it was true that one who collected riches in a corrupt way would not have a lasting benefit; that was what *he won't have the slightest progress* mean. It was also true that one could not eat more than his/her fill. The intention of this construction was to show that corrupt practices were so prevalent in the area of road construction. The implication of the practice is obvious; roads constructed without incorporating safety measures could significantly contribute to the death and injury of people and to the damage of resources. The government and its different institutions (ERA and its regional extensions) were responsible for the problems constructed in relation to the road. In Ethiopia, rent seeking, corruption and lack of good governance were the main discourses of the day.

6. Driver certifying firms got involved in practices aggravating the road safety problem

Driver certifying offices also were named as responsible bodies for the prevalence of the road safety problem. That people could get licenses without learning the skills they needed in a corrupt way was among the concerns that participants depicted.

Excerpt 63

መንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ እንደው እኔ ብዙ ጊዜም እናደባለሁ ሳሽከረከር፤ ለምን እንደው ጨጓራዬን አልጨረስኩም ብለህ ነው በዚህ በሹፌሮች ጉዳይ ላይ፤ ለምን ብዙ አሽከርካሪዎች፤ እኔ አሁን ስለምንም መኪና እንኳን ይዞ እሚያቅ አይመስልም / I usually get angry when I drive; you see I must have suffered from gastritis due to these drivers. many drivers by now do not even look as if they were holding a vehicle (Lines 1677-79)

መሪ እንኳን በስትክክል መኪናው ወደኋላ ወደፊት እንዴት እንደምትወጣ እማያቋ ሹፌሮች አሉ፤ አንተ ቆመህ የፊት ማርሽ አስገባህ ብሎ እየነዳ ዳገት ላይ ወደኋላ መጥቶ ይገጭህና፤ አንተ ብቻ ከኋላ ስለሆንክ ጥፋተኛ ነው እምትሆነው / there are drivers who even do not correctly use the wheel, who are not able to move [the vehicles] forward or backward; while he is driving up on a steep road, assuming he was using the brake to move forward, he would come backwards and hit you while you are not moving, and just because you are from behind, you will be counted as liable (Lines 1682-86)

ቢቃ ብቃት የሌላቸው ሹፌሮች አሉ፤ እኔ አሁን እንዳልኩህ ረዳቶች ያልኩት ለዚህ ነው። ለምን ብቃት ሳይኖራቸው መንጃ ፈቃድ እኔ እንዴት እንደሚሰጣቸው ሁሉ አይገባኝም / there are incompetent drivers period; that is why I told you about assistants. I don't understand how they get driving licenses while they do not have the competence. Sometimes I ask them, 'where do you bring the driving licenses from?' (Lines 1692-94);

እንዴ፤ ሄዶ የቤት መኪና ይዞ እኮ ገጭቶ መንጃ ፈቃድ ሳይኖረው ነው የምታቀው ብዙ ጊዜ ሰፈር ላይ፤ ከዛ መንጃ ፈቃድ አውጥቶ ሲሰጥ ታየዋለህ። ከየት አለህ ትለዋለህ፤ አዎ አውጥቻለሁ ምን ትላለህ? ቢቃ ወረቀት ነው እሚፈለገው ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ፤ ወረቀት ይዟል። ከያዘ ደሞ ህጉም ያንን ነው የሚያየው / a person whom you know in your village as not having the license may drive a vehicle and hit somebody. then you will see him showing a license from his pocket, 'do you have? where did you get it from?' when you ask him, he says 'yes I have got one.' what would you say? that is it; it is the paper which is wanted in Ethiopia and he has got it, and if he has got one that is what the law approves (Lines 1696-1700)

እኔ ግን ምናለበት እንደው ረዳቶች አሁን በጣም በረዳትነት ጎበዝ እሚነዱ ሹፌሮች አሉ፤ ረዳት ሆነው መንጃ ፈቃድ ሳይኖራቸው ማውጣት ሳይችሉ። ለነሱ እነሱ፤ ምናለበት ብቃታቸው ታይቶ መንጃ ፈቃድ ቢሰጣቸው ነው እምለው አንዳንድ ሹፌሮችን ስታይ / there are a number of assistants who are very good at driving; they are assistants, but they don't have driving license because they couldn't afford. I would say what if they were given the license after checking their competence when I see some drivers (Lines 1679-82)

In connection with certifying the young with fourth and fifth level driving licenses, a participant said see the way driving license is being offered. I mean imagine a very young man aged eighteen or twenty driving (Excerpt 58, Lines 1663-64) to mean that should not have been made. Both see the way... and I mean imagine... could indicate how emotionally and emphatically the

dangers of the practice were expressed, i.e., certifying very young men for such a responsibility was so worrying. The effect of doing so was RTAs: *by now they are causing many accidents in Addis Ababa* (Excerpt 58, Line 1668). Incapable but certified drivers were constructed as causing not just *accidents*, but *many accidents*. A suggestion for intervention was given as: *that should also be investigated* (Excerpt 58, Lines 1668-69), using *should* that implies very strong necessity. Thus, the office that offered them driving licenses was being constructed unfavorably.

Moreover, there were drivers who had driving licenses while they did not have the skill they needed to qualify them as drivers. These drivers were not few in number; they were constructed as a usual experience: *I usually get angry when I drive* (Line 1677); *many drivers by now do not even look as if they were holding a vehicle* (Lines 1678-79), the quantifier *many* would indicate that their figure was so huge. Unqualified drivers were also constructed as causes of pain: *you see I must have suffered from gastritis due to these drivers* (Lines 1677-78), due to the gap observed with them, i.e., *incompetence*. They were constructed as lacking even the basics of driving: *there are drivers who even do not correctly use the wheel, who are not able to move [the vehicles] forward or backward* (Lines 1682-84), and as contributors of RTAs for which they were not ready to take the responsibility: *while he is driving up on a steep road, assuming he was using the brake to move forward, he would come backward and hit you while you are not moving, and just because you are from behind, you will be counted as liable* (Lines 1684-86).

The way these *incompetent* vehicle drivers got driving licenses was constructed as a puzzle, and where they got their licenses was questioned. Thus, not only were people with forged licenses blamed, but also how the license was provided. Though it was not clearly stated, we could infer that people could get driving licenses without taking the proper training and/or examination in a corrupted/illegal way. Such a practice was disapproved emphatically: *so this way of offering the driving license, I am telling you the truth, I don't have drivers whom I count as if they have got it in the right way* (Lines 1694-96). They did not get driving licenses *in the right way* means it was attained through corruption. The hyperbole used (not finding even a single driver who got his/her license in the right way) is a very strong indicator of how widespread the problem was.

Comparing such forged driving license holding people with assistants who had better experience and exposure to the traffic system but that did not have the license, offering the license for

assistants after checking their competence was suggested: *I would say what if they (assistants) were given the license after checking their competence, when I see some drivers* (Lines 1679-82). However, there was a belief system in Ethiopia that simply accepted those with the paper, i.e. the license, and that approved of their competence without making any investigations into their skills. We could conclude that institutions associated with licensing drivers were positioned unfavorably.

7. Problems associated with vehicle standard, the road and speed

In Ethiopia, there are vehicles of various types and standards; especially with respect to their service years, we could find vehicles both of old age and the latest ones. When these two extremely opposite vehicles traveled on the highway that allowed or rather obliged drivers to travel at a comparatively higher speed, it would not be that difficult to guess what could happen if one of them were with the slightest fault or faced with any technical problem.

Excerpt 64

በተለይ አገልግሎታቸው ረጅም ዘመን የሆኑ ብዙ መኪናዎች አሉ፤ አገራችን ካለው ድህነታችን አንጻር፤ እና አሁን ሌተሰት የሆኑ መኪና ገና ፍሬን የነካህ ምንድነው ነዳጅ የረገጥክ ሳይመሰልህ የለም መኪናህ። እስከመጨረሻው ሰጥተኸው ደሞ እዛው ትጫሃለህ አንተ፤ እና መንገዱ ተመቻችቷል ብለህ፤ ዝም ብለህ የምናደርገው ጉዞ ሊሆን አይገባም። ሁልጊዜ በተመቻችም ቦታ ላይ ድንገት የሚፈጠሩ ነገሮች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉና ፍጥነታችንን እየቆጠብን አንዳንድ ጊዜ፤ ትንሽ ነገር በቂ ነው አሁን እንዳልኩህ። በዛች ሃይዌሪ ላይ፤ ወይ ሰው፤ ወይ ውሻ ቢመጣበት፤ ወይ ከብረቱ ወይ ከድልድዩ ወይ መኪናው በሚገርም መልኩ ድልድዩን ተሻግሮ ታየዋለህ። ፍጥነቱን መቆጣጠር እማልቸለው ከሆነ ለምን በዛ ፍጥነት እሄዳለሁ / vehicles that have served for many years, there are many of that sort in our country due to our poverty; again there are latest vehicles now vehicles that rush the moment you touch the brake or before you think you have given it the petrol. on the other hand, you have given it to the last and yet you are there with your loud noise, so we shouldn't travel just because the road is comfortable to, because on such comfortable situations since there always are things which could occur unexpectedly, we need to limit our speed sometimes. the smallest thing is enough ... on the highway if a person or a dog enters, the vehicle will crash with the guardrail or with the bridge, or to your surprise, you might see the vehicle jumping over the bridge. if I am not able to control my speed, why should I go at such a speed (Lines 1750-59)

ሃይዌሪንም መብረር አለብኝ ብቻ መንገዱ ስለተመቻ መብረር የለበትም የሚል ነው፤ በሃይዌሪም ላይ ራሱ መንገዱ ጥሩ መሆንም አለበት፤ ድንገት እንግዲህ በዛ እስርድ መጥተህ ጉድጓድ ቢገጥምህ እንዴት ነው እምትሄደው? ትንሽ መሪ ብትነካ፤ ቀጥታ ሄዶ ነው እሚጋጭብህ። ስለዚህ ጉድጓዱ ውስጥ ገብተህ መውጣት አለብህ፤ እና እነዚህ በሁሉ ቦታ ላይ ታላላክት እንደተሰማን አድርገን እንንዳ ነው እኔ። ይሄ ራሱ ሃይዌሪ ራሱ የራሱ ችግር አለው፤ ሀብረተሰቡም ያጠቃቀም የራሱ ችግር አለው / so instead of trying to fly just because the road is comfortable to, we need to use the highway just responsibly; the highway should also be of good standard because if you encounter with a hole while you are coming at a speed, how could you pass it? if you turn the wheel very slightly,, it crashes directly. so you have to go into the hole and come out. hence let's drive at all places responsibly; the highway has its own problem, and the public in relation to the way they use it have their own problem (Lines 1761-66)

ሌላው ደግሞ ይሄ መንገድ ላይ፣ አሁን ሰዎች በእግረኛ መንገድ ላይ አይሄዱም ይባላል፤ እግረኛ መንገድ እኮ በተለያየ ቁሳቁስ እኮ ተይዟል፡፡ እንዴት አድርጎ ነው ታዲያ በዛ ላይ እሚሄደው? እንደገና ደግሞ ትራፊኮች አራሳቸው እያዩ መኪናዎች አራሳቸው እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ አቁመው፤ ካፌቴሪያው እዛ እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ ነው ያለው፤ መኪናውን እሚያቆሙት እዚያ ነው፡፡ በየቦታው እንደዚህ አይነት ችግሮች አሉ / the other thing on the road is, now it is said people now are not using pedestrians' pavement but the pavement is now already occupied by different materials; how on earth could he travel on that? and again the traffic (policemen) themselves are observing that cars are parking on pavements, even the cafeteria is there on the pavement; they also park vehicles there. problems of this kind are everywhere (Line 1669-73)

Safety problems associated with vehicle standard and speed were discussed as contributors to RTAs that would occur in the ring road. The presence of too old vehicles sharing the same street with the latest ones was mentioned, though that not commented on, perhaps accepting/approving of it for economic reasons: *vehicles that have served for many years, there are many of that sort in our country due to our poverty* (Lines 1750-51). It was instead emphasized that only by *driving responsibly* i.e., *controlling one's speed*, that the problem could have been solved. The problem was, however, drivers did not put technical fitness of the vehicles they drove into consideration, particularly in the highway where driving at a speed was exercised. Regarding vehicles, the risk of driving at speed *vehicles that have served for many years* (Line 1750) was commented on, whereas regarding the road, crashes one could involve in when driving at a speed on damaged roads like those with holes was mentioned: *the highway should also be of good standard because if you encounter with a hole on the road while you are coming at a speed, how could you pass it? If you turn the wheel very slightly, it crashes directly* (Lines 1762-64). Thus, the highway, which was meant for speeding, should have been constructed or repaired for safer mobility of vehicles. However, it could be inferred that the case was different; vehicles of various standard (both too old to run fast and the brand new) would use the road which was not up to the standard; hence, the poor quality of the road coupled with vehicles of various standards being driven on it were constructed as contributors of the problem.

However, driving at speed on a comfortable road also was constructed as a contributor to RTAs. It was stated that unless one drove responsibly, getting involved in severe RTAs was possible due to speeding on a highway which was comfortable to drive on: *we shouldn't travel just because the road is comfortable to, because on such comfortable situations since there always are things which could occur unexpectedly, we need to limit our speed sometimes* (Lines 1754-56). People who drove at a speed simply because they found it *comfortable* to were criticized.

The intention was to emphasize on danger that could occur *unexpectedly*. It was stated that *there are always things which could occur unexpectedly*; hence, drivers needed to have been cautious all the time.

Furthermore, vehicles travelling at speed were construed as prone to danger for the smallest thing they would encounter with: *the smallest thing is enough ... on the highway if a person or a dog enters, the vehicle will crash with the guardrail or with the bridge, or to your surprise, you might see the vehicle jumping over the bridge* (Lines 1756-58). Since a vehicle is more powerful and stronger than a human being or an animal, it could easily crush the human being/animal it encounters with when it is at speed, though it could also be damaged. Thus drivers should all the time be sure of their skills of maneuvering vehicles they drive at speed; however, that was not observed. As could be inferred from the rhetorical question employed, *if I am not able to control my speed, why should I go at such a speed* (Lines 1758-59), people were criticized for not controlling themselves or their speed and for becoming causes of accident. The metaphor of flying (like a plane) for high speed driving was used in constructing people who drove at extremely high speeds. They were criticized for that: *instead of trying to fly just because the road is comfortable to, we need to use the highway just responsibly* (Lines 1761-62). The call for using the highway *responsibly* would imply that people did not drive responsibly; the call was made repeatedly: *hence let's drive at all places responsibly; the highway has its own problem and the public in relation to the way they use it have their own problem* (Lines 1765-66); both the ring road and drivers who used it were constructed unfavorably, as contributors to the prevalence of accidents.

The Chinese-made *Sinotruk* in particular was named for unacceptable speeding: *it is obvious how fast they drive the moment they begin driving* (Excerpt 58, Lines 1664-65); that was intentional and significant. First, it was a heavy duty truck that was known for its repeated involvement in crashes all over the country. People used to call it by its nick name *ቀይ ሽብር* / *Red Terror*, relating its red color and practices with that of the bloodshed Derg Regime. Recently, due to the gravity of the problem that it was causing, it was renamed *ISIS*. A further discourse heard of the truck is about its technical problem which was further related with the country it was imported from, i.e., China. Unlike Toyota and other Japanese and/or European products that had for decades been used in Ethiopia, Chinese-made trucks (and many other products) were publicly criticized for

their poor standards. RSSs of GIs would not accept such complaints, citing its use in other countries as well; however, they stated a technical committee was nominated to investigate the case, and that before taking any measures, they had to wait until the study was completed (*The Ethiopian Herald*, 13 March, 2015).

Regarding the road and how it was used, other groups of RSSs were positioned at responsible for the worsening of the road safety problem. These were vehicle owners/holders parking their cars on pavements, and street venders who used the pavements for their businesses: *cars are parking on pavements, even the cafeteria is there on the pavement* (Line 1672). By *cafeteria*, it was perhaps to mean restaurants offering outdoor services for customers that preferred to stay in their vehicles parked by the roadside; however, it could also mean the small scale street venders that served their customers letting them sit or stand by the roadside; some of these *cafeterias* had temporary shades prepared for customers, but the shades were on the pavements. If not totally occupied, all these could at least crowd the narrow pavements and hinder pedestrians from moving freely/safely, pushing them to involve in risky road use practices.

8. RSSs did not work responsibly

The participants also criticized on the fact that RSSs and road users who were not ready to take responsibility for ensuring road safety. Integration of stakeholders was what the road safety strategy document and key RSSs claimed. However, as could be seen from the construction of the road users, readiness to taking responsibility did not come out; hence, they called for its practicality:

Excerpt 65

እና ኃላፊነት ሁሉም፣ ሁሉም የባለድርሻ አካል ትራፊኩም ሌላውም ሁሉም እንደነዚህ አይነቱ። ሁልጊዜ፣ የግድ እንደእ እንደኔ፣ አሁን አንድ ጊዜ አንድ ጓደኛዬ ኢንጅነር ነው፤ ሄዶ ኮት ዲቯር ውስጥ ሁሉም ትራፊክ ነው አለ፤ ጥፋት ካጠፋህ፣ ከኋላህ ያለው መኪና ታርጋውን ጽፎ ለትራፊክ ይሰጣል። እኔ ሁላችንም ኃላፊነት በንደዚህ አይነት ነው ምክንያቱም ላንድ አገር እድገት፣ እንደው ሃገራችን አድጋለች ልንል እምንችለው ጥሩ ስነምግባር ሁላችንም ተላብሰን መኖር ስንችል ነው። እና ያን ለማድረግ ግን፣ ብዙ ጊዜ እኛ እንደምቀኝነት ነው እያየነው ያለነው፤ ኖ ይብዛም ይነስ የተወሰነ አደጋ ቀንሰን ነገ ጥሩ አደጋ ከማያደርሱ አገሮች ተርታ ልንሰለፍበት እንችላለን / so all stakeholders have responsibility, traffic police and others all of these kind, all the time; to me, it's a must. a friend of mine who is an engineer once went to Côte d'Ivoire. he said all are traffic police there; if you break the rules a person in the vehicle behind you will write your vehicle's plate number and give it to a traffic police. this should be the responsibility of us all because for our country to grow, well we could say our country has grown only when we all live by a worthy and ethical standard, but as to making that happen we usually see it as if it were

jealousy. no, by minimizing the accident we could more or less be in the list of countries that do not cause any accident (Lines 1834-40)

አሁን ብዙ ጊዜ አይ አበሻ፣ ምቀኝነት፣ አሁን ምን አገባው አስቷ? እንደዚህ ነው እሚባለው፣ ከደህንነት አኳያ ያደረኩት ድርጊት ተደርጎ አይታይም / now most of the time, they would say this is Habesha's (people of Ethiopia are also called Habesha) jealousy; does it really concern him? it won't be counted as an action which I did for the sake of safety (Lines 1850-51)

To prevent RTAs and ensure road safety, RSSs were called for taking responsibility: *all stakeholders have responsibility: traffic police and others, all of these kind* (Line 1833); moreover, the road safety work was constructed as a task that had to be done *all the time* (Lines 1833-34). The sharing of responsibility to prevent RTAs was construed as a *must* (Line 1834); it *should be the responsibility of us all* (Lines 1836-37) which was expressed using strong modal auxiliaries. It was expected that all RSSs discharged their responsibilities of minimizing the rate of RTAs in order for Ethiopia *be in the list of countries that do not cause any accident* (Line 1840). We find the word *responsibility* used repeatedly, with quantifiers *all* and *all of us*, as a way of stressing the necessity of working hand in hand among the stakeholders was fundamental.

To strengthen the claim for the involvement of all concerned, the case in Côte d'Ivoire was brought intertextually as an example where everybody there was found to have been helping the road safety work by informing the police of any rule violation of any driver on the road (Lines 1834-36). People who were involved in such a practice were construed as having *respect for fellow citizens* (Lines 1848-49). However, the reality in Ethiopia with regards to discharging one's responsibility or cooperating for road safety was too far from claims; as it was discussed so far, while there was a call for the working of all RSSs responsibly to address the road safety problem, participants constructed that actual practice was so insignificant.

If some of the RSSs contributed anything, it would not be valued by the majority others; *it won't be counted as an action which I did for the sake of safety* (Line 1851). Instead, it was taken as an intrusion into the affairs of others: they would say *does it really concern him* (Lines 1850-51)? Some would count such an effort as *jealousy: we usually see it as if it were jealousy* (Line 1839); *they would say this is Habesha's* (people of Ethiopia) *jealousy* (Line 1850). Hence, all these negatively connoted comments would not encourage people to get involved in the task.

The absence of involvement in the preventive task was constructed as a consequence of *lack of awareness* (Line 1843). Education, which was framed as of paramount importance by RSSs of

GIs, was recommended by road users also as: *what if all were to get an in-depth knowledge? It is not that simple* (Line 1844). Using pamphlets was suggested as the best way of reaching the masses with the recommended *knowledge*; it was taken as fitting to the needs or situations of many who did not have time to attend safety lessons provided formally: *if you distribute pamphlets, many could learn from them* (Lines 1845-46); they could read it wherever they were: *if you now give me a pamphlet here, I will read it* (Line 1848).

However, whatever the reason may be, we could conclude that the majority of RSSs and road users that the participants mentioned did not discharge their responsibility of preventing RTAs; hence, they were positioned unfavorably.

9. Road users' constructions of the government

Of the various ways of broadening the public's road safety awareness and creating sense of ownership of the road safety work, making the task inclusive at various stages of its planning and implementation was crucial. However, it was constructed that there was no practice of this kind in the process of formulating road safety related rules and regulations. It could be inferred from the construction that this practice affected the role of road users to safety negatively.

Excerpt 66

ይሄ እንግዲህ ሁልጊዜ ህግ አውጭው አስፈጻሚው እዛው የመንግስት አካል ብቻ ነው ... ምንድነው የህብረተሰቡ ችግር እና የኛ ችግር እንደነዚህ አይነት አካሎችን በተወሰነ ጊዜ፣ ገባህ እኔ በቀበሌም በምንም ይሁን ጠርቶ ሁሉንም ባለድርሻ አካል አድርጎ በዛ አይቶ እገናዝቦ የለም፡፡ ብዙ ጊዜ እሚወሰነው ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች፣ ዞን ያሉ ይሰበሰባሉ፤ እዛው የራሳቸው ሰዎች እንግዳ ሆነው ይመጣሉ ከመንገድ ትራፊክ ፖርት ፣ እዛው ያልቃል፡፡ መንገድ ትራፊክ ፖርት ሁሉ፣ የተጠራ ሁሉ፣ በመንገዱ ስነስርዓት ላይ ገንዘብ ተቀባይ አለ፣ ሰብሳቢ አለ፤ ይሄ መንገድ ትራፊክ ፖርት ነው፤ ጉዳዩ ይመለከተዋል ይሰበሰባል፤ ከሱ ግን አንድ ሹፌር ይበልጠዋል፡፡ እና እንዲህ አይነት ከህብረተሰቡ ጋር ተቀላቅሎ፣ (የለም)፤ የሆነ አካል ብቻ ወስኖ ወደታች መወርወሩ ፌዴራል አይደለም ብዬ አስባለሁ እንደራሴ አስተሳሰብ፡፡ ሁላችንንም ይሰማን፣ ሁላችንንም ጉዳዩ እንዲሰማን ተደርጎ ቢሆን ውጤቱም ያማረ ነው፤ እና ይሄንንም ግንዛቤ እዚያጋ ቁጭ ብሎ ይንገረን፣ ሁላችንንም ወሳኝ ናቸው ብሎ / well it is just the governmental body there that always ratifies rules and also responsible for their effecting ... the problem of the public which is also our problem is no one periodically invites you or related sectors recognizing all as stakeholders to involve be it at the kebele or whatever level, no one recognizes the issue that way; most of the time decisions are made by the traffic police gathered at the zonal level. people of their own are invited as guests from the roads transport (authority); the road system concerns everyone invited from the road transport, the cashier is there, the money collector is there, this is an issue of the road transport; it concerns him and so he involves; and yet, a single driver is better than him. so decision by mixing with the public, (never). I think it is not fair if only one sector decides alone and throws it down to the bottom; let's all sense the problem and if the issue were made to sense us all, the result would also be better; let him be there, take time and tell us this position recognizing all of us as having decisive role (Lines 1852-63)

First, it was construed that without involving other RSSs and the public, only GIs formulated and executed road safety rules/regulations: *well it is just the governmental body there that always ratifies rules and also responsible for their effecting* (Lines 1852-53). The words *always* and *just* could best explain the point being constructed; it was to mean that there was no room for others. Moreover, the word *there* indicates detachment, or absence of integration amongst GIs and other stakeholders. As a result, only the government was struggling to effect the execution of the rules it ratified; there was no cooperation from the private sectors and the majority road users.

In the discussion of the problem that the public faced in relation to road safety, absence of floor for their involvement in the work of addressing the issue came out emphatically: *the problem of the public, which is also our problem, is no one periodically invites you or related sectors, recognizing all as stakeholders to involve* (Lines 1853-54). From the clause *no one periodically invites you*, we could see that there was total exclusion of other RSSs and road users; we could also understand that it was a complaint that was constructed against the government for its denial of the public and responsible groups from engaging in the road safety work. While the pronoun *you* reflexively referred to the group of road users that the participant himself came from (public transport drivers), *related sectors* was used to refer to other RSSs, perhaps including pedestrians and the private sectors. Also, from *be it at the kebele or whatever level* (Lines 1854-55), it could be seen that the ‘floor’ was denied at all levels of administration, from the bottom up to the higher, because, *no one recognizes the issue that way* (Line 1855). The present simple was used in order to imply that the practice being criticized was so natural that it was difficult to imagine even in the near future to be recognized the way it was sought; hence, change was very much unlikely.

The right for involving in the work was claimed to have been given for people working in GIs, particularly for the police and for those working in the roads transport sector. Regarding the police, it was claimed that only those at the federal level were given the opportunity. In other words, bottom level practitioners working on the road, who were supposed to have a far better knowledge of the workings of the road traffic system, were not included in the domain. On the other hand, people working in the road transport sector but did not have any relevance to the issue were invited to involve only because of the personal relationships they had with those who invited them; *people of their own are invited as guests* (Lines 1856-57). The expression *this is an*

issue of the road transport; it concerns him so he involves (Line 1859) was sarcastic. It was to mean that these people joining the meetings and taking part in decisions pertaining to road safety did not have any professional input or social concern; practically the issue did not concern them and so they probably had nothing to contribute. In order to strengthen the claim, *the cashier* and *the money collector* were mentioned as examples of people involving in meetings on issues pertaining to road safety. As to who were of better contribution to road safety, it was put in bold as: *a single driver is better than him* [i.e., *the cashier* or *the money collector*] (Lines 1859-60).

Thus the practice that did not give the opportunity to the responsible RSSs was framed as *unfair*: *I think it is not fair if only one sector decides alone and throws it down to the bottom* (Lines 1860-61). By *only one sector*, maybe it was to mean FTP. The phrase could also be associated with *the governmental body* (Line 1852). Moreover, the practice (of discussing issues, formulating rules or regulations and trying to implement them) only by top level officials was construed as an act of throwing top level decisions down; hence, it was not owned by the public at all. Normally no one would positively accept and implement something that was thrown down. It might be for this reason that a plea for a reconsideration of the road safety work was made: *let's all sense the problem and if the issue were made to sense us all, the result would also be better* (Lines 1861-62). The plea was for a comprehensive approach to addressing the problem; it was for all RSSs to own the problem and engage for solution. The responsible organ was asked to take time to think over the case thoroughly, *recognizing* all RSSs and road users *as having* not just *role* but *decisive role* (Line 1863). The plea was for a practice which was different from what was being executed so far. Unlike the claim that was made repeatedly, the road safety work in Ethiopia did not involve the majority of the RSSs; most significantly, road users for whom the road safety work was meant were totally excluded. The RSSs of GIs were constructed unfavorably for not involving road users and RSSs of PSs in decisions and practices pertaining to road safety.

In this last sub-section, we have seen how RSSs and road users construed the role of other players in the road traffic system in the practices of addressing the road safety problem. As has been discussed, almost all the participants (RSSs and/or road users) construed other RSSs and road users unfavorably. RSSs the participants named (pedestrians, young/inexperienced drivers, driver certifying institutions, government offices, particularly ETA and ERA, businesses/people

occupying pavements for the safe mobility of pedestrians, technical fitness of vehicles and the police) were constructed negatively; they were positioned as contributors to the (worsening of) the road safety problem. There might have been some RSSs and individuals that had tried to alleviate the problem, but the efforts were constructed as of insignificant focus/impact. Unlike what was planned and claimed to have been, it could be implied from the constructions of the participants that there was not any integration/cooperation amongst the various stakeholders.

If there were any integration of the stakeholders, it was only among some RSSs of GIs which had a shared history and outlook on how the problem should have been addressed. They attempted to minimize RTAs and their impact using the individual user approach; they had the interest of staying with their historical and political position controlling the road safety work in the country. The only institutions observed to have been working regularly and in collaboration under the council's leadership were the FTP and MoT (ETA and ERA in particular), and their extensions in the AACAA. Unlike what was stated in NRSSPE, other RSSs of GIs and PSs and the majority road users did not have any picture in the actual road safety practices in Ethiopia. Therefore, it could be concluded that due to this partial, disorganized or rather unorganized road safety knowledge and practice, the road safety problem of the country was not addressed meaningfully; hence, RTAs were escalating year after year, consuming lives, limbs and resources ruthlessly.

Before closing this chapter, it is essential to briefly present an overview of the contribution of the knowledge of applied linguistics in analyzing the discourse of road safety. Constructionism was the adopted theory since the positivist approach was not able to show social/cultural conceptualizations of and ideological underpinnings associated with road safety that could be revealed from the spoken/textual constructions of the road safety participants. Hence, analyzing their discourses helped reveal RSSs' and road users' context-driven conceptualizations of the road safety problem. As Marston (2000) plainly asserted in his critical analysis of public housing policy, "positivist approaches to policy analysis have failed to address the way in which policy language constructs welfare identities, legitimates policy interventions and functions as an important site of ideological struggle over the meaning of human services."

Constructions of the road safety problem in Ethiopia were investigated as they appeared in both stakeholders' talks and policy/strategy/guideline/practice texts only because applied linguistics

has provided the proper theory, method and tools of analysis. In their constructions of the problem, RSSs had employed different linguistic features, but as a way of depicting the role of applied linguistics in this project, those which were focused on in the analyses are summarized below. Hence, the tools employed in the analysis of the collected data were: presupposition, speech acts, passivization, metaphor, anecdotes, loaded words/expressions, negatives, and argumentation strategies (like fallacious reasoning and claiming authority) that RSSs used.

Metaphor has been recognized as one of the most important rhetorical devices (Musolff, 2012). RSSs employed metaphor particularly in relation to the argumentative advantage that it provides with its users when they want to construct road safety; hence, they used health metaphor (as in healthy mobility), disease metaphor (when the road safety problem was construed as consuming lives). Moreover, when RSSs positioned others they worked with unfavorably, they used metaphor (as in the driver as caregiver to the pedestrian, to mean that while drivers are like the mother/the nurse, pedestrians are like children/patients who need caregiver for their safety).

The concepts of positioning and speech acts could be seen together, as it was discussed in the methodology chapter. In almost all of their favorable constructions of the self and unfavorable constructions of RSSs of PSs and road users, RSSs of GIs located themselves as powerful, authoritative and dependable, whereas others as powerless, irresponsible, reckless, etc. Thus, we find them in the illocutionary acts of instructing, ordering and blaming RSSs of PSs and road users; regarding themselves, on the contrary, they took the powerful position to explain/instruct how they handled the road safety work before, or if they did not perform it at all so far, they would simply pledge or promise to engage in some road safety related task of the future.

Generally, we could say that the thesis has centered its analysis on the experiential, expressive and relational values of words and grammatical features which RSSs and road users used in their talks and texts, and on what metaphors, if any, they used. Hence, it was on the three constructive effects of discourse: systems of knowledge/beliefs, social identities and social relations. RSSs' road safety conceptualizations and problems associated with road safety have revealed from analysis on the stakeholders' experiential values or systems of knowledge and beliefs. Their assertions about what road safety was (as if it were concerned with the safety of those in mobility), what the roads were for (as if they were particularly for vehicles) and what safety was

for (as if it were for people in mobility), and the construction of road safety as a discipline, etc. are some indicators of how experiential values that words and grammatical features have revealed. When they constructed the road safety problem in the context of Ethiopia, they used words which were loaded and negative that construed the road safety problem as serious, worrying, the worst, and unacceptable. However, we could also see contradictory constructions of how such a pressing problem should have been addressed: drastically versus progressively.

Most of all, that the RSSs of GIs and road users have a knowledge/belief system that construed road safety as a discipline that works to achieve its mission through education and enforcement has emerged from the linguistic analysis of the data; the construction of road safety as a task of the police and ETA/ERA revealed ideological position of the key RSSs, a position in line with the governmentality concept that promoted the perpetuation of the traditional/individualistic approach to road safety by blaming road users alone for the problem and targeting the same for solution.

The analysis conducted on the recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices was another area where the knowledge of applied linguistics was employed; using presupposition, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and speech acts as tools of inquiry, it was confirmed that the Ethiopian road safety road policy/strategy documents and RSSs had plenty of intertextual and interdiscursive links to the UN/WHO recommendation documents, depicting they were prepared based on the safe systems approach to road safety knowledge. Apart from direct quotes about (and mentions of) the safe systems approach, words like collaboration, coordination, partnership and integration were used as indicators of the claim for the multisectoral and interdisciplinary approach to addressing the problem. However, from the analysis conducted using speech acts and presupposition, it was also confirmed, as it was mentioned above, that unlike the claim of adopting the safe systems approach, what was being practiced was the individualistic/behavior based approach; hence, the claim was no more than ‘tokenistic’.

RSSs used various linguistic features to position themselves favorably and others unfavorably. This positioning of the self and others favorably/unfavorably was revealed from analysis conducted on relational values (social relations) and expressive values (social identity) that words and grammatical features (the RSSs and road users used) have. About the relational values

words and grammatical features that RSSs employed, we could see as an example that euphemism was used. In order not to be too critical about other stakeholders, or when describing themselves as if they were responsible for some of the road safety tasks which they did not handle effectively, they would employ euphemism as in: *we have taken this as an objective and are going about it* while there was nothing they did so far; or *a tendency for reduction of traffic accident is observed*, while in reality there was no improvement at all. The use of passivization and nominalization could also be mentioned. RSSs would prefer the passive or nominalization when they did not want to reveal RSSs which were responsible for some road safety problem; hence, in *unless the present trend is arrested*, the agent was obscured. The same was done in *the roads are not designed well with safety in mind*; passivization was used to obscure responsibility.

Regarding expressive values of words and grammatical features, that negative evaluation RSSs had about practices of other RSSs and road users which they described implicitly and explicitly could be mentioned as an example. Accordingly, drivers and pedestrians were construed as careless/reckless, irresponsible, negligent, inefficient, addicted, excessively money-oriented, etc.

Hence, in the study of a social/cultural problem like road safety, linguistic analysis of policy or media texts and constructions of the responsible players that were collected using in-depth interviews or focus group discussions could better provide insights both on conceptualizations of the problem, and on practices of mitigating the same.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Implications of the Study

5.1 Introduction

This study was conducted to explore conceptualizations of the road safety problem in Ethiopia and how current knowledge and practices of alleviating the problem are interpreted, appropriated and/or resisted by RSSs and road users. Based on UN/WHO's recommendation that asserted the importance of addressing the problem through collaboration of concerned stakeholders, i.e., employing multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategy (Peden et al., 2004, p.161), the goal of the thesis was to explore road safety conceptualizations of stakeholders and their constructions of practices they were engaged in to tackling the problem in Ethiopia. This was done by formulating four specific objectives: (a) understand how stakeholders conceptualize the road safety problem; (b) explore which road safety knowledge and practices stakeholders incorporate into/excluded from their daily practices; (c) analyze any impact of the incorporated/excluded road safety knowledge and practices on efforts of decreasing RTA-caused death, injury and resource damage; and (d) examine how the stakeholders position themselves and others in relation to the role they have to alleviating the problem. The reasons why efforts of addressing the problem were so insignificant (in terms of reducing number of lives lost and limbs injured) was also explored.

Data were collected through in-depth interviews, compilation of relevant policy and/or strategy documents, (informative and educative) media releases and observation; the data were read/heard several times, selected for their relevance, transcribed and translated when required and analyzed qualitatively using CDA, Fairclough's theoretical and methodological approach. By analyzing RSSs' and road users' discourses, it was possible to unpack their social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough, 2003, 1995, 1989). The rationale was that disparities and/or similarities in the RSSs' conceptualizations and constructions of the problem and ways of addressing it could significantly affect the overall road safety related practices and the impact of the problem upon lives and limbs of road users and resources of the country.

In this chapter, first, a brief summary of main findings of the study is provided. To make it easier to capture, the summary is divided in line with the specific objectives of the study. Next,

implications of the study for action and further research is provided, emphasizing on the major findings. Finally, some possible research areas in relation to the topic are reflected upon.

5.2 Summary and Conclusion

5.2.1 Conceptualizations of Road Safety and/or Road Traffic Accident

RSSs' and road users' conceptualization of *road safety* was first explored. To begin with, if road safety had to be construed as multisectoral and multidisciplinary, RSSs could not address it efficiently unless they had some shared understanding of the issue they were meant to address in collaboration. According to Elvik et al., the road safety problem could be construed from a variety of perspectives, mainly in terms of “a high number of accidents, a high accident rate or a high proportion of serious injuries” (2009, p. 7), all of which are based on RTA-statistics. They stated the possibility of considering non-numerical issues like the feeling of insecurity road users could experience. Although there was no scientifically ‘correct’ definition, using the knowledge of epidemiology was taken as a rational approach for conceptualizing the problem (Elvik et al., 2009, p.70). Over the past century, epidemiology’s contribution in framing of the problem has been significant; however, this thesis was conducted on the premise that RSSs’ and road users’ conceptualizations/constructions of the problem based on their social and cultural realities is far better than just the former if change in terms of saving lives and limbs were to be realized.

Accordingly, road safety was construed differently based on names it was given by the various RSSs, and the names it was given were related with the stakeholders’ priority than the approach they adopted, the safe systems approach that demanded for a collaborative effort to address the problem comprehensively. For the police, safety of vehicles and pedestrians in mobility was the concern whereas ERA was worried more about the safety of the road and road signs; for ETA, drivers’ and pedestrians’ road use behavior was the priority. Thus, the RSSs did not have a comprehensive conceptualization of road safety as the safety of road users, the vehicle and the road and its environment. Above all, the NRSSPE itself did not have a single term to use consistently as a logo; nor did it have any conceptual definition that could encompass RSSs’ conception whichever term they could have used. Hence, the road safety problem in Ethiopia begins with absence of an official and/or comprehensive way of framing and/or understanding it.

Secondly, while the concept of road safety and its definition needs to address the three basic components in the system, i.e., road users, vehicles and the road and its environment, *road users* does not mean just the traffic; it includes people who live in and work by the sides of the road. There are people in the streets like mobile/stationed vendors and their customers, beggars and road side dwellers; however, these people were not fully incorporated in the conceptualization of road safety. Similarly, the fact that roads would separate residents of the same neighborhood that were of social, cultural and historical cohesion was not recognized. Dwellers in the vicinities of the ring road, for example, would risk their lives attempting to cross the fenced road every time they wanted to be on the opposite sides of where they were located; although zebra crossings or over bridges were available for use at some distance from where they were, it seemed that they did not want to waste their time and energy searching for them every time they crossed the road. Hence, in agreement with the claim by Luria et al. (2014), for a “safety-climate concept to road safety [that] proposes a new concept – community road-safety climate,” it is essential to incorporate the larger community that is separated by the road system but is still in complex interaction in order for the road safety effort to succeed.

The *road safety problem* in Ethiopia was conceptualized as a *very serious problem that should be addressed through the concerted efforts of stakeholders*. In most constructions of the problem, epidemiology was used, i.e., number of people who died, were seriously/slightly injured, and the amount of resources damaged. Based on data they found as alarmingly high, and evoking their own RTA encounters and media framings, participants constructed the problem as *serious, worrying, the worst, and unacceptable*. Since road safety documents also used the same terms, it could also be taken as an intertextual link of whatever they heard or read about the problem. However, how such a serious problem should have been averted was rather ambiguous; it was constructed as a problem that could not be *overlooked* but one that should be arrested *drastically*, on the one hand, and as a problem that should be *reduced progressively*, on the other. Based on these contradictory constructions, it could be concluded urgency of addressing the problem has been compromised.

It was claimed that the problem had to be addressed by *concerted* efforts of RSSs through their *collaboration, coordination, partnership*, implying that based on the new approach, the problem was conceptualized as multisectoral and multidisciplinary. Thus, knowledge/practices of the

source countries that have implemented “vision zero” and the “safe systems” approach shaped the conceptualization of road safety in Ethiopia as a shared responsibility. Belin et al. (2011) also confirmed Sweden’s “vision zero” has shaped global road safety efforts that aspired to achieve innovative road safety policies in line with the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020.

On the other hand, road safety was construed as the *task of ensuring safe mobility of vehicles and pedestrians on the road which was particularly constructed for vehicles*. While the road in the Ethiopian context was space for a number of participants, like vehicle holders, pedestrians, street dwellers, street vendors and their customers, conceptualizing road safety as safe mobility of the traffic, and the road as belonging mainly to vehicles could not be taken as all-inclusive. It could thus be concluded that due to such a partial conceptualization, a number of other players/users of the road were excluded from being considered in practices of addressing the road safety problem.

Road safety has also been construed as a *full-fledged discipline, stream, or field of study* that was interested in addressing *safe mobility* and/or *accident*. The notion of road safety as an independent profession would imply that addressing the problem necessitates people of a particular expertise or specialty; however, this is against taking the issue as multisectoral and multidisciplinary. Moreover, if it were a discipline focusing just on *mobility* and on *accident*, the road environment would be excluded. While they may not be mobile, the road environment and its dwellers make up a major portion of the road system to have been incorporated in the conceptualization of road safety. For example, due to non-observance of the posted 30 kph speed limit for towns/cities, “Interstate and city roads accounted for 70.5% of fatal crashes in Ethiopia” (Tulu et al., 2013).

Road safety was also construed as the task of making sure that mobility of vehicles was *faultless*, i.e., *experiencing no accident at all*. In reality, though, it is unlikely to have mobility of *no accident at all*. The claim of Vision Zero was not faultless mobility or absence of accidents at all (Johansson, 2009); it accepts human beings’ fallibility and underscores that errors are inevitable. Instead, holding the assertion that it is unethical to lose or seriously impair people just because of mobility, it aspires for zero death and severe accidents. To conclude, conceptualizing road safety as creating *faultless/accident free* environment had an inherent misunderstanding of the very concept, making the effort overambitious and diverting stakeholders from focus.

Furthermore, road safety was construed in terms of problems it posed: the *road traffic accidents*; RTAs in Ethiopia were constructed as *the worst, terribly worrying and unacceptable*. However, the construction of RTAs as problems that *should have been among top priorities of the country* would reveal absence of the claimed emphasis that the problem demanded. On the contrary, RTAs were constructed as natural byproducts of mobility, i.e., as if lives and limbs consuming accidents were inevitable as long as there was mobility. However, Elvebakk (2007) has asserted that “fatalities in traffic are not an inevitable social byproduct of technological development, but a politically and ethically acceptable or unacceptable cost of a given level of mobility.” The socially accepted conceptualization of RTAs was that they are preventable public health issues.

Moreover, accidents were recognized as such only when they caused death, serious injury and/or some economic loss. Near-accidents and accidents of minor injury were not in the stakeholders’ conceptualizations. Elvik (2006) did the same when he proposed a framework for a rational analysis of road safety problems; he defined a road safety problem as “any factor that contributes to the occurrence of accidents or the severity of injuries.” He defined objectives of rational road safety analysis as “the identification of those problems that make the greatest contribution to accidents or injuries and that are amenable to treatment.” However, if psychological and social impacts caused by unrecognized RTA cases were considered, the way the problem was handled could have been totally different.

Similarly, in agreement with Borowy (2013) who revealed RTIs’ constructions as “a sign of development at an early stage or of an insufficiently coordinated development,” and the development model which asserted that countries should pass through some stages until they developed (McAndrews, 2013), RSSs of GIs in Ethiopia constructed RTAs emphasizing on economic burden that followed and based on the development model, and not on their impact on health/lives of victims. Considering the fact that the majority of RTA-victims were vulnerable road users, it could be concluded that issues of public health and social equity have totally been neglected. This was what Azetsop (2010) confirmed when he suggested a social justice approach to road safety addressing the uneven distribution of RTIDs across population groups.

Registering of RTA cases was of substantial help for making the proper intervention and for forecasting the future RTA trend that could further help improve road safety. However, RTAs in

Ethiopia were approved and registered only by the police; hence, if a police officer was not around, was not convinced of the gravity of the case, or if participants involved in the accident negotiated/agreed on how the cost of repair could be covered, the accident event and place may not have been registered. Had the case been registered, or had there been a mechanism of documenting RTA spots without necessarily connecting them with legal procedures, it could be of great help for intervention.

RSSs construed engineering fault as a contributor to RTAs although they did not take it as a key issue; the fault could have been due to problems related with the design of the road, or failure during road construction/maintenance, which was partly associated with irresponsibility of the road construction companies. For example, it could have lacked the necessary safety signs and precautions road users could read to act accordingly, or the signs might have been lost or damaged when the roads were used. The identification of such spots and the immediate intervention that should have followed was limited. Hence, safety of the road network as a key component of the safety conceptualization was neglected. This could have been due to a road safety work that focused on road users alone, as will be discussed in the coming section.

Finally, RTA was conceptualized as a burden due to some kind of *curse/order from the Creator*, and thus as if it could be solved only by intervention of the same. This could be construed as transferring one's responsibility away from the self unto the supernatural; road users were not ready to take responsibility for the RTA they caused or are involved in. However, the advocated principle of road safety recognizes RTAs as predictable and preventable; the road safety knowledge in Ethiopia lacks incorporation of these notions, preferring to blame God for whatever decisions they made. Salmon & Eckersley (2010) also confirmed that road crashes in Ethiopia are not culturally understood as preventable; they are perceived as inevitable: "an element of fatalism was common, often linked to a religious belief that God is in control."

5.2.2 Recontextualization of Road Safety Knowledge and Practices

The recontextualization of road safety knowledge and practices has been the other important focus of the study. The purpose of addressing this issue was to trace systems of knowledge and beliefs that were conveyed in the discursive events of RSSs shaping practices they were engaged in. Hence, it was possible to uncover which knowledge and practices RSSs included, which ones

they excluded, and what reasons they had for the decisions they made. By implication, that was helpful in understanding why efforts of addressing the problem did not match the gravity of the problem. Thus, analysis was conducted on the extracted data using presupposition, intertextuality, interdiscursivity and speech act theory as tools of inquiry. The general finding that emerged was: while there were significant concepts extracted from the source documents (mainly from that of the UN) into national documents like the NRSSPE, GTP I, AATP and ERA's RSAM, the adoptions were mostly partial, vague or just rhetorical; unlike what was suggested in the source documents and adopted into the national road safety strategy documents and guidelines, practices of addressing the problem were traditional. This is similar to Kimberlee's (2008) finding about UK's school-based road safety initiatives that were expressed as "rarely extend beyond the 'tokenistic'".

The NRSSPE, the road safety policy/strategy document in Ethiopia, was formulated based on the *safe systems approach* to road safety, the approach found in best practice countries' road safety knowledge and practices. That the *UN Global Plan Guideline* was mentioned by name indicates that it was used as a source when formulating the Ethiopian road safety policy; other documents like that of WHO, UNECA, and UNRSC were also incorporated. Considering the gravity of the problem and the necessity of timely intervention, formulating evidence-based strategy/policy document was so crucial; however, several gaps in relation to the document have been revealed.

The NRSSPE put the recommended *safe systems approach* in a somehow similar way as was documented in the sources, claiming the approach was for adoption by all UN member countries *regardless of their level of road safety performance*. However, the source document stated that it was only to be adopted flexibly, recontextualizing it to each country's situations and priorities. The most serious problem was not the duplication, but that it was not exercised properly: a big disparity was observed between what was stated in the document (the knowledge base) and what was performed (the practice). For example, collaboration among RSSs taking the problem as multisectoral and interdisciplinary was recommended; however, there was not any collaboration among RSSs in Ethiopia.

The problem was not just disparity between the general framework and the practice; there was partial/vague recontextualization of some of the salient elements of the approach when included

into the Ethiopian context. A case analysis was conducted to examine the difference, focusing on the *five pillars* countries were encouraged to implement and their recontextualization in Ethiopia. The NRSSPE did not have gaps with regard to incorporating the pillars; it has put each with detailed performance indicators of the past and how they would be implemented during the plan period. However, there were significant gaps when details of the source were examined, as it was revealed from the analysis on contents of a brochure that put the pillars with their enactment.

Generally, the brochure included all the pillars, but it was in a partial, vague or distorted way, to the extent of neglecting some key points referred to in the source documents. For example, while Pillar 2 was about *safer roads and mobility that deals with road development, the safety of all road users, especially pedestrians and other vulnerable users*, the brochure put it as *constructing roads with safety standards*, taking only a part of what was in the source document, and thus, distorting the very concept expressed there. Making the road safe for all, but particularly for the vulnerable road users was underscored. However, the brochure did not mention anything about the vulnerable. If we study the road infrastructure, we would not find it user friendly. The roads were not readable; they lacked the signs and marks that users could read easily. They also belonged to many others apart from the traffic; they were mostly occupied by mobility blocking stuff like parking vehicles, street vendors and their customers. Above all, as was depicted in the brochure, we could observe that safety of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users was significantly neglected.

The same was true with Pillars 3 (Safe vehicles), 4 (Road user Behavior) and 5 (Post crash care). Ensuring standard, entry and exist of vehicles (Pillars 3) is so poor in Ethiopia; for example, forged vehicle quality assurance certificate could be found from the black market. While road use behavior (Pillars 4) was an area of major work performance, the focus was on mass media and campaign-based education, so it was of little impact. Moreover, since people could get driving licenses illegally, they would opt for that instead of joining schools formally to learn. As for enforcement, apart from bribery involving drivers and the police, it has not yet been based on registration to discover the repetitive violators so as to ban them from driving and admit to retrain. Moreover, the road and its environment was so poorly designed that it would still be so difficult to implement the kind of enforcement that could contribute to positive change.

Finally, regarding the post-crash care issue of Pillar 5, the source made it clear that a three-stage treatment of the injured was essential: *onsite care, transport, and trauma care*, but the brochure put it simply as *post-crash medical care*, making both post-crash medical care and how it could be achieved vague. Treatment of RTA victims in Ethiopia was not different from that of other patients. Most of the time, RTA victims were left untreated until a police officer arrived at the scene; hence, onsite care is not provided; emergency transport facilities are rare, and even after arriving at a health facility, victims may not be given the proper service due to cost for medical services and medicine, lack of awareness, limited resource and manpower. Until recently, EMS as an independent discipline was not provided for medical trainees in the Ethiopian Universities; moreover, third party insurance coverage is a very recent development.

Therefore, we could conclude the pillars were not addressed to the level claimed; if there was anything to mention for having been performed better, perhaps the management aspect (Pillar 1) could be first picked, although gaps of incorporating RSSs which had stakes in the safety of the transport system were seen. Again, it was Pillar 4 (road user behavior) that almost all RSSs emphasized. However, some problems could be mentioned in relation to this pillar also. Although road safety was construed as multisectoral and multidisciplinary, although concerted effort of GIs and NGOs targeting the five pillars was claimed in road safety (policy) documents and education/promotion materials, the framing of road users as the main causes/contributors of the problem, and thus the claim for targeting their road use practices was so dominant. However, road safety work that emphasizes road users alone is labeled as individualistic/traditional approach to road safety.

In line with international road safety discourses that were depicted in the UN/WHO documents, RSSs' collaboration was called for in almost all the written road safety discourses in Ethiopia. Thus, the three documents analyzed (the NRSSPE, ERA's RSM and the AATP) stated the need for collaboration of GIs, NGOs and the public for the road safety work. In NRSSPE, the word *collaboration* and its synonyms (*integration, coordination, collaboration* and *partnership*) were used repeatedly, implying the firm position held when the road safety strategy was formulated. The AACA also enacted a proclamation establishing safety councils that would be comprised of various sectors, again strengthening the claim made nationally. However, the practice did not include any private sector or civic organization; moreover, the public's role in road safety efforts

was not recognized practically although safety concerns them as main users and victims of the road traffic system.

The data from interviews conducted with key RSSs did not have any different voice from what was stated in the documents; *collaboration, integration, coordination, partnership* of the various players was called for, but RSSs of GIs only were given the floor for engagement. Moreover, the stakeholders that were given the floor for participation were *identified, nominated* by the top/key safety players; thus, these identified/nominated RSSs were *expected* to *participate, engage, integrate* in the work as per the expectations set for them. It was thus more in the form of submission than deliberation that they would involve in the road safety work. In other words, only key RSSs of GIs governed the safety work; this indicates that power was contributing against a positive road safety performance in the country.

Stakeholders from the private sectors had counter discourses against practices of the key RSSs of GIs, particularly regarding the management aspect and approaches of addressing the problem. They agreed on the need for *collaboration* among RSSs, but they found the practice as mainly held by the police. They said the police were busy investigating RTA cases while they should have emphasized prevention, by *facilitating, improving* and *enabling*. Moreover, they found them lacking the budget and resources that could have enabled them to discharge their duties efficiently. Their position was confirmed from observed practices of the police; the police could not be found everywhere; they did not have enough vehicles for patrolling; they did not have the technology to conduct alcohol test; they did not have camera to check speeding, etc. The only practical effort of the police to address the problem was their engagement in punishing drivers for every reason, a practice that had resulted in further rule violation that could have contributed to the exacerbation of RTAs. According to some RSSs of PSs, RSSs of GIs preferred addressing the majority road users (pedestrians in particular) via safety lessons/messages, a practice which they did not appreciate; instead, they insisted on a focus on drivers. If change were to come soon, they believed the work should address drivers which were fewer in number and simpler to reach.

Generally, the key RSSs' preference for only some of the pillars, and their disregard for the others must have affected the overall road safety performance of the country. Most road users' risky road use practices or their resistance in complying with the basic traffic rules could be associated with the gap observed in addressing all the pillars with matching degrees of emphasis;

when they felt the system was disregarding their needs due to its slanted approach to safety, road users could have involved in practices that resulted in the poor road safety performance of the country.

Therefore, the claim regarding *integration, collaboration, coordination, partnership* among RSSs was not based on adequate understanding of the safe systems approach adopted or on an earnest readiness to implementing it. As a result, the execution of the approach that was advocated for its effectiveness elsewhere was very much impaired in Ethiopia. Anything realized was more of rhetorical than practical; vague, partial and even contradictory referencings to and practices of the approach were common. Moreover, except for complying with whatever was done by the key stakeholders, we could not see any significant involvement of the majority RSSs which were called for *integration* or *collaboration*; except RSSs of GIs, RSSs of PSs and individuals did not have the room for contributing their share. Most of all, the vulnerable road users, the main victims of road crashes, were totally excluded from practices that concerned them. It could thus be concluded that this practice contributed for the road safety problem of the country to persist.

5.2.3 Road safety stakeholders' constructions of the self and of others

In order to see how RSSs who were supposed to work in collaboration evaluate their own and others' contributions to road safety, the study has examined participants' constructions of the self and of others; of course that was supported by observation. According to the approach to road safety based on the safe systems theory, a key advantage of addressing the problem as multisectoral and multidisciplinary and adopting the philosophy of *shared responsibility* was so that each RSS could recognize its contribution to the prevalence or otherwise of the problem and take measures accordingly. Thus, regarding RSSs' collaboration and/or sharing of responsibility, the question that was to be addressed was: How do RSSs position themselves and others in relation to the role they have to alleviating the road safety problem in Ethiopia?

Hence, two of the three dimensions central to the constructive effects of discourse, social identities and social relations, were emphasized in this section while systems of knowledge and beliefs was the focus of analysis in conceptualization and recontextualization of road safety knowledge/practices. Social identity in the discourse of road safety refers to how RSSs and RUs

identify and position themselves in relation to their role as road safety practitioners or road users whereas social relations refers to how RSSs and RUs construct relations with or act towards others whom they were supposed to work with through their discourses.

According to Fairclough (1989, 1992) speakers/writers operate from specific discursive practices originating in special interests/aims which involve inclusions and exclusions. Thus, participants representing the three groups (GIs, PSs and RUs), when they expressed how they discharged their tasks, had all positive self-presentation; they mostly identified and positioned themselves as key contributors in the efforts of ensuring road safety in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the same stakeholders constructed others in the road system (practitioners and/or users) as *irresponsible* and hence aggravators of the problem. Therefore, instead of recognizing others as their partners that were working with them for the same goal, one constructed the other unfavorably, using negative expressions like *inefficient, negligent, ignorant, irresponsible, reckless* and *careless*.

The positive self-construction could sometimes be overgeneralized; the RSSs could frame members of their group as a whole favorably. For example, of all RSSs of GIs, the NRSC, FPC and ETA were given prominence; that means, *road safety management, enforcement* and *education* were framed as the most successful areas of all road safety works in Ethiopia over the past decade. They planned to focus on these areas for the future also. RSSs of GIs had also constructed positively only a sub-group under their larger group; for example, they construed the police as best of all GIs in addressing the safety problem. This could be related to their notion and/or interest of solving the country's road safety problem primarily by controlling and/or disciplining.

In the participants' constructions of the negative-others, although we could sometimes find them positioning other players in general as aggravators of the safety problem, it was only a specific group that they blamed most. For example, professional drivers were constructed as the most responsible of all; public transporters (taxi drivers in particular) and those working in the construction industry (particularly young Sinotruck drivers) were the main stakeholders to have been framed as causes/contributors to RTA prevalence. Quoting Umberson (1987), Nazif (2011) stated that "certain family roles (marriage and having children) are significantly associated to the promotion of health behavior which ultimately affects mortality," and showed relations between

social capital and risk taking. Hence, young drivers were blamed for speeding, overloading, and misbehaving in their interactions with enforcers and other road users in the traffic system. They also were blamed for involving in risky driving only to satisfy their drive for making more money. Since their income usually depended on how much they made per day or per trip, they could be motivated to work for longer hours and to overload, sometimes taking *khat* and other drugs to avoid drowsiness; hence, these practices would increase their chance of getting involved in RTAs and would worsen their effect if they were to happen. Moreover, for the risky driving of professional drivers, the pressure coming from owners of the vehicles they drove was another reason; vehicle owners were constructed as excessively driven to making more money to pay back soon the loans of their investment in the transport sector and/or to maximize profit; that could be a cause for RTAs to occur.

Pedestrians in Addis Ababa were positioned as *reckless* users of the road traffic system; they were constructed as: crossing the road anywhere they wished even when they were using their phones; travelling in lanes that were meant for vehicles; taking their right side while they should have been on their left; jumping guardrails into highways while they should have used overbridges or zebra crossings; etc. Pedestrians did not deny these accusations, but they believed they were not given the room they needed for their safe mobility. Compared to lanes for vehicles, most pavements in the city were not comfortable for pedestrians to walk on; for example, the roads could be asphalted whereas the pavements were made of cobblestone, or there were no pavements constructed at all. Again, mobility blocking objects/people like construction and/or commercial materials, street vendors and their customers that pushed pedestrians to using lanes of vehicles could be found on pavements. That the available crosswalks were at long distances, and that they sometimes could not be seen clearly had its own contribution for the improper road use practices of pedestrians. Similarly, that crossing bridges could not be found at short intervals or at places where there were many pedestrians to cross could have contributed to risky practices of crossing highways. The fact that highways divided villagers who lived for decades in close proximity/interaction was another factor; for every reason, people would cross them taking risks. As WHO (2013, p.7) stated, “the safe system approach provides a basis for low- and middle-income countries to avoid mistakes that were made by a number of high-income countries that designed roads mainly with motor vehicles in mind, and without adequate attention to pedestrian

needs.” It could thus be concluded that the road traffic system did not incorporate mobility needs of pedestrians, and that was the main factor for them to engage in risky road use practices.

Moreover, RSSs of PSs and road users, taxi drivers in particular, constructed the police unfavorably. While RSSs of PSs constructed them as if they were poorly capacitated with manpower and logistics (vehicles for patrolling, camera to control speeding and other traffic rule violations, and breathalyzers to control drink driving), road users found them as if they were running after their own benefits, by getting involved in bribery rather than working for the smooth flow of the traffic.

The stakeholders did not only position themselves as key contributors to the safety of the road system; they sometimes admitted the work that they did not accomplish at all. In so doing, they would express their readiness to commit themselves to road safety work in the future. The pledges/promises RSSs expressed in engaging in practices they did not yet perform could also have been strategies they employed not to take the blame. In Ethiopia, while the structure for sharing the road safety work was in place, there was not any legal culpability taken if a GI or a PS did not accomplish its share of the task, or if it contributed to the worsening of the problem. Hence, whether the RSSs admitted the tasks they did not accomplish or not would not make any difference. Vision Zero claims, “the designers of the system are always ultimately responsible for the design, operations and use of the road transport system and are thereby responsible for the level of safety within the entire system” (Johansson, 2009); however, only individual road users, particularly drivers, were held accountable in Ethiopia. This could clearly indicate the power imbalance regarding whom to hold responsible and the consequences thereof.

Mismatches between claims and practices were common with all the RSSs, and attempts were made to investigate how they arose. For road users’ involvement in improper road use practices, the reason was not just lack of knowledge (education) or legal frameworks (enforcement), but it could also be due to absence facilities they needed in the road network; as it was stated, the road and its environment did not properly accommodate pedestrians’ needs for mobility and road side residents’ needs for survival. Moreover, professional drivers had complaints against practices of some police officers; instead of accepting them as responsible colleagues of theirs working for the safety of the traffic system, taxi drivers in particular believed that some police officers had an

exaggerated interest to punishing them. They admitted their involvement in traffic rule violations for some economic or passenger or vehicle owner related reasons, but the police were not ready to understand them. Thus drivers did not want to see (or to be seen by) the police, construing them as if they were in the streets only to intimidate or punish them rather than to ensure safe mobility of the traffic.

