



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
M.A. PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY**

**(A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of the Master of Arts (M.A.) in
International Relations and Diplomacy)**

**Title:
THE USA RESPONSES TOWARDS THE CIVIL WAR
OF ETHIOPIA IN TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**

**BY
BELAY DEBEBE TELILA**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
JUNE, 2023**



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JUNE, 2023**

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis entitled, **THE USA RESPONSE TOWARDS THE CIVIL WAR OF ETHIOPIA IN TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**, is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by **Belay Debebe Telila** entitled “**THE USA RESPONSES TOWARDS THE CIVIL WAR OF ETHIOPIA IN TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE**”, submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy, obeys the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards for originality and excellence.

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DEDICATION

This thesis dedicated to those who passed due to the mistakes of their political mothers and fathers, who appointed themselves without telling whatsoever identity to whom they called a child, and for those who have been scarified to the political freedom of the people.

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My gratitude goes first to my savior Almighty God. And extend to the valuable efforts of the my advisor **Doctor Yonas Ashene** and for the more substantial scholars **Doctor Worku Yacob** from the Institute of International Relations, **Ato Tesfaye Yitayeh** from Minister of Foreign Affairs, and **Doctor Fana Gebresenbet** from Peace and Security Strategy Institute, and **Ato Wegene Mengistee** from Center for Dialogue and Research Cooperation that enhance the quality of my thesis work.

Lastly, I would like to thank for those who shared their knowledge and practice of political science and International Relations in class room, media, books and articles throughout the entire graduate study.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AEWP -	All Ethiopians Workers Party
AFRICOM -	United States Africa Command
AGOA -	African Growth and Opportunity Act
ALF -	Afar Liberation Front
CJTF-HOA -	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
EDORM -	Ethiopian Democratic Officers' Revolutionary Movement
EFMOH -	Ethiopian Federal Ministry of Health
ENDF - --	Ethiopian National Defense Forces
ENDRMC -	Ethiopia's National Disaster Risk Management Commission
EPDM -	Ethiopian People Democratic Movement
EPLF -	Eritrean People Liberation Front
EPRDF -	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP -	Ethiopians People's Revolutionary Party
FDRE -	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD -	Grand Ethiopians Renaissance Dam
GFDRE -	Government Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GFDRE -	Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HPRE -	House of People Representatives of Ethiopia
IDFC -	International Development Finance Corporation
IOM -	International Organization for Migration
NEBE -	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NRSAf -	National Regional State of Afar
NRSAm -	National Regional State of Amhara
NRSBG -	National Regional State of Benshanguel Gumuz
NRSG -	National Regional State of Gambella
NRSO -	National Regional State of Oromo
NRST -	National Regional State of Tigray
OAU -	Organization of African Union
OLA -	Oromo Liberation Army
OLF -	Oromo Liberation Front
OPDO -	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PMOFDRE -	Prime Minster Office of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
RSSNNP -	Regional State of South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples
SEPDM -	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SFT -	Special Force of Tigray
SIPRI -	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TPLF -	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TWCW -	Third Weyyanne Civil War
USAID -	United States Agency of International Development
USEE -	United State Ethiopia Embassy

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Abstract

The Ethiopia and the USA have more than a century bilateral relation. But the civil war between the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) and the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF) endangered Ethiopia by complicating and threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and imbalance the national interests between the USA and Ethiopia. The National interest protectors' of Ethiopia passed through security dilemma and politics of undermined and disrespected relations within the internationalization of internal war that affect the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA. This study basically uses the internalization of the fertile ground of the determinants of USA's responses towards the civil war of Ethiopia in National Regional State of Tigray (NRST) in the constructivist view by qualitatively explorative research method that contains external factors. A study fills the gap of limited research work in issues and in number using scattered and inconsistent data. As a result, to accomplish American interests, USA responses during the first round of the war tended to incline to the TPLF to return the TPLF-led leadership by dominant shuttle diplomacy in Ethiopia, at the Horn of Africa politics and entire world politics like in the UN. Significantly during the war, the USA declined its assistance and made illegible Ethiopia by more than forty percent and from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). At the end of the two years' war, the USA succeeded in support of the permanent ceasefire of the Pretoria Agreement between war actors of GFDRE and TPLF led by AU. As a recommendation, the agreement for no war efforts must be expanded to continue the inclusive policy of acts in a way that will fulfill the strategic interests of the United States, Ethiopia, and Africa.

Keywords: Internationalization of internal war, Civil war, Externalization, Internalization, Horn of Africa, Security Dilemma, and Diaspora diplomacy.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray from November 2020 to November 2022 between the GFDRE and the TPLF from the National Regional State of Tigray (NRST) had been challenged the bilateral relations of Ethiopia and USA. Including external factors, this thesis focuses on identifying and internalizes the determinants of the USA responses towards this civil war.

As background in mid-2018, the Ethiopian political dynamism that was walk-up in 2000s, produced fruit of hope for Ethiopian political freedom, but raised the old and the new bundle of challenges of grievances in Ethiopia politics.

As a new dimension, it was exacerbated because of a hundred percent vote of the EPRDF party member including the TPLF that was elected and appointed Abey Ahemed as EPRDF chairman and Prime Minister of the FDRE on March 27, and on April 2, 2018 respectively. Among others for instance TPLF propagated the threat of a never happen challenge on political reform that may ideologically and practically change nationalism from the ethnic to Ethiopian by dissolving the preamble, and Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution.

The misunderstanding of conceptions and un-inclusive practices of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) caused conflicts of the rule of law and disrespectful participants' relations which lead to an option less warlike relations and to conduct civil war.

The conflict scholars agreed that civil war is an internationalized internal war where national government actively involves in the military action, and where effective resistance between actors result in at least 1,000 military and civil battle deaths'. (Armitage¹ 2009, Anyanwu² 2002, Walter³ 2002, Singer and Small⁴, 1982) For Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2021), the number decreased to 25 people killed in armed conflict.

¹ David Armitage is a professor in Harvard University

² John C. Anyanwu is the principal Research Economist in Development Research Division of the Development Bank at the African Development Bank in Tunisia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. He is a Professor in University of Benin at the Department of Economics and Statistics.

³ Barbara Walter from University of California - San Diego who write "Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)"

⁴ Singer J. D. and M. Small (1982) who wrote, "Resort to Arms: International and civil war, 1816-1980"

This Third Weyyane Civil War (TWCW) in Tigray was continued in neighboring National Regional States of Afar and Amhara and within the proxy wars in other parts of Ethiopia. The war acts were the ignominy of one party of EPRDF, which has a non-war policy from 1991 to after the General Election of Ethiopia, 2005 that hated war for fifteen years, and next to this election for years' peacefully blended war up to the Abey Ahmed Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.

The war first affected the People of Tigray that scrutinized the loss of value of their identities, religions, culture, life, and property that strengthened insecurities of food, deep poverty, and displaced people locally and internationally. Materially they lost property of the thirty year in war economy and the twenty eight years non war to Tigray development. This directly affected population in and around Tigray during war is above the People of Tigray, more than ten million.

The challenges are not limited locally to Lencho (2022), this war was 'complicated, not only the intra conflict, but it is also an inter conflict' which participates other countries.

The internationalization of this internal war in an international issue participate states and concerned International Actors. They are the neighbor states of; Eritria, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia, regional powers; Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, USA, and Russia, from International Organizations; the UN with its agencies, the AU with its agencies, the G7 countries and the EU; and finally different individuals and groups of personals (Blanchard 2021; Brooke-Holland 2021) which also include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China with different dimensions and interests. Among them, the Abey government acknowledged the contribution of the states of Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan in its response to the HPRE.

This study from International responses focuses on the USA to understand how much it affects the more than three centuries of unofficial or more than a century of official diplomatic relations and sixty years of assistances of the People of America to Ethiopia.

The war also affected the 119 years of official diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and the USA for the third time. According to United State Ethiopia Embassy (USEE) the consulate closed on March 31, 1937, due to Addis Ababa being occupied by Italy on May 6, 1936, and when the Derg regime ideologically formed allies with Union of Soviet Socialist Republic from 1976 to 1989. For instance, as external factors during this war, publically there were at least two public political rallies in hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in Addis Ababa to oppose the USA that escalate the war relation.

The significant responses of the USA are ending the economic support of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in December 2021, unsecured Ethiopia by multiple security messages to International Communities from December - November 2021 (USA Embassy Ethiopia 2021), decreasing or blocking assistance, intervened in the number of American House and Senate resolutions, and lobbied the one-sided atrocity report by claiming Ethiopia many times in the United Nations.

The USA-AGOA program to Ethiopia was taken as economic leverage that increased exports from \$20.3 in 2015 to \$209.6 million in 2019. (Lighthizer⁵ 2020) The USA to Blanchard⁶ (2021) is the top humanitarian donor to Ethiopia by providing over \$893 million in September of FY2021, but about \$600 million for the Tigray response with restricted security assistance and some economic aid.

A study aimed to explore the determinants of the USA's responses towards the civil war of Ethiopia in the case of the TPLF may fill the gap of the limited research work by bringing together the scattered IR data of the two states.

A scope of the study does not include the details of the USA responses concerning the suffered Ethiopians in the RSAf, RSAm, RSBG, RSG, RSO, and RSSNNP. The acronym of TPLF is not synonymously used by the People of Tigray to stand members and the supporters of a party ideology and practices from inside and outside Tigray in the form of the political party, organizational, economic, and social groups, and individuals. Moreover, it was designated for those who blinded their eyes and mind to the opportunity to resolve grievances without war.

As a methodology, a writer uses a qualitative nature of an exploratory approach in constructive views with Neo-Neo debates due to the difficulty of collecting data, and the volatile and inconsistent nature of this active internationalized internal war, civil war.

⁵ Robert E. Lighthizer work in the United State Trade Representative and the President's Office as Ambassador and office

⁶ Lauren Ploch Blanchard is a Specialist in African Affairs contracted for the Congressional Research Service in America. She was present about this war before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations US House of Representatives on December 1, 2020. She is a journalist based in Washington and National Correspondent at Fox News.

In conclusion of the study, during the war the USA responses inclined towards TPLF due to the potential and capability factors of the experiences of personal leaders' quality and institutional leadership.

Moreover, this theses study insight that need to prioritize using post positivism to balance the Ethiopia and the USA strategic interests by ownership of Americans, People of Africa and Ethiopian Diaspora in America that contribute to people centric security by human consciousness that necessitates the protection of individuals treats from political oppression and environmental and institutional degradation, and to live in dignity in multi dimensions of personal, environmental, economic, political, community, healthy and food securities.

In summary, the introduction part below is organized into sub-topics of the problem statement of the study, the central argument of the study, objectives of the study, research questions about the study, research methodology, scope of the study, the significance of the study, and organization of the study.

1.1 Problem statement of the study

According to Semir Yusuf (2019), '..... the TPLF lost its control over the institutional levers of the EPRDF that gave a clear victory to the reformists'. It is when the TPLF's synonymous use of EPRDF ends or absolute monopoly of power severely started to decline.

In response, the TPLF planned and motivated to regain the monopoly of central national power and prepared politically and militarily by forming Tigray allies and Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). TDF comprised of special force from RST, Ethiopian National Defense Force defectors, local militias, members of Tigrayan political parties such as the TPLF, National Congress of Great Tigray, Salsay Weyane Tigray, Tigray Independence Party, other Tigrayan organizations, and previously unaffiliated youth who escaped to the mountains. In the military, TPLF prepared themselves about one to fifteen ratio to the National Defense Force of Ethiopia (NDFE) in Tigray.

In forming allies since November 5, 2021, the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Con-federalist Forces (UFEFCF) operation with an ideology of anti-Abiy ethnic federalism aimed to form a transitional government by force or by negotiation with a coalition of nine rebel groups; TPLF, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Gambella Peoples Liberation Army (GPLA), Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) up to January 2022, due to entrance of TPLF in

Afar, Agew Democratic Movement, Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF), Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM), Somali State Resistance and Kimant Democratic Party. For instance, in the second round of war, the TDF integrative force with OLF attacked NDFE.

During this civil war, the literatures written about the war and the USA responses toward were limited in number and issues below. The issues were focus on deescalate the crises, humanitarian aid, Abey's leadership and economic impact as a situation, conflict or war in Tigray without calling it "civil war of Ethiopia in National Regional State of Tigray" between governments of FDRE and TPLF and detailing the determinants of the USA responses clearly.

The Abey leadership, according to Louisa Brooke-Holland (20021), in his work of, "Ethiopia: Situation in Tigray" led to crises in question by removed quickly Tigrayans and the TPLF from position of power, and dissolved, reformed and renamed the government coalition EPRDF without TPLF acceptance. He also refers Alex de Waal as; as he with mostly Amhara political elite wants to abolish the federal system in favor of a unity government system. For him the USA made responsible government and military officials of Ethiopia and Eritrea for complicit in, undermining resolutions of the crises in Tigray, and imposed restrictions on economic and security assistance to Ethiopia. It is not clear the processes that detail the twenty eight years coalition up to the hundred percent votes to point of departing and the Eritrea's involvement.

Similarly according to Felix S. Bethke (2021) works of "Civil war in Ethiopia: the instrumentalization and politicization of identity" his shifting dynamics of ethnic power relations and the strategy of elite management contributed to the escalation of violence. But the war identity was transferred from political and military elites to regular citizens quickly and easily.

The humanitarian crises, for Lauren Ploch Blanchard (2021) in his work of "Ethiopia's Transition and the Tigray Conflict, Specialist in African Affairs", had a negatively impacted on US relations with Ethiopia as a strategic regional partner and the largest recipient of US humanitarian and development assistance in the world.

The war accordingly Samar Bagouri (2021) in his works of "The Extensive Cost: How the war in Tigray is impacting Ethiopia's economy?", was impacted the Ethiopia's economy directly and indirectly.

In addition to that, in 2022, Kibrom and et al., had wrote on the “Near Real Time Welfare and Livelihood Impacts of an Active Civil War: Evidence from Ethiopia.”, focus on impacts of the conflict on the food security and livelihood activities of affected households that result about 38 percent increase the probability of food insecurity from moderate to severe and a battle increases food insecurity by one percent. The rural areas less affected than the urban areas.

As responses, the political actors’ of Ethiopia seems accepted upon the correctness of the only political method, hard skill of violations including civil war. Moreover including human and economic crises it enhances the acts of silencing grievances by governing people by force within the practices of undemocratic political parties that weakening state machineries and disrespect the rule of the land that leads to disrespect and undermine relations between actors and born civil war easily. It may also biased the responses of the USA that ignore the interests of the people of Ethiopia that not efficiently call the early warning crises before war or make accountable of the civil war actors.

Generally, a study fulfills the scattered and limited dimensional information gap of literatures of this war by multi dimensionally exploring the public information of the USA and Ethiopia. It includes internalization and externalization of the causes and determinants of the US responses towards the civil war of Ethiopia in National Regional State of Tigray between government of FDRE and TPLF, including conceptualizing the theories and practices of internationalize conflicts in International relations.

1.2 Central argument of the study

As the thesis's central argument, the exclusive and imbalanced responses of the United States of America to the interest of the people of Ethiopia towards the civil war of Ethiopia in the case of TPLF affect the strategically broaden dimension of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA that may well damage cooperation or enhance public distrust.

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General objectives

The overall objective of the paper is to explore the USA response to the civil war in Ethiopia with respect to the government of FDRE and the TPLF to find the best conflict resolution mechanism.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

Specifically, the paper has the following objectives used:

1. Explore the USA and its agency responses to the civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray.
2. Discuss the implication of civil war on Ethiopia in Tigray and the USA responses towards the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA.

1.4 Research question about the study

The overall research question is, “What factors influence the USA responses toward the civil war of Ethiopia in the case of TPLF?”

1.5 Research methodology

1.5.1 Methodology and Analysis

Constructivists' believe that reality is a project under constant construction derived from inter-subjective knowledge and our interpretations of the political world. This thesis study uses exploratory research in qualitative methodology in constructivism perspectives with Neo- Neo debates.

In political science, qualitative method of analysis is used to analyze, how these war process determinants influence war outcomes over time and are used to sort out the endogenous and the exogenous variables. (Collier and et . al 2005)

The secretly volatile and the inconsistent nature of this civil war as a methodological approach, a study uses exploratory research. It investigates research questions that have not been studied in depth and challenges the absence of well-documented information or where data collection is difficult.

Constructivism succeeded in reaching a common between Neorealism and Neoliberalism due to both adopting the ontological position on the logic of consequences of material resources, power, and economic interdependent to shape the behavior of nation-state in IR, and the epistemological position of positivism under the functioning of universal laws, however, it is based the empirical validation and falsification of facts, post-positivism in IR. Constructivism holds the experiences through understanding the real nature, shared perceptions, interactions, and identities. It may

change the imagery by the active role of our mind in examining ‘how did it become that way’, and ‘how it ought to be’ to emancipate humanity through interactions and interpretations of ideas that may transform the enmity to friendship and vice versa.

According to Yu-tai Tsai (2009), the constructive perspective offers insight into human security through human consciousness, national identity, and interest formation for people-centric security instead of a state-centered concept. Human security, cited by Tsi and Tan (2007) is real security entails the protection of individuals from such threats as disease, hunger, unemployment, political oppression, and environmental degradation, cited Kofi Annan (2005) it is freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity, and UNDP Human Development Report defined it to seven dimensions of personal, environmental, economic, political, community, healthy and food security (cited UNDP 1994)

1.5.2 Source of data

The exploratory research uses primary and secondary data. The primary data of the thesis was collected from key respondents through key interviews’ and from the official websites of Ethiopia and the USA. Predominantly, the writer uses the website of the Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Embassy in America, the State Department of America, the Foreign Affairs of America, and the USA Embassy of Ethiopia and its agencies.

The secondary research sources are the available data taken from internet like books, research articles, and journals. The writer tried to be selective by using the American academics and work of US officials in politics of the US and Ethiopia.

The writer also uses key interviews with Senior Ethiopian International Relation Scholars using formal and informal ways; the Director General to USA affairs from the Minster of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of Ethiopia, a Senior Researcher from the Institute of International Relations, the Director of the Peace and Security Strategy Institute from Addis Ababa University, and the Researcher from the Center for Dialogue and Research cooperation in Addis Ababa.

The writer tried to enhances the relevancy or quality of information by counter-check with his reading of the work of experienced politicians and officials and academicians on bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the US. The writer succeeded to available information after he tried for at least three times to one interviewee. The wise understanding of the key respondents helped him

from the MoFA of Ethiopia, the Peace and Security Strategic Institute, the Institute of International Relations, and the Center for Dialogue and Research Cooperation takes place for more than fifty, forty, sixty, and fifty minutes respectively.

As the challenges, the writer encountered to access official information consistently from the Ethiopian Embassy, the Human Right Commission of Ethiopia, and the House of Peoples Representatives of Ethiopia, and physically from the US Embassy of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa physically. But a writer succeeded in accessing and using online information for instance from the US Embassy Ethiopia, the State Department, <http://www.foregn.senate.gov>, <http://www.congress.gov>, and <http://www.cbo.gov> filled the gap encountered in the research process.

1.6 Scope of the study

The scope of the study is only focused only on the determinants of the US responses to the civil war of Ethiopia in the case of the NRST. The study will discuss the factors that include the historical context of the civil war in Tigray and the official diplomatic history of Ethiopia and the USA.

In the war process, the writer has not detailed beyond NRST like the more suffered NRS of Amhara and Afar, and the other National Regional States of Ethiopia where the proxy war was conducted.

1.7 Significance of the study

The significance of this study is contributing to having cleared the challenges to understanding the responses of the USA and its Agencies that may improve the bilateral relations of Ethiopia with the USA. The USA is a critical country that existent at a critical time of Ethiopians graved each other that may contribute to understand the root causes of war in Ethiopia.

The lessons might be used to identify and understand internal and external determinants of the foreign policy of the State of Ethiopia, in which the inter-grown raged conflicts from all corners that need immediate and appropriate conflict resolution/management mechanisms with or without the International Community responses, including the USA.

1.8 Limitation of the study

The study encountered challenges in inaccessible of the available data because of the uncertainty and secrecy of political practice, and personal and institutional lack of commitments, and inconsistency and difficulty to analyze the black propaganda.

1.9 Organization of the study

The paper is organized into seven chapters; the first chapter called introduction comprised of the problem statement of the study, the central argument of the study, objectives of the study, research question about the study, research methodology, and analysis (source of data and instruments of data collection), the scope of the study, the significance of the study, limitation of the study and organization of the study.

The second chapter, literature reviews the concepts and practices of the civil war in International Relations (IR), Civil war in IR of Africa, Conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the US, and the causes of the Civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray.

The Third chapter, the historical bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA comprised of the USA and Ethiopia relations during the Emperors' period from 1903 to 1974, the US assistance in Ethiopia, the US bills/resolutions toward Ethiopia, and Ethiopian Diasporas' in America.

The fourth chapter discusses on the Civil war of Ethiopia in the case of the TPLF and the US during the Derg and the EPRDF periods, and the causes of the civil war in Ethiopia in Tigray since 1975.

The fifth chapter discusses the USA responses towards the civil war in Ethiopia in Tigray since November 2020 in contextualizes International civil war theories which includes the USA responses before and during this war.

Finally, the sixth chapter discusses the finding and conclusion of the study of the USA responses and civil war in Regional State of Tigray in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEWS

The scientific analytical discussion on the application of internationalized internal war in deconstructive politics of a multi-ethnic country like Ethiopia, is complicated under the claims of Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl⁷, where violence hardens ethnic identities to a greater extent than non-ethnic identities and violence escalation is faster or more intense in wars organized around ethnicity.

In this chapter, the writer theorize the theories of civil war in international relations, and practices of civil wars in Africa, and the HoA including its relation with USA used to explore the determinant issues of internationalized internal conflict in Ethiopia, in Tigray and the USA responses. He proposes at the system, social and state levels theories of cause and process of civil war as which it include the democratic peace theory, power transition theory, security dilemma theory, and grievance-greed theory, neo realist, neo liberals and constructivist.

In addition to that, the success and failure of the national interests of the USA in Ethiopia will be determined by Ethiopia's acts, its own internal and foreign affairs. Among others, the challenge complicates and imbalances interests that endanger the bilateral relations between the US and Ethiopia, Ethiopians. Thus, in a study of analysis, a writer explored mainly the American interests in Ethiopia in terms of International, Africa, and the Horn of Africa (HoA) plus a new determinant of Ethiopian Diasporas' in America.

2.1 Theories of civil war in International Relations

In the study of IR and foreign policy of the causes of war analysis, according to Levy (2011), one of the modified levels at the dyadic or system level focused on dyadic interactions between states at the global, regional and international systems. The dyadic level theories demonstrated the history of the interactions between pairs of states that have an enormous impact on their behavior.

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The realists' theorists assume that sovereign states (or territorial defined groups) act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic International System and use coercive threats to influence the adversary to maintain their reputations that advance their interests.

They argue that the primary determinant of international outcomes is the distribution of power at the dyadic or system levels of the strong doing what they can and the weak suffering what they must as cited Thucydides' (1996, p. 352), and of wars can arise either through predatory aggression or through a conflict spiral leading to an inadvertent war, (Levy 2011) that result from a threat of weakness and the struggle to be strong to serve the national interest.

System-level theories in war cause and implication dominated by realists are the balance of power theorists and the power transition theorists.

2.1.1 Balance of Power Theory

The theory predicts that states and particularly great powers will build up their arms and form alliances to balance against those who constitute the primary threats to their interests and threatens to secure hegemony. They agree that threats of hegemony generate counterbalancing coalitions that frequently led to general war. (Levy 2011)

2.1.2 Power Transition Theory

The theory of transition according to Anyanwu⁸ (2002), is used for political violence that is posited in regime transition processes for major change going on in which the ones who benefitted from the earlier situation always hold change back by connecting it with democratization (Cited Huntington 1991) and the transition might not be delivered the hope for better times, hence violence is likely to occur (cited Gurr, 1970).

In liberal view, state and societal-level theories explain war as a product of causal factors, internal to states. Among them, the paper proposes democratic peace and its cousin (Levy 1989), capitalist peace.

2.1.3 The Democratic Peace Theory

The democratic peace theory at the state and societal level theories is a predominant internal factor to the cause and the escalation of this civil war as the product of the absence of democratic culture and weak institutions, democratic culture and norms models, and institutional constraint model. The explanation of the former is the “democratic culture and norms” models (cited Owen 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001), which emphasizes that democratic societies are inherently averse to war because of the nature of democratic political cultures, as Kant argues that ‘citizens will not vote to send themselves off to war.

The other dyadic democratic peace of the “institutional constraints model” emphasizes the electoral accountability to the public through regular elections and the dispersion of power within the government through checks and balances among governmental institutions, the standard institution model. (Levy 1989) However political leaders are institutionally constrained from taking unilateral military action and are required to secure support from the public before authorizing the use of military force. More frequently they are externally tempted to use military force for the primary purpose of generating a rally around the flag effect that increases their domestic political support, the “diversionary theory of war” (Ibid).

According to cited Bueno de Mesquita and et.al. 2003, institutional explanation posits that ‘the primary goal of political leaders is their political survival. They theorized that according to Levy (2011) the political leaders with large winning coalitions (usual characteristics of democracies) require successful public policies to retain office, whereas political leaders with smaller winning coalitions (authoritarian states) require the satisfaction of key supporters through the distribution of private goods. For him where the democratic leaders initiate war only if they are confident of winning for political incentives that devote enormous resources to ensure a successful outcome by avoiding the costs of fighting in finding a negotiated settlement to misperceive and misperceptions of each other’s resolve or reduce crises and escalate to war, whereas the autocratic leaders whose political futures less sensitive to the outcome of the war and who need to conserve resources to distribute to key supporters at home and devote fewer resources to the conduct of the war.

2.1.4 The Capitalist Peace Theory

Liberals, the capitalist peace theory, according to Levy (2011) argue that trade, economic stagnation, and a culture of acquisitiveness promote prosperity that results in war. Trade enhances

prosperity and that prosperity removes domestic conditions that are conducive to war that it promotes prosperity, prosperity promotes democracy and democracy promotes peace (Cited Weede 1995), capitalist peace trumps democratic peace (cited Gartzke 2007) and increases the influence of groups that benefit from it and who consequently have an interest in maintaining a peaceful environment from it (Cited Rogowski 1989) as noted Blainey (1988) The prosperity enlarges the size of “war chests” and removes constraints on decisions of war. Economic stagnation can lead political elites to engage in the diversionary use of force to solidify their domestic political support, and it can also lead to pressures for protectionism that can lead to retaliatory actions that increase hostilities and possibly generate conflict spirals. In addition to that prosperity helps to promote a culture of acquisitiveness to acquire and possess more which generates conflict to war. (Ibid)

In constructive views a paper include the the greed and grievance theory and ethnic security dilemma.

2.1.5 The Greed and Grievance Theory

According to Collier and Sambanis (2002), greed and grievances are the cause of conflict as an opportunity not as motivation; greed distinguishes rebellions from other society which make rebellions profitable in some society weak. Similarly for them, objective grievances are the cause of conflicts that treat groups as exogenous of the groups in effect and endogenous to the grievances, but grievances are exogenous as their perception of opportunity is much more important as a cause of conflict than objective grievances.

Likely rebels are motivated mainly by greed rather than grievance (Fearon and Laitin 2001⁹; Collier 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 1999) For Fearon and Laitin (2001) countries' risk of civil war are depend on the conditions that favor insurgency for rebel recruitment and mark financially, not ethnic or religious characteristics that include poverty, slow growth, bureaucratically weak state, large population and rough terrain.

