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INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES (IPSS)

**INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SOUTH WESTERN
ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF ALLE AND KONSO**

BY
BANTAYEHU DEMISSEW ENEYEW

JUNE, 2016

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to those both Alle and Konso individuals who were victims of the inter-ethnic conflict. Particularly, for those Alle and Konso ethnic group members who lost their life and were imprisoned in connection to the 2011 and 2014 violent conflicts.

Finally, this work is dedicated to those Konso individuals who were killed on 12th March 2016 (during the researcher's field work) by the Regional security forces because of their quest for Konso Zone administration status. Thus, I want to express my deepest condolences to victims' families.

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NB: The author is exclusively responsible for all faults that reader may find out in this thesis.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
ASW	Amaro Special Woreda
BSW	Burji Special Woreda
CNs	Council of Nationalities
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
DFID	Department for International Development
DSW	Dirashe Special Woreda
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HOA	Horn of Africa
KSW	Konso Special Woreda
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPZ	Segen Area Peoples’ Zone
SCA	Strategic Conflict Analysis
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
SWs	Special Woredas’
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
WOGAGODA	Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, and Dawro

Glossary of Terms

<i>Afan Xonso</i>	The language of Xonsita (Konso)
<i>Alle</i>	An ethnic group residing in South Western Ethiopia
<i>Apa Timpa</i>	Holder of the sacred drum in both Alle and Konso
<i>Ataa</i>	Customary inter-clan/ethnic conflict resolution mechanism in Konso and Alle ethnic groups
<i>Awraja</i>	Administrative province/district made up of Woredas'
<i>Chaqa/Warshe</i>	A local beer used in Alle and Konso ethnic groups
<i>Derg</i>	The Military Council ruled over Ethiopia from 1974-1991
<i>Hella</i>	The warrior group of Konso
<i>Kebele</i>	The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia
<i>Kilil</i>	A Regional government in the post 1991 Ethiopia
<i>Konso (Xonsita)</i>	An ethnic group residing in South Western Ethiopia
<i>Moora</i>	Customary inter-personal conflict resolution mechanism in Alle and Konso ethnic groups
<i>Pago Alle</i>	The language of Alle ethnic group
<i>Segen</i>	A river name that intersects the territories of SAPZ
<i>Specail Woreda (Leyu Woreda)</i>	Administrative unit equivalent to Zonal administration
<i>Teklay Gizat</i>	Province during the feudal era
<i>Timpa</i>	Drum in Afan Xonso and Pago Alle languages
<i>Woreda</i>	An administrative unit below Zone and Special Woreda
<i>Zone</i>	Highest level of local government

Abstract

The theme of this study focuses on the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso of SNNPRS, South Western Ethiopia. The Alle and Konso ethnic groups have a long history of close relationships. The post 1991 Alle-Konso ethnic relation is either peaceful or conflictual. Their peaceful relation is manifested through their economic interdependence as well as shared socio-cultural practices. Since 1991, there were frequent inter-ethnic conflict between the two ethnic groups. The central objective of this research was to investigate the causes, actors, dynamics and impacts of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. The study was undertaken to investigate the nature of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic relations after the restructuring of the country along ethnic lines (since 1991) with special emphasis to the post-2010 inter-ethnic conflicts. Methodologically, the researcher employed qualitative research approach with exploratory research design. The researcher highly relied on primary sources of data; however secondary sources of data were also used. The tools used to collect data were in-depth interview, telephone interview, FGD and document analysis. Purposive sampling, a type of non-probability sampling was also used to select the participants for in-depth and telephone interview as well as FGD. The analysis of qualitative data was made using Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA) model.

As per the finding of this study, the pre 2010 Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict was mainly caused by the quest of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance. However, their post-2010 conflict is caused by multiplicity of factors: economic, political, security and socio-cultural and psychological factors. The actors involved in the conflict were internal and external actors. Moreover, the study revealed the impacts of the conflict as; economic, social and political. To manage the conflict and build peace in the study area formal and customary mechanisms of conflict management and peace building were undertaken. However, the attempts failed to address the root causes of the conflict and build lasting peace. Thus, as the finding of this study indicated, in the study area there are still minor inter-personal conflicts that can escalate in to inter-ethnic conflict. Based on the analysis of context, causes, actors and dynamics of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict two major scenarios are drawn: Best-Case and Worst-Case Scenarios. The major conclusion drawn is that politicization of ethnicity and/ ethnic mobilization take its lion share for continued and unresolved inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. Finally, the thesis suggested recommendations to address the conflict and build lasting peace in the study area.

Key Words: Ethnicity, ethnic-group, politicization of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, Alle, and Konso

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

Conflict is a disagreement or confrontation between two or more parties (groups) aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends (Miller, 2005). Similarly, Wolf (2006) explained conflict as a situation in which two or more actors pursue incompatible goals, where by one of the actors' experience damage, and the other actor causes this damage intentionally, or ignores it. Ethnic conflict is one particular type of such conflict that the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions (Wolf, 2006; Cordell & Wolff, 2011). In ethnic conflict whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its discontent in ethnic terms (Nguyen, 2010).

Ethnic conflict is now a pervasive and salient dimension of political and social conflict in several countries of the world. As cited in Jinadu (2007:8), Wimmer (2004) has observed, "Over the past decades, ethno-nationalist conflict has become the dominant form of mass political violence. The overwhelming majority of civil wars in the post-Cold War era were fought in the name of ethno-national autonomy or independence." Since the end of Cold War, the number of ethnic conflicts continued to increase. It is true that, in Africa, since the mid-1960s there have been prolonged and protracted ethnic-related violent political conflicts (*Ibid*). Similarly, Bujera (2002) stated since the end of Cold War the majority of conflicts in Africa are internal conflicts; in other words, conflicts between groups. Furthermore, as cited in Bujera (2002), the UN General Secretary Report on Africa (1999) stated the multi-ethnic character and politicization of ethnicity in Africa as a cause to conflict. Ethiopia is not far from this reality.

Ethiopia is one of the polities located in the Horn of Africa with remarkable ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. There are more than 80 ethnic groups (nation, nationalities and people) in the country (Habtamu, 2013). The Italian anthropologist Conti Rossini, expressed the country as 'a museum of peoples' because of its multi-ethnic nature (Levine, 1974). Since 1991, Ethiopia has gone further than any other country in using ethnicity as the central organizing principle of a federal structure of government (Bitwoded, 2014). As a result, political representation is organized based on ethnic grounds and ethnic groups are encouraged to claim "ethnic rights" (International

Crisis Group (ICG), 2009). Moreover, ethnicity becomes the primary means of mobilization and in turn leads to ethnic conflicts and violence.

Since 1991 (the installation of ethnic based federalism), there have been a number of latent and manifest ethnic conflicts widespread throughout the country. Even though accurate statistics are hard to come, various researches and reports witness the ethnic conflicts that have claimed the lives of many people and accounted the destruction of public or private properties as well (Sisay, 2007). Among the researched and documented ethnic conflicts few of them are Afar-Karrayu Oromo (Asnake, 2011); Borana-Garri (Tigist, 2014); Konso-Dirashe (Asnake et. al., 2013) & Yidenekachew (2011); Anywaa-Nuer (Daniel, 2009); Zeise-Dirashe (Tizazu, 2007); Amhara-Afar (Kebede, 2009); Dassenech-Nyangatom (Teshome, 2009); Amhara-Gumuz (Girma, 2014); and WoGaGoDa conflict (Data, 2006). Moreover, because of its multi-ethnic nature and less accommodation of ethnic diversity with other factors most of the ethnic conflicts are located in the South Western parts of Ethiopia, which encompasses the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) (Tefera, 2015). Segen Area People's Zone (SAPZ) is one of such conflict prone areas of the region with frequent inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. Alle-Konso conflict is one of the frequent inter-ethnic conflicts of SAPZ, which lasted for the past twenty years.

Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate the causes, actors, dynamics and impacts of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

In the post-colonial period, Africa is mired with intra and inter-state conflicts (Asnake, 2013). Horn of Africa (HOA) is one such part of the continent, which is highly susceptible to conflicts. It is the most conflict-prone area known in African politics of being an unstable, hostile and poor place due to protracted conflicts, wars and colorizations (Muhabie, 2015; Dagne, ND).

The Horn has endured many inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts. The conflicts and/wars that have occurred in the HOA since 1960s have largely been internal and been described in terms of ethnic conflicts (Dagne, ND). Indeed, the Horn experienced a number of internal armed conflicts, ethno-linguistic conflicts and religious radicalism (Muhabie, 2015). Ethiopia is not free from such ethnic conflicts. There is, rather a consensus among scholars that the inter-group conflict in

Ethiopia, particularly in recent times, is on the increase (Asnake, 2013). The reconstitution of the country into an ethnic federalism poses sets of opportunities and challenges. On one hand, it led to the recognition of the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups in the country. On the other hand, it appears to have transformed and even generated localized ethnic conflicts (Abbink 2006; Asnake, 2013).

Although the creation of ethnic federalism is an attempt to address the persistent ethnic questions in Ethiopia, many ethnic conflicts have been broken out since 1991. The ethnic conflicts are still critical challenges particularly in multi-ethnic regions of Ethiopia. As Esman (2004) and Tang (2015) argued, ethnic pluralism (ethnic diversity) is a prerequisite for the outbreak of inter-ethnic conflicts, but not an adequate condition. They argued that for inter-ethnic conflict to happen two or more ethnic groups must reside or contact in the same political, social and economic environment. Moreover, different scholars of peace and conflict study agree that it is likely for conflicts to occur in diversified community where many ethnic groups, languages, cultures and religions existed like SNNPRS (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2014). The SNNPRS is a multi-ethnic region having more than 56 ethnic groups (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2009). The region is prone to frequent intra-region ethnic conflicts compared to other regions of Ethiopia, which are [relatively] homogenous in their ethnic composition.

SAPZ is the second most multi-ethnic Zone/area of SNNPRS next to South Omo and witnessed frequent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts (Frew, 2012; Misganaw, 2014; Tefera, 2015). It is one of the 14 Zonal administrations of the region, which composed of five Woredas' (Alle, Konso, Dirashe, Burji and Amaro) and eight major ethnic groups called Alle, Konso, Burji, Kore, D'irashe, Mossiye, Mashole and Kusume. It was established in 2011 by blending four Special Woredas (Konso, Dirashe, Amaro & Burji) and the newly established Alle Woreda. One of the major reason for its establishment was to resolve inter and intra-ethnic conflicts of the area. As Misganaw (2014) stated the nature of ethnic conflicts in the area was "all against all." The intra and inter-ethnic conflicts of the area include Alle-Konso, Konso-Dirashe, Guji-Burji, Alle-Dirashe, Konso-Borana, Kore-Burji, Amaro-Dirashe and intra-ethnic conflicts with in Dirashe. However, the establishment of SAPZ does not resolve the ethnic conflicts of the area at the grass root level, but decreases the frequency to some extent.

Before the establishment of Alle Woreda as well as SAPZ, the major cause of Alle-Konso and Alle-Dirashe inter-ethnic conflicts were due to the quest of Alle common ethnic identity and autonomy/self-governance. Because of such inter-ethnic conflict, the Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance was officially recognized in 2010 four months before the establishment of SAPZ. However, as multiple sources of data collected by the researcher confirmed, after the establishment of Alle Woreda as well as SAPZ the conflict between Alle and Konso ethnic groups still not addressed at the grass root level.

In the study area, different authors/researchers have done different researches. However, the researches done said little or no reference to Alle and Konso inter-ethnic conflict. They are only Temesgen (2010) and Yacob (2010) who have done their Master's thesis on the quest of Alle ethnic identity and autonomy. However, their research work only focused on the issue of Alle ethnic minority quest for ethnic identity and self-administration with very little emphasis to identify the causes, actors, dynamics and impacts of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Moreover, their theses were conducted before the establishment of Alle woreda as well as SAPZ. In other words, they did not show the nature of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict after the establishment of Alle Woreda as well as SAPZ. Other Master's theses done include: Dirashe-Konso inter- ethnic relation, conflict management and transformation by Asnake, et.al. (2013), Yidenekachew (2011) and Tizazau (2007). In addition, the research has done on empowering indigenous system in local self-governance among the Dirasha by Frew (2012); the practice of self-government in SAPZ by Misganaw (2014) and the accommodation of ethnic diversity in ethnic groups of Dirashe and other ethnic groups of SAPZ by Tefera (2015). Moreover, many of these research works viewed the inter-ethnic conflicts of the study area as they are mainly caused by competition over scarce resources.

Moreover, as far as the researcher is concerned, no research work has done on Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict particularly after the establishment of Alle Woreda and SAPZ. The causes, actors, dynamics and impacts of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is little addressed or unexplained by the researches done on the study area. Therefore, this research intends to contribute in filling the existing knowledge gap on the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict with special emphasis to the post Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance recognition and establishment of SAPZ.

1.3. Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following key questions:

1. What are the underlying causes of Alle and Konso inter-ethnic conflict?
2. Who are the key actors of the inter-ethnic conflict?
3. What are the changing circumstances of the inter-ethnic conflict?
4. How does the conflict impact the study area?

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1.4.1. General objective

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the causes, actors and dynamics of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are to:

1. Identify the major causes of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict
2. Examine the actors of the conflict
3. Discuss the dynamics of the conflict
4. Assess the impact of the conflict on the study area

1.5. Significance of the Study

The following are the major significance of the research findings:

- It narrows knowledge gap on Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict
- It offers an insight for local government conflict management and resolution practitioners on the practice of managing inter-ethnic conflicts.
- It alleviates gaps of literature sources seen in the study area and serve as a reference to the works of government officials, policy makers, practitioners and scholars/researchers.
- Finally, it benefits other interested peace and conflict researchers as a springboard for further research on the issue.

1.6. Scope / Delimitation of the Study

Geographically, this study is delimited to Alle and Konso Woredas of SAPZ, SNNPRS. Thematically, it is concerned with the investigation of the context, causes, actors, dynamics and impacts of the conflict between Alle and Konso ethnic groups.

1.7.Limitation/Challenges of the Study

During data collection, it was not an easy task for the researcher to get adequate and accurate data from research participants. The adequacy and accuracy of data challenged by fear and suspicion of research participants because of the insecurity situation of the area. For example, because of fear and suspicion, one Konso key informant in Turo Kebele suspended the interview after ten minutes of discussion. Ethnic affiliation and loyalty to one's ethnic group had also its own impact in generating some sort of bias. Thus, the researcher rejected some amount of data after triangulation made through interview and FGD.

Moreover, few government officials of Alle, Konso and SAPZ were not voluntary to provide conflict situation reports. Another great challenge during data collection was from the SNNPRS government officials and security forces deployed in the study area. They forcefully took the researcher's interview notebook, data collection instrument guides and identification card. However, the researcher negotiated with the regional government officials and security forces as the study was undertaken only for academic research purpose. As a result, on the next day they brought back all the materials they took. After all, because of the insecurity situation and challenges faced during the fieldwork the researcher forced to use telephone interview as an instrument for data collection. As a result, telephone interviews conducted had their own limitations compared to face-to-face interviews.

However, with the help of field and/telephone assistants and colleagues of the study area the researcher tried to cope up with all the challenges aforementioned above.

1.8. Operational Definitions of Terms

- ❖ **Ethnic Conflict:** It is a conflict between two or more ethnic groups which is caused by different factors, but the conflict is defined in ethnic terms (Cordell & Wolf, 2011).
- ❖ **Ethnic Group:** a group of people with shared common culture, customs, language and ancestry, which identified itself and identified by others as an ethnic group (Barth, 1998).
- ❖ **Ethnic Identity:** It is an attribute of an ethnic group by which one ethnic group distinguished itself from the others (Taras & Ganguly, 2010).
- ❖ **Ethnicity:** It is a state being a member of an ethnic group (Kellas, 1998).
- ❖ **Local Government:** An administrative unit at the Zone, Woreda and Kebele levels.

1.9. Organization of the Thesis

This study is organized in to six chapters. Accordingly, the first chapter deals with background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives, basic research questions, significance, scope, limitations of the study, operational definitions of terms and organization of the thesis. The second chapter covers conceptual and theoretical framework of ethnic conflict and review of related literature. The third chapter discusses about the methodology of the research, which include design of the research, sources and instruments of data gathering, sampling techniques and size, selection of field assistants, fieldwork experience, methods and procedures of data analysis, reliability and validity and ethical considerations. The fourth chapter explores the demographic, socio-economic, cultural and political description of the study area i.e. SNNPRS, SAPZ, Alle and Konso woredas'. The fifth chapter deals with data analysis and presentation based on the research questions and objectives of the study. Finally, the sixth chapter presents major summaries, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

Chapter Two

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework and Review of Related Literature

2.1. Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

2.1.1. Concepts and Definitions of Conflict, Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity, Ethnic Group and Ethnic Conflict

2.1.1.1. The Concept of Conflict

The term “conflict” is as old as humankind that has been in existence in all spheres of human life. It is a feature of all human societies, and potentially an aspect of all social relationships (Avruch, 1998). Its root word is derived from the Latin term “confligere”, meaning to “strike together.” Lexically, the Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971), define conflict as strike, clash, fight, struggle, contention, confrontation, strife or incompatibility.

Conflict is a fluid and infinitely elastic concept and has become an issue over which scholars find themselves in sharp disagreement. There is no single agreed definition of conflict because of the multi-disciplinary nature of conflict research (Soremekuan et al., 2013). However, conflict can be defined as an opposition among social entities directed against one another (Oucho, 2002). Moreover, Galtung (2009) defines conflict in terms of incompatibilities with “A-B-C” triangle. For him full scale conflict can be described in conflict triangle with three corners, where corner “A” refers to conflict attitudes, “B” to conflict behavior and “C” the conflict or contradiction itself.

In the cultural context, conflict is a natural and inevitable aspect of any social relationship. It may be positive(functional) or negative (dysfunctional), the former strengthening group relationships where different members of conflicting groups share common ground values, and the latter threatening to erode the consensus needed for growth and development (Pedersen & Jandt , 1996). In general, conflict is defined as a situation in which two or more actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility (Bartos & Wehr, 2002; Cordel & Wolf, 2011).

2.1.1.2. Conceptualizing Ethnicity, Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Group

In the last decades, terms such as ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic group have become common and increasingly encountered not only the academic analysis of social phenomena but also the mass media (Eriksen, 2010). For example, the Los Angeles Times published a story in 1992 on ethnic conflict in Ethiopia under the headline “Ethnic Pride Gets a Test in Africa” (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998:15).

Even today, in Ethiopia it is common to hear and watch the news on ethnic identity and ethnic conflict. For instance, Addis Admas News (2008 (Ethiopian Calendar/E.C) :2) released a headline titled in Amharic “የቅማንት ጥያቄ ምላሽ ቢያገኝም ግጭቱ ተባብሶ ሰንብቷል” directly translated as “Even though, the Kemant Quest has Received Answers the Ethnic Conflict is Increasing”. In the statement of this news, around Gondar in the area of ‘Chilga’ the inter-ethnic conflict between ‘Amhara’ and ‘Kemant’ caused the death of many people and others stay at home because of fear of insecurity as a result of the violent conflict. Likewise, Sendek News (2008 (E.C):15) states the story on ethnic identity under the headline “አማራ ነን የወልቃይት ህዝብ ያልተመለሰ ጥያቄ” meaning ‘We are Amhara’ an Unanswered Question of the People of ‘Wokayit.’

The terms ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic groups lack conceptual clarity since its origin. They are often used interchangeably. In actuality, although these terms are closely related, there is a nuance dividing them. Ethnicity is the state of being ethnic or belonging to a certain ethnic group or it is an affiliation or identification with an ethnic group (Kellas, 1998). Whereas an ethnic group is a social group based on ancestry, culture, or national origin, ethnicity (Yang, 2000). Ethnic identity is defined as the set of meanings that individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including those attributes that bind them to that collectively and distinguished it from others in their relevant environment (Taras & Ganguly, 2010).

The word ethnicity has a long history. It is a derivative of the Greek word “*ethnos*’, meaning nation. The reference, however, is not to a political unity but to the unity of persons (people) of common blood or descent. In English language, the expression ‘ethnic group’ was proposed by Huxleand Haddon in 1935 as a substitute for ‘race’ to identify groups at the national level (Banton, 2000). In the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ethnicity first appeared in 1972 and recently became a source of debate in the field of political economy, where many scholars have investigated the relationship between ethnicity and civil war using econometric tools (Green, 2006).

By the 20th century, the meaning of ethnicity had changed again but had reasserted some of the original Greek conception. For the most part was the specific reference to religion and with it the idea that only “others” certainly not “us” could be an ethnic. Increasingly, ethnicity referred to a particular way of defining not only others but also ourselves and this is how it entered sociology (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998). However, from its inception ethnicity has remained a ‘hot potato’ of sociology and a complex and vague concept (Wolf, 2006; Verkuyten, 2005; Nnoli, 2007).

Scholars have not yet reached an agreement how to define ethnicity and ethnic group seemingly straightforward concept. The notion of ethnicity is both amorphous and imbued with extreme doses of subjectivity (Tigist, 2014). Moreover, due in part to its popularity ethnicity has become an unwieldy concept and currently suffers from both polysemy-whereby it has multiple definitions and synonymy-whereby it is close in meaning to other terms like “nation” and “race” (Green, 2006). Narrowly, an ethnic group is a group of people socially distinguished as distinct group, by others or by themselves, based on unique culture or national origin. According to this definition, ethnic group is defined by cultural characteristics (e.g., language, religion, customs or by national origin) (Yang, 2000). Membership in such groups is determined through self and outside ascription, mainly based on actual or imagined descent (Chandra, 2012; Horowitz, 1985).

In their book titled “Understanding Ethnic-Conflict” Taras & Ganguly (2010) define an ethnic group as a large or small group of people, in either traditional or advanced societies, who are united by a common inherited culture, racial similarity, common religion, and belief in a common history and ancestry and who exhibit a strong psychological sentiment of belonging to the group. Likewise, for Weber (1968) ethnicity has to do with a subjective belief in common origin, descent, and history. In his great work, “Economy and Society” defined ethnic groups as “human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent and shared origin because of similarities of physical type, custom, memories of colonization and migration” (Weber, 1968:389).

Many anthropologists have grappled with the problem of criteria for what is and what is not ethnicity. The criteria, which constitute ethnicity, vary from scholar to scholar and even from country to country (Mirsky, 1997). It will simply not do to state that an ethnic group is marked by shared culture, or even to point at specific ‘shared traits’ such as shared religion, language and/or customs. Kasfir (1976) cited in Nkwi (2015) suggests four ways of recognizing ethnic groups. These are (i) culture; (ii) language; (iii) traditional political organization; and (iv) territoriality.

Concisely, members of an ethnic group must share a common culture, language and custom and occupy the same territory.

Esman (2004) defined ethnic group as a self-consciousness community or collective identity based on perceived common descent, fictive kinship, historical experience, and culture, especially a common language. Moreover, in the Barth's Anthropological essay (1998) titled "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" ethnic group is defined as a population which: (1) is largely biologically self-perpetuating; (2) shares fundamental cultural values; (3) makes up a field of communication and interaction; (4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others.

The vagueness of ethnicity and ethnic group is also obvious in Ethiopia. In the country's supreme legal document, i.e. the constitution there is a gap in clearly defining what Nation, Nationality and people [ethnic group] means and what it constitutes. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution of article 39 (5) states:

A Nation, Nationality or People" for the purpose of this constitution, is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (FDRE constitution, 1995:14).

Therefore, the constitution is not clear in differentiating the three terms: Nation, Nationality and People. Rather it gives a merged definition of the three terms. Subsequently, the amalgamation of the three terms further creates ambiguity on the concept of ethnicity and ethnic group in the country (Wubshet Mulat, 2007).

2.1.1.3. Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. However, the novelty of ethnic conflict in the late 20th and early twenty-first centuries lies not in the existence of conflict among ethnic groups but in the intensity and global manifestation of that conflict. The adverse effects of such conflicts are felt in equal measure in the developed and developing worlds (Taras & Ganguly, 2010)

The end of the Cold War resulted in increased conflict along ethnic lines (Guelke, 2010). During the years 1945-89 a survey of ninety- two armed conflicts concluded that 'the engine that powers most of the wars in today's world is ethnic hostility (Brogan 1989 cited in Banton, 2000:482). Many violent conflicts fought today are between the members of different ethnic groups. Ethnicity

allows for the clear differentiation of in groups and out-groups, facilitating mobilization to collective action (Fearon, 2003; Horowitz, 1985).

Ethnic conflict is a phenomenon in international affairs that is almost equally difficult to understand, as it is to define. The term loaded with often legitimate negative associations and entirely unnecessary confusions. The most important confusion is that ethnic conflicts are about ethnicity and ethnicity is not the ultimate, irreducible sources of violent conflict in such cases. Alternatively, ethnicity may provide the mobilization basis for collective action, with violence being used as a tactic (Cordell & Wolff, 2010).

Ethnic conflict is a competition among groups for power, resources, opportunities and status (Esman, 2004). Likewise, Sisay (2007:7) define ethnic conflicts as:

...clashes among two or more ethnic groups due to demand for power, resources, identity, social status and the like. It refers to situations where people mobilize against others on the basis of ethnic identity. Conflicts increasingly present themselves as ethnic conflicts with ethnic identity serving and instrumentalised as the rallying point or the mobilization agent for the manifestation of the conflicts.

An ethnic conflict is one particular form of conflict that in which the goals of at least one party is defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues may be over which conflict erupts, at least one party to the conflict will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms or interprets the conflict along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide. In other words, an ethnic conflict involves at least one party that is organized around the ethnic identity of its members (Cordell & Wolff, 2010 & 2011; Wolff, 2006). Moreover, in ethnic conflict the conflicting parties are defined by a combination of historical, linguistic and cultural features (Schlee and Shongolo, 1995).

Esman (2004) and similarly, Kaufman (2001) identified three types of ethnic conflicts. First, **non-violent ethnic conflicts**: are conflicts that are pursued by civic/peaceful methods and usually managed peacefully. Second, **ethnic civil wars or armed conflicts**: are large-scale violent conflicts that involve central governments, extend over many months and even years, and may eventuate in civil wars with extensive casualties, property damage and refugee flows. Third, **ethnic riots**: are generally localized, explosive, short-lived, but often extremely brutal. Some ethnic riots result from accumulated anger against governments because of persistent discriminatory treatment and disrespect.

2.1.2. Conceptual Framework of the Context, Causes, Actors and Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict

According to Brown (1993), an ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, economic, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities (groups). Like other type of conflict, ethnic conflict is described in terms of context (profile), causes, actors, dynamics and impacts (consequences) of the conflict. A conflict profile (context) provides the overall background of the conflict and issues around the conflict. It describes the overall physical, geographical, environmental and/ecological, demographic, socio-cultural, economic and political situation of the conflict (conflict setting) (Engel & Korf, 2005).

The causes of ethnic conflicts are those factors, which contribute to the outbreak of the conflict and can be further described as root (structural) and proximate/trigger factors (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 2006; Engel & Korf, 2005). Depending on the context of each country or society, ethnic conflict can be caused by different factors such as economic, political, socio-cultural and security factors. In ethnically divided societies like Africa, ethnic conflict is not the result of a single factor rather it is caused by variety of factors. Similarly, in Ethiopia ethnic conflicts are caused by multiple factors such as historical factors, politicization of ethnicity, competition for economic resources, lack of economic and social opportunities, poor governance, lack of political participation, lack of security, ethno-centric federalism and politics (Sisay, 2007).


Conflict actors are all those engaged in or being affected by the conflict. In ethnic conflict, there are different actors that differ as to their goals and interests, positions and capacities (Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), 2012). Thus, the actors of ethnic conflict are varied across different countries/societies, which include internal and external actors.

Conflict dynamics is the resulting interaction between the context, causes and actors of the conflict (Department for International Development (DFID), 2002). Conflict dynamics in Africa are complex and involve a multiplicity of inter-locking local to international actors (Nasongo, 2015). In general, the dynamics of ethnic conflict is described in the escalation and d-escalation of the conflict, the windows of opportunity and scenarios of the conflict.

Conflict impacts a society or country at large in a number of ways. The impact (consequence) of conflict varies across the level and intensity of conflict which broke out. But, in most cases any

conflict has social, economic and political costs in the conflict area or country at large (University for Peace, 2011). In conclusion, based on the Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA) model the researcher used the following conceptual framework in analyzing the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework of Alle-Konso Inter-Ethnic Conflict



Source: Adapted and Organized from DFID (2002)

2.1.3. Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

Theories on ethnicity provide an obvious starting point when thinking about the nature of ethnic groups and the causes of ethnic conflict. There is no scholarly agreement on the essence of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. As a result, there are three major theories (approaches) that enables to answer questions of how ethnic identity is formed, why it persists and what causes ethnic conflict. These are primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism.

2.1.3.1. The Primordial Approach

The primordialist approach also called naturalist and socio-biological, describe ethnicity as a group's self-identification and/or ascription by others to belong to a certain ethnic group on the basis of common primordial identities (kinship, language, culture, customs and sometimes religion). Primordialists presumes ethnic identity as essentially a biologically given or natural phenomenon (Berghe, 1995; Geertz, 1963; Taras & Ganguly, 2010). In this sense, ethnic groups constitute the network in to which human individuals are born and where every human infant or young child finds itself a member of a kinship group and of a neighborhood, and therefore comes to share with other group members' certain common objective cultural attributes. Along with objective cultural markers, primordialists also stress the subjective or psychological aspects of self- and group-related feelings of identity distinctiveness and their recognition by others as a crucial determinant of ethnic identity formation and its persistence (Taras & Ganguly, 2010).

In primordialist perspective, ethnic identity is a subjectively held sense of shared identity based on objective cultural criteria. Thus, Smith (1991) identified six bases (foundations) of ethnic identity. These are: the existence of a group name in order to be recognized as a distinct community; belief in common ancestry; the presence of historical memories among group members; shared objective cultural attributes; attachment to a specific territory as an ancestral and traditional group homeland; and feeling of common solidarity with other group members (Taras & Ganguly, 2010; Guibernau, 2004).

For primordialists ethnicity is a fixed characteristic of individuals and/ groups of communities established at birth and will stay until they die (Horowitz, 1985). Accordingly, primordialists view ethnicity as natural and innate to human identity based on fixed deep primordial attachments to a group or culture. Cultural norms and blood relationships determine for one's identity and to the relationship between members of an ethnic group (Sisay, 2007).

Whether due to inherited biological traits or due to centuries of accumulated past experiences, ethnicity is always in its place and now not becoming beyond one's capability to determine (Van den Berghe, 1981 cited in Yang, 2000). If biological traits are considered, in one way or another ethnic boundaries and ethnic tensions are natural. The advocates of primordial approach consider conflicts as an outcome of ethnic differences, and therefore, not necessarily with further explanation. Smith (1993) underlines the same fact indicating that inter-ethnic conflicts take their

roots from ethnicity itself. For primordialists, the primordial attachments inherent in ethnicity, which are seen as stable and constant, cause communal action or conflict (Aalen, 2008). Indeed, primordialists claimed that ethnicity is a cause for inter-ethnic conflict.