Sometimes, this hostile relationship was exacerbated by bribery involving the two parties; some police officers were constructed as if they were not ready to react to some rule violating drivers due to the special relationship they had with them, whereas others were constructed as appearing accidentally in the street from where they hid only to stop taxi drivers and fine them for whatever reason (and reasons were abundant). Taxi drivers had to understand their intention and offer them some bribe in order not to get the fine tickets. Hence, while enforcement was to ensure traffic safety, it was used for personal gains. This could partly be the reason why taxi drivers find it difficult to accept enforcement positively; it would instead lead them to get involved in other traffic rule violations, like speeding or driving under the cover of other vehicles (not to be seen and caught red-handed) and over boarding (to compensate for the amount lost by the fine tickets); all these would increase the likelihood for RTAs to occur, and would worsen the pain if they did. Therefore, as it was claimed, although the role of education and enforcement was so significant, their execution needed to have been scrutinized for their appropriateness.

RSSs of PSs like driver training schools, transport service providing firms and road engineering consultants did not seem to have adequate understanding of the current knowledge and practices that could have improved road safety (for most of them were advocates of the individual road user approach rather than the safe systems approach), but they could have played a key role if they were given the opportunity to discharge their duties in cooperation. Driver training institutions, for example, claimed to have been the first to introduce some contents of the curriculum for safer driving, contents which were scaled up for national application. The concept and practice of training drivers with the *defensive driver training package* as best strategy to curbing RTAs also was advocated more by RSSs of PSs than by RSSs of GIs. Again, trainers had the idea of targeting drivers (more than the huge number of pedestrians) as one effective way for road safety awareness creation although it was not accepted/appreciated by RSSs of GIs. RSSs of GIs would usually complain about driver training schools; they believed the schools

were responsible for RTA prevalence providing insufficient training and getting involved in corrupt practices. The schools on their part constructed RSSs of GIs as lacking the proper road safety knowledge, coordination or management skill and commitment to reducing RTAs significantly. Absence of a formal floor for involvement of RSSs of PSs could have been the reason for the unfavorable constructions of one another. If RSSs of PSs had been involved in national, regional and/or local road safety councils or committees, they could contribute their share to the safety of the road system; moreover, the forum could be used for corrective actions if any of them were working irresponsibly.

The current procedure of certifying drivers was the other issue constructed as an aggravator of RTAs in Ethiopia. This approach provided the opportunity for the would-be-drivers to get certified with the maximum level permit although they were immature or inexperienced. Hence, young drivers certified via this procedure were constructed as reckless and as if they were facing anguish in prisons due to their involvement in crashes that caused people's death or injury. In the construction of the new driver training procedure, RSSs of PIs not only blamed RSSs of GIs who were responsible for endorsing the procedure, they also associated the problem with absence of space for the involvement of responsible RSSs. The 2009 Road Transport and Traffic Control Regulation that the Council of the AACAA favorably voted to ratify could be a case in point; the Government's attempt to implement it after seven years as of 22 February 2016 failed due to resistance it faced; hitting a massive strike, taxi drivers in the city expressed their opposition to its execution; one of the reasons they provided was that they were not given the room for participating in the process of formulating the regulation. The government expressed its readiness to revise both the driver licensing procedure and the transport and traffic regulation.

In conclusion, against their claim for a collaborative road safety work, RSSs of GIs did not want to share the space with concerned RSSs and road users. Contrary to the safe systems approach they adopted, they aspired to continue with the traditional/individual road user approach, by strengthening enforcement and education which were positioned as best ways of addressing the road safety problem. The other key pillars were almost forgotten, although they might have been mentioned here and there. This was due to their interest in staying with the hegemonic power of controlling everything they held. Perhaps this was the reason for RSSs of GIs to have been constructed unfavorably by almost all the RSSs and road users; most importantly, it was the main

reason for the insignificant impact of the road safety work or for the prevalence of RTA in Ethiopia. Resistance discourse against this dominant practice seemed to have emerged, but it was not as such strong enough to challenge effectively the hegemonic practice and to cause change; however, for the road safety culture to flourish and to curb the prevalent RTAs and their impact in the country, it needs to be strengthened urgently.

5.3 Implications of the Study

In this study, I have used social constructionism as a theory of knowledge, a theory which, unlike positivism, does not assume existence of knowledge in an objective world; instead, it recognizes knowledge as constructed by people. Particularly for the road safety problem, which demands involvement of stakeholders from a variety of sectors and disciplines, constructions of road safety by the different players of different conceptualizations needed to have been investigated so as to understand and address the problem better. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that the best way to investigate the problem was by analyzing RSSs' constructions of the problem, situating it in the context of systems theory that positions safety as a product of multiple elements operating in a complex environment and with shared responsibility. This was related to Vision Zero's conceptualization of road safety which not only claims responsibility sharing among the players, but also asserts the system should be adapted to psychological and physical conditions and limitations of human beings. Systems approach is a reaction against the simplistic or individualistic approach that positioned road users alone at responsibility for the safety problem and that targeted the same (road users) for intervention (Larsson, Dekker & Tingvall, 2010).

The available literature, although not abundance, confirms suitability of constructionist theories in social and/or institutional contexts where people would construct their versions of knowledge and practices in their real encounters. In the western world, the theory (and method of analysis) of CDA was employed in relation to vision zero to road safety discourse. However, applicability of these theories in low-income countries like Ethiopia where the social/cultural, political and economic contexts are totally different has not been explored yet. In light of the safe systems theoretical foundation which the Ethiopian road safety policy and practices claimed to have been based on, this project attempted to unpack how RSSs and RUs operating and/or using the road system of the country construed the road safety knowledge/practices they were engaged in. In

other words, discourses of the RSSs were analyzed, employing Fairclough's CDA, a theory with its elaborated discussion on how it could be applied in language oriented social research.

From the theoretical perspective, findings of this study, the revealing of social ills associated with the road safety knowledge and practices, could be taken as evidence for the applicability of the theory in the analysis of the road safety problem. By using CDA, the struggle between the traditional/hegemonic/individualistic approach to road safety and the recommended notion of road safety as a shared responsibility of RSSs and RUs was revealed. It was confirmed that despite presence of some introduction of the approach in policy documents, key RSSs' interest in taking it up seriously in actual practices was so insignificant; instead, they preferred to continue with the traditional approach that offered the few (the police and road/transport authorities) with the social and political power of owning/leading the work all by themselves, holding RUs alone as culpable for the RTAs they would experience. Since counter discourses were so weak, and those promoting the traditional approach were with supported by their historical/hegemonic position, the power imbalance was a factor playing against strengthening the newly introduced/emerging discourse. Unless the road safety knowledge and practices that blamed and targeted RUs alone was averted, it seems that the problem in the country would continue consuming lives, limbs and resources, and holding its victims responsible for the worst experience they were suffering. This was revealed as a result of employing the theory of CDA.

The research methods employed in this study and the way they were combined were not new. However, the method of analysis was unique in the analysis of the interview data in particular; it started with identifying relevant sections of interview transcripts taken from relevant parts of the corpus and continued analyzing each extract within its context of use. Hence, while the criteria for selecting extracts was mainly the social problem under scrutiny (the road safety problem), the analysis was largely language oriented; while "textual analysis can focus on just a selected few features of texts, or many features simultaneously" (Fairclough, 2003, p.6), I preferred the first, selecting a few features of a text at a time and analyzing them in-depth focusing on the issue under investigation. This helped me be on track, i.e., on the social problem I raised, for, if I were preoccupied with just the linguistic features, I would have lost the problem which I had planned to address. Hence, this could be taken as a methodological contribution that this project has made.

The conceptualization of road safety as multisectoral and multidisciplinary and the proposal for addressing the problem accordingly, and the sharing of responsibility between system designers and system users presupposes necessity of shared understanding and owning of the problem. To this end, communication among stakeholders plays a pivotal role. It is the shared discourse that could lead to consensus. If discourses of various RSSs are not given room, the grassroots along with the top, policy makers with practitioners and users, ownership of the new knowledge being introduced would be very much unlikely even if its positive impact were well predicted.

A significant share of the Ethiopian road safety problem could be ascribed to the absence of appropriate forum for RSSs to discuss issues related with conceptualization of the problem and ways of addressing it. Some players prefer to continue with their historical/hegemonic position being in favor of the traditional approach to safety; however, the real power to cause change should have been political commitment to the approach from above, and the public's resistance against traditional practices from the bottom. Thus, while formulating a road safety policy could be one huge step taken by the government, for its effective execution, the space should have been given for private sectors, interest groups and road users to have been actively involved.

Moreover, since the philosophy of shared responsibility expects each RSS to discharge its share, and since it states culpability for the part that each RSS has not performed, it is possible to push RSSs to change once they are made aware of what was expected of them. This could be handled by employing a critical check and balance by an independent institution with very strong support of dedicated political leaders. In this regard, findings of this study would suggest the following:

First, a broader conceptualization of road safety is mandatory. While the notion of road safety as the safety of the road and its environment, the vehicle, and the road user is fundamental, it needs to incorporate cultural, historic-geographic, and economic realities of the population in general and that of pedestrians and roadside residents in particular. Therefore, construction/rehabilitation of roads should be in line with these realities. Moreover, urban design, housing and construction need to put into consideration the survival/mobility demands of dwellers and pedestrians; it is also necessary to redesign urban areas in such a way that promotes healthy/safe mobility.

Another important element regarding road safety is involvement of all RSSs and road users in the practices of ensuring road safety. This is fundamental, be it for road safety knowledge

transfer or for collective decision on how the problem could be addressed better. Thus, GIs, NGOs, PSs, civic organizations and individuals need to engage in both the collective and independent efforts of ensuring safety. The larger RUs need to be aware of their duties and that of the RSSs. As WHO firmly expressed, commitment of the political wing is essential. Again, there must be both culpability for the failure and encouragement for the success of each RSS's effort. As it is applied in the form of fines when road users violate traffic rules, there should also be some ways of holding liable RSSs for any failure they might exhibit from discharging their duties.

The vulnerable road users (pedestrians and passengers) are the main victims of the road transport system in Ethiopia, and this necessitates raising the issue of social equity. Thus, the government is responsible for curbing the problem by, firstly, facilitating a healthier and safer traffic system, and secondly, covering medical cost and basic necessities of RTA victims and their families. In order for the vulnerable road users pressure RSSs work for the safety of the road system meaningfully, they need to have the knowledge providing them in the face to face mode and assisted by the media and other communication outlets. To strengthen this effort, interest groups comprised of academia, opinion leaders, RTA victims and their families, etc. could be established.

Road users are the most significant section of the road transport system. While it is fundamental to develop healthy (and environment friendly) mobility (like walking and cycling), it is important to limit vehicle travel speed to the level unexpected crashes could cause no more than temporary injury. This could affect economic development and faster mobility, but it is possible to base the speed limit on population distribution, hence making the limit stricter in urban than rural areas.

5.4 Suggestions for Future Research

The focus of this research has been RSSs' and RUs' conceptualizations of road safety and their constructions of how they engaged in efforts of addressing the problem. While findings of the study could significantly contribute to shaping RSSs' efforts of ensuring road safety, several gaps could also be observed to be addressed in the future's research on the same problem.

First, this project focused on only some of the many stakeholders that have significant stakes of the issue, although they were selected based on their historical role and natural presence as

practitioners on and users of the road system. Therefore, a number of other stakeholders could be studied independently and/or jointly but in depth. Of the key players that should urgently be addressed in the future's road safety study could be RTA survivors and family members of those who lost their lives due to RTAs. Investigating the way these people see the problem and ways of addressing it would not only contribute to the future's intervention, but it could also suggest what should be done for RTA survivors and for people who lost their loved ones due to RTAs.

Moreover, road safety related practices of MoH and MoE need thorough exploration, the first for how EMSs are being offered for RTA victims, and the second for how road safety related lessons are prepared and offered. The stakeholders addressed in this project and others which were not included could also be explored for deeper understanding of their functioning and for providing better recommendation that could help improve their road safety performances.

In order to properly address the road safety problem, while contribution of researches based on sociological/cultural approach is significant, they should be supported with timely statistical data and RTA trends found through the scientific approach. Therefore, researches that focus on trend, distribution, causes and magnitudes of RTAs need to be conducted on a regular basis. While social/cultural context driven conceptualization of the problem and intervention is mandatory, it could succeed only if it is backed up and based on accurate and up to date RTA data.

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Appendix A (Interview and observation guide questions)

I. In-depth Interview Guiding Questions

a. Guiding Questions for Road Safety Experts/Professionals/Officers Working in Different Organization

1. Personal Details of the Interviewee

1. Organization you work at:
2. Present position [and for how long have you been at this position]:
3. Earlier work experience at the Organization:
4. Other experience and practices [where/ for how long]:
5. What specific duties, roles and responsibilities do you have in the organization?

2. Guiding questions (for elaborated responses)

1. What does road safety mean to you?
2. What would you say about road traffic accident related death, injuries and resource damage?
3. How do you understand the road (traffic) safety issue in Ethiopia? Do you think road traffic unsafety is a problem that deserves that attention in Ethiopia?
4. What do you think are the vary causes of the prevalence of road traffic accidents in Ethiopia? Would you please elaborate them?
5. How do you evaluate other road users' (drivers, pedestrians, passengers) knowledge about road traffic unsafety and the level of the problem?
6. As a professional/expert working on road (traffic) safety, what could you say about the issue's development over the past decade? How does your organization position the road traffic safety issue in Ethiopia and contribute to decrease road traffic accidents? Why?
7. How do you understand the different road (traffic) safety documents at your organization? What do they originate from? How do you make use of them in your daily duties?
8. How much do you think the road safety documents address the actual safety problem at hand? How do you evaluate them?

9. Would you please discuss if there are any road (traffic) safety issues that the documents do not address very well or overlooked but are practically important?
10. Which RTS stakeholder do you think is discharging its responsibility efficiently? Why?
11. What do you think should be the most important focal areas of road traffic safety efforts in Ethiopia?
12. How much do you think the road traffic accident reports you hear everyday picture the realities on ground?
13. Considering the level of the problem, how do you evaluate the road safety efforts in Ethiopia? What problems have you observed in the efforts of decreasing road traffic accident fatalities, injuries and resource damage?
14. What makes your organization different from others working on road traffic safety? What makes it similar to others working on road safety?
15. Do you think safe road use information is being communicated among the RTS stakeholders and the public at large? Please elaborate it.
16. How do you evaluate road users' road traffic safety knowledge and practice? Do you think they are well aware of the level of the problem and prevention mechanisms?
17. How do you evaluate road safety stakeholders' knowledge about the level of the problem and policy strategies to decreasing it?
18. How do you evaluate the collaboration between your organization and other stakeholders working on road traffic safety? What specific strengths have you observed? What weaknesses have you observed?
19. Would you please tell me in detail if you have observed any gaps of communication/language use that doesn't have significance to decrease (or even could worsen) the road traffic accident problem?

General questions

20. How do you see the upcoming five-ten years' road traffic safety development in Ethiopia? What challenges do you expect? What opportunities could you see? What area do you think need to get focused?
21. If there is anything you would like to raise we have not yet mentioned or want to stress on an issue we have been discussing so far, please?

b. Interview Question Guide for Road Users (drivers, pedestrians, and road accident victims)

1. Personal Details of the Interviewee [I could fill them, not necessarily to ask]

1. Interviewee's Sex: (male / female)
2. Interviewee's Age:
3. Interviewee's Address:
4. Interviewee's Group: (driver / pedestrian / road accident victim)
5. How long in years as a (driver / pedestrian / road accident victim)?

2. Guiding questions (for elaborated responses)

1. What does road safety mean to you?
2. What would you say about the road traffic accident related death, injuries and resource damages in Ethiopia?
3. How do you understand the road (traffic) safety issue in Ethiopia? Do you think road traffic unsafety is a problem that deserves that attention in Ethiopia? How would you describe your road traffic accident experiences, if any?
4. What do you think are the vary causes of the prevalence of road traffic accidents in Ethiopia? Would you please elaborate them?
5. How do you evaluate other road users' (drivers, pedestrians, passengers) knowledge about the level of the problem?
6. What do you know about the country's road traffic safety policy/ strategy?
7. Who do you think is responsible for the road related problems in Ethiopia? Who should take the lead responsibility to curb them? Why?
8. Which RTS stakeholder(s) is/are discharging its/their responsibility efficiently? Why do you say so?
9. How much do you use road traffic safety information/lessons you might get from the media or other means?
10. How much do you personally contribute to decrease road traffic accidents and to maintain road safety in Ethiopia?
11. What do you think should be the most important focal areas of road traffic safety efforts in Ethiopia? What problems have you observed in the efforts of decreasing road traffic accident fatalities, injuries and resource damage?

12. Assuming you hear/read road accident reports at least occasionally, how much do you think these reports picture the realities on ground?
13. Considering the level of the problem, how do you evaluate the road safety efforts in Ethiopia?
14. Do you think safe road use information is being communicated among the public? How do you personally get road safety information and knowledge?
15. Would you please tell me in detail if you have observed any gaps of communication/language use that doesn't have significance to decrease (or even could worsen) the road traffic accident problem?
16. How do you evaluate your road traffic safety knowledge and practice? Do you think you are well aware of the level of the problem and prevention mechanisms? Why? To what extent do you put your knowledge into practice?
17. How do you evaluate other road safety stakeholders' knowledge about the level of the problem and policy strategies to decreasing it?
18. How do you evaluate the cooperation between you and other road users toward road safety? What specific strengths and weaknesses have you observed?

General questions

19. How do you see the upcoming five-ten years' road traffic safety development in Ethiopia? What challenges do you expect? What opportunities could you see? What area do you think need to get focused?
20. If there is anything you would like to raise we have not yet mentioned or want to stress on an issue we have been discussing so far, please?

ለጥናቱ መረጃ ለመስብሰብ ዝርዝር ቃለመልልስ ለማድረግ የሚረዱ መሪ ጥያቄዎች

ሀ. በልዩ ልዩ መስሪያ ቤቶች በኃላፊነት ደረጃ ላሉ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ባለድርሻ አካላት የተዘጋጀ መጠይቅ

1. ቃለ-መልልስ አድራጊው ግለሰብ አጠቃላይ መረጃ፤

1. መስሪያ ቤትዎ፡-
2. የሥራ ኃላፊነትዎ (እና በዚህ ደረጃ ለምን ያህል ጊዜ ሲያገለግሉ ቆዩ)፡-
3. በመስሪያ ቤትዎ የቀድሞ የሥራ ልምድዎ፡-
4. በሌላ ሥፍራ ሌላ የሥራ ልምድ ካለዎ (የትና ለምን ያህል ጊዜ)፡-
5. በመስሪያ ቤትዎ በተለይ የእርስዎን ተግባር ሚናና ኃላፊነት ቢነግሩኝ፡-

2. የተብራራ ምላሽ ለማግኘት ሲባል የሚነሱ መሪ ጥያቄዎች

1. ለርስዎ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ማለት ምን ማለት ነው?
2. በመንገድ ትራፊክ ምክንያት ስለሚከሰቱት የሞት፣ የአካል መጉደልና የንብረት መውደም አደጋዎች ምን ይላሉ?
3. የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ሁኔታ እንዴት ይረዳታል? የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት እጦት በኢትዮጵያ ያን ያህል ትኩረት የሚፈልግ ችግር ነው ብለው ያምናሉ? ለምን?
4. በኢትዮጵያ ለሚታዩት/ሚከሰቱት የትራፊክ አደጋዎች ምክንያት/ምንጭ ናቸው የሚሉአቸውን ነገሮች በዝርዝር ቢያስረዱኝ?
5. ሌሎች የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች (አሽከርካሪዎች፣ እግረኞች፣ ተሳፋሪዎች) ስለመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነትና ስለችግሩ ደረጃ ያላቸውን ግንዛቤ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል?
6. የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ላይ የሚሰሩ ባለሙያ እንደመሆንዎ በኢትዮጵያ ይህ ጉዳይ ባለፈው አስር ዓመት ውስጥ ያሳየውን ለውጥ እንዴት ያዩታል? የእርስዎ መስሪያ ቤት የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ጉዳይ እንዴት ያስቀምጠዋል? የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋዎችን በመቀነሱ ረገድ ምን ያህል አስተዋጽኦ እያደረገ ነው ይላሉ?
7. በእርስዎ መስሪያ ቤት ያሉትን ልዩ ልዩ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት መመሪያዎች እንዴት ይረዱአቸዋል? ምን መነሻ አላቸው? በእለት ከእለት ሥራዎስ እንዴት ነው የሚጠቀሙባቸው?
8. እርስዎ የመንገድ ደኅንነት መመሪያዎቹ ተጨባጩን የደኅንነት ችግር ምን ያህል እየደረሱ ነው ብለው ይገምታሉ? እንዴት ይገመግሙአቸዋል?
9. መመሪያዎቹ በሚገባ ያላካተቱአቸው ወይም የዘነጉአቸው ነገር ግን በተግባር ጠቃሚ ናቸው የሚሉአቸው የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ጉዳዮች ካሉ ቢያብራሩልኝ?
10. የትኛው የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ባለድርሻ አካል ነው ኃላፊነቱን በሚገባ እየተወጣ ነው ብለው የሚያምኑት? ለምን?

11. በኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ሥራ እርስዎ ወሳኝ ናቸው በሚሉአቸው በምን በምን ዙሪያ ማተኮር አለበት ይላሉ?
12. በየዕለቱ የሚሰሙአቸው የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሪፖርቶች የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ዕውነታ ምን ያህል ያንጸባርቃሉ ብለው ያስባሉ?
13. በኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ማስፈን ጥረቶችን ችግሩ ካለበት ደረጃ አንጻር እንዴት ይገመግሙአቸዋል? የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሞት፣ አካል ጉዳትና የሐብት ውድመትን በመቀነስ ጥረት ውስጥ ምን ምን ችግሮችን አስተውለዋል?
14. የእርስዎን መስሪያ ቤት በመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ዙሪያ ከሚሰሩ ሌሎች ምን ልዩ ያደርገዋል? ምንስ ያመሳስለዋል?
15. የሰላማዊ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም መረጃ በባለድርሻዎቹ አካላትና በኅብረተሰቡ መካከል እየተላለፈ ነው ይላሉ? እንዴት?
16. የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎችን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት እውቀትና ልምድ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል? ችግሩ ስለደረሰበት ደረጃና የመከላከያ ዘዴዎች በቂ ግንዛቤ አላቸው ብለው ያምናሉ? ለምን?
17. የመንገድ ደኅንነት ባለድርሻ አካላት ችግሩ ስለደረሰበት ደረጃና ለመቀነስ ስለተቀመጡት የፖሊሲ አቅጣጫዎች ያላቸውን እውቀት እርስዎ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል?
18. በእርስዎ መስሪያ ቤት እና በመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ዙሪያ በሚሰሩ ሌሎች ባለድርሻ አካላት መካከል ያለውን ትብብር እንዴት ይገመግሙታል? ምን ምን ጥንካሬዎችን አስተውለዋል? ምን ምን ድክመቶችን?
19. ለመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ መቀነስ ፋይዳ የሌለው ወይም ለማባባስ አስተዋጽኦ አለው የሚሉት አነጋገር፣ አቀራረብ ወይም የቁዋንቁዋ አጠቃቀም ካለ ቢያብራሩልኝ?

አጠቃላይ ጥያቄዎች

20. የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ደረጃ በሚቀጥሉት አምስትና አስር አመታት የት ይደርሳል ብለው ይገምታሉ? ምን አይነት ተግዳሮቶችን ይጠብቃሉ? እንደምን ያሉ ዕድሎችን ያያሉ? በየትኞቹ ዘርፎች ላይ ማተኮር ያስፈልጋል ይላሉ?
21. በመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ችግር ዙሪያ እስካሁን ድረስ ያላነሳነው ነገር ወይም ተነስቶም ቢሆን ሊተኮርበት የሚገባ ጉዳይ ነው የሚሉት ካለ ... ?

1. ለመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች - አሽከርካሪዎች እግረኞች እና የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሰለባዎች- የተዘጋጀ መጠይቅ

1. የቃለ-ምልልስ አድራጊው ግለሰብ አጠቃላይ መረጃ፤ /መጠየቅ የማይሹና ራሴ የምሞላቸው ጥያቄዎች አሉባቸው/

1. ጾታ፡- (ወንድ / ሴት)
2. ዕድሜ፡-
3. አድራሻ፡-
4. ምድብ (አሽከርካሪ / እግረኛ / የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሰለባ)፡-
5. ምን ያህል ጊዜ ሆነዎ በ(አሽከርካሪ / እግረኛ / የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሰለባ)ነት፡-

2. የተብራራ ምላሽ ለማግኘት ሲባል የሚነሱ መሪ ጥያቄዎች

1. ለርስዎ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ማለት ምን ማለት ነው?
2. በመንገድ ትራፊክ ምክንያት ስለሚከሰቱት የሞት፣ የአካል መጉደልና የንብረት መውደም አደጋዎች ምን ይላሉ?
3. የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ሁኔታ እንዴት ይረዱታል? የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት እጦት -የትራፊክ አደጋ መብዛት- በኢትዮጵያ ያን ያህል ትኩረት የሚፈልግ ችግር ነው ብለው ያምናሉ? የራስዎን የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ገጠመኝ - ካለዎ- እንዴት ይገልጹታል?
4. በኢትዮጵያ ለሚታዩት/ለሚከሰቱት የትራፊክ አደጋዎች ምክንያት/ምንጭ ናቸው የሚሉአቸውን ነገሮች በዝርዝር ቢያስረዱኝ?
5. ሌሎች የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች (አሽከርካሪዎች፣ እግረኞች፣ ተሳፋሪዎች) ስለመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነትና ስለችግሩ ደረጃ ያላቸውን ግንዛቤ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል?
6. እርስዎ ስለኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት አጠቃላይ ሃገራዊ ሥራ - ፖሊሲ/ስትራቴጂ - ምን ያህል ያውቃሉ?
7. ለኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ችግርና መፍትሄ እርስዎ ተቀዳሚ ኃላፊ ማነው ብለው ያምናሉ? ችግሩን በመቅረፍ ረገድ ቀዳሚውን ኃላፊነት ማን መውሰድ አለበት ይላሉ? ለምን?
8. የትኞቹ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ባለድርሻ አካላት ናቸው ኃላፊነታቸውን በሚገባ እየተወጡ ናቸው ብለው የሚያምኑት? ለምን እንዲህ አሉ?
9. በመገናኛ ብዙሀንም ሆነ በሌላ መንገድ የሚያገኙአቸውን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት መረጃዎች/ትምህርቶች ምን ያህል ይጠቀሙባቸዋል? ለምን?
10. እርስዎ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን ለመቀነስና የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነትን ለማስፈን በግልዎ ምን ያህል አስተዋጽኦ አደረጉ?
11. በኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ሥራ እርስዎ ወሳኝ ናቸው በሚሉአቸው በምን በምን ዙሪያ ማተኮር አለበት ይላሉ? የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሞት፣ አካል ጉዳትና የሐብት ውድመትን በመቀነሱ ጥረት ውስጥ ምን ምን ችግሮችን አስተውለዋል?

12. የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ሪፖርቶችን አልፎ አልፎም እንኩዋ የሚሰሙ ከሆነ፤ ሪፖርቶቹ የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ዕውነታ ምን ያህል ያንጸባርቃሉ ብለው ያስባሉ? በዚህ ረገድ ክፍተት አለ ብለው ካመኑ ተጠያቂው ማነው ይላሉ?
13. በኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ማስፈን ጥረቶችን ችግሩ ካለበት ደረጃ አንጻር እንዴት ይገመግሙአቸዋል?
14. የሰላማዊ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም መረጃ በኅብረተሰቡ መካከል እየተላለፈ ነው ይላሉ? እርስዎ በግልጽ የመንገድ ደኅንነት መረጃ እና ዕውቀት እንዴት ነው የሚያገኙት?
15. ለመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ መቀነስ ፋይዳ የሌለው ወይም ለማባባስ አስተዋጽኦ አለው የሚሉት አነጋገር፤ አቀራረብ ወይም የቁዋንቁዋ አጠቃቀም ካለ ቢያብራሩልኝ?
16. የራስዎን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት እውቀትና ልምድ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል? ችግሩ ስለደረሰበት ደረጃና የመከላከያ ዘዴዎች በቂ ግንዛቤ አለኝ ብለው ያምናሉ? ለምን? የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት እውቀትዎን በተግባር ለመተርጎም ምን ያህል ይጥራሉ?
17. ሌሎች የመንገድ ደኅንነት ባለድርሻ አካላት ችግሩ ስለደረሰበት ደረጃና ለመቀነስ ስለተቀመጡት የፖሊሲ አቅጣጫዎች ያላቸውን እውቀት እርስዎ እንዴት ይገመግሙታል? እውቀታቸውን ምን ያህል በተግባር ያውሉታል ብለው ያስባሉ?
18. በእርስዎና በሌሎች መንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች መካከል ለመንገድ ደኅንነት ሲባል የሚደረገውን ትብብር እንዴት ይገመግሙታል? በርግጥ ቅንጅታዊ አሰራር አለ ይላሉ? ምን ምን ጥንካሬዎችን አስተውለዋል? ምን ምን ድክመቶችን?

አጠቃላይ ጥያቄዎች

19. የኢትዮጵያን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ደረጃ በሚቀጥሉት አምስትና አስር አመታት የት ይደርሳል ብለው ይገምታሉ? ምን አይነት ተግዳሮቶችን ይጠብቃሉ? እንደምን ያሉ ዕድሎችን ያያሉ? በየትኞቹ ዘርፎች ላይ ማተኮር ያስፈልጋል ይላሉ?
20. በመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ችግር ዙሪያ እስካሁን ድረስ ያላነሳነው ነገር ወይም ተነስቶም ቢሆን ሊተኮርበት የሚገባ ጉዳይ ነው የሚሉት ካለ ... ?

II. Observation Guide/Checklist

Observing road users

Drivers, public transport service providers in particular:

When driving on busy streets:

Driving near/at zebra crossings:

Driving near/at traffic lights:

Driving in the presence of police officer:

Driving in the absence of police officer:

How drivers and conductors treat passengers:

Messages posted in the interiors of the vehicles:

Pedestrians:

When travelling on foot:

When crossing busy streets:

When crossing the ring road:

When/if they encounter with people whom they knew

If they engage in

If they involve in street business:

Observing the road:

Presence of road signs:

Road quality for vehicles:

Pavements for pedestrians:

Observing enforcers – the police and other transport officers:

How/if they facilitate mobility:

How they react to “traffic rule violators”:

How often/what time of the day they could be observed:

Could there be any difference in road use when they were not around?

Appendix B: Amharic Version of Interview Extracts & Media Contents used in the analysis

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.1 (a)

This document has originally been written in English.

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.17 (b)

This document has originally been written in English.

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.1-2 (a)

This document has originally been written in English.

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.11 (b)

This document has originally been written in English.

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.27-28 (c)

This document has originally been written in English.

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.46 (d)

This document has originally been written in English.

SFI2 (a)

ጠያቂ:- እና... የመንገድ ደገንነት አንዳንዴ ይባላል የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደገንነትም ይባላል(.)
የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደገንነት የመንገድ ደገንነት ምን ማለት ነው በሚለው ብንጀምርስ
መላሽ: እንግዲህ እኔ በገባኝ ደረጃ ሁለቱ እ ነገሮች መጠነኛ ልዩነት ያላቸው ይመስለኛል(.)
እ የመንገድ ደገንነት ማለት ሰፋ ያለ ሐሳብ ያለው ይመስለኛል(.) አጠቃላይ መንገዱ ወይም
050 ሰላማዊ የሆነ እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ የሆነ ኑሮ ሰላማዊ የሆነ ህይወት ከሚለው ጋር እሚቀራረብ
ነገር ሆኖ ነው ማየው የመንገድ ደገንነት ሲባል(.) እ የትራፊክ ደገንነት ስንልደሞ ከትራፊኩ
ጋር ከተንቀሳቃሹ ጋር ትራፊክ ማለት በመንገድ ላይ የሚንቀሳቀሰው ማንኛውም ነገር ማለት
ስለሆነ ከሱ ጋር የተያያዘው ማለት ነው(.) ስለዚህ የመንገድ ደገንነት ሲባል ከተንቀሳቃሹ
ከትራፊኩ ከመኪናው ከሰው ከምናምኑ ሌላ ከዛ ውጪ የሆኑ ነገሮች አደጋ የሚከሰትባቸው
055 ነገሮች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ(.) እና ያንን ሁሉ የሚያጠቃልል ሰፋ ያለ ሐሳብ ያለው ነው (.) ስለዚህ
አሁን እኛ እየሰራን ያለነው አጠቃላይ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደገንነት በሚለው ላይ ነው (.) ይህ
ማለት እንግዲህ እ ኦፍኮርስ ለዚህ የትራፊክ አደጋ እንዲደርስ አስተዋፅኦ የሚያደርጉ ነገሮች

ከትራፊክ ከተንቀሳቃሹ ውጪም ሆነው ለምሳሌ በላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንት ወይም በመሬት አጠቃቀም እ ችግር ምክንያት አደጋዎች ሊፈጥሩ ይችላሉ (.) ስለዚህ ጽንሰ ሐሳቡ ምንም 060 እንኳ እስካሁን ድረስ በዚያ ዙሪያ ላይ ይህ ነው እሚባል ስራ ተሰርቷል ብዬ ባልልም ያንን ሁሉ የሚያጠቃልል አስተሳሰብን ይዘን እኛ የምንሰራው ወደፊት በዚያ ላይ ተነስተን ነው (.) ያን ሁሉ ለማስገባት ለማስቀመጥ ነው ታሳቢ ባደረገ ሁኔታ ነው(.) የከተማ ላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንት የሃይዌይ ላንድዩዝ ማኔጅመንትን ሁሉ ባካተተ ሁኔታ ነው የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነትን ማስከበር የሚቻለው የሚል ታሳቢ ስላለን በዛ ደረጃ ነው እኛ እምናስበው (.) እና 065 እንግዲህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ማለት የዛ ሁኔታ ነው (.) ያንን አደጋዎችን ለመከላከል ወይም ደግሞ አስከፊነታቸውን ለመቀነስ ነው ስራ እየተሰራ ያለው (SFI2)

SFI2 (b)

መላሽ፡ ቅድም ለመግለጽ እንደሞከርኩት ደኅን የሆነ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ተከብሯል ወይም ሮድ ሴፍቲ ማቼሪቲ የሚሉት ዓይነት አለ(.) ያ ደርሷል ተብሎ ሚታሰበው ቅድም እንዳልኩት ተንቀሳቃሹ ትራፊክ ከማይንቀሳቀሰው የላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንቱን ጨምሮ እሱን 070 ሁሉ ኮከርዲኔትድ ያደረገ ኢንተግሬትድ የሆነ ስራ ተሰርቶ በዛ ላይ ውጤት ማምጣት ሲቻል ነው (.) በዚህ ጊዜ ነው የመንገድ ደኅንነት ተረጋግጧል ተብሎ የሚታሰበው (SFI2)

SCA12

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት የሚለውን ለመግለፅ መጀመሪያ መንገድ ማለት ምን ማለት ነው የሚለውን ነገር ማየት ያስፈልጋልና መንገድ የሚለውን ነገር ስናነሳ በተለይ ለተሽከርካሪ ተለይተው የተሰሩትን የሚያተኩር ነው (.) የከተማ ወይም የገጠር መንገድ ወይም ደሞ አውራ ጎዳና በሚል ልንለያቸው እንችላለን መንገዶቹ የተለያዩ ደረጃ አላቸው (.) ይሄንን መንገድ 075 ደህንነት መጠበቅ ስንል በዚህ መንገድ ላይ የሚጠቀሙ የተለያዩ አካላት አሉ (.) አክቹዋሊ የተለያዩ አካላት ስንል እንደኔ አስተሳሰብ እንዳንድ ነገር ነው እምወስደው አሽከርካሪም ሆኖ እሚጠቀመው ሰው ነው ደሞ እግረኛም ሆኖ እሚጠቀመው ሰው ነው ማለት ከእንስሳት ውጭ ማለት ነው(.) ስለዚህ እዚህ መንገድ ላይ የሚጠቀሙት አካላት በሙሉ በሰላም ወተው በሰላም እንዲገቡ ፕላስ መንገዱም ራሱ ከኢንጅነሪንግ ጀምሮ ነው የተሳካና የተሟላ ደህንነት ያለው 080 እንዲሆን የማድረግ ሥራ መስራት ማለት ነው ሁሉም በተለይ ደሞ ከትራፊክ ጋር ተያይዞ ትራፊክ ስንል እንቅስቃሴ ስለሆነ በመንገድ ላይ እንቅስቃሴ የሚያደርጉትን አካላት በሙሉ ደህንነት መጠበቅ የሚቻልበት ሁኔታ መፍጠር ማለት ነው (SCA12)

SPS18

ጠያቂ፡- የመንገድ ደህንነት ወይም የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት

መላሽ፡- ኦኬ እሱ ይሄ ኢኩቫለንት ይመስለኛል (.) ለምን መንገዱን ብቻውን ካወራህ ወደ
 085 እንትኑ ነው እሚመጣው መንገዱን ልትጠብቀው የመንገድ ደህንነት ካልክ መንገዱን
 ለመጠበቅ አውሮጳዊና ወይም የዛ አባል ስለኢንጅነሮቹ ወይም የመንገዱ ባለቤት የሆነ ሰው
 የመንገድ ደህንነት ቢል ይችላል(.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ካልን ግን በእንቅስቃሴ ምክን
 ያት የሚመጡትን አደጋዎች ይሆናል ብዬ ነው እኔ ትርጉሙ እንደዚህ ነው እሚገባኝ ለምን
 መንገዱን መጠበቅ አንድ ነገር ነው መንገዱን ብቻ ፎክስ ካረክ እንዳይቆፈር እንዳይበደስ
 090 እንደዚህ ነገሩን ሁሉ መከላከልን ልትጨምር ነው (.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ ከሆነ ግን አይ ቲንክ
 ይሄ ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ የሚሳተፉት እነሱንም ያካትታልና (.) አይ ቲንክ ብሮድ
 ይሆናል ብዬ አስባለሁ ካሁን በኋላ
 ጠያቂ፡- ኮምፕሬዝንሲቭ የሆነው ሁለተኛው ነው ነው
 መላሽ፡- ሁለተኛው ይመስለኛል አዎ (SPS18)

SFI4

095 መንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ስንል ቃሉን እንዲሁ በአጭሩ ማስቀመጥ ይከብዳል (.) ግን እንዲሁ ጠ
 ቅለል ባለ መልኩ ሰዎች እንቅስቃሴን ለተለያዩ ማህበራዊም ይሁኑ ኢኮኖሚያዊ (.) ኦር
 ለተለያዩ ጉዳዮች በምንቀሳቀሰበት ወቅት በእንቅስቃሴያችን መካከል የሚኖሩ በተለይ
 ከተሸከርካሪና ከመንገድ ጋር የተያያዙ አደጋዎች ነው (.) ዝም ብለን ድፍን ስናደርገው መንገድ
 መንገድ ነው (.) ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ነው (.) ደህንነቱ ደግሞ በዚያ እንቅስቃሴ መካከል በሰዎች
 100 ላይ ጉዳት እዳይደርስ በንብረት ላይ ውድመት እንዳይደርስ የሚኖር የደህንነት ጉዳይን ነው
 እምናየው (.) ያው ምን ማለት ነው ሲባል ደግሞ መንገድ ደህንነት ተጠበቀ ስንል ቅድም
 እንዳልኩት እንቅስቃሴን (.) እኛ ብቻ አይደለንም ሌላውም ይንቀሳቀሳል (.) በእንቅስቃሴ
 መካከል የሚኖሩ ግጭቶች እንዳይኖሩ ግጭት ኢን ኤ ሴንስ ከተሸከርካሪ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር
 ተሸከርካሪ ይገጨናል ወይ እኛ እንገጨዋለን ብለን ማለት ይቻላልና(.) በዚህ ምክንያት የሚፈጠሩ
 105 የመንገድ አደጋዎችን የምናይበት ስትረም ነው እንደው እንዳጠቃላይ ስናየው ማለት ነው(.) ያንን
 የደህንነቱን የማረጋገጥ ጉዳይ ወደፊት ስንገባ እናየዋለን (.) ግን እንዲሁ ጥቅል ጥሬ ቃሉን ስናየው
 ሰዎች ይንቀሳቀሳሉ (.) በዛ እንቅስቃሴ መካከል ለአደጋ በተለይ ከተሸከርካሪ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር
 የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ስለምንል ከተሸከርካሪ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር የተያያዙ በዛው ምክንያት
 የሚደርሱ አደጋዎች ጋር የተያያዙ ዘርፍ ነው ብዬ ነው እምወስደው (SFI4)

SFI3

110 መንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት እ በማንኛውም ሁኔታ ላይ የሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴዎች
 ከአደጋ የተጠበቁና ሰላማዊ የሆነ እንቅስቃሴን ከመፍጠር አኳያ የሚሰራ አንድ ራሱን የቻለ
 ሳይንስ ማለት ነው (.) የተሳለጠ እንቅስቃሴ እንዲኖር ከማድረግ አኳያ ነው ምናልባት ባጭሩ

ከማስቀመጥ አኳያ ማለቴ ነው (.) እና በውስጡ በርካታ ነገሮች ይኖሩታል ... የመንገድ ደህንነት ማለት ቀጥታ ደህንነቱን ማስፈን ማለት ነው ደህንነቱን ማስፈን መቻል ደግሞ አደጋውን መቆጣጠር መቻል ነው (.) ምናልባት ሙሉ-በሙሉ ላታጠፋው ትችላለህ መቀነሱን የሀይወቱም የንብረቱንም ማለት ነው ወይም የአካል ጉዳቱንም ጭምር ሙሉ ለሙሉ መቀነስ እ መቻል ማለት ነው (.) ደህንነቱን በተመለከተ ወይም የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነቱን ስታነሳው ማለት ነው (SFI3)

Excerpt 8

የመንገድ ደህንነት ስንል እ ... የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት እንደምታዩው ነው በቪክልስ ሞተር 120 በሞተር ሀይል በሚንቃሳቀሱ ተሽከርካሪዎች የሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ ነው (.) ይሄ በሞተር ኃይል የሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ ብቻውን አደለም (.) እ በእግራቸው የሚንቀሳቀሱ እግረኞችን እ ባራት እግር የሚንቀሳቀሱ እንስሳትን እ በሁለት እግር የሚንቀሳቀሱ ጋሪዎችን ወይም ደሞ የተለያዩ በሞተር ያልተደገፈ እንቅስቃሴ የሚያደርጉትን ሁሉ የሚያስተናብር ነው የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት (.) ስለዚህ ይሄ የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ይሄን ያክል ከፍተኛ ሞቢሊቲ ያለበት 125 ከሆነ የእንቅስቃሴ ባህሪያቸው የተለያዩ የሆኑ እሚስተናበሩበት ከሆነ እ ስለደህንነቱ ማሰብ ግዴታ ነው (.) ምን ማለት ነው ተሽከርካሪዎች ለሚያንጉዟቸው ተሳፋሪዎቻቸው ደህንነት ምቹ መሆን አለባቸው (.) ኖት ኦንሊ አደጋ አደጋን መከላከል ብቻ አደለም ተሽከርካሪዎቹ ምቹት ያላቸው መሆን አለባቸው (.) መስኮቶቻቸው ንፋስ እያስገቡ ለእንትን እሚያጋልጧቸው መሆን የለባቸውም (.) ዝናብ በሚዘንብበት ጊዜ ዝናብ እያፈሰሰ የተሳፋሪዎችን ደህንነት የሚ 130 ያሸማቅቁ መሆን የለባቸውም እ የተሽከርካሪዎቹ ቴክኒካል ፓርቶች ሙሉ መሆን አለባቸው (.) ሴፍቲያቸው የተረጋገጠ እ ኅማዎቻቸው ሊሾ መሆን የለባቸውም (.) ፎር ዛት ማተር እ ፍሬኖ ቻቸው ሙሉ መሆን አለባቸው (.) ፍሬቻዎቻቸው ሁሉ መልዕክት አስተላላፊ ስለሆኑ የተሟሉ መሆን አለባቸው (.) የመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ደህንነት ስንል የተሽከርካሪዎችን ብቃት ያሽከር ካሪዎችን ብቃት እንዲሁም ደግሞ የመንገዱን ለደህንነት ምቹ መሆን እና የሌሎችንም ደሞ 135 ተስተናባሪዎች የጋራ መጠቀሚያ ስለሆነው መንገድ የጋራ ግንዛቤ ወጥ የሆነ አመለካከት (.) በዛ ይሄንን ለማስከበር የወጡ ሕጎችንና ደንቦችን ሁሉም በጋራ ለማስፈጸም የሚያስችል እ ብቃት ባለው ሁኔታ የሚገለገሉበትና ከአደጋ ነፃ የሆነ እ ትራፊክ እንዲኖር የሚጠይቅ ነው እና እንደዚህ አይነት ግንዛቤ ነው መፍጠር (.) ሰፍቶ መታየት ያለበት በዚህ ደረጃ ነው ብዬ ነው እኔ የምወስደው (SCA8)

- 140 **ጠያቂ፦** ... የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት ምን ማለት ነው (.) እንዴት ነው ምትረዱት እንዴት ትገልፁታቸው ደህንነት ማለት በተለይም ደሞ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል መላሽ፦ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል እንደምታቀው መንገድ አለ ትራፊክ እሚባል አለ ደህንነት እሚባል ነገር አለ(.) መንገድ እምንለው ያው ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ አውራጃና (.) ልባሱ ከጠጠር ከአስፓልት ወይም ከጥርጊያ ወይም ከሌላ ሊሆን ይችላል
- 145 ያ አይነት የተዘጋጀ የመሬት ክፍሉን ነው እንግዲህ (.) መኪና እሚያስኬድ ስፍራ ሁሉ መንገድ አይባልም(.) መንገድ ለራሱ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ በዋናነት ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ የተዘጋጀ ነው(.) እ ያገር ኢኮኖሚ እንደኛ አይነት ያገር ኢኮኖሚ እሚከተል አገር ደሞ ያው ሰውም እግረኛው ማለት ነው እንሰሳቱም ባለብስክሌቱም ባለጋራውም ሊተረማመስበት ይችላል ማለት ነው (.) ለየብቻው መገንባት ስለማትችል ማለት
- 150 ነው (.) ስለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል በዚህ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀ አውራጃና ላይ የሚደረገው የሰው የተሽከርካሪና የእንሰሳት እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ የማድረግ ዲስፒሊን ማለት ነው በእኔ አረዳድ ማለት ነው (.) ሰላማዊ እንከን አልባ እንቅስቃሴ የመፍጠር ብቃት ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ተላላፊ ይባላል ወይም በምድር በአየር በየብስ እሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ ይሉታል ባሙያዎች(.) ልክ የምድር የኛ የየብስ ጉዳይ ስለሆነ
- 155 የመንገድ ስንል ያየር መንገድን አይደለም የባህር ላይን አይደለም የኛ እስፔስፊክ ሆኖ የየሰብ ላይ የመንገድ ላይ እንቅስቃሴ ነው እንደምታቀው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ይሄን እንቅስቃሴ የሰውን የተሽከርካሪን የእንሰሳትን የተናጠል የጣምራ እንቅስቃሴ ሰላማዊ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ከአደጋና ከማንኛውም አስጊ ነገር ነፃ በሆነ መልኩ እንዲንቀሳቀስ የተሳለጠ የመንገድና የተሽከርካሪ አጠቃቀም ብቃት የማረጋገጥ ዲስፒሊን ነው የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሲባል
- 160 ማለት ነው(.) ከማንኛውም አስጊ ስነልቦናዊ ስነልቦናዊ ከስነልቦናዊ ስጋት ነፃ መሆን አለበት(.) የኛ ደህንነት እኛጋ ሲባል እ ለደም ብዛት ለስኳር የሚዳርግ የማሽከርከር ስልት እየተጠቀመ ከዚህ ጅማ ስላደረሰህ ብቻ አደረሰኩ ብሎ ኩራት እሚሰማው አሽከርካሪ አለ (.) ግን ውጭ ነፍስ ግቢ ነፍስ ነው እንግዲህ ጭንቀት መከራ የተሞላበት ነው(.) ስለዚህ ደህንነት ሲባል ሰላማዊ ደህንነቱ የተረጋገጠ የተረጋጋ የሰከነ ጉዞ አርገህ (.) የሰከነ ጉዞ በትራፊክ ደህንነት
- 165 አንፃራዊ አገላለፅ ነው (.) ፈጥኖ ለመድረስ ዝግ ብሎ መንዳት ነው እንደምታቀው እሚባለው ማለት ነው (.) ደህንነት እሚባለው የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አንድ ጉዞ አንድ እንቅስቃሴ የወጣበትን አላማ በሚፈለገው ጊዜ በሚፈለገው አኳኝ በሚፈለገው ቦታ የማድረስ ብቃት ሲረጋገጥ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ተሰፍኗል አለ ማለት ይቻላል ማለት ነው(.) የሚፈለገው ነገር ሰው ከሆነ ሰውን በሚፈለገው አኳኝ ሲባል ያለስጋት ያለጭንቀት ያለውጥረት (.)

170 እንደወጣው ቀረው ክልጆች ተነጠልኩ አላማይ ሁሉ ከሸፈ(.) ስንት የደክምኩበት ነገር ያለማሰሪያ ተበትኖ ቀረ የሚል ጭንቀትና ስጋት ሳትፈጥር ማለት ነው (.) አስተማማኝ በሆነ መልኩ ስነልቦናዊ ጉዳት አካላዊ ጉዳት የንብረት ጉዳት ሳታደርስ በሚፈለገው ለዛ ለተሽከርካሪ መተላለፊያ ተብሎ በተዘጋጀው መንገድ ላይ የሚደረግን ጤናማ እንቅስቃሴና ፍላጎት የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማለት ይቻላል ማለት ነው (SPS19)

SPS18

175 እኔ እንግዲህ ያው ደህንነቱ ያለአደጋ በሚኒመም አደጋ ያለአደጋ ትንሽ ይከብዳል ይቻል ነበር ያለአደጋ ግን በሚኒመም አደጋም እንደው ለእኛ አገር ያዋጣል ብዬ ነው (.) በሚኒመምም ብንለው ግድየለም በሚል ነው እንጂ ደህንነት ማለት ያው እንግዲህ ሴፍ የሆነ ሮድ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም እንዲኖር ማለት ነው (.) መንገድ ደህንነት ሴፍ ሴፍቲን እንግዲህ ፈርስት አድርጎ ሁሉም ሰው የመጀመሪያ አድርጎት ያለ ምንም አደጋ በሰላም ስራውን

180 እንዲያከናውን ታስቦ ነው (.) የመንገድ ደህንነት እንግዲህ በእንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ የሚኖሩ ስህተቶችን አሾይድ ለማድረግ እሚያስችል ይመስለኛል ደህንነቱ (.) የመንገድ ደህንነት ያለአደጋ ጊዜዎች አመቶች ስራዎች እንዲቀጥሉ መታሰቡ ነው (.) ሶ ሮድ ሴፊቲ እሚለው እሱን ይመስለኛል እኔ እሚገልፀው (SPS18)

SPS19

የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ እምንለው በተሽከርካሪ የተነሳ መንገድ እና ከመንገድ ጋር በተያያዘ

185 ሁኔታ ማለት ነው መንገድና ከመንገድ ጋር በተያያዘ ሁኔታ (.) በሰው በእንስሳት ወይም በተሽከርካሪ ወይም በሶስቱ ወይም በሁለቱ ወይም በተናጥል በአንዱ ላይ ሊሆን ይችላል ሰው ብቻ የደረሰበት ጉዳት ሊሆን ይችላል ተሽከርካሪ ብቻ የተጎዳበት ሊሆን ይችላል ወይም እንስሳት ብቻ የተጎዳበት ሊሆን ይችላል ወይም የሚንቀሳቀስ ወይም የማይንቀሳቀስ ንብረት የወደመበት ሊሆን ይችላል(.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የማይንቀሳቀስ ንብረት ለምሳሌ ቤት

190 ደርምሶ ሊገባ ይችላል (.) ቤቱ አይንቀሳቀስም ተንቀሳቃሹ መኪና ግን ቤት ደርምሶ ሊገባ ይችላል (.) እ ድልድይ ሊሰብር ይችላል የመንገድ ትራፊክ ምልክት ሰብሮ ሊሄድ ይችላል የስልክ መስመር ላይ ጉዳት ስልክ መብራት ምስሶ ላይ ወይም መብራት ላይ ወይም በገበሬ እርሻ ላይ በቆሎውን ጤፉን ማሳውን ድብልቅልቅ አርጎ ሊሄድ ይችላል(.) ገበሬ ያንን ሀብቱን ንብረቱ ነው የመጠየቅ መብት አለው ... እንደዚህ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ፋይዳ ያላቸው እሚንቀሳቀሱ

195 እማይንቀሳቀሱ ነገሮች ላይ ጉዳት ካደረሰ ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ በተለይ ከዚህ ከመንገድ ትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ ጋር በተያያዘ ሁኔታ በእንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ የሚፈጠር ሂደት ሌላ ውጫዊ አካል የሚፈጥረው ሳይሆን በእንቅስቃሴ ውስጥ እሚፈጥረው

ሂደት ውስጥ በተሸከርካሪ ብልሽት ሊሆን ይችላል ቴክኒካል ጉድለት በአሸከርካሪው የአነዳድና የስነምግባር ጉድለት ሊሆን ይችላል ወይም በአካባቢ ተፈጥሯዊ ተፅዕኖ ሊሆን ይችላል (.) የመሬት መንቀጥቀጥ የአደገኛ ናዳ ነርፍ እንደዚህ የመሳሰሉት ነገሮች ሊሆን ይችላል (.) ወይም በሌሎች ተንቀሳቃሾች ስተት እግረኛው ራሱ በሚፈጥረው ስተት ሌሎች ተላላፊዎች በሚፈጥሩት ስተት ምክንያት አደጋ ይደርሳል (.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ይሄ ባህርይ ኖሮት ይሄንን ደሞ ነው ብሎ ማረጋገጥ የሚችለው ማንም አደለም የመንገድ ትራፊክ ፖሊስ ብቻ ነው ማለት ነው (.) የአስተዳደር አካላት ፖለቲከኞች ሀኪሞች ምኖች ይሄንን

205 የማረጋገጥ መብት የላቸውም ማለት ነው (.) በሀገር የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የሚረጋገጠው የአደጋው መንስኤ ሲጣራ በትክክል በመንገድ ትራፊክ ሥርዓት ውስጥ ሽፋን የሚያገኝ ሲሆን ነው (.) ማለትም ወይ የአሸከርካሪ ወይ የተሸከርካሪ ወይም የአካባቢ ስህተት የመንገድ ስህተት ሊሆን ይችላል (.) እነዚህ እነዚህ ምክንያቶች ናቸው ተብለው ሲረጋገጥ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ደረሰ ተብሎ ይመዘገባል ይሆናል (.) ከዚህ ጋር የሚመጣ የኃላፊነት እና የተጠያቂነት

210 ወሰኖችም አብረው ይመጣሉ ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የምንለውን በዚህ አይነት መልኩ ልናየው እንችላለን ማለት ነው (SPS19)

SFI6

እንግዲህ ሰው በለት ተለት ህይወቱም በሥራ ህይወቱም በማህበራዊ ህይወቱም ተንቀሳቃሽ ነው የሰው ልጅ ተንቀሳቃሽ ነው (.) ይህ እንቅስቃሴ ነው ትራፊክ እሚባለው (.) እንቅስቃሴ ሰው እንቅስቃሴ ያረጋል ሰው የጫኑ ተሸከርካሪዎችም እንቅስቃሴ ያደርጋሉ (.) የእነዚህ

215 የሁለቱ ግንኙነት ጤናማ ካልሆነ አደጋ ይኖረዋል ጤናማ ከሆነ ደግሞ ይሄን ጉዳይ አናነሳም ይሄን ጉዳይ አናነሳም (.) ስለዚህ ሰው እንዳልኩህ በለት ተለት ህይወቱ ወይም በሥራ አገልግሎት ወይም ለማህበራዊ ህይወቱ ወይም ለሌሎች ትልልቅ ጉዳዮች ሲንቀሳቀስ እንቅስቃሴው ደህንነት የሌለው ወደቤቱ የመመለስ አደጋ ያለው እ ወይም አካሉ ተጎድቶ ጤናው ተጎድቶ የሚመለስ ከሆነ እ ጥሩ አይደለም (.) አንደኛ እሚንቀሳቀሰው ይሄ ህብረተሰብ

220 በማህበራዊ ህይወት ፋይዳ ያለው ይሆናል በሀገሪቱ ኢኮኖሚም ፋይዳ ያለው ይሆናል በቤተሰብ ኢኮኖሚም ፋይዳ ያለው ይሆናል ባገሪቷ አመራርም ሊሆን ይችላል ፋይዳ ያለው ይሆናል ስለዚህ እንደዚህ ያለውን አምራች ሃይል ማጣት ነው የመጀመሪያው (.) ሁለተኛ እራሱ ተሸከርካሪውም ይጎዳል ይሄም ንብረት ማጣት ነው (.) ተሸከርካሪውም ሌላ ንብረት ይጎዳል ይሄም ንብረት ማጣት ነው እሚሆነው (.) እራሱን የተሸከርካሪውንም መንቀሳቀሻ

225 መንገድም ይጎዳል ይሄም ንብረት ማጣት ይሆናል (.) ... (.) እዚህም ንብረት ሲወድምም እንደገና ለማደስ ለማስተካከል ያልታቀደ ወጭ ያስከትላል ያልታቀደ ወጭ ያስከትላል በዚህ ባደጋ ወቅት ደሞ የጤና ጉድለት ያካል ጉድለት ሲከሰት የጤና አገልግሎት ለማግኘት ሲኬድ

ከተለመደውና ከመደበኛው የጤና አገልግሎት የተለዩ የጤና አገልግሎት ጫና ያመጣል (.)
 ያልታቀደ የጤና አገልግሎት ጫና ይኖራል (.) አምራች ሃይሉ ሲጠፋ የሥራ መስተጓጎሉ
 230 ምኑም ምኑም ብሎ የምርታማነቱ መውደቅ (.) እንግዲህ ባጠቃላይ ስታይ እነዚህ አደጋዎች
 ስለሚኖሩት የትራፊክ ደህንነትን በዚህ መልኩ ነው እምረዳው እኔም መሰረያ ቤታችንም
 በዚህ መልኩ ይረዳል (SFI6)

SCA8

በየትኛውም አቅጣጫ የእግረኞች መተላለፊያም ሊሆን ይችላል ኮሪደር ሊሆን ይችላል (.) ግን
 እዛ ላይ የሚደርሱ አደጋዎች ለምሳሌ የእግረኛ መሄጃ ላይ ያልተዘጋ ጉድጓድ ወይም የውሃ
 335 መፍሰሻ እንትን ቢኖርና አንድ አይኑ እማይደ ሰው በእግረኛ መንገድ እየተጓዘ ሳለ እግሩ
 ገብቶ ቢሰበር አደጋ ደርሷል (.) ስለዚህ ያ ቱቦው መከደን አለበት እ ወይም አደጋ
 በማያስከትል ሁኔታ መገንባት አለበት (.) ስለዚህ የመንገድ አደጋ ስንል ከመንገድ መጠቀም
 ጋር በተያያዘ እሚደርሰውን አደጋ ሁሉ ማለት ነው (.) ቱቦዎች ባለመዘጋታቸው ቦዮች
 እነዚህ የውሃ ማፍሰሻ እንትኖች ባግባቡ ባለመታነፃቸው በኢንጅነሪንግ ፎልት ስተት በተለያዩ
 340 ምክንያቶች ወይም ሰዎች የግንባታ ስራ በሚሰሩበት ጊዜ አስፈላጊውን ጥንቃቄ ለሌሎች አደጋ
 እንዳያስከትሉ አድርገው ባለመጠቀማቸው የሚደርሰውን አደጋ በሙሉ ማለት ነው (.)
 ከትራንስፖርት ጋር ብቻ የሚያያዝ አይደለም መንገድ አደጋ (SCA8)

SFI2

ባገራችን የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ በጣም በጣም ሲርየስ በኔ እኔ ውስጡ ስላለሁ እኔ
 በምረዳው ደረጃ በጣም ሲርየስ ጉዳይ ነው (.) ተገቢው ትኩረት ሊሰጠው ይገባል ብዬ ነው
 345 እማስበው (.) ምክንያቱም በያመቱ ባሁኑ ጊዜ እ ክሶስት ሺ በላይ ሰው ህይወት እያለፈ ነው(.)
 እ በርካታ ከባድ ያካል ጉዳት እየደረሰ ነው ከባድ ያካል ጉዳት ማለት ደሞ አብዛኛው ከባድ
 ጉዳት ከደረሰባቸው ውስጥ አብዛኞቹ ለዘላቂ ያካል ጉዳት የሚዳረጉበት ሁኔታ ነው ያለው (.)
 ቀላል ያካል ጉዳት እሚባለውም ቢሆን ቀላል አይደለም (.) በየሆስፒታሉ ለሌሎች በሽታዎች
 ይውል የነበረን መድሃኒት ይውል የነበረን ህክምና ቦታ ይውል የነበረን የሀኪም ጊዜን ይውል
 350 የነበረን ገንዘብ ሁሉ እያባከነ ያለ ነው (.) ኢቭን በገንዘብ ሲገመት በገንዘብ የሚወድመው
 በተሸከርካሪ በሃርድ ከረንሲ የመጡ ንብረቶች በሚጋጩበት ጊዜ የሚደርሰው ምናልባት እስከ
 ዜሮ ነጥብ ስምንት በመቶ እ የሚሉ መረጃዎች አይቻለሁ እኛ በዛ በኩል ያጠናነው ጥናት
 ባይሆንም እ እንደዛ ድረስ የሚደርስ አጠቃላይ ከአመታዊ ገቢያችን ወይም ጂዲፒያችን ያን
 ያህል እያጣን ያለንበት ሁኔታ እንደሆነ ነው እምንገነዘበው (.) በልዩልዩ ጥናቶችም ላይ ስናይ

