

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND COMMUNICATION**

**AN INVESTIGATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IGAD'S  
COMMUNICATION MESSAGES IN MEDIATING THE SOUTH SUDAN  
CONFLICT PARTIES**

**BIRUH AYNEKULLU**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF  
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF MASTER'S OF ARTS IN JOURNALISM AND COMMUNICATION**

**JULY 2016**

**ADDIS ABABA**

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM AND COMMUNICATION**

**AN INVESTIGATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IGAD'S  
COMMUNICATION MESSAGES IN MEDIATING THE SOUTH SUDAN  
CONFLICT PARTIES**

**BY  
BIRUH AYNEKULLU**

**APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS**

---

Adviser

---

Signature

---

Examiner

---

Signature

---

Examiner

---

Signature

---

Examiner

---

Signature

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to forward my most profound gratitude to all those who made this thesis possible. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Zenebe Beyene, for directing this thesis and for his encouragement and constructive comments.

I am forever appreciative of my family, for whose support I am truly blessed. I would like to thank my parents for their patience and love, even when I tested the term “unconditional”, to its limits.

I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to Tsion Woldegbail, for her invaluable assistance and moral support she offered me during my study. My heart-felt gratitude also goes to, Commander Abebe Muluneh and Tigist Hailu, who helped me in gathering all the necessary data I need for this study. Had it not been especially for Commander Abebe Muluneh, collecting the data from IGAD would have been insurmountable.

Finally, I extend my thanks to my classmates and friends Adonay Siefu and Mamush Ejigu for the time we spent together in challenging each other with ideas to better our theses.

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgement .....	i
Lists of Tables.....	v
Lists of Appendices .....	vi
Lists of Acronyms .....	vii
Abstract.....	viii
CHAPTER ONE .....	1
Introduction .....	1
1.1. Background of the study .....	1
1.2. Statement of the problem .....	3
1.3. The objectives of the study.....	4
1.3.1. General objective .....	4
1.3.2. Specific objectives.....	4
1.4. Research questions .....	5
1.5. Significance of the study .....	5
1.6. Scope and Delimitation of the Study .....	5
CHAPTER TWO .....	7
Review of Related Literature .....	7
2.1. The Role of Communication Messages in Peace Process .....	7
2.1.1. Communication messages in peace process .....	7
2.1.2. Peace journalism.....	8
2.1.3. Characteristics of effective communication messages in peace process .....	10
2.1.4. Constructing communication messages in peace process .....	14
2.1.5. Challenges for effective communication messages in peace process .....	16
2.2. The South Sudan Conflict and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).....	18
2.2.1. Historical background of South Sudan.....	19
The two civil wars (1955 – 1972) and (1983 – 2005) .....	20
2.2.2. The South-South Conflict during Sudanese Civil War .....	25
2.2.3. The Outbreak of the South Sudan Civil War .....	27
2.2.3.1. Regional Actors in South Sudan Conflict.....	28
2.2.3.2. International Actors in South Sudan Conflict.....	29
2.3. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) .....	30

2.3.1. IGAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanisms .....	31
2.3.2. IGAD and Sudan Peace Process .....	32
2.3.3. IGAD and the Media.....	33
2.4. Theoretical frameworks applicable in bringing behavioural change through communication messages.....	34
2.4.1. Overview of Social Cognitive Theory .....	35
2.4.1.1. Historical Background .....	35
2.4.1.2. The Four Cornerstones of Social Cognitive Theory.....	36
Human Agency.....	37
Human Capabilities .....	37
Vicarious Learning.....	38
Self-efficacy.....	38
2.4.2. Social Cognitive Theory and Message Designing.....	40
2.5. Persuasion and Elaboration Likelihood Model .....	41
2.5.1. The concept of persuasion.....	41
2.5.2. Elaboration Likelihood Model.....	43
CHAPTER THREE .....	46
Research Methodology .....	46
3.1. Research Design and Methods .....	46
3.1.1. Qualitative Content Analysis.....	47
3.2. Research Procedures .....	50
3.2.1. Sources and their Selection .....	51
3.2.2. Data Collection Methods .....	51
Sampling Techniques and Sample Size .....	51
3.2.3. Unit of Analysis .....	52
3.2.4. Trustworthiness of the study.....	53
3.2.5. Pilot Study and Instrumentation.....	54
3.2.6. Data analysis and presentation.....	55
Categories .....	56
CHAPTER FOUR .....	61
Data Presentation, Interpretation and Findings .....	61
4. Introduction .....	61

4.1. Data presentation and Analysis .....	61
4.1.1. The Coded themes of the messages .....	61
Providing Information .....	61
Enhancing Self-efficacy .....	64
Appealing Messages.....	65
Violent Reduction Messages .....	68
Inspiring the Conflict Parties .....	69
Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments .....	71
Setting Realistic Goals.....	72
4.2. Discussion of findings.....	76
4.2.1. Types of the Communication Messages .....	76
4.2.2. The Nature of the Persuasive Techniques of the Communication Messages .....	79
CHAPTER FIVE .....	84
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.....	84
5.1. Summary .....	84
5.2. Conclusions .....	85
5.3. Recommendations .....	87
References .....	88
APPENDICES .....	96

## **Lists of Tables**

Table 1- The total numbers and percentages of the messages that provide information .....	62
Table 2- The total numbers and percentages of the messages that enhance the self-efficacy .	64
Table 3 -The total numbers and percentages of the appealing messages .....	66
Table 4- The total numbers and percentages to violent reduction messages .....	68
Table 5- the total numbers and percentages of the messages to inspire the conflict parties ....	70
Table 6- The total numbers and percentages of messages that emphasis facilitators and purge impediments .....	71
Table 7- the total numbers and percentages of the messages that contain short and long term goals .....	73
Table 8- The coding categories total number and share in each communication tools .....	74
Table 9- The communication tools share number the categories .....	75

## **Lists of Appendices**

APPENDIX - A - A pilot study for the coding scheme (AU’s Press Release on May 12 2015).....	96
APPENDIX - B - Inter-coder Reliability of the Pilot Study.....	99
APPENDIX - C - A coding scheme of IGAD’s Press Releases (from March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015).....	100
APPENDIX - D - A coding scheme of IGAD’s affiliate CEWARN’S Newsletters (from March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015).....	102
APPENDIX- E - A coding scheme of CEWARN’S March, 2015 brochure.....	104

## **Lists of Acronyms**

- **CEWARN** -Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
- **CPA** – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- **DOP** - Declaration of Principles
- **ECOWAS** - Economic Community of West African States
- **ELM** - Elaboration Likelihood Model
- **EU** - European Union
- **IGAD** - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- **IGADD** - Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
- **NLC** - National Liberation Council
- **OSSES** - Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan
- **SCT** - Social Cognitive Theory
- **SPLA** - Sudan People’s Liberation Army
- **SPLA-Nasir** - Sudan People’s Liberation Army-Nasir
- **SPLA-United** - Sudan People’s Liberation Army-United
- **SPLM** - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
- **SPLM/A** - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
- **SPLM/SPLA-IO** - South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition
- **SSCC** - Southern States Coordination Council
- **SSDF** - South Sudan Defence Force
- **SSIM** - South Sudan Independence Movement
- **SSLA** - South Sudan Liberation Army
- **SSLM** - Southern Sudan Liberation
- **UN** - United Nations
- **UNMISS** - United Nations Mission in South Sudan

## Abstract

*The study investigates the effectiveness of the communication messages imparted by IGAD to impact the conflict parties' behaviour during the mediation process of the South Sudan conflict that broke out on December 15, 2013. Since, the mediation process has ended on August 17, 2015 and transformed to the implementation phase, the study culled the messages IGAD conveyed within the last six months of the mediation process, March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015, in its press releases, newsletters and brochure to be analyzed. The study used social cognitive theory and elaboration likelihood model as the principal frames to investigate how the regional institution designed its messages to have influence on the behaviour of the conflict parties. Employing qualitative content analysis, the study examined what types of communication messages the regional institution imparted and the nature of the persuasive techniques IGAD's communication used to enhance its messages effectiveness. The analysis found out that in its different types of messages IGAD described somewhat the desired behaviours and provide encouragement and encomium to the attuned behaviours of the conflict parties in the mediation process adequately and repetitively to motivate and enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties. Moreover, the study revealed that IGAD used attractive messages that acclaim its efficiency and proficiency as an institution to enhance its credibility and trustworthiness to engross the conflict parties' in consuming its themes. The study also disclosed that the communication messages IGAD conveyed were inadequate in providing information about the situation of the conflict and the challenges the mediation process encountered from the conflict parties. Since, informing the conflict parties about the risk and benefits of their behaviour would make them exert an effort to change their behaviour. Moreover, it is argued principally in this study that the effectiveness of the communication messages in expediting the mediation is limited by the inadequacy and febleness of the messages contents. Finally, the study makes some suggestions what the communication messages should subsume in their design to have a cogent impact on conflict parties' behaviour to expedite IGAD's mediation processes.*

# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

### 1.1. Background of the study

IGAD is an institution which was established in 1986 as Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development to address the severe and rampant droughts that ravaged the Horn of Africa region. The organization was revitalized in 1996 and renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Its mandate was expanded to incorporate a broad development agenda of food and security, environment protection, peace and security, and economic and social development in order to address specific needs of the region. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), composed of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda with its secretariat headquartered in Djibouti, covers northeast Africa, a region continuing to experience major changes, arguably more than any other part of the continent (Agreement Establishing IGAD, 1996).

The region is known for being very prone to violent conflicts and various forms of transnational security threats. It is thus common to come across experts on the region describing it as “the most dangerous corner of Africa, one of the most unstable and conflict-ridden parts of the world, or as a region that distinguishes itself from other parts of Africa by the prevalence and longevity of its multiple conflicts” (Hentz, 2013:217). Once again the security of the region is threatened by the conflict of South Sudan with the partaking of different conflict parties that IGAD is attempting to bring a peaceful resolution.

The United Nation (UN) General Assembly admitted the Republic of South Sudan on July 14 2011 as the 193<sup>rd</sup> member of the UN becoming African newest country. Struggling from various social and economic challenges the country started to achieve some visible economic growth at the inception of its independence. However, this situation has been reversed and greatly affected by the conflict that broke on 15<sup>th</sup> December 2013. On December 15, tensions between factions loyal to President Salva Kiir, of the Dinka ethnic group, and those aligned with his former Vice President, Riek Machar, of the Nuer ethnic group, exploded into fighting. Though, the conflict is coated with ethnic connotation, it clearly reflects a political fight among the country’s elites. However, the member of the political class often goes to the

ethnic card as a way to galvanize one's ethnic group to support one's political ambitions. The behaviour of the elites in the formation of the new state, coupled with deplorable economic social conditions, exacerbated the spread of violence (Young, 2015).

Besides, the South Sudan conflict is feared for not to be ensue of the envisaged regional war, since the conflict is pointed to the ongoing different interests pursued by East African regional leaders. Also, America and European Union has involved in the South Sudan peace process, similarly China has taken an active role in the ongoing peace process. The Arab world has also been interested in the South Sudan conflict (Ibid.).

For more than two years, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is trying to bring the conflict parties into agreement in the face of deep regional divisions and the parties' truculence. Efforts to end this violent conflict through the IGAD-driven mediation process led to the parties signing of the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) deal in January 2014. However, the parties repeatedly violated this agreement. Fighting continues albeit in low intensity compared to its beginning (IGAD press release, May, 16, 2015).

To overcome these challenges, IGAD announced a revised, expanded mediation "IGAD-PLUS" including the African Union (AU), UN, China, U.S., UK, European Union (EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) (IGAD press release, July, 23, 2015). The initiative is designed to present a united international front behind IGAD and bring off the warring parties to sign a peace agreement on August, 17, 2015(IGAD press release, August, 18, 2015).

Therefore, in the process of this peace agreement the role of IGAD's communication messages conveyed to influence these conflict parties should play a pivotal role in constructing peace in the themes of their contents for the appliance of the peace agreement. Even though the communication messages are almost never the sole agents of change, they are a prominent factor in complex peace process of conflict parties that give rise to change. The effects of the communication messages on the formation of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions are more apparent on the impact of behaviour. What determines this impact depends upon the message type, form, source, and environment. Hence, communication messages can assist institutions in their pursuit of a peace agreement between conflict parties, but

effectively only as strong as the content of their message and the institution they are conveyed from (Bratic, 2005).

There have been notable successes in changing attitudes and behaviours through communication messages. For example, communication messages are common in health campaigns and there is evidence that well-executed health communication messages have had small-to-moderate effects not only on health knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes, but on behaviours as well (Noar, 2006). But in relation to conflict there is some evidence on the success of individual interventions that involve communication messages but little conclusive evidence that communication messages by themselves change behaviour in relation to conflict parties.

However, this paper will try to see the communication messages of IGAD and analyse the disseminated information and messages as well as how the contents are shaped to persuade or bring behavioural change on the conflict parties by the regional institution. Thus, this study uses behavioural theories applied on most communication messages to investigate the effectiveness of the communication messages of IGAD. Because, communication messages could play a great role in a mediation process in persuading and bringing behavioural change on the conflict parties which will benefit all the parties and especially the South Sudanese.

## **1.2. Statement of the problem**

Inter-governmental institutions communication messages have the potential to promote values such as: peace, tolerance, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, social justice and sustainable development, with the main objective of establishing a culture of peace by transforming behaviour (Hoffman, 2013:35). Communication messages in peace process influence the perception of those who are directly involved, whether political and financial decision-makers or the civilian population through their depiction of the causes, progression and perspectives of the conflict. They do not simply reflect reality, instead they construct their own interpretation of reality with the information and news they produce in order to achieve a constructive work in the transformation of conflicts that have escalated (Legatis, 2015:2).

Although the South Sudan conflict is triggered by power struggle within the SPLM, it quickly took an ethnic dimension which also the rivalries favoured to mask it as ethnic conflict to their individual interest. Hence, the ethnic dimension of this conflict made it brutally

devastating. In addition, the conflict involves different regional and international parties who seem to have interest in one way or another (The Sudd Institute, 2014:10-12). The facilitator of the peace process appointed, which is IGAD, is working with some positive results to bring reconciliation, peace and hope to the South Sudanese. Therefore, in the progression of this peace process the information and messages IGAD conveying through its communication should attempt to build a common understanding of peace within the conflict parties. In South Sudan conflict with the country's own dark historical background, constructing the notion of peace in the nation state is very pivotal. Hence, the communication messages of IGAD should be reinforcement in motivating and enabling the conflict parties to bring behavioural change in the mediation process of South Sudan for lasting peace and bright future. In addition, the communication messages of IGAD should also be persuasive enough to engender behavioural change in the warring parties of the South Sudan conflict.

Therefore, analysing the effectiveness of the messages transmitted by IGAD's communications to influence the conflict parties to cooperate for lasting peace in South Sudan peace process will illustrate the efficacy of IGAD's communication messages in the peace process of the South Sudan conflict.

### **1.3. The objectives of the study**

#### **1.3.1. General objective**

The general objective of the study was to investigate the effectiveness of IGAD's communication messages by interpreting and analysing the contents of the press releases, newsletters and brochure conveyed during South Sudan conflict.

#### **1.3.2. Specific objectives**

1. To identify the communication messages presented in IGAD communication through its press releases, newsletters and brochure.
2. To analyze the nature of the persuasive techniques reflected in the communication messages of IGAD.

#### **1.4. Research questions**

1. What types of communication messages are presented in IGAD communications through its press releases, newsletters and brochure?
2. What are the natures of the persuasive techniques reflected in the communication messages of IGAD?

#### **1.5. Significance of the study**

The study is supposed to have a great significance in showing how the disseminated messages by a regional institution communications influence behaviour and be persuasive enough on conflict parties to bring peace. Hence, interpreting and analyzing the communication messages of a regional institution during a peace process will indicate the effectiveness of that specific institution's communication endeavours in achieving assenting behaviour on the conflict parties. Furthermore, investigating the efficacy of communication messages help communicators to understand what works, what does not and how it works. Besides, it will have an implication on an effort to surmount other similar conflicts in Africa and beyond.

#### **1.6. Scope and Delimitation of the Study**

The study aims at analyzing qualitatively the communication messages conveyed through the communication tools of IGAD. In addition, it will explain how the messages are communicated to bring behaviour change on the conflict parties of South Sudan using categories based on social cognitive theory and assay them employing one of the theories from the persuasion theories.

The scope is limited to analyzing purely the communication messages disseminated by IGAD on the prior six months of, August 17, 2015, Compromise Agreement. Though, all the press releases, newsletters and one brochure, which is the only brochure published during this period of time, are examined, the other messages which are out of this period of time and not imparted by these three communication tools are apart from the scope of this research.

In addition, because of budget and time constraints, the study is limited to analyzing the press releases, newsletters and brochure collected from Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan (OSSES) and Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

which both offices are situated in Addis Ababa. However, during the data collection the researcher attempted to analyze the newsletters published by IGAD Secretariat but since these newsletters are prepared for the internal staff their relevance for this study is trivial, hence, the researcher preferred to analyze the newsletters of CEWARN which have more propinquity to this study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Review of Related Literature**

Since the study attempts to investigate the imparted communication messages of IGAD's, reviewing literatures that have pertinence to the topics is imperative to have an analytical and theoretical framework. Hence, in this chapter, literatures written on communication messages for peace process are assessed in addition to the discussion of the theoretical frameworks.

#### **2.1. The Role of Communication Messages in Peace Process**

This section will examine the prevalence of peace media by defining the characteristics, the constructive coverage and the challenges of peace media in peace process. For the purpose of this paper, I shall characterize media to the communication tools an inter-governmental institution uses to convey message to its audience. It can be printed, audio, visual, electronic media or any combination of the above. In addition, this section will elaborate peace journalism since it is the concept this paper emanated from, so as to employ it in the communication messages of the inter-governmental institution.

##### **2.1.1. Communication messages in peace process**

Communication, generally speaking, is a process of transferring information from one person to another. It commonly refers to the imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information by speech, writing, or signs. Barrett defines it as "the transmission of meaning from one person to another or to many people, whether verbally or nonverbally" (Barrett, 2006:3). Communications in organizations involves targets, channels, and tools. Targets mean the audience, one wants to communicate with. Channels mean the way in which information is delivered. Tools are the concrete objects we use to carry our information, such as websites, press releases, newsletters, brochures, publications and so on (Gargiulo, 2005:25). Therefore, communication tools are very essential to communicate messages to the audiences. According to West and Turner the message is the most crucial element of effective communication (West and Turner, 2010:40). Therefore, communication tools in inter-governmental institutions have significant functions in socio-economic, political and cultural development by carrying their

messages to promote values such as: peace, tolerance, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, social justice and sustainable development. The long-term objective is to contribute effectively to the establishment of a culture of peace by transforming behaviour. Hence, an analysis and formulation of criteria to elaborate the roles of communications messages in establishing a culture of peace through ending cultural and symbolic violence, promoting nonviolence, facilitating a mode of emancipatory, relational communication is imperative in the contents of the communication messages for peace process (Hoffmann, 2013:35).

There are different actors engaged in a wide range of activities when it comes to communication for peace. Local governments, media organizations and NGOs, and these actors are supported by or work alongside international news media, training organizations, international and inter-governmental organizations engaged in peace operations and INGOS. Therefore, the communication messages disseminated by inter-governmental organization communication tools contribute an immense support to the efficiency of a peace process. According to Lehman, an active communication is becoming an essential element of mediators work because communication messages aim to change the conflict parties' attitude, build public support for the peace process, shape the public image of the international negotiator and avoid negative fallout from uncontrolled and misleading public exposure (Lehman, 2013:11).

### **2.1.2. Peace journalism**

In its simplest definition, peace journalism is “a set of tools, both conceptual and practical intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service” (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005a:5). It is a form of journalism that tells stories “in a way that encourages conflict analysis and a non-violent response in society” (Mogekwu, 2011:247). Tehranian (2002) states peace journalism as a kind of journalism and media ethics that attempts to transform conflicts from their violent channels into constructive forms by conceptualizing news and seeking common grounds that unify rather than divide human societies.

According to Aslam, power, politics and profit are the key factors in determining how war and conflict are reported. These factors lead to a value bias towards violence. News coverage

often focuses on the specific details of a war or conflict by covering the number of deaths and the types of weapons used. This style of reporting is referred to as war journalism. However, peace journalism is an alternative to this violence-focused style of news coverage (Aslam, 2011:119).

For the pioneers of peace journalism, if war journalism is the ‘low road journalism’, peace journalism is the ‘high road journalism’; if war journalism is explained using the analogy of sport journalism, then peace journalism is equated with health journalism (Lynch & Galtung, 2010). It is an upstream movement of the journalist against the downstream flow of war journalism practices: “Peace journalism is a serious, inquisitive, professional reporting making conflict more transparent” (Lynch & Galtung, 2010:17).

Lynch (2007:9) outlines the widely-shared principles of the interdisciplinary field of Peace and Conflict Studies:

- Violence is never wholly its own cause – Conflict is made up of structure, culture and process – the context, without which no explanation for a violent event is complete, or indeed, correct
- Non-violent responses are always possible – There is always more than one way of responding to conflict. Many people, in many places, are devising, advocating and applying non-violent responses
- More than two sides – There are always more than two parties to any conflict – some, whose involvement or interest is hidden, need putting on the map. Others, presented as a solid aggregate of view, may contain important internal divisions, and they need disaggregation
- Every party has a stake – Parties to conflict should be seen as stakeholders, pursuing their own goals, needs and interests – some openly acknowledged, but almost invariably some hidden as well.

Lynch argues these precepts can be used to help evaluate journalism and its coverage of conflict and also contends these precepts closely align with peace journalism, which considers the context of the conflict and analyzes its causes and impacts (Lynch, 2007:9). Instead of

framing the conflict in terms of victory or defeat, peace journalism provides a communication platform that might help facilitate non-violent conflict resolution (Aslam, 2011:119)

In addition, peace journalism should be expanded to include other social justice issues such as, poverty, climate change, animal protection, and education, as well as explore their interconnected nature (Ibid). As Shaw (2012:35) describes, peace journalism is more than just journalism; it is a part of larger processes and movements that challenge the systems and structures of violence to help achieve peace.

### **2.1.3. Characteristics of effective communication messages in peace process**

Communication messages for peace support or promote the peace discourse assuming the belief that positive change is within our power; that there are alternatives to violence; that empathy is a key component of human relations; and that all are equal. It implies that people should be engaged in the world and that cooperation and dialogue can be fruitful. If people's behaviour is made more aggressive due to exposure to violent message, it follows that they would enhance empathetic behaviour traits from exposure to conflict-sensitive messages and the visa-versa happens to peace message.

