



Addis Ababa University
College of Business and Economics
Department of Public Administration and Development Management

**Assessment of Local Administrative Discretion and Accountability
Mechanisms in Addis Ababa City Administration: The Case of *Yeka*
Sub-City *Woreda* 10**

By
Miheret Masresha

January, 2016
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Declaration

I, **Miheret Masresha Tessema** ,declare that ; the thesis entitled ,” Assessment of Local Administrative Discretion and Accountability Mechanisms in Addis Ababa City Administration :The Case of *Yeka* sub- city *Woreda* 10 .”Is my original work ,was not copied ,has not been presented for a degree in any other university as well as in Addis Ababa university ,and all the sources of the material used have been duly acknowledged.

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Miheret Masresha entitled “ *Assessment of Local Administrative Discretion and Accountability Mechanisms in Addis Ababa City Administration : The Case of Yeka Sub City Woreda 10*” which is submission in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of master in public management and policy (MPMP) ,compile with the regulation of the university and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality .

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Acronyms' and Abbreviation

AACACBB	Addis Ababa City Administration Capacity Building Bureau
AACAILIC	Addis Ababa City Administration Integrated Land- Information Center
AACACSA	Addis Ababa City Administration Civil Service Agency
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
CBO	Community Based Organization
CE	Chief Executive
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DECLG	Department of the Environment, Community- & Local Government
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary and Democratic Front
ET	Ethiopia
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GRMs	Grievance Redresses Mechanisms
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
HR	Human Recourse
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IGAA	Indian Government Account and Audit
JeCCDO's	Jerusalem Children & Community Development Organizations
KG	kindergarten
LGs	Local Governments
MCB	Ministry of Capacity Building
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PANE	Poverty Action Network of Ethiopia

PB	Participatory Budget
PBF	Performance Based Financing
SA	Social Accountability
S.C	Share Company
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

Abstract

The thesis attempts to explore with objective of , assessing the administrative discretions as well as the applicability of administrative accountability mechanisms practice in Addis Ababa yeka sub-city woreda ten .

To meet the above objectives, the research employed more of qualitative case study approach. Both primary and secondary data sources were used in gathering pertinent information. The technique of collecting primary data includes in-depth interviews at sub-city and woreda, focus group discussions with the community representative. Secondary sources such as published and unpublished materials such as books, proclamation, procedures, directives and manuals are used. Descriptive method of analysis is used to analyze the primary and secondary data.

The study found that local administrative discretionary power is not adequately devolved and accountability mechanisms, at woredas of Addis Ababa are not properly designed due to different reasons. It is challenged by many problems such as crucial autonomy still remain in the upper stratum, as well as lack in properly codified rules and regulation in administrative autonomy. As well as due to political curiosity intervening of politically assigned official in administrative procedures is also to be mentioned .The public accountability mechanisms are also not properly designed and social accountability is completely not designed.

Hence to make administrative decentralization meaningful recommendations are made on devolving adequate administrative autonomy ,codifying proclamation and other regulations and directives . Both the public and social accountability mechanisms have to be designed properly and adequately in woredas of Addis Ababa.

Key words: Administrative, Discretion, Accountability, Woreda, Regulating abilities, Procurement, Humanresource.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Back Ground of the Study

Administrative decentralization distributes authority and provides local governments with the autonomy to design their administrative systems, appoint their staff, and prepare and implement their development plans (Rameriz *et al*, 2006).

Local governments need to be endowed with administrative autonomy in order to be able to respond to local needs effectively (Aslam *et al* , 2010).

There are identified three broad power as being crucial for local government to be administratively autonomous .The first is to make change and enforce regulatory decisions .Second, to govern a procurement system and lastly, to manage human resources including recruitment and performance management (Yilmaz *et al* ,2008).Decentralization in its final outcome has to reshape power relations among the local residents, local governments, producers of local government services and higher levels of government including central government (Ibid.). Local government that can make and enforce regulatory decisions, govern a procurement system (based on national standards), and control and manage its workforce is administratively autonomous (Yilmaz ,2012).

Administrative discretion and accountability are indispensable themes in governing the local affairs. Administrative accountability structures have also to be designed in order to sure both public and social accountability mechanisms.

Accountability is not an automatic outcome of increased discretion of local governments. Specific mechanisms should be designed to ensure that citizens and higher officials are able and willing to hold local governments accountable for their discretion. The notion of administrative accountability can be divided into public accountability and social accountability (Aslam *et al* , 2010).

Ethiopia has limited experience with decentralization policies in comparison to many African countries in which a relatively developed system of local government prevailed from colonial heritage (UN habitat, 2002).

Notwithstanding the problem in transitional and developing countries, decentralization leads to local governance; local governance lead to local development both in urban and rural area; and local development lead to poverty reduction but still may not guarantee (UNDP, 1999).

Formerly, *Kebele* was the third administrative tier of the city. *woredas* (districts) structure functions in rural areas and municipalities in urban areas. Currently, Addis Ababa has 10 sub cities and 116 *woredas*, the structure was newly arranged since 2011 by the city administration (Zemelak 2011).

According to the Addis Ababa city government executive and municipal service organ re-establishment proclamation number 35/2012 “*Woreda Administration*” means the third administrative stratum of the city, which is a unit of sub-city.

The study were investigated the extent in which *woreda* are discretional administratively or to what extent does those administrative autonomy are adequately devolved to *woreda* from the upper administrative stratum in comparison to their tasks since their closeness to the grassroots population as well as the an indispensable theme accountability mechanisms weather it is properly designed, implemented or not in the *woreda* is investigated.

Therefore, the research is undertaken in *yeka* sub-city *woreda* 10 of Addis Ababa city administration in order to assess administrative discretion and the accountability mechanisms at the lower stratum of government in the city.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Ethiopia most of administrative discretionary power are on paper only and as most decisions on laws and planning seem to be top down ... (Yilmaz and Venugopal,2008). Inadequate devolution over civil service and human resource functions is primarily driven by political factors (World Bank, 2009).

Administrative functions such as enforcing regulatory decisions and governing the procurement system ,the laws are in place providing discretionary powers to the local authorities but because of capacities constraints and party interference ,*de facto* discretion does not exist (Tegegne and Dickovick, 2010) . Local government need to have discretion over regulating different local business activity, building permits, construction regulation, urban agriculture, and local tourism and others. But ,*de facto* practice indicate that there are most commonly restricted areas like local tourism, provision and maintenance of local sport facilities and regulation of retail and agricultural businesses (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008) .

The other discretionary area that local government needs to be endowed with is discretion over processes for procuring goods and services including management contracts. However, local governments are not authorized to make certain types of procurement agreements and require the approval of the central government. (Yilmaz et al, 2008). Procurement process can be divided into a number of steps that include specifying goods and services to be procured, designing the contract, selecting suppliers, appraising technical and financial qualification of the bidders, managing bid process, finalizing bid process and contract management .But, the role of the local government in each of these processes can vary significantly (World Bank Report No. 49059, 2009). The higher levels of government also intervene in the procurement process. This compromises the ability of the local government (Ibid.). Devolving of the human resource management is also the other administrative discretionary area that the local government needs to be endowed.

Local government competency and discretion over civil service and employment policies ideally covers establishment of control (controlling staff numbers and authority to remove surplus staff), recruitment autonomy (recognition as formal employer, authority to hire), career management control (vertical and horizontal mobility including transfers to deconcentrated units within the local government system), and performance management (directing and supervising activities and tasks, conducting evaluations, and exercising the ability to discipline and fire) (Yilmaz et al ,2008).

However, local governments lack authority over some key functions such as controlling staff numbers in each local office and facilities as well as others. (World Bank Report No. 49059 , 2009).

Ensuring appropriate use of such discretionary power requires introducing effective accountability systems. Within their discretionary space, local governments would be accountable to higher levels of government (upward accountability) as well as to citizens (downward accountability) (Ibid.).The notion of administrative accountability can be divided into public accountability and social accountability (Aslam *et al*, 2010). Public accountability approaches are necessary to provide channels for uncovering basic information on regulatory decisions, civil service practices, and services. Yet, public approaches alone fall short of ensuring proper use of administrative discretion. Therefore, there is a need to complement the public accountability approaches by the social accountability.

Failure of information dissemination negatively affects the ability of citizens to hold local government officials accountable. Auditing the public expenditure is a point to be raised as public accountability mechanisms for certain administrative tasks. But, more importantly, the auditors do not have the authority to issue opinions or recommendations on government propositions or to advocate alternative propositions.

local governments in Ethiopia have a high degree of upward accountability mechanisms without the accompanying discretion and down ward accountability mechanisms(Tegegne and Dickovick,2010)

1.3 Objective of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The study's general objective is to assess the local administrative discretion and accountability mechanisms in Addis Ababa city administration *woredas*, namely at *yeka* sub- city *woreda* ten.

1.3.2 Specific Objective of the Study

- To examine the different type of regulating abilities, which *woredas* are capable enough to enforce.

- To assess the types of procurement that the *woredas* have or not a discretion over it.
- To examine the discretion of *woreda* in hiring, firing, evaluating performance as well as conducting career management.
- To investigate stakeholders in different phases of procurement at *woreda*.
- To assess the responsible body in auditing public expenditure.
- To look at the methods in which information are delivered to the citizen.

1.4 Research Questions

The research tries to answer the following research questions:

- Does *woredas* have authority to enforce regulation over land, laws and small retail business?
- Does *woredas* have the discretion in the procurement of services ,goods , consultancy services and others ?
- Do *woredas* have adequate discretions in human resource activities like establishment of control, recruitment, career management and performance management?
- Does grievance redressal, disciplinary committee, public and social accountability mechanisms are well-designed in *woreda* ?
- Are there any information provision and citizen participation mechanisms available in *woredas* ?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study contributes to a better understanding of the current status and process of administrative decentralization in general and its implementation at *woreda* level in particular. This study also contributes to understanding on adequacy of the devolved administrative discretion in *woredas* of Addis Ababa. It is expected to provoke the urban policy makers to look for appropriate solutions on inadequacy of administrative autonomy in a way to meet the possible maximum needs of the local constituents.

Since the study is the first of its kind so far conducted in the city administration, it would have an immense importance and impact in the city in general and the subject

matter in particular. It will be an added value to the knowledge base on the implementation of *woreda* administrative decentralization and a stepping stone and springboard for future research studies and researchers in this particular subject in the city administration. And also, the policy makers, practitioners and the academicians are expected to benefit from the findings of this research.

1.6 Limitation of the Study

The study is constrained by the following issues.

- Lack of priorly undertaken study in the area of local government discretion and accountability mechanisms in the Addis Ababa city administration.
- Lack of updated and compiled data and relevant documents in the study *woreda*.
- Due to different reasons some officials and workers are not available in offices during data collection .
- Lack in literately reviewed documents because in the specific study area and frame work of the study accessible material in Ethiopia cases as well as other countries and continents is written by few authors and organizations.

1.7 Organization of the study

The thesis were organized in to five chapter .In the first chapter ,the back ground of the study ,statements of the problem ,objectives of the study , questions addressed in the study ,significance ,scope and limitation of the study is included .The second chapter contain research design and methodology .The third chapter blends in the reviewed literature about the definition of decentralization mostly the component of administrative discretion and accountability , and both the public and social accountability is covered . It also discusses local administrative discretion in Ethiopia. The fourth chapter addressed the powers and functions of *woreda* and summarizes and discusses the finding of study in the *woreda*. The last chapter finished by concluding and forwarding recommendation.