- 355 ኢትዮጵያ በአፍሪካ ውስጥ ብሎም በአለም ደረጃ የትራፊክ አደጋ በጣም አሳሳቢ ከሚባለበት አገሮች ውስጥ ነው ተመድባ እምትገኘው እና በጣም የትራፊክ አደጋ ባገራችን ትኩረት ሊሰጠው የሚገባ በጣም ሲርየስ ጉዳይ ነው የሚል ግምት ነው ያለኝ(.) አሁን ያለው እየተሰራ ያለው ሁኔታ በምን ደረጃ ላይ ነው ወይስ እንዴት ትገመግሙታልላችሁ ለሚለው በርግጥ ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ መንግስት የተሻለ ትኩረት ለጉዳዩ የሰጠበትን ሁኔታ እናያለን(.) ለዚህም
- 360 በቋሚነት እ ናሽናል ሮድ ሴፍቲ ካውንስል እሚባለውን አቋቁሞ በትራንስፖርት ሚኒስቴር ውስጥ ይሄ ስራ እንዲሰራ እየተደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ እሄ ከሚታዩ ከተሰጡ ትኩረቶች ውስጥ አንዱ ነው (.) መጠነኛ የሆነ የበጀት ድጋፍም ከመንገድ ፈንድ ጽሕፈት ቤት በሚገኝ የበጀት ድጋፍ እ ስራ ላይ እንዲውል እየተደረገ እ እንቅስቃሴዎች እየተደረጉ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) እነዚህ እነዚህ ነገሮች ሲታዩ የተወሰኑ መሻሻሎች ወይም ጅምሮች እንዳሉ ያሳያል
- 365 ሆኖም ግን ከችግሩ አንጻር በኔ ግምት ከችግሩ አንጻር አሁንም የተሰጠው ግምት እሚበቃው ነው ወይም ደሞ እንደው ጥሩ ነው ሊባል እሚችል ነው ብዬ አልገምትም (.) ገና ገና በጣም ዝቅተኛ ደረጃ ላይ ያለ ትልቅ ግምት ግን የሚያስፈልገው ነው ብዬ ነው እምገምተው (SFI2)

SPS19

- ያገራችን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ችግር ያገራችን እ አሳሳቢ ችግር ነው ተብሎ ሊወሰድ ይገባል የሚለውን ሀሳብ እኔም እጋራለሁ (.) ለምን አሳሳቢ ይሆናል ቢባል መልሱን ማንም
- 370 ተራ ሰው የሚመልሰው ነው (.) ምክንያቱም እ ችግሩ የሰው ህይወት ይበላል (.) ችግሩ የሰው አካል የእድሜ ልክና የዘለቄታ ጉዳት እስከማድረስ የጊዜያዊም ይሁን የዘለቄታ ጉዳት እሚያደርስ የአካል ጉዳት ያደርሳል እንደሚታወቀው (.) ከፍተኛ የሆነ የሥነ ልቦና ጥቃት ያደርሳል (.) በሌለ ኢኮኖሚ በኢትዮጵያ ነባራዊ ሁኔታ ደሞ በሌለ አቅም በዚህ እሚንገዳገድ ኢኮኖሚ ባደንባሪ በቅሎ ቃጭል ተጨምሮ (እየሳቁ) እንደሚባለው እ እሄንን ኢኮኖሚያችንን
- 375 ደሞ እንደገና ደሞ መደጎም ማገዝ መጠበቅ መንከባከብ ለተሻለ የሕዝብ ህይወት መለወጥና ለእድገት መጠቀም ሲገባ (.) ዝም ብለህ ከዛው ላይ እያወደምክ መሄድ ማለት አሳሳቢ ችግርነቱ አጠያያቂ አደለም ማለት ነው (.) እንኳን በእኛ ኢኮኖሚ ቀርቶ እኛ እንኳን በኛ ነባራዊ ሁኔታ እንኳን በኛ የኑሮ ገፅታ ቀርቶ እ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አለም አቀፍ ችግር ነው እንደሚታወቀው ማለት ነው (.) ደብሊው ኤች ኦም በሥነ ሥርዓት ያስቀመጠው
- 380 ነው (.) የአለም የጤና ድርጅት እንደሚታወቀው አሁን ካለበት የዘጠነኛ ነፍሰ ገዳይነት በሁለት ሺ ይሄ ነገር እየቀነሰ እንዲሄድ ካላደረግን ወደ ሶስተኛ ነፍሰ ገዳይነት ደረጃ ይሸጋገራል የተባለበት ነው (.) ስለዚህ እኛጋ እ ባሉን ውስን ተሽከርካሪዎች በሌላው አለም ካለው አንጻር ሲታይ ማለት ነው እ በመቶ ሺ እሚቆጠሩ አራት መቶ ሰላሳ ምናምን ሺ ተሽከርካሪ ናት ኢትዮጵያ ያላት (.) አሁን በሁለት ሺ አምስት ሰኔ ሰላሳ ላይ ያለው እንትን

385 መረጃ እንዲያመለክተው (.) ... ከሰማኒያ ሚሊዮን ሕዝብ በላይ ላላት ሀገር በጣም አነስተኛ ተሽከርካሪ ነው ያላት (.) በዩ ኤስ አሜሪካ አንድ መኪና ለሶስት አንዳንድ ቦታ ላይም ፊሾው ለሁለት ሰው ነው (.) ስለዚህ ለሶስት ሰው እንኳ ብንል ሶስት መቶ ሚሊዮን ሕዝብ ቢኖር መቶ ሚሊዮን ተሽከርካሪ አለ ማለት ነው ዩ ኤስ ኤ እንግዲህ (.) እና ከመቶ ሚሊዮን ተሽከርካሪ በላይ ነው በተባበሩት የአሜሪካ መንግስት የሚኖረው (.) እንግዲህ መቶ ሚሊዮን

390 ተሽከርካሪና አራት መቶ ምናምን ሺ ተሽከርካሪ (.) እኛም አገር ነን እነሱም አገር ናቸው እኛም ሀዝብ ነን እነሱም ሀዝብ ናቸው (.) የሰብአዊ መብት ጥያቄ ሲነሳ ያው መቼም የሞራል ጥያቄ ስለሆነ አቻ ያረግሃል ልዩነቱ ግን በጣም ብዙ ነው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ እንዲህ አይነት የኢኮኖሚ ድህነት ባለበት ረጅም ጉዞ የእግር ጉዞ የሚያደርግ ያመረተውን ምርት በተሽከርካሪ ለማንጓዝ እድል የሌለው ገበሬ ያለበት ሀገር ውስጥ (.) ተሸክሞ ጭኖም ነው

395 ምርቱን (.) ገበያ ሲሄድ ተሸክሞ ነው የመጨረሻዋ እምትጋራህ አሁያ ናት (.) አንዷ የትራንስፖርት ሞድ አፍ ትራንስፖርት ውስጥ እምታገኘው እኛጋ እንስሳ ነው (.) ግመል ምናምን (.) ስለዚህ እንደዚህ አይነት ችግር ባለበት ሁኔታ ውስጥ (.) ካለን ኢኮኖሚ ኢኮኖሚያችንም ካለን እንደዚህ የገበሬውን ህይወት መለወጥ በድህነት አረንቋ ውስጥ ገብቶ እሚሰቃየውን ሕዝብ ሕይወት መለወጥ ነው እንጂ ሀብታችንን እንደደላው ሰው (.) የደላውም

400 ቢሆን እንኳ አደጋ ማድረስ የለበትም (.) የእኛ ደሞ በኢትዮጵያ ነባራዊ ሁኔታ ካልከው አንፃር የኛ ደሞ የከፋ ይሆናል (.) ኑሯችንም እንደዛው ነው እንዲያሳዝንህ አሁን እኔ ምረዳው በውነት በጣም እሚሰማኝ ብዙ ጥሩ ኑሮ ኖረህ ሞት ተፈጥሯዊ ግዴታ ስለሆነ ማንም ይሞታል (.) እኛ እንሞታለን አሜሪካውያኑም ይሞታሉ (.) ግን የተፈጠረበትን ሰዋዊ ግዴታ አሳምሮ ተወጥቶ እሄን አለም ተጠቅሞበት ዘንጦበት ተንደላቆበት እሚፈልገውን ሁሉ

405 ሰርቶበት የሚሞተው ሰውና (.) የእለት ዳቦ አጥቶ ሲንገላታ ሲሰቃይ ሲያነባ ሰው መሆኑን በሚያጠራጥር ሁኔታ የሚኖረው ሕዝብ ደሞ ሲሞት እኩል ስሜት አይፈጥርልህም (.) ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ የሚደርሰው ሞት አሰቃቂ ነው (.) በኢትዮጵያ ሁኔታ ሌላው የተለየና ክፉ ነገር እሚያረገው ምንድነው እ አንድ ሰው ለምሳሌ ቤተሰቡን ሲያስተዳድር የነበረ ሰው በመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ስታጣ እሱ ብቻ ሳይሆን ቤተሰቡ ይበተናል (.) እንደምታቀው

410 እሚደርሰው ኢኮኖሚያዊ ማህበራዊ ቀውስ ብዙ ነው (.) መንግስት ማህበራዊ ፈንድ ስለሌለ እንደምታቀው ሶሻል ሴኩራቲያችን በጣም ደካማ ስለሆነ እንደውም ስለሌለን አንተ የለህም ማለት ልጆችህ የሉም ማለት ነው (.) እናት አባትህ ካንተ እሚጠብቁት ተጠዋሪ ቤተሰቦች ልጆች ሁሉ ማንም ጧሪ ደጋፊ ሳይኖራቸው (.) ... (.) ልጆችህ ትምህርት ቤት የመቀጠል እድል የለህም (.) ስለዚህ የኢትዮጵያን ነባራዊ ሁኔታ ስታይ ለሀብትና ለንብረት ደንታ ቢስ

415 እንድትሆን አደለም እሚያረጋህ (.) እኔ በጣም ሲሪየስ ሆኜ በዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ ለተማሪዎቼ አንዳንዴ ክፍል ውስጥ ገብቼ በማስተምርበት ሰአት እናገራለሁ (.) አሜሪካዊያን ኢራቅን

እንዳልነበረች አድርገው እንደነበረች እናረጋታለን ብለው ፕሮግራም ይቀርባሉ (.) እማይፈልጉትን አገር እንዳልነበረ ማረጋገጥ እንችላለን መልሱን የፈለግነውን ካረግን በኋላ ደግሞ ወደነበረበት እንመልሳለን ብለው ያቅዳሉ (.) ማውደም በእቅድ ይመራል በሌላው አገር

420 ((ሳቅ)) (.) ኢትዮጵያ ይሄ አቅም የላትም እንዲህ አይነት ነገር ውስጥ መቸውንም ቢሆን ልትሞክረው አትችልም (.) እንደተባለው የዛሬ ሀያ አመት ሰላሳ አመት (እየሳቁ) ይሆናል (.) አሁን ግን እኛ እምናውቀው በኢትዮጵያ ነባራዊ ሁኔታ እያንዳንዱ እስፒል በኔ እምነት ዋጋ አላት ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ (.) ... (.) ሁሉም የመኪና ኮምፖዘንት እሚመጣው እንደምታቀው ከውጭ ነው (.) ከውጭ ማለት ምን ማለት ነው እዳ ያለው ነው (.) እንደምታቀው የእኛ ብር

425 እየወደቀ የውጭ መግዣው አቅም እያደገ በሂደቡ ቁጥር እ አንድ ፍሬቻ ሰብረን አለጊዜው ስንቀይር የሚያስከፍለን ዋጋ አለ (.) መግዛት ብቻ ሳይሆን በዛ በግዥ ስርአት ውስጥ የተደበቀ ሌላ አገራዊ ጉዳት አለ (.) ሰውዬው መግዛት ስለቻለ ገዝቶ ሊሆን ይችላል ግን ጉዳት አለው ማለት ነው (.) ... (.) ስለዚህ እኛጋ በእንደዚህ አይነት መልኩ ስለሆነ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ በኢትዮጵያ ስጋት ነው አዎ ትክክለኛ ስጋት ነው (.) ምክንያቱም ትልቅ

430 ትንሽ በእድሜ በዎታ በትምህርት ደረጃ በሥልጣን በኃላፊነት ሳይወሰን በበርካታ የሀብረተሰብ ክፍሎች ላይ ያልተጠበቀ አሰቃቂና ዘግናኝ አደጋ ስለሆነ አሳሳቢነቱ አጠያያቂ አደለም (.) ደም ብቻ ሳይሆን ኢትዮጵያውያን ገንዘባቸው የደም ያህል ነው ዋጋ የሚያስከፍለው በአሁኑ ሰአት (.) የለህማ (.) ... (.) ስለዚህ አየኸው እንዲህ አይነት ኢኮኖሚ ውስጥ ቆሻሻ ገንዳ ውስጥ ሄዶ ለቅሞ የሚበላ ኢትዮጵያዊ ባለቤት አገር ውስጥ ለሀብትና ለንብረት ደንታ ቢስ

435 መሆን ማለት እ ከምንም በላይ በእውነት እኔ ፍፁም የኃላፊነት ጉድለት ነው ብዬ ነው የማስበው (.) ስለዚህ ከአቅም በላይ በሆነ ምክንያት ምንም ማለት አትችልም ስለታከምክ አትድንም (.) ትሞታለህ ታክመህም እንኳ (.) እግዚአብሔር ሲፈቅድ ሕክምናውም ሲሳካ ነው የምትድነው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ንብረት አይውደም አደለም ሞትም አይቀሬ ነው (.) አደጋ ሊደርስ ይችላል አደጋው ግን በአሽከርካሪዎች የኃላፊነት ጉድለት ሲደርስ የበለጠ ይሰማል (.)

440 በተሽከርካሪም ቢሆን እንኳ የተሟላ የቴክኒክ ብቃት ያለው ተሽከርካሪ ይዘን ለመሄድ ጥረት ካደረግን መቀነስ እንችላለን (.) በዚህ መልኩ እነዚህ ነገሮች እ አሳሳቢነታቸው ለኔ በደንብ ነው እሚታየኝ ለማለት ያህል ነው (SPS19)

SPS18

አዎ በጣም ወረሰት ነው ወረሰት ወርሰት ነው (.) እኔ እድሉ ስላለኝ እንትኑን የማየት አይቼዋለሁ (.) የአለምአቀፍ ሪፖርቶችንም አይቻለሁ ያገርአቀፍንም ከፌዴራል ትራፊክ

450 ጽህፈት ቤት የአስር አመት ሪፖርት አይቻለሁ (.) በአስር አመት ሀያ ሶስት ሺ አራት መቶ ሃምሳ ስድስት ሰዎች ያለቁበት አገር ነው ያለን (.) ኦልሞስት ያንድ ወረዳ ማለት ነው (.)

አይ ዶን ኖው ያሁኑ ወረዳ አደረጃጀት ይመስለኛል (ሳቅ) አንድ ወረዳ አልቆብሃል በአስር ዓመት ማለት በጣም በጣም በጣም እሚገርም አገር ነው ማለት (.) ሞት እኮ ነው (.) ያካል ጉድለት ምናምን እሱን ማንሳት እኔ ሚዛን እኔ እሚደፋው ሞት ነው ብዬ ስለማስብ ፎክስ

455 ብዙውን ጊዜ ሞት ላይ እሄዳለሁ (.) እና እኔ እንደውም መደንገጥ ሁሉ ነበረብን ነው እምለው(.) ወይ በደንብ አናየው ይሆን ሪፖርቱን ወይም በየቀኑ አሁን ሁለት ሰው አዲስ አበባ ሞቷል ስትባል ኖርማል መስማትም ብዙም ኖርማል የሆነ ሁለት ሰው ዛሬ እንደውም ተመስገን ነው ልትል ትችላለህ (.) ስትደምረው ነው እሚያስደነግጠው ባስር አመት ሃያ ሶስት ሺ ነው እንዴ ትላለህ (.) እንደዚህ ቢያዩ ትላለህ አይ ዶን ኖው የኔ እንግዲህ አፕሮች ይሁን

460 አላቅም (.) ጥሬውን ዝም ብሎ እያየ ይሆናል ሰው ገብቶሃል (.) የአንድ አለም አቀፍ እንትን ላይ ምን ይላል ሱናሜ ሁለት መቶ ሰላሳ ሺ ሰው ነው የሞተበት የሱናሜ አደጋ (.) ያለፈው ማለት ነው (.) የትራፊክ አደጋ ደግሞ ባለምአቀፍ ዋን ፓይንት ቱ አንድ ነጥብ ሁለት ሚሊዮን ይሞታል ይላል (.) ይሄ ማለት አምስት ሱናሜ ማለት ነው (ሣቅ) ዩ ሲ አምስት ሱናሜ ነው (.) እንዴት ታዲያ አምስት ሱናሜን ሳይለንት ሆነህ ታሳልፈዋለህ (.) አንድ

465 ሱናሜ ላይ ግን ያዙኝ ልቀቁኝ ሚዲያውም ምኑም ጩኸቱም (.) እንደውም አይረሳም ሱናሜውን አሁን አንተ ታስታውሳለህ (.) በአመት አንድ ነጥብ ሁለት ሚሊዮን ይሞታልን ግን የዛሬ ስድስት ወር ባገኝህ አታስታውሰውም (.) በቃ ሱናሜ ነው ሱናሜን ገብቷል እንትንህ ውስጥ (.) እና ሱናሜው አሁን ወርስት ነው ይክብድሃል ሱናሜ መጣ ሊመጣ ነው ቢባል ትደነግጣለህ (.) የትራፊክ አደጋ ግን ሳይለንት ኪለር ነው (.) አየህ በየቀኑ ምናምን

470 እየውና ግን ባመት ስትደምረው አምስት ሱናሜን አለማችን ታስተናግዳለች ኤቭሪ ይር ማለት ነው (.) ሶ ይሄ እኮ አሁን መንግስታትን ነው ብሌም ማድረግ ያለብህ (.) ለምንድነው ሳይለንት የሆናችሁት ሱናሜ ቢሆን እንረባረባለን ይሆናል (.) እንደው እርዳታም እርዱን እዛም ለተጎዱ ሰዎች የሆነ ነገር ታግዛለህ (.) ይሄኛውን ዝም ብሎ ነው እሚያልፈው ሞቱ እንዴ (.) አንድ ነጥብ ሁለት ሚሊዮን (.) በቃ አለፈ (.) የሚቀጥለውም ያንኑ ነው (.) ስለዚህ

475 አይ ቲንክ ጠንክሮ የተሰራ አልመሰለኝም የትራፊክ እንትን ላይ ዝም ብሎ ብዙው ወረቀት ላይ ነው (.) ዝም ብሎ ወሬ ይሆናል እ ወደመሬት አይወርድም(.) እና እንትኑን አተውትም አይመስለኝም እኔ (.) እ እስታትስቲክስ ችግር ያለበት ሰው ቁጥር አለ አዎ (.) ግን እንትኑ ላይ ነው እርምጃው ላይ ስራው ላይ እንዴት እናርግ ነው (.) እንደሱ ዝም ካልን ግን አለማችን በያመቱ አምስት አምስት በቃ ይቀጥላል ማለት ነው በርካታ ሱናሜዎች (.) ስለዚህ

480 ወይ የትራፊክ አደጋን ሱናሜ ብለን ብናወራው ይሻላል ብዬ አስባለሁ ትንሽ እንዲያስደነግጥ(.) አይ ቲንክ ይሻለናል (ሳቅ) ስለዚህ ኢትዮጵያ በሁለት ሺ አራት ላይ ሶስት ሺ ምናምን ሰዎች በሱናሜ አጣች ብንል ትንሽ እ ይገባ ይሆን ብዬ አስባለሁ (.) ሰው ሁሉ

ይገባው ይሆን (.) ወይ ባለሥልጣኖቹ ይገባቸው ይሆን አይ ዶን ኖው እንግዲህ ስሙን መቀየር (.) የትራፊክ አደጋ አሁን አይገባም (.) እና ኖርማል ሆኑ ኖርማል ይሆንብሃል (.)

485 ወይንም እንደው አንድ ሺ ሰው ሲሞት ሺዲዮ ባሳየው ሰው ብዙም እንትን እሚል አይመስለኝም ሰው በዝቶ እንደሆነም አላውቅም (.) እና የእኛን አገር እንዴት ትገልፀዋለህ ብትለኝ በጣም በጣም ጥሩ አደለም (.) በጣም (.) ሌሎች እኮ ባስር ሺ ተሽከርካሪ ከአምስት እስከ ስምንት ደርሰዋል (.) እኔ የስዊድንን እንትን አይቻለሁ (.) ፓርላማቸው ነውኮ የወሰነው ዜሮ ዜሮ አክሲደንት ነው እሚለው (.) ዜሮ አክሲደንት (.) እስቲ ምንም አደጋ ሳያደርስ

490 ሞትን ካዙዋሊቲን ዜሮ አደርሰዋለሁ ብሎ የሚታገል አገር አለ ማለት ነው (.) የኛ ደሞ ሶስት ሺ አንድ መቶ ምናምን ሰው ነው ሁለት ሺ አራት ላይ (.) ያሁኑን ሁለት ሺ አምስትን አላየሁትም (.) ግን እሚተናነስ አይመስለኝም (.) አራት ዲጂት ምንም ጥርጥር የለኝም (.) እና እንደዚህ አናሊሲሱን ስንሰራ ትክክል አይደለም (.) ወደ ኋላ አሁንም እስቲል አራት ዲጂት ነው ከዘጠና አምስት ጀምሮ አይቼዋለሁ ሁሉም አራት ዲጂት ናቸው (.) እና እንግዲህ

495 ከዘጠና አምስት ዘጠና ስድስት ይሻላል እንዳትል እዛው አራት ዲጂት ሆነህ ይሻላል ባትል ጥሩ ነው (.) ይሻላል ወደ ሁለት ዲጂት ብትገባ ይሻላል ልትል ትችላለህ (.) እዛ ሆኖ ግን አምስት መቶ ሰው ሲቀንስልህ ይሻላል (.) እንደሱ ከሆነ ምን ትሆናለህ በቃ የሰራህ ይመስልሃል (.) እና እዛ እዛ አካባቢ ሚስ ያረጉ ይመስለኛል ባለ ይሄ እሚመለከታቸው ባለሥልጣኖች ወይም ትራፊክ ጽህፈት ቤትም ይሁን መረጃ እንትን ላይ (.) ባምናው ግንቦት

500 ነው እሚለን ካምናው ግንቦት ጋር ሳስተያየው ነው እሚለው (.) ሚዲያም እንደዚሁ ነው እሚለው (.) ምን ማለት ነው ያምናው ጋራ ለምን ታስተያይዋለህ (.) ከፕላንህ ጋራ አይሻልም እንዴ (.) ፕላን ካደረከው ጋር ብታስተያይው አይሻልም (.) አዎ ፕላን የለሌው ወደ ኋላ ወደ ኋላ ይሄዳል (.) ፕላን ያረገው ከዜሮ ጋር ለምን አይነፃፀርም ፕላኔ ዜሮ ነው ስምንት ሰው ሞቶብኛል እስቲል ቅር ብሎኛል (.) ዩ ሲ ከታርጌትህ ጋር ነህ ወደኋላ ከሄድክ ግን ወደኋላ

505 መሻሉ ያው ነው መሻሉ እንትን ያኩራራህና እንዳትሰራ ያደርጋል (.) እና አደጋ በጣም አለ ልልህ ነው (SPS18)

SCA12

አንዳንድ ሰዎችጋ ያለው ግንዛቤ ምንድነው ለምሳሌ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን ምንድነው እሚሉት ከፈጣሪ እንደሚመጣ ቁጣ አድርጎ የማሰብ ነገር አለ (.) ይሄ

510 ስህተት ነው ምክንያቱም ጥንቃቄ አብዛኛው የትራፊክ አደጋ እየመጣ ያለው ከጥንቃቄ ጉድለት ነው (.) ቅድምም ስናነሳ የነበረው አንድ አሽከርካሪ የተወሰነለት ወሰን አለ በዛ ተጠንቅቆ ቢነዳ አደጋው አይከሰትም (.) እግረኛው እንዲያቋርጥ የተዘጋጀለት ቦታ

አለ በዛ ቢያቋርጥ አደጋው አይከሰትም (.) ዜርፎር የፈጣሪ ቁጣ ነው የሚለው ነገር ስህተት ነው (.) ሰውም እኔ ምን ቸገረኝ ፈጣሪ ይጠብቀኝ አይነት ነገር የሚያስብል

515 ግንዛቤ እንዲመጣ ያደርጋልና ይሄ አስተሳሰብ (.) አክቶሞሊ አሁን አሁን ምን ያህል እንደተቀረፈ ባላውቅም አሉ ይሄ አዘዘበት ፈጣሪ አዞበት ነው (.) ለምሳሌ ጠዋት ከሆነ በዚህ በጠዋት ፈጣሪ አዘዘበት የሚል ማህበረሰቡጋ የሚንፀባረቁ ነገሮች ስላሉ ይሄ ጥንቃቄ እንዳያደርግ የሚያደርግ አስተሳሰብ ስለሆነ ይሄ በጣም መቀረፍ ያለበት ነገር ይመስለኛል (SCA12)

SPS18

520 አዎ ዳውት አለኝ እኔ በጣም እጠራጠራለሁ (.) ማለት እንደው ዝም ብሎም አንድ ሰው ምን አለኝ መሰለህ በቅርብ እማውቀው ሰው ነውና (.) ሌሊት ስድስት ሰአት ሰባት ሰአት አካባቢ የሆነ ቦታ ሰው ለመሸኘት ሄድኩና ስመለስ አንድ ሰው ገጨሁ አለ (.) ጠዋት መኪናዎን አይቻት ነው የጠየኩት ምንድነው እንዲህ የተጠራመሰ ምናምን ስለው በጣም ስለምንቀራረብ ሰው መታሁና ይሙት ይዳንም አላየሁትም በቃ ዝም ብዬ ወደ ቤቴ ገባሁ ሌሊት ሰባት

525 ስምንት ሰአት ስለነበረ (.) ያ ሰውየ እንግዲህ ጠዋት ወይ በትራፊክ አደጋ ላይ ይመዝገብ ከሰው ተጣልቶ ይበሉት ወይም ሳይቀበርም ይቅር ማንም እሚያውቀው ነገር የለም (.) ግን እስቲል የትራፊክ አደጋ ነው እና ፊጅስተርድ አይሆንም በእርግጠኝነት (.) ይሄ እንግዲህ ዝም ብሎ አንድ ምሳሌ ነው እምነግርህ (.) እና እኔ የሌሊቴን ወይም ከትራፊክ ተቆጣጣሪዎች ውጭ የሆነ ከይታ ውጭ የሆነ አደጋ ብዙ ይኖራል ብዬ ነው እማስበው እንጂ እቺ መገለጫ

530 አትሆንም (.) እቺ እምትመዘገበዋ ጠዋት እምንሰማት የጧት ሪፖርት ዘ ሆል ገፅታውን እንደው ያሳየናል ብዬ አላምንም (.) ፕላስ ደሞ ገና እኮ ሆስፒታልም ደሞ ገብቶ እሚሞተው እሱምኮ ገና በእንትን ነው (.) በትራፊክ አደጋ በዛን ቀን ከባድ አደጋ ብሎ ሊሆን ይችላል የታለፈው እና ሞት ላይ አናገኘውም (.) ግን ሞቷል ሰውየው ከሶስት ቀን ይሁን ከሶስት ወር በኋላ (.) እንግዲህ ሪል የሆነ እንትን ዳታ ቤዝ ኖሮ እንደው እምንሰማው ሁሉ ትክክል ነው

535 ብዬ እንደው በግማሽ መጨመር አለብኝ ብዬ ነው (.) ለማስተምር እንደሱ ነው እንጂ ያለውን ጥሬ መረጃውን ብዙም እኔ እንትን የለኝም ሚዛን አይደፋም (.) ለምን እንግዲህ ይሄ የአዲስ አበባ ሆኖ ነው ሌላ ደሞ መአት ሰፊ ቦታ ነው ኢትዮጵያ ትልቅ እንትን መንገድ ላይ ዝም ብሎ ገለውት እሚሄደውን ነገር ተወው(.) ስለዚህ እንስሳ እንስሳ መግጨትም ባይ ዘ ዌይ አደጋ ነው (.) ግን አንሰማም አንድ ውሻ ገጭቶ ምናምን አትባልም (.) ለምን ያው እሚጠይቅህ በዛ

540 ነገር ባለቤትም የእንስሳው የውሻው ባለቤትም ምንም ስለማይኖር ይሁን ወይም እንዳደጋም ስለማናስበው እንጂ አደጋ ነው (.) እሱም ሁሉ ፊጅስተርድ መደረግ ነበረበት እና ተገጭቷል(.)

ከዛ ይሆናል እንደውም የተለማመደው በኋላ (.) (ሣቅ) እና እንትኑን አላምነውም ብዙ ያነሰ ነው ብዬ ነው እማስበው እኔ (SPS18)

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.14

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A brochure by ETA

መንገዶቻችንን የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ በሰላም ወትቶ በሰላም የሚመለስበትን ሁኔታ በመፍጠር ለሁሉም ተስማሚ እንዲሆኑ ማድረግ የሁላችንም ሃላፊነት ነው፤ ይህንን ሰላማዊ እንቅስቃሴ ለመፍጠርና መንገዶቻችንን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የጸዱ እንዲሆኑ ለማስቻል ሁሉም የድርሻውን መስራት ይጠበቅበታል፤ ለዚህም አገራችን የተቀበለችውን የመንገድ ትራፊክ 560 ደህንነት የተግባር አስር አመት አምስቱን የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ማለትም፡- የመንገድ ደህንነት አሰራር ለማሻሻል የሚያስችል የአቅም ግንባታ ማካሄድ፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ መንገድ መገንባት፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ እንዲኖር በአሽከርካሪና በእግረኛ መንገድ አጠቃቀም ላይ ለውጥ ማምጣት፤ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ተሽከርካሪ፤ የትራፊክ አደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ የሚሰጥ ህክምናን ቀልጣፋ ማድረግ፡፡ የሚሉትን አጠናክረን መስራት ይጠበቅብናል፡፡ 565 ይህ የተግባር አስር አመት ይፋ ከሆነ ከ2004 ጀምሮ እስካሁን በእነዚህ የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ላይ ምን ያህል ሰርተናል ብለን ራሳችንን መፈተሽ ይጠበቅብናል፡፡

A brochure by the Addis Ababa Transport Bureau

በመዲናችን አዲስ አበባ የትራፊክ አደጋን ማየትና ሪፖርት ማድመጥ የየዕለት ተግባራችን እየሆነ ከመጣ አመታት ተቆጥረዋል፡፡ የከተማዋ ኃዳናዎች መለያ እየሆነ ያለው የትራፊክ አደጋ የራሱ የሆነ የተለያዩ ምክንያትና መንስኤ ቢኖረውም በዋነኛነት ግን በጉዳዩ ላይ በቂ እና ሰፊ ያለመስጠት ችግር እንደሆነ ይስተዋላል፡፡ 570 ይህም ሲባል አሽከርካሪ ስለሚያሸከረክረው ተሽከርካሪ ቴክኒካዊ አቅም ጠንቅቆ አለመረዳት፤ ስለሚያሸከረክርበት መንገድ እና አካባቢያዊ ሁኔታ ጠንቅቆ አለማወቅ፤ የአየር ንብረትና የአየር ጸባይ ሁኔታን አለመረዳት፤ ስለሚጓዙበት መንገድ የፍጥነት ልኬት አለማወቅ እንዲሁም እግረኞች ስለመንገድ አጠቃቀም ያላቸው ግንዛቤ እናሳ መሆን ለችግሩ ከፍተኛ አስተዋጽኦ እንዳላቸው ጥናቶች ያመለክታሉ፡፡ 575 ስለሆነም የትራፊክ አደጋን ለመቀነስ በሁሉም የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ላይ ግንዛቤ የመፍጠር ተግባር ለነገ የምንተወው ሳይሆን ሁላችንም የበኩላችንን ድርሻ በአቅማችን ከዛሬ ጀምሮ የምንወጣበት ተግባር ነው፡፡

ይህንንም ግንዛቤ የመፍጠር ሃላፊነት ለመንግስት አካል ብቻ የሚተው ሳይሆን መንግስታዊ ያልሆኑ አካላትም ማለትም የአሽከርካሪና የተሽከርካሪ ማህበራት፣ የንግድ ድርጅቶችና ተቋማት፣ የትምህርትና የሃይማኖት ተቋማት፣ ወላጆችና ሌሎችም የሚመለከታቸው አካላት ትኩረት ሰጥተውና ተቀናጅተው ግንዛቤ የማስጨበጥ ስራ ቢሰሩ የከተማዋ መንገዶች የሞት ሳይሆን የህይወት ተስፋዎች ይሆናሉ፡፡

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.16

This document has originally been written in English.

ERA Road Safety Manual, 2002, p.3-4

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SFI2

- 615 ቅድም ለመግለጽ እንደሞከርኩት ደገና የሆነ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደገንነት ተከብሯል ወይም ማቼሪቲ ሮድ ሴፍቲ ማቼሪቲ የሚሉት ዓይነት አለ (.) ያ ደርሷል ተብሎ እሚታሰበው ቅድም እንዳልኩት ተንቀሳቃሹ ትራፊክ ከማይንቀሳቀሰው የላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንቱን ጨምሮ እሱን ኮርዲኔትድ ያደረገ ኢንተግሬትድ የሆነ ስራ ተሰርቶ በዛ ላይ ውጤት ማምጣት ሲቻል ነው(.) በዚህ ጊዜ ነው የመንገድ ደገንነት ተረጋግጧል ተብሎ የሚታሰበው (.) ... ምንድነው አሁን
- 620 ህጎች አሉ (.) እነዚህ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የሚደርስባቸው በርካታ ምክንያቶች አሉ (.) ላደጋው አስተዋጽኦ የሚያደርጉ በርካታ ዘርፎች በርካታ ወገኖች አሉ (.) አሁን እነዛ ዘርፎች ሁሉ ስራ መስራት መቻል አለባቸው ለአደጋው አስተዋጽኦ እያደረጉ እንደሆነ ተገንዝበው እ አደጋውን ለመቀነስ የሚያስችል ስራ መስራት መቻል አለባቸው (.) እ ያ ማለት ምን ማለት ነው (.) እ ለምሳሌ ላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንቱን ቅድም እንደጠቀስኩት እ ላንድ ዩዝ ጥንቃቄ
- 625 ካልተደረገበት የግረኛ መንገዶች ለልዩልዩ ጉዳዮች ሊውሉ ይችላሉ (.) ሕንፃዎች ወይንም የተለያዩ አገልግሎት የሚሰጡ ነገሮች ለትራፊክ አደጋ አስተዋጽኦ ሊያደርጉ በሚችሉ ሁኔታ ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ (.) እነዛ መኖር የለባቸውም ስለዚህ ያ አካል ያንን ማስወገድ አለበት (.) አዎ ከስራቸው አንፃር እያንዳንዱ አሁን በዚህ በመንገድ ደገንነት ዙሪያ እስቴክሆልደር ወይም ባለድርሻ አካል ተብለው የተለዩት አካላት የራሳቸው ባዎጅ የተሰጣቸው የስራ ድርሻ አለ (.)
- 630 በዚያ ውስጥ በስራቸው ውስጥ ለመንገድ አደጋ አስተዋጽኦ የሚያደርገውን ነገር እንዲያስወግዱ ይጠበቃል (.) ስለዚህ ያንን ኢንተግሬትድ ሆነን መስራት አለባቸው ህጎችም ወተዋል እነዛም ህጎች መከበር መቻል አለባቸው (.) አሁን የሕንፃ ግንባታ ወይንም የላንድ ዩዝ ማኔጅመንት ህግ አለን (.) የመንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ህግ አለን (.) እ የተሽከርካሪ ምርመራ የተሽከርካሪ አገባብ እ እነዚህ ሁሉ አጠቃላይ ነገሮች ህጎች የወጡባቸው ናቸው (.) ኢቭን በሲቪል ኮድ

635 ውስጥ ምን ያረገ ምን ይቀጣል የሚል ዝርዝር የተቀመጡ ነገሮች አሉ (.) እነዚህ ነገሮች ሁሉ
 ኢንተግሬትድ መሆን አለባቸው (.) እነዚህ ነገሮች ሁሉ ኢንተግሬትድ ሁነው ተቀናጅተው
 አንዱ ላንዱ መጋቢ እየሆነ ቢጋራ ከሰሩ አደጋውን መቀነስ ይቻላል ማስወገድ ይቻላል (.)
 እነዚህ ነገሮች ካልተቀናጁ ግን አደጋውን ሙሉ በሙሉ መከላከል ሳይቻል ይችላል (.)
 የተወሰኑት አንዱ ወይም ሁለቱ ባግባቡ ሰራቸውን ሳይሰሩ ከቀሩ እነዚያ ያልሰሯቸው ሰራዎች
 640 የሚፈጥሩት ችግር አደጋ ሊከሰትበት ይችላል (.) ምክንያቱም የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ባንድ
 ወይም በሁለት ወይም ከዛም በላይ በሆኑ ምክንያቶች ስለሚከሰት (.) አንዱ ጠንክሮ ቢሰራ እ
 የትራፊክ ቁጥጥሩን ብናጠናክረው ሌሎች ጉዳዮች በመንገድ ላይ ያሉ ነገሮች ካልተሰተካከሉ
 ምን ማለት ነው (.) ለምሳሌ አሁን አንተ ተጠንቅቀህ እምታሸከረክልል ልትሆን ትችላለህ (.)
 እኔ ተጠንቅቄ እማላሸከረክልል ወይም ተጠንቅቄ የማልጓዝ ከሆነ አንተ አደጋ እንድታደርስ
 645 ምክንያት እሆናለሁ ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ እያንዳንዱ ነገር መቀናጅት አለበት (.) እሄ
 ተቀናጅቶ የሚመለከተው ሁሉ ስራውን ከሰራ (.) እግረኛውም ኃላፊነት አለበት ከሱ
 እሚጠበቀው ስራ ምንድነው መንገድ ላይ ሲጠቀም ምን ማረግ አለበት ተብለው የተቀመጡ
 ነገሮች አሉ (.) እነዛን ባግባቡ አክብሮ መሄድ ከቻለ የበኩሉን አስተዋፅዖ አደረገ ማለት
 ነው (.) ስለዚህ እሄ ሁሉ ሲቀናጅ አደጋውን መቀነስ ይቻላል ብዬ ነው እኔ እማስበው እ እንደ
 650 መስሪያ ቤትም በዚያ ደረጃ ነው እምናስበው (SFI2)

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እኔ በመንገድ ደህንነት ረገድ ያሉትን አጠቃላይ ሁኔታዎች እ ለማየትና ለመቃኘት
 እንዲሁም እሚቀረውንና ያለውን ነገር ለማየት እ ያው እንደሚታወቀው እ በቂ ጥናት
 ማድረግ ይጠይቃል (.) ግን ካጠቃላይ መረጃ ካጠቃላይ ሁኔታ እስካሁን ካለን ምልከታ እና
 ቅኝት እና በሌሎች አገሮች እየተሰራ ካለበት ልምድና ያሰራር ስርአት አንፃር ሲታይ እኛ
 655 አገር የሚቀሩት ነገሮች ብዙ ነገር መሆናቸውን እሚያመለክቱ ሁኔታዎች ይታያሉ ማለት ነው
 እንደሚታወቀው (.) እ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነትን ለማረጋገጥ የመንገድ ትራፊክ
 ማኔጅመንት እራሱ እ በተገቢ ሁኔታ መደራጀት መቻል አለበት እሚል እምነት አለኝ እኔ
 ማኔጅመንቱ እራሱ ከማኔጅመንቱ ብንጀምር ፖሊሲው ይሄንን እሚያበረታታ እሄንን ፎርም
 ቅርፅ እሚያሰጥ እ ተጠያቂነትና ግልፅነት የሰፈነበት በአመራር በሎጅስቲክ እ በደንብ
 660 የተደራጀ የአመራር ክህሎት ብቃቱ እውቀቱ ያለው ሀይል ሊመራው ይገባል የሚል እምነት
 አለኝ (.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት በእኛ አገር እንደሚታወቀው በብሄራዊ መንገድ
 ትራፊክ ደንብነት አማካሪ ፅህፈት ቤት አለ (.) አሁን ደሞ ወደ ትራንስፖርት ሚኒስቴር
 ሄዷል ከትራንስፖርት (.) ለብዙ ዘመን በፌዴራል ትራንስፖርት ባለስልጣን ስር ነበር አሁን
 ወደ ፌዴራል ወደ ትራንስፖርት ሚኒስቴር ሄዷል (.) ከዛ በተረፈ በፖሊስ ሥር ነው ያለው

- 665 እንደሚታወቀው ማለት ነው (.) የትራፊክ ፖሊስ የሚባለው አካል ብቻ ነው ይህንን ኃላፊነት የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነትን የመቆጣጠር ስርአት የማስያዝ ምን ማለት ኃላፊነት (.) በእኔ እምነት ግን በጣም ለየት ባለ መልኩ የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን የሚመራ እራሱን የቻለ አካል ሊኖረው ይገባል የሚል እምነት አለኝ የተደራጀ ትራፊክ ፖሊስን መንገድ ትራንስፖርትን የመንገድና ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ እሚባለውን በፌዴራል
- 670 የትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን የሚባለውን አካል የሚመራ ሌሎችን ከመንገድ ምህንድስና ሥራ ጋር ከትምህርትና ከቁጥጥር አንፃር (.) ከማነው ከትምህርትና ከሥልጠና አንፃር ከቁጥጥር ከዚህ ከኢንፎርሰመንት ኢዲዬሽንና እና እነዚህ ኢንጂነሪንግ እሚባሉትን ሶስት ስራዎች በላይነት የሚመራ (.) የትራፊክ ፍሰቱን የመንገድ አጠቃቀም ስርአቱን ኢንጂነሪንግን እራሱ ፊት-ሌት እሚያረግ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ሊያረጋግጥ በሚችል መልኩ ነው ወይ
- 675 የመንገድ ምህንድስና ሥራው የመንገድ ምልክቶች የተሟሉለት ነው ወይ (.) ደረጃውን በጠበቀ መንገድ እየተሰራ ነው ወይ ለትራፊክ አደጋ ኢጋላጭ ነው ወይስ አይደለም የሚሉትን በሚገባ የመቆጣጠር የመምራት የማስተባበር ሥራ መስራት መሰራት መቻል አለበት እና እንደምታቀው አሁን ያለው የትራፊክ ፖሊስም ስትወ ስደው በሎጅስቲክ የተሟላ አይደለም(.) አዲስ አባ ባዲስ አባ ከተማ አንድ ተሽከርካሪና ሁለት ተሽከርካሪ ያለበት አካል ነው የአዲስ
- 680 አባን ትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት እሚመራው እሚቆጣጠረው ማለት ነው እንደምታቀው (.) ሞተረኞች ላይ በርካታ ችግሮች አሉ በቂ ሞተር የላቸውም የሞተር መለዋዎጫ እቃዎች በስነ ስርዓት ሚንቴይን የሚያረጉበት የራሳቸው ጋራዥ ወይም በጀት የላቸውም(.) ሊፓትሮል ሥራ የሚቆጣጠሩበት ምንም አይነት ተሽከርካሪ የላቸውም (.) አገሩ በሙሉ ተዘጋግቶ በቃ የመን ግስት ያለህ የፖሊስ ያለህ እየተባለ እየተጮኸ መንገድ ተዘጋግቶ እዛ መጥቶ የማስተንፈስ
- 685 ሥራ እንኳ ሊሰራ የሚችል እ ለዛ ዝግጁ የሆነ የተደራጀ አካል የለውም ይሄ ከተማ ማለት ነው (.) ጮኸህ ጮኸህ በቃ ጉልበተኛው ሄዶ ሄዶ በግጭትም በምንም ከናካቴው ደሞ ግጭት ይደርስና ተዘጋግቶ ቁጭ ይላል ፕላን እስኪነሳ ይልሃል አገሩ ተዘግቶ ሁለት ሰዓት ሶስት ሰዓት ቆመህ ትውላለህ ማለት ነው(.) ስለዚህ በማኔ ጅመንት የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት አለ ወይ እዚህ ከተማ ብለህ ብትል በእኔ እምነትና ቅኝት የለንም አለ ሊባል እሚችል አይደለም (.)
- 690 አደጋ ሲደርስ መመርመር የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት አንድ አካል ቢሆንም ዋነኛ ስራው ግን ሊሆን አይገባም ማስተናበር ፍሰቱን ማስተካከል እ የመንገድና ተሽከርካሪ በተሳለጠ ሁኔታ አገልግሎት እንዲሰጡ ማስቻል እነዚህን የመሳሰሉ ሥራዎች ነው መሰራት የነበረባቸው (.) ስለዚህ ሰው በሚፈልገው ጊዜ ወጥቶ በሚፈልገው ጉዞው ከሚወስደው በስተቀር በመስተንጓል የትራፊክ መጨናነቅ በመፈጠር ያላስፈላጊ ችግር በእክል በማጋጠም በጊዜ ላይ በሰአት
- 695 በሥራ እሚባክነው ብክነት ሁሉ የማኔጅመንት እጥረት ወይም የጠንካራ ማኔጅመንት ያለመኖሩ ውጤት እንጂ ተፈጥሯዊ ችግር ነው ተብሎ መውሰድ አይቻልም ማለት ነው(.)

ስለዚህ ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን እራሱ እ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮዎች እራሳቸው በተገቢው
 ሁኔታ ሊደራጁ ይገባል (.) ትራፊክ ፖሊስ ባግባቡ ሊደራጅ ይገባል የመንገድ ምህንድስና
 ሥራው ሳይንቲፊካል ሮድ ሴፍቲን ግምት ውስጥ ያስገባ የመንገድ ደህንነትን ግምት ውስጥ
 700 ያስገባ አሁን እዚህ አገር እሚሰራውን አይተህ ከሆነ መንገዶች ይገነባሉ (.) መንገድ
 በመሰራት ላይ ነው እንኳ ብሎ ምልክት እማይቀመጥበት ከተማ ነው (.) መንገዱ በመሰራት
 ላይ ነው ስለዚህ ተጠንቅቃችሁ አሽከርክሩ የምትል አንድ ባለሦስት ማዕዘን ምልክት እንኳ
 ለማስቀመጥ ይሄ ማኔጅመንት ጥንካሬ መገለጫ አይደለም (.) አለመኖሩን ነው ቁጥጥሩ
 አመራሩ በጣም ሥርዓት የሌለው መሆኑን ነው እሚያመለክተው (.) ሄደህ ሄደህ መንገዱ ዝግ
 705 ነው ትባላለህ (.) አማጅን እንግዲህ (.) አስቀድሞ ነገሮህ ተለዋጭ መንገድ እንድትጠቀም
 ማድረግ ሲገባ ከሄድክ በኋላ መንገዱ ዝግ ነው ተብለህ ትመለሳለህ (.) ስለዚህ ምን ለዚህ
 ተጠያቂ አካል የለም ለሚባክነው ጊዜ (.) ነዳጅ ያገር ሃብት ነው በውጭ ምንዛሬ የሚመጣ
 ነገር ነው እንደምታቀው እ ሠራተኞች ወይ ሃኪም ይሆናል ያ እንደዛ እሚጉላላውና መንገድ
 ላይ እንደዛ እሚንከራተተው (.) ወይ የአንድ የዩኒቨርሲቲ ሌክቸረር ይሆናል ተማሪዎቹ ቁጭ
 710 ብለው ሚጠብቁት እ እንደዚህ አይነት በቃ በጣም በርካታ ችግሮች ነው (.) ወይ አንድ
 ከፍተኛ ባለሥልጣን ይሆናል ስንት ባለጉዳይ እሚጠብቀው ምን ማለት ነው ይሄ (.) ወይም
 ሱቅ ገብቶ እሚፈለግ ሸቀጥ የያዘ መደብር ውስጥ ነጋዴ ሊሆን ይችላል (.) ስለዚህ ከዛ
 መጉላላት ጀርባ የምናደርሰውን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ማህበራዊ ቀውስ ግምት ውስጥ ያስገባ የአመራር
 እየተጠቀምን ነው ወይ ቢባል አይደለም ነው እንደውም እያባባስን ነው ያለው ማለት ነው (.)
 715 ድህነትን ለማስወገድ ጥረት አለ እዚህ ትግል አለ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ድህነትን ሊያባብስ
 የሚችል ግድየለሽነት የሰፈነበት ምንቸገረኝነት የሰፈነበት ተጠያቂነት የሌለበት የትራፊክ
 ደህንነት ማኔጅመንት አለ ማለት ነው (.) እና ስለዚህ እኔ ይሄንን እንደ ከመዋቅር አንፃር
 አለን እሚሉ አካል አሉ (.) አዲስአባ ትራንስፖርት መንገድና ትራንስፖርት ተነስቶ
 መግለጫ ሲሰጥ ትሰማዋለህ ይመለከተኛል ብሎ ስለሚያስብ (.) ያዲስአባ ትራፊክ ተነስቶ
 720 መግለጫ ሲሰጥ ታያለህ እ ፌዴራልም አንዳንዴ ተነስቶ ሲሰጥ ታቃለህ (.) ሪል በሆነ መልኩ
 ግን የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን እሚመራው ሪስፖንሲብል ኦርጋን የትኛው ነው ተብሎ ቢጠየቅ
 ግን ከኃላፊነትና ከተጠያቂነት አንፃር እኔ ነኝ እሚልህ አታገኝም (.) ይሄ ችግር አለብኝ ይሄ
 ችግር አለብኝ እሚሉ አመራሮች እንጂ እና መዋቅር እንጂ የስ ለዚህ ብልሽት ሽት ላለ
 አሰራር ተጠያቂው እኔ ነኝ የሚል አካል የለም (.) ዝም ብሎ ሥልጣን አለኝ ለማለት ብቅ
 725 ብሎ መናገርና ኃላፊነትን መውሰድ የተለያዩ ተግባራት ናቸው (.) ስለዚህ ኃላፊነቱን ወስዶ
 የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንቱን እምመራ እኔ ነኝ ሊልህ አይችልም ቲም ነው ቲም ወርክ ነው
 የትራፊክ ማኔጅመንት ሥራ (.) የሚመለከታቸው እስቴክክሆልደርስ በሙሉ ተቀናጅተው

የሚመሩት የሚሰሩት መሆን አለበት(.) ለምሳሌ ትምህርት ቤቶችን ትምህርት ሚኒስቴር ባባልነት መገኘት አለበት(.) ለምንድነው ትምህርት ሚኒስቴር የመግቢያ መውጫ በሮቻቸውን ስርአት ያሲዛሉ (.) የተማሪዎችን መግቢያ መውጫ ስርአትን ለመስራት በሚኒ ሚኒያ በለው በምን በለው ትምህርት ቤት በ የመንገድ ደህንነት በማገናዘብ ከካሪኩለም ከምን አንፃር ራሱን የቻለ አስተዋፅኦ አለው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ እነዚህን እነዚህን ሥራዎች ጤና ጥበቃ እራሱን በኢመርጀንሲ ጊዜ አደጋውን የተጎድዎቹን ቁጥር ለመቀነስ የጉዳቱን መጠን ሞት የነበረውን ወደ አካል ጉዳት አካል ጉዳት የነበረውን ወደ ስነ ልቦና የስነ ልቦናውን ምናምን ለማረጋገጥ

735 የመጀመሪያ እርዳታ አሰጣጥ ሥርዓታችን ይሄንን አቀናጅቶ ሊመራ የሚችል ማኔጅመንት ያስፈልጋል ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ አንደኛ መንገድና ተሽከርካሪን ባግባቡ ለመጠቀም የሚያስችል ሁለተኛ ከአቅም በላይ የሆኑ ችግሮች በሚከሰቱበት ሰአት ስርአት ሊያሲዝ የሚችል የተደራጀ የተሟላ በእውቀት በክህሎት የተሟላ በመሳሪያ የተደገፈ አመራር ሊሰጥ የሚችል አካል ያስፈልጋል (.) ሶስተኛ ይሄንን እየተከታተለ የህግ ክፍተቶች መኖራቸው

740 እንኳ ሲታውቅ የህግ ማመንጨት ኃላፊነቱን እየወሰደ መንግስት ተገቢውን ህግ ሥርዓት እንዲያወጣ በማስቻል ያንንም ሊተገበሩ ሊፈጸሙ ስራ ላይ ሊውሉ እሚችሉ ህጎች እንዲወጡ በማድረግ ደንቦች እንዲወጡ በማድረግ እንዲፈፀሙ በማስቻል ኃላፊነቱን ሊወጣ የሚችል አካል ሊኖር ይገባል (.) ስለዚህ እንደዛ አይነት ነገር እኔ በበቂ ሁኔታ አለ ማለት አይቻልም(.) ራዳር የለም ካሜራ የለም እንደምታቀው (.) ትራፊክ ማስተላለፊያ መብራቶች

745 አሁን ነው እየተተከሉ ያሉት (.) አዲስ አባ ቀድሞ ነበራት ለብዙ አመት ደሞ ከትራፊክ ማስተላለፊያ መብራት ውጭ ሆኖ ነው የኖረችው (.) የመንገድ ትራፊክ ፍሰቱ የበለጠ ኮምፕሊኬትድ እየሆነ ሲመጣ የግረኛው ቁጥር እየጨመረ ሲሄድ የመንገድ ተላላፊ ቁጥር እየጨመረ ሲሄድ ማኔጅመንቱ የዛን ያህል እየተፋጠነ ያንን የተጨናነቀ ነገር ስርአት እሚያሲዝና ያለምንም ውጣ ውረድ በቀጥታ ፍሰቱ አግባብ ባለው መልኩ እንዲሄድ የማስቻል

750 ብቃት እውን ካልተደረገ ያሉትም ይቀራቸዋል (.) አደረጃጀቱም በስነሥርዓት መቀየር አለበት (.) ህግና ሥርዓቱ በተሻለ ሁኔታ ሊቀረፅ ይገባል የሚል እምነት ነው ያለኝ እኔ (SPS19)

SFI2

755 እንደኛ ግምገማ እ መልካም ነገሮች ታይተዋል ብለን እንላለን (.) እ ያልተሻሻሉ ነገሮችም ኦፍኮርስ አሉ ግን እ የተሻሻሉ ብዙ ነገሮች አሉ (.) ከነዚህ መካከል ግንዛቤው እ ደኅና ደረጃ ላይ የደረሰበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) በተለይ ወደገጠር ወጣ ስትል በክፍለሃገር ያለው ሕዝብ በጣም ጥሩ የመንገድ አጠቃቀም የምታይበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) እ እንደዚሁ ተሳፋሪ ህግ መብቱን ለማስከበር ጥረት የሚያረጋግጥን ሁኔታ ታያለህ (.) ካሽከርካሪም አንጻር እ የሚገባውን

760 ፍጥነት እና መንገድ አጠቃቀም ጠብቀው የሚያሸከረክሩ እንዳሉ እምታይበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) በዚህም ሁኔታ ለውጦች አደጋ እስከመቀነስ ድረስ ለውጦች እሚመጡበት እሚታዩበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) ባንዳንድ አካባቢ ላይ ደሞ በተለይ ከተሞች ላይ እ ችግሩ የመንገድ አጠቃቀሙ በተለይ የግረኛው በጣም ከፍተኛ የሆነ ችግር ያለበት ምንም እ የታየ ለውጥ የሌለበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) ግን ያ ሰው ግንዛቤ አልወሰደም ልንል አንችልም ሙሉ በሙሉ (.) የሌለው ይኖራል

765 ግንዛቤ ያልያዘ የት መሻገር እንዳለበት እንዴት አርጎ መሄድ እንዳለበት እሚያቅ አይኖርም ልንል አንችልም ይኖራል (.) ነገር ግን ያን እሚያውቀው ይበዛል የሚል ግምገማ ነው ያለው(.) ነገርግን ተግባራዊ ማረጉ እንዴት ነው ስንል ነው ችግሩ ያለው ተግባራዊ እሚያደርግበት ሁኔታ የለም (.) አሁን አንድን ዝም ብሎ እንደልቡ እሚሄድ ይሄ ጆይ ወክር ይሉታል እ ለምንድነው በዚህ ሁኔታ እምትሄደው ወይም ትክክለኛው የመንገድ አጠቃቀም

770 የትኛው ነው ብትለው ትክክለኛውን ይነግርሃል (.) አንተ ለምን አልተጠቀምክም ስትለው ግን መልስ የለውም (.) እንደዛ አይነት ነው አብዛኛው የከተማ ሕዝብ (.) ስለዚህ ይሄ ኢንፎርሽን መንት ይፈልጋል ተከታታይነት ያለው የግንዛቤ የመቆርቆር ስራ ይፈልጋል (.) እ ይሄ ነው አደጋውን ስናየው እ በቁጥር ደረጃ ስናየው እየጨመረ ያለበት ሁኔታ ይታያል (.) እ ከሁለት ዓመት በፊት ሁለት ሺህ ቤት ውስጥ ነበረ ሁለት ሺ አምስት መቶ ሁለት ሺህ

775 ምናምን ነበረ (.) አሁን ሦሥት ሺህ ያለፈበት ሁኔታ እናያለን (.) ከሁለት ሺህ አራት ወደዚህ ያንን ሁኔታ እናያለን (.) እሄ ማለት ግን በስሌት ደረጃ ስናየው አደጋው ጨምሯል ማለት አይደለም (.) ኦፍኮርስ መቀነስ ነበረበት ግን እሄ አደጋው ጨምሯል ሊያስብል እማይችልበት ሁኔታ ምንድነው ባመት ምን ይህል ተሸከርካሪ ይገባል የሚለውን ታሳቢ ማድረግ ይኖርብናል (.) ከነበረው ካምስት አመት በፊት ከነበረው ካምስት አመት በፊት ሁለት ሺ

780 ምናምን ሰው የሚሞተው ስንት ተሸከርካሪ እያለ ነው ዛሬ ሶስት ሺ ምናምን ሰው የሚሞተው ስንት ተሸከርካሪ እያለ ነው ብለን ካልኩሌት ብናደርግ እድገት ላናይበት እንችላለን (.) ስለዚህ የተወሰነ አትሊስት እንግዲህ አስተሳሰቡ ምንድነው የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን ስትቀንስ መጀመሪያ ታስገነዝባለህ ከዛ በኋላ እስታብላይዝ ታደርጋለህ ከዛ በኋላ ትቀንሳለህ ነው (.) ስለዚህ አትሊስት እስታብላይዝ ለማረግ ወደሚያስችሉ አካባቢዎች ላይ ነው ያለው

785 የሚል ግምት አለን እኛ (.) አሁን እነዚህ አደጋዎች እንዴት ነው እሚደርሱት ስትል ማስ ካዠቀሉቲስ ይደርሳሉ አንዳንድ ጊዜ በርካታ ሕዝብ የጫኑ አውቶቡሶች እንዴ በሚወድቁበት ጊዜ እሚያልቀው ሰው ብዙ ነው (.) እነዛ ናቸው አሁን አደጋውን እንትን እያደረጉት ያለው እንዲያውም በፊት ዳታዎች እንደሚያሳዩት እ ከሁለት ከሶስት ዓመት በፊት እ ካምሳ ፐርሰንት በላይ ሃምሳ ሁለት ሃምሳ ሶስት ፐርሰንት ድረስ ያደጋው ዋና ተጠቂ እግረኛው

790 ነበረ (.) አሁን ከዛ ወዲህ ያሉትን ሁኔታዎች ስናይ ደሞ ወደተሰላፋሪዎች አብዛኛው ቁጥር ወደተሰላፋሪው የሄደበትን ሁኔታ ነው እምናየው (.) ይሄ ማለት ምንድነው እግረኛው በተወሰነ

ደረጃ ግንዛቤ እየኖረው በመምጣቱ ስርዓት ያለው የመንገድ አጠቃቀም በመጠቀሙ መቀነሱን ነው (.) በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ተሳፋሪው አሽከርካሪዎች ያልተለወጡ አሽከርካሪዎች በርካታ ሕዝብ ጭነው በሚያሸከረክሩበት ጊዜ አውቶቡሶች በሚገለበጡበት ጊዜ የሚደርሱ በርካታ

795 የሀይወት ጥፋቶችና የአካል ጉዳቶች በመድረሳቸው እንደዛ እየሆነ እየሆነ መሄዳቸውን እናያለን (.) ከትኩረትም አንጻር ያው የተሻለ ትኩረት ተሰጥቷል ብለን እናስባለን (.) ቅድም እንዳልኩት በቂ አይደለም ገና ብዙ ብዙ ይጠበቃል ከችግሩ አሳሳቢነት አንጻር (.) ቋሚ የመንገድ ደኅንነትን የሚመለከት ኦፊስ አልነበረም አሁን ቋሚ ኦፊስ ተፈጥሯል (.) እ ተመጣጣኝ ነው ባይባልም የተወሰነ ለመነሻ የሚሆን የበጀት ድጋፍ አለ (.) እ እነዚህ እነዚህ

800 ነገሮች እና እየተሰሩ ያሉ ስራዎች እና ቁጥጥሩን በቴክኖሎጂ ለመደገፍ እየተደረጉ ያሉ ጥረቶች መሳሪያዎች የመግዛት እ የመሳሰሉት ሰዎችን የማሰልጠን እንዲህ እንዲህ የመሳሰሉት ነገሮች አዳዲስ ህጎችን የማውጣት የትራፊክ ቁጥጥሩ እ ለግንዛቤው ለምኑ ለምኑ የሚጠቅሙ አዳዲስ ህጎችን የማውጣት የነበሩትን ሪቫይዝ የማድረግ ስራዎች ሁሉ የተሰሩባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ እነዚህ ሁሉ ስታይ እንዳጠቃላይ ለውጦች አሉ ማለት

805 እምንችለው በነዚህ መነሻነት ነው (.) ሆኖም ግን እኛ ከምንፈልገው ሃገሪቱ ሕዝቡ ከሚፈልገው አንጻር ግን እስቲል ብዙ መሰራት ገና ይጠይቃል ገና ገና ምንም ያልተነካ ነገር ነው ብለን ነው እምናጠቃልለው (SFI2)

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.13-14 (a)

This document has originally been written in English.

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.79 (b)

This document has originally been written in English.

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.80 (c)

This document has originally been written in English.