Moreover, at the heart of this schools of thought, Yang (2000) in his book titled “Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches” identified the following three basic arguments. First, ethnicity is an ascribed identity or assigned status, something inherited from one’s ancestors. Ethnicity is a very deeply rooted, primal bond to one’s ancestral bloodline. Second, an important corollary of ascribed identity, ethnic boundaries which demarcate who is a member of an ethnic group and who is not, are fixed or immutable. Ethnicity is static. If you were born Chinese, you will be forever Chinese, and you cannot change your membership to another group. Finally, common ancestry determines ethnicity. In other words, people belong to an ethnic group because members of that group all share common biological and cultural origins (*Ibid*).

Due to their argument of ethnicity as static (fixed identities) and, their further failure to take into account for unescapable variations in nature and level of conflicts both in a space and time the primordialists could not escape from serious criticism. First, they fail to account for changes in the ethnic group that could result in its dissolution or adaptation to new circumstances and technological developments. Second, they overlook the economic, political and social relationships between members of an ethnic group. As Barth (1969) argued, ethnic groups are never in isolation and individuals or collectives pass across the border even if they maintained some stereotypes to keep their identity and to exclude outsiders. Third, they are criticized by the changes that have occurred in many ethnic groups due to colonization, frequent migration and intermarriage relations (Tigist, 2014).

2.1.3.2. The Instrumentalist Approach

The instrumentalists view ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to obtain some larger, typically material end. It takes ethnicity as a deliberate tool to be manipulated by individuals or elite groups in their plan to obtain some larger or wider material and power motives (Taras & Ganguly, 2010). Instrumentalists, also view ethnic identity as flexible and malleable that individuals or groups may use ethnicity to achieve political, economic and other goals (Brass, 1991; Glazer & Moynihan, 1975).

Ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and compete effectively for state controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts, awards, and constitutional protections (Rothchild, 1997). Moreover, ethnic identity, gains social and political significance when ethnic entrepreneurs-for either offensive or defensive purposes or in response to threats or opportunities for themselves and/or their groups-invoke and manipulate selected ethnic symbols. In other words, ethnicity can be a device as much as a focus for group mobilization through the select use of ethnic symbols (kinship and cultural symbols) to mobilize people seeking political gains (Eriksen, 2001).

Instrumentalists focuses on the malleability of an ethnic identity and the role of elites in politicization of ethnicity. For instrumentalists, ethnic identity can be changed in the pursuit of economic interest and wealth. Ethnic identity symbols are something useful to the elite political leaders to influence their constituents in pursuing their political goals. The elite group (political entrepreneurs) create identity-based differences and manipulate/politicized those differences (Cohen, 1996; Brass, 1996). Politicized ethnic identity is thus the creation of elites, who draw up on, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves (Taras & Ganguly, 2010).

Some versions of instrumentalists which are referred to as circumstantialists or ethnoskeptics regard ethnicity either as a surrogate for more basic social forces such as class or colonial domination, or as a fraud perpetrated by persons with self-serving objectives to exploit mass publics in pursuit of their political or economic ambitions. Some instrumentalists also conceive the world as composed of rationally calculating individuals seeking to maximize their security, economic welfare, social position or power over others. Ethnicity is mainly a myth propagated and exploited by ambitions and unscrupulous political entrepreneurs to build political followings for themselves and help them to attain and secure political power (Esman, 2004).

For instrumentalists, conflict is largely stimulated by elites who could mobilize ethnicity in pursuit of their own narrow motives. In ethnic conflict, there are some instrumental goals and practical benefits that are promised, or threatening deprivations averted for members of ethnic communities, if their struggle should succeed (*Ibid*).

Nonetheless, the instrumentalist approach is criticized for two reasons. First, it fails to account for the deeper social structures that allow manipulation of the grievances of the ethnic group by their elite leaders. Second, it reduces the ethnic identity to cost-benefit oriented economic choices (Vayrynen, 1999).

2.1.3.3. The Constructivist Approach

The constructivist approach to ethnicity is often traced back to the work of German Sociologist Max Weber. Weber (1968) considered ethnicity as a mode of drawing boundaries between individuals and hence group making. Furthermore, Barth (1969) in his his work on “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” found a convincing evidence of how ethnic group boundaries were actually permeable and changeable. He also claimed that ethnic groups are constituted through construction of social boundaries i.e. a self-ascription and ascription by others. Constructivists emphasize the subjective manipulability, flexibility and strategic quality of ethnicity.

Constructivist theorist Aalen (2008) view ethnicity not as objectively given, but rather as socially constructed, fluid, flexible, susceptible to change over time, situationally defined and rational socio-cultural constructions. Ethnicity can be made through fission in which some groups left the existing society to have their own group and fusion in which two members form new ethnicity via assimilation either vertically or horizontally (Aalen,2008; Sisay,2007). Moreover, as Esman (2004) noted ethnic groups may pass from history and new solidarities may be created by new circumstances.

Intermarriage could be a good example here and even individuals or groups coming as strangers and be affiliated to a certain group, “guests becoming brothers, first metaphorically and then in a more and more binding sense” (Shlee & Shongolo, 1995:8). Myth and history are used to help to legitimize such construction. Hence, constructivists argue that ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open. This approach points that ethnicity is constructed from dense webs of social interactions. For constructivists ethnicity is not an individual attribute, but it is rather a social phenomenon. A person’s identity remains beyond the choice or control of that individual and hence ethnicity according to this approach is an endless process of becoming (Brubaker, 1995).

Social constructionists regard ethnic solidarity as the creation of human imagination, an intellectual construct, not an objective reality. However, it has no basis in nature, it can be regarded as real to the extent that people treat it as reality and behave accordingly. Thus, ethnic communities

are likely to be transitory, as individuals “negotiate” their identity and may find it beneficial to be affiliated with more than a single ethnic group and to move easily among them. In its perspective, social constructivism is closely linked to post-modernist beliefs that the world we experience is composed mostly of intellectually invented symbols and that notions of objective reality are false and illusory (Esman, 2004).

Constructivists categorically reject the notion that ethnic identity is both a natural phenomenon and a tool that is manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for individual and collective political ends. Constructivists contend that ethnic and national identities are enduring social constructions. In other words, ethnic identities are products of human actions/choices rather than biologically given by nature. Weber (1968) viewed an ethnic group as “human groups” whose belief in a common ancestry, in spite of its origins being mostly fictitious, is so strong that it leads to the creation of a community (Taras & Ganguly, 2010; Jenkins, 2008; Esman, 2004).

For constructivists, conflict happened because of certain types of what might be called pathological social system, which individuals could not control. In this regard, the social set up that breeds violent conflicts are not individuals. Constructivists see ethnic identity as a social construction and thus each conflict has its special social origin (Chipman, 1993; Xu, 2012).

To conclude, ethnicity and ethnic-conflicts are such complex phenomena of the world we live today. The debate between and/among these three theoretical approaches is ongoing and never ending. Which theory that drives ethnic identity and conflict may vary in place and time based on the social and political context of each community, ethnic group and country at large.

From the researcher’s empirical observation and experience ethnic identity in Ethiopia is largely constructed and instrumentatized. Undeniably, in Ethiopia there are crosscutting social identities because of the movement of people in different parts of the country. For instance, religion and ethnic identity are the two most important social identities largely crosscut across the country. In the researcher point of view there is no primordially pure “A”, “B”, or “C” or “other” ethnic group in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian society is not as it is or static for a long period of time rather it is mixed, changed and modified across time. Moreover, the emerging ethnic identities and their recognition from time to time can be an example of such social construction and instrumentalization of ethnic identity. For example, the recent ethnic identity formation and recognitions include; Alle of SNNPRS and Kemant of ANRS and others.

Thus, for the purpose of this study the researcher largely employed constructivist and instrumentalist view of ethnic identity and conflict. The researcher claimed that the constructivist and particularly the inststumetalist view of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict is more appropriate and best fitted with the issue investigated. Indeed, the researcher confirmed that these two theories of ethnicity largely support the ethnic conflict of the study area. In other words, in the study area, ethnic identity is constructed, politicized, mobilized, and in turn resulted the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso of Segen Area People's Zone.

2.2. Review of Related Literatures

2.2.1. What Causes Ethnic Conflicts?

Ethnic conflict has gained much attention since the end of Cold War and it becomes a worldwide matter (Tang, 2015). Since then, numerous theorists and scholars have attempted to explain the different causes of ethnic conflict based on their theoretical underpinnings (Nguyen, ND:2). As a result, there is no a comprehensive approach on the causes of ethnic conflict. Therefore, for full understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict there is a need to use a holistic and comprehensive approach suggested by different theorists and/ scholars.

To begin with, Huntington (1993) in his book title "Clash of Civilizations" argued that ethnic conflict is a result of globalization bringing multiple cultures in contact with each other and ultimately causing clash of civilizations. Therefore, for him ethnic conflict is the result of clash of civilizations because of the differences between civilizations and/culture. Nevertheless, Huntington's argument is subject to criticisms by different scholars.

Esman (2004) also argued that ethnic conflict is a consequence of ethnic pluralism, when two or more ethnic groups present and contact in the same political space/authority. This means, when ethnic groups contact and encounter one another, it will provide the necessarily condition for conflict. However, ethnic identity does not imply ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict is not necessarily violent. Similarly, Tang (2015) claimed that ethnic pluralism is a necessary condition for inter-ethnic contact, but not a sufficient condition for ethnic competition or conflict. It is misleading to say that ethnicity itself is the cause of any conflict, violent or not. Ethnic identities can generate conflict by associating different groups with different interests. These interests may be created in relation to differences among and/ between ethnic groups over language, religion, economic goods (Kaufuman, 2001).

Furthermore, Esman (2004) identified the causes of ethnic conflict as political, economic and social factors. First, **political factors:** Control of territory is the rawest and most fundamental of political issues that can cause ethnic conflict. The status of territory is at the heart of many instances of ethnic conflicts. In addition, in many instances a single ethnic community may have gained control of state institutions and used that control to channel the benefits available from government to members of its own ethnic group. Ethnic communities who believe their members have been victims of unequal treatment are likely to demand equitable inclusion in the polity.

Likewise, there are scholars who consider democratization as a political factor that can trigger ethnic conflict. Three aspects of democratization are central for the outbreak of ethnic conflict. First, the opening of political arena for formerly marginalized or suppressed groups to mobilize and organize their ethnic group members and trigger conflict. Second, political competition producing “winners” and “losers” because of a direct consequence of opening of the political arena. Third, the emerging plurality of actors generates competition over constituencies and resources and finally, the sequence of democratizing procedures (Vorrath et al.,2007).

Second, **economic factors:** A number of scholars and/authors argued that ethnic conflicts are at their roots, economic-clashes control over economic resources. In ethnically diverse societies, economic issues are almost at the same time ethnic issues (Kaufuman, 2001). When a nation-state is dependent on primary commodities, it is much more prone to internal violence. Thus, conflict is explained by greed or grievances where there are feelings of ethnic or political marginalization as one group is disadvantaged by another group in terms of access to natural resources (Nguyen, ND: 3).

Similarly, Esman (2004) argued that disputes over what appears to be political power, so runs the argument of economic determinists, at a deeper level involve power over economic resources. Those who gain political power will always use it to secure economic advantages for themselves and their followers at the expense of their rivals. Those whose grievances are expressed in political language are really protesting their disadvantageous economic situation.

In Africa, economic factors have been identified as one of the principal causes of ethnic conflict. Most ethnic groups have been in competition for scarce resources in different parts of Africa. In multiethnic societies, like South Africa, ethnic communities violently compete for scarce resources (Cocodia, 2008). Moreover, The African violent conflicts like bloody wars over diamonds in Sierra

Leon, the Nigerian ethnic conflicts to control the country's vast oil resources confirmed this reality (Wolf, 2006).

Third, **cultural factors**: The principal cultural issues that generate ethnic conflicts are language and religion. Both are at the core of an individual's sense of identity and the collective dignity and honor of ethnic communities. Language has both symbolic and instrumental value and it becomes a common subject of inter-ethnic contention because of ignorance/domination of languages in the expense of others. Religion is also more sensitive than language that reflects the collective identity of ethnic communities (Esman (2004). Religion has a significant influence on ethnic conflicts. However, the argument does not answer what aspect of religion has an influence on conflict and how religious diversity serves as an influence in causing ethnic conflict precisely (Fox, 2004).

Apart from the above factors of ethnic conflict, Gurr and Harff (1994) attempted to identify the causes of ethnic conflict. They viewed that ethnic conflict is impossible without ethnic mobilization. Likewise, Kaufman (2001) identified elites ethnic outbidding (a key component of ethnic mobilization) as a key process of manipulating the fear of ethnic extinction or domination in driving ethnic war. Kaufman claimed that manipulation of ethnic symbols is a key for understanding ethnic conflict/war. He emphasized that symbolic politics requires existing myths and symbols and manipulative elites.

Building on earlier work of other scholars Petersen (2002) argued that emotion is the driving force for ethnic conflicts. Peterson attempted to synthesize emotional drivers of ethnic conflict into a coherent theory. He began with a critique of the rational choice approach that insists ethnic conflict is as much about material stuff as about symbolic values. However, Tang (2015) criticized Petersen and other scholars that emotional drivers alone are insufficient for the outbreak of ethnic conflict. He asserted that emotion is insufficient for understanding the causes of ethnic conflict.

More broadly, Tang (2015) identified the four master drivers of ethnic conflict: emotion, interest, capability, and opportunity. For him the four master drivers are the key to linking the numerous psychological and material factors into a combined framework of causes of ethnic conflict. **First, emotion**: these include four specific emotions (emotional drivers) that can cause ethnic conflict: fear, honor, hatred, and anger (rage).

- **Fear**, especially fear of ethnic domination and annihilation
- **Honor**, links with prestige, grievance, resentment, and domination
- **Hatred**, one of the most potent predictors of conflict down the road
- **Anger**, especially rage (hard to predict), may be the most immediate driver of localized conflict. Directly, rage may induce spontaneous or mass-led violence and indirectly it may be one of the most important factors facilitating ethnic mobilization.

Second, Interest (Goals): It is a key driver of human behavior, including conflictual behavior. For ethnic groups, tangible interest in ethnic conflict has been most prominently associated with territory (separation or autonomy), domination over or total annihilation of another group, natural resources.

Third, Opportunity or Feasibility is another driver of ethnic conflict. Factors that affect opportunity include weakening of the central state, economic crises and foreign invasion (Peterson, 2002).

Fourth, Capability: It plays a key role in causing ethnic conflict. The factors that affect the capability of out breaking ethnic conflict include physical or/and military capability, terrain, supporting diasporas, lootable resources within a territory held by a minority, and support by ethnic kin in a neighboring country. Thus, it is easy to understand that without some military capability, a state cannot terrorize its ethnic minorities, and an ethnic minority cannot rebel.

Another research work identified the causes of ethnic conflict is Brown (1993) in the book titled “Ethnic conflict and International Security.” He identified the major causes of ethnic conflict at three levels of analysis: the systemic, the domestic, and the perceptual explanations.

❖ **The systemic explanations** of ethnic conflict focus on the nature of security systems in which ethnic groups operate and the security concerns of these groups. The first and most obvious systemic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity. Whereas the second systemic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that national, regional and international authorities must be too weak to keep groups from fighting and too weak to ensure the security of individual groups. In systems, where there is no sovereign i.e. where anarchy prevails, individual groups have to provide for their own defense and protection.

The two ethnic groups will attack each other in order to defense their security threat posed by another group is called security dilemma.

Recently different researchers have proven that security dilemma is useful when thinking about ethnic conflicts at the intrastate level. Barry Posen is the first popularized the application of the security dilemma to ethnic conflicts (Xu, 2012). He made interesting corresponding between an international system and inter-ethnic relations within a state from a realist standpoint. According to Posen (1993) in the state where anarchy emerges, ethnic groups behave as their security is not assured by the state and thus “the security dilemma” affects the relations amongst these ethnic groups, just as it affects relations among states.

Likewise, Wolff (2006) provides the notion of ethnic security dilemma as causal explanations of ethnic conflicts. For him, ethnic security dilemma includes elements of physical security, political security, economic and social security, cultural security, and environmental security.

- ❖ **The domestic explanation** focuses on factors that operate at domestic level that can cause ethnic conflict. The effectiveness of states in addressing the concern of their constituents and the impact of nationalism and democratization on inter-ethnic relation are the domestic factors that can cause ethnic conflicts. In addition, one problem in multiethnic societies is a tendency for political parties to be organized along ethnic lines and this in turn creates confrontation and conflict between different ethnic groups. Apart from this, many countries have inadequate constitutional safeguards for minority ethnic group rights. Even in places where minority rights guarantees exist on paper, they are often inadequately enforced (Brown, 1993).
- ❖ **The perceptual explanations** of ethnic conflict focus on the false histories usually passed from generation to generation by word of mouth. These stories become part of a group’s tradition. Distorted and exaggerated with time, these histories present one’s own group as heroic, while other groups are demonized. Grievances are enshrined, and other groups are portrayed as inherently vicious and aggressive (*Ibid*).

In the book titled “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” edited by Stewart (2008) explicated that the presence of major horizontal inequalities (HIs) or inequalities among culturally defined groups is the major cause of ethnic conflict within multiethnic and multi-religious countries. For him horizontal inequalities are inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups. In general, Stewart (2008) identified such inequalities as economic, social, political and cultural HIs.

- **Economic HIs:** include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets-financial, human, and natural resource. In addition, they comprise inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities.
- **Social HIs:** include inequalities in access to a range of services, such as education, health care and housing, as well as in educational and health status.
- **Political HIs:** include inequalities in political participation and access to political opportunities and power among ethnic groups. These include control over government offices and security sectors of the state.
- **Cultural status HIs:** include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups, languages, customs, norms and practices

Stewart further contended that any type of horizontal inequality can provide an incentive for political mobilization, but political inequalities i.e. political exclusion is most likely to motivate group leaders to instigate a rebellion. By contrast, economic and social inequalities, as well as inequalities in cultural status, are more likely to motivate the mass of the population.

In conclusion, conceptual and theoretical explanations concerning the causes of ethnic conflicts looks broad. However, the aforementioned causes investigated by different scholars (theorists) can broadly categorized as political, economic, social, and cultural factors. Regarding what causes the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict are discussed at chapter five of this thesis.

2.2.2. Politicization of Ethnicity and Ethnic Mobilization

Ethnicity is a powerful political and social force, and it can be both an asset and burden for political actors in multi-ethnic societies (Aalen, 2011). Ethnicity is politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity. Ethnicity can be socially relevant in a country without it being much politicized, and the degree to which ethnicity is politicized can vary across countries and over time (Fearon, 2004). In developing world, ethnic politics/ politicization of ethnicity is one of the main reasons for internal instability; countless wars, revolts, and conflicts.

For adequate understanding ethnic mobilization, it is better to conceptualize the term political mobilization. Conventionally, political mobilization is often understood as closely tied to electoral politics (Vermeersch, 2011). However, ethnic mobilization is far more than electoral campaigning based on ethnicity. It occurs not only at the time of elections but also during other points in time,

most likely at the time of particular events that can form a basis for mass action, be it in the form of collective street protests or less visible forms of petitioning (*Ibid*).

Olzak (1983) cited in Alptekin (2011) defines ethnic mobilization as the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity in pursuit of collective ends. Thus, in ethnic mobilization the most pertinent characteristic of the group is its ethnic identity. In fact, the acceptance and endorsement of ethnic identity by the group may be considered as a prerequisite of successful ethnic mobilization (Barany, 1998).

Traditionally, political scientists did not attach much importance to the ethnic aspects of political mobilization. Because, they often assumed politics of ethnic solidarity would disappear with the ongoing development of modernization and the spread of liberal-democratic values (Kymlicka 2000). However, it was the surge in ethnic conflict in the last decade of the twentieth century that changed views on ethnic mobilization significantly. Moreover, since 1990s, the literatures on the politics of ethnicity grow considerably. Hence, based on different literatures, four theoretical perspectives of ethnic mobilization are identified. Each perspective takes a different set of factors to be primarily responsible for causing and shaping ethnic mobilization (Vermeersch, 2011).

1. **The Culturalist Perspective**, which emphasizes the significance of strong subjective bonding and values within ethnic groups for shaping the lines of ethnic mobilization.
2. **The Reactive Ethnicity Perspective**, which uses an economic perspective to argue that the primary cause of ethnic mobilization lies in the coincidence of ethnic bonding and relative deprivation;
3. **The Competition Perspective**, which focuses on ethnic leaders making rational calculations about their identity and invoking ethnicity in their struggle for resources and power;
4. **The Political Process Perspective**, which emphasizes the role of the macro-political context, consisting of (1) the institutional environment and (2) the dominant political discursive.

In conclusion, mobilization is the precondition for perpetual ethnic conflict. It produces sentimental approach and politically eloquent concordance among the members of a group (Hashmi & Majeed, 2015).

2.2.3. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa and the Horn in Particular

Since the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts have reduced, while intra-state conflicts have increased; most of them unfolding along ethnic lines (Vayrynen, 1999; Shoup, 2008). Africa is one of the continents highly susceptible to intra and inter-state conflicts and/wars (Olaosebikan, 2010; Alabi, 2006). Ethnic conflicts have been a major characteristic in the democratic transitions in Africa in the post-Cold War era. One cannot deny the fact ethno political conflicts have been on the increase in Africa throughout the 20th century (Olaosebikan, 2010).

The problem of ethnic conflict in Africa is widespread and real. The root causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa are structural ethnic consciousness, colonial factors and unhealthy competitions (Obioha, 1999). First, **consciousness of one's ethnic origin or background** is a psycho-sociological reality that is largely universal in nature (Ekeazor, 1996). In Africa, ethnic consciousness provides African leaders with platforms for their ideological and morally deficient political positions. Moreover, the ruling class in order to sustain their position confuse their various peoples with conflict generating theories and explanations in the face of social and political questions facing them.

Second, **the issue of colonialism, and westernization contexts and situations** is seen as the cardinal and pivotal context, which gave, rise to and even promoted ethnic rivalry and conflict situations in Africa. For instance, colonial administration in Nigeria created interlocking conflicts situation through their pattern of administration. Furthermore, the colonial masters went ahead to manipulate, playing one group against the other in order to promote mutual antagonisms among African peoples.

Third, another fundamental or root issue in ethnic conflict in Africa is the **multi-ethnic factor**. Like ethnic consciousness, multi-ethnicity is a natural context within which most African states found themselves. This multiethnic situation usually results to manifest conflictual where one or a few groups dominate as in Nigerian case. In this case, the ethnic game is mainly played among the majority groups afflicted by a majority domination complex, while the minorities have to endlessly fight for fair treatment (Osaghae, 1994).

With regard to Horn of Africa (HOA), most of the wars/conflicts for the last decades have been described in terms of ethnic conflicts: the civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. Ethiopia is among the countries of HOA inhabited by more than eighty ethnic groups. Since ethnicity became the major criterion used in drawing boundaries of administrations different ethnic groups started to claim over political, social and economic issues based on their ethnic grounds. This in turn leads to conflict along ethnic lines in various parts of Ethiopia (Sisay, 2007).

2.2.4. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Ethnic Conflicts

After the collapse of the military regime, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized state power in 1991. Soon after, Ethiopia start experimenting Soviet style ethnic federalism as a mechanism to address the challenges related to accommodation of ethnic diversity. It was taken as a means of accommodating ethnic diversity and political settlement of the ethnic related conflicts in the past (Semahagn, 2012). This makes the country unique in Africa, where ethnic relations may be an obvious factor in national politics but not in any recognized form (Abbink, 2011; Muhabie, 2015).

However, since the restructuring of the country along ethnic lines ethnic federalism become a point of discussion and intense debate among scholars of the field and politicians (Wondwossen, 2008; Muhabie, 2015). On one hand, scholars and government agents advocate the use of ethnic federalism as a way of accommodating ethnic diversity. The EPRDF government officials and some other scholars like Hechter (2000) argued that ethnic federalism decreases the demand for secession in Ethiopia by increasing self-government. Furthermore, some political thinkers like Chabal & Daloz (1999) view ethnic federalism in Ethiopia as a good experiment. Likewise, Cohen (1996) regarded ethnic federalism as a useful tool in reorganizing Ethiopia.

On the other hand, there are different scholars /researchers who criticized ethnic federalism as it exacerbates conflicts (Cornell, 2002; Snyder, 2000). As cited in Aalen (2002), Mazrui (1994) argues that ethnic-based federalism of Ethiopia is the re-tribalization of the country. Moreover, for Ottaway (1994) ethnic-based federalism increases ethnic conflicts rather than defusing or minimizing ethnic strives. It might lead to the disintegration of a nation through creating a possibility of ethnic conflicts. Kymlicka (1998) also claim that federalism does not prevent secession, but serves as a stepping-stone for those groups whose aim is independence. As Merara

(2003) stated many people in Ethiopia opposed ethnic federalism, fearing that the result of this process could be the disappearance of Ethiopia from the political map of the world.

In general, the debate among different scholars and/government officials is continued for the last 25 years. Since the beginning, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was aimed at managing the ethno-linguistic diversity and lessens conflicts. Undeniably, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, led to the recognition of the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic groups. However, it also transformed and generated localized ethnic conflicts (Abbink, 2006). As many of the scholars and/literatures argued ethnic conflicts are still critical challenges in Ethiopia. They notified that federalism can exacerbate the very problems it seeks to address (Muhabie, 2015).

Although ethnic conflicts have not reached the horrible and catastrophic level as it has seen in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, several ethnic conflicts occurred since ethnic identity gained constitutional salience in Ethiopia. Since the reorganization of the country in to ethnic federalism, various inter-ethnic tensions/conflicts erupted in different parts of Ethiopia. Few of them include Amhara-Kemant (Addis Admas News, 2008 E.C); Gofa-Gamo, Afar-Oromo, Amhara-Oromo, Amhara-Gumuz, Borana-Gerri (Somali) (Sisay, 2007); Gedeo-Guji (Alemante, 2003); Anywaa-Nuer, Anywaa- Majangir (Dereje, 2009); Silte-Gurage, Sheka-Mejangir, Berta-Gumuz, Gedeo-Guji, WOGAGODA conflict (United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Ethiopia, 2012) and Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

Moreover, UNDP Ethiopia (2012) on its development brief titled “Towards a Comprehensive Peace Building Policy and Strategy for Ethiopia” identified the types of conflicts in the country as inter-clan/ethnic conflicts; regional border conflicts; natural resource conflicts and religious conflicts. Sisay (2007) also identified ethno-centric federalism and ethno-centric politics as a cause of inter-ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

However, the SNNPRS conflict assessment failed to show the existence of ethnic conflicts in the region. Based on the assessment the major causes of conflicts in the Regional state include: poverty, harmful traditional practices, lack of good governance, undeveloped peace culture and issues of border demarcation (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2014). Therefore, the assessment neglected the existing reality of ethnic conflicts with in the Regional state. The denial of ethnic conflicts further will affect the management and resolution of ethnic conflicts by the local government stakeholders, regional and federal government at large.

2.2.5. The Consequences of Ethnic Conflicts

In the post-Cold War by quoting Kellas, Hashmi & Majeed (2015) have estimated that due to ethnic conflict/violence ten million lives were lost during 1945 to 1975. Likewise, Ibrahim (1998) also stated that since 1945, ethnic conflicts have claimed some 16 million lives, several times more than those dead in inter-state wars. Moreover, from 1990 to 94, nearly 800,000 people were lost their lives in ethnic warfare between Hutus and Tutsi tribes in Rwanda and Burundi (Hashmi & Majeed 2015).

The impact of ethnic conflict has a very direct effect far beyond its epicenter. It creates instability, refugees, organized crimes and international terrorism. It also creates other ethnic conflicts in the same country or elsewhere in the region, and at times because of spillover effect of the conflict. Ethnic conflict usually forces people to displace from their residence and seek refuge in the neighboring countries/regions. Moreover, the crossing of state borders because of inter-ethnic conflicts created ‘internationalized ethnic conflict.’ (Moe, 2009). For example, the Hutu and Tutsi groups of Rwanda and Burundi has connected both countries and the conflicts in them. Moreover, in Asia, Balkans and Caucasus the conflicts happened in one country endangers the neighboring country’s peace and stability. The insecurity because of ethnic conflicts created in individual states and the entire regions create conditions in which organized crime can aggravate (Wolff, 2006).

In Africa due to inter-ethnic conflicts, a very large number of people are displaced from their home countries and became refugees in the neighboring countries (*Ibid*).

Chapter Three

Research Methodology and Fieldwork Experience

3.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the methodological issues of the study. The chapter deals with the research design sources and instruments of data collection used; sampling size and sampling technique employed; and selection of field assistants. In addition, the fieldwork experience and the methods and procedures of data analysis are discussed. Finally, the reliability, validity and ethical considerations are presented in this chapter.

3.2. Research Design

A research design is a plan, structure and strategy of investigation to obtain answers to research questions or problems (Kumar, 2005). In this study, the researcher employed qualitative research method. Qualitative research method is used to identify the characteristics and the significance of human experiences as described by participants and interpreted by the researcher at various levels of abstractions. The intent of qualitative research is to understand a particular social situation, event, role, group or interaction (Creswell, 1994).

Moreover, for this study exploratory (formulative) research design is used. Exploratory research design is important to gain new insights, discover new ideas and/or increase knowledge of experience of being involved (Burns et.al., 2011). It intends only to explore the basic research questions and it does not aim to give a final and conclusive solution to the existing problems, but it helps to have a better understanding of the problem. Therefore, the focus of exploratory research design is to discover new problems on which little or no previous research has been done (Brown, 2006; Kothari & Garg, 2014).

3.3. Sources of Data

In this research, most of the data were obtained from primary sources. However, few secondary sources were used to supplement the primary data. The primary sources of data were in-depth interviewees (such as key informants and government official informants), and FGD participants. On the other hand, secondary sources used are conflict situation official reports, thesis/dissertations, journal articles, books, legislations, newspapers and academic literatures.

Therefore, the analysis of this research relied on three type of data sources; qualitative interviewees, FGDs, and documents.

3.4. Instruments of Data Collection

In undertaking this study, multiple instruments of data collection were employed. The techniques of data collection used falls in to four categories: In-depth-interview, telephone interview, focus group discussion, and document analysis.