Peace messages can be educational, informative or entertaining which can be transmitted through audio, visual, print, and/or electronic. The communication of peace messages is only limited by our creativity and can be addressed also through fiction, drama, documentary, reality TV, music, game shows, etc. Hence, through these communication messages people will be enhanced to develop the values of moral sensibility, encouraging critical thinking and enhancing self-esteem (Wisler, 2005).

However, communication messages need not focus solely on "peace and love". Its intent is not to sanitize coverage by ignoring violence and war. Rather, it would frame violence not as a deterministic eventuality of conflict, but as a dire choice for dealing with conflict. Communication messages in inter-governmental institutions should be honest about the nature and extent of a problem they are dealing with while making room for non-violent conflict transformation and work on the behavioural change of the conflict parties (Ibid).

Since much of human communication involves persuasion, its aims are to influence our attitude and/or our behaviour. The transformation to a peace will require that the conflict parties be persuaded to adopt a peaceful solution. Therefore, the main question will be how can communication message effectively persuade conflict parties to adopt a peaceful solution? The purpose of this section is to outline some of the characteristics of effective communication messages.

***Making sure the messages are vivid, personal and concrete (Using captivating information)***

All persuasion begins with capturing attention. Without attention, persuasion is impossible. One of the most effective ways to ensure attention is to present information that is vivid, concrete and personalized. Vivid information increases the likelihood that a message will be attended to initially, a process called encoding, as well as recalled later. Because, information that is vivid is likely to stand out against all the other information that is competing for our attention. If the information is only remembered fleetingly, it is not likely to have any long-lasting impact upon our attitudes or behaviour (Stern & Aronson, 1984).

***Knowing the audience***

Before crafting the content of the message, and decide when and how to present it, it is crucial to the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of the intended audience. The messages that are developed will need to be tailored to the audience one wishes to reach. Exploring the attitudes and behaviour of the intended audience prior to developing the message helps to find a message that has moderate support. Obviously, a communicator doesn't want a message that is fully supported, or the communicator will simply be communicating what people already believe. However, the communicator doesn't want to present a message that is too far removed from the beliefs of the audience. If the message is too extreme, the audience will actually become less, rather than more, supportive after hearing the message. Therefore, the message shall be tailored so that it is slightly more extreme than the belief of the audience. Messages that are just slightly more extreme are likely to be embraced. Over time, it is possible to move people's attitudes and beliefs a great deal (Ibid).

### ***Credibility of the source***

Who presents the message has an impact upon how it is received. In general, the more credible the organization delivering the message, the more influence there will be upon the audience (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975).

### ***Framing the message***

Presenting and framing the concept one tries to promote is very important. Messages which emphasize losses which occur as a result of inaction are consistently more persuasive than messages that emphasize victory as a result of taking action with the loss of many (Davis, 1995).

### ***Using threatening messages***

Is it wise to use threatening messages in communicating with the public? There is no simple answer to this question, but literature in the field of stress and coping suggest that we need to first appraise an issue as a threat before we are likely to take appropriate action. However, to be effective threatening messages need to communicate more than just the threat we face. In response to a threat, people have what Richard Lazarus refers to as two broad coping strategies. According to Lazarus, individuals respond to threats by using either problem-focused coping or emotion-focused coping. Problem-focused coping, as the name suggests, refers to taking direct action to alleviate the threat. In contrast, emotion-focused coping might involve ignoring the issue, changing the topic whenever it is raised in conversation, denying that there is anything that can or needs to be done, etc. Whether someone uses problem-focused coping or emotion-focused coping appears to be determined by the perception of how much control they have to right the problem. If we perceive that we have a significant amount of control, we are likely to use problem-focused coping. If we perceive that we have very little, we are likely to use emotion-focused coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

Therefore, the use of threatening messages needs to be carefully considered. It is important that the audience understands the gravity of the situation. However, if the messages are not able to at the same time engender a feeling of common purpose and efficacy in dealing with

the threat, the messages may cause people to avoid, rather than constructively deal with, the issue (McKenzie & Dyal, 1991).

Therefore, threatening messages are a necessary part of directing people's attention to crises. However, they are likely to be counter-productive if they are not coupled with messages that are empowering. Further, repeatedly presenting a threatening message can cause people to habituate to the message. Once people understand the "crisis" it is wise to move primarily or exclusively on to dealing with the solution (Ibid).

### ***Decide on a one-sided versus two-sided message***

Even though all issues have more than one side, in developing persuasive communication, should a communicator address just one or both sides? The answer is "it depends". If the communication office is presenting its communication message to an audience that has little comprehension of the issue, it will be most persuasive if it presents just one side. But, if it is communicating with an audience that is aware of both sides of the issue, then it needs to present both sides to be perceived as credible. As with the content of the message, deciding on a one-sided versus two-sided message once again underscores the importance of knowing the audience (Davis, 1975).

In addition, presenting two sides of the issue has an additional advantage, because by presenting the opposing viewpoint, and providing the counter-arguments to this viewpoint, it is possible to safeguard the audience against alternative views. Also, it is essential to demonstrate that there is a win-win solution to the problem (Ibid.).

### ***Make the message specific and easy to remember***

A communication office should make sure that the actions that it advocates are clearly articulated when crafting its message. Messages that describe actions to be taken in clear, straightforward steps are more likely to be understood and followed (Heckler, 1994).

All actions that support sustainability require reliance upon memory. Research suggests that failing to address the role that memory plays can significantly harm the message (Ibid).

### ***Model sustainable behaviour***

One of the most effective methods for increasing adoption of a sustainable behaviour is to model the behaviour we wish to adopt by creating contact through the media. The media have an indirect effect by influencing the topic that we discuss. Because, when an audience received a communication message it subsequently discuss it, the conversation it has may convince it to make a change (Bandura, 1977).

#### **2.1.4. Constructing communication messages in peace process**

In conflicts, distorted conflict perceptions solidify into basic societal beliefs which include, besides delegitimation of the enemy, a positive self-image, belief in the justness of one's own goals and one's own victim status will be surfaced as a result of polarized conflict presentations (Austrian study centre for peace and conflict resolution, 2013:115). While in principle conflict is open to interpretation as either a competitive (win-lose) or a cooperative (win-win) process. Conventional war discourse, as initiated by political and military elites and adopted by mainstream journalism and its public, is all about the questions: "Who is the aggressor?" and "How can he be stopped?" (Deutsch, 1973). Whether deliberately or not, by adopting this particular perspective, societal discourse reduces conflict to a zero-sum game and becomes a motor of conflict escalation (Kempf, 2003). Only if it goes beyond such win-lose scenarios can communication message contribute to the transformation of war discourse into a more constructive form of discourse which guided by questions like: "What is the problem?" and "How can it be resolved?" (Kempf, 2003). Therefore, the deconstruction of war discourses thereby becomes more difficult because of two reasons. First, the communication practitioners who formulate the discourses in inter-governmental institutions are expected to critically question their audience basic convictions. Second, whether dissonant information which is incompatible with these basic convictions will be accepted or rather dismissed by the audience (Ibid.).

Therefore, Kempf and Gutierrez proposed a two-step procedure for deconstructing war discourse, reducing war-caused distortions of conflict perception and transforming violence-oriented war discourse into conflict-oriented peace discourse.

The first step is called de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage and broadly coincides with what is usually called quality journalism. It is characterized by neutrality and critical distance from all conflict parties (Kempf and Gutierrez, 2001).

Broadening the perspective on conflict and opening it to peaceful alternatives: win-win orientation as an option; questioning violence as a suitable means of conflict resolution, questioning military values and exploration of the conflict formation, therefore, is the very essence of de-escalation oriented conflict coverage (Kempf, 2003).

A war culture tends to reduce conflict to two parties fighting for the same goal which is to win and has a general zero-sum orientation that precludes constructive transformation of conflict. The real conflict, usually, is not so simple: there are several parties, several goals and a multitude of issues, and there is always the possibility of an outcome that might serve the interests of all parties. Therefore, de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage must study the conflict formation and investigate the causes and possible outcomes of conflict (Ibid).

De-escalation-oriented conflict coverage does not free conflict parties from the burden of a war culture, nor can it transform conflict into cooperative process. But it is the first step away from seeing “them” as the problem and from focusing on the question of who will prevail in war. If communication messages successfully create such a less biased perception of conflict, it will be less important for conflict parties to cope with conflict by maintaining beliefs about the justness of its goals, the rightness of its self-image, its victimization and the illegitimacy of the enemy. While the exploration of the conflict formation draws a more complex picture of conflict, it still does not free conflict parties from facing a seemingly unsolvable problem. Yet it can promote awareness that the simple solution offered by war and military is no solution to all (Kempf and Gutierrez, 2001).

While de-escalation-oriented conflict coverage still contains a dualistic construction of the conflict and merely deconstructs the antagonism and polarization of the conflict parties, part of this dualism is abandoned in solution-oriented conflict coverage. In that conflict parties’ beliefs about security are questioned by this second step of peace journalism, solution oriented coverage must at the same time assure that their deconstruction does not leave behind a vacuum. The transformation of war culture into peace culture thus requires an active search

for peaceful alternatives which cut across the antagonism between us and them. In order to accomplish this, solution-oriented conflict coverage must replace the antagonistic understanding of peace as “victory plus a cease-fire” with a cooperative concept of peace as “nonviolence plus creativity” (Ibid).

In addition, solution-oriented communication messages report on conflicts before violence occurs. As opposed to the distinction between “us” and “them”, it reveals the price that all sides must pay for war (even in the case of victory) and focuses on the parties’ shared interests and on the benefits they could gain from peace (Ibid).

All in all, reconciliation is impossible unless future partners come to understand each other. While wartime journalism tends to reduce social identity to those categories which divide conflict parties along dimensions like ethnic and cultural difference, nationality, religion etc., peace process also require emphasizing shared identities and similarities between former opponents. During wars, it may seem urgent to distinguish friends from enemies and, accordingly, to emphasize concepts that separate the opponents. As soon as peace is on the political agenda, however, antagonistic categories like “good and evil” or “winner and loser” become counterproductive and there arises a need to reconstruct the social relationships between former enemies by focusing on what the parties share in common (Ibid).

Also, the reconstruction of a pluralistic society based on tolerance and multiple identities requires an alternative framework of communication message as well. Instead of perpetuating the unit at war and its central categories, communication messages may contribute to peace-building by reconstructing a fluid set of social identities based on categories common to the members of both societies (Jaeger, 2002).

### **2.1.5. Challenges for effective communication messages in peace process**

Conflict parties often tend to derive the motivation for their actions not from objective facts but from a subjective interpretation of these facts (Kempf, 2003:4). Conflicts are therefore societal constructions and it is only in this societal framework that they can be deconstructed and transformed into peace-oriented discourses (Kempf, 2005:26). In this context it is important to consider that the communication landscape in countries of conflict is marked by a myriad of competing discourses superimposed on one another. These discourses are

constructed and driven by a diversity of social actors, both state and non-state: political parties, ministries, church institutions, NGOs, private companies and media (mainstream and alternative, local and international), as well as the armed forces, the police, armed insurgents, paramilitary groups and private security firms. They attempt to justify and win approval for their own interests while often attempting to legitimise or suppress alternative discourses (Legatis, 2015:4).

A further element of the landscape of communication amidst violence and conflict has to do with perceptions. The more quickly violent clashes, armed conflicts and civil wars escalate, and the longer they last, the more distorted and narrow the perception of those involved becomes. The psycho-social impact on people living in the conflict region is serious (Ibid.). They all develop a repertoire of socio-psychological strategies for coping with physical and psychological violence (stress, fear, permanent uncertainty, traumata, etc.), and for preserving their sense of identity. In such situations many people reject information that questions their own convictions, worldviews and stereotypes about the “other” or that renders them contradictory or even false (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013:940). Accepting such information would create conflicting perceptions, leading one to feel torn by creating cognitive dissonance. According to Bar-Tal and Halperin “this processing of information obstructs and inhibits the penetration of any new, alternative that could potentially facilitate progress towards peace” (Ibid.).

As a consequence, the individual’s perception turns inward, focusing on like-minded individuals and seeking, above all, the confirmation of his or her own group or identity in times of ongoing uncertainty and existential anxiety. The rights and goals of the “others” are contested or even demonised, while one’s own rights and needs are idealised. The hardening of what each seems to be his or her necessary positioning in the conflict, combined with protective socio-psychological barriers, fosters the emergence of a self-perpetuating and destructive culture of conflict (Glasl, 2007).

On the contested grounds of discourse in divided societies, the inter-governmental institutions communication messages, too, use the tools of journalism to construct conflict realities. They offer constructive solutions and also attempt to develop self-efficacy in the behaviour of the conflict parties and the interested actors in the conflict. Communication messages in conflict

situations help to determine whether, and to what extent, conflict actors are cognizant of the multiplicity of constructive solutions that could potentially be applied to the conflicting sets of interests (Nerone, 2013).

## **2.2. The South Sudan Conflict and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

To comprehend the current South Sudan conflict and the role of IGAD in the peace process, it is essential to assess the history of South Sudan prior to its independence from Sudan. Especially, it is pivotal to examine the two Sudan civil wars including the causes, actors, SPLM/A's cohesiveness, the peace building initiatives, and the CPA. Hence, this section tried to review some of the thresholds in the history and politics of South Sudan that are assumed to ignite divergence between the conflict parties and the involvement of IGAD critically and thoroughly so as to elucidate their significance to the theme of this study.

On November 25, 2011 the newly independent state of South Sudan is admitted as the eighth member of IGAD. This regional organisation of eight countries with its secretariat headquartered in Djibouti covers northeast Africa, a region continuing to experience major changes, arguably more than any other part of the continent. Solomon contends, "This is the only region of Africa where colonially drawn borders have been redrawn. In contrast to other regions of Africa, this is also where the prospect of further redrawing of borders remains a real possibility" (2014:1). He gives reason by mentioning the secession of Eritrea in 1993 which led to the redrawing of the map of Ethiopia and more recently in 2011, Sudan lost part of its resource rich territory as South Sudan became independent (Ibid.) However, IGAD is working with a stated ambition to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration among and within its member states. Each of these objectives is challenging, but none more so than the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict in a region that has been steeped in warfare for decades. Among the current conflicts the regional body had been mediating peace negotiations to end South Sudan's civil war, which had been a struggle to secure a deal in the face of deep regional divisions and the parties' truculence. Even though, IGAD achieved an agreement to be signed between the warring parties the unrest in the South Sudan is continuing.

Therefore, the following section of the literature review will assess the historical background of South Sudan, IGAD's involvement in transforming the conflict and the interested parties in the South Sudan conflict.

### **2.2.1. Historical background of South Sudan**

South Sudan, officially the Republic of South Sudan, is a landlocked country located in East-Central Africa. Some 619,745 km<sup>2</sup> in area, the Republic of South Sudan shares borders with Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya and Uganda to the southeast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest, and the Central African Republic to the west (Snyder, 2013).

The existence of South Sudan as an independent and sovereign country came on the heels of a long and taxing liberation struggle. South Sudan has had a turbulent history, one linked fundamentally to its northern neighbour, the Republic of Sudan which it separated from in 2011 after four decades of civil wars. Historically, the nexus between the two nations has been defined by the religious and ethnic differences that characterize the Sudanese populations. The Republic of Sudan is a massive landmass with a multitude of diverse groups of people, with the population of about 40 million people, which are subsumed roughly within 600 ethnic and linguistic groups, which could be identified in geographic, religious, and racial perspectives (Collins, 2008:4). To state the two distinct factors, the North is inhabited by the majority of Arabs and Islamized non-Arabs such as the Beja and the Fur, and the South, is home to Black African Christians and animist, with the population of about 6 million people out of the whole population of the Republic of Sudan, constituting some 117 different languages and 60 distinct ethnic groups of Western and Eastern Nilotes (Ruay, 1994:7). This sundry of linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity linked with incidents of slavery, Islamization and Arabization in the past put Sudan in the wake of its independence entangled in bloody and protracted conflict (Collins, 2008:8).

Different scholars have advanced divergent perspectives and expositions regarding the wider distinctions of these peoples and the responsible factors for the conflict in the Sudan. According to some scholars and elites the problem of Southern Sudan is caused by the British Colonial Administration, to them the socio-economic disparity and political malaise that

instilled a sense of distinctiveness between the Southern and Northern Societies is created by the British Colonial Administration (Al-Rahim, 1973:29-45; Alier, 1973:11).

As a result of this, the civil wars in Sudan was perceived by southern Sudanese as a struggle between two different race ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ (Edward & Idris 2007:81). They contend that at the root of the conflict lies racial, religious, and cultural differences, which resulted in stereotype, discrimination, and marginalization. However, this contention was put aside by the SPLM/A later, pointing the problem to the Khartoum government itself accusing for the political and economic contradictions with regard to southern Sudan (Healy, 2008:31).

All in all, the historical mishaps in the country that started from the annexation of Sudan by Muhammad Ali, a Turkish Viceroy of Egypt, 1821 – 1885, who usurped ivory and slaves through mass massacre, armed robbery and fierce intertribal bullying instilled a spirit of resentment and fear in the minds of southern Sudanese (Ruay, 1994:33). The independent Sudanese nation-state created by the forced merger of the North and the South and the subsequent military and civilian regimes ill-devised policies aggravated the problem and engendered devastating civil wars between the two societies (Hamid, 1989:127).

### **The two civil wars (1955 – 1972) and (1983 – 2005)**

#### ***The first civil war (1955 – 1972)***

In October 1954, The Liberal Party, a southern Sudanese political party formerly known as the Southern Party, passed a resolution calling for a federal status with northern Sudan, prior to the independence of Sudan in 1956. However, the calls of the Southern Party were not responded positively, following the negative response strife started to be seen in the Nzara and Juba regions. In August 1955, southern Sudanese soldiers belonging to the Sudan Defence Force Equatorial corps mutinied in Torit, Juba, Yei and Maridi (O’balance, 1977:41). The upshot of the mutiny was 261 deaths of the northern and the onset of the first Sudanese civil war (Hoile, 2002:28).

However, the mutinies were easily quelled and the following eight years were just a matter of guerrilla survival. Though, the 1955 mutineers organized themselves more effectively and joined hands with southern students and formed the secessionist Anya-Nya movement in 1963 (O’balance, 1977:57).

The Abbud regime (1958-1964) reinforced Arabic language and Islam by killing and persecution, particularly against the Southern 'infidels'. The imposition of Arabic language and Islam throughout Sudan by the Abbud regime was the immediate factor that led the two societies to the First Civil War (Girma, 1999:14).

Before the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement that offered a decade long relative peace and marked as the end of the First Civil War, one peace initiative was attempted. In 1965, the care-taker government (1964-1969) organized in Khartoum the Round Table Conference in which the Northern and Southern delegates put forward their respective schemes for compromise. The Southern delegates proposed the principle of self-determination allowing the southerners to decide through plebiscite on the options of federation, unity, or separation. However, the proposition was rejected by Northern delegation, which proposed instead a scheme of 'Regional Government' where southern autonomous government would be established with executive responsibilities devoid of legislative. A 12-member committee was established comprising the Northern and Southern delegation to search for compromise, which proved to be ineffective due to their temperament to the use of force as a way of advancing their positions (Wama, 1997:9).

Hence, the prospect for peaceful solution was far to foresee amid successive coup d'états and regime changes in the North and rifts amongst tribal lines of the Anya-Nya movement in the South. However, after the bloodless coup, that overthrew the government of Mohammed Mahgoub that brought Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri to power, in May 1969, changes started to be seen. Nimeiri introduced socialist policies after abolishing all political parties and institutions and, in a policy statement, recognized the 'historical and cultural differences between the North and the South' outlining that the 'Southern people have a right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan' (Hoile, 2002:30).

Additionally, Colonel Joseph Lagu, an Anya-Nya commander from Eastern Equatoria, grasping the shortcomings of the rifts within the tribal lines of the Anya-Nya movement, due to ethnic divisions and personal rivalries among the disparate rebel groups, brought together the dividing factions and created a united force, which began to be known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (Yoh, 2001:29). Therefore, the vested political interest

of Nimeiri and the integration within the Anya-Nya movement subsequently led to the 1972 'Addis Ababa peace agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan'.

The Addis Ababa Agreement, which was signed between the Nimeiri regime and the Southern Sudan Liberation (SSLM) in 1972, was expedited by Emperor Haile Selassie I. The Addis Ababa Agreement offered just a hiatus or merely a decade long ceasefire. Many scholars have proposed many factors why the Agreement couldn't bring lasting peace in Sudan. According to Shinn, some of the most important provisions of the Agreement were never properly implemented (Shinn, 2004:245).

In addition, the discovery of oil in 1978 by Chevron in different parts of the South made the situation worsened. Wakoson said, "the discovery of oil in the Southern Sudan created a political time-bomb" (Wakoson, 1993:45). The Northern government, with the intention of confiscating oil rich areas to the North, forwarded a proposal to redraw the boundary between the North and the South (Yoh, 2001:32).

Furthermore, President Nimeiri issued a presidential decree on 5 June 1983 that divided the South into three small and separate regions, with capitals in Juba, Malakal and Wau (Yoh & Maloka, 2005:32). According to Malwal (1981:244), the move was a gambit of the North to 'divide the South along ethnic lines', and against the constitution and the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Finally, to make matters worse, on 8 September 1983, Nimeiri declared the application of Islamic Sheria law throughout the country, including the Christian and Animist South; and Arabic would be the exclusive official language of the whole Sudan. This announcement was followed by a series of decrees, which came to be known as the "September Laws" (Wakoson, 1993:37). In the wake, another bloody war engulfed the country spearheaded by the government and the SPLM/A, formed in 1983 in Ethiopia, under the leadership of Colonel John Garang Mabior (Wama, 1997:11).

### ***The Second Civil War (1983 - 2005)***

The Second Civil war (1983 – 2005) was directly related to the First Civil War (1956 – 1972), which began in the first year of independence and lasted sixteen years. The Second Civil war,

which lasted twenty-two years, mainly involved the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which is the major rebel movement in the South. The war emerged as a consequence of the measures taken by President Nimeiry. The measures caused sheer tension in the South and a significant number of soldiers mutinied in the region (Shinn, 2004:245).

In 1983, to mediate the dispute, John Garang, a Dinka but a Lieutenant Colonel in the national army who later became the icon of the struggle and led the SPLM/A movement until his death in 2005, was sent. However, Garang himself sided with mutineers, encountered the National army, and fled to Ethiopia with Southern troops to form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military wing the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A). The formation of the SPLM/A marked the beginning of the Second Civil War, which ravaged and tore the country apart for more than two decades (Johnson, 2003: 61-62).