SFI2

ጠያቂ:-... እንደው አሁን ካለው ተጨባጭ ችግር አንጻር (.) የኢትዮጵያ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደኅንነት ስራ በየትኞቹ ዋና ዋና በሚሉዋቸው ዘውጎች ላይ እንደው ነጥቦች ላይ ማትኮር አለበት ይላሉ (.) ሞቱን የአካል ጉዳቱን እና የንብረቱን እንደዚህ ለመቀነስ ያለውን ችግር

850 ለመቀነስ በሁሉም መስክ መሰራት አለበት ይሄ እውነት ነው ግን በተለይ በዚህ ኤርያ ላይ በዚህ ትኩረት አፋጣኝ መሰጠት አለበት የሚሉት ነገር ካለ

- መላሽ፡- እ አዎ እንግዲህ እኛም ከዚህ በፊት የጀመርናቸው ነገሮች አሉ እንዲጋጣሚ ሆኖ ምክር ቤቱም እንዳቅጣጫ ያስቀመጠው ነገር ምንድነው ሁለት ትልልቅ ነገሮችን አስቀምጧል (.) ምክር ቤቱም እንዳቅጣጫ ያስቀመጠው ነገር ምንድነው ሁለት ትልልቅ
- 855 ነገሮችን አስቀምጧል (.) አንደኛው ቁጥጥርን ማጠናከር አለብን የሚል ነው (.) ስለዚህ ትልቁን በጀት ለቁጥጥር ስራ ማዋል አለብን ቁጥጥራችን በቴክኖሎጂ ውጤት የተደገፈ መሆን አለበት(.) በበቂ የሰው ሐይል በበቂ ስልጠና በቂ ግንዛቤ ተይዞ በቂ ዕውቀት ተይዞ እ መሰራት አለበት ተብሎ ዋናው ቁጥጥሩ ባንደኛ ደረጃ መጠናከር አለበት ተብሎ የተቀመጠ ጉዳይ ነው (.) እሄ ትክክለኛ አስተሳሰብ ነው (.) ሁለተኛው ደግሞ ግንዛቤውን ጎን ለጎን
- 860 ማጠናከር ነው (.) እ እግረኛውም አሽከርካሪውም ተሳፋሪውም ሁሉም ሕዝብ ስለመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ እንዴት ይከሰታል እንዴት መከላከል እችላለሁ(.) ብዙ ሰው አሁን እስካሁን ድረስ እ መለኮታዊ ጉዳይ ነው ብሎ እሚያስብ ሰው እኮ ይኖራል አለም (.) በቃ እግዚአብሄር ነው እንጂ ተጠንቅቀህ እምትድነው ነገር አደለም እግዚአብሄር ሙት ካለህ ትሞታለህ ብሎ የሚያስብ ሁኔታ ነው (.) ነገር ግን የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ በቅድና በመረጃ ላይ የተመሰረተ
- 865 ኢንተርኔትን ከተደረገበት መከላከል የሚቻል ክስተት ነው (.) እሄን እኛ በተሞክሯችን አረጋግጠናለን (.) በሳምንት እ ካምስት እስከ አስር ሰው ይሞትበት የነበረ ሃይዌይን በራዳር የተደገፈ የፓይለት ያምስት ወር የፓይለት ቁጥጥር ባደረግንበት ወቅት በምስራቅ ሸዋ ላይ ከዛ በጣም ምናልባትም እስከ ሃምሳ ፐርሰንት የሚደርስ ከዛም በላይ የሚደርስ እ እንዳንዴም በሳምንት ምንም ዓይነት የሰው ሞት ሳይከሰት ያለፈበት ሳምንቶችን አይተናል ቁጥጥር
- 870 በመደረጉ ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ከዚህ እምትረዳው ምንድነው የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ልንከላከለው የምንችል ጉዳይ ነው መለኮታዊ አይደለም (.) ሰው ከተጠነቀቀ ከተረዳ ምን ማረግ እንዴት አርጎ መንዳት አለበት እንዴት አርጎ በግሩ መሄድ አለበት እንዴት አርጎ ነው መንገዱን መሻገር ያለበት እንዲህ እያለ እያንዳንዱን ነገር ተገንዝቦ ከተጠቀመ ምንም ነገር የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ ላይደርስ ይችላል (.) ኢቭን በቴክኒክ ችግር ይደርስ በተሸከርካሪ
- 875 የቴክኒክ ችግር ይደርሳል ተብሎ የሚባለው ነገር እንኳን አሽከርካሪው ግንዛቤው ከኖረው አብዛኛውን ይቀንሰዋል ኢቭን ከዚያም ውስጥ(.) ለምን መኪናውን ከማስነሳቱ በፊት ቺክ አርጎ ከተነሳ በተገቢው ፍጥነት ከነዳ ምልክቶችን አክብሮ ከነዳ በቴክኒክ ምክንያት እንኳን የሚደርሰውን መከላከል ይችላል (.) የቴክኒክ ጉድለት እንዳለው ሲያይ አይነዳውም ወይም እየነዳ ሳለ በተገቢው ፍጥነት ላይ ከሆነ እየነዳ ሳለ የቴክኒክ ችግር እንደተከሰተ ሲያውቅ
- 880 መቆጣጠር ይችላል (.) በፍጥነት ላይ ከሆነ ግን መቆጣጠር አይችልም (.) ስለዚህ እኛ እምንረዳው ነገር ይሄን ነው (.) እሄ ሁሉ ግንዛቤ መያዝ አለበት እነዚህ ሁሉ ከተደረጉ መንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን መቀነስ ይቻላል (.) ስለዚህ ዋናዎቹ የመጀመሪያው ቁጥጥር

መጠናከር አለበት (.) ሁለተኛው ደሞ ግንዛቤው ጎን ለጎን መዳበር አለበት (.) እነዚህ ከተደረጉ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን በከፍተኛ ደረጃ መቀነስ ይቻላል (SFI2)

SFI2

885 **ጠያቂ:-** ብዙ ባለድርሻዎች አሉ እንግዲህ በዚህ በእናንተ በብሔራዊ የመንገድ ደህንነት ካውንስል ሥር ታቅፈው እየሰሩ ያሉ እና የትኞቹ ናቸው እንደው እንደሚገባ ኃላፊነታቸውን እየተወጡ ናቸው ብሎ ማለት እሚቻለው

መላሻ:- እንግዲህ እስካሁን በዚያ እየተሳተፉ ያሉት ወደሰባት አካባቢ ባለድርሻ አካላት አሉ(.) እ በእኔ ግንዛቤ ሰባቱም አጠቃላይ የትራፊክ ደህንነት ጉዳይ ተከፋፍሎ የተሰጣቸው

890 ናቸው (.) አንዱን ጥሎ ጉዳዩን ማንቀሳቀስ አይቻልም ሌላኛውንም ጥሎ ጉዳዩን ማንቀሳቀስ አይቻልም (.) ለምሳሌ ያህል ብንመለከት የፌደራል ፖሊስ የትራፊክ ህጉን የማስፈፀም ሥራ ይሰራል የማስፈፀም ሥራ ይሰራል (.) ስለዚህ የህግ ጥሰቶችን ይቆጣጠራል ተገቢውን ቅጣት ይሰጣል (.) የተሸከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት ያሸከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ብቃት እነዚህ እነዚህ የሙያ ክህሎቶችን እነዚህ እነዚህን ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን ይሰጣል (.) መንገዶቹ ለዚህ ለትራፊክ

895 ደህንነቱ ወይም አደጋውን ከመቀነስ አንፃር ምቹ ሆነው መሰራት አለባቸው ብለን ሃሳቡን ስናነሳ ይህንንም ጉዳዩ ነው ብሎ ወስዶ ቤቱ እሚሰራ መንገዶች ባለሥልጣን ነው ይሄም አለ(.) ድንገት ከዚህ ቁጥጥር ውጭ ወጥቶ አደጋ ቢከሰት የትራፊክ አደጋ ላይ የጤና የአካል ጉዳት ሲደርስ ደግሞ የህክምና አገልግሎት እነዚህን እሚሰጡት የጤና ጥበቃ ሚኒስቴር በስሩ ያሉ ጤና ጣቢያዎች ክሊኒኮች አገልግሎት እንዲሰጡ እሱም ይሰራል (.) አካል ጉዳት

900 ከተከሰተ ደሞ አንድ ተጠቃሚ ወይም ትራፊክ የትራንስፖርት አገልግሎት ተጠቃሚ ላይ ስለዚህ የኢንሹራንስ አገልግሎት እንዲኖረው ደግሞ ትራንስፖርት ፈንድ እሚባል አካል አለ(.) ይሄ አካል ይሄ ሦስተኛ ወገን ኢንሹራንስ እሚባለውን ተሸከርካሪዎች እንዲገቡ አድርጎ ገንዘቡን የሚሰበሰብ አካል ነው (.) ስለዚህ ሁሉም አሉ (.) ይሄ የመንገድ ፈንድ እሚባለው ድርጅት መንገዶች እራሱ እንዲሰጡ እ ለሴፊቲ ለሚደረጉ እንቅስቃሴ ይሄን ኢንሴንቲቭ

905 እሚያረግ ድርጅት ነው (.) እ ሌላው ትምህርት ሚኒስቴር ለተማሪዎች በትምህርት ቤቶች በክበባት መልክ የትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴን እንዲከታተሉ ክበብ አቋቁመውም ትራፊክ ፖሊሶችንም እንዲያግዙ ተማሪዎች ወደ ትምህርት ቤትም እንዲህ ሲገቡ ሲወጡ ያን ስራ እንዲሰሩ በማድረግ ግንዛቤው በተማሪዎች ደረጃና እዛ ባለው ማህበረሰብ እንዲኖር የማድረግ ሥራ ይሰራል (.) ሌላው በሚዲያ ደግሞ እንዲህ ለህብረተሰቡ በሰፊው የትራፊክ ደህንነት

910 መረጃ ወይም ግንዛቤ እንዲደረስ በማድረግ ደግሞ የመንግስት ኮሙዩኒኬሽን ጉዳዮች ጽሕፈት ቤት ድርሻውን ይወጣል (.) ሶ በዚህ መልኩ የባለድርሻ አካላት ያንዱ ሚና ከሌላኛው ያንሳል ይበልጣል ልንል የምንችለው አይነት አይደለም

ጠያቂ፡- አዎ አይ በተጨማሪም እኔ አሁን ጥያቄዬ በተጨማሪም አሁን ባለው እንቅስቃሴ ላይ ያላቸው ሚና እንዴት ነው ነው (.) ይሄም ትልቅ ሚና እንዳላቸው እንዳለ በካውንስል ደረጃ

915 ያው ከኑድርሻቸው ተቀምጧል (.) ግን በእንቅስቃሴ ደግሞ ሲታይ እ በእርግጥ ሁሉም የሚገባውን ያክል እያደረገ ይሆን(.) በእኩል ደረጃ ሁሉም ላይጠበቅበትም ይችላል (.) ሚናው የተለያዩ ስለሚሆን ግን እሚጠበቅበትን ያክል የሚያደርግ ካለ ወይም ከሌላ አይነት ነው

መላሽ፡- በዚህ ረገድ እንግዲህ የማን ድርሻ ይበልጣል ብዬ መገምገም ባልችልም ሁልጊዜ ከፊት እምናየው የትራፊክ ደህንነትን በሚመለከት በቅድሚያ እምናየው ፖሊስ ነው (.)

920 በተለምዶ እምናቀው ይሄንን ነው (.) አሁን በዚህ በኮሚቴ ሥራም የማስተውለው የፖሊስን ድርሻ ጎልቶ ነው እማያዬው (.) ጎልቶ እማየው የፖሊስን ድርሻ ነው (SFI2)

SFI4

ጠያቂ፡ የትኞቹ እንደሚገባ ኃላፊነታቸውን እየተወጡ ናቸው ብሎ መገምገም ይቻላል

መላሽ፡ እንግዲህ አሁን ያው በዋናነት መንገድ ትራንስፖርት አለ (.) እ ፌዴራል ፖሊስ አለ (.) እንደገናም ደግሞ ያው የዚህ የከተማው የአዲስ አበባ ፖሊስ ኮሚሽን ወንጀልና ትራፊክ አደጋ መከላከል አለ (.) እ ሁሉም ጥረቶች እያደረጉ ነው (.) እነዚህ አሁን የጠቀስኳቸው ብቻ

925 ሳይሆኑ አሉ የከተማው አስተዳደር በዚህ በኩል መንግስት በዚህ በኩል አለ (.) ሌሎችም ኢቭን አሁን ደንብ ማስከበር ደንብ ማስከበር አሁን ለምሳሌ መንገድ ላይ ያለውን ይሄ እግረኛው ላይ ያለውን ከማስወገድ አንፃር የራሱን ጥረቶች ያደርጋል (.) እና ሁሉም የየራሱን ኮንትራብዩት ያደርጋል (.) በዋናነት እንግዲህ ለዚህ ነገር ትኩረት ሰቶ እየሰራ ያለው በአሁን ሰአት መንገድ ትራንስፖርትም በተመሳሳይ እየሰራ ነው (.) ፌዴራል ፖሊስም እንደዚሁ (.)

930 እንደውም ምንድነው እያሰቡ ያሉት በአገርአቀፍ ደረጃ የትራፊክ እ በፌዴራል እስተራል የለም እና የትራፊክ ፖሊስ በዛ አይነት መልኩ ለማሰልጠን እና ስራ ለመስራት ማቴሪያልም እንዲሟላ የማድረግ እንቅስቃሴ የጀመሩበትና ሥልጠናም ለተወሰኑ ሰዎች የተጠብቱ ሂደት አለ (.) ይሄንን ስንመለከት ትኩረት ያገኘ ጉዳይ መሆኑንና እነዚህ ግን ሞር ደግሞ የበለጠ ለዚህ ጉዳይ ትኩረት ሰተው እየተንቀሳቀሱ ያሉ መሆኑን እምናይባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ (.)

935 መንገድ ትራንስፖርትም ፖሊስን ከማገዝ እነዚህ ከመገናኛ ሬዲዮኖችን በቀላሉ ሪፖርቶችን ለማስተላለፍ ለመገናኘትም አጠቃላይ ማለትም የትራፊኩንም ወንጀልም ከመደገፍ አንፃር ጥሩ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረጉ ነው ያሉትና (.) ከዚህ አንፃር ስንመለከት እነዚህ አካላት የበለጠ እየተንቀሳቀሱ ያሉ መሆኑን ያመለክታል (SFI4)

SCA13

940 እንግዲህ ምንድነው እኔ እኔ እማስበው ለምሳሌ አሁን አንዱ ያው ኢንጂነርን ጥላታ ያነሳነው ነገር አለ (.) የተሰሩት አልፎ ተሰርተዋል እነሱን ሞዲፋይ ማድረግ እሚቻል ከሆነ ያው የተወሰነ በተለይ ከእግረኛ መንገድ ጋር ተያይዞ የእግረኛ መንገዶቻችን አጥር ያላቸው ቢሆኑ አንዱ ኢንጂነርን ላይ የሚሰራው ቀጣይ የሚሰሩ ስራዎች ናቸው (.) አሁን በእርግጥ የሚሰሩ በሙሉ የእግረኛ መንገድ አላቸው (.) በተገቢው የተሟላ እየሆኑ እየተሰሩ ነው ያሉት (.) ሌላው

945 አሁንም ሰጪ ውስጡ እስኪገባ ድረስ የተጀመረው ስለትራፊክ ደህንነት የማሳወቁ ስራ የሚያገባው አካል ማለት ነው በዋነኛነት የሚያገባው አካል ይሄንን ነገር ሰጪ አእምሮ ውስጥ ገብቶ እስኪያነቃው ድረስ ሰላቸኝ ሳይል መሰራት አለበት (.) ከዚህ በተጓዳኝ ህግ አስፈፃሚው አካል ማለትም እኛ (.) ምክንያቱም እነዚህ ነገሮች ካልተደረጉ በስተቀር ነገሮች ልቅ ከሆኑ መስመር ሊይዙ አይችሉም (.) አንዳንድ ጊዜ በጣም ለራሴ አፍራለሁ (.) ማለት ወጣ ብለን

950 ስናይ አስፓልቶቻችን ከተሸከርካሪው ይልቅ ለእግረኛ የተሰሩ የሚመስሉባቸው ሁኔታዎች አሉ (.) አንዳንድ ቦታዎች በእርግጥ የመንገዱ አሰራር ለእግረኛም የሚሆን መንገድ አለመኖሩ ይሆናል (.) ኢቭን ግን የእግረኛም መንገድ እያለ በዛ ውስጥ ነው እግረኛ እሚሄደው (.) ይሄ ለምን ሆነ ብለን ስንል ደግሞ ኢንፎርሰመንቱ ስለሌለ ነው (.) ምናልባት ህጉን የማስተግበር ስራው ቢኖር ኖሮ እግረኛውን እምንቀጣው ቢሆን እዛ ውስጥ አይገባም (.) ቀለበት አይዘልም (.)

955 ዜርፎር እዛ ውስጥ አልገባም ማለት ሴፍ አረግነው ማለት ነው ሰውዬውን (.) ቢያንስ በቀላሉ ለአደጋ እንዳይጋለጥ የማድረግ ስራ ነው (.) ስለዚህ እነዚህ ነገሮች ተጠናክረው ተጋግዘው ሲሄዱ ነው ውጤታማ ነገር እናያለን ብዬ እማስበውና እነዚህ መሰራት አለባቸው (.) እነዚህ ከተሰሩ ለውጥ ይመጣል (.) ስለዚህ ፔድስቲሪያትም ላይ አሸከርካሪውም ላይ ሳይሰለች መሰራት መቻል አለበት ህጉን ከማስተግበር ጋር ተያይዞ (SCA13)

SCA12

ከአስር ወይም ከአምስት አመታት በኋላ ምን ደረጃ ላይ እንደርሳለን ብዬ ሳስብ ምክንያቱም እ ከተማችን ወይም ሀገራችን በእድገት ላይ ስላለች እ እድገቱ ደግሞ የሚያመጣቸው የራሱ ጠቃሚ ነገሮች አሉና (.) ለምሳሌ በቴክኖሎጂ መታገዝ እነዚህ አሸከርካሪ ማነው እ የትራፊክ አባሎቻችን ዘመናዊ የሆነ ሥልጠና እንዲያገኙ በማድረግ ወይም ደግሞ እነሲሲቲቪ ካሜራ

965 ራዳሮች አልኮል ቴስተር የመሳሰሉትን ማቴሪያሎች ጅምሩ አለ የመጠቀሙና እየተጠቀምን ስንሄድ አጥፊ አሸከርካሪዎችን በቀላሉ ስለምንቆጣጠር ደጋጋሚ አጥፊዎችም ቦታ እየቀያየሩ እንደፈለጉ ስለማይሆኑ (.) ሀገርአቀፍ ኔትወርክ እየተዘረጋ ሲሄድ ይሄ መንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ሲስተሙ የቴክኒክ ምርመራ ሲስተሙ እነዚህ እነዚህ ነገሮች እ በተጠናክረ መልኩ እና እያንዳንዱ ሰው በቴክኖሎጂ ታግዞ እየሰራ በሚሄድበት ጊዜ በሰዎች የሚሸፈኑ ነገሮች እየቀሩ

970 ይሄዳሉ (.) ለምሳሌ አሁን ምንድነው በሰዎች የሚሸፈኑ ስል ማንኛውም አሽከርካሪ ሁለት ሶስት መንጃ ፈቃድ አለው ፎርጅድ እያሰሩ(.) ዜርፎር ይሄኛው ሲያዝበት በዚህኛው ይቀጥላል እነዚህን (.) እነዚህን ነገሮች የምናስወግድበት ቴክኖሎጂ ወደምንጠቀምበት ደረጃ ላይ እንመጣለን (.) አገርአቀፍ የሆነ የላይስንስ ወይም መንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ሲስተሞች ይዘረጋሉ ኔትወርኮች ይኖራሉ ብዬ አስባለሁና (.) እነዚህ እነዚህ ነገሮች ሲኖሩ አሁን ያለው የትራፊክ

975 አደጋ አይ ሆኖ ሌሎች አገሮችም እንደዚሁ ከከፍተኛ ወደ መቀነስ እየመጡ ያሉበት ሁኔታ ነው እምናየው (.) መጀመሪያ አንድ ወቅት ላይ አደጋው በጣም አሳሳቢ ይሆናል (.) ዜን በዛ ላይ ሁሉም ተረባርቦ ሲሰራ ለሀገራቸው ለውጥ አምጥተዋል (.) እኛም እንደሱ አይነት ነገር እኛ አገር ይኖራል ብዬ ሆኖ አረጋለሁ (SCA12)

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980 ጠያቂ:- ደህንነት የእርሶን አልነገሩኝም አሁን የእናንተ የዚህ (የት.ቤቱ ስም) አስተዋፅዖ በዚህ በሴፍቲ ላይ በደህንነት ላይ

መላሽ:- (የት.ቤቱ ስም) እንደ ተቋም መጀመሪያም በአስራዘጠኝ ዘጠና (ምናምን) ሲመሰረት በአክሲዮን መልኩ ሲመሰረት ይዞት የተነሳቸው(.) በጣም ግዙፍና በርካታ አላማዎች ነበሩት(.) ከነዚህ ብዙ በርካታና ግዙፍ አላማዎች አንደኛውና ዋነኛው አደጋን ተከላክለው ማሸከርከር

985 የሚችሉ ፕሮፌሽናል ድራይቨርስን ማምረት ነው ዋናው(.) ባለሙያ አሽከርካሪዎችን ማፍራት ባለሙያ አሽከርካሪዎችን ማፍራት ማለት በጣም ትልቅ ነገር ነው ትልቅ አላማ ነው (.) ባለሙያ ናቸው ባለሙያነታቸው ደሞ እሚረጋገጠው አደጋን ተከላክሎ በማሸከርከር ሂደት ነው(.) አደጋን ተከላክሎ በማሸከርከር ሂደት ብቻም ሳይሆን ባለሙያነታቸው በቃ የታሰበ ለትን አላማ ማሳካት መቻላቸው (.) ይሄንን አላማ ይዞ ነው የተነሳው ማለት ነው ትምህርት

990 ቤቱ (.) ስለዚህ ከመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አንፃር የተሸከርካሪ ምርመራ ይዞ ለማድረግ የመጀመሪያ ይሰጠኝ ብሎ ጥያቄ ያቀረበ ተቋም ነው (.) በመንግስት ነበር እሚሰጠው ከዛ በፊት (.) (የት.ቤቱ ስም) ግን የተሸከርካሪ ደህንነት ምርመራ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አካል ነው ብሎ ነው እሚያምነው(.) የአሽከርካሪዎች የሰለጠኑ ባለሙያ አሽከርካሪዎችን የማፍራት ሥራ የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት አካል ነው ብሎ ነው እሚያምነው(.) እንደቢዝነስ

995 አደለም ይሄ እሚታየው ማለት ነው(.) ስለዚህ እኛ ይሄንን ተግባራዊ ለማድረግ በእርግጠኝነት ትምርትን በጥራት ለመስጠት ጥረት አርገናል (.) የራሱን ስርአተትምህርት አዘጋጅቶ መጀመሪያ መንግስት ፌደራል ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን ባገራቀፍ ደረጃ ስርአተትምህርት አውጥቶ ተግባራዊ ከማድረጉ በፊት (የት.ቤቱ ስም) የራሱ ሥርአተ ትምህርት የነበረው ተቋም ነው (.) ራሱ ስርአተትምህርት ምን ምን ላይ ፎክስ ማረግ አለብን (.) እ ባለፈውም

- 1000 እንደነገርኩህ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ በኢትዮጵያ ታሪክ የአሽከርካሪዎችን የስነምግባርና የስነ ባህሪ ትምህርት በመጽሐፍ ትምህርት አዘጋጅቶ በትምህርትም መደበኛ ትምህርት መስጠት የጀመሪያው (የት.ቤቱ ስም)ና (የት.ቤቱ ስም)-ብቻ ነው (.) አስራዘጠኝ ዘጠና ምናምን ላይ እኛ የስነምግባር ትምህርት እንሰጣለን በካሪኩለማችን ውስጥ አስገብተን (.) መንግስት አስገዳጅ ያደረገው ሁለት ሺ አንድ ላይ ነው(.) የሥነ ባህርይ ትምህርት እ ሁለት ሺ አንድ ነው
- 1005 በአዋጅ ግዴታ የሆነው (.) እኛ ግን አስራዘጠኝ ከስምንት ዓመት በፊት የስነምግባርና የስነ ልቦና ትምህርት እንሰጥ ነበር (.) ይሄ ምንድነው የአሽከርካሪዎችን አብዛኛው ክፍተት ከስነባህሪያና ከስነምግባር ጋር የመነጨ ችግር መሆኑን በመረዳትና በመገንዘብ ነው (.) ዛሬ ድረስ ያልተፈታ ችግር ነው እንደሚታወቀው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ በዚህ ረገድ (የት. ቤቱ ስም) ትልቅ ሚና ተጫውቷል ብለን በጣም በሙሉ ልብ በልበ ሙሉነት እንናገራለን (.)
- 1010 ትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣንም የተጠቀመው በአሁኑ ሰአት ካሪኩለሙ ውስጥ አስገብቶታል (.) ቅድም እንደተናገርኩት የአሽከርካሪዎች ማንዋል ላይም አስግብቶታል ቀጥታ ይሄንን አብዛኛውን የስነምግባር ትምህርት ክፍተቶች ችግሮች ጉድለቶች ምናምን እሚሉትን በቀጥታ በኔ በኩል የተዘጋጀውን መጽሐፍ ነው እንዳለ የወሰደው የተጠቀመበት ማለት ነው (.) ይሄ ለግባትነት የሚጠቅም ጽሁፍ ሰርተን በማቅረባችን ደስታ ይሰማናል ማለት ነው (.) ሌላ
- 1015 በጥራት ትምህርትን በማስተማር ረገድ በደንብ ቢቃ በተዘጋጀው የስልጠና መርሐ ግብር መሰረት በተመደበው ክፍለጊዜ መሰረት ጥራት ያለው ባለሙያዎች እንዲያስተምሩ በማድረግ ትልቅ አስተዋፅኦ አድርገናል (.) ለዚህም ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ የመጀመሪያ ዲግሪ ያላቸው በአውቶመካኒክ የመጀመሪያ ዲግሪ ያላቸውን አሰልጣኞች በመቅጠር በከፍተኛ ደረጃ በመቅጠር ለሥራ ያሰማራ ተቋም ነው (የት. ቤቱ ስም) ማለት ነው (.) ባለሥልጣን መስሪያ
- 1020 ቤቱ ያኔ ያዲስ አባ መንገድ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ ባለሥልጣን ይለን የነበረው አቨርኳሊፋይድ የሆኑትን ለምንድነው (እገሌ) እንደዚህ እምትቀጥሩ ብሎ እንወቀስበት ነበር (SPS19)

SPS18

- ባይ ዘ ዌይ ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግ ቢታወቅ ቢታወቅ እንደውም ሌላ ሥልጠናም አያስፈልግም ልትል ትችላለህ (.) ቢቃ አልፎ የነዱ ሰዎች ቴስት አርገውታል አግኝተውበታል በጣም ተቀይረውበታል (.) ደሞ ሌሎች ገና ይሄን እንትን ስላላገኙ እዛው ላይ ያሉ አሉ (.) እና ኢምፓክቱ እንግዲህ በሰዎች ነው በሰለጠኑ ሰዎች በምታገኘው ፊደባክ ነው እምትሰማው (.)
- 1025 ግን እንዳልከው ገዥ እንዲሆን ሌላውም ሁሉም በዚህ በንትን ፕሪንሲፕል እንዲሄድ የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግን ፓኬጅ እንደማንዳቶሪ እንደው እንዲገባ እንዲደረግ ያው የመንግስት እንትን ያስፈልጋል (.) መንግስት ማመን አምኖበት እንደውም አቨርቴክ

ቢያረገው ማለት ነው (.) አሁን በግል ነው እኔ በግል ነው የምሰራው ብዬሃለሁ (.) ግን ይሄን ነገር እኔ ራሴ እሰራዋለሁ ብሎ ቢይዘውም ጥሩ ነው (.) ዞሮ ዞሮ አላማው አደጋን ለመቀነስ

1030 ነው እንጂ ቢዝነስ አደለም (.) ባይ ዘ ዌይ ቢዝነስ እኔ አንዳንዴ እንደውም አንዳንዴ በነፃ እምሰጠው ትሬዲንግ አለ (.) አንዳንዴ ደሞ በጣም አቅማችሁ በሚችል መቶ ምናምን ብር ብትከፍሉ ችግር የለውም እላለሁ (.) ግን ኮስቱ እንደሱ አደለም

ጠያቂ:- አሁን ከምን አንፃር ነው ከውጤቱ አንፃር ይህን ያ ሊያመጣ የሚችለው ውጤት ካለ(.) ውጤቱ ደሞ የተቀመጡ ጎሎች አሉና ከዛ ጋራ ተያይዞ የሚሉት ካለ

1035 መላሸ:- ልክ ነው ባይ ዘ ዌይ ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቨር በመሆንህ ጎሉ ጎልህ ምንድነው አክሲደንትን አልሞስት በቃ ሞት የሚባለውን ዜሮ አደርገዋለሁ ነው (.) የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቨንግ ሜይን ኦብጀክቲቭ (.) እ ሜንቴናንስ ኮስት በጣም በጣም ትቀንሳለህ (.) ሌሰን ፕላን አለ አንድ ፔፐር የተሰራ አለ (.) በጣም በጣም ይሄ ሜንቴናንስ እሚባለው አይኖርም ማለት ይቀንሳል (.) አለ ግን ኖርማል የሆነው ሜንቴናንስ እንጂ ይሄ በግጭት የሚሆነው

1040 ሜንቴናንስ የለም (.) ዳውን ታይም በጣም ትቀንሳለህ እሚባክን የለም በግጭት በጥገና እምታባክነው ባለመኖሩ ጊዜ ትቆጥባለህ (.) እ ፍጆታ የትማ የነዳጅ አጠቃቀም ነዳጅ ፊውል ኮንሰምሽን ትቀንሳለህ (.) እነዚህ የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቨንግ እንትኖች ናቸው የፕሮፋይሉ በቃ እምታገኘው ከትሬዲንግ ፕሮፋይል በቃ ይሄን ነው የምታገኘው (.) ስለዚህ ይሄ ደግሞ ማንም ድርጅት ማንም አገር እሚፈልገው ነው (.) በተለይ የሮድ ትራፊክ አክሲደንትን አሾይድ

1045 አረጋለሁ ካልክ ፕራይመሪ ጎል እሱ ነው (.) ቀጥሎ ደሞ እነዛኛዎቹ ነገሮች ተጨማሪ ጥቅሞች ሆነው ሜንቴናንስን ታይምን እንደገና እሚሰማው እንትን ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቨር ስትሆን ኮንፌደንሰህ ይጨምራል (.) አሁን አንዳንዴ ምን ይላል ሰው እኔ ብሰለጥን ሌላው ያልሰለጠነ ሰው ቢገጫኝስ ይላል (.) እዛው ትሬዲንግ ውስጥ ግን መልሱን ታገኘዋለህ (.) የሰለጠነክው እኮ እነዛ ሰላሉ ነው (.) እነዚህ ያልሰለጠኑት እዳይገጩህ ነው ((እየሳቁ)) ያለዚያ

1050 ለምን አሰለጥንሃለሁ (.) ስለዚህ ያ ማለት ኮንፌደንስ ጨምረሃል ማለት ነው (.) አሁን ይቺን ሲጋት ይዘህ መተሃል (.) ከዛ ከስልጠናው በኋላ ግን የፈለገው ይምጣ (.) ለምን እኔ በጣም ኦብዘርቨር ነኝ ትላለህ (.) ስልጠናው እሚሰጥህ ኮንፌደንስህን ይጨምረዋል (.) ሌላው ለሌሎቹ አሽከርካሪዎች በጣም እንትን ትጨምራለህ አዛኝነት (.) ይሄ መንፈሳዊ እንትን የለም ርህራሄ ምናምን እምንላቸው የባህርይ ለውጥ ኮምፒሊትሲ ታመጣለህ (.) ለምን እዛ እንትን ውስጥ

1055 ባህርይ በጣም ትልቅ ኢምፓክት ስላለው ነው (.) ሶስቱ ሶስት ነገሮች ላይ ነው እሚሰራው ዲፌንሲቭ ኖሌጅ እስኪልና እ አቲትዩድ ላይ ነው (.) ሶስቱ ላይ ነው እሚያተኩረው የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቨንግ እንትኑ እሚያጠነጥነው እዛ ላይ ነው (.) ስለዚህ ባህርይ ይሄ ለሌሎቹ እንትን አዛኝ ስትሆን ደርቦብኝ ነው ምናምን የሚል ኮምፕሊይን አይደለም (.) ደረብ ምን ላርገው ምናምን አትልም (.) ደረብ ግን አዳንኩት እኔ ባልሆን ኖሮ አልቆለት ነበረ ነው

1060 እምትለኝ (.) ሶ ምን አረኩ ማለት ነው አንድ ሰው አዳንኩ የሚል የሆነ ለራስህ እሚሰማህ የሆነ ሳይኮሎጂካል እንትን አለ (.) ስለዚህ በነዚህ አምስት ምክንያቶች ማለት ነው የዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቬንግ ውጤቱ በዚህ ነው እሚለካው ማለት ነው (SPS18)

SPS18

1065 **ጠያቂ:-** ስለማሽከርከር ልዩ ስልጠና በሚለው ውስጥ በማሽከርከር ወቅት ድካምና የሰውነት መዛል ስሚኖራቸው ተፅእኖዎች ልዩ ሥልጠና የሚሉትም አለ
መላሻ:- ... አደጋን ተከላክሎ ማሽከርከር ውስጥ ብዙ ነው እንትኑ ወደ አስራስድስት የሚሆኑ ሞጁሎች አሉት ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቬንግ ማለት ነው (.) እዛ ውስጥ አንዱ ነው ይሄ ፋቲግ ማቴሪያውን እሚባለው (.) ይሄ ድካምና የሰውነት መዛል ቀላል አደለም በዚህ በተለይ ያገር
 1070 አቋራጭ በሚሄዱ ተሽከርካሪዎች ላይ (.) ድካም የሚያመጣው ለአደጋ ያለው አስተዋፅኦ ቀላል አደለም (.) ባንዳንድ አገሮች ሂያ ፐርሰንት ነው እሚያደርሱት ላደጋ ያለውን አስተዋፅኦ (.) ሂያ ፐርሰንት ቀላል አደለምና ስለዚህ እሱ ላይ ስልጠና እንሰጣለን (.) ይሄ ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቬንግ አንዱ ፓርት ነው ... (SPS18)

SPS17

ህብረተሰቡ በደንብ ባልሰለጠነበት እ ሞያውን ባላዳበረበት ነው ባሁኑ ሰዓት ላይ እየተጎዳና
 1075 ህዝቡም እያለቀ ያለው (.) ያንን ለማረጋገጥ ዋናው አላማችን ሁሉም በተቻለ መጠን እኛ እንደ ባለድርሻ አካላት ሾፌርቻችንን በማሰልጠን እና በማብቃት ወደፊት ይሄን አደጋ ለመቀነስ በራሳችን ወደፊት ይሄን እንደ ዕቅድ ይዘን እየሄድንበት ነው (.) እና አደጋው በምን አይነት ሁኔታ ላይ ይቀነሳል ለሚባለው ሁላችንም ተረባርበን አንድ ሆነን ከሰራን ያንዱ ወገን ነው ብለን ካልተውነው ስራው በጋራ እማይቀነስበት ምክንያት ምንም ነገር የለም (.) ግን ለብቻ
 1080 አንድ ወገን ብቻ አንድ ህግና ደንብን አፅድቆና አርቅቆ እሚመጣ ሆኖ ወደመተግበሩ እሚገባ ከሆነ አሁንም ቢሆን ባለድርሻ አካላትን ያላከለ ስራ እሚሰራ ከሆነ አሁንም ቢሆን እዛው ሞላ እዛው ፈላ ነው እሚሆነው (.) ያው ሲጀመር መንገድ የጋራችን ነው (.) የመንገድ ደህንነትም የጋራችን ነው (.) እና እንደባለድርሻ አካላት እኛንም ይመለከታል (.) ችግሮች አሉበት (.) አዎ በጣም ብዙ ሰፊና እ ተለቅመው እማያልቁ ችግሮች አሉበት ባሁኑ ሰዓት (.)
 1085 መንገድ ደህንነቱ አስቸጋሪ ደረጃ ላይ ደርሷል (.) ዋናው ይህም ሲሆን እ ባለድርሻ አካላቱ የራሱን እሚገባውን አስተዋፅኦ አላረገም (.) ሁሉም ባለድርሻ አካላት ያን ባለማረጉ የተነሳ ይህ አሁን እምናየው ውጥንቅጡ የወጣ የመንገድ ስርዓት አገራችን ላይ ሊሰፍን ችሏል (.) ስለዚህ ይሄን ወደአንድ ስናመጣ እኛም እንደባለድርሻ በብዙ ቦታ ላይ ብዙ ነገሮች አስቀምጠናል (.) ያው ተገቢውን ተገቢውን አንዳንድ ነገሮች አላገኘንም (.) ያ ነው እንጂ

1090 እኛ እንደባለድርሻ አካላት በጣም ጥሩ ጥሩ ሀሳቦችን እንደባለድርሻ አካላት አምተናል (.) ሲጀመር እ እኛ ባሁኑ ሰዓት ከአፍሪካ ቀዳሚ የሆንበትን የትራፊክ አደጋ ህብረተሰቡን በደንቡ ማሰልጠን አለመቻላችን ነው (.) ህብረተሰቡን እንዲያውቅ አለማረጋችን በዚህ ጉዳይ ላይ ኋላቀር አርጎናል (.) ይሄንኛው ህብረተሰቡን በደንብ ልናስተምር ይገባል (.) ይህንን በሰፊው ልንሄድበት መሄድ አለብን የሚል አቋም ነው ያለን (.) በደንብ መማር አለበት ህዝቡ 1095 ማወቅ አለበት (.) ይህንንም ስል ለምንድነው ለምሳሌ ጠዋትና ማታ እምናየውን ክራውድ የሚፈጠረው ህዝቡ ባግባቡ የትራፊክ ጃምን እምንፈጥረው ራሳችን ነን(.) ያንን ነገር መስራት እንችላለን አዎ እንችላለን ግን አልሰራንም (.)ያለመስራታችን ወደኋላ አስቀርቶናል (.) ለምሳሌ ስነሳ ጠዋትና ማታ ግራና ቀኝ ህዝቡ ያዲሳባ ህዝብ መንገዱን ጠብቆ ግራ ጠርዙን ይዞ አይሄድም ባገኘው ነው እሚሄደው (.) እ ከኛ በተሻለ እነአምቦ ባሁኑ ሰዓት ሰልጥነዋል

1100 እነባህርዳር ወደዛ ሄደዋል ግን እኛ ወደኋላ መተናል(.) እነዚህ እነዚህ በሰፊው ስላልተሰሩ ነው (.) ሌላው እ ዜብራ አጠቃቀማችን በጣም እኔ ከፈረንጅ አገር የመጡ ሰዎችና የኛን አገር ሳይ ግርም ይለኛል (.) እኛ እጃችን ኪሳችን ከተን ሞባይል እያወራን እየተዘናናን ነው እምንሄደው(.) መኪና ሰውሰራሽ ነው(.) ፍሬን ሰው ሰራሽ ነው (.) ያ ሰውሰራሽ አጋጣሚ ዘይቱ ሊፈስ ይችላል(.) ንፋሱ ቴቦ ሊቆረጥ ይችላል (.) ግን እጃችን ኪሳችን ከተን በመባይል 1105 እያወራን ስንሄድ የግድ ዜብራ መብታችን መሆኑን ማየት የለብንም (.) እና ዜብራ ላይ በጣም ከውጭ አገር የመጡ ሰዎች ስናያቸው ዜብራ ላይ እንዴት አርገው እንደሚያቋርጡ በፈጣን ነው (.) ቢቻል ይሮጣሉ ከሩጫ ያልተናነሰ እርምጃ ይራመዳሉ (.) ያንን ህብረተሰቡ እንዲሰለጥን አላረግነውም(.) አለማስተማራችን ነው ይሄን ሁሉ ያመጣው ችግራችን (.) ስለዚህ ይሄን ነገር በሰፊው ብንሄድበት ነገ ተነገውዲያ የለማች አዲሳባችንና የተማረና አደጋን የቀነሰ 1110 ውጤት ልናገኝ እንችላለን (SPS17)

SPS18

አኬ ጥሩ ነው አሁን እኔ አዌር ሁሉም ሰው አዌር ቢሆን ጥሩ ነው (.) ግን ባይሆንስ ደሞ (.) ባይሆንስ ብለን ደሞ ሌላውን ዳይሚንሽን ሁሉም አዌር ባይሆንና እኔ ተሸክራካሪውን ይዞት 1115 የሚሄደው ሰው እንትን ቢወስድለት ለዛኛው ሃላፊነት ማለት ነው ቢሆን አሁን ዋን ዌይ ይሆናል እንትኑ ግን በቃ ያው ነው ሶሌሽን አግኝተዋል (.) ወደሱ በደንብ እመጣልሃለሁ በኋላ ላይ (ሣቅ) ለምን እኔ አሁን ሳሽከረክር ልንገርህ አንተ ግራህን ያዝክ ቀኝ ያዝክ እኔ ነኝ ያዳንኩህ ብዬ እማስበው (.) አንተም እራሴን አድኛለሁ ብለህ ካሰብክ እኔ ደስ ይለኛል ግን እሱን መሞከር እንችላለን(.) እስኪ እንሞክረውና አንተ ግራ ያዝ እኔ እንዴት እንደማልገጭህ 1120 ላሳይህ (.) በቃ በደንብ አድርጌ ገጭሃለሁ (.) ስለዚህ ምንድነው ያንተ ድርሻ ገብቶሃል (.) በቃ እኔ ነኝ ካንተ የበለጠ ጉልበት አለኝ ካንተ የበለጠ እስፒድ አለኝ (.) ስለዚህ ብዙም

ራሱን እንዳያንክ ከቆጠርከው ብዙም አይመስለኝም (.) ስለዚህ እኔ ነኝ እኔ ስለአንተ ስላለኝ አስተሳሰብ እንጂ አንተ ፊትህን ስላየሁ ጀርባህን ሳይህ እገጭሃለሁ ማለት ነው እንዴ (.) እና አሽከርካሪዎችን እያያችሁ ሂዱ በትንሽ ፐርሰንት ያግዛል (.) ምናልባት ይሄ ዝም ብሎ

1125 ሜካኒካል ፌይለር ያጋጠመው ከሆነ ከቁጥጥር ውጭ የሆነ ምናምን ከሆነ (.) እንጂ እንደው ጠቅላላ የትራፊክ አደጋን ለመቀነስ እግረኞች ግራ በመያዛቸው የትራፊክ አደጋ ረገብ ብትለኝ እሱ አንደኛ ክሬዲት ታሳጣዋለህ የአሽከርካሪውን ክሬዲት (.) እሱ ነው ያዳነው ግን እዚጋ ክሬዲቱን ለማን ትሰጠዋለህ ሳለሰጠንከው እግረኛ (.) ግራ እንዲይዝ ስላደረኩት ለውጥ አመጣሁ ልትል ነው (.) እና ትንሽ ችግር አለው ይሄም (ሣቅ)እስቲል እኮ እሚገርምህ እዛው

1130 ላይ አስፋልት ላይ ናቸው ሰዎቹ (.) ምንድነው ያገዙት አሁን አንተ ፊት እኔ ፊት እና ጀርባ መውደድ ካልሆነ(.) በቃ ፊትለፊት ስለመጣ ከጀርባ አለ ጀርባውን ደሞ ሰቶ እሚሄድኮ አለ(.) ማለት አንተ ፊትለፊት ለእኔ ሆንክ ማለት ከጀርባህ ሌላ መኪና አለ አይደል እንዴ (.) ያ ይገጭሃል ማለት ነው (.) አንተ እኔን ነው እምትጠብቀው በዚጋ አይን የለህም (.) ስለዚህ ያኛው ሰውዬ እንግዲህ ሊገጨው እድል አለው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ያኛውም ጀርባህን

1135 ብትሰጠውም ያድንሃል እኔም ጀርባህን ብትሰጠኝ አድንሃለሁ (.) ሶ እኔ ነኝ በቃ ያንተ ሞግዚት ለእግረኛው ሞግዚት ነው ብዬ ነው እማስበው አሽከርካሪን (.) እሱን አዌርነስ ብትሰጠው ባትለፋ እግረኛ ላይ ባትለፋ (.) አትልፋ ሰማኒያ ሚሊዮን ላይ አትልፋ (.) አራት መቶ ምናምን ሺ መኪና ነው ያላት ኢትዮጵያ አራት መቶ ሃያ ሶስት ምናምን (.) እዛ ላይ አንዳንድ አሽከርካሪ ብትመድብ ከነስኮርቱ እንኳን ሁለት አርገህ ስምንት መቶ ሺ ቢሆን

1140 አሽከርካሪው እሱላይ ብትለፋ በስድስት ወር ሶሉሽን ታመጣለህ (.) ሰማኒያ ሚሊዮን ገና እሚወለድም አለ ሁሌ ስለእግረኛ እምታወራ ከሆነ መቶ አመት ስለእግረኛ ታወራለህ ማለት ነው(.) እና አይ ቲንክ የዳይሬክሽን ስህተት ሶሊሽን ላይ አቅጣጫ ልዩነት ያለ ይመስለኛል(.) በጣም ቻሌንጅ ነው እማረጋቸው (.) ማለት አሁን ያልካቸው ቢሮ አቶ እገሌን ነበር እማቃቸው(.) እሳቸውጋ ነበረ ሺዲዮ ሲሰጡኝ እኔ ይሄ ሺዲዮ ብዙም አይስማማኝም አልኩ(.)

1145 ምን እናድርግ ታዲያ (.) አይ አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነበረ መስራት የነበረባችሁ እዛ ላይ በጀት ለምን አልያዛችሁም (.) በቃ እኛ ውጤት አምጥተንበታል ይሄኛውን ምናምን (.) አኬ ይመስላል አዎ ውጤት ውጤት ይመስላል (.) እኔ እንግዳው እሻላለሁኝ እኔ አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው እምሰራው (.) እኔ እንደግለሰብ ማለት ነው ያለምንም እንትን እኔ አሽከርካሪው ላይ

1150 እሰራለሁ እናንተ እግረኛው ላይ ትሰራላችሁ እንግዲህ ውጤቱ ከመጣ አሪፍ ነው (ሳቅ)
(SPS18)

RUP29

መላሽ:- አሁን ላነሳ እምፈልገው ከታክሲ ተጠቃሚዎች አንፃር ነው ታክሲ ተጠቃሚዎች

- 1155 አንድ ወቅት ጀመርኩኝ ሁለት እሚያስቀምጠው ላይ ሶስተኛ አልቀመጥም አላስቀምጥም አልኩኝ (.) ተባላሁ በቃ ኡኡ እንዳለ ወረዱብኝ (.)
ጠያቂ፡- ማለት ታክሲው ውስጥ ያሉት ሰዎች (.)
መላሸ፡- ታክሲው ውስጥ ያሉት ሰዎች (.) እንዴት ምንድነህ አንተ ማነህ እንዴ እንዲህ ነው ምንም ሊሰሙኝ አልቻሉም ያልኩት ትዝ ይለኛል እኔ ኃጢያት ነው እኔ በማምንበት እና እኔ
- 1160 አላደርገውም አልኩ (.) ውረድልን ብለው ጮኹብኝ (.) ሶ ስለዚህ ምን ማድረግ ጀመርኩ እሺ ብዬ ፈቀቅ ማለት ጀመርኩ አንዳንድ ጊዜ አሁንም አላስቀምጥም የወያላውን ፊት አይቼ እሚፈራኝ ከመሰለኝ አላስቀምጥም እላለሁኝ (.) ((ሣቅ)) ሣቅ አንተ እማይፈራኝ ከመሰለኝ አስቀምጣለሁ (.) ስለዚህ አሁን ችግሩ እንማንም ነን ማለት ነው የተሸከረካሪ መኪናውን ምን የምናደርገው ሰዎች የምንጠቀመው ሰዎች (.) ሌላው ደሞ ያጋጠመኝን ልንገርክ (.) ስለዚህ
- 1165 ስለተሸከረካሪው ሙሉ ለሙሉ አስራሁለት ምናምን ተጭነን እንሄዳለንና ትራፊክ ላይ እጄን እንዲህ ማረግ ጀመርኩኝ በመስኮት አወጥቼ (.) እንዲህ አየኝና ዞረ ትራፊኩ ነው የዞረው (.) ማን ነበረ ቅድም እንዳልኩክ ከወያሎቹ ወይም ከታክሲዎቹ ጋር ዘመድ ነው ማለት ነው (.) ሙሉ ጥቅጥቅ ብለናል የቆመም ሰው አለ እጄን አውጥቻለሁ አይቶታል እጄን (.) ግን ዝም ብሎ አለፈ ያ የሚሆነውን ነገር አስበው (RUP29)

አንድ አንድ ነገሮች / Some Pressing Issues, Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014

- አዘጋጅ፡** አዎ ዝብርቅርቅ ያለ አካሄድ ነው አካሄዱ ሰው በቃ ግራ ጠብቆ መሄድ ይገባዋል ሲባል ቀኙን ይዞ ይሄዳል እ እንደዚሁም ደግሞ መቋረጥ በሌለበት አካባቢ ነው የሚያቋርጠው እንዲህ እንዲህ አይነት ነገሮች አሉ (.) እንደው ወደ ራሳችን እናምጣና አንተ ያለህ ልምድ
- 1175 ምን ይመስላል እንደው አንተ እግረኛ ስትሆን ትክክለኛ ሥርዓቱን ጠብቀህ ትጓዛለህ
1ኛደዋይ፡ (11:05)፡ እኔ ብዙ ጊዜ በጣም እንደዚህ አይነት ልምድ አለኝ (.) እኔ ላገሪቷ እምመኘው ነገር ስለሆነ እራሴ አደርገዋለሁ ብዙ ጊዜ ማለት ነው በእግራ ስሄድ ሁልጊዜ አጠቃቀሙን በስርአቱን ይገዢ ነው እምጠቀመው ምክንያቱም ከክልሎች የምማራቸው ነገሮች አሉ (.) እምሰማቸውም ያየኋቸውም ነገሮች አሉ አሁን ወደአምቦ አካባቢ ያየኋቸው ነገሮች
- 1180 አሉ ምክንያቱም ያዲሳባ ሰው እሚታወቀው በመንገድ አጠቃቀሙ ነው ወደ ክፍለሃገር ሲወጣ ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ያንን ነገር እኔ እንደዛ አይነት ነገር ውስጥ ላለመግባት በጣም ነው ጥንቃቄ እማደርገውና እ በእርግጥ አሁን ቀለበት መንገድ ብናይ ማለት ነው እኔ የሰባ ዓመት የስልሳ አምስት ዓመት እ አረጋውያን መንገዱን ድልድዩ ስር በድልድዩ ስር መንገዱን ዘለው ሲሻገሩ አያለሁ ይሄ ደግሞ ተገቢ አይደለም (.) ምክንያቱም አንደኛ ነገር
- 1185 የግንዛቤ እጥረት አለ እኛ እግረኛ ላይም እ አሸከረካሪው ላይም ከመፍረድ ከመፍረዳችን በፊት ለምንድነው መንገድ ትራንስፖርት ግንዛቤ የሚያስጨብጡ ነገሮችን እንደዚሁ ግራ ይዞ

መሄድን ቀኝ ይዞ መሄድን ለምንድነው እሚያስተምረው (.) መጀመሪያ ይሄ ቅስቀሳ የለም ይሄ በሌለበት ቦታ ተነስቶ ውይይት አድርገን ነገ ምንም ውጤት ላናገኝበት ነገር ምንድነው የምናደርገው አሁን ይሄንን ነገር የሚለውን ነው እኔ ለመጠየቅም የፈለኩት ወደ መንገድ

1190 ትራንስፖርት የሚመጡ ሰዎችም ካሉ ወይም የተጋበዙ እንግዶችም ካሉ (Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014)

SFI2

ጠያቂ:- ያደጋ ምክንያት ናቸው ወይም ምንጭ ናቸው ለዚህ ለደህንነት እጦቱ አስተዋጽኦ አድራጊ ናቸው ከሚባሉት ብዙ ነገር መጥቀስ ይቻላል ግን ዋናዎቹን እንደው ማስቀመጥ ይቻል ይሆን

1195 መላሽ:- እ ላደጋ ምክንያት የሚባሉ ብዙ ነገሮች አሉ (.) ትልቁን ቦታ የሚይዘው የህግ አለማክበር ነው (.) ተጠቃሚው ህግ አያከብርም ህግ አስከባሪው ደሞ ህግ የማስከበር አቅሙ ዝቅተኛ ነው (.) ዝርዝሮች አሉ አሁን ግን ይህን ስንል ምን ማለታችን ነው እ መንጃ ፈቃድ አወሳሰዳችንን ብንወስድ ለችግሩ መንስዔ እሚሆነው እንግዲህ የአሸከርካሪዎች ቸልተኝነትና በግረኞችም የግንዛቤ ማነስና ቸልተኝነት እ እነዚህ በብዙ መልኩ ይገለጻሉ (.) የተሸከርካሪው

1200 የቴክኒክ ጉድለትም እንደዚሁ አስተዋጽኦ አለው(.) መንገዶችም የራሳቸው አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው(.) እነዚ እነዚህ ባጠቃላይ ላደጋ ምክንያት እሚሆኑ ነገሮች ናቸው (.) እነዚህ እንዴት ሆኑ ስንል አሸከርካሪው አሁን እንዴት ላደጋ መንስዔ ይሆናል ስንል ከመንጃ ፈቃድ አወሳሰድ ይጀምራል (.) ስልጠናዎችን ባግባቡ ሳይወሰድ በቂ ስልጠና ሳይወሰድ ይቀራል አንዱ ነው (.) ወይም ደግሞ ንግሊጀንሲ ወይም ደግሞ ግዴለሽነት እሚባለው አለ (.)

1205 በልዩ ልዩ እ ነገሮች ተጽዕኖ ስር ሆኖ ማሸከርከር አለ ጠጥቶ ጫት ምንምን እያደረጉ መንዳት አለ እ እና ባጠቃላይ ህግ አለማክበር ደሞ ትልቁ ነገር ነው (.) እዛ ላይ ህጎች አሉ ምልክቶች አሉ እ መንገድ ላይ ልዩልዩ ምልክቶች አሉ (.) ትምህርቱ ላይ ሲሰጥ እነዛን ምልክቶች ማክበር እንዳለ ይነገራል ይማራል ህጎች ላይ ኔግሊጀንሲ እምንለው አል ዛት ነው እዛ አካባቢ ያለውን ችግር ነው (.) የህግ አካባቢ ማስከበር አነስተኛነት ሲባል ደግሞ አሁንም

1210 ህግ ማስከበር አቅማችን በጣም ዝቅተኛ ነው (.) እ የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነው ህግ እንዲያስከብር እሚጠበቅበት እሱ ያለው በብዛት አነስተኛ ነው በየቦታው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ሊገኝ አይችልም(.) የማስከበር አቅም ራሱ ግንዛቤ እጥረት አለ እ በቴክኖሎጂ የተደገፈ አለመሆኑ እነዚ እነዚህ ሁሉ የራሳቸው አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው(.) መንገዶች ስንል ደግሞ መንገዶች ባግባቡ የመንገድ ደኅንነትን ታሳቢ አድርገው ዲዛየን የተደረጉ አይደሉም (.) በኮንስትራክሽናቸውም

1215 በጥገናቸውም ወቅት ባጠቃላይ የመንገድ ደኅንነትን በበቂ ሁኔታ ያካተቱ አይደሉም(.) እነዚህ በመሆናቸው እ ያሸከርካሪው ስህተት ወይም የግረኛው ስህተት ወይም የሌላ የትራፊክ

ስህተት ሁሉ ወደአደጋነት ይለወጣል ማለት ነው (.) መንገዶቹ ሲገነቡ ያንዱን አካል ስህተት ሊደግፉ እንዲችሉ ሆነው ቢገነቡ መልካም ነበር (.) እንዲያ ሲሆን ነው የመንገድ ደኅንነትን በበቂ አካላት እሚባለው (.) እ አንድ ሰው ሰክሮ ሊያሸከረክር ይችላል ወይም በተለየ ጉዳይ

1220 ሆኖ ሊሮጥ ይችላል(.) ሲጋጭ እነዛ ነገሮች ሊደግፉት እሱን ከስህተቱ ሊመልሱት እሚችሉ አይደሉም(.) ባደጉ አገሮች እሚታየው ነው መንገዶች ሲገነቡ መንገድ ደኅንነትን በበቂ አካተው ሆነው ስለሚገነቡ የእያንዳንዱ ግለሰብ ስህተት ሁሉ ወደ አደጋ አይለወጥም(.) እዛ ይሄ በመሆኑ(.) ባገራችን ብዙ አደጋዎች እየተከሰቱ ያለው ከዚህ ውጭ ምንም እንኳን ልንከላከለው እምንችል ብንሆንም በተሸከርካሪው ቴክኒክ ጉድለትም ምክንያት የሚደርሱ

1225 አደጋዎችም አሉ (.) ምክንያቱም አሸከርካሪዎቻችን መኪናዎቻቸውን ከማስነሳታቸው በፊት ቼክ ማድረግ ያለባቸውን የተሸከርካሪዎቻቸውን የሴፍቲ አካላት ቼክ ስለማያረጉ የተሸከርካሪ የቴክኒክ ጉድለት ይደርሳል በቴክኒክ ጉድለት ምክንያት አደጋ ይደርሳል ማለት ነው (.) ኤኒሃው እንደዚህ እንደዚህ ያሉ ቁጥሩ አነስተኛ ቢሆንም እሚደርስ አደጋ እንዳለ ለመግለጽ ነው (.) እና መንስኤዎቹ እነዚህ ናቸው (SFI 2)

SFI2

1230 **ጠያቂ:-** ታንክ ዩ እንደው ቅድም መጀመሪያ አንስተው የነበረውጋ ነው አሁንም እንምጣና እ መቼም ብዙ ናቸው ባለድርሻ አካላቱ ሁሉም ግን በተመሳሳይ ደረጃ ባለ የኃላፊነት የትጋት ደረጃ ስራቸውን እየወሰዱ ናቸው ብሎ ማስቀመጥ ይከብዳል እኛን ቅድምም ጠቆም አርገዋል መላሽ:- ትክክል

ጠያቂ:- እና እ የትኞቹን እንደው ግምባር ቀደም አርጎ እንደሚገባ እየተወጡ ናቸው የትኞቹ

1235 ደሞ ገና ናቸው እንደዚህ አይነት ነገር ብሎ ማስቀመጥ እሚቻል ነገር ካለ

መላሽ:- ያ እ በርግጥ ሁሉም ባሁኑ ጊዜ ሁሉም በሚገባው ደረጃ ኃላፊነታቸውን እየተወጡ ነው ማለት አይቻልም ገና ጅምር ላይ ነው ያለው (.) ነገር ግን ችግሩ ራሱ ሁሉም መስሪያ ቤቶች ሁሉም ባለድርሻዎች እኩል አይነት ተጋላጭነት ወይም እኩል አይነት አስተዋጽኦ አይደለም ያላቸው (.) አንዳንዶቹ በጣም ከፍተኛ የሆነ አስተዋጽኦ አላቸው ስለዚህ ስራቸውም

1240 ያን ለመቀነስ ከፍተኛ መሆን እንዳለበት ይጠበቃል አንዳንዶቹ ዝቅ ያለ አስተዋጽኦ ያለው ተቋም አላቸው ነገር ግን እሱን ራሱኑ ለመቀነስ እ ጥረት ማረግ እንዳለባቸው ይጠበቃል (.) እንግዲህ ያን ነው ታሳቢ እሚያደርገው (.) እ አሁን እነማን የተሸለ እንቅስቃሴ አላቸው ሲባል ያው ያን ያህል በነጥብ አድርጎ ክራቲካል የሆነ ኢኛሉዬሽን ባይሆንም ካለው ከችግሩ አንጻር እ የትራፊክ ፖሊስ በዋናነት የፌዴራል ፖሊስ የተሻለ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረገ ያለበት

1245 ሁኔታ አለ (.) እ የኢትዮጵያ መንገዶች ባለስልጣን እ ምንም እንኳ ችግሩ ሰፊ የሚጠበቅበት ሰፊ የሚሰሩዋቸው ስራዎች ያን ያህል ንልተው ለመውጣት ገና ያልቻሉ ቢሆኑም ካለው

ተነሳሽነቱ እያደረገ ካለው ጅምር ሁኔታ አንጻር ጥረት እያደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) ጤና ጥበቃ ሚኒስቴርም እንደዚሁ ጥረት እያደረገ ያለበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) እንግዲህ እዚህ ላይ ግንዛቤ እንድንይዝ እሚገባው የጤና ጥበቃ ሚኒስቴር የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋን ከመቀነስ

1250 አንጻር ያለበት ኃላፊነት ምንድነው እሱ ላደጋ መንስኤ አይደለም(.) ጤናጥበቃ በራሱ ያደረጋቸው ለምሳሌ መንገዶችን ከመንገድጋ ስናይ መንገዱ ባግባቡ ባለመሰራቱ ሴፍቲን ግምት ባለማስገባቱ ያልሰራው ስራ አለ እንላለን (.) ጤናጥበቃ ግን ያልሰራው ስራ በመኖሩ አደጋው ደረሰ ማለት ሳይሆን አደጋው ከደረሰ በኋላ አፋጣኝ የመጀመሪያና የዘላቂ የህክምና መስጠት ሂደት ነው (.) አቅማችን በጣም ዝቅተኛ በመሆኑ ምክንያት መሞት ያልነበረበት ይሞታል እ

1255 በቀላል አደጋ ሊድን ይችላል የነበረ የከባድ አደጋ ጉዳተኛ ይሆናል (.) እንዲህ እንዲህ ያሉ ነገሮችን ነው (.) ስለዚህ ከዚህ አንጻር አሁን ጥሩ የግንዛቤ ደረጃ ላይ ነው ያለው (.) እሱም ጥሩ ወደ ወደሚጠበቅበት እየመጣ ያለ እንቅስቃሴ እያደረገበት ያለ ሁኔታ አለ(.) ከዚህ ውጪ እንግዲህ የትራንስፖርት ባለስልጣንም እ ሌሎች የሚመለከታቸው አካላት እንደትምህርት ሚኒስቴርም ምንም የበኩላቸውን የተወሰነ አስተዋጽኦ እያደረጉ ያሉበት ሁኔታ አለ (.) ግን እ

1260 እንግዲህ ስናስቀምጠው በዚህ ደረጃ እናየዋለን ያን ያህል ግን ክራቲካሊ የተገመገመ የሆነ አንድ የጋራ መገምገሚያ ነጥብ ወጥቶ የተገመገመ ነው ማለት ግን አይደለም (SFI2)

SCA12

ኦኬ እንግዲህ አሁን ካለን አሁን ባለንበት ደረጃ ላይ ምናልባት ይሄ የግል አስተያየቴ ሊሆን ይችላል እንጂ የእውቅት ማነስ አለ ብሎ ለመደምደም ያስቸግራል (.) ምክንያቱም አለ በተለያዩ አቅጣጫ ማለት በሚዲያው ማለት እንችላለን በቴሌቪዥኑም በሬዲዮም በሚገኙ

1265 የተለያዩ ፓምፕሎቶች ጭምር ሳይቀር ኢቪን አዲስ አባ ላይ እንግዲህ በያመቱ የትራፊክ ሳምንት ይከበራል (.) በነዚህ ሁሉ ስለትራፊክ አደጋ ኢቪን አደጋዎቹን ጭምር በማሳየት በፊልም በተደገፈ መቀስቀሻ ማለት ነው ለማስጠንቀቅ ለማስጋት በሚል የሚካሄዱ ጥረቶች አሉ (.) እነዚህን ሁሉ አልፎ ስናይ ግን ሰጧ እስቲል እዛው ሁኔታ ውስጥ ነው ያለው (.) ማለት እኔ የሚመስለኝ ስነምግባር ፕሮብሌም ይመስለኛል (.) ወይም ደግሞ ስለጉዳዩ ችላ

1270 ችላ ማለት ይመስለኛል (.) ሁለት ነገር የባህሪይ ጉዳይ አሊያም ደግሞ ለጉዳዩ ተገቢ ትኩረት ካለመስጠት (.) በስተቀር ፖሊስ በግሉ ለምሳሌ በማህበረሰብ አቀፍ አገልግሎት ላይ የሚሰራቸው በርካታ ስራዎች አሉ (.) ስለወንጀልም አስከፊነት ስለትራፊክ አደጋም አስከፊነት ባገኛቸው ኢጋጣሚዎች ሁሉ አሁን ታች ድረስ እስከ ብሎክ ወርዶ ተደራጅቶ አፄር በማድረግ ባገኛቸው ኢጋጣሚዎች ይሄንን ስራ ይሰራል (.) እ ሌላ የከተማ አስተዳደሩንም

1275 ስናይ የመገናኛ ብዙሃኑ በዚህ በኩል ብዙ ስራ ይሰራል (.) ስለዚህ የእውቀት ችግር ነው ብሎ መደምደም እንደግሌ ያስቸግረኛል (.) ምናልባት አሁን ያልኳቸው የባህሪና የኢግኖራንስ

ጉዳይ ወይም ደግሞ የቸልተኝነት ምክንያት ካልሆነ በስተቀር ... አሁን እዚህ ያለው ሰው ለእውቀቱ ቀስቃሽም ሳይፈልግ በሚዲያውም እቤቱ ድረስ ማለት ነው (.) በሚዲያው አቴንሽን ከሰጠ ቁጭ ብሎ የሚሰማበት በትራንስፖርት ላይ እያለ የሚሰማበት ብዙ አጋጣሚዎች

1280 አለ(.) ከዚህ ተነስቶ እንደውም ሞዴል መሆን እሚገባው የከተማው ሰው ነው (.) ለምን ይሄንን አላደረገም ብንል ስንል እኔ እንደሚመስለኝ ቅድምም ላይ እንደ ጠቀሰኩት አንዱ ፕሮብሌም ስነምግባር ነው (.) ሁላችንም ለህሊናችን እኔ አስፈልጋለሁ ምናልባትም ለራሱም ዋጋ የሰጠ አይመስለኝም አንዳንዱ (.) እኔ አስፈልጋለሁ (.) ለምሳሌ አንድ ዶክተር ቢሞት ለዚህች አገር ያንን ዶክተር እምናገኘው ከብዙ ጥረት በኋላ ነው (.) አገሪቷም ብዙ ኮስት

1285 አውጥታለች ነው (.) አስፈልጋለሁ (.) ዜን ለቤተሰብ ከሰፊ እሚበተኑት (.) ስለዚህ ለራሴ ብቻ አላስብም እንደዚህ አይነት እንትን ማሰብ ስጀምር እኔ ብኖር የምጠቅመው አካል አለ (.) መጀመሪያው እራሴን ዜን ቀጥሎ ፋሚሊዬን እያልኩኝ እምሄድባቸው ሁኔታዎች አለ(.) ስለዚህ ይሄ ነገር በማህበረሰቡ ውስጥ የገባ አልመሰለኝም (.) ማለት ወይም ደግሞ ይሄ የትራፊክ አደጋውን ከፈጣሪ እንደመጣ ቁጣ አይነት ነገር ይሁን አላውቅም (.) ግን ከፍተኛ

1290 የሆነ ቸልተኝነት አለ (.) የእውቀት ችግር አይደለም የእውቀት ችግር ካልሆነ ደግሞ የስነ ምግባርና የቸልተኝነት ችግር ነው ብዬ ነው እምደመድመው ይሄንን ጉዳይ (.) እነዚህ ነገሮች ስላሉ ነው (.) አንዳንዱኮ በጣም ትልቅም የሚባለው ሰው አንዳንዴ ምንድነው እስከሚያስብል ድረስ ተሸከርካሪ መንገድ ላይ ገብቶ ዜብራውን ለመልቀቅ ራሱ እንትን እሚል አለ ጅንን ይላል (.) ምንም እኮ አይደለም ቢቃ ፈጠን ፈጠን ብለን ለቀን ፍሰቱ ደግሞ ይቀጥል (.)