3.4.1. In-depth Interview

In-depth interview is a repeated face-to-face encounter between the researcher and informants directed towards understanding the informants' perspectives on their experiences, or situations as expressed in their own words (Kumar, 2005). In this study, the researcher conducted semi-structured interview. It is more appropriate type of interview because it is conducted with fairly open frame work, which allowed focused, conversational and two way communication. Moreover, it is placed between the two continuums: unstructured (closer to observation) and structured interview (closer to questionnaire) (Denscombe, 2007). A total of 22 in-depth interviewees were personally conducted. Out of these, 12 interviewees were selected from government officials of Zone, Woreda and Kebele level. In conducting the interview with government officials, the researcher tried to balance ethnic backgrounds of both Alle and Konso (see appendix 2). On the other hand, 10 key interviewees (informants) were selected from both community members of Alle and Konso who had better information on the conflict issue. All the interviews were conducted in the official language of the area i.e. Amharic. However, in few exceptions local languages were translated using field assistants and/language translators. During the interview, relevant notes were also taken. Moreover, based on their consent, only few of the interviewees were recorded using audiotape, transcribed and translated in to English. Most importantly, the interviews were conducted in a setting that the informants feel free and assume that they are in the natural course of interaction.

3.4.2. Telephone Interview

The researcher conducted three telephone interviews. This was due to the intense insecurity situation of the study area and the challenges faced the researcher during his fieldwork. As Kothari & Garg (2014), stated telephone interview is a kind of interview that consists contacting respondents on telephone itself. It is used at times; access can be gained to respondents who

otherwise cannot be contacted for one reason or the other. Among the telephone interviewees, two of them were from Alle and another one was from Konso. Moreover, field and/telephone assistants assisted all the telephone interviews (see appendix 2).

3.4.3. Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

Focus group discussion is exploring the perceptions, experiences, and understanding of a group of people who have some experience in common with regard to a situation or event (Kumar, 2005). For triangulating data obtained from in-depth and telephone interviewees, two FGD sessions were carried out. The participants of the FGD were selected based on their willingness, sex and ethnic background since the issue was sensitive. However, the female FGD participants were very limited in number because of their lack of willingness. Therefore, the Alle session was carried out at Gewadaa with six participants whereas the Konso session was held at Karat with seven participants. Like in-depth interviews, the field assistants assisted the FGD. The medium of communication for FGD was Amharic. Moreover, during the FGDs the researcher recorded field notes.

3.4.4. Document Analysis

In conducting this study (from its inception to finalization) various types of published and unpublished documents were explored and used, which include: conflict situation official reports or letters, constitutions, MA thesis, newspapers, figures, maps, working papers and other relevant documents. Before using secondary sources (documents), the researcher used three basic criteria of evaluating the sources of data namely: Reliability, suitability and adequacy of data.

3.5. Sampling Technique and Sampling Size

Since the study is qualitative the selection of in-depth and telephone interviewees were based on non-probability sampling method: purposive sampling technique. Accordingly, the researcher purposefully selected government official informants and key informants who can provide the best information. While selecting purposefully the researcher tried to consider their ethnic group, knowledge and position in the society/ethnic group. According to Kumar (2005), the primary consideration in purposive sampling is the judgment of the researcher as who can provide the best information to achieve the objectives of the research. It is extremely useful to construct a historical reality, describe a phenomenon or develop something about which only little is known.

As far as the sample size is concerned, most scholars like Kumar (2005) agree that qualitative research does not attempt to either quantify or determine the sample size. Therefore, in qualitative research, to explore the diversity, the researcher need to reach what is known as saturation point in terms of the finding investigated. Data saturation involves bringing new participants continually in to the data set is complete. In other words, saturation is reached when the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being added (Marshal et.al, 2013).

As a result, a total of 22 in-depth and 3 telephone interviewees participated in the study. For the sake of data triangulation, the researcher employed two FGD sessions, which involved six Alle and seven Konso participants in each session. The participants of FGD were purposefully selected from each ethnic group based on their knowledge and information on the conflict issue.

3.6. Selection of Field Assistants

In undertaking this study, having a field assistant was very vital. The field assistants were selected based on their willingness, ability to speak the local language and communication skill (see appendix 2). There were several reasons why the researcher used field assistants. The field assistants helped the researcher to create trust among the interviewees and FGD participants and the larger ethnic group members. During the fieldwork, there was insecurity in the study area and the movements of people were highly restricted because of fear of the regional special security forces deployed. At the time, having a field assistant was mandatory for the researcher to be accepted and be trusted by the members of the community/ethnic group. In addition, the field assistants involved in guiding and suggesting the potential in-depth and telephone interviewees to the researcher. Moreover, the field assistants translated when there was few misunderstanding between the researcher and the interviewees because of language barrier.

In general, the field assistants who assisted the researcher in facilitating face-to-face and telephone interviews as well as FGD were seven in number. All the assistants know the local language and culture of the area (see appendix 2).

3.7. Field Work Experience

Before the researcher went to the field area for data collection, all necessary preparation was made. The interview and FGD guides were prepared in English language. Then, it was translated in to Amharic (the language of data collection). Then after, the research advisor and other colleagues of the study commented and corrected the guiding instrument.

The field data gathering was conducted mainly for around three weeks from 19th February, 2016 to 14th March, 2016. At the beginning, the researcher went to Segen town and collected all necessary data with the help of a field assistant. Most of the Zone government official informants were positive in writing letters to the two Woreda administrations and giving data about the issue. However, they were busy in organizing and participating in the good governance campaign programme of the Zone. This made the researcher a little bit slower in collecting data in the Zone government offices.

The second fieldwork place was Konso Woreda that the researcher was challenged a lot because of the intense security situation. As a result, accessing the informants was very difficult for the researcher. Moreover, at the final days of data collection in Konso the researcher has faced a great challenge from regional security forces. While the researcher was interviewing in Konso Woreda office, the armed regional security forces came to the office and took all the researcher's field notes, FGD and interview guides and identification card. Soon, the researcher informed/reported about the problem faced to the IPSS and his advisor. However, after negotiation with the SNNPRS officials and security forces of the area they returned all the documents they took on the next day. The third research site was in Alle Woreda, which was better than the field experience of Konso except few challenges. In general, because of few gaps created during field data collection, the researcher conducted telephone interviews with the help of field/telephone assistants.

During data collection the researcher speaks neither Afan-Xonso nor Pago-Alle languages. However, there was no such a serious language barrier that faced the researcher. Because Amharic was spoken in most parts of the study area particularly in the towns. Moreover, all the research field assistants can speak the local language of the study area make the work of the researcher easier.

3.8. Methods and Procedures of Data Analysis

For analyzing data collected through in-depth interview, telephone interview, FGD, and document analysis the researcher utilized qualitative method of data analysis using Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA) model. Because, SCA model provides a deeper understanding of the conflict situation or context through assessment of structures, causes, actors and conflict dynamics (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 2006). Furthermore, the researcher made an effort to organize, analyze and interpret data in a sound manner.

3.9. Reliability and Validity

Reliability and validity are important concepts in research. Many research mistakes occur due to problems related to research validity and reliability. In order to maintain reliability and validity of the research the researcher used triangulation (use of multiple methods) of data collected through different instruments: in-depth-interview, telephone interview, FGD, and document analysis. In addition, the researcher used colleagues and peer reviews of the research project (from the beginning to the completion). Most importantly, the researcher repeatedly met with his advisor and this in turn created a chance to minimize errors in conducting the research.

3.10. Ethical Considerations

Research ethics is the “moral” principle guiding research from its inception through the completion and publication of results and beyond. Ethical issues are becoming a crucial element in social science research. A social science researcher has an obligation to respect the rights, needs and desires of the informant(s) (Creswell, 1994). Thus, the researcher followed ethical guidelines from the beginning to completion of this research project. The researcher obtained the in-depth interviewees, telephone interviewees and FGD participants’ informed consent and informed the purpose and type of data wanted from them. The anonymity and privacy of the research participants was respected and the collected data is carefully kept. In addition, an effort was made to avoid bias and to become objective as possible.

Chapter Four

Description of the Study Area

4.1. Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State at a Glance

The SNNPRS is located in South and Southwest part of Ethiopia. Internally, it shares boundaries with Oromia Regional State in the North East and Gambella Regional State in the North West. Globally, it shares borders with South Sudan Republic and Kenya in the South West and South respectively. The Region has an area of 110,931.90 square kilometers, which comprise 10% of the total area of the country. Out of this total area 26% is cultivated land, 22% virgin land, 12% grazing land, 11 % forest, 8 % covered by bushes and the rest 21% is covered by others (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2014).

With regard to climatic characteristics, the region consists of 6.2% sub desert ,49.8% desert, 36.5% moderate warm, 6.8% cold and 0.7% extreme cold (frigid) weather condition. The annual average rainfall ranges from 400- 2200 millimeter whereas the annual average temperature falls from 7.5- 27.5⁰ C (*Ibid*).

According to CSA (2007) report, the total population of the SNNPRS was 15,042,531 and covers 20.4% of the total population of the country. Accordingly, the annual rate of growth of the population is 2.9 %. Concerning the density of population, on the average 138 persons live in per square kilometer whereas the maximum density is 627 persons and the minimum is 21 persons in Gedeo and South Omo Zones respectively. However, based on the CSA population projection (2013) the total population of the region reached 18,276, 012 in 2015.

The region is unique in its enormous diversity; home to multi-ethnic, cultural, religious, political and socio-economic markers that define the plurality of identities distinguishing individuals and groups from each other (Beken, 2012 cited in Tefera, 2015). In the region, there are 56 different ethnic groups and languages, which are grouped under four language families: Omotic, Nilo-Saharan/Nilotic, Cushitic and Semitic (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2009 & 2014).

The SNNPRS was comprised five Regions that were among the 14 Regions established by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The five Regions that formed the Transitional SNNPRS are Region 7: North part of SNNPRS (Gurage, Hadiya, Kembata, Alaba, Tembaro,

Halaba and Yem). Region 8: East part (Sidama, Gedeo, Burji, Kore, Amaro, Burji and Gidicho). Region 9: Central part (Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, Dawro, Konta, Dirashe, Konso, Alle, Mosiye, Mashole, Zayse and Oyda). Region 10: South part (Basketo, Malle, Bana, Tsemay, Murssi, Ari, Hamer, Dassenech, and Gnangatom). Finally, Region 11: West part (Kefficho, Nao, Shekicho, Bench, Chara, Dizi, Surma, Meinit, Zilmamo and Sheko). The South Ethiopian Peoples Transitional Government was established on February 8, 1993 through the amalgamation of five regional states (region 7-11) of the TGE (Vaughan, 2003; SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2014).

At the end of the transitional period, the FDRE was established following the proclamation of the constitution on December 8, 1994. The SNNPRS was one of the nine constituting regional states established on June 24, 1995. Firstly, eleven Zones and five special Woreda administrations established the SNNPRS. However, after a while, the regional state was reorganized into thirteen Zones, namely: Sidama, Gedeo, Kambata-Tambaro, Gamo-Gofa, Dawro, Wolayita, Hadiya, Guraghe, Siltie, South Omo, Bench Maji, Kaffa and Shaka. The eight Special Weredas' (SWs') were Basketo, Konta, Halaba, Yem, Amaro, Burji, Konso and Derashe (SNNPRS, Council of Nationalities, 2014).


According to article 45 (1) of the revised SNNPRS constitution (2001), the regional state has three organs of government namely: Legislative (State Council & Council of Nationalities), executive and judiciary body. The three state organs except the Council of Nationalities have organized in all Zones, Special Woredas', Woredas' and Kebeles of the Region. Moreover, as per the constitution there are four hierarchical administrative structures namely: Regional (state), Zone/Special Woreda, Woreda and Kebele levels.

Accordingly, recently, from the 8 SWs, four of them (Amaro, Burji, Konso and Derashe) and the Alle Woreda have been reorganized in one Zone called Segen Area Peoples Zone (SAPZ). Hence, currently, all 56 ethnic groups of the SNNPRS are organized into 14 Zones, 4 SWs, 131 Woredas, 22 Cities and 3999 Kebeles. The 14 administrative Zones include Bench-Majji, Dawro, Gamo-Gofa, Gedeo, Gurage, Hadiya, Kaffa, Kembata-Tembaro, SAPZ, Sheka, Sidama, Silte, South Omo, and Wolayita. The 4 SWs' include Yem, Alaba, Konta and Basketo (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2014).


4.2. Segen Area People's Zone (SAPZ)

4.2.1. Geographical Location of the Study Area

Map 4.1. Map of SNNPRS Showing Administrative Zones and Special Woredas'



Map 4.2. Specific Map of the Study Area



4.2.2. Demographic, Socio-Cultural and Political Characteristics of SAPZ

SAPZ is one of the administrative Zones of SNNPRS, which was established on 28th March, 2011. Geographically, it is bordered with Gamo Gofa Zone at the North, Oromia Regional State at the South and East and South Omo Zone at the West. The Zone consists of five administrative Woreda's namely: Amaro, Burji, Dirashe, Konso and the newly established Alle Woreda. Its administrative capital is called Segen. It is 622 km far from Addis Ababa, 342 km from Hawasa and 67 km from Arba Minch (Segen Municipality, 2014).

Demographically, SAPZ is the home of multi-religious and cultural identities with eight dominant ethnic groups: Alle, Burji, Dirasha, Xonsita (Konso), Kore, Kusumie, Mashole and Moseye. Moreover, there are other ethnic groups living in the Zone such as Oromo, Amhara, Gamo, Wolita, Gurage and others. Its total population is estimated to be 734, 225 (SAPZ Culture and Tourism Department, 2015). The following table shows the estimated population of SAPZ by Woreda.

Table 4.1. Segen Area Peoples' Zone Population by Woreda

No	Woreda	Male	Female	Total	Coverage in SAPZ	Rank
1	Konso	127,975	137,701	265,676	36.2 %	1 st
2	Amaro	94,778	93,141	187,919	25.6%	2 nd
3	Derashe	64,420	67,091	131,511	17.9%	3 rd
4	Alle	38,890	39,478	78,368	10.7%	4 th
5	Burji	34,568	36,183	70,751	9.6%	5 th
	Total	360,631	373, 594	734,225	100%	-

Source: SAPZ Culture and Tourism Department, Hebre-Segen Magazine, 2015: ii

Before the establishment of Alle Woreda and SAPZ, the eight ethnic groups were arranged in to four Special Woreda's. The Dirashe Special Woreda (DSW) included five ethnic groups: Dirasha, Dhobasse (now Alle), Mossiye, Masholle and Kussume. The Konso Special Woreda (KSW) was composed of the majority Konso and the minority Gewada (now called Alle). The Amaro and Burji Special Woredas' composed of Kore and Burji ethnic groups respectively. However, as the Alle government official informants stated before the establishment of Alle Woreda the present

Alle ethnic group was identified as Dhobase (in DSW) and Gewada (in KSW). The socio-cultural and demographic characteristics of ethnic groups that constitute SAPZ are presented below.

1. The Burji Ethnic Group

The Burji ethnic group is one of the eight ethnic groups that mainly live in the Burji Woreda of SAPZ. Outside the country, they also live in Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa. According to the CSA (2007) report the population size of the ethnic group was about 71, 871. Its language is called '*Dashate*', which belongs to Cushitic language family. Their history of origin was from Central part of Ethiopia particularly from North Showa, Bulga area (Segen Municipality, 2014; SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2009).

2. The Dirashe Woreda

Until 28th March 2011 (establishment of SAPZ), it was designated as Dirashe Special Woreda (Dirashe Leyu Woreda). However, it become one the five administrative Woredas' of SAPZ. It is a multiethnic Woreda, which incorporates four major ethnic groups namely: D'irasha (majority in number), Masholle, Kussume and Mossiye. Its multi-ethnic nature makes unique among the Woreda's of the Zone. The Woreda is bordered with Gamo Gofa Zone at the North, Alle and Konso Woreda's at the South, Segen town and Amaro Woreda at the East (Dirashe Woreda Culture and Tourism Office, 2014; Tefera, 2015). The major ethnic groups of Dirashe Woreda are presented below.

❖ The Dirasha Ethnic Group

It is one of the four ethnic group in Dirashe Woreda, which constitutes the majority of population size and geographic coverage. According to the CSA (2007) report, the total population number of the ethnic group was 30,081. The ethnic group call its language, '*Dirashtata*' which is categorized under Eastern Cushitic language family. The ethnic group members claimed that their history of origin was from Borena-Oromo (Segen Municipality, 2014, Tefera, 2015).

❖ The Kussume Ethnic Group

It is among the four major ethnic groups of Dirashe Woreda. The ethnic group mainly live in Gato Kebele, which is located in the southern part of Gidole (administrative center of Dirashe Woreda). As per the CSA (2007) report, the total number of ethnic group was 7470. The Kusume's call their language "Kusumegna" or just "Kusume", which is grouped under the Cushitic language family.

The ethnic group members claimed their history of origin to be from the “Kolla” land of Mashole, a locality called “Talasso.” (Tefera, 2015; Segen Municipality, 2014).

❖ **The Masholle Ethnic Group**

It is one of the ethnic groups residing in the Dirashe Woreda. The ethnic group largely settled at a place called “Kolla Mashele” which is 26 km south of Gidole town. Based on the CSA (2007) report, its population size was 10,458. The mother tongue of the ethnic group is called ‘*Masholegna*’ and it is categorized under Cushitic language family (Tefera, 2015). According to the oral tradition of the ethnic group, its history of origin was from North Shewa, a place called Argoba (Segen Municipality, 2014; SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2009).

❖ **The Mossiye Ethnic Group**

It is one of the four ethnic groups of Dirashe Woreda located at the back of mount Gardulla. In its population number, it is the second largest ethnic group next to Dirasha ethnic group in Dirashe Woreda (Tefera, 2015). According to the CSA (2007), the population number of the ethnic group was 19, 698. Its language is called ‘*Mositata*’ or ‘*Mossiyetachi*’ which is categorized under the Cushitic language family (Segen Municipality, 2014). With regard to its history of origin, Tefera (2015:49) stated “historically the root of Mossiye ethnic group was Gochiree, a place located in Nallo Kebele and from this original place they expanded in to Killa and Basso. Presently, the Mossiye ethnic groups are living in the Nallo, Bussa-Killa and Bussa-Basso Kebeles.”

3. The Kore Ethic Group

It is one of the founding member of SAPZ with its own Woreda called Amaro Woreda. According to the CSA (2007), the population size of the ethnic group was 156, 983. The ‘*Korrete*’ is the mother tongue of the ethnic group and it belongs to Omotic language family. As the ethnic group oral tradition indicated, the ethnic group historically originated from Menz- North Shewa (SNNPRS Council of Nationalities, 2009; Amaro Woreda Tourism and Culture Office, 2013).

Table 4.2. Summary of the Ethnic Group Composition of SAPZ

N o	Ethnic Group	History of Origin	First Language	Language Family	Population (CSA, 2007)	Coverage in SAPZ
1	Burji	Bulga-Central Ethiopia	Dashate/ Burgigna	Cushitic	71, 871	11.8 %
2	Dirasha	Borana	Dirashetata	Cushitic	30, 081	4.9 %
3	Kussume	Kolla-Mashole: Talasso	Kusume/ Kusumegna	Cushitic	7, 470	1.2 %
4	Mashole	Argoba-North Shewa	Masholegna	Cushitic	10, 458	1.7 %
5	Mossiye	Nallo Kebele: Gochiree	Mositata/ Mossiyetachi	Cushitic	19, 698	3.2 %
6	Kore	North Shewa: Menz	Korrete	Omotic	156, 983	25.7 %
7	Alle	South of Saudi Arabia/ SW Ethiopia: Awogaro	“Pago-Alle” or “Allegna”	Cushitic	68, 600	11.2 %
8	Konso	Borana-Liben	Afan-Xonso	Cushitic	245, 430	40.2 %
	Total	-	-	-	610, 591	100%

Source: Adapted and Organized from the Sources Used

4.3. Alle and Xonsita Ethnic Groups

4.3.1. The Alle Ethnic Group

4.3.1.1. The Ethnic Group and Its Geographic Location

The Alle ethnic group is one of the fourth largest ethnic group found in SAPZ, Alle Woreda. The language of the ethnic group is called “Pago-Alle” which means the language of Alle. The language is categorized under Cushitic language family. Literally, the term “Alle” in “Pago-Alle” language refers to the people who live in “Dega”/temperate highland area or “people who live in cold areas”, referring to the hillsides where most of the Alle people live (Alle Woreda Culture and Tourism Office, 2014). But, currently, there are people of Alle who live in the hill foots (lowland) parts of the Woreda.

The Alle woreda was established on 2nd December, 2010, four months before the establishment of SAPZ (established on 28th March, 2011). It has an area of 1158 sq. km. It is bordered with Dirashe at the North, Konso at the South and South Western, Bena Tsema (South Omo Zone) at the West and Malle (South Omo Zone) at the North-West. According to the CSA (2007) the total population of Alle is 68 600. However, the CSA (2013) population projection did not mentioned the population current Alle Woreda. Thus, based on the estimation of the Alle Woreda Culture and Tourism Office (2014), the population reached 72, 970 of which 38, 778 are females and 34, 192 are males. More than 90% of the population live in rural villages. In terms of religion, the people of Alle practice Christianity (Orthodox and Protestant) and traditional belief (*Ibid*).

The administrative center of the Woreda was Gewada. In 2015, it was shifted to “Kolango” which means the center of nine clans. The Woreda is 650 km far South West of Addis Ababa, 422 Km South West of Hawassa, 92 km from Segen city and 17 km from Jinka (administrative center of South Omo Zone) main asphalt road (*Ibid*).

4.3.1.2. Topography and Economic Activities

The Alle Woreda has an elevation, which ranges from 590-2800 m above sea level with different landscapes such as plains, gorges, plateaus, hilly and mountain landscapes. Based on this elevation, the Woreda is divided in to three major agro-climatic zones with 1800 -2800 meters above sea level are called ‘Dega’ /temperate highland; those 1600-1800 meters fall under ‘Woina Dega’/ warm temperate semi-highland/ and areas below 590 meters are ‘Kola’ /semi-arid lowlands. Generally, the Woreda has 17.6% “Dega”, 47.2% “Woina dega” and 35.2% “Kolla”. The lowest

and highest average annual rainfall of the Woreda is between 1401-1800 mm while the average annual temperature is 20⁰C-23⁰C (Alle Woreda Culture and Tourism Office, 2014).

Agriculture is the main livelihood of Alle Woreda. Mostly, the Woreda produces a variety of food grains like teff, barley, oats, sorghum, maize, wheat, beans and peas. It also produces cash crops like coffee, ‘chat’, ‘gesho’ and others. Furthermore, the Woreda has a livestock population estimated as 298,210. Among this livestock population, 144, 341 of them are cattle, 71, 182 sheep and goats, 4505 equines and 78, 182 poultry (*Ibid*).

4.3.1.3. History of Origin

Regarding the history of origin of Alle there is no clear research based finding. However, there are different oral traditions about its origin. As some of the Alle elder key informants viewed, the descendants of the ethnic group are from “*Ham*” people who came from South of Saudi Arabia. Gradually, these people came from different direction and finally settled in their present land. However, the majority of Alle FGD participants claimed that the descendants of Alle came from the present South-West Ethiopia a place called “Awogaro.” The place is found between the present Alle Kebele’s of Dega Mashele and Addis Wolitima.


4.3.1.4. The Clan System and Socio-Cultural Organization

The Alle ethnic group has a traditional socio-political organization with its own clan system. There are nine clans with their own clan head and totem. The Alle key informants identified the name of the clans as “Amadiko/Ishaliko, Barto, Elako, Esmako/Regako, Gersiko, Guliko, Lohako, Mahaliko and Ospiko.” Moreover, all Alle FGD participants stated that each clan has its own clan chief/leader with its respective territory. Clan leadership or clan chieftainship is hereditary. The major duty of the clan chiefs is convincing their respective clan members to refrain from offending other clan members and to stop from brewing conflict. In addition, below the clan chiefs there are ‘Goda’s’, who are directly accountable to the clan chiefs and can decide on issues of their jurisdiction and territory. In addition, in the administrative hierarchy there are ‘Mankulos’ organized along family ties or kinship and they are directly accountable to ‘Godas’.

The Alle FGD participants further confirmed each administrative hierarchy (clan chieftainship, Goda and Mankulo) has subordinate cultural leaders called “Sarko” who consult the clan chiefs and convey the messages of the clan chiefs to the ordinary people. The people who had suffered and had grievance will bring their cases or petition before the “Sarko” and later the Sarko’s will

move to the area of the conflict and do their utmost to settle the conflict. However, when they fail to resolve the problem, they report about the case to their superiors (clan chief). Women do not have a role in the traditional administration. Nevertheless, the wife of the clan chief could seize power for life if her spouse dies devoid of a son who could inherit him.

Figure 4.1. Clan Administrative Organization of Alle Ethnic Group



Source: Adapted from the Interview made, 2016

4.3.1.5. Local Government Administrative Structure

After more than fifteen years of quest for common ethnic identity and self-governance, Alle established its own Woreda on 2nd December, 2010. Based on the Alle official informants currently the Woreda is organized in to five clusters or “Agelgelots” and each cluster has 3-4 Kebeles. The total numbers of Kebeles are 17; out of these 16 and 1 are rural and urban Kebeles respectively. Before its establishment, Konso and Dirashe Special Woreda’s administered the 17 Kebeles. Accordingly, 7 Kebeles were the part of KSW (Eyana, Gergema, Gewada, Guma, Kerkerte, Turuba & Kollango) and 10 Kebeles were part of DSW (Addis-Woltima, Bolle, Delbena-Gama, Dega-Mashelle, Diginte, Goroze, Dugulo, Lalicho, Lokete and Tsemaha).

Table 4.3. Clusters and Kebeles of Alle Woreda Administration

No	Name of the Cluster	No of Constituting Kebeles	List of Constituting Kebeles
1	Tshemaha	3	Tshemaha*, Bolle*, Lokte
2	Kolango	4	Kolango, Diginte*, Guma, Gergema
3	Gewadaa	4	Gewadaa, Eyana, Kerkerte*, Turuba
4	Dega Mashele	3	Dega Mashele, Delbena Gama, Goroze
5	Addis Woltima	3	Addis Woltima, Dugulo, Lalicho
Total		17	-

* Sign shows Kebeles with their livelihood is semi-pastoralism

Source: Organized from Interviews, 2016

4.3.2. The Xonsita (Konso) Ethnic Group

4.3.2.1. The Ethnic Group and Its Geographic Location

The Xonsita (Konso) ethnic group is located in the South West of Ethiopia, SNNPRS. Outsider people name the ethnic group as “Konso”. However, they call themselves as “Xonsita” It is believed that the name Konso is derived from the term ‘Konssita’ meaning “fertile and favorable land for crop production that is suitable to live.” But, this does not represent the whole parts of Konso (Segen Municipality, 2014). The mother tongue of the ethnic group is “Afan Xonso” or “Konsogna” that belongs to the Eastern Cushitic language family (Mamitu, 2002). Afan Konso is related to Afan Oromo language. As quoted by Lakew (1998:19), Hallpike (1974) wrote the relationship of the two languages as:

Afan Konso is an East Cushtic language, like Oromiffa, and the Konso believe that they were descended from Borana in the distant past, and from the Ala and Gouwada; they also have some close cultural and linguistic similarities to the Gidole. The relationship between the Konso and [Oromo] peoples is most obviously displayed in the linguistic evidence.

Apart from their mother tongue, the majority of Xonsita ethnic group speak Afan-Oromo, Amharic and Pago-Alle languages (Segen Municipality, 2014).

Following the country's Federal structure arrangement Konso became one of the five Special Woredas' (districts) of SNNPRS. After the establishment of SAPZ Konso Special Woreda lowered in to Woreda administration status. It is bordered with Dirashe Woreda in the North, Alle Woreda in North-West and West, Amaro and Burji Woreda in the East and Borana Zone in the South and South Omo Zone in the West. More precisely, Konso lies between 5° 15' and 5° 30' latitude North and 37°15' and 37°30' longitude East (FDRE, 2009).

At present, the Woreda constitutes 43 Kebeles. Out of these, 41 and 2 are rural and urban Kebeles respectively. The total area of the woreda is 2657 sq. km, and a population of 245, 430 people (CSA 2007). However, based on the population projection of CSA (2013) the population of Konso estimated to reach 276, 985 in 2015. Its administrative capital is called Karat (formerly Paqawle). It is situated 595 km South West of Addis Ababa, 365 km away from Hawasa, and approximately 90 km from Arba Minch city (SAPZ Culture and Tourism Department, 2015).

4.3.2.2. Topography and Economic Activities

The land of Xonsita is mountainous and hilly except the limited plains found around rivers and in the low lands. Almost all parts of those mountain ranges and hills are covered with terraces built of basalt stones. The rivers draining the region are either permanent rivers or dry rivers that flow seasonally. Among the permanent ones are the Segen river that drains the South and Southeast border, Woyto (Tullaya) river which drains the Western border and Delbenna river that drains the Central part of Konso springing from the high Derashe and Alle mountain ranges (Mamitu, 2002).

As cited in Mamitu (2002:21), Teferi Abate (1992) explained Konso as follows:

The Konso ecology is mainly characterized by stony soil, rugged features, hot temperature, and a remarkably high population density. This has resulted in shortages of fertile soil, grazing land, rainfall, water reserve, and other resources. In spite of all these shortages and problems, the Konso have managed to create a way of life for themselves on the rocky hilltops through their wise utilization of available local resources. They engage in intensive hoe cultivation, bee keeping, trade, etc.

The main economic activity of Konso is farming and they practice animal husbandry, bee keeping, and trade in some extent (Mamitu, 2002).

4.3.2.3. History of Origin

With regard to the origin of Xonsita, the majority of Konso key informants argued that, their descendants are originally from the area called Borana-Liben of the present day Oromia Regional State. However, some of the FGD participants also claimed that the historical origin of Konso is from Gidole (Dirashe) and Gedeo areas. However, all of the informants and FGD participants equally agree that the Konso ethnic group is originated from outside of the present-day Konso.

Moreover, Hallpike (1972) stated that the ancestors of Konso are from various surrounding areas. He further indicated that the Xonsita came to the present territory through migration from two directions, the east and the west. In the east direction, it was from Borana-Liben areas, and in the west direction, it was from Ala, Gauwada and Ilota (the range of the mountains). Likewise, as indicated on the magazine prepared by Segen municipality (2014) the Xonsita ethnic group was originated from the neighboring Oromia Regional State an area called Borana-liben.

4.3.2.4. The Clan System and Socio-Cultural Organization

In Xonsita ethnic group, the main social organizations, which governs the lives of the ethnic group, are three: Kinship organization, neighborhood organization and age grading system (Lakew, 1998). Clan or “kaffa” in Afan-Xonso is the largest social category or kinship unit in Konso ethnic group (Hallpike, 1972). The clan constitutes a number of lineages base on patrilineal ancestry. According to all key informants and FGD participants in the ethnic group there are nine exogamous clans these are Arkamayta, Elayta, Ishalayta, Keertitaa, Mahaleta, Pasaanta, Sawdata, Tigsayta and Tokmaleeta. Thus, except minor pronunciation differences the list of clans are similar across different researchers such as Hallpike (1972), Shako (1994) and Mamitu (2002).