⁹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin are Professors at Stanford University in Department of Political Science. Fearon is a researcher in Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Laitin is field researcher in Somali, co-director and fellowship in National Science Foundation, Stanford’s Immigration Policy Lab and National Academic science

The Greed and grievance theory according to Anyanwu (2002) is the application of civil wars in Africa owing to economic and political causes based on Collier-Hoeffler “greed”, a desire for private gain, and the “grievance”, aimed at achieving justice theory used to “loot-seeking” due to the existence of a “lootable” resources and “justice-seeking” respectively. For him the main proxy for greed and grievance according to cited Collier and Hoeffler’s greed is the ratio of primary commodity exports to gross domestic product (GDP), unusually low income, weak government military capability, and social cohesion of ethnic and religious diversity within a country tends to reduce their ability to function, and the proxies for the level of grievance decrease the opportunity cost of rebellion include social (ethno linguistic and religious) fractionalization, the degree of political repression/ democracy, ethnic dominance, and economic dysfunction (slow growth; high inflation; high income or asset inequality).

2.1.6 Ethnic Security Dilemma

According to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009), ethnic security dilemmas for cited Barry Posen, increase violence due to “tactical offensive dominates”, commitment problems when the state collapses, and an outbreak of political violence (cited Robert Powell 2006), incomplete partition (cited Johnson) and trustless relations that result from disrespect and exclusive ethnic power-sharing with its practices.

For them, it is because of ethnic identities which harden during the war and are more easily identifiable than other social identities that make individuals vulnerable to targeting for violence in the event of a failure of the peace process that results from ethnic groups becoming responsible for their security (cited Chaim Kaufmann) and for cited Posen, the offensive defense influenced by political geography surrounded by potentially hostile neighbors at risk create defensive motives as a better chance of winning for tactical military advantage for the ever use of force that leads to the dynamics of rapid escalation of violence in a preemptive.

The security dilemma logic relies heavily unstable on ethnic power-sharing on because ethnic identity is easily identifiable, easier making targeting individuals for violence after the ethnic war and Posen’s theory of the presence of powerful co-ethnics in a neighboring state. (Ibid)

2.2 Civil war and International Relations in Africa

Since the end of the cold war in many low and middle-income countries, violent political conflict has been increasingly affected as a major obstacle to economic development in countries where

about one-third of the world population lives. (Fearon 2010) An IR of Africa is not free from raging conflicts, including “the war for basics of human need”.

The new or third category is internationalized internal armed conflicts, civil wars which advance an intra-state conflict or internal conflicts, and international conflict or interstate conflicts, which have varying degrees of external involvement that prompted the insinuation which characterized Africa as the home of wars and instability. (Aremu¹⁰ 2010) In the IR of Africa war born incapability and externalization challenge of Africans.

Violent conflict or any form of war loosens capability and intensifies externalization, rather than doing the homework of Africans. Among other implications of insecurities to Rocca¹¹, in 2019 about 73 Million Africans passed through food insecurity from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and northern Nigeria, Global report (2020).

For Aremu (2010), Africa is the home of wars and instability, since 1960’s the series of civil wars taken place in Chad (1965-85), in Angola since 1974, Liberia (1980- 2003), and Burundi, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone (1991-2001), and to Haysom¹² (2014), most conflicts in Africa endure for long periods; over 20 years in the DRC, 40 plus in Sudan and 17 years Northern Sudan...

The civil war in North Ethiopia is the continuation of since 1975 war that first ended after the formation of the state of Eritrea but is now in a complex and new dimension that creates all-around dependency assistance, and deepens the insecurity of Ethiopia.

The Nature and Origins of Violent Conflict in Africa, according to Gilpin¹³ are weak governance, historical animosities, exclusionary politics, contested legitimacy, resource competition, external factors, globalized conflicts, and extremist ideologies.

According to or Aremu (2010) the main causes have multiple factors of arbitrary borders, heterogeneous ethnic composition, inept political leadership and corruption, the negative effect of the external debt burden, and poverty that may be looking outwards and more broadly inward

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¹¹ Camilla Rocca, MA, is Head of Researcher in the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. She is a political officer and independent analyst at the European Union in Central Africa.

¹² Simone Haysom is an independent consultant in conflict

¹³ Raymond Gilpin, Ph. D. is a Professor at the Cambridge University in UK. He is a Researcher in UNDP, African Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, Center Bank of Sierra Leone, the African Development Bank and the World Bank

looking. Although Singer (cited in Gomes Porto 2002:6) stressed territory, ideology, dynastic legitimacy, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, dominance, equality, and revenge. (Chingono)¹⁴

Some scholars put the challenges in psychological perceptions of political practices in Africa. In Africa psychological unhappiness according to Chingono, led to war, where conflicts breed hatred of the perceived cause of the unhappiness, the enemy, as a ‘necessary condition for war’ (cited Galtung 2012:8), and once war erupted, killing the ‘enemy’ euphemized as a victory, becomes a source of happiness.

Similarly, the causes of conflict are the implication of unhappiness in his cited analysis of Wehr (1979), seven competing approaches of the innate as social animals; the way the societies are generated and structured; the symptom of a pathological strain; the social development; the competing state interests in conditions of international anarchy; the misperception and miscalculation; and poor communication as natural process common to all societies.

Moreover, for the solution, Aall¹⁵ (2015) clearly stated that the complex formula needed for the diverse and complex long-term social and economic impact of the conflict in Africa by a mixed multi-faceted approach and the cooperation of many different individuals and institutions. In Africa, conflict creates only poverty and disaster of the natural environment, war, and famine that internally strengthen incapability and external overburden of loans and loosen the legitimacy of the states of Africa and Africans that lack inter wins cooperation.

For instance, Africa has deep and complex challenges in West Africa according to cited Obi (2012), the roots of the conflict are embedded in the interplay of historical factors, socio-economic crisis, legacies of authoritarianism of the politics of exclusion, international forces, and local struggles. Likewise, he also focuses on Bad governance and Corruption, Human rights violations, Poverty, Ethnic marginalization, and Small arms and light weapons proliferation, Annan (2014).

¹⁴ Mark Chingono has a Ph. D. work as Senior Lecturer at the Universities of Swaziland, Oxford, Cambridge and Cape Town

¹⁵ Pamela Aall is served as Senior fellow in the Global Security & Politics Program in Centre for International Governance Innovation’s, Lead the African Regional Conflict Management project in United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Advised for conflict prevention and management in International Security and the International Peace and Security Institute and Advised council of the European Institute of Peace.

Lastly African solution for African problem aimed to end the long term humiliation and colonial domination they had endured, instead seeking a relationship with their former colonizers and outside powers, not of paternalism, arrogance, and neo-colonialism, but of equal partnership as cited Landsberg 2011. (Lala 2018) With cooperation with Kenya, South Africa, US, UN and EU, AU for the first accomplished his vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena, Agenda 2063, 2015, (Ibid) in Pretoria, South Sudan.

2.3 Conflicts in Horn of Africa and the USA

In 2018 the Horn of Africa made dramatic developments of a power transition in April in Ethiopia, a peace deal in South Sudan in September, and a peace agreement in Ethiopia and Eritrea in July oppositely the reported fatalities from political disorder events and battles and remote violence in the Horn of Africa from January 2015 to December 2020, according to bringing clarity to crises of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project.

According to a project report fatalities from political disorder events in the HoA were about 1200 due to intensifying attacks and clashes in Benshangul Gumez in Ethiopia on Dec 2020, about 2000 due to a military offensive begins in Tigray, Ethiopia between Oct to Dec 2020, and about 1200 due to intensive violence in Tonj, Mayom and Akobo in South Sudan on Dec 2018, and battles, and remote violence about 250 events recurrent multi-sided violence in Jongless state, with ethnic groups receiving proxy support by various military, rebel and intelligence channels in South Africa between Apr to Jun 2020.

The American active in the Horn of Africa, according to Henze¹⁶ (1990) during the 1870s and 1880s, in the Egyptian army as the union and confederate professional officers in the HoA and they accompanied Egyptian units on campaigns in northern Ethiopia that replaced by Italy, France, and Britain when the US had no strategic interest until World War II. (See Figure 1) For him later in the 1950s, the US and its allies prioritized modernization and rational economic and social development with peaceful resolution between and within Horn countries.

¹⁶ Paul B. Henze is served as US Ambassador in Addis Ababa from 1967-1972 and as in charge of Horn of Africa affairs officer in the US National Security Council, 1977-1980




Figure 1 - The Horn in the Scramble for Africa (Paul B. Henze 1990)

However in South Sudan according to Knopf (2018), the militarization of the US, the competition for influence among the state of the HoA, the contest over the use of the Nile, and the implication of the rift between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt on the one hand and Qatar and Turkey on the other exacerbate the armed conflicts affecting the region and has further fractured an already fragmented political and security landscape.

As indigenous factors in the HoA according to Biruk¹⁷ (2011), there are three Healy's conflicts stem; historic patterns of amity and enmity, the center-periphery relations, and making alignments tradition of outside powers. Among member states of the HoA now it is a region where civil war is

¹⁷ Berouk Mesfin is a teacher and researcher In Addis Ababa University and in University of Grenoble, France

conducted in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, a war for what Eritrea into Ethiopia, and a potential inter-war between Sudan and Ethiopia.

In the HoA the operational and possible foreign presence of military forces facilities, and military naval are; the US in Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, UAE in Somalia and Eritrea, the UK in Somalia and Kenya, France in Djibouti with three bases and Somalia. And other countries, in Djibouti are; the China, Germany, Italy, and Spain, in Eritrea are; Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Russia and in Somalia are; the EU, Turkey, and India. Here there is a Combined Task Force (CTF) in Bab el Mandeb in the Southern Red Sea, Gulf of Eden. See figure 2.

According to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) posture statement (2020), (2019), and (2018), the HoA at the beginning of the Cold War attracted the attention of superpowers for basing purposes, especially the US military bases in the region is aimed to achieve the US foreign policy goals of maintaining its influence, strategic access and continue to advance its national interests in the region in this era of global power competition. (Mengistu¹⁸ 2020)

During the Cold War, according to Iyob and Keller (2016), the US's presence in the Horn led to its involvement in Ethiopia's domestic affairs with policy concentrated on keeping Haile Sellassie in power as well as keeping the Horn free from communism. (Ibid)

The US military base is categorized as an enduring, non-enduring, initial, temporary and semi-permanent base. The enduring base provides strategic access and uses to support US security interests for the foreseeable future and whereas the non-enduring; is also known as a contingency that supports and sustains operations during contingencies or other operations. All types are present in the Great Horn of Africa.

The US military bases in the HoA will incorporate the non-operation in Ethiopia; Kagnaw and Arbaminch; in Djibouti the only permanent US military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier and Chabelley Airfield; in Kenya Mombasa, Manda Bay, Lakipia and Wajir and in Somalia Kismayo, Baidoa, Bosaaso, Mogadishu, Baledogla and Berbera. Among them, Camp Lemonnier and Chabelley in Djibouti, Manda Bay, and Mombasa in Kenya are the US Africa command "enduring footprint" in 2019 (Turse 2020).

¹⁸ 28. Mangistu Ejeta Sima is MA graduate in International Relations and Diplomacy from Addis Ababa University in 2020




Figure 2 – Distribution of foreign military forces in the HoA (Neil Melvin¹⁹2019)

According to Mengistu (2020), Ethiopia was the center of all American airspace operations from the Korean War to the Vietnam War, cited Mangi, (1987:96).

The strategic place, ‘Kagnew was a communication base leasing in 1943 from Britain and 1953 from Ethiopia to control the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Middle East and curb activities of the Soviet Bloc’, cited Redie, 2013; Woodward, 2002; Schwab, 1978), and operated in some military installations in Ethiopia since 2003 principally as part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa (OEF-HOA), cited Vine (2016).

In addition in 2001, the US from Djibouti leased the former French Foreign Legion, established and deployed a Joint Task Force known as a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) with around 2000 US military service members as well as personnel from allied countries as a military mission both to counter militant Islamism and piracy, in 2003, cited (Styan, 2013:9; Vertin, 2019:14). (Ibid)

¹⁹ Neil Melvin has Ph. D. and served as Researcher and as a policy practitioner in the Horn of Africa Peace and Security project, United Kingdom

In 2008, responsibility for the CJTF-HOA was transferred to AFRICOM which controls the large and permanent military base in Africa which, is known as Camp Lemonnier which leased for 20 years in 2014, at an annual cost of \$63 million for a convenient launching pad for drone surveillance and attacks, as well as the logistics hub for anti-piracy and other multilateral missions in the region (cited Styan, 2013:12)

For example, following traffic incidents at Djibouti’s Ambouli airport, in 2013, the USA at Chabelley Airfield conduct drone operations in Yemen and Somalia as well as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq cited in Defense Web (2019). (Ibid)

Location	Facility type	Duration	Size of contingent	Official purpose
Djibouti city, Djibouty	Military base Airbase	2001-present	2000-4000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counter terrorism operations in Horn, East Africa, Middle East • UAV counter terrorism operations support for anti-piracy mission • Staging point for US regional and global operations/power projection (Countering Russian and Chinese influence in Africa) • Training of African military forces • Emergency/humanitarian assistance
Baledogle and Other sites, Somalia	Military base Airbase	2016 – present	500	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for operations against al-shabab • UAV counter terrorism operations • Training of Somali special forces
Manda Bay, Kenya	Military base Airbase	2006-present	200-250	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for operations in Somalia and along Somalian-Kenyan border • UAV operations • Training of Kenyan military forces
Mahe Island, Seychelles	Airbase	2009-present	About 100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UAV anti-piracy operations
Arbaminch, Ethiopia	Airbase	2011-15	130	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UAV counterterrorism operations
UAV – Unmanned aerial vehicle				

Table 1- United States military presence in the Horn of Africa (Neil Melvin 2019)

In Kenya, the US has four bases at Mombasa, Manda Bay, Lakipia, and Wajir and in Somalia, the US has around six military facilities located at Kismayo, Baidoa, Bosaaso, Mogadishu, Baledogla, and Berbera (Melvin, 2019a). In 2015, it was reported to be operating drones and conducting counterterrorism missions from a base at Kismayo Airport cited Defence Web (2019:2).

According to Melvin (2019), the foreign military presence in the horn of Africa with multi military missions of combined maritime forces, operation Atlanta, operation Ocean Shield and the European Union Training Mission in Somalia are China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,

the United Kingdom, and the United States. Among them the US has a large presence see figure 2 and table 1.

In summary, the primary US interest largely after 9/11 was security from violent extremist attacks against its embassies, businesses, and citizens in the region achieved by stable nations with effective, well-trained, and disciplined militaries and growing economies, Mangistu (2020), in addition to win the regional power competition from almost all continents forming strong alliance from HoA countries using partnership. Similarly to Kidest²⁰ (2014), the US needs strong partnership with in the HoA that lacks clear regional power despite the constraints of economy and political consensus; but Ethiopia emerged as a central and influential security player due to military power, population size, relative internal stability, and diplomatic strength. Civil war make instability of the people and its environmental capability within the weakness in military and diplomacy.

2.4 USA assistance in Ethiopia

The seventy years history of assistances to Ethiopia started by the technical aid agreement signed between Ethiopia and the US on May 15, 1952 and since 1961, the American people started aid work to Ethiopia using the United State Agency International Development (USAID) on grown economic and development assistance on agriculture and food security, democracy, human rights and governance, economic growth and trade, education, environment, gender equality and women's empowerment, global health, nutrition, water, working in crises and conflict, power Africa and country development cooperation strategy. (Shim 2021)

For him the US assistance from 1952-1970, concentrated on developing infrastructure, institutions and manpower training and since 1970, it focuses on rural development and education in malaria control programs and human resource development that were decreased from 1976 to 1979, in the forms of grants. For instance, in the 1960s, due to its strategic location in the Horn of Africa and importance to the U.S. military communications at kagnew Station, Ethiopia received the third highest grant amounts behind the Liberia and Nigeria. (Ibid) According to De Waal (1991), even if ungenerous assistance of far less than needed for a famine of 1970s, the US cutoff development

²⁰ Kidist Mulugeta is a Consultant on peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa in Governance and Public Administration Section of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa.

assistance except on average \$15 million official assistance to Ethiopia each year between 1977 and 1980, of small economic and non-lethal military assistance to Hickenlooper Amendment²¹ to the foreign Assistance Acts to the response of nationalized US-owned assets of twenty five US companies in 1975 without providing compensation of \$30 million.

Later on December 1985, the US concluded compensation agreement relating to property, rights and interests affected by measures of nationalization, expropriation or other restrictive measures ordered or decreed by the Ethiopian Government that removed all obstacles to receiving assistance by US. (Riesenfeld²² 1987) It is signed by Joseph O'Neill, and Ethiopia's commissioner for compensation, Getahun Terrefe for Ethiopia to pay seven million installments to US officials seeking about twenty million dollars. (Los Angeles 1985)

From 1981 to 1992, USAID assistance to Ethiopia was reduced to humanitarian and emergency assistance without development programs which restarted in 1993. (Shim 2021)

According to de Waal (1991), in 1979, the USAID program was officially terminated and throughout the 1980s all the US assistance to Ethiopia was humanitarian aid. For example, in 1985, the US became the country's largest donor through non-governmental organizations and the only donor who undertakes an investigation into the human rights aspects of the famine which mounted between July and September.

For him in 1984 and 1985, at the war zone in northern Ethiopia, the USAID was the only donor to contemplate giving substantial support to the cross-border operation. The US donated 5,000 MT to Eritrea Relief Association (ERA) and Relief Society of Tigray (REST) in April 1984, for the cross-border operation, a further 23,000 MT in November and another "substantial" donation in December where the Ethiopian government was totally intransigent and refused it. Throughout 1985, and afterwards, the "Food for the North" initiative was proposed in March, whereby the US voluntary agencies would work on the government side and World Vision was selected to provide aid for Tigray. (Ibid) A year before removal of Derg, Ethiopia was receiving the largest amount of

²¹ Named after Senator Hickenlooper who introduced a bill to suspend foreign aid to countries which expropriate American property without just compensation as a method to protect private foreign investment.

²² Stefan A. Riesenfeldt is a Professor of Law at the Universities of California, Berkeley and Hastings College of the Law.

the US assistances of any country in Africa, without even full diplomatic representation or a USAID mission. (Ibid)

According to USAID after the military-led Marxist regime in 1990s, aid objectives include democracy, food security and health initiatives, and in 2000s it focus on programs supporting the health and education objectives with strategic objectives of food security, essential services for health, basic education, democracy and governance, mitigate the effects of disasters and southern tier initiatives that reformulated in 2006, of anticipate and manage shocks, human capacity, governance capacity, economic growth and knowledge management and from 2008 to 2011, it renamed into peace and security, governing justly, investing in people, economic growth and humanitarian assistance. (Shim 2021) See figure 5.

The funding level of the USA government assists Ethiopia economically since 1951 September 30, to 2013, was approximately \$11.7 billion seeing the figure 10. In 2016 and 2017, the USA almost half percent decreased the security assistance from 1.2 million dollars to 648 000 all for IMET and dropped again in 2018, to 570 000 dollar all for IMET. (Shenn 2018)




Figure 3 - USAID assistances in Ethiopia by sector 2001 to 2015
(USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, Data Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Green book))

The goal of USAID/Ethiopia from 2019-2024, according to the country Development cooperation Strategy (CDCS) of which issues one billion dollars per year for Ethiopia used to transit Ethiopia to a more democratic, prosperous and resilient society with accountable institutions and private sector led growth. It is focus on the constrain of an Abiy ability to actualize his vision by unprecedented political and economic transformation of historic state-led economy towards private sector-led growth in the consideration of democracy as the biggest threat to future development and stability including demographics of population growth, urbanization, rural small land holding,

weak labor market, education, health, nutrition and gender role and disasters of climate driven disasters of drought, conflicts, health outbreaks and displacement. (USAID/Ethiopia 2019)




Figure 4 - USAID (and its predecessors) assistance to Ethiopia 1952 – 2015

Data: USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services

Country/ account	DA	ESDF	ESF	GHP-state	HP-USAID	IMET	INCLE	TOTAL
FY 2017	7 857			141 812	135 550	648	0	749 072
FY 2018	9 551			68 813	135 550	945	0	601 293
FY 2019	4 615		8 285	59 594	135 550	1543	4000	634 361
FY 2020		1 000		59 169	92 850	850	0	203 869
FY 2021		2 000		90 000	92 000	1000	3000	278 000
GHP=Global Health Programs					ESF=Economic Support Fund			
IMET=International Military Education and Training					DA=Development Assistance			
INCLE=International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement								

Table 2 – USA assistance from FY 2017 – 2021 (Source: State Department CBJs for FY2019-FY2021)

According to the strategy instead of increase assistances, the US assistance, declined in more than forty percent due to the escalation of civil war between the FGE and TPLF. See table. The FGE denied obstruction of humanitarian access in contradicting the reports of aid agencies; the U.N. and USAID, especially the USAID accused the government of a violation of International Humanitarian Law and can constitute a war crime. (Blanchard 2021).

For him, among bilateral aid the Trump Administration twenty five percent paused in 2020, and frozen the 2021, in response to Ethiopia’s decision to begin filling the GERD without an agreement with the downstream countries. However the Biden Administration delinked the aid suspension from the GERD dispute that includes remain suspended some funds in light of the

deteriorating humanitarian and human rights crisis and the aid request for FY2022, about \$304 million except IMET funding for the first time in years.

According to the US embassy Addis Ababa statement (2021) the US provide the 250 metric tons of supplies with worth over 1.5 million USD on March 9, 2021, for tens of thousands of Ethiopians affected by the ongoing conflict in the Amhara and Afar regions of Ethiopia to International Organization for Migration IOM and the Ethiopia’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) at a warehouse in Addis Ababa.

Totally the USA assist Ethiopia in 2021, is nearly 663 million dollar in human assistance for northern Ethiopia since crises begin, Antony J. Blinken and America’s 940 million dollars humanitarian assistance to the people of Ethiopia, Ambassador Geeta Pasi including 1.3 billion program in Ethiopia to support lifesaving humanitarian assistance in Afar, Amhara, Tigray and other areas of the country, to the ongoing COVID response and vaccine donations, to US investments in health and education and the US planning for post conflict recovery. (USEE 2021)




Figure 5 – USA assistance from 2017 – 2021

In 2022, USAID Launched more than 315 million dollars for Resilience programs in need of conflict affected communities and internally displaced peoples in Afar and Amhara, Kefta investment which lift up millions of vulnerable youth across Ethiopia in 18 cities, doses of COVID-19 vaccine, the public private partnership and a 9.5 million malaria elimination program. According to the USEE on February 8, 2022, all assistance in Ethiopia by USAID, the humanitarian and development agency of the U.S. government is provided by the American people

as a commitment to our shared values and an investment in the prosperity of Ethiopia's future generations.

In summary the supports of Americans are more than its expected result on the ground, not leveraged Ethiopian. The US Foreign policy to Ethiopia using assistance for development and security are used to protect the Horn from the Soviet Union ideology and to give more strengthen the exclusivist policy implementers which endanger the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and the cohesive nature of the people of Ethiopia internally, and with international community externally that contributed to instance of the distrusted, and threatened the bilateral relations with the USA.

2.5 The USA bills/resolution toward Ethiopia

The bill which passed by the senate of the US is more dangerous than the resolution of House of Representatives that become law as an act. Act is passed by both Houses of Congress and has been approved by the President or has passed congress over his veto, thus becoming law. The later has the advisory role of Foreign Relation Committee in the House of Representatives. A bill, legislative proposal enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in congress assembly labeled as H.R. and S.R respectively.

During Derg, the resolutions passed is summarized on table 7, and in the current government of PP that affect more the poor or who need work, hope seeker and under employed hard worker, happiness seeker of urban and rural Ethiopians who are not the exporter or the manufacturers or economic and political dealers. See table 5 below.

2.5.1 The S.Rs. toward Ethiopia

During the Derge period, more influential acts are the Hickenlooper Amendment and the International Security and Cooperation Act which affect Ethiopia of the time in development assistance and export economy.

The economic ties between two states' were banned by the Hickenlooper Amendment. It was proposed by Senator Hickenlooper on May 8, 1962, to cutoff foreign aid to any country taking American property without providing immediate and effective compensation as required by international law, justice and equity which was signed by President Kennedy on August and added in the foreign assistance Act of 1962. The act is used due to some twenty five the US companies' compensation about \$30 million following the Ethiopian government's nationalizations of 1975, and the Ethiopian government refused to pay. See table 5.

Ruling Period	Title	Year	Cause of Act	Authorized US administration
Derg	Hickenlooper Amendment	1962	Nationalizations of 25 US companies without compensation of \$30 million in 1975 and refused to pay	Banned economic ties and cutoff assistance
	International Security and Cooperation Act, S. 960	1985	A deliberate policy of starvation of its people and failing to grant fundamental human rights	Impose a trade embargo that cover all exports, limit credit and prohibit aid for military assistance
	The Promotion of Democracy Act, H.R 588	1987	Condemning the resettlement program and human rights abuses in Ethiopia	Prohibits coffee imports from Ethiopia, oppose furnishing aid 1987-1988, and call for free elections in Ethiopia and supporting democratic resistance forces in Ethiopia.
EPRDF	The Ethiopian Democracy and Accountability Act, H.R. 2003	2007	Recognizing the human rights violations committed in the post-election crises	Prohibit security assistance and US entry of any officials use lethal force against peaceful demonstrators or accused of gross human right violations
Prosperity Party	The Ethiopia Peace and Democracy Promotion Act	2021	Direct or complicit involvement in the perpetration of human rights violations and other unconscionable abuses	Limit Assistance and non-eligibility for trade preferences under AGOA
	Ethiopia Peace and Stabilization Act, Bill S.3199	2022	Individuals materially and directly contribute to the escalation of the civil war	Suspend American Assistance and authorize the administration to impose individual actors linked to undermining attempts to resolve the civil conflicts
	Ethiopia stabilization, peace and democracy act of H.R 6600	2022	Threatened peace and stability, undermined progress toward a ceasefire, obstructed humanitarian assistance or violating human rights	Suspend assistance and to investigate and seek accountability and require to develop and implement a strategy to promote peace, reconciliation, and human rights in Ethiopia and to report to the congress on its actions

Table 3 – Typical S. Res. and H.R. toward Ethiopia (Congress.Gov, Foreign.senate.gov and cbo.gov)

According to De Waal (1991), the International Security and Cooperation Act raised an insoluble moral dilemma and most severe test of the US policy towards Ethiopia, in late July 1985, by the Representative Toby Roth, R., Wisconsin which introduced as an amendment to the foreign aid bill and signed on August 8, by President Reagan due to the Ethiopian government guilty on both counts of conducting "a deliberate policy of starvation of its people" and failing to grant its citizens "fundamental human rights" that obliged to impose a trade embargo that cover all exports save emergency humanitarian aid. See table 5.

Now, because of the humanitarian crisis reported atrocities in Tigray according to Blanchard (2021), stated by Secretary Blinken and other senior officials in greater the U.S. engagement on the situation in hearings, correspondence, and legislation, the Senate passed S. Res. 97, with Unanimous Consent in May, called on the Administration to push for a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Eritrean forces, to mitigate the humanitarian crisis, to support an inclusive national dialogue process, to pursue accountability for abuses in Tigray and to use “all diplomatic, developmental, and legal tools” to prevent further ethnic-based violence and promote multi-party democracy in Ethiopia.