Though it's been largely argued that the Second Civil War started in 1983, Kim Deng, a South Sudanese military historian, has contended otherwise. He has asserted that there were a few adherents of Anya-Nya I movement that had distrust on the implementation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and chose to remain in the 'bush' and regroup themselves. Their demand was a total separation from the North, not a deceptive self-determination. Hence, they started Anya-Nya II movement after they fled to Ethiopia with their arms (Deng, 2012).

As a result of this, some of the mutineers that fled to Ethiopia with Garang joined the fledgling Anya-Nya II movement, led by Lt. Col. Sammuel Gai Tut Yang, while the others joined the newly established SPLM/A by John Garang. SPLM/A was established in May 1983, with around 2,500 soldiers in Ethiopia and 500 soldiers in Bahr el-Ghazal region of Southern Sudan. Initially, SPLM/A was led by John Garang and Joseph Oduho, however Joseph Oduho was deposed after a few months which made Garang to be SPLM/A's supreme commander. (Hoile, 2002:33-34; Johnson, 2003:61-62)

The SPLM/A and the Anya-Nya II had a few basic differences. Anya-Nya II movement was dominated by the southern Sudanese Nuer tribe who sought a total separation from the North, while, the SPLM/A dominated by southern Sudanese Dinka tribe who advocated nationalism,

Sudanism, and envisaged a united, but socialist and secular Sudan, which often referred as a New Sudan (Deng, 2012).

The SPLM/A sustained its stance on the liberation of the “whole” Sudan and the unit of its people and its “territorial integrity” for long time. John Garang, the Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/A, believed nationalism fights against separatism and brings the unity of all Sudanese of all races, genders, religions, and ethnicities. He also asserted that Sudan’s identity can be self-defined and decided by the people. However, Anya-Nya II, opposed the SPLM/A vision, and carried on to follow a separatist agenda where nothing less than independence would be acceptable (Hoile, 2002:37).

These ideological differences and the introduction of ethnic divisions between Dinka dominated SPLM/A and Nuer dominated Anya-Nya II, brought tensions and battles started to erupt between the two factions. The rivalry that led to the battles caused the death of prominent leaders of Anya-Nya II like, William Absullah Choul and Samuel Gai Tut (Ibid).

Eventually, Anya-Nya II dissolved with most of its troops joining the SPLM/A by 1988, while some preferred to join government-supported militia groups (Wells & Samuel, 1993). Also, a separate militia group known as the South Sudan Defence Forces which became in a way an umbrella of anti-SPLM/A forces in the South was formed by the splintered members of Anya-Nya II (Young, 2006:3).

While the South was being ravaged by war among the SPLM/A and Any-Nya II, and between the government and SPLM/A, in 1985 a broad-based popular movement ousted Nimeiri and instated General Abdel-Rahman Swar al-Dahab. In 1986, general elections were held that led to the formation of a coalition government by Umma, the Democratic Unionist Party and the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi became Sudan’s new Prime Minister (Fearon & Laitin, 2006:19). During this time, few hopeful peace talks were held between the elected leader Al-Mahdi and the SPLM/A (Lesch, 1987).

While endeavours for additional talks were in progress, the civilian coalition government of Sadiq al-Mahdi was overthrown, supported by Muslim Brotherhood, in a bloodless coup led by Omma Hassan al-Bashir on 1989 (Bizusew, 2004:52). Al-Bashir did not initiate any negotiations; rather he launched the most aggressive attacks on the South that led the war to

its apex. Hassan Al-Turabi, a long-established Islamist politician, had a significant influence on Al-Bashir. He was the architect behind many of Al-Bashir's policies in the early years (Girma, 1997).

Al-Turabi was also behind the new policies towards the South. Apropos the South, Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi proclaimed that it was a religious duty to fight and protect the Islamic nature of the country. Therefore, they manipulated and exploited the South-South conflict which weakened the rebellion accordingly (Haynes, 2007:316).

### **2.2.2. The South-South Conflict during Sudanese Civil War**

The largest rebel organization in Sudan was the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A had great success, led by John Garang, in the early years of the war. It was able to drive away the national army from most of the South within eight years (Jok & Hutchinson, 1999:126). However, during the early 1990's, the South was witnessing its worst episode of its own civil war as the SPLM/A fractured over power disputes.

In mid 1991, the SPLM/A suffered huge loss of its ally due to Mengistu's regime collapse in Ethiopia. The communist regime of Colonel Mengistu had been providing direct military aid to SPLM/A since the 1980s (Girma, 1997:38). To the dismay of SPLM/A, the new EPRDF regime in Ethiopia began its debt to the Khartoum government by withholding all sorts of support to the SPLM/A and ejecting the SPLM/A from its strategically vital military training bases in western Ethiopia (Collins, 2008:201 & Girma, 1997:5). This huge setback begot traditional resentments and power struggles to emerge within the movement. Frustrated with the leadership of Dr. John Garang, some members of the High Command started to accuse the movement of human rights abuses, dictatorial leadership, and favouritism towards the Dinka ethnic group (Girma, 1997:5).

As a result of the tensions within SPLM/A, the movement got divided into the lines of unionists and secessionists. The unionists, the main Dinka-dominated force called SPLM/A-Mainstream, led by Garang, for him the unionist position was very vital to win him the support of the Ethiopian Derg and, behind it, the Eastern Bloc and Libya. Overt secessionist SPLM/A field commanders; like Dr. Riek Machar, Dr Lam Akol and Gordon Kong fled to Nasir in eastern Upper Nile in 1991 from where they launched a revolt based on demands for

internal democracy and a shift in the goal of the armed struggle from a united, reformed Sudan to one of national self-determination for Southern Sudan. In August 1991, these secessionists separated from the mainstream SPLM/A formed SPLA-Nasir headed by Machar, a Nuer (Deng, 1995 & Hoile, 2002). While SPLM/A-Mainstream controlled most of Equatoria the SPLA-Nasir controlled most of Upper Nile province. In 1991 and 1992, the two groups were engaged in prolonged fierce battles and with sporadic conflicts in 1993 and 1994 as well (Girma, 1997: 5-6).

SPLM/A-Mainstream faced with another splinter group when Garang's deputy William Nyoun defected and formed SPLA-Unity which later joined SPLA-Nasir to form SPLA-United in March 1993. However, the SPLA-United also disintegrated when Dr. Machar formed the South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) and Dr. Akol became the commander of SPLA-United (Johnson, 2003, 90-97).

The severe split within the SPLM/A was the delight of the Bashir-Turabi regime to set off bloody battles between the different factions of the movement. The Bashir regime exploited this fratricidal infighting by bribing and supplying weapons to dissident Nuer guerrilla forces (Girma, 1997:6). In 1997, the SSIM concluded a peace agreement with the Sudanese government and Riek Machar became an assistant to Omar al Bashir and was president of the Southern States Coordination Council (SSCC) and also formed another party the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). In addition, Riek Machar became commander-in-chief of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), which was a group that brought the various anti-SPLA militias and factions representing many of the tribes of South Sudan to fight against the SPLM/A (Jonhson, 2003:95-99 & Rone, 2003:14-16 & Young:2015:11).

However, the SPLM/A was starting to gain more strength particularly when support and cooperation started to come from other regional rebel movements, in late 1990s and early 2000s. When various regional rebels, such as the Eastern Front and the Justice and Equality Movement, joined forces to place pressure on Khartoum, the civil war once confined to the South stretched the northern Sudan. At this point, the Sudanese government forces found themselves facing the SPLM/A along with six other opposition armies all united under a single commander. Due to the organized rebellion, neighbouring countries dreaded the

imminent instability in the region and pushed for conflict resolution measures (Haynes, 2007:315-316).

### **2.2.3. The Outbreak of the South Sudan Civil War**

Before the outbreak of the current South Sudan conflict, a series of armed rebellions, such as the National United Front and the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) led by the former SPLA General George Athor, were occurring shortly after the independence. Even though these rebellions are incapable of deposing the ruling regime, they are causing tensions and continuous civilian suffering in South Sudan. Majority of such groups are led by former SPLA commanders and basically aim at fulfilling their vested interests (Elizabeth, 2012).

A more serious conflict has erupted after the independence of South Sudan on 15 December 2013, following a weekend meeting of the SPLM's National Liberation Council (NLC), when fierce fighting erupted between rival units of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, South Sudan's capital (UNMISS, 2014). Now, South Sudan is in the news again for nothing but violent conflict that has raised fears of genocide. Although, the conflict is coated with ethnic undertones, it clearly reflects a political fight among the country's elites. But the members of the political class often reach for the ethnic card as a way to galvanize one's ethnic group to support one's political ambitions. The behaviour of the elites in the construction of the new state, coupled with deplorable economic social conditions, catalyzed the spread of the violence. Intrinsicly, the allegiances of the elites to the state institutions and to the central tenets of state building have been virtually nonexistent (Young, 2015).

As it is discussed in the previous sections of this paper, the internal crises within the SPLM/A are as old as the institution itself, starting from its inception of the movement in 1983. After, the signing of the CPA in 2005, the internal crises within the SPLM/A have been continuing. In 2008 SPLM's Second National Convention there was a power struggle between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar for SPLM chairmanship, a position that would make the president in the 2010 anticipated elections. However, the delegates voted to keep the status quo and Kiir was reconfirmed as the chairman, Riek Machar his first deputy, and Pagan Amum the secretary general (International Crisis Group, 2014).

In 2010 elections Salva Kiir chose Riek Machar as his running mate; however the Political Bureau, SPLM's highest political organ, used undemocratic procedures to select party candidates for various political positions, causing damaging relations among comrades within the party. Those who were not selected to contest on the SPLM tickets stood as independent candidates, and most of them lost in the elections. This move fundamentally led to some notable rebellions. However, despite the difference over the 2010 elections, the SPLM leaders stood together and steered the country towards the referendum and subsequently the independence (Ibid.).

However after the independence, Pagan Amum, the SPLM Secretary General and the First Deputy of the SPLM, Riek Machar, started to challenge the President at different meetings blaming him for failing the party. To manipulate these internal crises, different party leaders sought to position themselves as next in line to the SPLM party chairmanship (The Sudd Institute, 2014).

After the 2<sup>nd</sup> Independence Anniversary, the situation in the party worsened and the president decided to dissolve the entire cabinet, removing Riek Machar and Pagan Amum. The new government created by the president excluded all those who disagreed with him, and aggravated the situation when gave very senior cabinet positions to people from outside the party, and those formerly in the Sudan's ruling party, National Congress Party who had just recently joined the SPLM merely on political necessity. As if the exclusion of many SPLM leaders in the new government was not enough, the president pronounced the SPLM party structures dissolved, a move that clearly threatened the political future of a number of SPLM leaders. Although the president retracted the statement later, a lot of damage was already done. Therefore, this situation essentially angered those who were removed and seemingly consolidated the two factions under Reik Machar and Pagan Amum against the president. At this point, it was obvious that the country was in deep crisis and one thing led to another and the violent events of December 15<sup>th</sup> 2013 ensued (Ibid.).

#### **2.2.3.1. Regional Actors in South Sudan Conflict**

The conflict attracted some of the IGAD member countries, among which Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan are key players. Uganda in particular has provided military support to the

government. The intervention of Uganda in the South Sudanese affairs is informed by personal relationship between Museveni and Kiir as well as the apparent economic interests. In addition, Museveni does see ascension of Riek Machar to power in South Sudan as a likely threat to his regime because of the historical relationship between Riek Machar and the Uganda's Lord Resistance Army. Kenya, although it has not contributed any troops in the support of the government, is seemingly in support of the president but it is also playing a mediating role much more. Ethiopia is the lead mediating country among the IGAD member states, although there have been unconfirmed rumours of Ethiopian field commanders offering aid to the rebels (Young, 2015:54-56).

On the other hand, even though Khartoum denies the charges, the South Sudanese government has accused publicly Sudan's aid to the rebels. Conversely, Sudan accused South Sudan of supporting the rebel groups in Sudan. The tensions and counter-accusations between Sudan and South Sudan predate the crisis and so it is not surprising because the two nations do not have any trust towards each other (Ibid: 53-54).

#### **2.2.3.2. International Actors in South Sudan Conflict**

There are no clearly identified international actors that are fuelling the conflict; however, China and United States are allegedly competing for influence over the government of South Sudan. Although the United States is conspicuously the main player in terms of its influence over the government and the SPLM factions, there is fear that South Sudan was getting drawn more to China because of its oil investments in the country that worries the United States. The government of South Sudan accused the United States of having backed the rebels and the coup in an attempt to get a new government that will renegotiate oil deals. Moreover, Salva Kiir specifically accused the US of having proposed an interim government that does not include him. On the other hand, China is supplying weapons to the South Sudanese government to ensure that its interest in the region remains protected (International Crisis Group, 2015:24). These super powers interest will obviously challenge the efficacy of IGAD in mediating the conflict parties.

Another group of international actors includes the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Troika (US, Norway and the UK). Both

warring sides accused the UN of supporting the other. Particularly, the government has been very critical of the UN and its motives and that has created an unhealthy relationship between the two institutions. Troika was formed during the CPA negotiations to provide financial and technical support to the talks and help the parties to navigate very difficult issues. This group has been reactivated again to do very similar activities in the current South Sudan peace process. However, troika certainly has its own interests, which may complicate the process (Ibid: 21-23).

Therefore, the interests of these actors and the affiliation IGAD has to these actors will have an impact in the peace process of South Sudan. Also, the trust of the conflict parties towards IGAD is also the other issue IGAD's communication messages encounter and work on to prevail the negative perceptions of the conflict parties to bring behavioural change.

### **2.3. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter articulated that regional organizations play important roles in the maintenance of regional peace and security. Regional organizations like European Union (EU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which were initially focused on economic cooperation are assuming broader political and security functions in the post-Cold War period (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011:63).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). The precursor IGADD was established in 1986 at the initiative of UN agencies in the wake of the devastating drought and famine that hit the region in 1984-85. The six countries that formed the organization, which was then called the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), were Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. In addition to these founding countries, IGAD admitted Eritrea and South Sudan in 1993 and 2011, respectively (Mulugeta, 2014). The new mandate was adopted in March 1996 at the Nairobi summit and the organization was renamed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), at present, IGAD brings together the eight countries of the Horn of Africa. Among its principles the 1996 IGAD included the peaceful settlement of conflicts,

the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and peoples' rights (Staffer, 2012).

Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs is one of the priority program areas at IGAD and an aspect of the Authority's work. The underlying objective of the sector is to ensure security in the sub-region and to alleviate humanitarian suffering. The IGAD long term objectives are to ensure that peace and stability prevail in the sub-region so that economic development can take place and to contribute towards alleviation and mitigation of humanitarian crisis through long term strategies and response to acute crises ([www.igad.org](http://www.igad.org)).

This requires the development of conflict, prevention, management and resolution tools and the use of early response mechanism to prevent conflicts as well as capacity building in these areas. It also requires development of capacity to be better prepared to respond to humanitarian crises and mitigate human sufferings ([www.igad.org](http://www.igad.org)).

### **2.3.1. IGAD Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanisms**

Since the revitalization of IGAD the issue of peace and security in the Horn of Africa has been prioritized with a broader development mandate. For a collective goal of member states a peace and security strategy has been implanted since 2003. The main focus of IGAD is on capacity building and awareness creation, and on the Early Warning of conflicts. The prominent mission in this regard is the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002 around the intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The establishment of CEWARN is a clear evidence of the regional leaders' long term commitment to ensuring peace and stability by defusing or pre-empting conflicts. CEWARN aims to prevent conflict by providing timely early warning reports or alerts to governments of the region (Kagwanja, 2013).

IGAD's commitment to create formalized structures of conflict management founded CEWARN with the aim to collect and analyse data and provide timely alerts to responsible officials about the possibility of conflict breaking out.

On the other hand, IGAD's communications is implemented by its communications teams, from IGAD Secretariat, and specialized offices including Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (ICPALD), IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Center (ICPAC), as well as IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) (IGAD Newsletter, July, 2015). IGAD communication is working to make its products more effective and trying to enhance IGAD's visibility.

### **2.3.2. IGAD and Sudan Peace Process**

IGAD's involvement in the Sudan peace process started from 1993 when it established a Standing Committee on Peace to assist negotiations and end Sudan's civil war. IGADD, the fore-runner to IGAD, was a novice at the time of striving to mediate the Sudan civil war based on the fact that it had no prior circumstantial experience in conflict management and resolution. It was the need to intervene in Sudan that created impetus for the addition of a conflict mediation committee to the drought and development organization. In 1994, IGAD proposed Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a basis for negotiations which was accepted by SPLM/A but rejected by the Government of Sudan until 1998 (Hamad, 2003:6). However, the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrea war in 1998 had stagnated IGAD's peace process between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A (International Crisis Group, May 2010:16). In 1999, the IGAD Sub-Ministerial Committee on the conflict in Sudan established a 'Secretariat for the IGAD Peace Process on the Sudan' based in Nairobi with the mandate to carry out continuous and sustained mediation efforts with a view to arriving at a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But this attempt of the peace process was also floundered (Young, 2007).

The next peace process by IGAD began under Special Envoy Lt. General Lazaro Sumbeiywo in May 2002. On 20 July 2002 the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A signed the Machakos Protocol as a framework for the conduct of the negotiations which led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Kenya on 9 January 2005. The signing of the CPA ended the civil war that lasted for 21 years (Johnson, 2006:93).

IGAD's mediation and the signing of the CPA were widely cherished for its effective management of the process particularly when measured against earlier weaknesses of the

IGAD mediation. The mediation was also applauded for its impartiality, success in maintaining the integrity of the process, achieving good relations with the donors, and the steady production of protocols that culminated in the CPA (Young, 2007).

However, the Sudan peace process was not spared from criticism. According to Young, the peace process was condemned for limiting the definition of peace, focusing solely on the north-south dimension of the conflict, refusing to involve other political parties, treating the media as a threat to the process, and leaving the fate of the process to SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang and First Vice President Ali Osman Taha (Ibid.).

### **2.3.3. IGAD and the Media**

In the Sudan peace process IGAD's relations with the media were poor; no press officer was ever appointed. General Sumbeiywo was the de facto spokesperson for the peace process and he rarely spoke to the media. According to (Potter, 2006), General Sumbeiywo said, "I do not believe in mediating through the media at all. I do not have a public relations officer because that encourages the media" (Cited in Young, 2007:27). In the Sudan peace process the media was not seen as being important to the process, not appreciated as a medium by which developments in the peace process would be conveyed to the Sudanese public, and more significantly, not understood to be a means by which the impact of the media would transform the conflict parties to a more positive behaviour (Ibid.).

In addition the media could well have been a valued tool in the case of the inclusion of other political forces in broadening the peace process and gaining legitimacy by all political parties. Also, it is even harder to understand how any viable reconciliation could be carried out when the public and the interested parties were permitted little knowledge of the peace process (Ibid.).

Despite the criticisms on the peace process, some impediments on the implementation of the CPA and while some issues of disputes were postponed for discussion in post-referendum period, a referendum took place in Southern Sudan from 9-15 January 2011. Southern Sudanese living in the North and in Diaspora also voted. It was announced, on 7 February 2011, that South Sudanese voted in favour of secession. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan was

declared independent in a spectacular ceremony attained by many world leaders (Sudan Tribune, 2011).

## **2.4. Theoretical frameworks applicable in bringing behavioural change through communication messages**

One of the challenges for inter-governmental institutions dealing with peace process of the conflict parties is to overcome the psychological barriers and construct a new repertoire that facilitate the process of peace making and prepare the conflict parties to live in peace. In order to construct a new repertoire the communication messages disseminated through the communication tools of the inter-governmental institutions can play a vital role in bringing behavioural change on conflict parties.

In this paper, the researcher prefers to see the communication messages disseminated by IGAD's communication department from the perspective of Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) of Bandura's (1986) incorporating the expansion of the theory, self-efficacy and Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).

Bandura's (1986) Social Cognitive Theory reflects his view of human behaviour which is that individuals are both products and producers of their own environments and social systems. Triadic reciprocity is the term he uses to refer to the dynamic interplay of three determinants or factors of human functioning: behaviour, personal, and environmental.

An expansion of Bandura's (1986) Social Cognitive Theory, but separate from its triadic reciprocity, is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is described by Bandura as individuals' confidence in their ability to control their thoughts, feelings, and actions thereby influencing an outcome or their perception of their ability to be successful in an activity. These perceptions of self-efficacy influence individuals' actual performances, emotions, and choices of behaviour and the amount of effort and perseverance expended on activity.

Therefore, using Social Cognitive Theory and considering IGAD as an entity it is attempted to examine the impact of IGAD's behaviour on its communication messages. The self-efficacy of IGAD and the conflict parties can also be probed in producing and receiving the communication messages respectively. Since self-efficacy will have an impact on the

message-efficacy. In addition, Petty and Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood Model is implied to inspect the communication messages and the effects the messages have on attitudes and behaviour of the conflict parties. Cognitive processing has been recognized as an important component to persuasion, as scholars have suggested "you cannot understand the effects of communication message on people without knowing how people process the message" (Perloff, 2003:120). Hence, elaboration likelihood model will help to explain in this study the process the conflict parties go through when exposed to persuasive communication messages.

Hence, the theoretical perspectives of social cognitive theory and elaboration likelihood model are discussed in detail below to portray the input they have in investigating the effectiveness of the communication messages of IGAD in bringing behavioural change on conflict parties.

### **2.4.1 Overview of Social Cognitive Theory**

Bandura's social cognitive theory is one of the most highly influential and widely celebrated theories in the field of social psychology. Thus, it is no surprise that its influence has extended into multiple fields, including communication and especially on the study of media effects. Therefore, this section will lay out the historical background and basic tenets of social cognitive theory. Then, it will explore the ways in which media effects scholars have integrated it into their research and consider the ways in which scholars might build on the existing foundation of social cognitive theory-based media research to better illuminate media effects processes and their outcomes.

#### **2.4.1.1. Historical Background**

Behaviourist theories, in the early 1940s, like classical conditioning, assumed that external stimuli were the primary influence on human functioning with internal processes serving merely to transmit behaviour. However, American psychologist at the time introduced theories of social learning that rejected behaviourist notions of associationism as the primary source of behavioural motivation in favour of drive reduction principles. Though, these approaches were appealing, they failed to explain how individuals initiated novel behaviours or why they imitated the actions of others even when not directly reinforced (Bandura, 2005). In 1963, Bandura and Walters broadened the frontiers of traditional social learning theories

with the principles of social modeling, observational learning, and vicarious reinforcement. Two decades later, Bandura (1986) advanced a model of human functioning that accorded cognitive, vicarious, self regulatory, and self reflective processes central roles in the process of human adaptation and change (Bandura, 1986).