Although Konso have different clans, they have a common name “Konso” and the territory in which they live. Most importantly, they have a common language and way of life (Lakew, 1998). In Konso clan system, each clan’s man considers the clan members as his brother or sister. As a result, marriage is prohibited within a similar clan, which is similar to Alle ethnic group. In Konso each clan has its own leader (head) which is titled as “Poqalla Tuma.” The office of Poqalla is hereditary and their power is inherited for lifelong. Moreover, the clan heads are considered as holy ones among the community and as a result the practice of the polygamy is not allowed for them. In addition, the clan leaders have enjoyed respect and loyalty from their clan fellows and Konso ethnic group at large (Shako, 1994).

As all Konso key informants stated like Alle ethnic group there is marriage prohibition i.e. endogamy. As Lakew (1998) stated the nine clans are exogamic and patrilineal. Therefore, intermarriage is not allowed in each clan. However, there is no rule that prohibits the procurement of wives. For instance, clan X can marry wives from the remaining eight clans, i.e. except from its own clan (*Ibid*).

4.3.2.5. Traditional Authorities of Konso

Apart from clanship organization, the Xonsita ethnic group gives much respect to other traditional authorities. The following are common traditional authorities of Konso, who are highly respected by the ethnic group members.

❖ The “Hella” (The Warrior Group)

The Hella is an age grade group that is responsible for the administration of towns. Ensuring the security of the people and defend towns from neighboring attacks are the two major responsibilities of the warrior group. Thus, it is an obligation of hella members to take part in armed conflict in order to defend their people (Metasebia, 1998).

❖ The Senkeleta

It is an elected sub-Hella leader elected by the Hella members and council of elders. The selection criteria are having good behavior, good knowledge of Konso tradition and capability to assume responsibility. The major role of Senkeleta is to act as a chief coordinator of the responsible Hella (Mamitu, 2002).

❖ The Apa Timba (Dimba)

Apa Timba literally means the father of drum and the “timba” (drum) is sacred symbol of authority. The “timba” is a sign of the traditional administration. As Halpike (1972) stated the drum is the symbol of peace. However, as the majority of Alle and Konso Key informants stated the drum (timba) is also used for announcing the outbreak of wars/conflicts with the neighboring communities/ethnic groups. Moreover, as the Alle FGD participants confirmed the Apa Timbas (father of drums) are responsible to publicize the eruption of conflicts and encourage the youth to join wars using the drum.

As Lakew (1998) stated the Apa Timbas has no clan base i.e. people from different clans used to serve as the father of drum. Their selection is based on a good conduct, acceptance of the

community, ability to handle community affairs and good knowledge of Konso tradition (Metasebia, 1998).

❖ **The Retired Old Men Group**

This is the last age grading system of Konso that include the group of older men retired from traditional authority service. They usually spend their time in drinking “chaqa”, sitting in the moora and enjoying sun (Kimura, 2004). However, as one Konso FGD participant noted the retired old men groups are responsible during conflicts with the neighboring ethnic groups. They are expected to share their skill of war and encourage the youth and others who take part in the the conflict.

4.3.2.6. Local Government Administrative Structure

Based on the Konso official interviewees, the Woreda has a total of 43 Kebeles i.e. 41 and 2 rural and urban Kebeles respectively. The two urban kebeles include Karat and Segen. The rural and urban Kebeles are structured under six clusters (‘*Agelgelots*’). The cluster consists of a number of Kebeles based on the size of each cluster. Moreover, each Kebele is divided in to small parts or sub-villages called “*Kantas*”

Table 4.4. Clusters and Kebeles of Konso Woreda Administration

No	Name of the Cluster	No of Constituting Kebeles	Name of the Constituting Kebeles
1	Karat	14	Karat city, Jarso, Taraa, Nalayaa Segen, Turaite, Dhogato, Beayde/Pa'ayte, Fuchucha, Buuso, Machala/Nechelo, Kamoole, Kooche, Sorobo, Aba-Rooba/Ayayte*
2	Gumaide/ Koomaite	10	Becho, Segen city, Mellega & Dhugaya, Segen-Genet, Addis-Gebere, Garche, Ayloota, Dhogatu, Lultu, Birbirs
3	Fashe/ Fasha	8	Fasha, Kaho, Mechaqe, Teebana, Kaashalle, Kasargio, Toxa/Tokha, Kerra
4	Turo	6	Arfayte, Kalabo/Gelabo, Teshmallee, Lehayte, Khamalee, Kugnara
5	Kolme	5	Tebela & Kuchale*, Kallgale & Qolmalee*, Maderia & Gezaba(Matara & Gizeba)*, Borkara/Porqara, Masooya*
Total		43	-

*Sign shows semi-pastoralist Kebeles

Source: Organized Based on the Interview made, 2016

4.4. SAPZ as a Conflict Zone among the Constituting Ethnic Groups

SAPZ is a newly established Zone of SNNPRS. As the many of Zone and Woreda official informants stated the major reason for the establishment of the Zone was the conflict among/between different ethnic groups/SWs. Regarding the establishment of SAPZ Frew (2012:54) narrated:

.....according to official sources the Zone [SAPZ] is established in order to avoid inter -ethnic conflicts repeatedly occurring in that particular region. However, the rearrangement was made without properly consulting the local population. It was done by the decision of central political organ of the Regional State delegated through the chain of party command system to the lower level.

Moreover, regarding the initiation and establishment of SAPZ Misganaw (2014:62) stated:

..... the intention for establishing a new Zone [SAPZ] was to resolve the frequently occurring conflicts in the area. Besides, the project had extra objectives like the need for overcoming maladministration, inefficiency, unemployment, and related socio-economic problems of that area in general. The historical and cultural interface of the people in the area was taken as an opportunity for merger in order to enhance peace, stability, good governance, productivity for mutual benefit of all parties by bringing them into one roof-within one administrative structure. The Special Woredas'/nationalities were in a perpetual state of conflict for years.

According to the Zone official informants the frequent intra and inter-ethnic conflicts in the area that causes for the merger and establishment of SAPZ include; intra-ethnic conflicts with in Dirashe, Konso-Dirashe, Burji-Guji, Kore-Guji, Konso-Borena, Alle-Dirashe, Alle-Konso, Amaro-Dirashe and Dirashe-Zeise. Furthermore, the Zone official informants noted that comparatively the Zone is better than its previous situation in terms of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts. However, the informants did not deny the fact that still there are frequent ethnic conflicts in the study area. Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is one of such frequent conflicts of the Zone.

Moreover, the process for the establishment of SAPZ and the placement of the center was also disputable and/conflicting among the constituting ethnic groups SWs. Many of Alle and Konso key informants have uniformly confirmed that there was a problem in setting the administrative center of the Zone. During the placement of the Zone center, the Konsos were claiming its capital, Karat, to host the center taking advantage of its better infrastructure facilities. Similarly, the remaining three SWs' also claimed the Zone center based on their option. Finally, the Zone center was placed at the current city of Segen (previously Gumaide). However, according to Konso key informants the dispute over claiming the Zone center is not resolved still. As the FGD participants of Konso stated the Konso claim over the Zone center is ongoing. During the fieldwork, the researcher observed the tension between the people of Konso with SAPZ and SNNPRS Special Security forces deployed at Konso Woreda. The Konso claim over the Zone center is further transformed in to another question i.e. Konso quest for Zonal Administration. Because of this, the Regional special security forces killed two Konso individuals during the researcher's fieldwork.

Indeed, based on data collected, the tension between Konso with the Regional government and SAPZ and other recurrent inter-ethnic conflicts makes the study area the "conflict prone Zone."

Regarding the quest of Konso for Zonal administration and the consequences that followed one Konso Key informant stated the following:

We [Konso] claimed the Zone administration before the establishment of SAPZ. Konso has an infrastructure at Karat better than other four Woredas [Dirashe, Alle, Amaro & Burji]. However, the Zone was placed in a wrong place i.e. Segen [capital town of SAPZ] with poor infrastructure. As a result, the people of Konso were angered and created grievance. Since September 2015, we are asking the regional government to give Konso a Zonal Administration status. However, the responses given from both the SNNPRS and SAPZ were not positive. Rather, the special security forces killed our people. We never stop our peaceful quest for Zonal administration. The people believe that Konso is capable for Zonal administration because, we have adequate infrastructure at Karat and large number of population i.e. estimated 300,000 (KKI-3, Karat, 23rd February, 2016).

In general, the current quest of Konso for Zonal self-administration may create further grievances with in other constituting Woredas' and in turn lead to conflict. Because, as some of the Zone official informants explained there is still competition over the Zone center and control over the Zone government offices. Moreover, as many of the evidences from interviewees and FGD indicated that the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is not addressed at the grass root level. All these tensions and conflicts confirmed how the Zone is a conflict prone Zone.

Chapter Five

Data Analysis and Presentation

5.1. Introduction

This chapter deals with the discussion of findings obtained from primary and secondary sources of data. In the process of data presentation and analysis, the results obtained through each data collection instrument used in a mixed way as necessary. In other words, the results of the interview are presented together with the results of FGD and document analysis as it is appropriate.

Moreover, under this chapter, the basic research questions are answered, and the objectives of the study are addressed. The results of the analysis are presented under topics and sub-topics created in line with the objectives and basic research questions of the study. The information about the research participants' general background is attached in the appendix part (see appendix 2).

5.2. The Pre-1991 Historical Relationship of Alle and Konso Ethnic Groups

5.2.1. During Emperor Menelik II

For the purpose of power building and establishing politically united imperial state in Ethiopia, Emperor Menelik II expanded to the South, South West and South Eastern parts of Ethiopia. In 1897 Konso, Alle and neighboring communities/ethnic groups were incorporated by the forces of Emperor Menelik II led by Dejazmach Leulseged Atnafseged who was directly involved in the expansion to Sidama, Gedeo and Burji. Later on the expansion was led by the forces of Fitawrari Habtegiorgis followed the old route i.e. the Sidama-Gedeo-Burji-Saba-Sagan-Konso route (Hansemo, 1983).

The expansion of the state resulted in the creation of the vast province of Borana, which comprised almost the Southern half of the country (Hansemo, 1983; Hallpike, 1972). Fitawrari Habtegiorgis became the first governor of Borana province (Hansemo, 1983). The province comprised the territories of Gardula, Konso, Gamo, Goffa, Gumayde and Borana (Wondu, 2011). The administrative center of the province was Gardula town, located on the major trade route which connects Wolayta, Gamo, Amaro, Konso and Borana (*Ibid*). Hence, during Emperor Menelik II the present day Alle and Konso were part of the large province of Borana.

5.2.2. During Haile Selassie I (1941-1974)

Ethiopian patriots and the British beat the fascist Italian forces in 1941. Soon after the defeat of the Italian forces emperor Haile Selassie re-arranged the administrative structure of the old provinces in to small and manageable units. Accordingly, the old provinces were reorganized in to provinces, sub-provinces, districts and sub-districts (Clapham, 1966).

In the post 1941 administrative rearrangement, the Gamu-Gofa province (Teklay-Gizat) was one of the administrative divisions centered at Chenchu up to 1947. However, after the appointment of Dejazmach Gersu Duki (well known patriot), as a governor of the Gemu-Gofa in 1947 the center was shifted from Chenchu to Gidole. In 1957 again, when Dejazmach Tsehayu Enqusellassie was appointed a second round shift was made to Chenchu (Wondu, 2011). This administrative shift was due to the wish of individuals who were appointed. Under the Gamu-Gofa province there was Gardula Awraja which composed of five Woredas' namely: Gardula Zuria (the present Dirashe), Konso, Gumayde, Bonke and Kemba (Frew, 2012).

In 1942, Konso woreda was established with the assigned newly governor, Fitawrari Tadesse Wold. The Woreda was subdivided in to sub-districts (Miktil-Woredas) which centered at Turo and Fasha. After a short period of time the sub-districts were dissolved (Wondu, 2011). However, the Alle (17 kebeles) were administratively divided between Gardula Zuria and Konso woredas. Among these kebeles four of them were part of Konso Woreda and the remaining thirteen were part of Gardula Zuria Woreda (Temesgen, 2010).

5.2.3. During the Derg Regime (1974-1991)

The 1974 Ethiopian revolution ended the power and authority of Emperor Haile Selassie I. The military Derg regime assumed power and established a government (Bahru, 2000). After a while, the Derg regime slightly reordered the imperial regime patterns of administrative organization. As a result, Tekaly-Gizat was renamed Kifle-Hager and remained agent of the central government. The Awraja's and the Woreda's were also left as they were in most cases (Desalegn, 1985).

In general, the Derg regime established 14 administrative regions (Kifle-Hagers) and were divided in to 102 sub regions (Awrajas) and 556 districts (Woredas). The area inhabited by Konso, Alle and Dirasha became under the large administrative region of Gemu Gofa Kifle-Hager, in the province (Awraja) of Gardula. The Gemu-Gofa Kifle Hager as an administrative region lasted from 1974 to 1987. Its administrative capital was Arba Minch, and the provincial town of Gardula

Province was Gidole. Moreover, the province was further divided into administrative units corresponding to districts, known as Woreda (Frew, 2012; Shinohara, 1993).

With the declaration of the 1987 PDRE constitution the Derg regime further reorganized the administrations in to autonomous and semi-autonomous regions (Markakis, 2003). The administrative arrangement was an attempt to respond to questions of cultural autonomy intensified in the country. At that time, the Omotic speakers in South Western Ethiopia including Wolayta, Gamo, Gofa, and Dawro were lumped together and established North Omo Area Administration (Semen Omo Akababi Astedader). The Konso, Alle and their neighbor D'irasha's were made part of it regardless of the Cushitic language they speak (Frew, 2012).

After 1987, the new government structure of Awraja elevated the status of Konso from Woreda to Awraja. Regarding Alle, the government took additional three Kebeles from the previous Garadula Zuria Woreda in to the newley established Konso Awraja. Thus, the Alle populated Kebeles in Konso Awraja reached seven and under Gardula Zuria Woreda reduced to ten. However, the Derg was the first to officially recognize the territorial identification of Alle clan Bogolhos in to the legal status of nationalities (Temesgen, 2010).

In conclusion, during the Derg regime both Alle and Konso shared the administrative organization of the area. They were also in conflict in the 1970's along the present "Kolme Cluster". According to the Alle and Konso key informants, the conflict was caused by the competition over grazing land. However, due to the 1985 famine the two communities weakened and became peaceful.

5.3. The Nature of Post 1991 Relations

In 1991, the Dergue regime was toppled down by the EPRDF. Since then, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was established that ruled the country from 1991-1995. During this period 14 regional administrations (Kilils) were organized primarily along territorial bases. North Omo (Semen Omo) Region (Kilil) was one of the administrative region of TGE and named as Region 9. The region incorporated the central part of the current SNNPRS, which include Wolayta, Gamo, Goffa, Dawro, Konta, Dirashe, Konso etc. (Vaughan, 2003; Frew, 2012). Therefore, Konso, Dirashe and Alle (divided in to two) were part of North Omo Region.

In 1995, the FDRE constitution was promulgated and enforced. In addition, the administrative and political structure of the country was organized in line with ethnic identity. As a result, nine

regional states were established. The SNNPRS is among the nine federating units established through the merger of five transitional period regions (7-11) (Zemelak, 2014).

The Regional states were also organized their constituent local governments (Zone, Special Woreda, Woreda and Kebele) along ethnic lines. As the Zone government official informants stated, it was during this time the four Special Woredas' / *Liyu-Woredas*' (Konso, Dirashe, Amaro, and Burji) established. They are now part of SAPZ. Nevertheless, the Alles' were divided and administered under Konso and Dirashe Special Woredas'. Based on the division ten Kebeles and seven kebeles of Alle were part of DSW and KSW respectively. As many of Alle key informants identified it was during this time the Alle ethnic consciousness augmented and quest for Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance begun.

In general, the post 1991 Alle-Konso ethnic relation can be categorized in to peaceful (cordial) and conflictual relations. In other words, the post 1991 Alle and Konso relation can be viewed as peaceful at one time and conflictual on another time.

5.3.1. Peaceful (Cordial) Relations

Even though, conflictual relations mark the post 1991 Alle-Konso relation they have also peaceful (cordial) relations that can be manifested through their economic as well as socio-cultural links. The following are the major manifestations of Alle-Konso peaceful relations.

5.3.1.1. Economic Inter-Dependence: Local Markets and Trade

Both Alle and Konso have different agro climatic zones that can support for the production of variety of agricultural goods. Because of this variety of products and the proximity they have, their economic relation depends on the exchange of crops and livestock on local markets. The trade flow is mostly from the surplus production to the scarce production area. As many of Alle and Konso key informants revealed, in both Woredas' there are local market centers on weekly bases. In Alle Woreda there are two major local market centers, which are open on weekly basis namely: Gewadaa (on Tuesday and Saturday) and Kollango (Monday and Thursday). Whereas in Konso the weekly market centers are Karat (on Monday & Thursday) and Kolme (on Thursday). Apart from agricultural products, Alle and Konso also exchanged products such as cloth, salt and others mainly on Konso markets. In the Alle-Konso local markets different farmers, merchants, artisans, herders, petty traders, crop traders and others type of communities attended.

In general, the local markets in both Alle and Konso created economic interdependence between the two ethnic groups in the way that can raise peace between/among the community members.

5.3.1.2. Shared Socio-Cultural Practices

▪ Clan and Inter-Marriage Relations

Alle and Konso lived together for a long period of time and shared different socio-cultural activities. As Alle and Konso key informants stated, both ethnic groups have nine clans with patriarchal lineages. Each Alle clan has its own equivalent Konso clan. Moreover, key informants asserted that in both Alle and Konso each of nine clans has its own clan leader and totem it represents.

In Konso marriage is patrilineal in nature where men and women marry each other from different clan. Men and women of the same clan (*Kafa*) do not marry each other (Halpike,1972). As many of the Alle key informants declared, the same is true of Alle. According to this patriarchal clan system, marriage is allowed between different clan members. However, marriage is prohibited with in the same clan system. Based on this principle the two ethnic groups intermingled with each other through marriage. FGD participants of both Alle and Konso also explained that for marriage to be concluded the clan members (couples) should be from different clans. In other words, the couples should not be from “equivalent clans.” Therefore, clan “X” member from Alle can marry wives from the non-equivalent Konso clan members. In other words, clan “X” from Alle can marry wives from the remaining eight non-equivalent clans i.e. except from its equal clan. The following table shows the “equivalent clans” identified by the FGD participants of Alle and Konso.

Table 5.1. Equivalent Clans of Alle and Konso Ethnic Groups

No	Alle Clans	Equivalent Konso Clans
1	Amadiko/Ishaliko	Arkamayta
2	Elako	Elayta
3	Ospiko	Eshalayta
4	Gersiko	Keertitaa
5	Mahaliko	Mahaleta
6	Lohako	Pasaanta
7	Esmako/Regako	Sawdata
8	Guliko	Tiksayta
9	Barto	Tokmaleeta

Source: Organized based on Interviews made, 2016

Based on Table 5.1 every clan member of Amadiko/Ishaliko can marry from all clans of Konso except the equivalent Arkamayta and vice versa. After such clan equivalency is confirmed by the clan leaders and elders all the requirements for marriage fulfilled. The wedding day will be fixed and the bride gift also given to the family of female spouse in cash or kind. Finally, marriage concluded based on the cultural ceremony of both Alle and Konso.

Apart from inter-marriage relationships, both Alle (particularly Gewadaa area) and Konso have a commonly shared cultural institution of conflict resolution called “*Moora*” (Elders Council) (see appendix 3). As both Alle and Konso key informants confirmed that *Moora* is a council of elders used to resolve inter-personal conflicts with in each ethnic group/clan members. It plays an essential role in the social and ritual life the people of Konso, Alle and the neighboring Dirasha. As Kansite (2011) depicts *Moora* served as a place of public discussion that the plaintiff and defendant brought their cases before the local adjudicators. Any adult man and elder could attend the *Moora* without any restrictions. However, women are restricted to attend the *Moora*.

▪ Shared Food and Clothing Traditions

Alle and Konso share common wearing and food traditions that are expressed through their daily lives. As all participants of FGD said both Alle and Konso use local cultural foods such as “*kurkufa*”, “*chaqa/warshe*”, “*kocho*”, “*nefero*” (cooked bean) and others. “*Chaqa*” in Afan

Xonso and “*warshe*” in Pago Alle is a local beer and at the same time food prepared from corn (maize), sorghum, wheat, millet and other grains. Moreover, in both Alle and Konso, *moringa stenoptela* leaves locally known as “*mida shelaqata*” or in Amharic “*shiferaw*” and named as *halako* in some neighbouring areas has become the most dominant food item and today has an unestimated contribution for the attainment of food security (Guita, 2014).

▪ **Inter-group Communication and Language Sharing**

Even though, Alle and Konso speak different languages their language family is similar i.e. Cushitic language family. Moreover, due to their long time interaction and communication they use similar and/equivalent expressions/words in common. Moreover, as Alle and Konso key informants confirmed there are ethnic group members who can listen and speak both languages: Afan Xonso and Pago Alle. All FGD participants also revealed the fact that language similarity and sharing is common in border areas /Kebeles of the two Woredas’.

Table 5.2. Some Selected Similar and/Equivalent Words of Afan-Xonso & Pago-Alle Languages

No	Pago Alle Word”	“Afan Xonso Word”	Equivalent English Meaning
1	Nagayee	Nagayyta	How are you? Are you fine?
2	Biye	Pitta	Earth
3	Konfa	Konfa	Shorts
4	Kobe	Xoba / Xhoba or Khoba	Shoe
5	Damoo	Dhaama	Flour
6	Elge	Elka	Teeth
7	Monto	Monta	Sky
8	Soko	Sookitta	Table salt
9	Qorsha	Qorasha/Qoracha	Medicine
10	Muze	Muusetta	Banana
11	Pilla	Pilla	Knife
12	Tinsha	Tinnisha/Tinnasha	Sweet Potato
13	Taftare	Taftara	Exercise book
14	Puno	Punnita	Coffee
15	Timpa	Timpa	Drum

Source: Organized based on the Data obtained from Interviews, 2016

5.3.2. Conflictual Relations

Apart from their friendly relations, the Alle and Konso have been involved in a conflict (non-violent to violent) in different periods of time. Thus, for the ease of simplification the researcher categorized these conflicts in to two phases: 1995-2010 (the quest of Alle common ethnic identity & self-governance); and 2011 to present (the post -Alle ethnic identity and self-governance). However, the major focus of this study is the post-2010 Alle-Konso conflictual relations.

5.4. The Quest of Alle Ethnic Identity & Self-Governance (1995-2010)

5.4.1. The Disputed Alle Ethnic Identity and Grievance

In the post 1991, the country's political system was organized along ethnic line. After the announcement of the 1995 FDRE constitution the administrative arrangement of the country was reorganized based on the principle of nations, nationalities and people (FDRE Constitution Proclamation No.1/1995). Accordingly, the SNNPRS was established as one of the regional governments based on the constitution. Furthermore, the SNNPRS organized Zones, Special Woredas (SWs') and Woredas' along ethnic lines as the power granted from article 50 (4) of the FDRE constitution. For example, in the study area four SWs' were established namely: KSW, DSW, ASW and BSW. But, the situation of the ethnic minorities (such as Mussiye and Mashole) within these Special Woredas' were not emphasized by the officials, and none of them were consulted as to their need for administration (Yacob, 2010).

The name "Alle" as a marker of one ethnic group had little importance in the past, partly due to lack of collective consciousness and organized quest by this group (Yacob, 2010). However, the Alle collective ethnic identity emerged as a controversial issue after the establishment of the four SWs. As one Alle government official informant stated the establishment of these SWs created an opportunity for the development of Alle ethnic consciousness. Moreover, Konso and the neighboring Dirashe elites and the larger community imposed different alien names against Alle (Temesgen, 2010).

Regarding the alien names imposed on Alle, one Alle key informant narrated as the following:


Before the recognition of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance in 2010, the Konso and Dirashe used alien names to call Alle ethnic group. The names Dhobase, Goroze, Oraz, Harase and Tosho were used by Dirashe whereas the names Gewadaa and Halla by Konso. Moreover, both Konso and Dirashe considered the current Alle ethnic group [17kebeles] as a mere collection of different ethnic groups

who speak different languages. They considered the people as illiterate and having no ability to establish their [Alle] own administration. Nevertheless, we [Alle] have the same culture and land area/territory (AKI-2, Arba Minch, 9th March, 2016).

Moreover, from the researcher field experience in Konso Woreda, the name Gewadaa is still used as a substitute name for the current Alle ethnic group. Sharing the aforementioned alien names imposed on Alle, one Alle government official informant further put forward the grievances and angers created because of these alien names.

The alien names were used to divide the people of Alle as a collection of different ethnic groups. The Konso Special Woreda targeted to control the 7 Kebeles of Alle as different ethnic group. Nevertheless, such division and violation of our [Alle] rights for common ethnic identity further created anger and hatred against Konso. As a result, the people [Alle] protested against the KSW and refrained from paying tax to the Special Woreda (AWGO-3, Telephone Interview, 21st March, 2016).

Figure 5.1. The Process of Politicization of Alle Common Ethnic Identity



Source: Adapted from Weber et.al., 2016

The above figure (Figure 5.1) shows the politicization of Alle ethnicity since 1991. The Alle had a large potential pool of identities (indicated at t_0) such as Alle ethnicity, Pago-Alle language, Gewadaa, Dhobase, Harase, Oraze etc. However, after the establishment of ethnically organized SWs' in the study area only a small number of identities eventually

become salient (indicated at t_1). Primarily there were four salient identities such as Alle ethnicity, Pago-Alle language, Dhobase and Gewadaa. The local elites of Alle, Konso and Dirashe used these salient identities for political purpose. Among the salient pool of identities, Alle local elites largely politicized two of them (t_2). As a result of such politicization of ethnicity accompanied by grievance and anger further caused for the outbreak of 2008 violent conflict. Finally, at end of the 2008 violent conflict Alle recognized as an autonomous ethnic group and established self-administration in 2010.

5.4.2. The 2008 Ethnic Violence

According to Alle government official informants, the quest of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance repeatedly presented to the respective Special Woreda officials, Regional and Federal governments. However, their struggle for realizing collective ethnic identity has faced strong opposition from Konso and Dirashe government officials (Temegen, 2010).

The SAPZ government official informants further elaborated how the Alles' faced intense opposition from SWs and the consequences following it:

Because of the strong opposition faced from the Special Woredas' of both Konso and Dirashe, local political and educated elites mobilized the Alle's along their common ethnic identity. As a result, they entered in to conflict with both Konso and Dirashe Special Woredas' in 2008 (ZGO-4, Segen, 16th February, 2016).

Regarding the beginning of 2008 violent conflict, the FGD participants of Alle put forward that the conflict begun between the Nallo Kebeles of DSW and Dhobase (Alle) inhabited Addis Woltima Kebele. Step by step, the conflict escalated in to inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Dirashe. Soon after, the conflict spilled over to Konso Woreda and the conflict broke out between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. However, the intensity of the conflict between Alle (Gewada) and Konso was not comparable with the bloody Dirashe violent conflict (Temesgen, 2010).

Finally, according Konso key informants the security forces (Federal and Regional) intervened to manage the conflict. However, their intervention further fueled the conflict and became violent and bloody. As a result, many people (including security forces) killed and properties damaged on both sides. After the lethal violence, the regional government organized a peace conference on 21st July, 2008 at Gewadaa-Alle. The conference ended with the recognition of Gewada-Dhobase as one ethnic group and establishment of their own administration within a year (*Ibid*). Two years

later the name Alle as one ethnic group was officially declared and/recognized by the SNNPRS Council of Nationalities and Alle Woreda was established on 2nd December, 2010.

5.5. The Post-2010 Conflictual Relations: Post Alle Common Ethnic Identity and Self-Governance

After the recognition of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance in 2010 there was a general public expectation that the conflict between Alle and Konso will be addressed at the grass root level and peace will prevail for a long period of time” (ZGO-5, Segen, 16th February, 2016).

Four months later, after the establishment of Alle Woreda, SAPZ was established in 2011 with aim of addressing the intra and inter-ethnic conflicts of the area (see chapter 4). However, all these efforts were not successful in suspending /addressing the inter-ethnic conflicts of the study area. The 2011 and subsequent conflicts were among such evidences that show peace is not guaranteed between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. For example, in the post-2010, three major conflicts were broke out between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. These include: the 2011 violent conflict, the 2013 incident and recently the 2014 violent conflict.

5.5.1. The 2011 Violent Conflict

The 2011 conflict was the first violent conflict that exploded after the establishment of Alle woreda as well as SAPZ. Based on the data obtained from SAPZ conflict situation report (2014) and the Zone government official informants, the conflict begun at Kerkerte Kebele of Alle Woreda a place called “Kukuba-Sala (see appendix 4). The conflict started in April 2011 and lasted for three weeks.

At the outset, the conflict was between Kerkerte Kebele of Alle and Maderia-Gezaba of Konso. In the meantime, different actors mobilized both ethnic group members of Alle and Konso (see actors’ discussion). Consequently, the inter-personal clashes between two Kebeles escalated in to violent ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. Moreover, the conflict spread over the nearest Kebeles of Borkara, Kugnara and Tebela-Kuchale of Konso and Eyana and Gewada of Alle. At its extreme, both ethnic group members marched towards the conflicting area in order to support their ethnic allies.

Competition for the scarce resource of land is possibly the most widespread cause of conflict in rural as well as pastoral areas of Africa. Environmental degradation in land productivity and scarcity has contributed to the intensity of the competition (Abdalla, 2002). Similarly, the FGD

participants of both Alle and Konso confirmed that in Alle & Konso area there is scarcity of farmland because of population pressure and environmental degradation (see chapter 4). The problem is severe especially in Konso Woreda. Because of such problem, both Alle and Konso compete over the “Kukuba-Sala” forest and farmland. Moreover, as many of the key informants’ distinguished the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict primarily caused by competition over farm and forest land (see factors analysis).

The Zone government official informants explained that the “Kukuba-Sala” is an area of land, which was primarily a protected forestland but became a farmland after the control of illegal farmers of the area. Currently, it is both a farmland and semi-protected forest used by both Alle and Konso farmers. It is found in Kerkerte Kebele of the present Alle Woreda. However, before its demarcation under Alle Woreda the forest and/farmland was located on the border of the two Woredas’.

As both Alle and Konso FGD participants indicated, because of the 2011 violent conflict, many people were killed and wounded. However, there is no exact data on the number of people killed and wounded because of restricted culture of reporting (revealing) the information on such killings. In both cultures particularly of Alle reporting the dead during conflict is considered as “eroding group (ethnic) honor.”

5.5.2. The 2013 Incident

This was a non-violent conflict that erupted because of the killing of Konso merchant in Gewada-Alle. The conflict characterized by disorder and turmoil that manifested through beatings, burnings and looting of properties. However, there is no accurate data on the killing of people as a result of the incident. One of Alle key informant who has observed the situation stated the following story:

There were a longtime friends Baytu from Alle and Urmale from Konso. Once upon a time Urmale lent money to his friend Baytu. After a while, Baytu repaid half of the money to Urmale without any witness. Unfortunately, after some time Urmale denied receiving half of the money. He further took the case in front of Alle Woreda Court at Gewadaa. The court decided on Baytu to pay back all the money to Urmale. Baytu was very angered by the court decision and later on, he killed Urmale at a restaurant found in Gewadaa-Alle. After the news was heard, the Konsos’ beat and looted the properties of Alles’ in Gewadaa and other market places. On the other side, the Alles’ also took counter attacks (AKI-1, Gewada, 3rd March, 2016).