In addition to that among others the Ethiopia Peace and Democracy Promotion Act of 2021, referred to committee by Mr. Menendez, Mr. Risch and Mr. Coons which promote peace and democracy in Ethiopia by conflict resolution, mitigation and management and reconciliation by accountable individuals in Ethiopia and Eritrea for human violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by using all diplomatic, developmental and legal tools that end the conflict in northern Ethiopia and throughout Ethiopia including the promotion of an all-inclusive national dialogue and the advancement of the human, civil and political rights of all Ethiopians. (Menendez and et. al. 2021) See table 5.

2.5.2 The H.Rs. toward Ethiopia

During Derg, USA as policy from 1987-1988, declared the H.R 588 of 100th Congress of Promotion of Democracy in Ethiopia Act, regarding human rights and opportunities, condemning the resettlement program human rights abuses which call for human and civil rights, free elections and supporting democratic resistance forces in Ethiopia including prohibits coffee imports from Ethiopia and oppose furnishing aid to Ethiopia. (Congress.Gov) See table 5.

In 2021, the House Representatives, H.R. 445 passed an amended version of H. Res. 445 of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that condemning all violence and human rights abuses that call on all combatants in the conflict in northern Ethiopia to cease all hostilities, respect human rights, allow unfettered humanitarian access, and cooperate with independent investigations of credible atrocity allegations. (Bass 2021) This resolution according to Blanchard (2021), strongly disapprove the escalation of political tensions into armed conflict resolution and the removal of Eritrean forces. Nonetheless till Sep 2022, the Eritrean in war in Ethiopia and also the war escalated by starting a war in August 2022, by Tigray, TPLF force for the second round in both

directions to occupy, remove Abey and govern Ethiopia by force and offensive responses from Amhara - Kobo, Afar-Abala and Eritrea Zelanbessa and Bademea.

Among others the Ethiopia Stabilization, Peace and Democracy Act, the H.R 6600, required the president administration to develop and implement a strategy to promote peace, reconciliation, and human rights in Ethiopia and to report to the congress on its actions under the bill and other related matters. (cbo.gov)

2.6 Ethiopian Diaspora in America

Depend on individual promise, the one who legally ‘the non-in, by own interest’ and who legally committed and expected to do first for their corresponding state citizenship, but they are Ethiopians or/and Americans that bridge the interest of both countries.

Diasporas have a unique role in IR as non-state actors in between host state and homeland in sharing culture, investing emotion and preserving social capital. (Diamanti-Karanou²³ 2015) In 21st century, they considered as a new type of diplomatic tool called as Diaspora diplomacy in order to achieve diaspora engagement on contemporary issues of strategic importance. (Dimitrios²⁴ 2019) According to Shain and Barth (2003), Diasporas’ influence the relationships between domestic and international behavior in constructive and destructive ways that influence homeland by political conduits for conflict and intervention.

Ethiopian Diaspora²⁵ for Lyons (2007), some are generate Conflict by complicate and aggravate political struggles like the full involvement on 2005, General Election in shaping political development and in framing conflict issues by whom, who commonly have traumatic memories that undermine compromise to develop ‘diasporic identities’ through the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) and Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD).

In contrast, he also puts some have significant advantage in finance and opportunities to develop political strategies which are legitimate in the homeland. Similarly, they are the biggest investment groups and most influential in the political opposition (cited Leyons 2011; Elizabeth and Peter

²³ Youly Diamanti-Karanou is a professor at Northern University in Political Science

²⁴ Dimitrios Tzirakis is Geographical Policy Officer at the European Commission. He has MA in International and European Relations from Linkoping University at the Sweden faculty of Arts and Science in Department of Management and Engineering.

²⁵ According to Minister of foreign affairs, Ethiopian Diaspora means Ethiopians and foreign nationals of Ethiopian origins residing outside Ethiopia. (MFA 2013)

2013), and increasing remittance flowing to Ethiopia from \$1.8 billion in 2014 which plummeted to 393 million in 2017, cited World Bank (2019). (Mesfin²⁶ 2019) The 1980s largest resettled Ethiopian refugees are the second largest group in the US after Nigeria, Kuschminder²⁷ (2010). They have multiple memories of natal, parental, religious, cultural, historical and national memories which prolonged since 1970's intolerable political environment.

In 2014, the first and second generation Ethiopian migrants in the US are estimated 178000 and 73000 and respectively, among this about 86 and 87 percent of working age and under age 18 with low household income, two-third share in the labor force, and proportional educational attainment of the US population. (Migration Policy Institute 2014) This group in diplomatic front pressurized the US politicians to influence foreign policy of US congress like that recognize the human rights violations committed in the post-election crises and demanded punitive measures on the perpetrators called as the Ethiopian Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007. (Mesfin 2019)

The role of more than half million Ethiopian Diasporas to Benti²⁸ (2020), in USA are significantly influenced in shaping investment, democratization and remittance of the country Ethiopia.

Each parts of this chapter the theories of civil war in International Relations, civil war and International Relations in Africa, conflicts in Horn of Africa and the USA, USA assistance in Ethiopia, the USA bills/resolution toward Ethiopia, the S.Rs. toward Ethiopia and Ethiopian Diaspora in America to clarify the words used and to construct the internalization and the externalization statements in the last chapters of five and six of the study that include the conceptualization of the USA responses towards the Civil war of Ethiopia in NRST between Government of FDRE and TPLF. The conceptualization of the study associated with respect to theories of civil war in International Relations.

The next chapters reviewed the historical bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA since 1903 as follows.

²⁶ Mesfin Negash Bekele is MA graduate at the Sodertorn University in School of Social Science in Journalism

²⁷ Katie Kuschminder, Ph. D. is a research fellow at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. She researched on circular and return migration in Ethiopia and Afghanistan

²⁸ Solomon Benti Tola, Ma, is a graduate from Addis Ababa University in International Relations and Diplomacy.

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND THE USA, 1903 - 2018

Historically the bilateral relation between Ethiopia and the USA is examined at critical times of Ethiopians⁷. Among them it may include in the second attempt of Italy invasion in 1937, the unity of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952, the coup d'état of Mengistu Neway³¹ in 1960, Ethiopia's position on Eritrea in 1962, non-supply of armaments and finance in 1967 and 1973, Ethiopia's unrest in 1974, non-assistance for resettlement program from 1981 to 1988, negotiated peace in 1991 between EPRDF and EPLF, accepting EPLF separation policy, the Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998-2000, the pro-Egypt Grand Renaissance Dam Agreement in 2020, and peace talk between government of FDRE and TPLF in November 2022, in which that were influence Ethiopians political view today towards the USA. In the region to Henze (1990), Ethiopia all its vicissitudes remains both the most populous and historically best consolidated state.

The official historical bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the USA aged more than a century, specifically on education, according to the former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy (2020) the US partnership with Ethiopia is going back nearly seventy years. (USEE 2020)

According to Teshome²⁹ (2020) the US is the largest source of bilateral aid to Ethiopia for almost a third of total aid (cited Yonas, 2016), a strategic partner of “global war on terror” or of Obama's statement of “outstanding partner” in the horn, and a “major contributor” in the UN peacekeeping, Alemayehu (2017).

In this chapter first a writer reviewed historic facts or views about the diplomatic relation of Ethiopia and the USA in Emperors' periods, the Derg and the EPRDF periods up to the election of Prime Minister Abey Ahmed.

²⁹ Teshome Chala is an Assistant professor at the Ambo University in Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Ambo, Ethiopia. He has MA.

3.1 The emperors' period diplomatic relations between the USA and Ethiopia (1903-1974)

The USA relations with Ethiopia from World War II to the military overthrow Emperor Haile Selassie, according to former US Ambassador to the Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, Shinn (2018), dominated by access to Kagnew Communication station and security assistances but deteriorated with Derg regime that where normalized until outbreak of war with Eritrea due to human right situations in Melese led EPRDF and shown slow improvement began in 2018 during Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed.

The Emperor Tewodros IV period, according to scholars including in Addis Ababa University like Bahiru Zewde, is a time when Ethiopian history internationally or her modernity begun. But the EPRDF, OLF and ELF as exclusivist politicians mainly decline it to the period of Menlik, a hundred year history of Ethiopia.

For Atnafsegede (2014, p100), the IR of Ethiopia from Emperor Tewodros to Emperor Eyasu were determined by ‘friendship and trade by agreement’ and by accepting demarcated boundary and by returning the uncontrolled land of Ethiopia they (foreigners) can use the sea port diplomatically if not Ethiopia can protect Ethiopia from the attempts of colonialist or expansionist or to occupy Ethiopia by armed force.

In 1902, the US accounted for fifty nine percent of Ethiopia’s foreign trade of coffee, hides and skins, but declined due to trade competition with Japan and India. (Henze 1990) In contrary for McVety (2011) ‘Ethiopia never became a major trading partner of the USA and it did not become an important ally until the beginning of the Cold War.’

According to Amanda Kay McVety (2011), in 1903 the Theodore Roosevelt administration signifies Robert P. Skinner, as the first the United States representative on to diplomatic mission to Ethiopia said about Menilik that "He wishes to lift his people up to the point of being able to comprehend and utilize these modern improvements and inventions, and to turn them to their own advantage, for the defense of their country and their national liberty." See figure 3 and table 2.

For a businessman William Ellis of the time reflected on Menelik's efforts as he told to The New York Times that ‘as our American motto is, America for Americans, Monroe Doctrine, so I hope your motto will soon be Africa for Africans, Menelik Doctrine, and as Europe for Europeans.’

Diplomatic trade relation did not expand and lapsed until for reopening of an American legation in the 1920s. (Henze 1990)



Figure 6 - Images of Ethiopia in the Progressive Era, King Menelik of Ethiopia

Photo taken from article Amanda Kay McVety (2011) [The 1903 Skinner Mission: Images of Ethiopia in the Progressive Era](#), King Menelik of Ethiopia with his court in Addis Ababa in 1903. The photo is from the scrapbooks of the 1903 Skinner expedition to Ethiopia. Image courtesy is of the Massillon Museum, Massillon, Ohio.

The objectives of the US official relationship with Ethiopia of the time were both for opportunity and information used to holdout against the European imperialism, to search of a treaty of amity and commerce, to avoid threat of European nations which closed access like France, Italy and Great Britain, to maintain Ethiopia's independence, to transform the power of Ethiopia, to fulfill the Americans interest in science of anthropology, to create the United States of Abyssinia (Skinner), to open a new door for America's commercial empire and to secure a collection of the seeds of the more important crops peculiar to Ethiopia valuable in the uncultivated western lands of the United States. For Skinner "they did not rule Ethiopia, but they dominated its links to the outside world due to quickest way to reach the HoA and they did not want the US to alter that situation." (McVety 2011)

At the second attempt of occupation of Italy, according to McVety (2011) the Haile Selassie I nation tried to be seen as an equal and independent participant in the global community and called for assistance to fellow members of the League of Nations as International Morality that stake alone the Mexico, New Zealand, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States to denied Italian sovereignty.

Official diplomatic relations	Period
King of Ethiopia Menelik II and U.S. representative Robert P. Skinner signed a treaty of commerce in order to perpetuate and strengthen the friendly relations	December 27, 1903
The American Legation established when US Minister Resident and Consul General Hoffman Philip credential in Addis Ababa.	July 6, 1909
The US with draw its diplomatic representations, close the legation in Addis Ababa and US Minister Resident and Consul General Comelius Van Engert departed Addis Ababa on March 4 1937 due to Italians invasion of Ethiopia and occupied Addis Ababa	March 04, 1937
US consulate was closed	March 31, 1937
US Minister Resident and Consul General John K. Caldwell presented his credentials to reopen American legation.	August 31 1943
The Ethiopian legation in the United States was opened and Blatta Ephrem Tewelde Medhen served as Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.	November 9, 1943
The American legation was raised to Embassy status when Ambassador George R. Merrell presented his credentials.	June 28, 1949
The Ethiopian Legation was raised to Embassy status when Ras H.S. Imeru presents his credentials as Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary.	September 27, 1949

Table 4 – Official diplomatic relations from 1903 – 1949 (Data: USA Embassy Ethiopia)

Ethiopia, under the Emperor Haile Selassie, the US never publically recognized Italian authority in Ethiopia, she withdrawn her diplomatic representations and closed the legation in Addis Ababa due to Italians invasion of Ethiopia and occupied Addis Ababa on May 6, 1936. (USEE) See table 2.

According to Lyons³⁰ (1986) the relationships between them from 1950 to the mid-1960s were the politics of a patron-client relationship. For De Waal (1991) She was the United States' closest ally in Africa which was mainly characterized as the both policy of the decolonization of Africa, the US support the unity of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952, the USA access to the Ethiopia's strategic position of Kagnew, the US military assistance to Ethiopia received between 1953-76, the US support for a battalion sent to fight in Korea, and the three years concerned conciliatory attitude of the US towards the outbreak of popular unrest in February 1974.

³⁰ Terrence Lyons is an associate Professor and Co-Director in Institute for Conflict Analysis and Restoration, and in the Center for Global Studies George Mason University.

Kagnew was a listening post of America in the Middle East and naval facilities in Massawa to control the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and the Middle East and curb activities of the Soviet Bloc leased in 1953 (cited Redie, 2013; Woodward, 2002; Schwab, 1978) and paid \$7 million per year with the provision of training and equipment valued at more than \$250 million for the Ethiopian army during the 25-year period, cited Redie, 2013:486; Schwab, 1978:12. (De Waal 1991)

Bilateral relation during Hailselasie	Year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed the Lend Lease Act that result three thousand American civilians repaired Royal Air Force 	1942
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and manage Ethiopian Airlines • During the World War II both eligible assistance 	1945
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issued credit for purchasing US equipment 	1951
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed a treaty of amity and economic relations and a point four economic assistance agreement • Supporting Ethiopia to send troops to Korea war • Supporting the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia 	1952
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased security assistance to access Kagnew 	1953
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The US facilitated the Hailselasies' returning to power after a coup attempted by the imperial Bodyguard 	1960
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US accommodated Ethiopia's position on Eritrea 	1962
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US delivering high performance aircraft to Ethiopia when increasing conflict in Ethiopia's Ogaden and in providing emergency food aid 	1966, 1967

Table 5 – Ethiopia and USA bilateral relation during Hailselasie (USEEE,2021)

The military assistance was about 40,000 army men and 2,000 air force trained and equipped in Ethiopia and about 4,000 officers and air force personnel were trained in the US with an annual subsidy in the army about \$12 million but in 1967 and 1973 the US was unwilling to supply all the armaments and finance.(Ibid)

According to Shenn³¹ (2018), former American Ambassador to Ethiopia, the famine and the social unrest overthrow Hail Selasie in 1974 that end the chronological bilateral relation of Ethiopia and the US as tabulated below. See table 5.

According to the former President of Ethiopia Negasso Gidada, the coup d'état of Mengistu Neway was failed due to American hand, Daniel (2011 p118). The coup attempted at the end of 1960 designate the USA and Ethiopia bilateral relations. After the failure of coup of poor planning and lack of support of the US, the US established effective relations with middle level, educated,

³¹ David H. Shinn is a Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He served as the US Ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso from 1996 until 1999.

reform minded governments and military officials that offer real assistance in achieving their aspirations and helping to mold their political views along democratic lines. (Lyon 1986).

The US relation determined by economic and military interests respecting the territorial integrity of Ethiopia changed to political reform and modernization of the imperial regime, including equipping and training the forty thousand Ethiopian army men and sending the largest American Peace Corps volunteers in Ethiopia.

3.2 The Derg period Ethiopia and the USA, 1974-1991

US support during the Derg government declined up to freezing assistance in controversial bilateral relations with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian revolution controlled by Derg for the US to Henze (1990) inspired the long friendship and relationships with Haile Selassie, which accepted his deposition with regret but without rancor, retribution, or disruption of relations.

According to Shenn (2018), during the first two years of the Derg, the grant of American military aid to Ethiopia decreased without the maximum increase in foreign military sales. Nearly the Derg announced the shutdown of Kagnev station, in 1977, the same response taken by the President Jimmy Carter administration.

Economic assistance to Ethiopia held steady by suspending until the end of the 1980s, all military aid to Ethiopia in the pipeline that dominantly determined the US-Ethiopian relationship throughout the remainder of the Derg government through massive Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia and more modest American assistance to Somalia.

On the other political side of Ethiopia, the USA, according to De Waal (1991), first up to 1977, favored the conservative Ethiopian Democratic Union rebel front but had no militarily effective force. Second, the USA supported and later rejected the TPLF from 1984-1985 because of too left-wing ideology. And third, the USA supports an exiled Ethiopian People's Democratic Alliance but ended due to its lack of a military presence in Ethiopia.

Most likely, the Derg and the USA bilateral relation determined by antagonistic, trustless, critical, and appeasement relations. See table 6. The antagonistic relations between them from 1974 to 1975 passed through the US's declining military, economic, and development assistance. The trustless relationship between 1975-1980, the substantially increased aid became frozen in 1977,

leading Ethiopia to shift to the Soviet Union, and a small economic program and lethal military assistance provided in 1978 that dried for the second time in 1980, in violation of human rights. See De Waal (1991), Henze (1990), Bourk (2003), Poster (2012) and Shan (2018).

Ethiopia and USA bilateral relation during Derg period	Period
Demanded armaments from the US, and at the same time, Derg attacked US Imperialism in official pronouncements	1974
The military aid to Ethiopia continued, and arms shipments increased substantially	1975, 1976
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colonel Mengistu unilaterally terminated the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that ordered all US military personnel to leave immediately on April 30, 1977, before September of the 25-year lease expired, and cut the US Embassy staff fifty percent in November 1977. • The US embargoed all arms deliveries • The Economic aid completely dried • USA does not support the resettlement program in Ethiopia 	1977
A small program of economic assistance and a small amount of non-lethal military aid provided to the army.	1978
The US lobbied to leave the population of Ethiopian Jews, known as Falashas, and the US was active in trying to obtain a negotiated peace.	1980
The Reagan Administration policy determined for the Horn of Africa to isolate Ethiopia and support its pro-western neighbors.	1982
The US lobbied to leave the population of Ethiopian Jews, known as Falashas, and the US was active in trying to obtain a negotiated peace.	1989-91

Table 6 - Ethiopia and USA bilateral relation during Derg period

The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Acts of the USA to the Ethiopian government in 1975, the nationalization of US-owned assets of 25 companies without payment of \$30 million in compensation, and Colonel Mengistu, unilaterally terminated the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and ordered all US military personnel to leave Ethiopia. This hostile and distrustful relationship completely dried up US assistance during Derge, Alex de Waal (1991).

The critical relations between 1981 to 1988, passed ever assisted the resettlement program and consistently criticized the Derg record of violating human rights, creating famines, and being guilty of deliberately using starvation as a weapon of war, including isolating Ethiopia from the HoA and supporting opposing non-state actors, and during appeasement from 1989 -1991, the US, lobby to leave the population of Falashas and to obtain a negotiated peace between the Derg, EPRDF and EPLF officials. For the summary, see table 7.

According to De Waal (1991), during this period, the US sustained its involvement through support for the Khartoum, Nairobi, and Mogadishu axis and non-state actors that shared the

common aim of overthrowing the Derg regime in Ethiopia. During this period, the US strategy was to encircle a state, Ethiopia, by forging alliances with contiguous neighboring countries (Sudan, Kenya) and supporting non-state actors opposing the Derg (EPLF, TPLF/ EPRDF and, in the end, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Cited Magnolia 2013. However, Shnn (2018) said that the US consistently supported the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and has never provided support other than emergency assistance to Ethiopian separatist groups.

In appeasement relations, from 1989 - 1991, the US primarily had a crucial role in the final days of the Mengistu government by supporting the convening meeting between representatives of the government, the EPLF, EPRDF, and OLF in London in mid-May. She was assigned by Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen to negotiate a ceasefire and to establish the terms of a transitional government but later postponed to May 27, 1991, at the instigation of the rebel fronts because Mengistu fled on May 21, 1991, and his army disintegrates on June.

At the same time as De Waal (1991), the US asked the EPRDF to take control of Addis Ababa to prevent a breakdown in law and order. However, the US was the only major donor to direct her majority assistance to the rebel-held areas in 1989-91, following an objective assessment of the numbers of needy people to be found there.

‘Ten-Point’ of reiteration the principle of territorial integrity
• Not to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by the movement of insurgents.
• Un conditional ceasefire.
• Arms moratorium
• Open roads for famine relief
• Free trade to open movement of goods
• Refuge return to their point of origin
• Provisional national reconciliation council with international help and support.
• Convoke provisional administration to a constituent assembly to write the new constitution.
• Commitment used to human rights recognitions and programs of economic support and assistance of development.
• Principles and goals of the international community.

Table 7 – ‘Ten-Point’ of reiteration the principle of territorial integrity

In 1990, the USA initiated the principle of territorial integrity of the Ten-Point reiteration of commitment with Canada, major Western Europe countries, Japan, African states, Middle East

states, and the USSR. It is when Libya, Iraq, and Syria spoiled, and the TPLF disavowed separatism. (Henze 1990) See table 7.

According to former Ethiopian President Negasso Gidada, the United States actively participated in a tripartite agreement between the Derg, TPLF, and EPLF with a vote-less OLF that excluded the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethiopian Workers Party (AEWP). At the same time, the agreement failed the negotiator of England, Holland, Germany, and Sweden. (Daniel 2011)

This uneasy relationship of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the US, according to Berouk (2003), is classified broadly into three intervals of coexistence in maintaining military supply (1974-1977), confrontation (1977-1989) due to Ethiopia overtly aligned with the Soviet Union, and rapprochement to normalize its relations from 1989-1991.

After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, the Soviet Union fell apart at the end of the 1980s, with the US support for the Mengistu exile in Zimbabwe, resulting in the poor bilateral relationship between the US and Ethiopia, changing and returning to a dominant position. (Shenn 2018) Additionally, the US actively organized a series of meetings between the government and the rebel fronts in 1990 and 1991, alongside other intermediaries, employing an agenda with the Falashas, the supply of relief, and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The negotiated peace softened World Bank loans to Ethiopia that were ultimately successful in assisting the handover of power from the Mengistu government to the EPRDF and EPLF with less bloodshed through persistent diplomatic efforts and the long-standing US objection to Eritrean independence. (De Waal 1991)

The external support and facilitation failed the Mengistu government to obtain military aid from Washington that helped to turn Ethiopia back and sought an alternative external patron in Moscow. (Magnolia 2013) Moreover, the US banned development assistance and opposed assisting the resettlement program and the delivery of arms on accounts of the Hickenlooper Amendment and human rights abuses. (De Waal 1991)

During this period, the US sustained its involvement through support for the Khartoum, Nairobi, and Mogadishu axis, and for non-state actors that shared the common aim of overthrowing the Derg regime in Ethiopia. The US strategy was to encircle a state, Ethiopia, by forging alliances

with contiguous neighboring countries (Sudan, Kenya) and supporting non-state actors opposing the Derg (EPLF, TPLF/ EPRDF, and, in the end, the OLF. (Magnolia 2013) The US was the only major donor to direct its assistance to the rebel-held areas in 1989-91, per an objective assessment of the numbers of needy people to be found there.

The USA actively convened negotiations from the end of 1990 to 1991, between the government and the rebel fronts within the agenda of the Falasha's in Ethiopia, the provision of relief, and the commitment made in conflict resolutions, De Waal (1991).

3.3 The USA and the EPRDF period, 1991-2018

The USA supported the transitional government of the EPRDF with conditions of no democracy and no cooperation, as Herman Cohen³² used to hold a political conference by July 1, 1991, to represent the non-combatant political forces, and multi-party elections held within one year. An election extended to two years, de Waal (1991)

Beginning in 1991, the US played a critical role in legitimizing the new Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), Shenn (2018). But for him, before 1998, EPRDF in-cooperation with the persistent difference abuses democratization and human rights, and in the more complicated way after 2005. On regional issues, the USA cooperates with Ethiopia to end the crises in Somali, peacekeeping in Rwanda, and pressurized Islamist Sudan to change its policy of export of Islamist groups to Ethiopia with twenty million dollars for non-lethal military assistance together with Uganda and Eritrea, Shenn (2018).

Specifically to Pham³³ (2013), in the 1990s, Ethiopia worked with the US because of the threat posed by the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, by Al-Qaeda, by hosting the discredited US military presence where Un-manned aerial vehicles assigned to counterterrorism missions in East Africa.

The US supported the stability of HoA by encouraging Ethiopia to counter the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia, in Darfur by sending peacekeeping troops to the UN Hybrid-Mission in Sudan,

³² Herman Cohen was assistant secretary of state for African Affairs under President George H. W. Bush from 1989 – 1993. He served as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan (1987-1989).

³³ J. Peter Pham is a director of Michael S. Ansari Africa Center Atlantic Council. He presented a paper before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organization

in Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan to the UN Interim Security Force and the UN Regional Protection Force in Juba respectively in 2006, 2008, from 2010 to 2013, and 2014. (Shenn 2018)

The US significantly criticized and supported Ethiopia from the Ethio-Eritrea war (1998-2000) to 2005. For instance, the violations of human rights of Ethiopia by the US Congress and the Ethiopian diaspora, supporting the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the regional stability on counterterrorism, and the neutral position of the 2005 General Election of Ethiopia that started to complicate the bilateral relation like expelling the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute and other, equally toward the HoA concerns of Al-Shabaab terrorism in Somalia and Kenya, the conflicts in Darfur, end recrimination between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and independence and stability of South Sudan.

After many peoples were dead, disabled, and were displaced during the Ethio-Eritrea war to Gebru³⁴ (2015/16), the US prepared and supported to end of the war. First, without condemning the Eritrea attack on Ethiopia, She prepared failed peace agreement proposal with Rwanda to avoid strategically threatening instability of the HoA and the Red Sea that protect the US interests.

Second, the US involvement in the preparation and implementation of the peace agreement framework of the Organization of African Union (OAU)³⁵ Framework Agreement for a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute Between Eritrea and Ethiopia with OAU representatives which passed on Oct. 1998, on the thirty-fourth permanent assembly of the OAU in Oga-Dugu, Burkina-Faso.

This third civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray may cause by unsettling political differences, waves of anger, grievances, and violent conflicts. For instance, as unsettled differences and grievances, this issue may be backed by the win-loss relationship of the separation of TPLF in 2001 of the pro-against the late prime Minister Meles Zenawi which strengthened by the democratic centralism that inter-grown to the public decision on the first democratic battleground of Ethiopian democracy.

In the 2005 election, EPRDF was in hundred percent defeated in Addis Ababa for the first time, which lost its legitimacy in Addis Ababa-Ethiopia and continued in its birthplaces. This cracked relationship among the coalition parties was widening year by year using politicization of ethnicity in the economy and governance at regional and federal levels that transferred to an unplanned

³⁴ Gebru Asrat is a founder former leader and member of TPLF who Administers RST as President.

³⁵ The Organization of African Union (OAU) was replaced by African Union (AU).

changing spirit to entire Ethiopia to the strength of the movements of opposition parties and the public awareness.

Public awareness widens through the involvement of the concerned actors or citizens in governmental, non-government, and political organizations with the informal actors; Keerroo from Oromia, Fanno from Amhara, Zurma from Sidama, and the like and individuals. Most of them were innocent to the Ethiopian politics who are committed to changing the overflow of cruel governance and trying to fill the inclusive political space mainly gaped by EPRDF and to save the country and its people in avoiding holy peace crises. Both commit to what the Grand citizens did at the second attempt of Italy to occupy Ethiopia.

