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RETHINKING SARTRE'S THEORY OF FREEDOM: BEYOND PURIFYING REFLECTION, GROUP PRAXIS AND CONFLICTUAL HUMAN RELATION

BY

MELSEW LULIE

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MELSEW LULIE

ADVISOR

PROFESSOR BEKELE GUTEMA

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Approved by Board of Examiners

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis are duly acknowledged.

Declared by Melsew Lulie

Signature _____

Date _____

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Abbreviations

BN: *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (1956)

BT: *Being and Time* (1996).

BW: *Basic Writings* (1993).

CDR1: *Critique of Dialectical Reason*: *Theory of Practical Ensembles*. Vol. l (2004).

CDR2: *Critique of Dialectical Reason: The Intelligibility of History. Vol.2.* (1991).

CF: "Cartesian Freedom" (1962).

EH: *Existentialism is A Humanism* (2007).

MR: "Materialism and Revolution" (1962).

NE: *Notebooks for an Ethics* (1992).

PI: *The Psychology of Imagination (*1948*).*

IP: "Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology" (1970).

SM*:* Search for A Method (1963).

TE: *Transcendence of the Ego*: *An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness* (1960).

Abstract

Freedom is very much contentious yet desirable and worth pursuing. As it has been under multifaceted "attacks" and infringements, so many defenses of it have been made. Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of freedom is one of the powerful and arduous defenses of freedom against its enemies. His theory is worth pursuing because of its treatment and defense of both ontological and practical freedom. It tries to establish the ontological foundation of freedom and to analyze the conditions of practical freedom. In defending freedom, he argues that the fundamental interrelation of human beings is conflictual; although practical freedom is limited, ontological freedom is absolute; and the Look, scarcity, practico-inert totalities with their exigencies and counter-finalities, and bad faith induce conflict and hence the alienation and suppression of freedom. Sartre suggests existential psychoanalysis, pure reflection and group praxis to fight the alienations and suppressions of freedom and to remedy conflictual relations. I argued that Sartre's theory should be complemented, rectified and surpassed to have significance in our effort to secure our freedom. The fundamental interrelationship of human beings is essentially "caring" and conflict is only a deficient type of care-relation. Being a human being by itself is care; my co-existence with others is pervaded by care. Likewise, even if it is the case that conflict underlies our relation, Sartre's remedies are not much help to effect the avoidance of "his" conflictual relations and the realization of freedom because they may end up merely in providing a reflective awareness of one's freedom or in identification of one's fundamental choice or relieving the factical impotence of serial individuals. The horizon of practical freedom must be widened. So, the translation of Sartrean ontological freedom into practical terms must be sought in caring-relation, cultural change, redesigning of technology, and political and ethical measures.

Key words: Bad faith, Being-with, Care, Freedom, Fundamental Desire, Group Praxis, Intentionality, the Look, Nihilation, Practico-inert being, Reflection, Scarcity, Temporality.

Introduction

Perhaps, Jean-Paul Sartre's (1905-1980), a French philosopher, activist, playwright and novelist, phenomenal pronouncement that "man is condemned to be free" and "man is free, man is freedom" (*Existentialism is a Humanism*, hereafter *EH*, 2007:29) is one of the proverbial statements in the twentieth century philosophical discourses of freedom. He identifies freedom with the Being of humans. He states that to exist is to be free (*Being and Nothingness*, hereafter *BN*,1956:441). And as man "is not free not to exist," he is unfree "not to be free" (ibid:486). We are ontologically free; to be "unfree" is impossible. But, what does freedom mean? Are we really free? What takes our freedom if we are free? Why, and in what sense, are we free if we are free?

The term "freedom" has a favorable meaning. Everyone desires it, i.e., all of us strive to be free and to have freedom. Ordinarily, we are accustomed to call someone or his/her action free and unfree. However, we differ, even oppose, each other over what freedom is and what it consists in. Scholars also differ on the value of freedom, and on the conditions and means of its attainment. Isaiah Berlin notes, that "freedom" is a "protean" term whose meaning is "so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist" and whose senses reach more than two hundred (2002:168). Hence, it eludes a singular conceptual attribution; it lends itself to different and opposite interpretations. Nonetheless, we can attach to it some meaning, with some qualification and context, which is fairly common to the various senses. To this end, I should set out Mortimer Adler's general taxonomy on freedom, which can give a comprehensive survey of the views of some prominent philosophers in the discourse of freedom, based on the mode of i ts possession: circumstantial, acquired and natural freedom[1] which Adler again reduced the first mode to "freedom under circumstance" and the latter two into "freedom beyond circumstance."

Adler states that authors of "freedom under circumstance" believe that a person "is set free by removing whatever encumbrances restrain him, not by altering his desires or will"(1958:85). For him, the attainment of freedom depends on enabling or disabling circumstances, such as external forces of coercion or constraint, range of alternatives and fear induced by duress, to act as one wills or to realize as one's desires (ibid:111-117). Circumstantial freedom can be exemplified by freedom of self-realization. In other words, we are most free when we are at liberty to do what

[1] Adler's claim is not that "there *are* three kinds of freedom ,but only that we can distinguish three groups of authors, each of which is concerned with at least one of these three" modes. And that "certain authors may belong to two of these groups or even to all three" (1958:108).

we will together with the absence of arbitrary coercion and duress, the existence of opportunities and enabling alternatives. Hence, circumstantial freedom is affected by external circumstances. Although authors in this category make freedom totally dependent on circumstance, other scholars argue for "acquired freedom" of self-perfection that withstands the force of circumstance.

Adler also states that acquired freedom primarily consists of freedom obtained by developing moral character, virtue, or wisdom (1958:137-138). Authors under this kind of freedom believe that freedom has to do with curbing, controlling and taming one's desires. So, to be free is to will or desire that which is within one's control (ibid: 153-154). In short, acquiring virtuous character makes you free in any situation, although you need to curb your desires in tandem with the perfection of the will. Yet, there is another wing to "freedom beyond circumstance" which Adler named "natural freedom" that primarily concerns the freedom of self-determination[2], which customarily and narrowly relates to free will.

Adler states that natural freedom is one which inheres in all human beings regardless of their existential situations and irrespective of their states of mind or moral characters (1958:149). Authors ranging from those who expound about the autonomy of the will to those who spell out freedom of consciousness belong to this category of freedom (ibid:149-155). Expressed in a rough conflation, authors of this type of freedom argue that for we have the power of suspending our judgments and choices[3], and since our consciousness and will are free, we are free.

In sum, freedom is the removal of any hindrance, be it external circumstance or irrational desire or the corruption of the will or ignorance, to the realization of our desired goal. Moreover, circumstantial freedom of self-realization can be paralleled with practical freedom, and acquired freedom of self-perfection and natural freedom of self-determination can be roughly subsumed under ontological freedom. However, to have one mode of freedom alone does not make the conception and realization of freedom complete: there must be the translation of ontological freedom into practical freedom which involves both the recognition and avoidance of

[2]Adler makes a distinction among self-realization, self-perfection and self-determination. The first refers to "an individual's circumstantial ability to act as he wishes"; the second refers to "an individual's acquired ability to live as he ought"; and the last involves "an individual's natural ability to determine for himself what he wishes to do or to become" (1958: 168).

[3]Adler includes Sartrean conception of freedom under natural freedom of self-determination. But, I do not agree with Adler because there are textual evidences indicating that Sartrean freedom concerns also acquired and circumstantial freedom. His talk of conversion, authenticity, bad faith and practico-inert are supporting evidences of this fact.

impediments. Nor the possession of one type of freedom necessarily excludes another type of freedom. It is against and along this background that Sartre proffers a radical idea of freedom.

Sartre expresses freedom in terms of the being of human reality. He states:

> …the being of man …has appeared to us as freedom. Thus freedom … is not a property which belongs among others to the essence of the human being... with man the relation of existence to essence is not comparable to what it is for the things of the world. Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the *being* of "human reality." Man does not exist first in order to be free *subsequently;* there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free (*BN*:25).

So, freedom is the very structure of the being of "human reality" or "For-itself"[4] which is eternally "condemned to be free" so that it chooses its possibility and creates itself. But, if the being of humankind is absolute freedom, how does Sartre respond to the many unspeakable forms of unfreedom that we encounter in our concrete existential conditions? In what sense can we say that we are practically unfree? How do we lose this inescapable ontological freedom? How does Sartre treat the force of circumstance?

Sartre claims that due to the conflictual nature of human relation, the antipraxis of practico-inert and bad faith, individuals lose their ontologically given freedom[5] and become alienated. For him, the fundamental relation of human beings is conflictual. Our Relation is structured by the "Look"[6] which results in reciprocal objectivation between the Self and the Other. He states that "[w]hile I attempt to free myself from the hold [Look] of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me…Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others" (*BN*:364). Individuals remain alienated and unfree confronted with the freedom and the Look of the Other. Yet, Sartre postulates practico-inert[7]

[4] Sartre classifies "being" into "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itslef" the detail of which will be discussed in chapter one.

[5] David Detmer argues that two kinds of freedom can be identified in Sartre's discussion of freedom: "ontological" and "practical." Sartre relates "ontological freedom" to freedom of choice" and "practical freedom" to "freedom of obtaining." The first freedom being absolute and total, due to the nihilating power of the" for-itself", is the basic structure of human reality. In contrast, practical freedom is limited and can be accompanied by failure and degrees depending upon circumstances (1986:pp.58-65). Hence, I accept and follow Detmer's strategy.

[6] For Sartre the "Look "as an inescapable condition in which the Self becomes defenseless of being seen by, and an object for, the other (BN:259).

[7] Detmer says that "[p]ractico-inert," then, refers to all of those worked-over structures which alienate (re-appropriate) our freedom from us, and which restrict our present freedom by thrusting upon us only those meanings which we have already introduced into them. Thus, the relationship between praxis and practico-inert might most clearly be stated this way: we shape the world (praxis); and the world, on the basis of the manner in which we have shaped it, comes back to shape us (practico-inert) (1986:50-51).

being as a new form of monumental anathema to human freedom. This being is anathema to human freedom in a sense that it inevitably produces antipraxis by absorbing praxis. This antipraxis is accompanied by "counter-finality."[8] It results in alienating praxis because of, Sartre says, the "passive action which materiality…exerts on man…in returning a stolen praxis to man in the form of counter-finality" (*Critique of Dialectical Reason, vol.1*, hereafter *CDR1*,2004:124). Sartre adds that "[t]hese *human* objects [inert totalities]…lie heavy on our destiny because of the contradiction which opposes praxis (the labour which made them and the labour which utilises them) and inertia, within them" (ibid:46).

The antipraxis of practico-inert develops from the fact that our praxis occurs within the milieu of scarcity. According to Sartre, scarcity conditions our praxis and history too. It is the determinant of human praxis (*CDR1*:130). So, scarcity is a background to the anti-humanity of practico-inert. Like the "Look", scarcity is determinant of human praxis as well as human relation[9]. Sartre holds that it determines the kind of relation we have and in so doing the antipraxis or anti-humanity of practico-inert will bond man to man. Thus, human relation and praxis in the milieu of scarcity are non-human, alienating and antagonistic. Everyone is against everyone (ibid:128-130).

In so far as I act in the framework of "there is not enough for all," I pose a constant threat to the Other and hence I desire the elimination of the Other. Sartre notes the necessity of collective combat to counter alienating praxis and the antipraxis of worked matter (practico-inert). And hence he suggests group praxis as a remedy to such convoluted bind. He also identifies a third condition, i.e., bad faith, in and by which individuals lose their freedom and become alienated.

We are in bad faith when we unreflectively, and self-deceptively make God our project, i.e., the for-itself desires to be an "in-itself-for-itself", which is an "evasion of contingency and of facticity [the for-itself's reality]" (BN:566). We are also, according to Sartre, in the bad faith of the "spirit of seriousness" engulfs a person when he/she attributes more significance to the world and values rather than to him/herself. (ibid:580-581). So, both forms of bad faith involve a rejection of human reality which implies a flight from responsibility, or retreat from freedom, and hence alienation. Sartre recommends the method existential psychoanalysis and purifying

[8]Sartre defines it as a "contradiction which develops within an ensemble, in so far as it opposes the process which produces it and in so far as it is experienced as negated exigency and as the negation of an exigency by the totalized ensemble of practico-inert Beings in the field"(CDR I:193).
[9] While the Look is the terminology of *BN*, scarcity is that of *CDR1* having more concrete but the same conceptual function with the Look.

reflection, believing that bad faith originates in wrong project and impure reflection, as viable escapes from its alienation.

However, I argue in this thesis that given his characterization of human relation and scarcity, the realization of Sartrean[10] freedom is doomed to failure. Existential psychoanalysis, purifying reflection and group praxis are, although necessary, insufficient to realize its practical side. Its realization also requires the cultivation of care (which characterizes our relation), cultural and technological reconfiguration and institutionalization of ethico-political imperatives. To defend this thesis, some conceptual apparatuses, primarily from Martin Heidegger, Arif Dirlik, Andrew Feenberg, Immanuel Kant and Isaiah Berlin, are drawn. My assumption is that if it is corrected and complemented with the views of these scholars and if confusions about it are cleared, Sartre's analysis of freedom can be an insightful account to understand freedom, intellectually entertain it and practically realize it.

First, for Heidegger, "care" is the essence of humanity, i.e., being-in-the-world fundamentally involves care. He states that "[f]or this is humanism: meditating and caring, that man be human and not inhumane, "inhuman," that is, outside his essence" (*Basic Writings*, hereafter *BW*, 1993:224). He adds that care is the ontological structure of Dasein. Dasein is "being concerned about", being-ahead-of-itself (*Being and Time*, hereafter *BT*, 1996:179-180). Second, Dirlik, in his book, *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, argues that our approach to culture makes a difference in understanding and changing the world. And "culture affords us ways of seeing the world" (1997:25). Third, Feenberg, in his book *Transforming Technology: Critical Theory Revisited,* argues that we need a critical theory of technology which aims at redesigning of technology. He says that technological design is an ontological design (2002:107). Fourth, Kant, in his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, argues that moral principles have "extensive significance for all *rational beings"* unless we doubt the necessity and truth of morality (emphasis in original, 2002:25). Last, Berlin argues that "[t]he essence of…liberty…is the holding off of...intruders and despots of one kind or another" (2002:204). So, individuals are free when they are shielded, by law or any political measure, from the deliberate interference of another person when we keep these forces at bay from

[10] Unless it is qualified the term "Sartrean" represents Sartre's ideas himself; it is to meet the rule of adjectives.

throwing a monkey wrench into individual's personal activity and choice, from throwing a stone to block every path that an individual wants to go as a human being.

There are previous works done on Sartre which are too numerous to discuss here. So, I will present the views of these works en block for the sake of convenience, focusing only on most outspoken critics and passionate defenders of Sartre whose views relatively relate to my thesis. These categories of views are criticisms concerning break and continuity of Sartre's theory of freedom, "omnipotence" objection and objection concerning the ontology of values. According to David Detmer, thinkers who believe in the radical break of the early Sartre with the later Sartre argue that the early Sartre is concerned with an existentialist absolute freedom as evidenced in *BN* and the later with a Marxist theory of restricted freedom as typified by *CDR*(1986:93, and Gavin Rae, 2011:9). In contrast, thinkers, such as David Detmer and Gavin Rae, who believe in the existence of continuity between Sartre's early and later theory argue that "Sartre's…earliest and latest works to be *connected* by a continuous "intellectual development and progress," rather than *separated* by "a radical break"(Detmer,ibid:94, Rae:13).

The "omnipotence" objection relates to the break objection "because it [the former] relies so heavily on the claim that Sartre's defense of "absolute freedom" is scarcely distinguishable from a defense of human omnipotence" (Detmer, 1986:37). Also, Walter Kaufmann labels Sartre's theory of freedom as an "extravagant emphasis on man's complete freedom"…it [is] "at odds with the facts of life" (1973:148-149). So, Sartre's theory evades reality. Besides, Detmer tells us that Wilfrid Desan says that total "'freedom exists nowhere'" (ibid:84) and calls it a "'mere illusion'" (1986:81). Likewise, Maurice Merleau-Panty insists that the meaning of free action disappears since Sartre affirms absolute freedom and "it is everywhere, but equally nowhere" (1962:389).This objection subtly relates to the objection made to Sartre's ontology of values.

Detmer states that critics who attribute "total subjectivism" to Sartre's theory of freedom believe that since Sartre holds that values arise from one's absolute freedom of choice, they are utterly subjective, and "*any* choice or preference is as justified as any other; all are equally *groundless*"(emphasis in original, 1986:67). Risieri Frondizi says that "if it is sheer choice and not its content that counts, then all possibilities are equivalent and we end up in an ethics of mere chance" (1981:380).Thomas Anderson also states that "[by] denying all objective values, critics [such as Mary Warnock, Peter Caws, and Frondizi] argue, Sartre has no basis for claiming that

his moral goals should be preferred to any others" (1993:59). The logical corollary of this is the impossibility of distinguishing the free man from the slave and then moral action from the immoral one. Anderson says that "they [critics] claim that Sartre is in effect advocating total capriciousness and license" (1993: 64). Warnock states that "[i]f choosing freely for oneself is the highest value, the free choice to wear red socks is as valuable as the free choice to murder one's father or sacrifice oneself for one's friend"(1967:54). However, both Anderson and Detmer view this criticism of total subjectivism of Sartre as an unfounded critique.

Anderson states that Sartre's theory has freedom as "common value for all human beings" (1993:82) and thus resisting our attempt to attach total relativism, anarchism and radical individualism (ibid). Detmer also rejects the charge on Sartre's ethics as absolutely subjective or absurd (1986:163-176). Before ending my survey of previous works on Sartre, let me add two particular criticisms. First, Detmer tells us that R. J. Bernstein criticizes Sartre's virtue of authenticity by claiming that "the concept of radical conversion is nothing but a convenient, *ad hoc* escape hatch by means of which Sartre dishonestly attempts 'to escape from the stern lessons of his own ontological investigations'"(ibid:118). Gavin Rae says that Sartre's "action required to secure the individual's practical freedom is not always consistent…with his analysis of the conditions required to secure consciousness's ontological freedom" (2011:7-8).

My claim is basically neither about the "continuity and discontinuity" of his theory of freedom nor is the defensibility of his "absolute freedom" (although I accept his analysis of ontological freedom); neither is its relativism nor the inconsistency among his proposed solutions. Indeed, I think that there is a break-cum-continuity, a kind of evolutionary change, but not radical fission. The means of achieving freedom and the emphasis are changed, but the nub of his theory of freedom is the same. So, my argument is threefold. My first argument is that given his characterization of human relation, the Looks and scarcity, the realization of the practical side of Sartrean freedom borders on failure. But, I do not totally deny that human relation involves conflict; it is to argue that it is fundamentally characterized by care. Second, we have to go beyond Sartre to include cultural and technological reconfiguration as well as ethical principles and committed political measures. I am of the opinion that mere group praxis cannot avert the alienation and unfreedom. It may end up in collective morbidity, alienation, or to use Berlin's phraseology, "what had begun as a doctrine of freedom [designated as common good, class,

institutions, nations, etc.] turned into a doctrine of authority and, at times, of oppression, and became the favored weapon of despotism" (2002:37).

Consequently, I believe that existential psychoanalysis and mere purifying reflection cannot take us further than the trap of the rationalist thread that rational deliberation can make us free. There must also be ethical and political framework that can protect human praxis from a condition of free-for-all in which one free agent tramples over another. Finally, I do not deny that the Look involves some form of objectivation: it is to claim that it is "instrumental" Look which is objectifying. It is not also the case that scarcity in itself always invites antagonistic relations.

This thesis essentially tried to answer the following questions. Is human relation fundamentally conflictual? Is the Look always objectifying and alienating? Is scarcity naturally the source of conflictual human relation? Given a dreary human relation, can we sufficiently realize the practical side of Sartrean freedom through the effort of group praxis, existential psychoanalysis and purifying reflection? Or can we practically secure the ontological freedom through Sartrean framework alone? Is an alternative solution possible?

This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter one tries to expose the inextricable interconnection among Sartrean phenomenology, ontology and freedom. Here Sartre's views on the nature of consciousness, freedom and values are clarified and analyzed. The second chapter deals with Sartre's characterization of human relation and its two basic organizing forces, i.e., the "Look" and scarcity, and his means of attaining freedom, i.e., existential psychoanalysis, purifying reflection and group praxis. In other words, the geneses of conflict, unfreedom, oppression and exploitation in human relation, and Sartre's attempted but unfinished solutions to avert the situation are examined. And it argues that his descriptions of human relation and the organizing forces are partial and do not offer much help to realize freedom, and the proposed means are insufficient too. Then, the third chapter presents alternative view of human relation, and means for securing freedom. It also calls for a radical change in our way of seeing and doing through reconsideration of cultural outlook and change in technological design so as to fight the various forms of unfreedom. It also argues for the necessity of ethical principles and political measures in achieving and maintaining freedom. And finally, the conclusion proceeds.