The same story narrated by Konso key informant as follows:

When the 2013 incident [killing of Konso Merchant] happened, I was at Karat-Konso. Urmale was highly respected member of Konso community who lived in Karat. The people were very angry by the act of homicide. The killing was committed deliberately to attack the people of Konso. As a result, the Konsos' start beating and damaging the Alles' at the Karat market. Moreover, the vehicles that were ready to go to Gewadaa were forced to stop their journey. However, no one was killed from Alle (KKI-1, Segen, 19th February, 2016).

In general, the above two narrations confirmed that there was group mobilization that escalated the inter-personal conflict in to ethnic strife.

5.5.3. The 2014 Violent Conflict

It is the most recent violent conflict that was triggered by murdering of one child and wounding of another on 12th August 2014. As the data obtained from Konso key informants showed, the children were from Konso Kebele that bordered with Alle Woreda. The children killed/wounded when they grazed cattle around “Regede” farmland. The farmland is located in the border Kebeles of Alle and Konso Woreda. At that moment, both community and police did not know the perpetrators who committed the crime.

Nevertheless, according to Konso FGD participants, the Konsos' suspected as the people of Alle committed the crime/homicide. As the Zone government informants confirmed, in intensifying the incident in to inter-ethnic conflict different actors interplayed from both sides (see actors' analysis). Moreover, according to FGD participants of Konso, the fleeing of suspected Alle perpetrators' (latter investigated by police) created anger and grievance among Konso and further fueled the conflict. Interviewed SAPZ government official also did not deny the fact that, the four-suspected Alle individuals such as; one police, two farmers and other one individual still not arrested. The Alle ethnic group members are still giving protection for the perpetrators. Similarly, the Alle Woreda is not committed to handover the criminals to the law.

As a result, from 16-18 August 2014, the incident intensified in to violent conflict. The conflict spilled out in to the neighboring Kebeles of Alle and Konso. Accordingly, Gergema, Gewadaa and Kerkerte from Alle and Gelabo and Arfaide from Konso were the major Kebeles, which involved in the conflict (see appendix 4). As the FGD participants of both noted, other parts of Alle and Konso also participated in the conflict through playing direct and indirect roles.

In general, according to the SAPZ conflict situation report (2014), 110 suspected individuals directly participated in the 2014 violent conflict. Among these, 53 of them were from Konso and


the remaining 59 were from Alle. Besides, six Konso individuals were killed and one Zone police wounded. However, there is no evidence on the number of people killed among Alles'. With regard to properties, there are reports of 132 cases of looting, 21 cases of damage, and eight cases of loss (see appendix 4).

5.6. Analyzing the Post-2010 Alle-Konso Conflictual Relations

5.6.1. The Causes the Inter-Ethnic Conflict

The causes of conflict in Ethiopia are both multidimensional and complex (UNDP, 2012). Also, the causes of ethnic conflict are multiple. These include historical, political, economic, social and cultural causes (Sisay, 2007). Similarly, as the results from key informants and FGD participants indicated a blend of factors causes the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso. Accordingly, the contributing factors of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict are grouped into structural (root) and proximate (triggering) factors.

Fig 5.2. Alle-Konso Inter-Ethnic Conflict Tree



Source: Adapted from GTZ (2000:70)

The above tree (Figure 5.2.) is the visual representation of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. The tree images the interaction among root causes, core problem and the impacts of the inter-ethnic

conflict. The roots symbolize the underlying (root) causes of the conflict. The stem/trunk represents the manifest issue or core problem of the conflict, while the branches represent the consequences or impacts of the inter-ethnic conflict.

5.6.1.1. The Structural (Root) Causes

A. Economic Factors

Economic factors are identified as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa and elsewhere. Different theorists believe that competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa (Nnoli, 1980). In the case of Alle and Konso the following are the major economic factors of the inter-ethnic conflict.

❖ Scarcity and Competition Over Natural Resource: Land Resource

Among the countries like Ethiopia, land is the most vital bases for the livelihood of the people. As per the Agricultural Development Lead Industrialization (ADLI) policy of Ethiopia, land is the major source of livelihood and the country's economy. Almost all the livelihoods of Ethiopian society depend on the utilization of land. Because of population growth and environmental degradation, land becoming increasingly scarce. The possession of land means access to many other resources and therefore land often holds a high economic value. In addition, communities often have strong emotional and symbolic attachment to land and the resources on it. Thus, competition for control of valuable land can cause or sustain conflict (United States Institute for Peace (US IP), 2007).

The Alle and Konso inter-ethnic conflict is also caused by competition over land resource. As one Zone government informant declared, the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is partly caused by competition over land resource i.e. forest and farmland. As different studies and surveys indicated, the Alle-Konso area is vulnerable to environmental scarcity and shortage of rainfall. Based on, the SNNPRS Livelihood Profiles (2005) the Konso area is among the lowlands of SNNPRS which has the lowest rainfall (609 mm) for an arable area. In the area, land per capital production is declining in fertility from overuse. As a result, due to such environmental scarcity Alle and Konso compete over control of land resource i.e. "*Kukuba-Sala*" forest and farmland. As a result, they entered in to violent conflict in 2011.

Moreover, the population pressure speed up the competition over the land resource that led to conflict between the two. As cited in Tamiru (2014), the Konso Development Office estimated the

population number of Konso as 250, 750. Moreover, the annual growth rate of the population estimated to 2.6%. Based on this population number the Konso family in average has four family members. Whereas the Ethiopian average is 4.39 (CSA, 2007). Due to the increase of Konso population one man shares 0.53 ha land i.e. 1/0.53ha. Therefore, in Konso there is a dense population settlement in relation to land size. This dense population settlement and scarcity of arable land with other factors in turn lead to the conflict of Konso with the neighboring ethnic groups like Alle.

In his work titled “Environment, Scarcity, and Violence” Homer-Dixon (1999) states five general types of violent conflicts caused by environmental/resource scarcity. Among the types of conflicts identified by him, the first two of them seem to be relevant in understanding the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. These include: (1) disputes arising directly from local environmental degradation and (2) ethnic clashes arising from population migration and deepened social cleavages due to environmental scarcity.

In general, the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso is caused by competition over scarce land resource. This land scarcity is stems from environmental degradation/scarcity and population pressure particularly of Konso. In conclusion, one Zone government official informant narrates competition over scarce resource as one cause for the inter-ethnic conflict by taking the 2011 violent conflict as an example:

Due to competition over the control of “Kukuba-Sala” forest and farmland, the conflict broke out in 2011 around the border Kebeles of the two Woredas’. During that time, the land was not registered as well as demarcated. Nevertheless, both the farmers of Alle and Konso deforested the land illegally and cultivate on it. Both Alle and Konso Woreda farmers claim over the ownership of the Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland. Due to such competition for controlling and expanding farmland, the conflict escalated in to inter-ethnic conflict (ZGO-3, Segen, 16th February, 2016).

❖ **Mismanagement of Economic Resources: Border Land**

Mismanagement and poor demarcation of borderland was another contributing factor for the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso. As Alle and Konso key informants asserted, mismanagement of borderland and territory was one of the contributing factor for the 2011 violent conflict. Similarly, one Zone government informant narrated how borderland resource mismanagement causes the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso:

Beginning from the establishment of Alle Woreda there was territorial claim on the seven Konso Kebeles which latter constitute Alle. The dispute continues also after the establishment of Alle Woreda in 2010. The border territory was not demarcated until 2014. The mixed settlement of people of the border area [Alle and Konso] created border demarcation problem. As a result, lack of clearly defined border contributed for the outbreak of the 2011 violent conflict. Different elites of both were mobilized the border issue and escalated the conflict in to violent one (ZGO-6, Segen, 18th February, 2016).

Another Alle key informant also indicated the problem of borderland mismanagement by taking the 2011 violent conflict as an example:

After the establishment of Alle Woreda the competition between Alle and Konso farmers to control over Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland was amplified. During that time, the Zone and two Woreda administrations did not register the border farmland. There was no rule and regulation that could limit the farmers continued competition. Therefore, farmers expanded their farm over other farmers. The competition was very high. Moreover, there were farmers who forcefully took land of other ethnic group members. Finally, the 2011 conflict broke out because of this intense competition (AKI-3, Telephone Interview, 10th March, 2016).

B. Political Factors

❖ Politicization of Ethnicity and Ethnic Mobilization

In the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso, ethnicity is the most efficient base for group mobilization, and it gives enough ground for local elites to compete along ethnic lines. Instrumentalists stated that politicized ethnicity is the construction of elites to gain political as well as economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves (Taras & Ganguly, 2010).

As all Zone government official informants stressed in the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict there was manipulation of ethnic identity as prime mover of the conflict. In the conflict, political as well as educated elites were involved in the manipulation of ethnic identities. In all violent conflicts erupted the elites manipulated ethnic differences and fueled the inter-personal clashes in to ethnic conflict. Thus, politicization of ethnicity involves the preserving of ethnic groups and their distinctiveness and transforming them in to political conflict groups (Mesfin, 2006).

According to Zonal government official informants, the Alles mobilized (politicized) as they were discriminated and suppressed during their historical relation with Konso. Moreover, Alle local elites were encouraged their ethnic group members to protect/preserve the land to their children. On the other hand, Alle FGD participants noted that the Konso elites mobilized their ethnic group members, as ‘they are heroic and unique people in preserving their land resource and defending

their enemies.’ Thus, both Alle and Konso ethnic group elites mobilized ethnic differences and sentiments. As a result of such politicization of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization, the Alle-Konso violent conflict broke out in the 2011.

Concerning the 2014 conflict, the Alle FGD participants confirmed that the Konso political and educated elite’s instrumentalized the homicide as an act against Konso ethnic group. They were propagandized the killing of the child as deliberate. On the contrary, the Konso FGD participants pointed the fact that the Alle local elites mobilized their ethnic group members, as the Alles’ did not kill the child. Furthermore, they insisted, as the Konsos’ wanted to criminalize and imprison the people of Alle. In conclusion, the above case clearly shows how ethnicity was politicized/mobilized and became the cause for the 2011 and 2014 violent ethnic conflicts.

C. Security Factors: Proliferation of arms and Security Dilemma

Security factors are among the causes of inter-ethnic conflict mounting the conflicts between Alle and Konso. According to Zone government official informants, in the study area there is a high circulation of illegal arms through two directions: from Moyale via Borana to Konso Woreda and from Dasenech /Omorate via Bena-Tsema to Alle Woreda. Many guns sold to those individuals who wanted to buy in different black markets of the Alle-Konso. Having this chance, many people got the opportunity to buy and own automatic weapons. As Malam (2014) indicated the fundamental implication of small arms accumulation and circulation is in its tendency to pave ground for higher risk of violent and/armed conflict. The supply of arms stimulates violence instead of dialogue and has many undesirable effects.

As many of Alle and Konso key informants pointed out, there are two basic reasons why people of the area buy and own arms. First, in the area having a gun is considered as a symbol of wealth and respect. Therefore, in order to be respected and accepted by the society every household capable of buying will have a gun. Second, having a gun is considered as a means of self-protection, protecting clan members, village, and properties and guaranteeing security. As one Alle key informant claimed, in the area there is weak and inadequate security sector that can respond to conflicts. For example, in the violent conflicts of 2008, 2011 and 2014 the security forces were very late in preventing as well as managing the conflict.

In general, many of both Alle and Konso FGD participants and key informants said, every member of a community in the study area who can afford to buy a gun has a gun. The adults, youth and

aged individuals from more or less wealthy families have become owners of 1-2 guns per household. In the study area, if the household is rich it is expected to have guns per the number of children in the household. Moreover, as many of Alle key informants affirmed, those could not buy an automatic modern weapon will have traditional weapon/tools like spear. Spear is a traditional weapon usually made from wood and sometimes from durable materials like iron. The spear has a sharpened head poisoned with snake venom (saliva). The Alle's are known in their skill of preparing and using spears for self-and group protection.

In general, the easy availability of small arms is one of the contributing factor for Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. As United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Secretary-General Report (2015) indicates it, the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition is a key enabler of conflict.

In the study area and SAPZ as a whole, there is weak legal and security system that can control the circulation of illicit arms. Regarding the management and control of illegal arms of the area, one Zone government official interviewee stated the following:

The SAPZ is an area of illegal trade i.e. contraband. There is high circulation of illegal arms. The Zone government is trying to control and manage such illicit arms. However, only few of them are registered. Almost no community members of Alle and Konso are voluntary to register their arms. The covert culture of the society made our efforts of arm registration futile. In both cultures there is a strong relation between each member of the ethnic group and no one will uncover his neighbor/family secrete. Arms transfers and trafficking remain one of the major security problem of SAPZ (ZGO-6, Segen, 18th February, 2016).

Therefore, poor management and control of illicit arms escalated inter-personal clashes in to inter-ethnic conflict. This was true in the 2008, 2011 and 2014 inter-ethnic conflicts between Alle and Konso. Regarding the issue UNSC Secretary-General (2015) confirmed that poor weapons management is an area of alarming concern in the today's world. In many states, there is a poor national inventory practice of weapons and control of illegal arms.

Above all, the causes of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict could be applied in to the concept of ethnic security dilemma. For instance, in 2011, because of the competition over Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland the Alles' fired a gun against Konso farmers who were working there. The Konso's in response strengthened themselves by arming their ethnic group male fighters. Soon, the Alles' do the same. As a result, violent and bloody conflict broke out that causes for the death

of a number of people. This implied that while one ethnic group strengthen in arming its own group the probability to the conflict occurrence increased or the conflict will escalate. Posen (1993:28) in his article “Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” define security dilemma, as:

.... Because neighbors wish to remain autonomous and secure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions. This is the security dilemma: what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.

Bary Posen is the first author suggesting the security dilemma could also be applied to the intra-state level i.e. ethnic and intra-state conflict.

D. Socio-Cultural and Psychological Factors

❖ Weakening and/Undermining of Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism

Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms comprise social, economic, cultural and religious-spiritual dimensions in accordance with the entirety of traditions, customs and views of the society (Bukari, 2013). “Moora” and “Ataa” system are the two traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of Alle and Konso. Moora is an inter-personal conflict resolution mechanism whereas “Ataa” is an inter-group conflict-handling mechanism (see discussion of peaceful relation).

The participants of FGD of both Alle and Konso confirmed that the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were highly accepted and respected by the community of both. Because, the mechanisms are deep rooted in the values and cultures of the Alle and Konso society. Choudree (1999) argued that the traditional processes are relatively informal and less threatening with high emphasis to restoring relationships and reconciling groups. In other words, the traditional processes strive to restore a balance, to settle conflict and eliminate disputes.

However, now a day as many of Alle and Konso FGD participants and key informants witnessed the weakening and undermining of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area. Their values become eroded and diminished from time to time. This is because of the influence of modern local government institutions and their officials. The Zone and Woreda government structures substituted the role of traditional leaders through politically oriented institutions like 1:5 group arrangement and Kebele development committees. The modern theorists view traditional authority as a gerontocratic, chauvinistic, and authoritarian and increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is opposing to democracy (Logan, 2008).

Moreover, as one key informant from Mercy Corps, Arba Minch Office clearly repeated the fact that the role of cultural leaders (such as clan leaders, Apa Timpas etc.) in traditional conflict resolution is declining in the study area. However, as many of scholars like Sisay (2007) claimed traditional leaders have dominant power over maintaining peace, managing and resolving conflict.

Indeed, according to Alle and Konso key informants the weakening and/undermining of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of the area contributes for the continued inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso. Furthermore, based on the data obtained from both Alle and Konso FGD participants, in the area the common traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are not strengthened rather weakening from time to time. The traditional conflict resolutions held after the 2011 and 2014 violent conflicts failed to restore long lasting peace between Alle and Konso. Regarding the weakening and undermining of traditional conflict management and resolution one Alle key informant stated the following:

We [Alle and Konso] have a common traditional conflict resolution mechanism. When conflict happen between clans/ethnic groups, the society used “Ataa” mechanism of conflict resolution. “Ataa” is a conflict reconciliation mechanism by which the conflicting parties urged to forgive and forget to their enemies. After such reconciliation ceremony, lasting peace will prevail. However, today the values/ethics conflict resolution mechanisms are eroded due to the locally imposed government structures/institutions in contrary to these mechanisms. For example, the role of Apa Timpas are substituted by development committees organized at each Kebele (AKI-5, Gewadaa, 3rd March, 2016).

❖ **Psychological Factors**

Psychological factors are another driving forces behind the Alle and Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Since 1995, after relative development of their ethnic consciousness, the Gewadaa-Dhobase (Alle) have begun to feel that they are administratively divided, politically dominated and marginalized by the local ruling elite of Konso and Dirashe (Temesgen, 2010). As many of Alle key informants stated the feeling of grievance and anger also continued after the recognition of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance. One Zone official informant indicated that the impact of 2008 violent conflict created victim mentality among Alles’. During the conflict, both security forces and Konso male fighters killed a significant number of Alle ethnic group members. As a result, the Alles’ particularly those who were victims and victim families wanted to revenge against the Konsos’ when there is an opportunity to do so. This was clearly observed in the consequent inter-ethnic conflicts of 2011, 2013 and 2014.

On the other side, the Konsos were not happy in losing seven Kebeles that established the current Alle Woreda. The Alle FGD participants surfaced that there are Konso government officials who mobilized the people as “losing seven Kebeles means losing the government budget allocated for Konso Woreda.” As stated in Temesgen (2010) the basic intention of the Konso was to control and administer the whole area including the Dirashe if possible.

In conclusion, as the data obtained from the interview and FGD indicted emotions (such as anger, hatred and grievance) caused the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflicts that erupted in 2011 and 2014.

5.6.1.2. The Proximate (Triggering) Factors

❖ Inter-Personal Conflicts: Act of Homicide, Theft, Looting, and Beating

In the study area, there are instances whereby personal conflicts could eventually escalate in to inter-ethnic conflicts. Some individual conflicts that result in theft, looting and homicide occasionally extend in to inter-ethnic conflicts. For example, when either of the two groups kill a person, the victimized family/clan and/ethnic group members are driven to take a similar action or beyond that.

In the 2013 incident, the homicide of Konso merchant (inter-personal conflict) spiraled in to latent inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso.

Key informants of Alle and Konso have remarked that inter-personal conflicts of the area are the triggering factors for Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Regarding the inter-personal conflicts as a triggering factor for Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict one Zone government official informant narrated the following story by taking the 2014 violent conflict:

The 2014 Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict was triggered by the killing of one child and wounding of another. Initially, the conflict was limited to the families of victim children but because of local elite mobilization, it was escalated in to violent and bloody conflict. (ZGO-2, Segen, 17th February, 2016).

❖ Escaping of Individual Perpetrators/Criminals as an Aggravating Factor

As many of the Zone government official informants confirmed, in the conflict area individuals who committed crimes against another ethnic group gained protection from their own group members. For instance, the escaping of individual perpetrators was an aggravating factor for the 2014 Alle-Kono inter-ethnic conflict. Because of the 2014 murder, four suspected Alle individuals escaped and this in turn escalated the conflict in to inter-group conflict between Alle and Konso. For example, the escaping of suspected (latter proofed as guilty) Alle individuals as a result of the

2014 murder further aggravated and escalated in to inter-group conflict. As one Zone government official informant revealed, the people of Alle was collaborated with the suspected individuals. As a result, the perpetrators were not accessible to the Zone police.

5.6.2. The Major Actors of the Conflict and their Motives/Interests

5.6.2.1. Youth and Adults

Youth are both a power for positive and negative change of their countries. In today's world they are primary participants of conflict. There are different reasons why they participate in conflicts. These include; lack of economic opportunities, political voice and sense of belongingness to their communities and are easily mobilized by others (Mercy Corps, 2016).

In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict youth and adults are direct participants /actors of the conflict. They took part at the frontline of the conflict between the two. At the same time, they were impacted by the conflict directly and/indirectly.

Key informants of both Alle and Konso affirmed that youth and adults played a significant role in the conflict and/hostilities between the two. Youth and adults are energetic and voluntarily participated in the conflicts between the two. As the participants of Alle and Konso FGD identified the motives behind the participation of youth and adults in the conflict include; wish to help their ethnic group members and wanted to enhance economic opportunity through conflict/violence. For example, as a Zone police commander stated, in the 2014 violent conflict youth and adults looted a number of properties. Moreover, as many of the Zone government official informants noted, in the 2011 conflict youth and adults forcefully deforested and cultivated the Kukuba-Sala land at the same time they took other farmers land who were not their ethnic group member. As one Konso FGD participant surfaced, some ethnic group members of both also promised to youth and adults to grant farmland if they control the lands of the opposing groups forcefully.

Apart from the above motive, another internal motive of youth and adults to participate in the conflict is the culture of both ethnic groups. As many of Alle and Konso FGD noted, in both ethnic groups fighting with other group, which is considered as an enemy is being and becoming a hero /brave and respected member of the society. For example, as authors like Metasebia (1998) indicated in traditional authorities of Konso there is a warrior group (mostly

they are from youth and adults) called “Hella”, expected to defend their people or take part in armed conflict.

5.6.2.2. Individual Farmers: Wish to Control and Expand Farmland Holdings

Land is an important economic asset and source of livelihoods. It is linked to the community history, culture and identity. Communities, therefore, can willingly mobilize around land issues and making land a central object of conflict. Tensions over land also closely related to, or manipulated by political interests (UN Habitat, 2012).

This research has shown that one of the causes of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is competition over land resource. Thus, individual farmers, who want to control and expand farmland, were one of the major actors of the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Regarding the 2011 violent conflict one of Konso Woreda official informant stated:

The 2011 Alle-Konso violent conflict was caused by the competition over Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland. The major participants of the conflict were those individual farmers who wants to control land and cultivate on it. During the conflict, the farmers were united with their own ethnic group members. Initially, the conflict was between Kerkerte and Maderia-Gezaba farmers who compete over land resource. After the conflict started, the Alle farmers mobilized to dispel Kono farmers who cultivate in the area (KWGO-2, Karat, 22nd February, 2016).

FGD participants of Alle also strengthen the above view that the farmers of the area created an ethnic alliance with their own ethnic group members and controlled the land through conquest of other group members. They also pointed the fact that the farmers were mobilized and supported by local elites.

In general, as many of the FGD and key informants concluded the main motive behind the individual farmers was expanding land through competing with other opposite ethnic group individual farmers.

5.6.2.3. Local Elites

Vegara (2013) define elite as “a small group of people in a society who are powerful and have a lot of influence because they are rich, intellectual or politician etc.” Similarly, political scientists defined elite as ‘a certain class of people with superior qualification or holder of high positions in a given society’ (Kerstiens, 1966). Thus, elites consist of prestigious and established leaders, top politicians, businesspersons, intellectuals, high-level civil servants, senior military officers and

relatively transitory and less individually known leaders of mass organizations and politically consequential mass movements (Higley, 2008).

In general, based on sources of legitimacy, control over resource, position in the society, qualification and/ possessions different scholars identified different types of elites. These include political, economic, business persons, bureaucratic, aristocratic, governing and intellectual elites (Higley, 2008). Moreover, in different societies respect paid to elites because of their superior qualities such as skills, knowledge, virtues, and possessions. At the same time, such qualities of elites provide them with legitimacy to rule or exert influence over the society or their group members (Kerstiens, 1966).

In the context of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, three major local elites acted as an actor of the conflict such as political elites, educated elites and business elites.

i. Political Elites

Political elite is one kind of elite by which a group of people, political parties and/other kind of organizations who manage and organize government and all manifestations of political power (Vergara, 2013). In the context of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, political elites are those government officials in different levels such as Kebele, Woreda and Zone.

As some Zone official informants indicated, Woreda and Kebele government officials played their unseen role in the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. They manipulated and instrumentalized the ethnic differences of Alle and Konso for their own political benefits. Regarding such manipulation of ethnic identities, the instrumental theorists view ethnicity as a means to some specific but sometimes hidden political end and self-serving goals of elites rather than the general good of all. Ethnicity is more or less a mask of elite interest that employ ethnicity to gain certain interests. It is easy to mobilize people based on ethnicity (Rothchild, 1997).

In Alle and Konso inter-ethnic conflict political elites include members of the political leadership of the Zone, the two Woredas' and Kebeles. As different sources of data from FGD participants and Key informants confirmed the local government officials involved indirectly in to the inter-ethnic conflict. As indicated on the manual prepared by the SNNPRS Council of Nationalities (2014) titled "A strategy for Conflict Resolution and Its Implementation" in communities with

conflicts, the leadership and elites were actors in the conflict though their role may vary according to the nature of the conflict. The local leaders and elites may play roles in aggravating the conflict by supporting the other side of the conflict, due to their inability/unwillingness to give immediate solutions to conflicts and some cases being causes of conflicts.

As one Zone government official informant asserted during the 2008 Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict the Alle political elites mobilized the Alle common ethnic identity as a prime mover of the conflict. As Alle FGD participants claimed, ethnic mobilization was also evident in Konso political elites during the conflicts between the two. In general, as multiple sources of data from interview and FGD confirmed, in the subsequent clashes of 2011, 2013 and 2014 both Alle and Konso political elites instrumentalized the ethnic differences and caused for the outbreak of these violent conflicts. As many of Zone official informants revealed during the meetings/conferences of the two ethnic groups at Woreda/Zone level, the representative officials of Alle and Konso ethnic groups seem to be open and trust each other. However, they invisibly support and mobilize their own group members rather than being impartial. Moreover, the Alle government officials gave protection for individuals who were suspected for the killing of a child in 2014.

ii. Educated Elites

Educated elites are the second type of elites, which played a key role in manipulating and/mobilizing ethnic differences between Alle and Konso. In the context of Alle and Konso educated elites are group of individuals from those who can read and write up to those who hold university degree. Moreover, educated elites are those individuals who are respected and accepted by the ethnic group members by virtue of their education. In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, educated elites were among the major actor of the conflict in influencing the political situation of the locality or mobilized their ethnic group members particularly youth. Regarding the role of Alle and Konso educated elites as an actor of conflict one Zone government informant described as:

In the 2008 and susquent conflicts, the Alle and Konso educated elites participated indirectly in to the conflict. In the 2011, 2013 and 2014 conflicts, the educated elites exerted their efforts in mobilizing the youth, farmers, clan leaders, ethnic/clan members as well as victim families. Educated elites wish to take government power through creating acceptance by ethnic group members. For example, most of the government officials after the establishment of Alle Woreda were educated elites of Alle who played a mobilization role during the 2008 conflict. The Konso educated elites were also influential in propagating ethnic sentiments of farmers, youth, victim families, traditional leaders and ethnic group members as a whole. For instance, in the 2011

conflict the Konso educated elites orated as the Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland is their ancestors and the Alles' have no the right to use this land (ZGO-1, Segen, 15th February, 2016).

Moreover, one Alle key informant stated the following:

The Alle educated persons are highly accepted by the people of Alle. Because, the Konsos were considering the people of Alle as uneducated and illiterate before and after the Woreda establishment. Hence, those educated individuals encouraged the people of Alle to self-defend against the people of Konso. They told to us as the Konsos' suppressed and marginalized the people of Alle during KSW administration. The Alles are less educated as because of such marginalization during they were in the same administration i.e. KSW (AKI-4, Arba Minch, 9th March, 2016).

In conclusion, as the above narrations indicated both Alle and Konso educated elites were among major actors in influencing, mobilizing and motivating other actors or ethnic group members at large. Citing Ahmed (2004) Mesfin (2006) claimed that in ethnic conflicts the role played by an educated, literate intelligentsia in the creation and propagation a pan-ethnic consciousness is crucial.

iii. Business Elites

In addition to political and educated elites, business elites also played a significant role in the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. One informant from Mercy Corps focusing his experience of conflict management and resolution in Alle and Konso area before 2014 narrated the role of business elites as the following:

When we were working on conflict management and resolution in the Alle-Konso area one of the challenges was from business elites. Business elites of the area are extremely respected by their ethnic group members. Moreover, they have a strong attachment and belongingness to their ethnic group. The society has also high expectation for them in times of problem and/conflict. During conflicts with other groups, the business elites expected to support their ethnic group members financially or materially particularly of fighters in the forefront. For example, during the 2008 conflict both Alle and Konso business elites were supporting their group members through buying and/providing small arms, financing the family members of fighters in the conflict and logistics support during the conflict. The major reason for their support was their intrinsic motivation to help their ethnic group and fear of marginalization /exclusion of their group members after the conflict ended (MCKI, Arba Minch, 11th March, 2016).

Moreover, during the fieldwork, the researcher has witnessed the boycott of Konso ethnic group members against a Konso businessperson who own a hotel. The researcher observed when the Konso ethnic group members boycotted not to use the service provided by the hotel of that business

man. Because, as some ethnic group members told to the researcher, the business man collaborated with the regional security forces deployed to suspend the quest of Konso for Zonal Administration. As a result, none of the community members did use the services afforded by the hotel of the business person.

5.6.2.4. Traditional Leaders and Elders

A traditional leader is a person by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or seat and appointed in accordance with the customs and tradition of the society/ethnic group. In other words, a traditional leader/ruler is the traditional head of an ethnic unit or clan who is the holder of the highest traditional authority recognized by the ethnic group and/clan members. They are social leaders and systems rather than actual government institutions. Their primary function is to regulate and control relationship and social behavior within a traditional community (Mthandeni, 2006).

Both Alle and Konso discussants of FGD depicted the fact that both ethnic groups are highly structured and attached in the traditional clan system that bind the clan/ethnic group members. In both ethnic groups, traditional authority emanates from values and culture of each ethnic group. In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, the traditional leaders played as an actor of the conflict and to some extent involved in conflict management. However, their role in conflict management and resolution diminished from time to time (see conflict causes discussion).

As one Alle FGD participant remarked, even though their role of conflict management and/ resolution is diminishing the traditional leaders are closest to the people. They are also accepted by their ethnic group and/ clan members because they act as guardians of their clan/ethnic group culture.

As many of the Zone government informants confirmed the Alle and Konso traditional leaders paly a minimal role in conflict management and/resolution. The informants also revealed the fact that traditional leaders were actors of the conflict indirectly through supporting their own ethnic group/clan members. Moreover, they were mostly silent in managing and/suspending the conflict between the two.

Regarding the traditional leaders as an actor of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict one of the FGD participant of Konso portrayed the following fact:

In Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, the traditional/cultural leaders such as clan leaders and Apa Timbas' were the main actors of the conflict. Due to their closeness to the people, they supported and encouraged youth/farmers to defend against the opposing ethnic group members. During the conflicts clan leaders organized their clan and/ethnic group members to take part in the conflict. The Apa Timbas were also circulated information about the conflict around the villages and encouraged the youth to take part in the conflict. For example, in the 2011 conflict the Alle clan leaders and Apa-Timbas' were associated with their own ethnic/clan members rather than managing/settling the conflict. They campaigned as the Kukuba-Sala land was their property and no one has the right to use the land except Alles' (Karat, 26th February, 2016).