Significantly the struggle since 2006, forced the EPRDF to decide the resignation of PM Hailemariam Desalegn after the significant imposition and unrest of protests in 2016 that led to a tactical shift of power to PM Abiy Ahmed in a war-like election. Since mid-2018, these given new dimensions of the current politics with dimension challenges of Ethiopia and its people when as Chairman of EPRDF, Abiy Ahmed was elected on March 27, 2018, and in his appointment as prime Minister on April 2, 2018, with hundred percent including TPLF.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CIVIL WAR IN ETHIOPIA IN TIGRAY

In Tigray civil war repetitively occurred three times after the second defeat of Italy which tried to fail humanity and practically failed out by modernity or personality. The second civil war (wey-ann'e two), following the restoration of Haile Selassie, after the second defeat of the Italians in 1941, there was a revolt in Tigray Known as the Weyane.

According to Tefera (2019), in 1974, TPLF was established by 'the Tigray progressive University Student Association and then a leftist organization of the Tigrian National Organization and became the TPLF in February 1975. EPRDF is an umbrella of ethnic and national fronts dominated by a political TPLF force of six percent of the country. (Anwar 2018) Similarly the founder of TPLF, Argawi (2008) acknowledged that 'TPLF was the de facto ruling party in Ethiopia under the name of EPRDF.'

First, according to Aregawi (2008), the Ethiopian experiences grinding poverty, political repression by the autocratic government of Emperor Haile Selassie, and regional aftermath and unfulfillment of high expectations of post-war restoration after the liberation of Ethiopia from fascist Italian rule in 1941. Therefore for him, it resulted in the first weyyane rebellion in Tigray in 1942-43, regional consciousness in the young generation of the time and learnt second followers as consciousness and resort the ethnic exclusiveness in the formation of the TPLF for the independent Republic of Tigray up to mid-1999, to that of pan-Ethiopian perspectives.

The second civil war was conducted for thirty years between the TPLF and Derg. It was concluded by defeating Derg and taking power by EPRDF through the strong population support, the weak political environment and social fabrics, high capacity of formed alliances against the Derg government, and support of great external power like the US. The second and third weyyane civil war discuss in the subchapter on bilateral relations between Ethiopia and USA during Derg and EPRDF periods and on the next chapter since 2018.

Among factors the first, they have support of local people that may include the students and teachers, the peoples of urban, and the rural farmers. Among students, the first eleven established the TPLF in 1975, and in 1985, they formed the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, the vanguard

party with farmers. From 1984-1987, the local people provided active support for TPLF and increased nearly threefold in the number of TPLF fighters. In 1989, a TPLF army defeated Derg in Tigray and occupied the whole province.

Second, the war was disastrous civil war due to repeated attacks on civilian targets, numerous cases of abuse against civilians, unlawful execution, artificial food shortages, hunger, and poverty, weakened the political environment and social fabric of the cohesiveness. These help them to facilitate the power to transfer and use resources dominantly.

Third, end of 1980's, they started formation of alliances against government, the EPRDF to make joint operations with the Ethiopian People Democratic Movement (EPDM) militarily active in Wollo and Gonder provinces; Dessie-Mekele road, Lalibela, Korem, Sekotta, Wichale, Jarre and Haike, and since March 1991 with Afar Liberation Front (ALF) attack overran Bati, on the eastern escarpment of southern Wollo, Mille and captured Lalibela.

The EPRDF, in January 1989, was created by collusion of the TPLF and EPDM, the new Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM), and the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPD and later, the Southern Ethiopian People Democratic Movement (SEPDM). During 1990, the EPRDF concentrated on power consolidation and early 1991, launched three offensives in quick succession that destroyed the Derg army and the government of President Mengistu, the EPRDF Takeover on May-June 1991.

According to English scholar, Alex De Waal's (1991) report on *EVIL DAYS: 30 YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA*, the second civil war was characterized as indiscriminate against civilians that exceeds 150,000, and many areas heavily mined concluded by the defeat of Derg.

As a result of protest movements since 2018, according to a senior researcher of the HoA in the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa, Semir (2019), weakened institutions that suffered Ethiopia in three ways by fracturing command and control within the key sections, in need renegotiation between the Federal and Regional States and sliding from Rule of Law and Order.

In December 2019, he announced that the EPRDF dissolved to form the ruling party of the Prosperity Party on a pan-Ethiopian identity. Oppositely, the TPLF refused to join the Prosperity Party. According to Blanchard (2021), the unclear and weak institutional roles of the Federal and

regional governments, the escalation of the ethnic conflict across the country, the impacts of COVID-19, and the implementation of the new urban base megaprojects in Ethiopia created tensions between the RST and the Abiy government which was erupted into violence in November 2020.

Not only these, it includes poverty, non-qualified corruption fighting, continuing the exclusive policy, disrespect and destructive use rule of law, and undermining political practices between each other. For her, the domestic institutional involvers are the forefront Ministry of Defense, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the Media, the Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council, Ethnic Stakeholders, Civil Society such as the Interreligious Council of Ethiopia, and Ethiopian Peace Development Centre, as well as traditional cultural authorities.

In the early stage, the war was characterized by the conflict of the rule of law between law enforcement operation, GFDRE and protection of the Tigray's autonomy, TPLF. Both popularized the war by the declaration of war of life or death for the People of Tigray to protect from the destroyer of Tigray and called 'All to war' for all People of Ethiopia. The neighboring National Regional State of Amhara (NRSAm), and National Regional State of Afar (NRSAf) called their people to all round war against TPLF.

Shockingly, it is like returning to the 1991 report of an African Watch, the deep darkness due to the evil days of 30 years of wars, and famine in Ethiopia, that dedicated to the many unknown victims of thirty years of war and famine in Ethiopia, by Alex de Waal . The consequences of that and this war need deep study to return peoples healthy from their trauma; permanent and temporary disease, not only the people of Tigray, for entire Ethiopia and for being human in International Community especially for those who respect Internationally and naturally accepted rule of law.

Thirdly, the undermined and disrespected relations between political actors led to the start of the civil war on November 4, 2020, by TPLF when they attacked the Northern National Defense Force suddenly and continued to the November 2, 2022, Peace Talk Agreement.

According to ACLED, a war in Tigray involve Eritrea to the response of fired missiles at the airport and the Ministry of Information headquarters in Asmara, see the following figure as organized political violence in Tigray, Amhara, Afar Ethiopia, and Eritrea from August 01, 2020,

to January 15, 2021. See figure 7. For some scholars, it is the act of new state formation of Tigray due to china’s investor visiting RST, and the UN Secretariat Guterres phone call or contact with the leader of TPLF, Debretsion who created an office of external affairs of Tigray, without recognition of the FGE.




Figure 7 – Organized political violence in Tigray, Amhara, Afar Ethiopia, and Eritrea , 1 Aug 2020 – 15 Jan 2021, (Data: ACLED: Bringing clarity to crises)

The consequences of this war similarly affect directly the peoples of the NRST, NRSAm, and NRSAf, and in proxy wars, the National Regional State of Benshanguel Gumuz (NRSBG), National Regional State of Gambella (NRSG), National Regional State of Oromo (NRSO), and Regional State of South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples (RSSNNP) that destroy Ethiopia and Ethiopians humanity, the spirit of Ethiopia.

According to the key interviewee II, the relations between the FGE, and TPLF is only a conflict between the politically interested groups. He strongly disagreed as politically incorrect when we labeled it as intra-conflict, inter-war, and civil war in terms of the participation of neither all people of Tigray nor seventy percent of the population of RST.

Differently for interviewee I, war participation is a civil war that directly involves civilians from the RST, RSAm, and RSAf together with the other six regional states of Ethiopia. For him, the second stage of war fulfills the coding of civil war, conflicts only between the two political elites; the Federal and TPLF security forces; and it was popularized to the people of Tigray by TPLF and the peoples of Ethiopia and specifically to the RSAf and the RSAm by Federal government. After the TPLF announcement of the popularized war, and the FGE call to the People of Ethiopia,

especially for the neighbors RSAf and the RSAm militarized specialized forces, paramilitaries of Fanno and militia, and civilians where the war expanded which includes other regional states of Ethiopia.

During the war publically, the EU and the US supported TPLF, and China and Russia supported the Federal Government, especially in the first phase of the war. This internationalized internal conflict for the definition of Sambanis fulfills the civil war code in terms of participation, the organization as a political party and combatant, representation, sustenance of violation, resistance effectiveness, end of the war by peace treaty or victory, ceasefire truce or an end to the fighting and the continuation of the war.

In participation, the TRST started the war suddenly as they called it a surprise attack by ignoring, not protecting but attacking the Northern Command of National Defense Forces. The TPLF and FGE declared public war, which called civilians to the war and was recognized easily by International Systems like the AU, EU, UN, and USA.

The participation of America in this war was by passing a legal document and support to end war using the Representatives, senators, and officials of the USA. It contributed to an understanding of the challenges and attention given to the House of Representative and senate of America, and the UN, including the new appointment for the position of Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa that monitor and provide day-to-day information using the US-Embassy of Ethiopia to Americans and international communities.

Both have organized political parties of the PP for the FGE and the TPLF for the RST with principal combatant of the National Defense Force (NDF) with Special Force of Amhara (SFAM), Afar (SFAf), Oromia (SFO), Sidama (SFSi), South Nation, Nationalist and People Region (SFSNNPR), Benshangule (SFB), Gambela (SFG) and Somali (SFSO) with para-Militia Fanno (PMF) and Amhara Militias (AmM) and Afar Militias (AfM) and Tigray Defense Force (TDF) with Special Forces of Tigray (SFT) and Tigray Militia (TM) respectively that results too more than numbered deaths in code. Both called their people to involve in war.

During the war, the EU and the US supported TPLF, and China and Russia supported the Federal Government, especially in the first phase of the war. In this war, all ten regional states of Ethiopia

had participated locally in war relations and for cessation of war predominantly the AU, UN, EU, USA, Kenya, and South Africa.

TPLF paid human, natural, and half a century effort of capital made up of Ethiopians by war policy to sustain violence in expanding war two times to neighbor regions, integrating the proxy war on other parts of Ethiopia like in the Regional State of Benshangule Gumez (RSBG), Gambela Region (RSG), South Nation, Nationalities and Peoples Region (RSSNNP) and Oromia Region (RSO). It may be with the alliances of UFCF and pro legacy of Melese in the above regions to have an external route corridor to Sudan, to return west Tigray occupied by Amhara forces, and to control about eighty percent of the economic gate of Ethiopia in Afar and entire Ethiopia.

In war resistance, on November 29, 2020, the Government of Ethiopia stated as the military operation of the war in Tigray was completed, and an interim government of Tigray appointed by PM Abey till the TDF captured Mekelle, the capital city of the RST, June 28, 2021. The TPLF effectively resist by returning to Mekele and occupying most of North Ethiopia .from October to November 2021, up to Debr-Sinna near Addis Ababa.

After the first phase of war victory of the NDF within weeks and left Mekele, a capital city of the RST, the TPLF established government by replacing the Tigray PP. this would happen through either the publically hidden peace treaty or victory of the TDF. For the second phase, the war expanded by the TDF to the Regional State of Amhara (RSAm) and Regional State of Afar (RSAf) in August 2022 from Kobo but lost the occupied area from Central, East, and North Tigray at the human cost.

At the end of the first phase of the war, TPLF lost the governed areas since 1991, like western Tigray; Adigoshu, Hummera, Dansha, Maycadra, Bereket, Maygaba, and Adiremetse by NDF, SFA, AM, and PMF-Fano, and from North Tigray; Badame, Zelanbessa, Erob, and Tsorena by Eritrea and NDF. It adds some parts like Adi Arkay and Abargelle from the Amhara, and Abeala from Afar, but not now they left these areas.

The Aballa was returned to Afar after national and international influences to enhance the transportation of humanitarian support to the People of Tigray after the first round of war. After a six-month war break, the war started for the second phase in both directions of Tigray, which may present the failure of the hidden peace agreement.

In any way, this civil war is a war against the Ethiopians or fellow citizens without beliefs and interests that have been fought within Ethiopia to control Ethiopia by force. In war leadership, it is quite different from earlier wars between Haileselassie and Tigray farmers and Mengistu and TPLF, where the war conducted within TPLF led leadership of the first EPRDF of Melese legacy and Abey, the one who selected by TPLF by hundred percent.

The Tigray conflict introduced in different forms between the Tigray minorities and the majority Oromo and Amhara (Oro-Mara), between PM Abey Ahmed and Tigrayan elites, between the Ethiopian NDF led by FGE and the Tigray Regional Security Forces led by the TPLF and between the Federal Security Forces with Amhara Regional Security Forces and the TPLF. It is time when all harvest, what may be the EPRDF cultivation of the miscalculated, ignored, and illegalized facts, to build the state of Ethiopia.

At the beginning of the war, TPLF legitimize his announcement of war by claiming Abey government actions like un-constitutionally extending the term by citing COVID-19 concerns, reducing the RST budget, declaring the lack of legal authority of Tigray regional government, changing the military command force stationed in Tigray, designating the TPLF as a terrorist group in May 2021, scapegoat for the country ills, excessively targeting in the anti-corruption prosecutions and TPLF-linked businesses that felt isolations and unsafe of Tigrians. (Ibid)

The cause of the war may backed to the TPLF assembly, of which more than six hundred members of participants in Tigray decided to return power or to ask for independent Tigray. The first was by assassinating Abey and attempting it on June 16, 2019, and by escalating the conflicts in the entire country. The second, if all felt, want to ask for separation based on Article 39 of the federal constitution.

The TPLF major unconstitutional acts had they suddenly attacked an Ethiopian army, conducted an election, and established a coalition up to the transitional government of Ethiopia in Washington by endangering the country territorial integrity.

The political and military preparation of TPLF after thirty years publically started amazingly after hundred percent elected Abey as the leader of the EPRDF, or most likely after the formation of the Prosperity Party replaced the EPRDF. The ignorance character of TPLF during the war,

pronounced by Tigray officials' was to protect Tigray autonomy by the return to Federal Power or accomplish the Independent Tigray.

TPLF politically established a transitional government in Washington and militarily in the preparations of the Tigray Defense Force, creating alliances of Federalist Force for proxy wars, and infiltrating federal and regional security forces to serve the interest of TPLF.

The main contributors the FGE were; members of PPs at the federal; Minster of Defense, and regional level; mainly RSAm and RSAf, and other regional states including security forces, Pro-Abey former EPRDF members, the democratic institutions of Ethiopia; House of Federation, House of People Representatives, National Electoral Board, and Human Right Commission of Ethiopia, and civil society of the Wolkaite and Kemant Committees in terms of not to escalate conflicts and conduct civil war, by not implement the rule of the land, by making accountable and by not self-manage the resolution. The regular citizens from members of the Former Ethiopian Army, Militia, and Para-militia called Fanno. It includes the neighboring state of Eritrea,

In addition, more than eighty percent of my key respondents believed the entrance of Ethiopia has destructive interference. Among scholars in Ethiopia, some constructively consider the entrance of Eritrea as a necessary action because of the weakness of Abey leadership of the time, but some may be for the support of TPLF to the opponent of the Eritrea government and for the implementation of the agreement made between Esayas and Abey in Saudi Arabia, to qualify the interest of the state of Eritrea.

On the other sides, of members of former TPLF and Tigray PP, members of the security forces at the federal and regional level of TPLF-led EPRDF and PP-led EPRDF, regional militarized force named as a special force of Tigray, Militia, para-militia Fenkele and opposition parties in Tigray like Tigray Freedom Party. On this side, some militarized and non-militarized opposition parties that create a coalition of the UFEFCF groups of TPLF, OLA, GPLA, ARDUF, ADM, SNLF, BPLM, SSR, and KDP. In addition there is information on the presence of Eritrea state opposition parties.

During the beginning of the war, the TPLF military force comprised of the members of TPLF, members of the security forces in Ethiopia, the Pro TPLF-led EPRDF members, Tigray Defense Force, Tigray Militia, Tigray para-militia Fenkele, opposition parties in Tigray like Tigray

Freedom Party, and the coalition of the UFEFCF to support in proxy war and help when TPLF in the war in corresponding areas. For instance, the TDF attacked Bati, Kombolcha, Kamiss, and Debresinna with the OLA towns of RSAm.

Early in the conflict to Blanchard (2021), a mass killing occurred in the western Tigray town of Mai Kadra (Cited Ethiopian Officials), two rounds of killing (first of Amhara by ethnic Tigrayans and then revenge killings of Tigrayans by Amhara forces) (Cited Reuters), the law enforcement operations on November 4, 2020, following a TPLF attack on a military base and instigating conflicts along ethnic and religious lines to make Ethiopian ungovernable.

According to FGE officials, the ceasefire was announced on June 28, after the TPLF military and organizational capacity had been obliterated and no longer an existential threat and to facilitate aid distribution and allow farmers to plant in Tigray, but after less than two weeks, the SFT launched a new offensive war and take Mekele and open war to other parts of Ethiopia.

The responsive war of TPLF forces with the new name TDF instead of SFT transferred a war into Afar and Amhara, which displaced over 300,000 people and made another 1.7 million people food insecure and roughly a third of Tigray's population, over two million people, are internally displaced. Moreover, the relocations claims of Amhara officials asserted that the land "was taken by force and now has been returned by force" and of the interim Tigray, officials contended it as the Amhara forces "invade and forcibly occupy our land" due to the security gap. (Blanchard 2021)

The second round of war of the Addis Ababa offensive from October 16 to December 1, 2021, for TPLF with UFFCF forces specially integrated with OLA successfully occupy up to Debre Sina near Addis Ababa, the Capital city of Ethiopia. In the following weeks, the human loss occupied the place and returned to Mekele and occupied Kobo and Adarkay from RSAm and Abala and the other two words from RSAf. And TPLF lost Welkait, Tselemet, and Adiremet, the west Tigray. The TPLF force started wars and returned his place and lost Adarkay by force and Abala by international negotiation. See figure 8.

In internalization, it may end or strengthen the twenty-eight years' absolute dominance of TPLF-led EPRDF, from Ethiopia and Ethiopian mind. The secretive and non-inclusive political relations between regular citizens, militarized personnel, politicians, and political economists mostly

determined political culture of Ethiopia. Moreover, the undermined and disrespected political relations between politically militarized actors led the escalation of conflicts and internationalization of internal war between the GFDRE and the TPLF.




Figure 8 - Addis Ababa Offensive

The development of conflict to civil war escalate internally due to the first and the second attempt of Italy colonialism, the 1960's to 1970's political and social movement, the Derge political experience including the Red Terror, and the revolutionist and reformist political experiences of EPRDF including war in Eritrea and Somalia that should be taken as home and class work of Ethiopians as it damages the interest of the people who live in.

In contrary at least before the first or lately to the second attempt of Italy occupation, conflict may be resolved using cultural and spiritual social capital that hopes more the hand of the creator as Psalm 68:31: "Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God," in the name of the creator of the land and the sky, Allah, 'Wakka Guracha' and 'Megenno' in Oromo and in Gedeo languages for who All Know and See, and in the name of Saint Mary.

For instance, in Ethiopian history, you can read war prepared in years shall be ended by weighing a stone on a leader and the powerful taking the stone from those who ask for an excuse in the name

of the people, land, and military that he leads. This is a place where war is conducted as the last of the last option after assuring the first safety of the country by avoiding harm to the people, land, and military. In addition to that here war is conducted after official discussion and decisions made on the objective of war or war for what and by sending a message to opponents in place even in time.

The cause of conflict in Ethiopia differs in the degree of participation, geography, demography, culture, history, technology, social and political consciousness, international relations, and developments that governed dominantly the political definition and practices of Ethiopia and also Africa. But the root cause of civil wars including in sub-Saharan Africa is untenable cultural incompatibilities and nationalist aspirations for harbor grievances of nationalism of culturally distinct ethnic minorities because of discrimination by ethnic majority or ethnic or “civilizational” cleavages within a state. (Fearon and Laitin 2001)

Ethiopia may share these factors by the view of Solomon Inquai (2007), Ph. D. to show the discrimination, incompatibility, and non-civilization of Tigray due to the political theory and practices of Ethiopian leaders of Menilk, Haileselesie, and Mengistu.

He said that;

“When Ethiopian people everywhere resented the denial of basic human rights, the absence of rule of law, justice and freedom, and rampant corruption aggravated their poverty defies all comparison, but specifically Tigray as the agony of Tigray since Menlike Ethiopia was pushed aside and alienated many non-Amharas including those closest allies and collaborators by creating a separate territorial army which excludes Tigrayans and Eritreans, deliberately deprived, oppressed and neglected Tigrayans in the deed of negative development or construction and the Shoan rulers undermined Yohannes IV to misrule Tigray due to threat as the arch-enemy or a rival to the seat of power. In addition to that despite his rhetoric of socialism, Mengistu was brought nothing new, only more suffering and misery due to his view of Tigray as the hotbed of insubordination and insurrection that result in the omission of Tigray from his ten-year development plan in 1976 to bring it to heel.”(P15-17)

Similarly, even if Argawi (2008) argued as not oppressed in the exclusive sense, the TPLF asserts ‘the Tigrayans have been made to be the most hated, suspected and discriminated people in the empire, thereby making harmonious life intolerable’ (cited TPLF Manifesto, 1984)

Violent conflicts in Ethiopia including the cause of war ideological may have at least two dichotomies in multi-perceptual views that may need further study that may deescalate by having the space for compromise in their computation to demilitarized politicians and provide more freedom by securitized politicians under the rule of law. See figure 9.




Figure 9 – Dichotomist challenge of Ethiopia

Some scholars suggest that it is because of deficiency of natural geography; natural resource, climate, and demography but according to interviewee I, a senior researcher in International Relations and diplomacy, the Israeli and Arabs have a shortage of natural resources but they live without civil war.

For him, it is because of the uncompromised offensive beliefs of their political elites, the experiences of using armament, and the accumulation of military armaments. It is like the one of Tigray man used a statement as ‘war for Tigray is a cultural game’ which encourages revenge feeling to respond for the disrespected war. In addition to that weighting armament, not only

qualified for Tigray whereas in almost all rural parts of Ethiopia having and using the armaments for happiness and sadness are accepted cultural practice and in some parts having at least one armament in the name of one man per house is must that make him a hero to be respectful man and family in his household area.

The causes of the third civil war on in Ethiopia have multi-dimension in terms of politics, economic, social, institutional, historical, and foreign relations. A miscalculation of using war to solve shared problems leads to enhance new dimensions of silencing challenges that endanger the trustful integrity of Ethiopia and the cohesive nature of the people of Ethiopia.

Since 2018, among the challenges of Ethiopia according to Senassa (2021), the longstanding socio-economic, political, and cultural grievances are like land-related problems, lack of inclusive politics, non-patrimonial politics, economic domination of the TPLF and divisions within the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). They are exacerbated by the escalation of conflict with warlike relations between the FGE and RST.

According to the Institute for Peace and Security Studies in Addis Ababa University, the causes of the conflict in Ethiopia are 'economic inequality and youth unemployment, contested federal structure, lack of rule of law and breakdown of law and order, and trans boundary security factors and geopolitical dynamics' (Tsion 2020), the last three causes may exacerbated and legalized the born of the today's challenges of Ethiopian, the civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray.

The civil war of Ethiopia repetitively occurred in Tigray because of TPLF's expanded to other parts of Ethiopia largely in Amhara, Afar, Benshangul Gumz, Wolega – Oromia and Gambella. Where actors use armaments used to kill the strategic national interests of Ethiopia and try to cruelly govern people of Ethiopia by force.

For interviewee IV, the repetitiveness' of war is due to their visible role of state formation and experiences of punching above their weight. This may create overconfidence or undermine others in the transfer of power which excludes the contribution of others in the state formation. Politicizing ethnicity is not the same to politicize rule of law which may destroy friendship and solidarity in a political family and society at large. According to interviewee III, it is not new it is like fighters from Ethiopia Somali of West Somali Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). For him, the dominant causes of this war are unresolved structural questions, a far distance

from the capital of Addis Ababa, historically where armament was stored, the climatic condition, and strong and solidified nationalism including using war armaments.

How and who solves the structural question by using the right resources at the right place where it is needed? If it is not answered especially by the more than three-decade TPLF-led leadership and by the Tigray-PPs this includes the TPLF members.

For the writer the people of Tigray is not especially far in the economy, culture, religion, politics, and natural endowment than any Ethiopians. The structural question of Tigray may be solved by correcting the discourse on the political history of Ethiopia which academically begun or was written from Emperor Tewodros IV which may create knowingly or unknowingly agony that helps to respecting rule of law in friendship and solidarity within the people of Ethiopia.

This third civil war is not conducted by past conflict alignment, national attributes, systematic factors, and dyadic relation to the central government, rather it is between themselves, the old and the oldest new leadership of the TPLF, and EPRDF. The leadership conflict between the TPLF-led EPRDF and the PP-led EPRDF. It may also be between the hideous and the hidden member of EPRDF which built the strong systematic, national, and dyadic power that needs statuesque, and the popular complainers' who know the inequality danger and stand to change the covered political, economic, and social conditions.

An immediate cause of the war called the attack on the federal army using mebereqawi Tikat³⁶, an attack that takes place suddenly like 'natural shelling' called a surprise attack. The real causes of conflict for interviewee I am they consider themselves as a di-facto state by not accepting the authority of FGE and practice of the unclear mandate of the RST like conducting the election and demobilizing the Federal Army and for interviewee III in addition to the status quo of economic interests, the ups and downs of power in which power transition threat them due to the unitary view of PP in cancellation of the constitution, article 39 and changing its preamble into the People of Ethiopia.

According to Interviewee II, he uses conflict instead of civil war or war, he is not diverse in the immediate cause of conflict but he differs in the pretext of a conflict. For him, the pretext of

³⁶ Mebrekawi Tikat is an Amharic word like in English that may translate as an attack that takes place suddenly or surprisingly or unexpectedly, like 'explosion of natural shell'

conflict is Co-vid disease which made it impossible to conduct the scheduled General Election of Ethiopia by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and the TPLF unilaterally decided on a counter position to conduct the election independently after an establishment of electoral commission of Tigray without recognition of NEBE beyond Federal Constitution and held election. According to the federal constitution of Ethiopia, article 102 the mandate is to NEBE.

The cause of the conflict for him is the simultaneous action of the withholding budget of the regional state of Tigray by the House of Federation of Ethiopia and TPLF considered it like declaring war on RST and TPLF in addition to demobilizing the army from a North to West Ethiopia and not accepting the assigned military leader for Northern Ethiopia Army that led to the immediate causes of conflict by attacking of Ethiopian military force in Tigray.

An immediate cause of the war called as the attack on the Ethiopian army. The real causes of conflict for interviewee I, how they consider themselves as a di-facto state by not accepting the authority of FGE and practice of the unclear mandate of the RST like conducting the election and demobilizing the Federal Army, and for interviewee III is the TPLF's status quo of economic interests, and not accepting the ups and downs of power, and threatened by actions of power transition that will lead to the unitary view of PP in cancellation of constitution especially article 39, and changing its preamble from the nation, nationalities, and people to the People of Ethiopia.

The Third WCW between the FGE-PP and the RST of TPLF created antagonistic groups of participants who aimed to fulfill the interest of the powerful anarchic actors and who minimize the negative consequences of war from the powerless People of Ethiopia. They may be broadly categorized as internal, external, and Exo-internal groups.

The internal groups are domestically pro and against the “Medhemer”³⁷ reformists and their fellow citizens which include opposition parties and the mass, the external groups are those who have strategic interest groups of regional and international powers like the US, regional and International organizations like the AU, EU, and UN groups and interested international individuals and groups, and the exo-internal groups are the ‘contentious participants in role’ in offensive interference’ in overall internal issues or interests of the state of Ethiopia like some Eritrean and some Ethiopian diasporas.