CHAPTER TWO

Research Design and Methodology

2.1 Research Design

The study's employed a qualitative approach, because it carry outs strategies of inquiry case study which offers an opportunity to study a particular subject, e.g. one organization, in depth. Case study is popularly preferred in order to explore processes and activities, like the specific area of research selected by the researcher. In addition, in order to collect multiple forms of data and spending a considerable time in the natural setting and gathering information; adopting case study is appropriate. The study is undertaken by information from which are gathered via qualitative data like, an in depth interview and focus group discussion.

2.2 Sampling Design and Selection of the Study Area

The implementations of administrative decentralization in *woreda* level have not been studied in Addis Ababa city administration. In order to assess the state of administrative discretion, the *woreda* level administration and sector offices are taken as units of analysis for the study. *Woreda* level government structure was considered due to its relative closeness to the grassroots population and its being viable unit of government for meaningful socio-economic development at the local level.

Currently Addis Ababa city administration is divided in to ten sub- city and 116 *woredas*. Out of this population one *woreda* from *yeka* sub- city selected purposively as the sample of the study in order to assess the level of administrative discretion in the *woredas* of Addis Ababa city administration. The selection of a specific *woreda* as a study area is justified based on the following arguments. First, a survey of more *woredas* limits making thorough study and analysis of the subject. Secondly, conducting a study that represents more *woredas* is also difficult and requires more time and resource.

The respondents of the study are grouped into different categories. These are work unit coordinator and officers from sub- city, elected and assigned officials and sector office heads and officers at *woreda* levels and a sample of community members at *woreda* level. The type of sampling technique applied in this study is non-probability sampling, in

which purposive sampling was applied to select respondents, the concerned offices and officials and officers at *woreda* levels.

2.3 Data Sources and types

Both primary and secondary data used in order to assess the specific issues.

The primary data were collected through in depth interview, focus group discussion and documentation or archival of the *woreda*. Secondary data were collected from published and unpublished materials that are available in the form of directives, rules, regulations, proclamation, are used.

2.4 Methods of Data Collection

2.4.1 In -depth Interview

In-depth interviews were conducted with selected interviewees who are from both stratum of governing (sub- city and *woreda*). Interviewees are selected according to their expertise in the subject under investigation. Therefore, it is more or less like targeted interview, as it only targeted those with the right information or knowledge on issues studied. (See: annex II for the detail information of interviewees).

2.4.2 Focus Group Discussion

A focus group discussion were held in the *woreda* with the community members from different back grounds of status, age , sex and members in CBO to get information on accessing basic information of citizens in services and their active involvement in their own local affairs .

2.5 Methods of Data Analysis

The study used descriptive data analysis (Narration and explanation of information or data obtained using key-informants interview), to analyze both collected primary and secondary data. It mainly relied on qualitative data analysis .Even though the qualitative analysis is applied; quantitative data from interview has been included. Primary data from an in depth interview and focus group discussion were analyzed by description, interpretation and explanation. Data's which are collected from few interview question are also analyzed by the help of percentage, figures and average.

2.6 Scope of the Study

The study assessed the level of devolved administrative discretion to the *woredas* of Addis Ababa. As well as the study addressed the inseparable theme to discretion the accountability mechanisms which ensure the proper usage of discretionary power is adequately designed or not in the *woreda* is included. The reach of the study is geographically limited in *woreda* 10 of *yeka* sub- city Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Offices of *woreda* covered in the study are capacity building, construction and housing, building permission and controlling, sport, culture and tourism, trade and industry, CE office, finance and economic development, general manager and food, medicine and health care administration are included.

CHAPTER THREE

LITREATURE RIVIEW

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

3.1 Concept of Decentralization

Decentralization is the transfer of power and resources from national governments to sub national governments or to the sub- national administrative units of national governments. Decentralization is often regarded as a top-down process driven by a unitary or federal state in which the central government grants functions, authorities, and resources to sub national levels (USAID, 2009).

Types of decentralization have been further categorized by different author's .According to Elizabeth (2004) in her compilation she categorized it in to four categories; - political, administrative, fiscal and the market decentralization.

Political decentralization: Groups at different levels of government—central, meso and local—are empowered to make decisions related to what affects them.

Administrative decentralization: Different levels of government administer resources and matters that have been delegated to them, generally through a constitution. In terms of decentralization as a process of change, and according to the level of transfer of responsibilities, it is useful to distinguish between deconcentration, delegation and devolution.

Fiscal decentralization: In this case, previously concentrated powers to tax and generate revenues are dispersed to other levels of government, e.g., local governments are given the power to raise and retain financial resources to fulfill their responsibilities.

Market decentralization: Government privatizes or deregulates private functions.

3.2 Reasons for Pursuing Decentralization

First, countries pursue decentralization because there are strong theoretical reasons to suggest that (under certain conditions) decentralized governance improves economic efficiency and economic growth. Second, if central bureaucracies in a country function as distant, hierarchical rent-seeking organizations that are unaccountable and inefficient or ineffective at delivering public services, then decentralization could

*improve public service delivery and strengthen poverty reduction if decentralized local governments are generally more responsive and accountable than their central government counterparts (Yilmaz and Boex, 2010) . A **third**, reason for pursuing decentralization is that the presence of elected decentralized governments could be seen as more democratic and therefore – separately from the empowerment achieved by having a more responsive public sector and better public service delivery – worthy of being pursued on its governance merits. **Fourth**, decentralization reforms could be promoted (or in fact, opposed) for political or institutional reasons. In fact, political leaders in scores of countries pursue some form of decentralization primarily for specific political gain, rather than for reasons of good governance or improved public service delivery (Ibid.). **Fifth, and finally**, some countries pursue decentralization in a specific attempt to counteract centrifugal political forces and to preserve the nation-state (Ibid.).*

3.3 Administrative decentralization

Administrative decentralization seeks to distribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities ¹.

Administrative decentralization has three major forms:

Deconcentration:- : shifting decision-making power to central government officials located outside the capital. The field offices are accountable for their decisions to the central ministry. The main objectives of deconcentration are to improve administrative efficiency, enhance service delivery and ensure adequate representation of the central government as well as supervision at the sub-national level. Deconcentration is considered to be the weakest form of decentralization, although the opportunities for local input vary and sometimes strong field administrations can be found. ²

Delegation: - Delegation is a more extensive form of decentralization. Through delegation central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and

administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, semi-autonomous school districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel and may be able to charge users directly for services. ³

Devolution: - Devolution as the transfer of significant power, including law making and revenue was rising, by law to the locally elected bodies. There is a set of five fundamental characteristics in explaining the purest form of devolution.


- i) Power is transferred to autonomous units governed independently and separately without the direct control of central government;
- ii) The units enjoy corporate status and powers to secure its own resources to perform its function;
- iii) The units maintain control over a recognized geographical area;
- iv) Devolution implies the need to develop local government institutions;
- v) It is an arrangement of reciprocal, mutually beneficial and coordinate relationship between central and local government (Hossain, 2011).

3.4 Component of Administrative Discretion

There are two main components of an administrative discretion system firstly, discretion allowed to the local government to direct the business of the local government and then mechanisms to hold the local government accountable for appropriate use of this discretion (Aslam *et al* , 2010).

Figure 3.1

Administrative Discretion and Accountability Relationship



Source: Aslam *et al*, 2010

1. Accessed from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/admin.htm> on November 2014 .
2. Accessed from https://www.google.com.et/?gws_rd=cr&ei=VndNVsLEFcTDOtqBkcAD#q=administrative+decentralization+pdf on November 15 2015.
3. Accessed from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/admin.htm> on November 2014 .

3.5 Local Administrative Discretion

Administrative discretion has three components: ability to regulate, discretion over procurement of goods and services, and management of human resources (Aslam *et al* , 2010). Local governments that can make and enforce regulatory decisions govern a procurement system (based on national standards), and control and manage its workforce is administratively autonomous. Local governments have two characteristics that allow them to institute regulations that are closer to citizens' preferences to improve allocative efficiency. **Firstly**, since local government's jurisdiction comprises lesser number of people, the interest and preferences of citizens are not as varied as in larger geographical areas. Therefore, it is possible for the local governments to be flexible to different interests and at the same time regulate on more specific subjects (World Bank Report No. 49059, 2009).

Secondly, local governments can enhance the use of local information to formulate policies that are most effective in specific local contexts. In other words, powers that augment the discretionary authority of the local governments allow them to take effective and efficient "actions concerning those who can benefit from resources or opportunities, how, and to what extent" (Ibid.).

3.5.1 Local Government Ability on Regulation

Local governments need a minimum set of powers and capacities to initiate regulatory legislation on issues affecting their jurisdiction. They need the authority to approve and issue generally binding ordinances on public matters in their jurisdiction, subject to national and state laws (Yilmaz *et al*, 2008). In addition, local government legislation should give wide ranging regulatory powers to local authorities pertaining to local economic development, land-use planning and cultural and social development (Ibid.). Administrative autonomy is achieved when a local government can make and enforce regulatory decisions (ability to manage). When it can control and manage its workforce and when it can engage in its own procurements (Boex *et al*, 2014).

Most countries have regulatory powers over functions like cleaning, cultural and entertainment activities, traffic and parking, maintenance of public property, and local businesses including retail and livestock. In other areas, such as land zoning and acquisition, land assignment and use, building permits and construction regulation, the configuration of local government authority is more varied (World Bank, Report No 49059 ,2009) . The most commonly restricted areas are social protection, environmental protection, crime prevention, local tourism, provision and maintenance of local sport facilities and regulation of retail and agricultural businesses. The partial authority of local governments over regulation in crime prevention, social and environmental protection conforms to the theoretical recommendation because these public goods are partially non-excludable at the national level. On the other hand, local tourism, provision and maintenance of local sport facilities, and retail and agricultural business are purely local goods, and therefore, should be part of the local government regulatory authority (Boex *et al*, 2014).

3.5.2 Local Government Discretion to Procure Goods and Service

Expanded mandates and responsibilities for the provision of new services require that local governments be endowed with discretion over processes for procuring goods and services. The procurement contracts can take many forms including service or management contracts, leases, concessions, joint ventures and full or partial ownership .Procurement process can be divided into a number of steps that include specifying goods and services to be procured, designing the contract, selecting suppliers, appraising technical and financial qualification of the bidders, managing bid process, finalizing bid process and contract management. While the role of the local government in each of these processes can vary significantly, an important requirement for adequate discretion is that the local governments have clearly defined roles in each of the above mentioned processes (World Bank, Report No 49059, 2009).

Local governments can develop procurement strategies, identify associated processes, and issue contracts for goods and services. Discretion in procurement processes requires clearly stipulated rules set by national laws and regulations mandating that all

local governments adopt an annual procurement policy defining how local governments manage purchases and contracts (Yilmaz *et al* , 2008).

Generally, the greater the role of the local government in the above-mentioned processes, the more ability it has to respond to the demands of the public (Ibid.).

3.5.3 Local Government Discretion to Manage Human Resources

Local governments and administrations should have an appropriate degree of control over local employees. Generally this means at least the basic autonomy to hire and fire staff (within the bounds of established procedures defining a merit system), although autonomy can be more restricted in deconcentrated systems and greater in more fully devolved systems (USAID, 2009). Local governments gain greater administrative autonomy when they can pay their staff from their own budgets, have decisive control over staffing levels and skill mix, and can offer their staff enough incentives, flexibility, and opportunity in career advancement and performance outcomes. (Yilmaz *et al*, 2008).

3.6 Administrative Accountability

*Accountability for the exercise of regulatory powers requires avenues for complaints and redress, accessible to officials and others. Oversight over the use of civil service control includes measures to improve budget transparency on staff payments (including disclosures of wages and salaries of high-level officials), on policies and practices for new hires, and on practices for budget and establishment control (controlling staff numbers and the authority to remove surplus staff). Similar measures are needed to ensure transparency and openness of the procurement process to avoid misconduct and corruption. These measures call for appropriate channels for administrative audits that can be initiated by bureaucrats or elected leaders and by civil society groups (Yilmaz *et al* , 2008).*

3.6.1 Public Accountability

Public accountability refers to institutionalized practice of account giving by civil servants and public sector institutions. Although the literature on public accountability is devoted to the accountability of central governments, the issue is equally important for local governments, especially in the era of decentralization. Public accountability as

a supply-side approach is critical in establishing aggregate controls, prioritization, and efficiency in local government operations (Peteri, 2008).