Regarding to the role of Konso traditional leaders in the inter-ethnic conflict one of the FGD participant of Alle surfaced the following:

During the 2014 killing of a child, some Konso traditional leaders (such as clan leaders) around the incident Kebele were propagandizing the killing of the child as it was planned to attack the people of Konso. Moreover, they encouraged the Konso men to take a revenge against the Alles. On the other side, some of the Apa-Timbas were also circulating the issue around villages (FGD, Gewadaa, 4th March, 2016).

In general, the above narrations showed that both Alle and Konso traditional leaders were indirect participants of the inter-ethnic conflict. Apart from traditional leaders, the Alle and Konso elders (old aged) were indirect actors of the inter-ethnic conflict. According to some Zone official informants' elders did not directly involved in the conflict but they disseminated information about people wounded and/killed in the conflicts. They usually stand on the main roads and encourage the youth who run in to the conflict area to cooperate in the fight against the opposing group. They also provide their arms to their son and/to individuals they trusted more. Indeed, their role was limited to pushing the youth and/ adults through memorizing the past grievances.

5.6.2.5. Illicit Arm Dealers and Brokers

In the violent conflicts of Alle and Konso illegal arm dealers were one of the major actors of the conflict in fueling and also indirectly circulating firearms to their ethnic/clan group members. Despite the fact that, the major aim of arm dealers was doing business in selling small arms but they also incline to support their ethnic and/clan members during conflicts.

The greater HOA is a region full of conflicts ranging from outright wars, fully-fledged civil wars to anarchy and intervention. These create demand for both legal and illegal firearms. Refugees many of them combatants add their personal weapons in to the cycle. As a result, HOA is over supplied with all kinds of small arms all over the world (Kamenju, 2001).

In Ethiopia, even though, there is no accurate data different official reports revealed that there is a mass flow of SALW. The flow of illicit arms is largely common in pastoralist areas of ungoverned spaces and/ border regions. The border regions of pastoralists provide a large market for small arms (Leff, 2009). SAPZ is bordered with the pastoralist areas of SNNPRS and Oromia Regional State that provide small arms to the conflict area.

One of the Zone official informant stated the extent of circulation of small arms and arm dealers of the area.

The South Omo and Borana Zones' are the major source of small arms to the conflict area. In the area, there is high flow of small arms smuggled from these Zones through arm dealers and brokers. The arm dealers as well as arm brokers circulated the small arms to the conflict area through covert channels. In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, the arm dealers and brokers take their lion share in fueling the conflict. Before and during conflicts the arm dealers using arm brokers sell different type of small arms mainly Kalashnikov (such as AK-47) to their associates and ethnic group members. Their major aim is running their own business and also showing their loyalty to their ethnic/clan members (ZGO-2, Segen, 17 February 2016).

Moreover, many of the Alle and Konso key informants confirmed that arm dealers and brokers are invisible actors of the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. The violent conflicts of 2008, 2011 and 2014 were a big business for those arm dealers and brokers of the study area. However, they cause great pain for the ethnic group members of both Alle and Konso. Correspondingly, the FGD participants of both Alle and Konso explained the fact that illicit arm dealers and brokers driven the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

5.6.2.6. Women

It is increasingly recognized that, although, women are not directly involved in the inter-ethnic conflicts, their role is significant: 'every man who carries a gun has a woman in his life.' Women are not only victims of the conflict but also actors that can influence their husbands and act as catalyst of conflict (DFID, 2003).

In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict women were one of the actors that play a key role in stimulating the conflict. However, they did not directly involve in the conflict. Both Alle and Konso FGD participants affirmed that women were one of the actors of the inter-ethnic conflict. The major roles as an actor include: preparing food, encourage their husbands and sons, help victims, disseminate messages about the conflict around villages, take care of their children and

property and welcoming fighters from battle fields. Regarding the role of Konso women Mamitu (2002:113) narrated the following:

Konso women, have high regard to war heroes. The Konso people, including the Konso women regard themselves as being active warriors. This belief of warrior-ship greatly repeats and made visible itself through the Konso age grading system, the 'hela' group, which are still believed to be a warrior and town defending group. The sleeping of these warrior groups [the hella], in the 'moora' or 'pafta', is an alert to defend the town from unexpected danger and sudden attack.

Likewise, Hallpike (1974) cited in Mamitu (2002:114) states:

The main reason for the warrior groups sleeping outdoors [in the Moora] is said to mobilize easily in time of danger or attack. The other reason is that, if these groups of men continuously slept with their wives, there is a belief that they might get weaker. Hence, women are considered as a cause for men's weakness.

Thus, the above quotations indicate that the Konso women encourage their husbands/son(s) or warriors not to be accused of as a cause for men weakness. Moreover, as one Alle FGD participant mentioned, to encourage combatants (fighters) of their ethnic group women used different proverbs and sayings.

Regarding the role of Alle women as an actor of the conflict one Alle official informant stated as:

Even though women were not directly involved in the conflict, they played multiple roles. They disseminate information through shouting around the villages. Moreover, they prepared food and drinks encourage men to join the battlefield, transport and treat the wounded through traditional medication, collect food for fighters around the village, mistreat men who are unwilling to join the conflict and welcome fighters. Generally, their role is restricted to moral and material support (AWGO-4, Addis Ababa, 28th April,2016).

Figure 5.3. Women Role as an Actor in Alle-Konso inter-ethnic Conflict



Source: Organized based on Interviews made, 2016

Apart from as an actor Alle and Konso women were also victims of the conflict erupted in the area. As one Alle women key informant noticed, in the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict women were largely subject to damage and death. They also displaced to the neighboring Woredas'. This was because women were not armed to defend themselves from the scourge of the conflict. Likewise, the FGD participants of both Alle and Konso indicated that those women who protected their children and/property were exposed to injury and death.

5.6.2.7. Additional Actors: Victims' Families and Clan Members

As many of Alle and Konso key informants indicated, victims' family and clan members were also actors of the inter-ethnic conflict. In both ethnic groups, there is a high bond of family, clan and ethnic relations. This strong bond of relation is manifested in their social life and during the conflicts through creating alliances. As the FGD participants of Alle pointed that victims' family and clan members are more close to the persons killed or wounded in the conflict. As a result, during the conflict these actors have direct and indirect roles in igniting/pushing the inter-ethnic conflict. As many of the Zone official informants reaffirmed, during the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic

conflicts the victims' family and/clan members passed information to its respective ethnic group members. Moreover, they also directly involved in the conflict between Alle and Konso.

5.6.2.8. External Actors: Neighboring Ethnic Groups/Woredas'

In addition to the aforementioned internal actors, external actors were also significant in the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. As many of key informants signposted, external actors directly and indirectly supported Alle in one side and Konso on the other side. Accordingly, the Borana-Oromos' gave support to their close neighbor Konso and Bena-Tsemay supported Alle.

The Zone government interviewees' also claimed the reason for the involvement of external actors was due to their close relation and ethnic affiliations they have. For example, as many of Konso key informants maintained, the origin of Konso is from Borana-Oromo. Moreover, as cited in Wondu (2011), Amborn and Schubert (2005) stated that the people of Konso have blood relation with their neighboring Borana pastoralists. There is a strong belief among the Proto-Oromo speakers like Konso, share common origin with Borana Oromo. Oral traditions among the Konso, Mossiye and Dirashe discuss that their original homeland used to be in Liben-Borana.

Most importantly, the Konso speak a language similar to its neighbors. According to Halpike (1972), the Konso language shares 67%, 44% and 26% common words with Dirashe, Borana and Gewada [Alle] respectively. Thus, the relationship between Konso and their neighbor [Oromo] peoples is most obviously displayed in the linguistic evidence (*Ibid*).

Apart from ancestral and language relationship Konso and Borana have an economic relationship due to their close geographical proximity. Geographically, Borana-Oromo is located immediately next to Konso and is a trade partner. According to Cerulli cited in Wondu (2011), the trade relation between Borana and Konso was carried out through bartering up to the end of the 1940's. Konso cotton cloths and articles were exchanged for cattle, sheep or goat.

Concerning the cooperation of Konso and Borana-Oromo one Konso key informant explained as:

We [Konso] and Borana had a blood relation. We believed that our ancestral fathers were come from Borana. We had a long history of relation mostly cordial. However, we had also conflictual relations because of competition over control of grazing land. To be sure, the Borana are our ancestors. In times when the two [Konso and Borana] were in conflict with other groups they helped each other through proliferating/providing small arms and opening alternative roads. This was true during the 2008 and 2011 conflict of Konso with Alle (KKI-2, Karat, 23rd February, 2016).

On the other side as the FGD participants of Alle noted, the Alles' are closer to people of Bena-Tsemai in geographical as well as social proximity. Both Alle and Bena-Tsemai of South Omo are socially, economically and geographically closer. Geographically, the Alle Woreda shares its border with Bena-Tsemai at the west.

Furthermore, different researchers/scholars of the area wrote about the relationship of Alle and Bena-Tsemai. As cited in Yacob (2007), Lakew (2007) explains the tie between Alle and Bena-Tsemai as "four among seven clans of the Tsemai trace their origin to the hilly sides of Alle." Likewise, Bender (1971), Black (1976), Amborn et al (1980) and Girared (2002) cited in Yacob (2010) stated, the Tsemai people are closely related to Alle both linguistically and in aspects of culture. Linguistically, both peoples speak dialects named "Worize/Dually" belong to Cushitic language family. The people of Alle in lowland areas (Kerkerte and Dignite) east of Woito/Dullay River and the Tsemai are almost indistinguishable from each other's. Tsemai cross the river and take wives from Alle in the lowland areas, and produce crops around the river. The highland area agriculturalist Alle see Tsemai as their relatives and claim that they speak similar language (*Ibid*).

Similarly, one Alle key informant narrated the relationship and alliance between Alle and Tsemai during conflicts as follows:

The people of Bena-Tsemai and we [Alle] have a long time historical relation. We have a similarity in terms of language and culture. The two people have a strong psychological attachment because of marriage concluded between the two. There is also a trade relation between the lowland areas of Alle and Bena-Tsemai. They together graze land by crossing each other's border area. Apart from their social and economic relations, the two people help each other during conflicts with other groups of the area. They support each other in transferring small arms. For example, during conflicts of Alle with Konso, the Bena-Tsemys' created access to illicit arms to the people of Alle. During the 2011 violent conflict the Konsos' closed/obstructed the main road from Gewadaa to the neighboring areas (such as Gamo Gofa). As a result, the Bena-Tsemai's opened alternative roads for the people of Alle (AKI-2, Arba Minch, 9th March, 2016).

Key: A: Alle, K: Konso

- A/K1: Youth & Adults
- A/K2: Individual Farmers
- A/K3: Political Elites
- A/K4: Educated Elites
- A/K5: Traditional Leaders and Elders
- A/K6: Arm Dealers, Brokers & Business Elites
- A/K7: Victims Families and Clan Members
- A/K8: Women

Legend:

- Actors of the Conflict
- Discord or Conflict
- Close Relationship
- Weak (Intermittent) Relationship
- Alliance (Very good Relationship)
- Direct (Predominant) Influence
- External Actors

The pre-2010 (1995-2010) Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict was resulted from the quest of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance. After the violent conflicts with Konso and Dirashe, Alle gained common ethnic recognition and self-governance autonomy on 23rd November, 2010.

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
a while, the conflict ended without loss of human life. Nevertheless, properties of both Alle and Konso were looted and damaged.

Recently, in 2014 another incident happened around the border area of the two i.e. “Regede” farmland. In the incident, one child was killed and another wounded by unknown (but suspected from Alle) individuals. Soon after, the homicide escalated in to inter-ethnic conflict because different actors manipulated it. To manage and resolve the conflict different governmental and traditional conflict management actions/mechanisms taken. Traditionally, the two communities/ethnic groups undertaken a customary reconciliation ceremony (“Ataa”) around the place where the homicide was committed. Formally, the local government officials (Zone & Woreda) organized a peace conference at Dimaya. In addition, to address the land related problem land registration and certification launched by the collaboration of SAPZ and the two Woreda administrations’. Besides, peace Committees were organized beginning from Kebele to Zone level.

At time of finding of this thesis, there is no violent conflict between Alle and Konso except minor inter-personal disputes and/conflicts over Kukuba-Sala forest and farmland. Indeed, in the study area there is a negative peace what Johan Galtung (1967:17) explained as “absence of organized collective violence.”

In conclusion, the following timeline shows the escalation and de-escalation of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict through chronological order of major events in the post-1991.

Figure 5.5. Time line of Alle Konso Inter-Ethnic Conflict Major Events Since 1991



Source: Organized by the Researcher Based on the Analysis Made, 2016

5.6.4. The Impacts of the Conflict on the Local Communities

The magnitude of impacts of an ethnic conflict is determined by the nature and scope of the conflict (Dagne, ND). Accordingly, the impacts of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict on the local community are categorized in to economic, social and political impacts.

5.6.4.1. Economic Impacts

In economic aspect, ethnic conflict dismisses the very bases of development and discourages the playing field for sustainable development (Dagne, ND). The Alle and Konso official interviewees confirmed that the inter-ethnic conflict between Alle and Konso damaged the economic resources of the area. For example, in the 2011 and 2013 conflicts several individual properties were looted and damaged. In the 2011 conflict social services such as markets, health center and mills were destroyed. Moreover, individual houses of both Alle and Konso were burned and the people displaced from their home/residence. However, there is no exact data on the number of properties looted, damaged and burned from both Alle and Konso. But, the Zone Conflict situation report also indicated that in the 2014 conflict lots of individual properties (houses, animals and crops) were looted, burned and lost (see appendix 4).

Broadly, according to many of the Zone official informants, the recurrent Alle-Konso ethnic conflicts severely impacted the development activities of the Zone as well as the Regional government. During the conflict, much amount of money was budgeted for logistics related to conflict management and peace building. Thus, the conflict brought budget constraint among the Zone and the two Woredas. Moreover, in the SNNPRS annual work evaluation program, the SAPZ ranked at the lowest level because of intra and inter-ethnic conflicts of the area. The inter-ethnic conflict of the area shifted the attention of the Zone from development to conflict related activities.

In addition, many of key informants and FGD participants underlined that the Alle-Konso ethnic conflict affected the economic activities (such as agriculture and trade) of the study area. Because of fear of insecurity of conflict, the economic activities of the community hindered. This in turn negatively impacted the livelihood of the people in the conflict area. Based on the SNNPRS livelihood assessment, the study area is highly susceptible to food insecurity due to population pressure and environmental scarcity. The food insecurity further exacerbated by the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict.

The Zone government official informants stated that during conflicts of the two, the agricultural activity of farmers was interrupted because of insecurity situations. For example, the 2014 conflict broke out during cultivation season of the farmers of the area. As a result, the farmers of the area did not prepare their land for cultivation. Apart from the interruption of agricultural activities, the trade relation between Alle and Konso terminated due to fear of moving from place to place. Consequently, it endangered the flow of agricultural products and goods that profoundly reduced incomes of merchants and farmers.

In general, as confirmed by both Alle and Konso official interviewees, due to the inter-ethnic conflict valuable energies of youth lasted in the violent ethnic conflict. Moreover, the loss of lives and properties in the conflict posed a serious challenge to economic development of the study area. However, in contrary to the aforementioned impacts, the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict allowed arm dealers and brokers to take an advantage on selling small arms in to the conflict area.

5.6.4.2. Social Impacts

Apart from its economic impact, the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict has resulted social impacts. As per the SAPZ report on Alle-Konso ethnic conflict, loss of human life was the first of all social impacts in the study area (see appendix 4). Dagne (ND) argued that the most severe outcome of violent ethnic conflict is its social cost i.e. loss of human life. Even though, accurate data is not mentioned the Zone report further indicated that in in the 2011 violent conflict many people were injured, left homeless, displaced and killed. Moreover, as one Zone official informant confirmed during the conflict women who gave birth and who were pregnant forced to move from their home. In the conflict, most of the victims were also women apart from youth and adults (front fighters).

Regarding the recent 2014 violent conflict one Zone public prosecutor informant identified the death of more than six people and many other wounded including the Zone police officer. In line with such deaths, the conflict negatively influenced the students learning in the study area. Because of fear of insecurity, the students of both Alle and Konso were unable to regularly attend their school.

Moreover, many of the key informants and FGD participants asserted that the frequent Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflicts weakened and destroyed social the social inter-relation between Alle and Konso ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic/clan marriage links were disturbed as the conflict replaced friendliness/cooperation with hatred and grievance. Nevertheless, there is no clearly shown data

about broken marriages because of the conflict. At the same time, many both Alle and Konso key informants and FGD participants indicated the fact that a small number of marriages survived from marriage broking.

Regarding such broken and survived marriages, one Konso Key informant stated:

Since the past, we [Alle and Konso] have married each other based on our clan system. We have brothers and sisters from each ethnic group. Our relationship does not only depend on marriage we have also trade relations. However, during the conflict between the two most of such relationships broken. This happened in the 2011, 2014 violent conflicts. There were cases that the Inter-marriage relationships were partly broken. However, few inter-marriage relations continued after such violent conflicts (KKI-5, Karat, 23rd February, 2016).

As one Alle FGD participant surfaced, the broken marriages have also an adverse impact on the psychological and social wellbeing of children with mixed identities i.e. children born from Alle and Konso parents.

5.6.4.3. Political Impacts

Political impacts are other impacts of the conflict between Alle and Konso. As many of the Zone official informants stated, the conflict not only had economic and social impacts but also made political impact a reality. Because of the recurrent Ale-Konso inter-ethnic conflicts, politicized and manipulated ethnicity become evident in Zone and Woreda government offices. This in turn diminished the accountability and responsibility of government officials in making decisions related to managing and resolving the inter-ethnic conflict. As one Zone official informant stated, in the peace conferences organized at Dimaya, both Woreda government officials showed their indirect support to their ethnic group members rather than being impartial and address the conflict at the grass root level. Moreover, as some Alle official informants indicated, during the Zone meetings organized by the SAPZ there is a confrontation between Alle and Konso ethnic group representatives. The two ethnic group representatives' run their hidden agenda of supporting their own ethnic group rather than being responsible government officials.

Furthermore, as one Zone official interviewee confirmed, because of the suspicion and mistrust have been created between Alle and Konso officials they did not easily accepted decisions of the Zone related to conflict management. In general, the ethnic politics created between Alle and Konso endangers the institutional capacity of the Zone to respond to the conflicts in the study area including Alle-Konso.

5.6.5. Conflict Management and Peace Building Efforts

Conflict management is an intervention towards preventing the escalation and negative effects of violent and continuing conflicts. It is the reduction, containment and elimination of the propensity of conflict to violence by enhancing positive behavioral changes among the actors of the conflict (Habtamu, 2013). However, in conflict resolution root causes of conflict will get addressed, so that the situation is no longer violent, hostile and exploitative (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014).

Thus, as multiple sources of data revealed that the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is not addressed at the grassroots level. However, the conflict was managed and peacebuilding efforts were made through both customary (traditional) and formal mechanisms.

5.6.5.1. Customary (Traditional) Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution

Because of the influence of modern local government structure, the customary conflict resolutions of the study area remain on the edge of death. As many of the key informants confirmed, the values of customary conflict resolutions are eroded and replaced by local government politics. However, efforts were made to resolve the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict through a customary conflict resolution mechanism called “*Ataa*”

❖ Inter-Group Conflict Resolution Mechanism: “Ataa” System

Unlike *Moora* (examination of individual cases), “*Ataa*” system is used to reconcile inter-group conflicts i.e. inter-ethnic and/inter-clan conflicts. As both Alle and Konso key informants stated, “*Ataa*” is a mechanism of conflict reconciliation inter-linked with morality of both Alle and Konso ethnic groups. The “*Ataa*” system is widely used conflict resolution mechanism in both Alle and Konso ethnic groups. The *Ataa* conflict reconciliation usually took place during night time, in the area where the conflict erupted.

After the 2011 violent conflict, “*Ataa*” reconciliation ceremony carried out around the “*Kukuba-Sala*” farmland where the two ethnic groups fought over. Regarding the ceremony one Alle key informant who attended the ritual stated as:

After the 2011 violent conflict, both Alle and Konso gathered around a farm place called Kukuba-Sala. The attendants gathered from the nearest Kebeles mainly from Maderia-Gezaba, Masooya and Kerkerte. In the gathering, different community members of both Alle and Konso attended. These include; clan leaders, “senkeletas”, “hellas”, “Apa Timpas” and others. In the ceremony, perpetrators were condemned by the gatherings and all the participants promised not to repeat such kind of conflict.

The gatherings ate food and drank chaqa/warshe prepared for the ceremony. Finally, after the gathering was blessed (“mereka”) by clan leaders and elders the reconciliation ceremony completed (AKI-5, Gewadaa, 30th March, 2016).

As many of both Alle and Konso key informants and FGD participants confirmed, because of weakened values of Ataa system peace was not long lasted after the 2011 reconciliation ceremony. Then after, the 2013 and 2014 inter-ethnic conflicts occurred in the study area. Similarly, after the 2014 violent conflict, another conflict reconciliation ceremony was organized around “Regede” farmland between Gergema and Gelabo Kebeles on 23rd September, 2014 (see appendix 4).

5.6.5.2. Formal Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Attempts

i. Administrative and Corrective (Punitive) Measures

According to the Zone report (2014), in the 2011 and 2014 violent conflicts, punitive measures were taken against the perpetrators of the conflict. However, some ethnic group members of both Alle and Konso criticized it. According to the report, after the 2014 ethnic conflict different administrative and punitive measures were taken. Thus, after the conflict, the police identified 110 suspects that were involved in the conflict. Among these, four of them were highly suspected Alle individuals for the death of one child and wounding of another child. Moreover, 42 accusation files opened on the suspected individuals at the Zone High Court. Out of these 91 of them released on bail and 15 of them kept in custody waiting for decision (see appendix 4).

The report also indicated that 132 looted properties were collected. Out of these, 82 of them were partially/fully returned to property owners. In addition, 21 damaged and eight lost properties were identified. The police investigated suspected individuals for looted properties and brought their cases to the court. Accordingly, 23 primary property looters recorded and all of them were from Alle ethnic group. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of property looters on the side of Konso (see appendix 4). Lastly, persons displaced because of the conflict were returned to their village/home.

As the Zone public prosecutors stated, for investigation purpose two large investigation records/documents were organized along ethnic lines i.e. Alle and Konso. The Zone public prosecutors undertaken the investigation at the two towns namely Karat and Gewadaa. Accordingly, the investigation was made from September to November 2014. After the investigation was completed, the court made a verdict on 30th October, 2015. As a result, the court passed imprisonment decisions and released few of them free. Moreover, the court also decided

guilty of crime and imprisonment over four suspected Alle individuals after announcement was made on newspaper. However, few of the individuals (decided to be imprisoned) requested the court the right to appeal.

However, as many of FGD participants of both Alle and Konso claimed, the punitive measures taken were not free from complain and grievance from both ethnic group members. First, the Alle Woreda did not handover the four perpetrators (previously suspected) to the police/court because of ethno-centric politics and ethnic loyalty. Second, the punitive measures (imprisonments) were dominantly focused on rural community and Kebele government officials. However, the Woreda as well as Zone government officials (who were indirect actors) gained the right to impunity i.e. exemption from guilty of penalty.

ii. Peace Conferences

After the violent conflicts of 2011 and 2014, the local government (mainly SAPZ) organized peace conferences at “Dimaya” a place on the road from Karat to Jinka (South Omo). As one Zone official informant clarified, the overall organization of the peace conferences were almost similar. On the peace conferences, local government officials and ethnic group representatives of both Alle and Konso participated. These include few clan leaders, elders of conflicting Kebeles, religious leaders, concerned Woreda and Kebele officials.

However, many of Alle and Konso key informants and few Zone official interviewees stated that the peace conferences did not address the root cause of the conflict. One Alle former official key informant reaffirmed, during the 2014 peace conference the two Woreda government officials sided with their ethnic group rather than being impartial. Likewise, another Konso key informant also criticized the representation of clan leaders as it was symbolic and only few of them were attended the conference. Moreover, the major actors of the conflict such as youth, adults, educated elites, businesspersons, and others were not participated in the peace conference. Thus, the exclusion of such key actors indicated that the peace conference was not comprehensive. Another critic was from one Alle FGD participant, he criticized as the peace conference followed top-bottom approach. The organizers of the peace conference used emotions, anger and coercion as means of forcing participants to speak.

iii. **Border Demarcation, Land Registration and Certification**

As indicated on the conflict factors of this study, one of the major cause for Alle- Konso ethnic conflict is competition over border land. Therefore, to address such border competition the Alle-Konso border was demarcated in the post 2014 conflict. The demarcation was made in collaboration of the Zone and two Woreda governments. Accordingly, the disputed border forest and farmland i.e. Kukuba-Sala was demarcated under Alle Woreda administration. The Alle Woreda entrusted the responsibility of administering the Kukuba-Sala land (see appendix 4).

However, as Konso FGD participants confirmed that many people criticized the border demarcation. The demarcation was not through the full participation of ethnic groups of both Woredas. Moreover, in the demarcation process key community members such as clan leaders, elders were not included. As a result, some ethnic group members particularly of Konso did not easily accept the border demarcation. The community did not also accept the demarcation particularly of Konso. Some Konso ethnic group members are still demanding the borderland as it is inherited from their ancestors.

Moreover, as the Zone report on Alle-Konso ethnic conflict indicated, competition over control of farmland through illegal deforestation increased specifically after 19th March, 2014. Hence, to address such land grabbing different actions were taken from 22nd March to 16th August, 2014 by the group of committees (task force). The participants of the task force consisted of stakeholders from the Zone and two Woredas'(see appendix 4). However, in the task force the traditional authorities of both ethnic groups were not represented. As one Konso key informant claimed, lack representation of clan leaders in turn affected the acceptance of the decisions made by the committee (task force).

In general, in addressing the competition of the two ethnic groups over the Kukuba-Sala land the task force decided/undertaken the following two major activities (see appendix 4).

- Land registration and certification was made for 281 householders. Among these, 220 and 61 of them were from Konso and Alle respectively.
- The Kukuba-Sala land is decided to be administered under Alle Woreda administration.

iv. Organized Peace Committees

Peace building is the creation of peace building structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the root cause of conflict. Peace building comprises multidimensional responsibilities/activities from disarming of armed groups to the building of political, social, judicial and civil society organizations (UN Peace Building and Support Office, 2016). Based on this definition, it is difficult to say there is sustainable peace in the study area. However, efforts have made by the local government to manage the conflict and build peace in the study area. Thus, in an effort to build peace in the study area, peace committees were organized from Kebele to Zone level (see appendix 5).

As the Zone official informants stated, the establishment of peace committees was initiated after the 2014 violent conflict. The group of Woreda and Zone stakeholders (task forces) were decided to establish Kebele peace committees based on 1:5 group formation (1 individual coordinates 5 other group members). However, as one Alle key informant claimed the 1:5 group organization is subject to critics. It is criticized as the aim of the group is not to sustain peace in the study area rather to run the politics of the local government.

At the Zonal level, the peace committees are divided in to major and technical committees. However, many of the FGD participants confirmed that the peace committees are not effective in building long lasting peace. They do not address the root causes of the conflict between Alle and Konso.

5.6.6. Challenges/ Limitations of Conflict Management and Peace Building

Even though the aforementioned efforts were taken to manage the conflict as well as build peace in the study area the following major limitations/challenges are drawn from the researcher's investigation and data obtained from research participants.

A. Land Demarcation, Registration and Certification Limitations

- The registration and certification of border farmland was too late and it was not timely to address the inter-ethnic conflict. It took four years (2011 to 2014) of time.
- Demarcation, registration and certification of land was not based on full participation both Alle and Konso ethnic group members' representatives.
- The legalization of illegal deforestations and farming has further accelerated the competition rate of both Alle and Konso farmers. As a result, many of the key informants

and FGD participants confirmed that in the forest and farmland area there are inter-personal clashes that may further lead in to inter-ethnic conflict.

B. Lack of Gender Dimension

- ✓ The participation of women in conflict management and peace building was highly restricted/limited compared to men. For example, as all research participants stated, during the peace conferences organized at Dimaya the role of women was only limited to preparation of foods and drinks. The peace conferences were male driven/dominated, that neglected half part of the population i.e. women.

C. Lack of Preventive Mechanisms and Conflict Sensitive Development Projects

- The Local governments (Zone, Woreda and Kebele) approach to conflict is dominated by corrective (reactive) rather than preventive (proactive). Most of the initiations and activities were undertaken after the conflict happen. For example, organization of peace committees, land certification etc.
- Moreover, in the study area conflict sensitive development activities/projects that can create harmonious/peaceful relationships are limited.

D. Lack of Mutually Trusted Peace Conferences

As many of the participants of the research confirmed that in the peace conferences held at Dimaya there was a mutual distrust between officials of both ethnic groups. As Lewicki and Tomlinson (2003) argued, distrust is the expectation that another group motives, intentions and behaviors are threatening and harmful to one's own interest. Distrust not only hampers cooperation in peace process but also retaliate that causes that can escalate the conflict.

E. Local Government Institutional Weakness and Inadequate Support given from SNNPRS

- As many of key informants revealed that the Zone as well as the constituting Woredas' are institutionally weak (particularly security sector) in preventing the escalation of inter-personal conflicts in to ethnic conflict. In consequence, the weakness of security institutions has led to an increase in individual crimes (homicide, lootings, damages etc.) that further lead in to ethnic conflict. Moreover, as one Alle key informant noted, the Zone and Woreda security institutions were captured by ethno-centric politics. Because of such weakness, in 2014 the Zone as well as Woreda security institutions were unable to hand over the suspected individuals before the law. This in turn led to the violent conflict between Alle and Konso.

- Moreover, as all Zone official informants claimed, the support given by the SNNPRS to strengthen the security institutions of the newly established young Zone i.e. SAPZ is very limited.

5.6.7. Alle-Konso Inter-Ethnic Conflict Scenario Analysis

Assessing the Alle and Konso conflict scenario is important to identify and recommend possible responses to the conflict. Therefore, based on the dynamics and nature of the conflict; historical and current relations of the two ethnic groups' two conflict scenarios are identified: Best-Case and Worst-Case scenarios. Each of the scenario analysis is based on the finding, presentation and analysis of the conflict.