Chapter One: Sartre's Phenomenology, Ontology and Freedom

Introduction

Having seen the juxtaposition of phenomenology, ontology and freedom, a reader may ponder on their interrelation. The rationale is that one cannot understand Sartre's ontology without understanding his phenomenology and cannot understand his conception of freedom too without understanding his ontology. Put otherwise, Sartre's conception of freedom is based on his phenomenological descriptions of consciousness, being-for-itself and values. So, this chapter primarily aims at exposing such descriptions which help us to grasp freedom, according to Sartre. Moreover, it tries to meet objections, which are raised in the Introduction of this thesis, made against Sartre's theory of freedom that by making freedom totally absolute, he renders it meaningless and that there is break between Sartre's early and later theory of freedom. Finally, *en route,* this chapter presents my criticisms on his phenomenology, ontology and conception of freedom. Hence, the chapter presents phenomenology of consciousness first, ontology of being and of values and the nature of freedom last.

1.1. Sartrean Phenomenology

1.1.1. Emptying Consciousness

We saw J.P. Sartre's claim in the Introduction of this thesis that we are absolutely free. He identifies freedom with consciousness. To clearly see how he arrives at such a radical claim, it is appropriate and logical to engage with Sartre's phenomenology, particularly phenomenology of consciousness[11]. However, there is a difficulty: Sartre does not provide a semantic short-cut in his description of the nature of consciousness. So, we shall see his critique of "illusion of immanence," the relation between consciousness and intentionality, and consciousness's relation with negation.

Sartre sharply criticizes representationalist theories, both philosophical and psychological, which view consciousness as an epistemological granary. He states that one manifestation of these theories and commonsense view too is that they believe that the 'image' is *in* consciousness. Having the image of a snake is equivalent to having a "certain picture" of the snake *in*

[11] Sartre defines phenomenology as a "scientific, not a Critical, study of consciousness", and its method of investigation is "intuition" which enables us to directly confront with "presence of *the thing*" (*TE*: 35). So, it is an intuitive science of phenomenon.

consciousness. Hence, consciousness is depicted as a "place peopled with small likenesses and these likenesses were the image" (*The Psychology of Imagination*, hereafter *PI*, 1948:5-7). Sartre calls these theories "digestive philosophies" because they hold that "the spidery mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance" ("Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology," hereafter *IP*, 1970:4). So, consciousness, in their view, is like a gelatinous substance that absorbs in, stores in and understands everything which touches and impresses upon it. Sartre adds that these philosophies have suffered from an epistemological malaise which he calls "illusion of immanence" (PI:5), for they still believe that the objects of consciousness are inside, immanent to, the 'repository' consciousness. He wants to clear this illusion and dismantle the container and "spidery" picture of consciousness since it is the first task of a philosophy, he says, "to expel things from consciousness and to reestablish its true connection with the world" (*BN*,1956:li).

The expulsion involves emptying the so-called "contents" of consciousness including both the psychic objects, such as the ego and its states and qualities, and external objects (proper) of consciousness. But, why is Sartre so determined to empty consciousness? How does he do it? The reply to these questions requires us to go through both the simple and difficult paths travelled by Sartre. The simple path is the way he evicts external objects and his way of expelling psychic objects is a difficult one. Sartre states that things cannot be dissolved *in* consciousness. The tree which you see is just over there, in the street, in the meadow constantly twisted by the movement of the wind. Therefore, "[i]t could not enter into your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness" (*IP*:4). The slipping of things into consciousness necessarily implies the slipping away of consciousness. He holds that it is "impossible to slip these material portraits into a conscious synthetic structure without destroying the structure, without breaking the contacts, arresting the flow, breaking the continuity" (*PI*:6). Therefore, it is the structure of consciousness that it be empty of external objects and their "portraits." According to Sartre, consciousness is also equally empty of psychic objects of which the transcendental ego will be discussed very soon as clear and typical representative.

Sartre tells us that it is wrong to view the ego as an ""inhabitant" of consciousness." And it is "neither formally nor materially *in* consciousness: it is outside, *in the world.* It is a being of the world, like the ego of another" (emphasis in original, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, hereafter

TE, 1960:31). Here, one may ask that in what sense is the "I" outside of consciousness. For him, starting from Rene Descartes to Immanuel Kant and to Edmund Husserl, the ego has been viewed as a necessary transcendental and formal source of the unity of consciousness (ibid:36-37). And moreover, it has been considered as the material source of desires, states and acts (ibid:31). But, this trend has gone into reverse with Sartre's keen phenomenological investigation. The ego is a constitution out of the bricks of states, qualities and actions through reflective consciousness. The rationale is that while I am reading a book, "I" am totally absorbed in it, there is no Self: the Self appears when I begin to ask "who does the reading" and the answer is "it is the "I", "me", who is doing the reading". So, the ego appears in reflective consciousness. The ego cannot be, Sartre asserts,

> *in* states of unreflected consciousness, nor *behind* them. The *me* appears only with the reflective act, and as a noematic correlate [object] of a reflective intention...this ego… constitutes the ideal and indirect [noematic] unity of the infinite series of our reflected consciousnesses (emphasis in original,*TE*:59-60).

From this, Sartre reasons that if the ego appears only in reflection, the transcendental field of prereflective consciousness is "impersonal", "*without an I" (*emphasis in original, ibid:36*).*And, so, the "I" exists as a "transcendent", not transcendental, object. It is outside of consciousness, *in* the world, like "spatio-temporal beings" (external objects) (ibid:52).Thus, Cartesian *cogito* and Kantian transcendental ego are rendered useless as a principle for the unity of consciousness. The "I" in the "I think*"* is a reflective consciousness that reflects on doubting. Generally, Sartre identifies three reasons why he renders consciousness "contentless" and egoless.

The first, as we already saw, is that the existence of an "I" is useless for the unity of consciousness. Second, the existence of the "I" inside consciousness creates opacity and destroys its self-transparency and spontaneity. Sartre states that "[i]f it existed it would tear consciousness from itself; it would divide consciousness; it would slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade. The transcendental *I* is the death of consciousness" (emphasis in original, ibid:40).

The last and the fundamental reason is that it is a necessary law of "intentionality" that not only the ego and spatio-temporal beings be outside of consciousness, consciousness is external to itself. Sartre agrees with Husserl that "[a]ll consciousness is consciousness of something"

(*BN*:li). Detmer interprets this doctrine to mean that "consciousness is always *directional;* that consciousness, in everyone of its acts and in every one of its modes, always points toward some object. Thus, if I see, I see *something;* if I imagine, I imagine *something;* if I question, I question *something"* (emphasis in original, 1986:7).Therefore, it is a *"*necessity," Sartre holds, "for consciousness to exist as consciousness of something other than itself" (*IP*:5). He also adds that consciousness "intends" an object, transcends and projects itself towards an external object, to reach the tree. It is always outside itself, fugitive of itself (*BN*:li-lii). Since consciousness surpasses itself to encounter an object which is over *there*, it contains neither object of consciousness nor itself. This implies that consciousness is empty and free from the world. However, Sartre warns his readers that consciousness is also conscious of itself.

He affirms that "it possesses an immanent and natural consciousness of itself" (*PI*:15). He further says that a consciousness that is conscious of a table cannot be un-conscious of itself; otherwise, "it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious-which is absurd" (*BN*:lii). And, so, "every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself" (ibid:liii)[12]. But, what makes possible the positing of things by consciousness? What makes consciousness be outside itself?

Hazel E. Barnes, in the "Translator's Introduction" of *Being and Nothingness,* states that Sartre believes that "consciousness must exercise its peculiar power of nihilation (neantisation)" (xiii), to accomplish its positing of things and transcending of itself. And that "there *is* a power of withdrawal in consciousness such that it can nihilate (encase with a region of non-being) the objects of which it *is* conscious" (ibid). It is with its power of negating that consciousness can make and unmake the world and can free itself. According to Sartre, this nihilating power makes consciousness detach itself from the world so that it can be able to separate itself from, and to posit, the world[13] (*PI*:265-272). Accordingly, consciousness has the nihilating power of withdrawal not only from the world but also from itself. Sartre asserts that the For-itself[14] wrenches way (stands separate) from itself through its three *ekstases* (its modes of existence), that is, temporality, reflection and being-for-others, and "this wrenching away is constitutive of

[12] While Sartre sees a consciousness which is conscious of something as positional consciousness: it posits the world, he sees a consciousness which is conscious of itself as non-positional consciousness. "[T]here is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object": consciousness is prereflectively or non-positionally aware of itself. So, consciousness is conscious of both the world and itself (*BN*: li-liii).
[13]For Sartre, "negation is a refusal of existence. By means of it a being (or a way of being) is posited, then thrown back to nothingness…Negation is an abrupt break in continuity which cannot in any case *result* from prior affirmations; it is an original and irreducible event"(*BN*:11).
[14] Sartre usually identifies the consciousness with the For-itself and human reality the detail which will be seen in the next section.

its being" (*BN*:298). So, nihilation is the very structure of consciousness: consciousness is condemned to be its own nihilation. It nihilates both the world and itself: it withdraws from the world as well as from itself. Put otherwise, the transcendence of consciousness, of both the world and itself, is possible because of its power of "wrenching away." Ultimately, it seems that the freedom and spontaneity of consciousness derives from this power of negating withdrawal, and through this power, it purifies itself of all conventionally infused "contents."

In summary, Sartre critiques epistemological theories, particularly those theories which believe that 'mental entities'—such as ideas, impressions, concepts, images and the ego—are inside consciousness and thus rendering it a container to be filled. Perhaps, invoking empiricists' claim that the mind is a "blank slate" over which experience writes can suffice to see the conventional misconception about consciousness. His argument is that the 'immanence' of those entities makes consciousness passive and inert, contradicting its self-activatedness, intentionality and power of nihilation. Intentionality opposes 'immanence' and empties consciousness. Consciousness intends because 'intention' is its being and because negating is its intimate structure. Sartre metaphorically expresses consciousness as "purified…clear as a strong wind. There is nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond itself…It is just this being-beyond-itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a substance which makes it a consciousness" (*IP*:5).

Sartre's displacement of the ego, the Self, from consciousness has profound ramifications. Consciousness's awareness of the ego is no more than its awareness of another ego in so far as the ego is an 'object' (among other objects) of consciousness, an object of reflective consciousnesses and because the ego appears in reflection. This overcomes the epistemological insularity that Cartesian cogito knows nothing other than itself. But, this seems absurd outside Sartre's phenomenological parameter because it conflicts with our common sense[15]. It sounds strange to say that "I am conscious of myself no more than I am conscious of my friend." Furthermore, although intentionality helps Sartre to put the objects of consciousness external to consciousness, the original relation between them remains unclear. Of course, he tells us that their relation is nihilation. But, where does its power of nihilation originally come from?

[15] Note that I am not asserting that common sense is always true. But, there are truths proper to common sense. We may think of Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise .In the paradox, Achilles never catches and passes the tortoise assuming that the latter is five meters ahead of the former and Achilles has to pass an infinite number of points and distances to catch the tortoise. However, it would be sheer absurdity to think that Achilles never actually catches and passes the tortoise given their natural speed. Likewise, Sartre's claim is victim of logical pitfall.

Consciousness fundamentally exists as consciousness of something. If their original relation is only negation, how does negation come? The Cartesian problem of mind and body seems unresolved, despite the purge of "things" from consciousness. Finally, the being of consciousness that "consciousness is consciousness of something" implies that consciousness is ultimately consciousness of objects, things and the world, the Being of which will be the preoccupation of the next section.

1.2. Sartrean Ontology

We saw Sartre's phenomenological description of consciousness as intentionality, that is, the Being of consciousness is intentionality. We can infer that we were partially engaged in his ontology, his ontology of consciousness. In fact, we would be on dangerous ground if we try to strictly separate out Sartre's phenomenology and ontology. Even the subtitle of *Being and Nothingness* reads as "An Essay on Phenomenological ontology." [16] So, in this section, we will discuss Sartre's phenomenological ontology of Being in general. Consequently, we will see Sartre's ontology of values.

1.2.1. The Ontology of Being-in-itself and Being-For-itself

From the principle of intentionality that "consciousness is consciousness of something", we can analytically draw two kinds of being: the being that is *conscious of* and the being of the *something* which consciousness is *conscious of*, i.e., consciousness and non-conscious being. Here, Sartre redefines consciousness, following Heidegger's definition of Dasein[17], as "a *being* such that *in its being, its being is in question* so far as *this being* implies a *being* other than itself"(emphasis in original, *BN*:lxii). Thus, Sartre identifies consciousness, whose being is always in question, with "being-for-itself" and the non-conscious being, whose being exists for consciousness, with "being-in-itself."[18] Now we have two incommunicable regions of being, we shall first see the nature of Being-in-itself for ease of discussion.

According to Sartre, Being is "in-itself." It does not act on, and is not acted up on by, another being. Activity and passivity are unfit to it. It simply is itself. It is unfit for negation and

[16] My subtitles of "Sartre's Phenomenology" and "Sartre's Ontology" are made distinct for the sake of convenience. The distinction helps us to clear previous misconceptions and to go from the simple to complex analysis of Being .To go beyond this would be a pedantic distinction.
[17]It roughly means human being and derives from German words "Da" means there and "sein" means being (to be): Dasein is being there.
[18] Sartre usually uses the term Being to indicate Being -in-itself. He also sometimes opts to use, dropping the term consciousness, human reality to indicate Being-For-itself. It is not unusual to find other terminological inconsistencies also in reading Sartre.

affirmation. It does not relate to itself because it is "glued to itself" and undifferentiated. Consequently, it is "opaque to itself" for it is heavy with itself. In contrast to the For-itself, which is "what it is not" and "not what it is", being-in-itself is "what it is." The latter is sufficient to itself and does not require the former. While the For-itself has to be itself, Being-in-itself is solid, inseparably one with itself: it is a "synthesis of itself with itself." As a consequence, it is full positivity and atemporal, for we cannot say of it that it "no longer is." Finally, being-in-itself simply *is*. It exists without reason, i.e., its existence is gratuitous. It is neither possible nor necessary: it is contingent, and possibility is the province of the For-itself. In a nutshell, being is, in-itself and what it is (*BN*:lxiv-lxvi). Of course we cannot have full grasp of what Being-in-itself is without examining the three structures of being-For-itself: Nothingness, transcendence and temporality.

We saw above Sartre's two alternative definitions of Being-For-itself or consciousness as a *being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself,* and *a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not*. We saw also that consciousness empties itself by nihilating itself and the world. Consciousness's ability to put its own being and the being of other beings in question, its nihilating power and its possibility to be *what it is not* all refer us to the reality of negation, the "Not." Negation in turn takes us to Nothingness. Sartre holds that:

> [N]egation derives its foundation from Nothingness…because Nothingness envelops the *not* within itself as its essential structure…Nothingness stands at the origin of the negative judgment because it is itself negation. It founds the negation as an act because it is the negation as *being* (emphasis in original, *BN*:18).

Nothingness is the negation or nihilation of Being; it is non-being; it is "Not*"*. But, what brings Nothingness into the world? Sartre reasons that since Being-in-itself is full positivity and compacted, it can neither bring in nor contain Nothingness. The Being which brings Nothingness must have the power of nihilation as its structure, i.e. must "nihilate Nothingness in its Being," "in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question" and "must be *its* own *Nothingness"*. Only the For-itself or human reality is capable of nihilating both itself and Nothingness. So, Nothingness is brought into the world by Being-For-itself, even though it always "lies coiled in the heart of being-like a worm" (ibid:21-24). Consequently, negation is the essential bond

between the Being-in-itself and the Being-for-itself. However, one may ask that how are these two radically different regions of Being related?

Sartre answers this question as follows. The For-itself is not *what it is*. It is not a table, it is not a thing. Consciousness is consciousness of something: it implies a being of other-itself, i.e., the being of either psychic object or spatio-temporal things. Therefore, it is by "relation of the For-itself to the in-itself," says Sartre, that the former determines itself, that the For-itself "produces itself originally on the foundation of a relation to the in-itself" (*BN*:171-172). Consciousness is relational. The For-itself is fundamentally consciousness of the in-itself without which the former is nothing. What consciousness knows is constitutive of it, the being of it. Knowledge relates the For-itself to the in-itself[19]. It is, Sartre says, "the presence of consciousness to the thing" (*BN*:172), and this presence is possible because of the intentional directedness of consciousness (ibid:122). What is presence? This question points us to another structure of consciousness, i.e., temporality.

For Sartre, there are three ekstases[20] of the For-itself: temporality, being-for-others and reflection of which the detail of the last two ekstases will be touched upon in chapter two (ibid:298). He states that temporality is neither a "universal time" nor a static being: rather, it is the peculiar structure of being-For-itself. "The For-itself is the being which has to be its being in the diasporatic form of Temporality" (ibid:142). Hence, the For-itself is a temporally scattered being. In its intentional directedness, i.e., presence to being, the For-itself, says Sartre, is originally dispersed: "the For-itself is lost outside, next to the in-itself, and in the three temporal ekstases" (ibid:153). The three temporal ekstases of past, present and future are modes of being which the For-itself *has to be*.

Sartre argues that it is necessary that the For-itself has to *be* its own past, to be "back there behind itself," without being it, without the possibility of identification with it because the past is *was,* is *in-itself*. The for-itself is its past because it was it. It is the ontological law of the past that "I have to be *it in* order *not* to be *it* and I have *not* to be *it in* order to be *it*" (*BN*:112-120). Sartre

[19]Sartre views "knowledge as a type of relation between the For-itself and the in-itself" (*BN*:172). So, knowledge involves intentionality or transcendence which is the structure of consciousness.
[20]According to Sartre, the term "ekstasis", which is a Heideggerian Terminology, refers to the condition of consciousness's being-fleeing from-itself or to be standing outside of itself, to "distance from itself", or "the nothingness which "is made-to-be" as separation"(*BN*:137).

argues that the For-itself is a "presence to being-in-itself"[21] in so far as presence cannot be the ekstasis of the in-itself, in so far as it is the For-itself which is originally presence to itself, and in so far as it is the For-itself which is intentionally directed at Being (ibid:121-122). The presence of the For-itself is in the form of nihilation of being, as not being-in-itself. So, the present is not in so far as the For-itself is not. From this he concludes that "[t]he For-itself is present to being in the form of flight; the Present is a perpetual flight in the face of being…it makes itself present in the form of flight" (*BN*:123). The For-itself is a projection towards what it will be and it is in this sense that the present is a flight from its past towards its future.

The For-itself is in continuous flight towards its possibility, towards what it lacks in order to be itself. Hence, the future is the flight of the presence, outside itself, towards what it lacks. It is the project of the For-itself "outside the Present" to reunite with itself, towards that which it is not yet. Therefore, as Sartre concludes, the "Future constitutes the meaning of my present For-itself, as the project of its possibility" in that the For-itself is free because of the structure of nothingness (ibid:125-128). Thus, the Future is the future project of present For-itself. But, here, one may ask about the point of our engagement with the structure of nothingness, transcendence and temporality. A temporary reply is that it is because the For-itself is its own nothingness, it transcends the world, the past and itself, and it is temporally a diaspora that the For-itself is free and hence they constitute the ontological foundation for the freedom of the For-itself. It is here that we can see Sartre's rejection of the determinism of the past and establish ontological freedom. This freedom is the foundation of values which will be dealt with shortly. But, I shall present some evaluations of Sartre's ontological description of Being.

We have seen that being-in-itself is what it is, compacted, contingent, and completely inert, whereas being is what it is not and not what it, a lack of being, a desire for being and self-activating. However, he tells us that the For-itself appears when the in-itself attempts to "found itself", and to "remove contingency from its being. And "Being-in-itself 'can found' its nothingness but not its being" (*BN*:84). It is uncommon and contradictory that a compacted and completely inert being attempts to found itself, which is a kind of act. It is unclear how Sartre reconciles this contradiction. Moreover, if the For-itself exists only as nihilation of being-itself,

[21] Sartre states that the ontological structure of the For-itself is "to be itself in the form of presence to itself." This original presence involves detachment of consciousness from itself. This implies that it is the structure of the For-itself "to exist at a distance from *itself* as a presence to itself" and this distance is nothingness (*BN*:77-78).

as a desire for being and the latter exists in in-itself and lacks nothing, then the For-itself necessarily demands being-in-itself. The latter is necessary at least for the For-itself. It is unclear why Sartre makes it contingent and gratuitous. Finally, he interchangeably uses the term consciousness, the For-itself and human reality without qualification. He explicitly, but unacknowledged, transfers all the structures of consciousness to the For-itself or human reality. If consciousness is identical with man himself, it would be pointless to speak of consciousness as non-substantial and intentional and to speak of man as organism. And consequently, man's freedom would be perfectly equivalent with the freedom of consciousness, which is absurd.