It is the hallmark of modern democratic governance. Democracy remains a paper procedure if those in power cannot be held accountable in public for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, their policies, and their expenditures. Public accountability, as an institution, therefore, is the complement of public management (Bovens, 2003).It is comprised of three main dimensions: political, administrative, and financial. The Administrative arrangements establish the civil service rules that determine the autonomy and incentive structure for enabling accountable and well-functioning central and local bureaucracies. Furthermore, they define the funding level for governments to deliver these services (Peteri, 2008). Bellows' are public accountability structures in public offices.

Accountability Structures within Bureaucratic Hierarchies: The local government staff is accountable to higher administrative officers, public audit officers, supervisors, and legislative bodies (Aslam *et al*, 2010).Higher authorities may instigate investigations or audits of the use of administrative discretion by lower bureaucrats. These methods include internal control and audit, and are important as a first step to uncover information about maladministration by local governments (Yilmaz *et al* , 2008).

Specially Designed Independent Bodies: Mechanisms in response to increased complexities of administrative processes and new government challenges require specific expertise. Examples of these bodies include independent auditors (external auditors) who scrutinize the use of public funds for signs of misuse, ombudsmen who hear citizens' complaints about local governments' regulatory decisions and actions, or theme-specific bodies (such as the anti-corruption commissions, environmental review boards, or commissions for sustainable development) that address compliance issues with sector-based standards set by the national government (Ibid.).

Administrative Courts: Administrative courts with expertise on local issues address local conflicts that may arise between local government and citizens from the potential misuse of local governments' regulatory and administrative decisions. They also ensure

compliance with national laws, regulations, and standards. A court system that can levy credible check on local government and ensure its accountability should also have the authority to issue binding decisions on legal compliance by local governments (World Bank Report No: 49059-GLB, 2009).

Performance Based Financing: Performance based financing is a mechanism by which central or regional government can hold local governments accountable. According to this mechanism, central or provincial governments make the financing of specific local government project dependent on fulfillment of certain pre-determined criteria (Aslam *et al*, 2010). Performance based financing is deployed as a modality to motivate public service providers through the use of incentives in relation to performance against agreed outputs. It is informed by the principles of (i) autonomy in management and planning by service providers; (ii) separation of functions of regulation, financing, and service provision; (iii) involvement of the community in management of the services; and (iv) use of standardized instruments including business plans, contracts, verification and monitoring tools that are agreed at a decentralized level by sub national managers, community representatives (Toonen *et al*, 2009).

3.6.2 Social Accountability


Social Accountability as “an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability”. There are a great variety of initiatives that fall under this category. Initiatives as different as participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, social audits and citizen report cards all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government and can therefore be considered social accountability initiatives (Ackerman, 2005). Social accountability has emerged as an important weapon in the fight for better governance and service delivery. Traditional accountability relationships rely on top-down or external donor-driven monitoring of service providers. They often fail. As a complementary strategy, social accountability strengthens citizens-clients to monitor and exert accountability (World Bank, 2004). Two sets of obstacles must be overcome for this to happen. Citizens

must have reliable information on their entitlements and the performance of services and they must be able to take actions based on that information to demand accountability, something which often requires collective action. This way, social accountability can improve service delivery, especially for the poor (Ibid.).

Formal social accountability: Social accountability mechanisms are formal when they are written in laws and codes. For example, a law may require citizens to form a citizens' board to review the budget or to oversee a project.

Informal social accountability: Social accountability mechanisms are informal when they are not written in law but are initiated and maintained by non-state actors. These mechanisms, by definition do not have sanction powers over the elected officials. Nongovernmental organizations' maintained community groups are an example of informal social accountability mechanism (World Bank, Report No. 49059, 2009).

Figure 3.2 A frame works for social accountability



Source: World Bank, 2004.

Bellows are from many the citizens directly involved in the service delivered and make accountable officials.

Information Provision to Citizens: According to Aslam *et al* 2010, making information available to the public is a pre-requisite of any social accountability initiative. Introducing report cards will be one of the examples. Reporting performance to citizens is the other, which puts pressure on local governments to perform well on the indicators being reported. Thus, when a state uses public information to promote a local focus on results, the choice of indicators deserves careful thought. A performance report should present information that is fair, accurate, and complete (Vinson *et al*, 2000).

Citizen Oversight: Citizen-based initiatives complement internal government accountability mechanisms and oversee administrative processes of the local governments. A typical source of local government corruption and collusion involves drafting tender documents in ways that unfairly benefit one contractor over the others. Consequently, in many countries, citizens have organized public consultations in which different stakeholders get a chance to comment on draft tender documents before the start of the bidding process (World Bank ,Report No, 49059, 2009).

User Groups of Local Services: Participation is an integral part of the process of assisting the local authority lead overall community efforts to move towards an economic, environmental and socially sustainable future that delivers an improved well-being for this and future generations (DECLG, 2014).Community-managed user groups oversee the delivery of specific services in order to enable citizens to interact more effectively with the local government administration for service provision. Usually these are multi-stakeholder councils formed by different combinations of users, civil society organizations, government, and private sector representatives (Aslam *et al* , 2010).

Public participation can range from involvement in local neighborhood and community life (e.g. tidy towns, residents associations, sports clubs) to structured engagement with public authorities and associated decision-making structures (e.g. area committees, strategic policy committees, community development organizations, participatory

budgeting; petition rights; plebiscites; town or area meetings, including meetings of municipal districts) and everything in between , including voting(DECLG,2014).

Social audit is also a form of citizen participation that focuses on government performance and accountability. It is qualitatively different from other forms of audit and citizen participation, whose main purpose is to express citizen's voice and promote a more inclusive government, such as public demonstrations, advocacy and lobbying and/or public hearing initiatives, to name just a few. The central objective of a social audit is to monitor, track, analyze, and evaluate government performance, thus making public officials accountable for their actions and decisions. As an evaluation of government performance, a social audit exercise can be considered a mechanism of social oversight: that is, the control that citizens can exert on their government officials to ensure that they act transparently, responsibly and effectively (Berthin , 2011).

3.7 Local Administrative Discretion in Ethiopia

In order to have the necessary flexibility in delivering services and the opportunity to respond to local demands, local governments need to have administrative autonomy. In Ethiopia, the local government hardly seems to have any such discretion (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008). In administrative functions such as enforcing regulatory decisions and governing the procurement system ,the law are in place providing discretionary powers to the local authorities but because of capacity constraints and party interference ,*de facto* discretion does not exist .Local government also seem to lack the power of control and manage their workforce as all hiring and firing have to go through zonal or regional offices(Ibid.).

The central government has transferred significant powers and responsibilities with the exception of defense, foreign affairs, foreign economic relations, currency and monetary policy to the regional governments. Consequently, the responsibility for producing and distributing goods and services has been largely transferred to regional governments. Regional governments are responsible for the provision of infrastructure and services such as roads, education, health, housing, etc. Major capital investment decisions in urban water supply, construction and maintenance of roads, etc. are, however, the

responsibilities of the central government leaving the operation and maintenance of these services to local governments (UN HABITAT, 2001).

3.7.1 Local Government's Regulating Abilities in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia ,Concerning regulatory legislation, local governments can regulate land use, co-operatives and community activities, while municipal local government can regulate markets, sanitary services, and other municipal services. Local governments also have the autonomy to enforce regulation by sanctioning and punishing citizens in elected —social courts and *woreda* courts (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008).

local governments in rural woredas, they have the authority to determine land use they can decide the location of facilities such as ,wells ,health posts and clinics . They can also regulate cooperatives and community and community volunteer activities .In municipalities local government authorities can prepared and implement development plans and regulate markets ,sanitary services slaughters houses ,fire brigades and mortuary and burial services . They also have the discretion to issues marriage and birth certificates ,approved building plans ,and register properties(Ibid.).

3.7.2 Local Government Discretion over Procurement in Ethiopia

At the Regional and *woreda* levels, public procurement is governed by proclamations enacted by the respective regional governments derived from the federal law model. Currently, all nine regions and the city administration of Addis Ababa have enacted and adopted new public procurement proclamation while Dire Dawa city administration is using the federal proclamation and directives. In accordance with the federal model, the proclamations enacted by the regions and city administrations should be followed by issuance of regional directives and establishment of independent public procurement agencies for effective implementation of the proclamation. However, the proclamations ratified by regions have not provided for establishing independent procurement agencies. At operational level, Tender Committees are established in most procuring entities but the majority of entities are yet to have functional procurement management units (World Bank Report No: 45186-ET,2009).⁴

In Ethiopia, local government have the authority to engage in all kinds of procurement contracts including service contracts, management contracts, lease concessions, joint venture leases and full or partial ownership(World Bank,2009).

3.7.3 Local Government Discretion over Human Resource in Ethiopia

Local governments in Ethiopia are responsible for recruitment, retrenchment, hiring and firing of staff. However, the party plays a major role in all these decisions, so much so that the local government cabinet members and administrators are selected from the party lists (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2008). World Bank observation done in ten countries including Ethiopia ,over the distribution of local government power over different functions that determine the degree of discretion in civil service and employment policies. The observations indicate that the civil service rarely enters the decision calculus of decentralization design and is not recognized as essential to successful decentralization. (World Bank , 2009).

3.8 Administrative accountability in Ethiopia

3.8.1 Public Accountability in Ethiopia

Public accountability is the responsibility of public official to justify their conduct and performance to citizen using accountability mechanisms .It is also the responsibility of citizen to extract accountability from public official. It is imperative to improve governance, to strengthen the economic and social performance of a country (Desani, 2009). In article 12 of the FDRE constitution stated as -any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties. Functions of government at all levels shall be transparent and officials shall be accountable to the people. If these are not fulfilled by elected representatives or officials they shall be questioned and proper action will be taken (Meskerem, 2007).

3.8.2 Social Accountability in Ethiopia

Social accountability is a principle of good governance that relies on civic engagement. Citizens' [have] incomplete understanding of their citizenship rights, responsibilities and entitlements to public basic services. Around the world, including Ethiopia, citizens fear public officials and civil servants. Many citizens are afraid to challenge these public

officials and public servants regarding their service delivery performance. On the other hand public officials and civil servants have incomplete understanding of their duties and accountability to citizens (Dr. Samuel, 2014).

In an attempt to support Ethiopia's progress towards reaching the MDGs, the government of Ethiopia along with international development partners had established the protection of basic services-Ethiopian social accountability program(JeCCDOs,2006) having four basic components in June 2006. Among these, the fourth component, i.e. "the Social Accountability (SA)" is an approach by which citizens and their organizations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability using mechanisms such as citizens' report cards, community score cards, independent budget analysis, participatory budgeting, etc(Ibid.) .

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4. In order to identify citation from similar author and publication year, additionally publication number is used. Or justification is given in footnotes.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter covered findings from the qualitative data the level of administrative discretion and the designed accountability mechanisms in *woreda* 10 of *yeka* sub- city. Hence, the finding of the study is indicative and reflection of the remaining *woredas* of Addis Ababa city administration in the specific inquiry theme. Since the study also rely on the revision of proclamations, regulations and directives commonly used by all *woredas* in the city.