As a result of this, both to distance it from contemporary social learning theories and to emphasize the role of cognition in the people's capability to construct reality, self-regulate, encode information, and act, Bandura termed his theory as social "cognitive". In social cognitive theory, people are seen as self-organizing, proactive, self-reflecting, and self-regulating rather than as simply reactive organisms shaped by environmental forces or driven by basic inner impulses. For Bandura, introspection is critical to predicting the influence of environmental outcomes on behaviour as introspection is the mechanism by which people make sense of their psychological processes. Social cognitive theory also diverges from theories of behaviour that privilege biological factors, which tend to ignore the social and technological innovations that create environmental selection pressures for adaptation (Bussey & Bandura, 1999). Instead, social cognitive theory espouses a bidirectional influence in which evolutionary pressures alter human development such that people can create complex environmental innovations, which in turn create selection pressures for the evolution of specialized biological systems for functional consciousness, language, and symbolic communication. Hence, social cognitive theory proposes that human functioning is the product of reciprocal determinism, or the dynamic interplay of (a) personal factors (e.g., cognition, affect); (b) behaviour; and (c) environmental influences, which interact to influence human behaviour (Bandura, 1986).

#### **2.4.1.2. The Four Cornerstones of Social Cognitive Theory**

Considering the extensiveness of social cognitive theory and the interrelatedness among its concepts, it is difficult to elucidate the theory thoroughly. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is tried to discuss the four cornerstones of the theory. The first two are human agency and human capabilities which might be viewed as the foundation for the development of social learning. The third element, vicarious learning, captures the process through which observation learning takes place, and the final element, self-efficacy is the element that underlies the enactment of those learned behaviours.

## **Human Agency**

Social cognitive theory is rooted in the notion of human agency, which suggests that individuals are proactively engaged in their own development and that they are able to exercise a measure of control over their thoughts, feelings, and actions (Bandura, 1986). Agency operates through three modes. *Individual agency* is exercise when one's own influence is brought to bear on one's functioning and environment. People may also obtain desired outcomes by *proxy agency*, whereby another person secures benefits for the individual. Finally, people exercise *collective agency* when they work together to advance common interests (Bandura, 2006).

In addition, agency has four core properties; intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness. Intentionality refers to the creation of and the engagement in plans and strategies by which people realize predetermined intentions to act. Forethought is the property whereby people anticipate outcomes of their actions. Self-reactiveness is the property whereby individuals construct and regulate the appropriate courses of action. Finally, through self-reflectiveness, people reflect on their capabilities, the soundness of their thoughts and actions, and the meaning of their pursuits (Ibid.).

## **Human Capabilities**

The other basis of social cognitive theory which is related to the properties of human agency is human capabilities. Human capabilities comprise symbolization, forethought, self-regulation, self-reflection, and vicarious learning that provide the cognitive means by which people influence their destiny. More specifically, humans possess the capacity to symbolize, by which they extract meaning from their environment, construct guides for action, gain knowledge by reflective thought, communicate with others over distance in time and space, and store information (Bandura, 1986). Symbolization also allows people to engage in forethought, by which they plan action and anticipate its consequences. People self-react by meta-cognitively examining their functioning, which allows them to make sense of experiences, self-evaluate, and judge their capability to accomplish tasks. Further, this self-reflection is motivated by both the long and short term goals and challenges that people set (Bandura, 1986, 2001). These two types of goals work together, since short term goals provide motivation to take the incremental steps leading, over time, to the accomplishment of

long-term goals. Through self-regulation, people can adjust their behaviour to both set and meet their short and long-term goals (Zimmerman, 2000). Finally, vicarious learning, in which observations are symbolically coded and used as guides for future action, permits individuals to learn novel behaviours without the trial and error of performing them (Bandura, 1986, 2002). Since, this capability is the foundation of social cognitive theory it is discussed in detail below.

### **Vicarious Learning**

Social cognitive theory's main feature is its articulation of the functions and processes of vicarious learning (Bandura, 1986, 2002). That is, by observing the behaviours of others, an individual can develop rules to guide his or her subsequent behaviour. Observational learning is governed by the processes of attention, retention, production, and motivation. First, an individual must attend to, or selectively observe, the actions of a model. Attention is influenced by characteristics of the modeled behaviour (e.g., complexity), the model (e.g., attractiveness, similarity), and the observer (e.g., cognitive capabilities). Observed behaviours can be reproduced only if they are retained in memory, a process influenced by symbolic coding, cognitive organization, rehearsal, and cognitive skills. Production focuses on translating the symbolic representation of the observed behaviour into action. This process is influenced representational guidance (e.g., response production, guided enactment), corrective adjustment (e.g., monitoring of enactments, feedback), and the observer's capabilities and related sub-skills. Finally, motivational process help determine whether behaviours are enacted based on the nature of the reinforcement. Reinforcement may come from feedback generated by one's behaviour, the observed feedback given to others, or internal incentives, and may differ in valence (positive or negative). Reinforcement is related to another key aspect of social cognitive theory outcome expectancies. Outcome expectancies are the judgments of the consequences associated with a behaviour. Outcomes may be physical, social or self-evaluative in nature, and are usually associated with a positive or negative valence (Bandura, 1986, 2001).

### **Self-efficacy**

Bandura (1997) contends, although one might learn about possible desirable behaviours from observing others, those behaviours will not be enacted unless an individual possesses the self-

efficacy to do so. Self-efficacy beliefs are judgments that individuals hold about their capabilities to perform a behaviour at designated levels. Importantly, Bandura argues that “People’s level of motivation, affective states, and actions are based more on what they believe than on what objectively true” (Bandura, 1997:2). For this reason, self-efficacy beliefs are better predictors of people’s accomplishments than their previous attainments, knowledge, or skills as such beliefs are associated with goal-related effort, persistence, and resilience in the face of adversity. Self-efficacy beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors, such as the regulation of one’s motivation, thought processes, affective states, actions, or environmental conditions. These beliefs are often associated with outcome expectancies. More specifically, self-efficacy helps foster the outcome one expects like; confident people anticipate successful outcomes, whereas the opposite is true of those lacking confidence (Ibid.).

The influence of self-efficacy on the accomplishment of a task, however, does have its limits. High self-efficacy will not influence behaviour when people lack the resources to undertake an activity, believe the social constraints of prejudicially structured systems will prohibit them from reaching desired outcomes, or if they do not value the expected outcome. Also, people cannot accomplish tasks beyond their capabilities simply by believing they can; efficacy will not produce a competent performance in the absence of requisite skills (Bandura, 1995, 1997).

Taking into account, the importance of self-efficacy beliefs in the generation of behaviour, it is important to consider how such beliefs might develop. In fact, there appear to be four sources of information that help to form self-efficacy beliefs. The most influential source is mastery experience, in which the formation of self-efficacy beliefs is intuitive: individuals engage in activities, interpret the results of their behaviour, and use their interpretations to develop beliefs about their capability to engage in subsequent activities. Outcomes interpreted as successful raise self-efficacy; those interpreted as failures lower it (Pajares, 1997; Pajares & Urdan, 2006).

Through the vicarious experience of observing others perform behaviours is also the other way people form self-efficacy beliefs. Social modeling exerts an especially powerful effect on self-efficacy beliefs when people observe a model similar to themselves. Observing similar others succeed can enhance individuals’ beliefs about their own capabilities (“If they can do

it, so can I”) and motivate them to perform the task. Conversely, watching similar models fail can undermine observers’ beliefs about their own capability to succeed (Schunk, 1987). Model similarity is most influential for those who are uncertain about their performance capabilities, such as those who lack task familiarity and information to use in judging their self-efficacy or those who have experienced past difficulties (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, 1987).

Individuals also create and develop self-efficacy beliefs as a result of persuasion, or the judgments that others provide. Effective persuaders must cultivate other people’s beliefs in their capabilities while simultaneously ensuring that the envisioned success is attainable. Although positive persuasions may encourage and empower a person, negative persuasions can defeat and weaken self-efficacy beliefs. In fact, it is usually easier to weaken self-efficacy beliefs through criticism than to strengthen such beliefs through encouragement (Bandura, 1986).

Finally, people can gauge their self-efficacy by the physiological and emotional states (e.g., anxiety, stress, and arousal) that they experience as they contemplate an action. Strong emotional reactions to a task, like excitement or fear, provide signs about the anticipated success or failure of the outcome. Focusing on negative physiological cues, negative thoughts and fears can not only lower self-efficacy perceptions but they can also trigger additional stress that contribute to an inadequate performance. Thus, one way to raise self-efficacy beliefs is to improve physical and emotional well-being and reduce negative emotional states. Further, because individuals have the capability to alter their own thinking and feeling, enhanced self-efficacy beliefs can, in turn, powerfully influence the physiological states themselves. Based on the selection, integration, interpretation, and recollection of information from these four sources of information about self-efficacy, as well as the rules employed for weighting and integrating them, self-efficacy beliefs are ultimately formed (Bandura, 1997).

#### **2.4.2. Social Cognitive Theory and Message Designing**

The capacity of humans to think abstractly or symbolically positions the media as an important source of information to facilitate observational learning and increase self-efficacy to perform given behaviours (Bandura, 1994). In turn, social cognitive theory offers a vantage point from which to examine the influence of mediated content on audiences’ attitudes and

behaviours. Drawing from the above theoretical explication, social cognitive theory suggests that, in essence, for mediated content to positively affect audience members' behaviours, the audience must pay attention to attractive or similar models realistically performing relevant behaviours. Models engaging in positive behaviours should be positively reinforced, whereas those engaging in negative behaviours should be negatively reinforced. In such cases, mediated depictions of behaviour may be instrumental in bringing about positive personal and social changes, although alternative pairings of behaviours and reinforcements can prove to be problematic (Bandura, 2001).

Therefore, taking the communication messages as a model to influence the attitudes and behaviours of the South Sudan conflict parties, the characteristics of the messages like the persuasiveness, attractiveness, complexity and efficacy should be examined; which leads to the investigation of the message effectiveness of IGAD's communication. In addition, this study tries to assess the message effectiveness of IGAD's communication from the theoretical perspective of Elaboration Likelihood Model that emanated from persuasion theories discussed below.

## **2. 5. Persuasion and Elaboration Likelihood Model**

This section focused on one of the theoretical perspective of persuasion theories which is Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Before proceeding to the theoretical perspective of ELM the following section will assess the concept of persuasion as a whole.

### **2.5.1. The concept of persuasion**

According to, Perloff (2003:8) persuasion is defined as “a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to change their attitudes or behaviour regarding an issue through the transmission of a message, in an atmosphere of free choice”. Usually, people relate the concept of persuasion to corporations, government, or propaganda, but persuasion can also occur from person to person (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). Persuasion has been considered as the root of social movements and historical changes (Brock, Shavitt, & Brannon, 1994). Nowadays, persuasion has become more complex than ever as a result of the proliferation of information available. Individuals are exposed to numerous persuasive

messages that are recurrently competing for attention on daily basis (Larson, 1992). Moreover, with technological advances and cultural diversity, persuaders are constantly being challenged how to construct a message with efficacy that moves the audience (Perloff, 2003). Therefore, many persuasion researchers are constantly studying how message contents of a given source can effectively raise awareness, generate desired attitudes, build confidence, establish social norms, engage audiences emotionally, and ultimately influence behaviour (Rucker & Petty, 2006).

According to Miller there are three different types of persuasion (1980): shaping, reinforcing, and changing. Shaping persuasion involves the use of common associations to attract and shape the audiences attitude. Reinforcing persuasion involves strengthening pre-existing attitudes. Changing includes persuasion that changes attitudes and behaviours (Perloff, 2003).

For lasting behaviour change to occur, persuasive communication messages must gain an individual's attention, be comprehended, mentally rehearsed, and cognitively stored (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) suggested the source, message, recipient, and channel of the communication all play a role in this process. The message source is accountable for drawing and individual's attention and causing an initial belief change. The persuasive message can cause the initial attitude change, if comprehended. Also, factors related to the individual receiving the message impact and solidify the attitude further. Finally, the communication channel through which the message delivered will impact the message retention and any resulting behaviour change (Hovland, et al., 1953; Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). In addition the individual's motivation and the ability to process are also the most important factors in deciding whether a persuasive message will bring a lasting attitude change and influence behaviour (Petty and Cacioppo, 2009).

Therefore, to investigate the efficacy of IGAD's communication messages in bringing behaviour change to the South Sudan conflict parties, this study chose from different persuasion approaches and theories, the elaboration likelihood model since it provides a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of the communication messages.

### **2.5.2. Elaboration Likelihood Model**

As scholars have suggested “you cannot understand the effects of communication on people without knowing how people process the message” (Perloff, 2003:120). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (ELM) is basically a theory about thinking processes that might occur when a communicator attempts to change a person’s attitude through communication messages, the different effects that particular persuasion variables play within these processes, and the strength of the judgement that result. Therefore, cognitive processing has been recognized as an important component to persuasion (Petty et al., 2004).

Hence, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the basic assumption of the ELM is that persuasion in a communication can occur by taking either of two routes: the central route or the peripheral route. An individual’s motivation, ability to process, processing nature, and cognitive structure determine the resulting processing route. The central route relates to persuasion caused by the recipient of a message being able to think objectively and carefully or elaborate about all the aspects of the subject matter in the communication. The peripheral route, on the other hand, does not include careful thought and consideration; rather it relates to persuasion caused by a simple cue in the communication that is not central to the subject matter of the communication, such as attractiveness of the source, nice image or similar effects (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Through in-depth cognitive processing, the central route is impacted by previous knowledge and experiences (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 2009). The recall of previous knowledge paired with the processing of new information results in cognitive thoughts and builds upon one’s overall cognitive structure as a result the thoughts produced during this process will be favourable or unfavourable. When individuals have the motivation and ability, they will partake in this comprehensive cognitive effort to determine if the persuasive message is correct or incorrect (Petty et al., 2009). The greater the importance an individual associates with the topic discussed in the message, the more likely they are to expend cognitive effort (Petty & Wengener, 1998). Attitudes formed through the central route are “easy to access from memory, held with high confidence, persistent overtime, predictive of behaviour, and resistant to change until they are challenged by cogent contrary information” (Petty et al., 2009:134).

However, sometimes when thorough cognitive processing is not possible or desired, simple cues in persuasive messages influence attitude through the peripheral processing route. The simple cues contained within a message present individuals a way to evaluate a message without effortful cognitive work. This is possible within the peripheral route for persuasive cues to produce a “sleeper effect”. Peripheral processing can lead to effective attitude change, but only for a limited time because the attitude is not incorporated in the overall cognitive structure as it would be in the central route (Petty et al., 2009). Attitudes formed through the peripheral route are “less accessible, enduring, and resistant to subsequent attacking messages” (Petty et al., 2009:35). Hence, the persuasive impact of peripheral processing is short term.

Petty Cacioppo (1986) identified seven postulate of ELM. These are:

- “People are motivated to hold correct attitudes.
- Although people want to hold correct attitudes, the amount and nature of issue-relevant elaboration in which they are willing or able to engage to evaluate a message vary with individual and situational factors.
- Variables can affect the amount and direction of attitude change by (a) serving as persuasive arguments, (b) serving as peripheral cues, and/or (c) affecting the extent or direction of issues and argument elaboration.
- Variables affecting motivation and/or ability to process a message in a relatively objective manner can do so by either enhancing or reducing argument scrutiny.
- Variables affecting message processing in a relatively biased manner can produce either a positive (favourable) or negative (unfavourable) motivational and/or ability bias to the issue-relevant thoughts attempted.
- As motivation and/or ability to process arguments are decreased, peripheral cues become relatively more important determinants of persuasion. Conversely, as argument scrutiny is increased, peripheral cues become relatively less important determinants of persuasion.
- Attitude changes that result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments (central route) will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of behaviour, and greater resistance to counter persuasion than attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral cues.” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986:5)

To sum up, motivation and ability impact if and how an individual will process a message. In addition, both motivation and ability must be available for elaboration to be present and the motivational factors in ELM guide individual’s intentions when presented with a message to process. Various variables, including personal relevance and need for cognition, can influence

an individual's motivation to process. Hence, an individual's motivation to process will vary for each message they are presented with (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

In addition, when individuals have the motivation to think about a message, they must also have the ability to process the message in order to enroot enduring attitudes (Petty et al., 2009). Ability factors are those that instinctively affect an individual's processing of a message, without conscious intent. An individual's ability to process a message may be affected by repetition, distraction, the presentation of the message, and existing knowledge or previous experience with the topic (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).

Moreover, prior knowledge is one variable that affects an individual's ability to process a message. If individuals know about an issue being discussed in a persuasive message, then they are likely to process the information more carefully and with more thought (Perloff, 2003). Prior knowledge about the issue raised in the message equips individuals to agilely separate the issue-relevant arguments from information that is less central to the issue at hand (Wood, Rhode, & Biek, 1995). Besides, prior knowledge allows individuals to identify shortcomings in the information presented (Wood et al., 1995). Therefore, individuals with more knowledge about an issue are more likely to process information through the central route, while those with less knowledge are more likely to process information through the peripheral route (Perloff, 2003).

Petty et al. (1981:854) suggested, when considering motivation and ability to process persuasive information, "any variable that increases the likelihood that people will be motivated and able to engage in the difficult tasks of evaluating the message arguments increases the likelihood of the central route to persuasion". On contrary, those variables that decrease an individual's motivation and ability to cognitively process a message increase the likelihood of peripheral processing (Petty et al. 1981). Now that ELM has been discussed, the next chapter will be the research methodology which uses points from the two theoretical perspectives to collect the data.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Research Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodological approach of the study. Hence, points identified with the research design and their procedures are explained in detail.

#### 3.1. Research Design and Methods

The purpose of the study is to examine the effectiveness of the communication messages that are conveyed via the communication tools, i.e. the press releases, newsletters and brochures of IGAD during the South Sudan conflict. The reason to investigate the effectiveness of these communication messages emerges from the appeal to identify the messages contribution in assisting the mediators to compromise the South Sudan conflict parties. Communication has an immense role in shaping the attitudes of conflict parties during peace process. Hence, for this study the research questions and the nature of the problem rather than the tradition, paradigms or schools of thought are the determinant for the research architecture, strategy and tactics. Thus, this study uses a qualitative research method. According to Krippendorff (2004:87)

Avowedly qualitative scholars tend to find themselves in a hermeneutic circle, using known literature to contextualize their readings of given texts, rearticulating the meanings of those texts in view of the assumed contexts, and allowing research questions and answers to arise together in the course of their involvement with the given texts. The process of recontextualizing, reinterpreting, and redefining the research questions continue until some kind of satisfactory interpretation is reached. Scholars in this interpretive research tradition acknowledge the open-ended and always tentative nature of text interpretation.

Therefore, to investigate the effectiveness of the communication messages, their types and nature, the study makes use of qualitative research method. Among the various qualitative research methods, content analysis is opted and applied for this study. Content analysis in general (either qualitative or quantitative) is the most hallowed and widely used method in communication research to analyze media messages. Particularly, qualitative content analysis is often used for detailed understanding of media messages and the way they are communicated in specific context (Graber, 2004:46).

### **3.1.1. Qualitative Content Analysis**

The tool employed in this study has been qualitative content analysis. Hsieh & Shannon, (2005:1278), defined qualitative content analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns”. It uses the same systematic classification methods as quantitative content analysis, but does not quantify the results. In addition, it also allows the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data. Through qualitative content analysis, it is possible to distil words into fewer content-related categories. It is assumed that when classified into same categories, words, phrases and the like share the same meaning (Cavanagh, 1997). Hence, for this study qualitative content analysis is a befitted research method to gather data to answer the research questions. It allows the use of social cognitive theory to construct the categories adopted to investigate the text, but simultaneously enables for the development of new categories when the text guides have use for them as well as to employ elaboration likelihood model, from persuasion theories, on the analysis of the data. Since this study is exploratory, it goes off well with the use of qualitative method that favours for profound exploration rather than a rigid quantitative method.

The aim of qualitative content analysis is to attain categories or themes from a condensed and broad description of the raw data based on valid inference and interpretation (Patton, 2002). After becoming clear of the data, analysis is carried out using an inductive or deductive reasoning (Kyngas & Vanhanen, 1999). In inductive reasoning the categories and themes are used in a study derived from the text being studied, whereas, in deductive reasoning the categories and themes used in the research are acquired from previous research or they are attributed to theory (Berg, 2001:249).

Qualitative content analysis has three distinct approaches: conventional, summative, or directed. All three approaches are used to interpret meaning from the content of text data; however, their major differences are coding schemes and origin of codes as well as the degree of involvement of inductive reasoning (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).

In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. Researchers engross themselves in the text and determine the categories they will use in their

content analysis inductively. A summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context. Though, summative content analysis is very similar to the analysis used in quantitative content analysis, it goes beyond quantification of the manifest meaning by interpreting the context of the quantified words targeting to discern the latent meanings of the texts. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. The purpose of a direct approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory. Existing theory can help focus the research question and used to examine the text (Ibid.). Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999) classify this as a deductive use of theory based on their features on the role of theory. This study uses the direct approach content analysis since it allows the communication messages of IGAD to be categorized according to social cognitive theory.

According to Weber (1990) there are three main phases for both inductive and deductive qualitative content analysis: preparation, organizing and reporting. However, the research questions determine how rigid or flexible the qualitative content analysis will be. But generally there are eight steps, beginning with preparing data and advancing to writing up the findings in a research (Zhang and Wildmuth, 2009). The eight steps used in this study are discussed below.

**Step 1: Data Preparation.** This data preparation phase centred on preparing the data to be analysed and a choice should be made about what to analyse and why (Patton, 2002). In order to select the samples, the time span and the communication tools, for this study a purposive sampling techniques was employed. The data collection method is fully discussed in the next section.

**Step 2: Define the Unit of Analysis.** According to Neuendorf (2002:13) “The unit of analysis is the element on which data are analysed and for which findings are reported”. Hence, the unit of analysis is the unit of text that will be categorized during the content analysis. Content analysts define units in five kinds of distinctions: physical, syntactical, categorical, propositional, and thematic (Krippendorff, 2004:103).

Messages should be unitized beforehand so they can be coded, because discrepancy in defining the unit of analysis can perturb coding decisions as well as the corresponding outcome with other kindred studies (De Wever et al., 2006).

The unit of analysis in qualitative content analysis is often thematic (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009) and this study also used thematic unit of analysis. Thematic units are defined by their expression of an idea. Hence this study used a thematic unit based on the categories drawn from social cognitive theory.