1.2.2. The Ontology of Values: Subjectivity and Objectivity?

We saw in the Introduction of this thesis that critics have charged Sartre for making values totally subjective by deriving them from the total freedom of subject, and that Thomas Anderson and Detmer regarded this charge as baseless. Of course, Sartre's treatment of values is one of the contentious subjects that a reader encounters and finds it apparently paradoxical and discomfiting. Therefore, we shall see textual evidences which concern his treatment of values so that we can be able to have a fair deal and the definition given to them by him would be our point of departure. Sartre states that values are "demands which lay claim to a foundation"…Value derives its being from its exigency" (*BN*:38). And they are "the contradictory unity of praxis… and of exigency" (*CDR1*:247). As the unity of praxis (project) and exigency (demand), values are *sui generis*, unique: their being lies between being and non-being, between the ideal and the real. As Sartre himself puts it, "it [value] is not *being*, nor is it *existence*. It is *ideality*, that is, its being gets revealed only as *to be done*" (emphasis in original, *Notebooks for An Ethics*, hereafter *NE*, 1992:249-250). He also holds that "[t]he being of value qua value is the being of what does not have being…Value is beyond being [in so far as it is a lack]" (*BN*:93). They are not "transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity" (ibid:626): they arise in the world concomitant with the upsurge of human reality. However, they are not figments of the subject's imagination for they are realizable and realized demands through free praxis. As Sartre says, they spring up from themselves into the world "*to be made"* (emphasis in original, *NE*:250) and as lack. But, if values "lay claim to foundation", what is it? As to their foundation, Sartre vacillates between freedom and need.

For the early Sartre, values arise from freedom, that is, "freedom is the unique foundation of values" (*BN*: 38,EH:48). And "[v]alue haunts freedom" (BN:94, *NE*:248), and to choose is to value (*EH*:24). So, freedom is the source of values and we accept this or that value because it is we who freely invented it. Contrary to this, the later Sartre tries to make human need the foundation of values[22]. He states that every activity is "sustained, conditioned and set in motion by needs" (*Critique of Dialectical Reason, vol.2*, hereafter *CDR2*, 1991:388). And that "[t]here would be no acts without needs" (ibid:390). This implies that need is the primary force of all human activities and there would be no values without human needs. Elsewhere, he affirms that scarcity is the matrix of ethics itself: evil appears in the milieu of scarcity. So, values such as food and water originate in human need (CDR1:131-132). Put otherwise, "needs, which demand to be satisfied no matter what the situation, are the source of the *unconditional* character of moral norms", for Sartre (quoted in Anderson, 1993:121). Anderson interprets Sartre as saying that need is not a mere "inert lack"; it is a "felt exigency", a pressing "demand for satisfaction" from which emerges "the first normative structure" (1bid:120). So, we can extract two kinds of values: values of freedom and values of need, even though Sartre himself does not directly hold so. But, the problem for Sartre is how we can distinguish the values of freedom from the values of need and how we can reconcile them.

Sartre's reply would be that the norm or goal set by our needs is a "given", not freely selected by us, whereas values of freedom are invented by unconditioned free choice. The former has an objectivist tenor and the latter a subjectivist one. The difficulty is that he abhors any conceiving of values as objectivity and views such conception as an "immorality of ethics", as an embodiment of the "spirit of seriousness"(*NE*:8). Moreover, it contradicts his conception of value as ideality *to be made*. I cannot *make real* the value of food; I merely *encounter* it and must meet it. Of course, there are assertions, which Sartre himself utters here and there, that tellingly invite both a subjectivist and an objectivist intent. On one hand, he writes that "[y]ou are free, so choose; in other words, invent. No general code of ethics can tell you what you ought to do; there

[22] Unfortunately, I mostly rely on Anderson's Book entitled *Sartre's Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity* so as to expose the later Sartre's claim that values are rooted in need because I am unable so far to find Sartre's book known as *The Rome Lecture* where, that is generally believed, he gives detailed account of need as basis of ethics and which constitutes the later Sartrean ethics. It is also here we can see emphatic and terminological shift in Sartre's theory of freedom: terminologically, "project" is replaced with "praxis", and "desire" with "need"(however the first term in each pair is contained in the latter); emphatically, for the early Sartre, freedom is the source of values and they aim at realizing it and for that of later Sartre, need is the source of values and they aim at fulfilling it(primarily values and actions are meant to meet one's need; freedom can only be a distant, but by no means inferior, end. Sartre himself says we do "not just to have enough to eat but to have enough to eat in order to be able to be free" [quoted in, Detmer, 1986:184]).

are no signs in this world" (*EH*:33); that "my acts cause values to spring up like partridges"(*BN*:38); that "nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values"(ibid). This is a call upon human beings to create values for themselves and to renounce their search for universal principles and standards in choosing a particular course of action. Hence, there is a relativization of values and morality.

On the other hand, Sartre claims that "the world is human"(ibid:218) both in the sense of ontological claim that the world appears through consciousness's negation of Being and of ethical claim that it is already *humanized* (socialized by human praxis at whose base is need) which in turn indicates that the world is already populated with values. He also seems, as we have seen, to claim that values arise as practical necessities from human needs and so what we do is just *fulfilment*. Furthermore, he holds that "[v]alues are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands, like the signs which order us to keep off the grass" (*BN*:38). Finally, Sartre holds some form of Kantianism in that he argues that one chooses for all human beings in choosing (for) himself, that "[w]e always choose the good, and nothing can be good for any of us unless it is good for all" (*EH*:24), that in choosing an action, one must ask that ""[a]m I really a man who is entitled to act in such a way that the entire human race should be measuring itself by my actions?""(ibid:26), and that, therefore, "we can claim that universality exists, but it is not a given; it is in a perpetual construction" (ibid:43). So, the notion of good or bad seems to exhibit objectivity and the value which I create is a value for another too. There are values that preexist my creation demanding only conformance. We may apprehend Sartre's contradictory claim in the context of Sartre's claim that values, whether of freedom or of need, exist in the world only in so far as there are human beings, i.e., had humanity vanished off the face of the earth, values would have disappeared soon, for there would be no a transcendent support. Apart from this, Detmer advises us to understand Sartre as saying throughout his writings that freedom is the highest value, that one cannot practically free if he/she is hungry and therefore valuing of freedom directly gives a "*discoverable* value to food" without involving inventing it (1986:205). So, the early Sartre tells us to *invent* values and later to discover and rediscover values. However, one can still imagine the difference between *invention* and *discovery* so as to see the break and continuity in Sartre's treatment of values.

His argument is that since values are brought in by individual subjectivity, the evaluation of an action cannot have the being of objectivity. Put simply, subjective valuing neuters objective evaluation. I agree with him that values do not require transcendent bases, they are human creations and indeed *human* (concerns). But, a wholesale rejection of some objectively (pre)existing values is an outright rejection of morality itself. For instance, killing a person is objectively wrong whether there is a transcendent support or not and it was, is and will be wrong regardless of my existence. Although the wrongness of killing appears in tandem with a human valuation, its wrongness pre-exists me and it is objective of course. Killing is wrong by whatever measure. I think that in attacking religious ethics and secular objectivist ethics, Sartre goes too far. Besides, the subjective origin of value, the fact that values are creations of human beings, does not entail that moral principles are subjective and unnecessary. Detmer also argues that "the subjectivity of values" does not entail "subjectivity of value-judgments (1986:135-138). Furthermore, Sartre tries to avoid universal ethical principles because he believes that there are moral issues, for instance, the dilemma of his student to go to war or to remain with his mother, which resist objective resolution. However, the fact that there are moral dilemmas is indicative of the existence and usefulness of ethical principles, that is, it is the exception that proves the rule. For the rest, Sartre commits the faulty reasoning of "either--or--" fallacy when he presents these mutually exclusive alternatives as the only choices of the student. Consequently, Sartre claims that feeling is no help in distinguishing wrong from right action for there is no way of distinguishing "play-acting" from true feeling (*EH*:32), that is, we cannot morally estimate the strength of feelings. But, although we cannot give a mathematical estimation of the strength of feelings, it would be a betrayal of our sensitivity, and counterintuitive to equate the feeling of a crying baby whose mother has gone to fetch water with that whose mother has died, or, to identify the moral significance of the act of killing with the act of tweak. On the top of that, he states that "[w]e cannot decide a priori what ought to be done" (*EH*:P46). Action decides. If action decides the rightness and wrongness of an action, values are unnecessary in morality. The talk of inventing and discovering values is of no value. After all, I must not take an action to measure the value of my choice: to decide the rightness of a choice by action is to weigh it by the consequence of that action. However, it would be absurd to kill a person in order to judge whether killing is wrong or not. And the implicit imperative would be "kill so that you can know the moral significance of your action."

Finally, Sartre tells us to have a hierarchy of values at the top of which would be generosity (NE:9). However, hierarchy of values presupposes evaluation, objective judgment. Evaluation demands principles and ordering values itself is a moral action. We cannot evaluate (even subjectively) an action without assuming principles, at least in some intuitive ways. What Kantian imperatives, for instance, do is explicitation of what was assumed implicitly. I feed to a hungry person if I assume that avoiding hunger is good. I may value feeding a hungry person over gambling. This requires certain principles and standards. There is no ordering of values without principles. Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, Sartre's treatment of values is an appealing one.

His attempt to make human subjectivity, particularly freedom and need, the foundation of values is a novelty. It is one of the frontal attacks on the various forms of determinism made by him. It is basically a defense of human freedom, which is our next preoccupation.

1.3. The Nature of Freedom of Human Reality

We have seen that consciousness is intentionality and its power is nihilating withdrawal, that the For-itself is a *questioner in question* and it is in transcendence and always temporalizing itself, and finally that values are the free inventions of consciousness. One may ask that how are these structures and activities of the For-itself (consciousness) possible. Sartre answers that they are possible because the For-itself is the foundation of (its own) Nothingness. Then he asserts that Nothingness is brought into the world by the For-itself because it is free, it is freedom (*BN*:24) and of course "it must be free" (*PI*:267). In fact, the above structures and activities are meant to indicate and establish the freedom of human reality. But, what exactly is human freedom? In what sense is freedom absolute? How can we treat the force of circumstances? These are the basic questions we already raised in the Introduction of this thesis.

We have also seen the widespread criticism that Sartre's insistence on absolute freedom does not hold with reality: by prevaricating the issue of freedom and making freedom "everywhere but equally nowhere", he renders freedom an illusion, omnipotence and totally meaningless and thereby the disappearance of "free" action. We will see and judge in the course of our discussion

if the charge does hold good and we shall now delve into his description of freedom[23], but we should first note the following things. First, human reality is "rupture with the given", the nihilation of being-in-itself (*BN*:478). This nihilating rupture relates to the freedom of human reality. This implies that "human reality does not exist first in order to act later; but for human reality, to be is to act" for nihilation is an original act (ibid:476), and thus the identity of being and doing. And an act is the nihilation of *what is* and projection towards *what is not.* Second, Sartre rejects the determinism of psychic forces precisely because they are ineffective for they are outside of consciousness (ibid:433-440) and every human activity is a thetically conscious activity and no more unconscious derive in and for consciousness; the determinism of God (For-itself-in-itself) for it is self-contradictory and non-existent; and the determinism of the Past for it is *already* past and *behind* the present. Third, Sartre points out that "freedom is not a faculty of human soul" nor is it a "property" belonging to the nature of human reality (ibid:25). Fourth, his theory of freedom is not a defense of human omnipotence which can be easily disproved by "reminding us of our impotence" (ibid:482) through the simple observation that I cannot make this stone bread, or, choose to be tall if I am short. Finally, he affirms that will and passion are two different means of attaining a chosen end, chosen in light of a fundamental project: they both involve a choice of means, i.e., will is reflective and passion unreflective choice (ibid:441-476). So, we have freedom of the will and freedom of passion: both willed and passionate acts are free. We can infer from the above notes that freedom is totally free.

Sartre gives total autonomy for the freedom of choice and the latter relates to the ontological freedom of man. As we saw in the Introduction of this thesis, he identifies freedom with being of human reality and claims that we are "condemned to be free" (ibid:129,439,509,525). This absolute freedom rests on the For-itself's power of self-detachment from, or, nihilation of, everything what it *is*. He firmly asserts that:

> Human-reality is free because it *is not* enough. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be. It is free, finally, because its present being is itself a nothingness in the form of the "reflection-reflecting." Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself (BN:440).

[23] Detmer correctly says that "the sheer bulk of Sartre's output precludes the possibility of an encyclopedic or comprehensive treatment of his views, so I have had to be somewhat selective in my coverage" (1986:5). I will do the same without being economical with the truth.

Human reality is not foundation of its being but of its nothingness, it is a lack of being (in-itself). This Nothingness envelopes and supports the power of nihilation which in turn makes human reality to have reflection and presence. Thus, nothingness is the foundation and being of freedom. He states that "human reality is free to the exact extent that it has to be its own nothingness" by means of temporalization (self-distancing), intentionality and transcendence (projection of an end) (*BN*:453). Sebastian Gardner also states that "Sartre talks of freedom as involving some forcible break with the world—a 'permanent rupture in determinism'…the subject 'dissociating himself from the causal series' (2009:152-153). For Sartre, because of the nihilating power of human reality, ontological freedom is always "total and infinite" (*BN*:531,547). Circumstance cannot determine our ontological freedom of choice.

My freedom of choice is free whether I am a king or daily laborer, or prisoner or jailer: we cannot say that the jailer is freer than the prisoner. Ontological freedom admits no degree. Sartre states that "the situation of a man and his powers cannot increase or limit his freedom" and "freedom is similarly infinite in each individual" ("Cartesian Freedom," hereafter *CF*, 1962:183). He adds that "[m]an cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (*BN*:441). He even dares to say that "even the red hot pincers of the torturer do not exempt us from being free (ibid:506): "when we give in, we do so freely" (ibid:525). In so far as we are thrown into the world as freedom, it is in control of us to renounce our choice and direction and submit to the torture, or insist on choice and direction. This does not mean that we can always freely avoid the trouble, but that we are *free to choose to face up* the trouble head-on (free to resist or submit to the torture). The question is not about success or failure, but choice of freedom. That is why Sartre says that a "freedom of an action which ends in failure is simply freedom which fails" (*CDR1*:237). So, ontological freedom is absolute: "[t]o be free is to be condemned to be free" (*BN*:129). Quite strangely, Sartre admits freedom itself and the freedom of an Other as limits of ontological freedom.

Ontologically, we cannot be "unfree" even if we want. I cannot choose my freedom: I am a free "chooser." We are abandoned, or condemned, to freedom. "Freedom," Sartre holds, "is not free not to be free and that it is not free not to exist" (ibid:486). Hence, freedom is a restriction upon itself in a sense that it is forced to choose since *not to choose* itself is *to choose.* Moreover, I am thrown into the world as freedom but only amidst other freedoms, or in Sartrean parlance, my

existence is an "existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-others" (*BN*:512). It is also instructive to think of what we saw in the Introduction of this thesis that the Look of the Other turns me into an object, that is, the Other by its Look steals away my subjectivity and makes me exist as having an *outside* which is beyond my control. With the irruption of the Other, I come to have "certain determinations which I am without having chosen them": by the *signification of the Other*, I am Amhara or Oromo, Christian or Muslim, sociable or aloof, and troublemaker or peacemaker (ibid:523). He also expresses it in a more practical language by asserting that" only the free praxis of the Other on the basis of material circumstances, through some worked matter, can limit the efficacity and freedom of my praxis" (*CDR1*:320). So, the very existence of another freedom is a threat to my subjectivity, a never-directly-but-always-encountered limit to my freedom. In nutshell, freedom is internally limited in that it "cannot not-be freedom" and externally too in that "it is for others" as being looked at by them to serve their own ends. But, does this mean that freedom knows no obstacle? Is this not an equation of freedom with inner freedom? Can the situation or the circumstance do nothing about freedom? Not quite so.

These questions take us to Sartre's description of practical freedom and to see the force of circumstance. Despite misunderstandings which led Sartre's readers to pedantic and unfounded criticisms, he distinguishes between ontological and practical freedom. He says that "[i]t is one thing to test your freedom in the realm of action, of social or political activity, or of artistic creation, and another thing to test it in the act of understanding and discovering" (*CF*:180). He adds that one's "freedom to choose" must be distinguished from one's "freedom to obtain" (*BN*:505, 484). Also, Sartre identifies freedom neither with inner freedom nor with getting what one wishes. Freedom, he says, is not "a series of capricious jerks" nor are we "free to [obtain what we] wish whatsoever at any moment" (*BN*:452). It is a condition of an act which differentiates it from mere thought or dream. And stoical "inner freedom is a pure idealist hoax" involving "abstract thoughts and empty intentions" ("Materialism and Revolution," hereafter *MR*, 1962:237). Despite his claim that ontological freedom is absolutely free, Sartre conceives practical freedom with restrictions.

Basically, freedom is the nihilation of the given (in-itself) by the For-itself. It is a rupture of the For-itself with being-in-itself. Sartre says that freedom is a "breaking of contact with being" (*CF*:190),"the escape from an engagement in being" (*BN*:486). His reasoning that doing assumes

the nihilation of the given, that is, an act involves negating and working on matter. This implies that we are free in relation to the given, "in relation to state of things". So "freedom is not a simple undetermined power": if there is no obstacle, there is no freedom (ibid:485-486). After all, to be in the world is to be situated. Freedom is the "possibility of rising above a situation in order to get a perspective [of action and understanding] on it" (*MR*:235). Sartre argues that "to be free is to-be-free- to–change*"* (*BN*: 506) *the situation*. And to be free is to be free in the situation. So, Freedom is changing a situation. This implies that freedom involves a situation to "be changed: obstacles to be cleared, tools to be used" (*ibid*). He further argues that facticity[24] limits freedom: "freedom can exist only as restricted since freedom is choice. Every choice…supposes elimination and selection…freedom can be truly free only by constituting facticity as its own restriction" (ibid:495). As there cannot be freedom without a situation, there cannot be freedom—"as a power of nihilation and of choice"—without facticity. Sartre also talks of certain facticities in terms of the universal conditions as limitations to freedom: these universal conditions—"the necessities of being in the world, of having to labour and to die there"—are "the *limitations* which *a priori* define man's fundamental situation in the universe" (Emphasis in original, *EH*:42). So, human freedom (practical) is strictly limited.

Sartre says that the For-itself "everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created" (*BN*:489) and "freedom's very project is in general to do in a resisting world by means of a victory over the world's resistances" (*ibid*:507). He calls this resistance of things "coefficient of adversity."[25] In fact, it is freedom itself which attaches to things their coefficient of adversities. Hence, "[a] particular crag, which manifests a profound resistance if I wish to displace it, will be on the contrary a valuable aid if I want to climb upon it in order to look over the countryside", says Sartre (*BN*:482). But, he does not stop here. We saw in the Introduction of this thesis that we are in the *world* of practico-inert (worked matter) alienates human freedom. The practico-inert has an exigency of its own, i.e., machines, industries and automobiles have their own demands and patterns. Thus, our praxis must follow their orders. Sartre avers that "freedom, in this context [where practico-inert reigns], does not mean the possibility of choice, but the necessity of living these constraints in the form of exigencies which must be fulfilled by praxis" (*CDR1*:327). He continues to assert more drastically that "all men are slaves in so far as

[24] Sartre states that "the facticity of freedom is the given which it has to be and which it illuminates by its project…It is my place, my body, my past, my position in so far as it is already determined by the indications of Others, finally my fundamental relation to the Other"(*BN*:489).
[25] He says that "The coefficient of adversity of things is such that years of patience are necessary to obtain the feeblest result" (*BN*: 481).

their life unfolds in the practico-inert field and in so far as this field is always conditioned by scarcity"(ibid:332). So, practical freedom is limited by the exigency of practico-inert things.

Now we have enough of textual evidence to respond to the widespread charge that Sartre's theory of freedom is abstract and meaningless and makes freedom totally free and unlimited. I think context highly matters to understand things. The above textual evidence clearly shows us the context of Sartre's treatment of freedom. Therefore, it would be a grave and glaring error of judgment to accuse him of rendering freedom meaningless and absolute[26] and equating the condition of the slave with the master without understanding the context. Sartrean freedom is absolute in the context of autonomy of choice but limited in the sense of attaining an end. It is unlimited in the context that no psychological or supernatural force can determine my choice and project. It is concrete in the sense that freedom has an act as its condition. It is limited in the context that freedom supposes situation, facticity and resistance. As we discussed, Sartre denies both total subjectivism and objectivism: accepting either of them would be "immorality" or "violence" on freedom. Sartre's talk of responsibility and bad faith are additional indications for the concreteness, meaningfulness and limitedness of his treatment of freedom. It must also be noted that Sartre's acknowledgment of limitations on freedom in *Being and Nothingness* is an indication for the existence of continuity in his conception of freedom. This fact makes him free from the charge that Sartre's early theory of freedom is abstract and the later is concrete and there is a break between them.

As we saw, freedom is the being of consciousness (For-itself) and consciousness is consciousness of something and of itself. Once thrown into the world as freedom, we are conscious of it. Sartre declares that "if freedom is the being of consciousness, consciousness ought to exist a consciousness of freedom…it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom" (*BN*:29). According to him, we are abandoned free to carve out the humanity of human beings and invent our values. Because of this abandonment, and since we are conscious of it, we are always in anguish (*EH*:34). Therefore, we are free and conscious of our freedom through anguish. This again implies that we are responsible through and through for our actions.