³⁷ Medemher to Abey is an ideology used by Prosperity Party which replaces revolutionary democracy

According to Dunn³⁸ (2019), cited in Jan's Information Group, the TPLF is likely to depart the EPRDF before the scheduled 2020 parliamentary election because of mainly PM Abiy's plans to reorganize the EPRDF into one single party rather than an alliance of four which potentially weaken the EPRDF positions.

Before the war, the Amhara region was first controlled by the Tigrayan Forces due to atrocity perpetrated in late August and early September 2021, by the deliberate killing of unarmed civilians in Kobo, and rape and sexual assaults in and around Chenna and Nifas Mewcha. (Amnesty International 2022)

In clearly understanding the causes of this civil war from the responses of Prime Minister (PM) Abey Ahmed when he answers on law enforcement operations in Tigray Region as the challenges of reformation on the sovereignty questions of power transition and power struggle for the House of People's Representatives of Ethiopia (HPRE). As the escalation of conflicts to cause of war His answer focuses on, 27 years of conditions of the EPRDF as prewar factors of political history, socio-political, political economy, social, military, and media. See table 9.

A political factor of political history for him focuses on demanding people's democracy and equality, high demand for protection from torture, mass detaining, cruel and illegal disappearance, and undemocratic political practices. The political practices of the EPRDF were threatening the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) political leaders, conducting the suspended war-like election of the EPRDF leader for weeks, weakening the new reform and reformists groups, threatening the state with unstable agenda and exacerbating the statuesque strength.

As the socio-political consequences of political failures were mass bereaving in one place, horrible life of the society and the state, mass detained, and escalation of religious and ethnic conflicts that create fear of suspected to die of the reformist forces in the understanding of the complexity of conspiracy of Ethiopians' oppression and the wide range of hate and anemic feeling between each other. The military factor of personnel and institution, especially the TPLF groups, later labeled as junta were those who misuse of authority of security forces, illegal acts to appoint/refuse military leaders, interest in establishing symbolic government, high secrecy in operate, training, and communications of military armament and the movement of the army. It was supported by the

³⁸ Brian J. Dunn is a Major who graduated MA at the United States Air Force BS, US Air Force Academy

Civil War	Explode rocket in <u>Bahir Dar</u> and <u>Gonder</u> Attack the Ethiopian National Defense Force					
Bridge to war	Establishment of pity powerful militarized government					
Violent conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organized Junta Large numbers of violent conflicts Resignation of the former PM <u>Desalegn Hailmariam</u> Election <u>Abiy Ahmed</u> as leader of EPRDF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Terrorize the government by 113 conflicts except in <u>Tigray</u> Million peoples displacement Conduct proxy war other than <u>Tigray</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coup d'état discussion Stolen modern military armaments Militarized modern armaments Non returning key of missile 	Open face book war		Proxy wars beyond culture of war in Ethiopia like not acceptable killing of women in Somali and Afar
Intra conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demanding peoples democracy and equality, protection from torture, mass detaining, cruel and illegal disappearance Threatening the OPDO political leaders War like EPRDF leader election Threat the state by instability of agenda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mass bereaving Horrible life Mass detained Suspected to die of the reformist forces Escalation of religious and ethnic conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>Mis</u> use of authority Acts to appoint/refuse military leaders Interest to establish symbolic government Secrecy in operate, training and communications of military armament Refuse the movement of army and military armaments 	Establish own media lead by security leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accumulate wealth to remove the military and security leader Financial supports of diaspora 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intra personal conflicts Insecure reformist peoples at family level Threatening <u>Tigray</u> by anticipating war with <u>Amhara</u>, Eritrea and Federal government
Degree	Political	Socio- political	Military	Media	Political Economy	Social

Table 8 – The development of civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray (Data: PMOFDRE 2020)

- refusal of the people of Tigray to transfer the NDF rocket and missile by laying children's and women's under armaments.

The Conflict in Tigray causes the challenges and complexity of the reform and failures of the economy due to military and political conspiracy of the TPLF-led military and security forces, held a fake election, facilitate proxy wars and weaken Ethiopian military capability by dismantling military communication, and controlling separated military by their militia force but they sending priests and elders to negotiate and accompany them at the Northern Military Camp, the military depot of Ethiopian defense force which has greater than the sum of other military camps including the hundred percent rocket of Ethiopia army.

For him, the challenges have shaped reformists and Junta. The reformists understand to protect the oppressed people of Ethiopia without organization, have no military, have the commitment to change, are relatively politically organized but not in the military, weak in institutionalization, have anemic relation individually, understand historic destructive power transition, individually oppressed, consider themselves as state developer, accept government weakness due to weak in institutes and try to deescalate conflicts.

Tigrians military officer in Ethiopia army			
High military officials	Military officer	Before reform In percent	After reform In percent
	From General to Shaleka	55	26
	Mechanized army	100	50
	Mechanized brigade	85	45
	Land army	80	40
	Land brigade	80	40
	Military staff	50	25
	Military training	85	25

Table 9 – Before and after reform of Tigrians military officer in Ethiopia army

On the opposite side for him they are strong in militarized power, highly conspirator in ignorance of human beliefs, non-function or weakened government institutions, threatened by reformists movement especially when they met with Tigray that may separate and uncontrolled Tigrians, and the people of Gonder especially with Wolkaite committee and Kemant Committees, no willingness to free detained politicians like Andargachew Tsige, do not accept rule of law, they try to appoint military leaders in Ethiopia army by not accepting the assigned General Driba and capturing vice military leader General Adamu of a Northern Ethiopia Military Camp and not

accepting the economic, political, military, and rule of law reforms especially the military reform which threatened the diminution of the dominancy of Tigrians in the Ethiopia Army. For example, see a table from the high-level military officers' reform. See table 9.

In addition to the financial support of Diasporas', as a political economy, they accumulate wealth to remove the military and security leaders. These tight confrontational politico-economic military leadership of relations transfer to the society like escalation of intra-personal conflicts between and among members of EPRDF, insecurity of reformists at the family level, and threats of people of Tigray by anticipating war with the Amhara, Eritrea, and FGE.

These factors politically create an organized junta that led to large numbers of violent conflicts and socio-politically terrorize the government with 113 conflicts in the entire country except in Tigray, displacing millions of people and conducting proxy wars in other parts of Ethiopia like Oromia Region, Guji, and Kellem Wollega zones, Benishangul Gumuz region Kamashi and Metekel zones and SNNPR, Konso and Bench Sheko Zones, Segen Zuria Worda and Amaro Special Woreda. The proxy wars conducted were beyond societal cultural war practices like the unacceptable of killing women in Somali and Afar Ethiopia.

In addition to that in military space, there were violent conflicts and preparation for warlike coup d'état discussions among military and security forces, stolen modern military armaments and equipment to militarize themselves by modern armaments that work day and night which have laser and soundless modern and they decide to non-returning of the key of the missile for the FGE.

The media also contribute used to an open Facebook war between them after they established their media lead by them. These factors first led to the uncompromised solution of the resignation of the former PM Desalegn Hailmariam and primarily the selection of Abiy Ahmed by almost a hundred percent as leader of EPRDF.

Later, the inter grown conflicts between them led to war by attacking the Ethiopian National Defense Force, establishing a pitied militarized government in Mekelle, and exploding the rocket in Asmara, Bahir Dar, and Gonder.

The cause of civil war, according to interviewee IV, is due to undermining Abiy government, TPLF's interest to continue the statuesque by leading instability in the country, forming new alignment, labeling others' as the devil, and anticipating the pro-TPLF economic elites but also from other parts of Ethiopia.

The development and the causes of war as the official data from the responses of Prime Minister (PM) Abey Ahmed which is taken as the challenges of reform for sovereignty question in power transition and power struggle, for raised questions from the House of Representatives of Ethiopia (HRE) on law enforcement operations in RST will be summarized as the table below. See table.

The factors may dominantly be inculcated and exacerbated by the inability to form strong alliances or role conflicts of public institutions or misunderstanding of the interest of the people of Ethiopia which create personal perceptions of disrespect and undermine relations that may lead to anger with the revenge into personal interests of the dominant political leaders by using the instrument of the Ethiopian security forces with help of external actors.

This is where war may be used for 'the continuation of policy by other means which has been replaced by its opposite' (cited Aron, 1966) 'to compel opponents to fulfill the continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means' (cited Von Clausewitz, 1911). (Van der Dennen) These structural or fundamental causes due to ideological principles of the EPRDF; revolutionary democracy, developmental state doctrine, gimgemma (criticism and self-criticism), democratic centralism, and neo-patrimonialism mobilization of party membership and support (cited Larbi 2001; Vaughan 2011; Semahagn 2014; Prunier 2015; Abbink 2017) that resulted in the politics of exclusion and domination, undemocratic political culture, repressive laws and closure of the democratic opening, the rise of oligarchy and privatization of the state and internal schism within the TPLF. (Senassa 2021)

It is where the revolutionary democracy of EPRDF created two revolutionists; "the have", who have political and economic space publically, 'Vee eightists' and more secretly, and "the have no", who have limited political space and non in economy, and the stateless citizens, 'Political Dikkalas'³⁹, who have no distinct ethnicity with robotic political spaces and relatively the poorest.

³⁹ Political Dikala is a person born from a different clan or tribe or Ethnic group who opposes exclusive politics.

For some it is not only the war between the old failed EPRDF and the new EPRDF leadership, it may be an ideological war called the war between the ‘Plus game?’ and ‘Zero-sum Game’.

At the individual and societal level, the EPRDF is under confrontation which may enlarge to popular war to accomplish the Ethiopian democracy and freedom of the People of Ethiopia. The major factor of the hush-hush relationships may classified elite society in Ethiopia now may be as mass, traditional, social, traditionally political, political and political-economic elites mainly they share interrelated issues that focus on the dichotomy of traditionalism vs modernism, historic agony vs historic glory, Ethiopian religionism vs radicalism, cultural dominancy vs multiculturalism, majority vs minority, Ethnic nationality vs Ethiopian nationality, Zero-sum vs Zero plus? in the ideology of revolutionary democracy vs Medemeher, and equity vs equality in coinciding politics and economy respectively.

For some scholars, the cause of the war goes to the agreement between Abey of Ethiopia, and President Esayas Afeworki of Eritrea in Jidha which provide the battleground in the Ethio-Eritrea war from 1998-2000, to Eritrea which may be recognized by the military present now in Bademe, Tsorena, and Zelanbessa which cost more than a hundred thousand lives of Ethiopian. After on June 05, 2018, Abey agrees in giving disputed territory to Eritrea, alongside the Eritrean president declares the end of the war on June 09, 2018.

The entrance of Eritrea may be an application of Murdoch and Sandler with Blomberg and Hess's findings as conflict, reduce growth, but spillover effect to the neighboring country and the broader region, Collier and Sambanis (2002), it may be used as an opportunity for the one’ who work for the escalation of conflict and disrespect the rule of law including interference not to end the war. It also applies to the current Sudan occupation of the land of Ethiopia.

In general, the cause of the war of this civil war may contribute more first due to the undermined and disrespected relations between the governors of the political economy of the political parties and leaders, and the implementers of the established instruments of the rule of law and then to the blurred participation of the governed people of elites and ordinary citizens.

Second, the status quo of the non-equitable monopoly is needs the economic interest of conflict to continue the economic ills’ of the TPLF foot. Third, the ethnically destructive politics have

unhealthy effects of the past that socially create untrustworthy lives that put the individuals at to the overall insecurities. Fourth, the weak institutional responses locally are made political and security actors to decide without accountability using the non-one weak scenario which led possibly to war.

Fifth, Instead of clearing the bad and the good of the past and compromising them to the national interest used to better change or to become the history makers, they ego centrically glory or agony what the respected Ethiopians did.

Six, even if a stronger country have more benefits, all foreign relations are aimed cooperation under the rule of law to fulfill the national interest. The weak country will gates more by cooperative more in number with capability.

During these wars, the US because of war in Tigray for some Ethiopians portrayed as Ethiopia's enemy without clearing evidence to her engagement in the implementation of the 30 years' war concluded by establishment of State of Eritrea, and Ethio-Eritrea's war concluded by the agreement which favored Eritrea to occupy the contested areas. Moreover, the USA support humanitarian aid and call to end war for both parties even during war and strategically accepted Ethiopia's importance to the HoA and entire Africa.

The Next Chapter mainly presents the study on the continuation of the USA and Ethiopia relations since the election of Prime Minste2018, from 2018 to 2020, from 2020 to 2022, Pretoria agreement before and during civil war in Tigray, Ethiopia.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE USA RESPONSES TOWARDS THE CIVIL WAR OF ETHIOPIA IN TIGRAY

During this period the challenges of Ethiopia to Senessa (2021) are state-building and historical contradictions, political polarization and ethnic division, weak institutions and lack of the rule of law, ethnic conflict, and internal people displacement, high expectations and limitation of economic resources, baseless propaganda politics and ultra-nationalism, structural problem and the past stand pattern, lack of negotiated transition road map, high living cost and money laundering, the GERD, Covid-19, flood, drought and locust invasion.

The USA's strong support of EPRDF continued to Abey's government but declined because of GERD and during the war between FGE and TPLF.

5.1 The USA and Ethiopia relations since 2018

The USA Embassy in Addis Ababa issued warm congratulations on the confirmation of the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia as the stage of improvement in US-Ethiopia relations for counterterrorism and regional security in the HoA for human right improvement and faster democratization. (USEE 2018)

Similarly, for Blanchard (2021), the Ethiopian political transition in 2018 welcomed Abey by the USA as an opportunity to improve and deepen bilateral ties used to make inroads the USA investment and trade, to promote reforms and peace in the region, and to improve the security relationship including in the context of rising global power competition in the Horn of Africa region.

In 2019, the State Department of America hosted an Ethiopian Partnerships Forum, used to raise awareness of recent economic reforms and emerging business opportunities, accelerate American investments to transform the Ethiopian economy, and envision a new future of engagement between the two countries, such as benefiting efforts to open the telecommunications sectors, for him, representing the largest of improvement in the bilateral relationship between the two countries since the transfer of power to Abey's government, in May.

In early 2020, Ethiopia announced the USA International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), poised to facilitate up to \$5 billion in the USA investment, and the Trump administration tried biasedness toward Egypt to deal with filling and operations on the Grand Ethiopians Renaissance Dam (GERD) which stalled talks. (Ibid) An Ethiopian position on GERD resulted in the US response of cutting \$100 million in aid to Ethiopia. (Zengerle 2020)

Historically, for more than a century except on the final day of Eritrea's independence, the USA's engagement toward Ethiopia were not strategically mis the interests of Ethiopian to the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. It may include the unity of Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1952, the Ethiopia position on Eritrea 1962, and the Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998-2000.

The third civil war started in the transition period of the US government. Trump Administration did not consider it as it is serious, according to interviewee III, historically, the TPLF relation is with the Democratic Party of the US whereas the Biden Administration cleared an American interest by replaying the atrocity that happened in North Ethiopia using the personal relations of the former Ambassador Gebre Kristos and Samanta Powel's no genocide again agenda.

During the war, the EU and the US supported TPLF, and China and Russia supported the Federal Government, especially in the first phase of the war. Now, the USA interests in Ethiopia had been threatened strategically by regional power competitions from the colonial past of the region; the UK, France, and Italy, from other states like Egypt, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and from the EU.

Moreover, Ethiopia's landlockedness geographically decreases the strategic interests of the USA; Americans reflected the importance of Ethiopia in comprising to the new one-fourth million Ethiopian Diasporas in America and the relations with Africans. For instance, the USA diplomat considers Ethiopia as an important key player in International Relations (IR) of the Great Horn of Africa (GHoA) for overall food security, and to prevent conflicts and crises of drought and war initiatives because of its size, location, and potential to improve the countries. (Shim 2021) African issues are both internal and external to Ethiopian politics.

The consequence of the conflict, according to Blanchard (2021), in Tigray, to the UN, over 5.2 million worsening humanitarian crises and reported atrocities, and roughly nineteen percent of

the population and between 400 000 need emergency food aids, facing famine conditions experts estimate 900 000 people, and Sudan hosted over 60,000 refugees.

For him, to the UN Officials, the reform implementation for Tigray regional officials did not address their threat but rather fueled inter-communal rivalries due to the stigmatization of certain ethnic groups that significantly contributed to ethnic intolerance. In similar terms for him to Human Rights Watch, inadequate Ethiopian conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and insufficient efforts to pursue justice and reconciliation support the escalation.

The US is available at a critical time in Ethiopia. In the first phase of civil wartime for one of the NDF military leader, General Abebaw Taddess;

"Ethiopia's territorial integrity is endangered by separatist groups and individuals therefore we must be protected the country from the non-negotiated foreign peace, security, and masonry troops, established transitional government and the started separation of power, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) advised and tried to rose the question of the independence of Oromia."

According to a senior researcher in international relations and diplomacy Interviewee I, it is a war, where 'the poorness does not change the Ethiopian commitment'. And it is when the TPLF- was confused by American due to imposed sanctions on them and the Government of Ethiopia, Getachew⁴⁰. (Merja.com 2021) The US' responses were quite different before and during the war discussed below.

Ethiopian responses toward the US made political rallies in Addis Ababa, and other parts of Ethiopia and in the US including media propaganda that opposed the US stands on the civil war on Ethiopia. It was when both dangers the territorial integrity of Ethiopia by practically ignoring the strategic interest based on the sovereignty of the mass Ethiopians and the Americans. Some Ethiopians claimed the US's responses as the causes of the escalator of conflicts and civil war as an externalization factor but an internalization or the fertile ground of the political environment of Ethiopia contributes more so that Ethiopian homework conceptualized in a study.

5.2 The USA's responses' before the civil war

The US responses prioritized the US interest and the safety of American by strong partnership in terms participation in Ethiopia with involvement of Ethiopian Diaspora, and at the HoA

⁴⁰ Getachew Reda is current leader and negotiator of TPLF.

countries and entire Africa level. Her assistance is the foreign policy of US used to fulfill and develop US national interests.

The US response is strong on the safety of Americans in Ethiopia by assessing and providing advisory information many times and also for international communities. Near before the war on USEE, following the FGE declared a state of emergency nationwide on November 2, 2021, the USA State Department advisor started the departure of non-emergency US Government employees and their family members from Ethiopia due to the risk of armed conflict, civil unrest, and possible supply chain interruptions and other disruptions in Addis Ababa.

The US Embassy personnel are restricted from traveling outside of Addis Ababa city to limit a travel advisory level four do not travel. To understand more, please read the responses of the USA towards the development of TWCW, in appendix 3.

The US response before this war to interviewee I, was pro-the federal government by sending security forces to investigate the assassination attempt on Abiy Ahmed and provide wide media-coverage for the acceptance of the Abiy Ahmed leadership. Nevertheless, up to now, the investigation report was not clear to all Ethiopians. But for him after almost two years in 2020, the US responses were frozen because of the failed pro-Egypt Grand Renaissance Dam Agreement (GRDA) proposal, which was prepared by the USA in the President Trump Administration that result in the warning of the president to explode Ethiopians' right.

The proposal, according to interviewee III, included the hope of more than three billion Ethiopian Birr, which Abiy Ahmed appreciates by saying 'taking credit from the World Bank is like crediting from a mother's mouth unlike of the second mother.

The Grand Renaissance Dam (GRD) for Ethiopia is not only the security and the developmental issues of the governmental bodies, but it is also the Ethiopian Human Rights claim of those who have multi concerns on lives live under the poverty line in and around Ethiopia.

According to interviewee II, the bilateral relation before the war strengthen by supporting the reforms but declined due to the proposal of the GRDA which favored Egypt and undermine Ethiopia resulting in the withholding of development assistance to Ethiopia without humanitarian aid.

For interviewee IV⁴¹, before the war, the bilateral relation characterized as it was not destructive, but not strongly constructive rather it is silent relation due to the Federal Government's orientation of inward-looking rather than outward-looking and the pro-Egypt proposal of GRDA. Generally, the US responses before the war are mainly determined by the proposal of GRDA prepared by the Trump Administration, the support of reforms, and Abey leadership and development and economic assistance.

5.3 The USA's responses during the war

According to interviewee II, the TPLF 'Tigray Genocide' report, FGE denouncement of external actors' involvement, and International Community reports of atrocity in Tigray for him led the US to ignore the statement of the Federal Government rather she use to middle the society. This led the Ethiopian government to anticipate the escalation of conflict due to the historical tendency of democrats in interfering and middle in internal affairs which was not done by the Republicans.

For him, a report is the TPLF propaganda by using mainstream and social media to announce 'the Tigray genocide' as it takes place by the FGE and Amhara security forces with Eritrea force and Eritrea's involvement in internal issues of Ethiopia lately admitted by PM Abiy Ahmed response to the HPR of Ethiopia. The beginning of the war was the transition period of the Republican to Democrat, from condemnation to not condemning TPLF which resulted in a tendency to war. (Interviewee II)

In contrary after three months the Committee on Foreign Relation in the Senate of the US submitted the resolution, S. Res. 97 on the 117th congress 1st session, on March 9, 2021, in the understanding of the causes of this civil war because of the tension between the TPLF and PM Abiy Ahmed's PP which illegitimate election held by TPLF and unconstitutional postponed of General Election by the Federal Government that result in an attack of TPLF on the Northern Command of Ethiopian National Defense Forces in early hours of November 4, 2020, and evolve

⁴¹ An Interviewee IV is a researcher at the Center for Research and Development Cooperation. He has MA in Philosophy

an armed conflict response with allied forces with the consequences of thousands of deaths report.

According to a member of the Democratic Party, Karen Bass on Oct 23, 2021, the US condemned the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution on Ethiopia in an amended version of H. Res. 445., the war initiated in Nov 2020, by the TPLF attack on the ENDF in Tigray, to which the ENDF responded, and expanded to the Afar and Amhara regions. In her statement, ‘the resolution condemning all violence and human rights abuses in Ethiopia and calling for all combatants in the conflict in Northern Ethiopia to cease all hostilities, respect human rights, allow unfettered humanitarian access, and cooperate with independent investigations of credible atrocity allegations.’

According to Blanchard (2021), the first round of TWCW in Tigray for US prominent officials, like Secretary Blinken put as the “acts of ethnic cleansing” happen in Tigray from February to March, for Senator Chris Coons on March 2021, put it as ‘the humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses’ that risk the broader instability in the Horn, and for the first U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltman because of increasing political and ethnic polarization throughout the country results in Tigray crises from the symptomatic of a broader set of national challenges that have imperiled meaningful reforms.

Especially according to Secretary Blinken, the “acts of ethnic cleansing” happen when Tigray’s interim authorities accused Amhara regional forces of “forcibly removing people of Tigrayan origin” from western Tigray and relocating more than 100,000 people to the town of Shire with extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances, particularly of young men.”

In addition to that according to Jeffrey Feltman, the US will work with partners to secure a ceasefire, end the conflict, provide humanitarian aid, hold accountable those responsible for abuses, withdraw Eritrean forces, call for an inclusive political process in Tigray, and in a broader Ethiopia “to enable credible elections and wider national reconciliation.”

The Biden Administration in May announced visa restrictions for those who undermined the resolution of the crisis in Tigray and conducted abuses or hindered aid access, imposed restrictions on economic and security assistance for Ethiopia, and new defense trade controls. But he exempted humanitarian aid from the restriction of withholding support for new

multilateral development bank lending that did not address basic human needs and asked partners to do the same.

His administration urging Ethiopian authorities to promote reconciliation, human rights, and respect for pluralism, called for the withdrawal of Amhara forces from western Tigray, the TPLF from Amhara and Afar, and Eritrean forces from Ethiopia; unfettered aid access, and an end to the commercial blockade; and a negotiated ceasefire.

Prime Minister Abey Ahmed undermines the US announcements with acknowledgment of the denied Eritrean presence of Eritrean troops in the civil war of Tigray in assuring the Eritrea government that was agreed to withdraw.

According to Getachew, we were planning to negotiate and trust them (the American government) but one of them advised us to leave Tigray and capture Addis Ababa” (Merja.com 2021) Likewise during the war among the TPLF leader Fetlework Gebre Egziabehere approving in 2022, the US advised us to flee to the US, especially for those who had American Citizenship from Mekele, the capital city of RST and acknowledged that in TDF now there are many foreign military leaders. This may benefit the Former Defense Minister of Ethiopia, General Sie Abreha, and the former Deputy Foreign Minister Gebre Kristos after they ignite the war.

Prime Minister Abiy in his response to the HPRE rises the US that you (Americans) finished the American civil war between Abraham Lincolien and Jefferson Devis or between North and South America within three years which makes the similarity in the first attack of Jefferson Devis, which finished within three weeks here, but you means Americans claimed only as we act unconstitutionally where they (Tigrians force) attack unconstitutionally and in the world war II, Japan suddenly attacked your Army at Perl Harber then your response was used nuclear bomb that destroying Japan that result devastation of infrastructure and provide generational disease for innocent civilians.

The US according to the senior researcher, interviewee I, have been used the war as a means to acquire their interest; the support of Egypt and the tendency to support the TPLF in terms of interference of the external State of Eritrea and other regional states, reclaim of the West Tigray and humanitarian crises accountability.

He characterizes the US response as interruptions in internal affairs, not accepting the internal territorial integrity, and a tendency to interfere by taking herself as the implementer of Ethiopia's affairs and meddler of internal affairs using the statements of the USEE and Her officials. For him, the time of war clarifies the support of external actors which FGE; China and Russia and TPLF; the US, and the EU.

During the war, to interviewee IV, the USA used the war to advance the regional power computations of the Horn of Africa, especially with China by attempting to change the FGE like Guinea and Mali in Africa without the interest of disintegrating Ethiopia. For him, she tried to balance power between the transition government of Ethiopia led by Berhane of TPLF and the FGE, to intervene in the action of the atrocity of the state of Eritrea, and tried to replace the IGAD.

For him, this resulted from the TPLF winning militarily but failing in politics including his ally like OLA which lost confidence in the stability and ought to be his control part of Ethiopia.

According to interviewee II, the biased US responses, rather than a tendency to ward against TPLF was because of not condemning the atrocities made in peoples of Afar and Amhara, not pressurizing like the FGE did until the phone call between Abiy and Biden, holding development assistance except in humanitarian aid, ending the AGOA, and calling many times the pro-USA meetings in UNSC in the interest of Ethiopia, but all meeting was not successful due to great support of India, China, Russia, France, and English. The AGOA benefited Ethiopia for more than 200 million dollars per year and employed thousands of workers.

Ethiopia took it as economic leverage of increases exports from \$20.3 in 2015, to \$209.6 million in 2019. (Lighthizer 2020) The external character of Ethiopia to the US interest in Ethiopia In the first phase of the war, for him, was to win the great power competitions in HoA, like avoiding china's belt road initiatives influence in the region.

At the same time, the internal character of Ethiopia to US interest in Ethiopia as the US concerns were the entrance of unchanged Eritrea into Ethiopia were not pressurized by Ethiopia and unhappy to observe cooperative views and practices of foreign relations of Ethiopia. For him,

this led the interest of the US to control it, and Ethiopia follows the US's motto called, for What We Oppose, You Must be Opposed, or My Enemy must be Your Enemy.