**Step 3: Developing Categories and a Coding Scheme.** Categories and a coding scheme can be developed inductively and deductively. Inductive content analysis is seemingly used for studies that attempt to develop theory, rather than those that intend to explicate a particular phenomenon or verify an existing theory. In studies that have a preliminary model or theory on which they base their inquiry can develop an inceptive list of coding categories from the model or theory, and they can reshape the model or theory during the process of the analysis as new categories come forth inductively (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, contrary to quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis empowers the researcher to assign a unit of text to more than one category; however, the categories in the coding scheme should be defined in a way that they are internally as homogeneous as possible and externally as heterogeneous as possible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Since this research is based on Hsieh and Shannon's (2005:1281) directed approach to qualitative analysis, the text is coded using categories stemmed from social cognitive theory. However, new categories are developed within the course of analysis from the text when the existing category is not befitting. In addition unremitting comparison are expended to make sure the categories stay internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous as possible.

**Step 4: Testing the Coding Scheme on a Sample of Text.** According to Weber, coding sample text, checking coding consistency and revising coding rules is an iterative process and should continue until sufficient coding consistency is achieved (cited in Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009:311). The sample of the coded text consistency and clarity should be checked through an assessment of inter-coder agreement. Therefore, in this study the researcher has planned to code a sample of text from the press release and brochure of IGAD and attempted to train a

colleague unconnected to the study the coding method so as to cross check both coded sample texts.

**Step 5: Code all the Text.** When agreeable consistency has acquired in the coded sample, the coding rules are employed in the entire text. If new themes and concepts emerge during the coding process they are added to the coding manual (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Throughout the coding process the coding is checked frequently to ensure correct use of the categories (Schilling, 2006).

**Step 6: Assess Coding Consistency.** After coding the entire data the coding consistency are rechecked. According to (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Weber, 1990), there are three reasons the why the rechecking is crucial. 1) Humans are subject to fatigue therefore human coders are likely to make more mistakes during the coding process. 2) Even though a sample was coded in a consistent and reliable manner, new codes may have been added. 3) During the coding process, the coder's understanding of the categories and coding rules may change which may lead to greater inconsistency.

**Step 7: Draw Conclusions from the Coded Data.** This is a critical step in the analysis process which embraces making sense of the themes, categories and patterns that came forth from the data. Hence, the conclusions are drawn by exploring the properties and dimensions of categories, identifying relationships between categories, uncovering patters, and testing categories against the full range of data (Bradley, 1993).

**Step 8: Reporting Methods and Findings.** To make this study replicable, the method the study uses to gather data and the procedures and processes applied in analysing the data are addressed (Patton, 2002).

### **3.2. Research Procedures**

In general the initial course of action in doing content analysis is selecting a body of data (Graber, 2004:54). However, there are preconditions in the identification of data sources and data collection of the data selection process.

### **3.2.1. Sources and their Selection**

The data for this study was collected from the IGAD's communication tools i.e. press releases, newsletters and brochure. To have a comprehensive cognition of IGAD's communication messages the researcher collected the press releases, from Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan (OSSES), and the newsletters and brochure from Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) which are the affiliate offices of IGAD. This purposive sampling of sources is conducted because the communication messages in these offices of IGAD have more propinquity or relations to the study. In addition, these sources embody all the communication messages the inter-governmental institution endeavoured to convey to the conflict parties of South Sudan.

The other reasons why the study only examines the press releases, newsletters and brochure is first, IGAD's social media pages and the other communication tools only reflect the messages channelled by the press releases, newsletters and brochure. Secondly, the inter-governmental institution mostly communicates with its member states governments through its press releases, newsletters and brochure.

Thus, the study emphasised on sources which provide ample data for the researcher to investigate the effectiveness of IGAD communication messages in mediating the South Sudan conflict parties.

### **3.2.2. Data Collection Methods**

#### **Sampling Techniques and Sample Size**

There are no specific rules for the determination of sample size in qualitative research; rather sample size depends on considerations of the researcher related to the objective of the study, the usability and the credibility of the selected sources and time span (Patton, 2002). Hence, to select the samples (the time span and the communication tools that convey IGAD's messages) for this study, a purposive sampling technique was employed.

Purposive sampling is a term used to describe the strategic and purposeful selection of information. These specific type and number of the selected samples depend on the study objective and resources available. Hence, the selected samples were analyzed according to the

objective of the study and to their relevance in answering the research questions on the phenomenon under investigation (Ibid.). In the following, the sampling procedure as applied in this particular study is explained in detail below.

### ***Sampling procedure***

The purposively selected sources as discussed in the previous section are IGAD's press releases, newsletters and brochure. From this three communication tools messages the researcher has chosen those conveyed from 1 March 2015 to 31 August 2015 as sample of this study. This purposively selected time span singled out August 31, 2015 as its frame because of the August 17, 2015 signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, which could be considered as the milestone of IGAD led mediation process of the South Sudan conflict. This Agreement signed by the conflict parties of South Sudan is considered as the end of the mediation process by IGAD-Plus and the commencement of the implementation phase. Moreover, the six months prior to August 31, 2015 are purposively selected by the researcher presuming the communication messages conveyed by IGAD in the preceding six months of the August 17, 2015 agreement would hold strong messages to enhance their effectiveness in the mediation process learning from their contribution to prior failed agreements IGAD proposed for the conflict parties. Hence, the study analyzed 11 press releases, 3 bimonthly newsletters and 1 brochure published by IGAD communications within the six months selected as a time frame for this study. Thus, taking the 11 press releases, 6 articles from the newsletters and 5 articles from the brochure with the sum of 22 articles were selected for analysis.

Since, IGAD communication published during this period one brochure only through its affiliate office, CEWARN, on March, 2015, the researcher used this brochure to strengthen the study. Hence, investigating the messages transmitted by IGAD's press releases and CEWARN's newsletters during these six months is pivotal to study the effectiveness of the messages on the South Sudan conflict parties' appliance of the August 17, 2015 agreement.

### **3.2.3. Unit of Analysis**

Communication message which dealt with the South Sudan conflict and IGAD's led mediation of the conflict related issues was the unit of analysis for this study.

### **3.2.4. Trustworthiness of the study**

As interpretive method, qualitative content analysis varies from the positivist tradition in its basic assumptions, research purposes, and inference processes. Hence, using the conventional positivist research paradigm criteria, i.e. validity, reliability, and objectivity, to evaluate the quality of this research is improper. Therefore, this study uses Lincoln and Guba's (1985) proposed four substitute criteria for evaluating interpretive research work: credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability.

According to Bradley, (1993:436) "credibility refers to the adequate representation of the constructions of the social world under study". To enhance the credibility of qualitative content analysis, the data collecting strategies must be designed in a way that allows them to capably divulge the information that is being needed. In addition, the processes for coding and drawing conclusions from the raw data should be designed transparently. Furthermore, the coders must be skilled and execute in accordance with a comprehensive coding manual that consists of precise coding definitions and clear coding procedures (Weber, 1990). In an attempt to address the credibility of the coding manual, in this study, another coder read and coded the same sample of text. Ensuing coding recording is completed to validate the coding was consistent over the text.

Transferability refers to researcher's responsibility of providing data sets and descriptions that are sufficient enough for other researchers to satisfactorily judge how transferable the findings of the study are to other settings and contexts (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Therefore, this study will attempt to provide a detailed coding manual and an explanation of method so as to favour future researchers to judge the transferability of the study.

Dependability refers to "the coherence of the internal process and the way the researcher accounts for changing conditions in the phenomena" (Bradely, 1993:437). Therefore, this study will provide a detailed methodology, coding manual and description of results in order to be verified by the external audits the consistency of the research processes.

Conformability refers to "the extent to which the characteristics of the data, as posited by the researcher, can be confirmed by others who read or review the research results" (Bradley, 1993:437). The main procedure for establishing conformability is also through external audit

which will be determined by checking the internal coherence of the data, the findings, the interpretations, and the recommendations of the research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). As mentioned above, since this study will be presented with circumstantial methodology, coding manual and recital findings, future researchers will be able to carry out an external audit easily, to determine the dependability and conformability of the study.

### **3.2.5. Pilot Study and Instrumentation**

A pilot study is conducted by the researcher to be familiar with the appliance of the methodology and to provide insight into any vagueness of the coding instrument. It also will help the researcher to establish both content validity of the instrument and to revise research questions, format, and the scales. Moreover, for data transformation and to establish inter-coder reliability, alongside the researcher the text is coded using a content analysis methodology by another individual, uninvolved in the research project. For this pilot study, a press release published by African Union in regard to South Sudan conflict is selected as a sample to analyse and to differ from the actual source of data.

The coding process took place over a fortnight. Preceding the analysis of the text, the researcher acquainted the unfamiliar coder the purpose and background of the study, the methodology, the coding scheme, and content analysis procedures. Ensuing the coders' separately analyse the same text using a coding scheme based on social cognitive theory, the results were juxtaposed. At first, the results of the analyses revealed the coders agreed on the presence of messages that fit into seven categories extracted from social cognitive theory. The categories are Providing Information, Enhancing Self-Efficacy, Inspiring South Sudan, Emphasising Facilitators and Purguing Impediments, and Setting Realistic Goals. However, the first coder observed the presence of two new categories, Appealing Messages and Violence Reduction Messages, the second coder did not. The second coder observed the presence a category, Messages of Awareness, but the coders agreed to subsume these messages as subcategory of the existing category which is Providing Information.

As a result of this, despite minor inconsistencies in their observations the two coders were generally consistent in their textual analysis to acknowledge inter-coder reliability. Hence, the instrument designed by the researcher is used in the pilot study to analyze the sample text.

This coding scheme for the instrument is guided by social cognitive theory to address the initial research questions. The categories are:

- Providing Information (PI)
- Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)
- Appealing Messages (AM)
- Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)
- Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)
- Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)
- Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)

As mentioned above, rather than using the traditional criteria for evaluating the quality of research of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity the researcher will use the corresponding terms credibility, transferability, conformability, and dependability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In this pilot study the trustworthiness coding scheme of the instrument is verified.

### **3.2.6. Data analysis and presentation**

Data analysis of qualitative data is difficult because there is not many well formulated methods for carrying out analysis. “For quantitative data there are clear conventions the researcher can use. But the analyst faced with a qualitative data has very few guidelines for protection against self-deceit” (Miles, 1979:590). Qualitative data analysis uncovers categories, themes and patterns that help to answer the research question (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Thus, this study employed various tactics to ensure that the conclusion drawn from qualitative data are meaningful.

First the researcher double checked the relevance of the sample articles. Second, guided by the social cognitive theory, the researcher prepared the coding categories taking into account the research question. Third, the researcher engaged in a close reading of the sampled texts to ascertain the presence of themes related to the categories. Themes took the form of a single word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or entire document.

Since this study used existing theory as the basis of the coding scheme, the sample articles were examined using a coding scheme based on social cognitive theory. The coding scheme derived from social cognitive theory considers messages that Providing Information, Enhancing Self-Efficacy, Inspiring South Sudan, Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments, Appealing Messages, Violent Reduction Messages and Setting Realistic Goals. Under each category, the data gathered were systematically presented and analyzed to yield justifiable generalization of the study.

### **Categories**

Under the seven key categories of analysis, there are also sub-categories developed on the basis of social cognitive theory and data collected. The key categories are:

***Providing Information:*** According to Bandura, people will not exert effort to change their behaviours if they are not informed about the risks and benefits of their behaviour (2004). Therefore, the effectiveness of the communication messages of IGAD on impacting the conflict parties' attitudes towards the mediation process positioned on the information it provides on the risks and benefits of these parties behaviour towards the conflict and the mediation respectively.

***Enhancing Self-efficacy:*** Bandura argues that, self-efficacy beliefs are better predictors of people's capabilities than their previous attainments, knowledge, or skills as such beliefs are associated with goal-related effort, persistence, and resilience in the face of adversity (Bandura, 1997). Moreover, self-efficacy beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors, like the regulation of one's motivation, thought processes, affective states, actions, or environmental conditions (Bandura, 2001). Hence, messages conveyed by IGAD's communications to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties are categorized in this category.

***Appealing Messages:*** These messages emphasis on, the credibility of IGAD and on giving reasons and reinforcement why the conflict parties should adopt the desired behaviours for the mediation process. Thus, messages that are conveyed to educate the conflict parties about how to end the conflict and about the credibility of IGAD by reinforcing the conflict parties have an impact on the communication messages effectiveness by being more persuasive.

***Violence Reduction Messages:*** According to Bandura, social cognitive theory is founded in an agentic perspective; therefore, people are self-organizing, proactive, self-reflecting and self-regulating (1986). Thus, communication message that attempted to set a standard of morality through its message was categorized in this category.

***Inspiring South Sudan:*** Motivating people efficacy will increase their performance and grant them the desired behaviour. Because, the likelihood that people will act on the outcomes that they expect prospective behaviours to produce depends on their beliefs (Bandura, 2001). Messages that attempt to inspire the conflict parties by narrowing down the gap they have with the South Sudanese were categorized.

***Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments:*** the perceived facilitators and impediments associated with a behaviour influences an individual's self-efficacy to change that behaviour. Self-efficacy beliefs are measured in relation to the gradation of challenges that an individual expects to encounter while trying to change their behaviour (Bandura, 2004). Hence, messages that emphasise the conflict parties' commitment and provide new view of the conflict were categorized.

***Setting Realistic Goal:*** people's behaviour is guided by the aimed goals they set for themselves and the plans and strategies they use to realize these goals. Realistic goals about behavioural change can elevate self-regulation of the behaviour that is needed (Bandura & Simon, 1977). Communication messages imparted to the conflict parties during peace process should be framed in ways that instil in people the belief that they have the capability to alter the conflict and should demonstrate them the better outcome of their action. Thus, messages that indicate short and long-term goals for the conflict parties were categorized.

Under each category there are sub-categories, the following describes the sub-categories briefly.

The sub-categories under, *Providing Information*, are defined as follows:

***Impact of the conflict:*** Messages which highlight the devastating consequences of the conflict. These messages provide information on the disastrous humanitarian situation and the suffering of the people of South Sudan.

***Challenges for peace and stability:*** Messages with the theme of the challenges the mediation team facing to attain peace to the South Sudanese.

***Attributes of South Sudan principals' inefficiency:*** These are messages which feature the conflict parties' intransigence clinging on their old positions to resolve the conflict.

***Escalation of fighting in South Sudan:*** Messages which highlight the perpetual conflicts in South Sudan.

The sub-categories under, *Enhancing Self-efficacy*, are defined as follows:

***Provide encouragement:*** These messages emphasise on boosting the conflict parties spirit indicating the support they have from the international community and their engagement in the peace process.

***Positive and negative effects of an action:*** Messages that illustrates the positive and the negative effects of the conflict parties' actions.

***Define actions to be taken:*** These are messages that define the actions IGAD will take to alter the adverse consequences of their actions.

The sub-categories under, *Appealing Messages*, are defined as follows:

***IGAD's credibility and efficiency:*** These are messages designed to make aware of the conflict parties about the credibility and efficiency IGAD to induce them to have full trust and reliance on the mediation process. Since, the trustworthiness of IGAD to the conflict parties is very crucial for the effectiveness of its messages to be persuasive.

***How to information:*** Messages which emphasise on the approach the conflict parties should adopt to expedite the mediation process.

***Describe desired behaviours:*** Messages which demonstrates the desired behaviour the conflict parties should acquire to hasten the mediation process.

***Provide reinforcement:*** These messages highlight on reinforcing the conflict parties stressing on their pre-eminence to take the South Sudan to a better place or weaken it and endure for years.

The sub-categories under, *Violence Reduction Messages*, are defined as follows:

***Benefits of peace and stability for the conflict parties:*** These messages advocate about the approval the conflict parties will attain from the South Sudan people and the international community if they concert for peace.

***Tolerance between conflict parties:*** These messages construct a general positive affects and specific emotions about peaceful relations and tolerance with the opponent by describing beliefs and indicate good feelings the parties have towards South Sudan.

***Advocate national identity:*** These messages highlight on replacing tribalism and tokenism with patriotism and nationalism in the pursuit for peace.

The sub-categories under, *Inspiring South Sudan*, are defined as follows:

***Promote rule of law:*** Messages which highlight on the application of rule of law benefits for the conflict parties in achieving their aspired South Sudan.

***Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience:*** Vicarious experiences mediated through modelled attainment provide information to individuals that help them in making appraisals of their self-efficacy. The achievements of others are often used as an indication of the observers' own abilities (Bandura, 1997). Thus, these messages emphasise on the regional countries similar challenging experiences and how they overcome it.

***Upholding the conflict parties:*** These messages focus on elevating the conflict parties efficiency to fulfill the satisfaction of the people's demand underscoring the promise they gave to South Sudan people during pre and post independence.

The sub-categories under, *Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments*, are defined as follows:

***Recognition of the need to compromise:*** Messages which highlight on approving and applauding the recognition of the conflict parties cognizance to compromise. Messages which emphasis on this perceived facilitator which is, the recognition of the conflict

parties cognizance to compromise, enhances the conflict parties self efficacy to achieve the desired behaviour.

**Conflict parties' adherence to the commitments they made:** These messages stress on the need for the conflict parties to adhere to the commitments they made during the peace process. Thus, the commitments the conflict parties made during the peace process were the perceived facilitators which the communication messages uphold to be adhered.

**Formation of new relations with rival:** The personal impediments are the reasons why people impel to maintain undesired behaviours in the peace process. The cognitive framework of the conflict parties that affects the course of conflict via its interpretation are social norms, particularly about how to behave in conflict situations, as well as their attitudes towards each other. Once the conflict parties behaviour has become an issue, conflict is about who is right and who is wrong. As a consequence, attitudes towards each other will become even more negative (Bandura, 1979). Hence, the messages in this sub-category highlight on strengthening positive attitudes by avoiding issues that lead to misinterpretations of the others' goals or behaviour.

**Establishing new view of the conflict:** The other impediment is the conflict parties' hierarchies of values in determining the importance of possible wins and losses. Hence, the messages in this sub-category highlight on framing the conflict as a win-win situation and trying to find a solution which satisfies the parties' needs.

The sub-categories under, Setting Realistic Goals, are defined as follows:

**Short-term goals:** Messages which stress on the immediate goals the conflict parties can achieve for the people of South Sudan.

**Long-term goals:** These are messages which emphasise on the long-term goals which can be accomplished by taking the incremental steps provided by the motivation of short-term goals.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **Data Presentation, Interpretation and Findings**

#### **4. Introduction**

In order to analyze the communication messages IGAD has communicated to the conflict parties of South Sudan, the study collected the press releases from the Office of the IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan (OSSES), the newsletters and brochure from IGAD Conflict Early Warning And Response Mechanism (CEWARN), published during March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015. In this chapter the data are presented and analyzed with findings. The first part of this chapter presents the types of messages IGAD conveyed through its communication tools by describing the most prevalent messages forwarded on each communication tools. Moreover, these communication messages are examined, from the point of view of social cognitive theory and elaboration likelihood theory, how the type and pattern of the messages IGAD transmitted through these communication tools work together to change the behaviours of the conflict parties of South Sudan. The second part of this chapter presents the findings from the analysis.

#### **4.1. Data presentation and Analysis**

The communication messages selected for the purpose of this study are those conveyed through IGAD's press releases, newsletters and brochure. The communication messages are coded by seven categories derived from social cognitive theory and also are analysed from the perspective of elaboration likelihood model. The categories used for the coding of the raw data and the results are presented in this section.

##### **4.1.1. The Coded themes of the messages**

###### **Providing Information**

Individuals will not exert effort to change their behaviours if they are not informed about the risks and benefits of their behaviour (Bandura, 2004). IGAD provides information about the consequence of the South Sudan conflict and the conflict parties' behaviours to the South Sudanese and the mediation process. These messages are classified into four sub-categories:

impact of the conflict, challenges for peace and stability, attributes of South Sudan conflict parties principals' inefficiency and escalation of fighting in South Sudan. The themes of these sub-categorized messages are presented in IGAD press releases, newsletters and brochure at different scale. According to elaboration likelihood model by giving a problem a great coverage, the media can have important "indirect" effects on attitude change (Petty, Brinol and Priester, 2009: 134). Hence, IGAD communication should be able to provide all the atrocities the South Sudanese enduring and the challenges the mediators facing as a result of their action to conflict parties exhaustively. The following table summarizes the total numbers and percentages of the messages that provide information to the conflict parties in IGAD's communication tools.

Providing Information								
IGAD's communication tools	Impact of the conflict		Challenges for peace & stability		Attributes of South Sudan conflict parties principals inefficiency		Escalation of fighting in South Sudan	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	5	83.3	14	93.3	16	84.2	9	90
Newsletters	1	16.7	1	6.7	3	15.8	1	10
Brochure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	6	100	15	100	19	100	10	100

**Table 1- The total numbers and percentages of the messages that provide information**

As shown on Table 1 update information about the mediation process and the ferocity of the South Sudan conflict under the sub-category of impact of the conflict is most commonly presented by IGAD Special Envoys for South Sudan and IGAD Secretariat through the press releases. IGAD communication only revealed in its messages, the impact of the conflict like, about the disastrous humanitarian situation and the suffering of the people of South Sudan, 5 times through its press releases. Astonishingly, there is only 1 count of message on CERWAN's newsletters and nil on the brochure, which makes the total of IGAD's communication messages in regard to the impact of the conflict only 6. It is surprising that IGAD's communication spends such little time informing the conflict parties the consequences of their action, in a country where at least 50, 000 people are killed in two year civil war; over 5 million people are in need of aid, and nearly 3 million people at risk of starvation out of the total population of 11.5 million (United Nations, 2015). According to

Bandura (2001:267), “the anticipated self-satisfaction gained from fulfilling valued standards and discontent with substandard performances serve as incentive motivators for action”.

There are total counts of 15 messages in IGAD communication informing the conflict parties the consequence of their behaviours to the challenges for peace and stability in South Sudan. There are 14 messages in the press releases, 1 count of message in the newsletters and nil in the brochure. These behaviours include reiterating old positions and the intransigence of the conflict parties. IGAD’s press releases provide 16 counts of messages, the newsletters 3 counts of messages and nothing in the brochure dealing about the attributes of South Sudan conflict parties’ principals inefficiency. With the total counts of 19 messages IGAD communication mostly portrayed the inefficiency of the South Sudan government for not having a good will to mediate with the opposition. For instance, on August 17 press release IGAD condemned the government of South Sudan action for preventing the invited South Sudanese political parties to travel to Addis Ababa to participate in IGAD PLUS peace process which also shows the inefficiency of the South Sudan government to reach a compromised agreement. In addition, the South Sudan government hesitated to sign the August 17 Agreement initially which was signed by the SPLM/SPLA-IO, Former Detainees and the Other Stakeholders which also attributes to the inefficiency of the South Sudan government. Since these messages directly criticizing the South Sudan government principals the messages are sufficient to increase personal involvement and processing of the message arguments. By simply using the pronouns in a message from the third person (e.g., “one” or “they”) to the second person (i.e., “you”) it is triggering enough to increase personal involvement and processing of the message arguments on the targeted party (Burnkrant and Unnava, 1989).