[26] Frondizi tells us that "Sartre's extreme doctrine of absolute freedom is unique in the annals of philosophy. All other doctrines in favor of freedom at least acknowledge some limitation or other. (1981:383). But, the many limitations acknowledged by Sartre falsifies this charge.

As we saw, we are condemned to freedom to act, to make ourselves and to create our own values. As a logical correlate of this absolute freedom, we are absolutely responsible. Sartre holds that because of condemnation to freedom and of '"consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object,"' everyone "carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself" (*BN*:553). No psychological force, or unconscious drive, or past habit or natural or supernatural force can be held responsible for our misdeeds. Extenuating reasons or reassuring justifications, or, any sort of escape hatches are utterly unacceptable. A minor officer of Auschwitz camp cannot claim that he is not to blame for the execution of millions of Jews because he was ordered by the high ranking officers and Adolf Hitler. Sartre says of him that "there was no compulsion here, for the compulsion could have got no hold on a freedom" (ibid:554-555). So, any attempt to escape responsibility would be to enmesh oneself in a condition which Sartre calls "bad faith."

Bad faith is neither factual error nor mere personal solecism. Sartre states that it is fundamentally a "lie to oneself" (*BN*:48) and the person in question is in bad faith precisely because he/she knows what he/she is lying. Bad faith is a flight from freedom (*NE*:328) and responsibility by providing extenuating reasons or by fabricating various escape hatches, i.e., idols of God, of unconscious drive, of past, and of passion. Moreover, what seems surprising is that it develops in the structure of human reality, i.e., the For-itself *is not* what it is and *is* what it is not. In other words, for Sartre, human reality is both facticity (a thrown freedom that exists) and transcendence (in the sense of being a future project): to affirm solely the one while denying the other is to slip into bad faith (*BN*:56-58). We can identify, from Sartre's treatment of bad faith, two fundamental ways through which fleeing one's freedom clearly manifests: in our fundamental project and "spirit of seriousness." We saw that the For-itself is a nihilation of being, a lack of being, a desire for being and a projection towards being. Sartre states that as a lack of being, the For-itself desires being-in-itself in its attempt to be its own foundation, although it is only its own Nothingness. The fundamental desire of the For-itself is to become an impossible synthesis of "in-itself-For-itself" or "*ens causa sui"* which Sartre equates with God. The fundamental project of man is the project of becoming God, i.e., "man fundamentally is the desire to be God" (*BN*:565-566). This vain attempt to be God, which ends up only in failure for being unfit for human reality, exactly fills the bill of bad faith. Sartre advises us to reject our desire to be God and instead pursue freedom which is the fitting structure of human reality.

Serious human beings value God over their freedom. Sartre terms the practice of valuing transcendent God and making values transcendent and independent as "spirit of seriousness" (*BN*:580, *NE*:8). For to him, a person of spirit of gravity (Sartre's favored term is seriousness) disowns himself and gives more reality to God, the world and values. He denies himself his free subjectivity and makes freedom serve those absolutes: values become unsurpassable and a priori and the world more significant than him. This is "violence," Sartre says, on freedom because "instead of value, as a demand of freedom, only being able to be obtained by freedom, it becomes a demand on freedom…it can and must be attained even by the suppression of freedom" (*NE*:209-210). A person of spirit of gravity is in bad faith in that he flees from his freedom, fails to take responsibility to create his own values and makes himself a mere instrument of their demands. Sartre wants us to reject the desire to be God as well as the spirit of seriousness. But, he believes that it is through pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis, which will be dealt with in chapter two, that we can extricate ourselves from the bind of bad faith and be able to pursue freedom and take responsibility.

To summarize, Sartre believes that freedom is the ability to change one's situation. Freedom and situation are inextricably linked. Freedom involves the "anticipation" of obstacles within the situation. This disproves the charge that Sartrean freedom is too abstract. But, this does not mean that freedom is determined. Neither unconscious drive nor passion nor mechanical world nor the past can determine our choice. We are completely free in our choice unless we are in bad faith. Only bad faith can serve as a general scaffold for any form of determinism. Sartre's analysis of ontological freedom, i.e., Nothingness as the being of freedom can only exist in conjunction with obstacles and resistances, is a spectacular achievement. However, his conception of bad faith is too broad because a person under psychological duress and physical coercion may be in bad faith if he/she fails to abide by his/her freedom of choice. A choice under coercion, i.e., a terrible choice of either risking life or submitting to the torture of a red hot pincers, cannot be a free choice. If freedom of choice includes choosing between such terrible options, there will not be "free" choice. Therefore, I will not be in bad faith even if I submit to the torture of a red hot pincers.

Moreover, Sartre claims that the Look of the Other turns my subjectivity into an object and hence limits my ontological freedom. Indeed, the Look of the Other may snatch my subjectivity

and make it its plaything. But, no matter how the Other through its Look tosses and turns in my subjectivity, no matter how it thrusts a knife into my subjectivity, its Look cannot really touch my subjectivity. The Look of the Other cannot affect my freedom of choice. If the Look of the Other affects my freedom of choice, it is absurd even to think of it as absolute and infinite. The existence of the Other and its praxis, but not its Look, limit my praxis but not my freedom of choice. Praxis can only be limited by praxis but no by Look. Therefore, it is practical freedom, not ontological freedom, which is limited by the existence of the Other and its praxis.

Finally, all is well with Sartre's argument that despite the restriction of facticity, situation, coefficient of resistance, practico-inert and its counter-finality on practical freedom, ontological freedom is totally free. Problem arises for he stops there. His conceptions and analyses of "practical" freedom and ontological freedom do not exhaust all basic human freedoms. In other words, he is too concerned with freedom of choice than freedom of obtaining. Indeed, as Barnes points out in the Introduction of the *Search for A Method* (hereafter SM), Sartre's analysis of ontological freedom is significantly useful since people cannot fight for political freedom without knowing that they are existentially free (1963:xxi). However, the crippling blow on individuals' freedom comes not from people's ignorance of their own freedom but from the activities of other human beings. It is not to deny that an individual who is totally ignorant of his/her existential freedom cannot exercise well his/her freedom. Rather, it is to suggest that it is the actions of other people which obstruct individuals from attaining their chosen ends. Practically speaking, I will be alienated from my freedom when I am blocked from my path, from achieving my goal. Nevertheless, Sartre devotes himself to explaining more freedom of choice than practical freedom. As a result, he proposes existential psychoanalysis, group praxis and pure reflection so as to be aware of our freedom and realize it, even though they are insufficient in a situation where human relations and praxis are determined by scarcity and marred by conflict. The next chapter shows their insufficiency and how scarcity leads to conflict.

Chapter Two: Sartre's Conception of Human Relation and His Proposed Means to Freedom

Introduction

We have seen in the Introduction of this thesis and in Chapter One as well that Sartre believes that the Look of the Other and the counter-praxis of practico-inert limit freedom, and that values arise from need as influenced by scarcity. In other words, the Look and scarcity determine human "praxis" (Sartre's favored term for project or conscious action) and relation, and hence give rise to conflictual relations. So, relation remains conflictual and thus an alienation of freedom. Sartre presents existential psychoanalysis, purifying reflection and group praxis as viable solutions. This chapter attempts to expose his explication of the Look, scarcity, practico-inert, human relation and Sartre's proposed solutions. It also tries to establish the claim that conflict is not the fundamental structure of human relation and that the proposed solutions are insufficient to restore and realize human freedom. Hence, in this chapter we will see Sartre's analysis of how the Look and scarcity affect human relations.

2.1. Sartre's Conception of Human Relation

2.1.1. The Ontology of Look

We saw in Chapter One that our freedom is limited since we are thrown into the world peopled with other freedoms. This indicates that the existence of others is *apodictically* certain and that being-for-itself, Sartre holds, does not exhaust human reality, i.e., human reality has a structure which exists outside itself and depends on the "Other"[27]. This additional structure is being-for-others (*BN*:221-222). He further says that as the for-itself is just the negation of being-in-itself, it is also the negation (by appearing as not him) of an Other for-itself. So, the For-itself announces the For-others to us (*ibid*: 251-252). The Other negates me and I negate him in turn in the sense that I am for-myself by not being him and he is for-himself by being not me. Likewise, "the Other penetrates me to the heart," Sartre says, (*ibid*:237) and he is an extreme nihilation of my experience as with his irruption I receive a strange dimension of my being as object, as a being-for-others (*ibid*:228-236). Or, in Sartre's own parlance, "[h]e is the test of my being inasmuch as

[27] For Sartre, "the Other [in this sense] is neither a representation nor a system of representations nor a necessary unity of our representations (*BN*: 251), nor is he "empirical person who is encountered in my experience; he is the transcendental subject to whom this person by nature refers" (ibid: 234). He is "the ex-centric limit which contributes to the constitution of my being [for-others as object]" (ibid: 245). And "[h]e is the one who looks at me and at whom I am not yet looking"; he is the source and destination of my flight and alienation (ibid:269).

he throws me outside of myself toward structures which at once both escape me and define me; it is this test which originally reveals the Other to me"(*Ibid*:245). The structure which escapes and defines me is my being-for-others. But, how does human reality get its being-for- others?

We should first notice that Sartre notes that being-for-others is the third ekstasis by which I exist outside myself (*BN*:298). So, it is the fundamental structure of human reality. Next, he identifies the fact of being thrown into the world with having a body. For a human being to exist is to live its body only as consciousness: the body is a "conscious structure" of consciousness, i.e., the body exists only as consciousness (*ibid*:318-329). Also, however never limited to it (for it can be manifested through consciousness in the feeling of shame of oneself before the Other, for instance), being-for-others is mostly manifested through the body[28]. Sartre tells us that my body exposes me naked to the Other and it incessantly flows toward the Other. In short, our "body-for-us" is "the body-for-the-Other" (*ibid*:352-353). Sartre concludes that "my being-for-others…i.e., my Me-as-object…[is] "my *being-outside*" (emphasis in original, *ibid*:295-296). Through the Look of the Other my body became a body-for-him: it makes my objectivity haunt my subjectivity. But, what does the Look signify?

Basically, to be a human being-in-the-world, to have a body, to be being-for-others directly and necessarily implies the fundamental fact of Being-seen which in turn indicates the fact of Seeing. ""Being-seen-by-the-Other," Sartre says, "is the truth of "seeing-the-Other"" (*BN*:257). Sartre defines the Look as an inescapable condition in which one becomes defenseless of being seen by the other, an object for the Other (*BN*:259). However, Sartre reminds us that although it is usually manifested through the "ocular" stare, the Look can be present in the absence of the actual eyes of a human observer. It can announce itself where "there is a rustling of branches or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of a shutter" (*ibid*:258). Hence, in as much as I am-in-the-world, I am under the constant Look of the Other. The very irruption of the Other implies the arrest of my freedom and alienation of my possibilities. Sartre pessimistically asserts that "[m]y original fall is the existence of the Other" (*BN*:263).

Sartre argues that the experience of shame manifests my "original fall" and the Other. It reveals me that I have a being-outside; I am ashamed of my being-looked-at, i.e., I am ashamed of

[28]For Sartre, "the body is not that which first manifests the Other to me…The appearance of the Other's body is not therefore the primary encounter; on the contrary, it is only one episode in my relations with the Other and in particular in… making an object of the Other. Or if you prefer, the Other exists for me first and I apprehend him in his body *subsequently*. The Other's body is for me a secondary structure" (*BN*: 339).

myself being-an-object for-the-Other and I feel guilty because "my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object", for-the-Other, seated on chair as this pencil sharper is on the table (*BN:*260-263). Shame is an original reaction to the objectivizing Look of the Other and we have to react indeed since, to use an everyday expression, guilty conscience cannot sleep. Furthermore, a glance of look-see at the Other is enough to make the Other an object for me. By directing my Look towards him, I revenge myself on him. Sartre states that the "objectivation of the Other" is a defensive action and counter-reaction to recover my subjectivity, or, to free "me from my being-for the Other" (*ibid*:268). He further says that:

> Therefore my constant concern is to contain the Other within his objectivity, and my relations with the Other-as-object are essentially made up of ruses designed to make him remain an object. But one look on the part of the Other is sufficient to make all these schemes collapse and to make me experience once more the transfiguration of the Other. Thus I am referred from transfiguration to degradation and from degradation to transfiguration…(*BN*:297).

This implies that there is only a kind of rotational *being-looked-at* and *being-looking-at* between myself and the Other, causing a complete and incessant flight of my world towards him and, causing subjectivity to make good its escape from me—this flow of my world Sartre calls "internal hemorrhage" (*ibid*:257,261).So,"[u]nity with the Other is therefore *in* fact unrealizable" (*ibid*:366). Sartre maintains that our "*being-as-object*-for the other", and the other-for-us, is the fundamental "structure of our original relation with the Other" (emphasis in original, *ibid:340*). Thus, between the Other and me is there only covert and open hostility or reciprocal enslavement of freedom. Consequently, existential antagonism permeates concrete human relation down to the smallest detail. In order to better grasp this point, we shall dip into only two instances of what Sartre calls "primitive attitudes": love and hate.

Sartre holds that one way of maintaining and recovering my freedom is to identify myself with the Other as freedom (since he is the "foundation of my being-in-itself" which I want to achieve) in the form of assimilation. In other word, to assimilate the Other as a subject-looking-at me, I must identify myself with my object-ness (my being-seen)—for I cannot assimilate him by presenting myself as a subject-looking-at, an attempt of it would instantly turn him into an object (*BN*:364-366). Love is such an attempt of assimilation of the lover with the beloved (the Other).

Sartre affirms that "what the lover demands is that the beloved should *make* of him an absolute choice," Or, I demand of the beloved to "choose to be" a "being-as-loving" for the benefit of realizing my being (in-itself) (*ibid*: 370-371). However, the beloved does not identify the lover with himself, and does apprehend him as Object among other objects and thereby hold him captive. As such, love is the source of conflict and alienation. As a lover, I lay myself captivated by prostrating myself under the Look and freedom of the Other in my attempt to be loved. This failure of the love-project motivates the attitude of hate.

Sartre asserts that when my love-project ends in vain, I resign myself to hate and seek the death of the Other so that I will not have a being-for-the-Other and will reclaim my absolute freedom (*BN*: 410). However, the death of the Other cannot make the Other "did not exist." That is why Sartre says that "[h]e who has once been for-others is contaminated in his being for the rest of his days even if the Other should be entirely suppressed; he will never cease to apprehend his dimension of being-for-others as a permanent possibility of his being"(*ibid*:412). Hence, hate too is bound to fail to recover my freedom, and companionship with the Other is impossible.

The forgoing discussion implies that to look is to enchain. To *cherish* the Other in the form of assimilation is to enslave him. To hate the Other is to annihilate his freedom too. Both love and hate come to nothing. I am engaged intermittently but without success in recovering my lost freedom and stolen values. Here, we can make sense of Sartre's insistence that conflict is the original meaning of all human relations. "The essence of the relations," Sartre concludes, "between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein*[29]*;* it is conflict" (*BN*: 429).Therefore, human existence is a continual struggle to maintain one's subjectivity in this sense.

In view of Sartre's account of the Look, individuals will actually be in the grip of acute "paranoia" if it is true that the Other ontologically and antagonistically follows them everywhere they go and whatever they do. I will be in a horrible suspicion of Others around me if the Other's *unseen* Look touches my being at the heart, if the Other hovers, like malicious evil spirit if there is, near in my "environment"—when I read, I eat, I walk, I sleep, I steal, I defecate and in all my activities. This indicates that my relation with others cannot be one of true friendship and fraternity for it is already pervaded by suspicion and hostility. If so, human relation is conflictual.

[29]The term "Mitsein" is a German word which is usually translated as being-with and here Sartre uses it to address Heidegger's conception of Dasein as fundamentally "being-with" which we will be dealing in the next chapter. Sartre's account of the Look as a source of conflict is a critique of Heidegger's Mitsein in one sense.

The other point, indeed the important one, which I want to raise, is that Sartre's characterization of the Look as naturally objectifying is wide of the mark. From Sartrean phenomenological perspective, when I see a person, I do not say that this object is a person. When I see him, I immediately recognize him as a person. He appears to me standing already obtruded himself from the surrounding objects as a person. Perhaps, I could not differentiate whether this person is a stranger, my friend or enemy, criminal or a mayor or a female or male. But, at the moment of being-looked-at, he presents himself as a person. In other words, at my seeing him, I do not throw him into the status of object-ness: at my seeing him, he is *already* a person. The first encounter of the Look, therefore, does not turn the Other into an inert object: when I encounter him, what comes to my mind is his "humanness" like me, having a subjectivity like mine. From this point of view, it is possible even to claim that the original Look is a subjectifying encounter, but not an objectifying Look. The Other becomes an object to the Look of the Other only with the second Look, which I should call instrumental Look, that involves a kind of re-looking of the encountered Other. The instrumental Look is a kind of reflective Look: it is reflective because I consider the Other as object when I begin thinking about the Other. I may reflectively and instrumentally look the Other into two ways: as an object of knowledge and of *use*—they simply are modes of instrumental look.

The first mode arises when I try to raise questions, and to know, about the encountered Other. Suppose, for instance, that while carrying a bulging duffel bag and suitcase, I am walking through a public footpath on a meadow and haystacks over it. Suppose again that a person suddenly surges up or appears alongside the haystacks. What am I going to do at the immediate moment of looking at him/her? Will I think and say to myself that "there is an object"? No. I will say to myself that "there is a person there." However, I will try to know *that* encountered Other, and to ask in time that "who is that?" "What is he doing here?" "Is he a purse snatcher or ranger or cowboy?" It is just here the epistemic mode of instrumental Look comes to play, that is, my Look starts to objectify the other by making him/her an object of inquiry. Besides, the second mode of instrumental Look may arise. Suppose again that I, by whatever means, implicitly or explicitly, came across that the person alongside the haystacks was not a purse snatcher but haystack ranger. I may ask him/her to get him/her carry my suitcase, so that I can get a momentary sigh for me. If I do this, especially with force, I am objectifying him/her, or turning him/her into a utility-object. So, with a utility-Look, the encountered other happens to be a

utility-object or an object of use. Thus, the example shows us that it is the second Look or instrumental Look that is objectifying and alienating. The first/original Look is subjectifying, at least merely a neutral Look. Therefore, it is not the case that the very act of the Look is antagonizing and alienating: act of thingification begins with instrumental Look. However, Sartrean Look is always the source of conflict but not of friendship or cooperation. But, note that it is for the early Sartre conflict originates in the Look; the later Sartre shifted the origin of conflict into scarcity, although the role of the Other is still maintained. Therefore, it is worth going into his account of scarcity soon.

2.1.2. The Force of Scarcity: As Determinant of Praxis and Source of Conflict

We saw in Chapter One that being-for-itself, as a Lack of Being and in desire of Being, is the negation of being-in-itself, and that values and all human activities ultimately originate in human need. This indicates that need[30] connects the organic (the for-itself) with the inorganic (the In-itself). Sartre maintains that "it is through need that the first negation of the negation [it is so for it is primarily a lack] and the first totalisation appear in matter" (*CDR1*:80). And that "praxis springs from being-in-itself as its negation" (*CDR2*:332). It is through need that human beings unify ("totalize" is Sartre's favored term) inorganic materiality and their praxis. When a farmer digs and turns over a field, digs furrows to plant seeds and grow cereals, builds muddy ditch to facilitate run-off into the stream and establish a hawthorn against certain threats, it is out of need that he is organizing and hence negating the plow field (the inorganic matter). It is in this context that Sartre states that "neither the practico-inert, nor oppression, nor exploitation , nor this given alienation, would be possible if the huge ponderous socio-economic machine were not sustained, conditioned and set in motion by needs"(*CDR2*:388). Alienating as well as emancipatory praxis is borne out of the structure of need. It is to suppress the *lacunae* in us which we initiate plans, projects and actions. Sartre states that human need is "scarcity lived in interiority by the organ" and as such, it is *"the materiality of the action*, its reality and its foundation, its substance, and its urgency" (emphasis in original, *CDR2*:390). Had not need been *there*—scarcity in us—there would have never existed human action.

[30]Notice that the Sartre of *Being and Nothings* emphasizes on "desire" and "lack" , where as that of *CDR* on "need" and states that " Need itself, moreover, is already the unity of what is missing or the unity of what threatens interiorized and re-exteriorized in the field"(CDR2:332).

While we want to satisfy our demands, scarcity limits and conditions our praxis. Sartre holds that "the whole of human development…has been a bitter struggle against scarcity" (*CDR1*:123) and it is "an active element of history" (*CDR2*:422). It is in their attempt to deal with scarcity that human beings make history, and there would be stagnation of "human development" if there were no scarcity. All is right so far in this sense. Problem arises when we consider the kind of praxis we have in the milieu of scarcity. Every praxis, in so far as it is done within the framework of a strained field induced by scarcity, will contradict the other praxis and hence become alienating and anti-praxis—an introduction of non-human element into the social milieu. Sartre affirms that "[scarcity], in some form or other, has dominated all praxis… as long as the reign of scarcity continues, each and every man will contain an inert structure of non-humanity" (*ibid*:130). Thus, scarcity significantly conditions praxis, even makes it contradict itself and other praxis. But how does antipraxis or anti-humanity appear in the social milieu?