The chapter is mostly relied on the data from an in depth interview and focus group discussion made with employees, officials and community representatives. Furthermore, other documents like procedures, rules, directives, regulations , compiled report and studies undertaken by the upper tiers of government are also utilized in the study .Much of the analysis is founded on qualitative description - panoramic view of the collected data than the microanalysis .Not often in order to illustrate some general truth ,the study also elaborated by quantitative data.

Yeka sub- city *Woreda* 10 is amongst thirteen *woredas* in the sub- city. It is among the peripheral and expansion *woredas* in the city administration . Bordering with *woreda* 9 of similar sub- city to the south and with *woreda* 2 of alike sub- city to the west . Over again, bordering with *woreda* 3 of similar sub- city to the west of north, with *woreda* 5 of alike sub- city to the south of west. Also bordering with Oromiya to the north and once more yet bordered with east to *woreda* 11 of still similar sub- city .The total area of the *woreda* covers 1442.05 hectares . It accounts 17.56 percent of the sub- city land and it is the second largest *woreda* in land area coverage from the *yeka* sub-city *woredas* .It also have 11 sub- *woreda* ,36 *sefers* and 161 blocks(AACAILIC,2014) .



Box 4.1 Addis Ababa city administrative map.



Source: www.ilic.gov.et Accessed on November 2, 2014.

4.1.1 Socio Economic Profile of the Study Woreda

Health: One government health center is opened since 2014. Based on the fact that the city administration embarked on to launch a health center in each *woreda* based on the urban health program target - < single health center for 40,000 targeted population> .There is no other private health facility except the government a health center in the *woreda* (Ibid) .

Road: Now a day almost all *woredas* in Addis Ababa are immensely constructing a cobble stone road in their inner street which makes unproblematic the transportation

system. As respondents affirm the study *woreda* is one of the model *woreda* in the city, by constructing 32 kilometer cobble stone road, 10 km gravel road, and by making ready for service. Both kinds of road are constructed by the community and government mutually.

Education: In *yeka* sub- city large numbers of nurseries, pre -primary levels of education facilities are available in all *woredas*. Each *woreda* has education's office to manage all level of schools both run by the government and private sector. One government secondary school ,two government primary school , eight privately owned primary school and two privately owned KG are existing in the *woreda* (AACAILIC, 2014) .

Financial Institution: In *woreda* 10 only the “Addis Saving and Credit S.C “is serving the community .There is no other private as well as government banks (Ibid.).

4.2 Structure, Power and Function of *Woredas* in Addis Ababa

The devolution of power to lower administrative tiers is a new development in administrative and governance history of Ethiopia. Since the formation of the federal structure, substantial efforts have been made to devolve power to sub -national which has been mandated to prepare and implement development plans and programmes and set priorities clearly reflecting the needs of the people (MCB, 2005). Each *woreda* of Addis Ababa, in structural hierarchy with the powers and functions of the appropriate organs of a sub-city office, shall have the following powers and functions to be executed by the executive organs organized in respective field of activity (Proclamation No. 35/2012 page 90).

Box 4. 2, Power and Function of *Woreda* .


1. Encourage *woreda* residents, governmental and non-governmental organizations for development being a center for direct participation of *woreda* residents in development and a focal point of services delivery for those that can be delivered at *woreda* tire;
2. Supervise that local development activities are in accordance with the city plan, building laws and standards; control unauthorized constructions;

3. put in place code enforcement personnel and supervise their activities; follow up and supervise to avert the performance of illegal acts within the *woreda*; follow up security activities of the *woreda*; in accordance with the regulations of the city cabinet, cause residents of the *woreda* participate in local policy;
4. Coordinate and supervise that the residents of the *woreda* keep the sanitary and beauty of the environment;
5. Coordinate and support the establishment of various civic associations and social institutions in order to assist the enhancement of the *woredas* resident's participation;
6. encourage the organization of parts of the community that are engaged in small and micro trade activities and handicraft-ship to form associations, facilitate to avail the appropriate support to same;
7. facilitate and follow up the provision of educational and awareness raising activities to avert and control harmful traditional practices and customs, HIV/AIDS, concerning prevention of diseases and basic health care educations and other related issues to the resident community; administer health centers;
8. Follow up and supervise kindergartens, primary and secondary schools that are functioning in the *woreda*; promote basic education;
9. Prepare and submit the budget and plan of the *woreda* to the sub-city administration; assess and collect tax of Schedule 'C' tax payers; collect municipal service fees in accordance with the directives to be issued;
10. Keep full information about vacant lands and possession of lands available within the Boundaries of the *woreda*; administer houses that are owned by the city government Situated within the *woreda* based on the document submitted to it by the Housing Agency;
11. Protect and supervise parks and recreational areas;
12. Custody organized socio-economic information about the residents of the *woreda*; transfer same to the appropriate organ upon request.

Source: proclamation No. 35/2012 page 91.

The Current Organizational Structure of Woreda in Addis Ababa City Administration

Figure 4.3



Source: Researcher own, 2015.

*Keys -Municipality's services
 - State functions

4.3 Woredas Administrative Discretion

As respondents affirm *woredas* in the city administration have discretion over both the municipal service and state function. They are enforcing regulatory decision, except in few areas which need high professional skill and more sensitive areas like land zoning, rendering land possession certificate, those are managed by the sub-city, *woredas* have enforcing abilities in many areas. Powers which need high calibrated professionals are devolving hierarchically in the governing stratum of the city. *Woredas* are also discretionary in undertaking procurements including goods, consultancy services, and services. However, in the case of procurement for construction project their responsibilities will be barring by the sub-city and also their responsibilities deprived of due to the reason lack in high calibrated professionals in handling the sophisticated procurement procedures in different construction project need. *Woredas* are currently has the power to control and manage their own work force by themselves in hiring as well as firing. As it was stated by the HR unit interviewees' firing is only done in the cases of rigorous disciplinary faults, but in case of underperformance is not experienced. In some job position *woredas* are not allowed hiring, like the ICT professionals and drivers.

In proclamation No. 35/2012 the power and functions of *woredas* is stated, but it does not exactly point out area in which they are discretionary or not allowed for them to execute. Though, it is better to investigate thoroughly their discretionary area as well as the rationale behind in restraining *woredas* over few discretionary powers.

4.4 Woredas Enforcing Abilities in Regulation

4.4.1 Regulating Abilities over State functions

As part of its administrative autonomy *woredas* have enforcing abilities over both areas of the municipal and state function. Initially, better to look the state function or executive service like abilities in permitting buildings. Respondents affirm that *woredas* regulate building up to ground plus zero story for those who have legal land possession certificate. Those of who need to build up to Ground plus four story have to get the permission from the sub-city, and anyone who need to have a building

more than four story have to get an agreement from the city administration building permit and control authority . In devolving power there are areas which need caution. Areas which need advanced skill and high level expertise most of the time need emphasis ,for example the rationale behind in limitation permitting over story of building in *woredas* is due to the absence of technical expert like the civil engineers and other professional .Proposing land site for socioeconomic infrastructures building such as for school ,health center and youth center etc are also done by the *woreda* . The final approval of the proper site for building the public infrastructure was given by the city administration land development and management bureau . However, *woredas* in rural Ethiopia have the authority to determine land use and they can also decide the location were to be built for the social and economic infrastructure (Yilmaz and Venugopal, 2008). It illustrate that government has high disquiet in urban land .The government of Ethiopia after adopting proclamation number 721/2011, have strict control over urban land, the proclamation indicate that urban land entitlement is through lease only. The proclamation also indicate , land may be “allotted” for the purpose of building public infrastructure, the proclamation also warn that no region or city are permitted to transfer urban land in manner contrary to this proclamation.

In enforcing regulation the other area is culture and tourism. The interviewees’ respond that *woreda* enforcing abilities is limited since they are not allowed to execute cultural and entertainment activities and the task is suspended in upper tier of governing sub – city. *Woredas* are discreationed over petty activities like in licensing small business like restaurant ,café ,traditional drink houses and pension service in accordance with rule (Culture and Tourism Bureau, 2013) .As well as they take the initiative in identifying potential tourism sites that are not registered, in order to be registered.

Local sport facility controlling is also the other regulating area. The interviewed state that *woredas* in the city have only abilities in enforcing sport house ,club and gymnasium checking for services rendered is in accordance with the law or not and mentor the renewal of license annually which make them eligible to render the

service . But, even those institutions are serving at the grassroots most of their activities are regulated by the sub-city.

The urban agricultural activities are also among the discretionary area that is handled by the trade and industry sector in the city administration entire governing stratum. The interviewed state that government does not offer an emphasis for the urban agricultural business similar to the metalwork, building finishing, “blocks” production and woodwork, those are areas which are mostly encouraged by the government even by rent distribution . On the other hand, if the residents need to engage in urban agricultural business they are expected to run the business in their own residential house or other places which have legal land possession certificate by rent . This discretionary area is totally neglected and less emphasis is given to it.

Small business like local restaurant and food consumption business is also included in the regulating area –which regulated by the newly established office named as "Food , Medicine and Health care administration and controlling offices ".Somberly ,while the sector is newly established in the city administration by proclamation number 30/2012 , " a proclamation to establish Food , Medicine and Health care administration and controlling offices". Interviewees’ affirm that Procedures and codes are not issued which help to handle these food and food related business. Specially, *woredas* are critically in difficulty to handle the food consumption and food related business. But, in the entire governing stratum the problem is almost similar because of the aforementioned issues.

Interviewed officers state that the trade and industry office of *woreda* issues, renews, suspends and cancels license for retailing business in their vicinity in accordance with the law. Ensures undertaking of market stabilization activities by following up that distribution of basic commodities and services are in accordance with the law of market system. The regulating abilities of *woredas* retailing business is not undermined but due to lack in skilled human power and the unstable market situation of the time enforcing abilities goes beyond their control .

Public property maintaining is the other area to be discussed is regulating abilities. Public properties may be those that are fully used by the offices or public properties like roads ,bridges ,community police station ,etc which are constructed by the community participation .For the specific study those that are constructed by the community participation is discussed because those that are used by the office are maintained by budgeted finance of the government . Interviewees mentioned that Public properties after all during its damage, it has to be maintained by the communities themselves. *Woredas* don't have budget for maintenance of public properties like for the cobblestone road ,bridges etc which are constructed by the communities .The communities themselves are responsible enough to resuscitate those properties during their damage . Letting to the community alone such kinds of enforcing abilities is not right because even those properties are constructed by the community the government have to take part after all.

The environmental protection task is also to be included in the regulating abilities- in the *woreda* it is managed by the work unit under the direct control of CE of *woreda*. The interviewed respond that, follow and control the disposition of industrial residue, by-products and wastes are in accordance with the law under their vicinity. Issue in accordance with the environmental laws, certificate of competence of pollution prevention for production and service rendering institutions. Coordinate and be cause for planting different species of plant with economic, social and cultural benefit. Give permit for cutting of trees grown on private (proclamation No. 35/2012). As well as the work unit, undertake activities like due propagation of environmental protection and the sustainable and non-abuse use of natural resources (Ibid). Respondents state that , *De facto* practice is puny over the specified activity, because there is a lack of professionals(only one employee having a diploma in natural resource is employed) in the work unit of the study *woreda* as well as due to financial and other factors do not properly perform their duties .

4.4.2 Regulating Abilities over Municipalities' Services

In enforcing abilities over municipal services *woredas* are capable over few services. The interviewed respondents state that *woredas* issues only birth and death certificates, register residents of the *woreda* and issue identity card. However, issuing marriage certificate and accrediting different document that are wanted by citizens mostly for an abroad journey not allowed for them because the service is centralized in sub- city level. This will have a problem because most of services are suspended in the upper tier .*Woredas* become responsible for petty services and the upper stratum congested by those services seeker and bring a good governance problem.