IGAD also covers the series violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) which contributed for the escalations of fighting in South Sudan by emphasizing these conflicts are hindering the mediation process. The total counts of messages about the escalation of fighting in South Sudan are 10; the press releases contain 9, the newsletter with 1 count of message and nil on the brochure.

Accordingly, the communication messages IGAD conveyed are inadequate in providing information about the situation of the conflict and the challenges the mediation process

encountered from the conflict parties. It lacks emphasis on the negative effects of military force and/or questioning its appropriateness. Also, it lacks descriptions of the conflict parties' intentions and recounts the challenges the mediators are faced with during the mediation process.

### Enhancing Self-efficacy

IGAD's communication contains a variety of messages that could increase the self-efficacy of the conflict parties; one of the ways is to provide encouraging messages. Bandura argues that "people's level of motivation, affective states, and actions are based more on what they believe than on what is objectively true" (1997:2). Hence, IGAD communication focused on providing encouraging and encomium messages to the conflict parties to enhance their self-efficacy in every level of the mediation process. Because, self-efficacy beliefs are better predictors of people's capabilities than their previous attainments, knowledge, or skills as such beliefs are associated with goal-related effort, persistence, and resilience in the face of adversity (Ibid.). Table-2 summarizes the total numbers and percentages of the messages that enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties in IGAD's communication tools.

Enhance Self-efficacy						
IGAD's communication tools	Provide encouragement		Define actions to be taken		Positive & negative effects of an action	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	27	69.2	26	57.8	25	83.4
Newsletters	8	20.5	12	26.7	4	13.3
Brochure	4	10.3	7	15.5	1	3.3
<b>Total</b>	39	100	45	100	30	100

**Table 2- The total numbers and percentages of the messages that enhance the self-efficacy**

As indicated on the above table, there are a total of 39 IGAD communication messages that reflect encouragement to the action of the conflict parties that are attuned to the mediation process. Among these messages 27 of them found in the press release, 8 counts of messages in the newsletters and 4 in the brochure.

In addition, IGAD communication also delivers messages that illustrate the positive and the negative consequences of the conflict parties' actions. And define the actions IGAD would take if the conflict parties do not conduce to the success of the mediation process and lasting peace and prosperity for the people of South Sudan. The main theme in regard to these messages is, though, compromises seem difficult to the conflict parties, prolonging the conflict and refusing to make those necessary compromises does not serve their interests and mainly the interests of the people of South Sudan. Accordingly, by illustrating the consequences of the conflict parties' unwillingness to comprise and by defining the actions IGAD will take the content of IGAD communication messages desired to propel the conflict parties to compromise. Therefore, these messages are assumed to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties. Self-efficacy beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors, like the regulation of one's motivation, thought processes, affective states, actions, or environmental conditions (Bandura, 2001). Hence, by demonstrating the positive outcome of the conflict parties actions the messages are pursuing to elevate their self-efficacy and confidence. According to Bandura, self-efficacy helps foster the outcome one expects: confident individuals anticipate successful outcomes, whereas the opposite is true of those lacking confidence (Ibid.). Even if, to successfully motivate individuals to change their behaviour their self-efficacy must be increased, knowledge of the risks and benefits of behaviours creates the precondition for change (Bandura, 2004). Due to this, IGAD communication messages contain a total of 45 messages of the defined actions IGAD would take, there are counts of 26 messages of these on the press releases, 12 on the newsletters and 7 on the brochure. Whereas, there are a total count of 30 messages on illustrating the positive and negative effects the conflict parties actions of which 25 messages are on the press release, 4 on the newsletters and 1 on the brochure.

### **Appealing Messages**

According to elaboration likelihood, source credibility and the strength of the message argument are predicted to be important determinant of individual's acceptance or rejection of the recommendation when central route is followed (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Messages are considered appealing if the messenger is credible, gives "how to" information, demonstrates the desired behaviour and gives verbal reinforcement to its audiences. In addition, these

persuasive messages to be effective they must cultivate the conflict parties beliefs in their capabilities while simultaneously envisioned success is attainable (Bandura, 2001).

IGAD attempted to convey its communication messages by the different regional leaders and IGAD-PLUS Special Envoys and Representatives to make its messages credible and attractive. Moreover, to exalt credibility and trustworthiness the communication messages describes IGAD’s efficiency and proficiency as an institution to engross the conflict parties’ attention in consuming its themes. The other point IGAD emphasised in its messages is motivating the conflict parties to develop the desired behaviour they should develop to the mediation process. These messages are framed by fear appeal contents supposing to motivate the conflict parties and are followed by recommended action to reduce discomfort. The “how to” information is used to because fear arousing messages result in greater persuasion if they contain recommendations for reducing fear. For instance, messages like threatening the conflict parties if they prolong the conflict and refuse to compromise will have a dire consequence and backed with “how to” information and recommendation of the desired behaviour they should develop like willingness and commitment to compromise are provided in the communication messages.

The following table summarizes the total numbers and percentages of the appealing messages in IGAD’s communication tools.

Appealing Messages								
IGAD’s communication tools	IGAD’s credibility & efficiency		“how to” information		Describe desired behaviour		Provide reinforcement	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	15	34.8	13	46.4	17	58.6	26	66.7
Newsletters	14	32.6	4	14.3	8	27.6	9	23.1
Brochure	14	32.6	11	39.3	4	13.8	4	10.2
<b>Total</b>	43	100	28	100	29	100	39	100

**Table 3 -The total numbers and percentages of the appealing messages**

As listed above (Table-3), IGAD communication put forward a total of 43 messages that stress on the credibility and efficiency of IGAD out of this the 15 messages are in the press releases, the 14 messages are in the newsletters and also 14 of those messages are found in the brochure. Information like the success of the institutions, its affiliation with powerful

countries and inter-governmental institutions are the messages IGAD concentrated on to exalt its credibility. Bandura also argued that for mediated content to positively affect the audience members' behaviours, the audience must pay attention (Bandura, 2001). All persuasion begins with capturing attention, without attention persuasion is impossible. Thus, IGAD should be seen as credible by the conflict parties to have their attention and recognition. Since, who presents the message has an impact upon how it is received.

The "how to" information IGAD provided to the conflict parties to reach to the agreement more or less are correlated and the same as the desired behaviour demanded from the conflict parties to clinch the mediation process. IGAD exhorted the conflict parties to have a temperament of compromise, commitment, political will, courage, integrity and diligence to settle the mediation process and bring lasting peace and prosperity for the people of South Sudan. These qualities of behaviours are also emphasised on the "how to" information IGAD imparted to the conflict parties to adjudicate about the conflict. There are a total count of 28 messages that set forth a "how to" information in IGAD communication messages, the press releases contain 13 messages of this, the newsletters have a related 4 messages and the brochure holds 11 messages that deal with "how to" information. The total of IGAD communication messages that describe the desired behaviours count is 29, out of the total, 17 messages found in the press releases, 8 messages in the newsletters and 4 in the brochure.

Effective communication messages must be targeted to cultivate their audiences' beliefs in their capabilities while simultaneously ensuring that the envisioned success is attainable. Because individuals create and develop self-efficacy beliefs as a result of verbal reinforcement, or the verbal judgments that others provide (Bandura, 2001). IGAD's communication strived to deliver verbal reinforcement to the conflict parties by praising every attempt they made to the mediation process, emphasizing the urgency to achieve peace to South Sudan people, and frequently mentioning the full support of IGAD and its affiliates.

On the contrary, as positive behaviours should be positively reinforced, those engaging in negative behaviours should be negatively reinforced (Ibid.). As a result, the reinforcement instead of highlighting the advantages of peace, there is need to arouse fear by pointing out that the losses from the continuation of the conflict situation are higher than the losses from the possible settlement of the conflict, which requires compromises.

Hence, with total count of 39 messages that deal with delivering verbal reinforcement in IGAD communication, there are 26 messages counts in the press releases, 9 counts of messages in the newsletters and 4 messages out of the total count found in the brochure.

### **Violent Reduction Messages**

In communicating violent reduction messages the communicator must relate the messages to the interest of its audience. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986: 136), “the most important determinant of interest and motivation to process the message is the perceived personal relevance of the communication”. Since increasing the perceived personal relevance of a message is an important way to increase thinking (Petty, Cacioppo, & Haugtvedt, 1992), IGAD communication attempted to comport the messages to the conflict parties values and self-conception. The following table summarizes the total numbers and percentages of messages that are forwarded by IGAD as violent reduction messages through its communication tools.

<b>Violence Reduction Messages</b>						
IGAD's communication tools	Benefits of peace & stability for the conflict parties		Tolerance between conflict parties		Advocate national identity	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	5	83.3	9	100	-	-
Newsletters	1	16.7	-	-	-	-
Brochure	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	6	100	9	100	-	-

**Table 4- The total numbers and percentages to violent reduction messages**

As shown on Table 4, messages that depicted the benefit of peace and stability to the conflict parties were forwarded by IGAD communication to abate the violent mindset of the conflict parties. Total counts of 6 messages are found in the examined communication tools for content that deal with the benefit of peace and stability. Throughout the press releases messages that hold this theme counts 5, only 1 in the newsletters and there is none in the brochure. These messages portray how the conflict parties stand for the South Sudanese people all these years and also show how much the people endured the prolonged wars. In addition, the messages concentrated on that if the conflict parties wanted to realize their long-lived ambition of taking South Sudan to a better place the first roadblock to tackle is

eliminating the challenges they face to secure peace and stability. These messages are assumed to reduce violence by advocating the self interest of the conflict parties.

The other violence reduction message forwarded by IGAD's communication holds a theme of inducing tolerance between conflict parties. According to Bandura, social cognitive theory is founded in an agentic perspective; therefore, people are self-organizing, proactive, self-reflecting and self-regulating (1986). Hence, IGAD communication attempted to set a standard of morality through its messages to enable the conflict parties to self-sanction their violent action since it contradicts with their personal standards which serve as the regulatory influencers. Embedding the concept of tolerance through the messages of IGAD, in the internal standards of the conflict parties, serve as the basis for regulating their conduct to have a greater stability (Bandura, 1991b). The exercise of moral agency has dual aspects the first one is the inhibitive form that manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely whereas the second one proactive form of morality is expressed in the power to behave humanely (Ibid.). Hence, there are total counts of 9 messages with a theme and advocacy of the need to have tolerance between the conflict parties. All these 9 messages are found in the press releases, there is nothing that deals with this content in the newsletters and the brochure. These messages were needed because the August 17 Agreement by itself was called a Compromise Agreement.

However, messages that should deal with national identity and would have been beneficial to violence reduction are omitted in IGAD communication messages.

### **Inspiring the Conflict Parties**

Individuals' efficacy beliefs play a central role in the self-regulation of motivation through goal challenges and outcome expectation. It is partly in these efficacy beliefs that people choose what challenges to undertake, how much effort to expend in the endeavour, how long to persevere in the face of obstacles and failures, and whether failure are motivating or demoralizing (Bandura, 2001). Motivating people efficacy will increase their performance and grant them the desired behaviour. Because, the likelihood that people will act on the outcomes that they expect prospective behaviours to produce depends on their beliefs about whether or not they can produce the required performance (Ibid.). The messages delivered by

IGAD communication aims to maximize the performance of the conflict parties to produce the prospective behaviours by motivating their efficacy. In addition to increase the likelihood of elaboration IGAD communication presented issue-relevant information to be the determinant of persuasion (Petty and Priester, 2009). Table-5 summarizes the total numbers and percentages of the messages that are delivered to motivate the South Sudan the conflict parties in IGAD’s communication tools.

Inspiring South Sudan conflict parties						
IGAD’s communication tools	Promote rule of law		Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience		Upholding the conflict parties	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	2	100	4	100	14	100
Newsletters	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brochure	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	2	100	4	100	14	100

**Table 5- the total numbers and percentages of the messages to inspire the conflict parties**

As listed on Table 5, there are total counts of 4 messages about strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience and 14 total counts of messages elevating capabilities of the conflict parties to meet the people need but only 2 total counts of messages that motivate the conflict parties to abide by rule of law in IGAD communication messages. All these messages are only found in the press releases, both the newsletters and the brochure does not contain any message related to these themes. The messages about strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience attempted to induce the conflict parties by mentioning some of the regional countries experience, how they went through the same path and overcame it eventually and motivating how a possibility it is for the South Sudan to do the same. Elevating the capabilities of the conflict parties to meet the people need take the form of acknowledging and motivating the conflict parties interest to the attainment of the mediation process. In addition, the messages emphasised on the promise the conflict parties undertake to the South Sudan people during pre and past independence of South Sudan. However, the messages that promote the rule of law to motivate the conflict parties to abide by are not that much strong and articulated precisely, while, there are 2 messages only in the press releases which are also elusive.

## Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments

The perceived facilitators and impediments associated with behaviour influences an individual's self-efficacy to change that behaviour. Self-efficacy beliefs are measured in relation to the gradation of challenges that an individual expects to encounter while trying to change the behaviour (Bandura, 2004). In IGAD communication the perceived facilitators are assumed to be recognizing the need to compromise and adherence to commitment whereas the perceived impediments inferred to be forming relation with the rival and developing new view of the conflict. The following table summarizes the total numbers and percentages of messages that accentuate facilitators and purge impediments in IGAD communication tools.

Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments								
IGAD's communication tools	Recognition of the need to compromise		Conflict parties adherence to the commitment they made		Formation of relations with the rival		Establishing new view of the conflict	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	15	93.8	17	94.4	8	100	6	100
Newsletters	1	6.2	1	5.6	-	-	-	-
Brochure	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	16	100	18	100	8	100	6	-

**Table 6- The total numbers and percentages of messages that emphasis facilitators and purge impediments**

Based on Table 6, there are total of 16 messages in IGAD communication that acknowledge the recognition of the conflict parties to compromise and advocate for its actualization, almost all the messages 15 of them are found in the press releases, 1 message is in the newsletters and nil in the brochure. In addition, there are total counts of 18 messages that call for the conflict parties to adhere to the commitments they made, similarly almost all the 17 messages are delivered by the press releases, 1 message only by the newsletters and none by the brochure. The recognition of the conflict parties to compromise is welcomed by the expression in the press releases as the conflict parties fervent commitment to resolve the crisis in the South Sudan and by endorsing every effort they made during the mediation process. The call for the conflict parties to adhere to the commitments they made is illustrated in the

press releases every time the conflict parties breach the cease fire and show hesitation to proceed with the mediation process.

There are total counts of 8 messages about formation of new view and relation with the rival, which all the 8 messages are located in the press release and nil in both the newsletters and the brochure. There are total counts of 6 messages about developing new view of the conflict, like the previous messages all the messages are located in the press releases whereas both the newsletters and the brochure do not include the content. Messages that focus on the formation of new view and relation with the rival tries to broaden the perspective of the conflict parties about their rivals, rather than seeing each other as competitive (win-lose), it attempts to portray cooperative (win-win). On the other hand, the messages that tries to develop a new view of conflict attempted to promote the awareness of the simple solution offered by war and military is no solution to all and war will prevail no one.

### **Setting Realistic Goals**

An individual's behaviour is guide by the aspired goals they set for themselves and the plans and strategies they use to realize these goals. Realistic goals about behavioural change can enhance self-regulation of the behaviour that is needed (Bandura & Simon, 1977). Individuals self-reflect by meta-cognitively examining their functioning, which allows them to make sense of experiences, self-evaluate, and judge their capability to carry out tasks. Moreover, this self-reflection is motivated by both long and short term goals and challenges that people set (Bandura, 1986). These two types of goals work together, short term goals provide motivation to take the incremental steps leading, over time, to the accomplishment of long-term goals (Zimmerman, 2000). Table-7 summarizes the total numbers and percentages of the messages that contain short and long term goals in IGAD's communication tools.

Setting Realistic Goals				
	Short-term goals		Long-term goals	
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%
Press Releases	21	84	3	50
Newsletters	2	8	1	16.7
Brochure	2	8	2	33.3
Total	25	100	6	100

**Table 7- the total numbers and percentages of the messages that contain short and long term goals**

As indicated on Table 7, the communication of IGAD forwarded a total of 25 short-term goals messages, out of these messages the press releases hold 21 messages of this content, the newsletters have 2 messages of this kind of messages and 2 messages in the brochure. Most of the short-term goals are to make the conflict parties reach into agreement, secure good governance and stability in South Sudan, to establish Transitional Government Of National Unity and implementing the compromise agreement. The long-term goals messages IGAD forwarded are 6 in total. There are 3 messages counts about long-term goals in the press releases, 1 message in the newsletter and 2 messages in the brochure. These messages focus on granting the South Sudan people a general election after establishing Transitional Government Of National Unity and securing a lasting peace and prosperity for the people South Sudan.

All in all, IGAD's communication messages from its press releases, newsletters and brochure that are coded in accordance with social cognitive theory to seven categories are a total sum of 417 messages. Out of these 71.2% of them in count 297 messages are coded from the press releases that are assumed to have impact on the behavioural change of the conflict parties based on social cognitive theory. The newsletters only contain 17% of the coded messages which are 71 seemingly coded messages for this study. On the other hand, the brochure which most of its messages focus on the credibility and efficiency of IGAD comprises only 49 messages out of the total coded messages, which make its contribution 11.8% to IGAD's communication attempt to impact the conflict parties of South Sudan behaviours to peace.

During the coding process the researcher observed IGAD communication imparted and gave emphasis on the different themes differently on its communication tools. In the press releases messages with the theme of enhancing self-efficacy prevail in number from the other

categories, out of the 297 coded messages these messages contributed 78 messages with a share of 26.3%. However, the newsletters and the brochure focused on the appealing messages, mostly on the credibility and efficiency of IGAD. Out of the related 71 coded messages 35 messages contain appealing messages in the newsletters of IGAD, with 49.3%, nearly half of the messages targeting the South Sudan conflict parties holds a persuasion theme. Similarly, in the brochure out of the 49 coded messages more than half, the 33 messages incorporate a persuasion theme which makes their share 67.3 in percentage. Nonetheless, all the communication tools, press releases, newsletters and brochure, have given emphasis on the categories of enhancing self-efficacy and appealing messages they hold 26.3% and 23.9% in the press releases, 33.8% and 49% in the newsletters and 24.5% and 67.3% in the brochure respectively.

The following table illustrates the coding categories total number and share in each communication tools.

Categories	Press Releases		Newsletters		Brochure		Total no. of messages	Total percentage
	No. of messages	%	No. of messages	%	No. messages	%		
<b>Provide Information</b>	44	14.8	6	8.5	-	-	50	12
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy</b>	78	26.3	24	33.8	12	24.5	114	27.3
<b>Appealing Messages</b>	71	23.9	35	49.3	33	67.3	139	33.3
<b>Violence Reduction Messages</b>	14	4.7	1	1.4	-	-	15	3.6
<b>Inspiring conflict parties</b>	20	6.7	-	-	-	-	20	4.9
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments</b>	46	15.5	2	2.8	-	-	48	11.5
<b>Setting Realistic Goals</b>	24	8.1	3	4.2	4	8.2	31	7.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Total no. &amp; % of messages in the tools</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>71.2</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>11.8</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 8- The coding categories total number and share in each communication tools**

As indicated on Table 8 the categories derived from social cognitive theory to code the IGAD’s communication messages situated at different scale in the communication tools. Most of the categories are found in the coded press releases, whereas, the coded newsletters and brochure missed themes that matched with some of the categories. The category under the theme of inspiring conflict parties is not addressed in both the newsletters and the brochure. Furthermore, violent reduction messages and emphasising facilitators and purging impediments categories are omitted from the brochure theme of messages. The following table will summarize the coding result by stating the number and percentage of categories each communication tools delivered as their message themes to change the behaviour of the South Sudan conflict parties.

Categories								
IGAD’ communication tools		Providing Information	Enhancing Self-Efficacy	Appealing Messages	Violence Reduction Messages	Inspiring South Sudan	Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments	Setting Realistic Goals
Press Releases	No. messages	44	78	71	14	20	46	24
	%	88	68.4	51.1	93.3	100	95.8	77.4
Newsletters	No. messages	6	24	35	1	-	2	3
	%	12	21.1	25.2	6.7	-	4.2	9.7
Brochure	No. messages	-	12	33	-	-	-	4
	%	-	10.5	23.7	-	-	-	12.9
<b>Total number</b>		<b>50</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>31</b>

**Table 9- The communication tools share number the categories**

As shown on the above table all the categories are located in the coded press releases immensely leaving the newsletters and brochure with tiny share. Though, the full range of data collected especially from the press releases and newsletters is the same, the coding result shows the categories derived from social cognitive theory constitute overwhelmingly in the coded text of the press releases than the newsletters. In the next section the findings of the study will be discussed utterly.

## **4.2. Discussion of findings**

This study started with the purpose of investigating the communication messages of IGAD and the effectiveness and the impact they have on the South Sudan conflict parties and to assist the mediation process. The collected IGAD messages from the press releases, newsletters and brochure are coded in accordance with the categories derived from social cognitive theory and presented and analyzed basing elaboration likelihood model and social cognitive theory in the previous section of this chapter. Hence, this section will discuss the findings based on the research questions the researcher embarked on.

### **4.2.1. Types of the Communication Messages**

The first inquire in this study is to apprehend the types of the communication messages presented in IGAD communications through its press releases, newsletters and brochure. According to Bandura, “people’s level of motivation, affective states and actions are based more on what they believe than on what objectively true” (1997:2). Hence, enhancing the self efficacy of an individual can change his/her behaviour and action. Because, self-efficacy beliefs are better predictors of people’s capabilities than their previous attainments, knowledge, or skills as such beliefs are associated with goal-related effort, persistence, and resilience in the face of adversity (Ibid.). All in all, self-efficacy can affect motivation, performance and attainment of parties in conflict. As discussed broadly in the presentation and analysis section of this chapter, IGAD communication messages attempted to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties.