Sartre argues that whenever inorganic materiality undergoes negation and totalisation, it, through its passivity, "records "and "conserves" the imprint of human praxis only to eventually return it to its origin as "inverted praxis" (*CDR1*:122-123). This negated and totalized materiality Sartre calls "practico-inert" Being or "thing-man" the essence of which is the "government of inanimate matter by man" (*CDR2*:277). This Being has its own *stolen* and *negative exigency* which replaced *human exigency.* Sartre says that in a condition where the practico-inert reigns, my praxis is not a free totalisation: my praxis is just an "exigency of the *practico-inert Being"* as it designates me as "*the Other who is expected to do certain things"* (emphasis in original, *CDR1*:188-191). Hence, my free praxis, which is my being, becomes a predetermined function required and ordered by worked matter. Consequently, the counter-finality of practico-inert, as its end contrary to the finality of praxis, poses a serious threat to free praxis. To give an ordinary instance, a ditch built around a farm field to protect it from an inundation of flood waters may gradually develop into a deep gorge that will hinder the farmer from going to his other farm field, from the market, from the meadow and from visiting his relatives who live beside that gorge. And may he be forced to destroy the ditch he built. So, praxis becomes anti-praxis in its totalization of matter.

This indicates that in the world of practico-inert in conjunction with the milieu of scarcity, everyone is constituted and presented as an Other—an anti-human that stands as an alien menace

to every other and destroys their projects. Sartre asserts that "[n]othing—not even wild beasts or microbes —could be more terrifying for man than a species which is intelligent, carnivorous and cruel, and which can understand and outwit human intelligence, and whose aim is precisely the destruction of man"(*CDR1*:132). So, scarcity by pitting praxis against praxis makes man against man. The reign of practico-inert adds a new fuel to scarcity-caused violent human relation.

In nutshell, according to Sartre, we can identify two fundamental reasons why scarcity is the source of conflict and hence unfreedom. First, "*there is not enough for all"(CDR1*:128) so that the satisfaction of needs will inevitably lead to covert and overt struggles in so far as everyone will encounter every Other in the scarce field of satisfaction. Sartre himself puts it that "the *mere existence* of everyone is defined by scarcity as the constant danger of non-existence *both for another and for everyone*" (emphasis in original, *CDR1*:131). Second, practico-inert materiality exerts a passive action, as counter-praxis, by absorbing and conserving the imprint of human praxis on "man and his History in returning a stolen praxis," Sartre says, "to man in the form of a counter-finality" (*CDR1*:124). It is in this sense that Sartre argues that scarcity, as determinant of praxis and of course human relation, is the source of conflict and hence human relation is fundamentally conflictual. Now, it is worth doing to relate Sartre's idea that praxis, conflict, human relation and history are possible because there is scarcity with Karl Marx's conception.

But, I do not venture and want to compare and contrast all the ideas and themes discussed in their respective philosophy nor do I think it does have a direct bearing on the thesis (the thesis does not attempt to show the Marxism of Sartre) [31]. It is to show some basic Marxist ideas which the later Sartre embraces, surpasses and rejects. I hope this further clarifies Sartre's theory of freedom. So, I shall outline what Sartre agrees and disagrees with Marx.

Sartre, following Marx, claims that history moves in dialectics. He states that "Marx's originality lies in the fact that…he demonstrated that History is in development…that he preserved the dialectical movement both in Being and in Knowledge" (CDR1:23).Thus, history is conceivable only in terms of dialectics. Not only history, for Sartre, is dialectical but also "the praxis of the individual is dialectical" (ibid:99). This implies that praxis, as basis of history, as

[31].It was not my original intention to make such a comparison and contrast between Sartre's and Marx's philosophy. It is upon the recommendation of my examiner Setargew Kenaw (PhD), that there would be a conceptual and logical leap in the thesis if it does not show the relation Sartre has with Marx in so far as the former appropriates some ideas of the latter, which I tried to show their relations in brief. But, I fear it may create a thematic digression in the whole structure of the thesis.

the negation of matter is a dialectical totalization. We should also note that Sartre rejects the idealist dialectic of Hegel (which he considers it as "dogmatic dialectic" (CDR1: 15) and accepts a "*materialist dialectic"* (ibid:36) which he considers as *"*critical dialectic" (ibid: 15).While dogmatic dialectic provides idealistic interpretation of history, critical dialectic offers a materialist interpretation of history. Hence, Sartre fully endorses Marxian historical materialism.

Sartre affirms that "Everything we established in The Problem of Method! follows from our fundamental agreement with historical materialism"(CDR1:15)and that "the only valid interpretation of human History is historical materialism"(ibid:39-40). Nevertheless, he emphatically rejects dialectical materialism[32] because he believes that it reduces mind (consciousness) to matter (the in-itself) (MR:201); "it endeavors to ascribe freedom to things" (ibid:236); and it attempts "to establish a dialectic of Nature"(CDR1:26). This makes human beings outside the making of history. So, dialectical materialism is a denial of historical materialism (human history), an affirmation of natural history, and by extension a complete rejection of human freedom and of the temporality of human beings. Sartre's protestation is premised upon the assumptions that the "dialectic of Nature is Nature without men" (CDR1:26) and every dialectic originates in praxis (in the negation of matter by labor), due to which history can only be dialectical.

History, for Marx, the history of class conflict: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (The Communist Manifesto, 2008:33). Sartre would ask Marx that "what is the basis of class struggle itself?" Marx would answer that there is class because there is division of labor. Sartre surpasses Marx's claim, but without rejecting it completely, and asserts that there is class struggle, division of labor, conflict and contradiction between the mode of production and relations of production because there is scarcity. He states that "the appearance of classes (even if we admit, with Engels, that they originate in a differentiation of functions), is intelligible only in terms of an original negation[scarcity]" (CDR1:149); "The origin of struggle always lies, in fact, in some concrete antagonism whose material condition is scarcity" (ibid:113); "Exploiter and exploited are men in conflict in a system whose principal characteristic is scarcity" (SM 127); and the whole of human development, at least up to now,

[32].It should be understood that Sartre accepts historical materialism in the sense that human beings as organic materiality exist by negating inorganic materiality, i.e., praxis as the negation of matter. It is by negating (working on) matter and negated by matter in turn that human beings make history (to the extent that it makes them).

has been a bitter struggle against scarcity (CDR1:123). Thus, contradiction, class differentiation or antagonism or struggle arises when human beings try to negate scarcity by negating inorganic materiality. In other words, contradiction arises when we struggle to alleviate scarcity. Likewise, Sartre believes that there is basically history not because there is class antagonism but there is scarcity. Sartre affirms that "Scarcity…is the basis of the possibility of human history... But to say that our History is a history of men is equivalent to saying that it is born and developed within the permanent framework of a field of tension produced by scarcity"(CDR1:125). History would be stagnant and human beings would be dwarf and crooked if there would be no scarcity.

Sartre laments that Marx and Engels fail to see "the presence of the negative in History" (CDR1: 148), i.e., they overlooked the significance of scarcity. Without the negation of scarcity by praxis, there is no history. His claim in general is that praxis, dialectic and history are all possible because human actions are done in the milieu of scarcity. He further laments that by ignoring this truth, Marx and Engels fall into "economism" which is the "inhumanism" of Marxism (SM:132); it is inhuman because it excludes human choice and project from the making of history and thus history becomes the result of the conflict between the force of production and relation of production[33].The material conditions do influence but do not determine and control human actions. Otherwise, it would be a denial of human freedom, which we saw in chapter one, to change circumscribing situations. Thus, Sartre concludes: "Without these principles [economic conditionings] there is no historical rationality. But, without living men, there is no history" (SM:133). It is the exclusion of individuals from the making of history in Marxism which Sartre condemns.

Sartre's existentialism is an attempt to bring individuals back to their proper place in history and rescue Marxism itself: he states that "Marxism will degenerate into a non-human anthropology if it does not reintegrate man into itself as its foundation" (SM:179). However, Eric Fromm argues that Marx does recognize the value of individual freedom in the making of history and actually aims at achieving individual freedom. Fromm quotes of Marx as saying that '"The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals" (2004:12). Having this fact, it is not clear why Sartre, who is a man of thorough reading and tries to rescue

[33].Sartre accepts the significance of the material conditions of life in history. He states that "A materialist dialectic will be meaningless if it cannot establish, within human history, the primacy of material conditions" (CDR: 33); "The material conditions of his existence circumscribe the field of his possibilities"(SM:93) and "we support unreservedly that formulation in *Capital* by which Marx means to define his "materialism": the mode of production of material life generally dominates the development of social, political, and intellectual life"(ibid: 33-34).

Marxism, criticizes Marx for expelling individuals from the movement of dialectic and totalization of history. Despite this lack of clarity, Marx conception of freedom is as radical as Sartre's conception. Fromm tells us that Marx goes so far to argue that "Freedom" is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realize it" [34] (2004:51). So, both believe that human beings are free by nature, although they are now alienated. And there is a possibility to realize individual freedom. This possibility is to be realized through workers' revolutionary (group) praxis which aims at transcending the current situation and at "the elimination of classes" (Sartre, MR: 253-254).

Due to scarcity, human praxis involves inhumanity. History is a fierce struggle of individual against individuals, scarcity and practico-inert. Conceived so, freedom is alienated and human relation is reified and almost destroyed. We virtually and practically lose our ontological freedom—which is to his credit to defend resolutely. However, I argue that human relation is not fundamentally conflictual. The conflict which arises here and there can be considered as a failure of relation. Does our ontological structure give birth to conflictual relation? Can we be free provided that the fundamental structure of our relation is conflictual? Where does the failure lie? I shall return to these questions and my claim in the next chapter. Now, we shall to go on a brief excursion into Sartre's means or solutions, of realizing freedom.

2.2. Sartre's Proposed Way out from Conflict and Unfreedom

2.2.1. Existential Psychoanalysis

We discussed in Chapter One how bad faith arises in us. We are in a bad faith when we try to escape our freedom and responsibility and thereby think we are determined. I am in bad faith if I vainly try to identify myself with the In-itself. Existential Psychoanalysis[35] is Sartre's method to disengage people from the bind of bad faith. It is a hermeneutical decipherment of the fundamental choice. Sartre maintains that the For-itself, as we saw, is defined by its future project, i.e., it is a project towards the future[36]. And that any act is "a turning back of the future

[34] We should remember that freedom is the very structure of human being, not the essence, for Sartre. Essence for him is what we are going to make ourselves. I think that the difference between Marx and Sartre's conception is that of terminological one. The function and status of freedom in their conception is the same. The difference originates in the fact that the Sartre endorses the existentialist principle that existence precedes essence. If Marx had been contemporaneous with Sartre, he would have accepted Sartre formulation.

[35] For Sartre, existential psychoanalysis is an ontological comparative comprehension of the fundamental choice and its symbolic manifests by way of comparing their structures. It aims at "hermeneutic" "deciphering," "determination" and "conceptualization" of symbolic relations of acts to the fundamental choice (*BN*: 569).

[36] Sartre rejects, as we saw in Chapter One, Freudian determinism because conscious is conscious of itself, nothing is inside consciousness and the past is powerless to influence the present act. He rejects the determinism of empirical psychoanalysis that the unconscious drive and "Past" repressed desire determine our present actions,

toward the present" (*BN*:459). He also states that my "original choice" is a choice of my being: it is one with the being of human reality. So, as a desire and lack of being, the fundamental project of human reality is the project to be the in-itself-for-itself—the desire to be God (*BN*:664- 566). Hence, the original choice is the fundamental project.

This fundamental choice reveals itself through particular desires. Sartre holds that every act is a symbolic indication of a fundamental choice (*BN*:461). He also argues that the desire for possession is the most manifest desire for Being. All desires "to do" and "to have" are expressions of the desires "to be". To own in this case a car is to unite with being-in-itself (*ibid*:575-585). This implies that the various particular desires point us to it and are understandable merely from the perspective of the fundamental choice. Thus, existential psychoanalysis tries to make the subject "known to himself what he is" by revealing his fundamental "choice of being" (*ibid*:574) through comparative comprehension of the particular concrete desires. Now, I want to give some critical analyses on Sartre's psychoanalysis.

Sartre states that "[t]he being of the for-itself is an individual venture, and the choice must be an individual choice of a concrete being" (*BN*:598). And "it will be a choice which remains unique" (*ibid*:572). The fundamental desire is an ontological choice and specific to the analysand (the subject of psychoanalysis). It does not present itself to an empirical eye. What I know is the particular concrete choice. Granted so, how can I establish the connection of this particular choice of the analysand to his original choice given that the original choice is ontologically specific to the For-itself? What is the exact relation of the two choices? I think I cannot be conscious of the analysand's original choice since it is an ontological law that it be specific and unique to the subject's being. Is not to suffer from a delusion of grandeur to think that I know the analysand's original choice, which he is conscious of but he himself does not know, through hermeneutical decipherment? In addition, what I encounter is the being-for-others of the analysand, but he has a being-for-himself. The fundamental choice basically concerns his being-for-himself. Put otherwise, what I choose is a choice of my being, a being-for-myself. My being-for-myself-as-subject and my being-for-others-as-object cannot coincide if it is viewed from the essence of the Look. However, the existential psychoanalyst comprehends only the particular concrete choices, although Sartre posits them as manifestations of my being-for-myself, which

while embracing its method and its belief in the symbolic character of every act. He claims that psychoanalysis makes the unconscious activity active and the conscious one passive, and the repressed drive is conscious of it being repressed (*BN*: 53). And it excludes the temporal ekstasis of the future (ibid: 458).

exactly made up my being-for-others. What I exist-for-myself is the same with what I choose since "for human reality there is no difference between existing and choosing for itself" (*BN*:572). Therefore, in so far as the psychoanalyst cannot grasp me as I exist-for-myself, he cannot really decipher what I fundamentally choose and thus his effort proves unsuccessful.

By the same token, Sartre claims that existential psychoanalyst tries to make the subject "known to himself what he is" by comprehending his "choice of being" (*BN*:574). However, having accorded a metastable structure to human reality, i.e., human reality is what it is not and is not what it is, what is the value of comprehending what the analysand *is*? Human reality is fundamentally denied of the structure of "what is" by Sartre himself, although it is restored to it in the form of "being-for others" by the Look of the Other. This indicates that the particular subjective choice of the analysand always escapes the existential psychoanalyst in so far as first by virtue of human reality and second what the analysand reveals to psychoanalyst is only his being-for others, but not his being-for-himself (his basic choice of his being).

Besides, every act is a symbolic indication of a fundamental choice which lies behind the curtain; a particular action does not have its own motive and end. The end to be attained is the fundamental choice. Any sort of human activity has the trace of this original project. If I stand on my head, it is a whole revelation of my project to God: my standing on my head is induced by, and destined to, the God-project. Here, the end and the cause of my act is the same. Let alone the intimation of the determinism, in some sense, of my present act (which Sartre himself rejects), how can my standing on my head be a manifest to my fundamental project? It would be absurd to think that I stand on my head to be for-itself-in-itself, a perfect being. Of course, I know that I lack something, i.e., I am not perfect being. But, I know also that I can never be God. After all, what I prereflectively am conscious is the fact that I cannot be God, that the for-itself-in-itself is my original lack. Furthermore, if every activity indicates to a more fundamental structure than to its own end, then the talk of bad faith is insignificance *ab initio* because all acts will be on equal moral plane and they are different routes towards the same project like the various religions whose Truth is the *same* but the modes of its revelation are different.

On the credit side, Sartre makes our acts to be influenced by future project. I take into account my future project when I perform certain acts. He gives a second dimension to our present act, i.e., the future ekstasis which was denied by Freudian psychoanalysis since it believes that a

present act is an expression of past repressed desire. Moreover, Sartre shows us well that the repressed desire is not unconscious. If I desire to have intimacy but suspended it for a long time due to some justifiably restricting reasons, I am conscious of its being pushed back. Similarly, it cannot seat itself *in* consciousness if it is really unconscious. So far so good. But, to cast the repressed desire into the category of an *already dead Past* is to deny that people are historical beings, i.e., they bear the traces of history. Provided, for instance, that a child who is raised in severe upbringing which is accompanied by a kick at the bottom for any act of command, advice, gratitude and punishment, it would be foolish to expect him now to act otherwise than being pervaded and influenced by an act of *calcio(*kick*)*. He is not to blame for being in bad faith at least partly if he develops an aggressive manner or a nervous disposition. What is more is that the repressed desire is unfulfilled desire but yet to be fulfilled; it is held in abeyance due to disabling circumstances. The repressed desire is not a desire already *dead and buried*: it is a *buried alive* desire[37]. I accept the affective force of Freudian repressed desire while refusing the unconscious/conscious divide.

Finally, it can be claimed that existential psychoanalysis is the counterpart of empirical psychoanalysis in so far as my present act for the former is a symbolic manifestation of a chosen-but-yet-to-be-attained fundamental desire and for the latter for already chosen but repressed fundamental desire: in both cases, it is an indication of a fundamental desire. All in all, human reality is not either merely past or future. Unless there is a radical modification, it is the *same* repressed fundamental desire that is projected in the future by means of the present. To put it crudely, my present is the confluence of the past and the future. It is the *future* project repressed in that past. Sartre's existential psychoanalysis will be more effective if it underlies both the past as well as future ekstasis in uncovering the fundamental desire of the analysand. However, there is contradiction in Sartre's assumption that, on one hand, there is his claim for the unattainability of the For-itself's project to be the in-itself-for-itself and, on the other hand, his proposal for existential psychoanalysis. So much the worse is his pessimistic assertion that "[m]an is a useless passion" (*BN*: 615) and thus implying we cannot maintain and realize our freedom. It seems that Sartre still hopes that the maintenance and realization of freedom require purifying reflection.

[37]One can say that the repressed desire is a forbidden desire and we human beings tend towards what is forbidden from us. It is when we re-pursue the desire which was forbidden in the past that we are said to be, in view of Freudian Psychoanalysis, determined by the repressed unconscious desire. But, it would be a denial of consciousness itself to say that I pursue my desire without being conscious of it.

2.2.2. Purifying Reflection

I touched upon in Chapter One that reflection is one of the ekstases, i.e., temporality, reflection and being-for-others, of the For-itself and in the Introduction of this thesis that bad faith commences in an impure reflection. And I also used to present Sartre's claim that consciousness as prereflectively conscious of itself. However, I did not explain what reflection is despite making a silent use of it, and so it should be better to see now how Sartre understands it. For Sartre, as we saw in the previous chapter, consciousness is non-positionally or non-thetically conscious of itself and positionally aware of something. To be clearer, consciousness is aware of itself without positing itself as an object of reflection: it is conscious of itself non-reflectively. Hence, prereflective consciousness is the "immanent and natural" consciousness itself (*PI*:15). In contrast, reflective consciousness is a consciousness that turns upon itself (*BN*:154). Reflection is the wrenching away of consciousness from itself to posit its Self (*BN*:298). Reflective consciousness posits itself as an object of *thesis:* it withdraws from itself and reflects on itself as another consciousness and hence there appears the Ego or the Self[38].

Recall again that the For-itself as nihilation of the In-itself, it flees itself and is dispersed in the three temporal ekstases. Reflection is a secondary nihilation of the For-itself by itself to regain its lost Self in the original nihilation. Sartre states that "[r]eflection (reflexion) remains for the for-itself a permanent possibility, an attempt to recover being…[it] is a second effort by the for-itself to found itself — [to be what it *is*, its Self]" (*BN*:153). But, sadly, this "effort by the For-itself to recuperate itself" (*NE*: 5), he further says, results in reflective dissociation, that is, the "appearance of the for-itself for the for-itself." Or else, the mode of reflection induces "reflective scissiparity" between the reflecting and reflected-on consciousness (*BN*:p154). And so, the effort to bring in a synthetic unity between the reflecting and reflected-on, which reflection sees it as object, ends in failure precisely because it was the project of impure (accessory) reflection.

According to Sartre, the project of impure reflection is doomed to fail because (a) the For-itself is ontologically nothingness and hence freedom, (b) the reflecting consciousness vainly considers the reflected-on as an Other, only to deepen the scissiparity which stops halfway, by denying that it indeed is itself (*BN*:161) , (c) self-identity (the in-itself-for-itself) is unrealizable since the For-itself is what it is not and is not what it is, and (d) the object of reflection is basically

[38] See the first section of Chapter One to (re) understand how reflection causes the irruption of the Ego.

transcendent: I am conscious of my love to my friend but I am not and cannot be that love (NE:473). Therefore, accessory reflection in this context is in bad faith for it tries to knot once it cut the original tie, i.e., "it is an abortive effort on the part of the for-itself to *be* another while remaining *itself"* (*BN*:161) and it refuses to acknowledge its failure. Moreover, it is, Sartre affirms, this failure of the "objectivation and interiorization" (*BN*:154,160) of the impure reflection that motivates pure reflection.