They also control and coordinate solid waste management in their territory, follow and control green area in there vicinity. Interviewees respond that *woredas* do not have rendering abilities over cemeteries services. It is given by the sub city .For any religion follower who need to buried dead body- by paying 250 birr for child ,300 birr for adult and also 1000 birr for those who need to built little burial vault to as well as for dead body who don't have relatives to buried it appropriately ,the service is rendered by the sub- city .Respondents illustrate that culturally in Ethiopia cemeteries services is given by the religious institution most of the time, the involvement of government in the cemetery service is limited because the society prefer to access the service from the religious institution than the service rendered by the government. Similarly, funeral parlour services are almost completely delivered by the privately managed business institution. In all level of governing tier in the city administration, the service is not delivered with payment unless for those buried by the municipal.

4.5 Woredas Discretion over Procurement

4. 5.1 Types of Procurement Allowed to be procured by Woreda

Like as the other governing tier in the city administration *woredas* are allowed to enter in procurement of goods, service, and consultancy services as per it is allowed for any government pubic office which is partially or holly financed by the city administration(Proclamation No. 17/ 2009). Interviewees respond that goods and services procurement are typically under taken by the *woredas* ,while consultancy

service procurement is not practiced ,due to lack of high skilled professional, -most of the reasons raised for not entering in different procurement is the repercussion of lack in professionalism .Atypical example is before 2013, *woredas* in the study sub- city have mandate to administer construction projects and their procurement need .Such as ,for the health center ,schools and youth center buildings. However , due to poor efficiency of projects and deferred from the scheduled time to be completed which is occurred due to poor management of procurement, those projects which are under the discretion of *woredas* are takeover by the sub- city in ordered to be managed .*De facto* practice is different from the *de jure* on such kinds of discretion in the lower governing tier .

4.5.2 Participant in different Phases of Procurement

Procurement need of individual offices in the *woreda* is identified by finance and economic development office of respective *woredas* and then descriptions of the annual procurement plan is also done by them. Other countries experience shows that, for example in Rwanda, community representative actively participate in all steps of the procurement process (World Bank Report No 49059, 2009). In *woreda*, as well as in other level of governing tier in the city administration, the community does not have any role except in indicating the expected procurement need of the offices during the well-known meeting instance. Which deprived the community right in the FDRE constitution -adequate power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to enable the People to participate directly in the administration of such units (article 50). In conflicting, the community's in the *woreda* involved in procurement need of cobblestone road construction.

Interviewees respond that there are committees who run for the effectiveness of procurement process in the *woreda*. "*Tender committee*" is responsible in identifying potential bidder who participates in the official bidding processes . Selection of a successful bidder shall be carried out in either of the following two methods, not withstanding that the bid evaluation criteria varies from one type of procurement to another. First by setting the minimum technical requirement and selecting the bidder

with the lowest evaluated bid from among the bidders meeting such minimum technical requirements, or Indicating clearly in the bidding document the criteria to be applied to determine the functional or economic value of the procurement and the relative weight to be ascribed to each criterion and selecting the bidder with the highest cumulative result by conducting evaluation based on these criteria (BOFED, 2010). Additionally, in bidding; the most commonly used committee is the " *technical committee* " which is formulated from employee, with different technical proficiency in order to assure the aforementioned second alternative in bid evaluation .Because ,in order to approve the economic value of goods, it has be assured by professionals . Current practice of bidding is relatively better in *woredas* as well as other organizations in the city administration .Because, selection of bidding is not only done by the low cost but the economic value of the procured item has been measured(proclamation No 649/2009). Though the final selection of the bidder is done after the final approval of the technical committee , based on the supplied item economic values inclusive to its cost .The bidding process is completely undertaken in the bureaucratic organ without the interference of other interested party in its process . After all the CE of the *woreda* or delegated officials approve the final award to the winner of bid . However, the contractual agreement between the supplier and the *woreda* is completed between the head of the finance economic development office of the *woreda* and the manager of the supplier organization.

4.6 Woredas Discretion over Human Resource

4.6.1 Budget Pay roll and Establishment of Control

Woredas in the city have indispensable right over human resource such as in hiring and firing .Nevertheless ,in those basic right ; *woredas* regulating abilities constrained due to lack of technically proficient employee to handle the activities and also due to the political curiosity of the ruling party . Not often *woredas* fire employee due to rigorous disciplinary fault, but they don't practice their autonomy of firing in the case of underperforming. Proclamation number 6/2008 state that ,the service of a civil servant who has completed their probation period **may be terminated** due to inefficiency

where their performance evaluation result is below satisfactory for two successive evaluation periods despite exerting all their knowledge and ability to accomplish their work. Possibly one of the reason for *woredas* to restrain from firing underperforming employees emanate from the doubtful decree in proclamation, sentenced as <.....*may be terminated*>.It implies that, weather it is in underperforming or disciplinary fault, firing has not been performed as simply.

Any civil servant may be retrenched where his position is abolished, the government office is closed, or redundancy of human power is created. But, it is done after exhaustively looking at the alternative to be applicable before .For example , assigning in any government institution .So, retrenchment in any level of governing tier of the city administration is done cautiously after profoundly looking alternative before retrenching employees and if it is applied it is done by the final approval of the agency.

Proclamations No.6/2008 state that, the agency prepare and submit a salary scale to be applicable to the cabinet of the city administration, and supervises its proper implementation upon approval. However , the city administration does not have its own salary package different from the other regions . Always salary increment is practiced based on the announcement of salary increment by the central government.

But the proclamation indicates that, the agency undertakes studies on the types and payment of various allowances and submits it to the cabinet of the city and, upon approval, supervises its implementation.

Interviewees respond that *woredas* are not allowed to control over number of employees expected to be hired. The total number of employee expected to be hired in each *woredas* in Addis Ababa city is determined by the civil service agency .As well as the total number of employee expected in individual offices of *woreda* also decided by the agency .*Woredas* has the right to claim over gap in number of employee allowed to them to be recruited, if it has short fall or disguisedly to be recruited .

4.6.2 Recruitment

Respondents affirm that *woredas* in the city administration have the capabilities in hiring the necessitated employee based on limit number of staff set by the civil service agency of city administration (AACACSA, 2010).⁵ Though their ability to hire in most, they don't have the abilities of hiring employee in few positions. For example, it is not permissible for them to hire ICT professionals in *woreda*. If *woreda* necessitate to hire ICT expert, they have to submit the registered candidate by themselves for further selection of the right person to be hired, to the "Information Communication Technology Development Agency" of the city. It was due to the technicality of the profession which is not possible to be handle by the *woreda's* human resource work unit. The other example is driver; driver is also not hired by the *woreda*. Similar to the ICT profession after preparing their candidate they submit it to "Productivity Improvement Centre" - an institution which is superiorly directed and coordinated by the bureau of "Micro and Small Scale Enterprises Development" For selecting the last candidate to be hired for the *woreda*. Still the reason behind is due to lack of technically capable professionals in handling the selection of drivers.

Since the total number of employee expected in a single *woreda* is determined by the civil service agency, *woredas* have not discretion over determining the total number of employee as well as determining the number of employees in individual sector offices.

Most likely the recruitment mechanism in *woreda* is merit based. As it is respondents affirm it is mandatory to announce on government daily Amharic magazine called "Addis zemen Gazetta" the vacant position. During announcement full information of the required professional qualification as well as work experience expected from applicant and other required information is announced. After they selected employee in accordance with Addis Ababa city administration permanent employee recruitment procedure directive, hiring permanently is performed. It implies that *woredas* as well as other employers neutrally undertake recruitment from second party interference. In *woredas* and in other employer in the city administration there is a raised objection that there are a leader who stretch their hand in the recruitment process in order to

maintain the interest of the governing party .For example , in the study *woreda* during field visit the researcher heard that , the youth center manager is assigned in spoil method, however the manager is to be assigned in merit system . Senior officials of the *woreda* in contrary to the directives ,assigned the manager who have the ruling party affiliation.

4.6.3 Performance Management and Rewarding

The purposes of performance evaluation are to enable civil servants in order to effectively discharge their duties in accordance with the expected level, quality standards and time and expense. Evaluation of civil servants on continuous basis identifies their strengths and weaknesses with a view to improve their future performance (proclamation No. 6/2008). Performance evaluation which is undertaken in the *woreda* has to be viewed in to two .Initially , which is done at the "*individual office level*" -it is performed by the sub- city capacity building office " reform program implementation ,monitoring and evaluation work unit ". On the other hand, "*employee performance* " evaluation has to be done and coordinated by the civil service agency of the city in collaboration with human resource work unit of the respective *woreda*'s or institution .*De facto* practice is different from the aforementioned *de jure*, because employee evaluation is done with the technical assistance of "reform program implementation ,monitoring and evaluation work unit" of the capacity building office of *woreda* , by everyone work unit or offices themselves . Similarly, in bureaus and other organizations under the city administration employee evaluation is undertaken by work -units or divisions themselves.

Reward; irrespective of its type has the abilities to motivate employees for further effective discharge of their responsibilities. According to evaluation and reward directive prepared by the capacity building office of city, a reward -is a motivational cause to encourage employees or work units in order to meet effectively a strategy or objective of the organization. It has to be non financial such as in kind reward, scholarship, short term training which help them to upgrade themselves and other kinds of reward might be included. Financial rewarding is not allowed for the *woread* as

well as other government institutions in the city administration (AACACBB, 2014)⁶. Paradoxically, the balanced score card agenda, which is assertively preached and applied in all governing stratum of the city administration, in its stage 8 - called cascading, depicts that - cascading is done via three methods, first **spiritually**, then **physically**, finally through **reward or pocket cascading** (AACACBB, 2014)⁷. Obviously pocket rewarding means, which is to be putted in the wallet of employee. Not only financial but other kind of rewarding is also not applicable in *woredas*.

Routinely performed tasks and activities supervision in *woreda* is done by the respective capacity building office and it may also further assisted by the sub-city capacity building office supervisors, as per the capacity building responsibilities indicated in the proclamation No. 35/ 2012. Capacity building offices in the entire governing tier follow Support and evaluate with the view to enable the government organs having better service delivery.

4.6.4 Career Management

Empirical evidences signify that, Periodical salary increments to be made to civil servants based on their performance evaluation results as well as civil servants obtaining an evaluation result of satisfactory or above satisfactory should be entitled to a salary increment to be made every two years (proclamation 6/2008). However, interviewees indicate that there is no periodical salary increment made to civil servant based on their performance evaluation in any public office in Addis Ababa city administration. Moreover, except teachers and health professionals, other civil servant in the city administration are not entitled for salary increment which is made every two years.

5. Sourced from Addis Ababa city administration civil service agency permanent employments directives 2010.

6. <Evaluation and Reward Directives>, of Addis Ababa city administration. (Page 39)

7. <Manuals on Cascading Strategies up to Individual Employees>, prepared by AACACBB 2014.

In addition to salary increment, including *woredas* other institutions grant promotion to their employee .According to the Addis Ababa civil servant proclamation No. 6/2008; Promotion shall be given for the purpose of enhancing the performance of government institutions and to motivate the employees. The actual practice is far from written, promotion is serving as the best mechanism in fulfilling the vacant position in the *woreda*. Promotion is not awarded for the purpose of motivating employee rather it serve for the aforementioned purpose.

Regarding the mobility of employee, it is possible for employee to be shifted from one *woreda* to another with similar position and salary by the agreement of both *woreda* .Similarly, it is also possible for employees to be transferred within the *woreda* from office to office via promotion . As well as, as per the proclamation indicate; whenever necessary, based on a transparent procedure, transferring a civil servant to another equivalent position of an equal grade and salary or to another place of work within the government institution is possible. In all case of mobility it should have to be done by the agreement of the giver and recipient institution as well as by the good will of the employee .