The US's distrust and denial of relations with the government of Abiy to interviewee IV biased the responses. It was due to claims of possible alliances with Russia and China, a stability failure in the case of Sudan and Somalia, less encouragement of Ethiopia in IGAD, the No More movement by counting mottos like fighting the USA imperialist, and the announcement of the state of Eritrea of purchasing a military drone from Russia and provide an area of a military base for Russia.

The miscalculation and distrust relations of the US, toward FGE to interviewee III, in 2021, were biased due to the growing expectation of a power shift to the TPLF. For him, a TPLF winning the first phase of the war, in addition to the domination of the media environment, and denouncement of FGE statements for the entrance of Eritrean troops for more than three months, lead the US to talk with former TPLF personnel and dislikes the nationalist leaders who may protect the interest of Ethiopia. For him, the state of Eritrea's entrance into Ethiopia during the war was when the federal government's capacity was less than the TPLF defense force, one to fifteen ratio in the number of soldiers.

During the first round of war, the inline of the FGE military to General Abebaw Taddess, about forty thousand Ethiopian armies were ideologically incapacitated and practically inculcated not to die for Ethiopia but rather die for revolutionary democracy. For him, in practice, the Tigrian military leaders in FGE and in military and security institutions committed to the interest of the TPLF by resigning of highly experienced military leaders and interrupting the military command communication of the federal army in the preparation SFT for war about 250 000 trained troops with an equal number of supporters to a ratio of one to fifteen human power.

Simultaneously asking for assistance and deciding to have it is impossible for interviewee III, to see it given the US economic and development assistance policy to accomplish the US interests as requirements. During the war, Ethiopia fails to act under the contract of AGOWA, to use assistance for intended purposes, not for war, and to influence the two negotiators of FGE and TPLF to come to the table or peace, leading the USA to illegible the AGOWA and withholding development assistance to Ethiopia. A dollar before the war is more valuable to human kind, and

to the climatic environment or in which is less than a dollar strategic effort to stop the war is more than the millions of dollars in assistance and investments after the war.

The US's one-sided tendency responses to Interviewee I, determined to fulfill the support of Egypt's interests, forcibly acquire interest from the FGE, too benefited more from the TPLF by returning to power, and fears of the rise up the spirit of the Ethiopian nationalism that will ignite the incomplete Black Movement in the US and non-debility or the continuity of China's influence in Ethiopia. But for him, calling Eritrea is not new in IR, where now the US supports Ukraine militarily, in more than ten billion dollars. For him, announcing unfounded fears statements from the US embassy in Addis Ababa contributed to the decline in economic FDI and tourist movement without a non-practical attempt to stop or not to use war. Similarly, for him, the US aid support is crying like a crocodile due to the USAID examining to support the TPLF by supplying military communication tools.

On April 22, 2022, the US Department of State reconsidered travel to Ethiopia at travel advisory level 3 and declined the repetitive risk-advised level 4. It is due to armed conflict, civil arrest, and crime in the RST and Eritrea, armed conflict and civil unrest in the RSAm and RSAf in Ethiopia, terrorism, kidnapping, and land mines in border areas in Somalia; Crime, kidnapping, armed conflict and civil unrest in border areas in Sudan and South Sudan and terrorism and ethnic conflict in border areas in Kenya and armed conflict and civil unrest in Wolega Zones of the RSO in Ethiopia.

The second phase war started in August 2022, and ended on November 2, 2022, because of The Joint Statement between the Government of the FDRE and the TPLF on Article 2, which said the agreement of permanent silence of the guns and finished the two years of conflict in northern Ethiopia. (AU 2022) The contributor to the ten-day peace talk agreement in Pretoria in the Republic of South Africa is the Help of Au, South Africa, and Kenya, including the international support of the UN, EU, and US.

The next chapter focuses on finding and conclusion of this study including the contextualizing International civil war theories and the USA responses with respected to the civil war on Ethiopia in Tigray.

CHAPTER SIX

FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

Internalized and externalization of the USA responses towards the civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray were summarized and concluded as follows. Externalization, providing all bad for others, for instance, as external factors during this war, publically, there were public political rallies conducted in Addis Ababa and in the USA to oppose the USA and Westerner interference but that did not de-escalate or end the civil war.

This academic paper not theorized only using the externalization of the cause and the factors of the USA responses but rather explore it in the internalization of a war, the home work of the fertile grounds.

6.1 Contextualize international theories civil war; in Ethiopia in Tigray and the USA responses

The present International system is not given, it is the result of a historic process, and this process has resulted in the inclusion and exclusion of certain people to Andrew Linklater. For Alexander Wendt, the structure of the International system is a distribution of ideas rather than both seen through a material lens by the distribution of material capabilities and Institutional capabilities, of power and economy.

The construction of International relations is, made up of metaphysics; the reality of the nature of IR, social theory; the role of shared understandings as the perception of people or nation-states and discourse of interactions in society, and IR theories; that examine the role of identities, norms, and social territory regions.

These layers lead Nina Tannenwald (2005) to four beliefs of the first ideologies or shared beliefs that systematically reflected the social needs and aspirations of a group, class, culture, or state and political ideologies. Second, the normative beliefs distinguish right from wrong or just from unjust as the standard of behavior.

Third, the beliefs made up of the cause-effect that provides guidelines or strategies to achieve objectives as means-end relationships, and the last, the policy prescriptions that facilitate policymaking by specifying how to solve particular policy problems as the center of policy debates and associated with specific strategies and policy programs.

In addition to that constructivists' focuses are inter-subjective beliefs of ideas, conceptions, and assumptions that are widely shared among peoples and define International relations. States, alliances, and international institutions are the product of human interactions in the social world through social values, identity, assumptions, rules, languages, etc., that include material forces of power and economy. It has an idealist view of the social structure of shared understanding, expectations or knowledge, material resources, and practices. Constructivism emphasizes the social construction of reality, human relations, and International relations consisting of thoughts and ideas that are not essentially of material conditions or forces.

Among forerunner of constructivism Immanuel Kant argues subjective world knowledge filtered through human consciousness, for Max Weber world of inter-subjective understanding of social interaction is fundamentally different from natural world of physical phenomena, for Giambattista Vico the natural world is made of God, but the historical world is made by man (Pompa 1982:26), and for Wilhelm Dilthey, the human mind examine cultural aspects and historical processes that reflects in languages, actions, and institutions.

According to Friedrich Nietzsche, our statement about the world is highly influenced by our assumptions and convictions as subjective analysis is inevitable and challenged the concepts of objectivity and value neutrality in social theories, for Alfred Schütz, our knowledge about people and things are highly influenced by our perceptions and interactions with them, and for Peter Ludwig Berger and Thomas Luckmann, interactions of people in society evolve concepts about human behavior and become habituated and eventually institutionalized.

And for Alexander Wendt, knowledge is constructed inter subjectively by depicting the story of alter and ego who meet each other for the first time in article of 'Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics', and for Richard Ashley, an anarchy is the result of nation states' reluctance to surrender their sovereignty.

Although constructivists cooperate with Neo realists and Neo liberalists to survive and to secure the state, but they are differ in the kind of security policy which follows balancing power and creating International norms by focusing on the collective meaning that organizes actions and ideas of cooperation in the process of democratization, interdependence, and international institutions.

Neo realists focus on security measures by distributing power due to unexplained claims and threats that retain doubts about other states. In contrast, neo liberalist focus on the efficiency of institutions to achieve economic cooperation, and democratic peace, tackling domestic policy issues and the influence of the political regimes and political systems on the state's foreign policy in particular and international relations in general. For instance, for neo realist Kenneth Waltz, the structure of the International system influences the behavior of units, nation states, or agents and the other way round is not possible.

The neo-Neo debate between Neorealism and Neoliberalism was a consensus about the anarchic nature of international government and the absence of world government but addressed self-help mechanisms and interdependence to overcome insecurity in the International system.

For constructivists, Nicholas Onuf, lack of world government does not lead to disorder and violence but rather regulated by three categories of instruction of first, general principles of IR like sovereignty, human rights, international laws, etc., and their importance in ensuring peaceful IR.

Second the directive rule; for provisions for protecting these principles and punishing offenders. Third the commitment rules; promise to enter into treaties to protect human rights and the environment. For Wendt, there is no 'logic' of anarchy apart from the nation-state shaped by a shared understanding of ideational factors, practices, and interactions among nation-states that result in very cordial and enemies relationships.

In this chapter the writer conceptualize civil war at Ethiopia level, especially in Tigray, and the determinant issues of internationalized internal conflict. He proposes at the system, social and state levels as the concepts and applications which include the democratic peace theory, power transition theory, security dilemma theory, and grievance-greed theory.

The civil war is caused by the collapse of the human spirit, Armitage⁴² (2000) that it should be reviewed deeply to understand scientific explanation at the local to international level to end the lawless and unacceptable dehumanize war on the People of Ethiopia and to know the influencer that determine the US responses toward this war.

The actors have been influenced or governed by an application of IR theories of conflict and war mainly at the dyadic level of analysis as cause and implication of war (Jack S. Levy 2011) including escalator of war balance of theory (as Levy 2011 cited Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) and power transition theory (Levy 2011 cited Gurr, 1970, Huntington 1991, Anyanwu 2002), and the democratic peace theory of “democratic culture and norms” models (as Levy 2011 cited Owen 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001) and the “institutional constraints model” (Levy 1989, as Levy 2011 cited Mesquita and et.al), the democratic capitalist peace theory(as Levy 2011 cited Silberner 1948; 1972, Weede 1995, Gartzke 2007, Rogowski 1989 as noted Blainey 1988), the greed and the grievance theory (as Anyanwu 2002 cited Collier and Hoeffler’s), and Ethnic security dilemma (as Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl cited Posen, Powell 2006, Johnson, Kaufmann)

In the application of Levy’s, the US response geared to advance their interest in this civil war was most likely determined by internal factors; the historic, economic and political interaction between the decision-makers, by external factors; the regional and international competition of powers, and by organizational capacity where the more organized decisional structure of the TPLF and the weak reformist decisions’ of prosperity party.

All ignore nonparty responsibility and accountability of the state and its people with individuals’ decisions. This is like the understanding of House Representative, Karen Bass, on Oct 2021 as ‘the conflict is multifaceted and complicated by ethnicity, politics, and history that need negotiated solutions.’ No data is available that assures that strong America started this war on Ethiopia but the TPLF begin it to avoid threats and to return to the strongest position of Ethiopia. At multiple times but without mentioning the influencer, Getachew Reda a member of TPLF leaders acknowledged that there were impositions to start the war.

⁴² David Armitage, Ph. D. is a Professor of Universities of Harvard at the Department of History and Sydney

According to Dunn (2019), the national or state interest is none identical or modified by external pressure by its levers of power; domestic structure and actors, influence activities; activities and mechanisms and influence analysis; state behavior.

In this case, the internationally recognized states of the US and Ethiopia, and the RST led by the TPLF in Ethiopia. The RST has its unconstitutional territory and defined groups as distinct as a nation or ethnicity called the People of Tigray. Both need to advance none identical interest in structure, actors, issues, mechanisms, and behavior. In the last 28 years since 1991, Ethiopia is synonymously used as TPLF because of the absolute dominancy of TPLF in-state interest, the definition of the power structure, actors, and mechanism, except in state behavior. State behavior resulted from influence analysis not accomplished by the TPLF-led Ethiopia as expected.

The unilateral lever of power, and influence activities and analysis of the US interest accomplished with the stronger group of actors. Even if the land-locked geography decreases the American strategic interest, Ethiopia has a negative or positive role as a key player of special importance for the US policy used to deal with regional counterterrorism efforts, peacekeeping, and regional political stability in neighboring Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland and an alternative source of political and economic support to the growing influence of china not only in economy but also close relation with the Communist Party of China. (Shenn (2018)

Using influence analysis the local competition to have the Ethiopian power distribution in terms of historic, economic and political interaction with the regional and international powers competitors and have highly organized structure and capacity led to the partnership with the US.

In application of balance of power theory, the HoA Africa is a place of power computations of powerful states from all continents except Australia and South America. These competitions create threats of hegemony and counterbalancing coalitions of great power states in the region that may lead to a proxy war covered by civil war in weak states. Most scholars believe that Ethiopia has a positive or negative contribution to the balance of power to avoid hegemony which builds alliances by avoiding threats or arms.

A balance of power theory posits the avoidance of hegemony as the primary instrumental goal of states and the maintenance of equilibrium of power in the system (cited Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979). The USA has hegemony of military army in the region GHoA. For example in South Sudan according to Knopf (2018), the militarization of the US, the competition for influence among the state of the HoA, the contest over the use of the Nile, and the implication of the rift between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt on the one hand and Qatar and Turkey on the other exacerbate the armed conflicts affecting the region and has further fractured an already fragmented political and security landscape.

In Uganda, the military presence of the US and its agency USAID in Northern Uganda's Conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army in the last stage of the twenty-year war exacerbate trans-national conflict, rebel violence, and oversight of governmental abuses of strategic allies which caused immeasurable damage to both the affected civilian populations and the overall stability of the region that outweighing the benefits brought by aid programs. (Noris 2014)

Some scholars argue that the US calculation determined by the distribution of power at the system level led to the former EPRDF than today's EPRDF called the Prosperity Party (PP) in a conflict spiral or predatory aggression experiences.

The former EPRDF's beliefs on the balance of power theory made them successful in the formation of alliances under the hegemony of the TPLF until the 2005 election by leading and controlling the soft and hard power of the country and an ally of the US to the world war on terror in the Somalia and peacekeeping force using the supportive ideology of democratic centralism as party discipline. The real power in Ethiopia was in the hands of the TPLF and other parties in the governing collisions as puppets (cited International Crises Group 2009) that securitized by the Tigrayans as the referent object of security used to securitizing the Oromo and Amhara identities as a means to an end, that end being ethnic dominancy and regime security. (Anwar⁴³ 2018)

⁴³ Anwar Hassen Tsega is a Ph. D. Candidate and researcher at the Marmara University at the Department of Political Science and International relations, Istanbul, Turkey

Instead of using or distributing power, the latter was contained by major violent conflicts, including major battles conducted across regions of Ethiopia except in Tigray from August 2019 to October 2020, and then, since November 2020 it was confined in Tigray with little incidences elsewhere of armed conflict location and event data. (Kibrom⁴⁴ and et. al^{45, 46, 47, 48} 2022) See the figures 10 and 11 below. Major violent conflicts and major battles were conducted across regions of Ethiopia except in Tigray from August 2019 to October 2020, then, since November 2020, it has been confined to Tigray with few incidences elsewhere. (Ibid) They are more than thirty to the Abey's response to the questions raised by the members of the House of Peoples of Representatives of Ethiopia (HPRE).




Figure 10 - Battles, Aug 2019 - Oct 2020




Figure 11 - Battles, Nov 2020 - Oct 2021

(Data: World Bank Group 2022)

⁴⁴ Kibrom A. Abay is a researcher for International Food Policy Research Institute in Development Strategy and Governance Division in Cairo as a development and Agricultural Economist and Country Program Leader.

⁴⁵ Kibrom Tafere, Ph. D. is an Economist Researcher at the Development Research Group, World Bank, and Cornell University

⁴⁶ Guush Berhane, Ph. D. is a Senior Research Fellow International Food Policy Research Institute at the Development Strategy and Governance Division and Wageningen University in the Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy Group in Economics. He thought at Mekelle University, in Ethiopia

⁴⁷ Jordan Chamberlin, Ph. D. is a Spatial Economist at the Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center

⁴⁸ Mehari H. Abay, Ph. D. is an independent consultant contracted to the University of Florence in Development Economics and Local Systems

In mid-2018 the TPLF leader appreciated Abey's leadership experience and selected him with hundred percent which provide hope of better for the entire Ethiopia but this changed among others mostly on rule of law on cases of corruption, exclusive military reform, and the establishment of PP that led to the cause and escalation of conflict into civil war.

In Contrary to the balance of power theory, power transition theory posits hegemony is a common that is conducive to peace. They predict that a high concentration of power in the international system will generate counterbalancing coalitions so that hegemonies never arise. (Ibid) The US hegemony is not easy because of competitors' from China, Russia, UAE, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UK, France, Italy, and the like in the region and especially from the former colonizer around Ethiopia that lead to blind hegemony.

The prosperity party of the former member of EPRDF with its supportive parties from the Afar, Somali, Benshangul, Harare, and Gambella, in the beginning, apply the power transition theory that was supported externally; by the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and EU and exiled Ethiopian diasporas around the world and internally; by the members' of EPRDF and opposition parties including the exile parties like Ginbot 7, OLF and others using power sharing to generate counter-balancing coalitions that may create a hegemonic threat that led to the TPLF to enter to this war.

Now some scholars raise questions in the application of this theory rather it is like the incidence of war between Russia and Ukraine and the instruction to favor Ukraine by the US with about ten billion dollars, is clearing the interest of international power to return to the roadway to the cold war that may replace the multi-power system that led by the US and Russia.

The democratic culture and norms models as Kant argues that 'citizens will not vote to send themselves off to war, the TPLF unanimously decide without consultation and decision of the people rather than democratically struggle for strengthening electoral accountability by institutionalized check and balances, and secure rule of law to have more support from the public not only from the Tigrayans but also from all Ethiopians that may avoid unilateral decisions of political leaders.

For some scholars of Ethiopia, the US influence in internal affairs is due to the undemocratic culture of political parties and their governance and weak state institutions rather than government institutions. For interviewee III, the main challenge is the inability to own the country's homework using foreign affairs machines and unable to create strong friendships.

The "institutional constraints model, the fertile ground of failed institutional system internally led to citizens' distrust, chaotic life in misperceptions, the decline in the fighting of corruption and inter-grown unaccountability of political leaders, and ignorance of public goods that all resulted in commitment problems, less sensitivity to the outcome of the war, devalue of war cost and the spiral of war. According to key respondents, the weakness in human resources of the minister of foreign affairs of Ethiopia and poor integration with state institutions by ignoring the experienced personnel and diplomats and including politically affiliated nonprofessionals as a place of retirement contribute to the escalation of conflict. The places need permanent commitment in the world of most to compete based on uncompromised interest that needs the weak side of the other or in the world of some in which the capacity creates the negotiated compromised interest.

Interference will not always come from the strongest US rather this war shows us, this too-weakness can give a chance to be attacked by weak states like Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan. The interference of Eritrea is quite different from Sudan's occupation of Ethiopian land about fifty kilometers.

In capitalist peace theory application since the transition period, power from the TPLF-led EPRDF to the prosperity party, bridged by Oromo-PP with soft influence of Amhara-PP that characterized Ethiopia as a volatile state where the violence of conflicts increased almost in all parts of Ethiopia (See Figure 3), increase in local displacement, and high in artificial inflation due to decline or stagnation in economy and monopolization of the country's political economy that needs thick shouldered individuals and people, and those lead political elites to engage in the diversionary use of force to solidify their domestic political support and replace monopolization of political economy without removes domestic condition but conducive to war, against the democratic capitalist peace theory.

For some respondents the TPLF and its supporters who need the status quo exercise or implement this concept to return to power including the miscalculation of the US without considering the real development of Ethiopian politics where resurrection only for Jesus Christ.

The greed and grievance theory applied for some Ethiopians, the sons and families of the TPLF leaders were not in the war zone and TPLF and its Supporters consider their greed and grievances as an opportunity in a weakened political society free to recruit and financial support from their deposit, members, and institution indifferent way and by bank robbery including the politicization of ethnicity, religions, and poverty where the PP lack of strong institutions with its actors.

According to Prime Minister Abey, the war is between Ethiopians and a greedy junta but not between people of Ethiopia and Tigray'. The grievance and greed theory apply to the nature of contentious behaviors of the Tigray's political elites and their followers instead of cooperation to resolve the problem of justice, inequality of resource distribution, social inequality, ethnic dominancy, economic fractionalization, historical corruption, and lack of the common vision. They are inculcated in the questions of all Ethiopians that may contribute a lot or affect more Tigray people as an application of Collier-Hoeffler but not waiting in political consciousness.

There are perceptions to control the theories and practices of grievances and greed that create disrespect and uncompromised ways of political relations in terms of historical, social, and political-economic incompetency. In Ethiopia what makes difficult about the grievances, is a perception of exclusion and marginalization (Norwegian Refugee Council) for instance some political elites from the People of Tigray examined identically percept as political behaviors when they were led by the TPLF and by their supporters of PP as the same to that of the Derg and the Emperor periods since Menlike.

For some scholars, the US benefitted from the nature of TPLF of exclusive grievances in the historic, economic and justice-seeking and greed in the desire of private gain due to the existence of "lootable" resources in Ethiopia not only in the Regional States of Tigray but also in other parts of Ethiopia by exacerbating the political ethnicity and in creating ethnic dominancy in bone and blood within politicized socio-economic fractionalization and inequality.

In security dilemma, the EPRDF led political ethnicity to create ethnic groups that become responsible for their security due to its commitment problems in between the before old democratic revolutionists, and the later Medemer ‘new generation?’ reformist of primarily the TPLF and the Federal political leaders of PP, the border and security issues of an incomplete partition of Eritrea, the misconception of ethnic power-sharing stability and ignoring “tactical offensive dominates” (Barry Posen), the ethnic security dilemma.

According to Anwar (2018), the TPLF created ethnic polarization like Temketgna of the Amhara elites and Tebab of the Oromo elites to divide the two that make threatened the state power structure and national cohesion that results in marginalized dominant ethnic nationalities of Oromo and Amhara, ethnic cleansing of Amhara, forced displacement of indigenous people from their ancestral land in Guraferda Bench Maji, Beni Shangul region and Somali, and arresting and killing in the implementation of the Addis Ababa Master plan as used by Aregawi (2008)

These are insecure when sharing a national agenda, with mistrust of government and within ethnic groups, and irrational political and economic competition that may lead a new dynamics of the We vs Them conception. For some scholars, the distrust and disrespect relationship due to non-democratic norms and weak democratic institutions, and misconception of ethnic power and non-cohesively politically fractionalized society of the TPLF and the FGE contribute more to the escalation of the war than external factors like the US influence that need to go through under accountability by the rule of law.

Constructivism based on the empirical validation and falsification of facts, post positivism in IR holds the experiences through understanding the real nature, shared perceptions and interactions, and identity that may change the imagery by active role of the reader mind in examining ‘how did it become that way’, and ‘how it ought to be’ to emancipating humanity in which interactions and interpretations of ideas may transform the enmity to friendship and the vice versa.

Moreover, theses offers insight human security by human consciousness, national identity and interest formation on people centric security that necessitates the protection of individuals treats from disease, hunger, unemployment, political oppression and environmental degradation (Tsi and Tan 2007), freedom from want, fear and to live in dignity (Kofi Annan 2005), and in multi

dimensions of personal, environmental, economic, political, community, healthy and food security (UNDP 1994). (Yu-tai Tsai 2009)

History challenges current and future commitments for formation of State, state system, and International relations whether cooperative or conflictual which is made up of men and women but secured for better by emancipated human mind in interpreting experiences and observations in interactions.

Critical constructivism may lead the balancing power and collective meaning which organize actions, neorealist, and create norms and ideas of cooperation focus on democratization, interdependence and international relations, neo-liberalist. By Who, why and how cheaters also easily examined from its inception, and analyzed that aimed to correct before ending humanity naturally.

6.2 Finding of the study

The strong partners' of the former absolute dominance of the TPLF-led Ethiopia, basically the political economic actors had threatened the cohesive capability of Ethiopians and endangered the territorial integrity of the state of Ethiopia, which may also lead to non-strategic responses of the USA to the people of Ethiopia.

During the war, the USA's responses were significant to Ethiopia by ending legibility from the economic support of AGOA in December 2021, multiple interventions in the number of the American House and Senate resolutions, lobbying many times at the UN and UN Security Council and advised many times to all citizens of the US to leave Ethiopia as soon as possible. The USA Embassy Ethiopia multiple times advised at level 4 security messages per three days in December 2021 (USEE 2021) that called for all international community.

In addition to that, the Senior USA General William Zana to BBC Africa's (2021) said that, the USA and the allies showed their military hardware that planned and prepared for the military response after Ethiopia failed to settle this crisis.

Since November 4, 2020, the economic and social consequence of the war on Ethiopia, at the country level to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) growth of just under two percent for 2021, down from six percent in 2020 due to the over \$1 billion war cost, an acute foreign currency shortage and the surge inflation rate of Ethiopia, and socially it strained relations to alleviate food insecurity and poverty, improve health indicators, counter-terrorism, and instability in the region. (Blanchard 2021)

Socially, till March 2021, this civil war was estimated to displace 2 million people, including more than 50,000 in neighboring Sudan. (Deleer 2021) According to UN and USAID; it is where 5.2 million people, about ninety percent need food aid, and between 400,000 and 900,000 people facing famine conditions in the Tigray region because the war expand into Afar and Amhara, displaced over 300,000 people and made another 1.7 million people food insecurity. For UNHCR, since July 2021, in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions between 1 January 2021, and 1 February 2022, documented battles of about 1,099, incidents of violence against civilians about 352, and 8,894 reported fatalities, and since November 2020, over 68,500 Ethiopian nationals have sought asylum in the HoA and the Great Lakes Regions including at least 59,000 in Eastern Sudan (UNHCR 2022) but the Ethiopian government officials not accept a report.

According to the Human Right Council Report of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia on 19 September 2022, summarized as they find reasonable grounds to believe that violations such as extrajudicial killings, rape, sexual violence, and starvation of the civilian population since 3 November 2020, which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. (HRC 2022) Nevertheless, the report was criticized by Ambassador Redwan Husein, the Security Advisor of Prime Minster Abey Ahmed, as it is unclear and lacks a reality that aimed to claim and undermine Ethiopia.

The scientific causes, the escalation of conflict, the civil war conducted in Tigray on Ethiopia, and the US responses, were explored as part of the International community in an African internalization study at International, African, and HoA levels. In what's ever cause and contextualizes the war, it affect the bilateral relations of Ethiopia and the USA today.

As the causes of this TWCW, the TPLF as de facto or regional states undermined acts which threaten the Abiy government and its supporters. The threats accounted for the acceptance of Abey in Tigray, and institutionalizations of inward-looking economic and military reform affect

absolute dominancy of TPLF that strong the agony of Tigray political elites to what they called to the Addis Ababa Government.

As an escalation of conflicts that lead to civil war, the FGE claimed TPLF by conducting an election in Tigray, forming relations with other states and with International Organizations like China and the UN, making the new political and military alignments with federalist and con-federalist forces, and attacking the national defense forces of Ethiopia that undermined the rule of law in the land which results in disrespect relations between actors. Oppositely the TPLF claimed FGE by undermining the rule of law by; extending the Ethiopian General Election of Ethiopia, illegible and suspending the budget of the RST, and Tigrean focus corruption fighting.

Some argue that a cause of this war is the acceptance difference in the implementation of the Jeddah agreement on peace, friendship, and comprehensive cooperation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision, Article 4. See Appendix 4

For the escalation of conflict and to involve in this civil war using the political, economic, social, and environmental conditions for scientific war analysis of Bremer (1995), the TPLF-led EPRDF is stronger than the prosperity-led FGE in systematic factors of power distribution and alignment patterns. For instance, almost all modern armaments were controlled by Tigray leaders, the ratio of the number of military troops during the early stage of the war was about 250 000 TDF with 40 000 Federal troops, and the capacity to form allies in historical patterns of agony and disciplined or tight political structure, democratic centralism.

The militarily-political relations to accept and implementations of the constitutional law of the land, artificializes the implementers of the rule of law, unclear check and balance between the people, the state, and the government concerning declaring war, mismatch or roles conflicts among security and military leadership in using violence and armaments were to some scholars' lacked willingness. It creates undermined and disrespected relations between political, security, and military actors of Ethiopia who must fulfill the national interest, but that led to national commitment problems within the security forces and their followers.