There are a total of 114 messages that focused on enhancing the self-efficacy of the conflict parties out of the coded 417 messages IGAD conveyed through its press releases, newsletters and brochure. These 27.3% of messages provided encouragement for the conflict parties by stating the alliance of the regional countries and the international community to the bright future of South Sudan. Applauding every attempt of the conflict parties was also the technique used by IGAD’s communications to encourage the conflict parties and tried to aware them the proposed agreement reflects their ideas, concerns, and interests. The other means used by IGAD communication to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties is defining the action IGAD would take as consequences if they impede the mediation process by illustrating the

positive aspects of their actions. For instance, the March 3 issue of the press release informed the conflict parties, how the regional countries and the international community are dismayed and will not stand by and watch the humanitarian crisis, using the speech of Hailemariam Dessalegne, Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Statements like how difficult compromises must be made by both sides to serve the interest of the people of South Sudan frequently appear in IGAD communication messages. The messages also threaten the conflict parties regarding the consequences for a failure to find a solution will endure the country for years, and will only weaken South Sudan further.

Motivation also can occur by inspiring an individual and the motivational process can be determined based on the reinforcement (Bandura, 2001). Inspiring and motivating people efficacy will increase their performance and grant them the desired behaviour. Because, the likelihood that people will act on the outcomes that they expect prospective behaviours to produce depends on their beliefs about whether or not they can produce the required performance (Ibid.).

There are total counts of 20 messages that attempted to inspire the conflict parties, all these messages are situated only on the press releases of IGAD. Even though it was a theme that needs much emphasis, during the coding process it is observed that these messages are omitted in the newsletters and brochure. The category inspiring the conflict parties contributes only 4.9% of the overall coded messages.

Moreover, there are scanty messages which focused on strengthening the self-belief of the conflict parties and elevating the capabilities of the principals of the conflict parties to meet the people need. On the March 3 issue of the press release it is attempted to strengthen the self-belief of the conflict parties through vicarious experience using the speech of Hailemariam Dessalegne, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, it states,

The solution is in your hands. Do not throw it away. I recall an encounter between our former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and a university professor. The latter remarked, at the end of a public discussion at the university that, 'the ball is in the courts of the Ethiopian leadership. They can take Ethiopia to a better future, or they can take the country to a deeper crisis'. So I want to borrow this, and tell you, that the ball is in your court, and that you can take South Sudan to a better place or you can take the country to a deeper crisis. (Press Release, March 3, 2015)

The above statement shows that the conflict parties have all the solution in their hands, they can take the South Sudan people to agony and the country to a failed state or they can take the people to peace and stability. The other message forwarded by IGAD to strengthen the self-belief of the conflict parties is the devoted alliance of IGAD Partners like, United States, the Kingdom of Norway, The United Kingdom and Italy, and their readiness to assist the Parties in implementing the Agreement. IGAD communication messages also advocated that with the signing of the Agreement, a new era of peace and prosperity will be ushered to the people of South Sudan and their beloved country. This statement will reinforce the conflict parties' principals to elevate their capabilities to meet the people of the South Sudan need. According to Bandura (2001), outcome expectancies are the judgments of the consequences associated with behaviour. IGAD also emphasised its confidence, if the Agreement is implemented with sustained political will, courage, integrity and diligence, it will bring lasting peace and prosperity for the people of South Sudan. Consequently, the messages of IGAD attempted to motivate the conflict parties to develop the desired behaviours to end the prolonged sufferings of the South Sudan people with the proposed Agreement.

In addition, short-term goals messages provide motivation to take the incremental steps leading, over time, to the accomplishment of long-term goals (Zimmerman, 2000). For this reason, IGAD made an effort to set short-term goals for the conflict parties to follow in its communication messages. In the coded press releases, newsletters and brochure IGAD forwarded 25 messages of short-term goals. Basically, the short-term goal messages conveyed through IGAD communication for the conflict parties are initiating their commitment to resolve the crisis in South Sudan and come to an agreement. The other short-term goal put across by IGAD in its communication messages to motivate the conflict parties is establishing an inclusive Transitional Government of National Unity that will reform the security sector and issues of economic governance and reform, address justice, accountability and national reconciliation, and finalize a permanent constitution before leading the country to elections. If the short-term goals are inspiring enough to motivate the conflict parties they can adjust their behaviour to meet the short-term goals. According to Zimmerman (2000), through self-regulation, people can adjust their behaviour to set and meet their short and long term goals.

#### **4.2.2. The Nature of the Persuasive Techniques of the Communication Messages**

The other pursuit of this study is to investigate the natures of the persuasive techniques IGAD communication messages employed to achieve behavioural change on the South Sudan conflict parties. As discussed in the literature review chapter, according to elaboration likelihood model mass communication capacities to persuasion can be conceptualized as evoking one of two routes to attitude change, the central route and the peripheral route. The central route involves persuasion through what they name “message elaboration”, essentially, examining the content of the arguments closely and then changing one’s attitude on the basis of the merits of the arguments. The peripheral route involves attitude change based on cues irrelevant to argument quality (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).

Message elaboration is presumably when people are both able and motivated to process the arguments. The ability for people to process arguments happens when they are well informed, have illustrative comprehension of the issue, and when repetition adequately familiarizes them with argument. In addition, the motivation occurs when the issue is personally relevant, they are forewarned of the persuasion attempt, and/or have a pre-dispositional need for cognitive activity. Under such conditions, according to the ELM theory, quality of arguments is key determinant of attitude change (Ibid.).

Evidently, IGAD communication messages selected for this study contain issues personally relevant to the conflict parties. The sufficiency of information about the impact of the conflict and the attributes of the conflict parties’ principals to the escalation of the conflict are not adequate enough. Communication messages can deliver a flow of objective and accurate news and comment to the conflict parties. This provides the conflict parties with a basis on which to question their actions in response to the crisis affecting their people. In the coded press releases, newsletters and brochure, for this study, the coded messages that provide update information about the crisis in the South Sudan hold 12% out of the entire coded messages and 50 messages in counts out of the total 417 coded messages. These messages conveyed about the impact of the conflict, the challenges for peace and stability, the attributes for South Sudan conflict parties principals inefficiency and the escalation of fighting in South Sudan. However, detail information is not present regarding the human rights violations and the number of loss of life. According to the persuasion theory of ELM the ability for people to

process arguments happens when they are well informed, have illustrative comprehension of the issue, and when repetition adequately familiarizes them with argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The repetition of these messages in the gathered press releases, newsletters and brochure is inadequate to have a persuasive impact on the behaviours of the conflict parties, for instance, there are only 6 coded messages about the impact of the conflict regarding the occurrence of human rights violation and loss of life in a country where the death toll is 50,000 in the two year conflict and as many as 5.3 million people, about half the population of the country, facing severe food insecurity (UN Report, 2015).

However, these inadequate messages for impacting the conflict parties' behaviours, like the occurrence of human right violation and loss life are delivered citing the humanitarian organization and IGAD's Monitoring and Verification Team reports to honour their credibility. Since, the credibility of the messages has an immense effect on their persuasiveness.

Appealing messages are considered to exist if the messenger is credible, gives "how to" information, demonstrates the desired behaviour and gives verbal reinforcement to its audiences. Total of these types of messages counts are 139 which hold 33.3% of the total the coded messages from the press releases, newsletters and brochure. There are 43 counts of messages about the credibility and efficiency of IGAD. Since, the credibility of the source has an impact upon how it is received, the more credible the organization delivering the message, the more influence there will be upon the audience (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975). IGAD attempted to elevate its credibility by stating in its communication messages about its confederates' fervent commitment to resolve the crisis in South Sudan. The messages also reported that IGAD Special Envoys with all IGAD-PLUS partners (the IGAD member states, the five members of the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee, the Troika, China, the African Union Commission, the European Union, the United Nations and the IGAD Partners Forum) unanimously endorsed the Proposed compromise Agreement and expressed their full support for its implementation. These types of messages intended to affirm IGAD's credibility by displaying the commendations it has globally. In addition, the communication messages asserted that the IGAD leaders' tireless efforts, wisdom and patience, and most of all, their unity of purpose were one of the reasons for the successful signing of the Agreement for

Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. These kinds of messages are also planned to portray the credibility of IGAD. Furthermore, IGAD also tried to display its efficiency mostly in its newsletters and brochure. Almost all the messages delivered by the brochure of IGAD reveal the efficiency and the technological capacity of IGAD as an inter-governmental institution. IGAD also revealed on its newsletter that it convened training on conflict-sensitive reporting and peace messaging for South Sudanese journalists. As it is reported on the newsletter the main aim of the training was to equip these 21 South Sudanese journalists with critical skills that will enable them to execute their duties effectively in situations of conflict. This could be taken as an evidence for the efficiency of IGAD acknowledging the media role in conflict resolution.

The other messages IGAD disseminated in the “how to” information of the communication messages are the process the conflict parties should undertake to reach to amicable agreement. Emphasising on the personal responsibilities of the conflict parties will strengthen the “how to” information in IGAD communication messages. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) suggest personal responsibility enhances motivation to process issue-relevant arguments. Hence, there are 28 counts of messages that communicate a way the conflict parties should address the peace process. All of the messages enjoined the conflict parties the expeditious need to resolve the South Sudan conflict and the way to deal with it to seat on the compromise table. The effectiveness of these messages are so low and do not provide any tangible information to persuade the conflict parties. In providing a “how to” information emphasising on facilitators and removing impediments suspected to subsist in the behaviours of the conflict parties is very vital. The perceived facilitators and impediments associated with behaviour influences an individual’s self-efficacy to change that behaviour. Self-efficacy beliefs are gauged in relation to the degree of challenges that individuals expect to confront while trying to change their behaviour (Bandura, 2004).

Hence, developing and strengthening their prior positive knowledge and tackling the negative cognition of the conflict parties that impede the mediation process by providing different perspectives of the conflict in the “how to” information help to change their behaviour. Therefore, in the coding process it is observed there 16 messages about the recognition of the conflict parties to compromise emphasising on the personal relevance of the mediation.

Consequently these messages are enhancing a perceived facilitator the conflict parties have and help their self-efficacy to change their behaviour.

Furthermore, messages about developing new outlook of the rival and formation of new view of the conflict should be incorporated in the “how to” information so as to expunge the perceived impediments associated with a behaviour. There are only 8 counts of messages about developing new outlook of the rival and 6 counts of messages about formation of new view of the conflict. However, these messages have too weak arguments and appear on the press releases only. They only advocated the behaviour the conflict parties should sustain toward their rivals and promote inconclusively how peace is indivisible to the region. But the messages would have been efficacious if they emphasized on the goodwill gesture of the conflict parties to the mediation because; the behaviour or thinking of a person is influenced by his perception, rather than the actual reality. Perception forms between two groups initially due to an assumption that one group or both groups believe the counterpart to be hostile. The assumption in hostility leads to an act of hostility towards the counterpart (Kelman, 1997). Hence, the communication messages would have been effective if they attempted to alter the distorted image the conflict parties have for each other. If the messages contained an image formation for the conflict parties to develop a new view of the conflict, the messages would have been more effective in their messages embodiment. The contrast in perception between ‘the innocent self’ and ‘the aggressive other’ of the conflict parties leads to an impasse in the conflict, making it move out of the zero-sum game to reach a win-win approach (Ibid.)

The messages forwarded to elevate the desired behaviours of the conflict parties were coded from the press releases, newsletters and brochure to examine their persuasive nature. There are counts of 29 messages in the coded texts that describe the desired behaviours the conflict parties should develop to the effectiveness of the mediation process. Among the messages disseminated by IGAD communication honouring their commitment to compromise and cooperation prevail from other desired behaviours. Effective persuaders must cultivate other people’s beliefs in their capabilities while simultaneously ensuring that the envisioned success is attainable (Bandura, 1986).

There are also messages that emphasise on the indivisibility of peace amongst the South Sudanese community and insisted the conflict parties to have the same stand to. Also, the

messages asserted that the conflict parties must expunge the behaviour of solving problems with guns. In addition, the messages stressed on the political will, courage, integrity and diligence for the conflict parties to develop intensifying these are the behaviours that will bring lasting peace and prosperity for the people of South Sudan. Compared to the other persuasive messages IGAD conveyed these attempted to well inform the behaviours need to the conflict parties. Since the issue is personally relevant to the conflict parties and the messages did also forewarned the consequences of their behaviours as well as the repetition of the messages sufficiently familiarizes them the desired behaviours in contrast to the other subcategories of the coding scheme messages that describes the desired behaviours is efficient and persuasive enough. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), people are best able to process arguments to be persuaded is when they are well informed and when repetition sufficiently familiarizes them with the arguments, also they are motivated to do so when the issue is personally relevant and they are forewarned of the persuasion attempt.

Verbal reinforcements or the verbal judgments that others provide create and develop individuals' self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 2004). IGAD communication delivered 39 messages of verbal reinforcements, which main took the form of message to the effect; that the conflict parties can make a difference in the crisis of South Sudan. If verbal reinforcement raises unrealistic beliefs about personal capabilities it will result in failures that will discredit the persuader and diminish the recipient's beliefs in their own capabilities (Ibid.). However, IGAD communication messages are believable as they are accompanied with realistic goals and models messages (like, UN, EU, etc.). Since continued effort in the face of difficulty can also be learned through aspirational modelling, where the models convey messages how problems are surmountable and that valued goals are achievable (Bandura, 1997).

IGAD communication messages also delivered 25 short-term goals messages for the conflict parties to aspire to achieve. Moreover, the messages emphasised on the commitment the United States, the Kingdom of Norway, The United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, and the United Nations readiness to assist the parties in their interest to achieve these goals and the main issues which is peace and stability for the people of South Sudan.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **5.1. Summary**

This study sought to examine the effectiveness of the communication messages of IGAD conveyed to the conflict parties of South Sudan, with the goal of discovering how these messages are communicated to motivate behaviour change among the conflict parties. As it is known, that it is important, for the effectiveness of the communication messages they must have basis on behavioural change theories, Albert Bandura's Social Cognitive theory and Richard Petty and John Cacioppo's Elaboration Likelihood model.

This thesis begins with the introduction of South Sudan and IGAD (Inter-governmental Authority Development). The literature review in chapter two provides the role of journalism in a time of violent conflict and the messages that has come, to be known under the umbrella term "peace Journalism", and its uses in the regional institutions communication messages to have assistance during peace processes. It then reviews the background of South Sudan and the fierce struggle they had during the Sudanese Civil Wars and the role of IGAD in the region. As this thesis is based on behaviour change theories the literature review also provides an explanation of social cognitive theory and elaboration likelihood theory, in particular how they can be used to change behaviour of parties in conflict.

The nature of qualitative content analysis used in this research allows a deep analysis of the meanings, themes and patterns in the texts and this suits the exploratory nature of the current study. The methodology also clearly explains the qualitative content analysis and the steps taken to ensure the study is trustworthy. Chapter four presented and analysed the acquired data in detail. Based on the evaluation, the research arrived at the following conclusions.

## 5.2. Conclusions

The analysis shows that messages in IGAD communication lack potency. The social cognitive theory asserts that in order for an individual to make a behaviour change, they must have self-efficacy. In addition, elaboration likelihood model emphasizes that for individuals to have self-efficacy, they should receive cues to action including specific how-to information and verbal reinforcement (Rucker and Petty, 2007). However, in the case of IGAD, the assessment of this study revealed the effectiveness of the communication messages in expediting the mediation is limited by the inadequacy and feebleness of the messages contents. The messages delivered in its communication besides giving short reports they do not attempt to increase the self-efficacy of their target audience or contain strong persuasive arguments to motivate behaviour change among the conflict parties.

The supply of information about the dire conflict in South Sudan is not sufficient. Detail information should be provided through the communication messages regarding the South Sudan conflict, like human rights violation and death toll, and the consecutive breaches of the ceasefires to make the conflict parties well informed about the consequences of their action. According to elaboration likelihood model, for people to bring a behaviour change, they should be well informed (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Hence, the lack of information noticed in IGAD communication messages implicates how the mediation team for South Sudan and IGAD's communication team liaison in exchanging information is limited.

The analysis shows the communication messages asserted IGAD's efficiency describing its use of technologies and the support it has globally in the newsletters and brochure. These messages have use for the motivation of the conflict parties because the source attractiveness determines the extent of attention, it also determine the extent of acceptance (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The other communication message that shows IGAD's efficiency and IGAD's recognition of the media for peace is the training given for 21 South Sudanese journalists on conflict sensitive reporting and peace messaging. In the newsletter it is stated agreeably that the training aimed to expose the journalists to IGAD's work in promoting peace and security in the region as well as co-opting them into long-term partnership for peace building and conflict resolution in the IGAD region. However, this constructive notion

is not reflected adequately in the contents of the IGAD's communication messages which should have enhanced its effectiveness.

Nonetheless, messages that describe the desired behaviours demanded from the conflict parties are adequately provided in the communication messages, for the realization of the mediation process.

The extent of messages included about awareness, instruction and persuasion varies. Messages about awareness and persuasion are so limited however; messages that instruct the conflict parties are adequately forwarded. Since IGAD communication messages did not contain these three types of messages at same adequacy, conflict parties could not be motivated to make behaviours change by being persuaded.

All in all, the findings of this study lead up to IGAD's communication messages effectiveness in contributing for the furtherance of the mediation process was limited. However, messages intended to enhance self-efficacy and "how to" information were conveyed moderately to impact the conflict parties of South Sudan to make behavioural change. Moreover, the insufficiency in providing information in the communication messages manifested the excessive secretiveness of IGAD's mediation team regarding the mediation process and the conflict parties to the communication team. This, in turn, heavily blemished the communication message.

### **5.3. Recommendations**

This study attempted to show throughout its chapters the role of communication messages in reinforcing attitudes in the conflict parties during a peace process. Hence, Inter-governmental institution communication's compositions of messages should be the result of careful analysis of the information environment in the area of operations. In developing the mediator's core messages, several options and alternatives should be explored. The communication messages should adhere to the mediation team objectives to give the mediators coherence in communicating with the outside world and may contribute to their leverage with the parties of the conflict. Adequate information from the mediators enables the communicators to better understand the operating environment and to communicate better of the mission and the potential benefits of peace. These communication messages will further help the mediation team to mitigate the resistance of the conflict parties to consent.

The apparent financial and institutional drawbacks that plague the workings of IGAD imply that its communicators need to be assisted in a way that enable them to skilfully deliver conflict reports in a constructive way. This will play a paramount role in enhancing IGAD's impact on resolving conflicts at regional level.

In addition, peace processes will be expedited if they are accompanied with communication messages with needed qualities to change the behaviours of the conflict parties. The themes of the communication messages should be strong and hold constructive counter arguments during conflicts. For instance, leaders in South Sudan manipulate and create artificial ethnic divisions and groupings to serve their interests in mobilising force and for political gain. Thus, IGAD communication messages should attempt to implant in the minds of the conflict parties the notion of patriotism and nationalism and suggest that for the sake of the South Sudanese they need to move beyond tribalism and tokenism.

This study is exploratory and the findings should be used as the basis for further research into this very important area. The research could hopefully give communication practitioners working in inter-governmental and other institution working for peace a better understanding of how to report effectively in situations of conflict.

## References

- Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), March 21, 1996 Kenya, Nairobi IGAD agreement document
- Al- Rahim, Abdel (1973), 'Arabism, Africanism, and Self- Identification in the Sudan' in Dunstan Wai ed. *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 29-45
- Aslam, 2011
- Alier, Abel (1973), 'The Southern Sudan Question' in Dunstan Wai, ed. *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 11-27
- Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) (ed.) (2013). *Constructive Conflict Coverage – A Social Psychological Approach*. Berlin: regener
- Bandura, A., (2005). Primacy of self-regulation in health promotion transformative mainstream. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 54, 245-254.
- Bandura, A. (1977). *A social learning theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Bandura, A. 1979. Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In M. VonCranach, K. Foppa, W. LePenies, & D. Ploog (Eds.), *Human ethology: Claims and limits of new discipline*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bandura, A. (1986). *Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bandura, A. (1991b). Self-regulation of motivation through anticipatory and self-regulatory mechanisms. In R. A. Dienstbier (Ed.), *Perspectives on motivation: Nebraska symposium on motivation* (Vol. 38, pp. 69-164). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Bandura, A. (1994). Social cognitive theory and exercise of control over HIV infection. In R. DiClemente and J. Peterson (Eds.), *Preventing AIDS: Theories and methods of behavioral interventions* (pp 25-59). New York: Plenum.
- Bandura, A. (1997). *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. New York: Freeman.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory of mass communication. *Media Psychology*, 3, 265–299.
- Bandura, A. (2002). Growing primacy of human agency in adaptation and change in the electronic era. *European Psychologist*, 7, 1–16.

- Bandura, A. (2004). Social cognitive theory for personal and social change by enabling media. In A. Singhal, M. J. Cody, E. M. Rogers, & M. Sabido (Eds.), *Entertainment-education and social change: History, research, and practice* (pp. 75–96). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Bandura, A. (2006). Toward a psychology of human agency. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1*, 164–180.
- Bandura, A. (Ed.) (1995). *Self-efficacy in changing societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bandura, A., & Simon, K. M. (1977). The role proximal intentions in self-regulation of refractory behaviour. *Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1*, 177 -193.
- Bar-Tal, D., & Eran H., (2013). The Psychology of Intractable Conflicts: Eruption, Escalation, and Peacemaking, in: Leonie Huddy, David Sears & Jack Levy (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 923-956
- Berg, B.L. (2001). *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Bizusew Mersha (2004), ‘Sub- Regional Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Case of IGAD’s Mediation Role in the Sudan’. *MA Thesis*, Department of Political Science and International Relations. Addis Ababa University. Bradley, 1993.
- Bratic, V., ( 2005). “Media effects during violent conflict: Evaluating media contributions to peace building.” *Conflict and Communication online 4*(2). Online at [http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2006\\_1/abstr\\_eng/bratic\\_abstr\\_engl.htm](http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2006_1/abstr_eng/bratic_abstr_engl.htm). Accessed on: Nov. 23, 2015
- Bussey, K., & Bandura, A. (1999). Social cognitive theory of gender development and differentiation. *Psychological Review, 106*, 676–713. Cavanagh, 1997
- Cole F.L. (1988) Content analysis: process and application. *Clinical Nurse Specialist 2*(1), 53–57.
- Collins, Robert (2008), *A History of Modern Sudan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- De Wever, B., Schellens T., Valcke, M., & Van Keer H. (2006). Content analysis schemes to analyze transcripts of online asynchronous discussion groups: A review. *Computers and Education, 46*, 6-28.