4.6.5 General, Employee's Profile of the Study *Woreda*

For less quality of service delivered in any level of service giver institution of the city, lack of work experience of employee is among the many. Notwithstanding the above issue, most of employees in study *woreda* have relatively better academic back ground. According to the city administration civil service agency, the human power needed to be recruited for the study *woreda* is 294. Among those total employees to be hired in the study *woreda* , 110 of them must have to be a holder of first degree with different worth of work experience ,they account 37.4% of the total amount of workers expected in the *woreda* . The remaining 144 of them are expected to be the holder of diploma to be hired , they account for 48.9 % of the total amount of required workers in the *woreda* .The last 40 employees are uncompleted their high school class ,they becomes 13.6% of the total number of employees expected in the *woreda* .The study *woreda* does not effectively exercise its right of recruiting employees .181 employees

are currently hired in the *woreda* .They accounts only 61.5% of the total number of employees in comparison to total number allowed to be recruited .

Employee Expected to be hired by the Study *Woreda*, by their Expected Level of Education.


Figure 4.4



Source: From Survey 2015: Researcher own.

Currently hired employees in the *woreda* are 181, from the total number of employees which is ceiling by the city administration civil service agency 294. They accounts for 61.5 % of expected number of employees in the *woreda* .From those employees who are currently hired in *woreda* , 73 of them are first degree holder, they accounts 40.3 % of the total number of employee on work .On the other hand 76 of them, accounts for 41.9% are diploma holder .The rest 32 of employee , who account for 17.6% of the total employees in the *woreda* are in completed their high school class .

Figure 4.5 Current Available Human Resources in the Study *Woreda*



Source: From Survey 2015: Researcher own.

Currently , employees in *woredas* have better academic competence than the former lower governing tier of the city holding professionals in their offices . However, for the quality of service which is rendered in the *woreda*, the current effort of government to fill them with better academic back grounded employees is remarkable . However , rather than these it needs to empower and scale up skill of those young graduate in order to make them to cope up with practical work environment challenge.

4.7 Administrative Accountability Mechanisms in the *Woreda*

Each *woreda* should be accountable to the residents of the *woreda* and to the respective sub-city (proclamation No. 35/2012).An effective local accountability system should be based on a web of different checks and balances rather than any one single lever. This reflects the fact that local bodies have a number of different accountability relationships. To local people as users or taxpayers; to local third parties for their contribution to collective goals, especially where they are pooling resources; and to the centre for the funding they receive and their contribution to national outcomes (DCLG, 2011). All public office (means any office of the city government of Addis Ababa city established

as an autonomous entity by a proclamation or regulation and fully or partially financed by the city government budget (Regulation No. 48/2012)) including *woreda* administration has analogous accountability mechanisms . All public offices use rules, proclamations and regulations which are decreed by the city administration to serve all public offices.

4.7.1 Public Accountability mechanisms in *Woreda*

The public accountability mechanisms in *woredas* as well as in other public offices in the city administration do not make accountable public officials. Most of directives and regulations decreed by the city administration prefer to makes accountable only employee. However, regulation No. 48/20012 objective state that ... to establish the rule of accountability by all levels senior official and employees .Nearly most of the instance , officials in the *woredas* are loyal and accountable to their party (EPRDF) than to the citizens - who they promised to serve them better , during election campaign .Even proclamation No. 35/2012 state, the senior official accountability by excluding his /her to be accountable to the citizen. Indicated as, the chief executive of *woreda* is being accountable to the *woreda* council and to the chief executive of the sub-city (proclamation No. 35/2012). Still after decreed of regulation No. 48/2012 officials in the *woreda* , after committing light or rigorous administrative fault their accusation is handled by the ruling party - mean the final verdict of their fault is given by the ruling party not by the formal accountability mechanisms .

For example , as interviewees affirm that if they are witnessed by the rent seeking, without any administrative or court indictment they are moved from their position and assigned to the civil service offices in merit position .

The GoE established a public service tribunal to handle grievances and complaints that public servants might have compliant against their public employers (Randolph and Buli, 2011). Addis Ababa city administration has an administrative tribunal, which hears, litigates and decides cases brought to it. The administrative tribunal has a power, given to an ordinary court under civil procedure code, to execute its own decision, decree, order and the court procedure. According to proclamation No. 6/2008, it have

the power to hear and decide on appeals brought by a civil servant from all public offices including *woredas*. Relating to unlawful suspension or termination of service, being penalized by rigorous disciplinary penalty, an illegal attachment or deduction of their salary or other payments, infringement of their rights arising from an employment injury is appealed. And cases like (disciplinary penalties, written warning, fine up to three month's salary, down grading up to the period of two years and dismissal), which are investigated and decided upon by grievance handling committee, and also matters arising from employee request for termination letters and testimonials of service as well handled by the agency. Disgracefully, the tribunal power is only limited to settle issues of employee lone. It is empowered not, to hear cases related to officials in the city administration at all level of administrative tiers.

4.7.2 Different Public Accountability Mechanisms in *Woreda*

Grievance Redressal Mechanism in *Woreda*: Grievance is redressed in all individual offices of the *woreda* by an ad hoc committee having three members. The committee is ideally authorized to verdict over mal administration fell out by officials as well as civil servant. As interviewees indicate that the committee typically uses a complaint lodging formats sequentially arranged from **001** to **004**. The first format **001**, it facilitate for citizen or employee to appeal their compliant to the team or committee. Depending on the nature of compliant, redressing is done by format **002** by the ad hoc committee. Any grieved moaner, have the right to re appeal their doubt by the format **003**, if they are not satisfied by the decision given formerly. Lastly, with format **004** the last redresses were given by the official of the compliant raised on office (AACACBB, 2012). The *de facto* practice of these mechanisms is delusional and not practically done specially in the study undertaken *woreda*. *The grievance redress mechanisms structure in Addis is impressive on paper; it does not always exist in fact at sub-city and woreda level* (Randolph and Buli, 2011). The concern abovely raised is actually still occurred in the *woreda*. However, grievance redress mechanism in the city administration entire stratum in its -written procedures, tracking, administrative due process, impartiality, and timely response and right to appeal is reasonably consistent with international best

practices (Ibid.). This fact also holds true for the study undertaken *woreda*. Because the aforementioned issues are factual, but the paradox is, still on its applicability's in addressing effective solutions for the grieved service users is weakened. Because, designing the structure simply does not bring the expected result. Still citizens extremely complained to the service rendered by the *woreda*. Further both the officials and concerned stakeholders should have to exert their own efforts.

Disciplinary committee is functional in the *woreda*, it was formulated by selecting members from the individual offices. The total numbers of members could not surpass 3-5. The committee undertakes its duties in accordance with regulation No. 24/2012 and 48/2012 by dividing the disciplinary fault as light and rigorous, but the committee does not have the autonomy to examine disciplinary charges of officials in the *woreda*.

Customer compliant handling committee is another ad hoc committee that functioned in the *woreda*. As interviewees state, the committee is superiorly coordinated by the capacity building office and it has three members, among members the one is assigned by the CE of *woreda*. The one who is assigned by the CE is responsible to chair the committee. The other is representative of the employee and the third member of the committee is from the human resource work unit serve to record a minute.

As well, the formally recognized work unit which is under the CE of the *woreda* is **grievance redressal work unit**, with decided of three employees but currently only one employee is engaged in the work (AACACSA, 2010)⁸. The work unit is functioned under the direct rule of the CE, which makes its decision distrusted. Because, it couldn't be possible for them to be free from the oppression of the CE, since they are under the direct rule of him/her. As well as they don't have the independence to hear cases raised towards the CE as well as other officials. And also due to nebulous political reasons, they are imposed to prefer shutting up over officials' fault.

8. Sourced from Addis Ababa city administration Civil Servant Disciplinary Fault Handling Directives 2010.

Including the formal work unit there are redundant committee in *woreda* to handle the compliant and grievance of the citizen as well as employee. To make it more clearer there are 20 offices operational in the *woreda* , having their own compliant handling committee with minimum 3 member in it. So, $3 \times 20 = 60$ employee, plus 3 disciplinary committee members, totally 63 employees are assigned in these tasks .Surprisingly, they accounts 35.3 % of employees currently employed in the study *woreda*. Notwithstanding ,the truth that effective local accountability mechanisms has to based on different web of check and balance rather than single mechanism, the redundancy is extremely high .The check and balance point is not visible, the juncture were all those committee tasks integrated is not indicated.

Even thought, regulation No. 48/2012 and directive No. 24/2010 don't indicate the existence as well as to whom those independent committees at the individual offices level are directly responsible. The specific investigation is further strengthened by the Rondolph and Buli assessment. They indicate that, *Addis Ababa launched a GRM initiative based on the authority of the BPR, but has not created a legal foundation for the office by enacting a formal proclamation and regulation.*

Nevertheless its redundancy, the grievance handling system in *woreda* in upcoming end resolution for the appealed cases is feeble .

Despite the weakness of compliant handling mechanisms , citizens as well as civil servant mostly prefer to appeal their cases to the upper appellate organ in seeking for better response of their cases .

Independent Bodies role in Woreda Public Accountability Mechanisms: Ethiopia institute of ombudsman is among the independent bodies in the country in strengthening the accountability mechanism .Interviewees affirm that the institute didn't take any initiative in providing information to the resident of *woreda* in nearby and training to employee about the creation of GRMs that conform to international best practices as well as its pertinence for the *woreda*. Ethical and anti corruption commission has established a club by inclusion youth and women's in every *woredas* of Addis

Ababa. The club members in the study *woredas* are as a rule from the "youth and women's league" of the EPRDF. The movement of the club in disclosing maladministration is very weak as well the inclusiveness of the club established is not appropriate. It should have to comprise members from free and neutral youth and women's associations to making the club more inclusive. The more it is inclusive, the more capable in challenging maladministration, and making accountable officials and employees.

Citizen Charter in Woredas of Addis Ababa: The concept of citizens' charter is a new phenomenon in Ethiopia. It appears on the civil service agenda of the country after two decades of its birth in UK (1991). In February 2012, FDRE ministry of civil service officially announced the launch of citizens' charter and urged government organizations to develop their own (Fekadu, 2014). A citizen's charter is an expression of understanding between the citizen and the service provider about the nature of services that the latter is obliged to provide it, also serve as tools for enhancing standards of service delivery and fostering greater public accountability. Addis Ababa city administration is embarked on it immensely since 2014 in all its administrative stratum. Interviewees affirm that All offices in the *woreda* are imposed to prepare the charter without prior identification of the standard determined in BPR for services and existing performance of the organization, which is a pitfall in first footmark of citizen charter. The other issues to be emphasized is awareness of the citizen. Though, *woredas* is launching the citizen charter, citizen have nil information about the charter. Stakeholder identification - who has direct or in direct interest in the service being delivered - mostly employee and users, the later is not include in preparing and commenting the charter. The other pitfall is *woredas* have not scheduled program or other structured mechanisms to receipt a feedback or discusses with stakeholders. Currently in *woreda* citizen charter remains merely paper exercise because of the aforementioned deficiency. Unless the indicated issues are inculcated in process of implementation, it will not effectively release its role as a tool for public accountability.