5.6.7.1. Best-Case Scenario: Enduring Peace

Based on the data collected from key informants, government official interviewees, FGD participants and official documents and the analysis made in this chapter the Best Case-Scenarios include the following:

- ❖ **Border Demarcated between Alle and Konso:** Before 2014, there was no clearly demarcated border between Alle and Konso Woredas. However, soon after the 2014 violent conflict, the border between the two demarcated. The disputed “Kukuba-Sala” forest and farmland was also demarcated under Alle Woreda administration. This further lessens the border conflict between the two ethnic groups.
- ❖ **Registration and Certification of Farm-Holdings:** In 2014, the Kukuba-Sala farmland was registered and certificate was given to the farmers who cultivate on it. Even though the process of demarcation was problematic, it may further decrease the competition over deforestation and expansion of farmland. Moreover, based on the Zone report on Alle-Konso conflict the rule and regulation how to use the “Kukuba-Sala” forest and farmland is prepared and currently submitted to the Zone Administrative Council for approval (see appendix 4). If such rule and regulation how to use the Kuba-Sala land become effective, it will also further lessen the tensions between Alle and Konso ethnic groups.
- ❖ **Increased Conflict Management and Peace Building Efforts:** After the 2014 violent conflict, conflict management and peace building efforts increased from time to time. For instance, demarcation of border, registration and certification of land, organization of peace committees and initiation of the rules and regulation regarding the utilization of Kukuba-Sala

farm and forestland. These efforts show the possible prospects for peace between Alle and Konso ethnic groups.

- ❖ **Inter-Marriage and Cultural Relations:** Alle and Konso ethnic groups share common culture and tradition. Moreover, they have inter-marriage relations based on clan lineage system. Their inter-marriage relation resulted children with mixed identities i.e. born from Alle and Konso parents. Therefore, if these mixed identities and shared cultures are positively cultivated, they can build long-lasting peace between the two ethnic groups.

5.6.7.2. Worst-Case Scenario: Escalation of the Conflict

Apart from the worst-case scenarios, the following best-case scenarios are drawn based on the conflict analysis made above.

- **Legalizing the Illegal Farmland without Proper Corrective Action:** The 2014 Kukuba-Sala land registration and certification was undertaken without legally punishing the individuals who controlled land through illegal deforestation. Thus, the legalization of the illegal land further created competition between the two ethnic groups. This in turn may escalate in to inter-ethnic conflict between the two.
- **Impunity of Local Elites (Political, Educated and Business Elites):** In the recent 2014 violent conflict, the majority of individuals arrested and imprisoned were Kebele officials and individual farmers. However, the elites who directly and indirectly involved in the conflict were immune from legal measures and imprisonment. This danger the prospects for peace between the two ethnic groups.
- **Politicization of Ethnicity and Elite Mobilization:** Based on the evidence from the Zone government interviewees, still there is a confrontation between Alle and Konso elites including in the Zone government offices. During the 2014 peace conference, the political elites manipulated ethnic differences and further created victim mentality among participants of the conference. Hence, if such elite mobilization is not addressed at the grass root level it will hamper peace-building efforts. Moreover, it may further escalate in to another violent inter-ethnic conflict.
- **Inescapability of Inter-Personal Conflicts:** As the evidence from the 2011 and 2014 violent conflicts shown, in the study area there was an escalation of inter-personal clashes in to inter-ethnic conflict. Likewise, currently there are minor inter-personal clashes around the borderland area that can escalate in to inter-group conflict between Alle and Konso.

- **Absence of Effective Arms Control:** As multiple sources of data confirmed, in the study area there is a circulation of large number of small arms. The small arms are easily accessed by the people of the area and fired individual clashes in to inter-group conflict. Moreover, the easily availability of small arms contributed to the militarization of ethnic group members (see ethnic security dilemma). Thus, ineffective arms control may bread further inter-ethnic conflicts in the study area.
- **Weak Local Government Institutions:** As it has been said in the analysis part of this thesis, in the study area the local government institutions (Woreda and Zone) are weak in giving a fast response to inter-personal clashes before escalating in to inter-group conflict. For example, during the 2014 violent conflict that, the Alle police man escaped after he was indirectly involved in the killing of a Konso child. Still the police man is not brought to the court by the concerned Woreda and Zone security institutions. Thus, the case clearly confirms that because of such weak security institutions the inter-personal conflicts of the area could be escalated in to inter-group conflict.
- **The Quest of Konso for Zonal Self Administration:** As Konso key informants stated the ethnic group members of Konso openly requested the SNNPRS to grant Zonal self-administration beginning from September 2015. Since the establishment of SAPZ, the Konso claimed the center of Zone administration to be in Karat. However, the constituting ethnic Woredas' and the regional government rejected the question of Konso. Because of that, currently the Konsos' are now openly demanding Zonal self-administration through their elected representatives. Moreover, as one Alle key informant stated the Konso wanted to expand and incorporate the neighboring areas like Gewadaa (was part of KSW) and establish Zone administration. Thus, such quest of Zonal administration may danger the relationship of Konso with other neighboring Woredas' particularly Alle. This may further create tensions /conflict between Alle and Konso ethnic groups.

Chapter Six

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Summary and Conclusion

Inter-ethnic conflict is a conflict by which the primary line of confrontation is ethnic markers. In ethnic conflict whatever the cause, ethnic groups confronted each other with special emphasis to their ethnic identity. Moreover, for inter-ethnic conflict to happen two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity with in common political and socio-economic territory. Thus, the existing literatures claimed that multi-ethnic states are more prone to ethnic conflict than homogeneous states. However, it does not mean that ethnic diversity by itself is a source of ethnic conflict. Ethnic differences lead to ethnic conflict when ethnic differences are politicized for personal or group interests. In the contemporary world, ethnic diversity leads to ethnic conflict when ethnic identities are constructed and instrumentalized by different actors. Indeed, the more the society is divided along ethnic lines the more vulnerable to ethnic mobilizations and ethnic conflict.

The SNNPRS is an inter-ethnic conflict prone region of Ethiopia due to its multiethnic nature. As different research works indicated, the multi-ethnic regions of Ethiopia are more susceptible to inter-ethnic conflicts. Among the multi-ethnic areas of the region, SAPZ is one of the second most multiethnic Zone having eight major ethnic groups. In the past 20 years the area was full of inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. As a result, the area labeled as the conflict prone Zone. The Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is one of such conflict in the area.

As the finding of the research indicated, Alle and Konso lived together since the establishment of modern Ethiopian state. They were also administered under a similar political administration. Their post 1991 relation is either cordial or conflictual. Their cordial relation demonstrated on shared economic activities (e.g. trade) and social-cultural (e.g. intermarriage) relations. The two ethnic groups shared common food and clothing traditions. Moreover, because of their proximity for a long period of time, the two ethnic groups shared some common terms, expressions and communication pattern. Moreover, in some border areas, one ethnic group members speak the other language as a second language next to their mother tongue and vice versa.

Comparatively the pre-1991 Alle-Konso relation was more peaceful than the post 1991. After the reorganization of the country's political system in to ethnic lines (since 1991), the relationship

between Alle and Konso became rough. Since 1995 the ethnic groups of the area established their own self-administering SWs along ethnic lines, which lasted to 2011. However, the Alles' were denied of their common ethnic identity and self-administration right. Until 2010, they were administratively divided between KSW and DSW. As a result, the quest of Alle ethnic identity and self-governance embarked since 1995 and lasted to 2010. After the violent conflict of Alle with Konso and Dirashe their common ethnic identity and self-governance was officially approved on 2nd December, 2010. Therefore, the pre-2010 Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict was mainly caused by the quest of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance.

In the post recognition of Alle common ethnic identity and self-governance (since 2010), three major inter-ethnic conflicts broke out: The 2011, 2013 and the recent 2014. As the finding of this study revealed, there are two major categories of factors, which are responsible for the Alle-Konso ethnic conflict. These are structural and proximate (triggering) factors. The structural factors that caused the Alle-Konso ethnic conflict falls in to four categories. The first factors that caused the Alle-Konso conflict are economic factors such as competition over scarce farmland resource and mismanagement of borderland. Second, political factors such as politicization of ethnicity and ethnic mobilization are other pervasive factors. Security factors are the third causes of the ethnic conflict, which include; unregulated illicit arms and weak institutional capacity of local governments. Besides, ethnic security dilemma between Alle and Konso is another security factor that causes the inter-ethnic conflict. Fourth, socio-cultural and psychological factors together with the weakening of traditional conflict resolution/reconciliation mechanism contributed for the outbreak of the conflict. The victimhood mentality of Alle in their past relationship with Konso is another psychological factor and it makes the conflict hard to resolve. The Alle considered the past KSW administration divided and politically marginalized their people and the atrocity of violent conflicts that killed the lives of Alle created another cycle of victim mentality. At the same time, the Konso claimed the lost Kebeles (7 Kebeles) that latter incorporated in to Alle Woreda. Moreover, the major proximate factors of the post-2010 Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict are interpersonal clashes that result in homicide, looting and damage of property. At the same time, escaping of individual perpetrators because of weak security institutions aggravated the conflict between the two ethnic groups.

For inter-ethnic conflict to happen, different actors played direct or indirect role through instrumentalizing (mobilizing) ethnic differences. In the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict, different actors were involved directly or indirectly. The internal actors who participated in the conflict include individual farmers; youth and adults; local elites (political, educated and business); traditional leaders and elders; illicit arm dealers and brokers; women; victim family and clan members. The external actors also participated in creating access to illegal small arms and opening outlet roads during conflicts. The neighboring ethnic groups such as Borana-Oromo and Bena-Tsema of South Omo Zone engaged in Alle-Konso conflict as external actors. Alle and Konso claimed as they have blood relationship with Bena-Tsema and Borana respectively.

Conflict by its nature is either constructive or destructive. Conflict become destructive when it becomes violent. Due to the violent nature of Alle-Konso conflict, which broke out in the 2011, 2013 and 2014 impacted the local community of the study area. The impact of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict on the study area categorized as: Economic impacts (destruction of economic resources, infrastructures and hindrance to economic activities); social impacts (loss of human life, weakened social relations, disintegration of multi-ethnic families) and political impacts (increased political mistrust and ethnic centeredness in government responsibilities).

To manage the conflict and build peace in study area, different attempts were taken by the local governments (Woreda and Zone). However, as the findings of this study revealed, the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is not resolved at the grass root level rather managed. Because, there are still indicators for the outbreak of the conflict as indicated on the worst case scenario analysis of this study. The formal conflict management and peace building efforts taken include: corrective measures (i.e. litigation), peace conferences, border demarcation, farmland registration and certification; and organizing peace committees in the conflict area. Apart from formal efforts, traditional conflict reconciliation (“Ataa” system) held in the post-conflict period in order to build the broken peace. However, the conflict reconciliation did not bring lasting peace yet, it is because of traditional values of conflict resolution eroded from time to time. As the finding of this study showed, the efforts taken were more of corrective than preventive/proactive. In addition, the ethnic partiality (loyalty) of local government officials influenced the conflict management and peacebuilding efforts negatively.

In managing the Alle-Konso ethnic conflict and building peace in the study area, some of the challenges/limitations include poor quality land registration and certification; lack of gender dimension; lack of all-inclusive and mutually trusted peace conferences; lack of conflict sensitive development activities and local government institutional weakness.

Based on the scenario analysis of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict the prospects for peace (Best-Case Scenarios) include; demarcated borderland; registration and certification of farmland, increased conflict management and/ peace building efforts and inter-marriage and cultural relations. On the contrary, as the Worst-Case Scenario indicated, there are situations that can damage the future relationships of both ethnic groups and break out conflicts. Among them, legalizing the illegal farmland without legal action may result in further competition/conflict; inescapability of inter-personal conflicts; impunity of local elites that further created grievance; continued politicization of ethnicity and elite mobilization and spread of illegal small arms. Moreover, weak local government institutions particularly the security sector and the quest of Konso for Zonal administration may further impacted the prospects for future peace.

6.2. Recommendations

Based on the summary of finding and conclusion of the study, the following recommendations are forwarded as a way to address the existing challenges of managing and resolving the conflict and effectively building long lasting peace between Alle and Konso.

- ❖ The stakeholders who involve in conflict management and peace building in the study area should clearly aware of the root causes of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Most of the researchers of the area indicated that competition over land resource is the major source of inter-ethnic conflict in the study area. However, as the findings of this study indicated the cause of Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is not solely resource rather there are multiple factors.
- ❖ In the study area, competition over scarce resources (i.e. land) is one of the structural causes of the conflict. The population pressure of the area further increased competition and conflict over farmland resource. Moreover, majority of the competitors over farmland and front fighters during the conflict are youth and adults. Therefore, to alleviate the problem, the Regional and Zonal governments should create alternative income generating economic activities for the youth and adults through enhancing job creation and job opportunity.

- ❖ In the conflict area, the local governments (Zone, Woredas' and Kebeles') should strengthen their efforts of border and farmland management to be effective, transparent, fair and participatory.
- ❖ The two Woreda administrations (Alle and Konso) should cultivate their common socio-cultural markers in a way that can promote lasting peace in the study area. The finding of this study indicated that the Alle-Konso shared common socio-cultural traditions since they live together for a long time.
- ❖ One of the problem related to handling the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict is lack of conflict sensitive development activities (projects). Hence, both the Regional and local governments should promote conflict sensitive development activities in the border areas of Alle and Konso in a way that can build peace in the long run.
- ❖ Based on the research findings psychological factors are among the structural causes of the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict. Therefore, to address such deep-rooted victim mentality and ethnic grievance a comprehensive and all-inclusive (including all key actors) conflict reconciliation should be organized at the local level.
- ❖ As finding of this research revealed the major challenge in building peace in the study area is politicization of ethnicity and elite mobilization. Thus, the Zonal (SAPZ) as well as Regional government (SNNPRS) should make the local elites accountable to the conflict and take appropriate legal measures.
- ❖ The Regional government should give adequate support and strengthen the capacity of local government institutions to address the inter-ethnic conflicts of the area. The regional government should add capital budget to the newly established Zones like SAPZ. SAPZ is the most recent and newly established Zone of SNNPRS and has weak government institutions (particularly security sector) in terms of addressing the inter-ethnic conflicts of the study area like Alle-Konso ethnic conflict.
- ❖ As the finding of this study discovered, the area is near to the pastoralist as well as illegal trade areas of the country. As a result, there is high proliferation of small arms. The availability of these small arms further worsened the inter-personal conflicts in to group conflict. Therefore, in the study area effective, responsible arms control and management mechanism should be enhanced.

- ❖ The local governments of the area should encourage and strengthen the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, because they are highly accepted and respected in the society than the formal legal system. Therefore, the local government officials should use the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to address the frequent intra and inter-conflicts of the area rather than substituting and eroding with governmentally organized institutions.
- ❖ Moreover, to prevent the escalation of inter-personal conflicts in to inter-group conflict awareness should be created in both Alle and Konso ethnic groups. Moreover, community based and participatory crime prevention mechanisms should be organized at the Kebele level. Community policing is one of the mechanism that can handle inter-personal conflicts before escalating in to inter-group conflict.

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አዲስ አድማስ ጋዜጣ “የቅማንት ጥያቄ ምላሽ ቢያገኝም ግጭቱ ተባብሶ ሰንብቷል” በአለማየሁ አንበሴ፣ ገጽ 2፣ ቅዳሜ ህዳር 29/2008 ዓ.ም

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Appendices

Appendix 1. In-depth Interview and FGD Guides

The purpose of this in-depth interview and FGD guide is to gather data on issues of “Inter-ethnic Conflict in the South Western Ethiopia: The Case of Alle and Konso” The following questions formulated and used as a guide to semi-structured in-depth interview and FGD. The information obtained from the interviewees and FGD participants used only for research purpose.

1. In-depth Interview Guide Questions

A. Interview Guide Questions for Government Officials (Zone, Woreda & Kebele)

Context of the Conflict

1. Would you tell me about the history of origin of Alle/Konso ethnic group?
2. Who are Alle /Konso ethnic groups? (geographic, demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics)
3. How do you explain the historical relationship of Alle and Konso ethnic groups?
4. Could you explain the historical background of the inter-ethnic conflict?

Actors of the Conflict

5. Who are the main actors of the conflict? Could you list/explain?
6. What are the different values, positions and perceptions of these actors?
7. What are the incentives and disincentives for these different actors?

Causes of the Conflict

8. What are the structural causes of the conflict?
9. What are the triggering/proximate factors for the conflict?

Dynamics of the Conflict

10. Would you tell the present relationship of Alle & Konso?
11. Is the security situation improving or worsening in the conflict area? How?
12. What are the escalating/deescalating factors of the conflict?

Impacts of the Conflict

13. What are the damages that the conflict brought in your locality/community?
14. How do you explain the magnitude of the impact of conflict in your locality?

Responses to the Conflict

15. Who intervened to manage/resolve the conflict?

16. What were the roles (negative/positive) of the Zone, Regional and Federal Government in the conflict?
17. What kind of measures/solutions were taken from the Zone/Woreda/Kebele side to resolve the conflict?
18. What was the Regional/Zonal/Woreda government institutional capacity to respond to the conflict? Is there a popular confidence in the Regional/Zonal institutions?
19. What impact (positive or negative) will the Regional state/Zonal engagement have on the prospects for peace?
20. Does your Zone/Woreda/Kebele attempt for a peace process? Could you elaborate?

📖 Challenges of Conflict Management and Peace Building

21. What are the challenges encountered in the conflict management/resolution process?
22. What are the challenges of sustainable peace in the conflict area?

📖 Recommendations on Managing and Resolving the Conflict

23. As a responsible government official what do you suggest a solution to resolve the conflict?
24. How do you think the Alle-Konso inter-ethnic conflict can be managed or resolved?
25. How can the Regional State/Zonal development programs be sensitive to conflict dynamics?
26. Is there a need for a specific development project to address the conflict situation? What interventions could be supported?
27. Are essential public services being delivered, and to whom?

📖 Additional Information on the Issue

28. Do you have any more idea needed to the conflict issue?

B. Interview Guide Questions for Key Informants

1. How do Alle and Konso ethnic groups perceive their differences and similarities?
2. How do you explain the relationship between Alle and Konso?
3. How do you compare the relationships of Alle and Konso before and after the formation of SAPZ/Alle Woreda?
4. Who are the main actors of the conflict? Do they operate visibly or behind the scenes?
5. Are there any external actors in the conflict? Who are they?
6. What is the vested interest of actors in the conflict?
7. What are the actors' power base and resources in the conflict?

8. What are the roles of men and women in the conflict situation? What are their specific needs, interests and potential strengths?
9. What are the immediate and underlying causes of the conflict?
10. Does high population density produce pressures relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources?
11. What are the events, actions, that can be actual or potential trigger factors of the conflict?
12. What kind of consequences that these trigger factors have on structural/key causes of the conflict?
13. What is the negative impact of the conflict in the locality/region?
14. Which problems can local people solve themselves and require action by local government and federal government?
15. Finally, do you have any more idea on the issue that you want to say?

2. FGD Guide Questions

1. Would you discuss the relationship between Alle and Konso (past and present)?
2. What are the historical factors contributing to Alle and Konso Conflict?
3. Who are the main internal and external actors of the conflict?
4. Which actors are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict?
5. What are the roles of elders, clan leaders and religious groups in the conflict? How representative are they of local people?
6. What are the underlying causes of the conflict?
7. What are the immediate causes of the conflict?
8. Is there any damage on humans and properties due to the conflict? Please discuss
9. What is the government (kebele, woreda, regional state) institutional capacity to respond to the conflict?
10. What efforts have been tried to resolve the conflict so far?
11. How can development programs be designed to support peace building and mitigate against conflict risks?
12. If you have additional idea/comment concerning the conflict, please do so.

Appendix 2. List of Informants, FGD Participants and Field Assistants

A. Government Official Interviewees

No	Interviewee Code No	Sex	Age	Ethnic Group	Education Level	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Remark
1	ZGO-1	M	30	Dirashe	LLB Degree	Segen	15 th February, 2016	
2	ZGO-2	M	29	Oromo	BA Degree	Segen	17 th February, 2016	
3	ZGO-3	M	55	Kore	Diploma in Law	Segen	16 th February, 2016	
4	ZGO-4	M	29	Kore	Diploma in Law	Segen	16 th February, 2016	
5	ZGO-5	M	30	Kore	BA Degree	Segen	17 th February, 2016	
6	ZGO-6	M	28	Masholle	Diploma in Surveying	Segen	18 th February, 2016	
7	KWGO-1	M	28	Xonsita	LLB Degree	Karat	22 th February, 2016	
8	KWGO-2	M	55	Xonsita	LLB Degree	Karat	22 th February, 2016	
9	KKGO-1	M	46	Xonsita	8 th Grade	From Karat	15 th March, 2016	Telephone Interview
10	AWGO-1	M	29	Alle	BA Degree	Arba Minch	8 th March, 2016	
11	AWGO-2	M	31	Alle	Diploma	Kollango	29 th February, 2016	
12	AWGO-3	M	30	Alle	Diploma	From Kolango	21 th March, 2016	Telephone Interview
13	AWGO-4	M	32	Dirashe	BA Degree	Addis Ababa	28 th April, 2016	
14	AKGO-1	M	39	Alle	8 th Grade	Gewadaa	2 nd March, 2016	

Key: ZGO: Zone Gov't Official; KWGO: Konso Woreda Gov't Official; KKGO: Konso Kebele Gov't Official; AWGO: Alle Woreda Gov't Official; AKGO: Alle Kebele Gov't Official

B. Key Informants

No	Interviewee Code No	Sex	Age	Ethnic Group	Education Level	Place of Interview	Date of Interview	Remark
1	KKI-1	M	50	Xonsita	BA Degree	Segen	19 th February, 2016	
2	KKI-2	M	45	Xonsita	8 th Grade	Karat	23 rd February, 2016	
3	KKI-3	M	38	Xonsita	9 th Grade	Karat	23 th February, 2016	
4	KKI-4	F	61	Xonsita	Illiterate	Turo	24 th February, 2016	
5	KKI-5	M	35	Xonsita	BA Degree	Karat	14 th March, 2016	Former Youth Leader
6	AKI-1	F	60	Alle	Illiterate	Gewadaa	3 rd March, 2016	
7	AKI-2	M	30	Alle	BA Degree	Arba Minch	9 th March, 2016	
8	AKI-3	M	33	Alle	BA Degree	From Kollango	10 th March, 2016	Telephone Interview
9	AKI-4	M	24	Alle	Diploma	Arba Minch	9 th March, 2016	Victim family
10	AKI-5	F	53	Alle	Illiterate	Gewadaa	3 th March, 2016	Participated at Dimaya Peace Conference
11	MCKI	M	44	-	MA Degree	Arba Minch	16 th March, 2016	Involved in Conflict Mgt

Key: KKI: Konso Key Informant, AKI: Alle Key Informant, MCKI: Mercy Corps Key Informant

C. FGD Participants

No	Participant Code No	Sex	Age	Ethnic Group	Education Level	Session & Place FGD	Date of FGD
1	KFGDP-1	M	31	Xonsita	BA Degree	Konso-Karat	26 th February, 2016
2	KFGDP-2	M	28	“	BA Degree		
3	KFGDP-3	F	25	“	Diploma-Nursing		
4	KFGDP-4	M	30	“	BA Degree		
5	KFGDP-5	M	35	“	BA		
6	KFGDP-6	F	30	“	Diploma		
7	KFGDP-7	M	38	“	Diploma		
8	AFGDP-1	M	27	Alle	Diploma	Alle-Gewada	4 th March, 2016
9	AFGDP-2	M	23	“	Diploma		
10	AFGDP-3	F	24	“	Diploma		
11	AFGDP-4	M	28	“	BA Degree		
12	AFGDP-5	M	31	“	Diploma		
13	AFGDP-6	F	36	“	BA Degree		

Key: KFGDP: Konso Focus Group Discussion Participant, AFGDP: Alle FGD Participant

D. List of Field and Telephone Interview Assistants

N o	Field/ Telephone Assistant Code No	Sex	Age	Ethnic Group	Education Level	Field of Assistance	Remark
1	FA-1	M	30	Dirasha	BED Degree	Segen City	
2	FTA-2	M	28	Xonsita	BA Degree	Konso	Assisted for face to face & telephone interview
3	FA-3	M	27	Xonsita	Diploma	Konso	
4	FA-4	M	25	Xonsita	Diploma	Konso	
5	FA-5	M	23	Alle	University Student	Alle	
6	FTA-6	M	29	Dirasha	BA Degree	Alle	Assisted for telephone & face to face interview
7	TA-7	M	31	Alle	BA Degree	Alle	Assisted for telephone interview

Key: FA: Field Assistant; TA: Telephone Assistant; FTA: Field & Telephone Assistant

Appendix 3. List of Pictures of Taken During the Fieldwork



A. Segen Town Square



B. Turo Market (Konso)





C. “*Chaqa/Warshe*”-Local Beer



D. “*Moora*”: Public place for Conflict Resolution

Appendix 4. Relevant Official Documents



1. ከኩታ-ሳላ የእርሻ መሬት አጠቃቀም ችግር አንፃር የተከናወኑ ተግባራት፤

ከኩታ-ሳላ በታርታር-ቴ ቀበሌ ስር የሚገኝ የደንና የእርሻ መሬት አካባቢ ሲሆን በዚህ አለመግባባቶች ተፈጥሮ ወደ ብጥብጥ በማምራቱ ክቡር የሆነ የሰው ልጅ ህይወት መንግስት ጀምሮ በየደረጃ ያለው የመንግስት አካላት በመረባረብ ብጥብጡን በማርገብ በተወሰነ መልኩ የተፈቱ ቢሆንም በአካባቢው ዘላቂ ህላምን በሚያመጣ መልኩ መሰረታዊ ስርዓት አልበኝነት በሰፊነ ሁኔታ ጥቂት አርሶ አደሮች ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ በመንቀሳቀሳቸው ግጭቱ ዳግም እንዲያገረሽ ሰራ ዕድል የፈጠረ በመሆኑ በ2006 ዓ.ም በዚህ በተቀመጠው አቅጣጫ መሰረት ከሁለቱም ወረዳዎች እና ከሁለቱም ቀበሌያት ጥምር የሰላም ኮሚቴዎች ተዋቅረው የሚከተሉትን ተግባራት ለማከናወን ተችሎአል፡-

- ✓ ቀደም ሲል በ2003 ዓ.ም ቴክኒክ ኮሚቴው በሰራው ስራ መነሻ በማድረግ የዚህ መስተዳደር ም/ቤት ያስተላለፈውን ውሳኔ ለማስፈፀም በኮንሶ በኩል የ226 አርሶ አደር እና በኧሌ በኩል የ62 አርሶ አደር በጠቅላላው የ288 አርሶ አደሮችን የእርሻ መሬት ልየታ ስራ የተሰራ ሲሆን በኮንሶ የ6 እና በኧሌ የ2 በድምሩ የ8 አርሶ አደሮች በአካባቢ መልቀቅ፤ አደራሻቸው ባለመታወቅና ከተካለለው ክልል ውጭ በመሆናቸው ምክንያት በጥምር የሰላም ኮሚቴ ውሳኔ የተሰጠባቸው ናቸው፤
 - ✓ በመቀጠልም በውሳኔ ሰነድ መሰረት የእርሻ መሬት ለተለየላቸው አርሶ አደሮች ከኧሌ ወረዳ ግብርና ጽ/ቤት ጋር በመቀናጀት ለ280 አርሶ አደሮች የመሬት ልክት ስራ ተከናውኗል፤
 - ✓ በመጨረሻም በኮንሶ በኩል ለ198 አርሶ አደሮች ከኧሌ በኩል ለ60 አርሶ አደሮች በድምሩ ለ258 አርሶ አደሮች የመሬት ባለቤትነት የይዞታ ማረጋገጫ ደብዳቤ መረዳ ግብርና ጽ/ቤት በመሬት አስ/ር ዋና የስራ ሂደት በኩል የማስራጨት ስራዎች 98% የተሰሩ ሲሆን በኮንሶ ወረዳ በኩል የ20 አርሶ አደሮች ደብተር ለሥርጭት የተዘጋጀ እና የ2 አርሶ አደሮች የፎቶ ግራፍ ማቅረብ ሥራ ቀሪ ሲሆን በሁለቱም ወረዳዎች ግብርና ጽ/ቤቶች በኩል ትኩረት ተሰጥቶ እንዲጠናቀቅ ኃላፊነት ተሰጥቶአቸዋል፡፡
- ስለዚህ በኩታ-ሳላ አካባቢ የነበረው የእርሻ መሬት አጠቃቀም ችግር በህጋዊ አግባብ በዘላቂነት የመፍታት ስራዎች ተከናውኗል ፡፡ ምክንያቱም የሁለቱ ህዝቦች የግጭቱ መነሻ የነበረው ሥርዓት በሰላላው መልኩ የእርሻ መሬት አጠቃቀም ሂደቶች ስለነበሩ ነው ፡፡

ከዚህም ጋር ተያይዞ በኩታ-ሳላ አካባቢ ሌሎች የተፈጥሮ ሃብት ያለ በመሆኑ ይህ በእርሻዎች ዙርያ ያሉ ደኅንነት በ2003 ዓ.ም የቴክኒክ ኮሚቴ በሰራውና በዚህ ውሳኔ መሰረት የተጠበቀ ስለመሆኑ ህላም ኮሚቴውም በዚህ ልክ ተስማምቶ አጽንቷል፡፡በመሆኑም በአካባቢው ከዚህ በኋላ የህግ የበላይነት ለፍጥ ህዝቦች በጋራ በሰላማዊ መንገድ ተጠቃሚ የሚሆኑበት አግባብ የተፈጠረ ስለመሆኑ የሚያረጋግጥ ሁለት ሰነዶች በጥምር የህላም ኮሚቴዎች ተሰርቶ የተረቡ ሲሆን አንደኛው የ280 ተጠቃሚ አርሶ አደሮች አጠቃላይ መረጃ የያዘ 17 ገጽ እና ሌላኛው በኩታ-ሳላ አካባቢ ያለውን የእርሻ መሬትና የተፈጥሮ ሃብት አጠቃቀምና አጠባበቅ በሚመለከት የአካባቢው ተጠቃሚ አርሶ አደሮች የምትዳደሩበት 5 ክፍሎች ያሉት የመተዳደሪያ ውስጢ ደንብ ተዘጋጅቶ ለዚህ መስተዳደር ም/ቤት ለውሳኔ ቀርቧል፡፡

2. በ5ቱም ቀበሌያት መካከል የተከሰተውን ብጥብጥ አስመልክቶ የተሰሩ ስራዎች፡-

በመግቢያ ላይ ለመጥቀስ እንደተሞከረው በ2006 ዓ.ም በነሐሴ ወር በሁለት ህፃናት ላይ በተፈፀመው የነፍስ ግድያ የአንዱ ህፃን ህይወት ወድያውኑ ስያልፍ በሁለተኛው ላይ ክፉኛ የሆነ የመቀሰል አደጋ በመድረሱ ምክንያት በ5ቱ ቀበሌያት መካከል ግጭት ተፈጥሮ ወደ ብጥብጥ በማምራቱ ለተለያዩ ጉዳዮችና ጥፋት ህዝቡ ተዳርጓል፡፡ በመሆኑም የተቀሰቀሰውን ብጥብጥ በየደረጃ ያለው የመንግስት አካላት በመቀናጀት የማርገብ ስራዎችን በመስራት የተከሰተውን ግጭት በዘላቂነት ለመፍታትና ወደ በጎ ለመቀየር በርካታ የሰላም ግንባታ ስራዎች ተሰርቷል፡፡ እነዚህም የህላም ግንባታ ስራዎች፡-