Sartre holds that pure reflection "is that which must be won by a sort of catharsis" (*ibid*:155). And it involves the abandonment of the project of "synthetic unification" while recognizing its original dispersion or unity of existence *ab initio* (*NE*:478). Put differently, the For-itself renounces its quest for being—its project to be the In-itself-for-itself. Purifying consciousness enables, Sartre says, the For-itself *"*to put an end to the reign of this value [*ens causa sui*]" and instead it will *"*take itself for a value as the source of a value" (*BN*:627). Or else, "[t]here is a conversion from the project to-be-for-itself-in-itself and appropriation or identification to a project of unveiling and creation" (*NE*:481). This means that human reality, at the moment of conversion, will recognize its metastable ontological structure that it is not what it is and is what it is not, and freedom does not aim at self-identification but at creative action. This is exactly what does to be free mean: embracing one's facticity and transcendence. This brings the bad faith of fundamental project and spirit of seriousness to an end in as much as human reality pursues freedom, instead of God, as an end and takes it as a value as well as source of other values. Hence, authenticity prevails as humankind's mode of existence, and the advent of true morality which is in essence a "permanent conversion," Sartre claims, (*NE*:4). But, the question arises as to whether such a conversion is really possible given the natural and fundamental desire of people is God?

Given that the For-itself lacks being, it is inevitable for it to desire being. We always desire what we lack: of that there is no doubt. What is doubtful is the total abandonment of my fundamental desire if we agree on what the term "fundamental" implies. If my fundamental desire is to be God, I will naturally continue to pursue Him in any way. Even if my pursuit of God fails a thousand times one hundred percent, I will insist on pursuing it. To tell someone to abandon his fundamental desire is to advise him to renounce himself. It seems that Sartre is not clear enough whether the For-itself's fundamental desire is freedom or God. Besides, Sartre believes that it is

the failure of impure reflection which induces conversion. Granted so, conversion is not basically a pursuit of freedom but a total resignation. Similarly, there is no earthly reason to await the failure of my pursuit of God so as to embrace my freedom.

I believe that the major problem with Sartre is that he makes the fundamental desire of human reality one thing and the fundamental structure (original choice) another thing. As we have previously seen, the fundamental project is to be the In-itself-for-itself while the fundamental structure is freedom. In this sense, my being consists of two irreconcilable "fundamentals." Am I ontologically a desire or a choice? How is it that my desire and my choice are irreconcilably set apart? Sartre is undecided about it: although he opts for freedom standing within the parameter of conversion, he opts against it by making man as fundamentally a desire for the In-itself-for-itself. Nonetheless, Sartre's view can be reconstructed by making the fundamental ontological desire and structure of human reality one and the same, i.e., freedom (I do not claim that the fundament choice of human beings is either God or freedom. My claim is that if I choose either, my fundamental choice and fundamental desire are identical: both concern my being.) It is my desire which I choose and it is my choice which I desire. If my fundamental desire and fundamental choice are the same, I will have a total lucidity of my pursuit. The end and beginning of my pursuit will be my freedom. Of course, bad faith may arise in the course of realizing one's freedom. I may be confused about the choices of means but not about the end. One may, for instance, develop hatred to realize his freedom; the other go to war; some other appropriation and still another may form friendship. So, I will be in bad faith in the choice of means but not in the choice of a project. What is more, freedom conceived as my original desire as well as original choice, I will always see it as my bounden duty to pursue it. The pursuit and embrace of freedom will cease to be a ripple effect of a failed project: it will be an original project. Thus, the In-itself-for-itself as fundamental desire would be a useless hypothesis. After all, if I am free, what is the point of desiring an In-itself? Similarly, I am conscious that I cannot be a self-cause (God). Why do I desire to be it?

Once more, whether it is possible for reflection to really effect the realization of freedom is open to doubt. To realize something is to translate it into practice. Therefore, to realize freedom involves being practically free. To exist is co-exist with others in the social world, or to use W. A. Luijpen's expression, "[m]y presence in the world is a co-presence" (1960:178). The

realization of freedom implies being practically free in my co-existence with others in the social world. But, can pure reflection alone make me practically free in my co-existence with others? I do not think so. The mere renunciation of my pursuit of Being does not guarantee me that I be practically free while I am amidst others. My pure reflection may get cut short if the laws governing intersubjective relations are not set in motion. Co-existence means intersubjective existence. And action is interaction too. In such "interactive" existence, I may lose my freedom. Sartre would answer that once individuals underwent pure reflection, each would *will* its freedom and the freedom of others. However, my conversion makes me pursue my freedom but does not necessarily imply the realization of my pursuit and recognition of the freedom of others. Given the forces of the Look and scarcity and other circumstances, pure reflection alone does not takes us that much in the realization of our freedom. Sartre would grant Socrates's self-examination the status of pure reflection and consider Socrates himself as an existential convert. Socrates would have not undergone that villainous execution, were pure reflection sufficient to realize freedom. Pure reflection must be accompanied by the betterment of the socio-political and socio-economic structures. Thus, freedom does not require an individual's pure reflection alone: there must be conversion of the socio-political and economic structures. Indeed, the Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* seems lose his high hope for pure reflection when the Sartre of *Critique of Dialectical Reason* expounds group praxis.

2.2.3. Group Praxis

Sartre switched, as we discussed before, his point of emphasis from the ontology of the Look to the ontology of scarcity in his examination of the determinant of human relation which is and remains conflictual. Group praxis is his desperately sought solution to alleviate conflictual relations that originate in the milieu of scarcity exacerbated by practico-inert and its counter finality. With this end in view, Sartre examines various forms of social gatherings, in his attempt to mitigate the alienating forces of practico-inert by dint of group praxis, of which I will explain only two forms, i.e., the "serial" and "pledged group": the former shows well how isolation gives rise to alienation in the milieu of practico-inert and the latter serves as the best ideal to show the efficacy of group praxis.

The series[39] typifies the various pluralities of isolations and can be exemplified by a bus waiting queue. Everyone in the queue is the *same* as an isolated individuals and this sameness is also a "common alterity." He says that "[e]veryone is the same as the Others in so far as he is Other than himself" (*CDR1*:260). So, the common interest is the common identity, but *that same* identity is the source of Otherness and of struggle for there is not enough for all. Although serial unity mitigates opposition, every Other will continue to determine every Other as the Other since the menace of scarcity is not totally destroyed. The bus, Sartre says, creates "seriality as its own practico-inert being-outside-itself" (*CDR1*:265), and "every Other is both Other than himself and Other than Others" (*ibid*:266). Hence, seriality unity is characterized by a totalizing flight.

According to Sartre, alterity (and flight) as a formal rule mediates the relation among members in the series. As such, serial alterity causes the appearance and dominance of practico-inert field. It is the source of alienation. He holds that "all men are slaves in so far as their life unfolds in the practico-inert field and in so far as this field is always conditioned by scarcity [and mediated by serial alterity]"(*CDR1*:332). However, this serial impotence gradually induces the pledge.

Sartre states that the pledge, which can be instantiated by a unit of an army in the battlefield, arises against the "dangers of seriality" (such as flight, dispersion and alienation) and "when freedom becomes common praxis and grounds the permanence of the group by producing its own inertia through itself and in mediated reciprocity" (*ibid*:419). Put otherwise, the pledge originates in fear since the mitigation of the menace of common danger does not necessarily mean its total annihilation: it is only suspended to reappear unpredictably. But, the mitigation of the menace at the same time signifies a reinforcement of "individual antagonisms or of serial impotence" (*CDR1*:430). Moreover, there is contradiction in the establishment of the pledge that terror becomes its statute and the exigency, even at the expense of life. Sartre states that the freedom of the Other is *above* mine and the common praxis brings in common violence since the pledge is united by terror (*ibid*:434). This implies that the "being-in-the-group" of individuals is the "being of their freedom"; it is the negation of "serial impotence" by "free common praxis"; it is a guarantee of individuals not to revert to the demand of the practico-inert and of individual praxis to escape from alienation by turning to a common action (ibdi:434-435). Thus, terror as a

[39] Sartre says that "*a series is a mode of being for individuals both in relation to one another and in relation to their common being*…[it]represents the use of alterity as a bond between men under the passive action of an object, and as this passive action defines the general type of alterity"(emphasis in original, CDR1:266).

defense of the continuity of the pledge becomes the "origin of humanity" (*CDR1*:436) where common freedom triumphs over serial impotence and the group projects itself as an end in itself.

The challenge for Sartre is how to reconcile individual praxis with common praxis. Sartre answers that the structures of common praxis are the same with individual praxis: the objectives of the group and their corresponding operations to achieve them are "individual in character" (*CDR1*:509). So, in comprehending my praxis, I comprehend the common praxis. Moreover, the common aim is the "aim of everyone as a member of the group" and it "defines the group itself." And the group is only resort to serial impotence, i.e., a means for an individual to access the common praxis which is otherwise inaccessible (*ibid*:509-511).

In a nutshell, group praxis is the negation of serial alienation and alterity precisely because in the latter my freedom submits to the necessity of practico-inert (of making line and waiting inert) and in the former I am the author and director of my praxis. Group praxis mitigates serial inessentiality, alienation and impotence. And the pledge is a device for the resumption of freedom and to avert seriality from resurfacing. Sartre's analysis of how individual praxis harmonizes with the common praxis of pledged group so as to tackle serial alienation and alterity is a spectacular achievement. But, in a condition where practico-inert force makes and unmakes all sorts of human praxis, i.e., where serial alienation and alterity collaborate to subdue "human" praxis, any solitary effort to alleviate that condition is bound to fail. A single individual is too powerless to struggle against the conquering force of practico-inert and against the dominating praxis of all other human beings. However, Sartre's pledged group is negative in character and in its formation: it develops to combat external danger and always strives to fight internal dispersion; as such, the force of terror rules it. It is no doubt that the pledge relegates and suppresses individual freedom while it strives to sustain itself alive. It is not clear how the pledge could surpass its defensive praxis to creative freedom. Of course, a defensive praxis may be an expression of freedom but it is not a freedom in its proper sense; it is a freedom sustained and determined by terror. Similarly, widely viewed, the pledge exhibits the character of dictatorship: terror in the form of purge, even execution, can follow any form of deviation. It is a condition in which one can freely enter but cannot leave once joined in. I live my life with the freedom of entrance without exit permission. The choice to leave is pre-destroyed by the choice to unite with the group. The common praxis of a pledged group in this sense is an expression of a covert

dictatorship of Rousseauian general will. We need indeed politico-moral and legal frameworks to support the smooth functioning of individual as well as group praxis. Such frameworks can preclude the pledge from trampling over individual freedom. We should have in mind that any sort of group praxis aims at enhancing individual free praxes.

Furthermore, Sartre states that the pledge group makes freedom common praxis which should be supported by those who originally institute it as well as those who inherit it by virtue of their being born and grown up in it (*CDR1*:419). But, how can a praxis I inherited be an expression of my freedom provided that freedom is an individual ontological choice? It does not involve my choice. The freedom of my parents which turns out to be common praxis excludes a *priori* my free choice which is the structure of freedom. Only choice, in the form of conformance, remains as free action is annihilated beforehand. So, it is a community of dictators—enemies of freedom.

Finally, the fundamental question is not about whether we work as a group or separate individuals. It is about how we act or perform our praxis. It is about having an appropriate project with correct means of realizing it. The major form of alienation arises not from the mere serial practice of individual or lack of group praxis. It comes from group praxis: group praxis itself can be the source of anti-praxis and of alienation. A group praxis that is not properly done can turn out to be a contradiction to itself and to the praxis of individuals. Suffice it to think of the Nazism of the Third Reich: it involved group praxis but it was alienating for the group itself and for the Others (the Jews).

To summarize, Sartre argues that when the Other sees me, my free subjectivity is arrested and escapes me towards him. I became *objectivized-subject.* As such, I am dehumanized. But, my conscience pricks me as I am conscious of my being *objectivized-subject*. So, I turn my Look towards the Other. In my attempt to avert the flow of my subjectivity, values and world, I ensnare and enslave the Other. Even if I behave towards the Other without malice, I actually objectivize and dehumanize the Other in spite of myself. I cannot stop objectivizing the Other. It is ontologically and *a priori* determined. Similarly, human relation and praxis are also organized by scarcity. The latter intensifies conflictual relation set in motion by the Look.[40] In their attempt to assuage the severity of scarcity and satisfy their desire, people (by their own praxis) institute

[40] The difference between Sartrean Look and scarcity in determining human relation is that the former can only stir up conflict and the latter can be the source of both conflict and cooperation.

practico-inert being which stands against their freedom and praxis. Here, man has got three mortal enemies: man himself, scarcity and practico-inert being with its own finality.

As scarcity can be the source of unity and cooperation, conflictual relation is not necessarily caused by it. Beyond economic causes, there are plenty of causes such as political, moral and religious causes that stir up conflictual human relations. Even so, we cannot claim that human relation is fundamentally conflictual. Conflict is a failure in our peaceful co-existence. If the fundamental structure of human relation is conflict, the peaceful co-existence, "humanity", fraternity and the unity which we have would be impossible and solitary life would reign given that conflict is essentially divisive. The structure of care would have no place in human relation. I am not claiming for perfect harmony and unanimity in our relations. So many catastrophic wars and atrocities which have long been experienced by people are sufficient to indicate the existence of conflict in human relations. But, they are not proofs for the claim that the original meaning of human relation is conflict. In Sartre's account, human relation cannot go beyond existential antagonism for there is no reason to deny that ontological antagonism (given his account of the Look and scarcity) does imply ontic (existential or at the level of particular existence) antagonism. Even love is a concrete mode of existential contradiction. To exist is to conflict, in this context, with other people: life is a struggle against the Other .Thus, the very existence of the Other is a "clear and present danger" for my freedom and subjectivity. Ontologically, I am in state of insecurity and uncertainty. Therefore, the condition of existence borders on Hobbesian state of nature. And now freedom is almost lost and praxis is alienated[41].

So much the worse is that no pure reflection, or existential psychoanalysis or group praxis can sufficiently cure the maladies of human relation, i.e., it is difficult, virtually impossible, to realize practical freedom in Sartrean world of conflict[42]. In other words, if we accept Sartre's claim that the fundamental structure of human relation is conflict, then the realization of practical freedom is bound to fail. The mere recognition of my fundamental choice, that I am ontologically free or the mere fact that I am a member of a certain group does not make me practically free. Therefore, the mere shift from serial praxis to group praxis cannot be the real solution to alienating and alienated praxis. The fundamental structures (legal, political, social, ethical,

[41] It is not only conflict which causes the alienation of freedom: bad faith alienates freedom too.
[42] Sartre's proposed solutions show either the possibility of escaping conflict which in turn shows that our relation is not conflictual in essence or conflict is our natural state while peace and unity are artificially constructed structures.

economic, technological structures) of the society must be also deconstructed or restructured. The release and realization of freedom requires the combination of existential (individual) conversion and some "structural" conversions. The next chapter attempts to show how human relation is essentially caring and fraternity, and the necessity of change in the structures of society in order to translate freedom into practical terms.

Chapter Three: Reconsidering Human Relation and the Techno-cultural Outlook: Care, Techno-cultural and Political Action as Necessity in Realizing Freedom

Introduction

We have seen in the previous chapters that J. P. Sartre argues that human beings, as nihilating, temporal and "intentional" beings, have freedom as their fundamental being; that unless we fall prey to bad faith, we are totally free and no other power to determine our freedom of choice. And that scarcity, bad faith, the Look and practico-inert beings, which render human relations conflictual, make difficult the translation of ontological freedom into practical terms. Sartre's resolutions to such a difficulty have also been shown to be insufficient. This chapter tries first to show that human relation is basically characterized rather by "care" and concord than conflict. Then it tries to show the necessity of cultural reconfiguration, of redesigning technology, and of ethical-political resolutions in realizing freedom of action (practical freedom). With these ends in view, it makes use of concepts primarily from Martin Heidegger, Arif Dirlik, Andrew Feenberg, Immanuel Kant and Isaiah Berlin.

3.1. Heidegger: Human Existence as Essentially "Care" and Co-existence

We saw in the Introduction of this thesis that care is the being of Dasein, for Heidegger. It is better to see how he arrives at such a conclusion. We shall make a start with his definition of Dasein. He states that Dasein "is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being" (*BT*:10). It is an ontological structure of Dasein that it questions its being. Existence[43] is the essence of Dasein(*ibid*:40). It is as an existence that it questions its being—as an existence that it understands the question of being, according to Heidegger, (ibid:11). Its existence is characterized by "being-in-the-world." He says that "Being-in-the-world" is "the fundamental constitution of Da-sein" (*ibid*:49). The "being-in" of "being-in-the-world" indicates another structure of Dasein: "being-with"—Dasein is amidst of beings.

Heidegger claims that it is a character of "facticity"[44] that Dasein "can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny"[45] with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world"

43 Heidegger states that "Da-sein is always only its self *in existing*… the substance of Dasein not the unity of "body and soul but existence" (*BT*: 110).
44 Existence as an activity is the facticity of Dasein, for Heidegger. Dasein, essentially as an activity but not rationality, concerns about its facticity—its thrown Dasein.
45 Sartre also calls such a "destiny" universal human *condition*. He states that "what never varies is the necessity for him [man] to be in the world, to work in it, to live out his life in it among others, and, eventually, to die in it" (EH: 42).

(*BT*:52). In its existence, Dasein is "bound up" with other Daseins, i.e., Dasein shares the same destiny with other fellow human beings. He further says that as a "mere subject without a world" is utterly unthinkable, an "isolated I without the others" is unthinkable either (*ibid*:109). This indicates that being-with is a fundamental structure of Dasein "equiprimordial" with being-in. Heidegger says that "the world is always already the one that I share with the others…[It] is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others" (*BT*:111-112). W.A. Luijpen famously rephrases it as "[m]y presence in the world is a co-presence; my encounter with the world is *our* encounter; my world is *our* world" (emphasis in original, 1960:178). The world is "made" in such a way that if Dasein exists, it encounters others. Dasein itself is "encounterable." So, existence is a being-with—a co-encounter or co-existence. The structure of being-in-the-world[46] and hence being-with must be understood in terms of "care."

Heidegger asserts that care is the being of Dasein (*BT*:53,114,178); that care is the "primordial totality of being of Da-sein" (*ibid*:171); and that since "being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Da-sein, its being toward the world is essentially taking care"[47] (*ibid*:53). Any kind of ontical (particular) willing, wishing, predilection or urge presupposes care. He states that "[a]s a primordial structural totality, care lies "before" every factical "attitude" and "position" of Da-sein, that is, it is always already in them as an existential a priori" (*ibid*:180). The structure of care is most manifest through "angst" (*ibid*:171), or in Sartre's word, anguish.

Moreover, for Heidegger, Dasein is being toward its "potentiality-for-being" which is what itself is. This concern of Dasein about itself he calls "being-ahead-of-itself." He adds that "being-ahead-of-itself means *being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world"* (emphasis in original, *BT*:179). In other words, "Da-sein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (*ibid*:180). This implies that existence for Dasein is characterized by its temporal projection of itself in the presence-of-others towards the future. As a temporally "projecting-Being", Dasein comprehends both its Being and the Being of other beings. In other words, it is out of care for itself and others that Dasein temporally projects itself towards the future. It is in this context that Heidegger pronounces that "[m]an is the shepherd of Being" and "ecstatic existence is experienced as "care"" (*BW*, 1993:234). Hence,

[46] The structure of being-with is existentially revealed for the most part in the structure of being-one-another which Heidegger terms as "average everydayness" whose "subject" is again termed by him as the "They"(*BT*:118-121). Dasein's everydayness is its mode of quotidian existence.
[47] Sartre holds that care "has nothing to do with "distress," "melancholy," or "the cares of life" which can be found ontically in every Dasein. These-like their opposites, "carefreeness" and "gaiety"—are ontically possible only because Dasein, ontologically understood, is care" (*BT*:53).

although the degree may vary and its modes may be different, human existence is pervaded and characterized by the structure of care. This truth precludes any attempt to reduce human relation to mere conflict—which is what Sartre did. He makes such a reductionist conclusion based on his belief that the fundamental structure of the For-itself is "being-for" rather than "being-with." To better see which one is fundamental, I shall address Sartre's severe, sometimes distorted, critiques on Heidegger's concept of the structure of "being-with."

Sartre argues that the "being-for-others precedes and founds the being-with-others "(*BN*:414). And that I discover my being-with-others only once I comprehended my being-for-others (*BN*:245). His reason is that one cannot naturally find a concrete Dasein-with, or, my being-with-others is not a constitutive structure of my concrete being [48](ibid:248). Similarly, he argues that Heidegger unjustifiably passes from the "empirical and ontic establishment" to "co-existence as the ontological structure" of being-in-the-world (ibid:247). We should note first that these terms (being-with and being-for) are existential structures of Dasein or the For-itself. We should also note that to be-in-the-world is to be-in-human-world. The question is: is it because I am-being-with-others that I am-being-for others, or, is it because I am-being-for-others that I am-being-with others? The second option makes me think that I am-amidst-my classmates because I am-for-them. But, how can I be-for-them without first being-amidst-them? There is no logical or existential reason. We should reverse the relation. My being-there-amidst-my-classmates precedes my being-for-them. I disclose myself-for-my classmates by co-existing with them. I cannot be looked-at without first being present, while the presence may not be in person, to them. My "encounterableness" primarily shows my "being-withness." I am a being-with, being-with the Other, being with my friend, my parents, my teachers, my employer, and my servant. The thought of my having an outside-being-for these categories of people is possible only if I assume their co-existence with me. Affirming the precedence of "I am for-others" over "I am-with-others" would amount to say that although I am alone, I am-for-others, which is a contradiction. This shows the primacy of being-with over being-for.