Auditing of Government Projects and Budget: Auditing, acts as a safeguard on behalf of the proprietor (whether an individual or Organizations) against extravagance, carelessness or fraud on the part of the proprietor's agents or servants in the realization and utilization of the money or other assets and it ensures on the proprietor's behalf that the accounts maintained truly represent facts and that the expenditure has been incurred with due regularity and propriety(IGAA,2009).If it is experienced precisely; auditing help as an antidote for corruption in public organization .As well as it , discharge effectively its function as a public accountability mechanism. Interviewees indicate that *woreda* has an internal auditing work unit under the direct command of CE of the *woreda* .Incredible similarity , like the grievance redressing work unit , the internal auditing work unit is also directly commanded by the CE .It arouse further questions like, why all work unit strengthen the public accountability mechanisms are directly ruled by the CE of the *woreda* ?. However, the question is not addressed in this study; because it is beyond delimit of the study. Returning back to discussing its function, interviewees affirm that auditing work unit in *woreda* is most of the time audit the financial record of the local development committee –a committee which is formulated to coordinate and run the *sub woreda* development agenda .And also they may undertake ex- post auditing of account as well audit or control the proper usage of financial receipt and different model – mean a receipt voucher which help to deliver or receive items, serially. On the other hand, ex-post and ex-ante audit of socioeconomic projects those fully financed by the government is audited by the internal audit work unit of sub-city- having similar structural arrangement to *woreda* . Most of the time both the *woredas* and sub- city internal work unit of audit recommendation is not implemented .Cabinet member at both governing stratum are refusing and blame their finding .It manifest they are ignorant to the formal accountability structure.

The rationality behind restricting *woreda* internal audit work unit from auditing government project is not clearer .Three audit professionals are expected to be hired in the *woreda*. They are also expected to be a holder of bachelor of art degree (in accounting, management and economics) with different worth of work experience. But,

currently two auditors are hired and engaged in the work .In comparison to sub-city work unit, they have almost equivalent worth of work experience and job grade, their number is relatively almost equal to the sub- city. The sub- city auditing work unit don't covered the auditing of government project . They are always in backlog of 2-3 years of already accomplished project which need their ex-post auditing. Such kind of backloging will expose to fraud the government resource and further manifest the accountability mechanism is very feeble. Ex -ante auditing is mostly undertaken when the CE of sub- city request them to undertake auditing in case of distrust of any rent seeking behavior either in procurement or in other process of the project .It is also undertaken without prior plan to performing ex -ante auditing by the direct command of the senior official of the sub- city . Auditors in sub- city complained that their staff number is only four which is very limited staff number in comparison to the stretched project plan of government in the sub- city .

Performance based Budgeting as Accountability Mechanisms :Performance-Based Financing (PBF) is the transfer of money or material goods conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. PBF programs may be a hybrid of several different mechanisms. In each case, however, there is some form of agreement between the two parties, and reward transfer is contingent upon the achievement of an agreed-upon goal or target. Introducing demand- and supply-side incentives (financial or material) to the provision of quality services has the proven potential to improve outcomes (USAID, 2011). However , Ethiopia has adopting a program based budgeting mechanisms in all regions as well as city administration .For Ethiopia, the primary concern of Program budgeting is therefore to get infrastructure and services delivered to the people. Thus, Program budgeting is pursued through the sovereignty of each federal public body (the budgeting organization of either a ministry or an independent executive agency), in order to ensure practical infrastructure and service delivery (MoFED, 2010). PBF is not applicable in Ethiopia as well as in city administration by the government as well as other NGO in order to incentivize local government for their better services and

accomplishment of project as well as to sanction for their poor performance .However , some expertise advocate that with the current program and plan of the country PBF is not preferred because those who lag due to different reasons become the looser and the government program will be crippled .But ,the researcher believed that if it both PBF and program budgeting used together it could bring better change and also best suited for further strengthening accountability mechanism. Those who perform better have to be incentivized.

4.8 Social Accountability

Social accountability is about affirming and operationalizing direct accountability relationships between citizens and the state. In *woredas* of Addis Ababa the social accountability mechanism is awfully puny .Because of lack in adopted formal mechanisms in *woreda*. The only way that citizen account the elected or appointed official is, in used to method .Which is the public meeting undertaken in *woreda* routinely . The community moaned that , they are invited by the *woreda* administrator to step on the public meeting 12-15 recur per annum with similar agenda of discussing on contribution of cobblestone road and other construction ,on community policing and on frequently revised annual plan of *woreda*. The formal ways of accountability mechanisms including ; forming the CSO who seek actively to engage in fought maladministration , forming committee overseeing public services , anti corruption club and others who enforce, reward or sanction the public official as well as civil servant are inadequately executed in *woreda* .

4.8.1 Formal Social Accountability

Almost all formal social accountability mechanisms launched as a pilot program in Ethiopia by the CSO is tested by excluding Addis Ababa city , in different region of the country . On contrary, they recommend that, *a special emphasis should be placed on development of a citizen's report card for Addis Ababa*. Addis is not included in the pilot exercise completed by the Poverty Action Network- Ethiopia (PANE) (Froster and Winter, 2006).Addis Ababa, given it has large population and is capital city; better service delivery should be central issues in attracting increased local and foreign private

sector investment (Ibid.). As it is already mentioned, the accountability mechanisms employed in all governing stratum in the city administration is similar .In spite of its similarity, it's also neglected and acquired minor emphasis which put the public service in deepest trouble. Since *woredas* is the grass root organ that serve up the citizens at frontline, their social accountability mechanisms has to be further strengthened. Because ,it strengthen the citizens' voice, enhancing public sector service provider responsiveness and accountability to citizens, build demand-side pressure for accountability in public budgeting processes, and build citizen capacity to engage in the public budgeting processes. Those aims have been successful in "strengthening the use of social accountability approaches by citizen and civil society organizations (CSOs) as a means to make basic service delivery more effective, efficient, responsive and accountable" (Samuel *et al*, 2011).

4.8.2 Information Provision and Citizen Participation in *Woreda*

Result of inquiry illustrates the bridging mechanisms between citizen and administrators are limited in their far nature .Among those, bridging mechanisms-information exchange, dialogue and negotiation—between citizens and the *woreda* administrator are among the crucial. The lone method applied is, the traditional way of exchanging information like public meeting at hall which is mainly used by the *woreda* for disclosing its activity. The most commonly used in public offices "information center" is not available in the study *woreda* .

The absence of formal information provision mechanisms may put endanger rights like, accessing of information by citizen, making the voice of citizens to be heard and engagement of citizen in a process of good governance . It also negatively affects the ability of citizens to hold local government officials accountable.

The other issue is the willingness and ability of citizens and civil society. The established "*forums*" and "*associations* " in *woreda* are not capable to deal with administrators for betterment of rendered services .The reasons is due to the absence of platform of participation or almost all CSOs like forums and associations are managed and assisted by the government .Though ,their independence is doubtful

rather than disclosing maladministration and lack of good governance , they strongly serve the ruling party during the election time. Group discussion participants; strongly request that maladministration and red tape has to be avoided from service rendered in the *woreda*. They are also enthusiastic to have part in activities which is done for betterment of service. The willingness and ability of politicians to be accountable to the people is also the other important point. Since all appointed /elected officials at *woreda* are the member of the ruling party, they are loyal to their party than who give voice to them .They are more accountable upward than downward to the citizen. Finally, social accountability is strongly influenced by a range of underlying political, legal, social, cultural and economic factors. Since the political ground is obvious in all governing stratum, the fact which is happened in the study *woreda* hold true for many public offices. Association or organizations that are free from pressure of government are not available in the *woreda* . All CSOs functioning in the *woreda* are funded and supported by the government which makes their independence uncertain.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION

This chapter presents conclusion and recommendations of the study sourced from the study results which is analyzed and discussed in the above chapter.

5.1 Conclusion

The finding revealed a little more image on the extent of discretion and accountability mechanisms in *woredas* of Addis Ababa. Does really *woredas* of the city have adequately devolved discretion in order to accomplish tasks or services that the residents of metropolitan really seek? Since the power is vested no matter its adequacy officials and public servants should be accountable publicly to structured organ and also socially to the tax payers as well as service user citizens. So, the administrative accountability mechanisms is also investigated.

- First it was good to point out stated point on proclamation No. 35/2012. Weather it clearly indicate the power and function or discretion of *woredas* or not? Does not precisely specify the *woredas* discretion. The power and function of *woreda* to be executed are undermined or exceedingly have limitation in written proclamation. It was described in session of power and function of *woredas* in abovely indicated proclamation. The proclamation sentences by using prefix words like -encourage *woreda* residents...., supervise that local development activities, supervise their activities....., coordinate and supervise....., coordinate and support the establishment...., encourage the organization of...., facilitate and follow up the provision of...., custody organized socio-economic information...., etc. The aforementioned uncompleted sentence are prefix words in the proclamation to the executed power and function of *woredas*. It does not exactly point out the power to be executed and limit the local government or *woredas* task in coordination, facilitation, encouraging and custodians. Additionally, it does not designate exactly in which area does *woredas* has abilities in enforcing regulation, or *woredas* discretion over human resource, and also which types of procurement are allowed to enter in

for *woredas* is not clearly pointed in the proclamation or in any codified manner as well as other discretionary areas are not briefed .

- *Woredas* in Addis Ababa has discretion over both state function and municipal services. However , these discretion have a limitation because decisive discretionary area are still remained in sub- city.
- In the case of enforcing regulations over land, *woredas* in Addis have only power in proposing the location of land to be used for the socioeconomic infrastructure in their vicinity. The final approval has to be given by the building permit and control authority of the city administration .Regarding building permission only ground plus zero story is permitted by the *woredas* ,building up to four story is permitted by the sub- city and building to be built with more than four story need an agreement from the city administration building permit and control authority .The other is land zoning , zoning land for different purpose is done by the central government . It is done by non administrative stratum in the city .Urban land is assigned or possessed only by lease but government may allot land for socioeconomic infrastructure development.
- On the other discretionary areas like local tourism, local sport facility ,maintaining public property and environmental protection the *woredas* discretion is very limited in comparison to their current service delivery and the citizens seeking services from their since they are near to population .
- But , *woredas* have relatively better discretionary power enforcing local retailing business in their vicinity .

The second category over regulating area is municipal services.

- *Woredas* have petty discretion over municipal services such as issuing- birth and death certificate, and identity card .Citizens that require marriage certificate should have to go to the sub- city. Also, empowered for solid waste management in their vicinity .Cemeteries and funeral parlous services is not rendered by the *woredas* .The service is rendered by the sub-city beautification, parks and cemetery development and administration office for funeral of dead which don't have akin

to manage their funeral as well as anybody who need to access service of funeral in the cemetery area of the sub- city.

- Procurement is another category in local administrative discretion. *Woredas* in Addis Ababa has abilities to enter in different kind of procurement of goods, service, and consultancy services. Most of the time *woredas* don't enter in consultancy services agreement due to lack of experience to handle such type of procurement. As well as, all phase of procurement are managed superiorly by the executive of the *woreda* without the involvement of others stakeholder.
- Human resource management is another area in which local administrative discretion is articulated. *Woredas* have right in recruiting, evaluation of performance of employees, promotion and firing employees. Employing is not allowed in few position which are handled by different first administrative stratum bureaus. *woredas* may fire employee in the case of rigorous disciplinary fault. However, Rewarding employee is almost not applicable in the *woreda* .
- Accountability has to chase for the given discretion in any level of local government. Public accountability mechanisms are arranged in *woreda* relatively in better manner than the social accountability . Those mechanisms are arranged redundantly up to individual office of the *woreda* but its direct liability is not clearly defined. The other difficulty is, all the arranged mechanisms and codified rules don't make accountable appointed /elected officials but its role is merely to make accountable only employees.
- The grievance handling mechanism established as independent work unit is under the direct command of chief executive of the *woreda* .Which make the work unit function feeble because it could be difficult to investigate cases which are appealed towards the chief executive and other politicians . Despite redundancy , the grievance and compliant handling mechanisms power in rendering solution for the appealed cases is puny .Both employee and citizens bring their cases to the upper stratum sub- city in seeking better decision .