- ✓ ለብጥብጡ ምክንያት በሆኑ የአንዱ ህፃን ሞትና በሁለተኛው ላይ በደረሰው ጉዳት 4 ተጠርጣሪዎችን ከኧሌ ወረዳ በኩል በመለየት ለህግ በማቅረብና ከዚህ ጋር ተያይዞ በግጭቱ ላይ የተሳተፉ ነፍስ ገዳዮችን፤ በመገደል መከራና በአካል ላይ ጉዳት በማድረስ የተጠረጠሩ ግንባር ቀደም ተዋናዮችን ከ5ቱም ቀበሌያት በመለየት የወንጀል ምርመራ እንዲጣራባቸው ተደርጎ በአጠቃላይ ከአምስቱም ቀበሌያት በኩል የተረበ ክስ 42 የተጠርጣሪ ብዛት 114 (በኮንሶ በኩል 53 እና በኧሌ 61) ሲሆኑ ከእነዚህም ውስጥ በምርመራ ተጠርጥባቸው በዋስ የተለቀቁ 91 በፍ/ቤት የጊዜ ቀጠሮ ተጠይቆ በማረሚያ ተቋም ያሉና ውሳኔ እየተጠበቁ የሚገኙ ብዛት 15 ሲሆኑ በኧሌ ወረዳ በኩል ከተጠረጠሩ ከገዋዳ ቀበሌ ግለሰቦች መካከል 4 ተጠርጣሪዎች እስካሁን ለህግ ቁጥጥር ስር ያልዋሉና ቀርበው ቃላቸውን ለህግ ያልሰጡ በመሆናቸው የኧሌ ወረዳ መንግስት በጉዳዩ ላይ ልዩ ትኩረት ሰጥቶ ተጠርጣሪዎችን በአጭር ጊዜ ውስጥ ወደ ሕግ የማቅረብ ሥራ ተጠናክሮ እንዲቀጥል መንግስት ኃላፊነቱን ወስዶ ክትትል በማድረግ ላይ ይገኛል፡፡
- ✓ ሌላው በግጭቱ ወቅት ከተዘረፉ ንብረቶች አንፃር በገላበና በገርገማ ቀበሌያት መካከል ህዝቡን በማወያየት 132 የሚሆኑ በዓይነት የተዘረፉ ንብረቶችን በአግባቡ በመለየትና

በአንድ ቦታ በማሰባሰብ ከዚህ ውስጥ 82 የሚሆኑ ንብረቶች በዓይነታቸው በክፈልና በሙሉ ለባለንብረቶች የማስመለስ ስራዎች ተሰርቷል። ከዚህም ጋር ተያይዞ 21 የወደሙ 8 የጠፉ ንብረቶችን የመለየት ስራዎች የተከናወነ ሲሆን አፈፃፀሙ በሕግ አግባብ ውሳኔ እንዲያገኝ መረጃው ተጠናቅሮ ለሚመለከታቸው የሕግ አካላት እንዲቀርብ ተደርጓል።

✓ በግጭቱ ወትት ከቀደሙ የተፈናቀሉ ግለሰቦችን ሙሉ በሙሉ ወደ ቀደሙ የማስመለስ ስራዎች ተሰርቷል።

✓ ንብረቶቹን ከዘረፉት አካላት መካከል ከገርዘ ተበሌ 13 እንዲሁም ከጋርጋማ 10 በድምሩ 23 የሚሆኑ ግንባር ቀደም ዘራራዎችን በመለየት ለህግ የማቅረብ ስራዎች ተሰርቷል።

✓ በአምስቱም አገራዊት ተበሌያት መካከል የተከሰተውን ግጭት ለማብረድና እርቱ-ሠላምን ለማውረድ በተደረገው ርብርብ በሁለቱም ወገኖች በኩል ባህላዊ አባቶችንና ሽማግሌዎችን ያሳተፈ ባህላዊ እርት በተሟላ የባህላዊ የእርት አፈፃፀም/ሥነ-ሥርዓት በመሰከረም 13 ተን 2007 ዓ.ም በሕፃናቱ ላይ የግድያ ወንጀል በተፈፀመበት በረገዴ የእርሻ መሬት አካባቢ በተረቡ የባህል አባቶች /የኦሊና ኃላ/ ቤተሰቦች እንዲሁም ታዋቂ የአገር ሽማግሌዎች በተገኙበት በተሟላ ሥነ-ሥርዓት ተፈጽሟል። በእርት-አፈፃፀም ሥነ-ሥርዓቱም ከእንግዲህ ወዲያ እንዲህ ዓይነት ክስተት እንዳይከሰት ከድምዳሜ ተደርሷል።

በአጠቃላይ በሁለቱ ወረዳዎች አገራዊት ተበሌያት መካከል የተከሰተውን ግጭት በዘላቂነት ለመቆታት እንዲቻልና በአካባቢው ሠላም፣ ልማትና መልካም አስተዳደርን ለማስፈን የተከናወነ የሠላም ግንባታ ስራዎች በአጭሩ የተገለፀ ሲሆን ለዚህ ሁሉ የሠላሙና የልማቱ ባለቤት የሆነው ህዝቡ ራሱ በመሆኑ እነዚህን የሠላም አሴት ግንባታ ስራዎችን እንዲጠብቅና ዘላቂነታቸውንም እንዲያስተናግድ ጭምር መልእክታችንን እያስተላለፍን ይህ የዕርት ሠላም ኮንፍራንስ በተጠናው የመልካም አስተዳደርና የሰላም ማስፈኛ ጦንካራ የጋራ እቋም የሚያገዝበት እንደሚሆን ይጠበቃል።

መልካም ኮንፍራንስ !!



በደ/ቡ/ብ/ሕ/ክ/መንግስት የሰገን አካባቢ ህዝቦች ዞን
 በጥታና አስተዳደር መምሪያ
 SNNPR State Segen Area People's Zone
 Security & Administration Department

ቱባር 28/06/2012
 ተን 25/12/07

ለምገን አካባቢ ሕዝቦች ዞን ዋና አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት

ሠገን፤

ጉዳዩ፡- በ"ኩኩባ-ሣላ" አካባቢ የተወራውን ሥራ መረጃ ስለመላክ ይሆናል፡-

በምገን አካባቢ ሕዝቦች ዞን በኮንጎና ሸሌ ወረዳዎች በሚደራና ግዛባ እና በቃርቃርቱ ተበሌያት መካከል የ"ኩኩባ-ሣላ" የእርሻ መሬት አጠቃቀምን ሕጋዊ ሥርዓት ለማሰያዝ በጥምር ሠላም ኮሚቴ በ2006 ዓ/ም የተሠሩ አጠቃላይ ሥራ መረጃ 17...18...18 የያዘውን ሰነድ ከዚህ ሽግግ ደብዳቤ ጋር አባሪ አድርገን የላክን መሆኑን እንገልፃለን።

ግልባጭ፤

- ለመምሪያችን ኃላፊ
- ለመምሪያችን ግ/መ/መ/ዋ/ሥ/ዚ/ደት
- ለሀገር ግብርና መምሪያ
- ሠገን፤**
- ለሸሌ ወረዳ ፀጥታና አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት
- ለሸሌ ወረዳ ግብርና ጽ/ቤት
- ከላገን፤**
- ለኮንጎ ወረዳ ፀጥታና አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት
- ለኮንጎ ወረዳ ግብርና ጽ/ቤት
- ካሬት፤**
- ለቃርቃርቱ ተበሌ አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት
- ቃርቃርቱ፤
- ለሚደራና ግዛባ ተበሌ አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት
- ማግኘቢ፤**
- ለበርቆራ ተበሌ አስተዳደር ጽ/ቤት
- በርቆራ፤

ከሠላምታ ጋር!!



አገረ ሰፊ ጭ
AMARE BORE GUME
 የፀጥታና አስተዳደር መምሪያ
 ኃላፊ
 Head, Security & Administration
 Department



መግቢያ

ከኩባ-ሃላ የእርሻ መሬት እና የተፈጥሮ ሀብት አጠቃቀም ዙርያ በ2003 ዓ.ም በኮንሶ ወረዳ ማደራና ግዛባ ቀበሌ እና በአሰራር ወረዳ በታርቃርቱ ቀበሌ መካከል አለመግባባቶች ተፈጥሮ የተፈጠረውን አለመግባባቶችን ለማስተካከልና ለመፍታት ከሁለቱም ወረዳዎችና ቀበሌዎች በኩል የተወጣጣ ተከራካሪ የሆኑት ተቀባሪው በመሰራት ላይ እያለ አለመግባባቶቹ ወደ ብጥብጥ ደረጃ በማምራቱ ውድ የሆነው የሰው ልጅ ህይወት ጠፋ በርካታ ንብረቶችም በመወደም እንዲሁም ዜጎችም ከነበሩበት ተቃራኒ በመፈናቀላቸው በአካባቢው የነበሩ የልማት ሥራዎች ተቋርጠው የአካባቢው ህዝብም ለማህበራዊ፣ኢኮኖሚያዊና ፖለቲካዊ ቀውስ ከማስከተሉም በላይ በርካታ ሰዎችም ለእስራት ተቆጥለዋል፡፡

በመሆኑም ይህንን ችግር በዘላቂነት ለመፍታትና በአካባቢው ሰላምና ፀጥታ ሰፍኖ ህጋዊ አስራር ተፈጥሮ የሁለቱም ወረዳ አርሶ አደሮች በመቻቻል፣በመከባበር እና በመተሳሰብ የልማት የጋራ ተጠቃሚ እንዲሆኑ ከክልል አንስቶ በየደረጃ ያለው የመንግሥት መዋቅርና የፀጥታ ሃይል በርካታ ሥራዎችን ሠርተዋል፡፡ በዚህም መሃል የሰጠን አካባቢ ህዝቦች ህን መንግሥት በሁለት ወረዳ ተጠቃሚ አርሶ አደሮች መካከል የተፈጠረው ብጥብጥ አስቸኳይና አስገባብ በመሆኑ ተደም ስል በተከሰቱ ኮሚቴ የተወሩ ሥራዎችን መነሻ በማድረግና ተራ በርካታ የህዝብ ለህዝብ ሥራዎችን በመስራት በኩባ-ሃላ አካባቢ የእርሻ ተጠቃሚ የሆኑ አርሶ አደሮች በሰላማዊ መንገድ አብሮ የሚጠቀሙበትን ህጋዊ ሥርዓት በማመቻቸት የመጨረሻ ውሳኔ በማስተላለፍ በህዝብ ኮንፈራንስ በሰላማዊ መንገድ በሰርተ መጠናቀቁ ይታወቃል፡፡ ሆኖም ግን በአካባቢው አንጻራዊ ሰላም የታየ ሲሆንም በኮንሶ ወረዳ በማደርያና ግዛባ ቀበሌ ከጊዜ በኋላ በተጠቃሚ አርሶ አደሮች እና የፀረ-ሰላም አመለካከት ባላቸው ጥቂት ግለሰቦች የሆኑት ውሳኔ አንቀበልም በሚል በአካባቢው እስከ አሁን ልማት-ዘላቂ ሰላምና የህጋዊ አስራር ሥርዓት አልተገኝም፡፡በዚህም ምክንያት የሆኑት ውሳኔ ለማስፈፀምና ህዝቦች በጋራ በሰላማዊ መንገድ የአካባቢውን የተፈጥሮ ሀብት በህጋዊ መንገድ እንዲጠቀሙ ከክልል ጀምሮ ያለው የመንግሥት መዋቅር በተለያዩ ጊዜ በርካታ ሥራዎችን በመሥራት ያሳነሰ ጥረት ብዙዎችም በጥቂት ጥገኞች አጀንዳ ሰላም ወዳፉ አብዛኛው አርሶ አደር ሳይወድ በግድ የሚይዘውን አጀንዳ ተሽካም በመሆን የሆኑ ውሳኔ በአካባቢው ተፈጻሚ እንዳይሆኑና ዘላቂ ሰላም ሰፊና የልማቱ ተጠቃሚ ባለመሆኑ የአካባቢው ልማት እየናፈቀውም በዚህ ምክንያት ብቻ ጥቂት የማይባሉ አርሶ አደሮች ጠላታችን በሆነውና በጋራ በሚንታገለው ድህነትና ረሀብ መመታተቸው አልቀረም፡፡

ችግሮቹ ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ በመበራከቱና በአካባቢውም ከተቀመጠው ከመንግሥት ውሳኔ ውጭ ሥርዓት አልበንነት በሠፈነበት መንገድ በዚህ ዓመት ከመጋቢት 10/2006 ዓ.ም ጀምሮ ህገ-ወጥ ምንጣርና እርሻዎች በመጀመሩ ህገ-ወጥ አሠራርን በማስቀረት ዘላቂ ሰላምን በማረጋገጥ ህጋዊ ሥርዓት ለማስፈን በተቀመጠው አቅጣጫ ከሆነ ፀጥታና አስተዳደር መምሪያ አንስቶ የኮንሶና የአሰራር ወረዳዎች ፀጥታ መዋቅርን ጨምሮ የኩባ-ሃላ የተፈጥሮ ሀብት አጠቃቀም ዙርያ ያለውን ችግር ከማስተዳደር አንስቶ በዘላቂነት እስከ መፍታት ለመጨረሻ ጊዜ እንዲሰሩ በተባለው አቅጣጫ መሠረት ከመጋቢት 13/2006 ዓ.ም ጀምሮ እስከ ነሐሴ 10/2006 ዓ.ም ድረስ የተወሩ ሥራዎች ከዚህ በታች እንደሚከተለው ቀርቧል፡፡



ከመጋቢት ወር 13/2006 ጀምሮ እስከ ሚያዝያ 29/2006 ዓ.ም ድረስ በተገባሩ ላይ የተሳተፉ የመንግሥት መዋቅር አካላት

1.ዘዘን

- አቶ ኮራ ዲባሊ እና
- አቶ ሰይድ ሙዴ የሰጠን አካባቢን ፀጥታና አስተዳደር መምሪያ ባለሙያዎች


2. ከኮንሶ ወረዳ:-

- አቶ ካፒና ኮርቶሎ- የወረዳው ፀጥታና አስ/ር ጽ/ቤት ኃላፊ
- አቶ ዳንኤል ዳይጋን- የወረዳው ፀጥታና አስ/ር ጽ/ቤት የግ/መ/ዋ/ሥ/ዚ/አስተባባሪ
- ም/ሣጅን ካምቢሮ አዘጋጅ- የወረዳው ፖሊስ ጽ/ቤት የወ/መ/ት/ም/ዋ/ሥ/ዚ/አስተባባሪ
- አቶ እፋቶ ዳጂ- የማ/ግዛባ ቀበሌ ዋና አስተዳደር
- አቶ ቲታ ከማይላ- የማ/ግዛባ ቀበሌ ም/ዋና አስተዳደር
- አቶ ካልሻ ካይቱሮ- የማ/ግዛባ ቀበሌ ሥ/አስኪያጅ
- አቶ ካንሻሎ ካላሎ- የማ/ግዛባ ቀበሌ የሚሊሻ ኮማንደር

3. ከአሰራር ወረዳ:-

- አቶ ሳላይዶ ሰይፉ- የወረዳው ፀጥታና አስ/ር ጽ/ቤት ኃላፊ
- ኮ/ባል ኩቻቀ ጉያሎ- የወረዳው ፖሊስ ጽ/ቤት አዛዥ
- አቶ አምሳሌ አንጋሶ- የወረዳው ፀጥታና አስ/ር ጽ/ቤት የግ/መ/መ/ዋ/ሥ/ዚ/አስተባባሪ
- አቶ ባይክዳ ባይማሊ- የታርቃርቱ ቀበሌ ዋና አስተዳደር
- አቶ መብመድ ማጣፎ- የታርቃርቱ ቀበሌ ፍትህና ፀጥታ
- አቶ ባማሊ ባታሊ- የታርቃርቱ ቀበሌ መሬት አስተዳደር
- የታርቃርቱ ቀበሌ ሥራ አስኪያጅ

እነዚህ ከላይ የተገለፁ የዘንድህ-ሰላቱ ወረዳዎችና የሁለቱም ቀበሌዎች የሰላም ኮሚቴ አካላት በኩባ-ሃላ አካባቢ ያለውን የተፈጥሮ ሀብት አጠቃቀም ህጋዊ ሥርዓት ለማስፈፀምና በአካባቢው ዘላቂ ልማትና ሰላምን በማስፈን የሆኑት ውሳኔ ማስፈፀሚያ ዋና ዓላማውና ግቡ ሲሆን ኮሚቴው በመጋቢት ወር 14/2006 ዓ.ም በኩባ-ሃላ ሰታው በሙላት በመገኘት አቋር የማስፈፀሚያ ዕቅድ በጋራ ከ14/07/06 ዓ.ም ጀምሮ እስከ 29/08/2006 ዓ/ም ድረስ የሚፈፀመውን ተግባር ዕቅድ በጋራ በማውጣት ተግባራትን እንዲሁም በመከፋፈልና እስከአሁን ችግሩ እልባት ያላገኘበት ምክንያት በሰላቱት በማጠን ወደ ተግባር ገብቶ በመጀመሪያ ችግሮቹን ከወረዳ አንስቶ እስከ ቀበሌ መዋቅር ወስጥ በአመለካከት በአቅም ማንሳትና በግንዛቤ እንዲሁም በቀርጠኝነት መንገድ በታዩ ችግሮች ዙርያ ከሁለት ዙር በላይ የተናጠልና ሁለቱ ወረዳዎች የጋራ መደረክ በመፍጠር እልህ አስጨራሽና ግልጽ ትግል በማድረግ በዘጋጅነት ምዕራፍ ላይ ጠንካራ እቋም በመያዝ በተለይ በኮንሶ ወረዳ በኩልም በአልግሎት በኩልም ከተማ እና በኩርሶ በሁለቱም መንግሥቶች በምንተላቀቅ የጥገኛ ኃይሎች አስተሳሰብና አመለካከት ዙሪያ እንደ መንግሥት ግንኙነት በኩልም በላይ የመታገየ



በኩባ-ሳላ የእርሻ መሬት ተጠቃሚ አርሶ አደሮች ዝርዝር መረጃ

ተ.ቁ	ሙሉ ስም	ወረዳ	ቀበሌ	የእርሻው መጠን በሄ/ር	አዋሳኞች				ምርመራ
					ሰሜን	ደቡብ	ምሥራቅ	ምዕራብ	
1	ካዬላ ካንሹሎ በቀለ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.8	ግድላ ግድላማ	ጋርቱ ኑርያ	ብርቱ ወልደ	መንግስቱ አርታላ	
2	ካፍዬሌ ካርዬ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	2.0	ጋኖቱ ጋያማ	ለጨዋ	ማሙሽ ኩሲያ	ኩሲ	
3	ዳን በየኔ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.474928	ካማላ ካማ	አናሶ አንጋና	ኩሲያ ጋፊ	ኩርን ጋያ	
4	ማርቆስ ሣይመፍ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	1.6	ብርቱ ወልደ	ብርቱ ካማታ	ጃጃቦ ብሎው	ሱቱልባ ሀሻሽ	
5	ደኖቶ እማማ አርታላ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.394826	ካሳሳ ካያ	ካሳ አፍቱ	ጋልያ ቦርጌ	አንትሶ አንጋና	
6	ባይካታ ባይማረ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.270978	ባካሊ ባይማረ	አካባሽ አያሳ	ካላብሽ ጋርያ	ካሳሳ ካያ	
7	ካሻይና ካፒታኖ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.539690	አግታ ጋርሶ	ካሼሊ ካብታኖ	ፍትሊ በርሻ	ኩሲያ ፍርታ	
8	አታባ አልታዬ ባርሻ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.488454	አንትሶ አንታረ	ጉጃባ ሃረማ	ካሳ ሐፍቱ	ገሼኝ ሐይራሉ	
9	መንግሥቱ አርታላ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.8	ጋወዳታ ሣይማማ	ግድላ ግድላማ	አወዳት ካርላማ	ካይራቦ በርሻ	
10	ታረቀኝ ጋምኝ	አሊ	ቃርቃርቱ	1.2	አልታሳ ታፎው	ባለበት ባልሻ	ኡቱ ባልሻ	ሳይሳ ለይሎ	
11	ጋልደ ቦርጌጌ ጋታይሊ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	3.6	ጋሳሊ ማይሊ ማቱ	ካሳሳ ካያ	ጋሳ ሐፍቱ	ቦጎና ቦንጋ	
12	ከባለ ጋለሐ	አሊ	ቃርቃርቱ	2.7	ቱቱ ቱባለ	ባሊ በርሻ	ጋዳሻ ጋናታ	አድሰ አታማ	
13	ጉይታ ቦጋና	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.6479607	ጋርብ ከጋ	ጉፍቱ ጉኑሰላ	ጋይራቦ በርሻ	ቱራይቶ ጉኝ	
14	ጋኖቱ ጋያማ ኡስካካ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.883377	ጋይታ ጋንበሎ	አርካሊ ስርቱ	ካሳና ካሳሳ	መከና መንገድ	
15	ቦጋና ቦጋ አሙሰ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.6	ታምረ ጋያማ	ባቱሊ ባይሻ	ባጋቱ ጋባይና	ባርሊ ቦጎና	
				0.7877895	ባለድሊ ባይማረ	መስቀለ በቀሊ	ካንጋቶ ቦርጌ	ነጻ ጎንጮሎ	
16	ከበና ካያ ካሳ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.641076	ኩርሻሊ ጉጃጃሉ	ካይታ ካቦሎ	ካዋይታ ኩሲያ	ካይናታ ፍቱሽ	
17	ኩርሻታ ኩንኔ ካንሻሊ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.415364	ሙሴ ሙቱርቱ	ኩያ ኩፊቴልቱ	ኩዳሮ ኩሲሳ	ፍቱሊ ካያ	
18	ቱርቦ ባላይሐ ገለቦ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	2.0	ካማረ ከበለ	አርካሊ ሽለለ	ሣወታ ካያ	አላይቶ አስታማ	
19	ሣፍኝ ሣባታ ሣለሎ	ኮንሶ	ቦርቆረ	0.496505	መንገደ	ግድሊ	ባባይ	አይናታ ፍቱሽ	
20	ቱቶ ቱባለ ኮኔ	አሊ	ቀርቀርቱ	2.1	ጋይሶ ጉዳ	ጋበለ ጋለኔ	ጋዳሻ ጋናታ	አይናታ ፍቱሽ	
21	ካርምላ ካለበቶ ቦታያ	አሊ	ቀርቀርቱ	1.000113	ካልኔ አስታማ	ጋልሻ	አልታሳ ጋያማ	አይናታ ፍቱሽ	
22	አወራ ለምታ አስካካ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	1.643201	ታካመ ካምላ	ተካሎ ካምላ	ቱና ካሸበ	ካምቶ ካያማ	
23	ቶማስ ቶና ካስቦ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.666693	ጉልዳቶ ጉሊማ	ጋያሎ ገብቶ	አያኝ ኩሲያ	ጋምላ አሳቦ	
24	ማሙሽ ኩሲያ በላይኔ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.824870	ጉጃላ አባቱ	ከሻውሴ ኩሲያ	ኮኝ በየረ	አላሎ ሙንጃ	
25	ገድሻ ካንቶሊ በኞኞ	ኮንሶ	ቦርቆረ	1.096119	---	ታርጌ ፍዳ	ደን	ኩባላ ካያላ	

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260	ኩታዶ ኩንሱላ ያባሎ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.755840	ወጣቱ ሳንጉሊ	ታባኖ ታሊ	ኪታዬ ግራኝ	ኩሲቶ ኦዮባ	
261	ዘለቀ ሳባታ አባይሽ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	2.652624	ሣሙኤል ሣባታ	ካሃኖ ቡሜሮ	ኩሲያ ግራኝ	ኩዳሮ ሽፋራ	
262	ኩቻቦ ጨሎንታ	አሊ	ቃርቃርቱ	1.398059	መከና መንገድ	ደን	አሸንቶ አንጋሶ	ወጣቱ ሳንጉሊ	
263	ካይሳሳ ካሳላ ካያ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.6	በአባቱ ካሳላ ስም	ሰለተላክ ተሰርዟል			
264	ታሚሩ ጋያማ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.6	አዞ እማማ	ቦጋና ቦጌ	ፋሜቱ ኩሉሚ	ያቶ አታኔ	
265	ሣሙኤል ሣንቲሚ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.344839	ጌባሊ ጌታ	ኩፊታ በርሻ	ሊሜቦ ሳንቲሚ	ሉሊ ካይቱሮ	
266	ኛካ ሸፊ ለሚታ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.244276	አርማ አንጉሊ	ዘለቀ ጋይሳቦ	አላይሶ አኦይዶ	ባርሳንዴ ማሳላ	
267	ኩሲያ እንግዳ ታሜ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ		መሬት ኩባ-ሳላ እንደሌላቸው	የቦርቆረ አመራር	መግለጫ ሰጥቷል::		
268	ካዋርና ኩይናታ ባልቻ	ኮንሶ	ኩኛራ						
269	ካባታ ካምላ ሀይዳ	ኮንሶ	ቦርቆረ	0.722111	ብታማ ባሊማ	አልታኮ ታፎ	አትራ እንሳርም	ሲጋኔ ካንቶሊ	
270	ኩዳያ ካፊላ ሀውዳያ	ኮንሶ	ኩኛራ	0.694213	ቦጋና ቦንጋ	ጉርኝ ካያ	ዳጉ በየን	መደ ጎንጮሎ	
271	ብርሃኑ ለባይቶ ገለቦ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	2.136020	አታሎ አይሳሊ	ካዊን ካርሳቶ	ብጩ ጉያኦ	ኩሲያ ካዳርታ	
272	ብርቱ ወልደ ካንታሎ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	1.421933	አውርቱ ካርሳማ	ማይቦ ማንቱ	ኩቱላ ሳይሙሮ	ጋያላ ጋንሸላ	
273	ገመዳ ጉዮላ ገለቦ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.347391	ቦራይሻ አቦንጋ	ካይናታ ካሳላ	ቦራይሻ አቦንጋ	አይታማ አልሼ	
274	ሱትልባ ሀላሽ ኡርታ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.378634	ቻቻቦ ብሎ	ዴይደሶ አታኝ	ኩሲታ ኩቱልባ	ኩፊቱላ ሳይሙሮ	
275	ጉርሸላ ጉንጨጨህ ሀሸርታ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.400210	ጉያኦ ኩሲያ	ገቦና ጋሮ	ኩትላ ኩሲያ	ለሚታ ባናታ	
276	ኩሲታ ሀሻሽ ሀላሽ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.383462	ቻቻቦ ብሎ	ኩሲ ኩሞራ	ካዳን ካይሶላ	ሀሻሼ ሀላሽ	
277	ኩርታኔ ኩዴ አሳቦ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ		አካባቢውን ለቶ	ጅንካ የገባ			
278	ግራኝ ግርማ ጉለልቶ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.483721	ካዊን ካርሳቶ	ወንዝ	ወጣቱ ሳንጉሊ	ካንታሊ ካርታሊ	
279	ኪራ ያቶ ካይሳ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ		አንብተኛ				
280	ካሸቱ ካንቶሊ ጋርሻቶ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	2.731894	ሙቱርቱ ታንታርሽ	ካንድራ ኩሲያ	ትርጌ ትሶ	ኩርሻይቱ ኩኖ	
281	ካሳላ ካይቱሮ ሽፊታ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	1.303472	ታናኖ ቆርቶ	ወጣቱ ሳንጉሊ	ካይታላ ካካብሳ	ኩርቱሎ	
282	ባርሶ ባልካ በርሻ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.757256	ኩባሊ ኩሻሊ	ካሃላ ካካብሳ	ቃውታ አርታላ	ጌታ ኩራ	
283	ታታሎ አኩሚ ካንድሻ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.4	ካሳይቶ ካባይና	ገመዳ ባይላ	በድሊ በርሻ	ገናሊ ኩሲያ	
284	ደጀቤ ደሳኝ ደገፊ	አሊ	ኢያና	0.891611	ወጣቱ ሳንጉሊ	መከና መንገድ	ሱቱላ ስታላ	መከና መንገድ	
285	ካና ካዳይቶ ካይሳ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	0.76691949	ደን	ኩሲያ ካዳይቶ	ሱቱላ ስታላ	ብናኖ ቱራቶ	
286	ካታኖ አባይሼ	ኮንሶ	ማ/ግዛባ	1.127625	ኩርኝ ሸፊታ	ሳባታ አባይሼ	ኩሲ-አታሮ	ኩንዳሮ ሽፋራ	
287	ኩሲያ ታዬ	ኮንሶ	ገ/ቆልማሊ	2.106482	አልትሻ ታባኖ	ሣሙኤል ሳባታ	ሙሴ ሙቱርቱ	ካታኖ አባይሼ	
288	ሜማይሻ ጃርሶ ካያላ	ኮንሶ	ቦርቆረ	0.652215	ኩናቦ አታኖ	ካድሻ ካንቶሊ	መከና መንገድ	ትርካሳ ካዮላ	
289									
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Appendix 5

Organization of Peace Committees

Based on the data collected from the fieldwork the following are the organizations and stakeholders of peace committees in the study area.

1. Zonal Level

A. Major Peace Committee Stakeholders

- ✓ Zone Administration Head.....Chairman
- ✓ Zone Security & Administration Head.....Secretary
- ✓ SEPDM Zone Brach Head.....Member
- ✓ The two Woreda Administration Heads.....Member
- ✓ The two Woreda Police Commanders.....Member
- ✓ The two Woreda Militia Office Heads.....Member

B. Technical Peace Committee Stakeholders

- Zone Security & Administration HeadChairman
- Zone Police Department-Conflict Prevention Core Owner.....Member
- The two Woreda Security & Administration Heads.....Member
- The two Woreda Police Office-Conflict Preveton Core Process.....Member
- The Conflict area Kebele Officials and Kebele Managers.....Member
- Selected Kebele Elders.....Member

2. Woreda Level

Woreda Level Stakeholders

-  Woreda Administration Head.....Chairman
-  Woreda Security and Administration Head.....Secretary
-  Different Woreda Office Heads (Police, Justice, Children & Women, etc).....Member

3. Kebele Level

Kebele Level Stakeholders

- Kebele Administration Head..... Chairman
- Kebele Manger.....Secretary
- Militia Commander..... Member

- Youth Representative.....Member
- Women Representative.....Member
- Religious Institutions Representatives (Depending on each Kebele)....Member
- Kebele Elders Representative.....Member
- Clan Leader.....Member

Declaration

First, I, Bantayehu Demissew Eneyew declare that this thesis is my original work and all sources of material used in this thesis have been acknowledged. This has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) and is deposited in the University library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the library. I solemnly declare that this thesis is not submitted to any other institution anywhere for awards of any academic degree.

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✍ Date: _____

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This thesis has been submitted for an examination with my approval as an advisor.

Habtamu Wondimu (Professor) _____

Advisor

Signature

Date