Even the possibility of either conflict or concord lies coiled in the structure of being-with. If even conflict arises between my classmates and me, it is basically not because I have an outside objectified structure but because I am-with-them. Furthermore, even in conflictual relation or

[48] Although the weakness of Sartre's argument does not necessarily show the strength of Heidegger's claim, it is possible to reason in the manner of Sartre's critique of Heidegger that I have not an outside objectified concrete being-for which is by nature mine and is glued to my Being or subjectivity.

solitary life, we cannot be alone. It is, it seems, for this reason that people who are seriously at variance do not completely abandon each other. Nonetheless, I do not deny that I have a being-for-others—Heidegger himself admits this: what I do not accept is its priority over being-with. Thus, it could be that if Dasein is a being-with, then it concomitantly is being-for. Simply, there cannot be a "bare" being-with of Dasein. Despite this, being-for is an existential disclosure of being-with. In fact, there are no concrete "being-with" individuals: we are ontically separated; but this does not mean we are ontologically separated. Ontologically, care, for instance, as fundamental structure unifies Dasein with other Daseins. Heidegger's being-with is meant to signify that we are not existentially abandoned alone like Robinson Crusoe on his island. It is from this perspective that the oft-quoted Aristotle's dictum that man cannot live alone: a being outside society is either a beast or God can make sense. Thus, the origin of hatred as well as empathy lies in the structure of being-with. It would be futile to think to have individuals ontically glued to each other like conjoined twins in order for being-with to be the fundamental structure of human reality.

We should remember that, for Heidegger, being-with is fundamentally an existential structure. It ontically and empirically manifests in the "They" only usually but not always limited to it for the actual presence or absence of others does not make Dasein being-with or being-alone. When this fact is seen, Sartre's charge on Heidegger for making unjustified leap proves itself unjustified.

By the same token, Sartre argues that the realization of *Mitsein* (being-with) presupposes the recognition of what the Other is (BN:428). But, Heidegger's *Mitsein* is an existentially given structure. Whether I recognize it or not does not make a difference. I am co-present-with-others. My original relation with others is co-presence. I need to recognize what the Other is not to establish being-with but to found particular modes of it. In other words, I need to recognize what the Other is if I want to have hostile or friendly relation with him/her.

The next critique of Sartre on Heidegger is that the structure of being-with "renders impossible any concrete connection between my being and a particular Other given in my experience" (ibid:249). Nonetheless, being-with does not prevent me from establishing relation with my classmates. Co-presence does not determine *a priori* the particular mode of my relation with others. Whether my concrete relation with my neighbor should be hostile or friendly depend on my attitude towards others. Also, to say that I am co-present with others does not mean that I am

in complete harmony and unanimity with others. Even to expect such unanimity is to completely identify myself with others—which is absurd. How is existential separation necessary to realize concrete relations? To be sure, there is no need for separation to form relation: human relation is not like molecular bond between atoms which requires separation for the motion and collision of atoms. Sartre seems unaware of the logical implication of his own claim that the structure of being-with precludes any concrete particular relation. The logical implication is that existential separation is necessary to form concrete relations. Crudely expressed, Sartre is making an existential dissociation only to make an ontic association among the For-itselfs. However, I am not claiming for the impossibility of making concrete relation if (it is true that) human structure is existentially separated: my claim is that there is no reason which makes co-presence *a priori* determinant and forbidding of concrete relations.

However, even if it is true that being-for-other is the fundamental existential structure, it is not necessary that it induces only conflict. Why does not it induce concord and harmony? Sartre merely presupposes being-for to be an equivalent of being-against. That is why he says that because the For-itself has a being-for-others and the Look of the Others objectifies it, conflict emerges as the essence of human relation. But, being-for does not automatically imply antagonism. Otherness does not necessarily imply opposition and enmity. The Other is not always my negative counterpart. He is just another free individual like me. Thus, Heidegger is in advance of Sartre in his claim that being-in-the-world itself, including being-for, is care—not essentially conflict-ridden.

The structure of care constitutes the humanity of human beings. We care about ourselves, about other human beings and even for things. So, our whole being lies in care. There may be an enabling care or disabling care. In other words, our care for others can be either empathetic or antagonistic. Following Heidegger, we can claim that conflict is a deficient or minimal mode of care. Hence, conflictual relation is a deficient mode of care-relation. It is not the fundamental relation. Sartre omits empathetic care, and glamorizes and universalizes conflictual (dominating) care. But, care characterizes our quotidian existence, and is the original meaning of relation. This indicates that human relation fundamentally exhibits not a mere peaceful co-existence but also heartfelt peaceful co-existence. There is a heart to heart encounter between individuals. We should develop the empathetic care to work out the ground of practical freedom. Sartrean

resolutions of pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis, which are useful to achieve conversion, are ultimately meant to realize care—a care for freedom, a care for the being of Dasein or the For-itself. Although it is useful to alleviate our factical impotence, a mere slide into group praxis is insufficient to realize practical freedom. It is the development of care which can found our practical freedom. Sartrean resolutions should be presented in aid of care. Since care originally concerns the freedom (being) of Dasein, its cultivation has a bearing on freedom: it is as freedom and for freedom that we care. A relation which is conditioned by care can be a fertile ground for the realization of practical freedom. We should be not only conscious of our freedom, but also we should care about it. That care and concord fundamentally characterize human relations can be evidenced by a "public" practice which Heidegger calls "distantiality."

We are in a constant care so as to not distance the "public" practice and we thereby form the average everyday practice of the public. We succumb to the rules and norms of a society. Hubert Dreyfus expresses it as a "tendency to conform our behavior to a norm, even if that norm is frequently violated" (1995:153). He also quotes Heidegger that to "exist then means…*relating to oneself by being with beings*" (emphasis in original, *ibid*:238). This is an existential tendency of conformity in our relation with others by way of care. Therefore, care underlies not only human relations but also every attitude and situation of human beings. Thus, since being-in-the-world essentially involves care, and relation stems from it, human relation is fundamentally characterized by care and concord than by conflict—as held by Sartre. The cultivation of the structure of care should be accompanied by cultural change to foster freedom.

3.2. Dirlik's Cultural Reconfiguration

The rationale behind undertaking the task of cultural reconfiguration is that the realization of individual freedom requires changing the present situation and of course freedom is the power to go beyond one's condition and changing it. If we want to radically change the situation, we need a fundamental base. Culture provides a way of changing the world. Moreover, culture serves as a concrete foundation. It is a battle field where individuals interact with and confront each other.it is a battle field where exert their forces and lead to new developments. Alienating as well as emancipatory practices begin in culture. So, the realization of freedom requires cultural change, making freedom culture itself. Besides, it is not scarcity which necessarily leads to alienating conflict. It is our culture of appropriation which in the end leads to oppression, conflict and

alienation. That is why I see the necessity of cultural change as a constituent task in freedom realization project.

It is customary to view culture as a source of bondage. In other words, culture is nothing but the source of intellectual as well social imprisonment. So, it is believed that emancipation and progress can be realized when culture and tradition are cast out. Clifford Geertz states that enlightenment thinkers strove to "construct an [undistorted]image of man…whose essential type were to be uncovered by stripping the trappings of culture away from actual men"(1973:51). Graham Good also tells us that Geertz, Michel Foucault and Stephen Greenblatt have developed a "carceral vision" of culture by identifying it with '"wards, confines, and dungeons"' (2001:88). One can understand Enlightenment as a critique, and project and an endeavor to break with culture and tradition. But, as it will be clear soon, culture is not always a prison house: it can also be a source of freedom. As Good argues, degeneration as well as civilization begins in culture (2001:87). What matters is our way of approaching it. If no culture, no civilization. So, a cultural critique to change our view of culture and the world is necessary.

Dirlik argues that if we need to change the world, we must take radical and critical activity. Culture contains a framework for such an activity: it provides "ways of seeing the world" and helps us to understand the rationality of our lived experiences (1997:23). It provides not only seeing reality but also the means to change it. He continues to say that it also affords "a way of making and changing" and organizing the world (ibid:24). However, there is contradiction that culture can be the source of both freedom and unfreedom, i.e., it can serve as both instrument of hegemony and liberating practices. Dirlik tells us that culture can be the source of liberating practice if we view it as an activity, but not a static and autonomous reality. And the autonomous and static picture of culture serves as "mystification" and "instrument of hegemony in social and political relations" (*ibid*).

Our way of existence is conditioned by culture. As such, the value we give to freedom depends on the way we understand reality. One culture may be pecuniary where economic freedom is prioritized; the other may value religion and hence the prioritization of religious freedom; and still the other may value self-administration and hence the prioritization of political freedom. Such variations of valuing of freedom are due to cultural understanding of reality. Culture itself is the effect of many circumstances. John Dewey states that "the state of culture is a state of

interaction of many cultures, the chief of which are law, politics, industry, commerce, science and technology , the art of expressions and communication and of morals" (1939:23). Seeing that culture is the confluence of moral, technological, economic, social, political and religious practices and the most poignant forms of exploitation, oppression and alienation are rooted in culture, cultural reconfiguration as well as cultural critique plays paramount role in realizing freedom. Analogously, culture conditions the way we respond to the problem of scarcity. As we saw, Sartre reiterates that scarcity is the source of conflict and alienated praxis. But, is it really true that oppression and alienation are necessarily induced by scarcity? I do not think so.

First, some societies live in a heartfelt concord even though they experience scarcity. Even if there is scarcity, people for the most part live in concord than in hostility. If scarcity (provided that it informs every aspect of human praxis and relation—as claimed by Sartre) necessarily leads to conflict, why do people cooperate together to alleviate it? Why do not they struggle against each other like the "people" of Hobbesian state of nature? My intention is not to deny that human relation involves conflict. It is to indicate that, as we will see in the next chapter, the basic relation is care, which can be either anxious or peaceful—Sartrean characterization is reductive of all relations into the former mode. Further, scarcity is only one of the causes of conflict. But, to make it a necessary condition of conflict is to oversimplify the case. If it were the case that it is only scarcity that induces conflict, there would have no been the notion of peace (peaceful relation). Similarly, we have to question the longstanding economist's doctrine that human desire is unlimited while resources are limited, or that there is not enough for all. I believe that the world has enough of what we human beings need. What matters is how we come to appropriate (or own), use and share a given resource. Even if there is enough resource, there may be scarcity—a systematically and consciously created artificial scarcity. There is no doubt that people, for one reason or another, make resources scarce. For instance, I usually hear from Ethiopian media, although whose motive and certainty are questionable, that merchants intentionally make sugar scarce while hiding hundreds of quintals of sugar in their store. Likewise, some people possess billions of dollars and some others have nothing to eat, drink, wear and shelter. What does this mean? Conflict arises not necessarily because there is not enough for all. It is our culture of appropriation (or possession) and of dealing with scarcity that should be rethought. It is the cultural mystification of scarcity which requires demystification and elimination. Here lies the necessity of cultural reconfiguration. To claim that it is scarcity

which is the only real cause of conflictual relations and oppressions is to mystify the case and to be an intellectual accomplice in the production of smokescreen for various forms of unfreedom and oppression. It would be a theoretical parody. Because "scarcity" cannot be totally avoided, we will be forced to accept various forms of unfreedom and oppression as the natural consequences of the condition of scarcity. I am not claiming that there no scarce resources and that scarcity never cause conflict. My claim is that scarcity of resource by itself is not necessarily the cause of conflict and oppression: it is our way of appropriation (or attitude of possession) and our seeing of reality, and by extension our understanding of scarcity, which really cause conflict, conflictual relations, and hence alienation of freedom.

The essentiality and radicalness of cultural change lies in the fact that first it underlies change in many aspects of life for it is the repository of many truths, i.e., moral, epistemological, metaphysical, economic, political, artistic, scientific and technological truths, and second a true realization of practical freedom demands concrete foundation and culture fills this requirement well, i.e., because culture is a field where social forces and individuals meet, the measure which should be taken and the change which will be brought will be in accord with the life experiences of individuals. So, there will rather be an actual realization of freedom than mere sanctification of it in theoretical discourses. Moreover, the cultural change must aim at not only realizing freedom, but also achieving a culture of freedom. To this end, first, freedom must become a way of life and an ideal of practices so that freedom will have cultural base or firm social foundation. Next, people should demand not only their freedom: they must allow others to enjoy their freedom. We must recognize that we share the *same* world: love or hate it, we are co-present beings. My freedom is the same with the freedom of another: others and I are two different freedoms or existences. We must accept that we are being-with. Granting this, we must grant that I am free only in so far as I recognize the freedom of the other people or as far as my action does not deny the freedom of others. J.G. Fichte says that "freedom is never absolute…freedom is conceivable only as limited. Only finite freedom is actual…the "I" is called upon to limit self by another subject"[49] (quoted in Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M Higgins, 2003:154). We have freedom only in so far as we posit the freedom of others. We have to accustom ourselves to the practice of letting both oneself and others be free. It is this principle which must be entrenched in our culture. It is, in this sense therefore, as cultural malaise that the denial of freedom should be

[49] Fichte's talk of limited freedom relates to practical freedom or freedom of action, but not ontological freedom or freedom of choice.

defied. Finally, we should cast off the newfangled claim for the "incompatibility"[50] between freedom and wealth which induces the neglect of either in favor of the other. In fact, there is no earthly reason which opposes wealth to the realization of freedom, and forbids freedom to enhance productivity. Feenberg rejects that freedom and material prosperity are mutually exclusive. Reconstruction of technology that incorporates both efficiency and freedom is possible (2002:133-139). Hence, efficiency does not contradict humanistic values. Amartya Sen also argues that freedom and development reinforce each other. And freedom is the primary end and the chief means of achieving development (2000:xii). However, the provision of food while denying freedom has a pernicious effect on individual liberty. To provide merely materials for need is to provide "the conditions of freedom, yet withhold freedom itself" (Berlin, 2002:47). Nonetheless, carefully thought, they cannot be separated. It is only in desire of suppressing either of them that we pronounce their "contradictoriness."

The foregoing discussion shows that since freedom is a structure of reality and human beings are co-existent beings, and culture relates to the practical aspect of life, it should be and of course can become a way of life. If the culture of freedom is fostered or freedom becomes a way of life, culture itself would become the source and guardian of freedom. Sartrean pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis are useful to merely identify the fundamental structure of human beings, but they fall short of effecting radical cultural change. As culture conditions, and conditioned by, technological, ethical and political practices, cultural change should be supported and accompanied by appropriate technological design, and ethico-political frameworks.

3.3. Feenberg's Ontological Design of Technology

We saw that Sartre proposes group praxis as a means for countering alienation and oppression which emanate from the force of practico-inert. Of course, group praxis is useful to fight common danger. The difficulty is that the common danger is not always external: it emanates from within. The question is what does the group do? How does the group avoid the alienation of individual praxis? Sartre is not clear on such questions. He stops explaining how individual praxis reconciles with group praxis. The insufficiency of Sartre's proposal of group praxis is that it fails to specify the particular remedial action which should be taken by the group. I believe that

[50] Recently, there is, for instance, a belief in Ethiopia that we need bread first and then freedom, such as freedom of expression is only secondary and luxurious good. We need no doubt bread, but the suspension and denial freedom of expression in the name of it is as dangerous as the denial of bread.

revisiting our understanding of technology and its design as well plays a paramount role. Accordingly, democratizing technology can minimize such insufficiency.

We now live in a technological world where the force of technology is pervasive in every aspect of life. Put otherwise, the current society is largely a technological society. As worked matters are mediated by human beings and human beings by them (as Sartre would argue), human life and relations are highly mediated by technology and its imperative (such the imperative of maximizing efficiency and minimizing cost). Don Ihde states that "our being[is] in the midst of…technologies…our existence is *technologically textured*,…with respect to the large dramatic and critical issues…such as the threat of nuclear war or the worry over global pollution…but also with respect to the rhythms and spaces of daily life"(emphasis in original,1990:1). Being-in-the-world directly involves an encounter with technology in the forms of instrument—be it rudimentary or sophisticated. Ihde continues to assert that "*human activity …has always been technologically embedded"*[51] (emphasis in original, ibid:20). It is this factual necessity which makes underlining the redesigning of technology necessary and practicable.

Feenberg argues that technology has ambivalent structure in that it involves "social values in its design, and not merely the use, of technical systems…[it]is not a destiny but a scene of [social] struggle…in which civilizational alternatives contend" (2002:15). Our technological choice is not a choice for 'free' use of technology. The claim for neutrality, autonomy and mere instrumentality of technology does not hold true; at worst, it hides the issue and forbids an authentic solution beforehand[52]. His argument is that technological rationality involves political rationality: technological design is marked by politics. He states that "the process of technological rationality is a political process" (2002:170). And technology is an expression of "dominant paradigm of rationality" (*ibid*:64) embodying hegemonic social values that are experienced as technical rules or codes rather than as "bare" political imperatives (*ibid*:63-75). So, technological design involves not only social values but also it determines our choices.

The design of technology involves an "ontological design." Feenberg quotes Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores who jointly argue that ""in designing tools we are designing ways of being.

[51] Ihde argues that, perhaps, it is only in the Garden of Eden (if exists[ed]) that human beings could exist without the use of technology; technology is both the reward of being on the Earth and the price of leaving the Garden (1990:11-14).
[52] Ihde characterizes the structure of technology as "quasi-otherness" or "quasi-autonomy"—"stronger than mere objectness but weaker than the otherness found within the animal kingdom or the human one" (1990:100).

…[in such an] ontological designing, we are doing more than asking what can be built. We are engaged in a philosophical discourse about the self—about what we can do and what we can be"" (2002:107). The design of a technology is a choice. This choice relates to our way of being—our basic structure. This choice is an ontological choice of what kind of humanity we should have. Expressed otherwise, technological choice and design does not just reflect our material desire but also a determination of the being of our humanity. Thus, technological design involves ontological as well as political rationality.

Feenberg calls for a democratic transformation of technology through technical redesigning in such a way that it could incorporate the participation of wide range of suppressed contexts and occluded choices (ibid:3) in so far as it is undemocratic to exclude the vast majority from participation in technological choice[53].

Redesigning technology plays a double role. First, it accelerates the project of cultural reconfiguration. Since "technologies are embedded in cultural complexes" (Ihde, 1990:140) or technology is a "material culture" (ibid: 13) and a currently principal social force, technological change automatically involves significant cultural change which is necessary in realizing practical freedom. Next, appropriate technological design serves to curb the alienating force of practico-inert. The participation of all concerned bodies in technological design implies the incorporation of many choices (and of voices). Since technological design is a design of being, individuals will be co-designers of their future humanity. And that technology will become "our" technology— in contrast to "their" technology. Thus, as co-designers, individuals can determine and exercise their freedom of choice. Furthermore, since technology itself will become a technology of co-present beings and individuals are co-designers, the degree of "otherness" will be mitigated and thereby the reduction of conflict—to that same extent alienation will be reduced. If technology is an embodiment of the choice of individuals, it will not be used as an instrument of domination and hegemonic control. It becomes a democratized technology by means of which co-presence will be revealed and individual freedom is exercised. Technology will cease to stand as alien force against the praxis of certain groups—such as suppressed choices and occluded groups.

[53]. I used the word "democratization" in a sense that the design of technology should incorporate and take into account the choices and interests of all stakeholders. It should be designed in a way that it expands individual freedoms. It should not be a means of hegemonic ideology.

Through democratizing, technology will become a principal means in realizing freedom and in fighting the alienating force of practico-inert—a democratized technology can expand the horizons of individuals' freedom, and can at least reduce the conflict among human beings and between human beings and practico-inert beings. It will aim not only at minimizing physical impotence but also the exercise of individual freedom. For technology is not only a matter of enhancing manual dexterity and easing physical hardship and toil but also a power and hegemony, a democratic design of technology which renders an equal and free expression of subjectivities possible is necessary. Redesigning technology should also be accompanied by political actions and ethical prescriptions.

As we discussed, technological rationality involves political rationality. There is mutual influence between technology and political practice. The former can be a means of political control and hegemony. Political decisions and culture can determine the kind of technology we will have. In a condition where there is a degenerate and oppressive political culture, technology alone cannot totally liberate us since in such an atmosphere technology itself cannot be free. An oppressive political system can make technology alienating and oppressive. It would be inexpedient to try to democratize or liberalize technology and thereby guarantee individuals their freedom without democratizing or liberalizing the political system. Moreover, technology, even though it is a dominant material culture, is an as aspect of (social) life. Social life is determined by many factors. Still more, the serious blow against individuals' freedom also comes from political decisions and doctrines. These reasons indicate the necessity of political commitment in realizing freedom in addition to democratizing technology.