- Independent bodies like ombudsman and anticorruption institution contribution directly in strengthening the accountability mechanisms by rendering training and awareness creation is almost nil in *woreda*
- Social accountability mechanism is a method in which the citizen request upwardly. Formal methods to request service given by citizen is not well established in *woreda*. All the formal social accountability methods like citizen report card, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking and participatory monitoring and evaluation which are functional in rural Ethiopia as a pilot program by the aid of CSOs is not applied in Addis Ababa entire governing stratum.
- Community in *woreda* doesn't access information prepared about the plan, performance and different affairs. It critically hampers the citizens' involvement in making the service renderer accountable to them. Unless the citizen accessed sufficient information regarding the service, they don't have the means to make accountable the public officials.

5.2 Recommendation

- Since *woredas* are near to the population they have adequately to be empowered administratively as well as many power still remain in the immediate upper stratum have to be devolved adequately to accomplish effectively the citizens need of better services in *woreda*.
- The written documents :- like rules, codes and proclamation etc has to clearly indicate the discretionary area or the level of autonomy of *woredas*. Because, unless the autonomy or power is stated in black and white, any moment this fuzzi power will be denied and abused by the upper body of governing.
- Rules and regulation declared are abused by the politician and not properly functioned. Officials' must have to allow for reasonable justice by avoiding interfering in the applicability of rules and regulations. The capacity building bureau also have to shun its making upside-downing the tasks and responsibilities of different organ.

- In addition to the fuzziness', the autonomy base of *woredas* has to be broad since its near to the populace . As well as *woredas* has to be endowed with more skilled and professional which help them to handle task still remained in the sub- city .
- Discretionary area -like local tourism ,cultural and entertainment , regulating local sport facility and urban agricultural business are given less emphasis or neglected .It has to be given due emphasis for those area, because many of those area are possibly to be handled by the *woreda* administration ,than the other governing stratums in the city .
- Municipality services rendered in *woredas* are few in type. The base of services has to be broadened, for example in services like issuing marriage certificate. Currently the marriage certificate service seeker are overwhelming the service renderer office in the sub- city .In order to avoid this congestion of service user and rendering better service devolving the services up to *woredas* is important . As well as cemetery service has to be given in *woredas* .Because the service is not difficult to handle it in *woreda*.
- Public accountability mechanisms applied in *woreda* as well as other organ in the city has to make accountable the officials also ,because it make accountable only employee . Rules and directives prepared by the city, must have to make accountable both officials and employee. Making accountable only employee and letting officials, create in loss of confidence of citizens over the governing organs. Additionally , the sentence of Regulation No. 48/2012 which denote *official has to be accountable* , has to come to practice from mere remain on paper .
- The redundant grievance rederesal mechanisms in individual office of *woreda* has to be curtailed .Because redundant committees busy the routine work by absorbing large amount employee and bring pressure on the day to day tasks of offices . On the other hand GRM established under chief executive of *woreda* has to be restructured away from the CE office in order to make it independent. If it is

independently structured away from chief executive, it become favorable to hear cases raised on officials and chief executive.

- In dependent bodies like ombudsman and anticorruption commission role in accountability mechanism has to be boosted at the grassroots'. Because, those organs role in wrestling maladministration in *woreda* is puny. For example, anticorruption club established in *woreda* is almost lifeless. Those organs have to strive best to contribute so in creating strong and sustained accountability mechanisms in *woredas*.
- Internal financial auditing work unit in the *woreda* has to be empowered to undertake different auditing for the government project , and budget accounts etc .Because , the number of human power and professional competency level of employees at both *woreda* and sub- city are almost equivalent . Restraining *woreda* internal financial auditing work unit from the task is meaningless.
- The citizens and CSOs also have to take initiative in launching different social accountability mechanisms in *woreda* . like in most of other countries , which help them to defend their right over accessing information and making accountable officials .
- Social accountability mechanism like the citizen report card has to be adopted in the *woreda* since there is no formal methods that the citizen accesses information in the *woreda* .The simplest methods that mostly used like in preparing brochures ,pamphlet etc has to be accustomed to disseminate information for the citizens via the information center .
- CSOs which are functioning in *woreda* has to fight back for the betterment of service rendered in the *woreda* than serving the ruling party in the election time .

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APPENDIXES

Title of the thesis: Assessment of Local Administrative Discretion and Accountability Mechanisms in Addis Ababa City Administration: The case of Yeka Sub- City Woreda 10.

Check lists for the Field Work of Study

Interviews Questions

In order to answer the research questions and to meet objectives, primary data was collected through in-depth interview from different interviewees' in the *woreda* offices and also from few offices in the sub- city .Their detail information is described in bellows annex. Focus group discussion is also made with community representatives.

I. Administrative Discretion

A. Questions addressed by the key informants such as, CEO of the *woreda* and sport office head ,building permission and controlling office officers and culture and tourism office officers , in order to identify the area were *woredas* have abilities to regulate.

Regulating abilities

- Do *woredas* have autonomy in Land assignment and use?
- Up to which story of building does the *woreda* are capable to give permits?
- Which type of Building and construction are regulated by the *woreda* ?
- Who is responsible in Land zoning?
- Does *woredas* are mandated to involve in cultural and entertainment activities?
- Does *woredas* are capable in regulating local tourism?
- Do *woredas* regulate Local sport facilities?
- Who is responsible in maintaining public properties available at *woreda*?
- Does *woredas* have a contribution in environmental protection?

B. Questions addressed by key informants from Trade and Industry ,and Food , Medicine and Health care administration and controlling offices in order to Know the ability of *woreda* in controlling over local business .

Regulation of local businesses

- Does Local restaurants and other food consumption businesses are possible to be regulated by the *woreda* ?
- Do *woredas* have regulating abilities over local business like in retail?
- Do urban agricultural businesses are encouraged by *woredas* ?
- Do *woredas* have abilities in controlling over the commodities goods distributed?

C. Questions addressed by key informants from *woreda* manager office in order to know the regulating abilities of *woreda* over municipalities' services .

- Do *woredas* contribute for solid waste cleaning in their vicinity?
- Does the *woredas* have abilities in rendering service over cemeteries, funeral parlour services?
- Do *woredas* issue marriage certificate?
- Which municipalities services are not rendered by the *woredas* ?

D. Questions addressed by key informants from finance and economic development office of the sub- city and *woreda* in order to investigate the procurement discretion of *woreda*.

Discretion over procurement

- Do *woreda* have discretion over service contracts?
- Do *woreda* have autonomy to enter in management contracts?
- Do *woredas* have discretion over procurement of goods?

Participation in the phases of procurement processes

- Who Identifies needs/ specification of the goods and services?
- Who Appraises options of bidders?
- Who is responsible in designing and specification of the contract?
- Who do the selection of the supplier?
- Who identifies the technical and financial qualification of the bidders?
- Who is responsible for bid process management/evaluation of bids?

- Who finalize the bid process?
- Who sign the contract management?

E. Questions addressed by key informants from sub- city and *woreda* ,like the head of reform programs monitoring and evaluation work unit and M&E officers in order to investigate, who have responsibilities in evaluating performance of the *woreda* .

Performance Management

- Who direct and supervise activities and tasks in *woreda*?
 - Who is responsible in conducting evaluations?
 - Does the *woredas* have trained in offering financial rewards?
 - Do *woredas* have discretion in correcting disciplinary problem and fire underperforming staff?
 - Do the *woredas* set local incentives/salary top up?
- F. Questions addressed by capacity building offices head of *woreda* as well as human resource officers of *woreda*.**

Discretion over human resource

Budget payroll

- Does the *woreda* have authority to dismiss surplus staff?
- Do *woredas* are cable enough to determine the wage envelop?

Establishment of Control

- Do *woreda* are capable enough in controlling overall staff numbers?
- Does *woredas* are capable in controlling staff numbers in individual local offices and facilities?

Recruitment

- Do *woredas* are recognized as a formal employer?
- Employees in which level of qualification are to be hired by the *woreda* or have authority to hire?
- Does the recruitment mechanism in *woreda* is independent and merit-based?

Career Management

- Do *woredas* promote their employees?
- Do employees able to horizontally mobile within the local government?
- Is that possible for employee to be transferred within local government?

II. Administrative Accountabilities

A. Question addressed by key informant from internal audit officers of the *woreda* and sub- city in order to investigate the responsible bodies in auditing government project and account in *woreda* .

Public Accountabilities

Audit

- Who perform ex-post audit of accounts?
- Who perform ex- post audit of individual government projects?
- Who perform ex -ante audit and evaluation of the government's budget proposal?
- Who perform ex- ante audit and evaluation of individual government projects?
- Do the auditor have right of to issue opinions and recommendations for government?

B. Question addressed by key informant from sub- city and *woreda* capacity building offices reform program monitoring and evaluation officers

✚ At which level of the government are the following accountability bodies managed?

- Does the anti-corruption organs are functional at the *woreda* level?
- Do disciplinary committee in *woreda* are responsible enough for the oversight of the conduct of local officials and civil servant?
- The local council/or committees from citizens are responsible in oversees service delivered in *woreda*?

C. Question addressed by key informant from *woreda* capacity building officers (reform programs implementation, monitoring and evaluation officer)

✚ Social accountability:

Information provision and citizen participation

- Are there provisions in the code for information availability?
- Is there any formal structure for registering grievances and feedback?
- Is there any structured participation of the community in service provision monitoring, e.g. through user groups?
- Does the citizen charter implemented in all offices of *woreda*
- Does citizen charter is implemented with prior identification prerequisite of implementation

D. Questions addressed by key informant from *woreda* social court judge

- Which types of cases are handled by the *woreda* social court?
- Do the communities appeal their cases to the *woreda* social court?

III Focus Group Discussion Questions

Questions addressed by representative of community in the focused group discussion. In order to know the role of citizens in a service delivered as well the accountability of officials to the citizen at *woreda*.

- Is there any structured organ that makes community participant in different type's procurement as well as in its different phases ?
- Is there any structured organ that makes community participant in service provision?
- Are there any mechanisms that the community accessed information and make accountable officials to the citizens?

Appendix II

Position and office of key informants interviewed

No	Names of offices	Position of the respondents	No. of key informants interviewed
1	Chief executive office of <i>Woreda</i>	Chief executive officer	1
2	Capacity building offices of <i>Woreda</i>	2 from HR	4
		1 from M&E	
		1 Head of the office	
3	Building permission and controlling offices of <i>woreda</i>	1 Civil engineer	2
		1 data analyst	
4	Construction and housing office of <i>woreda</i>	1 surveyor	2
		1 Head of the office	
5	Culture and tourism office of <i>woreda</i>	1 culture promotion unit coordinator	2
		1 certification officer	
6	Sport office of <i>woreda</i>	Head of the office	1
7	Food , Medicine and Health care administration	1 health care unit coordination	2

	and controlling office of <i>woreda</i>	1 head of the office	
8	Trade and industry office of <i>woreda</i>	Modern marketing unit coordinator	1
9	Internal audit unit of <i>woreda</i> /under CE/	Audit unit coordinator	2
		1 auditor	
10	Internal audit unit of sub-city	Auditor	1
11	Finance and economic development office of <i>woreda</i>	Procurement unit coordinator	2
		Payment and finance unit coordinator	
12	Finance and economic development office of sub-city	Procurement unit coordinator	2
		Payment and finance unit coordinator	
13	Capacity building offices of sub-city	1 M &E unit coordinator	4
		2 M &E officer	
		1 Assessment and best practice officer	
14	Office of the <i>woreda</i> council speaker	Speaker of the council	1
15	Environmental protection unit of <i>woreda</i>	Environmental	1

	<i>/under CE/</i>	protection officer	
16	General manager Office in <i>woreda</i>	1 Vital statics office head	3
		1 Cleanness administration office head	
		1 Beautification and park office head	
17	Grievance handling unit <i>/under CE/</i>	Grievance hearing officer	1
	Total		32

Source: own sample of study, 2015.