1295 እኛም ወደ እምንቀጥልበት መቀጠል ነው (.) እና ቆመው እሚሰዳደቡም አሉ ያንተ መሰለህ ወይ የሚል (.) ይሄ ምንድነው የውስጣዊ የስነምግባራችን ችግር የባህሪያችን ነው (.) ስለዚህ የባህሪ ለውጥ ጭምር መምጣት መቻል አለበት የሚል አሳብ አለኝ SCA12

SCA13

ስለዚህ ጥሩ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ነን ወይም ጥሩ የመንገድ ደህንነት ሰፍኗል ማለት አይቻልም እውነት ለመናገር (.) እ ይሄ የሚያስችልበት ምክንያት ደግሞ ያለው የራሳችን

1300 ከሌላ ጋር ሲነፃፀር ያለው የትራፊክ አደጋው ነው (.) ከዛ ውጭ በየመንገዱ ያለው ደንብ ተላላፊውን ብዛት ስናየው ህግ አክብሮ የሚያሸከረክረው አሸከርካሪ በጣም ጥቂት ነው ማለት ይቻላል (.) ይልቁንስ የትራፊክ ፓሊሱን ሲያከብሩ ነው የምናየው እንጂ የትራፊክ ህጉን የሚያከብሩበት ሁኔታ የለም (.) እና ጥሩ የመንገድ ደህንነት አለን ብለን ማለት አይቻልም ...

- 1305 እና የትራፊክ አደጋ ምክንያቶች ተብለው ይቀመጣሉ የአሽከርካሪ ስህተት ከሰማንያ ፐርሰንት በላይ ነው (.) የእግረኛ ስህተት ይህን ያህል የመንገድ ችግር ይሄን ያህል የተሽከርካሪው ቴክኒክ ጉድለት ይሄን ያህል ብሎ የሚቀመጡ ነገሮች አሉ (.) አብዛኛው የአሽከርካሪዎች ስህተት ነው ነው (.) ምንድነው የአሽከርካሪዎች ስህተት የሚሆንበት ምክንያት አንዱ ህግን ተከትሎ የሚያሽከረክር አሽከርካሪ በተለይም ሲማር አደጋን
- 1310 ተከላክሎ የማሽከርከሪ ብቃት የተላበሰ አሽከርካሪ ስህተቱ የሌላም ሰው ቢሆን ስህተቱን ወደ ራሱ ወስዶ ተጋርቶ አደጋውን አያደርስም (.) ይሄ ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግ ትምህርቱ አንዱ ይሄ ነው (.) ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግ አንድ አሽከርካሪ የሌላውን ስህተት ተጋርቶ አደጋ ላለማድረስ ጥረት ያረጋል ነው (.) ለምሳሌ ይሄ ሲባል እግረኛው ቀለበት መንገድ ላይ ገብቷል(.) መግባት የለበትም በህግ ግን መቀጣት አለበት በመግባቱ በአሽከርካሪ ግን
- 1315 መገጨት የለበትም (.) ስለገባ የኔ መንገድ ነውና ያ መንገድ ብሎ የሚገጭ አሽከርካሪ አደጋን ተከላክሎ አላሽከረከረም ማለት ነው (.) ሶ እዛ ውስጥ ቢገባም አደጋውን መከላከል የሚችልበትን ሲስተም መጠቀም መቻል አለበት (.) በግልጽ የማይታየው ከሆነ አካባቢው በደንብ በግልጽ የማይታይ ከሆነ መብረር የለበትም ቀስ ብሎ መሄድ አለበት(.) በግልጽ የሚታየው ከሆነ ደግሞ ቆሞ አደጋውን መከላከል አለበት (.) ስለዚህ በወንጀል
- 1320 ህጎች ላይ የተቀመጡ አሉ (.) አምስት አርባ ሶስት አምስት ሰባ ሁለት አምስት አርባ ሶስት ብሎ አንድ ሁለት ሶስት ብሎ የሚቀመጡ ነገሮች አሉ(.) ሞያተኛው ምንድነው ሙያውን ሲያሽከረክር ሙያውን በብቃት እንዴት ተወጥቷል የሚሉ ነገሮች አሉ (.) ያን ተወጥቷል አልተወጣም ነው አሁን ዋናው ጥያቄ (SCA13)

SFI4

- ...ትልቁ እንደውም ዋናው ነገር እኔ የማስበው ሰው በተፈጥሯችን ሳየው ሰው ሰልፊሽ ነው(.) ምንም ጥያቄ የለውም እራሳችንን እንወዳለን (.) ግን የኛ አገር ደግሞ ከዚህ ከዚህ
- 1325 ከተሽከርካሪ ጋር በተያያዘ ጉዳይ በጣም ነው የሚገርመው (.) ያው እምትታዘባቸው ነገሮች አሉ መንገድ ላይ (.) ባጋጣሚ ትራፊክ ከሌለ ፕራዮሪቲ አለ ህግ አለ ትራፊኩም ያንን ህግ ነው እሚያስፈፅመው (.) አሽከርካሪውም ያንን ህግ ያውቃል (.) ያንን ህግ አክብሮ ቢሄድ ምንም ችግር አይፈጠርም (.) ግን ሁሉም እኔ ልቅደም እኔ ልቅደም በቃ የኔ የኔ የግል ኢንተረስት በጣም ስለሚብስበት ተቆላልፎ ሁሉም ሳይሄድ ይቆማል (.)

- 1330 አንዱ ትልቁ ችግር እራሳችን ነን (.) የግንዛቤም እጥረት ነው ብሎ ማለት ይከብዳል (.) ለህይወትህ አንተ ዋጋ መስጠት አለብህ (.) ግን ራሳችንን በጣም ስለምንወድ እኔ እንደምችኩል ሌላውም ይችኩላል ብዬ ስለማላስብ የራሴን ብቻ ሳስቀድም ራሳችን የምንፈጥረው ችግር ነው አንዱ ትልቁ ነገር (.) ሁለተኛ ያው ከመንግስት ሳይድም ያለው አለ ቁጥጥሩ መላላት የግንዛቤ ማስጨበጫ ስራዎቹ የሌሎች ከመንገድ ደህንነት ጋር
- 1335 የሚያያዙ ነገሮች መሟላት ያለባቸው መሰረታዊ ነገሮች በኢንፍራስትራስትራክቸርም (.) ከዛ በኋላም በሚኖሩትም ሥራዎች ውስጥ የሚኖሩ ክፍተቶች አሉ እነዚህ ምክንያቶች ናቸው(.) ሌሎች የብቃት አሰጣጣችንም እንደዛው ነው (.) አሽከርካሪዎቻችን ምን ያህል ብቁ ናቸው ዲሲፕሊኑ እውቀቱ ባህሪው የሚለው ነገር ሌላው ኢምፖርታንት ነገር ነው(.) እና እነዚህ ነገሮች ሲደመሩ ችግሩን አሳሳቢ ያደርጉታል(.) እና ቅድም እንዳልኩህ
- 1340 ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ ለውጥ እየመጣ ቢሄድም አሁንም ብዙ መስራት እንዳለብን ነው ብዬ የማምነው (.) ምክንያቶቹ ያው ይታወቃሉ የአሽከርካሪ ስህተት የእግረኛ ስህተት ሌሎች ደግሞ ዲቴይል ስትገባ ቅድሚያ አለመስጠት (.) እ ህጎች (.) ቢቃ ጥቅልል ብለህ ስትመጣ ህጎችን አለማከበር ነው (.) ህጎች ግን አሉ (SFI4)

SCA8

- 1345 ቸልተኝነት ነው ቸልተኝነት ነው (.) ስለዚህ ጉዳይ ብታነጋግራቸው በጣም እንደው እሚያስደንቅ የትህትና አቋም ያላቸው ሰዎች መንገድ ላይ ሲያሸከረክሩ ብታገኛቸው የማይክሮ ሰከንድ ትዕግስት አጥተው ሲሳደቡ ታገኛቸዋለህ (.) ከተጓዳኝ አሽከርካሪዎች ጋራ ጎን ለጎን ሲሄዱ ወይ ምን ሲሉ በጣም ተናደው ከፍተኛ የሆነ ብስጭት ተሰምቷቸው የማይገባ ነገር ሲያደርጉ ታያቸዋለህ (.) ለምን (.) የትራንስፖርት ሥራ በጣም ከፍተኛ የሆነ ትዕግስት
- 1350 የሚጠይቅ (.) በመንገድ ትራንስፖርት የሚደረግ ማናቸውም እንቅስቃሴ እግረኛም ይሁን አሽከርካሪም ይሁን ተሳፋሪም ይሁን ሌላም ሌላም አካል በሙሉ በትዕግስት መሞላት አለበት(.) ፍፁም በሆነ ትእግስት ነው ትዕግስት ስንል ይቺ ጊዜያዊ ትዕግስት አይደለም (.) ምክንያቱም ትዕግስት ማጣት እሚያስከትለው ጉዳት ህይወት እስከማጣት ነው (.) ንብረት ቀላል ነገር ነው እሚተካ ነገር (.) ህይወት ግን እሚለካ አይደለም በምንም አይነት ገንዘብ
- 1355 ሊለካ እሚችል አይደለም (.) የሴክንድ የማይክሮ ሰከንድ ትዕግስት ማጣት እሚያደርሰው ጉዳት መመለሻ የሌሌው ስለሆነ አሽከርካሪዎች በሙሉ እ እግረኞች በሙሉ በፍፁም ትዕግስት ነው ፍፁም ትዕግስት አብሶልዩት ትዕግስት ነው (.) በዚህ ላይ መቀለድ

- አያስፈልግም (.) እና ይሄንን ወደዚህ ደረጃ እሚያደርስ ግንዛቤ ይዘዋል ወይ ነው ዋናው ጥያቄ (.) ያቁታል እሚለውን እንቀበላለን (.) በሚዲያ እየተነገረ በመዝሙር በብሮሽር በጋዜጣ
- 1360 በተለያዩ አውደ እንትኖች በስልጠና ማዕከሎች ይሄን ያህል እየተነገረ ነው (.) ማንኛውም አሽከርካሪ አሁን መኪና ይዞ እሚያሸከረክር በሥልጠና ማዕከል ውስጥ ያላለፈ አሽከርካሪ የለም (.) በእናቱ ማህፀን ወጥቶ አሽከርካሪ ይዞ እንትን የለም መንጃ ፈቃድ ያላወጣ ካልሆነ በስተቀር (.) መንጃ ፈቃድ የማውጣት ፕሮሰስ ያደረገ ሁሉ ግን ስለትዕግስት ካሽከርካሪዎች ስለሚጠበቅ ብሄሻየር በዛ ማሰልጠኛ ውስጥ በሚያልፍባቸው ቢያንስ ካምስት ያላነሱ ቀኖች(.)
- 1365 ቀደም ሲል በትራንስፖርት ባለሥልጣን አምስት ቀን በክፍል ውስጥ ሥልጠና ውስጥ ያልፋል(.) ከዛ በኋላ በመስክ ሥልጠና ከአንድ ወር ያላነሰ ጊዜ ያልፋል (.) እነዚህ አንድ ላይ ተጣምረው ነው ፈተና አልፈው መንጃ ፈቃድ ይይዙ የነበረው (.) አሁን ደግሞ በግል ማሰልጠኛ ተቋሞች ውስጥ ረጅም ሰዓት ነው እሚያሳልፉት (.) ስለዚህ ሳይወድ በግድ ፈተናውን ለመፈተንና ለማለፍ ሲል ለዚህ የተዘጋጁትን መጽሐፍት ማኑዋልስ ማንበቡ አይቀርም (.)
- 1370 ሁሉም በዚህ እስቴፕ ውስጥ ያለፈ ከሆነ ደግሞ ሂ ኖውስ ሳምቲንግ ማለት ነው (.) አሁን ችግሩ ምንድነው የባህሪይ ለውጥ አለማምጣት ነው (.) የባህሪ ለውጥ ያንን አምኖ ተቀብሎ የባህሪይ ለውጥ አለማምጣት ችልተኝነት ነው (.) ሕግ አለማወቅ አይደለም ሕጎቹ አሁን በካሪኩለም ውስጥ ገብተው በስልጠና ውስጥ በስልጠና ማዕከል ውስጥ አሉ (.) የሥልጠና ፓኬጆች እየተሰጣቸው ነው (.) ከዛም በተጨማሪ በተለያዩ እነሱ ሁሉም ተሽከርካሪዎቻቸው
- 1375 ላይ በሚከፍቷቸው ኤፍ ኤም ፌዲዮ ጣቢያዎች ወይም በሌላ ኢጋጣሚ በዚህም ሆነ በዛ ስለትራፊክ ደንቦችና ምልክቶች እንዲሁም ስለሚያስከትሉት ቅጣት ያላወቀ የለም (.) እኔ አንድ ኤግዛምፕል ልንገርህ አንድ በጣም ጥሩ ሰው እሚባል የተቀጣውን ቅጣት(.) ሃያ ስድስት ሪከርዶች በአምስት አመት ውስጥ በአንድ መንጃ ፈቃድ ስም ተመዝግቦ ኮምፒውተር ላይ አይቻለሁ (.) ሃያ ስድስት ቅጣት ሪከርድ ያለው አሽከርካሪ አለ ይሄ በጣም ትንሹ ነው
- 1380 እንግዲህ በጣም ትንሹ ይመስለኛል (SCA8)

SCA8

- አሁን አሽከርካሪዎች በተለይ በንግድ ሥራ ላይ የተሰማሩት ለትራፊክ ደንቦችና ሕጎች መጣስ ምክንያት የሚሆናቸው ይመስለኛል እ ኮምፕቲሽኑ ነው (.) አንደኛ ኮምፒቲሽኑ ነው በንግድ አለም ውስጥ ያለው እ ገቢ ለማግኘት የሚደረገው ፍጫ የሚፈጥረው ነው (.) አንደኛ ትልቁ ኮምፒቲሽን ሽሚያው አለ ገቢያውን የመሻማት ነገር አለ (.) ሁለተኛ በአስተዳደር አካል
- 1385 በሕግ አስከባሪው አካል ያለው ንዝህላልነት ወይም ደግሞ ሪከርዶችን ይዞ ቅጣቱን ከደረጃ ወደ ደረጃ እያሳደገ አለመሄድ ሳንክሽን በመንጃ ፈቃዱ ላይ አለማሳረፍ እና የሕግ ክፍተቱን የሚያመለክት ነው (.) ለምን ብትለኝ በመጣ ቁጥር የቅጣት ፓድ እየተቆረጠ እሚሰጠው

ከሆነና ይሄ ሪከርድ ተደርጎ ሁለተኛ ዙር አጥፍቶ ሶስተኛ ላይ ሲመጣ አንተ መንጃ ፈቃድህ መነጠቅ አለበህ ለስድስት ወር ሳስፔንድ መደረግ አለብህ ዳግም ስልጠና ገብተህ ችሎታህ

1390 መረጋገጥ አለበት እማይባል ከሆነ ዋይ ኖት (.) ሰማኒያ ብር ነው እምትጠየቀው አርባ ብር ነው እምትጠየቀው የሚል ከሆነ ይሄ ችልተኝነትን ግድየለሽነትን የበለጠ እንደ ባህል እንዲቆጥረው መቀጣት ምንም ማለት እንዳልሆነ ወዲያውኑ ህገወጥ ሥራ ሰርቶ እንደሚመልሰው እዚህ ጋር አምስት ሰው ደርቦ ጭኖ ቢሄድ እሚፈለገው አስራ ሁለት ሰው ሆኖ እሱ በዚህም በዚህም አጠጋግቶ ኩርሲ አስቀምጦ አስራ ሰባት ሰዎችን ጭኖ ቢሄድ ያቺን

1395 ሰማኒያ ወይም አርባ ብር የተቀጣትን ወዲያውኑ እሚመልሳት ከሆነ በሕጉ በመቀጣቱ በእሱ ላይ እሚያሳድረው የመማር እንትን ይሄን ያክልም አይደለም (.) ስለዚህ የህጉ ክፍተት ያስፈፃሚው አካል ደግሞ በሪከርድ ላይ ተመርኩዘህ የቅጣት አፈፃፀም ደረጃው በየደረጃው እያደገ ስለሚሄድ የተለያዩ እስቴፖች ያሉት ቅጣት አለመኖር ነው (.) እ እንደገና ገበያ ላይ ያለው ኮምፕቴሽን በእለት ገቢ ለባለሀብቱ አስረክቦ የእሱን ድርሻ ከፍ ለማድረግ ያለው

1400 ፍላጎት እ ሕጉን ለመጣስ እንደ ዋነኛ ምክንያቶች ይሆናሉ ብዬ እገምታለሁ (SCA8)

SPS19

ቅድም በጥቅል መልኩ የሀብረተሰቡ ማህበራዊ ንቃተ ህሊና በሚፈለገው መልኩ አላደገም ብያለሁ (.) እዚህ እስፔስፊክ የሆነውን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አኳያም ሲታይ እውነት ለመናገር ከሆነ የመንገድ ደህንነት ግንዛቤያችን ዜሮ የገባ ነው ቢባል ስተት አይደለም በእኔ እምነት

1405 ማለት ነው (.) ለምሳሌ ውሰድ አሽከርካሪዎችን በቀላሉ ማየት ትችላለህ (.) እኔ ግርም ነው እሚለኝ (.) እዛ አሁን እፊትህ እግረኛ ምናልባት ያካል ጉዳተኛ ሊሆን ይችላል ወይም ነፍሰጡር እናት ልትሆን ትችላለች በምን ያህል ስፒድ ያንን መንገድ እንደምታቋርጠው መገመት የማይችል አሽከርካሪ ነው ያለው (.) ሄደህ ሄደህ ሄደህ አጠገቧ ስትደርስ ፍሬን ሴኮ ያገዝኩ ብለህ አውቶማትክ ፍሬን ተጠቅመህ አደጋው ግን ላይቀርልህ ይችላል ማለት ነው (.)

1410 ማድረግ የነበረብህ ፍጥነትህን እየቀነስክ መጠጋት ነውንጂ እዚህ ስትደርስ ፍሬን ማመቅ አይደለም ትልቁ ስራ (.) አሁን አሽከርካሪዎቻችንን ስትወስድ ይሄንን አይደለም (.) እኔ አሁን ((የአንድ አለማቀፍ መ.ያ.ድ. ስም ጠቅሰው)) አንድ ሰው ሲያጫውቱኝ ስልጠና ስንሰጥ (.) እ ምንድነው አሉ ሰውዬው ይችን አህያ ልትገጭ ነው መሰለኝ እያሉ ሄዱ አሉ (.) ሾፌር ናቸው እሳቸው (.) ከዛ በኋላ ኢማጅን አህያዋን አይተው እንደምትገጭ ከገመቱ ፍጥነታቸውን

1415 እየቀነሱ እየቀነሱ መጠጋት ሲገባቸው እና አህያዋን ማሳለፍ ሲገባቸው አላዩዋትም እንዳይባል ድንገት ገባች እንዳይባል አይተዋታል (.) ከዛ በኋላ ሄዱ ሄዱና አሉ እንደተባለው ገጪት (.) አላልኳችሁም አሉ አሉ አየኸው ((ሣቅ)) እኔ አሁን ምንም በምንም ታዕምር

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ግንዛቤ የሚባለው ነገር በጭራሽ በምንም በነገራቸውም አላለፈም ማለት ነው (.) እንኳን ውስጣቸው ምናቸውም የለም (.) እንግዲህ አላልኳችሁም (.) አየህ

1420 እየፎከሩ ሄደው እንደገጫት ቁጠር እንግዲህ አየኸው (.) እንደዚህ እንደዚህ አይነት ሾፌሮች አሉ ማለት ነው ገብቶሃል (SPS19)

SPS17

የትራፊክ ደህንነቱ ዋናው ችግር ሆኖ ያገኘነው እንደባለድርሻ አካላት ባሁን ሰዓት መንጃፊቃድ አሰጣጡ ሲጀመር አዲስ የመጣው በጣም ጥሩ ያልሆነና የህብረተሰቡን ግንዛቤ

1425 ያላማከለ በጣም እ አደጋን እየጨመረ የሄደ ህዝብን እየጨረሰ ያለው ይሄ ያሁኑ ሰዓት ያለው የመንጃፊቃድ አሰጣጥ ችግር ነው (.) ያ ችግር ባንዴ ከመሬት ተነስቶ አራተኛ ይሰጠዋል አምስተኛ ይሰጠዋል ሶስተኛ ይሰጠዋል (.) ያ ስለሆነ ልምድ በሌለው አይምሮው ሳይበስል ኃላፊነት ላይ እናመጣውና ህብረተሰቡን ላደጋ እና ራሱንም ላደጋ እንዳርገዋለን (.) ያ ትልቅ ጉዳትና ትልቅ በጣም ትልቅ ችግር የሆነ አሁን ባሁኑ ሰዓት ከርቸሌና እስርቤትን

1430 ያጨናነቀው ይሄ ነው (.) መጀመሪያ ይሄ ነገር ከመወሰዱ በፊት ባለ ድርሻ አካላትን ሳያማክል በተወሰኑ ግለሰቦች ብቻ የተወሰነ በመሆኑ ነው (.) ያ በመሆኑ የተነሳ ይሄ ነገር ይሄ አደጋ እየከፋ ሊሄድ ችሏል (.) አንድ ጥናት ላይ ሲቀርብ ተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ላይ ከመቶ ሰማኒያ አምስት ፐርሰንቱ አዲሱ መንጃፊቃድ ነው ጉዳት እያደረሰ ያለው የሚል ጥናት ሲቀርብ ግን ታዲያ ይሄንኛው ለምንድነው መፍትሄ ያልሰጣችሁት እሚል ነገር እኛም

1435 ተከራክረንበታል (.) እና አሁንም ችግር እየፈጠረ ያለው ውዥንብር እየፈጠረ ያለው በከተማዋ ውስጥ ይሄ ነው (.) ከተማ ውስጥ አደለም ሃገሪቷ ላይ በሙሉ ደረቅ አንድ እርጥብ አንድ ምናምን እየተባለ በጣም ባንዴ ተነስቶ እሚሰጥ መንጃፊቃድ አግባብ የሌለው ነው (.) ደረጃውን ጠብቆ እንደዱሮው ቢሄድ ኖሮ ይሄ ሁሉ ነገር እሚመጣ አይመስለኝም ነበር (.) ሌላው እንደዚሁ አደጋ ያባብሳል ብለን እምናስበው ያው እኛ ሲጀመር ታዳጊ ነን (.) አንድን

1440 ህግ እንደመጽሐፍ ቅዱስ ቃል እምንይዛት ህግ አለች (.) ለምሳሌ የመንገድ ስነስርዓቱ ጠዋትና ማታ ላይ በብዛት መኪናዎች የሚወጡበትና የሚገቡበት ሰዓት የተወሰነ ሰዓት ነው (.) ከዚህ ናዝሬት ጀምሮ ወደዚህ ብንመጣ ማታ ከአስራ አንድ ሰዓት በኋላ ወደዚህ መምጣት አስቸጋሪ ነው (.) እዚህ ከተማ ውስጥም አስቸጋሪ ነው (.) ስለዚህ ይሄንኛው ሳይድኢፌክት አለው ብዬ እማስበው የተማሪ ሰዓት ለብቻው የሰራተኛ ሰዓት ለብቻው የነጋዴ መውጫ

1445 መግቢያ ለብቻው (.) የቤት መኪናዎች የንግድ መኪናዎች የህዝብ መኪናዎች ቢለዩ መስመሩ ላይ አስፋልቱ ላይ (.) እነዚህ ሁሉ ከባድ መኪና በተወሰነ ሰዓት ቢሆን እነዚህ ቢለያዩ ይሄ ሁሉ ክራውድድና ይሄ ሁሉ መጨናነቅ አደጋ ላያመጣ ይችላል የሚል ሃሳብ ነው

ያለኝ (.) የተጠቃሚውን የመንገድ አጠቃቀም ስናየው በጣም በጣም የወረደና በይበልጥ ካዲሳባችንጋ አብሮ እማይሄድ ያጠቃቀም እንትን ነው ያለው (.) ያንን ነገር በማስተማር

1450 በብሮሽር በምኑም ቢሆን ማሰልጠንና ማሳወቅ ነው ያለብን (.) አስፈላጊ ሆኖ ከተገኘ ወደህግም ተገብቶ በህግም ማሳወቅ አለብን የሚል አቋም አለን (.) ለምን ቢባል (.) ባሁን ሰዓት ግማሹ ግራና ቀኙን እማያቅ እ መኪናን እማይፈራ ሰውሰራሽ መሆኑን እማያቅ ባለበት አገር ላይ ነን (.) ይሄንን ነገር ወደእንትን ለማምጣት ህግና ደንቦች ባለድርሻ አካላትን ባማከለ መንገድ ህግና ደንቦች ወጥተው ወደተገበር መግባት ያለባቸው ይመስለኛል (.) ይሄ

1455 ባልሆነበት አሁንም ቢሆን ብናስተምረውም አንድ ሰሞን በደንብና ህግ ማስከበር ከዜብራ ውጪ እሚሻገሩት እየታሰሩ ይቀጡ ነበር (.) ቀለበት መንገድ እየዘለሉ እየተቀጡ ነበረ (.) ሃያ አራት ሰዓት ይታሰራሉ የጉልበት ስራ ይሰራሉ (.) አለበለዚያም ደሞ ስልሳ ብር ነው ምናምን እየከፈሉ ይወጡ ነበረ (.) እሱ ትንሽ የሆነ ፍንጭ ሰቶ ነበር ተመልሶ እሱም ጠፋ (.) አሁን ሁሉም እንደፈለገው ነው እሚራመደው እንደፈለገው ነው መንገዱን እሚያቋርጠው (.)

1460 ያ ነገር በግድ እ በቃ ህግና ስርዓት ተበጅቶለት መሰራት ያለበት ይመስለኛል (.) ተጠቃሚውም ሹፌሩም ሁሉም የማወቅ ግዴታ የማወቅ ግዴታ ያለባቸው ይመስለኛል (SPS17)

SPS18

አሽከርካሪውንም እንዳትወቅሰው ግንዛቤ የለውም (.) እንግዲህ ፕርሰንት ዘጠናም ስጠው መቶም በለው ግን ምን (.) ምን አጭር ምንድነው የሰጠኸኝ ግንዛቤ ይልሃል (.) መንጃ ፈቃድ

1465 ብቻ ነው ያለው (.) ከዛ በኋላ ስለአደጋ እንዲህ ተከታታይነት ያለው በየሰድስት ወሩ በየሶስት ወሩ ምናምን ብለህ አምስት ሳንቲም በጀት ላሽከርካሪው ስልጠና አምስት ሳንቲም የለም (.) እኔ አይቼ አላቅም (.) ማለት ያው ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ ብዙም ሩቅ አደለም እንደው አንዳንዴ እስኪ እዚህ አካባቢ እኔ አሽከርካሪዎች ላይ ስለምሰራ በጀት ካለ እስኪ እነሱ ከኪሳቸው ከሚከፍሉ ብዬ ቼክ ለማድረግ ሄጃለሁ (.) እና የለም (.) ሶ እንግዲህ አሁን ዝም ብለህ ጣት

1470 መቀሰር ሊሆን ነው እንግዲህ (.) አየህ ምንም ሳትሞክር ሰውም እንዲሻሻልም ሳትነግረው መንስኤነቱንም በቁጥር ብቻ ቁጭ አርገህ (.) ግን ወደ ሶሊሽኑ እንግዲህ ችግር ብቻ ጠቁመህ ሶሊሽን ካልተናገርክ ምንድነው (.) ለዚህ ነው አሁን ለነሱም አሁን ሄድኤክ ነው (.) በቃ በጣም እማይገባቸው ነገር (.) ለእግረኛ ቅድሚያ ባለመስጠት ብትለው አሁን በቃ ያብዳል አሽከርካሪ (.) ሰለቸው (.) ማለት ሁሌ ሁሌ እንዴ እንዴት ሊሆን ይችላል ይላል (.) በኋላ ነው

1475 እንግዲህ በኔ በኔ አፕሮች ግን ይሰማማሉ (.) በኋላ ላይ ለምን አንተ ቀድመህ ኦብዘርቭ ብታረግ ኖሮ ምናምን ስለው ኦኬ እንደሱ ለማለት ነው እንዴ ይልሃል ገብቶሃል (.) እንትኑ ዝም ብለህ ግን እንደው ለመወንጀል በቃ ሰማኒያ ፕርሰንት እሱ ነው የያዘው ብለህ

እያመጣህ ሁሉንም ችግር ወደሱ እምትወረውር ከሆነ መፍትሄ አታገኝም (.) እንደውም ማደንቆር ይሆናል ማሰልገብ (.) እንደውም ይውጣላቸው አንዳንዴ ሲበዛበት ይውጣላቸው

1480 ይላል እልህ ውስጥ ታስገባዋለህ (.) እና አዌርነስ አሸከርካሪው ላይ አልተሰራም (.) እንደውም በንፅፅር እግረኛው ላይ የተሰራ ይመስለኛል (.) እንደውም ተሰርቷል (.) አንዳንድ ክልሎች በሞዴልነት እግረኛው ላይ ሰርተዋል ተብሎ በጣም እሚወደድ አለ (.) ሰጧን አይቻለሁ እኔም ይሄ ሺዲዮዎች ምናምን ሰተውኝ አይቻለሁ (.) ግን እሱን ቻሌንጅ ለማረግ ነበረ የሄድኩት (ሳቅ) ግን ያው እኛም በጣም ሰርተናል የሚል እንትን ሰተውኛል አይ ኮንቪንስ ግን

1485 አላረገኝም (ሣቅ) (SPS18)

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ጠያቂ:- እንደው ትራፊክ ፖሊስ እንዲህ እንዲህ አይነቶች ሌሎችን ምናልባት

መላሽ:- አዎ ፖሊሶች እንደዚህ ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች ማለት ነው እነሱም ስልጠና ያስፈልጋቸዋል (.) በጣም ጀንዩን መሆን አለባቸው ባይ ዘ ዌይ (.) አንዳንዶች ትራፊኮች

1490 ለእንትን እሚሰሩ አይመስለኝም (.) ለሴፍቲው ሳይሆን ለኪስ ሰላጡ ለራሳቸው እሚሰሩ ነው እሚመስለው (.) ያው እኔ እንግዲህ እድሉ ስላለኝና አሸከርካሪዎችን ስለማገኛቸው ቢቃ በጣም ነው እሚያሳዝነው (.) አንዳንዱ የተጫነውን ተሳቢ የተጫነ ያዘሉትን ማለት ነው ሊሾ ነው ኅማው ብለው ይቀጣቸዋል (.) አሁን የታዘለ ተሳቢ ምንድነው ታዝሏል እኮ አደል ሲወርድ ነው ያደጋ መንስኤ እሚሆነው (.) አዝሎትኮ እሚሄደው ይሄኔ ወደ ጋራጅ ሊሆን ይችላል

1495 ምንድነው (.) እዛ ድረስ እንትን ጫና ይፈጥሩባቸዋል (.) እ የራሳቸው ደሞ አንዳንዶች ክልሎች ምናምን የራሳቸው የቅጣት እንትን አላቸው (.) አሁን ኦሮሚያ ከምትቀጣ ቢቀር ይሻላል ይላሉ ለምን በየመንጃ ፈቃዱ ነው እንትናቸው የሚወጣው (.) አሁን አምስተኛ ላይ አምስት መቶ ብሎ ይጀምራል ስለዚህ ከባድ ነው ማለት ነው (.) እዚህ ደሞ እንደሱ አደለም አዲስ አበባ

1500 **ጠያቂ:-** ቢቀር ይሻላል ማለት

መላሽ:- ማለት እንደው ላለመቀጣት የሚሄዱበት መንገድ በጣም እንትን ነው (.) ኖርማሊም ቅጣቱም አይገኝም ማለቱ ነው ሄዶም ተቀጥቶም ስለዚህ ምን ይሻላል እዛው መደራደሩ (.) እና አንዳንዶች እንትኖች ኢንፎርሰመንት ላይ ያሉ ሰዎች ሁሉም ማለት አደለም ግን በጣም እሚሰሩት ነገር አሳዛኝ ነው (.) እና ሪሊ እነሱስ ወይ የትራፊክ ደህንነት ለማስፈን ነው ብዙም

1505 አደለም (.) ተደብቆ እንዴት ተደብቆ ከዛ አካባቢ ይወጣና ድፍን መስመር ጥሰሃል አሁን ድፍን መስመር ይሄ ሶሊድ ላይን እምንለው ማለት ነው ወጥቶ እንዲህ ሲልህ አሁን ምንድነው ለማቆም ነው እምትርበተበተው (.) ለምን አንተ አላየኝም ብለህ ሊሆን ይችላል

ድንገት ወጥቶ እንዲህ ሲል ለመቆም ኢቭን ትክክለኛ ቦታ እንኳን ይዘህ አትቆምም (.) በመሐል አደጋ ይደርሳል ...

- 1510 ምንድነው ችግርህ አይ ይቀጣኛል ነው ፍርሃቱ (.) እንግዲህ ምን አለበት ታዲያ ብትቀጣ አይሻልም (.) ለምን ካደጋው በኋላ ምንድነው እሱ እኔ ነኝ እንደዚህ ያደረኩት አይልህም (.) በጣም ሲምጥል ምሳሌ ልስጥህ (.) ኮልፌ ላይ የደረሰው የትራፊክ አደጋ ታስታውሳለህ (.) እዛ ላይ እኮ የአሽከርካሪው ጓደኞች ያው እኔ ስልጠና ላይ ብዙዎቹን ስላሰለጠንኩ መኪናው የቴክኒክ ችግር ነበረበት (.) ፌይል አርጓል ቴክኒክ ፍሬን ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ አቆመው
- 1515 አይበቃም በቃ አቆመው (.) ማለት አደጋ አይደርስም ማለት እኮ ነው (.) ግን ያቆመበት ቦታ የትራፊክ እንትን አይፈቅድም (.) ስለዚህ እዚህ መቆም አይቻልም አንሳ ነው (.) ይችን ተፅዕኖ እንግዲህ መቋቋም አቃተው ማለት ነው (.) ስለዚህ አሁን ዳይሬክት አደጋው ላይ እምታገኘው ሾፌሩን ነው (.) ቢሃይንድ ግን እዚህ መቆም አይቻልም የቴክኒክ ችግር አለበት እያለው ነው (SPS18)

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- 1520 አዎ እንግዲህ ይጠገንልኝ ይሄ ነገር ብዬው ነበር ንማው ይቀይርልኝ አሮጌ ነው ብዬው ነበር (.) አንድ ሁለት ቢያጆ ደርሰህ ትመጣለህ አለኝ በዚህ ምክንያት በረረና ይሄው ሰዎች አለቁብኝ ስልሳ ሰው ይልሃል (.) አይ ቢሃይንድ ከፊት ለፊት አታገኘውም ባለንብረቱን (.) ስለዚህ አሁን እኔም እንግዲህ አንተ ላይ ብጨርስ ኖሮ እንዲህ አይነት ተሽከርካሪ አልይዝም ብትል እዛ ላይ ዲፌንሲቭ ላይ ብጨርስ ያኛውን አትጠቅስልኝም ነበረ (.) አሁን ግን እድል
- 1525 አገኘህ ከዛ ለምንድነው ስልህ የንጀራ ጉዳይ ነው ትለኛለህ (.) ለምን እንደዚህ አይነት መኪና ትይዛለህ ስትለው ታዲያ ልጆቹ ምን ይብሉ ይልሃል (.) አሁን ወደ ማኔጅመንት ፓርት ነው ሴፍቲ እና እንትን ስትቀላቅለው ልክ አይመጣም ሴፍቲና ይሄ እለታዊ ይሄ መኖር እንትን እምታወራ ከሆነ እሱ ልክ አይመጣም (.) ስለዚህ ምን ላድርግ የእኛን አገር ታውቀዋለህ አንድ ሶስት ወር ሥራ አንድ ወር እንኳ ብፈታ ልጆቹ እሚበሉት ነገር የለም (.) ለዚህ ነው ሊሾ
- 1530 ከነሊሾው ንማ የሄድኩት እንጂ ጠፍቶኝ አደለም ይልሃል (.) አሁን አየህ አበላሽኸው እንትኑን ዲፌንሲ የሚለውን እዚህ ጋር በቃ ዩ አር ኖት ዲፌንሲቭ ዲፌንሲቭ ብትሆን ኖሮ ሴፍቲ ላይ ድርድር የለውም (.) ሶስት ወር ሥራ ብትፈታ በሕይወትህ አገኝሃለሁ እስር ቤትም አደለም እንደዚሁ እንገናኝ ነበር ሌላም ሥራ ታገኛለህ (.) አንተ ግን ሶስት ወር አደለም ምንም ሥራ መፍታት ስለማትፈልግ አሁን ግን ወይ እስር ቤት ነው አድራሻህ ካልሞትክ ወይም ደሞ
- 1535 ሬሳህ ነው ((የሚቀረው)) ስለዚህ ከኋላ ስለሚሆነው አትንገረኝ ነው (.) ከኋላ ባለቤቱ ተጽዕኖ እንደሚመጣ ያውቃል ግን ደሞ ማስቆም እሚችለው አሽከርካሪው ነው በቃ (.) እንዲህ አይነት መኪና አልይዝም ቢል ሌላውም እሚቀጠረውም ሰው አልይዝም ቢል ሌላውም አልይዝም

ቢል እንግዲህ ከቻይና ካላመጣ በስተቀር ይሄ ሰው አሽከርካሪ አያገኝም (.) ስለዚህ እስቲል አሁንም አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው እምደክመው ነው እምለው (.) ወደ ከኋላ ስላለው ስለ

1540 ባለንብረቱ ያደጋ መንስኤነት ወደፊት እስቴክሆልደር ነው ልክ ነህ ይመለከተዋል ተሽከርካሪው የእሱ ስለሆነ ማለት ነው ግን እነሱንም አዌር ማረግ ጥሩ ነው (.) እ ስለሴፍቲ ቅድሚያ ሰተው ተሽከርካሪው የራሳቸው ነው ለረጅም አመት ቢሰራላቸው ተጠቃሚ ይሆናሉ(.) ግን እኛ አገር ደሞ ባንድ ጊዜ እሚፈልገው ረጅም አመት ተሽከርክሮለት ሳይሆን በሶስት ወር የባንኩንም ምኑንም መልሶ ሌላም ሌላም (.) ስለዚህ ጫናው ምን ላይ ይመጣል

1545 አሽከርካሪው ላይ ይመጣል (.) ስለዚህ እነሱንም ትንሽ እንደው ማሰልጠን ጥሩ ነው እሚቀየሩ ከሆነ ባለቤቶቹ ማለት ነው (SPS18)

SPS18

እንግዲህ እኔ በጣም ሲምጥል የሆነ ሎጂክ ከሄድን መተኮር ያለበት አሽከርካሪው ላይ ነው (.)

1550 ለምን ያው ጥፋተኛም እሱ ስለሆነ (.) ሰማኒያ አንድ ፐርሰንት ከሰማኒያ በላይ ነው ቀጥታ ከዳታ ስትሄድ ከመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ዳታ (.) ሰማኒያ አንድ ፐርሰንት የአሽከርካሪ ስህተት ስለሚል ስትሰራም እንደዛው ነው (.) እንግዲህ ስለዚህ ሌሎችም እንግዲህ አምስትም አስርም ፐርሰንት ያላቸውንም እንደእንትን ቢዳሰሱ መልካም ነው (.) ግን ዋና ካልከኝ መንገድ ደህንነትን ለማስፈን አሽከርካሪውን ነው ማሰልጠን ያለብን ብዬ ነው እማስበው (.) እንደ

1555 እድል ሆኖ ግን እሱ ላይ አይደለም እየተሰራ ያለው (.) ባለፈውም አንስተነዋል እግረኛው ላይ ምናምን ላይ በሰፊው በጀት የዋለ ይመስለኛል (.) እና አሽከርካሪውን መቀየር ነው (.) እንግዲህ ሥልጠናውም እሱም ደግሞ ያው ዞሮ ዞሮ ያው ሞደርን ያልነው እንትንም ዲፌንሲቭ የሚለውን እንጂ እስኪል ያጥረዋል ብዬ አላስብም (.) እስኪል አለው ግን አቲትዩድና ኖዎሌጅ እነዚህ እነዛን ማዳበል ስላለበት እነሱ ሊመለሱለት የሚችሉት ደግሞ

1560 በዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቭንግ ፓኬጅ ውስጥ ያገኘዋል ብዬ አስባለሁና ሞር እሱ ላይ ቢሰራ ጥሩ ነው (.) ቀጥሎ ግን ያው እንግዲህ ሌላውም ግንዛቤ ቢኖረው ችግር የለውም (.) መንገድ ግን ብዙም መንገድ ላይ ቢሰራ አልልህም ለምን ብዙም አይደለም (.) እንደዚህ ግሑዝ የሆኑ ነገሮች ላይ ጊዜ ማጥፋት ብዙም አደለም ጥቅሙ (.) ለምን አሁን ያየሁት እንትን ስልሳ ስምንት ነጥብ ምናምን አራት ነው እንደዚህ ፐርሰንት አደጋዎች የሚደርሱት ለጥና ቀጥ ያሉ

1565 መንገዶች ላይ ነው ይላል (.) እና ለምን መንገድ ላይ ይሰራል (.) እምለው ገብቶሃል ለጥና ቀጥ ባለ ላይ ከሆነ እሚወድቀው ከሆነ እንግዲህ አስተሳሰቡ ላይ ነው (.) ችግሩ ያው አሽከርካሪው ነው እሚሆነው አይደለም እንዴ (SPS18)

SPS18

ጠያቂ:- ከዛ ባሻገር ደግሞ እናንተም አሁን በዚህ ማሰልጠኛ እምትጠቀሙባቸው ማኑዋሎች አዋጆች እንደዚህ አይነት ነገር አሉ (.) እነሱስ እንደው በአዎንታዊው ወይም ባሉታዊ መልኩ

1570 ያላቸው አስተዋጽኦ ላይ ኮመንት ማረጋገጥ ከተቻለ

መላሽ:- አሁን ለኔ ደግሞ አዋጅ ወይም እንትኖች ፊት ለፊት ምናምን ብታወጣ ለሥልጠና ለዚህ ለመንጃ ፈቃድ ለሚያወጣ ሰው ብዙም እንትን የለውም (.) በፈተና ለማለፍ ውጤቱን ለማምጣት ካልሆነ ምናምን ምን ይጨምርለታል (.) እንዳይቀጣ ከሆነ አዋጅ ብታወጣ እንዳይቀጣ እሚያደርገውን ነገር ልትነግረው ትችላለህ ነገር ግን አደጋ እንዳያደርስ አዋጁ

1575 አያግዘውም (.) አደጋን እንዳያደርስ ሴፍ ድራይቭንግ የሆነ ፓኬጅ ነው መስጠት ያለብህ

ጠያቂ:- ይቺ ኢንፎርሽን መንት ፓርት ለምሳሌ አለች

መላሽ:- አዎ አለች እሷ እኮ ምን ባይ ዘ ዌይ ምን ቅጣት (ሳቅ) ቅጣት እንዴት የእኛን አገር ካወራን እንደውም ብዙ እንትን ቅጣት ያለው ሰው ለመቀየር ያለው ድርሻ በጣም ኢምንት ነው (.) ለምን እንደውም ጊዜ ማጥፋትም አትፈልግም ወይ ሰድብኸው ሰድብኸው ጭምር ነው

1580 ትራፊኩን አንተ አዋቂ ብትሆን ኖሮ ምናምን ምናምን ብለህ ጣል አርገህ ከዛ ቅጣ ፃፍ ፃፍ

እንጂ እንትን ብለህም አደለም (.) ኮንቪንሲንግም አደለም እና እሱ አደጋን አያስቀርም (.) ባይ ዘ ዌይ ቅጣት ከእንትን በኋላ ነው አይደል (.) ካደጋ በኋላ እኮ ነው (.) አደጋን አያስቀረውም ማለት ነው ካደጋ በኋላ ስለሆነ

ጠያቂ:- ቀጥሎ ያለውን ምናልባት ካልሆነ በስተቀር

1585 መላሽ:- እኮ ካደጋ በኋላ ነው እምትቀጣው (.) ስለገጨ ትቀጣዋለህ ወይም መቆም የሌለበት

ቦታ ስለቆመ ትቀጣዋለህ (.) ለሚቀጥለው ካልሆነ አሁን እንዳያጠፋ አያደርገውም (.) ስለዚህ እንትን አደለም ፕሮአክቲቭ አደለም ሪአክቲቭ ነው ቅጣት እኮ (.) ከሆነ በኋላ ነው አይደል

ጠያቂ:- ልክ ነው

መላሽ:- ምንም ትርጉም የለውም ለእኔ ትርጉም የለውም (.) ስለዚህ ቅጣት ሰውን ይቀየራል

1590 ብዙም አላምንም

ጠያቂ:- ስለዚህ አሁን ምንድነው ለናንተ በተለይ አትኩራችሁ በምትሰሩበት በዚህ ስልጠና ዙሪያ ላይ እንደ ግብአት እየሆነን ነው የምትሉት መመሪያ ልበለው ወይም ማኑዋል ልበለው ወይም የሆነ ከመንግስት ወይም ብቻ ከየትም ይሁን እዛ ላይ ነው

መላሽ:- ኦኬ አይ እኔ አሁን ከዚህ ከዚህ እንትን ምንም ያገኘሁት ነገር የለም ግብአት

1595 እሚሆን ነገር የለም (.) ኖርማሊ ለመንጃ ፈቃድ ለሚያወጡ ሰዎች እንትን አለን ካሪኩለም

አለ በዛ መሰረት ታስተምራለህ (.) ኢት ኢዝ ኦኬ ያው ያችን እንትን ፕሮፎርም ለማረጋገጥ ላይሰንሱን እንዲያገኝ ያግዘዋል (.) ጥሩ ነው የቴክኒክ ግንዛቤ ስለተሸከረካሪው ያገኛል (.)

ስለመንገድ ስነ-ስርዓት ምልክት በለው ህጎችን ትነግረዋለህ (.) ግን እስቲል ይሄ ስልጠና አፖርቼኒቲ እንትን ታስቦ አደለም አደጋን ለመከላከል አደለም (.) በቃ ስልጠናው ነው ይሄን 1600 ያገኛል (.) አሁን እኔ ግን እማውራው አደጋን ለመከላከል አደጋን ለማስቀረት የሚያግዝ ምን ሌላ ሌላ ሪሶርስ አለ ከመንግስት እሱ የለም (.) ምንም የለም (.) በእርግጥ እኔ አሁን ዲፌንሲቭ ድራይቪንግ እሚባለው ነገር እሱ ጥሩ ነው (.) ማለት ከሌላ ቦታ ነው ከዚህ አደለም ለእኔ ሼል ነው ትሬኒንጉን የሰጠኝ ማለት ነው (SPS18)

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1605 ቆቡ አለ (.) የትራፊክ ቆብ አለ (.) የትራፊክ ቆቡን ለሚመለከተው ለማንኛውም ሰው የመንግስቱ መርህ ምንድነው የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ነውና ህግን ከጣስክ ይይዝሃል ነው ቆቡ የሚያመለክተው(.) ቆቡ ውስጥ ደሞ ያለ ሰው አለ ህጉን ያስፈፅማል ተብሎ የታዘዘ ነው (.) ግን ቆቡን የለበሰ ህጉን የማያስፈፅም ሰው ነው (.) ቆቡን ይፈሩና ያስፈፅማል የተባለውን ሰው ባክህ እኬለ ነው ብለው ሲያልፉት እንመለከታለን (.) ሲያልፉት እንመለከታለን (.) ምንም የሚመጣ ነገር የለም (.) ሁለቱ 1610 ናቸው ከህግ አስከባሪው አንፃር ስትመለከተው ማለት ነው (.) ሌላ በገጠመኝ የተሞላሁ ነኝ በነገራችን ላይ እና እ አንድ ጊዜ እንደዚሁ በጣም እማከብራት የቤተክርስቲያን ውስጥ ትልቅ በጣም እጅግ ግዙፍ የሆነች ሴት እንደዚሁ በኔው ከእኔው ወንድም አካባቢ ነው ሞተች አሉኝ (.) እንዴት ብዬ ስል ቅድም እንዳልኩህ ቆቡን አይቶ ሰውዬውን ሲመለከት እሚያልፍ ሰው ነበረና (.) በመገናኛ ውስጥ ለውስጥ ሲሄድ ከልጄ ጋር በነበረችበት ወቅት ገጭቶ ገደላት (.) ውስጥ ለውስጥ 1615 ማንን አልፋለሁ ብሎ (.) ያኛውን አልፋለሁ ብሎ ገደላት (.) እንደውም ልጄ ከትንሽ ልጄ ጋር ነው ትንሽ ልጄም እግሯ ተቆርጧል እሚባል ነገር አለ ስምቻለሁ (.) እና እማዬኮ እንደዚህ ሆነችብኝ እያለ ሰቆቃ ውስጥ እየገባ ነበር (.) በጣም አዝኛለሁኝ (.) እሄን እሄን ስትመለከት እ አሮጊቶችን ከጧሪ እሚነጥል ህፃናቶችን ካሳዳጊ እሚለይ እ ነገ ተስፋ አለን ብለው ተስፋ አለን ብለው የሚማሩትን የሚያስቡትን ሰዎች ከዚህ ከተስፋቸው የሚነጥል ገሸሽ እሚያደርግ 1620 እና እሚያስቀር ነገር ነው (RUP29)

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ወደ ሹፌሩ ወደ ራሱ ና (.) እ በነገራችን ላይ እንዲሁ ዝም ብዬ ሳስበው እ የትራፊክን አደጋ የሚያበዙት የግል ተሽከርካሪ መኪናዎች አይደሉም (.) አብዛኛውን ጊዜ እኔ የታዘብኩት 1625 ታክሲዎች የህዝብ ማመላሻዎች በህዝብ ትራንስፖርት ውስጥ ያሉ የግለሰብ መኪናዎች ናቸው (.) እነዚህን ነገር ለምን ያደርጋሉ ብዬ ስመለከት እንዲሁ አሁን ከብዙ ሰዎች ጋር የተጣመርኩ ስለሆንኩኝ በታክሲ ስራ ውስጥ ባለሀብት የሆነ ንደኛ አለኝና እሄንን ነገር ለምን

ያደርጋል ብለን አንድ ቀን እንጫወት ነበር (.) ስንጫወት ምን እንዳለኝ ታቃለህ ሁሌ እሚሯሯጠት ታክሲ ከሆነ ለባለቤቱ በቀን ሶስት መቶ ብር ያስገባል ይችን ሶስት መቶ ብር 1630 ምን ማድረግ አለበት በላጭ ብር ማግኘት መቻል አለበት (.) ሶስት መቶ ሰጥቶ ከሶስት መቶ በላይ ኪሳ መክተት አለበት (.) እንደውም ሁለት መቶ እና ከዛ በላይ ኪሳ ከባለንብረቱ በላይ ያስገባል ነው ያለኝ (.) ስለዚህ ይችን ለማስገባት እማይገባ ቦታ ውስጥ ምን ያደርጋል ይገባል (.) አሁን ወደ እንትኖቼ ወደ ህዝብ አሽከርካሪዎቹ ታክሲዎቹ ስንመለከት ለዚህ ሲዋከቡ ሲሯሯጡ ምን ሲሉ እንመለከታቸዋለን (.) እ ስለዚህ እዚህ ላይ እነዚህ ሰዎች ምን 1635 ከቅድመጋ ላይይዘውና እ ወገንተኝነት ነገ አደጋ ቢደርስ በኔም ላይ ነው እኔ ገንዘቡን ምን አደርገዋለው የሚል ነገርን እንዲያስቡ ማድረግ ትምህርት እሚቀርፀው ነገር ነው (.) ትምህርት ቤቱ ያልቀረፃቸው ነገሮች አሉ ማለት ነው እሄ ነገር ይከሰታል (.) ከዛም ባሻገር ሹፌሮቹ ላይ ሌላው አደጋ እሚደርሰው (.) እኔ መንግስት ለምን ዝም እንዳለው አላቅም(.) ጫት ይቅማሉ ወያላውም ጫት ሲቅም ታያለህ ሹፌሩም ጫት ሲቅም ትመለከተዋለህ እንዲህ 1640 እንዲህ አይነት ነገሮች ሲያደርጉ ትመለከታቸዋለህ (.) በእንደዚህ አይነት ህይወት ውስጥ ፉዞ ነገር ውስጥ እያደረገ ባለው ሰውዬ ምክንያት አደጋው ምን እየሆነ ነው (RUP29)

RUTD25

መላሽ:- ... ሌላው በተለይ ብዙ ወጣቶች ላይ እማየው ድንበር ያለፈ ፍጥነት ነው 1645 ጠያቂ:- አኬ አሽከርካሪዎች ማለት ነው ... መላሽ:- አዎ እና በተለይ በተለይ እኔ አላውቅም እነዚህ አሁን አይሱዙ እና እነዚህ ይሄ ከነጻ አይምሮ ውጪ እየተጠቀሙ ይሄ ጫት ምናምን ለእንቅልፍ ማባረሪያ እየተባለ ተብሎ በቃ እሚነዱት አነዳድ ያስደነግጥሃል (.) ኃላፊነት የጎደለው አካሄድ ነው (.) ብዙ ጊዜ አንዳንዴ የህዝብ ተሸከርካሪ ህዝብ ህዝብ ግጥም አርጎ ጭኖ አካሄዱ ያስጠላሃል (.) ... (.) አሁን እኔ 1650 መኪና መጥቀስ ባይገባኝም ይሄ አይሱዙ ሃይገር ምናምን አነዳዳቸው ራሱ እኔ በቃ አንዳንድ ጊዜ መሪዬን ያስለቅቁኛል ፍጥነታቸው(.) በፍጥነት እየመጣ ከላይ ይገባብሃል (RUTD25)

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.20

This document has originally been written in English.

አንድ አንድ ነገሮች / Some Pressing Issues, Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014

ፋኛ ደዋይ:- አደጋው አዲስ አበባም ላይ ሆነ በየክፍለ ሀገሩ ያለው ከመጠን በላይ እየከፋ ነው የመጣው (.) እንደገና የመንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጡ እኔ ያስራ ስምንት ዓመት ሃያ አመት ልጅ ዛሬ ሂኖትራክ ሲነዳ ገና ላዳ ((ትንሿ ታክሲ ማለቱ ነው)) እንኳን ሲይዙ እንዴት እንደሚበሩ

1665 ይታወቃል (.) ፍሬሽ ነው መርጥ ነው ቢቃ መታየትን ነው የሚፈልገው (.) ስለዚህ አራተኛ መንጃ ፈቃድና አምስተኛ መንጃ ፈቃድ ይዞ እዛ ላይ ሲንጠለጠል ምን ያህል ነው (.) አሁን አዲስ አበባ ላይ አደጋ እያደረሱት ያሉት እነሱ ናቸው በብዛት (.) ስለዚህ ያን ነገር ሁሉ መጠናት አለበት (.) ሌላው ደግሞ ይሄ መንገድ ላይ አሁን ሰዎች በእግረኛ መንገድ ላይ አይሄዱም ይባላል (.) እግረኛ መንገድ እኮ በተለያየ ቁሳቁስ እኮ ተይዟል (.) እንዴት አድርጎ 1670 ነው ታዲያ በዛ ላይ እሚሄደው (.) እንደገና ደሞ ትራፊኮች ((ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች)) እራሳቸው እያዩ መኪናዎች እራሳቸው እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ አቁመው ካፌቴሪያው እዛ እግረኛ መንገድ ላይ ነው ያለው (.) መኪናውን እሚያቆሙት እዚያ ነው (.) በየቦታው እንደዚህ አይነት ችግሮች አሉ (.) ያን ሁሉ ነገር ትራፊኮች ((ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች)) አይቆጣጠሩም (.) ሁለተኛ ነገር ቢያዩና ያንን ነገር ቢፀዳኮ ሰጪም የእግረኛ መንገዱን አይቶ አካሄዱን በራሱ ያስተካክል 1675 ነበረ (.) እና አዲስ አበባ ላይ ያለውና በየክፍለሃገር ያለው ሁኔታ ያደጋው ሁኔታ እየከፋ ነው (Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014)

RUTD22

መንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ እንደው እኔ ብዙ ጊዜም እናደዳለሁ ሳሽከረክር (.) ለምን እንደው ጨንራዬን አልጨረስኩም ብለህ ነው በዚህ በሹፌሮች ጉዳይ ላይ (.) ለምን ብዙ አሽከርካሪዎች እኔ አሁን ስለምንም መኪና እንኳን ይዞ እሚያቅ አይመስልም (.) እኔ ግን 1680 ምናለበት እንደው ረዳቶች አሁን በጣም በረዳትነት ነበዝ እሚነዱ ሹፌሮች አሉ (.) ረዳት ሆነው መንጃ ፈቃድ ሳይኖራቸው ማውጣት ሳይችሉ (.) ለነሱ እነሱ ምናለበት ብቃታቸው ታይቶ መንጃ ፈቃድ ቢሰጣቸው ነው እምለው አንዳንድ ሹፌሮችን ስታይ (.) መሪ እንኳን በስትክክል መኪናው ወደኋላ ወደፊት እንዴት እንደምትወጣ እማያቁ ሹፌሮች አሉ (.) አንተ ቆመህ የፊት ማርሽ አስገባሁ ብሎ እየነዳ ዳገት ላይ ወደኋላ መጥቶ ይገጭህና አንተ ብቻ 1685 ከኋላ ስለሆንክ ጥፋተኛ ነው እምትሆነው (.) ምን ሆነህ ነው ስትለው አንተ ነህ መተህ የገጨኸኝ የሚልህም ሹፌር አለ (.) የዛን ሰአት አንተ ምንድነው እምትለው (.) በቃ እግዜር ይስጥልኝ ነው የምትለው (.) እኔ አንዱ ወደኋላ መቶ ((ገጨኝ)) ... ጋቢና የተሳፈሩት ተሳፋሪዎች ምን ሆነህ ነው ወደኋላ መጥተህ የምትገጨው ምናምን ((አሉት)) የት አያችሁ ወደፊት መጥቶ ነው የገጨኝ (.) ክርክር ተጀመረ (.) የዘመድ ነገር ስለነበረ መኪናው እግዜር 1690 ይስጥልኝ ብዬ እኔ ራሴ ነኝ ያሰራሁት (.) ለምን ቢቃ ብቃት የሌላቸው ሹፌሮች አሉ (.) እኔ አሁን እንዳልኩህ ረዳቶች ያልኩት ለዚህ ነው (.) ለምን ብቃት ሳይኖራቸው መንጃ ፈቃድ እኔ እንዴት እንደሚሰጣቸው ሁሉ አይገባኝም (.) ከየት ነው ያመጣችሁት መንጃ ፈቃዱን ብዬ እምጠይቅበት ጊዜ አለ (.) ስለዚህ ይሄ መንጃ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ስለውነት ነው እምነግርህ እኔ በስትክክል አወጡ እምላቸው ሹፌር እንኳ የሉም (.) እንዴ ሂዶ የቤት መኪና ይዞ እኮ

1695 ገጭቶ መንጃ ፈቃድ ሳይኖረው ነው የምታቀው ብዙ ጊዜ ሰፈር ላይ (.) ከዛ መንጃ ፈቃድ አውጥቶ ሲሰጥ ታየዋለህ (.) ከየት አለህ ትለዋለህ (.) አዎ አውጥቻለሁ ((ይልሃል)) ምን ትላለህ (.) ቦታ ወረቀት ነው እሚፈለገው ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ወረቀት ይዟል (.) ከያዘ ደሞ ህጉም ያንን ነው የሚያየው (RUTD22)

RUTD25

ይሄ ሃይ ዌይ ሲሰራ የሃያ አመት ጋራንቲ ነው ገባ ተብሎ የተሰራው ቀለበት መንገዱ (.) ቦታ ደስ ብሎኝ ነበር (.) ገና ግን የተወሰነ ቦታ ጨርሰው እንደሄዱ የተወሰነ ቦታ መፍረስ ጀመረ(.) እና በዛ ነገር ላይ ተቆጣጣሪ ሆነው እሚሾሙ ሀገር ትበልጥበታለች (.) ብሩ ነገ ያልቃል (.) ብዙዎቹ እንደዚህ አይነት ነገሮችን ሲሰሙ እምንሰማቸው ጥራት ተቆጣጣሪ የሆነ 1705 ነገር ይደረግለታል (.) ግን ስንት ሀዝብ ስንት ሀገር ስንት ወገን እንደሚያልቅበት በዚያ ነገር ላይ (.) እና የትም አይደርስበትም ካንድ እንጀራ በላይም አይበላም (.) ከባረከለት እሚያገኘው በቂ ነው (RUTD25)

RUTD25

ጠያቂ:- የመንገድስ የመንገድ ነገር አስተዋጽኦ አይኖረውም የመንገዱ ሁኔታ ለአደጋ መላሽ:- ይኖረዋል (.) ... አሁን እኔ እንደው መንግስትም ትልቁ ትኩረት እማይሰጥበት ነው(.) አሁን በክረምት እንዲህ አስፋልቶች ብዙጊዜ ይበላሻሉ በጋም ዘልቀው ብዙጊዜ ይሄዳሉ(.) እየሄድክ እያለ ልክ ጉድጓድ ጋር ስትደርስ ፍሬን ትይዛለህ (.) በሃሳብ ላይ እያለ ከጓላህ መጥቶ ይገጭሃል (.) በርግጠኝነት ተጠንቅቆ እሚሄድ ከሆነ ስትቆምም ይቆማል (.) እና ያ ጉድጓድ ውስጥ ሲገባ ወይ አንተ ደሞ ገብተህ ትወጣለህ ሲል ተከትሎህ ሲገባ አንተ 1715 ትመለሳለህ (.) ያኔም አደጋ ይደርሳል (.) እና ብዙጊዜ አሁን እንደዚህ ሳያውቅ ቀና መንገድ ነው ብሎ ይሄድ ይሄድና ልክ ድንገት ጉድጓድ ሲያይ ንብረት ነው ብሎ ከገባም አንዳንዱ በንብረቱ ላይ ይወስናል (.) ይሄም ትልቁ ችግር ነው (.) እንግዲህ ይሄ ስብእና ነው ሁላችንም አንድ አይነት ውሳኔ አትወስንም (.) ...