During this civil war, the military leaders of TDF are the former member of the NDF of Ethiopia, a decade the highest military leader, Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensay, 1991-2001, next

to Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and Lieutenant General Tadesse Wored, who served on the military leadership of Ethiopia today. Both are the military negotiators from TPLF in the implementation of Pretoria Peace Agreement in Nairobi, Kenya.

Before the war, TPLF monopolized the national economic conditions of Ethiopia with its allies due to favored political economy policy. They moved or transferred wealth to Tigray because of fear of where Tigrians targeted corruption fighting process, and to organize themselves aimed to return to power by force. For some scholars, it is the struggle to replace the economic dominance of TPLF within the member EPRDF in the new dimension of the prosperity party led by OPDO and ANDM. The time is exacerbated when a question is raised, who are Oromo, and Amhara as well?

The economics of this war for Bagouri⁴⁹ (2021) may have future impacts on the integrity of the state drain budget, slow economic growth, the lower exchange rate of the Birr (ቲ) ⁵⁰, soaring inflation, fleeing foreign investments, declining export, and defaulting on debts.

For him, it extensively damaged the Ethiopian economy; by draining the budget of about 1 billion dollars, cited Antonio Guterres (August 2021), in which the military spent about four hundred sixty million dollars in 2020, cited Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Second, it slows economic growth, which drops to less than two percent in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing industries, found in all regions. Third, it lowered the exchange rate of the Birr (ቲ) from thirty-five to seventy-five per dollar, which led to suspending all lending and money transfers as well as all coverage for direct imports and caused crises in the exchange market and a lack of foreign reserves.

Fourth, soaring inflation results in food prices at 40.7 percent to a ten-year high, unemployment above 17 percent, and tax revenues dropping to less than nine percent of the GDP due to the security situation affecting agriculture and industries across the country.

⁴⁹ Samar Bagouri, Ph. D. is a researcher and Professor of Economics at Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies and in Cairo University

⁵⁰ ቲ is used for Ethiopia Birr like as Dollar designated as \$.

Fifth, fleeing foreign investments like Global fashion giant PVH Corporation due to the USA Administration that suspended Ethiopia's membership from AGOA and Ethiopia suspended a new telecommunication license award for foreign companies due to Human Rights violations and instability in the country.

Sixth, it was declining export of at least twenty million dollars in export revenue from the Tigray region. Seventh, it defaulted on debts in October 2021, lowered Ethiopia's sovereign credit rating by Moody Investors Service due to the ability to pay off debts and suspension of international Aids like the EU about worth 88 million euros (107 dollars).

Socially, for some scholars, the Tigray political elites most likely believed in social cohesion, or a form of alliance, by the experiences of creating wars. Therefore, they believed that they facilitated political instability in the entire country without violent conflicts or war-free RST but resulted in the people of Tigray anticipating attacks from other people of Ethiopia. In the political history of Ethiopia, Tigray, from TPLF formations as a political and military force, had experienced about a half-century of escalated conflict and passed through civil war for about twenty years.

To advance or to elongate the war, TPLF tried to occupy the strategic geopolitical position of the economic door of Ethiopia to Djibouti, more than eighty percent passage of import and export goods of Ethiopia, and the Sudan door for basically transferring military goods. And they expanded the war two times to the neighboring regional states of Afar and Amhara and up to neighbor Oromia on the road to Addis Ababa to return to power in Addis Ababa.

It may be created the character of the war by the psychological view of the analysis of Mayer's perceptual lens due to compatible of own needs, interests, wants, or values in primary leadership within military and security forces in the legacy of revolutionary democrats and the reformist of the prosperity politicians or between the legacies of white capitalism politicians, the former and the later.

The feeling lens of the leaders of OPDO and the reformist groups passed through fear, anger, bitterness, sadness, hopelessness, or the combination of creatures' live or death relations between them up to record the important information to be publicly used after death.

And the lens of action involved a violent or destructive warlike confrontation, local and international displacement, food insecurity, ethnic-based human cleansing, removing cultural and religious state values, violating human rights, and enlarged to destroy to make the distrusting relations with the US.

In addition, Ethiopia today may share the Gilpin analysis of war in IR of Africa as a cause like weak governance at Federal and Regional States levels, historical animosities between TPLF-led political leaders of the Federalist and Con-federalist forces, and prosperity party led by the former frontiers of EPRDF; the OPDO, EPDM later ANDM, the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM), the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and some other opposition parties, exclusionary politics of Zero-sum ideology, contested legitimacy among or between security forces and political leaders, un institutionalized and distrust resource exploration, accumulation and competition, strategic and security interest load of external factors, and globally recognized interwoven and multi-dimensional conflicts and extremist ideologies of radicalism.

Similarly, outward-looking, using Aremu (2010), contextualized as an arbitrary border within the war zone in Amhara and Tigray, grievance relations among politically heterogeneous ethnic composition, inept political leadership with symbolic or artistic authority, corruption of security in the national interest, the external debt burden, and poverty. It was solved by domestic efforts, not by an external solver only.

The territorial stresses within the Amhara and Tigray regions, the attempts at absolute dominancy, biasedness on self-determination, and the legitimacies of the dynasties; the Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Yohannes, Emperor Menlike, and Emperor Hailselasie, and the revolutionists; President Mengistu, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, and Hail Mariam Desalegn contextualized as an inward-looking, using Singer.

Revenge creates war. Actors had created a revenge relationship by excluding Ethiopia and Ethiopian values of history, religion, language, ethnicity, resources, and equality, strengthening the insecurity relationship at the national and international levels. Otherwise, the oppressed, psychologically felt unhappiness creates his enemy and kills the one who causes unhappiness that becomes a source of happiness, as Chingo put it as the cause of war in Africa.

The causes of this war may also be embedded in historic factors of dynastic experiences, externalization of socio-economic crises, legacies of exclusion politics of authoritarianism, and uncalculated and illegalized alliance formation with external forces using as external factors using Annan (2014) who cited Obi (2012). And internally it may include the undemocratic with complex conspirators' governance and blinding corruptions that examined or suffered in human rights violations, poverty, ethnic marginalization, and small arms and light weapons proliferation.

For some scholars, the root causes of this war and its implication using Obi might be the perceptions of the historic dynastic relation between Menilk and Yohannes, Derg and Melese, Melese and Abey governments, or Shewan-Amhara-led elite and exclusivist elites (Argawi 2008), by claiming for all bad for the hands of colonial, superpower and legacies of the former leader that contributes to the undermining and disrespect relations between political actors led to the difficulties for the formation of the internal and external trustful alliance, fight state corruptions from the heart and declining grievances in suffering in human right violations, poverty, ethnic marginalization and small and medium weapons proliferation in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia like in Benshangul Gomez and Wolega in Oromia.

In the Human Rights context, according to the Human Right Joint Investigation Report from May 16, to August 30, 2021, alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Refugee Law, Committed by all Parties. With reasonable ground, the following major violations and abuses occurred; the attack on civilians and civilian objects, unlawful killings and extra-judicial executions, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, arbitrary detentions, abduction and enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence, putting the security and lives of refugees at risk, forced displacement of the civilian population, internally displaced persons (IDPs), restrictions on freedom of movement, freedom of expression and access to information, pillage, looting, and destruction of property, denial of access to humanitarian relief, seriously undermined economic, social, and cultural rights, children subjected to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), physical injuries, killings and exposed to traumatic experiences and failed to provide special protection to older persons and persons with disabilities (PWDs). (EHRC/OHCHR 2021)

Therefore, the war internally endangers the territorial integrity and cohesive nature of Ethiopia to protect national interest due to problematic and complex military, political, economic, social, environmental, cultural, psychological, historical, and human rights implications of the war. Fail to securitize the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and the cohesive people of Ethiopia.

Concerning the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the US, during Emperor Menlike the US policy toward Ethiopia was to form an alliance to holdout against European imperialism, to establish a treaty of amity and commerce as a trading partner, to minimize the threat of access to Ethiopia's market and alter the dominancy of France, Italy and Great Britain, to maintain Ethiopia's independency, to support the transformation of Ethiopia, to meet interest in the science of anthropology and to secure a collection of the seeds of the more important crops peculiar to Ethiopia which may be found valuable in the exploitation of the uncultivated western lands of the United States.

Emperor Haile Selassie's period of International relations with the US was assistance in the second attempt at the occupation of Italy by never publically recognized Italian authority in Ethiopia, sharing policy of the decolonization of Africa, supporting the unity of Eritrea and Ethiopia, using Ethiopia's strategic position of kagnew and a conciliatory attitude towards the outbreak of popular unrest 1974.

At the same time, Ethiopia was required equal and independent participation in the global community, supported the policy of the decolonization of Africa, and battalion sent to Korea with USA support. According to Henze (1990), the American involvement in Ethiopia revolved around modern trade, exploration, missionary endeavors, and the desires of American Blacks to develop contacts with an old independent African country.

For him, in the 1960s, the US influence in Ethiopia expanded steadily in private relationship development, education, and development programs in Ethiopia, the favorite destination of the Ethiopian student in the US, and had more Peace Corps Volunteers than any other country in the world.

The Ethiopia bilateral issues with the US during Derg were the Military aid and later ideological attack on US imperialism in official pronouncements, the Economic aid and development

assistance, the support of a resettlement program, the fleeing of the population of Ethiopian Jews, and the negotiated peace with the EPRDF and EPLF. In an identical period, following the nationalization by the Ethiopian government, unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements that includes Kagnew station, and cut of the US Embassy staff of fifty percent, the US encountered her Hickenlooper Amendment.

Here isolation policies of the USA towards Derg were followed by the USA by supporting its pro-western neighbors for opponents of Derg, claiming Derg by human rights, creating famine, and using starvation as a weapon of war. Finally, through persistent diplomatic efforts, the USA assisted in the fleeing of the people of Ethiopian Jews and the handover of power to the EPRDF.

On another side of the US at the time, she supports opposition by the requirements of ideology; not too left-wing, military; presence in Ethiopia, and commitment; to the overthrowing of the Derg regime, in addition, to encircling Ethiopia by neighboring countries by support regionally the Khartoum, Nairobi, and Mogadishu axis, and oppositions EPLF, TPLF/ EPRDF and, in the end, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).

During the TPLF-led EPRDF, the US support the establishment of a transitional government, declined strong resistance, saved Addis Ababa to prevent a breakdown in law and order, dropped territorial integrity and accepted Eritrean independence, support the war on terror and involve to end a war with Eritrea peace agreement proposal with Rwanda and later with OAU.

From 1991 to 2012, despite the landlocked and poorest nation-state of Ethiopia strategically important to the US was because of its geographic location, relative strength in the region, availability of transnational terrorist groups, traditions of a strong military, and institutions, political leverage supported by the US policymakers and the headquarters for the African Union. (Seife⁵¹ 2018)

In recent years, a former US ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shan (2018), acknowledged that China's influence increased in Ethiopia when the US diminished with remains of the largest

⁵¹ Seife Ayalew, a Ph. D. candidate is training of trainer and researcher at the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Fairfax, United States, and in George Mason University.

bilateral aid donor, like the Gulf States, Turkey, and India. For him, China is the most important economic partner because of investment, concessionary loans, and infrastructure projects built by Chinese companies.

In practice, the US interest accomplishes through shuttle diplomacy in using interpersonally strong relations with political and economic leaders in dyadic relations of diplomatic bonds like the relation between Birhan Gebrkirstos and Samantha Power.

For the current PP of Ethiopia, the US has shown interest in investment and trade, promoting reforms and peace in the region, improving the security relationship, accelerating American investments to transform Ethiopia's economy, envisioning a new future of engagement, and mediating a deal on the GERD's filling and operations.

These interests are affected, for example, by the humanitarian crisis, human rights abuses, and acts of ethnic cleansing in Tigray. The implication of this war, the risk of instability in the HoA, and increasing political and ethnic polarization were solved by ending conflicts, ceasefire, providing humanitarian aid, holding accountability, withdrawing Eritrean forces, calling for an inclusive political process in Tigray, and a broader inclusive political process in Ethiopia.

The US imposed restrictions on economic and security assistance, withholding new multilateral development bank lending, urging Ethiopian authorities to promote reconciliation, human rights, and respect for pluralism called for the withdrawal of Amhara forces from western Tigray, the TPLF from Amhara and Afar, and Eritrean forces from Ethiopia; unfettered aid access and an end to the commercial blockade; and a negotiated ceasefire.

Most scholars what a writer reads and listens to believe that the US response was quite different before and during the war. The US response before the war is pro the federal government accepting Abiy's leadership, securing support by providing positive wide media coverage, and supporting the reforms in millions of dollars.

A proposal for Renaissance Dam Agreement made by the Trap Administration, which is taken as a pro-Egypt, and warning to explode the Human Right Dam, and the Biden Administration as the democrat had a historical tendency in interfering and middle in internal affairs, froze the relationship between the two leaders, transferred to the bilateral relations of the two states. It is

declining relations between the Federal government of Ethiopia and the US, including the TPLF, the Tigray Genocide report, the involvement of external actors of Eritrea and the Amhara force in Tigray, and the statements of external International organizations for atrocities in Tigray.

The war clarifies the external actors that support the Federal government; Turkey, UAE, China, and Russia, and for the TPLF; the US, and the EU. Almost all scholars agreed with biasedness on US responses toward TPLF until the phone call between Abey and Biden on January 10, 2022.

During the war, the US responses, show a tendency to support the TPLF in terms of the state of Eritrea and other regional states as interferences, in reclaim of the west Tigray of Amhara military force, humanitarian crises accountability, in humanitarian aids interruption, and external hegemonic alleys threats.

At the time, the US response was characterized as the tendency to interfere and meddle in the internal affairs of Ethiopia, and externally tried to secure and lead the international affairs of Ethiopia by using the US Embassy Ethiopia, state officials; statements, news, and alerts.

According to interviewee I, the summarized factors, the local value is used to furnish the international relations policy as a means to achieve permanent national interest by neither enemy nor friendship using the corrupt or the respected bilateral relation of the US and Ethiopia.

Now, regionally the US has competition from new like China, Russia, India, Turkey, Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia, EU, Etc, and the historical colonial legacies of France, English, and Italy, in neighboring countries, and in Ethiopia, by the tripartite agreement of France, English, and Italy on Ethiopia to Ethiopia without Ethiopian consent.

This has been acknowledged by the first Chinese envoy Xung Bing (2022), in the statement of Ethiopian authority at the Ethiopia- China conference in Addis Ababa as the region is complicated and intertwined with ethnicity, religion, and boundary issues that make it difficult to handle as many of them date back to colonial times.

For instance, the China belt road initiative in a decade, invest around 16 billion dollars for about 400 Chinese construction and manufacturing projects, and China regionally provides 1.2 billion

dollars in funding GERD in Ethiopia, oil monopoly in Sudan and South Sudan, and the only military base in Djibouti, since 2017. (Gbadamosi 2022)

All endanger the territorial integrity of Ethiopia that loosen Ethiopian integrity due to practical ignore the strategic interest based on the sovereignty of the mass Ethiopians and the Americans. Nevertheless, there were US sympathetic responses during the war like the USA secretary of state Antony Blinken's, repetitive call for 'peace negotiation', the USA Senators' introduce new sanctions to deescalate conflicts, and the USA appointing new multiple special envoys for the HoA, among them Mike Hammer succeeded in Pretoria in the Peace Talk Agreement to permanently cease-fire.

In general, during the war, both involved themselves in claiming each other at a higher level which affected the relations between the two countries. The bilateral relations between the USA and Ethiopia, to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Deputy PM and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia (MoFAE), Demeke said that it 'lack common understanding and respect with a direct impact on policies and institutions on the ground.' (MoFAE 2021)

And on the other side, the US officials claimed Ethiopia on the acts of ethnic cleansing, human rights abuses, crimes against humanity or genocide, disinformation, obstructing humanitarian aid and personnel, and the war crime. (Blanchard 2021)

Generally, Ethiopia shares the anarchic International and African IR conflict arena in the multiple insecurity and instability due to solving the conflict of interest by the war, including civil war, with the hope of cooperative and integrative solutions of the region. For instance, this war displaced hundreds of thousands and insecure more than nine million people, more than the people of Tigray.

Even if Ethiopia is internally unstable, she has the potential to use power for the security and stability of the HoA that may expand to Africa and other parts of the world due to its population size with the majority commitment. The priority interest of the USA is security. Human rights and Inclusive Democracy are the nexters' alternatively.

Generally, the time is one of the most critical times, like in the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1990s, change of government in Ethiopia. Peace talks of the AU-led agreement plan supported by Kenya, South Africa, the US, IGAD, EU, and the UN started on October 24-30, 2022, in South Africa, Pretoria. But it takes ten days within a conclusion of twelve points' agreements between FGE and TPLF. Among them is to end the war to ensure accountability, truth, reconciliation, and healing. See appendix 5.

An African Union, for the first time, accomplished its vision of an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena (Agenda 2063, 2015). The agreement creates war free hopes for all Ethiopians and for international elites. It is “the beginning of new dawn” for Olusengun Obasango (AU’s mediator), “momentous step” for Antony Blinken (the USA secretary of State) and “a well come first step” for Antonio Guterress (the UN Chief). (UN News 2022)

6.3 Conclusion of the study

Except for the last successful peace talks in Pretoria, the civil war between the FGE and TPLF, internally, endanger the territorial integrity and cohesive nature of the people to protect the national interest of Ethiopia and Ethiopian, and externally, in question the respected strategically broaden dimension of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and the US that will well damage cooperation or enhance public distrust.

Now for some scholars, Ethiopia lost its territorial integrity to Eritrea and Sudan physically, and fundamentally unclearly tightened in two contradictories interests; the one that supports the TPLF-led EPRDF for the imperialistic Meles legacy, and the member and supporters of PP, the pro-Abiy with some members of the opposition groups and individuals including those hope to meet their interest from the winner. The regular citizens need to be listened or returned their value of freedom sprit of Ethiopia rather than corrupted economy and politics.

Conducting long and spiral-corrupted war with unaccountable and hidden negotiations as a policy of Ethiopian national interest entrepreneurship might be carefully examined through the three-dimensional lens of conflict. The lens of conflict to Annan cited Mayer (2000), is categorized as the lens of perception; the own needs, interests, wants, or values in compatible

with someone else, feeling lens; through emotions, including fear, anger, bitterness, sadness, hopelessness or the combination of these, and lenses of action; involve a violent or destructive. (Annan 2014) we have to ask, what leaders make them violent or destructive actors to their people? Making accountability of authority by naturalizing the role of the state machinery will decrease the disastrous decisions and consequences of the war. But among them, some political elites and most regular citizens were interested and participated in the process to end the war.

Some inspired worriers to raise their hands above their heads, have their seats and provide political free space for all Ethiopians in discursive dialogues. The inclusive political Freedom of Ethiopia must be returned now by the respectful people of Ethiopia. It will accommodate the all-round multi-dimensional interests under the rule of law by non-militarized politicians and non-politicized military personnel by stateless men and women and ethnic-based citizens. It will solve ethnically institutionalized and historically biased challenges of Ethiopia that benefit all human communities, including the US.

For Tigray, when his opponent moved to Mekele including the member of a parliament, Prime Minister Abey in his response to the House of People's Representatives, he advised TPLF, by saying, 'your (Tigrians) interest accomplished with Ethiopia so that please do not have to think separation by using the experiences of this and that.'

Similarly, the writer hopes for the implementation of the Pretoria agreement, the first success of African cooperation, but some scholars argue that this civil war should be ended by permitting to form the state of Tigray as a recommendation due to some of Tigrians elites returning to the scenario of Tigray independency after they closed thirty years before. But Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl argued to learn from a state of Eritrea that attacks Ethiopia after a decade of its formation, which cost more than 100 000 lives.

They said that;

“World history since the emergence of the nation-state suggests that partitioning territories and creating new, more homogeneous states may not make the world more peaceful. At the limit, if ethnic diversity drives conflicts if all states are partitioned into ethnically homogeneous nation-states, the risk of intrastate conflict should decline, and the risk of interstate conflict goes up. The partition empowered ethnic elites which increases the risk of violence by

lingering territorial disputes weakening the status of residual minorities and forcing them to rebel, activating new ethnic or ideological cleavages, weakening the economic position of the rump or secessionist state, or forcing contests over the control of the regime in the secessionist state.”

The US-Ethiopia relations since World War II through the 1960s is a patron-client political exchange system that never subservient to the USA but pursues both national interests by opposing it where necessary as an independent state of Africa, Lyons (1986) what experienced today in the twenty-first century.

For Tibebe⁵² (2021) no amount of lobbying will change the US's policy towards Ethiopia's interests rather than the US interests, which led to finding a pass way by doing homework to balance interests created by IR issues like geopolitics of the HoA, Diaspora diplomacy and the man-made and natural capitals of Ethiopians and humankind.

According to interviewee I the internal considerations should include the self-reliant homework of Ethiopia and Ethiopians in the development of local values concerning accessibility of humanitarian aid, security, the confidence of citizens, freedom of speech, fight against corruption, rule of law, the economic and political equality and grounding the discourse level bureaucracy and accountability.

For him, the external consideration of the interest of the US should be diplomatically articulated in the win-win state-to-state relations which integrate the interest of Ethiopia to horn African states, create an accepting environment for the decision of Ethiopia, and non-compromise of the territorial integrity of the state of Ethiopia.

According to interviewee II, external determinants consider internal gross human rights violations and democracy, and internal factors are used in important alliance formation and stabilizing force in the horn of Africa.

As an internal factor, my interviewee III focused on the capacity of the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia to use its foreign affairs machinery properly by taking corrective actions for professionally

⁵² Tibebe Samuel Ferenji is executive director at Tibebe and Associate at Montgomery College. Maryland, USA. He has a master of Taxation from William Howard Taft University.

excluded experienced foreign affairs personnel and assigning professionals to the foreign affairs office.

For him, it includes building internal peace and long-term stability, using proper public diplomacy to influence informal public efforts of Diasporas and individuals in different languages, and creating long-term preparation of think of thanks, foreign diplomats and journalists. The place will not be a place for tired politicians, militarized personnel, and full-off problem individuals.

The determinant for the future and today's bilateral relations, for key interviewee IV, are trust restoration in which the political problem is resolved by political by the AU-led agreement with the support of the US and the EU to normalize the economic or other interest of the two countries.

The negotiation before negotiation for him includes the four times Seychelles agreement as the peace process to avoid war. Similarly, for him, the dialogue is not necessary, is a must either between the parties of the federal government, TPLF, and Eritrea or between the FGE and the Regional Government of Tigray.

More than eighty percent of my key respondents agreed on an Eritrea destructive interference, must withdraw its troops entirely from Ethiopia, without any condition FGE must allow lifesaving access to Tigray, make a durable ceasefire with third-party monitors, and initiate accountability for human rights abuse.

In addition, prolonging the war may benefit TPLF and the Abey government but not the People of Ethiopia, specifically the People of Tigray.

In conclusion of a study, during the war the USA response inclined towards TPLF due to the potential and capability factors of experiences of personal leaders' quality and institutional leadership.

The writer recommends that Ethiopia should internally focus on the construction of quality cooperative leadership without enterprising national interest and committed state institutions under the rule of law.

Trust restoration, taking corrective actions to the state failures, using inclusive diaspora-public diplomacy, stabilizing and creating trustworthiness within HoA countries, legalizing the state-to-state relation of Eritrea and Ethiopia, and prioritizing the rule of law, human rights issues, and accountability through avoiding exclusive policy that will create respectful relations. For a writer State of Eritrea is not used synonymously with the People of Eritrea.

For the writer, the USA response to the civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray needs to continuing of the positive intervention in the implementation of peace talks to silence war but should be upgraded up to an inclusive agreement between the stack in the power of Ethiopia from all part of Ethiopia, by giving free space as an internal issue of Ethiopia. Ethiopia never led by undemocratic and authoritarian leader who think, thinks' day and night for forty eight hours to lead the people by force with threat. Struggle for freedom of threat is instinctive.

Ethiopia needs all-round strategic support by accepting the territorial integrity of Ethiopia without damaging the cohesive interest of the People of Ethiopia. They can identify and implement the mutual strategic interests of Ethiopia, but Ethiopia needs the USA to balance an exclusive policy of TPLF.

The US interest will not always accomplish by shuttle diplomacy that focuses on leaders but may be fruitful through the balance and cooperatively inclusive decisions at the dyadic USA, HoA, and Ethiopia levels, including individuals, the concerns. Ethiopian Diasporas in the USA are an opportunity for the bilateral relations of the USA and the Ethiopia future betterment. I hope there are American Diasporas in Ethiopia who hate ills on the unprogressive fate of Ethiopia.

Finally, the writer uses the response of Abey to HPRE on law enforcement operations in the Tigray Region.

He said that;

*“Our next task is to rebuild the people of Tigray have extreme needs
to act immediately to alleviate the suffering of our people and to find ways to
facilitate the rebuilding and rehabilitation in the region.” (PMOFDRE 2020)*

And from the bilateral relation statement of the Ethiopian Embassy published in the Ethiopian Herald' said that;

“Despite all storms in state-to-state relations, ties between the peoples of Ethiopia and the US remain solid and beneficial for the two countries that have been characterized as confrontational, ignorant, and undermined relationships with punitive measures that will dampen opportunities for fostering a mutual partnership that needs forward-looking strategies based on mutual respect, interests and common understandings.”

And among the recommendation of Pham (2013) to Americans, he said that;

“The US should consider Ethiopia’s political reality that needs to balance the deep sense of history and nationhood, and also that need to identify the US acts or not as national interest with the direction of social, economic and political development of Ethiopia.”

Moreover, these study insight prioritize using post positivism to balance the Ethiopia and the USA interests at any time that will not affect the strategic interests of both countries by ownership of Americans, People of of Africa and Ethiopian Diaspora in America, that contribute to people centric security by human consciousness (UNDP 1994) that necessitates the protection of individuals treats from political oppression and environmental and institutional degradation, and to live in dignity in multi dimensions of personal, environmental, economic, political, community, healthy and food securities.