3.4. The Necessity of Political and Ethical Imperatives

3.4.1. Berlin's Defense of Freedom as a Political Measure

The realization of practical freedom is not an easy task. It demands comprehensive or multiple actions. Any attempt to realize it with a single action will be a half measure or a simplistic treatment of it. My claim that Sartrean pure reflection of a rationalist type or mere recourse to group praxis is not sufficient solution should be understood in this context. A cultural, technological, political and ethical action is badly needed. To this effect, Berlin provides a

framework for political action. He argues that the fundamental essence of freedom[54] is "not simply the absence of frustration…but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities…Such freedom ultimately depends …on how many doors are open, how open they are" (2002:32). And oppression is the blockage of such doors (ibid). Unfreedom is the closing of doors for free activity either by a dictator, or oppressive laws, or religious or customary practices. In other words, defending freedom involves the "'negative goal of warding off'" an arbitrary interference: to coerce a man to live up to a choice not of his own and "to block before him every door" except that one choice is to deny him a "life of his own" (ibid:174-175). Freedom is not equality and justice, nor sovereignty nor material security; to equate it with only either of these is to make use of them as a cloak of oppression and domination. Or, such identification would be, in Berlin's parlance, "as great a fraud as the freedom of the pauper who has a legal right to purchase luxuries…[It would be to issue] the conditions of freedom, yet withhold freedom itself" (2002:46-47). Now, let us have a brief excursion into secondary works on Sartre's theory of freedom.

Individual liberty, in the last analysis, comes first although we are co-present beings: co-presence does not mean mutual interference nor it forbids the exercise of individual freedom. The commonsense view that the guarantee of each kind of freedom is an infraction of the other is not true completely[55]. Of course, we have to choose between alternatives; but choosing one alternative instead of another is not a sacrifice, in its proper sense, of the unchosen alternative: it would be a sacrifice if the unchosen is more important and enriching than the chosen alternative. However, whatever the sacrifice of freedom in favor of material provision or justice or equality may be, whether I am conscious of my freedom or not, whether I make a group praxis or not, whether I am for and against the popular practice (and against government itself), whether I am rich or poor, there must be an area of individual freedom which serves as a buffer against any wave of oppression and domination. Berlin holds that "I may sacrifice my freedom for the sake of equality or fraternity but, a sacrifice does not increase the sacrificed" (2002:172). He continues to argue that although "[f]irst things come first: there are situations in which…boots are superior to Pushkin" (*ibid*:171), no doubt that "[t]here is a minimum level of opportunity for

[54] Berlin identifies two categories of freedom in history of philosophical discourse of freedom: positive and negative liberty. The former can be roughly typified by freedom of self-mastery and the latter by the doctrine of non-interference. They are equally important and the pursuit of each is equally justified. According to him, they have been liable to serious distortions ranging from nationalist self-determination to *laissez faire* economic freedom (2002:36-38,169,325-328).
[55]Berlin expresses this view by his slogan that "'Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows'" (2002:171).

choice—not of rational or virtuous choice alone—below which human activity ceases to be free in any meaningful sense" (*ibid*:44).

If I do harm on others in the name of my individual freedom, I am not exercising my individual freedom; if I think of it so, it is to betray freedom itself (freedom is not a freedom to infringe the freedom of my neighbor, but to exercise my own freedom, nor infringing my neighbor's freedom increases my freedom—it will remain an infringement). Moreover, the claim for an individual freedom is not a quest for the exercise of absolute freedom, unobstructed even by the freedom of another person. Such a quest is a malaise which pure reflection or group praxis alone cannot cure: the necessity of political and legal measure lies here. Berlin says that "the defense of liberty consists in the 'negative' goal of warding off interference" (2002:174). And "freedom is freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others...to struggle for personal freedom is to seek to curb interference, exploitation, enslavement by [other] men…Freedom…is coterminous with the absence of bullying or domination" (ibid:48). Individuals' freedom should be protected from deliberately created encumbrances.

Contrariwise, the freedom that will be attained by Sartrean group praxis will not be an individual freedom: it will be a group freedom—at best it will be self-government or sovereignty[56]. But, neither self-government nor sovereignty guarantees individual freedom, even group freedom. The group may be independent and free from external interference, but there may be unbridled mutual interference within the group or the group may intrude in the sphere of individual freedom. But, this is not what we normally intend to have. Berlin holds that an "equal right to oppress—or interfere—is not equivalent to liberty. Nor does universal consent to loss of liberty…preserve it merely by being universal, or by being consent" (2002:209). Group praxis is not a guarantee for freedom, although useful to fight against common enemy. What I really want is to be free whether I am alone or I am in a group: I basically need not a freedom which could be granted in group but could be denied in solitude, although there are freedoms, with paramount importance, which can be attained by being in group. Group freedom does not substitute individual freedom. Berlin tells us that Pericles pronounced to show the necessity of non-

[56] It is in the name of sovereignty or self-government that dictators have been oppressing individuals. These concepts should not be confused with freedom. A government may protect the sovereignty of the people while completely denying individuals of their freedom. But, can sovereignty sufficiently substitute freedom? to speak bluntly, it does not make a difference whether I am interfered by a foreign country or by my home country except the latter may offer me a vain pride of "sovereign slave." Berlin quotes of Benjamin Constant's slogan that "'it is not against the arm that one must rail but against the weapon. Some weights are too heavy for the human hand'" (2002:209). The question is not about who administers me but how much I am set free. He adds that the transfer of authority or sovereignty from one group to another "merely shifts the burden of slavery"; freedom is not whether one is oppressed by popular government, or king or set of laws; it is a matter of how much authority is concentrated (ibid).

interference and individual freedom that "Athens differs from Sparta in that 'we[Athenians] live as free citizens, both in our public life and in our attitude to one another in the affairs of daily life'"(*ibid*:300). To preclude the impingement of each individual's freedom by another individual, there should be legal or political imperative. This legal or political imperative should also be complemented by ethical imperative.

3.4.2. The Necessity of Ethical Principles in Realizing Practical Freedom

We saw in Chapter One that Sartre rejects any claim for ethical principles in our actions and their evaluations. For him, to demand principles for help in one's choice and action is to deny that we are free subjectivities who are entrusted to invent and support them—to be "possessed" of the spirit of seriousness. However, in so far as we are human beings, not angels, and to err is human, and since there is an inevitable communication among us and morality concerns how we communicate with each other, to use and follow principles is to be human (rational).

It is not an accident that moral philosophers have agreed about the necessity of moral principles, although they have disagreed about their nature and source. Some of them believe in the universality of ethical principles and others in their subjectivity or relativity; some of them make religion the legitimate source of ethical principles, others rationality and still some others human sentiment. For instance, for David Hume, moral principles originate in sentimental nature of humankind. He says that every moral pronouncement as praiseworthy or blameworthy directly depends on human sentiment (internal sense or feeling) which "nature has made universal in the whole species" or "human nature is capable of attaining" it (2006:189-190). Similarly, Kant makes rationality the origin of ethical principles (2002:5). He affirms that moral principles have "extensive significance for all *rational beings"* (emphasis in original, *ibid*:25) unless we doubt the necessity and truth of morality. If there is no genuine supreme principle, the question of morality is worthless. And "morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as that guiding thread and supreme norm of their correct judgment is lacking" (ibid:5-6).

Moreover, according to Heidegger, human beings are "normative" beings: they care not to deviate from the norm of social practice. This is exemplified by the doctrine of "distantiality." He affirms that "[i]n taking care of the things which one has taken hold of, for, and against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs from them…whether one's own Dasein

has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in relation to them"(*BT*:118). Dreyfus also interpreted Heidegger as saying that we feel embarrassed when "we fail to conform" and it "seems we just are norm-following creatures, and it makes us uneasy if our behavior is too distant from the norm" (1995:153). Thus, the feeling of shame in committing misdeeds is an indication for our tendency to conform to the average practice of the public.

This average public practice relates to morality and hence it concerns our comportment towards others. Morality is a public matter. So, the existence of moral principles is justifiable. Berlin also asserts that "[i]f we wish to live in the light of reason, we must follow rules or principles; for that is what being rational is. When these rules or principles conflict in concrete cases, to be rational is to follow the course of conduct which least obstructs the general pattern of life" (2002:48). So, it would be against the dictate of reason if we reject ethical principles because there are conflicting choices and we sometimes find ourselves on the horns of an ethical dilemma.

Moral principles can serve as roadmaps in guiding our action and interaction: they do not determine *a priori* our actions. Removing them from morality leads to cessation of morality itself: it will be a moral bankruptcy[57]. Indeed, I accept Sartre's belief that "subjectivity" is a reality for people. But, I think that the predominant concern of morality is interaction among individuals. Morality tells how individuals should act towards each other. People's intersubjective interaction is not without moral principles. But, if there are no moral principles to guide the intersubjective interaction of individuals, how are individuals to act and to interact with each other? In this sense, the actions of human beings seem to be blind because there are no moral principles. According to Sartre, as we saw in Chapter One, on one hand, in committing myself to a certain action, I also commit myself to all human beings and on the other hand, there is no available universal principle by which I can guide and evaluate whether my action is committed to myself and others. If this is being the case, how can one know and judge whether his/her action is also committed to the cause of others? Of course, one may feel responsibility for his/her action, but it will not be beyond a mere feeling for there is no moral rule that helps him/her to choose the proper course of action.

A wholesale rejection of ethical principles is not a solution at all: it would rather be a retreat from ethical problems and its solutions. The solution should be to choose the weightiest

[57] Risieri Frondizi says that "if one denies the possibility of finding some kind of rules or values, one risks getting into a chaotic moral situation" (1981:374).

principle, in terms of its ethical significance and enriching ability, to make ourselves be able to guide our choices and actions by that principle. Even anguish, which Sartre himself posits as a signification of the awareness of one's freedom (it is not rational to reject the anguish which relates to moral principles while totally accepting the anguish which relates to freedom), arises out of the concern for ethical principle: I will be anguished as to whether I should follow the basic moral principles or not—there is an ethical anguish. Ethical anguish can be a good backup for ontological anguish (the consciousness that I am ontologically free or freedom is my being). This anguish concerns whether my action is in accord with my freedom and the freedom of others or not. What ethical anguish, in the end, makes us conscious is to choose principle which is in accord with freedom. The moral principle that "killing is wrong" is partly recognition that individuals ought to be let free. This ethical prescription plays a paramount role in translating ontological freedom to practical freedom. So, our ethical task should not be to reject principles altogether but to choose the principle which most enhances and least frustrates, as Berlin would argue, both one's freedom and the freedom of others.

In summary, Sartre believes that we are imprisoned in bad faith of pursuing an unattainable goal—the desire to be God. We can liberate ourselves from such bind of bad faith if we reflect purely and lucidly on, and existentially analyze the choice we make. This helps us to renounce the blind demand for the in-itself-for-itself. It is an impure reflective consciousness which induces individuals to oppress and frustrate each other. My choice clashes with the choice of other individual because he/she and I do not clearly and lucidly reflect on them; if we do, conflict between him/her and me will cease soon and we will be in a total liberation. However, to desire an attainable goal is not an increase in freedom itself. No matter how pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis can be good in clearing confusion regarding the fundamental choice and can be good instrument of becoming conscious of one's freedom, they are quite far ,different from, and too insufficient to achieve, practical freedom itself. The fundamental sense of freedom cannot be attained by reflection and analysis, but by the disclosure of roads for walking and opportunities for action. Knowledge is neither freedom nor an expansion of it.[58]

Moreover, Sartre seems to think that individuals who underwent pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis—in short, convert individuals—choose what will be in a perfect accord with

[58] A person who has enough understanding of what freedom is and what it consists in can be equally unfree to express and exercise his/her freedom due to obstruction by other people or government. Knowledge promises to give freedom but does not guarantee its promise.

their fundamental constitution, i.e., everyone will pursue his/her freedom, so that there will be no conflict among themselves; individuals will follow their courses of action like the galaxies of stars in the solar system where each rotates within its own orbit. But, even if individuals recognize and exercise their freedom, conflict among them may occur since they are not saints and they may go astray regarding the means of exercising of their freedom. Furthermore, the road to achieve that fundamental constitution may not be only one but many paths, equally important, even conflicting roads—the truth from which derives the "necessity and agony of choice" (Berlin:2002-214) and the denial of which will be an outright recognition of "only one correct way of life" (ibid:197)—out of which we choose the road that has the least possible infraction of freedom itself. It is for this reason that pure reflection and existential psychoanalysis are insufficient to guarantee individual freedom, for we are not saints but people of conflicting desires—even if we agree that our fundamental value is freedom, we may come into disagreement in our choice of means of attaining it. Even Adam and Eve were given a moral law, which presupposes that they could go wrong in their choice, to protect individual freedom from infraction. "How am I to treat recalcitrant human beings?"(Berlin, ibid:192) if freedom can be realized through pure reflective awareness of one's freedom. That is why the presence of ethical and political imperative is necessary for the guarantee of individual freedom.

Sartre characterizes human relation as fundamentally conflictual—as a condition where there are no concord and heartfelt companion and where we are all hobgoblins ready to attack each other[59]. He believes that in such world of hobgoblins, freedom is lost. Indeed, in conflictual human relation, freedom is inevitably alienated. However, conflict is only a characteristic of a deficient human relation. I am not claiming for a perfect situation where human beings know, no conflict and hatred, only peace and fraternity, where individuals enjoy perfect liberty without any form of obstruction; to cling to this idea is to deny the existence of varieties of human choices, ideals, opinions, mistakes, interests and even incompatible rationalities; nor am I to belittle the role of conflict in alienating freedom. But, it is to claim that human relation basically involves concord, care and fraternity until it is supervened by discord and conflict. Being-in the world, or being-a-human being, itself is care. We cannot not-care. If the structure of being-in-the world is care, there will be no reason to deny that human relation fundamentally involves care.

[59] Alan Clark says that "there are no true friends in politics. We are all sharks circling, and waiting, for traces of blood to appear in the water" (quoted in Oxford Dictionary: Advanced Learner's Dictionary).

Even if it is true that human relation is conflictual and freedom is alienated in such a relation, Sartre's proposed solutions do not sufficiently resolve that conflict and do not help individuals to regain their "lost" freedom. It is difficult to exercise and realize freedom in a conflict-ridden human relation. In a condition where there is no even "freedom of the pauper", to tell people to undergo mere pure reflection or undertake group praxis is to mock their condition. In other words, to form a group because exercising individual freedom privately is made impossible is not an exercise and realization of individual liberty. And a rationalist strand of pure reflection, which is a secular counterpart of religious conversion, is not much help. As the problem of freedom is deep-rooted, its realization demands radical actions.

Culture should be used as means of liberation; with a view to this, it itself must be critiqued, liberated and changed. It must be made "freedom-oriented." Similarly, the design and use of technology should be democratized in such a way that it expands freedom while reducing alienating praxis. It should be directed not only at alleviating physical toils, but also at becoming an area which enhances the exercise of individual freedom. In short, the technical as well as social goal of technology should be freedom. Moreover, as technology and culture [60]are inextricably interwoven, making technology democratic and freedom-oriented can make culture democratic and freedom-directed and thus can foster the culture of freedom. This techno-cultural orientation towards freedom should be invigorated by political and ethical actions so long as freedom itself is a political and an ethical goal. The politico-legal framework must prevent potential conflicts among individuals and protect them from arbitrary mutual interference. Any arbitrary interference, be it individual, group or government, in individual freedoms must be barred beforehand. Correspondingly, the ethical task should be freedom-realization. As an ethical goal, realizing freedom needs ethical action which can be done by embracing normative principles, not by abandoning them for we are normative beings. Thus, the realization of freedom requires a concerted effort of many factors; Sartre's resolutions are too insufficient to effect this realization.

[60]We cannot safely totally dissociate technology from culture. As technology is very much rooted in culture, the former highly shapes the latter. But, it can be said that, as Professor Bekele Gutema suggests me, technology is an aspect of culture, and that it is a "material culture... in the very broadest sense" (Don Ihde, 1990:13).

Conclusion

This thesis has basically argued that Sartre's treatment of human relations as conflictual and its structuring forces—the Look and scarcity—are faulty for the latters do not exhaust all causes of conflictual relations and necessarily induce it, and that his resolutions are somehow deficient—because they may either fall short of effecting converts who recognize and respect both their freedoms and the freedom of others or merely end in the identification of "fundamental choice" or lapse into collective unfreedom—to enable individuals to practically have the ontological freedom, which is correctly and sufficiently defended by him, in their existential conditions. And, thus, more enabling and efficacious measures, which counter the supervention of conflict in care-relation and consider the force of current circumstances in alienating freedom, are needed.

Previous works, which I surveyed, on Sartre's theory of freedom are more concerned on the shortcomings of his concept of ontological freedom, i.e., his claim for absolute freedom is undue, non-existent, phantasmal and morally insensitive to differences inherent in actions, on his "ontological" analysis of the nature of human beings, on the inconsistency between the early and later Sartre's treatment of freedom and values, on the incompatibility of his remedies to secure freedom, and on defending the "limitedness" and "situatednes" of his freedom (David Detmer and Thomas Anderson are worth noting here). The critics mentioned above involve cherry-picking and de-contextualization for they overlooked open textual evidences that can be found in his writings and hence can disprove these intellectually uncharitable aspersions.

I assumed that if his view of the nature of human relation is revisited; if the importance he gives to scarcity and the Look are rectified; if his resolutions are complemented and yet surpassed; and if misunderstandings on his theory are rectified, Sartre's theory of freedom can be a valuable help to maintain and achieve the various forms of freedom which I roughly reduced to practical freedom. (Re)constructed and understood thus, his theory can be an effective defense of freedom against its various enemies that come under the cloak of determinism—such as cultural, political, historical, psychological, economic, and natural (and supernatural) determinism. We have to have a clear understanding of freedom, and the means and conditions of its attainment.

To defend my claim and justify my assumptions, I presented both my arguments and the views of Sartre in three chapters. Throughout the thesis, the nature of freedom, its condition and means

of realization are outlined. In chapter one, I tried to show the context of the absoluteness as well as the limitedness and the situatednes of Sartrean freedom, and the falsity of the various forms of determinism. And tried to answer these questions: what make us, why and in what sense are we, absolutely free, according to Sartre? In what sense, Sartrean freedom is limited and situated? I also attempted to show the weakness Sartre's treatment of values and the necessity of ethical principles in freedom-realization.

In the second chapter, I outlined how Sartre arrives at his claim that the Look and scarcity make human interrelations basically conflictual. And Sartrean solutions—which can help individuals to choose a right project, undergo conversion and fight common danger—to the problem of freedom and their weaknesses. I also outlined my criticism of Sartre. I argued that the Look is not objectifying and alienating by its nature. The Look is just a means of announcing one's encounter with the other. It is an explicitation of the structure of being-with. Moreover, pure reflection, which involves a kind of metaphysical and /or epistemic release, may end up in a kind of rational self-examination. What is more is that we have to wait the advent of convert individuals hundreds of years in order to avoid conflict and thus we would be free. Similarly, existential psychoanalysis falls short of identifying the fundamental choices of the analysand, for choice are peculiar, on Sartre's account, to individuals.

Finally, I think that if we assume that scarcity necessarily causes conflict, and alienation occurs because individuals act serially, group praxis does not give a significant help so long as it cannot totally avoid scarcity and conflict, even though it can abate them and is useful to reduce serial (individual) impotence.

Chapter three presented a complementary and an alternative analysis of human relations and solutions to secure practical freedom. It tried to establish that care is the basic characteristic of intersubjective relation, and securing practical freedom demands a combined effort of political, cultural, technological and ethical actions. Following Martin Heidegger, I argued that care and being-with are the fundamental structures of humankind. Human existence involves care and co-existence. We are thrown as "caring" freedom. I care both for my freedom and the freedom of others. Human relation involves care as well. If individuals care about both their freedom and the freedom of others and if our relation is recognized as and made to be as such, securing freedom

can be easier than what would be in Sartrean world of conflict which is only a defective type of care-relation.

Furthermore, there is no single panacea for the problem of freedom. We have to radically change our way of seeing, behaving and doing. To this effect, a cultural measure is well worth doing. Our way of responding to scarcity must be changed: evens so more dangerous if what is going in the name of scarcity and fighting it is not checked and halted. We have to change the cultural outlook on freedom either. Similarly, fighting the antipraxis of practico-inert totalities can effectively be done through democratizing technology. Technology should be freedom-expanding. The efficacy of technological action lies in the fact that the design of technology has the imprint of both our outlook and being: designing technology is designing our comportment towards, and the medium of our relation with, others. But, the cultural change and democratizing technology should be backed up by political and ethical actions and prescriptions. Accordingly, there must be the avoidance of deliberately made impediments, and suitable conditions in which individuals initiate their courses of action and ways of life to satisfy their very demands and desires. Equally, since moral principles—which are rejected by Sartre because of his belief that following them endangers individual freedom—relate to our comportment and interrelation (and since it is on the based on them that we interact with each other and they, in the end, prescribe that individuals should be let free), it is rational, valuable and effective to follow and use them in our course of action. I hope that taking and doing the above commitments can help individuals to secure their freedom. Our demand and predilection for freedom is unparalleled and we are always desirous of it. But, why is it still yet not realized so much as the sacrifice made to it? Why its realization is so an infant after more than thirty centuries of struggle?

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