ጠያቂ:- ብዙ አደጋ አለ ማለት ነው እንዲህ አይነት መላሽ:- አለው አለው የራሱ ድርሻ አለው (.) በርግጠኝነት የራሱ ድርሻ አለው (.) እና ብዙ ጊዜ የመንገድ መበላሸት የመንዳት አክቲቪቲህን ይቀንሰዋል ይዘጋል (.) አሁን አሰራ ስምንትጋ አጠና ተራ ሲመጣ አሁን መንገዱ ዝግት ብሏል (.) ለምንድነው የተዘጋው መንገዱ እንደልብ መኪኖቹን አያሳልፍም (.) ትልቁ አሁን ትራፊኮች በብዛት እዛች ቦታ ላይ በብዛት ኢንፎርም እያረጉ ነው መሰለኝ በክረምት እንኳ ሁለቴ ተሰርቷል አግባብ ያለው አሰራር

1725 ባይሆንም (.) እና ሲቆም ስትሄድ ስትቆም ስትሄድ ምን ትሆናለህ ፌድ አፕ እያደረክ ትሄዳለህ (.) ከዛ በኋላ አንዳድህም እየተለወጠ ይሄዳል (.) እና መጨረሻ ላይ እየተዘናጋህ መምጣት ነው ትመታለህ (.) እና እንዲህ አይነት ነገር መንገዱም የራሱ ድርሻ ሾፌሩም የራሱ ድርሻ እንዳለው መንገድም የራሱ ድርሻ አለው (RUTD25)

RUTD25

1730 ያ እንግዲህ ትልቁ አሁን መንግስትም ያልቻለው ጉዳይ ቢሆን እሱ ነው (.) ለምን ብለህ ብትል አላቅም (.) ይመስለኛል እንግዲህ አንዳንድ ነገር በኢንፎርሜሽን ደረጃ ነው እምትሰማው አግሪመንት ሲያረግ ከቻይና መንግስት ጋር ቀለበት መንገዱ ሲሰራ ድልድዮችን በመቶ ሜትር ላይ ሊሰሩ ነበር የተነጋገሩት እሚባለው (.) አሁን ባምሰት መቶ ቀርቶ ባንድ ኪሎሜትር በላይ ርቀት ነው ያለው (.) እያንዳንዱ ነገር ኮሰት ይፈልጋል (.) ኬክ መብላት

1735 ትፈልጋለህ (.) እውነቱን ነው እኔ አንዳንድ ጊዜ በብር ከሃምሳ ሄዶ ራሱን ሴቭ አድርጎ እዛ እሚፈልግበት ቦታ ላይ ቢደርስ ይሻላል (.) አይ ምን አላት ከዚች እዚች ብሎ ለጤና ጥሩ ነው ((የእግር ጉዞ)) ግን ኤነርጂ ያጠፋኸው ኤነርጂ ልትተካው ግድ ይልሃል (.) መተኪያ ግን ከትራንስፖርቱ (እየሳቁ) አይገናኝም (.) እና ብዙ ጊዜ አንደኛ ሰጪም ደካማ ነው (.) ያንን ያለውን ድልድይ ከሚሻገር እዚሁ አቋርጬ ልሂድ ይላል (.) በዛ መሃል ላይ ሲንደረደር

1740 ዘሎ ሮጦ መኪና ውስጥ ይገባል ያ ከፍተኛ ፍጥነት ላይ እሚሄድ መኪና ለአደጋ እየተጋለጠ(.) መንግስትም አሁን ፖሊስ ሁላ ትራፊክ አቁሞ ወደዚህ ወዳጠና ተራ አልቻላቸውም (.) እዚህጋ ሲከለከሉ እዛጋ ይዘላል (.) እና እንዲህ አይነት ችግሮች የቀለበት መንገዱ ችግር ነው ብዬ ነው እማስበው (.) እና ባብዛኛው እግረኛ ለመንገዱ የሚሰጠው ክብር ሳይሆን ስለራሱ ጠቀሜታና ጉዳትና ጥቅም ነው አስቦ እሚሻገረው አደጋ ይደርስብኛል ብሎ

1745 አይደለም (.) እዛ ድረስ ሄጄ ከምደክም ለምን እዚችጋ ለምን አላቋርጥም ይላል (.) እሄ ነገር ነውና እሄም ያው በግንዛቤ ሊፈታ እሚችል ነገር ነው (.) ግና ያው እንደመፍትሄ ያው መንግስት ሊያስቀምጥ የሚችለው ይሄ የብረት መሸጋገሪያ እንደዚህ አይነት ነገሮችን ሊያደርግ ግድ ይላል (.) ሌላው በሃይዌይ ላይ ሃይዌይ ስለሆነ የተሰጠ ፍጥነት አለ (.) ፍጥነቱን ሁሉ ከመኪና አንጻር ልታየው ደሞ ግድ ይልሃል (.) በተለይ አገልግሎታቸው

1750 ረጅም ዘመን የሆኑ ብዙ መኪናዎች አሉ አገራችን ካለው ድህነታችን አንጻር (.) እና አሁን ሌተስት የሆኑ መኪና ገና ፍሬን የነካህ ምንድነው ነዳጅ የረገጥክ ሳይመስልህ የለም መኪናህ(.) እስከመጨረሻው ሰጥተኸው ደሞ እዛው ትጮሃለህ አንተ (.) እና መንገዱ ተመቻችቷል ብለህ ዝም ብለህ የምናደርገው ጉዞ ሊሆን አይገባም (.) ሁልጊዜ በተመቻችም ቦታ ላይ ድንገት የሚፈጠሩ ነገሮች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉና ፍጥነታችንን እየቆጠብን አንዳንድ

1755 ጊዜ (.) ትንሽ ነገር በቂ ነው አሁን እንዳልኩህ (.) በዛች ሃይዌይ ላይ ወይ ሰው ወይ ውሻ ቢመጣበት ወይ ከብረቱ ወይ ከድልድዩ ወይ መኪናው በሚገርም መልኩ ድልድዩን ተሻግሮ ታየዋለህ (.) ፍጥነቱን መቆጣጠር እማልችለው ከሆነ ለምን በዛ ፍጥነት እሄዳለሁ (.) እስከፒዮ አለ የሚቀጥለው መኪና እየፈጠነ እሚመጣ ከሆነ ዳር አስይዜ ማሳለፍ እችላለሁ በራሴ ፍጥነት እንድሄድ (.) እና እንዲህ እንዲህ አይነት በተለይ ኃላፊነት በሚሰማው መልኩ

1760 ሃይዌይ ላይ ገብቶ መጠቀም መቻል እንጂ ሃይዌይንም መብረር አለብኝ ብቻ መንገዱ ስለተመቸ መብረር የለበትም የሚል ነው (.) በሃይዌይም ላይ ራሱ መንገዱ ጥሩ መሆንም አለበት ድንገት እንግዲህ በዛ እስፒድ መጥተህ ጉድጓድ ቢገጥምህ እንዴት ነው እምትሄደው (.) ትንሽ መሪ ብትነካ ቀጥታ ሄዶ ነው እሚጋጭብህ (.) ስለዚህ ጉድጓዱ ውስጥ ገብተህ መውጣት አለብህ (.) እና እነዚህ በሁሉ ቦታ ላይ ኃላፊነት እንደተሰማን አድርገን

1765 እንንዳ ነው እኔ (.) ይሄ ራሱ ሃይዌይ ራሱ የራሱ ችግር አለው ህብረተሰቡም ያጠቃቀም የራሱ ችግር አለው (RUTD25)

RUTD25

እኔ ትልቁ ትልቁ የዚህ ነገር መፍትሄ ሊሰራበት እሚችለው አንደኛ በፍጥነት በሚያሸከረክሩ አሸከርካሪዎች ላይ እና ሁለተኛ መንገድ አላግባብ እሚጠቀሙ እግረኞች ላይ ነው (.) በተለይ እግረኞች እንደው ሁ ኬርስ ምንም ነገር ኃላፊነት እሱ ጠብቆት እሚሄደው የለም (.) ክላክስ

1770 ስታደርግ ዛሬ ነወይ ያስገጠምከው ይልሃል (.) ዝም ስትለው ክላክስ የለህም ወይ ይልሃል ከዛም ይሰድብሃል (.) ይሄ አንዳንድ ጎረምሳ ደሞ ውጣ ይሄ ያንተ መንገድ አደለም ይላል (.) ምን ታርጋ እስክትለጥፍ ወደዳር ውጣ ይለዋል ከዛ ጸብ ይፈጠራል (.) አሁን መኪና አይደለህም ለጊዜው ዳር ያዝ ነው (.) አሁን እግረኞች ላይ በተለይ በጣም በጣም እግረኞች ላይ ደሞ ስንት አይነት ህብረተሰብ ነው ያለው (.) ሱሰኛ ህብረተሰብ አለ (.) ... (.) እና

1775 በእግረኛና ፍጥነትን ቀነስ እሚደረግበት ቦታ ቢመረጥ (.) ፍጥነትና በተለይ በዚች ከተማ በዚች በተጣበበች ከተማ ላይ እንደው ፍጥነትን ተጠቅሜ ነገሮችን እቆጣጠራለሁ ማለት ኔቨር እሚሆን ነገር አደለም (.) እና በተለይ ባሸከርካሪዎች እሄ ግንዛቤ ቢኖር እና ወገንንም እንደራስ ብናስበው (.) አንዳንድ ጊዜ እንደው ዘመድንም ስንጠይቅ ጥቁር አንበሳ በዚህ አደጋ እሚሰቃዩትንም እኔስ ብሆን ብሎ ራስን በዛ ቦታ ማስገባት (.) ሁላችንም የኃላፊነት ስሜት

1780 ነውና ይሄ ቢሆን በግረኞች ላይ በፍጥነት ላይ በሁለቱ ላይ የበለጠ ቢሰራ ጥሩ ነው ብዬ አስባለሁ (RUTD25)

RUTD22

ያው እነሱ ትራፊኮች ሲጀመር እኛ አሽከርካሪዎች ስንሆን ያው ብዙ ጊዜ እኛ እናጠፋለን እነሱ ደሞ ህግን ለማስከበር ነው እሚቆሙት እዚህ (.) ሲጀመር እኔ አሁን አደጋ ለምን ይደርሳል ብለህ ትራፊክ ቆሞ ትርፍ ልትጭን ትችላለህ ወይ ትርፍ ጭነህ እንዲያይህ አንድ 1785 መኪና ደርበህ ስትሄድ አንዱን ልትገጭ ትችላለህ (.) ያ ያ ነገርም እኛ ላይ ተጽዕኖ አለ (.) ትራፊክን ባየን ቁጥር በጣም እንዴ ወፍራም ከሆንን ራሱኮ እንከሳለን እነሱን ስናይ (.) ውኑቴን ነው እምነግርህ ነጭ ኮፍያ ካየን በጣም ነው እምንደነግጠው (.) ለምን ትርፍ ልትጭን ትችላለህ ጥፋት ቦታ ቆመህ ሊሆን ይችላል (.) ስለዚህ እነሱን ስናይ እንደውም እኛ አደጋ የማድረስ ቻንሳችን በጣም የሰፋ ነው (.) ሳይኖሩ እንደውም ደህና ነን እንሻላለን (.)

1790 ለምን ባይናችንም ስለምናይ አይ ቢቃ የሉም ብለህ ራስህን ዘና አርገህ ጠንቀቅ ብለህ ትሰራለህ (.) ድንገት የመንገድ ክራውድድነት ሊጨምርብህ ይችላል ለምን እዚህ አንድ መኪና ከተጋጨ ትራፊክ የለም ማለት መንገድ ተዘጋጋ ማለት ነው (.) ያ ያ አይነት ነገር አለ (RUTD22)

RUTD25

1795 እንግዲህ የትራፊክ ፖሊስ ብዙ ጊዜ ብዙ ጊዜ ሰዎች ሊጎዱበት እሚችሉትን ነገር እነዲታረም ያደርጋሉ (.) ለምሳሌ አሁን መንገድ ላይ አሁን ወደአስራ ስምንት ትንሽ እያደነኳቸው ነው (.) በጣም ክራውድድ በሆነበት ቦታ ሰአት አሁን መንገዱ ለምን አይሰራም እያሉ ፑሽ እሚያደርጉት እነሱ መሰለኝ (.) አሁን ተሰሚ መሆኑ እየሳበ ነው እኛ የት ሄደን እንደምንጮህ እኛ አናቅም (.) እና ብዙጊዜ ብዙጊዜ እኔ ትራፊኮች ከመቅጣት ይልቅ ሰዎች

1800 ለአደጋ እሚጋለጡበትን መንገድ ቢያስተምሩ ምናለ (.) አንዳንድ ጊዜ አንተን አይቶ አሁን አሮሚያ ክልል ባለፈው ሚዲያ ላይ ነው ምናምን አደጋው እየበዛ ሄደ (.) ፔንሽን ይሄ ቅጣቱ በጣም ከፍተኛ ነው ያን ቅጣት ሽሽት ሰዎች በከፍተኛ ፍጥነት እየሄዱ ለአደጋ እየተጋለጡ ነው እየተባለ እየተወራ ነበር (.) እና ብዙጊዜ ትራፊክ ፖሊሶችም በጥሩ ስነምግባር እንደው እንደአላማ ይዘው (.) አሁን አሁን ቀረ እኔ ትዝ ይለኛል አሁን በሰማኒያ በሰማኒያ አምስት

1805 ኮፍያውን እዚህ ስር አርጎ ቆሟል (በስተጀርባቸው እያመለከቱ) ትራፊክ የለም ብለህ ስትመጣ እዚችጋ አለ የሆነ ነገር ይዞ ብቅ ይላል (.) ምን ትለዋለህ ይሄን ከምን ስነምግባር ትመድበዋለህ (.) ቢቃ ተደብቆ ድንገት መውጣት ሰዎችን ለመቅጣት (.) ግልጽ ሆኖ ቢመጣስ ያም ወንድሙ ነው (.) በየንዳንዱ ቤትኮ አለ ትራፊክ እንዳለ ሁሉ ሾፌር አለ እዛ ቤት ውስጥ መምህር አለ ዶክተር አለ (.) እና ሁሉም የማህበረሰቡ አካል እንደአንድ እምነሆንበትን

1810 መካኒዝም እንደዚህ አይነት ግንዛቤ እንደዚህ አይነት አመለካከት እንዲፈጠር ሚዲያው ቢሰራ (.) እና እንደዚህ አይነት ነገር ቢደረግ (RUTD25)

RUTD22

አደጋን ለመቀነስ እኔ የትራፊክ ጉዳይ ነው አደጋን የሚቀንስ እምለው (.) ለምን የተመደበበት ቦታ ባግባቡ አሽከርካሪውም ሆነ እግረኛው የተደናገጠ ሲኖር አረጋግቶ 1815 ቢያሻግር (.) ሾፌሮችም ስሜታዊ ይሆናሉ ብዙ ጊዜ እነሱ እነሱን እንኳን ቢመክሩ (.) ምናል እኛ (.) ገንዘብ ቅጣትኮ እኛን አያስተምረንም (.) የሰው ልጅ ስትመክረው ነው ብዙ ጊዜ ትምህርት የሚወስደው ይሄ ይሄን ነገር እየመከሩ (.) እኛ ራሱ አሁን ትርፍ ጭነን ብታጠፋ ለምን እንዲህ ታረጋለህ ብለህ ብትመክረው እንኳን ያ ሰውዬ ውስጡ ይነካል (.) ነገ ስታገኘው በጣም ነው እሚደነግጠው (.) ይሄ ትራፊክ መክሮኝኮ ነበር 1820 ትላለህ (.) ያ ያ ነገር ስላለ ወደገንዘብ ወደቅጣት ብቻ አናተኩር እስቲ (.) ሾፌሮች ሲመክሩ አደጋም እንዳያደርሱ አሁን ኦሮሚያ ላይ ደስ ይልሃል (.) አቁመው አንዳንድ ቦታ ላይ ምክር ሰጥተው የሚሄዱ አሉ (.) ተረጋጋ እንዲህ አይነዳም ይነግሩሃል ይመክሩሃል (.) አዲሳባ ውስጥ እንዲህ አይነዳም እንዲህ አይደረግም ብሎ እሚመክርህ የለም (.) ክስ ብቻ ነው ትከሰሳለህ (.) አንተ ተከሰሃል በንዴት መንዳት 1825 ነው (.) በንዴት ስትነዳ ደሞ ሌላ ቦታ አደጋ ማድረስ ነው (.) ያ ያ ነገር እንዳይሆን ትራፊኮች በተቻላቸው አቅም የተደናገጠ ሰው መሻገሪያ ላይ ሲኖር እሱን እሱን ቢያረጋጉ (.) ሹፌሩም ቢናደድም እነሱ ህግ አስከባሪ ስለሆኑ ብዙ ነገር ስለሚገጥማቸው አረጋግተው በቃ አይዞህ እንዲህ መሆን አለበት ብለው መክረው ቢለቁ (.) እንደው እኛንም ቢመክሩን ህብረተሰቡንም እንደዛ ቢያስተናግዱ አደጋው 1830 ይቀንሳል ብዬ አምናለሁ (RUTD22)

RUTD25

እና ኃላፊነት ሁሉም ሁሉም የባለድርሻ አካል ትራፊኩም ሌላውም ሁሉም እንደነዚህ አይነቱ ((አለበት)) (.) ሁልጊዜ (.) የግድ እንደኔ እንደኔ (.) አሁን አንድ ጊዜ አንድ ንደኛዬ ኢንጅነር 1835 ነው ሄዶ ኮት ዲሾር ውስጥ ሁሉም ትራፊክ ነው አለ (.) ጥፋት ካጠፋህ ከኋላህ ያለው መኪና ታርጋውን ጽፎ ለትራፊክ ይሰጣል (.) እሄ ሁላችንም ኃላፊነት በንደዚህ አይነት ነው ምክንያቱም ላንድ አገር እድገት (.) እንደው ሃገራችን አድጋለች ልንል እምንችለው ጥሩ ስነምግባር ሁላችንም ተላብሰን መኖር ስንችል ነው (.) እና ያን ለማድረግ ግን ብዙ ጊዜ እኛ እንደምቀኝነት ነው እያየነው ያለነው (.) ኖ ይብዛም ይነስ የተወሰነ አደጋ ቀንሰን ነገ ጥሩ 1840 አደጋ ከማያደርሱ አገሮች ተርታ ልንሰለፍበት እንችላለን (.) ብዙ ጊዜ አሁን ትራፊክ ይታይና የተከለከለ ነገር ውስጥ ይገባል (.) ትራፊክ የለም እሱ ግን አለ (.) እነዚህ ነገሮች

ይበልጥ እንደው ለግንዛቤ ሊሆን ይችላል (.) ማታለል ይቻላል ግን ራሳችንን እያታለልን ነውና (.) በዚህ ነገር ላይ ሁሉም ሁሉም እንደው እነዚህን ጠለቅ ያለ እውቀት እሚያገኝበት ((ቢኖር)) ቀላል አይደለም (.) ዛሬ ትምህርት ቤት ገብቶ አይደለም ፓምፕሌት ብትረጭ

1845 ብዙዎቹ ሊማሩበት ይችላሉ (.) የግድ ትምርት ቤት እስክሪቢቶ ይዞ ምናምን ያንን ከኑሮ ሁኔታ ያን እሺ እማይል አለ (.) ጊዜውንም ያጠፋበታል ግን እዚህ አሁን ፓምፕሌት ብትሰጠኝ አነባለሁ (.) እና ሁላችንም ለዜጋ ክብር ይኑረን (.) ለዚህ ኃላፊነት እንሸከም (.) ሁሉም በንደዚህ አይነት መልኩ ከሄደ ምናልባት እቺ አገርም ((ለውጥ ታሳይ ይሆናል)) (.) አሁን ብዙ ጊዜ አይ አበሻ ምቀኝነት አሁን ምን አገባው እስቲ (.) እንደዚህ ነው እሚባለው

1850 ከደህንነት አኳያ ያደረኩት ድርጊት ተደርጎ አይታይም (RUTD25)

RUTD25

ይሄ እንግዲህ ሁልጊዜ ህግ አውጭው አስፈጻሚው እዛው የመንግስት አካል ብቻ ነው (.) ... ምንድነው የህብረተሰቡ ችግር እና የኛ ችግር እንደነዚህ አይነት አካሎችን በተወሰነ ጊዜ ገባህ እኔ በቀበሌም በምንም ይሁን ጠርቶ ሁሉንም ባለድርሻ አካል አድርጎ በዛ አይቶ አገናዝቦ

1855 የለም (.) ብዙ ጊዜ እሚወሰነው ትራፊክ ፖሊሶች ሆን ያሉ ይሰበሰባሉ (.) እዛው የራሳቸው ሰዎች እንግዳ ሆነው ይመጣሉ ከመንገድ ትራንስፖርት ((ባለስልጣን)) (.) እዛው ያልቃል (.) መንገድ ትራንስፖርት ሁሉ የተጠራ ሁሉ በመንገዱ ስነስርዓት ላይ ገንዘብ ተቀባይ አለ ሰብሳቢ አለ (.) ይሄ መንገድ ትራንስፖርት ነው ጉዳዩ ይመለከተዋል ይሰበሰባል (.) ከሱ ግን አንድ ሹፌር ይበልጠዋል (.) እና እንዲህ አይነት ከህብረተሰቡ ጋር ተቀላቅሎ ((የለም)) (.)

1860 የሆነ አካል ብቻ ወስኖ ወደታች መወርወሩ ፌዴር አይደለም ብዬ አስባለሁ እንደራሴ አስተሳሰብ (.) ሁላችንም ይሰማን ሁላችንም ጉዳዩ እንዲሰማን ተደርጎ ቢሆን ውጤቱም ያማረ ነው (.) እና ይሄንንም ግንዛቤ እዚያጋ ቁጭ ብሎ ይንገረን ሁላችንም ወሳኝ ናቸው ብሎ (RUTD25)

Appendix C: The English Version/Translation of the Interview/Document Extracts

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.1 (a)

Road traffic accident in Ethiopia is a serious problem. The death rate presently stands near 70 per 10,000 vehicles. Of those killed over half are pedestrians, of which 20% are children under the age of 18. The economic loss due to road accident is also significant. Unless the present trend is arrested, the social and economic problem of road accident is
005 *bound to become more and more serious as the number of cars increases. Considering the importance of road safety the Ethiopian government has requested the WB and its GRSF to review the road safety management capacity in Ethiopia. This review based on comparisons with good practice countries in road safety management and the UN Global Plan guideline are considered in the development of the decade strategy. (NRSSPE, p.1)*

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.17 (b)

010 *Road safety is a serious social and economical problem of the nation. The fatality rate per 10,000 vehicles in Ethiopia is still one of the highest in the world the world. Concerted and coordinated effort by the concerned organizations should be taken to drastically improve road safety. ...*

Objective: *To promote and coordinate collaboration of the concerned organizations and*
015 *participation of the public in road safety improvement efforts. (NRSSPE, p.17)*

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.1-2 (a)

Urban transport serves as veins to accelerate developments in industry, trade, education, health and other services. However, there is no compatible urban transport supply and effective management to meet the increasing trip frequency and mobility needs of the people and goods which resulted in the seriousness of the issue. Among the challenges of
020 *the urban transport include: Poor access to work place, education, health and other services due to lack of public transport service; Continuous increases in transport fair especially for low income groups; Lack of smooth traffic flow; Lack of infrastructure for None Motorized Transport (NMT) (for walking and bicycle); High rate of traffic accidents; Increasing air and noise pollution are the major ones.*

025 *Unless these challenges and other associated problems are addressed in time, they will have a negative impact on the socio-economic development of the city and on good governance which directly affects the livelihood of the residents. In order to narrow the gap between urban transport demand and supply, to provide the transport service that can support the residents' socio-economic development effort, it is vital to take necessary*

030 *measures which, in turn, will have an impact in solving complex problems observed in the sector. Therefore, in order to clearly identify those continuously increasing basic challenges, indicate clear direction and identify measures to be taken and to, optimally, utilize those positive experience, it has been found important to formulate Addis Ababa transport policy. (TPAA, 2011, p.1-2)*

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.11 (b)

035 *There is sufficient evidence that other relevant public institutions that have stakes in the city's transportation system are also organized and managed under different institutional organizations. Compounded by lack of skilled manpower and budgetary constraints, many of these institutions have exhibited fragmentation activities and fragmented institutional set-up which have rendered failures to coordinate the transportation system of the city. (TPAA, 2011, p.11)*

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.27-28 (c)

040 *The loss of life and property inflicted by road traffic accident in our city cannot be overlooked. Traffic accident in African cities is estimated to cost 1.5% to 2% of gross national product. Although a tendency for reduction of traffic accident is observed in our city, the increasing number of vehicles and consequent traffic congestion has still kept the figure high. The policy is formulated to drastically reduce the loss of life and property*

045 *caused by road traffic accident. ... Traffic safety council shall be established at different levels involving stakeholders and city residents to coordinate and enhance participation in minimizing traffic accident (TPAA, 2011, p.27-28)*

Transport Policy of Addis Ababa, 2011, p.46 (d)

The private sector has also a wider role in developing transport services, terminals and parking facilities. It has a role to make the service dependable and effective by adopting

050 new systems of transport service provision. Non-governmental organizations are also expected to contribute their part in improving the sector. Educational institutions should be involved in research and provide training in the sector. Other civil societies are also expected to play a crucial role in the efforts of educating the wider public on sectoral laws. (TPAA, 2011, p.46)

SFI2 (a)

Interviewer: ... what does it mean by road safety (.) sometimes it is called road safety it is also called road traffic safety ... what does it mean by road safety or road traffic safety

Interviewee: em now to my understanding these two things have I think some difference (.) em I think road safety has a bit wider concept (.) by road safety I see it as related to the
050 entire road or safe mobility safe existence safe life (.) em and when we say traffic safety in relation to mobility since by traffic it means everything that moves on the road so it means everything related with it (.) hence by road safety apart from the traffic the car the people and others there might be other things that could contribute to accident(.) so it is a concept that could incorporate all that (.) so now what we are doing is that we are working on the
055 road traffic safety (.) this means of course there are things that contribute to the occurrence of road traffic accident things other than the traffic the moving stuff for example due to problem related with land use management accidents could occur (.) so the concept is though I couldn't say noteworthy work has been done so far we will work in the future based on and bearing all that concept in mind (.) the intention is in a way to incorporate or
060 to put all that in the future (.) we have now the conviction that it is possible to ensure road traffic safety by incorporating urban land use management and highway land use management we are thinking to that extent (.) so then that is all about what road traffic mean (.) the work going on is to prevent the occurrence of such accidents or to lessen their severity (SFI2)

SFI2 (b)

065 **Interviewee:** em as I have tried to explain earlier we could say good road traffic safety is ensured or there is what they call it kind of maturity road safety maturity (.) it is believed that that is achieved like I said before when the work is done and if result could be attained

in such a way that work that coordinates and integrates all the moving traffic with the non-moving including the land use management (.) right this time it could be thought road
070 safety is ensured (SFI2)

SCA12

to describe the term road traffic safety obviously first it is necessary to see the question what does it mean by road so when we talk about road ... it emphasizes on those which are particularly constructed for vehicles (.) when we say keeping the safety of this road there are different parties who are using this road (.) actually when we say different parties as to
075 me they are the same because it is a human being who uses the road as a driver plus it is a human being who uses it as a pedestrian which means apart from the animals (.) so it is the task of making sure all parties using the road go out in peace and return back home safe plus the road itself beginning from its engineering needs to be effectively and fully safe such work has to be done (.) all particularly in relation to the traffic since by traffic it
080 means mobility it is creating conducive environment in which the safety of all parties moving on the road is ensured (SCA12)

SPS18

Interviewer: road safety or road traffic safety

Interviewee: OK it I think this is equivalent (.) because if you talk about the road only it will come to the road protecting the road (.) if you say road safety it is just about keeping
085 the road safe (.) one responsible for the road maybe a member of the roads authority it is about the engineers(.) if a person who is responsible for the road says road safety he can(.) but if you say road traffic safety I think it is about accidents caused by mobility I understand its meaning this way (.) because keeping the road is one thing if you pay attention to just the road like protecting it from being dug or damaged you will also include
090 protecting it from being washed away by flood (.) but if it is road traffic safety I think since this includes the traffic involving in mobility (.) I think I will take it as the one broader from now on

Interviewer: that means the one which is comprehensive is the second one

Interviewee: I think the second one (.) yes (SPS18)

SFI4

095 *when we say road traffic safety it is difficult to define the term plainly (.) but to put it generally we people move for various reasons for social or economic reasons (.) or when we move for various reasons while we are moving there are accidents we face caused by the vehicle and the road (.) if we just see it simply road is road (.) traffic is mobility (.) and safety is the task of making sure that people are not injured and property is not damaged*
100 *while they are moving (.) if we ask of what it means (.) we say road safety is ensured like I said before we move (.) but it is not just us others do also move (.) in order to prevent crash in the middle of mobility (.) crash in a sense in relation to vehicle when a vehicle is moving it might hit us or we could also say that we might hit it (.) so it is a stream by which we see the road accidents which are caused by these crashes this is how we see it in general (.) we*
105 *will see the task of making sure safety when we go further to the details (.) but if we just see the term in its broader sense and crudely people move from place to place (.) in the middle of that movement there is accident especially in connection with vehicles' mobility since we say road traffic safety I take it as a field which is related with accidents caused by mobility*
(SFI4)

SFI3

110 *by road traffic safety it means em a fully-fledged science that works to make sure that mobility conducted under any conditions is safeguarded from accident in order that peaceful mobility is created (.) it is the task of ensuring efficient mobility I mean this is perhaps how it is put briefly (.) and it could also have a number of other things in it ... road safety means just ensuring the safety and being able to ensure the safety means being*
115 *able to control the accident (.) maybe you can't get rid of it all in all but it is lessening it (.) but it means the ability of reducing all in all lives lost and resources damaged including the physical injury (.) this is what is meant by road safety or if you talk about the road traffic safety*
(SFI3)

SCA8

when we say road safety em road transport is it is just what you see (.) it is mobility by
120 *vehicles using vehicles powered by motor (.) this motor-powered movement is not alone (.) em road transport involves the movement of pedestrians going on foot animals walking*

with four legs carts moving with two legs or various non-motorized moving things (.) so if this road transport has that much mobility if it accommodates moving things of various character then it is a must to be concerned about its safety (.) this means vehicles should be comfortable enough for the passengers they board (.) it is not only preventing accident vehicles should also be comfortable enough (.) their windows should not allow the entry of wind that exposes passengers to the cold (.) when it rains they should not be leaking and as a result compromise their passengers' safety (.) em all the technical parts of the vehicles should also be fully checked (.) their safety needs to be checked their tires should not be so smoothened [to the level of no frictional force?] for that matter their clutches should also be safe (.) since their lights are message transmitters they should also be complete (.) when we say road transport safety we mean the fitness of the vehicles the fitness of the driver and the safety of the road and of all other users since the road is a common share of all users (.) they need to have shared awareness and uniform attitude on the rules and regulations ratified to ensure its effecting (.) all need to have shared readiness em it needs to have a traffic system that makes use of it effectively being free from accident that kind of awareness has to be created (.) my position is that it has to be understood in such a broader sense (SCA8)

SPS19

Interviewer: ... what does it mean by road traffic safety (.) how do you understand how do you explain safety especially by road traffic safety

Interviewee: by road traffic safety as you know it there is road there is what is called traffic and the so called safety (.) em obviously by road we mean highway which is prepared for the movement of vehicles (.) em whose cover could be gravel asphalt just a cleared way or any other (.) so it is that sort of prepared land (.) any place by which a vehicle could pass cannot be called road (.) road is an especially prepared one for the movement of vehicles (.) it is mainly prepared for the movement of vehicles (.) when the economic status of a country is em for a country whose economic status is similar to that of ours obviously em it could be overcrowded with people that means by pedestrians animals em bike riders and carts (.) em that means since you cannot build independently (.) so by road traffic safety it

150 means the discipline of making safe the movement of people vehicles and animals on a highway that is specifically prepared for vehicles this is how I understand it (.) it is the capacity of making safe faultless mobility (.) by traffic it is movement or professionals call it mobility made on land in air or dry transportation (.) ... (.) so it is the safety of this individual and joint movement of people vehicles or animals so as to let them move being

155 free from accident and any other risk (.) road traffic safety is a discipline of ensuring the competence of road and vehicle use (.) it has to be free from anything worrying like psychological psychological from psychological fear (.) our safety to us it means em driving in such a way that exposes you to hypertension or diabetes (.) just because he has taken you from here to Jimma there is a driver who says I've driven you safe and em feels

160 proud (.) but it is like being between life and death filled with anxiety and agony (.) therefore by safety it means having a journey that is peaceful whose safety is ensured being of the right pace and slow (.) a slow journey is a relative description from the perspective of safety (.) to arrive soon one has to drive slowly as you know it (.) by safety or road traffic safety it is possible to say that there is or road traffic safety is achieved when the

165 efficiency of making sure a journey a movement fulfill its goal at the right time in the right way and at the right place (.) whatever is needed (.) if it is a person driving the person without any worry (.) when we say in the right way it means without any sense of discomfort fear or tension (.) without creating fear and worry of the kind I left home never to return (.) I have departed from my children (.) all my dreams have failed (.) everything I

170 gathered has gone astray (.) it is possible to say road traffic safety is a healthy mobility and flow on the right way on the road designed for the movement of vehicles being dependable or without causing any psychological pain physical injury resource damage (SPS19)

SPS18

175 OK of course not with no accident at all but safety with a minimum accident it is a bit difficult to have it without accident though it was possible without any accident but even with a minimum accident I believe it works in the context of our country (.) I think it is OK even if we take it with the minimum accident (.) otherwise obviously safety means the safe use of road without any accident (.) road safety takes the conviction that all people hold

180 *safety first and perform their daily tasks safely and experiencing no accident at all (.) thus I think road safety enables one to continue with the times the years and the works by avoiding mistakes (.) I think this is what it describes (SPS18)*

SPS19

by road traffic accident we mean because of vehicle which means due to road and in connection with the road (.) there is injury on a human being on animals or on a vehicle or
185 *on all the three or on the two or independently it could be on one of them it could be injury on a person it could be damage only on a vehicle or it could be injury on only animals or it could be destruction of movable or immovable properties (.) as to road traffic accident on immovable properties for example the car could demolish a house and enter into it...the house is not movable but the car could demolish and enter a house (.) it could also wreck a*
190 *bridge or road traffic sign it could cause problem on telephone line on light pole or on electric or on a farmer's field it could completely destroy his maize or teff farm and go (.) the farmer then has since that is his property he has the right to ask for compensation by suing for the damage if there is any damage of movable and immovable things of economic value (.) ... (.) therefore road traffic accident occurs due to a reason associated with road*
195 *traffic it happens in the process of mobility (.) it does not happen due to any external factor(.) it occurs as a result of the process of mobility it could be due to vehicle's defect technical defect the driver's driving skill and behavioral problem (.) or it could be due the environment or natural impact like earthquake dangerous rock fall flood (.) it could be due to things of such kind (.) or due to mistakes of other travellers accident could occur due to*
200 *mistake committed by the pedestrian himself or mistakes committed by other commuters (.) while road traffic accident has such a characteristics no one has the right to confirm any accident but only the road traffic police can confirm that (.) that means administrative bodies politicians physicians and others do not have the right to confirming it (.) legally road traffic accident is confirmed only when the cause of the accident is investigated and if*
205 *the case could accurately be covered under the road traffic system (.) that means it could be caused by and so called as either the fault of the driver or of the vehicle or of the environment or it could be the fault of the road (.) when it is confirmed as due to such and such reasons then it will be registered and counted as road traffic accident (.) with this come boundaries of responsibilities and liabilities (.) thus we could perceive what we call*

210 road traffic safety this way (SPS19)

SFI6

obviously be it for their daily life for their job or for their social life people are mobile human being is mobile (.) it is this movement which is called traffic (.) as to mobility man travels vehicles boarding passengers do also travel (.) if the interaction between these two
215 is unhealthy it will have accident whereas if it is healthy we won't raise this issue we won't raise this issue (.) so like I told you be it for his daily life or for business purpose or his social life or it could be for other important issues when he travels if the travel is unsafe if it has a risk against returning back home em or if he returns being physically injured or unhealthy that is not good (.) first the public this person who is travelling could have social
220 contribution he could have economic contribution for the country or for his family he could have a leadership position and that is also one contribution therefore losing such a productive power is the first one (.) secondly the vehicle itself will be damaged and this is losing property (.) the vehicle itself could damage other property and this will also be losing property (.) it will also damage the road on which the vehicle travels and this is also
225 losing property (.)...(.) here again when property is destroyed there will be unintended cost to repair and correct (.) it will cause cost which is not planned (.) during this accident when there is health loss physical injury and when we go to health center for treatment it would cause pressure on the formal and usual health service (.) there will be a burden on the health service as it is unintended (.) when the productive power is lost there will be gap
230 on the job to be done and all these will result in failure of productivity (.)therefore in general since it will have these risks I understand traffic safety this way and our institution also recognizes it similarly (SFI6)

SCA8

whichever direction it could be pavement for pedestrians or it could be a corridor (.) but accidents that occur there for example on pedestrians' sidewalk if there is a ditch for water
335 or a sewerage system which is not covered and if a blind person who is walking on the pedestrian's pavement falls down and if his leg is broken it is an accident (.) so that sewerage should be covered or em it should be constructed in such a way that it won't

cause an accident(.) so when we say road accident we mean every accident which is caused in relation to the way road is used (.) it includes every accident that occurs because sewers
340 are not closed or the sewerage systems are not constructed properly due to engineering fault for various reasons or when people on the work of construction if they do not take the necessary precaution in such a way that they won't be accident causing on others (.) road accident is not something related with transportation only (SCA8)

SFI2

in our country the road traffic accident is very very serious to me (.) since I am one who is
345 involving in it to the level of my understanding it is a very serious issue (.) I think it needs the attention it deserves (.) because recently over three thousand lives are being lost annually (.) there are many severe injuries and by severe injury it means most of those experiencing severe injuries are facing permanent disability (.) even the so called slight injury by itself is not that simple (.) at every hospital it is wasting medicine medical wards
350 physician's time wealth all these that could have been used for treating other diseases (.) even in terms of capital the wealth wasted when vehicles and properties imported using hard currency are crushed (.) the loss calculated is probably up to zero point eight percent (.) I have seen evidences that confirm this though we have not conducted any research ourselves (.) the situation now is that we recognize we are losing that much from our total
355 annual income or from our GDP (.) if we refer to different studies we find Ethiopia categorized under countries with a very worrying traffic accident incidents in Africa and the world (.) so I believe traffic accident in our country is a very serious issue that deserves due attention (.) as to how the work is going or to the question of how do you evaluate the work (.) of course we observe the government paying better attention to the issue beginning
360 from the recent times (.) em to this effect it has already established the so called national road safety council under the ministry of transport and the situation now is that this work is being run (.) this is one of the perceivable attentions given to it (.) the limited amount of budget support from the roads fund office is also being used these are the activities we have (.) so these things they show us that there are some improvements or beginnings but

365 compared to the problem to my understanding compared to the problem I don't think the
emphasis it is given could be taken as sufficient nor could it be counted as good (.) I think it
is still at a very very poor level but one that deserves huge attention (SFI2)

SPS19

I agree with the idea that is put as our country's road traffic safety problem should be
taken as our country's serious problem (.) if asked why is it serious the answer any layman
370 can answer it (.) because the problem consumes human lives (.) the problem injures human
beings causing permanent disability (.) it affects human body for a long period of time be it
temporarily or forever as it is known (.) it causes very serious psychological problem (.) in
the Ethiopian context in the absence of economic strength which is so limited a struggling
economy (.) it is as the adage goes a ringing bell tied on the neck of an uncultivated mule
375 ((he laughs)) our economy while we should have kept it taken care of it looked after it by
subsidizing and supporting (.) while we should have used it for the betterment of lives of the
people and for development (.) if you carelessly continue destroying it then the seriousness
of the problem is unquestionable (.) that means leave alone our economy our existing
condition or our way of life the road traffic safety problem is international problem as it is
380 known (.) WHO has already put it clearly (.) it is known that unless we work to decline it
from its present ninth level position as a killer it is said by world health organization it will
rise up to be third level killer by two thousand (.) therefore on our part with the limited
number of vehicles that means if it is seen compared to the number of vehicles available in
the other world the number of vehicles that Ethiopia has is in hundred thousands (.) it is
385 only four hundred thirty plus as the June two thousand five ((this is Ethiopian calendar))
data shows (.) ... for a country of over eighty million population it has a very small number
of vehicles (.) in the US America the ratio is one car for three and even in some parts the
ratio is one for two (.) so if we say it is for three people if there are three hundred million
people which means there are a hundred million vehicles in the USA (.) so there are over a
390 hundred million vehicles in the United States of America (.) compare a hundred million
vehicles with four hundred thousand vehicles (.) we are a nation and they also are a nation
we are people and they also are people (.) the question of human rights since it raises

ethical issues obviously that makes you similar but the difference is so wide (.) so in such a situation of an economic poverty (.) this is a country where the peasant has to travel long
395 distance on foot because he doesn't have the opportunity to transport his produce by car (.) so he has to carry and load his produce he has to carry whenever he goes to the market (.) the only alternative you have to load your produce is the donkey (.) it is the animal which you find as one mode of transport in our country (.) and camel and the like (.) so in such a situation of a problem if we have the way and if we have the economy we have to change
400 the farmer's life (.) we have to change the life of the people leading such a miserable life being in an extreme poverty (.) we should not waste our wealth like a person who is so prosperous (.) even a prosperous person should not cause any accident (.) in our case since you asked in the context of Ethiopia ours is the worst (.) it is pity our life is like that this is how I understand it (.) I really feel so sorry (.) if you have led a very good life since death
405 is natural obligation everybody dies (.) we die and the Americans also die (.) but when you compare a person who as a human being passed away after he is done with the very cause of his creation who has effectively used this world who has led a prosperous and wealthy life who did everything he wanted (.) if you compare him with a person who is struggling with life lacking his daily bread passing through miserable life suffering and crying leading
410 life that puts in question whether he really is a human being (.) when such people die it doesn't give you any sense (.) death in Ethiopia is so terrible (.) the other thing that makes the Ethiopian situation so different and worse is that for example if you lose a family head due to road traffic accident it is not just the person but his family also breaks up (.) and as you know what follows is economic and social crisis (.) the government since there
415 is no social security our social security is so meager rather we don't have (.) you don't survive means your children don't survive too (.) your mother and father and those who are expecting your help children they won't have anybody to look after them (.)... your children won't have the opportunity of continuing school (.) so when you see the realities in Ethiopia it doesn't make you feel careless to wealth and to property (.) I sometimes speak
420 on this issue seriously when I teach my students (.) the Americans designed a program ahead of time first to demolish Iraq and then to rebuild it (.) if they don't want a country they say we can totally destroy it first and then after we make it the way we like we can

bring it back to the way it was and they plan that way (.) destruction is led by plan in the other country ((he laughs)) (.) Ethiopia doesn't have this capacity and it cannot try it at all
 425 forever(.) maybe some twenty thirty years from now as it is alleged ((laughing)) but what we know in the Ethiopian actual context now em I believe each and every pin has value in Ethiopia (.) ... all the components of vehicles are imported from abroad as you know it (.) it is from abroad means there is credit with it (.) you know how much it will cost us whenever we break the lights of our vehicle untimely and try to relace it while our currency's buying
 430 value is declining (.) the problem is not just purchasing but there is also national pain hidden inside that purchasing system (.) the person might have bought it since he could afford but obviously there is some pain (.) ... since this is how it looks like in our context (.) to the question is road traffic accident a threat for Ethiopia yes definitely it is a threat (.) because without any distinction between young and old or by age by gender by educational
 435 status by power by authority (.) it is terrible accident bringing unexpected anguish on many segments of the society (.) so the fact that it is a threat is unquestionable (.) these days it is not just their blood for Ethiopians by now even their money is as valuable as their blood (.) since you don't have any (.)... so you see in such an economy in a country where there are Ethiopians who feed themselves collecting food from waste garbage (.) being careless for
 440 wealth and for property means em above all really to me it is totally being irresponsible (.) so if it is due to things beyond your control you can't make it (.) you cannot recover because you see a doctor (.) you could die even though you have taken the treatment (.) that means you could get recovered only if it is the will of God and if the treatment succeeds (.) so it is not to say property should not be destroyed and death is avoidable (.) accident may
 445 occur but it becomes more painful if the accident happens due to drivers' irresponsibility (.) even for the vehicle if we try to travel by a vehicle which is technically fit we can minimize it (.) this way it is just to say I could see the seriousness of these things very well (SPS19)

SPS18

the worst yes worst it is the worst (.) since I have the access of the data I have seen international reports (.) I also saw the national report released from federal traffic office
 450 the ten years report (.) we are in a country where in ten years' time 23456 lives were lost (.) this is almost people of a district (.) I don't know the present structuring of districts but I

think so (laughing) (.) you have lost a district in ten years' time means it is a very very very surprising country (.) it is the fatality (.) for me talking about physical injury and the like is not weighty (.) since I believe fatality is the most significant one I usually focus on death (.)
455 *so I believe we should have also been terrified (.) or maybe we do not thoroughly see the report or when you are told every day that two persons died you may take it as something normal (.) when you hear it you take it as simple or maybe you could say thanks Lord for only two have died today (.) when you sum it up it becomes frightening you would say 23,000 in ten years (.) you say what if they see it this way I don't know maybe this is the*
460 *approach I have (.) maybe people are seeing it superficially you understand (.) as one international report puts a tsunami left 230, 000 people dead (.) which means the previous tsunami disaster (.) on the other hand due to traffic accident it says 1.2 million people die (.) 1.2 million (.) this means five tsunamis together (laughing) you see five tsunamis (.) how would you therefore keep silent and forget five tsunamis (.) as for one tsunami you shout*
465 *ceaselessly including the media (.) the tsunami it will never be forgotten (.) you too remember it (.) but as to the death of 1.2 million you won't remember it if I meet you after six months (.) as to the tsunami only the tsunami has entered into your heart (.) so the tsunami is the worst you find it so tough (.) you will be so frightened when tsunami comes or if it is said it will come (.) as for the traffic accident you see it is silent killer (.) imagine*
470 *the case every day and when you sum it up for the year our planet receives five tsunamis that means every year (.) so now it is the governments that you have to blame (.) why do you keep silent if it were tsunami we all would work together (.) or maybe like you ask for relief and there you may help them with something they need (.) but as to this one they will simply forget it (.) have they died (.) 1.2 million that's all (.) it has gone (.) the next one will*
475 *also be the same (.) so I think no hard work has been done on the traffic safety issue (.) most of the time it is just on paper (.) it happens to be simply talking it doesn't go down to the ground (.) so I don't think they are unaware of the case (.) a person with a problem of statistics yes there are the numbers (.) but all we need to focus on is on the measure on the task (.) what should we do (.) but if we simply keep silent like this our world will continue*
480 *receiving five five tsunamis every year that much tsunamis (.) therefore let's rather call the traffic accident as tsunami (.) I think that is better so that it worries us a bit (.) I think that is better for us (laughing) so I think like if we say Ethiopia has lost over 3000 people due to*

tsunami in 2004 em will it be understood a little bit (.) will all the people understand it (.) or the authorities (.) will they understand it if its name is changed (.) I don't know (.) now

485 traffic accident could not be understood (.) it has come like something normal (.) or what if I show the public a video of the death of a thousand people (.) I don't think it would give sense or I don't know if it is due to overpopulation (.) so if you ask me how could you explain the case in our country it is very very bad (.) extremely (.) others have reached to the level of five to eight for every ten thousand vehicles (.) I have seen that of Sweden (.) it

490 is their parliament that has endorsed the zero accident it says just zero (.) zero accident (.) imagine it means there is a country that is struggling for no accident (.) to reach the causality level to zero (.) on our part it was around three thousand one hundred in two thousand four (.) the recent one that of two thousand five I haven't seen it yet (.) but I don't think it is less (.) as for four digit I have no doubt (.) so when we do the analysis this way it

495 won't be accepted (.) if we go back or see it now it is still of four digit (.) I have seen it beginning from that of ninety-five all are four digit (.) so then you couldn't say ninety-six is better than ninety-five because it is there on four digit so you had better not say that (.) if you come to two digit then you could say it is better (.) but while it is there just because it decreased by 500 and say it is better if you go that way you feel as if you have done (.) so on

500 such and such areas I think they have missed the point (.) the authorities the responsible authorities or the traffic office or those working on the statistics it tells us about last May it says when I compare it with that of last May (.) the media also does the same (.) what does it mean (.) why should you compare it with that of last year (.) is it not better with your plan (.) is it not better to compare it with what you have planned (.) yes one who doesn't

505 have a plan goes to the past (.) one who has planned says why not I compare it to zero for my plan is zero (.) eight people have died so I am not happy (.) you see you are with your target (.) but if you return back it could be better but that might cause you to boast of and may hinder you from working (.) so all I want to tell you is accident is so rampant (SPS18)

SCA12

some people's understanding is that for example they count road traffic accident as wrath

510 from the creator there is such kind of conviction (.) this is wrong because it is discretion most of the traffic accident occurring is due to lack of discretion (.) as we raised it earlier

there is limit given for a driver if the driver drives carefully observing the limit the accident will not occur (.) the pedestrian there is delineated place for crossing the street if he crosses there the accident will not occur (.) therefore taking it as wrath of the Creator is a
 515 mistake (.) it brings on the people a kind of thinking which goes like I don't care let the Creator protect me (.) actually I don't know how much this problem is solved recently but still there are people who take it is an order from the Creator (.) for example if it is early in the morning there is some belief system in the society which is reflected as an order of the Creator upon him that very morning (.) I think this should totally be gotten rid of (SCA12)

SPS18

520 I have doubt yes I am very much doubtful (.) that means you know what somebody has told me a person whom I know very well (.) he said at about mid night I hit someone when I was coming back home after accompanying a person who was going somewhere (.) it was early in the morning that I saw his car which was damaged and when I asked him what had happened to his car(.) since we are close friends he said to me I hit him and entered home
 525 without checking whether he died or survived for it was at night one or two o'clock (.) as to that person the next morning no one knows whether he was registered as victim of traffic accident or as if he fought with somebody or even if he was left there without being buried (.) but it is still traffic accident and for sure it won't be registered (.) this I am telling you just one example(.) so I think there are a lot of accidents at night and others which are far
 530 from the reach of the traffic police otherwise this never shows the reality (.) I never believe what is being registered and reported every morning could reveal the whole picture (.) plus to that there are also others to die after they are admitted in the hospital (.) on the traffic accident report that day it might be registered as serious injury so it couldn't be seen as death (.) but that person might have passed away three days or three months later (.) so I
 535 don't take as if we have a real data base from which we hear the correct data so I have to add some half of it (.) when I teach I do like that so the crude data doesn't convince me that much it is not that weighty (.) because this is Addis Ababa but there is also a very wide area Ethiopia is a big ((country)) (.) imagine the number of things they hit on the road kill and go (.) so by the way animals even hitting animals is accident (.) but we do not hear a

540 report of the kind someone hit a dog or so (.) maybe because no one even the owner of the animal or the dog does not ask you or may not be around or because we do not count it as an accident I don't know but it also is an accident (.) it should have been registered as accident because it was a crash (.) perhaps the person has got his first experience of hitting from that very moment (laughing) so I believe ((the data)) is too little to represent (SPS18)

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.14

545 The new outlook in road safety improvement effort is the “safe system approach”, which emphasizes that the road system be designed to “ensure that in the event of crashes the impact energies remain below the threshold likely to produce either death or serious injury”. It is recommended that all countries, regardless of their level of road safety performance, move to “safe system approach” to road safety. This implies that roads
550 development program of Ethiopia should sufficiently address the road safety issues to overcome the present weaknesses by establishing a functioning road safety unit that will have the authority and capacity to implement regular road safety audits and ensure safety measures are taken accordingly. It also implies that the road design standards consider reducing conflict areas and crash impact forces not to cause death or serious injuries and
555 provide safe infrastructure to vulnerable road users. (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011, p.14)

A brochure by ETA

Making our roads safe by creating the environment in which all road users go in peace and return back safe is the responsibility of us all; in order to create this peaceful mobility and make our roads free from traffic accidents, it is expected that all accomplish their share. Accordingly it is expected that we effectively work on the five areas of emphasis of the
560 decade of action on the road traffic safety which our country has approved. That means: Capacity building that enables improve road safety work; Constructing roads with safety standards; Making change on driver and pedestrian road use behavior for safer road use; Safe vehicles; Making the post-crash medical treatment effective. We need to examine ourselves regarding how much we really have done on these areas of emphases since the
565 announcement of the decade of action in 2004 E.C. (2011G.C).

A brochure by the Addis Ababa Transport Bureau

Years have passed since seeing and hearing traffic accident reports has become our daily practice, here in our city Addis Ababa. While traffic accident is being sign of the streets of the capital, it may have its own causes and contributory factors. It is now observed that the main one is not paying adequate and proper attention.

570 *This means the driver does not fully understand the technical fitness of the vehicle which he is driving, does not fully know about the road and environmental conditions of the place where is driving, and does not know about the speed limit of the road which he is travelling on; studies have shown that pedestrians also have immense contribution to the problem since their knowledge of road use is so limited.*

575 *In order to lessen the traffic accident, thus, the work of awareness creation on all road users cannot be left for tomorrow; instead, to the extent we could, all of us should exert our share of responsibility beginning from today. This responsibility of creating awareness should not be left for governmental stakeholders alone, but non-governmental bodies like associations of drivers and vehicle owners, business firms and organizations, educational*
580 *and religious institutions, parents and other responsible bodies, if they work on awareness creation paying particular attention and in integration, the roads of the city won't be for death but for hopes of life.*

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.16

To develop national road safety strategies, plans and targets and to coordinate the concerted efforts of the various concerned organizations for its implementation and to
585 *promote awareness and participation of the public for sustained and drastic improvements of safety on the nation's road networks (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011, p.16)*

ERA Road Safety Manual, 2002, p.3-4

It is well recognized that road safety is a multidisciplinary multisectoral problem and the Manual recommends that the most effective way of improving road safety is to have the key agencies in the country collaborate and implement a joint and coordinated action
590 *plan. Ideally, any project designed to address a nation's road accident problem should examine the current and potential role of key sectors that could contribute solutions. ...*

Co-ordination is best undertaken by a road safety council with representatives of all key stakeholders or by multisector committee chaired by a lead Ministry or Authority. ...

The Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA), RRAs and Wereda's road offices have a particularly
595 important role to play as they provide and maintain the road network for road users. They
also contribute to the enforcement in collaboration with the major responsible entities - the
Road Transport Authority (RTA); Regions transport Bureaus and the traffic police through
creating a very strong influence on driver behaviour and thus enhancing safety of the road
network. Badly designed or maintained roads can contribute to driver error and lead to
600 road accidents. Conversely, well-designed and maintained roads, where the needs of road
users have been anticipated, can reduce potential risks and result in safer road networks.
In the early stages of motorization, the emphasis of most road authorities was toward
building and extending the road network and connecting remote parts of the country to
open them up for economic and social development. In general, road authorities focus
605 mainly on building the network and often little effort was placed on operational aspects.
Such roads, especially in rural areas, generally have poor sign and markings and junctions
are rarely channelized. However, in the early years, traffic volumes were usually quite low,
conflicts were rare, and the system operated for some time without too many constraints.
As traffic levels increase and vehicles and roads improve, faster speeds become possible
610 with the consequence that more conflicts arise resulting in increased safety problems. The
concerned parties at present are therefore forced to address road safety and traffic issues
from their respective perspectives. The RSA is therefore a formal, systematic procedure that
incorporates traffic safety knowledge into the road planning and design process to prevent
traffic accidents. (ERA Road Safety Manual, 2002, p.3-4)

SFI2

615 as I have tried to explain earlier we say good road traffic safety is ensured or there is what
they call it kind of maturity road safety maturity (.) it is believed that that is achieved like I
said before when the work is done and if result could be attained in such a way that work
that coordinates and integrates all the moving traffic with the non-moving including the
land use management (.) then it could be thought road safety is ensured (.) ...yes now there

620 are rules (.) there are many causes of road traffic accident (.) there are many sectors many
 groups which contribute to the accident (.) now all of these sectors should be able to work
 recognizing that they are contributing to the accident em they should engage in the work
 that enables to lessen the accident (.) what does it mean (.) for example as for the land use
 management which I mentioned earlier unless care is taken on the land use the pavement of
 625 pedestrian could be used for a number of other purposes (.) buildings or other stuffs for
 different purposes may be put in way they contribute to traffic accident (.) those things
 shouldn't have been there so that sector has to get rid of them (.) of course as part of their
 duty each of the road safety stakeholders or sectors which are specifically identified for
 this purpose have their own jobs and duties legally given to them (.) so as part of their job
 630 description it is expected that they get rid of anything that contributes to road accident (.)
 so they have to do that integrating with us and rules have already been enacted and these
 rules must also be observed (.) now we have construction or land use management rule (.)
 we have rule for how driving licenses should be given (.) em vehicle inspection vehicle
 import all these things have rules and regulations enacted for them (.) even in the civil code
 635 there are details that tell us which wrongdoing should be penalized what (.) all of these
 things should be integrated (.) if all these work together in integration all being combined
 in such a way that one feeds the other then it is possible to lessen and eliminate the
 accident (.) whereas if all these do not integrate it may not be possible to prevent the
 accident totally (.) if some of them em if one or two of them do not properly discharge their
 640 responsibilities the work which they did not accomplish could create some problem that
 may cause accident (.) because road traffic accident occurs as a result of one or two or
 more factors (.) if one works hard em if we strengthen the control but if other things on the
 road are not in order what does this mean (.) now take for example you may drive carefully
 (.) but if I don't drive carefully or don't travel carefully I will be a cause for you to involve
 645 in an accident (.) so each and everything should be integrated (.) if each responsible body
 works in coordination (.) the pedestrian has a responsibility the share of the pedestrian
 which is expected of him on the road when he uses the road is that there are things which
 he should do when using the road (.) if he travels respecting them properly that means he
 has contributed his share (.) so I think if all these are coordinated it is possible to lessen
 650 the accident em this is the way we see it as an institution also (SFI2)

SPS19

of course in order to see and assess and to comment on the gaps and the realities of the entire issues regarding road safety adequate study is required (.) but if it is seen based on general evidences and from the general observations and assessment we have had and based on experiences and practices of other countries there are obviously a lot of things
655 lacking in our country (.) to ensure road traffic safety I believe the road traffic management itself should be structured efficiently (.) to me the management itself if we begin from the management the policy should encourage this enabling it to have the structure the design em in such a way that it ensures accountability and transparency well-established in leadership and logistics (.) I believe people with the necessary leadership skills quality and
660 knowledge should run it (.) the road traffic management in our country obviously there is national road traffic safety advisory office (.) and it has been moved to the ministry of transport from (.) for many years it was under the federal transport authority and now it has gone to the federal to the ministry of transport (.) otherwise it is under the police as it is known (.) it is only the so called traffic police with the responsibility of controlling and
665 putting things in order (.) but I believe traffic management should be in a quite different form (.) I believe there should be an independent body responsible for leading the traffic management (.) a well facilitated one that leads together traffic police road transport the so called road and transport bureau the federal structure called transport authority and others related with the work of road engineering education and enforcement (.) what is
670 called education and training and enforcement or education and the so called engineering (.) one that leads the three (.) one that regulates the traffic flow the road use system even the engineering (.) it has to be ensured whether it is really in such a way that regulates the road traffic safety whether the road engineering work is with road signs to the level needed
675 (.) whether it is being constructed up to the standard (.) whether it is exposing users to traffic accidents or not through an efficient work of control leadership coordination (.) so as you know it if you take the existing traffic police it is not fully equipped logistically (.) in Addis Ababa it is an institution with only one or two vehicles at the Addis Ababa city level that leads and controls the Addis Ababa traffic management as you know it (.) there are a
680 lot of problems that the motorbike riding police are facing (.) they do not have enough bikes (.) they do not have the garage or the necessary spare parts or the budget by which they

could properly maintain the motorbikes (.) they do not have any vehicle for the purpose of patrolling (.) when the entire city is jammed by traffic being locked in the street everybody calls for the government the police for help and the city doesn't have a stand by force to
685 arrive soon and solve the problem (.) you could cry and cry for long and then it is only the powerful that would go (.) eventually collision could follow and they say let a plan be taken and the road the entire city would totally be locked and you could stay there stranded for two or three hours (.) therefore with regards to management if you ask whether there is any traffic management in this city according to my conviction and observation we do not have
690 or it is not in a position to be called we have one (.) although investigating accident when it occurs is among the responsibilities of the traffic management it should not be taken as its main job (.) instead they should have engaged in works like facilitating the traffic flow improving em enabling the road and the vehicles provide their services efficiently (.) it is these and other similar jobs that should have been done (.) so people need to travel anytime
695 they want taking only the time the journey needs and without facing or experiencing any kind of discomfort with no traffic jam (.) the problem on one's time job all this wastage is due to lack of management or it is a result of lack of strong management (.) therefore it should not be taken as a natural problem (.) so even the transport authority itself em transport bureaus themselves need to be structured efficiently (.) traffic police needs to be
700 structured efficiently (.) the road engineering work should incorporate take road safety into account scientifically (.) it should consider road safety (.) if you have seen how it is being run in this country now roads are under construction but this is a city where even a sign for road under construction is not put (.) just putting a triangular sign that says drive carefully since the road is under construction (.) this is not an indicator of a strong management (.) it
705 instead shows absence of control it indicates that the leadership is so disorderly (.) after you have gone a long distance you will be told that the road is closed (.) imagine (.) while it should have told you ahead of time so that you can use an alternative way after you have gone long you will be told that the road is closed and you have to return back (.) so what (.) no one takes the responsibility for the wasted time (.) fuel is wealth of the nation (.) it is
710 imported by foreign currency as you know it em the person suffering that much in the street could be a worker somewhere or a physician (.) or he could be a lecturer in one university whose students are waiting for him sitting idle em that is it (.) there are a number of

problems of this kind or he could be high ranked authority being waited for by a number of
 clients (.) what does this mean (.) or else he could be a merchant having some badly needed
 715 merchandise in his shop (.) so if we ask whether we are following leadership style that
 understands the economic and social chaos behind all that suffering the answer is no (.)
 instead we are worsening it (.) there is an effort of eradicating poverty here but on the
 contrary there is traffic management that aggravates poverty (.) management with no
 accountability but with much irresponsibility and with lots of carelessness (.) so as to me
 720 structurally some people could claim we have the system (.) you might hear the Addis
 Ababa road transport the road and transport bureau briefing that because it believes it is
 its responsibility (.) you might hear the Addis Ababa traffic police briefing this em even the
 federal itself you know sometimes it also gives a briefing (.) but if you ask which one is
 practically the responsible organ for the traffic management with respect to accountability
 725 and responsibility you cannot find anyone who would say yes I am responsible (.) there are
 leaders and structures that say I have such and such problems but nobody would say yes I
 am responsible for this worsened job (.) simply showing off to tell I am the authority and
 taking the responsibility are two different things (.) so one cannot say I am the leader of the
 traffic management taking all the responsibility (.) it is a team the traffic management work
 730 is team work (.) it should be one with all the responsible stakeholders lead and work in
 coordination (.) for example as for schools ministry of education should involve as a
 member (.) because ministry of education puts in order their school gates at entry and exit
 hours (.) the ministry needs to work on students' discipline on entry and exit hours be it via
 mini-media or whatever or even incorporating it in the curriculum (.) school has its own
 735 contribution for the creation of road safety awareness (.) therefore even the ministry of
 health is needed during times of emergency to minimize the effect of the accident to cut the
 number of victims or the level of injury (.) to change death to injury or injury to
 psychological problem or the psychological problem to just a simple incident (.) our
 emergency system needs management that could coordinate and lead all these (.) therefore
 740 leadership which is firstly one that enables an efficient use of road and vehicle and secondly
 one that is well structured well equipped even in knowledge and skill supported by
 technology one that could put things in order whenever problems beyond control were to

happen (.) third an independent body that could attend this and if there be any legal gaps to be perceived one that could take the mandate for creating legal frameworks is necessary
 745 (.) this body is responsible for enabling the government enact necessary rules regulations and guidelines that are practical and doable (.) so I don't think it is possible to say there are enough of such kinds of things (.) there is no radar no camera as you know it and it is just recently that traffic lights are being erected (.) Addis Ababa used to have them but then for many years it stayed without traffic lights (.) as the road traffic flow gradually becomes
 750 more complicated and as the number of pedestrians increases the management should likewise be of the same pace and should put things in order and enable the flow be of no difficulty and have the appropriate standard (.) unless this is put into a reality of course the existing ones lack a lot (.) the structuring should principally be changed (.) I have the conviction that the rules and regulations should also be crafted in a better way (SPS19)

SFI2

755 according to our evaluation we notify that good things have been observed (.) em there are of course things that have not been improved yet a lot other things have improved (.) among these the awareness has reached an encouraging level (.) especially if you go to the rural area you could see people in the countryside (.) they have very good road use behavior (.) similarly you can see the passenger trying to make sure that the rule his right
 760 is respected (.) from the perspective of the drivers too you could see them driving at the right speed and observing the right way of using the road (.) as a result changes to the level of reducing accidents are coming the situation is that they are being observed (.) on the other hand in some other areas especially in urban areas the problem the road use practice especially that of the pedestrian is full of very serious problems (.) none at all the situation
 765 is there is no change observed at all (.) but we couldn't say that that person doesn't have any understanding at all (.) some may be with no knowledge of road use (.) there may be some who don't know where they should cross how they should walk (.) we couldn't say there is no person who doesn't know at all there could be(.) but our evaluation is that the majority knows (.) but the problem is when we ask of how it is practiced and the situation is
 770 that it is not being put into practice (.) now if we ask one who walks as he wishes they call him jaywalker em why do you walk in such a way or if you ask him which one is the right

way of using the road he will tell you the right way (.) whereas when you ask him why not
 you use he doesn't have the answer(.) the majority of people in the urban area is like that(.)
 so this requires enforcement and continuous teaching the task of continuous knocking (.)
 775 this is it (.) when we see the accident em statistically it is increasing as it could be seen (.)
 two years ago it was in two thousands two thousand five hundred something in two
 thousands (.) but now we could see the figure being over three thousands (.) that is what we
 see beginning from two thousand four (.) but this doesn't mean the accident has increased
 when we calculate it (.) of course it should have decreased but the reason for us not to say
 780 the accident has not increased is we have to take into account the number of cars imported
 annually (.) compared to the former figure five years ago if we compare the number of
 vehicles when about two thousand people died five years ago with the number of vehicles
 today when about three thousand people die and calculate the ratio we may not see any
 increment (.) so at least there's change to some extent (.) the thought process in the work of
 785 decreasing road traffic accident is first you create awareness then you will stabilize ((the
 accident rate)) and afterwards you will decrease ((it)) (.) therefore we believe now it is at
 least at about the stage of enabling stabilization (.) now when you ask how these accidents
 occur they are mass casualties sometimes when buses loaded with lots of passengers fall
 down many people die at once (.) those are now aggravating the accident figure (.) even as
 790 the data show em two three years ago the main victims of accidents em over fifty percent up
 to fifty two fifty three percent were pedestrians but now if we see the recent situation it has
 gone to the passengers(.) now we see the majority of the figure has gone to passengers (.)
 this means that since pedestrians now are somehow acquiring the knowledge and since
 they are developing appropriate road use behavior we could see it decreasing (.) em on the
 795 other hand the passenger since drivers who have not yet changed when they drive loading
 many people and when the buses experience accidents there will be a number of fatalities
 and injuries and we perceive such things now and again (.) in terms of giving emphasis we
 believe better attention is being paid now (.) but like I said earlier it is not sufficient a lot
yet a lot is expected compared to the gravity of the problem (.) em there wasn't permanent
 800 office for road safety but now it is established (.) though it couldn't be counted as sufficient
 there is some budget support that is enough to start with (.) these and other works on
 progress and efforts of strengthening the control through technology like the purchase of

instruments and the training of manpower such things as passing of new rules and regulations the traffic control and the enactment of new regulations and revision works for education and for others purposes if you see all these it is based on them that we could in general say there are improvements (.) but compared to what we need what the country the public need a lot is still required to be done so we conclude putting it as a big challenge that hasn't been touched yet (SFI2)

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.13-14 (a)

The GTP: Performance Evaluation

810 Road transport: During 2004/5-2009/10 a road safety council was established; on main transport corridor areas with a record of high accident levels, traffic control was strengthened; measures were taken to ensure that accident victims receive immediate medical attention and a mass media public awareness campaign was conducted during the plan period. As a result of these measures, deaths due to road traffic accidents decreased
815 from 104 in 2004/5 to 52 per 10,000 accidents at the end of the plan period. Private companies were contracted to ensure technical inspection of vehicles. Moreover to address the transportation challenges facing the capital, Addis Ababa, the possibility of introducing mass transport system has been explored (GTP, 2010, p.13-14).

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.79 (b)

Strategic Direction: Considering the relatively low vehicle density in the country, the
820 number of traffic accidents is very high. Preventing and reducing traffic accidents and the resulting loss of human life and property, is imperative and timely. Accordingly, an integrated traffic security and modern traffic management system, supported by information technology, will be developed and implemented.

Objectives: A main objective of the transportation sub-sector is to ensure that the public
825 transport system is efficient and affordable so that the travel time of particularly the rural populations is reduced and they have more time for productive activities. A second main objective is that the urban transport system is efficient, secured and well integrated. A further objective is to build the effectiveness of regulatory bodies by putting in place an improved legal and regulatory framework. An effective institutional framework will help to

830 ensure private transport service providers are competent and provide proper standards of service. The human resource capacity for better management and service delivery will be developed. A national data base for freight and public transport will be created that will reduce the time processing administrative requirements and the costs of freight transport (GTP, 2010, p. 79)

Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010, p.80 (c)

Implementing Strategies: To achieve the above objectives and targets for the transport services sub-sector, world-class regulatory and service delivery systems will be introduced. National logistics coordination excellence and information centres will be built, while specialized human resource development in road transport will also be given attention. A rural transport expansion package will be design and implemented. An incentive structure for stakeholders who participate in the sub-sector will be created. Improvements will be
840 made to traffic management. An organizational system for control and integration of public transport associations will be developed; it will include a system for commercial companies to encourage them to import new automobiles and to address the needs of those who need special assistance. A modern traffic flow operations centre with the latest information technology will be built. A road safety council will be constituted, operational
845 at federal, regional and local levels, to initiate and coordinate road safety projects and programs and build a national road transportation data base. (GTP, 2010, p. 80)

SFI2

Interviewer: ... now in relation to the actual problem at present (.) which main areas do you think the road traffic safety work in Ethiopia should pay attention to (.) to decrease the death injury and resource damage em to decrease the existing problem (.) yes efforts need
850 be exerted on every aspects of the work this is true but are there areas you would like to say immediate attention should be provided

Interviewee: em yes of course there are things which we have started before now (.) as a matter of chance even what the council has put as a directive is that it has put two crucial themes(.) the first one says we should strengthen the enforcement so we have to allocate the
855 greater sum of budget for the work of enforcement (.) our enforcement has to be assisted with technological products (.) it is decided that the work has to be done by sufficient man

power with adequate training with appropriate understanding (.) em the enforcement is ranked as an issue of top priority (.) it is said it has to be strengthened and this is rational thought (.) and the second is side by side expanding the knowledge em with regards to road traffic accident the pedestrian the driver the passenger the entire public should know it how does it happen how could I protect it (.) now still now there might be a number of people who think that it is a matter of the supernatural there are still now (.) it is only because of God and it is not something you can be saved because of your precaution (.) the belief is that if God says you must die you will (.) but road traffic safety is if planned and evidence based intervention is made it is an occurrence that could be prevented (.) this is what we have proved from our experience (.) by the time we made a pilot control assisted with a radar on a highway in East Shoa where there were five to ten fatal accidents per week we have then witnessed weeks when there was a decrease of up to fifty percent even more and sometimes there were weeks with no fatal accident records at all just due to the control (.) so what you can understand from this is that road traffic accident is an issue that you can prevent (.) it is not supernatural (.) if the public takes the necessary precaution if one understands what he has to do and how he should drive how he should walk how he should cross the street (.) if one understands everything and use it that way there may not be any road traffic accident at all (.) even that which may happen due to technical (.) one which is said to happen due to vehicles' technical defect if the driver has the awareness he can minimize the majority of it (.) because if he checks the vehicle before he starts driving if he drives with the appropriate speed if he respects traffic signs he can protect accident that would occur due to technical defect (.) when he sees that there is technical defect he will not drive or while driving when he recognizes any technical defect if he is with the right speed he can control it but he can't control if he is on speed (.) so this is the way we see it so all these have to be understood and if all these are exercised it is possible to decrease road traffic injuries (.) so the main ones are firstly the enforcement has to be strengthened and secondly side by side the awareness has to be raised (.) if these are done it is possible to decrease road traffic injuries significantly (SFI2)

SFI2

885 **Interviewer:** there are many stakeholders working being coordinated under you em the national road safety council (.) so which of them could you say are discharging their responsibility appropriately

Interviewee: now so far about seven stakeholders are involving there em according to my understanding all the seven have been given a share of the entire traffic safety work (.) it is impossible to move the agenda forward leaving one of them or the other (.) if we see as an example the federal traffic police has the task of effecting the traffic rule it works on their implementation (.) so it controls violations of the rule and imposes the proper penalty (.) transport authority offers such things as vehicles' technical fitness drivers' technical fitness it offers these professional skills (.) roads authority when we raise issues of roads which are safe from traffic accident or when we say they should be constructed in such a way that they reduce the accident it is the roads authority which takes them as its own responsibility and works so it is there (.) if things go beyond this control and accident suddenly occurs and if there is any health problem or physical injury during this accident then health service is needed this service is provided by ministry of health and health centers clinics under it are to provide that so it also works (.) if a physical injury occurs on a road user or traffic on transport service user so in order for him to have insurance coverage there is an office the so called transport fund (.) this office obliges vehicles to have third party insurance coverage and is responsible to collect the money (.) so all are there (.) this office called roads fund is also the one which influences roads authority focus on safety by way of offering it incentives (.) em the other one is ministry of education it has the task of creating awareness of traffic safety in students and the staff working there by establishing traffic clubs and letting them work on traffic safety (.) the other one is the media by disseminating traffic safety information widely for the mass so this way government affairs communication office discharges its responsibility (.) so it goes this way and there is no

910 way for us to say the role of one stakeholder is less or more than that of the other

Interviewer: yes but practically my question is on their practical role based on the activities you are engaged in now (.) yes they have key role and that is why they are working at the level of the council and their share is already given but when it is practically seen em can we be sure that all are working to the level expected of them (.) at

915 a similar level that may not be expected from all since their roles are different (.) but the question is kind of is there anyone exerting its effort to the level expected of it or if there is no one

Interviewee: with regard to this though I couldn't evaluate as the share of this one is better what we all the time see to the front on the issue of traffic safety is the police (.) this is what
920 we know from experience (.) even now I observe in the work of this committee the share of the police being superior (.) I see the share of the police being more vivid (SFI2)

SFI4

Interviewer: now if that is possible to comment on which ones are discharging their responsibilities effectively

Interviewee: well obviously road transport is the main one (.) the federal police is there (.)
925 and obviously the city's Addis Ababa police commission crime and traffic accident prevention office (.) all are exerting their efforts (.) it is not only those I have mentioned now the city administration is this way and the government is also the other way (.) now there are also others (.) the rule and order effecting organ for example is getting rid of those on the street blocking the pedestrian it is trying its best (.) so each is contributing its
930 share (.) the main one though the one working on this issue paying particular attention at this moment em road transport is working hard in a similar fashion (.) the same is true for the federal police (.) even what they are planning now is that to train traffic police nationally em there is none at all at the federal level yet (.) so they have already started the initiative of training traffic police that way and then furnish it with the provisions (.) they
935 have already given the training for some people (.) when we observe this we could see it has got an emphasis and they are paying even more attention to it (.) by way of assisting the police with walkie-talkies for faster communication and reporting for its traffic and crime investigation work the road transport are also on a good move (.) when we see it with this regard it shows that these institutions are on a better move (SFI4)

SCA13

940 well I think now for instance there is one which we have mentioned the engineering part (.) those which were constructed earlier are already constructed (.) if it is possible to modify them somehow especially in connection with pedestrians' pavements like if pavements were

with guardrail this is among the future engineering works (.) of course all the roads being constructed recently have pavements for pedestrians(.) they are being constructed fully and properly (.) the other thing is the responsible sector should continue teaching the public the already started traffic safety education until it is inherently absorbed (.) mainly the responsible sector should continue the work tirelessly until it enters the minds of the people and alert them (.) in line with this should go the enforcement which is ours (.) because unless these measures are taken things could run wild and could not get the right track (.) sometimes I myself feel embarrassed (.) that means when we go out and see our asphalted roads sometimes it looks as if they were constructed for pedestrians instead of for vehicles (.) at some places of course the way the road is constructed is like there is no path for pedestrian (.) but even in the presence of pavement pedestrians enter the road (.) and if we ask why it is just because there is no enforcement(.) maybe if there were enforcement if we were to punish the pedestrian he wouldn't enter the road or jump into the ring road (.) therefore he doesn't enter the road means we have saved him (.) this is a task of protecting the person from being easily exposed to accident (.) so I believe we could see results if these things are strengthened and coordinated (.) so these things should be done for change could come only if they are performed (.) therefore it should tirelessly be worked both on the pedestrian and on the driver in line with the enforcement (SCA13)

SCA12

when I think of the stage we will reach after ten or five years since our city or our country is on growth em the growth will bring about its own useful things (.) for example being assisted by technology our traffic police will get modernized training or else when we continue using CCTV camera radars alcohol tester and similar materials which we have already started using we could easily control rule violating drivers and the repetitive violators since they couldn't be as they wish changing their addresses (.) when a network that covers the country is employed the system of offering driving license will be changed the system of technical inspection will be changed all these things will be handled in a far better way when everyone works being assisted by technology (.) things which are made by human beings manually will decrease (.) for example now when I say things shielded by people every driver has now two or three driving license which are forgery (.) therefore

when one is suspended he continuous with the other one (.) we will come to use technology that will help us get rid of such things(.) national license or driver licensing systems will be implemented I believe there will be networks (.) when such things are achieved I hope the
975 present traffic accident will decrease since even what we can see from the experience of other countries is they have gone through a path decreasing it from the higher level it was once (.) first at some time the accident happened to be very worrying (.) then they have caused change for their countries when all have worked hand in hand (.) I hope we too will have similar pattern in our country (SCA12)

SPS19

980 **Interviewer:** with regards to safety you have not yet told me about your school's em the contribution of (the school's name) to ensure road safety

Interviewee: (the school's name) when it was established as share company in the nineties it started with many very ambitious goals (.) one and the main one of these many and ambitious goals was producing accident defensive professional drivers(.) this was the main
985 one (.) producing professional drivers producing professional drivers means a very huge goal (.) they are professionals and their professionalism is evidenced by the their defensive driving skill (.) it is not just their accident defensive driving skill but their professionalism is proved by their ability of accomplishing the task for which they are meant (.) this was the goal the school has started with (.) therefore with respect to road traffic safety our school
990 was the first company to take the responsibility of conducting vehicle inspection to raise this question (.) in the past this was done by the government (.) but (the school's name) believes that vehicle inspection is a segment of the road traffic safety issue (.) drivers it believes that the task of producing trained professional drivers is an element of the road traffic safety issue (.) that means it is not taken as business matter (.) so to put this into practice for sure
995 we have made the effort of providing quality education (.)it has prepared its own curriculum before the government the federal transport authority prepared curriculum at national level and put it into practice (the school's name) was an institution which had its own curriculum (.) even the curriculum itself on which areas should we focus (.) em as I told you last time for the first time in the history of Ethiopia it is (the school's name) and only

1000 (the school's name) that has prepared driver ethics and behavior lesson in the form of a book and that has offered it incorporating it as one formal lesson (.) in the nineties we were offering ethical education incorporated in our curriculum (.) but the government made it mandatory in two thousand one (.) behavior education em was made mandatory by a proclamation in two thousand one (.) but in the nineties that means some eight years before

1005 the proclamation we were offering ethical and psychological lessons (.) this is so because we have understood the main gap of our drivers is behavioral and ethical problem (.) as it is known still today this problem has not been solved (.) therefore we have the confidence to say em we say it confidently that (name of the school) has played the biggest role in this regard (.) em transport authority has now used (.) it has included it in its curriculum (.) like

1010 I said before it has also included it directly in the drivers (training) manual from (.) most of the ethical education which treats the gaps the problems the lacks taking the entire book that was prepared by me (.) that means it has used it (.) to this em we are happy because we have prepared and offered a book that could help as an input (.) the other thing is in terms of offering quality education we have contributed a lot by training efficiently based

1015 on the training program in accordance to the period allotments and by using quality trainers (.) to this (the school's name) is a school which has for the first time employed at a higher level trainers who have first degree in auto mechanics and involved in the work (.) the responsible body by then was the Addis Ababa road transport bureau and this authority used to comment us as (.) why do you employ those who are overqualified (the participant's

1020 name) we used to be criticized for that (SPS19)

SPS18

by the way if defensive driving was known if it were known you might even say no need of other training package period (.) people who have already driven have tested it and they have benefited from it they are changed greatly (.) and others since they have not yet got it they are still there (.) so with regards to its impact you could get it from the feedback of

1025 people who have taken the training (.) but to make it compulsory like you said to train and put all within this principle to make the defensive driving package mandatory obviously government's intervention is necessary (.) the government has to be convinced with it and

even should take over it (.) now as I told you it is by myself I run it on my own (.) but it was good if it took the responsibility and run it (.) the goal is naturally to lessen the accident it
1030 is not business affair (.) by the way I do not take it as business sometimes I offer trainings for free (.) and at other times I say it doesn't matter if you pay the minimum rate only the amount you could pay a hundred or so (.) but that was not the actual cost

Interviewer: now what is the reason (.) is that due to the impact if at all there is any (.) and about the impact since there are set goals (.) what could you say in relation to the goals

1035 **Interviewee:** that is right by the way the goal because you are defensive driving your goal is so as to make the accident rate especially the death rate to zero level period (.) that is the main objective of defensive driving (.) em the maintenance cost you will decrease it very very much (.) there is a lesson plan em a paper that was prepared (.) overall the so called maintenance cost there will be none that means it declines (.) yes there is but it is only the
1040 normal maintenance not maintenance due to crashes (.) you will also decrease the downtime no wastage at all since you won't have any time to waste due to crashes or repair you can save time em as to consumption that of like tyre or fuel use you will decrease your fuel also consumption (.) these are the profiles of defensive driving that you will get from the training period (.) they are profiles of the training this is what you will
1045 get (.) and this is obviously what any organization any country needs (.) especially if you say I have to avoid road traffic accident it is the primary goal (.) and then the others are additional benefits maintenance time and again when you are defensive driver you will feel your confidence is developed (.) now sometimes people say well I am trained but what if the other who is not trained hits me (.) but you will get the answer from the training itself (.)

1050 the very reason of your being trained is just because there are people of that kind (.) it is so as not these untrained people hit you ((laughing)) otherwise why should I train you (.) so that means you have developed your confidence (.) you come with this doubt but then after the training you will say it doesn't matter whatever is to happen because I am now a very good observer (.) the training provides you it develops your confidence (.) the other thing is
1055 you will have deep you will increase you sympathy for other drivers (.) these spiritual things which we call like kindness you will completely bring about change of behaviour (.) because in the training behaviour has a very huge impact (.) defensive driving works on

three things em knowledge skill and em attitude (.) it focuses on the three defensive driving targets on that (.) so behaviourally when you sympathize with others you will not complain about how they drive (.) you won't say he was responsible for the mess so what could I do(.) rather you say he was at fault but I saved him (.) he would have almost died if I were not the person (.) so it means I have saved an individual (.) you will have that kind of psychological feeling (.) thus it is through these five reasons that the impact of defensive driving is measured (SPS18)

SPS18

1065 **Interviewer:** you have also a section under the special driving training package that says a special type of training on the impact of feeling tired and fatigue while driving

Interviewee: the training of defensive driving is so wide incorporating a lot of themes (.) it has about sixteen modules that means just defensive driving (.) this so called fatigue management is one amongst them(.) this feeling dizzy and weary is not that simple specially for those travelling by cross country vehicles (.) fatigue has very significant contribution to accident (.) some countries estimate its contribution to accident to twenty percent (.) since twenty percent is not that simple we offer training on it (.) this is part of the defensive driving training ... (SPS18)

SPS17

it is at this critical time when the society is not civilized properly and developed skillfully that people are being injured and killed (.) to curb the problem our main goal is we all as stakeholders need to train and capacitate our drivers as much as we could so that we could minimize this accident (.) we have taken this as an objective and are going about it (.) thus as to how the accident could be decreased if we all work hard as one and if we do not leave it as if it were someone's task if we work together there is no way for the problem not to minimize (.) but if it is one if only one sector takes it the sector which only drafts rules and regulations ratifies them and tries to implement then any work without the involvement of stakeholders such effort will still be in vein (.) obviously the road belongs to all of us (.) road safety also belongs to us all (.) so as stakeholders it also concerns us (.) there are problems (.) yes by now there are problems which are too many deep and innumerable (.)

1085 road safety has reached to a difficult level (.) this is the main one the stakeholders have not
 contributed their share to the level expected (.) since all the stakeholders have not done
 that we have now reached to such a messy road system widespread in our country (.) so to
 culminate the problem we as stakeholders also have suggested many things at many
 occasions (.) but we have not yet got the proper the proper things we need (.) that is the
 1090 problem (.) otherwise as stakeholders we have brought very very good ideas (.) first the
 problem by now is that we have not taught our people about the traffic accident by which
 we are the first in Africa (.) since we have not made the public aware of the problem this
 has caused us to lag behind (.) we need to teach the public very well on this matter (.) we
 have the conviction that we need to handle the issue seriously (.) the public needs to be
 1095 taught properly it has to know it (.) by this I mean for example the crowd we experience in
 the mornings and in the evenings it is we who are creating the jam on the people (.) can we
 work out that yes but we have not worked it out yet (.) we have not been working and that
 has made us lag behind (.) for example in the mornings and evenings the people in Addis
 Ababa are not using the road properly taking their lefts and being on the extreme sides of
 1100 the road (.) instead they walk as they wish (.) by now towns like Ambo and Bahir Dar have
 civilized far better than us but we are lagging behind (.) this has happened because the
 work has not been taken seriously (.) the other thing is the way we use zebra crossings (.) it
 really surprises me when I see foreigners and compare them with our people (.) we cross
 the road relaxing putting our hand in our pocket and talking on the cellphone (.) vehicle is
 1105 man-made (.) brakes is man-made (.) that man-made stuff could accidentally pour out its
 oil (.) the wind valve may be cut (.) but we cross the road putting our hands in our pockets
 and talking on the cellphone (.) we should not consider the zebra crossing as our right (.)
 so on the zebra crossings when we see people who come from abroad they cross the road
 so rapidly (.) if possible they run or stride which is as fast as running (.) we have not trained
 1110 the public that way (.) all this problem has come just because we have not taught them (.)
 so if we go about it seriously tomorrow and the day after tomorrow we could see Addis
 Ababa as well-developed educated and with a declined level of accident (SPS17)

SPS18

OK now awareness is good to me it is good if all the people are aware (.) but what if not (.) we need to see the other dimension too (.) what if all are not aware and I believe the person
1115 with the vehicle should take the responsibility for the other person (.) now it will be one way yes but it is all the same you have got the solution (.) I will come to it in a while (laughing) because let me tell you when I drive whether you have taken your right or your left I believe it is me who saved you (.) if you too believe I have protected myself I am happy but we can try it (.) let's try you take your left side and let me show you how I could
1120 hit you period (.) I could sure hit you (.) so what was your share (.) understand it is me who is more powerful who has more speed period (.) so if you count much as if you saved yourself I don't think so (.) so it is me it is my thinking about you that matters not my looking your face (.) does it mean I will hit you if I saw your back (.) so watching the driver in front of you might help by a very small percentage (.) maybe if he encounters mechanical failure
1125 or if it happens to be beyond his control (.) otherwise in order to minimize the whole traffic accident if you tell me like traffic accident has calmed because pedestrians have taken their left then first you will undermine the credit he deserves the driver's credit (.) he saved him but here you offer the credit for the pedestrian the one whom you have trained (.) you will say since I made him take his left side I have brought change (.) so this one also has some
1130 problem (.) well to your surprise they the people are still there on the asphalted road (.) what help have they provided him now except for an interest in being in front of him or at the back (.) is that all because he is in front of the car but there is also another one coming from behind (.) so for him he has given his back (.) which means you are in front of me means there is still another vehicle from behind you (.) is that not (.) which means it could
1135 hit you (.) you are watching me you do not have eyes the other way (.) therefore the other person has the chance of hitting you (.) so the other one whom you gave your back could save you and while you are giving me your back I also could save you (.) so it is me who is your caretaker (.) I believe the driver is the caretaker of the pedestrian (.) you had better give him the awareness and do not waste your time and energy with the pedestrian (.) why
1140 should you get tired with 80 million people (.) it is about four hundred eighty thousand vehicles that Ethiopia has just about four hundred eighty thousand (.) if you assign one driver for each or even if you made them two including the assistant (.) with a total of

about eight hundred thousand drivers if you toil on them you will bring solution in just six months (.) but on 80 million there are also the newborns and if you all the time talk about
1145 pedestrians that means you will continue a hundred years talking about pedestrians (.) so I think as for solution there is some problem of direction that leads to solution (.) I firmly challenge them (.) at the office you mentioned I know a person called Mr X (.) once I was with him (.) when they gave me video I said I don't think this video is of any help for me (.) what else can we do therefore (.) no I think you should have worked on the driver (.) why
1150 not you allocate budget for that (.) he said we have just brought about change this way (.) OK change yes it looks like change (.) if so I am better for I am working on the driver (.) as an individual and without any help I work on the driver and you work on the pedestrian then if there is any change that would be great (laughing) (SPS18)

RUP29

Interviewee: now I would like to mention taxi users (.) regarding taxi users once I started
1155 to refuse both sitting myself and allowing others to sit for three on a seat of two (.) then I was beaten down everybody cried shouted at me

Interviewer: do you mean the pedestrians the people in the taxi

Interviewee: yes the people in the taxi (.) how what are you (.) who are you (.) like this they no one was ready to listen to me (.) I remember what I said em it is sin according to my
1160 religion so I won't do that (.) get out of the taxi they all shouted at me (.) so what I started then after was I say OK and allow them to sit (.) sometimes I still don't allow (.) first I will see the conductor's face and if I guess he is afraid of me I say no (.) ((laughing)) you can laugh (.) if I guess he is not afraid of me I allow them to sit (.) so now the problem whom does it include it includes us (.) it includes those of us who use the vehicle (.) the other one
1165 let me tell you what I have encountered (.) it is about this vehicle we were traveling boarding full of passengers over twelve and when I saw a traffic police I did my hand like this ((stretching it)) through the window (.) he saw me like this ((staring at me)) and turned his face (.) it was the traffic police who turned his face (.) who was he (.) as I told you earlier it means he was a relative of the conductors or the drivers (.) it was full we were
1170 overcrowded there was also a person standing I stretched my hand he saw my hand (.) but he kept silent and passed by imagine what is going on (RUP29)

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Producer: yes the way we use the road is so haphazard (.) when people are told they have to take their left they take their rights (.) em they also cross the streets at places where crossing is prohibited (.) there are things like this (.) now returning to ourselves your
1175 experience as a pedestrian what does your way of using the road look like (.) do you observe the right rules when you travel

1st caller: I most of the time have such kind of practice (.) since this is what I wish for the country I do it myself I mean most of the time (.) when I travel on foot I adhere to the traffic rules (.) I respect the rule when I use the road (.) because there are things I learn from the
1180 regions (.) there are things I heard and there are also things I saw (.) I have seen several things in the Ambo district because a person from Addis Ababa is known just from the way he uses the road (.) that means when he is in the countryside (.) so that on my part I take care very much in order not to involve in things of that kind (.) and of course if we now see the ring road the elderly aged seventy and sixty when they cross (.) I see them crossing the
1185 street jumping the fence (.) they do it just under the bridge (.) this is not acceptable (.) the reason is first there is problem of awareness even with us the pedestrians (.) em before we blame drivers why not road transport provide awareness creating things like the training of taking one's left or taking one's right (.) in the first place there is no such kind of awareness creation (.) and in its absence we are conducting such discussions (.) if we won't
1190 get any result tomorrow what are we doing now (.) this is what I want to ask the road transport people if they come or if there are any invited guests (Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014)

SFI2

Interviewer: is it possible to list accident causes or some of the things that contribute to the road unsafety (.) many could be mentioned but is it possible to list only the main ones

Interviewee: many are said to be causes of accident (.) but the one that takes the biggest
1195 share is disregarding the rule (.) the user does not observe the rule whereas the enforcer has limited capacity of ensuring observance of the rule (.) there are details but now what do we mean by this (.) em if we see how we take driving licenses the very cause of the

problem is then drivers' negligence (.) there is also pedestrians' negligence due to lack of
 awareness em these could be explained in many ways (.) the vehicle's technical failure has
 1200 also its own contribution (.) the roads do also have their own contribution (.) such things
 are generally causes of accidents (.) if we ask how could these be (.) say if we ask how the
 driver could be cause of accident (.) it all begins from the way driving license is taken (.)
 the driver may not have taken the training appropriately (.) he may not have taken enough
 training this is one (.) or else there is this negligence or the so called carelessness (.) there is
 1205 also driving being under the influence of different things (.) drunk driving chewing chat
 and others (.) em and generally not observing the rule is the most significant one (.) there
 are rules and road signs (.) there are different signs on the road (.) as part of the training it
 is explained that road signs should be observed he learns that (.) negligence of the rules
 includes all that it is about the problem over that area (.) by poor capacity of enforcement
 1210 we mean our enforcement capacity is still very poor (.) em it is the traffic police who are
 expected to ensure that the rules are respected (.) but their number is limited and so traffic
 police could not be found everywhere (.) and there is problem of capacity and this lack of
 awareness and it is not assisted by technology (.) all these have their own contribution (.)
 em when we say roads the roads are not designed well with safety in mind (.) both during
 1215 times of construction and maintenance (.) generally they do not adequately incorporate
 road safety (.) so that means due to these factors em the driver's fault or the pedestrian's
 fault or fault of any other traffic all will change into accident (.) it was good if the roads
 were constructed in such a way that one would compensate for the mistake of the other (.) if
 it is so then it is called it has suitably incorporated road safety (.) a person may drink and
 1220 drive or for some reason he may drive at speed (.) but when he collides those things could
 not support and correct him from his mistake (.) this is seen in the developed countries (.)
 when roads are constructed since they incorporate road safety properly all the mistakes of
 every individual will not turn into accident (.) this is how it works there (.) apart from this
 the other reason for the occurrence of many accidents in our country though we should
 1225 have prevented it there are also accidents caused by vehicles' technical defects (.) because
 our drivers do not check safety components of their cars before they start driving technical
 defects occur and so accident due to technical failure will follow (.) anyhow it is just to

mention the presence of such accidents though the number is insignificant (.) so these are the causes (SFI2)

SFI2

1230 **Interviewer:** *em thank you now let's return back to the point you mentioned earlier (.) the stakeholders are many in number but it is difficult to generalize as if they all were taking their responsibilities in a similar way (.) you mentioned this earlier*

Interviewee: *exactly*

Interviewer: *so now em which ones are at the front discharging their responsibilities to the*
1235 *level expected and which ones are lagging behind (.) if there is anything to be put that way*

Interviewee: *of course right now it is impossible to conclude as if all are discharging their responsibilities properly this is just at an early stage (.) but the problem itself (.) not all the institutions all the stakeholders do not have similar exposure to the problem or they do not have equal share of contribution(.) some have very high contribution to the problem so it is*
1240 *expected that their work should even be more to minimize it (.) others are institutions with minor contribution but it is still expected to minimize that (.) they must exert their efforts so that's what is expected (.) now to the question which ones have better efforts (.) though there is no as such critical evaluation conducted based on set criteria in relation to the problem the traffic police mainly the federal police is now working with far better efforts (.)*
1245 *em the Ethiopian roads authority em though their efforts couldn't be seen boldly since the problem is wide and what is expected of them is deep their initiative and small beginnings indicate that they are also trying their level best (.) ministry of health is also extending its efforts (.) what we should bear in mind here regarding ministry of health is what the role it has in minimizing road traffic accident(.) it is not responsible for the accident(.) that means*
1250 *ministry of health as a cause for example as for the roads authority with respect to the roads we could say it may not have constructed the roads properly with safety in mind but for ministry of health the accident does not occur because there was something the ministry has not done (.) but once the accident has occurred because of our limited capacity to offering emergency care and continuous treatment em one who shouldn't have died may*
1255 *die and em one who could be cured with slight injury may suffer severe injury (.) there are such and such things so with this respect ministry of health is on the right understanding (.)*

it is good as it is moving to the level expected of it (.) em the others like transport authority em and other responsible stakeholders like ministry of education on their part are contributing their share in a limited way (.) therefore we put and see it this order but it is impossible to say this is an evaluation conducted critically based on some set standardized criteria (SFI2)

SCA12

OK well if we see it based on the situation we are in at present maybe this could be just my personal opinion but it is difficult to conclude it as lack of knowledge (.) because it is there via various outlets we could say the media the television and the radio including various pamphlets even a traffic week is celebrated in Addis Ababa every year (.) using all these there are efforts of creating awareness about the traffic accident even by using films made on accident scenes in order for them to be careful and to warn them of the danger (.) but against all these efforts the public is still inside the problem (.) this means I think there is an ethical problem (.) or else it seems to me it is carelessness about the issue (.) they are two things either behavior related problem or not providing the attention that the issue deserves (.) otherwise the police on its part has been engaged in a lot of works like through its community services (.) using every opportunity that stretches down to block level it engages in awareness works regarding severity of crime and severity of accidents (.) it involves in these tasks using every opportunity it gets (.) the other one if we see the city administration its various media are working a lot in this aspect (.) so I personally find it difficult to conclude it as lack of knowledge (.) unless maybe it is related with like I said behavior and ignorance or due to carelessness ... now people living here is nearer to the knowledge with no one to tell them since it comes to their houses through the media (.) there are a number of opportunities for the public to listen to from the media if they gave it attention sitting at their home or while on transportation (.) as a result the people in the city should have been model (.) if we ask why they didn't perform that task as to me and as I have mentioned earlier one problem is ethical (.) all of us do not convince our conscience that we all are important (.) I doubt if some of us value for our lives (.) I am important (.) for example if a doctor passed away we could get him only after a lot of efforts (.) after the

1285 country has invested a lot (.) I am important for the family under me that could be dispersed (.) so I won't think of myself alone when I think of the fact that there are people whom I benefit because of my survival (.) I have the thinking like first I myself and then my family (.) so I don't think this has gone into the minds of the society (.) or else I don't know if people count traffic accident like a curse that has come from the Creator (.) but there is a
1290 very serious negligence (.) it is not lack of knowledge and if it is not lack of knowledge I conclude the issue as ethical problem and carelessness (.) there are common (.) some people who are even considered as matured would enter into the vehicles' lane and walk so clumsily on the crosswalk not to leave it to the extent we say what happened to him (.) it is not a problem if we walk as quickly as possible and allow the flow to continue (.) let's also
1295 go to the place we wanted (.) and some also insult to each other uttering do you think the road belongs to you (.) so this is ethical problem within us it is our conduct (.) so I think we need to bring about change of behavior (SCA12)

SCA13

so to tell the truth it is impossible to say that we are good road users or that good road safety is ensured (.) em the reason not to say so is the existing road accident we experience
1300 compared to others (.) apart from that when we see the high number of rule violators on every road it is possible to say drivers who observe the law when they drive are very few (.) instead we see them respecting the traffic police and there is no way that they observe the traffic rule (.) so we cannot say we have had good road safety ...
so accident causes are listed and the share of drivers' fault is over eighty percent (.) things
1305 are put as pedestrians' fault this amount roads' problem this amount vehicles' technical fault this amount (.) so the majority of the problem is the driver's fault (.) the reason for drivers' fault is one who drives observing the rule especially when he is trained a driver who is acquainted with accident defensive driving skill even if there was fault by the other person he takes the fault for himself shares it and does not cause the accident (.) this is one
1310 of the lessons of defensive driving (.) by defensive driving it means a driver shares the faults of the other one and tries not to cause any accident (.) for example a pedestrian has entered into the highway (.) he shouldn't have entered so he has to be punished by the

law(.) but he mustn't be hit by the driver because he entered (.) if a driver hits him because he has entered the way claiming it which means he has not driven preventing accident (.)
1315 so even if he has entered his way he should use some system by which he could prevent the accident (.) if he couldn't see clearly if the environment could not be seen properly he mustn't drive fast he should drive slowly (.) and if he could see clearly he should stop and prevent the accident (.) there are articles on the penal code about this issue (.) five forty-three five seventy-two five forty-three and under that there are sub-articles put as one two
1320 and three (.) for a professional when he engages in his profession of driving there are queries regarding how effectively he discharged his responsibility (.) now the main question is whether he has discharged his responsibility or not (SCA13)

SFI4

the biggest problem or rather the main one to me is by our very nature I see human beings as selfish (.) there is no question that we love ourselves (.) but the case in our country in
1325 connection to the issue of vehicles is so shocking (.) obviously there are things which you witness on the road (.) if by chance there is no traffic police though we have the rule of giving priority no one is ready to do that but the traffic police was just to effect the same rule (.) the drivers also know the rule (.) there won't be any problem to be created if he were to obey the rule and travel (.) but everybody says let me be the first let me be the first
1330 it is mine it is mine (.) personal interest dominates extremely and eventually they will be stranded there being locked up to each other (.) one big problem is prioritizing ourselves(.) it is difficult to consider it as lack of awareness (.) you need to value your life (.) but since we love ourselves very much I don't consider the other could also be in a hurry as I am (.) I give priority to myself and this is a problem that we create (.) it is one big problem (.) the
1335 second problem is obviously on the governments' side (.) the control is loose there are also gaps with the awareness creation work (.) and the other basic road safety related thing is the infrastructure (.) there are gaps which also need to be addressed these are among the causes (.) others are related with how we offer driving licenses (.) how much efficient are our drivers in terms of discipline knowledge and behavior is the other important thing(.) so
1340 when all these things are summed up they will make the problem more serious (.) so as I told you earlier though change is coming from time to time I think we still have to work a

lot (.) the reasons are obvious driver's fault pedestrian's fault and if you go further to details it is just not yielding to the traffic (.) em the rules (.) when you summarize it you will arrive at disrespecting the rules (.) but there are rules (SFI4)

SCA8

1345 carelessness it is carelessness (.) if you ask them about this issue you will find people who were amazingly humble insulting others when they are driving lacking a micro second's patience (.) while they are driving being by the side of their colleagues you will see them involving in nonsense stuffs being extremely angry and feeling exceptionally upset(.) why(.) the transport sector demands high level of patience (.) every mobility of the road transport
1350 be it pedestrian driver passenger or any other sector it has to be filled with patience (.) by patience we mean absolute patience not this temporary patience (.) because the effect of lacking patience may cost one's life (.) wealth is so simple it could be substituted but life is not (.) it could not be measured by any standard of wealth (.) since the impact of lacking a second's or a micro-second's patience could never be reversed all drivers all pedestrians
1355 need to have absolute patience I mean absolute patience (.) there is no need of kidding about this (.) so now the main question is do they have the awareness that could reach them to such a level (.) we accept the claim that goes they know it (.) well it is being disseminated through the media and using songs brochures newspapers and various conferences (.) everyone who is now driving vehicle each of them there is no one who has
1360 not gone through training schools (.) if one has not yet got his driving license it won't be possible to drive a vehicle if he is the way he has come out of his mother's womb (.) everyone who has gone through the process of having their driving certification has got the lessons about patience behavior expected of drivers from a classroom course that lasted for at least five days (.) formerly when the training was provided by transport authority one
1365 has to pass through a five days' training (.) after that he stays for about a month on a field training (.) it is after the combination of these two trainings that they sit for an exam and have their license (.) and now they stay for longer hours in the private training institutes (.) so whether he like it or not in order for him to take the exam and pass he has to read the books and manuals that are prepared for this purpose (.) if all has passed through this step

1370 which means he knows something (.) now the problem is absence of change in behavior (.)
if one does not admit accept and change his behavior then it is carelessness (.) it is not lack
of knowledge of the rule for the rules are now incorporated into the curriculum and in the
training centers (.) training packages they are being offered to them (.) in addition to that
they could find them from all the FM radio stations they tune in to or by whatever means
1375 everybody now is informed (.) there is no one who does not know about traffic regulations
and signs and the penalties for violating them (.) let me tell you one example about the
number of penalties of somebody who is recognized as a very good person (.) he has a
record of about twenty six penalties just in five years' time (.) I have seen it recorded on the
computer just under one driving license (.) there is a driver with twenty six penalty records
1380 and this is the least I think it is the least (SCA8)

SCA8

now for drivers particularly those involving in the transport business sector the very reason
for them to violate the traffic rules and regulations is I think the competition (.) the first one
is competition in the business world em which is created due to strive for money (.) the
strive the competition is the main one the strive for the market (.) the second one is that of
1385 the administrative body recklessness on the part of the enforcer of the rule or a problem of
not keeping records and not increasing the fines stage by stage or absence of sanction on
the driving license (.) so this indicates the presence of some gap on the rule (.) if you ask
me why every time he comes if he is simply given the penalty pad and if this is not recorded
and when he comes second or third round if he is not warned of (.) like your driving license
1390 should be banned or you should be suspended for six months or you should go for a
retraining and your competence has to be confirmed then why not (.) if it simply says you
are fined eighty birr or forty birr this will lead to recklessness or carelessness (.) it will
further cause him to count it as a culture as if being penalized means nothing at all (.) or
even he could collect it back involving in an illegal practice (.) here while he should have
1395 loaded twelve passengers if he loads seventeen with five more letting them sit elsewhere or
on a stool and if he returns that fined eighty or forty birr instantly then there won't be
anything significant he could learn from the law or the penalty (.) so the problem is

limitations of the law (.) and enforcers do not penalize based on records and by increasing the fines step by step or there is absence of penalties of various steps (.) so the competition
1400 for market and his interest to increase his share of income after he has handed over that of the owner em I guess these are the main reasons for the violation of the law (SCA8)

SPS19

I said earlier in general that the society's social consciousness has not grown to the level expected (.) if we see here specifically in relation to road traffic to tell you the truth if I say our road safety awareness is at a zero level it is not wrong according to my conviction (.)
1405 for example take drivers you can observe simply (.) it really surprises me (.) there in front of you a pedestrian is crossing (.) maybe he is a disabled person or she could be a pregnant woman (.) the driver at present is one who couldn't even guess at what speed she is crossing (.) you drive and drive and drive until you arrive at her and then maybe you say I have applied the brake using it automatically just by her side but the accident may still be
1410 inevitable (.) what you should have done was reducing your speed while approaching her(.) so the most important job is not slamming on the brakes (.) now if you take our drivers they are not doing like this (.) once a person from ((name of an international NGO)) was telling me a story when we were offering training for his staff (.) he said the driver was saying this donkey is to be hit while he was approaching it (.) he is a professional driver (.) imagine if
1415 he saw the donkey and suspected that it would be hit he should have approached it reducing his speed bit by bit and he should have let the donkey cross (.) it is impossible to say he didn't see it or it entered the street accidentally (.) he saw it (.) after that he went on and on and like he said he hit it (.) and he said haven't I told you as the man told me (.) you see ((laughing)) now as for me no way has this driver had road traffic safety awareness (.)
1420 never at all did it pass by his side(.) leave alone in him it does not exist anywhere with him(.) haven't I told you (.) you see count it as if he hit it declaring to do so (.) you see it now (.) that means there are drivers of such kind you understand (SPS19)

SPS17

one thing we as stakeholders have found out as the main problem of the traffic safety is the current way of offering driving license (.) from the very beginning this newly introduced

1425 driver certification is not good(.) it has not put the public's awareness into consideration(.)
 the problem related with current way of certifying it has extremely increased the accident
 rate and caused death of many people (.) anyone standing from a scratch is now offered at
 once label four label five label three driving licenses (.) as a result we bring a man without
 any experience and while yet immature to a responsibility (.) we expose the public and the
 1430 driver himself to accident (.) that is a very serious pain and problem recently (.) it is the
 very cause of crowds in Kerchelle and other prison houses (.) firstly the action was taken
 just by limited individuals without consulting with stakeholders (.) for this reason the
 accident is worsening (.) according to one study presented at the parliament eighty-five per
 cent of the accident is caused by the new driving license (.) when this study was presented
 1435 we argued as to why a solution was not given (.) so even now this is the confusion the very
 problem in the city (.) not only just in the city this driver licensing in the name of dry one
 wet one stuff is inappropriate (.) if it were offered like it was in the past step by step and up
 to one's level I don't think all this would happen (.) the other thing which we believe could
 aggravate the accident is obviously we are developing nation(.) we have a rule and we take
 1440 the rule as if it were the word of the bible (.) for instance the road system in the morning
 and in the evening is so crowded (.) the time for all vehicles to go out and to enter is the
 same (.) if we come here from Nazareth in the evening after five o'clock it is so difficult (.)
 it is difficult to move here in the city too (.) so I think this has its own effect (.) there must
 be time for students time for workers independently entrance and exit time for the business
 1445 people (.) I believe if vehicles were separated as for private use for businesses for public
 services on the track on the asphalt (.) if heavy tracks were allowed only for a limited time
 if all these were separated all this crowd this jam may not cause accident (.) if we see how
 road users use the road initially we have a very very poor road use culture especially the
 case in Addis Ababa it doesn't go with the city (.) we have to train and let them know using
 1450 brochures and other means (.) we have firm standing that if need be we have to go to the
 rule and let them know by effecting the rule (.) if you say why (.) these days half of them do
 not know their rights and lefts em we are in a country where people do not fear the vehicle
 which is manmade (.) to curb this problem rules and regulations I believe rules and
 regulations have to be enacted involving stakeholders and they have to be put into action(.)

1455 in the absence of this even if we teach (.) once people crossing the road at places other
than zebra crossings were being held by enforcers in custody and were fined (.) people
jumping fences of the ring road were being fined (.) they were imprisoned for twenty four
hours or were made to involve in some labor work (.) or they were released paying fine of
sixty birr or so (.) that had given a bit hope but then quitted (.) now everyone walks as they
1460 wish (.) they cross the street wherever they want (.) I think that has to necessarily be taken
into consideration (.) the work needs to be done after legal systems are formulated (.) and I
believe the user drivers and all others have the duty of knowing the duty of knowing it
(SPS17)

SPS18

you can't blame the driver for he doesn't have the knowledge (.) as to the rate it doesn't
matter whether you give it ninety or say it a hundred percent but what (.) what knowledge
1465 he asks you what knowledge have you given me (.) all he have is only the driving license (.)
then after I have never seen a penny's budget allocated for the driver for a continuous like
quarterly or semiannual training about the accident (.) I mean since transport bureau is
not that far from here I as a trainer I went several times to check if they allocated training
budget for this issue so that they wouldn't pay from their pocket (.) and none at all (.) if so
1470 it would simply be pointing one's finger (.) so you see without making any effort and
without telling them to improve by simply putting in number that he is the cause and just
talking about the problem only but not showing the solution (.) if you don't tell the solution
now for this reason that it is a headache for them (.) that's all it is a puzzle to them (.) so if
you simply say due to not yielding for pedestrians the driver will get mad (.) he is bored
1475 like all the time he would say how could it happen all the time (.) eventually of course they
would agree with me my approach (.) when I eventually tell him like what if you were to
observe earlier then he would say OK is that what you wanted to say (.) you see (.) but if
you are simply like for blaming and say he has held eighty percent share and if you bring
all the problem and throw upon him then you won't get any solution (.) instead you will let
1480 him be deaf to the issue getting him bored (.) sometimes you might cause him be in a
grudge and even involve in the problem intentionally (.) so awareness work has not been
done on the driver (.) instead comparatively speaking I think it is done on the pedestrian

sure it has been done (.) I heard that some model regions have worked on the pedestrian and there is some appreciated work (.) I myself saw the people I have seen it from the video
1485 they gave me (.) in fact it was to challenge it that I went there (laughing) but they told me we too have done tirelessly though it has not convinced me (SPS18)

SPS18

Interviewer: well what about others like the traffic police

Interviewee: yes the police I mean the traffic police also need training (.) they should really be genuine (.) by the way some of the traffic police I don't think they are working for
1490 safety (.) instead of for safety it seems they work for themselves just for their pockets because they are hard up (.) obviously I have access to contact drivers since I train them (.) it is really disappointing some of them would penalize drivers for damaged tires of the trunk while it is loaded on the truck (.) now it is a loaded trunk what is the problem (.) it is already loaded and it would be cause of accident only when it is unloaded (.) perhaps it was
1495 to a garage that he was taking it being loaded so what (.) it is to that extreme that they put pressure upon them (.) em again some regions have their own penalty rate now (.) for example they say you better not be penalized in Oromia because the rate goes up with the level of the driving license (.) now for level five driving license the penalty begins with five hundred birr so it means it is very tough (.) but here in Addis Ababa it is not like that

1500 **Interviewer:** what does it mean by you better not be penalized

Interviewee: that means well the method they use not to get penalized is so odd (.) I mean normally the process for paying the fines is lengthy (.) for being penalized you have to go (.) so what is better is making a deal there (.) so what some of the people on enforcement do is so disappointing but it doesn't mean all of them (.) so are they really there to ensure traffic
1505 safety (.) not that much (.) how staying being hidden he hides somewhere and emerges to accuse you of violating the observance of the so called solid line (.) and that time when he said so you would try to stop the vehicle being terrified (.) because you might assume like he didn't see me and if he orders you to stop emerging unexpectedly even in your attempt to obey you may not park at the right place (.) as a result accident could arise ...
1510 what is the problem well the fear is like he will penalize me (.) then what if you are penalized is it not better because after the accident he would never say I was responsible (.)

let me give you a very simple example (.) you remember the traffic accident happened at Kolfe (.) friends of the driver ((have told me)) since I have trained most of them (.) the vehicle had some technical defect (.) it failed technically which means the brake (.) so he
1515 parked the vehicle is that not enough (.) he parked it means there won't be any accident (.) but the place where he parked is prohibited for parking (.) since it is forbidden here you have to move the vehicle (.) that means he was not able to resist this pressure (.) therefore the one you would get direct on the accident scene is the driver but behind he was urging him not to park there even if he was telling him that the vehicle had technical defects (SPS18)

SPS18

1520 yes well he tells you like I told him let this stuff be repaired let the tyre be changed for it was worn out (.) but he insisted I had to go for one or two rounds and for this reason the tyre went off and behold I lost sixty passengers (.) no it is behind not to the front that you get the owner (.) so as to me if I had done on you then you would refuse driving such kind of vehicle (.) if I had finished it there the defensive training you wouldn't have mentioned
1525 that (.) but now you have got the chance and so when I asked you of the reason you tell me that you have to make your living (.) when you ask him why he drives such kind of vehicle he says so what would my children eat (.) this is an aspect of management it won't be right when you mix safety and thingamajig safety and daily bread or if you talk about survival that won't be right (.) so what can I do (.) you know life in our country if I sit idle for three
1530 months or even for a month my children will have nothing to eat (.) he tells you it was for this reason that I went with worn down tyre not because I was ignorant of it (.) at this moment you see you have spoiled the defense concept (.) you are not defensive that's all (.) if you were defensive there would be no deal with regard to safety (.) if you sat idle for three months I could get you alive and not at a prison house too (.) we could meet like this
1535 and you would get another job (.) but you not for three months since you did not want to quit job for a while your address now could be either at a prison if you did not die or else it is your corpse ((that remains)) so don't tell me of people from behind (.) he knows the owner could exert pressure from behind but it is the driver who could resist it that's all (.) if he says I won't drive such kind of car and if the other one to be hired says I won't drive

1540 and the other also says I won't drive then unless he imports from China this person could not get any driver (.) so all I am saying is I still toil on the driver (.) with regard to the owner who is at the back as contributor of accident yes he is stakeholder you are right it concerns him also since the vehicle belongs to him (.) so in the future it is good to aware him also (.) em the vehicle belongs to them so by giving priority to safety if it serves them 1545 for a long time they will be benefited (.) but in our country what is needed is all at once (.) not its service for a long period of time but its return of the bank loan and even many more just in three months' time (.) so where will the pressure go it will be upon the driver (.) but training them a bit is also good if at all they would change that means the owners (SPS18)

SPS18

well to me if we follow the simplest logic the focus should be on the driver (.) because he is 1550 the obvious violator (.) eighty one percent it is over eighty percent if you go and see the data from the road transport database (.) since it says eighty one percent is driver's fault you have to work accordingly (.) well others with five or ten percent share it is OK if they also are treated (.) but if you ask me of the main one in order to ensure road safety I believe we have to train the driver (.) and yet it is unfortunate what is being worked on is 1555 not that one (.) as we raised this issue earlier I think a huge amount of budget is being used on pedestrians and the like (.) but the driver has to be changed(.) as to the training the very aim of this modern training called defensive driving is I don't think they lack the skill (.) he has the skill but he should also incorporate the attitude and knowledge aspects (.) since these could be found in the defensive driving package I think it is good if more emphasis is 1560 provided there (.) but next there is no problem if the others also get the awareness (.) but as for the road I wouldn't say it should be worked on the road because it is not that significant(.) wasting time on such physical things is pointless because even the data that I have seen says sixty eight point some number I think it is four percent ((68.4%)) of the accidents is on roads which are straight and leveled (.) so why should it be worked on the 1565 road (.) have you understood what I am saying (.) if the car wrecks on a road which is straight and leveled if it is so then it is on the conceptualization (.) the problem should obviously be the drivers is that not (SPS18)

SPS18

Interviewer: ... what about manuals proclamations and things of this kind you might be using at this training center (.) could you comment on them on the contribution they might
1570 have be it positively or negatively

Interviewee: to me even if you ratify things like proclamations regulations it doesn't have much help for a person who is being trained for his driving license (.) except for passing the exam earning some grades what benefit could it add to him (.) in order for him not to get penalized using the proclamation you enact you might tell him but the proclamation
1575 doesn't help him (.) not to cause the accident you need to offer him safe driving package

Interviewer: but there is the enforcement part for instance

Interviewee: yes it is there but by the way penalty (laughing) if we talk about penalty in our country the role of penalty to change is very insignificant (.) because you don't want to waste your time (.) you might even insult the traffic police dropping words like if you were
1580 considerate you may not penalize me but now go on write it down it doesn't matter (.) so it is not convincing it doesn't help to stop the accident (.) by the way penalty is after the incident after the accident is that not (.) since it is after the accident which means it doesn't stop the accident

Interviewer: but maybe the one to happen next time

1585 **Interviewee:** yes you penalize after the accident (.) because he hit something you penalize him or maybe because he parked at a prohibited place you penalize him (.) unless for the next one it doesn't help him not to violate now (.) so it is not proactive penalty is obviously reactive (.) is it not after the incident

Interviewer: exactly

1590 **Interviewee:** to me it doesn't have any sense it is nonsense (.) so whether penalty changes human beings I don't believe in it that much

Interviewer: so now for this particular type of training you offer what do you count and use as a resource (.) a guide or manual or I don't know what to call it but whatever material you have taken from the government or anywhere else (.) could you please

1595 **Interviewee:** OK no as to me from here from this stuff I have got nothing to help me as a resource (.) normally for those having their driving license we have the curriculum you teach based on that (.) it is OK just to perform that it helps him to get the license (.) it is

good it helps him to have basic knowledge on the technical aspects of the vehicle about regulations of the road and the signs (.) you tell him about the rules (.) but still this training
1600 opportunity is provided not putting accident into consideration (.) it is just the basic training and he gets that (.) but what I am talking about now is about other resources from the government that could help prevent accident to stop accident there is no(.) none at all(.) of course as far as I am concerned what is called defensive driving is it is good (.) and I got it from another place not from here it is SHELL that gave me the training (SPS18)

RUP29

1605 the hat is there (.) there is a hat of the traffic police (.) for whomsoever looks at the hat the principle of the government is that since he is a traffic police if you violate the rule he will arrest you that is what the hat shows (.) then there is a person under the hat who is ordered for effecting the rule (.) but he is one who is simply wearing the hat without effecting the rule (.) we observe them fearing the hat and as to the person assigned for effecting the rule
1610 they say that is mister x forget him and they pass him (.) we see them avoiding him (.) nothing will happen (.) you see these two things in relation to the rule (.) another experience I am full of incidents by the way em the other day in a similar way a woman whom I respect very much in the church who was big of a very influential personality they told me she died the same time my brother died (.) when I asked how it happened like I told
1615 you earlier when he saw the hat he discovered the person was not to leave him (.) it was around Megenagna (.) as he was passing the street under the bridge he hit and killed her under the bridge (.) whom did he want to run away from (.) it was to run away from the other one (.) I also heard she was with her daughter her little daughter and her daughter's leg was cut off (.) he was grieving calling his mother (.) I was terribly disappointed(.) when
1620 you see all these things em it is departing the elderly women from their care givers children from their parents em it is separating those who are going to school with a hope of tomorrow from their futures (RUP29)