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Appendix 1 - Facts of Ethiopia in third Civil War in Tigray (To be checked), Data: routers and USEE

Date	Facts of Ethiopia in third Civil War in Tigray
April 2018	Abiy Ahmed sweeps to power after a popular uprising
December 2019	Abiy awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for resolving the countries long established power dynamics.
December 2019	TPLF refused to join the nationwide Prosperity Party
August-September 2020	COVID 19 hits the country and Abiy postponed the National election
November 2, 2020	The government Ethiopia implemented a state of emergency in reflecting security concerns.
November 4, 2020	Tigray regional forces launch surprise attack and Federal government send troops into northern region of Tigray
November 6, 2020	Abiy government launches counter-airstrike
November 7, 2020	The Federal Parliament declared Tigray government illegal
November 9, 2020	Two rounds of ethnic killings begun in Mai Kadra massacre up to 500 civilians are killed while the federal government carries out more air raids in Tigray, with Abey saying the operation will be over soon.
November 10-13, 2020	Refugees flee to neighboring Sudan about 25 000.
November 14, 2020	TPLF launched rocket attacks in Asmara and airport of Amhara
November 23, 2020	Ethiopian federal force have surrounded Mekele at about 50km and Tigrayan forces fired rockets into Bahirdar, the neighboring Amhara region's capital.
November 26, 2020	Abiy ordered the National Defense Force to attack Mekele and "bring to justice" TPLF leaders.
November 28, 2020	Abiy tells parliament that operations in Tigray are over and soldiers control the Tigrayan capital Mekelle
November 28-29, 2020	Eritrea troops kill hundreds of people in the town of Axum
February–March 2021	Amhara force control Western Tigray
March 23, 2021	Prime Minster Abiy admitted for the first time that Eritrean troops entered Tigray
April 4, 2021	Ethiopia said Eritrean soldiers started to withdraw
June 11, 2021	The UN says 350 000 Tigrayans were experiencing famine with millions more at risk and accused Ethiopia of using food as a weapon of war but Ethiopia denied blocking aid.
June 21, 2021	Ethiopia held its twice delayed elections without Tigray due to security and logistical challenges
June 22, 2021	An Ethiopian air raid on a market in the Tigrayan town Togoga
June 25, 2021	International Medical Charity Doctors without Borders (MSF) said his three employees, two Ethiopians and one Spanish were brutally murdered in Tigray
June 28, 2021	The Federal Government –appointment interim government of Tigray flees as rebels advance on Mekele and then the

	government in Addis Ababa announced a unilateral ceasefire in Tigray.
June 29, 2021	Tigray forces take control of Mekele, and Ethiopian and Eritrean troops withdraw from most of Tigray except Western Tigray
July 13, 2021	Tigrayan forces push south and west into land claimed by the neighboring Amhara region
July 19, 2021	Tigray forces push east to attack the neighboring Afar region, towards a road and railway linking Ethiopia and Djibouti's port
August 23, 2021	The United states imposes sanctions on the chief of staff of the Eritrean Defense Forces, alleging serious human right abuse in the conflict of Tigray.
October 11, 2021	Ethiopia launched a ground offensive aimed at pushing Tigray forces out of Amhara and Afar
November 2, 2021	Ethiopia declared a six month state of emergency after Tigrayan forces gain territory
December 2021	Ethiopia's military recaptures the town of Lalibela
February 15, 2022	Ethiopia's parliament votes for an early end to a six month state of emergency
March 24, 2022	Ethiopia's government declared an immediate, unilateral truce to allow aid into Tigray. Tigrian forces later say they will respect a ceasefire if sufficient aid is delivered to their region 'within reasonable time'.
April 1, 2022	Food aid entered territory controlled by Tigray forces by road for first time since mid-December.
June 14, 2022	The federal government forms a committee to negotiate with Tigrayan forces, a public step towards peace talks.
August 20, 2022	The world food program said almost half the population of Tigray is in 'sever' need of food.
August 24, 2022	Fighting between Tigrayan forces and government forces erupts around the town of Kobo, ending a months-long ceasefire.
October 24, 2022	First peace talks on Ethiopia's Tigray conflict to start in the South African capital Pretoria.
November 2, 2022	Joint agreement between Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and TPLF led by AU.

Appendix 2 – USA and its agency assistance, 2020 – 2022, Data: USEE

Date	USA and its agency assistance
January 27.2020	The U.S. Assistance Secretary for Africa Affairs Tibor Nagy concluded a successful visit to Ethiopia which involved the inauguration of the Mekele American Corner (MAC), a modern space for learning, discovery and collaboration aimed at developing and empowering Ethiopia youth and emerging leaders. The US Embassy invested over 2 179 000 Birr in the MAC like in five others in Bahir Dar, Dire Dawa, Jimma and two in Addis Ababa at the US Embassy and the Ethiopian national Archives and Library Agency (NALA).
March 18. 2021	In his press release Antony J. Blinken the secretary of state said that the US Was provided an additional nearly 52 million dollar in assistance to respond to the humanitarian crises in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and US had provided a total nearly 153 million in humanitarian access since crises begin.
March 09, 2021	The USA hand over by A. Jacobson, charge d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa the 250 metric tons of humanitarian supplies worth over 1.5 million USD to Acting Chief of Mission, Jian Zhao of the international Organization for Migration (IOM) office in Ethiopia and Nesibu Yasin a Deputy Commissioner of the Ethiopia’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission at a warehouse in Addis Ababa.
March 01, 2021	USAID deployed disaster assistance response team to respond to humanitarian needs in Tigray to respnd to growing humanitarian needs stemming from conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region
April 16, 2021	The US handed over 1500 rolls of heavy duty plastic sheeting to the international organization for migration(IOM) to provide emergency shelter for tens of thousands of Ethiopian displaced by Tigray conflict
April `16, 2021	The US CDC launches 20 million dollar Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CERES) to strengthening the Ethiopia’s core public health capabilities.
April `08, 2021	US announced more than 152 million dollar additional humanitarian assistance for the people affected by Tigray Crises in response to growing needs in Ethiopia’s Tigray region through USAID.
May 25, 2021	The US handed over 33 vehicles and an array of medical and healthcare supplies valued at 3.5 million dollar to the Tigray Regional Health Bureau
May 15, 2021	Secretary antony J. Blinken made statement the US gravely concern on continuing Atrocity and denial of humanitarian access in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region as unacceptable behavior places the 5.2 million people in the region in immediate need of humanitarian assistance at even greater risk.
July 19, 2021	The US announced donation of 453 600 doses of the Johnson and Johnson COVID 19 vaccine to Ethiopia from 25 million doses to Africa.
August 05, 2021	US donated an additional 1 210 550 doses of COVID 19 vaccines to Ethiopia which was presented by US Ambassador Geeta Pasi
September 23, 2021	The US donates nearly one million Johnson and Johnson COVID-19 Vaccines to Ethiopia
September 08, 2021	US donated 46 cutting edge tuberculosis (TB) testing machines with worth of one million dollar to the people of Ethiopia through USAID.

October 13, 2021	Antony J. Blinken stated that the US provided more than 26 million dollar additional assistance to respond to the humanitarian crises in northern Ethiopia and nearly 663 million dollar in human assistance for northern Ethiopia since crises begin.
October 12, 2021	The US Embassy in Ethiopia has trained 650 plus Ethiopian broadcast and print journalists and editors on a variety of topics to support democratic reform including excellence in journalism.
December 15, 2021	Ambassador Geeta Pasi visited humanitarian warehouse in kality, Addis Ababa that make up America's 940 million dollars humanitarian assistance to the people of Ethiopia in 2021 and nearly 5000 bundles of emergency tarpaulin shelter material funded by the US government that provide lifesaving emergency shelter for roughly 12 000 Ethiopian affected by the conflict across Amhara, Afar and Tigray.
December 22, 2021	US Embassy urged using security message for US citizens in Ethiopia to depart using commercially available options due to the security situations deteriorate without warning.
December 29, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 30, 2021	The US Embassy passed message to US citizens able to use expired US passport on or after January 1. 2020 to return directly to the United States until March 32, 2022.
January 28, 2022	The US shared additional 1 680 120 doses of Pfizer vaccine with Ethiopia through COVAX.
January 18, 2022	Secretary Blinken's Vertual meeting with UN under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Griffiths and president of the international committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Maurer
January 15, 2022	The assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and special Envoy for the horn of Africa David Satterfield encouraged government officials to seize the current opening for peace by ending the air strikes and other hostilities, negotiating a ceasefire, releasing all political prisoners, restoring sustained humanitarian access, and laying the foundation for an inclusive national dialogue.
January 10 2022	President Joseph R. Biden phone called with Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy to discuss the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia and opportunities to advance peace and reconciliation by accelerating dialogue toward a negotiated ceasefire, improve humanitarian access, address the human rights, work alongside the African Union and regional partners to strengthen cooperation and concrete progress to resolve the conflict.
January 5, 2022	The US Embassy urges US citizens in Ethiopia to depart using commercially available options after Nov. 3 implementation of state of emergency of the government of Ethiopia.
February 22, 2022	The United states is gravely concerned by the reports of atrocities including sexual violence committed by fighters affiliated with the TPLF in the Amhara region of Ethiopia in late August and early September 2021
February 15, 2022	The US welcomes the lifting of the state of emergency in Ethiopia that continue to engage with all parties to advance an immediate cessation of hostilities, unhindered humanitarian access, transparent investigations into all human rights abuses and violations, and a negotiated resolution to the conflict.
February 8, 2022	USAID Launches Resilience programs worth of 11 Billion Birr after Visits Humaniterian Organization in BahirDar and Semera and met with Awol Arba, president of the Afar Regional State on February 3 and Dr. Yilikal Kefale the president of Amhara Regional State on February 4 discussed the need of conflict affected communities and internally displaced peoples in Afar and Amhara by USAID Ethiopia Mission Director Sean Jones.
March 18, 2022	USAID Ethiopia and the LEGO Foundation announced a new public private partnership to improve early childhood care and

	education project across Ethiopia with worth at least 25 million.
March 17, 2022	US charge' d'Affaires in Ethiopia Ambassador Tracey Jacobson met the Amhara Regional President Dr. Yilikal Kefale to visit Amhara regional recovery and humanitarian assistance efforts with beneficiaries of the US funded programs at Bahir Dar University to highlight US support for humanitarian assistance and peace.
March 16, 2022	The US Government announced an additional donation of 840 060 doses of the Pfizer vaccine and totally shared plus 7.8 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine with Ethiopia.
March 09, 2022	The US handed over 250 metric tons of humanitarian supplies to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Office in Ethiopia for tens of thousands of Ethiopians affected by the ongoing conflict in the Amhara and Afar regions.
March 04, 2022	US through USAID launched Kefta activity to Elevate in Amharic a new investment of 60 million dollars (3.1 billion birr) to lift up millions of vulnerable youth across Ethiopia in 18 cities.
March 01, 2022	The US shared 840 060 doses of the Pfizer vaccine with a total of plus 6.9 million doses of COVID -19 vaccine with Ethiopia.
June 07, 2022	Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State released statement as the US welcomed the progress in securing more regular access for humanitarian assistance to communities in need in the Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions of Ethiopia. In seven days more than 1100 trucks had reached Tigray to deliver lifesaving food, malnutrition treatment and health supplies, and other
July 19, 2022	USAID announced an additional \$55 million for ethiopia's food crises response
July 27, 2022	US provides more than \$488 million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Ethiopia
August 17, 2022	USAID announced \$7.7 million investment in Amhara region

Appendix 3 – The USA response toward Civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray

Date	USA response toward Civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray
November 17, 2020	The Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo US said that US was condemns the attack on Eritrea by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front on Nov.14 2020
November 17, 2020	The US embassy updates as military activity continued in Tigray region and telephone and internet service in the region remain cut.
November 14, 2020	The US embassy released security alert due to attacks on air ports in Bahir Dar and Gonder cities during the late evening of November 13 by TPLF
November 12, 2020	The US embassy released alert to potential relocation of American Citizens from Mekelle
November 04, 2020	The US embassy urged an immediate de-escalation of current situation in Tigray and a measured response by both sides to prioritize civilians’ safety and security.
February 27, 2021	In his press statement Antony J. Blinken secretary of state, the US strongly condemned the killing, forced removals and displacements, sexual assaults, and other extremely serious human rights violations and abuses by several parties
February 04, 2021	Secretary Antony J. Blinken spoken with Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed on the importance of bi lateral relations and US grave concern about the humanitarian crisis in the Tigray region and urged immediate, full and unhindered humanitarian access.
March 11, 2021	the US embassy in his press release the senior US commerce officials discussed on Trade and entrepreneurship with US and Ethiopian business women and encourages prosperity through mutually beneficial commercial engagement
March 10, 2021	US Secretary of state Antony Blinken Urges Eritrea to withdraw from the region due to violence in western Tigray as “ethnic cleansing” and ordered out of special forces from disputed area
March 02, 2021	The US secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Ethiopian Prime Minster Abiy Ahmed to emphasize the US concern about the humanitarian and human rights crises in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.
March 01, 2021	USAID deployed disaster assistance response team to respond to humanitarian needs in Tigray to respnd to growing humanitarian needs stemming from conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region
April 26, 2021	Secretary J. Blinken spoke with Ethiopian prime minster Abiy Ahmed to reiterate grave concern about the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights crises in the country, including the growing risk of famine in Ethiopia’s Tigray region as well as ongoing insecurity.
May 26, 2021	US President Joe Biden called for a ceasefire and an end to large-scale human rights abuses in Tigray
May 24 , 2021	US state department announced its imposition in economic and security curbs on Ethiopia, as well as visa restrictions on current or former Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials and member of the countries’ security forces including Amhara regional and irregular forces and TPLF members to be responsible for, or complicit in undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray.
May 23, 2021	The US secretary state Antony J. Blinken announced the appointment of the special envoy for the horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltmen to lead an international diplomatic effort to address political and security and humanitarian access. And deepening concerns about the ongoing crises in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region as well as other threats to the sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia.
May 20, 2021	US Embassy stated on deaths of humanitarian workers in Ethiopia, as US Government called on all armed actors in Ethiopia

	to safeguard the lives and activities of humanitarian workers throughout Ethiopia.
June 29, 2021	On the unilateral announcement of ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray, the US government considered it as a positive step if it would result in changes on the ground to end the conflict
June 25, 2021	US appalled and deeply saddened to the horrific killings of three Doctors without Borders in Ethiopia's Tigray region which was the statement of Ned Price, Department Spokesperson to must end attacks on humanitarian workers and called independent investigation and for the perpetrators to be held accountable.
June 11, 2021	Press release on election on Ethiopia as part of a democratic political process that involve dialogue, cooperation and compromise in the exercise of Ethiopians civil and political rights.
June 11, 2021	US Embassy launches "Helen Journey" a radio drama to help improve English language skills in Ethiopia.
June 1, 2021	US Embassy launched the reducing the prevalence of Domestic Servitude in Ethiopia project funded by US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office)
July 07, 2021	Secretary state Antony J. Blinken spoke with Ethiopian Prime Minister that stressed the need for all parties to the conflict to an immediate, indefinite, negotiated ceasefire.
September 17, 2021	US president made statement on the ongoing conflict in northern Ethiopia that causing a direct consequence of immense human suffering and threatens the unity of the Ethiopian state, nearly one million people were living in famine like conditions, and millions more face acute food insecurity and humanitarian workers has been blocked and harassed. His administration would continue for a negotiated ceasefire, an end to abuses of innocent civilians, humanitarian access to those in need and executive order on imposing sanctions on certain persons with respect to the humanitarian and human right crises in Ethiopia.
September 17, 2021	US president Joseph R. Biden, Jr. made statement on celebration of Enkutatash and send best wishes for a happy new year to all the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea and all those around the world celebrating it.
September 10, 2021	the US remains gravely concerned by ongoing conflict in multiple regions of Ethiopia as reports continued human rights abuses and atrocities by NDF, ERDF, Amhara regional and irregular forces, the TPLF and other armed groups.
September 03, 2021	USAID humanitarian aid was affected by the conflict and they were received reports of looting of humanitarian assistance from warehouses in communities in northern Amhara, much like what occurred during previous months in the Tigray Region by Eritrean and Ethiopian Forces.
September 01, 2021	Sean Jones, USAID Ethiopia Mission Director interviewed with Ethiopian broadcasting corporation.
October 29, 2021	US ambassador Geeta Pasi visited Hawassa and met with business leaders, workers, academics and journalists to talk about US government programs and as well as to hear from them about their experiences in their respective fields.
October 22, 2021	US ambassador Geeta Pasi and Assistant to the Administrator of USAID's Bureau for humanitarian assistance Sarah Charles visited Bahr Dar and they met president Yilikal Kefale to current dire humanitarian situation and plan.
October 12, 2021	The US Embassy in Ethiopia has trained 650 plus Ethiopian broadcast and print journalists and editors on a variety of topics to support democratic reform including excellence in journalism.
November 30, 2021	Security message, the US Embassy urges US citizens in Ethiopia to depart now using commercially available options and the embassy continues to process emergency passports and repatriation loans.
November 28, 2021	Copy of the above.

November 27, 2021	President Uhuru Kenyatta agreed with Secretary Antony J. Blinken in Nairobi on the importance of unhindered humanitarian access for all communities affected by the conflict and reiterated their support for an inclusive political dialogue.
November 23, 2021	US special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman briefed on going of situation in Ethiopia.
November 12, 2021	The US Department of the Treasury's office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four entities and two individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O) 14046 in response to the growing humanitarian and human rights crises and expanding military conflict in Ethiopia.
November 12, 2021	The US designated six targets associated with the Eritrean government and ruling party pursuant to executive Order (E.O.) 14046, which the president signed in September in response to the conflict in Ethiopia.
November 02, 2021	Ambassador Katherine Tai released statement on the AGOA of the president Biden announcement of today three countries will be terminated from its trade preference program as of January 1, 2022, absent urgent action to meet statutory eligibility criteria.
December 01, 2021	Security message, the US Embassy urges US citizens in Ethiopia to depart now using commercially available options and the embassy continues to process emergency passports and repatriation loans
December 02, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 03, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 04, 2021	Health Alert of US embassy Addis Ababa Ethiopia, by center for Disease Control and Prevention for one day on December 6 to COVID-19 testing requirement for travelers to US must show a negative pre-departure COVID-19 viral test taken the day before flight.
December 05, 2021	Security message, the US Embassy urges US citizens in Ethiopia to depart now using commercially available options and the embassy continues to process emergency passports and repatriation loans
December 06, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 07, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 08, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 09, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 12, 2021	Press statement of the US which notes grave concern unconfirmed new reports alleging egregious human rights abuses, atrocities and destruction of civilian infrastructure by Tigrayan forces in the Amhara and Afar regions of Ethiopia, which retreated US support for diplomacy as the first, last, and only option to cease hostility for an end to human rights abuses and violations; negotiations without preconditions; unhindered humanitarian access; and the start to inclusive national dialogue.
December 14, 2021	The Department of State advice at level 4 Travel Advisory of do not travel to Ethiopia due to armed conflict, civil unrest, communications disruptions, crime, and the potential for terrorism and kidnapping in border areas.
December 15, 2021	The Department of State updated its Travel Advisory, to do not Travel to Ethiopia due to armed conflict, civil unrest, communications disruptions, crime and the potential for terrorism and kidnapping in border areas
December 22, 2021	US Embassy urged using security message for US citizens in Ethiopia to depart using commercially available options due to the security situations deteriorate without warning.
December 29, 2021	Copy of the above.
December 30, 2021	The US Embassy passed message to US citizens able to use expired US passport on or after January 1. 2020 to return directly

	to the United States until March 32, 2022.
January 18, 2022	Secretary Blinken’s Vertual meeting with UN under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Griffiths and president of the international committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Maurer
January 15, 2022	The assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and special Envoy for the horn of Africa David Satterfield encouraged government officials to seize the current opening for peace by ending the air strikes and other hostilities, negotiating a ceasefire, releasing all political prisoners, restoring sustained humanitarian access, and laying the foundation for an inclusive national dialogue.
January 10 2022	President Joseph R. Biden phone called with Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy to discuss the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia and opportunities to advance peace and reconciliation by accelerating dialogue toward a negotiated ceasefire, improve humanitarian access, address the human rights, work alongside the African Union and regional partners to strengthen cooperation and concrete progress to resolve the conflict.
January 5, 2022	The US Embassy urges US citizens in Ethiopia to depart using commercially available options after Nov. 3 implementation of state of emergency of the government of Ethiopia.
February 22, 2022	The United states is gravely concerned by the reports of atrocities including sexual violence committed by fighters affiliated with the TPLF in the Amhara region of Ethiopia in late August and early September 2021
February 15, 2022	The US welcomes the lifting of the state of emergency in Ethiopia that continue to engage with all parties to advance an immediate cessation of hostilities, unhindered humanitarian access, transparent investigations into all human rights abuses and violations, and a negotiated resolution to the conflict.
February 3, 2022	US Embassy advises a travel advisory at level 4, Do not travel due to armed conflict that deteriorated security situation, limited consular access, US citizens detained by Ethiopian authorities, restricted or shutdown internet, cellular data, and phone services during and after civil unrest
March 31, 2022	US charge’ d’Affaires in Ethiopia Ambassador Tracey Jacobson visited Afar region to support recovery, humanitarian assistance efforts met the Afar Regional president Awol Arba.
March 24, 2022	Antony J. Blinken, secretary of state said that “ USA welcomes and strongly support the declaration of Government of Ethiopia of an indefinite humanitarian truce, effective immediately, and the commitment to work in collaboration with humanitarian organizations in expectation of the movement of life-saving assistance, inclusive political process towards common security and prosperity for all the people of Ethiopia, immediate end to the violence committed against civilians by all parties, make accountability for those responsible for atrocities and advance a negotiated and sustainable ceasefire including security arrangements..
March 17, 2022	US charge’ d’Affaires in Ethiopia Ambassador Tracey Jacobson met the Amhara Regional President Dr. Yilikal Kefale to visit Amhara regional recovery and humanitarian assistance efforts with beneficiaries of the US funded programs at Bahir Dar University to highlight US support for humanitarian assistance and peace.
April 30, 2022	US encouraged the government of Ethiopia and regional authorities in Tigray and Afar have taken building steps to enable the delivery of desperately needed food aid to war affected communities in acute food insecurity and extreme hunger as a direct result of conflict.
April 28, 2022	Ambassador Tracy Ann Jacobson, charge’ d’ affaires visited US supported drought relief sites in Gode, Somali Region and

	during her trip she met the Somali Regional President Mustafe Mohammed, humanitarian partners, internally displaced Ethiopian at Higlo IPD Camp and witnessed US funded humanitarian assistance efforts.
April 21, 2022	The US Embassy in Addis Ababa celebrated Earth Day with the Ethiopian Wildlife and Natural History Society by initiating the next phase of the NASA MAIA program in Ethiopia.
April 13, 2022	Special Envoy for the horn of Africa David Satterfield and Deputy Special Envoy Payton Knopf would arrived in Ethiopia for meeting with Ethiopian government officials, representatives of humanitarian organizations and diplomatic partners to continue US efforts towards ceasing hostilities, unhindering humanitarian access, transparent investigations into human rights abuses and violations by all.
April 09, 2022	The US reiterated its grave concern over continuing reports of ethically motivated atrocity committed by Amhara authorities in Western Tigray including those described in recent joint report by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, acts amount to ethnic cleansing.
April 01, 2022	The US welcomed steps by the government of Ethiopia and regional authorities to implement a cessation of hostilities and commend them on the delivery of humanitarian assistance over recent days to Ethiopians in the Tigray and Afar regions over one hundred thousand Ethiopians will receive lifesaving food..
May 10, 2022	Ambassador Tracy Ann Jacobson, charge' d' affaires of the US to Ethiopia and leaders from other international missions visited Lalibela, a united Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world heritage site in Ethiopia.
June 07, 2022	Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State released statement as the US welcomed the progress in securing more regular access for humanitarian assistance to communities in need in the Afar, Amhara and Tigray regions of Ethiopia. In seven days more than 1100 trucks had reached Tigray to deliver lifesaving food, malnutrition treatment and health supplies, and other
June 02, 2022	Ambassador Tracy Ann Jacobson, charge' d' affaires of the US to Ethiopia and USAID/Ethiopia Mission Director Sean Jones launched a new partnership with private social enterprise TEKI paper Bags PLC which has been owned and managed by young, deaf Ethiopian women.
June 01, 2022	Secretary Antony J. Blinken announced that Ambassador David Satterfield step downed and Ambassador Mike Hammer appointed as Special Envoy for the horn of Africa.
October 7, 2022	US welcomed the renewal of the mandate of the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia

Appendix 4 – The Jeddah Peace Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia
Agreement on peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between Eritrea and
Ethiopia

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea hereinafter referred to as the Two Parties; considering the close bonds of geography, history, culture, and religion between the two countries and their peoples; Respecting each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; Desiring to achieve lasting peace and cement their historical ties to achieve their lofty objectives; Determined to establish comprehensive cooperation on the basis of complementarity and synergy; Determined further to contribute actively to regional and global peace and security; Reaffirming the Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship that they signed on July 9, 2018, in Asmara; Reiterating their commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

The Two Parties agree as follows:

Article One

The state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation has started.

Article Two

The two countries will promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarity and synergy.

Article Three

The two countries will develop Joint Investment Projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones.

Article Four

The two countries will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision.

Article Five

The two countries will promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation.

Appendix 5- Pretoria Agreement between FDRE and TPLF

The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (the Government) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (the TPLF) (together referred to as the Parties) agree to the following terms:

Article 1 – Objectives

The objectives of this Agreement are to:

- 1) Reach an immediate and Permanent Cessation of Hostilities with a view to silencing the Guns and creating a conducive environment and laying the foundation for sustainable peace;
- 2) Restore the constitutional order disrupted due to the conflict in the Tigray Region;
- 3) Reject violence as a method of resolving political differences;
- 4) Guarantee security for all;
- 5) Ensure a lasting settlement of the conflict;
- 6) Provide a framework for addressing matters arising out of the conflict;
- 7) Provide a framework to ensure accountability for matters arising out of the conflict;
- 8) Foster reconciliation and the rehabilitation of social bonds;
- 9) Facilitate economic recovery and reconstruction;
- 10) Commit to addressing the underlying political differences;
- 11) Provide a framework for monitoring and verification of the implementation of the Agreement.

Article 2 – Principles Underpinning the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities


The Parties shall be guided by the following principles:

- a. Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE);
- b. Legality and respect for constitutional norms and principles enshrined in the FDRE Constitution;
- c. Respect for fundamental human rights and democratic norms and principles;
- d. Protection of civilians;
- e. Respect for the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance;
- f. Accountability and justice in accordance with the FDRE Constitution and the AU Transitional Justice Policy Framework;
- g. Unhindered humanitarian access to all in need of assistance;
- h. The use of humanitarian aid exclusively for humanitarian purposes.

Appendix 6- Map of Regional states of Ethiopia since 1991




Appendix 7 – Map of areas of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 - 2000



Source: Country Profile, Eritrea 2003, Economist Intelligence Unit.

Appendix 8 - Map of Regional State of Tigray since 2020



Appendix 9 - Interview questions

This interview question is prepared used to study the proposal thesis title called as **‘The USA response towards civil war of Ethiopia in Tigray’** that fulfill the requirement of the ‘Master of International Relations and Diplomacy’ from Addis Ababa University, school of social science, department of Political Science and International Relations.

The researcher plan to use as the respondents from the foreign minister of Ethiopia, the USA embassy in Ethiopia, the scholars from Addis Ababa University including students and the political parties’, the journalists and individuals’ seats in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Name of the institution _____

Position of work/qualification _____

1. What are the determinants used to enter into a civil war between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the rebels from a Regional Government Tigray Authorities? Why she became the repetitive war zone of Ethiopia?
2. How you describe the civil war between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the rebels from the Regional Government Tigray authorities and the USA responses before started? Who are the pro/against the response?
3. How you describe the USA responses during the civil war between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the rebels from the Regional Government Tigray authorities? Who are the pro/against response?
4. Can we generalize the USA responses are biased or sided? For whom? Why?
5. How can you describe aid support of the USA? How about before the war started? And How about from the beginning the war up to now?
6. Identify both the internal and the external factors which will determine more the bilateral relationship of Ethiopia and USA today and tomorrow?

Appendix 10 - key interview respondents

Code for respondents	Institution	Age	Qualification	Position	Date
Interviewee I	International Relations Institute	40-50	Doctor	Senior researcher	May 26, 2021
Interviewee II	Minister of Foreign Affairs	40-50	Master	Director general to USA affairs	April 31, 2021
Interviewee III	Addis Ababa University in Peace and security strategy institute		Doctor	Director of the institute	June 24, 2021
Interviewee IV	Center for Research and development Cooperation	40-50	Master	Researcher	24.06. 2022