- Deng, K., (2012). The “New Sudan,” Vision and its Effects on Southern Sudanese Unification. SouthSudan.net. Accessed Dec. 2015, Available at: <http://www.southsudan.net/thenewsudan.html>
- Downe-Wamboldt B. (1992) Content analysis: method, applications and issues. *Health Care for Women International* 13, 313–321.
- Eagly, A.H., & Chaiken, S. (1975). An attributional analysis of the effect of communicator characteristics on opinion change: The case of communicator attractiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 32, 136-144.
- Edward, J. K. & Amir, I., (2007), ‘The Consequences of Sudan’s Civil Wars for the Civilian Population’ in ed. John Laband *Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Africa: From Slavery Days to Rwandan Genocide*. London: Greenwood Press, pp. 227- 252.
- Elizabeth Haile. 2012. South Sudan’s Post-Independence Challenges: Greed or Grievance? University for Peace & Conflict Monitor.
- Hamad, Mohammed 2003, ‘IGAD’s Trojan Horse: Containing Sudan’s Regional Ambitions’ *22nd Annual Meeting of Sudan Studies Association 3rd International Conference of SSA, and SSUK* Georgetown University, USA, 31/07-04/08
- Hamid, Muhammad (1989), ‘Devolution and National Integration in the Southern Sudan’ in eds. Haynes, 2007
- Haugtvedt, C. P., and R. E. Petty. 1992. "Personality and attitude change: Need for cognition moderates the persistence and resistance of persuasion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* no. 63:308-319.
- Haynes, J., (2007). “Religion, Ethnicity and Civil War in Africa: The Cases of Uganda and Sudan.” *Round Table*. 305-317.
- Healy, S., (2008), *Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel*. London: Cantham House.
- Heckler, S. E. (1994). The role of memory in understanding and encouraging recycling behaviour. Special Issue: Psychology, marketing, and recycling. *Psychology and Marketing*, 11, 375-392.
- Hentz, J.J. 2013. IGAD and Regional Security in the Horn. *Routledge Handbook of African Security*. New York: Routledge.

- Hoffmann, J., (2013). Conceptualizing 'Communication for Peace'. UPEACE Open Knowledge Network Occasional Working Papers No. 1. San Jose: The United Nations mandated University for Peace (UPEACE).
- Hoile, D., (2002). The search for peace in the Sudan: A chronology Of the Sudanese Peace process 1989-2001. The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London. ISBN 1-903545-36-6
- Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). *Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of opinion change*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Hsieh H.-F. & Shannon S. (2005) Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research* 15, 1277–1288.
- International Crisis Group, (2010), 'Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence'. *Africa Report*. May 2010. No. 159. May 2010. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/sudan/159%20Sudan%20>. Accessed on 04/01/2016.
- Jaeger, S., 2002. Compatibility of Peace and News Media. *Communicator*, 37/1, 27-30.
- Johnson, D. H. (2006). 'Peace, Genocide and Crimes against Humanity in Sudan' in ed. Preben Kaarsholm *Violence, Political Culture, and Development in African*. Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 92-103.
- Johnson, D., (2003). *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Kebbede, Girma (1997) "South Sudan: A War-Torn and Divided Region," *Contributions in Black Studies*: Vol. 15, Article 4.
- Kelman, H. C. (1997). "Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict." In I.W. Zartman & J.L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Kempf, W. (2003). *Constructive Conflict Coverage. A Social Psychological Approach*. Edited by the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution. Berlin: regener.
- Kempf, W. (2005). Two experiments focusing on de-escalation oriented coverage of post-war conflicts. *Conflict & communication online*, 4/2.

- Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Kyngas H. & Vanhanen L. (1999) Content analysis (Finnish). *Hoitotiede* 11, 3–12.
- Lazarus, R., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, appraisal, and coping*. New York: Springer.
- Legatis, R., (2015). Media-Related Peace building in Processes of Conflict Transformation. *Bergof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Online edition Berlin: Bergof Foundation.  
<http://image.bergof.foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/rousbh.pdf>. Accessed on Feb 21 2015
- Lesch, A. M., (1987). “Behind Sudan’s Secession.” *The Council on Foreign Relations*, 1-19.
- Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Lynch, J., and McGoldrick, A., (2005). *Peace journalism*. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.
- Lynch, Jake (2007). A course in peace journalism. *Conflict & Communication Online*, 6(1).
- Malwal, B., (1981). *People and Power in Sudan: the Struggle for National Identity* Evergreen Book Distributors.
- McKenzie-Mohr, D., & Dyal, J. (1991). Perceptions of threat, tactical efficacy and competing threats as determinants of pro-disarmament behavior. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 6, 675-696.
- McQuail, D. (2010). *McQuails mass communication theory* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
- Miles M. & Huberman A. (1994) *Qualitative Data Analysis; an Expanded Source Book*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Nerone, J., (2013). The Historical Roots of the Normative Model of Journalism, in: *Journalism*, 14(4), 446-458.
- Neundorf K. (2002) *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Noar, S. M., (2006). A 10-year retrospective of research in health mass media campaigns: Where do we go from here? *Journal of Health Communication*, 11, 21-42
- O’Balance, Edgar 1977. *The Secret War in the Sudan*. London: Faber.

- Pajares, F. (1997). Current directions in self-efficacy research. In M. Maehr & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.). *Advances in motivation and achievement*. (Vol. 10, pp. 1–49). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Pajares, F., & Urdan, T. (Eds.). (2006). *Adolescence and education, Vol. 5: Self-efficacy beliefs of adolescents*. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing
- Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*. (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Perloff, R. M. (2003). *Dynamics of persuasion: Communication and attitudes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). *Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change*. New York: Springer/Verlag
- Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996). *Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary approaches*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1996). *Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary approaches*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Petty, R. E., Brinol, P., & Priester, J. R., (2009). Mass media attitude change: Implications of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In J. Bryant, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 125-164). New York: Routledge.
- Petty, R. E., Brinol, P., & Priester, J. R., (2009). Mass media attitude change: Implications of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In J. Bryant, & M. B. Oliver (Eds.), *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 125-164). New York: Routledge.
- Potter, W. J., & Levine-Donnerstein, D. (1999). Rethinking validity and reliability in content analysis. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 27, 258-284.
- Rone, Jemera 2003. Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights. Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1-56432-291 2. Accessed 1/2/2016. Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/sudanprint.pdf>
- Ruay, Deng Akol (1994), *The Politics of the Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821-1969*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstinte.

- Rucker, D. D., and R. E. Petty. 2006. "Increasing the Effectiveness of Communications to Consumers: Recommendations Based on Elaboration Likelihood and Attitude Certainty Perspectives." *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing* no. 25 (1):39-52. doi: 10.2307/30000524
- Schilling, J. (2006). On the pragmatics of qualitative assessment: Designing the process for content analysis. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, 22(1), 28-37.
- Shaw, I. S. (2012). *Expanding peace journalism: comparative and critical approaches* (Lynch, J. Hackett, R. A, Eds.). Sydney, Australia: Sydney University Press.
- Shinn, D. H., (2004). Addis Ababa Agreement: Was it Destined to Fail and are There Lessons for the Current Sudan Peace Process?. In: *Annales d'Ethiopie*. Volume 20, année 2004. doi : 10.3406/ethio.2004.1077
- Solomon Dersso. 2014. East Africa and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
- Stern, P.C., & Aronson, eds. (1984). *Energy Use: The Human Dim Research Council Committee on the Behavioural and Consumption and Production*. New York: Freeman.
- Sudan Tribune. (2011). Live Blog: South Sudan Independence. Accessed: March , 2016, Available at: [http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\\_article=39474](http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=39474)
- Tehrani, M., (2002). "Peace Journalism: Negotiating Global Media Ethics." *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 7, pp. 58-83.
- The Sudd Institute, (2014). South Sudan and the Prospects for Peace Amidst Violent Political Wrangling. Accessed on: Feb, 2016,
- Wakoson, N., (1993). The Politics of Southern Self-Government 1972-83" in *Civil War in the Sudan* edited by M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga London: British Academic Press.
- Wama, L. Barnabas (1997), 'Prolonged Wars in Sudan'. A Research paper presented to the Research Department Air Command and Staff College. Weber (1990
- Weber R.P. (1990) *Basic Content Analysis*. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA.
- West. R., & Turner, L.H., (2010). *Introducing communication theory. Analysis and application*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. New York.

- Wisler, A., (2005). "Peace Education." Course given at the European University Center for Peace Studies, Stadtschlaining, Austria.
- Wood, W., Rhodes, N., & Biek, M. (1995). Working knowledge and attitude strength: An information processing analysis. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences* (pp. 283–313). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Wood, W., Rhodes, N., & Biek, M. (1995). Working knowledge and attitude strength: An information-processing analysis. In R. E. Petty & J. A. Krosnick (Eds.), *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences* (pp.283-313). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Yoh, J. & Maloka, E. (2005). *The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects*. ISBN-10: 0798301805.
- Yoh, J., (2001). *The Conflict in Sudan*. Presented on the Seminar held by the South Africa Human Rights Commission, held at Parktown, Johannesburg, South Africa on 12/12/2015.
- Yong, J., (2007). *Sudan IGAD Peace Process: an Evaluation*. Sudan Tribune. Available at: [http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Igad\\_in\\_Sudan\\_Peace\\_Process.pdf](http://www.sudantribune.com/IMG/pdf/Igad_in_Sudan_Peace_Process.pdf)
- Young, J., (2015). *A Fractious Rebellion: Inside the SPLM-IO*. Small Arms Survey Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2E, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland
- Young, John 2006. *The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration*. HSBA Issue Brief No. 2. Accessed 12/12/2015, Available at: <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-02-SSDF.pdf>
- Zhang, Y., & Wildemuth, B. M. (2009). Qualitative analysis of content. In B. Wildemuth (Ed.), *Applications of Social Research Methods to Questions in Information and Library Science* (pp. 308-319). Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited. Retrieved March 13, 2016 from [http://ils.unc.edu/~yanz/Content\\_analysis.pdf](http://ils.unc.edu/~yanz/Content_analysis.pdf)
- Zimmerman, B. J. (2000). Attaining self-regulation: A social cognitive perspective. In M. Boekaerts, P.R. Pintrich, and M. Zeidner (Eds.), *Handbook of self-regulation* (pp. 13-39). New York: Academic Press.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX – A

#### A pilot study for the coding scheme (AU’s Press Release on May 12 2015)

#### Coding Sheet (Coder #1)

Categories		Place check mark when observed	Location of category in text (published month, page, paragraph and line (when necessary))
<b>Providing Information (PI)</b>	Impact of the conflict	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3;
	The challenges for peace and stability	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	Attributes for the South Sudan government inefficiency	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	The escalation of fighting in South Sudan	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)</b>	Provide encouragement	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 7;
	Defines actions to be taken	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 6;
	Illustrates the positive and negative effects of an action for peace	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Appealing Messages (AM)</b>	IGAD’s credibility	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 1; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 7;
	Provides “how to” information	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 6;
	Describes desired behaviour	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	Delivers verbal reinforcement	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)</b>	The benefit of peace and stability for the conflict parties	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2;
	Tolerance between conflict parties	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 6;
	Advocates national identity		
<b>Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)</b>	Promote rule of law		
	Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience		
	Elevating capabilities to meet the peoples’ need	<b>X</b>	p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 6;
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)</b>	Recognizing the need to compromise	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 6;
	Formation of new view and relations with the rival	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 6;
	Developing new view of the conflict	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 6;
<b>Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)</b>	Short-term goals	<b>X</b>	p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	Long-term goals		

## Coding Sheet (Coder #2)

Categories		Place check mark when observed	Location of category in text (published month, page, paragraph and line (when necessary))
<b>Providing Information (PI)</b>	Impact of the conflict	X	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3;
	The challenges for peace and stability	X	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	Attributes for the South Sudan government inefficiency	X	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	The escalation of fighting in South Sudan	X	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)</b>	Provide encouragement	X	p. 1, par. 7;
	Defines actions to be taken	X	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 6;
	Illustrates the positive and negative effects of an action for peace	X	p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Appealing Messages (AM)</b>	IGAD's credibility	X	p. 1, par. 1; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 7;
	Provides "how to" information	X	p. 1, par. 6;
	Describes desired behaviour	X	p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
	Delivers verbal reinforcement	X	p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 6; p. 1, par. 7;
<b>Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)</b>	The benefit of peace and stability for the conflict parties	X	p. 1, par. 2;
	Tolerance between conflict parties	X	p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 6;
	Advocates national identity		
<b>Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)</b>	Promote rule of law		
	Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience		
	Elevating capabilities to meet the peoples' need	X	p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 6;
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purgings Impediments (EFPI)</b>	Recognizing the need to compromise	X	p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 6;
	Formation of new view and relations with the rival	X	p. 1, par. 6;
	Developing new view of the conflict	X	p.1, par. 6;
<b>Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)</b>	Short-term goals	X	p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 6; p.1, par. 7;
	Long-term goals		

## **The difference between the two coders**

According to Coder #1, on page, 1, paragraph, 1, the press release tried to provide information in order to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties. It emphasises the escalation of the war since the beginning of May 2015 and is expanding to other states. Since the beginning of May 2015 up to 100,000 people flee their homes, in addition to over the 1.5 million people who have already been uprooted. According to Bandura, one way to increase the resilience of self-efficacy belief is through enactive mastery experience where a resilient sense of efficacy is built through structured demonstration of trails in the exercise of control over progressively more challenging tasks (Bandura, 1997). Hence, by emphasising the critical moment of the mediation process and by forwarding a persuasion message by defining actions the AU will take which is “effective implementation of sanctions against all those undermining the quest for peace, violating international humanitarian law and obstructing the efforts of peacekeepers on the ground” (May, 12, 2015, p. 1, par. 5), the paragraph attempts to enhance the self-efficacy of the conflict parties. In addition, it also gives information and rebukes the conflict parties to meet their obligation by questioning their action and threatening message. Coder #2 also agrees with the categorization of this paragraph after intense discussion.

Even though Coder #2 argued paragraph 3 on page 1, delivers verbal reinforcement, the need of tolerance between the conflict parties and the need to compromise, after a thorough discussion the two coders agreed on, the paragraph should be comprised in the category of Providing Information.

## APPENDIX – B

### Inter-coder Reliability of the Pilot Study

Categories	No. of coding decisions	Decisions on Which the two Coders agree	Decisions on Which the two Coders disagree	Reliability	
				Percentage Agreement	of
Providing Information (PI)	24	24	-	1	100
Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)	12	11	1	0.91	91.6
Appealing Messages (AP)	11	11	-	1	100
Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)	4	3	1	0.75	75
Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)	2	2	-	1	100
Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)	4	3	1	75	75
Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)	3	3	-	1	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>95</b>

## APPENDIX – C

### A coding scheme of IGAD’s Press Releases (from March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015)

#### Coding Sheet

Categories		Place mark observed	check when	Location of category in text (published month, page, paragraph and line (when necessary))
<b>Providing Information (PI)</b>	Impact of the conflict		X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.2; May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; May 16; p. 1, par. 2;
	The challenges for peace and stability		X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; May 16; p. 1, par. 1; May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; May 16; p. 1, par. 2;
	Attributes for the principals inefficiency		X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; Mar. 5; p. 1. Par. 1; May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; May 16; p. 1, par. 1; May 16; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 7; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2;
	The escalation of fighting in South Sudan		X	May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; May 16; p. 1, par. 1; May 16; p. 1, par. 2;
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)</b>	Provide encouragement		X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 1. Par.2; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 3, par. 1; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2;
	Defines actions to be taken		X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 1. Par.2; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; Mar. 5; p. 1. Par. 1; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 4; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 2; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 3; Aug. 7; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
	Illustrates the positive and negative effects of an action for peace		X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.2; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p.1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p.1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 2; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 7; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
<b>Appealing Messages (AM)</b>	IGAD’s credibility and efficiency		X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 1. Par.2; May 15; p. 1, par. 1; p.1, par. 3; p. 2, par. 2; July 23; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 3; p. 2, par. 2;
	Provides “how to” information		X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
	Describes desired behaviour		X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 3; Aug. 7; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 15; p.

			1, par. 1; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 5;
	Delivers verbal reinforcement	X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 1. Par.2; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; Mar. 5; p. 1. Par. 1; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 24; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
<b>Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)</b>	The benefit of peace and stability for the conflict parties	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 4; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2;
	Tolerance between conflict parties	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3;
	Advocates national identity	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2, par. 5; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2; p. 2, par. 1;
<b>Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)</b>	Promote rule of law	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; July 23; p. 1, par. 1;
	Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.2; p. 2, par. 5; July 23; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2;
	Elevating the capabilities of the principals to meet the peoples' need	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.2; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p.1, par. 3; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 3; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug.27; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 5;
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)</b>	Recognizing the need to compromise	X	Mar. 3; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; Mar. 5; p. 1. Par. 1; ; May 15; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2;
	Conflict parties adherence to the commitment they made	X	Mar. 3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; May 15; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 3; Aug. 7; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
	Formation of new view and relations with the rival	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 2, par. 1; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 5;
	Developing new view of the conflict	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 2, par. 1; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 5;
<b>Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)</b>	Short-term goals	X	Mar.3; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 1. Par.1; p. 2. Par.1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; May 15; p. 1, par. 4; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 4; May 16; p. 1, par. 3; May 16; p. 1, par. 2; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; Aug. 15; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 18; p. 1, par. 2; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 4; p. 1, par. 5; p. 2, par. 1;
	Long-term goals	X	Mar.3 (HD speech); p. 2, par. 5; July 23; p. 1, par. 1; Aug. 27; p. 1, par. 5;

## APPENDIX – D

### A coding scheme of IGAD’s affiliate CEWARN’S Newsletters (from March, 1, 2015 – August, 30, 2015)

#### Coding Sheet

Categories		Place mark observed	check when	Location of category in text (published month, page, paragraph and line (when necessary))
<b>Providing Information (PI)</b>	Impact of the conflict	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3;
	The challenges for peace and stability	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3;
	Attributes for the principals inefficiency	X		Mar/Apr. Ed.; p. 3, par. 2; p. 3, par. 3; May/June, ed.; p. 1, par. 3;
	The escalation of fighting in South Sudan	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3;
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)</b>	Provide encouragement	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 1; May/June, ed.; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 2, par. 6; p. 4, par. 1;
	Defines actions to be taken	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 1; May/June, ed.; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 2, par. 6; p. 4, par. 1; Aug/Sept., ed.; p. 3, par. 2;
	Illustrates the positive and negative effects of an action for peace	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 2; p. 3, par. 3; May/June, ed.; p. 1, par. 1; p. 2, par. 1;
<b>Appealing Messages (AM)</b>	IGAD’s credibility and efficiency	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 1; May/June, ed.; p. 1, par. 1; p. 1, par. 2; p. 1, par. 3; p. 1, par. 4; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 2, par. 6; p. 4, par. 1; Aug/Sept., ed.; p. 3, par. 2; p. 4, par. 2;
	Provides “how to” information	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 5; p. 4, par. 1;
	Describes desired behaviour	X		May/June, ed.; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 2, par. 6; p. 4, par. 1; Aug/Sept., ed.; p. 3, par. 2;
	Delivers verbal reinforcement	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3; May/June, ed.; p. 1, par. 3; p. 2, par. 1; p. 2, par. 2; p. 2, par. 3; p. 2, par. 4; p. 2, par. 5; p. 2, par. 6; p. 4, par. 1;
<b>Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)</b>	The benefit of peace and stability for the conflict parties	X		Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 3;
	Tolerance between conflict parties			
	Advocates national identity			
<b>Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)</b>	Promote rule of law			

	Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience		
	Elevating capabilities of the principals to meet the peoples' need		
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)</b>	Recognizing the need to compromise	<b>X</b>	Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 2;
	Conflict parties adherence to the commitment they made	<b>X</b>	Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 2;
	Formation of new view and relations with the rival		
	Developing new view of the conflict		
<b>Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)</b>	Short-term goals	<b>X</b>	Mar/Apr. ed.; p. 3, par. 2; May/June, ed.; p. 2, par. 6;
	Long-term goals	<b>X</b>	May/June, ed.; p. 2, par. 6;

## APPENDIX – E

### A coding scheme CEWARN’S March, 2015 brochure

#### Coding Sheet

Categories		Place mark observed	check when	Location of category in text (published month, page, paragraph and line (when necessary))
<b>Providing Information (PI)</b>	Impact of the conflict			
	The challenges for peace and stability			
	Attributes for the South Sudan principals inefficiency			
	The escalation of fighting in South Sudan			
<b>Enhancing Self-Efficacy (ESE)</b>	Provide encouragement	X		Mar. 2015; p. 5, par. 2; p. 10, par. 2; p. 10, par. 3; p. 13;
	Defines actions to be taken	X		Mar. 2015; p. 4, par. 2; p. 4, par. 3; p. 5, par. 1; p. 5, par. 2; p. 7, par. 2; p. 10, par. 2; p. 13;
	Illustrates the positive and negative effects of an action for peace	X		Mar. 2015; p. 4, par. 1;
<b>Appealing Messages (AM)</b>	IGAD’s credibility and efficiency	X		Mar. 2015; p. 4, par. 1; p. 4, par. 2; p. 4, par. 3; p. 5, par. 1; p. 5, par. 2; p. 7, par. 2; p. 8; p. 9, par. 1; p. 10, par. 2; p. 10, par. 3; p. 10, par. 4; p. 11, par. 1; p. 13; p. 14;
	Provides “how to” information	X		Mar. 2015; p. 4, par. 1; p. 4, par. 2; p. 4, par. 3; p. 5, par. 1; p. 5, par. 2; p. 7, par. 2; p. 8; p. 10, par. 3; p. 11, par. 1; p. 13; p. 14;
	Describes desired behaviour	X		Mar. 2015; p. 10, par. 2; p. 10, par. 3; p. 11, par. 1; p. 13;
	Delivers verbal reinforcement	X		Mar. 2015; p. 5, par. 2; p. 10, par. 2; p. 10, par. 3; p. 13;
<b>Violence Reduction Messages (VRM)</b>	The benefit of peace and stability for the conflict parties			
	Tolerance between conflict parties			
	Advocates national identity			
<b>Inspiring South Sudan (ISS)</b>	Promote rule of law			
	Strengthening self-belief through vicarious experience			

	Elevating capabilities of the principals to meet the peoples' need		
<b>Emphasising Facilitators and Purging Impediments (EFPI)</b>	Recognizing the need to compromise		
	Conflict parties adherence to the commitment they made		
	Formation of new view and relations with the rival		
	Developing new view of the conflict		
<b>Setting Realistic Goals (SRG)</b>	Short-term goals	<b>X</b>	Mar. 2015; p. 13; p. 14;
	Long-term goals	<b>X</b>	Mar. 2015; p. 13; p. 14;