RUP29

come to the driver himself (.) em by the way when I simply think over it em those aggravating traffic accident are not privately owned vehicles (.) as to my observation most

1625 of the time they are taxis public transporters (.) they are privately owned vehicles in the
 transport sector(.) when I thought of why they involve in such things (.) since I am one who
 interacts with many people I have a wealthy friend and once we were talking about why
 taxis are involving in things like this (.) you know what he told me (.) the reason for taxis to
 be so hurried all the time is (.) if it is a taxi he has to hand over three hundred birr for the
 1630 owner per day (.) so he should be able to collect more than this three hundred birr (.) after
 handing over the three hundred birr he has to collect another three hundred to put in his
 pocket (.) to your surprise he even collects two hundred or more than the sum he does for
 the owner as he told me (.) so to collect this sum he goes to unbearable places (.) we see
 the public transport drivers we see the taxis as they rush for this and the like(.) we see them
 1635 doing so (.) so now these people (.) let me connect this to what I said before em the sense of
 belongingness (.) it is education that could shape and lead them to think properly (.) if
 accident is to happen tomorrow it is on me too so what could I do with the money then (.)
 so this means there are things the school has not yet shaped since things like this are
 happening (.) moreover the reason why the drivers involved in accidents is (.) I don't know
 1640 why the government has preferred to keep silent on this matter (.) they chew chat you could
 see the conductor chewing chat and the driver also chewing chat (.) you see them doing
 things of this kind and being in stuffs of such kind (.) due to a person involving in such
 dizzy stuffs you know what is happening to the accident (RUP29)

Excerpt 56

Interviewee: ... the other is excessive speed which I mostly see with many of the youth

1645 **Interviewer:** OK that means drivers

Interviewee: I don't know especially these especially these Isuzu drivers and those who
 drive being out of freer mind taking things like chat which is said to be a way of getting rid
 of feeling sleepy and the way they drive is so frightening (.) it is driving irresponsibly (.)
 many public transporters which are fully loaded with passengers you really hate the way
 1650 they drive them (.) ... (.) now though I shouldn't have mentioned names the way they drive
 these higer isuzu and the like their speed is so terrible (.) they sometimes push me to the
 extent of ungrasping my wheel (.) he would come with speed and enter before you
 (RUTD25)

The National Road Safety Strategic Plan of Ethiopia 2011-2020, p.20

Drivers' poor skill and low level of safety awareness are identified as the main factors for fatal crashes. These are mainly speed, not respecting pedestrian priority, hazardous over-taking, unsafe use of freight vehicles to transport passengers and overloading of passenger buses. The drivers training, testing and licensing standards have only recently been harmonized nationally. (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011 p.19)

Commercial vehicles and/or professional drivers are involved in 89% of fatal collisions. This situation reflects the overall profile of the vehicles on Ethiopia's roads with the majority being taxis, buses, trucks or other types of commercial vehicles and private vehicles with professional drivers. (NRSSPE 2011-2020, 2011 p.20)

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4th caller: the accident both in Addis Ababa and in other regions of the country its magnitude is worsening extremely (.) now see the way driving license is being offered (.) I mean imagine a very young man aged eighteen or twenty driving the sinotruk today (.) it is obvious how fast they drive the moment they begin driving lada ((the smallest taxi)) (.) he is fresh and he runs fast since all he needs is being appreciated by others that is all (.) so when he holds that vehicle with level four or level five driving license imagine how much it would be (.) by now they are causing many accidents in Addis Ababa (.) so that should also be investigated (.) the other thing on the road is (.) now it is said people now are not using pedestrians' pavement but the pavement is now already occupied by different materials (.) how on earth could he travel on that (.) and again the traffic ((police)) themselves are observing that cars are parking on pavements even the cafeteria is there on the pavement (.) they also park vehicles there (.) problems of this kind are everywhere (.) the traffic ((police)) do not control all these (.) secondly if they watched that all mess and was cleared people could see the pavement and could have corrected their road use accordingly (.) so the case the accident rate both in Addis Ababa and in every region is worsening (Sheger 101.1, transmitted 27 March, 2014)

RUTD22

regarding the way driving license is given I usually get angry when I drive (.) because you see I must have turned my stomach due to these drivers (.) because many drivers by now do not even look as if they were holding a vehicle (.) to me probably there are a number of
1680 conductors who are very good at driving (.) they are conductors but they don't have driving license because they couldn't afford (.) I would say what if they were given the license after checking their competence when I see some drivers (.) there are drivers who even do not correctly use the wheel drivers who are not able to move forwards or backwards (.) while he is driving up on a steep road assuming he was using the brake to
1685 move forward he would come backwards and hit you when you are not moving and just because you are from behind you will be counted as liable (.) when you ask him there are drivers would dare to say it is you who came and hit me (.) what would you say at that moment (.) you will only say thank you (.) once a driver came on me and ((hit me)) ... the passengers in the cabin said(.) what happened to you that you hit him coming backwards(.)
1690 where have you seen (.) he pulled over and hit me (.) argument arose (.) since the vehicle was of a distance relative of mine I said thank you and paid the repair cost myself (.) just because there are incompetent drivers period (.) that is why I told you about conductors now (.) I don't understand how they get driving licenses while they do not have the competence (.) sometimes I ask them where do you bring the driving licenses from(.) so this
1695 way of offering the driving license I am telling you the truth I don't have drivers whom I count as if they got it in the right way (.) a person whom you know in your village as not having the license may drive a vehicle and hit somebody (.) then you will see him showing a license from his pocket (.) do you have where did you get it from (.) when you ask him he says yes I have got one (.) what would you say that is it (.) it is the paper which is wanted in
1700 Ethiopia and he has got it (.) and if he has got one that is what the law approves (RUTD22)

RUTD25

when the highway was under construction the ring road they said it was being constructed with a twenty years' guarantee (.) I was so glad (.) but when they completed only a part of

the road and moved to the next it started damaging (.) so those assigned as supervisors should have prioritized their country (.) the money will be done by tomorrow (.) when such
1705 things are heard we hear quality supervisors are benefited with something (.) but imagine how many people how much of the country how many folks are lost there (.) so he won't have the slightest progress (.) in fact he won't eat more than one injera (.) if He blesses it for him what he gets is enough (RUTD25)

RUTD25

Interviewer: *what about the road doesn't road condition have contribution to accident*

1710 **Interviewee:** *yes it has (.)... to me the government does not give it priority (.) now at such rainy seasons the roads are usually damaged and they stay in the same condition during the dry season too (.) when you find a hole while you are driving you will suddenly use the brake (.) the one coming from behind may not be focused and so will hit you (.) if he were careful for sure he stops the moment you stop (.) so when one enters the hole or expecting
1715 you will enter and come out he might follow you but you may return (.) at that time accident follows (.) so most of the time it is unknowingly he simply travels assuming the road was fine but when he suddenly sees a ditch he might decide against the vehicle since it is just a property (.) this is the other big problem (.) well this is related with one's personality for we do not decide in a similar way ...*

1720 **Interviewer:** *does it mean there are many accidents of this kind*

Interviewee: *yes it has its own share (.) surely it has its own share (.) so most of the time when the road is damaged it affects your driving activity it causes a jam (.) now if you come around Asra Simint approaching Atana Tera the road is blocked (.) why is it closed because the road doesn't allow a smooth flow of vehicles (.) what is significant there is I
1725 think the traffic police are informing repeatedly (.) it has been repaired twice even during this rainy season though it was not repaired properly (.) so when you stop and drive and stop and drive you will eventually fade away (.) after that the way you drive will also change (.) and finally you will be careless (.) so thing of this kind the road itself as the driver has his own share the road also has its own share (RUTD25)*

RUTD25

1730 well that is a big problem which the government itself has found so difficult (.) if you ask me why I don't know (.) some of the things we heard as information when agreement was made with the Chinese government when the ring road was constructed they said they agreed overpasses were to be constructed at a hundred meters interval (.) now it is not at a five hundred but is located at over one kilometer distance (.) everything costs (.) one may
1735 want to eat cake (.) I am telling you the truth it was good if he were to travel by one birr fifty cents and arrive at the place he wanted saving himself (.) if he says it is too short a distance well it might be good ((to walk)) for health but the energy you wasted must also be substituted (.) but the substitute is never comparable with the transport cost (laughing) (.) so most of the time people are weak (.) instead of using the available overpass they say let
1740 me cross it here (.) he jumps into the road and runs into the car in the middle exposing himself to the vehicle travelling at such a speed (.) the government now assigns traffic police at the area around Atana Tera but that couldn't stop them (.) when they are prohibited here they jump over there (.) so I think this is the problem of the ring road (.) so most of the time the pedestrian does not give due respect for the road (.) he doesn't think of
1745 the accident he might experience (.) he simply calculates his benefits and loses (.) he says why not I cross it here instead of going that all distance and get tired (.) this is it and it could also be solved if they were made aware (.) but as a solution the government should put bridges made of iron or other kind that is a must (.) the other point on the highway since it is highway speeding is allowed (.) but you should see that speed with respect to the
1750 vehicle (.) especially with vehicles that have served for many years there are many of that sort in our country due to our poverty (.) again there are latest vehicles now vehicles that rush the moment you touch the brake or before you think you have given it the petrol (.) on the other hand you have given it to the last and yet you are there with your loud noise (.) so we shouldn't travel just because the road is comfortable to (.) because on such comfortable
1755 situations always since there are things which could occur unexpectedly we need to limit our speed sometimes (.) the smallest thing is enough as I told you now (.) on the highway if a person or a dog enters the vehicle will crash with the guardrail or with the bridge or to your surprise you might see the vehicle jumping the bridge (.) if I am not able to control my speed why should I go at such a speed (.) the mirror is there so if the car behind is coming

1760 at a speed I can take the side of the road and let him pass (.) I could go with my own speed then (.) so instead of trying to fly just because the road is comfortable to we need to use the highway just responsibly (.) the highway should also be of good standard because if you encounter with a hole while you are coming at a speed how could you pass it (.) if you touch the wheel the slightest it crashes directly (.) so you have to go into the hole and come
1765 out (.) hence let's drive at all places responsibly (.) the highway has its own problem and the public in relation to the way they use it have their own problem (RUTD25)

RUTD25

as to me the main thing to work on for a solution is first on speeding drivers and second on pedestrians that use the road improperly (.) mainly pedestrians are like who cares and are not ready for any responsibility (.) when you blow your horn he says is that just today that
1770 you get it fixed (.) and if you keep silent he says don't you have a horn and then he insults you (.) some of these young drivers would say get out this is not your way (.) he says get out of the road until you get your plate number and then conflict follows (.) it is to say now you are not a vehicle so take the side of the road for the time being (.) now specially pedestrians are pedestrians are very very serious problem and there are a variety of their kind (.) there
1775 are also addicted people (.) ... (.) so regarding pedestrians and speed what if places were chosen (.) as for speed especially in this city this very narrow city assuming I could control things being in a speed never it won't be at all (.) so it is good if especially drivers were with this awareness and if we consider our folks as ourselves (.) sometimes when we go to Black Lion to visit relatives let's also see those suffering from this accident (.) it is
1780 good to imagine like what if I were in his position (.) since this is the responsibility for all of us I think it is good if the work were done more on pedestrians and on speed on these two (RUTD25)

RUTD22

well in the first place we as drivers usually disobey and the traffic police they stand there for the enforcement of the rule (.) to begin with if I tell you why accidents would occur you might have loaded extra passengers and if the traffic police is standing there while you are

1785 loading extra passengers you will try to go hiding under the cover of another vehicle and at that time you might hit somebody (.) so such things affect us (.) every time we see a traffic police alas if we were fat we would be tinnier when we see them (.) I am telling you the truth we will be very much terrified when we see a white hat (.) because maybe you have loaded extra or you might have pulled over at a prohibited place (.) so the chance for us to
1790 involve in accident is so wide when we see them (.) we are rather better when they are not around (.) because since we could see our environment you would say OK they are not around and you would relax yourself and work carefully (.) perhaps though the road could be more crowded because if there is an accident and there is no traffic police that means the road is jammed (.) things of that kind could happen (RUTD22)

RUTD25

1795 the traffic police mostly they mostly intervene in areas where people could be injured (.) for instance I appreciate those on the street around eighteen (.) I think it is the traffic police that push for the repairing of the road when it is very crowded (.) being heard is so appealing but for us we don't know where we should go and cry (.) so to me the traffic police instead of tending to punish most of the time what if they teach the people about how
1800 they are exposed to accident (.) sometimes upon seeing you for example in the Oromia Region the accident is worsening since the penalty fees are so high that people drive so fast to avoid them and as a result they are being exposed to more accident (.) I think it was from the media that I heard this last time (.) so the traffic police should also have the ethics they need to carry it as an emblem (.) it is no more practiced these days but I remember in
1805 the eighty eighty-five he would stand somewhere putting his hat here ((showing to his back)) and when you come assuming that there was no traffic police he is here and he emerges holding something (.) what would you say this (.) under what ethical standard could you categorize it (.) that is all after staying at a hidden place he suddenly appears to punish people (.) he should be in open that person is his brother (.) at each home as there is
1810 a traffic police there is a driver there is a teacher there is a doctor (.) so the media should work to create the mechanism by which all members of the society can act as one (.) so what if things of this kind were performed (RUTD25)

RUTD22

to minimize the accident I believe it is the traffic police who could minimize the accident (.) because at the place where he is assigned if there is anyone who is confused be it drivers or
1815 pedestrians what if he tries to calm them down and help them cross (.) and what if they advise drivers who most of the time become emotional (.) what if (.) I don't think paying fines would help us get any lesson (.) most of the time it is when you give them advice that human beings learn (.) what if they give advice on issues of such kind (.) even for us when we are found guilty of loading extra passengers if you give us advice saying why have you
1820 done that then the person will feel sorry deeply (.) and if you find him another time he will very much be embarrassed (.) you will say this traffic police advised me (.) so since there are things of that kind let's not focus on only fines (.) in Oromia when drivers are now advised not to involve in accidents that it is really interesting (.) some will stop the vehicle at some places give advice and go (.) they say slow down don't drive like this they advise
1825 you (.) in Addis Ababa don't drive this way don't do that no one advises you (.) it is only punishment you are penalized (.) when you are fined you will drive being annoyed (.) and when you drive being annoyed you will cause another accident somewhere (.) to prevent things of such kind what if the traffic police try to calm down the person who is confused standing at a crosswalk (.) and the driver could be annoyed but since they are enforcers of
1830 the rule and since they encounter with a number of things what if they calm him down give him some advice on what should have been done and send him (.) I believe the accident will minimize if they advise us and facilitate mobility of pedestrians (RUTD22)

RUTD25

so all stakeholders have responsibility traffic police and others all of these kind (.) all the time (.) to me it's a must (.) a friend of mine who is an engineer once went to Côte d'Ivoire
1835 he said all are traffic police there (.) if you break the rules a person in the vehicle behind you will write your vehicle's plate number and give it to a traffic police (.) this should be the responsibility of us all because for our country to grow (.) well we could say our country has grown only when we all live by a worthy and ethical standard (.) but as to making that happen we usually see it as if it were jealousy (.) no by minimizing the accident

1840 we could more or less be in the list of countries that do not cause any accident (.) most of the time now one enters into something forbidden after checking the absence of traffic police (.) you assume there is no traffic police but he is there (.) these things mostly happen perhaps due to lack of awareness (.) it is possible to cheat but we are cheating ourselves (.) so on this issue what if all were to get an in-depth knowledge it is not that simple (.) today
 1845 you don't have to necessarily go to school if you distribute pamphlets many could learn from them (.) it is not a must to go to school holding a pen which might be difficult (.) due to the struggle for life there are many who would not agree since it may waste his time (.) but if you now give me a pamphlet here I will read it (.) so let's all have respect for fellow citizens (.) let's shoulder responsibility for this (.) if all goes this way perhaps this country
 1850 ((may change)) (.) now most of the time they would say this is habesha's jealousy does it really concern him (.) it won't be counted as an action which I did for the sake of safety (RUTD25)

RUTD25

well it is just the governmental body there that always ratifies rules and also responsible for their effecting (.) ... the problem of the public which is also our problem is no one periodically invites you or related sectors recognizing all as stakeholders to involve be it at
 1855 the kebele or whatever level (.) no one recognizes the issue that way (.) most of the time decisions are made by the traffic police gathered at the zonal level (.) people of their own are invited as guests from the roads transport ((authority)) (.) the road system concerns everyone invited from the road transport the cashier is there the money collector is there (.) this is an issue of the road transport it concerns him and so he involves (.) and yet a single
 1860 driver is better than him (.) so decision by mixing with the public ((never)) (.) I think it is not fair if only one sector decides alone and throws it down to the bottom (.) let's all sense the problem and if the issue were made to sense us all the result would also be better (.) let him be there take time and tell us this position recognizing all of us as having decisive role (RUTD25)

Appendix E: A Sample of ETA/AATB Brochures Used in the Analysis

እንቅልፍ

እስከካሪያዎች ማሸከርከር ከመጀመራቸው በፊት በቂ እንቅልፍ መስጠት እንዳለባቸው ያስታውሱ፤ እረፍት እንቅልፍን እንደማይተካም ያስገንዝቧቸው፤

ቡናና ትንሽ እረፍት መውሰድ

እስከካሪያዎች በድካም ጊዜ ከ15 ደቂቃ ያልበለጠ እንቅልፍና ቡና መውሰድ ድካምን ለማስወገድ ጠቃሚ መሆኑን ያስታውሷቸው፤

የጉዞ መመሪያ

ለእስከካሪያዎቻችሁ በጸሐፊ የተዘጋጀ የጉዞ መመሪያ ይሰጧቸው፤

ሃሳብ መለንዘር

እስከካሪያዎቻችሁ ከስምረት ሃላፊዎች ጋር ያላቸውን ሃሳብ ያለምንም ገደብ እንዲለንዘሩ ያበረታታቸው፤ እንዲሁም የስምረት ሃላፊዎች በጎ ምላሽ እንዲሰጧቸው ያበረታታቸው፤

አደጋ በደረሰ ወቅት

እስከካሪያዎቻችሁ አደጋ በሚያደርሱ ወይም በሚደርስባቸው ወቅት ምን ማድረግ እንደሚገባቸውና ከማን ጋር ግንኙነት ማድረግ እንደሚኖርባቸው ያሳውቋቸው፡፡ እስከካሪያዎቻችሁ ብቻቸውንም ሆነ ረጅም ርቀት ሲጓዙ ሞባይል እንዲኖራቸው ያደርጉ፤ ሞባይሉን ምን ጊዜ መጠቀም እንዳለባቸው ይመሰክራቸው፤

ውሳኔ ሰጪ ያድርጓቸው

ሃይለኛ ዝናብ በሚዘግብበት በምሽት ወቅት ፤ ጭጋጋማ ወይንም ለአደጋ የሚያጋልጡ ሁኔታዎች ከፍተኛ በሚሆንበትና አየሩ ለአንዳድ ምቹ ባልሆነበት ወቅት እስከካሪያዎቻችሁ ጉዞውን መባረዝ እንደማችሉ ያሳውቋቸው፡፡

መንገዶቻችንን ለሁሉም የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ምቹና ተስማሚ እንዲሆኑ እናድርግ!

በትራንስፖርት ባለስልጣን እየተዘጋጀ በኢትዮጵያ ሬዲዮና ትብብር የሚቀርብ የመንገድ ደህንነት ፕሮግራም በኢትዮጵያ ቴሌቪዥን በዋናው ጣቢያ ዘወትር ፡-

ሐሙስ ከምሽቱ 3 : 40 - 4 : 00 ሰኞ ጠዋት 1 : 20 - 1 : 40

በኢትዮጵያ ሬዲዮ በዋናው ጣቢያ በኤፍ ኤም 93.1 እና በኤፍ ኤም 94.5

ዘወትር ሰኞ ከቀኑ 6 : 40 - 7 : 00 ማክሰኞ ጠዋት 1 : 35 - 1 : 55

በትራንስፖርት ባለስልጣን

የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት ማረጋገጫ ዳይሬክቶሬት የተዘጋጀ
ስልክ +25111515285
4ክ0 +25111551715
Website: www.transportauthority.gov.et
E-mail: guzotrafic@yahoo.com
facebook: - Guzo Radic and Tv program
ህዳር 2006

መንግሥታችንን ለሁሉም ተስማሚ እንዲሆኑ እናድርግ

መንግሥታችንን የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ በሰላም ወጥቶ በሰላም የሚመለስበትን ሁኔታ በመፍጠር ለሁሉም ተስማሚ እንዲሆኑ ማድረግ የሁላችንም ሃላፊነት ነው። ይህንን ስላላማዊ እንቅስቃሴ ለመፍጠርና መንገዶቻችንን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የዲ.ዲ. እንዲሆኑ ለማስቻል ሁሉም የድርሰውን መብራት ይጠበቅበታል። ለዚህም እንራትን የተቀበለችውን የመንገድ ትራፊክ ደህንነት የተማባር አስር አመት ለምስክርነት የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ማለትም

- የመንገድ ደህንነት አስራር ለማሻሻል የሚያስችል የአቅም ማግኘት ማካሄድ፤
- ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ መንገድ መገንባት፤
- ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ እንዲኖር በአሽከርካሪና በአግረኛ መንገድ አጠቃቀም ላይ ለውጥ ማምጣት፤
- ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ ተሽከርካሪ፤
- የትራፊክ አደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ የሚሰጥ ህክምናን ቀልጣፋ ማድረግ።

የሚሉትን አጠናክረን መስራት ይጠበቅብናል። ይህ የተማባር አስር አመት ይፋ ከሆነ ከ2004 ጀምሮ ለአካሉ በእነዚህ የትኩረት አቅጣጫዎች ላይ ምን ያህል ስርተናል ብለን ራሳችንን መፈተሽ ይጠበቅብናል። ዛሬም በሚደርሱ የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋዎች አብላጫውን ስህተት ይዘው የሚገኙት አሽከርካሪዎች መሆናቸው ስናይ የአግረኞች ስህተትና የተሽከርካሪ የቱክክስ ጉድለት ከነበረበት አለመቀነሱን ስናስተውል የሰራናቸው ስራዎች ጠንካራ እንዲሆኑ የሳዩናል፤ በተለይ ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የመንገድ ተጠቃሚ እንዲኖር በአሽከርካሪና በአግረኛ መንገድ አጠቃቀም ላይ ለውጥ ማምጣት የሚለውን በትኩረት ለንቀሳቀስበት ይገባል። ስለዚህ አሽከርካሪዎችም ሆነን እግረኞች የመንገድ አጠቃቀም ባህሪያችንን ቆም ብለን መስተዋል ይጠበቅብናል። አሽከርካሪዎችን የምናረራ የሚሰልጠኝ ተቆጣጥሮ የአሽከርካሪዎች የባህሪ ለውጥ ለማምጣት በሚሰሩ ስራዎች ላይ ልዩ ትኩረት መስጠት ይኖርብናል። ከዚህ በተጨማሪም ትግሩን ለመፍታት አሽከርካሪዎችን የምናስማራ ድርጅቶችና ባለሀብቶች በአጠቃላይ የአሽከርካሪ ቀጣሪዎች ትልቁን ድርሻ ልንወስድ ይገባል።

ለአሽከርካሪ ቀጣሪ ድርጅቶች

ማሽከርካሪ ከፍተኛ ሃላፊነትን ከሚጠይቁ ስራዎች ውስጥ ዋነኛው ነው። በማሽከርካሪ ስራ ትንሽ በምትመስል ስህተት የሰው ህይወት ያልፋል፤ የአካል ጉዳት ይደርሳል፤ የአገር ንብረት ይወድማል፤ በዚህም የቤተሰብ መባታትን፤ የእድሜ ልክ የአካል ጉዳተኝነትን ያስከትላል፤ ስለዚህ ደህንነት አስቃቂ የሆነ አደጋ ለማስቀረት ድርጅቶች ሁልጊዜም ነገሮችን በጥንቃቄ ማየት ይጠበቅበታል። ለዚህም ይረዳዎት ዘንድ የሚከተሉትን ተማባራዊ ያድርጉ።

የአሽከርካሪዎችን የአንቅልፍ ተጋላጭነትን ይከላከሉ

በማሽከርካሪ ወቅት ትኩረት ሊደረግባቸው ከሚገቡ ነገሮች አንዱና ዋነኛው መሪ ይዞ አንቅልፍ የሚወስድበትን ሁኔታ እንዳይፈጠር ማድረግ ነው። አብዛኛው የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ የሚደርሰው በተዳከመና በተሰለቁ አሽከርካሪዎች ምክንያት ነው። ይህም የሚያጋጥመው ደግሞ በአብዛኛው

- ረጅም የስራ ሰዓት መኖር
- በቂ አንቅልፍ ካለማግኘት
- የማጫጫት መድሃኒቶች ወይም አደንዛዥ እጾች ከመውሰድ
- በምሽት ከቀን አድካሚ ስራ በኋላ ማሽከርካርና ሌሎችም ከደካም ጋር ከሚገናኙ ነገሮች የሚመጣ ነው። ይህንንም ለመከላከል ለስራተኞቻችሁ ማለትም ለአሽከርካሪዎችና ለሰዎችሃላፊዎች የማንዘቢ ትምህርት መስጠት በትምህርቱም መሪ ይዞ በአንቅልፍ መውደቅ የለውን አደጋ፤ ከጉዞ በፊት ተመጣጣኝና በቂ አንቅልፍ እንደሚያስፈልግ፤ የጉዞ አቅድ፤ የአሽከርካሪዎች የስራ ጫናን ለመቀነስ የሚያስችሉ አሰራሮችንና የመሳሰሉትን ማየት ይጠይቃል።



የጉዞ ርቀት ይቀንሱ

አንድ አሽከርካሪ ምን ያህል ርቀት በቀን፤ በሰዓት፤ በወርና በአመት ማሽከርካር እንደሚገባው የሚያሳይ ጠቆሚ መረጃ በማስቀመጥ አሽከርካሪው ከተቀመጠው መመሪያ በላይ ረጅም ርቀትን እንዳይጓዝ ያድርጉ።

የአሽከርካሪዎችን የማሽከርካሪ ስዓት ይቆጣጠሩ


አንድ አሽከርካሪ ምን ያህል ስዓት ካሽከርካሪ በኋላ እረፍት ማድረግ እንዳለበት የሚያሳይ መመሪያ በማስቀመጥ አሽከርካሪዎች ተማባራዊ ማድረጋቸውን ይቆጣጠሩ።

ደህንነቱ የተጠበቀ የማሽከርካሪ ዘዴን ያስተዋውቁ

ጠቃሚ የሆኑ ፖሊሲዎችን በማውጣት ምክርና ስልጠና ለሰዎች ተላፊዎችና ለአሽከርካሪዎች ይሰጡ፤ በዚህም ለሚከተሉትን ነጥቦች ትኩረት ይሰጡበት

ጠጥቶና የሚያደንዝዙ ነገሮች መድሃኒቶች/መውሰድ

መጠጥ ጠጥቶ ወይም የሚያደንዝዙ ነገሮችን ወስዶ ማሽከርካርን ማባወገድ እንዳለባቸው ያስገንዝቡ።



ትኩረትን የሚሰርቁ ነገሮችን አለመፍጠር

ስራተኞቻችሁ በሚያሽከረኩበት ወቅት ስልክ እንዳይውሉ፤ መልእክት እንዳልኩ ወይም የንግድ ስራውን እንዳይከሰት እይጠብቁ፤ እነዚህን መሰል ስራዎች ተሽከርካሪውን ሲያቆሙ ብቻ መስራት እንዳለባቸው ያስታውቁ።

አስተማማኝ ፍጥነት

አሽከርካሪዎች በተወሰነው የፍጥነት ወሰን ማሽከርካር አስፈላጊነቱን መረዳታቸውንና የሰራ ባህል ማድረጋቸውን ያረጋግጡ፤ ከተወሰነው ፍጥነት በላይ የሚያሽከረኩትን አያስረታቱ።

♦ የቆመ ተሽከርካሪን ተከልሎ ማቋረጥ አደገኛ መሆኑን አግረኞች መንገዳቸውን አሳብተው በመንገድ ላይ የሚተላለፉ ተሽከርካሪዎችን በግልፅ ላይ ላይ አሽከርካሪዎችን የማቆም እድል ላያገኙ ለማቋረጥ በሚደረገው መከራ ብዙ አግረኞች ለአስቀድሞ አደጋ ይጋለጣሉ፡፡

- በመጀመሪያ በሽከርካሪ መንገድ ጦርዝ በመቆም ጥንቃቄ በተሞላበት መልኩ አንገተውንና ትክክለኛ ጥቅ በማድረግ ወደ ግራ መመልከት፤
- ከዚያም ወደ ቀኝ ተመልክተው ያልተቃረኑ ተሽከርካሪዎች መኖራቸውን አረጋግጠው የመንገዱን ግራና ቀኝ እየተመለከቱ በቀጥተኛ መስመር ያቋርጡ፡፡

ሐ. ተሽከርካሪ ላይ መሳራርና መውረድ

ተሽከርካሪ ላይ ሲሳራ፣ ሆኖ ሲወርዱ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ አለብዎት፡፡ ተሽከርካሪው መቆሙን ላያረጋግጡ መሳራር የለብዎትም፡፡ በተጨማሪም ለመውረድ ሲያስቡም ጦርዝተጠግቶ መቆሙንና በተቻለ መጠን የተከለከለ ስፍራ ያለመሆኑን አረጋግጠው መሳራርና መውረድ አለብዎትም፡፡



መ. አደጋ ሲደርስ ማንኛውም ሰው ማድረግ ያለበት ተግባር

- ⇒ ማንኛውም ሰው የተሽከርካሪ አደጋ ሲያጋጥመው በተቻለ መጠን ለተገደው እርዳታ ማድረግ፤
- ⇒ በአደጋ ምክንያት በቦታው የተገኘ ማንኛውንም ንብረት ጥበ ማድረግና ለፖሊስ ማስረከብ፤
- ⇒ ተገደውን ለመርዳት ካልሆነ በስተቀር ወደ አደጋው ቦታ በመቅረብ ወይም በመካከት ማስረጃዎችን ማጥፋት የለበትም፤
- ⇒ ከአደጋው ክስተት ያየውን ወይም የሰማውን መረጃ ለፖሊስ መስጠት ይጠበቅበታል፡፡

ሠ. ምልክትና ማመልከቻዎችን ከመጠበቅ አኳያ ሊወሰዱ የሚገባቸው እርምጃዎች

1. የመንገድ ምልክቶች እንዲጠበቁ ማድረግ፤
2. ምልክቶች ጉዳት ሲደርስባቸው ወይም ሲሰራቁ ከተመለከቱ ወይም ከሰሙ ለፖሊስ ማሳወቅ ይጠበቅባቸዋል፤
3. የምልክቶችን እይታ የሚከልሱ ነገሮችን መትከል ወይም አንዳንድ ማድረግ የለበትም፤



4. በምልክቶች ላይ ማስታወቂያዎችን መሰለፍ ወይም የምልክቶችን አቅጣጫ መቀየር የለበትም፡፡



በአዲስ አበባ መንገድና ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ በትራፊክ ማስጀመሪያ ቀና የቢራ ሂደት በመንገድ ደህንነት ማንዛቤ ትምህርት ኬዝ ቲም የተዘጋጀ



2005

በመንገድ አጠቃቀም ወቅት



በመንገድ ላይ በሚደረግ እንቅስቃሴ እንዲሁም በሚደረግ ከተሽከርካሪ ጋር በረጅም ጊዜ ለሚደረግ ጥያቄ መሰብሰብ ይገባል፡፡ በሀሳብ ተውጦ ወይም በታላቅ ተጓዥነት በተሽከርካሪ መንገድ ውስጥ ገብቶ በመዋገድ ምክንያት ህይወትን የማጣት ወይም እኩል ስርዓት ሊደርስ ስለሚችል ከራስ አልፎ በተሰጠ ላልታሰበ አስቃቂ ጉዳት አሳልፎ መስጠት ስለሚሆን ከዚህ አደጋ ራስን መጠበቅ አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡ በመሆኑም እንደገና መንገድ ላይ ሊገኙ የትን መቼት ምንን ማድረግ እንዳለባቸው ከዚህ በታች ለማየት እንሞክራለን፡፡

ሀ. በመንገድ ላይ መጓዝ የእግረኛ መሄጃ መንገድ ካለ በእግረኛ መንገድ ላይ መጓዝ፡፡

- በእግረኛ መንገድ ሲጓዙ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ አለባቸው፡፡ ምክንያቱም በመንገድ ዳር በሚገኙ ቡቶች፣ የተሽከርካሪ መውጫና መግቢያ በሮች ላይ በድንገት የሚገቡ ወይም የሚጠጡ ተሽከርካሪዎች ሊኖሩ ስለሚችሉ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ አለባቸው፡፡
- የእግረኞች መሄጃ መንገድ ከሌለው ከፊት ለፊት የሚመጣ ተሽከርካሪን ለማየትና ጥንቃቄ ለማድረግ እንዲችሉ የግራ ጠርዝ ይዘው መጓዝ አለባቸው፡፡ ምክንያቱም፡፡
- ከጀርባ የሚመጣውን ተሽከርካሪ ባለማየት እግረኛው ራሱ ለአደጋ መጓዝ ስለሚሆን፤
- ከተሽከርካሪው አቅም በላይ ሆኖ ከጀርባው የተከሰተ አደጋን ለማየትና ጥንቃቄ ለመውሰድ ስለሚያታይ ከአደጋው ለማምለጥ ያልቻለ አካላት በመሆኑና
- ከጎሳ በመለመድ ድምፅ ተደናግጠው የተላላተ እርምጃ በመውሰድ ለአደጋ ሊጋለጡ ስለሚችሉ ነው፡፡

በመንገድ አካፋይ ደሴቶች ላይ መጓዝ አደጋኛ ነው፡፡ የመንገድ አካፋይ ደሴታ ማለት የተሽከርካሪ መንገድን መሀል ለመሀል ለሁለት የሚከፍልና ተሽከርካሪዎች በሁለት አቅጣጫ ሳይጠጋጉ እንዲጓዙላቸው የሚያስችል ነው፡፡ እነዚህም፡፡

- በድንጋይ ኮርድን ተሰርተው አጥር ወይም ዕዕዋት ያለባቸው ሊሆኑ ይችላሉ፡፡
- በመንገድ መሀል ባልተቆረጠ ቀለም የሚሰመሩ አካፋይ መስመሮች ሊሆኑ ይችላሉ፡፡

ለ. መንገድ ማቆረጥ

1. የተሽከርካሪ መንገድ ሲያቆርጡ ማድረግ ያለበዎት ጥንቃቄ
 - መጀመሪያ ፊትን ወደ መንገዱ በማድረግ ከመንገድ ጠርዝ አጠገብ መቆም፡፡ ይህንን ማድረግ የአካባቢውን የትራፊክ እንቅስቃሴ በሚገባ ለማየትና ለመለየት ያስችላል፡፡
 - በማየትና በማድመጥ አካባቢውን ከተቀሩ በጎሳ የተቃረበ ተሽከርካሪ ካለ እስከማያልፍ ድረስ መጠበቅ፤
 - ተሽከርካሪ አስመናፍኑ ካረጋገጡ በኋላ መንገዱን በቀጥታና ባጭር ማቆረጥ፤
 - መንገድ በማቆረጥ ላይ ባሉበት ጊዜም ካላለቡት አቅጣጫ ተሽከርካሪ ሊደርስብኩ ስለሚችል ለሚጋጥጥ ግራና ቀኝ መመልከት፤
 - መንገድ ሲያቆርጡ በጣም በፍጥነት ወይም በዝግታ ሳይሆን ፊጠን ባለ እርምጃ መሆን አለብኩ፡፡
2. የመንገድ መገናኛ መስተላለፍ ወይም ክብ አደባባይ (የትራፊክ ማህፀን ደሴቶች) ውስጥ በመግባት ለማቆረጥ መቀጠር አደጋኛ ስለመሆኑ መገዛብ አስብዎት፡፡

የትራፊክ ማህፀን ደሴቶች ማለት እራትና ከዚያ በላይ የሆኑ መንገዶችን በማገናኘት ትክክለኛ አቅጣጫዎችን ይዘው ወደ ቦታው የሚቀርቡትን ተሽከርካሪዎች በመተባበል በሆነ በተወሰነባቸው ቅደም ተከተል መሰረት ለማስተላለፍ የሚያገለግሉ ሲሆን በተለምዶ እደባባይ ወይም ሀውልቶች በመባል ይጠራሉ፡፡ እነዚህ አደባባይ እግረኞች ጨርሶ እንዲቆሙባቸው የሚከስኩ ናቸው፡፡ ምክንያቱም ወደ እነሱ የሚያመራው እግረኞች የሁሉም መንገዶች አቅጣጫ ስለሚያቆርጥና ከየትኛውም መንገድ ተሽከርካሪ እንደሚመጣበት ስለማይታወቅ እደገንቱ ተረጋግጦ እንዲከሰክል የተደረገ ተግባር ነው፡፡

3. እግረኞች የትራፊክ ማስተላለፍ መብራት በሌለበትና ባለበት ቦታ እንዴት ማቆረጥ እንደሚገባቸው፡፡
 - የትራፊክ መብራት በሌለበት መስተላለፍ መንገድ ሲያቆርጡ
 - በመጀመሪያ ፊትን ወደ መንገድ በማድረግ በመንገድ ጠርዝ ላይ መቆም፤
 - አካባቢን መመልከትና ማደመጥ፤
 - በቅድሚያ ወደ ግራ ቀኝ ወደ ቀኝ ከዚያም ወደ ግራ በመመልከት የተቃረበ ተሽከርካሪ ያለመናፍኑ ካረጋገጠው በቀጥታና በአጭር መንገድ ፊጠን ባለው ማቆረጥ፡፡



- ♦ የትራፊክ መብራት ባለበት መስተላለፍ መንገድ ሲያቆርጡ
 - ለማቆረጥ ባለበት መንገድ ጠርዝ መቆም፤
 - ከፊት ለፊት ያለውን የእግረኛ ምስል ቀይ መብራት በርቶ ከሆነ ለማቆረጥ አይሞክሩ፤
 - የእግረኛ ምስል አረንጓዴ ሲሆን አንዲያቆርጡ የተፈቀደለዎ ስለሆነ ተሽከርካሪዎች መቆማቸውን አረጋግጠው ተጠንቅቀው ያቆርጡ፡፡ እዚህ ላይ ማቆረጥ የተፈቀደለዎ አንድ መንገድ ብቻ ሲሆን ስለሚችል የመንገድ መክፈያ ደሴት ላይ አንድተረብ ይቆሙ፤
 - እግረኛው በሚያቆርጥበት መንገድ በኩል ያሉት ተሽከርካሪዎች የሚቆሙ በሆነም በሌላ አቅጣጫ ካሉ መንገዶች በአንዱ በኩል ያሉት ተሽከርካሪዎች አንዲጎባኝላቸው መብራት ስለሚፈቅድላቸው ምንም እንኳን ምስል አረንጓዴ አቅጣጫ እግረኛው በሚያቆርጥበት መንገድ በኩል የሚጠመቡ ተሽከርካሪዎች ስለሚኖሩ ከማቆረጥ በፊት አካባቢውን በሚገባ መመልከት ያስፈልጋል፡፡
 - የትራፊክ ማስተላለፍ መብራት የእግረኛ ምስል የሌለበት ከሆነ በሚያቆርጡበት አቅጣጫ ተሽከርካሪዎች መብራት ሲያቆማቸው ብቻ ያቆርጡ፡፡

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ

በከረምት ወራት ማድረግ የሚገባችሁ ጥንቃቄዎች

ሀ. ልጆች

ልጆች እንደሚታወቀው በሚቀጥሉት ሃምሌና ሃሳሌ ከፍተኛ ዝናብ፣ ቅዝቃዜ፣ ብርድ፣ ጉም፣ ጭቃ፣ እና ሌሎችም የሚበዙባቸው ወራት ናቸው፡፡

በዚህ ወራት ትምህርት ቤቶች በመደበኛነት ዝግ ሆነው የሚቆዩበቸው ናቸው፡፡



በጥራቴዎ መብቶ ምቹ ርዕዮች መቀመጫ

ልጆች ትምህርት ቤት ሲዘጋ የተለያዩ ተግባራትን በማከናወን እንደምታባልፉ እናምናለን፡፡ ምናልባትም የሚጠናከሪያ ትምህርት በመማር፣ ወለጆችን በምትችሉት እቅም በስራ በማግዘ። ከእያንዳንዳችኋል ጋር የተለያዩ ጨዋታዎችን በመጫወት፣ የተለያዩ መዝናኛ ቦታዎችን በመግባት፣ ቤተሰብ በመጠየቅ፣ ወደሃይማኖት ተቆማት በመሄድ ልታባልፉ ትችላላችሁ፡፡

የመንገድ ትራፊክ አመራር ዋና የሥራ ሂደት

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ

ስለሆነም ከላይ የተጠቀሱትንና ሌሎች ተመሳሳይ በጎ ተግባራትን በምታከናውኑበት ወቅት እራሳችሁን ከመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ እንድትጠብቁ ከወዲሁ ለማስገዛብ እንወዳለን፡፡

ለ ወለጆችና መምህራን

ሀምሳት ልጆቻችሁን እስላሚያውን የቅድመ - ትራፊክ አደጋ የመከላከል ምክርና ትምህርት መስጠትም ይኖርባቸዋል፡፡

ሐ. የአካባቢው ማህበረሰብ

ሀምሳት ለመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ እንዳይባረጉ በመምከርና በማስተማር እስላሚያውን ሁሉ በማድረግ የዜጎችና የመራራ ግዴታችሁን እንድትወጡ እደራ እገለጻለን፡፡

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በከረምት ወቅት የደረሰ የትራፊክ አደጋ



የትራፊክ አደጋን በጋራ እንከላል!!!

የመንገድ ትራፊክ አመራር ዋና የሥራ ሂደት

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ



የመንገድ ትራፊክ አደጋ

እና

በከረምት ወቅት ለደረጉ የግንባታ ጥንቃቄዎች



በመዳኔትን አዲስ አበባ የትራፊክ አደጋን ማቆጣጠር ሪፖርት ማድመጥ የየሰላት ተግባራትን እየሆነ ከመጣ አመታት ተቆጥረዋል፡፡

የከተማዋ ጎዳናዎች መላያ እየሆነ ያለው የትራፊክ አደጋ የራሱ የሆነ የተለያዩ ምክንያቶች መገኘቱ በኖረውም በዋነኛነት ግን በጉዳዩ ላይ በቂ እና ሰፊ ትኩረት ያላመከበት ትግር እንደሆነ ይሰተቀላል፡፡

ይህም ሲባል አሽከርካሪ ስለሚያስከረከረው ተሽከርካሪ ተከትከዋል እቅም ጠንቅቆ አለመረዳት፣ ስለሚያስከረከርበት መንገድ እና አካባቢዎ ሁኔታ ጠንቅቆ አለመወቅ፣ የአየር ንብረትና የአየር ፀባይ ሁኔታን አለመረዳት፣ ስለሚጓዙበት መንገድ የፍጥነት ልኬት አለመወቅ እንዲሁም ለግረጃች በሰመንገድ አጠቃቀም ያላቸው ግንዛቤ እና መሆን ለችግሩ ከፍተኛ አስተዋፅኦ እንዳላቸው ጥናቶች ያመለክታሉ፡፡

ስለሆነም የትራፊክ አደጋን ለመቀነስ በሁሉም የመንገድ ተጠቃሚዎች ላይ ግንዛቤ የመፍጠር ተግባር ለገን የምትወጡ ሳይሆን ሁላችንም የበኩላችንን ድርሻ በእቅዎችን ከዛሬ ጀምሮ የምንወጣበት ተግባር ነው፡፡

የመንገድ ትራፊክ አመራር ዋና የሥራ ሂደት

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ

ይህንንም ግዝቢ የመፍጠር ሃላፊነት ለመንግስት አካል ብቻ የሚተው ሳይሆን መንግስታዊ ያልሆኑ አካላትም መለትም የእስክርካሪና የተሽከርካሪ ማህበራት፣ የግዳ ድርጅቶችና ተቆማት፣ የትምህርትና የሳማት፣ ተቆማት፣ ወላጆችና ሌሎችም የሚመለከታቸው አካላት ትኩረት በጥተውናተቀናጅተው ግዝቢ የሚከፈልበት ስራ በሱ የከተማዋ መንገዶች የሞት ሳይሆን የህይወት ተስፋዎች ይሆናሉ።

የትግሩን አሰባስቦ ለማለባት ያህል በ2004 ዓ.ም የተመዘገው የትራፊክ አደጋ ከዚህ በታች ቀርቧል።

በመሆኑም የከረምት ወቅት በራሱ ለትራፊክ አደጋ መስከት የሚያበረከተው አስተዋፅኦ ከፍተኛ ስለሆነ ምንም ዓይነት አደጋ

የአደጋ ዓይነት	ብዛት
የሰው ሞት	369
የአካል ጉዳት	2,010
የጥብረት ውድመት	9,150
ጠቅላላ ድምር	11,529

አንዳይከስት

- አንዳይከስት **እሽከርካሪ ከሆኑ፡-**
- አደጋን ተከላከሎ ማሽከርከር፤
- በአግረኛ ተጓዦች ላይ ውሃ አለመርጨት፤
- በጠባብ መንገድ ላይ ተሽከርካሪ አለማቆም፤
- በተሽከርካሪ ላይ የሚጫነውን ጭነት በሚገባ ማሰር ወይም ማልበስ፤
- ዕድታን የሚከላከሉ መጋረጃዎች ወይም ተላጣፊ ላስቲኮችን ያለሀጋዊ ፈቃድ አለመለጠፍ፤
- ያለማገገጫፊያ ምልክት የተባለሽ ተሽከርካሪን በመንገድ ላይ አለማቆም፤
- በጉም ወቅት የሃሳርፍ መብራትን መጠቀም፤
- አጭርና ረጅም የፊት መብራት መስራቱን እና አለመስራቱን ማረጋገጥ፤

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ



- የጉም ማቆላጫ ወይም ማስወገጃ የአላከትረክ ወይም የጥፋት መሳሪያዎች መስራትና አለመስራታቸውን ማረጋገጥና መጠቀም ካልሆነም ብኝን በሌለው ጉዳህ ጨርቅ በመጠቀም መጥረግ፤
- ጥርሱ ያልተበላና መሬት መቆንጠጥ የሚችል ጎሳ መጠጠምና መጠቀም እንዲሁም የፍሬን ሽራ ልባቢ መጠቀም፤
- በዝናብ ምክንያት በመንገድ ላይ ውሃ የቆጠሩ ጉድጓዶች ሊኖሩ ስለሚችሉ አሰራሪዎችን ቅድመ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ ተብሎ ነው፤
- ሌሎች የትራፊክ ፍላጎትን የሚያስናክሩ ድርጊቶችን አለመፈጸም፤
- የዝናብ መጥረጊያና የውሃ መርጫው በአግባቡ መስራቱን ማረጋገጥ፤
- በስነ ምግባር አራሳን ማጥፋት በየዕለቱ በማሳደግ ማሽከርከር፤
- ምንጊዜም ለህሊና እና ለህግ ተገዢ መሆን፤
- እሽከርካሪነት ትልቅ ሙያ መሆኑን ማመን፤
አግረኛ ከሆኑ፡-
- በጥንጥላ ወይም በዝናብ ኮፍያ ተከልለው መንገድ እያቋረጡ፤
- መንገድ በሚሸፍኑበት ወቅት ተሽከርካሪዎች መሉ በመሉ መቆማቸውን ማረጋገጥ፤

በአ/አ/መ/ ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ

- በዝናብ ወቅት የተሽከርካሪ መንሸራተት ሊያጋጥም ስለሚችል ጊዜ በጥተው ማስተዋል፤
- ጥንጥላ ሲጠቀሙ ዕድታዎን እንዳይጋርድብዎና የተሽከርካሪን እንቅስቃሴ ከማየት እንዳይቃወሙ ጥንቃቄ ማድረግ፤
- የአግረኛመንገድ ውሃ ሲቆጥር መንገድ ለመምረጥ ብለው ወደ መኪና መንገድ ከመግባት ይቆጠቡ፤
- እራሳዎን ከዝናብ ለመከላከል በሚያደርጉት ሩጫ ምክንያት ለትራፊክ አደጋ እንዳይጋለጡ መንገዱን በጥንቃቄ በማየት መጓዝ፤
- በዝናብ ወቅት የተሽከርካሪ መንሸራተት ሊያጋጥም ስለሚችል በሚሰሩበትና በሚወርዱበት ወቅት ተሽከርካሪ መቆሙን በደንብ ማረጋገጥ፤
- ሌሎች ባለድርሻ አካላት፡-
- የትራፊክ ምልክቶችን፣ የመንገድ ላይ መብራቶችን፣ የአግረኛ መሪያዎችን ማስተካከል፤
- አፈር፣አሸግ ድንጋይና የመሳሰሉትን ነገሮች በልተፈቀደ ቦታ ላይ አለማራገፍ ወይም እንዲራገፍ አለማድረግ፤
- የተቆፈሩ ጉድጓዶችን መሙላት፤
- ውሃ የሚተኛባቸውንና የራራራሉ መንገዶችን መጠገን፤



ሁሉም የአገረኛ ግድረጫ (ዜብራ) እንጠቀም!!!

በአዲስ አበባ መንገድና ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ



የአዲስ አበባ መንገድና ትራንስፖርት ቢሮ
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት

ከረምት

ለአሽከርካሪዎች አስቸጋሪው ወቅት!



የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት

የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት

የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት

የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት
የጥራት ማረጋገጫ ስርዓት


7. የአልኮል መጠጦችን እና እድገትን ወይም መድኃኒቶችን አሳይተዎት

የመጠጥን እና የእድገት ስርዓት
የመጠጥን እና የእድገት ስርዓት
የመጠጥን እና የእድገት ስርዓት




Print by Bemimet P.P. PLC 0118-961877/ 0911-672655

ለሚኒስቴር ጥያቄ ወይም አስተያየት 0113713965



6. በመሳተፍት ላይ የሰን ገም መስወገድ

የገም መስወገድ ወይም መስወገድ
የገም መስወገድ ወይም መስወገድ
የገም መስወገድ ወይም መስወገድ



የሰን ገም መስወገድ ወይም መስወገድ

የክረምት ወቅት ሊያገኙ የሚሆነው ለምሳሌ፡ ነው?




ከዚህ ውጭ፡ የሚከሰቱት ወይም የሚከሰቱት ለእንዲሁው የደረሰው፡ በዚህም ምክንያት አስከርካሪዎች ትክክለኛውን የመንገድ ረድዳ መቀየሩ እንዳያስከረክሩ፡ በእውነት እንዳይቆሙ፡ እና በክፍብ አፍቶ ካሉ ተሽከርካሪ ጋር ለመጋጨት የሚያደርጉትን ጥረት ይከታተላሉ፡፡

ከዚህ የላይታችንን እድሜን ያሳያል፡፡የተለይም ጭንቃማና ዘይቤን ከዚህ በፊት አስከርካሪዎች እርስ በእርስ ለመተባበር ካሉት ይሆንባቸዋል፡፡ ጭንቃማ መንገድ ከሆነም የቅት መሳሪያዎችን በማቆየት እድታን ይከሰታል፡፡

በክረምት ወራት አስከርካሪዎች ሊከተሉቸው የሚገባ መላዎች


በክረምት አስከርካሪዎች የተለያዩ የማስከርካሪ ብልሃትን መጠቀም ይኖርባቸዋል፡፡ ቀጥሎ የተከረከሩትን ጥቂት መላዎች እነሱ እንመልከት፡፡




1. በመካከለኛ ፍጥነት ማስከርካሪ

የክፍብ ውሃ በእስፋልት ላይ የጥራ እና የተለያዩ ቅጣቶችን ወይም ዘይትን ማጥፋፈፍና የማቆየት ባህሪ ስለሚኖረው ተረጋግቶ ተረጋግቶ በመካከለኛ ፍጥነት ማስከርካሪ የመከናወን ሕጻናት መሬትን የመቆጣጠር ለቀማሽውን የተሻለ እንዲሆን ከማድረግ በፊት ፍረገም ለመያዝ በቂ ጊዜ እንዲኖረን ያደርጋል፡፡

2. ከፈትሰፊታችን ያለውን ተሽከርካሪ ሁኔታ በማጠና ማስከርካሪ



በክፍብ ወቅት እርቀት ማየት አዳጋች ስለሚሆን ከፈትሰፊታችን ያለውን ተሽከርካሪ ሁኔታ በማጠና ማስከርካሪ ይመረጣል፡፡ ምክንያቱም ከፈት ያለውን ሁኔታ ከሊኖ ይልቅ ሕረት ስለሚመስሉት ነው፡፡ ስለዚህ ከፈትሰፊታችን ያለውን ተሽከርካሪ ሁኔታ በማጠና እንከቃኑ መካተል አስፈላጊ ነው፡፡ ይህም ማለት ፍረን ሊቀጥል ሊኖም መያዝ፣ የመብራት ምልክቶች ሲሰጡም መከታተል፡፡ ታዲያ ይህንን ስድረግ በበቂ እርቀት በመከታተል መሆኑን መከንታት ይከብራል፡፡



ከፈት ሰፊታችን እስከፊት ሁኔታዎቻችን ስንደ ከጎላችን ለሚከተለን አስከርካሪ የመብራት ምልክቶች በመከተል እንዲጠነቀቁ ማድረግ እድገን ይከሰታል፡፡

3. በቅፅበት ፍረንን አለመያዝ



በድንገት ፍረን መያዝ ለመሸራተት የማይረገን እድል ሠጪ ይደርገዋል፡፡ ተሽከርካሪውም ከቀጥራችን ውጪ ሊሆን ስለሚችል ያልተጠበቀ እድጋ ልዩነት አግኝተዋል፡፡ ስለዚህ እንደዚህ አይነት ሊያገመን መረጋጋትና መውሰድ ያለብንን እርምጃ በስኮ መገደብ ማከናወን ይጠበቅባል፡፡

4. ውሃ የቆጠሩ መንገዶች እና ጉድጓድ ላይ አለማስከርካሪ

-በተቆጠረ ውሃ ውስጥ ስለታመነ ነገሮች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ፡፡ በመሆኑም ሕጻን ሊያተኩሩ እና እድጋ ሊያስከትሩ ይችላል፡፡ ጎጂነቱም ልሙጥ ከሆነ መሸራተት ይመጣል፡፡ በአግረኞችም ላይ ውሃ እና ጭቃ ልንደግ እንችላለን፡፡



ስለዚህ



ጥርስ ያልተሰለፈ መሬት መቆጣጠር የሚችል ሕጻን መጠቀምና መጠቀም እንዲሁም የፍረን ሽራ ልቦስ መጠቀም፡፡

አስከርካሪዎች ትልቅ መውያ መሆኑን ማመንገጥ

ከዚህ መሰረት የመንገድ ተራፊክ ስደጋ ስራቶችንና ወገኖቻችንን ስመታደግ የሚከተሉትን ጥንቃቄዎችን በየዕለቱ ማስተዋወቅ ይገባል፡

ሠ/ሰሽከርካሪዎች፡

1/ ስደጋን ተከባ ከሱ ማሽከርከር ማሰብ የሚያስከፍረውን ተሽከርካሪ መሰራተኛ በሙሉ መቆጣጠር፣ የሌሎች ተሽከርካሪዎችን ስንቅስቃሴ ና ፍላጎት መረዳት፣ ከሁሉም በላይ የሽግግሮችን ስንቅስቃሴና ስነሰብና በፍጥነት በመረዳት የተራፊክ መጨናነቅ ና ስደጋ ሳይደርስ ጉዞን ማሳሰጥ ማሰብ ነው፡፡


2/ የማሽከርከር ስራ ፍጹም ተዕግስቶ የሚጠይቅ መሆኑን በመረዳት ስደጋን ተከባክሎ ማሽከርከር ይገባል፡፡

3/ የመንገድ ተራፊክ ደንቦችና ምሳክቶችን በማስተዋወቅ መቃኘትና ማክበር ስደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ ከሚደረሰው ፀፀት ያድኛል፡፡

ሰሽግሮች ተጓጉሞች ፡

1/ የመንገዱን ግራጦሲመር ደዞ በሽግግሩ መንገድ ሳይ መጓዝን ባህል ማድረግ

2/ ሰመንገድ ማቆራረጫነት በተዘጋጀው ዜብራ ሳይ ተሽከርካሪዎች መቆማቸውን በመረጋገጥ በጥንቃቄ መሻገር



3/ የተራፊክ መብራት በሰራተኛ ሰዎች ሰማቋረጥ ሲፈሰጉ በቅድሚያ ወደ ግራ ቀጥሎ ወደ ቀኝ በመመዘከት የተቃረበ ተሽከርካሪ ስለመኖሩን ስረጋገጠው ማቆረጥ ይቻላል፡፡

4/ የተራፊክ መብራት ባለበት ሰዎች መስቀሰኛ መንገድ ሰማቋረጥ ሲፈሰጉ በሰረገንዳ መብራት ውስጥ የሽግግሩ ምስል ሲታይ መቆረጥ ይቻላል፡፡

5/ ሰማቋረጥ የሚፈሰጉትን መንገድ ውስጥ በማየት የሚገኙ ተሽከርካሪን ተከሰሎ ሰማቋረጥ መሞከር ፍጹም ስደገኛ ስለሆነ ስንዳደራደሩት ስናስጠነቅቅዎታለን፡፡


6/ ሰማቋረጥ ከህጻናት ጋር በሚጓዙበት ወቅት ህጻናቱ ባስቀደሙ ግራ ስድ በሱህ የመንገዱን ግራ መስመር ይዞ መሄድ ይገባል፡፡

7/ ሁሉም የከተማ ነዋሪ በመኖሪያ ቤት፣ በስራ ቦታ፣ በትምህርት ቤት፣ በመዝናኛ ስፍራዎች፣ በጉዞ ወቅት በተራንስፖርት ሳይ የመንገድ ተራፊክ ስደጋን መቀነስ ብሎም ማከሰም ስለሚችልበት ሁኔታ በተሰደሙ ደግሞ ስለ ሽግግሮች የመንገድ ስጠቀም ባህል ሰው ጉዳዩ መረጋገጥ ስድንዳ ሳይደርግ ይገባል፡፡

8/ ወሳኝ ጾታ በተሰደ የመንገድ ስጠቀሚዎች ካለበት ሰዎች ስሁን ያሰው የሰደጋ መጠን ስንዳደራደሩ ያሳጋል፡፡



በሰደጋ ስበባ ከተማ ስለተደረገ የባህ ክ/ከተማ ትራንስፖርት ጽ/ቤት የመንገድ ተራፊክ ደህንነት ግንዛቤ ማስጨበጫ ኬዛ ተም



ከዚህ መሰል የመንገድ ተራፊክ ስጋ
ስራሳችንና ወገኖቻችንን ስመታደግ
የሚከተሉትን ጥንቃቄዎችን በየዕኩቱ
ማከተዋል ይገባናል

ሀ/ስሽከርካሪዎች፦

1/ ስደጋን ተከሳ ክቡ ማሸከርከር ማለት የሚያሸከርከሩትን ተሸከርካሪ ሙሴ በሙሴ መቆጣጠር ፣ የሴሎች ተሸከርካሪዎችን ስንቅስቃሴና ፍሳሳት መረዳት ፣ ከሁሉም በላይ የስጋረኞችን ስንቅስቃሴና ስነሰብኖ በፍጥነት በመረዳት የተራፊክ መጨናነቅ ና ስደጋ ሳይደረስ ጉዞን ማሳብጥማለት ነው።

2/ የማሸከርከር ስራ ፍጹም ትዕግኩትን የሚጠይቅ መሆኑን በመረዳት ስደጋን ተከሳክሎ ማሸከርከር ይገባል።

3/ የመንገድ ተራፊክ ደንቦችና ምዕክሶችን በማስተዋል መቃኘትና ማክበር ስደጋ ከደረሰ በኋላ ከሚደረሰ ፀፀት ያድናል ።

ለ/ስጋረኛ ተጓዦች ፦

1/ የመንገድን ግራመሴመር ደዞ በስጋረኛ መንገድ ሳይ መጓዣን ባህል ማድረግ

2/ ስመንገድ ማቋረጫነት በተዘጋጀው ዜብራ ሳይ ተሸከርካሪዎች መቆማቸውን በመረጋገጥ በጥንቃቄ መሻግጥ



3/ የተራፊክ መብራት በሲቢት ስፍራ መንገድ ስማቋረጥ ሲፈልጉ በቅድሚያ ወደ ግራ ቀጥሎ ወደ ቀኝ በመመለስ የተቃረበ ተሸከርካሪ ስለመኖሩን ስረጋገጠው ማቋረጥ ይቻላል።

4/ የተራፊክ መብራት ባለበት ስፍራ መስቀልኛ መንገድ ስማቋረጥ ሲፈልጉ በስረጋንዲ መብራት ውስጥ የስጋረኛ ምክል ሲታዩ መቋረጥ ይቻላል።

5/ ስማቋረጥ የሚፈልጉትን መንገድ ሙሴ በማየት የሚጋይድ ተሸከርካሪን ተከሰሎ ስማቋረጥ መሞከር ፍጹም ስደገኛ ስለሆነ ስንዳደሞክሩት ስናስጠነቅቅዎታለን።

6/ ስዋቂዎች ከህጻናት ጋር በሚጓዙበት ወቅት ህጻናቱ ባስዋቁዎች ግራ ስድ በሱስ የመንገዱን ግራ መስመር ደዞ መሄድ ይገባል።

7/ ሁሉም የከተማ ነዋሪ በመኖሪያ ቤት፣ በስራ ቦታ፣ በትምህርት ቤት፣ በመዝናኛ ስፍራዎች፣ በጉዞ ወቅት በተራንስፖርት ሳይ የመንገድ ተራፊክ ስደጋን መቀነስ ብሎም ማክሰም ስለሚቻልበት ሁኔታ በተሰደም ደግሞ ስለ ስጋረኞች የመንገድ ስጠቃቅም ባህል ሰው ጉዳዩ መነጋገሪያ ስድንዳ ዕናዳሮን ይገባል።

8/ ወጣቶች በተሰደ የመንገድ ስጠቃቅማችን ካልተሰጠ ስሁን ያለው የሰደጋ መጠን ስንዳደጫምሮ ያሳጋል።